[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRANSPARENCY, TRUST, AND VERIFICATION: MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS AND
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ALONG THE BORDER
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 1, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-57
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Filemon Vela, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Loretta Sanchez, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Brian Higgins, New York
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Norma J. Torres, California
Will Hurd, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan..................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Witnesses
Mr. Ronald D. Vitiello, Acting Chief, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Maj. Gen. Randolph D. ``Tex'' Alles, (Ret.-USMC), Executive
Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
TRANSPARENCY, TRUST, AND VERIFICATION: MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS AND
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ALONG THE BORDER
----------
Tuesday, March 1, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McSally, Hurd, Miller, Higgins,
and Torres.
Ms. McSally. The Committee on Homeland Security's
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine DHS's
efforts to secure the border and effectively measure border
security.
Before I begin, I just want to take the opportunity to
thank Mrs. Miller, the former Chairman of the subcommittee, for
her more than 5 years of superb leadership on this subcommittee
and the opportunity that has been provided to me to lead this
subcommittee. She has been an outspoken advocate and champion
for the border, visa, and maritime security, and fought
tirelessly for enhancements in the Visa Waiver Program that
were enacted into law in December. Just a few days ago, the
President signed the first-ever CBP Authorization Act, authored
by Mrs. Miller, and signed that into law.
I can say our security is much stronger because of the work
of Chairman Miller. I want to yield some time to Chairman
Miller.
Mrs. Miller. Well, thank you very much, Chairman. I am
delighted to call you that. As I think most people know, I am
going to be not seeking reelection at the end of this term. I
am a Michigan girl. Time for me to go home to Michigan, to the
world's 2 most beautiful grandchildren.
But at any rate, I had thought about this a bit, and
talking to Chairman McCaul, who indicated that he had an
interest in appointing you in the next Congress to the
Chairmanship for this subcommittee. I told him: Look, there is
nobody better.
It is incredible the passion that you have for the border,
not only the Southern Border but the Northern Border. I
appreciate, particularly with Mr. Higgins sitting next to you,
reminding the subcommittee as we go forward and into the next
future Congresses how important all of our borders are
certainly.
But I have had an opportunity to travel with you, down to
your beautiful district, and talk to a lot of your folks down
there. About a year ago this time, we took a group of us down
to the border.
When we think about border issues and what a critical
component it is of our National security, our homeland
security, I just thought that having you take the Chairmanship
early on here would make for a much smoother transition. I am
just absolutely delighted, when we think about the background
that you have, Bronze Star recipient, I think 25, 26 years in
the military, you and I have fought together for the A-10. I
will tell you what, I would go into battle with you anywhere,
all day long, all day long.
So this subcommittee has a fantastic reputation on the Hill
for doing very vigorous oversight. I know that will continue
under your Chairmanship and your leadership. I think, as you
mentioned, the Visa Waiver Program, that piece of legislation
signed into law already, and other kinds of things, the CBP
authorization, all of these and more, huge challenges that our
Nation faces.
I know I leave this Chairmanship in exceptionally good
hands. I look forward to continuing to work with you for the
remainder of this Congress. Anything I can do, just call
Michigan after that.
Thanks very much, and good luck.
Ms. McSally. Thanks, Chairman Miller. I just want to say I
am thankful for your tremendous leadership and honored for your
willingness to selflessly provide me this opportunity. I know I
have huge shoes to fill, and I will do everything I can every
day in order to make sure that we follow in your footsteps. But
I really appreciate the opportunity that you are providing me.
So thank you.
Okay. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Securing the border is ultimately one of the most important
responsibilities of the Federal Government. The instability and
chaos that drug cartels foster pose National security problems
and public safety threats that endanger border communities. In
fact, later this month marks the sixth anniversary of the death
of Robert Krentz, a Cochise County resident, slain on his ranch
roughly 30 miles north of the border.
In southern Arizona, we are impacted by border insecurity
every day--property destroyed, militarized-like checkpoints on
our roads, and the fear of violence from transnational criminal
organizations, or TCOs, running drug loads through our
communities. The reality and perception of insecurity near the
border also has negative impacts for businesses and tourism in
border regions, suppressing an already struggling economy.
The very same pathways and smuggling routes that facilitate
the illicit flow of people and drugs could also, potentially,
be used for terror, making it critical that we quickly gain
control of the situation along the border.
While progress has been made on the border over the last 25
years, there is much more work to be done. There is a reason
many Americans do not trust the Department when it comes to
border security. They rightly worry that the Department will
twist the numbers and give a false sense of security.
Border security measures recently put out by the Department
will do little to overcome this deficit of trust. Customs and
Border Protection reported that it was 81 percent effective on
the Southwest Border last year. That sounds impressive,
especially when compared to previous measures that indicate
around 44 percent of the border was under operational control.
These new effectiveness numbers are hard to believe and I
believe are inaccurate measures of the state of security on the
border. The new interdiction effectiveness rates include
unaccompanied children and families from countries other than
Mexico who turn themselves in, inflating that number. It also
fails to take into account the number that Border Patrol never
sees, or the denominator, which also inflates this
effectiveness number. The best analytical research, using all
available data on interdiction effectiveness, puts the true
probability of apprehension much closer to about 50 percent.
Finally, the numbers don't tell us where the illicit
activity was intercepted, which can sometimes be 100 miles or
deeper into the United States, putting border communities in
danger as traffickers transit our communities before they are
caught.
There are probably no better indicators of the
effectiveness than the price and availability of illicit drugs.
We have an alarming drug addiction epidemic in this country,
and it is only getting worse, impacting communities and
families across the Nation.
Families grappling with tragedy tell heartbreaking stories
of how their loved ones fell into addiction and how cheap and
easy it was for them to get these illicit drugs. The price and
availability of these drugs across the country demonstrate they
still move across the border with relative ease.
We must move beyond the political rhetoric that, on the one
hand, says the border is out of control, while, on the other
hand, says it is more secure than ever and everything is just
fine. But the only way to do that is being transparent when it
comes to security on the border. We all know the truth is
somewhere in between, but the American people don't know where
in between it is. So that just adds to the challenges and the
frustrations.
The truth is we have been given an incomplete picture as it
relates to the situation on the border, and we cannot
verifiably say where between those two ends of the spectrum we
actually are. That is the heart of the problem. For too long,
the U.S. Government has pushed the narrative that because we
catch a lot of people, or in some cases not many at all, or
have doubled the number of agents, or built miles of fence,
that the border must be secure.
That is just activity masquerading as effectiveness and
lacks the important denominator. The Border Patrol cannot
determine how many people we are not catching or detecting.
Assessing if the billions of taxpayer dollars spent every
year are actually effective at securing the border is a more
productive and transparent way to look at border security. Can
we stop drug cartels from moving their poison freely across our
border? Is CBP catching the overwhelming number of people who
cross the border illegally, and not just the ones they see?
What about the ones we don't see?
Of the illegal activity detected, how many were never
caught? Of those apprehended, how many were within a half a
mile of the border? How many were up to 25 miles? How many were
up to 100 miles? This actually matters, because if you are
living in that area, where it gets caught actually impacts the
public safety concerns for you and your family.
What about the flow of weapons and money that goes south
across the border to fuel the TCOs' illicit activity? Do people
along the border feel safe? How much of the illegal activity is
detected and caught by State and local law enforcement versus
CBP? Do border, State, and local first responders assess that
the border is secure? What is the actual effectiveness of the
checkpoints placed well inside our country?
What percent of the 1,954 miles of southern land border
does CBP have 100 percent situational awareness of, where if
something or someone approaches or moves across the border,
they will see it? This is a question I have been trying to get
the answer to for a very long time. What percentage of those
miles do they have operational control of, where agents can
successfully interdict the activity once it is detected?
Are the sensors, towers, and checkpoints, unmanned aerial
vehicles, manned aircraft, are they assisting our agents to
further these goals?
Those are the real measures of effectiveness the American
people can understand and need to know. I believe today's
hearing is the first step we must take to continue to develop a
complete understanding of what is actually happening at the
Southern Border, commonly known as situational awareness. We
use this term a lot in the military, by the way, and its
acronym is SA. How is your SA? Is your SA high? Is your SA low?
What percentage of SA do you have?
Achieving situational awareness will require extensive use
of technology. The border is too long and the terrain too rough
and inaccessible in some places to be everywhere at once. But
it will also take concentrating our agents closer to the border
and rapid reaction forces to quickly move agents to intercept
the activity once detected, before anyone becomes a public
safety threat to our communities.
It boils down to this: Do we know where the drug cartels
are beating us so we can adjust deployment of our technology
and agents to meet that threat? If the answer is no, we don't
have situational awareness along the border.
Once we fully understand the threat and the gaps in our
awareness and our capabilities, we can move quickly, together,
to address them. But without that, we are essentially flying
blind. As a pilot, no one wants to do that. That cannot
continue.
The time has come to adequately measure situational
awareness and effectiveness so we know where we are and, more
importantly, where we need to go. I am looking forward to
hearing from our witnesses today on CBP's plans to achieve
situational awareness on the border and provide Congress with
suitable metrics.
[The statement of Chairman McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairman Martha McSally
March 1, 2016
Securing the border is ultimately one of the most important
responsibilities of the Federal Government. The instability and chaos
that the drug cartels foster pose National security problems and public
safety threats that endanger border communities.
In fact, later this month marks the sixth anniversary of the death
of Robert Krentz, a Cochise County resident slain on his ranch roughly
30 miles north of the border.
In Southern Arizona, we are impacted by border insecurity every
day--property destroyed, militarized-like checkpoints on our roads, and
fear of violence from transnational criminal organizations (or TCOs)
running drug loads through our communities. The reality and perception
of the insecurity near the border also has negative impacts for
businesses and tourism in border regions, suppressing an already
struggling economy.
And the very same pathways and smuggling routes that facilitate the
illicit flow of people and drugs could also potentially be used for
terror, making it critical that we quickly gain control of the
situation along the border.
While progress has been made on the border over the last 25 years,
there is much more work to be done.
There is a reason that many Americans do not trust the Department
when it comes to border security. They rightly worry that the
Department will twist the numbers to give a false sense of security.
Border security measures recently put out by the Department will do
little to overcome this deficit of trust.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported that it was 81%
effective on the Southwest Border last year. This sounds impressive,
especially when compared to the previous measure that indicated around
44% of the border was under operation control.
These new effectiveness numbers are hard to believe, and I believe
are inaccurate measures of the state of security on the border.
The new interdiction effectiveness rate includes unaccompanied
children and families from countries other than Mexico, who turn
themselves in, inflating the number. It also fails to take into account
the number the Border Patrol never sees, or the denominator, which also
inflates the effectiveness. The best analytical research, using all
available data, on interdiction effectiveness puts the true probability
of apprehension much closer to 50 percent.
Finally, the numbers don't tell us where the illicit activity was
intercepted, which can sometimes be 100 miles or deeper into the United
States, putting border communities in danger as traffickers transit our
communities before they are caught.
There are probably no better indicators of effectiveness than the
price and availability of illicit drugs. We have an alarming drug
addiction epidemic in the country that is only getting worse, impacting
communities and families across the Nation.
Families grappling with tragedy tell heart-breaking stories of how
their loved ones fell into addiction and how cheap and easy it was for
them to get these illicit drugs. The price and availability of these
drugs across the country demonstrate that they still move across the
border with relative ease.
We must move beyond the political rhetoric that on one hand says
that the border is out of control, while the other says it is more
secure than ever and everything is fine. But the only way to do that is
by being transparent when it comes to security on the border.
The truth is we have been given an incomplete picture as it relates
to the situation on the border, and we cannot verifiably say where,
between those two ends of the spectrum, we actually are--and that's the
heart of the problem.
For too long, the U.S. Government has pushed the narrative that
because we catch a lot of people, or in some cases not many at all, or
have doubled the number of agents, or built miles of fence that the
border must be secure.
That is just activity masquerading as effectiveness and lacks an
important denominator. The Border Patrol cannot determine how many
people we are not catching, or detecting.
Assessing if the billions of taxpayer dollars spent every year are
actually effective at securing the border is a more productive and
transparent way to look at border security.
Can we stop drug cartels from moving their poison freely across the
border?
Is CBP catching the overwhelming number of people who cross the
border illegally? And not just the ones they see.
Of the illegal activity detected by CBP, how many were never
caught?
Of those apprehended how many were within .5 miles of the border
and how many caught between half a mile and 5 miles, 5 to 25 miles, 25-
100 miles, or over 100 miles inland?
What about the flow of weapons and money that goes south across the
border to fuel TCO's illicit and dangerous activities?
Do the people who live along the border feel safe?
How much illegal activity is detected and caught by State and local
law enforcement vs CBP? Do border State and local first responders
assess the border as secure?
What is the actual effectiveness of the checkpoints placed well
inside our country?
What percent of the 1,954 miles of southern land border does CBP
have 100% situational awareness of, where if something or someone
approaches or moves across the border, they see it? And what percentage
of those miles do they have operational control where agents can
successfully interdict the activity once it is detected?
And are the sensors, towers, checkpoints, unmanned aerial vehicles,
and manned aircraft adequately assisting our agents to further those
goals?
Those are real measures of effectiveness the American people can
understand, and need to know.
I believe today's hearing is a first step we must take to develop a
complete understanding of what is actually happening at the border--
commonly known as situational awareness.
Achieving situational awareness will require the extensive use of
technology--the border is just too long, and the terrain too rough and
inaccessible to be everywhere at once.
But it will also take concentrating agents closer to the border and
a rapid reaction force to quickly move agents to intercept activity
before anyone becomes a public safety threat to our communities.
It boils down to this: Do we know where the drug cartels are
beating us, so we can adjust the deployment of our technology and
agents to meet the threat? If the answer is no, then we don't have
situational awareness along the border.
Once we fully understand the threat and gaps in our awareness and
capabilities then we can move quickly to address them.
Without situational awareness we are essentially flying blind, and
that cannot continue.
The time has come to measure situational awareness and
effectiveness, so we know where we are, and more importantly where we
need to go.
I am looking forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how CBP
plans to achieve situational awareness on the border and provide
Congress with suitable metrics.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes the Acting Ranking
Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Higgins, for any statement he may have. He just broke
his microphone.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much.
Before I begin, I just wanted to also extend my
appreciation and thanks to our colleague, Candice Miller, for
her work on the committee and the subcommittee. While this is a
continuum, we still have a lot of work to do. The Northern
Border is much more secure because of your leadership on this
issue. I have enjoyed very much collaborating with you in the
best interests of those Northern Border communities. So thank
you very much, Candice.
I also want to congratulate my colleague from Arizona,
Representative McSally, on her new position as Chair of the
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. In the absence of
Ranking Member Filemon Vela, I am pleased to serve as the
Ranking Member today, particularly given the topic at hand,
border security.
