[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-116]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING
ON
LOGISTICS AND SEALIFT FORCE REQUIREMENTS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 22, 2016
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_____________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
20-076 WASHINGTON : 2016
________________________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia RICK LARSEN, Washington
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
Chair HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri Georgia
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
STEVE RUSSELL,Oklahoma
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces......... 2
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Dilisio, F. Scott, Director, Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics
Division (OPNAV N42), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.. 7
Jaenichen, Paul N., Sr., Maritime Administrator, U.S. Maritime
Administration................................................. 3
Lyons, LTG Stephen R., USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command........................................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 35
Dilisio, F. Scott............................................ 54
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 33
Jaenichen, Paul N., Sr....................................... 37
Lyons, LTG Stephen R......................................... 44
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
LOGISTICS AND SEALIFT FORCE REQUIREMENTS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 22, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. Before I begin my opening statement, let me
just say that just last night I was briefed on the Farsi Island
incident in January involving two U.S. Navy riverine boats and
was deeply disturbed by what I heard. I was disturbed not just
by the details of the incident itself, but about what they
imply about the training and materiel readiness levels of our
forces on the front lines and about our ability to deter
Iranian aggression and malicious behavior in the Middle East.
Unfortunately, I think this administration's policies have
seriously undermined both with grave implications for our men
and women in uniform and our national security.
So I want to take this time to encourage my colleagues on
this committee and throughout the rest of the House to get the
briefing on this important topic.
And today, the subcommittee convenes to receive testimony
on logistics and sealift fleet requirements.
I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank
them for the time and effort they expend on this most important
issue. Gentlemen, we thank you for being with us today and for
everything you do to defend our nation.
Since its earliest days, America has been a seafaring
maritime nation with a robust merchant marine. Today, merchant
ships carry around 90 percent of everything with the total
amount having more than tripled since 1970. This seaborne trade
fuels our economy and creates critical links with the global
commons.
Unfortunately for our national security, however, this
seaborne trade is being increasingly outsourced to other
nations and our own merchant fleet is in decline.
Between the years 2000 and 2014, our U.S. commercial fleet
has shrunk from 282 vessels to 179, a reduction of almost 40
percent. This commercial fleet reduction is increasingly
problematic for the U.S. military and specifically for the U.S.
Transportation Command [TRANSCOM] because these vessels support
the military's maritime lift requirements and their crews
provide the manning for military's mobilization forces
according to MARAD [U.S. Maritime Administration] and
TRANSCOM's assessments.
A reduction in the overall U.S. commercial sector has
severely jeopardized our ability to sustain any level of
prolonged military logistics support.
Furthermore, we are perilously close to not having
sufficient mariners to support even the initial mobilization of
our Navy's Ready Reserve Forces.
Unfortunately, the administration's fiscal year 2017 budget
request accelerates this decline and weakens our military. The
administration has proposed reducing funding for the Maritime
Security Program [MSP] by almost 20 percent. Such a reduction
will, in my view, undoubtedly reduce the size of our commercial
fleet below TRANSCOM's military requirements and reduce our
military surge capacity.
I look forward to better understanding the administration's
proposal, but I am determined to change this dangerous
trajectory.
Overall, I am concerned that this administration does not
fully appreciate the connection between the health of our
merchant fleet and our national security. Proposed changes to
the Food for Peace program continue to hurt our farmers and our
mariners.
While these changes would have economic impacts, this
subcommittee is focused today upon its harmful impact to
military readiness and the security of our nation.
In 1897, the first president of the Naval War College said
that both from the military and economic view, an extensive
marine commerce is a primal necessity to a country aspiring to
be a naval power. In the years since, America has become the
greatest naval power the world has ever seen.
But we must not let further decline in either our Navy
fleet or our maritime commerce undermine our position.
I now turn to my good friend and colleague, the ranking
member of the subcommittee, Congressman Courtney of
Connecticut, for any remarks he may have to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again, as someone who attended that briefing yesterday,
I would join you in recommending to our colleagues that they
follow up with the Navy to get that briefing.
Again, I don't want to just rehash a lot of the comments
that you made just a moment ago because, particularly in terms
of the Maritime Security Program, it is going to be, I think,
an issue that our subcommittee is going to look at with this
year's defense bill and for all the reasons that you set forth.
So again, rather than, you know, rehashing that comment, I
guess the other issue I just would like to highlight in my
opening remarks, and hopefully we will have a good dialogue
today with an outstanding panel of witnesses, is the issue of
maritime training requirements, because obviously we have got a
workforce issue here in terms of kind of refreshing an aging
workforce and in terms of, you know, the long view. This is
really critical in terms of getting that right.
According to MARAD's own information, the oldest ship in
the maritime training program that, again, is critical to
training this next generation, the TS Empire State attached to
SUNY [State University of New York] Maritime College is 55
years old and is expected to end its service life in 2019.
Again, according to MARAD, loss of this ship alone without
replacement would cause a loss of 36 percent of the existing
training ship capacity needed for mariner education, portrayed
``as a major setback to meet the rising national demand for
mariners by the agency in its 2017 budget request to
Congress.''
I want to applaud Administrator Jaenichen for his efforts
to alert Congress to this issue. And again, we look forward to
working with him as we put together our Seapower mark in the
coming weeks to make sure that really we give these critical
institutions the tools that they need to make sure that
changing requirements in terms of what is needed out there are
going to be met, because failure to do that is just going to
create a cliff that really will ripple through our entire Armed
Forces if we don't get it right.
So again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here
today. I look forward to your testimony.
Again, I will request that my written remarks, prepared
remarks be admitted for the record.
And yield the floor.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, they will be so entered.
And now we are pleased to have such a distinguished panel
with us today. We have the Honorable Paul N. Jaenichen, Sr.,
Maritime Administrator for the U.S. Department of
Transportation.
Thank you so much for being with us.
Also, Lieutenant General Stephen Lyons, U.S. Army, Deputy
Commander of U.S. Transportation Command.
General, it is always a pleasure to see you and thank you
for being here.
And then Mr. F. Scott DiLisio, Director, Strategic
Mobility/Combat Logistics, that is a whole mouthful to be able
to say, Director, but thank you, for the Office of Chief of
Naval Operations.
And we, as Mr. Courtney and I told you before, we just
appreciate so much your service to our country, but we also
thank you for being with us today.
And Mr. Jaenichen, I think you are going to start us. And
we look forward to any remarks that you may have.
STATEMENT OF PAUL N. JAENICHEN, SR., MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR,
U.S. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Jaenichen. Good afternoon, Chairman Forbes, Ranking
Member Courtney, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the U.S. merchant marine and the support
it provides for our nation to meet the Department of Defense
logistics and sealift requirements.
The U.S.-flag fleet of privately owned, commercially
operated vessels, along with government-owned vessels, provide
sealift surge and sustainment capacity to move equipment and
materiel to globally project our Armed Forces and Federal
agencies when needed, where needed, during times of conflict,
humanitarian crisis, and natural disasters.
Supporting these capabilities are the Maritime
Administration's National Defense Reserve Fleet, Ready Reserve
Force, and Maritime Security Program.
The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is a fleet of government-
owned merchant-type vessels that ensure our capability to
rapidly deploy military forces and equipment or emergency
humanitarian assistance and disaster response supplies to
events that require intervention by the U.S. Government.
The RRF currently consists of 46 ships selected on the
basis of their capabilities, their readiness condition and
location to meet Department of Defense expected surge sealift
requirements.
While the RRF has provided reliable and safe sealift to
support military and humanitarian missions in the past, the
fleet is aging. The average age of the fleet is currently 39
years, well above the normal service life of commercial
vessels.
The Maritime Administration is working closely with the
Department of the Navy [DON] and DOD [Department of Defense] to
monitor the material condition of the RRF as well as
determining the future recapitalization requirements of the
fleet.
I would note that while we have never fully activated the
RRF, the 78 ships that were activated in support of operations
in the first Gulf War exceed the number of vessels that I
currently have in the RRF fleet.
