    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                           TURKEY'S DEMOCRATIC DECLINE

    =======================================================================

                                     HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 13, 2016

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-196

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New York

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                                ----------

             Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats

                     DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
    TED POE, Texas                       GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin            TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Henri J. Barkey, Ph.D., director, Middle East Program, The Wilson
      Center.........................................................     6
    Fevzi Bilgin, Ph.D., president, Rethink Institute................    13
    Mr. Alan Makovsky, senior fellow, Center for American Progress...    21

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Henri J. Barkey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................     8
    Fevzi Bilgin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..........................    15
    Mr. Alan Makovsky: Prepared statement............................    23

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    56
    Hearing minutes..................................................    57
    The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe,
      Eurasia, and Emerging Threats: Material submitted for the
      record.........................................................    58

                          TURKEY'S DEMOCRATIC DECLINE

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 2016

                           House of Representatives,

             Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:54 p.m., in
    room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I call the subcommittee to order. This is
    our second subcommittee event of 2016 focused on the
    development of the situation in Turkey. And as we continue to
    watch with concern, I have titled today's hearing, ``Turkey's
    Democratic Decline.''
        Let me say from the offset that our comments, and even our
    criticisms, of the Turkish Government are predicated on a deep
    respect for Turkey and the Turkish people. Turkey and America
    have been and are friends. Friends speak plainly to one another
    about problems. That is what you will hear today.
        I would like to take this opportunity to extend my
    condolences to the families of all the victims of last month's
    terrorist attack at Istanbul's airport. It was a cowardly
    attack by radical Muslim extremists. And traveling through that
    region, I was able to personally pay a tribute to the victims
    of this horrendous massacre just a few days after the tragic
    event had occurred.
        Our expressions reflected those of sorrow, expressed and
    reflected those of the American people. Turkish victims are no
    different than American victims. These people have been
    murdered in recent months and recent years by radical
    extremists, represent an evil force on this planet that must be
    defeated and destroyed. And both of our countries, Turkey and
    the United States, will be a safer people and place when that
    happens.
        Those of you who have observed this subcommittee know, that
    while wishing the best for Turkey, we have concerns about
    actions taken by President Erdogan that may put his people at
    risk and weaken the strong ties between our countries. Our hope
    for a better situation and things would turn around has not
    happened, and we have been disappointed. And there is a
    mounting body of evidence suggesting that President Erdogan's
    party and his regime seems to be involved with corruption and
    misrule that is taking Turkey in exactly the wrong direction.
        President Erdogan's party has used the levers of power to
    limit dissent and to crack down on free journalism. Thousands
    of judges and prosecutors have been reassigned based on their
    political inclinations. And immunity from parliamentarians have
    been lifted, opening the way for charges to be used against
    them in order to sideline opposition, especially those in the
    HDP.
        Seemingly erratic, Erdogan has officially designated the
    followers of Mr. Gulen as a terrorist group, and this group was
    once, of course, a lynchpin of his political coalition. So he
    has gone from a relationship with a group that has been very
    important to his success to now declaring them as enemies and
    declaring them the enemies of his country. They helped bring
    him to power and now he has targeted them for repression.
        These kind of steps have taken Turkey further away from the
    shared values at the heart of our American-Turkish alliance.
    While a representative from the Committee to Protect
    Journalists couldn't be here today in person, they did send a
    written statement, and I will be submitting the entire
    statement for the record. But I wanted to read a short excerpt
    from it now.
        The Committee to Protect Journalists reports that over the
    past 2 years the Turkish Government, and I quote,

            ``Increased its repressive action against the press
            through using vague, broadly worded antiterrorist laws,
            bringing charges under an archaic law that carries jail
            terms for insulting the President, replacing the
            editorial management of opposition media outlets and
            firing their staff, routinely imposing bans on the
            reporting of sensitive stories, and prosecuting and
            imprisoning journalists on antistate charges in
            retaliation for their work.''

        That is, indeed, a sad description for the state of free
    media in Turkey. It is a sad description of how Turkey has
    changed in these last 5 years and has gone in the wrong
    direction. While I have always strived to maintain a balanced
    perspective, it is clear to me that Erdogan's actions have
    hobbled Turkey's democracy at home and left his country more
    isolated in the region than at any other time in recent memory.
        I have many questions for our witnesses today, but I
    especially look forward to their views on the recent
    rapprochement between Turkey, Russia, and Israel. While such
    developments are, of course, welcome, I can't help but wonder
    if this is merely a momentary change of attitude or something
    more durable. We can get into that during the testimony.
        With that said, I thank our witnesses. And without
    objection, all members will have at least until the end of this
    week to submit additional written questions for extraneous
    material for the record.
        I now turn to Mr. Meeks, the ranking member, to have
    whatever opening statement he would like.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher. And thank you
    for your remarks and organizing today's subcommittee hearing on
    the political trends in Turkey.
        As we all know, and as, I guess, clearly indicated even by
    the number of individuals that is in this room, Turkey is our
    important ally in an increasingly complex region. And, you
    know, I am grateful, especially grateful for the opportunity to
    take a look at Turkey again and again and again because that is
    how important our relationship is with Turkey.
        You know, when I first came into Congress, I looked at the
    number of countries around and the various regions, Turkey is
    truly an important ally and a country that I think that we have
    got to work with. And when you have friends, you should be able
    to talk honest and open with your friends. You know, it reminds
    me of some of the dialogue that we have here in the United
    States currently that is going on around our country and the
    talk is let's have a dialogue, and dialogue at times has to be
    frank.
        So when we look at some of the trends in Turkey, we see
    that some remain the same since our last hearing. Domestically
    President Erdogan continues to enjoy strong support but has not
    veered from his push toward the presidential system. The
    domestic conflict with the Kurds has not abated and is closely
    linked with the conflict in Syria. And as a result of the
    Syrian war, the refugee crisis in agreement with the EU has
    also remained a source of strain.
        On the other hand, there have been some other changes, some
    significant. A Prime Minister resigned in May. Terror attacks
    have struck the cord of fear, detracting tourists from visiting
    Turkey and further crippling their economy. These attacks test
    our resolve, our common values in an open society, and tip the
    balance between liberty and security.
        On the international front, Turkey and Israel recently
    signed a broad agreement to restore ties after a 6-year break,
    a step that I say that I welcome. Furthermore, Turkey's looking
    to restore relations with Russia, reopening a needed source of
    tourism. And yesterday, Prime Minister Yildilrum announced
    efforts to seek normalization with Syria, possibly presenting
    new opportunities for peace building and cooperation.
        Yet, where does that leave Turkish-U.S. and Turkish-NATO
    relations? And what can we do in Congress to make sure Turkey
    remains an ally and a friend and a trusted partner in the
    region? I believe it begins and ends with our commitment to our
    common principles and shared interests, and that brings us back
    to the democratic space in Turkey.
        We, in Congress, are indeed concerned with democratic
    progress in Turkey. I inquire about its state, as a concerned
    friend, as I said. I want to make sure--it is imperative to
    discuss the recent crackdown on the freedom of speech in
    Turkish universities and in the press. Tolerance in the face of
    domestic criticism is difficult, and regional events further
    complicate the situation.
        But nevertheless, we must fully defend the fight for
    academic freedom, for freedom of the press, and for the right
    of individuals to critique their governments, as difficult as
    that may be to hear. I say that here in the United States for
    the people of the United States, and I say that there for the
    people of Turkey, that they must have the freedom to express
    themselves.
        As we all know too well here in America, suppressing these
    voices only leads to an erosion of democracy, a hollowing out
    of society, and even an eruption of conflict. And as violence
    spreads across southeastern Turkey and into beautiful Istanbul,
    we are reminded of the delicate balance between security and
    liberty. Tragically, these are not isolated incidents. They
    serve to highlight the need for a path to peace in Turkey,
    Iraq, and Syria.
        So I too want, as the chairman indicated, send my
    condolences out to those who suffered losses at the recent
    attacks at the Turkish airport. We all looked with harrowing
    eyes as terror attacks took place there, and we wish and hope
    that the families--I know that they are undergoing tremendous
    loss and pain, and our prayers go up to them and their
    families.
        So I think that, Mr. Chairman, as I yield back to you, I
    hope that this hearing helps us to understand and bring a peace
    that is closer to our reality and help strengthen our
    relationship while we have some frank conversation and
    dialogue. I look forward to listening to the witnesses, because
    your testimony is important to me understanding and learning,
    and I think that, you know, those who are listening to this
    hearing, so that we can get information out, we can share and
    work together.
        Because the idea here is, when we have to be critical,
    let's be critical. But it is not just for the sake of being
    critical; it is for the sake of trying to make sure that we are
    all going to have a better tomorrow and better relationships
    between our countries and we can only do that with honest
    dialogue.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well said.
        Mr. Trott, do you have an opening statement?
        Mr. Trott. I would like to thank the chairman and ranking
    member for holding this timely and important hearing.
        I would also like to thank the witnesses for taking time to
    be here today.
        It seems like every time we try and hold Turkey accountable
    for their actions, their response is, but we are a NATO ally.
    Turkey certainly remains one of our allies, but that does not
    make them immune to honest and fair criticism. Turkey's
    insouciance to democracy and human rights under President
    Erdogan is disturbing.
        Just a couple days ago, Human Rights Watch reported that
    the Turkish Government is blocking independent investigations
    into alleged mass abuses against civilians across southeast
    Turkey. These abuses include heinous crimes like unlawful
    killings of civilians and mass force civilian displacement.
        I also remain concerned about the seizing of various
    Armenian churches in Turkey, including Surp Giragos in April.
    This is reminiscent of the events that led to the Armenian
    genocide over 100 years ago. And while I am discussing the
    genocide, I would like to applaud the German Parliament for
    overwhelmingly adopting a resolution calling the coordinated
    campaign to exterminate the Armenians in 1915 a genocide.
        All of us on this panel are lucky to be able to express our
    ideas freely and without fear of repercussions. Ordinary
    citizens and journalists in Turkey, however, do not have this
    privilege. Turkey remains one of the worst countries in the
    world when it comes to freedom of the press, and we got to see
    that firsthand in April when the President came to Brookings
    and his security repeatedly harassed, assaulted, and even
    reportedly tried to throw out media that they did not like.
        If this is how Erdogan's police act in Washington, one can
    only imagine how they act in Turkey. Mr. Chairman, Turkey's
    progress toward democracy is on a downward spiral. They are a
    country facing a myriad of issues, both domestically and
    internationally. Continuing down this disturbing path, when
    they are denying history, expropriating land, and severely
    restricting freedom of the speech, is not the answer.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Gabbard, do you have an opening statement?
        Let me just note that tomorrow I will be submitting a Sense
    of the House resolution based on today's testimony and some of
    the statements that you have heard in working with my
    colleagues, a Sense of the House resolution expressing concern
    about the direction of various societal trends and governmental
    trends in Turkey.
        And so today, I would invite my colleagues to, at the end
    of this hearing, work with me on developing that particular
    Sense of the House resolution.
        Now with that said, I would like to thank our witnesses for
    joining us today. We have three distinguished witnesses. Dr.
    Henri Barkey was the director of Middle East Program at the
    Woodrow Wilson Center here in Washington. Formally, he was a
    professor at Lehigh--is it Lehigh?--Lehigh University and
    authored several books on Turkey and Kurdish issues and served
    as a member of the State Department's policy planning staff.
        We have Dr.--I am really bad at names--Fevzi?
        Mr. Bilgin. Fevzi.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And----
        Mr. Bilgin. Fevzi Bilgin.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. There it is, okay. And is the founding
    president of Rethink Institute, a Washington-based think tank.
    He is an expert in the areas of constitutional and Turkish
    politics. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the
    University of Pittsburgh and has taught politics in both the
    United States and Turkey in addition to being a published
    author.
        And Alan Makovsky, I remember you. Makovsky, I have known
    that name before. There you go. A senior fellow at the Center
    for American Progress, a private think tank in Washington, DC.
    And from 2001 to 2013, he served as the senior professional
    member of staff here in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
    We were just reflecting on how neither one of us have changed
    over those 20 years. He helped us cover the Middle East and
    Turkey when he worked before us, and today he is here to,
    again, give us advice and some direction as to what our
    policies should be toward this situation now in Turkey.
        Before, of course, he did all this, he directed the
    Washington's Institute's Turkish research program and was an
    employee of the State Department.
        So we have three expert witnesses. And, Dr. Barkey, I would
    suggest we start with you. And I would request that, if we
    could, keep it down to about 5 minutes. All the rest of your
    statement will be part of the record for people to read, and if
    you could keep it down to the 5 minutes, we then could have a
    dialogue once all the witnesses have testified.
        Dr. Barkey.

