    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-133]

                OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE

                                   ----------

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   ----------

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 JULY 13, 2016

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                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                      VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman

    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 JACKIE SPEIER, California
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada               HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                    Georgia
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona              GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
                     Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
                     Katy Quinn, Professional Staff Member
                             Anna Waterfield, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman,
      Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations...................     1
    Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations...........     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Allvin, Maj Gen David, USAF, Director, Strategy and Policy, U.S.
      European Command...............................................     4
    Ellehuus, Rachel, Principal Director, Europe and NATO Policy,
      Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy)....................     5
    Tyra, Tom, Chief, Global Force Planning, Office of the Deputy
      Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Department of the Army................     6

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Allvin, Maj Gen David........................................    35
        Ellehuus, Rachel.............................................    43
        Hartzler, Hon. Vicky.........................................    33
        Tyra, Tom....................................................    49

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        EuroAtlantic Coalition statement for the record..............    57

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mrs. Hartzler................................................    61
        Mr. O'Rourke.................................................    61

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mrs. Hartzler................................................    65

               OVERSIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                  Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
                              Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 13, 2016.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler
    (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
                             INVESTIGATIONS

        Mrs. Hartzler. Good afternoon.
        I would like to extend a warm thank you to our witnesses
    testifying before us today. Thank you for being here.
        Before I begin, I would like to welcome the members of the
    full committee who are not permanent members of the
    subcommittee who are attending today.
        I ask unanimous consent that these committee members be
    permitted to participate in this hearing, with the
    understanding that all sitting subcommittee members will be
    recognized for questions prior to those not assigned to the
    subcommittee.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I also ask unanimous consent to include into the record all
    members' statements and extraneous material for members of the
    committee unable to attend today's hearing and who have asked
    to include a statement for the record in lieu of attendance.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 57.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. This afternoon, this subcommittee plans to
    discuss the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, with
    representatives of the U.S. European Command, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, and the Army. All have important roles in
    this initiative's development, implementation, and execution.
        The goal of this hearing is to assess how the Department
    [of Defense] has implemented the initiative since it was
    announced, authorized, and appropriated by Congress beginning
    in fiscal year 2015. We also seek to understand how the
    Department plans to execute the initiative through fiscal year
    2017.
        We would also like our witnesses to discuss the
    opportunities and challenges facing implementation within the
    current European security environment and how the initiative
    competes for resources among other critical priorities within
    the Department, including readiness.
        A military that is not ready to deploy cannot credibly
    serve as a deterrent against aggressive behavior. The
    Department of Defense [DOD] does not have enough ships to
    maintain a constant presence in key waters. They don't have a
    large enough end strength to support a permanent presence in
    Europe. And the Department's nuclear enterprise and missile
    defense systems are in dire need of modernization.
        The recent NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Warsaw
    Summit underscored many security challenges that Europe faces
    today. Foremost of these challenges is a resurgent Russia. The
    Warsaw Summit provided the opportunity to help form a cohesive
    and comprehensive NATO plan to counter Russian actions, using
    both conventional and unconventional methods, but there is much
    more to be done. Vigilant oversight and consistent evaluation
    will help ensure that the European Reassurance Initiative
    invests in the right areas and utilizes resources effectively
    and efficiently.
        From recent congressionally mandated reports submitted by
    the Department, it seems the Department's strategy, operations,
    and posture are evolving to adapt to the new security model in
    Europe.
        We must also address the important issue of funding the
    ERI. Currently, money for the initiative is requested annually
    through the overseas contingency operations [OCO] budget. While
    drawing from these funds provides near-term flexibility and
    responsiveness, relying on such year-to-year appropriations
    does not allow the Department of Defense to confidently plan or
    implement an evolving strategy in the region.
        The House-passed fiscal year 2017 National Defense
    Authorization Act addressed part of this issue by reallocating
    $2.2 billion of the request into the base budget. In doing so,
    the House has demonstrated its enduring commitment to the
    success of the European Reassurance Initiative.
        So I look forward to discussing the Department's strategy
    and the issues I have outlined. But before I introduce the
    witnesses, I turn to the Oversight and Investigations
    Subcommittee ranking member for any opening remarks that she
    would like to make.
        [The prepared statement of Mrs. Hartzler can be found in
    the Appendix on page 33.]

        STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
       CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
                             INVESTIGATIONS

        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Today's hearing is about the ERI, a program to deter
    Russian aggression and reassure our European partners and
    allies of our commitment to their security and territorial
    integrity.
        We should have no doubt that Russia does indeed pose a
    threat, but this threat looks very different from the 1980s. We
    should be mindful of this difference and allocate our scarce
    resources accordingly.
        Recent events in Europe have underscored this threat. For
    example, Russia has occupied Crimea and has fomented the
    continuing separatist struggle in eastern Ukraine. Across
    Europe and in particular along Russia's border, the threat of
    Russian intervention is on many people's minds.
        ERI began in fiscal year 2015 as a way to reassure our
    allies that we stand with them against these threats. If
    approved, ERI would shift focus to deterrence in fiscal year
    2017. It would increase the U.S. presence in Europe, build
    partner capacity, improve infrastructure, and facilitate
    interoperability. Over half of ERI funding is for
    prepositioning military equipment, which would reduce the
    reaction time needed for U.S. personnel to respond to urgent
    crises.
        I want to make sure programs like ERI take into account the
    current environment to deter Russian aggression in a
    sophisticated and measured way. Funding is expected to
    quadruple to $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2017, so it is even
    more important that Congress provide effective oversight.
        We should also keep in mind threats like cyber and hybrid
    warfare. I want to ensure, in addition to the challenges
    addressed by ERI, we are assisting our allies to guard against
    less conventional tactics.
        In addition to our commitment, our NATO partners must do
    their part and work to increase their capabilities, presence,
    and defense spending. The best defense of Europe is a strong
    collective defense. At last week's NATO summit in Warsaw, NATO
    leaders underscored their commitment to unity.
        Finally, I would like to know whether ERI achieves the
    right balance. Does it address the needs and requirements in
    Europe, and are we realistically looking at a long-term
    investment?
        I have concerns that the fiscal year 2017 funding for this
    program is requested through the OCO. The OCO funding is
    generally considered to be a temporary war fund. It looks
    increasingly like the ERI is going to be a long-term program.
    It also seems like Russia's destructive influence and
    destabilizing efforts will continue for years to come. Given
    this, using OCO to pay for ERI is no longer appropriate.
        Further, what message does it convey to our allies when we
    put this, quote, ``reassurance,'' unquote, program into a
    temporary funding account? It doesn't seem very reassuring. As
    we evaluate ERI today, I want to ensure our investment is made
    in the right way with long-term strategic planning and
    oversight in mind.
        And I yield back.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Ms. Speier.
        I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today. I want to
    thank them for taking the time to be with us.
        We have with us Major General David Allvin, the Director of
    Strategy and Policy at U.S. European Command; Ms. Rachel
    Ellehuus, Principal Director, Europe and NATO Policy, Office of
    the Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Mr. Tom Tyra, the
    Chief of Global Force Planning in the Office of the Deputy
    Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.
        Thank you all for being with us. And so now we will hear
    your opening statements.
        Major General Allvin, we will begin with you.

    STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN DAVID ALLVIN, USAF, DIRECTOR, STRATEGY AND
                     POLICY, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

        General Allvin. Thank you, Chairman Hartzler, Ranking
    Member Speier, and members of the committee. I want to thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you today and discuss
    the European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI.
        I would also like to express my sincere thanks on behalf of
    my commander and the Department of Defense for your support of
    this important initiative over the past 3 years. We believe it
    is making a real difference.
        The strategic environment in Europe has changed drastically
    over the past 30 months. One of the key reasons for the growing
    instability has been Russian malign influence, coercion, and
    aggression against NATO allies and other partner nations.
        Since the illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian
    activity in the Donbass region of Ukraine, the potential for
    Russia to further advance their military adventurism into NATO
    countries has demanded a strong response.
        We at U.S. European Command have been working to assure our
    allies that our commitment to Article 5 of the Atlantic Treaty
    is ironclad. The first 2 years of the European Reassurance
    Initiative were largely focused on assurance. To an extent,
    assuring our allies has a deterrent effect in and of itself.
        However, as we continue to see a malign influence and a
    Russia acting to upset international norms, we have
    transitioned beyond purely assurance. We are planning and
    executing activities designed to serve as a stronger deterrent
    to Russian aggression. The fiscal year 2017 ERI submission of
    $3.4 billion reflects this transition, and I would again like
    to thank the committee for its support.
        The rapid change in the security environment requires a
    prompt answer. ERI has provided the funding mechanism to
    respond quickly and effectively, while the Department conducts
    the full analysis as to which of these requirements are
    enduring and which may be shorter-lived to provide the
    appropriate counter to Russian aggression.
        At U.S. European Command, we also understand that there are
    fiscal pressures facing all government budgets. One of our most
    foundational principles as we design, plan, and execute our ERI
    activities is to preserve the integrity of the program and
    ensure that we are being responsible stewards of the taxpayers'
    dollars.
        Through close coordination with our policy and comptroller
    leadership in the Department, as well as the responsive
    oversight provided by Congress, we will continue to provide
    effective deterrence and assurance measures to prevent a
    conflict in Europe, which could have the potential to spread to
    the homeland.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Allvin can be found in
    the Appendix on page 35.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Ellehuus.

