[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-141]
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE:
21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES,
20TH CENTURY ORGANIZATION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 27, 2016
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia PETE AGUILAR, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah (Vacancy)
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Ellis, ADM James O., Jr., USN (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command.............................................. 5
Faga, Martin C., Former Director, National Renaissance Office,
Former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space.......... 7
Hamre, Dr. John J., Former Deputy Secretary of Defense........... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces................... 38
Ellis, ADM James O., Jr...................................... 47
Faga, Martin C............................................... 58
Hamre, Dr. John J............................................ 39
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 35
Documents Submitted for the Record:
GAO chart, ``Finding 1: DOD Space Acquisitions, Management,
and Oversight Are Fragmented Across Approximately 60
Stakeholders''............................................. 69
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 79
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 84
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 80
Mr. Rogers................................................... 73
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE: 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES, 20TH CENTURY
ORGANIZATION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 27, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:59 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everyone to
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee's hearing on ``National
Security Space: 21st Century Challenges, 20th Century
Organization.''
We are honored to have a very distinguished panel of expert
witnesses today. We have Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy
Secretary of Defense; Retired Admiral James Ellis, former
commander of U.S. STRAT Command--Strategic Command--the
acronyms around here are just getting to me; Mr. Martin Faga,
former director of the National Reconnaissance Office and
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space.
Dr. Hamre, you are respected on both sides of the political
aisle and known to be a wise and thoughtful leader on defense
issues. And I am aware that you have been studying space issues
with a group of experts for some time. And I am grateful to see
you engaging in this very important subject.
Admiral Ellis, you and Mr. Faga, your leadership in the
national security space during your careers, as well as your
recent co-chairing of the National Academies study on Space
Defense and Protection, will provide this committee a very
informed view regarding today's issues.
So why are we here today? I would like to start with a
quote. ``It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars
and weapon systems. We must also have an organization which
will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary
planning and the full warfighting capability. We do not have
this adequate organization structure today.''
``We have made improvements, but those improvements have
only been made at the margin. We need to do much more to be
able to fight in today's environment that will require the
concerted efforts for all four services.''
``The services can't operate alone. We are basically a
committee system. Committees are very good at deliberative
process, but they are notoriously poor in trying to run
things,'' closed quote.
This statement rings true for today's hearing. In fact,
those words were spoken in this very same hearing room by a
person sitting in this very same seat as our witnesses are
sitting today.
However, the statement was made by a witness in February of
1982. The witness was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Air Force General David Jones, speaking about the
organization of the Joint Staff. The statement General Jones
made took great courage and upset many people in the Department
of Defense at the time.
Organizational change is hard, and unfortunately, many
people take it personally. However, General Jones' candor with
Congress led to one of the most sweeping, greatly needed
reforms of the DOD [Department of Defense], the Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
Just as General Jones had the courage to talk honestly with
this committee, I commend the witnesses today who have had the
courage to discuss the challenges of the posture and
organization of our national security space activities.
No one in this room needs to be convinced of the importance
of space to national security. Space allows our warfighters to
project power across the globe and to keep our homeland safe.
Unfortunately, potential adversaries have recognized this, and
they are developing weapons to take away the advantages that we
have built into space.
There is a fundamental question before us today. Is the
Department of Defense strategically postured to effectively
respond to these threats and to prioritize the changed space
domain over the long term? It is all too clear that we are not.
There is no clear leadership of the military space domain
below the Secretary of Defense. Yes, there is an adviser,
councils, chiefs, directors, and even commanders. As the GAO
[Government Accountability Office] states, ``DOD space
leadership responsibilities are fragmented,'' closed quote.
While we certainly have great leaders within the space
enterprise, the structure is set up such that far too many
people are able to say no without the consequence for the delay
and the costs they create. Those responsible for the
organizing, training, equipping, and operational missions in
the national security space are not actually in charge.
As General Hyten told the Senate Armed Services Committee
in his confirmation hearing last week, ``We are moving much
slower in certain areas than our adversaries. We need our
industry and our acquisition process to move faster,'' closed
quote. I agree with General Hyten that we need to move faster.
However, I am concerned with the performance I am seeing
today. For example, the GPS [Global Positioning System] next-
generation ground system program is currently going through the
Nunn-McCurdy breach for massive cost overruns, including a
delay of operational capability that is 5 years beyond when it
was originally planned.
And I would like to talk about the Air Force mismanagement
of the weather satellite program, but I don't wanna get
spitting mad in front of everybody today. Unfortunately, this
is not a single point case, and it raises questions on the
current enterprise's ability to deliver the next-generation
space system to address the threat we face.
Separately, the military space activities are managed
within conflicting priorities of each of the armed services.
Many resisted the views of the airpower visionaries, such as
Brigadier General Billy Mitchell and General Henry ``Hap''
Arnold, to have an independent Air Force. However, very few
will argue today of the wisdom of their vision.
We have the best military and civilian space professionals,
alongside the most talented industry in the world. I believe
the question is not of their ability, but rather what tools,
structures, incentives, and responsibilities and authority we
need to give them to succeed. Put it another way, even the best
leaders can't succeed with a failed system.
For those that shy away from reform, I ask if it is better
to wait for a crisis to motivate those to change, or to instead
build a better system in a thoughtful and a deliberate manner
in order to avert such a crisis in the future. Dr. Hamre
foreshadows in his statement for the record, ``Space systems
will be attacked,'' closed quote.
The 9/11 Commission noted that we had all the information
and people we needed to prevent the day's events. We suffered
from a ``failure of imagination,'' closed quote. We must resist
temptation of bureaucrats to wait for a disaster to fix this
known failure. We must expect better. This committee will.
This hearing is the start of a focused oversight that we
will conduct on this important topic. I anticipate it will lead
to major reform in the Fiscal Year 2018 National Defense
Authorization Act.
I thank the witnesses again for being with us today. I am
looking forward to your testimony.
I now recognize my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr.
Cooper, for any opening statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to the
witnesses. I am happy to join the chairman in this effort. I am
glad that we have got, once again, the coveted mid-afternoon
hearing spot.
[Laughter.]
Not everyone is able to achieve that in the way we have.
[Laughter.]
But I would just ask unanimous consent my opening statement
be inserted for the record. I look forward to the testimony of
the three wise men here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Rogers. I now will recognize the witnesses and I ask--
first of all, thank you for being here. Thank you for the time
it takes to prepare your statements for this hearing and to
present your testimony. It is very valuable in assisting us in
trying to develop the policy that is so sorely needed in the
subject matter area.
And with that, we will start with Dr. Hamre. You are
recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your statement. And I
would say for--all statements will be admitted in total for the
record, so you can summarize, if you want to, or you can read
it, either way. With that, Dr. Hamre, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Dr. Hamre. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Cooper, thank you.
I know every witness comes and says how grateful they are to be
here and how grateful we are for your leadership. I really do
think you are doing an essential service right now.
You know, we have been drifting for 8 years, maybe 10
years, with the knowledge that our space systems are deeply
vulnerable, and we have not acted in any way in a manner that
is commensurate with the nature of the threat we face. So I
really am grateful that you are willing to take the lead here
for the Congress, because this is crucial.
I do have a statement, and I normally would, you know, go
through it. I am not going to do that, if I may, because I know
you have had a chance to look at it. I would like to say, you
know, the Department does have pockets of real excellence in
space. And you see the superb machines that we have built over
time. I mean, these are marvels, the things we have done.
And there are people that go to work every day with
astounding dedication, you know, really working hard. But
somehow, in a macro sense, we are failing to see what is
obvious now to us, that our opponents understand quite well
what they could do to change our entire posture. And we are not
responding in a very effective way.
And I ask myself why? Why is it that, when it is so obvious
what is happening, why isn't that we have been able to respond?
And, you know, the one thing I have done is spend a lot of
time thinking about organization in the Department of Defense.
And there is no perfect way to organize the Department of
Defense. It is such a vast enterprise. And I will say my
testimony, it is about moats and bridges.
I mean it. When you create an institution, the first thing
that institution does is dig a moat around itself to protect
itself bureaucratically. And it is up to then the Secretary to
find ways to get bridges, you know, and drawbridges and
hopefully they are down all the time, you know, where we can
get them working together. And we are failing here on this.
We do have mighty moats separating things, but we are not
bringing the whole together effectively. There are three
crucial circles. If you think of a Venn diagram, they shouldn't
be perfectly overlapped. There is only one place where these
three circles overlapped in the building, and that is with the
Secretary.
But you have an organizing principle, the title 10
authority. You recruit people, you train them, you build
facilities for them, you know, you give them equipment, et
cetera. So you have got a title 10 organizing principle. You
have got an operational response of people that go to work
every day to execute a military mission.
And then the third circle is the strategic guidance. What
are we doing? Those three are not in alignment in an effective
way in the Department. And they haven't been in in an effective
way for probably 20 years.
That is, I will hope with your work you help bring a focus,
how to bring those into proper alignment. We do have people
that are going to work every day operating the satellites. We
do have people who are going today building things, although I
would say our recent performance has been disappointing
compared to what it could have been and what it was in the
past.
We have, again, pockets of excellence. NRO [National
Reconnaissance Office] is a pocket of excellence. But we are
not uniformly excellent. I would say the piece that is missing
is leadership. Now, that is the purpose of your hearing today,
and I indicate in my little testimony, you know, there are four
broad things you could do.
You could create a fifth service, big mighty moat, very
hard to build bridges. You could create an analog to the
Missile Defense Agency with space. That takes care of the title
10 authority. That takes care of the operational authority. It
doesn't solve the leadership question.
You could restore the stature of the Space Command, make it
a four-star equivalent combatant commander, along with the
Strategic Command. That is the easiest thing to do.
You could give it SOCOM [Special Operations Command]-like
authorities, you know, where it buys things--so you could again
solve it. You are still not solving the leadership question.
And then a fourth option is you create kind of a parallel
to the Navy and the Marine Corps, where it is the Department of
the Navy. You have a Department of Air Force, but you have got
a separate service that is worrying about space.
All of these are options. None of them still get at this
core question of leadership at the top. And I know that the
Department, or recently, they have tried to solve this by
making the Secretary of the Air Force kind of the senior
person. It is just not providing the leadership that we need as
a nation.
Let me stop at that, and we will come back and talk to it.
My time is out, sir. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamre can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Admiral Ellis, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN (RET.), FORMER
COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
Admiral Ellis. [Inaudible] for your calling this hearing
today, and I am pleased to appear before it with my
distinguished colleagues. As you mentioned, Marty Faga and I
had the privilege of co-chairing a study over the last year and
a half related to national security space protection and
defense.
And as I noted in my prepared testimony, that addressed
technological, policy, and strategic issues. It did not address
organizational findings and recommendations. And I appear at
the invitation of the subcommittee to present my personal views
on these critical issues, not those of other study participants
or the National Academy.
In my few minutes of opening remarks, I want to touch on a
couple of areas that I think are essential to successfully
addressing this urgent national security need. They touch, bin
largely into seven specific areas that, based on my long-ago
naval background and, perhaps, in a too-cute pun I call the
seven C's, because each of them begin with ``C.''
And the first of them is commitment. We are facing a
serious multifaceted threat to our use of space in support of
our national security. And as Dr. Hamre has noted, the threat
to our space assets has been emerging over two decades at an
increasing rate, and our response to challenges identified long
ago has been too slow.
We now understand that mitigation of the threat and
creating resilience in our space systems will require a focused
effort over many years by many organizations. There is not a
one-and-done solution. Whatever changes we make, be they
policy, strategy, operational, technical, or organizational,
must be rapid, flexible, efficient, and effective, and we must
be committed to the task.
The second ``C'' is capabilities, as you have noted. It is
no secret that in the realm of national security space we are
not where we need to be. We need enhanced and focused
intelligence, dramatically improved space situational
awareness, improved technical capabilities, and tactical tools
made readily available to those we hold responsible every day
for space security.
We need to make resilience a specified requirement in all
elements of our systems, and understand both that not all
threats to our space systems are in space and not all
countermeasures or responses are on orbit.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we need better tools
to analyze our space-related critical infrastructure so that we
understand where the risk is greatest and the need most urgent
so as to appropriately prioritize allocation of resources to
get the most improvement in the shortest period of time.
The third ``C'' is competence. We must effectively
integrate national security space policy and strategy with
procurement and operational capabilities. Neither can function
well without the other. Diffused capabilities are often
necessary to meet the varied needs of warfighters, but there
must be consistency of policy and strategy and mechanisms for
sharing technological innovation, procurement efficiencies, and
best practices.
I fear bureaucracies as much as anyone, but Admiral Hyman
Rickover was fond of saying, ``If everyone is responsible, no
one is responsible.'' There must be a leader, a champion for
national security space at a level that cannot be ignored.
The fourth ``C'' is credibility. Some use the word
competence and credibility interchangeably. In my view, they
are not the same at all. Competence is what you are, but
credibility is what people think you are.
Our national credibility in addressing national security
space is shaped both by our policy and our strategy. I believe,
as President Kennedy did, that conflict in space is not
necessarily inevitable. By our policies and leadership, we can
deal with the space environment we have while shaping the
environment we want.
A clear and credible national space strategy is essential
to defining deterrent concepts appropriate for the space
environment. As I sometimes note, tactical energy in a
strategic vacuum is a recipe for disaster.
The fifth ``C'' is communication. Clear and unambiguous
communication is essential to success in this effort.
Externally, the tone and tenor of the conversation must be
balanced and appropriate, but they must also be realistic in
both reassuring allies and deterring adversaries.
As a nation we must be clear as to what we stand for in
space and what we will not stand for. Internal communication is
also critical to shared understanding among those many entities
in the interagency process.
The sixth ``C'' is collaboration. Just as space can be seen
as a newer version of the maritime global commons, addressing
the security challenges demands a collective and international
approach. Internationally, we must lead and shape not a
coalition of the willing, but a coalition of the ready,
willing, and able.
This cannot be seen as a United States effort alone. It
must be viewed as what it is, a shared effort for the benefit
and security of all humankind. Domestically, the commercial
space sector in all its diversity must be a real partner in the
operational and policy effort along with NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Administration] and NOAA [National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]. In fairness, we have
seen nascent efforts in this area, but there is still much to
be done.
The seventh ``C'' is courage, as you noted earlier, Mr.
Chairman. Effectively addressing the national security space
challenges will require organizational and individual courage.
We often say that change is hard, but the reality is that
things change all the time. In my view, it is the rate and
acceleration of change that is hard. In engineering terms, the
first and second derivative.
Creating an appropriate national security space
architecture, improved analytical capabilities, enhanced
capabilities, greater robustness, essential resilience, and
real deterrence will require a sustained effort and real and
effective change.
I thank you and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Faga, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN C. FAGA, FORMER DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
RENAISSANCE OFFICE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
FOR SPACE
Mr. Faga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you. The clock
is still counting. Thanks for the invitation to appear here
today. I knew that my colleagues were going to develop the
organizational issues that you raised, so I would like to
develop it from the perspective of acquisition, where I am most
expert and which is a key component of the challenges that
confront us.
