[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 28, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-91
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
Wisconsin JERROLD NADLER, New York
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas ZOE LOFGREN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
DARRELL E. ISSA, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
STEVE KING, Iowa Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JUDY CHU, California
JIM JORDAN, Ohio TED DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina SUZAN DelBENE, Washington
RAUL LABRADOR, Idaho HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia SCOTT PETERS, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
MIMI WALTERS, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado
JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas
DAVE TROTT, Michigan
MIKE BISHOP, Michigan
Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel
Perry Apelbaum, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
SEPTEMBER 28, 2016
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary 1
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 5
WITNESS
The Honorable James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Oral Testimony................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Material submitted by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a
Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and
Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary..................... 6
Additional material submitted by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr.,
a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, and
Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary..................... 15
Material submitted by the Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
Member, Committee on the Judiciary............................. 45
Material submitted by the Honorable Steve King, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Iowa, and Member, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 59
Material submitted by the Honorable Judy Chu, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California, and Member, Committee on
the Judiciary.................................................. 67
Material submitted by the Honorable Mike Bishop, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Member, Committee
on the Judiciary............................................... 96
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Questions for the Record submitted to the Honorable James B.
Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.........122
deg.OFFICIAL HEARING RECORD
Unprinted Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Material submitted by the Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative
in Congress from the State of California, and Member Committee on
the Judiciary. This material is available at the Committee and can
also be accessed at:
http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
ByEvent.aspx?EventID=105390
OVERSIGHT OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2016
House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in Room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bob
Goodlatte (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Goodlatte, Sensenbrenner, Smith,
Chabot, Issa, King, Franks, Gohmert, Jordan, Chaffetz, Marino,
Gowdy, Labrador, Farenthold, Collins, DeSantis, Walters,
Ratcliffe, Trott, Bishop, Conyers, Nadler, Lofgren, Jackson
Lee, Cohen, Johnson, Chu, Deutch, DelBene, Jeffries, Cicilline,
and Peters.
Staff Present: (Majority) Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff &
General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief
Counsel; Zach Somers, Parliamentarian & General Counsel;
Caroline Lynch, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations; Ryan
Breitenbach, Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
Homeland Security, and Investigations; (Minority) Perry
Apelbaum, Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Danielle Brown,
Parliamentarian & Chief Legislative Counsel; Aaron Hiller,
Chief Oversight Counsel; Joe Graupensperger, Chief Counsel,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and
Investigations; and Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member.
Mr. Goodlatte. Good morning. The Judiciary Committee will
come to order.
And, without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
a recess of the Committee at any time.
We welcome everyone to this morning's hearing on
``Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.''
Before I begin this hearing, I want to take a few minutes
to recognize the chief counsel of the Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, Caroline
Lynch. After 15 years working on Capitol Hill, Caroline has
decided to move back to her home State of Arizona to be close
to her family and to pursue the next steps in her career.
Needless to say, we are very sad to see Caroline go.
During her time in Washington, D.C., Caroline worked for
Representative John Shadegg, both in his personal office and as
chief counsel of the House Republican Policy Committee. In
2006, Caroline came to work for the House Judiciary Committee,
and in 2008, she became chief counsel of the Judiciary
Committee's Crime Subcommittee.
At the Committee, Caroline has had an enormous impact on
the reform of our criminal and national security laws. Few
people in Washington have done as much to promote the safety of
our communities. Caroline has overseen the drafting,
negotiation, and passage of critical legislation regarding the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, and the most sweeping set of
reforms to government surveillance practices in nearly 40
years, the USA Freedom Act, among many other priority
legislative initiatives.
Anyone who has met Caroline knows she is immensely
intelligent, hardworking, loyal, and a discerning chief
counsel. And, of course, those people she has negotiated with
have found her to be a skillful and formidable but fair
advocate. Her team at the Subcommittee know her to be a
determined leader and a steadfast friend. I have appreciated
Caroline's deep knowledge of criminal laws, the strength of her
convictions, and her courage to speak the truth in a place
where it is rarely convenient to do so.
We wish Caroline well in her new endeavors, and I thank her
for her years of dedicated service to this Committee, the U.S.
House of Representatives, and the American people.
[Applause.]
Mr. Goodlatte. And I know the Ranking Member, Mr. Conyers,
would like to say a few words as well.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you very much, Chairman Goodlatte.
This is indeed a unique moment in our history, and on
behalf of the Democratic staff and Democratic Members of the
Committee, I want to recognize Caroline Lynch for her hard work
and her dedication for the past 10 years.
As chief crime counsel for the Republicans during this
time, she worked collegially with her Democratic colleagues on
a broad range of criminal justice issues. The Crime
Subcommittee is legislatively the busiest Subcommittee, to me,
in all of Congress, and every crime-related bill that has been
enacted during her time here has had the benefit of her
expertise.
There are many examples of this, but I will cite her role
in helping Members find common ground on section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act so that we could enact important reforms in the USA
Freedom Act. This important law will both safeguard our
national security and our civil liberties, and it set a
precedent for how we can proceed on such issues in the future.
Her work on this legislation was essential to its ultimate
success.
We will miss her insight on these issues as well as her
friendship and her friendliness as she leaves the Committee for
other endeavors in her home State of Arizona.
We wish you all the best.
[Applause.]
Mr. Goodlatte. I think you would agree with me in saying
that, while her work is not quite done today and the rest of
the week, she has also been very critical to the bipartisan
work that we have been doing here the past few years,
culminating in 11 bills so far passing out of this Committee
dealing with criminal justice reform.
And we thank you for the contribution you have made for
that. And that work has been, indeed, very bipartisan, so we
thank you all.
We now welcome Director Comey to your fourth appearance
before the House Judiciary Committee since your confirmation as
the seventh Director of the FBI. Needless to say, the past year
since our last oversight hearing has been challenging for the
FBI on a number of fronts that we hope to review with you
today.
I want to begin by commending the men and women of the FBI
and the NYPD and the New Jersey Police Department for their
swift action in identifying and apprehending Ahmad Khan Rahami,
whose cold and cowardly acts of terrorism last week injured 29
American citizens.
This was the latest in a string of attacks stretching back
to the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and continuing through the
terror attacks in San Bernardino, Orlando, and Minneapolis.
They all share one common thread--namely, radical Islam.
This Administration, however, including the FBI, has coined
this cancer with the euphemism of ``countering violent
extremism.'' If the FBI and the rest of our national security
apparatus continues its myopia about focusing on ethereal
issues of extremism, their mission to protect the American
people will always be one of following up on terrorism's
aftermath.
I look forward to hearing from you about how the FBI is
working to proactively combat radical Islamic terrorism and put
an end to this string of violence.
While terrorism is a malignancy which must be purged, other
events at home have called into question the confidence that
Americans have historically held in a blind and impartial
justice system.
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the FBI's
investigation into her seemingly criminal conduct is a case in
point. It seems clear that former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton committed multiple felonies involving the passing of
classified information through her private email server. The
FBI, however, declined to refer the case for prosecution on
some very questionable bases.
This past Friday afternoon, the FBI released additional
investigative documents from the Clinton investigation which
demonstrate, among other things, that more than 100 of the
emails on Secretary Clinton's private server contained
classified information and that emails required to be preserved
under Federal law were, in fact, destroyed.
Even more alarming, we have recently learned that President
Obama used a pseudonym to communicate with Secretary Clinton on
her email server. Why is this relevant? As Secretary Clinton's
top aide, Huma Abedin claimed, when informed by the FBI of the
existence of an email between her boss and the President, ``How
is that not classified?''
Armed with knowledge of the President's now-known-to-be-
false claim that he only learned of Clinton's private email
account ``at the same time everybody else learned it, through
news reports,'' did the FBI review why the President was also
sending classified information over unsecure means. In effect,
this President and the former Secretary of State improperly
transmitted communications through nonsecure channels, placing
our Nation's secrets in harm's way.
Secretary Clinton's decision to play fast and loose with
our national security concerned not simply her daughter's
wedding planning or yoga routines but, instead, quoting you,
Director Comey, ``Seven email chains concerned matters that
were classified at the Top Secret/Special Access Program level
when they were sent and received.'' Top Secret/Special Access
Programs contain some of the most sensitive secret information
maintained by our government. This is a truly remarkable fact.
Were anyone of lesser notoriety than Hillary Clinton guilty of
doing this, that person would already be in jail.
For Americans unsure what a special access program, or SAP,
is, it is the kind of information that a war-planner would use
to defeat an enemy or even clandestine intelligence operations.
The Wall Street Journal explained that an SAP usually refers to
highly covert technology programs often involving weaponry.
Knowledge of these programs is usually restricted to small
groups of people on a need-to-know basis.
For those wondering whether this kind of information on an
unsecure server is a problem, you need read no further than the
Huffington Post, which reported Hillary Clinton's private email
server, containing tens of thousands of messages from her
tenure as Secretary of State, was the subject of hacking
attempts from China, South Korea, and Germany after she stepped
down in 2016.
To conclude, let me ask everyone to engage in a thought
experiment. One of this Nation's signature accomplishments in
the war on terror was the raid on Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May
2, 2011, that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden. That
operation, which was conducted by an elite team of U.S. Navy
special operators, was, of course, highly classified.
Now, imagine, if you will, that classified information
relating to the raid was passed through a nonsecure email
server and was accessed by Nations or individuals hostile to
the United States. Rather than a highly successful covert
operation, we might have had a team of dead U.S. servicemen.
Hillary Clinton chose to send and receive Top Secret
information over a personal, unsecure computer server housed in
her various homes and once reportedly placed in a bathroom
closet. These actions, without a doubt, opened these
communications to hostile interception by our enemies and those
who wish America harm.
These facts, and not the imagined history I have asked you
to contemplate, were the basis of the investigation by the FBI.
And these are the facts that you, Director Comey, chose to hold
unworthy of a recommendation to prosecute, saying that no
reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case.
We, as Congress and the American people, are troubled how
such gross negligence is not punished and why there seems to be
a different standard for the politically well-connected,
particularly if your name is Clinton.
Mr. Director, I look forward to your testimony today.
At this time, I am pleased to recognize the Ranking Member
of the Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, for
his opening statement.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte.
Welcome again, Director Comey, for your appearance here
today.
The FBI's mission is a complex undertaking: to protect the
United States from terrorism, to enforce our criminal laws, and
to lead the Nation's law enforcement community.
That mission ought to mirror our own priorities in this
Committee. In the past few days, for example, we have witnessed
near-fatal terrorist attacks in Minnesota, New York, and New
Jersey. These attacks underscore the growing fear that
individuals can be moved to violence at home by the propaganda
of ISIS and other terrorist groups abroad even though they have
no direct connection to those organizations.
To me, this threat is dire. We should be doing all we can
within our communities and within our constitutional framework
to mitigate the danger. But will our majority here in the House
use their time today to discuss these attacks? I suspect that
they will not be in their focus in this campaign season.
In Charlotte, in Tulsa, in Dallas, right here in
Washington, and in other cities across this country, our
citizens demand answers to questions about race and policing
and the use of lethal force by law enforcement. Our police are
under siege, often underresourced, and, in some cases, hard-
pressed to build trust with the communities they serve.
Director Comey, your continued work to foster lines of
communication between police officers and the general public is
commendable--and necessary if we are to keep our citizens safe
from harm.
But will my colleagues discuss this pressing issue with the
Director of the FBI, whose leadership in the law enforcement
community is paramount? I hope so. I am also afraid the focus
may be elsewhere.
The FBI is the lead agency in the investigation of cyber-
based terrorism, computer intrusions, online sexual
exploitation, and major cyber fraud. We have known for some
years about the persistent cyber threat to our critical
infrastructure. Now we hear reports of a new cyber threat to
the very basis of our democratic process.
Twice this summer, Director Comey, I wrote to you with my
fellow Ranking Members to ask you to look into reports that
Russian state actors are working to undermine our election
process.
Without objection, Mr. Chairman, I ask that both these
letters be placed in the record.
Mr. Goodlatte. Without objection, they will be made a part
of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
It is now the clear consensus of the intelligence community
that the Russian Government was behind the hack of the
Democratic National Committee and not, as some suggested,
somebody sitting on their bed that weighs 400 pounds.
On Friday, we learned from one report that the United
States intelligence officials are seeking to determine whether
an American businessman identified by Donald Trump as one of
his foreign policy advisers has opened up private
communications with senior Russian officials, including talks
about the possible lifting of economic sanctions if the
Republican nominee becomes President.
The report cites to an unnamed ``senior U.S. law
enforcement official,'' which I presume means someone in your
orbit, Mr. Director.
Without objection, I ask that this article, Mr. Chairman,
be placed into the record as well.
Mr. Goodlatte. Without objection, it will be made a part of
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
Let me be clear. If true, this allegation represents a
danger to our national security and a clear violation of
Federal law, which expressly prohibits this type of back-
channel negotiation.
And I am not alone in describing the nature of this threat.
Speaker Ryan himself has said that ``Russia is a global menace
led by a devious thug. Putin should stay out of this
election,'' end quotation.
But will our majority join us and press you on this problem
today, Director Comey? Instead, I believe that the focus of
this hearing will be more of the same: an attack on you and
your team at the Department of Justice for declining to
recommend criminal charges against Secretary Hillary Clinton.
In recent weeks, this line of attack has been remarkable
only for its lack of substance. Your critics dwell in character
assassination and procedural minutia, like the proper scope of
immunity agreements and your decision to protect the identities
of individuals wholly unrelated to the investigation. They want
to investigate the investigation, Director Comey, and I
consider that an unfortunate waste of this Committee's time.
With so many actual problems confronting this Nation and so
many of those challenges within your jurisdiction and ours, you
would think my colleagues would set their priorities
differently. I hope that they do and they listen to our
conversation today.
I thank the Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.
And, without objection, all other Members' opening
statements will be made a part of the record.
We welcome our distinguished witness. And if you would
please rise, I will begin by swearing you in.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about
to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Thank you.
Let the record reflect that the witness answered in the
affirmative.
FBI Director James Comey is a graduate of the College of
William and Mary and the University of Chicago Law School.
Following law school, Director Comey served as an assistant
United States attorney for both the Southern District of New
York and the Eastern District of Virginia. He returned to New
York to become the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of
New York. And, in 2003, he served as the Deputy Attorney
General at the Department of Justice.
Director Comey, we look forward to your testimony. Your
written statement will be entered into the record in its
entirety, and we ask that you summarize your testimony in 5
minutes. You may begin. Welcome.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. COMEY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Conyers, the
Members of the Judiciary Committee. It is good to be back
before you, as the Chairman said, for the fourth time. I have
six more to go, and I look forward to our conversations each
time.
I know that this morning there will be questions about the
email investigation, and I am happy to answer those to the
absolute best of my ability. In July, when we closed this case,
I promised unusual transparency, and I think we have delivered
on that promise in, frankly, an unprecedented way. And I will
do my absolute best to continue to be transparent in every way
possible.
But what I thought I would do, because I know we will talk
about that quite a bit, I want to just focus on some of the
other things the FBI has been doing just in the last couple of
weeks. And my objective is to make clear to you and to the
American people the quality of the people who have chosen to do
this with their lives, to do something that is not about money,
it is not about the living, it is about the life that they
make.
And I just picked four different examples of things we have
been working on that illustrate the quality of the folks, the
scope of the work, which is extraordinary, and the importance
of partnerships, because it is true that the FBI does nothing
alone.
So just to tick off four from four different parts of our
organization, obviously, as the Chair and Mr. Conyers both
mentioned, in the last couple weeks, our folks in the New York
area have been working in an extraordinary way with their
partners at Federal, State, and local organizations of all
kinds to bring to justice very quickly the bomber in the New
Jersey and New York attacks.
That work was done in a way, frankly, that would have been
hard to imagine 15 years ago in a time of turf battles and
worries about my jurisdiction, your jurisdiction. They showed
you how it should be done, how it must be done. And I think we
should all be very proud of them.
Second, within the last week, a hacker from Kosovo, who
worked for the so-called Islamic State in hacking in and taking
the identifies and personal information of American military
employees and then giving it to the Islamic State so they could
target these people, was sentenced to 20 years in jail for that
hacking. His name is Ardit Ferizi.
Our great folks, together with lots of partners around the
world, found this Kosovar in Malaysia, and our Malaysian
partners arrested him, brought him back to Virginia, where he
was just sentenced to 20 years for his hacking on behalf of the
Islamic State. Terrific work by our cyber investigators.
And, obviously, as you know, we are doing an awful lot of
work through our counterintelligence investigators to
understand just what mischief is Russia up to in connection
with our election. That is work that goes on all day every day,
about which I am limited in terms of answering questions. But I
wanted you to know that is a part of our work we don't talk
about an awful lot but it is at the core of the FBI.
And the last one I want to mention is, 2 weeks ago, a 6-
year-old girl was kidnapped off her front lawn in eastern North
Carolina in a stranger kidnapping. And all of law enforcement
in North Carolina surged on that case. We rolled our Child
Abduction Rapid Deployment Team, which is a capability we have
built around the country to help in just these kinds of
situations. These are agents and analysts who are expert at
doing what has to be done in that golden 24 hours you have to
try and save a child.
And so we rolled those resources, we worked with our
partners at State and local levels in North Carolina, and
overnight we found that little girl. We found that little girl
chained by her neck to a tree in the woods, alive, thank God,
and she was rescued.
The picture that they showed me that morning of that little
girl with wide eyes and her long hair around her shoulders but
still a thick chain around her neck connecting her to that tree
is one I will never be able to get out of my own head, because
it is both terrible and wonderful. It is terrible because of
what happened to this little girl; it is wonderful because,
together, we found her and saved her.
So I called the sheriff in North Carolina, I called our key
team members who worked on that to thank them. And they told me
that they were relieved and exhausted and that they are all
hardened investigators but they stood that early morning in the
command center and cried together because it almost never ends
this way.
So I said to the sheriff and to our people, I wish we
didn't live in a world where little girls were kidnapped off of
their front lawns, where we had to do this kind of work, but,
unfortunately, we live in that world. And because we do, I am
so glad that those people and the rest of the people that work
for the FBI are in that world, because we are safer, we are
better because they have chosen to do this with their lives.
The best part of my job is the people I get to watch, to
see their work, to admire their work, to support their work in
any way that I can. They are doing extraordinary work for the
American people across an incredible array of responsibilities.
I know you know that, and we are very grateful for the support
you give to the men and women of the FBI. And I look forward to
our conversation about their work, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Comey follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you, Director Comey.
We will now begin questioning under the 5-minute rule, and
I will begin my recognizing myself.
You testified that the FBI did not investigate the veracity
of Secretary Clinton's testimony to the Select Benghazi
Committee under oath. We referred the matter to the United
States attorney for the District of Columbia.
Is the FBI now investigating the veracity of Secretary
Clinton's testimony to the Select Benghazi Committee?
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Department has the referral--I think there were two
separate referrals--has the referrals. Now it is pending, and
so I am not going to comment on a pending matter at this point.
But the matter has been received by the Department of Justice.
They have the letters from the Committee.
Mr. Goodlatte. And you cannot tell us whether or not you
are indeed investigating?
Mr. Comey. I can't.
Mr. Goodlatte. When do you expect that you will be able to
tell us more about this pending matter before the FBI?
Mr. Comey. I don't know, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. Paul Combetta with Platte River Networks
posted to Reddit asking how to ``strip out a VIP's (VERY VIP)
email address from a bunch of archived email.'' He went on,
``The issue is that these emails involve the private email
address of someone you'd recognize, and we're trying to replace
it with a placeholder address as to not expose it.''
This clearly demonstrates actions taken to destroy evidence
by those operating Secretary Clinton's private server and by
her staff. Certainly, Combetta did not take it upon himself to
destroy evidence but had been instructed to do so by Secretary
Clinton or her staff.
So my first question to you is, was the FBI aware of this
Reddit post prior to offering Mr. Combetta immunity on May 3,
2016?
Mr. Comey. I am not sure. I know that our team looked at
it. I don't know whether they knew about it before then or not.
Mr. Goodlatte. Isn't this information evidence of
obstruction of justice and a violation of Mr. Combetta's
immunity deal?
Mr. Comey. Not necessarily, no.
Mr. Goodlatte. Why not?
Mr. Comey. It depends on what his intention was, why he
wanted to do it. And I think our team concluded that what he
was trying to do was, when they produced emails, not have the
actual address but have some name or placeholder instead of the
actual dot-com address in the ``from'' line.
Mr. Goodlatte. Last week, the American people learned that
Cheryl Mills, Secretary Clinton's longtime confidant and former
State Department chief of staff, and Heather Samuelson, counsel
to Secretary Clinton in the State Department, were granted
immunity for production of their laptops. Why were they not
targets of the FBI's criminal investigation?
Mr. Comey. Well, a target is someone on whom you have
sufficient evidence to indict. A subject is someone whose
conduct at some point during the investigation falls within the
scope of the investigation. So, certainly, with respect to Ms.
Mills, at least initially, because she was an email
correspondent, she was a subject of the investigation.
Mr. Goodlatte. Did the FBI find classified information on
either of their computers?
Mr. Comey. I think there were some emails still on the
computer that were recovered that were classified, is my
recollection.
Mr. Goodlatte. Isn't that a crime?
Mr. Comey. Is what a crime, sir?
Mr. Goodlatte. Having classified information on computers
that are outside of the server system of the Department of
State unsecured.
Mr. Comey. No. It is certainly something--without knowing
more, you couldn't conclude whether it was a crime. You would
have to know what were the circumstances, what was the
intention around that. But it is certainly something--it is the
reason we conducted a yearlong investigation to understand
where emails had gone on an unclassified system that contained
classified information.
Mr. Goodlatte. And what did you determine with regard to
the emails found on her computer?
Mr. Comey. I hope I am getting this right, and my troops
will correct me if I am wrong, but they were duplicates of
emails that had been produced, because the emails had been used
to sort before a production.
Mr. Goodlatte. Now, both Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson
were granted immunity for production of these computers, these
laptops. Why were they then allowed to sit in on the interview
with Secretary Clinton?
Mr. Comey. Right. The Department of Justice reached a
letter agreement with the two lawyers to give them what is
called act-of-production immunity, meaning nothing that is
found on the laptop they turn over will be used against them
directly, which is a fairly normal tool in investigations.
They were--Ms. Mills, in particular, was a member of
Secretary Clinton's legal team. And so Secretary Clinton
decides which of her lawyers come to voluntary interviews with
the FBI.
Mr. Goodlatte. Is it usual to allow a witness or potential
witness in a subsequent prosecution, had one been undertaken,
to be present in the room when the FBI interviews another
witness and potential target of an investigation?
Mr. Comey. The FBI has no ability to exclude or include any
lawyer that a subject being interviewed chooses to have there.
Mr. Goodlatte. Even if the lawyer is a witness in the case?
Can you cite any other instance in which a witness to a
criminal investigation, who has already been interviewed by the
FBI, has been allowed to accompany and serve as legal counsel
to the target of that investigation?
Mr. Comey. I can't from personal experience. It wouldn't
surprise me if it happened.
The FBI has no ability to decide who comes to an interview
in a voluntary interview context. If it was a judicial
proceeding, a judge could police who could be there. And,
obviously, lawyers are governed by canons of ethics to decide
what matters they can be involved in. But it doesn't fall to us
to say: You can be in, you can't be in.
