EXAMINING TSA’S GLOBAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE HOMELAND FROM AVIATION THREATS AND ENHANCE SECURITY AT LAST-POINT-OF-DEPARTURE AIRPORTS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION
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EXAMINING TSA’S GLOBAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE HOMELAND FROM AVIATION THREATS AND ENHANCE SECURITY AT LAST-POINT-OF-DEPARTURE AIRPORTS

Tuesday, December 8, 2015

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:12 p.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Katko [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Katko, Rogers, Rice, and Keating.

Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, will come to order.

The subcommittee is meeting today to have its 10th hearing, I believe it is, our 10th hearing of the season to examine TSA’s global efforts to protect the homeland from aviation threats and enhance security at last-point-of-departure airports.

Now, according to media reports, our allies in the United Kingdom believe that the Metrojet flight—I am sorry—I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

The recent Metrojet crash over the Sinai peninsula is tragically reminiscent of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, which took down PanAm Flight 103, killing all aboard, including 35 Syracuse University students traveling home for the holidays. It also claimed the lives of one of my best friend’s sisters who went to Oswego State University.

Now, according to the media reports, our allies in the United Kingdom believe that the Metrojet flight was brought down by the very same type of device used in the Lockerbie bombing. It is deeply disturbing to me that innocent people from my district in Syracuse, as well as all of the traveling public, may still be threatened today by the same type of bomb used over 27 years ago.

Even though this most recent attack was not targeted at American citizens or an American aircraft, we cannot and should not hesitate to learn from this tragedy and identify ways in which we can mitigate such threats from becoming successful again in the future.

The international aviation system represents our modern globalized world. However, with interconnected transportation systems come interconnected risk. Much like the Lockerbie bombing affected my community in Syracuse all those years ago, the
Metrojet tragedy affects our security as well. We cannot afford to ignore potential security lessons from this incident.

Today, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security is holding this hearing to better understand the size and scope of TSA’s global programs aimed at securing international aviation, as well as recent efforts to enhance security at overseas airports with direct flights to the United States.

The recent tragic bombing of the Metrojet flight, which killed all 224 people on board, reminds us once again of the attractive target aviation is for terror groups. Additionally, if this attack was indeed carried out by the ISIS, as has been claimed, it represents a shift in the threat landscape against aviation and a newfound capability for ISIS in carrying out attacks.

Because of this, TSA’s overseas mission is now more important than ever. It is critical that this subcommittee understands the extent of TSA’s global reach, as well as how the U.S. Government is working with its foreign partners and aviation stakeholders to enhance security at overseas airports.

Moreover, efforts by other entities such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, which plays a vital role in setting aviation security standards world-wide, are an essential component in proliferating security best practices and building capacity at high-risk airports around the world.

Since the Lockerbie terror attack, we have seen a number of attempted attacks against U.S. aviation targets. These plots, such as 9/11, the Christmas day bomber, the printer-cartridge bombs, and the shoe bomber, have each caused massive reevaluations in the way passengers are screened and security is maintained.

I am very happy to see that TSA has taken steps to increase security at overseas airports in recent weeks and I applaud their swift efforts in doing so. I hope these efforts will be successful.

However, there remain gaps in security which need to be addressed. Specifically, this subcommittee has worked intensely throughout the 114th Congress to shed light on the serious lapses in security vetting among aviation workers with access to secure and sensitive areas of airports.

Additionally, I remain very concerned at the overall state of airport access controls. We cannot solely focus on shuffling passengers through security screening, while ignoring open back doors at airports.

This subcommittee understands these vulnerabilities, which is why we have passed a number of bills, including two of my own, to close gaps in aviation worker vetting and enhance the security of airport access controls across the United States.

These bills, together with our other oversight efforts, are bringing critical attention to a very important issue. These recent terrorist attacks in Egypt, Paris, Mali, and Lebanon reminded all of us in Congress of the important responsibility we have to the American people to ensure that their Government is working to keep them safe from a wide array of determined and focused adversaries who are hell-bent on threatening our lives and way of life by terrorizing our cities and skies.

It is with this sober understanding that we meet today to discuss efforts to secure overseas airports and international aviation.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from New York, Miss Rice, for any statement she may have.

Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this hearing.

I also want to thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Terrell for coming to talk with us about TSA’s efforts to secure international flights traveling to the United States from last-point-of-departure airports abroad.

As we all know, on October 31 of this year, Metrojet Flight 9268 crashed over Sinai, Egypt after departing from Sharm el-Sheikh International Airport en route to Russia. Multiple sources have confirmed that a bomb smuggled on-board the aircraft caused the crash, killing 224 people.

Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure airport in which U.S. carriers and TSA work, there have been reports that security within the airport was weak and those security concerns contributed to Britain’s decision to suspend all flights to and from Sharm el-Sheikh in the immediate aftermath of the crash.

The attacks in Paris and the shootings last week in California are the latest tragedies to remind us that the threat of terrorist attacks is very real and the risk is very high right now. The Metrojet bombing is a reminder that commercial flights are still a major target for terrorism.

We have to be going above and beyond right now in our efforts to protect the American people. Part of that effort includes making sure that international airports with flights bound for the United States are fully complying with all aviation security standards and that TSA and all relevant parties share all information about terrorist threats and security concerns.

There are currently 308 last-point-of-departure airports in the world, and every day more than 2,000 flights travel from foreign countries to the United States. TSA’s Office of Global Strategies operates throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and TSA representatives operate in countries with airports deemed critical to our National security.

OGS recurrently certifies these airports by conducting security assessments and has deemed them low-risk for out-bound flights to travel directly to the United States. They are on the ground annually conducting more than 120 foreign airport assessments, 1,800 air carrier inspections, and 700 foreign repair station audits.

It seems that OGS’s methods are working efficiently, but we cannot afford to get comfortable or complacent right now because, again, the Metrojet bombing is all the indication we need to know that there are terrorist groups and radical individuals targeting commercial aviation.

Mr. Terrell, in your written testimony, you mentioned the security directives and the emergency amendments that were coordinated at 8 last-point-of-departure airports in response to the Metrojet crash. I am eager to hear more about the measures taken in response to this crash, although I know we will have to have that discussion in a secure setting.
I appreciate Administrator Neffenger acting quickly to issue needed directive amendments that will help eliminate any perceived vulnerabilities at last-point-of-departure airports.

I am pleased to know that OGS participates in multilateral forums with the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and many others. I think this collaboration is a testament to the fact that international aviation security is an on-going, inclusive effort, and that your office is being proactive with your approach to enhancing security on international flights.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I look forward to a productive conversation today, and I yield back the balance of my time.