      STATEMENT OF HENRI J. BARKEY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST
                       PROGRAM, THE WILSON CENTER

        Mr. Barkey. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member
    Meeks, and members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to
    testify today, and I ask that my written testimony be admitted
    into the record, please.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Without objection.
        Mr. Barkey. There is no question that when it comes to
    issues of free speech, due process, individual and civil
    rights, the situation in Turkey, has deteriorated significantly
    over the last 3 years. The atmosphere created by the ruling
    justice and development party and President Erdogan is not
    conducive to free discussion of ideas, policies, and politics.
        What I will try and do is give you essentially in bullet
    points what has happened and then try to offer you an
    explanation. First of all, you have all already alluded to the
    press. The press is under a tremendous pressure. It is a
    twofold sets of pressures: One is that you see journalists
    being fired, newspapers being closed, taken over, same thing
    happening to television stations, as well as social media. That
    is one aspect of it.
        The other aspect is that there is also simultaneously an
    attempt to build a parallel, if you want, press that is
    completely subservient to the President and the party. And it
    is essentially, when you look at that press on a daily basis,
    as I do, all you see is essentially the legal education of
    official propaganda, if you want, but most importantly, what
    you see is that there is no room for any discussion of any
    opposing ideas in that place.
        So the press is under enormous pressure, and it is not
    surprising that Freedom House has downgraded Turkey's status
    from partially free to not free, which is actually quite
    damning for a country that is a member of the NATO alliance.
        But the press is not the only one, and this is important to
    understand. Every institution of civil society in the State is
    also under attack with an effort to dominate. It is true for
    business associations. It is true for academia. Thirty-seven
    academics have been fired so far. But I know a lot of friends
    of mine who are under investigation, and more will be fired as
    time goes by, eventually to be replaced with people who are
    more conducive to the official position.
        Similarly, the judiciary is being revamped and to make it
    much closer to the government. Even individuals are not immune;
    1,845 individuals have been charged for insulting the
    President, some of the penalties are dire. So far nobody has
    gone to jail. And even former allies of Mr. Erdogan are under
    the same oppression.
        So why is this change? I mean, the interesting thing is
    that Mr. Erdogan and his party came to power, and in a
    paradoxical way it was the biggest and most important opening
    of the Turkish political system ever, since 1923, I would say.
    They came out against the military, they came out against
    traditional ruling elites, and for a while they ruled in that
    way.
        But they changed. They changed, I would argue, for two
    reasons: One is Mr. Erdogan has won victory after victory and
    he thinks he is invincible, but most importantly, he actually
    does feel vulnerable. He feels vulnerable because Turkish civil
    society is still quite dynamic, can resist, can disagree, and,
    as we saw in elections in 2015, actually defeat Mr. Erdogan.
    But Mr. Erdogan is the President not the Prime Minister. The
    Prime Minister has all the legal powers that the constitution
    gives, so he feels vulnerable in the Presidential powers, so to
    say.
        But fundamentally, I would argue, the real reason for the
    change is Mr. Erdogan's decision to not make peace with the
    Kurdish--the PKK and with the Kurds. In fact, he was making
    enormous progress in that direction, commendable progress. And
    he scuppered the peace negotiations after his own people had
    signed the document. And the reason he did it--and this also--
    we won't have time for this--but explains the changes in
    foreign policy. The reason he did it is because of the threat
    it perceives from the Syrian Kurds, in Syria, as the Syrian
    Kurds, who have aligned themselves with the United States, make
    progress and move against ISIS.
        In the process, what he is afraid of is that a Syrian
    Kurdish entity that is closely aligned with the Turkish Kurds
    will emerge and therefore pose a strategic threat to Turkey.
    And he decided--this is the reason why he decided to
    essentially go on that rampage against the press, against the
    Kurds.
        And in some ways, it also explains the changes that you see
    today in foreign policy because, as he finds himself isolated,
    he is trying to reconfigure his friendships, or so he thinks,
    with the idea that he will come up with a common, shall we say,
    cause against the Kurds.
        And I will stop here. The red light has gone on.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Barkey follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. Dr. Bilgin.

