[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AN UPDATE ON THE TAKATA AIRBAG RUPTURES AND RECALLS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 2, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-49
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRED UPTON, Michigan
Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Chairman Emeritus Ranking Member
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG WALDEN, Oregon GENE GREEN, Texas
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas LOIS CAPPS, California
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
Vice Chairman JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio DORIS O. MATSUI, California
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington KATHY CASTOR, Florida
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey JERRY McNERNEY, California
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky PETER WELCH, Vermont
PETE OLSON, Texas BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia PAUL TONKO, New York
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
BILLY LONG, Missouri Massachusetts
RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina TONY CARDENAS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
BILL FLORES, Texas
SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
CHRIS COLLINS, New York
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
Chairman
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky Massachusetts
PETE OLSON, Texas TONY CARDENAS, California
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida PETER WELCH, Vermont
SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma officio)
FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, opening statement.............................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Illinois, opening statement........................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Witnesses
Mark R. Rosekind, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration................................................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Answers to submitted questions............................... 108
Kevin M. Kennedy, Executive Vice President, North America, Takata 42
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Answers to submitted questions \1\........................... 121
David Kelly, Project Director, Independent Testing Coalition..... 52
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Answers to submitted questions \2\........................... 122
Mitch Bainwol, President and Chief Executive Officer, Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers....................................... 54
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Answers to submitted questions \2\........................... 123
John Bozzella, President and Chief Executive Officer, Association
of Global Automakers........................................... 62
Prepared statement........................................... 64
Answers to submitted questions............................... 124
Submitted Material
Letter of June 2, 2015, from Jacqueline Gillan, President,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, et al., to Mr. Pallone
and Ms. Schakowsky, submitted by Ms. Schakowsky................ 94
Statement of American Car Rental Association and Consumers for
Auto Reliability and Safety, June 2, 2015, submitted by Ms.
Clarke......................................................... 96
``Takata Airbag Inflator Ruptures: Timeline of Events,''
submitted by Mr. Burgess....................................... 100
----------
\1\ Mr. Kennedy's answers to submitted questions have been retained in
committee files and also are available at http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF17/20150602/103546/HHRG-114-IF17-Wstate-KennedyK-
20150602-SD005.pdf.
\2\ Mr. Kelly and Mr. Bainwol did not answer submitted questions for
the record by the time of printing.
AN UPDATE ON THE TAKATA AIRBAG RUPTURES AND RECALLS
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in
room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael C.
Burgess (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Burgess, Lance, Blackburn,
Harper, Guthrie, Olson, Kinzinger, Bilirakis, Brooks, Mullin,
Upton (ex officio), Schakowsky, Clarke, Kennedy, Cardenas,
Butterfield, Welch, and Pallone (ex officio).
Staff present: Leighton Brown, Press Assistant; James
Decker, Policy Coordinator, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade;
Andy Duberstein, Deputy Press Secretary; Graham Dufault,
Counsel, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade; Melissa Froelich,
Counsel, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade; Kirby Howard,
Legislative Clerk; Paul Nagle, Chief Counsel, Commerce,
Manufacturing, and Trade; John Ohly, Professional Staff Member,
Oversight and Investigations; Olivia Trusty, Professional Staff
Member, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade; Michelle Ash,
Democratic Chief Counsel, Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade;
Christine Brennan, Democratic Press Secretary; Jeff Carroll,
Democratic Staff Director; Elisa Goldman, Democratic Counsel;
Meredith Jones, Democratic Director of Communications, Member
Services, and Outreach; Adam Lowenstein, Democratic Policy
Analyst; and Timothy Robinson, Democratic Chief Counsel.
Mr. Burgess. I want to welcome Dr. Rosekind to our
committee hearing today. The Subcommittee on Commerce,
Manufacturing, and Trade will now come to order. The Chair
recognizes himself for 5 minutes for the purposes of an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
So, again, I want to extend my welcome to everyone as we
revisit a very serious motor vehicle deficit. Six months ago
this subcommittee held a hearing looking at the same issue, and
members of the subcommittee were assured that everything was
being done, and that testing and expertise were being brought
to bear, but there were still a lot of unanswered questions. I
was not chairman at that time, but I did sit in on the
subcommittee hearing, and I remember raising the concern that
safer does not mean the same thing as safe. Here we are 6
months later, and I was hoping we were getting down the road of
safer, but it is still unclear to me how far away we are from
safe.
A few weeks ago the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration launched the largest motor vehicle safety recall
in our Nation's history due to defective Takata airbags. This
recall may impact 13 percent of the country's driving stock,
affecting an unknown number of vehicles, and spanning 11
vehicle manufacturers. Since our last hearing, tragically,
there has been an additional death attributed to an exploding
Takata airbag in my home State of Texas. Every morning I fear I
am playing headline roulette waiting for another rupture,
another injury, another death. While it has now been confirmed
that there is a defect affecting at least six Takata airbag
inflators, we don't have any great clarity as to the root
cause, and how we will know when we get to that point where we
are safe. Clarity and transparency are indeed needed.
One thing that certainly isn't clear is why we are
launching this national recall now, instead of almost a year
ago, when basically the same information was before us. The
American people deserve much better. They deserve to know, when
a national recall is announced, if their car part is of the
recall. I am repeatedly visited by vehicle manufacturers who
lament the challenges of getting drivers to respond to recall
notices, especially following a year of record recalls, and an
overwhelming sense of recall fatigue. Yet, when we do have the
attention of consumers, how is it helpful to tell them that
there is a recall, but to check back later to see if you need
to do something? NHTSA serves a fundamental and critical role
in ensuring vehicle safety. It is critically important that it
be part of the solution in every step of the recall process in
removing defective vehicles from the road.
The supply of replacement parts is also of concern. I am
glad that the agency has--acknowledging that it has a role to
play. United States drivers are competing against a global
supply chain, and recalls in many parts of the world. I also
acknowledge that Dr. Rosekind is still fairly new to NHTSA, and
was not yet the administrator at our last hearing. I hope that
we will see more action going forward, as this is now direct
and timely.
I have serious concerns about where we are in the process.
It is inconceivable to me that none of the tests conducted by
Takata over the past year on over 30,000 inflators has given us
a clearer picture and dictated more direct action. And why is
it that we still don't have any deployment testing being done
by anyone besides Takata? At what point do we accept that we
need to completely eliminate defective inflators and implement
a new design, and a new manufacturing process? Are all the
driver's side airbag replacements now using different inflator
compounds? What is different about the passenger side
inflators?
We do have many questions today. The most important
question of all, however, does not involve compounds, desiccate
O-rings, or moisture. It is simply this, when will we have a
plan that can be presented to the public, identifies who is
affected, and when they will have a safe, not a safer, but a
safe replacement part available? Nothing is more important, and
nothing else is acceptable. In the meantime, the driving public
should continue checking their Vehicle Identification Numbers
against the NHTSA database to see if their vehicle is affected,
and this includes vehicles that have previously been recalled.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burgess follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Michael C. Burgess
Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to our hearing
today as we revisit a very serious motor vehicle defect. Six
months ago, this subcommittee held a hearing looking at this
same issue and the Members were assured that everything was
being done and that testing and expertise were being brought to
bear. But there were still a lot of unanswered questions. I sat
in on that hearing and raised the concern that Safer is not the
same thing as Safe.
Six months later, I hope we are getting down the road of
safer, but it is still unclear to me how far away we are from
Safe. A few weeks ago, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration launched the largest motor vehicle safety recall
in our Nation's history due to defective Takata airbags. This
recall may impact up to 13% of the country's driving
population, affecting an unknown number of vehicles and
spanning 11 vehicle manufacturers.
Since our last hearing, tragically, there has been an
additional death attributed to an exploding Takata airbag in my
home State of Texas. Every morning I fear I am playing headline
roulette waiting for another rupture. While it has now been
confirmed that there is a defect affecting at least six Takata
airbag inflators, we still don't have any great clarity about
what was the root cause and how we know that we are safe going
forward. Clarity and transparency are needed.
One thing that isn't clear is why we are launching this
national recall now instead of almost a year ago when we had
almost the same information before us. The American people
deserve much more. They deserve to know when a national recall
is announced if their car is part of the recall. I am
repeatedly visited by vehicle manufacturers who lament the
challenges of getting drivers to respond to recall notices,
especially following a year of record recalls and an
overwhelming sense of recall fatigue. Yet, when we do have the
attention of consumers, how is it helpful to tell them there is
a recall but check back later to see if you need to do
something. NHTSA serves a fundamental and critical role in
ensuring vehicle safety. It is important that it be a part of
the solution in every step of the recall process in removing
defective vehicles from the road.
The supply of replacement parts is also a concern. I am
glad that NHTSA is acknowledging that it has a role to play.
U.S. drivers are competing against a global supply chain and
recalls in many parts of the world. I also acknowledge that Dr.
Rosekind is still fairly new to NHTSA, and was not yet the
Administrator at our last hearing. I hope we will see more
action from them going forward that is direct and timely.
In that vein, I have serious concerns about where we are in
the process. It is inconceivable to me that none of the tests
conducted by Takata over the past year on over 30,000 inflators
has given us a clearer picture and dictated more direct action.
And why is it that we still don't have any deployment testing
being done by anyone besides Takata? At what point do we accept
that we need to completely eliminate the defective inflators
and implement a new design and manufacturing process? Are all
the driver side airbag replacements now using different
inflator compounds? What is different about the passenger side
inflators?
We have many questions today. The most important question
of all, however, does not involve compounds, desiccant, o-rings
or moisture. It is simply:
When will we have a plan that can be presented to the
public that identifies who is affected, and when they will have
a SAFE, not safer, but SAFE, replacement part available?
Nothing is more important, and nothing else is acceptable.
In the meantime, the driving public should continue
checking their VIN numbers against NHTSA's database to see if
their vehicle is affected. This includes those vehicles that
have previously been recalled.
Mr. Burgess. Chair now recognizes--I will be happy to yield
to Mrs. Blackburn the balance of the time.
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank the witnesses for both panels for being here. As Chairman
Burgess has said, this is an issue that we have followed, are
continuing to work on, and you are going to see us stay with
this issue. The fact that we have these airbag ruptures, that
they have caused serious injury and death, is of concern to us.
I questioned Takata at the last hearing about a November 19,
2014, New York Times article which noted that engineers at
Takata's Moses Lake, Washington, facility had raised serious
concern about the use of ammonium nitrate as an airbag
propellant. They had done that as far back as 1999, yet they
persist with this. Questions persist, and I thank you all for
being here for our hearing. I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Gentlelady yields back. The Chair thanks the
gentlelady. The Chair recognizes Subcommittee Ranking Member
Ms. Schakowsky, 5 minutes for an opening statement, please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
today's hearing on the Takata airbag recall. The American
people deserve to know what went wrong with Takata's airbags,
and why it took so long to discover, and how the committee and
this Congress will respond to ensure that it never happens
again.
Chairman Upton recently remarked about his airbag deploying
after hitting a deer and said, ``Maybe I am lucky it wasn't a
Takata''. But at least 34 million Americans aren't so lucky. We
have a guest here today, Angelina Zujarta, who was a victim--
raise your hand--who was a victim of a Takata air rupture. At
least six people have been killed by their airbag. In
Angelina's case, it was 3 years ago, she was in a car accident
at only 25 miles an hour. Shrapnel from a defective airbag
ripped her chest, and we are just very thankful to have her
here today. Here is an example of such an airbag that has these
holes in it, where the--am I on the wrong side? Here we go.
That shows where the shrapnel came out. This is an example--
these are examples of these sharp pieces that landed in her
chest in two places. These are not the exact ones, but shrapnel
like this, and it is very, very dangerous. We need to stop it.
My big concern about this recall is that the root cause
really has not been yet determined. We have been told that a
combination of factors, including humidity and age, contribute
to airbag ruptures, but we don't know whether the flaws in the
design, manufacture, installation, or some other aspect of the
airbag, which means that we still can't be sure that
replacement airbags being installed right now are any safer.
Well, this is really dangerous, and we need to know what caused
this failure to make sure that it doesn't happen again.
But as we wait for those questions to be answered, there
are steps we can take right now to improve vehicle safety. Many
of those are included in H.R. 1181, the Vehicle Safety
Improvement Act, legislation that I introduced earlier this
year, along with my colleague, and several others, Frank
Pallone, the ranking Democrat on the full committee. And I am
hopeful that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join
me in this bill. 2014 was the year of the recall. Almost half
of all cars on our roads were recalled. GM, Honda, and other
major auto companies failed their customers, and lives were
lost as a result. The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act takes
valuable lessons from those recalls, and addresses existing
weaknesses and information sharing, oversight, and
accountability regarding auto safety.
The legislation includes several provisions that would have
benefitted consumers whose cars have those faulty airbags. One,
the bill would double NHTSA's funding for vehicle safety
programs, a priority that has been severely underfunded by this
Congress. Two, H.R. 1181 would increase the quantity and
quality of information shared by auto manufacturers not only
with NHTSA, but with the public, and with Congress. Had more
information about Takata airbag ruptures been cataloged and
diagnosed earlier, I believe lives could have been saved.
Three, the bill would require manufacturers to fix all recalled
vehicles free of charge, rather than just those that were
purchased within the past 10 years. And Takata has indicated
that age of airbags is a contributing factor to ruptures, and
many of the vehicles with defective Takata airbags are more
than 10 years old. They should clearly be subject to mandatory
fixes.
Under the legislation, NHTSA would also have new imminent
hazard authority to expedite recalls related to dangers
defects. It would eliminate the regional recall program,
ensuring that all cars subject to a recall are repaired,
regardless of their location. Both of those changes would have
improved the speed, scope, and efficacy of the Takata recall.
The ongoing investigation into Takata airbag ruptures may
identify additional policies that would limit the risk of
similar recall during--in the future. If it does, we should
enact them as soon as possible. In the meantime, we can't
afford to wait to act on legislation that we know would save
lives. It is not just committee Democrats who want action. A
who's who of leading consumer and auto safety organizations
support H.R. 1181, and I really implore my Republican
colleagues to join me in this legislation. I ask unanimous
consent that this advocates letter be added to the record.
Mr. Burgess. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Ms. Schakowsky. And I am eager to hear answers from our
witnesses about what led to this massive failure, how to
prevent another one in the future. And in the meantime, we
can't delay common sense safety improvements that will save
lives. I urge the committee to advance the Vehicle Safety
Improvement Act without delay, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Schakowsky follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing on the
Takata airbag recall. The American people deserve to know what
went wrong with Takata airbags, why it took so long to
discover, and how this committee and this Congress will respond
to ensure that it never happens again.
Chairman Upton recently remarked about his airbag that
deployed after hitting a deer, ``maybe I'm lucky it wasn't a
Takata.''
At least 34 million Americans aren't so lucky. We have a
guest here today, Angelina Sujata, who is a victim of a Takata
airbag rupture. At least six people have been killed by their
airbag--a supposed safety feature.
My biggest concern about this recall is that the root cause
has not been determined. We've been told that a combination of
factors--including humidity and age--contribute to airbag
ruptures, but we don't know whether the flaw is in the design,
manufacture, installation, or some other aspect of the airbag.
That means we still can't be sure that the replacement airbags
being installed right now are any safer. That isn't just dumb--
it's dangerous. We need to know what caused this failure to
make sure it doesn't happen again.
But as we wait for those questions to be answered, there
are steps we can take right now to improve vehicle safety. Many
of those are included in H.R. 1181, the Vehicle Safety
Improvement Act--legislation I introduced earlier this year.
2014 was the year of the recall. Almost half of all cars on
our roads were recalled. GM, Honda, and other major auto
companies failed their customers--and lives were lost as a
result. The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act takes valuable
lessons from those recalls and addresses existing weaknesses in
information sharing, oversight, and accountability regarding
auto safety.
The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act includes several
provisions that would have benefitted consumers whose cars have
those faulty airbags:
The bill would more than double NHTSA's funding
for vehicle safety programs--a priority that has been severely
underfunded by this Congress.
H.R. 1181 would increase the quantity and quality
of information shared by auto manufacturers with NHTSA, the
public, and Congress. Had more information about the Takata
airbag ruptures been catalogued and diagnosed earlier, lives
could have been saved.
The bill would require manufacturers to fix all
recalled vehicles free of charge--rather than just those that
were purchased within the past 10 years. Takata has indicated
that age of airbags is a contributing factor to ruptures, and
many of the vehicles with defective Takata airbags are more
than 10 years old. They should clearly be subject to mandatory
fixes.
Under the legislation, NHTSA would also have new
Imminent Hazard Authority to expedite recalls related to
dangerous defects. It would eliminate the regional recall
program, ensuring that all cars subject to a recall are
repaired, regardless of their location. Both of those changes
would have improved the speed, scope, and efficacy of the
Takata recall.
The ongoing investigation into the Takata airbag ruptures
may identify additional policies that would limit the risk of a
similar recall occurring in the future. If it does, we should
enact them as soon as possible. In the meantime, we can't
afford to wait to act on legislation that we know would save
lives.
It's not just committee Democrats who want action. A who's
who of leading consumer and auto safety organizations support
H.R. 1181 and urge this committee to move it forward without
delay. I ask unanimous consent that their letter be added to
the record.
I am eager to hear answers from our witnesses about what
led to this massive failure, and how to prevent another one in
the future. In the meantime, we cannot delay commonsense auto
safety improvements that will save lives. I urge the committee
to advance the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act without delay,
and I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Gentlelady yields back. The Chair thanks the
gentlelady. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, 5
minutes for an opening statement, please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. An airbag is a safety
measure that you hope that you never have to use. And if you do
need it, you need to have it work exactly right. And yes, I had
my own incident, going back for the Memorial Day break in
Michigan less than 2 weeks ago. It was dark, it was at night,
there wasn't much of a moon, and I was driving at 70 miles an
hour when I hit not one deer, but two. I was lucky. The seat
belt worked, airbag deployed, just as they were designed. It
was a scary moment for anyone, and I remember thinking, you
know, I am lucky I didn't have a defective Takata airbag at the
time. And then I thought, the safety of your airbag can't be
just a game of luck. Being from the auto State, which includes
Takata's headquarters in Auburn Hills, Michiganders understand
better than most just how complicated cars are, and how much
goes into each and every part. Cars are certainly safer today
than ever before. As miles driven, and as the age of the car
goes up, deaths and injuries have gone down.
What concerns me today, though, are the multiyear safety
investigations where we can identify a problem, but a solution
is nowhere in sight, where the preferred approaches are Band-
Aids, instead of an effective cure. In these Takata airbags, we
have a problem. It has persisted for years. And again we have
NHTSA opening up an initial investigation, and closing it,
before revisiting it years later. The technology truly is
rocket science, but you don't need to be a rocket scientist to
see that more needs to be done, and it should have been done a
lot quicker. When lives are put in jeopardy, delay is deadly.
There wasn't much doubt at our December hearing last year that
the airbags were defective, but it still took 6 months to say
so.
Dr. Rosekind was not the administrator when we held our
last hearing in December, and there has been some--certainly
some positive movement of late. Now Takata is changing its
formulation of propellant in the replacement on the driver's
side, either because someone else is making it, or because they
were using improved formulations of their own. But this isn't
the case on the passenger side. Instead, they continue to try
to perfect an innumerable set of manufacturing variables which,
for 10 years or more, have resisted perfection. So we trust
that this time the moisture won't get in, and everything else
will be just perfect.
Once we have safe replacements, we need people to actually
be able to replace them. Recall rates of 15 to 30 percent are
unacceptable. We have to understand what the plan is from NHTSA
and the automakers. NHTSA will be--for the first time act as a
central coordinator. Such a move seems warranted, if not
overdue, but we need to clearly understand the plan so that it
can be relayed to the public. The messaging around these airbag
recalls has been tortured, at best. We need more information,
clear information from consumers. I am concerned that NHTSA and
Takata decided to release head turning, headline grabbing
recall numbers at a time when the information is not yet
actionable for consumers. Drivers read about the recall,
biggest one in history, but could not look up if their own car
was part of the recall, including mine, a week or two after my
incident. How does that help safety? Surely a better way
exists.
At a time when this committee should be focusing on how to
update NHTSA, how to incentivize the rollout of better safety
technologies, and how to improve recall take rates, we are
instead forced to understand why safety, our very highest
priority, seems relegated to the back lot. Testing is overdue.
Change is overdue. Safe replacement parts are overdue. Six
months ago I asked the question, what should I say to the mom
in Michigan who asked me if she and her family are safe behind
the wheel? Six months later I, unfortunately, have to ask the
same question. We will have as many hearings as needed, and
require as much reporting to this committee as needed, to
ensure that this problem is finally resolved, restoring the
safety of our Nation's roadways and trust of the American
people.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton
An airbag is a safety measure you hope you never need--if
you do need it, you need it to work exactly right. I had my own
incident with an airbag while back in Michigan just two weeks
ago. It was in the evening, pitch black, while driving on the
interstate at 70 mph when I struck two deer. I was lucky that
my seat belt worked and my air bag deployed--just as they were
designed. It's a scary moment for anyone and I remember
thinking, ``I'm very lucky I didn't have a defective Takata
airbag.'' And then I thought, ``the safety of your airbag can't
be a game of luck.''