[The statement of Miss Rice follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN RICE

DECEMBER 8, 2015

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for convening this hearing.

I also want to thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Terrell for coming to talk with us about TSA’s efforts to secure international flights traveling to the United States from last-point-of-departure (LPD) airports abroad.

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Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure airport in which U.S. carriers and TSA work, there have been reports that security within the airport was weak. And those security concerns contributed to Britain’s decision to suspend all flights to and from Sharm el-Sheikh in the immediate aftermath of the crash.

The attacks in Paris and the shootings last week in California are the latest tragedies to remind us that the threat of terrorist attacks is very real and the risk is very high right now—and the Metrojet bombing is a reminder that commercial flight are still a major target for terrorism.

We have to be going above and beyond right now in our efforts to protect the American people—and part of that effort includes making sure that international airports with flights bound for the United States are fully complying with all aviation security standards, and that TSA and all relevant parties share all information about terrorist threats and security concerns.

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I think this collaboration is a testament to the fact that international aviation security is an on-going, inclusive effort and that your office is being proactive with your approach to enhancing security on international flights.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I look forward to a productive conversation today, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Katko. Thank you, Miss Rice.

Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

DECEMBER 8, 2015

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this important hearing today.

I would like to say that our thoughts and prayers remain with the individuals who perished aboard Metrojet Flight 9268 in Egypt.

This terrible act, which multiple sources have now confirmed was indeed a bombing, renews concerns regarding international aviation cooperation, specifically at last-point-of-departure airports.

These airports are those in which a flight originates from a foreign country, bound for the United States.

Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure, it is alarming that someone was able to board this plane with an explosive device—and successfully detonate it to destroy the aircraft—is alarming.

There have been other international aviation incidents that were also cause for concern.

On Christmas day 2009, Abdul Muttalab successfully smuggled an explosive device on-board a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit but failed to detonate it properly before being detained by passengers.

In October 2010, packages mailed from Yemen containing explosives hidden inside of printer cartridges were successfully intercepted, but not before traveling in cargo holds, and in one instance, aboard two passenger planes.

This latest incident is a stern reminder of how important coordination with foreign governments, international aviation organizations, and air carriers is to securing aircraft bound for the United States from Foreign Airports.

With that being said, I thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Joseph Terrell from TSA’s Office of Global Strategies for being here today to talk about the important role they plan in international aviation security.

I am interested in learning how TSA shares threat information with all parties involved to ensure that responses are appropriate and thorough by all parties.

The Office of Global Strategies works to secure last-point-of-departure airports and foreign repair stations by working with international entities such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, as well as through foreign airport assessments and foreign air carrier inspections.

I look forward to your testimony, and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Katko. We are pleased to have a distinguished witness before us today on this important topic.

This witness is Mr. Joseph Terrell—did I pronounce that right? Joseph Terrell, who currently serves as deputy assistant administrator in the Office of Global Strategies at the Transportation Security Administration. Previously, Mr. Terrell served as TSA’s Federal security director at the Pittsburgh International Airport.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Terrell to testify.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH P. TERRELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF GLOBAL STRATEGIES, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. Terrell. Thank you.

Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Global Strat-
egies and our efforts to mitigate the international aviation security risk to the United States.

TSA’s mission is to protect the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. Within TSA, OGS works with international and domestic partners to reduce security risks to international transportation modes. OGS coordinates with foreign governments, air carriers, and international organizations to implement responses that effectively mitigate the likelihood of a successful attack.

This involves a spectrum of activities to identify risk in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence and develop mitigation plans.

TSA assesses security at foreign airports served by U.S. aircraft operators and at foreign airports serving as a last point of departure for foreign air carriers. Under this authority, OGS identifies vulnerabilities at foreign locations through assessments of airports and inspections of air carriers from those airports to ensure they are operating at a minimum consistent with the security standards adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

In fiscal year 2015, our transportation security specialists performed hundreds of air carrier inspections and 146 foreign airport assessments touching down in over 125 countries. We have a range of tools available to compel compliance with both agency and international requirements.

OGS gathers data through foreign airport assessments, air carrier inspections, and other operational activities and feeds it into our risk methodology framework. We then analyze each area of concern to identify high-risk locations, possible attack methods, and key risk factors. Locations deemed problematic are evaluated with a focus on identifying vulnerabilities and root causes, and then to determine an appropriate mitigation strategy.

OGS relies on a variety of tools to mitigate issues identified during airport assessments, inspections, and other visits. In the event of a specific threat or vulnerability, TSA may issue security directives to U.S. air carriers and emergency amendments to foreign air carriers for implementation at select last-points-of-departure locations.

Last month, TSA coordinated a global response with internal and external partners to develop SDs and EAs related to the crash of the Metrojet Flight 9268 in the Sinai peninsula. OGS scheduled visits and coordinated inspections to the regulated air carriers to verify compliance with the additional measures.

TSA also focuses on capacity development as a mitigation tool. We provide aviation security training to foreign partners through a variety of courses in screener supervisory skills, preventive security measures, crisis management, basic security, cargo security inspections, and train-the-trainer programs, among others.

Additionally, TSA has provided equipment loans valued at around $3 million to 12 countries that do not have the allocated resources to procure their own equipment.

Because mitigation measures overseas are implemented by each country’s own personnel, consistent with their own requirements, OGS relies on its internationally-deployed workforce to influence key decision makers in foreign locations and industry partners to
understand the threat, maintain awareness of vulnerabilities to the aviation security system and encourage the implementation of mitigation strategies.

Our talented international experts are highly respected and have helped establish and elevate globally consistent standards internationally. We also conduct extensive outreach and engagement at the global, regional, and bilateral levels with our international partners, and Administrator Neffenger has made these engagements a priority with 3 international trips during his first 5 months at TSA.

OGS works regularly with ICAO to establish and enhance baseline international standards for aviation security. TSA’s engagement is continuous, conducted at the highest organizational levels, to discuss ongoing security vulnerabilities and to promote and share best practices with our international partners.

As Administrator Neffenger commented to the international partners at the IATA Aviation Security World Conference in Dublin last month, achieving common goals calls for a shared approach; one that begins with a serious commitment to understanding security threats and then collaborating with one another to reduce vulnerabilities across many discrete elements of aviation system.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss TSA’s work mitigating in-bound risk to the United States from overseas, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Terrell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH P. TERRELL

DECEMBER 8, 2015

Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Global Strategies (OGS) and our efforts to mitigate the international aviation security risk to the United States.

