[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NORTH KOREA'S PERPETUAL PROVOCATIONS:
ANOTHER DANGEROUS, ESCALATORY
NUCLEAR TEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-230
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
21-543PDF WASHINGTON : 2016
________________________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Victor Cha, Ph.D., senior adviser and Korea chair, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 5
Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia,
The Heritage Foundation........................................ 13
Sue Mi Terry, Ph.D., managing director, Bower Group Asia......... 27
Mr. David Albright, president and founder, Institute for Science
and International Security..................................... 38
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Victor Cha, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................ 7
Mr. Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement........................... 15
Sue Mi Terry, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 29
Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement........................... 40
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
The Honorable Matt Salmon, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arizona, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific: Material submitted for the record..................... 62
The Honorable Grace Meng, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York: Prepared statement.......................... 67
NORTH KOREA'S PERPETUAL PROVOCATIONS:
ANOTHER DANGEROUS, ESCALATORY
NUCLEAR TEST
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:27 p.m., in
room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Salmon. I apologize for both of us being a little bit
tardy. We had the Foreign Minister from Burma, who was here to
meet with the chairman of the full committee, and we were asked
to attend. So, thanks for being so patient. I really appreciate
you not leaving.
The subcommittee will come to order. Members present will
be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the
official hearing record.
Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for
5 calendar days to allow statements, questions and extraneous
materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in
the rules.
Last Friday, North Korea conducted its fifth and most
powerful nuclear test to date. This latest provocation coming
just weeks after they fired off three additional missiles
during the G-20 summit in China. While U.S. and United Nations
sanctions have undoubtedly hurt the North Korean economy, Kim
Jong-un continues to willingly and belligerently defy U.N.
Security Council resolutions as well as international norms.
Clearly, he is not fazed by the administration's so-called plan
of strategic patience, and so continues with his childlike
behavior that endangers much of the world. The House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, under the leadership of Chairman Royce, has
taken the lead to address this intransigence. While we have
already taken bold steps in increasing sanctions, clearly, more
must be done. We are here today to identify and work toward
proactive policy solutions that will put an end to the
provocations of this rogue regime. Enough is enough.
As good as the additional sanctions have been, without
China's enforcement, it will never be enough. I would like to
hear from our panel on how to best engage China on this issue.
We have been talking about this for a very, very long time, and
it doesn't seem like we have gotten them properly motivated. We
have talked to some of our allies about the same issue. And,
frankly, China's almost nonintervention in this issue is very,
very frustrating. We would love to hear any thoughts you might
have on how we can get them a little bit more excited about
getting more involved.
China prefers the status quo in North Korea rather than
risk a flood of North Korean refugees and a shared border with
the Korea-U.S. alliance. Some experts even worry that China may
use its enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions and
diplomatic assistance as a wedge, forcing South Korea to choose
between China and the United States as its main partner on the
peninsula. The international community at large is alarmed at
China's indifference to date over North Korean provocations,
especially with nuclear detonations so near its own border.
Even North Korea's willingness to embarrass China by upstaging
the G-20 ceremonies with a nuclear test has not yet led to real
action by China.
The administration has appeared to make some progress on
our trilateral engagement with Korea and Japan, our two closest
allies in East Asia. The House recently passed my legislation,
which was cosponsored by Mr. Sherman, to encourage further
dialogue and cooperation between our nations, with particular
emphasis toward the North Korean threat. I will be very
interested to hear from our panel on the potential for further
cooperation from South Korea and Japan on how we might best
work together to address North Korea's dangerous behavior.
The United States recently convened its annual joint
military exercises with South Korea. The U.S. flew two bombers
over South Korea to provide some reassurance to our friends in
Seoul, but I am not sure these messages resonate with
Pyongyang. We all know that there are few options to instill
real change from within North Korea, but waiting it out will
not solve anything. We need a proactive approach.
Most agree that getting information to the people of North
Korea, unfiltered by the current regime, would greatly benefit
the people of North Korea and aid efforts to diminish the
stranglehold Kim has over the nation. I have legislation that
passed through this subcommittee that would provide an overdue
update and enhancement of those efforts. Boosting the
information flow in North Korea would cripple Kim Jong-un where
he is most vulnerable, and that is in the realm of reality.
Again, sanctions efforts have been a huge focus in
Congress, but due to China's lack of resolve, they seem to have
little practical impact. I would like to determine what we can
do to take it to the next level. What other chokepoints can we
squeeze to shut off funding to North Korea's nuclear ambitions?
Cutting off access to financial messaging systems, such as
SWIFT, was a successful strategy to induce compliance with
Iran, and we should pursue the same strategy toward North
Korea, in my belief. The rogue regime should not have access to
the international financial system.
As if its other activities weren't reason enough to cut off
its financial messaging access, North Korea has been identified
as the likely culprit of a serious hack on SWIFT earlier this
year, in which the culprits stole $81 million from Bangladesh's
central bank. For that reason, I am working on legislation to
end North Korea's access to interbank financial transfers to
prevent further abuses and reduce funding to North Korea's
nuclear program.
Time and again, North Korea has proven that, so long as it
is able, it will continue to advance its nuclear program, for
both internal domestic strength as well as international
bargaining power. While the United States has shown a
willingness to negotiate with North Korea when it takes even
modest steps toward denuclearization, North Korea has shown no
interest--zero interest--in maintaining international norms.
This cycle cannot continue, and we cannot strategically wait
with a potential catastrophe looming.
I look forward to a frank discussion with our witnesses on
what to do next with this rogue regime.
And I would like to recognize the ranking member for his
opening statement, and then we will go to you, the witnesses.
Thank you.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these
hearings. To amplify your reason why we were both late, we met
with the Foreign Minister of Burma, also known as Myanmar, who
happens to be Aung San Suu Kyi, one of the most inspirational
women in the world. And, some would say, the de facto head of
state of an important nation in Southeast Asia.
I want to thank you for holding these hearings as we look
at North Korea's fifth test overall. Its second test conducted
just this year. The bomb's yield is estimated to be as much as
20 kilotons or even more. And, if accurate, that would mean
that the test involved a bomb with at least twice the yield of
any other bomb tested by North Korea. We used to have the
luxury of saying the North Koreans just want to get our
attention; they just want some this or that concession. That is
why they tested the missile; that is why they tested the
nuclear explosive device. We can no longer just view North
Korea as an annoying, petulant child. It is clear that North
Korea is testing missiles and bombs for the purpose of
developing warheads and ICBMs that can be put together and can
reach our allies and, ultimately, the continental United
States. The testing they are engaging in is necessary to
achieve that goal. The fact that North Koreans have greatly
increased the tempo of their testing is consistent with the
view of an all-out effort to achieve these frightening
capacities.
We need to approach this problem with both a clenched fist
and an open hand. As to the clenched fist, we can have
sanctions on North Korea and its leaders, but these will be
significant but not enough to change its policy unless we have
the cooperation of China. China is North Korea's lifeline,
whether it is food, whether it is oil, whether it is trade,
whether it is money, whether it is hard currency. China is
North Korea's window to the world and the provider of the
financial services that they need. China needs to realize that
there will be consequences well beyond our current targeted
sanctions on this or that business entity if it continues to do
business as usual with North Korea. China needs to understand
that if North Korea uses its nuclear weapons, we will blame not
only the regime in Pyongyang but also the regime in Beijing.
