[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REVIEW OF THE NEW LONDON EMBASSY PROJECT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 8, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-86
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JIM JORDAN, Ohio ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
TIM WALBERG, Michigan Columbia
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee JIM COOPER, Tennessee
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TED LIEU, California
MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey
KEN BUCK, Colorado STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
MARK WALKER, North Carolina MARK DeSAULNIER, California
ROD BLUM, Iowa BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
JODY B. HICE, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin
WILL HURD, Texas
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
Jennifer Hemingway, Staff Director
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
Andrew R. Arthur, National Security Subcommittee Staff Director
Cordell Hull, Senior Counsel
Sharon Casey, Deputy Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on December 8, 2015................................. 1
WITNESSES
Ms. Lydia Muniz, Director, Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations, U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 7
Mr. Gregory B. Starr, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Mr. Steve A. Linick, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector
General, U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 16
REVIEW OF THE NEW LONDON EMBASSY PROJECT
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Tuesday, December 8, 2015
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Jordan, Walberg,
Amash, Meadows, DeSantis, Buck, Walker, Blum, Hice, Russell,
Carter, Hurd, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, DeSaulnier,
Welch, and Lujan Grisham.
Chairman Chaffetz. Good morning. The Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform will come to order. Without objection,
the chair is authorized to declare a recess at any time.
Today's hearing is the third in a series examining the
State Department's construction of diplomatic facilities
overseas. In July, we learned how State failed to properly
acknowledge known risk in the construction of the new embassy
in Kabul, Afghanistan. Building the embassy in Kabul has taken
longer and cost hundreds of millions of dollars more than
budgeted, leaving embassy staff in less secure and temporary
facilities. In September, we saw how a long delay to design and
build consulates in Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, exposed
personnel to some unnecessary risk. And today we hope to
understand the State Department's progress in the building a
new embassy in London, perhaps the single largest expenditure
we've had on such a building.
Obviously, the United States needs a large, secure, and
functional embassy in the capital of one of its oldest and most
important allies. Certainly, our presence in London is
noteworthy and it needs to provide a variety of functions,
above and beyond what other embassies, I'm sure, are called
upon to do. But one of the things we're concerned about is the
State's gambling with Federal dollars to get the embassy that
our diplomats need.
Over the summer, the State Department inspector general
issued a report on its findings regarding the London embassy
construction. The inspector general found that while the agency
has certified to Congress its plan for a new embassy would be
secure, in reality that was not necessarily the case at that
time. In fact, State had no idea that the embassy had met
security standards, but it started the construction anyway.
State's premature certification and construction violated
Federal law and its own internal policies, which required State
to prove the new embassy would be safe before construction
began. Construction in London began before State even blast
tested the embassy's outside wall, a test designed to ensure
the safety of the building and its personnel.
Rather than admitting that it violated Federal law, State
doubled down. Outside the building, called the curtain wall,
had failed several computerized blast tests. In fact, let's put
up a picture of the rendering. This is just a rendering, not a
picture, but a rendering of what the new embassy is supposed to
look like in its finality. The outside of the building, called
the curtain wall, had failed several computerized blast tests.
Thank you. You can take that down.
State's Diplomatic Security Bureau required Overseas
Buildings Operations to do full-scale blast test using
explosives rather than a computerized simulation. That blast
test did not start until at least 3 months after State
certified to Congress that the curtain wall was safe. And the
curtain wall did not actually pass blast testing until
approximately 6 months after the certification and construction
had begun.
Proceeding without knowing whether the building would be
safe was gambling with the government's money, and we're
concerned about that long term. State is freely spending tax
dollars on its embassy and consulate construction around the
world, yet asserts it is, quote-unquote, self-funding the
London project through sales of other properties in London.
But that's part of the problem with the London embassy
construction. State sold its current embassy in London to a
group of investors, and under the deal State has to leave its
current space by early of 2017. Significant financial penalties
to State and ultimately the taxpayers will be incurred should
construction run over schedule. As we've learned over several
past hearings on the subject, most of the time, at least our
experience, that has happened.
Fear of those penalties drove State to take significant
risks to meet its aggressive schedule. These risks include
contracting vehicle never before used by the State Department.
According to the inspector general, the contracting officer did
not fully understand the contract. That lack of understanding
resulted in the Overseas Building Operations office and the
inspector general's inability to account for roughly $42
million. The IG does not believe the money is missing. It's
just not accounted for due to mismanagement.
Quite frankly, I can't tell the difference. If they can't
account for it and they can't find it, I just don't know how
it's not missing, and that's part of what we're hoping to clear
up here today.
Even accepting the IG's conclusion, this shows that State,
trying to meet perhaps too aggressive a construction schedule,
made another gamble by using a contracting vehicle that it did
not understand. State did accept the inspector general's
recommendation that it offer additional training for future
contracts of this sort, but there are some other challenges and
questions we have that we hope to have clarified regarding the
London embassy project.
The State Department spent $1 million, evidently, on a
granite sculpture that was too heavy for the new embassy.
However, no one figured that out before spending the money. In
addition, the glass for the curtain wall should have been
earning some frequent flyer miles as press reports indicate the
glass was manufactured in Europe, shipped to the United States
under guard for framing, and then sent back across the Atlantic
for installation in London. State's under secretary for
management, the same person who certified the construction
could begin before the blast testing, dismissed the criticism,
saying, quote, ``Sometimes you have to move things, sometimes
you don't,'' end quote.
And finally, the documents produced to the committee show
that State authorized what appears to be $12 million in soil
remediation. As we have discussed in other hearings this year,
particularly in Mexico City, State apparently doesn't mind
building embassies in places where the soil is contaminated. We
would like to learn more about what's happening there.
We need to get our people in safe facilities as quickly as
possible. We don't need to take wild risks and freely spend
money that could otherwise be used to get other folks in high-
risk places into safer facilities.
Building and construction is a volatile situation. There
are many, many moving parts, and things change and adapt as
they move over time. We understand that. There needs to be some
degree of flexibility. But with two outstanding recommendations
from the inspector general, we would like to have those
resolved and have this discussion.
This is a billion-dollar expenditure and we need to get it
right, because London is one of our most important embassies on
the face of the planet, and we need to make sure that it's done
right and properly and we account for, in this case, tens of
millions of dollars that we can't seem to find.
So, with that, I would now like to recognize the
distinguished member, the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
calling today's very important hearing.
As I said at our first hearing on the London embassy
project back in July of last year, our diplomats overseas
deserve the most secure embassies in the world. Today, a year
and a half later, I am pleased that experts from the State
Department and its construction contractor have confirmed that
this project is meeting all security specifications, including
for the glass curtain wall that is being built to comply with
all of the required security standards.
The recent attacks in Paris, as well as those here in the
United States, remind us that we face threats not only in high-
risk locations like Afghanistan. And, of course, London has
been the victim of its own horrific terrorist attacks,
including the 2005 suicide bomb attacks against the public
transit system that killed 52 people, as well as the stabbing
last Friday, the details of which are still being investigated.
As the President discussed in his speech Sunday night, the
terrorist threats continue to evolve here and abroad.
In Assistant Secretary Starr's written testimony today, he
highlights the Department's efforts to research, develop, and
evaluate new and innovative methods in order to protect our
people in the face of this ever-changing threat. In addition to
meeting all of the required security standards, construction of
the London embassy remains on budget and on schedule according
to the State Department.
In her written testimony at today's hearing, Lydia Muniz,
the director of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations,
states that this project, and I quote, ``is on budget and on
schedule to be completed at the end of 2016,'' end of quote.
Some people may not know this, but this entire project is
being funded through proceeds from the sale of our existing
embassy property in London, meaning that this project has posed
no additional cost to the United States taxpayers. Meeting
security, budget, and schedule milestones during such a large-
scale and complex project is no small feat. The Department has
a rigorous construction schedule so that it can move our
personnel from the existing outdated embassy to the new
facility as quickly as possible.
I also want to thank the inspector general for being here
today and for the work of his office in ensuring that funding
is being used judiciously on this project. We've come a long
way since the massive cost overruns and delays we saw in the
construction of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq during the previous
administration. However, we must always strive to continue
improving our processes. So I thank the inspector general for
his report, and I look forward to hearing about any remaining
concerns that may still need to be addressed with regard to
this project.
The new embassy currently being built in London will have
more stringent security features than found in many other high-
profile buildings throughout the world, including the building
we are sitting in right here today in Washington, D.C. These
features include blast resistant setbacks from the street,
anticlimb barriers, and a number of other specifications.
Today, I hope our State Department witnesses will discuss
all of these issues. But I also hope they will address one
more. While we must ensure that our diplomats serving overseas
have secure facilities, we also have to make sure they are able
to do their jobs. According to press reports, many diplomats
are concerned that the United States will not be well served by
preventing our diplomats from being able to interact abroad.
They are concerned that a fortress mentality will impair their
work.
So, in addition to addressing security concerns, which are
paramount, I hope our witnesses here today will also discuss
how they plan for the new embassy to operate in a way that
maximizes the functions of our critical international diplomacy
while keeping our diplomats safe.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any
members who would like to submit a written statement.
Chairman Chaffetz. We'll now recognize our witnesses. I'm
pleased to welcome back Ms. Lydia Muniz, director of the Bureau
of Overseas Buildings Operations at the United States
Department of State; we have Mr. Gregory Starr, assistant
secretary of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the United
States Department of State; and Steve Linick, inspector general
of the Office of the Inspector General at the United States
Department of State.
Welcome all.
Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn
before they testify. If you'll please rise and raise your right
hands.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth? Thank you.
Let the record reflect that all the witnesses answered in
the affirmative.
We would appreciate your limiting your verbal comments to 5
minutes. Your entire written statement will, obviously, be
entered into the record.
Ms. Muniz, you're now recognized for 5 minutes. Bring those
mics right up close. We need the projection, plus we need it
for the--there we go. Thank you.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF LYDIA MUNIZ
Ms. Muniz. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and members of
the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the U.S. Department of State's project to
build a new U.S. Embassy in London. I'm Lydia Muniz, director
of the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations at the U.S.
Department of State.
As the single real property manager for all U.S. Government
diplomatic properties overseas, OBO manages the design,
construction, acquisition, sale, and maintenance of the
Department's worldwide property portfolio. That portfolio
includes the property platform supporting 275 missions in 190
countries and has over $14 billion in projects in design and
construction.
Like you, the State Department is deeply committed to the
safety and security of our personnel serving abroad. Every new
design and construction project that OBO undertakes meets the
security and life safety standards required by law and by our
team of experts in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and within
OBO. We work with DS at all steps of the process to ensure that
security standards are met in our designs and that security
considerations are addressed in our operations.
In 1960, the Department of State opened a new U.S. Embassy
in London located on Grosvenor Square. Not surprisingly,
security and life safety standards have evolved significantly
since that time and the Chancery does not meet current security
and life safety standards. In addition, after more than 50
years of occupancy, the facility has aged and is in need of
extensive investments in infrastructure.
In 2006, OBO examined several options to renovate the aging
Chancery. At that time, a major rehabilitation of the facility
was estimated to cost approximately $550 million and to take
nearly 7 years to complete. The quandary was that even after
such a significant investment, the Chancery would still not
meet the most critical security standards.
So OBO began exploring alternative solutions and in 2007
developed a plan to finance a new embassy project through an
innovative property swap of existing U.S. Government property
in London. The solution would allow OBO to construct a new,
safe, and secure Chancery using no new appropriated funds. As
envisioned, the project remains financed entirely from the
proceeds of sale of existing functional property, and I'm
pleased to report that the project is on budget and on schedule
to be completed at the end of 2016.
Some have asked about the innovative design of the new
London embassy. It is a strong design that meets not only the
Department's high standards for security and safety, but also
stringent local requirements for design and sustainability. It
is essentially a steel-framed cube with a glass curtain wall.
The project is efficient, makes maximum use of development
rights on limited real estate, and makes use of best practices
more than innovation.
This committee has inquired about the use of glass curtain
walls. Glass curtain walls are nonload-bearing exterior walls
that typically provide for large, unobstructed spans of glass
across multiple floors. Curtain wall systems have been used by
the design and construction industry since the early 1900s, and
the Department has used curtain wall systems in over a dozen
embassy and consulate projects since the 1950s.
Among the benefits of curtain wall systems when used with
steel frame construction are that they are particularly
efficient in terms of space utilization and can be erected
faster than a built-in-place solution such as poured concrete,
effectively shortening construction durations. More
importantly, regardless of design or construction methodology
and materials, all new U.S. embassies and consulates adhere to
the same security and safety standards.
When looking at the challenges of providing an updated
facility in London, the Department could have simply stopped at
an expensive major rehabilitation that would have been funded
with appropriated dollars and still not resolved the
significant security deficiencies. Instead, the Department
developed an innovative financial and design solution that will
provide for a modern, secure facility at no cost to the U.S.
taxpayer. The development of creative solutions, mindful of
limited resources, is what government should be about.
