[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-135]
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S NUCLEAR
DETERRENT MODERNIZATION PLANS AND BUDGETS: THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 14, 2016
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
20-822 WASHINGTON : 2017
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Haney, ADM Cecil D., USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command...... 4
Klotz, Lt Gen Frank, USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration........................................ 1
Rand, Gen Robin, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command 5
Scher, Hon. Robert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy,
Plans, and Capabilities, Department of Defense................. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces................... 42
Haney, ADM Cecil D........................................... 58
Klotz, Lt Gen Frank.......................................... 44
Rand, Gen Robin.............................................. 74
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 39
Scher, Hon. Robert........................................... 52
Documents Submitted for the Record:
By Mr. Cooper:
Henry Kissinger-Brent Scowcroft op ed...................... 94
By Mr. Franks:
Statements on the importance of the LRSO................... 96
By Mr. Garamendi:
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry article.......... 100
Ranking Member Adam Smith article.......................... 98
By Mr. Rogers:
Letter to Secretary of Defense Carter from Senators........ 92
President Obama letter to Senator Alexander................ 91
President Obama message to Senate.......................... 89
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Zinke.................................................... 105
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Aguilar.................................................. 118
Mr. Cooper................................................... 111
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 115
Mr. Rogers................................................... 109
Dr. Wenstrup................................................. 119
PRESIDENT OBAMA'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT MODERNIZATION PLANS AND BUDGETS:
THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 14, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:33 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. The House Armed Services Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces will come to order. We welcome everybody to
our hearing today. It is a hearing titled, ``President Obama's
Nuclear Modernization Plans and Budgets: The Military
Requirements.''
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here and the
time it took for them to prepare for this hearing. It takes a
lot of time. I know it is aggravating, but it is very helpful
to us. And we really appreciate your service to our country,
but also the time and energy it took to prepare for this
hearing and your making yourself available.
Because of scheduling, we have kind of gotten in a time
crunch. So the ranking member and I have agreed to dispense
with our opening statements. And we would advise the witnesses
that your opening statements will be accepted for the record
and ask each of you if you could spend about 3 minutes just
summarizing the broad text so we can get to the meat of the
hearing, which is really the Q&A.
So our witnesses today are the Honorable Frank Klotz,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the
Honorable Robert Scher, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans and Capabilities; Admiral Cecil Haney,
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and General Robin Rand,
Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command.
And with that, General Klotz, you are recognized for 3
minutes.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Rogers and Mr. Cooper can
be found in the Appendix beginning on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
General Klotz. Thank you Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the nuclear modernization program. This
committee's leadership and its steadfast support for nuclear
security enterprise have been vital to the Nation's ability to
maintain a credible deterrent and a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal.
The nuclear deterrent is a foundational capability of U.S.
national security. Although it has been decades since the end
of the Cold War, our nuclear enterprise continues to play an
essential role in preventing conflict and deterring attacks
upon the United States, our Armed Forces, and our allies and
friends, in an increasingly complex and unpredictable
international environment.
We must, therefore, maintain nuclear deterrent
capabilities, not only for ourselves, but also for our allies
and partners around the world. As NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] reaffirmed just last week in its Warsaw Summit
Communique, and I quote, ``The strategic forces of the
Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the
supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.''
Now following direction provided by successive Presidential
budget requests and in congressional legislation, the
Department of Energy and the NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] are currently extending the life of four of the
weapons in our stockpile and modernizing the facilities and
infrastructure at our national security laboratories and
production plants.
The scope, budgets, and schedules of the LEP [life
extension program], the infrastructure modernization, and the
DOD [Department of Defense] delivery systems have been fully
integrated and coordinated in a tightly coupled plan.
As a result of consistent funding provided by Congress and
the significant improvements NNSA has made in program
management over the past 2 years, all of our LEPs are on
schedule and within budget.
However, we are long overdue for an updated, smaller, safer
complex that will meet military requirements. I can think of no
obstacle that poses a greater risk to the long-term success of
our work than the current state of NNSA's aging infrastructure.
To address immediate mission needs, we have begun major
investments in the capabilities identified in the Nuclear
Posture Review, including building a new uranium processing
facility in Tennessee and replacing the chemical and metallurgy
research building at Los Alamos in New Mexico.
We are also pursuing third-party financing and public-
private partnerships to complement traditional line item
capital construction projects as a faster, and in some cases,
more effective and efficient means of providing appropriately
sized and modernized facilities for our 21st century operations
and workforce.
We believe greater use of such approaches should continue
to be aggressively explored, and we appreciate this committee's
strong endorsement of that view.
In closing, America's nuclear deterrent remains a
foundational capability for the security of the United States
and its allies. NNSA will continue to assure the stockpile
remains safe, secure, and effective without nuclear explosive
testing. But achieving our plans for tomorrow's stockpile
requires adequate resources, balanced investments, and a
constancy of purpose.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you this
afternoon, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in
the Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Rogers. Great.
No pressure, Mr. Scher. You are recognized for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT SCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Scher. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today, and I will dive right in.
President Obama's approach to reducing nuclear dangers has
consistently included two key pillars: working toward a world
without nuclear weapons, and maintaining effective deterrence
along the way.
Because we cannot responsibly count on achieving global
disarmament before the U.S. arsenal ages into obsolescence, we
must proceed with modernized replacements to maintain our
nuclear deterrent for us and our allies.
In multiple reviews, the administration concluded that
stable deterrence is best provided by sustaining our nuclear
triad and dual-capable aircraft [DCA]. The triad and DCA
provide the credibility, flexibility, and survivability to meet
and adapt to the challenges of a dynamic security environment
without requiring us to mirror every nuclear weapon systems
others might employ.
The need to sustain effective deterrence and strategic
stability drives the requirement to modernize U.S. nuclear
forces. And we must make investments now to have replacements
ready when needed.
Contrary to frequent mischaracterizations, we are not
spending a trillion dollars on nuclear modernization. The
modernization costs, spread over 20 years, will be an estimated
$350 billion to $450 billion.
While not a small amount of money, as you know, the total
defense budget in fiscal year 2016 alone was over $580 billion.
The cost for nuclear modernization is substantial, but it is
not unreasonable for what Secretary Carter has called the
bedrock of our security.
Our modernization plan is also consistent with the
President's Prague agenda. It directly supports U.S.
nonproliferation and disarmament objectives by enabling
reductions in our arsenal while continuing to assure allies
that they do not need their own nuclear capabilities.
Claims that U.S. modernization signals a nuclear arms
buildup or a renewed arms race do not fairly characterize our
activities and those of other countries.
Recapitalizing the triad will preserve existing military
capabilities for preventing both large-scale and limited
nuclear attacks, even as threats evolve. To deter massive
nuclear attack, the United States must maintain a force that is
invulnerable to a disarming first strike.
Strategic stability requires a solid foundation that is not
susceptible to any single point of failure, and each leg of the
triad makes its own unique and critical contributions.
While a massive nuclear strike would bring the greatest
devastation imaginable, the more acute threat might be a
limited attack aimed at coercing, rather than destroying, the
United States or its allies.
An adversary faced with losing a war of aggression might
use a small number of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or
allies in an attempt to force capitulation. Our unwavering
commitment to the security of our allies should make it clear
that this would be a grave miscalculation destined to fail.
Nuclear deterrence and disarmament share the same ultimate
goal of reducing the risk of nuclear war. As we continue to
work towards a world without nuclear weapons, effective nuclear
deterrence is an imperative we must not ignore.
Thank you and this committee's support for that effort.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scher can be found in the
Appendix on page 52.]
Mr. Rogers. Admiral Haney, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ADM CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
COMMAND
Admiral Haney. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, and distinguished members of this committee. I
am honored to be here today, not only to be with these
professionals, but representing all the sailors, soldiers,
airmen, and marines and civilians that provide strategic
deterrence day in and day out.
These professionals represent our most precious resource
and deserve our unwavering support. As a result of their
efforts today, our Nation's strategic nuclear deterrence force
remains safe, secure, and effective and ready, and strategic
stability is sustained.
That said, our capabilities as a whole have lasted well
beyond their designed service life. And it is crucial that we
modernize our strategic deterrence capabilities, which underpin
our national and global security.
You know the threat. You have had many briefs, including
with me, over countries like Russia, China, North Korea, in
their pursuit associated with nuclear capabilities.
Comprehensive strategic deterrence and assurance and
escalation control require a long-term approach, and it is far
more than just nuclear weapons and platforms.
The President's budget for 2017 provides a great balance
between national priorities, fiscal realities, and begins to
reduce some of the risks we have accumulated because of
deferred maintenance, sustainment, and modernization. This
budget supports my mission requirements.
But let me be clear, there are no margin to absorb new
risk. When you look at our triads, we must move forward with
replacement programs for our intercontinental ballistic missile
programs.
The Ohio replacement program is my number one priority, due
to the fact that we already have a degradation in that
capability over some years due to delays in execution of that
program.
Similarly, our bombers provide us the air-delivered nuclear
weapons, which offer unique strategic deterrence value
associated with air capability that provides both strategic and
extended deterrence. And our stockpile is safe, secure, and
effective, but it is the oldest it has been.
And as a result, we need to continue to move forward life
extension programs and our strategy called the 3+2 warhead
strategy. That is a long-term approach.
At the end of the day, we must ensure that no nuclear-armed
adversary can think that they can escalate their way out of a
failed conflict. They must perceive that restraint is the best
course of action.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Haney can be found in
the Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Admiral Haney.
General Rand, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF GEN ROBIN RAND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE GLOBAL
STRIKE COMMAND
General Rand. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
members of the subcommittee, as I complete my inaugural year as
the commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, thank you for
allowing me to appear with my United States Strategic Command
boss, Admiral Haney, to represent our striker airmen.
As you know, Air Force Global Strike Command was created to
provide a focus on the stewardship and operations of two legs
of our Nation's nuclear triad while also accomplishing the
conventional global strike mission. A key to our continued
success will be our ability to modernize, sustain, and
recapitalize our forces.
Therefore, it is imperative we be flexible enough to
operate seamlessly in a world that continues to rapidly change.
Potential adversaries continue extensive, some claim
unprecedented, modernization efforts across the full spectrum
of their nuclear capabilities.
Therefore, Air Force Global Strike Command's mission set
needs to continue to evolve and grow as we strive to provide
highly effective combat forces to our Nation's combatant
commanders.
Hence, my focus is to make sure Air Force Global Strike
Command is rightsized with our manpower and resources, while
balancing necessary modernization and recapitalization
programs.
I look forward to addressing any questions you have about
our modernization plans for the Minuteman III ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] system, our bomber fleet,
the air-launched cruise missile, the UH-1N helicopter, our
current B61 weapon series, our nuclear weapon storage areas,
and our nuclear command and control communications weapon
system.
Finally, I am prepared to offer my opinion on the
consequences to our Nation's and our allies' security if these
already long-overdue modernization efforts are not carried out
according to their scheduled timelines.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee to highlight the need for modernization across Air
Force Global Strike Command. I stand ready to address your
questions.
[The prepared statement of General Rand can be found in the
Appendix on page 74.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
Thank all of you for your outstanding statements. I want to
start the questioning.
Admiral Haney, I want to ask you about the overarching
strategic picture in the national security environment that our
nuclear forces are operating within and trend lines that you
see right now.
You have been doing this a long time. And as deputy
commander of Strategic Command around the time when our current
nuclear consensus was forged in the Strategic Posture
Commission, the Nuclear Posture Review, the New START
[Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, and the commitment to
President Obama's nuclear modernization plan.
So you have seen where we were in 2009 and certainly have a
good sense of where we are now, and I think where we are
heading, based on the conversations I have had with you.
So give us your professional military opinion. What do you
see as the trend lines in our national security and our
strategic picture since 2009? And are things getting better or
worse?
Admiral Haney. Chairman, thank you for the question. You
know, as I look over this time period, and it is unfortunate
that we see where our relationship with Russia has occurred,
starting with that as one of our five challenges you often hear
us talk about, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent
extremists.
Russia has not only modernized a lot of their capability in
terms of the nuclear part of the business, that includes not
just silo base intercontinental ballistic missiles. They also
have mobile base intercontinental ballistic missiles, which
means they can move them around--harder to find.
They also have modernized their submarine program. They are
continuing to do so. And they have also modernized some of
their air capability, and continue to do so, including air-
launched cruise missiles, both conventional and nuclear
variants.
Russia has been working on modernizing both conventional
and nuclear capability, as well as cyber and counterspace
capability. And capability is one thing. It is what they do
with it and how they talk about it is just the other thing.
The other piece that has changed is the provocative nature
of statements that have been made by Russian leaders associated
with that. And the display of their capabilities, such as long-
range strategic aircraft flights in other areas around the
world without transponders on and those kind of things, what I
would say is other provocative kind of actions that when you
add them all together it is not in a good place.
And I am hopeful that that will improve, associated with
our whole-of-government efforts, which is a big part of
deterrence going forward. But that is Russia.
China, while you are looking at some of the activity in the
South China Sea, has also been a country that has also
developed and modernized their nuclear and strategic
capabilities in the same areas: nuclear, space, and cyber. And
in particular in the nuclear piece, they are not as
transparent.
When you look at Russia and the United States, we have the
associated treaties, such as New START treaty, that allow us
transparency and visibility, which is a good thing in terms of
those weapons that come under that treaty.
It doesn't cover all the nonstrategic nuclear weapons that
Russia has, but in China's case, we don't have such a thing. So
we don't have the transparency, in terms of not just what they
have but in the direction in which they are going.
And then, of course, North Korea has been in the news quite
a bit here in terms of their aspirations and associated tests,
both nuclear tests, missile tests, and what have you. Even
recent at-sea tests that shows that piece. Those are the things
that I have seen specifically change.
In Iran's case, of course, having the Joint Agreement there
has put a change, in my opinion, in the other direction by at
least giving us leverage and also some visibility in terms of
what is going on in that nation.
While they still have other activities, a lot of testing
going on with missile programs and what have you, from a
nuclear standpoint there is a mechanism now. And that piece is
different as well.
So in the balance of things going through those particular
areas in a succinct manner, clearly in an unclassified form,
but it is something that we have to balance in terms of
maintaining strategic stability, given those directions and
developments that those nations have been after.
Mr. Rogers. Well, thank you. As you and I have discussed,
there are some outside advocacy groups who have been calling
for changes in our nuclear programs and policies, as well as
our modernization plans. More specifically, there is discussion
and pressure on this administration to either delay or cancel
the LRSO [long-range standoff weapon] and GBSD [ground-based
strategic deterrent]. Can you share your thoughts on whether
that would be a wise course of action or not?
