[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. POLICY TOWARD PUTIN'S RUSSIA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-191
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Michael McFaul, senior fellow and director at the
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford
University (former American Ambassador to Russia).............. 5
The Honorable Jack Matlock, fellow, Rubenstein Fellows Academy,
Duke University (former American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R).... 16
Leon Aron, Ph.D., resident scholar and director of Russian
Studies, The American Enterprise Institute..................... 23
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Michael McFaul: Prepared statement................. 8
The Honorable Jack Matlock: Prepared statement................... 20
Leon Aron, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................. 25
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California: Extraneous material submitted for the
record......................................................... 59
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement............... 67
U.S. POLICY TOWARD PUTIN'S RUSSIA
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TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2016
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. The committee will come to order. I will
ask all our members to take their seats.
Winston Churchill famously described Russia as ``a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,'' but I think for many
of us, less well-known is what he said next, because he
commented about unlocking that riddle. He said, ``But perhaps
there is a key. And that key is Russian national interest.''
The problem is that we are not dealing with the interests
of the Russian people. We could be if we were broadcasting into
Russia the way we did during the Reagan administration when we
had that message about political pluralism and tolerance and
that message of educating people effectively on what was going
on inside Russia and around the world. But we don't.
Instead, we are dealing with the interests of Vladimir
Putin, because he is in a position there where he is calling
the shots. And he has not demonstrated much interest in
cooperating with the United States. In fact, many of his
policies are directly undermining America--from selling
advanced weapons to Iran to destabilizing our allies by sending
waves of Syrian refugees, over several million now, across
their borders. And for the first time since the end of the Cold
War, we have seen a situation where we have been forced to
increase our military presence in Europe to make clear our
readiness to defend NATO.
Yet, in this environment, Putin continues to escalate. That
is why we have this hearing today on our U.S. policy toward
Putin's Russia. Over the past year, he has repeatedly sent
Russian warplanes to buzz U.S. ships and planes in
international waters. These are reckless acts, these are
provocative acts, and a miscalculation could easily result in
direct confrontation.
As this committee has examined, Russia's propaganda
machine--and for any of you who have watched RT television, you
can see how it has a constant stream of disinformation that it
puts out about the United States, about the U.K., about what
actually happens in the world. But that machinery, under Putin,
is in overdrive. It is undermining governments, including NATO
allies. And, meanwhile, back in Russia, independent media and
dissidents are forcefully sidelined. And for the media, when I
say ``forcibly,'' I mean imprisoned or sometimes shot.
A big part of the problem is that the administration has
repeatedly rushed to try to cooperate with Russia, beginning
with a string of one-sided concessions in the New START arms-
control agreement. I would just point out, when we pulled out
the interceptor system in Poland and in the Czech Republic, I
think that was a blunder. We were quick to join diplomatic
efforts in Syria, even as the opposition forces we support have
come under repeated Russian aerial attack. And this has
convinced the Russians that, once again, the administration
will concede a great deal for very little in return for the
concession.
That does not mean that we should rule out cooperation with
Russia. We should cooperate with Russia. But cooperation means
benefits for both sides. A tougher and more consistent approach
on our part might convince Putin that cooperation is more
advantageous than the reflexive confrontation that he often
resorts to.
We have clearly demonstrated that we are open to
cooperation. It is Putin who is not. And if he continues
playing a zero-sum game and regards the U.S. as an enemy to
achieving his ends, then the possibility of compromise is zero
under that circumstance. Much of his behavior to date fits that
description, most glaringly seen by his invasion of Ukraine and
what happened in Georgia.
Unfortunately, Putin has repeatedly calculated--rightfully
so--that the administration's response to his aggression will
be lackluster. The U.S., in cooperation with the EU and others,
has imposed sanctions, which have resulted in significant
pressure on the Russian economy, but the administration has
refused to provide Ukraine, for example, with the anti-tank
weaponry needed to stop Russian tanks, which can only be
interpreted in Moscow as weakness.
The tragedy is that there are many problems where both
countries could benefit from cooperation. One of the most
obvious is combating Islamist terrorism. One witness today has
intensely studied its rapid spread in Russia and in Central
Asia, which, together, provide the largest number of recruits
for ISIS outside of the Arab countries.
Putin says he is genuinely concerned about the rising
threat. In fact, that was his stated goal in intervening in
Syria. But, as we know, his real agenda was to save the Assad
regime, which has meant targeting the opposition forces that
are supported by the U.S. far more than any targeting of ISIS
forces.
It is clear that U.S. strategies to deal with Russia have
failed. If we want to accomplish a different result, we must
negotiate from a position of strength. Only then will
cooperation be possible with a man who has demonstrated that
the hope of cooperation cannot survive the cold calculation of
his narrow interests.
And one way to address this, to get back to a theme that I
have pushed for a number of years here with my colleague Eliot
Engel, is the legislation that Eliot and I have advanced to try
to get back to a program, as we once had with Radio Free
Europe, which we should be doing with social media, with
television. We should be broadcasting into Russia, telling
Russians what is actually going on in their society, explaining
to Russians what is happening around the world, explaining the
issue of tolerance, of political pluralism, of these
perceptions that the rest of the world have, and the truth.
If Putin is going to continue to put out disinformation and
misinformation and lie about the West, at the very least we
could be telling the truth about what is happening inside
Russia to Russians so that the people have a better
understanding of this situation.
I now turn to Ranking Member Eliot Engel of New York for
any comments he may have.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me
say I agree with the statement you just made. Thank you for
calling this hearing. You and I have long shared deep concerns
about Russia's aggression under Vladimir Putin, and I am
grateful that you have focused the committee's attention on
this challenge.
To all of our witnesses, welcome to the Foreign Affairs
Committee. We are grateful for your expertise and insight.
Ambassador McFaul, let me say how particularly impressed I
was with your service as our top diplomat in Moscow. I know you
were the target of all sorts of absurd accusations and
harassment by Putin's allies, and I know that you were never
afraid to push back against misinformation and stand your
ground. And you are exactly the kind of diplomat we need to
meet 21st-century challenges, so thank you for your service.
And the other witnesses, thank you, as well, for your
service.
I have come to view Putin's Russia as a unique challenge on
the global stage. When we face crises around the world, we
often ask ourselves, ``What could we have done differently?''
or, ``What are the opportunities to defuse the situation?''
But, with Putin, there may not be answers to those questions
because he is playing by his own set of rules.
Putin has ignored Russian law, cracking down on the human
rights of Russia's people and literally robbing future
generations of their prosperity. He has destroyed Russia's
standing in the world, walking away from the country's
international obligations and shoring up the brutal Assad
regime in Syria. And he has threatened the norms that have
largely kept the peace in Europe since World War II, trampling
on the sovereignty of Russia's neighbors, testing the resolve
of NATO, and working to undermine Western unity.
I want to be careful not to conflate Putin and his corrupt
leadership with the Russian people. Russia is a great nation,
but Putin is not Russia. He is an unapologetic, authoritarian
kleptocrat, a grave threat to his own people and to stability
and security across Europe and beyond.
So how do we craft a policy to deal with such an
unpredictable and irresponsible leader? For now, the best
approach seems to be one of geographical containment. We cannot
fix what is ailing Russian society, but we can try to keep it
within Russia's recognized borders.
This may be a great test for NATO's role in the 21st
century. NATO, of course, has no ambition to chip away at
Russia's territory, but I am confident that the alliance will
keep its Article 5 promise. Putin uses lies and confusion to
cast doubt on NATO's ability, so I am glad that NATO is ramping
up its presence in Eastern Europe, sending a clear signal that
the alliance will not back down in the face of Putin's
aggression.
I believe and I have said for a long time that I think NATO
is being tested. And if we fail the test, I think it the end of
the alliance. We cannot fail the test.
Aside from that, sanctions have given us mixed results. As
violence in eastern Ukraine escalates again, it is clear that
sanctions haven't done enough to thwart Putin's ambitions. But
sanctions are better than nothing, and, in the long term, I
believe we have weakened Putin's ability to project a
destabilizing force beyond Russia's borders.
But we know Putin isn't going anywhere, so we are left to
ask, what else should we be doing?
I recently introduced legislation that, in my view, would
take us in the right direction. My bill, the STAND for Ukraine
Act, would tighten sanctions on Russia and would reject any
form of recognition of Russia's rule over Crimea in the same
way we didn't recognize Soviet occupation of the Baltic states
during the Cold War. It would also help to drive investment in
Ukraine and push back against Russian propaganda and
disinformation.
There are other issues I hope we can touch on today, as
well: How do we help the Russian people hear a different point
of view? And the chairman spoke about that in his opening
statement. After all, Putin's apparent approval ratings have a
lot to do with the fact that there is simply no alternative.
How do we seize on the common ground we share with the citizens
of Russia? Even if the United States isn't popular in Russia,
we know that the country's citizens are disgusted by corruption
at every level of government.
And let me close by saying we are not focusing on Russia
today because we want to pick a fight, breathe new life into
old animosities, or drag the country down. A failed Russia
would spread damaging ripple effects around the world. Rather,
we hold out hope for the people of Russia. We want to see them
realize their democratic aspirations. We want to see their
country become a stable and prosperous European power and
partner on the world stage. Putin has strangled democracy in
Russia. We had such high hopes.
But I look forward to hearing our witnesses today and
hearing what they have to say, and I thank them again for
coming.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. All right.
This morning, we are pleased to be joined by a
distinguished panel.
The Honorable Michael McFaul is a professor at Stanford
University. Prior to his position, Ambassador McFaul served 5
years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant
to the President and Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia at
the National Security Council, and then as the U.S. Ambassador
to Russia.
Ambassador Jack Matlock is a fellow at Duke University,
and, prior to this position, Ambassador Matlock served 35 years
in the American Foreign Service. During that time, he has
served as the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, and Ambassador
to Czechoslovakia from 1981 to 1983.
Dr. Leon Aron is a resident scholar and director of Russian
studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He has served on
the Broadcasting Board of Governors since 2015. Prior to these
positions, he taught at Georgetown University.
Without objection, the witnesses' full prepared statements
will be made part of the record, and our members will have 5
calendar days to submit statements and questions and extraneous
material for the record.
Ambassador McFaul, please summarize your remarks, if you
could. Thank you, Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MCFAUL, SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR AT THE FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO
RUSSIA)
Ambassador McFaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you----
Chairman Royce. Ambassador, let me just interrupt you. If
everyone would push that red button.
Ambassador McFaul. Push the top button?
Chairman Royce. There you go.
Ambassador McFaul. All right? There you go.
So I will thank you again, Chairman Royce and Ranking
Member Engel and other members of the committee, including
several of you that I had the pleasure of hosting in Moscow
when I was Ambassador.
It is great to be back with Ambassador Matlock and Leon
Aron, people I know well. I guarantee you, if you listen, you
are going to learn something from these two gentlemen today.
