    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                 THE U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA COUNTERTERRORISM RELATIONSHIP

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 24, 2016

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-162

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New York

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                                  ---------

             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                            TED POE, Texas, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          BRAD SHERMAN, California
    PAUL COOK, California                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin            ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Tim Roemer, Ph.D. (former 9/11 Commissioner).......     6
    Mr. Simon Henderson, director, Gulf and Energy Policy Program,
      The Washington Institute for Near East Policy..................    16
    Ms. Karen Elliot House, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science
      and International Affairs......................................    21
    Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of
      Foreign Service, Georgetown University.........................    26

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Tim Roemer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..............    10
    Mr. Simon Henderson: Prepared statement..........................    18
    Ms. Karen Elliot House: Prepared statement.......................    23
    Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................    28

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    50
    Hearing minutes..................................................    51

              THE U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA COUNTERTERRORISM RELATIONSHIP

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2016

                         House of Representatives,

            Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
    p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order. The witnesses
    will take their seats. Without objection, all members may have
    5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous
    materials for the record subject to the length limitation in
    the rules.
        Today, the United States and Saudi Arabia work together on
    maintaining security in the Middle East. Despite the
    differences between the two countries, we both face the same
    terrorist enemies that seek our destruction in the post 9/11
    era. Our counterterrorism cooperation with Saudi Arabia has
    increased. According to the Department of Treasury, the kingdom
    has made improvements in enforcing stringent banking rules that
    help stem the flow of money to terrorist groups through Saudi
    financial institutions.
        Saudi Arabia is the co-chair of the Counter-ISIL Finance
    Group, and this group seeks to cut off ISIS from the
    international finance system. Saudi Arabia has launched
    aggressive military campaigns in Syria and Yemen, and while the
    kingdom has taken important steps since 9/11 to counter
    terrorism, it has some room to improve.
        I think we must separate the individuals that live in Saudi
    Arabia and what they do to support financially terrorism, and
    the Government of Saudi Arabia. While the Kingdom of Saudi
    Arabia has adopted strict laws prohibiting terrorist finance,
    there continue to be press reports about Saudi charities and
    individual donors funding ISIS, al-Qaeda, and foreign fighters.
        The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia still spends billions of
    dollars every year exporting the Wahhabi interpretation of
    Islam through its networks of building mosques and schools
    throughout the world including in the United States. Wahhabism
    is a fundamentalist form of Islam that insists on a literal
    interpretation of the Quran. Its 18th century founder Abd al
    Wahhab in seeking to purify Islam taught that apostates--that
    is, Christians and Jews and some Muslims--should be persecuted
    and in some cases killed.
        So we should not be surprised that some people practice,
    when they are taught Wahhabism, violence. While not all
    followers of Wahhabism are terrorists, many argue that Wahhabi
    followers are more easily recruited by terrorist groups.
        ISIS openly follows this strict form of Islam and cites
    Wahhabi clerics, but it does not accept the royal Saudi family
    as legitimate authorities. Some of the Wahhabi ideology has
    been exposed in Saudi textbooks and the U.S. has pushed Saudi
    Arabia to address the problem.
        In 2006, the Ambassador at Large for International
    Religious Freedom John Hanford told Congress the Saudi
    Government would finish its comprehensive revision of textbooks
    by 2008. Here we are 8 years later, and the process is still in
    the future. Where is the new book? As of 2014, high school
    textbooks worldwide contained offensive materials about Jews,
    Christians, and others. For example, a 12th grade textbook
    professes that treachery, betrayal and that annunciation of
    covenants are among the attributes of the Jews. Another 12th
    grade textbook asserts that the punishment for conversion away
    from Islam is execution.
        This is somewhat disturbing, and the Saudi Arabian
    Government needs to be more aggressive in revising these
    textbooks if that is the goal. The same can be said about
    sermons given by Saudi clerics as mosques behind closed doors.
    Researchers have cited hateful messages by clerics that are
    tantamount to incitement.
        Then of course there is the issue that has been brought up
    again regarding counterterrorism prior to 9/11. 9/11 Commission
    reports note that Saudi Arabia was long considered a primary
    source of al-Qaeda funding. There is speculation about the
    extent of the Saudi Government officials in providing help to
    9/11 hijackers, 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals.
        Then there is the issue of the 28 missing pages in the 9/11
    report. I have read the 28 missing pages that the public does
    not have access to, and I think the public should have access
    and be able to see those 28 pages. It is my understanding that
    the Saudi Arabian Government also wants those 28 pages
    declassified. I think we must make a distinction to some extent
    between post-9/11 and events that occurred before 9/11.
        If a foreign country, any country, can be shown to have
    significantly supported a terrorist attack on the United
    States, the victims and their families ought to be able to sue
    that foreign country no matter who it is. Like any other issue,
    we should let a jury decide that issue and the damages, if any.
    As a former judge, I am a great advocate in having litigation
    in our courts of law to get justice.
        If our policy is between American victims and also victims
    from other parts of the world regarding 9/11 versus our
    priorities with dealing with foreign countries, I think our
    Government should always come down on the side of victims and
    their families of 9/11, without exception.
        There are issues dealing with foreign countries, but the 9/
    11 victims, their families, certainly need justice to occur.
    Some say that this occurred a long time ago and it is time to
    move on with our relationships with foreign countries. Fifteen
    years ago, waiting for justice to occur is too long under our
    system.
        If in fact some other government may have been involved in
    the 9/11 attacks, I am not saying they were or they weren't,
    but part of this hearing is to explore this issue as well. The
    United States national security interest does include working
    with Saudi Arabia, but the national security interest of the
    United States also must include making sure that the victims of
    9/11 have all of the facts of what occurred on that day that
    none of us will forget.
        I will yield to the ranking member from Massachusetts for
    his opening statement.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for conducting this
    hearing, and I would also like to thank our panel of witnesses
    who bring with them years of experience and knowledge on the
    topic of today, Saudi Arabia.
        For decades, the United States has maintained strong
    bilateral relations with the kingdom. Anchored by U.S.-Saudi
    security cooperation and U.S. concern for global availability
    of Saudi energy, we have engaged the Saudi Government as a
    strategic partner to promote regional security and global
    economic stability.
        However, our relationship is deeper than just shared
    security challenges. It is in both of our countries' interest
    to strengthen this relationship, yet for us to be mindful that
    over the last few years shifts in political and economical
    landscape of the region have shed light on the kingdom's
    domestic policies. Issues such as political reform, education,
    human rights, and religious freedom are now more prominent in
