[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACQUISITION
REFORM ACT: EXAMINING REMAINING CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 7, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-48
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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21-291 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mark Walker, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
Vacancy, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Steven Wallen, Director, Explosives Division, Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, Science and
Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Ms. Jill Vaughan, Assistant Administrator, Office of Security
Technologies, Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Michele Mackin, Director, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing
Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. T.J. Schulz, Executive Director, Security Manufacturers
Coalition:
Oral Statement................................................. 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Appendix
Questions From Chairman John Katko for Steven Wallen............. 45
Questions From Chairman John Katko for Jill Vaughan.............. 45
Questions From Chairman John Katko for Michele Mackin............ 50
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACQUISITION REFORM ACT: EXAMINING REMAINING
CHALLENGES
----------
Thursday, January 7, 2016
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Katko
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Carter, Walker, Ratcliffe,
Rice, Keating, and Payne.
Also present: Representative Hudson.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Transportation Security will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the remaining
challenges to transportation security acquisition reform. I now
recognize myself for an opening statement.
Taxpayer dollars should never be wasted on technology that
is not effective or meeting our needs. Unfortunately, this is a
problem with which the TSA has struggled for many years. Our
Government relies upon private-sector innovation to develop
security technologies. However, that innovation comes with a
price tag and we cannot reasonably expect the private sector to
spend millions of dollars into research and development of new
and emerging technologies without greater transparency,
communication, and interaction from both the TSA and the
Department of Homeland Security as to what their future needs
and technology investments will be.
In the agency's short history, TSA has exhibited a number
of deficiencies in its procurement process. However, the
acquisitions challenges facing TSA are not insurmountable. It
is incumbent upon this subcommittee to provide the necessary
oversight to streamline the agency's policies and procedures
while ensuring that taxpayer dollars are appropriately spent on
technologies that are proven to be effective at protecting our
Nation's transportation systems.
I recently sat down with Administrator Neffenger, and I
know that he is acutely aware of some of the challenges TSA
faces in this regard. I look forward to continuing to support
him in his efforts to lead and reform this agency along with
Ms. Vaughan and others. The purpose of today's hearing is to
examine the challenges that TSA faces in their research and
development of security technologies and how those challenges
affect TSA's acquisitions practices.
On December 18, 2014, before we were sworn in for this
Congress, President Obama signed the Transportation Security
Acquisition Reform Act into law, which was introduced by
Congressman Hudson, my predecessor last year. This bipartisan
bill was passed on the premise that TSA must be more
transparent and strategic in identifying its technology
investment needs by working closely with industry stakeholders
to develop and procure future technologies.
In addition, this legislation required TSA to submit to
Congress a strategic, 5-year technology investment plan. This
plan, which was provided to this committee in August of this
year, lays out the--last year, rather, lays out the agency's
vision for near-term technology investments while providing a
clearer vision of the agency's often opaque acquisition
strategy. Producing a 5-year plan is a meaningful step in the
right direction and includes a number of pragmatic observations
and goals. However, more must be done to build on the strategy
and turn words on paper into more efficient and streamline
procurement process. I will note that Ms. Vaughan was sworn in
as a new director of this project a few weeks before it became
incumbent upon her to come up with a strategy. So good luck,
Ms. Vaughan.
Earlier this year, Ranking Member Rice and I visited the
TSA integration facility to observe how TSA tests and evaluates
existing and emerging screening technologies. Additionally, we
have met with a number of industry stakeholders offering a
range of impressive technologies and innovations to better
secure our Nation's transportation systems. These stakeholders,
like TSA, share a desire to improve the security of the
traveling public and mitigate threats from a rapidly-evolving
threat landscape and have talked frankly about the state of
existing technologies and the challenges facing the agency.
However, many of them also have shared troubling anecdotes
about the bureaucratic difficulties they have encountered in
attempts to partner with TSA in the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate. I am concerned
that bureaucracy and stagnation are preventing TSA and DHS from
being responsive to legitimate security threats facing our
Nation.
Indeed, while it is critical that any acquisition process
includes safeguards to prevent wasting taxpayer dollars on poor
investments and unproven technology, it is just as critical
that we are not failing to meet our most basic mission, and
that is to prevent terror attacks against transportation
targets.
This is, no doubt, a challenge and I am intent on holding
both TSA and industry accountable to reasoned effective
investment strategy. I am concerned about whether TSA is making
procurement and investment decisions in a vacuum without
leveraging sufficient support from other Government experts and
stakeholders.
Additionally, I remain unconvinced that TSA and Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate are working
closely enough to develop and test existing and future
technology. A lack of cross-pollination and communication
between these entities is, I believe, hindering our ability to
meet mission needs.
I look forward to hearing different perspectives from our
witnesses today on how DHS and TSA work together to make their
procurement decisions; how this committee's legislation has
informed this process; and what more needs to be done to ensure
that taxpayer dollars are being spent in a deliberate and
strategic manner with an eye towards keeping us safe. I would
like to thank all of you for being here today and we have a
two-paneled hearing.
I will note that prior to preparing here today, I have been
encouraged about what I have heard about some of the
improvements being made at TSA and I am looking forward to
hearing about similar improvements at DHS if, in fact, they do
exist. Note that we are not here to indict anybody. We are here
to just find out how we can make the process better. It has
gotten better. It needs to get better, and that is what this
whole goal today is about.
We will begin by hearing testimony from a panel of
Government witnesses followed by a panel representing the
security technology industry.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman John Katko
January 7, 2016
Taxpayer dollars should never be wasted on technology that is not
effective or meeting our needs--unfortunately, this is a problem with
which the Transportation Security Administration has struggled for many
years. Our Government relies upon private-sector innovation to develop
security technologies. However, that innovation comes with a price tag,
and we cannot reasonably expect the private sector to spend millions of
dollars in the research and development of new and emerging
technologies without greater transparency and communication from both
TSA and the Department of Homeland Security as to what their future
needs and technology investments will be.
In the agency's short history, TSA has exhibited a number of
deficiencies in its procurement processes. However, the acquisitions
challenges facing TSA are not insurmountable, and it is incumbent upon
this subcommittee to provide the necessary oversight to streamline the
agency's policies and procedures, while ensuring that taxpayer dollars
are appropriately spent on technologies that are proven to be effective
at protecting our Nation's transportation systems. I recently sat down
with Administrator Neffenger, and I know that is he is acutely aware of
some of the challenges TSA faces in this regard. I look forward to
continuing to support him in his efforts to lead and reform this
agency.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the challenges the
Transportation Security Administration faces in their research and
development of security technologies and how those challenges affect
TSA's acquisitions practices. On December 18, 2014, President Obama
signed the ``Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act'' into law,
which was introduced by Congressman Hudson last year. This bipartisan
bill was passed on the premise that TSA must be more transparent and
strategic in identifying its technology investment needs, while working
closely with industry stakeholders to develop and procure future
technologies. In addition, this legislation required TSA to submit to
Congress a strategic 5-year technology investment plan. This plan,
which was provided to this committee in August of this year, lays out
the agency's vision for near-term technology investments, while
providing a clearer vision of the agency's often opaque acquisitions
strategy. Producing a 5-year plan is a meaningful step in the right
direction and includes a number of pragmatic observations and goals.
However, more must be done to build on this strategy and turn words
on paper into a more efficient and streamlined procurement process.
Earlier this year, Ranking Member Rice and I visited the Transportation
Systems Integration Facility to observe how TSA tests and evaluates
existing and emerging screening technologies. Additionally, we have met
with a number of industry stakeholders offering a range of impressive
technologies and innovations to better secure our Nation's
transportation systems. These stakeholders, like TSA, share a desire to
improve the security of the traveling public and mitigate threats from
a rapidly-evolving threat landscape and have talked frankly about the
state of existing technologies and the challenges facing the agency.
However, many of them also have shared troubling anecdotes about the
bureaucratic difficulties they have encountered in attempts to partner
with TSA and the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate.
I am concerned that bureaucracy and stagnation are preventing TSA
and DHS from being responsive to legitimate security threats facing our
Nation. Indeed, while it is critical that any acquisitions process
include safeguards to prevent wasting taxpayer dollars on poor
investments and unproven technology, it is just as critical that we are
not failing in our most basic mission--to prevent terror attacks
against transportation targets. This, no doubt, is a challenge, and I
am intent on holding both TSA and industry accountable to a reasoned,
effective investment strategy. I am concerned about whether TSA is
making procurement and investment decisions in a vacuum, without
leveraging sufficient support from other Government experts and
stakeholders. Additionally, I remain unconvinced that TSA and the
Department of Homeland Security's Science & Technology Directorate are
working closely enough to develop and test existing and future
technology. A lack of cross-pollination and communication between these
entities is, I believe, hindering their ability to meet mission needs.
I look forward to hearing different perspectives from our witnesses
today on how DHS and TSA work together to make procurement decisions,
how this committee's legislation has informed this process, and what
more needs to be done to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being spent
in a deliberate and strategic manner.
I would like to thank all of you for being here today. We have a
two-panel hearing here today. We will begin by hearing testimony from a
panel of Government witnesses, followed by a panel representing the
security technology industry.
Mr. Katko. With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of
the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from New York, Miss Rice for
any statements she may have.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I want to thank
you for convening this hearing and I want to thank the
witnesses for coming to talk with us about TSA's technology
acquisition process, its strengths, and weaknesses, and what
TSA is doing to make the process more effective and more
efficient.
The Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act was
signed into law just over 1 year ago. Among other things, the
law requires the administrator to establish a strategic 5-year
technology investment plan and submit its intentions to
Congress. The administrator, with the approval of the
Secretary, published the 2015 report to Congress in August of
last year. This 5-year plan shows us the full scope of TSA's
investment objectives and it is a good start. But there are
clearly some challenges that need to be addressed.
In December GAO released a report assessing TSA's
acquisition process, specifically, its process for testing and
evaluating screening technology. This test and evaluation
process is a necessary step that allows TSA and DHS to
determine whether technologies meet mission needs before
proceeding with procurement and deployment which saves the
agency time and money. The GAO report acknowledges that TSA has
come up with ways to improve the test and evaluation process in
part by developing a third-party testing strategy in order to
determine whether or not a vendor's technology is immature
before TSA and DHS begin the test and the evaluation process.
Unfortunately, we have learned from this report that TSA
has yet to implement that strategy. Allowing third-party
testing and evaluation would determine early on if a certain
technology is mature enough to deploy which will save,
obviously, time and money, and prevent wasteful spending.
So I hope to hear from our witnesses today why that
strategy has not yet been implemented and when we can expect
that it will be. While third-party testing has yet to be
finalized, I am pleased to learn that TSA has been highly
responsive to GAO's recommendations. I agree with the Chairman,
Ms. Vaughan, you are not in an enviable position, but you were
kind enough to take some time to meet with me yesterday and as
a result of that, I think that this is going to be a very
fruitful hearing.
So with TSA's screening more than 1 million passengers and
checked bags, and more than 3 million carry-on bags every
single day, it is critical that TSA utilize taxpayer dollars as
efficiently as possible to procure the most effective
technology available. We know that those numbers will only keep
growing. The Federal Aviation Administration aerospace forecast
for fiscal years 2015 to 2030 projects the number of passengers
on U.S. carriers to increase 2 percent each year over the next
20 years.
So TSA clearly needs technology that will cater to such
growth, and as new threats emerge there is no question that we
need to prioritize certain security-related technologies over
others. That is why it is so important that TSA do the work now
to establish and finalize all of the components of a
straightforward and cost-efficient acquisition process in order
to ensure that the agency can continue to fulfill its mission
and keep passengers safe.
I appreciate the fact that TSA has been so responsive to
the GAO report. I truly do appreciate the opportunity to talk
with our witnesses today about TSA's efforts to improve their
acquisition processes. Among other things, I look forward to
learning more about how TSA works with DHS to evaluate the
different technologies.
I am also interested in the ways in which TSA incentivizes
small businesses to be able to innovate and compete with larger
companies that provide screening technology. That is probably
one of the biggest challenges I think that we face today.
TSA's acquisitions process has been described as too long
and too expensive for large businesses, so I can only imagine
the issues that arise with small businesses, other start-ups
that are trying to break into a field, that are obviously at a
competitive disadvantage, and may endure a lengthy process only
to learn their products aren't mature enough for deployment. So
I hope our witness can speak to that point as well.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I
look forward to a productive conversation today. I yield back
the balance of my time.
[The statement of Miss Rice follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kathleen Rice
January 7, 2016
The Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act was signed into
law just over 1 year ago. Among other things, the law requires the
administrator to establish a strategic 5-year technology investment
plan and submit its intentions to Congress. The administrator, with the
approval of the Secretary, published the 2015 report to Congress in
August of last year. This 5-year plan shows us the full scope of TSA's
investment objectives, and it's a good start--but there are clearly
some challenges that need to be addressed.
In December, GAO released a report assessing TSA's acquisition
process--specifically, TSA's process for testing and evaluating
screening technology. This test and evaluation process is a necessary
step that allows TSA and DHS to determine whether technologies meet
mission needs before proceeding with procurement and deployment, which
saves the agency time and money.
The GAO report acknowledges that TSA has come up with ways to
improve the test and evaluation process, in part by developing a third-
party testing strategy, in order to determine whether or not a vendor's
technology is immature before TSA and DHS begin the test and evaluation
process.
But unfortunately, we've learned from this report that TSA has yet
to implement that strategy. Allowing third-party testing and evaluation
would determine early on if a certain technology is mature enough to
deploy, which will save time and money and prevent wasteful spending.
So I hope to hear from our witnesses today why that strategy has
not yet been implemented, and when we can expect that it will be. While
third-party testing has yet to be finalized, I am pleased to learn that
TSA has been highly-responsive to GAO's recommendations. With TSA
screening more than 1 million passengers and checked bags and more than
3 million carry-on bags every day, it's critical that TSA utilize
taxpayer dollars as efficiently as possible to procure the most
effective technology available.
We know that those numbers will only keep growing. The Federal
Aviation Administration Aerospace Forecast for fiscal years 2015-2035
projects the number of passengers on U.S. Carriers to increase 2
percent each year over the next 20 years. So TSA clearly needs
technology that will cater to such growth, and as new threats emerge,
there's no question that we need to prioritize certain security-related
technologies over others.
That's why it's so important that TSA do the work now to establish
and finalize all the components of a straightforward and cost-efficient
acquisition process, in order to ensure that the agency can continue to
fulfill its mission and keep passengers safe. Again, I appreciate the
fact that TSA has been so responsive to the GAO report, and I
appreciate the opportunity to talk with our witnesses today about TSA's
efforts to improve their acquisition processes.
Among other things, I look forward to learning more about how TSA
works with DHS to evaluate technologies. I'm also interested in the
ways in which TSA incentivizes small businesses to be able to innovate
and compete with larger companies that provide screening technology.
TSA's acquisitions process has been described as too long and too
expensive for large businesses--so I can only imagine the issues that
arise with small businesses that may be at a competitive disadvantage,
and may endure a lengthy process only to learn their products aren't
mature enough for deployment. So I hope our witnesses can speak to that
point as well.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Miss Rice.
Our first witness is Mr. Steven Wallen, who currently
serves as the director of the Explosives Division in the
Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate. Previously Mr. Wallen worked for the United States
Secret Service for 20 years where he managed the Science and
Technology Group, including the Engineering Research and
Development Branch. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wallen to
testify.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN WALLEN, DIRECTOR, EXPLOSIVES DIVISION,
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Wallen. Good afternoon, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member
Rice, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify alongside my
colleague from TSA on the ways the Science and Technology
Directorates' work on transportation security technology
supports the aviation security mission. In this testimony I
will discuss S&T's approach to research and development and how
our partnerships with TSA and others are leading to new
aviation security in explosive detection and mitigation
solutions.
S&T's mission is to deliver effective and innovative
insight, methods, and solutions for the critical needs of the
Homeland Security enterprise. Under Dr. Brothers' leadership as
Under Secretary, S&T has focused the last 2 years on reshaping
S&T's approach to R&D. To achieve this, S&T set up
interdisciplinary teams to work closely with field operators,
to identify challenges and develop user-driven solutions. S&T
has initiated several programs to advance technology
development and reach operational goals. Our Apex projects
represent some of the highest profile and most revolutionary
projects in the directorate. These ambitious projects look at
the Nation's security strategically and address future
challenges while continuing to support today's operational
needs.
The Apex screening and speed project is tailored to address
maximizing the effectiveness of screening while minimizing
inconvenience to travelers. S&T's Apex program is supported by
a new category of resources called Apex Technology Engine
Teams. These engines provide expertise in focused topic areas
and enable crosscutting R&D that moved S&T's entire portfolio
forward.
S&T has also recently reinstituted Integrated Product
Teams. The IPTs are initially addressing 6 topic areas:
Aviation security, biological threats, counterterrorism, border
security, cybersecurity, and first responder resources. Through
the IPTs S&T is implementing a formal process for identifying,
validating, and prioritizing technical capability needs to help
guide future R&D investments within DHS.
The aviation security IPT is designed to address a wide
array of topics including checkpoint check baggage, air cargo,
systems architecture and integration, and emerging threats. The
aviation security IPT is chaired by TSA, and has subgroups that
are jointly chaired by TSA and S&T and include members from
other DHS and non-DHS organizations.
