[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-133]
OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
----------
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
----------
HEARING HELD
JULY 13, 2016
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JACKIE SPEIER, California
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia Georgia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Katy Quinn, Professional Staff Member
Anna Waterfield, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 1
Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations........... 2
WITNESSES
Allvin, Maj Gen David, USAF, Director, Strategy and Policy, U.S.
European Command............................................... 4
Ellehuus, Rachel, Principal Director, Europe and NATO Policy,
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy).................... 5
Tyra, Tom, Chief, Global Force Planning, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Department of the Army................ 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Allvin, Maj Gen David........................................ 35
Ellehuus, Rachel............................................. 43
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky......................................... 33
Tyra, Tom.................................................... 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
EuroAtlantic Coalition statement for the record.............. 57
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 61
Mr. O'Rourke................................................. 61
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 65
OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 13, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Mrs. Hartzler. Good afternoon.
I would like to extend a warm thank you to our witnesses
testifying before us today. Thank you for being here.
Before I begin, I would like to welcome the members of the
full committee who are not permanent members of the
subcommittee who are attending today.
I ask unanimous consent that these committee members be
permitted to participate in this hearing, with the
understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be
recognized for questions prior to those not assigned to the
subcommittee.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent to include into the record all
members' statements and extraneous material for members of the
committee unable to attend today's hearing and who have asked
to include a statement for the record in lieu of attendance.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 57.]
Mrs. Hartzler. This afternoon, this subcommittee plans to
discuss the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, with
representatives of the U.S. European Command, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, and the Army. All have important roles in
this initiative's development, implementation, and execution.
The goal of this hearing is to assess how the Department
[of Defense] has implemented the initiative since it was
announced, authorized, and appropriated by Congress beginning
in fiscal year 2015. We also seek to understand how the
Department plans to execute the initiative through fiscal year
2017.
We would also like our witnesses to discuss the
opportunities and challenges facing implementation within the
current European security environment and how the initiative
competes for resources among other critical priorities within
the Department, including readiness.
A military that is not ready to deploy cannot credibly
serve as a deterrent against aggressive behavior. The
Department of Defense [DOD] does not have enough ships to
maintain a constant presence in key waters. They don't have a
large enough end strength to support a permanent presence in
Europe. And the Department's nuclear enterprise and missile
defense systems are in dire need of modernization.
The recent NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Warsaw
Summit underscored many security challenges that Europe faces
today. Foremost of these challenges is a resurgent Russia. The
Warsaw Summit provided the opportunity to help form a cohesive
and comprehensive NATO plan to counter Russian actions, using
both conventional and unconventional methods, but there is much
more to be done. Vigilant oversight and consistent evaluation
will help ensure that the European Reassurance Initiative
invests in the right areas and utilizes resources effectively
and efficiently.
From recent congressionally mandated reports submitted by
the Department, it seems the Department's strategy, operations,
and posture are evolving to adapt to the new security model in
Europe.
We must also address the important issue of funding the
ERI. Currently, money for the initiative is requested annually
through the overseas contingency operations [OCO] budget. While
drawing from these funds provides near-term flexibility and
responsiveness, relying on such year-to-year appropriations
does not allow the Department of Defense to confidently plan or
implement an evolving strategy in the region.
The House-passed fiscal year 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act addressed part of this issue by reallocating
$2.2 billion of the request into the base budget. In doing so,
the House has demonstrated its enduring commitment to the
success of the European Reassurance Initiative.
So I look forward to discussing the Department's strategy
and the issues I have outlined. But before I introduce the
witnesses, I turn to the Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee ranking member for any opening remarks that she
would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Today's hearing is about the ERI, a program to deter
Russian aggression and reassure our European partners and
allies of our commitment to their security and territorial
integrity.
We should have no doubt that Russia does indeed pose a
threat, but this threat looks very different from the 1980s. We
should be mindful of this difference and allocate our scarce
resources accordingly.
Recent events in Europe have underscored this threat. For
example, Russia has occupied Crimea and has fomented the
continuing separatist struggle in eastern Ukraine. Across
Europe and in particular along Russia's border, the threat of
Russian intervention is on many people's minds.
ERI began in fiscal year 2015 as a way to reassure our
allies that we stand with them against these threats. If
approved, ERI would shift focus to deterrence in fiscal year
2017. It would increase the U.S. presence in Europe, build
partner capacity, improve infrastructure, and facilitate
interoperability. Over half of ERI funding is for
prepositioning military equipment, which would reduce the
reaction time needed for U.S. personnel to respond to urgent
crises.
I want to make sure programs like ERI take into account the
current environment to deter Russian aggression in a
sophisticated and measured way. Funding is expected to
quadruple to $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2017, so it is even
more important that Congress provide effective oversight.
We should also keep in mind threats like cyber and hybrid
warfare. I want to ensure, in addition to the challenges
addressed by ERI, we are assisting our allies to guard against
less conventional tactics.
In addition to our commitment, our NATO partners must do
their part and work to increase their capabilities, presence,
and defense spending. The best defense of Europe is a strong
collective defense. At last week's NATO summit in Warsaw, NATO
leaders underscored their commitment to unity.
Finally, I would like to know whether ERI achieves the
right balance. Does it address the needs and requirements in
Europe, and are we realistically looking at a long-term
investment?
I have concerns that the fiscal year 2017 funding for this
program is requested through the OCO. The OCO funding is
generally considered to be a temporary war fund. It looks
increasingly like the ERI is going to be a long-term program.
It also seems like Russia's destructive influence and
destabilizing efforts will continue for years to come. Given
this, using OCO to pay for ERI is no longer appropriate.
Further, what message does it convey to our allies when we
put this, quote, ``reassurance,'' unquote, program into a
temporary funding account? It doesn't seem very reassuring. As
we evaluate ERI today, I want to ensure our investment is made
in the right way with long-term strategic planning and
oversight in mind.
And I yield back.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Ms. Speier.
I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today. I want to
thank them for taking the time to be with us.
We have with us Major General David Allvin, the Director of
Strategy and Policy at U.S. European Command; Ms. Rachel
Ellehuus, Principal Director, Europe and NATO Policy, Office of
the Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Mr. Tom Tyra, the
Chief of Global Force Planning in the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.
Thank you all for being with us. And so now we will hear
your opening statements.
Major General Allvin, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN DAVID ALLVIN, USAF, DIRECTOR, STRATEGY AND
POLICY, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Allvin. Thank you, Chairman Hartzler, Ranking
Member Speier, and members of the committee. I want to thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss
the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI.
I would also like to express my sincere thanks on behalf of
my commander and the Department of Defense for your support of
this important initiative over the past 3 years. We believe it
is making a real difference.
The strategic environment in Europe has changed drastically
over the past 30 months. One of the key reasons for the growing
instability has been Russian malign influence, coercion, and
aggression against NATO allies and other partner nations.
Since the illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian
activity in the Donbass region of Ukraine, the potential for
Russia to further advance their military adventurism into NATO
countries has demanded a strong response.
We at U.S. European Command have been working to assure our
allies that our commitment to Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty
is ironclad. The first 2 years of the European Reassurance
Initiative were largely focused on assurance. To an extent,
assuring our allies has a deterrent effect in and of itself.
However, as we continue to see a malign influence and a
Russia acting to upset international norms, we have
transitioned beyond purely assurance. We are planning and
executing activities designed to serve as a stronger deterrent
to Russian aggression. The fiscal year 2017 ERI submission of
$3.4 billion reflects this transition, and I would again like
to thank the committee for its support.
The rapid change in the security environment requires a
prompt answer. ERI has provided the funding mechanism to
respond quickly and effectively, while the Department conducts
the full analysis as to which of these requirements are
enduring and which may be shorter-lived to provide the
appropriate counter to Russian aggression.
At U.S. European Command, we also understand that there are
fiscal pressures facing all government budgets. One of our most
foundational principles as we design, plan, and execute our ERI
activities is to preserve the integrity of the program and
ensure that we are being responsible stewards of the taxpayers'
dollars.
Through close coordination with our policy and comptroller
leadership in the Department, as well as the responsive
oversight provided by Congress, we will continue to provide
effective deterrence and assurance measures to prevent a
conflict in Europe, which could have the potential to spread to
the homeland.