I have a longer report that I want to put in the record,
but I just want to answer two questions today in the limited
time I have: Why did we get here, how did we get here, in terms
of this confrontation, which I believe is worse than at any
time since the Cold War? In fact, I think you have to go deep
into the Cold War to see a time that has been so
confrontational. And, as the Russians like to say, ``Chto
delat,'' what is to be done.
And I want to focus on the diagnostics first, in part
because I am an aspiring professor, recovering bureaucrat, and
I think it is important to know the ``why'' question before you
do the prescription. So I am going to first focus on that and,
in my limited time, then get to prescriptions.
One argument why we are in this mess that we are in today
is that Russia, and Putin in particular, is pushing back after
decades of American aggression against him. The United States
lectured Russia about markets and democracy, we expanded NATO,
we bombed Serbia, we invaded Iraq, we supported color
revolutions, so the argument goes, and so Putin just had to
push back; he was compelled to annex Crimea and intervene in
eastern Ukraine. And most certainly that is the main conflict
that has sparked the confrontation.
Now, I want to be clear. None of those policies were
popular in Moscow during the last three decades, although it
should be noted that both President Yeltsin and Putin at one
point flirted with the idea of actually joining NATO.
But in between that negative record that I just described
and our moment today, there was a period of cooperation. We in
the Obama administration called it the ``reset.'' And, during
that period, we got a lot of things done that, Mr. Chairman, in
my opinion, were in the American national interests. We got the
START Treaty done. We got sanctions on Iran. We expanded the
northern distribution network to supply our troops in
Afghanistan so we had an alternative route instead of Pakistan,
which was vital to a military mission we had in 2011 when we
killed Osama bin Laden. We got them into the World Trade
Organization. We got them to support U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya. And we increased trade and
investment during that period. By the way, during this period,
60 percent of Americans thought Russia was a friendly or allied
country, and vice versa inside Russia.
That was just 4 years ago. That wasn't 40 years ago or
before the Bolshevik revolution. So you can't explain the
period of cooperation that I just described looking at these
previous variables. Something else has to be here.
A second explanation is that Obama was weak and created the
permissive conditions for Putin's aggression. Maybe we will
have time to talk about that in questions and answers in more
detail.
I would just remind you that every time a Russian leader
has decided to use force or to suppress democratic movements in
Eastern Europe, the United States has not had good options for
deterring it. Whether it is in Georgia in 2008 under George W.
Bush, the crackdown on Solidarity in 1981 under Ronald Reagan,
1968 in Czechoslovakia, or 1966 in Hungary, we did not have
military means for stopping them.
Let me say something really provocative. I believe the
Obama administration's response looks more like Ronald Reagan's
response to what happened in Poland in 1981 than George Bush's
response to what happened in Georgia in 2008. That did get your
attention, didn't it? I will bet you we are going to come back
with that.
The third explanation, and what I think is the real driving
explanation for what is going on, is this is all about domestic
politics in Russia and in Ukraine and very little to do with
American foreign policy, either strong or weak. Two things are
important to this explanation. One, Putin returned. And Putin
is not Medvedev. He sees the world in zero-sum terms. He sees
the hand of the CIA in fomenting revolutions in the Arab world,
in Ukraine, and in Russia. And he sees us fundamentally as an
enemy. And, second, there were giant demonstrations against his
regime in December 2011 and in the spring of 2012 when I was
Ambassador, and he needed a new argument to suppress those
people, to say that they were the enemies of the regime. And
that is when he rolled out this old playbook from the Soviet
era and described us--the United States, the Obama
administration, and me personally--as the enemy, those that are
fomenting revolution against him.
And, in that context, there is not an easy way to cooperate
with him if he sees the world in these zero-sum terms and if he
sees an American hand behind these uprisings, be they in Moscow
or Kiev.
So, to me, I actually agree with both the previous
statements. It is a tragic moment in U.S.-Russian relations; I
don't celebrate this at all. But we have to have a patient,
comprehensive policy for deterring Russian aggression, working
with the government when it is in our national interest, and
supporting Russian society.
In my written remarks, I go into detail about a six-point
plan. Let me just mention the headlines and then stop. One,
most important of all, in my opinion, to deter Putin's
aggression, is to help Ukrainian democracy and markets succeed.
Nothing else is more important than that objective, and so I
look forward to seeing your legislation. I think that is orders
of magnitude more important than anything else. Second,
strengthening NATO, as has already been noted. I fully concur
with that. Third, pushing back on Russian propaganda, not
through American propaganda but through facts. I agree with
that. Fourth, working with the government in limited ways when
we can, when it serves our national interest. And, finally,
engaging in supporting the Russian people, because there is no
reason to contain both the state and the people. We should
continue to engage when the circumstances allow.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador McFaul follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Thank you, Ambassador McFaul.
Now we will go to Ambassador Jack Matlock.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK, FELLOW, RUBENSTEIN
FELLOWS ACADEMY, DUKE UNIVERSITY (FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO
THE U.S.S.R)
Ambassador Matlock. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
thank you for your invitation to join these distinguished
scholars.
Chairman Royce. Ambassador, I am going to suggest you pull
that microphone closer. There you go. Thank you, sir.
Ambassador Matlock. All right.
Thank you for your invitation. And I am very pleased to
join these distinguished scholars in discussing our relations
with Russia. Ambassador McFaul coauthored, among his other
works, a fine book which I make a required reading for my
students of U.S.-Russian relations. And he, of course, was
Ambassador to Russia. And I would have to say that I don't know
whether it was an advantage or disadvantage, but he had a
larger staff to deal with Russia than I had to deal with the
entire Soviet Union. So I don't know whether that was a
blessing or a curse, except that I had, I think, the best staff
anyone could wish at the time that we were dealing with the
Soviet Union. And, of course, Dr. Aron and I go back a long way
in many different meetings and so on. So I am very happy to be
here along with them.
Some of my perceptions are going to be probably different,
because I am deeply concerned with the direction U.S.-Russian
relations have taken of late. We can debate--and I will
participate in it if we wish--what caused this. I have written
extensively on it. And I would simply say that the perception
on both sides, in both cases, I think, has distortions. Theirs
may be greater or lesser than ours, but there is cause and
effect in the interaction that went both ways.
The mutual accusations and public acrimony has at times
been reminiscent of that at the height or the depth of the Cold
War, but the issues are quite different.
The Cold War was fundamentally about ideology, the attempt
of the Communist-ruled Soviet Union to spread its control of
other countries by encouraging what Karl Marx had called
proletarian revolutions against existing governments. The
Soviet leaders called their system socialist, but it actually
was state monopoly capitalism that tried to replace market
forces with government fiat. It was a catastrophic failure in
meeting people's needs, but it managed to build a formidable
and, in some respect, unmatched military power.
Today's tensions are not about ideology. Russia is now a
capitalist country. Okay, one that has more state control than
many others, but basically capitalist. It is not trying to
spread communism in the world. Today's tensions, if we really
look at them objectively, are more like those that, through
incredible misjudgment, brought on World War I--that is,
competition for control of territory in and outside Europe.
We know how that ended. Every European country involved
suffered more than they could possibly have gained. Competition
over territory was bad enough a century ago. Since World War
II, however, the danger has risen exponentially if countries
with nuclear weapons stumble into military conflict. The number
of nuclear weapons that remain in U.S. and Russian arsenals
represent a potential existential threat to every nation on
Earth, including specifically both Russia and the United
States.
So how did we end the Cold War and reduce this threat? One
key element was an agreement that President Ronald Reagan and
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made in their very first
meeting. They agreed on a statement that Reagan had made in two
previous speeches: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never
be fought. And then they added, since both countries are
nuclear powers: That means there can be no war between us.
With that statement agreed, Secretary of State George
Shultz was able to argue convincingly that an arms race between
us was absurd. We could not fight each other without committing
suicide, and what rational leader was going to do that? In just
a couple of years, we had abolished a whole class of nuclear
weapons and our arsenals and, shortly thereafter, cut strategic
nuclear weapons in half.
In concluding the New START agreement, which Ambassador
McFaul has reminded us of, the Obama administration made an
important contribution to our national security. But, since
then, nuclear cooperation with Russia has deteriorated and
seems practically nonexistent. It is urgent to restore that
cooperation if we are to inhibit further proliferation. We are
unlikely to do so if we proceed with plans to increase our
military presence in Eastern Europe.
I am aware that one of our presumptive candidates for
President has indicated that he might find some form of nuclear
proliferation desirable. I believe that is profoundly mistaken,
as is the idea that allies should pay us for their protection.
I do not believe we should use our fine military as hired
gendarmes to police the world, even if those protected were
willing to pay the cost.
These comments, however, do reflect one important truth
which we need to recognize, and that is that military alliances
can create liabilities rather than augmenting power. When our
interests are not closely aligned, an American security
guarantee can create a moral hazard. What is to keep an
``ally'' in quotes, deg.from picking a fight
unnecessarily and then expecting Uncle Sam to win it for him?
Sounds like schoolyard bullying to me.
I have trouble, to take just one example today, to find
much concurrence between American security interests and
Turkish behavior. Is Turkey really an ally, or is it a problem?
I don't want to single them out--I could use other examples.
Yes, when we have made commitments, we must honor them. But
we must be more careful and selective about taking on
liabilities. And some of our alliances formed under the
different conditions of the Cold War should be reviewed. And I
think that, increasingly, I believe you will find, if you
question them, your constituents, many of them are worried
about our over-military-involvement in the world, about
attempts to use our fine military, the best in the world, to
solve problems that can't be solved by military means and to
carry out tasks that are more in the interests of other
countries than they are in the United States.
We must set our priorities, and the highest priority should
be the protection and security of the United States of America.
The only thing that threatens our existence would be another
nuclear arms race that gets out of hand.
Let's bear that in mind, because that is something
President Ronald Reagan understood. Yes, he was a heavy critic
of communism, but his idea was, yes, we have to stop the Soviet
Union from expanding its influence; they have a crazy system.
If that is what they want, that is their business. And, as a
matter of fact, we didn't bring down communism; Gorbachev
brought down communism. It was brought down by internal
pressures, and it was brought down by internal pressures when
we ended the Cold War and ended the external pressures on the
Soviet Union. I think there are lessons here that we have
sometimes forgotten.
Now, I have views on how we might deal with Russia on
current issues such as Ukraine and Syria, democratization, and
human rights and will share them if you wish. I believe there
are dignified ways we can reduce tensions with Russia on those
issues and others.
However, the main thing we should bear in mind, that is, in
confronting the greatest dangers to civilized life in this
country, such as terrorism--didn't we have a reminder just 2
days ago in this horrible massacre? Now, if there is any issue
that the U.S. and Russia have common interest, it is in
fighting terrorism. They are more vulnerable than we are.