Admiral Haney. First, I would say here, as I mentioned in
my opening statement, I am very pleased with the President's
budget for 2017 that is over here, in terms of meeting the
direction and efforts here to modernize where we need to, not
just the nuclear weapons, but all the way through the national
nuclear command and control capabilities, sensing apparatus,
and what have you.
From my perspective, we need to modernize those things, and
the future for our intercontinental ballistic missile program
is very important. So moving forward with ground-based
strategic deterrent, GBSD as we call it, is paramount in terms
of the capabilities we need for that part of the triad.
And from an air leg, you mentioned the long-range standoff
cruise missile. That missile, too, is very important in terms
of having an effective air leg.
In order to have comprehensive deterrence, this requires us
to have a complex problem for an adversary. And consequently, I
would say today we really need to make sure our triad is a
credible capability. Not just today, but well in the future,
and that is why those programs are so important.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
General Rand, the same question. But I would ask, in
addition to discussing whether you think it is wise to postpone
or delay or to terminate the LRSO or GBSD, these same advocacy
groups are arguing that in the alternative--and I make the
reference because you made reference to it in your opening
statement--that we should instead just try to further upgrade
or modernize the Minuteman III. So share your thoughts on
those----
General Rand. Yes, sir. Well, I welcome that opportunity. I
would break it down into two areas. I would look at weapon
systems, and there are two issues I am concerned with,
reliability and survivability. In reliability, we get the
greatest vote in that. In survivability, enemy and potential
adversaries have a vote in that.
Our current systems today are becoming increasingly
difficult to remain reliable. They are getting old. And it is
harder. And certainly, with the enemy's vote in the increasing
A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial] environment that we are going
to be operating in if we use nuclear weapons and/or our
conventional weapons, it is much more difficult.
And so GBSD and LRSO, in my opinion, are very, very
important that we go to that so that we can make sure that if
we ever use these weapons as intended, we have a high
probability of success that they will hit their intended
target. And so delaying those would be of great concern to me.
Mr. Rogers. What about the efficacy of just upgrading the
Minuteman III as opposed to replacing the GBSD?
General Rand. Sir, I think that is unwise. I think that for
many reasons the Minuteman III now is coming up on its 50th
year in service. It is difficult. There are efficiencies to be
gained with a new system. A lot of efficiencies with manpower,
with command and control, with the reliability, and certainly
then the survivability aspect of that weapon.
And from a cost savings, I know we talked about there will
be some costs associated with this, but over the life span of
the program we will make a lot of efficiencies that will start
getting return on the dollar when we go to this in terms of
manpower, the maintenance requirements and the command and
control of our facilities that we have. So there is a lot of
benefits that will come with that over the course of the life
span.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
The Chair recognizes the ranking member for any questions
he may have.
Mr. Cooper. I, too, would like to welcome the distinguished
witnesses, and I will be very brief. I have two questions on
topics that are coming up in conference.
First, Admiral Haney, is there any military requirement to
keep the W84 cruise missile warhead that has been slated for
dismantlement prior to 2009--that had been slated for dismantle
prior to 2009?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Cooper, I don't. You know, once
a piece goes into the retirement listing, they are--to me, it
is ready for disposal. And those associated weapons, like a
W84, that are there, to my mind, should be disposed of.
The only savings of, you know, as we look at our inactive
stockpile as a whole, is to ensure we have the requisite parts
and pieces, if you will, in case we have a technical or a
geopolitical issue. But the W84 it is not one of those from my
standpoint.
I would think it may be good to ask General Klotz some of
the question from an NNSA perspective.
Mr. Cooper. General Klotz, do you have a viewpoint on that?
General Klotz. Mr. Cooper, are we going to have a
classified session after this? Is that still----
Mr. Cooper. Yes.
General Klotz. I would like to take that to a classified
session, if I could.
Mr. Cooper. General Klotz and Admiral Haney, regarding the
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] that the House
passed, the provision regarding restricting dismantlement, what
are the consequences for the life extension programs if we
restrict dismantlements the way the House-passed NDAA suggests?
Does that also have to be held for classified?
General Klotz. No, that doesn't. I would be very happy to
address that, Congressman Cooper. As you know, the
administration had requested in the President's fiscal year
2017 budget request that we increase the funding available for
dismantlement.
We have been spending roughly about $50 million a year to
do dismantlement, which involves largely disassembly work at
the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, and the Y-12 Plant in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee. We wanted to increase that to $67 million to
accelerate the process by which weapons that have already
retired, are already in the dismantlement queue, would be
dismantled.
Part of it was to live up to a pledge that Secretary of
State Kerry made at the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review
Conference in New York last year, that we would accelerate
dismantlement.
We also saw it as an advantage in the sense that, one, it
would allow us to hire a lot more technicians at both Pantex
and at Y-12. We estimated about 30 to 40 at Pantex and about
half that amount at Y-12.
Now, while those people would initially be trained to do
dismantlement, in order to do that work they would have to get
the necessary security clearances and some of the basic skills
associated with working with nuclear weapons so that we could
also, at some point, use them for other key and critical work
associated with life extension programs, surveillance, and
other sorts of things.
So we continue to think that that is an important thing for
the country to do. And it is an important thing for NNSA to be
able to do.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair recognizes the gentlemen from
Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also thank you
for holding this hearing. And I thank all of you for how you
are serving our country.
There is a lot of chatter out there from some disarmament
advocates pushing a no-first-use policy. However, President
Obama considered and rejected that type of policy in both the
2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2013 nuclear employment
guidance.
So, Secretary Scher, do you agree that before we would ever
adopt--and I would hope we wouldn't--but before we would ever
adopt a no-first-use policy, we would want to consult with
allies like NATO allies or Asian allies such as Japan and South
Korea?
Mr. Scher. Certainly. I think there is no question that one
of the key pieces to our declaratory policy is not just
deterrence against conflict with the U.S., but protection of
our allies. And hence, I would imagine and could not imagine
that we could change the policy without talking to our allies
and friends who would be affected by this.
Mr. Lamborn. And there are no such discussions taking place
currently?
Mr. Scher. No such official discussions are taking place.
There has been no decision within the administration to change
the no-first-use policy.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. That is reassuring.
Admiral Haney, when the Nuclear Posture Review says that
the U.S., quote, ``Will work to establish conditions under
which such a policy, the no first use policy, could be safely
adopted,'' unquote, has the U.S. come any closer to achieving
those kinds of conditions that would allow for a safe adoption
of a no-first-use policy?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, in terms of the conditions that
would be required, I am not at a good position to list what
those are here in this open hearing. I would just say that we
know the current policy has served us well over many years and
that it will get--you know, if there is some movement to change
that, that would require some scrutiny to make sure we are not
going to impact strategic stability at large by such a move.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, then could you then comment on how such
a policy, were it ever to be adopted, would be a limit on a
future Commander in Chief in maybe an unacceptable way?
Admiral Haney. Well, I would just generalize and say that,
you know, as I look at part of my job as commander of Strategic
Command and what I am responsible for in developing plans and
what have you, the real key for me is making sure I can
maximize Presidential decision space and options. So that is
sort of the approach that I would put globally to most of these
things.
Mr. Lamborn. And what would be your best military
professional advice regarding whether the U.S. should adopt a
no-first-use policy or not?
Admiral Haney. Well, given the earlier question that
Chairman Rogers asked associated with where our strategic
conditions around the globe, that I outlined, I would want to
ensure that we had some serious deliberations in terms of
trying to balance how that would help, if you were to change
that, in terms of its impact on strategic stability.
So, you know, I only have a personal advice in this regard
that we need to be very careful given the directions and
developments that we see around the world, that we do
everything in our power to maintain strategic stability.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And would anyone else care to comment on
the desirability or lack of desirability for a no-first-use
policy?
Secretary Scher.
Mr. Scher. I think the decision was carefully considered a
number of times, as you noted. And I think the administration
currently feels very comfortable with where that is.
Of course, this President and any future President should
always take a look at the environment, understand what
capabilities we bring to deterrence, what the security
environment looks like, and one would hope that any decision
would be made based on what increases our strategic stability.
And certainly this President could make a decision one way
or the other, as he already has up to this point. And a future
President will also want to, I would assume, look at all those
conditions and make a determination for him or herself.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you all for your answers.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the hearing. And gentlemen, thank you for all of your service,
your thoughtful action and work on these issues. I want to get
a couple of numbers out of the way right away.
Mr. Scher, you said the total cost over 20 years is $350
billion to $450 billion. And the Congressional Budget Office
says that for the next 10 years, it is $348 billion. These
numbers don't quite coincide.
Could you further explain why you made the 20-year estimate
at a range that might even be lower than the 10-year estimate
from the Congressional Budget Office?
Mr. Scher. Sure, Congressman. I can't speak to the CBO's
numbers. The $350 billion to $450 billion is what we believe,
and, you know, we have to make estimates at some point when we
are looking out that far, over the course of 20 years, it will
take to recapitalize the three legs of the triad.
So what it takes to modernize each one of the legs. That
includes things such as the Ohio replacement program submarine,
LRSO, the GBSD replacement of the Minuteman, and also the B-21.
So it is those particular modernization acquisition programs.
Mr. Garamendi. Does that also include the weapons----
Mr. Scher. It includes----
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. Like bombs and----
Mr. Scher [continuing]. It includes the deliveries. It does
not include the warheads.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. I think what we need here, because
there are obviously some significant difference in estimates,
and for some time we have been asking for serious estimates
beyond the 10 years. And apparently you have that available. So
if you could make that available to us it would be helpful
because this is an ongoing debate as to what this is going to
cost.
Mr. Scher. And we have had this conversation before, and I
will go back to look at it and providing as clear----
Mr. Garamendi. Well, sure.
Mr. Scher [continuing]. The greatest clarity as I can from
the people who do the budget.
Mr. Garamendi. No, you just said that you just gave us
great--you----
Mr. Scher. And I can defend the $100 million difference,
the estimates.
Mr. Garamendi. Yes. Well, we will give it to you in
writing. And if you would please respond in as great as detail
as you have available that would be helpful.
Mr. Scher. Of course.
Mr. Garamendi. In your testimony you also talked about to
deter massive nuclear attack the United States must maintain a
force that is invulnerable to disarming strength. What is that
force? Is it all of it or is it part of it?
Mr. Scher. So it needs to be invulnerable to disarming
strike.
Mr. Garamendi. ``Invulnerable to a disarming strike.''
Mr. Scher. Right. So the concept behind the statement is
the idea that we do not want to have an arsenal that any of our
potential adversaries would think that they can get rid of,
that they can eliminate on their own in a first strike.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So therefore in your view each of the
three legs of the triad is vulnerable----
Mr. Scher. I would----
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. To a first strike. Is that
correct?
Mr. Scher. The submarine force, currently I would ask the
operational folks to weigh in, but I think some are more
vulnerable than others. Certainly there are known locations for
certain pieces. There are unknown for others.
Mr. Garamendi. And Admiral Haney, are the submarines
vulnerable to a first strike, all of them, part of them, new,
old?
Admiral Haney. Congressman Garamendi, the only time a
submarine is vulnerable is when it is in port.
[Laughter.]
The rest of the time when it is underway it is underwater,
stealth conditions, not vulnerable.
Mr. Garamendi. But is it not our strategy to always have
more than one underway?
Admiral Haney. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Therefore they are not vulnerable to a first
strike?
Admiral Haney. That is correct. We----
Mr. Garamendi. How does that work, Mr. Scher, from your
statement? Don't answer. That is just rhetoric on my part.
I think the rest of this should be in closed session, so we
will go there. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State
of Alabama, home of the 2016 national football champions, Mo
Brooks for any questions he may have.
Mr. Brooks. I love that introduction.
Secretary Scher, this committee has heard that the
administration is considering extending the New START treaty
with Russia for an additional 5 years, even though the treaty
limits don't even take effect until 2018 and don't expire until
2021.
So this would be extending a treaty 5 years early and
pushing expiration out until 2026, which is beyond the limit of
the next President's two possible terms. If true, this action
drastically limits the options for the next two Presidential
terms.
For instance, he or she would have no leverage to get
Russia to include its vast stockpile of tactical nuclear
weapons in an arms control regime. Reducing the number of
Russia's thousands of tactical nuclear weapons must be a
priority as the Senate said when it ratified the New START
treaty.
Russia's conduct under Mr. Putin is remarkable, violating
the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty in multiple
ways, failing to comply with prohibitions on chemical and
biological weapons, invading and annexing parts of the Ukraine,
threatening NATO with nuclear weapons. The list is long.
Tell me, is the Obama administration going to seek to
extend the New START treaty before its term is up in January?
Mr. Scher. So Congressman, I do not know the answer of
whether or not that the administration will make that
determination. Certainly it is an option that is given in the
treaty, but it is also not something that must be taken up.
Mr. Brooks. Who in your judgment would know the answer to
that question?
Mr. Scher. In the end it will be the President that gets to
make a determination of whether or not he believes it is in the
United States interest to extend the treaty as allowed for in
the treaty.
Mr. Brooks. Anyone between you and the President who would
also have knowledge of that and have the answer?
Mr. Scher. There are ongoing discussions, as you have
heard, but I really am not at liberty to talk about ongoing
discussions before decisions have been made.
Mr. Brooks. We know that the Obama administration had the
Intelligence Community put together a National Intelligence
Estimate [NIE] prior to the New START treaty. This is standard
practice so we know what we are getting into. Has the National
Intelligence Estimate been put together for a possible
extension to the treaty?
Mr. Scher. I don't know that one has. I will tell you,
however, that the Intelligence Community is consulted before
any decision of any type like this, whether or not tasked in a
formal NIE or not.
Mr. Brooks. Secretary Scher, let me move to a separate but
very much related topic. The rumor mill is swirling, which is
often the case on Capitol Hill, thanks to the small in number
but very vocal disarmament advocates in Washington. You can
help us put a rumor to rest.
In December of last year Under Secretary of State Rose
Gottemoeller testified to our subcommittee that the
administration would not seek a prohibition on nuclear testing
through a United Nations Security Council resolution. There has
been talk of pursuing that avenue to skirt the United States
Senate, which is unlikely to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty any time soon.
Under Secretary Gottemoeller said to a suggestion that they
might pursue that option, quote, ``I have been in constant
battle with our NGO [non-governmental organization] colleagues
over this issue. We do not agree with this notion,'' end quote.
And when asked for assurance that this would be pursued she
responded, quote, ``Correct,'' end quote.
Can you assure us again that this path is not being
considered and will not be pursued by the administration?
Mr. Scher. Again, I can't disclose what is going on, but I
can assure you that there is--understanding I was coming before
you and thinking this might come up I actually talked to the
Under Secretary Rose Gottemoeller and she assured me that there
is nothing that she is thinking of. She stands by the
statement--that would take away the prerogative of the Senate
for ratifying treaties.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Scher.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State
of Washington, Mr. Larsen, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Home of the 2015 rowing champions, the
University of Washington Huskies.