Again, thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Allvin can be found in
the Appendix on page 35.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ellehuus.
STATEMENT OF RACHEL ELLEHUUS, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, EUROPE AND
NATO POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you.
Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you also for the opportunity to
discuss the U.S. European Reassurance Initiative as well as
some of the recent moves that NATO has taken under the Warsaw
Summit.
Prior to but particularly since 2014, we have really felt
acutely the changed security environment in Europe. Where
previously European Command had been focused on theater
security cooperation and support to other combatant commands,
we now face a real threat in the European theater, whether it
is to the east or to the south.
And thanks to the help and the responsiveness of ERI, we
have been able to respond rapidly to this changing security
environment. We are working very closely with individual
allies, with NATO, as well as within the U.S. Government, to
reinforce our collective commitment to NATO Article 5.
Since 2014, when we began ERI, we have moved from assurance
to deterrence, in step with the security environment. And
looking forward to 2017, we will continue to move in that
direction, as Russia's provocation does not change. We have
seen increased exercises, irresponsible behavior from the
Baltics to the Black Sea, and we need to continue to move in
step with that.
I wanted to, rather than focus on the five lines of effort,
which General Allvin has already highlighted, talk about how
U.S. leadership in this regard is paying dividends.
Europeans and NATO are stepping up. At the recent Warsaw
Summit, Secretary General Stoltenberg was able to report and
announce that a majority of allies had either halted or
reversed downward trends in their defense spending and, for the
first time since 2009, overall NATO defense spending had
increased.
These are positive trends. We see individual allies
stepping forward, as witnessed by the enhanced forward presence
whereby alongside the U.S., the U.K. [United Kingdom], Germany,
and Canada will provide framework nation status in the three
Balts [Baltic States] and Poland. So we are seeing very
positive signs that our leadership in this area is making a
difference.
That having been said, we need to continue to work at this.
And the three challenges that I see post-Warsaw and as we
continue to think about the future of ERI are: firstly,
institutional adaptation. We need to find a way to make NATO
more agile in terms of its decisionmaking, command structure,
and defense planning. Secondly, defense investment, and that is
not just monetary but also in terms of political will. We need
to encourage folks to continue to increase their defense
spending and to support operations both within the European and
transatlantic theater and further afield. And, finally, we need
to combat internal political challenges and resist those who
seek to divide us or undermine the international security
order.
In these past 2 years and in the 50-plus years that NATO
has existed, we have found one thing as the threats have
evolved and the security involvement has evolved, and that is
that we are stronger together. So thank you for your support.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ellehuus can be found in the
Appendix on page 43.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Ms. Ellehuus.
Mr. Tyra.
STATEMENT OF TOM TYRA, CHIEF, GLOBAL FORCE PLANNING, OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Mr. Tyra. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Speier,
distinguished members, I thank you for the opportunity to
explain the Army's contribution to the European Reassurance
Initiative.
I have provided a written statement. I would ask that you
put it into the record and we proceed to your questions.
Mrs. Hartzler. So ordered. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tyra can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
Mrs. Hartzler. All right. I very much appreciate each of
your comments. Now we will begin with some questions.
So, in February of this year, former Commander of U.S.
European Command General Breedlove noted in his posture
statement that EUCOM has less than the minimum required
personnel, equipment, and resources to accomplish our current
theater strategy.
Can you elaborate on these shortfalls that General
Breedlove references? And will the ERI budget request mitigate
some of these shortfalls and gaps? And are there any other
additional resources that are needed to sufficiently support
ERI?
So, General, I want to start with you.
General Allvin. Yes, ma'am. And with the reference to the
personnel, equipment, and resources, we find that within the
European theater we see a more aggressive Russia that is
influencing on the periphery states of NATO.
And so, given the current correlation of forces that might
exist in a conflict, specifically with the United States, we do
not have nearly the forces we had after 25 years of the
degradation of the forces in Europe.
This has been understandable because there have been other
national security priorities that obviously have taken
precedence in other parts of the world. However, we find
ourselves now with a smaller number of forces from all services
as well as the appropriate equipment in order to be able to
field and to respond to any other Russian aggression.
And I would say that what ERI has done is it has rapidly
enabled us to reverse that trend. Specifically, when we look at
our fiscal year 2017 submission, when we look at this heel-to-
toe rotation, that is an additional armored brigade combat team
that is able to make its way into theater with its equipment
full-up and ready to train not only with our joint force in the
United States forces but also with our partners and allies to
enhance interoperability.
I would say that also the submission for the APS, or the
Army Prepositioned Stocks, offers the opportunity for that
additional equipment that can start to come closer to leveling
the playing field, if you will.
But understanding the resource-constrained environment that
we are in, we are pleased with the submission in moving the
right direction to be able to recover those resources and the
manpower and the forces to be able to deter further Russian
aggression. And if the deterrence succeeds, we won't have to,
God forbid, get in a conflict.
Mrs. Hartzler. That would certainly be the goal.
Do either one of you want to weigh in on that question?
Ms. Ellehuus.
Ms. Ellehuus. Yes, certainly. Thank you for the
opportunity.
I think the unfortunate reality is is that, given today's
security environment, demand continues to outpace supply. And
the flexibility of funds, such as ERI and some of the training
funds that you have provided us to build partner capacity not
just of allies but also of partners, help us offset that fact.
One of the other things I would like to highlight is how we
offset our risk with our cooperation with allies and partners.
So I think increasingly you are seeing the United States
cooperating at a strategic level and at an operational level
with NATO allies.
So we have seen the French carrier Charles de Gaulle deploy
in the Middle East to help us with some of our stress on our
naval and maritime forces. We have seen, you know, cooperative
arrangements to use one another's bases. And we have seen host
nations stepping up. So when we send our forces to the Baltic
States, host nations such as Poland and the Balts are stepping
forward to provide that infrastructure and support.
So, as we realize that the demand outpaces the supply, we
need to look and rely more heavily on our allies and partners
to help us out.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good.
Mr. Tyra.
Mr. Tyra. Yes, thank you.
So the ability to deploy, first, in and of itself, will
make the Army more capable of meeting its global requirements.
The units that we deliver, though, will be decisive-action-
trained, so we would consider they are ready to conduct
operations.
The ability to work with allies and partners and develop an
interaction capability and a commonality of training and
equipping and the ability to fight together is a bonus. And I
think we would view this as actually building readiness higher
than it is as we developed, and, over time, the soldiers that
make those rotations will come back better able.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good.
Ms. Ellehuus, you discussed the recent NATO summit and some
of the outcomes of that. And I think it is encouraging, the
increased amount of resources that the countries are providing
and their joint willingness to work with us on training and
having that forward presence.
But I just wonder, do you see any risk to NATO's cohesion?
And, if so, what are those potential risks there? And how
should NATO's Article 5 and 6 commitments be applied in this
highly ambiguous domain?
Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you.
Well, certainly there are a number of forces and actors who
are trying to undermine alliance unity, but, fortunately, the
Warsaw Summit was a representation of the fact that we are
committed to collective defense and they won't be able to do
that.
So, whether it is Russian propaganda in the Baltic States
and Poland or in Central Europe or it is, you know, provocative
actions towards our ally Turkey, I think we have demonstrated
through Warsaw and our commitments there to collective defense
and Article 5 that we are going to be sticking together and we
are not going to allow them to undermine that.
I am anticipating a question about Brexit, so I will
preempt it, but we have----
Mrs. Hartzler. Please tell us about Brexit and your
feelings on its impact.
Ms. Ellehuus. We have a very close relationship, uniquely
close relationship, with the United Kingdom, and, you know, in
anticipation of a ``yes'' or a ``no'' vote, we continued to
reinforce that relationship.
In the days following the Warsaw Summit and the vote, the
U.K. has reinforced its commitment to a number of important
initiatives. So they have publicly committed at the Farnborough
Airshow to their maritime patrol aircraft and the commitment to
procure nine P-8s. They have announced procurement of Apaches,
and they have announced intent to move forward as quickly as
possible--I believe it is the 18th of July--with a debate on
their continuous at-sea deterrence and that principle.