Like my colleagues from Arizona, Texas, and Michigan, I
also represent a border district, though mine is located on our
Nation's border with Canada, much like Mrs. Miller. The 26th
Congressional District of New York consists of portions of Erie
and Niagara Counties, including the cities of Buffalo and
Niagara Falls, and sits adjacent to America's maritime border
with Canada, along the Niagara River and the eastern shores of
Lake Erie.
Buffalo is home to the Peace Bridge, the busiest passenger
crossing on the Northern Border, and a crucial link between the
economies of western New York and southern Ontario and our 2
great Nations. Niagara Falls is home to 2 more international
crossings, the Rainbow Bridge and the Whirlpool Bridge, which
are also critical to travel and tourism in the region.
Cross-border travel and the efficient flow of goods and
people across the border are vital to the communities I am
privileged to represent. We are fortunate to have a strong
partner in border security and facilitation matters on our
Northern Border, that being Canada.
Like most Americans, I have a keen interest in ensuring
that all of our Nation's borders are secure, including, of
course, the Southern Border, but I will focus my comments today
on our Northern Border, since our border with Canada is often
somewhat foreign to these discussions.
The nature of the threat on the Northern Border, primarily
terrorists and their instruments entering the United States
across the vast open spaces of our 5,000-mile shared border
with Canada, is certainly very different from the Southern
Border where the volume of undocumented crossers from Mexico
dwarfs the number that enter from Canada each year. Still,
there are far fewer Federal resources dedicated to securing the
Northern Border, which could be a cause for concern. Only a
fraction of the total number of Border Patrol agents, air
assets, cameras are deployed on the Northern Border, meaning
situational awareness on the Northern Border is not what it
should be.
Similarly, the United States Customs and Border
Protection's Office of Field Operations continues to be
understaffed at ports of entry based on the agency's own
staffing model, which slows legitimate crossers, and makes it
more difficult for officials to spot the handful who may pose
concern. The fact that our shared border with Canada includes
the Great Lakes and other waterways regularly enjoyed by
thousands of legitimate boaters only adds to the challenge of
achieving situational awareness in the region.
I hope to hear from our Customs and Border Protection
witnesses today about how we can improve situational awareness
along our Northern Border, perhaps in conjunction with our
Canadian partners.
With respect to measuring border security, many of the
metrics used on the Southern Border, such as the number of
individuals apprehended or pounds of drugs seized, are just as
appropriate for the Northern Border. I hope to hear from our
Government Accountability Office witness today about what their
work indicates about the state of border security, and
especially what metrics might be most appropriate for the
Northern Border.
Finally, I look forward to hearing from the entire panel
today about how the Department of Homeland Security, with
support from Congress, can continue to better secure all of our
Nation's borders.
I thank the witnesses for being here. I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The statement of Mr. Higgins follows:]
Statement of Hon. Brian Higgins
March 1, 2016
Like my colleagues from Arizona and Texas, I also represent a
border district, though mine is located on our Nation's border with
Canada. New York's 26th Congressional District consists of portions of
Erie and Niagara Counties, including the cities of Buffalo and Niagara
Falls, and sits adjacent to America's maritime border with Canada along
the Niagara River and the eastern shores of Lake Erie.
Buffalo is home to the Peace Bridge, the busiest passenger crossing
on the Northern Border and a crucial link between the economies of
Western New York and Southern Ontario and our two great Nations.
Niagara Falls is home to 2 more international crossings, the Rainbow
Bridge and the Whirlpool Bridge, which are also critical to travel and
tourism in the region.
Cross-border travel and the efficient flow of goods and people
across the border are vital to the communities I am privileged to
represent. We are fortunate to have a strong partner in border security
and facilitation matters in our northern neighbor, Canada. Like most
Americans, I have a keen interest in ensuring all of our Nation's
borders are secure, including, of course, the Southern Border. But I
will focus my comments today on our Northern Border, since our border
with Canada is often somewhat forgotten in these discussions.
The nature of the threat on the Northern Border--primarily
terrorists or their instruments entering the United States across the
vast, open spaces of our 5,000-mile shared border with Canada--is
certainly very different from the Southern Border, where the volume of
undocumented crossers from Mexico dwarfs the number that enter from
Canada each year.
Still, there are far fewer Federal resources dedicated to securing
the Northern Border, which could be cause for concern. Only a fraction
of the total number of Border Patrol agents, air assets, and cameras
are deployed on the Northern Border, meaning situational awareness on
the Northern Border is not what it should be.
Similarly, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Field
Operations continues to be understaffed at ports of entry based on the
agency's own staffing model, which slows legitimate crossers and makes
it more difficult for officials to spot the handful who may pose a
concern.
The fact that our shared border with Canada includes the Great
Lakes and other waterways regularly enjoyed by thousands of legitimate
boaters only adds to the challenge of achieving situational awareness
in the region. I hope to hear from our CBP witnesses today about how we
can improve situational awareness along our Northern Border, perhaps in
conjunction with our Canadian partners.
With respect to measuring border security, many of the metrics used
on the Southern Border--such as the number of individuals apprehended
or pounds of drugs seized--are just not as appropriate for the Northern
Border.
I hope to hear from our Government Accountability Office witness
today about what their work indicates about the state of border
security, and especially what metrics might be most appropriate for the
Northern Border. Finally, I look forward to hearing from the entire
panel today about how the Department of Homeland Security, with support
from Congress, can continue to better secure all of our Nation's
borders.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields. Other Members of the
committee are reminded opening statements may be submitted for
the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 1, 2016
We are fortunate to have Members representing border districts--one
on the Northern Border and one on the Southern Border--leading the
discussion today. Of course, this is not a new discussion. This
committee has held several hearings over the years examining DHS's
efforts to improve situational awareness along our Nation's borders and
develop metrics to assess the state of border security.
Achieving situational awareness of 8,000 miles of land border with
Canada and Mexico, not to mention thousands more miles of maritime
border, is no easy task. With the support of Congress, in recent years,
DHS has deployed an unprecedented number of Border Patrol agents, new
technology including cameras and radar systems, and assets such as UAVs
in order to improve situational awareness. Due in large part to the
vast, open spaces of America's borders, much more remains to be done.
I hope to hear from our witnesses today about where DHS has made
progress on situational awareness, where the most significant gaps
remain, and how we can best go about addressing them. This committee
has also discussed border security metrics, and particularly how we can
determine whether the Department of Homeland Security's border security
efforts are working. We have seen Border Patrol shift from reporting
miles of border under ``operational control'' to reporting apprehension
data to trying to develop a Border Condition Index.
Today, the Department uses risk assessments to characterize the
state of areas of the border. Measuring border security effectiveness
is more complex than it may seem, in part due to differences of opinion
on what constitutes ``border security'' in the first place. For some,
border security means stopping people from crossing the Southern Border
between the ports of entry.
It is that, but it is more. It also means securing our Northern
Border, our maritime borders, and our air, sea, and land ports--not
just from individuals entering unlawfully, but also narcotics and other
contraband and, most importantly, terrorists.
We need a meaningful, workable set of metrics that offers an
accurate assessment of security of all of our Nation's borders, both at
and between the ports of entry. I hope to hear more from our witnesses
about what the most relevant metrics might be. I am especially pleased
that we are joined today by a witness from the Government
Accountability Office, Ms. Rebecca Gambler. GAO has done some very
important work on border security matters on behalf of this committee.
I hope to hear from Ms. Gambler about what GAO's body of work indicates
about the state of situational awareness and security along our
borders. Indeed, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses
about how we can continue to better secure our Nation's borders.
Ms. McSally. We are pleased to be joined by three
distinguished witness today to discuss this important issue.
Ronald Vitiello is the acting chief of the U.S. Border
Patrol. As its chief operating officer, he is responsible for
the daily operations of the U.S. Border Patrol and assists the
commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in planning
and directing Nation-wide enforcement. Chief Vitiello began his
Border Patrol career in 1985 and has served in Swanton, Tucson,
and Laredo sectors.
General Randolph Alles is the executive assistant
commissioner for CBP's Office of Air and Marine, a position he
has held since January 2013. In this role, Mr. Alles is charged
with overseeing the AMO mission of using aviation and maritime
assets to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and
unlawful movement of drugs and other contraband from entering
the United States. Before joining AMO, he spent 35 years in the
United States Marine Corps, retiring in 2011 as a major
general.
Rebecca Gambler is director of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's Homeland Security and Justice Team,
where she leads GAO's work on border security, immigration, and
the Department of Homeland Security's management and
transformation. Prior to joining GAO, Ms. Gambler worked at the
National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for
Democratic Studies.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record.
The Chair now recognizes Chief Vitiello for 5 minutes to
testify.
STATEMENT OF RONALD D. VITIELLO, ACTING CHIEF, U.S. BORDER
PATROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Vitiello. Thank you, Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member
Higgins, and the distinguished Members of the subcommittee, for
the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the U.S. Border
Patrol to discuss situational awareness and effectiveness.
Border Patrol operations along the U.S. border are
constantly challenged by evolving tactics of transnational
criminal organizations and individuals. To enhance our
situational awareness and detect changes in threat levels and
criminal flows across the border environment, the Border Patrol
uses sophisticated technology and various tactics to gather
information and intelligence. We collaborate with State, local,
Tribal, as well as international law enforcement, intelligence,
defense, and local community partners.
Thanks to the support of this subcommittee, CBP has
deployed capable resources to increase our situational
awareness along the Southern Border and our ability to rapidly
respond as appropriate to areas of increasing risk. For
example, integrated fixed towers deployed along the border in
Arizona provide a long-range persistent surveillance. These
tower systems automatically detect and track items of interest
and provide centralized operations with video and geospatial
location of suspected items of interest for identification and
appropriate action.
Mobile technology, mounted on vehicles or carried by
agents, is used in conjunction with fixed assets and provides
the Border Patrol flexibility and agility to adapt to changing
border conditions and threats. Tactical aerostats, acquired as
part of the Department of Defense Reuse program, have also
proven to be a vital asset in increasing CBP's situational
awareness and our ability to detect, identify, and track
illegal cross-border activity.
In addition to the use of surveillance technology,
collaboration and information sharing with our law enforcement
partners is a key component of building situational awareness
and response capabilities along the Southwest Border. We work
closely within CBP, especially with Air and Marine Operations,
as well as multiple DHS, Federal, international, State, and
local law enforcement agencies.
The Border Patrol is an active participant in the DHS
Southern Border and Approaches Campaign and has a crucial role
in the Joint Task Force-West, an integrated operational
approach to addressing the threat of transnational criminal
organizations along the Southwest Border. We also participate
in regular briefings with Federal, State, and local partners
regarding the current state of the border in order to monitor
emerging trends and threats.
To ensure that the Border Patrol is positioned to respond
to emerging threats, the Border Patrol uses a risk-based
strategy to deploy resources. Our risk assessments are formed
by multiple indicators, including the interdiction
effectiveness rate, which is the percent of detected illegal
entrants who are apprehended or turned back after illegally
entering the United States between the ports of entry.
Furthermore, in coordination with the new DHS joint
requirements process, the Border Patrol uses a Capability Gap
Analysis Process to conduct mission analysis and identify
capability gaps in specific geographic locations.
Because of the complexity of our border security mission,
there is no single metric that can measure the full scope of
our security efforts. Instead, we rely on a number of
significant indicators to evaluate trends and developments over
time, assess our performance, and refine our operations.
Tracking total apprehensions provides us information about
the volume of people attempting to cross the border illegally.
However, further analysis on the individual level can and does
expand our understanding of changes in illegal activity between
the ports.
For example, we consider the rates of recidivism or the
percentage of apprehended individuals who have crossed the
board illegally multiple times. This distinction is important
in understanding the threat environment. Moreover, as a
measure, it informs our decisions to redeploy resources to
high-risk areas and to apply appropriate consequences in order
to reduce repeat activity. Other analysis considerations
include how many arrested individuals have criminal records,
outstanding warrants, or were arrested while smuggling people
or drugs.
This analysis, in conjunction with the information obtained
from fixed and mobile surveillance systems and our law
enforcement partners enhances situational awareness and better
enables the Border Patrol to detect, identify, classify,
monitor, and appropriately respond to threats and other
challenges along our U.S. borders.
Thanks again for the opportunity to appear today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Vitiello and Mr. Alles
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Ronald Vitiello and Randolph D. Alles
March 1, 2016
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today on
behalf of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to discuss measuring
effectiveness and situational awareness of the Southwest Border.
Along the more than 5,000 miles of land border with Canada and
Mexico, and approximately 95,000 miles of shoreline, CBP works with our
DHS, interagency, and State and local partners to secure our borders
and the associated airspace and maritime approaches to prevent illegal
entry of people and goods into the United States, while also
facilitating lawful trade and travel.
The border environment in which CBP works is dynamic and requires
adaptation to respond to emerging threats and changing conditions. We
appreciate the partnership and support we have received from this
subcommittee, whose commitment to the security of the American people
has enabled the continued deployment of resources and capabilities we
need to secure the border.
The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and Air and Marine Operations (AMO),
in conjunction with DHS Joint Task Force--West, have primary
responsibility for the border security mission between the Nation's
ports of entry (POEs) through the coordinated use of integrated assets
to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful
movement of people, illegal drugs, and contraband toward or across the
borders of the United States. CBP implements intelligence-driven
counter network strategies focused on areas of greatest risk, and
deploys its capabilities to adapt to emerging threats along the border.
Detecting and interdicting terrorists and their weapons will always
be a focused priority. Furthermore, the illegal cross-border activities
of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and other bad actors
pose a growing threat to border security and public safety. TCOs
control most cross-border trafficking of guns and illegal drugs, and
there is evidence of their increased involvement with human smuggling.
Using a risk-informed and intelligence-driven approach, CBP will
continue to enhance our efforts to anticipate and respond to threats to
our National security, ensure the safety of the U.S. public, and deter,
prevent, and disrupt future illegal activities.
As the preeminent law enforcement agency responsible for
safeguarding and managing America's borders, CBP develops and sustains
situational awareness of current and potential threats and associated
risks. Situational awareness forms the cornerstone of our approach to
proactively identify and eliminate criminal and illegal activity across
the Nation's air, land, and maritime borders. It is derived from CBP's
comprehensive understanding of the threat environment and provides an
in-depth picture of the current operating conditions within a specific
region of the border environment.
Situational awareness, like the border environment, is dynamic and
grows through a variety of types of information collection--obtained
through intelligence and surveillance technology--and analysis in the
context of other regional or National cross-border trends, especially
those concerning illicit trafficking and unlawful border crossings. CBP
leverages a wide range of tactics, techniques, and sophisticated
technologies to enhance situational awareness and increase CBP's
ability to prevent and disrupt threats in the border environment.
The border environment in which CBP operates is challenged by
continuously-evolving tactics of TCOs, terrorists, and other criminals.