    the U.S.-Saudi relationship than it was in years past.
        There is no doubt these sensitive issues have contributed
    to growing challenges between Washington and Riyadh. In April,
    President Obama met with Saudi officials. While the visit
    allayed concerns like making sure our shared security interests
    remain strong, still, gaps in the fence remain.
        Further complicating the relationship is America's
    increasing energy independence and the recent shale oil boom
    that has produced our imports, increased imports and increased
    our exports when it comes to oil. Saudi Arabia and other OPEC
    members rely on American markets to refine their systems and
    bring to the market heavy sour crude oil.
        As we continue to witness the evolution of this region
    through the lens of the administration's final year, it is
    important that we consider our own objectives. It is the
    responsibility of the United States to keep our foreign policy
    objectives close in mind as we assess our bilateral relations
    with partners and whether they promote or hinder these goals.
        Of particular concern to me is the credibility of our
    shared counterterrorism operations and intentions. While our
    two countries have worked successfully to address
    counterterrorism threats and the financing of those threats
    through intelligence sharing and monitoring compliance, other
    actions may complicate these efforts. For example, Riyadh's
    campaign in Yemen has changed our efforts to combat al-Qaeda in
    the Arabian Peninsula, and domestic counterterrorism efforts
    have directly targeted human rights activists and peaceful
    protestors who have been tried in Saudi in terrorism tribunals.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses in regarding
    the future of the United States and Saudi in terms of their
    relationships and how we can work together to align mutual
    goals and promote a more open society. I yield back, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the ranking member. The chair will now
    recognize other members for a 1-minute opening statement. The
    chair recognizes Mr. Issa from California for 1 minute.
        Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    holding this important hearing today. There are two committees
    that will be looking at the proposal that has come from the
    Senate, this committee and Judiciary. The Judiciary Committee
    has to look, quite frankly, at U.S. law and whether litigation
    against the sovereign nation is appropriate. We as a committee
    have to look at the world. We have to look at the bigger
    question. What if we do this without an affirmative, specific
    foreknowledge of wrongdoing by a representative at a high level
    of the Saudi Government?
        The answer is clear. If we look at it and allow discovery,
    a poking around, a typical plaintiff's trial lawyer look-see,
    then in fact the rest of the world will likely respond. If the
    rest of the world likely responds, there is no question but
    that actions of U.S. persons or U.S. entities, including but
    not limited to our intelligence community, will have us in
    courts around the world.
        It is our responsibility both here at this committee and
    when looking at highly classified documents to reach a
    conclusion of whether or not this case should be allowed to go
    forward before allowing discovery outside of the U.S.
    Government. I thank the chairman for his yielding, and yield
    back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California. The chair
    recognizes another gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for
    an opening statement.
        Mr. Sherman. Our laws already provide an exception to
    sovereign immunity for those who are state sponsors of
    terrorism. It seems only a slight increase in that to say it
    should apply if the plaintiffs are able to show that the
    foreign government engaged in terrorism here in the United
    States.
        But as important as it is to have our judicial system work
    for the benefit of victims, it may be that it is up to the
    United States to compensate the victims as we have to some
    degree. And the most important thing is not punishing those who
    committed or supported this act, but preventing the next act of
    terrorism.
        What concerns me is the Saudi Government comes to us and
    says they are our friend and we should protect them from this
    statute, while funding every day the Wahhabi mullahs who not
    only preach orthodox practice of Islam but preach violent
    murder against those who they disagree with. And it is time for
    Saudi Arabia to come clean. They can't say they don't support
    terrorism. All they do is fund at the hundreds of millions of
    dollars a year those who plant the seeds of terrorism around
    the world. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
    gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
    important hearing on the critical relationship between the
    United States and Saudi Arabia.
        For over 70 years, both countries have had a close economic
    partnership beginning with the establishment of the Arab
    American Oil Company, Aramco, by the Standard Oil Company in
    1944.
        In recent decades, Saudi Arabia has made substantial
    progress in their counterterrorism efforts post 9/11. They have
    strengthened financial policies aimed at countering terrorist
    financing and worked with the United States and other countries
    to increase transparency and information sharing. They have
    also imposed harsh sentences on Saudi nationals who attempt to
    join foreign terror groups and have conducted military
    operations against the Islamic State and other terrorist
    organizations in the region. These are all important steps in
    working toward peace and security for the region.
        As we work together to combat Islamic extremism, we must
    keep in mind the considerable influence that Saudi Arabia has
    over the ideologies and religious practices that will guide the
    Middle East for years to come. I look forward to hearing from
    our witnesses on the future of U.S.-Saudi Arabia terrorism
    relationship. Again, I appreciate the leadership of our
    chairman, Chairman Judge Ted Poe, and I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
    gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 1 minute.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    holding this hearing. It is long overdue. How many Americans
    have to die? How many of our innocent citizens are blown up or
    are murdered from a terrorist act that we are ignoring,
    intentionally ignoring who is financing those acts.
        I think it is clear to all of us who have been active in
    Washington over the years that the Saudis and the Saudi royal
    family have been right up to their eyeballs in terrorist
    activity and supporting the terrorist activity of radical
    Islamic forces in the Middle East. It is up to us to call the
    truth, to say the truth. We are not going to correct the
    situation. It won't get better unless we are willing to step up
    and basically let the American people know who is the bad guy
    and who is the good guy in this age of terrorism.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, all
    members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions,
    extraneous materials for the record subject to the length
    limitation in the rules. And without objection, all witnesses'
    prepared statements will be made part of the record.
        I ask that each witness keep your presentation to no more
    than 5 minutes. I will introduce each witness. I do want to
    thank all four of you for being here early, on time before we
    ever started, supposed to start this hearing, but as you all
    know votes got in the way. So I do appreciate your patience.
        Ambassador Tim Roemer is a former Member of Congress and a
    former U.S. Ambassador to India. While he was in Congress he
    sat on the House Intelligence Committee and was a member of the
    9/11 Commission.
        Mr. Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the
    Gulf and Energy Policy Program at Washington Institute for Near
    East Policy. He has written two studies of the Saudi royal
    family, both of which were published by The Washington
    Institute.
        And Mrs. Karen Elliot House is currently a senior fellow at
    the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
    Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. She is the author of
    the book on Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past, Religion, Fault
    Lines--and Future.
        And Dr. Daniel Byman is a professor at Georgetown
    University's School of Foreign Service. He has served on the 9/
    11 Commission staff and has testified numerous times before
    this committee.
        Ambassador Roemer, we will start with you. You have 5
    minutes.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIM ROEMER, PH.D. (FORMER 9/11
                             COMMISSIONER)