So I think that, while there are external forces that seek
to divide, we have presented a united front and that, even
given some of the trends that could undermine our ability to
operate effectively and together, we have a strong enough base
that I think we will manage to weather the storm.
Mrs. Hartzler. I would cautiously say I think I am
optimistic or encouraged by some of the recent events and some
of the things you just shared. So that is good news.
I now turn to the ranking member, Representative Speier,
for her questions.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Allvin, in your statement, you said that Russia
employs multiple types of warfare--conventional, irregular, and
asymmetric--to induce regional instability.
How is the ERI going to improve our ability to defend
against Russia's asymmetric tactics?
General Allvin. Thank you very much for that question.
I would say two things. With respect to sort of the hybrid
warfare, which is one of the common terms, hybrid warfare is
neither new or unique, but the way the Russians are applying it
very effectively now is primarily below the conventional level.
So I would say that the way that the European Reassurance
Initiative approaches this is, with our partners and allies
specifically in areas which are susceptible or have been
susceptible to some of these hybrid tactics, whether they be
information operations or propaganda or cyberattacks or these
sort of things that disrupt the internal governmental flow or
the workings of the government, the European Reassurance
Initiative has allowed us to have engagements in those
countries. There has been some of the funding that has gone
towards some of the cyber engagements that we can teach our
tactics and procedures about attribution, about hardening and
resilience with the cyber capabilities, about attributing not
only the cyberattacks but also some of the propaganda. So it
really is an awareness and sharing the tactics and techniques
that we use to be able to highlight those.
But I would say that, on the hybrid warfare, part of the
hybrid is the high end, and the high end is the conventional
conflict. And I would say that, historically, has proven to be
the most costly and the most irreversible. And so, if we can
continue to reassure and now deter that conventional conflict,
it at least sort of brackets it and allows us to work down in
some of these lower areas of malign influence and coercion
beyond the large conventional conflict.
And so I think the ERI helps us both have a stronger
deterrent effect against the conventional conflict, but there
are elements that we are doing with engagement and resilience
and hardening that help against some of these elements of the
lower echelons of hybrid warfare.
Ms. Speier. Major General, you had indicated to me
privately that the troops that we will have stationed as part
of ERI would be engaged in military exercises. And you had
suggested that the numbers may be as high as 100 per year--some
smaller, some larger. How many of these are airshows?
General Allvin. Ma'am, I actually wouldn't put an airshow
in the----
Ms. Speier. Good.
General Allvin [continuing]. Category of exercises.
When we refer to these exercises and when I say 100, some
of these are small, maybe company-level exercises, but these
are building that understanding, that cohesion at the unit
level. And I would say those are the most prolific.
However, with the initial funding we have been able to
receive through ERI, we are able to have exercises at the
larger level, the battalion level and above, which really help
us to understand the interoperability between formations.
Because we understand that U.S. European Command will not be
the sole entity that will have to defend against Russian
aggression. We will be fighting with our allies and partners in
the region.
And so these broader exercises, these higher-level
exercises really enhance that confidence to be able to fight
and maneuver and do combined arms warfare beyond just the
United States but in the coalition.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Tyra, what type of military equipment do
you expect to be deployed over the next 5 years as part of the
ERI?
Mr. Tyra. So, in the next year, we intend to build an
armored brigade combat team. If supported, we intend to build a
fires brigade, which is artillery, which would be tube and
rocket artillery, to add to it.
We intend to build a division headquarters battalion, which
is the equipment that the division commander and his staff
use--approximately 500 soldiers. So it would be, you know,
computers, radios, satellite communication, vehicles, that kind
of stuff, to allow them to conduct mission command throughout
the region. And that will be in 2017.
If the program continues, we would look to meet the next
identified requirements for the defense of Europe. And I think
you would expect to see engineering battalions moved over
there. I think you would expect to see possibly the ground
element of an Army aviation brigade. I think we would want to
see more satellite communication, more logistics, and whatever
was required to speed the delivery of a fighting force.
Ms. Speier. So, in terms of actual weapons to be warehoused
over there in the next year, we are not talking about a sizable
number of weapons systems being transferred over there? I was
under the impression that that is what we were doing.
Mr. Tyra. So, in the first armored brigade combat team, you
would see 80 M1 tanks and 140 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 18
artillery systems, a number of mortar systems and smaller
pieces of equipment. So we would end up with that, plus the
support vehicles that enable that to fight.
Then there would be a rotating brigade that would bring
identical sets of equipment. As you delivered the fires
brigade, you would expect, you know, another 100 or so
artillery systems, either tube- or rocket-launched, to be added
to that fires brigade.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Ellehuus, you know, this is an example of mission
creep. I might actually be supportive of this, but this started
out as a $1 billion emergency fund for 1 year, and now it is
morphing into a $3.4 billion program that, for all intents and
purposes, is becoming permanent.
What do you see the funding levels growing to in subsequent
years?
Ms. Ellehuus. Well, certainly, we are aware of this tension
between things that are paid for through supplementary funding
as opposed to things that are part of our regular base budgets.
And when we vet the requests that come through from the
services and the combatant commands, we take a very close look
at those to make sure that we are not funding enduring
requirements indefinitely, and over time we too would like to
see more things move into the base, not least because, as all
of you have said, it provides a degree of certainty to our
allies and partners that our commitment is enduring rather than
year to year.
In terms of future-year budgets, I mean, we do have to plan
against a baseline, so, you know, I would anticipate that we
would plan against last year's baseline as a going-in
proposition and then adjust from there. But, you know, we don't
want to come in every year asking you to double this amount. We
do need to continue to protect the integrity of the program and
take a close eye at what is being proposed and what fits with
what we need to respond to the strategic environment and
whether we are using the right sources of money.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
Now we will go to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ellehuus, this is somewhat of an opinion question, I
recognize, but it is something that I ask myself. Russia's
economy today, the impact that it has on Putin's decisionmaking
process and how aggressive he is. The weakness in his economy
could lead him to be more aggressive; it could lead him to be
less aggressive.
What is your opinion on that, whether or not he is less
aggressive or more aggressive because of his current economic
state? And what happens if the price of oil returns to where
his economy actually recovers?
Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you for your question.
Yes, it is certainly a difficult balance to determine
whether we want a strong Russia or an internally destabilized
Russia. So when we think about things like sanctions and oil
prices, certainly, instability in Russia is a concern, as well
as external provocation.
It is hard to say exactly when I look at what causes a
reaction from Mr. Putin and what does not. It seems like, you
know, we can try to get into his mind and guess at what is an
excuse for provocation, but I don't think that he necessarily
needs one.
I take the example of two recent exercises that we had in
Europe. We had Anakonda just here in the beginning of June with
31,000 soldiers from 24 nations. We also had BALTOPS 16, which
has been happening for decades, and that had about 6,100
soldiers. And it is something that the Russians have been
invited to previously, they are aware of. And, of the two
exercises, he griped about BALTOPS rather than Anakonda.
So it is hard to get into the mindset and sort of determine
what would be provocative and destabilizing. But I think, in
the first instance, we need to make sure that we are doing the
best to make sure that we deter his aggression and that we are
prepared if that deterrence fails.
Mr. Scott. And correct me if I am wrong. It seems to me
that maybe his perception of weakness on the other side may be
more of a determining factor than how strong he is internally
or his country is financially.
Ms. Ellehuus. Yes. I think an outward show of strength is
something that reinforces domestic support for his leadership.
And so, if there is an opportunity or an opening to demonstrate
that resolve against NATO or individual allies, I think we have
seen he is an opportunist and will take that initiative.
Mr. Scott. But if that outward show has--the more risk that
that outward show has, the less likely he is to engage in it
then. Would that be a fair statement?
Ms. Ellehuus. Could you please repeat that?
Mr. Scott. So the less likely he is to--the more strength
that there is on the other side of it, the less likely he would
be willing to engage in those provocative behaviors.
Ms. Ellehuus. Yes. I think that is certainly our intent
with the moves we are trying to take under ERI and in the NATO
context.
Earlier, resilience was mentioned. And if you build
resilience in a country and you give them options--so, for
example, you know, if Putin thinks one of the tools at his
disposal is cutting off energy supplies in the Baltic States or
the Black Sea, he will use that. But if there is kind of a
safety net and an alternative, it undermines his ability to
hold them at risk.