     STATEMENT OF RACHEL ELLEHUUS, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR, EUROPE AND
        NATO POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)

        Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you.
        Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, distinguished
    members of the committee, thank you also for the opportunity to
    discuss the U.S. European Reassurance Initiative as well as
    some of the recent moves that NATO has taken under the Warsaw
    Summit.
        Prior to but particularly since 2014, we have really felt
    acutely the changed security environment in Europe. Where
    previously European Command had been focused on theater
    security cooperation and support to other combatant commands,
    we now face a real threat in the European theater, whether it
    is to the east or to the south.
        And thanks to the help and the responsiveness of ERI, we
    have been able to respond rapidly to this changing security
    environment. We are working very closely with individual
    allies, with NATO, as well as within the U.S. Government, to
    reinforce our collective commitment to NATO Article 5.
        Since 2014, when we began ERI, we have moved from assurance
    to deterrence, in step with the security environment. And
    looking forward to 2017, we will continue to move in that
    direction, as Russia's provocation does not change. We have
    seen increased exercises, irresponsible behavior from the
    Baltics to the Black Sea, and we need to continue to move in
    step with that.
        I wanted to, rather than focus on the five lines of effort,
    which General Allvin has already highlighted, talk about how
    U.S. leadership in this regard is paying dividends.
        Europeans and NATO are stepping up. At the recent Warsaw
    Summit, Secretary General Stoltenberg was able to report and
    announce that a majority of allies had either halted or
    reversed downward trends in their defense spending and, for the
    first time since 2009, overall NATO defense spending had
    increased.
        These are positive trends. We see individual allies
    stepping forward, as witnessed by the enhanced forward presence
    whereby alongside the U.S., the U.K. [United Kingdom], Germany,
    and Canada will provide framework nation status in the three
    Balts [Baltic States] and Poland. So we are seeing very
    positive signs that our leadership in this area is making a
    difference.
        That having been said, we need to continue to work at this.
    And the three challenges that I see post-Warsaw and as we
    continue to think about the future of ERI are: firstly,
    institutional adaptation. We need to find a way to make NATO
    more agile in terms of its decisionmaking, command structure,
    and defense planning. Secondly, defense investment, and that is
    not just monetary but also in terms of political will. We need
    to encourage folks to continue to increase their defense
    spending and to support operations both within the European and
    transatlantic theater and further afield. And, finally, we need
    to combat internal political challenges and resist those who
    seek to divide us or undermine the international security
    order.
        In these past 2 years and in the 50-plus years that NATO
    has existed, we have found one thing as the threats have
    evolved and the security involvement has evolved, and that is
    that we are stronger together. So thank you for your support.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Ellehuus can be found in the
    Appendix on page 43.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Ms. Ellehuus.
        Mr. Tyra.

    STATEMENT OF TOM TYRA, CHIEF, GLOBAL FORCE PLANNING, OFFICE OF
       THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

