    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    			[H.A.S.C. No. 114-115]
    _____________________________________________________________________

                                 HEARING

                                   ON

    		NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

    			FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

                                  AND

    		OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

    			COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    			HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

    		     ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

            		    SECOND SESSION
                                  _____________

    			FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

                                       ON

    			THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL

    			DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET

    			REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT

    				OF DEFENSE

                                  ________________

            			HEARING HELD

            		        MARCH 22, 2016

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                 __________________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    20-067                       WASHINGTON : 2017

    ______________________________________________________________________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       One Hundred Fourteenth Congress

                 WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      ADAM SMITH, Washington
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado                   Georgia
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          JACKIE SPEIER, California
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana              TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York      MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada               TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida           RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    PAUL COOK, California                MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio               BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana             SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               PETE AGUILAR, California
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
    THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma

                      Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                     Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
                          William S. Johnson, Counsel
                             Britton Burkett, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
      on Armed Services..............................................     3
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..........................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of
      Defense; accompanied by Hon. Mike McCord, Under Secretary of
      Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer, U.S.
      Department of Defense..........................................     4
    Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr., USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
      Staff..........................................................     9

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Carter, Hon. Ashton B........................................    67
        Dunford, Gen Joseph F., Jr...................................   104
        Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
          Member, Committee on Armed Services........................    65

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Ms. Bordallo.................................................   123

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Coffman..................................................   128
        Ms. Duckworth................................................   129
        Mr. Lamborn..................................................   127
        Ms. Speier...................................................   127
        Mr. Takai....................................................   129

    THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM
                           THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                               Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 22, 2016.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
    Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
        The committee meets today to receive testimony from the
    Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff on the national defense authorization budget request from
    the administration.
        Like last year, the committee has spent a number of weeks
    hearing from our military leaders, the Intelligence Community,
    and outside witnesses before asking the Secretary to testify on
    the current budget request. What we have heard over these weeks
    reaffirmed the fact that the U.S. faces a wider range of
    serious threats than at any time in our history.
        The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] told
    our committee that, quote: ``The world is far more complicated;
    it is far more destabilized; it is far more complex than at any
    time I have seen it.''
        Currently serving senior commanders have described the
    ability of the military we rely upon to face those threats as,
    quote, ``minimally adequate.'' Aviation units in the Marine
    Corps cannot meet training and mission requirements. With less
    than a third of Army forces at acceptable levels of readiness,
    the Army is not at a level that is appropriate for what the
    American people would expect to defend them. Those were quotes
    as well.
        Another is, less than half of the Air Force combat units
    are ready for a high-end fight. It is the smallest, oldest, and
    least-ready force across the full spectrum of operations in our
    history. Those snippets of testimony across the services is
    remarkably consistent, candid, and disturbing. Indeed, my own
    visits with service members recently leads me to suspect that
    even these assessments don't tell the whole story.
        We often discuss readiness, but it is a vague term without
    concrete meaning for a lot of Americans. Recently, I have heard
    firsthand from service members who have looked me in the eye
    and told of trying to cannibalize parts from a museum aircraft
    in order to get a current aircraft ready to fly an overseas
    mission; of getting aircraft that were sent to the boneyard in
    Arizona back and revitalized in order to fly missions; of
    pilots who were flying well below the minimum number of hours
    required for minimal proficiency and flying fewer training
    hours than those of adversaries that they were sent to meet.
        I have heard of not having enough senior enlisted people to
    train and supervise the younger ones, and those who remain
    working longer and longer hours. And I have even heard
    firsthand from service members who have to buy basic supplies
    like pins and cleaning supplies and paper towels out of their
    own pocket, because if they go through the military process, it
    will take 3 or 4 months, and for them, it is just not worth it.
    I expressed concern last week that there is a rise in class A
    mishaps, which may be another indicator of a readiness crisis.
        Last year, General Dempsey testified that the fiscal year
    2016 funding request was the lower, ragged edge that was
    necessary to execute the defense strategy and that we have no
    slack, no margin left for error or strategic surprise. Yet the
    budget request from the administration this year is $18 billion
    lower on meeting those basic requirement minimums, and it is
    less than the budget agreement of last December.
        It seems clear that the same strategy we assumed would have
    us out of Iraq and Afghanistan, where Russia would be a friend
    thanks to the reset, and where terrorism was confined to the JV
    [junior varsity] teams, does not continue to be valid. That is
    also the same strategy that has led us to cut troops,
    equipment, training, and bases.
        Both Congress and the administration are responsible for
    this state of affairs. Over the last 5 years, the President and
    Congress have cut over half a trillion dollars from defense,
    and these cuts come at a cost. It has increased risk that our
    troops will be killed or captured, that a mission will fail, or
    that we will lose a fight.
        What our hearings over these last few weeks have shown is
    that this risk is real, and there is evidence to prove it is
    growing. The military is strained to a breaking point. Our
    witnesses today are in a unique position to help our political
    leadership and the American people understand the state of
    affairs, and I would say we would all be derelict in our duty
    if we tried to sweep it under the rug.
        On a final note, this morning the news brought us, again,
    stories of tragedy in a terrorist attack in Europe. The
    administration's budget request asks for more money to fight
    ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] in Iraq and Syria, and I
    think that is understandable and appropriate.
        What I do not understand is that the law required the
    administration provide Congress a written document laying out
    its strategy to fight ISIS. That document was due February 15,
    2016. We have received nothing, and there is no indication that
    anything is on the way.
        The world is growing more dangerous. We have cut our
    military too much, and I believe it is up to the political
    leadership in this country to take the action necessary to
    enable our service men and women to defend American lives and
    American interests. The men and women who serve and the Nation
    deserve better than we are now.
        I yield to the distinguished gentlelady of California, as
    the acting ranking member today, for any comments she would
    like to make.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement
    be entered into the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
    Appendix on page 65.]

        STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
                CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mrs. Davis. Over the last several weeks, we have received
    testimony from combatant commanders, from our service chiefs,
    from service secretaries. And they all have given us their best
    military advice, and it could not be more clear: the threats,
    as the chairman has noted, we face are real and growing.
        Just this morning, attacks in Brussels claimed at least 26
    lives, and dozens were injured. Our hearts certainly go out to
    the Belgian people as they recover from this horrific act of
    violence.
        Secretary Carter, you have emphasized that the President's
    budget request centers on five key challenges: Deterring
    aggressive behavior on the part of a resurgent Russia and a
    rising China; containing the dangerous unpredictable North
    Korean regime; neutralizing Iran's malign influence; and
    defeating ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and other
    manifestations of violent extremism.
        Unfortunately, in the midst of these challenges, we are
    searching for budget workarounds instead of fixing the
    underlying problem. The Department of Defense [DOD] needs
    fiscal certainty to reliably perform critical missions and to
    maintain lasting superiority.
        Secretary Carter, you have asserted that the fiscal year
    2017 shortfall risk can be mitigated but that DOD needs a
    comprehensive long-term budgetary solution. We must remember
    the devastating harms inflicted by sequestration in the Budget
    Control Act caps. Years of budgetary standoffs leading to
    numerous threatened government shutdowns, one actual government
    shutdown, and congressional overreliance on continuing
    resolutions have combined to produce debilitating fiscal
    uncertainty.
        Although it is unclear whether the House will pass a budget
    resolution this year, the resolution passed last week by the
    House Budget Committee raises more questions than it answers.
    The committee-passed resolution is nominally BBA [Bipartisan
    Budget Act] compliant, but it would offer a net increase of
    roughly $18 billion to the defense base budget. It would do so
    by assuming that $23 billion of overseas contingency
    operations--what we call OCO funding--would be used for base
    budget purposes, but it would not increase the BBA top line of
    $74 million for OCO funding.
        My first question is, which OCO beneficiary would end up
    paying the bill in this shuffle? Would the money come from the
    portion requested for DOD, that is, the warfighter? Would it
    come from the State Department, which also receives OCO funding
    to perform vital functions in contingency operations? Or would
    it come from both?
        Chairman Price's budget resolution also poses another open-
    ended question. It appears to allow the chairman of the House
    Budget Committee to adjust OCO funding levels going forward on
    the basis of new information, which means that, at some point,
    supplemental OCO funding could be used to circumvent BBA
    funding levels.
        The DOD, the Congress, has to make hard choices, especially
    when it comes to balancing force modernization with the very,
    very critical need that the chairman addressed: to sustain
    readiness. Would these issues become harder or easier if near-
    term OCO needs are supplemented by longer-term base budget
    requirements in fiscal year 2017? How would the DOD prioritize
    its needs if OCO funding levels are reduced within the BBA top
    line?
        And, most importantly, what poses the greatest risk to
    national security, providing funding for base budget
    requirements at the level requested by the President or
    providing funding for near-term OCO requirements at least
    initially at levels lower than requested? We need to carefully
    consider Chairman Price's proposal and every other potential
    adjustment to the defense budget as we work to build this
    year's defense authorization bill.
        We must also give the Department additional flexibility to
    reduce excess infrastructure and overhead, to phase out old
    platforms, and to adjust the healthcare and benefit structure.
    The President came to us with a budget that focuses on adapting
    to the threats that we face today and also one that follows the
    law by conforming to the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015,
    including approximately $582.7 billion in discretionary budget
    authority for the Department of Defense. So, now, we must
    uphold our end of the deal in Congress.
        Thank you all for being here today. I look forward to your
    testimony.
        And thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
        The committee is pleased to welcome today the Honorable
    Ashton B. Carter, the Secretary of Defense; General Joseph
    Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; as well as
    the Honorable Mike McCord, the Comptroller and Chief Financial
    Officer [CFO] of the Department.
        Gentlemen, again, welcome to the committee. Without
    objection, your full written statements will be made part of
    the record.
        And Mr. Secretary, you are recognized for any comments you
    would like to offer.

    STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. MIKE McCORD, UNDER
    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER,
                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Carter. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry.
        Congresswoman Davis, thank you.
        Thanks, all the members of the committee. Thank you for
    hosting me here today.
        I want to begin by condemning this morning's bombings in
    Belgium. Our thoughts and our prayers are with those affected
    by this tragedy, the victims, their families, and survivors.
    And in the face of these acts of terrorism, the United States
    stands in strong solidarity with our ally Belgium. We are
    continuing to monitor the situation, including to ensure that
    all U.S. personnel and citizens are accounted for. We also
    stand ready to provide assistance to our friends and allies in
    Europe, as necessary.
        Brussels is an international city that has been host to
    NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and to the European
    Union [EU] for decades. Together, we must and we will continue
    to do everything we can to protect our homelands and defeat
    terrorists wherever they threaten us. No attack--no attack--
    will affect our resolve to accelerate the defeat of ISIL. I
    will have more to say about this later in the testimony.
        Thank you again for hosting me today and for steadfastly
    supporting DOD's men and women all over the world, military and
    civilian, who serve and defend us. I am pleased to be here with
    Chairman Dunford, Under Secretary McCord, to discuss President
    Obama's 2017 defense budget, which marks a major inflection
    point for the Department of Defense.
        As I will describe in detail, the threat from terrorism is
    one of the five challenges, as has been noted, that the United
    States now faces and will in the future. In this budget, we are
    taking the long view. We have to, because even as we fight
    today's fights, we must also be prepared for what might come
    10, 20, or 30 years down the road.
        Last fall's Bipartisan Budget Act gave us some much-needed
    stability after years of gridlock and turbulence. And I want to
    thank you and your colleagues for coming together to help pass
    it. That budget deal set the size of our budget, and with this
    degree of certainty, we focused on its shape, changing that
    shape in fundamental but carefully considered ways to adjust to
    a new strategic era and to seize opportunities for the future.
        Let me describe the strategic assessment that drove our
    budget decisions. First of all, it is evident that America is
    still today the world's foremost leader, partner, and
    underwriter of stability and security in every region of the
    world, as we have been since World War II. That is thanks in
    large part to the unequivocal strength of the U.S. military.
        And as we continue to fulfill this enduring role, it is
    also evident that we are entering a new strategic era. Today's
    security environment is dramatically different from the last 25
    years, requiring new ways of investing and operating. Five
    evolving strategic challenges--namely, Russia, China, North
    Korea, Iran, and terrorism--are now driving DOD's planning and
    budgeting, as reflected in this budget.
        I want to focus first on our ongoing fight against
    terrorism and especially ISIL, which as the attacks in Belgium
    today again remind us, we must and will deal a lasting defeat,
    most immediately in its parent tumor in Iraq and Syria but also
    where it is metastasizing, and all the while we are continuing
    to help protect our own homeland.
        Let me give you a quick snapshot of what we are doing to
    pressure and destroy ISIL's parent tumor in Iraq and Syria. In
    Iraq, with our support, the Iraqi Security Forces retook Ramadi
    and are now reclaiming further ground in Anbar Province and are
    simultaneously shifting the weight of their effort towards
    Mosul in the north.
        With our advice and assistance, Iraqi and Kurdish security
    forces have begun the shaping and isolation phase of the
    operation to collapse ISIL's control over Mosul. That was the
    mission Marine Staff Sergeant Louis Cardin was supporting when
    he gave his life over the weekend providing critical protection
    to Iraqi forces and coalition military advisers in northern
    Iraq. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family and with the
    other Marines injured in Saturday's rocket attack. Their
    sacrifice will not be forgotten, and our global coalition will
    complete the mission they were supporting.
        In Syria, capable and motivated local forces supported by
    the United States in our global coalition have retaken the east
    Syrian town of Shaddadi. This town served as an important
    logistical and financial hub for ISIL and a key intersection
    between its Syria and Iraq operations. In fact, Shaddadi was so
    important to ISIL that its so-called minister of war was
    involved in ISIL's defense of the town. We killed him while our
    local partners expelled ISIL from the town. In doing so, the
    coalition campaign severed the last major northern artery
    between Raqqa and Mosul and, therefore, between ISIL and Syria
    and ISIL and Iraq. And we are intent on further isolating and
    pressuring ISIL, including by cutting off its remaining lines
    of communication in southern Syria and into Turkey.
        In addition to local forces we are working with, 90 percent
    of our military and coalition partners from Europe, the Gulf,
    Asia, 26 countries in all, including, by the way, our ally
    Belgium, have committed to increase their contributions to help
    accelerate the defeat of ISIL.
        We have increased strikes on ISIL-held cash depots, oil
    revenues, and sites associated with its ambitions to develop
    and use chemical weapons. And we are addressing ISIL's
    metastases as well, having conducted targeted strikes against
    ISIL in Libya and Afghanistan. As we are accelerating our
    overall counter-ISIL campaign, we are backing it up with
    increased funding for 2017, as the chairman already noted,
    requesting 50 percent more than last year.
        Now, before I continue, I want to say a few words about
    Russia's role in this. Russia said it was coming into Syria to
    fight ISIL, but that is not what it did. Instead, their
    military has only prolonged the civil war, propped up Assad,
    and as of now, we haven't seen whether Russia has retained
    leverage over Assad to facilitate a diplomatic way forward,
    which is what the Syrian people need.
        One thing is clear, though: Russia's entry into Syria
    didn't impact our campaign against ISIL. Along with our
    coalition partners, we are intensifying our campaign against
    ISIL in both Iraq and Syria and will continue to do so until
    ISIL is dealt a lasting defeat.
        Two of the other four challenges reflect a return in some
    ways to great superpower competition. One is in Europe, where
    we are taking a strong and balanced approach to deter Russian
    aggression. We haven't had to devote a significant portion of
    our defense investment to this possibility for nearly a quarter
    century, but now we do.
        The other challenge is in the Asia-Pacific, where China is
    rising, which is fine, but behaving aggressively, which is not.
    There, we are continuing our rebalance to the region to
    maintain the stability we have underwritten for the past 70
    years, enabling so many nations to rise and prosper in this,
    the single most consequential region for America's future.
        Meanwhile, two other longstanding challenges pose threats
    in specific regions: North Korea is one. That is why our forces
    on the Korean Peninsula remain ready, as they say, to fight
    tonight; the other is Iran, because while the nuclear accord is
    a good deal for preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon,
    we must still deter Iranian aggression and counter Iran's
    malign influence against our regional friends and allies,
    especially Israel, to which we maintain an unwavering and
    unbreakable commitment.
        Now, addressing all of these five challenges requires new
    investments on our part, new posture in some regions, and also
    new and enhanced capabilities. For example, we know we must
    deal with these challenges across all domains and not just the
    usual air, land, and sea, but also especially in cyber,
    electronic warfare, and space, where our reliance on technology
    has given us great strengths and great opportunities but also
    led to vulnerabilities that our adversaries are eager to
    exploit.
        Key to our approach is being able to deter our most
    advanced competitors. We must have and we seem to have the
    ability to ensure that anyone who starts a conflict with us
    will regret doing so. In our budget, our capabilities, our
    readiness, and our actions, we must and will be prepared for a
    high-end enemy, what we call full spectrum.
        In this context, Russia and China are our most stressing
    competitors, as they have both developed and continue to
    advance military systems that seek to threaten our advantages
    in specific areas. We see them in the South China Sea and in
    Crimea and in Syria as well. In some cases, they are developing
    weapons and ways of war that seek to achieve their objectives
    rapidly before they think we can respond. Because of this, DOD
    has elevated their importance in our planning and budgeting.
        In my written testimony, I have detailed how our budget
    makes critical investments to help us better address these five
    evolving challenges. We are strengthening our deterrence
    posture in Europe by investing $3.4 billion for our European
    Reassurance Initiative [ERI], quadruple what we requested last
    year.
        We are prioritizing training and readiness for our ground
    forces, a very important matter emphasized very appropriately
    by the chairman, and reinvigorating the readiness and
    modernization of our fighter aircraft fleet. We are investing
    in innovative capabilities, like the B-21 Long Range Strike
    Bomber, micro-drone, and the arsenal plane, as well as advanced
    munitions of all sorts.
        In our Navy, we are emphasizing not just increasing the
    number of ships, which we are doing, but especially their
    lethality, with new weapons and high-end ships, and extending
    our commanding lead in undersea warfare, with new investments
    in unmanned undersea vehicles, for example, and more submarines
    with the versatile Virginia Payload Module that triples their
    strike capacity from 12 Tomahawks to 40.
        And we are doing more in cyber, electronic warfare, and
    space, investing in these three domains a combined total of $34
    billion in 2017. Among other things, this will help us build
    our cyber mission force, develop next-generation electronic
    jammers, and prepare for the possibility of a conflict that
    extends into space. In short, DOD will keep ensuring our
    dominance in all domains.
        As we do this, our budget also seizes opportunities for the
    future. That is a responsibility I have to all my successors,
    to ensure the military and the Defense Department they inherit
    is just as strong, if not stronger, than the one I have the
    privilege of leading today.
        That is why we are making increased investments in science
    and technology, innovating operationally, and building new
    bridges to the amazing American innovative system, as we always
    have, to stay ahead of future threats. That is why we are
    building what I have called the force of the future, because as
    good as our technology is, it is nothing compared to our
    people.
        And in the future, we must continue to recruit and retain
    the very best talent. Competing for good people, for an All-
    Volunteer Force, is a critical part of our military edge, and
    everyone should understand this need and my commitment to
    meeting it.
        And because we owe it to America's taxpayers to spend our
    defense dollars as wisely and responsibly as possible, we are
    also pushing for needed reforms across the DOD enterprise, and
    we need your help with all of them. From further reducing
    overhead and excess infrastructure, to modernizing and
    simplifying TRICARE, to proposing new changes to the Goldwater-
    Nichols Act that defines much of our institutional
    organization, as I intend to do shortly, to continuously
    improving acquisitions.
        And on that subject, I want to commend this committee, and
    especially its leaders, for your continued dedication and
    strong partnership with DOD on acquisition reform. We have
    already taken important strides here, such as last year's
    reforms to reduce redundant reporting requirements and
    documentation. And as you are looking to do more, so are we.
        Chairman Thornberry, I know you laid out new proposals on
    this last week. Some of what you are proposing would save us
    critical time in staying ahead of emerging threats. That is
    very important, and we appreciate that. It is extremely
    helpful.
        And I know this is just a draft, and I appreciate that you
    put it out there for discussion. In that regard, I have to say
    that, in the current draft, there are some things that are
    problematic for us, so I am also hopeful that we can continue
    to work with you on your proposals to ensure that DOD has the
    flexibility needed to apply the principles in your work to
    addressing all the diverse acquisition challenges we have to
    solve for our warfighters.
        I appreciate your willingness to hear our ideas as well,
    including ways to make it easier for program managers to do
    their jobs, and involving the service chiefs more in
    acquisition decisionmaking and accountability. And I look
    forward to working together as we have before.
        Let me close on the broader shift reflected in this budget.
    The Defense Department doesn't have the luxury of just one
    opponent or the choice between fights, between future fights
    and current fights. We have to do it all. That is what this
    budget is designed to do, and we need your help to succeed.
        I thank this committee again for supporting the Bipartisan
    Budget Act that set the size of our budget. Our submission
    focuses on the budget shape, making changes that are necessary
    and consequential. We hope you approve it.
        I know some may be looking at the difference between what
    we indicated last year we would be asking for and what the
    budget deal gave us: a net total of about $11 billion less is
    provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act out of a total of almost
    $600 billion. But I want to reiterate that we have mitigated
    that difference and that this budget meets our needs.
        The budget deal was a good deal. It gave us stability. We
    are grateful for that. Our greatest risk, DOD's greatest risk
    is losing that stability this year and having uncertainty and
    sequester return in future years. That is why, going forward,
    the biggest budget priority for us strategically is Congress
    averting the return of sequestration to prevent what would be
    $100 billion in looming automatic cuts so that we can maintain
    stability and sustain all these critical investments I have
    been speaking of.
        We have seen this before, and that same support coming
    together is essential today to address the security challenges
    we face and to seize the opportunities within our grasp. As
    long as we work together to do so, I know our national security
    will be on the right path and America's military will continue
    to defend our country and help make a better world for
    generations to come.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Carter can be found in
    the Appendix on page 67.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        General Dunford.

    STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Dunford. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis,
    distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thanks
    for the opportunity to join Secretary Carter and Secretary
    McCord in appearing before you.
        I would like to begin by echoing Secretary Carter's
    comments on the loss of Staff Sergeant Cardin; his family, the
    eight other Marines who were injured this weekend, and the
    victims of this morning's attack in Brussels are in our
    thoughts and prayers.
        I am honored to represent the extraordinary men and women
    of the joint force. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
    civil servants remain our single most important competitive
    advantage. And thanks to your support, the United States
    military is the most capable fighting force in the world.
        I don't believe we should ever send Americans into a fair
    fight. Rather, we must maintain a joint force that has the
    capability and credibility to assure our allies and partners,
    deter aggression, and overmatch any potential adversary. This
    requires us to continually improve our joint warfighting
    capabilities, restore full-spectrum readiness, and develop the
    leaders who will serve as the foundation for the future.
        The United States is now confronted with challenges from
    both traditional state actors and non-state actors. The
    Department has identified five strategic challenges, and
    Secretary Carter has outlined those. Russia, China, Iran, and
    North Korea continue to invest in military capabilities that
    reduce our competitive advantage.
        They are also advancing their interests through competition
    with a military dimension that falls short of traditional armed
    conflict and the threshold for traditional military response.
    Examples include Russian actions in Ukraine, Chinese activities
    in the South China Sea, and Iran's malign influence across the
    Middle East.
        At the same time, non-state actors, such as ISIL and Al
    Qaeda, pose a threat to the homeland, the American people, our
    partners, and our allies. Given the opportunity, such extremist
    groups would fundamentally change our way of life. As we
    contend with the Department's five strategic challenges, we
    recognize that successful execution of our defense strategy
    requires that we maintain credible nuclear and conventional
    capabilities.
        Our strategic nuclear deterrent remains effective, but it
    is aging and requires modernization. Therefore, we are
    prioritizing investments needed for a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear deterrent. We are also making investments to
    maintain a competitive advantage in conventional capabilities,
    and we must further develop capabilities in vital and
    increasingly contested domains of space and cyber space.
        As the joint force acts to mitigate and respond to
    challenges, we do so in the context of a fiscal environment
    that has hampered our ability to plan and allocate resources
    most effectively. Despite partial relief by Congress from
    sequester-level funding, the Department has absorbed $800
    billion in cuts and faces an additional $100 billion of
    sequestration-induced risk through fiscal year 2021.
        Absorbing significant cuts over the past 5 years has
    resulted in our underinvesting in critical capabilities. And
    unless we reverse sequestration, we will be unable to execute
    the current defense strategy and specifically to address the
    challenges that Secretary Carter outlined in his remarks.
        The fiscal year 2017 budget begins to address the most
    critical investments required to maintain our competitive
    advantage. To the extent possible, within the resources
    provided by the 2015 Bipartisan Budget Act, it addresses the
    Department's five challenges. It does so by balancing three
    major areas: investment in high-end capabilities; the
    capability and capacity to meet our current operational
    demands; and the need to rebuild readiness after an extended
    period of war. In the years ahead, we will need adequate
    funding levels and predictability to fully recover from over a
    decade at war and delayed modernization.
        A bow wave of procurement requirements in the future
    include the Ohio-class replacement, continued cyber and space
    investments, and the Long Range Strike Bomber. It will also be
    several years before we fully restore full-spectrum readiness
    across the services and replenish our stocks of critical
    precision munitions. And I know the committee has heard from
    the service chiefs on the specifics of that readiness recovery.
        In summary, I am satisfied that the fiscal year 2017 budget
    puts us on the right trajectory, but it will take your
    continued support to ensure the joint force has the depth,
    flexibility, readiness, and responsiveness that ensures our men
    and women never face a fair fight.
        Once again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
    you this morning, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in
    the Appendix on page 104.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. McCord, I understand you do not have an oral statement.
    Is that correct?
        Secretary McCord. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. I appreciate you being here today as well.
        Mr. Secretary, I think you are exactly right to condemn the
    attacks in Brussels, and you are exactly right to express
    sympathy for the victims. I think the question especially for
    this committee but for the American people is, okay, what are
    we going to do about it?
        And in last year's bill, section 1222 asked the
    administration to provide a strategy for how we were actually
    going to implement the President's stated desire to degrade and
    destroy ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. And as I
    mentioned, it has been radio silent. We have heard not a word
    from anybody.
        Now, to be fair, it is not just a matter for the Department
    of Defense. It is not just the military who will defeat ISIS,
    and the requirement in law was not just directed to the
    Department of Defense. But do you have any idea when we might
    see a strategy on how to beat ISIS?
        Secretary Carter. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And you are right: the Brussels attacks reinforce our need
    to accelerate the defeat of ISIL. We have a strategy for doing
    so. I will describe it in a moment. The strategy document, the
    strategy report you are asking for, its delivery is imminent.
    It is a DOD-plus-others document, and we will get that to you.
        But the strategy in brief is this, and then I will connect
    it to the Brussels attacks. I was describing the campaign in
    Iraq and Syria, which we are accelerating, and, Mr. Chairman
    and members, we are looking for more opportunities to do so. We
    found opportunities. I expect us to find more opportunities in
    the future.
        We want to accelerate the defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria.
    Why? Because that is what I call the parent tumor of the
    cancer. That is where it started. And if we can expel ISIL from
    Raqqa and Mosul, that will show that there is no such thing as
    an Islamic State based upon this ideology. So that is
    necessary, but it is not sufficient.
        We also need to destroy ISIL in the places to which it has
    metastasized around the world. And to get to the Brussels
    attack, that reminds us--and the report will also, by the way--
    that important as the military effort is, essential as it is
    and committed as we are to that in the Department of Defense,
    the Chairman and I and everybody else, it is necessary, but it
    is not sufficient.
        We need the intelligence. We need the homeland security. We
    need the law enforcement. And so do our partners because of the
    kind of thing you saw in Brussels this morning. So we have the
    strategy. We will produce the strategy--the report based on
    that. We need your help.
        And in that connection, finally, if I just may add a note,
    Mr. Chairman, an appeal, we have before this committee and
    three other committees some reprogramming requests that are
    relevant to our ability to carry out the campaign in both Iraq
    and Syria.
        And, as you know, according to the rules, if we are going
    to do a reprogramming, we have to ask the permission of this
    committee and three other committees. We have done so. So far,
    we have gotten different answers from everybody, which is fair
    enough, but if you can help us, we need to get across the
    finish line quickly. We have got to be agile in the defeat of
    ISIL, and that means we need to be agile in this matter of
    reprogramming as well. I appreciate your help in that regard.
        Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything about
    the overall strategy.
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, on the reprogramming, I think
    all of us would feel better about a reprogramming if we knew
    what direction we were going, which is why in last year's bill,
    the request was: Okay, tell us how you are going to do this.
    And then, as you want to move money around and a variety of
    other things, I am sure there will be lots of support. But
    until there is some sort of coherent direction on how we are
    going to beat these guys, then I think it is harder to have
    that conversation.
        Let me just ask you one other thing because I know other
    members will want to continue to explore that topic. You were
    exactly right, as was Chairman Dunford, in expressing sympathy
    for the loss of the marine over the weekend.
        I am getting an increasing number of questions about the
    troop cap levels, which exist in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
    because, as I understand it, there are some people who are
    subject to the troop caps, and then there are some people who
    rotate in for a short amount of time that are not subject to
    the troop caps.
        And the argument is that if you are rotating people in
    every 30 days, or whatever it is, to keep below the troop caps,
    then the people who are rotating in are not going to have time
    to get acclimated to the environment and may be at increased
    risk. The other argument I have heard is that when you have
    these artificial troop caps, you don't bring in the force
    protection that you would in other situations where you are not
    subject to those troop caps.
        So, I guess, my question to you is, do you believe there is
    reason to be concerned that these artificial troop caps in Iraq
    and in Afghanistan lead to increased risk for our service
    members?
        Secretary Carter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, with respect to the troop cap numbers, there
    has been no change in that regard, and you are right: people
    who are temporarily assigned--and this has been true for here
    and in Afghanistan for some time--they, under the caps, are
    counted differently, as you well know. And I can't go into it
    in detail here, where each and every unit is, but we do provide
    that to the committee and so you can have that, not in this
    setting.
        But to get to the substance of what you said about
    everybody--I will get the Chairman to comment on this too--
    everybody that is in Iraq is properly trained for the mission,
    that included the Marines there. And to force protection, that
    was, in fact, their mission.
        What they were doing was helping to protect the staging
    area near Makhmur, where we are and our coalition partners are
    helping the Iraqi Security Forces, some of the brigades that
    will constitute the envelopment force of Mosul. So that is part
    of the preparation for operations against Mosul, and precisely
    what they were doing was protecting that position.
        That was a necessary task. We are very sorry about the loss
    of this member in accomplishing that necessary task, but it was
    necessary because we needed to position them there. And these
    Iraqi Security Forces, who in the end will be the force that
    both takes and holds Mosul, they need to be trained, and they
    need to be positioned near Makhmur. That is what was going on
    there.
        Let me ask the Chairman if he wants to add anything.
        General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, to your specific question
    about have we compromised force protection or other critical
    capabilities as a result of the force cap, I can tell you we
    haven't done that. And I have routinely engaged Lieutenant
    General McFarland and commanders on the ground and asked them,
    is there something else you need? In fact, I will see General
    McFarland again this afternoon, have the same conversation with
    him.
        To date, we haven't had any requests that we have gone to
    the President with--and this is now over the last several
    months--for capabilities that has been denied. We are in the
    process right now of bringing forward recommendations for
    increased capability as a result of operations in Mosul, Raqqa,
    and elsewhere, so we can maintain a momentum and accelerate the
    campaign.
        But at this time, Chairman, I don't have concerns that we
    have not put forces on the ground that have impacted either our
    force protection, CASEVAC [casualty evacuation] capability, or
    any of those things. We build a force from the bottom up with
    those in mind.
        The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that, General.
        To me, it makes no sense to put artificial troop caps in
    any place. The question is, what does it take to do the
    mission? And I know, just as I trust you to continue to follow
    this question, it is something that the committee wants to
    continue to follow as well.
        Last question. General, you heard some of my comments
    earlier about the readiness issues. Let me just offer a handful
    of other quotes on the record. General Neller said our aviation
    units are currently unable to meet our training and mission
    requirements primarily due to ready basic aircraft shortfalls.
        General Milley and General Allen have testified, less than
    one-third of Army forces are at acceptable levels of readiness.
    The readiness of the United States Army is not at a level that
    is appropriate for what the American people would expect to
    defend them.
        Last week, Secretary James: Less than half our combat
    forces are ready for a high-end fight. And she later said: The
    Air Force is the smallest, oldest, and least-ready force across
    the full spectrum of operations in our history.
        Do you agree that we have a significant readiness problem
    across the services, especially for the wide variety of
    contingencies that we have got to face?
        General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I do. And I think those are
    accurate reflections of the force as a whole.
        From my perspective, there are really three issues: there
    are the resources necessary to address the readiness issue;
    there is time; and then there is the operational tempo. And the
    readiness challenges that we are experiencing right now are
    really a result of several years of unstable fiscal environment
    as well as extraordinarily high operational tempo. And it is
    going to take us some years to get out of the trough that we
    are in right now.
        What I am satisfied with in this year's budget, fiscal year
    2017, is that we have met the requirements from a fiscal
    perspective that the services have identified for readiness. In
    other words, we can't buy our way out of the problem in fiscal
    year 2017 with more money because of the aspect of time and
    operational tempo.
        I think the service chiefs probably also identified to you,
    Mr. Chairman, and the committee, that in the case of the Army,
    the Navy, and the Marine Corps, it will be sometime around
    fiscal year 2020 before they address their current readiness
    challenges. And the Air Force is projecting horizon as late as
    fiscal year 2028 before they come out of the challenge.
        And part of that is, again, operational tempo and resources
    and time. And some of it is what you saw in your recent visit
    down in the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing where depot-level
    maintenance has been backlogged. What you saw in the Marine
    Corps, I think, reflects in some part what you will see in all
    the services, perhaps not to the same degree as Marine
    aviation, but that same dynamic exists in each one of the
    services and reflects in the comments that you heard before the
    committee.
        The Chairman. I will just say, I think it is important for
    us and for you all to continue to not only watch this issue but
    really understand down deeper what is happening. Statistics are
    one thing, but you talk to these folks eyeball to eyeball and
    the sense of frustration and concern is very evident.
        Thank you for your answers. I yield to Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Again, thank you both for your extraordinary service to our
    country.
        I wanted to go back for a second to the questions that I
    raised in the opening statement because I think we grapple with
    that here. And I know that we are going to be talking about OCO
    funding down the line, overseas contingency, and the Bipartisan
    Budget Act as well.
        You stated, as you just did, equipment is one thing but
    well-trained personnel and leadership are quite another, and
    the latter do take time. And so we need to work this as best we
    can. In the statement I offered, what you have said quite, I
    think, clearly, that modernization and readiness of our force
    structure is where your tradeoffs are going in the budget
    process. And I am wondering, would the Department's tradeoff
    choices become harder or easier if OCO needs are supplemented
    by base budget requirements within bipartisan budget compliant
    top line? Is that helpful? What poses the greatest risk really
    to our national security, providing funding for base budget
    requirements at the level requested by the President or
    providing funding for near-term OCO requirements at least
    initially at levels lower than requested?
        One of the things that I was just going to say, Mr.
    Secretary, that I know you have said so well here is that under
    the best of all possible worlds, we would be funding the base
    budget at the level that we need, including OCO for very
    specific oversea contingencies. But that is not exactly where
    we are right now. And we have to be certain that other budget
    requirements, whether it is in the homeland security, whether
    it is in--wherever that may be are also working well within our
    budget as we move forward.
        Secretary Carter. Well, you are right: generally speaking,
    the base and the OCO budgets have different managerial
    purposes. The base budget is for things that are enduring,
    meeting enduring requirements, and OCO is for the variable
    costs associated with urgent ongoing operations. That is still
    largely true, but it is not completely true.
        And to get to your question, one of the ways that we were
    able to mitigate the difference between what we last year
    planned in our 2017 budget and what the bipartisan budget
    agreement provided us, was to use some OCO, about $5 billion
    net. And that is one of the things that bought down that risk
    associated with that difference, but it is only one way that we
    did that.
        We also benefitted, by the way, from fuel costs, different
    inflation indices than we expected. And what we did with the
    remaining--to get to your point of what do we do to accommodate
    the Bipartisan Budget Act, that $11 billion change, we took it
    out of some procurement accounts, some aircraft, and some
    smaller programs. We took it out of MILCON [military
    construction].
        Let me tell you what we didn't do to accommodate that
    difference between the BBA and what we planned on last year. We
    didn't take it out of military compensation, any of our service
    members' compensation. We didn't take it out of readiness, out
    of the readiness recovery plans that the Chairman has referred
    to. We didn't take it out of any of our major acquisition
    programs, stop any of them, break any multiyear contracts. And
    we didn't change any of our end-strength numbers, targets, as a
    result of that.
        So that is how we accommodated the $11 billion, and that is
    the reason why the Chairman and I say, that part we managed to
    mitigate and bring forward a budget that meets our needs. Our
    worry is in the future and with the $100 billion cuts that we
    face. And wherever they come from in the accounting, that is
    the biggest strategic risk to us.
        Mrs. Davis. General Dunford, did you want to----
        General Dunford. Congresswoman, the thing I would probably
    add is, you talked about modernization over force structure.
    And, frankly, this year, as we focused on capability
    enhancements, it was really as a result of 3 or 4 years of not
    addressing those and realizing that we were losing our
    competitive advantage against the peer competitors that I
    mentioned, the Russias, the Chinas, and even in this case of
    North Korea and Iran.
        And we knew, were we not to make those capability
    investments this year, if you look out 3 to 4 or 5 years, we
    would not be where we needed to be. So, from my perspective, it
    isn't so much force structure over modernization; it is trying
    to get within the top line that we have the right balance
    between force structure and capability in today's force, with
    sufficient investment in tomorrow's force to make sure that the
    force that we have today that I am proudly able to say is the
    best in the world is the best in the world in 2021 and 2022.
        And that is why I think the Secretary directed us this year
    to make a slight course and speed correction in terms of how we
    were investing our funds to get better balance between today's
    fight and tomorrow's fight.
        Mrs. Davis. Yeah. And I think, Mr. McCord, as well, I think
    what may be understandable in terms of the defense budget isn't
    necessarily understandable to folks that are looking at their
    budgets in other departments, and that is partly where the rub
    comes.
        Secretary McCord. I think that is correct, Mrs. Davis.
        And just one point on your earlier question. To get a
    marginal maybe increase in OCO this year without knowing if we
    could count on it in the future is pretty sub-optimal for us in
    terms of being able to plan and use that money as effectively
    as we might. If we knew that the requirement would be taken
    care of permanently, that is much better for us.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, I am going to take you in a different
    direction, totally different subject. I want to personally
    thank you and especially thank Secretary Robert Work. I spent
    13 years of my life trying to clear the names of two Marine
    pilots who crashed a V-22 Osprey in Marana, Arizona, on April 8
    of the year 2000.
        Secretary Carter, I want to thank Secretary Work publicly
    because he did something that I could not get the Marine Corps
    to do, and that is to look openly and evaluate the information
    that we had put together working with experts. Many of those
    were Marine pilots themselves. There were aeronautical
    engineers who came to the aid of saying that at the time, if
    you remember, that Secretary of Defense Cheney wanted to scrap
    the V-22 program. There was a lot of pressure. There was a lot
    of push by the Marine Corps to make sure that the V-22 was
    their plane for the future.
        When I reached out and found Secretary Work, he spent the
    time to meet with me and spent several hours, days, researching
    all the information that we had put together. A team of experts
    helped me to put it together. And then he came back with his
    evaluation that the record needed to be corrected, that it was
    unfair to Colonel John Brow, pilot, and Major Brooks Gruber,
    copilot, whose wife brought this to my attention in the year
    2002.
        And I want to say today that you have brought peace--
    Secretary Work and you--have brought peace to the families of
    John Brow and Brooks Gruber. And I believe sincerely that John
    Brow and Brooks Gruber are now resting in their graves, and
    they are resting peacefully because of what you and Secretary
    Work have done.
        This has gotten national attention. And I have talked to
    Trish Brow, and I have talked to Connie Gruber. They are
    hearing from marines who are now retired. They are hearing from
    friends from years passed who have said ``Hallelujah'' that now
    the truth is known and those two pilots will not take the blame
    for what was unfair at the time of the accident.
        So I want to thank you publicly and thank Deputy Secretary
    Robert Work, because the truth is now known that they were not
    responsible for that accident. It was a combination of many,
    many factors. So I will give you a chance to respond, and then
    I will yield back the balance of my time.
        Secretary Carter. Thank you so much. I appreciate you
    saying that. I am glad that the families are able to be at
    peace now, and I will pass that on to Secretary Work, my
    excellent Deputy Secretary. I am pleased to hear you say that
    about him, but I am not surprised.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you, sir.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I think you have an obligation, certainly a
    right, to respond to something that former Deputy Director of
    CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] said yesterday in response to
    a question. He said that ISIL is winning, and he said based on
    two assessments: one, although there is less caliphate
    territory, they seem to be spreading their influence beyond the
    caliphate territory; and then, of course, in direct reference
    to the attacks in Brussels.
        So I wanted to get your assessment about whether you think
    ISIL is winning, and if not, your assessment of the former
    Deputy Director of CIA's comments.
        Secretary Carter. I am not familiar with those comments.
        And as far as the campaign is concerned, I am confident
    that we will defeat ISIL and that we have the momentum of the
    campaign in Iraq and Syria. I gave you some of the details
    about that. And we are prepared to give you much more. We are
    doing more. We are actually looking to do yet more than that.
    And I am confident that that will result in the defeat of ISIL
    in Iraq and Syria. And as I said, that is necessary. It is not
    sufficient, as the attacks in Belgium suggest.
        And let me ask if the Chairman wants to add anything to
    that. But ISIL will be defeated. We have a strategy to do that.
    I am sorry the report hasn't gotten to you but will shortly,
    and I am confident that strategy will succeed.
        General Dunford. Congressman, first, I am not complacent
    about the threat of ISIL. And I recognize the spread of ISIL
    particularly over the last 15, 18 months transregionally or
    globally.
        With regard to Syria and Iraq, in October I appeared before
    the committee, and at that time, I think it was fair to say