Beyond the IPT process, S&T works with TSA in two
significant ways. One of those ways is through my division of
S&T, the Explosives Division. We are devoted to protecting
citizens and our country's infrastructure against the
devastating effects of explosives, by taking innovative
approaches to detection and countermeasures. Through our work
with TSA, industry, academia, and other Government agencies,
S&T delivers concepts, science, technologies, and systems that
increase the country's ability to detect explosives and
mitigate the effects of an explosive blast.
The Explosives Division's portfolio is divided into three
operational areas: Aviation solutions, intermodal solutions and
facilities protection, and foundational science. Aviation
solutions develops cost-effective systems for screening air
cargo, checked baggage, carried item, and people at
checkpoints.
Intermodal solutions and facilities protection develops
technologies capable of screening high throughput areas where
traditional checkpoints are neither effective nor efficient.
Additionally, they developed tools to improve current canine
capabilities and screening methods. Vehicle screening methods.
Foundational science evaluates homemade and conventional
explosives, and blast phenomenology that makes applied R&D
possible. S&T's Explosives Division regularly interacts with
various offices in TSA and works closely with TSA's Office of
Security Capabilities. Our organizations share information on
goals, requirements, and current and proposed projects. Both
organizations frequently offer to hold joint meetings with
vendors to evaluate the status of projects, discuss new
technology, or discuss proposals.
Another significant way in which S&T works to further TSA's
mission is through the Transportation Security Lab in Atlantic
City, New Jersey. TSL is 1 of 5 S&T labs and has a specialized
campus and a highly-experienced staff who are dedicated to
advancing detection technology from conception to deployment.
In addition to its research and assessment activities, TSL
houses an independent test and evaluation group that advances
TSA's mission by conducting certification and qualification
tests on detection technologies. TSL also provides technical
assistance to help industry mature their concepts in
preparation for certification and qualification testing. S&T
brings to bear a range of capabilities and expertise in support
of TSA in the explosives detection and mitigation portfolio.
The aviation security IPT, my division and the TSL, we are
investing with TSA and other stakeholders in both evolutionary
and revolutionary improvements in transportation security.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
committee today and welcome your questions and the opportunity
to further discuss our work.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wallen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven Wallen
January 7, 2016
Good afternoon Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) work on
transportation security technology. In this testimony, I will discuss
S&T's approach to research and development (R&D) and how our
partnerships with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the
private sector, and universities are leading to new explosives
detection and mitigation solutions.
S&T's mission is to deliver effective and innovative insight,
methods, and solutions for the critical needs of the Homeland Security
Enterprise (HSE). Many of the constraints that S&T and other Federal
R&D organizations face result, often indirectly, from processes and
authorities suited to a previous era of relatively less competition for
technical expertise and less emphasis on organizational agility and
responsiveness to rapid change. The homeland security mission
encompasses numerous complex threats that evolve quickly and strain
operational capabilities running on traditional, multi-year development
and acquisition cycles. Under Dr. Reginald Brothers' leadership as
Under Secretary, S&T has focused the last 2 years on reshaping S&T's
approach to R&D to overcome those constraints. That meant finding ways
to mine sources of innovation like start-ups that may not traditionally
work with Government. To achieve this, we set up interdisciplinary
teams working closely with field operators to accelerate translation of
operational challenges into real, user-driven solutions. And that meant
speeding up our internal processes to the maximum extent possible to
ensure long-term relevance of solutions that become operational and
enter wide-spread use.
To foster that approach to R&D, we have focused on five priorities:
Develop visionary goals for the organization.
Produce an actionable strategy.
Foster an empowered workforce.
Deliver force-multiplying solutions to homeland security
stakeholders.
Energize a Homeland Security Industrial Base.
visionary goals
In the past, S&T had a very operational focus in helping to bridge
capability gaps identified by component partners and stakeholders.
While S&T continues to work daily with component partners, first
responders, and other stakeholders on immediate issues, the
organization undertook an effort last year to create comprehensive,
far-reaching visionary goals that look 20 or more years into the
future. These visionary goals serve as our strategic direction and will
ultimately improve DHS's capabilities and make our Nation more secure.
Screening at Speed: Security that Matches the Pace of
Life.--Noninvasive screening at speed will provide for
comprehensive threat protection while adapting security to the
pace of life rather than adapting life to security. Unobtrusive
screening of people, baggage, or cargo will enable the seamless
detection of threats while respecting privacy, with minimal
impact to the pace of travel and speed of commerce.
A Trusted Cyber Future: Protecting Privacy, Commerce, and
Community.--In a future of increasing cyber connectivity,
underlying digital infrastructure will be self-detecting, self-
protecting, and self-healing. Users will trust that information
is protected, illegal use is deterred, and privacy is not
compromised. Security will operate seamlessly in the
background.
Enable the Decision Maker: Actionable Information at the
Speed of Thought.--Predictive analytics, risk analysis, and
modeling and simulation systems will enable critical and
proactive decisions to be made based on the most relevant
information, transforming data into actionable information.
Even in the face of uncertain environments involving chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents, accurate,
credible, and context-based information will empower the aware
decision maker to take instant actions to improve critical
outcomes.
Responder of the Future: Protected, Connected, and Fully
Aware.--The responder of the future is threat-adaptive and
cross-functional. Armed with comprehensive physical protection,
interoperable tools, and networked threat detection and
mitigation capabilities, responders of the future will be
better able to serve their communities.
Resilient Communities: Disaster-Proofing Society.--Critical
infrastructure of the future will be designed, built, and
maintained to withstand naturally-occurring and man-made
disasters. Decision makers will know when disaster is coming,
anticipate the effects, and use already-in-place or rapidly-
deployed countermeasures to shield communities from negative
consequences.
These goals will serve as our strategic direction and will
ultimately improve DHS's capabilities and make our Nation more secure.
S&T will continue to provide operational support and help stakeholders
Nation-wide meet near-term requirements while, with the Visionary Goals
as a guide, also facilitating longer-term R&D opportunities with public
and private-sector communities.
force-multiplying solutions
The Apex Program
Grounded in our Visionary Goals and working in mission areas that
cut across our DHS component partners, S&T launched 6 new Apex projects
including 1 in direct partnership with TSA. These ambitious programs--
which are based on vetted, long-term requirements of DHS operational
components--look strategically at the Nation's security and address
future challenges while continuing to support today's operational
needs. It is worth noting that in order to create the new Apex
projects, we reduced the overall number of programs at S&T to have
fewer, but more impactful, projects. New Apex project areas include the
following: Biothreat awareness, aviation screening, next-generation
cyber infrastructure, flood awareness, next-generation first responder,
and border situational awareness. In addition to existing Apex projects
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection on passenger screening (the
Apex Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering Program) and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) on data analytics (the Apex Border
Enforcement Analytics Program), Apex projects represent some of the
highest-profile and most promising projects in the Directorate.
Engines
S&T's Apex program is supported by a new category of projects
called Apex Technology Engine Teams (Engines) that provide expertise in
focused topic areas, enable cross-cutting R&D, and benefit S&T's entire
portfolio including our work with TSA. Engines represent a novel
approach in S&T for realizing S&T's Visionary Goals and powering
innovation. The first wave of Engines includes the following:
Data Analytics
Situational Awareness and Decision Support
Communications and Networking
Behavioral Economics and Social Sciences
Identity and Access Management
Modeling and Simulation
Our Engines harness subject-matter expertise and capabilities
across the Department and leverage technological, scientific,
industrial, and academic communities to provide continuous support in
areas of need common to multiple, and sometimes all, DHS component
agencies. S&T's Engines identify and share subject-matter expertise,
technical solutions and tools, best practices, lessons learned, and
reusable products and solutions on behalf of Apex and other S&T
projects. Collaboration to leverage knowledge from the DHS enterprise
and external stakeholders are core components of the Engine approach.
In less than a year, the Engines model has already begun to take
root. As one example, the Data Analytics Engine works with nearly every
operational component in DHS. It recently won an award for work with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency on the U.S. Fire
Administration's National Fire Incident Records System and has a highly
successful program underway with ICE's Homeland Security
Investigations. Additionally, the Data Analytics Engine continues to
support customer projects such as TSA's third-party pre-screening by
providing technical evaluation of analytics software.
Integrated Product Teams
Science and technology are near-universally acknowledged as
critical elements to future operational success. By prioritizing
solutions that substantially multiply the effects of manpower and other
existing assets, components and customers are more likely to recognize
S&T's value and integrate a jointly-developed R&D portfolio into their
procurement cycles and, ultimately, their operations. In the last year,
we have made significant strides in this area including, most
significantly, re-establishing the Department's Integrated Product
Teams (IPT) as part of the Secretary's April 2014 Unity of Effort
initiative.
In August, the Secretary directed S&T to reinstitute these cross-
departmental IPTs for the purpose of identifying technological
capability gaps and coordinating R&D to close those gaps across the
mission areas of the Department. The overall effort is led by S&T, but
the individual IPTs are led by senior representatives from the
operational components with representation from the Joint Requirements
Council (JRC) and support from S&T.
One of the first 5 topic areas for IPTs is Aviation Security and is
chaired by TSA. The remaining 4 topic areas are Biological Threats,
Counterterrorism, Border Security, and Cyber Security. S&T will also
continue its on-going IPT supporting our Nation's first responders
through the First Responders Resource Group, and the IPT will create
additional sub-IPTs to address key issues such as resilience. Going
forward, the IPTs will be one mechanism by which the Department
identifies and coordinates its R&D efforts to align DHS's priority
missions.
Acquisition Support in the Department
S&T's Office of Test and Evaluation oversees test and evaluation
(T&E) for DHS major acquisitions including at TSA, ensuring homeland
security technologies are reliable, interoperable, and effective. S&T
provides test and evaluation oversight for the Department's major
acquisition programs housed by the DHS components. In this capacity,
S&T develops DHS-wide T&E policies and procedures, acts as principal
advisor on operational T&E to the Office of the Secretary and the
component heads, and manages a T&E Center of Excellence to support the
Department. As an independent T&E organization within DHS, the
objective is to help every program plan and execute robust T&E
throughout the acquisition life cycle, bringing credible assessments to
all acquisition decisions.
For pre-acquisition requirements development, S&T has also been an
active participant in the Department-wide JRC, a part of the
Secretary's Unity of Effort Initiative. The JRC identifies common
capability needs and challenges across DHS components and will work as
an essential input into S&T's own R&D process. In addition to JRC
membership, S&T currently provides the JRC's primary analytic
resources. As such, S&T is helping develop and refine JRC analysis,
methodology, and process in addition to partnering with topic-specific
teams to conduct capabilities-based assessments. Working under the
direction of the JRC chair and with the other JRC stakeholders, S&T
will establish a lasting and functional framework for the Department's
requirements process.
homeland security industrial base
In many cases, DHS--more than many Federal agencies such as the
Department of Defense--is dependent on commercially-available, off-the-
shelf products to achieve its mission. As a result, partnership with
industry, specifically in product development, is essential. R&D
projects can yield isolated, one-off solutions, but a truly successful
portfolio must strategically shape the shelf by inserting homeland
security applications, if not as primary use cases or applications, at
least as considerations during companies' product development cycles.
If successful, that approach results in numerous products on the shelf
that operators may use.
S&T has enjoyed considerable success expanding and refining
outreach to industry including in the area of explosives detection and
mitigation. We continue to host industry days to inform and educate the
private sector on our direction and available opportunities for
partnership, including one last June dedicated to checkpoints and S&T's
screening-focused Apex project. We published a new S&T Strategic Plan
and overhauled S&T's website to be more informative and transparent to
potential private-sector partners. Additionally, we launched innovative
accelerator and prize competition platforms to reach innovators and
communities that may have never heard from or worked with Government
before. S&T expanded our Silicon Valley presence with a pilot program
that aims to maintain constant, face-to-face contact with venture
capital and start-up communities outside the Beltway, including in the
Silicon Valley area. By combining these efforts with willing partners
within the Department, including in the Management Directorate and
Office of General Counsel, we are beginning to see real interest in
private-sector participation in a Homeland Security Industrial Base.
r&d and t&e in explosives detection and mitigation
S&T's Explosives Division is devoted to protecting citizens and our
country's infrastructure against the devastating effects of explosives
by seeking innovative approaches in detection and countermeasures.
Through our work with operational partners like TSA and with industry,
S&T delivers concepts, science, technologies, and systems that increase
the HSE's ability to detect explosives and mitigate the effects of an
explosive blast. The Explosives Division's portfolio is divided into
three operational areas:
Aviation Solutions, developing cost-effective systems for
screening air cargo, checked baggage, carried items, and people
at checkpoints that will improve detection capabilities, reduce
false alarm rates, and improve the overall customer experience.
Intermodal Solutions and Facilities Protection, developing
technologies capable of screening in high-throughput areas
where traditional checkpoints are neither effective nor
efficient and enhancing tools to improve current canine and
trace detection screening methods.
Foundational Science, determining explosives and blast
phenomenology that makes applied R&D possible, including the
study of explosive material characteristics relevant to
discrimination and detection and the assessment of blast
effects on aircraft and infrastructure.
In addition to the broader approaches and capabilities in S&T
described above, below are descriptions of a number of elements that
are specifically contributing to the success of the explosives R&D
portfolio.
Partnership with TSA
Through the Aviation Security IPT, S&T is implementing a formal
process for identifying, validating, and prioritizing technological
capability gaps to help guide future R&D investments within DHS S&T.
The Aviation Security IPT includes 5 Sub-IPTs: Checkpoint, Checked
Baggage, Emerging Threats, Air Cargo, and System Architecture and
Integration. Although the primary IPT is chaired by TSA, the Sub-IPTs
are jointly chaired by TSA and DHS S&T and include members from other
organizations such as Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Secret
Service, the Federal Protective Service, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The Aviation Security IPT charter was signed on October
15, 2015, and the results of the capability gaps evaluation, program
crosswalk, and R&D plan are currently being combined and prioritized by
a cross-component body of senior leaders, known as the S&T Research
Council.
S&T's Explosives Division regularly interacts with various offices
in TSA and often works closely with TSA's Office of Security
Capabilities. The organizations share information on goals,
requirements, and current and proposed projects. Both organizations
frequently offer to hold joint meetings with vendors to evaluate the
status of projects, discuss new technology, or discuss proposals. The
organizations are evaluating the means by which to use proposals
submitted to the other organization's Broad Agency Announcements to
expedite the procurement process.
Aviation Checkpoint Screening at Speed Apex project
Our Aviation Checkpoint Screening at Speed Apex project is
developing next-generation, leap-ahead screening hardware with
potential to substantially improve the security and passenger
experience at checkpoints. The Screening at Speed Apex specifically
focuses on developing the technologies and framework that is compatible
with TSA's vision for an Aviation Checkpoint of the Future while at the
same time enhancing TSA's ability to reliably detect smaller and
evolving threats and to distinguish potential homemade explosive (HME)
threats from items commonly carried by passengers. S&T envisions a
future where TSA screeners are able to spend less time on complicated
images and more time observing and assisting passengers and resolving
alarms. The technology being developed as part of the Screening at
Speed Apex will strengthen security and lead to expedited passenger and
baggage screening.
Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)
Located in Atlantic City, New Jersey, TSL is one of S&T's 5 labs
and is dedicated to advancing detection technology from conception to
deployment through applied research, test and evaluation, assessment,
certification and qualification testing. TSL's Independent Test and
Evaluation group provides certification and qualification tests.
Additionally, they create laboratory assessments that provide DHS
components, including TSA, with critical information about equipment
and its ability to detect explosives and other contraband. TSL also
provides system developers and manufacturers with a range of explosive
test articles to help them develop software to locate explosive threats
artfully concealed on passengers or in their luggage. With a
specialized campus; a highly-experienced staff including physicists,
chemists, engineers, and mathematicians; and numerous cooperative
research and development agreements with industry and academia, TSL is
a National asset for transportation security.
DHS Tyndall Reactive Materials Group (TRMG)
Another important DHS S&T asset which supports the work of TSA and
furthers aviation security is the TRMG. The TRMG is an explosives data
collection facility located at Tyndall Air Force Base in Panama City,
Florida, which collects and maintains data on explosive materials using
specialized facilities and equipment under the oversight of DHS S&T.
One of the key ways in which the TRMG supports DHS S&T and TSA programs
is by collecting large amounts of data on HME materials. TRMG personnel
work to meet the needs of the Electronic Baggage Screening Program
(EBSP) and the Passenger Screening Program (PSP), by providing vendors
with information and a test platform for algorithm development to
detect new threats. Their work is designed to keep pace with the
dynamic and expanding requirements and threats at transportation
screening portals and to maintain the capacity to conduct testing on
systems and technologies to detect improvised explosives.