        Mr. Tyra. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Speier,
    distinguished members, I thank you for the opportunity to
    explain the Army's contribution to the European Reassurance
    Initiative.
        I have provided a written statement. I would ask that you
    put it into the record and we proceed to your questions.
        Mrs. Hartzler. So ordered. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Tyra can be found in the
    Appendix on page 49.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. All right. I very much appreciate each of
    your comments. Now we will begin with some questions.
        So, in February of this year, former Commander of U.S.
    European Command General Breedlove noted in his posture
    statement that EUCOM has less than the minimum required
    personnel, equipment, and resources to accomplish our current
    theater strategy.
        Can you elaborate on these shortfalls that General
    Breedlove references? And will the ERI budget request mitigate
    some of these shortfalls and gaps? And are there any other
    additional resources that are needed to sufficiently support
    ERI?
        So, General, I want to start with you.
        General Allvin. Yes, ma'am. And with the reference to the
    personnel, equipment, and resources, we find that within the
    European theater we see a more aggressive Russia that is
    influencing on the periphery states of NATO.
        And so, given the current correlation of forces that might
    exist in a conflict, specifically with the United States, we do
    not have nearly the forces we had after 25 years of the
    degradation of the forces in Europe.
        This has been understandable because there have been other
    national security priorities that obviously have taken
    precedence in other parts of the world. However, we find
    ourselves now with a smaller number of forces from all services
    as well as the appropriate equipment in order to be able to
    field and to respond to any other Russian aggression.
        And I would say that what ERI has done is it has rapidly
    enabled us to reverse that trend. Specifically, when we look at
    our fiscal year 2017 submission, when we look at this heel-to-
    toe rotation, that is an additional armored brigade combat team
    that is able to make its way into theater with its equipment
    full-up and ready to train not only with our joint force in the
    United States forces but also with our partners and allies to
    enhance interoperability.
        I would say that also the submission for the APS, or the
    Army Prepositioned Stocks, offers the opportunity for that
    additional equipment that can start to come closer to leveling
    the playing field, if you will.
        But understanding the resource-constrained environment that
    we are in, we are pleased with the submission in moving the
    right direction to be able to recover those resources and the
    manpower and the forces to be able to deter further Russian
    aggression. And if the deterrence succeeds, we won't have to,
    God forbid, get in a conflict.
        Mrs. Hartzler. That would certainly be the goal.
        Do either one of you want to weigh in on that question?
        Ms. Ellehuus.
        Ms. Ellehuus. Yes, certainly. Thank you for the
    opportunity.
        I think the unfortunate reality is is that, given today's
    security environment, demand continues to outpace supply. And
    the flexibility of funds, such as ERI and some of the training
    funds that you have provided us to build partner capacity not
    just of allies but also of partners, help us offset that fact.
        One of the other things I would like to highlight is how we
    offset our risk with our cooperation with allies and partners.
    So I think increasingly you are seeing the United States
    cooperating at a strategic level and at an operational level
    with NATO allies.
        So we have seen the French carrier Charles de Gaulle deploy
    in the Middle East to help us with some of our stress on our
    naval and maritime forces. We have seen, you know, cooperative
    arrangements to use one another's bases. And we have seen host
    nations stepping up. So when we send our forces to the Baltic
    States, host nations such as Poland and the Balts are stepping
    forward to provide that infrastructure and support.
        So, as we realize that the demand outpaces the supply, we
    need to look and rely more heavily on our allies and partners
    to help us out.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Very good.
        Mr. Tyra.
        Mr. Tyra. Yes, thank you.
        So the ability to deploy, first, in and of itself, will
    make the Army more capable of meeting its global requirements.
    The units that we deliver, though, will be decisive-action-
    trained, so we would consider they are ready to conduct
    operations.
        The ability to work with allies and partners and develop an
    interaction capability and a commonality of training and
    equipping and the ability to fight together is a bonus. And I
    think we would view this as actually building readiness higher
    than it is as we developed, and, over time, the soldiers that
    make those rotations will come back better able.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Very good.
        Ms. Ellehuus, you discussed the recent NATO summit and some
    of the outcomes of that. And I think it is encouraging, the
    increased amount of resources that the countries are providing
    and their joint willingness to work with us on training and
    having that forward presence.
        But I just wonder, do you see any risk to NATO's cohesion?
    And, if so, what are those potential risks there? And how
    should NATO's Article 5 and 6 commitments be applied in this
    highly ambiguous domain?
        Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you.
        Well, certainly there are a number of forces and actors who
    are trying to undermine alliance unity, but, fortunately, the
    Warsaw Summit was a representation of the fact that we are
    committed to collective defense and they won't be able to do
    that.
        So, whether it is Russian propaganda in the Baltic States
    and Poland or in Central Europe or it is, you know, provocative
    actions towards our ally Turkey, I think we have demonstrated
    through Warsaw and our commitments there to collective defense
    and Article 5 that we are going to be sticking together and we
    are not going to allow them to undermine that.
        I am anticipating a question about Brexit, so I will
    preempt it, but we have----
        Mrs. Hartzler. Please tell us about Brexit and your
    feelings on its impact.
        Ms. Ellehuus. We have a very close relationship, uniquely
    close relationship, with the United Kingdom, and, you know, in
    anticipation of a ``yes'' or a ``no'' vote, we continued to
    reinforce that relationship.
        In the days following the Warsaw Summit and the vote, the
    U.K. has reinforced its commitment to a number of important
    initiatives. So they have publicly committed at the Farnborough
    Airshow to their maritime patrol aircraft and the commitment to
    procure nine P-8s. They have announced procurement of Apaches,
    and they have announced intent to move forward as quickly as
    possible--I believe it is the 18th of July--with a debate on
    their continuous at-sea deterrence and that principle.
        So I think that, while there are external forces that seek
    to divide, we have presented a united front and that, even
    given some of the trends that could undermine our ability to
    operate effectively and together, we have a strong enough base
    that I think we will manage to weather the storm.
        Mrs. Hartzler. I would cautiously say I think I am
    optimistic or encouraged by some of the recent events and some
    of the things you just shared. So that is good news.
        I now turn to the ranking member, Representative Speier,
    for her questions.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        General Allvin, in your statement, you said that Russia
    employs multiple types of warfare--conventional, irregular, and
    asymmetric--to induce regional instability.
        How is the ERI going to improve our ability to defend
    against Russia's asymmetric tactics?
        General Allvin. Thank you very much for that question.
        I would say two things. With respect to sort of the hybrid
    warfare, which is one of the common terms, hybrid warfare is
    neither new or unique, but the way the Russians are applying it
    very effectively now is primarily below the conventional level.
        So I would say that the way that the European Reassurance
    Initiative approaches this is, with our partners and allies
    specifically in areas which are susceptible or have been
    susceptible to some of these hybrid tactics, whether they be
    information operations or propaganda or cyberattacks or these
    sort of things that disrupt the internal governmental flow or
    the workings of the government, the European Reassurance
    Initiative has allowed us to have engagements in those
    countries. There has been some of the funding that has gone
    towards some of the cyber engagements that we can teach our
    tactics and procedures about attribution, about hardening and
    resilience with the cyber capabilities, about attributing not
    only the cyberattacks but also some of the propaganda. So it
    really is an awareness and sharing the tactics and techniques
    that we use to be able to highlight those.
        But I would say that, on the hybrid warfare, part of the
    hybrid is the high end, and the high end is the conventional
    conflict. And I would say that, historically, has proven to be
    the most costly and the most irreversible. And so, if we can
    continue to reassure and now deter that conventional conflict,
    it at least sort of brackets it and allows us to work down in
    some of these lower areas of malign influence and coercion
    beyond the large conventional conflict.
        And so I think the ERI helps us both have a stronger
    deterrent effect against the conventional conflict, but there
    are elements that we are doing with engagement and resilience
    and hardening that help against some of these elements of the
    lower echelons of hybrid warfare.
        Ms. Speier. Major General, you had indicated to me
    privately that the troops that we will have stationed as part
    of ERI would be engaged in military exercises. And you had
    suggested that the numbers may be as high as 100 per year--some
    smaller, some larger. How many of these are airshows?
        General Allvin. Ma'am, I actually wouldn't put an airshow
    in the----
        Ms. Speier. Good.
        General Allvin [continuing]. Category of exercises.
        When we refer to these exercises and when I say 100, some
    of these are small, maybe company-level exercises, but these
    are building that understanding, that cohesion at the unit
    level. And I would say those are the most prolific.
        However, with the initial funding we have been able to
    receive through ERI, we are able to have exercises at the
    larger level, the battalion level and above, which really help
    us to understand the interoperability between formations.
    Because we understand that U.S. European Command will not be
    the sole entity that will have to defend against Russian
    aggression. We will be fighting with our allies and partners in
    the region.
        And so these broader exercises, these higher-level
    exercises really enhance that confidence to be able to fight
    and maneuver and do combined arms warfare beyond just the
    United States but in the coalition.
        Ms. Speier. Mr. Tyra, what type of military equipment do
    you expect to be deployed over the next 5 years as part of the
    ERI?
        Mr. Tyra. So, in the next year, we intend to build an
    armored brigade combat team. If supported, we intend to build a
    fires brigade, which is artillery, which would be tube and
    rocket artillery, to add to it.
        We intend to build a division headquarters battalion, which
    is the equipment that the division commander and his staff
    use--approximately 500 soldiers. So it would be, you know,
    computers, radios, satellite communication, vehicles, that kind
    of stuff, to allow them to conduct mission command throughout
    the region. And that will be in 2017.
        If the program continues, we would look to meet the next
    identified requirements for the defense of Europe. And I think
    you would expect to see engineering battalions moved over
    there. I think you would expect to see possibly the ground
    element of an Army aviation brigade. I think we would want to
    see more satellite communication, more logistics, and whatever
    was required to speed the delivery of a fighting force.
        Ms. Speier. So, in terms of actual weapons to be warehoused
    over there in the next year, we are not talking about a sizable
    number of weapons systems being transferred over there? I was
    under the impression that that is what we were doing.
        Mr. Tyra. So, in the first armored brigade combat team, you
    would see 80 M1 tanks and 140 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 18
    artillery systems, a number of mortar systems and smaller
    pieces of equipment. So we would end up with that, plus the
    support vehicles that enable that to fight.
        Then there would be a rotating brigade that would bring
    identical sets of equipment. As you delivered the fires
    brigade, you would expect, you know, another 100 or so
    artillery systems, either tube- or rocket-launched, to be added
    to that fires brigade.
        Ms. Speier. Okay. Thank you.
        Ms. Ellehuus, you know, this is an example of mission
    creep. I might actually be supportive of this, but this started
    out as a $1 billion emergency fund for 1 year, and now it is
    morphing into a $3.4 billion program that, for all intents and
    purposes, is becoming permanent.
        What do you see the funding levels growing to in subsequent
