[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-110]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 15, 2016
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Buck, Lt Gen David J., USAF, Commander, Joint Functional
Component Command for Space
Calvelli, Frank, Principal Deputy Director, National
Reconnaissance Office
Cardillo, Robert, Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency
Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command
Loverro, Douglas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense
Weatherington, Dyke, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Space, Strategic, and Intelligence Systems, U.S. Department
of Defense
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Buck, Lt Gen David J......................................... 71
Calvelli, Frank.............................................. 93
Cardillo, Robert............................................. 85
Hyten, Gen John E............................................ 29
Loverro, Douglas............................................. 48
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces........................... 27
Weatherington, Dyke.......................................... 61
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Slide: Commercial Launch Environment......................... 107
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bridenstine.............................................. 111
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 135
Mr. Cooper................................................... 125
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 129
Mr. Peters................................................... 136
Mr. Rogers................................................... 115
Mr. Turner................................................... 136
FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 15, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:05 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rogers. All right. This hearing of the House Armed
Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here and
taking the time to prepare for this hearing.
We are going to have a problem with votes in a little
while, crunching our time. We have a big panel, so the ranking
member and I have agreed that we are going to dispense with
opening statements, both on our side and on your side, so we
can go straight to questions and answers and try to get both
the open side of this hearing as well as the classified part of
this hearing done before they call us for votes, which we think
will be around, what, 4:00? 3:30 or 4:00. I have no control
over that.
So anyway, we will accept the opening statements for the
record and go straight to questions, and I will recognize
myself for the first set of questions. That is without
objection. All right.
[The prepared statements can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 27.]
Mr. Rogers. General Hyten, some have suggested that we
should--well, first let me for the record acknowledge who all
we have for witnesses here today.
We have General John Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space
Command; Mr. Doug Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy; Dyke Weatherington, Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space, Strategic and
Intelligence Systems. I would like to see your business card.
That is a lot to put on there.
Lieutenant General David Buck, Commander Joint Functional
Component Command for Space; and Mr. Robert Cardillo, Director
of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; as well as Frank
Calvelli, Director of the National Reconnaissance Office,
deputy director. It says director here. I was trying to give
you a promotion.
Mr. Calvelli. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Betty wouldn't like that, would she?
Mr. Calvelli. No, she wouldn't.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you all for being here. All right. We
will go to questioning.
General Hyten, some have suggested that we should phase out
Atlas V and go to Delta IV and Falcon 9 mix prior to a new U.S.
engine being built. In testimony at the SASC [Senate Armed
Services Committee] earlier this month, the Secretary of the
Air Force stated that preliminary analysis showed it was going
to cost $1.5 to $5 billion in additional costs, depending on
assumptions of when to transition.
Can you provide your perspective on going to Delta-Falcon-
only capability before we replace the RD-180? If this cost had
to be taken out of existing space accounts, what would be the
impact on the Air Force space mission?
General Hyten. Thank you, Congressman. The impact on the
existing Air Force space mission would be significant, because
if you have to take billions of dollars out and try to do
something else with it, what are you going to take out? Are we
going to stop doing GPS [Global Positioning System]? Are we
going to stop doing missile warning? Are we going to stop doing
satellite communications? Those are very, very difficult
questions. So it will actually come back to the Air Force and
we will have to decide where to do that.
The number $1.5 to $5 billion is a significant number. What
it should really tell you is, that in reality, we don't know
how much that will cost us. The reason we don't know how much
it will cost us, and the estimates are so huge is because, as
the Secretary said, we have so many assumptions about what the
future is going to look like. Are we going to have a Falcon 9
Heavy in the interim period between 2019 and 2022? What is the
industry going to look like between 2019 and 2022? All those
questions we really don't know the answer to.
We know if we come off of Atlas and go to Delta, there are
certain things we have to do. SBIRS and AEHF, two of our big
satellites today, the Space-Based Infrared System, the Advanced
Extremely High Frequency satellite system, only fly on Atlas
today, so we would have to figure out on how to move those to
Delta. We would have to do the engineering analysis and maybe
reconfigure those satellites and reconfigure the interfaces to
do that, which means we will have to store AEHF and SBIRS for a
certain period of time. All that costs us money. That costs us
money in the near years.