We must protect our staff serving abroad, and using the
lessons learned over decades, we can design and build embassies
and consulates to better serve our mission and colleagues, are
a better value to the U.S. taxpayer, and make better use of
scarce resources in the short and long term. Security, safety,
and excellence in diplomatic facilities are mutually
reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.
U.S. embassies the world over serve as visible reminders of
America's influence and global diplomatic presence. They are
symbols of America's culture and values. Just as importantly,
they are safe, secure, and functional platforms from which our
staff advance vital U.S. foreign policy objectives. With the
depth and breadth of its responsibilities, our embassy in
London will soon have a platform that does all of these things
and that better supports their critical work with one of our
oldest friends and most important allies.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Muniz follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
Mr. Starr, you're now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. STARR
Mr. Starr. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and
distinguished committee members, good morning. And I want to
thank you for your invitation to appear today to discuss the
construction of the U.S. Embassy in London. I, along with my
colleagues at the Department of State, look forward to working
with you to examine the issue and illustrate how we
collectively support the men and women who serve at this
mission with a safe and secure facility.
As the assistant secretary for diplomatic security, I work
every single day with my colleagues to ensure a safe
environment for our people. Environments in which we operate
today require comprehensive planning, agile decisionmaking, and
deft diplomacy. Most of all, they require us to be present,
fully engaged, and 100 percent committed to the security of our
people and our facilities.
The U.S. Embassy in London is an exceptionally important
platform for diplomatic and consular engagement to advance our
national interests in this country. As you know, I work closely
with my colleagues in the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations as the Department builds diplomatic missions that
increase the safety and security, as well as meet rigorous
security standards.
Concerning the U.S. Embassy in London, DS has worked with
OBO throughout the design and construction project to ensure
that this project would be executed while meeting the security
standards.
As you know, the threats faced by the Department are ever-
evolving. In response to this changing environment, DS commits
a significant amount of time and effort and energy towards
research and evaluation in order to ensure our facilities are
able to combat such threats. The outcome of this innovation
provides DS with different designs and different building
methodologies that accommodate the Department in these
environments.
We owe it to our diplomats, along with our security
professionals in the field, to provide them with safe, secure
platforms from which they can operate. I want to thank Congress
for the resources and support that you have provided and look
forward to your continued support in years ahead.
Thank you. And I will be glad to answer any questions you
have.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
Mr. Linick, you're now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEVE A. LINICK
Mr. Linick. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
about OIG's July 2015 audit of the new embassy compound in
London and its implications for future Department of State
construction projects.
At a cost of more than a billion dollars, the London
embassy project is among the most expensive embassies built by
the State Department. Our audit had two objectives. First, we
sought to determine whether the Department resolved security
issues before allowing construction to begin associated with
the exterior glass curtain wall on the outer facade of the
Chancery building. Department policy required that those
security issues be resolved before construction could begin.
Second, OIG sought to determine whether the Department adhered
to Federal contracting requirements in negotiating the price
for the construction of the London compound when it accepted
$42 million in additional contract expenses without obtaining
sufficient justification for them.
We found the Department's practices in both areas, the
timing of the security certification and the acceptance of the
added expenses, did not conform to applicable requirements. As
a result, we made four recommendations which are in the process
of being addressed by the Department. Two have been closed. Let
me briefly discuss our security-related findings first.
The Department's physical security standards require most
new office buildings to provide adequate safeguards to protect
people from the effects of explosions and projectiles. The
exterior curtain wall at the London compound had to meet
criteria that includes blast protection requirements.
Within the Department, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations, OBO, directs building programs and the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, DS, is responsible for overseeing new
construction to ensure compliance with security standards. By
statute, the Department must certify to Congress that a
construction project for a new embassy will provide proper
security before it undertakes such a project.
The Department's published interpretation and
implementation of the statute is contained in the Foreign
Affairs Manual. It states that no construct should be awarded
or construction undertaken before certification.
Notwithstanding this policy, since at least 2003 the
Department has followed the practice of authorizing
construction contractors to begin work prior to certification.
In the case of the London compound, the contract award, site
work, and construction began many months before the Department
certified the project to Congress in December of 2013 as
providing adequate security protection.
OIG is also concerned that the Department certified the
safety of the project without obtaining blast testing results.
The blast testing was not completed until May of 2014, more
than 6 months after certification. As early as November 2012,
DS notified OBO of its concerns with the curtain wall design
and reiterated that a full blast test needed to be completed to
ensure that the wall met standards. DS changed course after the
director of OBO provided a written assurance shortly before
certification that it would address any issues should the test
fail. DS and OBO ultimately agreed that the curtain met
standards.
By initiating construction without first completing the
blast testing, the Department committed itself to constructing
a building that could have required significant redesign,
potentially placing the Department and taxpayers at financial
risk.
Let me turn to OIG's second area of concern, the
Departments contracting process. The Department initially
targeted early 2017 as the move-in date for the London
compound. To meet this target, the Department chose a new
contracting strategy, the Early Contractor Involvement, or ECI,
which was intended to shorten the time between design and
construction by involving the construction contractor early in
the process.
London was the Department's first experience with ECI.
Under Federal rules, a contractor using the ECI is required to
submit two pricing proposals to the government. The first one
is an initial target price for construction which is submitted
at a point where project design is partially completed. The
second one is a final price proposal submitted at a later stage
of the design phase. Under the rules, the contractor is
required to submit sufficient data to support any difference in
price so the government can effectively negotiate a firm, fixed
price.
In the case of the London compound, the Department's
contracting officer negotiated the final price of the contract
without requiring the contractor to explain adequately a $42
million difference between the initial proposal and the final
proposal.
In sum, our findings and recommendations, if implemented,
will have a positive impact on future Department projects and
reduce risk to taxpayers. Thank you again for the opportunity
to discuss this work, and I look forward to addressing your
questions.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Linick follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
I'll now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Ms. Muniz, how is it that OBO started construction on this
facility prior to having the security parameters in place? And
how is it that the under secretary of management certifies to
Congress that it's safe and secure but when they haven't
completed all the security tests?
Ms. Muniz. Let me take that question first and then I'll
hand it over to Greg, who is the one who certifies and confirms
that these projects meet all of the Department's
securitystandards.
I'd like to remind the committee that when a project is
certified, what DS is doing and what, ultimately, the under
secretary for management is doing is they are certifying a
design. The design of the London embassy met all of the very
stringent requirements that were provided by Diplomatic
Security. It meets those using very complex calculations and
running those calculations for hundreds, sometimes thousands of
hours. So it is possible to confirm by calculation that designs
meet the standards, and that's precisely what was done.
Chairman Chaffetz. Why did you start construction prior to
the DS certification?
Ms. Muniz. I would argue that we did not start
construction. I would argue that we awarded a construction
contract as the Department has done since----
Chairman Chaffetz. When do you think we----
Ms. Muniz. --for the last 10 years.
Chairman Chaffetz. When did you think we started
construction?
Ms. Muniz. So for years piling and doing the pile caps is
considered part of the site work and the site stabilization.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. So let me run you through a couple
pictures. These are pictures provided by State Department on
your Flickr account.
[Slide.]
Chairman Chaffetz. Are you telling us that that's not
construction?
I have three pictures here I would like to show you. And
what we've been told is these pictures are dated by State
Department on the State Department Web site prior to the
certification. And that's what the inspector general's--I mean,
it didn't come to our attention but for the inspector general,
and you don't seem to agree with it, and we're confused by
that. We're supposed to believe that that's not construction.
Go to slide number 2.
[Slide.]
Chairman Chaffetz. That to me seems like an awful lot of
work going on and a lot of construction, and you don't believe
that that's--you telling us that's not construction?
Ms. Muniz. I agree it is an awful lot of work. But under
the definitions that we use and have used for years with
Diplomatic Security, we do site pilings, and we cap those
pilings to stabilize the earth, the soil, and the site before
we come out of the ground.
Chairman Chaffetz. Go to the next slide.
[Slide.]
Ms. Muniz. This exact process has been followed with the
standard embassy design for 10 years--over 10 years--exactly
the same process of awarding contracts, of doing site work, and
then of coming out of the ground after certification.
Chairman Chaffetz. We've never built a building like this.
You've never used a blast wall like this. It had not been
certified, it had not gone through the testing. When I went to
London and talked to the people on the ground, they said we've
never built anything like this.
And the point the inspector general is making, I'd like to
get his comments on this, is you're taking a huge risk. That,
to me, looks like construction. And you're saying that, well,
it's done in the past, it's not construction.
Mr. Linick, is that construction? Does that put us at risk?
What if that hadn't passed this test?
Mr. Linick. Well, when you----
Chairman Chaffetz. Go ahead, Mr. Linick.
Mr. Linick. When you look at a picture like that, to me,
that does look like construction. But from the point of view of
our report, it's really irrelevant, because the Department's
own published policy, the FAM, says you can't even award a
contract, okay, or undertake and initiate construction prior to
certification. So, in my view, that means no activity should be
occurring based on their own published policies, which are the
official interpretation of the statute which Congress pasted.
By initiating construction prior to certification, prior to
testing, what you're doing is committing to a course of
construction, committing to a building that may have to be
redesigned if the blast testing fails or if certification
doesn't work. And that's primarily our concern, is that the
Department needs to take into consideration the risk to
taxpayers as a result of a failure of testing.
I don't know what would have happened in this case had
blast testing failed. It's not clear to me. But this has
implications not just for this embassy, but really for future
projects.
Chairman Chaffetz. And that is the key to why we're here.
Mr. Starr, I'll give you a chance to answer. My time is
expiring. But this picture was taken weeks before you even
started your testing.
Mr. Starr. Sir, those photographs are dated 2014. I
certified that building in December of 2013.
Chairman Chaffetz. Keep going.
Mr. Starr. In addition, I want to make something clear,
that for years, we have done something called soil
stabilization, as Lydia Muniz was referring to. Your first
photograph is closest to what we allow to occur before we
actually start to construct the building. We will not let OBO
start constructing the foundation of the building, even the
foundation, before certification. We do permit them to do soil
stabilization----
Chairman Chaffetz. Was your blast test--let me--was your
blast testing done before that date?
Mr. Starr. No, sir. But I'd like to talk about that as
well----
Chairman Chaffetz. But that's the point. That's the point.
Mr. Starr. --because there is no requirement to do blast
testing. Sir, there is no requirement----
Chairman Chaffetz. You're here to tell me as the head of
Diplomatic Security you're not required to do blast testing?
Mr. Starr. No, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. You need a piece of legislation that
tells you we're going to have to do blast testing?
Mr. Starr. No, sir. If I could explain.
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. But don't come before us and tell
us that you had certified that building. That's not what the
inspector general had found.
Mr. Starr. No, the----
Chairman Chaffetz. You had not done the blast testing when
that--look how far developed that was. They didn't whip that up
in 2 weeks.
Mr. Starr. Sir, if I may explain. For most of 2013, my
staff went back and forth with OBO and did not certify the
building based on the original designs that we got. We did have
questions about the design of that building. OBO and the
architects and the blast consultants went back many times from
the original designs and looked at it and closely evaluated how
to build that building to meet our standards--to meet our
standards.
In late November of 2013, in late November and in early
December, I sat down with my entire staff, I sat down with OBO,
we sat down with the architect of record, and we sat down with
the Weidlinger company, which was the architect of record's
blast consultant, one of the absolute most experienced, best
blast consultants in the world, bar none. The question that I
needed answered to me before I would certify that building was
will that building as it is currently designed meet our
standards, our forced entry standards, our blast standards.
Weidlinger, the architect of design, and my own people said,
yes, it will.
Chairman Chaffetz. When was that?
Mr. Starr. In late November and early December of 2013.
Chairman Chaffetz. Then why didn't you do any blast
testing?
Mr. Starr. Sir, we learn things from blast tests. I also am
a little bit from the, I don't know, from the Missouri school,
I want to be shown that things actually do it. But when I have
the architect of record and perhaps the best blast engineering
company in the world, Weidlinger, telling me that this building
will protect our people, absolutely will protect our people,
that is a promise that they're saying and putting in writing.
And, therefore, I can sit there and I can write a certification
to you, a promise that the facility resulting from the project
is going to protect our people adequately.
Now, we wanted to blast test it anyway. We scheduled those
blast tests shortly after that. We learned things from blast
testing. In the lay-ups of the blast testing we actually used
glass that was thinner, we used glass that was the same, we
used glass that was thicker. We learn things from blast
testing. And, ultimately, when we blast tested the full lay-up,
it confirmed exactly what the engineers had said: It passed.
Chairman Chaffetz. That's not true.
Mr. Starr. Yes, it is.
Chairman Chaffetz. You had failures during these blast
tests.
Mr. Starr. No, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. You're telling me there were no failures
in these blast tests?
Mr. Starr. I am telling you that.
Chairman Chaffetz. No, were there any failures on these
blast tests?
Mr. Starr. Component tests, pieces of glass that we tested,
including some that were less than what we were putting up,
including some that were less, failed.