During the conduct of the NRC [National Research Council]
study, we recognized that acquisition has to be more flexible
and far faster than it is today. The current times an analysis
of alternatives [AOA] typically takes 2 years. At the end of
that time, it is commonly recommended that we continue on the
same course.
General Hyten recently noted that when he asked the authors
of a recent AOA why they had recommended the status quo, they
replied that they had received no requirements for resilience,
so they didn't know how to treat it. Now that isn't a very
desirable answer, but it is understandable. The combat
commanders don't yet know how to answer that question.
Our space programs are accomplished by program managers
[PMs]. They are my most admired people. In its recent report on
defense space acquisitions, the GAO noted that for some
programs, PMs are reviewed by 56 organizations at 8 levels
above them. Needless to say, these long processes consume
months and much of the time and energy of the program manager.
In its report the GAO also stated, ``By contrast the NRO's
processes appear more streamlined than DOD's.'' Why is that?
There are a number of reasons. The NRO has a relatively narrow
mission and its high priority is widely acknowledged. The NRO
is a joint activity of the DNI [Director of National
Intelligence] and the Secretary of Defense, and the director
reports to them through a very short reporting chain.
The NRO can fully engage in the budget process of which it
is a part. I gave many more reasons in my written testimony
that we can talk about later, if you wish.
In addition to DOD and NRO space activities, there is a
third element, commercial space systems with national security
application. Today this is primarily satellite imaging and
satellite communications [SATCOM]. The DOD buys lots of
satellite communications, but usually with short-term
contracts.
For years, SATCOM operators have pushed the government to
engage in longer term arrangements that would encourage and
guide investments. There is an example of where the government
did exactly that.
NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] has a 10-year
fixed price contract with DigitalGlobe to deliver imagery as a
service. This meant that DigitalGlobe capitalized the
satellites, that is they raised the money, had them built,
launched them, and operates them. NGA has substantial tasking
rights and gets a large portion of the daily take, all for an
annual fee.
I will close by offering just a few thoughts on
organizations. Ideas have been put forth for many years of ways
to organize space more effectively, to put one person in
charge, and to streamline. We do need to remember that
acquisition of national space systems is carried out almost
entirely by three organizations: Air Force Space and Missile
Systems Center, NRO, and Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command.
All are relatively small, on the scale of military
organizations, and capable organizations that work effectively
on behalf of their users. Operations are carried out by Air
Force Space Command and smaller Navy and Army commands. The
problem they all have to deal with is those many levels in
organizations above them that interact with every decision that
they make.
One common prescription is to establish a very senior
position charged to pull all of this together. I worry that
instead of solving the problem, we simply increase 56 to 57,
and I have seen that before. Moreover, and the most important
thing I will say today, in my experience, the most important
thing is to keep the acquisition process tightly tied to the
mission, that is the ultimate users, whether they are
intelligence users, military users, or whomever.
Big organizational changes come with long-term impacts. I
reorganized the NRO almost totally in 1992. It was the right
thing to do, but it took 10 years for the NRO to fully work
through that. The current situation I would start by asking the
Secretary of Defense to review what do all the people who
interact with space do and is there value added?
I would measure the response by constantly examining what
happens to the program manager, the person actually getting
something done? When the program manager starts the journey,
what happens along the way? If the program manager's life is
getting better, we are on the road to success.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Faga can be found in the
Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank all the witnesses for those outstanding
opening statements.
Now I will recognize myself for the first questions. And I
want to start by trying to help us understand the challenges
that we face. And I would tell all the witnesses, I am going to
ask for a yes or no answer, but don't worry. In just a minute
on the second part of this question you will get to expand. So
don't feel like I am boxing you in.
I would ask each one of you, do you believe that we are
currently adequately postured to address the serious challenges
faced in space?
Dr. Hamre.
Dr. Hamre. No.
Mr. Ellis. No, I do not, sir.
Mr. Faga. No.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Let me ask this. Why do you believe
that, Dr. Hamre, and just be succinct and try to abbreviate
your--in a nutshell what you think is the reason why we are not
adequately prepared?
Dr. Hamre. I do not think that we have exercised the
appropriate strategic leadership probably for 15 years on
space. This problem has been growing. It is far more dangerous
than we realize. We have not challenged the combatant
commanders to understand their vulnerabilities.
We have not done a stress test to really know what would
happen to us. We have been too preoccupied with getting a broad
space policy right without operationalizing it and turning it
into real doctrine.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Admiral Ellis, why not?
Admiral Ellis. I would echo Dr. Hamre's comments. We have
been surprised. We assumed space would always be the sanctuary
it was 15 or 20 years ago. The technology and the threat has
outpaced our creation of policy and strategy appropriate to the
need. Most importantly, we lack significant capabilities.
We are playing catch-up in a very real sense, but it is not
just about hardware and technology. A lot of it is about
policies that deal, as I said earlier in my opening remarks, at
the strategic level. What is it we stand for? What is it we
will accept? What are the concepts of deterrence that are
appropriate for this new domain?
That conversation, while under way now, is beginning and
you can look back, as the committee has, at virtually two
decades of studies that have highlighted this both on the
procurement side and on the operational and policy side.
So I think we got surprised, quite frankly, and a number of
people along the way predicted that possibility even and now we
find ourselves playing catch-up in a very real sense. A lot is
under way. The awareness is certainly there.
You hear it and see it in a lot of the products and
writings and things that are being produced, particularly
within the Air Force. But unfortunately I don't think we are
moving at a pace that is going to close the gap that needs to
be closed very, very quickly.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Faga, why are we not prepared?
Mr. Faga. I would start off by saying we say quite a bit
about this in our NRC study, which is available free online to
anybody. We don't fully know how to respond.
The experience that General Hyten had of realizing the
combatant commanders can't yet tell him what capability they
need, how will their war plans change, and what backups will
they use? What non-space assets could be pursued? We don't have
all of that. We don't have all that worked out.
As Admiral Ellis testified, there are things we can do.
Arrangements with allies, codes of conduct, deterrence
measures, things we can do at the strategic level that will
help the situation.
This is a problem really only fully recognized, in my view,
in 2014. I will have to say, as Admiral Ellis said, lots going
on in the Pentagon, but it certainly hasn't come together to an
adequate answer to the question you asked.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I think that the degree of exposure has
heightened in the last couple of years and probably since 2014,
but Admiral Ellis is right. This has been recognized for nearly
two decades as a problem area and studied to death for 2 years,
which leads me to my next question.
Do you think this is a problem the DOD can correct itself
or will it need to be compelled by statute to do something in
particular to remedy the situation? And I will leave that to
anybody who wants to answer.
Mr. Faga.
Mr. Faga. So in my mid-career, I spent time as a staff
member on the House Intelligence Committee staff. And one of
the things I watched and learned is the first thing you want to
do is lay out for the Department what the problem is and ask
them to come up with a solution so that they do that inside the
construct in which they live. It probably won't be adequate.
And secondly, they will need legislation from you for
powers they don't currently have. But I think it starts with,
let them tell you what they need to do.
Admiral Ellis. Mr. Chairman, as we talked in your office, I
am very reluctant personally when I am outside an organization
to offer prescriptive comments on exactly how they need to
reorganize.
It goes back to my days as a young test pilot when I would
find a deficiency in a new aircraft and I was cautioned, never
tell the contractor or the designer what to do to fix it,
because if he does what you told him to do and it doesn't fix
it or it has unintended consequences, you are liable and the
program is no further along.
The better approach is to tell him this problem needs to be
fixed and let him use his creativity and insight to do that.
Now, he needs to be held accountable for that corrective action
there is no doubt.
So I would only suggest that DOD, with the right level of
understanding, which I believe that they have now on the
seriousness of this, ought to be asked and expected to identify
whether the changes that they put in place have delivered on
the promise that they expected, whether the timelines are
reduced, whether efficiencies are being realized, whether this
collaborative process is working.
My personal view, and I think I am aligned with Dr. Hamre
in this regard, is we need to put somebody in charge and give
them the authorities and the accountability for outcomes, not
aspirations.
But I would encourage them to be given the opportunity to
shape an organizational structure that best suits their needs.
It is kind of like where you put the sidewalks on a college
campus. In organizational structures you put the sidewalks
where the paths are worn in the grass. And so within the
organization, who needs to talk to each other, who needs to
communicate in order to get the job done ought to be the way
they begin to pursue organizational realignment.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Dr. Hamre.
Dr. Hamre. You know, it is the Congress that establishes
national goals and gives direction to the executive branch to
undertake them. I would think it is best for the Congress not
to tell the executive branch how to accomplish those goals, but
we have watched 20 years where this has not come together.
And I ask myself why has it not come together? And I think
it is because internally we have been fractured. And it has
been hard to sustain a focus in the Department, common across
the board. So I, I do think you are going to have to put
pressure to get this done right and you have an opportunity
with a change of administration coming.
And I think you should think about concrete things that
need to be done in a 3-year window, because that is roughly the
window of a Secretary, and an 8-year window, roughly the time
horizon an administration is in office and accountable, and
then the past 8 years.
And I think each of the tasks we need in each of those
categories will be equally urgent, but I think we need to
disaggregate the nature of this problem. Because right now we
are too diffuse----
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Dr. Hamre [continuing]. And we are not coming up with
answers to these problems.
Mr. Rogers. Well, thank you. Before I yield to the ranking
member, I wanted to point out just to give you some, everybody
in the room some idea about how difficult this problem is. The
GAO stated space acquisition management and oversight is
fragmented across 60 stakeholders.
So I asked the GAO to put together an organizational chart
just so we could get a good mind's eye view of what it is like.
They said it was too complicated to put a chart together. So
what they gave me was this list of--I don't know what it is a
list of, just complexities.
So I had my staff try to put together an organizational
chart, and this is it. Nobody has got line authority to make
decisions, and this org chart has to be simplified.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
69.]
Mr. Rogers. So with that, no pressure, ranking member, you
tell us how we are going to simplify it.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share your
commitment to enhance our space capabilities. I do think it is
important to point out, though, that we have much to be proud
of, what we have today. I think none of the witnesses would
want to trade our capability with that of any other nation. So
I think, really, more the question is preserving our margin of
excellence over any possible rival.
I appreciate your testimony and the accumulated wisdom that
you all have. There are many ways to fix a problem. I hope that
the next Congress will be able to tackle this issue based on
the foundation that the chairman is laying.
Dr. Hamre, in your testimony, you talked about some pockets
of excellence that are out there, things that even by our
desire to enhance our program are still performing at near peak
levels, and I think you mentioned NRO.
Mr. Faga mentioned program managers as generally excellent
in what they do. Would you share his enthusiasm for that level
of what Air Force colonel that is out there making projects
happen?
Dr. Hamre. Well, the NRO has had a demonstrated history of
really quite high performance. You know, in general, I think
our acquisition system has declined over the last 30 years. I
hate to say it.
I think it is in large measure because we have elevated the
gunsmithing of buying things above the marksmanship questions
of what we are trying to do. And I, you know, I just--I hate to
say this, but we need to go back and revisit the Packard
Commission and the way we created the institutions recommended
in the Packard Commission.
We have created a giant compliance organization in the
building. It used to be that a brilliant colonel with a couple
of briefings could be in front of the Secretary of Defense
within weeks. You know, now it takes a couple of, it takes
months, maybe even a year for a good idea to get in front of
the Secretary. And the steps along the way are just
unbelievable. So broadly, the acquisition system, in my view,
is failing us.
Mr. Cooper. That is, indeed, a big task, but Chairman
Thornberry is working to try to improve that. One of you
gentlemen pointed out to us before the hearing that there were
many fewer challenges, contractor contests of bids, you know,
10, 20, 30 years ago, but now it is almost a routine matter.
So when you mentioned compliance, I think you are really
talking about making something challenge-proof once the
contract is awarded, right? This is kind of gold-plating the
procurement process so that it is incredibly slow, and by the
time the technology is fielded, it is largely out of date.
Another important aspect of the overall testimony was
Admiral Ellis' focus on the global commons and comparing it
with the way the seas were viewed, you know, a long time ago.
Establishing some sort of international framework for this or
even establishing our own warfighting rules is going to be a
challenge.
And I look forward to receiving your guidance on that,
because these are indeed complex matters and probably no one
has thought through all the implications of what needs to be
done.
I found particularly interesting Mr. Faga's trust in the
program managers and his management philosophy that if you
empower them and get all the distractions out of the way, they
will be able to do a better job.
Mr. Faga, if you could describe for us briefly the career
path of these program managers? We talked about this briefly
before the hearing and about when they exit the Air Force or
the service and then what they move on to?
Mr. Faga. I did describe a career path, unfortunately one
seldom followed today, but it typically starts as as a junior
officer or civilian at a subsystem project level, then moves up
to project manager for a subsystem. It usually involves an
operational tour of some kind.
At some point a director of engineering in the SPO [system
program office], commander of a ground site, deputy program
manager, program manager, and that typically took about 20
years. And as I said to you, nobody ever contested those
colonels.
When I was at the NRO, I called them the great colonels.
And when I talk to some of them today, 20-some years later, I
still say the great colonels. But we are not doing that kind of
development nearly as much today, whether in the NRO or in the
Air Force.
It is one of the reasons I pushed hard a few years ago,
successfully ultimately, to get a permanent engineering cadre
in the NRO, which it did not have and which it is now building.
My view being this is very complicated stuff and people need to
spend 20 or 30 years doing it, not an occasional tour.
Mr. Cooper. You pointed out something to me I found very
interesting, that these colonels actually shunned promotion.
Mr. Faga. Again, we are talking a time in the past, but I
would speak to lieutenant colonels and say, look, you have got
to get out of the NRO. I will help you get a great assignment
in a regular--you can't get promoted maybe even to colonel,
certainly not to general.
Every single one of them said, ``I don't care. I believe in
this work. I like the organization. I will retire as a
lieutenant colonel or a colonel. I will go into the industry.
Please don't worry about me anymore.''
Mr. Cooper. So it sounds like part of it was the passion
for their project, but part of it was an alternative career
path that was as attractive for them or more attractive than
becoming a general.
Mr. Faga. Frankly, the most successful post-military
careers are colonels who are in their late forties or early
fifties, plenty of runway. Many of them became vice presidents
in the business, and they knew that. They knew that. But
frankly to them it wasn't the rank or the money. It was, ``I
can stay in the business. I can keep doing this.''
Mr. Cooper. So perhaps we on the committee need to
understand that real world relationship and take that into
account. One thing that I have worried about for a long time is
the punch-your-ticket mentality where people do an assignment
for 2 or 3 years, but by the time they get good at it they get
promoted out of there and you lose that expertise that you are
training into them all the time.
But another facet seems to be that some of these
extraordinary performers are being taken by private industry.