        Mr. Roemer. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
    Member Keating, fellow members, I ask unanimous consent the
    entirety of my statement be entered into the record, and I
    would recognize a special guest I have here today, my son
    Matthew Roemer who just graduated from Wake Forest University.
        Mr. Poe. Without objection----
        Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Poe [continuing]. Your comments will be made part of
    the record. And we do recognize your son who is a recent
    graduate of Wake Forest.
        Mr. Roemer. Thank you, sir.
        Throughout the history of our engagement with the kingdom
    our relationship with Saudi Arabia has been strategically
    crucial yet a challenging one and at times a very demanding
    one. Saudi Arabia sits at the crossroads of so many critical
    issues for American foreign policy interests--terrorism, Iran,
    Middle East stability, energy, and human rights.
        Serving on the 9/11 Commission, we noted that the U.S.-
    Saudi relationship had been in the dark for too long. Both
    countries' governments recognized the value in working closely
    together, but neither was willing to make the case for the
    relationship in public to argue for its merits and its
    shortcomings.
        The 9/11 Commission recommended over 10 years ago, ``The
    problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted
    openly. It should include a shared interest in greater
    tolerance and cultural respect translating into a commitment to
    fight the violent extremists who foment hatred.'' Ten years ago
    we said that.
        Today we still struggle to talk directly about our
    relationship with the kingdom. In light of this fact, I would
    like to thank this committee for holding this hearing on this
    subject bringing greater transparency and clarity to American
    diplomacy and to the American people.
        The Saudis pose a number of challenges for the United
    States and its foreign policy. Saudi society still continues to
    produce a disturbing number of recruits and supporters for
    terrorist groups around the world including in Syria. Moreover,
    according to a front page article in the New York Times just
    this past Sunday titled, ``How Kosovo Was Turned into a Fertile
    Ground for ISIS,'' Saudi influence and money has transformed
    this once tolerant Muslim society into a ``font of Islamic
    extremism and pipeline for jihadists.''
        Domestically, the Saudi Government still continues to have
    a poor record on human rights. The Saudis are fighting a war in
    Yemen with goals different than the United States, thus
    creating some problems for the United States in the Middle
    East. These are signs, ladies and gentlemen, that the United
    States and Saudi Arabia still have much work to do in this
    crucial partnership; and it is a partnership.
        I believe that our relationship with the kingdom is crucial
    to our interests in the Middle East. Addressing our concerns
    diplomatically and privately is often the appropriate path. As
    a former diplomat we often did this behind closed doors,
    however, sometimes we must honestly and openly confront our
    legitimate differences. Friends and allies cannot bury their
    disagreements. They must frankly address them and
    counterterrorism must be at the top of the American and the
    Saudi list.
        Counterterrorism. After 9/11, the news that 15 of the 19
    hijackers had come from Saudi Arabia led many Americans to
    question whether the Saudis were the ally we thought them to
    be. They continue to be our ally, but an embattled one.
    Furthermore, we found that Saudi Arabia was fertile ground for
    fundraising and support for al-Qaeda. In the 9/11 Commission
    report we did not discover high level and direct Saudi
    Government involvement in the plot, but wrote that Saudi Arabia
    had been a problematic ally in the fight against terrorism.
        There is a glaring contrast some days and weeks and months
    between high level Saudi legitimate cooperation in helping the
    United States uncover plots, which is critical for us, but it
    often directly conflicts with the society and culture that
    sometimes exports extremism and intolerance.
        There has been recent media attention to these 28 pages
    that Judge Poe just cited, classified information actually
    written by Congress in the Joint Intelligence Committee, but
    was reviewed and investigated by the 9/11 Commission. I served
    on both of these panels. I am strongly in favor for
    declassifying this information as quickly and as soon as
    possible. For national security reasons the 9/11 families
    deserve it, the American people deserve it, and justice
    deserves it.
        We have the right as Americans to transparency and
    sunlight, not the darkness that conspiracy theories thrive on
    in today's cynical political climate. While the 28 pages are
    important to declassify--we need to get those out--it is
    crucial to understand the unclassified 9/11 Commission report,
    particularly Chapters 5, 7, and the footnotes where we talk
    about some of the problems that are ongoing today in Saudi
    society to export extremism, fund radical ideology for
    terrorist groups, and supply a stream of jihadists around the
    world.
        We have seen, no doubt, improvements from the kingdom. It
    has created a deradicalization program and is helping to
    reintegrate extremists back into society in a regular fashion.
    Saudi intelligence agencies have worked very closely with their
    American counterparts to share information about threats from
    extremist groups, most notably a tip-off in 2010 which
    reportedly led to the disruption of a plot to bomb U.S. cargo
    planes.
        They also briefly participated in the U.S. war, led against
    the Islamic State, coalition in Syria. According to the most
    recent State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the
    Saudis have instituted a number of legal reforms to strengthen
    the prohibitions on supporting terrorism.
        These are crucial tools in fighting terrorism, but
    sometimes they are not sufficient strategic ones. Saudi Arabia
    has outlawed terrorist groups like the Islamic State and banned
    its citizens from providing financial support to them. Yet
    despite these official acts, studies on the background of
    Islamic State foreign fighters continue to show that Saudi
    recruits are among the most numerous among the group's ranks.
        A recent West Point study confirmed that Saudi recruits
    were in the highest three groups in Syria. The threat of
    extremism cannot be countered by police, intelligence and
    military actions alone. The Saudi Government needs to address
    the threat of radicalization and extremism within its own
    society.
        In all of this we should be cognizant of the fact that the
    Saudis themselves are threatened by extremism and have suffered
    greatly from it. In 2003, Saudi al-Qaeda terrorists unleashed a
    campaign of attacks in that country that shocked the kingdom.
    The Saudis took immediate steps to address this.
        I want to speak for a moment, Mr. Chairman, about Iran.
    Iran's support for terrorism is a serious threat to Middle East
    stability, American interests, and American allies in the
    region. In the face of these threats we must make sure that
    Saudi Arabia, the focus of so much of Iran's attention and
    ambitions, is able to resist and appropriately confront
    Tehran's attempts to influence the region.
        How we manage this makes vital difference to our friends
    and allies in the Middle East. We cannot allow Saudi Arabia's
    justified fears of its neighbor to lead to deeper disagreements
    within and with the United States. While we work together to
    counter some of Iran's nefarious efforts to stoke instability
    in the region, this must not distract from the fight against
    terrorist threats like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
        Mr. Chairman, I will skip through some comments on energy.
    I want to conclude on a human rights topic. Congress helped
    create the United States Commission on International Religious
    Freedom in 1998 in order to promote the fundamental human
    rights of people to worship and observe their faith in peace.
        Since its creation, the Commission, at the urging I might
    add of Congress, has done valuable work uncovering examples of
    intolerance, anti-Semitism, and incitement to violence in Saudi
    textbooks provided to schools in developing countries all over
    the world. The Islamic State has even discovered and utilized
    this material in some of their textbooks to reflect their world
    view. One scholar has even noted the use of this material in
    schools under the Islamic State's control in Raqqa, Syria.
        While the kingdom has made some progress in revising its
    textbooks and curtailing extremist material, and we note that
    and encourage that, this Commission notes that the Saudi
    Government still includes highly offensive references in their
    high school textbooks.
        So to conclude, members of this important subcommittee,
    having served in both the legislative and the executive
    branches of American Government, I have seen the important role
    that congressional oversight and your counsel plays in shaping
    American foreign policy.
        The U.S.-Saudi relationship is an area where Congress must
    continue to play an important role with the executive branch
    and for the American people. Congress should continue to hold
    oversight hearings, insist on better progress on
    counterterrorism results from Saudi Arabia, and discuss the
    human rights situation.
        The U.S. Intelligence Community gives credits to Saudi
    Arabia for developing and cooperating on counterintelligence
    and helping stop specific attacks. We are grateful for this.
    While this is true, we must see more consistent results from
    Saudi Arabia on preventing the export of intolerance and
    extremism around the world; we must work together to curtail
    the financial support for al-Qaeda and terrorist groups; we
    must see more results on reducing the Saudi supply of the high
    number of foreign fighters in Syria.
        Resetting and rebuilding this decades-long strategic
    partnership with Saudi will be a foreign policy priority for
    the United States in 2017. And I thank the chairman and ranking
    member and members for my testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Roemer follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador.
        Mr. Henderson.