Center of Excellence for Awareness and Localization of Explosives-
Related Threats (ALERT)
Led by Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts, ALERT is 1
of S&T's 10 university-based Centers of Excellence (COE) and is
dedicated to transformational research, technology, and educational
development surrounding explosives-related threats. The COE network is
an extended consortium of hundreds of universities conducting
groundbreaking research to address homeland security challenges. S&T's
COEs work closely with the homeland security community to develop
customer-driven, innovative tools and technologies to solve real-world
challenges. ALERT's researchers bring strengths in designing advanced
sensors; detecting weakly-defined targets from a stand-off distance;
signal processing and sensor integration; characterizing explosives;
understanding improvised explosive device (IED) detonator signatures;
shock physics; and material science.
path forward
S&T brings to bear a range of capabilities and expertise in support
of TSA and the explosives detection and mitigation portfolio. Through
the Aviation Security IPT and routine formal and informal interactions,
we are investing with TSA and our stakeholders in both evolutionary and
revolutionary improvements. I thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the committee today, and welcome your questions and the
opportunity to further discuss our work.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Wallen. Before I proceed further,
I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from North Carolina,
my predecessor, Mr. Hudson, be allowed to sit on the dais and
participate in this hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I do want to note before we go any further and thank Mr.
Hudson because he was the one who propounded the bill, the
Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act of 2014, and it
is why we are here, and why we are trying to get some reform to
the acquisition process at TSA. I commend you for your work,
Mr. Hudson, on that.
Our second witness is Ms. Jill Vaughan, who currently
serves as the assistant administrator within the Transportation
Security Administration's Office of Security Technologies.
Previously, Ms. Vaughan served as deputy chief information
officer and deputy assistant administrator for TSA's Office of
Information Technology. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Vaughan to
testify.
STATEMENT OF JILL VAUGHAN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF
SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Vaughan. Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and
Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you
today to discuss the TSA's use of technology to meet our
mission of protecting the Nation's transportation system.
TSA utilizes a range of technological capabilities to
screen passengers and accessible property. Checkpoint screening
technologies include: Advanced imaging technology, metal
detectors, bottled liquid scanners, explosive trace detection
technologies, and advanced technology X-ray. Checked baggage
technologies include: Explosive detection systems and explosive
trace detection technologies. These technologies represent a
substantial improvement in detection capability over the
previous technologies. For example, they strengthen TSA's
ability to detect nonmetallic explosives which current
intelligence identifies an active threat to aviation security.
TSA continues to pursue advanced concepts and capabilities
to meet our mission demands. Our industry partners are
developing technology solutions to close capability gaps,
optimize existing technologies, and drive towards future
screening innovations. TSA is updating existing technology as
new capabilities become available instead of requiring complete
system replacements. TSA closely partners with the DHS Science
and Technology Directorate on Research and Development.
TSA has also partnered with Science and Technology through
the Aviation Security Integrated Product Team to plan for the
fiscal year 2018 through 2022 resource allocation plans to
further align research and development projects to meet
security needs. This critical process enables our enterprise to
identify capability gaps and to coordinate research and
development to close those gaps. The Transportation Security
Acquisition Reform Act, or TSARA, signed into law December 2014
has helped TSA to increase transparency in the use of best
practices for security technology acquisitions. This mandate
offered an opportunity to expand our partnership with industry
and aviation security stakeholders, communicate future focus
areas and themes, and articulate planned technology initiatives
through the development of a 5-year strategic technology
investment plan.
TSA has worked to enhance transparency and partnerships
with its stakeholders. TSA does so through a range of industry
forums such as the Security Manufacturers Coalition, the
Washington Homeland Security Roundtable, and regular Industry
Days.
In addition, TSA is developing an Innovation Lane concept
to enable early capability demonstrations and to allow industry
access to stream-of-commerce data and real-time user feedback,
a key request of industry.
TSA is investing in the future of aviation security by
pursuing enhanced technology to enable a flexible, adaptable
approach. Key to this vision is a system-of-systems approach
which integrates technology, data, and processes within and
across airports. TSA is developing a system architecture that
will expand risk-based security through an integrated security
screening system. TSA will continue to collaborate with
stakeholders to develop a shared vision for the future state of
aviation security where business data and next generation
platforms combine to address emerging and evolving threats. TSA
is also working to secure the current and future fleet against
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats by integrating
cybersecurity considerations into current and future
capabilities.
TSA published information assurance requirements and
socialized them with industry through Industry Days and a
series of technical interchange meetings. Continued focus on
cybersecurity will safeguard our transportation security
equipment against the continuously-evolving cyber threat.
I also want to thank the Government Accountability Office
for their continuing efforts to enhance security of the
transportation system, particularly as a result of the report
on our testing and evaluation process. This report resulted in
two recommendations with which we fully concur. We are eager to
continue working with industry to finalize aspects of our
third-party testing strategy and further assess testing data to
identify additional areas for efficiency.
One year after TSARA was signed into law, TSA has increased
transparency and alignment across security technology
acquisitions to promote an effective, adaptive, and flexible
system of security capabilities to safeguard the American
public from terrorist attacks on transportation systems.
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, I want to thank the
subcommittee for your continued partnership on this issue, and
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Vaughan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jill Vaughan
January 7, 2016
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) use of technology to
meet key mission objectives.
TSA was created in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 2001,
to protect the Nation's transportation systems and ensure freedom of
movement for people and commerce. Our operations use a range of
capabilities in a risk-informed approach to screen nearly 660 million
passengers and nearly 2 billion carry-on items and checked bags
annually. As a result, Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) were
able to prevent 119,000 dangerous items from being carried onto
airplanes in fiscal year 2015. Our screening technology evolves to meet
the dynamic threat through our extensive partnerships across
Government, academia, and industry.
passenger screening
Congress established TSA through the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA) (Pub. L. 107-71), which designated passenger
screening as a Federal responsibility. TSA prioritizes its technology
investments based on intelligence community assessments concerning the
evolving nature of terrorist capabilities, tools, and intent. TSA
performs risk analyses as the foundation for deriving operational needs
and requirements, taking into consideration potential threats,
vulnerabilities to those threats given current system capabilities, and
the consequences in the event of an attack. To meet these challenges,
passenger screening technology, processes, and systems must continually
adapt and evolve. TSA utilizes a range of technological capabilities to
screen passengers and accessible property. Passenger screening
technologies include Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), metal
detectors, explosives trace detectors (ETD), and bottled liquids
scanners (BLS). Carry-on baggage is screened using Advanced Technology
X-Ray, BLS, and ETD technologies.
Prior to the development and fielding of AIT and dual view AT X-
ray, metal detection and single view X-ray were the most common methods
for screening passengers and carry-on baggage, respectively. These new
AIT and AT X-ray technologies provide a substantial improvement in
detection capability for the most significant concealments over the
previous generation, and specifically strengthen TSA's ability to
detect non-metallic explosives, which current intelligence has
identified as an on-going threat to aviation security.
TSA closely partners with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) on Research and Development
(R&D) to ensure development efforts align with program goals and
expectations for achieving and implementing higher levels of
performance detection. DHS S&T is assisting TSA in the advancement of
detection capabilities by characterizing new threats to aviation. These
efforts will assist TSA, as well as small and large business equipment
manufacturers, in the development of enhanced future systems. TSA is
seeking to acquire a robust adaptive passenger screening system that
builds upon existing capabilities while advancing functionality to
ensure a higher level of system effectiveness and efficiency.
transportation security acquisition reform act (tsara) background
The TSARA was signed into law on December 18, 2014 (Pub. L. 113-
245) and mandated increased transparency and the application of
acquisition best practices for security technology acquisitions. The
law includes provisions for TSA to advance small business contracting
goals, adhere to acquisitions and inventory policy and procedures, and
develop a Five-Year Strategic Technology Investment Plan. Building on a
previously-developed strategic and capability investment plans, TSA
developed the Five-Year Strategic Technology Investment Plan, which the
agency found to be an opportunity to further our partnership with
industry and aviation security stakeholders, communicate future focus
areas and themes, and articulate planned technology initiatives and
purchases.
In developing the Five-Year Plan, TSA augmented on-going Industry
Days and vendor communication with a series of Industry Forum Working
Groups and released a Request for Information (RFI) to solicit industry
input. TSA then incorporated this industry feedback into a draft copy
of the Plan. This report was also reviewed by the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee (ASAC) before being finalized and submitted to
Congress on August 12, 2015. The Plan was published on the
FedBizOpps.gov website on September 2, 2015.
TSA received thoughtful insight from stakeholders throughout the
development of the report, which provided a strong framework for TSA's
Five-Year Strategic Technology Investment Plan. Four key themes anchor
the Plan:
Integrating principles of Risk-Based Security (RBS) in
capabilities, processes, and technologies;
Enhancing core mission delivery by focusing on a system (or
systems) that analyzes threats, risks, and opportunities across
the aviation security environment;
Streamlining acquisitions, requirements, and test and
evaluation processes; and
Increasing transparency in engagement with stakeholders to
enable innovation.
Streamlining acquisitions and increasing transparency of the
acquisition process is an area of focus for TSA. TSA is continuing to
pursue advanced concepts and capabilities to enable TSA's vision of the
future of security screening. To better focus these investments, TSA
generates a list of capability gaps to drive continued technology
development and enhancement using a structured, repeatable process.
Technology solutions are developed by industry to close capability
gaps, strengthen aviation security, and drive toward future screening
innovations. Recognizing that the threat environment is constantly
evolving, TSA actively pursues enhanced capability development to
address capability gaps, optimize existing technologies, and develop
future technologies. Capability development occurs in tandem with
recapitalization and enables TSA to upgrade existing platforms with new
capabilities. This allows TSA to upgrade existing technology by
improving detection algorithms (or other similar methods) as new
capabilities arise, instead of requiring complete system replacements.
In addition to the upgrade process, TSA also outlined planned
technology recapitalization. Transparency about the acquisition process
as well as technology priorities provides stakeholders better insight
on how to partner with TSA.
Since enactment of TSARA, TSA has worked to enhance transparency
and partnerships with stakeholders and execute technology initiatives
as identified in the Five-Year Strategic Technology Investment Plan.
TSA's end goal is accelerated capability development through rapid
identification, testing, prototyping, and piloting with the ability to
quickly evaluate products and push forward promising capabilities. TSA
continues to engage with industry through forums such as Washington
Homeland Security Roundtable, Security Manufacturer's Coalition and
ASAC, in addition to regular Industry Days. TSA is also developing a
concept to enable early capability demonstration and allow industry
access to data and real-time user feedback, which has been a frequent
request from industry.
test and evaluation process updates
When a vendor fails a Qualification Test (QT) and Operational Test
(OT) multiple times, TSA's acquisitions deadlines are extended and the
Government's Test & Evaluation (T&E) and acquisition costs increase. To
alleviate some of these concerns, TSA is pursuing Third-Party Testing
as an opportunity to allow vendors to refine their products with an
outside entity, which reduces TSA's cost and time from test delays.
TSA is working with the National Institute of Science and
Technology (NIST) to develop a Third-Party Test Program to ensure
capabilities are mature enough to enter TSA's formal T&E process. To
support the implementation of third-party testing, TSA approved the
Third-Party Test Strategy on April 21, 2015. TSA plans to begin
implementing the Third-Party Test Program in a phased approach by
December 31, 2016.
TSA also created a Policy and Guidebook to standardize TSA roles,
responsibilities, and policy and provide vendors guidance on how to
prepare a Qualification Data Package. This will assist in reducing the
acquisition time line and the amount spent on retest costs.
Additionally, TSA developed a Master Tracker to better manage and
monitor testing events and information. The tool delivers a
comprehensive understanding of all T&E events and will aid TSA in
closing a Government Accountability Office's (GAO) recommendation to
conduct a root-cause analysis of testing challenges and their impact on
the acquisition processes. The incorporation of a Third-Party Test
Strategy reduces cost and time associated with test delays, shortens
the acquisition time line, and streamlines the incorporation of future
technology initiatives.
future technology initiatives and system architecture
TSA has invested in the future of aviation security by pursuing
enhanced technology to enable a flexible, adaptable, and robust multi-
capability approach to detecting and disrupting an evolving range of
threats. The key to this vision is a holistic ``system-of-systems''
perspective, which integrates technology, data, and processes within
and across airports. TSA is developing a system architecture that will
enable expanded implementation of RBS by developing an integrated
security screening system that defines business rules, equipment
functionality, information exchange, and decision making. This system
architecture approach will allow TSA to proactively identify gaps and
define capabilities at a system level. TSA will continue to collaborate
with stakeholders to develop this shared vision for the future state of
aviation security where business, data, and next-generation platforms
combine to enable near-real-time decision making and response
capabilities to address emerging and evolving threats.
TSA has determined functional enhancements that will address
existing capability gaps over the next 5 years outlined in the
technology initiatives in the Five-Year Plan. Technology enhancements
will enable a future system defined by:
Enhanced algorithms for Explosives Detections Systems that
decrease false alarm rates to minimize officer resolution and
the removal of items from passenger bags;
Dynamic algorithm switching and the application of risk
profiles facilitate the evolution of RBS, ensuring passengers
and baggage are screened at the appropriate risk level;
Biometrics to enable real-time identity verification of
passengers at the checkpoint; and
Next generation carry-on screening capabilities to more
precisely screen carry-on baggage, improving detection
capabilities and false alarm rates.
conclusion
TSARA mandated certain best practices for procuring and using best
available technology to meet critical mission needs. The Five-Year
Strategic Technology Investment Plan mandated by the law presents a
forward-looking investment plan that supports best practices and
improved transparency in security technology acquisition programs. Now,
1 year after TSARA was signed into law, TSA has increased transparency
and alignment across security technology acquisitions to deploy an
effective, adaptive, and flexible system of security capabilities to
safeguard the American public from terrorist attacks on transportation
systems.
I want to thank the subcommittee for your continued partnership on
this and other important issues, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Vaughan. We appreciate your
taking your time to be here today.
Our third witness, Ms. Michele Mackin, has served as the
director of the Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management--
that is quite a title--at the Government Accountability Office
since 2012. Previously, Ms. Mackin served as assistant director
of GAO from 2001 to 2012. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Mackin
to testify.
STATEMENT OF MICHELE MACKIN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ACQUISITION
AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Mackin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon,
Ranking Member Rice and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for having me here today to discuss TSA's test evaluation and
acquisition of security-related systems. My statement is based
on our December 2015 report which stems from a mandate in the
Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act.
In general, the goal of test and evaluation is to find as
many problems as possible so failure can be a good thing as
long as knowledge is gained. A rigorous testing protocol is the
best way to ensure that TSA is buying effective screening
technologies. We found that TSA's test and evaluation processes
followed DHS requirements and comport with best practices in
industry. The process involves multiple layers of laboratory
testing and importantly, operational testing at airports with
actual transportation security officers. But, if extensive
retesting is needed, it can create inefficiencies in the
acquisition system, and that is what we found.
We analyzed the outcome of all 22 security-related systems
that TSA tested over a 5-year period. All of these systems have
either been deemed fit to procure, or were ultimately rejected.
The 22 systems were evenly split between passenger and baggage
screening systems. We found that of the 22 systems exactly
half, 11, passed all rounds of testing and were qualified for
procurement.
So why did so many systems not make the cut? The bottom
line is that the systems vendors submitted to TSA were not
technologically mature when testing began. They often needed
significant fixes and had to be retested often multiple times.
Extensive retesting increases costs to TSA and to the vendors.
Importantly, it means it takes longer to field these systems to
end-users at airports. In one example the planned acquisition
schedule for an explosive detection system slipped by 5 years
while multiple rounds of testing occurred.
TSA's 2015 technology investment plan states that policies
have been implemented to ensure system maturity at the start of
testing. Based on our work, however, they are not there yet.
TSA is taking actions to improve the situation. For example,
they are sharing test plans with industry and taking steps to
better define requirements and to share those requirements with
industry earlier so vendors can be better prepared for the
testing. Industry representatives told us they have seen some
improvement in the sharing of test plans and requirements but
would like to see more. They are also very concerned about the
time and investment they are having to make to get their
systems through multiple rounds of testing and qualified for
procurement.
Another key effort underway is to require third-party
testing before vendors ever enter the formal TSA testing arena.
TSA planned to implement this requirement early this year. We
found, however, that aspects of the plan were not fully
understood. For example, TSA did not know how many potential
third-party testers were out there, or what the costs could be
to Government or to vendors. We recommended that the approach
be more fully developed before implementation and TSA now plans
to roll this out in phases starting at the end of this calendar
year.
Finally, we found that TSA was not comprehensively
assessing the test data across all systems. It had the
information for each system, but wasn't collecting or analyzing
the data across all systems. This includes time frames for
testing, reasons for any delays, the costs, and the results of
the testing.
Based on our recommendation, TSA has begun to collect this
data. Once complete, TSA will have a better picture of key
factors contributing to delays in acquiring screening systems,
but now the question is how will TSA use this information to
improve the acquisition process going forward? Assessing the
data and using it, along with the planned actions to improve
technology maturity at the start of testing, those are the
critical next steps to help inject more efficiency into the
acquisition process.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rice, this concludes my
prepared remarks. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Mackin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michele Mackin
January 7, 2015
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the
Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) test and evaluation
process for passenger and baggage screening technologies. TSA is
responsible for overseeing security operations at the Nation's roughly
440 commercial airports as part of its mission to protect the Nation's
civil aviation system. TSA screens individuals, their carry-on luggage,
and their checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent carriage of any
prohibited items, such as explosives and contraband, on board
commercial aircraft. To carry out these activities, the agency relies
to a large extent on security-related screening technologies, such as
explosives detection systems and advanced imaging technology devices.