Then Delta will be more expensive. There is no doubt Delta
will be more expensive. The number is going to be in the
billions, there is no doubt about that, but exactly where it
comes out, I don't know. So planning for uncertainty is not a
good place to be. So we would like to plan for certainty in the
transition, which is why we are asking for additional RD-180s
to allow us to compete.
Goodness knows we want off the Russian engine as fast as
any human being on the planet. We want off the Russian engine
as fast as possible. But, asking the American taxpayers to
write a check for multiple billions of dollars in the future
for an unknown is a very difficult thing to do, and for the Air
Force, that will be a very difficult budget issue to work.
Mr. Rogers. And I would like for the record to ask you this
question. We have had testimony on panels that you have sat on,
as well as a host of other people at this table, as well as
others, who have said that they believe with some degree of
confidence that we can have a replacement engine and have it
certified in the 2020 to 2022, 2023 timeframe. Is that
something you still believe is accurate?
General Hyten. So the two contracts we have just signed,
for the first stage engine, both require delivery of that
engine by December of 2019. It will then take 2 to 3 years to
certify that into a rocket system to allow us to launch. So
that means by 2022 to 2023, we should be ready to launch.
Mr. Rogers. And you have confidence in that timeframe?
General Hyten. I have more confidence today than I did last
year. There is always risk in any development program that is
looking at new technology. So there is risk in that, but I am
more confident this year with both the Aerojet Rocketdyne
solution, as well as the Blue Origin solution than I was last
year, because the progress that we have made working with
industry and the progress that I have seen from those two
companies.
Mr. Rogers. And my point in raising that is that this is
not an infinite amount of time that we are talking about, that
we have got to wrestle with this RD-180 issue, that we can see
the light at the end of the tunnel if we just remain steadfast
and find a way to make this--navigate these waters, and then
get off of it permanently.
Mr. Calvelli, you heard General Hyten's observations about
the Delta-Falcon mix. Do you agree with those, and can you tell
us what impact that would have on NRO [National Reconnaissance
Office] operations?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes. I agree with what General Hyten
answered, and as well as, you know, the implications to us are
the same that the Air Force has, and I think one of the big
things here would be the timing. So, for example, I have got
unique vehicles that were designed around flying on an Atlas.
If I was told, like, tomorrow they could not go on an Atlas, I
mean, the cost would be higher. If it is a gradual transition
over a period of years, the cost would be lower. And so it all
depends on the timeframe of the decision is made.
Mr. Rogers. But you would agree--I am asking. I don't want
to ask leading questions----
Mr. Calvelli. Okay.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. We are not in the courtroom, but
would you agree that the timeframe after you get past 3 to 5
years is just hard to predict. I mean, there is no way to know
that you are going to have, what kind of launch opportunities
are going to be out there or demands.
Mr. Calvelli. Sure. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Rogers. All right. The underpinning of the Air Force
RD-180 replacement plan is based on creating two commercially
viable launch systems which all meet the EELV [Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle] requirements. Let me give you two
examples of what I have heard about the commercial market from
experts on this point that we were just talking about. General
Mitchell's study on the RD-180 reliance mitigation stated,
quote, ``Launch capability exceeds demand three to one to
service this fixed market,'' closed quote. And you can see the
monitors for a slide on this commercial launch environment
according to General Mitchell's report.
[The slide referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
107.]
Mr. Rogers. Separately, Ms. Katrina McFarland, who leads
acquisition in OSD-AT&L [Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics], stated in one of our
launch hearings last year that, quote, ``The 2014 commercial
space transportation forecast that came out has a flat line on
what we can anticipate in the future that would bring in, in
terms of commercial NGO [non-governmental organization] to the
government. They are all competing for the same size pie,''
close quote.
General Hyten and Mr. Weatherington, do you disagree with
General Mitchell and Ms. McFarland's assessment of the
commercial launch market? General Hyten first.
General Hyten. So if you look at that chart, the one thing
that should be clear to everybody is that we have never
predicted the commercial launch market correctly. I don't think
we fully understand what the commercial launch market is going
to be, and I wouldn't bet exactly where the commercial launch
market is going to end up in 3 to 5 years again.
What I would say is the commercial launch market is more
mature. And the one thing, if you look at those numbers on
there, there are still significant numbers available for the
commercial launch industry. Our launch industry, unfortunately,
has not been able to ever compete for those, because we have
been way too high priced. If you look at how many EELVs, how
many of the rockets, Atlas and Delta, that we have launched
since the beginning, 92. Of those 92, 62 were for the
Department of Defense [DOD] and the national security missions.
