GOLDWATER–NICHOLS REFORM: 
THE WAY AHEAD

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

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The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. “Mac” Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. “MAC” THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Thirty years ago after five years of study and effort, the Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act. I think virtually everybody would agree it has been tremendously successful. I also think virtually everyone would agree, in spite of 30 years of success, it needs to be looked at again and reviewed because no law that we pass is successful for all time.

The House has roughly a dozen provisions related to Goldwater-Nichols and strategic thinking and planning in the military; the Senate has about 20. And as we head towards conference, it seemed to me it was important to get some learned perspectives on the various proposals in our bill and the Senate bill and the things we need to be thinking about.

I could not ask for a better panel of witnesses, either in previous jobs or in their current jobs, and to have a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, a former Under Secretary of Defense, a former combatant commander, a four-star, gives us a variety of perspectives and very helpful insights on the issues we face.

Before turning to our witnesses, let me turn to the ranking member for any comments he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with your comments. I think this is a very appropriate time to revisit Goldwater-Nichols, to look at the command structure, figure out, you know, what is the best plan going forward. And I also agree that we have three outstanding witnesses to give us some guidance in that.

I think the issues that I am most interested in are, number one, is it too top heavy the way we have it structured with the command structures? That is one of the complaints I know that the Senators have made, is that as you, you know, create all these commands there then comes, you know, all kinds of bureaucracy that
comes with it, various sort of, well, I guess the government equivalent of middle managers. Is that necessary? Could we save some money by consolidating that and trimming that down?

And then the second thing that I have been intrigued by is something General McChrystal has talked about, is the need for greater flexibility in terms of moving around DOD [Department of Defense] assets. And is the current combatant command structure the best way to do that?

As a challenge arises, you want to be able to pull together the best team from wherever it is to confront that challenge. That is what General McChrystal basically did in response to Al Qaeda. As he said, it takes a network to defeat a network. And the network that was built, not just by him, but certainly by others, took from all across government, and not even just DOD, to maximize our intelligence assets and our military assets to confront that threat. So does the current combatant command structure allow for that level of flexibility?

And then frankly something that I have, you know, always sort of puzzled over and don't know that well is, you know, the Joint Chiefs versus the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] versus the combatant commanders, what is the chain of command? Who is in charge of what? And how do they all work together? And is there a way that they could work together better?

So those are the three things that have arisen out of some of our discussions on our side and also in looking at what the Senate has done, that I hope we will hear from our witnesses today.

And with that, I will yield back and I thank the chairman for having this very important hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I think he raises excellent points.

Again, let me welcome our witnesses. We are pleased to have Dr. John Hamre, the president and CEO [chief executive officer] of the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]; General Carter Ham who is now the president and chief executive officer of the Association of the United States Army; and Dr. Dov Zakheim who is senior adviser at CSIS and also a senior fellow at the CNA Corporation. I am not going to take time to go through all of their qualifications.

Again, thank each of you for being here. Without objection, any written material you would like to provide will be made part of the record.

Dr. Hamre, the floor is yours.

**STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN J. HAMRE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Dr. Hamre. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, thank you. It is a real privilege to be back in front of this committee. I think I have testified in front of this committee over 50 times. It hasn't always been fun, this one is going to be a lot better than some of them, but I am honored that you would have me back. Thank you.

If I might start with just two very brief observations and then I would like to comment on each of the five sections that you asked me to review.
First, I would just ask you as you are looking at this legislation and how it changes the Department, please be careful. We are in war. We have got at least two wars going on. We have got tense operations around the world. We are going to have a change in the government that is coming up. And so I would ask you to approach this with prudence, please.

The second thing I would say is that, unlike 30 years ago when I was on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee when we passed Goldwater-Nichols, at that time we had failure in the field. We were failing as a military organization in the field. That is what motivated change then. We do not have failure in the field today.

We have policy failure, but it is not military failure. And so I think we have to be very careful to understand why we need to make changes now. We need to make changes now because we don't have enough resources to support the needs that we have. We have to find ways to make this organization more agile, more streamlined.

And the question is, can that be the basis for a substantial reform agenda?

So let me now take—there were five sections that you asked me to comment on.

First, the Senate provision calls for elevating the stature of technology Director of Defense Research and Engineering [DDR&E] and diminishing the stature of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [AT&L].

Let me say, we won the Cold War not because we had a larger military. We won the Cold War because we had superior technology on our side of the battlefield.

And the Packard Commission, when it was formed, the Packard Commission wanted to make the Department of Defense a better buyer of things. They did not intend to diminish the DDR&E, but they did. In effect, we decapitated the head of the innovation ecosystem within the Department.

The Director of Defense Engineering and Research was the capstone of a system that put superior hardware into the hands of our soldiers. We lost that. And I will tell you right now, we are losing the innovation agenda between us and the Chinese and the Russians. We are falling behind.

I don't think that you can turn the large organization of AT&L, and the numbers are between 1,500 and 2,500, I just can't get a good number, they will never become an innovation organization. They are a compliance organization.

If we are going to restore innovation to the Department, we have to create a lean, superior position in the Department, the number-three position in the Department needs to be the chief innovation officer who is going to bring superior technology and put it in the hands of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines going forward.

So in this provision, I strongly support this provision.

The second one you asked me to comment on is the provision in the Senate bill that would cut general officers and flag officers by 25 percent. You have a modest provision in your bill that says that you should not have four-stars as sub-unified command officers. I
think that you have approached it with a principle about looking at the content, and I agree with that.

I do think that this is a case where I think the Department understands we probably have too many general officers and both the House and the Senate do. What we don’t have is a coherent plan. And simply imposing a cut of 25 percent is pretty arbitrary given the time we are in right now.

My personal recommendation is that you keep the 25 percent cut in place, but move the implementation date a year away and ask the Department to come back to you with a real plan on what it would look like. If you don’t like their plan you have a club. But let them have a voice on how they would shape this. I think that would be an important improvement when you come out of conference.

You asked me to comment on the provision section 941 in the Senate bill on cross-functional teams. And I understand the sincerity of the proposal. But I think it is profoundly wrong for the Congress to dictate the operational activities within the Department.

You establish structure and you establish goals; I don’t think it is right for the Congress to say how the Secretary of Defense should organize the internal activity of the Department. I think you ought to hold them accountable. If it isn’t functioning well, hold them accountable.

But to dictate the procedures, I mean, you have got to have this many people in the meeting, they have got to meet every Tuesday and they have got to have a staff, I think that is wrong. I don’t think that is appropriate for the Congress to dictate to the Secretary of Defense.

Hold him accountable, let him organize the Department the way it is best to accomplish those goals.

Fourth, you asked me to comment on the provision that is in the Senate bill that would authorize the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to do certain administrative functions, but put him in the chain of command.

Here I would say, you know, this is a very important issue. This is an issue of almost constitutional significance. In our system, I mean, democracies always struggle. How do you control authoritarian organizations with guns? And that is what the Defense Department is, it is an authoritarian organization. There is authority and people follow the chain of command.

The way we have handled that problem in this democracy is by civilian control, started by George Washington who insisted on civilian control.

Civilian control is to make sure only the President, and the President can never escape accountability for decisions to go to war, and you don’t put the military in the way that confuses that, either to give him clouded judgment or to give him an excuse.

Now, the provision that the Joint Staff is recommending is to let them do small administrative things. And I would say civilian control is a toggle switch, it is on or it is off. It is not a rheostat; you can’t dial it. You either have civilian control or you don’t.

Now, the issue that they say, you know, there are small administrative things that we should just give to the Chairman. For 4
years, I met every morning with the Chairman and the Vice Chairman and the Secretary, and I will just tell you it is not a problem to do those matters. Those things happen in minutes.

So I think we are overstating the nature of the problem and we are understating the severity of the implications if you go down this road. I would strongly encourage you not to accept this provision.

Finally, you asked me to comment on both the House and the Senate bills, past bills have provisions that would cap the numbers of people on the National Security Council [NSC].

Chairman Thornberry’s amendment has a different approach, which is to say the President can decide how big a National Security Council he wants, but if that National Security Council is more than a hundred people, it is really doing more operational things. Operational responsibility, the oversight needs to be with the Congress for that.

OMB [Office of Management and Budget] has about 450 people and there are 6 members of OMB that are required for confirmation. The National Security Council staff today is about 450 and there is no oversight.

If it is going to be an operational organization, if it is going to really be directing activities in the field, the Congress has a constitutional responsibility to oversee that activity, in my view.

Now, the chairman’s mark, it is somewhat arbitrary. It says if it is a hundred people or less we will deem that that is a coordination organization. If it is more than a hundred, we will deem that that is an operational organization. Now, the precise number doesn’t matter, but the constitutional principle matters greatly.

And I think it is exactly the right thing. It is forcing the debate we need to have in this country. Are we going to increasingly have the operations of the executive branch being run in the White House through the National Security Council staff? If that is the case, then Congress has an obligation to oversee that. I firmly believe that is a constitutional principle.

So I would ask that you carry that into your deliberations with the conference. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hamre can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Ham.

STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

General Ham. Thank, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Smith and members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

I am honored to be here with two distinguished colleagues, Dr. Hamre and Mr. Zakheim, both long-serving, distinguished public servants and both of whom have far more experience and expertise in the realm of the management of the United States military than I do, but I hope I can perhaps bring some insight into the operational components of this.

I would agree, Mr. Chairman, that this is an ideal time to review the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a law which, in my opinion, has had
overall significant, positive effect on the U.S. armed force and it has most certainly affected, frankly, my own personal and professional development.

I was a captain when the law was passed, not a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, so a pretty junior officer. And not long after the law was passed I was slated to go to the College of Naval Command and Staff in Newport. For a soldier, this was a very unusual thing to go to the Navy Staff College. And truth be told I resisted that assignment with great passion until finally somebody said you have your orders, report to Newport.

And so just to emphasize the point, there were two other fellow Army majors at that time in the Naval College of Command and Staff, Army Majors Ray Odierno and Stan McChrystal. We were all in that class together. And I would say that that initial exposure to joint education set each of us on paths that would lead to multiple joint command and staff experiences and, in my view, none of which would have been likely absent Goldwater-Nichols.

As a battalion commander, we deployed to Macedonia on United Nations duty under the auspices of Joint Task Force Provide Promise. Later I attended the Air Force War College. I served on the joint staff at U.S. Central Command on 9/11 and for 2 years after that.

As a general officer, I commanded a multinational unit in Iraq, had two operations positions on the Joint Staff and, as the chairman indicated, concluded my active service at U.S. Africa Command.

Again, I suspect that my path would have been far different had the Congress not passed Goldwater-Nichols.

I would agree with Dr. Hamre, and that while I agree that some changes are required, I would urge an element of caution. The old adage of measure twice, cut once I think seems about right to me as we consider changes to this very, very important law.

And for me from an operational perspective, one of the measures of effectiveness ought to be, will the changes that we are proposing and considering to implement, will they improve military effectiveness, not simply be change for change sake?

And so I look forward to your questions and I am honored to be here. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Dr. Zakheim.

STATEMENT OF DR. DOV ZAKHEIM, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, SENIOR ADVISER, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. Zakheim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, sir, and Mr. Smith, members of the committee, it is nice to be back to speak to you again.

I tend to agree with both the previous speakers in general, particularly with many of the things John Hamre just said. The question as to why do it now is really important. We are not fighting the same kind of enemy that we fought when Goldwater-Nichols was first passed. We are fighting several different kinds, funda-
mentally different kinds of enemies. We do everything from fighting Ebola to fighting ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] to worrying about conventional threats, and China and Russia are not identical conventional threats.

So when you use the terms “agile and adaptive” I think you are absolutely right. There is no other way to deal with this. And although John is right that we have done pretty well and Carter is right that we need to be careful, we should ask ourselves, have we done as well as we could?

And if you really think we have done as well as we could, particularly over the last 15 years, then I would argue you don’t have to change a thing.

But if you don’t have a hundred percent feeling about that, then you really do need to look to change. And I commend this committee and, frankly, the Senate Armed Services Committee as well for saying no, we could be doing better.

We are bloated, there is no question about it. We are not only bloated in terms of headquarters, we are bloated in terms of total civilians, we are bloated in terms of contractors. We don’t even know how many contractors we have.

And therefore, when you talk, for example, about reducing the number of four-stars, and I would tend to agree with what this committee is saying, which is there are some obvious changes that can be made, you can have one task force commander and not three, four component commanders. I would argue you do need some numbers or some percentage. Otherwise, DOD is not going to do what you ask them to do.

Do the numbers or percentages have to be as large as the Senate side recommends? I don’t think so. I think your side is probably closer to the truth on that. You have got to give some flexibility to DOD. You can point to some obvious changes, as I just mentioned. But nevertheless, some target has to be there. If there isn’t a target, they are not going to shoot at it.

Regarding the acquisition side, I totally agree with John regarding the USDR&E [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering]. I would say this, though. We have a very undereducated acquisition corps. There is no mandate that every single person who is in the acquisition business get up to speed on modern technology. You can get a master’s degree and not go to another course again and wind up being in Senior Executive Service [SES].

And if you will come back and tell me, oh, yes, there is the Defense Acquisition University, I would ask you to take a look, go online and take a look at their curriculum and then tell me if that is adequate. And I guarantee you won’t.

So it seems to me when you have a system that created its own rapid acquisition system to get around itself, which is what DOD did, something is fundamentally wrong.

Now, the only question that arises if you want DOD to really focus on innovation is, how do you reach out to the commercial sector? And the ways and means for doing that are not the ways and means we operate with right now. Profit is seen in a very different light by the commercial sector than by the bureaucracy, for example.
We have different parts of the FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] that address these. We tend to go to the more conservative route, the more mechanistic route. And the more we do that, the more we alienate the very kinds of cutting-edge technologists that we would really want to work with.

And one other thing. If you want to get somebody who is really going to be great, another Bill Perry as it were, then you better make it a lot easier for them both to get confirmed and then to do the same work when they leave the Department.

The kinds of people that we really need are exactly the kinds of people that don’t want to come. And I think we need to bear that in mind.

Cross-functional teams, I think John Hamre dealt with that exceedingly well, and as well with the question of the NSC staff.

I want to say one thing about the role of the Chairman. John’s experience may have been what it was, but it has not always been clear to me that the Chairman really is a source of independent advice to the President. And the Chairman should be, to the point where if the Chairman needs to disagree with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman should be able to do that without any repercussions at all.

So the 4-year term for a Chairman is really important in that regard. If you know you are going to be turned over within 6 months or 12 months or 18 months, you are going to be very cautious about what you say because it is the Secretary that reappoints you. If you know you have got a 4-year term, you are going to speak your mind in front of the President. And I think the Nation needs that.

If we are going to look at headquarters staff and the Joint Staff in particular, we had better start looking at agencies as well. One of the great shell games that we have played in the Department is the old Doc Cook game, right? They were told to cut headquarters staff in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], he created Washington Headquarters Services and everybody moved to WHS where they still are, by the way, and have grown by 70,000 civilians in the last 15 years.