Mr. Goodlatte. But wouldn't you agree that it is a conflict
of interest for them to serve as attorneys for Secretary
Clinton in this matter, having been interviewed by the FBI as
witnesses?
Mr. Comey. That is a question a lawyer has to answer for
him- or herself.
Mr. Goodlatte. You are a lawyer, Director Comey. What is
your opinion of that?
Mr. Comey. Oh, I don't want to offer an opinion on that,
but that is something a lawyer has to decide for themselves, I
assume, with counsel and consulting our canons of ethics, what
matters you can be involved in and what you can't.
But, again, the Bureau's role in conducting a voluntary
interview is to interview the subject. Who they bring is up to
them.
Mr. Goodlatte. How can you trust the veracity of Secretary
Clinton's answers, knowing that witnesses previously
interviewed by the FBI were allowed to participate in the
interview?
Mr. Comey. We assess the answers based on what is said and
all the other evidence we have gathered.
Mr. Goodlatte. In----
Mr. Comey. It doesn't matter----
Mr. Goodlatte [continuing]. Consultation with her
``attorneys,'' who are also witnesses to what was previously
done earlier and may, in fact, have, themselves, violated the
law, for which they requested and were granted immunity.
Mr. Comey. Again, the answer is--excuse me--the answer is
the same. We make the assessment based on what the witness says
and the other evidence we have gathered in the case. Who is
sitting there, to me, is not particularly germane.
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you. My time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Conyers, for his questions.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
Thank you so much.
Director James Comey, twice this past week, the city of
Charlotte, North Carolina, has been shaken by the shooting
deaths of Black men. It is only one city out of many in this
country looking for answers about the use of force by police.
We on this Committee are looking for answers too.
You are a vocal advocate for better collection of
information about violent encounters between police and
civilian. Has the FBI's ability to collect this information
improved in the year since we have last discussed it? And why
are these statistics so important to our current discussion on
the use of force by police?
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.
We are having passionate, important conversations in this
country about police use of force in connection with encounters
with civilians, especially with African-Americans.
Mr. Conyers. Yes.
Mr. Comey. All of those conversations are uninformed today.
They are all driven by anecdote. Because, as a country, we
simply don't have the information to know: Do we have an
epidemic of violence directed by law enforcement against Black
folks? Do we have an epidemic involving brown folks? White
folks? We just don't know. And in the absence of that data, we
are driven entirely by anecdote, and that is a very bad place
to be.
I don't know whether there is an epidemic of violence. My
instincts tell me there isn't, but I don't know. I can't tell
you whether shootings involving people of any different color
are up or down or sideways, and nor can anybody else in this
country. And so, to discuss the most important things that are
going on in this country, we need information. And the
government should collect it. I can't think of something that
is more inherently governmental than the need to use deadly
force in an encounter during law enforcement work.
Mr. Conyers. Yeah.
Mr. Comey. And so what has changed in the last year, which
is really good news, is that everybody in leadership in law
enforcement in the United States has agreed with this, and they
have agreed the FBI will build and maintain a database where we
collect important information about all such encounters
involving the use of deadly force. That will allow us to know
what is going on in this country so we can have a thoughtful
conversation and resist being ruled by individual anecdotes.
That is why it matters so much.
We are making progress. We will have this done--I would
like to have it done in the next year. Certainly in the next 2
years this database will be up and running, because everybody
gets why it matters so much.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
On August 30, I wrote to you regarding Donald Trump's
extensive connections to the Russian Government. The letter
cites to a number of troubling reports, some that suggest mere
conflicts of interest, others that might suggest evidence of a
crime.
Last Friday, we read a new report suggesting that Mr.
Trump's foreign policy adviser has been meeting with high-
ranking, sanctioned officials in Moscow to discuss lifting
economic sanctions if Mr. Donald Trump becomes President. The
same report quotes, ``a senior United States law enforcement
official,'' who says that this relationship is being,
``actively monitored and investigated.''
Is the FBI investigating the activities of Mr. Trump or any
adviser to the Trump campaign with respect to any line of
communication between the campaign and the Russian Government?
Mr. Comey. I can't say, sir. As I said in response to a
different question from the Chairman, we don't confirm or deny
investigations.
Mr. Conyers. Well, more generally, then, is it lawful for a
private citizen to enter into official government negotiations
with a foreign nation?
Mr. Comey. I don't think it is appropriate for me to answer
that hypothetical.
Mr. Conyers. Uh-huh. Well, in my view, our research shows
that it is not. The Logan Act, 18 U.S.C., section 953,
prohibits this conduct, in my view.
Does Mr. Trump currently receive intelligence briefings
from the FBI?
Mr. Comey. Both candidates and their running mates are
offered on a regular basis briefings from the entire
intelligence community. Some portion of the first briefing
included an FBI segment, so yes.
Mr. Conyers. Does his staff attend those meetings as well?
Mr. Comey. No, just the candidate and the Vice Presidential
candidate.
Mr. Conyers. Uh-huh.
And, finally, if a member of either----
Mr. Comey. Okay, no, I am wrong. I am sorry. I have to
correct what I said.
Each was allowed to bring two people. And, as I recall, Mr.
Trump did bring two individuals with clearances to the
briefing. Secretary Clinton did not.
I am sorry. I misstated that.
Mr. Conyers. All right.
Finally, if a member of either campaign were engaged in
secret, back-channel communications with a foreign adversary,
could that line of communication pose a threat to national
security?
Mr. Comey. Mr. Conyers, I don't think it is appropriate,
given that I am not commenting on whether we have an
investigation, to answer hypotheticals that might make it look
like I am commenting on whether we have an investigation. So I
would prefer not to answer that, sir.
Mr. Conyers. Well, thank you for being here today.
And I thank the Chairman and yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman, recognizes
the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Sensenbrenner, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Comey, welcome.
Who authorized granting Cheryl Mills immunity?
Mr. Comey. I am sorry?
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Who authorized granting Cheryl Mills
immunity?
Mr. Comey. It was a decision made by the Department of
Justice. I don't know at what level inside. In our
investigations, any kind of immunity comes from the
prosecutors, not the investigators.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Did she request immunity?
Mr. Comey. I don't know for sure what the negotiations
involved. I believe her lawyer asked for act-of-production
immunity with respect to the production of her laptop. That is
my understanding. But, again, the FBI wasn't part of those
conversations.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Now, it has been a matter of public
record that Secretary Clinton brought nine people into the room
where two FBI agents were questioning her. Is that normal
practice?
Mr. Comey. I don't know if there is a normal practice. I
have done interviews with a big crowd and some with just the
subject. It is unusual to have that large a number, but it is
not unprecedented, in my experience.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Now, Cheryl Mills, you know, also stated
that she was an attorney. I am very concerned that when a fact
witness represents a client who might be the target of an
investigation there is a conflict of interest.
And, you know, rather than letting Ms. Mills make a
determination, would the FBI be willing to refer the matter of
a fact witness, Ms. Mills in this case, representing a target,
Secretary Clinton in this case, to the appropriate bar
association for investigation?
Mr. Comey. That is not a role for the FBI. Even though I
happen to be a lawyer, we are not lawyers; we are
investigators.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay.
Mr. Comey. So that is a question for the legal part of the
Department of Justice.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay.
Why did Ms. Mills request immunity? Was she hiding
something or was she afraid that something would incriminate
her that was on her laptop?
Mr. Comey. I don't know. I am sure that is a conversation
she and her lawyer had and then her lawyer had with lawyers at
the Department. I just don't know.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Uh-huh. Well, you know, there was an op-
ed by Professor Jonathan Turley that appeared in the media that
said that there are a lot of good cases scuttled by granting
immunity. And there was lots of immunity that was granted here.
Doesn't it concern you, as an investigator, that your
chiefs in the Justice Department decided to become an immunity-
producing machine for many people who would have been very key
witnesses should there have been a prosecution?
Mr. Comey. I don't think of it that way. It doesn't strike
me there was a lot of immunity issued in this case. I know it
is a complicated subject, but there is all different kinds of
immunity. There are probably three different kinds that
featured in this case. Fairly typical in a complex, white-
collar case, especially, as you try and work your way up toward
your subject. So my overall reaction is this looks like
ordinary investigative process to me.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Well, the target was not an ordinary
target. I think we all know that. And since you announced that
there would be no prosecution of Secretary Clinton in July,
there have been several very material issues that are
troubling, and would this not require a reopening of the
investigation to solve those issues?
Mr. Comey. I haven't seen anything that would come near to
that kind of situation.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Oh----
Mr. Comey. I know there are lots of questions, lots of
controversy. I am very proud of the way this was done.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Well, you know, come on now. With all,
you know, due respect, since you made this announcement, there
have been many more issues that came out that were not on the
table prior to your announcement that the investigation against
Secretary Clinton had been dropped.
And, you know, I think the American public is entitled to
answers on this, particularly since we have to know, you know,
the extent of the classified information which ended up being
in the private email server.
You know, all of us on this Committee have got security
clearances of some kind or another, you know, and I am kind of
worried that, you know, if I got some classified information
and went back to my office and used an unsecured server to send
it to somebody who may also have had classified information, I
would be in big trouble. And I should be in big trouble if I
did something like that.
There seems to be different strokes for different folks on
this. And that is what Americans are concerned about,
particularly when we are looking to elect someone to the
highest office of the land and the leader of the free world.
I don't think your answers are satisfactory at all, Mr.
Comey. I do have a great deal of respect for you, but I think
that there is a heavy hand coming from someplace else.
And, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman, recognizes
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me express my admiration and thanks to the FBI
for the professional manner and excellent work they did in the
bombings that occurred in New York about a block out of my
district to apprehend the suspect within, what, 48 hours. And
through everything, it was a very good indication of teamwork
and of professionalism, and I congratulate you on that.
Secondly, let me say that I think that the mud that is
being thrown from the other side of this table here
continually, only because of the ongoing Presidential election,
in the case in which the FBI decided there was nothing to
prosecute, it is over--we all know nobody would even be talking
about it if one weren't--if Hillary Clinton weren't a
Presidential candidate. This is pure political maneuvering.
But let me talk about a case that may pose a current
national security threat to the United States and ask you a few
questions about that.
In his earlier remarks, Mr. Conyers referenced an August 30
letter from the Ranking Members of a number of House
Committees. That letter asked whether the FBI was investigating
troubling connections between Trump campaign officials and
Russian interests and whether they contributed to the illegal
hacking of the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic
National Campaign Committee.
You are familiar with that letter, I take it.
Mr. Comey. Yes, I am familiar with the letter.
Mr. Nadler. I would like to ask you a few questions.
The letter said this: ``On August 8, 2016, Roger Stone, a
Donald Trump confidant, revealed that he has communicated with
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange about the upcoming release of
additional illegally hacked Democratic documents. Mr. Stone
made these statements during a Republican campaign event while
answering a question about a potential October surprise.''
Obviously, if someone is stating publicly that he is in
direct communication with the organization that obtained these
illegally hacked documents, I assume the FBI would want to talk
to that person.
Has the FBI interviewed Roger Stone about his
communications with Julian Assange or his knowledge of how
WikiLeaks got these illegally obtained documents?
Mr. Comey. I can't comment on that.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Stone stated that he has knowledge about
upcoming leaks of additional illegally hacked documents. Has
the FBI asked him about those communications?
Mr. Comey. I also can't comment on that.
Mr. Nadler. Because it is an ongoing investigation?
Mr. Comey. I don't want to confirm whether there is or is
not an investigation. That is why--that is the way I answered
Mr. Conyers' questions as well.
Mr. Nadler. Director Comey, the FBI acknowledged in
private--in public statements and testimony that it--
acknowledged that it was investigating Secretary Clinton's use
of a private email server, and that was while the investigation
was still ongoing. Now you can't comment on whether there is an
investigation.
Is there a different standard for Secretary Clinton and
Donald Trump? If not, what is the consistent standard?
Mr. Comey. No. Our standard is we do not confirm or deny
the existence of investigations. There is an exception for
that: when there is a need for the public to be reassured; when
it is obvious it is apparent, given our activities, public
activities, that the investigation is ongoing. But our
overwhelming rule is we do not comment except in certain
exceptional circumstances.
Mr. Nadler. Aren't there exceptional circumstances when
close officials to a candidate of a major political party for
the United States says publicly that he is in communication
with foreign officials and anticipates further illegal
activity?
Mr. Comey. I don't think so.
Mr. Nadler. Mr. Trump's campaign chairman, Paul Manafort,
resigned after failing to disclose his role in assisting a pro-
Russian party in Ukraine. The Associated Press reported,
``Donald Trump's campaign chairman helped a pro-Russian party
in Ukraine secretly route $2.2 million in payments to two
prominent Washington lobbying firms in 2012, and did so in a
way that effectively obscured the foreign political party's
efforts to influence U.S. policy.''
Has the FBI interviewed Mr. Manafort about his failure to
disclose his work for this foreign government, as Federal law
requires?
Mr. Comey. I have to give you the same answer, Mr. Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Has the FBI interviewed Rick Gates, who
reportedly still works for the Trump campaign, about his
involvement in this scheme?
Mr. Comey. Same answer, sir.
Mr. Nadler. Same answer.
Director Comey, after you investigated Secretary Clinton,
you made a decision to explain publicly who you interviewed and
why. You also disclosed documents, including notes from this
interview--from those interviews.
Why shouldn't the American people have the same level of
information about your investigation of those associated with
Mr. Trump?
Mr. Comey. Well, I am not confirming that we are
investigating people associated with Mr. Trump.
In the matter of the email investigation, it was our
judgment--my judgment and the rest of the FBI's judgment that
those were exceptional circumstances where the public needed
transparency.
Mr. Nadler. Okay.
My final question is the following. You investigated
Secretary Clinton's emails and so forth, everything we have
been talking about. You concluded, I believe quite properly,
there was nothing to prosecute. And you have announced, in my
opinion quite properly, that you had investigated it and there
was nothing there--or there was nothing to prosecute. That was
proper.
But having announced--when a prosecutorial agency announces
that ``we have investigated so-and-so and we have decided to
prosecute because'' or ``we have investigated so-and-so and we
have decided not to prosecute because,'' why is it appropriate
for that prosecutorial agency to go further and say, ``Even
though we decided not to prosecute, we still think this person
did this, that, or the other thing and it was proper or
improper''? Why is it proper for a prosecutorial agency to
characterize your opinion of the propriety of the actions of
someone who you have announced that you have decided did
nothing criminal and shouldn't be prosecuted?
Mr. Comey. That is a very hard decision. That is why it is
the exception to the rule. You do risk damaging someone who
isn't convicted.
The judgment I made in this case is, given the unusual--in
fact, I hope unprecedented--nature of this investigation, that
it was appropriate to offer that transparency. Not an easy
call. I really wrestled with it, but I think, on balance, it
was the right call.
Mr. Nadler. Let me just say before my time expires that I
think--and I am just talking for myself--that that was highly
inappropriate; that, having determined that there was nothing
to prosecute and having announced that quite properly, for a
prosecuting agency, the Department of Justice, to comment with
comments that will be looked upon as authoritative that what
she did was right or wrong or good or bad is not the
appropriate role of a prosecuting agency and risks, not in this
case perhaps, but risks--and I talk really now because of the
future.
I don't want to see that happen again with regard to
anybody, because it puts anybody who did not commit a crime,
who you or the Justice Department or whoever has determined did
not commit a crime or there is no evidence sufficient to
prosecute, puts them at the mercy of the opinion of an
individual or individuals within the prosecuting agency. And
that is just not right under our system.
I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Comey, thank you for those examples of the FBI's
good work in your opening statement. I think we all appreciate
what the FBI has done.
My first question is this: Would you reopen the Clinton
investigation if you discovered new information that was both
relevant and substantial?
Mr. Comey. It is hard for me to answer in the abstract. We
would certainly look at any new and substantial information.
Mr. Smith. Yeah. Let's impersonalize it--in general, if you
discovered new information that was substantial and relevant,
you would reopen an investigation, would you not?
Mr. Comey. Again, even in general, I don't think we can
answer that in the abstract. What we can say is, if people--any
investigation, if people have new and substantial information,
we would like to see it so we can make an evaluation.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Let me give you some examples and mention
several new developments that I think have occurred and ask you
if you have become aware of them.
The first example is what the Chairman mentioned a while
ago. An employee at a company that managed former Secretary
Clinton's private email server said, ``I need to strip out a
VIP's (VERY VIP) email address from a bunch of archived emails.
Basically, they don't want the VIP's email address exposed to
anyone.''
I assume you are aware of that.
Mr. Comey. I am aware of that.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
The same employee called a new retention policy designed to
delete emails after 60 days a, ``Hillary cover-up operation.''
And you saw that, did you not?
Mr. Comey. Say the last--I am sorry, Mr. Smith, I couldn't
hear the last----
Mr. Smith. The same employee called the new retention
policy designed to delete emails after 60 days a ``Hillary
cover-up operation.'' You saw that?
Mr. Comey. I don't know that particular language.
Mr. Smith. Okay. We will get you the source, but you can
take my word for it that that is what he said.
Mr. Comey. I will.
Mr. Smith. Another example: A former Clinton Foundation
employee, who also managed the Clinton server, destroyed
devices used by former Secretary Clinton by smashing them with
a hammer. You are aware of that?
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Two employees of the company that managed former Secretary
Clinton's server recently pled the Fifth Amendment to Congress
to avoid self-incrimination. And you are aware of that?
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
And then, lastly, 15,000 more work-related emails were
discovered, though there had been an attempt to wrongly delete
them. And you are aware of that?
Mr. Comey. I think we discovered them.
Mr. Smith. Right.
To me, Director Comey, what I cited are not the actions of
innocent people. There is a distinct possibility that Mrs.
Clinton or her staff directed others to destroy evidence in a
government investigation, which, of course, is against the law.
So I would urge you to reopen your investigation.
Do you want to comment on that?
Mr. Comey. I don't.
Mr. Smith. Okay. I know you can't tell us whether you have
or have not, but I believe I have given evidence of new
information that is relevant and substantial that would justify
reopening the investigation.
My next question is this: I know you granted immunity to a
number of individuals, but if you had new information that is
relevant and substantial, you would be able to investigate them
further, wouldn't you?
Mr. Comey. Not to quibble, the FBI doesn't grant immunity
to anybody. The Department of Justice is able to grant very
different kinds of immunity. If new and substantial evidence
develops either that a witness lied under a grant of use
immunity or under any kind of immunity, of course the
Department of Justice can pursue it.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Mr. Comey. Nobody gets lifetime immunity.
Mr. Smith. Right. Okay. Thank you, Director Comey.
Last question is this: As Chairman of the Science
Committee, I issued the FBI a subpoena on September 19, 2016.
The due date for a response was 2 days ago, September 26.
Bureau staff has still not provided the requested information
and documents.
Yesterday, we pointed out to them that the Science
Committee has jurisdiction over the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, which sets standards for the Federal
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014.
I trust you intend to comply with the subpoena.
Mr. Comey. I intend to continue the conversations we have
been having about the subpoena.
Mr. Smith. Yeah.
Mr. Comey. As you know, we have made a lot of documents
available to at least six Committees, and the question of
whether we should make them additional--available to another
Committee is something that we are struggling with but talking
to your folks about.
Mr. Smith. Okay. To me, there is no struggle. If we have
clear jurisdiction, which we can demonstrate, it, I think,
obligates you to comply with the subpoena.
Mr. Comey. Yes, sir. We are not trying to be disrespectful.
We are just not sure we see the jurisdictional issue the way
that your folks do. But we are continuing to talk about it.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you, Director Comey.
Mr. Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Smith. I will yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
The Chairman of the full Committee had asked something
earlier, and I just want to point out and ask that it be placed
in the record--according to the Maryland Code of Ethics
19301.11, it specifically prohibits a former or current
government officer or employee from acting as a counsel to
someone that they represented in government. And I would like
that to be placed in the record.
In light of the fact that the Maryland Bar has----
Mr. Goodlatte. Without objection, it will be made a part of
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Issa. In light of the fact the Maryland Bar has this
prohibition, would that have changed your view of allowing her
in and saying you had no authority?
Mr. Comey. I am not qualified nor am I going to answer
questions about legal ethics in this forum. The FBI has no
basis to exclude somebody from an interview who the subject of
the interview says is on their legal team.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you, Director Comey.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman, recognizes
the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Director Comey, for once again appearing
before this Committee, as you appear before so many Committees
here in the House. Sometimes I wonder how you get any work done
at all, that you are called up here so frequently.
You know, there has been a lot of focus on the private
email that Secretary Clinton used, just as her predecessor,
Colin Powell, used. So far as I am aware from the public
comments, there is no forensic evidence that there was a breach
of that server, although theoretically you could intrude and
not leave evidence.
But there has been very little focus on the breach at the
State Department email system. Now, it has been reported in the
press that this breach of the State Department email system was
one of the largest ever of a Federal system and was
accomplished by, according to the press, either China or
Russia.
I am wondering if you are able to give us any insight into
whether it was, in fact, the Russians who hacked into the State
Department email system or whether that is still under
investigation.
Mr. Comey. Not in this open forum, I can't.
Ms. Lofgren. All right. I am hoping that we can get some
insight in an appropriate classified setting on that.
Now, we have watched with some concern--and I know you are
also concerned--about the Russian intrusion into our election
system. It has been reported to us that the Russians hacked
into the Democratic National Committee database. They also
hacked into the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.
And it seems that they are making an effort to influence the
outcome of this election. We have been warned that the
information stolen might not just be released but also be
altered and forged and then released, in an effort to impact
the election here in the United States.
Yesterday, there were press reports--and I don't know if
they are accurate, and I am interested if you are able to tell
us--that the Russians have also hacked the telephones of
Democratic staffers and that there was a request for Democratic
staffers to bring their cell phones into the FBI to have them
mirrored.
Can you tell us anything about that?
Mr. Comey. I can't at this point. What I can say in
response to the first part of your question, any hacking is
something we take very seriously. Any hacking in connection
with this Nation's election system is something we take
extraordinarily seriously, the whole of government. So it is
something the FBI is spending a lot of time on right now to try
and understand. So what are they up to and what does it involve
and what is the scope of it to equip the President to decide
upon the appropriate response. And so that is one of reasons I
have to be very careful about what I say about it. That work is
ongoing. I should make clear to folks when we talk about our
election system, there has been a lot of press reporting about
attempts to intrude into voter registration databases. Those
are connected to the Internet. That is very different than the
electoral mechanism in this country, which is not.
Ms. Lofgren. We had actually a hearing, and I had the
chance to talk to Alex Padilla, who is the Secretary of State
in California. Number one, they encrypt their database. And
number two, even if you were to steal it, there is backups that
you couldn't steal. So they can't really manipulate that. But
you could cause a lot of damage. I mean, you could create chaos
on Election Day that would--and you could target that chaos to
areas where voters had a tendency to vote for one candidate
over another in an attempt to influence the outcome. So it is
not a benign situation certainly, and one that we want to worry
about.