      STATEMENT OF MR. SIMON HENDERSON, DIRECTOR, GULF AND ENERGY
     POLICY PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

        Mr. Henderson. Thank you. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
    Keating, distinguished members of the committee; it is an honor
    and privilege to appear before you today. I have written about
    Saudi Arabia, particularly the royal family known as the House
    of Saud, for more than 20 years. Arguably, I publish more about
    Saudi Arabia, ten analyses so far this year, than anyone else.
    I also have a reputation for detailed reporting which probably
    explains why I have never been to Saudi Arabia. I have never
    been given a visa to visit there although I have traveled
    widely in the rest of the Middle East.
        Saudi Arabia sees itself as the leader of the Islamic
    world, a leader if not the leader of the Arab world, and by
    virtue of it being the world's largest oil exporter, a leader
    of the energy world. Of these leadership roles, it is the
    Islamic one which is from a Saudi perspective by far the most
    important. Within the kingdom are Islam's two holiest places,
    Mecca and Medina. Ensuring the safety of Muslim pilgrims who
    thereby recognize Saudi leadership is a paramount concern.
        This emphasis on Islam was a feature of a memorable memo
    written by a departing British Ambassador 32 years ago. He
    identified three principal features of the kingdom. Islam was
    one of them, insularity was another--it is a very closed
    society, or was at that point--and he also noted that the
    kingdom was incompetent, a feature which I often ask friends
    who have visited the kingdom whether it is still valid or not
    and they suggest that it is. And that is a word which perhaps
    partly explains our concern about Saudi counterterrorism
    efforts.
        Apart from Islam, a major influence on Saudi thinking is
    history, particularly recent history. I would argue that the
    two most important events in Saudi minds both date back to
    1979. In February of that year, the Islamic Revolution in Iran
    overthrew the Shah and brought to power a clerical regime of
    Shiite Muslims, the majority faith in Iran. As Shiites, they
    are historical rivals of Sunni Muslims such as Saudis. The
    ethnic difference of Iranians mostly being Persians rather than
    Arabs is also significant.
        Later the same year, in November 1979, the Grand Mosque in
    Mecca was seized by Sunni militants, contesting the legitimacy
    of the House of Saud. It was 2 weeks before Saudi soldiers,
    with the embarrassingly necessary assistance of French special
    forces, regained control. Since then, the House of Saud has had
    to fight on two contradictory fronts: Countering regional
    Iranian mischief including support for the kingdom's own
    minority Shiite community, while also dealing with Sunni
    extremists including potential jihadists, at home.
        The principal challenge for the U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism
    relationship is that right now there is more than the usual
    amount of differences on emphasis and direction which can apply
    to even close allies. It has to be significant that in the
    recent profile of President Obama in The Atlantic, Saudi Arabia
    was criticized more severely and more often than any other
    country, ally or not.
        A new and challenging dimension in the relationship was
    introduced a year ago when King Abdullah died and was replaced
    by King Salman. Three months after that the line of succession
    changed. The Crown Prince was sacked and he was replaced by the
    Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, and more significantly,
    the number three slot of the Deputy Crown Prince was taken by
    King Salman's younger son Muhammad bin Salman who is just 30
    years old.
        At the moment, we are facing an uncertain future.
    Washington's principal partner on counterterrorism issues for
    the last decade or so, Muhammad bin Nayef, has been
    marginalized but the need for an effective counterterrorism
    partnership is as great as ever. Also, Riyadh is distrustful of
    Washington's approach to what the Saudi sees as at least half
    of the terrorism problem, Iran.
        In these circumstances, the United States cannot take for
    granted its current counterterrorism partnership with Saudi
    Arabia. Despite differences and public insults, the
    relationship needs to adapt so the substance of it can be
    sustained during the continuing period of political uncertainty
    and especially within the House of Saud and where the real
    power lies. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Henderson follows:]
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                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Henderson.
        Ms. House. Microphone.

      STATEMENT OF MS. KAREN ELLIOT HOUSE, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER
              CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

        Ms. House. Oh, excuse me, I am saying in my best Texas
    accent, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Mr. Keating.
        Mr. Poe. And I can understand you a whole lot better than I
    can Mr. Henderson, that is for sure.
        Ms. House. Yes, I knew you wouldn't need a translator for
    me. The others may.
        I am going to focus on Saudi Arabia itself because much is
    changing in the kingdom these days. A new generation of young
    Saudi leaders is now in charge after nearly six decades of rule
    by aged and increasingly infirm sons of the founder. Also
    changing, unfortunately, is the U.S.-Saudi relationship which
    was built on the tacit understanding of Saudi oil for U.S.
    support and protection.
        On my latest visit there in January, the most recent of
    dozens of visits over the last 38 years--I began going as a
    reporter for the Wall Street Journal--I found Saudi royals and
    a lot of Saudi citizens, the number one question they wanted to
    ask is, is the U.S. policy of avoiding involvement in Middle
    East problems permanent or will a new administration, a new
    U.S. President again exert traditional leadership in the Middle
    East including support for our Saudi ally?
        Obviously, with the Presidential election some months away
    we don't know what the next administration's policy would be,
    but the point I want to make is I believe it is clear already
    that the future of Saudi Arabia with this new generation of
    leaders for some of the reasons Simon mentioned, with this new
    generation of leaders in charge is of critical importance to
    us.
        Despite the fact that the U.S. produces more oil than any
    time in 30 years, we are still dependent on the global oil
    market even though only 8 percent of our oil comes from Saudi
    Arabia. And secondly, obviously as been mentioned by the
    chairman and others, Saudi Arabia is the wellspring of this
    religious Wahhabi philosophy that motivates at least some of
    the jihadi hatred that seeks to destroy the Western way of
    life. So for those reasons, I think it is critically important
    that U.S. policymakers understand the forces at work in the
    kingdom.
        Support for Saudi stability and Israeli democracy have been
    two of the key U.S. goals in the Middle East, certainly in my
    whole lifetime, and in my view they must remain so. The new
    generation of leadership in Riyadh has a vision--I stress the
    word vision--to transform the Saudi economy and to some extent
    its society that will benefit, in my view, not only Saudi
    citizens but also potentially strengthen U.S.-Saudi relations
    if we are wise enough to seize that opportunity.
        It is not U.S. influence that has encouraged these changes,
    in my view, but we should welcome and support them. The new
    leadership, as Simon said, includes Crown Prince Muhammad bin
    Nayef, the individual in charge of combating terrorism, and I
    can assure you that Saudis too focus on the need to retain
    Muhammad bin Nayef as the man that in their view has protected
    them from terrorism. There is not much concern about ISIS in
    Saudi Arabia, and the reason is Muhammad bin Nayef. From
    everything I hear cooperation with the U.S. on anti-terrorism
    is deemed to be good both on our side and theirs where he is
    concerned.
        And to the extent that rich Saudis give money as do other
    rich people in the Persian Gulf to help finance terrorism, this
    does not, in my view, constitute official Saudi policy but
    rather evades it. They understand, whatever the case on 9/11,
    they understand now that terrorism is a threat to them too.
        The new Deputy Crown Prince that Simon mentioned and the
    significance of both of these young men is that they are
    grandsons of the founder. So one is 55 and the Deputy Crown
    Prince is only 30. He is responsible for the country's defense,
    its economy, and Aramco. Literally, not since his grandfather
    Ibn Saud has a 30-year-old prince had the amount of power that
    he has. Last month he laid out what I think is a quite
    remarkable vision to sharply reduce dependence on oil; to
    create jobs for the 70 percent of the Saudi population that is
    under 30 years of age and many of them unemployed; to open
    opportunities for, as he put it, all Saudis which is a code
    word for including women; and he even on the record came out
    for ``more moderate brand of Islam.''
        I stress this is a vision and not a plan, but having met
    with him myself in January in Riyadh, I do think that he is
    serious and I am happy to answer questions about that if you
    have any.
        Mr. Poe. Sum up your remarks, if you would, Ms. House.
        Ms. House. Pardon. So I will skip Iran. I do not believe
    the Saudis are entirely paranoid when they look at what Iran is
    doing in the region, which is antithetical to their interests
    and I would argue to ours too.
        So I will close by just saying it is not too late for a new
    U.S. administration to improve the relationship with Saudi
    Arabia, but it will require being honest about the fact that we
    don't have the same values, stressing a point the Ambassador
    made, and we do have a common strategic interest and that is a
    stable Persian Gulf that is free of any other hegemonic
    domination. And in my view we should seize this opportunity to
    support economic reform in Saudi Arabia and to rebuild trust
    with the Saudis by being honest about the difference, because
    instability in Saudi Arabia in a Middle East that is already
    completely unstable is in no one's interest. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. House follows:]
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                                    ----------

        Mr. Poe. Dr. Byman.

    STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, EDMUND A. WALSH
            SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Byman. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and
    members of this distinguished subcommittee, thank you for this
    opportunity to appear before you again and testify today.
        Saudi Arabia has made considerable progress on
    counterterrorism in the last 15 years, but it still has a long
    way to go. Before the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks
    and, really, until al-Qaeda began to attack the kingdom
    directly in May 2003, Saudi Arabia was often uncooperative on
    counterterrorism. The Khobar Towers investigation often
    encountered significant problems working with the Saudi
    Government; al-Qaeda-linked individuals were often not
    investigated or at least those investigations were not shared
    with U.S. officials; and more broadly, individuals in Saudi
    Arabia, some of them linked to the government, supported an
    array of causes linked to Kashmir, Afghanistan and elsewhere,
    causes on which al-Qaeda also drew.
        Since 2003, as others have said, there has been a
    tremendous change. Al-Qaeda brought the war home to Saudi
    Arabia and Saudi Arabia responded very strongly to the point
    where the 9/11 Commission declared in 2004 that the kingdom of
    Saudi Arabia is now locked in mortal combat with al-Qaeda. We
    have seen an aggressive effort to disrupt cells and also some
    progress on terrorism financing. We have seen intelligence
    sharing and significant penetrations, Saudi Arabia has served
    as a drone base for operations in Yemen, and this is
    invaluable.
        The Islamic State, like al-Qaeda, is considered a top
    security threat by the Saudi regime. The Islamic State itself
    has declared Saudi Arabia to be an enemy, and its propaganda
    shows a black flag flying above Mecca. Islamic State terrorists
    have attacked mosques of Shia Muslims in the kingdom and also
    Saudi security officials, and the Saudi Government has arrested
    over 1,000 suspected Islamic State supporters, foiled several
    attacks, and is trying to take effort to stop people from
    traveling to fight.
        Complicating this picture, however, is that support for
    terrorism in Saudi Arabia is often difficult to distinguish
    between the government, important organizations within society,
    and individuals acting against the will of the government. The
    Saudi regime's legitimacy is tied directly to the clerical
    establishment and since, really, the 1970s and perhaps before
    has been deeply engaged in supporting an array of Islamic
    causes around the world.
        It has spent tens of billions of dollars on this, and as
    Ambassador Roemer mentioned, the article in the New York Times
    on Bosnia is almost a classic example of the sort of support we
    see where the Saudi Government was supporting an array of
    mosques and other institutions that fostered extremist
    teachings.
        At times the regime has supported these institutions, at
    times it has deliberately ignored them, at other times it has
    cracked down so there has not been a single consistent
    response. And because these figures are often important for
    regime legitimacy, it is politically very difficult for them to
    do so.
        We still see support for a number of radical groups around
    the world. I would single out Pakistan in particular as a place
    where this is still commonplace. The campaign in Yemen against
    the Houthis there has indirectly aided al-Qaeda in the Arabian
    Peninsula by giving them free space in which to operate.
        Now the good news is, senior Saudi preachers working with
    the government have urged individuals not to go to terrorist
    groups, not to fight in Iraq and Syria, but as has been
    mentioned we see many preachers, many religious institutions
    condemning other Muslims in particular, also being very
    critical of non-Muslims and at times quite anti-American. And
    much of this in the United States at least would be free
    speech, right. It is not speech I like, but it would be free
    speech.
        But nevertheless, it creates a fertile soil around the
    world of indoctrination and it plays directly into the
    narrative that the Islamic State pushes that it is defending
    true Islam against a host of enemies including many within the
    Muslim world.
        I will conclude simply by saying that the United States has
    very deep differences with Saudi Arabia. These involve for
    example women's rights, homosexuality, religious freedom,
    freedom of speech--these are deep and fundamental differences.
    At the same time, Saudi Arabia is a vital partner on
    counterterrorism. And one of the difficulties in any policy is
    walking this line between a vital partner yet one who is more
    partner than friend. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
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                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. I thank all of our witnesses for their testimony,
    and I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. I will make
    this comment. It is obvious that Saudi Arabia acts in its own
    interest. Not necessarily that is a bad thing, but countries
    should act in their own best interest including the United
    States. We should act in our best interest.
        Regarding the 9/11 Commission report, the 28 classified
    pages, I would like each of you just to give me a yes or no on
    this. Should those 28 pages be declassified in your opinion?
    Ambassador, you have already said.
        Mr. Roemer. I am strongly in favor of declassifying the 28
    pages as soon as possible, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Poe. Mr. Henderson.
        Mr. Henderson. Since you limit me to a yes or no answer,
    the answer is yes.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you.
        Ms. House.
        Ms. House. As a journalist my answer is obviously yes.
        Mr. Poe. And Dr. Byman.
        Mr. Byman. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Poe. As mentioned in your testimony, and many members
    have talked about JASTA and the Senate unanimously passing
    legislation last week, the bill doesn't mention any governments
    but it says that the bill makes a foreign government that
    provides tangible support to terrorists who carry out an attack
    on the United States subject to the jurisdiction of an American
    courts. Do you think that is a good idea, Ambassador?
        Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, I would put my former congressman
    hat on, but also try to talk a little about my hat as a former
    diplomat. I am also strongly in favor of the Senate bill. I
    think it is a bipartisan bill where Senator Cornyn, who you
    know well, and Senator Lindsey Graham have both put in their
    considerations and narrowed the scope of the bill so that it
    does not stretch across the world and create problems on
    sovereign immunity for other diplomatic situations. It is
    narrowed to this particular issue with Saudi Arabia.
        And Mr. Chairman, I would then say that given that we are a
    country of rules and laws and that if our court thereby finds
    that there was some activity or action by Saudi that
    contributed, let our courts prevail and let justice prevail. We
    should pass this bill.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador.
        Mr. Henderson.
        Mr. Henderson. I agree that our courts should be allowed to
    prevail with the caveat of be careful what you wish for and
    taking such action could lead to Saudi retaliation whether it
    be withdrawing Treasury bills or actions against Americans in
    the kingdom. I don't think that is what we are looking for.
        Mr. Poe. Ms. House, what do you think, should we pass it or
    not? It is our decision that is going to come up next week. The
    Senate did it. What do you think?
        Ms. House. This is beyond my expertise. But as someone who
    travels abroad a lot and in Saudi Arabia, a very closed and
    conservative society, I worry about what Simon just said, be
    careful, and what Congressman Issa raised earlier, the risk of
    retaliation. I mean, I believe vengeance is mine sayeth the
    Lord, I shall repay; that perhaps there is something to be said
    for letting the Lord handle that part of the vengeance on the
    Saudis.
        Mr. Poe. All right.
        Dr. Byman, can you narrow it down to a yes or no?
        Mr. Byman. I will say a caveated yes, sir.
        Mr. Poe. We don't get to caveat vote. It is a yea or a nay
    without an explanation. I am just--what is your opinion of the
    bill?
        Mr. Byman. My opinion of the bill is that as long as the
    bar is very high for what constitutes state support, then it is
    appropriate for the courts to decide this.
        Mr. Poe. A couple of other observations, this hearing, you
    all have talked about a lot of things including Iran, and the
    Saudis have a two-front war apparently or a two-front concern
    in the Middle East. It is terrorism and it is also Iran. And I
    think as Mr. Henderson testified that our concern really is
    terrorism and not so much Iran. The crimes in Syria have cost
    millions of folks to move into Europe. Has the Saudi Arabian
    Government ever taken any Syrian refugees into Saudi Arabia?
        Mr. Henderson. My understanding is that Saudi Arabia along
    with the other Gulf states has not taken refugees in a manner
    that we would recognize; that Europe is taking refugees. I
    believe that at least some of the Gulf states, I am not sure if