     STATEMENT OF FEVZI BILGIN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, RETHINK INSTITUTE

        Mr. Bilgin. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and
    the members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify before you today on Turkey's democratic decline. And I
    ask that my full written testimony be admitted into the record.
        It is fair to say that all the major political developments
    in Turkey in the last 5 years can be attributed to Recep Tayyip
    Erdogan's presidential aspirations. A de facto Turkish-style
    presidential system is already in place, where Erdogan appoints
    and dismisses Prime Ministers, shapes the cabinet, packs the
    court in bureaucracy with sworn loyalists.
        The final step is to make a constitutional amendment that
    will set the new regime in stone. Freedom of speech and freedom
    of press is under fire. Thousands of journalists were already
    fired since 2013. There is no mainstream media left, only a few
    daring but small outlets for dissent. Independent media outlets
    are seized or censured, and social media is routinely blocked.
        An important casualty of the Erdogan's political
    aspirations and Turkey's democratic decline is the community
    known as the Gulen or Hizmet movement. The government has
    targeted the movement especially since the outbreak of the
    corruption scandal in Turkey in December 2013.
        According to Erdogan and his lieutenants, the corruption
    allegations brought forward were, in fact, an insidious attempt
    to topple the AKP government. They claim that this was
    orchestrated by Gulen movement affiliates nested in the
    judiciary and police forces. The Gulen movement on the other
    hand has vehemently denied these allegations, calling them
    baseless accusations serving to cover up the corruption.
        The movement essentially is a faith-based network of
    individuals, organizations, institutions, inspired by the ideas
    of Turkish-Islamic scholar Fethullah Gulen, who is now residing
    in the United States. It subscribes to a moderate, Sufi version
    of Islam, along with emphasis on interfaith dialogue.
        In Turkey, the movement established private high schools in
    every town, mostly which became nationally ranked institutions.
    Graduates of these schools moved onto both the public and
    private sectors, many joined the government bureaucracy. The
    movement also launched influential media outlets in Turkey. The
    network showed noticeable efficiency, dynamism, defying the
    traditionally introverted and subdued culture of Turkish
    conservatism.
        However, the movement quickly overreached itself in Turkey.
    The sheer size of the network exposed it to the ill intentions
    of those who sought influence and leverage. A penchant for high
    politics in some circles seemingly undermined the message of
    tolerance and inclusion that characterizes the larger movement.
        The media affiliated with the movement, on the other hand,
    while promoting democratization, demilitarization of politics,
    and EU membership, alienated the foes of the AKP government,
    which in better days was pursuing those very same objectives.
    The reputation of the movement media was also tainted when they
    under-emphasized the irregularities and misconduct during the
    coup trials several years ago of military officers,
    journalists, and academics.
        The movement in Turkey now faces blanket persecution.
    According to the news, state news agency, as of July 2016, more
    than 4,000 individuals have been detained and about 1,000 have
    been sent to jail. The detainees are from all walks of life and
    include businessmen, doctors, teachers, journalists, academics,
    philanthropists, and even housewives. In addition, the
    government is taking over privatized schools and colleges, and
    charity organizations that were established by the movement
    participants.
        Businesses that have financially supported those
    initiatives are seized on a daily basis. Many have had to flee
    the country to avoid detention. The remaining hundreds of
    thousands of individuals that are ordinary citizens dedicated
    to education, charity, and service, and unrelated to the so-
    called political struggle are awaiting their fate. The
    movement-affiliated media has been subjected to a violent and
    illegal takeover, including the highly circulated ``Zaman'' and
    ``Bugun'' newspapers, and several TV stations, resulting in the
    firing of thousands.
        As an annual report published by the U.S. Department of
    State attests, Turkish courts have been going through political
    pressure in the last few years. As a result, people in the
    movement, as well as other dissidents, will not have a chance
    to stand a fair trial, despite very serious accusations leveled
    against them.
        Human Rights Watch stated that the persecutions for
    membership of an alleged Fethullah Gulen terrorist organization
    are ongoing, although there is no evidence to date that the
    Gulen movement has engaged in violence or other activities that
    could reasonably be described as terrorism. But the lack of
    evidence of criminal activity did not prevent the government
    from designating the movement as a terrorist organization. This
    move allows the government to implement harsher antiterrorism
    laws for Gulen movement cases.
        The Turkish Government also continues to harass the
    movement outside Turkey. The foreign governments are pressured
    to shut down schools and other institutions affiliated with the
    movement in their countries. The Turkish Government has long
    sought Gulen's extradition to Turkey from the United States.
    Thus, they launched a litigation campaign against the movements
    affiliates in the United States, and most recently, a U.S.
    Federal judge dismissed such a lawsuit in Pennsylvania.
        And thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Bilgin follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. You are next.

       STATEMENT OF MR. ALAN MAKOVSKY, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
                           AMERICAN PROGRESS

        Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the
    subcommittee, it is an honor for me to testify before you
    today. As you said in your introduction, I worked here for 12
    years as a staffer, from 2001 to 2013. And knowing the----
        Mr. Meeks. Is your mike on?
        Mr. Makovsky. Oh, I am sorry. Now it is.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. You should have known that more than
    anybody.
        Mr. Makovsky. I have never been on this side of the table
    before, sir. I was always a quiet staffer in the background.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Go ahead Alan.
        Mr. Makovsky. Anyway, I just wanted to say that as a former
    staffer and knowing the great importance accorded hearings such
    as these, I am deeply privileged to have been invited to
    testify and I thank you.
        I respectfully request that my written testimony, as
    submitted, be entered into the record.
        And I would like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in the
    condolences you offered to the Turkish people on the June 28
    attack on the Ataturk Airport.
        The title of this hearing, ``Turkey's Democratic Decline,''
    sets out the problem: Turkey's democracy, never as good as it
    should have been, is indeed rapidly deteriorating. On virtually
    every front, media, judiciary, political governance, Kurdish
    rights, private business, universities, as my colleagues here
    have all detailed, freedom is diminishing and power is being
    concentrated in President Erdogan's hands. Arguably not since
    the death of Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and
    certainly not since the advent of free elections in Turkey in
    1950, has one man held so much power in the Turkish system.
        President Erdogan's primary focus, perhaps more correctly
    his obsession these days, is to formalize a Presidency-based
    system in Turkey in place of the longstanding parliamentary
    system. His second and third-ranking priorities, probably in
    that order, are ridding Turkey of any Gulenist influence, real
    or imagined, and defeating the PKK and, related to that,
    quashing any Kurdish movement for collective rights.
        Certainly, because of the horrific terrorism staged by ISIS
    over the past year in Turkey, I have no doubt that fighting
    ISIS has also become more of a priority for Turkey, and Turkish
    officials now speak of the importance of fighting ISIS and the
    PKK simultaneously. But I don't believe that President Erdogan
    yet sees ISIS as quite as serious a threat to his power and to
    Turkey as he sees the Gulenists and the PKK.
        I know there is already a lot of overlap in this testimony,
    and I don't want to do another catalogue of all the human
    rights abuses. Let me throw out, on freedom of the press, yet
    another NGO's report. Reporters Without Borders, in its 2016
    World Press Freedom Index, actually ranks Turkey just 151st out
    of 180 countries--three slots behind Russia, by the way. So it
    is not a positive record. Another study has said that 70
    percent of the Turkish print media, and a similar portion of
    the electronic media, is now a mouthpiece of the government,
    either owned directly or slavishly supportive of the
    government.
        I know my time is rapidly diminishing here, so maybe--look,
    you know, I would like to say a little more about what is going
    on with the Kurds. I think----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. You have time. Please do.
        Mr. Makovsky. Ranking Member Meeks, you very specifically
    in the last hearing in February--you talked about the
    importance of dialogue today and you analogized it to the civil
    rights movement in this country, which I am certainly old
    enough to remember and to have been a small part of.
        Look, I think what is going on--the assault on the Kurds in
    the southeast is a terrible mistake. The PKK is not blameless.
    It was a mistake for them to declare autonomy in various zones,
    to goad the Turks. It was a mistake for them to build up their
    weapons during the ceasefire.
        But the response of the Turkish military, I think, has
    really caused tremendous destruction, dislocation that at one
    point created several hundred thousand displaced persons within
    Turkey. That fact got very little publicity. And we saw some of
    the pictures, such as from Cizre that reminded us of pictures
    from Kobani. Again, I don't think the PKK is blameless, but I
    think the approach that Turkey has taken is completely wrong
    and has alienated the Kurdish population and made it more
    difficult to enter into that dialogue that you spoke about.
        In my written testimony, I speak a bit about what the
    future should be of U.S.-Turkish relations. And I don't have
    time--I don't know if I have time to just quickly list a couple
    of the principles, but----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. We will get it in the questions. There you
    go.
        Mr. Makovsky. Okay. I will be happy to end it there. Thank
    you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. My first question is, what were
    you just going to say?
        Mr. Makovsky. Well, first and foremost, Turkey has always
    been an ally valued for its strategic location, which has been
    the center-piece of our bilateral relationship. The more
    pressing our need for access to Turkish bases, most famously
    Incirlik Air Force Base, the greater Turkey's leverage in our
    bilateral relationship.
        And of course, when we are fighting a war, as we are now
    against ISIS, that need for access is quite pressing. It can be
    tempting therefore not to say much publicly about Turkey's
    democratic shortcomings out of concern that Ankara's response
    will be to deny us access.
        It is important to do our best not to give in to that
    temptation, lest we appear cynical about our own values, lest
    we de-spirit those many Turks who look to us for support on
    legitimate issues of freedom. At the same time, when we
    criticize, we should criticize as a friend, as you said, Mr.
    Chairman, not as an antagonist.
        Perhaps we might think of the following principles: First
    of all, we should be fully supportive of Turkey regarding
    external threats. I think it was a mistake for us to withdraw
    Patriots from southern Turkey last fall just as the Russian
    buildup in Syria was starting. I think we should make more port
    visits in the Mediterranean, as I have heard requested from
    Turkish officials.
        Second of all, we should be supportive in principle, as we
    already are, of Turkey's right to defend itself against the
    PKK, which is on our terrorism list because it has killed
    civilians.
        But the Turkish assault on several cities and towns in its
    southeast, as I said, has created mass suffering and deep
    alienation that only complicates Turkey's relations with its
    Kurdish population now and in the future. We should speak out
    strongly against abuses of freedom of the press and politically
    motivated arrests in Turkey. I know President Obama and Vice
    President Biden have made important gestures in that regard
    this year.
        And thirdly, we should also strongly support the right of
    the Kurds to cultural freedom and democratic expression. That
    means speaking out about all Turkish Government efforts to
    quash the Kurdish movement by criminalizing freedom of speech,
    removing the Kurdish presence in Parliament, again, as we have
    heard already, and by using excessive force that amounts to
    collective punishment.
        If I could, Mr. Chairman, just quickly add, I do think we
    have to prepare for a better day also. I know that NDI and IRI
    have some important freedom-supporting programs in Turkey, and
    I think it is important that those be supported.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. We will note that. And I think that it is
    always important for us when we are dealing with a country that
    has been so close to us, and such a friend, that whenever there
    are some very noticeable areas of conflict where we disagree
    now and we are not operating, that we make sure we do our very
    best to confront those issues in a way that will facilitate
    more friendship rather than driving a country away. And that is
    hopefully what we are doing today.
        Where does the panel come down on this, the fact that
    Turkey now has apologized to Russia on shooting down the plane?
    Let me just note that I was horrified that they shot the plane
    down in the first place, and now they are apologizing for it.
    What is that all about? And what is all this about where we
    have--Turkey has made very, how do you say, hostile moves
    toward Israel in the last few years and now it seems to be
    reaching out to go the opposite direction. What is the take of
    the panel on those two things, Doctor?
        Mr. Barkey. Well, first of all, I would say that in the
    Russia case it was very clear that they had made a huge mistake
    and they had paid a very big price economically with the
    collapse of tourism. Tourism collapsed because of the violence
    and the terrorism but also because of the Russians.
        The deal with Israel is actually more interesting. I don't
    think it is a real warming up of relations. It is more
    cosmetic. But fundamentally, it is not about improving
    diplomatic relations but it is about gas. Eventually, the Turks
    want--and the Israelis also very much are pushing for a gas
    pipeline from the Israeli gas fields, which will go through
    Cyprus and then to Europe. And, in fact, there is a way in
    which this is a good sign, because that means that maybe the
    Cyprus is--there will be a deal in Cyprus, that we will be
    moving toward a Cyprus settlement.
        But the unfortunate aspect of this is that this charm
    offensive has, especially with Syria now, has another downside.
    It has a major downside to it. And it is possible that he is--
    Erdogan is going to double down on the PYD in Syria and on the
    PKK in Turkey in a way in which he--Erdogan sees the PYD as
    essentially the most important threat to Turkey, because he
    thinks because the PYD is a creation of the PKK, that you will
    have essentially a front, a Kurdish front.
        Paradoxically, the Turks, who used to be very opposed to
    the KRG, to the Iraqi Kurdish movement, are now very close to
    it. They could have done the same thing with the PYD. The PYD
    was looking to establish relationship with the Turks. But for
    Erdogan, he made a strategic decision, and all this charm
    offensive now, all this moving on, I fear, is for a doubling
    down on the anti-PYD policy.
        And I think that is going to be problematic for us given
    the fact that we have now a relatively robust alliance with the
    PYD in fighting against ISIS. And that is the thing we need to
    watch, I think, much more carefully than anything else which
    have immediate repercussions.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. My time is used up now, and we will have a
    second round.
        Mr. Meeks.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for your testimony.
        And I just want to see if I can get some further
    understanding domestically what is going. And you are right, as
    I was trying to identify in the past, talking about some of the
    lessons learned from us in the United States and what has taken
    place, it is the prism from which I work.
        So for example, when someone tells me that the Turks are
    trying to pack the court, I don't get too upset at that because
    we are trying to pack the courts here also, you know. That has
    been the big issue here, who is going to win this election so
    that the Supreme Court--it makes a difference. So that I am not
    upset about.
        But I am upset about when there are journalists and others
    who want to express what their views are and that they are
    incarcerated as a result of that. And/or when there is the big
