[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA COUNTERTERRORISM RELATIONSHIP
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 24, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-162
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
---------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Tim Roemer, Ph.D. (former 9/11 Commissioner)....... 6
Mr. Simon Henderson, director, Gulf and Energy Policy Program,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.................. 16
Ms. Karen Elliot House, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs...................................... 21
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of
Foreign Service, Georgetown University......................... 26
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Tim Roemer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.............. 10
Mr. Simon Henderson: Prepared statement.......................... 18
Ms. Karen Elliot House: Prepared statement....................... 23
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 28
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 50
Hearing minutes.................................................. 51
THE U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA COUNTERTERRORISM RELATIONSHIP
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TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. The witnesses
will take their seats. Without objection, all members may have
5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous
materials for the record subject to the length limitation in
the rules.
Today, the United States and Saudi Arabia work together on
maintaining security in the Middle East. Despite the
differences between the two countries, we both face the same
terrorist enemies that seek our destruction in the post 9/11
era. Our counterterrorism cooperation with Saudi Arabia has
increased. According to the Department of Treasury, the kingdom
has made improvements in enforcing stringent banking rules that
help stem the flow of money to terrorist groups through Saudi
financial institutions.
Saudi Arabia is the co-chair of the Counter-ISIL Finance
Group, and this group seeks to cut off ISIS from the
international finance system. Saudi Arabia has launched
aggressive military campaigns in Syria and Yemen, and while the
kingdom has taken important steps since 9/11 to counter
terrorism, it has some room to improve.
I think we must separate the individuals that live in Saudi
Arabia and what they do to support financially terrorism, and
the Government of Saudi Arabia. While the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia has adopted strict laws prohibiting terrorist finance,
there continue to be press reports about Saudi charities and
individual donors funding ISIS, al-Qaeda, and foreign fighters.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia still spends billions of
dollars every year exporting the Wahhabi interpretation of
Islam through its networks of building mosques and schools
throughout the world including in the United States. Wahhabism
is a fundamentalist form of Islam that insists on a literal
interpretation of the Quran. Its 18th century founder Abd al
Wahhab in seeking to purify Islam taught that apostates--that
is, Christians and Jews and some Muslims--should be persecuted
and in some cases killed.
So we should not be surprised that some people practice,
when they are taught Wahhabism, violence. While not all
followers of Wahhabism are terrorists, many argue that Wahhabi
followers are more easily recruited by terrorist groups.
ISIS openly follows this strict form of Islam and cites
Wahhabi clerics, but it does not accept the royal Saudi family
as legitimate authorities. Some of the Wahhabi ideology has
been exposed in Saudi textbooks and the U.S. has pushed Saudi
Arabia to address the problem.
In 2006, the Ambassador at Large for International
Religious Freedom John Hanford told Congress the Saudi
Government would finish its comprehensive revision of textbooks
by 2008. Here we are 8 years later, and the process is still in
the future. Where is the new book? As of 2014, high school
textbooks worldwide contained offensive materials about Jews,
Christians, and others. For example, a 12th grade textbook
professes that treachery, betrayal and that annunciation of
covenants are among the attributes of the Jews. Another 12th
grade textbook asserts that the punishment for conversion away
from Islam is execution.
This is somewhat disturbing, and the Saudi Arabian
Government needs to be more aggressive in revising these
textbooks if that is the goal. The same can be said about
sermons given by Saudi clerics as mosques behind closed doors.
Researchers have cited hateful messages by clerics that are
tantamount to incitement.
Then of course there is the issue that has been brought up
again regarding counterterrorism prior to 9/11. 9/11 Commission
reports note that Saudi Arabia was long considered a primary
source of al-Qaeda funding. There is speculation about the
extent of the Saudi Government officials in providing help to
9/11 hijackers, 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals.
Then there is the issue of the 28 missing pages in the 9/11
report. I have read the 28 missing pages that the public does
not have access to, and I think the public should have access
and be able to see those 28 pages. It is my understanding that
the Saudi Arabian Government also wants those 28 pages
declassified. I think we must make a distinction to some extent
between post-9/11 and events that occurred before 9/11.
If a foreign country, any country, can be shown to have
significantly supported a terrorist attack on the United
States, the victims and their families ought to be able to sue
that foreign country no matter who it is. Like any other issue,
we should let a jury decide that issue and the damages, if any.
As a former judge, I am a great advocate in having litigation
in our courts of law to get justice.
If our policy is between American victims and also victims
from other parts of the world regarding 9/11 versus our
priorities with dealing with foreign countries, I think our
Government should always come down on the side of victims and
their families of 9/11, without exception.
There are issues dealing with foreign countries, but the 9/
11 victims, their families, certainly need justice to occur.
Some say that this occurred a long time ago and it is time to
move on with our relationships with foreign countries. Fifteen
years ago, waiting for justice to occur is too long under our
system.
If in fact some other government may have been involved in
the 9/11 attacks, I am not saying they were or they weren't,
but part of this hearing is to explore this issue as well. The
United States national security interest does include working
with Saudi Arabia, but the national security interest of the
United States also must include making sure that the victims of
9/11 have all of the facts of what occurred on that day that
none of us will forget.
I will yield to the ranking member from Massachusetts for
his opening statement.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for conducting this
hearing, and I would also like to thank our panel of witnesses
who bring with them years of experience and knowledge on the
topic of today, Saudi Arabia.
For decades, the United States has maintained strong
bilateral relations with the kingdom. Anchored by U.S.-Saudi
security cooperation and U.S. concern for global availability
of Saudi energy, we have engaged the Saudi Government as a
strategic partner to promote regional security and global
economic stability.
However, our relationship is deeper than just shared
security challenges. It is in both of our countries' interest
to strengthen this relationship, yet for us to be mindful that
over the last few years shifts in political and economical
landscape of the region have shed light on the kingdom's
domestic policies. Issues such as political reform, education,
human rights, and religious freedom are now more prominent in
the U.S.-Saudi relationship than it was in years past.
There is no doubt these sensitive issues have contributed
to growing challenges between Washington and Riyadh. In April,
President Obama met with Saudi officials. While the visit
allayed concerns like making sure our shared security interests
remain strong, still, gaps in the fence remain.
Further complicating the relationship is America's
increasing energy independence and the recent shale oil boom
that has produced our imports, increased imports and increased
our exports when it comes to oil. Saudi Arabia and other OPEC
members rely on American markets to refine their systems and
bring to the market heavy sour crude oil.
As we continue to witness the evolution of this region
through the lens of the administration's final year, it is
important that we consider our own objectives. It is the
responsibility of the United States to keep our foreign policy
objectives close in mind as we assess our bilateral relations
with partners and whether they promote or hinder these goals.