The Maritime Security Act of 1996 established the Maritime
Security Program, or MSP, which provides direct annual stipends
for up to 60 active, commercially viable, militarily useful,
privately owned, U.S.-flag vessels and crews operating in
international trade.
The MSP fleet ensures DOD access to U.S.-flag ships and
oceanborne commerce and international trade with the necessary
intermodal logistics capability to move military equipment and
supplies in the event of armed conflict or national emergency.
The fleet also provides critical employment for up to 2,400
qualified U.S. mariners.
Of the 78 U.S.-flag vessels that trade internationally
today 78 currently participate in the MSP program. The number
of vessels in the international trading U.S.-flag fleet has
generally stayed above 100 for the past decade, reaching a peak
of 106 in 2011. And since then, we have seen a decline to the
78 vessels, or roughly a 26 percent drop in the last 3 years.
The decline in this segment of the fleet is coincident with
the decline of government-impelled preference cargoes, and the
overall volume of preference cargo transported aboard U.S.-flag
vessels has substantially decreased since 2005 when preference
cargoes peaked due to military operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq.
The Maritime Administration's assessment of the civilian
U.S. merchant mariner pools shows that the number of civilian
mariners available to crew government sealift ships, when
activated, has declined over the past decade. And the number of
qualified and experienced mariners available will likely not be
adequate in the very near future unless we take positive action
to reverse this trend.
Current estimates show that we only have about 11,280
mariners that have the necessary U.S. Coast Guard credentials
to operate large seagoing ships. And we greatly value those
mariners who have recently sailed and those who have experience
sailing our government-owned sealift vessels. And that current
number is sufficient to activate the Federal Government-owned
sealift-surge sealift fleet of 63 ships, that includes both the
Maritime Administration's RRF and the military's Sealift
Command's surge vessels, only for a period of 4 to 6 months,
but it is not enough for sustained operations.
Further losses in the number of commercial U.S.-flag ships
and the corresponding loss of mariner jobs and international
trade will significantly impact our ability to crew this
sealift fleet in the future.
The Maritime Administration is taking action to address the
issues that challenge the U.S. maritime industry through the
development of a draft National Maritime Strategy. We expect to
publish the draft strategy in the coming months, and I look
forward to providing it to the committee.
Thank you again for your time and interest in the nation's
maritime transportation capacity and capability and the
opportunity to provide a status update for our program and
discuss what may be a very critical juncture point for the
long-term health of the international trading U.S. merchant
marine.
I look forward to any questions that the subcommittee may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaenichen can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Jaenichen, thank you so much for your
testimony.
General, we would love to hear any comments that you might
have.
STATEMENT OF LTG STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S.
TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
General Lyons. Thank you, sir. Chairman Forbes, Ranking
Member Courtney, distinguished members of the Seapower and
Projection Forces Subcommittee, I want to thank you for
inviting me and my colleagues, Administrator Jaenichen and Mr.
DiLisio, here to discuss our military sealift capability that
is so incredibly essential to our national defense.
It is my distinct privilege to be with you today
representing the outstanding men and women of the United States
Transportation Command. As this committee knows, a major
strategic advantage of the United States is our ability to
project and sustain forces anywhere at anytime around the
globe. And that is dependent on a ready sealift enterprise.
Our nation has been and will continue to be reliant on
sealift as the predominant means to move military equipment and
supplies in support of global operations.
To accomplish this task, our nation's strategic sealift
capability comprises two distinct fleets. First, the government
organic fleet consisting of pre-positioned ships that are at
strategic locations worldwide, and a CONUS-based [continental
United States] fleet of reduced operating status vessels
largely available in 5 days.
Second is a U.S.-flag commercial merchant fleet managed by
commercial operators engaged in daily commerce for which MARAD
provides government advocacy.
These two fleets, government and commercial, are
inextricably bound together by the merchant mariners that crew
both. U.S. merchant mariners crew our pre-positioned ships that
are currently deployed and commercial commerce fleets day to
day, and in crisis are called to crew our Navy sealift fleets.
So without a healthy U.S. merchant mariner fleet, we lack the
capability to deliver our military forces to war.
As I sit here today, it is our collective assessment that
our military sealift capacity, organic, commercial, and the
mariners that crew them, is sufficient to meet our deployment
surge requirements in accordance with our national military
strategy with acceptable risk.
Over the last 20 years, a series of mobility capability
assessments have validated an enduring requirement of roughly
20 million square feet of roll-on/roll-off space, that is about
91 vessels, the ability to surge 34,000 containers, 86
petroleum tanker ships and a myriad of specialty ships, such
ships that enable us to bring joint logistics over the shore to
create multiple dilemmas for any adversary and multiple options
for joint force commanders.
However, despite being in good shape today, we are keenly
aware of two trends that are cause for concern and action to
ensure that the strategic logistics remains a competitive
advantage of the United States.
We share MARAD's concerns regarding the health of the U.S.-
flag commercial sealift industry. DOD's emergency preparedness
programs, like the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement,
known as VISA, and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement provide
access to commercial fleets. And DOT's [Department of
Transportation's] Maritime Security Program provides incentives
for carriers to retain the U.S. flag.
These programs not only enable DOD to gain critical access
to U.S. commercial vessels, but also access to global networks
and the merchant mariners that I mentioned earlier.
The MSP program provides ready access for up to 60
commercial ships and is dependent upon three legs of a stool:
the first being government-impelled cargo, the second
commercial workload, and the third a congressionally
appropriated stipend to offset the costs of operating under a
U.S. flag.
We think our reliance on the commercial industry for ships
and mariners is a cost-effective means of providing military
sealift when compared to the cost of building an equivalent
government capability.
The national security sealift policy underscores our role
as a maritime nation and clearly articulates the need for DOD
to retain the ability to respond unilaterally to security
threats.
We appreciate MARAD's efforts and congressional interest in
stemming the decline of our U.S.-flag merchant fleet in order
to sustain our current capacity that is so necessary to retain
our DOD readiness.
The second area I will just touch on briefly of concern is
the emergency age-out of our government organic sealift fleet.
The average age of this fleet is approximately 40 years old and
our first vessels will begin to reach their 50-year life
service in 2020.
As a result, the United States Navy is developing a sealift
recapitalization plan to prevent loss of DOD's capability to
assure we have sealift requirements. And we appreciate Mr.
DiLisio's outstanding efforts in this area.
Finally, I will highlight what many senior DOD leaders and
the service chiefs have already addressed, and that is how the
emergence of great-power competition changes the way we need to
think about maintaining the competitive advantage that
USTRANSCOM brings.
The joint operating environment is changing rapidly and not
necessarily in predictable ways as emerging adversaries will
attempt to counter U.S. interests and contest our operations in
the domains of cyber, space, air, and maritime in ways that we
have not seen before. Given all of this, we are confident that
our need to project power will not decline.
In closing, I again want to thank this committee and my
colleagues from the Navy and MARAD for your continued
leadership at this critical time in our nation's history. I
look forward to your questions and ask that my written
statement be submitted for the record.
Sir, thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Lyons can be found in
the Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, all the written statements
will be submitted for the record.
And Mr. DiLisio, we are glad to have you and look forward
to your comments.
STATEMENT OF F. SCOTT DILISIO, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC MOBILITY/
COMBAT LOGISTICS DIVISION (OPNAV N42), OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS
Mr. DiLisio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Forbes,
Ranking Member Courtney, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to speak about the
state of readiness. I also have not only sealift, but the
Combat Logistics Force [CLF] and a bunch of special mission
ships that do all kinds of great things for our nation.
We continue to meet operational requirements while driving
innovative and nontraditional solutions to global logistics. I
am honored to be joined today by Deputy Commander U.S.
Transportation Command, Lieutenant General Lyons and the
Maritime Administrator, Mr. Jaenichen. We are true partners. We
work very hard together, and we have worked very hard on some
of these issues we are about to talk about.