Sometimes we tend to forget that. And I still don't understand
why we have not been able to have more effective cooperation.
So I think the main thing we need to bear in mind is that,
in confronting these things, whether it be terrorism, failed
states, organized crime, environmental degradation, U.S. and
Russian basic interests are not in conflict. As we deal with
them, as we must, Russia will either be part of the problem or
part of the solution. It is obviously in our interest to do
what we can to encourage Russia to join us in confronting them.
They are unlikely to do so if they regard us as an enemy or a
competitor for influence in their neighborhood.
As I said, we can argue about who is more responsible for
the situation, but the fact is that, as you well know, politics
is driven by perceptions. And their perceptions are that we
have been consistently moving against their interests and
trying to encircle them and even trying to interfere in their
internal politics.
Yes, President Putin has made many mistakes, many that are
not in Russia's interests. But Russia's President, Russia's
Government is a matter for Russians to decide. Their scandals
are a matter for them to deal with. And I think when we
presume----
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Professor Matlock.
Ambassador Matlock [continuing]. To do this ourselves, that
is----
Chairman Royce. Thanks for----
Ambassador Matlock. Above all, I think we need to return to
the position Reagan and Gorbachev set out: A nuclear war cannot
be won, must never be fought, and that means there can be no
war between us. To act on any other principle can create a risk
to our Nation and the world of unimaginable gravity.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Matlock follows:]
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----------
Chairman Royce. Thank you for those points.
We now go to Dr. Aron.
STATEMENT OF LEON ARON, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR AND DIRECTOR OF
RUSSIAN STUDIES, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Aron. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I
don't have to remind anyone in this room that this is a tough,
even rough, patch in the relations between the United States
and Russia. There are many reasons for this troubling state of
affairs, for which both sides bear responsibility.
But I would like to explore today one of the key elements
of the present situation, and that is Vladimir Putin's system
of beliefs, his vision of Russia in the world, and his
understanding of his role as Russia's leader.
I want to do it because, contrary to a fairly popular view,
I don't believe that his foreign policy, in particular his
relationship with the United States, are made on an ad hoc
basis. I think, instead, it is part of a long-term geopolitical
project rooted deeply in his ideology, in his self-imposed
personal historic mission, and domestic political imperatives
of his regime's survival.
There are few tenets in Vladimir Putin's credo that can be
fairly ascertained now after his 16 years in power. Whether he
was taking a break as the President or not, he was the
effective leader.
One, the end of the Cold War was Russia's equivalent of the
1919 Versailles Treaty for Germany, a source of endless
humiliation and misery.
Two, the demise of the Soviet Union, in Putin's words, was
``the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.''
Three, the overarching strategic agenda of a truly
patriotic Russian leader, not an idiot or a traitor or both, as
Putin almost certainly views Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris
Yeltsin, is to recover and repossess for Russia political,
economic, and geostrategic assets lost by the Soviet state at
its fall. A few years back, I called this the Putin doctrine,
and I think he has implemented it successfully and consistently
virtually from day one of his Presidency.
In addition to his KGB training, these views are also
shaped by Putin's favorite philosopher, Ivan Ilyin, whom the
Russian President cites in speeches, assigns as reading to
governors, and whose remains he had moved from Switzerland to
re-inter on one of the most hollowed Russian grounds, the
Donskoy Monastery in Moscow.
Ivan Ilyin believed, in essence, that Russia is never wrong
but perennially wronged, primarily by the West; the West's
hostility to Russia is eternal and prompted by the West's
jealousy of Russia's size, natural riches, and, most of all,
its incorruptible saintly soul and God-bestowed mission to be
the third Rome, the light among nations; the plots against
Russia are relentless, and, while truces are possible and often
tactically advantageous to Russia, genuine peace with the West
is very unlikely.
In addition to ideology--and Mike McFaul referred to this--
Putin's foreign policy is also shaped by a large, I would say,
urgent and powerful domestic political imperative. By the time
of Putin's third Presidency, the toxic domestic economic
climate had begun to reduce Russian economic growth to a crawl,
even with the oil prices historically high. Most troubling for
the regime, Putin's popularity, which was and continues to be a
key to the regime's legitimacy, dropped by almost one-third
between 2008 and 2011.
In the words of Putin's personal friend, trusted adviser,
and former First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance,
Alexei Kudrin, Russia had hit an institutional wall and needed
a different economic model.
Putin chose to ignore this advice and reject it. And,
instead of liberalizing institutional reforms, he made likely
the most fateful decision of his political career: He began to
shift the foundation of his regime's legitimacy from economic
progress and steady growth of incomes to what might be called
patriotic mobilization. There followed the annexation of
Crimea, the hybrid war in Ukraine, and then Russia's
involvement in Syria.
Putin appears to have stepped on an authoritarian escalator
from which there is no exit except by physical demise or
revolution. And the regime he is heading is presenting the West
with an unprecedented challenge: A highly personalistic
authoritarianism, which is resurgent, activist, inspired by a
mission, prone to risky behavior both for ideological reasons
and for those of domestic political legitimacy, and armed, by
the latest count, with 1,735 strategic nuclear warheads on 521
delivery platforms.
Does that mean that the United States cannot cooperate with
Putin's Russia? Of course not, so long as we do not waste time
and effort in areas where the gap in ultimate goals between
Washington and Moscow is too wide to bridge, such as it is, I
think, in Syria.
Yet there is one area where the coincidence of goals is not
just possible but vital to the interests of the United States.
Today, Russia does indeed find itself under siege--of course,
not by the West, despite what the state propaganda machine
asserts on national television daily. It is under the siege
from what, in Mr. Rohrabacher's subcommittee a few months ago,
I described as the Russian jihad.
Russia is indeed under pressure domestically and from the
outside. And I will be happy to provide you with the results of
my research, but let me just mention that we can and should
cooperate with Moscow in Central Asia. Central Asia is more
vulnerable to Taliban and ISIS than any other region in the
world today. Yes, it is primarily Russia's problem, yet it will
be our problem, as well, when an area with a population of 68
million people becomes a terrorist haven and a magnet for
would-be world jihadists.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to ask that a
recent article of mine in Foreign Policy titled ``Playing Tic-
Tac-Toe with Putin'' is entered into the record.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aron follows:]
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----------
Chairman Royce. Without objection. Very good. We will enter
that into the record, Dr. Aron.
I was going to ask you about your perceptions on Central
Asia and where we could cooperate here. And I think your point
about recruitment--there are literally thousands of recruits
coming out of Russia into ISIS right now, but, on top of that,
there is the wider problem of this radicalization and the pace
of it.
It seems to me that there is this room for cooperation,
but, at the same time, there are questions about what Putin
would seek from us, what could he offer. There is also the
question in terms of associating ourselves with Putin's
counterterrorism efforts, because I am not sure what form they
would take, given the way in which we try to conduct our
counterterrorism operations with a great deal of, shall we say,
care.
And what is, obviously, most vexing to me is watching
Syria. Instead of hitting ISIS, he hit the Free Syrian Army,
and instead of hitting the army, he hit the markets. His
bombers hit, you know, the hospitals, hit the schools. This
aspect of this is what is so troublesome for us in the West
because it seems counterproductive in terms of the effort of
actually going after Islamist terrorism.
So walk us through how, Dr. Aron, we could engage on that
front.
Mr. Aron. Well, on Syria, I mentioned, yes, all those
things you mentioned could be summarized under the heading of
``Different, Divergent Goals.'' The goal of Putin in Syria is
(A) to save the Assad regime, and we could discuss why he wants
it; (B) to present the West with a total repugnant choice
between Assad and ISIS; and (C) have Russia as the dominant
outside player in the Middle East. Clearly, neither of those is
our goal.
In Central Asia, on the other hand, I think the goals do
coincide. Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman, last week there was
not just a terrorist act, there was street fighting in the city
of Aktobe in Kazakhstan between government troops and
terrorists. That is 400 kilometers from Russia's borders. You
know, that is less than 250 miles.
Churchill was mentioned here, I think by Jack Matlock.
Central Asia is the soft underbelly of Russia. This is an
enormous area. You know that there are 6 million guest workers,
many of them illegal, in Russia coming in and out from Central
Asia. Russia is the major recruitment center for ISIS, an
estimated 300 to 500 recruiters. Most of Central Asians have
been recruited not in Kazakhstan or Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan,
they were recruited on construction sites in Moscow to join
ISIS.
There are all kinds of statistics. For example, Russian
speakers from Russia and the former Soviet Union, primarily
Central Asia, are the second-largest language group in ISIS
after Arabic speakers.
We cannot help Putin inside the country, and we could
discuss why he has this problem inside the country--
radicalization of its own Muslims and the guest workers. But in
Central Asia, I believe, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and, to a
certain extent, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are very troubled
states. If they fall, as I said, the danger to us is that they
will become havens for terrorists.
Chairman Royce. But let me just add a point, because Mr.
Engel and I have traveled in Central Asia, and we have had many
meetings and many explanations from local government officials
about how Gulf-state money floods into that region and acquires
either radio stations, television stations, newspapers;
increasingly, how also imams come from another part of the
world----
Mr. Aron. Right.
Chairman Royce [continuing]. And change the indigenous
Muslim faith, or ideology, to a new ideology. As they would say
to us, these are not our customs, these are customs that are
being imported here, but they are changing our culture.
And it looks like what we see happening across Central Asia
is also happening across southern Russia. And that, then, leads
to this problem. And I would argue this is going to be the next
big problem because of the rate at which this is happening.
The last point I wanted to ask you--I am almost out of
time--is just some of the stuff that we hear on RT television
or in Russian propaganda--the Zika virus was created by the
United States. You know, you have a $450 million budget
spreading this kind of nonsense across Latin America, Central
Asia, Europe, around the world, here, a lot of disinformation,
24 hours a day.
There has to be a more effective way to move forward to
counter this disinformation, get the facts out there, and, item
by item, knock this stuff down, you know, knock this narrative
down with the truth about what is going on, because, obviously,
it is having an impact among the Russian-speaking population in
Eastern Europe, certainly, but beyond that now. This is being
translated in all these other languages. And it is just a
constant, big lie, propaganda effort that has to be countered.
Dr. Aron, any response on that?
Mr. Aron. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have to put on my BBG
Governor hat. We have a good relationship with your committee.
We are working together to make U.S. international broadcasting
more effective.
Let me tell you, though, that my own experience is that,
ultimately, the most effective countermeasure to the Russian
propaganda is not just the U.S. airwaves but empowering the
local Russian-speaking population in former Soviet Union.
Chairman Royce. Reporters and stringers?
Mr. Aron. Reporters, stringers----
Chairman Royce. Uh-huh.
Mr. Aron [continuing]. Through nongovernment and government
grants.