TSA’s mission is to protect the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. Within TSA, OGS works proactively with international and domestic partners to reduce security risks to international transportation modes. When a new or potential threat or vulnerability emerges, OGS coordinates with foreign governments, air carriers, and international organizations to implement responses that will effectively mitigate the likelihood of a successful attack. This involves a spectrum of activities to identify risk in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Once a threat is identified, OGS analyzes the underlying factors and develops mitigation plans.

IDENTIFYING THE IN-BOUND RISK

Under Title 49 of Chapter 449, United States Code, the Secretary of Homeland Security is required to assess security at all foreign airports served by U.S. aircraft operators and at those foreign airports serving as last-point-of-departure locations for foreign air carriers using, at a minimum, the security standards adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Secretary’s authority to do so has been delegated to OGS on behalf of TSA. Under this authority, as well as under regulations at 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.3 and 1546.3, OGS identifies vulnerabilities at foreign locations through assessments of foreign airports and inspections of air carriers that fly from those airports.

To determine the appropriate frequency of the assessment and inspection visits, OGS developed a methodology, using the threat, vulnerability, and consequence model, to define the risk associated with each airport under its jurisdiction. This methodology ensures the allocation of OGS assets is based on the likelihood of a location being targeted (threat), the protective measures in place (vulnerability), and the impact of the loss of that airport’s services (consequence). Once this is determined, assessments are coordinated by the applicable TSA representatives (TSARs)
and completed by a team of Transportation Security Specialists (TSSs) from 1 of our 6 Regional Operation Centers (ROCs) located world-wide. In addition, OGS engages in recognition of international programs commensurate with TSA’s own requirements in the United States, as well as interagency initiatives, and screening pilots. These DHS programs—such as the recognition of National Cargo and National Explosive Detection Canine Security Programs, the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C–TPAT), and the Air Cargo Advance Screening Pilot—provide TSA with opportunities to identify vulnerabilities at last-point-of-departure (LPD) airports overseas while also engaging closely with domestic and international partners to promote information sharing.

In fiscal year 2015, our TSSs performed 289 air carrier inspections and 146 foreign airport assessments. Our commensurability programs also continued to thrive, with the recognition of now 40 National Cargo and 3 National Explosives Detection Canine Security Programs with foreign governments, to include the 28 Member States of the European Union.

ANALYZING THE IN-BOUND RISK

OGS works to fully gauge the in-bound risk from LPD airports based on specific attack methods. This analysis provides valuable insight into what mitigation actions would have the greatest impact to reduce in-bound risk.

OGS gathers data through foreign airport assessments, air carrier inspections, and other operational activities and feeds it into its risk methodology framework. OGS then analyzes each area of concern to identify high-risk locations, possible attack methods, and key risk factors. LPD locations deemed to be highly vulnerable or high-risk are further analyzed through a review process that involves subject-matter experts within OGS. This entire process enables OGS to evaluate the key risk drivers with a focus on identifying vulnerabilities at that LPD location and their associated root causes to determine the appropriate mitigation strategy.

MITIGATING THE IN-BOUND RISK

OGS has a variety of tools available to mitigate issues identified during airport assessments, air carrier inspections, or other visits. Options range from providing on-the-spot correction recommendations, conducting formal training, and recommending enacting a Public Notice stating that the airport does not implement adequate security measures, or suspending service entirely. These last two responses are usually considered when all other attempts have failed in assisting the airport or host government to improve security. When a specific threat is identified or significant vulnerabilities warrant additional and immediate mitigation actions, TSA may issue Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) for implementation by air carriers at selected LPD locations. TSA works diligently to develop appropriate regulatory language for the SDs and EAs to address identified vulnerabilities and also communicate new policy requirements with foreign and domestic partners.

SDs are regulations issued to mitigate threats posed to transportation for U.S. airport and aircraft operators, and EAs are issued to foreign air carriers and aircraft. These regulations apply to all U.S. air carriers operating anywhere, foreign air carriers operating to or from the United States and U.S. airport operators. SDs and EAs are intended to mitigate security-related risks against civil aviation. Additionally, TSA may issue information circulars to regulated parties to share security concerns.

Last month, OGS coordinated with internal and external partners to develop SDs and EAs related to the crash of Metrojet Flight 9268 in the Sinai Peninsula at 8 LPDs in the region. Following issuance of these SDs and EAs, OGS conducted visits or inspections to the regulated air carriers at the applicable last-point-of-departure airports to verify compliance with the additional measures. Follow-up inspections will allow TSA to continue to assess continued compliance and whether any additional or modified measures are necessary in light of evolving threats. As with other vulnerability-driven SDs and EAs, the results of these visits will enable TSA to determine if the mitigation actions were successful.

Another important part of OGS’s mitigation efforts is capacity development. OGS provides aviation security training to foreign partners through a variety of courses in screener supervisory skills, preventative security measures, crisis management, basic security, cargo security inspections, and train-the-trainer programs, among others. In addition, TSA provides equipment loans to those countries that do not have the allocated resources to procure their own equipment. Often, OGS works in conjunction with its international partners, such as Australia or the United Kingdom, to provide training or equipment to countries where we have mutual operations.
Because mitigation measures overseas are implemented by each country's own personnel, OGS relies on its internationally-deployed workforce to influence key decision makers in foreign locations and industry partners to understand the threat, maintain awareness of vulnerabilities to the aviation security system, and encourage the implementation of mitigation strategies. Our TSARs provide on-site representation at U.S. Embassies and Consulates around the globe. TSARs are based in Abu Dhabi, Amman, Bangkok, Beijing, Berlin, Brasilia, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Dakar, Johannesburg, London, Madrid, Manila, Mexico City, Miami, Nairobi, Nassau, Ottawa, Panama City, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Singapore, Sydney, The Hague, Tokyo, and Warsaw. The TSARs all have regional responsibilities in addition to their duty post assignment. International Industry Representatives, also located in Embassies and Consulates around the world, serve as TSA’s primary representatives to regulated non-U.S. air carriers and U.S. aircraft operators that serve international airports.