    it applies to Saudi Arabia, have been generous in allowing
    Syrians who already live in their countries to bring in
    relatives and family members at this time.
        Mr. Poe. All right, thank you. I think it is somewhat
    interesting that Saudi Arabia does not take Syrian refugees,
    which is a whole different issue. I am going to yield to the
    ranking member from Massachusetts for his questions. Mr.
    Keating.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I wanted to see if you could comment on this. As Ambassador
    Roemer and Dr. Byman have mentioned there has been, you know,
    increases in legal reforms and efforts to really constrain
    financially the ability of people in Saudi Arabia to, you know,
    fund for this extremist activity.
        Now how successful has that been, and if hasn't been as
    successful as it should be, then why not? Is it a lack of will
    or are they encountering difficulties just implementing this?
    If you could comment on that because I think it is a
    fundamental question of transparency. They are doing this. They
    are attempting to do it, how effective have they been?
        Mr. Roemer. I would say, Mr. Keating, I hate to sound like
    Harry Truman who talked about economists on the one hand and
    the other hand, but on the one hand you see the Saudis
    cooperating, helping us, cracking down on terrorism, passing
    national laws to try to restrict people from joining up with
    the Islamic State, and on the other hand as we read in the
    recent article in the New York Times, Saudi money and
    government financing for more jihadis going from Kosovo to
    Syria.
        We need both the Saudi hands working together with the
    United States on counterterrorism as a principal concern along
    with our other strategic objectives, which are Middle East
    stability, which are making sure that Iran cannot do us harm
    through terrorism, through promoting human rights and through
    some of the other key issues that we have mentioned here.
        I would also say, Mr. Keating, that our relationship with
    the Saudis, while it is difficult right now on this particular
    issue, we have had difficulties with them and they have had
    difficulties with us before. They were not in support of the
    U.S. invading Iraq in 2003. They were not in favor of the U.S.
    negotiating President Obama's nuclear deal and kicked back
    vociferously about that. They were not, you know, for Harry
    Truman recognizing Israel so quickly. So we can get through
    this, but I am glad that counterterrorism is front and center
    today.
        Mr. Keating. Dr. Byman, just quickly. Has it been effective
    and if not why?
        Mr. Byman. It has been somewhat effective. We have seen
    groups in Chechnya run out of money because of a decrease in
    Saudi support. The Islamic State advised its supporters in the
    kingdom to channel money through Kuwait because the efforts in
    the kingdom were extensive enough to be disruptive.
        But a number of causes still enjoy considerable domestic
    legitimacy. Again, I mentioned Pakistan. And as a result, you
    can give to groups that are kind of one level out from the most
    radical but the individuals involved often cross over. Part of
    it is simply technically very hard, but I think part of a
    problem is a deep political will issue to go after the entirety
    of the problem.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you. Just quickly, I think the panel has
    done a great job covering as time permits a wide array. But I
    want to ask you this question if you could just answer it
    briefly because of time, where do you see Saudi Arabia 10 years
    from now particularly in terms of the U.S.?
        Mr. Henderson. Saudi Arabia in 10 years' time will, I
    think, be very much recognizable as the Saudi Arabia of today.
    I don't anticipate any revolution, any emerging republic to
    replace the royal family.
        What I don't know is who will be king of Saudi Arabia then,
    when the transition will occur, and under what circumstances it
    will occur. This is very different from the way our knowledge
    of Saudi Arabia looking backwards over the last 30 or 40 years
    where there was a predictability to the whole thing. With the
    eminence, the increasing prominence of the 30-year-old Muhammad
    bin Salman, previous conceptions about how Saudi Arabia is
    going to move forward have to be discarded.
        Mr. Keating. So it is less predictable. Does anyone else
    quickly want to venture any vision?
        Ms. House. It is definitely less predictable, but I think
    it is likely not to be dramatically different. But in my view
    it will have inched forward some. Women are, I know nobody
    likes to hear this, but they are much better educated than the
    men and they are much more willing to work and they are
    managing to get opportunities.
        And the Saudi people, while unhappy with various things at
    home, look around at the total chaos and bloodshed in the rest
    of the Middle East and whatever they think of the Saudi royal
    family now, they prize stability over change.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Wilson, South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Judge Poe.
        And Ms. House, Saudi Arabia has incredible influence in the
    Islamic world. With the status of reforms to the Saudi
    educational curriculum promised in 2008, has that been produced
    or not?
        Ms. House. No. I don't think so, because as the man who was
    in charge of changing the textbooks told me when I was writing
    my book, at some level it doesn't matter what the textbooks
    say. When you close the door, the teacher is in charge, and all
    too many of the teachers are in total agreement with the more
    rigid Wahhabi philosophy that has been ingrained.
        Mr. Wilson. And it seems illogical to me the promotion of
    jihadism would create such a level of instability that would
    threaten the regime in Riyadh. Is that not correct?
        Ms. House. No, they have been very successful. As I said,
    Muhammad bin Nayef, the Crown Prince, they have been very
    successful at controlling terrorism in the kingdom since the
    2003, '04, '05 period when they had a lot of it. And now, and
    people want that stability and if repression occurs against
    some human rights advocates in the context of that most Saudis
    are sadly willing to overlook that. As Dr. Byman said, what we
    would call free speech they punish.
        Mr. Wilson. And it just seems again counterproductive, but
    hope springs eternal.
        Ms. House. Counterproductive to do what?
        Mr. Wilson. To the existence of the kingdom. That there
    would be such an extremist ideology that just could----
        Ms. House. No, as he said, it is fundamentally what gives
    the royal family their legitimacy is that we support the
    Wahhabis who are propagating the one true Islam. And they
    prefer that it be exported as they are doing in other places,
    and they control themselves, the jihadis, at home.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, I just see the instability whether it be
    Yemen or you name it, or Pakistan or Libya, wherever, Kosovo.
    But bottom line, thank goodness we have good people like
    Ambassador Roemer around.
        And Ambassador, I am really grateful. From the state of
    South Carolina, the late governor John C. West served as
    Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and worked very closely to establish
    a warm, bipartisan relationship. Can you judge the
    effectiveness of Saudi Arabia's attempt to fight terrorism
    financing? Have we seen a noticeable impact on their financing
    of groups in the region?
        Mr. Roemer. Congressman Wilson, thank you for the question.
    I would say that it is inconsistent on financial crackdowns and
    financial progress. We have probably seen since 2003 more
    progress from the Saudis than at any other time once they had
    the internal attacks and took this quite seriously.
        But I think as Dan Byman said, we often see this supported,
    ignored, and then a crackdown, and supported, ignored and a
    crackdown, and not consistent enough. The financial area is
    somewhere where I think the United States and the Treasury
    Department has been very successful at working with the Saudi
    Government in some areas, but I don't think it is consistent
    enough and I don't think it has passed through from the top
    levels of Saudi society down into the cultural and religious
    areas.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, thank goodness again that you are
    involved, and we need your guidance.
        And Mr. Byman, how would you characterize the Saudi
    counterterrorism campaign in Yemen? Has it been effective?
        Mr. Byman. Sir, for the most part the campaign has not been
    effective. They have gone into Yemen primarily to fight the
    Houthi movement there which they believe is backed, is tied to
    Iran. In my view the ties are real, but the Saudis overstate
    them considerably.
        But the Middle East, sir, as you know is a mess, and what
    makes it more confusing is the Houthis are fighting al-Qaeda in
    the Arabian Peninsula. So by fighting the group the Saudis
    believe is tied to Iran, they have given the al-Qaeda group
    more freedom of operation. Recently they have been trying to
    fight both, but that said, the big winner of the Saudi
    intervention has been al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, again, thank each of you for as you say a
    very complicated situation. Thank you.