Detecting changes in threat levels and criminal flows across the border
environment requires the use of various tactics to gather information
and intelligence in both low- and high-threat areas. To promote and
advance situational awareness, CBP deploys sophisticated surveillance
and detection technology and collaborates with domestic and
international law enforcement, intelligence, defense, and local
community partners.
advanced technology and capabilities
Thanks to the support of this subcommittee, CBP has deployed
capable resources to increase our situational awareness, identify
changes in the border environment, and rapidly respond, as appropriate,
to areas of increasing risk. The use of technology in the border
environment is an invaluable force multiplier to increase situational
awareness.
Along U.S. Borders
The information gleaned from fixed and mobile surveillance systems,
ground sensors, imaging systems, and other advanced technologies
enhances situational awareness and better enables CBP to detect,
identify, classify, monitor, and appropriately respond to threats and
other challenges along the U.S. borders.
The Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) systems and Remote Video
Surveillance Systems (RVSS) are fixed technology assets used in select
areas along the Southwest Border. The IFT system is a series of fixed
surveillance towers and equipment located in Arizona that provide long-
range persistent surveillance. These tower systems automatically detect
and track items of interest, and provide centralized operators with
video and geospatial location of suspected items of interest for
identification and appropriate action. RVSS provide short-, medium-,
and long-range persistent surveillance mounted on stand-alone towers or
other structures. The RVSS uses cameras, radio, and microwave
transmitters to send video to a control room and enable a control room
operator to remotely detect, identify, classify, and track targets
using a video feed.
In some areas along the Southwest Border, CBP also uses Unattended
Ground Sensors (UGS) and Imaging Sensors (IS), which contribute to
improved situational awareness, agent safety, and rapid response. These
sensors support our capability to detect and identify subjects. When a
ground sensor is activated, an alarm is communicated to a data decoder
that translates the sensor's activation data to a centralized
operations center computer system. IS are a specific type of unattended
ground sensor with an integrated camera and the ability to transmit
images or video back to the operations center.
Fixed-system technology increases CBP's situational awareness and
the Border Patrol's ability to detect, identify, classify, and track
illicit activity by providing line-of-sight surveillance to efficiently
detect incursions in varying terrain. CBP integrates mobile and
portable systems to address areas where rugged terrain and dense ground
cover may allow adversaries to penetrate through blind spots or avoid
the coverage areas of fixed systems.
Working in conjunction with fixed surveillance assets, CBP's mobile
technology assets provide flexibility and agility to adapt to changing
border conditions and threats along the Southwest Border. Mobile
Surveillance Capability systems provide long-range mobile surveillance
with a suite of radar and camera sensors mounted on USBP vehicles.
Mobile Video Surveillance Systems provide short- and medium-range
mobile surveillance equipment mounted on telescoping masts via camera
sensors mounted on USBP vehicles. Another system, the Agent Portable
Surveillance System (APSS), does not need to be mounted to a vehicle.
These current generation assets provide medium-range mobile
surveillance mounted on a tripod and transported by three or more
agents. Two agents remain on-site, one to operate the system, which
automatically detects and tracks items of interest and provides the
agent/operator with data and video of selected items of interest. Next
generation APSS options are being explored.
These technologies not only provide significant security benefits
and multiply the capabilities of law enforcement personnel to detect,
identify, and respond to suspicious activity, but they also enhance
public safety along the border. Mobile surveillance technology systems
enable agents to position the technology where it is needed at a
specific moment, extend our observational capabilities--in this case,
by helping see through the darkness and increasing the accuracy and
speed of our response.
CBP's Tactical Aerostats and Re-locatable Towers program,
originally part of the Department of Defense (DoD) Reuse program, uses
a mix of aerostats, towers, cameras, and radars to provide USBP with
increased situational awareness through an advanced surveillance
capability over a wide area. This capability has proven to be a vital
asset in increasing CBP's ability to detect, identify, classify, and
track activity. As of December 2015, USBP agents seized 122 tons of
narcotics and conducted over 50,000 apprehensions of illegal border
crossers with the assistance of existing aerostats and towers.
Technology is critical to border security operations. Through the
deployment of these complementary and effective fixed and mobile
systems, CBP gains more coverage and situational awareness of
surveillance gaps, and increases its ability to adapt to changing
conditions to effectively detect, identify, classify, track, and
interdict potential threats along the borders.
From the Air and the Sea
AMO increases CBP's situational awareness, enhances its detection
and interdiction capabilities, and extends our border security zones,
offering greater capacity to stop threats prior to reaching the
Nation's shores. Through the use of coordinated and integrated air and
marine capabilities--including fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft,
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), tethered aerostats and patrol and
interdiction vessels--AMO detects, interdicts, and prevents acts of
terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other
contraband toward or across U.S. borders. AMO conducts critical aerial
and maritime surveillance, interdiction, investigation, and multi-
domain awareness law enforcement operations, in addition to providing
assistance to ground personnel.
AMO's fleet of aerial assets provides critical surveillance and
situational awareness across the Nation's land borders, in the littoral
waters, in the maritime approaches to the United States, and in the
international source and transit zones.
AMO P-3 Long-Range Trackers and Airborne Early Warning Aircraft
provide detection and interdiction capability in both the air and
marine environments. Sophisticated sensors and high-endurance
capability greatly increase CBP's range to counter illicit trafficking.
P-3s are an integral part of the successful counter-narcotic missions
operating in coordination with Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)--
South. P-3s patrol in a 42 million-square-mile area that includes more
than 41 nations, the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and
maritime approaches to the United States.
Additionally, UAS are increasingly instrumental in CBP's layered
and integrated approach to border security. AMO has deployed 6 UAS
along the Southwest Border to detect, identify, and classify moving
tracks of interest over land and sea. Four of these aircraft have
Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VADER) capability, which is a
side-looking airborne radar that detects illegal border crossers and
relays their positions to field agents, while simultaneously capturing
terrain change detection information across larger stretches of the
border. UAS are also used to meet surveillance and other mission
requirements along the Northern borders and in the drug source and
transit zones. During fiscal year 2015, CBP's VADER-equipped UAS
recorded 9,371 detections of illegal activity.
Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA) have a multi-mode radar for
use over water and land, an electro-optical/infrared camera system, and
a satellite communications system. This highly adaptable and capable
aircraft replaces several older, single-mission assets. An equally
important and more capable asset is the DHC-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA). It bridges the gap between the longer range P-3s and UAS and the
smaller MEA. The DHC-8 is an invaluable situational awareness platform
for AMO in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.
AMO uses the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) to provide land,
maritime, and aerial domain awareness, including detection of low-
altitude aircraft and other potential threats. CBP assumed
responsibility of TARS from the U.S. Air Force in 2013, providing radar
detection and monitoring of low-altitude aircraft and surface vessels
along the U.S.-Mexico border, the Florida Straits, and a portion of the
Caribbean. With 8 aerostat sites--6 along the Southwest Border, one in
the Florida Keys, and one in Puerto Rico--the TARS elevated sensor
mitigates the effect of the curvature of the earth and terrain-masking
limitations associated with ground-based radars, enabling maximum long-
range radar detection. In fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015
combined, TARS recorded nearly 1,000 suspected cross-border attempts of
non-commercial aircraft, about 50 percent of all border-related radar
detections in the air domain.
Some of the most important advancements in increasing CBP's
situational awareness are in the area of data integration and
exploitation. Downlink technology, paired with the BigPipe system,
allows AMO to provide a video feed and situational awareness to its law
enforcement partners in real time. In addition, the Minotaur mission
integration system allows multiple aircraft to share information from
multiple sources, providing a never-before-seen level of air, land, and
sea domain awareness. As the Minotaur system evolves across the fleet,
it will provide increased awareness for a greater number of users as
the information is integrated into the Air and Marine Operations Center
(AMOC).
A vital component of DHS's domain awareness capabilities, CBP's
AMOC integrates the surveillance and law enforcement data capabilities
of DHS's Federal and international partners. CBP agents assigned to
AMOC serve to correlate information from USBP technology with AMOC's
systems to close the gaps in situational awareness. This combined
effort has contributed to a reduction in the ultra-light aircraft
activity on the Southwest Border. Fiscal year 2015 suspect activity has
decreased to 59 events from a high of 332 in fiscal year 2010. Office
of Field Operations (OFO) officers from the National Targeting Center
imbedded at AMOC use their tools to close the seam between commercial
and general aviation suspect activity. Overall, AMOC evaluated almost
500,000 internal air tracks in fiscal year 2015 with a 99.99 percent
successful resolution rate. AMOC has integrated DoD and FAA sensors
into the CBP network to expand our awareness well beyond the U.S. air
and maritime borders. The stemming of the panga-type boat threats on
the West Coast is attributed to the whole of DHS (CBP, U.S. Coast
Guard, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/Homeland Security
Investigations) coordinated efforts with Mexican partners facilitated
through this integration and collaboration.
Coordinating with extensive law enforcement and intelligence
databases, including Classified systems and communication networks,
AMOC enhances our situational awareness and uses its capability to
coordinate a law enforcement response to suspect activity in the air,
maritime, and land domains. AMOC systems are connected to nearly 150
locations in various agencies to enable collaboration. For example, in
fiscal year 15 AMOC coordinated over 400 Mexican responses to illicit
air traffic preventing it from crossing our borders.
CBP uses tactics such as periodic reconnaissance patrols, sign-
cutting, tracking, and UAS flights to understand the threats faced
along the Nation's borders and in the approaches. For example, CBP uses
change-detection capabilities in various ways to gather information and
intelligence in low-threat areas. Change-detection capabilities
increase the level of situational awareness in all areas, including
those areas currently assessed as lower risk. This allows CBP to
continue focusing resources in areas where the highest risk exists, but
to quickly identify any emerging threat adaptation through information
and intelligence and take appropriate steps to rapidly minimize any new
risk.
CBP's continued deployment of fixed and mobile border surveillance
technology, integrated with AMOC's enhanced domain awareness
capabilities, allows CBP the flexibility to shift more officers and
agents from detection duties to the interdiction of illegal activities
on our borders. Additionally, CBP is looking to the future by working
closely with the DHS Science & Technology Directorate to identify and
develop additional technologies to improve our situational awareness,
surveillance, and detection capabilities along our land and maritime
borders.
intelligence and information sharing
Criminal intelligence sharing is a key component in building
situational awareness efforts along the Southwest Border. CBP and
participating component agencies contribute to several initiatives to
improve the combined intelligence capabilities of Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and international partners along the Southwest Border.
CBP hosts a monthly briefing/teleconference with State and local
partners in order to monitor emerging trends and threats along the
Southwest Border and provide a cross-component, multi-agency venue for
discussing trends and threats. The weekly briefing focuses on
narcotics, weapons, currency interdictions and alien apprehensions both
at and between the Southwest Border. These briefings/teleconferences
currently include participants from: DHS Joint Task Force West, ICE;
USCG; Drug Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation;
U.S. Northern Command; Joint Interagency Task Force-South; Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; U.S. Attorneys' Offices;
Naval Investigative Command; State Fusion Centers; and local law
enforcement as appropriate.
operational coordination
Secretary Johnson's Unity of Effort initiative has put in place new
and strengthened management processes at DHS headquarters to enable
more effective DHS component operations. In addition, DHS-wide border
security activities are being strategically guided by the Southern
Border and Approaches Campaign. Aimed at leveraging the range of unique
Department roles, responsibilities, and capabilities, the Campaign
enhances our operational approach to working together in a more unified
way to address comprehensive threat environments. This cross-component
strategy includes the development of 3 pilot DHS Joint Task Forces
(JTF)--JTF-West, JTF-East, and JTF-Investigations.
The creation of the JTFs, unified joint task forces along the
Southwest Border and in the approaches to the United States, increases
information sharing with Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies; improves situational awareness, border-wide criminal
intelligence-led interdiction operations; and addresses transnational
threats and associated violence.
Over the last 10 years, DHS has significantly increased its border
security capabilities by adding thousands of front-line law enforcement
personnel, and making substantial investments in infrastructure,
situational awareness, and surveillance technology, strategically
deployed to areas of increasing challenge. This shift in border
security resources and overall border security management is
responsible for the significant decrease in the illegal flow of people
across the Southwest Border over the last 10 years.
USBP and AMO use a risk-based strategy to deploy resources and
address emerging threats. In coordination with the new DHS joint
requirements process, USBP uses the Capability Gap Analysis Process
(CGAP) to conduct mission analysis and identify capability gaps. From
this analysis, USBP performs follow-on planning to identify operational
requirements over the short-, mid-, and long-term and to identify
potential solutions, which may (or may not) include technology,
tactical infrastructure, or other solutions depending on the nature,
scope, severity, and geographic location of a given capability gap.
Terrain, threat, and other considerations vary greatly across sectors
and regions, making a ``one size fits all'' approach ineffective. The
AMO CGAP process is in the developmental stage at this time. Once
completed, it will interface with USBP processes to further identify
aviation technology solutions targeting border security initiatives.
As conditions on the ground or in the approaches change, CBP will
adjust its operational posture and will continue to invest and focus
border security resources in the most effective and efficient way
possible to meet the Nation's border security needs.
indicators of success
Thanks to this subcommittee's support, the Nation's long-term
investment in border security continues to produce significant and
positive results. Border Patrol apprehensions--an indicator of illegal
entries--totaled 337,117 Nation-wide in fiscal year 2015, compared to
486,651 in fiscal year 2014. This represents a 30 percent decline in
the last year and almost 80 percent below its most recent peak in
fiscal year 2000. CBP Officers and Agents also played a critical
counter-narcotics role, resulting in the seizure or disruption of more
than 3.3 million pounds of narcotics in fiscal year 2015. In addition,
the agency seized more than $129 million in unreported currency through
integrated counter network operations. In fiscal year 2015, AMO
contributed to the arrest of 4,485 suspects, the apprehension of more
than 51,130 individuals, and the interdiction of more than 213,000
pounds of cocaine.
USBP uses the Consequence Delivery System (CDS) on the Southwest
Border as a means to standardize decision making in the application of
consequences and examines the efficiency and effectiveness of
individual consequences on various types of deportable aliens.
Recidivism and the average number of apprehensions per recidivist are
the strongest indicators of CDS effectiveness. Since CDS implementation
in fiscal year 2011, the annually reported recidivism rate has
decreased from an average of 27 percent to 14 percent in fiscal year
2015 and average apprehensions per recidivist decreased from 2.71 to
2.38 in fiscal year 2015. Contributing factors to the reduction
included reducing the percent of apprehensions resulting in a Voluntary
Return, the least effective and efficient consequence, from 59 percent
in fiscal year 2010 to 4 percent in fiscal year 2015; and applying more
effective and efficient consequences to illegal aliens with a higher
probability of making subsequent illegal entries.
CBP reports on several performance measures, in accordance with the
Government Performance and Results (GRPA) Act of 1993 and the 2010 GPRA
Modernization Act, and we are committed to the on-going monitoring and
reporting of program accomplishments and progress toward meeting
mission goals. AMO reports annually on a GPRA metric that tracks the
percent of detected conventional aircraft incursions resolved along all
borders of the United States. In fiscal year 2015, AMO reported a 99.3
percent border security success rate for this metric.