When Secretary Gates closed down JFCOM [U.S. Joint Forces Command], what happened? Everybody floated somewhere else, and not just the military folks whom you could assign to other things like combat positions, but all the suits like me, they moved as well. That is not what you want. If you are going to reduce, you have got to reduce vertically, not just horizontally. I think that is critically important.

Let me just close with one other point, having been comptroller in my last job. We have a system now called PPBE [Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution]. We added an E, I was the one that added the E actually for execution, but we don’t really follow execution terribly well.

If you want to spend your money well, you need to be able to review your burn rates, as they are called in the commercial world, on a regular basis. We do it once a year in between the budget itself. That is not enough. At a minimum it should be every 3 months. See what has come up. Look at ISIS; ISIS came up out of nowhere.
You need to move your money quickly. By the way, a little bit of help on the reprogramming side from the Congress wouldn’t hurt either, but you need to move your money quickly, you need to review where the money isn’t being spent as quickly as possible so you can move it into those things that are needed to fight an ISIS which bites you all of a sudden or an Ebola which bites you all of a sudden.

We need 21st century financial management as well as 21st century acquisition management.

I think I have run out of time, so I will stop here and take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zakheim can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all, very interesting, helpful comments.

I am going to reserve my questions until later and yield to the ranking member.

Mr. SMITH. Just one very broad question, and this is something we discussed at a dinner at CSIS and had a very good conversation, I think, about the national security staff. But the question that sort of came up near the end was, you know, the National Security Council was created post World War II, and post-World War II we built basically an infrastructure for the national security threats that we saw at that time, basically to, you know, deal with the economic fallout of a, you know, devastated world, deal with the threat of communism.

And we have built, you know, from the Marshall Plan to the NSC to all manner of different things to confront that. And I think we had a fairly clear idea both of the threat we were facing and what we were doing to respond to it.

We are in a bit of a pickle on that at the moment in that I think we do have a clear understanding of the threats that we face. It is just that there is a lot of them. They are very, very different. Just, you know, to run through it, certainly there is terrorism in all its iterations, and then there is what Russia is doing, there is what China is doing, Iran, North Korea. And then as you mentioned there is the various things, like Ebola and other things, that come up that would play a role. And so I think you could fairly easily put out a matrix and say this is what we are trying to contend with.

What you can’t really do is explain how our entire foreign policy/national security apparatus is structured to meet that threat. I would say that there are two reasons for that, and I think the second one actually is more important. But the first reason is because of the sheer complexity of it.

But the second one is we want to imagine that we have more money than we actually do. And also, worse than that, we keep hoping that at some point in the future more money will show up.

Now, in 2010, Secretary Gates and the Obama administration did this sort of deep dive on national security strategy and looked out 10 years and said, yes, how much money are we going to have to deal with this, and built a budget around those threats. And those threats, A, have changed since 2010 rather dramatically, but
B, we have a lot less money and are going to have a lot less money than we thought we were going to have in 2010.

So how would each of you sort of build a strategy so that we can get more out of what we have and recognizing we simply don’t have the money frankly to meet all of those threats in the ways that we would like to meet them. But given that, where should we spend our money? What are the two or three most important reforms to meet that threat environment that I just described?

I think you went through each of them in a very helpful way, but not in sort of that, you know, comprehensive picture, here is the strategy, here is our limited resources, here is where we need to spend the money.

So I would be curious, you know, it is like 1946 all over again and we are rebuilding our foreign policy/national security apparatus, what is most important for us to do? And again, be realistic in terms of what our dollars are that are available.

Dr. Hamre, if you want to——

Dr. HAMRE. Well, let me take just a narrow piece of it. It is such a broad question.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Dr. HAMRE. But let me take just a narrow piece. And I think part of it is, you know, is the structure of our regional combatant commanders right for today?

And I think to step back to say, what is our grand strategy today? Well, our grand strategy today, because we have such a multiplicity of threats, our grand strategy today is to build up allies and partners around the world that can join us to create a security environment that is peaceful and deters bad action. That is, I think, our grand strategy, that is what we did after World War II in Europe. We never really pulled it together in Asia; we are pulling it together now in Asia.

So I think you do need forward-placed, regional commanders. I think calling them combatant commanders was a mistake actually. We ought to change that name.

But it is a huge advantage for us to have these officers forward, four-star officers forward who can engage in a very proactive way building alliance partnerships.

Now, when we passed Goldwater-Nichols, we had the assumption at that stage that we were going to actually fight wars through those regional combatant commanders. We have now formed task forces, joint task forces and combined task forces and I think that there is some capacity to make some structural change in how the Department is organized.

Carter Ham was a combatant commander and so I think he needs to be the one to speak more about this. We cannot afford to lose those four-stars forward. We probably can make it more efficient on how we resource them, their structure, and how we bring things together for the task forces that are under them.

Mr. SMITH. Yes. I think the most important thing you said there and something that we need to more clearly include in our national security strategy is the building of partners because that is the only way we confront those threats.
Now, obviously, we were trying to build partnerships during the Cold War and all that, but we were still overwhelming dominant. That is not the case now.

And, General Ham, actually that is a good segue to you because in Africa I know that, you know, that has been key. And you have sort of looked to the Horn of Africa where I think we have been reasonably successful because we have had decent partners and it is a sliding scale, I will grant you, but in Kenya and Ethiopia and Uganda to confront the threat in the Horn and the Arabian Peninsula.

Whereas you look at Mali and West Africa, we haven’t been able to find those partners to confront the narco [narcotics] states, to confront the terrorism, to confront the problems spilling out of Libya.

So if you could talk a little bit about that piece. How might we restructure, for instance, you know, work better with the State Department, work better with USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], which are component parts of building that partner capacity?

General Ham. Thanks, Congressman Smith. It won’t surprise you that having formerly sat in that seat I think there is value in having in the six geographic combatant commands a group of people who wake up every day focused exclusively on the United States relationship with the countries in that area of responsibility. I think there is a lot of goodness that derives from that.

I would, though, agree that change is necessary. I will confess to this committee that frankly I was too timid as the commander of Africa Command on making adjustments and reducing the size of the staff and, frankly, the size of the headquarters budget.

We made some modest reductions, about 5 percent each year. It wasn’t enough, given the fiscal realities that the Department was facing. So I think there is change that can be effective in looking for opportunities where common capabilities can be shared more effectively and efficiently across combatant commands so that each combatant command doesn’t have to have its own particular staff or command element that provides a certain function.

In the development of strategy, I think we actually have a pretty good model, at least of military strategy. When I was still in active service and started with Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates, continued with General Dempsey and Secretary Panetta, which ultimately yielded the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012, that process, to me, was pretty good.

It was led by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as you would expect it would be, and also by the Joint Staff. But the service secretaries, service chiefs, combatant commands were all part of that process. We all had the opportunity to provide our input, our advice and recommendations up to and including a conversation with the Commander in Chief as the product was nearing finalization.

But then I think there was a next step which was done largely out of the public view, which was very, very important to me. Under the Chairman’s direction or General Dempsey’s direction, we then tested that Defense Strategic Guidance against the threats that we envisioned present and near term. And we assembled the
right people, the combatant commanders, the service chiefs and others and applied the capabilities that we envisioned, that were outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance against known and anticipated threats.

And that yielded for the Chairman and I think for the Secretary of Defense a measure that says, can we in fact achieve the outcomes envisioned in the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 with the means that we think will be available to us? And what is the level of risk?

So it is not just the development of the strategy, it is how do you then evaluate the level of risk for that strategy to be effective.

Lastly if I could, Mr. Smith, on the national security staff, my perspective is different than my colleagues’, from two different perspectives as a combatant commander and then as the director for operations on the Joint Staff prior to that.

As a combatant commander, I didn’t often have direct interaction with the national security staff, but sometimes would be brought in for deputies’ committees, sometimes for principals’ committees if there was a particular matter that was being discussed.

I had a lot more engagement as the director for operations in the Joint Staff. And I think the way that former Secretary Flournoy described it is the tyranny of consensus I think was a real challenge in that environment where there was a seemingly almost endless review of deputies’ committees and other gatherings below the principals’ level on the National Security Council trying to address the various difficulties, challenges, sometimes objections that would be raised by one participant or another in that process.

That seemed to me to be indicative of a lack of agility, a lack of responsiveness. So we have got to find some mechanism, I think, when the information is largely known, but there is disagreement, how do you still advance that issue ultimately for decision by the President or whoever the right body may be.

Mr. Smith. And I am sorry, I have taken up a lot of time, so if you have something just quickly, Dr. Zakheim, I want to let some other folks get in.

Dr. Zakheim. Just very quickly then. First, I think your question fundamentally goes beyond the Defense Department. It is a real issue of national strategy.

Mr. Smith. Right.

Dr. Zakheim. We still haven’t figured out how to relate Defense to State to AID to the agencies you have talked about, not to mention Agriculture, FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], a lot of others as well. So it starts there. That is where the White House is important.

I don’t agree, as General Ham said, regarding the NSC staff because once they get too large they begin to think they are operational. They never really are. They are not qualified to be; it is not what they are supposed to be doing. But when you think you are operational and you tell the operators how to operate, you really make a mess and I think we have seen that several times. And it isn’t just one administration that has done that.

But just very quick thoughts about what our national strategy might look like. I agree, allies are important. We ought to look at integrating them a lot more. You know, we have Australian deputy
commanders in WESTPAC [Western Pacific], you know, for our own combatant command we have foreigners as part of our chain of command. We ought to think about how to expand that, how to really make them functional allies and not just nominal allies.

We ought to look at also at the fact that we no longer can think about everything as less or included cases. We used to do that during the Cold War and in many ways we still implicitly do. There are some cases that just are not less or included. We need to outline those, outline all the others, and then see, okay, where can we take greatest risk.

And finally, I think it is terribly important that we have a better sense of when we intervene and when we don't. We are never going to know for sure, at least let us have some guidance.

Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Chairman, thank you.

And to each of you, let me echo what the chairman said about applauding you for your service to our country and thanking you for that. All three of you deserve that.

I would like to expand a little bit on this strategy concept because there is a huge disconnect with even what we mean by the concept of strategy. When I hear people talking about our allies, it seems like we want to get bigger and bigger and broader and broader on our strategy until we get almost to the point like a beauty pageant where we are just talking about world peace and nobody can really argue with the strategy, but yet we don't know how to make procurement decisions based on it.

So we have general after general who retired that come sit before us and tell us DC is now a strategy-free zone. Andy Marshall would sit here and testify that a lack of strategy is probably our biggest threat.

At some point in time, we can't have a global strategy. We have to have something that this committee can look at and say this is our strategy, we are going to base procurement decisions on it.

That 2012 defense guidance, General, that you mentioned, we had General Dunford testify it was based on four major faulty assumptions that, one, Russia was going to be cooperative; two, China was going to be cooperative; three, that ISIS wasn't going to be a problem; and four, we are going to be out of Afghanistan and Iraq.

But when all of those fail, that strategic guidance fails and every single person, based on procurement decisions, when we would lift that up and say can you make procurement decisions based on this, those guys, they just laugh, they laugh at us.

So my question is this. When we look at threats like ISIS and we look at the rise of China and we look at Russia, do we have to structure at the Pentagon? What do we need to change so that we can create realistic strategies that we can then articulate to policy-makers? Because if we are articulating them, it is being done somewhere that I haven't found over the last 16 years because over and over again we are saying tell us that strategy.

And then the third thing, how do we make those strategies so we can articulate them faster and so that we can then have some con-
sistent procurement basis so that we can make the long-term procurement decisions we need to implement those strategies?

And the last part of this. I know, and I am one of these, we love to have this great—we decry interservice rivalry. But at some point in time, does interservice rivalry actually play a good role in helping make sure we are not getting faulty assumptions and we are really getting the right strategies that we need to have?

So I would throw that out to all three of you for your thoughts.

General HAM. I will start, sir. So my point on the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was the process, I thought, was very, very helpful. And I think it yielded a good product. Indeed, the conditions changed and I think we have not adapted to those changed conditions.

But again, I come back to I think that was not a bad process to develop it. Maybe we ought to do it more frequently in order to adjust as the global security environment changes.

With regard to, I think, a body whose voice is, in my view, not as influential as it should be in the development of strategy and in the implementation of operations is the collective body of the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman obviously has a primary role and advisory role to the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the National Security Council. And I think the Chairman individually executes that function quite effectively.

In my view, the body of the Joint Chiefs, the collective wisdom and military judgment that is resident in that body, I think that could be reinforced and strengthened, not to counter the Chairman, but to offer to the point that you raised, that there are sometimes different perspectives based on service culture, background experiences, operational experiences.

And so I think that, in my view, the most senior policy and decisionmakers would be well-served by broader, more substantive engagement with the body of the Joint Chiefs, not only the Chairman.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. It is a good question. And part of it is that we tend to forget that strategy is talking about how to apply means to ends. And what has been driving many of us crazy is no one defines the ends anymore.

So what are the ends? Well, we know some. We don't want a fight at home, it is much better to be forward deployed. We want to work with allies, it makes a lot more sense that way.

But there are other things as well. How do we define threats? Is every threat something that calls for military response? Are there those that don't? Now, of course, issues will arise that we can't predict, but in general how do we think about these things? We haven't defined that at all.

What we have done instead is create mechanistic formulas and mechanistic papers, like the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review). So every time a budget changes we come up with a so-called new strategy, but that doesn't really mean anything. You know, if you change your strategy every other year, you don't have a strategy at all.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

My time is expired, but I would love, Dr. Hamre, at some point in time to talk with you about this.
Dr. Hamre. If I may just 1 minute just to say——
Mr. Forbes. He is the boss.
Dr. Hamre. I think we have a coherent strategy with China. We haven’t articulated it very well. We are not going to let China push us out of Asia, and our role is to make sure that we are there and that everybody in Asia feels comfortable and wants us there. That is working and I think we have a strategy.
I think our strategy with Russia is very clear. We are going to buck up NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] again. We took our eyes off the ball, we are going to get NATO strong again. And we have got to ask that the Europeans do a better job of their own defense. It is a familiar theme.
If we have a strategy in the Middle East, I don’t know what it is. I can’t see it. I don’t know how we are designing it. And I think we do need to have a strategy to know what we are going to do going forward.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I will try to be a little more flexible on time, but I also want to get around to everybody.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith.
I would also like to thank the witnesses for taking the time to be with us today and making critical decisions regarding the composition and the operation of our armed services.
Goldwater-Nichols resulted in significant changes in the way our military plans, trains, and fights, and few would argue that these changes were generally beneficial in terms of operations and efficiency.
I strongly, gentlemen, support reform that strengthens our Armed Forces while also allowing them to operate more efficiently. But I do oppose change simply for the purpose of change.
Like some of my colleagues, I, too, am concerned that across-the-board cuts to GOs [general officers] and SESs, as described in the Senate NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], are unwise, given that each organization and headquarters faces different missions, operating environments, and challenges.
I am in favor of reducing staffs if they have indeed become bloated. But we must be sure that we aren’t eliminating vital positions in the likely event that some of our organizations are truly running efficiently today.
So I do want to thank you all for your comments. I also appreciate your commentary on security cooperation and building partner capacity.
General Ham, I know you know this firsthand. As Ranking Member Smith noted, and I have appreciated your comments on the National Guard State Partnership Program which has unique capabilities to work around some of the bureaucratic challenges on a country-by-country basis.
But I do have a question for Dr. Hamre. And I appreciate your answering very bluntly and forward your five points that we asked you to answer.
Joint officer development, including JPME [Joint Professional Military Education], was a major part of the reform in 1986. Now,
this was imperative given the starting point that we faced on the heels of the Vietnam War and other significant military operational failures.