So demonstrating strength is certainly a way to change that
calculus and make the costs outweigh the risks.
Mr. Scott. And so this helps get to my point, which may be
contradictory, respectfully, to another colleague's point.
If we have a short-term commitment, he can simply wait us
out, where if we show a long-term commitment, then maybe he
doesn't feel like he is--maybe he is not as froggy, as we would
say in south Georgia----
Ms. Ellehuus. Right.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. If you will.
Ms. Ellehuus. It is difficult to know, sir.
Mr. Scott. What other plans, other than the European
Reassurance Initiative, does the DOD have to deter Russia over
the long term?
Ms. Ellehuus. Well, I know that we have a number of
classified programs, which we would be happy to come back and
discuss in another forum, that try to look at some of Russia's
capabilities and the military buildup that they have undertaken
in recent years and how we might get at that.
For example, I think you are all very familiar with the
third offset strategy and some of the efforts we are trying to
take to think about how we change the way we approach
conventional capabilities and make sure we retain the military
edge. So that is definitely one thing.
Also, I would say that, you know, in addition to European
Command, we have to remember that other combatant commands have
a role in deterring Russia. So I know that Northern Command is
looking very closely at the Arctic and what Russia is doing in
the Arctic and trying to make sure that, while we keep that
stable and safe and demilitarized, we are not being naive about
what Russia's intentions there. Similarly, PACOM [U.S. Pacific
Command] has a role to play. If you are on the west coast, that
is how you are looking at the Russia threat. So there are a
number of initiatives underway across the Department.
Mr. Scott. My time has expired, but, Madam Chair, I hope we
have a time for a second round of questions.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. I do too. Thank you.
Now we turn to the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham.
Ms. Graham. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
appreciate it.
And thank you all very much for being here today.
Please pardon my lack of knowledge in this area, but what
is Russia doing in the Arctic?
Ms. Ellehuus. Well, certainly, they have a presence there,
and a great part of their territory is in the Arctic, so a lot
of that presence is legitimate. It is economic interests, and
as we see new seaways opening up, I think they are thinking
ahead to the economic opportunities but also to being able to
control those lanes and passageways.
So, in addition to military buildup in the Baltic Sea
region, we are seeing some changes in military buildup in the
Arctic, as well--increased exercises and presence that we
hadn't seen to date.
So, while some of the presence is certainly legitimate and
in defense of their economic and legitimate interests, some of
it is a little bit worrying, given that in the Arctic Council
and other fora we really try to focus on keeping that a
conflict-free zone and keeping it stable.
Ms. Graham. Uh-huh. Anything else to add by the other two
panelists?
General Allvin. Ma'am, I would just add the one. Sort of an
exclamation point on that is, you know, beyond their legitimate
interests, I forget how many years ago, but they did take sort
of the rhetorical point of placing a platinum Russia flag on
the northern pole, sort of staking their claim to the very
north part of the Arctic.
So there is some rhetoric that is sort of this bullying
type of behavior that has been consistently how they approach
things.
Ms. Graham. Uh-huh. Thank you.
And I think that segues nicely into my next question: Putin
as a bully and how we deal with that type of a personality, the
uncertainty that he presents. Because we never know what he is
going to do. He is capable of anything.
So I would like you all to address that. How do we deal
with someone of the personality type of a Putin?
General Allvin. Ma'am, I will take the first shot at that,
and then the smarter people to my right and left will probably
be able to improve on that.
But that is a question that we ask ourselves continuously.
And I think, absent being able to get into the mind of Mr.
Putin, which none of us have been able to, I think that we go
back to the principles, I guess, of deterrence, when, in fact,
we look at the principles of what we need to do to prevent
certain behavior or unacceptable behavior from occurring from a
certain actor.
And the deterrence theory really says, if you want to
prevent that behavior, you need to do a couple of things. You
either need to convince that potential doer of adversarial
actions that the outcome that they seek will not be attainable,
they will not achieve the benefit that they perceive they are
going to achieve by that, or, in the pursuit of that, the cost
will be so high that it will not be worth that benefit they
anticipate they are going to gain.
And so that really is the traditional deterrence paradigm.
So if you perceive him as a bully or if you perceive him as a
confident, aspirant, great-power leader, however you do that,
we judge his actions and we look at what the potential actions
would be that would be adversarial to our national security
interests, and then what are the things we can do to either
make that perception that it is unattainable or that the cost
of attaining it would be too high.
And so that is really at the heart of really what the ERI
really is. It starts with assurance, where we are showing that
we have a stake in the game, perhaps greater than Putin's
Russia believed that we did. And so, for the first couple of
years, we are assuring our European allies we are going to be
there, our commitment to Article 5 is ironclad.
Now, as we are showing we have a better interoperability
with them, we are putting more credible combat formations in
there, we are showing that cohesion, now we are looking at
trying to convince Putin's Russia that this is going to cost
more than you think, and your ambitious behavior here may be
met with the cost that you may not want to incur for your
particular adventurism.
And so we really just fall back on the principles of
deterrence as really the foundation for some of the activities
we are doing with ERI, whether it is a bully or whatever you
see him as.
Ms. Graham. Thank you.
Ms. Ellehuus. I often think of, sort of, you know,
childrearing metaphors in context to international relations,
so I very much appreciate the question.
I think, first and foremost, we need to demonstrate unity.
So, whether it is on sanctions or, you know, just trying to
pick off individual allies, I think that is the worst thing we
can do, is allow him to separate us from one another. We just
have to demonstrate that resolve and unity.
I actually think the administration's policy of a strong
and balanced approach to Russia is very wise, because one of
the things that Putin seeks is influence. He wants to matter.
He wants a seat at the table. But in order to coerce that
behavior in the right direction, where it is supporting rather
than undermining the international system, we cooperate with
them in areas where they are being a constructive actor. So you
reward the good behavior while punishing the bad--again, going
back to the childcare metaphor.
Ms. Graham. My kids would be appalled to hear me say this
in an open hearing, but that approach does work.
And thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
We will move on to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Russell.
Mr. Russell. And thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
allowing me to join your committee today.
And thank you, panel, for being here. It is good to see Mr.
Tyra. It has been many, many years. And, General Allvin, it is
good to see you again.
We have had suggestions here today of mission creep, but I
recall, when I joined the military in the mid-1980s, in Europe
we had two full corps of soldiers. That would have been a
minimum of four total divisions and two armored cavalry
regiments, not to mention air forces and allies. So this is not
a mission creep. This is staunching the bleed-out of a presence
to virtually nothing now in Europe.
It calls to mind that deterrence without a deterrent is a
bluff that gambles the future security of Europe. So I guess my
question to the three of you is, how reassuring would it be to
Europe if we don't have a deterrent, if we don't build this
contingency force? What would the reaction be in that scenario?
General Allvin. Well, thanks for the question.
I think it, again, is trying to predict an unknown, but I
would say that history has shown that if one seeks to split the
alliance or a set of individual nations, then one can show how
perhaps the team is not all playing together.
And so, to your point, the lack of showing our commitment--
and our commitment in presence, our commitment in
interoperability, our commitment in training and exercises to
show that we are a cohesive, credible combat force--I think
logic would dictate that that would have a negative effect on
the alliance's confidence in its ability to fight as an
alliance and repel a Russian aggression.
Ms. Ellehuus. Can I preempt you?
So I, again, am reassured by some of the language in the
communique from the Warsaw Summit. NATO focused very much on
deterrence and defense and how to reinforce that even if we
don't have the volume of forces and capabilities in theater
that we had previously.
And the way that they put it is they underscored that that
collective defense is a fundamental responsibility of NATO, and
it relies on a whole suite of capabilities. So it is a mix of
the nuclear, the conventional, missile defense, and,
increasingly, even cyber and space and other elements.
So, even if we don't have the heft of conventional forces
that we had, I am hopeful that the way we think creatively
about the mix of capabilities enables us to get at the problem
and to deter.
Mr. Tyra. So I would add to that, the U.S. has a long
history of displaying the ability to deploy enormous resources
against a problem, and that raising the determination in the
U.S. and its allies is not profitable, right? And, therefore,
you can, in fact, deploy that entire force and keep deploying
it without having to build more of it. The economies in Europe,
the U.S. economy, they are all capable of conducting these
operations.