CBP recognizes the need for relevant performance measures to verify
the effectiveness of our operations and assets. However, due to the
sheer size of the air, land, and sea borders, and the motivation of
individuals to illegally enter the United States, challenges still
exist to measure our success. Furthermore, as border security
operations become increasingly integrated, the ability to quantify
individual contributions to shared outcomes becomes increasingly
complex. AMO and USBP will continue to collaborate with internal and
external partners to enhance current metrics, and develop new metrics,
that provide meaningful outcome-focused measurements of illegal
activity, trends, and effectiveness. We look forward to sharing these
efforts with this subcommittee in the future.
conclusion
To fully implement the risk-informed, counter network/intelligence-
driven operations that focus our capabilities against the highest
threats, CBP continually evaluates its effectiveness and enhances
situational awareness and adjusts its resources as required.
The continued deployment of sophisticated fixed and mobile
surveillance systems, in conjunction with intelligence and operational
integration, enhances situational awareness and better enables CBP to
plan effectively, enhance its agility, and appropriately respond to
threats in the Nation's border regions and approaches to secure the
homeland.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. We look forward to your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Chief Vitiello.
The Chair now recognizes General Alles for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RANDOLPH D. ``TEX'' ALLES, (RET.-USMC),
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Alles. Good morning, Chairman McSally and Ranking
Member Higgins and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss the role
of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Air and Marine
Operations.
AMO is participating in the securing of our Nation's
borders. We are a critical component of CBP's border security
mission. We secure our Nation from transnational threats,
including terrorism, weapons and drug smuggling, and other
illicit activities to our 4 core competencies--interdiction,
investigation, domain awareness, and contingencies in National
taskings. Based at our 74 locations Nation-wide, AMO detects
and interdicts the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs,
and contraband toward and across the air border and the
maritime approaches and within the Nation's interior.
Our greatest asset is our people, from front-line to
support personnel. Of note is our cadre of experienced agents.
Our air and marine agents average 17 years of experience; 63
percent are military veterans. I am sure the entire committee
can understand the importance of experienced pilots. But the
Chairman, I think, as an aviator, you, in particular, will
appreciate that our air interdiction agents average over 5,000
hours of total flight time.
These agents are trained and empowered to conduct
investigations, serve warrants, and make arrests under a broad
range of authorities. They operate a fleet of specially-
equipped aircraft, marine patrol and interdiction vessels, and
an array of advanced surveillance technologies.
Much of our effort is aimed toward border security. We flew
the majority of our flight hours in fiscal year 2015 in close
partnership with the U.S. Border Patrol.
We are having an impact. For instance, as we increased our
flight hours in Arizona over the last 3 years, we have seen a
corresponding decrease in apprehensions. Across our entire
program, AMO contributed to more than 4,000 arrests, 50,000
apprehensions, the interdiction of 230,000 pounds of cocaine,
and the seizure of $49 million in fiscal year 2015.
We also participate in joint operations with a variety of
Federal partners. It includes the Coast Guard, the United State
Navy. We conduct counternarcotic operations in the southeast
coastal and source and transit zones of Central and South
America.
We are the leading provider of airborne detection and
monitoring to the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, based out
of Key West. We also provide direct assistance to partner
nations with shared interest in border security, most notably
Mexico and Canada.
AMO has been extensively involved in planning and
development of all three of the DHS Southern Border and
Approaches Campaign JTF, Joint Task Force. In particular, AMO
holds a deputy director's position with Joint Task Force-East
in Portsmouth, Virginia, which is responsible for the southeast
maritime approaches to the United States.
Air and Marine agents also bring their unique skill sets
and knowledge of the air and maritime environment to various
regional task forces, such as ICE-led Border Enforcement
Security Task Force, more commonly called BEST. AMO operates
the Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, California,
a state-of-the-art law enforcement domain awareness center.
AMOC uses advanced surveillance systems and intelligence
databases to detect threats to the homeland and coordinate
their interdiction. In fiscal year 2015, AMOC evaluated almost
half a million air tracks with a 99.99 successful resolution
rate.
Over the last 10 years, AMO has aligned and deployed our
limited resources in response to regional illegal activity with
the focus on increasing effectiveness. Our approach is not only
informed by analysis of trends in illegal activity, but also an
assessment of our assets' effectiveness and rate of return.
This method informs our effective use of personnel in our
diverse mission sets. Implementing this concept is critical to
the effective use of resources Congress and the American people
have come to expect from Air and Marine Operations.
Moving forward, we will continue to work with our partners
to enhance our detection, investigation, and interdiction
capabilities to address emerging threats and to protect
American security interests along the Nation's borders in
source and transit zones, in our customs waters, and within the
Nation's interior.
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to
testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, General Alles.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gambler for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member
Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify at today's hearing to discuss GAO's work
on Department of Homeland Security actions to deploy resources
and measure progress in its efforts to secure U.S. borders.
Today, I will focus my remarks on 2 key areas in which GAO
has assessed DHS's efforts to secure our Nation's borders.
First, I will highlight our work reviewing DHS efforts to
deploy resources to the Southwest Border and to measure the
effectiveness of those resources. Second, I will discuss GAO's
work reviewing DHS performance measures for achieving
situational awareness and border security.
With regard to my first point, DHS has deployed agents in a
variety of technological, tactical, and other resources to the
Southwest Border. For example, between fiscal years 2004 and
2015, Border Patrol increased the number of agents on the
Southwest Border from about 9,000 to over 17,000. CBP has also
made progress toward deploying programs under the Arizona
Border Surveillance Technology Plan, including fixed and mobile
surveillance systems, agent portable devices, and ground
sensors, and these technologies have aided CBP's border
security efforts.
While these resource deployments have been positive, CBP
could do more to strengthen its management of Southwest Border
security resources and better assess the contributions of these
resources to border security efforts. For example, CBP has
identified the mission benefits of surveillance technologies,
such as improved situational awareness and agent safety. CBP
has already begun requiring Border Patrol to record data within
its database on whether or not an asset, such as a camera,
assisted in an apprehension or seizure.
These are positive steps toward helping CBP assess the
contributions of its surveillance technologies to border
security. However, CBP needs to develop and implement
performance measures and analyze data it is now collecting to
be able to fully assess the contributions of its technologies
to border security.
Further, with regard to air and marine assets, in 2012 we
reported that Air and Marine Operations could better ensure
that its mix and placement of assets were effective and
efficient by, for example, more clearly linking deployment
decisions to mission needs and threats, documenting analyses
used to support decisions on the mix and placement of assets,
and considering how deployments of border technology affect
requirements for air and marine assets at cross locations. We
found that these steps were needed to help CBP better determine
the extent to which its allocation decisions were effective in
addressing customer needs and threats.
With regard to my second point, Border Patrol has not yet
fully developed goals and measures for assessing efforts and
identifying resource needs to secure the border. Through fiscal
year 2010, DHS's goal and measure for border security was
operational control, defined as the ability to detect, respond
to, and address cross-border illegal activity across all U.S.
border miles.
After this time, DHS transitioned to using the number of
apprehensions on the Southwest Border between ports of entry as
an interim performance goal and measure. We previously reported
that this measure provided some useful information but did not
position the Department to be able to report on how effective
its efforts were at securing the border, resulting in reduced
oversight and accountability.
DHS has discontinued use of these measures and has begun
using other measures, such as the rate of recidivism and the
rate of effectiveness in responding to illegal activity. The
Border Patrol is also in the process of developing other goals
and measures. However, it has not yet set target time frames
for completing its efforts across all borders, as we have
recommended.
While DHS is working to address our recommendations, until
new goals and measures are in place, it is unknown the extent
to which they will address our past findings and provide DHS
and Congress with information to more fully assess CBP's
efforts to secure the border between ports of entry.
In closing, our work has identified opportunities for DHS
to strengthen its border security programs and efforts. We have
made a number of recommendations to the Department to address
various challenges and to enhance management and oversight of
border security-related efforts. DHS has generally agreed with
our recommendations and is taking action to address them, and
we will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in these areas.
This concludes my oral statement, and I am pleased to
answer any questions members have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
March 1, 2016
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-16-465T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Southwest Border continues to be vulnerable to cross-border
illegal activity, with DHS apprehending over 331,000 illegal entrants,
and making over 14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015. DHS has
employed a variety of resources to help secure the border, including
personnel, technology--such as cameras and sensors, tactical
infrastructure--such as fencing and roads, and air and marine assets.
This statement discusses: (1) DHS efforts to deploy resources on
the Southwest Border and measure the effectiveness of these resources
in securing the border, and (2) DHS efforts to develop performance
goals and measures for achieving situational awareness and border
security. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued
from September 2009 through May 2015, with selected updates through
February 2016 on DHS enforcement efforts and actions to address prior
GAO recommendations. To conduct the updates, GAO interviewed agency
officials and reviewed related documentation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously made recommendations for DHS to, among other things,
(1) strengthen its management of technology plans and programs and (2)
establish milestones and time frames for the development of border
security goals and measures. DHS generally agreed and has actions
underway to address the recommendations.
southwest border security.--additional actions needed to assess
resource deployment and progress
What GAO Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), has taken action to deploy various resources--
including agents and technology--along the Southwest Border and assess
those resources' contributions to border security. For example, in
December 2012, GAO reported that CBP's Border Patrol scheduled agents
for deployment differently across Southwest Border locations, and
although in most locations less than half of Border Patrol
apprehensions were made within 5 miles of the border in fiscal year
2011, Border Patrol had moved overall enforcement efforts closer to the
border since the prior fiscal year. GAO also reported in December 2012,
that Border Patrol tracked changes in the effectiveness rate for
response to illegal activity across border locations to determine if
the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets were deployed
and used effectively, and took steps to improve the data quality issues
that had precluded comparing performance results across locations at
the time of GAO's review. For example, Border Patrol issued guidance in
September 2012 for collecting and reporting data with a more
standardized and consistent approach. DHS has reported the
effectiveness rate as a performance measure in its fiscal year 2015-
2017 Annual Performance Report.
Further, in March 2014, GAO reported that CBP had made progress in
deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology
Plan, but that CBP could strengthen its management and assessment of
the plan's programs. GAO reported that while CBP had identified mission
benefits of technologies to be deployed under the plan, the agency had
not developed key attributes for performance metrics to identify the
technologies' individual and collective contribution, as GAO had
recommended in 2011. GAO also reported in 2014 that CBP officials
stated that baselines for each performance measure would be developed
and that by the end of fiscal year 2016, CBP would establish a tool to
explain the impact of technology and infrastructure on situational
awareness in the border environment. CBP should complete these actions
in order to fully assess its progress in implementing the plan and
determine when mission benefits have been fully realized.
In December 2012, GAO reported on Border Patrol's efforts to
develop performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of
efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and informing the
identification and allocation of border security resources. GAO
reported that DHS had transitioned from a goal and measure related to
the capability to detect, respond to, and address cross-border illegal
activity to an interim performance goal and measure of apprehensions
between the land border ports of entry beginning fiscal year 2011. GAO
reported that this interim goal and measure did not inform program
results or resource identification and allocation decisions, limiting
DHS and Congressional oversight and accountability. DHS concurred with
GAO's recommendation that CBP develop milestones and time frames for
the development of border security goals and measures and Border Patrol
works to define a new overarching performance goal for achieving a low-
risk border and develop associated performance measures. CBP should
complete these actions in order to fully assess its capabilities and
progress to secure the border.
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work
reviewing actions taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
deploy resources at the Southwest Border, and the extent that DHS
measures the effectiveness of these deployed resources to improve
situational awareness and achieve a more secure border. The Southwest
Border continues to be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, and
DHS reported apprehending over 331,000 illegal entrants and making over
14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015.
The U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol), within DHS's U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), is the Federal agency with primary
responsibility for securing the border between the U.S. ports of
entry.\1\ CBP has divided geographic responsibility for the Southwest
Border among 9 Border Patrol sectors.\2\ Border Patrol's 2004 National
Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy), developed following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was designed to facilitate the
build-up and deployment of border resources to ensure the agency had
the right mix of personnel, technology--such as cameras and sensors,
and tactical infrastructure--such as fencing, roads, and lighting and
to deploy those resources in a layered approach at the immediate border
and in other areas distant from the border. Since fiscal year 2004, the
first full fiscal year DHS was in operation, the number of agents
assigned to patrol U.S. Southwest land borders increased from about
9,500 to about 17,500 agents near the end of fiscal year 2015.\3\ In
addition to personnel, DHS has employed a variety of technology,
tactical infrastructure, and air and marine assets to assist with its
efforts to secure the border. For example, in November 2005, DHS
announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program,
which was responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection
system using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network
(SBInet), and tactical infrastructure along the Southwest Border to
deter smugglers and aliens attempting to illegally cross the border. In
January 2011, in response to internal and external assessments that
identified concerns regarding the performance, cost, and schedule for
implementing the systems, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced
the cancellation of further procurements of SBInet systems. After the
cancellation of SBInet, under which CBP deployed surveillance systems
along 53 of the 387 miles of the Arizona border with Mexico, CBP
developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) in
January 2011, which includes a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to
help provide security for the remainder of the Arizona border.
Moreover, we reported in 2011 that DHS continued to deploy other
tactical infrastructure along the Southwest Border, and CBP's Air and
Marine Operations (AMO)--formerly known as the Office of Air and
Marine--operates a fleet of air and marine assets in support of Federal
border security efforts.
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\1\ Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled
entry into or departure from the United States. Specifically, a port of
entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land
border location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear
passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws,
and where a person may apply for admission into the United States
pursuant to U.S. immigration law.
\2\ Each of the 9 Border Patrol sectors has a headquarters with
management personnel and these sectors are further divided
geographically into varying numbers of stations, with agents assigned
to patrol-defined geographic areas.
\3\ Border Patrol reported agent staffing statistics for on-board
personnel as of September 19, 2015.
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Through fiscal year 2010, these resources were used to support
DHS's goal to achieve ``operational control'' of the Nation's borders
by reducing cross-border illegal activity. The extent of operational
control--also referred to as effective control--was defined as the
number of border miles where Border Patrol had the capability to
detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. In May
2012, Border Patrol issued the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan
(2012-2016 Strategic Plan), stating that the build-up of its resource
base and the operations conducted over the past 2 decades would enable
the Border Patrol to focus on mitigating risk rather than further
increasing resources to secure the border. This new strategic plan,
with a goal to achieve a low-risk border, emphasized using intelligence
information to inform risk relative to threats of cross-border
terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal migration across locations;
integrating border security operations with those of other law
enforcement partners; and developing rapid response capabilities to
deploy the resources appropriate to changes in threat.
Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS
faces in implementing its border security efforts. My statement
discusses our key findings in the areas of: (1) DHS efforts to deploy
agents, technology, tactical infrastructure, and air and marine assets
on the Southwest Border and measure the effectiveness of these
resources in securing the border, and (2) DHS performance measures for
achieving situational awareness and border security.