As of August 2015, TSA had deployed approximately 15,000 units of
security-related technology to airports Nation-wide. In our past work,
we have found that TSA encountered challenges in effectively acquiring
and deploying passenger and baggage screening technologies and had not
consistently implemented Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy
and best practices for procurement.\1\
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\1\ In GAO, Advanced Imaging Technology: TSA Needs Additional
Information Before Procuring Next-Generation Systems, GAO-14-357
(Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2014), we recommended that TSA establish
protocols to facilitate capturing operational data on passenger
screening at the checkpoint. TSA concurred with this recommendation and
stated that it will monitor, update, and report the results of its
efforts to capture such data and evaluate any cost impacts. In
addition, in GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives
Detection Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening
Actions Are Needed, GAO-11-740 (Washington, DC: July 11, 2011), we
found that TSA's explosives detection systems were not configured to
meet the most current requirements.
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My statement today draws from our report on TSA's test and
evaluation of security-related technologies, which we issued last
month.\2\ We examined the extent to which: (1) TSA's test and
evaluation process helps meet mission needs through the acquisition of
passenger and baggage screening technologies; and (2) TSA's planned
actions to improve the test and evaluation process address factors
contributing to inefficiencies in acquiring those technologies. Based
on our findings, we recommended that TSA: (1) Finalize certain aspects
of its revised testing approach before implementing it; and (2) conduct
and document a comprehensive assessment of testing data to identify key
factors contributing to any acquisition inefficiencies and potential
areas for reform.
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\2\ GAO, TSA Acquisitions: Further Actions Needed to Improve
Efficiency of Screening Technology Test and Evaluation, GAO-16-117
(Washington, DC: Dec. 17, 2015).
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To conduct this work, we reviewed DHS and TSA acquisition and
testing documentation for passenger and baggage screening technologies
tested since June 2010 and conducted our own analyses of the
information. We also met with relevant TSA and DHS officials, which
included site visits to the 2 primary testing facilities for TSA's
security-related technologies--the TSA Systems Integration Facility in
Arlington, Virginia and the DHS Transportation Security Laboratory in
Atlantic City, New Jersey. Additionally, we met with industry
representatives to obtain their views on the test and evaluation
process. More detailed information on our scope and methodology can be
found in our December 2015 report.
In addition to our report on TSA's test and evaluation process, we
have other on-going work for this subcommittee pertaining to TSA's
acquisitions of screening technologies. First, we are assessing TSA's
implementation of our prior recommendations related to the acquisition
of security-related technologies. And secondly, we are assessing TSA's
progress in implementing key provisions of the Transportation Security
Acquisition Reform Act, which was enacted in December 2014. We plan to
issue both reports this winter.
We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
test and evaluation critically informs acquisition decisions, but
failures during testing have decreased acquisition efficiency
Consistent with Departmental guidance and acquisition best
practices, TSA's test and evaluation process supports its acquisition
decisions by providing DHS and TSA officials with information regarding
the ability of passenger and baggage screening technologies to meet
mission needs prior to a decision to procure the technologies. Before
DHS makes a procurement decision, vendors submit potential systems--
vendors' versions of a specific technology type--to TSA for
consideration. If TSA accepts systems for testing, they undergo a 3-
phase test and evaluation process.
Systems undergo qualification and certification testing at
the DHS Transportation Security Laboratory to qualify or
certify that they meet explosives detection requirements.
If explosives detection requirements are met, the systems
undergo additional qualification testing at the TSA Systems
Integration Facility, where system performance is verified
against additional requirements, such as system reliability,
availability, and maintainability.
Systems that have successfully passed testing at the TSA
Systems Integration Facility then undergo operational testing
at selected airports, where TSA evaluates their operational
effectiveness and suitability in a realistic environment.
This phased test and evaluation process provides the agency with
critical information regarding system capabilities, saving it from
investing in potentially expensive yet ineffective equipment. Such
validation of product knowledge early in the acquisition process--
before key investments are made--is consistent with best practices used
by commercial firms.\3\ We found in our December 2015 report that from
June 2010 to July 2015, only half of the 22 systems that TSA and DHS
tested successfully passed qualification and operational testing and
were therefore deemed effective and suitable for deployment. TSA
procured all but one of the 11 successful systems. The system TSA did
not procure was a portable explosives trace detector system that
transportation security officers could use to randomly screen
passengers' hands and their accessible property for traces of
explosives residue. TSA found the system to be operationally effective
and operationally suitable with limitations, but a new threat emerged
and TSA deferred the procurement, deciding to wait for a system that
could meet TSA's new detection requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key
to Better Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-00-199 (Washington, DC:
July 31, 2000).
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An additional 8 systems were tested from June 2010 to July 2015 and
testing remains on-going. In addition, during this period 1 vendor
withdrew its system from the testing process. These 9 systems are not
depicted in figure 1 below, which shows the number of systems that
progressed through each phase of TSA's test and evaluation process
during this period.
TSA officials emphasized that immature technologies submitted by
vendors are a key driver of testing failures and therefore delays in
TSA's ability to buy screening systems for use in airports. Because
immature technologies often experience multiple failures during testing
and require retests, testing takes longer than originally anticipated
and costs more. TSA provided us with examples of 3 explosives detection
systems that required multiple retests, which resulted in acquisition
delays of several years. TSA ended up spending over $3 million in
additional costs incurred in retesting to ensure the systems were
effective and suitable.
In addition, we found in our December 2015 report that 4 of the 11
systems that successfully passed TSA's testing process in the last 5
years required at least 2 formal rounds of qualification or operational
testing before TSA qualified them for procurement. According to TSA
leadership, the security-related technologies industry is still
maturing--since it primarily developed after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001--and TSA has had to work extensively to help
industry develop systems that will meet the agency's mission needs.
Industry representatives involved in testing these systems also told us
that systems are not always mature when they enter TSA's test and
evaluation process and that they can require significant modifications
and retesting before they are ready to be bought and deployed to
airports.
tsa's planned actions to improve test and evaluation may not reduce
acquisition inefficiencies
Acknowledging the need to better ensure technology maturity at the
start of testing to improve the efficiency of its acquisition process,
TSA has recently initiated reforms. For example, to increase
transparency, TSA officials told us that they are sharing test plans
with vendors to better prepare them for testing; however, to maintain
the integrity of the test process, they do not intend to provide
vendors with detailed information that could be used to ``game'' the
tests. While industry officials agreed that TSA has become more
transparent, they said that the number of test plans that TSA has
shared thus far has been limited. Another key action TSA is taking is
developing a third-party testing strategy, which it has partially
implemented for technologies that have already entered the test and
evaluation process. Under TSA's interim third-party testing guidance,
effective July 2014, a vendor experiencing a significant failure during
testing is required to fund and undergo third-party testing. The
results must be provided to TSA demonstrating that the system has met
the previously failed requirements before the system is allowed to
resume TSA's testing process. To further streamline the acquisition
process, TSA is in the process of establishing additional third-party
testing requirements that will affect vendors proposing new systems to
TSA. Under this part of the strategy, vendors will be required to
obtain a third-party verification that they meet various requirements
before they ever enter the test and evaluation process.
TSA plans to implement this strategy in 2016, but it is too soon to
tell whether the strategy will reduce acquisition inefficiencies
because TSA has yet to finalize key aspects. For example, TSA has not
identified whether there are a sufficient number of eligible third-
party testers or established a mechanism to oversee the testing they
will perform. In addition, TSA officials are unsure whether the third-
party testing strategy will save overall acquisition costs, which they
have highlighted as a potential benefit. Specifically, while vendors
will be responsible for funding the third-party testing, industry
officials told us it is probable that they will reflect these
additional costs in their pricing. TSA officials told us they had not
assessed potential cost impacts or the possibility that third-party
testing costs could be a barrier to entering the market for new
vendors. As we established in prior work, components of sound planning
include, among other items, identifying: Problems and causes;
resources, investments, and risks; roles, responsibilities, and
coordination; and integration among and with other entities.\4\ Without
finalizing the strategy before implementation, it may not be as
effective as envisioned and TSA risks unintended consequences, such as
increasing acquisition costs.
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\4\ GAO, Social Security Disability: Additional Performance
Measures and Better Cost Estimates Could Help Improve SSA's Efforts to
Eliminate Its Hearings Backlog, GAO-09-398 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9,
2009).
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Further, at the time of our 2015 review, TSA had not conducted a
comprehensive assessment of testing data--such as time frames for
completing testing and costs incurred--because it lacked a mechanism to
track and consolidate testing data across all technologies. This
information would include, for example, an overall assessment of
testing delays, costs, time frames, and results across all technologies
that were tested. Thus, TSA does not have any documented assessment
supporting the decision to implement the third-party testing strategy;
officials were also not able to provide us with testing time frames for
each of the 22 systems tested in the past 5 years.\5\ However, after we
raised this point during the course of our review, TSA officials
developed a master testing tracker to more comprehensively track
testing data. While the master testing tracker TSA developed is a
positive first step towards more informed decision making, officials
have not established a plan for assessing the information collected
from the tracker. We previously found that agencies can use performance
information to identify problems in existing programs, to try to
identify the causes of problems, and/or to develop corrective actions.
The benefit of collecting performance information is only fully
realized when this information is actually used by agencies to make
decisions oriented toward improving results.\6\
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\5\ While TSA was unable to provide us with testing time frames for
the 22 systems, we reviewed test and evaluation plans, test reports,
and other documentation to determine the number of systems that passed
each phase of TSA's testing progress.
\6\ GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, DC:
Sept. 9, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA's actions to address acquisition inefficiencies--in large part
through its third-party testing strategy--focus on improving
technological maturity and better ensuring readiness for testing.
However, TSA and industry officials we spoke with identified additional
issues that may be contributing to inefficiencies, which third-party
testing may not address. Specifically, TSA and industry officials
highlighted issues pertaining to optimistic acquisition schedules and
how requirements have been defined and interpreted in the past. Without
conducting and documenting an assessment of testing data available to
date across all technologies and sharing it with key stakeholders, such
as TSA's program management offices, DHS, industry, and end-users, it
is too soon to tell to what extent TSA's actions will reduce
acquisition inefficiencies. Specifically, TSA may be missing
opportunities to identify other factors, in addition to technology
immaturity, that are outside the purview of testing officials, but that
also contribute to acquisition inefficiencies.
concluding remarks
Due to the significant challenge TSA faces in balancing security
concerns with efficient passenger movement, it is important that the
agency procures and deploys effective passenger and baggage screening
technologies. TSA has acknowledged the need to improve the efficiency
of its test and evaluation process and taken steps that could increase
the maturity of technologies put forth by vendors and reduce the burden
on TSA's own testing resources. However, without further actions, these
steps may not reduce acquisition inefficiencies. To help ensure that
the actions TSA takes to improve the test and evaluation process
address identified challenges and that they are informed by existing
information, we recommended in our December 2015 report that TSA: (1)
Finalize all aspects of the third-party testing strategy before
implementing further third-party testing requirements for vendors to
enter testing; and (2) conduct and document a comprehensive assessment
of testing data available to date, such as time frames for completing
testing, costs incurred, and testing delays across all technology areas
to identify key factors contributing to any acquisition inefficiencies
and potential areas for reform. DHS concurred with our recommendations
and estimated that it would complete both actions by the end of
calendar year 2016.
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Mackin, for your testimony. We
appreciate you taking the time to be here today. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions.
It is presumed that TSA had problems in their acquisition
process because we had this bill passed by former Chairman
Hudson, but I don't think it is productive for me to go back
into an analysis of what has gone on because we already know
what has gone on.
My biggest concern with TSA since I got this chair, was
that for a young agency it has all of the tell-tale signs of
well-entrenched bureaucracy. Miss Rice and myself and others on
this committee are dead-set to make sure that we fix that. I
think this bill is a good start in the right direction. It is a
somewhat dry topic to some, but it is critically important to
the future of this agency, and the future of our air traffic
and the safety of our passengers in the airline industry. So it
is a really, really important topic.
So my biggest concern in this realm is that there is always
the incentive in a great democracy like ours for someone to
build a better mouse trap. Sometimes those ideas don't get to
the people they want to at TSA, at least that is the way it has
been in the past because it became more insular, I believe, in
its acquisition process, and if you didn't have your nose under
the tent already, it is very hard to get your nose under the
tent, especially for a new vendor. But, you know, if that was
the case in the past, people like Apple may not have had an
opportunity to show their products to people and get them to
market.
We need to have a process whereby good, innovative ideas
even, if they aren't from someone you are comfortable with as a
vendor, should at least be taking a look at. You should at
least kick the tires. You should at least see if that is a good
idea that can be implemented. That is one of the things I am
very concerned about with respect to this, why this exercise we
are undertaking today is so important.
Of course, this is the beginning of the oversight process
and we are going to continue it moving forward as long as I am
Chairman.
Now, with that being said, Ms. Mackin, I understand your
study was a 5-year study. You went back and looked at things.
Could you tell me what in the last year or so you can tell me
that is most encouraging and the thing that is most concerning
with you about the acquisition process that we are discussing
today?
Ms. Mackin. You are right. We assessed the test data over a
5-year period to end in July 2015. So our information was
rather current. I think that I am encouraged absolutely by the
response we got from TSA, not only when we provided them with
our draft recommendation, but even during the course of our
audit, they were very open to our comments about assessing the
test data across the systems, for example, and taking a little
more time to work out this third-party testing strategy before
requiring vendors to undergo it.
I think my concern might be that TSA was not proactive in
doing these things on their own. I think we have a history of
GAO making recommendations that TSA implements, which is a good
thing. But we have had issues in the past and this could be an
issue now too of, they could have taken steps to assess the
test data, or recognize that maybe the third-party test
strategy wasn't quite ready to roll out. So I think that's the
next bag I would respond with.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Mackin. Ms. Vaughan and Mr.
Wallen, you have a colossal responsibility and that is to
reform a process that has not been very impressive in the past.
I applaud you for your efforts thus far, and this is not
criticism. I want to just find out how we can help you make the
process better, and make sure we are not missing great ideas,
great technologies, and that we are keeping up with the
technological advances instead of trying to play catch-up like
I think TSA has done in the past.
So again, I will ask you a similar question, Ms. Vaughan
and Mr. Wallen afterwards, if time permit, and that is simply,
what can you point to in the last year that you have changed
that you think is the most significant, and what are the most
significant things you need to work on to continue to make this
process a better process?
Ms. Vaughan. So thank you for your question. I acknowledge
what Ms. Mackin indicated. We are eager to take a proactive
approach in addressing some of the things she recognized. I
think some of the things that are very significant in the
response in our 5-year plan, we did for the first time ever
disclose and provide what we indicate are our capability gaps
in the overall system, which is significant.
So we went through, we developed a very rigorous process
over the last year or 2 to develop what we called the
Transportation Security Capability Analysis Process. Through
that process, we have identified and socialized through our 5-
year strategic framework plan, what those capability gaps are
to try to give industry better early indicators of where we
would like to see them generate their investments when they are
looking at how they would like to structure what type of
capability they would like to work on. So I think that is a
significant step forward.
In addition, an alignment with Science and Technology and
my counterpart, Mr. Wallen, we have under the Secretary's
direction established the Aviation Security Product Team. It is
a team that meets and we basically have taken those capability
gaps that we have developed, and S&T, Science and Technology is
leveraging those to inform how they will resource the problems
we are trying to solve.
So we are very interested in further alignment with Science
and Technology to take the capability gaps to inform how
research and development will be resourced moving forward.
I think those are very positive steps for us.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Wallen, briefly the same question.
Mr. Wallen. Okay. I am agreeing with my other witnesses.
Moving forward, the IPT process has been very good in helping
us work even more closely together, and it has been a good step
in the right direction in identifying needs and solutions to
fill those needs.
You had mentioned working closely, more closely with
innovators and not losing that. One of the other things that
S&T is doing is opening an office in Silicon Valley to be
closer to innovators out on the West Coast to have more insight
into what they are doing, and working with other communities in
the Government, in industry, and in academia, to be closer to
innovation and to get ideas outside of the normal ideas and to
be able to get more of the creative innovation.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. My time has expired. I just
want to urge you with the strongest words possible, Mr. Wallen,
and Ms. Vaughan, to continue down this track. I mean, you are
at the beginning of a long overhaul process, and I encourage
you to keep doggedly pursuing making this a better process,
because it is--I can't think of anything more important that
TSA could be doing and Homeland Security could be doing than
that type of stuff, to give the proper tools to the people out
in the field to make the airlines safer.
So with that, I recognize Miss Rice for 5 minutes of
questioning.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I think that if we
were to focus on two things that I think the general public
expects from agencies like DHS and TSA, in their everyday
travel, it is to have the best, most sophisticated technology
to ensure safe travel, and that we develop that and procure
that in as efficient a time frame as possible.
It sounds like you are attempting to make the process more
efficient, but my question is, where did the creative ideas
come from in terms of what is the hot new technology? I mean,
is it DHS or TSA calling, you know, whoever the big companies
are that are in this atmosphere, and say, okay, this is what we
want you to work on, or you saying to them what are you seeing
out there, and what are you developing in the private sector
that may be something that we like?