Of particular concern to me is the credibility of our
shared counterterrorism operations and intentions. While our
two countries have worked successfully to address
counterterrorism threats and the financing of those threats
through intelligence sharing and monitoring compliance, other
actions may complicate these efforts. For example, Riyadh's
campaign in Yemen has changed our efforts to combat al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, and domestic counterterrorism efforts
have directly targeted human rights activists and peaceful
protestors who have been tried in Saudi in terrorism tribunals.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses in regarding
the future of the United States and Saudi in terms of their
relationships and how we can work together to align mutual
goals and promote a more open society. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the ranking member. The chair will now
recognize other members for a 1-minute opening statement. The
chair recognizes Mr. Issa from California for 1 minute.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing today. There are two committees
that will be looking at the proposal that has come from the
Senate, this committee and Judiciary. The Judiciary Committee
has to look, quite frankly, at U.S. law and whether litigation
against the sovereign nation is appropriate. We as a committee
have to look at the world. We have to look at the bigger
question. What if we do this without an affirmative, specific
foreknowledge of wrongdoing by a representative at a high level
of the Saudi Government?
The answer is clear. If we look at it and allow discovery,
a poking around, a typical plaintiff's trial lawyer look-see,
then in fact the rest of the world will likely respond. If the
rest of the world likely responds, there is no question but
that actions of U.S. persons or U.S. entities, including but
not limited to our intelligence community, will have us in
courts around the world.
It is our responsibility both here at this committee and
when looking at highly classified documents to reach a
conclusion of whether or not this case should be allowed to go
forward before allowing discovery outside of the U.S.
Government. I thank the chairman for his yielding, and yield
back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California. The chair
recognizes another gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for
an opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. Our laws already provide an exception to
sovereign immunity for those who are state sponsors of
terrorism. It seems only a slight increase in that to say it
should apply if the plaintiffs are able to show that the
foreign government engaged in terrorism here in the United
States.
But as important as it is to have our judicial system work
for the benefit of victims, it may be that it is up to the
United States to compensate the victims as we have to some
degree. And the most important thing is not punishing those who
committed or supported this act, but preventing the next act of
terrorism.
What concerns me is the Saudi Government comes to us and
says they are our friend and we should protect them from this
statute, while funding every day the Wahhabi mullahs who not
only preach orthodox practice of Islam but preach violent
murder against those who they disagree with. And it is time for
Saudi Arabia to come clean. They can't say they don't support
terrorism. All they do is fund at the hundreds of millions of
dollars a year those who plant the seeds of terrorism around
the world. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing on the critical relationship between the
United States and Saudi Arabia.
For over 70 years, both countries have had a close economic
partnership beginning with the establishment of the Arab
American Oil Company, Aramco, by the Standard Oil Company in
1944.
In recent decades, Saudi Arabia has made substantial
progress in their counterterrorism efforts post 9/11. They have
strengthened financial policies aimed at countering terrorist
financing and worked with the United States and other countries
to increase transparency and information sharing. They have
also imposed harsh sentences on Saudi nationals who attempt to
join foreign terror groups and have conducted military
operations against the Islamic State and other terrorist
organizations in the region. These are all important steps in
working toward peace and security for the region.
As we work together to combat Islamic extremism, we must
keep in mind the considerable influence that Saudi Arabia has
over the ideologies and religious practices that will guide the
Middle East for years to come. I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses on the future of U.S.-Saudi Arabia terrorism
relationship. Again, I appreciate the leadership of our
chairman, Chairman Judge Ted Poe, and I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 1 minute.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. It is long overdue. How many Americans
have to die? How many of our innocent citizens are blown up or
are murdered from a terrorist act that we are ignoring,
intentionally ignoring who is financing those acts.
I think it is clear to all of us who have been active in
Washington over the years that the Saudis and the Saudi royal
family have been right up to their eyeballs in terrorist
activity and supporting the terrorist activity of radical
Islamic forces in the Middle East. It is up to us to call the
truth, to say the truth. We are not going to correct the
situation. It won't get better unless we are willing to step up
and basically let the American people know who is the bad guy
and who is the good guy in this age of terrorism.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, all
members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions,
extraneous materials for the record subject to the length
limitation in the rules. And without objection, all witnesses'
prepared statements will be made part of the record.
I ask that each witness keep your presentation to no more
than 5 minutes. I will introduce each witness. I do want to
thank all four of you for being here early, on time before we
ever started, supposed to start this hearing, but as you all
know votes got in the way. So I do appreciate your patience.
Ambassador Tim Roemer is a former Member of Congress and a
former U.S. Ambassador to India. While he was in Congress he
sat on the House Intelligence Committee and was a member of the
9/11 Commission.
Mr. Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the
Gulf and Energy Policy Program at Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. He has written two studies of the Saudi royal
family, both of which were published by The Washington
Institute.
And Mrs. Karen Elliot House is currently a senior fellow at
the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. She is the author of
the book on Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault
Lines--and Future.
And Dr. Daniel Byman is a professor at Georgetown
University's School of Foreign Service. He has served on the 9/
11 Commission staff and has testified numerous times before
this committee.
Ambassador Roemer, we will start with you. You have 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIM ROEMER, PH.D. (FORMER 9/11
COMMISSIONER)
Mr. Roemer. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
Member Keating, fellow members, I ask unanimous consent the
entirety of my statement be entered into the record, and I
would recognize a special guest I have here today, my son
Matthew Roemer who just graduated from Wake Forest University.
Mr. Poe. Without objection----
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe [continuing]. Your comments will be made part of
the record. And we do recognize your son who is a recent
graduate of Wake Forest.
Mr. Roemer. Thank you, sir.
Throughout the history of our engagement with the kingdom
our relationship with Saudi Arabia has been strategically
crucial yet a challenging one and at times a very demanding
one. Saudi Arabia sits at the crossroads of so many critical
issues for American foreign policy interests--terrorism, Iran,
Middle East stability, energy, and human rights.
Serving on the 9/11 Commission, we noted that the U.S.-
Saudi relationship had been in the dark for too long. Both
countries' governments recognized the value in working closely
together, but neither was willing to make the case for the
relationship in public to argue for its merits and its
shortcomings.
The 9/11 Commission recommended over 10 years ago, ``The
problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted
openly. It should include a shared interest in greater
tolerance and cultural respect translating into a commitment to
fight the violent extremists who foment hatred.'' Ten years ago
we said that.
Today we still struggle to talk directly about our
relationship with the kingdom. In light of this fact, I would
like to thank this committee for holding this hearing on this
subject bringing greater transparency and clarity to American
diplomacy and to the American people.
The Saudis pose a number of challenges for the United
States and its foreign policy. Saudi society still continues to
produce a disturbing number of recruits and supporters for
terrorist groups around the world including in Syria. Moreover,
according to a front page article in the New York Times just
this past Sunday titled, ``How Kosovo Was Turned into a Fertile
Ground for ISIS,'' Saudi influence and money has transformed
this once tolerant Muslim society into a ``font of Islamic
extremism and pipeline for jihadists.''
Domestically, the Saudi Government still continues to have
a poor record on human rights. The Saudis are fighting a war in
Yemen with goals different than the United States, thus
creating some problems for the United States in the Middle
East. These are signs, ladies and gentlemen, that the United
States and Saudi Arabia still have much work to do in this
crucial partnership; and it is a partnership.
I believe that our relationship with the kingdom is crucial
to our interests in the Middle East. Addressing our concerns
diplomatically and privately is often the appropriate path. As
a former diplomat we often did this behind closed doors,
however, sometimes we must honestly and openly confront our
legitimate differences. Friends and allies cannot bury their
disagreements. They must frankly address them and
counterterrorism must be at the top of the American and the
Saudi list.