And they lead very productive commercial lives then but we lose
their military expertise. So figuring out that relationship is
something that we are going to have to be able to do, as is
having fewer layers of management over these people so that
there is less red tape to cut through.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps we will have time for
another round of questioning.
Mr. Rogers. We will. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you for being here. It is always encouraging to me to have
people like you thinking and doing the things necessary to help
protect our children. I have got 8-year-old twins and I really
like them, and I really appreciate you guys for watching out
for them.
Admiral Ellis, I was particularly impressed with your
testimony and I wanted to ask you, what is your understanding
of the arrangements there in place between the DOD and the
Intelligence Community as it relates to the various commercial
companies regarding the U.S. Government's ability to task and
use those commercial satellites that we have in space in times
of crisis or wartime?
Admiral Ellis. Well, thank you, Mr. Franks. There are a
couple of dimensions or a couple of levels to that. First off,
as we have noted earlier, there is a nascent effort to bring on
the operational side the private sector, the civilians into the
JICSpOC [Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center],
and as you are well aware and bring a presence there.
The authorities do not yet exist, as I understand it, for
DOD to exercise actual control over those resources and the
like. But at least they are communicating to the extent that
classification levels permit, which is, again, an issue that we
have to deal with sometimes.
The space situational awareness, the information that we
have we can't share with the commercial colleagues. So on the
operational side there is movement and some low levels of
progress.
On the procurement side, as Mr. Faga has already indicated,
I think DOD is recognizing that the improvements and
enhancements in the private sector capabilities that are
resident on orbit are absolutely staggering, and in many cases
offer a more ubiquitous, if you will, presence and ability to
draw unnoticed perhaps that would not necessarily be resident
in a DOD dedicated system.
And you have to assume that our adversaries know exactly
what the orbital parameters are and when the television camera
is overhead and the like. And the more of those things on which
we can draw, I think, the better.
But I don't, and my impression is, I don't have, you know,
up-to-date information as of today, but the contracting
vehicles that Marty referred to earlier, the ability to buy
this access on a regular basis on the spot market, to make
long-term commitments that would allow the private sector to
grow those capabilities even more given a level of certainty in
terms of the DOD being a reliable customer is not yet where it
would need to be to close the business model, if you make the
case.
And don't misunderstand me. These folks are patriots, too.
Not every patriot wears uniforms. They are trying to do what
they can to support the national security needs of the Nation
and have for many, many years.
But they are frustrated by their inability to deal over the
long term. They are having to make business decisions, talk to
shareholders and make financial commitments and yet they don't
have certainty as to the long-term character of DOD's
relationship.
And those things need to be addressed and can be to create
the kind of system we want, a national security space
enterprise that, as I said in my testimony, that essentially
redefines what national security space looks like. It isn't
just the NRO. It isn't just the DOD.
It is the commercial sector, and not just the
communications, as important as that is, but now the imagery
and the like that can come from those resources. And that has
the potential to be a much more reliable and resilient system.
And so we need to move and improve in that situation.
Mr. Franks. Well, I might, Dr. Hamre, let me, if I could,
expand the question a little bit and then pass it over to you.
Given what I am hearing from Admiral Ellis, that we don't have
all of those things figured out just yet as far as what we can
use and cannot use, what are the most time-sensitive reforms we
have to implement in order to be prepared for a conflict that
either begins or spreads into space? And what is your
understanding of our ability to use some of those private
resources?
Dr. Hamre. Well, sir, what I wanted to bring to the
committee's attention, we do this right now in aviation. We
have something called the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.
We pay commercial airlines money to put features into
commercial aircraft so that they are useful for us for military
purposes. We give them a subsidy every year for carrying around
that dead weight because it is important to us.
When they are mobilized, we indemnify those aircraft. We
use them in wartime. We have a model that we could use for
space, probably have to be adapted in some ways, but we have a
model. And it exists. It is legal. It has been proven out in
our system.
So this is something we can do. And I really would think it
would be an important contribution for your committee to
develop the architecture for that.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Aguilar, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Ellis, in
your testimony you pointed to one of GAO's proposals, the
creation of a defense space agency as the one to clearly define
responsibilities, leadership, and authorities for the oversight
of military space.
In your opinion and if some of the other witnesses could
also comment, what are some of the risks you foresee if the
defense space agency were to be created?
Admiral Ellis. I am sorry. For clarification, sir, you want
the risks, the downsides of that?
Mr. Aguilar. Correct. Correct.
Admiral Ellis. Well, as you may recall, in a proposal that
I endorsed for that, it was primarily focused on the
procurement and not on the operational side. But I think some
would view it as a negative that it didn't include all national
security space.
In other words, the way I see it, because of the
capabilities and the efficiencies and the better performance we
have seen in the NRO, I did not believe and do not believe that
homogenizing that by bringing it and all its capabilities under
the Department of Defense is a thing to do. So it would not in
that sense oversee all of the national security space.
It would require some legislative relief. That is not
necessarily a problem, but it could be and that is certainly
your area of expertise and not mine. And it does have, as do
all changes that are proposed or addressed by the GAO other
than the do-nothing option, has the potential for some level of
disruption.
But, you know, we have given this opportunity for change
two decades now. And we have seen some here in the last couple
of years, particularly within the Air Force, certainly a focus
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on this.
The question is is this making a difference? Is this
enough? Is this kind of an incremental approach that isn't yet
delivering on the potential and the needs to improve the
process?
So again, I am not a big favor of dramatic increases in
bureaucracy. I am not a big fan of precipitous and unthoughtful
action, but we have got to do something different than we have
been doing to get a different outcome.
And so that is the reason that I believe that raising this
to the Under Secretary of Defense level, the accountability for
space, and as I said in my opening remarks, being accountable
for outcomes and not aspirations is hugely important. But with
that have to come the authorities and the responsibilities that
enable that be happening, to happen, so----
Mr. Aguilar. Others on risks?
Dr. Hamre. I would say I think the downside in my view of
this is that we will look at this as a military hardware-only
solution. You create an organization that is designed to build
military hardware, that is all they are going to do.
And I think the architecture of survival and resilience
going forward is going to be far more dependent on commercial
platforms and diversification of our capacities than it is
about buying military stuff. We are really good at building
reconnaissance satellites--really good. But we can only afford
to buy one or two of them.
You know, we need to find a totally different way where we
are putting much more of our focus on what the private sector
can give us and how we would use that. And we have put a
provocative thought in front of you but, you know, I think the
average number of airmen it takes to maintain a satellite's
constellation is like 700.
But the average number of people you would find in a
commercial satellite operation running a satellite network is
10, okay? And there is just a different world here, and we have
got to start thinking about how do we tap into the private
sector and the capabilities that they can give us that we could
use?
And I think the only reason--I am not arguing with Jim's
recommendation, Admiral Ellis' recommendation, but it would
again lock us into thinking we have to have military answers to
this problem. I would like us to have commercial things.
Mr. Aguilar. Sure.
Mr. Faga.
Mr. Faga. Many advantages which the NRO enjoys, almost all
of them are externally granted, so this isn't something that
came from within. There is an organization in DOD that is
similar, Missile Defense Agency [MDA].
In fact, it is fascinating. I was amazed, in fact, in a
study not too long ago, to look at the charter and the
authorities of the director of MDA, a charter written around
2002 or so. It reads like the 1961 charter of the NRO. It is
absolutely amazing. And frankly, dealing with a very, very
difficult problem, I think they have worked wonders.
So we do have examples inside of DOD that I think are
instructive.
Mr. Aguilar. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
important hearing. And I want to thank each of the panelists
for your presentation. In 10 years this is one of the best
presentations I have ever been witness to, so thank you.
You have all referred to snippets of what the problem is
and I want to ask each of you to define as concisely as
possible what it is we need to solve. I have heard you quote
Admiral Rickover ``If everyone has responsibility no one has
responsibility.'' General Hyten was quoted to the effect that
resilience has only now recently become a priority.
It takes too long to bring assets online and there are too
many layers of reporting and review. But what is it that we
need to solve? Could you each state that for the help of myself
and the rest of the committee?
Admiral Ellis. Well, sir, and it can sound overly
simplistic, and I don't mean it this way. You have touched on a
number of the dimensions. And this is a multifaceted problem.
There isn't just one single element.
But in the end, it always comes down to leadership. It
always comes down to a commitment on the part of those that are
responsible for this that they believe passionately and that
they have the authorities they need to do it. They have the
accountability and that they are comfortable with, and they go
out and get it done.
Now, that sounds simplistic, and I don't mean it that way.
There is a lot of detail underneath all of that.
Organizational? Yes. Technical? Certainly. Resiliency I talked
about in my statement.
All those things are the kinds of things that the leader
needs to bring into focus. But it needs to be done, and it
can't just be talked about. It just can't be reviewed. We don't
need another study and the like.
We know, I think in our hearts, what needs to be
accomplished. We just need to have the courage to go out and do
it.
Dr. Hamre. Sir, I would say we are coming up on a new
administration. If I was in your position, what I would demand
is that the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs do a
stress test of all of our war plans on what happens with
plausible space denial action by opponents.
We will know where we are if you do a real stress----
Mr. Lamborn. Which I think is what JICSpOC is supposed to
help resolve?
Dr. Hamre. Well, the Secretary needs to do this and the
Chairman needs to do this.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Dr. Hamre. This has to be at the very top in my personal
view.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Dr. Hamre. And then the second thing that needs to be done
immediately is a cyber evaluation. I personally believe the
easiest way for the opponents to get in is through cyber. And I
personally believe they are probably already there. We cannot
afford to find that out in the start of a war. We need to
figure out where we are for reliability now.
And then the longer term is how are we going to get greater
diversity and use of private sector assets? We buy it, we pay
for it, you know, we rent it, whatever, so we are not entirely
dependent on these great big expensive, small number of
platforms that are easy to attack.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Faga.
Mr. Faga. So who is in charge of military air? Who is the
one person in charge of military air? All four services do it.
There is no one person in charge. And the reason for that is it
is very complex. All the services are engaged, OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense] engaged. It is a fundamental
capability.
I don't mean that the stewardship of it isn't good. I think
it is because it is well-developed. It is well-established.
This is all new for the space community. That is why my view is
just looking for the right person to attach all of those
spaghetti lines to is not the answer.
Everybody has got work to do here. People want to make the
acquisition process faster. I certainly do. In fact, in my
early years in the NRO as an engineer, our standard planning
number for a new system was 42 months to delivery, and we
routinely met it.
But there are policy issues. There is the education of the
combatant commands who all say they need it but don't fully
understand its significance.
There are jobs for everybody to do and it takes leadership,
just as it takes leadership in the services to run their air
assets, which in the Navy is only one of several major assets.
I would want to look at the multifaceted problem that we
have here more than look for, who was that person that I can
put in charge of everything?
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you all.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. It
is an honor to be here with you gentlemen. The folks that work
in our space industry today stand on the shoulders of giants,
and you are those giants. And it is great to have you before
this committee.
I would like to start by saying I have read a number of
the, maybe not recommendations, but the different options that
have been presented by the three of you.
One that I think is of particular interest is the idea of
the reestablishment of a U.S. Space Command, not just Air Force
Space Command, but a U.S. Space Command.
In other words, a functional combatant command similar, you
mentioned, Dr. Hamre, similar to what we see with SOCOM, where
in effect you have a functional combatant command, but it also
has some responsibility to do the man, train, and equip
mission. Is that kind of what you were thinking when you said
that?
Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir. I think, as I mentioned, there are
three circles of leadership which we have to have in the
Department. You have to have the organizational title 10. You
are bringing together the resources, buying things, training
people, et cetera.
You have to have----
Mr. Bridenstine. But that would normally fall under one of
the four services, the service----
Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir, although we do have things like the
Missile Defense Agency, which stands outside.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
Dr. Hamre. SOCOM has unique acquisition authorities we gave
it when we created SOCOM. So you could create special
acquisition authorities and give it to the Space Command. I
think they would be wise to use the fairly considerable
infrastructure that already exists but have leadership
capacities at the Space Command.
Then you have to have operational responsibility. That is
what they do every day at Space Command, but it needs to be for
everybody. We need to make this a joint thing. And then you
have to have strategic leadership, and that is where you need
to have, as Admiral Ellis said, you need to have a focus in the
Pentagon, somebody in the Pentagon.
SOCOM has the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations.
He has a counterpart in the Pentagon. We have to have a
leadership counterpart in the Pentagon. I think that is what
you are hearing from this group.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. And the reason that intrigues me is
because one of the questions that the chairman asked was, what
does it require from Congress?
And creating a combatant command, my understanding is the
Secretary of Defense has the authority to disestablish a
combatant command or establish a combatant command, which means
it really wouldn't require anything from us other than the
strategic guidance that Congress wants to see a unified command
responsible for this kind of capability, which I believe is
critically important.
One of the things that concerns me is we have to make sure
that we are keeping separate the idea of a combatant command
from the man, train, and equip mission. I understand there is
overlap. There has to be overlap.
One of the other things that intrigued me about what you
wrote was that--and I think, Admiral Ellis, you mentioned a
similar thing, creating a service within the Air Force much
like maybe the Army Air Service was to the Army, much like the
Marine Corps is today to the Navy, where you have got different
officer progressions, you have got different budgets, but you
report to the same, ultimately the same service secretary.
It doesn't seem like having a space combatant command would
necessarily be separate from having a space service within the
Air Force that might have a different organizational structure.
Not going as far as to be disruptive in creating a separate
service, but within the Air Force having a service that is
dedicated specifically to that, is that, the two are not
mutually exclusive. Is that correct? That is really my
question.
Dr. Hamre. Well, I should rely on Admiral Ellis, because he
is the military officer here. I think that you need his
judgment on this question more than mine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes.
Admiral Ellis. Well, as some of you may be aware, I was in
command of the United States Strategic Command when U.S. Space
Command was merged with it. And it was done not because space
was unimportant, but because space was so important that it
needed to be brought in even closer alignment with the
warfighter.
And, as you may recall, we completed the first nuclear
posture review and determined that we are redefining the term
``strategic.'' Strategic used to be and used to mean nuclear.
Mr. Bridenstine. Right.
Admiral Ellis. And then it was expanded to include all
capabilities with strategic impact.
Mr. Bridenstine. Right.
Admiral Ellis. And they included everything, I mean, global
strike, missile defense, that hated acronym C4ISR [command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance] and all of those things, all of which
relied so heavily on space assets. The intent was to bring
those more closely in alignment and use that reduction to
improve and enhance the creation and oversight of those
capabilities.
But to your point, sir, if you were to create a new
strategic command or a space command, you would be using the
same elements that already exist, and----
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
Admiral Ellis [continuing]. And you would create a
headquarters, because everything is operated through component
structures as you are well aware from----
Mr. Bridenstine. Sure.
Admiral Ellis [continuing]. From your military background.
But, it would also draw from the pool of space experts that
exist within the services and departments for its manning and
staffing.
So I would argue that, again, I am not necessarily a big
fan of an organizational change just to do that, because I
really don't think that the operational piece is as much the
issue.
