[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING TSA'S GLOBAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE HOMELAND FROM AVIATION
THREATS AND ENHANCE SECURITY AT LAST-POINT-OF-DEPARTURE AIRPORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 8, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-47
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mark Walker, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witness
Mr. Joseph P. Terrell, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Global Strategies, Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Joseph P.
Terrell........................................................ 21
EXAMINING TSA'S GLOBAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE HOMELAND FROM AVIATION
THREATS AND ENHANCE SECURITY AT LAST-POINT-OF-DEPARTURE AIRPORTS
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Tuesday, December 8, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:12 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Katko
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko, Rogers, Rice, and Keating.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security, will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to have its 10th hearing,
I believe it is, our 10th hearing of the season to examine
TSA's global efforts to protect the homeland from aviation
threats and enhance security at last-point-of-departure
airports.
Now, according to media reports, our allies in the United
Kingdom believe that the Metrojet flight--I am sorry--I now
recognize myself for an opening statement.
The recent Metrojet crash over the Sinai peninsula is
tragically reminiscent of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, which
took down PanAm Flight 103, killing all aboard, including 35
Syracuse University students traveling home for the holidays.
It also claimed the lives of one of my best friend's sisters
who went to Oswego State University.
Now, according to the media reports, our allies in the
United Kingdom believe that the Metrojet flight was brought
down by the very same type of device used in the Lockerbie
bombing. It is deeply disturbing to me that innocent people
from my district in Syracuse, as well as all of the traveling
public, may still be threatened today by the same type of bomb
used over 27 years ago.
Even though this most recent attack was not targeted at
American citizens or an American aircraft, we cannot and should
not hesitate to learn from this tragedy and identify ways in
which we can mitigate such threats from becoming successful
again in the future.
The international aviation system represents our modern
globalized world. However, with interconnected transportation
systems come interconnected risk. Much like the Lockerbie
bombing affected my community in Syracuse all those years ago,
the Metrojet tragedy affects our security as well. We cannot
afford to ignore potential security lessons from this incident.
Today, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security is
holding this hearing to better understand the size and scope of
TSA's global programs aimed at securing international aviation,
as well as recent efforts to enhance security at overseas
airports with direct flights to the United States.
The recent tragic bombing of the Metrojet flight, which
killed all 224 people on board, reminds us once again of the
attractive target aviation is for terror groups. Additionally,
if this attack was indeed carried out by the ISIS, as has been
claimed, it represents a shift in the threat landscape against
aviation and a newfound capability for ISIS in carrying out
attacks.
Because of this, TSA's overseas mission is now more
important than ever. It is critical that this subcommittee
understands the extent of TSA's global reach, as well as how
the U.S. Government is working with its foreign partners and
aviation stakeholders to enhance security at overseas airports.
Moreover, efforts by other entities such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization, which plays a vital
role in setting aviation security standards world-wide, are an
essential component in proliferating security best practices
and building capacity at high-risk airports around the world.
Since the Lockerbie terror attack, we have seen a number of
attempted attacks against U.S. aviation targets. These plots,
such as 9/11, the Christmas day bomber, the printer-cartridge
bombs, and the shoe bomber, have each caused massive
reevaluations in the way passengers are screened and security
is maintained.
I am very happy to see that TSA has taken steps to increase
security at overseas airports in recent weeks and I applaud
their swift efforts in doing so. I hope these efforts will be
successful.
However, there remain gaps in security which need to be
addressed. Specifically, this subcommittee has worked intensely
throughout the 114th Congress to shed light on the serious
lapses in security vetting among aviation workers with access
to secure and sensitive areas of airports.
Additionally, I remain very concerned at the overall state
of airport access controls. We cannot solely focus on shuffling
passengers through security screening, while ignoring open back
doors at airports.
This subcommittee understands these vulnerabilities, which
is why we have passed a number of bills, including two of my
own, to close gaps in aviation worker vetting and enhance the
security of airport access controls across the United States.
These bills, together with our other oversight efforts, are
bringing critical attention to a very important issue. These
recent terrorist attacks in Egypt, Paris, Mali, and Lebanon
reminded all of us in Congress of the important responsibility
we have to the American people to ensure that their Government
is working to keep them safe from a wide array of determined
and focused adversaries who are hell-bent on threatening our
lives and way of life by terrorizing our cities and skies.
It is with this sober understanding that we meet today to
discuss efforts to secure overseas airports and international
aviation.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the
subcommittee, the gentlewoman from New York, Miss Rice, for any
statement she may have.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening
this hearing.
I also want to thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Terrell
for coming to talk with us about TSA's efforts to secure
international flights traveling to the United States from last-
point-of-departure airports abroad.
As we all know, on October 31 of this year, Metrojet Flight
9268 crashed over Sinai, Egypt after departing from Sharm el-
Sheikh International Airport en route to Russia. Multiple
sources have confirmed that a bomb smuggled on-board the
aircraft caused the crash, killing 224 people.
Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure
airport in which U.S. carriers and TSA work, there have been
reports that security within the airport was weak and those
security concerns contributed to Britain's decision to suspend
all flights to and from Sharm el-Sheikh in the immediate
aftermath of the crash.
The attacks in Paris and the shootings last week in
California are the latest tragedies to remind us that the
threat of terrorist attacks is very real and the risk is very
high right now. The Metrojet bombing is a reminder that
commercial flights are still a major target for terrorism.
We have to be going above and beyond right now in our
efforts to protect the American people. Part of that effort
includes making sure that international airports with flights
bound for the United States are fully complying with all
aviation security standards and that TSA and all relevant
parties share all information about terrorist threats and
security concerns.
There are currently 308 last-point-of-departure airports in
the world, and every day more than 2,000 flights travel from
foreign countries to the United States. TSA's Office of Global
Strategies operates throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, and TSA representatives operate in countries with
airports deemed critical to our National security.
OGS recurrently certifies these airports by conducting
security assessments and has deemed them low-risk for out-bound
flights to travel directly to the United States. They are on
the ground annually conducting more than 120 foreign airport
assessments, 1,800 air carrier inspections, and 700 foreign
repair station audits.
It seems that OGS's methods are working efficiently, but we
cannot afford to get comfortable or complacent right now
because, again, the Metrojet bombing is all the indication we
need to know that there are terrorist groups and radical
individuals targeting commercial aviation.
Mr. Terrell, in your written testimony, you mentioned the
security directives and the emergency amendments that were
coordinated at 8 last-point-of-departure airports in response
to the Metrojet crash. I am eager to hear more about the
measures taken in response to this crash, although I know we
will have to have that discussion in a secure setting.
I appreciate Administrator Neffenger acting quickly to
issue needed directive amendments that will help eliminate any
perceived vulnerabilities at last-point-of-departure airports.
I am pleased to know that OGS participates in multilateral
forums with the International Civil Aviation Organization, the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and many others. I think
this collaboration is a testament to the fact that
international aviation security is an on-going, inclusive
effort, and that your office is being proactive with your
approach to enhancing security on international flights.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I
look forward to a productive conversation today, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Miss Rice follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kathleen Rice
December 8, 2015
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for convening this hearing.