China needs to know that it risks a serious change in
relationship with the United States if it does not assist us in
this effort. It cannot assume that it will always have access
to the United States market the way it does now. And, there are
those who say that it is unthinkable to link the trading
relationship with the foreign policy relationship. I think it
is time to think the unthinkable. But, what we are likely to do
is just keep doing what we have been doing, which has been very
ineffective in stopping North Korea's efforts.
At the same time, we need an open hand. We should be
discussing with North Korea a nonaggression pact, if they are
still seeking one. We should be discussing with China that if
there was a unification of the Korean Peninsula, something I
don't think is going to happen anytime soon, but that if that
were to happen, that the United States would not take military
advantage of that, that, if anything, there would be a smaller
American military presence on the Korean Peninsula and that it
would not be north of the 38th parallel.
And, we should explore whether some of our sanctions on
North Korea could be reduced or eliminated, at least for a
while, if there were very intrusive inspections to enforce a
regime that froze its nuclear program. The idea of accepting,
even for a while, that North Korea keeps what it has may sound
like a departure from orthodoxy. But, every year, they have
more, and it would be a good year if they did not increase
their nuclear capabilities.
I should point out that North Korean nuclear doctrine seems
to call for having about 12 usable nuclear weapons to defend
their country. They will soon have a 13th, and it may go on
eBay. Not exactly on eBay, but once they get a certain number,
they can think of selling the next one. If it is sold, it will
not be for tens of millions of dollars; it will be for billions
of dollars. Fortunately, there is no terrorist organization in
the world that can provide that amount of money, but I can
think of one or two states that would like to have nuclear
weapons that could muster billions of dollars. And, I am going
to continue my effort to convince the Chinese Government that
they should not allow nonstop flights between Pyongyang and
Tehran that don't stop for fuel in China. It is always good to
get more fuel, and it is always good for the Chinese Government
to be in a position to know what is on the plane.
What is more likely is we are just going to keep doing what
we are doing. We will talk at China, but we won't do anything
that forces them to change their policy. And we will be back
here, unfortunately, without our chairman in the years to
come--unless you want to do a third iteration of your
congressional career to hold hearings--and by then, we may be
talking about testing an ICBM that has proven to go thousands
of miles. I don't want to be here to do that, but I am not
moving to Arizona, so if it does happen, I will be here to see
it.
And, I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. I thank you.
In the interest of time, we would like to move to the
witnesses, and upon your conclusion, we will have questions by
the members of the panel up here.
You have all testified before Congress before, but let me
just remind you that, with our lighting system, when it is
green, you are good as gold; when it turns amber, you have got
a minute left; when it is red, please finish. I know we have a
lot of questions, a lot of interest. This is a very pressing
issue and pressing time.
First of all, we have Dr. Cha, senior adviser and Korea
chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies;
Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia
at the Heritage Foundation; we have Dr. Sue Mi Terry, managing
director of Bower Group Asia; and Mr. David Albright, the
president and founder of Institute for Science and
International Security.
We thank the panel for joining us today to share their
experience and expertise.
And, Dr. Cha, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF VICTOR CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND KOREA CHAIR,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, Representative
Sherman, and committee members.
North Korea is shaping up to be the number one security
threat for the next U.S. Presidency. Since 2009, there have
been 62 ballistic missile and nuclear tests, versus 17
ballistic missile and nuclear tests during the Clinton and Bush
administrations. So, there has been a steep change, and neither
of the candidates have really addressed this issue. This issue
is going to hatch in the next administration.
What the North Koreans want--as Representative Sherman
said, we used to think they wanted attention and that is why
they did these sorts of things. That is clearly not what we are
talking about anymore. In my opinion, they are trying to
demonstrate, to the best of their ability, a survivable nuclear
capability. And, they are trying to do that, at least signal
that, before the next U.S. President comes into office.
And I think we have more provocations to come. The data
that we are collecting at CSIS on our Beyond Parallel Web site,
which we will be releasing soon, indicates that they like to do
things in a specified window around U.S. Presidential
elections. So, I expect that there is more to come.
The threats are obvious, and I think both Chairman Salmon
and Representative Sherman have spoken to these. And, I
particularly want to emphasize the horizontal proliferation
threat. I mean, their statements are talking about
standardizing a weapons design. The suggestion is that the next
step is production. And, if they do produce scores of missiles,
nuclear-tipped missiles, there is only one thing that they can
do with them, and that is to sell them. History has shown that
they have sold every finished weapon system they have ever
developed, whether it is missiles to Pakistan and Iran, whether
it is a nuclear design for a 5-megawatt reactor to Syria, or
even discussions with Saddam Hussein at one point, except
Saddam was not ready to pay for anything yet.
Unfortunately, we are going to go back to the usual
playbook: Angry statements from the United Nations, perhaps
another Security Council resolution.
The sanctions are not doing the things that we want them to
do. They are not retarding the program. They are not forcing
the North Koreans back to the negotiation table. And they are
not--even though this is an unspoken aspect of sanctions--they
are not causing the regime to be unstable. So the current
pattern is not working.
So, what should we do? I mean, I will offer some ideas. I
don't know if they are new ideas, but I will offer some ideas.
The first, and I think foremost, is that we need to deploy
THAAD on the Korean Peninsula. Both the South Korean people and
U.S. forces on the peninsula are naked without it. And, I know
this is shaping up to be a controversial issue in South Korea,
but this is not a political issue, even though it is being
played as political in South Korea. This is a national security
issue.
Second, I think we can do more in terms of sanctions. We
can certainly boost or turbocharge the sanctions. We can close
the loophole in 2270 when it comes to the sectoral measures,
coal and these sorts of things. We can ban fuel exports to
North Korea. We can ban the overseas labor exports. As Chairman
Salmon said, we can do something with SWIFT. We can designate
Air Koryo for violating the U.N. ban on importing luxury goods
and bulk cash transportation. We can try to ban North Korean
transactions in other foreign currencies, including the RMB. So
there are a number of sanctions that we could do.
I also want to draw attention to the importance of
continuing to focus on trying to implement the U.N. Commission
of Inquiry recommendations, including discussion in the U.N.
Security Council about holding North Korean leaders responsible
for human rights abuses.
I do agree that we can't do all of this without leaving
open some sort of diplomatic path. Otherwise, we are just
headed on a path to war. And, so I think, in this regard, China
should convene a five-party meeting. When we created the Six
Party Talks, that was the purpose, was to have five-party
meetings in which we could talk with the Chinese and others
about more coordination on contingency planning.
Finally, let me say that I think we do need to engage China
more on sanctioning, but I think we also need to engage them on
thinking about the overall direction of the leadership in North
Korea and how we might be able to effect change there. This
problem, as we can see, based on the number of tests they have
been doing, really coincides with the assumption of power of
this leadership, this new young leadership. And, as long as
that is there, this is going to continue to be a problem. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cha follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Klingner.
STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW FOR
NORTHEAST ASIA, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Klingner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sherman, and distinguished members of the panel. It is truly an
honor to be asked to appear before you again on such an
important issue to U.S. national security.
North Korea's repeated violations of U.N. resolutions have
led to a new international consensus on the need for stronger,
more comprehensive sanctions. The enhanced punitive measures
are welcome, if long overdue, but their utility is dependent on
complete and forceful implementation.
This year, Congress passed the North Korea Sanctions and
Policy Enforcement Act, which had a major impact by inspiring
or pressuring others to implement long overdue measures on
North Korea. The act increased U.S. leverage at the U.N.
Security Council. It led other nations to undertake similar
actions or to wean themselves away from business dealings with
Pyongyang. And it led the Obama administration to finally
designate North Korea as a primary money laundering concern and
target several North Korean entities, including Kim Jong-un,
for human rights abuses. Yet, more can and needs to be done.
Besides the Obama administration's policy of timid
incrementalism of sanctions enforcement, another major problem,
as you have identified, is China. In March, China agreed to
U.N. Resolution 2270, which has been touted as the toughest to
date. That is true, but as has been the case with every
previous resolution, it was watered down due to the demands of
Beijing. And Chinese banks and businesses seemed to be pulling
back from North Korea early in 2016. However, China took
similar action after every previous North Korean nuclear test,
and each time, China temporarily tightened trade and bank
transactions with Pyongyang only to subsequently reduce
enforcement and resume normal economic trade within only a few
months. For years, China has been an enabler of North Korean
misbehavior at the U.N.
China's reluctance to strongly pressure its ally provides
Pyongyang a feeling of impunity, which encourages it only
toward further belligerence. The effectiveness of international
sanctions is hindered by China's weak implementation.
The economic noose is now tightening on the North Korean
regime, and it faces a perfect storm of conditions that make it
more vulnerable to economic pressure. The regime is facing a
reduced flow of hard currency due to the increased financial
sanctions; the increasing pariah status of the regime that is
scaring away business partners; decreased global prices for
resource commodities, which is a major North Korean export; the
slowing Chinese economy; and South Korea ending its involvement
in the failed Kaesong joint economic venture, which had
generated nearly a quarter of North Korea's foreign trade.
Now, how to respond to North Korea? The international
community should take all possible measures to cut off the flow
of money into North Korea and substantially increase pressure
on the regime. In my written testimony, I have provided a
lengthy list of specific recommendations, and I will highlight
a few here.
There are additional measures we can take, but as important
is fully implementing all the measures and the powers that we
already have. But some of the steps, as you have already
alluded to, are imposing secondary sanctions and penalizing
entities, particularly Chinese financial institutions and
businesses that trade with those on the sanctions list.
Imposing secondary sanctions could have a chilling effect on
Chinese economic engagement with North Korea. To date, the
Obama administration has not sanctioned a single Chinese entity
for facilitating North Korean prohibited behavior.
Compel the removal of North Korea from the SWIFT financial
transfer network, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman. The Obama
administration and the European Union pressured the Belgian-
based hub for electronic financial transactions to disconnect
sanctioned Iranian banks in 2012. We should do the same with
North Korea.
We should also work to ban North Korean overseas workers
exploited in highly abusive conditions. North Korea has an
estimated 60,000 to 100,000 workers overseas, earning the
regime an estimated $300 million to $400 million a year. We
should also increase information operations, through overt and
covert means, to promote greater North Korean exposure to the
outside world to have a long-term corrosive effect on the
regime.
The U.S. and its allies must also implement measures to
defend themselves against the spectrum of North Korea's
military threat. As Mr. Cha has pointed out, we should deploy
the THAAD ballistic missile defense system in South Korea. It
is better than anything Korea has or will have for decades to
defend against North Korean land-based missiles. We should also
urge South Korea to deploy sea-based ballistic missile defense
against the submarine missile threat from North Korea.
Currently, Seoul has no systems to defend itself against an
SLBM. We should also augment allied antisubmarine warfare
capabilities. North Korea's apparent ability to evade allied
submarine detection systems is worrisome.
And, finally, we should fully fund U.S. defense
requirements. The U.S. military is smaller today than it was on
9/11.
In conclusion, at present, any offer of economic
inducements to entice North Korea to abandon its nuclear
arsenal is an ill-conceived Wile E. Coyote plan with little
chance of success. Sanctions and targeted financial measures
may take time to have an impact on the regime's financial
condition. In the near term, however, such measures enforce
U.S. and international law, impose a penalty on violators, and
constrain the inflow and export of prohibited items for the
nuclear missile programs. The difficulty will be maintaining
international resolve to stay the course.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Dr. Terry.
STATEMENT OF SUE MI TERRY, PH.D., MANAGING DIRECTOR, BOWER
GROUP ASIA
Ms. Terry. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify before you on this very difficult
problem.
North Korea is a very personal issue for me. My entire
paternal side of the family came from the north, and I have
personally witnessed the pain of divided families.
In the aftermath of the fifth nuclear test, again, the
community of Korea watchers is divided as to what the next
steps should be. As a number of North Korea experts argue,
sanction strategy as a policy of U.S. policy is no longer
working, and it is time to return to negotiations with North
Korea even without preconditions. Other experts call for
ratcheting up more pressure against the Kim regime by
enforcement of sanctions and other measures, such as
information warfare, even if it means potentially risking
escalation by the regime or even potentially risking
instability.
I actually believe that if there is any chance at all that
North Korea would ever entertain the idea of ever giving up
nuclear weapons program, it would be only because we have made
it so that the Kim regime is facing a very stark choice between
keeping its nuclear arsenal and regime survival.
Victor and Bruce Klingner just laid out before you--as they
laid out, I agree that this ratcheting up pressure must begin
with tougher sanctions and, more importantly, better
enforcement. As you have heard, we have just not done that yet.
It is premature to argue that sanctions are not working, or it
has failed. Until February of this year, we did not even have
comprehensive sanctions against North Korea. We finally have
stronger sanctions in place, but for sanctions to work, it
needs to be enforced.
Here again, the chief problem has been China. China is
still reluctant to enforce--to implement the U.N. sanctions.
There are many examples of China's noncompliance, and I point
out some of this in my written testimony.
President Obama has also yet to fully use the broad powers
that the Congress has given him to penalize any Chinese
companies or banks for continuing to do business with North
Korea. Confronting Kim Jong-un credibly depends on getting
bankers in China and other countries to comply with the
sanctions, which means a credible threat of secondary sanctions
is necessary.
In addition to enforcement of sanctions, the next steps are
to close existing loopholes and add even more individuals and
entities to the list. You have heard what some of them could be
both by Victor and Bruce. That includes banning labor and
disconnecting North Korean banks from SWIFT system.
Beyond sanctions, I think there are other actions that we
can take to ratchet up pressure, including: Promoting human
rights in North Korea, seeking ways to increase information
dissemination into the north, and finding ways to give Internet
access to North Korean citizens. North Korea should also be
placed back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. I know you
have discussed this with both speakers in the past.