I want to take a brief minute and talk about someone other
than the mariners and recognize the people of the Military
Sealift Command [MSC] and the Maritime Administration. The
ships and facilities they operate worldwide would not work
without the skilled operators and support people. And they
create our readiness.
The Combat Logistics Force and strategic sealift missions
are accomplished by an organic fleet comprised of 122 ships.
These ships support numerous missions, including at-sea
resupply of our naval combatants; pre-positioning of critical
unit equipment; ammunition and sustainment for Marine Corps,
Army, and the Air Force; humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief activity; towing; diving and salvage operations
worldwide; rapid intratheater movement of cargo and personnel;
and afloat staging capabilities.
The Navy's Combat Logistics Force ships resupply Navy
forces at sea, enabling carrier strike groups [CSGs] and
amphibious ready groups [ARGs] to operate forward and remain on
station during peacetime and war.
The Combat Logistics Force ships include replenishment
oilers, T-AOs; fast combat support ships, T-AOEs; dry cargo and
ammunition ships, T-AKEs. The T-AOs primarily provide fuel, but
they are limited in their ability to provide dry cargo. T-AOEs
and T-AKEs are multi-product ships.
This year, we will begin recapitalizing our oilers with the
award of the USNS John Lewis (T-AO 205) would be our newest
oiler.
The strategic sealift program provides necessary
transportation of Marine Corps and Army combat equipment, fuel,
and sustainment. The capabilities are provided to the combatant
commanders through three methods: afloat pre-positioning, surge
sealift, and sustainment shipping. Methods encompass 85 organic
ships with each providing a crucial set of capabilities when
called for tasking or activated for service.
The pre-positioned fleet is strategically located in key
areas based on anticipated need, ensuring ready access for
contingencies. Doing so provides flexible, rapid response of
military equipment, combat gear, supplies essential to
sustaining initial phases of contingencies, including major
combat operations.
The Expeditionary Transfer Dock [ESD]--and Mr. Chairman, I
promised you I would use both sets of acronyms until we are all
comfortable with them--formerly the Mobile Landing Platform,
MLP, joined the large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships as
part of the maritime pre-positioning force.
The combination enables greater sea-basing capability and
increased flexibility across the operational area. The ESD is a
tremendously versatile ship and will act as a floating base for
expeditionary operations.
Equipped with a deployable vehicle ramp, the ESD is an
intermediary transfer point for troops, equipment, and
sustainment moved ashore by landing craft, air cushion, and,
here is the other one, Expeditionary Fast Transport, EPF,
formerly Joint High-Speed Vessel [JHSV].
The EPF is designed for high-speed intratheater transport.
Experimentation is revealing more potential missions to include
high-speed logistics shuttle work, humanitarian assistance,
theater security cooperation, and security force assistance.
Surge ships are the second subset of sealift, and we will
talk about that more. And I will cut my comments brief. We have
talked a bit about the surge.
Right now, we are working with fleet commanders to
complement both Combat Logistics Force and strategic sealift
capabilities by examining innovative ways to improve capability
and capacity to perform theater security cooperation missions
that also enhance overall Navy combat force capability. This is
done through a variety of adaptive force packaging. These can
create cost-effective opportunities for our fleet to expand
support missions and sustain global presence.
We will continue to support forward presence, relieve
stress on the rest of the force through traditional and
innovative approaches. We will continue to rely on the CLF
force to include our new ships that we are introducing and
strategic sealift as they contribute to the Navy's tenets.
I also want to thank you for your continued support of our
force. And thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
the subcommittee. Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DiLisio can be found in the
Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Forbes. Well, thank you so much for being with us, and
for all of our witnesses.
I am going to defer my questions until the end. I have a
number that I just need to get on the record, but I want to
make sure all of our members can get their questions in first.
Mr. Courtney, if you don't mind, I have one motion to make
before I recognize you.
Mr. Garamendi has joined us and we are glad to have him.
And I would just like to make sure he can ask his questions. So
I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be
allowed to participate in today's hearing after all
subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions.
Is there an objection?
Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi, we are glad to have you with us today.
Mr. Courtney, you are recognized for any questions you
might have.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses.
Mr. DiLisio, I rode on the USNS Trenton last summer from
New London to Rhode Island, and I just finally got straight in
my head what a Joint High-Speed Vessel is, and then you guys
changed the name on me.
[Laughter.]
So it is an EFP?
Mr. DiLisio. EPF.
Mr. Courtney. EPF, okay. Anyway, yes, that is right.
Mr. Jaenichen, I want to again just kind of drill down a
little bit on the Maritime Security Program because there has
been obviously Congress has been sort of back and forth on this
as well as the budget that came over.
So last year we authorized $5 million per ship in our
authorizing language for this program. The omnibus then funded
about, I think, $3.5 million per ship. And the President's
budget comes over at $3.1.
Obviously, you all made pretty powerful statements about
how critical this is, about keeping the fleet together. What is
the right price point? And is $3.1 really too low? And if it is
too low, what does that mean in terms of, you know, just trying
to, again, keep this mission going?
Mr. Jaenichen. Congressman Courtney, I certainly appreciate
the question. First of all, I greatly appreciate this
subcommittee's support for the authorization of the $3.5 which
was subsequently approved in the consolidated appropriations of
2016, which also include the authorization for just shy of $5
million for 2017 in the fiscal year budget.
At the time that was approved by Congress and signed by the
President, the fiscal year 2017 budget was already prepared and
was in preparation to come over to Congress to meet the
President's budget request drop to Congress on time.
We had insufficient time to actually analyze that. If you
take a look at the Maritime Administration's budget, if you
take a look at my 2016 enacted budget of $399 million, that
would be an additional $90 million about because we received
$210 million to support the MSP program at $3.5. That is about
22 percent of MARAD's budget that was enacted.
And if I compare that to the $423 in the President's budget
request, it will be a 27 percent increase because it would
require an increase of $114 million. That was not something we
were able to analyze at the time the budget was dropped.
The budget was prepared based on the program of record
which authorized $3.1 through fiscal year 2018. But what I will
tell you is, as General Lyons pointed out in his opening
statement, there are three things that the Maritime Security
Program relies on. The first is it requires access to
government-impelled cargo. Those cargoes have decreased by 75
percent since 2011, and so that has actually put downward
pressure on the viability of the fleet.
Additionally, the overcapacity in the global market. We
have seen freight rates that are the lowest they have ever been
in nearly several decades. The result of that is, in order for
the MSP fleet to be viable, there is really only one place to
go and that is the stipend amount to ensure that the fleet can
remain viable.
We have already pointed out that it is very vital. It is
the core of our U.S.-flag international fleet. It is 60 out of
the 78 ships that we have currently. We have 57 that are
currently sailing in the program, as I pointed out in my
opening remarks. That fleet is critical for national security
to be able to globally project and sustain the Armed Forces.
So hopefully that answers your question.
Mr. Courtney. It does. So again, just so we are clear, the
request that came over then was sort of a legacy request from a
prior policy that----
Mr. Jaenichen. It was the program of record at the time the
budget was prepared.
Mr. Courtney. Okay. I will take that as a green light for
our subcommittee to revise.
Another issue which again went sort of back and forth last
year was the issue of the maritime academy training ships,
which I mentioned in my opening remarks.
By our count, this issue has been studied five times going
back to 2007 and most recently in 2015 where, you know, it is
pretty clear that, you know, failure to act on this is going to
create a hole in terms of training those critical positions
that you talked about.
So unfortunately, though, the 2017 budget that came over,
and I realize you have your, you know, limitations about, you
know, what your testimony can be, but it requests $6 million
for another study of requirements and alternatives for training
ship needs.
And you know, I just, you know, clearly the clock is
ticking here in terms of the age of these training ships. And
every study that has been done I think has been a pretty
powerful endorsement about the fact that we need to move
forward.