        Mr. Poe. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
    California, Mr. Sherman, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Sherman. Okay. Let me just quiz you all by a show of
    hands. How many of you believe that the House of Saud will be
    in control of Saudi Arabia 15 years from now, a monarchy under
    the House of Saud? If you think so, raise your hand.
        Ms. House. 15.
        Mr. Sherman. 15 years. Okay, we have got four hands raised.
    That is a better odds than many governments in the Middle East
    get.
        Ms. House. People are passive.
        Mr. Sherman. Second, the Saudis have said they would sell
    $750 billion of assets if we pass this law. I don't think they
    would do it, but even when they say they would do it is this to
    avoid attachment as a litigation defense strategy, or is this
    to punish and scare the United States? Why are they claiming to
    do the 750? Ambassador.
        Mr. Roemer. Congressman, I don't think they would do it.
    They didn't buy those securities in American bonds to do us a
    charitable work. They did it to make money. They are not going
    to sell it if it loses them a lot of money----
        Mr. Sherman. On the other hand you could----
        Mr. Roemer [continuing]. Opening that threat to us. I don't
    think----
        Mr. Sherman. You could say that a U.S. bond is four basis
    points better than investing in a euro bond, and then if there
    is a genuine risk that a lawsuit will lead to the attachment of
    those assets, because if there is a lawsuit I don't know
    whether the damages are only $1 billion. Maybe they are $10
    billion. Maybe with punitives they are $750 billion. So I don't
    think they would do it to punish us. I wonder whether it is a
    litigation strategy.
        Just some commentary, I mean, Saudi Arabia is a monarchy,
    so by definition you don't have the right of the people to
    control the government. So you can't have free speech because a
    lot of speakers would say that the people should control the
    government. And their human rights toward women, LGBT, and
    religious freedom is zero. Now we accept that. I mean, a Mormon
    missionary in Riyadh is, I assume, a dead Mormon missionary or
    just an imprisoned Mormon missionary. I don't know which.
        But, so I focus on, okay, we know that all about them. The
    question is are they exporting terrorism? Two ways that they
    can export terrorism, one is to the finance the people that
    actually blow things up. Here is the money today, blow
    something up tomorrow. 9/11 support, of course. That is the
    focus of the 28 pages. But the other is to finance a propaganda
    education machine designed to teach millions of people that
    blowing things up is a good idea.
        The House of Saud and the Wahhabis have an alliance that
    goes back to the 1700s. I can't fault them if they finance
    efforts to say, hey, you should strictly follow Islam. Pray
    five times a day; don't slough off and do four. But we are not
    talking about just orthodox practice. We are talking about are
    they teaching people.
        How much money is Saudi Arabia spending out of government
    money or royal money to spread Wahhabi Islam, and is there a
    form of Wahhabi Islam they can spread that is orthodox but not
    violent?
        Mr. Roemer. The answer to your first question is it doesn't
    matter much how much they are spending because it doesn't cost
    much. We found on the 9/11 Commission that the entire operation
    against the United States to pull off----
        Mr. Sherman. Oh, yes. If they were financing the people
    that blow things up you do that for small amounts of money. But
    if your goal is to change popular opinion from Rubat to Jakarta
    and to create millions of people who think that killing non-
    Muslims is a good idea that can be expensive. And I know that
    others have talked about did they finance this or that
    terrorist attack. My focus is, are they financing a well
    designed propaganda effort to create millions of pro-terrorist
    thinkers? Does anybody have an idea how much they are spending
    to finance Wahhabism, and can you draw distinction between
    violent and non-violent Wahhabism or is there just one
    Wahhabism?
        Ms. House. There are lots of Saudis who would argue that
    you can draw a distinction between violent and non-violent
    Wahhabism. The late King Abdullah fired some of the senior
    religious scholars who in essence the supreme court of what is
    the right Islam. King Salman has restored one of them. So there
    are a lot of people in Saudi Arabia who do not believe in
    killing other people.
        But I think your point is well taken that it is more, in my
    view it is less the direct financing than the indirect
    promotion of a form of religion that we obviously would regard
    as intolerant.
        Mr. Sherman. I would go beyond intolerant. I mean those who
    are just orthodox----
        Ms. House. Intolerant and violent.
        Mr. Sherman [continuing]. And say bad things, who teach
    that if you have, you know, you are going to hell if you have a
    ham sandwich, that is a certain intolerance. It is when you
    start advocating blowing things up that I draw the line. I
    yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
    gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
        Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. To my good friend from
    California, according to a Senate Judiciary Committee
    testimony, Saudi Arabia spends $4 billion a year on mosques,
    madrassa preachers, students, and textbooks to spread the
    Wahhabi creed, if that helps out at all.
        If I could turn to Mr. Henderson, do you think that the
    kingdom, the House of Saud, can survive without its affiliation
    to Wahhabism? Can it survive?
        Mr. Henderson. Could you just repeat the question?
        Mr. Perry. Can the kingdom, can the House of Saud survive
    without its affiliation to Wahhabism?
        Mr. Henderson. It would be a very different kingdom.
    Historically, it is a partnership between the House of Saud and
    the religious leadership.
        Mr. Perry. So is that a tepid yes? Is it, I mean so you are
    saying there is a chance? What is that?
        Mr. Henderson. I don't think--it is a hypothetical which
    I----
        Mr. Perry. Well, I guess----
        Mr. Henderson [continuing]. Never thought of it before and
    because I don't think it is within the range of realistic
    possibility.
        Mr. Perry. Okay, so it is not realistic. Because it seems
    to me the House of Saud, the Saudis have said we are now an
    unreliable partner, so to speak, because we are not able to
    protect their monarchy.
        But I would say that they have been duplicitous and
    unreliable because they have spent $4 billion a year or
    something to that effect to spread Wahhabism around the globe,
    including North America, et cetera. I mean, I have got all the
    stats here of the thousands of mosques and centers and colleges
    and, you know, 80 percent of the mosques, 1,200 mosques
    operating in the U.S. were constructed after 2001, mostly with
    Saudi financing. And it just goes on and on from there whether
    you go to Europe or wherever you go.
        That having been said, at some point as an ally, who we are
    engaged in this war on terrorism whether we like it or not
    because the war has come to our doorstep, is it too much to
    ask, I guess that is the question. Is it too much to ask for
    them to stop that? To stop it.
        Mr. Henderson. I think what you are describing is a very
    valid question. I did not recognize comments of your colleague
    Mr. Sherman in terms of defining what is journalistically known
    as Wahhabism as being necessarily violent. I think it is
    intolerant and it is a conservative and strict Islam which is--
    --
        Mr. Perry. I would rather you not use the term
    ``conservative'' as opposed to fundamentalist. Thank you very
    kindly.
        Mr. Henderson. Sorry, it is the British-ness in me. I am
    sorry.
        Mr. Perry. I appreciate that but it means something here.
        Mr. Henderson. Forgive me.
        Mr. Sherman. With a personal approvance, I would prefer you
    go back to the original phraseology.
        Mr. Perry. Reclaiming my time and then some, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Henderson. Okay. I think there is a concern amongst
    leaders of Muslim communities in other parts of the world that
    Saudi Arabia spends a lot of money bringing mosques and
    bringing teachers to their countries and introducing a stricter
    form of Islam to----
        Mr. Perry. But do they not make the connection that when
    they bring the mosques and the teachers and the teaching they
    are bringing terrorism, an ideology of terrorism and death?
        Mr. Henderson. I don't think Wahhabism has an ideology of
    terrorism.
        Mr. Perry. Okay, I appreciate your opinion.
        Ms. House, you talked about our relationship with the
    Saudis and Israel and how important it is to maintain that
    stability in the Middle East, but does that mean that the
    United States should accept the circumstances of what many
    Americans, myself included, see as Saudi Arabia support,
    material support, through the construction of mosques and the
    ideology around the world including their own neighborhood,
    should we accept that for the stability, as you put it, in our
    relationship with Israel and Saudi Arabia?
        Ms. House. Well, I think we ought to, and hopefully we do,
    continuously try to underscore to them that it is not in----