    that ISIL had the momentum. Since that time, they not only have
    less territory, they have less resources. They have less
    freedom of movement. We have reduced the number of foreign
    fighters that are actually able to flow back and forth. And,
    frankly, I think their narrative is less effective than it was
    some months ago.
        But this is a long fight. And I am confident in telling you
    that we have the momentum today. I am also confident in the end
    state that Secretary Carter identified. But this morning was
    another reminder that there is a long fight ahead, and it will
    require not only the military effort to deny sanctuary to the
    enemy in Syria and Iraq, to limit their freedom of movement, to
    build the capacity of regional partners, which is what we are
    doing, but it will require a much greater cooperation amongst
    intelligence organizations from nations.
        There are over 100 nations that have foreign fighters in
    Syria and Iraq with over 30,000 foreign fighters. So the
    cooperation of all those countries and the intelligence
    organizations, law enforcement officials, as well as the
    military coalition that we put together in Iraq and Syria and
    conducting operations elsewhere, is all going to be critical.
    And it is going to take some time before we get there.
        But I am confident, at least today, that we have the
    momentum in Iraq and Syria. And we are increasingly taking
    actions outside of Iraq and Syria to make sure that we also
    keep pressure, as we have tried to keep pressure on Iraq, on
    the enemy simultaneously across both of those countries. It is
    going to be necessary that we do the same thing
    transregionally.
        Mr. Larsen. I am going to move to the budget and talk about
    taking the long view.
        Unfortunately for you, you don't get to be here for the
    implementation of the long view and to help us deal with the
    actual long view. And we have been having this debate a little
    bit, and Mrs. Davis touched upon it. And I am just wondering
    how you envision affording these incredibly expensive programs
    that we have outside, not just outside of this budget but
    outside of the 5 years and even 10. Nuclear modernization is
    one of those, but it is not the only one where we are going to
    be called upon, if we have the fortunate success of staying
    here, to resolve and solve.
        Secretary Carter. Well, we can afford all of those. We
    wouldn't have started them if we didn't think we could complete
    them. However, we are assuming when we do so that we will
    continue to have budget stability. If there is instability or
    sequester, as I said, and I think the Chairman just said, we
    are going to have to fundamentally reassess our ability to meet
    our needs, not only in the long run but in the short run.
        And you are right: it will be future Congresses and future
    administrations who carry that burden. I hope that they
    continue to give us budget stability as we have had now for 2
    years. That is what the country needs. That is what our
    Department needs. That is what, by the way, what every
    department trying to administer programs needs.
        But if we snap back to the sequester cuts, we are going to
    have to reconsider all of these programs. We need them and
    therefore we need the stability. Chairman.
        Mr. Larsen. That is fine. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Forbes.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you
    gentlemen for being here.
        General Dunford, it is always an honor to have the top
    uniformed officer in the United States before us, and so I am
    going to direct my questions to you since I only have 5
    minutes. And I would like to first ask you a question we have
    been asking all of our officers before us. Did you submit your
    written remarks to anyone for approval or review other than
    someone under your direct command before you had to come before
    us?
        General Dunford. Congressman, I did submit my remarks to
    the Office of Secretary of Defense as well as Office of
    Management and Budget. No changes were made in my written
    remarks as a result of that review.
        Mr. Forbes. Now, one of the things that I heard you just
    say in response to the chairman was you said that your
    readiness concerns were based on an unstable fiscal
    environment. And one of the concerns I always have, we wrestle
    within this committee, is simply this: when we look at whether
    strategy is driving the budget, the President's budget, or
    whether the President's budget is driving strategy, the
    question is, which one of them are predominant?
        Is it the strategy that is predominant in driving the
    President's budget, or is it the President's budget that is
    predominant in driving the strategy?
        General Dunford. Congressman, I think this year, it is fair
    to say that within the top line that we were given----
        Mr. Forbes. No. For the last several years, just as a rule,
    is it the strategy that is more predominant in driving the
    budget or the budget that is more predominant in driving the
    strategy?
        General Dunford. I would say if you go back to the last few
    years and particularly look at sequestration in 2013, the
    fiscal environment has had a bigger impact than the budget.
        Mr. Forbes. So, then, when we have constantly asked people
    that have come in here, many people from the Pentagon, saying
    that the budgets are in line with the strategy, then what you
    are saying is basically that it has been the budget that has
    been driving our strategy?
        General Dunford. Congressman, let me--if I can give you
    just a little bit of a nuanced answer, here what I am confident
    in saying. Today, we have a defense strategy that calls for us
    to defeat an enemy, to deny another adversary, to protect the
    homeland, as well as deal with violent extremism. I am
    confident in fiscal year 2017 that we will be able to do that--
    --
        Mr. Forbes. All right.
        General Dunford [continuing]. With risk.
        Mr. Forbes. Let me ask you this. And I don't mean to cut
    you off. I only have 3 minutes. I am looking at a document here
    that was signed by President Obama on January 3, 2012, for the
    Defense Guidance, and he says specifically in here: This
    guidance was requested to guide the spending over the coming
    decade. Then I have it signed on January 5, the Defense
    Guidance, by Secretary Panetta, and this is what over and over
    again people who have been coming in here pointing to and
    saying this has been directing their spending. And then we had,
    in 2014, the Quadrennial Defense Review. Over and over again,
    people have sat where you are sitting and have said that this
    has guided the spending of the Department of Defense.
        Has the Department of Defense been following the
    President's guidelines and been basing their spending on these
    two documents?
        General Dunford. We have, Congressman, but what we have
    been doing is living year to year and deferring modernization
    that is going to cause a build in the out years, so----
        Mr. Forbes. And I understand that. Now, let me ask you
    this, because these documents are based on certain assumptions.
    Did either of these two documents account for the rise of ISIL?
        General Dunford. They did not.
        Mr. Forbes. Did either of these two documents assume that
    U.S. forces will no longer be in Iraq and Afghanistan?
        General Dunford. They did not.
        Mr. Forbes. And, in fact, we do have forces still in Iraq
    and Afghanistan.
        Did either of these two documents assume that we would
    reset our relationship with Russia and that we would be able to
    cooperate with them?
        General Dunford. We did not foresee Russia's current
    actions in those documents.
        Mr. Forbes. So the assumptions made for these two documents
    were not correct with the Russians, right?
        General Dunford. With regard to Russia, that is correct.
        Mr. Forbes. Did either of these two documents account for
    China's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea?
        General Dunford. Not to the extent that we have seen it,
    Congressman.
        Mr. Forbes. Now, with that, wouldn't it be fair to say if
    the assumptions that these assumptions were based upon were
    invalid or wrong, that the strategy would also have been
    invalid or wrong?
        General Dunford. The strategy needs to be refined, and we
    are in the process of doing that. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Forbes. And, also, General Odierno, when I asked him
    that question right after these were put into place, he said:
    We struggle to even meet one major contingency operation. It
    depends on assumptions. And I believe some of the assumptions
    that were made are not good assumptions; they are unrealistic
    and very positive assumptions.
        Yet these are the two documents that helped guide the
    President's budget in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. So wouldn't
    it be fair, General, for us to say that, instead of just the
    unstable fiscal environment, that a big part of the reason we
    are in the current situation we are in is because the
    President's strategies were based on faulty assumptions?
        General Dunford. This year, Congressman, we----
        Mr. Forbes. I am talking about the last several years
    leading up to this. This year's budget is not putting us in the
    situation that the chairman talked about.
        General Dunford. If you are asking, did we foresee the
    current conflict with ISIL and Russia----
        Mr. Forbes. I am asking you, wouldn't it be fair to say
    that rather than just fiscal instability, that the reason we
    are in the problem is because of a faulty strategy?
        And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, and I
    yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to both witnesses for your service and your
    testimony today. I just have a couple quick questions.
        And, Secretary Carter, Admiral Stavridis, retired admiral,
    Under Secretary Stackley, Secretary Mabus have all appeared
    over the last couple of weeks, and we have talked about this
    question of the long view of the undersea fleet, which Admiral
    Harris and General Breedlove said at this point are kind of
    playing zone defense out there because of what is happening in
    the Pacific and the North Atlantic.
        Again, this is a good budget in terms of investing, as you
    point out, in shipbuilding or submarine building, but down the
    road, you know, there is a possibility that we are going to see
    a dip at probably the worst possible time. And so I guess the
    question is, do you agree that this is an issue that we need to
    work on, as Secretary Stackley has promised, so that we, again,
    are able to keep our eyes focused on the long view in terms of
    that emerging challenge?
        Secretary Carter. I do agree with that. Our undersea
    capability is a critical strength of the United States. We need
    to keep that strength and extend that strength. And I think the
    biggest issue we are going to face beginning in the 2020s is
    the beginning of the Ohio-class replacement, and that is the
    building, once again, of SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines]
    as well as attack submarines, SSNs, which we are doing today.
    And we have been stressing now for several years we are going
    to need some consideration of the need to recapitalize our
    undersea nuclear deterrent, because that can't be done at the
    expense of the rest of the undersea fleet or we will erode our
    dominance, so that is going to--that is a major issue that is
    looming in the 2020s.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And, again, we think--you know, we
    have found some ways to use different authorities, multiyear
    procurement, et cetera, to try and, again, maximize every
    efficiency to help in that effort. And, again, Secretary
    Stackley emphasized that when he appeared before the committee.
        I would like to shift gears for a second. First of all, I
    want to thank you for your comments regarding what happened in
    Brussels yesterday, and also noting that Brussels is actually
    the home of NATO, and, you know, there is a lot of work that
    takes place in that city which is extremely important in terms
    of our national defense. Yesterday, the frontrunner for the
    Republican nomination told the Washington Post, NATO was set up
    at a different time; I think NATO as a concept is good, but it
    is not as good as it was when it first evolved.
        In your testimony, I counted three instances--the fight
    against ISIL, the continuing efforts in Afghanistan, and also
    the European Reassurance Initiative--where NATO is absolutely
    at the center of our military strategy and operations. Is NATO
    relevant today? I mean, I guess we need to ask that question,
    given what is out there in the public domain.
        Secretary Carter. Well, let me begin by saying the
    following, and I have said this before, and I am going to say
    this again and again in the course of the year: I recognize
    that this is an election year. I will not speak to anything
    that is in the Presidential debate. I believe that our
    Department has a tradition of standing apart, and I very much
    value and respect that tradition, and so I am going to, with
    great respect, decline to answer any question that is framed in
    those terms and, by the way, also not have General Dunford or
    any of our, especially of our uniformed officers----
        Mr. Courtney. So I agree, and I respect that. And I guess
    the question I would ask, then, is that the European
    Reassurance Initiative, that funding, again, is going to flow
    through the NATO structure. I mean, that is not a, you know----
        Secretary Carter. It is. It is. It is. And securing our
    NATO partners from particularly Russian aggression is the
    principal purpose of the European Reassurance Initiative.
        With respect to the counter-ISIL fight, the NATO allies as
    individual countries are members of the coalition. The question
    has arisen whether NATO as a group should also be a member of
    the coalition, and that is being discussed right now with NATO.
    The reason for that being that NATO has some force generation
    capabilities that no individual country has, and that is the
    reason why the question arises whether it can play a role in
    the counter-ISIL fight.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you for those answers.
        The Chairman. Mr. Miller.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dunford, looking back at the 2012-2014 Strategic
    Guidance and Defense Reviews, what specifically has changed in
    the geopolitical world? And based on those changes, is it safe
    to say that we need to look at--following on what Mr. Forbes
    said--recalibration or resizing of our current forces?
        General Dunford. Congressman, thanks. I would say that the
    most significant changes: one has been Russia; two has been the
    rise of ISIL. We talked about the behavior of China in the
    South China Sea, and certainly the capability development of
    North Korea have all been a concern. Iran remains a concern,
    but, quite frankly, the trajectory that they have been on was
    predictable even as those strategy documents were written, and
    so I think we accounted for Iran; but in the four other areas,
    we have seen either capability development or behavior or a
    combination of the two that have significantly changed the
    operating environment over the last few years.
        Mr. Miller. And I do think it is important that the
    American people understand the guidance that was used to set
    the size and shape of the force, and the current guidance, as
    you have already stated, said to defeat a regional adversary
    and deny another aggressor in the another region. However, in
    your written statement, you stated that, quote, ``The joint
    force will be challenged to respond to a major written
    contingency,'' unquote, and that, quote, ``Capability and
    capacity shortfalls would be particularly acute if the force
    were called to respond to a second contingency on an
    overlapping timeline.''
        So I would think that this might suggest that there is a
    significant risk that the joint force wouldn't even be able to
    execute a single major contingency operation. Is that true?
        General Dunford. Congressman, our assessment is we can meet
    the requirements of a single contingency. There is significant
    risk in our ability to do that, certain capability areas would
    be particularly stressed, but we can accomplish the objectives,
    albeit with much more time and probably casualties than we
    would like.
        Mr. Miller. The guidance calls for sufficient forces to
    execute, as you just said, two contingency operations,
    defeating one aggressor and denying the other. So, you know, if
    you put it in a real world scenario, could the current force
    today defeat a North Korea and deny Russia while at the same
    time defending the homeland?
        General Dunford. Congressman, we would be challenged to do
    those three things. Our assessment is we can do that, again,
    but it would take more time, particularly in the case of North
    Korea. It would take more time, and we would see more
    casualties than we would want to have.
        Mr. Miller. So the Department has cut the end strength and
    the force structure on the assumption that it did have the
    sufficient forces to carry out the assumptions that are there.
    So, given the current strategic environment, will the
    Department need to revisit the force size and guidance?
        General Dunford. Congressman, just to be clear, in terms of
    cutting force structure, my perspective is, you know, force
    structure is one element, but what is most important is that
    the force structure that we have has the proper resourcing to
    be well trained and well equipped. And so what I believe we
    have done inside the budget is we have got the force structure
    that is affordable within the top line that we have, and we can
    achieve the balance between the training, the resourcing, the
    modernization, the infrastructure support, and the force
    structure, all those things have to be combined. And so, you
    know, my assessment is that we are trying to get the balance
    right as opposed to saying that the current force structure is
    absolutely the best force structure we could have.
        Mr. Miller. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas.
        Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And welcome to our guests. It is always good to have you
    before us. And I think today's tragic events in Brussels really
    are a stark reminder of the many challenges that you all deal
    with every day and that we are here to support you with. And I
    especially appreciated both your comments on the need for
    budget stability as you deal with the challenges of today, but
    also with the need to look forward, because as we all know, and
    I remember a previous chairman, Ike Skelton, always commenting
    upon, that we plan for today but we never quite know where the
    next challenge is going to come from. And in the world we live
    in today, it is clear that they can come from many, many
    different places.
        But, Secretary Carter, I also wanted to thank you for the
    emphasis that you have placed in this year's budget on research
    and development, really knowing that it is key to maintaining
    our technological edge, that in this rapidly changing
    environment, we have got to maintain our investments. And as
    many on the committee know, defense-related research and
    development has faced a disproportionately large cut over the
    past several years, far more than has been required under the
    Budget Control Act. So I was especially encouraged to see that
    the Department will be investing in two new facilities at MIT's
    [Massachusetts Institute of Technology's] Lincoln Lab. As you
    know, the lab has provided the Department with breakthrough
    advancements for decades, and I thank you for your support of
    the lab's revitalization and the important role that it plays
    in the Massachusetts innovation ecosystem. It is part of
    something much larger.
        But I would like to turn to the issue of sexual assault
    prevention and response in the military. I have been troubled
    by a number of stories, including a series in the AP
    [Associated Press] and recent stories in the Washington Post,
    about senior officer sexual assault cases, which have called
    into question the transparency of the military justice system
    and the services' willingness to pursue allegations against
    officers. I understand that the Military Justice Review Group's
    proposal that was shared with this committee by the Department
    gives the Department 2 years to come up with a design for an
    online system of tracking cases and 2 years to implement that
    system. And I would encourage the Department to work with all
    speed to make the military justice system as transparent as
    possible. And I hope the Department will make the system open
    to survivors and the public as you move ahead.
        But we have all heard the troubling accounts of victims of
    military sexual assault who are later retaliated against, those
    who seek recourse through the system of justice. Some 62
    percent of victims have experienced social or professional
    retaliation, according to the Department's own survey data. And
    I have also read the Judicial Proceedings Panel recommendation
    to implement a standard retaliation reporting form. It is
    imperative to me that the Department track these incidents and
    hold those responsible accountable. It is key to maintaining
    the unit cohesion and all that is part of readiness as well.
        So my questions are, Secretary Carter, what is the
    Department doing to ensure service members who report sexual
    assault aren't retaliated against?
        Secretary Carter. Thank you very much for that question.
    And sexual assault is unacceptable anywhere in society, but it
    is particularly unacceptable in our military, and the reason is
    this: the profession of arms is based upon trust, and it is
    based upon honor, and sexual assault erodes both honor and
    trust and, for that reason, is completely unacceptable at any
    level.
        Moreover, to get to your point, as we study that question
    more and take more action--and I am not happy that there is
    sexual assault in the military, I am very pleased that we are
    taking it on frontally, and we need to do that, and we need to
    learn how to do better. The two issues you raised are places
    where we are learning how to do better. Retaliation, for
    example, was something that I don't think--I think it is fair
    to say in our department, we did not appreciate the importance
    of that phenomenon until the last couple of years, and so we
    are having to take that on board. Retaliation creates
    additional victims to the victim of the sexual assault, and
    this can be peers, and it can be others who are part of giving
    the victim their care, their right--the options and the
    response that they deserve, and so it is an important new
    ingredient, and we are trying to get on top of that.
        And, finally, with respect to transparency, we are
    committed to that. You are right, we have made a commitment to
    you about greater transparency in this matter, and I intend for
    us to carry that through. Thank you for raising that.
        Ms. Tsongas. Thank you. I have run out of time. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being
    here today.
        With the attacks in Brussels, it is another reminder we are
    in a global war on terrorism, and it is continuing. And I just
    want you to know that I have faith in you, and we are counting
    on you to protect American families. And part of that is not
    forgetting 9/11. This is a continuing war; we will be in it for
    quite a while, but your service I know I appreciate as a
    grateful dad of four sons who have served in the military under
    you all's command.
        General Dunford, as Chairman Thornberry has mentioned, we
    have serious concerns about the state of the Marine Corps
    aviation. Marine Corps aviators and maintainers at the Marine
    Corps Air Station in Beaufort, South Carolina, tell us how they
    have had to cannibalize parts from museum aircraft to get their
    current fleet in the air. They don't have the parts. They don't
    have the people. They are not getting the training.
    Furthermore, General Robert Neller has testified that there
    aren't enough aircraft to even meet our training and mission
    requirements. I am very concerned that if they had to deploy
    tomorrow, they would be sent into a fight unprepared and ill
    equipped.
        How are we addressing this potential reality of an
    inability to respond to near-peer adversary or multi-adversary
    engagement? Beyond Marine Corps aviation, what else is at risk?
        Secretary Carter. Before you answer that, can I just thank
    you very much. I acknowledge your comments. And especially
    thank you for your contribution of your sons. Thank you,
    Congressman.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, again, hey, we are in this together, but
    the American people need to know it is a global war on
    terrorism;
    9/11 must not be forgotten. So thank you.
        General Dunford. Congressman, quickly, go back to how we
    got in the position we are in with Marine aviation, as well as,
    frankly, as I mentioned, across the joint force, there are
    similar stories that I could point out. Part of it was deferred
    modernization, so we are flying aircraft now that are very old.
    Part of it was, back in 2013, we went through sequestration. We
    had a backlog of depot-level maintenance that has caused the
    availability of ready basic aircraft and so forth. So these
    issues exist throughout the joint force. And part of what we
    are arguing for now is stability in funding, managing the
    operational tempo, and getting the appropriate resources is
    going to be what we need to get out of this trough, and it is
    going to take some years before we are able to do that.
        Mr. Wilson. And we will be working with you.
        And, Secretary Carter, last week, Admiral John Richardson
    testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee [SASC]
    that Iran had violated international law earlier this year by
    boarding sovereign U.S. vessels, detaining 10 U.S. sailors, and
    seizing an estimated 13,000 pages worth of information from
    laptops, GPS [Global Positioning System] devices, and maps.
        Would you agree with Admiral Richardson's assessment? If
    so, would you please let us know what subsequent action has
    been taken to rectify this brazen defiance of international
    law?
        Secretary Carter. I absolutely agree with Admiral
    Richardson. The actions of the Iranians with respect to our
    sailors was unprofessional; it was outrageous. And I just
    caution you all, since Admiral Richardson is looking into the
    circumstances of this matter, but when you see something on
    television, you are looking through the lens of Iranian TV and
    Iranian propaganda. Those sailors didn't deserve that. That