OGS also conducts extensive outreach and engagement at the global, regional, and bilateral levels with our international counterparts. OGS collaborates on mitigation measures to counter existing threats as well as new and emerging threats. Specifically, OGS works with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to establish and enhance baseline international standards for aviation security. As the U.S. Government’s representative to the ICAO Aviation Security Panel of Experts, TSA works with other international representatives to shape international aviation security standards on important issues such as cargo security and the coordination of capacity development. TSA also engages international air carriers and aviation stakeholders, such as the International Air Transport Association, Airlines for America, the American Association of Airport Executives, and Airports Council International, or in forums like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the North American Aviation Trilateral. TSA's engagement is continuous, and includes the highest organizational levels: For example, Administrator Neffenger recently visited his counterparts in London, Amsterdam, and Tel Aviv to discuss on-going security vulnerabilities and to share best practices with our international partners.

CONCLUSION

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss TSA’s work mitigating in-bound risk to the United States from overseas. We are constantly looking at more effective ways to improve and enhance the international aviation security arena to ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce in an ever-evolving threat environment. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Terrell, and I very much appreciate your testimony here today. We are in the midst of voting hell, I think, today, from it looks like, a bunch of procedural votes are being called repeatedly. So we are probably going to be interrupted.

We are going to be interrupted in about 10 minutes to have to go and vote. But we are going to get through a couple rounds of questioning first, if we can.

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. Mr. Terrell, I just want to—I will jump right into it, I was going to have you give me more of a background, but given the time constraints, I want to jump right into it.

The security assessments, if I understood your testimony correctly, and the mitigation decisions are done by each country where their airport is located, correct?

Mr. Terrell. Each country has an obligation under international agreement to ensure the security measures in their countries are consistent with international standards.

Mr. Katko. So basically, there are minimum international standards by which these countries are supposed to meet them, correct?

Mr. Terrell. That is correct.

Mr. Katko. Did that includes Sharm el-Sheikh, just by curiosity?

Mr. Terrell. It does.

Mr. Katko. Okay. It is clear that they were not meeting those standards in retrospect?
Mr. Terrell. It is easy to draw that conclusion.

Mr. Katko. What happens when an airport is not meeting the standards? What punitive measures, if any, can be taken?

Mr. Terrell. There are a number of things, and I think it is important to draw a distinction of the types of vulnerabilities and threats that we address.

First is when the threat is such that there aren't existing countermeasures in existence to deal with it. What we do then is work with our international partners to craft countermeasures, often reflected in SDs and EAs, to address that.

The second are instances in which there are countermeasures that we believe are sufficient to address existing threat, if indeed they are implemented to the degree they are supposed to. I think, based on what we understand in the Sharm el-Sheikh case, that, had the procedures been properly implemented, that there may have been a different outcome.

So that shapes our response to try to work with foreign partners to assist Egyptians, or in other cases provide opportunities for them to be able to actually implement appropriately the countermeasures.

Mr. Katko. One of the concerns I have is that we shouldn't—and I am not impugning TSA at all, but I don't think we should be in a position of waiting until something happens, then we realize there is a vulnerability, and then we act accordingly.

Mr. Terrell. Yes, and most certainly, if I may, we do not do that, and, again, as I pointed out, in the past year alone, we visited 125 airports, and we are indeed in the vulnerability assessment business.

We do have a very robust means to compel compliance to the international standards. Technically, given the authority that is presented to us by statute, with the concurrence of the State Department and the Secretary of Homeland Security, if we are concerned to the degree that conditions at a particular airport represent a risk to the traveling public, we could—or the U.S. Government has the ability to go to prohibit operations between that country and the United States.

Mr. Katko. Have they ever done that in the past?

Mr. Terrell. It has happened a couple times in the past. Not recently.

Mr. Katko. Is there something that we can do legislatively that could help you—give you more freedom to do that more easily?

Mr. Terrell. I think, actually, I would trumpet this as a success story, that there are a lot of instances in which we have been close, but given the resources, the focus, the attention that we present to these areas that have proven to be problematic, that we have negated the need to actually—to go to that degree.

That is a last-case scenario, and in many instances, we would be able to mitigate it through a various number of means.

Mr. Katko. Now, as I understand it, TSA does have some authority to do assessments of airports internationally, correct?

Mr. Terrell. We have—yes. We—well, yes. We have a requirement under statute to conduct assessments anywhere there is a U.S. civil aviation interest, and we do do that.

Mr. Katko. What happens when an airport is not meeting the standards? What punitive measures, if any, can be taken?
Mr. KATKO. Now, when—and if I understand it correctly, you have to give notice of these assessments. Is that right?

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, we do.

Mr. KATKO. All right. So that is part of my concern. Is there any way we can fix that so you don’t give them so much notice?

Kind of like—I am thinking of internally—when GAO goes around, or some of the other ones go around to TSA domestically, they don’t give them notice that they are doing it, and so that—I think that gives you a more genuine feel for the security preparedness at the airports and security vulnerabilities.

From that we can craft proper legislation, and patch up the holes. But when you go overseas, and you have the—you give them notice of—maybe it is a month ahead of time or whatever, it gives them opportunity to be on their best behavior when you are there, and that concerns me, because that doesn’t give you an accurate snapshot of the day-to-day activities at the airport.

So is there something we can do to fix that so we can give you more—increased ability to do with the randomization that I think is really important?

Mr. TERRELL. Yes. I certainly appreciate that question.

Two things: First and foremost is that, while we have a statutory authority to conduct these assessments, our statutory authority does not extend into these other states, as—of course, as you know—and quite often, there is a bit of resistance to what is being perceived as extraterritoriality of our requirements.

But I will point out that—you know, it is almost a sixth sense—and I could speak with some authority here, as a former—I started off as inspector, many, many years ago, and I think inspectors have a sixth sense about what they are seeing is actually legitimate, or a horse-and-pony show, as they say, or if it is something that we believe is a sustainable practice.

One of the things we do in those cases where we believe that what we are seeing is not sustainable and, indeed, just a show for us, is we do work—we gain a lot of significance from working with the host government in ensuring that, given a—by an understanding of the government’s—their own oversight program, their own training programs, their own regulatory requirements—all these things that give us some confidence of whether or not what we are seeing operational during these periodic visits is indeed sustainable.

Mr. KATKO. Okay. Briefly, then I will—I might—my time is up here. But I want to—just one quick follow-up question.

It would—even if we don’t have the ability, legislatively, to legislate what other countries do, we do have the ability to legislate what our airlines can do.

So if our airlines are at foreign airports, and foreign countries want to do business with us, isn’t it fair to say that, if we tell that airline, “if you can’t get an agreement from their government to allow random security checks at your airports by TSA, then you can’t do business there,” I think—couldn’t that solve the problem?

Mr. TERRELL. I would—I am not quite sure I am prepared to answer that. I am not—to be perfectly honest. You know, and again, I want—I would like to reiterate that I don’t think—part of the reason we have been successful over these—a number of years is
by operating collaboratively with a lot of these—our foreign partners.