[Laughter.]
Maybe we don't play football as well as you down there in
Alabama, but it is not the only sport, believe it or not.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Scher, you might know that some of the
conversation that we have in this committee, especially on this
side of the aisle, goes to the affordability of the
modernization.
And in your testimony you, in your written testimony, said
that the trillion-dollar number is a mischaracterization. And I
guess my question to you, though, is where do you think it
comes from, first?
Second, if after 20 years you are at $450 billion and then
we really start to spend money over those next 10 years, I can
see a world, in my mind, where there is a trillion dollars over
the next 30 years. I don't know that I will be here. I know you
won't be here, sitting here.
[Laughter.]
Maybe somewhere else, but not sitting here perhaps.
So in your view where does this come from? Because the main
issue, and General Rand in his verbal testimony at the end
basically invited us to ask him. And you are great. I like you,
but basically invited us to ask you how great nuclear
modernization is.
I think it is great. It is greatly expensive as well. And
the debate is less about whether or not it is needed.
It is more about you are leaving us a gigantic obligation,
what everyone loves, but if I go to the Readiness Subcommittee
they have got everything they love over there. Or they have
things they love. And we go to the other subcommittees they
have got things they love, too.
And pretty soon we don't have a $580 billion defense
budget. It will be much larger because everybody gets what they
love and they don't want us to make any choices.
So what are you going to--the number comes from and what
are you all doing to convince, well, maybe not all of us, but
certainly me that you are prioritizing at all? Because I don't
think that you are.
Mr. Scher. So thank you, Congressman. I can't tell you
where the number comes from. Obviously it is a big number and
it makes a splash, and I think, you know, depending on how you
want to calculate costs for how long, you can get to any number
of numbers that you wish.
What I know of is that the modernization piece is what I
said. And again, it is a pretty big range given that we have so
much uncertainty out into the out-years, which is why it is
hard for us to always pin this down.
There also are additional costs no doubt. One of the costs
is the weapons themselves, the warheads. One of the costs is
sustaining these pieces, the operations and maintenance piece.
So I am sure you can piece together many different expenses on
this.
And, you know, all of these are known for today but not
known for tomorrow. For example, fiscal year 2017 sustainment
of our force is approximately $12 billion a year. That is for
the entire force.
One would imagine, and what acquisition people tell me is
when you have a new system it actually costs you less to
maintain, although overall costs will go up as well.
So I don't know what that number is going to look like out
in the future, but that is sort of another piece to the cost is
those sustainment costs.
In terms of affordability, I have said it before and I will
be forced to repeat it, it is about prioritization. We in the
Department of Defense feel that this is such a critical mission
that we must prioritize it at the top and that in fact we will
look to take risk elsewhere because it is so important that
fundamentally we have nuclear deterrence covered appropriately.
And we believe, and the administration has determined, that the
triad is the best way of doing that.
It does mean that there are costs in other places, and we
always present what we have as a budget that is balanced. It
gives me the opportunity to say that sequestration would, of
course, throw almost all of this up into the air and to great
risk across the board.
So we hope that we can get out of the situation where we
are worried about a $100 billion cut based on sequestration
that we had not programmed for and would have to go back and
take a look at the full range. But even then, your priorities
are affordable if they are your top priorities.
Mr. Larsen. Well, I guess, I have got, you know, 30-some
seconds left. And maybe the problem is with the committee
because this subcommittee thinks we are first among equals in
the money we should get and the other six believe that as well.
But, you know, we don't have that debate. Everyone avoids
that debate on this committee, on the whole committee, that
everybody does get what they want.
But if we are the first among equals and what I heard you
say at the top of the Department, there is a commitment to the
nuclear modernization. You didn't say first and foremost, but
you almost said it. Then maybe we need to get there, too, but I
don't know that we will.
You know, I have been on this committee 16 years and I
always said before the most dangerous thing to give the
Department is everything it wants because there are no
priorities. And the second most is not giving it enough because
then you are not doing all the right things. And we haven't
found that balance here.
So happy vacation, committee.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Utah, Chairman
Bishop, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Bishop. I don't get any State accolades here?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rogers. Oh, the great State of Utah, home of the Utes.
How is that?
Mr. Bishop. That is good enough. That is good enough.
General Rand----
Mr. Larsen. PAC-12 baseball champions.
Mr. Rogers. What is a Ute, by the way?
Mr. Larsen. PAC-12 baseball champions, Rob.
Mr. Rogers. National baseball champions.
Mr. Larsen. PAC-12----
Mr. Bishop. Thank you. They are still the Utes, yes.
General Rand and Admiral Haney, I appreciate you being
here. Let me--help me make sure I have got this right. The Air
Force did conduct an analysis of alternatives on the ground-
based strategic deterrent program.
And as I understand, you looked at a simple life extension
of the current Minuteman III and the results were--and I think
I got out of it you wouldn't actually save any money. And
secondly that the military effectiveness requirements would not
be there, assuming the adversary continues on their present
defensive capability improvements.
So let me ask you, General and then Admiral, why won't this
actually save money? Why won't it meet military requirements?
General Rand. Sir, when we looked at the life extension
over a 50-year period, which is fair to look at for a Minuteman
III, the study revealed it would be in a--$160 billion.
For the GBSD as we are working our requirements and what we
feel our best gouge in our analysis is we can do that same
period of time at $159 billion and then the efficiencies we
will gain in terms of manpower saving, security forces, the
command and control, the reduction in some of the facilities
that we need, not having to go out and do the maintenance on
some of the launch control centers that we have to do, there
will be in that same period of time additional savings.
Again, you know, writing checks that you can't cash yet,
but we are thinking up to $20 billion over that same period of
time.
Mr. Bishop. All right. And the second----
General Rand. And the GBSD----
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Part of that was if you just
simply extend the Minuteman III. That does not meet our defense
capabilities, right?
General Rand. No, sir. And what that doesn't do, the
Minuteman III, and this is my key point is it doesn't address
the survivability piece. If that weapon is used and if we are
not willing to use it then why have it? If that weapon is used
to be a deterrent for this Nation, then it needs to have a high
probability that it will get to the target that it is intended
for.
Mr. Bishop. All right. Well, thank you.
And Admiral, let me ask a slightly different question then
because I think you got the answer right there. If the
Minuteman III then is advanced in aging and we stick to the
current schedule for the GBSD program, what would be the
consequences if that GBSD program then is delayed?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, if that program is delayed it
really puts one leg of the triad at significant risk as we go
forward from, as was stated, from a reliability standpoint as
well as we continue to test, which we have to.
And very important as the system matures to keep your
testing program under way, that the number of missile bodies
that we will have will also go below my requirements. And then
finally we have age-out problem associated with the rocket
engines themselves as we go forward.
So when you add all that together it puts the strategic
stability and our deterrence capability at significant risk if
we were to lose a leg of the triad like that.
Mr. Bishop. Okay.
And then let me go to Secretary Scher if I could. We still
have not seen a request for proposals [RFP] for the first phase
of this program, even though I think this committee was assured
that that was going to happen in April.
Why do we continue to see a delay in Milestone A decisions
to proceed with this program, if indeed that is such an
important element to do that?
Mr. Scher. The Department of Defense and the acquisition
side that is looking at this continues to go through this
process. They are looking to get out an RFP after the DAB
[Defense Acquisition Board] in Milestone A, which I am told is
in early August.
And the acquisition professionals I spoke to said that they
believe this is along lines with normal practice, but are
absolutely looking to move this forward as soon as possible.
And we have money in the budget to go forward with this when we
get through Milestone A.
Mr. Bishop. So they recognize that this was scheduled to be
done in April and what is this now, almost August. And it might
be done in August.
Mr. Scher. Yes, Congressman.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Bishop. Well, it seems to me that there is some holdup
in a desk at maybe the Under Secretary for AT&L [Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics]. Is that basically what is going on?
Mr. Scher. Honestly, sir, there is a reason I am not an
acquisition professional. And I don't know the answer to that.
But they have told me that they are moving forward and expect
it to be done in August.
Mr. Bishop. Well, you know, this committee is considering
Senate proposals to dismember the AT&L organization, and it
doesn't really help us to support the continued existence when
necessary programs seem to be delayed and not necessarily
appropriately delayed or not having a good reason for it.
And I am over by 7 seconds. I apologize for that. I yield
back to the chairman from the great State of Alabama that does
have a mediocre football team that lost to Utah in the last
bowl game we were together. But other than that----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rogers. Roll Tide.
[Laughter.]
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from the great State
of Louisiana, home of the LSU [Louisiana State University]
Tigers, Dr. Fleming for 5 minutes.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank you
General Rand and Admiral Haney for being here and the others,
General Klotz.
Let us talk about a statement made by former Chief of Staff
General Welsh. He said that if he could comment on the weapon
station facility recapitalization programs in terms of timeline
of what can we expect for the future, General Welsh indicated
that Barksdale Air Force Base would begin in fiscal year 2018
but he later explained to me that the program would slip 1 year
to fiscal year 2019.
So how confident are you that the weapon storage facility
is on track in terms of technical solutions and the budget? And
what do you need from this committee to stay on track?
General Rand. Sir, I will take that one. I think that that
is a very fair question. The complicating factor with the
Barksdale is that the WSF, that is what we will be calling
them, the weapons storage facilities, for bombers is more
complicated than for it is for our ICBMs.
And we didn't want to come out the chute and have Barksdale
be the first one we do----
Dr. Fleming. Yes.
General Rand [continuing]. Because it is going to be more
of a technological challenge for us. And so we wanted to use
the one at Malmstrom first and make sure--not that we would
fail there. We are not going to fail, but that we didn't get in
over our head before we went to Barksdale. And that was the
reason to go to 2019.
We are on track to meet that and there are dollars for
that. It is in the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan]. I am very
confident that is a top priority, why I mentioned in my
statement one of our priorities is the WSF----
Dr. Fleming. Right.
General Rand [continuing]. Recapitalization and
modernization.
Dr. Fleming. Yes.
General Rand. And I will keep you appraised of--you
personally----
Dr. Fleming. Yes.
General Rand [continuing]. I will keep you appraised of any
changes to any timelines.
Dr. Fleming. Yes. I appreciate that and all that is all
very logical. I just wanted to make sure we are on track,
remain on track, and there are no other complicating factors.
Okay.
Again, for Admiral Haney and General Rand, there has been
sufficient discussion as to whether or not the Nation should
build a new nuclear cruise missile. The opponents of the
missile come onto Capitol Hill, other notable officials such as
William Perry argue a cruise missile is destabilizing and
unnecessary.
In Dr. Perry's case he argues that the B-2 bomber anti-
gravity nuclear bomb, the B61, will be, quote, ``around for
decades,'' end quote, to come and ultimately we will see a new
stealth bomber, the B-21, of course, making the standoff
cruiser unnecessary.
So I would like your perspectives whether a small number of
B-2s, which was first made public in 1989 and a new bomber, an
aircraft that hasn't even been built yet, the B-21, will be
able to guarantee access to a complex threat environment? And
hopefully should the B-21 be built on time and on budget, will
that new aircraft entirely eliminate the need for a standoff
capability?
General Rand. Sir, I will take the first crack at it and
then I will defer to my boss. It is my humble opinion and I
think to address that question you have to answer why do we
need a long-range standoff weapon.
Well, whether it is the current ALCM [air-launched cruise
missile] or the LRSO and so there are several good reasons why
you want to have standoff capability. One is survivability
again.
Dr. Fleming. Yes.
General Rand. You don't want to get into the eye of the
tiger if you can avoid it. It gives the President flexibility.
It gives crews flexibility. It causes the enemy targeting
challenges.
It allows you to not go as far with your bombers, not need
the same amount of tankers. There are a lot of efficiencies. So
when you address why do you need standoff, I think it is fairly
indisputable.
So then you go why do we need an LRSO then? As you said so
well, the B-21 will start being delivered in the mid-2020s,
will continue delivering those into the 2030s and 2040s.
The B-52, which is solely reliant on the ALCM right now,
the air-launched cruise missile, is going to be with us for a
long time. And that is the weapon of choice for that. And that
would significantly hinder my boss here in his targeting
requirements that he has as a STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command]
commander.
Dr. Fleming. Sure.
General Rand. And the ALCM is aged out. It is a 10-year
missile that is in its 30th year. It is having difficulties
maintaining its reliability. But more importantly, the missile
will not be survivable in the ever-increasing A2/AD
environment.
Dr. Fleming. Yes.
General Rand. So if we want that weapon to have a high
probability of hitting the target it is intended for, we need a
new weapon system, a new LRSO. It is not a new concept.
Dr. Fleming. Right.
General Rand. And it is not a new warhead.
Dr. Fleming. Yes.
General Rand. But to get where it needs to go we need to
invest in the LRSO.
Boss, I will defer to you.
Admiral Haney. I would say I echo all of those statements.
First and foremost we have an air-launched cruise missile now
and we would be ill-advised to allow that to just go away and
not have it replaced.
When you look at my capability today and as mentioned, our
B-52s will be around well into the 2040s. And as a result,
they, in order to have a sufficient air leg, not having the B-
52 as part of that would be really, really bad from a
deterrence and strategic stability standpoint.
We have one now and we need to continue to have one to
avoid making a less complex problem for any adversary that may
think they can escalate their way out of a failed conflict. We
want to keep that contained, that restrained is a better
option.
I would also say it is very important to our extended
deterrence commitments as we go forward in terms of having that
kind of capability. So that is what I would add to it. Really
an impact to strategic stability if we lose that portion of our
air leg going forward.
Dr. Fleming. Right. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Coffman [presiding]. Mr. Bridenstine, of Oklahoma.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Scher, I wanted to have you talk for a second
about the triad. I believe that each leg of the triad
complements the other legs of the triad. I have heard many
people suggest that it is redundant, in fact, maybe even some
people on this committee have suggested that.
Would you comment on whether or not you believe it is
complementary or redundant?
Mr. Scher. So certainly this administration has determined
that these are complementary. Certainly there are a lot of
things. There are overlapping capabilities.
Of course, this is what has kept strategic stability for
decades, and I think we all believe that having these
overlapping capabilities to, as Admiral Haney said, change the
calculus and complicate the calculuses of any adversaries, is
in fact, not just redundant but important to the strategic
stability.
Each leg, as you said, has its own particular piece. The
submarines, as noted, are the most survivable of them. The air
leg is one that when generated is the easiest for messaging
because it can be seen. It also is the most important for our
allies that the extended deterrence that they see comes from
those kinds of options as well as with the lower yields of
those weapons.