Counterterrorism. After 9/11, the news that 15 of the 19
hijackers had come from Saudi Arabia led many Americans to
question whether the Saudis were the ally we thought them to
be. They continue to be our ally, but an embattled one.
Furthermore, we found that Saudi Arabia was fertile ground for
fundraising and support for al-Qaeda. In the 9/11 Commission
report we did not discover high level and direct Saudi
Government involvement in the plot, but wrote that Saudi Arabia
had been a problematic ally in the fight against terrorism.
There is a glaring contrast some days and weeks and months
between high level Saudi legitimate cooperation in helping the
United States uncover plots, which is critical for us, but it
often directly conflicts with the society and culture that
sometimes exports extremism and intolerance.
There has been recent media attention to these 28 pages
that Judge Poe just cited, classified information actually
written by Congress in the Joint Intelligence Committee, but
was reviewed and investigated by the 9/11 Commission. I served
on both of these panels. I am strongly in favor for
declassifying this information as quickly and as soon as
possible. For national security reasons the 9/11 families
deserve it, the American people deserve it, and justice
deserves it.
We have the right as Americans to transparency and
sunlight, not the darkness that conspiracy theories thrive on
in today's cynical political climate. While the 28 pages are
important to declassify--we need to get those out--it is
crucial to understand the unclassified 9/11 Commission report,
particularly Chapters 5, 7, and the footnotes where we talk
about some of the problems that are ongoing today in Saudi
society to export extremism, fund radical ideology for
terrorist groups, and supply a stream of jihadists around the
world.
We have seen, no doubt, improvements from the kingdom. It
has created a deradicalization program and is helping to
reintegrate extremists back into society in a regular fashion.
Saudi intelligence agencies have worked very closely with their
American counterparts to share information about threats from
extremist groups, most notably a tip-off in 2010 which
reportedly led to the disruption of a plot to bomb U.S. cargo
planes.
They also briefly participated in the U.S. war, led against
the Islamic State, coalition in Syria. According to the most
recent State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the
Saudis have instituted a number of legal reforms to strengthen
the prohibitions on supporting terrorism.
These are crucial tools in fighting terrorism, but
sometimes they are not sufficient strategic ones. Saudi Arabia
has outlawed terrorist groups like the Islamic State and banned
its citizens from providing financial support to them. Yet
despite these official acts, studies on the background of
Islamic State foreign fighters continue to show that Saudi
recruits are among the most numerous among the group's ranks.
A recent West Point study confirmed that Saudi recruits
were in the highest three groups in Syria. The threat of
extremism cannot be countered by police, intelligence and
military actions alone. The Saudi Government needs to address
the threat of radicalization and extremism within its own
society.
In all of this we should be cognizant of the fact that the
Saudis themselves are threatened by extremism and have suffered
greatly from it. In 2003, Saudi al-Qaeda terrorists unleashed a
campaign of attacks in that country that shocked the kingdom.
The Saudis took immediate steps to address this.
I want to speak for a moment, Mr. Chairman, about Iran.
Iran's support for terrorism is a serious threat to Middle East
stability, American interests, and American allies in the
region. In the face of these threats we must make sure that
Saudi Arabia, the focus of so much of Iran's attention and
ambitions, is able to resist and appropriately confront
Tehran's attempts to influence the region.
How we manage this makes vital difference to our friends
and allies in the Middle East. We cannot allow Saudi Arabia's
justified fears of its neighbor to lead to deeper disagreements
within and with the United States. While we work together to
counter some of Iran's nefarious efforts to stoke instability
in the region, this must not distract from the fight against
terrorist threats like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Mr. Chairman, I will skip through some comments on energy.
I want to conclude on a human rights topic. Congress helped
create the United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom in 1998 in order to promote the fundamental human
rights of people to worship and observe their faith in peace.
Since its creation, the Commission, at the urging I might
add of Congress, has done valuable work uncovering examples of
intolerance, anti-Semitism, and incitement to violence in Saudi
textbooks provided to schools in developing countries all over
the world. The Islamic State has even discovered and utilized
this material in some of their textbooks to reflect their world
view. One scholar has even noted the use of this material in
schools under the Islamic State's control in Raqqa, Syria.
While the kingdom has made some progress in revising its
textbooks and curtailing extremist material, and we note that
and encourage that, this Commission notes that the Saudi
Government still includes highly offensive references in their
high school textbooks.
So to conclude, members of this important subcommittee,
having served in both the legislative and the executive
branches of American Government, I have seen the important role
that congressional oversight and your counsel plays in shaping
American foreign policy.
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is an area where Congress must
continue to play an important role with the executive branch
and for the American people. Congress should continue to hold
oversight hearings, insist on better progress on
counterterrorism results from Saudi Arabia, and discuss the
human rights situation.
The U.S. Intelligence Community gives credits to Saudi
Arabia for developing and cooperating on counterintelligence
and helping stop specific attacks. We are grateful for this.
While this is true, we must see more consistent results from
Saudi Arabia on preventing the export of intolerance and
extremism around the world; we must work together to curtail
the financial support for al-Qaeda and terrorist groups; we
must see more results on reducing the Saudi supply of the high
number of foreign fighters in Syria.
Resetting and rebuilding this decades-long strategic
partnership with Saudi will be a foreign policy priority for
the United States in 2017. And I thank the chairman and ranking
member and members for my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Roemer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Henderson.
STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON HENDERSON, DIRECTOR, GULF AND ENERGY
POLICY PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Henderson. Thank you. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
Keating, distinguished members of the committee; it is an honor
and privilege to appear before you today. I have written about
Saudi Arabia, particularly the royal family known as the House
of Saud, for more than 20 years. Arguably, I publish more about
Saudi Arabia, ten analyses so far this year, than anyone else.
I also have a reputation for detailed reporting which probably
explains why I have never been to Saudi Arabia. I have never
been given a visa to visit there although I have traveled
widely in the rest of the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia sees itself as the leader of the Islamic
world, a leader if not the leader of the Arab world, and by
virtue of it being the world's largest oil exporter, a leader
of the energy world. Of these leadership roles, it is the
Islamic one which is from a Saudi perspective by far the most
important. Within the kingdom are Islam's two holiest places,
Mecca and Medina. Ensuring the safety of Muslim pilgrims who
thereby recognize Saudi leadership is a paramount concern.
This emphasis on Islam was a feature of a memorable memo
written by a departing British Ambassador 32 years ago. He
identified three principal features of the kingdom. Islam was
one of them, insularity was another--it is a very closed
society, or was at that point--and he also noted that the
kingdom was incompetent, a feature which I often ask friends
who have visited the kingdom whether it is still valid or not
and they suggest that it is. And that is a word which perhaps
partly explains our concern about Saudi counterterrorism
efforts.
Apart from Islam, a major influence on Saudi thinking is
history, particularly recent history. I would argue that the
two most important events in Saudi minds both date back to
1979. In February of that year, the Islamic Revolution in Iran
overthrew the Shah and brought to power a clerical regime of
Shiite Muslims, the majority faith in Iran. As Shiites, they
are historical rivals of Sunni Muslims such as Saudis. The
ethnic difference of Iranians mostly being Persians rather than
Arabs is also significant.