Sixteen were for NASA, and 14 were for the commercial sector,
only 14.
Mr. Rogers. That is amazing.
General Hyten. Fourteen in the entire history of the
program. So whatever we do, we need to be more competitive and
more commercially viable as we get to the out years. But that
is why it is a public/private partnership, because the
commercial sector is not there right now. We believe that,
eventually, there will be a commercial industry in space, but
even with the commercial industry we have right now, we need to
be more competitive in----
Mr. Rogers. What do you base that on when you say you
believe there will be more of a commercial demand?
General Hyten. Because I watch the maturation, especially
in the satellite communication business, of how the satellite
communication business has flourished in recent years. When we
started these programs back in the mid-1990s, there was really
no commercial business. There is a commercial business now. A
lot of that commercial business goes overseas to launch. There
is also a new business taking place, mostly out of Silicon
Valley, that many people call ``new space'' that is looking at
distributed constellations of numbers of small satellites. One
of those companies is going to figure that out, because there
is a huge business case for them to figure it out. When that
happens, I can't tell you, I am not a business person. But I
can tell you that that is much different than it was in the
1990s when we started down this path.
Mr. Rogers. All right. Mr. Weatherington, you heard me try
to recite Ms. McFarland and General Mitchell's observations.
What are your thoughts?
Mr. Weatherington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So to leverage
on what General Hyten said, from AT&L's perspective, the launch
market really has three components. It has got the NSS
[national security space] component; it has got the other U.S.
Government component, largely NASA [National Aeronautics and
Space Administration]; and it has got the commercial
components. And as General Hyten indicated, all three of these
components are difficult to predict in the future. Let me just
give you one example. So for national security space, our
manifest is flat to trending slightly downward through the FYDP
[Future Years Defense Plan]. Later on, you will probably ask us
some questions on resiliency, and General Hyten and his staff
are working hard to develop strategies that address our lack of
resiliency today.
One of those potential solutions is to disaggregate some
constellations that likely would result in an increase in NSS
launch capacity, but we aren't there yet. So it is difficult to
predict what the NSS launch manifest will be in the future.
Other government contractors, NASA, we have got the
question of where the International Space Station is going to
go in the future, so that is an unknown. And, again, as General
Hyten said, there is really two components for commercial:
there is the base of commercial, commercial SATCOM [satellite
communications], supporting a variety of users; and then this
new space market that may be emerging.
Now, you know, we bought this before about 10 years ago
where we anticipated the significant increase in commercial
space, and that did not materialize. So I think the point here
is we have to plan for various contingencies. From AT&L's
perspective, we think the best solution moving forward is a
plan that gives us two certified launch providers that support
the entire NSS manifest, and some fraction of their capability
could be used for the commercial or other government market. If
that does not transpire, we still need two certified launch
providers to provide the U.S. Government assured access to
space.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The Chair now yields to the ranking
member from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the chairman. I would also like to
welcome the witnesses. It is a very distinguished panel. I will
be saving most of my questions for the classified session
later, but I would first like to associate myself with General
Hyten's answer to the chairman regarding the RD-180. I thought
that was very well expressed.
It worries me greatly the GPS OCX [Next Generation
Operational Control System] ground system delays and cost
overruns. And I noted that Lieutenant General Sam Greaves said
that, quote, ``It is the number one troubled program within the
Department of Defense,'' end of quote.
Sadly there is a lot of competition for that title, but to
be the winner is not something to be proud of. So if any of you
would like to comment on that situation, I would love to hear
your answer.
General Hyten. Thank you, sir. I will start. I have been on
the record expressing my displeasure of the OCX program. I
called it a disaster in the press. And I think any program that
is a billion dollars over budget and 5 years late meets the
definition of a disaster. But the question we have to ask
ourselves is what is the best way forward, what is the best way
out of this.
And Mr. Kendall and AT&L, and I will let Mr. Weatherington
talk about the details, had a session in December, and a
session just last week with the contractor, going through the
details looking at the various options. And as we sit here
today, the best answer is for Raytheon, the contractor
involved, to deliver that capability in a time certain manner
and give us the capability that we need to make sure that GPS
is available for future years in a cyber secure environment.
And I will let Mr. Weatherington answer the acquisition
details.