One of the examples that I believe I gave, testifying on
the issue of the Russian propaganda in the Senate, was
StopFake, which is a very effective site in Kiev run by the
students of the department of journalism of the Mohyla Academy.
This is ultimately the only way to counter the Russian
propaganda, because it gives the people of those countries--
and, of course, this could be spread. Similar efforts are
occurring in the Baltics and in Central Asia.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Dr. Aron.
Mr. Eliot Engel of New York.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador McFaul, I wanted to discuss with you a little
bit about one of the things you mentioned when you said that
Ukraine is central to blocking Putin.
I have been really at odds with U.S. policy toward Ukraine.
First of all, back in 2008, I think it was a strategic blunder
that NATO did not admit Ukraine--and Georgia, by the way--in
2008. I know that the Bush administration said that they pushed
to have it done but that the Germans and then, to a lesser
degree, the French blocked it. I think that Putin's aggression
in both those countries would not have happened if they had
been members of NATO. I think our lack of bringing them into
NATO makes it virtually impossible for them to come into NATO
in the future, and I think that was a time lost.
I think that Ukraine is so important. It is really the
center of where we have our disagreements with Russia. If we
allow Crimea to just be annexed and do nothing about it, don't
even talk about it anymore, if we allow Putin to start this
nonsense in--if we allow Putin to continue his nonsense, I
should say--in eastern Ukraine--you know, reports indicate that
the fighting has stepped up again in Ukraine. And it seems that
every time Putin feels pressure in one part of the world he
will intensify the military campaign in the Ukrainian east as a
valve to release that pressure. And, you know, at the same
time, Ukraine is fighting serious corruption problems, and it
limits its government's ability to respond to the Russian
aggression.
I mean, I just think that we have the most pro-Western
government in Ukraine that we could possibly have, and God
forbid that government falls. It will be 100 years before we
will have anything like that.
And, to me, this really strikes at the core of NATO. If we
want NATO to continue to be successful and not just worthless,
it seems to me Ukraine is where we make our stand.
I disagree with the administration's lack of providing
weapons to the people of Ukraine. I know they feel that Ukraine
can never beat Russia, and so, if we provide Ukraine with more
weapons, it will just escalate the situation. But I think Putin
makes a different calculation. When Russian soldiers start
coming home in body bags, I think that his calculation will be
different, that he can just make trouble whenever he wants to
and there will be no price to pay.
So I want you to expand on Ukraine, because I think that is
really where it is all about. And shame on us if we allow that
regime in Ukraine to falter.
Ambassador McFaul. Thank you for the question.
I agree. I agree with everything you just said. I do
believe that the best way to support reform and those that care
about democracy and markets in Russia is to have Ukraine
succeed. I believe that the best way to deter further
aggression from Ukraine is to help Ukraine succeed. It is when
the government is collapsing, when democracy is not working,
when the economy is not producing that creates the permissive
conditions for more mischief.
So I really do think the key moment in all of European
security right now is what this government will do over the
next 2 to 10 years. This is a long-haul issue. This is not
something that is going to be solved in 6 months.
Mr. Engel. ``This government'' meaning which government?
Ambassador McFaul. The Ukrainian Government.
Mr. Engel. The Ukrainian Government.
Ambassador McFaul. Yes.
Now, I would disagree slightly. I think there were people
that used to be in the government that were better. You know,
Minister Jaresko, for instance, was, I think, a great Finance
Minister, the former Minister of the Economy. I hope to see
them back again.
But, generally, I think the glass is half-full, not half-
empty. They are doing some extraordinary things, especially on
the macroeconomic front, when facing some real big challenges.
And, you know, talking to some very senior folks over at the
IMF in the last few days, they are pleased with the progress
they have made.
The one issue that they agree, that the Ukrainians agree,
and I agree that needs more focus is a fight against corruption
and to get the oligarchs out of the political process. That is
going to be a long process, and we should be engaged in that
process. I think what happens in Ukraine really determines the
fate of what Russia will do with respect to that part of the
world.
With respect to Europe, with NATO, I would just say two
things. One, I disagree--I want to make sure everybody
understands I do disagree with Ambassador Matlock right now.
Whether it was right to expand NATO or not, we could relitigate
that. We were probably on different sides of that debate. But
to pull back now, I think, would be a very dangerous thing
because it would create a vacuum, it would create uncertainty
about our commitment to our NATO allies.
And, to me, the best way to keep the peace--we are all
quoting Ronald Reagan. Let me quote one more Ronald Reagan
quote. I am also at the Hoover Institution, by the way. ``Peace
through strength.'' So Putin needs to have zero doubt in his
mind that we are going to have our Article 5 commitments to our
allies, including our allies the Baltic states and Poland. And
that is why I support making that clear.
By the time when we got to the government, just to be clear
about the historical record, the debate about Ukraine joining
NATO was over. Whether that was good or bad, again, we can talk
about that; it was not on the agenda. So when I see on RT that
they are doing this in Crimea to stop NATO expansion, it is
nonsense. There was no NATO expansion.
I was in the government for 5 years, and pretty much every
meeting with Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev and on every phone call
but one, the issue of NATO expansion never came up once,
because the issue was over. Ukraine was not asking to join
NATO. NATO did not want Ukraine to join. After the election in
2010, Mr. Yanukovych even more so did not.
It all is a post facto rationalization for what Putin did
in Ukraine that he brings that up. And I think we need to be
clear about that historical record.
Mr. Engel. Okay. Thank you.
Ambassador McFaul. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. And thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, for making sure that this was a very balanced hearing
today. And I appreciate that, realizing that some of the things
that I believe are going on in the policies here don't reflect
very many of my fellow members' ideas of what the policies
should be. But we are all trying to be honest and trying to
make a better world, trying to find a way that we can actually
have peace between two of these major countries, the United
States and Russia.
And I am proud to have played a role in Ronald Reagan's
efforts to defeat communism and end the Cold War and, yes,
Ronald Reagan's intent to create a new era of friendship
between the United States, the people of the United States, and
the people of Russia. And I know that Ambassador Matlock played
an important role in this, as well, and I am very happy to see
him and hear him with us today.
Let me just note, I have been watching this for a long
time, as well, and I am appalled at the depth that we have let
our relationship sink to at this point. We are at the lowest
point of any time since the ending of the Cold War.
And I do not believe, as some people have indicated already
that they believe, that all of this can be related to Putin.
The fact is there has been an unrelenting hostility toward
Russia from the very days that we were negotiating with them
and they were making concessions that led to tearing down the
Berlin Wall; that led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops, which
were no longer Soviet troops, were Russian troops from Eastern
Europe; which led to major arms reduction agreements between
our countries; that, even during those times, there was an
element that hated Russia. Over and over again, we would hear
it. And some of them had very good reasons, because their
family were murdered by communists, who happened to be
Russians, during the Cold War.
And also we had people who just could not get over the fact
that it was not Russia that was the enemy in the Cold War, it
wasn't the Russian people, but was, indeed, communism that was
the enemy. It was the communism that spurred Russia to build
these rockets and missiles that threatened us, to support
radical elements around the world, to create revolutions in
order to establish atheistic communist dictatorships throughout
the world. That was communism. That wasn't the Russian people.
But yet there have been thousands of documents that have
just recently been declassified--Mr. Matlock, I want to ask you
if you have seen some of these and whether you agree with
them--that did say that we actually proposed to the Russians
that, if they would withdraw their troops from Eastern Europe,
that at that point we would not be expanding NATO, and we gave
them the impression they would be integrated into the economies
of Western Europe and the world. And, in either case, there was
no ability for the Russians to get into Europe. That is not
even a question. But, at the same time, we end up expanding
NATO.
Was there an understanding, although it wasn't written
down, that we would not have an expansion of NATO, so that
Russians would withdraw their troops and troops with guns aimed
at Russia would not go right up to their border? Was that an
understanding at that time, Mr. Matlock?
Ambassador Matlock. It was indeed. It was indeed the
understanding at that time. Now, this was not a legal
commitment.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Ambassador Matlock. I must say I testified in the Senate
against the original NATO expansion because I thought it was
not in the U.S. interest, and I thought it was not necessary to
begin to divide Europe again. At the end of the Cold War, we
had a Europe whole and free, and that was the objection. You
don't keep a Europe whole and free by taking what had been a
Cold War alliance, which should have been preserved as it was,
and using it by moving the things left, and it was quite
predictable then that if we did.
So the reason that I had for not expanding NATO was the
interest of the United States. However, it is quite true that
the Bush administration and our allies, particularly our
Germans, made statements during German unification that clearly
implied that if the Soviet Union did not use force in Eastern
Europe, and allow Germany to allow and stay in NATO, there
would be no expansion of NATO jurisdiction.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And this----
Ambassador Matlock. At one point, Secretary Baker said not
one inch to the east, and Gorbachev answered that, of course,
that would be unacceptable. They were talking about east
Germany, but the language is general.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman----
Ambassador Matlock. That was the understanding. Now, it was
not a legal question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me jump in here for a moment. That was
long before there was ever any Mr. Putin, and in fact, this is
long before any of these ``hostile acts'' that we are being
told about happened. That was an indication of what? That
people were still going to be treating Russia as if it was the
Soviet Union. And so right from the beginning, we have had this
incredible hostility that--and just let me note, we have, for
example, buzzing our airplanes right now, buzzing--are being
buzzed by Russian airplanes, our ships. The American people see
that.
Well, where are our ships? The ship that was being buzzed--
I don't remember where I heard this--was in the Baltic Sea and
here it was, I don't know how many miles from St. Petersburg,
but why are we sending our U.S. military forces that close to
Russia? We have nuclear weapons delivery systems that are being
aimed at Russia. How else would they think of that except as
being a hostile act? And for them to buzz a ship to see what
kind of ship it was right off their borders.
By the way, some of these ships that we have sent there are
closer to Russia than Catalina Island is to Los Angeles. What
if some nuclear weapons delivery system showed up there? What
would we think? Would we send an airplane out to buzz it around
and see what kind of ship it is?
I think that both sides, both Russia and the United States
need to take a deep breath and step back from this whole
military operation that are actually making things worse rather
than making things better, and we need to find out where our
differences are, negotiate them, see where we can work
together.
And Mr. Aron, thank you very much for your wonderful
testimony today, which is aimed at where we need to work
together, or we are all going to suffer because radical Islam
is the threat today, not the Soviet Union. And so, I appreciate
you focusing on where we could cooperate, which would be better
for both of us.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and----
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will be ready for a second round if we
have it.
Chairman Royce. Okay. And we are going to go to Mr. Gregory
Meeks of New York.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first say, Ambassador McFaul, you are right, and
that I have learned a lot listening to all three of you. As you
said in your initial statements, it has been very----
Ambassador McFaul. And I will send you my book for free,
okay.