And as well it is a recallable one until you have actually
launched the weapon. It takes hours for an aircraft to be able
to get to a point where before it would launch and they can be
called back at any time.
Obviously the ICBM force is the most responsive. It has
highly secure command and control. And it strengthens
deterrence by ensuring that the disarming first strike that I
mentioned about isn't possible.
And even if it could, that, you know, they would have to--
there is no such thing as a small operation. They would have to
go in massively to take that out.
So it is all of these interlocking pieces that we believe
and that we have evidence of decades has provided for strategic
stability even in the height of the Cold War, that we believe
needs to be maintained. And that was the determination of the
administration through the Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 and
the implementation review in 2013.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you for that.
Admiral Haney, from a military requirements perspective,
some have criticized President Obama's modernization plan as
an, quote, ``all of the above strategy, seeking to replicate
the Cold War arsenal or even start a new arms race.''
This argument, of course, ignores the 85 percent massive
reduction in our nuclear forces since the Cold War and the
elimination of entire weapon classes, including nuclear
artillery shells, sea-launched cruise missiles, and other types
of weapons.
Admiral Haney, do you believe the administration's
modernization plan reflects a desire to replicate our Cold War
arsenal or start an arms race? Or do you believe that it simply
modernizes systems necessary to execute specific military
requirements and missions of the highest importance?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, I would say no, the plan is not
to build up for some cold war. Quite frankly it is the latter
in the case of having an effective capability in order to
maintain strategic stability, deterrence, assurance, and
escalation control.
And I would say when you look at the categories of things,
warheads significantly reduced, 85 percent since about 1967 to
where we are today, as you have mentioned, but also platforms.
When you look at the Ohio replacement program it is not the
same number of submarines we have today, less tubes than what
have been associated with the design.
So in many categories we are only working to modernize and
retain what we need in order to maintain.
Mr. Bridenstine. So the idea that we are trying to create a
cold war arsenal or start an arms race you would say that is
false?
Admiral Haney. Quite the contrary. False.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. That is good.
Finally, Secretary Scher, from a cost perspective I want to
talk for a second about the cost of modernization and maybe put
it into some perspective.
When you think about nuclear recapitalization and
conventional recapitalization from a, you know, when you think
about the entire defense budget, can you give us some
comparison? What is the--between the two, conventional and
nuclear?
Mr. Scher. Certainly. So nuclear modernization itself as we
are looking is going to be less than 4 percent of the overall
DOD budget. And even at its peak it is about 11 percent of the
total fiscal year 2017 acquisition budget.
So using fiscal year 2017 as a baseline for what the
acquisition budget looks like the peak number would be at about
11 percent of the total. Again, we can't predict what our
budget number, so, you know, that is our best gauge of, if you
will.
But while, again, it is a lot of money but we believe it is
important and it is sustainable.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Great. Thank you.
And General Rand, final question, I heard you earlier. You
mentioned that you made a decision on the best gouge at the
time. Would you share for this committee what gouge is?
General Rand. Oh, I am sorry. It is just our best----
Mr. Bridenstine. And I say that as a Navy pilot who is now
in the Air National Guard.
General Rand. Our best estimate.
Mr. Bridenstine. Your best estimate. Got it. Okay.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Coffman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, gentlemen, and thank you so much
for your dedication and service to our country.
I am not sure who is the best person to answer this
question, but obviously very concerned about Russia and their
focus on nuclear weapons, both strategically and in tactical
nuclear weapons.
And I wonder if one of you could discuss right now their
focus in terms of tactical nuclear weapons and their doctrine
in terms of deployment of those weapons?
Mr. Scher. I think I can. Let me talk from the policy
perspective that we are looking at. I think one of the concerns
we have is the state--certainly just looking at the fact of the
modernization and that is something we can go into in
classified setting.
It is concerning to see that there is clearly--the Russians
are clearly continuing to look at nuclear weapons as a clear
and important part of their arsenal. And they are building it
up both in size and type--not beyond the limits of the new
START agreement, to be clear, but in other areas we certainly
see. And they have violated the INF treaty, for example.
Also of concern is the way they look to--and I think
Secretary Carter said saber-rattling with nuclear weapons. How
they are using them, how they are training with them
extensively and in an increased manner.
And finally there is the idea that is floating around in
the military circles within Russia of the use to escalate to
win a conflict, or escalate to de-escalate is often how it is
referred to.
And the idea that there could be a limited nuclear use that
could hopefully stop a failed conventional crisis and that they
could win a conventional crisis that they might think they are
losing or could lose by the use of limited nuclear weapons, as
Admiral Haney spoke about in his opening statement.
That is particularly concerning and dangerous. No one,
Russians or anyone else, should think that they can use nuclear
weapons to escalate their way out of a failed conventional
conflict. The use of nuclear weapons would change dramatically
and fundamentally the nature of any conflict.
But those kind of issues are ones that we are most
concerned about as we look at the developing environment and
security environment, especially in regard to Russia.
Mr. Coffman. And those are tactical weapons integrated with
conventional forces?
Mr. Scher. That is a separate piece in terms of the
actual--what they are doing. They could use any different kinds
of weapons, but certainly that is also a concern, their
integration of tactical with conventional units.
Mr. Coffman. And it is a first strike doctrine, is it not?
Mr. Scher. They are not calling it such, but there is
certainly the implication that--of escalate to, you know, work
their way out of a crisis. So we are certainly planning and
thinking about that they would or certainly could do that in a
worst-case scenario.
Mr. Coffman. Oh. What else?
Secretary Scher, can you characterize the risk to national
security if we fail to modernize our nuclear forces?
Mr. Scher. Certainly, and Admiral Haney I think from an
operational perspective can add if he wishes, but if we do not
modernize these forces we will not have these forces available
for use or operations. This is not a question of modernizing or
keeping old forces. This is a question of watching them slowly
age out from our forces.
So we would prefer to make decisions if we are to draw down
our forces, if we feel the security environment is right and
can do so with a willing partner, we would prefer to do any
such reductions as part of policy, not as part of aging out of
old equipment. So that to us is the biggest issue involved
here.
Mr. Coffman. Admiral Haney.
Admiral Haney. I would just add that the real key to
deterrence is the perception of your adversary. An adversary
has to understand that you have not just a safe, secure, and
effective, but a ready and reliable and credible capability.
And anything that detracts from that perception will cause
that adversary to think that they may be able to do something.
And we cannot afford that in terms of nuclear weapons given the
existential threat that they would impose upon our way of life
and our country.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Admiral Haney. I would also say that we don't want to
default and lose a leg or a partial leg of a triad because we
haven't modernized. And we are to the point now, as I mentioned
earlier, that we can ill afford to wait longer. We are to the
point now where we have delayed.
The good news was our predecessors designed it built to
last and we were able to some life extension programs, et
cetera, but now we are in a point where reliability,
survivability, as you have heard today, will be at risk. And
hence, deterrence and our assurance to our allies will be of
question.
Mr. Coffman. General Rand, in looking at the next
generation bomber is the Air Force considering any existing
platforms, any existing airframes to work off of as they did
with the refueler that saved a lot of money?
Mr. Chairman, can I take that for the record?
Mr. Rogers. They can go ahead and answer. Time has already
expired.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Mr. Rogers. Go ahead and answer.
General Rand. Sir, we have been very fortunate and I can
talk in more detail in the classified part. We have been able
with the B-21--we are going to be able to use a lot of hard
lessons learned from current existing platforms.
This is the family of systems and it was built that way to
augment and be able to work with some of our systems. And I can
talk about what those are in classified as well.
I would also say we have learned a lot from the B-2. And
the B-21 is a Northrop Grumman product. That is not necessarily
why we bought it, but there is a lot of resident expertise that
will reside there with the company and with our partners. So I
am pretty confident that we are going to be able to get this
up, platform on time, on schedule, and it is going to be a
humdinger.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, home of
the Ohio State Buckeyes 2015 national football champions.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for that
Buckeye shout-out.
Gentlemen, I appreciate all the discussion that is
happening today, some of it being incredibly technical.
I want to go to just a policy issue or discussion on the
issue of nonproliferation versus disarmament. And there is I
think a great deal of misconception that happens in the
discussions of nonproliferation and disarmament,
nonproliferation being keeping weapons out of the hands of
others, disarmament is when you get rid of your own.
And I want to go through a series of policy positions that
I think you in your evidence of your testimony today, you agree
with. And then I want to contrast that with some issues that we
are seeing in nonproliferation disarmament, and then I am going
to engage the chairman in a discussion here on some further
action items here.
So with each of you, I mean, from our discussion today it
is my understanding that each of you believe that it is
critical to the United States to field the LRSO and GBSD.
Correct? If every one of you could you audibly answer and we
will go down and we will start here, General?
General Rand. Yes.
Admiral Haney. Absolutely.
Mr. Scher. Yes.
General Klotz. Yes.
Mr. Turner. In the United States 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review it said that the United States would not announce a no-
first-use or a sole purpose declaratory policy. You still agree
with that policy perspective, do you not?
General Rand. Sir, my personal opinion is yes.
Admiral Haney. I agree.
Mr. Scher. That remains our policy, yes.
General Klotz. I agree with Mr. Scher. That remains our
policy.
Mr. Turner. Excellent. And you believe that Secretary
Carter, Secretary Moniz, Chairman Dunford, that they all agree
also with the issue of the LRSO, the GBSD, the no-first-use or
sole purpose declaration policies that we just discussed. You
agree that there is consistency in their positions also?
General Rand. Yes, sir. In my discussion with Admiral
Haney, who is closer to those individuals than I am, that is
what I have been led to believe.
Admiral Haney. Well, I would not want to speak for the
Chairman. I work for the Secretary of Defense and the
President, so I will leave it at that. But while GBSD and LRSO
I have had many discussions with the Chairman, the other I have
not.
Mr. Turner. You have no reason to believe that they have a
differing opinion?
Admiral Haney. I do not.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Scher. And I will refer to the current policy and the
current budget up here, which supports all the things you
noted.
Mr. Turner. Okay.
General Klotz. Yes. I try not to speak for Secretary Moniz
because I found he is extraordinarily articulate and a lot
smarter than I am. I know certainly on the things which the
Department of Energy and the NNSA have responsibility for,
which is developing the warheads for LRSO and the warhead that
would go on the GBSD, we are fully supportive of those
programs.
Mr. Turner. Excellent. Now, I am going to ask you some
questions that relate to a public information study that are
widely held beliefs by the public and ask your position and
your opinion as to whether or not you agree with them.
The public views nuclear weapons as the ultimate protective
weapon. Nuclear weapons make us safe. The public views the
world as a dangerous place. Are those opinions that the public
has that you would also agree with?
General.
General Rand. Sir, I believe the world is a dangerous
place, and I believe that nuclear weapons and its deterrent
value can't be overstated, and that it does provide us safety
and security.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Admiral Haney. I believe that one has to always look at
things in a more complex piece. Deterrence is a complex issue,
lots of parts and pieces, and I don't believe in just bumper
statements.
Mr. Turner. But do you believe it is an essential portion,
would you not?
Admiral Haney. But it is definitely. As I have stated
before in opening statement, et cetera, that it is essential to
our national security.
Mr. Turner. Excellent.
Mr. Scher. Nuclear weapons are a critical piece of our
national security. And it is a dangerous world.
General Klotz. Well, as I said, Congressman, in my opening
remarks, even though the Cold War, the end of it was decades
behind us, we still live in a very complex, dangerous,
international system and that nuclear deterrence is a
foundational capability of maintaining our security, but not
only our security alone but the security of our allies and
friends across the globe.
Mr. Turner. Well, this report goes on to say that the U.S.
public believes that the nuclear arsenal is an effective
deterrent that dissuades enemies from attacking us. The thing
that I am reading from is from the U.S. in the World talking
about issues with Americans, ``Talking about Nuclear Weapons
with the Persuadable Middle.''
It is a study that was done of the American public for the
purposes of persuading them not for nonproliferation but of
disarmament. And what is concerning about this report is in
addition to identifying--some of these studies were done in
Indianapolis. They engaged citizens for it and tested messages.
And they came to conclusions. They gave this walk-through
of what you can and cannot say with the goal being disarmament
and our elimination of our nuclear weapons. They actually come
right out and say that one of the things you are not to do in
talking to the persuadable middle is to tell them that your
goal is getting to zero as your primary goal.
It goes on to say that nuclear weapons should be presented
as a security threat and as a risk to the United States, not as
a security issue of the United States.
Mr. Chairman, if I might just for a moment. This study and
this group is in part funded by Ploughshares. And Ploughshares,
I have been given documents, apparently has significant
investments that are in even the Cayman Islands. And there is a
grave concern as to how this funds a message alternative that
is somewhat disingenuous to the policy perspectives that you
have just articulated.
And I want to ask the chairman to join with me in taking
the next step of looking at this discussion of disarmament
versus nonproliferation and how the message is being funded to
try to dissuade the American public of the things that you just
testified to we know to be the case with disingenuous
statements and misinformation.
So I will be sharing this with the chairman. I hope to get
back to you gentlemen and hope to have your assistance also in
ways that we can counter the alternative message that I think
makes your job harder----
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. When you come back to us for help.
Mr. Rogers. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me, but you have very successfully
put together a hearing here that is becoming extraordinarily
one-sided, in part because my Democratic colleagues are not
here. However----
Mr. Turner. Attendance is important, but Mr. Chairman, I
didn't yield the time, the additional--that you were giving.
Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry, but you----
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
Go ahead.
Mr. Garamendi. If I might, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman from California, go ahead.
Mr. Garamendi. So to complete this, I want to congratulate
you on this, the success that you are having in presenting one
side of this argument. Others of us, myself and perhaps others,
might disagree with many of the things that have been said
here, perhaps because of our absence, which is our fault,
certainly not yours.
The other side of this story has not been told. First--
nobody is talking about disarmament from this side of the
aisle. Nobody. Right?
Mr. Rogers. But here----
Mr. Garamendi. I want to make this clear. I have listened
to at least a half a dozen on the other side here, and this has
gone on and on. Nobody on this side is talking about
disarmament. We are talking about let us be wise, let us be
smart, and let us recognize that there are limits.
Mr. Rogers. Well, the chair is going to have to intervene
here.
Mr. Garamendi. And I would appreciate the opportunity to
ask the questions.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair has recognized the individuals who
are present for their questions. They can ask what questions
they want to.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Montana for 5
minutes for any questions he may have. Mr. Zinke.
Mr. Zinke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as a former SEAL
[Sea, Air, Land teams] commander I have tried to stay away from
nuclear weapons. Some of that earlier in my career. You may
recall we had the man-portable one, and I was unfortunately
selected to that program. I am glad we see it gone away.