The issue, as we focused on a lot here, is procurement----
Mr. Bridenstine. Right.
Admiral Ellis [continuing]. Of the tools and the systems
that our space warfighters need, and quite frankly, that is not
the role of a combatant command. They can provide requirements,
but they don't buy or oversee those kinds of processes. That is
an organize, train, and equip function.
Mr. Bridenstine. I am out of time, but I want to make this
one last--in 2001, there was a report that came out from a
commission on organization and management of national security
space chaired by Donald Rumsfeld before he was Secretary of
Defense.
And that commission explicitly stated what you said, which
is within the Air Force, you have got the people that generate
the requirements. Those are the operators. And then you have
got the people who do the purchasing. And those are not the
same people. And that creates a disconnect.
And in the commission report, it actually specified the NRO
as the agency that actually does it right, where the operators
are directly involved in the acquisition. And because of that,
when there is an anomaly in a space system, the operators know
the difference between an anomaly and an attack. And that is a
very important thing.
So I think when we think about acquisitions as it comes to
space, we need to think about it differently than when we buy a
tank or something else.
So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I recognize myself for the next series of questions. Mr.
Bridenstine just made the observation about the NRO, which we
have talked about. They do it right. I mean they do it much
better.
And when you look at the director of the NRO, they have
direct report to the Secretary of Defense--or not the Secretary
of Defense, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and then the
DNI. And then the rest of military space is this. I mean, it
just seems like we have got to find something comparable if we
are going to get the sort of efficacy that we see at the NRO.
One of the options that the GAO report offered was the
PDSA, the Principal DOD Space Advisor. And some of the
departments say that, you know, taking the Secretary of the Air
Force and changing the title from executive agent to PDSA is
the solution, and we are in the first year of that.
My problem with that is the A, advisor. If the Secretary of
the Air Force is an advisor, who is in charge? So tell me what
I am missing? It seems to me that we have changed the title,
and we have moved the deck chairs around on the ship, but we
haven't changed the direction of the ship. Somebody tell me why
I am wrong.
Mr. Faga.
Dr. Hamre. Sir, I don't think you are wrong. I mean, it
is--again, I don't personally believe the Secretary can
alienate his responsibility for bringing focus to what we are
doing as a department. And it is very hard to assign that to a
subordinate entity and have everybody else take that person
seriously.
Mr. Rogers. Perfect question, does the Secretary of the Air
Force him- or herself have time to do this? Are they just going
to delegate it to somebody?
Dr. Hamre. You know, 30 years ago when I think it worked
well, it was actually the Under Secretary of the Air Force
whose job it was to run space. But that was because it was the
Secretary's priority, and the Secretary backed that individual
up, and everybody in the building knew that was the Secretary's
person.
I just don't hear that when I talk to people in the
Department right now that there is a clarity of who is
responsible and who is actually running things for space.
Mr. Rogers. Should the Secretary of the Air Force be in
charge of all DOD space?
Dr. Hamre. Well, you have to empower the secretary to have
the Secretary's authority. I mean the only way that works is
when the Secretary of Defense says, that person will decide for
me, and I haven't heard that.
Mr. Rogers. So are you saying it should be an OSD joint
command?
Dr. Hamre. No, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Or joint responsibility, rather?
Dr. Hamre. Again, my personal view is things really
function--you know, the Department has a balance between line
organizations and staff organizations. Line organizations are
those that really run things, the service chiefs. They run
these military departments. We have some defense agencies that
are line organizations.
Everything in OSD, and to include the Secretary of the Air
Force is line responsible, but only for things in the Air
Force.
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Dr. Hamre. Nobody in the Navy is going to think that they
are going to take an order from the Secretary of the Air Force.
Mr. Rogers. So by virtue of what you are just saying, it
should be an OSD responsibility?
Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think it needs to be a combination of OSD
oversight and military line responsibility and how you get
that--you can do it through a defense agency. You can do it
through a unified command. But you need to have somebody who is
going to work every day, that is their job. They are not simply
advising the Secretary in what they think that person should
do.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Faga.
Mr. Faga. I want to talk about your point about advisor by
pointing out the secretary in her Air Force Secretary role is
doing 90 percent of military space in terms of acquisition.
Ninety percent of it is in the Air Force.
The Navy program is tiny and that is about it. Army program
is mostly support equipment. So she has already got most of it.
Now, the significance of being the principal advisor means she
can go direct to the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense]. In the big
bureaucracy of the Pentagon and as senior as she is, that is a
big deal. It is a privilege I enjoyed when I was the director
of the NRO.
And once in a while, someone somewhere else in the
bureaucracy would decide to take me on. We went to the
Secretary. They lost. That was that.
I think she has the same opportunities, so I am not as
ready to give up on it as others may be. We will see. We will
see.
It is also the case that Secretary James is pretty engaged
and energetic. I think she is having some success. Because in
examining all of these questions, I come back to who is in
charge of military air or many other functions that exist
within the Department?
So I think she is pretty well-situated. She is the third
ranking official in the Department, pretty well-situated.
Mr. Rogers. Yes, I would say, first of all, this has got
nothing to do with Secretary James particularly. It has more to
do with the position. Now, she is an extraordinarily competent
lady.
This is about the Secretary of the Air Force being charged
with this advisor role when I don't see it being given the
decision-making authority and control of the money to implement
decisions and then the responsibility for success.
And also, I frankly don't see this as being the Air Force's
primary mission. I think it has been my experience in the last
few years that it seems that space is always going to take a
back seat in the Air Force, and that bothers me. That may be an
erroneous observation on my part, but it is one that concerns
me.
Yes, sir, Dr. Hamre.
Dr. Hamre. Mr. Chairman--and I don't want to pick a fight
with my two colleagues, who are far more expert on this than I
am, but, you know, we have war plans that depend on space
today, and they will fail if space is attacked.
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Dr. Hamre. Well, I don't see the Secretary of the Air Force
solving that problem. I mean, this has got to be the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs that is doing a stress test of all of his
war plans with his commanders. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
does not report to the Secretary of the Air Force.
Mr. Rogers. That is the whole reason why this has taken
such a priority for this committee. If we are going to fight a
war successfully, we have to have space control, and the
attributes that it brings. And if, those are vulnerable now. It
is just the facts. So this has to be addressed.
All right, I will stop there and turn over to the ranking
member for his additional questions.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been a very
productive discussion. I was wondering if we need to have a
similar hearing, though, on establishing some sort of enhanced
cyber command?
Dr. Hamre mentioned that perhaps our greatest vulnerability
with satellites is through cyber. But each of these domains
seem to be requiring greater attention and more flexibility
from the bureaucracy so that we can live up to our full
potential. So would you gentleman each suggest that we have a
similar discussion regarding cyber the way we are doing space
today?
Admiral Ellis. Yeah, I certainly think that dialogue is
essential, sir. I think there are some real parallels here. We
have challenges in the cyber domain with attribution, knowing
who actually did the act that we now discover is being, you
know, performed against us.
Same thing can be true in space. Is it debris when your
satellite fails or was it a nefarious act on the part of
another actor? And you know, there are some parallels, and I
think that kind of oversight and understanding, but it also
highlights a lot of the same complexities in all of this.
If you create a standalone cyber command, what is the
impact of that drawing expertise from the services that may be
in short supply to stand up that command? And what are the
implications of moving cyber both offense and defense into the
warfighting domain of the combatant commanders, which was the
intent?
I mean it is as Dr. Hamre said, and as I said in my
prepared testimony, every organizational alignment is sub-
optimized for something. You just have to decide what your
priorities are.
Is it what is most important or is what you do the most?
The two are not necessarily the same. And so how you structure
that, there are going to be some pluses and minuses in every
structure. And I think you are hearing that from my colleagues
here, and all of them with good inputs.
Mr. Cooper. There is general agreement on that?
Mr. Faga. Yeah.
Admiral Ellis. Yeah.
Mr. Cooper. To sell a new space command or some sort of an
enhanced space capability to the American people and perhaps to
our own colleagues, it is going to be very important that they
understand the significance of satellites.
And I noted in Mr. Faga's testimony he quoted General
Formica as saying that ``Every company commander depends on
space and they all take it for granted.'' You know?
[Laughter.]
You know, if every captain is dependent that means
everybody who wears a uniform is dependent on it. And I know in
the private sector I know some people who can't play golf
without relying on a satellite.
[Laughter.]
But some people can't play anyway, but----
[Laughter.]
And it is a hard sport. But it almost makes me think of
having a satellite-free day to enhance the awareness of the
importance of satellites except for the fact that satellites
are already so critical that that would devastate the economy
in probably every nation in the world if we were to try to go
without the timing functions and other functions that are
hidden deep in the background of every ATM or every machine we
depend on.
So we are already beyond the point at which we could
deprive ourselves voluntarily of this capability, but that is
exactly probably what the enemy is thinking about doing to us
in the event of an attack to bind us before we even knew we
were attacked and then to probably disguise that as a debris
strike and have us in a quandary for a while before we knew who
to blame.
Mr. Faga.
Mr. Faga. Sir, the military plays this as a war game in
what they call Schriever Games. I would strongly recommend that
you get their classified briefing on some of the their recent
games on exactly the point you have just raised, Mr. Cooper.
You would find it revealing.
Mr. Cooper. Finally let me end with the point that if we
want to live up to our full military potential and do the right
thing then, A, we would fully fund our troops, which we haven't
been doing for about 15 years now, using devices like OCO
[overseas contingency operations] funding and things like that
in which we basically are asking for the Chinese and other
international creditors to help pay our bills.
B, we would clear up some of these bureaucratic oversight
lines ourselves. I think the Department of Homeland Security
reports to some 60 congressional committees or subcommittees;
the satellite area is probably almost as confusing. And my
colleague Mr. Bridenstine's excellent point having the operator
and the acquirer be more the same people then they know what is
going on.
Well, we have, of course have this ancient divide between
authorizing committees here and appropriators and only the
appropriators really matter.
[Laughter.]
Yeah, that is right. So we have a lot of housecleaning to
do here on this side of the dais. But I thank you, gentlemen,
for your excellent testimony. It has been very thought-
provoking.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, for a second 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I would like to drill down with
each of you on the slow acquisition process. That is one of the
major facets of the problem we are trying to deal with. And I
would like to mention that I recently met with a commercial
SATCOM provider who can order a new satellite from Lockheed
Martin and have it built and launched within 24 months.
And yet Lockheed also provides to DOD but not on a 24-month
schedule, and so I don't think it is Lockheed. What is it, why
do we have such slow acquisition schedules?
Mr. Faga.
Mr. Faga. Because it takes a very long time to decide what
it is we are going to build, even if the decision after a
couple of years of effort is we are going to build exactly what
we have already got. When a SATCOM operator goes to Lockheed,
first of all they are saying we want to use the standard bus.
You know, I want array of transponders that looks roughly
like this. There isn't very much design work. There is no new
engineering. It is really just building something pretty close
to what you sold me last time and due in 24 months.
It is also interesting their approach to how to maintain
their constellation. Even at NRO we used to go through these
great design life studies and calculations and recalculations.
What SATCOM operators tend to say is I have got a 50-some
satellite constellation. I have got three satellites on orbit
that are spares, and I have got two or three of them on the
ground ready for launch.
Getting to launch can be really slow. It can take months. I
might mention in that regard that I once had the opportunity to
visit the Arianespace launch facility in Kourou in French
Guiana. And their system was all designed from the ground up
pretty much in the 1980s.
The whole system is integrated. They can fly different
sizes of their satellites off the same pad. Platform heights
are the same. Electrical plug-ins are the same all the way up
and down.
With that kind of modern infrastructure, they can launch
very quickly. We don't have that capacity in the United States.
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral Ellis.
Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. It is a great question, and in
fairness there are differences that we levy on national
security assets. Now, you can ask a fair question and I think
you have. How much of that should be done in the exquisite
designs that we custom-tailor, as the Brits would say bespoke
creation for national security purposes.
Sometimes they are legitimate requirements. EMP
[electromagnetic pulse] hardening against high-altitude nuclear
detonation, encryption that requires a great deal of onboard
computing power, protective devices for optics and things that
aren't necessarily a part of the commercial sector. And
sometimes there is some reason for that.
But we also need to understand, as Mr. Faga has indicated,
and as the chairman has noted, and I think Dr. Hamre mentioned
as well, there is robustness and resilience in having a lot of
nodes, a lot of perhaps less capable assets.
And so there has--we are beginning to see a cultural change
on the DOD side where they are understanding that that last
ounce of weight doesn't necessarily need to go to one more
diopter of capability. Maybe it needs to go to bolting on the
little sensor that we all have outside our garage that turns
the light on when somebody approaches so that we know when
another satellite comes within--comes within our area. And, you
know, and again, that is very simplistic, and believe me, I am
not a satellite designer, but it shows you the kind of trades
we need to make.
Maybe we take a little less capability and a lot more
resilience as we move forward and at the same time draw much
more heavily on the capabilities that are resonant in the
commercial sector.
Mr. Lamborn. Like so CubeSats [miniaturized satellites],
for instance?
Admiral Ellis. Right.
Dr. Hamre. Sir, a friend of mine once said, you know, a
candle maker will never invent electricity. And so we have done
such a brilliant job building satellites in the military we
don't think anybody else knows how to do that.
You know, I doubt anybody inside the military DOD
environment would figure out how to land a rocket booster tail-
first back on the launch pad, you know? But the private sector
did.
Now, it just seems to me we need to break out of the
tyranny of thinking we are the only people that know what we
are doing. There is a heck of a lot of people in the private
sector now building sophisticated platforms and we don't pay
attention to what they are doing. I mean, they are launching
satellites where 10 people can maintain that satellite.
Mr. Lamborn. I had one provider, private outfit say that
they could put up CubeSats, very rudimentary but effective, not
for six figures or seven figures, but for five figures.
Dr. Hamre. Yes.
Mr. Lamborn. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr.
Ashford, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you. It is good to see you again.
Admiral Ellis is--still remains a legend in Omaha and thanks
for all--certainly your service in commanding the strategic
forces, but also in your leadership in the community in so many
things that you did during your years there. So thank you.
And I also thank the rest of you for your service as well.
It--serving in Omaha is just a special----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rogers. It is a hardship.
Mr. Ashford. But it is a hardship, though.
[Laughter.]
Don't anybody repeat. But anyway----
[Laughter.]
I was going to follow on just a bit with Congressman
Lamborn's questions, and I think it was we have had other
discussions about other challenges and the need to--that
perfection is the enemy of good and that we need to find a
quicker way to get to market or get to the line with what we
are doing. And I think Senator Lamborn pretty well asked that
question.
I have sort of a general question, though of Admiral Ellis,
if I could? When you were at strategic force, when you were the
commander at that time, it was a time of great change. I mean,
there were things happening very quickly. There was operational
change going on and you were--oversaw that and admirably so.