My statement today is based on reports and testimonies we issued
from September 2009 through May 2015 that examined DHS efforts to
enhance border security and assess the effectiveness of its border
security operations on the Southwest Border (see Related GAO Products
at the end of this statement). It also includes selected updates we
conducted through February 2016 on DHS enforcement efforts and actions
to address our previous recommendations. Our reports and testimonies,
as well as the selected updates, incorporated information we obtained
by examining CBP's management of resources; analyzing Border Patrol
planning and operational assessment documents; reviewing DHS's
processes for measuring security at the Southwest Border; and
interviewing relevant DHS officials. More detailed information about
our scope and methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies.
We conducted all of this work in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
cbp has deployed resources to secure the southwest border, but
additional actions are needed to measure their effectiveness
Border Patrol Scheduled Agents Differently Across Sectors and
Enforcement Activities, and Took Steps to Improve Data
Measuring Overall Effectiveness
In December 2012, we reported on Border Patrol's evolving approach
for deploying agents along the Southwest Border.\4\ In that report we
found that Border Patrol's 2004 Strategy provided for increasing
resources and deploying these resources using an approach that provided
for several layers of Border Patrol agents at the immediate border and
in other areas 100 miles or more away from the border (referred to as
defense in depth). According to the CBP officials we interviewed for
our report, as resources increased, Border Patrol sought to move
enforcement closer to the border over time to better position the
agency to ensure the arrest of those trying to enter the country
illegally. Additionally, headquarters and field officials said station
supervisors determined: (1) Whether to deploy agents in border zones or
interior zones, and (2) the types of enforcement or nonenforcement
activities agents were to perform.\5\ Similarly, Border Patrol
officials from the 5 sectors we visited stated that they used similar
factors in making deployment decisions, such as intelligence showing
the presence of threat across locations, the nature of the threat, and
environmental factors including terrain and weather.
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\4\ GAO, Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet
in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs, GAO-13-25
(Washington, DC: Dec. 2012).
\5\ Within the Border Patrol station areas, ``border zones'' are
those with land directly on the U.S.-Mexico border, and ``interior
zones'' are without international border miles. Enforcement activities
include, for example, patrolling the border and traffic checks, while
nonenforcement activities include, for example, remote-video
surveillance, facility maintenance, and training.
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We reported in December 2012 on Border Patrol data from fiscal year
2011 that showed how agent workdays were scheduled and found
differences across sectors in the percentage of agent workdays
scheduled for border zones and interior zones and across enforcement
and nonenforcement activities. Specifically, we found that while Tucson
sector scheduled 43 percent of agent workdays to border zones in fiscal
year 2011, agent workdays scheduled for border zones by other Southwest
Border sectors ranged from 26 percent in the Yuma sector to 53 percent
in the El Centro sector. Our analysis of agents deployed for
enforcement compared to nonenforcement activities ranged from 66
percent for Yuma sector to 81 percent in Big Bend sector.
Border Patrol officials we interviewed attributed the variation in
scheduling border zone deployment in fiscal year 2011 to differences in
geographical factors among the Southwest Border sectors--such as
varying topography, ingress and egress routes, and land access issues,
and structural factors such as technology and infrastructure
deployments--and stated that these factors affect how sectors operate
and may preclude closer deployment to the border. Additionally, we
found that many Southwest Border sectors have interior stations that
are responsible for operations at some distance from the border, such
as at interior checkpoints generally located 25 miles or more from the
border, which could have affected their percentage of agent workdays
scheduled for border zones. We have planned work to assess Border
Patrol deployment and management of agents across the Southwest Border
beginning later this year.
We also reported in December 2012 that Border Patrol sector
management used changes in various data over time to help inform
assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of
illegal migration, smuggling of drugs and other contraband, and
terrorism. These data showed changes in the: (1) Percentage of
estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) number of
seizures of drugs and other contraband, and (3) number of apprehensions
of persons from countries at an increased risk of sponsoring
terrorism.\6\ In addition, apprehension and seizure data could be
analyzed in terms of where they occurred relative to distance from the
border as an indicator of progress in Border Patrol enforcement
efforts. Border Patrol officials at sectors we visited, and our review
of fiscal years 2010 and 2012 sector operational assessments, indicated
that sectors historically used these types of data to inform tactical
deployment of personnel and technology to address cross-border threats.
Our analysis showed that in most Southwest Border sectors less than
half of Border Patrol's apprehensions and seizures were made within 5
miles of the border in fiscal year 2011. In Tucson sector, for example,
47 percent of Border Patrol's apprehensions of illegal entrants, 38
percent of the drugs and contraband seizures, and 8 percent of the
apprehensions of aliens from special interest countries were within 5
miles of the border. However, our analysis also showed that Border
Patrol had moved overall enforcement efforts closer to the border since
the prior fiscal year.
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\6\ These data also included the percentage of estimated known
illegal entrants who are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders).
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Further, we reported that Border Patrol sectors and stations
tracked changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine
if the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets were being
deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials
from Border Patrol headquarters. Border Patrol calculated an overall
effectiveness rate using a formula in which it added the number of
apprehensions and ``turn backs'' in a specific sector and divided this
total by the total estimated known illegal entries--determined by
adding the number of apprehensions, turn backs, and ``got aways'' for
the sector.\7\ Border Patrol views its border security efforts as
increasing in effectiveness if the number of turn backs as a percentage
of estimated known illegal entries has increased and the number of got-
aways as a percentage of estimated known illegal entries has decreased.
In our December 2012 report, we analyzed apprehension, turn back, and
got-away data from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 for the Tucson sector
and found that while apprehensions remained fairly constant at about 60
percent of estimated known illegal entries, the percentage of reported
turn backs increased from about 5 percent to about 23 percent, while
the percentage of reported got-aways decreased from about 33 percent to
about 13 percent. As a result of these changes in the mix of turn backs
and got-aways, our analysis of Border Patrol data using Border Patrol
methodology for our report showed that the enforcement effort, or the
overall effectiveness rate for Tucson sector, improved 20 percentage
points from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, from 67 percent to 87
percent. Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for
eight of the 9 sectors on the Southwest Border also improved from
fiscal years 2006 through 2011, using Border Patrol methodology.
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\7\ Border Patrol defines estimated illegal entries as the total
number of deportable aliens who were apprehended, in addition to the
number of entrants who illegally crossed the border but were not
apprehended either because they crossed back to Mexico--``turn
backs''--or continued traveling to the U.S. interior and Border Patrol
was no longer actively pursuing them--``got-aways.''
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At the time of our review in 2012, Border Patrol headquarters
officials said that differences in how sectors defined, collected, and
reported turn back and got-away data used to calculate the overall
effectiveness rate precluded comparing performance results across
sectors. They stated that each Border Patrol sector decided how it
would collect and report turn back and got-away data, and as a result,
practices for collecting and reporting the data varied across sectors
and stations based on differences in agent experience and judgment,
resources, and terrain. The ability to obtain accurate or consistent
data using these identification sources depends on various factors,
such as terrain and weather, according to Border Patrol officials. As a
result of these data limitations, Border Patrol headquarters officials
said that while they considered turn back and got-away data
sufficiently reliable to assess each sector's progress toward border
security and to inform sector decisions regarding resource deployment,
they did not consider the data sufficiently reliable to compare--or
externally report--results across sectors at the time we issued our
report in December 2012.
Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September
2012 to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the
collection and reporting of turn back and got-away data by Border
Patrol sectors. As we reported in 2012, Border Patrol officials
expected that once the guidance was implemented, data reliability would
improve. Since that time, DHS has reported the effectiveness rate in
its fiscal year 2015-2017 Annual Performance Report as a performance
measure and method to publicly report results of its border security
efforts on the Southwest Border.
CBP Has Not Yet Fully Applied Performance Metrics or Assessed the
Contributions of its Deployed Surveillance Technologies and
Fencing
In March 2014 and April 2015, we reported that CBP had made
progress in deploying programs under the Arizona Border Surveillance
Technology Plan, but that CBP could take additional action to
strengthen its management of the Plan and its various programs.\8\ The
Plan's acquisition programs include fixed and mobile surveillance
systems, agent portable devices, and ground sensors. Specifically, we
reported in March 2014 that CBP had identified the mission benefits of
its surveillance technologies, as we recommended in November 2011.\9\
CBP had identified mission benefits of surveillance technologies to be
deployed under the Plan, such as improved situational awareness and
agent safety. However, we also reported that the agency had not
developed key attributes for performance metrics for all surveillance
technology to be deployed as part of the Plan, as we recommended in
November 2011. As of May 2015, CBP had identified a set of potential
key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be
deployed under the Plan; however, CBP officials stated that this set of
measures was under review as the agency continued to refine the
measures to better inform the nature of the contributions and impacts
of surveillance technology on its border security mission.\10\ While
CBP had yet to apply these measures, CBP had established a time line
for developing performance measures for each technology. In November
2014, CBP officials stated that baselines for each performance measure
were to be developed, at which time the agency was to begin using the
data to evaluate the individual and collective contributions of
specific technology assets deployed under the Plan. Moreover, CBP plans
to establish a tool by the end of fiscal year 2016 that explains the
qualitative and quantitative impacts of technology and tactical
infrastructure on situational awareness in specific areas of the border
environment. While these are positive steps, until CBP completes its
efforts to address our recommendation and fully develop and apply key
attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be deployed
under the Plan, it will not be able to fully assess its progress in
implementing the Plan and determine when mission benefits have been
fully realized.
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\8\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional
Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-
14-368 (Washington, DC: Mar. 4, 2014), and Homeland Security
Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal Actions Needed to
Improve Accountability, GAO-15-171SP (Washington, DC: Apr. 22, 2015).
\9\ GAO-14-368 and GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology:
More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-
12-22 (Washington, DC: Nov. 4, 2011).
\10\ GAO, Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS's Efforts
to Implement and Assess Infrastructure and Technology, GAO-15-595T
(Washington, DC: May 13, 2015).
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Further, in March 2014, we found that CBP did not capture complete
data on the contributions of these technologies, which in combination
with other relevant performance metrics or indicators could be used to
better determine the contributions of CBP's surveillance technologies
and inform resource allocation decisions. Although CBP had a field
within its Enforcement Integrated Database for data on whether
technological assets, such as SBInet surveillance towers, and
nontechnological assets, such as canine teams, assisted or contributed
to the apprehension of illegal entrants and seizure of drugs and other
contraband, according to CBP officials, Border Patrol agents were not
required to record these data.\11\ This limited CBP's ability to
collect, track, and analyze available data on asset assists to help
monitor the contribution of surveillance technologies, including its
SBInet system, to Border Patrol apprehensions and seizures and inform
resource allocation decisions. We made two recommendations that: (1)
CBP require data on asset assists to be recorded and tracked within its
database; and that once these data were required to be recorded and
tracked, (2) analyze available data on apprehensions and technological
assists, in combination with other relevant performance metrics or
indicators, as appropriate, to determine the contribution of
surveillance technologies to CBP's border security efforts. CBP
concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them. In
June 2014, in response to our recommendation, CBP issued guidance
informing Border Patrol agents that the asset assist data field within
its database was now a mandatory data field. Agents are required to
enter any assisting surveillance technology or other equipment before
proceeding. As we testified in May 2015, to fully address our second
recommendation, CBP needs to analyze data on apprehensions and
seizures, in combination with other relevant performance metrics, to
determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to its border
security mission.
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\11\ In addition to maintaining data on asset assists, the Border
Patrol collects and maintains data on apprehensions and seizures in
DHS's Enforcement Integrated Database.
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In addition, with regard to fencing and other tactical
infrastructure, CBP reported that from fiscal year 2005 through May
2015, the total miles of vehicle and pedestrian fencing along the
nearly 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border increased from approximately 120
miles to 652 miles.\12\ With the completion of the new fencing and
other tactical infrastructure, DHS is now responsible for maintaining
this infrastructure including repairing breached sections of
fencing.\13\ We have previously reported on CBP's efforts to assess the
impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. Specifically, in
our May 2010 and September 2009 reports, we found that CBP had not
accounted for the impact of its investment in border fencing and
infrastructure on border security.\14\ CBP had reported an increase in
control of Southwest Border miles, but could not account separately for
the impact of the border fencing and other infrastructure. In September
2009, we recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border
fencing and other infrastructure to border security.\15\ DHS concurred
with our recommendation, and in response, CBP contracted with the
Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis
of the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. We have
on-going work for this subcommittee and others assessing CBP's
deployment and management of tactical infrastructure, and we plan to
report on the results of this work later this year.
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\12\ The length of the border with Mexico is defined by the U.S.
International Boundary and Water Commission at 1,954 miles. The length
of the land border is 675 miles, while the length of the border along
the Colorado River and Rio Grande is 1,279 miles.
\13\ CBP reported that maintaining the fence cost the Department at
least $7.2 million in 2010.
\14\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges
Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-
651T (Washington, DC: May 4, 2010), and Secure Border Initiative:
Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing
Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9, 2009).
\15\ GAO-09-896.
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CBP Has Reassessed Its Mix and Placement of Air and Marine Assets to
Better Address Mission Needs and Threats
Our March 2012 report on AMO assets highlighted several areas the
agency could address to better ensure the mix and placement of assets
is effective and efficient.\16\ These areas included: (1) Documentation
clearly linking deployment decisions to mission needs and threats, (2)
documentation on the assessments and analysis used to support decisions
on the mix and placement of assets, and (3) consideration of how
deployment of border technology will affect customer requirements for
air and marine assets across locations.
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\16\ GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More
Effective Use of DHS's Air and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518, (Washington,
DC: Mar. 30, 2012).
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Specifically, we found that AMO had not documented significant
events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement
across locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate
that its decisions to allocate assets were the most effective ones in
fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats, among other things.
While AMO's Fiscal Year 2010 Aircraft Deployment Plan stated that AMO
deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were
positioned to best meet the needs of CBP field commanders and respond
to the latest intelligence on emerging threats, AMO did not have
documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan
to mission needs or threats.
We also found that AMO did not provide higher rates of support to
locations Border Patrol identified as high priority, a fact that
indicated that a reassessment of AMO's resource mix and placement could
help ensure that it meets mission needs, addresses threats, and
mitigates risk. AMO officials stated that while they deployed a
majority of assets to high-priority sectors, budgetary constraints,
other National priorities, and the need to maintain presence across
border locations limited overall increases in assets or the amount of
assets they could redeploy from lower-priority sectors. While we
recognized AMO's resource constraints, the agency did not have
documentation of analyses assessing the impact of these constraints and
whether actions could be taken to improve the mix and placement of
assets within them. Thus, the extent to which the deployment of AMO
assets and personnel, including those assigned to the Southwest Border,
most effectively utilized AMO's constrained assets to meet mission
needs and address threats was unclear.