    is--we would never treat people in that manner. And to get to
    your question, I can't say much about it, but at the time, we
    were preparing to protect our people as soon as they were
    seized, and we only stood down that effort when we were assured
    that they were going to be returned to us safely, but it was
    outrageous treatment. I think Admiral Richardson has stressed
    that, and I would second that, but also I want to commend him
    on the treatment of the sailors. They are back home. The Navy
    did what it needed to do, which is, first of all, take care of
    their health and welfare, and is now learning the full
    circumstances of that.
        He has not completed his review of that, so I don't know
    what his consequences are from that, but this much we know,
    which is that is not behavior that we would have exhibited in
    the reverse circumstance.
        Mr. Wilson. I also want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for
    your efforts to promote public-private cooperation in
    cybersecurity, but a challenge we have is recruiting and
    training. What are we doing to prepare for the continuing cyber
    war?
        Secretary Carter. Well, thank you for that question. You
    are absolutely right. The critical thing in cyber is people,
    good people. We are spending more money on it, we are making
    big investments in it, but that is not the key. The key is, are
    we able to get the good people to flesh out our 133 cyber
    mission force teams, which, as you know, is what we are
    building up at CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] and all the other
    service components. The key is people. And we are doing better
    at attracting and retaining skilled technical people. I will be
    up at a physics class at West Point, as it happens, tomorrow,
    seeing some of our wonderful people who are being technically
    trained in their cyber center there. But, in addition, let me
    say that building bridges, which I am trying to do, we are all
    trying to do, between our department and the technology
    community is critical.
        Historically, the United States has drawn upon the great
    strength of this Nation, whether it is satellites or missiles
    or the Internet itself, and we need to keep doing that, and I
    am committed to doing that, because that is part of the future.
        And the last thing I will say is just a pitch for the role
    of the National Guard and Reserve Component in this regard. I
    was up in Washington State a couple of weeks ago. There is a
    Reserve unit up there that consists of people who work at
    topnotch companies like Microsoft all day on network defense,
    and then, in their Guard duty, they are defending our networks.
    It doesn't get any better than that, a citizen soldier coming
    in in cyber.
        So there are lots of ways we are trying to make sure we
    have good people, but we are able to, but that is the key, is
    good people in cyber.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Takai.
        Mr. Takai. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Carter, I would like to talk about the Rim of the
    Pacific exercises, or RIMPAC. In your letter last year to
    Senators McCain and Reid, you stated that you believe that
    China's participation in RIMPAC would advance cooperative
    approaches to common security challenges, increase transparency
    and mutual understanding, and integrate China into a
    cooperative forum. You also say that you may modify our defense
    engagement decisions based on evolving circumstances.
        My question is, have you recently evaluated China, and have
    you made any changes to the invitation to the PLA [People's
    Liberation Army] navy to participate in this year's RIMPAC?
        Secretary Carter. We are constantly evaluating our
    relationship with China and China's behavior, including in the
    South China Sea, where I emphasize we have very serious
    concerns about their aggressive militarization there.
        They have an invitation to RIMPAC, and we will continue to
    review that, but you might say, what is the logic for having
    them there in the first place? Our strategy in the Asia-Pacific
    is not to exclude anyone, but to keep the security architecture
    going there in which everyone participates, and that is what
    has led over 50 years to the rise of Japan, then South Korea,
    then Taiwan, then Southeast Asia, and now, yes, China and
    India. We are not excluding China from that security
    architecture, in which America plays the pivotal role, and we
    intend to keep playing that pivotal role. That is what the
    rebalance is all about.
        China is, however, self-isolating. Its behavior is
    isolating itself in the region. That is why all these partners
    are coming to us and saying: Can you do more with us? So not
    just big exercises with lots of parties, like RIMPAC, but we
    have the Japanese investing more, the Australians investing
    more, the Philippines just inviting us, once again, to work
    with them more closely, even Vietnam, India. So Chinese
    behavior is self-isolating and driving many countries to want
    to do more with us and are doing more with us, but that is not
    the way China is going to continue to benefit, as it has now
    for several decades, from the security system and the open
    system that we, the United States, have underwritten now for
    many decades.
        Mr. Takai. Okay. So if China builds a runway on Scarborough
    Shoal reef, PACOM [Pacific Command] Commander Admiral Harris
    assesses that Beijing will have total access across the South
    China Seas.
        Secretary Carter, is China conducting or preparing to
    conduct reclamation at the Scarborough Shoals, which is only
    120 miles from Subic Bay in the Philippines where our Navy
    regularly operates? And would you say that this behavior is
    consistent with U.S. objectives and the regional security
    environment?
        Secretary Carter. Well, Congressman, we are concerned about
    that prospect. And is it consistent? No, it is not consistent.
    It is the kind of behavior that we will react to in our own
    military posture and deployments, and all the regional partners
    will react to. So it will be self-defeating and self-isolating
    for China, so I hope they don't do that, but we are prepared
    for that eventuality should it occur. But, no, it is not a good
    thing for them to do that, and they shouldn't.
        And by the way, I would just say just to be fair about it,
    that our policy is that no one ought to be militarizing these
    features. There are these disputes over maritime claims in the
    South China Sea. Our view isn't to take sides on them. Our view
    is that everybody ought to resolve those peacefully and not
    militarize those features, China and anyone else who has done
    that, but China has done it far more than anybody else.
        Mr. Takai. Thank you. And I do agree, it is not consistent
    with U.S. objectives, and like you say, no one should be
    militarizing that area.
        So my question, then, is why, then, should we reward China
    with their aggressive behavior by including them in an event
    meant for allies and partners? China's behavior is the polar
    opposite, as you mentioned, of U.S. objectives in the region,
    and that is why I submitted a proposal to the NDAA [National
    Defense Authorization Act] that would prohibit China's
    participation in RIMPAC this year. I hope you and your
    department will reassess this situation and follow suit. Do you
    have any comment? Briefly. We have 10 seconds.
        Secretary Carter. No. We are constantly reassessing that. I
    gave you the logic for the invitation in the first place and
    will continue to reassess it in accordance with your letter.
        Mr. Takai. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Last week, General Milley stated before the committee,
    quote, that less than one-third of the Army forces are at
    acceptable readiness levels to conduct sustained ground combat
    in a full-spectrum environment against a highly lethal hybrid
    threat or near-peer adversary. Obviously, this statistic is
    undoubtedly alarming and illustrates that the risk associated
    with a less-than-ready military force is unacceptable.
        All too often, we speak about military risk in terms of
    numbers and percentages as opposed to more real and tangible
    consequences. When asked a similar question last year about
    risk, then Chief of Staff, Army, General Ray Odierno, made
    clear that direct correlation existed between increased risk
    and loss of lives on the battlefield. Quite plainly, Odierno
    stated that people would die. While I apologize for my
    frankness, it is critically important that our colleagues in
    Congress and the general public clearly understand what is
    meant when you say ``risk.'' We are currently in the throes of
    our debate on the budget, and there are those who continue to
    say: We can accept increased risks; we can lower the costs; we
    can continue to accept sequestration or cuts.
        General Dunford, would you please help us better understand
    what you mean when you say ``risk''? Is there a direct
    correlation between risk and loss of lives on the battlefield?
    And, also, is there a direct correlation between risk and
    winning, knowing that we now have issues with Russia, China,
    North Korea, and certainly ISIS? Could you give us an
    understanding of how the word ``risk'' translates?
        General Dunford. Congressman, I can. First of all, there is
    a correlation between risk and casualties. And when I talk
    about risk against our objectives, I am talking about how long
    it will take and how many casualties we will suffer. Those are
    the two elements of risk that I refer to.
        You mentioned sequestration, and I will tell you what the
    risk of sequestration is. The risk of sequestration--and I am
    talking now the $100 billion that still looms out there--means
    that we would have to go back and actually rewrite our
    strategy, and I am talking about the ends of our strategy. So
    when you talk about winning, there is a correlation also
    between our ability to win against the current adversaries that
    we have identified, the peer competitors that we have
    identified, and sequestration. And my assessment is that we
    will not be able to deal with the five challenges that
    Secretary Carter and I outlined in our opening remarks, the
    Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and violent extremism. Were
    we to go to sequester-level funding, I can't imagine us being
    able to satisfactorily deal with those five challenges and, by
    the way, the challenges that we can't foresee.
        Mr. Turner. Secretary Carter, when you were here last year,
    one of the things that you said was that it would be so
    important to get a 2-year budget deal. Many of us in Congress,
    including myself, who voted for it, believed we had a 2-year
    budget deal. We believed that we would be looking this year at
    the budgetary process with a fairly firm 574 commitment to base
    budget funding, which would result in stopping the cuts that
    the Department of Defense has been put to, but when we received
    the President's budget, the President indicated that there were
    increased overseas contingency operations funding that he would
    need for his operations, $3.4 billion for Europe, additional
    dollars for ISIS. And rather than putting those on top, meaning
    that they are additional things that the President would need
    to do, he took that out of the base funding of the Department
    of Defense. Now, we are having in Congress the debate putting
    those dollars back. And, again, it was unexpected, because that
    was not part of the 2-year budget deal that you advocated for
    and that we voted for and that we all thought we were operating
    under.
        Could you please tell us what the consequences are of the
    cuts that will happen to the base budget of the Department of
    Defense if we accept the President's budget, because clearly
    there are things that you are going to have to not do that you
    will get to do if we put that money back.
        Secretary Carter. Well, the President's budget reflects the
    bipartisan budget agreement. The numbers in the budget are the
    numbers in the BBA.
        Mr. Turner. Secretary Carter, I know you know that we
    completely disagree with you. I mean, Congress' expectation is
    that you had a base budget of 574. I don't think you would have
    supported a 2-year budget deal that would have had a cut to the
    base budget in year 2017. And my question is not really, what
    is the deal? My question is, what are you losing? Because you
    are obviously losing something from 574 with the reduction that
    the President has taken of about $13 billion out of the base
    budget for OCO operations.
        Secretary Carter. We are going to have to agree to disagree
    about that, about whether we budgeted to BBA, because we
    believe we did. However, to answer what I gather is part of
    your question, namely what did we do about the difference
    between what we said last year we intended to request this year
    and what we requested this year. I addressed that earlier. That
    was a $22 billion difference that, because of OCO and some
    other economic adjustments that went our way, like fuel prices
    and so forth, ended up being a net of $11 billion. And I
    explained exactly what we did to adjust and mitigate risk
    associated with that $11 billion. We cut a lot of minor
    procurement programs. We scaled back some of our aircraft buys.
    We took it out of MILCON. That is how we accommodated the $11
    billion. We can tell you in detail how that was done.
        And I also explained what we didn't do. We didn't go into
    military pay to make up that difference. We didn't go into the
    readiness recovery plans that the Chairman has described and
    that are so critical to restore our readiness, including full-
    spectrum readiness for the Army and the other services. We
    didn't cancel any multiyear procurements or other major
    acquisition programs. And we didn't change any of our force
    structure targets, number of ships, Army end strength, or
    anything like that. We did what we did. We have described what
    it is. We believe that we were able to mitigate that risk, and
    that is what we did.
        Our biggest risk going forward--I will just say it again;
    we have said it many times--the biggest risk to us
    strategically in our defense is a return to sequestration, a
    collapse of the bipartisan budget agreement, and that is our
    biggest concern.
        The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, last week, we were able to listen to
    testimony from Acting Secretary of the Army Murphy and General
    Milley. And Secretary Murphy said, to continue this line of
    questioning on risk begun by Mr. Turner, said something to the
    effect of this budget places the Army at high risk. And prior
    to that, General Milley had made that connection explicit
    between risk and the loss of the service members' lives who we
    will put in harm's way. We reduce risk, we reduce that loss of
    life. So there couldn't be anything more serious or grave for
    us to make a decision on.
        My question for you is, is that level of risk comparable in
    the other service branches? And what is your guidance to us as
    a committee going into the NDAA as a Congress that might look
    in the near future at supplemental funding to further mitigate
    that risk in this upcoming budget year?
        Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, let me completely
    associate myself with what Acting Secretary Murphy and General
    Milley said. That is our highest priority for the Army in this
    budget, is readiness. They both made that clear, I concurred in
    that, and that is why the Army's readiness recovery plan is
    fully funded in the budget.
        Now, what does that consist of? It gets back to the
    question earlier about full spectrum. In order to recover full
    spectrum--remember where we are coming from here is an Army
    that was working extremely hard in Iraq and Afghanistan to meet
    the rotational needs of a counterinsurgency battle, and they
    were being trained for that. Now they are trying to restore
    their training to full spectrum for the other problems that we
    highlighted among the five that we are highlighting in this
    budget. To do that, they need to pass through their training
    ranges, and those high-level training ranges have a certain
    capacity. We are building that capacity, but it is going to
    take some time for them to come out of it. And it is not going
    to just take time; it is going to take budget stability. That
    is why I keep coming back to the need for budget stability.
        And then the last thing in your question, the other
    services have comparable readiness issues. They are all
    different, but they are comparable in the following sense: all
    are trying to make long-term plans to get better in readiness.
    In the Marine Corps, it is particularly aviation, as the
    Chairman has pointed out. In the Navy, it is principally a
    maintenance issue, and they are working very hard on that. In
    the Air Force, it is, very importantly, and I think the Air
    Force leadership has indicated this and the chairman mentioned
    this as well, the very high OPTEMPO [operational tempo]. The
    Air Force is trying to train for high readiness. At the same
    time, we are working them very hard in the counter-ISIL fight
    and elsewhere. So it is a little bit different in each service,
    but there is a challenge in each case, and that challenge--and
    we have plans to improve readiness, but they can't be executed
    if we are returned to budget--to sequester levels.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Let me ask two followup questions to clarify.
    One, are we doing all we can do within this budget request to
    mitigate that risk? If not, what do we need to do? I would be
    happy to join my colleagues and you in making the necessary
    changes too. My understanding is that risk is a term of art in
    terms of what the service chief submits to the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs. And what I would like to know, is what we heard
    from the Acting Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army
    reflected in the other service branches? Yes or no, if we have
    less risk in those others, are there more resources to pull to
    address the high risk, which I understand is a term of art,
    that was disclosed to us in the hearing last week?
        Secretary Carter. Well, with respect to the first part, we
    have in this budget for 2017 done everything that the Army
    wanted to do. I completely support them to get on the path to
    restoring readiness. It can't be done overnight----
        Mr. O'Rourke. This is as much as we can do.
        Secretary Carter [continuing]. As I described. And so it is
    not a money issue. It is a money stability issue for the Army,
    and we have got to have that.
        And with respect to, ``does that translate into risk,''
    yes. Does it translate into risk for the other services? Yes,
    it does. And is that reflected in how the Chairman and I and
    the rest of the Joint Chiefs and the service secretaries deal
    with risk in each service contribution to joint war plans and
    across joint war plans? Absolutely, it does.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you. I am out of time.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, what priority do you assign to the
    Department's nuclear deterrence mission?
        Secretary Carter. It is the bedrock of our defense. It is
    not in the news every day, thank goodness, but it is the
    bedrock of our defense. So having a safe, secure, and reliable
    nuclear deterrent is bedrock priority, and we give it the
    highest priority, and that is both in operating the force
    currently, and the subject was raised earlier about the need to
    keep a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The
    particular issue being raised was the submarine force. In the
    future, we will change out the Ohio for the Ohio-class
    replacement. That is a necessary evolution. It is a very
    expensive evolution, but we have to do it, because we have to
    retain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear force as a bedrock.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, that leads me to my second question. Do
    you see the recapitalization of the nuclear deterrent as
    affordable in this budget environment?
        Secretary Carter. As I said earlier, particularly you can
    see it right now that the submarine recapitalization in the
    decades of the 2020s cannot be taken out of the rest of the
    Navy's shipbuilding budget without seriously crippling that
    shipbuilding budget. So we are going to need to make room for
    that. We have been saying that now for several years. You can
    see it. It gets nearer every year, but sure as shooting, we
    have to do that, and the reason is that the Trident submarines
    are aging out. It has to do with the stress on the hulls of
    submerging and coming up so many times. And they are going to
    have to be replaced. And that is the survivable part of our
    triad. It is absolutely essential. We are going to need to
    recapitalize it.
        Mr. Rogers. Great.
        General Dunford, are the Joint Chiefs convinced and
    unanimous that we must modernize the triad?
        General Dunford. Congressman, I am. I have not talked to
    the current group of Chiefs collectively, but previously, when
    I was the Commandant of the Marine Corps and we met with
    General Dempsey, my predecessor, the Joint Chiefs unanimously
    subscribed to modernization of the triad.
        Mr. Rogers. Great.
        General, your predecessor undertook an assessment of the
    Russian violation of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear
    Forces] Treaty. He concluded it posed a risk to the United
    States itself as well as to the security of our allies in
    Europe. Do you agree?
        General Dunford. I do, Congressman. In fact, it reflected
    in the budget our capabilities to deal with just that threat.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, we have been waiting over a year to be
    briefed on the military options that you have in response to
    that. Can you assure me we will get that for my staff, me and
    the ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, within
    the next 3 or 4 weeks?
        General Dunford. Congressman, I or my staff will come over
    and see you soonest.
        Mr. Rogers. I would appreciate that.
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time
    to my friend and colleague from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.
        Mr. Kline. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        General Dunford, a couple of years ago, I was in
    Afghanistan, and you were the senior American commander there,
    and we had significantly more than 10,000 U.S. forces. In
    January, I was back in Afghanistan, and General Campbell was
    the commander there, and it was operating under a force
    management level of 9,800 troops. Now General Nicholson is on
    the ground there, and he is currently undertaking a review of
    the situation there to make his recommendations.
        If he were to come back after completing his review with a
    recommendation to change the force management level--I don't
    know who invented that term, by the way, but it bothers me a
    lot, because it is a strategy by political numbers--but if he
    were to come back and say, ``We need to increase that FML by
    some unspecified number, 1,000, 2,000 or something like that,''
    and if he were to come back and say, ``We need to lift the
    restrictions that we are operating under that says I can't
    train and advise and assist below the Afghan corps level,'' and
    if he were to come back and say, ``I need the authority to
    unilaterally target the Taliban and the Haqqani network,''
    would you support those recommendations going to the President?
        General Dunford. Congressman, first of all, General
    Nicholson is going to provide recommendations, and I know what
    the President has articulated as the end state, and I can
    assure you my recommendation, which will forward any
    recommendation that General Nicholson will make, will be
    benchmarked against my assessment of our ability to meet our
    objectives. That is exactly what I did when I was a commander
    on the ground and exactly what I would do in my current
    position.
        Mr. Kline. So you don't know whether or not you would
    support General Nicholson's recommendations if he came back
    with those that I just suggested?
        General Dunford. What I would make clear to the President
    in making a recommendation is whatever capabilities I believe
    are necessary, and I can't speculate as to whether General
    Nicholson will ask for an increase right now, Congressman, but
    what I would say is if he came in and said, ``These are the
    capabilities we need to accomplish the mission,'' and I agreed
    with General Nicholson's assessment, I would forward to the
    Secretary a recommendation that would include whatever
    capabilities are necessary for us to achieve the end state. Of
    that, I am clear.
        Mr. Kline. Thank you. My time has expired.
        Secretary Carter. Let me just second that.
        Mr. Kline. Thank you.
        Secretary Carter. That is the way it works.
        The Chairman. Ms. Gabbard.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning and for
    your service.
        Secretary Carter and General Dunford, both of you talked
    about the threat of North Korea in your opening remarks. And I
    appreciate your leadership in maintaining the Department's
    focus both on current and emerging threats in the Asia-Pacific.
    I think North Korea's launch of their short-range missiles
    demonstrated just yesterday how serious and important this
    threat is, which must remain at the forefront as we look at how
    and where we are placing and investing our defense resources.
    Obviously, representing Hawaii, this is something that we are
    keenly aware of, as the threat from North Korea continues with
    their increased capabilities, as well as people on the West
    Coast who find themselves within range of their ICBMs
    [intercontinental ballistic missiles].
        Secretary Carter, you discussed the ongoing consultations
    with South Korea's hosting a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense] system. Can you give us an update on those talks and
    can you also share the Department's commitment to continuing to
    increase and enhance our missile defense capabilities of the
    homeland? In particular, in Hawaii we have a test site for the
    Aegis Ashore at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, and I and
    others here on the committee are pushing toward
    operationalizing that to increase that protection.
        Secretary Carter. Well, thank you. And thank you for the
    role that the Hawaiian facilities do play in allowing us to
    develop and test our missile defenses. And we are doing a
    number of things to react to and protect ourselves and our
    people from the North Korean missile threat.
        Let me just back up a minute and say, you know, I talked
    about ``fight tonight'' on the Korean peninsula. We are
    absolutely committed to that. The Chairman and I pay attention