You know, I would mention that—25 years ago, that—you know, we were the only state conducting these—this activity. One of the things that we were often told is that the only reason that you are here—being us—is that there is a risk to these particular countries, because the United States has a civil aviation interest involved.

In the past 25 years since then, you know, after all the incidents you just referred to, but including Australia and Bangkok and London and Madrid, we have a lot of partners that are emerging that have realized that the path that we chose 25 years ago is indeed the way to go.

We have leveraged our leadership and experience—this, in seeking collaboration with like-minded partners to join us in promoting international standards globally.

We have been able to create communications and share information with a lot of our partners that we were unable to do, you know, 10 or 15 years ago.

So I think we are making a lot of progress in trying to garner a coalition of like-minded partners to promote aviation security standards internationally. I think we have been very much the beneficiaries of that.

Mr. KATKO. Okay. I have more questions, but I am going to go for another—we will do another round, most likely. But the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member, Miss Rice, for 5 minutes of questions, and then at the conclusion of her questions, we will break, we will vote real quick and we will come right back and get right at it again.

Mr. TERRELL. Thank you.

Miss RICE. I think that we can all agree—and I am sure you would agree, Mr. Terrell——

Mr. TERRELL. Yes, please.

Miss RICE [continuing]. That it is in every country, every airline, every security agency's best interest to ensure that an incident like what happened with the Russian jet does not happen in your country, because that could affect your economy, it can affect—you know, obviously issues of National security.

So I think it is probably fair to assume that everyone starts from a point of wanting to have a level of inspection that they believe is going to be effective to prevent things like this from happening.

I have a question about—I understand, in the aftermath of the Metrojet bombing, the last-point-of-departure airport security was increased at the last-point-of-departure airport. Is that correct?

Mr. TERRELL. Yes.

Miss RICE. Based on the directive by the—I believe it was Secretary Johnson?

Mr. TERRELL, Yes, ma'am.

Miss RICE. Yes. Now, just out of curiosity, what about the airports that fly to last-point-of-departure airports? Are the people as in a directing—you know, as a stop along the way, not a direct flight, obviously—are the bags, are the passengers on that plane re-screened when they get to the last-point-of-departure airport?
Mr. Terrell. Yes, they are. Most States—and I say most States because there are some geographic locations where that isn’t the case, but by and large, any airport—any operation to the United States that operates through a transit point, we require them to be treated as an originating flight. Their bags will be screened and passengers will be screened before continuing on.

Miss Rice. Where do you—how is the—how are the lines of the communication between your agency and agencies of your type and other countries vis-à-vis threat levels, country-specific issues that are going on, information sharing—how is that all done?

Mr. Terrell. Of course it certainly depends on the State, but by and large our community is a relatively small one, and to your point that you made earlier, we all have the same interest. Any security event, as the Egyptians are aware of right now, is incredibly damaging to their economies.

We have—we are very active in multilateral organizations. We have 28 transportation security representatives. They are around the world, whose sole job is to foster these relationships with our counterparts globally.

We have a number of sort-of ad hoc groups and so we are incredibly engaged with our counterparts. There is a great thirst within our community also to share and participate collaboratively to the extent that we can. You know, there are a great many nations who are in the exact same boat as we are.

Miss Rice. The Chairman asked you a question about doing covert inspections. I, you know, think it is probably a tough thing to legislate, but are—we do we have agreements with any country on doing things like that? Like what was done with TSA recently?

Mr. Terrell. No, there—it is frowned upon and—if we were to conduct any it would be contrary to a lot of States’ laws for us to do that.

Miss Rice. No, no, no. I understand that, but I am talking about that—that is one of the things that we do here in this country to ensure that our aviation system is as safe as possible. Do we have conversations with other countries where we encourage them to do the same thing?

Mr. Terrell. I am sorry, I misunderstood. Yes, yes indeed. We are aware and, actually, it is not unusual for other states to have their own covert programs in place. You know, we find it beneficial to the extent that laws permit to be able to share and have these discussions. But yes.

I misunderstood your question, I am sorry.

Miss Rice. So obviously, it is not just your agency that is responsible for inspections and security. I mean, you have ICAO, you have got the air carriers, you have got foreign governments. Just how is all that coordinated? I mean, all you have to do is look back at 9/11 and we see that there was certain information that was siloed within various Government agencies that probably should not have what we know should not have been—well, we know should not have been.

I think that 9/11 woke us up to the need for more open, liberal information sharing between agencies.
So how—I mean, these are—throw in different countries and different procedures and how is—how do you feel about the information that you get from other countries that may be something that we need to know?

Mr. Terrell. I am encouraged by the increase, you know, just in terms of how all these different entities relate. ICAO, I think it is probably fair to say the requirements that they have established sort of set the context within which each member state operates. States that have like-minded concerns and approaches towards aviation security, it is beneficial to both parties to share information.

We, in turn, regulate each of our respective air carriers and airport operators consistent with international standards, and the regulations—requirements, rather, that each state imposes on its regulated entities.

So it is a logical exchange, but again, the key is to open up communication, share information to the degree practicable. Most certainly since the threat landscape has changed over the past 10 or 15 years.

Miss Rice. I yield back.

Mr. Katko. We are going to take a brief recess at this time, subject to the call of the Chair. I anticipate it will be about 15 minutes. Okay.

Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. Katko. The subcommittee is reconvened, and we just were awarded with another motion to adjourn—the third one in the last hour that has been filed by someone in Congress trying to be obstreperous, it appears.

But in—nevertheless, we have about another 15 minutes of questioning we can do, and we will get to as much as we can. Seeing no other colleagues here, I am going to go for another round of questioning, between myself and Miss Rice and anyone else who may appear.

I wanted to kind of touch on employees at foreign airports, before I go back, and if there is time to give you more of an overarching analysis of what we can do better over there and how we can help you get—make—have better security over there.

It is my understanding that, at a lot of these foreign airports, there are a lot of employees—just like in the United States—that are contract employees.

Correct me if I am wrong, is it fair to say that these contract employees are subject to screening standards that are implemented by the individual countries—is that correct?

Mr. Terrell. That is correct.

Mr. Katko. Okay. Do you—does TSA or the United States have any influence whatsoever over those screening procedures?

Mr. Terrell. We do to a certain degree. It is a requirement under ICAO that each state provides background checks to each employee at airports and working for air carriers, to the extent that is practicable under each state’s laws, recognizing privacy laws and that type of thing vary from state to state.