And I think that is how we would sell them. What they need
is assurance that the U.S. is with them, and then that would be
enough.
Mr. Russell. Well, thank you for that.
And I guess my last question would be, what impact would it
have on other nations?
We have made much of the initiative to encourage our
European allies to provide 2 percent towards their national
defense, and we see some movement on that. Some is mixed. A lot
of it is tied to a lot of factors.
If we lead and show, from no presence to now a brigade
combat team, with a promise of, as you suggest, Mr. Tyra, that,
as we show up, there is more to follow--you may pick on little
brother today, but big brother is coming. If we don't do that,
what impact would that have on the 2 percent initiatives that
we have worked so carefully to try to craft with our European
allies to make their own commitments?
Ms. Ellehuus. I can begin, since you took the last one.
Certainly, it is a fine balance between being there and
being a good NATO ally and doing our part while not allowing
inequitable burden-sharing.
So I think a good example of this is the enhanced forward
presence [EFP]. The U.S. actually did not commit to be a
framework nation until we were pretty certain that other allies
were going to step up. And it goes with this thinking that, you
know, Europeans should also be taking responsibility for their
security and caring about it as much as we care about the
transatlantic space. So enhanced forward presence is an example
of how the U.S. was careful not to underwrite everything,
because we had already done quite a bit through ERI.
On 2 percent, I think we do need to keep the pressure on.
Again, five allies have stepped up and are now at or above 2
percent, and others are on their way. But we regularly, in our
office, have people coming through and telling us that we need
to keep the pressure on, because they need to be able to go
back to their parliaments and argue for greater defense
spending and why it is central to stability, economic
stability, in their countries.
Mr. Russell. Thank you for that.
And I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, gentleman.
Now we will turn to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me to
join the hearing today.
I would love to follow up on Mr. Russell's point. We have
talked a lot today about deterrence and about the money that we
are committing towards that end. But I think it would also send
a very powerful message for our NATO allies to meet their
commitments in terms of proximity to Russia itself, to the
threat that that potentially presents. They have the most to
lose in a confrontation.
And it blows me away that, of the 28 NATO member countries,
only 5 have met a minimal threshold of 2 percent while we are
spending near 4 percent, double all other NATO countries
combined. And of the Baltic States, only Estonia has reached
that--the Baltic States, who we seem to be preoccupied with in
terms of potential Russian provocation.
And so my concern--I don't know if you have an answer to
it. You said that we are pretty certain that some of these
member countries are going to meet their commitments; we need
to do more.
If you have something specific to share, I would love to
hear it. If not, I would just love to make the point that we
are creating a moral hazard by upping an investment from $789
million to $3.4 billion without a concurrent commitment in real
dollars or euros from our allies on the continent. And I think
that sets its own set of problems in motion.
The other thing that I would like to ask of General Allvin
is, last week, we had a great panel, including Dov Zakheim, who
talked about the tyranny of consensus. And you have been
talking about all the reasons that ERI makes sense, everything
that it might be able to do. I would love to get a sense of the
intellectual rigor that went into making these decisions and
coming up with this strategy.
In much the same way that we may or may not have been able
to forecast that Russia might feel encircled as we brought more
countries formerly in the eastern bloc into NATO, is there some
unintended consequence that we might want to think about now or
that you could share with us, in terms of upping our
commitment, our force structure, the amount of money that we
are spending, ratcheting up the escalation in that area? Again,
maybe for the right reasons; maybe we have thought all of this
through. But assure me that you have thought through some of
the other consequences that may not have been obvious from your
testimony.
General Allvin. Well, sir, I would say, specifically, with
respect to the approach that we have taken, as I mentioned,
there has been a transition. For the first couple years, it was
really about assurance. And so if one wanted to say that was a
more passive approach, because when you looked at the way that
we were executing and had been executing, it was very
disaggregated with our formations. And it was sort of a
statement that we are here, we are here, but the way that we
were here in many of the--the presence in the Baltics, for
example, was not necessarily a credible combat formation, but
it sent that message that we are standing next to our allies.
And as we saw the continued malign influence and the
activities, that is what has had us step up----
Mr. O'Rourke. I am sorry to interrupt you. I have limited
time.
So I am not so interested in the thinking that went into
coming up with this as the strategy, but the thinking that
challenged this strategy. What are the potential risks of this
strategy? What could go wrong?
General Allvin. So you actually touched on it very well,
Congressman, is that there is an escalation risk here. And so,
as we try and understand those things which are true red lines,
those things which are rhetorical red lines, the consistency is
with our commitments of resources and equipment and exercises
and increased focus in Europe. It is also with the consistent
messaging, the messaging of what we are here to do and the
objectionable behavior by the Russians that has caused this
response.
Mr. O'Rourke. From my perspective as a Member of Congress,
Crimea caught me by surprise. And, again, from a little bit of
a distance, although I sit on the committee and I have been
able to be in some classified discussions on this, I think all
of us would have liked to have known more about what was about
to come before it hit us.
Tell me what, since Crimea, you have done in terms--that
you could talk about here--in terms of maybe Russian language
specialists who are on your staff, your ability to collect
information, the ability not just through deterrence and force
presence but perhaps the nonforce aspects of what we do in
Europe to prevent something from happening in the first place
or to anticipate it before it hits us.
General Allvin. Absolutely.
Mr. O'Rourke. And I didn't leave you much time, so I may
have to take this for the record, Madam Chair.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
General Allvin. I would just--I will introduce, and perhaps
I will get a chance to expound on it later, but the Russian
Strategic Initiative is something I would like to share and
talk about.
Of course, with respect to the intel [intelligence]
capabilities, I am not of that particular ilk, and I know that
there are more intel professionals who can speak more deeply on
this. But they are committed to regaining that expertise in the
quantities that have sort of eroded over the past 15, 20 years,
for the right reasons, because there are more global
requirements for that. But that is a commitment that the intel
community is making.
The Russia Strategic Initiative is--much of it is about
learning, it is about understanding. So, to your point, sir,
that the surprise of Crimea, that caught a lot of us sort of
unawares, and understanding that we need to be able to have a
better understanding of the thinking, of the strategy, of the
doctrine of Russia to be able to anticipate better, in
conjunction with the increasing resources from the Intelligence
Community, we have an understanding to how to respond to those
and perhaps get ahead of that.
So and I would be happy to talk further at length about the
Russia Strategic Initiative, which is something that,
incidentally, was initially funded through ERI.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mrs. Hartzler. You bet. And we are getting ready to start
here in a minute a second round of questioning. So if you can
stick around, we would love to have you have the opportunity to
share any more questions you might have, because those are
really excellent questions.
Representative Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is great
to be here.
First of all, I just want to associate myself with
Representative Russell and Representative O'Rourke and their
remarks about the importance of contributions to the NATO
alliance. You emphasized how important it is that we have a
united alliance.
General, you used the terms ``commitment in presence,''
``confidence in the alliance,'' ``effectiveness of
interoperability.'' Do you think it would be a wise decision to
dismantle NATO?
General Allvin. No. Absolutely not. I could go on for
minutes or hours, but, absolutely, if NATO----
Mr. Moulton. Well, you are preaching to the choir here. We
just, unfortunately, have a major-party candidate who thinks
that is a good idea.
You also talked about the importance of deterring Putin.
And I couldn't agree more that he is a real threat. Is it
helpful to have people talking about his leadership, praising
his military accomplishments? Is that a good way to deter
Putin, General?
General Allvin. I can really only speak to the way that we
can try and avert behavior through our strength and, sort of,
the primary deterrence theory model. With respect to other
influences outside of the principles of deterrence, which are
deny the benefit or increase the cost, I am not really a
deterrence specialist beyond the principles of deterrence
theory, so I really can't speak to those elements.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
Would anyone else like to comment on that?
Ms. Ellehuus. We work with alliances and partnerships every
day, so we see the value of those.
And the transatlantic community, you know, Putin aside,
when we have other nations who are undermining the rules-based
international order which we have tried so hard to create, I
think the transatlantic community has greater influence
together.
And so, outside of a NATO perspective, I think in terms of
relative influence, there is a rationale for keeping NATO and
increasing our relationship with individual allies in the EU.