    to that every day. Again, that is not something that is in the
    newspapers every day, but our contribution to the defense of
    South Korea is very, very important and rock solid.
        On the missile defense front, we are doing things at all
    ranges. You mentioned Aegis Ashore, THAAD. And just to answer
    your question about THAAD on the Korean Peninsula, we are
    discussing that with the Koreans; we have an agreement in
    principle to do that. And I should say the reason for that, the
    reason for that is to be able to protect the entirety of the
    peninsula against North Korean missiles of greater range. That
    is why we want to add THAAD to what already exists there, which
    is Patriot, both South Korean and U.S. Patriot.
        Finally, to the homeland, it is with the possibility of
    North Korea having the capability to range the United States
    with ICBMs that we began several years ago to increase both the
    number of our ground-based interceptor system and also its
    capability. So we are increasing the number of those
    interceptors from 30 to 44. We are improving the kill vehicle
    on the front end, and we are adding radars to that. So we are
    doing a great deal. But, unfortunately, we have to, because we
    see, as you mentioned yesterday, the action of North Korea.
        Let me see if the Chairman wants to add anything to that.
        Ms. Gabbard. I would like to shift to both of your comments
    as well with regard to Ukraine and Russia. Much of the $3.4
    billion for the European Reassurance Initiative goes towards
    military funding and training and so on and so forth. In
    particular in the Ukraine, obviously, there are many challenges
    that they are facing kind of in their whole of government, but
    specifically within the military, we have seen time and time
    again how there is no tank-to-tank competition possible as
    Ukraine faces different threats coming from Russia. But can you
    speak to what kind of training we are assisting them with with
    regards to unconventional or special forces tactics and
    guerilla warfare, which can take a toll on what Russia is doing
    there?
        Secretary Carter. We are doing that. That is part of the
    support that we give to the Ukrainian forces, both against what
    you might call symmetrical or traditional kinds of combat
    operations, and also helping them with this unique brand, but I
    am afraid to say a here-to-stay brand of hybrid warfare that we
    have seen in Eastern Ukraine.
        Let me ask the Chairman to elaborate.
        General Dunford. Congressman, on that issue specifically,
    we have currently five conventional Ukrainian battalions going
    through training and one special operations unit going through
    training. Their training cycle will complete in September. I
    recently received an update probably assessed as some of the
    best, most effective training we have provided to the
    Ukrainians to date, and that is both the Ukrainian and U.S.
    perspective. Much of that training is informed by Russian
    behavior over the last few years and lessons learned in terms
    of integrating unconventional warfare, information operations,
    cyber capabilities, conventional capabilities. So I believe we
    are addressing that in our training program right now that is
    taking place with Ukrainian forces. And this is Ministry of
    Defense forces. Heretofore, we had trained just Ministry of
    Interior forces. This is the first cycle now of Ministry of
    Defense forces trained in these areas.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. General Austin,
    CENTCOM [Central Command] commander, said to the Senate Armed
    Services Committee that additional capabilities are going to be
    necessary to take Raqqa and Mosul, including additional U.S.
    personnel, intelligence, logistics, other advise-and-assist
    teams.
        Do you agree with General Austin on the assessment that
    additional U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq and Syria are
    going to be necessary to take Mosul and Raqqa, and will you
    personally support that----
        Secretary Carter. I do. We already have. I expect us to do
    more, because we are looking for opportunities to do more. So
    General Austin is right. And, of course, all this is in support
    of the Iraqi Security Forces, but it includes support to the
    Iraqi Army, support to Sunni tribal forces, support for police
    training. By the way, it is not just U.S., but I have been
    getting coalition contributions as well. And as we assemble the
    forces to move on Mosul, we will be doing more. And when we
    have taken those requests to the President, as the Chairman
    said earlier, he has consistently granted those requests. And I
    expect there to be more in the future, because we want to get
    Mosul; we want to defeat ISIL in Iraq.
        Mr. Conaway. Well, we have got to have Raqqa as well. ABC
    is reporting that the----
        Secretary Carter. Yes, Raqqa as well.
        Mr. Conaway [continuing]. Brussels came out of Raqqa.
        Secretary Carter. Absolutely.
        Mr. Conaway. Let me pivot to something that is a little
    more mundane, but nevertheless important, and that is auditing.
        Secretary Carter. Yes.
        Mr. Conaway. I worry that--oh, by the way, Michael McCord,
    thank you for the report from your group on where everything
    stands right now. I don't necessarily want to go into the
    details of that, but thanks for getting that over to the
    committee in response to the NDAA.
        Can you talk to us about transition to a new civilian
    leadership team next year and the impact that might have on the
    affordable minimum with respect to getting this audit process
    done by the deadlines? I worry that the impact from, you know--
    Leon Panetta started this deal; Hagel kept it up. Secretary
    Carter, you are full throated in favor of it. Are there risks
    that a new civilian team might not have the same emphasis?
        And, General Dunford, will you comment on the military's
    side of that issue as well?
        Secretary Carter. I am absolutely fully in support of it,
    and I thank you very much for your persistence and your
    leadership in inducing us to do this. And I also want to thank
    Mike McCord and his whole team for their role in it.
        You asked about the future. My guess is that this will
    continue, because the logic is quite clear. The necessity is
    quite clear, so I think that will be clear to people who come
    after myself and the Chairman. I am pretty confident that it
    will. It certainly should, and of course, you will have a role
    in helping remind them of this. There is a whole team behind
    this in all of our components, and I think they will--they are
    committed to this work. They will remain committed to this
    work.
        Chairman.
        General Dunford. Congressman, I could speak from both my
    current perspective and as a former service chief. I mean, I
    would tell you I really do believe that it is now part of our
    culture. And as you know, we have been at this now 4 or 5 years
    and worked pretty hard at it. And, frankly, I think the
    uniformed personnel that are involved in the audit process and
    the civil servants involved in the audit process are fully
    committed to actually coming back over here and laying on the
    table a clean audit. I mean, that is a bar they have set for
    themselves. And, again, I don't think the civilian transition
    that will take place this year is going to change the objective
    of the individuals who have been working so hard. Again, most
    of the folks that are doing the heavy lifting, they aren't
    going anywhere, and they are pretty clear about in their
    commitment to get this thing done.
        Mr. Conaway. Well, I appreciate that. And I hope our Senate
    colleagues during the confirmation process, whoever is doing
    that next time, will make that clear.
        And just to be sure, the resources necessary to move this
    forward are in this budget, the requests?
        Secretary Carter. They are.
        Mr. Conaway. General Dunford, did you want to comment on
    the need for additional U.S. troops to counter ISIL and
    actually defeat them in Mosul and in Raqqa?
        General Dunford. Yes. Congressman, I fully support the
    comments that General Austin has made and that the Secretary
    has endorsed. We have from the very beginning said that we
    would recommend whatever capabilities are necessary to maintain
    momentum and achieve the end state. And I do assess that to be
    successful in both Raqqa and Mosul and beyond, we are going to
    need additional capabilities. And at the right time, we will be
    prepared to provide that recommendation to the President.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. McCord, let me warn you, I promised Mr.
    Conaway, we are going to do a briefing or hearing on the audit
    issue, and it will be talking with you and the other folks
    about dates for that, but it is something that Mr. Conaway is
    going to stay on our case till we see it all the way through,
    and I think----
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman [continuing]. A lot of us are committed to
    doing that.
        Ms. Bordallo.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        As a representative from the Asia-Pacific area, I would
    like to start off by expressing my sincere sympathy for the
    people of Belgium and for the family of the marine killed this
    weekend in Iraq.
        I do know that Representative Takai already spoke on China
    and Representative Gabbard referenced North Korea. So, on Guam,
    we are considered the tip of the spear in the Asia-Pacific
    region, and I know the budget request contains nearly $250
    million for fiscal year 2017 military construction projects. We
    are seeing tangible development, such as facility construction,
    take place. So I am asking, Secretary Carter, what role the
    administration sees for Guam in the broader strategy; should
    Congress continue moving forward with construction on Guam?
    And, additionally, it is often said that budgets reflect
    priorities, and you spoke to the Senate Armed Services
    Committee last week about continuing to support the Asia-
    Pacific rebalance strategy. So would you say that this strategy
    continues to be a priority of the administration?
        Secretary Carter. I can. And the Asia-Pacific is where half
    of humanity lives. It is where half of the economic activity of
    the globe is. It is the single region of greatest consequence
    for America's future. We can't forget that. And thank you for
    everything Guam does with us and for us and as part of us out
    there.
        Guam is a critical part of the posture improvements and
    strengthenings we are doing in the Asia-Pacific. I mentioned
    the part that we are doing unilaterally. That is very
    important. Guam is a part of that. We do a lot with partners as
    well, and there is so much momentum out there. Now, part of
    that momentum is caused, as I mentioned earlier, by Chinese
    aggression. But we are determined to meet it, and Guam is an
    important part of that. So thank you.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. You've
    done so much for us. I thank you for your contributions.
        Also, I have another question for either yourself or
    Secretary McCord. It is estimated that the Defense Department
    spends nearly twice as much on service contractors as it does
    on civilian personnel, even though they are often doing the
    same work. Nevertheless, the Department's budget request seeks
    to cut civilian personnel and increase spending on service
    contracts.
        In this extremely constrained fiscal environment, can we
    expect to see the Department leverage the clear cost savings
    found in civilian personnel versus contractors? Are we still
    waiting for a complete accounting of all service contracts that
    was mandated back in 2008, but we have still not received the
    report?
        Secretary Carter. Thank you. I will just say at the
    beginning, then turn it over to Under Secretary McCord, we are
    committed to reducing the strength particularly of headquarter
    staffs, both civilian and contractor, and for that matter,
    military. That is where those numbers come from.
        And are we getting better at understanding how we are doing
    the spend for services contracting? Yes, we are getting better
    at that. The Deputy Chief Management Officer [DCMO] of the
    Department along with Mr. McCord work on that, and we are
    committed to meeting those targets. They are part of our budget
    outlook. If we don't keep working on tail, we are not going to
    be able to invest in the tooth. So it is an essential thing to
    do.
        And I ask if Under Secretary McCord wants to add anything.
        Ms. Bordallo. The contract.
        Secretary McCord. I would just add, as the Secretary said,
    we have the instructions both internal and from the Congress to
    hold down civilian and to keep commensurate with the drawdown
    of the military, and we recognize that mandate.
        And as he said also, we are looking hard at service
    contractors. The DCMO, Mr. Levine, is leading an effort. In
    fact, my turn is coming, I think, within the week to report to
    him within my own office, just like everybody else has to do,
    on what we are doing to review all of our service contracts to
    make sure they are still justified. And history has shown that
    just the sunlight of looking at that drives the cost down. You
    relook whether you really need everything that you are doing,
    and that is an important part of our efficiency effort for this
    budget.
        Ms. Bordallo. I only have a few seconds left.
        We still haven't received the report. Will we receive a
    report of some kind? This has been due since 2008.
        Secretary McCord. We will have to get back to you for the
    record on the exact status of the report. I don't have it at my
    fingertips.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 123.]
        Ms. Bordallo. All right. Thank you very much.
        And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Carter, General Dunford, Mr. McCord, thanks so
    much for joining us today.
        General Dunford, in the previous hearings that the House
    Armed Services Committee has held, there has been a lot of
    discussion about readiness. And, obviously, for all of us, the
    concern about returning to full-spectrum readiness is at the
    very top of our list. I think General Milley put it best. He
    said: Readiness doesn't have a constituency. And I think that
    is why it is critical for members of the House Armed Services
    to make sure that we are the constituency for military
    readiness for our men and women in uniform.
        Tell me where we are with the current budget situation with
    where we project to be with the proposal in fiscal year 2017 on
    the path to restore readiness. We are right now just at the
    point of setting conditions to restore readiness. Tell us how
    far away we are and what milestones you expect to achieve in
    restoring full-spectrum readiness.
        General Dunford. Thanks, Congressman.
        With regard to 2017, we took inputs from all the services
    as to what they needed in fiscal year 2017 along their path to
    restore readiness, as you've outlined. And that was a priority
    for the Secretary. And so we fully resourced the service plans
    for readiness restoration. Keeping in mind that we knew we
    couldn't get to where we needed to be in 2017 because of the
    other elements associated with readiness recovery: One,
    operational tempo; the other the aspect of time.
        So with regard to where are we relative to where we need to
    be, three of the services have indicated that fiscal year 2020
    or 2021 would be where they would get to if we are not
    sequestered and we actually received the resources we project
    to receive.
        The Air Force is a little bit outside of that because of
    the unique challenges they have, and I think some of the
    numbers I have seen are as long as 2028, somewhere between 2024
    and 2028. So three of the services probably about 5 years away;
    one of the services may be 7 or 8 years away from full
    restoration of readiness.
        Mr. Wittman. Gotcha.
        Let me get your perspective on one of the elements of that
    readiness restoration, and that is aviation readiness. And when
    you paint the picture about full-spectrum readiness it is
    across the service branches. But one of the areas that really
    concerns me is the assessments that we are hearing about
    aviation readiness, and it starts with the Marine Corps and
    what they are trying to do to restore. And Lieutenant General
    Davis, I think, is doing all that he can.
        It is a pipeline issue; how much can we do, and how fast
    can we do it just based on capacity? But give me your
    perspective about where we are with aviation readiness across
    the service branches, and what can we do in the context of
    full-spectrum readiness to get there as soon as possible also?
        General Dunford. Thanks, Congressman.
        There are two issues: One is the state of the current
    aircraft that we have. And, again, we had some difficulty with
    depot-level maintenance and so forth associated with the last
    few years. And so we are in a trough with regard to the
    readiness of the platforms that are in the inventory right now,
    what we call ready basic aircraft.
        And although the Marine Corps perhaps is the most extreme,
    each of the services has similar challenges with regard to the
    ready basic aircraft for deployability, particularly those
    units that are in home station. We are confident that those
    units that are forward deployed have what they need. But those
    units that are at home station have a shortfall of ready basic
    aircraft.
        The path to address the maintenance issue, of course, is
    stable funding in the future, both for our depot-level and also
    for our local-level maintenance. The other issue is the
    modernization piece. Much of the reason we are where we are is
    we deferred modernization, and so the aircraft that we are
    flying is in the inventory longer than it needs to be. So there
    is really two pieces of this that are not unrelated, but they
    both come together.
        So my assessment of what we need to do is, one, we need to
    fully fund our depot-level maintenance and sustain the aircraft
    that are in the inventory; and, number two, we need to stay on
    path for the modernization plan we have to address the long-
    term issue, which we really see manifest itself out in 2021,
    2022, and beyond.
        Mr. Wittman. I want to get perspective from both you and
    Secretary Carter as far as the concept of readiness restoration
    and looking at, how do we get to the point that we need to be?
    And you bring up, I think, an extraordinarily important point.
    Readiness as a term of art has traditionally represented
    training, operation, and maintenance. But I believe it also
    should reflect the element of modernization, because I think
    that is directly tied to readiness.
        I want to get your perspective on where you see
    modernization as part of the list of elements that must be
    attained in restoring readiness.
        Secretary Carter. For my part, you are absolutely right:
    training, maintenance are important parts of readiness. But in
    some forces, and you mentioned aviation, the real answer is the
    replacement of an aircraft that is now so old that it has cost
    too much to maintain, or we are simply not able to maintain
    them at the levels that--so the guys don't have aircraft to
    fly. We are seeing that with respect to the CH-53 in the Marine
    Corps. I am sure you are familiar with that. That is an example
    of it. Also, to take another Marine Corps example, the F-18s in
    the Marine Corps, the older versions of those. So modernization
    is a key part of restoring readiness.
        Chairman.
        General Dunford. I will be very quick. I think I am out of
    time, Congressman. But what I would say is this: I have talked
    about fiscal year 2017 as being sufficient. It is not
    everything we needed, and I subscribed to what the service
    chiefs have said when they came in. But my greatest challenge
    as I look in the budget in the future is the bow wave of
    modernization that is going to come in 2019, 2020, 2021. We
    talked about the nuclear enterprise, but, frankly, it is the
    whole inventory of joint capabilities.
        And we have had 4 or 5 years of deferred modernization
    right now. We have done the best we can to start to rebalance
    that in fiscal year 2017. It took us years to get to where we
    are. It will take us years to get out of where we are.
        But this modernization issue is tomorrow's readiness. I
    equate it to health and wellness. So today we are not as
    healthy as we would want to be, but we can get the job done. We
    are not investing in the health of the organization today,
    which will result in some wellness challenges down the road,
    which will read readiness.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Ms. Duckworth.
        Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I just want to take a moment to also express my deep
    condolences and solidarity with our allies in Belgium, across
    NATO, and across the European Union. This morning's cowardly
    terrorist attacks were not only an attack on the people of
    Brussels but an attack against Europe and civilized people
    everywhere who condone such horrific acts of terror.
        Secretary Carter, in your written testimony, you lay out
    five evolving challenges that are driving the Department's
    planning and budget. And I want to focus on the fifth
    challenge: countering terrorism overseas and protecting our
    homeland. In your written testimony, you also outline three
    military objectives to defeat ISIL, and you say the third is
    the most important to protect the homeland again.
        With that in mind, please provide the specific steps the
    Department is taking to coordinate with its interagency
    partners to protect the homeland and what actions Congress
    needs to take to bolster those initiatives, funding,
    legislative.
        Additionally, you mentioned the development of DOD's
    transregional counterterrorism strategy. Could you describe the
    pillars of that strategy and how it complements current efforts
    to deny terrorists a safe haven from which they can train,
    plan, operate, and launch these kind of attacks, for example,
    here in the homeland?
        Secretary Carter. Certainly. And thank you for the
    question.
        I will start and then ask the Chairman to reinforce. You
    are right: our mission of protecting the homeland, which we
    need to do at the same time we fight overseas to defeat ISIL,
    is one we share with the Intelligence Community, with law
    enforcement at all levels, and also with Homeland Security. And
    we work very closely with them.
        Through NORTHCOM [Northern Command], we have a command that
    actually has precisely that mission, which is to protect the
    homeland by working with other interagency partners. We do
    that. We have plans to reinforce them if they request it. In an
    incident, we support them all the time with equipment,
    technology, intelligence, and so forth. And it is a two-way
    street. We work with them. It is a very smooth working
    relationship, and the Chairman can elaborate more on that.
        One thing I want to particularly ask him to elaborate on is
    your second point about transregional. One of the things that I
    am looking at in connection with the so-called Goldwater-
    Nichols issue is strengthening the role of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff and the Chairman in precisely this way, the transregional
    coordination. We have combatant commanders. They are excellent,
    but they are focused on particular regions.
        I look to the Chairman--and he does an excellent job of
    this--of balancing resources and making sure that the different
    COCOMs [combatant commands] are cooperating, both in NORTHCOM
    and the other combatant commanders. Let me ask him to
    elaborate.
        General Dunford. Congresswoman, to be specific, what we did
    back in November, we asked the Special Operations Command to
    take the lead, not from a special operations perspective but
    because they did have connective tissue in each one of our
    combatant commands, and they were capable of doing this.
        To begin the development of a transregional terrorism plan
    and countering violent extremism writ large, we have been
    working at that now for a couple months. We most recently had a
    meeting in The Tank on Friday afternoon where I convened the
    Joint Chiefs and all of our combatant commands to look at this.
        Critical to that is having a common operational picture and
    a common intel picture across all of our combatant commands, so
    that is the first part. The second thing is having an
    assessment process that integrates what all the combatant
    commanders see transregionally into a single vision that the
    Secretary of Defense can see.
        And then, as the Secretary alluded to at the end of his
    comments, a process to make recommendations for the
    prioritization and allocation of resources across all the
    combatant commands so that, much like we are trying to provide
    pressure across ISIL in Iraq and Syria, we are trying to do
    that transregionally at the same time. So we are very focused
    on that.
        You asked a specific question about, what are we doing to
    improve our interagency, and I would add to that interagency
    and international cooperation, which is very critical. Within
    the interagency, we meet routinely now and the Secretary and
    Secretary Kerry lead the effort. We meet routinely to do deep
    dives on issues like resourcing or foreign fighters or
    intelligence sharing.
        And with regard to our partners, we have a very promising
    initiative in Jordan right now where we have, I think we are up
    to 15 nations that participate in an information and
    intelligence exchange to help us just on the problem of foreign
    fighters. And so those kind of collaborative processes are
    really necessary.
        And to be honest with you, there is a lot of walls for us
    to break down in order for us to be effective. And that is what
    we are in the process of doing. And our transregional plan is
    designed not only to integrate our capabilities across the
    combatant commands but also with our coalition partners, and
    this plan will be borne with a coalition perspective in mind.
        Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. I am very interested in the
    Jordan initiative, and perhaps I will have my staff follow up
    with your office, if that is possible.
        Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Gibson.
        Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    panelists.
        The attack this morning reminds us we are still at war with
    an evil, determined enemy that must be defeated.
        And earlier in the testimony today, we had discussion about
    restoring deterrence as well, peace through strength. And I am
    interested in hearing first from General Dunford. The RAND
    Corporation has published a study, Limiting Regret: Building
    the Army We Will Need, and here we are talking about the ERI
    [European Reassurance Initiative] initiative.