I also want to thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Terrell for
coming to talk with us about TSA's efforts to secure international
flights traveling to the United States from last-point-of-departure
(LPD) airports abroad.
As we all know, on October 31 of this year, Metrojet Flight 9268
crashed over Sinai, Egypt after departing from Sharm el-Sheikh
International Airport en route to Russia. Multiple sources have
confirmed that a bomb smuggled on-board the aircraft caused the crash--
killing 224 people.
Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure airport
in which U.S. carriers and TSA work, there have been reports that
security within the airport was weak. And those security concerns
contributed to Britain's decision to suspend all flights to and from
Sharm el-Sheikh in the immediate aftermath of the crash.
The attacks in Paris and the shootings last week in California are
the latest tragedies to remind us that the threat of terrorist attacks
is very real and the risk is very high right now--and the Metrojet
bombing is a reminder that commercial flight are still a major target
for terrorism.
We have to be going above and beyond right now in our efforts to
protect the American people--and part of that effort includes making
sure that international airports with flights bound for the United
States are fully complying with all aviation security standards, and
that TSA and all relevant parties share all information about terrorist
threats and security concerns.
There are currently 308 last-point-of-departure airports in the
world, and every day more than 2,000 flights travel from foreign
countries to the United States. TSA's Office of Global Strategies (OGS)
operates throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And TSA
representatives operate in countries with airports deemed critical to
our National security.
OGS recurrently certifies these airports by conducting security
assessments, and has deemed them low-risk for out-bound flights to
travel directly to the United States. They are on the ground annually
conducting more than 120 foreign airport assessments, 1,800 air carrier
inspections, and 700 foreign repair station audits.
It seems that OGS's methods are working efficiently, but we cannot
afford to get comfortable or complacent right now--because again, the
Metrojet bombing is all the indication we need to know that there are
terrorist groups and radical individuals targeting commercial aviation.
Mr. Terrell, in your testimony you mentioned the security
directives and the emergency amendments that were coordinated at 8 LPD
airports in response to the Metrojet crash. I'm eager to hear more
about the measures taken in response to this crash, although I know
we'll have to have that discussion in a secure setting.
I appreciate Administrator Neffenger acting quickly to issue needed
directives and amendments that will help eliminate any perceived
vulnerabilities at last-point-of-departure airports. I am pleased to
know that OGS participates in multilateral forums with the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and many others.
I think this collaboration is a testament to the fact that
international aviation security is an on-going, inclusive effort and
that your office is being proactive with your approach to enhancing
security on international flights.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I look
forward to a productive conversation today, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Miss Rice.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
December 8, 2015
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this important
hearing today.
I would like to say that our thoughts and prayers remain with the
individuals who perished aboard Metrojet Flight 9268 in Egypt.
This terrible act, which multiple sources have now confirmed was
indeed a bombing, renews concerns regarding international aviation
cooperation, specifically at last-point-of-departure airports.
These airports are those in which a flight originates from a
foreign country, bound for the United States.
Although Sharm el-Sheikh is not a last-point-of-departure, it is
alarming that someone was able to board this plane with an explosive
device--and successfully detonate it to destroy the aircraft--is
alarming.
There have been other international aviation incidents that were
also cause for concern.
On Christmas day 2009, Abdul Muttalab successfully smuggled an
explosive device on-board a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to
Detroit but failed to detonate it properly before being detained by
passengers.
In October 2010, packages mailed from Yemen containing explosives
hidden inside of printer cartridges were successfully intercepted, but
not before traveling in cargo holds, and in one instance, aboard two
passenger planes.
This latest incident is a stern reminder of how important
coordination with foreign governments, international aviation
organizations, and air carriers is to securing aircraft bound for the
United States from Foreign Airports.
With that being said, I thank Deputy Assistant Administrator Joseph
Terrell from TSA's Office of Global Strategies for being here today to
talk about the important role they plan in international aviation
security.
I am interested in learning how TSA shares threat information with
all parties involved to ensure that responses are appropriate and
thorough by all parties.
The Office of Global Strategies works to secure last-point-of-
departure airports and foreign repair stations by working with
international entities such as the International Civil Aviation
Organization, as well as through foreign airport assessments and
foreign air carrier inspections.
I look forward to your testimony, and yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Katko. We are pleased to have a distinguished witness
before us today on this important topic.
This witness is Mr. Joseph Terrell--did I pronounce that
right? Joseph Terrell, who currently serves as deputy assistant
administrator in the Office of Global Strategies at the
Transportation Security Administration. Previously, Mr. Terrell
served as TSA's Federal security director at the Pittsburgh
International Airport.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Terrell to testify.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH P. TERRELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF GLOBAL STRATEGIES, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Terrell. Thank you.
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to
discuss the Transportation Security Administration's Office of
Global Strategies and our efforts to mitigate the international
aviation security risk to the United States.
TSA's mission is to protect the Nation's transportation
systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.
Within TSA, OGS works with international and domestic partners
to reduce security risks to international transportation modes.
OGS coordinates with foreign governments, air carriers, and
international organizations to implement responses that
effectively mitigate the likelihood of a successful attack.
This involves a spectrum of activities to identify risk in
terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence and develop
mitigation plans.
TSA assesses security at foreign airports served by U.S.
aircraft operators and at foreign airports serving as a last
point of departure for foreign air carriers. Under this
authority, OGS identifies vulnerabilities at foreign locations
through assessments of airports and inspections of air carriers
from those airports to ensure they are operating at a minimum
consistent with the security standards adopted by the
International Civil Aviation Organization.
In fiscal year 2015, our transportation security
specialists performed hundreds of air carrier inspections and
146 foreign airport assessments touching down in over 125
countries. We have a range of tools available to compel
compliance with both agency and international requirements.
OGS gathers data through foreign airport assessments, air
carrier inspections, and other operational activities and feeds
it into our risk methodology framework. We then analyze each
area of concern to identify high-risk locations, possible
attack methods, and key risk factors. Locations deemed
problematic are evaluated with a focus on identifying
vulnerabilities and root causes, and then to determine an
appropriate mitigation strategy.
OGS relies on a variety of tools to mitigate issues
identified during airport assessments, inspections, and other
visits. In the event of a specific threat or vulnerability, TSA
may issue security directives to U.S. air carriers and
emergency amendments to foreign air carriers for implementation
at select last-points-of-departure locations.
Last month, TSA coordinated a global response with internal
and external partners to develop SDs and EAs related to the
crash of the Metrojet Flight 9268 in the Sinai peninsula. OGS
scheduled visits and coordinated inspections to the regulated
air carriers to verify compliance with the additional measures.
TSA also focuses on capacity development as a mitigation
tool. We provide aviation security training to foreign partners
through a variety of courses in screener supervisory skills,
preventive security measures, crisis management, basic
security, cargo security inspections, and train-the-trainer
programs, among others.