How does that information flow go? Either Mr. Wallen, or
Ms. Vaughan.
Ms. Vaughan. I can start. Thank you for your question. I
would say it depends on the maturity of the technology. So
vendors have an opportunity to reach out. We do a lot of
coordination with Science and Technology, and I would say
depending on the maturity of the technology is where we make
recommendations to that particular vendor to begin their
journey.
In terms of looking for new ideas, the TSA and Science and
Technology both do what we call a targeted broad agency
announcement process. What that this is is, it is us providing
our set of requirements out to industry to say we are
interested in receiving more information to try and solve this
sort of problem.
Industry has an opportunity to provide feedback through a
series of proposals. We then evaluate those proposals and
provide, depending on the solutions that are presented, we will
provide funding to those entities to provide kind of their
investment to try to get them up and running, so to speak.
Miss Rice. Let me just stop you right there, Ms. Vaughan,
because you and I spoke yesterday--and what I am going to talk
about now preceded your tenure, but we sat and had a roundtable
with some of the contractors, and they expressed a level of
frustration that is, you know, expected, obviously. That it's
not an efficient process, that we are told to develop this, and
then when we finally do, we don't want that anymore.
You are talking about a system that really benefits only
those companies that have the resources to invest their own
money until they can get a contract. Small businesses, there is
no space for small businesses. So first of all, can cooperative
research and development agreements be expanded to cover both
Science and Technology and TSA activities? Is that already
being done, or is there a way to do that?
Mr. Wallen. Could you repeat that, please?
Miss Rice. Do the two agencies, DHS and TSA actually get
together and coordinate what research and development they ask
various companies to do? Do you do that already?
Mr. Wallen. Yes, the broad agency announcement that Ms.
Vaughan had mentioned, we coordinate our responses to those. We
talk to each other about the proposals that we see. So that is
coordinated.
Miss Rice. Those are direct lines of communication because
what we have heard is that it is very difficult to get an
answer where someone is accountable for the communication.
Mr. Wallen. So I can look into that. Our program managers,
I know, talk to the director of the Mission Assurance Division,
so I do know that they converse.
Miss Rice. I think that there just needs to be a system by
which the communication is more direct and that there is clear
accountability.
The other thing is, I just think that we need to support as
much innovation as possible and a lot of that innovation is
coming from smaller businesses that just don't have the capital
to invest that kind of up-front money. I mean, they are funded
by private equity but they don't have the kind of money. So I
know that, depending on the proposal, I mean, or do you have
proposals that are put out specifically to small business
innovators to give them a chance to kind of break into this
world?
Ms. Vaughan. So I would say from a TSA perspective, we
acknowledge small businesses. This is a difficult market. What
I would say to that is, one of the things I am working very
diligently on is developing what we call a new systems
architecture. What that really means is, it basically will
provide for more of an open architecture that will allow for
interoperability and more commonality so that we can look at
the checkpoint as an entire system and an entire framework.
I think if we can move into that sort of system
architecture where systems have more commonality associated
with how they talk to each other, it will allow for the
entrance of new, smaller companies to play in that particular
space.
Miss Rice. Well, and also, and I don't know if you have
this, but maybe an effective mentor kind of protege program
that encourages small, innovative technology companies to
partner with, you know, larger businesses. I mean, that
obviously is something that I would think you would want to
promote. Right?
Ms. Vaughan. Yes, absolutely. We are, as I mentioned in my
opening statement, establishing an Innovation Lane concept
which this would really allow for products that are in
development after they have gone through kind-of a level of
testing to validate that they meet the minimum security
standards, but it would allow industry to actually see how
their capabilities play out in the operations environment.
Miss Rice. So my time is up. I thank you all, and I just
want to leave you with this one thought. Terrorists, ISIL,
ISIS, all of them, they are innovating every day, and if we do
not keep pace with that, shame on us. We have the ability to
stay ahead of them. But we cannot let an overly-bloated
bureaucratic process stymie that.
So I thank you all for your efforts that you are making to
streamline that, and Ms. Mackin, for your input which I am
happy to hear was well-received by TSA. Thank you. I yield
back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Miss Rice. The Chair will now
recognize other Members of the subcommittee for 5 minutes for
questions they may wish to ask the witnesses.
In accordance with our committee rules and practices, I
plan to recognize Members who were present at the start of the
hearing by seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later
will be recognized in the order of arrival.
The next person to ask questions is a gentleman with the
best-looking tie on the dais, and that is Buddy Carter from
Georgia.
Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank each of you for
being here today. We appreciate it very much. Ms. Vaughan, I
want to start with you because I am concerned about the
approval process that TSA has and especially when it comes to
new technology. Let's say, for instance, that there is a new
technology that is being tried out and is working through the
approval process and all of a sudden, you come to a requirement
that TSA feels like is not being met. What happens then?
Ms. Vaughan. Thank you for your question. So the testing
process, it is likened to a 3-step process. When a technology
is making its way to the testing process, it first starts out
at the Transportation Security Laboratory located in New
Jersey. If it passes the detection standard, meaning it can
detect a threat against a set of requirements, then it moves to
our testing facility near Reagan airport in a lab environment.
There it is tested for things like safety standards,
reliability, maintainability, and the like.
If it passes those tests, then we move it into an
operations environment which to me is critical because the
technology really needs to, you know, operate within the
construct of an airport and the officer, most importantly. So
during the course of that, there are certain requirements that
are considered, I would say significant. So it depends on the
failure of what was happening during the course of testing. But
if a piece of technology does fail during the course of
testing, the manufacturer, the vendor, is immediately notified
so we can discuss what types of steps need to be taken for the
vendor to remediate the situation, whether that be they take
their product back and they make the necessary changes if it is
a hardware fix, or if it is failing a safety standard there may
be some hardware modifications that have to be made to that
piece of technology.
So it really depends on the nature of the change. Then from
there, once they submit back their product after they believe
they have remediated the failures or the issues that occurred
during testing, they would notify us and we would work with
them to get them back into the testing process to resume
testing.
Mr. Carter. Okay, you know, 2 questions here. First of all,
what time line are we talking about here? I mean, from start to
finish, how long are we talking about?
Ms. Vaughan. Sir, it honestly depends.
Mr. Carter. Just an average.
Ms. Vaughan. Well, as Ms. Mackin indicated, we have some
products that we demonstrated during the course of her testing
review of our process where we had certain technologies that
were going back and forth for several years.
We have other issues where a piece of technology fails, and
it is a rather simple fix, I will call it, and it gets right
back into the process. So I think it depends on how significant
the failure is during the course of testing.
Mr. Carter. But from start to finish, on average, there is
no average? I mean----
Ms. Vaughan. I would say from start to finish it could be
approximately about a year time frame if I had----
Mr. Carter. A year time frame.
Ms. Vaughan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Carter. That seems like a long time. Let me ask you
this: When there is an instance where you have to go back to
the manufacturer and say, hey, you need to fix this because it
is not working, do you stop at that point and then resume at
that point, or do they have to start all over again in the
process?
Ms. Vaughan. No, sir. They don't have to start over again.
We do what is called regression testing which is essentially
where we kind-of pick up where we left off, but we also have to
validate that when they implemented the new changes, it didn't
inadvertently change something else that had already passed.
Those are very normal testing procedures.
So anything they would implement as a fix, we have to go
back and validate that it didn't inadvertently modify something
and now something else is failing as a result of the fixes they
put in place.
Mr. Carter. Does the Department ever use third-party
testing? I mean, do you ever have third parties to do the
testing for you, or is this all hands-on, the Department has
got to do it?
Ms. Vaughan. Sir, right now, the testing--the 3-step
process I described is performed by the Government. That is why
we are very interested in working with industry to establish a
third-party testing process. We think it will greatly increase
the level of transparency so manufacturers and industry can
better understand how mature their product is before they enter
our formal testing process.
Mr. Carter. Okay, so where are you at in that discussion
with the third parties?
Ms. Vaughan. So we have an Industry Day coming up next
month that we are coordinating with the Security Manufacturers
Coalition and the Washington Homeland Security Roundtable. We
have been working with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology to develop the third-party testing framework and we
will socialize that with industry to obtain their feedback on
where we are in the process.
Mr. Carter. You feel like that will streamline the process
and perhaps even speed up the process?
Ms. Vaughan. Yes, sir, I do. I liken it to an Apple iPhone.
Mr. Carter. Sure.
Ms. Vaughan. I don't think Apple would sell us an iPhone
before they had internally tested it and checked it to make
sure a consumer would buy it.
Mr. Carter. Well, I am glad to hear you say that. It sounds
like you are making progress, and I am encouraged by that. So
thank you again. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. That was absolutely perfectly 5 minutes. That is
amazing. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Payne from New Jersey for
5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our Ranking
Member. I think the gentleman has the best-looking straight tie
on.
You know, Ms. Vaughan, in my other committee
responsibilities, I am on Small Business, and so I think the
topic today is very, very poignant in terms of the continuity
of the things that I am looking at. You know, with regard to
small and disadvantaged company participation, aside from
learning of the procurement opportunities through
fedbizopps.gov, is there any other type of outreach conducted?
For instance, a small and disadvantaged company technology
fair, or procurement opportunities newsletter distributed via
electronic mailing on a list?
Ms. Vaughan. So, sir, I acknowledge your concerns about
small business. We actually have a small business fair coming
up next month and there will be a specific component focused on
technology. That is a TSA-wide small business fair. So we are
always looking for other opportunities to increase the level of
small business participation.
I do believe the third-party testing strategy will give
industry and small businesses more access and transparency into
our processes so that the overall process, hopefully, doesn't
seem as cumbersome as it may have seemed in the past.
We also do those targeted broad-agency announcements that I
discussed earlier, which is really where we really go out with
a set of requirements to see what is available and it gives
anybody an opportunity to respond in which we would award
proposals to those folks where it looks like it may meet the
need or the problem we are trying to solve.
Mr. Payne. Well, that is great because I am always looking
for opportunities to partner with different agencies for
opportunities for small businesses lying in my district and my
State. So I will be reaching out to you with respect to that.
I want to know, has TSA considered allowing small business
to perform portions of the qualification process in parallel to
reduce costs? For example, a new technology is received. The
appropriate safety certification, can the testing at the
laboratory at TSL be done in parallel with operational tests
and evaluation at TSL--TSIF, I am sorry.
Ms. Vaughan. Sir, yes, I think that's absolutely something
we can look into. I think as we further develop our third-party
testing strategy, and looking at the roles and responsibilities
of that process with industry, that is absolutely something we
can explore.
Mr. Payne. Okay. All right. Chair, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Payne. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Walker from North Carolina for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My Joseph Bank
signature collection tie is starting to feel a little slighted
in the room, but we will work through it.
I am still not overly confident in some of the
implementations of the GAO and I just want to revisit that to
make sure that we are passing along to our constituents that
there is something that is being--some action steps being
taken.
Ms. Mackin, I would like to go back to you just if I could,
please, for just a moment. Who is accountable to make sure that
these recommendations are being implemented at a timely pace?
Is that something that you are responsible for?
Ms. Vaughan. Yes.
Ms. Mackin. Yes. We have a very active recommendation
follow-up process at GAO. In this case it will be easy because
the Department concurred, agreed to implement both
recommendations, and we have actually seen actions they are
taking already, even before our report was issued. So we will
definitely be following up on the concrete steps they are
taking for both recommendations.
Mr. Walker. Sure. I am thrilled to hear that. Are there any
recommendations that are outstanding that are still yet to be
implemented that you guys are continuing to work on?
Ms. Mackin. Of the security-related TSARA-type
recommendations we have made 58 over the years; 51 have been
fully implemented. There are, I think, about 3 that are still
outstanding, all pertaining to the AIT system. We, of course,
are continuing to track TSA's progress in implementing those
recommendations.
Mr. Walker. When you say over the years, what kind of time
line are we looking at?
Ms. Mackin. October 2003 to present, essentially.
Mr. Walker. Okay, and those 3, are we working in some kind
of proactive manner to finalize it? Is there a gap? Is there an
issue--help me understand, why are we----
Ms. Mackin. TSA is making progress on those 3. As I said,
they all pertain to the Advanced Imaging Technology program.
One has to do with tracking the false alarm rates of that
system across all of the systems at all of the airports, and
making sure that the security officers are doing patdowns, as
appropriate, when an alarm does go off.
Again, TSA has agreed with the recommendation. It is just a
matter of taking all of the steps to get it in a place where we
would consider it fully implemented.
Mr. Walker. I appreciate both your knowledge and your
articulation of those remaining implementations. A 2012
Congressional report detailed that TSA was housing equipment at
the Transportation Logistics Center in Dallas. This created a
significant cost, as you might imagine, to the American
taxpayer without a proper tracking system. Is there any
indication this practice has been updated, changed, modified?
Can one of you speak to that? Ms. Vaughan.
Ms. Vaughan. Yes, sir, I can speak to that. Yes, I
acknowledge the issues that were encountered in the past. We
have worked--I have worked with our counterparts in the Office
of Finance and Administration to establish an inventory asset
management policy to track the duration, the age of the
equipment in the warehouse, as well as the total dollar
threshold of the equipment in the warehouse. I review those
metrics with the chief financial officer on a biweekly basis.
Mr. Walker. Okay, and how does this equipment storage
affect TSA's recapitalization plan? Can you speak to that?
Ms. Vaughan. The equipment in the warehouse is essentially
into different categories. So some of it is associated with
maintenance, or if we have recently bought a newly-procured
system and we are in the process of recapitalizing and moving
things from the warehouse or out of an airport, it is the
staging environment to validate that all of the appropriate
software and everything is on the machines. So it is constantly
an evolving situation depending on the state of
recapitalization or the use of safety stock out of that
particular warehouse.
Mr. Walker. All right. Ms. Mackin, Ms. Vaughan, thank you
very much for your answers. With that, I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Walker. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Keating for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just following up
briefly on a couple of the other points made regarding small
business that Miss Rice and Mr. Payne mentioned as well.
What we are hearing from some of our small businesses in
the Massachusetts area is the flexibility because they are
small, and some of the fairs and other things are important,
but is there an incorporation of web seminars, and conference
calls, and those things to provide more flexibility in reaching
out and communicating with small business as well, some of the
major ways of doing it?
Ms. Vaughan. So from a TSA perspective, we are always
interested in looking--I am always interested in looking for
new and different opportunities to engage small business. I
think they are a critical player, especially from an innovation
perspective. They have some of the best ideas.
I would say from a TSA perspective we did publish as part
of the TSARA, the Transportation Security Acquisition Reform
Act, a small business process guide. We do host Industry Days
and things like that. I personally meet with many different
small businesses to try and look for different opportunities
for them.
I do believe the Innovation Lane concept of establishing
capabilities at a particular airport will be another avenue as
well as the third-party testing strategy. I think that will
open up additional opportunities for small businesses to enter
into this marketplace, and expand our industrial base.
Mr. Keating. Yeah, for some time I have been trying to
promote as much as possible, a stronger collaboration with
academic institutions and for many reasons. One of them is
innovation. You are getting, you know, clearly some of the most
creative minds involved in the process.
No. 2, in terms of some staffing from time to time it is
great to build bridges. It is one of our concerns with TSA is
just recruitment and maintenance of people, and I think if you
build those kind of associations, that is helpful as well.
I know that some of the institutions that are really
specializing in different area, explosives. I know Northeastern
University, for instance, has done a lot of work on explosives,
and I know there are a lot of academic, you know, resources
that are available. How far have you reached the academic
communities?
The other thing I think is also important, sometimes when
you are dealing strictly with vendors, they are just pushing
their own products and perhaps you don't get as objective a
viewpoint as you might through some academic avenues too. So
what are you doing with the academic institutions to try and
help and use as a resource?
Ms. Vaughan. So I can speak from a TSA perspective, and
then I am sure Mr. Wallen would like to inject as well. But we
do work with the National Labs on a regular basis to explore
other opportunities. We also work with our counterparts at
Science and Technology and the relationships that they have
with academia.
Mr. Wallen. To continue on with Ms. Vaughan's comments, we
work with National Labs frequently. We also work with the
Centers of Excellence. You mentioned ALERT up at Northeastern
University. We work with them to look for new innovation, new
creation of new devices, new topics, new areas. So they are
very helpful in bringing forward technology.
Mr. Keating. Yeah, and just lastly, you know, the airports
are so different the way they are managed, the way they are
operated. That creates challenges in and of itself. How
successful--I know you are going to try out some of the
possible procurement, you know, products at individual
airports, but how does that create challenges for you? How are
you working with the different airports, the different size
airports, the differently-structured airports, in this whole
process?
Is there anything you can inform us about in terms of
perimeter security needs that you think might be--I know we do
a lot of concentration on the gate and getting through, but
what about perimeter security? Are there, you know, are there
devices? Is there technology that can be more helpful around
perimeters of airports as well? I know I asked 3 or 4 things,
but just jump in.
Ms. Vaughan. Absolutely. Thank you for your question.
So from an airport perspective as we look at trying to
establish these Innovation Lanes, some of the airports that we
have been in discussions with are in the middle of an airport
recapitalization where they are looking to really make some
modifications to the way the airport is laid out. Those present
wonderful opportunities to try and inject an innovation concept
and some of those folks are very eager to do that.