Later the same year, in November 1979, the Grand Mosque in
Mecca was seized by Sunni militants, contesting the legitimacy
of the House of Saud. It was 2 weeks before Saudi soldiers,
with the embarrassingly necessary assistance of French special
forces, regained control. Since then, the House of Saud has had
to fight on two contradictory fronts: Countering regional
Iranian mischief including support for the kingdom's own
minority Shiite community, while also dealing with Sunni
extremists including potential jihadists, at home.
The principal challenge for the U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism
relationship is that right now there is more than the usual
amount of differences on emphasis and direction which can apply
to even close allies. It has to be significant that in the
recent profile of President Obama in The Atlantic, Saudi Arabia
was criticized more severely and more often than any other
country, ally or not.
A new and challenging dimension in the relationship was
introduced a year ago when King Abdullah died and was replaced
by King Salman. Three months after that the line of succession
changed. The Crown Prince was sacked and he was replaced by the
Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, and more significantly,
the number three slot of the Deputy Crown Prince was taken by
King Salman's younger son Muhammad bin Salman who is just 30
years old.
At the moment, we are facing an uncertain future.
Washington's principal partner on counterterrorism issues for
the last decade or so, Muhammad bin Nayef, has been
marginalized but the need for an effective counterterrorism
partnership is as great as ever. Also, Riyadh is distrustful of
Washington's approach to what the Saudi sees as at least half
of the terrorism problem, Iran.
In these circumstances, the United States cannot take for
granted its current counterterrorism partnership with Saudi
Arabia. Despite differences and public insults, the
relationship needs to adapt so the substance of it can be
sustained during the continuing period of political uncertainty
and especially within the House of Saud and where the real
power lies. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Henderson follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Henderson.
Ms. House. Microphone.
STATEMENT OF MS. KAREN ELLIOT HOUSE, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Ms. House. Oh, excuse me, I am saying in my best Texas
accent, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Mr. Keating.
Mr. Poe. And I can understand you a whole lot better than I
can Mr. Henderson, that is for sure.
Ms. House. Yes, I knew you wouldn't need a translator for
me. The others may.
I am going to focus on Saudi Arabia itself because much is
changing in the kingdom these days. A new generation of young
Saudi leaders is now in charge after nearly six decades of rule
by aged and increasingly infirm sons of the founder. Also
changing, unfortunately, is the U.S.-Saudi relationship which
was built on the tacit understanding of Saudi oil for U.S.
support and protection.
On my latest visit there in January, the most recent of
dozens of visits over the last 38 years--I began going as a
reporter for the Wall Street Journal--I found Saudi royals and
a lot of Saudi citizens, the number one question they wanted to
ask is, is the U.S. policy of avoiding involvement in Middle
East problems permanent or will a new administration, a new
U.S. President again exert traditional leadership in the Middle
East including support for our Saudi ally?
Obviously, with the Presidential election some months away
we don't know what the next administration's policy would be,
but the point I want to make is I believe it is clear already
that the future of Saudi Arabia with this new generation of
leaders for some of the reasons Simon mentioned, with this new
generation of leaders in charge is of critical importance to
us.
Despite the fact that the U.S. produces more oil than any
time in 30 years, we are still dependent on the global oil
market even though only 8 percent of our oil comes from Saudi
Arabia. And secondly, obviously as been mentioned by the
chairman and others, Saudi Arabia is the wellspring of this
religious Wahhabi philosophy that motivates at least some of
the jihadi hatred that seeks to destroy the Western way of
life. So for those reasons, I think it is critically important
that U.S. policymakers understand the forces at work in the
kingdom.
Support for Saudi stability and Israeli democracy have been
two of the key U.S. goals in the Middle East, certainly in my
whole lifetime, and in my view they must remain so. The new
generation of leadership in Riyadh has a vision--I stress the
word vision--to transform the Saudi economy and to some extent
its society that will benefit, in my view, not only Saudi
citizens but also potentially strengthen U.S.-Saudi relations
if we are wise enough to seize that opportunity.
It is not U.S. influence that has encouraged these changes,
in my view, but we should welcome and support them. The new
leadership, as Simon said, includes Crown Prince Muhammad bin
Nayef, the individual in charge of combating terrorism, and I
can assure you that Saudis too focus on the need to retain
Muhammad bin Nayef as the man that in their view has protected
them from terrorism. There is not much concern about ISIS in
Saudi Arabia, and the reason is Muhammad bin Nayef. From
everything I hear cooperation with the U.S. on anti-terrorism
is deemed to be good both on our side and theirs where he is
concerned.
And to the extent that rich Saudis give money as do other
rich people in the Persian Gulf to help finance terrorism, this
does not, in my view, constitute official Saudi policy but
rather evades it. They understand, whatever the case on 9/11,
they understand now that terrorism is a threat to them too.
The new Deputy Crown Prince that Simon mentioned and the
significance of both of these young men is that they are
grandsons of the founder. So one is 55 and the Deputy Crown
Prince is only 30. He is responsible for the country's defense,
its economy, and Aramco. Literally, not since his grandfather
Ibn Saud has a 30-year-old prince had the amount of power that
he has. Last month he laid out what I think is a quite
remarkable vision to sharply reduce dependence on oil; to
create jobs for the 70 percent of the Saudi population that is
under 30 years of age and many of them unemployed; to open
opportunities for, as he put it, all Saudis which is a code
word for including women; and he even on the record came out
for ``more moderate brand of Islam.''
I stress this is a vision and not a plan, but having met
with him myself in January in Riyadh, I do think that he is
serious and I am happy to answer questions about that if you
have any.
Mr. Poe. Sum up your remarks, if you would, Ms. House.
Ms. House. Pardon. So I will skip Iran. I do not believe
the Saudis are entirely paranoid when they look at what Iran is
doing in the region, which is antithetical to their interests
and I would argue to ours too.
So I will close by just saying it is not too late for a new
U.S. administration to improve the relationship with Saudi
Arabia, but it will require being honest about the fact that we
don't have the same values, stressing a point the Ambassador
made, and we do have a common strategic interest and that is a
stable Persian Gulf that is free of any other hegemonic
domination. And in my view we should seize this opportunity to
support economic reform in Saudi Arabia and to rebuild trust
with the Saudis by being honest about the difference, because
instability in Saudi Arabia in a Middle East that is already
completely unstable is in no one's interest. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. House follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Dr. Byman.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, EDMUND A. WALSH
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Byman. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and
members of this distinguished subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you again and testify today.
Saudi Arabia has made considerable progress on
counterterrorism in the last 15 years, but it still has a long
way to go. Before the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks
and, really, until al-Qaeda began to attack the kingdom
directly in May 2003, Saudi Arabia was often uncooperative on
counterterrorism. The Khobar Towers investigation often
encountered significant problems working with the Saudi
Government; al-Qaeda-linked individuals were often not
investigated or at least those investigations were not shared
with U.S. officials; and more broadly, individuals in Saudi
Arabia, some of them linked to the government, supported an
array of causes linked to Kashmir, Afghanistan and elsewhere,
causes on which al-Qaeda also drew.