Additionally, TSA has provided equipment loans valued at
around $3 million to 12 countries that do not have the
allocated resources to procure their own equipment.
Because mitigation measures overseas are implemented by
each country's own personnel, consistent with their own
requirements, OGS relies on its internationally-deployed
workforce to influence key decision makers in foreign locations
and industry partners to understand the threat, maintain
awareness of vulnerabilities to the aviation security system
and encourage the implementation of mitigation strategies.
Our talented international experts are highly respected and
have helped establish and elevate globally consistent standards
internationally. We also conduct extensive outreach and
engagement at the global, regional, and bilateral levels with
our international partners, and Administrator Neffenger has
made these engagements a priority with 3 international trips
during his first 5 months at TSA.
OGS works regularly with ICAO to establish and enhance
baseline international standards for aviation security. TSA's
engagement is continuous, conducted at the highest
organizational levels, to discuss on-going security
vulnerabilities and to promote and share best practices with
our international partners.
As Administrator Neffenger commented to the international
partners at the IATA Aviation Security World Conference in
Dublin last month, achieving common goals calls for a shared
approach; one that begins with a serious commitment to
understanding security threats and then collaborating with one
another to reduce vulnerabilities across many discrete elements
of aviation system.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss TSA's work mitigating in-bound risk to the United
States from overseas, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Terrell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph P. Terrell
December 8, 2015
Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the
subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office of Global
Strategies (OGS) and our efforts to mitigate the international aviation
security risk to the United States.
TSA's mission is to protect the Nation's transportation systems to
ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. Within TSA, OGS
works proactively with international and domestic partners to reduce
security risks to international transportation modes. When a new or
potential threat or vulnerability emerges, OGS coordinates with foreign
governments, air carriers, and international organizations to implement
responses that will effectively mitigate the likelihood of a successful
attack. This involves a spectrum of activities to identify risk in
terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Once a threat is
identified, OGS analyzes the underlying factors and develops mitigation
plans.
identifying the in-bound risk
Under Title 49 of Chapter 449, United States Code, the Secretary of
Homeland Security is required to assess security at all foreign
airports served by U.S. aircraft operators and at those foreign
airports serving as last-point-of-departure locations for foreign air
carriers using, at a minimum, the security standards adopted by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The Secretary's
authority to do so has been delegated to OGS on behalf of TSA. Under
this authority, as well as under regulations at 49 C.F.R. 1544.3 and
1546.3, OGS identifies vulnerabilities at foreign locations through
assessments of foreign airports and inspections of air carriers that
fly from those airports.
To determine the appropriate frequency of the assessment and
inspection visits, OGS developed a methodology, using the threat,
vulnerability, and consequence model, to define the risk associated
with each airport under its jurisdiction. This methodology ensures the
allocation of OGS assets is based on the likelihood of a location being
targeted (threat), the protective measures in place (vulnerability),
and the impact of the loss of that airport's services (consequence).
Once this is determined, assessments are coordinated by the applicable
TSA representatives (TSARs) and completed by a team of Transportation
Security Specialists (TSSs) from 1 of our 6 Regional Operation Centers
(ROCs) located world-wide.
In addition, OGS engages in recognition of international programs
commensurate with TSA's own requirements in the United States, as well
as interagency initiatives, and screening pilots. These DHS programs--
such as the recognition of National Cargo and National Explosive
Detection Canine Security Programs, the Customs-Trade Partnership
against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and the Air Cargo Advance Screening Pilot--
provide TSA with opportunities to identify vulnerabilities at last-
point-of-departure (LPD) airports overseas while also engaging closely
with domestic and international partners to promote information
sharing.
In fiscal year 2015, our TSSs performed 289 air carrier inspections
and 146 foreign airport assessments. Our commensurability programs also
continued to thrive, with the recognition of now 40 National Cargo and
3 National Explosives Detection Canine Security Programs with foreign
governments, to include the 28 Member States of the European Union.
analyzing the in-bound risk
OGS works to fully gauge the in-bound risk from LPD airports based
on specific attack methods. This analysis provides valuable insight
into what mitigation actions would have the greatest impact to reduce
in-bound risk.
OGS gathers data through foreign airport assessments, air carrier
inspections, and other operational activities and feeds it into its
risk methodology framework. OGS then analyzes each area of concern to
identify high-risk locations, possible attack methods, and key risk
factors. LPD locations deemed to be highly vulnerable or high-risk are
further analyzed through a review process that involves subject-matter
experts within OGS. This entire process enables OGS to evaluate the key
risk drivers with a focus on identifying vulnerabilities at that LPD
location and their associated root causes to determine the appropriate
mitigation strategy.
mitigating the in-bound risk
OGS has a variety of tools available to mitigate issues identified
during airport assessments, air carrier inspections, or other visits.
Options range from providing on-the-spot correction recommendations,
conducting formal training, and recommending enacting a Public Notice
stating that the airport does not implement adequate security measures,
or suspending service entirely. These last two responses are usually
considered when all other attempts have failed in assisting the airport
or host government to improve security. When a specific threat is
identified or significant vulnerabilities warrant additional and
immediate mitigation actions, TSA may issue Security Directives (SDs)
and Emergency Amendments (EAs) for implementation by air carriers at
selected LPD locations. TSA works diligently to develop appropriate
regulatory language for the SDs and EAs to address identified
vulnerabilities and also communicate new policy requirements with
foreign and domestic partners.
SDs are regulations issued to mitigate threats posed to
transportation for U.S. airport and aircraft operators, and EAs are
issued to foreign air carriers. These regulations apply to all U.S. air
carriers operating anywhere, foreign air carriers operating to or from
the United States and U.S. airport operators. SDs and EAs are intended
to mitigate security-related risks against civil aviation.
Additionally, TSA may issue information circulars to regulated parties
to share security concerns.
Last month, OGS coordinated with internal and external partners to
develop SDs and EAs related to the crash of Metrojet Flight 9268 in the
Sinai Peninsula at 8 LPDs in the region. Following issuance of these
SDs and EAs, OGS conducted visits or inspections to the regulated air
carriers at the applicable last-point-of-departure airports to verify
compliance with the additional measures. Follow-up inspections will
allow TSA to continue to assess continued compliance and whether any
additional or modified measures are necessary in light of evolving
threats. As with other vulnerability-driven SDs and EAs, the results of
these visits will enable TSA to determine if the mitigation actions
were successful.
Another important part of OGS's mitigation efforts is capacity
development. OGS provides aviation security training to foreign
partners through a variety of courses in screener supervisory skills,
preventative security measures, crisis management, basic security,
cargo security inspections, and train-the-trainer programs, among
others. In addition, TSA provides equipment loans to those countries
that do not have the allocated resources to procure their own
equipment. Often, OGS works in conjunction with its international
partners, such as Australia or the United Kingdom, to provide training
or equipment to countries where we have mutual operations.