    years?
        Ms. Ellehuus. Well, certainly, we are aware of this tension
    between things that are paid for through supplementary funding
    as opposed to things that are part of our regular base budgets.
    And when we vet the requests that come through from the
    services and the combatant commands, we take a very close look
    at those to make sure that we are not funding enduring
    requirements indefinitely, and over time we too would like to
    see more things move into the base, not least because, as all
    of you have said, it provides a degree of certainty to our
    allies and partners that our commitment is enduring rather than
    year to year.
        In terms of future-year budgets, I mean, we do have to plan
    against a baseline, so, you know, I would anticipate that we
    would plan against last year's baseline as a going-in
    proposition and then adjust from there. But, you know, we don't
    want to come in every year asking you to double this amount. We
    do need to continue to protect the integrity of the program and
    take a close eye at what is being proposed and what fits with
    what we need to respond to the strategic environment and
    whether we are using the right sources of money.
        Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
        Now we will go to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Ellehuus, this is somewhat of an opinion question, I
    recognize, but it is something that I ask myself. Russia's
    economy today, the impact that it has on Putin's decisionmaking
    process and how aggressive he is. The weakness in his economy
    could lead him to be more aggressive; it could lead him to be
    less aggressive.
        What is your opinion on that, whether or not he is less
    aggressive or more aggressive because of his current economic
    state? And what happens if the price of oil returns to where
    his economy actually recovers?
        Ms. Ellehuus. Thank you for your question.
        Yes, it is certainly a difficult balance to determine
    whether we want a strong Russia or an internally destabilized
    Russia. So when we think about things like sanctions and oil
    prices, certainly, instability in Russia is a concern, as well
    as external provocation.
        It is hard to say exactly when I look at what causes a
    reaction from Mr. Putin and what does not. It seems like, you
    know, we can try to get into his mind and guess at what is an
    excuse for provocation, but I don't think that he necessarily
    needs one.
        I take the example of two recent exercises that we had in
    Europe. We had Anakonda just here in the beginning of June with
    31,000 soldiers from 24 nations. We also had BALTOPS 16, which
    has been happening for decades, and that had about 6,100
    soldiers. And it is something that the Russians have been
    invited to previously, they are aware of. And, of the two
    exercises, he griped about BALTOPS rather than Anakonda.
        So it is hard to get into the mindset and sort of determine
    what would be provocative and destabilizing. But I think, in
    the first instance, we need to make sure that we are doing the
    best to make sure that we deter his aggression and that we are
    prepared if that deterrence fails.
        Mr. Scott. And correct me if I am wrong. It seems to me
    that maybe his perception of weakness on the other side may be
    more of a determining factor than how strong he is internally
    or his country is financially.
        Ms. Ellehuus. Yes. I think an outward show of strength is
    something that reinforces domestic support for his leadership.
    And so, if there is an opportunity or an opening to demonstrate
    that resolve against NATO or individual allies, I think we have
    seen he is an opportunist and will take that initiative.
        Mr. Scott. But if that outward show has--the more risk that
    that outward show has, the less likely he is to engage in it
    then. Would that be a fair statement?
        Ms. Ellehuus. Could you please repeat that?
        Mr. Scott. So the less likely he is to--the more strength
    that there is on the other side of it, the less likely he would
    be willing to engage in those provocative behaviors.
        Ms. Ellehuus. Yes. I think that is certainly our intent
    with the moves we are trying to take under ERI and in the NATO
    context.
        Earlier, resilience was mentioned. And if you build
    resilience in a country and you give them options--so, for
    example, you know, if Putin thinks one of the tools at his
    disposal is cutting off energy supplies in the Baltic States or
    the Black Sea, he will use that. But if there is kind of a
    safety net and an alternative, it undermines his ability to
    hold them at risk.
        So demonstrating strength is certainly a way to change that
    calculus and make the costs outweigh the risks.
        Mr. Scott. And so this helps get to my point, which may be
    contradictory, respectfully, to another colleague's point.
        If we have a short-term commitment, he can simply wait us
    out, where if we show a long-term commitment, then maybe he
    doesn't feel like he is--maybe he is not as froggy, as we would
    say in south Georgia----
        Ms. Ellehuus. Right.
        Mr. Scott [continuing]. If you will.
        Ms. Ellehuus. It is difficult to know, sir.
        Mr. Scott. What other plans, other than the European
    Reassurance Initiative, does the DOD have to deter Russia over
    the long term?
        Ms. Ellehuus. Well, I know that we have a number of
    classified programs, which we would be happy to come back and
    discuss in another forum, that try to look at some of Russia's
    capabilities and the military buildup that they have undertaken
    in recent years and how we might get at that.
        For example, I think you are all very familiar with the
    third offset strategy and some of the efforts we are trying to
    take to think about how we change the way we approach
    conventional capabilities and make sure we retain the military
    edge. So that is definitely one thing.
        Also, I would say that, you know, in addition to European
    Command, we have to remember that other combatant commands have
    a role in deterring Russia. So I know that Northern Command is
    looking very closely at the Arctic and what Russia is doing in
    the Arctic and trying to make sure that, while we keep that
    stable and safe and demilitarized, we are not being naive about
    what Russia's intentions there. Similarly, PACOM [U.S. Pacific
    Command] has a role to play. If you are on the west coast, that
    is how you are looking at the Russia threat. So there are a
    number of initiatives underway across the Department.
        Mr. Scott. My time has expired, but, Madam Chair, I hope we
    have a time for a second round of questions.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. I do too. Thank you.
        Now we turn to the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham.
        Ms. Graham. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
    appreciate it.
        And thank you all very much for being here today.
        Please pardon my lack of knowledge in this area, but what
    is Russia doing in the Arctic?
        Ms. Ellehuus. Well, certainly, they have a presence there,
    and a great part of their territory is in the Arctic, so a lot
    of that presence is legitimate. It is economic interests, and
    as we see new seaways opening up, I think they are thinking
    ahead to the economic opportunities but also to being able to
    control those lanes and passageways.
        So, in addition to military buildup in the Baltic Sea
    region, we are seeing some changes in military buildup in the
    Arctic, as well--increased exercises and presence that we
    hadn't seen to date.
        So, while some of the presence is certainly legitimate and
    in defense of their economic and legitimate interests, some of
    it is a little bit worrying, given that in the Arctic Council
    and other fora we really try to focus on keeping that a
    conflict-free zone and keeping it stable.
        Ms. Graham. Uh-huh. Anything else to add by the other two
    panelists?
        General Allvin. Ma'am, I would just add the one. Sort of an
    exclamation point on that is, you know, beyond their legitimate
    interests, I forget how many years ago, but they did take sort
    of the rhetorical point of placing a platinum Russia flag on
    the northern pole, sort of staking their claim to the very
    north part of the Arctic.
        So there is some rhetoric that is sort of this bullying
    type of behavior that has been consistently how they approach
    things.
        Ms. Graham. Uh-huh. Thank you.
        And I think that segues nicely into my next question: Putin
    as a bully and how we deal with that type of a personality, the
    uncertainty that he presents. Because we never know what he is
    going to do. He is capable of anything.
        So I would like you all to address that. How do we deal
    with someone of the personality type of a Putin?
        General Allvin. Ma'am, I will take the first shot at that,
    and then the smarter people to my right and left will probably
    be able to improve on that.
        But that is a question that we ask ourselves continuously.
    And I think, absent being able to get into the mind of Mr.
    Putin, which none of us have been able to, I think that we go
    back to the principles, I guess, of deterrence, when, in fact,
    we look at the principles of what we need to do to prevent
    certain behavior or unacceptable behavior from occurring from a
    certain actor.
        And the deterrence theory really says, if you want to
    prevent that behavior, you need to do a couple of things. You
    either need to convince that potential doer of adversarial
    actions that the outcome that they seek will not be attainable,
    they will not achieve the benefit that they perceive they are
    going to achieve by that, or, in the pursuit of that, the cost
    will be so high that it will not be worth that benefit they
    anticipate they are going to gain.
        And so that really is the traditional deterrence paradigm.
    So if you perceive him as a bully or if you perceive him as a
    confident, aspirant, great-power leader, however you do that,
    we judge his actions and we look at what the potential actions
    would be that would be adversarial to our national security
    interests, and then what are the things we can do to either
    make that perception that it is unattainable or that the cost
    of attaining it would be too high.
        And so that is really at the heart of really what the ERI
    really is. It starts with assurance, where we are showing that
    we have a stake in the game, perhaps greater than Putin's
    Russia believed that we did. And so, for the first couple of
    years, we are assuring our European allies we are going to be
    there, our commitment to Article 5 is ironclad.
        Now, as we are showing we have a better interoperability
    with them, we are putting more credible combat formations in
    there, we are showing that cohesion, now we are looking at
    trying to convince Putin's Russia that this is going to cost
    more than you think, and your ambitious behavior here may be
    met with the cost that you may not want to incur for your
    particular adventurism.
        And so we really just fall back on the principles of
    deterrence as really the foundation for some of the activities
    we are doing with ERI, whether it is a bully or whatever you
    see him as.
        Ms. Graham. Thank you.
        Ms. Ellehuus. I often think of, sort of, you know,
    childrearing metaphors in context to international relations,
    so I very much appreciate the question.
        I think, first and foremost, we need to demonstrate unity.
    So, whether it is on sanctions or, you know, just trying to
    pick off individual allies, I think that is the worst thing we
    can do, is allow him to separate us from one another. We just
    have to demonstrate that resolve and unity.
        I actually think the administration's policy of a strong
    and balanced approach to Russia is very wise, because one of
    the things that Putin seeks is influence. He wants to matter.
    He wants a seat at the table. But in order to coerce that
    behavior in the right direction, where it is supporting rather
    than undermining the international system, we cooperate with
    them in areas where they are being a constructive actor. So you
    reward the good behavior while punishing the bad--again, going
    back to the childcare metaphor.
        Ms. Graham. My kids would be appalled to hear me say this
    in an open hearing, but that approach does work.
        And thank you. I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
        We will move on to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
    Russell.
        Mr. Russell. And thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for
    allowing me to join your committee today.
        And thank you, panel, for being here. It is good to see Mr.
    Tyra. It has been many, many years. And, General Allvin, it is
    good to see you again.
        We have had suggestions here today of mission creep, but I
    recall, when I joined the military in the mid-1980s, in Europe
    we had two full corps of soldiers. That would have been a
    minimum of four total divisions and two armored cavalry
    regiments, not to mention air forces and allies. So this is not
    a mission creep. This is staunching the bleed-out of a presence
    to virtually nothing now in Europe.
        It calls to mind that deterrence without a deterrent is a
    bluff that gambles the future security of Europe. So I guess my
    question to the three of you is, how reassuring would it be to
    Europe if we don't have a deterrent, if we don't build this
    contingency force? What would the reaction be in that scenario?
        General Allvin. Well, thanks for the question.
        I think it, again, is trying to predict an unknown, but I
    would say that history has shown that if one seeks to split the