But to the degree that we can influence and leverage partnerships with other—our relations with other states to encourage
states that—to create a robust vetting scheme for their employees, we do indeed do that. That is a routine part of our assessment activity.

Mr. Katko. So by the very definition of the standard you enunciated, it appears that there are divergent standards based on the countries involved.

I know there is, with respect the United States and our Western European allies, because I was over there with a CODEL, as was Miss Rice, and we saw first-hand that there was differences, part of which, I think, contributed to what happened in Paris.

Their standards—their security standards just aren’t as high as ours. So that has caused some of the concern we have with vulnerabilities at last-point-of-departure airports is—No. 1 is—you know, you have limited oversight capabilities—at least currently—for TSA over there.

You have, overlaid with that, varying degrees of oversight of employees in general, and contract employees in particular. The airlines I know—the U.S. carriers—do a great job, I think, of taking security seriously. That is obvious.

But when you have the contract employees—the caterers, the people working on the engines, the people—you know, doing the things that you should be concerned about—my concern is, how do we plug the gap, or can we do anything to try and require them to—under the ICAO or anything else to do a better job? Because I know some just aren’t doing a good job screening their employees.

Mr. Terrell. Yes. There are a number of ways that we can, and that we do, do that. One, as I mentioned earlier—I just want to restate that, if we do believe the state has a deficient or inadequate system of background checks, we remind them of their obligation under ICAO, and provide recommendations that we believe would help them.

Second, in terms of bridging gaps when there are deficiencies, you know, we do indeed require flight crew, cabin crew who fly to the United States to be vetted to our standards before they are allowed to fly aircraft or participate in aircraft activities to the United States, and we also—as I am sure you know—through our secure flight program, vet each and every person who flies as a passenger to the United States.

So I think those—and I will mention one other thing, too—that if we do not have luck with a host government in trying to provide—you know, a more vigorous vetting process, then we can define other—levy other requirements on our carriers to put a bubble around the operations to the United States, such as make sure that there are aircraft guards to ensure there is no unauthorized approaching, to make sure that the catering that you mentioned is indeed screened and checked before it boards aircraft destined to the United States.

We can—we do require—make those requirements to compensate for instances in which were not happy with what those governments provides.

Mr. Katko. Right. I understand. But, for example, mechanics. I mean, if a mechanic breaks bad, they could do something on an airplane that—a problem that could only manifest itself once they are in the air.
Those are the types of things I am concerned about, is finding the needle in the haystack, that lone wolf which is so vexing here in the United States, with our higher standards, and I worry about it doubly so in foreign countries where their standards may not be as high as ours, right?

So, because of that, it seems to me that we’ve got to do more. I know this is a concern that was enunciated by the airline industry. We had a roundtable with them last week, and they were certainly concerned about that, amongst other things.

But that is one thing that they are very concerned about, is—you know, different countries have different standards for screening, and—you know, you have limited ability to be a watchdog internationally, and it seems to me that it really is a gaping vulnerability.

I understand when you say that there are some things that are good and you are doing all right with, but it seems to me we have got to find ways of not just saying what is okay, but how to fix the things that aren't okay, and to me, this is one of those things that is not okay.

So I would be interested in hearing from you, briefly, of the concerns you have with the vetting of employees and the screening of employees internationally. What can we do to stop it, other than what you described—putting a bubble around an airplane, type of thing?

Let’s face it, some airports you go to, internationally, you have nothing but foreigners—foreign contract carriers—to work on the engines. So you can’t put a bubble around the individual that is working on your engine.

So how do we try and fix what I see as a security vulnerability?

Mr. Terrell. We can—what we can control are the requirements that are in place for aircraft that operate to the United States. We have—it is within the FAA purview, but—yes, I do believe, for example, using mechanics as an example, that they have—that any type of maintenance is done at a FAA-certified location. There are a number of measures in place.

I think one of the things that we have had—we were starting to really——

Mr. Katko. I don’t mean to interrupt you, Mr. Terrell, but I am—it is getting a little frustrating, because you are not telling me things that need to be fixed, and I am hearing from the airline industry, things need to be fixed.

So instead of just telling us the good things, tell us about the bad things, because that is what we are really here to do, is try and help you guys, give you the tools to fix the things that need to be fixed.

Mr. Terrell. Yes. What I was hoping to clarify is that there are, you know, just by virtue of the fact that we are trying to promote change in locations in which we do not have expressed authority, that there are a number of ways that we—by leveraging partnerships, by working—trying to raise standards with international organizations—you know, by leveraging partners that may be more influential in other parts of the world than we are to try to promote standards.
We have had—I think we have had a lot of success in—you know, as I mentioned, by virtue of—you know, our leadership internationally, we are resourced, you know, we provide—we have been recently providing training to states on conducting their own assessment programs.

So we have a number of different ways, I think, in which we have been very creative and very aggressive in trying to promote standards internationally.

Mr. Katko. All right, so according to you, then there is nothing else we need to do. Is that right?

Mr. Terrell. When you say “we”——

Mr. Katko. The United States, to help shore up security internationally. You have not told us one thing, in all the testimony today, of anything that needs to be shored up internationally—that we can help you with.

Is there—if that is the case, there is nothing, just tell us that.

Mr. Terrell. Well, with all due respect, I think what we have, really, is just a continuum, on our part, of trying to continuously elevate standards.

Mr. Katko. I understand that. Is there something we can do to help you, or do you not need our help?

Mr. Terrell. I am an operational guy, sir. As far as what the Congress can do for us, I would probably best leave to others. I mean, I am not—I don’t really quite—I haven’t thought that one through.

Perhaps I need some time to think about it and get back to you.

Mr. Katko. The Chair now recognizes Miss Rice for questions.

Miss Rice. Sir, in your testimony, you said that your office conducted 146 foreign airport assessments——

Mr. Terrell. Yes.

Miss Rice [continuing]. In fiscal year 2015. What were the outcomes, in general? Were they all satisfactory? Were they all passing? Were they—some failing? Did some have to be taken out of—you know——

Mr. Terrell. In almost every instance, there are opportunities that—there are—the way we characterize is, discrepancies noted.

Miss Rice. Okay. So give me the top 5 discrepancies that you noted in these foreign airport assessments in fiscal year 2015.

Mr. Terrell. I would—just off the top of my head, I would think that access ID is the——

Miss Rice. So, people not having it? Losing it and it not being reported?

Mr. Terrell. Just not wearing them. Just not wearing them.

Miss Rice. Not wearing them?