We further found in March 2012 that AMO did not document
assessments and analyses to support the agency's decisions on the mix
and placement of assets. DHS's 2005 aviation management directive
requires operating entities to use their aircraft in the most cost-
effective way to meet requirements. Although AMO officials stated that
it factored in cost-effectiveness considerations, AMO did not have
documentation of analyses it performed to make these decisions. AMO
headquarters officials stated that they made deployment decisions
during formal discussions and on-going meetings in close collaboration
with Border Patrol, and considered a range of factors such as
operational capability, mission priorities, and threats. AMO officials
said that while they generally documented final decisions affecting the
mix and placement of assets, they did not document assessments and
analyses to support these decisions.
Finally, we reported that CBP and DHS had on-going interagency
efforts under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across
U.S. borders through deployment of technology that may decrease Border
Patrol's use of AMO assets for air and marine domain awareness.
However, at the time of our review, AMO was not planning to assess how
technology capabilities could affect the mix and placement of air and
marine assets until the technology has been deployed. Specifically, we
concluded that Border Patrol, CBP, and DHS had strategic and
technological initiatives under way that would likely affect customer
requirements for air and marine support and the mix and placement of
assets across locations--CBP and DHS also had on-going interagency
efforts under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across
U.S. borders through deployment of technology that may decrease Border
Patrol's use of AMO assets for air and marine domain awareness. AMO
officials stated that they would consider how technology capabilities
affect the mix and placement of air and marine assets once such
technology has been deployed.
To address the findings of our March 2012 report, we recommended
that CBP, to the extent that benefits outweigh the costs, reassess the
mix and placement of AMO's air and marine assets to include mission
requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and
technological changes. DHS concurred with this recommendation and
responded that it planned to address some of these actions as part of
the Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Aircraft Deployment Plan. In September 2014,
CBP provided us this Plan, which was approved in May 2012, and updated
information on its subsequent efforts to address this recommendation,
including a description of actions taken to reassess the mix and
placement of AMO's assets. According to AMO, after consulting with DHS
and CBP officials and approval from the Secretary of Homeland Security
in May 2013, the office began a realignment of personnel, aircraft, and
vessels from the Northern Border to the Southern Border based on its
evaluation of the utilization and efficiency of current assets and
available funding to accomplish the transfers. In September 2015, AMO
officials provided GAO with data and analysis documenting that
personnel, aircraft, and vessels were in the process of being moved to
support the realignment of assets, which addressed the intent of our
recommendation.
border patrol has not yet developed goals and measures for assessing
efforts and identifying resource needs under the fiscal year 2012-2016
strategic plan
In December 2012, we reported on Border Patrol's efforts to develop
performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its
efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and for informing
the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the
border.\17\ We found that until fiscal year end 2010, DHS used Border
Patrol's goal and performance measure of operational control as the
publicly reported DHS goal and outcome measure for border security and
to assess resource needs to accomplish this goal.\18\ We had previously
testified in February 2011 that at the time this goal and measure was
discontinued at the end of fiscal year 2010, Border Patrol reported
achieving varying levels of operational control of 873 (44 percent) of
the nearly 2,000 Southwest Border miles.\19\ Border Patrol officials
attributed the uneven progress across sectors to multiple factors,
including terrain, transportation infrastructure on both sides of the
border, and a need to prioritize resource deployment to sectors deemed
to have greater risk of illegal activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See GAO-13-25.
\18\ Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles under
operational control using factors such as operational statistics,
third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, resource
deployments, and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents.
\19\ GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border
Control Measures for the Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T, Washington, DC:
Feb. 15, 2011).
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DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and
outcome measure for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual
Performance Report. Specifically, citing a need to establish a new
border security goal and measure that reflected a more quantitative
methodology as well as the Department's evolving vision for border
control, DHS established the interim performance goal and measure of
the number of apprehensions between the land border ports of entry
until a new border control goal and measure could be developed. We
testified in May 2012 that the interim goal and measure provided
information on activity levels, but did not inform program results or
resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore, until
new goals and measures could be developed, DHS and Congress could
experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability.\20\ Further,
studies commissioned by CBP documented that the number of apprehensions
bore little relationship to effectiveness because agency officials did
not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border illegal
activity.\21\
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\20\ GAO, Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in
Implementation and Assessment Efforts, GAO-12-688T (Washington, DC: May
8, 2012).
\21\ For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the
Effect of the Arizona Border Control Initiative (Arlington, VA: Oct.
18, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our December 2012 report, we found that Border Patrol was in the
process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the
progress of its efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and
for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to
secure the border, but had not identified milestones and time frames
for developing and implementing them. According to Border Patrol
officials, establishing milestones and time frames for the development
of performance goals and measures was contingent on the development of
key elements of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, such as a risk assessment
tool, and the agency's time frames for implementing these key
elements--targeted for fiscal years 2013 and 2014--were subject to
change. Specifically, under the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan, the Border
Patrol planned to continuously evaluate border security--and resource
needs--by comparing changes in risk levels against available resources
across border locations. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency
was in the process of identifying performance goals and measures that
could be linked to the new risk assessment tools that would show
progress and status in securing the border between ports of entry, and
determine needed resources, but had not established milestones and time
frames for developing and implementing goals and measures because the
agency's time frames for implementing key elements of the plan were
subject to change.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Border Patrol officials stated that DHS and Border Patrol had
established a performance goal--linked to relevant measures--addressing
border security that, as of October 2012, was being used as an internal
management indicator. However, a DHS official said it had not been
decided whether this goal and the associated measures would be publicly
reported or used as an overall performance goal and as measures for
border security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recommended in our December 2012 report that Border Patrol
establish milestones and time frames for developing a: (1) Performance
goal, or goals, for border security between the ports of entry that
defines how border security is to be measured, and (2) performance
measure, or measures--linked to a performance goal or goals--for
assessing progress made in securing the border between ports of entry
and informing resource identification and allocation efforts.\23\ DHS
agreed with these recommendations and since our December 2012 report,
has added performance measures for border security to its Annual
Performance Report. In its Fiscal Year 2015-2017 Annual Performance
Report, these measures included the percent of people apprehended
multiple times on the Southwest Border and the rate of effectiveness in
responding to illegal activity. Further, as part of its efforts to
revise the Border Patrol strategic plan, Border Patrol has developed
outcome measures for each of 14 objectives, and according to officials,
Border Patrol continues to work toward the development of goals and
measures to support its overarching performance goal of low-risk
borders. Until these new goals and measures are in place, it is unknown
the extent to which they will address our past findings and would
provide DHS and Congress with information on the results of CBP efforts
to secure the border between ports of entry and the extent to which
existing resources and capabilities are appropriate and sufficient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ GAO-13-25.
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Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or Members of the committee may have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Ms. Gambler.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
I appreciate the testimony from all of our witnesses today.
If we could just put up the display that I want to use just for
reference.
As I mentioned, one of the challenges we have is, to
summarize, we have gone from a measurement of operational
control in 2010, I know that is small, but where we basically
said--you said 44 percent of the border was under operational
control--abandoned that, went to apprehension numbers, which
Ms. Gambler pointed out is that is just a numerator, right?
That just tells you how many people you have apprehended
without an understanding of the denominator.
So now, as of a year ago, you are trying to do some level
of denominator, which includes those that got away, right,
those that you detected that got away. But if you look up here,
again, at the display, I am just trying to simplify it, talking
about situational awareness, if 100 people cross the border
illegally, you are still measuring, as an example, if you
detected 60 of them, you are measuring how many apprehended and
how many got away or turned back of that 60. So that could come
out to: Hey, we are at an 80 percent interdiction
effectiveness.
But the concern of this committee and the concern of my
constituents is, what about the other 40? They are not included
in the denominator at all because we don't necessarily know
that it is even 40 of them. We don't know what that number is,
right? So until we have a sense of true understanding of a
denominator, we are not going to be able to know our
effectiveness.
Look, I am a fighter pilot. I am trying to simplify this as
best I can, although I know it is kind-of complex. We have
1,954 miles of the Southern Border. It seems to me you all
could come back to us with an answer of: Of that 1,954 miles
amount of miles we have situational awareness of. I don't know
what that number. Is it 200? Is it 1,500? We know if anything
moves across the border, we are going to detect it. We know
exactly what is happening and we are going to detect it.
Then the second piece is, can we actually intercept it?
That is the effectiveness thing. The American people don't know
what that number is. We don't know what that number is.
So, Chief Vitiello, do you understand the challenges that
we have with not really understanding the denominator? No. 2,
can you tell me today, of the 1,954 miles, what percent do you
feel you have 100 percent situational awareness of? What is
that number?
Mr. Vitiello. Thanks for that question. I won't sit here
today and tell you that we know exactly what the denominator
is. That is something that we have been trying to accomplish
with regard to effectiveness.
I am reminded of Eisenhower's words to the military that
plans are useless but the effort of planning is essential
because it puts your team in the place where they can rapidly
adjust to changing circumstances.
So what we have done over the last several years is signed
ourselves up through the GPRA measures, which pinned into the
foundation of the Government Performance Results Act, right, a
requirement that Congress set for us. We looked at what was
there that we could use, and we tried to strengthen our ability
to measure effectiveness at the border. So when an agent has an
encounter, when an entry is noticed, how many people are
apprehended in that encounter, and what are the results of
people who either ran back across the border or eventually got
away.
So I can't say that that is a perfect endeavor because it
is done by human beings. What I can say is that we have a
systematic protocol that allows agents to assess zone by zone,
line by line at the border, talk about how many entries, record
those entries, and then record the encounters as they see them
in real time.
There are lots of places, as you know, they are very rural,
very remote, it is difficult for us to access the border. But
what we try to do is we have a systematic way of recording
entries and then subtracting what happens after the encounters,
either got away, turned back, or apprehended. Then we put that
math together and we sign ourselves up for the effectiveness
rate.
Ms. McSally. I get that. That is all in the bottom part of
that bracket there. That is you trying to adequately measure
those that you have detected, have you intercepted them or did
they get away, right?
Mr. Vitiello. Right. But there is an assessment line for
every part of the border. It is not just the entries that we
see or know about. There are places where we can see entries in
real time because of the deployment, because of the fixed
towers, because of the mobile technology that agents have,
their own observations, they are at the line and they see
people come across. So all of that activity is recorded, the
ones that are seen and the ones that are not seen but have left
evidence of the entry.
Ms. McSally. Right. But that is still all in the
denominator there or in the bottom part of the bracket there.
You said you were at 81 percent effectiveness rate last year,
right, based on that analysis?
Mr. Vitiello. What we do for the recording, yes, that gets
us to 81 percent for the year.
Ms. McSally. But do you have any sense of what the real
denominator is?
Mr. Vitiello. Not perfectly.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Of the 1,954 of the Southern Border, can
you give us a sense of what percentage or what number of miles
you feel you have situational awareness to the point that if
something comes across, you know it, you may not be able to
intercept it, but you know it?
Mr. Vitiello. So about 56 percent of the border is--we
kind-of segment the border into 2 specific categories. Of all
the things that we do, not just on the effectiveness rate but
all the things we are trying to record, about 56 percent of the
border is deployed in a way that agents and/or our technology
can see activity in real time.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Fifty-six percent. Thank you.
Ms. Gambler, was my line of questioning, do you have
anything to add to that to provide our situational awareness?
Ms. Gambler. Sure. I think a couple of things. I think the
situational awareness piece is very important in terms of being
able to get a sense of the reliability of the information and
the measures that CBP does report out, that Border Patrol does
report out.
The other thing that I would add in terms of the measures
is, in thinking about the interdiction effectiveness rate that
Border Patrol is using now, as we have reported, it is
important not just to kind of look at what the percentage is,
whether it is 81 percent or something else, but also to look at
sort-of the makeup of that interdiction effectiveness rate,
because Border Patrol is counting in the numerator
apprehensions plus turn-backs.
So, as we have reported in the past, differences and
changes in turn-backs and got-aways over time can have an
impact on what that ultimate interdiction effectiveness rate
is. So in some of our past work, we have reported on not just
the effectiveness rate, but also the apprehension rate, which
is looking at how many arrests Border Patrol actually makes
relative to the overall estimated known illegal entries.
Ms. McSally. Great. My time is up. But part of the
numerator of their effectiveness rate includes those like
unaccompanied children and people who have turned themselves in
at the border. They haven't necessarily been apprehended,
right, they have just turned themselves in. That is part of the
numerator, Chief?
Mr. Vitiello. We record all the encounters and all the----
Ms. McSally. But is that part of your effectiveness
numerator?
Mr. Vitiello. It would be in part of that math, yes.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. My time has well expired. So I
want to now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
Chief Vitiello, the concerns of the Southern Border deal
primarily with illegals coming in and drug smuggling. What do
you see are the major challenges in terms of the Northern
Border and potential threats, existing or emerging?
Mr. Vitiello. So our concerns on the Northern Border are
the same in the sense that you want situational awareness. You
want to understand what is happening. You want to know what the
trends are. The challenge is understanding what the criminal
networks are doing and how they are trying to defeat border
enforcement and border security.
I think the biggest challenge is there is lots of open
space. Like what we talked about earlier, there is 56 percent
on the Northern Border. The other 44 percent is covered by
technology. So the Air and Marine Operations flies on our
behalf the UAS that can give us an assessment of the border in
those locations where the deployment isn't dense enough to see
activity in real time. On the Northern Border, that is more
common than it is on the Southern Border.
So the challenge is, is being in the right places. That has
to be informed by intelligence. We do have ways to overcome
that. We have good collaboration amongst the DHS entities on
the Northern Border, amongst the State and local law
enforcement on the Northern Border, as well as a robust
relationship with Canada, both on the law enforcement and the
intelligence side.
Mr. Higgins. Any new or emerging threats, any troubling
trends that have been detected within the last 18 months or so?
Mr. Vitiello. So we are constantly looking at things. There
has been some activity of people going from the United States
into Canada. So it is a good relationship with us and the RCMP
on that particular facet. Then we are concerned about people
who are in Canada that may be ideologically aligned with the
threats that the Nation faces writ large.
Mr. Higgins. Any change in cross-border relations with
respect to the new government in Canada?
Mr. Vitiello. No, we are still doing the same kind--we
still have set up the same constructs, the same liaison, the
same interaction.
Mr. Higgins. How would you characterize that relationship?
Mr. Vitiello. It is very good.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
In a previous hearing, it was disclosed that Hezbollah,
that acts as a proxy for Iran, a Shia terrorist group, had a
presence in North America in some 15 cities, including 2 major
cities in Canada. Are you aware of that presence? We were told
at the time that we shouldn't be all that concerned because
Hezbollah's activity was limited to fundraising. Well, a
terrorist organization that is doing fundraising within the
United States and Canada is, to me, a very troubling sign. Do
you have any thoughts on that, awareness of it?
Mr. Vitiello. So that is something that we are aware of.