Chairman Chaffetz. There you go.
Mr. Starr. Pieces that were less than what we were doing,
sir. We do blast testing to learn a lot of things. We find out
a lot from it. The full-scale mockup of the building that we
did passed every single test with flying colors.
Chairman Chaffetz. After you had started the construction.
Mr. Starr. Reaffirming what the architects and the blast
engineers gave us in writing saying absolutely this will pass.
Chairman Chaffetz. My apologies to my colleagues. I do not
want to take so much time. I want to give you the latitude to
offer those types of answers.
You have a very skeptical Congress who thinks you're
gambling with a lot of money and a lot of commitment here. At
the same time, you have an inspector general that finds it's
not in compliance with the law, not in compliance with your own
internal standards. And you're here to try to convince us,
based on those three photos, that that's not actually
construction. And that's why we're having this meeting.
Mr. Starr. I understand that, and I appreciate the
opportunity to----explain myself
Chairman Chaffetz. Let me go to my ranking member, Mr.
Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Starr, let's be clear, you had said that
the pictures were taken, according to the dates, in 2014. Is
that right?
Mr. Starr. 2014.
Mr. Cummings. And your certification came in 2013. Is that
correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Now, were there a series of tests leading up
to the major blast test?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Can you explain that? Because we need to--I
need to understand exactly what goes into the certification
process. If you can do it briefly.
Mr. Starr. The certification process does not require us to
do blast testing. I mean, literally, we could have just
accepted the engineer's and the architect's and the blast
consultant's and say, yes, this meets standards. We do this in
many cases.
In this case, because the windows were very large, we
decided we're going to blast test this anyway. We did some
component testing before. And, as the chairman says, there's a
report. One of them says that it's inconclusive. We actually
had overpressures that were higher than what we needed to test
to and we had pieces of glass that were actually less robust
than what we built this building with to test them.
We learn things from that type of testing. When we did the
full-scale mock up, as the engineers had predicted and had
certified to us, it passed with flying colors.
Sir, we promise that we are going to build a building that
meets our standards. We are building a building that meets our
standards.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, there has been a lot of
discussion about how the London embassy will look rather than
how it will function. But if you're sitting inside the embassy,
whether it has a glass wall or cement wall or some other wall,
the issue is the same, you want to know that you are protected.
Am I right?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Is your mic on?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So I would like to clarify. So there's no
remaining doubt that the new London embassy will protect the
men and women who work there. Is the new London embassy project
meeting all the State Department security requirements to date?
Mr. Starr. Yes, it is.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Ms. Muniz, would you agree with that?
Ms. Muniz. Yes, it absolutely is.
Mr. Cummings. Now, the glass curtain wall of the building
has been an issue for us for some time on this committee. So I
would like to be clear on that wall. Mr. Starr, does the glass
wall surrounding the embassy structure meet all the State
Department-specified security requirements?
Mr. Starr. Yes, it does.
Mr. Cummings. Has it passed all the requirement in the
blast test?
Mr. Starr. Yes, it has.
Mr. Cummings. Director Muniz, does the glass wall support
the structure of the building or is it an external layer of
protection?
Ms. Muniz. It's an external layer. Curtain walls are
differently than a window wall. A curtain wall is not load
bearing. In other words, the wall could be removed and the
structure would be intact.
Mr. Cummings. All right. And are you confident in the
performance of all the components of the wall, including the
panels, the fasteners, and other materials?
Ms. Muniz. I'm very confident.
Mr. Cummings. Are you, Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Cummings. All right. The Department's security
requirements include certain features that all new embassies
must meet, including setbacks from the street of at least 100
feet, anticlimb and antiram features, and other physical
properties. Is that right, Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Cummings. In addition to these standard baseline
requirements, you testified in your previous hearing on July 9
that you also adapt security requirements depending on the
context, the threat, and the environment in each case. For
example, for our facility in Afghanistan, you stated, and I
quote, ``We constantly examine our security methods to adapt to
an evolving threat environment.'' You also said that you, and I
quote, ``scrutinize the environment in Afghanistan, our
security footing, to seize opportunities to improve security
where possible,'' end of quote. Now, is that right?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Cummings. How do you go about doing that?
Mr. Starr. We look at what types of attacks we are likely
to be subjected to. We look at the theater that we're operating
at. We look at what weapons, terrorists, and others have in
their hands and how they could attack us. We look at terrorist
tactics and procedures. And then we make determinations, in
addition to our physical security measures that are our
baseline standards, of other things that we may have to do.
In certain cases, we are using overhead cover to ensure
that mortar attacks and rocket attacks are protected from. In
certain cases, we have things like radar warning systems that
give us time in advance when we're being attacked for people to
take cover and duck-and-cover systems. These are examples of
things that we look at, depending on what country we're in and
where we're at, and then how we try to mitigate the threats.
Mr. Cummings. When you're looking at what happened in
Paris, is there anything--and I don't want to get into any kind
of secret information--but is there anything that we could
learn from that that would affect the embassy, the building of
the embassy, at all?
Mr. Starr. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Because of the type of attack, I take it.
Mr. Starr. No, we have seen those types of attacks before.
Those attacks were effective because they were attacking soft,
unhardened targets without protection. It really does not apply
to better protected facilities.
Mr. Cummings. I got you. And does the new London embassy
project meet both the overall security standards and any
environment-specific requirements you believe are necessary?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. We looked closely at London. We look
at our security standards. The facility, as I said, in the
certification under Public Law 100-204, as amended, that
facility resulting from this construction project will meet our
standards and will provide the adequate safety and security for
our personnel in that facility.
Mr. Cummings. Do you agree, Ms. Muniz?
Ms. Muniz. I do.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Linick, you've heard all of this, my
line of questioning. Do you disagree with anything that has
been said by either Mr. Starr or Ms. Muniz?
Mr. Linick. Our work did not assess whether it's safe and
all of that. So I have no reason to dispute that.
Mr. Cummings. Very well. Very well.
One other thing, Mr. Starr. Yesterday--I'm going back to
the Paris incident--but yesterday I had to do a speech at a
building directly across the street from the FBI building. And
while I was waiting to park, I just noticed that there are
just, I mean, just lines of cameras, which I would have
expected, in front of that building and all around it as a
matter of fact, cameras everywhere. And I was just thinking
about the Paris piece. I mean, do we--do you all worry about
those kinds of attacks at all?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. There are attacks that are--we have
suffered in the past. If you remember the Jeddah attack on our
consulate, there were armed gunmen with AK-47s and explosives
that came in, they breached our perimeter over the wall.
Because of our security standards, they never got into our
facility, and the Saudi forces and our guard forces effectively
terminated that. The same thing happened in Herat, in
Afghanistan.
We're aware of those types of attacks. We believe that we
have the proper security in place to defend against them.
Mr. Cummings. Now, can you talk briefly about this $42
million? That's a lot of money. I mean, Americans looking at
this would say, you know, $42 million overrun--is that right,
Mr. Linick, is that the right, proper description of it, the
$42 million, do you want to call them change orders? What do
you want to call them?
Mr. Linick. The $42 million was an increase in price which
was not justified and it was accepted by the Department. So we
just don't know whether the $42 million is supported with
accurate data.
Mr. Cummings. Would you comment on that, Ms. Muniz? Either
one of you?
Ms. Muniz. I'd be happy to. I'm not sure what this $42
million is about. What I do know is that when we first notified
this project to the Hill and, in fact, when we first notified
the acquisition of the site, this project is $30 million under
those initial notifications and continues to be $30 million
under.
Mr. Cummings. Do you have a comment on that, Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. No, sir. No, I'm not familiar with that. That's
out of my security realm.
Mr. Cummings. Can you all get your numbers together then? I
mean, it sounds like you're saying one thing, Mr. Linick, she's
saying another. She's talking about 30 under, you're talking
about 42 over. Hello?
Mr. Linick. Yes. Congressman, the $42 million, actually OBO
was asking for information to support that figure and they
weren't getting it. And the contracting officer misinterpreted
the law and didn't realize that he was supposed to get that
information from the contractor. This was at OBO's request. And
OBO, to my knowledge, still is not satisfied with the
justification of that $42 million.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, Ms. Muniz?
Ms. Muniz. I believe what Mr. Linick may be talking about
is the fact that when we used ECI, the Early Contractor
Involvement, the reason we did that is that to the degree that
you can involve the contractor much earlier in the design
phase, you can resolve a lot of issues that would later become
issues during construction. So it's a way of getting the whole
team involved very early.
It is the case that in an ideal circumstance, using ECI,
this contracting method, we would have had more pricing
information from the contractor. And we did try to obtain that
additional pricing information. So I think that's quite right.
And that is a tool that we're trying to improve and that is
actually an improvement over our prior program where we did not
have Early Contractor Involvement.
It is, however, the case that our estimates of the
construction contract and of the total project budget are still
on target. And, in fact, our budgets are coming in, we're
coming in $30 million under our initial proposal.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. I now recognize Mr. Mica of Florida.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, we're spending a lot of money on this facility. I
guess it's in the billion-dollar range, if that's correct. And
we're designing it--well, it was designed an unsafe or unsecure
manner based on some requirements that we should be following.
We have--State relies on--the State Department relies on an
unpublished 2003 draft memorandum between the Bureaus of
Overseas Buildings Operations and Diplomatic Security rather
than Federal law and FAM. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. In any discussion of whether a FAM or Federal
law takes priority, Federal law takes priority.
Mr. Mica. But it doesn't appear that, again, that there was
proper procedure and proper consideration for security given
the final design.
Mr. Starr. Sir, I disagree with that. I think that we fully
complied with the law, absolutely.
We do have one portion of the FAM that I think has not been
updated since 1993. And in particular, in the early 2000s, when
we were using standard embassy design, that is a design-build
methodology of receiving the project, as opposed to design-bid-
build, the FAM says we're not supposed to sign a contract
beforehand. In fact, that does need to be modified in the FAM.
The law says nothing about that. But we are----
Mr. Mica. Okay. So that's a recommendation to avoid the----
Mr. Starr. Yes, that is one of the recommendations from the
inspector general and we are addressing that.
Mr. Mica. I think that's very important.
Again, we're--you know, the thing is under construction and
the design is there. This was built to the Inman
specifications?
Mr. Starr. It goes all the way back to the Inman
specifications. And then we've gone through several iterations
of this, finally culminating with P.L. 100-204 that gave us
directions that we need to certify in advance of the
construction of the building that the facility is going result
in a building or a facility that's safe for our classified
information, our national security activities, and our people.
Mr. Mica. And the new design, does that include all of the
embassy functions? Are there other functions, like Foreign
Commercial Service operations, in other facilities around
London? I'm not familiar with what we've got outside of the
embassy there.
Mr. Starr. There were other embassy functions in the--what
was called the Navy Annex. We were not co-located, that is
another law that Congress has passed, that we must have 100
feet of setback for every facility that we build and we must
co-locate everybody in the facility----
Mr. Mica. But do we rent other----
Mr. Starr. --and they were not co-located in the old
facility.
Mr. Mica. But they will be co-located in this facility?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. How about Foreign Commercial Service operations?
Mr. Starr. Yes. Off the top of my head, I can't name every
agency that will be in the new facility, but we have----
Mr. Mica. And will there be--my other question--will there
be some outside?
Mr. Starr. No.
Mr. Mica. I visited Paris, I went to the Paris Air Show and
then spent a day looking at our facilities in Paris, because we
knew after Hebdo that it could be a target. And they chose not
to go after the hardened targets now, you know, a cafe, or a
restaurant, a theater. And people at a Christmas party are
their new targets.
But any other recommendations you have in changing the law
so that we don't have the hiccups we have with this particular
project?
Mr. Starr. No, sir.
I would like to say something. Since 1985 and the Inman
Commission, we've gone through a series of processes, like
having the Overseas Security Policy Board set security
standards for new construction. We've had laws passed that
require us to co-locate our personnel and have 100 feet of
setback or in new construction. Only the Secretary of State can
waive that. We are required to tell Congress in advance of
starting the construction of the actual building that the
building will result in a safe and secure facility.
We have since, well, since I've been on board, we have
never breached that trust and we never will. Every building
that we build will meet the security standards. We are getting
the funding from Congress not because we need to replace out-
of-date buildings, because the buildings are insecure. That's
why Congress gives us the funding. This particular project is
not using appropriated funding. It's using proceeds of sale.
But I assure you also that we would never build a building that
will not be safe and secure for our people, our national
security----
Chairman Chaffetz. Well, with all due respect, if the
gentleman will yield, the problem is when you have a facility
that the life expectancy is less than 10 years, it's a
different set of standards. And that's not what happened in
Benghazi. That's not what happened in Tripoli. You did not
erect a facility in Tripoli that was secure. It was the biggest
embarrassment to this government. I've been there. I've seen
it. You cannot tell me that you've done that every single time
when people were killed in those facilities.