Now, even as we push for enforcement of sanctions and
ratcheting up pressure on the Kim regime, I am very aware that
these measures could also fail and no amount of pressure may
change the regime's calculus. Nonetheless, after more than two
decades of dealing with North Korea, I think we are left with
very, very few options. And if we manage to enforce sanctions,
including secondary sanctions, over a sustained period of time,
I think this will be the first time we decisively raised the
stakes, the cost for Kim Jong-un in pursuing the nuclear
weapons program. And this might, just might, make him
reconsider his policies. If it doesn't and the critics of
sanctions policy are right, that even the strictest enforcement
of sanctions will not make the Kim regime reconsider its
nuclear program. Even so, I believe enforcement of sanctions
and a containment policy are the right next steps, even as we
leave the door open for engagement down the road. In addition
to sending a message to other rogue regimes about the cost of
flouting international law, I think these pressures could also
weaken Kim Jon-un's grip on power. And while they might at some
point precipitate instability, potential instability, I believe
that this is an outcome that we should welcome, not fear,
because over the longer term, we should really be pursuing a
policy of unification of the two Koreas.
Let me just conclude with this point. While Kim Jong-un's
hold on power appears to be firm right now, I think there is a
growing sign of discord among the elite class. We have recently
seen an increasing rate of defection by very high-ranking
elites. All these frequent purges and executions of high-level
elites may help strengthen Kim Jon-un's rule in the short run,
but all this heavy-handed rule is more likely to corrode long-
term elite support for Kim.
This is, again, where the sanctions enforcement will help.
The more we intensify economic pressure against the Kim regime,
the more we shake the confidence of the elites, the more that
Kim Jong-un will be left vulnerable, as he will have less
foreign currency to underwrite the lifestyle of the elites,
whose support is essential in maintaining his grip on power.
And at the end of the day, it is when Kim Jong-un is facing
really an abyss, he might finally choose to disarm, or, failing
that, it may be that the North's policy will only change if a
different leadership fundamentally emerged. Tightening the
sanctions screws now, I think, will hasten that day. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Terry follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Albright.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER,
INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Albright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, for
holding this hearing.
North Korea's recent nuclear test, its second this year,
demonstrates its resolve and commitment to developing a nuclear
arsenal able to strike its enemies. Reversing that growing
threat must be a greater U.S. priority. This test, its largest
to date, combined with a number of recent ballistic missile
tests, should lead the United States and its partners to accept
that North Korea can strike its neighbors with nuclear weapons,
and it is making progress on building a long-range nuclear-
capable force.
Diplomatic efforts so far have proven inadequate to stop
North Korea's progress. However, when agreements were reached,
they improved transparency over North Korea's nuclear programs,
slowed its progress, and led to fewer regional provocations by
the regime. In short, negotiating with North Korea is a
strategy that can yield both short- and long-term gains. The
United States needs to reinvigorate its efforts to seek the
dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear arsenal for sure.
With regards to that endeavor, it has to be recognized that
China is not going to deliver North Korea's denuclearization.
Unless China dramatically changes its current policies, it is
not going to institute sanctions or other measures that it
views as risking the collapse of the North Korean regime.
Although we at my institute support increasing pressure on
China to apply more effective sanctions on North Korea, the
United States cannot rely on China to press hard enough to get
North Korea to make significant nuclear concessions. The United
States needs to find additional ways to influence North Korea,
including direct negotiations.
At my institute, we are still assessing the recent test,
but based on North Korea's statements and the yield of the
test, we preliminarily assessed that North Korea may have a
family of relatively reliable miniaturized fission weapons with
a destructive force rivaling the size of the Hiroshima blast
that can use plutonium or weapons-grade uranium and fit on a
number of ballistic missiles. North Korea's statement after the
test implies that North Korea could have learned to use
weapons-grade uranium in what it has called the standardization
of the nuclear warhead. This opens the path to building a large
number of miniaturized nuclear weapons using weapons-grade
uranium. North Korea is likely to be able to produce
considerably more weapons-grade uranium than plutonium and in
ways that largely escape our current detection.
Taking account of the recent tests, my institute estimates
that North Korea has about 12 to over 20 nuclear weapons. We
believe, over the next 5 to 10 years, it can significantly
increase the number of weapons.
There remains plenty of room to improve and strengthen the
sanctions on North Korea. To my institute, the immediate
priority is the United States sanctioning Chinese companies
involved in providing controlled or sensitive goods to North
Korea. The U.S. Government should use its authority to sanction
illicit actors in China that supply North Korea's nuclear
missile and other nuclear programs. In addition, in order to
prevent the further expansion of North Korea's nuclear
programs, more coordination is needed among allies to thwart
North Korea's overseas purchases for its nuclear and missile
programs. It is also useful to step up sanctioning of banks and
financial institutions involved in business with North Korean
nuclear missile and military programs.
Reestablishing meaningful negotiations with North Korea
will not be easy, but it should be a major U.S. priority. How
to achieve meaningful denuclearization negotiations, and what
they should cover requires much deeper study, but any
negotiation should be premised on a firm commitment to achieve
North Korean denuclearization and avoid in any way legitimizing
North Korean nuclear weapons. These negotiations should include
broader initial declarations of its uranium and plutonium
pathways to the bomb and provide access to nuclear sites
outside of the Yongbyon complex.
Moreover, the negotiations cannot focus only on the nuclear
program. They will need to ratchet back North Korea's ballistic
missile programs and resolve regional security issues. Finally,
North Korea must commit to not proliferate abroad and not to
engage in nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran or other
countries.
Congress has an important role in establishing U.S.
sanctions and sanctions policy on North Korea, and it should
encourage the administration to use its authorities given in
the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016.
It should also explore more ways to encourage China to apply
sanctions on North Korea. However, as I have said, the United
States should not depend solely on China. It also needs to
develop other ways to influence North Korea to denuclearize.
Engaging North Korea has historically shown that it yields
limitations and more transparency into North Korea's nuclear
activities compared to a policy of ignoring the threat while it
grows. Combined with greater efforts to rein in its illicit
activities and addressing regional security concerns, changing
the status quo of North Korea's ongoing dangerous provocations
is possible. New thinking is needed to reengage this dangerous
regime and start the process of achieving denuclearization.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I appreciate the witnesses'
comments.
The United States has engaged in negotiations with North
Korea in the past from time to time during the Bush
administration. We agreed to certain lifting of sanctions at
the commitment that Korea would do certain things. We lifted
the sanctions, started the flow back into North Korea, and
quickly found out that it was a ruse. They went back to doing
exactly what they did before.
While, Mr. Albright, I don't discount the importance of
diplomacy and negotiations, I don't think most of us are very
trustful that Kim Jong-un is an honest broker and that he is
somebody that we can count on to keep his word once he gives
it. I think that the sanctions that we have employed
heretofore, both by the United States and the international
community at large, have been largely unsuccessful in getting
any kind of change or desired change from North Korea. And, I
am increasingly believing that China's intransigence on the
issue is becoming more and more frustrating. On one hand, they
loudly proclaim that they are just as committed to stopping the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in North Korea as the rest of
us are, but yet they are really not doing that which they can
to make change.