And again, without having you, you know, sort of get sort
of juxtaposed to the budget that your Department sent over, if
we don't start--in terms of the timeframe we are in right now
with that old ship that is coming off at SUNY Maritime in 2019,
if we don't start cutting some steel and creating and building
a ship pretty soon, I mean, is it going to be too late to, you
know, heel-to-toe to keep at least that fleet sized where it is
today?
Mr. Jaenichen. Ranking Member Courtney, I certainly
appreciate the question. First of all, in your opening remarks
you highlighted the impact of the Empire State in terms of the
training capacity for the State maritime academies. It is about
36 percent.
As you noted also, the vessel is 55 years old. It has its
classification from the American Bureau of Shipping through
2019, as well as a certificate of inspection from the Coast
Guard.
There is a potential to be able to conduct a service life
extension of that vessel. However, I am concerned about the
cost and whether that is the right approach.
We have done an estimate based on an ABS [American Bureau
of Shipping] survey. We take a look at the deferred
maintenance. We have also taken a look at a crew assessment.
And I have also had my ship surveyors down onboard the ship.
And then we had an independent organization actually evaluate
what it would cost. And the estimated cost is $104 million to
be able to do a service life extension on that ship.
Normally if you had a 15-year-old ship, a service life
extension would be about 10 years. I cannot guarantee that
spending that amount of money would give us 10 more years on
that particular vessel. It may give 3, it may not give any
because there are so many unknowns with regards to when you
have a vessel that old.
I am concerned about the capacity. The study that is
requested in fiscal year 2017 is to do an independent
validation of several requirements. In addition to the
requirements, are there other alternatives?
We have done most recently last year a study that was
conducted by Volpe [The National Transportation Center], which
did a business case analysis, which took a look at the options.
That is available and we can share that with the committee if
desired.
We recognize that this is a very costly program to be able
to exercise and to be able to put a training ship fleet
together, so that study is an attempt to make sure that we have
done everything we can to take a look at what alternatives are
available to do that independent validation.
If it were left up to me, I would try to move that up as
quickly as I can to be able to support building a fiscal year
2018 budget which I have to do this summer. And so I will
endeavor to do that if at all possible using the appropriated
funding that we currently have.
I greatly appreciate the support of Congress to dedicate
the $5 million to be able to do the construction design. And we
fully intend to execute that money this year, as intended.
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. And again, I think reading
between the lines we can sort of get some direction about where
we may want to head in a couple of weeks on this issue.
Lastly, you know, again, this perennial question of the
Jones Act in terms of its justification is being talked about
by a lot of our colleagues in different committees and possibly
in different legislation.
Can you talk about what the impact of repeal of the Jones
Act would be in terms of, again, the mission that, you know,
the witnesses have to carry out every day?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Ranking Member Courtney. A repeal
of the Jones Act, I think, would be traumatic for the U.S.
merchant marine. And I will give you several reasons.
Currently today, the shipbuilding construction order book
has 32 vessels on it. Twelve of those are tankers, 20 of them
are articulated tugs and barges. It also includes six other
type vessels. Two of those are roll-on/roll-off container
vessels that are being built at VT Halter [Marine] and also
some additional container vessels to be able to support both
the Hawaii trade and the Puerto Rican trade.
That ship construction that is going on in U.S. shipyards,
is actually in conjunction with the other Federal shipbuilding
that we do. If you take away the building requirement by
repealing the Jones Act, that construction does not occur.
And as a result, what ends up happening is the Federal
Government will now incur all of the overhead costs. I very
much doubt that we would build one of our ships for the Navy or
one of our other Federal agencies overseas. So that overhead
now comes to us, which would exponentially increase our costs
to be able to maintain those shipyards viable and that
industrial base which is critical.
Our concern here is, if we ever had to ramp up, for
whatever reason, that capacity will be lost and it is not
something that could be recovered easily.
I am also concerned about the loss of the mariner jobs. As
we talked about earlier, we are at the very cusp of not being
able to do. We can do the surge and we are right at the very
edge of being able to do that. But we cannot sustain longer
than 3 to 4 months the capability to provide logistics movement
to support the Department of Defense.
If the Jones Act goes away, we currently have 92 ships that
are operating under the Jones Act under the U.S. flag. The
total fleet of self-propelled vessels greater than 1,000 tons
is 170; 78 are in the international trade and 92 in the Jones
Act. That is what is supporting that 11,280 mariners in our
mariner pool currently today.
Without the Jones Act, that goes away, I can't support DOD,
I can't support national security.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
And thank you to all the witnesses.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The distinguished gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
Byrne, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I might note for the panel that my Uncle Jack graduated
from the Merchant Marine Academy and unfortunately, like so
many of the men that served in World War II, he was lost at
sea. So I know that the people that participate in this
activity are not doing so risk free. And I appreciate every day
what you do and the sacrifice that the people that you work
with make.
Mr. DiLisio, I want to talk to you, and I get confused by
the acronyms, too, about the Expeditionary Fast Transport
Vessel, the EPF. I don't know why it is not the EFT, but it is
the EPF, so I will get used to that.
As I understand it, the original plan was to build 18. We
have delivered six and six are in various phases of
construction or have been contracted for at the very least.
In the last 2 years, the administration has not asked for
any additional of these vessels, but the Congress has gone
ahead and authorized and appropriated one each year.
So you just described that the missions that that vessel
can perform have actually broadened. You have discovered more
things that it can do.
Talk a little bit about how important that vessel is and
what you would be able to do if you had the full complement of
18.
Mr. DiLisio. Thank you for the question. Most of what we
are finding out right now is through experimentation. So there
is quite a difference between being interested in experimental
work vice full deployment. And as you might gather, we are into
our early deployments on these ships.
So I have really only got two ships that are in full
deployment status and two coming. The total complement was 10,
not 18. We had truncated the program at some point in time to
10.
And the interesting part is they are good for 270 days a
year. We couple about 90 days for maintenance for a ship. These
ships, because they are made out of aluminum and they are fast
transports, they have to be dry-docked every year.
So there is a trade-off between me telling you thank you
very much for the additional ship and then me figuring out how
to blend in the operational costs of that across the total
force. And so I pick up a dry dock every year for every ship I
get. And so it does become a challenge balancing that.
That said, I do believe over the course of the next year or
so we are going to find that that ship is very versatile. I am
sure you have heard some noise--news--you have heard some news
about----
Mr. Byrne. Sometimes news up here is noise.
Mr. DiLisio. It could be.
[Laughter.]
That was maybe a Freudian slip.
But you have heard about some of the things we are learning
as we operate the ship. We have taken the ship into higher sea
states in some cases and had some cracking. We have gone and
fixed those. So we are kind of in the infant stage with the
EPF.
I do believe that ship will grow up very fast, but there is
a trade between every ship we add, and then how wide I can
space the operational costs as we utilize that force.
I hope that answers your question.
Mr. Byrne. It does. But expand upon the various things that
you are finding out, even though some of it is experimental.
What are the various new things that you are finding out that
it can do?
Mr. DiLisio. Fair enough to say that it is a large, open
space. If you can envision the mission space of the ship being
large enough to carry six Abrams tanks, it has got a lot of
open space. So anything you can do in modular fashion and you
can drive up the ramp, anything that you can put into a 20 foot
by 20 foot container or a 20-foot-long container, it could be a
special missions operation, it could be anything you could put
in a 7-meter or 11-meter RHIB [rigid-hulled inflatable boat]
off the side of the vessel, it could be anything you can fly
off of the flight deck, whether that is manned or unmanned. And
I am just kind of giving you a wide scope of things that are
opportunities.
And they operate all over the world. So also you could get
into a modular form of logistics supply and delivery for other
ships, anything that you can bring up that ramp.
We talked a little bit about the ESD that is also in the
Pacific. The EPF can mate skin-to-skin with that ship and
reconfigure loads at sea, up to sea state about two-and-a-half.
So if you are in fairly calm seas, reconfiguration at sea is
now a possibility.
We had always wanted sea-basing capability over time, and
this gets us closer to it.