Today as a result of the past 30 years, joint operations are more ingrained in our leadership and officers. So given the military of today versus the military of back then, 1986, do you feel that the very specific and often cumbersome officer development and education requirements of Goldwater-Nichols are still required to ensure joint knowledge?

Dr. Hamre. Thank you, it is a very key question. And I personally believe we need to do a fairly fundamental review of this. I am not smart enough and I haven’t done that review personally to give you a recommendation.

I do feel that for 30 years we have had a calorie theory of management, not a vitamin theory. You know, we have put more money on it, we have made things bigger, but we really haven’t figured out what does it take to create a healthy organization and we have just let putting more money into it as being the answer.

You know, we created the joint duty officer assignment about 10 years after DOPMA [Defense Officer Personnel Management Act] was passed. And Congress created DOPMA. DOPMA creates a fairly rigid process by which officers have to advance. And we put joint duty officer on top of that.

It is now a, in my view, too constrained a system. It needs to be re-engineered, but it has to be re-engineered by experts who really know personnel management. I do not have that background. I am not competent to be able to give you an answer for that. I do think you are right to press for it.

And I think probably this would be one of those things where the committee asking for, you know, a genuine commission, you did very well with the commission you set up to look at retirement and health care, that sort of thing, something like that again, looking at how well we are doing managing officer talent would be, I think, very valuable.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.

I have one final question. I am just curious, and maybe you don’t have the answer as well. But if we implement some of these changes, is there a significant cost saving?

Dr. Hamre. Well, I don’t think that, you know, cutting the number of general officers isn’t going to be a cost saving directly. What it is, it starts the process where we spend less energy friction internal to the system and more of our energy goes towards output. And we are going to find lots of opportunities to make our organization more streamlined if we start at the top and think how could we do things differently. I think there are a lot of opportunities for that.

A little example, you know, we will have a thousand people managing a constellation of satellites where the private industry will have 10 people doing the same job. So you are not going to discover that until you really break open organizations saying, how do we do things differently?

I think that starts with the top. That is why I would recommend that you seriously look at top changes.

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much to all the witnesses.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, could I make a comment about JPME?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General HAM. So I think you are right, ma’am, that the cohort of officers serving today are much more attuned, much more comfortable operating in a joint environment than I was growing up. That is a result of what you did in the law, so we don’t want to lose that.

I think there is measure for some greater flexibility in the application of joint duty assignments. There are lots of examples that two officers sitting side by side doing largely the same function, one gets joint credit and the other doesn’t. There are some improvements that I think could be done in that regard.

I think there is merit in the proposal to reduce the timeline of assignments from 3 years to 2. That seems to be about right.

But we don’t want to lose the goodness that this cohort of officers have, that feel very comfortable while retaining their service pride and culture, but they are very comfortable in the joint environment. That is a good thing for the Armed Forces and we want to make sure we continue that.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Fleming.

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today, and thank you for your service to our Nation.

I want to focus for a moment on the downsizing of the four-stars. I believe I think I read 41 down to 27 is being considered. Is that locked in stone or is that still just up for discussion at this point?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. My understanding is it is very much up for discussion.

Dr. FLEMING. Okay, all right, just asking. So my question is, just briefly because I have follow-up questions, what are the pros and cons? What do we give up by downsizing our number of four-stars?

General HAM. So I will start. There are some modest savings in immediate staff of a four-star, unsurprisingly. A four-star’s immediate staff is a little bigger than a three-star, et cetera. But it is the downward effect of a four-star headquarters and then the cascading effect.

Dr. FLEMING. Right.

General HAM. On the negative side, I think we ought to be a little cautious. Four-stars get access to places that sometimes three-stars can’t.

Dr. FLEMING. Yes.

General HAM. I am most familiar with Europe. I was the last four-star Army service component commander in Europe, that my successors have all been three-stars. It has been okay, but the reality is most of their counterparts are four-stars.

Dr. FLEMING. Right.

General HAM. There are access challenges. It was tough sometimes for me as a four-star to have conversation with Russian counterparts. I know we are suspended from that right now.

Dr. FLEMING. Yes.
General HAM. I have heard that the same is true with China. The Army for a long time had a three-star Army service component commander in the Pacific, difficult for that commander to have discussions with their Chinese counterpart, easier now that that Army component is a four-star.

Dr. FLEMING. Correct.

General HAM. So there is balance.

Dr. FLEMING. Sure. Well, the reason why I bring it up is you may recall, and I hate to bring up bad things that happen in history, but Barksdale Air Force Base is the Air Force base now home for Global Strike Command in Louisiana. They are in control, of course, of nuclear missiles and nuclear bombers.

You may recall that back around 2007, 2008 there were several instances that happened with nuclear weapons that were very unfortunate. One was the transport, unauthorized transport of nuclear weapons from one point to another, which actually it was actually found and discovered at Barksdale itself. That led to standing up Global Strike Command, and now there is a four-star general in charge of that.

And the reasons cited, among them was the fact that there was not a high-level general in charge of our nuclear weapons, which is arguably the most important tools of war that we have, certainly the most devastating in case of a mistake.

One of the reasons cited for having a four-star in charge of Global Strike Command is to make sure that there is top-level access to discussion and resources. So I do have a concern, at least when it comes to the Air Force, about, again, the shedding of four-stars and how that could impact our nuclear armament.

So I would love to have your comments on that.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, I would simply say that the way the House side has approached the issue with a smaller number of cuts to the four-star levels and essentially saying to the DOD look carefully at what is needed, so a case like the one you made probably would carry some weight over there.

Dr. FLEMING. Sure.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Arbitrarily cutting whatever it is, 17, whatever the number is, probably is too far, too fast, and without enough thought.

So there is a way to approach this, there is a case for reducing the number of four-stars. I am not entirely convinced that if you are a three-star you don’t have any clout at all.

Dr. FLEMING. Right.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Certainly that is not my experience when I was in the Department.

Dr. FLEMING. Sure.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. But nevertheless, you have got to do this with some care and understanding. And I think the way this particular committee is approaching it is about right.

Dr. FLEMING. Yes?

Dr. HAMRE. Just very briefly, I was on the Schlesinger Commission that reviewed that incident.

Dr. FLEMING. Yes, right.

Dr. HAMRE. My personal view is that this was a long-term trend. It started when the Air Force transferred the bombers from the
Strategic Command to the Tactical Command. There was a four-star in charge——
Dr. Fleming. Right.
Mr. Hamre [continuing]. But he didn’t care about the nuclear mission.
Dr. Fleming. Right.
Dr. Hamre. And are there ways that you can keep the focus for the nuclear mission with a three-star? I think you can and I think the Air Force has really embraced it now, but it does require the chief to understand that that is his responsibility to make sure that that part of the mission suite is healthy.
And I take my hat off to General Welsh. He did a great job, I think. I am confident that General Goldfein will do the same thing.
I understand your concern. But the real cause of losing a focus was when we took the bombers and gave them to the Tactical Air Command.
Dr. Fleming. Yes? Okay.
General Ham. So I would just add to what Dr. Hamre said in his opening statement. I think to afford the Department of Defense the opportunity to conduct a review, maybe a little bit more time, extending this a year, let them come back to you and say here is our proposal, that makes a lot of sense to me rather than trying to do it in the near term.
Dr. Fleming. Yes, okay.
Thank you, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. O’Rourke.
Mr. O’Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would also like to thank each of you for your presentation and the questions that you have answered so far. You have really hit on, I think, the most critical, most fundamental aspects of what we do as Members of Congress. And you mentioned the separation of powers, the civilian control of the military.
Dr. Zakheim, you said no one defines the ends anymore.
General Ham, you talked about the tyranny of consensus and the importance that we escape that.
All those are on my mind. And when I think about a defense budget of $610 billion that consumes half or more of our discretionary budget, I don’t know if that is too much or too little. I don’t know exactly what we are trying to achieve in the world and in specific areas like the Middle East, it is especially confusing.
And so I know that much of what we are talking about today is about the executive’s authority, the NSC, whether it is too large, whether it is operational or merely coordinating, and I think those are important questions and you have helped me to better understand that.
But perhaps each of you could spend a little bit of time guiding me as a Member of Congress in terms of what we could do to better define these ends, to have a defined strategy towards which we can apply the means, use to help us make decisions on specific weapon systems, force levels, total budget levels.
The themes that you have touched on could not be more important to the job that I am trying to do.
So, Dr. Hamre, I will ask you to begin.
Dr. Hamre. Thank you. I was on the committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee back in the 1980s, into the 1990s. I remember the first year that I was on the committee our bill was 5 pages long and our report was 96 pages long. This year, the Senate Armed Services Committee bill is 1,600 pages long.

The Congress, and this is collectively, it is this committee, it is the Senate committee, everybody, is on the wrong path. You are not more powerful when you ask thousands of little questions. You are powerful when you focus on big issues.

That used to be the historic role of the Armed Services Committee, focus on the big issues. What fundamentally is shaping the direction of the country and our national security? Instead, the committees have become trapped in chasing after thousands and thousands of little issues. And I think it has been to the diminishment of the committee.

So I strongly would urge you to pull back from all of this mechanical stuff. I mean, the Department loves it when you do that, by the way, because they can throw a thousand colonels at you, you know, I mean, they will win.

But when it comes to debating the big issues, the big issues of state and national purpose, you have the upper hand, but you are not playing in that court. And I would ask you to reconceptualize how you think about your role as a committee.

General Ham. Sir, I would take a similar vein. We have talked a little bit about the development of national security strategy from which derives the national military strategy. And while this committee appropriately focuses most on the national military strategy and the role of the Armed Forces, it must be understood that that occurs in a context of a broader, you know, cliche phrase of whole-of-government approach that applies all of the instruments of national power.

And for this committee to say how do the Armed Forces, how does the Nation’s military capability fit into that overarching national security strategy, I think we probably have, in my view, have, in many times and many cases, overemphasized and focused almost exclusively on the military component and not so much on the other underlying and albeit important, at least equally if not more important other elements of national power.

Dr. Zakheim. I would align myself with those points. I would also add this. You have the power of the purse. If you have a better understanding of the big questions the way John Hamre just laid them out, then you can ask, how does what the Department is asking you for fit in with those big questions? So if they want something that relates, say, to the Middle East, and I agree with John Hamre, we have no strategy in the Middle East, and you ask them, well, why should I pay for this if it is for the Middle East, what is it actually going to do for me when I don’t know what you want to do, those kinds of questions you can and should ask.

And one other area which is terribly important, you have got to do the things that DOD will not do for itself. This whole hearing, the whole idea of acquisition reform, Goldwater-Nichols. Goldwater-Nichols wasn’t cooked up by DOD. I was in DOD at the time. When John was on the Hill, I was inside the Department. We were bitterly opposed to it.
So if you want and see a need for change, don't bet on DOD doing it for you. And that is something else you should be doing.

The CHAIRMAN. I just have to say I think Dr. Hamre and Dr. Zakheim are exactly right on both cases. One of my goals, which I have completely failed at so far, is to shrink the size of our bill over the last 2 years. A variety of reasons, but I think we have got to do better at focusing on the big stuff, so very good questions.

Mrs. Walorski.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

As you know and you have already spoken to this, the question on the NSC, the National Security Council, I was interested in the comments that former Secretaries Gates and Panetta when they talked about the National Security Council's micromanagement of military operations.

I am interested in hearing from all of you, but I just wanted to direct this first question to General Ham. From your perspective as a former combatant commander, how do you see this issue of micromanagement as Panetta and Gates have described?

General HAM. As a combatant commander, ma'am, I didn't actually perceive it as micromanagement because, frankly, our engagement with the National Security Council staff was pretty minimal. I mean, it was occasional with me personally. If there was a particular contingency or matter that was being discussed, usually at the invitation of the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman, then I could have been brought in.

My perspective as the director for operations, J–3 on the Joint Staff, was different. And there were the frequency and the level of detail that was requested by the National Security Council staff was beyond that which I felt was necessary for that body to make policy decisions and I think started a trend very much into operational matters.

And so there was tension there and sometimes we would get guidance from the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to say simply, you know, we are not going to go down that path, we are not going to provide that level of detail because it is too operational.

But it was, you know, near-constant dialogue, particularly if there was a pending contingency operation that was being discussed at those levels.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Yes, Dr. Zakheim, if you could kind of weigh in on what Dr. Hamre was talking about earlier, just your perspective on the Senate having a cap on members versus the House language which requires FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] and Senate confirmation, those two types of things. I am interested just to hear your perspective as well.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, I personally think that the House side's approach is probably better in the sense that, look, if the NSC staff is relatively small, then it truly is an advisory staff and there is no need to confirm the national security adviser. Once it gets too big, it is operational. And John pointed out the size of OMB and the size of the NSC staff are roughly the same.

So yes, the whole purpose of the national security adviser has just changed.
I would point out something else. General Ham speaks from his experience. But when you were the J–3 the NSC was smaller. The problem with the NSC staff is that it has gone up like that. And frankly, when you have all these people sitting around, they are going to look for something to do.

And I will never forget, sometimes we would get a call when Mr. Rumsfeld was my boss, you know, the White House wants X or somebody would tell us the White House wants X. And the Secretary would say, well, who in the White House? I mean, the White House is a big place, it has janitors, too.

So you get this tendency, the President wants, the White House wants, that is the part of the problem. When you have a small staff that understands its function and that is working full tilt at that function, you are not going to have these sorts of problems.

Mrs. Walorski. Dr. Hamre, you want to add anything to that?

Dr. Hamre. Just to say that when Henry Kissinger was national security adviser he had 40 people on his staff. When Zbig Brzezinski was national security adviser he had 44 on his staff. There are 450 right now.

Now, that is qualitatively a different operation. And I hear it from all of my friends who are, you know, CINCs [commanders in chief] and the Joint Staff, they are getting phone calls from GS–11s telling him turn ships around. I mean, that is not the role of the National Security Council.