Mr. Starr. Sir, you are correct that the Benghazi facility
did not meet the standards. We did not build that facility.
There's a difference between when we have to go places and
sometimes accept what we can lease and try to upgrade it in the
meantime.
My promise to you is then when we build a facility----
Chairman Chaffetz. What would you consider Tripoli?
Mr. Starr. Tripoli, we leased----
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. But this is the problem. You take
an American and you put him out there, they're in a very
difficult circumstance, we need our diplomats out there
engaging with these people. Do you think they care that there's
a difference whether you built it or somebody else built it?
You're certifying that it's secure and you don't do that on a
regular practice. It is regular practice to offer waivers. In
fact, one of the waivers we're looking at here happened in
London.
So that's why we keep having these hearings. Don't lead
this Congress to believe that every facility we put people into
is safe and secure when you offer waiver after waiver after
waiver, because you did it in Tripoli, You did it in Benghazi,
and you've done it before in other places.
Mr. Starr. Sir, I agree. No one is more cognizant of what
happened in Benghazi than I am. No one is more cognizant than I
am in the Department----
Chairman Chaffetz. You just sat here before us and told us
every building we put people in----
Mr. Starr. We build--sir, sir, please----
Chairman Chaffetz. And that's mincing words.
Mr. Starr. No, it's not.
Chairman Chaffetz. That's not being honest and candid with
the American people and with this Congress.
Mr. Starr. Sir, it is not mincing words. I am being exact.
When we build a new facility from scratch----
Chairman Chaffetz. What do you tell the kid from Tennessee
that you send overseas----
Mr. Starr. May I answer?
Chairman Chaffetz.--well, we leased this one, so it's not
as secure. What do you tell that family?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, may I answer the question? Public
law says when we build a new facility--and we've had, thanks to
Congress, a new embassy construction program for many years--
every single one of those buildings that we build new meets
every one of those standards. We don't waive things.
When we have to accept--Congressman, please--when we have
to go into different places and lease a facility that we know
doesn't meet our standards, we try our best to upgrade it. We
try to provide other methods of mitigating the threat, whether
it's U.S. Marines, whether it's Diplomatic Security agents.
Sometimes we use temporary barriers around them.
I cannot make a leased facility that has never been--never
been designed to meet blast standards or setback meet blast
standards or setback. There's a difference between when we
build new--and that's what you ask us to certify--when we build
new, then we have to go out on more or less an expeditionary
basis and lease something. The facilities that we had in
Tripoli and Benghazi did not meet the new embassy construction
standards and do not.
Mr. Mica. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Before the gentleman yields back, are
there any waivers in Jakarta? The answer is yes.
Mr. Starr. No, I don't----
Chairman Chaffetz. And you're building that facility.
Mr. Starr. I don't believe there are waivers in Jakarta.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. You give us a list of new
construction waivers and you put in writing that that number is
zero, because that is not true.
Mr. Starr. Sir, every year we provide a report to Congress
on any waivers that we have given for new construction. We
provide it every single year.
Chairman Chaffetz. You give this committee--is that fair
enough--you give that information to this committee.
Mr. Starr. We give it to our committees, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, the House Foreign Relations Committee, the
Appropriations----
Chairman Chaffetz. Will you give that to our committee?
Mr. Starr. Absolutely.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. And the reason you're here is
you have an inspector general saying you're not abiding by
Federal law.
So our time has gone well past. Ms. Maloney from New York
is now recognized for a very generous 5 minutes.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
important meeting.
And I'd like to ask Assistant Secretary Starr, our number
one focus is to protect the men and women who are serving our
country overseas. And is this facility secure? Are they
protected in this London facility that you're building?
Mr. Starr. In the new facility that we're building, yes.
Mrs. Maloney. Is it one of the most secure embassies in the
world now with the new technologies?
Mr. Starr. It will be, yes.
Mrs. Maloney. It will be one of the most secure in the
world.
So the bottom line that we're looking at, going forward, we
have to make sure that they are secure, and you're testifying
that this is one of the most secure sites in embassies in the
world.
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, thank you for that.
But I do want to point out that President Obama, in his
speech last night, talked about the evolving threat of
terrorism. It's not just what we face today, it's what's going
to be tomorrow, what the new technique's going to be. And he
said, and I quote, ``The terrorist threat has evolved into a
new phase,'' end quote.
So I want to know how are we responding to these new phases
as a result of new technologies or whatever is going forward.
So I'd like to ask you--well, I guess it was, your report, Mr.
Linick, your report highlights the importance that research and
development and testing is important for innovative development
designs. That's what you were stressing in your report. Is that
correct, that you have to have these new technologies and
testing for the new technologies and emerging threats?
Mr. Linick. Congresswoman, our report didn't assess whether
innovation is necessary or not necessary. Our focus was narrow
in that we looked at whether or not the security issues were
resolved before construction, before contract award. That's
what we looked at, and we also looked at the contract. So I'm
not in a position to tell you whether we need innovation, et
cetera.
As far as testing goes, my only point with that was that
the testing of the glass curtain wall didn't occur for 6 months
after certification, and it was our opinion that it ought to
have occurred before certification because we fail to see how
you can certify something is safe without, you know, making
sure that it passes the blast test.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, then, Assistant Secretary Starr, there
is a need, would you say, for research and development. And I
understand there's a research and development group within the
Diplomatic Security. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, Congresswoman, it is.
Mrs. Maloney. Okay. And I understand that a lot of what
this unit develops may be classified, but can you give this
committee a quick overview of the type of other research or
methods that DS, or development security, is--diplomatic
screening and security is developing?
Mr. Starr. Congresswoman, thank you for the question.
We work, sometimes by ourselves, sometimes with the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, sometimes with the National Labs, and
we--our buildings meet higher standards for our security
standards--and I don't want to go into exactly what they are--
than any type of commercial building. And in order to do that
we had to develop new types of products.
I can tell you that one of the products that we developed,
if you look at the first generation of embassies that we built
from 1988 to 1992 that withstood blasts, the windows were about
2 feet by 2 feet and they were about 5 inches thick. Today we
can build windows, we have windows and commercial contractors
build them for us now, that are, you know, 6 feet by 8 feet
that meet the blast requirements. And that has further
developed to the point where we are building the embassy in
London and Jakarta where the curtain wall is actually all glass
and yet still meets those blast requirements.
These are the types of things that, as we go forward
building new buildings, give us different options to build
while still meeting very rigorous security standards.
Mrs. Maloney. That's good to hear, that you're focusing on
this blast response. But can you elaborate on how the State
Department is utilizing other creative solutions to adopt to
the ever-evolving threat requirement that we have around the
world for our embassies? Ms. Muniz or Mr. Starr, either one.
Ms. Muniz, since we've heard from the other two panelists.
Ms. Muniz. Let me respond first to your earlier question
about the importance of looking at new materials and--new
materials for the State Department in any event.
Curtain wall technology is really the predominant
technology that is used to build what we call high-rise
buildings, and high-rise is defined as anything above seven
stories.
What we found as we were moving forward in our construction
project is that--in our construction program, rather--is that
increasingly it was difficult for us to find large sites in
cities that are quite developed and where real estate is quite
expensive. So it was really in our interest and the
Department's interest to take advantage of technologies that
would allow us to build buildings higher and to do that
efficiently and economically. So that is the benefit of testing
new products or using new products to new standards, such as
curtain wall, though, again, curtail wall has been in use in
the construction industry since the early 1900s.
With respect to the types of flexibility that we build into
our buildings, I'll address first what we do that is
nonsecurity related, and then we'll turn it back to my
colleague, Mr. Starr.
The Excellence initiative, we've tried to look at a lot of
things that are used in industry quite skillfully to make
better use of our buildings and make them endure longer. So we
have used raised floors and demountable partitions rather than
hard partitions so that if we need additional staff or
reconfiguration, it can be done quickly and easily at very
little expense.
We've also looked, to the degree possible, building in as
much efficiency and sustainability as we can to drive down
operating costs. That's also an important factor when we select
our sites. So we are picking sites that are increasingly closer
to the colleagues that our diplomats work with in order to
drive down the operating cost of shuttling them 30, 45 minutes,
sometimes an hour to visit their colleagues.
So all of these things combined--additional flexibility,
technologies that will help us build faster, but also building
in places where we can have our diplomats close to the
colleagues and the people they need to work with--those are all
things that the program is focusing on.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, thank you for your hard work.
My time has expired. Thank you.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
We'll now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Walker, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We hear a lot about construction today. Obviously, it's a
very important topic. But I believe today's hearing is also
about the process, it's about accountability, it's about
transparency.
In 2013, December 2013, the under secretary for management
certified to us in Congress that the State had ensured the
adequacy of all safety-related measures. In fact, the DS had
expressed concern about State's use of computer modeling to
simulate this blast testing for the curtain wall, and they
ordered a full mockup blast test before certification was
appropriate.
The problem is, is that testing did not start until
February 2014 and was not complete until May of 2014. It is not
clear in the certification package to Congress that State
provided notice that blast tests was ongoing. And here's the
questions. There's a couple of them.
Did State's certification to Congress in December 2013
explicitly alert the committees that State had not even begun
blast testing?
Ms. Muniz, I'll start with you.
Ms. Muniz. I'm not certain that it did, that we were very
clear about when blast testing was going to happen in the
succession of the project.
I'd also like to add that certification is done of the
designs of a project, and those designs were stamped, and by
calculation all of the designs met the rigorous requirements
established by Diplomatic Security.
Mr. Walker. So when you say that all safety measures have
been completed, you're just saying that's a certification with
the projection that they will be completed. Is that my
understanding?
Ms. Muniz. I'm not sure I understand your question. Let me
frame it this way. So when a building is certified--and then
I'll turn it over to Mr. Starr, who--DS is responsible for
those certifications and for their reference to the under
secretary for management.
Certification is done of designs of building. By design,
engineers calculate that designs meet any of the requirements,
including blast loads. That was done prior to the certification
of the London embassy project.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr. Congressman, essentially, certification is a
promise to Congress. You've given us the resources, and you
want to know that we're certifying to you, in advance of
starting the building of the building, that the facility
resulting from the project is going to be safe and secure. It's
a promise.
We can fulfill that promise many different ways. In some of
the standard embassy designs, when we were first looking at the
standard embassy designs, we were a little nervous about some
of the things, and we certified them based on what the
architects were telling us, and we could look at concrete and
we could look at steel and pretty much figure it out.
As we go forward into newer types of methodologies, we do
rely on our architects, and, as I said, quite possibly the best
blast architecture firm in the world, Weidlinger, and telling
us, yes, this design meets your standards; this design will
surpass your standards. And I can take that and promise to you,
promise to Congress the facility resulting from this design is
going to meet our standards.
Well, we went even further than that afterwards and blast
tested it just to ensure that their calculations were correct,
and in fact they were.
Mr. Walker. Did it show the highlights or highlight
weaknesses in the design? In other words, did it include a
memorandum from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence in which the Office notes that should blast
testing highlight weaknesses in the design of the curtain wall,
Director Muniz has confirmed in writing that all necessary
steps will be taken to rectify the issues?
Can you confirm here today that Congress received that memo
with the December 2013 confirmation, Ms. Muniz?
Mr. Starr. I don't think we sent that to Congress, sir.
What we did was certify that the design met the requirements.
And we also talked about, well, if the blast testing showed
that it didn't, what would we do, even though the engineers
were fully saying, yes, it would.
Mr. Walker. Let me ask Mr. Linick.
Did you know whether Congress received the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence memo in December 2013 with
State's verification package?
Are you saying, Mr. Starr, that you never sent that to
Congress?
Mr. Starr. I'm trying to remember the actual package. I
know the certification is signed by the under secretary for
management. I don't think--I think the certification says that
we've consulted with ODNI on this. I'm not sure that in the
package that we send to you that we actually include the memo
from ODNI.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Linick, do you recall? Mr. Starr doesn't
remember.
Mr. Linick. It's not clear to me whether the certification
package advised Congress that testing would occur after the
certification.
Mr. Walker. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired and maybe
follow up with someone else, but thank you.
Mr. Starr. Congressman, if you'd like, I will get back to
you with an answer afterwards, whether the package we send to
Congress actually has the ODNI letter or not, if you'd like.
Mr. Walker. Can you give me a time for when you're able to
do that? A week? Two weeks?
Mr. Starr. I can find out by tomorrow and give your office
a call.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. If the gentleman will yield.
Mr. Walker. Absolutely.
Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Starr, you're taking great liberties
that I think are well beyond your ability to back them up to
suggest, quote, ``Engineers fully said it would,'' end quote.
It was not unanimous. All the engineers did not line up and say
this meets every standard.
And what I point to is Mr. Linick's report. Go to page 9 of
the audit itself. It goes through the audit results.
Mr. Linick, please clearly tell us, in your opinion, did
they or did they not violate their own internal policies on
what they should or should not be doing and when they should do
it?