Mr. Moulton. Great. Thank you very much.
I would like to talk about something that some other people
have brought up, which is the Russian hybrid warfare threat and
how we are meeting that threat.
When I was in Eastern Europe looking at the threat of
Russia last year, it was very clear that we have gotten--you
know, we were doing some good tank drills and things like that,
but Russia has an incredibly well-developed propaganda effort--
for example, extensive propaganda, both clandestine but also,
frankly, very public, with their public TV stations.
One of the lessons that we have learned in fighting ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] over the past several years
is that we can drop a lot of bombs and kill a lot of ISIS
fighters, but if we don't address the recruiting effort, either
right there on the ground amongst the family and friends of
those we kill or through the Internet with folks even back
home, then we are really not going to win this fight against
ISIS.
And it strikes me that there is a bit of an analogy with
the fight against Russia, that we can add a few more battalions
of tanks and do some larger tank drills and shows of force with
our Air Force, but if we are not addressing the way that they
are really undermining confidence in the NATO alliance right
there in Eastern Europe, then we are probably not going to win
this fight in the long run.
So, General, can you talk about the balance that you see in
the ERI and whether we are putting enough effort into those
types of battles as well?
General Allvin. I would say that balance of effort does not
necessarily equate to balance of dollars.
Mr. Moulton. Sure.
General Allvin. So I think that there are some areas that
are smaller dollar amounts within ERI, and some of the things
that we are doing just within the normal conduct of business
with our Special Operations Command in Europe that really get
at this using the host nation to strengthen their ability to
attribute, to be able to sort of call out, to be able to
identify that which is true with that which is being, you know,
formulated, the facts on the ground.
I think, inherently, you step back and it is easy to
understand how a country that acts fully out of interests
versus a country which is value-based has an advantage
tactically in being able to not be encumbered by the truth. So
it makes it a bit of a challenge, but one that I think we
embrace happily as a values-based nation.
So I think those sort of things that we are doing to be
able to help them attribute it, confront it, call them out, and
be able to identify the differences between the truth and what
is being portrayed, that is being funded partially through ERI
and some of the engagements that we do in the day-to-day
business within European----
Mr. Moulton. Do you think it is being funded sufficiently?
General Allvin. Honestly, I am not enough of an expert to
say what----
Mr. Moulton. I mean, my impression a year ago was that we
were doing very little, compared to what they are doing, to
counter their effort. So, I mean, if there has been a dramatic
change in the last 12 months, then I would be willing to revise
my assessment, but----
General Allvin. I would offer that, as we look at this, it
is not necessarily the Russian military alone that is doing
this. They are approaching it with a whole-of-government,
whole-of-nation approach, and----
Mr. Moulton. And do we have enough of a whole-of-nation,
whole-of-government approach in response?
General Allvin. I would say that is beyond my particular
area of expertise to----
Mr. Moulton. From your perspective, do you think you are
being supported enough? I mean, you have a job that is very
dependent on these other arms of government. Do you think we
are doing enough?
General Allvin. I honestly--understanding the tensions that
exist within this government for all the things that have to be
done, I cannot speak credibly as to what the other elements of
the government are doing, whether it is sufficient.
Mr. Moulton. So, General, if you cannot even speak to what
the other elements of government are doing, it certainly
doesn't give me enough confidence that we have enough of a
whole-of-government approach to this threat.
Thank you very much.
Madam Chair, thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
Now, as has been alluded to, in this initiative for fiscal
year 2017, we are funding the operation at $3.4 billion, which
is up from $789 million authorized and appropriated last year.
So that is a huge increase in investment.
And the request addressed most of those funds towards a
conventional buildup, including consecutive, rotational, or
heel-to-toe deployments of U.S. troops and the prepositioning
of an armored brigade combat team's equipment in Europe. And
the funds also are providing for additional military exercises
with one or more foreign partners, building foreign military
capacity, countering unconventional threats, and military
construction, or MILCON, projects.
So, just for the record, could you expound on specific
examples of the way this money is being used, specific MILCON
projects that are going to be using this money, specific
training exercises that you have been doing, and examples of
building that foreign military capacity?
General.
General Allvin. Yes, ma'am. Well, I would say
specifically--well, starting with the exercises. That is one we
alluded to earlier, whether it be Anakonda 16 or the BALTOPS or
Cold Response, Trident Juncture. These are elements of
exercising that we are enabling to grow and be more
multinational and more opportunities to test interoperability
amongst nations. So, on the exercise, it has been very robust.
The infrastructure, when we talk about MILCON, it is not
necessarily what we would consider big construction. It is a
very small percentage. But the military construction is really
to allow the infrastructure of the host nation to better
support their training and our training needs alongside them.
So, when you have slight improvements, for example, in
training ranges, in Bulgaria, for example, that allows us to
have better bilateral or multilateral exercising and training
interoperability exercises, given the improvements in the
ranges, for example.
With respect to the presence--I would say that each of
these five lines of effort, the key is that this is one area
where the sum is much greater than the parts. If you have the,
sort of, slight increase in the infrastructure, it enables you
to do more robust exercising. If you have a greater presence of
this armored brigade combat team, which is their heel-to-toe,
fully with their equipment, it allows you to do more broader
engagements and interoperabilities and leverage the small
infrastructure improvements that we are doing. As you increase
the engagements with your partners at the smaller level with
building partnership capacity, that is done through the
presence and the engagements of those forces that are able to
come over.
And in a purely deterrence aspect, which is really what
this--the prepositioned stocks are largely a deterrent aspect,
but they also enable the Army to in future times come over and
fall in on that and be able to exercise that as a deterrent. So
each of those really feed into each other for an overall
increased deterrent effect.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. And, as we discussed privately,
you will be modernizing some of the bunkers and some of the old
facilities that are there in order to house the equipment and
to be able to have those prepositioned stocks.
What can we expect our allies to contribute to the ERI from
both a capability and capacity perspective?
And, separately, would the U.S. Foreign Military Sales
program be a useful mechanism through which the U.S. could aid
our ERI partners? And, if so, are there any FMS cases that are
currently working their way through the FMS process relating to
this initiative and our partner nations?
Ms. Ellehuus. I can begin on that.
Certainly, you know, as we have moved from assurance to
deterrence, and we have learned more each year as we have
proceeded with the training and exercises and other efforts
under ERI. So, for example, as we do the training and
exercises, we find other vulnerabilities, in terms of
maneuverability or movements or gaps in infrastructure or
communications, and so we are able to build on that.
And those aren't just vulnerabilities that we, the United
States, needs to come in and fix; those are lessons learned
that we pass on to individual allies about their
vulnerabilities and what they need to do to reinforce their own
defense, and there are things that we pass on to NATO as well.
So, to give you one example, you are probably familiar with
NATO's RAP, or Reassurance Action Plan, which was a holdover
from the Wales Summit in 2014. And the NAC [North Atlantic
Council] recently agreed the Readiness Action Plan reception,
staging, and onward movement and preposition capability
packages, whereby NSIP [NATO Security Investment Programme]
funding, about 300 million euros, will be used to support ERI
projects, so design and construction, including storage of U.S.
equipment in Poland.
So, you know, that is a lot of words, but, in short, we
have said we want to preposition stocks in Poland and we want
to train there, and NATO is recognizing that they will take
advantage of those sites as well. And so they recognize that
NATO will also provide funding for that. So that heavily
reduces the bill for the U.S. and allows us to either give back
that ERI funding or use it elsewhere.
And so I give you that example just to show the kind of
expectations we are conveying not only to individual allies, in
terms of host-nation support, but to NATO, saying, you are
benefiting from this as well, you are going to use those
training ranges, you are going to use those bases.
In terms of your second question about building partner
capacity and FMF [Foreign Military Financing], I would have to
get back to you because I would need to confer with State
Department about what the security assistance plan is for this
year.
But I do know that in the discussions that DOD has been
involved in with State Department about building that program,
we have argued for pooled funding for the Baltic nations to
increase their capabilities under the Baltic Defense
Capabilities Initiative, particularly in areas such as air
defense. And so we have tried to look at them, you know, as
three rather than individual nations and look at what they
already have and what they might need in future to reinforce
their own defenses, using mechanisms like FMF.