And if it is the role of the National Security Council, the Congress has a responsibility, a constitutional responsibility to oversee it. We just have to decide how we are going to go here.

That is why I think the Thornberry amendment and now the House approach is the superior way to proceed on this.

Dr. Zakheim. And I would just add——

Mrs. Walorski. Sure.

Dr. Zakheim. I would think Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brzezinski were pretty good at their job with that small number of people.

Mrs. Walorski. I appreciate it.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.

Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. It is very insightful to hear your different perspectives on this.

Dr. Zakheim, you talked about national security strategy as really being kind of the big-picture approach that we need to be looking at if we are looking at the cause and how we can improve the situation.

You know, I think there is no argument that the security environment today is far more complex than it was during the Cold War, yet our national security strategies and processes have not necessarily evolved to reflect that reality.

I think both the House and Senate bills have recommended streamlining the strategic planning within the Department by eliminating the QDR, replacing it with a top-down defense strategy, but it still does not go to the heart of the issue with what you raised, Dr. Zakheim, which is all of the other elements within the Federal Government that play an important role in this national
security strategy so that the DOD is not operating kind of in a silo or in a vacuum.

You know, I think we have seen some marginal efforts and attempts to do this that really have not been particularly successful. You know, I don’t think they will happen on their own.

So I would like to hear from you how we can develop or conduct a national security review that would accomplish that goal, what your recommendations would be of building this overall national security strategy wherein the DOD obviously plays a very critical role working alongside and in parallel with these other agencies.

Dr. Zakheim. Since you mentioned me I will start, Congresswoman.

The first thing is to recognize that DOD is not the answer to everything. DOD has become the default position. My favorite anecdote about Afghanistan was the Iowa National Guard teaching farmers out there to farm because the Department of Agriculture wasn’t sending people because they didn’t have to.

National security involves a lot of agencies. And this is something the National Security Council staff should be doing. Instead of giving operational guidance that drives people like General Ham a little bit crazy, they should be working on a comprehensive national security strategy reaching out to every single agency that has an input, that has a part to play, and rethinking the role of those agencies.

And why is it that State Department people get killed and people in uniform get killed and people in the intelligence agencies, but somebody in the Agriculture Department who needs to go out to Afghanistan doesn’t have to go if he or she doesn’t want to. There is something fundamentally wrong with that.

We need to reconsider what we mean by national security. To me, that is job number one of the National Security Council staff.

Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.

General Ham. I would agree with that, ma’am, just to say it is much broader than the armed services and we have got to find a way, and I would agree with Dr. Zakheim that I think the national security staff is the right entity to forge the various elements of our government, craft a national security strategy from which derive all of the others.

How do you get to that? How do you drive that? I think it is by asking those tough questions that Dr. Hamre said, the big questions rather than the specific questions. You know, what is it that we are trying to achieve? And then I think for this committee, you know, what is the military component of that strategy?

But absent that broader, overarching strategy, we always say, I mean, uniformly everybody signs up and says there is no military solution to this problem or that problem or this campaign, but yet there is very little conversation about other than military solutions to those challenges.

So again, broadening and deepening the conversation, I think, will be helpful.

Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.

Dr. Hamre. Ma’am, the reason DOD is always tasked to do things is because we are the only part of the government that can mobilize capacity beyond what we are in peacetime. You know, we
do not buy extra policemen. You know, we make them work overtime when it is the 4th of July. We don’t have extra firemen, you know, we don’t have extra diplomats.

But we do have the capacity in the Defense Department to fundamentally change ourselves when the President says you have got to do something. We can bring up reservists, we can bring in contractors. We know how to do that, that is why we are always the ones that get tasked to do it. But we are frequently being put in positions where we are not the best party to be doing it.

This has to be something that the President makes a priority to get other agencies of the government to be working with us. So I strongly agree with my colleagues on that.

I also feel that, you know, the Department needs to be held accountable to the big questions, not all the little questions. I mean, the little questions are mechanical, those are administrative. They have the responsibility to do it right, you need to be pressing them on the very large questions. What are we doing in the Middle East? What is our strategy?

Ms. GABBA. Yes.

Dr. HAMR. How are we going to turn that situation around? It is spiraling into chaos. What are we going to do?

I think we have a strategy in Asia, we just haven’t gotten anybody in the administration to articulate it very clearly.

So I think if you press, lift this debate up, lift this debate up so it is at the national purposes, what are we doing as a nation, what do we need for our people, this is why we asked you to serve to do those questions.

Ms. GABBA. Thank you.

Thank you, very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMI. I just wanted to follow up quickly, Dr. Hamre, on that issue as you talk about, you know, the military does it because they have the bandwidth basically, whereas you would have an instance where USAID or Ag [Agriculture] or Justice or any number of different departments would be better qualified.

At the end of the day, the reason for that is they don’t have the money, they don’t have the personnel. I don’t see that changing. I don’t see where that money is going to come from. I mean, the only logical place to take it from would be, well, if the DOD is doing something that it would prefer someone else to do, take the money from DOD, put it in the State Department, good luck with that.

Am I wrong about that, first of all? Do you think that is a realistic approach to say, hey, let us move more money in there? But more importantly, short of that, if we can’t do that, is there a better way to do it than we are doing it now within the confines of the money that we have?

Dr. HAMR. Well, sir, I think there is no easy way to do it in the short term. For example, one of the reasons the Defense Department, we budget excess officers. You know, we have a TTHS [Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students] account where we buy 10 percent more officers than we need to fill all the jobs. But that is because some of them are in transit, some of them are in training. I mean, there are different reasons why. But you have
given us the permission to do that and we bake that into our budget.

The overhead account in personnel in the State Department is one-half of 1 percent. That is long-term disability. They need to have a higher percent of authorized Foreign Service Officers so that they have the capacity to send people off to training, they have the capacity to mobilize and to get people into a theater on short notice. Right now they have to take it out of resources because they don't have it.

So honestly, it is a mechanical thing, but budgeting a small amount of overhead would help dramatically with this problem.

Mr. Smith. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, may I follow up on Mr. Smith’s question?

So I would agree with that and it certainly manifests itself in professional military education where a small number of civilians from various agencies across the government go to the National Defense University and other places. That is invaluable experience for them, but also for the uniformed officers who are in that. If we could increase that, that would be good.

And lastly, as combatant commander, I really appreciated the so-called dual-key authorities that the Congress has given to the State Department and Department of Defense that you can go do something if both departments agree on that. That is a great way, again, to build the synergy between, you know, the State Department and Department of Defense in activities abroad and I found those to be very useful.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Obviously, one concern that I have, I think that the Congress has, is the extraordinary growth in the size of the bureaucracy in the Department of Defense. And now we are having a debate about reducing the number of four-stars. But it seems that the genesis or the origin and the growth is the rise of these combatant commands.

And it seems that certainly some of them have a good focus. But it seems like in some of them they have become incredibly parochial as to their region. There are redundant functions with the State Department. So how would you state that we ought to look at the effectiveness of combatant commands and to what extent we ought to have them going forward?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Well, let me try to deal with that.

The combatant commands may have generated some additional civilian slots because the military end strength is what it is. But I don’t think that is the major driver in the growth of civilian numbers.

And I think what is needed is a far more careful look clearly with congressional legislation, otherwise it will never happen, at why we need as many as we have added in the last 15 years.

I mean, it is arguable that as we have added the 7,000 civilians we haven’t gotten particularly more efficient. If we had, you might not be having this hearing today. So there is something fundamentally wrong and it goes well beyond the combatant commands.
As to the combatant commands themselves, I agree with you there needs to be some change. I think there should be a four-star cyber commander, for example.

Whether you need a NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] and a SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] separately is something that needs to be looked at. Whether you need a CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] and an AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command], given that the locus of Islamic terror is somewhere between the two of them, maybe you want to rethink that.

I think there needs to be a closer look, again going back to John Hamre’s point, what are we trying to do in the world, and then, okay, what kind of commands do we need in order to do that. Unfortunately, that is not how the UCP works, the Unified Command Plan, and those aren’t the questions we have been asking.

General HAM. It won’t surprise you, Mr. Coffman, that I feel pretty strongly about the value of geographic combatant commands. Again, as I stated earlier, I think there is great value in having a commander and a group of people who wake up every day focused on a specific region.

I would agree, though, that they don’t need to be as large as they are. I failed in that in my time at Africa Command. I should have been more aggressive at reducing the size of the command and I regret that. So I think there is a time to do that.

But I wouldn’t give up the goodness of the relationships that are developed between that combatant command and the military leaders in the area of responsibility. That is a very valuable component, I think, in our building partner capacity and reliance upon others.

The point that the threats that we face today are no longer exclusively regional or transregional, some of them certainly are global threats, so mechanisms that allow greater agility in the application of force and capabilities across combatant command boundaries, I think those would be helpful.

I always felt that I had a great relationship with European Command, Central Command, Pacific Command as we did things together. But frankly, it was more based on personality than it was on structure. So we need some structure that makes cross-combatant-command boundaries more effective and more efficient.

Mr. COFFMAN. So when we look at Goldwater-Nichols, it seemed that the momentum for it was looking at military setbacks that have occurred with the failure during the Carter administration of the rescue in Iran and with the failure, ultimate failure of the Marine Corps presence in Lebanon under the Reagan administration.

I was involved in the early phases, the unfortunate failure in Beirut that led to the loss of, I think, 241 U.S. military personnel.

So when we look at the response in Benghazi and we look at our structure, what have we learned? Because I was in a Marine amphibious unit positioned off Lebanon to evacuate the U.S. embassy on order. And we were there, we were positioned there when things were getting hot in Lebanon. What have we learned in terms of our inability or our inertia in terms of responding to a Benghazi from the standpoint of looking at our overall structure?

General HAM. I obviously have some familiarity with this subject and have appeared before this committee on this subject.
I think we have learned a lot. I think first and foremost, obviously, the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities is primarily the pur-
view of the Department of State and host nations. There are some things that can be strengthened there.

In terms of military response, I think some of the things that the Department of Defense has done over the past few years to de-
crease response time by establishing a Commander's In-extremis Force dedicated to Africa which didn’t exist before, to establish the
Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Spain that is postured to respond more quickly, I think those are al-
very, very positive steps that have occurred from a tragic inci-
dent.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to see all of you here. Thank you for your inputs and really all your service to the country.
I wanted to ask you if you could, you know, this is probably a difficult thing to do, but I know that it is something you have thought about a lot, could you look at an Iraq-type decisionmaking process today and think about what would be different between now and, say, 2003? And what still needs to change, what would need to change in statute as well as internally at the Department of Defense?
Dr. ZAKHEIM. I lived through that.
Mrs. DAVIS. Right.
Dr. ZAKHEIM. I don't know, is the answer. And the reason I tell you that is that when you get to the level of the President and the Vice President and the Secretaries of State and Defense, those are decisions that are not going to be driven by a particular mechanism or indeed by some kind of structure.
Those are the kinds of decisions that are made for a host of different reasons and different motives. And so as you saw perhaps just from what happened in Britain with Mr. Blair's reaction to the really sharp criticism of Britain's involvement in Iraq, on the one hand he was kind of penitent, but on the other hand he had his back up and said, no, you know, this is what I wanted to do. That is what Presidents do.
I mean, ultimately, Truman was right, the buck does stop there. And for something like that, the buck will always stop there.
General Ham. I will try, Mrs. Davis, and just say simply, you know, military planning we often develop plans based on what do we think are the most likely outcomes, most likely enemy or adver-
sary reactions and then what are the most dangerous.
And I think sometimes we get fascinated by the most likely and build all of our plans and contingencies based on what we antici-
pate will be the most likely outcome, and we are less prepared for the most dangerous, perhaps an unlikely outcome, but one that has very significant consequences. So we need to be prepared for that bad outcome as well as the most likely outcome.
It is a reminder to all of us that when we begin military opera-
tions, there is not a lot of certainty as to what the outcome will be. And so making sure that we have the ability, the adaptability
to recognize when conditions are changing and then the flexibility to modify our courses of action and our policies as those conditions change. I think that is probably one of the lessons that we have learned over the past 10 or 15 years.

Dr. Hamre. Representative Davis, forgive me for kind of doing this, but I think this is why you want to have civilian control. I don't think that the decisionmaking in 2003 was produced by the military demanding a war. I mean, you want absolute accountability for why things are done and it rests with the President, it rests with the constitutional officers that execute the President's directions.

And this is why you do not want to bring in a complicating factor where you can blame the military for what, in essence, is a political decision. This was back in a time when there was a great deal of fear in America and we didn't really understand what had happened to us after 9/11. We reacted with anger and blind rage in many ways.

But that was a political decision, it was not the product of military recommendations or the byproduct of the civilian/military relationship. It was unequivocally a policy choice and I think we have to always keep it that way.

Mrs. Davis. Well, I certainly appreciate all of your answers. I think part of the concern as you were talking about how we, you know, strategically look at capacity, capacity on many different levels, and part of what I know I have always been concerned about, I think we all were, is whether we asked those appropriate questions.

What capacity do we even have for understanding the situational awareness, if you will, and trying to get underneath? You know, what really lies at the bottom of some of those decisions? So I appreciate that.

Dr. Zakheim.

Dr. Zakheim. Well, I was just going to say that is a role of both the Intelligence Community and the military to lay out as best they can what the situation looks like from their perspective.

On the other hand, the decision is the President's and his senior people, his political people. It is a policy decision, John's absolutely right.

Mrs. Davis. Right, thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Hamre, I wanted to begin with you. You wrote an article back in March speaking about the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, saying specifically that they shouldn't be inserted into the chain of command, the role should be advisory so they can be more directive from that perspective rather than in the chain of command.

Subsequent to that in April, Secretary Ash Carter came out and said that he wanted to look at ways to clarify the role and authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. And he also wanted to make sure that the Chairman maintained his independence within that particular realm of duties.
Give me your perspective on where you think the Chairman should function in the role between the Secretary, the administration, and the Joint Chiefs and staff, therefore?

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think this is, of course, one of the most complicated questions. And I would say the role of the Chairman is probably the most complicated job in the world if you think about, because his job is to ensure that the President understands the implications of choices he or she wants to make, but is objective about those recommendations to the President and so he can’t become an advocate for what comes up through the chain of command to the Secretary.

His role is really to be this superior counselor to the President, that can give him military judgment and advice as he thinks about it. And I think the chairmen have actually done a good job of that. I think they have worked very hard at that because they were not invested in the recommendation that sat in front of the President. They certainly knew about it, they helped to shape it, but it was their job to give independent advice to the President. I think we want to preserve that.

And I don’t think we want to cloud in any sense it is the President’s decision if he is going to put somebody in harm’s way. It is the President’s accountability to the public. We can’t let that get confused by somehow thinking, well, the military were the cause of that. The military cannot be the cause for political decisions.