The chief reason is, as I have talked with some of our
Chinese diplomats, they say it is their concern that there will
be a flood of refugees over the China border if they impose the
kind of sanctions, economic and otherwise, that would really
motivate North Korea that it could implode their economy. So,
there is a fear of that.
I am not sure that I buy that. In fact, I kind of almost
feel like, on one side, they are saying, ``Don't do it''; on
the other side, you know, they are allowing many of their
companies to provide the wherewithal to increase that nuclear
program.
I would really like to explore more ideas. I mean, we have
talked about the deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula,
which I strongly support. In fact, we just passed a bill that I
and Brad Sherman authored dealing with trilateral relationship
between us, Japan, and South Korea, but also strong language in
there about the deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula.
So, on one hand, that, you know, is a step in the right
direction, but China is also using all their political
influences to pressure China--or, excuse me, pressure Seoul not
to do that. In fact, that is probably one of the biggest
sources of political blowback that they are getting to getting
it done, because South Korea counts on China very heavily in
their economic projections and economic strength. So that kind
of pressure from China is very inordinate.
What are some of the other things that we can do to get
China to the table? I agree with targeted sanctions against
Chinese companies that are in the mix, you know, with this
Chinese--or excuse me, this North Korean proliferation. But Mr.
Sherman has suggested at times past--I think it is kind of
provocative--maybe we should be looking at other potential
economic sanctions against China because of their lack of
interest in getting this done. And I am asking, you know, what
are your thoughts on that? Are those possible motivators?
The other thing that I am wondering is--I know when it was
said during the campaign, a lot of people got real excited, but
what is the likelihood that China and South Korea at some point
in time, if North Korea develops a really robust nuclear
program and it is proven to be reliable, what is the likelihood
that South Korea and Japan, those two entities, might start
looking at their own nuclear programs in a defensive realm?
Those are my thoughts.
And, Dr. Cha, would you maybe start off your response?
Mr. Cha. Thank you, Chairman. I will try to address a
couple of these. I think they are all very important points,
and I think you have framed the policy problem quite well.
Let me just say, on negotiations, as someone who
participated in the last set of negotiations, the 2005-2007 Six
Party Agreed Framework, I know what that rabbit hole looks
like. And it will start out with--in terms of what we could
get. It will start out with a ban on--they will self-declare a
testing ban as long as we are in talks with them. And then, if
we are lucky, we might get a freeze on operations at the 5-
megawatt reactor at Yongbyon. I think that will be about as far
as we can get during the course of negotiations.
That freeze won't be verifiable in the sense that they
won't let the IAEA in, I don't think. And, of course, it won't
include anything outside of Yongbyon, even the one facility
that they have said is a uranium facility at Yongbyon. So I
think it is going to be--so we have been down that rabbit hole.
And it will do something, but, at best, it is a holding
position and a suboptimal holding position. So I am also one
for negotiations, but it is going to be very difficult.
On what we should do, I mean, I think there are two areas
of vulnerability that we should press on. With regard to China,
China doesn't respond to what North Korea does. China responds
to what the United States does in response to North Korea. And
whether it is secondary sanctioning or even something that is a
little bit more radical, including possibly altering the
disposition of our forces on the peninsula in a way that makes
our overall capabilities more robust but makes our forces less
vulnerable. That would be something China would take notice of.
And, with regard to North Korea, you have already hit on
it. Both of you have hit on it, and that is the information
issue. That is what they see as a vulnerability. But, the thing
is, either of these things entails more risk on the part of the
United States and our policies on this issue. What we see thus
far, what we all find so distasteful, the current position, is
because we have generally been quite risk-averse when it comes
to dealing with this problem. But, it has grown so out of
control that some of these other measures we might consider
that press on vulnerabilities of both China and North Korea are
there, but it requires us being willing to take on more risk.
Mr. Salmon. I am going to yield to the next question, but
the risk of the status quo is far worse than anything that you
are talking about as far as what those risks entail, I believe.
The risk of just allowing it to go as it is going right now is
a very frightening venture, and I think that if we are doing
risk assessment, you got to take that into account as well.
Mr. Lowenthal.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I would like to follow up on your questioning now. After
listening, I find this fascinating.
I have heard a lot about, you know, China and China's
intransigence and lack of compliance to really helping,
especially in terms of--and then the response of, what kinds of
pressure can we put on?
What about other kinds of alternatives? I am not really
understanding very well the role of China in the sense that, is
there a way that we can enlist China as a partner, not as an
adversary in this relationship, but as a partner in terms of
what does China fear about North Korea's weakness? Does China
need North Korea strong, or would they like to see something
different, and what are they frightened of? And what does China
want in all of this? I am not hearing, what would China want in
something like this? Because I am just hearing one side, what
we want, what we do. And I agree with that. But what does China
want in this relationship, and are they frightened of
something? I would like to kind of understand more if we are
really talking about other kinds of alternatives. Anybody?
Ms. Terry. Yes. I would like to just discuss some of the
points that the chairman and you have just made. And China,
just briefly to go over your point, I think economic sanctions,
trade, it is all good, but there is no political will in the
Obama administration. So I think we really need to still focus
on the secondary sanctions and target Bank of China, Bank of
Daedong, Chinpo Shipping, and so on.
Regarding your point about what does China fear, I think
part of what we can discuss with China is that China fears
instability in the Korean Peninsula. China fears unification
ultimately, because it does not want a pro-U.S. unified Korea
with potential U.S. forces on the----
Mr. Lowenthal. Is that an obstacle, or could that be a
potential for us to have discussions with them?
Ms. Terry. This is somewhat controversial, but I would like
to argue that--in terms of trying to help come up with creative
thinking is, say, if you can engage and try to have a candid
discussion with China. It would be very difficult to do so,
but--not only about the nuclear program, but the potential
instability and potential unification scenarios. And, we might
have to make that kind of grand bargain where we do sort of
promise to reduce U.S. troop presence or even it has to be,
post-unification, pulling U.S. forces out. But, that is
something that we could consider in addition to just sort of
trying to pressure China.
I just want to get back to your point about South Korea and
Japan arms race. I think that is a very big concern, that if we
let nuclear North Korea happen, ultimately, I think there will
be an instability in the region. Because South Korea is already
talking about bringing tactical nuclear--some South Koreans
are--bringing tactical nuclears back to South Korea, and they
will cause arms race both by South Korea and Japan.
Mr. Klingner. I would just add, Mr. Albright pointed out
the exponentially growing North Korean threat. We have had what
to some were sudden unexpected revelations that ``gambling was
going on in the casino,'' in that missiles that had been under
development for years had success, and that shocked people. So
now you have this new fear that the threat is real. It would be
humorous if it weren't disturbing.
So we have a submarine-launched ballistic missile which had
a breakthrough. The intermediate-range missile had a
breakthrough. Guam is now under direct threat. So it is a
question of, are we serious or not? There are things we can do
at the U.N. We should push for eliminating what is called the
``livelihood purposes'' loophole on the ban on North Korea's
export of resources. The loophole is bigger than the ban.