Looking at today 10 years, 12 years later, where it's
different challenges, different threats, but how would you
compare the two? Over the last 12 years' times--we need the
change we are talking about here, but what are those
differences that make this so critical at this time?
Admiral Ellis. Well, as we have discussed all along, Mr.
Ashford, and you know this very well, what has unfolded over
the last decade and a half is truly remarkable in the national
security environment and you gentlemen and ladies live that
every day and so you know what I am about to say.
You know, the levels of threat that we have had to deal
with, and not whipsawing but moving from the focus on classic
Cold War-level adversarial relationships to the
counterterrorism fight. It has changed the complexion and the
context of the conversation in this Nation.
I was telling John before we convened, my son, believe it
or not, is in the U.S. Army, graduated from West Point of all
things, and he has done 19 deployments to Afghanistan in his
career. And so my point here is this Nation has been
fundamentally redirected and now the pendulum seems to be
coming back.
We are seeing once again, you know, recidivist Russia and a
China that is still trying to decide what it wants to be in
terms of relationships as a great power.
And so there have been, in fairness, a lot of changes that
have unfolded in the national security environment since I was
privileged to wear the cloths of the Nation in Omaha up until
2004.
And that doesn't mean that I have got all the answers, that
anyone does, but well, I think we need to be reminded by all of
this that you can't design a perfect solution. That we need to
design forces and capabilities in the context of this hearing
that can serve all dimensions of national security.
And as I said in my prepared remarks, national security
space is now redefined, as the ranking member indicated, to
include the commercial elements and the economic. I mean, your
cellphones won't work without out that timing signal.
It is not just your, the GPS on your golf cart. It is
fundamental banking and other services. And so this is a new
environment. We could have seen it coming. I believe that some
people did see it coming looking at the reports of a decade and
a half ago of commissions and panels.
But we are where we are, and the question is what do we do
going forward and what kind of changes will be most effective
and efficient in accomplishing what this Nation needs?
Mr. Ashford. Thank you, and it seems to me that that--and
the changes are happening so much quicker now that designing
the system to address it, it has to be flexible enough to, to
Dr. Hamre's point, where we find private-public partnerships
if, for lack of a better term, to get to that solution. So I
don't know, Doctor, would you like to comment on that? Maybe it
is not necessary, but if you----
Dr. Hamre. Yes, sir. The private sector cannot afford to
take 5 years or 8 years to develop a satellite. I mean, it--
especially if you don't need to. So but we have, you know, in
the Department, I mean, first of all, labor is a free good.
Well, no wonder we have 700 people maintaining satellites. You
don't pay for them.
But the private sector has to pay for every one of them and
they cost money and so they have as few as they can. So they
design reliability into the satellite.
I mean, we think about it in a different way in the private
sector than--we have to start thinking differently. Candle
makers have to start thinking in a different way.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you.
I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
quickly address I think a very intelligent question from
Ranking Member Cooper. Dr. Hamre, I think you mentioned it as
well, which is the cyber piece.
When you think about what satellites do, fundamentally they
collect data. In some cases they create their own data. They
transmit data. In some cases they process their own data
onboard. So they are in essence just a component of the global
network.
And so really you cannot separate space from cyberspace.
They are one and the same and have to be thought about in that
way. So I just wanted to make sure that I got that out there.
As I thought more about one of your suggestions, Dr. Hamre,
regarding creating a U.S. Space Command, when you think about
what the Department of Defense does in space it is my
assessment, you know, we focus a lot on space support, which is
launch and the satellite control network, those kind of
activities.
We do space enhancements where we provide data to the
warfighter, whether it is communications or remote sensing, GPS
signals. Those are all enhancements to the warfighter and/or
for the Air Force for air dominance.
And then when you take it a step further, we are just now
getting to the point where we as a country do space defense or
space control, which I know in this town sometimes gets a
reaction from people.
But ultimately, if we are going to be successful in
fighting and winning in space we have to be able to use space
and to deny our enemies from using space, which means we have
to have some level of space control, which we as a nation have
not even been thinking about until just recently.
So standing up, in my opinion, a U.S. Space Command when we
are only now starting to think about space control, let alone
delivering effects from space--when I am talking about effects
I am talking about kinetic effects from space. Space is not at
this point a deliverer of power projection.
That being the case, I think it might be premature to
suggest that we need a U.S. Space Command kind of organization.
It goes right back to what Admiral Ellis said. The challenge we
have is in acquisition. And so I think it is important that
when we think about that we focus on the defense space agency.
I think Dr. Hamre, you suggested it, and Admiral Ellis.
Going back to the commercial, I had a NASA, former NASA
Administrator Griffin in my office not too long ago, and he
made a, I think, a very important point, which is right along
the lines of what you are talking about, Dr. Hamre, which is he
said the Department of the Navy is entirely dependent on fuel
for ships, for airplanes. We need fuel.
But the Department of the Navy does not operate any
drilling rigs. We don't do any refining of fuel. We actually
buy fuel from the commercial sector.
When it comes to space and when it comes to communications,
when it comes to remote sensing, we are moving in a direction
where it is a commodity provided by the private sector.
So even the elements where we as a nation use space for
fighting wars, space support, space enhancements, even those
particular items are now being commercialized in ways that we
haven't seen before, which means the Department of Defense
needs to start focusing where it only can focus, which, of
course, is in space control and eventually space warfare.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I thank all the witnesses. We have been called for votes
otherwise there would be a third round. But we have got 6
minutes to get over to the Capitol. I can't overstate how much
I appreciate you and your thoughtfulness, your contributions to
this dialogue. And I can't oveemphasize this is the beginning
of the discussion that this committee is going to be having,
not the end. And I thank you.
And with that we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 27, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 27, 2016
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
September 27, 2016
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 27, 2016
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. The NRO is a defense agency; however it is not
statutorily defined as a combat support agency (CSA). In contrast, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency are all combat support agencies. As we
prepare for a war to extend into space, is it time we think of the NRO
as a combat support agency?
Dr. Hamre. I am not an expert here, but I suspect that the NRO
status was set year back when it was jointly supervised by the Defense
Department and the Director of Central Intelligence, the predecessor to
the Director for National Intelligence. I would need to check with
expert friends, but I know that the NRO functions as a combat support
agency. The NRO also has important non-defense intelligence missions,
and I don't know if the designation would complicate any of that. From
a defense standpoint, it would be a good thing to have them also
included as a combat support agency. But I would need to defer to
others to know if that would prove to be a problem for their other
national missions.
Mr. Rogers. GAO stated that there was a 10-year gap between the
delivery of GPS satellites and user equipment. There have been similar
issues with other space programs, such as Space-Based Infrared Systems
(SBIRS) and its ground station, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) Satellite and its ground terminals. Why do these acquisition
problems, regarding the poor synchronization of delivery of satellite,
ground, and user terminals, keep reoccurring?
Dr. Hamre. We have tended to split the various components of a
space program into different program offices under different services.
Because the GPS signal needs to be incorporated into hundreds of combat
systems and platforms, it wasn't possible to give the task of ground
based user equipment to the GPS program office. This tends to reflect a
general problem we have in the Department for systems that have broad
application that cross service lines. The only way to solve that is for
the Office of the Secretary of Defense to do a better job insisting
there is integration and coordination for such complex systems with
such broad applicability within the Department.
Mr. Rogers. Are you seeing innovation and long-term research and
development planning in national security space programs? Why or why
not?
Dr. Hamre. We still have a very dynamic laboratory environment, in
both the private sector and in government laboratories. What is lacking
is the capacity to move innovative new ideas from laboratories into
actual procurement programs. My personal view is that this difficulty
in introducing innovative new ideas is the byproduct of the Packard
Commission recommendations, which made the mechanics of acquisition
more important than technology innovation. The Director for Defense
Research and Engineering used to be the third most powerful position in
the Department of Defense, and always drew exceptionally talented
individuals with broad experience. We diminished this position with the
Packard Commission implementation and made the mechanics of acquisition
more important. We are now suffering from this unintended development.
The 2017 NDAA makes a good step at fixing this, but there is much more
that needs to be done.
Mr. Rogers. What are your views on the Joint Interagency Combined
Operations Center (JICSpOC)? What should the future of it be, and how
should it compare with the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC)?
Should we have two operations centers serving different functions?
Dr. Hamre. I think it is good to have an interagency joint
operations center, and it should be integrated with the Joint Space
Operations Center. Often other departments or bureaus of the government
fear being brought into DOD operations centers because they are afraid
of the mass and momentum you see in DOD organizations. They feel they
will be coopted by being a part of a DOD operations center. It may be
that the JICSpOC is a compromise so that we could get interagency
participation. The most important thing is to make sure they are
working seamlessly together.
Mr. Rogers. What arrangements should be in place between the DOD
and the IC and various commercial companies regarding the U.S.
Government's ability to task and use commercial satellites in crisis or
wartime?
Dr. Hamre. I would direct the Committee's attention to something
called the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, or CRAF. CRAF has been in place for
40 years. In essence, U.S. commercial airline companies join the CRAF
program. If an emergency comes up, we can call on those aircraft in the
CRAF to change their schedules and start flying missions for the
Department of Defense. We pay them for this, of course, but more
importantly, the U.S. Government indemnifies the aircraft when they are
on government missions. We have a similar arrangement for cellular
communications during a national emergency. This is the formula for
emergency mobilization of commercial space assets. More importantly, I
think we should start placing regular work (communications, some
reconnaissance, etc) with commercial satellite companies in peacetime.
We need to broaden the network we use so that potential adversaries do
not have a limited set of government satellites to attack. We want to
force them to attack a broad range of capabilities in a very public way
as part of our deterrent strategy.
Mr. Rogers. The NRO is a defense agency; however it is not
statutorily defined as a combat support agency (CSA). In contrast, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency are all combat support agencies. As we
prepare for a war to extend into space, is it time we think of the NRO
as a combat support agency?
Admiral Ellis. As you know, the NRO is not an intelligence agency.
It designs, builds, and operates the reconnaissance satellites of the
United States government, and provides satellite intelligence to
several government agencies, particularly signals intelligence (SIGINT)
to the NSA, imagery intelligence (IMINT) to the NGA, and measurement
and signature intelligence (MASINT) to the DIA.
The intelligence it provides is essential to enabling other
agencies to successfully meet all of our national security needs,
including combat support. While, in that sense, the NRO provides
indirect combat support, that contribution is already fully understood
and appreciated. Unless such a designation would significantly enhance
the NRO's already high effectiveness, I do not see it as an urgent
need.
Mr. Rogers. GAO stated that there was a 10-year gap between the
delivery of GPS satellites and user equipment. There have been similar
issues with other space programs, such as Space-Based Infrared Systems
(SBIRS) and its ground station, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) Satellite and its ground terminals. Why do these acquisition
problems, regarding the poor synchronization of delivery of satellite,
ground, and user terminals, keep reoccurring?
Admiral Ellis. While I do not have specific current knowledge of
each of the systems described, such delays are often a result of
procurement processes that separate the procurement of the ground
system from the on-orbit segment, attempt to capture efficiencies by
using a common ground system for more than one satellite constellation,
or, in order to reduce program costs, attempt to use existing ground
systems for new satellites, only to find that they later have to
replace aging ground segments in order to fully employ the new systems.
All of the above are well-recognized challenges for which there are
existing programmatic management, resourcing and leadership solutions.
Mr. Rogers. Are you seeing innovation and long-term research and
development planning in national security space programs? Why or why
not?
Admiral Ellis. I am seeing such efforts in both the government and
the private sector but I am concerned that the level of investment is
insufficient to recapture lost ground as our overall investment in
critical national security research and development has declined in
recent years.
As I noted in my prepared remarks, we have been surprised by the
rate of technological change in national security space, both in terms
of our increased reliance on it and, even more critically, by the
dramatic increase in the ability of potential adversaries to threaten
it.
Finally, while R&D investment is essential, so is the ability to
know where the need is largest and the potential positive impact the
greatest. We need more effective tools for system-wide analysis to
ensure we are focusing on what is most important.
Mr. Rogers. What are your views on the Joint Interagency Combined
Operations Center (JICSpOC)? What should the future of it be, and how
should it compare with the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC)?
Should we have two operations centers serving different functions?
Admiral Ellis. The answer, as with many things, is ``it depends.''
The stated purpose of the newly-created JICSPOC is for the military,
Intelligence Community (IC), and commercial partners to craft concepts
of operation and clarify who does what and how in the event of attacks
on U.S. satellites. In my view, that describes a place where a much-
needed series of simulations and exercises can take place to enhance
understanding of the national security space interrelationships, define
overlapping capabilities and, most importantly, identify gaps in the
structure, authority, and accountability. I fully support such
immediate interagency and commercial outreach efforts; they are long
overdue.
On the other hand, I believe strongly in unity of command,
authority and accountability. As I note often, collaboration is not the
same as consensus; someone has to be in charge. This is particularly
true in the national security space domain where challenges can
manifest themselves quickly, sometimes at the speed of light.
I support the experimental character of the JICSPOC but agree that
the lessons from its tests need to move quickly to a single command
center, appropriately staffed by all stakeholders, with a clearly
defined chain of command. They are not lessons learned just because we
write them down; we actually have to learn them and things need to
change as a result.
Mr. Rogers. Does the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which is
a part of the DOD, have the same acquisition and decision-making
challenges the military space program does? Why or why not?
Admiral Ellis. The NRO is a much smaller and streamlined
organization and, while the acquisition and decision-making challenges
it faces are the same as the military space program, the speed with
which the NRO can respond to them is much greater, the access to key
decision makers is much easier, and the oversight regulations and
restrictions are far fewer. All of this equates to a more effective
procurement process, more technological agility, and clearer lines of
responsibility and accountability.
Mr. Rogers. Has the DOD and DNI been able to maintain oversight of
the NRO, while still empowering the Director? Why are the NRO
acquisitions more streamlined than the military space programs?
Admiral Ellis. The organizational relationships among the DOD, the
DNI and the NRO remain strong and the NRO continues to effectively and
efficiently support both agencies. There have been some candid
discussions about operational control of NRO satellites in the context
of achieving consistent policies and clear, responsive decision-making
in time of potential crisis. This has resulted in the creation of the
JICSPOC to simulate and evaluate potential challenges and solutions.
As in the answer to the question above, the NRO is physically a
much smaller and streamlined organization and, while the acquisition
and decision-making challenges it faces are the same as the military
space program, the speed with which the NRO can respond to them is much
greater, the access to key decision makers is much easier, and the
oversight regulations and restrictions are far fewer. All of this
equates to a more effective procurement process, more technological
agility, and clearer lines of responsibility and accountability.
Mr. Rogers. Your National Academies report talked about the need to
clarify operational authorities for space. Can you expand on that? What
is your view of unity of command versus unity of effort?