Being from the auto State, which includes Takata's
headquarters in Auburn Hills, Michiganders understand better
than most just how complicated cars are and how much goes into
each and every part. Cars are safer today than ever before. As
miles driven and the age of the car go up, deaths and injuries
have gone down.
What concerns me today, though, are multiyear safety
investigations where we can identify a problem but a solution
is nowhere in sight; where the preferred approaches are band-
aids instead of an effective cure. In these Takata airbags we
have a problem that has persisted for years. And again we have
NHTSA opening an initial investigation and closing it before
revisiting it years later.
This technology is truly rocket science. But you don't need
to be a rocket scientist to see that more needs to be done and
that it should have been done sooner. When lives are put in
jeopardy, delay is deadly. There wasn't much doubt at our
December hearing that the airbags were defective, but it still
took six months to say so.
Dr. Rosekind was not the administrator when we held our
last hearing in December and there has been some positive
movement of late. Now, Takata is changing its formulation of
propellant in the replacements on the driver's side--either
because someone else is making it or because they are using
improved formulations of their own. But this is not the case on
the passenger's side. Instead they continue to try to perfect
an innumerable set of manufacturing variables, which for 10-
plus years have resisted perfection. Do we trust that this time
the moisture won't get in and everything else will be perfect?
Once we have safe replacements, we need people to actually
replace them. Recall rates of 15--30 percent are unacceptable.
We must understand what the plan is from NHTSA and the
automakers. NHTSA will for the first time act as a central
coordinator. Such a move seems warranted, if not overdue, but
we need to clearly understand the plan so that it can be
relayed to the public.
The messaging around these airbag recalls has been tortured
at best. We need more information, and clearer information for
consumers. I am concerned that NHTSA and Takata decided to
release head turning, headline grabbing recall numbers at a
time when the information is not yet actionable for consumers.
Drivers read about the biggest recall in history, but could not
look-up if their car was part of the recall. How does that help
safety? Surely a better way exists.
At a time when this committee should be focusing more on
how to update NHTSA, how to incentivize the rollout of better
safety technologies, and how to improve recall take rates we
are instead forced to understand why safety, our very highest
priority, seems relegated to the back lot. Testing is overdue.
Change is overdue. Safe replacement parts are overdue. Six
months ago I asked the question, ``What should I say to the mom
in Michigan who asks me if she and her family are safe behind
the wheel?'' Six months later I unfortunately have to ask the
same question. We will have as many hearing as needed and
require as much reporting to this committee as needed to ensure
that this problem is finally resolved--restoring the safety of
our Nation's roadways and the trust of the American people.
Mr. Upton. And I yield back the balance of my time to Mr.
Lance.
Mr. Lance. Thank you, Chairman Upton, and distinguished
members of the committee. I telephoned my car dealer last week.
I have a 2004 Honda Accord. I did not indicate my title. I just
telephoned as a regular and ordinary citizen, and I was told
that I will need a new airbag. It seems to me that one of the
main purposes of this hearing is to make sure that Mr. and Mrs.
John Q. Public are aware of the recall, are able to be informed
quickly as to whether their automobile is affected, one of 34
million inflators recalled, and be confident that the
replacement is safe.
During the subcommittee's hearing 6 months ago, Takata's
witness indicated extreme reluctance to cooperate with NHTSA's
requests for an expanded recall, and I characterized the
testimony at that time as tendentious. I am extremely
dissatisfied with the company's obstinate attitude during a
majority of this process, and I hope that its recent change of
heart will be sincere. It occurs, of course, after being fined
$14,000 a day. I look forward to discussing this with the
distinguished person now in charge, Mr. Rosekind. And, Mr.
Chairman, I hope that this will be a hearing of great substance
for the American people.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, Mr. Pallone, 5 minutes for an opening statement,
please.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Though it has taken
months, I am glad that Takata finally admitted that its airbags
are defective, and finally moved forward with national recalls.
Getting dangerous cars off the road is crucial. Airbags are
supposed to save lives, and not take lives.
But these national recalls came after a full year in which
we have seen a rather sloppy rollout of recalls of these
exploding airbags. Each automaker seems to have handled the
recalls differently. Some automakers conducted regional safety
improvement campaigns in high absolute--areas. At the same
time, others conducted regional recalls in the same areas. Some
automakers expanded their recalls to more States. Some
eventually conducted national recalls of certain cars. One
automaker advised against passengers using front seats until
the airbags are fixed, even offering to disable passenger
airbags as a precaution.
All of this has led to considerable confusion for the
public. Drivers are unsure if their cars are part of the
recall. Those who have already had their airbag replaced do not
know if they need to have it replaced again. But most
importantly, people do not know if their cars are safe to
drive. This is the second hearing this subcommittee has held on
the Takata airbag recalls, and our first hearing was 6 months
ago, and yet in that time we are still left with many of the
same questions. We still do not know the root cause of the
Takata airbag defects. We certainly know enough to take action,
however. And while I appreciate and share the majority's
concerns about this Takata crisis, I am disappointed by its
lack of action. Auto safety is not a partisan issue. However,
even after the GM ignition switch issues, the Takata airbag
ruptures, and even going back to the Toyota sudden acceleration
problems, this committee has failed to take appropriate
legislative action.
Earlier this year, Subcommittee Ranking Member Schakowsky
and I, and of course she mentioned it, with a number of other
members of the subcommittee introduced the Vehicle Safety
Improvement Act of 2015. Many provisions in our bill would
address problems that occurred in the Takata airbag and the GM
ignition switch recalls. I mentioned to Congresswoman
Schakowsky that my car--I had a Chevy Impala, I think it was a
2008, I still have it--was, you know, subject to the ignition
switch issue. And, you know, I received a notice in the mail,
but there was still some confusion, even on my part, as to what
this was all about. I was told that until I actually had the
opportunity to go to the Chevy dealer that I should separate
the two parts of the key from the keychain, or whatever this
thing is called. And, you know, I continued to do that, even
after the--even after they soldered and fixed the key. And, of
course, I had to look up and see if my VIN number was one of
the Impalas that had to be recalled. But even in my mind, there
is a lot of confusion about, you know, what was being
accomplished.
And I think that is why we need legislation. The National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration, or NHTSA, has
received much of the blame in both the GM recall and this
Takata recall, but it is clear that NHTSA simply does not have
the resources and authorities it needs to protect drivers and
passengers, and to hold automakers and automobile parts
suppliers accountable for safety defects. Our bill provides
more resources and tools to NHTSA, increasing fines for
manufacturers that violate vehicle safety laws. Also, in both
cases, automakers and parts suppliers failed to timely produce
critical information that may have helped NHTSA identify
problems earlier. The bill improves the early warning reporting
system by making more reported information public, and
requiring manufacturers provide significantly more information
about any fatal accident involving a safety defect.
So, Chairman Burgess and Chairman Upton, I appreciate your
interest and, you know, what you have said today, in terms of
continued oversight of these recalls, but I think that we need
to begin our legislative work, and not just talk about more
investigations. I hope that we can work together to move
forward with a bill to keep our citizens safe on the roads. I
yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Though it has taken months, I am
glad that Takata finally admitted that its airbags are
defective and finally moved forward with national recalls.
Getting dangerous cars off the road is crucial. Airbags are
supposed to save lives, not take lives.
But these national recalls came after a full year in which
we have seen a rather sloppy roll-out of recalls of these
exploding airbags. Each automaker seems to have handled the
recalls differently.
Some automakers conducted regional ``safety improvement
campaigns'' in high absolute humidity areas. At the same time,
others conducted ``regional recalls'' in the same areas. Some
automakers expanded their recalls to more States. Some
eventually conducted national recalls of certain cars. One
automaker advised against passengers using front seats until
the airbags are fixed, even offering to disable passenger
airbags as a precaution.
All of this has led to considerable confusion for the
public. Drivers are unsure if their cars are part of the
recall. Those who have already had their airbag replaced do not
know if they need to have them replaced again.
But most importantly, people do not know if their cars are
safe to drive.
This is the second hearing this subcommittee has held on
the Takata airbag recalls. Our first hearing was six months
ago. And yet, in that time, we are still left with many of the
same questions.
We may still not know the root cause of the Takata airbag
defects, we certainly know enough to take action. And while I
appreciate and share the majority's concerns about this Takata
crisis, I am disappointed by its lack of action.
Auto safety is not a partisan issue. However, even after
the GM ignition switch issues; the Takata airbag ruptures; and
even going back to the Toyota sudden acceleration problems,
this committee has failed to take appropriate legislative
action.
Earlier this year, Subcommittee Ranking Member Schakowsky
and I, with a number of other members of this subcommittee,
introduced the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act of 2015. Many
provisions in our bill would address problems that occurred in
the Takata airbag and the GM ignition switch recalls.
The National Highway Transportation Safety Administration
(NHTSA) has received much of the blame in both the GM recall
and this Takata recall. But it is clear that NHTSA simply does
not have the resources and authorities it needs to protect
drivers and passengers and to hold automakers and automobile
parts suppliers accountable for safety defects. Our bill
provides more resources and tools to NHTSA, increasing fines
for manufacturers that violate vehicle safety laws.
Also in both cases, automakers and parts suppliers failed
to timely produce critical information that may have helped
NHTSA identify problems earlier. Our bill improves the Early
Warning Reporting System by making more reported information
public and requiring manufacturers provide significantly more
information about any fatal incident involving a safety defect.
Chairman Burgess, I appreciate your interest in continuing
oversight of these recalls. But we don't need any more
investigation to begin our legislative work.
I hope that we can work together to move forward with our
bill to keep our citizens safe on the roads.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. That concludes member opening statements. Chair would
remind members that, pursuant to committee rules, all members'
opening statements will be made part of the record.
We do want to thank all of our witnesses for being here
today, taking the time to testify before the subcommittee.
Today's hearing will consist of two panels. Each panel of
witnesses will have an opportunity to give an opening
statement, followed by a round of questions from members. Once
we conclude with the questions on the first panel, we will take
a very brief recess to set up for the second panel.
Our first panel today will consist of a single witness,
Administrator Mark Rosekind of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration. Dr. Rosekind, we appreciate you being
here today, and you are now recognized for 5 minutes to
summarize your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF MARK R. ROSEKIND, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Rosekind. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to provide an update on NHTSA's efforts to address defective
Takata airbags. There is a more detailed explanation of our
efforts in my prepared statement, but let me summarize what
NHTSA has done, and what we are doing. All of NHTSA's actions
are focused on achieving one main goal, the only acceptable
goal, a safe airbag in every American vehicle.
On May 19 Secretary Fox of NHTSA announced that Takata had
filed four defect information reports with the agency, covering
an estimated 33.8 million defective airbag inflators that
Takata had shipped to automakers. Takata, as an original
equipment supplier, does not know into which vehicles those
inflators were installed. Prior to the filing, automakers had
recalled a total of 18.5 million vehicles. All of the May 19
filed defect reports involved recalls that are national in
scope.
Since May 19, 11 auto manufacturers have been scouring
their own records to determine which vehicles are affected. To
date, automakers have filed additional recalls, bringing the
total to an estimated 30.4 million vehicles. During that May 19
announcement, NHTSA made clear the consumers might have to wait
to determine if their vehicles were covered by the expanded
recall while automakers made their own recall filings. As you
know, Takata's defect filings were a necessary first step
before the automakers would initiation their own filings. The
automakers' filings contained the detailed make and model
information and Vehicle Identification Number, or VIN numbers,
that allow individual vehicle owners to determine if they are
affected by this recall. Obviously this delay is frustrating,
and if there is any way to avoid that anxiety, it would have
been done.
In NHTSA's public communications philosophy, and like all
of our other interactions, we followed a very simple
philosophy, to make information available to consumers as
quickly as possible. To that end, NHTSA has established a
microsite called Recalls Spotlight. It is located at
safercar.gov, and includes key consumer information on recall
issues of high public interest. It includes continuously
updated information on the Takata recalls. On May 19 and 20,
after the DOT NHTSA announcement, more than 1.5 million people
conducted VIN lookup searches on safercar.gov, including nearly
one million on May 20. On May 19, Secretary Fox also announced
a Consent Order with Takata that gives NHTSA oversight into the
company's testing, requires its full cooperation with our
investigation, and, importantly, gives us the ability to fully
evaluate the adequacy of proposed remedies.
It was also announced that NHTSA has launched an
administrative process, a coordinated remedy program, to
prioritize and coordinate the actions of Takata and the
manufacturers. NHTSA is using this authority provided under the
Safety Act, and by Congress in the Tread Act, for the very
first time. We need to acknowledge Congressman Upton for
driving that vision, and working with others to provide a
mechanism to address the challenges and circumstances that are
now faced in this recall.
Many Americans have asked whether we can trust remedy
inflators any more than the defective inflators. NHTSA's
Consent Order with Takata, the coordinated remedy program, and
NHTSA's own testing, are all essential actions designed to
provide full and final answers to that critical question. NHTSA
will continue pursuing answers until the American people can
have a safe airbag in every vehicle.
There continues to be great interest in establishing the
root cause of these defects. While some factors appear to have
a role, such as time and absolute humidity, the full story is
not yet known, and a definitive root cause has not been
identified. In my recent experience as an NTSB Board member,
and a veteran of many major transportation investigations, it
may be that there is no single root cause, or the root cause
may never be known. Secretary Fox addressed this directly on
May 19, clearly stating that uncertainty cannot stop NHTSA from
acting to protect safety. In areas of uncertainty, NHTSA must
act, focused firmly on our safety mission.
Lastly, whatever the final numbers turn out to be, this may
be the largest, most complicated consumer safety recall in our
Nation's history. Fixing this problem is a monumental task. It
will require tremendous effort from the auto industry. It will
also require tremendous effort from NHTSA. And yet the agency
must manage this enormous and necessary task with too few
people, and insufficient funding. The same people managing the
Takata recall must also continue to analyze thousands of
consumer complaints, investigate scores of other potential
defects, and oversee more than 1,200 other recall campaigns
that automakers and equipment manufacturers now have underway.
NHTSA must accomplish this task with a defects investigation
budget that, when adjusted for inflation, is actually 23
percent lower than its budget 10 years ago.
NHTSA needs your help to protect the safety of Americans on
our country's roads. The President has submitted a budget
request that would fund significant improvements in NHTSA's
defect investigation efforts, providing the people and
technology needed to keep Americans safe. The Administration
has proposed the Grow America Act, which would provide stable,
increased funding for our agency, and important safety
authorities to help us in our mission. As proposed, the Grow
America Act, and in a recently introduced bill, if imminent
hazard authority had been available to NHTSA, this hearing
would have a very different focus. At NHTSA we address safety
risks every day.
I urge the members of the subcommittee and your colleagues
in Congress to help NHTSA address these safety risks and keep
the traveling public safe on America's roadways. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rosekind follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman. We will move into
the question-and-answer portion of the hearing. I start by
recognizing myself 5 minutes for questions.
And, Mr. Administrator, again, thank you very much for
being here. Thank you for making yourself available to me both
in person, on the telephone, as you have worked your way
through this process. Just so that people are clear, the VIN
number that we keep talking about, the Vehicle Identification
Number, people could access that number at the lower left hand
of their windshield or inside the driver's door?
Mr. Rosekind. I hope they are paying attention to you. They
can find that VIN in that location, and go to safercar.gov to
see if their vehicle is in the recall.
Mr. Burgess. And that is the Web site, safercar.gov. Now,
if someone checked their VIN number and got the all clear on
May 1, do they need to do anything further, or are they good to
go?
Mr. Rosekind. We suggest people check that on a weekly
basis.
Mr. Burgess. You issued the initial recall in the middle
part of May. How quickly can people assume that you are getting
the uploaded information into your Web site so that, if they
check the Web site, they can be confident that the information
they get is current?
Mr. Rosekind. So--thank you for that question, because
clarity for consumers is critical here, and Takata had to file
their defect reports before the auto manufacturers could put
together their information. And what is clear is we can't just
get numbers. They have to be accurate. So they have to do their
due diligence, and then we have to do ours. At this point, we
have--seven out of the 11 manufacturers have provided the
information, which are now covering up to 30.4 million
vehicles, but weekly people should be checking.
Mr. Burgess. So, let me just ask you this, is there
anything else that you can do, or we can do, to make certain
that this process is clearly and effectively communicated to
the driving public?
Mr. Rosekind. I think you just did part of it, and we are
trying to do the same thing, which is give people safercar.gov,
and helping them on a weekly basis go. I do have to acknowledge
the auto manufacturers have stepped up and really provided an
accelerated production of those numbers, which we are checking,
so they are getting up there very quickly.
Mr. Burgess. OK, but then that brings up the other point,
the--their ability to access the remedy inflators. Where do we
stand with that, the production and distribution of those
remedy inflators? Where are you?
Mr. Rosekind. Again, very important for people to
understand the whole process. And I won't give the whole list
now, but part of what we are--this whole hearing is really
addressing is, before May 19, there was denial of a defect.
There was mostly a focus on root cause. There was concern about
the supply chain, whether the remedy even worked or not. So
that all changed on May 19.
Mr. Burgess. Well, let me stop you there. We are no longer
concerned if the remedy works?
Mr. Rosekind. I am sorry?
Mr. Burgess. We are no longer concerned if the remedy
works?
Mr. Rosekind. We absolutely are, and that is what I am
saying. On May 19 the focus changed. There has been
acknowledgement by Takata that there is a recall, and they are
all national. The second is a Consent Order with NHTSA, which
allows us to be directly involved in oversight for testing to
make sure that the remedy is going to be adequate or not. And
then the third part of that is a coordinated remedy program,
which goes to your question, and that is now NHTSA is in the
driver's seat, and we will coordinate and prioritize to make
sure that the supplies are available, and that they get out
there as quickly as possible.
Mr. Burgess. But just so people are clear, to cut through
any of the talk surrounding this, are the replacement devices
safe? Not safer, but safe, unequivocally safe.
Mr. Rosekind. And thank you, because, again, that is a very
important, confusing point. People need to look up their VIN
number now, and if they have a recall to go get a replacement
inflator, they need to do that. And we have got to point out,
there are millions of airbags that are out there every day
protecting people, including millions by Takata, that are
functioning properly. We are trying to get the defective ones
off.
And so, yes, they need to go get it fixed. What we will do
is identify if there is an interim remedy, because you are
correct, some of these may not have the longevity that is
needed to make sure that it is a lifelong, for the entire life
of the vehicle, fix.
Mr. Burgess. So, you know, what am I supposed to do? One of
my kids calls me and says, hey, I got a bad VIN number, but
good news, they have got a replacement, and I am going to get
it fixed. Am I OK with that? Am I OK letting my child drive
that car?
Mr. Rosekind. And your dealer should be able to tell you
whether they have a fix that is long term, or they have an
interim remedy. And the bad news is, if there is an interim
remedy, you should get a call back from the dealer when it is
time to get that fixed for the long term.
Mr. Burgess. OK. So even someone who gets it fixed may not
really have it fixed?
Mr. Rosekind. And the dealer better make that clear.
Mr. Burgess. I just want to ask you one thing quickly. I
was being interviewed on a national business show the other--or
last week, and they pointed out to me that in New York, I guess
is where the show originated, that they called dealers around
the town, and they said they were laughed at when they said,
can we bring our vehicle in to get our airbag changed, that
they did not have a supply.
So I did the next logical thing, and called my local guy
who does all things cars back in the district, and he actually
provided me some--what I think is some--this was recent
information. Number one, no one is reporting any panicked or
irate customers as a result of the recall. I do remember a few
months ago some dealers were complaining about mad customers. I
am going to assume this was when there was no process in place.
And only one dealer had a real volume for replacements. Another
one had maybe 1,000 that needed to be replaced, but no one was
bringing their vehicles in. And that is, and will continue to
be, a problem, that people aren't recognizing that their
vehicle needs to be fixed.
My time is expired. I will recognize the gentlelady from
Illinois, 5 minutes for your questions, please.
Ms. Schakowsky. I think it is really important, what you
said earlier, not all of the VIN numbers are up yet, is that
true, so that people need to be checking. They may be driving
a--with a Takata airbag that will, and their vehicle may be
recalled, but it is not up online right now, right?
Mr. Rosekind. That is correct.
Ms. Schakowsky. OK. So----
Mr. Rosekind. We have seven out of the 11 manufacturers----
Ms. Schakowsky. OK. So people should not necessarily feel
secure, but they should just keep checking. I wanted to talk
about one of the authorities that would be in the Vehicle
Safety Improvement Act, and that would be to give NHTSA more
authority itself for recalls. The first known Takata airbag
inflator rupture occurred in 2004, May 2004. That was 11 years
ago. And months after NHTSA called for national recalls, which
was last November, Takata has finally relented, because it is
still within their authority to do that. NHTSA currently has no
authority to take emergency action, even in cases where defects
are known, and there is strong and immediate risk of serious
injury or death.