Mr. Meeks. Okay. I will take it. I will read it. I have a
long trip. It will be good to read. And let me also say that,
for me, you know, I consider myself a multilateralist, and I
believe that diplomacy is the best way to try to resolve
things. And you know, I have heard the conversations going back
and forth about President Reagan and Gorbachev. Well, we can
always go back to Kennedy and Khrushchev. Even when we were at
the height of this danger of nuclear weapons, the dialogue
between them continued. In fact, President Kennedy also went to
the Soviet Union then to meet with Khrushchev so that they
could have conversations, and there were telephone calls going
back and forth in trying to make sure that we didn't have a
major catastrophic scenario that could have ruined the world
actually.
And so, for me, to cast off and say that we shouldn't talk
to one country or another just does not make sense in this day
and age. It didn't make sense in the 1960s, and it still
doesn't make sense today in 2016. And so we have to figure out,
in my estimation, on how do we do talk and work with one
another. And when I initially came into Congress, with me,
there were two huge countries that are important. Sometimes we
get along with them and sometimes we don't, but we have got to
figure this out.
Russia is one of them. Turkey is the other. Because when
you talk about the global context, you can't act as though they
don't exist because they do. And so much so, that I was, at
that time, tried to establish and we were moving a long a
Russian caucus.
We would talk with the Russians on a regular basis and try
to get to know members of their Parliament, because sometimes I
think when you have parliamentarian-to-parliamentarian
conversation relationships, that helps things, as opposed to
breaking things down, and I, for one, think that that is a
direction that we still need to move in, and I think it is
tremendously important.
And as you said, Ambassador McFaul, in this current
administration, there is a lot that we have done together, a
lot of things. Some, you know, when you talk about the START
Treaty and the interest of WTO, security, U.N. Security
Council, dealing with, you know, the sanctions against Iran as
far as nuclear weapons are concerned because it is all in our
mutual interest, and I agree with you 100 percent in regards to
supporting and making sure we are there for our NATO allies and
not pulling out.
Now, it seems to me, and I just want to be corrected one
way or the other, that when Medvedev was in charge, there was
really close dialogue, et cetera. Now, some will tell me that
Putin was always in charge, and he was the guy in the
background. And so when it ended, and Putin came back in, it
seemed to me that there then became some real problems with
reference to communication, even with reference to you as
Ambassador to Russia, and whether or not the reset agreement,
whether or not that was successful or not.
Can you tell me what happened? Why, you know, in that
change, especially when Putin was in charge all along, what
happened right in that period so that our relationships at
least try to work in a common interest on things that are
common to both of us, what happened in that time?
Ambassador McFaul. So Congressman, thank you for that great
question that I can't do justice to in a minute-and-a-half, but
I think it is a fundamental question, because if we don't get
the answer right, the prescriptions are going to be wrong.
I just want to remind you that we did have this period of
cooperation, and your efforts, Congressman, I just want to
applaud. I think engagement is always good. Even if you
disagree, you want to know why you are disagreeing, and
somebody--we were talking earlier about cooperation on
counterintelligence with terrorists. We did that, Mr. Chairman.
We did that with the Russians. And you remember, you and I
spent a really interesting day down at the KGB offices, right,
learning in terms of cooperation. We were doing all those
things.
Moreover, I just want to read you--you don't have to
believe. Let me quote President Medvedev speaking about NATO at
the NATO summit in Lisbon. I was there with him. This is what
he said on the record, and I will tell you what he said after
the record later. He said, ``Incidentally''--this is the
President of Russia--``even a declaration approved at the end
of our talks states that we seek to develop a strategic
partnership. This is not a chance choice of words, but signals
that we have succeeded in putting the difficult period in our
relations behind us now.''
That is the President of Russia. That is not Barack Obama.
That is the President of Russia just a few years ago, so you
have to explain what happened after that----
Mr. Meeks. That is right.
Ambassador McFaul [continuing]. To understand the conflict.
And in my view, just to re-underscore it, it has to do with
Putin coming back. Yes, he was the grand decision maker all the
time. We dealt with both the Prime Minister and the President
when I was in the government, but at the end of day, he had a
much more suspicious view of the United States, and in
particular, a suspicious view that we go around the world
overthrowing regimes, either covertly or overtly that we don't
like.
And by way, there is a lot of data to support his
hypothesis about American foreign policy over the last 70
years. And so the President--I was at many of these meetings,
and the President would sit with Putin and say, The CIA is not
supporting the overthrow of Mubarak. The CIA is not supporting
the overthrow of your regime. These Russians, some of them are
in the back here actually, they are actually acting on their
own. These Ukrainians, they are actually acting on their own.
They are not controlled by the United States of America.
Putin didn't want to believe that. Now, whether he knew the
truth but didn't want to believe it for political purposes or
genuinely didn't believe it--we used to argue about that in the
administration, but he decided that he needed us as an enemy,
to discredit these people.
And the last thing. We have heard--and you know, there is
blame to go around, and I am happy to talk about some of the
mistakes that we made if I had more time, because I do think we
made a few mistakes in the Obama administration. But I want to
radically reject this moral equivalency that somehow we are all
to blame here, and you know, that it is blame on America, blame
on the United States. I want to know precisely what the Obama
administration did to cause this conflict, because I can tell
you precisely what Putin did.
If we had the 10 Commandments about how to be a good
multilateralist, how to be a good international citizen, at the
top three, one of them would be: Thou shall not annex the
territory of thy neighbor.
And I am sorry, that is what he did.
Mr. Meeks. That is right.
Ambassador McFaul. We didn't annex any territory. We didn't
support any revolution against him, and there has to be a
response to that. We just can't sit on our hands and say, Well,
you know, let's all try to get along here. No, there has to be
a response. Thou does not--especially in Europe, we cannot
allow annexation to become policy that does not have a
response.
Having said all that, I want to remind you that even during
the conflict that we had, we still managed to cooperate with
Mr. Putin. I was there with him when we did the chemical
weapons deal between the United States and Russia in September
2003. That is smart diplomacy. We managed the P5+1 negotiations
on Iran, even during this time, and some of these other issues,
including terrorism, if we can cooperate where it is in our
national interest, we should, but we have to also respond to
these aggressive things when they happen.
Mr. Meeks. Absolutely.
Chairman Royce. We are going to go to Mr. Steve Chabot of
Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Matlock. Since I was mentioned, may I make a
statement here. I have never used moral equivalency. This is
not my----
Ambassador McFaul. I did not----
Ambassador Matlock. Nor have I ever----
Ambassador McFaul. I didn't mention you, Jack.
Ambassador Matlock. You did.
Ambassador McFaul. I didn't mean to.
Chairman Royce. If I could----
Ambassador McFaul. I was quoting my own testimony.
Chairman Royce. If I could go to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio,
he has some questions.
Mr. Chabot. Thanks. I have just have a couple of points
first before I ask any question. I think it is pretty clear to
me and a number of us that I think this administration's
withdrawal from America's traditional leadership role has left
a power vacuum around the globe, one that Putin has taken
advantage of, as well as other bad actors. ISIS, obviously,
comes to mind, China building islands in the South China Sea,
and then militarizing them.
But Putin, with invading Crimea, and to a great extent, I
think the West lamely protested, but ultimately did little or
nothing, I would like to commend my colleague from the
Commonwealth of Virginia for his attention on Crimea, for
example, and my colleague, the ranking member, obviously has
stressed in his remarks of Crimea that we not forget what has
happened there, because I think the world has to a great
extent.
But you know, after basically invading and then having a
bogus referendum and essentially taken over the country, they
have continued with aggression in eastern Ukraine, and the
Ukraines have fought bravely, but they are just outgunned.
Putin has also been expanding Russia's military footprint in
places like Armenia, which has welcomed thousands of Russian
troops and an infusion of advanced weaponry, and this has
resulted in Putin pressuring NATO's southern flank, just as the
alliance is trying to reinforce its eastern flank, and having
been to Poland and Latvia and Lithuania and Estonia and Hungary
and other countries in the region, a lot of these countries are
just scared to death with what Putin is up to.
But Putin continues to hone in on Nagorno-Karabakh, an area
that we don't talk about that much anymore. We talked about it
maybe a couple of decades back, but not much anymore, but it is
a region that is vulnerable to conflict, and tensions have
flared up and deaths are occurring there. There has been
military action there in recent months, and I believe he hopes
this arrangement, Nagorno-Karabakh will shore up his
international reputation and pull Armenia and Azerbaijan closer
to Russia and further away from the West.
Putin's engagement in Syria in the Middle East has only
complicated matters there. As the U.S. works to defeat a
ruthless terrorist group, ISIS in the region, Putin undermines
our efforts, to a great extent, by lending support to the Assad
regime, continuing to test the limits of Turkey, supplying
weapons systems to Iran, and on and on.
But let me--and I don't have a huge amount of time,
obviously, even less. Let me go to the first point that I
raised about Crimea.
I think that, you know, the world, unfortunately, to a
considerable degree, has accepted this as a fait accompli. You
don't hear much in the news about it about--in the press much
at all. It is my understanding that the repression there is
worsening, that Russia is tightening its grip on Crimea, that
they are escalating their campaign against dissents, and Dr.
Aron, would you comment on what is happening in Crimea and what
the rest of the world ought to be doing about it, including the
United States now?
Mr. Aron. Well, thank you very much, and I am sure my
colleagues could comment, too. Just the latest number by the
refugee agency, Ukrainian refugee agency, but I think they are
being quite honest here. About 100,000 refugees left Crimea.
Now, this is out of a population of probably half a million.
What I find most dangerous----
Mr. Chabot. That is 20 percent of the population has left
their country?
Mr. Aron. Approximately. Approximately. I mean, you know,
these numbers, because nobody could get there without being
harassed, and many are barred from going there, many
international organizations by Russia, it is hard to say, but
the numbers are staggering.
What concerns me--and I would like to circle back to my
issue of the Russian jihad, is that as far as we could
establish, in percentage terms, relative to their population,
the greatest ethnic representation in ISIS is Crimean Tatars,
at between 300 and 500 people, and there are no more than
120,000 Crimea Tatars. Now, this is greatly exacerbated by the
fact that Putin dissolved the self-governing body of the Crimea
Tatars in Crimea. He prevented their leaders, including Mosad
Jamilif, former Soviet dissident, from coming back to their
homeland, returning.
So there is a whole group of exiles now in Ukraine. So this
all exacerbates the situation, and it, again, feeds into
extremism in the case of Crimean Tatars. Because when I spoke
about the danger of the Russian jihad, from the inside, the key
danger is that the Islamic militancy that used to be confined
largely to North Caucasus is now spreading inside Russia. It is
spreading toward Tatarstan. It is spreading toward the fringes.
Of course, always the fringes, of about 6 million strong
Central Asian Diaspora in Russia.