    debate, which my question is now, that is taking place about
    constitutional reform process of which I am not clear on.
        So I know that there is some renewed talks about the
    constitutional reform process. I know it took place there
    prior, in 2012, and things broke down. So my question is, where
    are we now, and what is at stake in regards to this dialogue
    internally in the prospects for greater instability internally
    in Turkey, and how will that affect us as an ally?
        Mr. Bilgin. Well, let me just interject here. The
    constitutional reform is an important aspect of the last really
    several years of Turkish politics, as I mentioned, that it has
    all started with Erdogan's presidential aspirations.
    Technically, nobody understands why presidentialism is needed
    in Turkey.
        But the first attempt to reform constitution in 2012
    collapsed because of that interjection of presidentialism as an
    AKP proposal. And, now after that, several other elections that
    AKP and Erdogan won and now it is on the table again. And what
    is being demanded or what is being aimed is to build a regime,
    which is called presidential regime, but in actuality it is a
    one-man rule where, you know, somebody will be an elected
    autocrat with unbridled executive power. That is what it will
    end up with, and that is why it is very controversial.
        So the system is parliamentary system at the moment. And
    normally, as we heard before, the Prime Minister is the
    executive, chief executive of the government. But there was
    just a switch of Prime Ministers last month, and everybody
    forgot about that already, I think, because everybody knows who
    is pulling the threads.
        And people are afraid, are concerned that, you know, as
    Erdogan--as powerful as he is now, how is he going to be when
    he is an elected President with all these powers. So that is a
    major concern. And the timeline goes, either we need a
    constitutional amendment in the Parliament or a referendum.
        Mr. Meeks. Let me just ask then maybe, Mr. Barkey, given
    that--could there be--if, you know, there is talk about a
    constitutional reform process, you know, could it be a fair
    election or not? I mean, I have recently just seen what took
    place in the U.K, whether they are going to, you know, stay
    into the EU or not. But that seemed to be an open and a fair
    election.
        So are you saying that there cannot be an open and fair
    expression of the people of Turkey, that it will be so weighted
    down because of the heavy handedness of Mr. Erdogan that it
    won't be transparent and clear? Is that----
        Mr. Barkey. Look, in Turkey, historically, elections have
    been clean and people have enormous amount of trust in the
    electoral process. But for the first time now, that faith in
    the electoral system is disappearing very quickly, and it is
    clear now that you will not get fair elections anymore. There
    are enough people who are now saying that the system is rigged.
        The AKP gets enormous amount of money from contributions
    from businesses that get funneled so that it can use for
    elective purposes. The difficulty with press is completely
    controlled now. [Microphone off.] You have 70 percent of that
    being even higher, but by the government and its allies,
    therefore you cannot have free elections or should we say fair
    elections. Free elections, yes, but fair elections, which is
    really contrary to--since 1950 a process of free and fair
    elections.
        Mr. Meeks. My last question on this round then would be,
    would you say that is the fact that the outside, what is going
    on in Syria, what is going on with the PKK, what is going on
    with the PYD, does that have an effect domestically also on
    whether or not the Turkish people allow, you know--well, the
    authoritarian policies to increase that it seems to be
    happening now in regards to Mr. Erdogan?
        Mr. Barkey. Well, unquestionably. Whenever you have--you
    can pose the PKK, the Kurdish threat as an alien threat, and
    that allows you to clamp down obviously on freedom of speech;
    therefore, that affects the elections, I mean, by definition.
    And if you go to the southeast, I mean, in the Kurdish areas,
    you have this amazing military presence, you have this amazing
    oppression that you see.
        So yes, I mean, the notion of--plus people have been
    displaced, 500,000 people have been displaced. When are they
    going to vote? How are they going to vote? Are they going to be
    able to vote? What happens to the Syrian refugees? Will they be
    able to vote? I mean, there is all these things now going on
    that has undermined people's confidence in the electoral
    process.
        Mr. Meeks. I have a question for you in the next round.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Trott.
        Mr. Trott. Thank you, Chairman.
        My questions are to the entire panel, and anyone can feel
    free to opine. I wonder if anyone could give me insight into
    what the status of the Armenian churches that were seized by
    the Turkish Government and what the status of the churches are
    at this point.
        Mr. Makovsky. Congressman, the only one that I am
    personally familiar with--maybe my colleagues know more--is the
    one that is located in the Sur district of Diyarbakir. Right
    now the whole district is essentially closed, so no one can
    have access to the church, including worshipers.
        Mr. Trott. Okay. Thank you.
        With respect to the Muslim brotherhood, so they have been
    shunned by much of the Middle East, but the President has
    chosen to embrace them and is still controlling channels on
    television. What is the reason behind that, and why shouldn't
    we be concerned by that?
        Mr. Bilgin. The Muslim brothers, there was a support for
    Muslim brothers, it was a part of a general policy of the
    Turkey's Middle East policy to basically support these
    opposition elements that kind of seem a little--look like AKP.
    And now, as you said, some Equfan elements were residing in
    Turkey. And now it seems that Turkey's ready to make a shift
    again, making a peace with General Sisi so that it is likely
    that they will be kicked out soon, I mean, of Turkey.
        Mr. Barkey. I don't think ideologically that Mr. Erdogan
    has changed his mind about the Muslim brotherhood. I think he
    is very sympathetic to them. He is very quick on his feet. I
    mean, he changes policies when those policies don't work for
    him, and clearly he has decided now a rapprochement with Egypt
    and with Israel, given that Hamas is also part of the
    brotherhood is convenient for him.
        But I would say that fundamentally, in terms of where his
    loyalties and where his preferences lie, they are with the
    Muslim brotherhood. So what you will see is probably policies
    of dissimulation other than real change when it comes to this
    issue.
        Mr. Makovsky. Just as a historical matter, when the Sisi
    takeover happened, it was in the middle of major demonstrations
    going on in Turkey. I think it brought out Erdogan's paranoia,
    both in terms of his fear that something immediate from these
    demonstrations might happen and also based on Turkey's history.
    I think he has always been concerned about the possibility of a
    military coup.
        And so I think that is what it reflected. But I do agree
    with Henri that I don't think we are likely to see him change
    his spots anytime soon. And I am skeptical that things will
    move forward on relations with Egypt anytime soon. His foreign
    minister has talked about it, but Erdogan made some very strong
    anti-Sisi statements after the foreign minister spoke.
        Mr. Trott. Thank you.
        And then lastly, with respect to Turkey's priorities in
    Syria, and how do they align with the United States and where
    do they diverge generally?
        Mr. Barkey. Well, they have--at the beginning, we were on
    the same page. We both thought that Assad would leave in 6
    months. When that failed and when the opposition failed to come
    up with serious resistance to Assad, you saw Turkey's support
    for Jabhat al-Nusra increase. And this came to a boil in 2013
    when President Erdogan visited the White House. He was
    confronted with that. He was asked to stop supporting Jabhat
    al-Nusra.
        The problem is that in the process of supporting Jabhat al-
    Nusra, a major infrastructure of jihadist supporters was
    created in Turkey, who funneled people and arms to Jabhat al-
    Nusra with government support but also people who went to ISIS.
        But where we are now today, for us, priority number one is
    ISIS; for Erdogan it is the PYD then Assad, and then ISIS. So
    in that sense, in there, we are not on the same page. For him,
    both the PYD and Assad, even though he is talking about
    overtures to Assad, are far more important and far more than
    the jihadist threat.
        Mr. Makovsky. Just to elaborate a bit, I agree on the
    divergences. His primary focus is the Syrian Kurds and Assad.
    Ours is defeating ISIS. He wouldn't mind if ISIS is defeated in
    the process, but it is not his priority.
        Second of all, and I think it is the number one issue in
    U.S.-Turkish relations right now, is the fact that we are
    working closely with the YPG, with the Syrian Kurds, which he
    considers part of the PKK. And indeed, he has some reason to
    see their origins in the PKK. And from his point of view, it is
    U.S. support for a terrorism group.
        And, as I say, I noticed in a respected Turkish polling
    company survey this month, Metropoll, 73 percent of Turks said
    that the U.S. sides with terrorists against Turkey. It is a
    very disturbing kind of answer, but I am certain that what it
    is about is this disagreement about the YPG.
        Mr. Bilgin. Yeah. Congressman, despite repeated bombings
    committed by ISIS in Turkey, an enormous threat that is posed
    by the domestic operatives, which may number to like in
    thousands, so far very few ISIS members were arrested and no
    one has been convicted out of terrorism or something so far. So
    this is kind of unbelievable basically, given the fact that,
    you know, Turkey has been bombed like one after another, latest
    in Istanbul Airport. Maybe Istanbul Airport may change the
    situation.
        Mr. Trott. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. And now Ms. Gabbard.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Makovsky, your last comment about the poll is
    interesting, because as we look at Dr. Barkey's comments about
    Turkey arming and directly aiding al-Nusra, which is an al-
    Qaeda affiliate, this goes to the crux of the question of our
    relationship with Turkey, as our number one priority is, and
    should be, defeating ISIS, al-Qaeda, and these other jihadist
    groups. Turkey is directly and has indirectly been supporting
    them now for years.
        So, you know, each of you in your opening remarks spoke
    about Turkey's democratic shortcomings, lack of freedom of the
    press, lack of due process, freedom of speech, individual and
    civil rights violations. We saw last year how the election went
    and really how the process was manipulated to benefit Erdogan.
        We see a direct contradiction in Syria with Erdogan's
    continued fixation on getting rid of Assad, bombing the Kurds
    who have been without dispute our most loyal, dependable
    partners on the ground fighting against ISIS. Turkey's actions
    have directly strengthened groups like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and al-
    Nusra.
        The question is, you know, Turkey is a NATO partner and
    they claim to be an ally. When you look at all of these issues,
    both with democratic values as well as objectives that are
    directly counterproductive to ours and threaten our security,
    how can you make the argument for NATO--for Turkey to maintain
    its status as an ally?
        And the follow-up to that is, do you see the current
    government--do you see a path forward for Turkey being capable