So, Dr. Rosekind, in November of last year NHTSA called for
this national recall of certain vehicles with defective
driver's side airbags. Takata had refused to conduct the
national recall. I know you weren't there at the time, but if
NHTSA had had the authority to mandate emergency recalls, do
you think the agency--or let me put it this way. Would you have
used it, with regard to Takata?
Mr. Rosekind. And thank you for the rephrasing. Starting at
my confirmation hearing, I made it clear NHTSA will use every
tool available. If imminent hazard authority had been
available, we would have used it.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. The--as I said, the--this
legislation does allow for imminent hazard authority to recall,
and NHTSA has testified before the subcommittee in the past,
asking for that authority, so I guess you have already stated,
you agree with the need for that authority?
Mr. Rosekind. Absolutely.
Ms. Schakowsky. And would it have been beneficial to NHTSA
in carrying out its mission to reduce deaths, injuries, and
economic losses resulting from motor vehicle crashes?
Mr. Rosekind. Absolutely. And just to highlight, what you
are focused on, as an imminent hazard, would have allowed us to
get these airbags off the road. And there are still procedures
to make sure everything is done transparently, officially, but
we wouldn't have been waiting. There could have been lives
saved, and people--injuries prevented with imminent hazard
authority.
Ms. Schakowsky. There are a number of other provisions in
the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act. It would double the funding
for NHTSA. So, first, let me have you comment on that, in terms
of the resources that you have to do the job that needs to be
done, and--but I think Americans all expect is being done.
Mr. Rosekind. At my confirmation hearing in December I
highlighted people, technology, and authorities, that we needed
to look at those. I got to NHTSA and found out it was more
under-resourced than I had ever imagined from the outside. And
since I have been there, we have done everything we are--we
can, and will be doing with what we have available to us.
I could give you a list of 29 different things that have
already gone on, process improvements, et cetera. At some point
you need people and authority to get the job done, and that is
a concern. I highlighted, even in December, there are eight
people looking at 80,000 complaints coming in, and there are
now eight people in the recall group that have to do with this
recall, 34 million vehicles, and the other 1,200 campaigns that
are going on at the same time.
Ms. Schakowsky. I think it actually would be helpful to
this committee that, if you had additional resources, to tell
us exactly how that would be used, and how then it would impact
consumer safety. So I would appreciate seeing that.
Mr. Rosekind. And I would be happy to do that, because, in
fact, in the President's 2016 proposal, we have identified
what--our request for enhanced funding. So we could actually
talk about a trend analysis division, a special investigation
division for defects. We can provide that to you.
Ms. Schakowsky. I would appreciate it. The legislation that
some of us are co-sponsoring, it would increase civil
penalties, it would limit--eliminate most statutory maximum
penalties to make sure that bad actors have every incentive to
get unsafe vehicles off the road. It would also make sure
that--it would eliminate what I think is really the farce of
regional recalls. Wonder if you could comment on those
provisions.
Mr. Rosekind. Sure. Just as far as the cap goes, Grow
America goes to 300 million, yours has no cap. Clearly the
message there is that $35 million is not enough to really get
an effect, so anything that gets us to 300 million or beyond
would be great. And I think, as far as regional recalls, my
perspective is that everything is national.
Ms. Schakowsky. Good. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Gentlelady yields back. Gentlelady's time is
expired. Chair recognizes the chairman of the full committee,
Mr. Upton, 5 minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, we welcome
your appearance before us, and wish you all the best. I want
you to know that I have made an inquiry--I don't know what the
Appropriation Committee did with regard to the NHTSA budget,
but I am--I will find out soon.
Prior to the May 19 announcement, what efforts did you do
to coordinate with the auto manufacturers so that they could
identify the VIN numbers impacted by the recall?
Mr. Rosekind. And before I go specifically to that, let me
just say there were a lot of actions and inactions before May
19, so it has already been raised here that Takata was
pressured to go for a national recall, denied any defect. We do
have to acknowledge----
Mr. Upton. We saw that in December back here too, before
you were on board.
Mr. Rosekind. That is exactly--and the auto manufacturers
stepped up to actually take on those recall service campaigns
and other things, even though Takata was denying. So there was
some action before that.
Mr. Upton. So just to use my own little personal
experience, I don't do this very often, but with my incident
coming back for the--to Michigan for the Memorial Day break, so
I did plug in to safercars.com with my VIN number, and I am not
sure that we still can determine today it was a Ford Explorer,
'06, and I can't really tell today even if it was a Takata
airbag, or TRW, or whoever it was. The information was not
readily available when I got online last week.
Mr. Rosekind. And that is why the information that is
coming back at safercar.gov is really just called to get
recalled or not. It won't give you the specific----
Mr. Upton. Yes, it didn't have it on the recall list.
Mr. Rosekind. Yes, which means you would be clear if it
wasn't there as a recall.
Mr. Upton. Although I am supposed to be checking every
week, is what you are saying?
Mr. Rosekind. On a weekly basis. Which, by the way, is a
good thing to do anyway because of the number of recalls that
are coming out, is just to check that on a regular basis.
Airbags aside, that is a good source to have bookmarked for you
to go back.
Mr. Upton. So the auto manufacturers really did step up,
then, is what you are saying?
Mr. Rosekind. And----
Mr. Upton. All of them?
Mr. Rosekind. And that was to--again, previously, when
Takata denied, the manufacturers stepped up to look at recalls
and what they could do. To your question specifically, we had
contact with them the day before to let them know something was
coming related to the defect so they would have a heads up, and
since then have been in contact with them about the
coordination that is coming forward.
Mr. Upton. So you and I talked in advance of the
announcement. And what is the timetable--what is the goal, the
timetable, for completely resolving the issue? Being able to
identify which vehicles have these defective airbags, getting
them replaced, making sure that the owners are there. What is
your hopeful timeframe for this to be resolved, and we can move
to the next issue?
Mr. Rosekind. At this point, I believe if anybody gave you
a number, they don't know what they are talking about. Here is
our plan to get there, and that is--we have already initiated
contact and had meetings with both the auto manufacturers and
suppliers, other meetings bringing all of them together. That
will create a plan that will look at the effectiveness of the
remedy, the supply, and try--and basically getting to 100
percent recall. We hope to have a public hearing by the fall
that will lay all of that out, all three of those elements.
Mr. Upton. What steps have you taken to, you know, has
NHTSA taken to ensure that the propellant safety and evaluation
for the integrity of the studies and testing being submitted to
NHTSA by various parties? That seems to be a real element here.
Mr. Rosekind. Yes. And, again, thank you for highlighting
that, because part of the Consent Order actually allows NHTSA
to directly focus the testing, so we can make sure that goes to
both the adequacy of the remedy, as well as for root cause. So
now we have some direct oversight and involvement with that.
Before we were just on the receiving end. Now we can actually
direct. And, as you know, everybody was focused on root cause,
which is still not determined, nobody focusing on the remedy.
Mr. Upton. So when someone has one of these defective
airbags, they have to replace the whole thing? They can't
replace just the propellant, is that right? They have got to
take the whole thing out, and put a whole new device in with a
different propellant, is that right?
Mr. Rosekind. That is correct.
Mr. Upton. OK. Thank you. Thank you very much for being
here. Yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair recognizes
the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Pallone, 5
minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On February 20 of
this year NHTSA sent a letter to Takata, informing the company
that its failure to cooperate with NHTSA's investigation of the
airbag defect, as well as Takata's prior knowledge of the
defect, would result in fines of $14,000 per day for each day
Takata failed to cooperate. By the time those fines were
suspended under the Consent Order last month, Takata had been
fined about $1.2 million. So, Doctor, how much of the 1.2
million that Takata owes in fines has the company paid to
NHTSA?
Mr. Rosekind. Basically, with the Consent Order, we made
sure that the investigation continues, as well as the potential
for future penalties. And so, at this point, nothing has been
collected because we are looking at an open investigation with
potentially future penalties to be collected.
Mr. Pallone. So when do you expect that the penalties will
actually be paid to the agency?
Mr. Rosekind. That could be at any time. And part of that I
think will come as the investigation continues. We are focused
right now on the safety element of it. As it unfolds there may
be need for, again, further penalties, and I am sure that would
be part of the package that would be----
Mr. Pallone. I was going to ask you about further
penalties, but you obviously think you do--there is a
possibility of additional civil penalties against Takata?
Mr. Rosekind. Yes.
Mr. Pallone. OK. A Reuters article last week cited a source
within Takata, explaining that the daily fine was a factor
motivating Takata to agree to a national recall, but it still
took 3 months of daily fines to get Takata to agree. Are
financial incentives an effective means of ensuring compliance
amongst manufacturers, in your opinion?
Mr. Rosekind. No question. And I think from the earlier
question, going from 35 to 300 or no cap is critical. If I can
take just a moment, I would highlight that there was the
penalty, there was a preservation order, and, frankly, NHTSA
was working on a unilateral program to go after this that we
made sure was communicated to Takata as well.
Mr. Pallone. Do you believe that increasing the size of the
statutory penalties would have allowed NHTSA to put more
pressure on Takata and other automakers and, in turn, to reach
an agreement to conduct a national recall sooner?
Mr. Rosekind. No question.
Mr. Pallone. OK. Last year GM was fined the statutory
maximum of $35 million for its failed handling of the ignition
switch recall. Many regulators and advocates, including
Transportation Secretary Anthony Fox, asked Congress to raise
or eliminate those statutory maximums in order to send a
stronger message to bad actors. I mean, it is impossible to put
a price on the cost of a serious injury of a loss of life. No
financial penalty or compensation can bring back a family
member, but stronger financial incentives can go a long way in
deterring manufacturers from hiding defects and not cooperating
with Federal investigations.
So, you know, as I mentioned, Congresswoman Schakowsky and
others on the committee have introduced the Vehicle Safety
Improvement Act, which would not only raise per violation civil
penalties, but also eliminate most statutory maximum penalties.
So do you believe strong financial penalties would discourage
automakers and parts suppliers from hiding possible defects, or
incentivize quicker action from manufacturers?
Mr. Rosekind. Absolutely.
Mr. Pallone. All right. And, lastly, I wanted to ask you,
would increased fines make automakers more likely to cooperate
with NHTSA investigations?
Mr. Rosekind. Yes.
Mr. Pallone. All right. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, 5 minutes
for questions, please.
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Rosekind,
I thank you so much for taking your time and being here. Let us
go back to your November 18 second special order to Takata,
where they were to come to you with information--further
information about their propellant mix. And what we would like
to know is what you have been given, what you know about that
mix, what is the specific use of that mix in the replacement
parts, or the remedy parts, as you call them, and in new
vehicles?
Mr. Rosekind. And I can provide as much technical
information as you would like. What you have identified is one
of the special orders that actually triggered the daily
penalties that started, because we basically had 2.4 million
documents dumped on us with all of that information, and tried
to understand where the meaningful pieces were. So we have some
of the meaningful pieces now identified, and we can certainly
bring you as much technical information that was provided.
Mrs. Blackburn. Are you satisfied with the information that
Takata has provided to you on their propellant mix?
Mr. Rosekind. We are still--we are working our way through
that information. They have been open about----
Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Rosekind [continuing]. Providing us testing data----
Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Rosekind [continuing]. But the information that you are
asking about was millions and millions of pages that have grown
to about 2.4, so we are still making our way through that.
Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Are they being forthcoming in bringing
clarity to that? We want to know what the mix is, the
propellant mix is. So are they satisfying the questions that
will--that consumers will have when they want to know--this
component that is in their vehicle that is to make the vehicle
safe now explodes, it causes injury, and the question is, have
they arrived at something that is going to make certain that
indeed it is safe?
Mr. Rosekind. And I would say they will now. That us part
of the consent----
Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Rosekind [continuing]. Order, that they are required to
provide that information.
Mrs. Blackburn. So you are satisfied? I think if you could
just have someone from your team provide a summary so that we
will have that for the record, that would be helpful to us for
future hearings and for legislation.
Also, let me go to the point that was made--back to that
December hearing we had, that ammonium nitrate was used as a
propellant in the 1990s. And--so what we would like to know,
have you all found any evidence of ruptures from the--that
occurred in the '90s? And, if not, does NHTSA have any insight
into why not?
Mr. Rosekind. And that is a good question. Again, I will go
back and make sure that that is part of the information that we
provide you. What is really important about the Consent Order
is we now get to be in the driver's seat to direct this kind of
testing. We will be looking at it both historically, and see
how that informs what we need to do now.
Mrs. Blackburn. OK. We would love to have that as a follow
on, if you will, as to what occurred in the '90s, and as you go
back and do a revisit of the information that you have, that
would be helpful.
One last thing, you mentioned that the auto manufacturers--
and Chairman Upton mentioned that they had been doing their
part in meeting this. I want to know if you are satisfied with
how the dealers are being compensated for this, if they are
being made whole. Because if everyone is taking their car in
for the replacement, that is a lot of loaner cars, that is a
lot of man hours. So would you speak to that?
Mr. Rosekind. Actually, I would suggest you ask that of the
individuals on the next panel, because we would be focused on
that only if it interfered with the recall.
Mrs. Blackburn. OK. We are going to ask the next panel
that, but I wanted your insight also. And with that, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentlelady, gentlelady yields
back. Chair recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, 5
minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Thank you very much,
Administrator. Great for--of you to be here, and I appreciate
your service to the country, and your--willing to testify
today. I want to touch base with you a little bit. You have
heard some of my colleagues already mention the Vehicle Safety
Improvement Act, and I want to touch on that, and particularly
the need for safety upgrades for used cars.
Used car sales in March and April of this year reached more
than three million cars sold for each month, but purchasers of
used cars now face major loopholes when it comes to auto
safety. Most do not know it. The Vehicle Safety Improvement Act
would take two concrete steps toward making our used car market
safer. First, the bill would require the buyer's guide window
form to include information about a vehicle's history of damage
and recall or repair history. Second, the bill would also
prohibit dealers from selling or leasing used vehicles subject
to a recall until the dealer has repaired the defects.
So, Dr. Rosekind, I--concerned that consumers have an
implicit perception that used cars are safe and free of defect,
and that dealers have made all necessary repairs. Is that true,
or what light can you shine on that problem?
Mr. Rosekind. This is part of the Grow America proposal. It
is part of what you are describing, and I guess I just--I can't
imagine that you would sell a new car, used, leased, et cetera,
if you knew there was a defect involved, not to have it fixed
before you put it in somebody's hands. Just seems like we don't
have the system working properly.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. I would agree. So, Doctor, a
purchaser of a used car can find some vehicle history
information through the National Motor Vehicle Title
Information System, but that information is available only if
the purchaser knows where to find it, and pays a fee. So do you
agree that purchasers of used cars can benefit from knowing
that a used car they intend to purchase has been previously
junked, salvaged, or marked as a total loss?
Mr. Rosekind. Any information that is going to help them
determine the safety of that vehicle is going to be useful to
that consumer, no question.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. So the Vehicle Safety
Improvement Act requires information from vehicle history
report to be made available through the National Motor Vehicle
Title Information System to be included in a buyer guide window
form. Do you think that is a smart provision to go for?
Mr. Rosekind. Every piece of safety information is going to
be helpful.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Finally, sir, current dealers
are prohibited from selling or leasing new vehicles subject to
recall unless a dealer makes the necessary repairs, but the
same regulation does not apply to used cars, which means that
used cars may be sold or leased to consumers with unrepaired
defects. The average recall completion rate for vehicles is
about 75 percent, meaning that a full 25 percent of all
recalled cars are not being repaired. For that Takata airbag
recall, the completion rate so far has been much, much lower.
In many of these cases the cars are not being repaired
because the current owner of the vehicle doesn't know anything
about the recall. So what efforts does--has NHTSA undertaken to
increase the awareness of used car buyers and lessees about the
potential safety defects, and what does NHTSA--or what
obstacles does NHTSA face in getting this information out to
consumers?
Mr. Rosekind. I don't think there is any question this is a
huge part of the whole system, and we have--Secretary Fox and I
have really emphasized finding defects is great, but if you
don't get them fixed, doesn't really matter. So we actually
held, at the end of April, an event called Retooling Recalls,
asking the industry for new ideas, and have set the standard as
100 percent target to get recalls done.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. So do you agree, then, that
the provision of the Vehicle Safety Improvement Act that
prohibits the sale or lease of used cars until any defect has
been remedied would help increase recall completion rates?
Mr. Rosekind. Absolutely.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. And would it make drivers of
used cars safer?
Mr. Rosekind. Absolutely.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Are there other tools that
would help improve the safety of those cars? What would they
be?
Mr. Rosekind. And I would say, from our even in April,
there was a great list of possible things that could be done,
and we are looking at all of them. But we had manufacturers
come in and talk about some of their new strategies, and there
were some new things that only one manufacturer is doing. We
need to figure out what NHTSA could do to get those basically
across the entire industry.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. And, Doctor, how can this
committee be of any service to you as you try to get that
information out?
Mr. Rosekind. Frankly, I think the bill that has been
introduced and Grow America Act are two of the most critical
things right now, as far as our authorities and budget. And
then directly there is the budget, which allows us not just
people, but the authorities, and other kinds of opportunities.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. And, briefly, I only have a
short period of time left, but if--did I hear you say earlier
in your testimony, Doctor, that there were--you had eight staff
that were working on this recall of 34 million vehicles, and
that same staff of eight people working on 1,200 other recalls?
Mr. Rosekind. There are 51 in the Office of Defect
Investigations. Eight of them look at the 80,000 complaints
that come in. A different eight are handling this recall.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. But--so eight people----
Mr. Rosekind. Correct.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. OK. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, the gentleman
yields back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey,
Mr. Lance, 5 minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Lance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Rosekind, I went
online regarding my own situation, and the Web site is
safecar.gov?
Mr. Rosekind. Safercar.gov.
Mr. Lance. Spell that out for the public, please.
Mr. Rosekind. Thank you. S-a-f-e-r-c-a-r-dot-g-o-v.
Safercar.gov.
Mr. Lance. And it has on it how many millions of VIN
numbers?
Mr. Rosekind. The total number of VINs I can't tell you
specifically. For the Takata right now, we are up to 30.4
million vehicles, seven manufacturers.
Mr. Lance. And I know you are working as quickly as you
can, but at the moment, not all of the VIN numbers are on that
site, and I was just lucky that my VIN number had already come
up. But you are informing the American people, through this
committee hearing, which is being televised across this
country, that the American people should go on that Web site
frequently?
Mr. Rosekind. Weekly.
Mr. Lance. Weekly? Now, can you estimate, Dr. Rosekind, as
to when you might have all of the numbers up on the site? And I
know that is a difficult question, and I am just asking, is
there a timeframe that you think you might be able to have?
Mr. Rosekind. We have seven out of 11, and the
manufacturers are working quickly. I would hope within the next
2 weeks we should have that complete data set.
Mr. Lance. So within the next 2 weeks you----
Mr. Rosekind. That is the plan.
Mr. Lance. Very good. Now, I didn't ask this, because then
I called the dealer, and the dealer was very, very cooperative,
and said that he thought he would have a new airbag within 1
week to 4 weeks, and did I need a loaner car? But I didn't
think to ask, should the American people ask, is this for the
driver or for the passenger? And I have no idea at the moment,
and perhaps I should, as to whether in my personal situation it
is the driver or the passenger. And, as I understand it, in
some situations, it is both. Could you enlighten the committee,
and through the committee the American people, on that aspect
of all of this?
Mr. Rosekind. Safercar.gov will tell you what the recall is
for specifically. Driver, passenger, both, it will give you
that information so you will know what to ask the dealer, don't
have to rely--you don't have to rely on the dealer to tell you
what needs to be fixed.
Mr. Lance. And are there situations where there will be the
need for a new airbag for both the driver and the passenger in
the same automobile?
Mr. Rosekind. That could be.
Mr. Lance. Do the auto manufacturers themselves have the
responsibility, I trust, to inform those who have purchased
their automobiles of these potential defects?
Mr. Rosekind. And they make that information both through
safercar.gov, they are the ones who provide us the make and
model and VIN numbers, as well as--most of them provide that on
their own Web sites as well.
Mr. Lance. And are they mailing letters to those who own
the vehicles?
Mr. Rosekind. Yes. There are recall letters that are
officially labeled for people to know specifically what is
being recalled.
Mr. Lance. And do you know, Dr. Rosekind, how many of those
letters have gone out so far?
Mr. Rosekind. That I would have to look into and get back
to you.
Mr. Lance. Thank you. The Wall Street Journal says today,
based upon a German study, that there may be at least four
factors that could lead to all of this, and the factors include
damaged or problematic inflator components, the positioning of
the inflator and airbag system in vehicles, prolonged exposure
to heat and humidity, and manufacturing variability. Are you
now analyzing the new study from the Germans as to whether--
what they suggest may be true?
Mr. Rosekind. So we are looking--we are both aware of that
report, and looking at that, plus there are multiple folks
doing testing. You are going to hear from an independent
testing coalition of the auto manufacturers. Takata is doing
its own. Automakers are doing their own. The Consent Order is
going to give us access to all of that data.