Mr. Linick. They clearly did violate their policies, the
FAM, by certifying after contract award and after construction,
and that's the basis of our finding, finding A. This is an
issue that doesn't just affect the London embassy, but also
other embassies as well.
The question Congress should know, what constitutes
construction when certification is occurring, there should be
transparency in the process so Congress knows exactly what
rules the State Department's relying on when it undertakes
construction and when it certifies.
So that's really--that's the essence of our report and
finding.
Chairman Chaffetz. And, Mr. Starr, to suggest that
government buildings are more secure than any--the
representation you made--than any private sector building on
the face of the planet? You cannot get away with saying that.
There a lot of buildings out there going to be a lot more
safe and secure using different materials and different--why do
you make such sweeping generalizations when you know they can't
be backed up? That's something the committee needs to report.
Mr. Starr. I said that our----
Chairman Chaffetz. No, we'll pull back the record.
Mr. Starr. Congressman----
Chairman Chaffetz. You're just overstepping your bounds.
Mr. Starr. Congressman, I am not----
Chairman Chaffetz. No, you're trying----
Mr. Starr. I am----
Chairman Chaffetz. I am not calling on you right now. We're
calling on Mr. Welch.
Mr. Welch is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And this issue of embassy security obviously is very
important. I appreciate the work you're doing.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the work you're doing, and I
enjoyed my trip to Libya with you to inspect an embassy.
You've got a tough job, and I think we appreciate that.
I've got a couple of areas of questions. One is taking up on
what Mr. Cummings started on about the 100-foot setback. The
State Department has several additional physical security
standards for diplomatic facilities, and they include the
anticlimb perimeters, hardened building exteriors, and safe
spaces for taking refuge in the event of the attack.
Do all the new embassies have these type of features? And
I'll--go ahead, sir.
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. Every embassy that we construct anew
does.
Mr. Welch. And are there any other security features or
requirements that you think is critical to securing the
embassies?
Mr. Starr. Sir, the security standards that we have for
construction of a new embassy are extensive. The things that
you mentioned are not the only things that we have. The
standards are passed by the Overseas Security Policy Board,
which is a set of directors of all of the agencies that are--
security director of all the agencies that exist overseas that
are at our embassies and consulates, including the Department
of Defense, Department of Justice, the intelligence community,
everyone.
Mr. Welch. So some of these, Mr. Starr, some of these
security features for U.S. embassies in London and elsewhere
are actually more stringent than what we have for many
governmental buildings at home here in D.C. For example, none
of the congressional office buildings have any of the anticlimb
features of U.S. embassies. Is that right?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, you're correct, although what
you're pointing out is an issue that we also have overseas.
These buildings predate building to new, safer standards. They
were built many years ago. We have embassies like that as well.
Mr. Welch. Right. So the building we're in right now
doesn't have many of these features that are going to be
organic to the construction of facilities overseas, including
London, right?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir, if I understand your question, yes.
Mr. Welch. All right. Another topic. One of the things that
I've seen in visiting some of our embassies is that there's a
conflict between the needs of security, which oftentimes
dictate a somewhat remote location and almost a fortress-like
construction, and the accessibility to people who need to use
the embassy. And I actually am one who has always favored
having our facilities located more in the center of cities
rather than way in the outskirts.
Is there any way to resolve that? And I don't know if
that's just a concern I have or if it's shared by any of my
colleagues.
Mr. Starr. Director Muniz will say something about this as
well. But at the beginning of the program, after the loss of
the embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, we built many
embassies in the Sahel and across Africa and many other places
that had 10 acres of land and were not in the center of the
cities.
As we are approaching sort of the midpoint of building new
embassies, we've built over 110 new facilities now, we find
ourselves in a position where we want, particularly in cities
in Europe and other places, to not be very far out, and that
requires a building that is not low and flat and takes 10 acres
of land to build. We're looking on, like London, a small
smaller site, and we go up. And that means we have to have the
new technology, like curtain walls, to be able to do those
things.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
Ms. Muniz, do you have anything you'd like to offer that
relates to questions I've asked? And by the way, thank you for
your good work.
Ms. Muniz. Thank you.
I would just add that I believe very strongly that we could
build great embassies that project an openness and meet all of
the security standards and be in those locations where our
diplomats need to be. I really think that these are things that
we can resolve. It takes creativity, and it takes an approach
to each site that we're able to find really an approach that
we're taking now, an original look to see how we can build on
that site. But I'm very comfortable that we can meet all the
security standards and have our diplomats located where they
need to be.
Mr. Welch. I want to thank you all. And just a word of
advice that you don't really need, but the chairman's really
been taking a very active interest in this, and I think a lot
of us support him in that concern for safety, and I know you do
as well. So to the extent you can stay in touch with the
committee, I think that will be helpful to all of us. Thank
you.
I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Hice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linick, let me just begin with you. Did your office,
the Office of the Inspector General, make recommendations to
OBO to not begin the construction until they were sure that the
building would survive a blast?
Mr. Linick. Congressman, we recommended that OBO establish
controls to ensure that construction is not initiated before
designs have been approved by the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security. And then we recommended to the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security that they establish controls to require that testing
is completed before certification to Congress.
Mr. Hice. Okay. So is that--it would be a ``yes'' then?
Mr. Linick. I mean, we did recommend that certification----
Mr. Hice. Which included that it could survive a blast.
Mr. Linick. That all of that----
Mr. Hice. That's the whole purpose.
Mr. Linick. Exactly. Yes.
Mr. Hice. All right. And with the DS--and let me go a
little bit further with what you were just saying--did your
recommendation to DS include that they have controls in place
to make sure that any building is fully vetted so that it is
adequate for security purposes?
Mr. Linick. Yeah. And more precisely, that any required
testing be done before certification.
Mr. Hice. Okay.
Mr. Linick. So that there is--so that safe--so they can
establish that safety is adequate.
Mr. Hice. All right. In your recommendations, from your
perspective, from the office--OIG's office--would a letter from
an architectural firm be adequate, or did you want more than
just a letter?
Mr. Linick. Well, they had always--they were clearly--DS
was clearly not satisfied with the safety of the glass curtain
wall until blast testing was to occur. In fact, they were
concerned about it as early as November 2012 all the way to
December 6, just a few days before certification. So a letter
in that circumstance wouldn't have sufficed. They had to do the
blast testing that was a required test. So, no.
Mr. Hice. So you're saying that the blast testing was
required.
Mr. Linick. I'm saying--that's right--I'm saying that if
they're going to certify it safe, they ought to do the blast
testing before they certify it safe, especially since blast
testing was something they were very concerned about, because
if it failed, then what?
Mr. Hice. Then all failed. And we've heard today from Mr.
Starr that in his opinion blast testing was not required, but
in your opinion that's the only way to adequately ensure that
it was equipped to endure a potential blast.
Mr. Linick. Yeah, what's required under the law is that
before undertaking any new construction, they certify that
adequate and appropriate steps have been taken to ensure the
security of the project, the construction project.
Like I said, in my view, the blast testing had to be
completed, otherwise what's the point of certifying.
Mr. Hice. Otherwise, all you have is a letter.
All right, so, in your opinion, the recommendations that
came from your office were not fulfilled. Is that true?
Mr. Linick. Well, the Department actually has agreed in
theory to comply with our recommendations, but we haven't
closed them yet, those two recommendations, the one I just
mentioned, until we see documentation. We haven't seen any
controls.
Mr. Hice. So the recommendations are still outstanding?
Mr. Linick. That's correct.
Mr. Hice. All right. In your words, did you receive
pushback from OBO or DS on the recommendations?
Mr. Linick. Well, initially--initially, we received
pushback, but during the compliance process they have appeared
to agree to comply with our recommendations.
Mr. Hice. Although that has not yet taken place.
Mr. Linick. No, but we're still in the process of following
through with this.
Mr. Hice. Is there any reason, any valid reason that you
can think of as to why OBO and DS would not comply, would
refuse, deny to implement your recommendations initially?
Mr. Linick. Well, they're not--our recommendations are
simply that, recommendations. We can't require them to. They
have to agree to it. So other than that----
Mr. Hice. Right, but is there any valid reason you can
think of why they would not proceed with fulfilling your
recommendations?
Mr. Linick. No, we made our recommendations, we made our
findings, and we stand by them.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Is there anything legislatively that can be
done that would help?
Mr. Linick. I think Congress might want to consider
clarifying what it means to undertake, initiate construction
prior to certification. I think that would help. Because, after
all, you've heard that there are various definitions of what
construction is, and I think some clarity on what construction
is and, you know, exactly when blast testing, if required
testing has to occur, would help.
Because when Congress received the certification package in
December, it's not clear to me what Congress knew, it's not
clear to me that Congress realized that the Department was
relying on an internal memorandum of understanding, which is
not law. And, ultimately, we've got to rely on the laws and our
official interpretations of them. That's the problem, from our
point of view.
Mr. Hice. Okay. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you. That was very helpful.
Ms. Norton, you're now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I must say, Mr. Starr, it must be difficult today to be a
diplomat abroad in light of what we're seeing. After the Paris
attacks, I wonder if there are specific changes that the State
Department feels are necessary in light of those attacks.
Mr. Starr. We're looking closely at the Paris attacks. We
are looking for lessons learned from the Paris attacks. I don't
think that there's anything necessarily going to come out of
that that's going to affect how we build buildings or how we
construct facilities.
What we are looking at, from the Consular Section and from
other methods, is how to best warn Americans overseas even
faster than we do, and I think we do a very good job of it now.
We encourage all Americans that are overseas to register with
embassies and consulates who are in the region. You can do that
online now. We're taking advantage of more online tools. Many
embassies----
Ms. Norton. All Americans, did you say?
Mr. Starr. We encourage all Americans that are overseas to
register and let us know that they're traveling overseas. Many
embassies nowadays have automatic SMS messaging, and if an
American citizen provides their telephone number or an email
address to us, if something is going on in their location, we
can message them immediately and warn them to either, you know,
shelter-in-place or evacuate or things like that.
So I think one of the lessons from Paris that we're
learning is that, as I think, quite honestly, as many of us had
feared for many years, that terrorism that we had seen in
places like the Middle East and African countries was
eventually going to evolve through Europe and to other
countries. And these are countries that have many, many, many
American expatriates and many American visitors and tourists.
So we are looking at how we can better warn American citizens
overseas.
As I say, I think we do a very good job of it already, but
in the aftermath of Paris we're even taking another look at it
and see whether there's even better ways that we can do it.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Starr, you probably get it coming both
ways. There were recent reports in the press that some
diplomats feel hampered in their diplomatic activity because of
the kinds of security that you apparently have had to place on
them.
Have you had such complaints? And have you considered how
diplomacy, which has to be done everywhere, is or can be
carried on in light of diplomats who are hellbent on doing what
they came to do but the Department may feel that there are
dangers if they proceed? How do you reconcile the dangers with
people feeling that they're not always able to do their job?
Mr. Starr. Congresswoman, that is an excellent question.
It's something that we thrash with very often, and we've had a
lot of questions about it.
One of the reasons we build safe and secure facilities is
so that when our embassy officers and our local staff are in
the embassy, working out of the embassy, it's a safe and secure
facility and we don't lose it or everybody in one attack. To
the absolute maximum extent, we don't want to lose an embassy
like in Dar es Salaam or Nairobi when the bombings took place.
We want to make sure that we never lose the embassy proper, so
that we don't lose our platform for diplomacy and law
enforcement and justice and intelligence and aid programs.
But the flip side of this is that diplomats have to get out
of the building. Diplomats, by their very nature, don't work
just inside that building. They need to get out. They need to
talk with legislators. They need to talk with human rights
advocates. They need to talk with people that are running aid
programs and humanitarian affairs. They need to talk with the
people that are running the country in power. They need to talk
with the opposition.
Well, in order to do that, we have other programs besides
just the embassy building program. This is why we provide
armored cars. This is why we have Diplomatic Security agents
and bodyguards in some cases. This is, of all cases, why we are
now engaging in training our diplomats in FACT training,
Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training, for 5 days before they
go overseas, to give them medical skills, countersurveillance
skills, driving skills, rudimentary understandings of weapons
and explosives.
These are the types of things that are the flip side of,
you know, creating a safe and secure embassy when they're
there, but also understanding that their job is to get out and
to meet people and talk with people and represent the United
States. So we have both types of programs that we're running
simultaneously.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say, I
think perhaps Benghazi, more than Paris, may have taught about
eager democrats trying to go to places that aren't safe.
Perhaps one learned more from Benghazi than even from Paris.
So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman.
We'll now recognize Mr. Carter of Georgia for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
Mr. Starr, correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe this is
the third time you've been here before this committee this
year. Is that correct, yes or no?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carter. Yes, third. That's what I thought. That's what
my calculations showed. You appeared here before this full
committee in July to review the cost overruns of the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul, and again in September to discuss both
security concerns and cost overruns with the two U.S.
consulates in Mexico. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carter. And that's just two examples, two examples that
you've had to answer for this year. Other examples would
include the State Department paying a construction company
$18.5 million for renovations to a prison in Afghanistan
originally slated to cost $16 million, and then the firm only
completed half of the work over 5 years. And now the State
Department calculates it's going to cost another $16 million to
finish the project.