Because mitigation measures overseas are implemented by each
country's own personnel, OGS relies on its internationally-deployed
workforce to influence key decision makers in foreign locations and
industry partners to understand the threat, maintain awareness of
vulnerabilities to the aviation security system, and encourage the
implementation of mitigation strategies. Our TSARs provide on-site
representation at U.S. Embassies and Consulates around the globe. TSARs
are based in Abu Dhabi, Amman, Bangkok, Beijing, Berlin, Brasilia,
Brussels, Buenos Aires, Dakar, Johannesburg, London, Madrid, Manila,
Mexico City, Miami, Nairobi, Nassau, Ottawa, Panama City, Paris, Rabat,
Rome, Singapore, Sydney, The Hague, Tokyo, and Warsaw. The TSARs all
have regional responsibilities in addition to their duty post
assignment. International Industry Representatives, also located in
Embassies and Consulates around the world, serve as TSA's primary
representatives to regulated non-U.S. air carriers and U.S. aircraft
operators that serve international airports.
OGS also conducts extensive outreach and engagement at the global,
regional, and bilateral levels with our international counterparts. OGS
collaborates on mitigation measures to counter existing threats as well
as new and emerging threats. Specifically, OGS works with the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to establish and
enhance baseline international standards for aviation security. As the
U.S. Government's representative to the ICAO Aviation Security Panel of
Experts, TSA works with other international representatives to shape
international aviation security standards on important issues such as
cargo security and the coordination of capacity development. TSA also
engages international air carriers and aviation stakeholders, such as
the International Air Transport Association, Airlines for America, the
American Association of Airport Executives, and Airports Council
International, or in forums like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
and the North American Aviation Trilateral. TSA's engagement is
continuous, and includes the highest organizational levels: For
example, Administrator Neffenger recently visited his counterparts in
London, Amsterdam, and Tel Aviv to discuss on-going security
vulnerabilities and to share best practices with our international
partners.
conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
TSA's work mitigating in-bound risk to the United States from overseas.
We are constantly looking at more effective ways to improve and enhance
the international aviation security arena to ensure the freedom of
movement for people and commerce in an ever-evolving threat
environment. I look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Terrell, and I very much
appreciate your testimony here today. We are in the midst of
voting hell, I think, today, from it looks like, a bunch of
procedural votes are being called repeatedly. So we are
probably going to be interrupted.
We are going to be interrupted in about 10 minutes to have
to go and vote. But we are going to get through a couple rounds
of questioning first, if we can.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. Mr.
Terrell, I just want to--I will jump right into it, I was going
to have you give me more of a background, but given the time
constraints, I want to jump right into it.
The security assessments, if I understood your testimony
correctly, and the mitigation decisions are done by each
country where their airport is located, correct?
Mr. Terrell. Each country has an obligation under
international agreement to ensure the security measures in
their countries are consistent with international standards.
Mr. Katko. So basically, there are minimum international
standards by which these countries are supposed to meet them,
correct?
Mr. Terrell. That is correct.
Mr. Katko. Did that includes Sharm el-Sheikh, just by
curiosity?
Mr. Terrell. It does.
Mr. Katko. Okay. It is clear that they were not meeting
those standards in retrospect?
Mr. Terrell. It is easy to draw that conclusion.
Mr. Katko. What happens when an airport is not meeting the
standards? What punitive measures, if any, can be taken?
Mr. Terrell. There are a number of things, and I think it
is important to draw a distinction of the types of
vulnerabilities and threats that we address.
First is when the threat is such that there aren't existing
countermeasures in existence to deal with it. What we do then
is work with our international partners to craft
countermeasures, often reflected in SDs and EAs, to address
that.
The second are instances in which there are countermeasures
that we believe are sufficient to address existing threat, if
indeed they are implemented to the degree they are supposed to.
I think, based on what we understand in the Sharm el-Sheikh
case, that, had the procedures been properly implemented, that
there may have been a different outcome.
So that shapes our response to try to work with foreign
partners to assist Egyptians, or in other cases provide
opportunities for them to be able to actually implement
appropriately the countermeasures.
Mr. Katko. One of the concerns I have is that we
shouldn't--and I am not impugning TSA at all, but I don't think
we should be in a position of waiting until something happens,
then we realize there is a vulnerability, and then we act
accordingly.
Mr. Terrell. Yes, and most certainly, if I may, we do not
do that, and, again, as I pointed out, in the past year alone,
we visited 125 airports, and we are indeed in the vulnerability
assessment business.
We do have a very robust means to compel compliance to the
international standards. Technically, given the authority that
is presented to us by statute, with the concurrence of the
State Department and the Secretary of Homeland Security, if we
are concerned to the degree that conditions at a particular
airport represent a risk to the traveling public, we could--or
the U.S. Government has the ability to go to prohibit
operations between that country and the United States.
Mr. Katko. Have they ever done that in the past?
Mr. Terrell. It has happened a couple times in the past.
Not recently.
Mr. Katko. Is there something that we can do legislatively
that could help you--give you more freedom to do that more
easily?
Mr. Terrell. I think, actually, I would trumpet this as a
success story, that there are a lot of instances in which we
have been close, but given the resources, the focus, the
attention that we present to these areas that have proven to be
problematic, that we have negated the need to actually--to go
to that degree.
That is a last-case scenario, and in many instances, we
would be able to mitigate it through a various number of means.
Mr. Katko. Now, as I understand it, TSA does have some
authority to do assessments of airports internationally,
correct?
Mr. Terrell. We have--yes. We--well, yes. We have a
requirement under statute to conduct assessments anywhere there
is a U.S. civil aviation interest, and we do do that.
Mr. Katko. Now, when--and if I understand it correctly, you
have to give notice of these assessments. Is that right?
Mr. Terrell. Yes, we do.
Mr. Katko. All right. So that is part of my concern. Is
there any way we can fix that so you don't give them so much
notice?
Kind of like--I am thinking of internally--when GAO goes
around, or some of the other ones go around to TSA
domestically, they don't give them notice that they are doing
it, and so that--I think that gives you a more genuine feel for
the security preparedness at the airports and security
vulnerabilities.
From that we can craft proper legislation, and patch up the
holes. But when you go overseas, and you have the--you give
them notice of--maybe it is a month ahead of time or whatever,
it gives them opportunity to be on their best behavior when you
are there, and that concerns me, because that doesn't give you
an accurate snapshot of the day-to-day activities at the
airport.
So is there something we can do to fix that so we can give
you more--increased ability to do with the randomization that I
think is really important?
Mr. Terrell. Yes. I certainly appreciate that question.
Two things: First and foremost is that, while we have a
statutory authority to conduct these assessments, our statutory
authority does not extend into these other states, as--of
course, as you know--and quite often, there is a bit of
resistance to what is being perceived as extraterritoriality of
our requirements.
But I will point out that--you know, it is almost a sixth
sense--and I could speak with some authority here, as a
former--I started off as inspector, many, many years ago, and I
think inspectors have a sixth sense about what they are seeing
is actually legitimate, or a horse-and-pony show, as they say,
or if it is something that we believe is a sustainable
practice.