Mr. Terrell. Yes. You know, I would think, and if we were going to summarize, that there are probably more issues associated with access control, more than anything else, which is problematic. I am not sure that isn’t necessarily related to the fact that, because of the importance of that in the security airport regime, that we pay very close attention to that, too.

Miss Rice. Okay. Anything deficient about the background checks they do for their contract employees in the airports?

Mr. Terrell. Again, there—we do—there are states that are—they would probably, consistent with international standards, do
employment checks and background checks, and are not permitted by their own privacy laws to conduct criminal background checks.

This is something that we work constantly with certain key states to try to ensure the importance of them having a keener picture on the criminal background of folks that they are providing access to secured areas.

Miss Rice. Do you do a summary of the foreign airport assessments you do for every fiscal year?

Mr. Terrell. We—yes, in terms of results?

Miss Rice. Yes, yes.

Mr. Terrell. We most definitely use them for our purposes to identify trends.

Miss Rice. So, what I would like to do is see if you could provide the committee with those reports, because the Chairman’s questions before had to do with what are ways that you think that we can help you. It seems to me that the key to that is for us to see what your assessment is of foreign airports with whom we do business, from an economic standpoint, but certainly from a National security standpoint, and a public safety standpoint.

Why don’t we take a look at that and see if we can come up with ways that, maybe not necessarily through legislation, but ways that we might be able to take these assessments that are—the purpose of which is to ensure that every foreign country with whom we do business is actually maintaining a level of—a standard of care, if you will, right—that gives us the confidence that we can tell our airlines flying to those countries, “You are okay to fly there, and everyone is safe, and you should continue, Americans, to travel wherever you want to go.”

Maybe if we could take a look at that report, that would be a good starting point. So if you could provide us that, that would be great.

Mr. Terrell. Yes, ma’am.

Miss Rice. Okay.

Now, are there currently, as you sit here, any regions or countries that you believe require more of a presence from OGS? If so, why?

Mr. Terrell. Yes, I would say absolutely there are. You know, part of our—how we allocate resources and ensure that the limited number of people that we have are used most efficiently is, you know, we definitely have a risk methodology in which we gauge vulnerabilities, in particular, specific locations.

Miss Rice. So do you have specific countries that you have concerns about or regions?

Mr. Terrell. Yes, we do.

Miss Rice. You do. Are you not able to say that in an open setting?

Mr. Terrell. I would prefer not to.

Miss Rice. Okay. Great. So let me just ask you this, you did 146 assessments. How many foreign airports are there?

Mr. Terrell. Three-hundred-and-something, I think.

Miss Rice. So is it every other year they can expect to be inspected?

Mr. Terrell. It depends.

Miss Rice. Or is there a requirement?
Mr. TERRELL. No. What—again, some airports we visit quarterly. Some airports we don’t visit for a few years.

Miss RICE. You make the risk assessment?

Mr. TERRELL. Oh, absolutely, yes.

Miss RICE. Is that a question of—if you had more resources, you would do 300-plus assessments a year?

Mr. TERRELL. Not necessarily. I mean, to be perfectly honest, there are a number of airports that we have full confidence not only in the counter-measures that are in place at that location, but also the thoroughness and effectiveness of the oversight and the seriousness with which the particular government takes these matters. We have a lot of partners that view things the exact same way that we do.

Miss RICE. Okay. I yield back.

Mr. KATKO. Briefly, and then I think we are going to have to wrap up here. We can submit the rest of our questions, if you agree, Miss Rice, on paper, and we will submit them to TSA and ask them to answer them.

One refrain that I have heard from the airline industry is that information sharing subsequent to an incident is good at first, and then it seems to tail off. I think that bears itself out with respect to the Metrojet incident.

The airlines learn from the information you give them whether or not they think it is important. So I asked them to go back to TSA, let them know that—encourage them to continue the lines of communication even if they think the information they have has nothing to offer. I kind of liken it to the days when I was talking to witnesses as a prosecutor. They would not tell me some things, and they said, “Well, I didn’t think that was important.” I said, “Let us decide what is important.”

So let the airlines decide what is important, and just—any information, any tidbits you have either helping or hurting an investigation, let them know as soon as you can because they can build upon that. I ask that you that, and they asked me to convey that message to you as well.

Mr. TERRELL. Will do.

Mr. KATKO. The rest of the information I think we will submit in writing. We appreciate your time here today, sir. We are sorry for the breaks, but some people are deciding to have fun today in Congress by calling these motions to adjourn repeatedly, so we are going to have to deal with them.

Thank you very much.

The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR JOSEPH P. TERRELL

Question 1. What is the Office of Global Strategies involvement in assessing risks and creating Emergency Amendments? Does OGS have any input for this process?

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Global Strategies (OGS) provides significant input in the Emergency Amendment (EA) process. TSA issues EAs in response to either threat or vulnerability concerns. In instances of threat-based EAs, OGS leverages its risk analysis to target the application of new requirements. Vulnerability-based EAs are derived from OGS’ Foreign Airport Assessment program. During an airport assessment, OGS inspectors note vulnerabilities and provide their observations from the assessments to TSA’s Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement to draft and issue EAs as warranted. The EAs provide security requirements on the air carriers above and beyond what is required in the air carrier’s current TSA-accepted security program in order to address the vulnerabilities and mitigate the risks.

Question 2. When TSA learns of new vulnerabilities and issues emergency amendments and security directives, it is important that the relevant entities comply to ensure that airports and aircraft are not at risk.

What is the Office of Global Strategies’ role in relaying these new measures to last-point-of-departure airports?

Answer. When Emergency Amendments/Security Directives (EAs/SDs) are issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), they are relayed to the affected air carriers by TSA’s Office of Global Strategies’ International Industry Representatives (IIRs). The IIRs serve as TSA’s principal liaisons with air carriers. The IIRs share EAs/SDs through direct communications with their industry counterparts. Additionally, TSA posts the EAs/SDs on the Homeland Security Information Network, an internet portal that allows air carriers to access applicable TSA security programs and directives. While EAs/SDs are specifically issued to regulated entities, the air carriers, TSA understands the importance of information sharing with its foreign government partners. The Transportation Security Administration representatives (TSARs), which are part of the Office of Global Strategies, serve as the principle liaisons with foreign government transportation security experts, including those responsible for security at international airports. The TSARs are TSA’s primary interlocutors for threat information, intelligence, vulnerabilities, best practices, and other pertinent security issues with foreign governments and airports. When TSA issues a threat-specific SD or EA, the TSARs who cover the applicable region provide their transportation security counterparts with the enhanced security measures for awareness.