The State Department has spent $5 million on fancy
glassware--$5 million on fancy glassware--at U.S. embassies?
The new embassy in Papua New Guinea had to be entirely
scrapped, entirely scrapped and started over. That resulted in
almost quadrupling the cost of the project. Is that correct,
Mr. Starr, yes or no.
Mr. Starr. I believe that's correct, sir.
Mr. Carter. So here we find ourselves here today. So today
we see that the State Department has decided to act contrary,
as we've been told, contrary to Federal law and State
Department policies by starting construction on the London
embassy before the required blast testing was completed. We've
established that point, that's why we're here today.
The State Department has blatantly ignored its own
policies, it's ignored Federal law and numerous
recommendations. Poor decisionmaking has exposed the State
Department to millions, millions of dollars in cost overruns.
And now you're trying to push ahead and start the project, as
we've seen, so that there's no turning back.
Does that sound familiar? Does that sound familiar to
anything? Does that sound familiar to the Foreign Affairs
Security Training Center that you're trying to build in
Virginia right now? Does that----
Mr. Starr. No, sir, it does not sound familiar to me.
Mr. Carter. It does not.
Mr. Starr. And I think you're misstating a lot of the
facts.
Mr. Carter. And, Mr. Starr, I'm following your example,
because you've misstated a lot of the facts all day long. You
could have renovated and you could have redone the current
London embassy for less than a billion dollars if you'd only
slowed down and made sure it was done correctly. We've
established that here today. We've established that.
And then you know what bothers me so much about this? Is
that we're making the same mistake all over again. All you have
to do is look at what you're trying to do with the Foreign
Affairs Security Training Center. That's all we've got to do.
You look at what was done. You compared FLETC, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center down in Glynco, Georgia. They
submitted a bid of $243 million. You went to Fort Pickett. They
submitted a bid of $950 million. And you went back to Fort
Pickett and said, ``Aw, come on, can't you do better than
that?'' They said, ``Okay, we'll come down to $450 million.
We'll just eliminate the dormitories, the cafeterias, all the
things that already exist at FLETC, we'll eliminate all those
and we'll get the price down.''
You know, why don't we do this? I tell you what let's do,
Ms. Muniz and Mr. Starr. Let's just go ahead and schedule, Mr.
Chairman, let's go ahead and schedule the next hearing on the
cost overruns at FASTC? You want to go ahead and do that? It'll
just save us a lot of time.
Because we know you're going to be right back here. We've
seen it already.
Let me tell you, when you get back here on the cost
overruns on that, if I'm still on that committee, don't count
on my support.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Starr. Is there a question you'd like me to answer,
Congressman?
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman----
Mr. Carter. Mr. Starr, I don't----
Chairman Chaffetz. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman
yields back.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, is now
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you all for being here. It's good to see
you back, a few of you.
Mr. Starr, I think part of the frustration is that you
answer with such specificity and inclusiveness that it's hard
for any of us to take some of your testimony seriously that
everything is okay. Now, I've talked with your colleague a
number of times, have a good relationship, I believe, with her
in terms of trying to find areas to address the embassy and
diplomatic needs that we have.
So I guess the question I have for you is, I heard Mr.
Linick talking to Mr. Hice about the need for clarity. So would
you say that some of the ``not following the rules'' is because
of ambiguity in the law?
Mr. Starr. No, sir, I don't believe so. First----
Mr. Meadows. So why are we not following?
Mr. Starr. I don't think this committee--I don't think we
have had the opportunity to spend the time with the staff of
this committee that we spent in years past with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on the building program.
Mr. Meadows. So whose fault is that? This committee?
Because I'm willing to take this committee to task if they
haven't made themselves available.
Mr. Starr. No, sir. I think this hearing and briefings that
we're trying to do, I think, are valuable. I think they help
the committee understand things. This is a tough business, and
we do make choices.
Mr. Meadows. Well, but let me get back to the question. I
only have 5 minutes. Because I've been able to spend time with
Ms. Muniz in my office. She came after a hearing and said, you
know, ``Is there anything that we can offer?'' We've had
follow-ups since then. You know, it's that dialogue. And while
we may not agree on everything, we were able to come to an
understanding on a number of issues.
And so I guess my question is, if there is not a lack after
ambiguity, other than informing us, what's the problem, Mr.
Starr? Are we going to come in under budget? Are we going to
come in? Are you going to----
Mr. Starr. Well, the budget, sir, I can't really tell you
about. What I can tell you is----
Mr. Meadows. So we may require appropriations to finish
things?
Mr. Starr. This building, I don't believe so. If you'd like
to ask Director Muniz. But the security of this building, I can
tell you, we are building a building that meets our standards.
Mr. Meadows. But does the ends justify the means?
Mr. Starr. No, sir. It's a question that you have to look
at.
Mr. Meadows. Well, it's not a question that you have to
look at. It's a question of law. And what Mr. Linick----
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Meadows. --has pointed out is, is that there seems to
be either ambiguity or the lack of following what has been laid
out. Which is it?
Mr. Starr. I don't believe there's a lack of ambiguity in
the law, sir. We are required----
Mr. Meadows. All right. So there's a lack of following----
Mr. Starr. No. And certainly no lack of following it. I
certify----
Mr. Meadows. So everything's okay?
Ms. Muniz. If I could jump in.
Mr. Starr. Sir, this building is--we promised----
Mr. Meadows. All right. Hold on. Let me let her----
Mr. Starr. But, sir, just, we promised Congress----
Mr. Meadows. You've been talking a lot. Let me let her jump
in. She wanted to jump in. So let me----
Ms. Muniz. I'm sorry. I just want to jump in and give my
interpretation of the issue.
I really believe that, first of all, the work that OBO does
and DS' certification of our projects is highly technical.
You're familiar with construction. It is a very technical
field.
I believe the crux of this discussion is a difference of
interpretation. We are very clear and believe that the law
provides us the right to certify based on designs and on
calculations, which is done commonly across the industry. The
IG has interpreted that a blast test was necessary before
confirming that.
I would argue that blast tests are done commonly--not blast
tests--testing of components of buildings are done commonly
during the construction phases, and when developers, whether
it's a State Department government developer or in private
industry, when there is an understanding that any kind of a
course correction can be made and all of the standards can
still be met, construction proceeds from the beginning with
adjustments made during construction so we finish on schedule
and we certify.
Mr. Meadows. And as you know, I understand that. I guess
the real question is the American taxpayer dollars. At what
point are we so sure that those standards are met? Because Mr.
Starr has indicated there are a number of waivers that they
have continued to give, maybe not on London, but on other
projects, and yet he says that we're following all the
standards, and those were your words in quotes, all the
standards. So why would you need a waiver if you're following
all the standards?
Mr. Starr. Sir, the law requires that we inform Congress.
For new construction----
Mr. Meadows. That's not the question.
Mr. Starr. For new construction, I can't even remember the
last time we've asked for any waiver for setback----
Mr. Meadows. I didn't ask that.
Mr. Starr. --or for co-location or for any of our----
Mr. Meadows. Mr. Starr----
Mr. Starr. --or for any of our standards.
Mr. Meadows. Mr. Starr, it's your testimony that suggested
that there's waivers and that you followed all the rules. Those
two are mutually exclusive. It couldn't happen.
Mr. Starr. Sir, when we have to take a facility that's
already built, when we go into a city that we have to accept,
we're never going to meet the standards, and we do issue a
waiver for those.
Mr. Meadows. Mr. Starr, with all due respect, that's apples
and oranges. We were talking about new construction. Have you
done any waivers with new construction?
Mr. Starr. I think the only--we have a waiver in Jakarta
for the swing space and for a historic building that's on the
compound. I can't remember another waiver that we've issued for
new construction.
Mr. Meadows. On new construction? All right. Will you get
that to this committee?
Mr. Starr. Yes. I promise, sir.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you. I'll yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Before the gentleman yields back, this
is why I have a problem when you make sweeping generalizations,
saying we never issue waivers. And we know there's two examples
right there. You make this infinitely more complex in your
testimony. That's my personal opinion.
And to suggest that we haven't made staff available, well,
here's my frustration. June 23, 2014, we sent a list of
questions still outstanding, have not gotten a full and
complete response to that. July 21 we sent a letter, production
is still going on.
We sent another letter dealing with Maputo, Harare, and
Saudi Arabia, sent August 6, still outstanding. We sent a
letter to you on October 16 regarding danger pay, still
outstanding. Sent another letter on October 7, due October 21,
production has not even started on that, nor was it even
started on danger pay.
So you say it's a lack of communication, but when I send
you a letter and this committee wants to get some answers, even
when we've given you, you know, nearly 6 months, you can't seem
to respond to us. And that leads us to beg the question of what
is it that they're hiding, why will they not comply with this?
We're asking, I think, some very basic, simple questions.
Other committees--or other agencies don't have this
problem. Some do, but others don't. And it's compounded by the
fact that we have the greatest respect to the inspector general
community, and when these professionals, without their partisan
hats on, without--come in and look and do an analysis and say
impartially that there's a problem here, it gets our attention.
We're irresponsible if we just ignore it and put it on a
shelf. My biggest fear is these 13,000 people throughout the
inspector general community, they do good work, they'll look at
it sometimes for a year or 2, and that we don't respond to it.
That's my concern.
And so the situation here with the blast wall is different
and unique because it's never been used. Not only has it never
been used by us as the United States Government, when I went to
London, the people on the ground, good, hard-working people
committed to making the very best, safest product they can, and
I asked them, ``Is there an example somewhere in the universe
that we can look at this?'' They said, ``No, nobody's ever done
this before.'' They were proud of the fact that we were blazing
new trails. That kind of begs the question that maybe we should
do a testing.
And then you come before our committee today and suggest
that all the engineers were all lined up behind us. That's not
true. That is fundamentally not true.
And so I think Mr. Linick makes a very good point, the
certification we give to Congress, I mean, you can play, you
know, hide the rabbit, and we've got to try to figure out which
hole it's under, but there's an expectation, I think, in the
law that that certification tells us that the tests have been
done and that you--and you say it's not a lack of clarity, but
you have the inspector general disagreeing with you. That's why
we're here today.
So I appreciate the gentleman letting me use some of his
time. Let's now recognize Mr. Russell for 5 minutes.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, thanks
for addressing this important issue.
We all realize it doesn't matter which embassy a threat may
get. The symbology of just getting one. We saw the destruction
of the Beirut embassy that resulted in many of the security
standards that we now live by. We saw the loss of the Tanzania
and Kenyan embassies that furthered under Secretary of State
then Colin Powell to make standard embassy design so that we
could have something that would economize the dollars that we
have and also provide security in all of the foreign missions
that we possess.
And therein lies the problem. We've seen in recent years a
deviation, some for needs of topography or needs of the country
or needs of the mission, but some just for purely different,
political reasons.
And I guess, you know, Director Muniz, you know, you bring
not only integrity and a great work ethic and reputation that I
think both sides respect, and you've certainly earned that, but
my question, and we see it here even with the London embassy,
what do you think would be the most important, spending
hundreds of millions of dollars beyond the scope of what's
needed in nonstandard designs with renewable energy projects
and initiatives or building proven secure embassies that will
maybe alter for esthetics or for culture in our most vulnerable
missions overseas? Which is more important dealing with the
terror threats that we face globally today?
Ms. Muniz. Thank you for your question.
I think I would argue that we don't have to choose one. We
can do both. So I think London is a great example of, as I
explained earlier, the Department was faced with a situation
where we could have spent $550 million at the time of that
estimate. Today that would be $730 million we could have
invested in renovating the existing Chancery and it still would
not have met security standards. So we had to look at
alternatives. We sold existing functional properties in London
to finance the current project.
Many of the sustainability requirements of the embassy, the
public art requirements for that embassy, were put on us by the
city of London and by the borough in London in which we're
developing that building. So part of it is, is what we need to
do satisfy the local government's requirements for us to build,
much like----
Mr. Russell. And I do appreciate the----
Ms. Muniz. --we meet local requirements----
Mr. Russell. Sure.
Ms. Muniz. --here.
Mr. Russell. Sure. And I understand the cultural needs. I
mean, we are representing our country in theirs around the
globe. I've had the privilege to travel as a member of this
committee to many countries examining embassies. But I don't
think that we are having security and thrift as the greatest
thing in view.
And then to hear you, Mr. Starr, say that, in essence, it's
all unicorns and rainbows and it's perfect out there, and then
now we need to spend hundreds of millions of more dollars on a
training facility that, quite frankly, our Armed Forces could
probably cooperate and provide many of those needs.
And I guess, you know, just from infantryman's point of
view and having been in a number of embassies in my military
career over more than two decades, I saw a lot of glaring
things that you don't even seem to be caring to address. And so
I'd like to address so some of them since we have here you
here.