    alliance or a set of individual nations, then one can show how
    perhaps the team is not all playing together.
        And so, to your point, the lack of showing our commitment--
    and our commitment in presence, our commitment in
    interoperability, our commitment in training and exercises to
    show that we are a cohesive, credible combat force--I think
    logic would dictate that that would have a negative effect on
    the alliance's confidence in its ability to fight as an
    alliance and repel a Russian aggression.
        Ms. Ellehuus. Can I preempt you?
        So I, again, am reassured by some of the language in the
    communique from the Warsaw Summit. NATO focused very much on
    deterrence and defense and how to reinforce that even if we
    don't have the volume of forces and capabilities in theater
    that we had previously.
        And the way that they put it is they underscored that that
    collective defense is a fundamental responsibility of NATO, and
    it relies on a whole suite of capabilities. So it is a mix of
    the nuclear, the conventional, missile defense, and,
    increasingly, even cyber and space and other elements.
        So, even if we don't have the heft of conventional forces
    that we had, I am hopeful that the way we think creatively
    about the mix of capabilities enables us to get at the problem
    and to deter.
        Mr. Tyra. So I would add to that, the U.S. has a long
    history of displaying the ability to deploy enormous resources
    against a problem, and that raising the determination in the
    U.S. and its allies is not profitable, right? And, therefore,
    you can, in fact, deploy that entire force and keep deploying
    it without having to build more of it. The economies in Europe,
    the U.S. economy, they are all capable of conducting these
    operations.
        And I think that is how we would sell them. What they need
    is assurance that the U.S. is with them, and then that would be
    enough.
        Mr. Russell. Well, thank you for that.
        And I guess my last question would be, what impact would it
    have on other nations?
        We have made much of the initiative to encourage our
    European allies to provide 2 percent towards their national
    defense, and we see some movement on that. Some is mixed. A lot
    of it is tied to a lot of factors.
        If we lead and show, from no presence to now a brigade
    combat team, with a promise of, as you suggest, Mr. Tyra, that,
    as we show up, there is more to follow--you may pick on little
    brother today, but big brother is coming. If we don't do that,
    what impact would that have on the 2 percent initiatives that
    we have worked so carefully to try to craft with our European
    allies to make their own commitments?
        Ms. Ellehuus. I can begin, since you took the last one.
        Certainly, it is a fine balance between being there and
    being a good NATO ally and doing our part while not allowing
    inequitable burden-sharing.
        So I think a good example of this is the enhanced forward
    presence [EFP]. The U.S. actually did not commit to be a
    framework nation until we were pretty certain that other allies
    were going to step up. And it goes with this thinking that, you
    know, Europeans should also be taking responsibility for their
    security and caring about it as much as we care about the
    transatlantic space. So enhanced forward presence is an example
    of how the U.S. was careful not to underwrite everything,
    because we had already done quite a bit through ERI.
        On 2 percent, I think we do need to keep the pressure on.
    Again, five allies have stepped up and are now at or above 2
    percent, and others are on their way. But we regularly, in our
    office, have people coming through and telling us that we need
    to keep the pressure on, because they need to be able to go
    back to their parliaments and argue for greater defense
    spending and why it is central to stability, economic
    stability, in their countries.
        Mr. Russell. Thank you for that.
        And I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, gentleman.
        Now we will turn to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me to
    join the hearing today.
        I would love to follow up on Mr. Russell's point. We have
    talked a lot today about deterrence and about the money that we
    are committing towards that end. But I think it would also send
    a very powerful message for our NATO allies to meet their
    commitments in terms of proximity to Russia itself, to the
    threat that that potentially presents. They have the most to
    lose in a confrontation.
        And it blows me away that, of the 28 NATO member countries,
    only 5 have met a minimal threshold of 2 percent while we are
    spending near 4 percent, double all other NATO countries
    combined. And of the Baltic States, only Estonia has reached
    that--the Baltic States, who we seem to be preoccupied with in
    terms of potential Russian provocation.
        And so my concern--I don't know if you have an answer to
    it. You said that we are pretty certain that some of these
    member countries are going to meet their commitments; we need
    to do more.
        If you have something specific to share, I would love to
    hear it. If not, I would just love to make the point that we
    are creating a moral hazard by upping an investment from $789
    million to $3.4 billion without a concurrent commitment in real
    dollars or euros from our allies on the continent. And I think
    that sets its own set of problems in motion.
        The other thing that I would like to ask of General Allvin
    is, last week, we had a great panel, including Dov Zakheim, who
    talked about the tyranny of consensus. And you have been
    talking about all the reasons that ERI makes sense, everything
    that it might be able to do. I would love to get a sense of the
    intellectual rigor that went into making these decisions and
    coming up with this strategy.
        In much the same way that we may or may not have been able
    to forecast that Russia might feel encircled as we brought more
    countries formerly in the eastern bloc into NATO, is there some
    unintended consequence that we might want to think about now or
    that you could share with us, in terms of upping our
    commitment, our force structure, the amount of money that we
    are spending, ratcheting up the escalation in that area? Again,
    maybe for the right reasons; maybe we have thought all of this
    through. But assure me that you have thought through some of
    the other consequences that may not have been obvious from your
    testimony.
        General Allvin. Well, sir, I would say, specifically, with
    respect to the approach that we have taken, as I mentioned,
    there has been a transition. For the first couple years, it was
    really about assurance. And so if one wanted to say that was a
    more passive approach, because when you looked at the way that
    we were executing and had been executing, it was very
    disaggregated with our formations. And it was sort of a
    statement that we are here, we are here, but the way that we
    were here in many of the--the presence in the Baltics, for
    example, was not necessarily a credible combat formation, but
    it sent that message that we are standing next to our allies.
        And as we saw the continued malign influence and the
    activities, that is what has had us step up----
        Mr. O'Rourke. I am sorry to interrupt you. I have limited
    time.
        So I am not so interested in the thinking that went into
    coming up with this as the strategy, but the thinking that
    challenged this strategy. What are the potential risks of this
    strategy? What could go wrong?
        General Allvin. So you actually touched on it very well,
    Congressman, is that there is an escalation risk here. And so,
    as we try and understand those things which are true red lines,
    those things which are rhetorical red lines, the consistency is
    with our commitments of resources and equipment and exercises
    and increased focus in Europe. It is also with the consistent
    messaging, the messaging of what we are here to do and the
    objectionable behavior by the Russians that has caused this
    response.
        Mr. O'Rourke. From my perspective as a Member of Congress,
    Crimea caught me by surprise. And, again, from a little bit of
    a distance, although I sit on the committee and I have been
    able to be in some classified discussions on this, I think all
    of us would have liked to have known more about what was about
    to come before it hit us.
        Tell me what, since Crimea, you have done in terms--that
    you could talk about here--in terms of maybe Russian language
    specialists who are on your staff, your ability to collect
    information, the ability not just through deterrence and force
    presence but perhaps the nonforce aspects of what we do in
    Europe to prevent something from happening in the first place
    or to anticipate it before it hits us.
        General Allvin. Absolutely.
        Mr. O'Rourke. And I didn't leave you much time, so I may
    have to take this for the record, Madam Chair.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 61.]
        General Allvin. I would just--I will introduce, and perhaps
    I will get a chance to expound on it later, but the Russian
    Strategic Initiative is something I would like to share and
    talk about.
        Of course, with respect to the intel [intelligence]
    capabilities, I am not of that particular ilk, and I know that
    there are more intel professionals who can speak more deeply on
    this. But they are committed to regaining that expertise in the
    quantities that have sort of eroded over the past 15, 20 years,
    for the right reasons, because there are more global
    requirements for that. But that is a commitment that the intel
    community is making.
        The Russia Strategic Initiative is--much of it is about
    learning, it is about understanding. So, to your point, sir,
    that the surprise of Crimea, that caught a lot of us sort of
    unawares, and understanding that we need to be able to have a
    better understanding of the thinking, of the strategy, of the
    doctrine of Russia to be able to anticipate better, in
    conjunction with the increasing resources from the Intelligence
    Community, we have an understanding to how to respond to those
    and perhaps get ahead of that.
        So and I would be happy to talk further at length about the
    Russia Strategic Initiative, which is something that,
    incidentally, was initially funded through ERI.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mrs. Hartzler. You bet. And we are getting ready to start
    here in a minute a second round of questioning. So if you can
    stick around, we would love to have you have the opportunity to
    share any more questions you might have, because those are
    really excellent questions.
        Representative Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is great
    to be here.
        First of all, I just want to associate myself with
    Representative Russell and Representative O'Rourke and their
    remarks about the importance of contributions to the NATO
    alliance. You emphasized how important it is that we have a
    united alliance.
        General, you used the terms ``commitment in presence,''
    ``confidence in the alliance,'' ``effectiveness of
    interoperability.'' Do you think it would be a wise decision to
    dismantle NATO?
        General Allvin. No. Absolutely not. I could go on for
    minutes or hours, but, absolutely, if NATO----
        Mr. Moulton. Well, you are preaching to the choir here. We
    just, unfortunately, have a major-party candidate who thinks
    that is a good idea.
        You also talked about the importance of deterring Putin.
    And I couldn't agree more that he is a real threat. Is it
    helpful to have people talking about his leadership, praising
    his military accomplishments? Is that a good way to deter
    Putin, General?
        General Allvin. I can really only speak to the way that we
    can try and avert behavior through our strength and, sort of,
    the primary deterrence theory model. With respect to other
    influences outside of the principles of deterrence, which are
    deny the benefit or increase the cost, I am not really a
    deterrence specialist beyond the principles of deterrence
    theory, so I really can't speak to those elements.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
        Would anyone else like to comment on that?
        Ms. Ellehuus. We work with alliances and partnerships every
    day, so we see the value of those.
        And the transatlantic community, you know, Putin aside,
    when we have other nations who are undermining the rules-based
    international order which we have tried so hard to create, I
    think the transatlantic community has greater influence
    together.
        And so, outside of a NATO perspective, I think in terms of
    relative influence, there is a rationale for keeping NATO and
    increasing our relationship with individual allies in the EU.
        Mr. Moulton. Great. Thank you very much.
        I would like to talk about something that some other people
    have brought up, which is the Russian hybrid warfare threat and
    how we are meeting that threat.
        When I was in Eastern Europe looking at the threat of
    Russia last year, it was very clear that we have gotten--you
    know, we were doing some good tank drills and things like that,
    but Russia has an incredibly well-developed propaganda effort--
    for example, extensive propaganda, both clandestine but also,
    frankly, very public, with their public TV stations.
        One of the lessons that we have learned in fighting ISIS
    [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] over the past several years
    is that we can drop a lot of bombs and kill a lot of ISIS
    fighters, but if we don't address the recruiting effort, either
    right there on the ground amongst the family and friends of