I want to just quickly touch on a concern I have also on
cyber on rule 41, and how the FBI is interpreting that. I am
concerned that the change, as understood by the FBI, would
allow for one warrant for multiple computers, but would include
allowing the FBI to access victims' computers in order to clean
them up. Cybersecurity experts that I have been in touch with
have raised very strong concerns about that provision,
especially using malware's own signaling system to disable the
malware. The cyber experts who have talked to me and expressed
concern believe that that ultimately could actually trigger
attacks. And, so, I am wondering if you have any comments on
how the FBI intends to use rule 41 vis malware on victims'
computers?
Mr. Comey. Yeah. Thank you.
Mr. Goodlatte. Time of gentlewoman has expired. The witness
will be permitted to answer the question.
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not an expert, but
one of the challenges we face, especially in dealing with these
huge criminal botnets, which have harvested and connected lots
of innocent peoples' computers is how do we execute a search
warrant to try and figure out where the bad guys are, and get
them away from those innocent people? And the challenge we have
been facing is to go to every single jurisdiction and get a
warrant would take, literally, years. And so we are trying to
figure out can we use rule 41 to have one judge issue that
order and give us that authority.
Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired. I
would just like to close by expressing the hope that the FBI
might seek the guidance of some of the computer experts at our
national labs on this very question of triggering malware
attacks. And I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The point is well taken. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Comey,
Chairman Goodlatte, in his introduction of you, mentioned that
you are a graduate of the College of William and Mary. And as
you may well know, I am a graduate of William and Mary as well.
Anyway, you may remember that our alma mater is very proud
of something called the honor code. And I checked out the
wording of the honor code to make sure that I was correct on
it. And I will tell you exactly what it says. It says, ``As a
member of the William and Mary community, I pledge on my honor
not to lie, cheat, or steal, either in my academic or in my
personal life.'' Well, one of the people whose behavior you
investigated, Hillary Clinton, didn't have the good fortune to
attend the College of William and Mary. But she did attend
Wellesley. And I wondered whether they had an honor code. And I
found out, I looked it up, they do, and they did. And here is
what it says, ``As a Wellesley College student, I will act with
honesty, integrity, and respect. In making this commitment, I
am accountable to the community and dedicate myself to a life
of honor.'' Let me repeat part of that again. ``I will act with
honesty.''
Now, I am sure the young women attending Wellesley today,
and those that have attend it in the past, are proud that one
of their own could be the next President of the United States.
But a majority of the American people have come to the
conclusion that Hillary Clinton is not honest and cannot be
trusted. It is about two to one who say that she is dishonest.
In the latest Quinnipiac poll, for example, the question being:
Would you say that Hillary Clinton is honest or not, 65 percent
said no. And only 32 percent said yes, she is honest. You know,
Republicans and Democrats. Not surprisingly, were
overwhelmingly one way or the other. But Independents, 80
percent of them said nope, she is not honest. And only 19
percent of them said she is.
So Director Comey, since you and your people were the ones
who investigated Hillary Clinton's email scandal, I would just
like to ask a couple of questions. First, Hillary Clinton
claimed over and over that none of the emails that she sent
contained classified information. Was she truthful when she
said that?
Mr. Comey. As I said when I testified in July, there were--
I am forgetting now after 2\1/2\ months the exact number, but
there were 80 or so emails that contained classified
information.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. So she said they didn't contain
classified information and they did. So that sounds like not
being truthful. Not trying to put words in your mouth. But I
think that is what that means.
Hillary Clinton then came up with a fallback position
saying: Well, none of the emails I sent were marked classified.
But that wasn't true either. Was it?
Mr. Comey. There were three--as I recall, three emails that
bore within the body of the text a portion marking that
indicated they were classified confidential.
Mr. Chabot. And again, not putting words in your mouth, but
I think that means that no, she didn't tell the truth in that
particular instance.
Hillary Clinton said she decided to use a personal email
server system for convenience. And that she would only have to
carry around one BlackBerry. Was she being truthful when she
said she just used one device?
Mr. Comey. She used, during her tenure as Secretary of
State, multiple devices. Not at the same time, but
sequentially.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Again, I am going to take that as she
said one and it was more. So, therefore, not honest. And in
fact, some of the devices were destroyed with a hammer, as has
already been mentioned. Is that the type of behavior that you
would expect from someone who is being fully cooperative with
an investigation, destroying devices containing potential
evidence with a hammer?
Mr. Comey. Well, we uncovered no evidence that devices were
destroyed during the pendency of our investigation. And so why
people destroy devices when there is no investigation is a
question I am not able to answer.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Director, a little less
than 2 months ago, Hillary Clinton, in talking about her
emails, claimed that you said ``that my answers were
truthful.'' PolitiFact, by the way, gave this claim a Pants on
Fire rating. Did you say that she was telling the truth with
respect to her email claims?
Mr. Comey. I did not. I never say that about anybody. Our
business is never to decide whether someone--whether we believe
someone. Our business is always to decide what evidence do we
have that would convince us not to believe that person. It is
an odd way to look at the world, but it is how investigators
look at the world.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Director Comey, it must have been,
and I am almost out of time, but it must have been very awkward
for you, you are tasked with investigating a person who could
be the next President of the United States, and the current
President of the United States has already prejudged the case
and telegraphed to you and the entire Justice Department that
he, your boss, has come to the conclusion that there is not
even a smidgen of corruption, his own words, before you have
even completed your investigation. You were aware that he had
said that, weren't you?
Mr. Comey. Yes, I saw those reported in the press.
Mr. Chabot. Okay. And finally, it just seems to me here
that there was clearly a double standard going on. Like, for
example, if anybody else had done this, like a soldier or a
serviceman who did virtually the same thing, they would have
been prosecuted and were, but not Hillary Clinton. And that is
a double standard, and that is not the way it is supposed to
work in America. And I am out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Comey. I disagree with that characterization, but----
Mr. Goodlatte. The gentleman is permitted to respond.
Mr. Comey. I don't think so. I actually think if I--if we
were to recommend she be prosecuted, that would be a double
standard because Mary and Joe at the FBI or some other place,
if they did this, would not be prosecuted. They would be
disciplined. They'd be in big trouble. In the FBI, if you did
this, you would not be prosecuted. That wouldn't be fair.
Mr. Chabot. I will give you the benefit of the doubt
because you are an alumni of William and Mary.
Mr. Comey. Okay.
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee,
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Chairman, thank you so very much. Many
Americans have come to trust Hillary Clinton as a dedicated
committed public servant. But I believe it is important as we
address these questions, let me make one or two points. My
colleagues have already made it, and I look forward maybe to
coming back to Washington to dealing with the potential Russian
intrusion on the election system. I am not asking you,
Director, at this time. And also the issue of connecting the
dots as we deal with terrorism across America. But I do want to
acknowledge Eric Williams, an outstanding detailee to this
Judiciary Committee, and thank him for his service. And I want
to thank the SAC in Houston, Mr. Turner, for helping us in the
shooting that occurred in Houston, as you well know, that gave
us a great deal of fear and scare just a couple of days ago.
But, Director Comey, my Republican colleagues have
questioned, second-guessed, and attacked you and your team of
career FBI agents. They disagree with the results of your
investigation. They want you to prosecute, or to ask the DOJ to
prosecute Secretary Clinton regardless of the facts. So they
have engaged in an almost daily ritual of holding hearings,
desperately trying to tear down your investigation and your
recommendations. I believe you testified previously that your
recommendation in that case was unanimous, and your
investigation was carried out by what you called an all star
team of career agents and prosecutors. Is that right?
Mr. Comey. Yes. These were some of our very best. And
sometimes, because I am lucky enough to be the person who
represents the FBI, people think it is my conclusion. Sure it
is my conclusion, but I am reporting what the team thought and
their supervisors and their supervisors. As I said, this was--
as painful as it is for people sometimes, this was not a close
call.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me continue. You have written that the
case itself was not a cliff hanger. Is that right?
Mr. Comey. Correct. Correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Recently, Republicans have attacked the
decision to provide limited immunity to individuals during the
investigation. For example, when Congressman Chaffetz learned
about this, he stated, ``No wonder they couldn't prosecute a
case. They were handing out immunity deals like candy.'' I
understand that the FBI does not make the final call on
immunity agreements. That was the DOJ. You made that clear. So
his statement was just wrong. But did you consult closely with
DOJ before these immunity agreements were concluded by giving--
by having facts?
Mr. Comey. Right. Our job is to tell them what facts we
would like to get access to. The prosecutor's job is figure out
how to do that. And so they negotiate--I think there were five
limited immunity agreements of different kinds that they
negotiated.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Did you or anyone at the FBI ever object
to these decisions to grant immunity? Did you think they made
sense?
Mr. Comey. No. It was fairly ordinary stuff.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Was the FBI or DOJ handing out immunity
agreements like candy?
Mr. Comey. That is not how I saw it. I didn't see it----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Congressman Gowdy, a good friend, also
objected to granting immunity to Bryan Pagliano and Mr.
Combetta at Platte River Networks. He quoted: ``These are the
two people that FBI decides to give immunity to, Bryan and the
guy at Platte River, if it happened.'' Those are the two that
you would want to prosecute. So you are giving immunity to the
trigger people, and everybody goes free.'' Do you agree with
this assessment? Did the FBI screw up here and let everyone go
free because of these limited immunity deals?
Mr. Comey. No, I don't think so. The goal in an
investigation like this is to work up. And if people have
information that their lawyers are telling you that you are not
going to get without some limited form of immunity and they are
lower down, you try to get that information to see if you can
make a case against your subjects.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Congressman Gowdy also said this about the
FBI: ``I have been underwhelmed by an agency that I once had
tremendous respect for.'' Let me just say, sitting on this
Judiciary Committee for many, many years, going through a
number of investigations, I have never been proud of an agency
that has always been there when vulnerable people are hurting,
and when there is a need for great work. But my question to you
is: What is your response to that, Director Comey? Do you
believe these criticisms are fair?
Mr. Comey. I think questions are fair. I think criticism is
healthy and fair. I think reasonable people can disagree about
whether I should have announced it and how I should have done
it. What is not fair is any implication that the Bureau acted
in any way other than independently, competently, and honestly
here. That is just not true. I knew this was going to be
controversial. I knew there would be all kinds of rocks thrown.
But this organization and the people who did this are honest,
independent people. We do not carry water for one side or the
other. That is hard for people to see because so much of our
country we see things through sides. We are not on anybody's
side. This was done exactly the way you would want it to be
done. That said, questions are fair. Feedback is fair.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely. But the foot soldiers, we use
that term in the civil rights movement, your agents on the
ground, you take issue with whether or not they were
compromised or they were adhering to somebody else's message.
Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Comey. Absolutely. You can call us wrong, but don't
call us weasels. We are not weasels. We are honest people. And
we did this in that way, whether you disagree or agree with the
result, this was done the way you would want it to be done.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You were able to learn that Mr. Pagliano
and Mr. Combetta--you learned what they had to say. And if
anyone provided statements to the FBI had actually provided
evidence that Secretary Clinton has committed a crime, would
you then have recommended prosecution to the DOJ?
Mr. Comey. Oh, yeah. If the case was there, very
aggressively.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are you sure you wouldn't have been a
little nervous about doing so, a little intimidated?
Mr. Comey. No. I really don't care.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You don't look like it. You are kind of
tall, and that----
Mr. Comey. I have a 10-year term. That is the beauty of
this--while there is a lot of challenging things about this
job, one of the great things is I have a certain amount of job
security. And so no. Either way, we would have done what the
facts told us should be done.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So are you now second-guessing your
decision regarding Hillary Clinton?
Mr. Comey. No.
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Director
and ask my colleagues to give the respect that this agency in
this instance deserves. Thank you so very much for your
service. I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director, I have got a
lot of concerns. But one of them refers to Reddit. At the time
that the Department of Justice at your behest or your
involvement gave Paul Combetta immunity, did you do so knowing
about all of the posts he had on Reddit, and capturing all of
those posts and correspondence where he was asking how to wipe,
or completely erase on behalf of a very VIP, so to speak?
Mr. Comey. I am not sure sitting here. My recollection is,
and I will check this and fix it if I am wrong, that we had
some awareness of the Reddit posts. I don't know whether our
folks had read them all or not. We had a pretty good
understanding of what we thought he had done. But that is my
best recollection.
Mr. Issa. Okay. In the last week, en masse, he has been
deleting them from Reddit posts. Is that consistent with
preserving evidence? And I say that because there is still an
ongoing interest by Congress. And only in spite of Reddit's own
senior, what they call, flack team trying to hide it, only
because a few people caught it do we even know about it. And
this and other Committees are interested in getting the backups
that may exist on these deletions. You know, I guess my
question to you is, is he destroying evidence relevant to
Congressional inquiries? And I will answer it for you. Yes. He
is. And what are you going to do about it?
Mr. Comey. That is not something I can comment on.
Mr. Issa. Well, let me go into something that concerns this
body in a very specific way. As a former Chairman issuing
subpoenas, I issued a subpoena, and additionally, I issued
preserve letters in addition to that. Now-Chairman Chaffetz
issued what are effectively preserve letters. Some of them were
directly to Hillary Rodham Clinton while she was still
Secretary. Others, the subpoena in 2013, was to Secretary
Kerry. These individuals destroyed documents pursuant--or took
it out of Federal custody pursuant to our subpoena and our
discovery. As a result, they committed crimes. My question to
you is, when I was a Chairman and I wanted to grant immunity to
somebody, I had to notice the Department of Justice, and you
were consulted. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Comey. In a particular matter?
Mr. Issa. In any matter.
Mr. Comey. I don't know whether the FBI is consulted in
that circumstance.
Mr. Issa. Okay. For the record, yes. The Department of
Justice does not grant immunity without checking with Federal
law enforcement to see whether it will impact any ongoing
investigation. That is the reason we have a requirement to give
notice. When the reverse was occurring, you were granting--
handing out like candy, according to some, immunity, did you
or, to your knowledge, Department of Justice confer with
Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman Chaffetz, Chairman Smith or any of
the other Chairmen who had ongoing subpoenas and
investigations?
Mr. Comey. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Issa. So isn't there a double standard that when you
granted immunity to these five individuals, you took them out
of the reach of prosecution for crimes committed related to
destruction of documents, or withholding or other crimes
pursuant to Congressional subpoenas?
Mr. Comey. I don't think anybody was given transactional
immunity.
Mr. Issa. Oh, really? Now, we have are not allowed to make
your immunities public, but I am going to take the privilege of
making one part of it public. I read them. You gave immunity
from destruction to both of those attorneys. Not just turning
the documents over, specifically destruction. You did the same
thing with these other two individuals, Bryan and Paul
Combetta. You gave them immunity from destruction.
Mr. Comey. Yeah. I don't think--well, again, I could always
be wrong, but I don't have them in front of me either----
Mr. Issa. Well, because you don't let us take them out of
the SCIF, it is a little hard for us too. But the fact is when
you read them----
Mr. Comey. Can I finish my answer? I am pretty sure that
what was granted was use immunity in the case of those two
people, co-extensive with 18 U.S.C. 6001, which means no
statement you make can be used against you directly or
indirectly. Transactional immunity is sometimes given also by
prosecutors, says you will not be prosecuted in any event for
this set of facts. I don't think there was any transactional
immunity.
Mr. Issa. But when I read for both of the attorneys that
immunity was granted, it, in both cases, said destruction, in
addition to the turning over. Why was that--why would you
believe that was necessary, or do you believe that would be
necessary? You wanted the document. You wanted the physical
evidence. Why did you have to give them immunity from
destruction of materials? And because my time is expiring, when
you look into it and hopefully get back to this Committee, I
would like to know, does that immunity apply only to
destruction on the computers delivered so that other
destructions by Cheryl Mills could still be prosecuted?
Mr. Comey. Yeah. Again, my recollection is no transactional
immunity was given. Protection of statements was given to the
Combetta guy and Mr. Pagliano.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentlemen. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent,
quickly, that a group of documents be included, and I will
summarize them. They are basically the letters and subpoenas
that led up to the destruction of documents that were
previously held for preservation. Additionally, the blog posts
from Reddit. If those could all be placed in the record.
Mr. Goodlatte. Without objection, they will be made a part
of the record.*
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Note: The material referred to is not printed in this hearing
record but is on file with the Committee, and can also be accessed at:
http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
ByEvent.aspx?EventID=105390
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goodlatte. The gentleman from Tennessee is recognized.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir. Director Comey, would you
consider the FBI's most important job presently fighting
terrorism and threats to the homeland?
Mr. Comey. Yes. That is our top priority.
Mr. Cohen. How much time do you think the FBI and you have
spent responding to congressional inquiries, and on this
particular email investigation? Could you give me an idea how
many man months or years have been expended on responding to
the different Committees that have called you in time after
time after time, and repetitiously accused you of doing
politics rather than being an FBI Director?
Mr. Comey. I can't. I don't have any sense.
Mr. Cohen. Could it be--would it be months of cumulative
man hours, or would it be years of cumulative man hours?
Mr. Comey. You know, I don't know. A lot of folks have done
a lot of work to try and provide the kind of transparency that
we promised. It has been a lot by a lot of people. I just don't
have a sense of the----
Mr. Cohen. How many hours have you spent before Congress on
this?
Mr. Comey. Testimony? Four hours and 40 minutes without a
bathroom break, I want to note for the record. And whatever
today is. Those would be the two main appearances. I was asked
questions at Senate Homeland yesterday about this, and then
House Homeland in July, I think. I am guessing 10 hours or so.
Mr. Cohen. And you prepared for this, though. I mean, the
10 hours is just like the iceberg?
Mr. Comey. Oh, sure. Yeah.
Mr. Cohen. Could your time and the FBI's time better be
used fighting terroristic threats here in America?
Mr. Comey. You know, we are still doing it all. So no one
should think that we have taken a day off because we are also
doing oversight. We do both.
Mr. Cohen. In the case in New York where Mr. Rahami tried
to detonate some bombs, did detonate a bomb, his father had
accused him of being a terrorist at one time. And he had
stabbed his brother and was in jail. Did the FBI interview him
when he was in jail about his possible terrorist tendencies and
his trips to Pakistan or Afghanistan?
Mr. Comey. I will answer that. I am trying to be very
circumspect at how I answer questions about the case, because
the guy is alive and is entitled to a fair trial. And if I
don't do anything that would allow him to argue, he lost the
ability to have a fair trial. The answer is we did not
interview him when he was in jail in 2014.
Mr. Cohen. And why would that be? You interviewed the
father, I believe. You might have talked to the brother. You
might have talked to a friend. The best evidence was him. He is
in jail. You didn't have to--you know. Why did they not go and
talk to him?
Mr. Comey. You know, sitting here, I don't want to answer
that question yet. I have commissioned, as I do in all of these
cases, a deep look back. We are trying to make the case now. We
will go back very carefully, try to understand what decisions
the agents made who investigated that and why, and whether
there is learning from that. So I don't want to answer it just
now, because I would be speculating a bit.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir. Some people have suggested you
made a political calculation in your recommendation dealing
with Secretary Clinton and the emails. Did you make a political
calculation in coming to your ultimate decision?
Mr. Comey. None.
Mr. Cohen. Some said that on national television, that
Secretary Clinton's emails were destroyed after a directive
from the Clinton campaign. You announced your decision, you
stated publicly, ``We found no evidence that Secretary
Clinton's emails were intentionally deleted in efforts to
conceal them.'' Is that not correct?
Mr. Comey. That is correct.
Mr. Cohen. Others have said they lost confidence in the
investigation and questioned the genuine effort in which it was
carried out. Did the FBI make a genuine effort to carry out a
thorough investigation?
Mr. Comey. Oh, yes. Very much.
Mr. Cohen. And did you take some hits from the position you
took when you announced your decision?
Mr. Comey. A few. A few. Yeah.
Mr. Cohen. Difficult.
Mr. Comey. Difficult, but I just thought it was the right
thing to do. I am not loving this. But I think it is important
that I come and answer questions about it. As long as people
have questions, I will try to answer them.
Mr. Cohen. You are not loving this? Do you need a bathroom
break?
Mr. Comey. No, no, I am good.
Mr. Cohen. Setting a record?
Mr. Comey. I will let you know at 4:40. How I am doing?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir. At FBI buildings, we know what
they shouldn't be named. And you know my position on that. And
I hope you keep that well in mind. You are a credit to the FBI.
You are a credit to government service, and to your alma mater.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman and
recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King, for 5 minutes.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you, Director,
for your testimony here before this Committee. Again, I was
listening in the exchange between yourself and Mr. Issa. I
would just like to confirm that you were confirming that Mr.
Combetta made the Reddit posts?
Mr. Comey. I don't know whether I am confirming it. I think
he did, is my understanding. But, yeah, that is my
understanding. I think he did. I haven't dug into that myself.
I have been focused on a lot of other stuff as we have talked
about. But I think that is right.
Mr. King. I certainly can accept that. And I would like to
just go back to the interview with Hillary Clinton and how that
all came about on that July 2 date. But first, I am looking at
the dates of the conditional immunity documents that I have
reviewed. And I see that Mr. Pagliano had one dated December
22, and another one dated December 28. Can you tell me what
brought about that second agreement, why the first one wasn't
adequate, and if there was an interview with Mr. Pagliano in
between those dates? So December 22 and 28 of 2015?
Mr. Comey. I think what it is, and Mr. Gowdy and Mr. Marino
will recognize this term, the first one is what we call a
queen-for-a-day agreement, which was to govern an interview, so
limited use immunity for an interview. And then I believe the
second one is the agreement for use immunity in connection with
the investigation. So it is sort of a tryout for him to get
interviewed, for the prosecutors and investigators to poke at
him. And then the second one is the agreement they reached. I
think that is right.
Mr. King. And to the extent of if we are going to go any
further, we will go off of the December 28 agreement. That
would be how I would understand that.
Mr. Comey. Well, I think they are both important to him and
his lawyer. But the first is an intermediate step to the
second.
Mr. King. Okay. Thank you. Then were you aware of the
President's statement on October 9, 2015 when he reported that
Hillary Clinton would not have endangered national security?
Mr. Comey. Obviously, I don't know the dates, but I
remember public reporting on a statement like that.
Mr. King. And the following October, and I will state it,
the report I have is October 9. Then again, on April 10, 2016,
it was reported that the President had said that Hillary
Clinton was careless, but not intentionally endangering
national security. Were you aware of that statement as well?
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Mr. King. And then I would like you, if you could
characterize the interview, sometime around, I believe, May 16
it was reported that you said you intended to interview Hillary
Clinton personally?
Mr. Comey. I never said that because I never intended that.
And I am sure I didn't say that publicly.
Mr. King. Were you aware of the report that that was your
public statement?
Mr. Comey. Yes. I think I read it and smiled about it.
People imagine the FBI Director does things that the FBI
Director doesn't do.
Mr. King. In fact, and I am not disputing your answer, I am
just simply, for the record, this is a record that is dated
September 28, 2016, Buffalo News, that has your picture on it,
and takes us back to--that is when it was printed, excuse me.
Takes us back to a document May 16, 2016, has a picture of you
on the front of it, and I will ask to introduce it into the
record, it says, ``FBI Director James Comey told reporters that
he would personally interview Hillary Clinton 'in coming days.'
'' And I would ask unanimous consent to introduce this article
into the record.
Mr. Goodlatte. Without objection, it will be made a part of
the reported.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And not as a matter of
indictment, I don't dispute your word on this, it is what the
public expectation was hanging out there is my real point. And
then with that public expectation, I think the public was
surprised to learn about who was or wasn't in that room. Can
you tell us who was in the room involved in either listening to
or conducting the interview of Hillary Clinton on that date of
July 2, 2016?