Now, I think the issue at hand and I think the way that your committee dealt with it was to acknowledge the Secretary has a lot of delegation authorities that he could exercise. And that is within the prerogative of Goldwater-Nichols that was established and I think you are right to highlight that and to say, why doesn’t that become an appropriate vehicle for dealing with what are truly administrative matters?

But I know the political power of the Joint Staff and I would be very loathe to give the Joint Staff more political power when it ultimately is a political decision that has to be accountable to the electorate.

Mr. Wittman. Thank you.

Dr. Zakheim, I want to shift gears a little bit here. You spoke earlier about efficiencies within the Department of Defense and specifically where dollars are going. And I am very much concerned along the same realm, and that is that we are getting dollars directly to readiness. And in many situations, they are not getting there.

You pointed out, I think very eloquently, that about 40 percent of the total Pentagon budget or spending, which is about $240 billion out of the base budget, goes to overhead and support. So it doesn’t get directly to the warfighter. It doesn’t get to the things that we need to be doing, whether it is training, whether it is the overhead of operations and maintenance and modernization.

And you have also seen, too, that since 2009 the workforce there in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown by more than 2,000 people or 18 percent, and the Joint Staff grew from 1,286 to 4,244, an increase of 240 percent.

I think all those things are very, very significant in looking at that element of growth.
Tell me this. How do we in the future reshape the direction of resources to make sure that we are indeed focusing that on rebuilding readiness? You know, the full-spectrum readiness is not a place where we are going to be until sometime in the 2020s. To me, the way to short-circuit that, sans all the issues we deal with, sequester and those kinds of things, is to create efficiencies within the Pentagon.

Give me your perspective. I know you spoke a little bit about it, but I wanted to get you to drill down a little bit more about how we get there.

Dr. Zakheim. Well, starting with the Office of the Secretary and the Joint Staff, I mean, clearly you can legislate a ceiling for both. It has been done before. What you have to watch out for is another WHS or the siphoning off to other agencies. And unless you put in language there that says these people really have to go, they are not going to go. So that is number one.

Number two is one of the biggest black holes in budgeting, and I think John Hamre will probably agree with me on this, he was a comptroller before he was a deputy, is base operations. What do we mean by base operations? There are things that we really need to spend money on and there are things that maybe we shouldn’t be spending money on.

And I think getting to the bottom of that is daunting, but it is very important if you are looking for the kinds of efficiencies that you could then turn the money over toward procurement and R&D [research and development] and the other things you are talking about.

And finally, as I said, getting your arms around the contractor corps. What does it mean?

One thing that I have suggested over the years is you put a 2-year moratorium on anybody leaving the Department, whether military or civilian, before they can become a contractor that is doing staff augmentation, which is really the problem. Because what they do is they flip their badge and they go back to the same job, but meanwhile somebody else has replaced them as well and all of a sudden you have got two people doing one job.

There ought to be a moratorium set on that. You ought to make it much, much harder for people just to flip their badges. Once that happens, they are going to look elsewhere and that will start bringing the numbers down, too.

Mr. Wittman. Very good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. Larsen. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LARSEN.先生，我想你已經提到了。在未來，我們如何調整資源的方向，以確保我們真正將其集中在重建準備上？你知道，全範圍的準備狀態並非我們現在就可達到的。對我來說，消除所有我們遇到的問題，如預算削減和這種種事情，創建部隊中的效率提升，是關鍵。

請給我您的意見。我知道您之前提到一些，但我想要您更深入地介紹一下我們是如何達到那裡的。

Dr. Zakheim. 好的，從國防部長辦公室和联合軍事委員會開始。我清楚地表示，您當然可以為兩者立法。它們之前已經做過。您必須注意的是另外一個WHX或資金的轉移，如果不將這些人確切地趕走，他們將不會離開。這就是第一點。

第二點是預算中最大的黑洞之一，我認為John Hamre會同意我的看法，他在當董事的時候是財務長。我們所謂的基層運作是什麼？有一些我們真的需要花錢的事情，而有一些也許我們就不應該花錢。

並且，我想徹底解決這一點是具挑戰性的，但它非常重要，如果您正在尋求這種種類的效率，您可以將這些錢轉向採購和R&D〔研究和發展〕以及您正在談論的其他事情。

最後，我說過，您的胳膊要圍繞承包商群體。這意味著什麼？

有一件事是我多年來一直建議的就是，您應該對任何人從部隊中離開後的兩年內設立一種禁制，無論是軍事還是民事的，他們在成為承包商前，正在做人員補充的事情，這就是問題。因為，他們將他們的標牌轉換回去，並回到同一份工作，但同時，其他人已經取代了他們，突然，有兩人正在做同一份工作。

這種禁制應該設立。您應該讓這種情況變得更難，對他們的標牌進行翻轉。一旦這發生了，他們將要去其他地方尋找，這將開始帶來數字的下降，也。

Mr. Wittman. 很好。

感謝您，先生，主席。我讓步。

Mr. LARSEN. 謝謝您，先生，主席。

Dr. Hamre, 一個重要的角色是AT&L副部長，正在擔任主要的決策權限，為重要防務採購計劃。所以，在那種角色中，正如我們所知，部長在DOD中在某個項目開始時，是否進入發展或生產，這是一個關鍵決策人。因此，即使在財政年度2016法案中，鼓勵AT&L將該權限下放更多場合的情況下，副部長仍然保留了部長權限，作為主要決策權限的權限。
So the Senate has a proposal to break up the Under Secretary for AT&L and it is not 100 percent clear on whether or not the new Under Secretary for Research and Engineering would continue to serve in that role as the decision authority.

So a couple of questions, do you support the Senate’s idea of a new Under Secretary retaining this milestone decision authority? Or should Congress make clear in whatever language you need to come up with where that authority sits?

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I think my personal view is we need to lift up the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to make it the number-three position in the building again. It once was, we need to put it back there again. You cannot have that be the number-three position and not let him have milestone acquisition authority. You are going to have to keep that role with the DDR&E.

But we don’t need a giant compliance organization surrounding him and that is what we have had. And I think putting a lot of the responsibility back to the services, which is what you did last year, was the right thing to do.

This year I think it would be a mistake to try to separate the milestone authority and put it into another Under Secretary. You need to keep that with the DDR&E and I think you can fix that when you are in conference.

Mr. Larsen. Mr. Zakheim.

Dr. Zakheim. I agree with that. I think that General Milley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, has proposed a number of other things that can be devolved back to the military, which will, again, reduce the need for these massive staffs that support the current Under Secretary.

I think the intent and the focus should be on innovation and technology development. That is why the suggestion that you change the nature of what the Under Secretary does is so important.

And most of the acquisition work, leaving aside the milestone issue that was just discussed, belongs with an Assistant Secretary for Acquisition who should do that job. That is not where we go if we really want to innovate. That is where we have been. And everybody agrees we are not innovating.

So you need to have this focus that, you know, what Harold Brown did when he had that job, what Bill Perry did when he had that job, that is what they should be doing. And if you look at their records and what they brought in and the records of what DOD has done over the last many years actually, compared to what is going on in the commercial sector, you will see that something is amiss and maybe we should go back to that original model.

Mr. Larsen. Yes, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Senate is coming up with some interesting proposals regarding military structure, so I would like to focus on two of these proposals.

And, Mr. Chairman, I have here a letter to start out with from 11 retired senior military commanders, including former STRAT-
COM [U.S. Strategic Command], PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command], and NORTHCOM commanders, expressing concern with Senate section 502 which would repeal the requirement for the director of the Missile Defense Agency to be a three-star officer as part of the imposition of an across-the-board cut to general officer/flag officer billets.

The letter gives five reasons why the director of this critical $30 billion agency should be a three-star and not a lower-rank officer. So I would ask unanimous consent that this be entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Mr. LAMBORN. So my question for the witnesses is, given the importance of missile defense, do you agree that experience has shown that the MDA [Missile Defense Agency] should be led by a three-star military officer? Who would care to comment on that?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. I will be happy to. I was there in 1983 when General Abe [Abrahamson] was the first three-star officer in charge of what was then called SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative].

There is no question in my mind that you should have a three-star. I don’t know if my colleagues will agree with me or not. As long as missile defense is an important national defense priority, then you should have a three-star dealing with it. And the reason is very simple, there are tons of two-stars.

I know of one person who once held my job who would only see four-stars. I thought that was pretty outrageous myself. And believe me, the services that had to deal with that individual were not happy either.

But there are just a lot of two-stars. And when you have an Under Secretary or a Secretary or Deputy Secretary, and John Hamre can speak for the latter, they are just not going to deal with a two-star the way they deal with a three-star, nor with—I argue, I suspect, would the Hill. I can’t speak for the Hill, but that is my suspicion.

As long as it is a major and priority American defense activity, it should be a three-star, it should be run by a three-star. That is my view.

Mr. LAMBORN. Any other comments?

General HAM. Just very quickly. I think obviously missile defense is a vital component of an overarching strategy. The decision as to individual positions and officers, I think, ought to be part of a broader, more comprehensive review of the general and flag officer ranks within the Armed Forces.

In the particular case of the Missile Defense Agency, one advantage of having a three-star is that that requires a specific nomination and confirmation process, obviously why you all obviously still confirm promotions to major general, it is more individual and tailored at the three-star level. And that level of scrutiny may be appropriate given the importance of missile defense.

Dr. HAMRE. Sir, this is the first I have learned of this and so I haven’t had a chance to study it.

I would just like to step back and reflect. I mean, we had a one-star Army general that brought together the Manhattan Project.
You know, the man who did mobilization for armored combat vehicles—-

Mr. LAMBORN. If you could wrap up in about 20 seconds because I have got a second—-

Dr. HAMRE. Yes—for armored combat vehicles, he was a colonel.
Mr. LAMBORN. I have got a second question.

Dr. HAMRE. I mean, so all I am saying, it is the context of general officer structure, which is what General Ham said. I personally am not convinced you need to have four-stars heading up acquisition commands. And so I think it needs to be put in the scale with a thoughtful review that needs to be done by the Department.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you.

My second issue is Senate section 903 would establish an Assistant Secretary for Information. And this would combine oversight of space and cyber.

Dr. HAMRE. Well, if I may on this. Sir, assistant secretaries do not oversee four-star generals. Let me just be candid. I mean, so when you are talking about CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], you are talking about one of the biggest things and most important areas.

Right now, the only position right now that you can adequately oversee that is the Deputy Secretary of Defense. So this is new to me. I personally would doubt that an Assistant Secretary would have the throw weight to be able to oversee the scale of issues that are inside those two areas.

Mr. LAMBORN. Any other comments before my time is up?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. No, my experience is exactly the same.

General HAM. I would agree.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Walz.

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all three for being here. And I really appreciate, I think, just in the brief time I have been here the stress on a national security strategy and the idea of interagency cooperation, obviously that has always been a goal, but the three of you with the expertise you bring.

And it might be somewhat encouraging to you, we just came, some of us, Colonel Gibson and Chairman Conaway who are over chairing an Ag Committee hearing on the intersection of agriculture and national security, focusing on the agri-business development teams in Afghanistan and some of these things about how we can use all our smart power, exactly what you are talking about.

And General Ham, I think I would start with you. Just recently, your successor, General Rodriguez in AFRICOM, asked for congressional authority to be able to move funds over to USAID for this very purpose. We can train and equip all we want, but if you have got a food-insecure population as a basis, we are not going to get anywhere.
And can you explain from your perspective when you were in there of how that hampers you, that ability of what he was asking for?

General Ham. Absolutely. I think what has happened over the past couple of years was that appropriately we are taking a broader, more current, comprehensive view of what constitutes security. It is not just military forces, it is food security, it is water security. And so it goes back to the comments before of a national security strategy that embraces all of that and how do we most appropriately bring the many tools that the government has to bear in these issues.

And so the Department of Defense has capabilities, both personnel, other resources. Can we find ways to have the authority to use those resources to achieve a security objective that might be nontraditional, might be nonmilitary? So greater flexibility is most appreciated and most helpful.

Mr. Walz. Can any of you explain the dynamics of what is happening here? When we were doing the NDAA, we were asked about this and I had that amendment. And the combatant commander was obviously asking for it, the folks were asking for it. But when we tried to put this forward, folks at DOD seemed to be resistant to it, which seemed so counterintuitive to me about did the right hand know what the left hand was doing.

What do you think the dynamics of that was of what was going on there? Because it was a shift of money, it was basically taking DOD money and sending it to State, which apparently seemed like a major threat, but it was for the purpose of giving that combatant commander the exact flexibility you are asking about.

General Ham. I think that is exactly the issue is obviously in a resource-constrained environment that, you know, one department is loathe to apply its resources for another department or another agency with some concern that there will be a shortfall in its own functions and, frankly, what the precedent might be.

Mr. Walz. A legitimate concern, a legitimate concern.

And I don't want to appear naive or whatever, but I think we need to fix this, we need to get this done. Who is the person can make that happen? Is that with the President's national security strategy and forcing this issue down? Or is this so institutionally siloed and ingrained that it just——

Dr. Zakheim. It can be dealt with. First of all, and I will speak as somebody who actually did agree to transfer money to State when I was comptroller, I did it through OMB. And that is where you have to start looking. You know, everybody brings Congress because, you know, you have got the oversight committees and they have their own budgets, but it all starts with OMB. OMB is the one that allocates.

And what they always say is, well, we can't allocate more to State because if we do Congress won't accept it. So there is an inbuilt excuse for not changing very much. That is number one. Focus on OMB, they will hate it.

Number two, money alone is not the solution. Let me give you an AID example. AID has become a contracting agency. It is moving away from that. It is fundamentally a contracting agency.

Mr. Walz. Yes.
Dr. ZAKHEIM. It is not what it was during, say, the Vietnam War. One of the things they do is that the people who are actually out in the field risking their lives, people in OTI [Office of Transition Initiatives], are not even allowed to become part of AID because they haven’t checked the right boxes on the application form, all they have done is serve the country at the risk of their lives.

So the nature of what AID should be should change. And that is not a dollar thing. That is an internal culture thing. And that may be something you want to discuss with your colleagues on the other committees.

So it is really a combination of things and there is no one solution. But is there a way to solve this thing? Absolutely, we don’t have to keep going the way we are going.

Dr. HAMRE. I would just say, sir, that the further away you get from Washington, the more cooperation you get across agencies.

Mr. WALZ. Yes.

Dr. HAMRE. If you gave authority for General Ham when he was AFRICOM to use some of his money and transfer it to another agency to help him with a job, we would get a lot of this out. This is not a problem. This is a Washington problem.

I was the comptroller, Dov was the comptroller. I fought like hell to make sure that the State Department didn’t get my money. You know, that is my job, that is my job for the Department of Defense. But in the field, these guys are looking for people to work with all the time.

So I think a lot of this could be solved if we created some authorities for local commanders to reach out and find people where they can get that kind of help. We don’t let them do that now because of the way we structure control over dollars.