Since 2003, as others have said, there has been a
tremendous change. Al-Qaeda brought the war home to Saudi
Arabia and Saudi Arabia responded very strongly to the point
where the 9/11 Commission declared in 2004 that the kingdom of
Saudi Arabia is now locked in mortal combat with al-Qaeda. We
have seen an aggressive effort to disrupt cells and also some
progress on terrorism financing. We have seen intelligence
sharing and significant penetrations, Saudi Arabia has served
as a drone base for operations in Yemen, and this is
invaluable.
The Islamic State, like al-Qaeda, is considered a top
security threat by the Saudi regime. The Islamic State itself
has declared Saudi Arabia to be an enemy, and its propaganda
shows a black flag flying above Mecca. Islamic State terrorists
have attacked mosques of Shia Muslims in the kingdom and also
Saudi security officials, and the Saudi Government has arrested
over 1,000 suspected Islamic State supporters, foiled several
attacks, and is trying to take effort to stop people from
traveling to fight.
Complicating this picture, however, is that support for
terrorism in Saudi Arabia is often difficult to distinguish
between the government, important organizations within society,
and individuals acting against the will of the government. The
Saudi regime's legitimacy is tied directly to the clerical
establishment and since, really, the 1970s and perhaps before
has been deeply engaged in supporting an array of Islamic
causes around the world.
It has spent tens of billions of dollars on this, and as
Ambassador Roemer mentioned, the article in the New York Times
on Bosnia is almost a classic example of the sort of support we
see where the Saudi Government was supporting an array of
mosques and other institutions that fostered extremist
teachings.
At times the regime has supported these institutions, at
times it has deliberately ignored them, at other times it has
cracked down so there has not been a single consistent
response. And because these figures are often important for
regime legitimacy, it is politically very difficult for them to
do so.
We still see support for a number of radical groups around
the world. I would single out Pakistan in particular as a place
where this is still commonplace. The campaign in Yemen against
the Houthis there has indirectly aided al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula by giving them free space in which to operate.
Now the good news is, senior Saudi preachers working with
the government have urged individuals not to go to terrorist
groups, not to fight in Iraq and Syria, but as has been
mentioned we see many preachers, many religious institutions
condemning other Muslims in particular, also being very
critical of non-Muslims and at times quite anti-American. And
much of this in the United States at least would be free
speech, right. It is not speech I like, but it would be free
speech.
But nevertheless, it creates a fertile soil around the
world of indoctrination and it plays directly into the
narrative that the Islamic State pushes that it is defending
true Islam against a host of enemies including many within the
Muslim world.
I will conclude simply by saying that the United States has
very deep differences with Saudi Arabia. These involve for
example women's rights, homosexuality, religious freedom,
freedom of speech--these are deep and fundamental differences.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia is a vital partner on
counterterrorism. And one of the difficulties in any policy is
walking this line between a vital partner yet one who is more
partner than friend. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
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Mr. Poe. I thank all of our witnesses for their testimony,
and I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. I will make
this comment. It is obvious that Saudi Arabia acts in its own
interest. Not necessarily that is a bad thing, but countries
should act in their own best interest including the United
States. We should act in our best interest.
Regarding the 9/11 Commission report, the 28 classified
pages, I would like each of you just to give me a yes or no on
this. Should those 28 pages be declassified in your opinion?
Ambassador, you have already said.
Mr. Roemer. I am strongly in favor of declassifying the 28
pages as soon as possible, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. Mr. Henderson.
Mr. Henderson. Since you limit me to a yes or no answer,
the answer is yes.
Mr. Poe. Thank you.
Ms. House.
Ms. House. As a journalist my answer is obviously yes.
Mr. Poe. And Dr. Byman.
Mr. Byman. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. As mentioned in your testimony, and many members
have talked about JASTA and the Senate unanimously passing
legislation last week, the bill doesn't mention any governments
but it says that the bill makes a foreign government that
provides tangible support to terrorists who carry out an attack
on the United States subject to the jurisdiction of an American
courts. Do you think that is a good idea, Ambassador?
Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, I would put my former congressman
hat on, but also try to talk a little about my hat as a former
diplomat. I am also strongly in favor of the Senate bill. I
think it is a bipartisan bill where Senator Cornyn, who you
know well, and Senator Lindsey Graham have both put in their
considerations and narrowed the scope of the bill so that it
does not stretch across the world and create problems on
sovereign immunity for other diplomatic situations. It is
narrowed to this particular issue with Saudi Arabia.
And Mr. Chairman, I would then say that given that we are a
country of rules and laws and that if our court thereby finds
that there was some activity or action by Saudi that
contributed, let our courts prevail and let justice prevail. We
should pass this bill.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Henderson.
Mr. Henderson. I agree that our courts should be allowed to
prevail with the caveat of be careful what you wish for and
taking such action could lead to Saudi retaliation whether it
be withdrawing Treasury bills or actions against Americans in
the kingdom. I don't think that is what we are looking for.
Mr. Poe. Ms. House, what do you think, should we pass it or
not? It is our decision that is going to come up next week. The
Senate did it. What do you think?
Ms. House. This is beyond my expertise. But as someone who
travels abroad a lot and in Saudi Arabia, a very closed and
conservative society, I worry about what Simon just said, be
careful, and what Congressman Issa raised earlier, the risk of
retaliation. I mean, I believe vengeance is mine sayeth the
Lord, I shall repay; that perhaps there is something to be said
for letting the Lord handle that part of the vengeance on the
Saudis.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Dr. Byman, can you narrow it down to a yes or no?
Mr. Byman. I will say a caveated yes, sir.
Mr. Poe. We don't get to caveat vote. It is a yea or a nay
without an explanation. I am just--what is your opinion of the
bill?
Mr. Byman. My opinion of the bill is that as long as the
bar is very high for what constitutes state support, then it is
appropriate for the courts to decide this.
Mr. Poe. A couple of other observations, this hearing, you
all have talked about a lot of things including Iran, and the
Saudis have a two-front war apparently or a two-front concern
in the Middle East. It is terrorism and it is also Iran. And I
think as Mr. Henderson testified that our concern really is
terrorism and not so much Iran. The crimes in Syria have cost
millions of folks to move into Europe. Has the Saudi Arabian
Government ever taken any Syrian refugees into Saudi Arabia?
Mr. Henderson. My understanding is that Saudi Arabia along
with the other Gulf states has not taken refugees in a manner
that we would recognize; that Europe is taking refugees. I
believe that at least some of the Gulf states, I am not sure if
it applies to Saudi Arabia, have been generous in allowing
Syrians who already live in their countries to bring in
relatives and family members at this time.
Mr. Poe. All right, thank you. I think it is somewhat
interesting that Saudi Arabia does not take Syrian refugees,
which is a whole different issue. I am going to yield to the
ranking member from Massachusetts for his questions. Mr.
Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to see if you could comment on this. As Ambassador
Roemer and Dr. Byman have mentioned there has been, you know,
increases in legal reforms and efforts to really constrain
financially the ability of people in Saudi Arabia to, you know,
fund for this extremist activity.