One of the things we do in those cases where we believe
that what we are seeing is not sustainable and, indeed, just a
show for us, is we do work--we gain a lot of significance from
working with the host government in ensuring that, given a--by
an understanding of the government's--their own oversight
program, their own training programs, their own regulatory
requirements--all these things that give us some confidence of
whether or not what we are seeing operational during these
periodic visits is indeed sustainable.
Mr. Katko. Okay. Briefly, then I will--I might--my time is
up here. But I want to--just one quick follow-up question.
It would--even if we don't have the ability, legislatively,
to legislate what other countries do, we do have the ability to
legislate what our airlines can do.
So if our airlines are at foreign airports, and foreign
countries want to do business with us, isn't it fair to say
that, if we tell that airline, ``if you can't get an agreement
from their government to allow random security checks at your
airports by TSA, then you can't do business there,'' I think--
couldn't that solve the problem?
Mr. Terrell. I would--I am not quite sure I am prepared to
answer that. I am not--to be perfectly honest. You know, and
again, I want--I would like to reiterate that I don't think--
part of the reason we have been successful over these--a number
of years is by operating collaboratively with a lot of these--
our foreign partners.
You know, I would mention that--25 years ago, that--you
know, we were the only state conducting these--this activity.
One of the things that we were often told is that the only
reason that you are here--being us--is that there is a risk to
these particular countries, because the United States has a
civil aviation interest involved.
In the past 25 years since then, you know, after all the
incidents you just referred to, but including Australia and
Bangkok and London and Madrid, we have a lot of partners that
are emerging that have realized that the path that we chose 25
years ago is indeed the way to go.
We have leveraged our leadership and experience--this, in
seeking collaboration with like-minded partners to join us in
promoting international standards globally.
We have been able to create communications and share
information with a lot of our partners that we were unable to
do, you know, 10 or 15 years ago.
So I think we are making a lot of progress in trying to
garner a coalition of like-minded partners to promote aviation
security standards internationally. I think we have been very
much the beneficiaries of that.
Mr. Katko. Okay. I have more questions, but I am going to
go for another--we will do another round, most likely. But the
Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member, Miss Rice,
for 5 minutes of questions, and then at the conclusion of her
questions, we will break, we will vote real quick and we will
come right back and get right at it again.
Mr. Terrell. Thank you.
Miss Rice. I think that we can all agree--and I am sure you
would agree, Mr. Terrell----
Mr. Terrell. Yes, please.
Miss Rice [continuing]. That it is in every country, every
airline, every security agency's best interest to ensure that
an incident like what happened with the Russian jet does not
happen in your country, because that could affect your economy,
it can affect--you know, obviously issues of National security.
So I think it is probably fair to assume that everyone
starts from a point of wanting to have a level of inspection
that they believe is going to be effective to prevent things
like this from happening.
I have a question about--I understand, in the aftermath of
the Metrojet bombing, the last-point-of-departure airport
security was increased at the last-point-of-departure airport.
Is that correct?
Mr. Terrell. Yes.
Miss Rice. Based on the directive by the--I believe it was
Secretary Johnson?
Mr. Terrell. Yes, ma'am.
Miss Rice. Yes. Now, just out of curiosity, what about the
airports that fly to last-point-of-departure airports? Are the
people as in a directing--you know, as a stop along the way,
not a direct flight, obviously--are the bags, are the
passengers on that plane re-screened when they get to the last-
point-of-departure airport?
Mr. Terrell. Yes, they are. Most States--and I say most
States because there are some geographic locations where that
isn't the case, but by and large, any airport--any operation to
the United States that operates through a transit point, we
require them to be treated as an originating flight. Their bags
will be screened and passengers will be screened before
continuing on
Miss Rice. Where do you--how is the--how are the lines of
the communication between your agency and agencies of your type
and other countries vis-a-vis threat levels, country-specific
issues that are going on, information sharing--how is that all
done?
Mr. Terrell. Of course it certainly depends on the State,
but by and large our community is a relatively small one, and
to your point that you made earlier, we all have the same
interest. Any security event, as the Egyptians are aware of
right now, is incredibly damaging to their economies.
We have--we are very active in multilateral organizations.
We have 28 transportation security representatives. They are
around the world, whose sole job is to foster these
relationships with our counterparts globally.
We have a number of sort-of ad hoc groups and so we are
incredibly engaged with our counterparts. There is a great
thirst within our community also to share and participate
collaboratively to the extent that we can. You know, there are
a great many nations who are in the exact same boat as we are.
Miss Rice. The Chairman asked you a question about doing
covert inspections. I, you know, think it is probably a tough
thing to legislate, but are--do you have--do we have agreements
with any country on doing things like that? Like what was done
with TSA recently?
Mr. Terrell. No, there--it is frowned upon and--if we were
to conduct any it would be contrary to a lot of States' laws
for us to do that.
Miss Rice. No, no, no. I understand that, but I am talking
about that--that is one of the things that we do here in this
country to ensure that our aviation system is as safe as
possible. Do we have conversations with other countries where
we encourage them to do the same thing?
Mr. Terrell. I am sorry, I misunderstood. Yes, yes indeed.
We are aware and, actually, it is not unusual for other states
to have their own covert programs in place. You know, we find
it beneficial to the extent that laws permit to be able to
share and have these discussions. But yes.
I misunderstood your question, I am sorry.
Miss Rice. So obviously, it is not just your agency that is
responsible for inspections and security. I mean, you have
ICAO, you have got the air carriers, you have got foreign
governments. Just how is all that coordinated? I mean, all you
have to do is look back at 9/11 and we see that there was
certain information that was siloed within various Government
agencies that probably should not have what we know should not
have been--well, we know should not have been.
I think that 9/11 woke us up to the need for more open,
liberal information sharing between agencies.
So how--I mean, these are--throw in different countries and
different procedures and how is--how do you feel about the
information that you get from other countries that may be
something that we need to know?
Mr. Terrell. I am encouraged by the increase, you know,
just in terms of how all these different entities relate. ICAO,
I think it is probably fair to say the requirements that they
have established sort of set the context within which each
member state operates. States that have like-minded concerns
and approaches towards aviation security, it is beneficial to
both parties to share information.
We, in turn, regulate each of our respective air carriers
and airport operators consistent with international standards,
and the regulations--requirements, rather, that each state
imposes on its regulated entities.
So it is a logical exchange, but again, the key is to open
up communication, share information to the degree practicable.
Most certainly since the threat landscape has changed over the
past 10 or 15 years.
Miss Rice. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. We are going to take a brief recess at this
time, subject to the call of the Chair. I anticipate it will be
about 15 minutes. Okay.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Katko. The subcommittee is reconvened, and we just were
awarded with another motion to adjourn--the third one in the
last hour that has been filed by someone in Congress trying to
be obstreperous, it appears.
But in--nevertheless, we have about another 15 minutes of
questioning we can do, and we will get to as much as we can.
Seeing no other colleagues here, I am going to go for another
round of questioning, between myself and Miss Rice and anyone
else who may appear.
I wanted to kind of touch on employees at foreign airports,
before I go back, and if there is time to give you more of an
overarching analysis of what we can do better over there and
how we can help you get--make--have better security over there.