And you have just highlighted, last quick comment, why this
is so difficult. There are over 10 different configurations of
the inflator across all the different makes and models. That is
part of the problem with trying to figure out what the root
cause has been.
Mr. Lance. As I understand it, part of this is using
batwing shaped wafers inside airbags. Would you, through the
committee, explain to the American people what that means?
Mr. Rosekind. And that has to do with the shape or design,
basically, of the propellant container. And that is a perfect
example of the different design configurations that are in over
10 different of these inflators. And that is part of the
problem. In fact, there are some Takata airbags in certain
manufacturers that have ruptured in some manufacturers', but
not other manufacturers', cars.
Mr. Lance. Thank you, you have been very helpful, and let
me say I look forward to the testimony of the second panel.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Burgess. Gentleman yields back. Chair thanks the
gentleman. Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Cardenas, 5 minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Cardenas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Dr.
Rosekind, for all of your service, and for answering our
questions today. Not only for us, but for the people we
represent throughout the country. I am going to start off by
talking about the--your administration, to get an understanding
of how well we are or are not doing, to make sure you have the
resources to protect the American public--or to help protect
the American public.
One estimate puts the number of vehicles on U.S. roads in
2014 at about 253 million, which is nearly four million more
than the estimate of 2013. Meanwhile, in spite of the growing
volume of vehicles, and the increasing complexity of newer
vehicles, NHTSA's budget has remained relatively flat over the
past few years. The fiscal year 2016 budget appropriation of
837 million continues this trend, coming in more than 70
million short of NHTSA's request.
Dr. Rosekind, do you believe that the stagnant funding for
NHTSA, as part of the do more with less culture that has
resulted from sequestration, has made it harder for the
administration to do its job of keeping unsafe vehicles off the
roads?
Mr. Rosekind. There is no question, where NHTSA is
addressing safety risks every day, that the budget and
personnel and authority issues are helping create more risk for
us. From my confirmation hearing, I have identified--we have
done, and will continue to do everything internally, process-
wise, procedurally that we can to be more effective, but at
some point, eight people to look at 80,000 complaints, up from
45,000 the year before, now you are just talking, you know,
people that can get the job done.
Mr. Cardenas. Um-hum. Well, I constantly hear--I have been
elected to office 18 years at various levels, and I constantly
hear some of my colleagues talk about fiscal conservativeness,
and talking about how Government needs to operate more like a
business. I don't know of too many businesses that responsibly
act with eight human beings trying to handle 80,000, you know,
moving parts of issues and constituents. That is not
efficiency. I think that is--well, it is delinquency, to be
honest with. And not delinquent on you, but delinquent on us,
the appropriators. I think we need do--to do a better job of
protecting the American public, or helping you do your job of
helping to protect the American public.
The Office of Defect Investigation, which is responsible
for screening and reviewing 40,000 consumer complaints per
year, and conducting investigations of possible defects, had 51
full time staff in March of 2014, down from 64 in 2002. NHTSA's
fiscal year 2016 budget request includes a request for funds to
do--to more than double the number of ODI personnel. Dr.
Rosekind, is the 837 million that the House Appropriations
Committee approved for the 2016 fiscal year, is it sufficient
for increasing the number of ODI personnel?
Mr. Rosekind. No. That basically flatlines where we are
today. And----
Mr. Cardenas. OK.
Mr. Rosekind. And just to inflate that for you
appropriately, that 40,000 number was last year. Because of all
the attention last year, that number is now 80,000 complaints
coming in.
Mr. Cardenas. So that is where we----
Mr. Rosekind. Doubled.
Mr. Cardenas. So that is where you get to the 80,000?
Mr. Rosekind. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cardenas. Thank you. It is clear that additional
funding sources for NHTSA will be critical to ensure the--
ensuring the administration can keep drivers and passengers
safe. That is why, in addition to new appropriations
specifically for NHTSA's vehicle safety programs, H.R. 1181
would authorize a new vehicle safety user fee. This fee would
be paid by vehicle manufacturers for each U.S. vehicle
certified to be Federal--to meet Federal safety standards,
beginning at $3 per vehicle, and increasing annually to $9 per
vehicle. But this could potentially generate tens of millions
of dollars for NHTSA to spend specifically on safety. Dr.
Rosekind, do you think NHTSA would be able to find efficient
and effective ways to channel the money raised by such a fee
into consumer safety?
Mr. Rosekind. No question. And I think, if anything, it is
all about the safety mission, I think for the agency, and for
me, so you give us more resources, and we will give you more
safety.
Mr. Cardenas. OK. And, once again, looking at the numbers,
the number of vehicles on American roads is growing, correct?
Mr. Rosekind. Yes.
Mr. Cardenas. And, fortunately and unfortunately, when we
have better systems of identifying when there is a defect, that
means that we are much more aware quicker of how many more, in
this case millions, of people need to be notified and
coordinated with, et cetera, so that we can actually get them
in a safer place, with a product that has been identified as
being defective, correct?
Mr. Rosekind. No question. We want to move the whole
industry to a more proactive safety culture. Early
identification means early intervention. Small numbers, we
wouldn't be where we are today.
Mr. Cardenas. Um-hum. Well, I think that Americans take it
for granted that we do have these systems. Unfortunately, I
think that too many Americans ignore the idea that Congress is
not doing its job of properly appropriating so that they are
safe. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. The Chair recognizes gentleman from Kentucky, Mr.
Guthrie, 5 minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for recognition.
Thank you for being here today, real--appreciate it. I have a
question. You mentioned--talking about going to the site and
putting in your VIN number, that you have the information from
seven of 11 manufacturers. Is there a timeline you think you
will have the other four?
Mr. Rosekind. That was asked earlier, and our plan is to
have that within 2 weeks, if not sooner. The manufacturers are
working very quickly.
Mr. Guthrie. Uh-huh.
Mr. Rosekind. Not just about getting the numbers. It is
checking the accuracy, which both they and NTHSA have to do.
Mr. Guthrie. So that is the process that is taking--OK.
Takata suggested that the particular make and model of a
vehicle may be contributing to the inflator defects. Has NHTSA
reviewed that analysis and come to some conclusion with that?
Mr. Rosekind. And that is part of the problem with the root
cause right now. There are not just 10 plus different designs
of the inflators, but we are looking at different makes and
models, so that is exactly what the difficulty is. There are
some Takata inflators in a make and model that has not
ruptured. The same Takata inflator in a different make and
model might rupture. So when you think about all the different
variations you have to look for, that is why it is a challenge
right now trying to come to a root cause.
Mr. Guthrie. Yes, but earlier in my life I was a certified
quality engineer, and so it seems like it is difficult to
recreate the problem. I mean, you--it is just--you can't figure
out exactly the root cause, I am sort of getting at.
And I was, you know, vehicles last a lot longer than they
used to, and people have them for quite a while. And they tell
you to change your oil every 3,000 miles, your tires every so
many thousand, rotate them. Is there any manufacturer or
vehicle out there that has routine maintenance at all on
airbags that you know of?
Mr. Rosekind. That is a very good question. I don't believe
so, but I will get a specific answer for you. And right now the
average vehicle is in service for 11.4 years.
Mr. Guthrie. Um-hum.
Mr. Rosekind. So even many of the statutes that are out
there that only go to 10 are surpassed by the vehicles that are
on the road now.
Mr. Guthrie. So--I mean, obviously people who buy a vehicle
expect their airbag to last as long as their vehicle lasts,
but, as far as we know, there is not a routine kind of
maintenance or check? It is hard to--I mean, it is one of those
things it is a destructive test then to check your airbag, and
you move forward.
I have a question. Since December 3, the hearing that we
had in 2014, how many additional fatalities and injuries? You
might have answered that, but I am not sure I heard that when
you were speaking.
Mr. Rosekind. Specifically we are aware of six worldwide,
people that have lost their lives, and at least 100 injured.
Mr. Guthrie. And also, Mr. Friedman, you weren't here,
testified in December that you were going to hire an expert in
propellant and bag production--airbag production within a week
of the last hearing. Has that--that has taken place, hasn't it?
Mr. Rosekind. Yes, it has, and I have tried to identify--we
have at least four people on staff that know airbags quite
well----
Mr. Guthrie. Um-hum.
Mr. Rosekind [continuing]. But now we have someone with
particular expertise in the areas we are looking at that has
been on staff.
Mr. Guthrie. These four people that know airbags, are they
part of the eight that you were describing, so they are also
looking at the other--as well?
Mr. Rosekind. We have three or four staff people that have
the expertise, as well as a consultant that is outside that has
been added. And the three or four staff people are part of the
eight that we----
Mr. Guthrie. That you were describing? Well--and--so has
there ever been an airbag consultant before on--this is new, I
guess, due to this issue?
Mr. Rosekind. And this individual was picked specifically
because of their expertise on the propellant side. Because,
even with the inflator, if you think about design and all the
other elements, we are really focused on the chemistry in the
propellant.
Mr. Guthrie. Well, thank you, and I appreciate you being
here. I know we are all here trying to find an answer because
of the--even since December 6, and the hundreds of injuries,
and we need to get to the bottom of it, and thank you for being
here today. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burgess. Gentleman yields back. Chair thanks the
gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York,
Ms. Clarke, 5 minutes for your questions, please.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank our
Ranking Member. Dr. Rosekind, thank you for all of your work
and testimony here today. NHTSA first asked Takata to conduct a
national recall in November of 2014. Takata responded by
questioning NHTSA's authority to order the company to undertake
the national recall. In a December hearing held by this
subcommittee, Takata reiterated its belief that a national
recall was unwarranted, although. I should note that many of
the auto manufacturers extended the recalls anyway.
Nearly 6 months to the day since the last hearing, we are
in a much different place, but also 6 months behind where we
should be in getting these dangers airbags out of our cars. Dr.
Rosekind, in today's world goods and services cross State lines
without a second thought. Our cars have an average lifetime of
11 years on the road, and frequently spend time in all corners
of the country during their lifetimes. Given the realities of
the world in which we live today, is it possible for NHTSA to
guarantee that a regional recall will be sufficient?
Mr. Rosekind. Our approach has been--my approach has been
to make sure we focus on national recalls, and that was part of
the challenge previously, was Takata's denial that there was
even a defect. And even though manufacturers stepped up, there
was a wide range of patchwork, basically. Service campaigns,
some recalls, some regional, some national, it was all over the
place. May 19 NHTSA took the driver's seat, and quarter rated--
our coordinated remedy will change all of that.
Ms. Clarke. Yes, I don't think so either. H.R. 1181, the
Vehicle Safety Improvement Act, would eliminate the farce of
regional recalls by making clear that all safety recalls of
motor vehicles and replacement parts must be carried out on a
national basis. The bill will also allow NHTSA to prioritize
certain parts of the country when the quantity of replacement
parts is limited.
Dr. Rosekind, in the past NHTSA has supported regional
recalls. Earlier in this hearing you said that, from your
perspective, recalls are national. Can I then assume you
support this provision of the Vehicle Safety Act?
Mr. Rosekind. We are interested in safety for everybody, so
we start with a national recall.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. Takada's written testimony explains
that for two of the Takata airbags being recalled, the recall
will be regional, and NHTSA will have to order Takada to expand
the recalls nationally. Will you commit to expanding all of the
Takata recalls nationally now?
Mr. Rosekind. And I think it has been interesting to watch
peoples' response to those two. Those two passenger airbag
inflators are the most problematic, and so that, basically, is
trying to ensure that the people at the highest risk get their
fix as quickly as possible. If you read those defect reports,
it expected that those will be national.
Ms. Clarke. So that means that we are looking to have a
national recall now?
Mr. Rosekind. With--yes, with a very specific focus to make
sure in those problematic ones we get those high risk people
covered as quickly as possible.
Ms. Clarke. The recalls of Takata airbags began as safety
improvement campaigns, and regional recalls in all--only
certain parts of the country with high absolute humidity. As
NHTSA, Takata and care--car manufacturers learn more about the
defect, and as inflator ruptures occurred outside those high
humidity areas, the air--automakers each responded differently.
Some expanded their recalls to additional States, others
expanded recalls nationally, and the information for consumers
was hard to find.
It seems to me that the regional recalls in this case only
added to consumer confusion. I believe that conducting national
recalls from the start, with an allowance for prioritization of
placement parts to our most vulnerable geographic areas first
would have lessened the consumer confusion in this case.
Dr. Rosekind, do you agree that that rollout of the recalls
could have been handled better from the very beginning?
Mr. Rosekind. What I am going to do is focus, which
Chairman Burgess already said, I think you beat me by a month
or so, being in the chairs, and so I can speak to the last 5
months, that we are going after national recalls for these to
make sure every American gets a safe airbag in their vehicle.
Ms. Clarke. I just want to make sure that we learn from
this lesson.
Mr. Rosekind. Absolutely.
Ms. Clarke. You know, it is very interesting that, you
know, we are trying to reorganize how we do things. If we know
from the very outset, then we can administer best practices
going forward.
Mr. Rosekind. Absolutely.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentlelady, gentlelady yields
back. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the high
humidity city of Houston, Texas, 5 minutes for your questions,
please.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome Dr.
Rosekind. Before my questions, I want to put a human face--
victim of a defective Takata airbag. His name was Carlos Saliz.
He was 35 years old, lived in Spring, Texas, went to Spring
High School, loved working with his brothers at Progressive
Pumps. He bought a used 2002 Honda Accord, was involved in a
minor crash on January 18 of this year. His airbag deployed,
supposed to save his life, and took his life. He left behind a
wife, Nicole, and three kids, Devon, Alyssa, and Angelina.
His vehicle had a recall notice put out in 2011. He bought
the car in 2014. He had no clue that the vehicle may be
defective. He fell through the cracks. My question is, how can
NHTSA make sure Carlos never happens again? How can we track
the ownership of the vehicle with recall notices?
Mr. Rosekind. First, thank you for recounting that.
Everyone at NHTSA can give you a number. In 2013 there were
32,719 lives lost on our roadways. We know the exact number.
Thank you, because you gave--to the six people that have lost
their lives worldwide, you gave a name and a face to one of
those victims. And I think the concern which has been raised
here earlier is that was a person that had a used car that had
a recall notice out. And so people are buying used cars, or
renting cars that have recalls and defects, acknowledged
defects, that are not being fixed beforehand. So we are looking
for, through Grow America, the Improvement Act that has been
introduced, ways of trying to fix that gap.
Mr. Olson. Well--as Mr. Case--Kennedy said, make sure that
the ownership of the car follows recall notices, because Carlos
had no clue that his car was defective. He was driving what he
thought a great vehicle, had been out there since 2002, and
gets in a minor accident and dies because his airbag killed
him.
I want to talk about--Deputy Administrator Friedman came
here in December, and he stated that NHTSA would look into the
safety of replacement airbags, the ones replacing. And he said
that NHTSA was examining the airbag manufacturers that use the
same propellant. My question is, what is the status of those
investigations, the new devices and the propellant?
Mr. Rosekind. Thank you, because this allows me to
highlight the Consent Order that has been signed will allow us
to direct testing. Previously that was almost exclusively on
root cause. Now we will have an ability to make sure the
testing goes to the adequacy of the remedy, right to your
question, which is there are a variety of possible solutions,
and we need to make sure that testing goes on to examine those,
and make sure that the replacements will be effective long
term.
Mr. Olson. Are there other inflators that need to be
examined from different models of vehicles?
Mr. Rosekind. And thank you. I think, you know, one of the
concerns is we do not know the root cause at this point. On the
other hand, we do know that there are plenty of inflators that
are functioning successfully. In 2013, 611,000 crashes where
airbags deployed, so we know they can function, and we know
that there are even different versions of Takata airbags that
are not rupturing. So that is the good news, is we have other
models or examples that can be pursued to understand what to
change now.
Mr. Olson. Final question about fatigue of recalls. I mean,
last year the American people have been--with GM ignition
switch recalls, massive recalls, Takata airbags out there, all
the recalls--with them. I mean, heck, this past year I got a
new pickup truck, got a notification from GM that there would
be some sort of defect in some sort of sensor, so I had that
taken out at the dealership. My question is, do you think there
is recall fatigue, and how can we fight the fact that recall,
after recall, after recall are hitting the American public, and
finally they just say, I am tired of this, I am driving my car,
it is fine. So how can we fight recall fatigue? Any ideas?
Mr. Rosekind. First of all, I think it absolutely exists,
and we held an event in April called retooling recalls, one to
readjust. 75 percent may be good, but we have readjusted the
target to be 100 completion. And then it was actually fantastic
to see the number of manufacturers that are coming up with
creative ways. Some manufacturers are actually taking their
creative team to help them sell vehicles, and now applying them
to the recall.
So they are having special hours, they are having weekends
with, you know, things for the kids. Private investigators are
going to home to locate these people. A whole list of new
ideas, and we are going to try and find a way to make sure
everybody in the industry has excess to those--access to those
ideas, and actually are following up to take action.
Mr. Olson. Thank you. About out of time. On behalf of
Carlos Saliz, thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 5
minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First
let me thank you, Chairman Burgess, for holding today's
hearing. I think this is a very important hearing, and
hopefully we can get some good information into the record that
can have a bearing directly on the issue that we are talking
about.
This is an important issue. I am somewhat surprised, Mr.
Chairman, to learn that the Takata airbag malfunctions have
been linked to areas of high humidity. I am not sure that I
really knew that. If I knew it, I didn't fully appreciate it
until recently. I represent a very humid district down in North
Carolina. Maybe not as humid as the districts are down in
Texas, Mr. Chairman, but we are indeed a region that is very
humid from time to time.
Though North Carolina is outside the designated high
absolute humidity area, one of these airbag malfunctions
occurred in my State, causing me a great a deal of worry about
the safety and efficacy of airbags manufactured by Takata, and
the potential for my constituents to be seriously harmed, or
even worse. I also have concerns about what practical impact
this recall, and any recall, will have on the rental car
market, so I will be concentrating on this aspect during my
question time today.
The U.S. rental market is huge, we all acknowledge that. In
fact, one study estimates that there were nearly 2.1 million
rental cars in service last year. However, despite the scale of
the market, Federal law does not require rental car companies
to remedy defects in rental cars before renting them to
consumers. So a company could rent a car subject to this recall
without an airbag that has yet to be replaced.
So, Dr. Rosekind, again, thank you for your testimony. Do
you believe that rental car companies should be prohibited from
renting a car unless all known recalls and effects--defects
have been repaired?
Mr. Rosekind. If a defect has been identified, used cars
and recalls should be fixed before they are allowed to put keys
in consumers' hands.
Mr. Butterfield. That is just clear as it can be. Do you
think that most consumers would assume that a rental car, which
may be newer than their own vehicle, is a safe vehicle?
Mr. Rosekind. And that is the problem. While we can have
this hearing, and talk about getting people for Takata to go to
safergov dot--safercar.gov, almost nobody who rents a car or
buys a used one will probably ever do that. And that is a gap
we have to fill.
Mr. Butterfield. Yes. Well, I drive a 1995 Toyota and a
2000 Ford Explorer, and all of the rental cars that I rent are
much better than my personal vehicles.
Dr. Rosekind, do you think consumers have a right to free
loaner cars while their cars are getting repaired? Regardless
if consumers are given loaner cars, should there be a
requirement that those loaners themselves, before being loaned,
have no outstanding recalls?
Mr. Rosekind. So thank you for raising that question. It
comes up often what people should do, and we are telling
people, if there is concern about their Takata inflator, they
should talk to their dealer or manufacturer about a loaner or
rental car.
Mr. Butterfield. Recently Congresswoman Capps and myself
introduced a bill that would prohibit a rental car that
receives a notification about any defect or non-compliance with
Federal motor vehicle safety standards to rent or sell the
vehicle unless the defect is remedied. Dr. Rosekind, NHTSA has,
in the past, supported similar legislation that prohibits
rental car companies from renting vehicles subject to a recall,
unless the defect is remedied. As the new NHTSA administrator,
do you continue to support this type of legislation?
Mr. Rosekind. And the Administration, and Secretary Fox,
have done that as well through Grow America, which specifically
has both used car and rental car defect issues covered just
that way.
Mr. Butterfield. All right. You are very clear in your
responses, and I thank you for the manner in which you
responded. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Bilirakis, 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate. And
thank you, Dr. Rosekind, for testifying today. It is my opinion
that the Takata SPI inflator rupture may have been--it is my
understanding, anyway, that the--it may have been caused by
high humidity. What is the minimum exposure period before an
inflator is considered by Takata to be at risk in a high
humidity area? And if you have an opinion as to whether it was
caused by high humidity, I would like to hear it as well.
Mr. Rosekind. I am going to put my NTSB hat on and just say
I would be very cautious about saying probable cause at this
point, because there is no root cause. But to your question,
there is no--there is absolutely data that shows humidity,
because of the moisture, can have an effect on the inflator.