Mr. WALZ. Well, I appreciate the three of you, your candid and refreshing remarks on this, because we have got to get this right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

And I recall that there was some controversy about the flexibility that the commanders, say, in Iraq and Afghanistan. What was that, commander’s something? Yeah, yeah.

Dr. ZAKHEIM. Oh, CERP [Commander’s Emergency Response Program], yeah.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, the CERP money. You know, and that was controversial because you couldn’t figure out where it was going to go. But I am very sympathetic with what you all are talking about, more flexibility on the ground by the people who have to live there makes a lot of sense.

This has been terrific. Let me just touch on a couple of things right quick.

Dr. Hamre on the AT&L, DDR&E issue, if you keep milestone decision authority with DDR&E, doesn’t DDR&E have to have the apparatus to evaluate whether a program is appropriate for the next milestone? In other words, doesn’t it have to have the bureaucracy to make that decision?

Dr. HAMRE. It is going to have to have some bureaucracy to help make that decision. If you have an Assistant Secretary, AT&L that is an Assistant Secretary, most of the mechanics of that will be done in that office.
And I am hoping that the reform that you put in place last year by moving milestone authority back to the services, by making the service chiefs accountable is going to lower the obligation to have OSD have a giant organization that is checking every little box.  

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, okay. I hope so, too, but I just wanted to check on that.  

Dr. Zakheim said he thought extending the term of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from 2 to 4 years was a good thing. Do either of the other of you have an opinion on that?  

General Ham. I fully support a 4-year term for both Chairman and Vice Chairman. Ideally they would be offset. I am not sure you want to legislate that. I think you still want the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense to have a degree of flexibility, but 4-year terms would be helpful.  

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.  

Dr. Hamre. Sir, I also agree. A 4-year term, I think, is a good thing.  

I would ask you also to look at another element inside the Senate bill, which precludes the Vice Chairman from ever becoming the Chairman. I am not sure that that is a healthy provision. You know, that is, in essence, taking the Vice Chairman and making him the least important guy on the Joint Chiefs. Given the role that the Vice Chairman plays, I am not sure that is a healthy thing to do.  

Dr. Zakheim. And can I speak in support of that point, too, Mr. Chairman?  

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I wasn't aware it was in the Senate bill.  

Dr. Zakheim. It is in the bill. And what you are essentially doing is saying to the Vice Chairman this is your terminal position, you are a lame duck from the first day you have taken this job. That is not a good thing.  

And quite frankly, if the Vice Chairman is talented enough, why shouldn't he or she be promoted? It is ridiculous.  

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Lastly, I think the conversation we have had about broader strategy has been very helpful. I am going to narrow down for just a second. Do any of you have views about the specific QDR replacement that we have in our bill, which tries to, number one, have it not be so expensive and time-consuming and worthless, in my view, but does replace it with something where you start out with an outside panel and then come back with the Secretary's defense guidance and then the plans that go from that?  

Dr. Zakheim. I think it is a good idea because QDR, like some other things that go on in the Pentagon, if you actually were at one of those meetings, the walls are lined with people who are falling asleep or are asleep. And it becomes this massive group exercise not to mention the fact that the language is totally anodyne because, again, it is this culture of consensus. So it becomes a total waste of time almost from the time it is published, maybe even before it was published. So I certainly support your idea.  

Whether that goes as far as one could, I don’t know, but it is a great start. And I would be totally behind it.  

General Ham. I would agree with that, Mr. Chairman, because I think a new strategic review begins with a question of trying to define the ends, which we have talked about here, rather than be-
beginning from a conversation of the ways. It seems to be often begun with the ways and say what we can fit inside the available ways rather than having the larger conversation first.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Dr. Hamre. Mr. Chairman, forgive me for not having studied that provision, and so I am going to make a comment in ignorance.

But the reason that the QDR has become so worthless as a process is because you all are looking at it. I mean, they do not want to expose their deliberations in a way that takes the international deliberations and make them public. And they have a right of privacy to figure out what they want to do for their recommendations.

I personally think the committee could have enormous impact if you took a select group of, say, 10 members of the committee, 11 members of the committee to preserve the majority, and say you guys write a national strategy for the committee and then we are going to debate it ourselves. I promise you, you will transform the way this town thinks because for the first time you are going to be looking at a national strategy. And then you bounce that off against the executive branch, it will change the nature of how you think what your role is.

Your role is, I mean, you are the chairman of the board and this is the board for the Nation, thinking about our national strategy. But you are behaving like third-level program managers in a corporation. You are looking at all the little stuff. Please, I plead with you, look at big issues.

You can't do that with a committee this big. You are going to have to create a special task force to try to work through something and say this is going to be our national strategy document, this is what we think the Nation is going to need for the next 10 years and we are going to debate it inside our committee.

I think you would transform things because you also change the way your committee would be thinking about itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Interesting.

Dr. Hamre, CSIS, as you know, produced a report, I think it was in 1999, called "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols." One of the key elements, to me, that stood out was the point you made very well that when you go to battle with the majors we are not asking the big questions and we inevitably lose. And so I take your point.

It has been challenging for me to figure out how from the legislative branch we encourage or require a real strategy rather than this thing that the QDR has become. It is hard for us to make that happen.

You know, so maybe your thought or your idea is worth pursuing.

Dr. Zakheim, I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that maybe it is a combination of both. In other words, as long as you have something like the QDR it is going to be useless. So change that and maybe John's idea alongside it, so then you get a real discussion as to where we want to go as a nation.

Dr. Hamre. There is nothing like competition. If the executive branch knows you are going to be writing a strategy and you are doing it on a bipartisan basis so that it really has, you are going to cause them to look at it other than this is just an exercise. And I thought the last national strategy was meaningless.
The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. Well, we are in agreement with that. And I appreciate it.

Adam, do you have something else?

Mr. SMITH. No, I guess just a comment. I think it is a very good idea to have our committee perhaps do that. I think, you know, personally I think we could replace the O&I [Oversight and Investigations] Subcommittee and that would be a more useful use of our time. We have got all kinds of oversight and investigations we do within this committee and, of course, with OGR [Oversight and Government Reform] and all over the place. It would, I think, be a more useful committee if we had a bipartisan group that tried to do that, that tried to come up with a strategy for us and then we could, you know, hopefully base our bill off of that strategy.

But other than that, very, very helpful. Thank you very much. If nothing else, you educated all of us on what the Senate’s been up to. So we appreciate that.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. For better or for worse.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I really appreciate you all’s time. I told you we would try to finish at 12. We are done. Thank you all very much. It has been very helpful.

The hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 7, 2016
Statement before the
House Armed Services Committee

“Goldwater-Nichols Reform: The Way Ahead”

A Testimony by:

John J. Hamre, Ph.D.
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense

July 7, 2016
2118 Rayburn House Office Building
Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear today to discuss reforms to the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Act. I was a member of the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee at the time the committee deliberated on the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation. I knew it was very important work, but I had no idea how profoundly it would improve the Department of Defense and our national security. This truly was landmark legislation, and demonstrates the enormous impact of well-designed legislation.

Let me start with a fundamental point. Back in 1986 we needed to reform the Department of Defense in significant ways because we were failing on the battlefield. Today I believe there is a need to reform the Department and amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but let me state clearly that the Department of Defense is NOT a broken organization. We are not failing in the field. In every time zone on the globe, American military personnel are performing effectively on essential missions.

Yet there is a need to reform the Department again, and I commend the leadership of this Committee and all Members for their serious commitment to getting it right. The Department is far too inefficient in using resources and cumbersome in adapting to changing challenges. We need to reform the Department to make it more agile and innovative.

Your letter of invitation asked that we address five issues:

- Eliminating the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L), the elevation of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to the former stature of AT&L, and the creation of a new Under Secretary for Management (a redesignation of the Under Secretary for Business Management and Information).
- A proposed 25% reduction in general officers/flag officers and in the ranks of the Senior Executive Service;
- Establishing “cross functional teams”
- A new authority to authorize the Secretary of Defense to delegate transfer of forces across combatant commands to the Chairman, effectively putting the chairman in the chain of command.
- Imposing caps on the staff of the National Security Council and requiring the National Security Adviser to be confirmed by the Senate under stipulated conditions.

I will briefly comment on each of these issues, and obviously would be pleased to answer any questions you might pose to me and the other members of this panel.

Eliminating USD/AT&L, and raising the stature of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering

Back in 1986, the Congress established the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. It was part of a series of recommendations proposed by the Packard Commission to make the Defense Department more proficient in procuring major systems. The legislation made the mechanics of acquisition the most important goal in the overall acquisition process. An
unintended consequence was the diminishment of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE).

In essence we elevated the prominence of “gunsmithing” and reduced the importance of marksmanship. The DDRE was the key position that brought innovation to the Department of Defense. We won the cold war, not because we fielded a larger military than the Soviet Union, but because we harnessed the innovation of science and technology to give our forces technological superiority on the battlefield. Great innovators like Harold Brown and Bill Perry epitomize the type of leadership we had that made innovation a centerpiece of our defense strategy.

Creation of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and 30 years of additional legislative restrictions has turned the AT&L organization into a giant compliance organization. Compliance organizations will never foster innovation. The best evidence of this is to see how recent Secretaries of Defense have side-stepped the acquisition bureaucracy to introduce new capabilities. Secretary Bob Gates famously sidestepped the Army acquisition command in order to introduce blast-resistant combat vehicles. Secretary of Carter has created innovation centers outside the purview of the acquisition community, in order to bring in technology innovation into the department.

I know the Members of this Committee know the facts better than do I. But we are seeing startling technological advances by Russia and China that seriously challenge our capacity to operate in combat conditions. America is at risk of losing the defense innovation race.

We have a giant compliance organization where instead we need a lean innovation organization to transform the acquisition process in the Department. I strongly encourage the Committee to positively consider the Senate provision (Section 901). I have no doubt that the provision can be improved through give and take between the two committees in conference, but I hope the Committee embraces the need to make structural changes to restore a focus for innovation in the Department.

The Senate provision (Section 901) would also re-designate the recently established Under Secretary of Defense for Business Management and Information as the Under Secretary of Defense for Management and Support, and provide this position with the responsibility to oversee the business operations of the Department. I also think this is a positive recommendation. There are four primary “line” operations in the Department—the Departments of Army, Navy (including Marine Corps) and Air Force, and the collection of Defense Agencies. The Defense Agencies are operating organizations, like the military departments. They now spend nearly a quarter of the total base budget every year, but there is no direct senior line management responsible for their operations. The oversight of the Defense Agencies is left to the staff organs of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I strongly believe that the defense agencies should have dedicated line management, as do the military departments. The offices of the Secretary of Defense should continue to exercise oversight on policy matters, but we need competent management of the business activities of the defense agencies. For these reasons, I support Section 901 in the Senate bill.
It is quite important to note, though, that for this Under Secretary for Management to be successful, we must change the way the Congress approaches ethics restrictions and conflicts of interest. It is virtually impossible to recruit a highly skilled, senior individual from industry to work for the Defense Department these days because we have made it so onerous to avoid the theoretical conditions of potential conflict of interest. We are seriously blocking great talent from serving because of onerous and intrusive de-confliction rules. The reforms envisioned in Section 901 will not succeed unless we also reform the restrictiveness of the confirmation process. Much of this can be done by the Senate Armed Services Committee adopting the same ethics rules that are used by other committees in the Senate. This is an essential prerequisite for success of this reform initiative.

**Reduce by 25% the number of general officers and flag officers, and members of the Senior Executive Service**

The Senate bill contains a provision (Section 501) that stipulates which command positions may be led by O-10 officers. The House bill contains Section 910 that would stipulate that component commands may be led by only an officer of O-9 rank. Section 1112 of the Senate Bill also imposes a 25% reduction on the ranks of the civilian Senior Executive Service.

I remember something that Secretary Bill Perry once said to me. He said “reductions produce reform, reform does not lead to reductions.” In the abstract, bureaucracies do not envision dramatic reform. As a friend of mine once said “candlemakers will never invent electricity.” It takes an external challenge to enliven imagination about how work can be done more efficiently. So I start with the bias that an enforced reduction in numbers of senior leaders is needed to stimulate bureaucratic reform.

Secretary Carter has stated that he sees value in reducing the number of senior officers and civilians in the Department. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you move the implementation date for your mandated cuts to take place one year after the next Secretary has submitted his or her budget proposals. If the Department fails to undertake these reforms, your provision would remain in place and impose cuts. We are presently fighting three wars at this time—In Afghanistan, in Syria/Iraq and more generally against terrorist organizations world-wide. We also are leading a campaign against intimidation by China in the South China Sea and in Eastern Europe by Russia. We will have a new President and a new Administration in six months. We really do need to ask the current senior military leadership to give us a thoughtful plan. They have received the message that change is needed. I have heard that from each of the Service Chiefs. I believe we should give them the chance to give us the plan on the most effective way to reduce senior leadership.

**Establishing “cross functional teams”**

You have asked us to reflect on Section 941 in the Senate-passed bill. Section 941 outlines an elaborate structure to create integrated cross-functional teams in the Department. I believe I understand the aspirations of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I do not think this is the right way to do it. In general, I believe the Congress should express to the Secretary of Defense broad guidance and objectives. You should leave it to the Secretary of Defense to faithfully
implement your guidance. I believe it is hugely inappropriate to dictate to the Secretary how he must accomplish your guidance.

Section 941 is a fundamental violation of the doctrine of checks and balances. The section not only tells the Department what the Congress wants accomplished, but stipulates the method by which the Department must implement the broad guidance. The Congress cannot run the Department of Defense and it should not try to do so. If the Congress believes that the Department needs improved integration of mission planning and execution, stipulate that, but leave it to the Department to decide how best to implement that guidance.

Hold them accountable for outcomes. But do not dictate how the Secretary of Defense should accomplish those goals.

Authorizing the Secretary of Defense to bring the Chairman into the Chain of Command

The Senate-passed bill contains a provision (Section 922) that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to give command authority to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for limited actions. Specifically, the Senate has indicated it should be the right and responsibility of the Chairman to transfer forces from one combatant command to another without the Secretary’s direction.

Again, I understand the intent of the Senate concerning this authority, and the desire to make some mechanical functions less onerous. But with great respect, I think this provision is a mistake, and I think it is dangerous.

Let me say a word about civilian control. All democracies wrestle with a fundamental question. They depend on military establishments for national security. But military establishments are not democratic in content or nature. Military establishments are hierarchical, authoritarian and command-oriented. Military departments are dangerous for democracies, and democracies need to establish structures and procedures to control these authoritarian establishments.

America was blessed that our first President—George Washington—was a military man, but he enshrined civilian control as a foundation for our democracy.

When the Congress adopted Goldwater-Nichols, the leadership of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees wrestled with this key question. The central design criteria for reform was to strengthen civilian control. I believe that still should be the premier design goal of this reform agenda.