It is my understanding that, at a lot of these foreign
airports, there are a lot of employees--just like in the United
States--that are contract employees.
Correct me if I am wrong, is it fair to say that these
contract employees are subject to screening standards that are
implemented by the individual countries--is that correct?
Mr. Terrell. That is correct.
Mr. Katko. Okay. Do you--does TSA or the United States have
any influence whatsoever over those screening procedures?
Mr. Terrell. We do to a certain degree. It is a requirement
under ICAO that each state provides background checks to each
employee at airports and working for air carriers, to the
extent that is practicable under each state's laws, recognizing
privacy laws and that type of thing vary from state to state.
But to the degree that we can influence and leverage
partnerships with other--our relations with other states to
encourage states that--to create a robust vetting scheme for
their employees, we do indeed do that. That is a routine part
of our assessment activity.
Mr. Katko. So by the very definition of the standard you
enunciated, it appears that there are divergent standards based
on the countries involved.
I know there is, with respect the United States and our
Western European allies, because I was over there with a CODEL,
as was Miss Rice, and we saw first-hand that there was
differences, part of which, I think, contributed to what
happened in Paris.
Their standards--their security standards just aren't as
high as ours. So that has caused some of the concern we have
with vulnerabilities at last-point-of-departure airports is--
No. 1 is--you know, you have limited oversight capabilities--at
least currently--for TSA over there.
You have, overlaid with that, varying degrees of oversight
of employees in general, and contract employees in particular.
The airlines I know--the U.S. carriers--do a great job, I
think, of taking security seriously. That is obvious.
But when you have the contract employees--the caterers, the
people working on the engines, the people--you know, doing the
things that you should be concerned about--my concern is, how
do we plug the gap, or can we do anything to try and require
them to--under the ICAO or anything else to do a better job?
Because I know some just aren't doing a good job screening
their employees.
Mr. Terrell. Yes. There are a number of ways that we can,
and that we do, do that. One, as I mentioned earlier--I just
want to restate that, if we do believe the state has a
deficient or inadequate system of background checks, we remind
them of their obligation under ICAO, and provide
recommendations that we believe would help them.
Second, in terms of bridging gaps when there are
deficiencies, you know, we do indeed require flight crew, cabin
crew who fly to the United States to be vetted to our standards
before they are allowed to fly aircraft or participate in
aircraft activities to the United States, and we also--as I am
sure you know--through our secure flight program, vet each and
every person who flies as a passenger to the United States.
So I think those--and I will mention one other thing, too--
that if we do not have luck with a host government in trying to
provide--you know, a more vigorous vetting process, then we can
define other--levy other requirements on our carriers to put a
bubble around the operations to the United States, such as make
sure that there are aircraft guards to ensure there is no
unauthorized approaching, to make sure that the catering that
you mentioned is indeed screened and checked before it boards
aircraft destined to the United States.
We can--we do require--make those requirements to
compensate for instances in which were not happy with what
those governments provides.
Mr. Katko. Right. I understand. But, for example,
mechanics. I mean, if a mechanic breaks bad, they could do
something on an airplane that--a problem that could only
manifest itself once they are in the air.
Those are the types of things I am concerned about, is
finding the needle in the haystack, that lone wolf which is so
vexing here in the United States, with our higher standards,
and I worry about it doubly so in foreign countries where their
standards may not be as high as ours, right?
So, because of that, it seems to me that we've got to do
more. I know this is a concern that was enunciated by the
airline industry. We had a roundtable with them last week, and
they were certainly concerned about that, amongst other things.
But that is one thing that they are very concerned about,
is--you know, different countries have different standards for
screening, and--you know, you have limited ability to be a
watchdog internationally, and it seems to me that it really is
a gaping vulnerability.
I understand when you say that there are some things that
are good and you are doing all right with, but it seems to me
we have got to find ways of not just saying what is okay, but
how to fix the things that aren't okay, and to me, this is one
of those things that is not okay.
So I would be interested in hearing from you, briefly, of
the concerns you have with the vetting of employees and the
screening of employees internationally. What can we do to stop
it, other than what you described--putting a bubble around an
airplane, type of thing?
Let's face it, some airports you go to, internationally,
you have nothing but foreigners--foreign contract carriers--to
work on the engines. So you can't put a bubble around the
individual that is working on your engine.
So how do we try and fix what I see as a security
vulnerability?
Mr. Terrell. We can--what we can control are the
requirements that are in place for aircraft that operate to the
United States. We have--it is within the FAA purview, but--yes,
I do believe, for example, using mechanics as an example, that
they have--that any type of maintenance is done at a FAA-
certified location. There are a number of measures in place.
I think one of the things that we have had--we were
starting to really----
Mr. Katko. I don't mean to interrupt you, Mr. Terrell, but
I am--it is getting a little frustrating, because you are not
telling me things that need to be fixed, and I am hearing from
the airline industry, things need to be fixed.
So instead of just telling us the good things, tell us
about the bad things, because that is what we are really here
to do, is try and help you guys, give you the tools to fix the
things that need to be fixed.
Mr. Terrell. Yes. What I was hoping to clarify is that
there are, you know, just by virtue of the fact that we are
trying to promote change in locations in which we do not have
expressed authority, that there are a number of ways that we--
by leveraging partnerships, by working--trying to raise
standards with international organizations--you know, by
leveraging partners that may be more influential in other parts
of the world than we are to try to promote standards.
We have had--I think we have had a lot of success in--you
know, again, as I mentioned, by virtue of--you know, our
leadership internationally, we are resourced, you know, we
provide--we have been recently providing training to states on
conducting their own assessment programs.
So we have a number of different ways, I think, in which we
have been very creative and very aggressive in trying to
promote standards internationally.
Mr. Katko. All right, so according to you, then there is
nothing else we need to do. Is that right?
Mr. Terrell. When you say ``we''----
Mr. Katko. The United States, to help shore up security
internationally. You have not told us one thing, in all the
testimony today, of anything that needs to be shored up
internationally--that we can help you with.
Is there--if that is the case, there is nothing, just tell
us that.
Mr. Terrell. Well, with all due respect, I think what we
have, really, is just a continuum, on our part, of trying to
continuously elevate standards.
Mr. Katko. I understand that. Is there something we can do
to help you, or do you not need our help?
Mr. Terrell. I am an operational guy, sir. As far as what
the Congress can do for us, I would probably best leave to
others. I mean, I am not--I don't really quite--I haven't
thought that one through.
Perhaps I need some time to think about it and get back to
you.
Mr. Katko. The Chair now recognizes Miss Rice for
questions.
Miss Rice. Sir, in your testimony, you said that your
office conducted 146 foreign airport assessments----
Mr. Terrell. Yes.
Miss Rice [continuing]. In fiscal year 2015. What were the
outcomes, in general? Were they all satisfactory? Were they all
passing? Were they--some failing? Did some have to be taken out
of--you know----
Mr. Terrell. In almost every instance, there are
opportunities that--there are--the way we characterize is,
discrepancies noted.