Mr. Comey. I can't tell you for sure. I can give you a
general sense. The witness and her legal team. And then on our
side of the table, our agents, prosecutors from the Department
of Justice. I don't know if any of our analysts were in there
or not. But sort of our team, their team.
Mr. King. And how many of your team? How many FBI
investigators?
Mr. Comey. I don't know for sure, sitting here. I think we
probably had eight to 10 people on our side, prosecutors and
agents. That is a knowable fact. I just don't know it sitting
here.
Mr. King. Prosecutors. Did Loretta Lynch have her people in
there?
Mr. Comey. If you mean Department of Justice lawyers, yes.
Sure.
Mr. King. So how many Department of Justice lawyers would
have been there?
Mr. Comey. I don't know for sure. Again, I think it was
probably about eight people; probably about four lawyers, about
four from the FBI. But again, I could be wrong.
Mr. King. Okay. So around four investigators, around four
potential prosecutors from the DOJ, a couple of attorneys for
Hillary Clinton, Hillary Clinton herself. That would set the
scene fairly closely?
Mr. Comey. I think Secretary Clinton's team was bigger than
that. I don't know the exact number.
Mr. King. Okay. And then, when you received the counsel as
to the recommendation you were to make to Loretta Lynch, I am
going to just go through this quickly, you didn't review a
video tape, an audio tape, or a transcript. So you would have
had to rely upon the briefings from the people that were in the
room who would have been your investigative team?
Mr. Comey. Yes. The agents who conducted the interview,
yes.
Mr. King. And they were briefing off of notes that they had
taken, which are now in the SCIF, but redacted?
Mr. Comey. Right. They write them up in what is called an
FBI 302.
Mr. King. And so Loretta Lynch had her people in the room,
and they would have had access to your investigators in the
room. And out of that came a piece of advice to you that she
had already said she was going to hand that responsibility over
to you as Director of the FBI as to making the recommendation,
which turned out to be the decision on whether or not to indict
Hillary Clinton?
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Director will answer the question.
Mr. Comey. I am not sure I am following it entirely. There
was no advice to me from the Attorney General or any of the
lawyers working for her. My team formulated a recommendation
that was communicated to me. And the FBI reached its conclusion
as to what to do uncoordinated from the Department of Justice.
Mr. King. Even though Justice was in the room with your
investigators? And I would make that final comment and I yield
back. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Comey. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Russian hacking into
the databases of the Democratic National Committee and the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, as well as Russian
hacks into the voter registration systems of Illinois and
Arizona, serve as ominous warnings to the American people about
the risks that our electoral processes face in this modern era.
Unfortunately, Trump Republicans in the House are as obsessed
with Hillary Clinton's damn emails as Trump has been about
President Obama's birth certificate. Just like The Donald
closed his birth certificate investigation after 5 years of
fruitless investigation, however, I predict that the Trump
Republicans will, at some point, close this email persecution.
The American people are sick of it. The attention of the
American public is increasingly focused on the security of this
Nation's election infrastructure. On Monday, the Ranking
Members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees,
Senator Dianne Feinstein and Congressman Adam Schiff, issued a
joint statement setting forth the current status of this
investigation. It said this: ``Based on briefings we have
received, we have concluded that the Russian intelligence
agencies are making a serious and concerted effort to influence
the U.S. Election.'' They work closely with intelligence
community individuals to be able to put that statement out to
the American public.
Director Comey, I don't want to ask you about any
classified information, but is their statement accurate?
Mr. Comey. I don't--I can't comment on that in this forum.
As I said in my opening, we are investigating to try to
understand exactly what mischief the Russians might be up to in
connection with our political institutions and the election
system more broadly. But I don't want to comment on that at
this point.
Mr. Johnson. Free and fair elections are the linchpin of
our society. A compromise or disruption of our election process
is something that this Congress certainly should be looking
into. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Comey. I can't speak, sir, to what Congress should be
looking into. But the FBI is looking into this very, very hard
for the reasons you say. We take this extraordinarily
seriously.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. In June, the FBI cyber division
issued a flash alert to State officials warning that hackers
were attempting to penetrate their election systems. The title
of the flash alert was, ``Targeting Activity Against State
Board of Election Systems.'' The alert disclosed that the FBI
is currently investigating cyber attacks against at least two
States. Later in June the FBI warned officials in Arizona about
Russian assaults on their election system, and hackers also
attacked the election system in Illinois, where they were able
to download the data of at least 200,000, or up to 200,000
voters. In August, the Department of Homeland Security convened
a conference call warning State election officials and offering
to provide Federal cyber security experts to help scan for
vulnerabilities. And yesterday it was announced that at least
18 states have already requested election cybersecurity help to
defend their election systems.
Director Comey, since these flash alerts and warnings went
out over this summer, I would appreciate you letting us know
whether or not there have been any additional attacks on State
operations or databases since June.
Mr. Comey. There have been a variety of scanning
activities, which is a preamble for potential intrusion
activities, as well as some attempted intrusions at voter
registration databases beyond those we knew about in July and
August. We are urging the States just to make sure that their
dead bolts are thrown and their locks are on, and to get the
best information they can from DHS just to make sure their
systems are secure. And again, these are the voter registration
systems. This is very different than the vote system in the
United States, which is very, very hard for someone to hack
into, because it is so clunky and dispersed. It is Mary and
Fred putting a machine under the basketball hoop at the gym.
Those things are not connected to the Internet. But the voter
registration systems are. So we urge the States to make sure
you have the most current information and your systems are
tight. Because there is no doubt that some bad actors have been
poking around.
Mr. Johnson. All right. With that, I will yield back the
balance of my time. And thank you, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Gohmert, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Director Comey,
thanks for being here. I was a bit astounded when you said the
FBI is unable to control who a witness, coming in voluntarily,
brings in to an interview. I have seen a lot of FBI agents tell
people who could come into an interview and who could not. And
in this case, and I am sure you have heard some of the
questions raised by smart lawyers around the country about
providing immunity to people like Cheryl Mills in return for
her presenting a laptop that you had every authority to get a
subpoena, and if you had brought a request for a search
warrant, based on what we now know, I would have had no problem
signing that warrant so you could go get it anywhere you want.
And in fact, I have talked to former U.S. attorneys, A.U.S.A.s,
who have said if an FBI agent came in and recommended that we
gave immunity to a witness to get her laptop that we could get
with a subpoena or warrant, then I would ask the FBI not to
ever allow this agent on a case.
Can you explain succinctly why you chose to give immunity
without a proffer of what was on the laptop, give immunity to
Cheryl Mills while she was an important witness, and you could
have gotten her laptop with a warrant or subpoena?
Mr. Comey. Sure. I will give it my best shot. Immunity we
are talking about here, and the details really matter, that we
are talking about, is act of production immunity, which says we
want you to give us a thing. We won't use anything we find on
that thing directly against you. All right? It is a fairly----
Mr. Gohmert. Well, and I understand that, and I understood
that from reading the immunity deal. And that is what is so
shocking because she was working directly with Hillary Clinton.
And, therefore, it is expected since the evidence indicates she
was pretty well copied on so many of the emails that Hillary
Clinton was using, that pretty much anything in there would
have been useable against her. And you cleaned the slate before
you ever knew.
Now, some of the immunities you give, the last paragraph
mentions a proffer. Was there a proffer of what the witness
would say before the immunity deals were given to those that
got those immunities?
Mr. Comey. Can I answer first, though, your question about
what I think it made sense to have active production immunity
for Cheryl Mills' laptop?
Mr. Gohmert. I would rather--my time is so limited. Please.
Mr. Comey. It is an important question, and I think there
is a reasonable answer, but I will give it another time. I
think in at least one of the cases, and I am mixing up the
guys, but with Mr. Combetta, maybe also with Mr. Pagliano--no.
I got that reversed.
Mr. Gohmert. It is yes or no. Did you have a proffer from
them as to what they would say before you gave them immunity?
Mr. Comey. I believe there was a proffer session governed
by what I just referred to is called a queen-for-a-day
agreement, with at least one of them to try and understand what
they would say. But----
Mr. Gohmert. Because the deals that I have seen back 30
years ago before I went to the bench, the FBI would say you--
and the DOJ. Of course, we know FBI can't give immunity. It has
to come from DOJ, just like it is not the FBI's job to say what
a reasonable prosecutor should do or not do. You give them the
evidence and then you let them decide. But a proffer is made
saying this is what my client will say. Then the DOJ decides,
based on that proffer, here is the plea we will offer, here is
the immunity we will offer. And if your client deviates from
that proffer, the deal is off.
You got really nothing substantial. It is as if you went
into the investigation determined to give immunity to people
instead of getting a warrant. You gave immunity to people that
you would need to make a case if a case were going to be made.
And I know we have people across the aisle that are saying:
Well, it is only because she is a Presidential candidate. It
happens to be, in my case, I wouldn't care whether she was a
Presidential candidate or not. What is important to maintaining
a civilization with justice and fairness is a little
righteousness where people are treated fairly across the board,
and it does not appear that in this case, it comports with
anything that FBI agents, with centuries of experience, have
told me they have never seen anything like this.
So one other thing, I know this happened before your watch,
but under Director Mueller, Kim Jensen, who prepared 700 pages
of training material for those who would go undercover and try
to embed with al-Qaeda, it was wiped out because CARE and some
of the people that were unindicted co-conspirators named in
your Holy Land Foundation trial, they said: We don't like them.
They do not allow agents to know what Kim Jensen put in that
700 pages that was so accurate, so good about Islam, that we
could imbed people in al-Qaeda and they wouldn't suspect them.
I would encourage you to start training your FBI agents so
whether they are in San Bernardino, Orlando, New Jersey,
wherever, they can talk to a radicalized Islamist and determine
whether they are radicalized. Without Kim Jensen's type
material, you will never be able to spot them again, and we
will keep having people die.
Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
Director is permitted to respond if he chooses to do so.
Mr. Comey. I don't think I have anything at this point.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from
California, Ms. Chu, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Chu. Thank you. Director Comey, during this Committee's
oversight hearing last year, I asked you about the cases of
Sherry Chen and Xi Xiaoxing, both U.S. citizens who were
arrested by the FBI, accused of different crimes related to
economic espionage for China, only to have those charges
dropped without explanation.
Since you last testified before the Committee, both cases
have been closed. Now, I know that you may not be personally
familiar with the individuals' cases, or may not be inclined to
comment on the facts of these cases to the Committee today.
However, would you be willing to provide a written explanation,
or possibly a summary of the investigations to clarify how and
why the FBI handled the cases the way they did?
Mr. Comey. I don't want to commit to that sitting here. We
would certainly consider what we can supply consistent with
things like the Privacy Act. But we will certainly consider it.
I am familiar with the cases. I remember your questions about
it last year. And so we will take a look at what we can share
with you. We can't obviously do it in an open forum, in any
event.
Ms. Chu. I understand that. But I appreciate the
consideration.
Now I would like to address a different topic. Director
Comey, your agency recently introduced an online initiative
aimed at promoting education and awareness about violent
extremism called Don't Be a Puppet. This program was designed
to serve as a tool for teachers and students to prevent young
people from being drawn toward violent extremism.
However, national education groups, faith groups, and
community organizations have raised serious concerns about the
way in which the program presents the problem of violent
extremism. Particularly troublesome is the Web site's charge
that teachers and students should look for warning signs that a
person may be on a slippery slope of violent extremism, and to
report activity that may or may not be indicative of
radicalization.
For instance, the Web site encourages students and teachers
to report when others use unusual language or talk about
travelling to suspicious places. The user of the Web site,
however, is left to draw inferences about what constitutes a
suspicious place, or what language is unusual enough to be
reported to a trusted authority. For example, a trip to France
or Germany, which hosts many far-right extremist groups may not
sound suspicious to many users. But a trip to Saudi Arabia or
Iraq, home to various Muslims' holy sites, possibly would.
So on August 9, the American Federation of Teachers led a
number of national groups in a letter written to you. And, Mr.
Chair, I would like to submit this for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Ms. Chu. And among the many concerns they raise is the
potential for such initiatives to exacerbate the profiling and
bullying of students of Middle Eastern background that--and
what they--over and above what they already experience. So how
do you respond to the concerns expressed by the American
Federation of Teachers about the impact of the FBI's Don't Be a
Puppet Program, and the effect it may have on schools in
immigrant communities?
Mr. Comey. Well, thank you for that. I am glad they shared
their feedback. Boy, I hope either before or after the feedback
they go on and actually go through the Don't Be a Puppet.
Because I have done it. I honestly can't understand the
concerns. It is a very commonsense thing. One of our big
challenges is how--if a kid starts to go sideways toward
violence, the people closest to him are going to see something
likely. How do we get folks to a place where they are
sensitized to make commonsense judgments that this person may
be headed in a very dangerous direction? It is never going to
be perfect. But I actually think a lot of thought went into
this, including faith groups, all kinds of civic groups, to
make sure we got something that was good commonsense education
for kids and for teachers. And so I am a little bit at a loss.
Maybe we ought to meet with them and they can show me which
parts of it they actually think are problematic. But I think it
is a pretty darn good piece of work, is my overall reaction.
Ms. Chu. So, Director Comey, you have gone to the Web site
and looked at it. So what, then, would you consider to be a
place that sounds suspicious or what would you consider to be
an unusual language that somebody is speaking so much so that a
student should report them to the authorities?
Mr. Comey. I think what it says is speaking--using unusual
language, not speaking Pashto or French or German. I think it
means speaking in an unusual way about things. And suspicious
place, Syria leaps to my mind. If someone is talking to
classmates about thinking about traveling to Syria, the
classmates ought to be sensitized to that. The teacher ought to
be sensitized to it, so we can try and intervene with that kid
before we have to lock them up for most of their life.
Ms. Chu. But do you have evidence to show that this program
is actually countering recruiting efforts by violent
extremists?
Mr. Comey. I don't. But it sure makes a lot of sense to me.
And it seems, again, a commonsense way to equip kids to resist
the siren song that comes from radical Islamists or skinhead
groups or hate groups of different kinds. So, look, it is not--
I am sure it is not perfect, because nothing in life is. We
would welcome feedback. But the general idea makes a lot of
sense to me.
Ms. Chu. I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director, in your
opening comments, you said this was an unusual case. I would
say that is the understatement of the year. Husband of the
subject meets with the attorney general 3 days before Secretary
Clinton is interviewed by the FBI. Nine people get to sit in
with Secretary Clinton during that interview. One of those was
her chief of staff, Cheryl Mills, who was a subject of the
investigation. Five people get some kind of immunity. Five
people get some kind of immunity, and yet no one is prosecuted.
Three of those people who get immunity take the Fifth in front
of Congress, and one of them doesn't even both to show up
whenhe is subpoenaed, supposed to have been at that very chair
you are sitting at. And, of course, the Attorney General
announces that she is going to follow your recommendations even
though she doesn't know what those recommendations are, the
only time she has ever done that.
So, of course, this was unusual. We have never seen
anything like this. Which sort of brings me to the posts. I
would like to put up the posts that some have talked about
which is the posts on Mr. Combetta on Reddit. And you said
earlier that you don't know if you examined this during your
investigation. So let's examine it now. ``I need to strip out a
VIP's address from a bunch of archived email. Basically they
don't want the VIP's email address exposed to anyone.''
Now, Director, when I hear the term ``strip out email
address,'' I think of somebody is trying to hide something,
somebody is trying to cover up something, and it sort of raises
an important question from these two sentences. Who is the
``they'' who wants something hid, and who is the VIP who also
wants something hid? Director Comey, is it likely the VIP--
well, it is not just a VIP. It is a very, very important
person, according to Mr. Combetta. Is it likely that that
person is Secretary Clinton?
Mr. Comey. Yes. Sure.
Mr. Jordan. Okay. And is it also likely that the ``they''
refers to her, Secretary Clinton's staff, and, specifically,
Cheryl Mills.
Mr. Comey. I don't know that. Either her lawyers or some
staff that had tasked him with the production.
Mr. Jordan. So one other thing that is important on that,
if we could but that back up, one other thing that is important
is the date. The date at the top says July 24, 2014. So
whenever I see a date, and I am sure you do the same thing, I
always look at what is happening about that same timeframe,
what may have happened directly before that and maybe directly
after that.
So I went back to your reports that you guys had given to
us. The first report back last month, August 18, 2016, page 15.
Well, on page 15 it says, ``During the summer of 2014, the
State Department indicated to Cheryl Mills a request for
Clinton's work-related emails would be forthcoming. State
Department gives Cheryl Mills a heads-up that she has got to go
round up all of Secretary Clinton's email. On that same page,
it says, ``The House Select Committee on Benghazi had reached
an agreement with the State Department regarding production of
documents on July 23, 2014,'' just the day before, so I find
kind of interesting. Then from your report that we got just
last week, ``After reviewing several documents dated in and
around July 23, 2014, Paul Combetta had a conversation with
Cheryl Mills, and after reviewing it July 24,'' there is that
date again, ``2014 email from Bryan Pagliano, Paul Combetta
explained Cheryl Mills was concerned Clinton's then-current
email address would be disclosed publicly.''
So it sure looks to me like it is Secretary Clinton, as you
said. But also that it is Cheryl Mills and Bryan Pagliano who
are urging Mr. Combetta to cover this stuff up. You agree?
Mr. Comey. From what you read, it sure sounds like they are
trying to figure out a way to strip out the actual email
address from what they produce.
Mr. Jordan. Well, they are actually trying to strip it all
out, .pst file and everything. Here is the takeaway in my mind.
Mills gets a heads-up, Cheryl Mills gets a heads-up, in mid-
summer of 2014; July 23, the day before Mr. Combetta's Reddit
post, the Benghazi and the State Department reach an agreement
on production of documents. Cheryl Mills has a conversation
with Paul Combetta. He goes on Reddit then and tries to figure
out how he can get rid of all this email, even though he is not
successful then. He has to do it later down the road with
BleachBit. And then the clincher. The clincher. Just last week,
he is going online and trying to delete these Reddit posts. He
is trying to cover up his tracks. He is trying to cover up the
coverup.
So I guess the question, as someone was asking earlier, in
light of all this, are you thinking about reopening the
investigation?
Mr. Comey. I may have misunderstood what you said during
the question. I don't understand that to be talking about
deleting the emails. I understand it to be talking about
removing from the ``from'' line the actual email address. And,
but anyhow, maybe I misunderstood you. But the answer----
Mr. Jordan. Well, the same guy later BleachBit--took
BleachBit and did delete emails.
Mr. Comey. Sure. Yeah.
Mr. Jordan. So my question is, the guy you gave immunity
to, the guy who took the Fifth in front of us, is online trying
to figure out how to remove email addresses, change evidence,
later uses BleachBit, that guy who won't testify in front of
Congress, and he has correspondence with Cheryl Mills, Cheryl
Mills, a subject of the investigation, Cheryl Mills who also
got some kind of immunity agreement, Cheryl Mills who walked
out of certain--walked out for part of the questions during the
interview with the FBI. Seems to me that is pretty compelling,
and the timelineis pretty compelling as well.
Mr. Comey. I am not following. Compelling of what? There is
no doubt that Combetta was involved in deleting emails.
Mr. Jordan. After conversations with Cheryl Mills.
Mr. Comey. He had the ``oh s-h-i-t'' moment, as he told us.
And that is why it was very important for us to interview this
guy to find out who told you to do that, why did you do that.
That is why he was given use immunity.
Mr. Jordan. Did you know about the Reddit posts when you
interviewed him?
Mr. Comey. As I said earlier, I think we did. I think our
investigators did. I am not positive as I sit here.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chairman, I mean, the guy is trying to
cover up the Reddit posts where he is trying to figure out how
he can cover up the email addresses. And I find that
compelling, particularly in light of the fact that just the day
before, he is talking with Cheryl Mills, and the State
Department is on notice that the Benghazi Committee wants these
very documents. I find that compelling. But obviously the FBI
didn't. And this is just one more, one more, on that list of
things that make this case highly unusual. I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Director is permitted to respond if he
chooses to do so.
Mr. Comey. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Deutch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Comey, the
FBI is tasked with very serious responsibilities. You are on
the front lines trying to prevent terrorist attacks. You are
investigating public corruption. And as I told your agents on a
recent visit to your Miami field office, I am grateful to you
and your agents, all of the women and men of the FBI, for your
dedication to the--and commitment to the pursuit of justice. We
are most grateful.
Now, one critical responsibility of the FBI is to
investigate when American citizens violate Federal laws
involving improper contacts with foreign governments. And,
Director Comey, if an American national goes outside government
channels to negotiate with a foreign government on behalf of
the United States, that is a very serious crime, one that would
violate the Logan Act, which, as you know, is the law that
prohibits unauthorized people from negotiating with foreign
governments in the place of the United States Government.
Director Comey, would the FBI take allegations of Logan Act
violations seriously? Is that within your jurisdiction?
Mr. Comey. Yes. It is within our jurisdiction.
Mr. Deutch. And if you had credible evidence that someone
had violated the Logan Act, would the FBI investigate that
alleged violation of law?
Mr. Comey. I think we have done many Logan Act
investigations over the years. And we certainly will in the
future.
Mr. Deutch. And am I correct in assuming that you are
familiar with publicly quoted comments from various
intelligence sources that have said that Russia has targeted
the United States with a legal State-directed hacking?
Mr. Comey. I am aware of the published reports.
Mr. Deutch. If an American citizen, Director Comey,
conducted meetings with a Russian individual who has been
sanctioned by the United States about potential weakening of
U.S. sanctions policy in violation of the Logan Act, would the
FBI investigate?
Mr. Comey. I don't think it is appropriate to answer that.
That gets too close to confirming or denying whether we have an
investigation. Seems too close to real life. So I am not going
to comment.
Mr. Deutch. Okay. But there are--you have investigated
Logan Act violations. It is something that is clearly within
your jurisdiction.
I appreciate, Director Comey, your confirming that the FBI
would treat these potential violations of law both seriously
and urgently, because everything that I just outlined that you
said the FBI would investigate has apparently happened already.
Public reports suggest that the Logan Act may have been
violated by Carter Page, one of the men Donald Trump signaled
out as the top foreign policy adviser.
So now the campaign appears eager to revise Mr. Page's role
given the attention rightly being given to his illicit
negotiations with a sanctioned Russian official. I read reports
from Yahoo News from last week that law enforcement may already
be looking into this issue. And I assume we all agree that the
allegations are very serious. Russia, a Nation that hacks
America, a Nation that continues to enable Assad, the Assad
regime, to slaughter the Syrian people, a Nation that threatens
and violates the territorial integrity of its neighbors and our
European allies.
It is a dangerous violation of Federal law if Donald
Trump's adviser, Carter Page, is engaging in freelance
negotiations with Russia. And here is what we know. In March,
Donald Trump named Carter Page as a foreign policy adviser. In
July, Mr. Page traveled to Moscow to give a speech that was
harshly critical of the United States. And during that trip,
Mr. Page is reported to have also met with a Russian official
named Igor Sechin, a member of Vladimir Putin's inner circle
and the president of the petroleum company, Rosneft, who was
sanctioned by the United States under executive order 13361,
prohibiting him from traveling to the United States or
conducting business with U.S. firms.