Now how successful has that been, and if hasn't been as
successful as it should be, then why not? Is it a lack of will
or are they encountering difficulties just implementing this?
If you could comment on that because I think it is a
fundamental question of transparency. They are doing this. They
are attempting to do it, how effective have they been?
Mr. Roemer. I would say, Mr. Keating, I hate to sound like
Harry Truman who talked about economists on the one hand and
the other hand, but on the one hand you see the Saudis
cooperating, helping us, cracking down on terrorism, passing
national laws to try to restrict people from joining up with
the Islamic State, and on the other hand as we read in the
recent article in the New York Times, Saudi money and
government financing for more jihadis going from Kosovo to
Syria.
We need both the Saudi hands working together with the
United States on counterterrorism as a principal concern along
with our other strategic objectives, which are Middle East
stability, which are making sure that Iran cannot do us harm
through terrorism, through promoting human rights and through
some of the other key issues that we have mentioned here.
I would also say, Mr. Keating, that our relationship with
the Saudis, while it is difficult right now on this particular
issue, we have had difficulties with them and they have had
difficulties with us before. They were not in support of the
U.S. invading Iraq in 2003. They were not in favor of the U.S.
negotiating President Obama's nuclear deal and kicked back
vociferously about that. They were not, you know, for Harry
Truman recognizing Israel so quickly. So we can get through
this, but I am glad that counterterrorism is front and center
today.
Mr. Keating. Dr. Byman, just quickly. Has it been effective
and if not why?
Mr. Byman. It has been somewhat effective. We have seen
groups in Chechnya run out of money because of a decrease in
Saudi support. The Islamic State advised its supporters in the
kingdom to channel money through Kuwait because the efforts in
the kingdom were extensive enough to be disruptive.
But a number of causes still enjoy considerable domestic
legitimacy. Again, I mentioned Pakistan. And as a result, you
can give to groups that are kind of one level out from the most
radical but the individuals involved often cross over. Part of
it is simply technically very hard, but I think part of a
problem is a deep political will issue to go after the entirety
of the problem.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Just quickly, I think the panel has
done a great job covering as time permits a wide array. But I
want to ask you this question if you could just answer it
briefly because of time, where do you see Saudi Arabia 10 years
from now particularly in terms of the U.S.?
Mr. Henderson. Saudi Arabia in 10 years' time will, I
think, be very much recognizable as the Saudi Arabia of today.
I don't anticipate any revolution, any emerging republic to
replace the royal family.
What I don't know is who will be king of Saudi Arabia then,
when the transition will occur, and under what circumstances it
will occur. This is very different from the way our knowledge
of Saudi Arabia looking backwards over the last 30 or 40 years
where there was a predictability to the whole thing. With the
eminence, the increasing prominence of the 30-year-old Muhammad
bin Salman, previous conceptions about how Saudi Arabia is
going to move forward have to be discarded.
Mr. Keating. So it is less predictable. Does anyone else
quickly want to venture any vision?
Ms. House. It is definitely less predictable, but I think
it is likely not to be dramatically different. But in my view
it will have inched forward some. Women are, I know nobody
likes to hear this, but they are much better educated than the
men and they are much more willing to work and they are
managing to get opportunities.
And the Saudi people, while unhappy with various things at
home, look around at the total chaos and bloodshed in the rest
of the Middle East and whatever they think of the Saudi royal
family now, they prize stability over change.
Mr. Keating. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Wilson, South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Judge Poe.
And Ms. House, Saudi Arabia has incredible influence in the
Islamic world. With the status of reforms to the Saudi
educational curriculum promised in 2008, has that been produced
or not?
Ms. House. No. I don't think so, because as the man who was
in charge of changing the textbooks told me when I was writing
my book, at some level it doesn't matter what the textbooks
say. When you close the door, the teacher is in charge, and all
too many of the teachers are in total agreement with the more
rigid Wahhabi philosophy that has been ingrained.
Mr. Wilson. And it seems illogical to me the promotion of
jihadism would create such a level of instability that would
threaten the regime in Riyadh. Is that not correct?
Ms. House. No, they have been very successful. As I said,
Muhammad bin Nayef, the Crown Prince, they have been very
successful at controlling terrorism in the kingdom since the
2003, '04, '05 period when they had a lot of it. And now, and
people want that stability and if repression occurs against
some human rights advocates in the context of that most Saudis
are sadly willing to overlook that. As Dr. Byman said, what we
would call free speech they punish.
Mr. Wilson. And it just seems again counterproductive, but
hope springs eternal.
Ms. House. Counterproductive to do what?
Mr. Wilson. To the existence of the kingdom. That there
would be such an extremist ideology that just could----
Ms. House. No, as he said, it is fundamentally what gives
the royal family their legitimacy is that we support the
Wahhabis who are propagating the one true Islam. And they
prefer that it be exported as they are doing in other places,
and they control themselves, the jihadis, at home.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I just see the instability whether it be
Yemen or you name it, or Pakistan or Libya, wherever, Kosovo.
But bottom line, thank goodness we have good people like
Ambassador Roemer around.
And Ambassador, I am really grateful. From the state of
South Carolina, the late governor John C. West served as
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and worked very closely to establish
a warm, bipartisan relationship. Can you judge the
effectiveness of Saudi Arabia's attempt to fight terrorism
financing? Have we seen a noticeable impact on their financing
of groups in the region?
Mr. Roemer. Congressman Wilson, thank you for the question.
I would say that it is inconsistent on financial crackdowns and
financial progress. We have probably seen since 2003 more
progress from the Saudis than at any other time once they had
the internal attacks and took this quite seriously.
But I think as Dan Byman said, we often see this supported,
ignored, and then a crackdown, and supported, ignored and a
crackdown, and not consistent enough. The financial area is
somewhere where I think the United States and the Treasury
Department has been very successful at working with the Saudi
Government in some areas, but I don't think it is consistent
enough and I don't think it has passed through from the top
levels of Saudi society down into the cultural and religious
areas.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank goodness again that you are
involved, and we need your guidance.
And Mr. Byman, how would you characterize the Saudi
counterterrorism campaign in Yemen? Has it been effective?
Mr. Byman. Sir, for the most part the campaign has not been
effective. They have gone into Yemen primarily to fight the
Houthi movement there which they believe is backed, is tied to
Iran. In my view the ties are real, but the Saudis overstate
them considerably.
But the Middle East, sir, as you know is a mess, and what
makes it more confusing is the Houthis are fighting al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula. So by fighting the group the Saudis
believe is tied to Iran, they have given the al-Qaeda group
more freedom of operation. Recently they have been trying to
fight both, but that said, the big winner of the Saudi
intervention has been al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula.
Mr. Wilson. Well, again, thank each of you for as you say a
very complicated situation. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Let me just quiz you all by a show of
hands. How many of you believe that the House of Saud will be
in control of Saudi Arabia 15 years from now, a monarchy under
the House of Saud? If you think so, raise your hand.
Ms. House. 15.
Mr. Sherman. 15 years. Okay, we have got four hands raised.
That is a better odds than many governments in the Middle East
get.
Ms. House. People are passive.