    those we kill or through the Internet with folks even back
    home, then we are really not going to win this fight against
    ISIS.
        And it strikes me that there is a bit of an analogy with
    the fight against Russia, that we can add a few more battalions
    of tanks and do some larger tank drills and shows of force with
    our Air Force, but if we are not addressing the way that they
    are really undermining confidence in the NATO alliance right
    there in Eastern Europe, then we are probably not going to win
    this fight in the long run.
        So, General, can you talk about the balance that you see in
    the ERI and whether we are putting enough effort into those
    types of battles as well?
        General Allvin. I would say that balance of effort does not
    necessarily equate to balance of dollars.
        Mr. Moulton. Sure.
        General Allvin. So I think that there are some areas that
    are smaller dollar amounts within ERI, and some of the things
    that we are doing just within the normal conduct of business
    with our Special Operations Command in Europe that really get
    at this using the host nation to strengthen their ability to
    attribute, to be able to sort of call out, to be able to
    identify that which is true with that which is being, you know,
    formulated, the facts on the ground.
        I think, inherently, you step back and it is easy to
    understand how a country that acts fully out of interests
    versus a country which is value-based has an advantage
    tactically in being able to not be encumbered by the truth. So
    it makes it a bit of a challenge, but one that I think we
    embrace happily as a values-based nation.
        So I think those sort of things that we are doing to be
    able to help them attribute it, confront it, call them out, and
    be able to identify the differences between the truth and what
    is being portrayed, that is being funded partially through ERI
    and some of the engagements that we do in the day-to-day
    business within European----
        Mr. Moulton. Do you think it is being funded sufficiently?
        General Allvin. Honestly, I am not enough of an expert to
    say what----
        Mr. Moulton. I mean, my impression a year ago was that we
    were doing very little, compared to what they are doing, to
    counter their effort. So, I mean, if there has been a dramatic
    change in the last 12 months, then I would be willing to revise
    my assessment, but----
        General Allvin. I would offer that, as we look at this, it
    is not necessarily the Russian military alone that is doing
    this. They are approaching it with a whole-of-government,
    whole-of-nation approach, and----
        Mr. Moulton. And do we have enough of a whole-of-nation,
    whole-of-government approach in response?
        General Allvin. I would say that is beyond my particular
    area of expertise to----
        Mr. Moulton. From your perspective, do you think you are
    being supported enough? I mean, you have a job that is very
    dependent on these other arms of government. Do you think we
    are doing enough?
        General Allvin. I honestly--understanding the tensions that
    exist within this government for all the things that have to be
    done, I cannot speak credibly as to what the other elements of
    the government are doing, whether it is sufficient.
        Mr. Moulton. So, General, if you cannot even speak to what
    the other elements of government are doing, it certainly
    doesn't give me enough confidence that we have enough of a
    whole-of-government approach to this threat.
        Thank you very much.
        Madam Chair, thank you.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
        Now, as has been alluded to, in this initiative for fiscal
    year 2017, we are funding the operation at $3.4 billion, which
    is up from $789 million authorized and appropriated last year.
    So that is a huge increase in investment.
        And the request addressed most of those funds towards a
    conventional buildup, including consecutive, rotational, or
    heel-to-toe deployments of U.S. troops and the prepositioning
    of an armored brigade combat team's equipment in Europe. And
    the funds also are providing for additional military exercises
    with one or more foreign partners, building foreign military
    capacity, countering unconventional threats, and military
    construction, or MILCON, projects.
        So, just for the record, could you expound on specific
    examples of the way this money is being used, specific MILCON
    projects that are going to be using this money, specific
    training exercises that you have been doing, and examples of
    building that foreign military capacity?
        General.
        General Allvin. Yes, ma'am. Well, I would say
    specifically--well, starting with the exercises. That is one we
    alluded to earlier, whether it be Anakonda 16 or the BALTOPS or
    Cold Response, Trident Juncture. These are elements of
    exercising that we are enabling to grow and be more
    multinational and more opportunities to test interoperability
    amongst nations. So, on the exercise, it has been very robust.
        The infrastructure, when we talk about MILCON, it is not
    necessarily what we would consider big construction. It is a
    very small percentage. But the military construction is really
    to allow the infrastructure of the host nation to better
    support their training and our training needs alongside them.
        So, when you have slight improvements, for example, in
    training ranges, in Bulgaria, for example, that allows us to
    have better bilateral or multilateral exercising and training
    interoperability exercises, given the improvements in the
    ranges, for example.
        With respect to the presence--I would say that each of
    these five lines of effort, the key is that this is one area
    where the sum is much greater than the parts. If you have the,
    sort of, slight increase in the infrastructure, it enables you
    to do more robust exercising. If you have a greater presence of
    this armored brigade combat team, which is their heel-to-toe,
    fully with their equipment, it allows you to do more broader
    engagements and interoperabilities and leverage the small
    infrastructure improvements that we are doing. As you increase
    the engagements with your partners at the smaller level with
    building partnership capacity, that is done through the
    presence and the engagements of those forces that are able to
    come over.
        And in a purely deterrence aspect, which is really what
    this--the prepositioned stocks are largely a deterrent aspect,
    but they also enable the Army to in future times come over and
    fall in on that and be able to exercise that as a deterrent. So
    each of those really feed into each other for an overall
    increased deterrent effect.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. And, as we discussed privately,
    you will be modernizing some of the bunkers and some of the old
    facilities that are there in order to house the equipment and
    to be able to have those prepositioned stocks.
        What can we expect our allies to contribute to the ERI from
    both a capability and capacity perspective?
        And, separately, would the U.S. Foreign Military Sales
    program be a useful mechanism through which the U.S. could aid
    our ERI partners? And, if so, are there any FMS cases that are
    currently working their way through the FMS process relating to
    this initiative and our partner nations?
        Ms. Ellehuus. I can begin on that.
        Certainly, you know, as we have moved from assurance to
    deterrence, and we have learned more each year as we have
    proceeded with the training and exercises and other efforts
    under ERI. So, for example, as we do the training and
    exercises, we find other vulnerabilities, in terms of
    maneuverability or movements or gaps in infrastructure or
    communications, and so we are able to build on that.
        And those aren't just vulnerabilities that we, the United
    States, needs to come in and fix; those are lessons learned
    that we pass on to individual allies about their
    vulnerabilities and what they need to do to reinforce their own
    defense, and there are things that we pass on to NATO as well.
        So, to give you one example, you are probably familiar with
    NATO's RAP, or Reassurance Action Plan, which was a holdover
    from the Wales Summit in 2014. And the NAC [North Atlantic
    Council] recently agreed the Readiness Action Plan reception,
    staging, and onward movement and preposition capability
    packages, whereby NSIP [NATO Security Investment Programme]
    funding, about 300 million euros, will be used to support ERI
    projects, so design and construction, including storage of U.S.
    equipment in Poland.
        So, you know, that is a lot of words, but, in short, we
    have said we want to preposition stocks in Poland and we want
    to train there, and NATO is recognizing that they will take
    advantage of those sites as well. And so they recognize that
    NATO will also provide funding for that. So that heavily
    reduces the bill for the U.S. and allows us to either give back
    that ERI funding or use it elsewhere.
        And so I give you that example just to show the kind of
    expectations we are conveying not only to individual allies, in
    terms of host-nation support, but to NATO, saying, you are
    benefiting from this as well, you are going to use those
    training ranges, you are going to use those bases.
        In terms of your second question about building partner
    capacity and FMF [Foreign Military Financing], I would have to
    get back to you because I would need to confer with State
    Department about what the security assistance plan is for this
    year.
        But I do know that in the discussions that DOD has been
    involved in with State Department about building that program,
    we have argued for pooled funding for the Baltic nations to
    increase their capabilities under the Baltic Defense
    Capabilities Initiative, particularly in areas such as air
    defense. And so we have tried to look at them, you know, as
    three rather than individual nations and look at what they
    already have and what they might need in future to reinforce
    their own defenses, using mechanisms like FMF.
        But we can certainly take that for the record and get you
    exact numbers for FMF.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 61.]
        Mrs. Hartzler. I appreciate that. Yeah, this subcommittee
    has been looking at the foreign military sales process and ways
    that it is impacting our global defense, as well as any
    problems, so that is why I ask that question.
        My last question before I turn to the other members is,
    giving the information coming out of Eastern Europe, I
    understand that there are very lethal threats to our primary
    ground combat platforms and their crews. And many in the Army,
    including General McMaster, the Director of the Army
    Capabilities Integration Center and Deputy Commanding General
    of Futures at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, has
    stated that our ground combat vehicles are losing their
    qualitative edge over our adversaries. ``With Russia
    demonstrating the capability to field advanced anti-tank
    weapons and thermobaric warheads, our armored vehicles and
    servicemembers will be vulnerable in a fight.''
        So I understand that new technologies like the Active
    Protection System, the APS, can defeat these threats, and they
    have already been successfully fielded and combat-tested by our
    allies with great results. And I have been a very strong
    advocate of APS technologies to protect our men and women and
    believe we need the technology fielded now.
        So, General Allvin, can you tell us how EUCOM, in
    particular, views the threat situation to our ground combat
    vehicles? And how is EUCOM working with the Army to address the
    threat sooner rather than later, especially if the APS solution
    already exists?
        General Allvin. Well, I will tell you that what we are
    learning in--as we mentioned, this last 30 months has been--it
    is relatively rapid, I guess, in bureaucratic timeframe, but we
    have been getting smarter about what it takes to operate in the
    vicinity of and what combat might look like if, God forbid, it
    were to actually happen through some of our contingency
    planning and wargaming.
        And that actually has yielded deficiencies in several
    domains, so it is not only just the land domain but the air
    domain. Their ability to inhibit freedom of movement and the
    qualitative edge is, sort of, waning in several areas.
        So, while I can't speak to this specifically, what we do as
    a result of that, those are the capability gaps and shortfalls
    that we do submit in each of those domains, those shortfalls,
    as they are identified and clarified to the Department. And
    that goes back to the services and into the building to come up
    with the solutions to those.
        So we do identify the gaps and the shortfalls, and then the
    solutions come out through OSD [Office of the Secretary of
    Defense] and the services. And I would say that this one, this
    particular one, has not elevated above others to us. There is a
    general category of inhibitors to freedom of movement and
    things where the qualitative edge has waned with respect to a
    potential confrontation with the Russians.
        Mrs. Hartzler. I am having a classified briefing tomorrow
    on some of these issues, so perhaps we can delve further into
    those vulnerabilities at that time. But thank you for your
    answer.
        Ranking Member Speier, do you have any additional
    questions?
        Ms. Speier. No.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Very good.
        Mr. Scott, do you have any additional questions?
        Mr. Scott. General Allvin, I wanted to follow up, and this
    may give you a chance to speak about the initiative you were