Having said that, the triad, explain to me, General Rand,
on the order and magnitude of your rack and stack of operating
costs and sustainment. What is the rack and stack of our triad?
General Rand. I will talk to the two legs that I have and I
will defer to Admiral Haney on the submarine. Right now the
ICBM, the operations and sustainment yearly is $1.2 billion.
For our bomber fleet that end is $2.5 billion for
operations and sustainment. That is pretty cost effective. That
makes up approximately 5.4 percent of the Air Force's TOA
[total obligation authority] budget.
Mr. Zinke. And Admiral.
General Rand. And if I may? The one thing with the bombers
I would go while it is more expensive than ICBM, sir, remember
it is dual capable. We are also getting conventional use out of
all our bombers that are doing multiple things at any given
time. So that number is not just supporting the nuclear
enterprise.
Mr. Zinke. And Admiral, want to weigh in?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, I don't have numbers with me
today, so I will have to take it for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 105.]
Admiral Haney. I would just say it is more complicated than
looking at a rack and stack of operating costs and what have
you. It is the attributes associated with each leg of the triad
that have to be balanced with the associated costs.
So to not have your most survivable leg of the triad would
have significant consequences to the value of the triad.
Mr. Zinke. So would it be safe to say that the land-based
is a cost-effective part of the triad given what it provides?
Admiral Haney. Well, I would say every leg of the triad is
effective. When you say land-based you are saying, I am
assuming, specifically intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Mr. Zinke. Yes, sir.
Admiral Haney. But I would say the intercontinental
ballistic missiles have certain attributes that are very
effective in deterrent, others that are not so much. The
business of being able to take a bomber and signal with it, as
well as the flexibility with it in terms of things is very
important to the deterrence equation.
The business of, as we discussed earlier here, not knowing
where the submarine is gives it a unique survivability
attribute such that, again, no adversary will want to escalate
their way out of a failed conflict.
Mr. Zinke. Provided the seas remain relatively transparent,
right?
Admiral Haney. Well, I will just say throughout my career,
people have been trying to tell me that the seas are going to
be transparent. I have done a lot of ASW [anti-submarine
warfare] in my years of service, and ASW is hard, anti-
submarine warfare. It is not a trivial business, and I don't
see in the foreseeable future the oceans becoming translucent.
Mr. Zinke. Well, let me shift to part of the supporting the
land-based is the helicopters. Throughout this process we
looked at it, we went back and forth, replace the UH-1
Novembers with another aircraft. Initially I looked at the
Black Hawks. There was an existing contract. Let us just put
them on there. It made sense from my perspective.
I understand that fleet-wide we need to take a little more
time to look at it. Given that what is in the NDAA now is to
have it at least under contract by 2018 to allow bidding, have
we taken any steps forward since then to look at the
requirements of the--the fleet?
General Rand. One thing I can tell you absolutely is
Admiral Haney and I are absolutely in lockstep on is the need
for a UH-1N replacement.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Missouri,
Chairman Hartzler, for any questions she may have.
Mrs. Hartzler. First of all I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for allowing me to be here today since----
Mr. Rogers. Sure.
Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. This isn't one of my regular
subcommittees. But given the topic of nuclear globalization and
the guests that are here today, certainly appreciate the
opportunity to visit about the nuclear deterrent, and certainly
glad to see once again you, Admiral Haney and General Rand and
as well as you, General Klotz.
So the first question I have is for Secretary Scher,
Admiral Haney and General Rand. And it kind of builds on some
of the questioning that was done by my colleague Mr. Fleming
talking about the LRSO a little bit.
But we are hearing arguments that the LRSO should be
cancelled, and the reason is because air-launched cruise
missiles are, they say, destabilizing because they could be
either nuclear-armed or conventionally armed. And that an
adversary can mistake one for the other in a conflict.
So are our current AGM-86 cruise missiles both conventional
and nuclear? And do you consider them destabilizing? And along
with that, do you believe our potential adversaries consider
dual-capable cruise missiles destabilizing?
So Secretary.
Mr. Scher. So I think we have evidence to suggest that we
have strategic stability with the current systems, which can be
both nuclear or conventionally armed. So I do think that point
of your argument raises questions as to why a system that would
be recapitalizing and modernizing an existing system and not
adding new capabilities would suddenly be destabilizing.
The other piece, of course, is that destabilizing in the
nuclear context means does the adversary believe that you can
have a disarming first strike? And that is not something that
is possible with individual LRSO or the ALCM. So I think we
believe that this is, in fact, that strategic stability would
be decreased if we did not have an LRSO to replace the ALCM.
Mrs. Hartzler. Anyone else? Admiral.
Admiral Haney. I would also add that our adversaries are
also, Russia, for example, has had air-launched cruise missiles
of both variety. So we have had a history of the air-launched
cruise missile, the ALCM, and it hasn't been destabilizing.
So the argument that seems not very thoughtful in that we
have had this capability. I think the thing that is
destabilizing if we let it decay and not have it, that will be
destabilizing.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is good. Thank you.
General Rand. Ma'am, I agree with what has been said
already. We have been using the Air Force and the Navy cruise
missiles now for over 30 years. And there hasn't been any
indication that it is destabilizing.
I would also submit that if we went that, at least for the
air-breather, then any one of our airplanes are dual capable,
whether it is an F-16, the Strike Eagle, the B-52, the B-2,
they all are carrying conventional weapons as well as nuclear
weapons.
So anytime they take off you would have to ask them is that
destabilizing?
Mrs. Hartzler. You anticipate my second point, my second
question, exactly. So we have the same issue with the aircraft
because they are dual capable. Very good.
General Klotz, I would like to turn to you. What are the
impacts to the NNSA if the LRSO and its warhead, the W80-4 is
significantly delayed or cancelled.
In particular, and, you know, this is--I have met you
before there at the Kansas City. So what are the impacts to the
Kansas City National Security Campus as well as the Pantex
Plant which do most of the production work and the Livermore
National Lab and Sandia National Labs, which have primary
design responsibility?
General Klotz. Thank you very much for that question. First
of all, let me emphasize there has been no decision made to
delay the W80-4 life extension program.
Mrs. Hartzler. Right.
General Klotz. And we are proceeding on the program of
record as laid out in the President's budget, in our Stockpile
Stewardship Memorandum, and in the National Defense
Authorization Act, which requires the Secretary of Energy to
deliver a first production unit of a life-extended W80 warhead
by 2025.
This committee, I believe staff on this committee had asked
each of those organizations that you mentioned what the impact
would be, so don't take my word for it.
Let me just, if I could, in their responses, for instance,
Sandia National Laboratory said, and this is, of course,
responding to a hypothetical, that if this program were delayed
by 5 years we would need to move the newly trained staff on the
order of 300 to 600 people to other currently undefined
programs or lose staff by attrition.
And if we ever had to restart that program we would have
difficulty in recruiting and rehiring new people do that. Same
comments from the other parts of the nuclear security
enterprise.
As I mentioned earlier, we have very carefully phased
programs in terms of our life extension programs. As we finish
work on one or two of them concurrently we are ready to move
into the next program using many of the same skilled workforce,
many of the same processes, many of the same components that
are made in Kansas City and elsewhere.
So if you have a 1 to 2 or 3-, 4-, 5-year gap because of a
decision to cancel a program or because of, you know, lack of
funding or extended, you know, CRs [continuing resolutions] or
whatever the case may be, it has an impact on our ability to
get these jobs done on budget and on time.
Mr. Rogers. The gentlelady's time has expired. I thank the
panelist.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank all of
you. General Rand, it is good to see you again.
And Admiral Haney, appreciate you.
I don't know the rest of you quite as well, but I
appreciate you for being here.
Mr. Chairman, I have a small document that was put together
by my staff and it sort of highlights the list of quotes from
some of the senior DOD officials about why we believe that LRSO
is so important. And I am asking for unanimous consent to allow
it to be put in the record.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 96.]
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
I might just read a couple of quotes off it, Mr. Chairman.
From Secretary of Defense Carter in May of last year, he said
the reason for the advanced cruise missile is to replace the
missile that exists now, in recognition of the fact that air
defenses are improving around the world and that keeping that
capability to penetrate air defenses with our nuclear deterrent
is an important one.
``I think it is important to continue to have a penetrating
air-breathing missile for nuclear deterrence.'' That is
Secretary Carter.
Second one from Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall.
``As potential adversaries acquire more advanced air defenses
and nuclear forces, the credibility of our nuclear standoff
capability will undoubtedly deteriorate.''
``Our allies will feel this deterioration most acutely. And
without the LRSO's advanced standoff capabilities, the bomber
leg of the triad will gradually become a symbol of our decline
rather than a bellwether of our enduring American strength.''
Admiral Haney and General Rand, I wanted, if I could, to
ask both of you your professional military views on the LRSO. I
know you guys have talked about it since before I got here, and
I apologize that I missed it. But it is in my mind important
enough to maybe reiterate anything that you feel would be
necessary.
Can you describe the military requirements that are driving
the need for the LRSO? And how do deterrence requirements,
aging in our current cruise missile and bombers, and
developments in other nations influence this need for the LRSO?
And I will start with you, Admiral Haney, and then to
General Rand.
Admiral Haney. Thank you for the question, Congressman
Franks. The LRSO is very important to strategic deterrence,
assurance, extended deterrence, and strategic stability. Right
now, since we have the air-launched cruise missile, consistent
with some of the quotes you read, to not have that kind of
capability would be very destabilizing.
It would also make a less complex problem for any
adversary. And since we do have adversaries that have nuclear
weapons it is important that our deterrence capability is
credible going into the future.
And we also have nations that have invested in not only
their nuclear arsenal but into anti-access/area-denial kind of
capability. And that in itself has to be dealt with.
So we don't want to dilute this problem for any adversary.
We want to make sure that deterrence works----
Mr. Franks. Yes.
Admiral Haney [continuing]. Not just now but well into the
future and consequently we need that kind of capability.
I will turn it over to General Rand.
General Rand. Sir, as I mentioned earlier, professional
airman for 37 years now and the enemy gets a vote. And the
improvements in the anti-access and area-denial that the enemy
now possesses and will continue to improve upon over the next
10 to 15 years, makes a long-range standoff capability critical
for us to be able to put bombs on target, our missiles on
target, that are intended to make it to the desired target. So
we need that capability.
The current ALCM, air-launched cruise missile, has aged
out. It is already 30 years old. It is increasingly difficult
to make it reliable, keep it reliable, and it is going to be
darn near impossible for it to be survivable----
Mr. Franks. Yes.
General Rand [continuing]. If it is needed in the future.
Mr. Franks. Well, I guess I would be disingenuous if I
wasn't glad you said what you just said. Let me just add one
other layer to it. In your professional military judgments,
what would be the consequences of choosing to delay or cancel
the LRSO program?
I know it is probably you are just reiterating some of
the--but what about the delay? What----
Admiral Haney. A delay would put us at significant risk of
impacting our air leg of the triad. Particularly important when
you look at my air leg today it is primarily made up of B-52s.
So being able to have that capability, not just today, it is a
platform that will serve us well into 2040. And consequently
that is why it is also important.
And as we look at future platforms their ability to have
standoff capability as we see these advances in air threats and
what have you, will be very important so that we can maintain
strategic stability.
General Rand. I am the force provider of our nuclear forces
to Admiral Haney and the President, and I would have to tell
Admiral Haney that if we continue to rely on the ALCM past 2030
it would be very difficult for me to be able to provide the
resources that he needs to accomplish the mission.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman's time has
expired.
The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from California
for any additional questions he may have.
Mr. Garamendi. First of all, if I might put into the record
two pieces of writing, one by our ranking member of the
committee, Mr. Smith, and another one by former Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Perry?
Mr. Rogers. Without objection so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 98.]
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Secondly, Mr. Chairman, when I
approached you a few moments ago you were saying that it was
fair that everybody have a chance to speak, and indeed that is
true.
But perhaps because my colleagues are not here and perhaps
because there are not as many of us on this side as there are
on your side, fairness would seem to be more along the line of
equal time. If that were the case, I would request exactly 41
minutes of questioning so that our side would have equal time
with your side. Is that possible, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Rogers. Committee rules were established at the
beginning of the Congress. That is not the way the rules work.
Mr. Garamendi. It is on the floor.
Mr. Rogers. Not in committee.
Mr. Garamendi. So I guess the answer is no. Therefore I
will take 3 minutes and 48 seconds to try to respond to the
questions here. But first let me congratulate you and your
staff and your members for putting together a terrific show.
One-sided to be sure, and the kind of questions that the
American public should be asking, including questions about
cost.
Mr. Scher, you were the most disingenuous hearing
representative of numbers I have yet heard in this committee.
And I must tell you I am very, very disappointed in you because
you disassembled the truth by eliminating from the discussion
extraordinary costs associated with the bombs, with the command
and control, the production facilities, and the cleanup. So
understand my disappointment. Your numbers are bullshit.
Now, a couple of questions. Admiral Haney, Secretary Scher,
the United States has uncontested conventional superiority,
does it not? Conventional superiority?
Admiral Haney. I----
Mr. Garamendi. We also have undetectable submarines.
Admiral Haney, thank you for your testimony here today about
the submarines and whether they are detectable or not in two
different questions, one from mine and one from one of my
colleagues here.
It certainly gives a second strike capability. Does those
submarines also give us first strike capability? Admiral?
Admiral Haney. Well, first of all I would say our
conventional capability is----
Mr. Garamendi. That is not the question I am asking. I am
asking the question about the submarines, first strike, second
strike. Submarines good for both?
Admiral Haney. The submarine leg is designed to be the most
survivable leg in order to provide us the second strike
capability. But clearly the President could decide how he would
want to use the capability. The only----
Mr. Garamendi. So the answer is yes they are good for first
strike as well as second strike.
Admiral Haney. They could be, yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, they could. How much redundant--what is
this all about? And the questions here and the discussion here
would indicate that we are looking at these nuclear weapons for
conventional, for normal warfare. Is that correct?
Or is it only to deter any nuclear? What are we talking
about here? What is this all about, the fundamental question?
Admiral Haney. I think first and foremost, in terms of
references, you go back to the Nuclear Posture Review, it
specifically cites that we have nuclear weapons in order to
provide nuclear deterrence for our country, assurance for our
allies. If deterrence fails, it is also my job to provide
options to the President in order to carry out his orders.
Mr. Garamendi. So it is about deterrence. That is what
these nuclear weapons are for, deterrence?
Admiral Haney. It is to deter strategic--to deter nuclear
war, but if deterrence fails let no adversary have any doubt
that we have plans in order to deal with that, that have been
also articulated in the employment guidance for the nuclear
weapons.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Do we then consider these weapons also
for conventional war?