And we could get into the chemistry, but your main question is
what we have seen in the data. Somewhere between 7 \1/2\ to
about 12.3 years is where we are seeing that inflator can
rupture.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. All right. Next question is, I
understand that NHTSA is helping prioritize the most urgently
needed replacements to various parts of the country that need
it most. In theory, this approach would help manage a finite
supply, and ensure that the consumers who are most in danger
are protected more quickly. But this phased approach does not
appear to match with NHTSA's rollout in May 19, which grabbed
headlines by covering 34 million vehicles.
My constituents are in a high humidity area, I represent
Florida, but it is unclear whether they can now obtain
replacement parts, and if not, at which point can they obtain
replacement parts in the future? I would like for you to answer
that question. Are replacement parts available now in Florida,
but maybe not available in New Jersey, and other parts of the
country? And, again, are there enough replacement parts
available, period?
Mr. Rosekind. So first I would say safercar.gov is going to
let them know, if they are checking that. They say recall for
their vehicle, they need to call their dealer, because they
will tell them if the part is available. For the second part,
there is no question that one of the issues that we have with
our coordinated remedy program is to make sure that sufficient
supply of inflators are available across the country.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, and Representative
Clarke covered the additional questions. So I appreciate it
very much, and I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Indiana, Ms. Brooks,
5 minutes for your questions, please.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to say, when
you have testified, Dr. Rosekind, that NHTSA was working hard,
or you have testified that--working hard to stamp up some
testing facilities of your own so you can verity the work that
Takata is doing, it was in your written testimony, can you give
us a status update on those validation activities? And is there
a new NHTSA testing facility for these airbag inflators? Can
you just share with us what is happening with that progress?
Mr. Rosekind. And thank you for asking about that, because
previously what NHTSA did was arrange to have data available to
us, but his now provides us another resource to actually verify
the testing, and any testing. So whether it is Takata's, or the
independent coalition, we will be able to look at all that.
So we have a facility in Ohio that allows us to do some
testing, but because of the inflator rupture, we are talking
about ballistic testing. You have got to blow them up and have
them rupture. So Batel is helping us do that, and we basically
have a plan already outlined. So, as of May 19, that plan is
underway. How many have actually been tested by this point, I
can't say, but we have our own independent testing being done
by an outside laboratory to help us do that.
Mrs. Brooks. So you are now using--because it required a
different kind of testing than you had capabilities for, you
are now using an outside tester?
Mr. Rosekind. Correct.
Mrs. Brooks. And do you have any idea how long the testing
has been going on, and how is it going?
Mr. Rosekind. I will get you specifics. I know the contract
with Batel was signed a while ago, and the most important thing
was to get a plan, which, as I have tried to emphasize, is not
just, you know, we have tried to not just look at the root
cause, which is what everyone else--we are now also trying to
focus on the remedy. So I can get you information about when
that contract was signed, what the plan is, and basically that
should tell you what the calendar expectations are as well.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you. And--so you have mentioned several
times in your testimony today that we may never know the root
cause, and the root cause is a problem. And so problems
associated with the beta inflators have persisted for years,
and it feels as if we are not making any progress in
determining the root cause. So, given that, how will we know--
how will--be satisfied that you have enough data to determine
the adequacy of the proposed remedy if we don't know the
original root cause?
Mr. Rosekind. So I have often--around NHTSA, even though
they wonder why I keep bringing this up, but while I was at the
NTSB is when we investigated the 787 Dreamliner Boeing lithium
ion battery fire. That was a year investigation, and some
people would question whether the root cause was ever
discovered. The entire fleet was grounded. And so that required
Boeing coming up with a solution without fully knowing the root
cause, which was identifying all the potential failure points,
engineering a solution to that, testing it, and now they are
flying again very quickly.
So we have that possibility, including the fact there are
all kinds of airbags, including Takata inflators, that are out
there that are not rupturing. So, between those two things,
there is an opportunity, without root cause, to still get a
solution.
Mrs. Brooks. So essentially taking your experience form
NTSB, and how that would be the proposal that you will use
going forward with Takata?
Mr. Rosekind. Yes, and let me just add, because I haven't
had chance to say this, but you have just raised one of the
core questions we have been asking, at least since I have been
there in January, is how long do you wait?
Mrs. Brooks. Um-hum.
Mr. Rosekind. So I had been at the NTSB--we couldn't wait a
year to come up with an answer or not come up with an answer.
So that is part of why we have pushed to basically take the
driver's seat to get a focus on the remedy, and the supply, and
all the other factors that will make a difference to get that
safe airbag in everybody's vehicle.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, and thank you for your work on
this. You are right, we can't wait, and so--encourage your
persistence in fighting for this. Thank you.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentlelady, gentlelady yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Kinzinger, 5 minutes for your questions, please.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, sir, thank you
for being here and answering our questions. Most of them have
been asked. I just have a couple of ones, so I probably won't
take all of my 5 minutes.
But you talk about the coordinated remedy program, what is
going to be involved, and when will you have a plan for acting
as the central coordinator for the coordinated remedy program?
Mr. Rosekind. So--thanks, because that gives me a chance to
really focus on the endgame here. I keep talking about NHTSA
sitting in the driver's seat, because, up until this point, it
was really unclear how this was all going to happen. And so now
we have a plan to be meeting with the manufacturers. We have
already made contact with them. We will be meeting with
suppliers. We will have joint meetings. And our intent, once
that plan is together, is to have a public meeting, so there is
transparency to the entire plan and schedule. We are hoping for
that hearing to occur in the early fall.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK. All right. And who within NHTSA with
recall logistics expertise will be leading this coordination,
or is this something that you are doing to need to probably
contract out?
Mr. Rosekind. Actually, right now there is an internal team
at NHTSA that is overseeing this, so I have people from the
defect/engineering group, a group that is dealing with the
legal enforcement issues, and communications. So those three
groups have come together to basically provide oversight for
the process.
Mr. Kinzinger. And do you believe that they have enough
expertise to carry out this process, enough recall logistics
expertise?
Mr. Rosekind. At this point yes, and I think during our
development of a future plan, if we find other resources are
needed, I will be the first one to let everybody know to make
sure----
Mr. Kinzinger. OK.
Mr. Rosekind [continuing]. That we get this done right.
Mr. Kinzinger. So if you don't have it, you would be
willing to look at, you know, outside, or whatever you need to
get this done right?
Mr. Rosekind. Yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK. Well, you have answered pretty much all
the questions I have, so, with that, I will yield back the 3
minutes remaining.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman. Will you yield
your remaining time to me?
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes, I will yield it to you.
Mr. Burgess. I thank the gentleman for that. Mr. Rosekind,
as you are probably aware, last night in the Rules Committee we
did the rule for the Transportation Appropriations bill that
will be on the floor either this week or next week. So,
recognizing we were having this hearing today, I asked the
Transportation Subcommittee in Appropriations if they would
share with me the spending plan submitted to their subcommittee
by NHTSA. Every agency and department is required to submit a
spending plan to the Appropriations Committee, or appropriate
Appropriations Subcommittee, as they do their work, and build
the appropriations bills that we will then vote on.
So, I have got to say, what I was given is pretty sparse,
so I am going to give you the benefit of the doubt, and if you
would like to provide me with the spending plan that you
provided to the Appropriations Subcommittee, I would be happy
to review it, and review it with you, if you would like.
Chairman Upton said--he made reference to the fact that we need
to make sure the appropriations are in line. Ms. Schakowsky has
talked about that. So, again, I will make this available to
you, if it is as written, and that is fine. If you think there
is a different spending plan that I should be looking at, I
will be happy to do that. And, again, I will be happy to follow
up with you. And I do want to stress, you have always been very
good about keeping me, as the chairman of the subcommittee,
informed about what you are doing, and for that I am very
grateful.
I am filibustering just a little bit because Mr. Engel is
allegedly on his way here. So let me just ask----
Mr. Rosekind. And can I----
Mr. Burgess. Yes, please.
Mr. Rosekind. I want to thank you for that opportunity,
because when we--the President's budget has much detail about
new----
Mr. Burgess. Mr. Rosekind, I have got to interrupt you
there.
Mr. Rosekind. OK.
Mr. Burgess. The President's budget never gets a single
vote. Republican Senate----
Mr. Rosekind. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burgess [continuing]. Or House, Senate, Republican or
Democrat, no one would even offer the President's budget up for
a vote this year. So that is, you know, I mean, the President--
and this is not unique to the Obama administration. President
Bush's budgets, when I was here in the majority earlier,
frequently those would not pass on the floor of the House and
the Senate.
So, sure, the President sends up a wish list that balances
never, and, yes, it has got everything funded to a level that
would be great, if we lived in a world of unlimited resources,
but you are the Administrator. And I have run a business. You
understand that, as the Administrator, sometimes you have to
prioritize spending, and that is what we really are looking for
you to do. That is what we want you to do, just as the same as
the director of NIH, just the same as Dr. Frieden at the CDC.
We want you to prioritize and spend appropriately. But, again,
I will give you the benefit of the doubt. This looks pretty
thin to me. I just welcome the chance to go through the
spending plan with you.
And then, finally, last year, on a bipartisan basis, this
committee requested that the Government Accountability Office
review NHTSA's internal structure and procedures to assess the
agency's ability to keep pace with advancements in vehicle
technology. At the committee's hearing in December, Deputy
Administrator Friedman committed to cooperating with the
Government Accountability Office's review. Will you reaffirm
this commitment to cooperate with GAO in this review?
Mr. Rosekind. Absolutely, and we already are.
Mr. Burgess. I appreciate that very much. Do you have any--
OK. At this point we are going to have to forego questions by
Mr. Engel, and I apologize. We will get his questions to you in
writing, and any member of the committee may have further
questions. But, seeing there are no further members wishing to
ask questions for this panel, I do want to thank Administrator
Rosekind for being here today.
This will conclude our first panel. We will take a brief
recess to set up the second panel. Thank you, sir.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burgess. I will call the subcommittee back to order.
Thanks to everyone for their patience, and for taking time to
be here today. We will move into the second panel for today's
hearing. We are going to follow the same format as the first
panel. Each witness will be given 5 minutes to summarize their
opening statement, followed by questions from the members.
For our second panel, we want to welcome the following
witnesses: Mr. Kevin Kennedy, the Executive Vice President of
North America Takata; Mr. David Kelly, Project Director,
Independent Testing Coalition; Mr. Mitch Bainwol, President and
CEO of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers; and Mr. John
Bozzella, the Chief Executive Officer of Global Automakers.
We will begin our second panel with Mr. Kennedy. Sir, you
are recognized for 5 minutes for your opening statement,
please.
STATEMENTS OF KEVIN M. KENNEDY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NORTH
AMERICA, TAKATA; DAVID KELLY, PROJECT DIRECTOR, INDEPENDENT
TESTING COALITION; MITCH BAINWOL, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS; AND JOHN
BOZZELLA, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF
GLOBAL AUTOMAKERS
STATEMENT OF KEVIN M. KENNEDY
Mr. Kennedy. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky,
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to
be here on behalf of Takata, and our employees throughout the
United States. For Takata, safety is the core of who we are and
what we do. We are proud that Takata airbags have saved
thousands of lives, and prevented serious injuries in hundreds
of thousands of accidents. It is unacceptable to us for even
one of our products to fail to perform as intended. We deeply
regret each instance in which someone has been injured or
killed.
We are committed to doing everything in our power to
address the safety concerns raised by airbag ruptures. Our
chairman has made that commitment personally to Administrator
Rosekind, so let me tell you what we are doing. After months of
testing, and extensive analysis, we have agreed with NHTSA to
take broad actions, in conjunction with automakers, to respond
to your concerns, and those of the public. We have recommended
dramatically expanded recalls, including national recalls, that
go well beyond what is suggested by the science and testing.
Most of the ruptures on the road, and all of the fatalities
in the U.S., have involved older Takata driver airbag inflators
with batwing shaped propellants--propellant wafers, pardon me,
that were originally subjected to previous recalls, and most of
those have occurred in the regions of the country with high
heat and absolute humidity. Nevertheless, we are proposing
expanded national recalls to replace all of these batwing
driver inflators, from the start of production through the end
of production, in any vehicle registered anywhere in the United
States. The recommended recalls will proceed in stages. The
final stage will include the replacement of all batwing driver
inflators previously installed as remedy parts. Takata will
cease producing the batwing driver inflators altogether.
There have been far fewer field ruptures involving
passenger airbags. Nevertheless, our agreement with NHTSA also
contemplates significantly expanded recalls for passenger
airbag inflators, including a nationwide recall for one type of
inflator. The recalls for the other passenger inflators will
cover specific vehicle models ever registered in the high
absolute humidity States, but with the potential, excuse me,
for the recalls to expand to other States, if ordered by NHTSA.
We will continue to test inflators beyond the scope of the
recalls to determine whether further action is appropriate.
For both driver and passenger airbags, all analysis to date
indicates that the potentials for rupturing is limited to an
extremely small fraction of older inflators. That is not meant
to minimize the issue. One rupture is too many. It does
explain, however, why Takata's filings state that a safety-
related defect may arise in some of the inflators. Not all of
the inflators covered by the proposed recalls are defective.
Based on 50,000 tests to date, and research involving
leading experts from around the world, our best current
judgment is that the potential for rupture is related to long
term exposure over many years to persistent conditions of high
heat and high absolute humidity, as well as other potential
factors, including possible manufacturing and vehicle specific
issues. Nonetheless, we have proposed a broader remedy program.
NHTSA will play a central role in overseeing this remedy
program. Takata will prepare a plan for NHTSA, outlining steps
to help determine the safety and expected service life of the
remedy parts. We will also work with NHTSA and our customers to
get the word out to consumers to help maximize recall
completion rates.
In addition to increasing our own testing, we are actively
supporting the testing work of the automakers and NHTSA. We
also continue to support the work of the Independent Quality
Assurance Panel, led by former Secretary of Transportation Sam
Skinner, and we are continually ramping up our production of
replacement kits. In December we were producing approximately
350,000 kits per month. We are now producing more than 700,000,
and by September we expect our monthly production to reach one
million units.
Half of the replacement kits we shipped last month
contained inflators made by other suppliers, and by the end of
the year we expect that to reach 70 percent. We have confidence
in the inflators we are making today, the integrity of our
engineering and manufacturing, and we believe that, properly
made and installed, these inflators will work as designed to
save lives. We will continue to do everything we can to ensure
uncompromised safety, and the success of the recall efforts,
and we will keep Congress, NHTSA, and the public updated on our
progress. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]
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Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman. Mr. Kelly,
recognized for 5 minutes for your opening statement, please.
STATEMENT OF DAVID KELLY
Mr. Kelly. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to
appear before you to discuss the activities of the Independent
Testing Coalition. The ITC is comprised of 10 automakers that
have Takata airbags in their passenger vehicles, and is
committed to an independent and comprehensive investigation of
the technical issues associated with Takata airbag inflators,
and look forward to the results of this process as we focus on
the safety, security, and peace of mind of all motorists. Our
primary goal is to find the root cause of this problem.
As we have started to look at this issue of energetic
disassembling, it is apparent that there is no silver bullet or
easy solution to be found. The public needs to understand that
experts have been studying this problem for years. If this was
anything but the complex project that it is, a root cause would
have been identified by now. Unfortunately, that is not the
case, and a final determination is not imminent.
We have devised a detailed testing plan that, when
completed, will examine every identified aspect of this
problem. We will conduct more--we will conduct tens of
thousands of chemical tests alone. This will be supplemented by
a similar number of non-destructive tests, and many thousands
of advanced computer simulation runs. In addition, there will
be a significant amount of data generated from our tests that
then must be analyzed. This issue is too important for any
stone to be left unturned.
I do want to stress that we intend to conduct our
investigation in an independent manner. We will work with
Takata, we will work with NHTSA, we will work with all the
affected parties, but we will conduct this investigation in an
independent manner. We very much appreciate any input and
suggestion from all the parties, but we will do our own
analysis of others' data and testing procedures. When we finish
our investigation, we do intend to make our findings public.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
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Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair recognize
Mr. Bainwol, 5 minutes for your testimony, please.
STATEMENT OF MITCH BAINWOL
Mr. Bainwol. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky,
members of the subcommittee, thanks for this opportunity. On
behalf of the 12 leading global--on behalf of 12 leading global
OEMs, including the U.S. companies, and nine European and
Japanese-based companies, I appreciate this opportunity to
testify. I would like to make four summary points. First, your
hearing today is timely and welcomed, and we are fully
committed to doing our part to successfully complete this
recall, while continuing to build on the very significant
safety advances of recent years. The magnitude of the Takata
airbag recall is unprecedented and global. There are no easy
answers, or quick fixes. That is why we support Administrator
Rosekind's decision to use NHTSA authority to organize and
prioritize affected manufacturers remedy programs. We all want
a clear, unified approach. We share this committee's
frustration. It is very difficult for us to be able to tell our
customers, your constituents, how long this will take to be
fully resolved.
Second, though the logistics in a global economy with about
80 million units sold each year around the world are highly
complex, and there are legal impediments to the industry-led
coordination, the key challenge of most recalls is more basic,
and that is getting consumers to take advantage of the free
fix, especially in order vehicles. The average consumer
participation rate for light vehicle recalls after about a year
and a half is 83 percent for newer vehicles, but falls to 44
percent for vehicles 5 to 10 years old, and falls further to 15
percent for vehicles older than 10 years.
Because of these concerns, our members have tasked the
alliance to conduct the most intensive public opinion research
ever on recalls to learn what motivates some consumers to
respond, and why others don't, what motivates consumers to go
into the dealership and get it done, what messages work, and
what messengers are most effective. Work is underway now, and
we will share the results with NHTSA and you to help forge a
multi-pronged effort to strengthen consumer participation.
Third--context. Recall policy is vitally important, and we
are committed to strengthening the process for resolving
defects. That said, it is just one piece of the safety
equation, and, as a share of fatalities on the road, a
relatively fractional one. Most fatalities, certainly 90
percent plus, result from human error, principally impaired
driving, and failure to sue seat belts. While we are seeing
profound gains in safety over the last 50 years, and especially
over the last decade, technology does offer the promise of even
greater advances as we build on crashworthiness, and introduce
the idea of crash avoidance functionality. All the new jargon
we hear, driver assist, V to V, V to X, and ultimately self-
driving vehicles, are part of a continuum that thankfully will
save thousands of lives by helping to compensate for driver
error. This isn't speculation. This is our emerging reality.
Fourth, and finally, let me state the obvious. OEMs are
passionately committed to improving safety, and we are very
proud of the results we have achieved, both because it is the
right thing to do, and because it is good business. Safety
innovation is critical to the competitive landscape. Auto
companies are investing about 100 billion, billion with a B,
every year in research and development to comply and to
compete, to comply with a various--with various public policy
requirements in the U.S. and elsewhere, and to compete in the
globally dynamic marketplace. That investment is paying off,
and our polling shows that your consumers, that your customers,
your constituents, do see the progress. Relative to 10 years
ago, your constituents say cars are safer by 86 to 5 percent,
they get better fuel economy by 89 to 3 percent, and they are
of higher quality by 79 to 12 percent, so the progress is being
recognized, and that is terrific.
Thanks for the opportunity to share our thinking. We stand
ready to work with you, and your staffs, to make our roads as
safe as possible.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bainwol follows:]
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Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair recognize
Mr. Bozzella, 5 minutes for your statement, please.
STATEMENT OF JOHN BOZZELLA
Mr. Bozzella. Chairman Burgess, Ranking Member Schakowsky,
members of the committee, I really appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today. Global Automakers represents
international automotive manufacturers that design, build, and
sell cars and light trucks in the United States. Our members
sold 43 percent of new vehicles purchased in the U.S. last
year, and produced 40 percent of all vehicles built here.
Individually and jointly, our member companies are committed to
working toward a future in which there are zero highway
fatalities. The safety of Americans traveling on our roadways
remains a priority.
Mr. Chairman, this hearing presents an opportunity to
further this important discussion on improving auto safety. The
Takata recall is an unprecedented situation. The number of
manufacturers, and the number and age of affected vehicles
involved, along with the sophistication and complexity of the
technology, makes this unique. As such, affected automakers are
taking extraordinary measures to locate and communicate recall
information to vehicle owners so that they know to take their
vehicles in for repair.
Our members have gone far beyond what the law requires.
They are--multiple rounds of recall notices. They are sending
Express Mail to ensure that the notifications are not
discarded. They are using multiple platforms, such as
advertising, social media, and electronic communications. They
are working closely with their dealer networks to ensure that
dealers have the capacity to service vehicles with open
recalls. Additionally, they created the ITC to conduct
independent testing of recalled parts, as led by David Kelly.
Of course, recall campaigns are only one component of
creating a safer driving environment. The Takata recall
highlights the complex nature of the industry and the
challenges we face today. All stakeholders must work together
in the effort to improve vehicle and highway safety. Critical
areas of focus include proper oversight of existing safety
systems, the development and introduction of new technologies,
and driver and passenger behavior. This committee, through its
authorship of the TREAD Act, has given NHTSA the ability to
require reporting and tracking of safety-related data that
better allows us to identify problems in the existing fleet of
vehicles, and to address and solve them.