Security detachments. Basic stuff. You're complaining about
not having tens of millions of dollars or hundreds of millions
of dollars for this or that security. Well, I've got some
questions for you. Night vision devices, aiming aids for our
security detachments, we're talking four figures here could fix
these in any given embassy.
Power generation, water storage on the periphery walls,
very vulnerable. They said, ``Well, we can hold out for 30
days.'' Not if it's out there on the wall and it's already
taken, which usually is the first thing that gets assaulted at
an embassy, is the outer wall.
And then we see sewer and underground vulnerabilities. You
ask, ``Okay, where does this go, what's the access here?''
``Well, we think there are some bars down here that would
prohibit people getting up.''
I mean, these are consistent things that I've seen on my
trips. And we're not talking hundreds of millions of dollars,
sir, we're talking single-digit millions could fix a great many
of these things.
My question to you, if you are so dedicated to security,
what are you doing to address those things?
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Congressman. There are thousands of
things that are wants and there are things that are needs.
Working closely with the inspector general, who goes out and
looks at our posts, and then we put together multiagency teams
that include the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps
that look at our embassies and DS agents that go out----
Mr. Russell. And they tell me they need these things.
Mr. Starr. We look at these things--no, sir, I have no
request from the Marine Corps for night vision devices. I have
specialized units.
Mr. Russell. You should get out to your embassies more and
talk to those security teams that are out there.
Mr. Starr. Sir, I have been to Afghanistan, Iraq----
Mr. Russell. No, I'm not talking Afghanistan and Iraq. I'm
talking countries that largely have peaceful populations.
Mr. Starr. I've been to many of those places as well, sir.
Mr. Russell. Well, I have no doubt that you have. And I
would suggest, in fact I would like a report back on how you're
addressing--when you have basic marine riflemen that don't even
have an aiming aid on their rifle per rifleman, when you don't
even have in a, say, six-and-one security detachment and they
don't have seven total night vision devices, these are very,
very simple fixes.
When you're talking about peripheral water storage and
electrical generation that could be brought interior, much more
close, and allows these legations to survive in the critical
hours where they could maintain their communications and
continue, I would say we have much, much more work to do.
And, quite frankly, Mr. Starr, I've not been impressed with
a lot of the initiatives and the bright rosy picture that you
portray, because in very simple, correct fixes, we can do so
much more than we're doing now in practical terms without
asking the American taxpayer for hundreds of millions of
dollars.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me beyond my
time. I yield back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Before the gentleman yields back, I want
to follow up on his question. Are you suggesting to us that
there are no outstanding requests for anything from the
Marines?
Mr. Starr. Sir, the Marine Corps is responsible for
providing weapons for the marine detachments. I am not aware
that there are unfulfilled requests from the marine detachments
through their MCOs to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps sets
the specifications for what weapons they get, what gear they
have. That is up to the Marine Corps, not up to Diplomatic
Security.
The larger question about other things that we have----
Chairman Chaffetz. When, when, wait, I want to get to the
marines here, okay.
If they need material, if they need equipment, they're to
make----
Mr. Starr. Requisition through the Marine Corps.
Chairman Chaffetz. Through the Marine Corps.
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. And they're to get that from the Marine
Corps?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. So if they need night vision capability,
they need to be able--they're sitting there in the booth and
they want to be able to see the perimeter, whose responsibility
is that?
Mr. Starr. That would--if there's a need for night vision
equipment, it would come from the Marine Corps.
I would tell you, sir----
Chairman Chaffetz. Wait a second. Now, there's individual
goggles.
Mr. Starr. Right.
Chairman Chaffetz. But then there are cameras.
Mr. Starr. Right, which is ours. All of our cameras have
night vision capabilities.
Chairman Chaffetz. That is absolutely not true.
Mr. Starr. Sir, we----
Chairman Chaffetz. You are so full of it, I can't even
begin to tell you. That is not true. You come before this
committee, you come before Congress, and you keep representing
that we have all this in. They do not.
Mr. Starr. Sir, we have spent the last 3 years----
Chairman Chaffetz. Don't bark back at me. No, Mr. Starr,
you are not----
Mr. Starr. We have spent the last 3----
Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Starr, Mr. Starr, the time--when I
ask you a question, then you can answer it.
This is the problem with you in this position. You cannot
tell me that there is night vision capability at each of our
embassies and consulates. Is that what you're testifying to?
Mr. Starr. Sir, all of our cameras, even our lowest and
oldest cameras, have enhanced resolution.
Chairman Chaffetz. Do they have a night vision capability?
Mr. Starr. They are capable of seeing what is going on in
the compound at night, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. In the dark?
Mr. Starr. If--if--we lose all power and if we lose all
generators, there are certain posts that will not be able to do
that. But we have low light capability, and we've had that
since the early '90s.
Chairman Chaffetz. You are misrepresenting the facts, Mr.
Starr.
Mr. Starr. Sir, we have low light capability cameras, and
we have engaged, since Benghazi, in an upgrade program starting
with all of our----
Chairman Chaffetz. It's not complete. You've wanted us to
believe, if I didn't question you, that every one of our posts
can see at night. They can't.
Mr. Starr. Sir----
Chairman Chaffetz. And you don't understand that. You are
the assistant secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and you
don't know that our people can't see at night.
Mr. Starr. Our marines and our agents can see at night.
Mr. Russell. Well, I would tell you this, Mr. Starr, if I
may, Mr. Chairman, the regional security officers are the ones
that provide, as you well know, the security for each of the
compounds. State funds the RSO's request.
Mr. Starr. Correct.
Mr. Russell. And that includes many of the pieces of
equipment that they ask for. Now, either the integrity of the
Marine Corps is at stake here, where they say that they can't
get the equipment because it's funded through the RSOs, or
maybe somebody else's integrity is at question here.
Chairman Chaffetz. I think the picture is really clear. You
can understand why these RSOs are having so many problems. I
walk into every embassy I go into now and ask them if I can see
at night. One of the most recent embassies I walked into, they
said, ``Well, if the lights are on.''
I said, ``Well, what happens if it's dark, what happens if
they shoot out the lights?'' ``No, then we couldn't see a
thing. We'd be in the pitch dark.''
How you, in that position, have the arrogance to come
before us and say everybody has the ability to see at night,
I'm telling you, Mr. Starr, you are beyond, beyond belief here.
This is why we keep coming back here, because that is
fundamentally and totally not true. And I'm dedicating my life
running around the world to make sure that they get the
equipment that they have. The problem is, the person who is in
position to do it, who could go down to Home Depot and buy this
stuff, isn't doing it, doesn't even think it's a problem.
I would love to see a list. Are you able to provide a list
to us of all the outstanding requests by the regional security
officers? Can you provide us that list?
Mr. Starr. I believe I can, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. When will you provide it?
Mr. Starr. Give me 2 weeks, sir.
Chairman Chaffetz. Two weeks it is.
Chairman Chaffetz. Now I recognize the gentleman from
Alabama, Mr. Palmer----
Mr. Starr. May I comment, sir?
Chairman Chaffetz. Sure.
Mr. Starr. Sir, we have embassies all across the world. We
have embassies in Third World countries and First World
countries. We have embassies where we have never lost power,
and we have embassies where we do lose power and we run on
generators. We have some of the most comprehensive security
standards for any facility in the world.
Now, I'm not saying that our buildings are built better
than the protection for nuclear facilities, but in comparison
to a regular office building, our facilities are built to a
standard that is very safe and secure. Our embassies in Sudan
and in Tunis withstood 8-1/2 hours of crowds pounding on them
when the police wouldn't come and rescue our people. Our
marines and our RSOs had the equipment to defend those
embassies during that time. Nobody got in. Nobody was injured.
We have comprehensive programs. They're not perfect. There
is no such thing as a perfect program, and we continue to run
reasonable risks overseas. But we will do our absolute best to
ensure that our people are safe and secure.
Chairman Chaffetz. I appreciate you getting that list to
this committee. I do appreciate it. We look forward to seeing
it in 2 weeks.
Mr. Palmer from Alabama is now recognized.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Muniz, Mr. Starr, why does the Overseas Buildings
Operations and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security rely on
unpublished draft memorandum rather than Federal law and the
Foreign Affairs Manual to determine when to begin construction
on facilities?
Ms. Muniz. I'm not sure I understood your question
correctly. I think it was, why do we rely on our published
policy versus law?
Mr. Palmer. Unpublished, on unpublished draft memorandum.
Ms. Muniz. I would say that we rely on the law when it
comes to certifications to Congress. I would turn this over to
Mr. Starr.
Mr. Starr. Sir, in terms of certification, I agree with the
inspector general that we have a section of the FAM that's out
of date that does not--is actually saying something that's
different than public law. If there's any question about what
takes precedence, it's public law over the Foreign Affairs
Manual.
Mr. Palmer. Then what is your response to the OIG's finding
that the use of the draft memorandum, without telling anyone,
is likely to mislead audiences, including Congress, who expect
the Department to follow its published policies?
Mr. Starr. Sir, the public law requires us to certify to
Congress that the facility resulting from the construction
project is going to be safe and secure for our national
security activities, our classified information, and our
people, our personnel. We are providing a facility in line with
that certification that is safe and secure for our people, our
national security activities, and our classified information.
Mr. Palmer. Well, my concern is, as the OIG's report points
out, is that it's likely to mislead people, including Congress.
And I want to go--put the slides back up that Mr. Chairman
had up at the very beginning of hearing on the construction
project.
Ms. Muniz, you've made the argument that that's not
construction. I worked for two international engineering
companies, engineering construction companies, and it is--there
are times when you could separate the site work from the
overall contract where it could be contracted out. But having
worked in engineering construction, I can assure you that site
work is part of the construction. But even more importantly,
when you're setting piles, it's absolutely critical to the
construction process.
And I think you made the assertion that that's not
construction. Frankly, I was astounded when you said that. It
raises questions, in my mind, your competence in your position.
Ms. Muniz. I would like to be clear about the Department's
position on this. So, first of all, with respect to this photo,
this photo was taken after certification.
Mr. Palmer. Before you go any further, are you saying this
is the Department's position, that setting the piles and doing
the basic foundation work is not part of the construction?
Ms. Muniz. The Department--what I explained is that the
Department has allowed for years, since 2003, the construction
of piles up to pile caps in advance of certification. That has
been common practice for over 10 years.
Mr. Palmer. If you do that, does this not result in
substantial numbers of change orders when you haven't certified
the building and you find out later that the foundations are
not sufficient? I think there has been some issues with that.
Ms. Muniz. We have not found that. And we certainly have
not found that in the case of London.
Mr. Palmer. I'm talking about overall, because I think
there are issues with exceeding the budgets, having numerous
change orders. I think there was some issue with a couple of
things you wanted to put in the building that you couldn't put
in because you found out that the building wouldn't support it.
Ms. Muniz. I'm not sure which project you're referring to.
That's certainly not the case in London.
Mr. Palmer. Well, my point about this is, is that you come
in and, listening to the chairman's questioning, and you argued
that or assert that the setting of the piles is not part of the
construction progress and that you admit that you have done a
lot of this work without certification of the building, which
raises questions to me that if the building has not been
certified that it leaves the door open for design changes that
do impact the construction costs.
And I think that's one of the problems that we have in
trying to make sure that the taxpayers' interests are
protected, not only that our employees who depend on these
facilities for their protection are taken care of, but that we
take care of the fiscal aspect of this as well. I mean, you
know, we're deficit spending every year, and certainly not--it
is not totally due to cost overruns.
And this is something that I'm finding throughout the
Federal Government. But it is a problem here. And listening to
some of the other questions that have been asked about some of
the inadequacies that are not being addressed, and we're
spending, I think, millions of dollars having to address issues
of design changes and change orders and other aspects of
construction projects.
And, again, frankly, for someone to assert that setting the
foundations and driving the piles is not part of the
construction process raises serious questions in my mind about
the qualifications of the individuals that make those
assertions.
I've gone over my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I yield
back.
Chairman Chaffetz. Thank you.
As a follow-up here, I now have a number of issues and
questions I need to go through.
So that picture that was just up on the screen, that is one
of our concerns. I think it's a legitimate concern, it's
something that the IG is seeing, something that we're seeing.
If we can put that picture back up there, that same one, which
the most recent one.
If I hear right, OBO is saying that's not construction,
that has been the practice for 10 years, predated what you had
done. And we're looking at that, saying, well, we think that
does meet the standard of construction.
And one last line, then I'll give you a chance to answer.
In the IG report, it says, quote, ``The Department must provide
certification to Congress that the project design will meet
security standards prior to undertaking construction.'' And I
think this is the disconnect. We may not be able to resolve it
today, but I think we've understood where the disconnect, in
part, is.
Ms. Muniz.