Mr. Byrne. Well, I thank you all for what you do. We need
to do a better job, I think we all agree on that, in supporting
what you do. Because your support capability and your support
activities are so very important to our ability to defend the
country. So I know our other members of the subcommittee, we
are all going to try to find some way to help you out. But it
is a tough budget environment.
So thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Byrne.
The chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. Wittman, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses today, Mr. Jaenichen,
Lieutenant General Lyons, thanks so much for all of your
efforts and appreciate what you do and the challenges that you
meet.
Mr. Jaenichen, I wanted to ask you--I am sorry, Mr.
DiLisio, too. I'm not forgetting your presence here. I want to
thank you, too.
Mr. Jaenichen, I want to ask you, specifically with the
Maritime Security Program, as you know, Congress has authorized
about $5 million per ship stipend to retain those vessels, to
make sure we have them on standby with the necessary capacity.
Yet the fiscal year 2017 budget request supports $3.1 million
per ship.
If the Congress supports the administration's request, then
obviously there is going to be a shortfall there in creating
less capacity than what you all project that is needed to make
sure we have those ships available.
So tell me what happens if Congress funds the stipend at
$3.1 million versus the $5 million per ship.
Mr. Jaenichen. Congressman, thank you for the question.
First of all, I need to talk a little bit about, as I
mentioned earlier, the requirement for the MSP program at its
inception was really based on the three-legged stool that
General Lyons referred to. Two legs of the stool have almost
gone away with regards to the access to government-impelled
cargo and also commercial cargo, which really leaves the
stipend as the only place to go.
In 2011, based on a 2010 baseline, MARAD conducted a study
and we estimated that the average differential cost to operate
a U.S.-flag vessel versus a foreign-flag vessel was about $4.6
million. If you progress that to fiscal year 2016 numbers, it
is somewhere between $5 and $7 million and our average is based
on a back-of-the-envelope review of some of the assessments of
the operators' costs as about $6.1.
That authorization that was provided just shy of $5 million
in the consolidated appropriations is about the right number.
The industry has told us that is the right number.
At $3.1, I can't guarantee that the fleet will be able to
stay what it is currently at the ship mix and the operators
that are currently in the fleet today. They are severely
challenged. The entire global industry is losing money as are
the operators that are participating in the MSP program.
Mr. Wittman. Do you believe--you pointed out capacity and
only 78 ships available in the domestic fleet, 60 of those
contracted under MSP.
A couple of questions. With this shortfall, it seems like,
to me, we could lose even more of those ships of the 60 that we
need. So not only are you in a situation with current need, but
even the surge capacity with us going down to 78 ships is now
in significant jeopardy.
So give me your perspective on how do we get to the right
place in this with requesting fewer dollars per ship, knowing
what that creates and those ships moving out of MSP, fewer
ships overall available in MSP and only having 60 ships today.
It seems like, to me, we have got a train wreck coming.
Give us your perspective on what we need to do to make sure
that that doesn't happen.
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Congressman.
Just to make sure, there are 57 ships of the 78 today. We
have approved one additional ship to come in, but it is not
under U.S. flag yet, to replace one of the RO/ROs [roll-on/
roll-off ships] that caught fire last summer. And we are
currently reviewing essentially the requests for two additional
vacancies that currently exist in the program.
With regard to the program itself, that 60-ship capability
is extremely important. But our challenge, as I pointed out, as
I was answering Ranking Member Courtney's question, the budget
that we submitted in fiscal year 2017 was based on the program
of record at the time the budget was developed.
There was insufficient time, as I mentioned before, to be
able to do an assessment to get increased to the authorization
that was provided by Congress in the consolidated
appropriations for 2016.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this, too. This isn't only an issue
about the number of ships, but it is also an issue of our
merchant mariners. If there is not a demand there for the
merchant mariners, then our cadre of folks that we need to take
these ships to sea, to run them, to make sure we have that
capability there, not just the capacity, but the capability in
the merchant mariners goes away, too.
Give me your perspective on where this leaves us, too, with
the merchant mariners that we need to make sure MSP is
successful.
Mr. Jaenichen. The real critical aspect is I need to have
an active fleet that actually has the mariners that are sailing
on a daily basis.
We have done an estimate. In order to activate the ready
surge capability that we have in the organic government or the
government-owned fleet, we currently today have about 627
mariners that are keeping them in that ready-5 status that
General Lyons talked about in his opening remarks.
To be able to activate all of those vessels, and that
includes the 15 for Military Sealift Command and also the 2
Missile Defense Agency ships that I also support for special
mission, requires an additional 1,300 mariners to be able to
activate them and then push them out to where they need to go
to be able to support that global projection and sustainment of
our Armed Forces.
We can do that with the current number of mariners for
about 3 to 4 months. It is that first crew rotation that is
critical and that is what I cannot be able to guarantee at this
point.
With the number that I have today, I have a very, very
small margin to be able to say that I can do that and surge
that fleet completely.
After the 4-month period, again, I can't do that. I would
need at least 40 more ships sailing actively under U.S. flag
and the mariners there to be able to guarantee you that I can
provide sustainment.
We have a perfect storm coming. And the perfect storm is
the fact that starting on the 1st of January of 2017 the
International Maritime Organization [IMO] Standards for
Watchkeeping and Training [STCW--Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watchkeeping] come into effect. Those
requirements are different. If you are not actively sailing
today, which means that you are not actually being paid to get
that upgraded license to be able to meet the STCW requirements,
you are likely not going to do it because it is going to come
out of your pocket.
So in past situations where we have had to surge the fleet,
we have actually had mariners that have come out of retirement
to be able to do that. They will not be available to us after
January of 2017.
And the impact is, if I were to use some of those mariners
without those STCW endorsements, they do not have to allow our
ships into the ports where we potentially have to debark the
equipment to be able to support DOD's operations.
So the impact is, is we are very close to not having enough
mariners. And I am concerned at what happens in the future.
It is also a very aging workforce. And I am concerned that
they could retire on us. And again, I don't know where that
point is, but we are getting very close to it.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This seems to be a
strategic catastrophe in the making.
Mr. Forbes. I agree.
The gentlelady from Missouri, Mrs. Hartzler, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, one of the greatest privileges that we have as
Members of Congress is to get to appoint or nominate young
people for the service academies. And I know that there is a
merchant marine academy. I have had the privilege of sending a
young lady from our district there. She loves it. And she and
her family can't say enough great things about it.
So looking at the shortfall that you are talking about here
in manpower, can you just give me kind of an update? I haven't
had the privilege yet of visiting, it is on my to-do list. But
how many people are going through the academy, and if you think
this might be a bright spot in helping meet these shortfalls?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
Currently today there is about 250 in each incoming class.
We graduate around 200 on an annual basis, 25 percent of them
go on to active duty into one of the branches of the armed
services, and then about the rest, 75 percent, will actually
sail on our commercial fleet.
That number today, and if I combine that with the six State
maritime academies, I produce about 900 mariners a year. The
only ones that are required to sail are the ones that go to
Kings Point and those that receive what we refer to as a
student incentive program stipend, which is $8,000, and they
have about a 3-year service obligation. Those that go to Kings
Point have a 5-year service obligation.
I am concerned. There was a study that was completed by the
Secretaries of Labor, Education and Transportation. That report
was released in August of 2015. And in that we used a 2012
baseline in terms of the age demographics for the seafarers.
We need 70,000 new mariners by 2022. Half of those are
licensed officers. The programs that you are referring to, both
Kings Point and the State maritime academies, are producing
only about 900 of that shortfall. So we are going to be far
short of being able to meet that requirement that we know is
coming in 2022.
There is ample opportunity and there is great opportunity
for those seafarers. But again, it relies on the U.S.-flag
fleet.
As I mentioned earlier, if the Jones Act were to be
threatened, those jobs would go away. That creates a challenge
for our seafarer workforce.
Mrs. Hartzler. Do you see any opportunity or changes being
made in your training and your recruitment of young people to
help make up the shortfall? So if I heard you right, you need
70,000 new people by 2022----
Mr. Jaenichen. 2022.