Admiral Haney. Congressman, I think you know we have
conventional options. And to your first point you said we have
significant conventional capability. But conventional weapons
will not deter nuclear capability from an adversary.
Mr. Garamendi. So the answer is yes?
Admiral Haney. The answer is the answer I gave.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, then I will interpret your answer as
yes.
Admiral Haney. You want yes/no answers. I am not into that
game. I am a commander of significant military capability.
Deterrence is an important issue for our Nation's--our Nation's
survivability. Nuclear weapons provide an existential threat to
our country.
Mr. Garamendi. Indeed.
Admiral Haney. And we have to deal with it from a
deterrence standpoint and an assurance standpoint to our
allies.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I would agree with you that the
principal purpose, in fact, the only purpose is to deter the
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance.
Well, I have gone 43 seconds into my request for 41
minutes. I guess I had best quit.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair would make note of the fact that Mr. Scher has
demonstrated himself to be nothing but competent, candid, and
forthright in his responses before this committee in every
appearance, including this one.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, I disagree.
Mr. Rogers. I have already noted that.
Mr. Scher, you are welcome to take the floor and make any
statements if you would like to, and you don't have to if you
don't want to.
Mr. Scher. I can't imagine there is anything I would say
that would solve the problem that Congressman Garamendi has
presented.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I do have one last question. And by the
way, you will be pleased to know because we have had such a
very fruitful dialogue here today we are not going to have a
classified annex session.
But I would like to close, you know, I have met with all of
y'all before this hearing and one of the questions I have got
is if in fact the administration did choose to go down the path
of either delaying or attempting to delay or terminating the
LRSO or GBSD, as a practical matter how would they do that?
Mr. Scher, do you have a thought?
Mr. Scher. I think that is a question I have thought about
as well. Obviously the fiscal year 2017 budget, which is still
the position of the administration, is up here on the Hill for
action. So obviously you all have in your hands that issue.
Certainly we will work on and could develop another budget,
but that would be for the next term to do. But I would
emphasize that at this point the decisions that hold, the
President submitted to the Congress, are the position of the
Department and the administration.
Mr. Rogers. Anybody have anything else to add to that
about--your thoughts on that? General Rand.
General Rand. Sir, earlier it was stated that as I almost
welcomed to take on questions about--on that I was daring. My
job is a force provider.
I have two legs of the triad that I am responsible for.
They are old. They are wearing out. And if I am asked to
provide forces to do a mission, I have to be candid and tell
you there will come a point where I cannot do it with existing
capabilities because they are not reliable or they will not be
survivable.
I am acutely aware of the costs associated with this. I
will give the consequences if we do not replace these aging,
wore out systems. Other people decide if we are going to have
the triad. I am going to tell you what will happen if we
continue to use and rely on the things that we currently have.
We need to modernize.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you all. This Congress and this
administration cannot do its job effectively without the wise
counsel of individuals such as yourselves. And we appreciate
what you have done for our country heretofore, and what you
have done for us here today.
And with that, this committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 14, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 14, 2016
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 14, 2016
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 14, 2016
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ZINKE
Admiral Haney. Details concerning Triad operating costs are
included in the annual Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems,
and Nuclear Weapons Command and Control System [as specified in Section
1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012].
The operations and sustainment (O&S) costs for nuclear delivery systems
include legacy system operations and maintenance and associated
personnel to support those systems.
The Ohio-class submarine and Trident II (D5) ballistic missile
approximate average annual O&S cost is $4.2B (FY16-FY20). The
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force approximate O&S annual
cost average is $1.5B (FY16-FY20). Finally, the strategic bomber and
air delivered weapon approximate O&S annual cost average is $2.8B
(FY16-FY20). [See page 27.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 14, 2016
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Scher, does the Department of Defense believe
President Obama's nuclear modernization plans are undercutting nuclear
nonproliferation efforts? Do our allies fear that recapitalizing the
U.S. nuclear triad, building the LRSO cruise missile, and life-
extending our nuclear warheads is creating a new nuclear arms race?
Mr. Scher. The U.S. modernization program is fully consistent with
the Administration's nonproliferation efforts and is not triggering a
nuclear arms race; it is designed to decrease the likelihood of a
future arms race. We are decreasing the number of nuclear warheads and
types of delivery systems in the arsenal, not increasing them. The
Administration's plan focuses on sustaining and modernizing the
platforms, delivery systems, and warheads of our current triad to
preserve existing military capabilities in the face of evolving
threats, rather than developing new nuclear weapons with new military
capabilities. This approach decreases the likelihood of a future arms
race by maintaining a deterrent capability that is robust and stable,
rather than one that is necessarily reactionary to every move by
potential adversaries. Our allies and partners in both Europe and Asia
are counting on U.S. nuclear modernization to enable the continuance of
extended deterrence commitments that help assure them they do not need
to pursue their own nuclear arsenals.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Scher, does the building of the LRSO nuclear
cruise missile result in a more ``usable'' weapon that the existing
cruise missile? Is it going to lower the nuclear-use threshold and be
used for nuclear warfighting--or does it strengthen deterrence?
Mr. Scher. Like all U.S. nuclear weapons, the fundamental role of
the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile is to deter nuclear
attack. LRSO will not be more ``usable'' than the existing AGM-86B Air-
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) it replaces. Rather, it is critical for
maintaining the range of explosive yields and response options
currently available to the President for deterring and, if necessary,
responding to nuclear attack. Retaining capabilities that maintain
credible means for responding to a nuclear attack strengthens our
ability to deter such an attack from ever taking place. The United
States has long maintained a high threshold for contemplating nuclear
use. Sustaining the capability currently provided by the ALCM will not
lower the threshold for U.S. nuclear use.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Scher, do you think President Obama's nuclear
modernization plan is affordable? What are its costs in both an
absolute sense and a relative sense--compared to the defense budget or
the Federal budget, for instance? How do nuclear recapitalization costs
compare to broader conventional recapitalization costs within DOD?
Mr. Scher. Sustaining effective nuclear deterrence is the highest
priority of the Department of Defense (DOD). The Administration's
nuclear modernization program is affordable if prioritized
appropriately by the Department, Congress, and the Nation. DOD
estimates that the total cost for recapitalizing our nuclear forces
will be in the range of $350-$450B over the next twenty years. To put
this in context, the total defense budget in FY 2016 alone is $580B.
Annual costs for nuclear modernization, which are separate from nuclear
sustainment and operations, are projected to peak in the late 2020s at
3-4 percent of FY 2017-level annual DOD spending, or about the
equivalent of 11 percent of the DOD's total FY 2017 acquisition budget,
if projected out assuming 2 percent annual inflation.
Sustaining effective nuclear deterrence is the highest priority of
the Department of Defense (DOD). The Administration's nuclear
modernization program is affordable if prioritized appropriately by the
Department, Congress, and the Nation. DOD estimates that the total cost
for recapitalizing our nuclear forces will be in the range of $350-
$450B over the next twenty years. To put this in context, the total
defense budget in FY 2016 alone is $580B. Annual costs for nuclear
modernization, which are separate from nuclear sustainment and
operations, are projected to peak in the late 2020s at 3-4 percent of
FY 2017-level annual DOD spending, or about the equivalent of 11
percent of the DOD's total FY 2017 acquisition budget, if projected out
assuming 2 percent annual inflation.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Scher, you chair a key committee within NATO
related to nuclear and deterrence planning. Based on its most recent
communique from the Warsaw Summit, does NATO support a nuclear no-
first-use declaratory policy? What would be the impacts to NATO if the
U.S. were to declare a nuclear no-first-use policy of its own?
Mr. Scher. NATO's nuclear declaratory policy was most recently
reiterated in the Warsaw Summit: the fundamental purpose of NATO's
nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter
aggression. This policy was developed in the context of the current
U.S. declaratory policy. The circumstances in which NATO might have to
use nuclear weapons are extremely remote, but if the fundamental
security of any of its members were threatened, NATO has the
capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be
unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that an adversary could hope
to achieve. Any decisions regarding changes to U.S. nuclear declaratory
policy should be done in consultation with our allies, including NATO,
to ensure that our allies remain confident of our nuclear security
commitments.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Scher, as we've discussed before, I'm deeply
worried about what I consider to be a failure to respond to Russia's
violation of the INF treaty. I believe such failure emboldens Russia to
act illegally in a manner of ways, not just on this treaty. So, I ask
you, do you believe Russia has paid a price for its violation of the
INF treaty? In what way?
Mr. Scher. Yes. Russia's violation of the INF Treaty is a serious
challenge to the security of the United States and its allies and
partners; however, the development of Russia's INF Treaty-violating
system is only part of an overall pattern of Russia's recent coercive
and aggressive behavior. The Administration determined the best
approach is to consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty
in the context of this overall bellicose behavior, and to respond
across a range of areas. The Department of Defense (DOD) identified a
range of military responses to Russia's intermediate-range
capabilities, including Russia's Treaty-prohibited ground-launched
cruise missile. The responses included active defenses to counter
intermediate-range strike systems, counterforce capabilities to prevent
Russian intermediate-range strikes, and countervailing strike
capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces. These investments, taken
together, form a comprehensive response to the broader strategic
environment, including Russian military actions, Russia's aggressive
behavior, and its violation of the INF Treaty. The responses will make
impose a cost on Russia for aggressive behavior, to include actions
that they may consider in the future, and include a range of efforts
pursued unilaterally, bilaterally with allies and partners, and also
collectively with the NATO Alliance.
For example, DOD plans to continue the European Reassurance
Initiative (ERI), with $789.3 million requested in Fiscal Year (FY)
2016. Under the ERI, the United States has increased our persistent,
rotational air, land, and sea presence in the Baltics and in Central
Europe to reassure Allies and to deter Russian aggression. ERI also
enables the United States to expand bilateral and multilateral
exercises in Europe to improve interoperability and to strengthen U.S.
warfighting capability in the face of newer threats from Russia. DOD is
seeking funding for ERI in FY 2017.
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Scher, what are the counterintelligence risks
of allowing China to inspect our THAAD site in South Korea, once that
missile defense capability has been deployed? Can you commit to this
committee that we will have access to any intelligence assessment done
to evaluate this question before the Administration makes any decision
to allow such access?
Mr. Scher. The Department of Defense currently has no plans and has
made no decisions regarding third-party access to a future Terminal
High-Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) site in the Republic of Korea.
Regarding any intelligence assessment of the site, we would defer to
the Intelligence Community on releasability questions.
Mr. Rogers. Admiral Haney, in your capacity as commander of
Strategic Command, would you find yourself more likely to recommend to
a President that he use an LRSO than you would with our current air-
launched cruise missile? Is LRSO more ``usable'' in your mind--and
therefore more likely to be used?
Admiral Haney. As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the
use of nuclear weapons would only be considered in extreme
circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States and
its allies. As such, the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile will
not be ``more usable'' than the current Air Launched Cruise Missile
(ALCM).
The LRSO program replaces the aging ALCM which has far exceeded its
originally planned service life. The LRSO will continue to provide the
President an effective nuclear standoff capability to address a range
of contingencies in non-permissive environments.
Mr. Rogers. Admiral Haney, the administration has sought further
reductions in deployed strategic nuclear forces beyond the levels in
the current New START Treaty. Do you believe these further reductions
should be done unilaterally, or must they be done in concert with
Russia via a bilateral and verifiable treaty? Are more robust and
intrusive verification measures needed at such lower force levels?
Admiral Haney. Any proposal to change our deployed strategic
nuclear forces beyond the levels in New START should be examined within
the context of a bilateral and verifiable treaty architecture. Such a
path moving forward offers the best means to preserve strategic
stability through qualitative and quantitative parity.
More robust verification measures are not necessarily needed at
lower force levels. There is not a simple tradeoff between lower force
structure levels and more robust and intrusive verification measures.
Over the course of numerous U.S.-Russia arms control agreements both
parties have approved sufficient measures to achieve verification. The
challenge is in determining what verification mechanisms are
appropriate. It would be premature to provide an assessment on the
necessary verification measures without further information regarding
the specific context of any proposed negotiations at lower force
levels.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. Several independent estimates place DOD and NNSA costs
associated with the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 30 years
at approximately $350 billion per year for the next 10 years. These
costs for modernization will grow significantly in the late-2020s, with
the nuclear deterrence mission potentially costing about a trillion
dollars over 30 years. Please provide further information detailing
Secretary Scher's assessment of $350-$450 billion over 20 years for
nuclear modernization/recapitalization.
General Klotz. This question would be more appropriate for DOD to
answer.
Mr. Cooper. What are the risks and benefits of a no-first-use
policy? Under what circumstances would the U.S. benefit from using
nuclear weapons first?
Mr. Scher. Adopting a no-first-use policy could, in theory, be
beneficial if it reduced the risk of nuclear attack or coercion against
the United States and its allies, or otherwise led nuclear-armed
potential adversaries to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their
security strategies. The risk of adopting a no-first-use policy is that
it might instead undermine deterrence and weaken our ability to assure
allies and partners that they do not need their own nuclear arsenals.
We will not speculate about the benefits and risks of using nuclear
weapons in hypothetical scenarios; however, we should be clear that the
purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the
United States and its allies and partners, deter other threats against
U.S. and allied vital interests, and achieve U.S. objectives if
deterrence fails. Therefore, we must assess alternative declaratory
policies not only for the impact they might have on U.S. employment
decisions, but also for how potential adversaries and U.S. allies and
partners would perceive those policies and the consequent effect they
would have on extended deterrence, assurance, and our nonproliferation
objectives.
Mr. Cooper. Do you believe we could control escalation once a
nuclear weapon is used?
Mr. Scher. No one should have absolute confidence in their ability
to control escalation in a conflict between States with nuclear
arsenals postured to ensure second-strike capabilities. This
understanding underscores our view that the fundamental role of nuclear
weapons is to deter nuclear attack against the United States, its
allies, and partners. However, effective deterrence requires a balanced
approach to escalation risk. We must be prepared if an adversary
creates a conflict and drives it across the nuclear threshold; we do
not want to simply assume that if the nuclear threshold is crossed that
escalation cannot be limited. We are tasked with providing the
President with credible options for responding to nuclear threats and
nuclear aggression, including responding to limited nuclear use.
Possessing an appreciation of escalation risk together with a range of
options for responding to nuclear attack makes credible our message
that adversaries cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional
aggression.
Mr. Cooper. What are the benefits and risks of doing away with
launch-on-warning policy? What impacts, if any, could changes to this
policy have on force structure?
Mr. Scher. The United States does not have a launch-on-warning
policy. We instead retain the option for the President to launch
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) under attack, while also
planning to ensure that we are not reliant on doing so. The difference
between launch-on-warning and launch-under-attack is attack assessment.