        And RAND concludes that we are going to need three armored
    brigade combat teams and associated forces to restore a
    credible deterrence. I am interested to know whether or not you
    agree with that assessment, and if you don't, then what you
    think is necessary to restore that credible deterrence.
        And then, for both the Secretary and for the Chief, I have
    a bill, a bipartisan bill, over 40 cosponsors now, the POSTURE
    Act, which stops the drawdown for the Army and the Marine
    Corps. That is the total Army, the Army, the National Guard,
    the Army Reserve, and the Active Duty Marine Corps and the
    Marine Corps Reserve.
        Assuming that that would come with the necessary resources
    for operations so that we don't hollow out the force and the
    complement of modernization that goes with it, I am interested
    in your assessment on how that would impact the risk that we
    currently have, given the fact that earlier in your testimony
    today, Mr. Secretary, you talked about where we are today was
    based on a series of assumptions which have changed.
        So how would this POSTURE Act, if enacted with the
    necessary resources so we don't hollow out the force, how do
    you assess that would impact the risk, and how might these
    additional land forces be arrayed to deal with things, such as
    the ERI?
        Secretary Carter. I will start. On the two issues, first,
    with the armored brigade combat teams, the Chairman can
    elaborate, and I don't want to go into our operational plans
    here. But we are developing our operational plans for the
    defense of NATO territory against both ordinary attack and what
    I called earlier hybrid warfare, and we are developing those
    plans and the requirements that come from them.
        I am not familiar with the particular report that you cite,
    but that is now a necessity as a consequence of Russian
    behavior, as I said in my opening statement.
        With respect to Army and Marine Corps end strength, the
    Chairman can speak to that also, and I am sure the chiefs have
    as well. But I will just, both in the Army and the Marine
    Corps, their emphasis to me in the preparation of this budget
    has been on readiness. And they have end-strength plans to come
    down from the levels that they were previously, and their
    priority is the readiness of the force not changing those end-
    strength goals. I concur with that.
        Chairman.
        General Dunford. Congressman, we have made a down payment.
    You talk about what do we need in Europe, and, of course, it is
    not just about Army forces; it is the aggregate of joint
    capability. In the ERI, I think you know that we have an
    armored BCT's [brigade combat team's] worth of equipment at
    division headquarters, engineering equipment on other units
    that are part of our prepositioned stocks.
        We also pay for a constant presence of another brigade
    combat team that will be over there for exercises and assurance
    for our partners as well as deterrence. What the overall number
    is that we may have a year or 2 or 3 years down the road I
    couldn't speculate. I don't think the RAND study is wildly off
    base, but, again, to me, it is a function of not just looking
    at Army presence in isolation but looking at the aggregate of
    joint capability that will do what we need it to do, which is
    assure our partners as well as deter.
        With regard to the end-strength issue, Congressman, my
    greatest concern is, in fact, that we have balance in the
    force, and we have not only the right force structure, but we
    have the right capability. And you hit it exactly right: if we
    are going to grow the force, we need to make sure that the
    infrastructure supports that; we need to make sure that the
    manpower supports that; we need to make sure the equipment
    modernization supports that; and then the operations, the
    maintenance dollars that will allow us to train that force as
    well.
        So all of those levers have to be adjusted at the same
    time. Otherwise, the force gets out of balance. And that is why
    our focus this year was on capability over capacity. The reason
    is we felt like we were getting out of balance where we didn't
    actually have the right amount of training, the right amount of
    equipment in place to make sure the units that we had were at
    the highest level of readiness possible.
        Mr. Gibson. Well, thank you, General.
        And let me just say for my colleagues and for the American
    people watching at home for the record that we are on path to
    draw down our land forces to pre-World War II levels. We had
    General Milley here last week, and he describes the array and
    the mission set, and given the changes to the assumption as
    high risk and given the fact that when you turn this off, it
    takes 3 to 4 years to actually get the combat readiness
    restored, I think this bipartisan bill, we need to summon the
    will, get the resources, and get it enacted.
        And, with that, I know my time has expired. Thank you,
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
        General Dunford, your statement warns of an expanding
    Iranian malign influence and increasing capability in the
    region. In your assessment, is Iran more or less capable today,
    militarily speaking, than they were the day the nuclear deal
    was signed?
        General Dunford. Congressman, I believe that Iran was
    spreading malign influences. They were capable of doing that
    before the agreement, and I think they are capable of doing it
    after the agreement. I haven't seen any measurable increase in
    their capabilities. But, again, I am under no illusion about
    what Iran's intent is, what their capabilities are, or what the
    current level of activity is across the Middle East.
        Mr. Scott. Have you seen any change in their behavior?
        General Dunford. I have not seen any specific change in
    their behavior, Congressman, with the caveat that they were
    spreading malign influence before the agreement, and they
    continue to do so.
        Mr. Scott. Absolutely, now they have $150 billion to help
    them spread it. And if there has been no change in the
    behavior, then certainly my concern is that the world is not
    more safe but less safe with them having that money.
        Just a couple of quotes from the President, if I may:
    Today, after 2 years of negotiations, the United States,
    together with our international partners, has achieved
    something that decades of animosity has not, a comprehensive
    long-term deal with Iran that will prevent it from obtaining a
    nuclear weapon. The deal offers an opportunity to move in a new
    direction, a different path, one of tolerance and peaceful
    resolution of conflict.
        Another quote, September 10 of 2015: This is a victory for
    democracy, for American national security, and the safety and
    security of the world.
        And then the budget that was presented, and I agree with
    the budget statement: Iran's malign activities in pursuit of
    missile technology continue to pose a threat to our interests
    and allies in the region. To combat those threats the budget
    continues efforts to hold Iran accountable for its
    destabilizing behavior by advancing preparations, posture,
    regional partnerships, and planning to preserve the President's
    options for any contingency.
        So one statement September, a budget statement 5 months
    later.
        Secretary Hagel--what is the Defense Department doing to
    mitigate what is a clearly growing risk from the Iranian
    ballistic missile program?
        Secretary Carter. Well, thank you for that.
        And you are right: the nuclear deal with Iran was about
    their nuclear weapons program and, if implemented--and we will
    know whether it is implemented or not--will keep them from
    having a nuclear weapon. That doesn't stop them from having
    other capabilities and exhibiting other behavior that concerns
    us.
        One of those is ballistic missiles. That is why we are
    strengthening our ballistic missile defenses in the region, in
    Europe, to defend our friends and allies there, our own forces
    there that are deployed there. That is why we have Aegis
    Afloat. That is why we have Aegis Ashore. That is why our other
    partners procured those same missile defenses from us, and that
    is why we help Israel with its defense against short-range
    rockets, both the Iron Dome system and the David's Sling
    system.
        They are also, by the way, developing the Arrow system
    against longer range missiles. We help them with that too. So
    we are doing a great deal in the missile defense area in that
    region.
        Chairman, if you have anything.
        Mr. Scott. If I can quote James Clapper, the Director of
    National Intelligence, what he said to SASC [Senate Armed
    Services Committee] on February 9: Iran probably views the
    Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a means to remove
    sanctions while preserving nuclear capabilities.
        General Austin, March 8, 2016: We have not seen any
    indication that they--meaning the Iranians--intend to pursue a
    different path.
        Now, I think he is talking about with regard to their
    malign activities, not specifically with nuclear, with regard
    to General Austin's statement there.
        But just a few things that they have done since then: Aside
    from what they did to our sailors, they have continued to test
    ballistic missiles. October 11, 2015, they tested a new
    generation of surface-to-surface missiles. The U.N. [United
    Nations] stated this test violated U.N. Security Council
    Resolution 1929.
        On November 21, 2015, they launched another medium-range
    missile. On March 8 of this year, Iran launched several
    missiles from multiple sites around the country. The Iranian
    general who commands the program stated: Revolutionary Guard
    Corps does not give in to threats.
        Secretary Carter.
        Secretary Carter. The nuclear agreement, and I said at the
    time that it was struck, hasn't changed our commitments in the
    Department of Defense at all. We remain postured and committed
    to defending our friends and allies, our own interests in the
    region, and countering Iran's malign influence in all of these
    areas.
        It is good if it is implemented, which it is being so far,
    at eliminating the nuclear danger. But for everything else, we
    remain full speed ahead and on course for what we were doing
    last year, the year before. And those programs are just
    building. I will see if the Chairman wants to add anything, but
    we have a major commitment there.
        Mr. Scott. My time has expired. But I just don't understand
    why we wouldn't have included other threats in any type of deal
    that gave them $150 billion.
        The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Dr. Wenstrup.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to, if we could for a second, talk about our
    current rules of engagement in our theaters of operation. I
    have service members who are leaving the military, and they are
    coming to me saying that this is dangerous. We are not able to
    engage in a way that will allow us to defeat our enemy.
        And I understand the need to try and keep down civilian
    casualties. I get that completely. But I have a concern that we
    are protecting our enemies more than we are those that we are
    sacrificing to try and save. And that is the real concern.
        Throughout our history, we have people that have given
    their lives so that others can live. And with what we see
    taking place, my concern is that every time we let an enemy go,
    because of our very restrictive rules of engagement, hundreds
    if not thousands of more innocents are killed. They become
    fatalities because of genocide. Are we really winning?
        And so I would like you to address our rules of engagement
    that I am hearing so many complaints about from our service
    members.
        Secretary Carter. We assess and reassess them all the time,
    including on a strike-by-strike basis. So your question is very
    apt, very appropriate, and we try to balance those things. We
    do it every day, and we do it in a very practical way.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Mr. Secretary, when was the last time we
    changed them?
        Secretary Carter. Geez, we modify them all the time. Let me
    ask the Chairman to explain.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Sure.
        General Dunford. Congressman, I would like to distinguish
    between rules of engagement and collateral damage. Those have
    been conflated a bit in some of the discussion. I have heard
    the same thing you have. And I want to make it clear on the
    rules of engagement, those are enduring.
        And any time one of our young soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    and marines is in harm's way, and it is a hostile intent and
    that you can positively identify an enemy, they can engage.
    That hasn't changed. There is no restriction on our ability to
    do what must be done to protect themselves.
        With regard to collateral damage, we make an assessment
    virtually every time we engage. And right now, we start with a
    baseline of zero civilians. But I am here to tell you, if we
    have a target that justifies an expanded view of collateral
    damage in a particular case, we will make that adjustment.
        So to your question, when was the last time we changed, I
    can't assure you that it was this morning, but I can assure you
    it was probably sometime in the last couple days where General
    Austin made a decision to expand the number of civilian
    casualties that might be incurred in a particular target given
    the importance of that target.
        What we have tried not to do is make enemies of the very
    people that we are trying to protect in places like Iraq and
    Syria. And we also try to make sure that, at the end of the
    day, we don't become the enemy. We are fighting with our
    values. And at the end of the day, 5, 10 years from now when
    this war is over, it will be because we won the war of values
    and the war of ideas, not because we dropped a bomb in one
    place or another.
        Dr. Wenstrup. I understand that is a very fine balance. I
    personally would give my life so my family could live, if that
    is what it came down to.
        My other concern comes to, are we in any way, shape, or
    form trying to work out an international or system of justice
    for those that we detain? We are not dealing with a Timothy
    McVeigh here with domestic terror, and we are not dealing with
    a World War II situation where at the end of the war we sign a
    peace treaty and return our POWs [prisoners of war]. We are
    releasing people from Guantanamo. Some are returning to the
    fight.
        Do we really have a formal system of justice? We are a
    country of laws, and we have a system of justice, and I think
    that is an expectation. And I haven't seen us going in that
    direction.
        Secretary Carter. Well, thank you.
        We have various possibilities for detention if we take a
    prisoner. There is law-of-war detention. There is detention by
    transfer to another country. We did that, for example, in the
    case of the Umm Sayyaf raid and Abu Sayyaf raid, where the
    custody became the Government of Iraq. And then we have the
    possibility of criminal prosecution in Article III courts,
    which has also been exercised by the United States, a number of
    convictions.
        With respect to Guantanamo, what you say is the reason why
    we are looking for--and I personally support this--a place to
    detain those people who are in Guantanamo Bay. Let me be clear
    about this. There are people in GTMO [Guantanamo Bay] that it
    will not be safe to transfer to another location. I won't sign
    off on their transfer to another location for just the reason
    you described.
        Dr. Wenstrup. I appreciate it.
        Secretary Carter. So that is why we need an alternative
    detention facility for law-of-war detainees. We need to be
    extremely careful about that, and that is why I would like to
    find an alternative location.
        Dr. Wenstrup. Well, I would also like to see a more clear
    system of justice rather than we could do one, two, or three
    things.
        But my time has expired. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the
    committee today. We certainly all greatly appreciate your
    service to the Nation and over the course of your very
    distinguished career, so we thank you for your service.
        Secretary Carter and General Dunford, over the past decade,
    the Department has had to reconcile the reality of a reemerging
    great power competition with the size and composition of our
    own military today.
        Secretary, I highly commend and am very supportive of your
    vision for the third offset strategy and look forward to seeing
    how that unfolds and look forward to being supportive as we
    make that transformation.
        Beyond that, as we evaluate the architecture of our future
    fighting force, what should the balance between the forward-
    deployed power and sufficient surge Ready Reserve capacity look
    like across the services?
        Secretary Carter. Well, first of all, thank you for your
    support for our technology efforts, third offset, and so forth.
    It is an important part of planning for the future. I said,
    this is a budget that tries to turn a corner and, while dealing
    with today's threats, also look ahead 10, 20, 30 years from
    now, and particularly to high-end potential opponents that we
    haven't had to worry about as much in recent years. So thank
    you for your support for that.
        And I am sorry; the second part of your question?
        Mr. Langevin. Sure. Just saying that as we evaluate the
    architecture of our fighting force, what should the balance
    between a forward-deployed power and sufficient surge Ready
    Reserve capacity look like across the services?
        Secretary Carter. I will start and then maybe the Chairman
    can pitch in.
        It is important to have forward forces because they are the
    first edge of the response to a crisis, number one; number two,
    their being there is a way of working with friends and allies
    so we don't have to do everything ourselves. So it is an
    important part of our building partner capacity capability.
        But what deters is the full weight of the American military
    that would arrive on the scene after those initial forces had
    engaged. And I think that is what we--when we talk about
    deterring opponents, what deters them is not just what is right
    there in front of them; what deters them is the full weight of
    the American military that will arise.
        And so our surge forces are a critical part of the
    deterrent. And no one should measure our deterrent capability
    by what we have forward presence. That is an indication, but it
    is not the whole story.
        Chairman.
        General Dunford. Congressman, getting that balance right is
    dynamic. And to assure you, every year, we gather up all the
    combatant commanders' requirements for both the crisis response
    and assurance mission as well as what they need for major,
    major operations plan contingency.
        And so we make adjustments annually to make sure that we
    get that balance right between those forces that have forward
    deployed, forward engaged on a day-to-day basis, providing us
    access, making sure that we are prepared to respond to crisis,
    and also making sure that the residual capabilities and
    capacities on the bench, if you will, are prepared for a major
    contingency.
        So when you ask what is the right balance, it is a constant
    process of evaluation to make sure we do exactly what you are
    suggesting we should do, which is get that balance right.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, both of you.
        Going back to the third offset strategy--and, again, very
    supportive of that--and the technology game changing, and it is
    going to help provide us with the advantages that we need,
    especially on cybersecurity, which I have been a strong
    proponent on and other technologies.
        But, Secretary, how do you believe we can best direct our
    investments and our policies to ensure that the progress that
    we made toward achieving a third offset strategy is sustained
    into the next administration?
        Secretary Carter. Well, I think in this and in other
    matters, the strategic logic behind our investments this year,
    behind this 2017 budget, is intended to point the direction
    toward the future. So we have crafted it carefully. And I think
    that both--it is the needs it highlights in terms of the five
    challenges and what we have put in motion, especially including
    these technology efforts are so compelling that I am confident
    that they will continue into the future.
        Mr. Langevin. And Secretary Carter, I have been one of the
    biggest proponents of cybersecurity as a critical warfighting
    domain during my time in Congress. And I believe it is
    imperative that the services understand the cybersecurity
    requirements laid before them when it comes to much-needed DOD
    programs and weapons systems in order to avoid serious cost
    impacts and schedule delays.
        How are we managing cybersecurity at an enterprise level
    and incorporating cyber technologies into program requirements
    sooner? And I guess, we will have to answer that one for the
    record.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        The Chairman. Secretary, if you would, please. Thank you.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. And I will yield back.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mrs. Walorski.
        Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, for being
    here.
        Mr. Secretary, just following up on Representative
    Wenstrup's question, but are you aware of any discussions to
    close the naval station at Guantanamo Bay or transfer it to
    Cuba?
        Secretary Carter. I am not, no.
        Mrs. Walorski. General Dunford, same question for you. Are
    you aware of any discussions to close the naval station at
    Guantanamo Bay or transfer it to Cuba?
        General Dunford. I am not, Congresswoman.
        Mrs. Walorski. Mr. Secretary, your department delivered a
    product in February entitled ``Plan for Closing the Guantanamo
    Bay Detention Facility.'' However, this document failed to
    address the specific elements required by the fiscal year 2016
    NDAA. Therefore, as this committee has previously stated, the
    requirement has not been met.
        In this document, there were three options outlined for
    handling future detainees. They were on a case-by-case basis:
    number one was prosecution of the military commission system or
    in Federal court; two, transfer to another country for an
    appropriate disposition there; or, three, law-of-war detention.
        Yet, in recent testimony, senior Department of Defense
    officials testified that--and I am referencing this article in
    Stars and Stripes--they testified there is a requirement for a
    long-term detention but, quote, ``they do not know where long-
    term prisoners would be housed,'' which, I think this is very
    troubling testimony, Mr. Secretary, considering we currently do
    have a location.
        So my question is, prior to conducting an operation where
    capturing individuals is either intended or possible, do you
    have to determine which of these three options is appropriate?
        Secretary Carter. Generally speaking, we do and have and
    that has worked out. And with respect to the report, if I can
    just respond to that----
        Mrs. Walorski. Sure.
        Secretary Carter [continuing]. And the question of
    location. We were not specific about a location, and the reason
    for that is this: The optimal location for a law-of-war
    detention facility will depend upon several things that we
    don't know right now. For example, we don't know whether the
    Congress is going to respond to this idea. If we can do it
    quickly, then we will probably pick an existing facility and
    try to build on that. If we have----
        Mrs. Walorski. An existing facility in this country or----
        Secretary Carter. Yes. And if we have a longer period of
    time, we may build a new facility from scratch. It will depend
    upon the number of detainees that we have and that we plan for.
    It will depend upon the structure of the military commissions
    process, which is something which is set in statute, by the
    way.
        So the very reason that we have to discuss this with the
    Congress--and we submitted this plan. Because let me be clear,
    it is forbidden by law to do this now, so we need your
    concurrence----
        Mrs. Walorski. Oh, I understand. I am very familiar with
    the law.
        Secretary Carter [continuing]. About that. And the reason
    that the plan calls for a dialogue between us and the Hill is
    that we can't select the optimal design and, therefore, the
    optimal location and, therefore, fully do the costing until
    that conversation has been had, because you guys have a say----
        Mrs. Walorski. I understand.
        Secretary Carter [continuing]. In the design parameters of
    the ultimate facility.
        But I hope you will give it consideration. I have said--and
    I believe this--I think it would be good to put this on a path
    to being dealt with by the time the administrations change.
        Mrs. Walorski. I understand. And I apologize for
    interrupting. I guess, two things. You and I have talked about
    this for months. But two things: I think the American people
    look at this, as I do, as a very dangerous precedent; that we
    are looking at potentially bringing these terrorists with blood
    on their hands that have already killed Americans back to this
    soil, which I think is reprehensible.
        But, secondly, we were just reminded again with this
    bombing this morning in Brussels that there is an active war on
    terror. And I have been sitting here 3 hours, and the first
    question the chairman asked was about strategy and things that
    were supposed to be handed over to the Congress in February,
    and they still haven't. And I look at this kind of as the same
    thing, that we are still waiting for some kind of a detailed
    plan that the President said would be made available and you
    have too.
        My question is this: Is it possible that, due to such
    factors as bureaucratic obstacles, delays in timing, inability
    to negotiate with another country, that an opportunity to
    conduct a capture operation would be lost? Or, in other words,
    would this issue of not being able to have a place for future
    detainees--because of the President's desire to close
    Guantanamo and bring those terrorists here--ever inhibit a
    question on these attacks that we are doing with ISIL and
    engaging with them the issue of, like, let's not go there
    because we don't know, and we don't want these long-term
    prisoners?
        Secretary Carter. That has not occurred in my observation.
    Let me ask the Chairman.
        General Dunford. No, Congresswoman. And, frankly, that
    would be one of the first things that I would ask if we were
    asked to do something is--that is going to be part of the
    decision making to go after an individual--is, what is going to