In part, the number of recalls that have occurred in recent
years is evidence that the requirements of the TREAD Act,
NHTSA's ongoing vigilance, and the commitment of the
manufacturers, are advancing the goal of improved vehicle
safety. Automakers are now deploying advanced technologies
which will accelerate the move from crash survival to crash
avoidance, including forward collision warning and braking, and
soon vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to infrastructure
communications. According to the DOT, vehicle to vehicle
communications, when fully deployed, could address 80 percent
of crashes involving unimpaired drivers.
A holistic approach to vehicle and highway safety must
include human behavior, which plays a role in a voluntary
recall system. For newer vehicles, the recall completion rate
is upwards of 80 percent. The completion rate falls
dramatically as vehicles age. This is a key challenge in
resolving the Takata recall, and raises an important question,
are there limits to the success of a voluntary system? Global
automakers and our members are exploring ways the industry can
achieve better outcomes. We are working with NHTSA officials,
and are happy to talk with you about new methods for getting
useful, effective, and actionable recall information to our
customers, such as including recall notifications and annual
vehicle registration processes.
Mr. Chairman, it is important to keep in mind that highway
safety is improving. This past December, NHTSA announced that
traffic fatalities decreased by 3.1 percent over the previous
year, and by nearly 25 percent since 2004. However, there is
clearly more work to be done. Regarding the Takata recall, the
most important thing we can do right now is to make sure people
are aware of the status of their vehicle. Every vehicle owner
should go to safercar.gov and enter their VIN, the Vehicle
Identification Number, to determine whether additional action
is needed. This needs to be done now, and it needs to be done
several weeks from now, when manufacturers will have posted the
specific VINs of the vehicles that have just been added to the
recall list. Personally, I did this myself for my vehicle and
my children's vehicle, and it gave me the peace of mind to
knowing where we are at.
Global automakers and our members will continue to work
toward our mutual goal of 100 percent recall completion, and
zero traffic fatalities. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bozzella follows:]
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Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman. Chair thanks the
entire panel for their testimony today. We will move into the
question portion of the hearing, and I will recognize myself
for 5 minutes for questions.
I have got a couple of questions that relate to the
propellant in the inflator. And, Mr. Kennedy, I am primarily
going to ask you, but, Mr. Kelly, if you have information,
because of your independent testing role, please feel free to
add. Is--Mr. Kennedy, is Takata the only airbag manufacturer
that uses sodium nitrate in its airbags?
Mr. Kennedy. It is ammonium nitrate, sir----
Mr. Burgess. I am sorry, ammonium.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. And I believe we are the only one
that uses it as a main propellant. There are other
manufacturers that use it as a supplemental propellant.
Mr. Burgess. Is there any other airbag, other than those
manufactured by Takata, that has been--experienced this
energetic disruption, I think you called it, Mr. Kelly?
Mr. Kelly. I can't really speak to all--recalls for the
other suppliers, Chairman Burgess. I really don't know the
answer to that.
Mr. Burgess. Well, it is just that we have had, you know,
this is the second hearing that I have been involved in of--on
this issue, and ammonium nitrate just keeps coming up. I mean,
it is a pretty powerful compound, and it just begs the
question, is there a linear relationship between the ammonium
nitrate used as an inflator and these accidents that are
happening?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, the studies that we have done, and the
research that we have from some of the leading experts in the
world, seem to indicate that ammonium nitrate is certainly a
factor in the inflator ruptures. There are many, many other
factors. I think you heard Dr. Rosekind talk about some of
them. You have heard Mr. Kelly talk about some of them. The--
takes a long time. As Dr. Rosekind said, 7 to 12 years. It
takes high absolute humidity, it takes high heat.
But what is difficult about the situation is you can put
two inflators in that situation, one of them is fine, and one
of them is not. So that is really what the struggle has been
with getting to the root cause. But ammonium nitrate appears to
be one of the factors that contributes.
Mr. Burgess. So it is--high humidity is an issue. My
understanding is some of these are manufactured with a
desiccant to absorb humidity----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Mr. Burgess [continuing]. Which would then go along with a
7-to-12-year timeframe of--presumably the desiccant is going to
get completely used up over some period of time. Is that
correct?
Mr. Kennedy. I don't know that it would get complete used
up, sir. It depends on the amount of moisture that is in a
particular inflator, and the amount of desiccant. Many of our
later generation inflators do contain desiccant, along with
ammonium nitrate. We have not seen this issue with those
inflators in the field, so we know that that is a factor that
contributes to the life of the inflator.
Mr. Burgess. Does Takata manufacture any airbag that is
used in any make or model of vehicle that uses sodium--I mean,
I am sorry, ammonium nitrate without a desiccant?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes. Some of our--some--all of these inflators
that are involved in these issues that we are talking about are
all ammonium nitrate without desiccant.
Mr. Burgess. And are you still manufacturing ammonium
nitrate without a desiccant as the propellant?
Mr. Kennedy. For a few platforms that we have not
transitioned out of yet, but we are working to transition out
of them as quickly as possible.
Mr. Burgess. So, I am sorry, you go out and buy a brand new
car off the showroom floor, and it could have one of these
instruments in it?
Mr. Kennedy. It could have an ammonium nitrate-based
inflator that does not have desiccant, that is correct.
Mr. Burgess. Is there any obligation to warn the consumer
that they are buying something that may be problematic?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, the recalls that are in process at this
point are for certain timeframes, certain vehicles, certain
technologies. Those would not be involved in a brand new
vehicle at this point, but that is why we are continuing, as
part of the Consent Order, to test outside of the boundaries of
what is involved in the recall to really understand what this--
what the total scope is.
Mr. Burgess. Well, I am sorry, you are not providing me
much reassurance with that answer. Let me just ask you this.
You said that by September you will be up to a million units a
month----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, and then we will continue to go up after
that as well.
Mr. Burgess. But under--just simple math, it is--for 34
million vehicles, I mean, it is almost 3 years as a timeframe.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, it is about--I mean, roughly--the exact
numbers are in the DIRs, but the additional due to these DIRs
is about 16, 17. I don't mean to minimize it. It is obviously a
huge number whichever way you look at it. But previously there
had been about 18 million of that 34 that have already been
under recall. We have supplied over four million kits already
since January of last year, and now, as I said, we are up to
750,000 a month, going to a million a month----
Mr. Burgess. OK. Let me just----
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Going beyond that.
Mr. Burgess. Let me just ask you this. I don't mean to
interrupt, but my time is up.
Mr. Kennedy. That is OK.
Mr. Burgess. Are any of the replacement modules that you
are putting--reinstalling in vehicles that are brought in to
have their airbag system changed out, are any of those ammonium
nitrate propellants without desiccants?
Mr. Kennedy. Some of them are. As I said, we have gotten
about 50 percent with outside inflators that are nonammonium
nitrate. On the driver's side, where we have had most of the
issues, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, we are completely
transitioning out of the batwings, and we will be using either
a desiccated inflator without batwings, or we will be using a
competitor's inflator.
Mr. Burgess. All right, thank you. My time has expired. Ms.
Schakowsky, 5 minutes for questions, please.
Ms. Schakowsky. I want to follow up on the chairman's
question. You have talked about what are the possible reasons,
including ammonium nitrate perhaps being part of the cause, and
you are saying, if I understand you correctly, that you are
providing replacement bags that have--that are--have ammonium
nitrate without a desiccant?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, ma'am, that is correct.
Ms. Schakowsky. So--I don't understand that. What is under
recall right now?
Mr. Kennedy. Certain model years, certain designs, on
certain vehicles.
Ms. Schakowsky. But why, if ammonium nitrate may be a
problem, would you, and why would I buy, a--put in--why would
you put it in a car, why would I buy a car that has a
potentially dangerous airbag? I am not understand.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we are working to move away from those
as quickly as we can, but to--in a vehicle, it is not as easy
as just changing the color of the car, or changing a bolt.
Ms. Schakowsky. No, you are----
Mr. Kennedy. It is very, very----
Ms. Schakowsky. No, I am talking about replacements now,
not even the----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Ms. Schakowsky [continuing]. New cars.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Ms. Schakowsky. So the replacement could be as dangerous as
the current, why would you even replace it?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, as I said, without really exactly
understanding the root cause, and continuing to test outside of
the bounds of what we have already recalled, we are trying to
determine that. We are trying to understand exactly what are
the factors that lead to this, and should we do something
different than what we are doing right now?
We know it does--as you heard Dr. Rosekind say, it takes 7
\1/2\ to 12 years, so putting in a brand new part is a huge
improvement in safety. And as we continue to test, if it shows
that we need to take additional actions, we will take
additional actions.
Ms. Schakowsky. So does the recall affect cars that are
over 10 years old?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, some of them--I think--well, the original
recalls did. These new ones announced, I would have to look at
the DIRs and see, because of that overlap that I talked about.
But some of them go back to as early as I think 2000, 2001----
Ms. Schakowsky. OK.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Were the first ones involved.
Ms. Schakowsky. My understanding is that you are doing that
of older cars, but you are not required to do so. So I wanted
to ask you if Takada has taken a position on the Vehicle Safety
Improvement Act, H.R. 1181?
Mr. Kennedy. No, we have not publicly. I am aware of the
bill. I am not aware of all the particulars in the bill. But we
certainly support any effort that would help improve the return
rate on recalls.
Ms. Schakowsky. So let me give you some of the items in the
bill, and see if you would support that. H.R. 1181 would
increase the quantity and quality if information shared by auto
manufacturers with NHTSA, the public, and Congress,
specifically requires manufacturers to include in their
quarterly submissions to NHTSA additional information on fatal
incidents possibly caused by a defect, and assess why the
incident may have occurred, and removes the limitation on the
number of model years that should be reported. Is this
something that sounds supportable to you?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, it is a little disingenuous for me,
because it is not a requirement for our company to comment on
it. But it would seem like that would be a good idea in order
to increase the visibility on some of these issues that have
been going on in the field.
Ms. Schakowsky. Do you think it would be a good idea to not
limit to 10 years the number of mandatory--of recalls, asking
that cars older than 10 years be part of the required recall?
Mr. Kennedy. Quite frankly, I didn't know there was a limit
of 10 years, because, as I said, some of these vehicles are 15
years old.
Ms. Schakowsky. Would you think that it is a good idea for
NHTSA to have new imminent hazard authority to expedite recalls
related to dangerous defects?
Mr. Kennedy. That is, again, a difficult one for a
supplier, I think, to answer. But I think anything that
improves the safety on the road is certainly a step in the
right direction.
Ms. Schakowsky. Do you think there is any reason to support
regional recalls, as opposed to national recalls?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, you know, obviously ours started off as
a regional recall. And the reason that it was doing--a couple
of reasons it was doing that. Number one was because that is
what the science and data showed where the issues were. And
there are going to be some cases where, I think, that is
probably correct. And it also helps----
Ms. Schakowsky. But people do drive their cars to other
places.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, that is true, but--the other thing I was
going to say, it also helps with getting parts into the
priority areas as quickly as possible, which is part of the
four DIRs that we came to agreement with NHTSA on in the last
couple of weeks.
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Kennedy, can I work with you as well,
obviously, primarily with the members, but talk to you about
the legislation?
Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Kennedy. You are welcome.
Mr. Burgess. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. Chair
recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, 5 minutes for your
questions, please.
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kennedy, I am
going to stay right with you. Did you drive a car that has a
Takata airbag?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, I do.
Mrs. Blackburn. You do?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, I do.
Mrs. Blackburn. What about your family?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, every one of them.
Mrs. Blackburn. Are you concerned----
Mr. Kennedy. No, I am not.
Mrs. Blackburn [continuing]. The safety of those? OK. I was
listening to your statement, and I think I must have missed
something here, because you talked about manufacturing the--
stopping the manufacture of the batwing airbags, but you never
mentioned the ammonium nitrate. You kind of left the
propellant----
Mr. Kennedy. Correct.
Mrs. Blackburn [continuing]. Out of the mix, and then
addressed it with Mr. Burgess a little bit. I want to ask if
you agree with this statement. This is from an explosives
expert at Missouri University of Science and Technology, and he
said the following about ammonium nitrate, it shouldn't be used
in airbags, but it is cheap, unbelievably cheap. Do you agree
with that statement?
Mr. Kennedy. That it is unbelievably cheap, or that it
shouldn't be used? Are you----
Mrs. Blackburn. Both.
Mr. Kennedy. I wouldn't say that it is unbelievably cheap.
I would say it is competitive with some of the other propellant
formulations that are out there, like guanidine nitrate, which
some of our competitors use, and which we use in some other
inflators. I don't think--I mean, it is a blanket statement
that says it should not be used. No, I don't agree with that,
because obviously we use it. We have had some issues with some
of our ammonium nitrate inflators, but many of them have
performed very well.
Mrs. Blackburn. Are you an explosives expert?
Mr. Kennedy. No, ma'am, I am not.
Mrs. Blackburn. You are not?
Mr. Kennedy. I am an engineer, but I am not a----
Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. I am not a chemist, I am not an
explosives expert.
Mrs. Blackburn. All right. Then let us go to what Ms.
Schakowsky was saying. You are still using this, so isn't it
true that ammonium nitrate is a dangerous substance to be used
in airbag inflators?
Mr. Kennedy. No, I don't believe it is a dangerous
substance to be used in airbag inflators.
Mrs. Blackburn. OK, you do not believe----
Mr. Kennedy. We use phase stabilized ammonium nitrate. Most
of the issues that you hear about ammonium nitrate are it
losing its phase stabilization.
Mrs. Blackburn. All right. Then isn't it true that ammonium
nitrate is cheaper than other compounds, such as tetrazole?
Mr. Kennedy. Probably--maybe tetrazole, but at the time
when we started to use ammonium nitrate, there--the competing
material out there was guanidine nitrate.
Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Kennedy. And those two are very similar in cost. There
is not a huge----
Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Difference between those.
Mrs. Blackburn. You are an engineer, and isn't it true that
your own engineers at Takata warned you about using ammonium
nitrate?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, from some of the newspaper articles I
have read, I assume you are referring to Mr. Lillie's comments,
is that correct?
Mrs. Blackburn. Mr. Britton and Mr. Lillie.
Mr. Kennedy. OK.
Mrs. Blackburn. Yes.
Mr. Kennedy. And what I can tell you is this. Every
development program, every product that any supplier every
makes, there is always a spirited debate about what are the
right components, what is the right design, what--and there are
tradeoffs on all of those things. The previous materials that
we used for propellant was sodium azide. Sodium azide was
extremely toxic. It also had the unwanted effect that, when it
was deployed, it did not burn very cleanly, and there was a lot
of effluent that were put into the vehicle, and a lot of people
that had respiratory issues were bothered by those.
So we, you know, every propellant, every design, there is
always a spirited debate----
Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. And you can probably find
people----
Mrs. Blackburn. All right.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Always on one side----
Mrs. Blackburn. I get that. I want----
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. And not on----
Mrs. Blackburn [continuing]. To move on----
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. The other.
Mrs. Blackburn [continuing]. Because I am about to run----
Mr. Kennedy. OK.
Mrs. Blackburn [continuing]. Out of time here. OK. Given
that you are recalling cars that may have already been
repaired, have there been any field incidents reported in
inflators that were installed as parts, any of the remedy
situations? Have you had any occurrences with those?
Mr. Kennedy. Not that I am aware of, ma'am.
Mrs. Blackburn. So all of the replacement parts have
performed 100 percent satisfactorily in the cars in which they
have been installed?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, what I said was I am not aware of any of
the replacement parts----
Mrs. Blackburn. Would you double check that and get back to
us----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, ma'am, I will.
Mrs. Blackburn [continuing]. And let us know? What does
Takata believe we know from testing today that we didn't know a
year ago?
Mr. Kennedy. We know a lot, and not just from our testing.
I know I heard some of the gentlemen refer to the Fraunhofer
report which was released. We brought Dr. Noits from the
Fraunhofer Institute into our facility in February. We brought
a team from NHTSA in.
Mrs. Blackburn. What kind of changes are you making with
that information, then, if you are still using the propellant
that is a problem?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, as I said, we do have later designs to
use desiccant. That is one of the things that has been proven
to improve the situation. We also have alternate propellants
now with guanidine nitrate that we have--we started production
a year or 2 ago, and we are continuing to ramp those up. I
think overall you will see our production of ammonium nitrate
go down rapidly.
Mrs. Blackburn. I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Gentlelady yields back. Chair thanks the
gentlelady, and the Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Massachusetts, 5 minutes for your questions, please.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Thank you, Chairman. Thank
you to the witnesses for being here. I apologize, I had to step
out, but glad to come back. Mr. Kennedy, you indicted that you
expect that the use of ammonium nitrate would decrease. Why--in
your--in the future. Why is that?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, it is certainly got a bad reputation
through all of this, and it--as I said, it is one of the
contributing factors that everyone believes is involved in this
issue.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Can you----
Mr. Kennedy. Sorry.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Can you, sir, signify that--
or guarantee that as long as ammonium nitrate is used in those
products, the products are safe?
Mr. Kennedy. I am sorry?
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Can you guarantee that as
long as ammonium nitrate is used in those products, that the
products are safe?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we believe properly manufactured and
designed ammonium nitrate, phase stabilized ammonium nitrate,
can be done properly.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. So the--I guess--you
indicated in your testimony--your written testimony a little
while ago that, in certain circumstances, these conditions can
result in an alternation in the propellant wafers in the
inflators that could potentially lead to overaggressive
combustion.
Mr. Kennedy. Right.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. And so it is--your statement,
though, is that if it is properly manufactured, and then under
the right circumstances, those conditions would not exist?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we have seen those in very rare cases,
and that is--goes back to the root cause discussion we were
having a little bit earlier. We do not have the definitive root
cause. We know a lot, and we know a lot more than we did in
December, based on all the testing that we have done, and all
the testing that our outside experts have done.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. So the testing that you have
done has indicated that, if I understand you correctly, and
please correct me if I don't, but--is the ammonium nitrate, or
the substances used in the production of these wafers, and--
then, under certain conditions of humidity and heat over time
could lead to a malfunction----
Mr. Kennedy. Could lead to----
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts [continuing]. In a crash?
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Correct.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Could lead to? And that you
are going to--your plans are to phase out the use of ammonium
nitrate in your products?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we have been phasing that down, and
phasing later propellants, but a lot of them, even some of the
ammonium nitrate ones, were with desiccant. We had gone from
non-desiccated ammonium nitrate to desiccated ammonium nitrate,
and now we are moving to a--what is called a guanidine nitrate.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. And the guanidine nitrate you
said is a similar cost?
Mr. Kennedy. A similar cost, yes.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. So then why not adopt it
earlier?
Mr. Kennedy. You know, it was--we made investments in order
to process ammonium nitrate. We were having good success with
ammonium nitrate. It was competitive. As I said, it had a
number of these other advantages to it that our customers
enjoyed, so it was not something that, until some of these
recent issues, really thought, and gave us a reason to re-think
it.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Some fairly significant
disadvantages of late, though, yes?
Mr. Kennedy. I am sorry?
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Some fairly significant
disadvantages of late, though, I would----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. And then, sir, I think you
tried to touch on this, but forgive me if I am still a little
bit confused, I--in an article in the New York Times yesterday,
indicated that--the headline, I believe, says, ``Takada says it
will no longer make side-inflator linked to airbag defect.''
Mr. Kennedy. I am sorry, what did that say?
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. ``Takata says it will no
longer make side-inflator linked to airbag defect,'' and
basically says that you----
Mr. Kennedy. I----
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts [continuing]. Will not be
using ammonium nitrate. There was another piece in another
newspaper I saw today saying that ammonium nitrate still would
be manufactured. And a piece in Reuters that I think said that
it wasn't going to be in, then the piece was withdrawn. So can
you try to clarify for me, is ammonium----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts [continuing]. Nitrate still
being used in the products, and should people--what should
people do? Do they have--can they have confidence in the airbag
product that is going into the cars----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes. I am glad you asked that question. There
was a lot of confusion yesterday once our written testimony was
released.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Both cited your rest--written
testimony. One said that you are, and one said you are not----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts [continuing]. So----
Mr. Kennedy. Well, yes, it----
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. I appreciate the
clarification.
Mr. Kennedy. It is a long story. We have had people working
on that since it came out. As I think I mentioned earlier, we
are continuing to use ammonium nitrate in our propellants,
phase stabilized ammonium nitrate, both with and without
desiccant, but we--there are not many without desiccant that
are still out there.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. OK.
Mr. Kennedy. What we did say we were going to quit making
were these batwing shaped inflators, because that seemed to be,
again, one of the issues that we have seen from all the testing
that we have done. It is more prevalent in the batwing
propellant wafers.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts. OK. Given that, I only have
about 30 seconds left. I will stop going forward, and, Mr.
Chairman, I will yield back. Thank you. Thank you to the
witness.
Mr. Kennedy. You are welcome.
Mr. Burgess. The gentleman yields back. The Chair thanks
the gentleman. Recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Lance, 5 minutes for your questions, please.