With regard to China, I think they don't want a crisis on
their border, but their behavior is only creating the
conditions that will bring about that crisis. The Obama
administration and the Bush administration have had
conversations with China, trying to explain that their
reluctance to pressure their ally is only bringing about the
crisis they don't want, and it is only going to cause the U.S.
and its allies to take responsive measures that they won't
like.
So we can try to induce their cooperation, but when we talk
about secondary sanctions on China, we can almost sort of toss
that off, but it is actually very, very important, because what
it can do is actually induce Chinese banks and businesses to do
things that the government doesn't want them to do.
We saw that back in the mid-2000s with Banco Delta Asia.
The Chinese Government didn't want Bank of China to cut off
North Korea. The Bank of China knew it could be susceptible
under U.S. law to being precluded from access to the U.S.
financial system. So the Bank of China, in essence, told the
government: Well, we hear you, but we have to disagree. We have
to cut off North Korea. Otherwise, the Bank of China could face
sanctions. So if we were to sanction even one Chinese entity,
it would send a very strong signal to the others.
Mr. Albright. Could I add to that? Is there still time?
Because I think it is very important that the enforcement of
the existing sanctions be done rather than--I mean, it is
important to look for new ones. I mean, maybe there is a silver
bullet out there and maybe SWIFT is potentially that.
But at the same time, it is critical to send a message to
China, because another issue with China is that on a lot of
these exports to North Korea, it claims it is just a big large
developing country that can't manage its own system. And, I
think, there is some truth to that. There are hundreds of
thousands of companies licensed for export in China. And even
if you take a European country, some of the smaller ones, you
are talking about hundreds or 1,000 companies that can do that.
So the control issues are profound.
But I think that that also creates an opportunity, that
China doesn't support these exports, but it is not going to do
anything. And I think the U.S. can play a very important role
in sending a signal into China that it needs to do it. And I
think it is critically important at this time to enforce the
sanctions that this Congress has passed. And there are
companies in China that are known to deal with North Korea, and
strong cases can be made that they are violating the sanctions
and the U.S. should actually sanction them.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
General Perry.
Mr. Sherman. I would ask for 1 minute.
I want to address this issue what I think China would want.
I mean, they would prefer if North Korea didn't have a nuclear
program, but that is not high on their list. They would like to
continue trade. That is not the highest thing on their list.
The purpose of sanctions is to force the regime to change its
policy by creating regime-threatening sanctions, and China does
not want this regime threatened.
And the one thing that they don't want----
Mr. Lowenthal. Because of----
Mr. Sherman. Because they could see, if this regime
implodes, two very bad things happen for China: Millions of
very poor North Koreans move north as refugees. And then you
might see a unification under the South Korean Government. And
unless we promise otherwise and unless they can believe the
promise, an American military, not on the 37th, 38th parallel,
but right up on their border. So, they don't want an American
Army on their border. They don't want the implosion of the
regime.
Mr. Lowenthal. I agree with all those things that you are
saying, but could that be the basis of a discussion?
Mr. Sherman. It ought to be, but I will yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thanks. Congressman Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cha, you suggested a new posture or profile for the
United States military in South Korea. Can you be specific?
Mr. Cha. Well, I think there is more that we can do in
terms of missile defense, not just one THAAD battery, but more
than one. My colleague Bruce referenced sea-based platforms in
terms of missile defense. SM3, I think that is another name.
And these sorts of things will both create better defense of
the peninsula and get China's attention.
Mr. Perry. What about land-based force?
Mr. Cha. So that is the next piece.
Mr. Perry. And other than missile defense, seagoing missile
defense, what about seagoing?
Mr. Cha. Seagoing missile defense----
Mr. Perry. No, other than missile defense. But I am talking
about more robust naval posture. Is that----
Mr. Cha. Yes. I think that, both in Japan and in Hawaii and
in Guam, and then the land-based forces on the Korean
Peninsula. I mean, there is an argument--I am not necessarily
advocating this argument, but there is an argument that could
be made in the sense that those forces traditionally have been
a tripwire for a second conventional ground invasion. That is
not going to happen again. And in that sense, the tripwire
concept may not be relevant anymore. There are other ways to
defend and maintain the strength of the U.S. extended
deterrence on the peninsula that don't require a tripwire and
that also don't leave forces vulnerable to chem, bio, or a
nuclear attack from the north.
Now, you know, this is not the forum in which to get into
details on things of that nature. But, all I am saying is that
we should be willing to discuss new things, as the chairman
said, new ideas, that make sense in terms of our defense
against a nuclear North Korea, but also that are things that
can create enough concern in the case of China that they might
be willing to change their own risk assessment of pressuring
North Korea.
Mr. Perry. What is South Korea's--how would they view or
how would they be interested in increasing those postures,
ground forces, sea-based----
Mr. Cha. I think there would be a great deal of interest in
things that augment the capabilities, both U.S. and combined
capabilities. The ground troops would be a very controversial
issue for them, just because there is a legacy issue there.
Mr. Perry. Right.
Mr. Cha. And that would be very controversial.
Mr. Perry. Okay. And then one final question from a
messaging standpoint or information operations, like the Voice
of America, et cetera, how robust is our capability now? Is it
used to the fullest extent? What can be done to increase that,
or should that be increased? And, does it have any effect at
all?
Mr. Cha. It definitely has an effect. Defector testimony
shows, not--well, 100 percent of defectors, but defector
testimony suggests close to 80 or 90 percent of people inside
North Korea have had exposure to a foreign radio broadcast.
This is really a question of resources, I think. The more
resources that can be put to this, the more you can enhance
that capability. I mean, there is a hardware issue there too,
in terms of, you know, where can you bounce these things off?
So, I guess you could say that the tube is kind of small, but
there is still a lot more that can go into that tube that would
have an impact.
Mr. Perry. What would be North Korea's response to
increasing the volume on that? No pun intended.
Mr. Cha. I think the regime would be very sensitive to it.
And this is a bigger vulnerability I think for them than THAAD,
for example.
Mr. Perry. When you say ``very sensitive,'' I mean, I am
sure they don't want any of it. They don't like what there is
now, and they are going to like it less if we do more, but what
is our risk in doing more?
Mr. Cha. There is a risk.
Mr. Perry. What is that risk?
Mr. Cha. Well, in the past, when the South Koreans
increased information coming across the border, the North
Koreans have threatened to take out the speakers. So there is
that risk. There is the risk that they could respond in anger
and shell an island. There is definitely a risk to it.
But my point is that these sorts of strategies will
necessarily entail more risk. Otherwise, we remain stuck in the
current cycle that we are in.
Mr. Perry. Thanks. Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Ms. Terry. Can I add a quick comment to that? I spent a lot
of time debriefing North Korean defectors. I think information
dissemination is one of the keys we have that we can use
against the North Korean regime. The risk is that they are
going to get angry, but so what? I mean, we are looking for
ways to work here. Monopoly on information is one of the
pillars of the regime's stability. This is how they were able
to survive for this long. So I think finding ways to try and
disseminate information into the north is critical for us.
And we have got to find ways to open the Internet to the
people of North Korea--I know we have been sort of working on
that--so they can have access to information, they can
communicate freely with their South Korean brethren and so on.