Mr. Sherman. Second, the Saudis have said they would sell
$750 billion of assets if we pass this law. I don't think they
would do it, but even when they say they would do it is this to
avoid attachment as a litigation defense strategy, or is this
to punish and scare the United States? Why are they claiming to
do the 750? Ambassador.
Mr. Roemer. Congressman, I don't think they would do it.
They didn't buy those securities in American bonds to do us a
charitable work. They did it to make money. They are not going
to sell it if it loses them a lot of money----
Mr. Sherman. On the other hand you could----
Mr. Roemer [continuing]. Opening that threat to us. I don't
think----
Mr. Sherman. You could say that a U.S. bond is four basis
points better than investing in a euro bond, and then if there
is a genuine risk that a lawsuit will lead to the attachment of
those assets, because if there is a lawsuit I don't know
whether the damages are only $1 billion. Maybe they are $10
billion. Maybe with punitives they are $750 billion. So I don't
think they would do it to punish us. I wonder whether it is a
litigation strategy.
Just some commentary, I mean, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy,
so by definition you don't have the right of the people to
control the government. So you can't have free speech because a
lot of speakers would say that the people should control the
government. And their human rights toward women, LGBT, and
religious freedom is zero. Now we accept that. I mean, a Mormon
missionary in Riyadh is, I assume, a dead Mormon missionary or
just an imprisoned Mormon missionary. I don't know which.
But, so I focus on, okay, we know that all about them. The
question is are they exporting terrorism? Two ways that they
can export terrorism, one is to the finance the people that
actually blow things up. Here is the money today, blow
something up tomorrow. 9/11 support, of course. That is the
focus of the 28 pages. But the other is to finance a propaganda
education machine designed to teach millions of people that
blowing things up is a good idea.
The House of Saud and the Wahhabis have an alliance that
goes back to the 1700s. I can't fault them if they finance
efforts to say, hey, you should strictly follow Islam. Pray
five times a day; don't slough off and do four. But we are not
talking about just orthodox practice. We are talking about are
they teaching people.
How much money is Saudi Arabia spending out of government
money or royal money to spread Wahhabi Islam, and is there a
form of Wahhabi Islam they can spread that is orthodox but not
violent?
Mr. Roemer. The answer to your first question is it doesn't
matter much how much they are spending because it doesn't cost
much. We found on the 9/11 Commission that the entire operation
against the United States to pull off----
Mr. Sherman. Oh, yes. If they were financing the people
that blow things up you do that for small amounts of money. But
if your goal is to change popular opinion from Rubat to Jakarta
and to create millions of people who think that killing non-
Muslims is a good idea that can be expensive. And I know that
others have talked about did they finance this or that
terrorist attack. My focus is, are they financing a well
designed propaganda effort to create millions of pro-terrorist
thinkers? Does anybody have an idea how much they are spending
to finance Wahhabism, and can you draw distinction between
violent and non-violent Wahhabism or is there just one
Wahhabism?
Ms. House. There are lots of Saudis who would argue that
you can draw a distinction between violent and non-violent
Wahhabism. The late King Abdullah fired some of the senior
religious scholars who in essence the supreme court of what is
the right Islam. King Salman has restored one of them. So there
are a lot of people in Saudi Arabia who do not believe in
killing other people.
But I think your point is well taken that it is more, in my
view it is less the direct financing than the indirect
promotion of a form of religion that we obviously would regard
as intolerant.
Mr. Sherman. I would go beyond intolerant. I mean those who
are just orthodox----
Ms. House. Intolerant and violent.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. And say bad things, who teach
that if you have, you know, you are going to hell if you have a
ham sandwich, that is a certain intolerance. It is when you
start advocating blowing things up that I draw the line. I
yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. To my good friend from
California, according to a Senate Judiciary Committee
testimony, Saudi Arabia spends $4 billion a year on mosques,
madrassa preachers, students, and textbooks to spread the
Wahhabi creed, if that helps out at all.
If I could turn to Mr. Henderson, do you think that the
kingdom, the House of Saud, can survive without its affiliation
to Wahhabism? Can it survive?
Mr. Henderson. Could you just repeat the question?
Mr. Perry. Can the kingdom, can the House of Saud survive
without its affiliation to Wahhabism?
Mr. Henderson. It would be a very different kingdom.
Historically, it is a partnership between the House of Saud and
the religious leadership.
Mr. Perry. So is that a tepid yes? Is it, I mean so you are
saying there is a chance? What is that?
Mr. Henderson. I don't think--it is a hypothetical which
I----
Mr. Perry. Well, I guess----
Mr. Henderson [continuing]. Never thought of it before and
because I don't think it is within the range of realistic
possibility.
Mr. Perry. Okay, so it is not realistic. Because it seems
to me the House of Saud, the Saudis have said we are now an
unreliable partner, so to speak, because we are not able to
protect their monarchy.
But I would say that they have been duplicitous and
unreliable because they have spent $4 billion a year or
something to that effect to spread Wahhabism around the globe,
including North America, et cetera. I mean, I have got all the
stats here of the thousands of mosques and centers and colleges
and, you know, 80 percent of the mosques, 1,200 mosques
operating in the U.S. were constructed after 2001, mostly with
Saudi financing. And it just goes on and on from there whether
you go to Europe or wherever you go.
That having been said, at some point as an ally, who we are
engaged in this war on terrorism whether we like it or not
because the war has come to our doorstep, is it too much to
ask, I guess that is the question. Is it too much to ask for
them to stop that? To stop it.
Mr. Henderson. I think what you are describing is a very
valid question. I did not recognize comments of your colleague
Mr. Sherman in terms of defining what is journalistically known
as Wahhabism as being necessarily violent. I think it is
intolerant and it is a conservative and strict Islam which is--
--
Mr. Perry. I would rather you not use the term
``conservative'' as opposed to fundamentalist. Thank you very
kindly.
Mr. Henderson. Sorry, it is the British-ness in me. I am
sorry.
Mr. Perry. I appreciate that but it means something here.
Mr. Henderson. Forgive me.
Mr. Sherman. With a personal approvance, I would prefer you
go back to the original phraseology.
Mr. Perry. Reclaiming my time and then some, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Henderson. Okay. I think there is a concern amongst
leaders of Muslim communities in other parts of the world that
Saudi Arabia spends a lot of money bringing mosques and
bringing teachers to their countries and introducing a stricter
form of Islam to----
Mr. Perry. But do they not make the connection that when
they bring the mosques and the teachers and the teaching they
are bringing terrorism, an ideology of terrorism and death?
Mr. Henderson. I don't think Wahhabism has an ideology of
terrorism.
Mr. Perry. Okay, I appreciate your opinion.
Ms. House, you talked about our relationship with the
Saudis and Israel and how important it is to maintain that
stability in the Middle East, but does that mean that the
United States should accept the circumstances of what many
Americans, myself included, see as Saudi Arabia support,
material support, through the construction of mosques and the
ideology around the world including their own neighborhood,
should we accept that for the stability, as you put it, in our
relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia?