Section 922 of the Senate bill would authorize the Secretary of Defense to place the Chairman in the Chain of command for selected administrative matters. This may sound like an insignificant matter. But I would also argue that transferring units from one command to another constitutes an insignificant burden on the Department. These are matters that are dispensed with in minutes. When I was Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary Cohen would host a meeting every morning, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Vice Chairman and me. We met every day, even when one of the four of us was not in town. We dealt with issues like this all the time. It took
only a few minutes to discuss and resolve an issue. It was not a burden on anyone. And it preserved the sacred principle of civilian control.

I know that the Joint Staff has argued that this would be a step toward efficiency to give the Chairman the authority to deal with small matters like this. But civilian control is a toggle switch—either on or off. It is not a rheostat where you can dial some level of civilian control and give powers directly to the Chairman. If delegation authority for force movements is needed, a premise I do not accept, then the Secretary should be allowed the ability to delegate to the Deputy Secretary or the appropriate Under Secretary, not to a military officer.

The purpose of civilian control is to establish an unequivocal accountability for military action to the President of the United States. No President can blame outcomes on the military. The awesome decision to take America to war rests exclusively with the President, through the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs needs to be unencumbered as an honest adviser to the President. He should have no conflicted judgment because he was accountable for actions that succeeded or failed.

I know that the Senate’s recommendation was honestly considered to be minor and administrative in nature. But it is the start of a path that is dangerous.

Managing the evolving activities of the National Security Council

Both the S. 2943 and H.R. 4909 contain provisions that deal with the role and activities of the National Security Council (NSC). The Senate bill (Section 1089) would impose an absolute cap of 150 people, either direct employees or detailers, who may serve on the staff of the National Security Council. The Thornberry Amendment would stipulate that “if the staff of the council exceeds 100 employees at any point during a term of the President and for the duration of such term . . . the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

These two provisions are enormously important. We are dealing with an issue that is at the fault line of American constitutional government. The Constitution requires that the Congress oversee the activities of the Departments of the Executive Branch. Officers of those Departments must be confirmed by the Senate. They may operate only pursuant to funds appropriated by the Congress. But it is also clear that the President has a right of privilege and privacy in operating the Executive Office of the Presidency.

So the status of the National Security Council rests at the fault line of the Constitution. Is the NSC an extension of the work of the departments, where the Congress has oversight? Or is the NSC an extension of the President where the right of presidential privilege gives privacy and autonomy to its deliberations?

I strongly believe that the Thornberry Amendment is a superior approach to this issue and should be adopted.
If the NSC is to function as a coordinating element of the Executive Office of the President, I believe it should not be subject to Congressional oversight. If the NSC, however, is to become an operating arm of the Executive Branch—and there is enormous evidence that it is becoming just that—then I believe there is a constitutional obligation for the Congress to oversee the NSC. The Thornberry Amendment makes a judgment that a staff of fewer than 100 would be deemed to represent a coordinating NSC. A staff that exceeds 100 would be deemed to be an operating arm of the Executive Branch and subject to oversight. I should note that currently the NSC staff exceeds 400 and that OMB, which has about 450 staff, includes six senior officials who require Senate confirmation.

This provision does not threaten the prerogatives of the President unless the President decides he wants to direct military forces from the White House, not through the Secretary of Defense. I believe this provision honors the constitutional imperatives of both the Presidency and the Congress. Therefore, I strongly endorse the House provision, and encourage its adoption by the Congress.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the Committee, there are no more important issues that this Committee will deliberate than the issues we have discussed this morning. This hearing reflects the fundamental responsibility of this great Committee to lead the Nation on fundamental matters of national security. I congratulate you for holding this hearing, and thank you for giving me a modest role in your deliberations. I stand ready to answer any question you might pose.
Dr. John J. Hamre

John Hamre was elected president and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in January 2000. Before joining CSIS, he served as the 26th U.S. deputy secretary of defense. Prior to holding that post, he was the under secretary of defense (comptroller) from 1993 to 1997. As comptroller, Dr. Hamre was the principal assistant to the secretary of defense for the preparation, presentation, and execution of the defense budget and management improvement programs. In 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed Dr. Hamre to serve as chairman of the Defense Policy Board.

Before serving in the Department of Defense, Dr. Hamre worked for 10 years as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. During that time, he was primarily responsible for the oversight and evaluation of procurement, research, and development programs, defense budget issues, and relations with the Senate Appropriations Committee. From 1978 to 1984, Dr. Hamre served in the Congressional Budget Office, where he became its deputy assistant director for national security and international affairs. In that position, he oversaw analysis and other support for committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Dr. Hamre received his Ph.D., with distinction, in 1978 from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C., where his studies focused on international politics and economics and U.S. foreign policy. In 1972, he received his B.A., with high distinction, from Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, emphasizing political science and economics. The following year he studied as a Rockefeller fellow at the Harvard Divinity School in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
## Disclosure Form for Witnesses

**Committee on Armed Services**
**U.S. House of Representatives**

**Instruction to Witnesses:** Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 114th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants), or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the current and two previous calendar years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness’s personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness’s appearance before the committee. Witnesses may list additional grants, contracts, or payments on additional sheets, if necessary.

**Witness name:**

**Capacity in which appearing:** (check one)

- [ ] Individual
- [ ] Representative

**If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:**

**Federal Contract or Grant Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) or grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

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TESTIMONY BY
GEN CARTER HAM, USA RET.
FORMER COMMANDER
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

SUBMITTED TO
UNITED STATES HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

114TH CONGRESS

Hearing

July 7, 2016
Per Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5) of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 114th Congress, I have not received any federal grants or contracts relevant to the subject matter of this testimony during the current or previous two fiscal years.

BIOGRAPHY

GEN Carter F. Ham, USA Ret.
President & Chief Executive Officer, Association of the United States Army

General Ham is the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Association of the United States Army. He is an experienced leader who has led at every level from platoon to geographic combatant command. He is also a member of a very small group of Army senior leaders who have risen from private to four-star general.

General Ham served as an enlisted infantryman in the 82nd Airborne Division before attending John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. Graduating in 1976 as a distinguished military graduate, his service has taken him to Italy, Germany, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Macedonia, Qatar, Iraq and, uniquely among Army leaders, to over 40 African countries in addition to a number of diverse assignments within the United States.

He commanded the First Infantry Division, the legendary Big Red One, before assuming duties as director for operations on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon where he oversaw all global operations. His first four-star command was as commanding general, U.S. Army Europe. Then in 2011, he became just the second commander of United States Africa Command where he led all U.S. military activities on the African continent ranging from combat operations in Libya to hostage rescue operations in Somalia as well as training and security assistance activities across 54 complex and diverse African nations.

General Ham retired in June of 2013 after nearly 38 years of service. Immediately prior to joining the staff at AUSA, he served as the chairman of the National Commission on the Future of the Army, an eight-member panel tasked by the Congress with making recommendations on the size, force structure and capabilities of the Total Army.

He resides with his wife, Christi, in Arlington, Virginia.
Opening Statement:

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith – thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee. I am honored to be here with Dr. Hamre and Mr. Zakheim, both distinguished public servants.

I agree that now is an appropriate time to review Goldwater-Nichols, a law which, in my opinion, has had overall positive effect on the U.S. Armed Forces and has most certainly affected my own professional development.

Not long after the law was passed, I went to the College of Naval Command & Staff in Newport. And, just to emphasize the point, fellow Army Majors Ray Odierno and Stan McChrystal were in my class. That initial exposure to joint education set each of us on paths that would lead to multiple joint command and staff experiences, none of which would have been likely absent Goldwater-Nichols.

As a battalion commander, we deployed to Macedonia on U.N. duty under the auspices of Joint Task Force Provide Promise. Later, I attended the Air Force War College, served on the staff at U.S. Central Command on 9/11 and for two years after. As a general officer, I commanded a multinational unit in Iraq, had two operations positions on the joint staff and concluded my active service at U.S. Africa Command. Again, I suspect that my path would have been far different had the Congress not passed Goldwater-Nichols.

While I agree that some changes are required, I’d urge some caution. The old adage, measure twice, cut once seems about right to me. Let’s be sure the changes to the law are likely to improve military effectiveness, not simply change things.

I look forward to your questions.
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS REFORM: THE WAY AHEAD

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Dov S. Zakheim

July 7, 2016

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Committee:
It is an honor to appear again before you, today to discuss the way ahead for an updated version of the Goldwater-Nichols reform.

At the outset, I wish to note that the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation fundamentally changed, for the better, not only the nature of the chain of command, but also altered in a material way the balance of power and influence in the Department of Defense by ensuring that the best and the brightest officers constituted the Joint Staff. This had not previously been the case when the Joint Staff was a terminal assignment for most officers.

Nevertheless, the Defense Department faces far more complex challenges in today’s international environment than it did when Goldwater-Nichols became law. These challenges require a DoD and its military and civilian staffs that in the words of HR 4909 is “agile and adaptive.” This unfortunately is far from the case today. Our national security planning system has not kept up with the challenges to our security; staffs are too large, and their product is too mechanistic and all too often overtaken by unanticipated events. In a similar vein, our acquisition corps is too slow-moving to keep up with cutting edge technological developments in the civilian sector, too often insufficiently educated to be sophisticated consumers, and too hidebound by regulations to work in tandem with non-defense industry.

Although military end-strength continues to drop, headquarters are bloated and cumbersome. Despite a marked increase in civilian personnel since 2000, the Department is probably less efficient than it was then. There are not only too many admirals, generals, and presidential appointees, but too many civilian staffers, and far too many contractors serving in staff augmentation positions. All in all, DOD overhead now accounts for over 40 per cent. of the Pentagon budget more than twice total defense budgets of Britain and France combined. The cost of DOD headquarters alone exceeds $40 billion.

Streamlining and Updating the Combatant Commands

I applaud both Armed Services Committees for coming to grips with the need for an updated version of Goldwater-Nichols, even if their solutions are not identical. With respect to headquarters rationalization, there is much to commend the proposal to reduce the number of four-star flag and general officers, as long as their civilian staffs, and even more so, civilian contractors, are reduced commensurately and not transferred elsewhere, as was the case when the Joint Forces Command was disestablished (military staffs could be reassigned to more operational positions). It is important to apply a number, or alternately, a percentage, to the proposed reductions; but, apart from eliminating four-star billets from component commanders, other reductions should be left to the Department of Defense. With respect to what are currently component commands, the proposal to instead create joint task forces combining all the services has much merit in a world where rapid and urgent response to a host of different situations is the order of the day.

There is a strong case for creating an independent four-star Cyber Command, given the importance of cyber in today’s security environment. At the same time, however, there is an equally strong argument for combining the Northern and Southern Commands. Moreover, some consideration should be given to combining the Central and Africa Commands, since CENTCOM’s area of responsibility already includes Africa’s most powerful nation, Egypt.

Reassessing the Responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Both committees have rightly focussed on the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All too often, the chairman has not been as independent a source of advice for the president as the original Goldwater-Nichols Act anticipated. This situation must be remedied; the Chairman should be able to provide military advice to the Commander-in-Chief even if it conflicts with that of the Secretary of Defense. In that regard, it is important that the Chairman and Vice Chairman be appointed to staggered four-year terms so as to reinforce their independence. Moreover, the Chairman should have authority delegated by the Secretary of Defense to allocate resources and capabilities among the combatant commanders; this has often been the case in practice (it certainly was the case with respect to resources when I served as the Pentagon's Comptroller).

On the other hand, the Joint Staff should not be converted into a General Staff, as some have recommended. A General Staff would be too divorced from operations; moreover, history has demonstrated that General Staffs can undermine civilian control, the bedrock of our national security structure. The size of the Joint Staff must be reduced, however. From just 2010 to 2012 it grew by 230 per cent, from 1286 to 4244 personnel. Proposed reductions to levels below 2000 personnel, with no more than 1500 on active duty, are very much in order. Again, civilians and contractors should not be reassigned to other positions, nor should new Joint Staff agencies be created to absorb those subject to headquarters reductions.

Streamlining the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Since 2009, the size of the civilian workforce in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown by nearly 18 per cent, or more than 2,000 people. OSD's staff size has expanded in part because more and more Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries are added to its ranks, all of whom, like the Under Secretaries have staffs, as do their principal deputies. There is no reason why there should be a separate layer of principal deputies, with staffs all their own. One Assistant Secretary should be dual-hatted as the principal deputy, with a single staff to support both functions.

The is some merit to the proposal that the Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, be recast as focusing on research and engineering, or better yet, research and development, given steady and rapid technological breakthroughs as forecast by Moore's Law. Yet unless the Congressional confirmation system is radically streamlined, it is unlikely that persons most familiar with commercial advances in hi-tech will be willing, or indeed able, to serve in that position, however it is redefined. It is right for Congress to stress the importance of appointing people to manage rapid technological change; it must not at the same time deter the most qualified people from seeking those appointments.

Over the years the Services have suffered a decline in influence over acquisition decisions. Building upon additional authorities given to them in the FY 2016 NDAA, the Services have requested an even greater say in a system that, on the one hand, despite best efforts of the current DOD leadership, remains bloated and slow moving, and, on the other, directly affects their ability to organize, train and equip their personnel. There is much merit in General Mark Milley's call for de-layering OSD oversight by allowing the Army, rather than OSD, create independent cost estimates; maintain complete control over analyses of alternatives to any given program; certify technology-readiness levels; and have full responsibility for testing. Finally, there must be a concerted effort to ensure that the entire civilian acquisition corps receives the same level of continuing education as does its military counterpart. The Defense Acquisition University's course-load does not fill that bill. Even then, there is no mandatory requirement for ongoing professional education; too many civilians have not taken a course in any field relating to advanced technology since they obtained their Master's Degree.
There are other opportunities for creating a more efficient OSD beyond addressing the acquisition corps. There is no reason why there should be more than one Assistant Secretary for international security relations. Nor is it clear why the Assistant Secretary for Strategy and Plans, a position which not long ago was held by a Deputy Assistant Secretary, should not incorporate special operations and homeland defense, with a commensurate reduction in staffing. Other reductions in the number of Assistant Secretaries, or at least downgrading to their former non-confirmable positions—for example the Assistant Secretaries for Logistics and for Readiness—are also worthy of consideration.

The proposal to re-designate the newly created Under Secretary for Management and Information into the Under Secretary for Management and Support. The role of a CIO is very different from the role of a COO, or, in the case of the Under Secretary, a deputy COO. Moreover, many of the agencies currently under the aegis of the present team of Under Secretaries receive too little oversight. They would be better managed by an Under Secretary whose primary role would be to ensure their effective operations. I would counsel, however, that both DFAS and DCAA remain with CFO/Comptroller. Both are normally functions that in the civilian sector fall under the CFO. Moreover, since the new Under Secretary for Support would be dealing with major contracts, and would have them managed by the Defense Contracts Management Agency, it would be inappropriate for the same official to manage the auditors who would be reporting on the proper management of those contracts.