Launch-under-attack is not based solely on a single warning indicator;
rather, an attack assessment considers data from multiple sensors and
the apparent intent of the incoming attack in the context of the
international situation.
This policy of retaining the option to launch under attack enhances
deterrence of large-scale nuclear attack. Potential adversaries with
large nuclear arsenals cannot be certain of their ability to destroy
U.S. ICBMs because the President has the option of launching those
forces before the incoming adversary strike reaches its targets.
The capability to launch ICBMs before they are destroyed by an
incoming attack does not place a requirement on the President to do so.
Although the United States has the ability to launch its ICBMs promptly
after an authenticated, encrypted, and securely transmitted order from
the President, this does not mean our nuclear forces are on a ``hair-
trigger'' alert posture. The United States employs multiple, rigorous,
and redundant technical and procedural safeguards to protect against
accidental or unauthorized launch or a launch based on incorrect
information.
Eliminating the option to launch under attack would reduce
Presidential flexibility, as the President would not have the option of
launching ICBMs before an incoming strike destroyed all or a portion of
them. This, in turn, would reduce uncertainty about the consequences of
a large-scale nuclear attack against the United States. Eliminating
launch-under-attack does not increase Presidential decision-time; it
only takes away the President's option to decide.
Eliminating the ability to launch under attack would not
necessitate any changes in force structure, but eliminating the
responsiveness of the ICBM force could lead to future requirements to
bolster other elements of U.S. nuclear force structure and posture,
such as bomber alert levels. Some argue that the United States could
reduce the alert-level of our ICBMs if there was no ability to launch
under attack. This change to our nuclear posture, however, would entail
serious risks to strategic stability, because de-alerting ICBMs might
incentivize an adversary to strike first in a crisis before forces were
re-alerted. It would also degrade our ability to hold time-sensitive
targets at risk with ICBMs.
Mr. Cooper. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the use of
nuclear weapons would only be contemplated in the most extreme
circumstances to defend U.S. or allied survival. Is this still the
policy of the United States? And in this context, would the use of low-
yield nuclear weapon be required as a response to a potential use of a
low-yield nuclear weapon by Russia?
Mr. Scher. The policies laid out in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
Report remain in effect. The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons,
which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter
nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners. The
United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances to defend its vital interests.
The nuclear and conventional forces of the United States support a
range of options available to the President for responding to nuclear
attack, including options for responding to an adversary's potential
use of a low-yield nuclear weapon. Determining what response best
serves the security interests of the United States and its allies and
partners is a Presidential decision. There is no required response to
any specific type of adversary attack.
Mr. Cooper. Several independent estimates place DOD and NNSA costs
associated with the nuclear deterrence mission over the next 30 years
at approximately $350 billion per year for the next 10 years. These
costs for modernization will grow significantly in the late-2020s, with
the nuclear deterrence mission potentially costing about a trillion
dollars over 30 years. Please provide further information detailing
Secretary Scher's assessment of $350-$450 billion over 20 years for
nuclear modernization/recapitalization.
Mr. Scher. The Department of Defense (DOD) Office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation estimates that the total cost of
recapitalizing U.S. nuclear forces will be $350 billion-$450 billion
over the next twenty years. DOD will continue to refine its estimate as
a number of modernization programs mature in the coming years.
This estimate covers the full cost of recapitalizing the nuclear
weapon delivery systems and warheads of the U.S. strategic triad. It
includes the Ohio Replacement Program submarine; the Ground-Based
Strategic Deterrent; the Long-Range Standoff cruise missile; the Air
Force tail kit assembly for the B61-12 gravity bomb; and the full cost
of the B-21 bomber (even though this aircraft is also being developed
to meet conventional warfighting requirements). It also includes
modernization of nuclear command, control, and communications. Finally,
this estimate includes annual DOD funds reprogrammed to the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to support warhead modernization
activities, including Life Extension Programs described in NNSA's
Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan.
The DOD estimate excludes nuclear force sustainment and operation,
which are $12 billion in FY 2017. It also excludes NNSA infrastructure
recapitalization, such as construction of new uranium and plutonium
facilities. These additional costs are necessary for the United States
to remain a nuclear weapons state irrespective of what our nuclear
modernization plans entail.
Mr. Cooper. Is there a military requirement to make the Long-Range
Stand-Off Weapon have conventional capability?
Admiral Haney. The Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization
Act [Section 217(a)(1)] requires the Air Force develop a conventional
variant of the LRSO prior to the retirement of the existing
Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM). The CALCM retirement
timeline has not been established and DOD does not have a specific plan
for developing a conventional LRSO variant at this time.
Mr. Cooper. What are the risks and benefits of a no-first-use
policy? Under what circumstances would the U.S. benefit from using
nuclear weapons first?
Admiral Haney. As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the
current policy is:
The U.S. will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks
with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United
States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear
weapons The U.S. would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in
extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the U.S. or its
allies and partners The U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear
non-proliferation obligations This policy is an important contributor
to maintaining strategic stability. U.S. extended deterrence and
assurance commitments ensure that our allies remain confident in our
capabilities, with the added benefit of reducing the likelihood of
nuclear proliferation. Beyond the implications this has for achieving
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty goals, the ability of the U.S. to
dissuade nuclear weapon acquisition minimizes strategic risk. In short,
the current policy promotes strategic stability and guarantees the
safety and security of our allies under any scenario when their very
existence and way of life may be threatened. Substantial analysis and
dialogue should be conducted including specific analysis associated
with U.S. allies and partner assurance perspectives to weigh the impact
a ``No First Use'' policy would have. Among other things, such analysis
should consider the following:
``No First Use'' policy removes ambiguity for U.S. adversaries
Potential aggressors may not fear U.S. nuclear response even if they
attacked with advanced conventional, chemical, and/or biological
weapons. They would risk U.S. nuclear retaliation only if they attacked
with nuclear weapons Allies and partners would no longer be assured via
the U.S. nuclear umbrella. As such they may even consider acquiring
their own nuclear weapons.
Mr. Cooper. Do you believe we could control escalation once a
nuclear weapon is used?
Admiral Haney. Yes, I believe it may be possible but I hope to
never find out. Efforts to control escalation must consider and employ
all elements of national power via a whole of government approach. A
military response, be it nuclear, conventional or non-kinetic, is
merely one tool available to the President. As discussed in the
``Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States''
specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C. (June 2013), the Presidential
guidance ``. . . directs that DOD will maintain a sufficient,
diversified and survivable capability at all times with high confidence
and capability to convince any potential adversary that the adverse
consequences of attacking the United States or our Allies and partners
far outweigh any potential benefit they may seek to gain from such an
attack. It also preserves the flexibility to respond with a range of
options to meet the President's stated objectives should deterrence
fail''. In keeping with this guidance, USSTRATCOM has developed options
across the spectrum of potential responses, including nuclear options,
in order to provide decision space to the President so he/she can
respond appropriately to the conditions at hand. However, it is solely
a Presidential decision if and when those options are executed.
Mr. Cooper. What are the benefits and risks of doing away with
launch-on-warning policy? What impacts, if any, could changes to this
policy have on force structure?
Admiral Haney. As discussed in the ``Report on Nuclear Employment
Strategy of the United States'' specified in Section 491 of 10 U.S.C.
(June 2013), the revised Presidential Guidance recognizes the
significantly diminished possibility of a disarming surprise nuclear
attack and directs DOD to examine further options to reduce the role
Launch Under Attack plays in U.S. planning, while retaining the ability
to Launch Under Attack if directed. Thus USSTRATCOM has developed
options across the spectrum of potential responses, including nuclear
options, in order to provide decision space to the President so he/she
can respond appropriately to the conditions at hand. It is solely a
Presidential decision if and when those options are executed.
Mr. Cooper. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the use of
nuclear weapons would only be contemplated in the most extreme
circumstances to defend U.S. or allied survival. Is this still the
policy of the United States? And in this context, would the use of low-
yield nuclear weapon be required as a response to a potential use of a
low-yield nuclear weapon by Russia?
Admiral Haney. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review remains the policy
of the United States, to wit, ``the U.S. would only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
of the U.S. or its allies and partners.''
How and when the United States uses a nuclear weapon is a
Presidential decision. The current and planned conventional and nuclear
force structures are specifically designed to provide the President
with the best possible range of tailorable response options. This
provides the President and his senior advisors with the flexibility to
evaluate courses of action in light of a host of considerations.
Mr. Cooper. Are you confident that the required changes in culture
to improve the morale and performance of missileers are being
implemented effectively? What challenges, if any, remain?
General Rand. Yes. Over the last two years, we have worked very
hard to improve the overall culture in the missile community, and we
are now seeing the benefits of our efforts focused on manning,
training, operations, equipment, infrastructure and morale. Our Command
has built a culture of empowerment versus one of strict compliance,
allowing our young and motivated officers to set and achieve goals,
while distinctively recognizing and rewarding them for excellence in
the nuclear enterprise.
With respect to manning, we overhauled the missileer career path to
retain experience and further promote the development of weapon system
expertise. We are attracting talent with ROTC scholarships and active
recruiting. Additionally, we repositioned instructors from centrally-
located wing organizations and moved them out to the operational
missile squadrons. As part of this initiative, we've mandated
instructors be on their second assignment as a missileer to ensure they
have a wider breadth of knowledge to share with younger officers. We
also added two field grade officers in leadership positions to every
squadron. These actions provide our young missileers opportunities for
daily mentorship, as well as guidance on viable options for career
paths. As a result we have made more effective use of our human
resources, while simultaneously promoting career development.
On the training and operations front, we revised our AFGSC
directives governing training, completely re-vamping our methods--from
part-task training to mission execution. Mirroring other comparable
USAF operations disciplines, we shifted to pass-fail testing and
refocused the emphasis from test performance to training and learning.
These combined efforts shifted our missileers' focus from grades to
tasks, ultimately resulting in enhanced mission proficiency.
Operationally, we've promoted stability in alert scheduling of missile
crews through effective utilization of all wing assigned and qualified
personnel, as well as established the means to monitor and detect if an
organization exceeds established alert rate levels. Rigorous attention
on scheduling of alert and training activities provides greater
predictability and protects the time off of Missile Wing personnel.
As a result of Force Improvement Funds, we acquired 95 new vehicles
in FY14 for missileers and maintenance personnel to travel to their
remote operating locations, and an additional 576 vehicles in FY15 and
FY16 for all nuclear bases. With the FY16 NDAA $322M infusion for
modernization of equipment and infrastructure at our installations, we
were able to fund a new Weapons Storage Facility at F.E. Warren Air
Force Base and a Tactical Response Force Alert Facility at Malmstrom
Air Force Base. Looking forward, we are requesting $440M for future
nuclear infrastructure requirements across the command. Our desire is
to fund the Minuteman III and UH-1N replacement. In the last two years,
we have made great strides to improve the Morale, Welfare and
Recreation facilities at our bases. All our fitness centers have
implemented 24/7 operating hours, providing access for all our Airmen,
regardless of duty shifts. The Air Force Food Transformation Initiative
continues to be implemented at our installations and will provide our
Airmen more dining options with expanded menus. Additionally, we have
expanded non-appropriated funds for locally-developed programs.
Our challenge is to ensure we never return to the culture of old.
To this end, I've established a directorate in my command to focus on
leadership development, lessons learned and innovation. This helps
promote the flow of ideas for improvement from the lowest levels in the
field directly to myself. I personally chair a monthly council which
reviews all our initiatives, fosters best practices, and allows for
sharing of lessons learned between Wings and Numbered Air Forces. I
receive regular status updates on our open force improvement items. I
solicit input from my Commanders in the field where inefficiencies and
redundancies exist that undermine our Airmen's time and weaken their
motivation. I empower them to stop doing those things that take away
our ability to fulfill our mission responsibilities and weaken morale.
I appreciate your support as we continue to improve our nation's
nuclear forces, ensuring our Strikers have the resources necessary to
ensure they are always prepared to safely, securely and effectively
carry out their duties which our nation has entrusted to them.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. General Klotz: How many plutonium pits are required
for planned life extension programs? How many new pits are required?
General Klotz. This information was previously provided to the
Committee as part of the classified annex to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan in April 2016. NNSA remains
committed to achieving war-reserve (WR) pit production levels set forth
in the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, and agreed to as
part of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) Strategic Plan, to support
stockpile requirements for newly-manufactured pits.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Haney and General Klotz: How many pits are
required to address geo-political surprise? What analysis was done to
arrive at this number? Can you deliver this analysis to Congress? Why
do we need to expand plutonium pit production capacity?
General Klotz. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and 2013 Report to
Congress on the Nuclear Employment Strategy (specified in 10 U.S.C.
491) state that a non-deployed hedge, properly sized and ready to
address technical risks, also fulfills the requirements of a
geopolitical hedge. Pits are only one of many critical components in a
nuclear warhead, and are managed to support all stockpile activities
(e.g., life extension programs, surveillance, and aging concerns). The
January 16, 2014 Assessment of Nuclear Weapon Pit Production
Requirements Report to Congress confirmed the requirement for achieving
50-80 pit per year production capacity by 2030. This requirement was
codified by Congress most recently in the 2016 NDAA (Sec. 3140), and is
informed by the following factors: 1) U.S. policy objectives to
maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent is contingent
on the national capability to produce plutonium pits, 2) Pit aging
studies conclude pits will not have unlimited lifetime, and even with
pit reuse, plutonium work may be required to assure weapon safety,
security, and long term reliability to preclude the need for weapon
testing, and 3) The ability to produce plutonium pits in sufficient
quantity and timeliness to address technical issues is essential to the
long term reduction of the non-deployed weapon stockpile.
To meet our commitments, as set forth in the Fiscal Year 2015
National Defense Authorization Act and agreed to as part of the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC) Baseline Plan, NNSA needs to produce newly-
manufactured pits to support future stockpile requirements. NNSA's
current efforts to optimize existing infrastructure for plutonium
operations at Los Alamos National Laboratory will support a maximum 30
pits per year (ppy) production capacity by 2026. In order to achieve
production capacity beyond 30 ppy and support future stockpile needs,
additional infrastructure is required.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Scher and Mr. Klotz, what is the plan to pay for
nuclear modernization? Will the top line be raised or will other parts
of the defense and energy budgets suffer? If so, which ones? Have
discussions begun about how to pay for the nuclear enterprise during
the coming bow wave in the 2020s and 2030s?