But we can certainly take that for the record and get you
exact numbers for FMF.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 61.]
Mrs. Hartzler. I appreciate that. Yeah, this subcommittee
has been looking at the foreign military sales process and ways
that it is impacting our global defense, as well as any
problems, so that is why I ask that question.
My last question before I turn to the other members is,
giving the information coming out of Eastern Europe, I
understand that there are very lethal threats to our primary
ground combat platforms and their crews. And many in the Army,
including General McMaster, the Director of the Army
Capabilities Integration Center and Deputy Commanding General
of Futures at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, has
stated that our ground combat vehicles are losing their
qualitative edge over our adversaries. ``With Russia
demonstrating the capability to field advanced anti-tank
weapons and thermobaric warheads, our armored vehicles and
servicemembers will be vulnerable in a fight.''
So I understand that new technologies like the Active
Protection System, the APS, can defeat these threats, and they
have already been successfully fielded and combat-tested by our
allies with great results. And I have been a very strong
advocate of APS technologies to protect our men and women and
believe we need the technology fielded now.
So, General Allvin, can you tell us how EUCOM, in
particular, views the threat situation to our ground combat
vehicles? And how is EUCOM working with the Army to address the
threat sooner rather than later, especially if the APS solution
already exists?
General Allvin. Well, I will tell you that what we are
learning in--as we mentioned, this last 30 months has been--it
is relatively rapid, I guess, in bureaucratic timeframe, but we
have been getting smarter about what it takes to operate in the
vicinity of and what combat might look like if, God forbid, it
were to actually happen through some of our contingency
planning and wargaming.
And that actually has yielded deficiencies in several
domains, so it is not only just the land domain but the air
domain. Their ability to inhibit freedom of movement and the
qualitative edge is, sort of, waning in several areas.
So, while I can't speak to this specifically, what we do as
a result of that, those are the capability gaps and shortfalls
that we do submit in each of those domains, those shortfalls,
as they are identified and clarified to the Department. And
that goes back to the services and into the building to come up
with the solutions to those.
So we do identify the gaps and the shortfalls, and then the
solutions come out through OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] and the services. And I would say that this one, this
particular one, has not elevated above others to us. There is a
general category of inhibitors to freedom of movement and
things where the qualitative edge has waned with respect to a
potential confrontation with the Russians.
Mrs. Hartzler. I am having a classified briefing tomorrow
on some of these issues, so perhaps we can delve further into
those vulnerabilities at that time. But thank you for your
answer.
Ranking Member Speier, do you have any additional
questions?
Ms. Speier. No.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good.
Mr. Scott, do you have any additional questions?
Mr. Scott. General Allvin, I wanted to follow up, and this
may give you a chance to speak about the initiative you were
talking about earlier.
What requirements remain unfunded under the current budget,
and how would you assess the risk that that causes the forces
under European Command? And then just any general comments that
you have. I know you had some comments about the Russian
initiative.
General Allvin. Well, thank you.
I would say that, in general, we do need those forces that
are coming in through ERI, those increased rotational forces.
And I think one of the other areas that has been identified is
also, as we mentioned, the ability to counter this anti-access/
area denial capability that the Russians have been able to put
up that could inhibit the freedom of movement. That is about as
much depth at this classification.
But I would say thank you for the opportunity to reengage
on the Russia Strategic Initiative. Because one thing we
certainly understand is that we do have some learning to do,
and we have to do it fairly rapidly. And so, while the
Intelligence Community is really working hard on being able to
increase the robustness and the capacity of their resources and
their analysts and the understanding, we also in the Department
understand that this is an issue that crosses combatant
commands and it is something that we need to understand as a
department.
And so, thanks to initially the funding of the European
Reassurance Initiative, we have developed this Russia Strategic
Initiative. And I can tell you at this classification level,
its primary role is to enhance our understanding and to help
support some of the planning that we would do and some of the
deterrent activities.
A lot of these questions that have been asked today we are
still trying to get to the correct answers on. The Russia
Strategic Initiative is moving us closer to a better
understanding that will help us be able to have more satisfying
answers to questions like this in the future.
And I would say that this is an example, as we look at the
question of what is in the OCO which should be into base, this
is one of those that the Department realizes this is a long-
term initiative. And so it has been transitioned into a program
of record. So the funding that started off in ERI is going to
transition into the Army's base budget as a program of record.
So this is one of the examples where we keep analyzing those
things that we think are going to be long-term requirements and
how we might be able to move them into the base budgets.
So thank you for the opportunity to respond.
Mr. Scott. Do you think that Mr. Putin underestimated the
global response with his actions in the Ukraine?
General Allvin. That is a very difficult question. It is a
great question, and I think that there are many competing
scholars who have differing opinions as to whether he achieved
some level of success and is satisfied with that at this point.
There are others who will say that he was surprised, that he
did not anticipate the level of national unity post-Crimea that
actually came against him when he went into the Donbass.
I will say that is still an open question at this point,
but, as we look at the future, we do understand something about
Russia, that they are a learning and adaptive country. This is
not the Soviet Union of old. And so, as you look at the tactics
and the techniques and what they have been doing, starting with
Georgia in 2008 up to now, they are learning and adapting.
The question of what they are learning from Ukraine I
believe is still an open one, and I can't give you a good,
solid answer on that.
Mr. Scott. Do either of you have an opinion on that that
you would like to share?
Ms. Ellehuus. I think he certainly underestimated the
resolve coming out of NATO. I mean, the increase in defense
spending and the refocus on deterrence and defense, that has
really energized the alliance at a time when I think some
countries were certainly sitting back and looking for a further
peace dividend. It has woken up a lot of people.
I think of the example of Germany, in particular, which has
always played a pretty calm role in arbitrating between, kind
of, Europe and Russia. And, you know, Chancellor Merkel speaks
Russian and has a long history there and so thought she had an
understanding of where he was coming from. But, clearly, a lot
of countries woke up and realized that you can't handle----
Mr. Scott. They also have very strong trade relationships
with Germany, as I understand it. And I would think that that
would lead to maybe part of the surprise that he had from----
Ms. Ellehuus. Certainly. But Germany, in particular, has
been very strong on sanctions, with Chancellor Merkel leading
the charge in their rollover each and every time and focusing
on the importance of Minsk implementation. Other nations
haven't been as strong, but she has been a real champion of
that, despite the damage it has done to Germany's economy.
Mr. Tyra. So I would observe that every action that has
been taken has resulted in an action that is unhelpful to them.
And so the more times they push, the harder it gets. And I
think the reaction is they are only making the coalition
stronger, they are only making NATO stronger. And I think they
will eventually get to that point.
I would observe that Germany, among others, is one of the
framework nations for the EFP. And so I think it is clear where
they believe their future lies.
Mr. Scott [presiding]. Well, certainly, every member of
this committee is aware of the challenges of what is in OCO
that we would prefer to be in base and something that we look
forward to resolving as time goes forward.
I would make one final point, which is, certainly, he saw
where our NATO allies increased their defense spending, and he
can also see when we reduce our defense spending. And I think
that maybe leads to a false perception of weakness of the
United States and our resolve.
With that, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
General Allvin, going back to the line of questions about
unintended consequences or thinking through next-order effects
of some of the decisions we are making today, we increase our
force size in Europe and the amount that we are spending there;
ideally, Russia gets the message and it deters them from
provocation or doing things that we don't or the Europeans
don't want them to do. What if Russia increases its force size
with its border with NATO?
To Ranking Member Speier's question in terms of
anticipating the budgetary consequences of this, do we see you
back here, or someone from the Pentagon, 2 years from now
saying, ``Look, we thought $3.4 billion was going to do the
trick. It turns out the Russians have put two more divisions
here. We need to step up''?
You can understand my concern along this trajectory. Tell
me how you have addressed that concern for yourself or for
others in the Pentagon.
General Allvin. Well, certainly, our role in U.S. European
Command is to be able to identify, sort of, the demand as we
see it to be able to counter security threats in Europe. So to
the extent that--and I certainly wouldn't be able to predict
what might happen in the coming years.