So Mr. Sechin has a clear and personal interest in lifting
U.S. sanctions against him and other top Russian officials put
in place by President Obama after Russia's military action in
Ukraine. Now, if these two men met to discuss sanctions policy,
or a lifting of sanctions under a potential Trump
administration, this would be enormously concerning.
Just last week the press reported that U.S. intelligence
officials are seeking to determine whether an American
businessman identified by Donald Trump as one of his foreign
policy advisers has opened up private communications with
senior Russian officials, including talks about possible
lifting of sanctions.
Mr. Comey, it is illegal if Trump's adviser met with
Russians who have been sanctioned by the United States about
lifting these sanctions. And I am grateful for your
reassurances this morning that the FBI would investigate
potential violations of the Logan Act by any individual who
engages in unauthorized negotiations with a foreign government.
I remind my colleagues that Donald Trump invited Russia to hack
the United States. I remind my colleagues that Donald Trump
suggested breaking America's longstanding commitment to our
NATO allies and weakening U.S. sanctions against Russia. Is
there a connection between these reckless and dangerous policy
proposals, and the potential violation of the Logan Act by
Donald Trump's Russia adviser?
Mr. Comey, we appreciate very much the FBI's vigilance in
pursuing justice. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The gentleman is permitted to respond if you
choose to.
So the Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Marino, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, Director, for being here. I think we have worked
on a couple of cases together in our districts.
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Mr. Marino. Would you clarify something for me on act-of-
production immunity? Does act-of-production immunity go beyond
this scenario that I am going to state?
You ask for a computer from a witness. You give that
witness act-of-production immunity that, in my interpretation,
is that the agent who has that now in his or her hands, the
witness is immune from the agent getting on the stand and
saying that person--this is that person's computer because they
gave it to me.
Does it go beyond that? Or was there additional immunity
for Ms. Mills stating that anything on that computer cannot be
used against her?
Mr. Comey. As I recall it, Congressman, the act-of-
production immunity for Ms. Mills was: You give us this
computer; we will not use--we, the Justice Department--anything
we find on the computer directly against you in connection with
investigation or prosecution for mishandling of classified
information. I think that is how they defined it.
Mr. Marino. But that goes beyond act of production. Doesn't
act of production simply state that I am the agent, I can't get
on the stand and say that belongs to that individual because
they simply gave it to me? It sounds like more, additional
immunity was given that says: And what is on this we cannot
hold against you.
Mr. Comey. Well, I think of it as--I still think of it as
an act-of-production immunity. From my experience, that is what
I would characterize that agreement.
And I guess you are right, there could be a more limited
form of act-of-production immunity which simply says: Your fact
of giving us this object will not be used against you directly.
Mr. Marino. Yeah.
Mr. Comey. I would have to think through whether it can be
parsed that way. But I think I take your point.
Mr. Marino. So that is why I am saying additional immunity
was given. And I don't think it was warranted at that point.
Let me ask you this. We have both empaneled many grand
juries, investigative grand juries. Why not empanel an
investigative grand jury whereby you have reasonable suspicion
that a crime may have been committed, and then you have the
ability to get warrants, subpoenas, get this information,
subpoena witnesses before the grand jury under oath, and if
they take the Fifth--if it is not the target, if they take the
Fifth and say, ``I am not going to talk to them,'' you can give
them, whether it is use immunity--the AG can give them that,
and you had that authority. And then transactional has to come
from the judge.
And if they refuse to testify then, then you can say, fine,
we are going to take you before a judge, hold you in contempt,
and then you are going to sit in jail until you answer our
questions.
Wouldn't that have been much simpler and more effective
than the way this has gone about? I know that I have done it
many, many times. And sometimes we find a situation where there
isn't enough evidence, and most of the time we find there is
enough evidence.
Mr. Comey. Yeah. No, it is a reasonable question. And I
don't want to talk about grand jury in connection with this
case or any other case----
Mr. Marino. That is why I posed it the way I did.
Mr. Comey. Right. From our training, we know we are never
supposed to talk about grand jury----
Mr. Marino. Yes.
Mr. Comey [continuing]. Publicly, but I can answer more
generally than that.
Anytime you are talking about the prospect of subpoenaing a
computer from a lawyer that involves the lawyer's practice of
law, you know you are getting into a big megillah.
Mr. Marino. Okay, please let me interrupt you.
Mr. Comey. Sure.
Mr. Marino. I understand that clearly. Why did you not
decide to go to an investigative grand jury? It would have been
cleaner, it would have been much simpler, and you would have
had more authority to make these witnesses testify--not the
target, but the witness testify.
That seems the way to go, Director. We have done it
thousands of times. This just was too convoluted.
Mr. Comey. Yeah, again, I need to steer clear of talking
about grand jury use in a particular matter. In general, in my
experience, you can often do things faster with informal
agreements, especially when you are interacting with lawyers.
In this particular investigation, the investigative team
really wanted to get access to the laptops that were used to
sort these emails.
Mr. Marino. Okay. When was----
Mr. Comey. Those are lawyers' laptops. That is a very
complicated thing. I think they were able to navigate it pretty
well to get us access.
Mr. Marino. The media says that Ms. Clinton repeated--the
media says--41 times that I do not recall or I do not remember
or variations of that. Is that a fact or----
Mr. Comey. I don't know. I have not--I have not counted. I
have read the 302, obviously.
Mr. Marino. Wouldn't that have been taken into
consideration?
Mr. Comey. I am sorry?
Mr. Marino. Wouldn't that selective memory be taken into
consideration?
Mr. Comey. Sure. The nature and quality of a subject's
memory is always a factor.
Mr. Marino. All right. My time has expired. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from
Washington State, Ms. DelBene, for 5 minutes.
Ms. DelBene. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, Director Comey, for spending all this time
with us today.
In 2010, the White House set up the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process, the VEP, and implemented it in 2014 so it
could give the government a process for determining whether,
how, and when to disclose vulnerabilities to technology
companies so that they would be able to address those
vulnerabilities and patch them.
And in a couple situations I know there was disclosure from
the FBI. In April of this year, the FBI informed Apple of a
security flaw in older versions of iOS and OS X, its first
vulnerability disclosure to Apple under the Vulnerabilities
Equities Process.
In May of this year, the FBI's Cyber Division warned the
private sector about a fake USB device charger that can log the
keystrokes of certain wireless keyboards. And that was 15
months after the FBI discovered the vulnerability.
In the warning, the FBI stated, ``If placed strategically
in an office or other location where individuals might use
wireless devices, a malicious cyber actor could potentially
harvest personally identifiable information, intellectual
property, trade secrets, passwords, or other sensitive
information.''
Other instances of the FBI using the VEP are scarce, and,
indeed, there have been reports that it is rare for the FBI to
use this process. And so I wanted to, you know, ask you why
this is and what is your view of the process.
Mr. Comey. Thank you for that question.
The process seems to me to be a reasonable process to, in a
structured fashion, bring everybody who might have an optic on
this in the government together to talk about how do we think
about disclosing a particular vulnerability to the private
sector against the equities that may be at stake in terms of
national security in particular.
And so I think it makes sense to have such a process. The
FBI participates in it when we come across a vulnerability that
we know the vulnerability and it falls within the VEP's
jurisdiction.
I don't know the particulars of the case. You said there
was a 15-month delay in disclosing a particular vulnerability.
I don't know enough to react to that. I probably wouldn't react
in an open forum, in any event. But that is my overall
reaction.
Ms. DelBene. And does every vulnerability discovered go
through this process, in terms of understanding whether or not
you would disclose?
Mr. Comey. I think there is a definition of what falls
under the process. You have to know the vulnerability. So we
have to have knowledge of, so what is it that allows it, the
vulnerability, to be exploited. We didn't, for example, in the
San Bernardino case. We bought access, but we didn't know the
vulnerability, what was behind it.
But I forget the definition, as I sit here, of which
vulnerabilities have to be considered.
Ms. DelBene. And so is there another process that you might
use that is different from the VEP when you are looking at----
Mr. Comey. I don't know of one.
Ms. DelBene [continuing]. Vulnerabilities and whether or
not they----
Mr. Comey. Before the VEP, I know our folks would routinely
have--make disclosure to private entities, but I don't think
there is a--I don't know of a process outside of VEP.
Ms. DelBene. But you are not sure if in every situation the
VEP is used whenever you discover a vulnerability?
Mr. Comey. It sounds like a circular answer, but if it is
a--and, obviously, I didn't read the VEP before coming here
today. We could get smart on it very quickly and have somebody
talk to you about it.
But if it falls under the definition of things that have to
be discussed at the VEP, of course we do. I just can't remember
what that definition is exactly.
Ms. DelBene. Okay. I am trying to understand, if a
vulnerability is discovered, if there is always a standard
process that you would go through to understand whether or not
that information would be disclosed, and if that process is the
VEP. That is the----
Mr. Comey. Yeah, that is a great question. I don't know the
answer to that, whether there is a set of vulnerabilities that
would fall outside of the VEP process. And if that is the case,
how do we deal with it? I don't know, sitting here.
Ms. DelBene. Thanks. If you have other feedback on that, I
would appreciate it at another time.
Mr. Comey. Okay.
Ms. DelBene. In August, you said that stakeholders needed
to take some time to collect information on the ``going dark''
issue and come back afterward to have an adult conversation.
And I agree with you.
And so I wondered if you would agree that there is room for
us to work together on ways to help law enforcement that don't
include mandating a backdoor?
Mr. Comey. Totally. I keep reading that I am an advocate of
backdoors, I want to mandate backdoors. I am not. I have never
advocated we have to have backdoors. We have to figure out how
we can solve this problem together. And it has to be everybody
who cares about it coming together to talk about it.
I don't know exactly what the answer is, frankly. I can see
the problem, which I think is my job, is to tell people the
tools you are counting on us to use to keep you safe, they are
less and less effective. That is a big problem. But what to do
and how to do it is a really complicated thing, and I think
everybody has to participate.
Ms. DelBene. Thank you. Thank you so much for that.
And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman, recognizes
the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start by acknowledging progress. I think it is
important that we do so. This morning, we have had nine
straight Democrats talk to the FBI about emails without asking
for immunity. That is a record.
And I suspect the reason that they have not asked for
immunity from Director Comey is they would say they have done
nothing wrong. I find that interesting, because that is exactly
what Heather Samuelson and Cheryl Mills' attorneys said. In
fact, they said it just a few days ago, and I will quote it:
``The FBI considered my clients to be witnesses and nothing
more.''
And then Ms. Mills and Ms. Samuelson's attorneys said this.
I think this is the most interesting part. ``The Justice
Department assured us my clients did nothing wrong.''
Well, Mr. Chairman, if you are assuring subjects or targets
or witnesses, whatever you want to call them, that they have
done nothing wrong, it does beg the question, what are you
seeking and receiving immunity from? I mean, if you have done
nothing wrong--laptops don't go to the Bureau of Prisons, Mr.
Chairman; people do. So the immunity was not for the laptop.
The immunity was for Cheryl Mills.
And if the Department of Justice says you have done nothing
wrong, it does beg the question of why you are seeking or
receiving immunity. And it could be, Mr. Chairman, it could be
for the classified information that was the genesis of the
investigation. It could be for the destruction of Federal
records which came from that initial investigation. Or it could
be both.
Mr. Comey, I want to ask you this: Did the Bureau interview
everyone who originated an email that ultimately went to
Secretary Clinton that contained classified information?
Mr. Comey. I don't think so. Nearly everyone, but not
everyone.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, you and I had a discussion the last time
about intent. You and I see the statute differently. My opinion
doesn't matter; yours does. You are the head of the Bureau.
But, in my judgment, you read an element into the statute that
does not appear on the face of the statute. And then we had a
discussion about intent.
So why would you not interview the originator of the email
to, number one, determine whether or not that originator had a
conversation with the Secretary herself?
Mr. Comey. There are a handful of people who the team
decided it wasn't a smart use of resources to track down. One
was a civilian in Japan, as I recall, who had forwarded
something that somehow got classified as it went up. And the
other were a group of low-level State Department people
deployed around the world who had written things that ended up
being classified.
Nearly everyone was interviewed, but there was a small
group that the team decided it isn't worth the resources.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, to that extent, if you interviewed the
overwhelming majority of the originators of the email, will you
make those 302s available to Congress? Because I counted this
morning 30-something 302s that we do not have.
Mr. Comey. Okay. I will go back and check. My goal is
maximum transparency, consistent with our obligations under the
law. I will check on that.
Mr. Gowdy. Well--and I appreciate it, for this reason:
Intent is awfully hard to prove. Very rarely do defendants
announce ahead of time, ``I intend to commit this crime on this
date. Go ahead and check the code section. I am going to do
it.'' That rarely happens.
So you have to prove it by circumstantial evidence, such as
whether or not the person intended to set up an email system
outside the State Department; such as whether or not the person
knew or should have known that his or her job involved handling
classified information; whether or not the person was truthful
about the use of multiple devices; whether or not the person
knew that a frequent emailer to her had been hacked; and
whether she took any remedial steps after being put on notice
that your email or someone who has been emailing with you
prolifically had been hacked; and whether or not--and I think
you would agree with this, Director.
False exculpatory statements are gold in a courtroom. I
would rather have a false exculpatory statement than a
confession. I would rather have someone lie about something and
it be provable that that is a lie, such as that I neither sent
nor received classified information; such as that I turned over
all of my work-related emails. All of that, to me, goes to the
issue of intent.
So I got two more questions. Then I am going to be out of
time.
For those who may have to prosecute these cases in the
future, what would she have had to do to warrant your
recommendation of a prosecution? If all of that was not
enough--because all of that is what she did. If all of that is
not enough, I mean, surely you cannot be arguing that you have
to have an intent to harm the United States to be subject to
this prosecution. I mean, that is treason. That is not a
violation of this statute.
Mr. Comey. No. I think we would have to be able to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt a general awareness of the
unlawfulness of your conduct, you knew you were doing something
you shouldn't do. And then--obviously, that is on the face of
the statute itself. Then you need to consider, so who else has
been prosecuted and in what circumstances, because it is all
about prosecutorial judgment.
But those two things would be the key questions: Can you
prove that the person knew they were doing something they
shouldn't do, a general criminal intent, general mens rea?
Mr. Gowdy. But the way to prove----
Mr. Comey. And have you treated other people similarly?
Mr. Gowdy. The way to prove that is whether or not someone
took steps to conceal or destroy what they had done. That is
the best evidence you have that they knew it was wrong, that
they lied about it.
Mr. Comey. It is very good evidence. You always want to
look at what the subject said about their conduct.
Mr. Gowdy. Well, there is a lot. There is a lot. If you saw
her initial press conference, it all falls under the heading of
``false, exculpatory statement.''
I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, but the Director did--you
started off by giving us examples of things the Bureau has
done. And every one of us who has worked with the FBI, that is
the FBI that I know. The one that went and saved that girl in
North Carolina, that is the FBI that I know.
What concerns me, Director, is when you have five immunity
agreements and no prosecution; when you are allowing witnesses
who happen to be lawyers, who happen to be targets, to sit in
on an interview. That is not the FBI that I used to work with.
So I have been really careful to not criticize you. In
fact, I said it again this morning. They wanted to know was he
gotten to, did somebody corrupt him. No, I just disagree with
you. But it is really important to me that the FBI be
respected. And you have to help us understand, because it looks
to me like some things were done differently that I don't
recall being done back when I used to work with them.
And, with that, I would yield back to the Chairman.
Mr. Comey. Can I respond to that?
Mr. Goodlatte. Yes, you may.
Mr. Comey. I hope someday when this political craziness is
over you will look back again on this, because this is the FBI
you know and love. This was done by pros in the right way. That
is the part I have no patience for. Sorry, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Director Comey, for your extraordinary
service to our country. And please convey to the professionals
at the FBI my gratitude for their exemplary service to the
people of this country. And, particularly, I want to
acknowledge the extraordinary, prompt, and effective response
to the recent bombings in New Jersey and New York. It is just
another example of this extraordinary agency and your
extraordinary leadership.
Director Comey, many of us have expressed a concern about
the growing incidence of gun violence in this country. And we
expressed condolences and concern of following the recent mass
shootings in Burlington, Washington, where five people lost
their lives. We shared the same sentiments after incidents in
Aurora and Newtown and Charleston. But as more Americans lose
their lives to senseless gun violence, this Congress has been
absolutely silent and inactive on this issue.
So I would like to really turn to you and your career in
public service, both as a U.S. attorney and now as the FBI
Director, with so much experience in dealing with the
consequences of gun violence, and ask you to kind of share with
us what you think might be some things Congress could do to
help reduce gun violence in this country.
If I recall correctly, in 2013, during your confirmation
hearings, you at least alluded to your support for universal
background checks, bans on illegal trafficking of guns, assault
weapons, and high-capacity magazines.
So I am wondering what you think would be effective for us
to do to help reduce the incidence of gun violence in this
country.
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Congressman.
And you are exactly right. We just spend a lot of time
thinking, investigating, and mourning the deaths in mass
shootings. I think it is really important, though, the Bureau
not be in the policy business, and be in the enforcement
business. And so I am going to respectfully avoid your
question, honestly, because I think we should not be in the
place of--we should be a factual input to you. We should not be
suggesting particular laws with respect to guns or anything
else.
Mr. Cicilline. So let me ask you, Director, about a very
specific enforcement challenge.
I introduced a piece of legislation called the Unlawful Gun
Buyer Alert Act to get at this issue of a default process. This
is where people buy a gun, they purchase a gun, but they are
not permitted to buy one under law, but the 3-day time period
has elapsed. And, between 2010 and 2014, 15,729 sales to
prohibited persons occurred. That means people who were not
lawfully permitted to buy guns got a gun 15,000 times.
So my legislation would require that when that happens that
local law enforcement is notified. They can then make a
decision, should we go prosecute this person who is now in
possession of a gun illegally, should we, you know, execute a
search warrant, but they would at least be put on notice, in
your community, a person who should not have a gun bought one,
so they can take some action.
Would that make sense in terms of your enforcement
responsibilities?
Mr. Comey. It might. I know ATF is notified in those
circumstances----
Mr. Cicilline. Which, of course, is a very different set of
priorities for ATF; do they go and actually execute a warrant
and charge somebody. But there are State and local prohibitions
on that that could be acted upon. So would it also make sense
to notify local law enforcement?
Mr. Comey. It might. I would want to think through and ask
ATF how do they think through the deconfliction issues that
might arise there, but it is a reasonable think to look at.
Mr. Cicilline. Now, the second--my next question, Director,
is: There has been recent discussion about implementing stop-
and-frisk in cities to address crime even at the national
level. And, although the data shows that this
disproportionately targets people of color--and just to give
you some context, in 2011, when stop-and-frisk activity reached
an all-time high in New York City, police stopped 685,000
people; 53 percent of those individuals were Black, 34 percent
were Latino, and 9 percent were White. More than half were ages
14 to 24 years old. And of the 685,000 people that were stopped
and frisked, 88 percent were neither arrested nor received any
sort of citation.
Do you believe this stop-and-frisk policy is an effective
tactic to address crime in our Nation's cities? What would a
Federal implementation look like that Mr. Trump has called for?
And how can Congress minimize racial profiling and
discriminatory, ineffective techniques like stop-and-frisk and,
instead, promote activities that build trust and confidence
between the police and the community?
Mr. Comey. I don't know what a Federal program would look
like, because we are not in the policing business; we are
investigative agencies at the Federal level. But the Terry
stop--the ``stop-and-frisk'' is not a term we use in the
Federal system--the Terry stop, which is the stop of an
individual based on reasonable suspicion that they are engaged
in a criminal activity, is a very important law enforcement
tool.
To my mind, its effectiveness depends upon the conversation
after the stop. When it is done well, someone is stopped, then
they are told, ``I stopped you because we have a report of a
guy with a gray sweatshirt who matches you. That is why I
stopped you, sir. I am sorry.'' Or, ``I stopped you because I
saw you do this behavior.''
Because the danger is what is an effective law enforcement
technique can become a source of estrangement for a community,
and you need the help of the community. So it is an important
tool when used right, and what makes the difference between
right and wrong is what is the nature of the conversation with
the person you stopped.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. Very good.
Mr. Chairman, I would just like to finally associate myself
with the remarks with Congressman Deutch regarding the Logan
Act violations and the remarks of many of my colleagues
regarding the attempts by the Russians to interfere with our
democracy and electoral process, and take great comfort in the
Director's commitment to continue to understand this as an
important responsibility of the agency to protect the integrity
of our democracy.
And, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz.
And as I do, I want to thank him for making, as Chairman of the
Oversight and Government Reform Committee, this very nice
hearing room available to us while the Judiciary Committee
hearing room is under renovation.
So the gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes, with my
thanks.
Mr. Chaffetz. Well, and I appreciate the extra 5 minutes of
questioning for doing so. So thank you very much.
Director, thank you for your accessibility. You have been
very readily available, and we do appreciate that.
This investigation started because the inspector general
found classified information in a nonsecure setting and the FBI
went to a law firm and found this information. They seized at
least one computer and at least one thumb drive.
Did you need an immunity agreement to get those?
Mr. Comey. It was not--I don't think there was--in fact, I
am certain there was no immunity agreement used in connection
with that.
Mr. Chaffetz. So did it really take the FBI a full year to
figure out that Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson also had
computers with classified information on it?
Mr. Comey. No. It took us to that point in the
investigation to insist that we try to get them.
Mr. Chaffetz. Were you getting them because they had
classified information or because there was some other
information you wanted?
Mr. Comey. No. We thought those were the tools, as we
understood it, that had been used to sort the emails. And the
investigative team very much wanted to understand, if they
could, whether there was an electronic----
Mr. Chaffetz. Well----
Mr. Comey [continuing]. Tale of how that had been done.
Because the big, big issue was what did they delete, what did
they keep, and----
Mr. Chaffetz. But why did you need an immunity agreement?
Why didn't they just cooperate and hand them over? The law firm
did, didn't they?
Mr. Comey. Well, yes. That is a question really I can't
answer. That is between a lawyer and her client and the Justice
Department lawyers. For whatever reason, her lawyer thought it
was in her interest to get an act-of-production immunity
agreement with the Department of Justice.
Mr. Chaffetz. The FBI interviewed David Kendall's partner
but did not interview David Kendall. Why didn't you interview
David Kendall?
Mr. Comey. I don't remember. I don't remember that
decision.
Mr. Chaffetz. Going back to this Reddit post, this was put
up on July 24 of 2014. You believe this to be associated with
Mr. Combetta, correct?
Mr. Comey. Yes, I think that is right.
Mr. Chaffetz. This is the one that Mr. Jordan put up about
the need to strip out a ``VIP's (VERY VIP) email address from a
bunch of archived emails.'' He is referring to a Federal
record, isn't he?
Mr. Comey. I don't know exactly which records he is
referring to.
Mr. Chaffetz. How is this not a conscious effort to alter
Federal records? I mean, the proximity to the date is just
stunning.
Mr. Comey. I am sorry, what is the question?
Mr. Chaffetz. How is this not a conscious effort to alter a
Federal record?
Mr. Comey. Well, depending upon what the record was and
exactly what he was trying to do and whether there would be
disclosure to the people they were producing it to saying, we
changed this for privacy purposes. I just don't know, sitting
here.