Mr. Lance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon to you
all, gentlemen. I was at the hearing in December. I was the
vice chair then, as I am now. Mr. Terry was in the chair in
December.
I quote from the transcript, Mr. Kennedy, directly from the
transcript of the December hearing on this matter. I had asked
your colleague, Mr. Shimizu, about this whole matter, and I had
stated, ``Takata's current view, based upon reliable
information, does not support a nationwide determination of a
safety defect in all vehicles equipped with the subject driver
side inflators. This is not the view of the agency at the
Federal Government''--obviously NHTSA--``that protects the
American people, and so you are dramatically and diametrically
in opposition to the view of NHTSA. Is that accurate?''
And then Mr. Shimizu discussed this with his colleagues,
there was a translation problem, but he then answered the
question, and he said, quote, and this is direct quote from the
transcript, ``Yes, correct, that is our statement.'' And then I
went on to say, ''In conclusion, and we will be asking this of
NHTSA later in the hearing, on November 26 NHTSA demanded a
national recall''--and, of course, that was not the view of
Takata at that time. What has changed, Mr. Kennedy, between
then and now?
Mr. Kennedy. Much has changed, much. At that----
Mr. Lance. There has been one additional death.
Mr. Kennedy. There was the one additional death that we are
aware of----
Mr. Lance. That certainly has changed.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. In Texas. That was, as I think
was also mentioned, was a vehicle that had been recalled 4
years ago, unfortunately.
Mr. Lance. But not to the owner. This was a subsequent
owner.
Mr. Kennedy. I know, and that is----
Mr. Lance. That is an important factor for the American
people to know, Mr.----
Mr. Kennedy. It is a very important factor. A very
important factor, I agree with you. But back to your original
question of what has changed, at that time we had, I think,
8,000 tests done. Now we have got 50,000 tests done. We have
seen some patterns start to emerge in some of the testing and
the data that we have accumulated. That is what has led us--and
all of the other testing and analysis has been done by outside
experts. We have hired experts--I think you have seen the
Fraunhofer report now.
Mr. Lance. Yes. I was the person who quoted.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Mr. Lance. Moving on, the issue of ruptures was first known
by Takata in 2004, and the first six deaths I believe occurred
approximately in 2009, and so this has been an ongoing problem
of great significance. In the last 6 months how much have you
been fined? I believe it is $14,000 a day. How much in total
have you been fined, Mr. Kennedy?
Mr. Kennedy. I think Dr. Rosekind answered that. I think it
was----
Mr. Lance. I am asking for your answer, Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy. I believe it totals up to about $1.2 million.
Mr. Lance. And have you paid that?
Mr. Kennedy. To my knowledge, no.
Mr. Lance. And why is that?
Mr. Kennedy. That is part of the discussion and negotiation
with NHTSA. They have agreed to suspend it as part of the
Consent Order, but they have reserved the right to incur
further penalties as they see fit.
Mr. Lance. Now, based upon your testimony to the chairman
and to the ranking member, is it possible that replacement
airbags will continue to have ammonium nitrate in them?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir, they will. Some of them will.
Mr. Lance. And you are confident that they will be safe for
some period of time, or an extended period of time?
Mr. Kennedy. We feel that they are safe, and that is why
as--again, as part of the Consent Order, we are continuing to
test outside of the scope of the recalls, and we are continuing
to test to make sure that the remedy parts are safe.
Mr. Lance. Should those who are having an airbag replaced
ask whether or not their new airbag will contain ammonium
nitrate, and perhaps ask for a different replacement airbag?
Mr. Kennedy. I am--I have--not really sure how to answer
that, sir.
Mr. Lance. And are there new automobiles fresh off the
assembly line that contain ammonium nitrate airbags?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, there are.
Mr. Lance. Thank you.
Mr. Kennedy. You are welcome.
Mr. Lance. Mr. Bozzella, you indicate that the rate of
compliance with recalls drops dramatically. And did I hear you
right that it is 15 percent for older vehicles, and could you
explain exactly the years involved where it would be as low as
15 percent?
Mr. Bozzella. Yes. I don't know that I mentioned exactly
the numbers----
Mr. Lance. Perhaps you did.
Mr. Bozzella [continuing]. But you are exactly right,
Congressman. The trend is that further out into the ownership--
--
Mr. Lance. Yes.
Mr. Bozzella [continuing]. Of a vehicle, the recall
completion rate is lower.
Mr. Lance. Um-hum.
Mr. Bozzella. If the question is why is that, second and
third owners----
Mr. Lance. Yes.
Mr. Bozzella [continuing]. These vehicles are often owned
by second and----
Mr. Lance. Yes.
Mr. Bozzella [continuing]. Third owners----
Mr. Lance. Yes.
Mr. Bozzella [continuing]. They are difficult----
Mr. Lance. Yes.
Mr. Bozzella [continuing]. To find, and so the
manufacturers are doing everything they can right now, working
very hard to increase those completion----
Mr. Lance. Thank you. In conclusion, because my time has
expired, I am concerned about those who have vehicles that they
have purchased not new. This would be people who might not be
aware, necessarily, to the greatest extent of someone who has
purchased a new automobile. We want to protect all of the
American people, and this is of great concern. And I want to
work with you and others, and the committee, to make sure that
all Americans are protected. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke, 5 minutes for your questions, please.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
our panelists. The day before the subcommittee's hearing in
December, Takata sent a letter to NHTSA in which the company
rejected a national recall. Part of the stated reason for
rejecting the national recall was Takata's contention that it
was not required by law to make a good faith determination of
whether its product contained a safety-related defect or to
conduct a recall because Takata is not a manufacturer of motor
vehicles, or of replacement equipment.
Mr. Kennedy, this question was asked of Mr. Shimizu in
December, but I want to hear from you now, do you agree with
that statement made by your company in December?
Mr. Kennedy. It sounds like a lot of legal talk to me. I am
certainly not a lawyer.
Ms. Clarke. It is not legal. It is very simple. It says
here that it is your contention that you are not required by
law to make a good-faith determination of whether a product
contained a safety-related defect, or to conduct a recall
because Takata is not a manufacturer of motor vehicles, or of
replacement equipment.
Mr. Kennedy. I really don't know the answer to that. I
would have to do a little bit of research and get back with you
on----
Ms. Clarke. All right, very well. By entering into the
Consent Order with NHTSA, it is my understanding that Takata
has submitted to NHTSA's jurisdiction. Is that correct?
Mr. Kennedy. I believe that would probably be the proper
term.
Ms. Clarke. That is correct?
Mr. Kennedy. We have come to an agreement with NHTSA.
Ms. Clarke. So that is correct?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. Do you now agree that Takata is
subject to the jurisdiction of NHTSA, at least as to the laws
and regulations related to safety-related defects?
Mr. Kennedy. Again, it is an area of the--you are asking me
a law question that I am not really properly qualified to
answer. I could certainly look into it and get back with you. I
mean--but certainly we recognize NHTSA's authority, if that is
really the question that you are asking, and we have worked
very hard with NHTSA, especially over the past 3 or 4 months,
to come to the agreement on the consent agreement, the
preservation order, the DIRs----
Ms. Clarke. So let me ask you this: Do you now agree that
Takata is required to decide in good faith whether your
products contain a safety-related defect?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we clearly did say, in the DIRs, that a
defect may arise in some of the subject parts. So I guess the
answer to that question would be yes.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Kennedy, is Takata paying for all of the
replacement airbags?
Mr. Kennedy. I am not sure what you mean by--are we----
Ms. Clarke. Yes.
Mr. Kennedy. We are selling them.
Ms. Clarke. Well, there are airbags that now need to be
replaced----
Mr. Kennedy. Correct.
Ms. Clarke [continuing]. Right? Are you paying for them?
Mr. Kennedy. We are working with each one of the OEM--each
one of our automaker customers to discuss financial
responsibility, and we are----
Ms. Clarke. What does that mean?
Mr. Kennedy. That means that we are having discussions with
each one of the----
Ms. Clarke. So you are not paying for them?
Mr. Kennedy. I wouldn't say that we are paying 100 percent
for everything with every automaker.
Ms. Clarke. So you are negotiating what you will pay and
what you won't?
Mr. Kennedy. Which is a normal course of business
on----
Ms. Clarke. I am just asking.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes. It is a normal course of business in the
automotive----
Ms. Clarke. A New York Times article from May 20 stated
that Takata said automakers shared the blame for this massive
recall because ``testing specifications prescribed by the
vehicle manufacturers failed to uncover faults.'' Is that
correct?
Mr. Kennedy. That was one of the conclusions from the
Fraunhofer report that was----
Ms. Clarke. But is that correct?
Mr. Kennedy. We believe that is correct.
Ms. Clarke. OK. Can you explain that statement a little bit
more?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes. What it means is, whenever a supplier
provides a product to an automaker, there is a specification
that you are required to meet. There is a certain set of tests
that you have to run, a certain quantity of tests that you have
to run, and we do that. And as a general rule, you know, we do
that with every new product, we review it with the OEM, and
they sign off on it and say, yes, we accept this, or no, we
don't. And these products went through that process.
So what we are--what the report was trying to say is that
the specifications that were out there at the time don't--did
not capture the issues that we are seeing in the field today.
Ms. Clarke. So you are saying the manufacturers failed to
uncover the faults, so----
Mr. Kennedy. What we are saying is the specifications that
we tested to, and provided parts to, did not encompass the
scope of this problem.
Ms. Clarke. And so they--because--you are saying that they
failed to uncover these faults?
Mr. Kennedy. I am not--I am maybe not going to quibble
about the wording, but that is exactly--I mean, that is what--
--
Ms. Clarke. So you are not taking any responsibility----
Mr. Kennedy. No, ma'am, that is not what I said at all.
Ms. Clarke. OK.
Mr. Kennedy. That is not what I said at all.
Ms. Clarke. OK. So you are saying they share the blame
because they should have uncovered the faults during this----
Mr. Kennedy. Well, I am----
Ms. Clarke [continuing]. Testing of specifications? That
is----
Mr. Kennedy. What I am saying is that, in the automotive
industry, products are developed to meet specifications.
Typically, if you meet the specification, you provided a part
that is acceptable.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy. You are welcome.
Ms. Clarke. Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burgess. Gentlelady, Mr. Bainwol was trying to provide
an answer for you as well.
Ms. Clarke. OK.
Mr. Burgess. With unanimous consent, Mr. Bainwol be allowed
to answer.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bainwol. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, and I say
this not as a lawyer, or an engineer, or someone who negotiates
these contracts, but the specs that are let out when a contract
like this is negotiated relate to performance specifications,
and do not relate to the fundamental notion that the product
should be safe. You know, this is about the form of the
deployment, and items like that, in terms of which cars it is
going to be appropriately fitted for, but there is an
understanding that the supplier will provide a product that
complies with FMBSS. And part of that is making sure that the
controlled explosion is a controlled explosion.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burgess. Gentlelady yields back. The Chair thanks the
gentlelady. Chair thanks Mr. Bainwol. Mr. Guthrie, you are
recognized for 5 minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Guthrie. Thank you very much. Mr. Kennedy, I guess I
will direct this at you as well. I guess I am understanding--if
you really don't know the root cause, then you really don't
know if the product that failed was manufactured to
specification. Now, the tests might have met specification, but
you really--I mean, you--was it manufactured to specification,
and it failed anyway, so therefore the specification came from
the OEM was the issue, or--I mean, if you don't know the root
cause, you don't really know the answer then, I guess, yes?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, that is part of the difficulty that we
have with this issue. And I think you have heard Mr. Kelly talk
about, you have heard Dr. Rosekind talk about it. It is a very
multifaceted, very complex issue as to what is going on. And
there are different types of inflators. You heard I think Dr.
Rosekind say 10 different inflator types involved in this.
Mr. Guthrie. Um-hum.
Mr. Kennedy. And one of them, and the parts that we have
gotten back in the past few months, we have seen what looks
like a manufacturing defect that we think allowed moisture into
the inflator. That is on one of those. The other ones, we
haven't been able to make that determination.
So, I mean, we have expended a lot of effort with a lot of
experts----
Mr. Guthrie. Yes, sir, that is----
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. To try to get to that, but,
unfortunately, we have not yet got to a definitive root cause
across every one of these inflators.
Mr. Guthrie. And that leads--I understand. I am in the
automotive--that is what my background is, automotive industry.
So you get the product specifications, the blueprint, and you
meet to that----
Mr. Kennedy. Right.
Mr. Guthrie [continuing]. And you ship to that. And if they
fell within the specification, then that is an engineering
issue. If you didn't manufacture to the specification, that is
your issue. And----
Mr. Kennedy. Right.
Mr. Guthrie [continuing]. Seems like you don't know exactly
where that is. But, following on what my friend from Tennessee,
Ms. Blackburn, was talking about, I mean, if you don't know the
root cause, and this is a question I don't know if we got a
good answer to, how do you know the replacement parts or--that
they bring in for the recall are not going to fail? I mean,
how--what is the surety of that?
Mr. Kennedy. Well----
Mr. Guthrie. And I think Mr. Lance actually asked--tried to
get to that as well.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, and that is a very good question. Many of
the replacement parts that we are using are different designs
now. Everything on the driver's side will be a completely
different design. As I said, about 50 percent of what we
shipped last month were with our competitor's inflators, that
do not use ammonium nitrate, and have not demonstrated issues
in the field, to my knowledge. That will go up to 70 percent
here in the next month or so. And so we are looking to change
to different inflator designs, or alternate designs for the
replacement parts as quickly as----
Mr. Guthrie. But you are already sending replacement parts
now, right?
Mr. Kennedy. We are sending--yes, and we have been sending
replacement----
Mr. Guthrie. So, I mean, how do you know those are--if you
are going to bring in a car for a recall to replace, how do you
know those aren't----
Mr. Kennedy. Well, that is the reason that the Consent
Order is written the way that it is, in order to require that
we continue to test the remedy parts, and we continue to test
outside of the scope of the recalls, in order to make that
judgment.
Mr. Guthrie. But you tested before you shipped the first
product.
Mr. Kennedy. We did, yes.
Mr. Guthrie. And they passed the tests?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Mr. Guthrie. And there could be a manufacturing defect that
you did that made them fail, so how do you--so we don't know? I
mean, you don't--until you know the recalls, you don't know
that these replacement parts are not going to have the same----
Mr. Kennedy. We have confidence in the ones we are making.
The process has changed a bit over the years. And, as I said, a
lot of them we are using alternate designs that really have
never experienced issued, to our knowledge. But there is a
percentage of them, and that is exactly why the Consent Order
is written the way that it is, and why we are continuing to do
the testing and the analysis that we are doing.
Mr. Guthrie. OK. And I think you said earlier you are
shipping--I think I wrote down about 700,000 replacement kits?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes. We shipped 740,000 in May.
Mr. Guthrie. And up to a million--and how much are you
shipping daily? I guess you ship daily to the----
Mr. Kennedy. Multiple--every day. And we get multiple
trucks back every day with parts back from the field.
Mr. Guthrie. And how are you prioritizing who gets--is it
regional? You are prioritizing----
Mr. Kennedy. You know, up to this point, we have been able
to keep up with demand for replacement parts. There are a
couple of part numbers that are on back order right now. We
expect to have that back order completed in the next 2 weeks.
Now, obviously, it is going to expand with this expansion
when the letters start going out to the consumers, but that is
why we are adding additional capacity both internally--we have
got seven new inflator lines coming in over the next 6 to 12
months. We have got additional inflator lines going in at our
competitor's. We have got additional kit lines going in in our
manufacturing facility. So we are continuing to ramp up----
Mr. Guthrie. And you also have to maintain current
production at the same time, right?
Mr. Kennedy. We also have to maintain current production.
That is a very good point.
Mr. Guthrie. I have a question with the other, since we
have--just--would you all talk about the replacement part, if
it is in your--if you would like to comment on the replacement
kit process that is going on. Is that anything you guys would
like to comment on, or--is that within your purview?
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, we will be looking
at the replacement parts, and the efficacy of the replacement
parts, as part of our investigation.
Mr. Bainwol. And I would simply note that the complexity of
this one is enormous. It is not just the 30, 34 million units
in the U.S. There are global issues as well. And so production,
allocation, prioritization are all hugely significant issues.
And that is why we think that, in this instance, NHTSA was
appropriate to assert its coordination capacity. And there is
no other way to solve this in a fashion that guarantees
fairness, and guarantees as expeditious a response as possible,
so that is why we have done that.
Mr. Bozzella. I would just add, Congressman, that the
manufacturers are doing what they need to do to take care of
their customers, knowing what they know now.
Mr. Guthrie. Thanks a lot, and I appreciate it. And, you
know, I have worked in manufacturing. We didn't have any what
we would call inverted diamond, or safety issues in our
product, but trying to find the root cause--and when you can
recreate the problem, that is when you know you found the root
cause. And we are all anxious to get to that point, so thank
you for----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes. And that has been one of the most
difficult parts of this whole thing, is--as I said, any one
failure is unacceptable to us. But, in the analysis, the
failure rate is so low it is hard to, you know, as you----
Mr. Guthrie. Recreate the problem.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Know, turn it on and turn it off.
We just--we haven't been able to do that.
Mr. Guthrie. Once you can do that, you know what is turning
it on and turning it off.
Mr. Kennedy. Then we just want to turn it off, yes.
Mr. Guthrie. Well, we are looking forward to getting to the
bottom of it. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you.
Mr. Guthrie. I am out of time.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentlemen, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, 5 minutes
for your questions, please.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have been hearing
conflicting reports on whether the--this is for Mr. Kennedy. We
have been hearing conflicting reports on whether the
replacement parts are different than the defective inflators.
Some news reports have talked about a change in the chemical
composition and shape of the propellant used in the inflators.
At the December hearing Mr.--I guess it is Shimizu--of Takata
talked about improvements made to the manufacturing process in
recent years that said the inflators were the same. So I just
wanted to understand this issue a little better, Mr. Kennedy.
Is there any difference between the replacement inflators and
the original defective inflators?
Mr. Kennedy. It depends on each one of the different
inflators that you are talking about. As I mentioned, about 50
percent of what we have been sent last month was outside
inflators. Those are obviously completely different than our
original inflators. On the driver's side we will be using
either alternate Takata designs or alternate outside for
everything. And the driver's side is the one that has had the
most issues, and the most severe issues.
On the passenger sides, right now there are a percentage of
those that are outside inflators, but there is still a
percentage that are the same design inflator that was in the
original modules, but, obviously, manufactured at a later time.
Mr. Pallone. All right. In Takata's defect information
report to NHTSA regarding PSDI-4 inflators, Takata notes that,
and I quote, ``Continues''--``It continues to produce a small
number of PSDI-4 inflators for use as remedy parts. Takata
intends to cease production of the subject inflators, including
for use as remedy parts.'' So, again, when does Takata intend
to stop producing the PSDI-4 inflators as replacements?
Mr. Kennedy. We have a couple of carmakers with some older
vehicles that have not qualified a new inflator yet. We are
working--and they have been working very hard to do that with
us, and with our competitor. And what the plan is in that DIR
is--I think they call it phase four. The phase four would be to
go out and get all of the remedy parts that we supplied that
were of that design, the PSDI-4.
Mr. Pallone. But then when that happens, then they stop
producing these PSDI-4 inflators as replacement, what will
Takata use to replace the old ones?
Mr. Kennedy. We have--it depends on the vehicle and the
manufacturer. Some of them are our competitor's inflators. We
are buying inflators primarily, I think, on driver's side for--
from TRW and Autoleve, and we also have a later generation
Takata inflator called PSDI-X with desiccant in it that has
proven to be very robust, and some of them will be in PSDI-X.
Mr. Pallone. But then are we are to assume that the reason
Takata is stopping its production of these PSDI inflators is
because they are unsafe?
Mr. Kennedy. The PSDI--the batwing propellant geometry was
one of the factors that was called out in some of the testing
and the analysis that we have done, and some of our outside
experts have done, as a factor. So, in order to just eliminate
that factor completely, we said we would quit making that----
Mr. Pallone. So you----
Mr. Kennedy. We don't make it for production any longer.
Mr. Pallone. You are not sure----
Mr. Kennedy. It was only for a replacement part.
Mr. Pallone [continuing]. But you suspect there could be a
problem?
Mr. Kennedy. Correct.
Mr. Pallone. OK. Now, you say you are going to replace the
inflators in four stages. You mentioned, I guess, that the
fourth stage will include subject inflators previously
installed as remedy parts, right?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pallone. Well, will the people that had their original
PSDI-4 inflators replaced with the new PSDI inflators, say, for
example, in December 2014, will they have to have them replaced
again?
Mr. Kennedy. Anyone that had an inflator replaced with a
PSDI-4 inflator would have to have that replaced again, yes,
that is correct.
Mr. Pallone. So I imagine that someone who has already had
their inflator replaced as part of this recall may not realize
that they have had--that that have to have it replaced again.
So how do you plan to communicate that to the consumer?