    of or even interested in changing their policy so that they can
    actually truly be an ally and a partner?
        Mr. Barkey. This is the $64,000 question. It depends a
    little bit on the position we take in U.S. Government. Look, I
    spent time in U.S. Government and I follow U.S. policy
    carefully. We tend to always shy away of pushing very hard with
    the Turks.
        Because we are always afraid that because we have so many
    issues on a daily basis, Turkish and American bureaucrats talk
    on 1,000 different issues. We are very close allies, and there
    is a constituency for this alliance in Turkey.
        But the problem, I think, is that before Erdogan and with
    Erdogan, we have very early stood our line. Let me just say,
    look at Putin. Not that I want to place Putin here. But he
    stood his ground with Erdogan and Erdogan had to essentially
    capitulate. It reminds me what an Arab diplomat told me in
    Iraq, this year, he said, we hate what Putin does, but we love
    the way he does it.
        Ms. Gabbard. Can I just ask you a follow-up. You said we
    have very rarely, if ever, stood our ground against Turkey.
        Mr. Barkey. Right.
        Ms. Gabbard. What is this source of this great fear that
    would cause the United States of America to cower in fear and
    not standing our ground?
        Mr. Barkey. Look, there is always the basis. There is the
    NATO relationship. There is the ability of--I mean, we are too
    integrated with Turkey. And in general, the bureaucracy is very
    much afraid.
        The decision to support the Kurds, in Syria, at the time of
    Kobani, was taken by the President against the position of
    his--the State Department and the White House allies--aides,
    right. They were saying, oh, the Turks will be very upset. He
    did it. And look at the benefits because the Turks were not
    opening the bases to the U.S. until then. Once they realized
    that we were aligning ourselves with the YPG, suddenly they
    opened the bases.
        So there is a way in which we can send Erdogan a message.
    Look, if Turkey is an ally, even if Erdogan is problematic,
    even if there are lots of people in Turkey--but at the core,
    this is a long-term relationship which we have not known how to
    manage well.
        Mr. Makovsky. I think the reason for U.S. reticence is
    because Turkey is such a strategic ally, because of its
    location.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Is your mike on?
        Mr. Makovsky. It is.
        I think we have been concerned that if we speak out, that
    we will lose access to important assets like Incirlik Air Force
    Base. And I think that is what has inhibited us. Just the same
    way the EU, which used to be the strongest advocate of human
    rights in Turkey, has largely been silenced because of its
    concern about the refugee issue and Turkey's ability to
    manipulate that.
        I think we have been, over the years, concerned about
    Turkey's ability to manipulate our access to what is, after
    all, its sovereign territory, Incirlik Air Force Base and other
    facilities. I think we do have to consider--I hope this is
    going on somewhere in the government--whether there are other
    assets in the region that at least over the long term could be
    employed in the way that Incirlik is now, almost solely is in
    Turkey, and so that we could lessen our dependence on Turkey.
        You asked will they change? I don't think that is the
    trend. I think the trend is toward greater independence, partly
    because if you look at the whole history of our alliance with
    Turkey, it has been one of growing Turkish independence. They
    started off as a very impoverished Third World country and now
    they are an upper middle income country, as classified by the
    World Bank. So there has been a normal trend whatever the
    government.
        Second of all, you have a government which is right now--
    which is very critical of us, and of the West, and has shown
    very anti U.S. reflexes. I don't think we are going to get--I
    don't think we are going to see any change under this
    government.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Weber.
        Mr. Weber. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, can we turn the air-
    conditioner down or on? Apparently this is a hot topic. Gosh,
    where do we start? Mr. Makovsky.
        Mr. Makovsky. It is fine. Alan would be sufficient.
        Mr. Weber. You don't care what we call you, just call you
    for dinner.
        So you said something about the Syrian--his main concern--
    Erdogan's, was the Syrian Kurds, was it ISIL or Assad you said?
        Mr. Markolsky. Erdogan's main concern?
        Mr. Weber. Correct.
        Mr. Markolsky. Erdogan's main concern right now is the
    Syrian Kurdish movement.
        Mr. Weber. Okay.
        Mr. Makovsky. But closely related to that, it is getting
    rid of Assad.
        Mr. Weber. It is Assad.
        Mr. Makovsky. Assad, yeah. And that is really--the Syrian
    Kurdish problem is something new, but our divergence over
    whether it should be Assad or ISIL as a priority has been going
    now for several years.
        Mr. Weber. Okay. And I came in late, so some of this may be
    redundant. Forgive me. One of you said, and I think it was you
    that said a respectable poling institution in Turkey was
    Metropoll?
        Mr. Makovsky. Yes.
        Mr. Weber. Give me the results of that poll again.
        Mr. Makovsky. Yes, they asked--I am getting this
    approximately right, in the fight with terrorism, who do
    Western countries like the U.S. and Germany side with, Turkey
    or the terrorists? And 73 percent said----
        Mr. Weber. This was in Turkey?
        Mr. Makovsky. Yes.
        Mr. Weber. Inside Turkey?
        Mr. Makovsky. Yes. Seventy-three percent said the West side
    with the terrorists.
        Mr. Weber. So much of I am reading is about how he has done
    away with opponents, starting with Fethullah Gulen and the
    press, and he has, you know, put a lot of them in prison. He
    just seems to oppress everybody who disagrees with him. How
    does this polling organization get to apply its trade about him
    with them under his thumb?
        Mr. Makovsky. Well, I think there are still pockets of
    independent expression in Turkey. As far as I am aware, these
    polls are done independently. I could see why you might think
    from that question that it was manipulated, but if you went
    through the whole survey you might not think that.
        Mr. Weber. Okay. So, so far you don't believe that they are
    under his thumb?
        Mr. Makovsky. This particular polling company? Look, I
    don't think so because they called the 2015 elections
    essentially correctly. I think they have shown themselves over
    the years to be essentially----
        Mr. Weber. Okay. Over how many years?
        Mr. Makovsky. Well, they have been at it that I have been
    aware of for at least, I think, a dozen years.
        Mr. Weber. He has let them continue even in that length of
    time?
        Mr. Makovsky. Yes. I mean people say different things about
    these polling companies whether they are closer to or further
    from the regime. People do not currently say that this polling
    company is close to the regime.
        Mr. Weber. Okay. Okay, fair enough. I think you said in
    your comments one of you did, I have been reading through the
    comments that he probably more closely wanted a Putin style
    system.
        Mr. Makovsky. That was me.
        Mr. Weber. That was you, okay. And then you also said I
    think it was Dr. Barkey that Turkey has been busy, or maybe it
    was in response to my colleague down on the left, from Hawaii,
    that Turkey has been arming al-Nusrah.
        Mr. Barkey. Was.
        Mr. Weber. When did that stop?
        Mr. Barkey. It is not completely clear. I mean we asked
    them in 2013 to stop, but it took a while for them to stop. But
    it is a lot of informal networks that are independent of the
    government that still continue to support both al-Nusrah and
    ISIS. I mean when you think of the bombing in Istanbul the
    other day, it could not have happen if they did not have
    domestic help.
        Mr. Weber. Right.
        Mr. Barkey. But that is not the government. That is
    networks that were created at some time, at some point with the
    government.
        Mr. Weber. But if the government turns a blind eye he is so
    busy after the news stations and the people like the Gulen and
    others, then those who are perpetrating this kind of violence
    kind of run amok, doesn't they?
        This is a question for all three of you really, are there
    any other countries that you know of NATO, EU or in the United
    Nations, who you see this kind of power grab going on in any
    other country? Power grab, in other words, where they are
    shutting down the press, they are dealing with all the
    dissidents, they are----
        Mr. Barkey. Unfortunately the list is quite long.
        Mr. Weber. Okay. Nothing in the list is quite long of
    people or countries?
        Mr. Barkey. Countries. I mean, of leaders in countries
    where you see this.
        Mr. Weber. You see this same kind of action that you see
    from Erdogan in other countries. Name one.
        Mr. Barkey. Hungary.
        Mr. Weber. Hungary. There is one. Name two.
        Mr. Bilgen. Venezuela during Chavez.
        Mr. Weber. Venezuela, okay. Don't miss my question. In the
    EU, in the U.N. or in--NATO, EU or U.N., any of those
    countries?
        Mr. Barkey. U.N. includes everybody so you can go Zimbabwe,
    you can go Ethiopia. There is a whole series of countries. You
    are not going to run out of countries.
        Mr. Weber. This level of corruption you would equate those?
        Mr. Barkey. Yes.
        Mr. Weber. That is interesting.
        Mr. Bilgen. There is rising trend of authoritarianism in
    the world at the moment too. So that means Turkey is part of
    that, it extends even to Hungary, which is part of the European
    Union.
        Mr. Weber. So you all's testimony today is that you don't
    put Turkey at the top of that. You can equate those with other
    countries.
        Mr. Makovsky. I think, Congressman, if I could----
        Mr. Weber. Yes, this is a question for all three.
        Mr. Makovsky. I think that the Reporters Without Borders
    ranking that I mentioned is very useful in that regard. There
    is no other NATO or EU country listed below Turkey. They listed
    them 151st out of the 180----
        Mr. Weber. Yeah, three behind Russia. I came in late so I
    didn't hear you testimony.
        Mr. Makovsky. That is correct, three behind Russia.
        Mr. Weber. Three behind Russia
        Mr. Makovsky. Yes.
        I am not an expert on Hungary and no doubt I have read
    enough about it to know though there are some authoritarian
    trends going on there, but in Turkey I think it has reached
    very severe proportions, particularly recently with new laws
    that will increase his power over the judiciary and possibly
    over private enterprise as well.
        Mr. Weber. Okay. And Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. If you
    are in a hurry I have one other question.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Go right ahead.
        Mr. Weber. Actually, I have three other questions, since
    you opened the door. He was easy, wasn't he?
        So there was a 16-year-old in one of your notes, a 16-year-
    old boy, who called him a criminal or something? A 15-year-old
    boy?
        Mr. Makovsky. A thief, 16.
        Mr. Weber. A 16-year-old called Erdogan a thief and he
    wound up in jail. What is his status?
        Mr. Makovsky. He was released. If I recall correctly, he
    was never--it never actually came to trial, but I believe he
    was held in jail for 4 days.
        Mr. Weber. Are the two of you aware of that case?
        Mr. Makovsky. Yes. Am I right, 4 days?
        Mr. Bilgen. Yes.
        Mr. Barkey. I don't know that case. I know----
        Mr. Weber. You don't know that case. So from what you heard