        Mr. Perry. Ma'am, with all due respect this has been going
    on for decades. At what point do we require action on their
    part? Talking is one thing, but there are terrorists running
    around the globe----
        Ms. House. Well, what kind of action can you require?
        Mr. Perry. Well, we can request that they no longer fund
    this; that they change the teaching; that they get in the game
    on this like we have to be. Is that too much to ask? And is it
    worth the stability?
        Ms. House. It is not too much to ask, but I don't know that
    it will result in a change.
        Mr. Perry. Is it too much to demand for the sake of our
    relationship?
        Ms. House. Well, what is the rest of the demand? If not, we
    are not going to protect our interest in the Persian Gulf
    anymore?
        Mr. Perry. What about our interest in our schools and our
    neighborhoods here where people are going to blow us up? What
    about those interests, or are they not important? Because they
    are coming here, they are here now.
        Ms. House. They are.
        Mr. Perry. So at what point, what is the tipping point, if
    you know?
        Ms. House. I just think--I didn't get to talk about Iran. I
    think that you are focused on Saudi Arabia today for obvious
    reasons, but they are not the only people propagating terrorism
    in the Middle East. Iran is too.
        Mr. Perry. Okay, I agree with that. But for their part,
    let's just talk their part and our relationship. Do we just
    continue to accept it without any--there is no benchmark. We
    don't see any milestones at all from my standpoint.
        Mr. Poe. The witness can answer that question.
        Ms. House. I think it is my personal view that the regime
    could do more. In history, when the old man was founding the
    country and the religious nuts, his Ikhwan, wanted to invade
    Iraq and he knew that the British did not want him to and would
    cut off his money he kept them from doing that. He in essence
    waged a war on his own troops and won. When the royal family
    chooses to lay down a marker I think they can.
        And so I believe that is why I am intrigued with what the
    young guy is doing when he talks about, and I know talk is
    cheap, but talks about moderate Islam. The young people in
    Saudi Arabia these days are not just dependent on Saudi TV. You
    can now get 90 channels of TV. You can watch anything in Saudi
    Arabia. And they are all on the internet and they all do have a
    much greater idea about what goes on in the rest of the world.
        So there is some change in the society, and I remind you
    again 70 percent of the people are under 30 years of age. It
    could be a quite different Saudi Arabia not liberal like this
    country, but it could be a quite different place in 10 years if
    the society cut off from its ability to be passive and
    dependent on the government through spending oil to give
    everybody a job and buy their loyalty which they can't afford
    anymore, if people become self-reliant which they are urging
    them to do--we have to see if this transpires--it will be, I
    think, a somewhat different society.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the witness. Mr. Rohrabacher from
    California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. We were talking about
    words, a little back and forth on words. Let me just note,
    sometimes it is discouraging to hear people use certain words
    or the inability of certain people to use words. At a time when
    radical Islamic terrorism threatens to murder tens of
    thousands, if not more, Americans, it is quite disconcerting
    that our own President can't use the term ``radical Islamic
    terrorism.'' And that needs to be looked at closely.
        In terms of the Saudis, I will have to suggest that Ms.
    House that I like your optimism, but there is a thing called
    irrational optimism. And that is when someone gets beaten in
    the head a number of times and think they can do the same exact
    thing without getting beat in the head. The Saudis have been
    financing terrorism now for 20 years at least, at least. I mean
    they are, Saudis were behind the Taliban. Saudis financed
    Pakistan and they still do, and the Taliban were financed by
    that money.
        Just what, 2 days ago there was a drone attack where we
    took out the new leader of the Taliban, and where was he? He
    was in Pakistan. And who do you think is paying his bills in
    Pakistan, the Pakistanis? They are broke. They get their money
    from Saudi Arabia. So the Saudis have been financing this
    mayhem.
        I mean, it is not just the fact that 15 of 19 of the
    terrorists that murdered 3,000 Americans on 9/11 that they were
    Saudis, but it is what the government has actually done. And
    let me ask, how many of you there believe that the royal family
    of Saudi Arabia did not know and was unaware that there was a
    terrorist plot being implemented that would result in an
    historic terrorist attack in the United States in the lead up
    to 9/11? Do you believe that the Saudi royal family did not
    know? Raise your hand if you think that.
        Oh, okay. Let me just suggest this, that--okay. We have two
    and two, I think. So you guys believe that the Saudi royal
    family may well have known there was a major terrorist attack
    coming.
        Mr. Roemer. Mr.----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Go right ahead.
        Mr. Roemer [continuing]. Congressman, you and I go way back
    from our time together when I served up here. That is just too
    difficult of a question for somebody to raise their hand or put
    their hand down to----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, it is not for me. I will raise my
    hand right here. And let me tell you something----
        Mr. Roemer. Have you read the 28 pages?
        Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. That within 4 months before
    9/11, I was tipped off by a very high ranking Taliban who
    happened to work with me in Afghanistan when we were fighting
    the Soviets that there was going to be, there is a plot going
    on and what do you think about this ongoing plot? And I might
    say, the Warren Commission didn't seem to--when I sent that
    information over that I had been tipped off, they did not
    follow through on it. I wonder, why?
        And so what we have here is a high level ranking member of
    the Taliban knows about this, but we don't think that the high
    ranking people in Saudi Arabia who are financing the whole
    thing didn't know about it? This is clear that the Saudis have
    been intentionally involved in the mass slaughter of Americans
    and other people in the world in a terrorist way.
        We know that they are, number one, we know that they are
    currently financing madrassa schools and they teach, what do
    they teach these kids at school? When they come out of them
    they can, yes, they can be radical Islamic terrorists, but they
    can't do anything else in the modern economy. They finance
    mosques that are preaching the worst kind of hatred. And we are
    hearing about this all the time in the Balkans where they are
    financing the worst kind of--and we have of course the direct
    finance of terrorism that we have seen directly into Saudi
    Arabia.
        And we are being told by you today that we really don't
    know if the Saudi royal family is involved in this. Well, even
    if they are aware of this they are responsible. After 9/11--
    they didn't want to kill 3,000 Americans on 9/11. They wanted
    to kill 50,000 Americans on 9/11. 50,000. That is what they
    thought. When those buildings were going to come down, they
    didn't know that we could get all the people out. They were
    there for a mass slaughter of Americans.
        And we have just managed to just sort of, well, let's give
    them the benefit of the doubt whether or not the royal family
    knew about this or not. I say that the Saudi royal family has
    made itself clear that they do not deserve the benefit of the
    doubt because of all of their actions they have been involved
    in.
        And whether or not the young Saudi royal family members
    that are watching TV now are going to have an epiphany that
    Wahhabism isn't really, doesn't demand them to go out and
    attack the West, whether or not that is going to happen or not
    I don't think we can rely on that. Especially when you find
    that all of these young Islamic terrorists are springing up in
    different parts of the world including in San Bernardino,
    including at the Boston Marathon, you have these people who
    have been exposed to Western society but they have also been
    treated to a very high dose of Wahhabi radical Islamic
    philosophy that leads them to commit these terrorist acts.
        It is either we are going to face reality or there is going
    to be more and more of our people slaughtered. And I think how
    we deal with Saudi Arabia it has either got to be realistic or
    our people are going to suffer the consequences. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California. I thank all
    of the witnesses for being here. I want to thank the guests in
    the gallery as well, and also want to recognize some of the
    folks from the families of 9/11 that are here today as well.
        Thank you once again, and there may be other questions we
    have. You know the routine. We put them in writing, we send
    them to you, and we expect an answer in 10 days. The
    subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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