Mr. Chaffetz. These are documents that were under subpoena.
These Federal records were under subpoena. They were under a
preservation order. Did Mr. Combetta destroy documents?
Mr. Comey. I don't know whether that was true in July of
2014, they were under a subpoena.
Mr. Chaffetz. Did he ultimately destroy Federal records,
Mr. Combetta?
Mr. Comey. Oh. I have no reason to believe he destroyed
Federal records.
Mr. Chaffetz. He used BleachBit, did he not?
Mr. Comey. Yeah, the question is what was already produced
before he used the BleachBit. The reason he wanted immunity was
he had done the BleachBit business after there was publicity
about the demand from Congress for the records. That is a
potential----
Mr. Chaffetz. And not just publicity. There was a subpoena.
Mr. Comey. Right. That is potentially----
Mr. Chaffetz. And there was communication from Cheryl Mills
that there was a preservation order, correct?
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. And he did indeed use BleachBit on these
records.
Mr. Comey. Sure. That is why the guy wouldn't talk to us
without immunity.
Mr. Chaffetz. And so when he got immunity, what did you
learn?
Mr. Comey. We learned that no one had directed him to do
that, that he had done it----
Mr. Chaffetz. You really think that he just did this by
himself?
Mr. Comey. I think his account--again, I never
affirmatively believe anybody except my wife. But the question
is do I have evidence to disbelieve him, and I don't. His
account is credible, that he was told to do it in 2014, screwed
up and didn't do it, panicked when he realized he hadn't, and
then raced back in and did it after Congress asked for the
records and The New York Times wrote about them. That was his,
``Oh, s-h-i-t,'' moment.
Mr. Chaffetz. But he----
Mr. Comey. And that was credible. Again, I don't believe
people, but we did not have evidence to disbelieve that and
establish someone told him to do that--no email, no phone call,
nothing.
The hope was, if he had been told to do that, that would be
a great piece of evidence; if we give him immunity, maybe he
will tell us so-and-so told me to, so-and-so asked me to, and
then we are working up the chain.
Mr. Chaffetz. But he did indeed destroy Federal records,
and he was told at some point to do this, correct? Who told him
to do that initially? When he was supposed to do it in December
and he didn't do it, who told him to do that?
Mr. Comey. One of Secretary Clinton's staff members. I
mean, I can't remember, sitting here. We know that. One of her
lawyers; it might have been Cheryl Mills. Someone on the team
said, ``We don't need those emails anymore. Get rid of the
archived file.''
Mr. Chaffetz. This is what is unbelievable about this,
because there is classified information, there is--there are
Federal records that were indeed destroyed. And that is just
the fact pattern.
Here is the other thing that I would draw to your attention
that is new. September 15 of this year, I issued a subpoena
from the Oversight and Government Reform Committee on these
Reddit posts. Four days later, they were destroyed--or taken
down. They were deleted. I would hope the FBI would take that
into consideration. Again, we are trying, under a properly
issued subpoena, to get to this information.
Let's go to Heather Mills real quick. How does the--in the
2016 interview with Cheryl Mills, she says, quote, Mills did
not learn--in the interview report that you--the interview
summary from the FBI--Mills did not learn Clinton use using a
private email server until after Clinton's tenure.
Also, you have this interview with Mr. Pagliano, who said
he approached--quote, Pagliano then approached Cheryl Mills in
her office and relayed a State Department employee's concerns
regarding Federal records retention and the use of a private
server. Pagliano remembers Mills replying that former
Secretaries of State had done similar things, to include Colin
Powell.
It goes, then, on to a page 10, and this is what I don't
understand. The FBI writes, Clinton's immediate aides, to
include Mills, Abedin, Sullivan, and a redacted name, told the
FBI they were unaware of the existence of a private server
until after Clinton's tenure at State or when it become public
knowledge.
But if you look back at the email from Heather Mills, if
you go back to 2010--this is to Justin Cooper, okay? Mills to
Cooper, who does not--he works for Clinton; he doesn't work for
the State Department. ``FYI, HRC email coming back. Is server
okay?'' Cooper writes back, ``You are funny. We are on the same
server.''
She knew there was a server. When there is a problem with
Hillary Rodham Clinton's emails, what did they do? She called
the person who has no background in this, who is not a State
Department employee, no security clearance, and then tells the
FBI, ``Well, I never knew about that,'' but there is direct
evidence that contradicts this.
How do you come to that conclusion and write that in the
summary statement, that she had no knowledge of this?
Mr. Comey. That is a question?
Mr. Chaffetz. Yes.
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentleman has expired, but
the Director will answer the question.
Mr. Comey. I don't remember exactly, sitting here. All--
having done many investigations myself, there is always
conflicting recollections of fact, some of which are central,
some of which are peripheral. I don't remember, sitting here,
about that one.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. DeSantis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSantis. Director Comey, violent crime is up in this
country, isn't it?
Mr. Comey. Our UCR stats we just released show a rise in
homicide and other violent crime in 2015.
Mr. DeSantis. Violent crime, I think, was about 4 percent,
but the homicides were up 10 percent. Is that correct?
Mr. Comey. Ten-point-eight percent.
Mr. DeSantis. And that is a pretty startling, concerning
increase. Do you agree?
Mr. Comey. Yes. It is concerning.
Mr. DeSantis. Now, I don't know if you have data in 2016,
but is your sense that 2016 is going to look closer to 2015, is
there any indication that the rate is going to go back down?
Mr. Comey. No. We continue to see spikes in some big cities
in a way we can't quite make sense of. There is no doubt that
some 15 to 30 cities are continuing to experience a spike.
Whether that will drive the whole number up, I don't know.
Mr. DeSantis. Now, the FBI has now assumed control of the
Dahir Adan, the Minnesota stabbing terrorist investigation. Is
that confirmed, that that was a terrorist attack, at this
point?
Mr. Comey. We are still working on it. It does look like,
at least in part, he was motivated by some sort of inspiration
from radical Islamic groups. Which groups and how we are not
sure of yet.
Mr. DeSantis. But he was praising Allah, was asking at
least one of the potential victims whether they were Muslim,
and I know ISIS did take responsibility for it, correct?
Mr. Comey. They claim responsibility. That isn't
dispositive for us, because they will claim responsibility for
any savagery they can get their name on. But we are going
through his entire electronic record and history of all of his
associations to try and understand that.
Mr. DeSantis. Now, there was a report from the House
Homeland Security last year that said that Minnesota was
actually the number-one source for ISIS fighters in the United
States. One, do you acknowledge that that--or do you agree that
that is true? And, if so, why is Minnesota churning out so many
jihadists?
Mr. Comey. I don't know for sure whether that is true, but
it sounds about right. We have very few ISIL fighters from the
United States, even over the last 2 years.
There have been a number of Somali-American-heritage young
men who have gone to fight with Al Shabaab in Somalia and with
ISIL. I suspect the reason is that is one of the few areas in
the United States where we have a large concentration that is
susceptible to that recruiting.
The great thing about America is everybody is kind of
dispersed. That is one of the areas where there is an immigrant
Muslim community that seems to be susceptible for some reason--
in small measure. Again, we are talk about eight people, I
think the number is. But that is my reaction to that.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, what is the FBI doing to deal with the
problem? You have an insular community that may make this
problem more significant, so how is the FBI combating that?
Mr. Comey. Oh, in a bunch of difference ways. With lots of
partners to make sure we know the folks in the--especially the
Somali-American community in Minneapolis. The U.S. attorney
there has done a great job of----
Mr. DeSantis. Have they been helpful with the FBI?
Mr. Comey. Very. Very. Because they don't want their sons
or daughters involved in this craziness any more than anybody
else does.
Mr. DeSantis. Now, with Paul Combetta, I am just trying to
figure out what happened here. He never said that he remembered
anything from that March 25 phone conversation with the Clinton
people. Of course, that was days before he BleachBit'd the
emails. He never said he had any factual knowledge of anything
that happened on that call. Is that his basic statement? As I
read the 302s, he didn't really provide any information.
Mr. Comey. I can't remember for sure. It would be in the
302. You have probably seen it more recently than I have.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, I saw one 302 said that he pled the
Fifth. Obviously, he was given immunity. Another said that
there was an invocation of attorney-client privilege at one
time in one of the other summaries.
So I am just trying to figure out, you know, what happened
with Combetta, why was he not able to provide information. He
had immunity. This was something that was much more fresh in
his mind than previous conversations with Clinton people would
have been. And yet you said he was credible. To me, feigning
ignorance, that is not credible given the timeline, where you
have The New York Times saying that this server existed, the
House immediately sends a subpoena, he has this conversation,
and then, lo and behold, a few days later, all the emails are
BleachBit'd.
Mr. Comey. Well, he told us that, with immunity, that no
one directed him to do it, instructed him to do it. We
developed no evidence to contradict that.
Again, we are never in the business of believing people;
the question is always what evidence do we have that
establishes disbelief. We don't have any contrary evidence. His
account is uncontradicted by hard facts.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, it is--he is in a situation where he
has--these things are now under a subpoena, and he has
conversations with people who they potentially could implicate,
and then he takes this action. So I guess the question is, is
it more reasonable to think that he just would have said, ``Oh,
you know what? I just need to all of a sudden BleachBit this
stuff,'' without any direction at all? I just find that to be
something that is difficult to square.
Let me ask you this. In September, you sent a memo to your
employees at the FBI basically defending the way the Bureau
handled this investigation. Why did you send that?
Mr. Comey. It was about how we were doing transparency,
because there was all kinds of business about whether we were
trying to hide stuff by putting it out on a Friday, and I
wanted to equip our workforce with transparency about how we
were doing our productions to Congress so they could answer
questions from their family and friends.
Mr. DeSantis. But you----
Mr. Comey. I want them to know we are conducting ourselves
the way they would want us to.
Mr. DeSantis. And you have--because you mentioned former
agents and people in the community. I mean, this has provoked
some controversy within the ranks of current and former agents?
Mr. Comey. Not within the FBI. Again, who knows what people
don't tell the Director, but I should have--I should have asked
Mr. Gohmert.
If there are agents in the FBI who are concerned or
confused about this, please contact me. We will get you the
transparency you need to see that your brothers and sisters did
this the way you would want them to.
Mr. DeSantis. All right. I am out of time, but I will say
just, when I was in the military--you had said no one would be
prosecuted. I mean, maybe that was just for civilian, but I can
tell you that people, if you had compromised Top Secret
information, there would have been a court marshal in your
future.
And I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. Would the Director care to respond to that?
Mr. Comey. No. Fine.
Mr. Goodlatte. That is a direct comparison to the finding
of yourself, that, as you stated in your news conference, that
no prosecutor would prosecute somebody under similar
circumstances.
Mr. Comey. I understood Mr. DeSantis to be expressing a
personal opinion. I accept that at face value. I just haven't
seen the cases that show me on the public record that that is
true. But I accept his good faith.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, did you make the decision not to recommend
criminal charges relating to classified information before or
after Hillary Clinton was interviewed by the FBI on July the
2nd?
Mr. Comey. After.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Then I am going to need your help in
trying to understand how that is possible. I think there are a
lot of prosecutors or former prosecutors that are shaking our
heads at how that could be the case.
Because if there was ever any real possibility that Hillary
Clinton might be charged for something that she admitted to on
July the 2nd, why would two of the central witnesses in a
potential prosecution against her be allowed to sit in the same
room to hear the testimony?
And I have heard your earlier answers to that. You said
that, well, it was because the interview was voluntary and they
were her lawyers. But I think you are skirting the real issue
there, Director.
First of all, the fact that it was voluntary, it didn't
have to be, right? You could have empaneled an investigative
grand jury, she could have been subpoenaed. And I know you have
said that you can't comment on that, and I don't really care
about the decision about whether or not there should have been
a grand jury here, but since you didn't have one, it goes to
the issue at hand about whether or not this interview should
have ever taken place.
With due respect to the answers that you have given, the
FBI and the Department of Justice absolutely control whether or
not an interview is going to take place with other witnesses in
the room. Because the simple truth is that under the
circumstances as you have described those interviews never take
place. If there was ever any possibility that something Hillary
Clinton might have said on July 2 could have possibly resulted
in criminal charges that might possibly have resulted in a
trial against her relating to this classified information,
well, then, to use your words, Director, I don't think that
there is any reasonable prosecutor out there who would have
allowed two immunized witnesses central to the prosecution
proving the case against her to sit in the room with the
interview, the FBI interview, of the subject of that
investigation.
And if I heard you earlier today, in your long career, I
heard you say that you have never had that circumstance. Is
that--did I hear you correctly?
Mr. Comey. That is correct, but----
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. And I never have either, and I have
never met a prosecutor that has ever had that.
So, to me, the only way that an interview takes place with
the two central witnesses and the subject of the investigation
is if the decision has already been made that all three people
in that room are not going to be charged.
Mr. Comey. Can I respond?
Mr. Ratcliffe. Yes. Please.
Mr. Comey. I know in our political lives sometimes people
casually accuse each other of being dishonest, but if
colleagues of ours believe I am lying about when I made this
decision, please urge them to contact me privately so we can
have a conversation about this.
All I can do is to tell you again, the decision was made
after that, because I didn't know what was going to happen in
that interview. She would maybe lie during the interview in a
way we could prove--let me finish.
I would also urge you to tell me what tools we have as
prosecutors and investigators to kick out of an interview
someone that the subject says is their lawyer.
Mr. Ratcliffe. That is not my point. The interview never
should have taken place if you were going to allow the central
witnesses that you needed to prove the case to sit there and
listen to the testimony that the subject was going to give. It
never happens. It has never happened to you, and it has never
happened to me or any other prosecutor that I have met.
And you know you have defended the people that were
involved in this of being great, but if it has never happened,
I wonder why this is a case of first precedent with respect to
that practice that you and I have never seen in our careers.
Mr. Comey. You and I don't control the universe of what has
happened. I suspect it is very unusual.
A key fact, though, that maybe is leading to some confusion
here is we had already concluded we didn't have a prosecutable
case against Heather Samuelson or Cheryl Mills at that point.
If they were targets of our investigation, maybe we would have
canceled the interview, but, frankly, our focus was on the
subject. The subject at that point was Hillary Clinton.
Mr. Ratcliffe. All right. Let me move on.
According to the FBI's own documents, Paul Combetta, in his
first interview on February the 18th told FBI agents that he
had no knowledge about the preservation order for the Clinton
emails, correct?
Mr. Comey. I don't know the dates of that, but I am sure it
is in the 302.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay.
But then 2\1/2\ months later, on May the 3rd, his second
interview, he made a 180-degree turn, and he admitted that, in
fact, he was aware of the preservation order and he was aware
of the fact that that meant that he shouldn't disturb the
Clinton emails, correct?
Mr. Comey. Yep.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Well, then I need your help again
here, because when I was at the Department of Justice, your
reward for lying to Federal agents was an 18 U.S.C. 1001 charge
or potential obstruction-of-justice charge; it wasn't immunity.
Mr. Comey. Depends on where you are trying to go with the
investigation. If it is a low-level guy and you are trying move
up in the chain, you might think about it differently.
Mr. Ratcliffe. But he lied to an FBI agent. You don't think
that is important?
Mr. Comey. Oh, it is very important. It happens all the
time, unfortunately. It is very, very important. Sometimes you
prosecute that person and end their cooperation; sometimes you
try and sign them up.
Mr. Ratcliffe. But if they lie to an FBI agent after they
are given immunity, they have violated the terms of their
immunity agreement.
Mr. Comey. Oh, sure, after, after the agreement.
Mr. Ratcliffe. And so that is my point. He shouldn't have
immunity anymore.
Mr. Comey. Oh, I am sorry. I may have misunderstood you. He
lied to us before he came clean under the immunity agreement
and admitted that he had deleted the emails.
Mr. Ratcliffe. No, not according to the FBI's documents. He
had the immunity agreement in December of 2015. These
interviews took place in February and March and May of this
year, 2016.
Mr. Comey. Combetta?
Mr. Ratcliffe. Combetta.
Mr. Comey. Okay. Then I am--then I am confused and
misremembering, but I don't think that is right.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Well, let me--my time has expired, but
I have one last question, and I think that it is important.
At this point, based on everything, do you think that any
laws were broken by Hillary Clinton or her lawyers?
Mr. Comey. Do I think that any laws were broken?
Mr. Ratcliffe. Yeah.
Mr. Comey. I don't think there is evidence to establish
that.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Well, I think you are making my point
when you say there is no evidence to establish that. Maybe not
in the way she handled classified information, but with respect
to obstruction of justice--and you have a pen here--I just want
to make the sure the record is clear about the evidence that
you didn't have, that you can't use to prove. So this comes
from the FBI's own report.
It says that the FBI didn't have the Clintons' personal
Apple server used for Hillary Clinton work emails. That was
never located, so the FBI could never examine it. An Apple
MacBook laptop and thumb drive that contained Hillary Clinton's
email archives was lost, so the FBI never examined that. Two
BlackBerry devices provided to the FBI didn't have SIM cards or
SD data cards. Thirteen Hillary Clinton personal mobile devices
were lost, discarded, or destroyed with a hammer, so the FBI
clearly didn't examine those. Various server backups were
deleted over time, so the FBI didn't examine that.
After the State Department and my colleague Mr. Gowdy here
notified Ms. Clinton that her records would be sought by the
Benghazi Committee, copies of her emails on the laptops of both
of her lawyers, Cheryl Mills and Heather Samuelson, were wiped
clean with BleachBit, so the FBI didn't review that. After
those emails were subpoenaed, Hillary Clinton's email archive
was also permanently deleted from the Platte River Network with
BleachBit, so the FBI didn't review that. And also after the
subpoena, backups of the Platte River server were manually
deleted.
Now, Director, hopefully that list is substantially
accurate, because it comes from your own documents. My question
to you is this: Any one of those in that very, very long list,
to me, says obstruction of justice. Collectively, they scream
obstruction of justice. And to ignore them, I think, really
allows not just reasonable prosecutors but reasonable people to
believe that maybe the decision on this was made a long time
ago not to prosecute Hillary Clinton.
And, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. Director, do you care to respond?
Mr. Comey. Just very briefly. To ignore that which we don't
have--we are in a fact-based world, so we make evaluations
based on the evidence we are able to gather using the tools
that we have. So it is hard for me to react to these things
that you don't have. So that is my--that is my reaction to it.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Farenthold, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
Director Comey, thank you for being here. I know this is--
there are a lot of things you would probably much rather be
doing than sitting on the hot seat, so to speak.
And here is where I am coming from on this. You have been
asked a lot of questions today about the Clinton investigation.
And what I am hearing from folks back in Texas--and I am just
going to take a big-picture view of this--is this stuff just
simply doesn't pass the smell test on a lot of areas.
You just had my colleague from Texas, Mr. Ratcliffe, list a
long list of things that you all didn't have in the
investigation. You have been asked earlier today, well, you
know, would you reopen the investigation, what would it take to
get you to reopen the investigation.
We have had five people given immunity, which, basically,
we got nothing, when, you know, perhaps a plea agreement or
something else might have worked. You have your interpretation
in your previous testimony before Congress that section 793(f)
required intent, when, in fact, the standard is gross
negligence.
And it is just a long list of things that just have people
scratching their heads, going, ``If this were to happen to me,
I would be in a world of hurt, probably in jail.'' And how do
you respond to people who are saying that this is not how an
average American would be treated, this is only how Hillary
Clinton would be treated?
Mr. Comey. Yeah. Look, I have heard that a lot, and my
response is: Demand--when people tell you that, that others
have been treated differently, demand from a trustworthy source
the details of those cases. Because I am a very aggressive
investigator, I was a very aggressive prosecutor. I have gone
back through 40 years of cases, and I am telling you under oath
that to prosecute on these facts would be a double standard,
because Jane and Joe Smith would not be prosecuted on these
facts.
Now, you would be in trouble. That is the other thing I
have had to explain to the FBI workforce. You use an
unclassified email system to do our business, and in the course
of doing our business--talk about classified topics--you will
be in big trouble at the FBI, I am highly confident of that. I
am also highly confident, in fact certain, you would not be
prosecuted. That is what folks tend to lump together.
So I care deeply about what people think about the justice
system and that it not have two standards. It does not, and
this demonstrates it.
Mr. Farenthold. But you look at General Petraeus and his
handling of classified information. You look at--and I will go
back to what you are saying----
Mr. Comey. But when you look at it, demand to know the
facts. I don't want to dump on General Petraeus because the
case is over, but I would be happy to go through how very
different that circumstance is than this circumstance.
Mr. Farenthold. And you talk about you tell your FBI
agents, if you do what we are investigating here with material
from the FBI, you would be in a world of trouble. I would
assume that could potentially be fired.
Is Hillary Clinton in--she didn't get in any trouble at the
State Department. The only trouble she has got now is trying to
explain it to the American people.
Mr. Comey. Right. She is not a government employee, so the
normal range of discipline that would be applied to FBI
employees if they did do something similar doesn't apply. And I
gather--I think that is some of the reason for people's
confusion, lumping these two together, and their frustration,
but it is what it is.
And all I can tell people is: Demand the facts. When people
tell you, oh, so-and-so has been treated differently, demand
the facts on that.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Let's just do a hypothetical.
Let's say somebody here in Congress were to email my personal
email some classified information, and I am on my--I get it on
my phone. It comes to my cell phone too. My personal email
comes to my personal cell phone. I look at it and go, ``Wow,
that probably shouldn't be on there,'' and don't do anything.
I mean, to me, that is being grossly negligent with
classified information, and I should--and that is a violation
of 793(f). And that is exactly what Hillary Clinton did, I
think.
I mean, at what point do you get to intent? The classified
information was on an unsecured server, you knew it was there,
and you didn't do anything about it. To me, that is gross
negligence, period. I would think I would be prosecuted for
that.
Mr. Comey. Yeah. I am confident that you wouldn't. But we
just have to agree to disagree.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. If I ever get in trouble----
Mr. Comey. Don't do it.
Mr. Farenthold.--I am going to save this clip.
Mr. Comey. Don't do it. I guess I can't control Congress.
If you work for us, don't do it.
Mr. Farenthold. No, I have absolutely no intention of doing
it.
So, again, I just want to say, don't get frustrated when we
continue to ask these questions. Because we are not badgering
you because we want to badger you; we are talking to you
because the American people are upset about this and don't
think it was handled appropriately. And that is the basis, at
least, of my questioning. And I thank you for appearing here.
Mr. Comey. And I totally understand that, that I think
there are lots of questions people have, which is why I have
worked so hard to try and be transparent. There has never been
this kind of transparency in a criminal case ever, but because
I understand the questions and the importance of it, I have
tried.
But I hope people will separate two things: questions about
facts and judgment, from questions and accusations about
integrity. As I said before, you can call us wrong, you can
call me a fool. You cannot call us weasels. Okay? That is just
not fair.
And I hope we haven't gotten to a place in American public
life where everything has to be torn down on an integrity basis
just to disagree. You can disagree with this. There is just not
a fair basis for saying that we did it in any way that wasn't
honest and independent. That is when I get a little worked up.
Sorry.
Mr. Farenthold. I am out of time. I----
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Michigan, Mr. Bishop, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
Thank you, Director Comey, and I appreciate your testimony
here today.