    Mr. Makovsky say is that a travesty?
        Mr. Barkey. Oh, yes. I mean 1,825 people have been
    prosecuted for insulting the President.
        Mr. Weber. Eighteen-hundred forty-five--now I also read a
    quote where who was it, Erdogan said to the Organization of
    Islamic Cooperation meeting in Istanbul, and you may have
    quoted this Mr. Makovsky so forgive me if it is redundant, he
    said that Westerners, quote, deg. ``Look like friends
    but they want us,'' speaking about Muslims, ``dead. They like
    seeing our children die.'' Is that on video?
        Mr. Makovsky. That is a good question. I have not seen it.
    I read it in the Turkish press, in both Turkish and English.
    The English quote that I used came from the Turkish press--the
    English-language Turkish press. But I don't know whether it's
    on video or not.
        Mr. Weber. And does----
        Mr. Makovsky. Could I add?
        Mr. Weber. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Makovsky. On the issue of the article 299 which
    criminalizes insulting the Presidency, I thought maybe, if I
    could, just quickly give you a little context. That is not an
    Erdogan creation. That has been there since the 1920s. That law
    has been forever in the books, but it does seem that Erdogan
    has used it far more frequently than any other President. And
    just as a point of comparison--and this is based on another NGO
    study--his predecessor used it 139 times. His predecessor save
    one, 26 times. He has been using it an average of over three
    times a day, through March 1st. That 1,845 figure was through
    March 1st and that is the Turkish Government figure.
        Mr. Weber. Thank you very much for your answer.
        Mr. Chairman I yield back.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. It is th intent of the chair to
    have a sound round. And I will proceed.
        And let me just note so far, and what we came into this
    room understanding, there seems to be a very negative trend
    going on in Turkey. We have tried we had several hearings,
    trying our best to reach out and try to let the people of
    Turkey know, the Government of Turkey know that the United
    States and the people of United States are grateful for the
    friendship that they have shown and really are grateful for the
    role that Turkey has played over the last several decades.
    However, that trend is very easy to see. There is a cycle of
    tyranny and a cycle of radicalization that seems to be going on
    in Turkey that is frightening about where that could lead.
        Take a look at what has happened in Pakistan, another
    country that is strategically located, a friend of ours in the
    cold war, and what has happened in Pakistan? You have a vicious
    radicalization with various elements in their society in which
    you have terrorists--a home base for terrorism, not only in
    their own country where they are repressing their people with
    radical Islamists, but also engaging in terrorist acts that
    might even be traced to the Istanbul airport for all we know,
    because they have been immersed in this.
        But yet trying to reach out--we still give aid to Pakistan,
    even though they are doing this stuff. So I do not believe that
    what was happening in Turkey is going to lead to a dramatic
    departure of our relations, but it might evolve into something
    that is a nightmare like as what has happened in Pakistan and
    our relations today.
        Let me ask this question of the panel, does anyone on the
    panel have any information about, or believe, that Turkey was
    involved with taking weapons from Libya and sending them to
    Syria? Does anyone on the panel know anything about that? I am
    just probing here.
        Mr. Makovsky. I have heard that charge made, but I----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. But nobody has direct
    information about it?
        Let me just note that there are other--it would be a
    disaster for us to lose Turkey as a military partner, but there
    are other countries around that have air bases in that region.
    I mean Erbil itself could serve as a base for military
    operations so that Kuwait and any number of countries right
    there could provide what now is provided by Turkey. What would
    be bad is to make sure the dynamics that are created by such a
    large country with significant resources and people going in
    the wrong direction.
        So with that, let me ask this, and one of the things that I
    find just--it is hard for me to understand this but it has
    happened in other countries as well, and that is when you have
    the President of this country, but now the permanent Prime
    Minister, now the President whatever you want to call him, his
    whole political base was established with a Gulen movement. Am
    I pronouncing it right Gulen?
        Mr. Makovsky. Gulen.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. The Gulen movement. And as far as I can
    see and I have studied what they believe and I have talked to
    some people in that movement, they tend to be people who have
    high values and are looking for a more open and you say
    tolerant Islam. That would be very admirable type of--by the
    way, it would be the equivalent of the Rotary Club in the
    United States. In essential you have a philosophy of helping
    other people who also are politically involved and involved in
    the community efforts to help people.
        How is it that the Gulen movement now has been declared
    public enemy number one by the man who they were actually
    helped put into power, and over the years has been one of the
    chief sources of support. How did that come about?
        Mr. Barkey. I would like to say something about the Gulen
    movement. I mean the Gulen movement, I agree with you, has an
    image of tolerant Islam. Yes they were allied with Erdogan.
    When Erdogan came to power he did not have the personnel and it
    was the Gulen movement that staffed it.
        But the Gulen movement also, if you ask the Kurds, the
    Gulen movement was very hard on the Kurds, because Gulenist
    judges and prosecutors unleashed lots and lots of cases against
    Kurds that are still continuing today. There are people who
    went to prison for nothing. I just met with one of the most
    important lawyers in the Diyarbakir, a few weeks ago, he spent
    4\1/2\ years in jail. You know why? Because he was at the
    demonstration, somebody 5,000 people behind him opened a flag,
    a PKK flag and the judges and the prosecutors said, oh, you are
    a member of the PKK because you were standing in front of 5,000
    people ahead of you.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So is that the Gulen movement? Or is
    that----
        Mr. Barkey. If you go and ask the Kurds, the Gulenists were
    very, very hard on the Kurdish nationalist movement. There were
    many ways it was very good. They brought in very good staff,
    but on one issue they whether very, very hard. So it is not a
    completely--we have to also acknowledge what was wrong with
    them.
        The reason he turned on them is because he thinks--probably
    he may be right, that the Gulenists actually exposed the
    corruption. I mean the people who leaked those tapes off
    Erdogan and the money issues he thinks are Gulenists.
        And today the irony of course is that when he came to power
    and he aligned himself with Gulen against the military, today
    it is he and the military against Gulen so the alliances have
    changed, but----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So the Gulen movement it ended up exposing
    some of the corruption----
        Mr. Barkey. Right. That is what he thinks.
        Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. That was part of his
    entourage?
        Mr. Bilgen. And it should be added that, we are talking
    about quite a large network, or it was large, in Turkey. It was
    influential especially media for some one of the things that I
    would like to mention is, now that the Cihan news agency, was
    seized by the government, we don't have a watchdog to actually
    follow the election. That was the only one, that was the only
    one.
        Now you are going to go learn the election results from
    state news agency, whatever number they put up it will be the
    number. But it was always checked against Cihan news numbers
    before. Since it is a large network, as I said it has--because
    of that it has usual shortcomings like it's a diverse network,
    there are nationalists, there are more biased, less biased
    people, there are more secular, less secular. And there are
    people who are just minding their business about, like,
    teaching, opening schools and so on and there are others who
    are more interested in politics. Right? So it is hard to define
    where it ends, where it begins, and how a judge or prosecutor
    is basically considered a part of it while they themselves are
    rejected and so on.
        So there are all these shortcomings and I think nobody can
    really solve that. And even the movement itself the
    spokespeople and so on, cannot really address some of these
    questions.
        So in the larger picture especially outside Turkey or
    something the movement is known by more like dialogue
    activities, education activities or something. And that seems
    to be the core of the movement and movement message rather than
    what happened in the last few years in Turkey in the political
    scene.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Go right ahead. Comment on that----
        Mr. Makovsky. Let me say two good things about the movement
    and raise one questionable thing.
        First of all I have never seen a shred of evidence that
    they support anything other than peace. So the declaration of
    the Turkish Government that the Gulenists are a terrorist group
    is absurd.
        Second of all, in their schools they have taught science
    and mathematics; they have really emphasized what we would
    think of as more traditionally secular subjects like science
    and math. I can't vouch for exactly how they are taught, but I
    don't know of too many Islamic movements in the world that
    emphasize science and math. That is a real plus.
        Where I think the failing has been and, again, this is not
    proveable, but I think many followers of Gulen, many Gulenists
    acknowledge that a significant minority of the police and of
    the judiciary were Gulenists because they wanted to be part of
    those organizations and exercise power.
        And I think there is evidence, circumstantial evidence,
    that they did act corporately sometimes and particularly in the
    anti military trials that went from 2008 through 2011 with
    manufactured evidence and----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. It seemed to me from just a distance the
    Gulenist movement is somewhat like the Masons were in our
    country's history back in the founding of our country, they
    were idealistic people who had an idealistic philosophy. And
    again, somewhere between the masons an the Rotary Club. And I
    think----
        Mr. Bilgen. With schools.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Just one last note here about Turkey and--
    I will have a closing 1-minute statement.
        Mr. Meeks.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This good conversation and as I am listening I am just
    thinking in my head that things are always complicated. And I
    always try to tell my children sometimes, as we are right now,
    with what is going on in America, trying to look at something
    from somebody else's point of view, turn it around.
        And as I have said in my initial statement, I am really
    concerned when I see the human rights groups and others denying
    individuals the opportunity to talk, et cetera. At the same
    time I understand that some of the interests that the Turks may
    have is different than what our interest is, because they are
    in that region and we are not. I also understand the Turks not
    necessarily just doing exactly what we tell them because it is