Mrs. Hartzler [continuing]. And you are only graduating
about 900 a year. So what are some other programs that you have
out there to try to meet the shortfall?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you. We are currently working with the
Military Sealift Command. We are also working with the American
Maritime Partnership. We have recognized that veterans, as they
are leaving the services, many of them have seafaring
capabilities, those that are operating Army watercraft, those
in the Coast Guard, and those in the Navy.
We are working on a military-to-mariner program because we
think that is a way that we can potentially get the shortfall
within the Committee on Marine Transportation System, the CMTS.
We are working with our 27 agencies on an integrated action
plan to be able to get to the heart of that.
The real issue is how they get credit for the courses that
they take over the course of their military career to be able
to get a U.S. Coast Guard endorsement and we are currently
working on that particular issue.
The challenge right now is a veteran comes out, he
literally has to start from scratch because he gets no credit
for any of the experience or any of the training that he has
had. So we are actually getting to the heart of that.
Obviously there are other ways to do it, but we do have
limited capacity. We are pretty much, in terms of what we are
doing at Kings Point, we are at capacity there with regards to
what we are able to do and the State maritime academies are at
capacity as well.
Obviously, the training ship fleets which supports--in
order to get an officer's license requires 360 days during the
period of time that you are actually training for that
endorsement. That is difficult to obtain. The State maritime
academies do it through a combination of training ships
sailing, typically they have 100-day cruises every year, and
then they also have to have some commercial time. Kings Point
does it by sailing commercially for 1 year out of the 4 years
that they are taking their curriculum.
So that actually is one of the challenges, just capacity.
Obviously, as the fleet size has decreased, our ability to
place cadets and midshipmen on those fleets is reduced as well.
So I am concerned about our capacity to train as well as the
ability to meet the demand of the future mariner workforce.
Mrs. Hartzler. Well, I commend you for thinking outside the
box. I think especially targeting veterans, I think, makes a
lot of sense. And if there is any help that we can provide to
helping so that they qualify more easily, it just makes a lot
of sense and I know we will be here ready to help.
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, as we mentioned to you before we
started, we now have a series of votes. I think it is five
votes, if I am not mistaken. And so if it is okay with you we
are going to recess during those votes and then we will all
come back after that time.
So we stand in recess until the completion of these votes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, we are going to go ahead and get
started, if it is okay. Mr. Courtney said that was okay with
him.
And I have a few questions. As you know, I deferred mine
until after the other members, and then Mr. Garamendi will have
his time for questioning.
But General, if you could, and these are some questions we
just need to get on the record for our transcript, but how many
ships are required to support the Maritime Security Program?
General Lyons. Sir, thanks for the question. TRANSCOM fully
supports the 60 ships that are in the Maritime Security Program
and the capability that brings.
Mr. Forbes. In your best, professional military judgment,
is there a sufficient analysis to underpin the 60-ship military
requirement?
General Lyons. Sir, there is. Really, over the last 20
years we have done several mobility capability assessment
studies, all arriving at similar types of conclusions in terms
of the types of vessels and the capability we need to surge. So
yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. In your best, professional military judgment,
does the fiscal year 2017 budget request support the 60-ship
MSP requirement?
General Lyons. Sir, it does support a 60-ship MSP
requirement. You know, the big question alluded to earlier is,
are those incentives inside that program sufficient to retain
the U.S. flag. And I think Administrator Jaenichen addressed
those earlier, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Jaenichen, TRANSCOM has indicated a
military requirement of 60 ships. Once again, can you explain
the impact of the fiscal year 2017 budget proposal to the MSP
force structure?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you for the question, Chairman. The 60
ships in the program, obviously when we submitted the 2017
budget, that was at the program of record at the time, which
was at $3.1.
My concern with regard to the fleet today is, as a result
of the downward pressure that we have seen on their ability to
get both commercial and the decrease that we have seen in
government-impelled cargoes has put significant downward
pressure on the fleet.
The stipend amount today, I cannot guarantee that that is
sufficient to keep those vessels in the program. And as we have
indicated, all the three of witnesses have said, those 60 ships
are important for our national security.
And the operators themselves who have those agreements,
they have to make financial decisions based on what they are
able to do. And if it is losing money, then they are not going
to be able to stay in the program. We have seen that before.
They have told us that the reason for reflagging or to flag out
of the program is because they can't make it financially
viable.
Mr. Forbes. If you had to venture your best estimate based
on the fiscal year 2017 budget and what it would do to the
force structure, how many ships do you think it would reduce
the structure by?
Mr. Jaenichen. I can't give you a number, Chairman, in
terms of what it would be. I know that there could be an
adverse effect; I just can't tell you what that would be.
Mr. Forbes. That is fair.
General, what is your assessment of our U.S. mariners'
ability to sustain a full-scale mobilization of the Ready
Reserve Force?
General Lyons. Chairman, I think where we are today, we
would be able to support a surge of the force. But as
Administrator Jaenichen indicated, we are in a downward trend
in the number of mariners. We are very, very concerned. We are
right on the margin between medium and high risk to be able to
mobilize that fleet. And of course, the bigger issue is to be
able to sustain that fleet over a long period of time,
prolonged period of time.
So we have some serious concern. Even though today I think
we are okay, we have some significant concerns about that
capability in the future.
Mr. Forbes. Could you help me in terms of surge capability
and tell me, we could do it initially, could we sustain it over
any length of time? And if so, what would your approximate
length of time be that you would tell the committee?
General Lyons. You know, Chairman, difficult to say. Enemy
gets a vote how long the duration of that conflict, per se.
Administrator Jaenichen, I think, has indicated in his mariner
assessment that we would be able to surge the fleet and sustain
it for a several months, but not much past that point. And I
will defer to MARAD on that, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. If our nation loses another 200 U.S.
mariners, will we have sufficient forces to even support the
initial activation of the Ready Reserve fleet?
General Lyons. Again, you know, MARAD has done a lot of
work here. The analysis that I have seen, we have got some
concerns about where we are in the threshold. Again, I think we
would be able to surge the fleet initially. The ability to
sustain that really becomes somewhat problematic for us.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Jaenichen, could you comment on that, if
you would?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have estimated
that we need about 11,019 mariners to be able to have the
capability to surge. And once we have reached that point, now,
my concern is not necessarily being able to surge, but also our
assessment is based on today. I can't tell you what it will be
2 years from now or 5 years from now. And I am concerned about
our ability to do that in the future as we take a look at the
aging demographic of our seafaring workforce.
So we are very close to the margin between that medium and
high risk, as I indicated earlier, to an earlier question.
In order to be comfortable with the number of mariners we
have, with the STCW requirements that go into effect in January
of 2017, we need an estimate of approximately 40 more ships to
have sufficient mariner pool that is sailing actively on a day-
to-day basis to make sure we have the right number.
Mr. Forbes. If we lost 200 mariners, would we be in high
risk?
Mr. Jaenichen. We would, sir.
Mr. Forbes. General, how important is the Ready Reserve
Force to our military's ability to support a full-scale
mobilization?
General Lyons. Chairman, it is extremely important. In
fact, without that Ready Reserve Force fleet, we would be
unable to deliver a significant portion of combat power
globally. So we are absolutely reliant upon that capability
from the pre-positioned ships that are forward positioned, to
the surge fleet, to the Ready Reserve Force fleet. Those are
critical in our ability to project power.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Jaenichen, over the long term would the
administration's Food for Peace proposal increase or decrease
the number of U.S. mariners?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Chairman, for the question. If we
go back to the 25 percent reduction that occurred in 2012 when
we did the ``Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century''
that reduced the food aid program from 75 to 50 percent in
accordance with a 1954 civilian cargo preference, we estimated
at that time we would lose somewhere between 9 and 12 ships.
We have subsequently lost 28. Now, we also recognize that
that is coincident with all of the downward pressure on the DOD
cargoes, the retrograde from Afghanistan and Iraq. So those all
occurred at the same time, which is it is that total
government-impelled cargo which has actually caused that.