Obviously, the terrorist threat is the one that is primary for
the Department and CBP, as well as the Border Patrol. So that
interaction with our counterparts in Canada, and then improving
our awareness and our ability to detect trends and changes to
include what cultural support exists for those kind of things
in Canada.
Mr. Higgins. So the Southern Border, what is the linear
miles of the Southern Border?
Mr. Vitiello. It is nearly 2,000.
Mr. Higgins. Two thousand. And 5,000 miles of Northern
Border with Canada?
Mr. Vitiello. Correct.
Mr. Higgins. There are currently approximately 20,000
Border Patrol agents and about 1,000 Air and Marine
interdiction agents on board?
Mr. Vitiello. Yes.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. Of those totals, how many are deployed
along the Northern Border in terms of either numbers of
percentages?
Mr. Vitiello. So we are in the range on the Northern Border
for Border Patrol agents of about somewhere in the neighborhood
of 2,000, 1,900 to 2,000.
Mr. Higgins. So that is about 10 percent.
Mr. Vitiello. Ten percent.
Mr. Higgins. Ten percent. Is that adequate?
Mr. Vitiello. So it is something that we constantly look
at. Obviously, if you speak to the chief that is in Buffalo,
Brian Hastings, he will ask for more resources. It is something
that we look at carefully to make sure that they are equipped
to do what we are asking them to do.
Mr. Higgins. Is it safe to say that any additional
resources in terms of agents that you would be requesting in
the future, 90 percent of those would go to the Southern Border
and 10 percent would go to the Northern Border?
Mr. Vitiello. So what we want to do is we want to resource
to the threat and the risk. So, yes, that is primary for us,
the Southwest Border, and then as needed on the Northern
Border.
Mr. Higgins. All right. I see my time is expiring. I will
yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thanks. We should probably have another round
if you want a little more. So thanks.
The Chair now recognizes my colleague and the Vice Chair of
the subcommittee here, Mr. Hurd from Texas, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
My first question, I am going to go specific and get more
general. First off, thanks for being here. You all three have a
very difficult job. I represent over 800 miles of the border,
and I know the men and women in Border Patrol, what they are
doing in order to keep us safe.
My first question is, with only 56 of the almost 2,000
miles of the Southern Border being under operational control, I
want to join my Governor, Governor Abbott, and our colleague
from Texas, Congressman Cuellar, in asking why was a 50 percent
cut made for flight hours in support of Operation Phalanx
despite full funding for the number of flight hours that were
requested, and this while the number of migrant crossings have
increased?
I think, General Alles, it would probably be best for you.
Can you provide some clarity?
Mr. Alles. Sure. I think, first off, what I would comment
on is the Department of Defense has overall been shifting away
from nontraditional missions. So while their budget has shrunk
by $110 billion here over the past 4 years, and we have seen
them move away from transit zone missions, the Tethered
Aerostat Radar System was passed to DHS, if we wanted to
continue to operate it, we would have to take it on board. So
they moved away from these nontraditional mission sets.
In the mean time, as they are doing that, we are upping our
participation, our flight hours in the south Texas area. So it
increased our personnel by 50 percent in the McAllen-Laredo
area and it added 83 percent to our flight hours. So most of
the delta that you would lose in Phalanx, we were making up in
Air and Marine Operations. We will continue to up those rates
inside Laredo and McAllen as the years go on. So we are
actually adding hours to our program to make up for those.
Mr. Hurd. So just so I am clear, DHS is increasing the
number of organic operations to take over the change in the
Operation Phalanx.
Mr. Alles. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Hurd. So would some of that money need to be
reprogrammed directly to DHS?
Mr. Alles. I mean, clearly, I will be happy to take 3,800
more flight hours, if that is the question, sir.
Mr. Hurd. The other question you hit on, and, Chief,
probably this question is best directed at you, there is a gap
in the number of bodies you can hire and what you have hired.
Is that correct?
Mr. Vitiello. Yes. It is somewhere in the range of 1,200
agents down from the authorized staffing level.
Mr. Hurd. If you can give me a 30-second snapshot on what
is being done to try to fill that void.
Mr. Vitiello. So a robust recruitment effort, lots of
reengineering in the hiring process, and trying to let people
know that we are hiring and get folks out there. We are working
with DOD on using some of their transition centers and do hub
hiring with folks that are transitioning out of the military.
So we are in those locations. Then we are hubbing some of the
hiring processes in which we take the 5 or 6 steps that can all
be done in a couple of days at locations, we are trying to do
that as well.
Mr. Hurd. If there is a need to help streamline that
process and this body can be helpful, please let us know.
Because this gets to another issue about, there have been a
number of reports, both by Border Patrol, the OIG, independent
groups, that highlight some rough conditions, some would say
deplorable, at forward operating bases that are being used by
agents, cases of E. coli in the drinking water, lack of
maintenance and repairs.
Can you tell us what is being done to address these cases
that were brought up in the OIG report from last month?
Mr. Vitiello. So we are well aware and commented and
accepted the recommendations from OIG to get those facilities
in a condition that we expect them to be. If we are going to
expect agents to deploy in those locations, we want them to be
safe and healthy while they are doing it.
Mr. Hurd. Can you talk to me about the rate of recidivism
and how that is a more--why you decided to start using that as
a metric of effectiveness along the border?
Mr. Vitiello. So we think it matters when we classify the
arrests individually, right, do people have a prior criminal
record, do they have a prior immigration history, and how many
times they have crossed the border previously. So we think that
if we are concentrated on what we do post-arrest, we have a
system called a Consequence Delivery System which looks at the
classification, tells us who is in front of us, and then
applies the post-arrest consequence that is most appropriate
for that class of individual. That has proven to be effective
in a way that drove the recidivism down across the Southwest
Border.
Mr. Hurd. But that is driving down recidivism, that is not
necessarily driving down illegal traffic across the border,
correct?
Mr. Vitiello. It is not.
Mr. Hurd. Interesting.
Madam Chairman, I have run out of time. I yield back the
time I do not have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes our colleague, Mrs. Torres, from
California.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
Chief, over the past several years, CBP and the Coast Guard
have seen an increase of smugglers using small boats, what is
also known as pangas, along the California coast. Can you
describe the challenges that you are having detecting and
interdicting these pangas on the coastline? It is my
understanding that too often you don't know they are there
until they are on shore and the smugglers are long gone.
Mr. Vitiello. So I think the biggest challenge is the
vastness of the area that we are concerned with. So you can put
a panga almost anywhere along the coast. So our job and what we
have concentrated on is making the communities that are
affected by this aware.
We have, obviously, worked well with Air and Marine for
directed patrols and feeding the intelligence that we know
about, particular activity levels. We have done the same kind
of work with Mexico to understand where the departure locations
are. Then we have redeployed agents and technology along the
coast so that we can be better prepared when we do know of a
landing or an impending landing.
Then, obviously, ICE on the follow-up for when these
seizures are made, when we do interdict folks at sea or on the
land in a panga, then they follow up and try to figure out what
the network responsible, right, the criminal network that sent
those people and that is part of their trafficking
organization. So we have asked them to work back that
information so that we can dismantle or disrupt that activity
along the coast as well.
I think the general might have----
Mr. Alles. I will just comment that we put more assets out
there in terms of the multi-role enforcement and tried to
patrol the offshore in California. So that aircraft as we are
buying it, it is currently being procured, has helped us
increase our density for maritime domain awareness.
It is still a problem out there. Though the pangas in many
ways has dropped off, we still have a lot of concerns with what
I will call legitimate conveyances. So if a lot of drugs are
being moved or contraband are being moved in, basically, your
mom and dad's cabin cruiser, obviously, it is an illegal
activity, but you don't know it just by the vehicle itself.
Where a panga, obviously, is just made for illegal activity. So
that is more obvious.
So that goes back to what Chief Vitiello mentioned in terms
of higher cooperation with these border task forces, with
Border Patrol, with ICE, with the other partners that are
working in both the State, local, Federal to develop the
information sources so we know where to interdict those
vessels.
Mrs. Torres. Are you coordinating with local authorities
that may have a unit patrolling within their Coast Guard or
within their coast?
Mr. Alles. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely.
Mrs. Torres. LAPD, San Diego PD, they all have boats.
Mr. Alles. Right. All that cooperation is critical to us.
The State and local is very critical to us.
Mrs. Torres. Are you providing training for them? Are your
officers training with them to help them understand and
identify potential risks? Or are they on their own doing this?
Mr. Alles. You might want to comment.
Mr. Vitiello. Yes, in the task force environment, this is
their threat as well, and so there is lots of cooperation with
regard to presence on the water for those elements, the State
and locals that do have patrol capability. Then in the task
force environment, they are part of the follow-up that goes
into the investigation and tries to identify which networks are
responsible and then do the prosecutions for us.
Then in the task force environment, under Operation Stone
Garden in California, a lot of the resources that are applied
through that grant are used for this activity, the task force
environment specifically related to the offshore threat, the
panga.
Mrs. Torres. It is my understanding that the Coast Guard
equipment and vessels have been greatly ignored over the past
several years and have not necessarily been kept up-to-date. So
how does that equipment or lack of equipment impact your
ability to be able to identify and capture this activity?
Mr. Vitiello. I can't speak to their profile as it relates
to the investments or where they are at financially, but they
are part of this response. So at the DHS level, they are in the
task force environment. Obviously, they bring capabilities to
the problem.
Mr. Alles. I would just mention they are critical really at
the medium range. So we have near-shore vessels that work
inside the 12-mile limit basically. Their cutters are really
what work at extended range to do the interdiction. So without
them, and we have very high cooperation with them in terms of
patrols, that is a missing component if they are not doing
well.
Mrs. Torres. Going back to the question that was asked, the
numbers that I have for, that you are 1,700 agents
underdeployed. That is the number that I have. In your
recruitment efforts and your training process, how long is your
training process and how many drop out during that process?
Mr. Vitiello. I would have to get specific with numbers,
attrition that relates at the academy. But most of the
attrition that we see is in the hiring process itself. In the
academy, there is probably, I think it is in the range of 8 to
20 percent, somewhere in there. I could be more specific given
some time to get back to you.
Mrs. Torres. Okay. What I am really interested in is, after
your initial investment in identifying potential candidates and
putting them through a background and all of the expense that
is associated with checking someone's background, I want to
make sure that you are doing everything that you can to keep
them in the academy and to graduate them.
Mr. Vitiello. Yes. So there are a number of programs
underway. The attrition at the academy isn't really the issue.
Attrition overall is something that bears watching because we
can maintain that investment if we do things to avoid attrition
or to lower that number. But our main problem is touching
enough people to apply and then people making it successfully
through the hiring process.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
Let's go into another round of questions here. I want to go
back again to the effectiveness rate. I don't know if you have
this number, Chief, but if you take out the unaccompanied
children, those who have actually voluntarily turned themselves
in, which I really think you should take out of the number
completely, do you have a number of effectiveness, based on how
you are measuring it, of those who have evaded apprehension and
those that you have caught?
Because, I think, as the number of people turning
themselves in go up, your effectiveness rate goes up. So that
is actually a really skewed way to measure it. I would
encourage you to take it out. But if you take it out, what is
your actual number?
Mr. Vitiello. So we did look at that in specific detail. If
you look at the south Texas activity profile, the family units
and the UACs, the UACs are not trying to evade us. So this idea
of turning themselves in is absolutely right on. So it would
affect the effectiveness rate for that part of the border.
It doesn't seem to hold true as you move west. So off the
top of my head, if McAllen is in the 80 percent range with
family units and UACs as part of the denominator, then it would
be something less than that for adult males. It would be
something less from that if you looked at the entire corridor,
the sector itself.
But, again, what I would like to point out is that we
really do want our agents to record these encounters in
specific detail. We want those numbers to be credible.
Then anecdotally are the other trend lines, right?
Interdiction effectiveness in and of itself is a good number.
It is sticky. We all want to know how we do at bat. We all want
to know our batting average. But there are other things that we
are looking at that relate to overall activity.
So I take your point that if those numbers are included and
we were claiming success at 81 percent and we were all done, no
more investment is required, then it would be a problem. But
that is not where we are at. What we want to do is we want the
system to credibly count what happens and then make adjustments
from that, looking at the other 11 factors, the output measures
that we are looking at.
Ms. McSally. Yes, I agree. But I think we need to at least
come to, like, an understanding and an agreement of what the
formula should be, and then you can measure the effectiveness
over time, right? If the formula does include those who are not
evading apprehension, then that skews the formula.
So can you at least get back to us with what the number
really is maybe for last year once you take out those that were
not evading apprehension? Then I would just encourage you that
if you are reporting to us and reporting to the American people
about your effectiveness, it should take those out of there,
because you should be measuring the number that were evading
apprehension and the number that you actually were able to
catch. Does that make sense?
Mr. Vitiello. Yes. I am happy to get back to you
specifically with that population separate from the overall
numbers.
Ms. McSally. So similarly, again, just to remind everybody,
those that you detected, that you apprehended, and turn-backs
are in the numerator, and the denominator are those who got
away, right, the total number you detected. I am probably doing
that, but you included turn-backs in your success rate.
Mr. Vitiello. For the overall effectiveness, right. So if
there is an encounter at the line and the person evades by
going back into Mexico, for instance, well, then, yes, we would
use that as an assessment of that encounter.
Ms. McSally. So they have to be back into Mexico for it to
be counted as a turn-back?
Mr. Vitiello. That is what we call a turn-back.
Ms. McSally. Okay. I mean, are you guys accounting for the
fact that they may turn around and 2 hours later come back over
again?
Mr. Vitiello. Of course, because all of the entries are
recorded, that is part of the numerator as well, right? So if
we see it directly, then that is counted. When people are
encountered, the record of their entry is put into the system
as well. So all of the back-and-forth is accounted for.
Ms. McSally. Okay.
How about if the Cochise County Sheriff's Department is the
one who actually apprehends somebody or a drug load that has
come over and then they turn them over to you, that, I am
assuming, is included in your effectiveness rate as well,
right?
Mr. Vitiello. It depends on the timing but, generally, yes.
Ms. McSally. So all State and local law enforcement
apprehensions that are turned over to you are in the
effectiveness rate?
Mr. Vitiello. I believe if it is within 30 days of the
recorded entry, yes.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Do you break that out, as well? Like,
can you give us the numbers of how many were actually
interdicted by your guys versus State and local law
enforcement?
Mr. Vitiello. We can typically track what gets turned over
to us, yes. I am happy to show you that.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great.
I want to turn to infrastructure effectiveness. So we have
1,954 miles of the Southern Border; 652 of those miles have
some sort of barrier or fence, right, vehicle barrier,
pedestrian fence; I think 299 miles of vehicle barriers. I am
really testing my math here today, but--and then the rest would
be pedestrian-focused.
So if I do my math right, 1,302 miles of the Southern
Border do not have any sort of barrier--vehicle barrier,
pedestrian barrier--at this current time, correct?
Mr. Vitiello. Correct.