Miss Rice. Okay. So give me the top 5 discrepancies that
you noted in these foreign airport assessments in fiscal year
2015.
Mr. Terrell. I would--just off the top of my head, I would
think that access ID is the----
Miss Rice. So, people not having it? Losing it and it not
being reported?
Mr. Terrell. Just not wearing them. Just not wearing them.
Miss Rice. Not wearing them?
Mr. Terrell. Yes. You know, I would think, and if we were
going to summarize, that there are probably more issues
associated with access control, more than anything else, which
is problematic.
I am not sure that isn't necessarily related to the fact
that, because of the importance of that in the security airport
regime, that we pay very close attention to that, too.
Miss Rice. Okay. Anything deficient about the background
checks they do for their contract employees in the airports?
Mr. Terrell. Again, there--we do--there are states that
are--they would probably, consistent with international
standards, do employment checks and background checks, and are
not permitted by their own privacy laws to conduct criminal
background checks.
This is something that we work constantly with certain key
states to try to ensure the importance of them having a keener
picture on the criminal background of folks that they are
providing access to secured areas.
Miss Rice. Do you do a summary of the foreign airport
assessments you do for every fiscal year?
Mr. Terrell. We--yes, in terms of results?
Miss Rice. Yes, yes.
Mr. Terrell. We most definitely use them for our purposes
to identify trends.
Miss Rice. So, what I would like to do is see if you could
provide the committee with those reports, because the
Chairman's questions before had to do with what are ways that
you think that we can help you. It seems to me that the key to
that is for us to see what your assessment is of foreign
airports with whom we do business, from an economic standpoint,
but certainly from a National security standpoint, and a public
safety standpoint.
Why don't we take a look at that and see if we can come up
with ways that, maybe not necessarily through legislation, but
ways that we might be able to take these assessments that are--
the purpose of which is to ensure that every foreign country
with whom we do business is actually maintaining a level of--a
standard of care, if you will, right--that gives us the
confidence that we can tell our airlines flying to those
countries, ``You are okay to fly there, and everyone is safe,
and you should continue, Americans, to travel wherever you want
to go.''
Maybe if we could take a look at that report, that would be
a good starting point. So if you could provide us that, that
would be great.
Mr. Terrell. Yes, ma'am.
Miss Rice. Okay.
Now, are there currently, as you sit here, any regions or
countries that you believe require more of a presence from OGS?
If so, why?
Mr. Terrell. Yes, I would say absolutely there are. You
know, part of our--how we allocate resources and ensure that
the limited number of people that we have are used most
efficiently is, you know, we definitely have a risk methodology
in which we gauge vulnerabilities, in particular, specific
locations.
Miss Rice. So do you have specific countries that you have
concerns about or regions?
Mr. Terrell. Yes, we do.
Miss Rice. You do. Are you not able to say that in an open
setting?
Mr. Terrell. I would prefer not to.
Miss Rice. Okay. Great. So let me just ask you this, you
did 146 assessments. How many foreign airports are there?
Mr. Terrell. Three-hundred-and-something, I think.
Miss Rice. So is it every other year they can expect to be
inspected?
Mr. Terrell. It depends.
Miss Rice. Or is there a requirement?
Mr. Terrell. No. What--again, some airports we visit
quarterly. Some airports we don't visit for a few years.
Miss Rice. You make the risk assessment?
Mr. Terrell. Oh, absolutely, yes.
Miss Rice. Is that a question of--if you had more
resources, you would do 300-plus assessments a year?
Mr. Terrell. Not necessarily. I mean, to be perfectly
honest, there are a number of airports that we have full
confidence not only in the counter-measures that are in place
at that location, but also the thoroughness and effectiveness
of the oversight and the seriousness with which the particular
government takes these matters. We have a lot of partners that
view things the exact same way that we do.
Miss Rice. Okay. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Briefly, and then I think we are going to have
to wrap up here. We can submit the rest of our questions, if
you agree, Miss Rice, on paper, and we will submit them to TSA
and ask them to answer them.
One refrain that I have heard from the airline industry is
that information sharing subsequent to an incident is good at
first, and then it seems to tail off. I think that bears itself
out with respect to the Metrojet incident.
The airlines learn from the information you give them
whether or not they think it is important. So I asked them to
go back to TSA, let them know that--encourage them to continue
the lines of communication even if they think the information
they have has nothing to offer. I kind of liken it to the days
when I was talking to witnesses as a prosecutor. They would not
tell me some things, and they said, ``Well, I didn't think that
was important.'' I said, ``Let us decide what is important.''
So let the airlines decide what is important, and just--any
information, any tidbits you have either helping or hurting an
investigation, let them know as soon as you can because they
can build upon that. I ask that you that, and they asked me to
convey that message to you as well.
Mr. Terrell. Will do.
Mr. Katko. The rest of the information I think we will
submit in writing. We appreciate your time here today, sir. We
are sorry for the breaks, but some people are deciding to have
fun today in Congress by calling these motions to adjourn
repeatedly, so we are going to have to deal with them.
Thank you very much.
The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Joseph P. Terrell
Question 1. What is the Office of Global Strategies involvement in
assessing risks and creating Emergency Amendments?
Does OGS have any input for this process?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office
of Global Strategies (OGS) provides significant input in the Emergency
Amendment (EA) process. TSA issues EAs in response to either threat or
vulnerability concerns. In instances of threat-based EAs, OGS leverages
its risk analysis to target the application of new requirements.
Vulnerability-based EAs are derived from OGS' Foreign Airport
Assessment program. During an airport assessment, OGS inspectors note
vulnerabilities and provide their observations from the assessments to
TSA's Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement to draft and
issue EAs as warranted. The EAs provide security requirements on the
air carriers above and beyond what is required in the air carrier's
current TSA-accepted security program in order to address the
vulnerabilities and mitigate the risks.
Question 2. When TSA learns of new vulnerabilities and issues
emergency amendments and security directives, it is important that the
relevant entities comply to ensure that airports and aircraft are not
at risk.
What is the Office of Global Strategies' role in relaying these new
measures to last-point-of-departure airports?
Answer. When Emergency Amendments/Security Directives (EAs/SDs) are
issued by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), they are
relayed to the affected air carriers by TSA's Office of Global
Strategies' International Industry Representatives (IIRs). The IIRs
serve as TSA's principal liaisons with air carriers. The IIRs share
EAs/SDs through direct communications with their industry counterparts.
Additionally, TSA posts the EAs/SDs on the Homeland Security
Information Network, an internet portal that allows air carriers to
access applicable TSA security programs and directives. While EAs/SDs
are specifically issued to regulated entities, the air carriers, TSA
understands the importance of information sharing with its foreign
government partners. The Transportation Security Administration
representatives (TSARs), which are part of the Office of Global
Strategies, serve as the principle liaisons with foreign government
transportation security experts, including those responsible for
security at international airports. The TSARs are TSA's primary
interlocutors for threat information, intelligence, vulnerabilities,
best practices, and other pertinent security issues with foreign
governments and airports. When TSA issues a threat specific SD or EA,
the TSARs who cover the applicable region provide their transportation
security counterparts with the enhanced security measures for
awareness.