Our estimate for what is proposed in the fiscal year 2017
budget, we have included in that budget $25 million as a
mitigating factor to make sure that we don't have an adverse
effect on the mariner pool, we will be able to maintain some
ships, principally the ones that are principally carrying food
aid cargo that are not in the MSP. And so $24 million of that
would be dedicated to those non-MSP carriers and then a million
would be dedicated to the retraining of the mariners to make
sure that we have that capability.
So we recognize that the proposal from the administration
does have an impact on the U.S. merchant marine and we are
trying to mitigate that with the budget request that has been
submitted.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. How does the loss of mariners impact the
military's ability to support the Navy's Ready Reserve Force,
General?
General Lyons. Chairman, the merchant mariner is
inextricably linked to the Department of Defense's ability to
project force. And so as I indicated earlier, the predominant
cargo, both equipment and supplies, go by sealift. And so
without that merchant mariner capability, we don't have a DOD
surge sealift capability.
Mr. Forbes. And Mr. Jaenichen, what is the administration's
plan to provide sufficient mariners to support sustained
operations, not just the initial activation of the Ready
Reserve Force?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Chairman, for the question. The
Maritime Administration is currently working on a draft
National Maritime Strategy which we hope to address. And as I
indicated to Congresswoman Hartzler's question earlier, we are
working within the Committee on Marine Transportation System to
put together a ``Veteran-to-Mariner'' program to try to get at
the shortfalls that we are currently experiencing.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. DiLisio, will the proposed inactivation of
a T-AOE in fiscal year 2017 increase or decrease our military
readiness?
Mr. DiLisio. Mr. Chairman, our current requirement for CLF
ships is 29. The AOE takes us at 30, so that would be losing
any margin I have, so I will be right at the margin with 29.
Mr. Forbes. The administration has proposed to eliminate an
aircraft carrier, euthanize 11 cruisers, eliminate a carrier
air wing, and now inactivate another T-AOE. Is the inactivation
of the T-AOE driven by fiscal pressures?
Mr. DiLisio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The USNS Rainier is
the ship we are talking about right now. And that is a
financial trade given the 40-plus million dollars of service
life extension work I would need to do to her to keep her in
service and the 60-plus million dollars a year it takes to
operate her. So as it turns, it is a $100 million proposition
for one ship. The alternative ships are in the $40, $50 million
a year range.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Just a couple more questions and then we
will move on.
This is for Mr. Jaenichen and General Lyons. There are some
in Congress that have indicated that the United States should
outsource our military maritime lift capacity to other foreign
nations and that U.S. crews should be replaced by foreign
crews. Could you both explain the value of an organic maritime
lift capability and why Congress needs U.S. mariners in the MSP
program and the Ready Reserve Force?
Mr. Jaenichen. Chairman, thank you for the question. The
first thing I would say is the U.S. merchant marine and the
mariners that are part of that active workforce have always
responded to the call. They are patriotic. They have done what
is needed to conduct our sealift requirement. They have never
failed to carry our requirements, equipment, supply, materials,
to support the Department of Defense operations.
I cannot say the same for foreign-flag crews. We have had
several instances in which they have not gone into the theater
for their own fear of their own safety.
We also run the risk if you have foreign seafarers that
potentially we are at the risk of some political decision by
another country who those mariners potentially are national
citizens to. And I don't think that is a position that we want
to be in going forward.
Mr. Forbes. General, do you have thoughts on that?
General Lyons. Chairman, yes, sir. We believe that the case
for a U.S.-flag fleet is compelling. There is no guarantee
whatsoever that a foreign-flag fleet will sail into harm's way,
as the Administrator said, and we have had cases of that in the
past.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Garamendi, if you would be patient with me,
one more. We have the gentlelady from Hawaii and then we will
be right to you.
So the gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
General Lyons, can you speak to your Ready Reserve Force
requirements and whether or not you have enough of your either
organic mariners or commercial vessels to meet that
requirement?
General Lyons. Yes, ma'am. Today we have a capability that
I believe is sufficient to meet the national military
strategy's requirements with acceptable risk.
The issue we face is where we will be tomorrow. We see some
downward trends that are significant in nature, one of which is
the health of the merchant mariner industry that we have been
discussing and those mariners that not only sail our commercial
vessels, but also sail our Ready Reserve Force fleet, our surge
fleet crew, our pre-positioned equipment that is out there
today.
So we believe we are in good shape now, but we do have some
concerns about where we are headed in that as well as the age-
out of the organic fleet.
Mr. Jaenichen. Congresswoman, if I could add just a few
comments. First of all, we get great support from our resource
sponsor in the Navy. They provide us the funding to be able to
maintain the maintenance and repair as well as the crewing
dollars to be able to support that Ready Reserve Force in their
ready status.
My concern is we are doing that with a fleet that is 39
years old. So as General Lyons pointed out, we have acceptable
risk today, but we are doing it with ships, some of the ships
that I have in my fleet are 50 years old. We are doing the best
we can. Some of the equipment is obsolete; it is no longer
made, so we have to take extraordinary measures to be able to
maintain the readiness of that fleet.
If that fleet is called, I would like to say that I can
guarantee every single time we will be able to do it. But as we
get farther in time, and we have every intent to utilize the
funding to be able to extend that service life to 60 years, I
can't guarantee you it will be able to be able to carry the
equipment that we need.
Several of the ships in the inventory are steamships. They
are hard to maintain, hard to operate. And if we are surging to
be able to support a specific operation and I have a problem on
one of those ships that's, you know, 40 years old, we may not
be able to support the fight and there are potential soldiers,
sailors, or marines that could be at risk as a result of that.
Ms. Gabbard. Similarly, you have talked about the
importance of the Maritime Security Program as it relates to
your ability to respond and move people and logistics, et
cetera. What is the fleet size requirement of the Maritime
Security Program?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
Sixty has been identified as the number. There has been some
mobility and capability assessment, as General Lyons alluded to
earlier.
Typically, that fleet is for sustainment. It is a
commercial fleet. The surge would actually be done by our
organic assets, both with the Military Sealift Command with
their pre-po ships and also the Ready Reserve Force ships that
we have.
What has happened over time is those ships in the MSP
program are typically in commercial service. They will then
become available once they are able to position themselves to
be able to carry those sustainment cargoes.
The 60 that is there based on the operational requirements,
that would require a classified briefing to be able to
specifically go through those particular movements that are
required to be able to support the most comprehensive and most
challenging scenarios that the Department of Defense has. But
we need all 60 to be able to do that.
It also makes the assumption that we will have no losses.
And we recognize that there are changes in the environment, as
General Lyons pointed out in his opening comments, from the
standpoint of cyber, from air and maritime defense that that
may not be a valid assumption going forward.
And my understanding is DOD is doing a study on the
potential risks and what kind of numbers would require to be
changed or added to be able to ensure we have the correct
capability going forward.
Ms. Gabbard. Assuming that you do have losses and being
able to account for that.
Mr. Jaenichen. Assuming that we could have losses, that is
correct, ma'am.
Ms. Gabbard. Right, right. Okay, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Forbes. And thank
you for the courtesy of allowing me to participate.
This is the fourth hearing that I have been in in the last
couple of months that deals with this issue.
And Mr. Chairman, you may want to add to your record the
hearing record of those other committees. I think it would be
useful in that all of those committees' hearings have all come
to the same point, and that is that we have a national security
issue here, a very, very serious one.
The House Armed Services Committee usually winds up talking
about national security and the risks that we run. This is a
real one and it is happening in real time.
And I thank you very much for your questions, Mr. Chairman.
They were right on. And most of the questions I would ask, you
have already done.
I just maybe kind of weave this together from this hearing
and other hearings.