I think as we look at how we potentially could design a
checkpoint of the future, you know, looking at what that looks
like in working with the airport, we could involve some
discussions around perimeter security and some of the
capabilities that might benefit.
So it is really taking it from a system-of-systems approach
and looking at the entire system and the framework and the
checkpoint.
Mr. Keating. Okay, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Keating. The Chair now recognizes
Mr. Ratcliffe from Texas for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
witnesses for being here, for your testimony, and giving us an
opportunity to fulfill our obligation with respect to
oversight. I want to follow up in that regard with respect to
some of the things that the GAO and DHS IG found about
deficiencies in the acquisition of new technology. I am sure
this has been talked about earlier in the hearing.
One example is the acquisition of trace portal or puffer
machines that were designed to blow air on the passengers in
order to detect explosive particles. From my understanding, TSA
didn't really adequately test these in the environments that
they would be, in airports with ambient humidity and dirt
particles. The bottom line is after spending $30 million, those
machines were removed.
You know, I know we all want to be better stewards of
taxpayer dollars. I am pleased to hear about some of the
developments through the testimony that has been given here
today. But I want to follow up, and I want to start with you,
Ms. Vaughan, I know that technology is ever-evolving. I look at
what has happened with regard to our cell phones in the last 10
years. So I can only imagine where airport security can be in
the next 10 years.
But in some prior Congressional testimony, TSA
Administrator Neffenger talked about getting to a place from a
technology standpoint where passengers become their own
boarding passes through the use of biometrics, like fingerprint
scans, to verify identities. I am all in favor of making the
passenger experience safer, and more efficient, and innovative
approaches to security. But that being said, I would like to
hear a little bit more in that regard about your plans, the
plans of TSA to be able to secure databases of biometric
information that can be used to confirm passenger identities.
Ms. Vaughan. Yes, sir. Thank you for your question. Having
been the former chief information security officer for TSA,
cybersecurity is core to my heart. So before we do anything in
terms of capabilities or rolling out technologies, I will
absolutely ensure which is why cybersecurity was one of the
common themes associated with my 5-year plan, we will
absolutely ensure that cybersecurity requirements, as well as
privacy considerations are considered and wrapped into whatever
capabilities we would be fielding, including any biometric
solutions.
Mr. Ratcliffe. So can you elaborate a little bit about that
plan with regard to comprehensive IT security, a framework for
these security technologies?
Ms. Vaughan. Absolutely. So I worked with my counterpart in
the Office of Information Technology, who is the chief
information officer. We essentially are leveraging the
Department's policies around IT security. So moving forward,
all procurements for new capabilities of transportation
security equipment will include cybersecurity requirements so
that we can ensure that our capabilities maintain pace with
ever-evolving cybersecurity requirements and the threat as we
move forward in the cyber environment.
Mr. Ratcliffe. So, does that plan include testing
methodologies both during the qualification and operational
testing?
Ms. Vaughan. Yes, sir. So our counterparts at the
Department have also, as part of their oversight authority, are
also including cybersecurity testing as these capabilities move
through the process. So not only will we be tested from a
security authorization perspective in accordance with the
Federal Information Security Management Act, FISMA, they will
also receive additional sets of testing from the Department in
their oversight testing role.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Terrific. So one of the other things that
Administrator Neffenger talked about was that he would like to
screen at the speed of life. In that regard talked about a goal
of combining metal detection with non-metallic anomaly
detection, shoe X-rays, vapor detection, all which sounds great
but it is very ambitious goal. So in that respect, does TSA or
should I say how does TSA communicate its needs to industry
partners since the report here calls for mutually-beneficial
dialogue and communication on that front?
Ms. Vaughan. Absolutely. So there I would go back to the
system architecture and a system-of-systems approach that we
are coordinating with industry through the Security
Manufacturers Coalition and the Washington Homeland Security
Roundtable. Very interested in working with them to establish
open architecture standards to drive towards Mr. Neffenger's
vision of looking at the checkpoint as a system.
Mr. Ratcliffe. All right. Well thank you, Ms. Vaughan. Mr.
Wallen and Ms. Mackin, I had questions for you but didn't talk
fast enough. So my time is expired. I will yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe. The Chair now
recognizes the former Chair, Mr. Hudson, from North Carolina.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for hosting
this hearing. I appreciate the opportunity to be back here at
the subcommittee. It is nice to be here. It is great to see
that the subcommittee is in great hands with your leadership
and Miss Rice's leadership. I think your backgrounds uniquely
qualify you for this. As I have watched as an interested party,
I have appreciated the work you have done so far this year. So
thank you for letting me be here with you today. I thank the
panel for being here and your time.
This Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act is a
product of several years of work. I was proud to be a part of
that, along with Bennie Thompson, Cedric Richmond, Mr. Keating,
Mr. Payne. This truly was a bipartisan effort, something where
we worked together, worked with outside stakeholders, worked
very closely with TSA. I am proud of the product. So it is very
gratifying to have the opportunity to come back here in a cameo
role and hear some of your testimony. I appreciate the work
both with the Government Accounting Office, playing their
input, and then your work as well inside the agency. Because
these are important issues.
I would like to maybe dive a little deeper on Miss Rice's
point that she was making earlier about engaging industry,
communicating with industry. One of the issues that we looked
at early on that led us to want to develop this bill was this
idea that--and, frankly, it started because we stood up an
agency and said go solve this problem that is happening right
now and come up with technology to solve something that is
already happening. So you are playing catch-up from the
beginning as an agency.
But in dealing with the outside industry, what we were
hearing was they will put out a request for a certain type of
technology that isn't feasible. Then they will sort-of pull it
back. Then they will put out a request. Then we will start
investing money to try to develop a product that we can
present. Then they will say actually, we are not going to do
that anymore, we are going to go a different direction. So the
communication with outside industry was a challenge for
industry, because industry does have to invest money, has to
invest time if they are going to work with TSA and come up with
technology and concepts.
When you talk about the capability gaps, when we talk about
innovation, I love to hear what you are saying about that and
the way you are trying to address that. But the ability to have
predictability, for industry to see where TSA is going, and
also to maybe play a role in that. You know, folks, the
innovators love the fact that you have got a Silicon Valley
office. These are the folks that can help maybe TSA see where
we are going to be 5 years from now, what things are possible.
So it can speed up the process. But it can also get us to a
better outcome.
So I am just curious, if you could maybe give, Ms. Vaughan,
an example of how this is working now, and if there is any
specific instances where this has happened, or how you have
moved to implement this and some of the changes that have been
made?
Ms. Vaughan. So, thank you for your question. I would say
that through our work with Science and Technology, we have made
great strides to ensure that the operator, TSA's needs and the
capability gaps are aligned with the research and development,
so that we can have a more streamlined vision to industry as to
where we are going.
I acknowledge, I think, you know, there has been some
issues in the past about the Government needing to be
additionally transparent to industry. We have made some great
strides in trying to both increase transparency through our
testing and evaluation process, through sharing all of our
process guides, our test plans, and things like that, as well
as ensuring that the needs of the operator are aligned to
research and development so we can really focus and help
industry understand where we are going.
So I am very hopeful that that is the direction we are
moving. I also meet with the vendors on a regular basis to talk
about where we are and where we are going. I think those
conversations have been very helpful for both sides.
Mr. Hudson. Are they any structural barriers that still
exist that prevent you from maybe doing more, whether it is
with small business, as has been raised, or just industry
specifically? Are there still things that Congress can do to
make your job easier? Are there things this committee could
work towards to help us all reach that goal?
Ms. Vaughan. So I think this act was wonderful because I
was in the job about 14 days after it was signed. So for me, it
really helped me put together my vision in short order. Looking
at what I walked in to see, you know, yes, we need to increase
transparency and communication with industry. That only
benefits both sides I think from a Government and industry
perspective. Then I also think it allowed me to really signal
to industry what my vision is, where are key themes, where are
we going with cybersecurity and system architecture, and
innovation lanes.
So I appreciate the legislation. I do think the legislation
you all put forth in terms of allowing TSA to donate equipment
overseas is very helpful because I think that will allow us to,
you know, strengthen our, you know, work with our foreign
airport operators overseas to strengthen security where
possible.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much, Mr. Hudson. Many people
often say that Government, Congress doesn't get anything done.
Well, this is proof positive that you find a problem, you find
a solution to it, Mr. Hudson. We are clearly making progress. I
commend you for that. I commend all of you for that.
I want to thank all of you for your thoughtful testimony.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions for
each of you. We will ask you to respond to those in writing.
The hearing record will be open for 10 days. The panel is now
dismissed.
But before I do so, I want to thank all of you for a great
job. The hopefulness of the testimony was good. We have got a
long way to go, like I said. Let's keep it going. For those of
you testifying for the first time, we all think you did a fine
job. So congratulations.
Now, with that being said, I am going to ask you to get
away from your desk quickly because we are trying to get this
done quickly and transition to the second team. Thank you very
much.
We are in a very brief adjournment. We will sit here.
[Recess.]
Mr. Katko. We are back in session. The Chair now recognizes
the second panel.
We are pleased to have a very distinguished second panel
before us. Let me remind the witness that his entire written
statement will appear in the record.
Our witness is Mr. T.J. Schulz who currently serves as the
executive director of the Security Manufacturers Coalition. Mr.
Schulz, we recognize you to testify but we do want to caution
you that there are 17 votes expected. We have to leave in about
5 or 10 minutes.
So without objection, the committee will recognize the
Members for as much questioning as we can possibly handle here.
I am not confident that we can do much. If you would like to
have a truncated version of your testimony so we can get a
little bit of testimony, that is fine too. We will leave it up
to you.
In any regard, you have 5 minutes total to testify.
Whatever we don't cover today, we can cover in written
questions to follow up, okay.
Mr. Schulz. Indeed. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. All right. Mr. Schulz.
STATEMENT OF T.J. SCHULZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SECURITY
MANUFACTURERS COALITION
Mr. Schulz. Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and
Members of the subcommittee, let me thank you for the
opportunity to testify on improvements to the TSA acquisitions
process.
I am here today representing companies that develop and
deliver first-rate threat detection and screening equipment
across the country and around the world. We are pleased to
provide our views on improving the TSA acquisitions process.
We commend this committee and the Congress for passage of
the Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act which will
help establish more accountability and transparency in the
process. Having said that, we believe there are a number of
challenges facing the TSA and the viability of a robust,
competitive, domestic manufacturing base. The TSA's 5-year
technology plan shows an agency in sustainment mode with
investment focused primarily on recapitalizing systems. We see
very little detail in the plan on investments in next
generation equipment with improved detection and operational
capabilities.
Improving the overall TSA acquisitions process can also
enhance competition in the industry. We believe that the
greatest opportunity for improvement lies in fixing the current
test and evaluation process. The process is vital to ensuring
that capable technologies are fielded. But in its current
state, it simply takes too long and unnecessarily wastes
millions of dollars for both Government and industry.
To that end, we acknowledge and endorse the findings
outlined by the GAO on the test and evaluation process. We also
share GAO's concerns that the third-party testing process
recently instituted by the TSA could, in fact, serve to
increase costs and time associated with equipment testing.
There really is no certainty as to whether the TSA will accept
the findings of that third party.
In the future, Congress should monitor the third-party
testing policies and support resources that TSA needs to set up
and maintain a workable system. TSA should also endeavor to
identify a handful of solid core capability and operational
requirements in the involved industry and the development of
those requirements. That will help attain better alignment
between the TSA and the vendors.
Moving beyond the T&E process, we urge Congress to monitor
and keep updated on the interface between the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate and TSA to make sure that they are
coordinating the development of newer, higher-capability
equipment that can be transitioned to a more effective testing
process and eventual deployment.
The plan outlines a desire to transition to a network
system-of-systems. A key component of this is our open
architecture functionality. Industry must be closely involved
as TSA embarks on this goal, as companies have spent tens of
millions of dollars in R&D in order to get to higher-capability
equipment. Efforts to seek to standardize the equipment could,
indeed, stifle innovation.
In closing, this committee's strong oversight and the TSA's
efforts to improve the acquisitions process has had positive
results. We believe continued oversight and monitoring will
ensure TSA stays on track to implement needed reforms and
updates to the 5-year plan. I look forward to taking your
questions to the extent we have time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schulz follows:]
Prepared Statement of T.J. Schulz
January 7, 2016
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the 9-member Security Manufacturers
Coalition, thank you for the opportunity to share our collective
thoughts on potential areas of improvement in technology research,
strengthening the TSA test and evaluation process, and bringing clarity
and stability to technology acquisitions. Your vigilance and oversight
this past year was most welcome, and the SMC stands ready to work with
you and the TSA in 2016 to improve the security of the traveling
public.
The SMC is the unified voice of leading security technology
companies with manufacturing operations and offices in 10 States. The
7,000 direct and 20,000 in-direct jobs generated by SMC members run the
gamut of systems engineering and design to advanced product assembly
with tested and certified equipment deployed across the transportation
network throughout the world. Every coalition member is committed to
delivering first-rate threat detection and screening equipment to
protect our Nation and our people.
The coalition is primarily focused on: (1) Developing a straight-
forward dialogue and collaboration with our key Government partners;
(2) improving the TSA test and evaluation (T&E) process, for which this
subcommittee just received GAO testimony and on which we largely agree;
(3) improving the overall TSA acquisition planning; (4) urging an
improved R&D process that ties back to TSA requirements and
procurement; and (5) ensuring adequate funding is in place to execute
important equipment upgrades and recapitalization.
I am also pleased to serve on the aviation security advisory
committee (ASAC) and as the co-chairman of the ASAC's newly-formed
security technology subcommittee. Our thanks to the committee again for
supporting legislation to codify the ASAC and ensure technology is a
key focus of this important industry advisory group to the TSA.
tsa leadership
My testimony today will largely focus on TSA's T&E process, the
importance of building off of the 5-year acquisition plan requirements
of the Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (TSARA--Pub. L.
113-245), and Congress's important role moving forward. However, first
and foremost, any meaningful result today and in the future will only
be achieved when industry has an active and purposed seat at the table
with Government--not simply to receive information, but to generate a
constructive dialogue on the threats we face and vulnerabilities ripe
for exploitation by our adversaries. This will enable manufacturers to
align private-sector technology research and capabilities with current
and future threats, as well as to ensure a viable domestic security
technology industrial base is maintained.
Over the past 4\1/2\ years in which the SMC has been operating, we
have seen a laudable increase in engagement by TSA with the industry.
This trend continues under Administrator Neffenger's leadership and
with Office of Security Capabilities Assistant Administrator Jill
Vaughan, who has genuinely sought a greater partnership with
manufacturers. We are optimistic TSA understands how unpredictable
purchasing cycles and multi-year time lines for equipment development,
testing, and qualification negatively impact both Government and the
industry.
tsa acquisition plan
TSARA required TSA to develop a 5-year technology acquisition plan.
Released in August, the Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan
for Aviation Security (henceforth referred to as the ``Five-Year
Plan''), is a positive step forward in accountability, cross-
jurisdictional collaboration and industry engagement. An essential
document for industry planning, the Five-Year Plan provides some
visibility into TSA's schedule for replacement and upgrades of existing
equipment, and projected future capability needs. But this is just a
first step. Industry needs a more precise roadmap to know where and
when to invest. Ensuring our R&D efforts focus on the capabilities that
will meet TSA priorities and address emerging security threats is
critical to protect the citizens of this country. Greater partnership
between TSA and industry will only help with this process.
The SMC believes the Five-Year Plan can be leveraged to vastly
improve TSA's acquisition process and, ultimately, the security of our
aviation system. This committee is in a unique position to monitor
progress TSA is making on acquisition reform. The SMC supports all
efforts to ensure TSA is making necessary changes to: Streamline and
strengthen the T&E process; align budget requests to identified
requirements; provide clear and consistent details on the threat
profile to ensure industry is prepared to respond and TSA is making the
right investments; and ensure meaningful engagement with industry.
plan details
The SMC encourages Congress to require future iterations of the
Five-Year Plan to provide more specific dollar allocations and
investment detail tied to particular equipment type. The spend plan
generically suggests a $3.6 billion investment over the 5-year period
but fails to align those expenditures along actual programs, projects,
and activities. Further, there is virtually no mention of ``new''
acquisition as opposed to recapitalization. Finally, the acquisition
plan should be based on the true needs of the TSA from a technology
capabilities standpoint, not an expected budget framework.
This lack of detail creates challenges for industry. By example,
``Figure 8. Approved PSP and EBSP Recapitalization'' on Page 22 of the
Five-Year Plan indicates TSA plans to recapitalize 897 Enhanced Metal
Detectors (EMDs) in fiscal year 2016. At this stage, it is unclear
whether TSA plans to purchase these machines directly off of the
Qualified Equipment List--equipment that has been certified and cleared
through the T&E process--or whether new requirements will be introduced
requiring additional testing and validation. At present, TSA has not
provided vendors a schedule, RFP, or plan to extend the useful life of
existing EMDs operating under standing requirements. The SMC is equally
concerned that in fiscal year 2017 and beyond order volumes for EMD are
less than 10 percent of fiscal year 2016.