I think there are ways to maybe work with Google and Facebook
to pilot their global initiative in North Korea. I think we
need to increase the range and power of TVs and AM broadcasting
to North Korean audiences and so on. We can work on covert
ways. We can work with the intelligence community to find
covert ways. Whatever we can to get information into North
Korea, I think, is one of the things that we can actually
pursue.
Mr. Perry. Dr. Terry, doesn't that all have to be covert? I
mean, we can broadcast as much as we want. We can facilitate
some way for them to see the Internet. But if you don't have
the hardware and if it is punishable by death to be caught
viewing these things----
Ms. Terry. Sure. Even in overt ways. I think overt ways,
covert ways. I am just emphasizing the importance of trying to
get information into North Korea.
Mr. Perry. Thank you.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have seen how hard currency sanctions were more
successful than other sanctions in the past. Can you comment on
whether or not you think those types of sanctions would be as
effective or more effective today, and, if so, why or why not?
Mr. Klingner. I think it is first important to point out
the multiple objectives that sanctions and targeted financial
measures have. Some have said people are already impatient:
``Well, it has been 4 months. Sanctions haven't worked. Let's
go back to diplomacy,'' which had 20 years of failure.
But even before it changes North Korea's behavior, it is
enforcing U.S. Law. It is imposing a penalty or pain on those
that violate our law and U.N. resolutions. It constrains or
puts in place measures to constrain the inflow of items for
their prohibited nuclear missile programs, including money from
illicit activities. It puts into place measures to reduce the
risk of proliferation. And then, five, the most difficult in
conjunction with all your instruments of national power, it is
trying to alter their behavior.
So I would say on four of the five, the sanctions have
already been successful to some degree. The fifth is the most
difficult. But when we have a very small country with very few
avenues of access to the outside world--and that is mainly
China--it is I think a better target than Iran.
Some would say: ``Well, you can't sanction Iran, because it
is so big, it is so connected with the world, it has got oil,
et cetera; go after North Korea.''
Well, now that we had pressure on Iran, which brought about
the negotiations, now people are saying: ``Well, that worked
because it was so big and so well-connected; it won't work with
North Korea.''
I would argue the opposite.
Ms. Gabbard. Interesting.
Mr. Cha. May I add?
Ms. Gabbard. Dr. Cha.
Mr. Cha. So I would agree with what Bruce said. I think
there are two issues when we are talking about these currency
sanctions. I don't know, Representative Gabbard, if your
question is suggesting this. But one of them is--however it
is--is to reduce the North Koreans to having to carry suitcases
of cash if they want to do any sort of transaction. So that is
one. And that is the proliferation findings.
The other part--and this is the part that I am not sure if
your question is--is the freezing of their assets and accounts
overseas because that is a different--that is directly linked
to the leadership, right. And that could have a very big impact
on how this leadership thinks and addresses and behaves. And
so, whatever sanctions the committee is working, whatever
legislation, I think these are the two objectives. We want to
reduce them to having to carry suitcases of cash, and then we
also want to be able to target those assets that we think are
connected to the leadership wherever they are. So----
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
Mr. Albright.
Mr. Albright. Yeah. I think one of the problems, though, is
that China resists these kinds of sanctions. I mean, their view
is, if you close off the financial system to North Korea, and
it is concentrated in certain Chinese banks, it will collapse
the state. So you immediately run into this problem where they
just don't cooperate.
But at the same time, we don't really know what is going to
happen. And I think it is, again, an argument why we need to
get the administration to enforce the existing sanctions and
target some of these banks, target some of these entities, and
then let's see what happens.
One thing--I don't know, I don't want to take your time,
but I think, on the engagement, I don't think that we have to
accept crumby conditions of engagement, shutting down 5-
megawatt reactor--I forget the other condition you gave. I
mean, we simply say: No, it is not enough.
And even I was engaged in the discussions on the--before
the Leap Day Deal, and North Koreans were willing to shut down
and stop the centrifuges at the Pyongyang centrifuge plant. Who
knows if they would have followed through. But even that is not
enough today. We need to have more than that if there is going
to be a negotiation. So I think it is up to us to sculpt the
engagement, not to accept kind of the pitiful things that North
Korea may offer initially.
Ms. Gabbard. I think that is the remaining question. I
don't have time for it now, but, you know, people have raised
getting back to the negotiating table, setting the conditions
to be able to make that possible, but then addressing the
chairman's point about the lack of trust in actually being able
to execute knowing that there has to be truly enforceable
consequences to noncompliance in that situation.
So thank you all for being here.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Well, if we are going to achieve our political
objectives for the foreign policy establishment, et cetera,
here in this country, we need to do two things: First, don't
make compromises, and don't admit how weak our position is.
And, second, cling to the idea that we are somehow going to
completely disarm North Korea of all nuclear weapons. And then,
third, when we fail to achieve our objectives, which has been
true this entire century, just shrug it off, and as long as you
don't propose any radical change in policy, the foreign policy
establishment will say you know what you are talking about. And
the fact that we have totally failed to slow down this program
doesn't mean that we haven't achieved the political objectives
of all telling each other that we know what we are talking
about.
If I gather from your testimony, China is loath to accept
regime-threatening sanctions on this regime, and this regime is
not going to eliminate its nuclear program unless it faces
regime-threatening sanctions. The question here is, is this a
regime willing to settle for 10 to 15 nuclear weapons and a lot
of monitoring? Because we know that they won't give up all of
their nuclear weapons unless they face regime change and regime
endangerment.
Will they, just to avoid pressure and get along with China,
accept a world in which they are a limited nuclear state? I am
not saying that we would make this concession, but how would
that look from their standpoint?
Mr. Albright.
Mr. Albright. I think they would be interested. I mean, I
would be scared to make that kind of concession. It could be
very damaging in the region, but I take your point. And I would
say that----
Mr. Sherman. Are you predicting that, I mean, when you
close your eyes and think of the world 15 years from now, do
you think that North Korea will have a greater or lesser
nuclear capacity than they have today?
Mr. Albright. Well, I feel that they are going to have a
greater, but we have to be guided by denuclearization in order
to ensure----
Mr. Sherman. It would be nice to cling to denuclearization,
but as I think you predict, I think as most of us would
predict, if we keep doing what we have been doing, we are going
to get a very similar result, but I want to----
Mr. Albright. I am just afraid we are going to get that
result if we do accept 15 deliverable nuclear weapons.
Mr. Sherman. Okay, keep in mind, unless the regime is truly
threatened and close to falling, they are not going to give up
their 10 to 15 weapons because they feel they need those to
defend themselves from us. And keep in mind, when they asked
for a nonaggression treaty, the response from Vice President
Cheney was no because we contemplate aggression.
So it is not like I would expect them to completely. But I
want to go to a much smaller issue, not that it is a small
issue, and that is state sponsor of terrorism designation. The
first issue is, is this legally justified? One could argue
that, you know, long ago, North Korea kidnapped people. They
kidnapped people to make movies. They kidnapped people to get
advice on Japanese etiquette. They kidnapped people, and some
would say, well, that happened a long time ago so you can't
call them a state sponsor of terrorism. But they haven't
released them. So it is a continuing act of terrorism. They
haven't returned their bodies if they died of natural or
unnatural causes. So maybe that is a continuing act of
terrorism.