So Crimea, in addition to being a gross violation of
international norms, in addition to being a gross violation of
human rights of the Crimean Tatars and others who live in
Crimea, it is also a very dangerous situation where it could
lead to the rise of Islamic extremism.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher [presiding]. Thank you very much, Dr. Aron,
and--thank you, and look who has got the gavel now.
Ms. Bass. Oh, oh, we are all in trouble.
Mr. Rohrabacher. My goodness, isn't democracy wonderful.
I now recognize Karen Bass. Thank you very much.
Ms. Bass. Why, thank you, Mr. Chair.
One, I just wanted to thank the panelists. I really
appreciated all the testimony, and I wanted to agree with my
colleague here, Representative Meeks, that I am sure all of us
learned a lot from what each of you had to say.
I wanted to ask, Ambassador Matlock, you referred to, in
your testimony, that you had some additional views on how we
could reduce tension. You also said that--I believe you said
that one thing that we shouldn't do is increase our military
involvement, or require payments from NATO countries, and then
you cautioned on taking on liabilities.
And I was wondering, the ranking member is talking about
legislation that would impose additional sanctions, and I
wondered about your comments within that context, and if we did
impose additional sanctions, would that be an example of the
liabilities that you were concerned about?
Ambassador Matlock. Yes. Thank you very much for the
question. Obviously, in just a few minutes, I cannot go into
great detail. Let me first address the issue of Ukraine in
Crimea.
I think everything said by the others has been correct, but
they have taken a lot of things out of context. And frankly, I
do not agree that our new national security is significantly
affected by what happens in Ukraine. I think we have to have
certain priorities. And second, I am certain there is no way to
solve the problem militarily. Let's look at reality. Russia,
given its history, given its close association, is not going to
allow the Ukrainian situation to be solved militarily, so
giving military aid, encouraging a military response simply
causes more damage to the area, and it is not going to be
solved that way.
The basic thing we have to bear in mind, and this is
unfortunate, but it is reality, and that is, you cannot have a
united prosperous Ukraine which does not have close relations
with Russia. And the second thing is, if you look at the
politics and history and the economics, Ukraine is better off
without Crimea. Now, I don't like the way Russians took it, and
we should not recognize it, as we don't. However, to think that
by bringing pressure to bear on them we can make them change
their policy simply plays into Putin's hands because it makes
it a national issue. So any attempts to use military force or
to encourage it will make the situation worse.
Now, that is one thing. Now, on the--this is true of some
of these other issues. Obviously, terrorism is a threat to both
of us. I think that we need to define our aims as to what the
ultimate aim is. Our aim in Syria should not be to remove the
leader, whoever he is. Our aim should be to do what we can to
keep the country from falling apart to keep ISIS out, to keep
the refugees out of Europe.
Now, the Russian opinion has been, you will get more chaos
in Syria if you remove the current regime the way we did in
Iraq, the way we did in Libya. They have a point. Can't we
understand that?
Ms. Bass. Can I ask you, if the ranking----
Ambassador Matlock. I think what we need to do is to
concentrate on those areas where our interests are and find
better ways to do them.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Ambassador Matlock. As far as Russia's internal government,
Russians are going to decide that. And to the degree that we
try to interfere, they look at it just as we looked at the
Communist Party during the Cold War.
Ms. Bass. Okay.
Ambassador Matlock. That is if our democratization efforts
are simply in opposition to the current regime. They are going
to react to that.
Ms. Bass. Let me ask, Ambassador McFaul, I wanted to one
question. And thank you very much, Ambassador Matlock.
What do you see as the future? I mean, do you think that
Putin is going to make a switch again? I don't know when his
``term'' is over, but do you think that he will switch again
and become the Prime Minister and prop up another President?
What is your best guess?
Ambassador McFaul. So first of all, I just want to be clear
about this. To the degree that which we interfere, Putin is
going to react. I totally agree with Ambassador Matlock on
that. What I disagree is the assumption that somehow we are
interfering.
We did not give one penny to the democratic opposition when
I was in the U.S. Government, and I just want to make that
clear because I think you said ``perceptions.'' Well,
perceptions have to be rebutted when they are not true, okay.
We are not fomenting revolution in Russia and----
Ambassador Matlock. But they had an Assistant Secretary of
State speaking on a telephone, cell phone that could be
monitored talking about who should be the Prime Minister of
Ukraine in a revolutionary situation.
Ambassador McFaul. I was speaking on----
Ambassador Matlock. Now, what are the Russians going to
think about that?
Ambassador McFaul. Well, that was a mistake. I agree with
you.
Ambassador Matlock. Not only was it a mistake, it was----
Ambassador McFaul. It was a mistake, but if you want to
know the full details, it was the mistake in the----
Ambassador Matlock. And you wonder about perceptions.
Ambassador McFaul. Well, let me give you the----
Ambassador Matlock. If it had happened in----
Ambassador McFaul. Doctor----
Ambassador Matlock [continuing]. Cuba or Mexico, how would
we have reacted?
Ambassador McFaul. So let me give you the full context of
that conversation if you are interested. The conversation was
about how to get a coalition government together with President
Yanukovych. We, the United States Government, the Obama
administration, were seeking to diffuse tensions on the
streets, and we, on February 21, worked hard with our European
allies to cut a deal between the opposition and Mr. Yanukovych,
President Yanukovych. The Vice President called him about a
dozen times to cut a deal between him and the street. We were
not trying to overthrow Mr. Yanukovych, and 12 hours later, for
some unexpected reason, he showed up in Rostov. To this day, I
don't know why he fled. So----
Ms. Bass. My question----
Ambassador McFaul [continuing]. You said we need context--
--
Ms. Bass [continuing]. About Putin----
Ambassador McFaul. There is little context.
Ms. Bass. Hello.
Ambassador McFaul. But I want to come back to your
question, Ma'am.
Ms. Bass. Thank you.
Ambassador McFaul. I am a giant optimist about Russia. I
want to make that clear. I am a huge optimist about Russia. I
can't predict when and where, and the interregnum, I have no
prediction about, but I, as a social scientist, I study
political and economic change around the world, and Russia is a
rich country. Russia has a rising middle class. Most Russians
want to be integrated into the world, and yes, Russians should
be in charge of their own fate. But Russians, all of them, not
just Mr. Putin or that regime, and I just don't think those
structural forces of change that Russia is going to somehow be
the one country that becomes middle income or high--when they
become an even higher income country, and be the one country
that will not move in this kind of forces for political and
economic modernization.
I just have met too many young people that are just like my
students at Stanford that just want a normal life. They want a
good job, they want to travel abroad, and they want their
government to represent them----
Mr. Rohrabacher [presiding]. Thank you.
Ambassador McFaul. And so in the long run, I am incredibly
optimistic about Russia. I just don't know how long the long
run is.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Aron. Chairman Rohrabacher----
Mr. Rohrabacher. The Chair will recognize Mr. Joe Wilson of
South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Acting Chairman Dana Rohrabacher.
And it is right on point. I have been optimistic about a U.S./
Russian friendship. And I have had a number of visits have been
very inspiring to me to promote nuclear cooperation, building
friendships with the people of Russia from Moscow to St.
Petersburg to Novosibirsk and Siberia. I have been very
grateful that my home community of Columbia is the sister city
of Shiabinsk. I have had wonderful visits. And every time I go,
I have been so impressed by the people of Russia, the culture
of Russia.
I have had members of the Duma visit our office. They have
been welcomed. But sadly, things have not developed like I
anticipated. Additionally, in my home community of South
Carolina, the midlands of South Carolina, we welcomed a large
number of very prosperous Russian Americans to our community.
In fact, the Columbia Civic Ballet could be misidentified as
the St. Petersburg Civic Ballet, and we welcome the--again, the
extraordinary contributions of Russian Americans to our State.
But sadly, the high hopes that I had of mutual benefit
cooperation, as you indicated, with growing middle class travel
has really been crushed by the aggression that I have
personally seen in our extraordinarily brave ally, the Republic
of Georgia, and that hasn't been mentioned. That was 2008. And
then, of course, the aggression in Ukraine.
With that, Dr. Aron, in April 2016, Russian fighter jets
flew within 30 feet of the USS Donald Cook, then flew a Russian
interceptor within 50 feet of American reconnaissance aircraft.
Could you explain the rationale between such bizarrely
dangerous actions on the part of Russia and what can be done by
the United States and our allies to curtail such activity?
Mr. Aron. My goodness, that is quite a question. Before I
answer, just a factual correction, if I may. I misspoke. The
population of Crimea is 2 million people. So 100,000 refugees
constitutes about 5 percent, not 20 percent, an important
correction.
I am a big believer, and I know--and I know Jack Matlock
may not agree with that, but I think Mike McFaul, and I think
similarly about these things. I think most of these acts are
done for domestic political purposes. The government of 3 years
ago, before Ukraine, before anything else, a top Russian
political sociologist, whose name I will not mention, just I
don't want to get him in trouble, told me, Leon, you know, why
are you talking about foreign policy as something separate from
domestic? The only thing going for this regime is its foreign
policy. This is where the legitimacy is. Russia rising off its
knees again, Russia is where the Soviet Union used to be, and
Vladimir Putin secured Russia as a great super power again.
We underestimated the appeal that this caused in the hearts
and minds of millions of Russians because we underestimated the
hurt that occurred when the Soviet Union collapsed. So these
singular facts of bringing it to the brink and bringing it to
the point is to show domestically that Putin is not intimidated
by the United States, that he is ready to take all the
necessary means to defend Russia against the danger that may
not exist.
I think Mike McFaul and I agree on this. The point is that
he is almost forced to act provocatively because that is where
his regime support and legitimacy and popularity is.
Mr. Wilson. And, but again, 30 feet, 50 feet, that is
ridiculous. The obvious extraordinary loss of life that could
occur is so irresponsible, and not in the interest of the
people of Russia, or its foreign policy or its military.
Mr. Aron. Sir, as I said in the concluding remarks to my
statement, we are facing an unprecedented danger, a risk-prone,
highly personalistic authoritarian regime that acts both out of
mission and out of ideology. It is pushed toward these types of
acts, and that is what scares me the most.
Mr. Wilson. You mentioned Foreign Affairs magazine, and
yesterday, General Philip Breedlove, the former commander of
European commander and NATO supreme allied commander, had an
article that I am confident you probably already read, that
America needs to do more to deter the Russian threat. And so I,
again, appreciate all of your service, and I thank you very
much for being here today. And I yield back to the----
Mr. Aron. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Acting chairman, of all people,
Dana Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you. Now, let me get this
straight. You have a candidate somewhere saying he wants to
make his country great again? And then takes over the reigns of
power? That could never happen really in a modern society,
could it?