Mr. Kennedy. You know, that is another great question, sir,
and that is another part of the Consent Order and agreement we
have with NHTSA. We are going to work with NHTSA, and the
automakers, to do a proactive safety campaign. We have been
working with a professional media firm that has done these kind
of things in the past. We know that Honda, last year, had
initiated kind of a media campaign where, like, on your cell
phone, if you called up Google, there would be a banner at the
bottom that said ``check your airbag.'' We have talked to
Honda. We know what worked, what didn't work.
So we have 60 days from the Consent Order signing on May 19
to come back with this plan to NHTSA, and work with the OEMs in
order to help increase that visibility, and get that message
out to people whose cars need to come back in.
Mr. Pallone. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.----
Mr. Kennedy. You are welcome.
Mr. Pallone [continuing]. Chairman.
Mr. Burgess. Gentleman yields back. Chair thanks the
gentleman. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Houston, 5
minutes for your questions, please.
Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our
witnesses. My first questions are for you, Mr. Kennedy. One
theme that has come through loud and clear at this hearing from
Dr. Rosekind and all of you all is the lack of--we still don't
know about the root cause of these defects. We have ties to
humidity, heat, desiccants, batwings, all sorts of things, but
no root cause, and that bothers me.
The plane I flew in the United States Navy was a P-3 Orion.
It was a modified version of the Lockheed L-10 L-182 Electra.
That plane had a bad defect. It was called roll mode. That
meant the wings fell off the plane. That was the root cause of
two crashes. It is hard to find because those planes were torn
up when they hit the ground. They didn't know what happened,
but yet we found out what happened, found the root cause, and
those planes have been flying for 60 years in our navy.
And so I have heard you say that you know that the--there
is heat, humidity, desiccants, propellants. You have mentioned
there is a tie with--you have some propellants out there
without desiccants, correct?
Mr. Kennedy. Correct.
Mr. Olson. How many of those, sir, are out there right now?
Mr. Kennedy. I would have to check and get back with you,
sir, but it is a significant number.
Mr. Olson. If I am in my home in Houston, Texas, because we
are 95--95 percent humidity and 95 degrees, so we are ground
zero for these problems. How about there? Do I tell my people
back home, guys, they are all here, 100,000 cars, 50,000 cars?
Any idea?
Mr. Kennedy. No, I do not know the number, sir.
Mr. Olson. What is the problem, then, with finding these
cars and putting desiccant in there, replacing it with a
desiccant? Make sure--if that is some factor, how about take
that out of the equation? Put that in it right now?
Mr. Kennedy. That is--well, that is exactly what we are
doing with every one of those PSDI, PSDI-4, PSDI-4K inflators.
Mr. Olson. OK. So----
Mr. Kennedy. That is exactly what the first DIR is.
Mr. Olson. So by the end of this year there will be no bags
out there without some sort of desiccant with their propellant,
correct? With that ammonium nitrate, is that right?
Mr. Kennedy. No, that is not what I am saying, sir.
Mr. Olson. But that is a problem. You said that is one of
the problems. We don't know what going out there. I think it is
safe, to me--that is--it is a propellant having some sort of
problem with the humidity and the heat, how about putting a
desiccant with all the propellants? Make sure that goes out of
the equation, maybe find the root cause?
Mr. Kennedy. Or an alternate inflator. That is the plan
with the ones that have shown to be issues in the field, which
are these--what we have referred to as PSDI, PSDI-4s. That is
what we are doing. The later inflators that we are replacing
those with will either have desiccant, or they will be from one
of our competitors.
Mr. Olson. OK. My questions now are for the gentlemen here
from the manufacturers. There will be big costs with these
recalls. Who is going to pay for that? Will it be Takata, the
manufacturers, the dealers? I mean, who is going to pay for all
this recall? Mr. Bainwol, any idea, sir?
Mr. Bainwol. I can tell you that consumers do not pay. So
that is the critical point. My hunch is there may be some
debate about who actually bears the costs. I think our
perspective on where that should end up is pretty clear.
Mr. Olson. Mr. Bozzella?
Mr. Bozzella. Yes, I would agree with Mr. Bainwol. I think
the consumer will not pay. We need to do--we need to take care
of the customer. Manufacturers need to take care of the
customer, working with the dealers, the suppliers, and with the
regulator to do so.
Mr. Olson. How about the dealers? What are you hearing
about them about the costs? Because, for example, my truck had
a little small recall notice, and I got that taken care of when
I replaced the oil. So I went there to have, like, 5 minutes
done. I probably was there for about an hour having something
fixed. Any reply from those guys how this is hurting their
business, spending more time on recalls than actually selling
cars and fixing cars they would normally have to maintain?
Mr. Bainwol. Well, the dealers come out whole. They are--
they are reimbursed for the recall. And it is oftentimes
governed by State franchise rules, but they are made whole.
Mr. Olson. And one final question for you, Mr. Bainwol and
Mr. Bozzella. Remember in the first panel I talked about the
last victim of these airbags, a guy named Carlos Saliz from
Spring, Texas. As you know, he bought a used car, a 2002
Accord, and defect came out, the recall notice came out in
2011. He got in a crash this year, never knew that his car was
defective. How can you guys help make sure we track those cars
from recall to actual owner so there is not--sort of gap?
Because he had no chance to have that recall notice. He had no
idea his car was defective.
Mr. Bainwol. It is an important point, and it is one we are
very sensitive too. The fundamental notion with safety is that
it is a shared responsibility.
Mr. Olson. Yes.
Mr. Bainwol. We have a piece of it, consumers have a piece
of it, the dealers do. Certainly NHTSA, and certainly the
States. And so we have all got to do a better job of tracing
the ownership so that we can communicate. And that is one of
the reasons why we have gone through this exercise, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, about conducting research to
figure out what makes people go in and get the job done. We
have got to find a way to turn that trigger so they go in and
get the work done.
Mr. Bozzella. It is a great question, and I would simply
add to that that is, as I mentioned in my testimony, that we
ought to consider looking at the point at which an owner
registers or re-registers his or her car as a point for further
notification. In the case of the incident that you mentioned,
had that approach or procedure been in place, the--that owner
may have been notified at the point of registering that used
car that there was an open recall. So we think that merits
some--that is worthy of merit.
Mr. Olson. Thank you. I am out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Bilirakis, 5 minutes for your----
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you----
Mr. Burgess [continuing]. Questions, please.
Mr. Bilirakis [continuing]. Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
so very much, and thank the panel for their testimony.
Mr. Kennedy, can you verify that some cars that were
previously recalled, and supposedly fixed, will have to be
recalled again for a second airbag replacement?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes. Do you have any initial numbers on how
many consumers are affected? If not, when will you know, and
how will the consumers be notified?
Mr. Kennedy. You mean consumers that would have had to
bring their cars in twice?
Mr. Bilirakis. Correct.
Mr. Kennedy. I don't have that information yet, sir. As I
think Dr. Rosekind said, a lot of the OEM, a lot of the
automakers, are still entering their VINs, and getting the
quantities, and the exact vehicles. So, after that, it would be
easier----
Mr. Bilirakis. How do you plan to notify the consumers?
Mr. Kennedy. We are still working on that plan. As part of
the consent, there was--we were given 60 days to develop this
plan, and we certainly want to do it in conjunction with the
automakers. We don't want to do something that is going to be
at odds with the automakers. So we have, as I mentioned, a
media firm that is familiar with these types of activities. We
have some ideas on paper we are working, and we will certainly
be reviewing those with NHTSA, and having NHTSA's involvement,
as well as the automakers.
Mr. Bilirakis. So why weren't these issues dealt with the
first time they were recalled? In other words, why--I don't--
there is just no excuse. It is inexcusable, as far as I am
concerned, but give me an answer.
Mr. Kennedy. It is----
Mr. Bilirakis. Why weren't these issues dealt with the
first time?
Mr. Kennedy. It is a fair question, sir, and it is a
difficult question. I think you have heard from a lot of
different people today, it is an extremely complex issues.
There are--when we first started seeing some issues back in
2005, we did national recalls on a large number of parts. And
we thought we had identified root causes, we thought we had
gotten everything from the field, we thought we are doing all
the right things. And then we started seeing these sporadic
issues in the field, and that is what led to the action that
started last year.
So it has been very elusive to us, and it has been very,
very difficult to get a consistent pattern that would tell us
exactly what the root cause is----
Mr. Bilirakis. OK, Mr. Kennedy, let me--I have a couple
more questions.
Mr. Kennedy. OK.
Mr. Bilirakis. How can you possibly assure consumers, my
constituents, the second replacement will be effective, and a
third replacement will not be necessary?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, on most----
Mr. Bilirakis. Could you assure my constituents that will
be the case?
Mr. Kennedy. I mean, on most of the replacement parts, as I
said, they are going to be later designs, or from our
competitors, when we are putting those in. There are still a
few, and that is why, as part of the Consent Order, we are
still testing the remedy parts to make sure that those are
going to be sufficient for the life of the vehicle, and why we
are continuing to test outside of the ranges of the recalls
that were in the DIRs that were announced a couple of weeks
ago.
So we are trying to cover that. I can't tell you right now
that everything is done, but we are--we have anticipated that
problem, and we have an agreement with NHTSA that allows us to
continue to look at that. And if actions are required, we will
take actions.
Mr. Bilirakis. OK. Since the first airbag inflator ruptured
in 2004, it is true that Takada tested roughly 128 airbags from
2004 in--is that correct?
Mr. Kennedy. I am not familiar----
Mr. Bilirakis. From 2004 to 2008, is that correct?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes. I am not familiar with that number, sir.
I can double check and----
Mr. Bilirakis. Please get----
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Get back with you.
Mr. Bilirakis [continuing]. Back to me on that.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, I will.
Mr. Bilirakis. Do you believe that enough was done to
investigate this issue and bring awareness to consumers on the
potential risk and threat of defective airbags? Was enough
done?
Mr. Kennedy. On--you mean on those original ones?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, the original----
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Mr. Bilirakis [continuing]. One.
Mr. Kennedy. We were able to identify what we thought, and
what our automaker customers thought, was a very solid root
cause. We had manufacturing data, we had test data. We were
able to recreate the problem. But, clearly, there was something
else going on----
Mr. Bilirakis. Could more have been done?
Mr. Kennedy. Again, I--you could probably always say more
could be done, but what we did, we thought, and our automaker
customers thought, was sufficient to get to root cause, and to
take action, and that is what we did.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, Mr. Bainwol--one last question, Mr.
Chairman. Have any companies requested that Takata remove
ammonium nitrate from the propellant formula used in the airbag
inflators?
Mr. Bainwol. That is an answer I don't know the answer to--
question, and I will find out and report back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Please get back to us. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentleman, gentleman yields
back. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Mullin,
5 minutes for your question, please.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kennedy, you
have--I have actually sat here and enjoyed watching you. You
are very skillful on the way you approach the answers. I could
probably take a lesson or two from that. But, at the same time,
we just don't seem to be getting the answers. I mean, you can
tell the frustration that this panel is getting. We have got a
young lady that is sitting over your shoulder that is bearing
the scars of a mistake that was made, and we are still not
getting the answers. I mean, I am a business owner. I
understand when we fell. I understand when we make a mistake.
Mr. Kennedy. Um-hum.
Mr. Mullin. But now what? What the solution was is we did a
recall, and we replaced them with other things that were still
faulty? There is no excuse for that. Zero. Maybe this panel is
just looking to hear you say, we screwed up. But I know that
is--cause legal issues for you all. But a screw up is a screw
up. Taking blame is just that.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we----
Mr. Mullin. Hey, we messed up. I mean, we heard just a
while ago, who is going to be responsible for this. I don't
know. What do you mean we don't know? Who made the product?
Whose product was it? Whose name was on it? That is who should
pay for it. I just wonder--I--I am sitting here thinking, well,
OK, maybe that is why we haven't been moving very fast, because
you haven't taken ownership of it.
At the same time, we have got--not telling how many
vehicles are out there. More young ladies, or young men, are
going to bear the scars again. Or worse than that, someone is
going to not be able to finish out their life. What is that
worth to you? How do you put a dollar amount on that? What if
that was your daughter? I have got three at home. I can tell
you what it is worth. Do you have a daughter?
Mr. Kennedy. I have a daughter and a son.
Mr. Mullin. And a son. Wouldn't you be pretty passionate
about it? Wouldn't you want----
Mr. Kennedy. Absolutely.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. The owner to be owning up to it,
and say, we are going to do whatever it takes, we will take the
responsibility for it?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, and we believe we----
Mr. Mullin. But, you know--but, sir, you are still making
what--we believe. 2004, we are in 2015. How long have you been
making airbags?
Mr. Kennedy. Since, I believe, 1987.
Mr. Mullin. How many more studies do you need to have?
Mr. Kennedy. As I said, and I think--I am not trying to be
evasive. I mean, you have heard it from other people that have
been involved in this, they are very smart people too. It is--
--
Mr. Mullin. Evasive?
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. A very multifaceted issue that we
do not----
Mr. Mullin. Multifaceted. That is a great term to use. We
use political terms here all the time. We know how to talk a
little bit around in circles. We are looking for ownership.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we----
Mr. Mullin. I understand it is complex. The product you
make is very complex. I have been hit in the face with a few of
them.
Mr. Kennedy. Me, too.
Mr. Mullin. Yes. Fortunately, I have survived. I understand
the issue about--from impact to stopping you, the safety behind
it, this can be complex, but a problem is a problem. It is not
that complex. You do what it takes. You know, you have to
figure out, OK, what is a life worth? Put a dollar amount on
it? I don't know how you can.
Mr. Kennedy. I don't know how you can either, sir----
Mr. Mullin. You get it replaced.
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. And we certainly do not.
Mr. Mullin. Instead you said that the complexity of it, we
don't really know the makeup of it, but our competitors are
finding out a product to replace. Your competitors?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we----
Mr. Mullin. You guys--it sounds like, to me, you are
willing to do anything but take ownership. Your competitors? I
can't imagine sitting up here and saying, my competitor is
going to fix my problem.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we were doing that in order to get parts
in the field faster. Some of our competitors have products
that----
Mr. Mullin. You have known about it since 2004.
Mr. Kennedy. Not to the level that we have here, sir.
2004----
Mr. Mullin. You--in 2004 you identified there was a
problem. You said that you could recreate the problem. You knew
there was a problem.
Mr. Kennedy. And we thought we had a root cause at that
time too. We thought the----
Mr. Mullin. Did you replace them?
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Issue was closed. Yes. We
initiated----
Mr. Mullin. How did you track them down?
Mr. Kennedy. Pardon me?
Mr. Mullin. How did you track them down?
Mr. Kennedy. We worked with the automakers that were
involved.
Mr. Mullin. But we still haven't got people notified.
Mr. Kennedy. And that is a problem.
Mr. Mullin. I mean, I----
Mr. Kennedy. That is a huge problem.
Mr. Mullin. I raise cattle, and if my cow, for some reason,
I sell, and it ends up in California, and somehow ends up with
mad cow disease, it is not born with a birth certificate, or a
serial number, or----
Mr. Kennedy. Right.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. Or a bar code, but yet we are able
to track it all the way back to my farm.
Mr. Kennedy. Right.
Mr. Mullin. And we can't do that with an airbag?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we can tell you exactly what airbag we
sent, and the OEMs--the automakers can tell you what vehicle it
is in. The issue, for the most part, has been getting that
recall rate back up.
Mr. Mullin. No, it is the cost. I believe we already found
the root of the problem. It is the cost.
Mr. Kennedy. No, sir, I----
Mr. Mullin. No one wants----
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Disagree with that.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. To bear the cost.
Mr. Kennedy. I disagree with that.
Mr. Mullin. If we wanted to find the problem, you cannot
convince me we couldn't find a solution. Except----
Mr. Kennedy. We----
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. We haven't even agreed on the
panel that is in front of me who is going to pay for it. I
think that is the root of the problem. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Mr. Burgess. Chair thanks the gentlemen, gentleman yields
back. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Kinzinger, 5 minutes for questions, please.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for the
four of you, thank you for being here, and thanks for being
willing to talk with us about these very important issues.
You know, at a December haring I asked our panel, which
included BMW, Toyota, and Honda, if they agreed that sharing
OEM part numbers and other identifiable information with the
automotive recycling industry would help increase safety. They
agreed, and expressed support for the efforts to improve
methods to identify parts, and to share part numbers with
recyclers. Earlier this year, in February, Transportation
Secretary Fox stated that he also supports auto manufacturers
providing part numbers to recyclers, and that, furthermore,
manufacturers should provide this information in an easy to use
format. The key here is that this approach would not require
the creation of any new Government program or bureaucracy, but
it is something that the industry should tackle on its own.
To Mr. Bozzella and Mr. Bainwol, it appears that we have a
unique instance where regulators and industry seem to agree on
an approach to address a problem in large part because everyone
understands that sharing this information will improve safety.
My question is this, if you know the answer, when and how do
your members plan on making this information available to
recyclers, and are you aware of any discussions in the industry
to help share this information to improve safety? Mr. Bozzella?
Yes, if you could go first?
Mr. Bozzella. Congressman, I am--I don't know the answer to
your question. I will certainly go back to our members that
were on the panel and get back to you.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK. And, Mr. Bainwol, do you have any----
Mr. Bainwol. Likewise.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK. So, yes, if you guys could--because I
understand that you may be unaware of the issue, if you could
maybe get that information and follow up with my office, that
would be helpful, as we continue to explore this issue going
forward. I will ask you this, what can your organizations do to
kind of help facilitate this, and to make something like this
happen?
Mr. Bozzella. I will get--we will have a conversation
within our association, and we will be able to get back to you
after that point.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK, great.
Mr. Bainwol. So I would simply note that this question of
resolving, and getting expeditious recalls done, is an
important priority for everybody, and we do view this as, as I
said earlier, a shared responsibility, and we are willing to
work with anybody to make sure we can get this job done as
quickly as humanly possible.
Mr. Kinzinger. OK, great. Mr. Chairman, that is all the
questions I have. If you would like my time, I can yield it to
you, or I can yield back.
Mr. Burgess. Will accept you yielding back----
Mr. Kinzinger. I yield back.
Mr. Burgess [continuing]. And I thank the gentleman. The
gentleman yields back. Chair recognizes Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
request unanimous consent to submit a written statement of the
American Car Rental Association and the Consumers for Auto
Reliability and Safety into the record.
Mr. Burgess. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Burgess. I will recognize myself just for one follow
up. And I dwelled a lot on the ammonium nitrate as a
propellant, and this question really is for anyone. My prior
life, I was a physician. I did work some in emergency rooms,
and I remember airbag deployments with sodium azide, and I
remember burns, and eye injuries, forearm burns, knee burns
when the bag went off. But I also recall that there were
environmental concerns about sodium azide, and Mr. Kinzinger
brought up about salvage yards, and there was concern about
this sodium azide just eventually getting into the environment.
So are there any other propellants that are being worked
on? Is there, like, a--purely a gas propellant, carbon dioxide
or something that can--or nitrogen, something that wouldn't
have the characteristics--the explosive characteristics of
ammonium nitrate, or the toxic characteristics of a sodium
azide?
Mr. Kennedy. Yes, sir, there are a wide variety of
inflators out there. We call them cold gas inflators. They are
just a cylinder that is filled with gas under high pressure,
and you have a small ignitor that hits a little burst disc, and
the gas comes out. There are some that we call hybrids that
have gas, and then have a little bit of propellant that kind of
heats it up. Usually it is not ammonium nitrate in most of
them. Then there are alternate solid fuels out there, primarily
guanidine nitrate is what most of the industry uses now, and
what we are transitioning to.
We can provide all kinds of information, if you would like
to take a look at--and some----
Mr. Burgess. Well----
Mr. Kennedy [continuing]. Are better in other applications
than others.
Mr. Burgess. What is the barrier for getting something that
is less explosive than ammonium nitrate, and less toxic than
sodium azide?
Mr. Kennedy. You know, it really goes back to some of the
tradeoffs that I was talking about earlier, size, weight,
performance.
Mr. Burgess. Cost?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, and cost is certainly one of them too,
yes. I mean, some of those gas inflators are bigger, so you--it
is harder to get them in a steering wheel, for instance. So
there are those kind of tradeoffs. But we can certainly provide
any kind of information that you are interested in seeing.
Ms. Clarke. I would appreciate you making that available to
the subcommittee. I think that would be helpful to us.
Mr. Kennedy. Very well, Chairman Burgess.
Mr. Burgess. Well, seeing there are no further members
wishing to ask questions, I do want to thank all of our
witnesses for their participation in today's hearing. It has
been a long one. Pursuant to committee rules, I remind members
they have 10 business days to submit additional questions for
the record. I ask the witnesses submit their response within 10
business days upon receipt of those questions. And, without
objection, subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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[Mr. Kennedy's answers to submitted questions have been
retained in committee files and also are available at http://
docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20150602/103546/HHRG-114-IF17-
Wstate-KennedyK-20150602-SD005.pdf.]
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[Mr. Kelly did not answer submitted questions for the
record by the time of printing.]
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[Mr. Bainwol did not answer submitted questions for the
record by the time of printing.]
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