Ms. House. Well, I think we ought to, and hopefully we do,
continuously try to underscore to them that it is not in----
Mr. Perry. Ma'am, with all due respect this has been going
on for decades. At what point do we require action on their
part? Talking is one thing, but there are terrorists running
around the globe----
Ms. House. Well, what kind of action can you require?
Mr. Perry. Well, we can request that they no longer fund
this; that they change the teaching; that they get in the game
on this like we have to be. Is that too much to ask? And is it
worth the stability?
Ms. House. It is not too much to ask, but I don't know that
it will result in a change.
Mr. Perry. Is it too much to demand for the sake of our
relationship?
Ms. House. Well, what is the rest of the demand? If not, we
are not going to protect our interest in the Persian Gulf
anymore?
Mr. Perry. What about our interest in our schools and our
neighborhoods here where people are going to blow us up? What
about those interests, or are they not important? Because they
are coming here, they are here now.
Ms. House. They are.
Mr. Perry. So at what point, what is the tipping point, if
you know?
Ms. House. I just think--I didn't get to talk about Iran. I
think that you are focused on Saudi Arabia today for obvious
reasons, but they are not the only people propagating terrorism
in the Middle East. Iran is too.
Mr. Perry. Okay, I agree with that. But for their part,
let's just talk their part and our relationship. Do we just
continue to accept it without any--there is no benchmark. We
don't see any milestones at all from my standpoint.
Mr. Poe. The witness can answer that question.
Ms. House. I think it is my personal view that the regime
could do more. In history, when the old man was founding the
country and the religious nuts, his Ikhwan, wanted to invade
Iraq and he knew that the British did not want him to and would
cut off his money he kept them from doing that. He in essence
waged a war on his own troops and won. When the royal family
chooses to lay down a marker I think they can.
And so I believe that is why I am intrigued with what the
young guy is doing when he talks about, and I know talk is
cheap, but talks about moderate Islam. The young people in
Saudi Arabia these days are not just dependent on Saudi TV. You
can now get 90 channels of TV. You can watch anything in Saudi
Arabia. And they are all on the internet and they all do have a
much greater idea about what goes on in the rest of the world.
So there is some change in the society, and I remind you
again 70 percent of the people are under 30 years of age. It
could be a quite different Saudi Arabia not liberal like this
country, but it could be a quite different place in 10 years if
the society cut off from its ability to be passive and
dependent on the government through spending oil to give
everybody a job and buy their loyalty which they can't afford
anymore, if people become self-reliant which they are urging
them to do--we have to see if this transpires--it will be, I
think, a somewhat different society.
Mr. Poe. I thank the witness. Mr. Rohrabacher from
California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. We were talking about
words, a little back and forth on words. Let me just note,
sometimes it is discouraging to hear people use certain words
or the inability of certain people to use words. At a time when
radical Islamic terrorism threatens to murder tens of
thousands, if not more, Americans, it is quite disconcerting
that our own President can't use the term ``radical Islamic
terrorism.'' And that needs to be looked at closely.
In terms of the Saudis, I will have to suggest that Ms.
House that I like your optimism, but there is a thing called
irrational optimism. And that is when someone gets beaten in
the head a number of times and think they can do the same exact
thing without getting beat in the head. The Saudis have been
financing terrorism now for 20 years at least, at least. I mean
they are, Saudis were behind the Taliban. Saudis financed
Pakistan and they still do, and the Taliban were financed by
that money.
Just what, 2 days ago there was a drone attack where we
took out the new leader of the Taliban, and where was he? He
was in Pakistan. And who do you think is paying his bills in
Pakistan, the Pakistanis? They are broke. They get their money
from Saudi Arabia. So the Saudis have been financing this
mayhem.
I mean, it is not just the fact that 15 of 19 of the
terrorists that murdered 3,000 Americans on 9/11 that they were
Saudis, but it is what the government has actually done. And
let me ask, how many of you there believe that the royal family
of Saudi Arabia did not know and was unaware that there was a
terrorist plot being implemented that would result in an
historic terrorist attack in the United States in the lead up
to 9/11? Do you believe that the Saudi royal family did not
know? Raise your hand if you think that.
Oh, okay. Let me just suggest this, that--okay. We have two
and two, I think. So you guys believe that the Saudi royal
family may well have known there was a major terrorist attack
coming.
Mr. Roemer. Mr.----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Go right ahead.
Mr. Roemer [continuing]. Congressman, you and I go way back
from our time together when I served up here. That is just too
difficult of a question for somebody to raise their hand or put
their hand down to----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, it is not for me. I will raise my
hand right here. And let me tell you something----
Mr. Roemer. Have you read the 28 pages?
Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. That within 4 months before
9/11, I was tipped off by a very high ranking Taliban who
happened to work with me in Afghanistan when we were fighting
the Soviets that there was going to be, there is a plot going
on and what do you think about this ongoing plot? And I might
say, the Warren Commission didn't seem to--when I sent that
information over that I had been tipped off, they did not
follow through on it. I wonder, why?
And so what we have here is a high level ranking member of
the Taliban knows about this, but we don't think that the high
ranking people in Saudi Arabia who are financing the whole
thing didn't know about it? This is clear that the Saudis have
been intentionally involved in the mass slaughter of Americans
and other people in the world in a terrorist way.
We know that they are, number one, we know that they are
currently financing madrassa schools and they teach, what do
they teach these kids at school? When they come out of them
they can, yes, they can be radical Islamic terrorists, but they
can't do anything else in the modern economy. They finance
mosques that are preaching the worst kind of hatred. And we are
hearing about this all the time in the Balkans where they are
financing the worst kind of--and we have of course the direct
finance of terrorism that we have seen directly into Saudi
Arabia.
And we are being told by you today that we really don't
know if the Saudi royal family is involved in this. Well, even
if they are aware of this they are responsible. After 9/11--
they didn't want to kill 3,000 Americans on 9/11. They wanted
to kill 50,000 Americans on 9/11. 50,000. That is what they
thought. When those buildings were going to come down, they
didn't know that we could get all the people out. They were
there for a mass slaughter of Americans.
And we have just managed to just sort of, well, let's give
them the benefit of the doubt whether or not the royal family
knew about this or not. I say that the Saudi royal family has
made itself clear that they do not deserve the benefit of the
doubt because of all of their actions they have been involved
in.
And whether or not the young Saudi royal family members
that are watching TV now are going to have an epiphany that
Wahhabism isn't really, doesn't demand them to go out and
attack the West, whether or not that is going to happen or not
I don't think we can rely on that. Especially when you find
that all of these young Islamic terrorists are springing up in
different parts of the world including in San Bernardino,
including at the Boston Marathon, you have these people who
have been exposed to Western society but they have also been
treated to a very high dose of Wahhabi radical Islamic
philosophy that leads them to commit these terrorist acts.
It is either we are going to face reality or there is going
to be more and more of our people slaughtered. And I think how
we deal with Saudi Arabia it has either got to be realistic or
our people are going to suffer the consequences. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California. I thank all
of the witnesses for being here. I want to thank the guests in
the gallery as well, and also want to recognize some of the
folks from the families of 9/11 that are here today as well.
Thank you once again, and there may be other questions we
have. You know the routine. We put them in writing, we send
them to you, and we expect an answer in 10 days. The
subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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