All right. It is supposed to be a joke. That was supposed
to be funny. All right. We now have Mr. Boyle.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you, and thank you to all three of the
witnesses. I have several things I want to go over, but first,
I can't help the irony that we are having this hearing, and
literally, in the last 5 minutes, The Washington Post is
reporting that according to security experts, Russian
Government hackers have hacked the Democratic National
Committee to find oppo research that the DNC has, and that is
according to our own security experts. So spare me the moral
equivalency language that mistakes have been made on both
sides.
Second point I would like to make is I know that there are
some who want to conveniently take shots at President Obama and
the Obama administration over what happened in Crimea, and that
somehow if the U.S. President had been stronger, this would
have been prevented. Is it Hungary, 1956, President Eisenhower;
1968, Czechoslovakia would have been Lyndon Johnson; 2008, when
George W. Bush was President, the invasion of Georgia. Those
were previous Presidents, both Democrats and Republicans, who
were unable to prevent a Russian premier, or then chairman of
the USSR, from acting.
Now, third, that having been said, I want to associate
myself with what Ranking Member Engel said in terms of our
response now moving forward to support Ukraine. I believe there
is more that we can be and should be doing. Clearly, we are in
joint operations now with the three Baltic Republics as well as
in Poland. I wish that we were doing more, and I am a cosponsor
of legislation to do more in Ukraine, and I was hoping that
possibly Mr. McFaul, you could speak to that more specifically
what we could be doing now to bolster Ukraine and make sure
that those who are Western looking succeed, because I agree,
that would be one of the greatest things for American foreign
policy.
Ambassador McFaul. So thank you for your question, and I
agree. I want to associate myself with you in terms of that
historical record. I think, in terms of Ukraine, I just want to
underscore, again, more context, that I don't see consolidating
democracy or strengthening markets in Ukraine as anti-Russian.
When I was Ambassador, we had this argument frequently with
senior members of the Russian Government, and we--our position,
our administration's position, was you should be able to join
whatever trade agreement you want, whatever treaty you want, as
long as it doesn't infringe on other rights and
responsibilities that you have in other organizations that you
joined in terms of seeking win-win outcomes.
I think the idea of going back to some 19th century idea of
spheres of influence makes no sense in the 21st century. The
borders, you know, where I live in the Silicon Valley, the idea
that somehow borders and geography are what makes countries
rich or not is just, you know, that is a very outdated----
Mr. Boyle. Very retrograde.
Ambassador McFaul. Yeah, I want to just really make that
clear that this is not an anti-Russian policy that to support
Ukrainian democracy or Ukrainian markets. And in that regard, I
think the best investment that you all have supported with your
support has been to help develop Ukrainian civil society. I
think it has been a fantastic success story, that it cannot be
done in other countries for other circumstances. But I think
the pressure from society to make the government perform is the
best way to try to help reform in Ukraine.
And it is working now. It is difficult, it is hard, it is
not easy to correct 30 years of oligarchic corrupt capitalism.
I want to underscore that. It is going to be a long process. It
is going to take some electoral cycles, in my view, to change
that, but I think that is the core. Support society, support
independent media, and they will put the pressure on the
government.
Mr. Boyle. Let me--since I have time and now less than, in
50 seconds, let me just shift a bit. You know, there is
something kind of self-centered in a sense that we always think
when foreign policy actor does X, it is somehow because of
something that the U.S. did or did not do. I tend to believe
that a lot of Putin's actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine
have less to do with any U.S. policy and more to do with
Russian domestic politics, and specifically, his standing, and
I was wondering if any of you would like to speak to that.
Agree or disagree?
Ambassador McFaul. Could I just briefly say----
Ambassador Matlock. Now----
Ambassador McFaul. Go ahead, Jack. Go ahead. I will go
second.
Ambassador Matlock. I think one thing we tend to forget is
that there is only one country that can solve Ukraine's
problems, and that is Ukraine. The basic problem is that
Ukraine is a deeply divided society.
When I was Ambassador to the Soviet Union, whenever I went
to Ukraine, I always gave my speeches in Ukrainian language. I
have been following things that happened in Ukraine since I was
a high school student and did reporters on the role during the
war. I know this country. And I also know that when they got
independence, their borders were, to some degree, artificial.
Crimea had only been added by fiat without consulting anybody
in the 1950s.
Now--and so Ukraine--I went there to advise a group in the
late 1990s on national security from--other former colleagues
from our National Security Council, we were telling them how we
organize our national security. The Ukrainians came back and
said: Look, you are talking about foreign policy. Let me show
you what our problem is. And they showed the sides of the last
election, very evenly divided almost entirely on the west on
one side and on the other side in the east and south.
Now--and this is in every election. Also, they had a
constitution, which was not a Federal constitution, it was
unitary. A President who won maybe by just 1 percentage of the
vote named every governor. And you know where the violence
started after the Maidan? It started in the west by them taking
over the governorships. The corrupt President that they got rid
of would never have been elected if Crimea had not been part of
Ukraine.
There are a lot of issues here, a very deep history, and
the basic problem is Ukraine. Yes, Russia has intervened, just
as we take a very close interest in countries to us but----
Chairman Royce [presiding]. Yes, Ambassador, but we have
run over the time.
Ambassador Matlock [continuing]. The fact is the Ukrainians
are going to have to solve it.
Chairman Royce. Right.
Ambassador Matlock. And our involvement tends to have a
negative effect.
Chairman Royce. Yes, Ambassador. We are going to need to go
to Mr. Ted Poe of Texas. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being
here. Ambassador Matlock, I appreciate the fact that you are so
knowledgeable, and you have looked at the whole issue with
Russia as a historical point of view starting with really
before World War I. I think we need to understand history,
especially the way the Russians understand history so that we
can move forward.
I am not going to ask you a question, because if I ask you
a question, it is like asking you the time, you will tell me
how to make a watch, and so I am just going to make a couple of
comments.
I never thought I would see the day that in a committee
hearing, we would have two former Ambassadors from the same
region of the world mix it up together during the committee
hearing. I think that is--it is a good thing. I am not being
critical.
Ambassador McFaul. It is democracy, right?
Mr. Poe. It is democracy. I think it is a good thing. Let's
talk a little bit about Hitler.
The Russians moved into Georgia in 2008. I am always in the
wrong place at the wrong time. I happened to be there a week
after they invaded, and I saw the tanks up on the hill, and
then in the West, we didn't do anything, and the tanks are
still there and they have one-third of Georgia.
Crimea, the Russians took Crimea, their little green men,
they moved into eastern Ukraine, chairman and I and some others
were there right after the Russians came into eastern Ukraine,
and they are still there. I just need a yes or no from the
three of you.
Are the Russians going to stay in that one-third portion of
Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine? Are they going to stay
there or are they going to go home? Are they going to stay, Mr.
Ambassador McFaul? Let's start on--I will start on the far left
here. Are they going to stay in those areas?
Ambassador McFaul. My prediction is yes. You said one word.
Mr. Poe. One word. It is either yes or no.
Ambassador McFaul. I am a professor. I don't know how to
give one word answers. Yes.
Mr. Poe. Ambassador Matlock, just yes or no.
Ambassador Matlock. I think they are going to stay in those
enclaves in Georgia, which the Georgians treat it the way the
Serbs were treating Kosovo.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Ambassador Matlock. And the problem has been----
Mr. Poe. Mr. Ambassador, excuse me for interrupting.
Ambassador Matlock. Crimea----
Mr. Poe. Crimea, are they going to stay in Crimea?
Ambassador Matlock. Will they stay? Most likely, unless----
Mr. Poe. Answer the question.
Ambassador Matlock. Unless----
Mr. Poe. Are they going to stay in Crimea?
Ambassador Matlock [continuing]. The majority of the people
prefer to be in Ukraine. In that case, Crimea will become a
liability, and there will be incentive to join with Ukraine.
Mr. Poe. Eastern Ukraine, are they going to stay in eastern
Ukraine?
Ambassador Matlock. They would be required to give Crimea
autonomy----
Mr. Poe. Mr. Ambassador, just answer the question.
Ambassador Matlock [continuing]. Which now they haven't
been. I think a lot of----
Mr. Poe. Mr. Ambassador, to stay in eastern Ukraine? The
Russians in eastern Ukraine?
Ambassador Matlock. In eastern Ukraine, no. I think there
was never an intent----
Mr. Poe. Dr. Aron, what is your opinion?
Ambassador Matlock [continuing]. To take the Dombok. The
Dombok----
Mr. Poe. I have moved on to the next witness.
Ambassador Matlock. But they----
Mr. Poe. I have moved on to the next witness, please, sir.
I reclaim my time. My time.
Chairman Royce. I think just----
Ambassador Matlock. They will make sure that there is not
an anti----
Mr. Poe. I need some help, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Matlock. In charge of the Dombok.
Chairman Royce. I think my hearing is a little impaired,
and I am not the only one with the difficulty sometimes of
hearing, and so we will go to Dr. Aron.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Aron. Yes, on all three until the regime changes
Mr. Poe. All right. The only other question I have time for
is what do you think the Russians will do next? Where are they
going? I think Putin finds an opportunity, he seizes it, and he
moves in. People in Russia are nationalistic. His popularity
skyrocketed when he went into Georgia and Ukraine. You know, I
think he wants to be the next czar of Russia. I think that is
probably what he is after, but where do you think they are
going to go--Putin is going to move next?
Ambassador McFaul. I don't assume that he has a grand plan
to go into this place and that place and the other. I think it
is incumbent upon us to reduce the opportunities for him to do
those things. I think Novorossiya has been a fantastic failure,
for instance. What he tried to do in seizing territory in the
eastern Ukraine has been a fantastic failure, and it is, in
part, a failure because there was pushback. And that is why,
you know, I go back to peace through strength. If we make sure
that he has no doubt about our commitments to Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania, that will keep the peace, and that is what I
would want us to focus on as a way not because to confront
Russia, but to keep the peace on that very precarious border.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Aron, what is your opinion, future movement,
if any, by Mr. Putin?
Mr. Aron. The most vulnerable is the Baltics, and of them,
the most vulnerable, the Narva area between Russia and Estonia.
And I agree with Mike, those are three NATO members now, and
presumably, that is a deterrent.
But if the domestic situation requires it, I think Putin
may try to expose NATO as a paper tiger, and have a great
upsurge in domestic popularity. So that is a huge risk.
Chairman Royce. We need to go to Mr. Cicilline of Rhode
Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses. I had an opportunity recently to travel with my good
friend, Mr. Rohrabacher, to Moscow, and one of the meetings we
had was at the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe. What I
learned was very disturbing. The Russian Government, under the
leadership of President Putin, had shut down all of the radio
stations. I think there were 30 or so.
There was one station remaining that had a freestanding
license, and then the Russian Government passed a law that
required, if I am remembering this correctly, that it have the
majority Russian ownership, so that license ultimately was
revoked as well.