Mr. Weatherington. Sir, again, to leverage on General
Hyten's comments, Secretary Kendall signed out an ADM
[Acquisition Decision Memorandum] on 22 December that provided
an additional 24 months of schedule for the program. It also
set a requirement for quarterly deep dives. As General Hyten
indicated, that first deep dive took place last week out at
Aurora, Colorado. That was attended by Mr. Kendall and the
Secretary of the Air Force, so I think that indicates this
problem has significant senior leadership attention in the
Department.
Currently, we believe there is reasonable expectation that
Raytheon can deliver the capability that we need, but Mr.
Kendall also directed the Air Force to develop off-ramps for
the program in the situation that we can't close on this
program.
I think it is also important to point out that while the
program is troubled, the capability that OCX delivers is
absolutely critical to the warfighter. We have got to improve
our resiliency both in space and in ground, and that was one of
the significant goals that OCX had. So whatever we do for the
program specifically, we have to deliver that capability to the
warfighter.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you. I have no more questions, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the ranking member. The Chair now
recognizes the vice chairman of the committee, Mr. Lamborn of
Colorado, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this will be
both for General Hyten and General Buck, but there is a
difference between JICSpOC [Joint Interagency Combined Space
Operations Center] and JSpOC [Joint Space Operations Center].
Can you explain why each one is--where it is at and what are
the plans going forward, especially for JICSpOC, which is the
newer of those two organizations?
General Hyten. Yes, sir. For the record, the Joint Space
Operations Center is at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
It is the day-to-day operation center that is commanded by
General Dave Buck, the commander of the joint force component
under Strategic Command, to lead the day-to-day operations.
And they have two fundamental missions that drive their
focus: number one, they have to be organized, trained, and
equipped to provide space support to theater warfighters around
the world, and that is what they do tremendously well every
day. And the second piece is they have to provide us
situational awareness of everything that is going on in space.
They end up providing that situational awareness for us and for
users around the world, including international partners as
well as commercial partners.
What we realized is that if conflict does, God forbid,
extend into space someday, we need to have the capability to
focus on planning for that conflict. And so we decided that we
would create an experimental organization at Schriever Air
Force Base in Colorado, to look at experimentation of that
conflict should it one day occur. We started that on the 1st of
October and we continue to do that.
The reason that Schriever Air Force Base was chosen was
really for a very simple reason, is that Schriever Air Force
Base has unique connectivity. We can talk about that
connectivity in detail in the classified session, but basically
the bottom line is it is connected to every national security
ground station in the world from Schriever Air Force Base. That
connectivity is essentially important so that you can respond
real-time to concerns and contingencies that may arise in space
someday.
And so that is the basic reason why the JICSpOC, the Joint
Interagency Combined Space Operations Center, was put at
Schriever Air Force Base.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Yeah, General.
General Buck. Yeah. General, thank you, sir. I have nothing
more to add. I think it was a very succinct answer and spot on.
Mr. Lamborn. All right. Great. And then what is next for
JICSpOC after the fourth and last experimental period in May?
General Hyten. So after the fourth experimental period in
the JICSpOC--well, actually we are going through that process
right now. We have learned a great deal from the first three
periods. We are continuing to look. We have proposals up to the
senior leadership in the Department now about how we transition
to a future construct.
You will see in our 2017 President's budget that we have
requested money, a small amount of money, for the JICSpOC, as
well as continuing funding for the JSpOC and the JSpOC mission
system. We believe that both of those will have a significant
role in the future, but that role will be determined by the
senior leadership in the Department as we come to the end, but
those recommendations are coming forward now.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I am just really excited about the
potential for the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community [IC] working together in an organized, formal way for
the first time ever when it comes to space.
General Hyten. Well thank you, Congressman, for that
statement, because to me that is the number one lesson learned
from the JICSpOC right now, is that the critical partnership we
have with the NRO and the Intelligence Community, it is better
than I have ever seen it in my 35-year career. It is remarkable
the progress that we are making, and that partnership is
critical to the future.
Mr. Lamborn. Would anyone from the Intelligence Community
like to add anything?
Mr. Calvelli. Yes. So as you know--and I couldn't echo
better the words General Hyten said, but as you know, I mean,
there are adversaries out there that are trying to deny our
capabilities that we have in space and the decisive advantage
that space gives us.