I think our role here is to ensure that the money that we
are being given now, we are spending it in the most efficient
and effective manner, to where we are actually increasing the
power of the alliance, increasing the power of not just the
United States forces over there but the interoperability and
that what we are learning from our training and exercises is
making the entire alliance stronger.
And if we succeed at that, then, in fact, the likelihood of
coming back--and whether that comes back or makes it through
the Department--because that is actually what we do. We compete
with all the other combatant commands to say, this is what we
see in our AOR [area of responsibility]. I think the more
successful we are in utilizing the resources we have now to
help build the alliance and build that unity, the less likely
it is that you will see us here, you know, in a couple years.
Mr. O'Rourke. So a success would be we have calibrated this
correctly, we have spent the right amount, we have put the
precise number of forces there to get the desired outcome.
Failure would be the Pentagon coming back or a future
administration coming back and saying, actually, we didn't
quite get this right; it looks like the Russians have
escalated; we now need to, in turn, escalate.
Let me ask you, just because of limited time, as we bring
more U.S. forces into this region and as the Russians respond
in kind, I think we increase the opportunities for
miscalculation. You mentioned your efforts towards ensuring
that we do a better job of gathering intelligence and are just
smarter and more effective with the resources that we have
there.
Talk about military-to-military cooperation with Russia,
your relationships with your counterpart or your counterparts
in Russia and your ability to talk to each other to ensure that
we don't have a miscalculation that leads to an unintended
conflict or war.
General Allvin. I am going to actually probably yield that
second to my policy counterpart.
But I will just say quickly on the first, I don't know that
I would calculate that failure would be necessarily that we
come back here. It might be a failure to predict. There are
certain things that they say the enemy gets a vote. So the
failure to predict exactly what an unpredictable Russia would
do could actually result in us coming back.
So there are many things that we don't fully have control
over. We are going to focus on the things we do have control
over to make sure that, again, we are making the best use of
the resources that you are providing for us.
I am going to actually turn it over with respect to the
mil-to-mil policy to Rachel.
Ms. Ellehuus. Yes, certainly. Thank you.
Yes, I mean, I think when we look at these programs each
year, success would actually be Russia behaving responsibly and
becoming a cooperative partner, as it has been in the past, on
Afghanistan, in the Balkans. We have very positive examples of
a time when they did work with the international community.
If things have gotten worse, I think we need to actually
have a more fundamental relook at our prioritization of the
Russia threat vis-a-vis other threats that the Department and
the U.S. Government have identified.
In terms of how--you know, your question about
deconflicting and dialogue with Russia, again, the strategy is
strong and balanced, so the ``balanced'' side of that is having
a dialogue with Russia. Today, in fact, there is a NATO-Russia
Council meeting. It is the second since 2014, when we said no
business as usual and actually stopped the military-to-military
cooperation under the business-as-usual rubric.
So we do continue that dialogue, not least in Syria, where
it is very important that we talk with them to avoid
miscalculation. And every time they have a violation of
airspace or fly too close to our ships, we also call out that
bad behavior, because the last thing we need is miscalculation
or an accident.
Mr. O'Rourke. Yeah. Well, I appreciate that.
And, as I yield back, I would just like to make the point
that I would view continued escalation to be a failure. And I
would hope that, in maybe working through the committee staff,
the ranking member, and the chair, there would be some way to
hold a joint hearing with our colleagues on Foreign Affairs,
because I would really like to understand everything that we
are doing to address these issues militarily but also non-
militarily.
And nothing that I can think of condones Russia's behavior
in the areas that we have talked about, but there is a logic to
it. And I can understand them responding to the growth of NATO,
to things that happened in Ukraine, a part of the world that is
central to the Russian psyche. And the responses, while not
justified, are understandable to me.
And, in that same way, I want to make sure we are thinking
through adding $3.4 billion to the fire, bringing more forces
in, and potentially setting us on a trajectory where we will be
obligated, as things continue to escalate, to bring more forces
and more dollars into play, thereby provoking additional
responses that may not be wise, they may not follow the
international norms, but may follow a logic that we have seen
play out from Georgia to Ukraine to Crimea.
And so, anyhow, I would just like to set that out there. I
really appreciate your all's work and response to our
questions.
With that, I yield back to the chair.
Mr. Scott. Ma'am, do you have any?
Ms. Speier. No.
Mr. Scott. I want to thank all of you for being here. It is
very clear to me that we need your expertise.
And the other thing that is clear to me from this hearing
is that Putin--he may be predictable sometimes and at other
times unpredictable, but he clearly would not have stopped in
the Ukraine, in my opinion, had the United States not shown the
resolve and had our NATO allies not shown the resolve that they
did to stop him.
And so we will have honest and respectful discussions about
the funding of the operations in that part of the world. And I
look forward to your input on that, and I look forward to
making the world a better place.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 13, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 13, 2016
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 13, 2016
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 13, 2016
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Ms. Ellehuus. Yes. For Ukraine, there is one FMS case for 2,250 AN/
PVS-14 Night-Vision Devices that is still being processed using the
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funds, and the devices are
tentatively scheduled to be delivered by the end of September 2016.
Other than Ukraine, there are no other FMS cases to our Partner nations
that are funded with ERI appropriations. [See page 22.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O'ROURKE
General Allvin. While more work needs to be done, EUCOM has
enhanced our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
interoperability and sharing with partner nations in order to maximize
limited resources. This includes multiple lines of effort: coordinating
processes, sharing key intelligence questions, deconflicting
capabilities, and developing shared architecture and tools. [See page
17.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 13, 2016
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Mrs. Hartzler. Please expand on your comments about the value of
restricting Russia's options by ``bracketing'' the scope of its hybrid
warfare. Even if Russia takes actions at the lower-intensity end of the
hybrid warfare spectrum, what value do you foresee in continuing to
invest the full amount of requested ERI funds to increase the costs to
Vladimir Putin--and therefore decrease the likelihood--of higher-end
military engagements? Do you believe the U.S. should continue to fund
ERI based on an analysis of the region's strategic goals and the
changing operational landscape in Europe?
General Allvin. (U) In order to effectively counter the lower end
of hybrid warfare and strive to prevent high end conflict, USEUCOM must
understand what messages our adversary is pushing, which messages have
traction with key audiences and how our adversary reacts to US counter-
messaging and reassurance/deterrence activities. This understanding
will both help USEUCOM message more effectively, and avoid
unintentionally provoking our adversary.
(U) A lack of a presence in the information environment during
steady state operations would leave DoD at a distinct disadvantage when
dealing with audiences that have been inundated with adversary
propaganda and malign influence efforts. USEUCOM is reliant on ERI
funding to augment the ASSURED VOICE base funding it currently receives
in order to effectively counter propaganda and deter aggression. Until
this funding issue is addressed, USEUCOM's ability to compete in the
information space will be limited and therefore the risk of higher end
military engagement is increased.
(U) With regard to the last question on if ERI should continue to
be funded, as a Combatant Command it is our responsibility not to
advocate for funding sources but to clearly communicate requirements
given our strategic environment and assigned missions. Given this, we
clearly see an enduring demand signal to successfully deter Russia, and
sincerely appreciate the support to date Congress has provided through
ERI.
Mrs. Hartzler. Please provide an update on the timeline for
deploying the 80 M-1 tanks and 140 Bradley vehicles to EUCOM, and
please elaborate on the the types of modernization and capability
improvements that will be integrated into each set of vehicles.
Mr. Tyra. Starting in 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 2017, the Army will
initiate heel-to-toe rotations of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)
to Europe. The current plan is to rotate units with 87 M1A2SEPv2 Abrams
tanks and 138 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs). With respect to the
Bradley Fighting vehicles, 125 are M2A3 BFVs and 13 are M7A3 Bradley
Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicles. These vehicles have digital
architecture and 2nd Generation forward-looking infrared which provides
visible imaging for day or night operations. If the European
Reassurance Initiative program continues, the Army would recommend
fielding an additional Armored Brigade as prepositioned stock. This
would provide U.S. Army Europe two complete Armored Brigade
prepositioned stock sets while continuing to rotationally deploy one
ABCT.
Accordingly, the Army has requested funding to modernize 14 Abrams
and 14 BFVs available due to unit conversions in the European
Reassurance Initiative portion of the 2017 President's Budget. This
will begin building a second ABCT set in Europe.
[all]