Ms. Muniz. So my comment about this photo is only that this
photo shows work beyond the piles. So what we have argued is
that it has been common practice in the Department to award a
construction contract, I'll be very clear about that, for
years, award a construction contract and to allow the beginning
of the construction of the piles to the pile cap. We stop prior
to the foundation and certainly prior to coming out of the
ground. This photograph was taken about 5 months after
certification, which is why you do see the building coming out
of the ground in this photo.
Again, I want to be very clear about awarding the
construction contract. It's clear to me why that would be
viewed as commencing construction. And that is a practice that
the Department has undertaken for 12-plus years and is simply a
practice that we continue to progress with.
I do agree there is this--there is this ambiguity between
awarding the construction contract and the certification. But I
really believe that we should work together to resolve the
issue, because the advances in speed that we have been able to
make awarding design-build contracts or awarding contracts and
having those piles come out of the ground, and those have
benefited the program for over 10 years, have been because we
have gone forward with that practice.
So I think we should work to find a methodology that
everybody is comfortable with where we can move those projects
forward.
Chairman Chaffetz. Sounds good. The problem is the
inspector general is also not convinced. And I think we would
have a greater level of confidence, but the inspector general
still 5 months out is still saying this is an outstanding
recommendation.
And I think it is also materially different when you have
such a design element that is dramatically different. It's not
something we've ever done before, nobody has ever done before.
And it's not a little, hey, we're going to try a new air
conditioner. We're talking about the whole facade, the whole
blast wall of the entire building in this day and age where
safety and security is so paramount.
We have surrounded it. I'm just saying we want to work with
you on that. But I also want you to work with the inspector
general. I think our issue is not just pulled out of thin air,
it is well founded, and that the IG is really the one that
pointed this out.
Along with that is there are four outstanding
recommendations? Or two of those have been closed? Help me, Mr.
Linick, as to where we're at with this.
Mr. Linick. Yes, Congressman. Two of those have been
closed, those relating to the $42 million. The two
recommendations were that the Department put together policies
and procedures to make sure people understand the contracting,
the ECI method, and also that there's training. And both of
those have been closed. We've seen documentation indicating the
Department has completely followed those recommendations.
Chairman Chaffetz. What's outstanding?
Mr. Linick. The other two that are outstanding are the ones
to DS and OBO regarding making sure there are controls in place
to ensure that construction is not initiated before
certification and that required testing is done before
certification.
Chairman Chaffetz. And I think it would be helpful if State
could provide sort of a definition of what construction is,
because I think this is where there is a disconnect between the
three different entities here, between State, the IG, and
certainly us in Congress. So I hope you find that favorable.
We'll work towards that.
Mr. Cummings. Will the gentleman yield just for a second?
Chairman Chaffetz. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, you just hit on a very
important point. It seems as if you have one understanding and
you have another, Mr. Linick. And some kind of way, we've got
to come together or we're going to be going through this
process over and over again. It seems--would you agree, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Chaffetz. Yes. That's why we're 5 months later
after these recommendations and we're having to call a hearing.
Mr. Cummings. I think that's very important that we figure
out how do we get on the same page with regard to understanding
the law and the regulations.
Is that--Ms. Muniz?
Ms. Muniz. I think that's fair. And I think there is a way
that we can come to an understanding and brief the committee so
that we are all very clear about when construction contracts
are awarded, when certification happens, and all of the steps
in between. I do think that's something that's achievable.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you for yielding.
Chairman Chaffetz. Taking photos of buildings under
construction, what is--is there a State Department policy on
that? We do it? We don't do it? I'm getting conflicts here.
Mr. Starr. We actually can't prevent it. I mean, you canbe
outside of our perimeter and take photographs of it as it's
going up. We have certain things, certain places, and certain
sections inside that we don't allow photographs.
Chairman Chaffetz. When I was in Jakarta touring that
facility, you know, I'm on the Oversight Committee, I'm the
chairman of this committee, and they didn't want me--I took
some, but they didn't want me to take any photos of those
buildings in a very raw state. And then we come back and we
look online and you got Flickr accounts.
And go to the other one. This is all public, you know. And
I really do question, based on the security side, I don't know
if you all are having to look at this, but there's another
photo, hopefully we have it, from the inside of the building,
where I really question whether--whose best interest is that? I
mean, I know we want to get our Facebook posts up and get more
people following us on Instagram. But we'll show you these.
And this is a sensitive post. We got a lot of classified
information that's going to be flowing through there. And we're
showing the duct, you know. We just passed a law, an energy
bill that doesn't allow for us to show how electricity flows
and where, and, yet, we're out there taking pictures and
posting them up and trying to promote, hey, look at how the
construction is coming along.
And I think it is a security question. And I think we
should--I just encourage you to go back and look at that,
because I don't think it's in anybody's best interest to
actually have the intimate details. From the street, afar,
anybody, you know, their hotel, is taking a picture, I mean,
you're right, not much we can do about that. But when we do it
internally, I think that's somewhat of a problem.
The glass. I do question the whole blast wall and why we
picked such an opulent-looking facade. What is the cost of
taking this and shipping it? I believe it's constructed in
Germany, right, goes to Connecticut, then it's got to go back
over to Europe. What does that cost to do? Because now we're
starting to see it blossomand going into other facilities, like
Jakarta and other places.
So why this? And what is the actual cost of this?
Ms. Muniz. So we could get back to you on the detailed cost
of the curtain wall as separated from the rest of the building.
Ms. Muniz. I don't have that off the top of my head.
I do know that, as you pointed out, on the London embassy,
the glass is manufactured in Germany, is shipped to the U.S.
for security reasons to be reassembled with the frames, which
are manufactured here, and then shipped back.
We, when letting a contract, don't control what we call the
means and methods in that construction contract. So we let the
contractor find the best provider of any material. My hope is
that we will be able to, and Jakarta is an example where we are
using a U.S. manufacturer of the glass, as well as the frame.
And I think that's the ideal scenario.
Chairman Chaffetz. The cost of the glass, the production,
the shipment, all of that, my understanding this is in the
range of, you know, this alone is about $100 million dollars of
the expense. So when is a reasonable time to get that
information?
Ms. Muniz. Given the holidays, I'm being conservative----
Chairman Chaffetz. Understood.
Ms. Muniz. Given the holidays, why don't we give you
something early January. We'll try to see if we could break out
the cost. Some of this will require us to go to the contractor
and ask for their number.
Chairman Chaffetz. Fair enough. Fair enough. Let's keep
going because I want to----
Ms. Muniz. But we could work on it.
Chairman Chaffetz. Fair enough. I want to get through this.
There's an issue with the VAT tax. I don't know where we're
at in this process. I've read news reports. Locally they were
going to charge us a VAT tax. State said no. Then we were on
again. What is the status of the VAT tax obligation?
Ms. Muniz. We have resolved the VAT tax discussions, and we
would be happy to have more detailed conversations in a closed-
door setting about the resolution of the agreement. But the
conversation----
Chairman Chaffetz. Why can't you share that, at least the
tax bill?
Ms. Muniz. The conversation has been resolved with the
British authorities and we are within our budget and actually
below our budget, which had included an estimate for VAT.
Chairman Chaffetz. Why is that? Is there some classified,
something classified about this? Or is it just embarrassing?
Ms. Muniz. It's not just embarrassing, but our bilateral
conversations and agreements on VAT with different countries
are occasionally privileged. And in this instance, that is the
case. But, again, we would be happy to have a more detailed
briefing in a closed-door setting.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay. I'll trust you on that.
Ms. Muniz. But the issue is resolved, you will be happy to
know. The discussions are closed and we are within the budget.
Chairman Chaffetz. There was a news report that you had
spent a million dollars on some slabs, I don't know how to
describe it other than slabs of cement that were supposed to
adorn the embassy. It was a million-dollar expenditure. The
artist's last name, I think, is Scully. But then it was
discovered, at least according to one news report, that it was
too heavy to move and certainly too heavy to be in the embassy.
What is the latest on that fiasco?
Ms. Muniz. So the latest on the art acquisitions is we had,
you are quite right, contracted with a gallery to provide a
monumental sculpture for the outside of the embassy. As you'll
recall, we were required in order to get permitting for the
building to invest 1 million pounds in public--what would be
considered public art, not unusual in large, developed cities.
That went towards that contribution.
It is true that the sculpture, as envisioned, was solid
granite blocks and my understanding is was too heavy for the
position where it was going to be. But we are going to replace
it with other public works. The piece in question was not
purchased, and the piece was not manufactured, and we have an
agreement with the gallery to work out other arrangements for
that public art.
Chairman Chaffetz. How much are we going to spend on art in
this embassy?
Ms. Muniz. So the total art budget is a little over $4
million. As you know, we provide 0.5 percent of all of our
construction contract amounts for art programs in our new
buildings, new embassies and new consulates. In this instance,
because of the 1 million pound requirement to add public arts,
we added that, because all of that will be focused on the
exterior of the embassy to get our permits.
Chairman Chaffetz. Was that a London city request or was
that----
Ms. Muniz. We can get back to you on whether it was the
Borough of Wandsworth or the city of London, but it was
certainly a local requirement.
Chairman Chaffetz. Mr. Starr, have you had, and I'm talking
broadly here, there been any data breaches of our information
systems at the State Department in the last 12 months?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Chairman Chaffetz. How many?
Mr. Starr. I know of only one that any data was
exfiltrated.
Chairman Chaffetz. And was that different than the Office
of Personnel Management?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Chairman Chaffetz. And how many people did it affect?
Mr. Starr. There was no PII released, sir, no personal
identifiable information. It wasn't that type of breach.
Chairman Chaffetz. Was there any classified information
released?
Mr. Starr. No, we don't believe there was any classified
released either.
Chairman Chaffetz. Within the structure, who's responsible
for the security of those systems?
Mr. Starr. Diplomatic Security runs a computer virus,
computer cybersecurity center for IRM, which runs the
infrastructure, the pipes, does all the communications, and all
oF that. They're responsible for the system. We help protect
from the outside, looking at things that are coming in. We work
closely with US-CERT and with Homeland Security and other
agencies to make sure that we have the right types of
protection on the outside of the system.
Chairman Chaffetz. Internally, what sort of operating
systems are you using? Microsoft products?
Mr. Starr. Yes. It is mostly Microsoft based, although
there's a tremendous amount of other applications on the
system. But it's a Microsoft-based system.
Chairman Chaffetz. Like Windows what?
Mr. Starr. Sir, there are--there are--I'm actually not the
best one to tell you this. IRM would be the one to tell you. I
can tell you what is on my screen, which is I think Windows 7,
when it comes up on the unclassified system.
Chairman Chaffetz. Windows 97 or Windows----
Mr. Starr. I think it's Windows 7.
Chairman Chaffetz. It's old, isn't it?
Mr. Starr. It's fairly new. State has made a significant
investment in trying to upgrade the unclassified systems. But I
would be very pleased to come up and--some of this gets into
sensitive information, particularly about that breach. I'd be
very pleased to come up and talk with you. But I would also, if
I was, I would like to bring the head of IRM with me.
Chairman Chaffetz. Okay.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. I just want to make sure we're clear now. You
all--Mr. Starr, you're going to be providing us--I was out of
the room in a meeting when you, apparently, said this--that you
were going to be providing us with all the security requests
from the regional security offices within the next 2 weeks. Is
that right?
Mr. Starr. I will try my absolute best to do that, sir,
yes.
Mr. Cummings. Okay. And you all are also going to try to
see if you can get on the same page here.
How do you plan to try to do that, Ms. Muniz?
Ms. Muniz. I think the old-fashioned way. We'll have a
conversation. We'll map something out. And then we'll come
brief to the Hill and to others who are sort of outside the
process to make sure that it's clear and makes sense.
Mr. Cummings. And are you agreeable to try to do that, Mr.
Linick?
Mr. Linick. Absolutely.
Mr. Cummings. Very well.
I want to thank you all for being here today. I appreciate
your testimony. We, of course, have our concerns. We are always
concerned about cost, even though we know how this is pretty
much paid for by the swap or whatever you want to call it, but
the fact--the sale of the properties, our properties overseas
over in London, in England. But we're also very concerned, as
always, about security. And I think the frustration that you
heard from the chairman, I think a lot of that is about the
frustration of trying to make sure that we're doing it right,
so that cross all our t's and dot our i's.
So, anyway, but thank you all for being here, and I look
forward to working with you.
Chairman Chaffetz. I thank you all. This is one of the, as
I've said a couple times before, this is one of the things that
makes this country so unique and so sought after, is we have
heated discussions about things we care about in an open and
transparent way.
We have people, the inspector general community, who
dedicate their lives, and we appreciate them and their efforts.
I want them to know how much we care about their work product
and the time and effort that they take, sometimes gone for long
periods of time, traveling around the world.
Those that serve in Diplomatic Security and the OBO office,
I've had the pleasure of meeting these oftentimes very young
people who are out there dedicating their lives. They are very
patriotic people, they work hard, and serving their Nation, and
they're proud of what they're doing. And that is the spirit in
which we approach this as well, as I know the both of you do.
So we appreciate this hearing, look forward to the
interaction.
And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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