Admiral Ellis. There have recently been some candid discussions
about operational control of all national security satellites,
including the NRO assets and those commercial communications satellites
used for national security purposes, in the context of achieving
consistent policies and clear, responsive decision-making in time of
potential crisis. This is understandably, a complex technology, policy,
and authority issue. In fairness, the discussion has arisen as a result
of our appropriately re-defining the scope of ``national security
space'' to include all of the space-borne resources we employ and those
on which we rely as a nation and with our global partners. It should
not and must not be viewed as a ``power grab'' but rather as an
acknowledgement of newly appreciated realities of the nature,
capabilities, and speed of potential threats.
This has resulted in the creation of the JICSPOC to simulate and
evaluate potential challenges and solutions and to craft concepts of
operation and clarify who does what and how in the event of attacks on
U.S. satellites. In my view, that describes a place where a much-needed
series of simulations and exercises can take place to enhance
understanding of the national security space interrelationships, define
overlapping capabilities and, most importantly, identify gaps in the
structure, authority, and accountability. I fully support such
immediate interagency efforts; they are long overdue.
I support the experimental character of the JICSPOC but agree that
the lessons from its tests need to move quickly to a single command
center, appropriately staffed by all stakeholders, with a clearly
defined chain of command. They are not lessons learned just because we
write them down; we actually have to learn them and things need to
change as a result.
On the other hand, I believe strongly in unity of command,
authority and accountability. As I note often, collaboration is not the
same as consensus; someone has to be in charge. This is particularly
true in the national security space domain where challenges can
manifest themselves quickly, sometimes at the speed of light.
Mr. Rogers. You took control of U.S. Strategic Command when U.S.
Space Command was merged with it. Can you give us your perspectives of
that decision, why it happened, and what has changed since then?
Admiral Ellis. The combining of United States Strategic Command and
United States Space Command took place in the context of redefining the
term ``strategic'' in support of national security. Rather than
``strategic'' referring, as it had for decades, to nuclear and nuclear-
related systems, the meaning was more broadly and classically expanded
to mean anything having global, national, and high-level influence or
impact. Clearly, all space systems were a critical part of those
capabilities and essential enablers to each leg of the newly-defined
``New Triad.'' To meet the nation's defense goals in the 21st century,
the first leg of the New Triad, the offensive strike leg, went beyond
the Cold War triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-
armed bombers. ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and nuclear weapons would, of
course, continue to play a vital role. However, they would be just part
of the first leg of the New Triad, integrated with new non-nuclear
strategic capabilities that strengthened the credibility of our
offensive deterrence. The second leg of the New Triad required
development and deployment of both active and passive defenses--a
recognition that offensive capabilities alone may not deter aggression
in the new security environment of the 21st century. Active and passive
defenses will not be perfect. However, by denying or reducing the
effectiveness of limited attacks, defenses can discourage attacks,
provide new capabilities for managing crises, and provide insurance
against the failure of traditional deterrence. The new domain of
cyberspace was also included in the new STRATCOM responsibilities. The
third leg of the New Triad was a responsive defense infrastructure.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. defense infrastructure has
contracted and our nuclear infrastructure has atrophied. New approaches
to development and procurement of new capabilities were intended to
ensure that it would not take 20 years or more to field new generations
of weapon systems.. The effectiveness of this New Triad depended upon
command and control, intelligence, and adaptive planning. ``Exquisite''
intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of adversaries can
permit timely adjustments to the force and improve the precision with
which it can strike and defend. The ability to plan the employment of
the strike and defense forces flexibly and rapidly will provide the
U.S. with a significant advantage in managing crises, deterring attack
and conducting military operations. Much of this capability is resident
in or enhanced by our space systems. In my view, the consolidation was
entirely appropriate and was implemented with the full collaboration
and cooperation of U.S. Space Command. It reflected the reality that
the space systems are not a stand-alone capability but have significant
value if shaped by, supportive of, and integrated with the warfighting
combatant commands through the efforts of U.S. Strategic Command. The
many and varied national security challenges since the combination have
reinforced the value of the ``strategic'' systems resident in a single
command with clear authority and accountability.
Mr. Rogers. What arrangements should be in place between the DOD
and the IC and various commercial companies regarding the U.S.
Government's ability to task and use commercial satellites in crisis or
wartime?
Admiral Ellis. The stated purpose of the newly-created JICSPOC is
for the military, Intelligence Community (IC), and commercial partners
to craft concepts of operation and clarify who does what and how in the
event of attacks on U.S. satellites. In my view, that describes a place
where a much-needed series of simulations and exercises can take place
to enhance understanding of the national security space
interrelationships, define overlapping capabilities and, most
importantly, identify gaps in the structure, authority, and
accountability. I fully support such immediate interagency and
commercial outreach efforts; they are long overdue.
On the other hand, I believe strongly in unity of command,
authority and accountability. As I note often, collaboration is not the
same as consensus; someone has to be in charge. This is particularly
true in the national security space domain where challenges can
manifest themselves quickly, sometimes at the speed of light.
I support the experimental character of the JICSPOC but agree that
the lessons from its tests need to move quickly to a single command
center, appropriately staffed by all stakeholders, with a clearly
defined chain of command. They are not lessons learned just because we
write them down; we actually have to learn them and things need to
change as a result.
Mr. Rogers. The NRO is a defense agency; however it is not
statutorily defined as a combat support agency (CSA). In contrast, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency are all combat support agencies. As we
prepare for a war to extend into space, is it time we think of the NRO
as a combat support agency?
Mr. Faga. I don' think there is a need or value to designate NRO as
a Combat Support Agency. Unlike DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO is a combined agency
of the DOD and DNI. It receives its tasking direction from the
functional managers who are acting on behalf of the DNI in that
capacity. Further, NRO is something like a Military Service in that it
develops, acquires and operates reconnaissance satellites but it makes
no decisions about how those assets will be deployed. Accordingly, it
is not in a position to take direct military tasking, but responds to
tasking, including military tasking, through already established
mechanisms which operate through the DNI.
Mr. Rogers. GAO stated that there was a 10-year gap between the
delivery of GPS satellites and user equipment. There have been similar
issues with other space programs, such as Space-Based Infrared Systems
(SBIRS) and its ground station, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency
(AEHF) Satellite and its ground terminals. Why do these acquisition
problems, regarding the poor synchronization of delivery of satellite,
ground, and user terminals, keep reoccurring?
Mr. Faga. Commonly, space systems and their ground or user
equipment have been treated as separate activities, with separate
budgeting and separate development organizations. For example, the Air
Force develops the space segment at SMC/Los Angeles and the ground
segment or user equipment at Electronic Systems Command/Boston. SMC is
a part of AF Space Command and ESC now renamed as a part of the AF Life
Cycle Management Center, is a part of Materiel Command. l Budgeting for
the two is separate and largely independent. It is easy for space and
ground to get badly out of sync and often did.
Mr. Rogers. Are you seeing innovation and long-term research and
development planning in national security space programs? Why or why
not?
Mr. Faga. Yes, and especially so since the concern for resiliency
has arisen in the last couple of years. This concern has forced
consideration of changes in architectures and in individual satellites
as well as serious consideration of the best role for commercial
offerings.
That said, during interviews held by the National Research Council
team that produced NRC's report of Space Defense and Protection, space
system contractors told us that NRO was more interested in innovations
and AF more likely to buy more of the same. One consequence of that,
the contractors reported, is that it is hard to develop good staff
skills and experience if innovation isn't introduced regularly, to say
nothing of the performance advantages typically obtained.
Mr. Rogers. What are your views on the Joint Interagency Combined
Operations Center (JICSpOC)? What should the future of it be, and how
should it compare with the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC)?
Should we have two operations centers serving different functions?
Mr. Faga. I am not familiar in any detail with the JICSpOC but I
believe the idea is that initially it will serve as a center to develop
the systems and techniques to perform Space Situational Awareness at
the pace necessary in a contested environment. Lt. Gen. Raymond, while
service as Commander of 14th AF, explained that the JSpOC performs its
tasks over periods of hours to days while future operations will have
to do so in minutes, even seconds. The AF is learning how to do that at
JICSpOC. Eventually, I believe that JICSpOC will take over the mission
operationally and there will be one, vastly more capable center. It
will take several years to achieve this.
Mr. Rogers. Does the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which is
a part of the DOD, have the same acquisition and decision-making
challenges the military space program does? Why or why not?
Mr. Faga. The NRO isn't simply ``a part of the DOD'' but is a joint
activity of the DNI and the DOD. This is an important distinction
because the NRO budget is largely controlled by the DNI as is
operational tasking. DOD elements like NGA and NSA especially, play
large roles in both but they do so in their capacity of support to the
DNI. All of this means that the NRO carries out a relatively narrow
mission, albeit important and expensive, for a limited user group with
which it can interact intimately. Thus getting to decision is generally
far easier than within DOD.
An additional factor affecting NRO is that it must follow the
Federal Acquisition Regulations but not all of the Defense supplements
which are voluminous. This long standing practice reflects the fact
that the experience level of contracting personnel in NRO tends to be
higher than in DOD and the greater flexibility granted by the FAR is
appropriate when in the hands of a highly experienced contracts
officer.
Mr. Rogers. Has the DOD and DNI been able to maintain oversight of
the NRO, while still empowering the Director? Why are the NRO
acquisitions more streamlined than the military space programs?
Mr. Faga. Yes. While DOD and DNI oversight is far more extensive
than in earlier decades, the Director remains empowered. This is
largely because she can interact at very senior levels with the DOD and
ODNI and can make her case directly and receive direction and decisions
quickly. Excessive analysis and the time taken to perform it and slow
decision processes are the biggest problems for a program manager at
any level trying to maintain cost, schedule and performance.
Mr. Rogers. Your National Academies report talked about the need to
clarify operational authorities for space. Can you expand on that? What
is your view of unity of command versus unity of effort?
Mr. Faga. Our concern was the delegation of authority to take
action which is granted by the President to operational commanders. In
the case of space, these delegations and rules of engagement are not
well developed largely because such actions haven't been seriously
contemplated until recently. While I think the most likely attacks
would be cyber, jamming or laser, it is relevant to note that a direct
ascent attack on a low orbit satellite requires only 13 minutes. A
decision process that takes longer than that won't get the job done.
A related ongoing debate is whether the Commander of Stratcom
should be empowered to direct the response of NRO satellites to attack
or threat of it. I believe that even in time of conflict, that the DNI
mechanisms for tasking and control of NRO assets should remain in
place, albeit in tight coordination with the Stratcom Commander
including appropriate participation in the JICSPOC. I lived a version
of this problem while serving as DNRO during the First Gulf War.
Control of certain assets was transferred from the multi-agency group
that performed it for the DCI to DIA which wasn't trained in carrying
it out. The result was a large drop in performance. Fortunately, there
was time before combat operations began for DIA to get up to speed and
perform well. Here, where timelines may be only minutes, changes from
normal operating methods is likely to turn out badly.
Mr. Rogers. Generally speaking, what authorities does the Director
of the NRO have in terms of overall direction, budgeting, architecture
development, operational direction, research and development, and
acquisition approval? Is there any counterpart, in the military space
program, that has the same authorities as the Director of the NRO?
Would the military benefit from having someone with similar
authorities?
Mr. Faga. The DNRO has a substantial role in most of these areas
but never complete. I'll answer individually to explain:
- The DNRO works for the SecDef and the DNI and exercises overall
direction subject to their direction or approval. As a practical
matter, direction from the SecDef and DNI is high level and the DNRO
has substantial discretion to carry out that guidance within the NRO as
she deems appropriate.
- The DNRO builds an NRO budget subject to annual guidance from
the DNI and with a final budget approved by the DNI with concurrence
from the DOD. The key here is that the number of people involved is
relatively small compared to programs in DOD and the DNRO and her staff
can interact with all of them.
- The DNRO is largely responsible for developing and maintaining a
national reconnaissance architecture subject to the concurrence of the
DNI and the DOD. She has considerable discretion here but not total
control.
- The DNRO has little authority for operational control. The NRO
launches and provides the ground station operating crew, maintains
health of the satellite, etc. but all tasking comes through DNI
mechanisms. Other than for engineering test, the DNRO issues no
direction on the operational use of the NRO satellites.
- The Director has great discretion in the application of R&D
funds. Typical of most companies, generally a % of the program is
devoted to R&D with almost total discretion in how the funds are
applied.
- Acquisition approval comes from the DNI with DOD concurrence (or
the inverse for MIP funded activities). Once granted, the Director has
substantial discretion in management of the program to its completion.
The person closest in authorities to the DNRO is the Commander, AF
Space Command who has acquisition and also has operational authorities
which the DNRO does not. He has a budgeting role but not one as strong
as the DNRO. The Secretary of the Air Force has budgeting authority for
about 90% of military space so these two executives have very
significant roles.
Regarding establishing a ``DNRO-like'' person in DOD, I would note
that, as described above, the DNRO has a powerful position but draws
authorities and approvals from a range of seniors. The benefit she has
is the ability to interact with relatively few people at senior levels
and considerable discretion inside the NRO which is not typical in DOD.
This speaks to my point in oral testimony about empowering the Program
Manager where, in this case, the Program Manager is the DNRO. I think
that is more important than a single person inserted in DOD somewhere
to replicate the DNRO.
Mr. Rogers. When you were the Director of the NRO, you also served
as an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. What are your thoughts on
the importance of that the connection with the military and
intelligence programs? What is the role of Principal DOD Space Advisor
with regard to the NRO?
Mr. Faga. It was helpful as it gave me a role within the AF that
was useful, especially as the NRO hadn't been declassified and wasn't
acknowledged. Perhaps more important was that I was a Presidential
appointee, confirmed by the Senate. That increased standing in the
Pentagon substantially. That said, I played a role in military space
and NRO but didn't serve as a coordinator between them to any great
extent.
I think the current arrangement, with the DNRO serving only in that
capacity is the better arrangement as it is certainly a full time job.
I don't know the role of the PDSA in any detail, but believe that
the role with regard to NRO is modest, one of achieving coordination
and certainly cooperation but not direction.
Mr. Rogers. What arrangements should be in place between the DOD
and the IC and various commercial companies regarding the U.S.
Government's ability to task and use commercial satellites in crisis or
wartime?
Mr. Faga. The DOD and IC do use commercial space companies
extensively in peace, crisis and war. As long ago as the first Gulf
War, at least half of satellite communications into theatre was
provided by commercial providers. In more recent times, commercial
imagery has also been used extensively in crisis and wartime
situations.
I think that one thrust of your question is what can be expected of
commercial providers in crisis and war. This is largely a matter of the
contractual arrangement between the government and the provider. When I
joined several company boards after service in government and a
nonprofit, I quickly learned that risk is always monetized. So, if
commercial service in conflict brings extra risk, it can be monetized
through contract payments, provision of extra services and capabilities
in the satellites, agreement by the government to provide certain
protections, insurance and other means. The key is to anticipate and
work out the expectations and contractual mechanisms in advance.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. This committee has focused on acquisition reform over
the past two national defense authorization bills. Generally, how is
acquisition within the space enterprise unique from the rest of DOD
acquisition? More specifically, what areas of space acquisition require
the most attention and are likely to require reforms specific to them?