Figure 8 also suggests acquisition in fiscal year 2017 of 296 Next
Gen Advanced Technology X-ray (AT-2) machines. Industry is awaiting a
list of requirements for this technology, which may include
cybersecurity hardening. Even under the best possible scenario, if the
requirements document were released and a manufacturer provided
equipment to TSA for T&E immediately, the likelihood of TSA being able
to purchase in fiscal year 2017 is challenging based on the
comprehensive testing process.
Overall, industry is concerned about future recapitalization plans
outlined in the Five-Year Plan that consist of peaks and valleys on a
year-by-year basis. This makes resource allocation and staffing
extremely challenging for manufacturers. A more consistent, level spend
plan spread out over the 5 years would enable original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) to maintain consistency in staffing and
manufacturing plans.
t&e process reform
TSARA is an important first step to meaningful reforms, but while
plans are great, it is the implementation of those plans that
determines ultimate success. TSA has outlined a number of initiatives
underway at OSC that seek to improve the acquisitions process,
particularly relating to the development, testing, and qualification of
security equipment. While TSA has done a good job of providing
transparency into the process for industry, the fact remains that under
the best scenario, it can take 3 years or longer to navigate a piece of
equipment through the T&E process. While the bar must be high, this
process impacts innovation, competition, improved security and
efficiency, as both the Government and industry expend undue time and
resources navigating a complicated process.
We believe GAO did an admirable and fair assessment of the state of
TSA's test and evaluation process and we offer a few of our
perspectives for this committee's consideration.
First, GAO touches on a key challenge at TSA: The need to improve
coordination internally in the T&E and overall acquisitions process.
The report cites a lack of coordination between program managers and
the T&E division, which has led to problems in establishing unrealistic
acquisitions schedules and conflicts in the interpretation of test
results. Quite simply, the barriers to effective coordination within
TSA need to be broken down to facilitate a more coordinated
acquisitions process. Breaking down internal barriers and empowering
key individuals as well as instituting direct accountability is
absolutely required.
Second, as noted in the report, the TSA has begun to share test
plans with OEMs for specific transportation security equipment (TSE).
The SMC supports this as a means to ensure alignment on the goals and
testing procedures between the TSA and vendors. TSA has provided test
plans for Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), and they are helpful, but
we encourage test plans for other TSE to be shared.
The GAO also notes OSC has implemented plans and policies that
would engage third parties to assist in the test and evaluation
process. The SMC shares the concerns raised by GAO that the TSA has
undertaken third-party testing without a clear vision of what the end-
state will truly be. As noted by GAO, the current third-party testing
procedures could potentially raise costs and lengthen an already
arduous equipment vetting process rather than provide an expedited,
focused review that in turn gets equipment to the field.
The SMC believes that developing a viable and optional third-party
testing process could be an example of a collaborative initiative by
TSA and industry. Under this process, TSA would select and certify
providers in the private sector and conduct proper oversight of these
entities. Once this is in place, TSA should then accept the findings
and results of the third-party providers and not start the entire
testing process over again, particularly on items that are not critical
to detection and operational performance. Rather than TSA spending
considerable time testing items that can be objectively measured (such
as size, weight, lights, basic functions), and then spend weeks in
coordination and correction, third-party testing could offer a faster,
more cost-efficient alternative by allowing TSA to focus on the
critical aspects of threat detection. Overall, third-party testing
should be used as an economical way to ensure requirements are met, not
as a duplicative, costly measure.
It should be noted that setting up this structure will require
substantial resources by OSC, as the initial vetting, approval and
certification of third-party testing providers, and the sustained
monitoring and oversight, will require considerable support. However,
SMC believes the security and industry innovation benefits of a
reliable, well-constructed third-party vetting process warrant TSA's
attention and Congress' persistent oversight to get this right.
Recently, TSA has reached out to SMC to begin framing out a third-party
testing program in 2016 and we look forward to this dialogue.
The SMC also endorses GAO's recommendation that the TSA conduct a
comprehensive assessment of testing data, including time frames, costs
incurred and testing delays across all technologies, to ascertain the
factors that lead to recurrent chokepoints in the T&E process. This
would provide a good opportunity for industry and TSA to collectively
identify and find solutions to address the most prominent stumbling
blocks in the process.
Finally, perhaps the single, most critical element for ensuring a
successful test and evaluation process is the thoughtful development of
equipment requirements. TSA and industry have struggled over the years
with requirements that number in the hundreds, many of which have
little relevance with the core detection and operational performance of
the equipment. There is also the challenge of constantly shifting
requirements, which cause significant disruptions in the testing
process. We have urged TSA with each procurement to identify the
handful of solid, core requirements to test capabilities.
In summary, shortening and streamlining the testing process and
collaborating with industry to identify recurrent chokepoints and
develop solutions would go a long way to getting newer, more advanced
equipment into the field. It will provide a higher degree of certainty
to industry that the process isn't a series of roadblocks, but
important, measurable checkpoints on a linear road. It will also help
to foster more competition and effective use of Government and industry
resources.
s&t investment & interagency collaboration
The TSA's Five-Year Plan projects a more integrated engagement with
the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. We urge the committee to
require more detail in future iterations of the Five-Year Plan to
include specific examples and plans of S&T investment directly tied to
fulfilling TSA identified capability gaps and future requirements; the
subsequent transition of TSE from development to the T&E stage; and
eventually acquisition. There are substantial opportunities to improve
coordination between S&T and TSA to ensure the development of newer,
higher-capability equipment that can be transitioned to a more
effective testing process and fielded more expeditiously.
The SMC supports the thoughtful investment of research dollars,
provided it is tied to addressing real threats identified by TSA as a
capability gap and with an eye toward eventual and realistic
procurement either by the Government or as a requirement of Government
(as in the case of air cargo). Secretary Johnson's efforts to better
align S&T Integrated Product Teams (IPT) under the Unity of Effort
Initiative is a welcome first step. TSA and OSC needs to have a
prominent role in the IPT effort, and ultimately should have a lead
role in identifying key R&D needs and activities, as they are
responsible for acquiring and operating equipment that will meet new
and evolving threats. Further, industry input should be solicited early
on in the process to ensure research goals align with achievable, cost-
conscious results.
life cycle
Along with the T&E process and up and down procurement cycles,
there are other notable challenges for industry. In 2014, with no
industry input, TSA made a decision to expand the projected life cycle
of EDS machinery from 10 to 15 years. This had significant implications
on company manufacturing and staffing plans. While the justification by
TSA was that detection capabilities for known threats continues to be
sufficient, the results are that future threat research and response is
stifled and next-generation detection and high-speed capabilities are
delayed.
The life-cycle decision may have a very real budgetary and
operational impact for TSA, as the ability to maintain and keep
equipment fully operational and performing its mission after 10 years
of service is increasingly difficult. This means more patches,
difficulty finding replacement parts, more service calls, antiquated
operating systems, and less efficiencies. Further, trying to bring 10-
to 15-year-old equipment into the Age of the Internet of Things is
almost impossible as the equipment was designed and built to
requirements that never envisioned cybersecurity, internet
connectivity, or data conversion capabilities.
Congress should closely watch TSA life-cycle equipment
determinations for both delayed security impacts, operational cost
increases, and the very real implications for a viable domestic
security industrial base. At a minimum, pushing equipment approval time
lines to the right delays the next generation of equipment with
increased capabilities, hinders current performance and stifles
innovation.
A market environment that engenders innovation is our best defense
against improvised explosives and thwarting transportation threats.
Certainly intelligence is key, but when this fails, if we are not
encouraging technological innovation and next-generation investment, we
will lose not only our technological edge, but the industrial base that
goes with it.
open architecture
Related, the Five-Year Plan touches on a desire by TSA to move to a
networked system of equipment, or as Administrator Neffenger refers to,
a ``system of systems.'' A key component of this end-state is an open
architecture which functionally seeks to better integrate technology
applications and apply security countermeasures, ``at the system level
rather than the component level'' (pg. 25).
The SMC appreciates the discussion provided in the Five-Year Plan
on this system-of-systems approach and recognizes the security
proposition of data sharing. However, industry remains skeptical of
this initiative without greater transparency on what could be a
significant business disruption and potentially impact security
efficacy. With a goal of implementing this concept within the next 5-10
years, the constructive engagement with industry right now is vital.
SMC encourages caution and thoughtfulness in an effort that appears
to seek uniformity, commonality, and standardization amongst the
various TSE, which could ultimately discourage the drive for innovation
and newer capabilities. While industry supports the concepts behind
risk-based, layered security, potentially surrendering intellectual
property and company-sensitive algorithms developed through tens of
millions of dollars of private-sector investment generates another set
of risks, including the potential degrading of the competitive nature
and vibrancy of the industry. We look forward to discussing this in
more detail with TSA in the future to reach a desired state of better
capabilities and integration, while maintaining a viable industry base.
transportation security equipment funding
As mentioned in the Five-Year Plan and the GAO Report, TSA is
transitioning into a technology sustainment mode focusing on
recapitalization of over 2,400 pieces of equipment that are reaching
their end of life over the next 5 years. While process is key, it is
also absolutely critical to ensure that recapitalization of security
equipment is fully funded to keep our transportation system safe and
the industry viable.
The SMC is grateful to Congress for its leadership in fully funding
the fiscal year 2016 DHS budget request for TSA Checkpoint Support and
EDS Procurement/Installation. We encourage the subcommittee to work
with your colleagues to continue this trend while reducing the
bureaucratic barriers for innovation and deployment.
SMC would encourage this subcommittee to require future TSA budget
documents to allot specific funding amounts to various technologies
within the Checkpoint Support account and insist the Five-Year Plan
provides a lookback on actual equipment purchased during the preceding
3 fiscal years. Because Checkpoint Support funding is not delineated to
individual equipment types, industry has had difficulty ensuring
Federal funds are truly reaching the intended target and consistent
with previous documents. Further, previous EDS procurements have been
significantly delayed or cancelled after significant vendor investment.
Congress should insist on an accounting for these unspent funds and
ensure they are carried over EDS replacement only.
These details would go a long way to informing Congress on the true
TSA operational equipment need as opposed to budget-constrained funding
requests.
closing
The SMC believes the mission the Chairman and Ranking Member are on
is the right one. As equipment begins to phase out, new technologies
must be researched, developed, and purchased. New threats cannot be
resolved with antiquated solutions.
The SMC encourages continued, vigilant oversight. However, we would
encourage the Congress to be mindful of new legislation that could
serve to bog down an already ponderous acquisitions process with more
requirements and procedures. This could serve to add additional delays
and costs. We recommend Congress work with TSA and industry to find
efficiencies and make this complicated process more streamlined and
effective. Doing so will save time and money, while providing OEMs and
emerging companies more certainty to develop and produce a new
generation of equipment with better capabilities to meet ever-evolving
threats.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. I remind you that you will
have an opportunity, given how this is shaking out with our
votes, to submit anything to supplement your testimony based on
what you heard today in the first panel. I will give you an
opportunity to make any comments you want on what you heard
today. So, please, I encourage you to do so.
Given all that and given what you have heard today, in
addition to what you have stated, is there any one thing that
you would point to that remains a systemic, the biggest
systemic problem within TSA, even within the last year's
adjustments that have been made, what is the biggest systemic
problem you see?
Mr. Schulz. I think the transparency has gotten much better
thanks to the work of this committee and the legislation and
the plan. Now is really the time where the rubber hits the
road. We need to take this industry engagement to another
level. That involves more detail on the plans that TSA has as
it relates to new innovation, new innovative technologies,
while also recapping the systems that are already in place.
This really involves a test and evaluation process. That is
something that absolutely needs to get fixed. It takes way too
long. It really inhibits competition in smaller companies as
well. The GAO said we need to get more data there. We need to
get into that process and see if there are recurrent
chokepoints in the system. We need to work with industry and
the TSA to identify those and see what we can do to make that
better.
Mr. Katko. Okay. Miss Rice, do you have anything?
Miss Rice. So, what are your thoughts about how third-party
testing might--it was clearly the opinion of Ms. Vaughan that
third-party testing is going to make this a much more efficient
process. Do you agree with that or not?
Mr. Schulz. Again, we have stated some concerns about the
policy as it is in place right now and that we don't have any
guarantee that that is going to save any time or cost. We do
think that there can be stood up a viable third-party system.
What that would entail is TSA going out and identifying capable
entities that would be able to do this testing, to certify
them. They would also have to do continual monitoring of these
entities as well.
A key component of this is that the TSA, once this third-
party finds that the company hit the mark, the TSA should be
able to accept that. We shouldn't have to go back and do
substantial regression testing back at the TSA.
Miss Rice. How often does that happen?
Mr. Schulz. Well, we are not really engaged in that third-
party system. But----
Miss Rice. No, but the going back. I mean, if you are
saying they not accepting----
Mr. Schulz. Ms. Vaughan touched on the fact that there is
quite a bit of regression testing that takes place. That does
take an awful lot of time because not only do you have to go
ahead and do the test and the vendor has to go and find fixes
for that problem, but then you bring it back and there is all
sorts of paperwork identified all throughout that process.
Miss Rice. It sounds like communication is a problem?
Mr. Schulz. It is a problem. It is something that can be
solved though. The communications within the TSA itself, the
GAO points to the fact that sometimes there is not quite
alignment within the TSA from the program managers to the
people that are actually doing the testing. Sometimes there is
misalignment as it relates to what the requirements mean.
Sometimes the test plans and the test results, there isn't
alignment there. Then you bring in the vendors. Sometimes the
vendor comes into the program thinking that they know what the
TSA wants. They are not quite in alignment there.
Miss Rice. Well, that was the point that I was trying to
make with the previous panel. What are the lines of
communication that are set up and where is the attendant
accountability for conversations that are had between agency to
agency, not just agency to agency, DHS to TSA, but to the
vendors?
Mr. Schulz. She mentioned, Jill mentioned the sharing of
test plans. To our knowledge, I think for the EDS equipment,
that has taken place. I don't know for the other technologies
whether those test plans have been shared. That is very helpful
because it gives the vendor an idea of what the TSA is looking
for and how they are going to be conducting the testing. There
are definitely opportunities to look, work with TSA to, again,
find these chokepoints and figure out what the communication
implications are.
The requirements is a big topic too. It is a very big topic
because really the success of your T&E process is going to be
based on how robust those requirements are. Sometimes, as I
mentioned before, there might not be complete alignment within
the TSA as to what those requirements are.
Miss Rice. Hear you loud and clear. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Katko. I apologize for the brevity of your testimony.
But, again, it is very helpful. I think the colloquy between
Miss Rice and yourself really nailed one of the biggest
concerns we have in the committee and something we are going to
continue to pursue going forward.
Again, I apologize for the brevity of your testimony. But I
encourage you strongly to submit anything in writing that you
wish to offer in addition to your testimony of any concerns you
have.
We want to get this right. We understand we are at the
beginning of, this is a marathon, not a sprint. There is a lot
more to be done here. So I encourage you to keep the lines of
communication open with us, keep the discussions open. If you
think more roundtables are helpful as well, we would be happy
to have them as well. Because we want to fix this process. We
want to make sure it is the best process it possibly can be. We
have a long way to go. TSA is a bureaucratic agency that needs
to change some of its old habits. Some of the old habits ought
to go.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Chairman, along those lines, in your
written testimony, I imagine your clients have some private-
sector clients as well they deal with. If you could for the
committee contrast the way that they are working with the
private side and the public side, I think seeing that side-by-
side might be very helpful to us. Thank you.
Mr. Katko. Yes. That is a great point. We want to thank you
very much for your testimony. I thank the Members of the
committee for their questions as well. The Members of the
committee may have some additional questions for the witness.
We will ask you to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing record will be
held open for 10 days. Without objection, this subcommittee
stands adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman John Katko for Steven Wallen
Question 1. Industry stakeholders have previously told the Members
of this subcommittee that the relationship between DHS's Science &
Technology Directorate and TSA's Research & Development has caused
inconsistencies in the development of new technologies.
Can you explain the operational relationship between DHS S&T and
TSA R&D?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. TSA plans to utilize third-party testing for
technologies that do not meet the operational standards TSA requires. I
understand that there are not any third-party testers that can
replicate the explosive testing environment like DHS S&T is able to.
How is DHS S&T involved in the third-party testing?
Question 2b. Was DHS S&T consulted at the point TSA was developing
this plan?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. I have been informed that DHS S&T, specifically the
Transportation Security Lab, significantly collaborates with private
industry when developing technologies.
Please describe the collaboration and how it has aided in the
development of security technologies.
Question 3b. What emerging security technologies is DHS working to
develop?
Question 3c. What biometric technologies is DHS testing? Looking to
develop in the future?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. During the hearing, TSA and DHS described progress
made through the constitution of an Integrated Product Team (IPT) on
Aviation Security. The IPT will identify capability gaps and coordinate
R&D program in 2018-2020.
Please provide IPT capability gap recommendations for R&D
investment and a current schedule of IPT activities.
Question 4b. What is the projected role of industry stakeholders as
part of the IPT process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Has TSA procured equipment received basic or
transitional S&T investment to address TSA identified capability gaps
or overcome technological barriers? Please provide examples.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Provide examples of S&T-led Broad Agency Announcements
that have eventually translated into a TSA aviation security equipment
procurement.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. The Strategic Five-Year Technology Investment Plan
notes that approximately $75 million has been spent by S&T for
university research.