The JICSpOC is an amazing effort between the IC and the DOD
to share information, whether that is indications and warning,
or whether it is on defensive kinds of maneuvers that we
potentially could do, through a whole unity of effort between
the two organizations.
And to me from an IC perspective, the more information we
have between ourselves to share information and protect our
systems, the better off we will be. So it is a great
opportunity, and it is a great teamwork between the IC and DOD.
Mr. Cardillo. I would just quickly echo those comments on
both ends. It is a synergy we haven't seen before. NGA
[National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] is fully
participating in all of these experiments so that we can best
serve the Nation.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And one last question. General
Hyten, you are asking for $20 million for a ground enterprise
to take 17 different interfaces for ground control systems and
make one system, so training is much more consistent throughout
the Air Force. Do you want to respond to that?
General Hyten. So it is taking 17 different ground systems
that we have right now, and not creating a single ground
system, but creating a single interface and a single common
structure, because today we have to train our airmen, top rate,
17 different systems. That is inefficient, it is expensive, and
it is also hard on our airmen.
So we would like to have a common interface, a common
structure that everything plugs into so that the ground systems
of the future will all be built to plug into that same common
interface as we walk into that. That is what we are really
talking about, the enterprise ground. That is why it is a
fairly small amount of money, because it is really engineering
work, system engineering analysis that has to be done to define
where we are going to go in the future.
Because the money for the ground systems is actually in all
these big programs, SBIRS, AEHF, GPS, they all have significant
funding for the ground. The question is, how do we actually
build that ground structure in the future so it is a common
structure for our airmen to operate on.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you very much.
General Hyten. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Nebraska, Mr. Ashford, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a brief
question, if I might. I was out at STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic
Command] last week and met with General Wilson, and he gave a
great brief on all the issues they are dealing with. Could
someone answer, I do--one of the areas we talked about, of
course, and we talk about a lot in here is cyber and being able
to stand up the force necessary by 2018 to address those
issues. Could someone just give a comment, General, on where
that is? General Hyten.
General Hyten. So I actually think I am the only one on the
panel that can, so I apologize to my panel members, but I have
cyber underneath my command as well. And so part of our job in
the Air Force is to man our section of the Cyber Mission Force,
39 teams that we have to field. We are in the process of
building those out right now.
The Cyber Mission Force is a key element. It consists of
national mission teams to protect the Nation, combat mission
teams to support the combatant commanders, and cyber protection
teams to defend our own capabilities.
We are making progress. We are a little behind in the Air
Force in stepping up to that. We have a training pipeline that
is limited in how many people we can put through that. I know
that commanders for Strategic Command and the commander of
Cyber Command have both complained to my leadership about us
going faster. We are doing everything we can to put extra
capabilities, and figure out smarter ways to train our cyber
professionals to get there.
Mr. Ashford. Thanks, General. Could I ask one follow-up? Do
you see a benefit, we had some discussions about, to ramp up
the training, to provide additional training sites, additional
training opportunities? Is that something you are thinking
about doing?
General Hyten. It is. In fact, the Air National Guard is
standing up a new unit in Arkansas----
Mr. Ashford. Right.
General Hyten [continuing]. And one of the things we are
looking at is how to better leverage the Guard as a total force
to provide us additional training opportunities.
Mr. Ashford. And I think Nebraska is one of those National
Guard teams as well.
General Hyten. Yes. And the Guard is a perfect partner in
cyber, more than maybe any other mission, because it can be
done from anywhere, it requires unique training, it doesn't
require 24/7, because you can come in and come out. It is a
perfect total force mission, and we are looking at new ways to
leverage the Guard and the Reserve to do that.
Mr. Ashford. Thanks, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
Chairman Forbes for 5 minutes for any questions he may have.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for being here today.
Earlier this month in a House Appropriations hearing with
Secretary James and General Welsh, they were asked a question
about eliminating single-point failures in space launch by
continuing development of secondary launch sites at Wallops
Island, Virginia, and Kodiak, Alaska, which help support small-
and medium-class launches for DOD, civil, and commercial users.
In response, General Welsh stated that, quote, ``As we look at
the space enterprise and how we do it differently in the future
as we look at more disaggregation, micro sats [satellites],
cube sats, small sats, things that don't have to go from a
large launch complex, I think proliferating launch complexes is
going to be a natural outshoot of this.''