But I will ask Dr. Cha, what is the most recent act of
terrorism other than continuing to hold these hostages
committed by the North Korean regime?
Mr. Cha. I would focus on cyber. The attack against Sony
Pictures Entertainment.
Mr. Sherman. Yeah. I haven't studied the statute, but is
that something that justifies designating a state as a state
sponsor of terrorism?
Mr. Cha. I think it does. I mean, the administration
defined it as cyber vandalism, I think, or cybercrime, but
there was the destruction of hardware. There was a taking of
information.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. So it is a strong legal argument whether
you look at kidnapping movie actors and directors, or
vandalizing movie software.
But now let's look at the policy. Is it good policy to
designate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism? Does
that move us in the direction of limiting this regime?
Mr. Albright.
Mr. Albright. I think it is useful to consider. I mean, it
was a big goal of theirs to be taken off the list. So it
certainly argues to threaten to put them back on. I mean,
again, I don't know the legal aspect of this and whether cyber
attack is terrorism.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Klingner and Dr. Terry.
Mr. Klingner. I think if you look at 18 U.S. Code section
2331 and the definitions there of what constitutes
international terrorism, I think the Sony hack and the threats
of ``9/11-style attacks'' against a population, and these
threats were to intimidate and coerce a population, influence a
policy of government, et cetera; I think that in and of itself
fulfills it.
In my testimony in January, I included a list of other acts
that they have done, including attempts against----
Mr. Sherman. Good. So that is in our record. And, Dr.
Terry, would designating them be good foreign policy. I will
ask for a quick answer.
Ms. Terry. Yes. I absolutely agree. I think it would be
largely symbolic, to be honest, but North Korea was very keen
on getting off that list, as Victor knows. They tried very
hard. It truly bothered them, so I think it is useful. I think
it is a leverage that we can use against North Korea, and I do
think they have done a lot of things, including repeated
assassination attempts and kidnapping attempts on humans. So
there is a whole list of reasons why they can be put back on
the list.
Mr. Sherman. Just to conclude, I think we need to bring a
lot more effort and settle for a much smaller objective. We
have been trying to see a completely nonnuclear North Korea and
somehow achieve that without doing anything that ruffled
anybody's feathers, here or Beijing. What we ought to be is
settling for less and being willing to ruffle some feathers to
get even that limited objective. We should be willing to tax
Chinese exports to the United States. We should be willing to
build the Voice of America towers. We should be willing to list
them as a state sponsor of terrorism. They need a hell of a lot
more carrots and a hell of a lot more sticks if we are even
going to get them to something that most of you would say would
be an unacceptable solution.
It is just much better than what is likely to happen if we
do nothing. I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here. I come here as a member of this committee and
subcommittee and also as the co-chair of the Congressional
Caucus on Korea.
Let me begin by expressing my skepticism about the efficacy
of sanctions. Up here, when we want to condemn, cite, punish
bad behavior, almost always we invoke sanctions as if, well,
that will deter the behavior. And I don't know--a former
colleague of yours, Dr. Cha, Gary Hufbauer, wrote a very
thoughtful book years ago on the history of sanctions and how
effective they are and raised a lot of questions. You know, in
some cases, they seemed to have had the desired effect, but
usually, it is combined with some other external thing so that
at the margins, whoops, the sanctions really made it hurt--oil
prices plummeting or whatever it may be.
In and of themselves, it is very difficult to create a
regime that really can squeeze to the point where we get the
desired outcome and the intended target--you know, it renounces
its undesirable behavior.
And I am just concerned here that, with respect to North
Korea, I don't think we have--I mean, it is not apparent to me
that we have a lot of options. I have noticed, for example, in
the printed media now we are talking now about, well, maybe we
can try to get countries to send back North Korean workers to
deny North Korea that capital, that foreign exchange.
You mentioned, Dr. Cha, well, maybe we could target
leadership through certain sanctions. So Kim Jong-un can't, you
know, access Courvoisier. His father seemed to like
Courvoisier, as I recall. But if we are reduced to that, just
how effective, I mean, shouldn't we be realistic about what
sanctions can and cannot do? And it just seems to me that we
are, remember, the goal here is to give up that nuclear
ambition and destroy those existing 15 nuclear weapons or
whatever number. I mean, that is our goal. It may or may not be
achievable, but what sanction provides that tradeoff, from the
North Korean point of view?
Mr. Cha. Well, I have no disagreement with you,
Congressman, about the inefficacy of sanctions thus far. I
think where the policy debate really is, is that lack of
efficacy because sanctions in general don't work or because we
haven't done enough? And for many in the policy community, and
I think for this administration, the answer right now is we
haven't done enough because when we compare the sanctions on
DPRK versus those on Iran, the Iran sanctions were much more
comprehensive than what we are seeing on DPRK. So I think that
is where the administration is now and that is where they have
been pushing.
Having said that, I would agree with you. I mean, I think
the sanctions are meant to do one of three things, and none of
them are happening. They are supposed to either bring the North
back to the table, which they haven't done. They are supposed
to retard the growth of the program, which it hasn't done. Or,
it is supposed to destabilize the regime. And it hasn't done
any of these three things.
Mr. Connolly. I will just say, when I commended Gary
Hufbauer's book, that was pre-North Korea sanctions, I think,
and he really raised a broader question, not about these
sanctions with this regime, but sanctions in general. What kind
of foreign policy really are sanctions? And they are of dubious
value. I mean, sometimes they seem to have helped, but it is
not clear you can single them out and say: That was
dispositive. Rhodesia comes to mind.
Mr. Albright. Can I add one?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, and then we have got to go because we
have got votes.
Mr. Klingner. There is a difference between sanctions and
targeted financial measures. And the smart sanctions that have
been done in the last 10 years are very different from what
traditional trade sanctions have been. And a book I would
commend would be ``Treasury's War,'' by Juan Zarate, a former
Treasury Department official, which articulates the very strong
differences.
You know, it is only this year that we actually have as
many North Korean entities being sanctioned as Zimbabwe
entities. So it took a number of years just to get to the level
of Zimbabwe. And then, on the efficacy of diplomacy, some would
say, well, North Korea builds nuclear weapons when we are not
talking to them. That is true. They also build nuclear weapons
when we are talking to them, and they also build nuclear
weapons when they sign agreements never to build nuclear
weapons and when they promise to give up the weapons that they
promised never to build in the first place. We have had four
agreements where they would never build weapons and four to
give up those weapons, including the Leap Day agreement, which
was a very low bar, and they broke that one.
Mr. Albright. You know, I would just add, in the nuclear
area, sanctions have----
Mr. Salmon. We have 4 minutes before we have to vote.
Mr. Albright. Okay. I would just say, I think sanctions can
work in the nuclear area better. But you can't do it alone. And
I would agree with you. You have to have more.
Mr. Salmon. I thank the panel. I thank the committee
members and appreciate all of the insight.
This meeting is adjourned, thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]