Just in followup to all this discussion regarding the
Clinton investigation, specifically with regard to the
interview of Secretary Clinton, I am holding in my hand a
memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James Cole. It is dated
May 12, 2014. This memorandum was issued to you and others on
the policy concerning electronic recording of statements.
Are you familiar with this memorandum?
Mr. Comey. Yes. Uh-huh.
Mr. Bishop. The policy establishes a presumption that the
FBI will electronically record statements made by individuals
in their custody. Now, I know that Secretary Clinton was not
technically in custody, but the policy also encourages agents
and prosecutors to consider electronic recording in
investigative or other circumstances where that presumption
does not exist.
The policy also encourages agents and prosecutors to
consult with each other in such circumstances. And given the
magnitude of what we have been talking about today and the huge
public interest and demand for information with regard to the
public trust, I think this is specifically important to this
discussion.
Now, you are aware of this policy, correct?
Mr. Comey. Right, that applies to people that are in
handcuffs.
Mr. Bishop. But not--it also applies to--the policy also
encourages agents and prosecutors to consider electronic
recording in investigative matter--in other matters where that
presumption does not exist, does----
Mr. Comey. Sure.
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. It not?
Mr. Comey. The FBI doesn't do it, but, sure, I understand
that they encouraged us to talk about it.
Mr. Bishop. So the agents, then, did not consider to
conduct the interview in a recorded situation then?
Mr. Comey. We do not record noncustodial interviews. Now,
maybe someday folks will urge us to change that policy, but we
don't. And we sure wouldn't want to change it in one particular
case.
Mr. Bishop. Well, that is the policy. I am just reading the
policy that is issued by the Deputy Attorney General, James
Cole, that--it was to you and to others in the Department of
Justice--that establishes the policy. So if you don't do it, I
assume that you are doing it against the policy of the
Department of Justice.
Mr. Comey. No. That policy only governs custodial
interrogations, so people who have been locked up. We do not--
and it is not inconsistent with Department of Justice policy--
record noncustodial, that is, voluntary interviews, where
someone is not in our custody.
Mr. Bishop. Well, I am reading this differently then,
because it does say that there is an exception, that it is
within your discretion to record such----
Mr. Comey. Well, sure, you could. And I don't know, maybe
some other Federal investigative agencies do. The FBI's
practice is we do not record noncustodial interviews.
Mr. Bishop. Okay. Thank you, Director.
I want to pivot, if I can, and build off Representative
DeSantis' questions with regard to the refugees attempting to
enter the United States and specifically with regard to Syrian
refugees.
I am wondering if you can tell me--we have talked about
this process and the fact that we do not have a process in
place that we can rely upon. You have indicated before when you
testified and I asked the question that we just simply don't
have enough information to ensure that we have the information
that we need to ensure that these people are not a threat to
our country.
Can you expand upon that now after a year? Can you tell me
whether or not we have more information, more capabilities to
vet these refugees?
And I say this because, in my district in Michigan, in this
fiscal year, Michigan has taken the fourth most refugees of all
States, 4,178. And we are the--we have taken the third most for
Iraq, the second most from Syria. Michigan has absorbed an
enormous number of refugees, and I think you can understand our
concern with regard to the fact that we don't have information
necessary to identify whether or not they are a threat.
Can you assuage my concern and the concerns of my
constituents that we have a system in place that we can vet
these individuals and they don't pose a threat to our country?
Mr. Comey. I can assuage in part and restate my concern in
part.
Our process inside the United States Government has gotten
much better at making sure we touch all possible sources of
information about a refugee. The interview process has gotten
more robust. So we have gotten our act together in that
respect.
The challenge remains, especially with respect to folks
coming from Syria, we are unlikely to have anything in our
holdings. That is, with people coming from Iraq, the United
States Government was there for a very long period of time, we
had biometrics, we had source information. We are unlikely to
have that kind of picture about someone coming from Syria, and
that is the piece I just wanted folks to be aware of.
Mr. Bishop. Has anything changed in your vetting process?
Have you updated it? Do you have any concerns with an increased
terrorist activity in the last 6 months, including New York,
New Jersey, and Minneapolis.
Has anything changed in the vetting process? Can you be
confident that foreign fighters or other refugees entering the
country are not planning future attacks on our country?
Mr. Comey. Well, as I said, over the last year, since I was
last before you, the vetting process has gotten more effective
in the ways I described.
I am in the business where I can't ever say there is no
risk associated with someone. So we wake up every day, in the
FBI, worrying about who might have gotten through in any form
or fashion into the United States or who might be getting
inspired while they are here. So I can't ever give a blanket
assurance.
Mr. Bishop. Director, I respect your opinion. And this is
not a policy question. I am asking you based on your personal
opinion as a law enforcement officer that we rely upon to keep
this country safe. Is there anything that you would do to
ensure, as you said, that our country is safe with regard to
this refugee process?
Mr. Comey. Anything that I would do?
Mr. Bishop. Anything that you would do, any recommendations
you have for Congress, for this country, that would ensure our
safety?
Mr. Comey. Yeah, I shy away from assurances of safety,
given the nature of the threats we face. I do think that there
may be opportunities to do more in the social media space, with
refugees in particular. And I talked to Jeh Johnson yesterday
about it. I know this is a work in progress.
So much of people's lives, even if we don't have it in our
holdings, may be in digital dust that they have left in
different places. Are we harvesting that dust on people who
want to come into this country in the best way? And I think
there may be ground for improvement there.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Director.
And I will yield back. But, Mr. Chairman, I would ask
unanimous consent to enter the memorandum that I referenced
earlier dated May 12, 2014, into the record.
Mr. Goodlatte. Without objection, it will be made a part of
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Collins, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Comey, I appreciate you being here. You are, I
believe, forthright, much more so than, you said, in any other
criminal case we have had. But I am also still in the military.
I am still in the Air Force Reserve. I went to my drill back in
July. I was hit by an amazing amount of questions from
different servicemembers on this issue of how does the former
Secretary of State get to do this and yet we have members of
the military who are prosecuted all the time.
Your statements earlier were fairly startling when you
said, I don't know of anybody else that has been classified as
this. Just since 2009, Department of Justice has prosecuted at
least seven people under the Espionage Act, all for very
similar cases.
Now, you said go look at the facts. Well, we are looking at
the facts in these cases. The interesting one--and, you know,
you said that, in looking back at your investigation,
mishandling or removal of classified information, we cannot
find a case that would support bringing criminal charges on
these facts. All right. Well, it didn't take nothing but a
simple legal search to find a Marine that fall in it. Now, I
guess their name is not Jane or Joe, so they did get
prosecuted. Okay?
And this is the issue under 18 U.S.C. 793(f), gross
negligence. This is what the Marine did. They took classified
information that was put into a gym bag, cleaned out, washed,
and took. All right? Simple mishandling. The court of appeals
actually upheld this case, and this is what they said, that the
purpose of Federal espionage statutes is to protect classified
documents from unauthorized procedures, such as removal from
proper place of custody, which would mean how you deal with
this. Regardless of means of removal, it was apparent gross
negligence and was a proximate cause of the document's removal.
United States v. McGinnis, said it is clear the Congress'
intent is to create a hierarchy of defenses against national
security, ranging from classic spying to merely losing
classified materials through gross negligence or the
mishandling of.
It was sort of also ironic for me that when I had to go
back in July and this past month when I went back, I had to do
my annual information assurance training. They went through
everything that we have to do with handling classified
information. I had been in a war zone, I have been in--this is
just common knowledge among most everybody in the world.
Obviously not to the Secretary.
How can you then explain to me this Marine's mistake in
taking classified documents or mishandling them is more severe
than the Secretary of State, who sent and received classified
emails on a regular basis, including those that were originally
classified, not those that were classified later but were
originally classified?
Mr. Comey. I am familiar with the case, and I am quite
certain it is not a 793(f) case. It was prosecuted----
Mr. Collins. His conviction was under 793(f).
Mr. Comey. Yeah, I don't think--I mean, I will go back and
check again. I would urge you to too. I am pretty sure it is
not under the gross negligence prong of 793(f). But it is a
Uniform Court of Military Justice prosecution, not by the
Department of Justice. Am I remembering correctly?
Mr. Collins. This was from and is appealed out in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces of the United States.
Mr. Comey. Okay. But, regardless, I think even--I don't
think this is under the same provision, but even there, that is
a case involving someone who actually stole classified
information, hard copies.
What people need to remember--and I don't say this to make
little of it. I think it is a very serious matter. What
happened here is the Secretary used an unclassified email
system, her personal system, to conduct her business.
Mr. Collins. And let's just stop right there. That, in and
of itself--and I understand it's an uncomfortable--we have been
through a lot--you have been through a lot of questions. I
apologize. But let's just come back to the basics here.
We are trying to parse that I didn't have such as Sandy
Berger or all these others who have been prosecuted, they took
a hard copy. In today's society, and even understanding if you
go through any information assurance class, anything else, they
tell you it cannot be on a personal laptop. In fact, there was
another chief petty officer who had classified information on a
personal computer. It went back and forth to a war zone. That
is not physical documents.
It's on a--to parse words like that is why the American
people are fed up. They are fed up with the IRS Commissioner
when he does it. They are fed up here. I am not attacking
your--I think you are one of the more upright people I met. I
think you just blew it. I think the Attorney General blew it. I
shared this with her.
And I think when we come to this thing, there is no other
way that you can say that there is no others that resemble
this. As a lawyer, you are taught all the time to take facts
and put them--they might not be exact, but they fit under the
law. You can't--I mean, so I guess maybe I am going to change
the question, because we are going to go down a dead end. You
are going to say it wasn't and----
Mr. Comey. Congressman, can I respond----
Mr. Collins. So let me ask you this. I want to change
questions.
Do you honestly believe that a lady, a woman of vast
intelligence, who was the First Lady of the United States, who
was a Senator who had access to classified information all of
the Members here do, who was Secretary of State who had even
further classification ability even beyond what we have here,
do you believe that in this case, honestly, she was not grossly
negligent or criminal in her acts?
Mr. Comey. First of all, I don't believe anyone other than
my wife. My question is what evidence do I have to establish
that state of mind. And I don't believe I have evidence to
establish it beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mr. Collins. Then, really, what we are saying here is this,
is she is--this is in essence what you are saying. You said I
can't prove it, and I understand. There are a lot of out folks
out there in the law that, you know, they come to us all the
time. I am an attorney as well. And they come to us and say, it
is not what we know, it is not what we think, it is what we can
prove. I get it.
But here is the problem with this. And this is the person
who is asking to lead this country. If she can hide behind this
and blatantly get approval from the FBI through an
investigation, which has been covered here thoroughly, then I
just do not understand. She is either the most arrogant, which
probably so, or the most insanely naive person we have ever
met.
Because when I actually show evidences of basically the
same thing, which you can take fact and correlate to law, this
is why the Armed Forces right now have the new term called the
Clinton defense. ``I didn't know. I didn't mean to.'' It is the
Clinton defense.
With questions like this, Director, we have given the
ability now to where nobody takes this seriously. And this is
why people are upset. When it was originally classified, she
can tell all the stories she wants. She can have the backup
from you that no prosecutor--which is, again, amazing to me,
that a law enforcement would tell the prosecutor--because how
many times I have been on both sides of this where the law
enforcement agent says I am not sure we have a case here, but
when the prosecutor looks at it, the prosecutor says, yeah,
there is a case here.
I don't really, frankly--no offense--care what--if I am
prosecuting, what the law enforcement officer--if I can see the
case and I can make it, that is my job, not yours. And yet now
we have a whole system that has been turned upsidedown, not
because I don't believe your honesty of your people, but I
believe you blew it because you, frankly, didn't have the whole
situation into effect where the FBI would look political.
And, unfortunately, that is all you have become in this.
And it is a sad thing. Because you all do great work, you have
done great work, and you will do great work. But I think it is
time to start--we just bring down the curtain. There is a
wizard behind the thing, Ms. Hillary Clinton, who is playing
all of us. Because she is not that naive. She is not stupid.
She knew what she was doing, because she was simply too bored.
If she, God forbid, gets into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and just
gets bored with the process, then God help us all.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Comey. Mr. Chairman, there are only two----
Mr. Goodlatte. The Director is permitted to respond.
Mr. Comey. Yeah, two pieces of that I need to respond to.
First, you said hiding behind something. This case was
investigated by a group of professionals. So if I blew it, they
blew it too. Career FBI agents, the very best we have, were put
on this case, and career analysts. We are a team. No one hid
behind anything.
American citizens should insist that we bring criminal
charges if we are able to investigate and produce evidence
beyond reasonable doubt to charge somebody. That should be true
whether you are investigating me or you or Joe Smith on the
street. That is the way this case was done. It is about
evidence.
And the rest of it I will let go.
Mr. Collins. Mr. Chairman, I will--and I apologize--I am
not--this is the problem, though. When you take it as a whole--
it has been said up here this is a unique case. You talk about
it being a unique case. Director, this is a unique because I
truly--and I don't think you convince hardly anybody except
your own group that--I don't think you ever said they couldn't
blow it. They blew it. Anybody else would have been prosecuted
under this, in my humble opinion.
Mr. Comey. You are just wrong.
Mr. Collins. You say no.
Mr. Comey. You are just wrong. We will just have to agree
to disagree.
Mr. Collins. Well, unfortunately, there is a lot to
disagree on this.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Idaho, Mr. Labrador, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Labrador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Director Comey, I have always appreciated your
testimony before this Committee, and I respect the work that
you do for the FBI.
When you made your recommendations to the Department of
Justice to not prosecute Hillary Clinton, I actually disagreed
with your decision, but I appreciated your candor in explaining
to the American people and to us those recommendations.
Since that decision, I continue to view you as honorable
and a strong leader for the critical Federal agency. In fact, I
did 20 townhall meetings over the recess, and I was lambasted
at every one of them, in fact I think I lost votes, because I
defended your integrity at every one of those townhall meetings
and I told them why, even though I disagreed with your
conclusions, I thought you came to it from an honorable place.
However, as more information has come to light, I question
the thoroughness--and I am not questioning your integrity, but
the thoroughness and the scope of the FBI's investigation.
In the past week, we have learned of the grants of immunity
to several key witnesses in the Clinton investigation,
including Hillary Clinton's former chief of staff and one of
the individuals responsible for setting up her server.
I am really disappointed by this revelation and confused as
to why these immunity grants were necessary and appropriate,
given the circumstances. It appears to me that the FBI was,
very early in this investigation, too willing to strike deals
and ensure that top officials could never be prosecuted for
their role in what we now know was a massive breach of national
security protocol.
We have a duty to ensure that our FBI is still in the
business of investigating criminal activity. So at what point
in the investigation was Cheryl Mills offered immunity?
Mr. Comey. Cheryl Mills was never offered immunity. Not to
quibble, but she was given letter immunity to govern----
Mr. Labrador. At what point?
Mr. Comey. June of 2016. So June of this year. So about 11
months into the investigation.
Mr. Labrador. So, and to be clear, was she offered immunity
for interview and potential testimony or for turning over the
laptop as evidence?
Mr. Comey. Turning over the laptop as evidence. It governed
what could be done in terms of using it against her, that
laptop.
Mr. Labrador. To your knowledge, was Cheryl Mills an
uncooperative witness prior to the immunity deal?
Mr. Comey. I think our assessment was she was cooperative.
I forget the month she was interviewed, but she was interviewed
fully before that.
Mr. Labrador. And she always cooperated?
Mr. Comey. I think our assessment was--again, this is the
odd way I look at the world--we had no reason to believe she
was being uncooperative.
Mr. Labrador. So could this investigation have been
completed without these grants of immunity in place?
Mr. Comey. In my view, it couldn't be concluded
professionally without doing our best to figure out what was on
those laptops. So getting the laptops was very important to me
and to the investigative team.
Mr. Labrador. So in your vast experience as an
investigator, as a DOJ attorney, now as an FBI Director, how
many times have you allowed a person who is a material witness
to a crime you are investigating to act as the lawyer in that
same investigation?
Mr. Comey. Well, ``to let'' is what I am stumbling on. The
FBI has no power to stop someone in a voluntary----
Mr. Labrador. No, no, no, no. You are speaking--let's just
be honest. You allowed, the FBI allowed Cheryl Mills to act as
the attorney in a case that she was a material witness. How
many times have you----
Mr. Comey. In the same sense that I am ``allowing'' you to
question me----
Mr. Labrador. How many times have you----
Mr. Comey.--I can't stop you from questioning me.
Mr. Labrador. How many times have you done that prior?
Mr. Comey. I have not had an experience where the subject
of the interview was represented by a lawyer who was also a
witness in the investigation.
Mr. Labrador. Okay. So you have never had that experience.
Mr. Comey. Not in my experience.
Mr. Labrador. You prosecuted terrorists and mobsters,
right?
Mr. Comey. Correct.
Mr. Labrador. And during your time in Justice, how many
times did you allow a lawyer who was a material witness to the
case that you were prosecuting to also act as the subject of--
as the attorney to the subject of that investigation?
Mr. Comey. As I said, I don't think I have encountered this
situation where a witness--a lawyer for the subject of the
investigation was also a witness to the investigation. I
don't----
Mr. Labrador. So this was highly unusual, to have----
Mr. Comey. In my experience, yes.
Mr. Labrador. Okay.
In your answer to Chairman Chaffetz, you indicated that you
had no reason to disbelieve Paul Combetta when he told you that
he erased the hard drive on his own. Is that correct?
Mr. Comey. Correct.
Mr. Labrador. However, in the exchange on Reddit, he said,
``I need to strip out a VIP's email address from a bunch of
archived emails. Basically, they don't want the VIP's email
address exposed to anyone.''
Those two statements are not consistent. How can you say
that he was truthful when he told you nobody told him to act
this way but yet you saw this Reddit account that says where
``they'' told him that he needed to act in this way?
Mr. Comey. I think the assessment of the investigative team
is those are two very--about two different subjects. One is a
year before about--in the summer of 2014 about how to produce
emails and whether there was a way to remove or mask the actual
email address, the HRC, whatever it is, dot-com. And the other
is about actually deleting the content of those emails sitting
on the server.
Mr. Labrador. It seems like in your investigation you
found, time after time, evidence of destruction, evidence of
breaking iPhones and other phones, all these different things,
but yet you find that there is no evidence of intent.
And I am a little bit confused as to your interpretation of
18 U.S.C. 793(f). On the one hand, you have said that Secretary
Clinton couldn't be charged because her conduct was extremely
careless but not grossly negligent, correct?
Mr. Comey. That is not exactly what I said.
Mr. Labrador. That is what you said today. But you have
also said----
Mr. Comey. I don't remember saying that.
Mr. Labrador [continuing]. There was no evidence of her
intent to harm the United States.
But you will agree that a person can act with gross
negligence or even act knowingly without possessing some
additional specific intent. So which is it? Is it a lack of
gross negligence that she had or a lack of intent?
Mr. Comey. In terms of my overall judgment about whether
the case was worthy of prosecution, it is the lack of evidence
to meet what I understand to be the elements of the crime, one;
and, two, a consideration of what would be fair with respect to
how other people have been treated. Those two things together
tell me--and nothing has happened that has changed my view on
this--that no reasonable prosecutor would bring such a case.
The specific-intent question, yes, I agree that specific
intent to harm the United States is a different thing than a
gross negligence or a willfulness.
Mr. Labrador. So just one last question. You have talked
about Mary and Joe. And Mary and Joe would be disciplined at
the FBI if they did what Hillary Clinton did. If Mary and Joe
came to you and asked for a promotion immediately after being
disciplined, would you give them that promotion?
Mr. Comey. Tough to answer that hypothetical. It would
depend upon the nature of the conduct and what discipline had
been imposed.
Mr. Labrador. And what if they ever asked for a promotion
that would give them management and control of cybersecurity of
your agency and the secrets of your agency after they had done
these things? Would you give them that promotion?
Mr. Comey. That is a question that I don't want to answer.
Mr. Labrador. All right.
Mr. Goodlatte. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Mrs.
Walters, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Walters. Hi, Director Comey.
Despite the absence of an intent mens rea standard in 18
U.S.C. section 793(f), you have said that there has never been
a prosecution without evidence of intent. Thus, the standard
has been read into the statute despite the specific language
enacted. What exactly are the legal precedents that justify
reading intent into the statute?
Mr. Comey. Well, my understanding of 793(f) is governed by
a couple things--three things, really: one, the legislative
history from 1917, which I have read, and the one case that was
prosecuted in the case. And those two things combined tell me
that, when Congress enacted 793(f), they were very worried
about the ``gross negligence'' language and actually put in
legislative history we understand it to be something very close
to ``willfulness.''
Then the next 100 years of treatment of that actually tell
me that the Department of Justice for a century has had that
same reservation, because they have only used it once. And that
was in a case involving an FBI agent who was--in an espionage
context.
So those things together inform my judgment of it.
Mrs. Walters. Okay.
Considering the importance of protecting classified
information for national security purposes, a lot of people
disagree that an intent standard should be read into that
statute. What specific language would you recommend we enact to
ensure gross negligence is the actual standard for the statute,
not intent?
Mr. Comey. I don't think that is something the Bureau ought
to give advice on. It is a good question, as to what the
standard should be. I could imagine Federal employees being
very concerned about how you draw the line for criminal
liability. But I don't think that is something we ought to
advise on, the legislation.
Mrs. Walters. Okay.
Should we enact a mens rea standard for extreme
carelessness for the statute?
Mr. Comey. Same answer, I think, is appropriate.
Mrs. Walters. Should we enact a civil fine?
Mr. Comey. A civil fine for mishandling classified
information?
Mrs. Walters. Uh-huh.
Mr. Comey. I don't know, actually, because it is already
subject to discipline, which is suspension or loss of clearance
or loss of job, which is a big monetary impact to the people
disciplined. So I don't know whether it is necessary.
Mrs. Walters. Okay.
I want to change subjects----
Mr. Comey. Okay.
Mrs. Walters [continuing]. For my next question. As you
know, the number of criminal background checks for noncriminal
purposes, such as for employment decisions, continues to
increase annually.
I don't expect that you have this information on hand;
however, would you be willing to provide the Committee and my
staff with the number of criminal history record checks for
fingerprint-based background checks that the FBI has conducted
over each of the past 5 years?
And what are your thoughts regarding whether the FBI has
the capacity to process the increasing number of background
check requests?
Mr. Comey. I am sure we can get you that number, because I
am sure we track it. So I will make sure my staff follows up
with you.
Mrs. Walters. Okay.
Mr. Comey. I do believe we have the resources. Where we
have been strained is on the background checks for firearms
purchases. The other background check processes we run, my
overall sense is we have enough troops to do that. We are able
to--we charge a fee for those, and I think we are able to
generate the resources we need.
Mrs. Walters. Okay. Thank you.
I yield back my time.
Mr. Issa. Could the gentlelady yield to me?
Mrs. Walters. Sure. I would be happy to yield to you, Mr.
Issa.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Director, some time ago, you appeared before this
Committee, and you told us that you had exhausted all of the
capability to unlock the San Bernardino iPhone, the 5C. Did
that turn out to be true?
Mr. Comey. It is still true.
Mr. Issa. That you had exhausted all of your capability?
Mr. Comey. That the FBI had, yes.