Question 3. Can you detail for us the process in place to disseminate threat information from TSA to air carriers and foreign governments that fly out of or operate last-point-of-departure airports?

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) shares threat information with domestic aircraft operators, foreign air carriers, and foreign governments, collaborating closely amongst TSA program offices to ensure the information is provided in the most efficient and secure means possible.

- TSA’s Transportation Security Administration representatives (TSARs), which are part of the Office of Global Strategies (OGS), serve as the principle liaisons with foreign government transportation security counterparts. The TSARs are TSA’s primary interlocutors for threat information, intelligence, vulnerabilities, best practices, and other pertinent security issues with foreign governments. When TSA issues a threat-specific Security Directives (SDs) or Emergency Amendments (EAs), the TSARs who cover the applicable region provide their transportation security counterparts with the enhanced security measures for awareness.
• TSA’s International Industry Representatives (IIRs), which are part of the OGS, serve as the principal liaisons to U.S. and foreign air carriers conducting international operations. IIRs provide alerts of new threats, address air carrier vulnerabilities, report intelligence and share threat information through direct one-on-one communications with their industry counterparts on both a regular and ad hoc basis. Additionally, IIRs provide their carriers with TSA-issued SDs and EAs, which add supplemental security measures in response to specific and emergent threats.

• TSA’s Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement (OSPIE) Industry Engagement Managers provide unclassified teleconference calls and meetings to share information on new and evolving threats with domestic industry stakeholders. Additionally, OSPIE solicits feedback and discusses aviation security matters with domestic industry stakeholders at Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) and Airlines for America (A4A) Committee meetings. Both committees meet at least 4 times a year, but may meet more often according to the agenda.

• TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with OSPIE and OGS, works directly with cleared security representatives within the aviation industry in passing Classified or Sensitive, proprietary industry information on new or evolving threats to aviation equity. There are multiple communication methods in which the information is passed, to include a Classified computer system, secure telecommunications, and directly via meetings with aviation industry representatives. This information is passed through routine bi-weekly Classified and Unclassified teleconferences, quarterly Classified meetings and ad hoc as needed.

Threat information is often part of a routine dissemination to the various stakeholders for the relevant TSA program offices. As appropriate, however, when the threat warrants, the applicable program offices coordinate efforts to release information concurrently.

Question 4. Mr. Terrell, in your testimony, you stated that the Office of Global Strategies analyses multiple areas of concern to identify high-risk locations and possible attack methods.

Once an area is deemed as high-risk, what steps are taken to mitigate potential risks in that area?

Answer. Leveraging its risk analysis, the Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Global Strategies (OGS) continually identifies foreign airports where the vulnerability (in particular) and risk (in general) are deemed to be high. For each location, a Cross-Directorate Review (CDR) is conducted that involves the Regional Operations Center personnel, including the inspectors who identified the vulnerabilities, the TSA representative for that country, the International Industry Representatives for each carrier operating between the airport and the United States, the Risk Analysis team, the Capacity Development team, and OGS senior leadership. Each site is discussed in detail and potential courses of action are identified. OGS then conducts follow-up assessments and inspections to determine if the CDR actions were successful.

When OGS identifies significant vulnerabilities that warrant additional mitigation actions, OGS may issue Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) for air carriers to implement at selected locations. Following issuance of the SD/EA, OGS uses a number of methods—including ad hoc visits or air carrier inspections—to verify compliance with these additional measures. This information enables OGS to determine whether the SD/EA measures are sufficient and whether other tools will be necessary to ensure compliance such as a secretarial action which includes: A 90-day action, to give the host country time to improve security measures; public notification; imposition of operating authority conditions; or suspension of service for applicable air carriers operating to/from that location.

Question 5. Mr. Terrell, in your testimony you stated that when a specific threat is identified or significant vulnerabilities warrant additional mitigation actions, Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) are implemented. How often are these implementations made?

Answer. Some Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments (EAs) are issued immediately due to a potential threat (such as the SDs and EAs issued after the crash of MetroJet Flight 9268), while others are issued due to a deficiency discovered during an airport assessment or other significant concerns discovered that require immediate correction. TSA continually solicits feedback from the aircraft operators and foreign air carriers—through their assigned International Industry Representatives (IIRs) and Principal Security Inspectors—and considers any issues raised. Furthermore, TSA’s Office of Global Strategies and the Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement participate in industry working groups to discuss
and develop future policy as part of a regular schedule for considering changes to required security programs. Below is a breakdown of the EAs and SDs issued to foreign air carriers and domestic aircraft operators respectively with international flights.

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<tr>
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<th>Total Number of Current SDs/EAs</th>
<th>Newly Issued in 2015</th>
<th>Renewed in 2015</th>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Amendments</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
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**Question 6.** What entity within your office is responsible for follow-up inspections to ensure these directives and amendments are being followed? How often are the follow-up inspections performed?

**Answer.** Initial and follow-up inspections are conducted by the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) international inspector cadre out of the 6 TSA Regional Operations Centers. Follow-up inspections are conducted shortly after implementation of emergency measures to ensure the regulated entities are fully compliant. As appropriate, TSA's Office of Global Strategies (OGS) will deploy its inspectors again to conduct further follow-up. As part of OGS’ regular compliance schedule, inspections are conducted in accordance with the risk-based methodology established by the Office of Global Strategies, which determines frequency of visits based on various factors, to include: Frequency of flights out of a particular location, security concerns at the last point of departure or other intelligence-driven factors.

**Question 7.** Mr. Terrell, if an LPD airport fails an assessment and neither the airport or host government can absorb the cost associated with correcting the cause of failure, what happens to the airport? Is the air carrier responsible for the costs?

**Answer.** The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office of Global Strategies (OGS) will work with the appropriate authorities in the host country to address and properly mitigate any identified security deficiencies through training, instruction, or capacity development where resources and political partnership will allow. If the assessment of the last-point-of-departure airport results in significant findings which indicate that a condition exists that threatens the safety and security of aviation transportation to or from that airport, the Secretary of Homeland Security in coordination with the Secretary of State have the ability to determine whether further Secretarial action is warranted. Secretarial action may include: 90-day action to give the host country time to improve security measures; public notification; imposition of operating authority conditions; or suspension of service for applicable air carriers operating to/from that location. In locations where resources do not facilitate the ability of the host country to absorb the cost of improving security measures, it may be incumbent upon air carriers operating from that location to absorb costs associated with meeting TSA-issued security directives and emergency amendments.