Mr. Jaenichen, is it about cargo? Is it really about cargo,
that these ships, if they are going to be able to maintain,
they have to have cargo? The food aid has been reduced, Ex-Im
[Export-Import] Bank has been reduced, and the military's been
reduced. Some of those are policy, some of those are
fortunately the wars have ground down a bit.
Is it cargo?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you for the question, Congressman. In
every situation where we have talked to an operator who has
reflagged a ship, he has told us that it is the absence of
cargo which has contributed significantly to their decision to
reflag or to scrap those vessels.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. And we have talked extensively about
the mariners and the average age of the mariners, licensing
issues, and the ships that are not available for the mariners
to be on. And I won't go into that except that that is
obviously a problem here.
It seems to me that what we have is a government and
administration that is not looking at all of the pieces of this
puzzle and weaving them together in a way that is sensible,
both for national security, for jobs, for the shipyards, and
the like.
We know that there is a threat on the Jones Act, which
testimony already on the record today about the importance of
the Jones Act for all the pieces of this puzzle.
We know that the USAID [U.S. Agency for International
Development] is determined to cash out the commodity portion of
the Food for Peace. We have had testimony here today about the
downward pressure that that puts on the maritime industry.
We know that at the moment the Ex-Im Bank is not operable
and that there are problems there. And thankfully, we do not
have the need at the moment for the military that we have had
in the past.
We need to get this together.
Mr. Forbes, your hearing is extremely important, together
with the other hearings. And I think as we go through the
policy questions and the NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act] and as we talk to the Foreign Affairs Committee, we need
to make it very, very clear that this is a national security
issue.
Your committee is on this. I know that Mr. Hunter and the
Coast Guard Maritime Committee are also on it.
But I think we can weave together here a very compelling
argument to sustain the MSP, the Ready Reserve Force, and the
mariners that go with it by pushing the Food for Peace back to
$75 [million].
One more question. Where does the $25 million come from,
Mr. Jaenichen?
Mr. Jaenichen. Congressman Garamendi, that is actually in
our budget for the Maritime Security Program for the MARAD
budget in 2017. It is actually included so that the total is
actually $211 [million], which is in the MSP request because it
includes that $25 million to support the administration's
proposal for additional 25 percent flexibility.
Mr. Garamendi. Last year that money came from the Food for
Peace program. Is this different this year?
Mr. Jaenichen. It is an identical proposal to what was in
the fiscal year 2016 request, Congressman.
Mr. Garamendi. Was the Food for Peace program reduced by
the 25?
Mr. Jaenichen. It is reduced by the flexibility for an
intervention that would include a potential local and regional
purchase, but I would refer you to USAID for how they would
actually execute that particular authorization.
Mr. Garamendi. It is just very curious that instead of
sending food and we are now taking money out of the food
program and circulating it back to the MSP program. It doesn't
make much sense to me.
Mr. Jaenichen. Congressman, we are--I think you have
confused it. There was a proposal at one time to be able to use
the food aid reform and have money. This proposal is not that.
This is just a funding in the MSP line to support the
mitigation efforts.
Mr. Garamendi. I think we would be better off shipping food
and keeping the mariners busy, keeping the ships busy, rather
than providing what basically is a welfare program that may or
may not keep the mariners busy. It depends whether those ships
get laid up or not.
Mr. Jaenichen. Congressman, that proposal is no longer on
the table as under consideration.
Mr. Garamendi. Money is fungible and it moves.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your committee. And you are
onto something very, very important here.
Know that the Subcommittee on Transportation is with you to
try to sort this out.
Mr. Forbes. We thank the gentleman.
And Mr. Courtney is now recognized for any questions he may
have.
Mr. Courtney. Just one quick follow-up.
Mr. Jaenichen, you mentioned to Representative Hartzler a
few minutes ago. Again, MARAD is going to be issuing a
comprehensive maritime strategic plan shortly. Is that right?
Mr. Jaenichen. That is correct, Ranking Member Courtney. In
fact, we have had that, it is in interdepartmental review now.
It has been in OMB [Office of Management and Budget] for a
while. I hope to be able to get that out for draft public
comment, and then we would take those public comments and then
we would finalize the strategy. And I am hoping to have that
draft National Maritime Strategy out in the next couple of
months.
Mr. Courtney. And how many years has it been since the last
plan?
Mr. Jaenichen. The last strategy dates back to 1936 as
modified in 1970, so it has been a while, sir.
Mr. Courtney. And how many departments did you have to run
the traps on this?
Mr. Jaenichen. During my initial review, we actually
started this process back in 2014, the first National Maritime
Strategy symposium was held in January of 2014, we held a
second in May. Once we got the draft done, we have shared it
with the 27 agencies and commissions that were in the Committee
on Marine Transportation System and I also provided it and got
comments that we included in our draft that we provided to OMB
that came from the majors, so Coast Guard, Department of
Energy, DOD, Army Corps of Engineers, to ensure that we had it
about right.
And so we are in that process now to go through to get
final interdepartmental review.
Mr. Courtney. So about 80 years and 27 agencies. Again, I
just want to salute you for your persistence in this and just
tell you we look forward really enthusiastically for the draft.
And I want to thank you and the witnesses for your
testimony.
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Mr. Forbes. Well, thank you, gentlemen.
As you remember, Mr. Courtney and I had indicated to all
three of you that at the end we would give you whatever time
you needed to clarify any of your remarks or to add anything to
the record that you thought might be pertinent.
So we will start now, and just thank you again for being
with us.
And Mr. Jaenichen, any closing thoughts that you have for
us?
Mr. Jaenichen. Chairman, I would just like to talk a little
about the importance of the MSP just one last time. If you
recall, we reauthorized the MSP program out to 2025. And all of
the carriers signed up for that program at that time.
The world has completely changed from the time that they
resigned those contracts to get out to 2025. And so that timing
and the stipend amount that was there, we all recognize that
they are under downward pressure, as I have already testified
to. So I would encourage the committee to think about that as
we go forward in terms of the future viabiity of the MSP.
The second is the mariners themselves. They are a strategic
national asset. That is what allows us to provide national
security. If there were any other workforce sector that
supported national security, that had experienced a 20 percent
loss and reduction in the number of people, there would be a
public outcry.
This is a crisis in the making and we are not talking about
it. That is one of the reasons why I greatly appreciate this
committee for having this hearing today.
The final one that I have is with regards to the
recapitalization of the sealift fleet and the training fleets.
We are operating old ships. And as a result in operating old
ships, it costs more, it is more expensive to continue the
operation and repairs. And at some point, we reach a limit and
we are not going to be able to operate.
The ships, if they can't operate, if they are in the Ready
Reserve Force, I can't provide the requirement to provide that
sealift for DOD. And if it is a training ship, I don't have the
capacity to train the mariners that we have already identified
are essential to our future and to be able to support the
Department of Defense.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
General, any closing remarks that you would like to offer
us?
General Lyons. Chairman, thank you. I think it was said
today this is clearly a national security issue. This committee
certainly recognizes that strategic mobility is a competitive
advantage of the United States.
And sir, I would just like to thank you, leadership, the
entire committee for your work to keep our national defense
strong. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, General.
Mr. DiLisio, we are going to let you have the last word.
Mr. DiLisio. That is unusual.
[Laughter.]
What I wanted to do, Mr. Chairman, was we have talked a lot
about the MSP program and we talked about mariners. And
certainly with my partners, everything they have told you, I
agree with.
What I want to remind everyone is that we have 122 organic
ships that we did not talk about that use the same mariner
pool. And these are organic ships like the pre-positioning
ships that are already in place, ready to go in theater in
fully operational status with the very same mariners onboard.
So as what we have described as a catastrophe in the
making, as the quality of the mariner pool begins to shrink, as
the numbers shrink, the people that are going to be on the
pointy end delivering Marine Corps and Army equipment is also
going to be at risk.
And I will tell you, we pick the best we can find. But 122
organic ships, same mariners. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Mr. Forbes. Gentleman, thank you all so much again for your
service to our country and for being here today.
And if there are no other questions, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
March 22, 2016
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 22, 2016
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]