Mr. Issa. So shouldn't we be concerned from a cyber
standpoint that you couldn't unlock a phone that, in fact, an
Israeli company came forward and unlocked for you and basically
a Cambridge professor or student for 90 bucks has shown also to
be able to unlock and mirror or duplicate the memory?
I mean, and this is purely a question of--you apparently do
not have the resources to do that which others can do. Isn't
that correct?
Mr. Comey. I am sure that is true in a whole bunch of
respects, but, first, I have to correct you. I am not
confirming--you said an Israeli company? I am not confirming--
--
Mr. Issa. Well, okay. A contractor for you, reported to be,
for a million dollars, unlocked the phone. So I would ask you
to confirm, the phone got unlocked, right?
Mr. Comey. Yes, it did.
Mr. Issa. Okay. So the technology could be created outside
of ordering a company to essentially, you know, reengineer
their software for you, correct?
Mr. Comey. In this particular case, yes.
Mr. Issa. Okay. And so you lack that capability. How can
this Committee know that you are in the process of developing
that sort of technology, the equivalent of the Cambridge $90
technology?
Mr. Comey. How can the Committee know?
Mr. Issa. Yeah. I mean, in other words, where are the
assurances that you are going to get robust enough?
We have an encryption working group that was formed between
multiple Committees to no small extent because of your action
of going to a magistrate and getting an order because you
lacked that capability and were trying a new technique of
ordering a company to go invent for you.
The question is, how do we know that won't happen again,
that you will go to the court, ask for something when, in fact,
the technology exists or could exist to do it in some other
way, a technology that you should have at your disposal, or at
least some Federal agency should, like the NSA?
Mr. Comey. Well, first of all, it could well happen again,
which is why I think it is great that people are talking about
what we might do about this problem.
It is an interesting question as to whether we ought to
invest in us having the ability to hack into people's devices,
whether that is the best solution. It doesn't strike me as the
best solution. But we are--and I have asked for more money in
the 2017 budget--trying to invest in building those
capabilities so when we really need to be able to get into a
device we can.
It is not scaleable, and I am not sure it would be
thrilling to companies like Apple to know we are investing
money to try and figure out how to hack into their stuff.
Mr. Issa. Well, isn't it true that we have clandestine
organizations who have the mandate to do just that, to look
around the world and to be able to find information that people
don't know you can find, keep it secret, get it out there?
And my question to you is, shouldn't we, instead of giving
you the money, simply continue to leverage other agencies who
already have that mandate and then ask you to ask them to be
your conduit for that when you have an appropriate need?
Mr. Comey. That is a reasonable question. It may be part of
the solution. Real challenges in using those kinds of
techniques in the bulk of our work, because it becomes public
and exposed. But that has to be an important part of the
conversation.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being here, Director Comey.
Director Comey, I--the last thing I want to do is to
lecture you on anything related to the law, because I think you
have given your whole life to that effort.
And I guess, in the face of so many things already having
been said here and asked, that all I can do is to try to sort
of reassociate this in a reference of why there is a rule of
law. You know, we had that little unpleasantness in the late
1770's with England over this rule of law, because we realized
there is really only two main ways to govern, and that is by
the rule of men or the rule of law. And sometimes it is
important for all of us just to kind of reconnect what this
whole enterprise of America is all about. And I, again, don't
seek to lecture you in that regard.
And I know--and you have to forgive me for being a
Republican partisan here, because I am very biased in this
case. But I know that when you interviewed Mrs. Clinton you
were up against someone that really should have an earned
doctorate of duplicity and deception hanging on her wall. I
don't know that you probably could have interviewed a more
gifting prevaricator. So I know you were up against the best.
But, having said that, when I read the law here that I know
so many have already referenced--I think maybe that is the best
way for me to do that. 18 U.S.C. 1924 provides that any Federal
official who ``becomes possessed of documents or materials
containing classified information of the United States and
knowingly removes such documents or materials without authority
and with the intent to retain such documents or materials at an
unauthorized location shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for not more than 1 year or both.''
Now, I didn't miss one word there. It does not require--
that section does not require an intent to profit. It doesn't
require harm to the United States or otherwise to act in any
manner disloyal to the United States. It only requires intent
to retain classified documents at an unauthorized location.
And I believe, sir, in all sincerity to you, person to
person, I belive that some of your comments reflected that that
is what occurred. And, over the last several months, I believe
that is the case.
And so I have to--it is my job to ask you again why the
simple clarity of that law was not applied in this case.
Because the implications here are so profound. For your
children and mine, for this country, they are so profound.
And, again, I don't envy your job, but I want to give you
the remainder of the time to help me understand why a law like
this that any law school graduate--if we can't apply this one
in this case, how in God's name can we apply it in any case in
the world? Why is it even written?
So I am going to stop there and ask your forbearance and
just go for it.
Mr. Comey. Sure. No, it is a reasonable question.
That is the--18 U.S.C. 1924 is the misdemeanor mishandling
statue that is the basis on which most people have been
prosecuted for mishandling classified information have been
prosecuted. It is not a strict liability statute. I was one of
the people, when I was in the private sector, who argued
against strict liability criminal statues. It requires, in the
view of the Department of Justice and over long practice, proof
of some criminal intent, not specific intent to harm the United
States but a general awareness that you are doing that is
unlawful. So you have to prove criminal intent.
So there are two problems in this case. One is developing
the evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Secretary
Clinton acted with that criminal intent. And, second, even if
you could do that, which you can't, looking at the history of
other cases, what would be the right thing to do here? Has
anybody ever been prosecuted on anything near these facts?
And, again, I keep telling the folks at home, when people
tell you lots of people have been prosecuted for this, please
demand the details of those cases. Because I have been through
them all.
So that combination of what the statute requires and the
history of prosecutions told me--and, again, people can take a
different view, and it is reasonable to disagree--that no
reasonable prosecutor would bring that case. That, in a
nutshell, is what it is.
Mr. Franks. Well, you said it was a reasonable question.
That was a reasonable answer. But I can't find that in the
statute.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Comey--and I am going down a completely different
path. Our law enforcement in this country have a consistent
enemy in a group called sovereign citizens. And what I have
seen in my district, we lost two officers in St. John Parrish
about 4 years ago, and we just lost another three officers in
Baton Rouge, with another couple injured.
In the case in St. John Parrish, we actually had the
perpetrators on the radar in north Louisiana, and, at some
point, they moved to south Louisiana in my district and we lost
contact. So, when St. John Parrish deputies went to their
trailer park, they had no idea what they were walking into, and
they walked into an ambush with AR-15s and AK-47s, and the
unimaginable happened.
So, through NCCIC and other things, are you all focused on
making sure--and I think there are about 100,000 of them. But
are you all focused on making sure that our law enforcement has
the best information when dealing with, whether it is sovereign
citizens or terrorist cells or other bad actors, that that
information gets to the locals so they are not surprised and
ambushed?
Mr. Comey. Well, we sure are. And I don't know the
circumstances of that case, but I will find out the
circumstances.
In two respects, we want, obviously, people to know when
someone is wanted. But, more than that, we have a known or
suspected terrorist file that should have information in that
about people we are worried about so that if an officeris
making a stop or going up to execute a search warrant and they
run that address of that person, they will get a hit on what we
call the KST file.
So that is our objective. And if there are ways to make it
better, we want to.
Mr. Richmond. Now, let's switch lanes a little bit, because
this is one of--I think an issue when we start talking about
criminal justice reform and we start talking about the FBI. In
my community and communities of color and with elected
officials, there seems to be two standards: one for low-level
elected officials and then one for other people.
So I guess the facts I will give you of some of our cases--
and you tell me if it sounds inconsistent with your knowledge
of the law and your protocol, but nonprofit organizations where
elected officials have either been on boards or had some
affiliation with, when those funds are used in a manner that
benefits them personally, they have been prosecuted. And I mean
for amounts that range from anywhere from $2,000 upwards to
$100,000.
Your interpretation of the law, that if nonprofit funds are
used to benefit a person and not the organization, that that is
a theft of funds--because I believe that those are a lot of the
charges that I have seen in my community. Would you agree with
that?
Director Comey. Sure, it could be. And I know from personal
experience, having done these cases, that is often--that is at
the center of a case involving a corrupt official.
Mr. Richmond. Now, let's take elected official out and just
take any foundation director or board director or executive
director who would use the funds of a nonprofit to pay personal
debts or bills or just takes money. You would agree that that
would constitute a violation of the law, criminal statute?
Mr. Comey. Potentially. On the Federal side, potentially of
wire fraud, mail fraud, or a tax charge, potentially.
Mr. Richmond. The other thing that I would say is that, in
our community, we feel that it is selective prosecution; that
if you are rich, you have another standard; that if you are an
African-American, you have another standard.
And there are a number of cases that I will give you off-
line, but it appears that--and my concern is the authority of
your agents to decide that a person is bad and then take them
through holy hell to try to get to the ultimate conclusion that
the agent made, and they don't let the facts get in their way.
And at the end of the day, you have businesspeople who spend
hundreds of thousands of dollars to protect their reputation
and to fight a charge that they ultimately win, but now they
are broke, they are defeated, because, when it comes out, it
says the United States of America versus you.
So I would just ask you to create a mindset within the
Department that they understand the consequences of leaks to
the press, charges, and what happens if--when those charges are
really not substantiated, you still break a person. And I think
that you all have a responsibility to be very careful with the
awesome power that you all are given.
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank back--I would yield
back.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
The Director is welcome to respond.
Mr. Comey. I very much agree with what you said,
Congressman, at the end of that. The power to investigate is
the power to ruin. Obviously, charging people can also be
ruinous. So it is when we have to be extraordinarily prudent in
exercising fair, open-minded, and careful. So I very much agree
with that.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Michigan, Mr. Trott, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Trott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Director, for being here. And thank you for
your service to our country.
When you made your statement at the press conference on
July 5, you said, ``I have not coordinate or reviewed this
statement in any way with the Department of Justice or any part
of government. They do not know what I am about to say.''
I have no reason to question your integrity, but is there
any chance that someone working in your office or as part of
this investigation knew what you were going to decide and
recommend and maybe told one of the Attorney General's staff
what was about to happen on July 5?
Mr. Comey. Anything is possible. I would--I think I would
be willing to bet my life that didn't happen----
Mr. Trott. Okay.
Mr. Comey [continuing]. Just because I know my folks.
Mr. Trott. So here is why I ask. The facts give me pause.
The investigation started in July of 2015. Many of us in
Congress, including myself, suggested that the Attorney General
should recuse herself because of her friendship with the
Clintons and because of her desire to continue on as Attorney
General in a Clinton administration.
Then she had the fortuitous meeting on the airplane with
former President Clinton on June 30. Then on July 2, give or
take, she came out and said, you know, I have created an
appearance of impropriety, and so I am going to just follow
whatever the FBI Director's recommendation is.
And then, 3 days later, you had your press conference. And
in your press conference, you said, ``In our system of justice,
the prosecutors make the decisions about what charges are
appropriate based on the evidence.'' That is not what happened
in this case. Ultimately, you made the decision. Isn't that
what happened?
Mr. Comey. Well, I made public my recommendation. The
decision to decline the case was made at the Justice
Department.
Mr. Trott. But before you had that press conference, you
knew, based on the Attorney General's public comments that she
was going to follow whatever you recommended. So, ultimately,
you made the decision in this case as to whether or not charges
should be filed against Secretary Clinton. Isn't that the
reality of what happened?
Mr. Comey. I think that is a fair characterization. The
only thing I would add to that is I think she said--I don't
remember exactly--that she would defer to the FBI and the
career prosecutors at the Department of Justice.
But, look, I knew that once I made public the FBI's view
that this wasn't a prosecutable case that there was virtually
zero chance that the Department of Justice was going to go in a
different direction. But part of my decision was based on my
prediction that there was no way the Department of Justice
would prosecute on these facts in any event.
So I think your characterization is fair, but I just wanted
to add that color to it.
Mr. Trott. But you can see how some of us would look at the
dates and the facts leading up to your press conference and
think, okay, for a year we have been suggesting she is not the
appropriate person to make the ultimate decision as to whether
charges should be filed; she won't recuse herself. And then 3
days before you come out with your recommendation, which she
has already said she is going to follow, she basically decides
to recuse herself. Those facts give me pause.
Mr. Comey. I get why folks would ask about that, but I
actually think it is--there are two dates that matter. But I
think what generated that was the controversy around her
meeting with President Clinton, not the interview with
Secretary Clinton.
Mr. Trott. That is a whole other discussion.
So let's talk about Cheryl Mills. So you have said earlier
today that it really wasn't up to you to weigh in on whether
there was a conflict for Ms. Mills to act as Secretary
Clinton's lawyer in the interview.
But, again, you are kind of taking your attorney hat on and
off whenever it is convenient. You decided that at the
beginning of that interview it wasn't appropriate for you to
weigh in as a lawyer suggesting there was a conflict. But then
again, your recommendation is, ultimately, as a lawyer, what is
being done in this case. Do you see little bit of inconsistency
there or no?
Mr. Comey. No, I see the point about the--look, I would
rather not have an attorney hat on at any time. I put it on
because I thought that was what was necessary at the conclusion
of this investigation. But I stand by that. The agents of the
FBI, it is not to them to try and kick out someone's lawyer.
Mr. Trott. Well, what would have happened if you had said,
Ms. Mills, because of the history here, you can't be in this
interview?
Mr. Comey. I don't know. I don't know.
Mr. Trott. Could you have said that to her?
Mr. Comey. I guess you could. It would be well outside our
normal role.
Mr. Trott. So, a number of times today, you have said there
really is no double standard. And so now I am just asking you
as a citizen and not even in your capacity as Director of FBI,
can you sort of see why a lot of Americans are bothered by a
perceived double standard?
Because if any of the gentlemen sitting behind you this
morning, who I assume are with the Department, had done some of
the things Ms. Clinton did and told some of the lies that she
told, you said in your statement that this is not to suggest
under similar circumstances there wouldn't be consequences. In
fact, there would be--they would be subjected to administrative
sanctions.
And now we have an election going on where she is seeking a
pretty big promotion. So maybe your point is she wouldn't be
charged under similar facts, but can you sort of see why so
many people are bothered by the facts in this case, given that
really nothing happened to her and now she is running for
President of the United States? I mean, just, can you see the
optics on that are troubling?
Mr. Comey. Oh, I totally get that. That is one of the
reasons I am trying to answer as many questions as I can,
because I get that question.
But, again, folks need to realize, in the FBI, if you did
this, you would be in huge trouble. I am certain of that. You
would be disciplined in some serious way. You might be fired. I
am also certain you would not be prosecuted criminally on these
facts.
Mr. Trott. And you have said that, and I appreciate it.
Let me just ask one quick question, because I am out of
time. But Mr. Bishop started to talk about this, and his
district is affected, as well, in Michigan. But my district in
southeast Michigan has the third-largest settlement of Syrian
refugees of any city in the country, behind San Diego and
Chicago. That is Troy, Michigan.
And you said last fall in front of a Homeland Security
Committee hearing that you really didn't have the data to
properly vet the Syrian refugees that are trying to come in,
and you said that again this morning.
But, you know, last weekend, I am at a grocery store and a
Starbucks, and two different constituents walked up to me and
said, ``Can't you stop the President's resettlement of Syrian
refugees into Troy, Michigan? We are all afraid.'' And they are
based on, largely, your comment that we don't have the database
to really vet these folks.
Anything I can tell the folks back in Michigan that we are
doing, other than--all I say now is we just have to wait for a
new President, because this President has increased the number
of refugees by 60 and 30 percent year over year the last 2
years, we just have to wait for a new President. I would like
to be able to say the FBI is doing something different than
they were doing last year when you made those comments.
Mr. Comey. Well, as I said earlier, they can know that we
are--if there is a whiff about this person somewhere in the
U.S. Government's vast holdings, we will find it. And the
second thing they can know is, if we get a whiff about somebody
once they are in, we are going to cover that in a pretty tight
way.
What I can't promise people is that if--I can't query what
is not in our holdings. That is the only reservation I offer to
people.
Mr. Trott. Thank you, sir.
I yield back.
Mr. Goodlatte. Well, Director Comey, during questioning
earlier, there was a dispute that arose over the contents of
one or more of the immunity letters that were issued,
particularly with regard to the issue of whether or not it
contained immunity for destroying documents, emails.
The individual who was questioning you about that was
former Chairman Issa of the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee, and I want him to be able to clarify. Because we
have contacted the Department of Justice and asked them to read
the immunity letters to us.
So the gentleman is recognized briefly.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will try to be
very brief.
Under the immunity agreement with one or more individuals--
we will use Cheryl Mills as, clearly, one of the individuals--
she negotiated a very, very good deal from what we can
discover. She did not just receive immunity related to the
production of the drive, computer, and the contents but, in
fact, received immunity under 18 U.S.C. 793(e) and (f), 1924
U.S.C.--18 U.S.C. 1924, and the so-called David Petraeus
portion, 18 U.S.C. 2071. And I will focus on 2071. Her immunity
is against any and all taking, destruction--or even
obstruction, the way we read it--of documents, classified or
unclassified.
Now, the only question I have for you is--and I know you
are going to put this to Justice and we may have to ask them
separately--for the purposes of what you needed as an
investigator, because you were the person that wanted access to
the computer, does that deal make any sense, to, in return for
things which she could have objected to as an attorney and held
back but which had no known proffer of leading to some criminal
indictment of somebody else, she received complete immunity, as
we read it, from obstruction or destruction of documents,
classified and unclassified. And that is based on a re-review
of the immunity agreement.
Mr. Comey. You know, I think this is--you are right, this
is a question best addressed to Justice. But I think you are
misunderstanding it.
As I understand it, this was a promise in writing from the
Department of Justice: If you give us the laptops, we will not
use anything on the laptops directly against you in a
prosecution for that list of offenses. It is not immunity for
those offenses if there is some other evidence.
Now, that said, I am not exactly sure why her lawyer asked
for it, because, by that point in the investigation, we didn't
have a case on her to begin with.
Mr. Issa. Well, I understand that. But based on the Reddit
discovery and others, the ``they asked me to do it''--and you
said so yourself, it was probably Cheryl Mills, the ``they.''
You have an immune witness who has to tell you who they were.
If the ``they were'' told me to delete, and that is Cheryl
Mills, then, in fact, you have evidence from an immune witness
of a crime perpetrated by Cheryl Mills, the ordering of the
destruction of any document, classified or unclassified, which,
clearly, she seems to have done.
Mr. Comey. Then she wouldn't be protected from that. If we
developed evidence that she had obstructed justice in some
fashion--all she is protected from is we can't use as evidence
something that is on the laptop she gave us----
Mr. Issa. Right. So the information put into the record
today, which included these Reddit discoveries, show that there
is a they who asked to have the destruction of information.
Under 18 U.S.C. 2071, if she doesn't have immunity for that
order, she could, and by definition should, be charged. Because
ordering somebody else to destroy something, as an attorney,
well after there were subpoenas in place that were very
specific, that is clearly a willful act, isn't it?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?
Mr. Issa. Of course.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Your line of questioning--well, first, let
me show my cards. I believe that Cheryl Mills has an impeccable
character, as my line of questioning suggested that Director
Comey and his staff have impeccable character.
But, my good friend, there is immunity given--I don't think
this applies to Ms. Mills, and I looked at the sections that
you are speaking of--if you take local, criminal, and State
actions, given to the worst of characters for a variety of
reasons. That was not the reason given to Ms. Mills. I am sure
that it is a lawyer that was trying to be the most effective
counsel to Ms. Mills as possible.
Mr. Issa. Well, reclaiming my time, the gentlelady's point
may be true. I am only speaking to the Director based on things
were done that should not have been done. We now have evidence
in front of this Committee, in the record, of people destroying
records of activities as late as a few days ago.
So the fact that there still should be an open question,
first of all, as to could she be prosecuted, and if in fact the
``they have told me to destroy this,'' under the exact same
statute that included David Petraeus, who was no longer on
Active Duty, 18 U.S.C. 2071, there is at least a case to be
made.
Now, the problem we have is the lawyer negotiated a set of
terms which hopefully doesn't mean that she gets a free pass
even if she willfully ordered the destruction of documents,
which it does appear she did.
And, look, my job is not to be judge, jury, or hangman. My
job is to look at what has been presented to us, ask the
highest law enforcement officer in the land to, in fact, look
into it. Because it does appear as though it is there.
Ms. Jackson Lee. A brief yield, my good friend.
Mr. Issa. Of course.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Certainly, we have an oversight
responsibility of the Director. I think he has been very
forthright. But none of the actions of destruction can be--I
don't think we have anything in evidence that suggests that Ms.
Mills contributed to the dictating or directing----
Mr. Issa. Well, the gentlelady may not have been----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Any destruction.
Mr. Issa. The gentlelady may not have been here----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So we can't speculate here.
Mr. Issa. The gentlelady may not have been here at the
time, but the Director himself, when asked who would the
``they'' would have been in that order to destroy, at least
said it probably was or likely could have been Cheryl Mills. We
are not saying it is. What we are saying is you have an immune
witness.
Mr. Goodlatte. The gentleman will suspend.
Mr. Issa. Of course.
Mr. Goodlatte. The purpose of this was to set the record
straight as to what the content of the document was. That has
been accomplished. And the debate will continue on----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goodlatte [continuing]. And continue on outside of this
hearing room.
Mr. Issa. And I would only----
Ms. Jackson Lee. We can state; we cannot speculate. I
yield----
Mr. Issa. And I would only ask the Director be able to
review those document at Justice and follow up with the
Committee. It would be very helpful to all of us.
I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Goodlatte. The Director has answered in the affirmative
that he will do that.
Mr. Comey. Yes, we will follow up.
Mr. Goodlatte. First of all, I want to thank Director
Comey. We didn't make 4 hours and 40 minutes, but we did almost
make 4 hours, and I know you have been generous with your time.
However, I will also say that I think a lot of the
questions here indicate a great deal of concern about the
manner in which this investigation was conducted, how the
conclusions were drawn, and the close proximity to that and the
meeting of the Attorney General with former President Clinton
on a tarmac. At the same time, she then said, ``Well, I am
going to recuse myself,'' and then, shortly after that, you
took over and announced your conclusions in this case, which
are hotly disputed, as you can tell.
The Committee and the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee have referred to the United States Attorney for the
Eastern District of--for the District of Columbia a referral
based upon her testimony before the Select Committee on
Benghazi, suggesting that your statement at your press
conference and your testimony before the Oversight and
Government Reform Committee very clearly contradicted a number
of statements she made under oath before that Committee.
And I want to stress to you how important I think it is
that we made that referral for the purpose of making sure that
no one is above the law. And in many cases regarding
investigations, it is not just the underlying actions that are
important, but they are the efforts of people to cover those up
through perjury, through obstruction of justice, through
destruction of documents.
And so I would ask that this matter be taken very, very
seriously as you pursue whatever actions the Department chooses
to take, making sure that no one is above the law.
Mr. Comey. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Goodlatte. With that, that concludes today's hearing,
and I thank our distinguished witness for attending.
Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days
to submit additional written questions for the witness or
additional materials for the record.
And the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Questions for the Record submitted to the Honorable James B. Comey,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation*
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*Note: The Committee did not receive a response from the witness at
the time this hearing record was finalized.
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