    be the disposition of that individual?
        Mrs. Walorski. And what if the answer comes back? Because
    we know there are long-term situations now engaging. What if
    the answer comes back and says: We simply don't know? Or GTMO,
    because GTMO is an operation right now that is there?
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Byrne.
        Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, obviously, we are here on a day of tragedy,
    tragedy for the Belgians, tragedy for the world. ISIS is now
    taking responsibility for the murders this morning. We had a
    marine that was killed last weekend in Iraq. I know you feel
    that personally. We have a law that we passed called the
    National Defense Authorization Act. It required you to submit
    to the Congress by February the 15th a plan for defeating these
    people.
        I know you told the chairman that it was imminent. The
    statute says you shall do it by February the 15th. You are in
    violation of the law. When an average American is in violation
    of the law, there are consequences. Would you care to explain
    to the committee why there shouldn't be consequences for your
    failure to follow a law that was signed by your President?
        Secretary Carter. Well, I already explained that that
    report will be in front of you imminently. With respect to the
    larger question----
        Mr. Byrne. Mr. Secretary, that is not my question. The
    statute says you shall do it by February the 15th. Do you not
    agree that you are in violation of that law?
        Secretary Carter. We are going to submit that report. It
    has taken some time. It is not just a department----
        Mr. Byrne. I am going to ask you again. Do you not agree
    that you are in violation of the law?
        Secretary Carter. We will have that report to you shortly,
    Congressman.
        Mr. Byrne. I don't think that is a satisfactory response.
    When we pass a law around here, it means something. Now,
    people's lives are at stake. You know that better than any of
    the rest of us.
        Secretary Carter. Well, the people's lives aren't at stake
    over a report.
        Mr. Byrne. Excuse me for a minute, Mr. Secretary. It is not
    too much to ask that you comply with the laws that we pass and
    the President signs.
        Secretary Carter. As the Chairman----
        Mr. Byrne. So it is not sufficient for you to say it is
    imminent. You need to give us a plan now.
        Let me ask you about another report. You are also required
    to submit when the President puts forth his budget a 30-year
    ship plan for the Navy. You didn't do that either. That is a
    statutory requirement. Why didn't you submit a 30-year ship
    plan?
        Secretary Carter. I don't know about the 30-year ship plan.
    We have a number of these statutory plans. We work on them very
    hard. There are many, many, many of them, Congressman.
        Let me ask Mr. McCord if he knows the status of that
    particular one, the second one that the Congressman raised.
        Secretary McCord. I believe it is in process also and is
    nearing completion.
        Mr. Byrne. Well, under the law, that was supposed to be
    submitted with the President's budget request. Now, the
    existing ship plan we have got calls for 52 littoral combat
    ships [LCS]. You have not amended that plan. You have requested
    40. The Secretary of the Navy has told us in this room he needs
    52. He has told us there is no study to change that. Mr.
    Stackley, his Assistant Secretary for Acquisitions, says there
    is no Navy study or analysis that would change that. You have
    no 30-year ship plan to change that, yet you've tried to
    unilaterally change it in the budget. What is your basis, if
    you have no 30-year ship plan that updates the 52 request, when
    there is no Navy analysis, what is your basis for reducing the
    ship request from 52 to 40 on the LCS?
        Secretary Carter. The basis is this, and this is something
    that we decided all jointly, and that the joint requirement--
    that we were going to buy 40 and not 52 littoral combat ships.
    The littoral combat ship is successful. It is good at what it
    does. It is better than the mine countermeasure ships it
    replaces. It is better than the coastal patrol craft it
    replaces. But 40 is enough.
        And the reason we made that decision is that we thought--we
    believe and were convinced that the money is better spent on
    ships that are more capable. We are looking for more capable
    and lethal ships as well as more ships in the Navy. And we also
    added----
        Mr. Byrne. If the Navy has no analysis on that, where's
    your analysis? Do you have a report?
        Secretary Carter. We did an analysis in the course of----
        Mr. Byrne. Where is it?
        Secretary Carter [continuing]. Of preparing the budget. We
    did a lot over the course of the last summer, and we can
    provide that to you.
        Mr. Byrne. Shouldn't it be in that ship plan?
        Secretary Carter. We can provide that to you. But the point
    I am making is a very important strategic one, which is we need
    ships that are more capable and more lethal and more high end.
    That is one of the themes of this whole budget. So exactly the
    point you are raising is one of the very themes----
        Mr. Byrne. Mr. Secretary, if that is so important, why
    wouldn't you give us a new ship plan? Because your old ship
    plan, the one----
        Secretary Carter. I am sure the shipbuilding plan will
    reflect that.
        Mr. Byrne. You were supposed to give it to us when the
    President's budget was submitted. Now, you and your staff may
    not think these laws are important, but they are.
        People wonder why the people of America are angry right
    now. They are angry because people in Washington feel like they
    are above the law. And none of us, Mr. Secretary, I am not
    above the law, and you are not above the law. Give us a plan
    for the Middle East and give us some sort of analysis that is
    different from the Navy's analysis on reducing the LCS request
    from 52 to 40.
        And I yield back.
        Secretary Carter. We will provide those reports.
        The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    gentlemen.
        Secretary Carter, could you just prioritize--I know you
    have a lot of choices to make and priorities to make--low,
    medium, or high, the fight against ISIS, the military fight
    against ISIS in the next 5 years?
        Secretary Carter. Oh, that is extremely high.
        Ms. McSally. How about the priority of ensuring that if we
    do send our troops into harm's way, that they have the best
    capability overhead for close air support should they come
    under fire?
        Secretary Carter. Close air support is a critical part of
    the joint capability.
        Ms. McSally. So high as well? Great.
        How about if we have an American who has to eject or is
    shot down or an isolated personnel and they need the best
    capabilities overhead for combat search and rescue to be able
    to get them out of there. Low, medium, or high?
        Secretary Carter. Well, combat search and rescue is a must
    have everywhere we have forces deployed.
        Let me ask the Chairman if he has----
        Ms. McSally. Just in general. That is just the context. I
    think you would agree high, right?
        General Dunford [continuing]. Right----
        Ms. McSally. So I am pleased to see that you are choosing
    not to mothball any A-10s in this fiscal year, but I am deeply
    concerned about the 5-year plan based on you sharing that those
    priorities are all high. We have mothballed the equivalent of
    four A-10 squadrons since 2012. We have only nine remaining,
    and there are actually less airplanes in them than they used to
    have.
        The squadron I commanded used to have 24, and now they are
    down to 18. They are currently in three theaters, South Korea,
    Europe, and in the fight against ISIS. And I think you saw that
    firsthand.
        I am confused about some statements and really
    contradictions in the 5-year plan, so I just want to see if I
    can figure this out. The F-35 requirements document says that
    the A-10 will be replaced by the F-35. The F-35 is supposed to
    replace the A-10. That is part of the requirements document.
        We have highlighted over the last year--I have--in many
    hearings concerns about shortfalls. We need a fifth-generation
    fighter. But when it comes to close air support, the F-35
    having shortfalls in loiter time, lethality, weapons load, the
    ability to take a direct hit, the ability to fly close combat
    and be able to survive, and their night capability and their
    digital targeting capability.
        Because of that, your [office of] Operation[al] Test and
    Evaluation has agreed to do a fly-off between the F-35 and the
    A-10 as part of the evaluation of the F-35, which we were glad
    to see, because we are concerned that this space is going to
    have increased risk until we see if there is a proven
    replacement.
        But in your budget, you say that the A-10s will be replaced
    squadron by squadron by the F-35s. So that seems to me that the
    outcome is being predetermined. That is my first concern. We
    are yet to have a fly-off. We think that is going to happen in
    fiscal year 2018 or 2019, yet you are saying that we are
    predetermining the outcome that the A-10s will be replaced
    squadron by squadron by the F-35.
        Similarly, we have the Air Force leadership, when asked in
    a March 3 hearing--and then I followed up last week--basically
    said the F-35 is really not going to replace the A-10. That is
    going to be more the F-16 and the F-15E, which contradicts the
    requirements doc and contradicts your own statement.
        If you look at the Air Force's 5-year plan, they are going
    to put 49 A-10s in the boneyard in fiscal year 2019, another 49
    in fiscal year 2020, 64 the year after that, 96 the year after
    that. Basically, they are getting rid of the A-10. But the fly-
    off isn't going to happen until at least fiscal year 2018. We
    won't be able to see the outcome of whether we are going to
    have a decrease in capabilities until at least a couple years
    down the line.
        So I am just concerned about these contradictions. The Air
    Force recently is saying that manning is their challenge, that
    this is their newest excuse as to why they need to be starting
    to put the A-10 in the boneyard, talking about how they just
    don't have the manning.
        And yet last we looked at, we have got hundreds of people
    that are playing the tuba and the clarinet wearing the uniform
    as opposed to core military capabilities. If we really had a
    manning crisis, from my perspective, we would tell people to
    put down the tuba and pick up a wrench or a gun, but we are not
    at that place.
        So I am just concerned with where we are right now in these
    conflicting statements. So I just ask you, General Dunford, do
    you think that if we put the A-10 in the boneyard before we
    have a proven tested replacement for these high-priority
    missions, will there be a risk to American lives?
        General Dunford. Congresswoman, what we need in the joint
    force is the ability to deliver close air support effectively.
    That is, as you know, it is not just a flat formation; it is a
    training issue and so forth.
        Ms. McSally. Right.
        General Dunford. So as the advocate for close air support
    and joint capabilities, I absolutely believe that we need a
    transition plan, and there needs to be a replacement for the A-
    10 before it goes away. There is no question.
        Ms. McSally. So that means you don't agree with us putting
    it in the boneyard before we even assess whether the F-35 would
    replace it?
        General Dunford. What I don't agree with is getting rid of
    a capability without replacing it. And what I can tell you,
    without going into great length, is we recently met with all
    the chiefs--General Welsh was there--to take a look at the
    issue of close air support as a whole and to make sure that we
    are looking carefully at the platforms that are being
    introduced, what capability gaps will exist, how do we mitigate
    those gaps, and from that, if we can't mitigate the gap, how
    does that inform the program in the future.
        So I can tell you that the interest that Congress has
    generated quite a bit of interest inside the Department. And
    again, as the proponent for joint capabilities, I can assure
    you I will look at this from a close air support perspective to
    make sure the joint force has the close air support capability
    that it needs to have.
        Ms. McSally. Thanks. My time has expired, but I just want
    to say, I believe we need a conditional-based replacement not a
    time-based replacement; that we shouldn't be putting any more
    of these in the boneyard until the fly-off is done and A-X [A-
    10 replacement aircraft] is developed; and we make sure that we
    are not putting more American lives at risk.
        The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, General Dunford, first of all,
    thank you all for your service to our country.
        General Dunford, how would you assess our combined arms
    capability today that we have been involved in
    counterinsurgency warfare for quite some time, although we are
    more to an advise and assist role. But I am concerned about
    just the fact that we haven't trained for some time. And how
    would you make that assessment?
        General Dunford. Congressman, there is no question that
    over the course of almost a decade involved in primarily
    counterinsurgency operations, the joint force's ability to
    integrate combined arms at the high end eroded. We are probably
    about 2\1/2\ years or 3 years into focusing on that once again.
        Are we where we need to be? No, we are not. And that is
    exactly why we are focused on both restoring full-spectrum
    readiness as well as making sure our exercises regenerate the
    kind of capability that we had some 10 or 15 years ago, that we
    are all confident that we had 10 or 15 years ago.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary and General Dunford, I am concerned that--I
    would hope respectively that we would take a harder look at
    shifting more capability to the Guard and Reserve and also not
    allowing them to lapse into being a strategic reserve and to
    somehow maintain them as an operational reserve.
        Now, take a look at their training requirements, take a
    look at potentially mobilizing them on a periodic basis even in
    a peacetime role to maintain their effectiveness. But I think
    that we are not taking a hard enough look prospectively at
    being able to more cost-effectively maintain our capability but
    to utilize the Guard and Reserve more. And I wonder if both of
    you could comment on that.
        Secretary Carter. I concur with you that we need to do more
    thinking. We are doing more thinking. I think that the simple
    dichotomy between an operational reserve and a strategic
    reserve made sense in the Cold War. I think the Reserve
    Component proved its versatility in the course of the years of
    war in Iraq and Afghanistan and is proving uniquely valuable in
    some particular areas.
        I mentioned cyber earlier. That is very important. That is
    not a niche. It is not exotic. It is a critical part of our
    future. And so I think being creative and effective about the
    use of the Reserve Component for strategic effect, not as a
    strategic reserve in the old Cold War sense, absolutely. We are
    thinking that way, and we need to continue to think that way.
        Chairman.
        General Dunford. Congressman, one of my responsibilities on
    behalf of the Secretary is global force management. And I can
    assure you right now in virtually every place where we are, the
    joint force, the Guard and Reserve are fully integrated into
    that. And, of course, as you know, the difference between a
    strategic reserve and the operational reserve is that we
    wouldn't typically be using them to meet the kind of
    requirements that we are meeting today.
        But you can go to South America today. I was there last
    week. Guard and Reserve are down there doing partnership
    capacity. You can go to Africa. You can go to Asia. You can
    look at BCTs [brigade combat teams] that are being mobilized to
    participate in operations, elements of BCTs to participate in
    operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
        So I would tell you today the Guard and Reserve are fully
    integrated in meeting all the commitments that the joint force
    has. And I would envision that to be the case in the future,
    not just because it helps to maintain effective Guard and
    Reserve but because we actually can't meet our requirements
    without fully integrating the Guard and Reserve into our
    overall force management processes.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
        I do think that there are--when I look at the personnel
    cost differences between an Active Duty soldier and Guard and
    Reserve member, nondeployed, that they are fairly
    extraordinary. And so whatever we can do, I think, to be able
    to save money but maintain capability I think we really need to
    take a look at going forward.
        I think the last question, in your view, this attack in
    Belgium, is it a result of the fact that we are making gains in
    Iraq and Syria in terms of rolling back ISIS and ISIS needs to
    maintain the narrative of being ascendant in order to attract
    recruits and money from across the radical Islamic world in
    that this is a way to maintain that narrative by striking
    outside their territory?
        General Dunford. Congressman, I can't say whether this
    particular attack is a result of that, but we have always said,
    and we anticipate, that as we put increased pressure on the
    enemy in Iraq and Syria and their narrative begins to erode
    because their freedom of movement erodes, the resources erode
    and so forth, that they are going to lash out and conduct
    terrorist attacks.
        And so we would expect the kinds of things we saw in
    Belgium to be a result of pressure that they feel in other
    places. There is no question about it. They will balance
    conventional tactics, which we have seen from the enemy, with
    guerilla tactics in places like Syria and Iraq when they are
    not as successful, with terrorist attacks around the world to
    maintain relevance and to continue to jihad. There is no
    question about it.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        If you all will allow me, I have got just a couple issues I
    want to touch on right quick.
        Mr. McCord, we have talked a lot about readiness and
    training and maintenance. It is true, is it not, that virtually
    all the money for training, for maintenance of aircraft and so
    forth, is in the base part of the budget?
        Secretary McCord. That is correct. The vast majority is,
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Yeah.
        Secondly, my understanding is, as you all were putting
    together your budget request, over $5 billion of that request,
    $5 billion worth, was savings, inflation and especially fuel
    savings. Now, obviously, the price of oil goes up and down, and
    you have a very long period when you have to formulate your
    budget.
        My question is, as you look at it today, how do your
    assumptions on the price of fuel measure against the reality of
    today?
        Secretary McCord. For----
        The Chairman. Is it better or worse than you assumed?
        Secretary McCord. It is better today. Are you talking most
    about fiscal year 2016 or 2017?
        The Chairman. 2017.
        Secretary McCord. For 2017. The prices that we were
    directed to assume are higher than what are prevailing today.
    As you note, that fiscal year hasn't even started and won't
    start for some time, and it will go a year after that. So there
    is a long time for these prices to have to hold before such
    savings would actually be realizable. But, yes, they are lower
    today.
        The Chairman. Well, I just am a little concerned that there
    are assumptions built in the budget. And nobody knows what the
    price of oil is going to be, although it has been going up some
    in recent days. But as you point out, this doesn't even start
    until October 1. I was just wondering how it measured up.
        10 U.S.C. 153 requires that the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs provide a risk assessment to Congress by February 15. We
    heard from the service chiefs that they have provided that
    input to the Chairman. My understanding is it has been done,
    and it is sitting in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
    somewhere. Do you all have any clue about when this might be
    coming?
        General Dunford. Mr. Chairman, I can answer that. We did
    complete it some time ago. What we wanted to do was bring the
    chiefs together in The Tank to discuss it with the Secretary.
    We did that a week ago Monday. And so we now have that to the
    Secretary and that should be coming over right away. I mean, it
    is complete.
        We worked on it pretty hard this time, Mr. Chairman. And
    what you will see is a different organizational construct. We
    tried to take a look at each of the five challenges we have
    spoken about and really get after in a meaningful way the risks
    associated with each one of those five challenges and then what
    I would call a crosscutting risk of the joint force.
        So while it has been a couple weeks late now, I hope you
    will find it worth it. And, again, one of the reasons why we
    kept it a little bit longer was so we could have an opportunity
    to do a face-to-face with the chiefs and the Secretary, and we
    did complete that last Monday.
        The Chairman. Well, I do think this is important, and so I
    look forward to it. It is significant for the committee.
        If I can just make an offer again to both of you, it has
    been one of my goals--and I have certainly not been as
    successful as I wanted to--to reduce the paperwork burdens that
    Congress puts on the Department, so fewer reports, if a
    briefing can be done, a one-time report rather than a recurring
    report.
        I would offer, again, if you all want to submit to us
    reports that you think are superfluous or overly burdensome,
    not worth the time and effort, get me that. And I will
    definitely look at it, because I want to continue to reduce the
    unnecessary or less-than-necessary paperwork burdens that
    Congress puts on the Department.
        At the same time, as you have heard today, what is left we
    are serious about. And so time is important. Again, we talked
    about the ISIS report, come up with reprogramming requests. We
    don't have a strategy on where it is happening. So I am trying
    to have fewer things but be serious about the ones that we
    have.
        Please tell me and get it to me about things you think are
    unnecessary. But at the same time, as you have heard some of
    today, I think there is frustration when the law is not
    complied with.
        Finally, General Dunford, I saw an open letter--I don't
    know--signed by several dozen retired military, other notable
    names, that the time was right to relook at Goldwater-Nichols
    of 30 years ago and that we needed to be serious that
    significant changes were in order, although they did not detail
    what those changes should be, by the way, in the letter.
        So I want to ask you your view. I know there is a fair
    amount of interest about examining and perhaps modifying the
    Goldwater-Nichols requirements. Please tell me where you think
    we are on that, if it needs to happen, and then suggestions you
    may have.
        General Dunford. Thanks, Chairman.
        First of all, I do think there is an imperative for reform
    at this time, and I think it is a result of a change in the
    character of war. The basic nature of war, in my estimation,
    doesn't change. The character of war has changed. And by that
    specifically, I mean that most of the crises and contingencies
    that we have today, immediately transregional; they cut across
    multiple combatant commands. They are multidomain: sea, air,
    space, cyberspace, undersea. And they are multifunctional:
    ballistic missile defense, special operations, strike
    capabilities, and so forth. And that has changed the nature of
    integration of the joint force and, frankly, the requirements
    for the Secretary to make timely decisions in a transregional,
    multidomain, multifunctional fight.
        So I think the more fundamental areas that we need to look
    at for change with regard to Goldwater-Nichols is, number one,
    making sure that the Secretary does have the ability to make
    decisions in a timely manner and making sure he does have the
    ability to integrate the joint force in that transregional,
    multidomain, multifunctional fight.
        It also requires, in my estimation, the Joint Staff to take
    a different approach to strategy and to ensure that we write
    strategies for, for example, the problem sets we spoke about
    today. So it isn't just an aggregation of operations plans if
    you are dealing with a Russia or a China, but you have a
    strategic framework within which those operations plans are
    met. And I think the National Military Strategy needs to be
    refined in order to provide that framework within which OPLANs
    [operations plans] are developed.
        And then the final piece of that in execution is the
    Secretary's ability to prioritize and allocate resources in a
    timely manner for a fight that is ongoing in multiple combatant
    commands at the same time. So, from my perspective, as we think
    about reform, we should focus on the character of war and what
    reforms are necessary to make sure we can fight in the 21st
    century.
        And what I have alluded to are some fundamental changes in
    warfighting in the 21st century that I think we can reinforce
    and optimize the joint force's ability to meet with some very
    fundamental changes. And I am prepared to make those
    recommendations to you, Chairman.
        Secretary Carter. And may I just second that. That is
    exactly along the lines that we are thinking, Chairman, as I
    alluded to earlier. Obviously, we will need your support if any
    of that requires statutory change, but those are the dimensions
    to which I am looking to the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs
    of Staff, and especially the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, given the changed nature of warfare. We would like to
    strengthen that.
        The Chairman. Well, I am anxious to see what you suggest,
    even if it is not all the reforms that some of these other
    folks are pursuing. But, obviously, with markup basically for
    this committee about a month away, for us to have time to look
    at it, we will want to see it promptly.
        Secretary Carter. I am planning that, to do that quite
    soon, and it will involve the capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff and the Chairman, while preserving the independent
    military advice that they provide to me and the President.
        The Chairman. Okay. Good. Thank you. Thank you, all three,
    for being here today. The hearing stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================