    just in our interest and them not seeing it being in their
    interest, just as I don't expect someone to tell us to do what
    is in their interest, if it is not in our interest.
        So that happens between countries at times. And so when I
    listen to the difficulty to the Turks, we talk about the PKK,
    there, to them they are Daesh. That is their number one
    terrorist group, not to us, because they are not to us, but to
    us it is those folks in Syria and Iran who--I call them Daesh
    because I don't call them an Islamic State they are not an
    Islamic--they don't practice Islam if you talk to any Muslim.
        So there are conflicting interests that are natural. And so
    I can't see a head of state of a country saying we are going to
    forget our national interests to go with someone else's. So our
    difficulty is is trying to figure out how we can bring it
    together so that both of our interests are taken care of.
        So what am I asking? And I go through this with another
    country all the time. And maybe Mr. Makovsky, we have this
    dialogue with the chairman all the time.
        The other big country that you have got conflicts right now
    is Russia. And Russia has different interests than we do,
    Russia though similar to Turkey had an individual that was the
    Prime Minister that decided he wanted to be the President and
    all the power shifted. Russia is not with us, we are not with
    them when they went into the U.K.
        So the first question is what is the difference, if there
    is any, because I am trying to figure out both these countries,
    between Russia and Turkey?
        Mr. Makovsky. Simply put, Turkey is an ally, Russia isn't.
    Turkey is part of the NATO alliance and that alliance is
    supposed to be dedicated to freedom and democracy, a key--a
    core of that alliance. Russia is not part of that. If you
    separate that fact and look at the trends inside those two
    countries, they become more similar. And I do--Mr. Erdogan has
    not spelled out exactly what kind of Presidency he has in mind,
    but I do worry. Many people suspect that President Putin is his
    model.
        And so you are right if you look at strictly domestic
    trends: There are a lot of similarities. But if you look at our
    responsibility, and this is my humble opinion, Mr. Ranking
    Member, if you look at our responsibility to speak out, it is
    much greater when we are talking about an ally than when we are
    not.
        Mr. Meeks. Anybody differ?
        Mr. Bilgen. Well, I would like to say that when we look at
    the larger picture, the political system of Turkey and the
    people, the public opinion which may be manipulated, but is
    very much, kind of embedded in Western alliance, NATO in
    European Union. These are hard facts, these are difficult to
    change even for a strong person as you are gone as he is now.
        So there are two ways to look at this. Some time when I
    follow the developments in Turkey I just see symptoms of state
    tradition in Turkey. State tradition in Turkey, is a very
    powerful tradition which was never democratic through addition.
    It was always bureaucratic, always prioritize state over the
    individual. So that has been going on for hundreds of years. It
    is not going to change quickly as far as I see.
        But we can see the anomaly at the moment we are facing as a
    phase in Turkey's political advancement or we may see it as a
    breaking point. It didn't break yet, okay but it may break. I
    think, you know, these next couple of years are critical.
        Mr. Meeks. Let me just ask you this then. So what I am
    trying to get at is there a way just like our priority is to
    make sure we get rid of Daesh, now is it such a priority for
    the Turks that the PKK doesn't exist? And just as we want to
    get rid of Daesh they went to get rid of PKK. They are saying
    based upon--that is what I am hearing, based upon the poll that
    you had, they are saying, well, we want you United States to
    help us get rid of the PKK because they are terrorizing us. And
    so how do we--and so there is a balance back and forth as
    opposed to they are saying, okay, we are allies, but we need
    you to help get rid of our terrorists.
        Now, I am hearing at another point that we need to push
    back so we should side with some of those folks that might be
    against them to shut them up a little bit. Where do we get to a
    balance?
        Mr. Barkey. On the PKK issue, I mean, remember the
    difference between Daesh and PKK is in the case of the PKK
    there is an original sin. The original sin is that you had a
    Kurdish problem in Turkey that was unacknowledged, repressed,
    very, very violently over the years nobody talked about it, we
    never talked about it until the PKK emerged and made it
    essentially an issue. And this by the way is something that
    Erdogan recognized. After he sat down--he had his government
    sit down with the PKK leader who was in prison on an island in
    Turkey and they negotiated a deal. So he decided to renege on
    the deal, and we have been his allies in the sense that we have
    been fighting and helping him on the PKK issue and we continue
    to do so. He essentially reneged on the deal.
        It is not like Daesh in the sense that he made a deal, he
    could have gone ahead and finished the deal and we would not be
    talking about these problems now. He made his own decision,
    fair enough. That is where I say we should be able to push back
    and maybe help maybe being an intermediary we can push back.
    The important thing to understand about Turkey though--from the
    tone of the hearing, look this is a country that is very
    divided at the moment, and it is a country where you still have
    despite all the pressure, a civil society that is pushing back
    and fighting back those are our allies.
        Mr. Meeks. All countries are very divided. The United
    States are very divided.
        Mr. Barkey. I know. But what I am saying to you is the
    impression we are getting here is the Erdogan has complete
    control. And I am saying he doesn't have complete control yet.
    So the fact of the matter is we don't have a substitute, Kuwait
    and Erbil are not a substitute, Congressman Rohrabacher to
    Turkey.
        I mean Turkey's embedded in NATO. Nobody else is going to
    replace Turkey from that perspective. We have allies in Turkey
    that we can work with even if Erdogan is problematic. But we
    need to hold to our principles and to our policies when we deal
    with Erdogan.
        Mr. Meeks. Similar to we should do in Russia? These are two
    big countries that we can't ignore.
        Mr. Barkey. Absolutely. Absolutely.
        Mr. Meeks. We can't ignore Russia, we can't ignore Turkey.
        Mr. Barkey. Right. That is my point.
        Mr. Makovsky. The balance is very difficult but you are
    absolutely right, it has to be a cornerstone principle of ours
    that we oppose the use of violence for political end so we are
    correct----
        Mr. Meeks. Absolutely.
        Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. To oppose the PKK in that
    regard. But I think we do have to acknowledge that Erdogan at
    first--at first--Erdogan came around to negotiating with the
    PKK indirectly, but almost directly, and he seemed to be the
    one that reneged on the deal. That doesn't justify the PKK use
    of violence, not at all. But I think that context is very
    important.
        And, maybe if I could add, why did he renege on the deal?
    In my view, the emergence of a Kurdish political party that
    opposed his Presidency plans, I think infuriated him. Just like
    he felt spurned by the Gulenists, he felt spurned by the Kurds
    who he felt had reason to be grateful to him and in fact made
    some very important gains under him.
        I visited Diyarbakir several times last year, but I had not
    been there for 15 years until then, and--this was before the
    fighting broke out, on my first visit--the gains were immense.
    He felt they owed him gratitude. I think when the party emerged
    that, contrary to his expectations, opposed his Presidency
    ideas rather than supported it, he decided to unleash the
    furies.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well thank you very much. And I would like
    to thank the witnesses, I just have a very short observation
    which is of course the prerogative of the chair.
        Mr. Meeks. Of the chair.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Would you like to have a final word?
        Mr. Meeks. Again just thanking you, very insightful and I
    thank the chair for having us here. I think in the next few
    months we should have another one and hopefully in January when
    I am the chair we will have another one.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I will be the ranking member, what?
        Mr. Meeks. But I just want to thank you very much. This
    kind of dialogue is tremendously important for us to air out
    for us to think about as you move forward. This stuff is not
    easy, it is not simple, it is complicated. And as many people
    as I talk to about--one side they are on one side or the other,
    very similar to here in the United States. If you come and went
    to one particular State the United States is all one way and
    talk to someone else and say oh, no, it is another way. And
    this kind of dialogue is very helpful.
        So Mr. Chairman, I think that this commitment to the
    committee and hearing is very timely and very important to
    looking at what we are doing on the Foreign Affairs Committee
    as far as foreign policy.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. I think Mr. Meeks and I have a very
    good relationship and I think it is exemplary of our Foreign
    Affairs Committee, and that we are able to do things. I would
    remind Mr. Meeks and other members that we will be trying to
    put together a sense of the House resolution expressing
    concerns over the trends in Turkey, not condemnations but
    expressing concerns over the trends in Turkey.
        When we are analyzing Turkey within the context of what is
    going on in the bigger picture and the EU is falling apart,
    think about this. Britain's exit of the EU, this is a first
    huge step--as huge, as someone else would say who may end up
    President--and so so we have got some changes.
        And of course in our lifetime Turkey was constantly trying
    to become part of the EU and part of the common market. And now
    I think that is probably history. And I think that Erdogan
    represents more of a nationalistic Turkey focus rather than
    Europe focus approach. So these are all major changes that are
    going on. And let us hope that as these changes happen I
    believe that NATO--if we have a new President, if it is Mr.
    Trump, I would expect that NATO and the EU alliances would
    become less important and that individual deals and
    relationships between countries, respecting that each country
    has its own interest at stake, but trying to find the common
    ground where people can act together, that will replace some of
    the more systematized approaches that we have had since the
    beginning of the cold war and the cold war is over.
        So with that said, whatever emerges in this new era, Turkey
    will play a very significant role. It is right there in the
    middle of everything.
        So we have taken very seriously, we respect the people
    there. We are concerned that its trendline--and by the way just
    one last note, it has been my experience that whenever the
    suppression of the press goes up, the level of corruption rises
    at the same rate.
        And if we have the suppression of various political
    elements in society, in Turkey. And we have the suppression of
    freedom of the press you can expect that there will be
    corruption as a result and it will not bode well for the people
    of Turkey. We are on their side.
        And I now hold this committee adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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