    talking about earlier.
        What requirements remain unfunded under the current budget,
    and how would you assess the risk that that causes the forces
    under European Command? And then just any general comments that
    you have. I know you had some comments about the Russian
    initiative.
        General Allvin. Well, thank you.
        I would say that, in general, we do need those forces that
    are coming in through ERI, those increased rotational forces.
    And I think one of the other areas that has been identified is
    also, as we mentioned, the ability to counter this anti-access/
    area denial capability that the Russians have been able to put
    up that could inhibit the freedom of movement. That is about as
    much depth at this classification.
        But I would say thank you for the opportunity to reengage
    on the Russia Strategic Initiative. Because one thing we
    certainly understand is that we do have some learning to do,
    and we have to do it fairly rapidly. And so, while the
    Intelligence Community is really working hard on being able to
    increase the robustness and the capacity of their resources and
    their analysts and the understanding, we also in the Department
    understand that this is an issue that crosses combatant
    commands and it is something that we need to understand as a
    department.
        And so, thanks to initially the funding of the European
    Reassurance Initiative, we have developed this Russia Strategic
    Initiative. And I can tell you at this classification level,
    its primary role is to enhance our understanding and to help
    support some of the planning that we would do and some of the
    deterrent activities.
        A lot of these questions that have been asked today we are
    still trying to get to the correct answers on. The Russia
    Strategic Initiative is moving us closer to a better
    understanding that will help us be able to have more satisfying
    answers to questions like this in the future.
        And I would say that this is an example, as we look at the
    question of what is in the OCO which should be into base, this
    is one of those that the Department realizes this is a long-
    term initiative. And so it has been transitioned into a program
    of record. So the funding that started off in ERI is going to
    transition into the Army's base budget as a program of record.
    So this is one of the examples where we keep analyzing those
    things that we think are going to be long-term requirements and
    how we might be able to move them into the base budgets.
        So thank you for the opportunity to respond.
        Mr. Scott. Do you think that Mr. Putin underestimated the
    global response with his actions in the Ukraine?
        General Allvin. That is a very difficult question. It is a
    great question, and I think that there are many competing
    scholars who have differing opinions as to whether he achieved
    some level of success and is satisfied with that at this point.
    There are others who will say that he was surprised, that he
    did not anticipate the level of national unity post-Crimea that
    actually came against him when he went into the Donbass.
        I will say that is still an open question at this point,
    but, as we look at the future, we do understand something about
    Russia, that they are a learning and adaptive country. This is
    not the Soviet Union of old. And so, as you look at the tactics
    and the techniques and what they have been doing, starting with
    Georgia in 2008 up to now, they are learning and adapting.
        The question of what they are learning from Ukraine I
    believe is still an open one, and I can't give you a good,
    solid answer on that.
        Mr. Scott. Do either of you have an opinion on that that
    you would like to share?
        Ms. Ellehuus. I think he certainly underestimated the
    resolve coming out of NATO. I mean, the increase in defense
    spending and the refocus on deterrence and defense, that has
    really energized the alliance at a time when I think some
    countries were certainly sitting back and looking for a further
    peace dividend. It has woken up a lot of people.
        I think of the example of Germany, in particular, which has
    always played a pretty calm role in arbitrating between, kind
    of, Europe and Russia. And, you know, Chancellor Merkel speaks
    Russian and has a long history there and so thought she had an
    understanding of where he was coming from. But, clearly, a lot
    of countries woke up and realized that you can't handle----
        Mr. Scott. They also have very strong trade relationships
    with Germany, as I understand it. And I would think that that
    would lead to maybe part of the surprise that he had from----
        Ms. Ellehuus. Certainly. But Germany, in particular, has
    been very strong on sanctions, with Chancellor Merkel leading
    the charge in their rollover each and every time and focusing
    on the importance of Minsk implementation. Other nations
    haven't been as strong, but she has been a real champion of
    that, despite the damage it has done to Germany's economy.
        Mr. Tyra. So I would observe that every action that has
    been taken has resulted in an action that is unhelpful to them.
    And so the more times they push, the harder it gets. And I
    think the reaction is they are only making the coalition
    stronger, they are only making NATO stronger. And I think they
    will eventually get to that point.
        I would observe that Germany, among others, is one of the
    framework nations for the EFP. And so I think it is clear where
    they believe their future lies.
        Mr. Scott [presiding]. Well, certainly, every member of
    this committee is aware of the challenges of what is in OCO
    that we would prefer to be in base and something that we look
    forward to resolving as time goes forward.
        I would make one final point, which is, certainly, he saw
    where our NATO allies increased their defense spending, and he
    can also see when we reduce our defense spending. And I think
    that maybe leads to a false perception of weakness of the
    United States and our resolve.
        With that, Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
        General Allvin, going back to the line of questions about
    unintended consequences or thinking through next-order effects
    of some of the decisions we are making today, we increase our
    force size in Europe and the amount that we are spending there;
    ideally, Russia gets the message and it deters them from
    provocation or doing things that we don't or the Europeans
    don't want them to do. What if Russia increases its force size
    with its border with NATO?
        To Ranking Member Speier's question in terms of
    anticipating the budgetary consequences of this, do we see you
    back here, or someone from the Pentagon, 2 years from now
    saying, ``Look, we thought $3.4 billion was going to do the
    trick. It turns out the Russians have put two more divisions
    here. We need to step up''?
        You can understand my concern along this trajectory. Tell
    me how you have addressed that concern for yourself or for
    others in the Pentagon.
        General Allvin. Well, certainly, our role in U.S. European
    Command is to be able to identify, sort of, the demand as we
    see it to be able to counter security threats in Europe. So to
    the extent that--and I certainly wouldn't be able to predict
    what might happen in the coming years.
        I think our role here is to ensure that the money that we
    are being given now, we are spending it in the most efficient
    and effective manner, to where we are actually increasing the
    power of the alliance, increasing the power of not just the
    United States forces over there but the interoperability and
    that what we are learning from our training and exercises is
    making the entire alliance stronger.
        And if we succeed at that, then, in fact, the likelihood of
    coming back--and whether that comes back or makes it through
    the Department--because that is actually what we do. We compete
    with all the other combatant commands to say, this is what we
    see in our AOR [area of responsibility]. I think the more
    successful we are in utilizing the resources we have now to
    help build the alliance and build that unity, the less likely
    it is that you will see us here, you know, in a couple years.
        Mr. O'Rourke. So a success would be we have calibrated this
    correctly, we have spent the right amount, we have put the
    precise number of forces there to get the desired outcome.
    Failure would be the Pentagon coming back or a future
    administration coming back and saying, actually, we didn't
    quite get this right; it looks like the Russians have
    escalated; we now need to, in turn, escalate.
        Let me ask you, just because of limited time, as we bring
    more U.S. forces into this region and as the Russians respond
    in kind, I think we increase the opportunities for
    miscalculation. You mentioned your efforts towards ensuring
    that we do a better job of gathering intelligence and are just
    smarter and more effective with the resources that we have
    there.
        Talk about military-to-military cooperation with Russia,
    your relationships with your counterpart or your counterparts
    in Russia and your ability to talk to each other to ensure that
    we don't have a miscalculation that leads to an unintended
    conflict or war.
        General Allvin. I am going to actually probably yield that
    second to my policy counterpart.
        But I will just say quickly on the first, I don't know that
    I would calculate that failure would be necessarily that we
    come back here. It might be a failure to predict. There are
    certain things that they say the enemy gets a vote. So the
    failure to predict exactly what an unpredictable Russia would
    do could actually result in us coming back.
        So there are many things that we don't fully have control
    over. We are going to focus on the things we do have control
    over to make sure that, again, we are making the best use of
    the resources that you are providing for us.
        I am going to actually turn it over with respect to the
    mil-to-mil policy to Rachel.
        Ms. Ellehuus. Yes, certainly. Thank you.
        Yes, I mean, I think when we look at these programs each
    year, success would actually be Russia behaving responsibly and
    becoming a cooperative partner, as it has been in the past, on
    Afghanistan, in the Balkans. We have very positive examples of
    a time when they did work with the international community.
        If things have gotten worse, I think we need to actually
    have a more fundamental relook at our prioritization of the
    Russia threat vis-a-vis other threats that the Department and
    the U.S. Government have identified.
        In terms of how--you know, your question about
    deconflicting and dialogue with Russia, again, the strategy is
    strong and balanced, so the ``balanced'' side of that is having
    a dialogue with Russia. Today, in fact, there is a NATO-Russia
    Council meeting. It is the second since 2014, when we said no
    business as usual and actually stopped the military-to-military
    cooperation under the business-as-usual rubric.
        So we do continue that dialogue, not least in Syria, where
    it is very important that we talk with them to avoid
    miscalculation. And every time they have a violation of
    airspace or fly too close to our ships, we also call out that
    bad behavior, because the last thing we need is miscalculation
    or an accident.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Yeah. Well, I appreciate that.
        And, as I yield back, I would just like to make the point
    that I would view continued escalation to be a failure. And I
    would hope that, in maybe working through the committee staff,
    the ranking member, and the chair, there would be some way to
    hold a joint hearing with our colleagues on Foreign Affairs,
    because I would really like to understand everything that we
    are doing to address these issues militarily but also non-
    militarily.
        And nothing that I can think of condones Russia's behavior
    in the areas that we have talked about, but there is a logic to
    it. And I can understand them responding to the growth of NATO,
    to things that happened in Ukraine, a part of the world that is
    central to the Russian psyche. And the responses, while not
    justified, are understandable to me.
        And, in that same way, I want to make sure we are thinking
    through adding $3.4 billion to the fire, bringing more forces
    in, and potentially setting us on a trajectory where we will be
    obligated, as things continue to escalate, to bring more forces
    and more dollars into play, thereby provoking additional
    responses that may not be wise, they may not follow the
    international norms, but may follow a logic that we have seen
    play out from Georgia to Ukraine to Crimea.
        And so, anyhow, I would just like to set that out there. I
    really appreciate your all's work and response to our
    questions.
        With that, I yield back to the chair.
        Mr. Scott. Ma'am, do you have any?
        Ms. Speier. No.
        Mr. Scott. I want to thank all of you for being here. It is
    very clear to me that we need your expertise.
        And the other thing that is clear to me from this hearing
    is that Putin--he may be predictable sometimes and at other
    times unpredictable, but he clearly would not have stopped in
    the Ukraine, in my opinion, had the United States not shown the
    resolve and had our NATO allies not shown the resolve that they
    did to stop him.
        And so we will have honest and respectful discussions about
    the funding of the operations in that part of the world. And I
    look forward to your input on that, and I look forward to
    making the world a better place.
        With that, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                              A P P E N D I X