                                 A P P E N D I X

                                 March 22, 2016

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 22, 2016

    =======================================================================

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 March 22, 2016

    =======================================================================

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

        Mr. McCord. During the House Armed Services Committee hearing on
    March 22, 2016, you asked about a report which was requested in the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law
    110-181). A member of your staff, Mr. Jason McMahon, confirmed section
    807 as the item of interest to you. The Department produced section 807
    reports for FY2009, and every subsequent year up to and including the
    report for FY2014. The reports and accompanying data are posted on the
    Department's Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) public
    webpage:
        http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/cp/
    acquisition_of_services_policy.html
        The files are large, because they contain the report and the
    inventory listing of service contracts. The inventory data for FY2015
    is posted, but the report is not yet finished. The reports are usually
    finished in July or August for the previous year's data.
        Every year when complete, these reports and the corresponding
    inventory listings are sent to the defense committees, the Speaker of
    the House and President of the Senate. They are then posted on the
    website above. A Federal Register notice is also published to notify
    the public of the update.   [See page 38.]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 22, 2016

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

        Mr. Lamborn. The Director of National Intelligence recently
    testified to Congress that ``Russia and China continue to pursue weapon
    systems capable of destroying satellites on orbit, placing U.S.
    satellites at greater risk in the next few years.'' 1. Please describe
    the foreign counterspace threat. 2. Can you confirm that Russia and
    China both have or have tested ASAT weapons launched by ballistic
    missiles?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mr. Lamborn. You said in a recent speech in San Francisco that
    ``DOD must now prepare for and seek to prevent the possibility of a
    conflict that extends into space, and we are.'' What exactly is the
    Department doing to prepare for such a conflict, from resourcing and
    training to developing operational capabilities? What is at risk if we
    lose our space capabilities early in a conflict, and how will this
    affect our ability to fight and win wars?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mr. Lamborn. Secetary Carter said in a recent speech in San
    Francisco that ``DOD must now prepare for and seek to prevent the
    possibility of a conflict that extends into space, and we are.'' What
    exactly is the Department doing to prepare for such a conflict, from
    resourcing and training to developing operational capabilities? What is
    at risk if we lose our space capabilities early in a conflict, and how
    will this affect our ability to fight and win wars?
        General Dunford. Space is essential to the defense of the homeland,
    allies, and interests abroad. Space-based capabilities such as
    positioning, navigation, and timing signals; protected and secured
    communications; and strategic and theater missile warning underpin
    Joint Force operations. Our space systems increase our Joint Force's
    overall efficiency and effectiveness while helping to reduce risk and
    limit losses. The Department is working to ensure that the United
    States does not cede the space domain and that we maintain our access
    to, and freedom of action with, space-borne capabilities. Initiatives
    include the development of Joint doctrine for space operations, and
    ways to increase space system and architecture resiliency and
    survivability.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
        Ms. Speier. How does DOD intend to ensure notifications of released
    sex offenders reach the appropriate local law enforcement jurisdiction
    personnel where that offender intends to reside?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Ms. Speier. How will the Director of Emergency Services (DES) or
    Provost Marshals Office account for sex offenders on post?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Ms. Speier. How do you plan to track offenders who served no
    confinement time?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Ms. Speier. How do you intend to track offenders in States that do
    not utilize the SORNA Exchange Portal?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Ms. Speier. How do you plan to comply with International Meagan's
    Law (IML) as it applies to sending dependents overseas that are
    convicted sex offenders?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Ms. Speier. For purposes of uniformity and continuity, it makes the
    most sense to have a universal set of policies/practices across all
    services that is managed by OSD and not the service component heads.
    Can you explain to the committee why DOD has chosen to maintain
    differentiating regulations, policies, and practices in each of the
    service branches?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
        Mr. Coffman. Secretary Carter recently stated, ``We don't want a
    draft . . . We don't want people chosen for us. We want to pick people.
    That's what the All-Volunteer Force is all about. That's why the All-
    Volunteer Force is so excellent.'' He also recently noted that one-
    third of Americans aren't eligible for military service for various
    reasons. Given the quality and the success of the All-Volunteer Force,
    do you believe maintaining the selective service system in its current
    form is necessary as a matter of defense policy?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mr. Coffman. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000
    combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities
    or traumatic brain injury for misconduct. These discharges have
    significant impact on those veterans' eligibility for benefits and
    services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental
    health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its
    discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members
    suffering from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the
    cracks, and thousands more were discharged prior to the Department's
    changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed
    services, not just to the Army. From the DOD perspective, do you
    believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly to
    veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if
    so, do you have any specific proposals?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mr. Coffman. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve
    forces are disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-
    connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact
    that the services can decline to provide them separation physicals,
    which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do you believe
    that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard
    members and reservists of all branches of service if they'd like a
    physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How
    do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members' service-connected
    injuries are documented?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mr. Coffman. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000
    combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities
    or traumatic brain injury for misconduct. These discharges have
    significant impact on those veterans' eligibility for benefits and
    services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental
    health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its
    discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members
    suffering from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the
    cracks, and thousands more were discharged prior to the Department's
    changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed
    services, not just to the Army. From the DOD perspective, do you
    believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly to
    veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if
    so, do you have any specific proposals?
        General Dunford. The Department is committed to ensuring that
    Service members who experience mental health issues are accurately
    diagnosed, receive the treatment, benefits, and follow-on care and
    benefits commensurate with their characterization of service, and are
    not unfairly stigmatized or inappropriately subjected to negative
    administrative or punitive action. The Military Department Review
    Boards, including the Discharge Review Boards, have robust procedures
    and responsive personnel in place to ensure full and fair reviews of
    requests from members and former members of the Armed Forces to change
    the characterization of their discharges or seek other relief based
    upon a diagnosed mental health condition.
        The law requires the Military Departments to conduct a health
    assessment sufficient to evaluate the health of all members at the time
    of separation. This assessment determines if existing medical
    conditions were incurred during active duty service, provides a
    baseline for future care, completes a member's military record, and
    provides a final opportunity to document health concerns, exposures, or
    risk factors associated with active duty service, prior to separation.
    It is DOD policy that the Service Review Boards considering post-
    traumatic stress or traumatic brain injury cases include a physician,
    clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. Each Military Department has
    assigned at least one physician on a permanent, full-time basis to the
    Military Department Review Boards Agency, usually the Offices of the
    Surgeons General, where such expertise is resident. These assigned
    physicians provide each Board with the expertise and guidance necessary
    to assess any medical issues, to include mental health-related matters,
    in their deliberations over requests for records corrections.
        Mr. Coffman. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve
    forces are disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-
    connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact
    that the services can decline to provide them separation physicals,
    which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do you believe
    that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard
    members and reservists of all branches of service if they'd like a
    physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How
    do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members' service-connected
    injuries are documented?
        General Dunford. Current Department of Defense policy requires all
    Reserve Component (RC) members serving 180 days or more on active duty
    or more than 30 days in support of a contingency operation to have a
    Separation Health Physical Exam (SHPE). All Services and the National
    Guard Bureau are fully committed to meeting this requirement to ensure
    any service related injury or disability is properly identified,
    evaluated, and documented prior to separation.
        Mr. Coffman. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000
    combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities
    or traumatic brain injury for misconduct. These discharges have
    significant impact on those veterans' eligibility for benefits and
    services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental
    health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its
    discharge process to prevent the improper separation of service members
    suffering from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the
    cracks, and thousands more were discharged prior to the Department's
    changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the armed
    services, not just to the Army. From the DOD perspective, do you
    believe that the discharge review boards should be more friendly to
    veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if
    so, do you have any specific proposals?
        Mr. McCord. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
        Mr. Coffman. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve
    forces are disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-
    connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact
    that the services can decline to provide them separation physicals,
    which are actually mandatory for Active Duty members. Do you believe
    that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard
    members and reservists of all branches of service if they'd like a
    physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How
    do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members' service-connected
    injuries are documented?
        Mr. McCord. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH
        Ms. Duckworth. During the hearing, General Dunford indicated there
    were still interagency barriers that limit the effectiveness of the
    DOD's transregional terrorism plan. Please provide a detailed list,
    along with an accompanying explanation of each, of what those barriers
    are, indicating where appropriate, what, if any statutory impediments
    are limiting your efforts and where congressional action is required.
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Ms. Duckworth. During the hearing, General Dunford indicated there
    were still interagency barriers that limit the effectiveness of the
    DOD's transregional terrorism plan. Please provide a detailed list,
    along with an accompanying explanation of each, of what those barriers
    are, indicating where appropriate, what, if any statutory impediments
    are limiting your efforts and where congressional action is required.
        General Dunford. We are working with Interagency and international
    partners to implement a comprehensive approach designed to counter
    threat networks operating across our various Geographic Combatant
    Command boundaries. The Joint Force lacks sufficiently flexible
    transregional fiscal authorities or appropriation language that would
    allow for streamlined movement of resources between Combatant Command
    regional boundaries.
        While we have not identified specific statutory impediments that
    are limiting our current approach, we are undertaking a holistic look
    at this issue and will be prepared to seek Congressional action as
    appropriate in the future.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI
        Mr. Takai. In regard to the ``pivot to Asia'' strategy--the
    Department has been on the Hill to do notifications for the Maritime
    Security Initiative money in FY16. You are currently looking to execute
    funding mostly for the Philippines and some for Vietnam, Malaysia, and
    Indonesia. I have heard big ideas about the foreign military sales and
    financing being provided under a rubric of ``sense, share, and
    contribute.'' Please provide information about FY16 funding, and what
    you plan on doing with the $60 million FY17 request?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]
        Mr. Takai. North Korea is developing its nuclear weapons and long-
    range ballistic missile programs in defiance of U.N. Security Council
    resolutions. Alarmingly, this year North Korea conducted its fourth
    nuclear test and last month, launched a satellite into orbit using
    long-range ballistic missile technology. While U.N. resolutions
    requiring member states to inspect all cargo in and out of North Korea
    for illicit goods and arms are helpful, and I applaud the
    administration for stepping up its sanctions policy to freeze North
    Korean government property in America, and ban U.S. exports to, or
    investment in, North Korea, I have to ask this question. If the U.S. is
    so concerned that North Korea may develop the ability to place a bomb
    on a long-range ballistic missile that could reach the U.S. West Coast,
    WHEN are we going to convert the Aegis missile defense test site in
    Hawaii into a combat-ready facility to help protect the U.S. mainland?
        Secretary Carter. [No answer was available at the time of
    printing.]

                                      [all]