Please provide specific examples of aviation technology upgrades,
solutions, or equipment that have been produced and eventually deployed
in the field by OSC through these programs.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. What recommendations would you suggest to increase
collaboration amongst DHS and TSA and industry?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman John Katko for Jill Vaughan
Question 1a. A provision of the Transportation Security Acquisition
Reform Act (TSARA) requires TSA to collaborate with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to develop standardized criteria
for testing security screening technologies.
What is the status of the development of the standardized criteria
for security-related technologies?
Question 1b. Has the criteria been effective in the R&D of any
technologies?
Answer. One of the key themes in the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) Strategic 5-Year Technology Investment Plan is
the focus on a system-of-systems approach rather than procuring
independent technologies with specific functions TSA would take a
holistic approach moving towards increased interoperability and
integration, which would include development of standards for open
architecture. TSA is collaborating with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) on security-related technology
interface standards that could promote more interoperable passenger and
baggage screening systems. TSA believes the development of these
standards and associated architecture will help to streamline
technology investment and enhance delivery of security capabilities.
In addition, TSA is working with NIST, through the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Standards Executive to enhance
interoperability. When developing specifications and solicitations, TSA
works with NIST to ensure proper reference to established relevant
standards. With sponsorship by the DHS Standards program, NIST and TSA
collaborate in order to cross-utilize subject-matter expertise to trace
standard explosive materials and to support quality assurance efforts
for fielded Explosives Trace Detection systems. NIST has also provided
support for TSA's test and evaluation program to develop non-contact
scanner testing. The collaboration with NIST has led to a more
performance-sensitive, general level of acceptance tolerances, and a
more open analysis software tool to move forward from simulant-based
acceptance of Explosive Detection Systems. These tools are currently
being transitioned to support both Factory and Site Acceptance Testing,
once the Project Management Office contractually requests the vendors
to update their associated test procedures to implement these American
National Standards Institute test kits.
TSA recognizes that further collaboration with NIST may open
possibilities, help the agency plan for the future, assist TSA with
reducing process delays, and define more precise outcomes in the
future. In our work to develop the most accurate and precise screening
technology we continue to make great strides to ensure that operational
requirements and capability gaps are aligned with research and
development efforts.
Question 2a. TSARA mandates that TSA notify the appropriate
Congressional committees when making a purchase of security-related
technology totaling $30 million or more.
How often does TSA utilize its ``other transaction'' authority to
purchase security-related technologies?
Question 2b. What technologies have been procured under the
category of ``other transaction''?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
use other transactional agreements (OTAs) to acquire Transportation
Security Equipment. However, prior to 2005, TSA may have used OTAs to
acquire testing services and test equipment from Original Equipment
Manufacturers for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program. That test
equipment included Explosives Detection Systems and ancillary
equipment. One unit may have been installed at the Transportation
Security Lab; another unit remained with the Original Equipment
Manufacturer to continue development efforts; and perhaps one was
placed in the field following the test. All of these units were
disposed of after becoming obsolete. Current TSA policies do not allow
for the use of OTAs to purchase Transportation Security Equipment.
Question 3. I understand that DHS has mandated new cybersecurity
requirements for all networked equipment, and that TSA has communicated
9 critical cybersecurity requirements to vendors.
Has compliance with these cybersecurity requirements resulted in
any delays to TSA's deployment schedule for security equipment?
Answer. TSA is currently in the process of sharing proposed
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requirements with the
transportation security equipment (TSE) vendors to enhance current and
future systems' cybersecurity. However, TSA will not know the full cost
and associated time lines until responses from the TSE vendors are
evaluated against the cost and benefits of the proposed enhancements.
While these activities are being pursued, TSA has mitigated the
cybersecurity risk to TSE by disconnecting them from the Security
Technology Integrated Program (STIP) network pending these programmatic
decisions.
These efforts to address cybersecurity requirements have impacted
the test and evaluation schedule for the development of Credential
Authentication Technology (CAT). In January 2016, TSA released a
request for proposal to the CAT vendor for the implementation of the
cybersecurity requirements, and held a technical interchange meeting
with the vendor to discuss technical specifications and requirements
for personal identity verification integration and the other
cybersecurity requirements. Once the cybersecurity requirements are
met, then the CAT vendor can resume testing. Procurement and deployment
decisions and time lines are dependent upon successful completion of
testing activities. In that regard, TSA has already notified DHS of a
schedule breach and is preparing the Congressional report identifying a
schedule breach for CAT pursuant to 6 U.S.C 563b, as enacted by the
Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (Pub. L. 113-245). Such
occurrences could impact milestones and disrupt time tables in the
future.
Question 4a. I understand that DHS cybersecurity mandates requiring
PIV card access could delay the deployment of the Credential
Authentication Technology.
How is TSA working to rectify these delays?
Question 4b. When will CAT be deployed, if at all?
Answer. The time line for testing and deployment of Credential
Authentication Technology (CAT) has been impacted by the efforts to
address several cybersecurity requirements, such as Personal Identity
Verification (PIV) enabling. The Transportation Security Administration
is working to meet all cybersecurity requirements to enable CAT to
proceed to final Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E).
In January 2016, TSA released a request for proposal to the CAT
vendor for the implementation of the cybersecurity requirements, and
held a technical interchange meeting with the vendor to discuss
technical specifications and requirements for PIV and the other
cybersecurity requirements. Once cybersecurity requirements are met,
then the CAT vendor can resume testing. Procurement and deployment
decisions and time lines are dependent in part upon successful
demonstration of system effectiveness, suitability, and cybersecurity
readiness through Initial Operation Test and Evaluation (IOT&E).
Question 5a. GAO has reported that TSA fails to adequately monitor
the maintenance of its security screening technologies which would
ensure the equipment's effectiveness, and yet TSA found it appropriate
to lengthen the life span of the EDS machines.
What is the current maintenance strategy for security-related
technologies?
Question 5b. How is the maintenance of security-related
technologies tracked?
Question 5c. What prompted TSA to elongate the life span of some
security-related equipment? Was it from information derived from the
maintenance records?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the
Inspector General report found that, in some cases, local
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel at the airports
were not aware of the status of corrective maintenance actions, or the
schedule for preventive maintenance being conducted by contracted
technicians. Since then, TSA has implemented measures to improve
visibility of maintenance actions and schedules at the local level.
TSA has detailed and accurate maintenance data on all of its
Transportation Security Equipment (TSE). TSA centrally manages the
Performance-Based Logistics contracts under which TSE is maintained. As
part of these contracts, the maintenance contractors' capture and
report detailed information for each corrective maintenance action, and
this information is reported to TSA for validation and analysis.
TSA's operational experience has indicated that deployed
technologies have the ability to operate longer without a negative
operational impact or requiring increased maintenance. TSA equipment is
in a constant state of maintenance and refurbishment, and is tested or
calibrated on a daily basis to ensure proper functioning prior to use.
As a result, the TSE in the field has exceeded initial service life
estimates and consistently achieves Operational Availability rates at
or above 98 percent. Because the material condition and functionality
of the equipment does not justify replacement, TSA deemed it fiscally
responsible and operationally sound to extend the service life of the
equipment.
Most importantly, the deployed fleet of Explosives Detection
Systems has shown the capability to be upgraded with and to run
enhanced algorithms. Therefore, the TSE will reach the end of its
useful life and need to be replaced when next generation technologies
with improved detection or efficiencies are available, or when the
current fleet has reached technical obsolescence (i.e., inability to
run enhanced algorithms to detect the threat). TSA will ensure that
future considerations of any service life extensions will include
engagement with industry.
Question 6a. TSA's recent failures have been well-publicized and
prompted TSA to conduct a massive re-training effort.
Has TSA collected data on failure rates since the re-training has
taken place? Have failures rates gone down?
Question 6b. Did the failure rates and retraining process inform
any decisions regarding future technology purchases?
Answer. Screening operations are the core mission of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Our Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) screen hundreds of millions of passengers and
approximately 2 billion carry-on and checked bags each year to prevent
dangerous and/or prohibited items from being carried onto aircraft.
In response to the results of the recent DHS Inspector General
covert testing of airport checkpoints and the subsequent TSA Action
Plan, TSA has developed and delivered Mission Essentials--Threat
Mitigation (ME-TM) training to the entire TSO workforce plus a number
of TSA Headquarters and Federal Security Director staff. The overall
objective of Mission Essentials training is to instruct the screening
workforce on the link between intelligence information regarding the
current threat, capabilities within checkpoint technologies,
operational procedures, and the role of the TSO in mitigating those
threats. These principles will be reinforced through additional
offerings in the Mission Essentials training series scheduled for
quarterly release, and the principles are being incorporated into the
TSO Basic Training Program for newly-hired officers.
Training the workforce is a priority for TSA. Collection of data
for validating the effectiveness of training is on-going and among
several measures being implemented as part of the TSA Action Plan.
Total assessments conducted have increased over the previous year to
approximately 14,000 annually. As a result, TSA has observed
improvements in covert test assessments since the completion of ME-TM
training. This Classified aggregated National data can be shared with
the committee in the appropriate environment.
The TSA Office of Inspection regularly conducts covert ``Red Team''
testing to measure the effectiveness of TSA security systems and
identify vulnerabilities in the people, processes, and technology. The
``Red Team'' tests are developed and deployed based upon an insider-
level of knowledge and current intelligence regarding threats against
transportation systems. Once tests are completed, a Classified report
is prepared which includes the results, findings, and recommendations
for mitigating identified vulnerabilities. TSA can provide a briefing
to the committee in a Classified setting if further information
regarding testing procedures and results is requested.
Another element of TSA's response includes assessing areas where
screening technology equipment can be enhanced. This includes new
software, new operating concepts, and technology upgrades in
collaboration with our private-sector partners. TSA will ensure more
emphasis is given to human factors in the development of requirements
used for future procurements.
TSA recently hosted equipment manufacturer representatives at the
TSA Academy on the Glynco, Georgia, campus of the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). The purpose was to facilitate
coordination between the vendors and Academy instructors and staff, as
well as to address gaps in awareness about technology training. A
significant focus has been placed on ensuring that TSOs understand both
the capabilities and the limitations of the technologies deployed so
they can be used most effectively. The relationship between equipment
vendors and instructors is vital to ensuring that TSOs remain up-to-
date on the capabilities of TSA technology.
Question 7. GAO points out that TSA will now include third-party
testing for technologies that do not meet the TSA requirements and need
additional development but TSA did not account for several factors that
will impact the effectiveness of the third-party testing and,
therefore, not be as cost-effective.
Has TSA made improvements to the third-party testing process as a
result of the GAO report?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
observed challenges with transportation security equipment passing
qualification testing and operational testing, resulting in delayed
acquisition processes and increased test and evaluation costs. TSA is
working to address these challenges by developing its Third-Party Test
Program, which is intended to streamline the acquisition process by
requiring vendors to provide more mature systems in response to
procurement opportunities.
TSA initiated its Third-Party Test Program in July 2014, with an
announcement on the Federal Business Opportunities website. To support
the implementation of this program, TSA approved the Third-Party Test
Strategy on April 21, 2015. The strategy was developed with support
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It
provides a high-level overview of TSA's Third-Party Test Program and
the associated roles and responsibilities for TSA stakeholders.
In addition, TSA is also working with NIST to develop Third-Party
Test Procedures. This document will identify standardized testing
criteria, testing requirements, and standardized test scenario
templates for transportation security equipment. In support of this
effort, TSA conducted a detailed analysis of each technology's
historical rate of failures for qualification testing and operational
testing, and is leveraging this analysis to help define the
requirements for third-party testing. The priority for developing each
technology's third-party test requirements and templates are based on
acquisition time lines and then the historical rate of failures.
Furthermore, TSA continues to work with NIST to leverage industry
best practices and international conformity assessment standards in the
development of its Third-Party Test Program. The program will allow TSA
to receive applications for potential third-party test organizations
and will enable TSA to ensure the organization is capable of testing to
TSA's requirements.
Finally, TSA is continuing to ensure transparency throughout the
process of developing its Third-Party Test Program. TSA hosted an
industry day on February 25, 2016, to engage with industry on the
detailed updates of the program and solicit feedback on the processes.
In support of the industry day, TSA distributed a Request for
Information through the Federal Business Opportunities website on
January 26, 2016. The purpose of this request is to gather an
understanding for the potential market of available third-party test
organizations and generate feedback from industry on their concerns and
ideas for TSA's program. TSA will leverage responses to the request to
drive discussion during the industry day, and will ensure to
incorporate industry's feedback into the continued development of its
Third-Party Test Program.
Question 8. TSARA required TSA to develop a 5-year technology
investment plan, which TSA defined as an investment plan for aviation
security.
Why did TSA's Five-Year Technology Investment Plan not encompass
other transportation sectors?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
procure, deploy, or maintain security technology for other
transportation sectors; therefore, the plan does not encompass them.
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C 44901(1) TSA must screen all passengers and
property that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by
an air carrier or foreign air carrier.
TSA, in collaboration with other transportation sector stakeholders
and the Government Coordinating/Sector Coordinating Councils, does
develop capability gap analyses for other transportation sectors. TSA
also maintains several robust programs to assess the marketplace,
promote developing security technologies, and provide security
technology data and information to industry and other Government
departments and agencies.
Question 9. Does TSA capture and utilize secondary screening data
to assist in the development of security screening equipment in terms
of lowering false alarm rates, as GAO suggests?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration actively
utilizes secondary screening data to directly influence Detection
Standards, including false alarm rates for both Advanced Imaging
Technology systems and Advanced Technology X-ray systems.
Secondary screening data is often used to inform a variety of
performance metrics through Modeling & Simulation tools and the
requirements development process (e.g., Detection Standards are
directly incorporated into requirement documents). Analysis of data,
including false alarm rates, on how the equipment is affecting the
system is used to model staffing needs. Networking of Transportation
Security Equipment will also provide real-time performance data.
Question 10. During testimony, it was identified that the process
for security-related technologies to be tested and evaluated is,
approximately, 1 year.
How is TSA working to improve the average time span to T&E and
procure security-related technologies?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) works
closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and
Technology Directorate to identify new and emerging technologies to
safeguard our Nation's transportation network. TSA follows DHS
Acquisition Directive 102 (AD-102) for the procurement of new
capabilities or procurement of capability upgrades (either hardware or
software) to existing transportation security equipment.
The amount of time it takes for a technology to pass through the
procurement process varies widely depending upon the complexity of or
enhancement to the system, and the technology's readiness for testing.
TSA is proactively working towards accelerating the acquisition
process, reducing procurement delays, and reducing the overall time-to-
deploy, while at the same time ensuring that required detection
capabilities are achieved.
TSA is working to increase communications with the transportation
security equipment vendors and is revamping current processes to ensure
more collaboration and their earlier involvement. Additionally, TSA is
increasing transparency into its testing and procurement strategies to
allow vendors the opportunity to create long-term development
strategies to support TSA's acquisition plans. Finally, TSA is
conducting a comprehensive assessment of Test and Evaluation (T&E)
processes to identify challenges and their impact on the acquisition
process, and to identify continued areas for improvement.
TSA is currently exploring opportunities to increase the ``up-
front'' communication between TSA and the vendor by revamping the
Qualification Management Plan (QMP) and Qualification Data Package
(QDP) process. The purpose of a QMP is to provide guidance to vendors
on how to prepare a QDP with sufficient detail and substantiation to
enable TSA to determine whether a system is ready to enter into TSA's
formal T&E process. This process will allow TSA to better communicate
system requirements to the vendor.
Question 11. Please identify which locations TSA has identified for
potential implementation of ``innovation lanes''.
What is the time line for implementation of ``innovation lanes''?
Question 11b. What locations does TSA plan to utilize for the
``innovation lanes''?
Question 11c. What are TSA's priorities for test and evaluation as
part of this initiative?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
pursuing the establishment of Innovation Lanes at various airports. An
Innovation Lane would be a partnership with manufacturers and industry
to demonstrate emerging capabilities in an airport environment.
TSA is in the early stages of defining Innovation Lanes and is just
beginning to have discussions with airports. Innovation Lanes could
provide an opportunity for TSA and vendors to gather data in an
operational environment, while potentially enabling manufacturers to
mature technologies before entering into the formal acquisition
process, thereby reducing the overall time it takes for TSA to
introduce new technologies. Innovation Lanes could also help TSA
develop detection requirements, Concept of Operations, and testing
methodologies.
Questions From Chairman John Katko for Michele Mackin
Question 1. How would GAO categorize the changes TSA has enacted
since the implementation of the Transportation Security Acquisition
Reform Act?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. How do the acquisition processes of DHS and TSA compare
to other Government agencies' best practices?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Given the findings of GAO's latest report, were there
any issues identified that would warrant future investigation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. GAO, in its latest report on TSA acquisitions,
identified that 11 of 22 security-related technologies failed the TSA
testing and evaluation process.
What steps can TSA take to develop a more efficient process to
prevent such high failure rates in their testing and evaluation
process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. A 2012 Congressional Report detailed that TSA was
housing equipment at the Transportation Logistics Center in Dallas,
Texas, at significant cost to the American taxpayers without a proper
tracking system.
How does the equipment in storage affect TSA's recapitalization
plan?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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