General Klotz. Supporting the Administration's agenda to maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, modernizing our
nuclear security enterprise, and reducing the threat of nuclear
proliferation remains a top priority. I am confident that the FY 2017
President's budget for NNSA will fully meet all of our national nuclear
security requirements. We have a very clear and shared view of what
those requirements are. DOD and DOE, through the Nuclear Weapons
Council, continue to assess budgets and programs to meet requirements
in the coming years. The budget projections for future years, FY 2018-
FY 2021, remain subject to the sequester caps set in the Budget Control
Act of 2011.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Scher, on page two of your written testimony you
state that ``The modernization costs, spread over twenty years, will be
an estimated $350B-$450B.'' You then stated during the hearing that
this figure did not include some costs associated with nuclear
modernization, such as life extension programs for warheads. Please
provide the committee with the source and precise composition of this
figure. What costs, programs, and operations does the $350B-450B figure
include? What costs reasonably associated with the nuclear mission does
it exclude (such as warhead modernization, command and control
modernization, operations, pit production capacity expansion, etc.)?
Mr. Scher. The Department of Defense (DOD) Office of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) estimates that the total cost
of recapitalizing U.S. nuclear forces will be $350 billion-$450 billion
over the next twenty years. DOD will continue to refine its estimate as
a number of modernization programs mature in the coming years. This
estimate covers the full projected cost of recapitalizing the nuclear
weapon delivery systems and warheads of the U.S. strategic triad. It
includes the Ohio Replacement Program submarine; the Ground-Based
Strategic Deterrent; the Long-Range Standoff cruise missile; the Air
Force tail kit assembly for the B61-12 gravity bomb; and the full cost
of the B-21 bomber (even though this aircraft is also being developed
to meet conventional warfighting requirements). CAPE's recapitalization
estimate also includes modernization of nuclear command, control, and
communications. Finally, this estimate includes annual DOD funds
reprogrammed to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to
support warhead modernization activities, including Life Extension
Programs described in NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan.
The DOD estimate excludes nuclear force sustainment and operation,
which are $12B in FY 2017. These costs would be necessary even if
forgoing modernization and warhead life extension were a viable option.
It also excludes NNSA infrastructure recapitalization, such as
construction of new uranium and plutonium facilities, which like
sustainment costs would be necessary even if forgoing force
modernization were a viable option.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Scher, you are the chairman NATO's Nuclear
Planning Group. Can you describe the range of views our NATO allies
have on the current U.S. nuclear modernization plan?
Mr. Scher. As is the case in the United States, views in Allied
governments are wide-ranging and I will not speak to the opinions of
other nations individually. However, it is very clear, as was
reaffirmed most recently in the Warsaw Summit Communique, that all NATO
governments fully endorse the enduring importance to the Alliance of
nuclear deterrence, along with the unique role the United States plays
in maintaining that deterrence. This role depends in part on
modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons to ensure that NATO's nuclear
deterrence capability remains credible and effective.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Scher and Mr. Klotz, what is the plan to pay for
nuclear modernization? Will the top line be raised or will other parts
of the defense and energy budgets suffer? If so, which ones? Have
discussions begun about how to pay for the nuclear enterprise during
the coming bow wave in the 2020s and 2030s?
Mr. Scher. The nuclear modernization program is fully funded in the
President's Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request. Modernization is
affordable if prioritized appropriately by the Department, Congress,
and the Nation. The Department scrutinizes its budget submission
annually and evaluates potential tradeoffs to align with both near- and
long-term national defense priorities. DOD will continue to work with
the White House in building future budgets to determine how best to
fund the modernization of the nuclear enterprise.
Mr. Garamendi. Under what circumstances would the U.S. consider the
first use of the nuclear weapon? How do these scenarios influence
military requirements and U.S. nuclear posture? How do these specific
first-use scenarios affect the planned nuclear modernization?
Mr. Scher. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear
weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the
United States or its allies and partners. In the case of countries not
covered by our negative security assurance--States that possess nuclear
weapons and States not in compliance with their nuclear non-
proliferation obligations--there remains a narrow range of
contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons play a role in deterring a
conventional, chemical, or biological weapon attack against the United
States or its allies and partners.
The U.S. nuclear modernization plan is designed to preserve
Presidential flexibility to respond with a range of options to achieve
U.S. and allied objectives should deterrence fail. Any potential
specific first-use scenarios do not affect the planned U.S. nuclear
modernization.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Haney, is reducing our deployed nuclear
forces in accordance with the New START Treaty in the national security
interests of the United States? Would you support further, bilateral
reductions below the current New START central limits?
Admiral Haney. Yes, the New START Treaty preserves strategic
equivalence between the United States and Russia. It is a useful
component in preserving strategic stability. Both the U.S. and Russia
are on track to achieve the New START Central Limits within the terms
set by the treaty. Continuing to remain in compliance is prudent.
U.S.-Russia arms control agreements are in the best interests of
the both parties and the Euro-Atlantic community. If further bilateral
reductions below the current New START central limits are contemplated,
the reduction would require further analysis and scrutiny, including a
deep understanding of the scale and scope of any proposed reductions.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Haney: President Obama stated in 2013 that
the United States could ``ensure the security of America and our
allies--and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent--while
reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third''.
If a negotiated reduction could be reached, how would you recommend
structuring U.S. nuclear forces if one-third fewer warheads? Would you
recommend eliminating certain platforms? Rebalancing between legs of
the triad? Simply reducing numbers with the same overall structure?
Admiral Haney. The current U.S. nuclear force structure provides
the President a flexible, reliable, and survivable range of deterrence
and assurance options to meet our strategic stability objectives. As
part of the New START deliberation process, the Department completed a
very thorough analysis process to inform negotiations. I would
recommend that any future force structure or deployed weapon changes,
as part of a negotiated reduction, occur in a similar manner.
The value of the Triad in maintaining strategic stability is not
strictly related to deployed launcher or weapon numbers. As stated in
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Triad provides an assured second
strike capability and the ability to mitigate unexpected technological
problems or operational vulnerabilities in any single Triad leg.
Therefore, even at reduced deployed weapon levels, the U.S. should
maintain a credible and effective Triad to maintain strategic stability
and meet our deterrence objectives and assurance commitments.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Haney: Please provide to the committee a
list of consultants or contractors that STRATCOM uses for nuclear
deterrence studies.
Admiral Haney. USSTRATCOM conducts nuclear deterrence studies and
related analytical activities to ensure we meet our primary mission of
deterring strategic attack on the U.S. and our allies. Formal policy
recommendations and strategic decision making are internal functions
conducted primarily and routinely by military and government civilian
staff. Periodically, USSTRATCOM utilizes external and independent
organizations to provide their perspectives on strategic deterrence.
External organizations consist of the University Affiliated Research
Center (UARC) and the Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance.
--The UARC is the academic outreach USSTRATCOM utilizes for nuclear
deterrence studies and is a 5-year sole sourced Individual Delivery,
Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract in partnership
with the University of Nebraska. There is currently a contract
agreement with the University of Nebraska which consists of five task
orders supporting nuclear deterrence strategy and policy. The task
orders are: Behavioral Influence, Deterrence Strategic Stage Set, Risk
of Extended Deterrence, Development/Assessment of Narrative/Counter-
Narrative, and Horizontal and Vertical Nuclear Proliferation.
--The Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance is not a
contracted entity but is a collaborative partnership with 31 confirmed
member universities and partners. Objectives of the alliance include
developing the next generation of deterrence professionals,
establishing relationships and continuous dialogue with Academia, and
stimulating new thinking in deterrence and assurance studies.
USSTRATCOM currently has eight student teams and advisors at local
universities and three National Defense University USSTRATCOM Scholars
conducting research on deterrence and assurance issues. The Strategic
Advisory Group (SAG) is an independent organization not funded by or in
contract agreement with USSTRATCOM. With the SAG, nuclear deterrence
strategy and policy subject matter experts provide their strategic
deterrence and assurance perspectives to CDRUSSTRATCOM.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Haney and General Klotz: How many pits are
required to address geo-political surprise? What analysis was done to
arrive at this number? Can you deliver this analysis to Congress? Why
do we need to expand plutonium pit production capacity?
Admiral Haney. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and 2013 Report to
Congress on the Nuclear Employment Strategy (specified in Section 491
of 10 U.S.C.) states that a non-deployed weapon stockpile, properly
sized and ready to address technical risks, also fulfills the
requirements for addressing geopolitical surprise. Accordingly, pit
quantities are managed to support the non-deployed weapon stockpile as
well as all required stockpile sustainment and life extension
activities to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.
The January 16, 2014 Assessment of Nuclear Weapon Pit Production
Requirements Report to Congress confirmed the requirement for achieving
50-80 pit per year production capacity by 2030. This requirement was
codified by Congress most recently in the 2016 NDAA (Sec. 3140), and is
informed by the following factors: 1) U.S. policy objectives to
maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent is contingent
on the national capability to produce plutonium pits, 2) Pit aging
studies conclude pits will not have unlimited lifetime, and even with
pit reuse, plutonium work may be required to assure weapon safety,
security, and long term reliability to preclude the need for weapon
testing, and, 3) The ability to produce plutonium pits in sufficient
quantity and timeliness to address technical issues is essential to the
long term reduction of the non-deployed weapon stockpile.
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Haney, please describe the current level and
frequency of dialogue between the United States Government and Russia
on strategic matters, to include military-to-military communication.
Are you currently facing any statutory restrictions which interfere
with your ability to communicate with Russia and ensure strategic
stability?
Admiral Haney. U.S. and Russian officials regularly meet through a
variety of bilateral and multilateral venues and at multiple levels.
For instance, senior officials meet semiannually as part of the New
START Bilateral Consultative Commission. Similarly, the Open Skies
Consultative Commission holds working-level sessions on a monthly
basis. More importantly, there are a wide array of regular and ad hoc
meetings between U.S. and Russian governmental officials.
While I lack awareness of all the intergovernmental interactions
that occur with Russia, Public Law 114-92 (Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA)
Subtitle E--Matters Relating to the Russian Federation ``Section 1246.
LIMITATION ON MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.'' does specifically address funding limitations for
any bilateral military-to-military cooperation between the Governments
of the United States and the Russian Federation pending certain
actions.
Mr. Garamendi. Under what circumstances would the U.S. consider the
first use of the nuclear weapon? How do these scenarios influence
military requirements and U.S. nuclear posture? How do these specific
first-use scenarios affect the planned nuclear modernization?
Admiral Haney. I would refer to the policy articulated in the 2010
Nuclear Posture Review:
The U.S. will continue to strengthen conventional
capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-
nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear
attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose
of U.S. nuclear weapons
The U.S. would only consider the use of nuclear weapons
in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the U.S. or
its allies and partners
The U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear
nonproliferation obligations
Thus, first use may be considered ``in extreme circumstances to
defend the vital interests of the U.S. or its allies and partners''. It
is our policy not to specify what those ``extreme circumstances'' are
in order to preserve Presidential decision space ensuring they have the
ability to respond as appropriate to the crisis at hand. This ambiguity
enhances deterrence.
We develop options that can be executed across a range of
capabilities. Whether they are executed is solely a Presidential
Decision. ``First use'' does not drive or even directly affect our
posture or modernization. The modernization program must continue to
ensure that the nuclear force structure is safe, secure, and effective.
Without a modernization program that is intended to address the three
aforementioned attributes, U.S. senior leaders would have less
effective options.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AGUILAR
Mr. Aguilar. In your testimony you estimated that modernization
costs, spread over 20 years, would be an estimated $350B-$450B.
However, during the hearing you mentioned that this estimate did not
include the warheads, sustainment costs, or command and control among
others.
A) Do you have a 25-year estimated costs plan that not only
includes modernization, but also warheads, sustainment, and command and
control? If so, when will it be delivered to the members of this
committee? If not, why not and when is the Department planning on
producing such a document?
B) If this estimate were extended to 30 years, would the Department
then agree that nuclear modernization could cost an estimated 1
trillion dollars as some commentators have predicted?
Mr. Scher. The joint Department of Defense (DOD) and National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear weapons sustainment and
modernization strategy is presented in the Nuclear Weapons Council
Baseline Strategic Plan. The plan, which provides the basis for nuclear
weapons budget planning, is a 25-year view summarizing the timelines
for production and deployment of nuclear warheads, DOD delivery
systems, and associated NNSA production infrastructure such as pit and
tritium production. DOD generally does not develop 25-year program cost
estimates. The DOD estimates that the total cost of recapitalizing U.S.
nuclear forces will be $350 billion-$450 billion over the next 20
years. This excludes sustainment and operation of the existing force,
which currently costs about $12B per year. The recapitalization
estimate includes modernization of nuclear command, control, and
communications, as well as modernization of DOD delivery systems in all
three legs of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad. It includes the full
cost of the B-21 bomber, even though this aircraft is also being
developed to meet conventional warfighting requirements. DOD's
recapitalization estimate also includes annual DOD funds reprogrammed
to NNSA to support warhead modernization activities, including Life
Extension Programs described in NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Management
Plan. DOD will continue to refine its cost estimate as a number of
modernization programs mature in the coming years. DOD's 20-year
estimate for total nuclear modernization costs covers the bulk of the
so-called bow wave of nuclear recapitalization funding. As a result,
extending it from 20 to 30 years would not result in a significant
proportional increase. The total costs for nuclear modernization over
30 years will be far lower than $1 trillion.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP
Dr. Wenstrup. Administrator Klotz, in your Tritium Report from last
October, NNSA estimated costs for build-out of a national security
enrichment capacity using the American Centrifuge technology--the only
existing technology that is ready for use for national security
purposes and which the report found to be ``the most technically
advanced and lowest risk option for future production of unobligated
enriched uranium.'' In generating these cost estimates, did NNSA also
consider public-private partnerships, lease-to-own, or any other cost-
sharing mechanism that would lessen the burden on the taxpayer? If not,
why not?
General Klotz. As required by the Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, the Department provided an
analysis of the available uranium enrichment technology options and a
preliminary cost and schedule estimate to build a national security
train. The preliminary cost estimate used existing data for the most
mature technology available at that time, the American centrifuge
technology, and at the time, data was not available to analyze and
develop an acquisition strategy. The Department is still conducting
market research for its domestic uranium enrichment needs, and will
issue a Request For Information (RFI) as soon as practicable to help
determine industry interest and contracting mechanisms that would be in
the Government's best interest.
Dr. Wenstrup. Administrator Klotz, in December 2015 and January of
this year, NNSA publicly stated that the kick-off of the acquisition
process to obtain a domestic enrichment capacity was ``imminent,'' and
that a Request For Information (RFI) related to a future program would
be released within weeks, if not days. Six months later, no such RFI
has been released. What is the timeline for issuing the RFI and how
long do you expect the RFI period to run?
General Klotz. The Department is still conducting market research
for its domestic uranium enrichment needs, and will issue a Request For
Information as soon as practicable.
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