Question 3. Can you detail for us the process in place to
disseminate threat information from TSA to air carriers and foreign
governments that fly out of or operate last-point-of-departure
airports?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) shares
threat information with domestic aircraft operators, foreign air
carriers, and foreign governments, collaborating closely amongst TSA
program offices to ensure the information is provided in the most
efficient and secure means possible.
TSA's Transportation Security Administration representatives
(TSARs), which are part of the Office of Global Strategies
(OGS), serve as the principle liaisons with foreign government
transportation security counterparts. The TSARs are TSA's
primary interlocutors for threat information, intelligence,
vulnerabilities, best practices, and other pertinent security
issues with foreign governments. When TSA issues a threat-
specific Security Directives (SDs) or Emergency Amendments
(EAs), the TSARs who cover the applicable region provide their
transportation security counterparts with the enhanced security
measures for awareness.
TSA's International Industry Representatives (IIRs), which
are part of the OGS, serve as the principal liaisons to U.S.
and foreign air carriers conducting international operations.
IIRs provide alerts of new threats, address air carrier
vulnerabilities, report intelligence and share threat
information through direct one-on-one communications with their
industry counterparts on both a regular and ad hoc basis.
Additionally, IIRs provide their carriers with TSA-issued SDs
and EAs, which add supplemental security measures in response
to specific and emergent threats.
TSA's Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement
(OSPIE) Industry Engagement Managers provide unclassified
teleconference calls and meetings to share information on new
and evolving threats with domestic industry stakeholders.
Additionally, OSPIE solicits feedback and discusses aviation
security matters with domestic industry stakeholders at
Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) and Airlines for
America (A4A) Committee meetings. Both committees meet at least
4 times a year, but may meet more often according to the
agenda.
TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination
with OSPIE and OGS, works directly with cleared security
representatives within the aviation industry in passing
Classified or Sensitive, proprietary industry information on
new or evolving threats to aviation equities. There are
multiple communication methods in which the information is
passed, to include a Classified computer system, secure
telecommunications, and directly via meetings with aviation
industry representatives. This information is passed through
routine bi-weekly Classified and Unclassified teleconferences,
quarterly Classified meetings and ad hoc as needed.
Threat information is often part of a routine dissemination to the
various stakeholders for the relevant TSA program offices. As
appropriate, however, when the threat warrants, the applicable program
offices coordinate efforts to release information concurrently.
Question 4. Mr. Terrell, in your testimony, you stated that the
Office of Global Strategies analyses multiple areas of concern to
identify high-risk locations and possible attack methods.
Once an area is deemed as high-risk, what steps are taken to
mitigate potential risks in that area?
Answer. Leveraging its risk analysis, the Transportation Security
Administration's Office of Global Strategies (OGS) continually
identifies foreign airports where the vulnerability (in particular) and
risk (in general) are deemed to be high. For each location, a Cross-
Directorate Review (CDR) is conducted that involves the Regional
Operations Center personnel, including the inspectors who identified
the vulnerabilities, the TSA representative for that country, the
International Industry Representatives for each carrier operating
between the airport and the United States, the Risk Analysis team, the
Capacity Development team, and OGS senior leadership. Each site is
discussed in detail and potential courses of action are identified. OGS
then conducts follow-up assessments and inspections to determine if the
CDR actions were successful.
When OGS identifies significant vulnerabilities that warrant
additional mitigation actions, OGS may issue Security Directives (SDs)
and Emergency Amendments (EAs) for air carriers to implement at
selected locations. Following issuance of the SD/EA, OGS uses a number
of methods--including ad hoc visits or air carrier inspections--to
verify compliance with these additional measures. This information
enables OGS to determine whether the SD/EA measures are sufficient and
whether other tools will be necessary to ensure compliance such as a
secretarial action which includes: A 90-day action, to give the host
country time to improve security measures; public notification;
imposition of operating authority conditions; or suspension of service
for applicable air carriers operating to/from that location.
Question 5. Mr. Terrell, in your testimony you stated that when a
specific threat is identified or significant vulnerabilities warrant
additional mitigation actions, Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency
Amendments (EAs) are implemented. How often are these implementations
made?
Answer. Some Security Directives (SDs) and Emergency Amendments
(EAs) are issued immediately due to a potential threat (such as the SDs
and EAs issued after the crash of MetroJet Flight 9268), while others
are issued due to a deficiency discovered during an airport assessment
or other significant concerns discovered that require immediate
correction. TSA continually solicits feedback from the aircraft
operators and foreign air carriers--through their assigned
International Industry Representatives (IIRs) and Principal Security
Inspectors--and considers any issues raised. Furthermore, TSA's Office
of Global Strategies and the Office of Security Policy and Industry
Engagement participate in industry working groups to discuss and
develop future policy as part of a regular schedule for considering
changes to required security programs. Below is a breakdown of the EAs
and SDs issued to foreign air carriers and domestic aircraft operators
respectively with international flights.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
Number of Newly Renewed
Current Issued in in 2015
SDs/EAs 2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security Directives.................... 28 7 13
Emergency Amendments................... 25 7 14
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 6. What entity within your office is responsible for
follow-up inspections to ensure these directives and amendments are
being followed?
How often are the follow-up inspections performed?
Answer. Initial and follow-up inspections are conducted by the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) international inspector
cadre out of the 6 TSA Regional Operations Centers. Follow-up
inspections are conducted shortly after implementation of emergency
measures to ensure the regulated entities are fully compliant. As
appropriate, TSA's Office of Global Strategies (OGS) will deploy its
inspectors again to conduct further follow-up. As part of OGS' regular
compliance schedule, inspections are conducted in accordance with the
risk-based methodology established by the Office of Global Strategies,
which determines frequency of visits based on various factors, to
include: Frequency of flights out of a particular location, security
concerns at the last point of departure or other intelligence-driven
factors.
Question 7. Mr.Terrell, if an LPD airport fails an assessment and
neither the airport or host government can absorb the cost associated
with correcting the cause of failure, what happens to the airport?
Is the air carrier responsible for the costs?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office
of Global Strategies (OGS) will work with the appropriate authorities
in the host country to address and properly mitigate any identified
security deficiencies through training, instruction, or capacity
development where resources and political partnership will allow. If
the assessment of the last-point-of-departure airport results in
significant findings which indicate that a condition exists that
threatens the safety and security of aviation transportation to or from
that airport, the Secretary of Homeland Security in coordination with
the Secretary of State have the ability to determine whether further
Secretarial action is warranted. Secretarial action may include: 90-day
action to give the host country time to improve security measures;
public notification; imposition of operating authority conditions; or
suspension of service for applicable air carriers operating to/from
that location. In locations where resources do not facilitate the
ability of the host country to absorb the cost of improving security
measures, it may be incumbent upon air carriers operating from that
location to absorb costs associated with meeting TSA-issued security
directives and emergency amendments.
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