                                 July 13, 2016

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 July 13, 2016

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                       DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 July 13, 2016

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 July 13, 2016

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                RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

        Ms. Ellehuus. Yes. For Ukraine, there is one FMS case for 2,250 AN/
    PVS-14 Night-Vision Devices that is still being processed using the
    European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) funds, and the devices are
    tentatively scheduled to be delivered by the end of September 2016.
    Other than Ukraine, there are no other FMS cases to our Partner nations
    that are funded with ERI appropriations.   [See page 22.]
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O'ROURKE
        General Allvin. While more work needs to be done, EUCOM has
    enhanced our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
    interoperability and sharing with partner nations in order to maximize
    limited resources. This includes multiple lines of effort: coordinating
    processes, sharing key intelligence questions, deconflicting
    capabilities, and developing shared architecture and tools.   [See page
    17.]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 July 13, 2016

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                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER

        Mrs. Hartzler. Please expand on your comments about the value of
    restricting Russia's options by ``bracketing'' the scope of its hybrid
    warfare. Even if Russia takes actions at the lower-intensity end of the
    hybrid warfare spectrum, what value do you foresee in continuing to
    invest the full amount of requested ERI funds to increase the costs to
    Vladimir Putin--and therefore decrease the likelihood--of higher-end
    military engagements? Do you believe the U.S. should continue to fund
    ERI based on an analysis of the region's strategic goals and the
    changing operational landscape in Europe?
        General Allvin. (U) In order to effectively counter the lower end
    of hybrid warfare and strive to prevent high end conflict, USEUCOM must
    understand what messages our adversary is pushing, which messages have
    traction with key audiences and how our adversary reacts to US counter-
    messaging and reassurance/deterrence activities. This understanding
    will both help USEUCOM message more effectively, and avoid
    unintentionally provoking our adversary.
        (U) A lack of a presence in the information environment during
    steady state operations would leave DoD at a distinct disadvantage when
    dealing with audiences that have been inundated with adversary
    propaganda and malign influence efforts. USEUCOM is reliant on ERI
    funding to augment the ASSURED VOICE base funding it currently receives
    in order to effectively counter propaganda and deter aggression. Until
    this funding issue is addressed, USEUCOM's ability to compete in the
    information space will be limited and therefore the risk of higher end
    military engagement is increased.
        (U) With regard to the last question on if ERI should continue to
    be funded, as a Combatant Command it is our responsibility not to
    advocate for funding sources but to clearly communicate requirements
    given our strategic environment and assigned missions. Given this, we
    clearly see an enduring demand signal to successfully deter Russia, and
    sincerely appreciate the support to date Congress has provided through
    ERI.
        Mrs. Hartzler. Please provide an update on the timeline for
    deploying the 80 M-1 tanks and 140 Bradley vehicles to EUCOM, and
    please elaborate on the the types of modernization and capability
    improvements that will be integrated into each set of vehicles.
        Mr. Tyra. Starting in 2nd Quarter Fiscal Year 2017, the Army will
    initiate heel-to-toe rotations of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)
    to Europe. The current plan is to rotate units with 87 M1A2SEPv2 Abrams
    tanks and 138 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs). With respect to the
    Bradley Fighting vehicles, 125 are M2A3 BFVs and 13 are M7A3 Bradley
    Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicles. These vehicles have digital
    architecture and 2nd Generation forward-looking infrared which provides
    visible imaging for day or night operations. If the European
    Reassurance Initiative program continues, the Army would recommend
    fielding an additional Armored Brigade as prepositioned stock. This
    would provide U.S. Army Europe two complete Armored Brigade
    prepositioned stock sets while continuing to rotationally deploy one
    ABCT.
        Accordingly, the Army has requested funding to modernize 14 Abrams
    and 14 BFVs available due to unit conversions in the European
    Reassurance Initiative portion of the 2017 President's Budget. This
    will begin building a second ABCT set in Europe.

                                      [all]