Lastly, I commend those proposals to do away with the Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR involves far too many staff doing far too little of consequence. It is a prime example of government inefficiency. Reducing personnel is but one way to create a more agile and responsive OSD. Eliminating unnecessary paperwork exercises like the QDR is another.

TRICARE Reform

The Congress continues to press for improvements in the TRICARE system. As a former Commissioner on the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, I can only say that the Commission’s proposals would go much further in upgrading this important benefit for service members and their families. The Commission proposed a complete overhaul of TRICARE, and the creation of TRICARE choice that would more closely resemble the excellent and efficient health insurance program that is available to civilian government employees. I still believe that our recommendations would be welcomed by the vast majority of military personnel by providing more flexible, responsive and tailored plans for military families.

Toward More Efficient Budget Implementation

I would be remiss if I did not mention two major reforms that I believe are long overdue in the current process known as Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution, PPBE for short. When I formalized the inclusion of budget execution—the E—into the process, I hoped that the Department would undertake more than one mid-year review. I felt that given the changing demands for resources that emerged during the budget year, and the variance in the rates of expenditure, or burn rates, from those initially forecast, it was important that budget reviews take place on a quarterly basis. My views have not changed in this regard.

Coupled with such reviews is the need for far more flexibility with respect to prior approval reprogramming ceilings. These are much too low, and too constrained, and prevent the timely
adjustment of accounts for a host of programs. I would urge the Congress, including this committee, to raise both the aggregate and the individual account ceilings, so as to ensure that financial responsiveness keeps pace with operational responsiveness.

The National Security Council

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, among your many excellent proposals is that which reduces the size of the National Security Council staff to 100, and requires that the National Security Advisor be confirmable if the staff exceeds 150. The NSC is a staff organization that has operated under the dangerous illusion that it plays an operational role in national security. It does not; that is the function of the State Department, DOD and other executive agencies. The NSC staff is just that, a staff, and one that support an official who serves the President in a special advisory capacity. It is well known that former National Security Advisors have been shocked by the growth of their former staffs; it is not clear that such growth has led to more effective or efficient decision-making. Some would argue that it has had the opposite effect. The proposal that this committee has put forward would remedy the current situation; I hope it is enacted into law.

The Congress has taken the important step of attacking the stodginess of our national security processes on a host of fronts. I hope that this is but the first step in a process that could, and should, take several more years before it is fully realized.

Thank you.
Honorable Dov S. Zakheim

Dov S. Zakheim is Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Senior Fellow at the CNA Corporation. Previously he was Senior Vice President of Booz Allen Hamilton where he led the Firm’s support of U.S. Combatant Commanders worldwide.

From 2001 to April 2004 he was Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense, serving as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on financial and budgetary matters, leading over 50,000 staff, developing and managing the world’s largest budgets, and negotiating five major defense agreements with US allies and partners. From 2002-2004 Dr. Zakheim was DOD’s coordinator of civilian programs in Afghanistan. He also helped organize the 2003 New York (UN) and Madrid Donors conferences for Iraq reconstruction.

From 1987 to 2001 he was both corporate vice president of System Planning Corporation, a technology and analysis firm based in Arlington, Va. and chief executive officer of its subsidiary, SPC International Corp. During the 2000 presidential campaign, he served as a senior foreign policy advisor to then-Governor Bush.

From 1985 until March 1987, Dr. Zakheim was Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), playing an active role in the Department's system acquisition, strategic planning, programming and budget processes. Dr. Zakheim held several other DOD posts from 1981 to 1985. Earlier, he was a principal analyst in the National Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional Budget Office.

Dr. Zakheim has served on numerous government, corporate, non-profit and charitable boards. His membership of government boards and panels includes the United States Commission for the Preservation of America's Heritage Abroad (1991-93); the Task Force on Defense Reform (1997); the Board of Visitors of the Department of Defense Overseas Regional Schools (1998-2001); Defense Science Board task forces on "The Impact of DOD Acquisition Policies on the Health of the Defense Industry" (2000) and “Urgent Operational Needs” (2009); the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Board (2008-2010); the International Business Practices Advisory Panel, which he chaired (2008-2010); and the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2008-2011). He currently serves on the Commission on Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization, is a member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel, and of the Defense Business Board, which he helped establish, and on which he served first as a member from 2004-2010 and then as a Senior Fellow from 2010-2013.

Dr. Zakheim is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Chatham House/The Royal Institute of International Affairs. He is Vice Chairman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Board of Trustees, and of the Board of Directors of the Center for The National Interest; he is also a member of the Board of Control of the United States Naval Academy. Dr. Zakheim was elected a Fellow of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences in 2011.

A 1970 graduate of Columbia University with a B.A., summa cum laude, and a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Dr. Zakheim also studied at the London School of Economics. He holds a doctorate in
economics and politics at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford, where he held three graduate and post-graduate fellowships. Dr. Zakheim was an adjunct Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and an adjunct Scholar of the Heritage Foundation. He has been an adjunct professor at the National War College, Yeshiva University, Columbia University, Georgetown University and Trinity College, Hartford, Conn., where he was Presidential Scholar.

The author of a dozen books or monographs, and of numerous articles, Dr. Zakheim has lectured and provided print, radio and television commentary on national security policy issues domestically and internationally. He blogs for Foreign Policy/Shadow Government and The National Interest. He is the recipient of numerous awards for his government, professional and civic work, including the Defense Department’s highest civilian award in 1986, 1987 and 2004.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 114th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants), or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the current and two previous calendar years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness’s personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness’s appearance before the committee. Witnesses may list additional grants, contracts, or payments on additional sheets, if necessary.

Witness name: Dov S. Zakheim

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☒ Individual
☐ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: ___________________________

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June 24, 2016

Senator John McCain
218 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Senator Jack Reed
728 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senators McCain and Reed,

There is a provision in the Senate version of the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act which would repeal the following statutory requirement:

§203. Director of Missile Defense Agency

If an officer of the armed forces on active duty is appointed to the position of Director of the Missile Defense Agency, the position shall be treated as having been designated by the President as a position of importance and responsibility for purposes of section 601 of this title and shall carry the grade of lieutenant general or general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, vice admiral or admiral.

We strongly urge you not to rescind this requirement for several reasons.

First, the scale, scope and complexity of the position demands the minimum grade of a lieutenant general or vice admiral. The incumbent serves in several capacities including the Acquisition Executive and Head of Contracting Authority for the Ballistic Missile Defense portfolio of programs valued at more than $30 billion. These include land- and sea-based sensors and interceptors as well as air- and space-based sensors. The elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) are also globally deployed from Romania to the UK to Greenland to California to Alaska and Japan. The ongoing development of the BMDS involves the entire spectrum of weapon systems acquisition from basic research to development to production to deployment and sustainment.

Second, the position involves establishing working relationships with very senior allied military and political leaders where the executive experience and savvy of at least a three star is required. The quality of these relationships can mean the difference in success or failure in integrating U.S. and allied capabilities which can have a direct effect on our ability to provide defense for our deployed forces, allies and friends. Examples include the co-development of the SM 3-IIA interceptor with the government of Japan and the development and construction of interceptor sites in Europe.

Third, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency must engage with very senior industry leaders to include CEOs of the top major defense contractors. This is critical to ensure the proper management and resourcing of the programs to achieve their cost, schedule and operational performance objectives.
Fourth, the Director must be able to interface at the most senior levels with the Services and other Defense agencies to ensure the proper integration and implementation of capabilities as well as their eventual transition.

Finally, any downgrade of this position at this time would send the absolute wrong message to our adversaries that the U.S. is backing off of missile defense as a priority within our warfighting capability.

So again we strongly urge you not to change the requirement for at least a lieutenant general or vice admiral to fill the Director of the Missile Defense Agency position.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Obering III, Lt. Gen., USAF (Retired)
Director, MDA (2004-2009)

Ronald T. Kadish, Lt. Gen., USAF (Retired)
Director, MDA (1999-2004)

Peter P. Lyles, Gen., USAF (Retired)
Director, BMDO (1996-1999)

Malcolm R. O’Neil, LTG, USA (Retired)
Director BMDO (1993-1996)

Ambassador Henry F. Cooper
Director, SDIO (1990-1993)

Kevin P. Chilton, Gen., USAF (Retired)
Commander, USSTRATCOM (2007-2011)

Victor E. Rains III, Gen., USAF (Retired)
Commander, USNORTHCOM (2007-2010)

Timothy J. Ziemba, Gen., USN (Retired)
Commander, USPACOM (2003-2010)

Richard P. Formica, LTG, USA (Retired)
Commanding General, USASMDC/ARSTRAT (2010-2013)

Joseph R. Linscott, LTG, USA (Retired)
Commanding General, USASMDC/ARSTRAT (2001-2003)

Kenneth Todaro, Brig. Gen., USAF (Retired)
Deputy Director, MDA (2014-2015)
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. The House-passed version of the NDAA includes a provision I offered with my friend Joe Wilson to expand talent-exchange authorities so that DOD employees may gain experience at private companies, and to bring innovative industry leaders to DOD. I believe we need to see more efforts like these incorporated into Department-wide reform initiatives. In what ways can we reform Goldwater-Nichols, specifically to empower the workforce within the Department to improve strategy-making, as well as better collaborate with industry to manage costs, enhance capabilities, and fulfill requirements?

Dr. Hamre. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. When Goldwater-Nichols was first enacted, the international security environment was already demanding, and has only become more complex and unpredictable in recent years. As the United States continues to face challenges across the globe—such as ISIL in the Middle East, proxy warfare in Ukraine, and island-building in the South China Sea—and as we look to reform Goldwater-Nichols, how can we best frame this effort to make the Department more agile while retaining its strength and taking into account emerging security challenges?

Dr. Hamre. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. The House-passed version of the NDAA includes a provision I offered with my friend Joe Wilson to expand talent-exchange authorities so that DOD employees may gain experience at private companies, and to bring innovative industry leaders to DOD. I believe we need to see more efforts like these incorporated into Department-wide reform initiatives. In what ways can we reform Goldwater-Nichols, specifically to empower the workforce within the Department to improve strategy-making, as well as better collaborate with industry to manage costs, enhance capabilities, and fulfill requirements?

General Ham. The requirements in the law that address the professional development of the officers of the Armed Forces have yielded, in large part, a cohort of senior uniformed leaders with broader understanding and experience in joint service matters. That has been, in my opinion, a significant contributor to the increased operational effectiveness of the force as a whole. Similar focus on the professional development of the Department of Defense’s senior civilian staff would likely result in broader understanding and experience across that important cohort. Given rapidly changing technologies, increasing opportunities for Department of Defense senior leaders to interact with, and learn from, private enterprises (perhaps not limited to industry) would be of significant benefit to the Department. A side effect would be to enhance the private sector’s understanding of the Department of Defense. In order to do this, though, the Department would need authority, funding and manning above authorizations (much like the Army’s Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account) so that individuals detailed to opportunities with the private sector would not leave gaps in their parent Service or organization. Lastly, there may be an opportunity to leverage the vast private sector experience resident in the reserve components to strengthen the linkages between the Department and the private sector.

General Ham. The complexities of the current (and envisioned future) strategic environment require a national decision-making process that is agile and responsive. This is an area that requires improvement. Goldwater-Nichols (rightly, in my opinion) strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but, over time, the role of the collective Joint Chiefs of Staff seems to have been diminished. The body of the Joint Chiefs represents the most senior, most experienced military advisors of our nation. Their collective views, not just the view of the CJCS, ought be more prominent in national security decision-making. While the Combatant Com-
manders (acknowledging that I previously served as one) are ideally suited to plan and conduct regional activities and operations, they do not bear responsibilities for the long-term health and readiness of the force nor for the consequences that operations in one region might have in another region. That is why, in my view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be increasingly engaged in national security decision-making.

Mr. LANGEVIN. The House-passed version of the NDAA includes a provision I offered with my friend Joe Wilson to expand talent-exchange authorities so that DOD employees may gain experience at private companies, and to bring innovative industry leaders to DOD. I believe we need to see more efforts like these incorporated into Department-wide reform initiatives. In what ways can we reform Goldwater-Nichols, specifically to empower the workforce within the Department to improve strategy-making, as well as better collaborate with industry to manage costs, enhance capabilities, and fulfill requirements?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. When Goldwater-Nichols was first enacted, the international security environment was already demanding, and has only become more complex and unpredictable in recent years. As the United States continues to face challenges across the globe—such as ISIL in the Middle East, proxy warfare in Ukraine, and island-building in the South China Sea—and as we look to reform Goldwater-Nichols, how can we best frame this effort to make the Department more agile while retaining its strength and taking into account emerging security challenges?

Dr. ZAKHEIM. A major reason for the Department’s inability to react quickly is its heavy bureaucratic structure combined with a risk-averse culture. There are simply too many layers in the DOD’s decision-making and acquisition processes. To a great extent, this is due to an oversized civilian bureaucracy, coupled with an overly heavy military staff structure. Moreover, to some extent professional military education, and to a far greater extent continuing education for civilians, both fall woefully short in encouraging independent thinking, risk-taking and experimentation. The bureaucracy is totally risk-averse, and prefers pursuing well-trodden strategic and technological paths rather than experimenting with bold new concepts. As a result, there is insufficient original strategic thinking for coping with the complexities of today’s international environment, nor is there a sufficiently well-educated staff to foster creative technological advances. Far greater efforts should be exerted to foster strategic thinking at senior service schools and the National Defense University. Military officers attending these schools should all “major” in strategy; graduates should be fully conversant with strategic thinking. In addition, upon graduation they should have published at least one original piece on some aspect of future U.S. strategy in an increasingly complex international security environment. This is not to denigrate the importance of other subjects such as the PPBE process, but learning about process does not foster creative thought. Although the vast majority of flag and general officers have attended senior service school, this is not universally the case. For those officers who will later be involved in strategy development and formulation, senior service school should be a prerequisite for promotion to flag/general officer rank. Similarly, and without exception, civilians who are likely to play a role in the formulation of strategy should not accede to the Senior Executive Service unless they have spent a year at one of these schools. The current effort to realize a “Third Offset Strategy” bears promise. Nevertheless, it cannot succeed unless accompanied by a serious reduction in the many layers of bureaucracy, in other words, a reduction in the size of the civil service in particular, as well as by a fundamental change in the Pentagon’s culture. The latter can only take place if DOD alters its traditional system for measuring and rewarding its officials. Military officers serving in the acquisition corps should not achieve general or flag officer rank, and civilians should not enter the Senior Executive Service, unless they will have completed at least two semesters either in a leading institute of technology. Nor, for that matter, should either officers or civilians be designated as program managers, at the O–6 or GS–15 level, unless they have pursued a similar educational program. In addition, risk-taking should be encouraged, not undermined, and officials who develop innovative ideas should be rewarded, not punished, for thinking “outside the box.”