So Ambassador McFaul, it seems to me that in responding to
this very sophisticated and very pervasive state-controlled
media and propaganda machine, I think, really extraordinary, I
think the best estimates are that they spend more than $450
million a year to broadcast to more than 30 million Russian
speakers 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. What, if anything, are
we doing, can we do to provide information that counters that
narrative when the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe are
basically precluded from providing information, or maybe that
has changed since my visit?
Ambassador McFaul. So I want Leon Aron to speak to this
because he does serve on the BBG board and he knows these
issues a lot better than I do, but I do want to just associate
myself with what he said earlier in his testimony.
It is difficult for the United States Government to give
money to reporters because that immediately will taint them. I
know, you know, all the reporters, almost all the reporters in
Russia, and if they were here today, the independent ones, they
would say do not do that. We can't--we can't take your money.
We need to be independent. What we can do is we can provide
them with information, we can have strategic alliances with
them to provide that, we can provide internships in our news
organizations. We, at Stanford University, for instance, we
have a Knight Fellowship program where we will soon have the
former editor of Oktyabr as a visiting scholar because she was
thrown out of her job.
And so those kinds of things, educational programs, I
think, need to get much more attention. Because there are lots
of, literally thousands of Russians, trying to figure out a way
to contribute to their country that are now living in exile.
These are the kind of opportunities that we should expand, but
what we can do internally, I will let Leon answer that
question, if he wants to.
Mr. Aron. Thanks very much, Mike. Thank you, sir. Just a
brief comment. Russia is still not Iran or China. Social media
are more or less free, and this is where the effort is going,
because the generation we will want to affect is the generation
of social media. And you know, as far as I know, BBG and the
gruntees, that is the radios, are less of radios. They are more
of TVs, they are more of Twitter, they are more of social media
platforms, and I think there is hope there.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. The second question I have is,
one thing we saw a tremendous evidence of was the deterioration
of the Russian economy, serious structural problems, falling
oil prices, the Ukraine-related sanctions, and it is pretty
clear the Kremlin has worked to preempt potential domestic
discontent through this distraction of foreign interventions.
And my question really is, with the conflict in eastern
Ukraine settling into a stalemate and the Russian military
intervening in Syria last fall, how long can this kind of
opportunistic strategy work? And what should we do to prepare
against it? Maybe Ambassador McFaul, I can start with you?
Ambassador McFaul. So I agree with your analysis, and
public opinion poll data out of Russia, even though it is very
difficult to get accurate data, also concurs with that. I would
just say historically and comparatively, we are not very good
at predicting when declines and economic growth or depression
leads to political change, and I would just remind you that I
would never try to make a prediction based on that. But is
there tension around that? Are people asking why are we in
eastern Ukraine when, you know, our economic situation is
getting worse? That question is being asked more and more
there.
My view is we need to stay the course in terms of what the
policy is. I want to lift sanctions on Russian individuals and
companies. I want to associate myself with that, if and when
they do what they have signed up to do and their proxies have
signed up to do in Mensk. It is just that simple. If you do
this, then the sanctions will be lifted.
I find it very scary when people say sanctions aren't
working, so let's lift them, or an idea that is floating around
Europe right now, let's do partial sanctions for partial
implementations. I think those are very bad ideas. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. We have luncheon with the Dalai Lama, so--
and without objection, there are a couple of witness statements
that I am going to include for the record.
And now we will go to Mr. Tom Marino of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman. Excellent hearing.
Gentlemen, I would like you to be as precise as possible. We
all have something to do after this. I have three questions.
Ambassador McFaul. I am not having lunch with the Dalai
Lama. I wish I were.
Mr. Marino. I am a former prosecutor. I don't have time for
long winded answers. Let's go to number 1.
Ambassador McFaul, Putin obviously has a very big ego.
People say to me he wants to be next General Secretary. I
disagree with that. I think Putin wants to be the second Peter
the Great, and the plan to make Russia a leading power, if not,
the leading power with the world. What say you?
Ambassador McFaul. I agree.
Mr. Marino. Great.
Ambassador McFaul. But I want Russia to be great, too. I
personally think it would be in our national interest for
Russia to be great. I do not believe the strategy he is seeking
to achieve that objective is a smart one.
Mr. Marino. Great. Okay. Dr. Aron, Bush's decision not to
intervene in Georgia and Obama's decision not to intervene in
Ukraine, I see that as signaling to Putin that the United
States does not care to get involved in these foreign affairs,
and as that, the U.S. will not challenge Putin, or NATO will
not challenge Putin, will this allow him or signal to him that
he could continue his expansionism?
Mr. Aron. Putin has not been made to pay for his policies,
definitely. The benefits, domestic political benefits, far
supersede the price that he had to pay, either economically or
militarily. There are ways to change this balance. It would
require the things that Mike mentioned about Ukraine. I am also
for arming Ukraine with strictly defensive weapons--but you're
absolutely right. So long as his benefits, his domestic
political benefits, exceed, far exceed the price that he pays
politically and economically and militarily for his adventures,
he will continue.
Mr. Marino. Okay. And I am taking a gamble here, Ambassador
Matlock. Please be very concise in your answer. Will Putin back
off if the United States significantly increases its military
strength and go back to the belief of Reagan through peace
through strength?
Ambassador Matlock. I think he is more likely. I don't know
that anybody can say precisely what he will do. He may not
know. But the danger is, if we confront what he is doing
militarily, which as yet, I think does not affect our national
interest with military means, he can push us into another
nuclear arms race. I think that is what we have to watch,
because that is going to be very hard to deal with.
Mr. Marino. Okay. Good point, Ambassador Matlock. And then
Dr. Aron, would you respond to that as well? Do we need to
increase our military strength to keep Putin in check?
Ambassador McFaul
Ambassador McFaul. Yes.
Ambassador Matlock. I think----
Mr. Marino. Sir, Just a minute. Just a minute. I am asking
Ambassador McCaul.
Chairman Royce. Ambassador McFaul, you are recognized.
Ambassador McFaul. My answer is yes.
Mr. Marino. Okay.
Ambassador McFaul. I support everything we are doing
leading up to the Warsaw Summit.
Mr. Marino. And I am sorry, I referred to you as McCaul.
Ambassador McFaul. Because you have a Member McCaul.
Mr. Marino. I know. Dr. Aron.
Mr. Aron. I believe that Putin needs to see some credible
signs of paying more for his policies. Whether--I don't think
we need to, you know, boost, you know, tremendously our
military forces, but we need to look at specific instances
where we can credibly threaten Putin to pay a higher price
domestically, politically, for his adventures abroad.
Mr. Marino. Just a little information. I am vice president
of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I hear consistently, when I
am in NATO meetings around the world, what is the United States
going to do to put Putin in his place? I think perhaps he is
one of the most dangerous people in the world, and gentlemen, I
would love individually to have dinner with each one of you. I
could learn so much. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Marino, and I also want to
thank the panel, the witnesses here today. We--and Jerry.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. How are you?
Mr. Connolly. Fine.
Chairman Royce. I am calling--I am going to recognize you.
Go ahead.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, my friend. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I want to pick up where my friend Mr. Marino left
off. I am the head of the U.S. delegation to the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, and I have to say, I heard a lot of
stuff from my friend from California and from Ambassador
Matlock that would not, in any way, reflect the reality of our
NATO partners across the board, with one or two exceptions.
Boy, it would come as news to the Baltic republics that the
Russians are peace-loving people who are just buzzing our ships
in the Black Sea because we are too close to their littoral,
because the Russians are buzzing them, and they are guilty of
one thing, sovereign independence. That is what they are guilty
of.
They are not doing anything provocative. In fact, the very
last thing in the world they want to do is anything
provocative. Explain that Russian behavior. The illegal
annexation of the sovereign territory of the Ukraine, the
Crimea, and now the illegal occupation. I was just in the
Ukraine. Fighting goes on as we speak. People are dying because
of Russian provocation. Russian subterfuge pretending these are
Ukrainian nationalists and patriots who they have no control
over.
We have already lost one commercial airliner in that
conflict. It was almost certainly downed. It was almost
certainly downed at the loss of terrible civilian life over the
sovereign territory of the Ukraine because of Russian
provocation and Russian provocateurs, not Ukrainians, not
Americans hating Russia. Russian behavior.
Putin seems to be engaged in some kind of reestablishment
of Russian hegemony in some kind of delusional czarist longing
for some glorious past that really never existed, and that is
very dangerous. It is also dangerous for Putin to misread U.S.
resolve and NATO resolve. I worry about that.
History, in the last 200 years of this republic, is strewn
with people who made that miscalculation, pushed us too far.
And Ambassador McFaul, I couldn't agree with you more with
what you said earlier. That is Russia's responsibility. Maybe
we have miscalculated an occasion. And we certainly shouldn't
cloud the fact that there are areas of cooperation we
appreciate. You know, we cooperate on the space station. We
cooperated on JCPOA to a great contribution to world peace, as
far as I am concerned. Although many of my friends on the other
side of aisle, in fact, all of them opposed it, but it has been
100 percent complied with, and we are grateful to Russian
participation and responsibility for at that.
But Putin seems to be pushing all the wrong--you know, the
hot buttons with respect to the NATO alliance and to the United
States. And I guess I would ask this, Ambassador McFaul: What
is it you think Putin is trying to do? I mean, is it a testing
of the system? Is it something more than that?
Ambassador McFaul. So thank you for your question, and I do
agree that we need to stand with our allies. I think the idea
of four new battalions in the east is the correct thing. Again,
those battalions are not going to invade Russia. Come on, let's
be honest about this. Only fools would think about doing that,
and we are not foolish, but they are there in a defensive
posture.
You know, my own view of why he did what he did is very
contingent and circumstantial and emotional. I was still
Ambassador, right? He didn't invade Ukraine when I was
Ambassador. He invaded the day after I left. I want to point
that out for the record. But the buildup was there, and it was
in response to the collapse of the government in Kiev, right?
It was to exact revenge over his ally falling there. It was
not, in my view, some grand design to recreate the Soviet
Union, and that, therefore, gives me hope that if we----
Mr. Connolly. But let me interrupt you.
Ambassador McFaul. Yeah, please.
Mr. Connolly. Again, I just came back from the Ukraine, but
I also was in Kurdistan, I was also in Mongolia. My sense in
Central Asia is deep anxiety about Russian intentions. There is
a sense among those countries that that is precisely what he is
up to, that this was not an isolated example.
Mr. Poe and I, the co-chairs of the Georgia caucus, I
assure you the Georgians feel that this is about territorial
reengagement and reexpansion after a period of contraction
under Yeltsin and that period. And so I think there is real
anxiety among lots of former eastern countries too and they are
looking to our leadership to try to respond to it.
Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Royce. And I think on that point, Mr. Connolly, we
really want to thank all the members. I want to thank the
witnesses here, too. We had a great exchange of information. We
may be following up with each of the witnesses here, and Tom
Marino may be following up with you on dinner plans. So again,
thank you, and we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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