Dr. Hamre. Acquisition of space assets is not inherently different.
But there are unique qualities to space that do impact acquisition.
These are exceptionally expensive assets and we buy them in very
limited numbers. This is more analogous to buying aircraft carriers
than trucks. The long lead time and high expense requires a different
oversight structure. But space acquisition is not inherently different
from normal government acquisition. The broader question is could we
use more commercial modalities to get space capabilities. Currently we
focus on government-only spacecraft and these become exceptionally
expensive and have very long development cycles. The commercial sector
has much shorter cycles, which means cheaper satellites that are
replaced more often as advanced technology becomes available. I believe
we need to look at very different models for buying space-based
capabilities.
Mr. Cooper. You noted that existing and emerging commercial
capabilities represent opportunities for improving capacity and
resilience, and that commercial space operations are particularly
efficient. Could you elaborate on how using commercial capabilities,
for example for imagery or space situational awareness, will help
improve national security capability and capacity? And what lessons on
efficiency can be learned and applied to enhance national security
space operations?
Dr. Hamre. There are a new generation of commercial satellite
companies that are producing lower fidelity systems in great number.
These are sometimes called cube-sats or micro-sats. The resolution will
always be inferior because these are very small satellites (5 inch
square and 20 inches long, for example) compared to current
reconnaissance satellites that are enormous. So the images from these
lower-fidelity satellites will not be useful for important intelligence
missions. But they could be perfectly adequate for many military
applications. The advantage of these small satellite constellations is
that they are constantly improving the technology on the satellite, and
can introduce these improvements every 6 months. Giant reconnaissance
satellites freeze technology (remarkable technology, to be sure) for a
15 year period. Micro-sats are no substitute for our sophisticated
satellites, but they are a very important potential complement, and
could take on a much larger range of missions, especially for the
Defense Department.
Mr. Cooper. This committee has focused on acquisition reform over
the past two national defense authorization bills. Generally, how is
acquisition within the space enterprise unique from the rest of DOD
acquisition? More specifically, what areas of space acquisition require
the most attention and are likely to require reforms specific to them?
Admiral Ellis. There are many similarities between procurement of
space systems and the acquisition of other DOD capabilities. There are
also reasons why some of the policies, regulations and oversight are
applicable to both.
There are some differences that should be considered, however. The
first is the capability focus of our space systems. Past policies have
focused on designing and building ``exquisite'' space systems where
every ounce of capability and reliability has been designed in and
little attention has been paid to resilience or robustness. This must
change.
A second area is the long lifetime for which our on-orbit systems
are designed. This has led to a post-launch technological status quo.
Perhaps consideration of lower cost and shorter lifetimes is
appropriate to allow technological refreshment at a faster rate. A
second lifetime consideration could explore the possibility of modular
on-orbit upgrades and refueling to provide the best of both worlds.
A third area for consideration is consistency of purpose and the
sharing of best acquisition practices across the DOD, IC and commercial
stove-pipes. There is an opportunity, without giving all space
acquisition authority to a single entity, to more effectively share
among all those contributing so much to national security space. Much
good work is being done but it is not widely shared and its broader use
has not been widely encouraged.
Mr. Cooper. This committee has focused on acquisition reform over
the past two national defense authorization bills. Generally, how is
acquisition within the space enterprise unique from the rest of DOD
acquisition? More specifically, what areas of space acquisition require
the most attention and are likely to require reforms specific to them?
Mr. Faga. There are many similarities but the space enterprise
tends to change at a higher pace. Planes, ships and tanks tend to have
service lives of 20-40 years and more. While individual satellites may
typically last 10-15 years, new requirements and technology tend to
drive revised designs every few years. To do this well, all of the
processes involved need to move faster than they do. Taking several
years just to get to a decision of what to buy is way too long.
Space systems are largely information systems and much closer to
terrestrial IT than to planes, ships and tanks. We need to recognize
that most systems won't be built in large numbers or for long periods
of time so don't need all of the ``ilities'' treatments that major
defense systems receive. Like terrestrial IT, we need to think of
services more than systems and provided by commercial providers under
service contracts or with government-purchased satellites as
appropriate. In either case, we need to think about the service we are
obtaining rather than the platform and contract model we are using.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral Ellis' testimony was particularly strong in
making the point that strategy must come first. What should our
strategic vision for national security space be, and how can we ensure
our strategy will function across the spectrum of conflict?
Dr. Hamre. Our strategic vision for space must be integrated with
our broad strategic vision for national security. Space needs to be
able to make its contribution to our military success on earth. We must
take steps to insure that we can reliably function through the spectrum
of conflict conditions to support terrestrial military operations.
Space will continue to be a critical capability, but we need
reliability and resilience. Adversaries are now threatening our assured
use of space, so we need to adapt our plans to insure that we can
accomplish all our missions successfully. In some instances, this will
place less dependence on space. It also means we need to change the way
we approach space from a public standpoint. We are now able to draw on
a much richer range of commercial assets, to include foreign commercial
assets, for critical space functions. Drawing on a much wider range of
assets will enhance deterrence and increase dissuasion of potential
hostile actions.
Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the importance of budget authority in
DOD, and compare the budget authority that the Commander of Air Force
Space Command has, in comparison to the Director of the NRO.
Dr. Hamre. I need to make sure I properly understand this question.
The Commander of the Air Force Space Command has budget authority for
some things, such as operating his ground-based installations. But I
assume that you are talking about the ability to buy satellites. I
think there are three authorities that need to be balanced--the
authority to establish requirements, the authority to buy things, and
the authority to operate things. The NRO has the authority to buy
things and operate things. The USAF Space Command largely has authority
to set requirements and to operate things, but not to buy things. There
is no easy answer on how to balance these three authorities.
Organizations that establish requirements but don't have accountability
for buying or operating things tends to lead to gold-plating of
requirements and systems, for example. I would need to map out all the
various authorities in order to properly answer your question.
Mr. Lamborn. A review of the budget documents shows that the
unclassified space RDT&E budgets are at a 30-year low. Why do you think
that is?
Dr. Hamre. I would need to study this carefully, and I have not. So
my initial response is that we no longer need to spend so much money on
unclassified space RDT&E because we now have such a robust private
sector. 40 years ago, the Federal Government needed to invest in this,
where today it can buy it from the private sector. And DOD continues to
make significant investments in classified space RDT&E. But I do
suspect that overall R&D spending on space by the federal government is
down compared to years past. The more important question is how can we
tap into the vitality I see in the private sector on space? That is the
challenge of today.
Mr. Lamborn. What should the future mission of the JICSpOC be? How
does that compare to the current and future mission of the JSPOC?
Dr. Hamre. Again, I don't know this to be the case, but I suspect
that the JICSpOC is separate from JSPOC because non-defense agencies
are wary of being sucked into a DOD-dominated environment. It is easier
to get coordination if they are given a somewhat autonomous space
separate from DOD. But I would need to study this problem more in order
to give you a better answer.
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral Ellis' testimony was particularly strong in
making the point that strategy must come first. What should our
strategic vision for national security space be, and how can we ensure
our strategy will function across the spectrum of conflict?
Admiral Ellis. As noted in the National Academy report provided to
the Subcommittee, given the country's broad dependence on space for
both civil and military activities, U.S. interests would appear to be
served by a strategy focused on creating an environment in which there
exist no means to unilaterally attack U.S. space systems without
attribution and effective counters, or a future where space systems
offer sufficient resiliency that such unilateral attacks are not
effective in negating a space capability. However, given the dependence
of potential adversaries on space systems in time of conflict, the
interests of the United States may also be served by having the means
to disable adversary space systems in time of crisis or conflict.
Moreover, a number of means to attack space systems have been
demonstrated or are postulated, and failure to protect against the use
of such systems would put the United States at a significant
disadvantage. While the United States may decide what space future it
prefers, the United States is not the sole determiner of that future.
U.S. actions will be constrained by what our potential adversaries--and
even our friends--decide to do. Furthermore, frenetic innovation in the
commercial space sector has the potential to be the main driver of
change in the space domain. Put somewhat differently, the United States
faces a short-term operational problem that needs to be addressed with
urgency and it also faces a more complex, long-term strategic problem.
In the short term, what should the United States do to counter the
emerging, multi-faceted threat to U.S. national security space assets?
Potential measures include hardening systems against known and
predicted means of attack; establishing capabilities to mitigate the
effects of successful attacks on U.S. space systems; expanding systems
to detect attacks in progress, including confidently distinguishing
attacks from other sources of failures; and reacting to them,
implementing political-military means designed to deter attacks, and
developing and deploying retaliatory systems and other means to hold
adversaries' assets at risk. This is not just a matter of developing
hardware; organizations, policies, doctrine, and operational concepts
need to be modified or created in parallel. Policy issues include
declaratory policies with regard to attacks on the national security
space architecture, including commercial space systems that provide
national security functions, as well as appropriate responses to
attacks on significant commercial systems. Addressing this problem
requires a clear understanding of the threat and the diverging time
lines associated both with threat evolution and timely deployment of
solutions.
Mr. Lamborn. Your recent National Academies report talked about the
need to clarify operational authorities for space. Can you please
expand on that? What is your view of unity of command versus unity of
effort? Who--if anyone--is responsible for disseminating information
regarding warning and/or insight into adversarial operations across the
defense and intelligence communities?
Admiral Ellis. There have recently been some candid discussions
about operational control of all national security satellites,
including the NRO assets and those commercial communications satellites
used for national security purposes, in the context of achieving
consistent policies and clear, responsive decision-making in time of
potential crisis. This is understandably, a complex technology, policy,
and authority issue. In fairness, the discussion has arisen as a result
of our appropriately re-defining the scope of ``national security
space'' to include all of the space-borne resources we employ and those
on which we rely as a nation and with our global partners. It should
not and must not be viewed as a ``power grab'' but rather as an
acknowledgement of newly appreciated realities of the nature,
capabilities, and speed of potential threats.
This has resulted in the creation of the JICSPOC to simulate and
evaluate potential challenges and solutions and to craft concepts of
operation and clarify who does what and how in the event of attacks on
U.S. satellites. In my view, that describes a place where a much-needed
series of simulations and exercises can take place to enhance
understanding of the national security space interrelationships, define
overlapping capabilities and, most importantly, identify gaps in the
structure, authority, and accountability. I fully support such
immediate interagency efforts; they are long overdue.
On the other hand, I believe strongly in unity of command,
authority and accountability. As I note often, collaboration is not the
same as consensus; someone has to be in charge. This is particularly
true in the national security space domain where challenges can
manifest themselves quickly, sometimes at the speed of light. The
precise organizational and authority structure should be left to the
agencies involved and not imposed by fiat or decree from external
entities.
I support the experimental character of the JICSPOC but agree that
the lessons from its tests need to move quickly to a single command
center, appropriately staffed by all stakeholders, with a clearly
defined chain of command. They are not lessons learned just because we
write them down; we actually have to learn them and things need to
change as a result.
Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the importance of budget authority in
DOD, and compare the budget authority that the Commander of Air Force
Space Command has, in comparison to the Director of the NRO.
Admiral Ellis. As the Subcommittee is well aware, budget authority
is the final arbiter of influence in the DOD, just as it is in any
organization. From a procurement perspective, Air Force Space Command
executes much of its authority through the Space and Missile Systems
Center (SMC) at Los Angeles AFB, California, which designs and acquires
all Air Force and most Department of Defense space systems. As with all
DOD procurement, these processes are subject to procurement regulations
and policies that may not be specifically designed to support the
unique character of the space enterprise.
I cannot compare the NRO's budget authority but sense that it is
adequate to their needs and that they operate under a much more
streamlined and tightly-coupled process.
Mr. Lamborn. A review of the budget documents shows that the
unclassified space RDT&E budgets are at a 30-year low. Why do you think
that is?
Admiral Ellis. In my opinion, the decline in Federal space R&D
spending is simply a result of the budget pressures on discretionary
spending forcing choices between development and procurement.
From a private sector perspective, many worthy research projects
are risky, with uncertain prospects for success or future utility, and
may require a long-term commitment of resources and infrastructure.
These qualities of the science enterprise lead to underinvestment by
private industry, which in general is more focused on lower-risk
research and product development with the promise of short-term
results. This is why industry spends 80 cents of every R&D dollar on
development, and only 20 cents on basic and applied research (for
civilian science agencies, the ratio is reversed).
Mr. Lamborn. What should the future mission of the JICSpOC be? How
does that compare to the current and future mission of the JSPOC?
Admiral Ellis. The stated purpose of the newly-created JICSPOC is
for the military, Intelligence Community (IC), and commercial partners
to craft concepts of operation and clarify who does what and how in the
event of attacks on U.S. satellites. In my view, that describes a place
where a much-needed series of simulations and exercises can take place
to enhance understanding of the national security space
interrelationships, define overlapping capabilities and, most
importantly, identify gaps in the structure, authority, and
accountability. I fully support such immediate interagency and
commercial outreach efforts; they are long overdue.
On the other hand, I believe strongly in unity of command,
authority and accountability. As I note often, collaboration is not the
same as consensus; someone has to be in charge. This is particularly
true in the national security space domain where challenges can
manifest themselves quickly, sometimes at the speed of light.
I support the experimental character of the JICSPOC but agree that
the lessons from its tests need to move quickly to a single command
center, appropriately staffed by all stakeholders, with a clearly
defined chain of command. They are not lessons learned just because we
write them down; we actually have to learn them and things need to
change as a result.
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral Ellis' testimony was particularly strong in
making the point that strategy must come first. What should our
strategic vision for national security space be, and how can we ensure
our strategy will function across the spectrum of conflict?
Mr. Faga. Strategy is the first and topmost of the steps leading to
actions. It sets the overall goals and plans. The trouble with most
strategies is that they are aspirational, not realistic and fail to
become true guides for action. The strategy challenge for space now is
the need to shift from information satellites living in a benign
environment to systems that have to survive in conflict. The strategy
begins with laying out what the expectations of commanders are as well
as an understanding from providers of what can realistically be
achieved. Strategies that simply state, ``systems will be made
resilient'' are not useful statements.
Mr. Lamborn. Your recent National Academies report talked about the
need to clarify operational authorities for space. Can you please
expand on that? What is your view of unity of command versus unity of
effort? Who--if anyone--is responsible for disseminating information
regarding warning and/or insight into adversarial operations across the
defense and intelligence communities?
Mr. Faga. In partial response, please see my answer to question 21.
Unity of command vs unity of effort in this context refers to whether
DOD controls NRO satellites, at least for purposes of protection, in
time of crisis or war. I recommend the unity of effort approach where
the NRO continues to respond to DNI direction in the use of its
satellites. One of the lessons to me while serving as DNRO during the
first Gulf War was that DOD is not the only user of satellite
reconnaissance during the fight. The NSC, State and others had pressing
needs which were largely adjudicated by the DCI and now the DNI. Even
regarding protection, I can envision a situation where DOD says you
need to move or you'll be killed in a few minutes, and the DNI saying
the info being gained at this moment is so important that it's worth
that price. Moreover, I think this is an issue debated over the least
likely threat-direct attack. Cyber, jamming and laser threats are far
more likely in my estimation.