Ms. McSally. I think, Ms. Gambler, in your testimony, you
talked about one of the challenges--this is taxpayer money,
right, going into these barriers. Especially in the discussion
that is going on today about what it will take to secure the
border, we certainly owe the taxpayers some sort of report on
whether the investment they are making, at millions of dollars,
is actually effective before we would even make additional
investments, you know, to complete the barriers.
So I want would to ask, Ms. Gambler, for you to just
elaborate on some of the concerns related to infrastructure
assessment.
Ms. Gambler. Sure. So 2 thoughts there, Chairman.
One is that in GAO's prior work looking at tactical
infrastructure, to include fencing, one of our key
recommendations was for CBP to conduct an assessment to figure
out the contributions of tactical infrastructure to their
overall goals and measures for border security. So that is
point No. 1.
The second point is that we have on-going work right now
for this subcommittee looking at CBP's oversight management and
deployment of tactical infrastructure. That includes a number
of the things that you just mentioned--looking at requirements,
costs. We are also looking at how well CBP is maintaining and
sustaining what they already have out there. It is not just
necessarily about deploying new tactical infrastructure, but
they need to maintain what they have.
Then, third, we are looking at what data indicate about the
potential effectiveness of tactical infrastructure and the
contributions that tactical infrastructure can make to border
security. We will be reporting that out to this subcommittee
and others later this year.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
Chief Vitiello, if you were in a resource-unconstrained
environment, of the 1,300 miles that are remaining, I mean, do
you have a sense of how many miles or what percent you would
want to put additional barriers and what types of barriers?
Mr. Vitiello. Not specifically. I mean, I think what we do
in this capability gap analysis is, when we task the field, we
ask the agents on the ground, we ask the chiefs and the
leadership in the field to say, hey, where are you being
challenged by areas that lack control or have too high of
activity where the risk is high, and then we would ask them.
Of that 1,300 miles, some of that would be, you know, the
natural barrier in and of itself would negate having to put
man-made structures there, but there are probably a couple of
miles out there where agents would like to have a physical
barrier to give them an advantage.
Ms. McSally. Is it a couple of miles, or is it a couple
hundred miles?
Mr. Vitiello. I don't know. I could----
Ms. McSally. Okay.
Mr. Vitiello. I would like to be more specific.
Ms. McSally. Yeah.
Mr. Vitiello. The CGAP tells us exactly that, and I could
give you a zone-by-zone picture of where that might be.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great. Thank you.
General Alles, could we talk a little bit about the use of
VADER technology and how that is impacting the ability to
increase situational awareness, No. 1?
Look, we have VADER deployed on Predators in Arizona, but I
have also heard individuals suggesting that we should be
putting it on manned aircraft in order to complement some of
the strengths and weaknesses of using it on unmanned aircraft.
So if you could just comment on the use of VADER and
increasing situational awareness and the potential to put it on
manned aircraft.
Mr. Alles. So I think, overall, and particularly in
Arizona, we have seen quite a large gain in situational
awareness by using the VADER system.
So the system, if the dismount--so VADER, for those who are
not aware, is a dismounted radar, basically. It tracks people
who are walking on the ground. It has about over a 95 percent
effectiveness rate if they are in the field of view of the
radar and they are moving on the ground. So that is quite high.
The numbers we continually--you know, on an average year, we
will get in about 8,500, 9,000 detections off the VADER system,
which is quite good considering the areas we use it in and the
amount of time we have available.
So it has been a good tool for us in terms of situational
awareness, particularly in Arizona. It is now being moved into
the south Texas area, so we are working with the Border Patrol
in terms of implementation there. That is still a work in
progress, working with the sector people to employ it most
effectively.
Then I would comment, on the manned side, the Army has
deployed the system on manned aircraft. I think they have 5 of
them, is what they told me. So that is a possibility.
We looked at the endurance time, the dwell time of the
system and the cost of putting it on a manned aircraft. It
could be done. We, at this point, prefer to move towards
effectiveness on the Predator system, overcoming more of the
weather challenges, the basing challenges with the system to
get more hours out of the airframe than actually moving down
the road to a new airframe. It would go on our MEA aircraft, if
we chose to do that----
Ms. McSally. Yeah.
Mr. Alles [continuing]. But right now we have moved down
primarily the Predator route.
Ms. McSally. So, I will just comment, I mean, you know, I
have a lot of time airborne in the military, and, I mean, the
unmanned and the manned bring strengths and weaknesses, right,
and they are best when they complement each other. I mean,
there is the dwell time that is the benefit of the unmanned,
but there are limitations--FAA and weather--that the manned can
actually then get into those gaps.
So it is really not either/or, from my perspective. It is
you are able to bridge some of those gaps by using both of
them.
I am way over my time, so I will hand it over to--if you
want to just comment real quickly on that, and then----
Mr. Alles. I would just say that one thing we looked at was
kind of what I will call a ``VADER light'' to go on some of our
smaller aircraft.
Ms. McSally. Yeah.
Mr. Alles. So the VADER on the larger Predator would be
able to target smaller aircraft to a more localized vicinity
based on movement they see. That is what we have been looking
at lately.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great.
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
You know, Customs and Border Protection, the work of, you
know, professional agents, a lot of it is intuitive and
enhanced by, you know, technology that is available and that is
emerging. I think the difficult thing with Customs and Border
Protection is you rarely get credit for what didn't happen, but
everything you do is about making things not happen.
So, in this highly-charged political environment, there is
a lot of talk about building walls and building them higher
than they were proposed previously, including building a wall
on the Northern Border.
I mean, I just have to ask the question, because I really
don't--is that a good expense of resources, or are we much
better off hiring, you know, more professional Customs and
Border Protection?
I would ask the whole panel. I just----
Mr. Vitiello. So we have seen great effect of the fencing,
the wall that is there on the Southwest Border. I am not aware
of a requirement on the Northern Border where a chief in the
field or agents have said, hey, it would great to have a
physical barrier here. The challenge on the Northern Border is
not volume, like the Southern Border and it matters if you have
a physical barrier. I have not seen a place on the Northern
Border where fencing would make the difference.
But in the CGAP and what we charge the sectors to do, if
that requirement came forward, we would look at it, we would
analyze it against some of the data that we have about where
the fencing is----
Mr. Higgins. Who would that order come forward from?
Mr. Vitiello. So if, in the CGAP, in the planning tool, if
they said, hey, this challenge could be overcome with a
physical barrier, then we would consider it that way.
Mr. Higgins. That has never happened?
Mr. Vitiello. I am not aware of a requirement on the
Northern Border for fencing.
Mr. Higgins. But on the Southern Border it has?
Mr. Vitiello. Oh, yes.
Mr. Higgins. Oh, I see. Okay. So, in that regard, you know,
the physical barrier has improved, you know, the work of
Customs and Border Protection?
Mr. Vitiello. Absolutely has.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
Mr. Alles. I would just comment that, particularly on the
Northern Border, we have focused the cooperation between
Customs and Border Protection, other Federal, State, and locals
as a critical piece. It is a large border. You know, trying to
find isolated activity is very difficult. You can't do that
without information or intelligence.
So that has been our primary focus, is to focus in those
areas. We have seen, actually, good results over the past 3
years as a result of taking that approach, in terms of focusing
more with those agencies on investigations or source
information or the kinds of things that indicate criminal
activity and then interdicting that activity.
Ms. Gambler. Then, Congressman, I would add that I think
your question gets at a key finding from GAO's body of work on
border security programs, which is that DHS has not always done
a good job of documenting and justifying the different
investments it is making, whether that is in technology or
other things.
So I think your question gets at a key point of GAO's work,
which is for DHS and CBP to do a better job of justifying and
providing the justification for the investments that they are
making so that the Department, Congress, and the public can
have better oversight of what the planned investment is and
what we hope to get out of it.
Mr. Higgins. Well, to that issue, in your professional
judgment, what would be the best utilization of resources--you
know, human, technology, physical--given what you know today
and what you anticipate tomorrow?
Mr. Vitiello. My experience is you have to have a bit of
all of that. You have to have sort of the--our first function
in the Border Patrol is being present on the border, patrolling
the border. But that is best done with having the right kind of
technology that cues the work of agents, having these important
relationships both in the United States with local, State, and
Tribal law enforcement, as well as our counterparts in Canada.
You have to have all of those things working together and
then some awareness of the world-wide intelligence, what is
happening both on the Northern and the Southern Border, inside
those criminal networks, and where could the threats converge
in certain locations. So you have to have a combination of
things, resources, and information.
Mr. Alles. I would agree on the combination but also
highlight that, I mean, who we are trying to apprehend or
arrest is a thinking person, so the agents are a key part of
this. How they are trained and how they respond, I think, is
very critical.
Mr. Higgins. Are those answers acceptable to GAO?
Ms. Gambler. I think what I would say, Congressman, is that
this is why it is important for DHS and CBP to have in place
some of the metrics we have been discussing.
Because those metrics, not just over the overall metrics
for border security but the things we have found in terms of
having metrics for the contributions that fencing and tactical
infrastructure have to border security, having metrics and data
that assess the contributions that different technologies are
having to border security, those types of measures and the
associated data are really important to be able to position CBP
and the different components to make those, you know, risk-
informed, resource-based decisions that I think we have been
discussing.
So I think the metrics are key for them to be able to do
that.
Mr. Higgins. Madam Chair, I just want to thank the panel. I
think, you know, their testimony and their responses have been
very, very helpful to this committee and its work. So thank you
very much.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
I have a few more questions if you have a little endurance
here. We have a captive audience, so thanks.
One more deep dive into, kind-of, the assessment of
effectiveness.
Chief, do you guys assess--I mentioned in my opening
statement--where they are intercepted, how close to the border
they are intercepted, as a measure of effectiveness?
Intercepting drug cartels on the south side of John Ladd's
ranch in Arizona, for me, is far more effective, and to my
constituents, than on the north side of his ranch. You know,
even a mile is like an eternity if you are living right on the
border, right, and then 5 miles or 20 miles or 100 miles.
I have seen the heat map, so, I mean, I see, kind of, where
your interceptions are. But as part of your effectiveness, the
nirvana for us is that the interceptions are happening at the
border, at the line of scrimmage, so that they are not a public
safety threat and impacting the perception of security in the
community.
So, as part of your effectiveness, are you doing a deeper
dive into where they are intercepted? Or is somebody who is
intercepted 100 miles inland just as effective as somebody who
is intercepted right at the border?
Mr. Vitiello. So we agree that we would like to do this
work as close to the line as possible. It feeds into all kinds
of the logistics and how we are effective and how we are moving
activity and changing and assessing risk at those locations.
We can and do landmark all of the apprehensions, so the
heat map is based on, you know, physical encounters that are
recorded in real time. Then we do have a measure that looks at
the number of apprehensions at a checkpoint versus what happens
on the line.
So, yes, in all of the places that I worked, when I worked
in Nogales--and I know this is true in Douglas when it was a
lot busier than it is now--part of our quest was to compress
the zone of enforcement and do this work as close to the line
as possible. It makes us more efficient over time.
So, when you look at the effectiveness and you look at all
the trends, the recidivism, the kinds of apprehensions that are
being made of people who have criminal records, when you are
looking at drug seizures, you want to have that done as close
to the border as possible. Because we can landmark those
apprehensions, we can show you in detail where most of the
arrests are being made.
Ms. McSally. So that is another thing I would like you to
get back to us on if you have numbers already--or, you know,
start measuring that--is, of the number you are saying you are
effective, how many are, like, within a couple hundred yards of
the border and then how many are, like, deeper in, just to be
able to get a sense of where the effectiveness is of getting
them at the border before they are a public safety risk.
Mr. Vitiello. I will be happy to show you that.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
Okay. One last question. The use of unmanned aerial systems
or drones is certainly increasing situational awareness for
you, using systems like the Predator. Great. But there is also
the opportunity for tactical-level drones for the agents to be
able to use that are not necessarily controlled out of your
office, General, but are actually run by the units and the
sectors.
Equating, again, to my military experience, we have the Air
Force and assets that are controlled by the Air Force, but the
Army, you know, and the Marines, they also have their tactical-
level airborne assets and drones that give them situational
awareness that they can launch in order to build situational
awareness and is controlled by them.
Is this something that you all are looking into to deploy
for the agents so that they can have their own situational
awareness without having to be controlled out of Air and
Marine?
Mr. Alles. So it definitely is something we are looking at.
I mean, right now, the hold-up has been FAA rules. So we have
no rules yet to operate those systems. When we do, we want to
do a pilot with the Border Patrol. I think it would be
advantageous in certain areas.
I would remark, since I used these things in the Marine
Corps, they have attacks. I mean, someone has to fly the
platform, and it is not as self-sufficient as probably----
Ms. McSally. Yeah.
Mr. Alles [continuing]. The contractor advertises. However,
I do think it has advantages. We have talked with them
extensively about special operations use or maybe even just
general line use. So I think that is the way we will progress
in the future.
Ms. McSally. Chief, is that something you want to comment
on?
Mr. Vitiello. Yeah, that is correct. As I have talked about
capability gap analysis, there are several sectors that have
come forward and asked for those assets so that they can be
better at solving the problems we are asking them to.
Ms. McSally. I am even talking about some of the ones that
are just handheld. An agent on the ground launches one and it
just gives them a bigger picture of that, you know, 3D that
they don't necessarily have.
I will comment that Cochise College in my district actually
has a great unmanned aerial systems training program. They
would love to, you know, be able to partner, if we are talking
about using the tactical system like that, to be able to
partner, because it is right there near the border, and, you
know, providing some of that training.
But I just think this is something that is worth looking
into, even though you don't want to have a huge tax, but it
certainly----
Mr. Alles. Right.
Ms. McSally [continuing]. Would increase situational
awareness.
Mr. Alles. No, I think so.
I was going to comment, too, on the comments about
apprehensions close to the border. Be aware that as we use the
VADER system we are actually tracking in Mexico, and that
information is being passed. So the intent is to interdict as
close to the line as possible. So that is a regular occurrence
daily out there in Arizona.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
Well, let me just say that we have so many Border Patrol
Agents and Air Interdiction Agents across the Southern Border
that are working right now in order to, you know, keep our
country and our community safe. I know we are all grateful. On
the Northern Border, as well. I didn't mean to forget that. We
appreciate all the hard work that you all are doing and that
they are doing right now out there. Like many in law
enforcement, you never know when you are going to work, you
know, what you might come upon. So we appreciate them putting
the uniform on every single day and appreciate all you are
continuing to do in your service in order to address some of
these issues to keep our country and communities safe.
I want to thank the witnesses for your valuable testimony
today. I really appreciated, you know, the discussion and the
questions. We have some other follow-up questions we would love
to hear back from you on.
I appreciate the Members' questions. I thought it was,
again, a good discussion.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions
for the witnesses, and so we just ask that you respond to those
in writing if they submit them. Pursuant to committee rule
VII(e), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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