Regarding the dissemination of warning and insight, both the IC and
DOD communities do this. Typically, the IC is collecting longer term
and more detailed information like ``what are the specific capabilities
of this threat'' while the DOD is providing warning near the moment of
attack.
Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the importance of budget authority in
DOD, and compare the budget authority that the Commander of Air Force
Space Command has, in comparison to the Director of the NRO.
Mr. Faga. I believe that their budget authority is similar but
their ability to influence what budget authority they receive is quite
different. Regarding similar authority, both must receive their budgets
pursuant to a budget submission by the President and Congressional
Authorization and Appropriation. Both receive funds subject to the
limitations of the Program Elements used and to reprogramming rules and
thresholds. However, the reporting chain of the DNRO is far shorter and
she has the ability to directly engage the Principals who decide her
budget. Both the DNRO and Commander AFSPC are subject to the effects of
budget drills that suddenly move significant money from their program
to another. However, the entire National Intel Program is 10% of the
size of the Defense budget and the likelihood of an event of which
affects the NRO of which the DNRO is unaware, is far smaller than for
the Commander AFSPC.
Mr. Lamborn. A review of the budget documents shows that the
unclassified space RDT&E budgets are at a 30-year low. Why do you think
that is?
Mr. Faga. I think there are two elements to this decline: reduced
spending for research on new technologies or systems and reduced
spending on new starts. Regarding the first, the temptation in tight
budget times is to push off the future to maintain present capability.
Similarly, the desire for continued service from legacy systems tends
to push out spending for new starts. Existing systems have many
supporters among current users; new ideas have few supporters and are
consequently very hard to get funded in the President's Budget.
Congressional interest in this matter is particularly important,
because it is often the Congress that pushes the Administration to take
on new things. In intelligence, it is important to keep developing new
capabilities that adversaries will be unaware of for some period of
time. Those are the most valuable capabilities.
Mr. Lamborn. What should the future mission of the JICSpOC be? How
does that compare to the current and future mission of the JSPOC?
Mr. Faga. The JICSpOC should become the ops center for the era we
are entering where space systems are subject to interference or attack.
I see it subsuming and replacing the JSPOC. The JICSpOC is learning how
to operate on timelines measured in minutes while the JSPOC operates on
timelines measured in hours to days. Lt. Gen. Raymond once described
the JSPOC as largely a space cataloging operation. The JICSpOC will
need to become a combat operations center.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. The current acquisition approach can take 10-plus
years to deliver a new capability. This approach cannot keep pace with
the evolving threat and advances in technology. What changes to the
acquisition process will need to happen in order to reduce the time to
deliver new capability to less than 5 years?
Dr. Hamre. This problem is not unique to space. In general, defense
acquisition has evolved to take long times. The barrier to get new
programs is so high that the Services often load up the requirements
for the program, thinking that it is their only chance. So we postulate
capabilities that technology cannot currently provide for some systems
and develop that technology along the way. I personally would favor an
acquisition system that allows incremental advances over time. We have
done that in the past very successfully, for example with the F-16. But
we have not done that with space procurement. This is largely because
the number of units we buy is very small and over a long period of
time. So we tend to load them up with capabilities that are very
advanced and do have technical uncertainty. This is one of the reasons
why I favor relying much more on commercially-provided capability,
which is expanding.
Mr. Coffman. Where are the key areas that you see commercial
capability most effectively augmenting the national security space
mission, both from a capability and a space resiliency perspective?
Dr. Hamre. Right now I think the strongest area is in
communications capabilities. But I think we will increasingly see much
stronger commercial capabilities for reconnaissance and surveillance.
The fidelity will lag our government satellites, but commercial
fidelity is getting very good. For precision navigation, it is more a
case of using the positioning signals from satellites of other
countries. We are seeing growing commercial capabilities for space
launch, and that will continue. All together, these commercial
developments give us the promise of more redundancy and
reconstitutability. But we need to change how we think about buying
space capabilities if we are going to take advantage of these trends.
Mr. Coffman. The NRO has seen some real success through the
application of autonomy and analytics capabilities into their
architecture--driving down costs and improving the intelligence value
and responsiveness of their enterprise. What other space-based missions
(beyond intelligence), could benefit from the application of advanced
analytic capabilities?
Dr. Hamre. I must plead insufficient knowledge to properly answer
your question. I don't know enough about how the NRO has accomplished
this in order to postulate other options we might pursue.
Mr. Coffman. Each space protection program is contained within its
own Special Access Program (SAP) with a limited number of billets,
creating knowledge silos. How should DOD and the Intelligence Community
balance security concerns with their ability to leverage technology and
capabilities across the government and industry?
Dr. Hamre. You have hit on a key problem. By definition, very few
people know about the details of SAP programs, and for good reason. But
this also means we never can build on the advances of one program to
make another SAP program more effective and less expensive. The
mechanisms of coordination for SAP programs are largely administrative,
rather than programmatic. It would be an interesting experiment to
create a small cell reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, charged with the goal of seeing where the program details of
one SAP program might be usefully applied to another SAP program.
Mr. Coffman. The current acquisition approach can take 10-plus
years to deliver a new capability. This approach cannot keep pace with
the evolving threat and advances in technology. What changes to the
acquisition process will need to happen in order to reduce the time to
deliver new capability to less than 5 years?
Admiral Ellis. There are some dramatically different approaches
that should be considered as we address the rapid technological change
and growing threats that confront us.
The first is the capability focus of our space systems. Past
policies have focused on designing and building ``exquisite'' space
systems where every ounce of capability and reliability has been
designed in and little attention has been paid to resilience or
robustness. This must change.
A second area is the long lifetime for which our on-orbit systems
are designed. This has led to a post-launch technological status quo.
Perhaps consideration of lower cost and shorter lifetimes is
appropriate to allow technological refreshment at a faster rate. A
second lifetime consideration could explore the possibility of modular
on-orbit upgrades and refueling to provide the best of both worlds.
A third area for consideration is consistency of purpose and the
sharing of best acquisition practices across the DOD, IC and commercial
stove-pipes. There is an opportunity, without giving all space
acquisition authority to a single entity, to more effectively share
insights among all those contributing so much to national security
space. Much good work is being done but it is not widely shared and its
broader use has not been widely encouraged. Here, a single DOD-level
Undersecretary for Space would have a key role.
Mr. Coffman. Where are the key areas that you see commercial
capability most effectively augmenting the national security space
mission, both from a capability and a space resiliency perspective?
Admiral Ellis. Commercial contributors are already making key
contributions across the full spectrum of national security space. In
addition to the long-standing contributions to our multi-frequency,
space-borne communications architecture, we now see opportunities
emerging in commercial imagery, earth-sensing using other sensors, and,
of course, the developing launch systems. All of these can bring
enhanced capability, multi-nodal redundancy, and enhanced resiliency.
A key element of our ability to capitalize on commercial space is
resisting the temptation to over-control and over-regulate. We are
still not buying commercial SATCOM capacity as efficiently as we might
and spectrum control and allocation processes are highly bureaucratic.
We cannot approach the commercial sector with the same slow processes
and restrictive regulation and expect to get a different outcome.
Mr. Coffman. The NRO has seen some real success through the
application of autonomy and analytics capabilities into their
architecture--driving down costs and improving the intelligence value
and responsiveness of their enterprise. What other space-based missions
(beyond intelligence), could benefit from the application of advanced
analytic capabilities?
Admiral Ellis. As I described above, while R&D investment is
essential, so is the ability to know where the need is largest and the
potential positive impact the greatest. This is a perfect place for
real, even-handed, and dispassionate analytical capabilities. We need
more effective tools for system-wide analysis to ensure we are focusing
on what is most important. While allocation of funds is sometimes a
valuable metric, it cannot define where resources can be most
effectively employed. The ``critical infrastructure in space'' that we
have created must be carefully analyzed to ensure that we really
understand the capability and resiliency challenges confronting us and
that we are not making decisions on the basis of assumptions that are
no longer valid as a result of dramatic changes in the technology,
organizational structures, or the operating environment.
Mr. Coffman. Each space protection program is contained within its
own Special Access Program (SAP) with a limited number of billets,
creating knowledge silos. How should DOD and the Intelligence Community
balance security concerns with their ability to leverage technology and
capabilities across the government and industry?
Admiral Ellis. Unfortunately, the plethora of national security
leaks and revelations over the last five years, from Snowden to
WikiLeaks, has brought reconsideration of the movement toward more
information and intelligence sharing that began in the days after 9/11.
There are legitimate concerns, as we see Top Secret documents appearing
in the public domain, that higher levels of classification and limited
access are key elements in preserving the classified character of our
most precious technologies.
In my opinion, retaining the balance inferred in the question is
appropriate but is getting more difficult each day. One technique is to
carefully parse programs into distinct sub-elements, including basic
technology, system integration and operational concepts, that can be
appropriately shared but do not reveal the entirety of the program and
its impact.
A second approach is to allow DOD to develop and provide ``black
box'' capabilities to civilian or non-DOD space programs that are bolt-
on, tamper-proof and add capabilities without revealing the classified
technologies or operational concepts. If we are to get full use of all
space assets, effectively integrate them into a security network, and
create a more resilient system across the DOD, IC, and commercial
sectors, everyone must be included and contribute.
Mr. Coffman. The current acquisition approach can take 10-plus
years to deliver a new capability. This approach cannot keep pace with
the evolving threat and advances in technology. What changes to the
acquisition process will need to happen in order to reduce the time to
deliver new capability to less than 5 years?
Mr. Faga. As a baseline, I noted in my testimony that several
decades ago the standard planning number for a new satellite
acquisition was 42 months. This number assumed that the technology was
ready and development could begin. This target was usually met.
Commercial satellite procurements today usually meet this timeline or
do better. Acquisitions in 24-36 months are common.
Today's military and IC satellite systems are more complex but
available technology is also more mature. The big change is the amount
of time deciding and agreeing on what to build as well as the
contracting process before real development work begins. This can
easily consume 3 to 5 years and partially explains the 5 to 10 year gap
that you point out.
Another delaying factor is the annual budget process that allows
everyone not in favor of the program to have an annual opportunity to
delay, underfund or even cancel it. These budget drills often put
programs into an undesirable or even unworkable funding profile that
further delays development and adds greatly to total cost. As these
processes are much less at work in SAP programs, they tend to do better
in terms of cost and schedule.
One approach is to reverse the impediments described above. Another
is to do more buying of a service or a turn-key system where the
government specifies what it wants at the beginning and takes delivery
at the end. So, in the case of commercial imagery, NGA buys imagery
from Digital Globe generally independent of which of several satellites
does the collection. However, the government could also turn to
satellite builders for complete satellites delivered on orbit.
Commercial imagery and satcom companies generally use this approach.
An approach resembling this was used in the 90s and was called
Total System Procurement Responsibility (TSPR) which largely failed.
However, it didn't fail because the concept was flawed but because it's
implementation was flawed. The approach still requires government
involvement but government managers thought it meant ``hands off.''
There needs to be customer involvement throughout but it is largely not
directive in nature, it serves to help with modification of
requirements, choosing among alternatives when problems arise and other
major issues. However, it is not involved in the minutia of the
problem.
Mr. Coffman. Where are the key areas that you see commercial
capability most effectively augmenting the national security space
mission, both from a capability and a space resiliency perspective?
Mr. Faga. Commercial satcom has long been a major supplier of
service to national security space. The DOD CIO has recently estimated
that 40% of DOD satcom is commercial. I recall that during the first
Gulf War it was estimated at 60%. Nonetheless, I believe that there
will likely always be a need for specialized, highly resilient satcom
systems built for and operated by DOD. However, in many cases it would
be possible to purchase the satellite under a commercial-like contract
where the government specifies at the beginning and takes over the
system on orbit. This can work for complicated satellites but only for
those that can be fully specified at the beginning of the program. This
is not practical where there is substantial development and non-
recurring engineering involved.
The national space community has used commercial satellite imagery
for over 20 years with good success. As offerings increase, this usage
will surely increase as well. As a result, the NRO and NGA have set up
a special combined office to deal with the blending of commercial and
NRO systems that is clearly coming.
It is possible that commercial PNT, weather and space situational
awareness offerings will be available in the near future.
A particularly attractive approach to use of commercial satellites
is for hosted payloads that are no acknowledged. The most valuable
capability is one not known to others. Such a secret is hard to keep
today but SAP programs succeed at doing so routinely.
Mr. Coffman. The NRO has seen some real success through the
application of autonomy and analytics capabilities into their
architecture--driving down costs and improving the intelligence value
and responsiveness of their enterprise. What other space-based missions
(beyond intelligence), could benefit from the application of advanced
analytic capabilities?
Mr. Faga. I am not familiar with these efforts in any detail. I
know that the NRO has been using autonomous means to quickly review
data in order to sort from a large volume of data to smaller amounts
that analysts can quickly exploit. Other IC agencies are also doing
this on other forms of data. Some of these efforts seek to exploit
different sources of data at the machine level and do valuable sorting
and combining of data before presentation to the analyst so that the
material that is presented is more comprehensive and valuable. It is
estimated that analysts spend about 60% of their time searching for and
organizing data and only 40% analyzing. Clearly, managers want to
reduce that 60% substantially and increase the time for value-added
work.
Another application of analytics becoming important in the
development of space systems and others, it model based systems
engineering. In this technique, a computer model of the entire system
is developed which provides greater insight into the system than
previous methods and allows for easy examination of potential changes
to the system. Many NRO contractors are now using this technique.
Mr. Coffman. Each space protection program is contained within its
own Special Access Program (SAP) with a limited number of billets,
creating knowledge silos. How should DOD and the Intelligence Community
balance security concerns with their ability to leverage technology and
capabilities across the government and industry?
Mr. Faga. SAP programs are valuable because they successfully
maintain secrecy for very long periods such as the entire development
period for a new capability. Often, knowledge of the very existence of
a vulnerability being exploited by a SAP program, or knowledge of the
existence of the SAP program even absent any details, is enough to make
it worthless. In such cases, very tight security is clearly necessary.
There are two problems with SAP programs of which I am aware: 1.
Once a program is put into SAP status, the security program is
developed by the Program Manager. This means that there is little
consistency among the various SAP programs. While I am in favor of the
very strict security programs used, they should be consistent among
them. 2. The highly classified nature of SAPs and exacerbated by the
point above, it is often very hard to provide the capability to
legitimate users, be they intel analysts or combat commanders. In the
case of the combat commander, for example, it is vital that the
capability be understood, practiced with and accessible in a combat
situation. This is often not the case. The key question is whether this
magnificent technical capability is able to offer operational value. I
have seen war-game situations where an important SAP capability wasn't
available to a combatant commander because the command and control link
was knocked out but the system itself remained functional.
[all]