He added, ``this is the kind of thing General Hyten is
talking about. How do we change the game for the long-term.''
General Hyten, as you know, Wallops and Kodiak represent
the only other launch sites in the United States capable of
launching to orbit outside of the Cape and Vandenberg. Could
you please elaborate on General Welsh's comments about
opportunities to make greater use of these space ports to
support DOD missions?
General Hyten. So the most important element in General
Welsh's statement was the existence of smaller satellites and
different satellite architectures in the future. We believe,
and we have built something we call the Space Enterprise
Vision, the joint vision with the National Reconnaissance
Office, where we look at different ways of doing business in
the future. And smaller satellites--not necessarily small, but
smaller satellites are a key piece of that puzzle.
One of the reasons that we only operate out of the Cape and
Vandenberg today, Cape Canaveral in Florida and Vandenberg in
California, is because the satellite processing facilities that
are required in order to move those satellites onto the rockets
only exist at the Cape and Vandenberg. We could not do that out
of Kodiak or Wallops today.
But as we move into a different structure where we have
smaller satellites, and small satellites, and maybe cube sats
as well as someday to do missions, we will need to take
advantage of it. That also builds resiliency into our launch
infrastructure. We have vulnerabilities when everybody knows
that the only place that we launch our rockets from are at Cape
Canaveral and Vandenberg. It is better to have more places to
launch from.
I will be going up to Alaska in 2 months to visit Kodiak. I
look forward to that. I have seen Wallops in the past. I did
Wallops missions way, way back when, when I was a captain.
There are advantages of going there, but, again, the satellites
have to be ready. It is satellites that drive the launch
business, not the rockets. If the satellites are there, then
the launch industry will respond to it.
Mr. Forbes. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Loverro, how are DOD space procurement policies taking
into account the opportunities that newer orbital launch
facilities like Wallops and Kodiak provide, and how can
Congress support efforts to make sure these launch complexes
are available to support small- and medium-class defense launch
needs?
Mr. Loverro. Sir, I think most of the policies that the
administration has put forward definitely support both
commercial and State-sponsored launch capabilities. So you have
seen a proliferation, we have talked about Kodiak and Wallops
today, but there are no less than 6 different States that have
filed for space launch ports authority.
I think this is a great example of the competitive nature
of space launch and I think that this is a place that we should
allow that industry to flourish by, again, encouraging the
commercial world and the States to go ahead and make those
investments.
I will tell you, I agree with everything that General Hyten
says, but I would also harken back to the question of what is
the launch industry going to look like in the future that we
answered when we talked about launch vehicles.
If we don't have a large commercial space industry, if we
only have the government space launch capability, we also can't
maintain economically more than a couple of launch sites, so--
because launch sites are not free. They are just not pads that
sit there by themselves. They have to be maintained. So there
has to be enough throughput. And that goes back to what General
Hyten said, you need--the satellites drive the launch
infrastructure. Launch infrastructure doesn't drive the
satellites.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you very much for your testimony. And I wish we had several
hours to go through it.
General Hyten, is the Air Force and the military dependent
upon GPS for virtually everything?
General Hyten. I think the world is dependent on GPS. The
military certainly is. We have built an amazing capability that
fundamentally changed warfare. All precision warfare--most all
precision warfare today is based on GPS. We still have laser-
guided munitions that we drop in certain areas, but most of the
munitions we drop are GPS-guided. Most of our operations are
GPS-fed. The timing signal that comes off GPS in some ways is
more important than the navigation signal. So we are
unbelievably----
Mr. Garamendi. In fact, the ATM [automated teller machine]
won't work without the timing----
General Hyten. Your ATM won't work----
Mr. Garamendi. No----
General Hyten [continuing]. Gas, stoplights stop working.
Mr. Garamendi. Do all of you gentlemen agree with that? You
know, it is like--it has been said that GPS is the single point
of failure, is that correct, for virtually everything that you
have talked about here?
General Hyten. It could be looked at as a single point of
failure, but one of the things that we do is we build
resiliency into our weapons systems, we have a backup inertial
navigation system that we use in most of our weapons systems to
allow us to do that. Nonetheless, GPS is a vulnerability, so we
are looking at a number of different ways, we can talk about
that in the closed hearing in more detail, but a number of
different ways to ensure that we can continue to operate in a
GPS-denied environment.
Mr. Garamendi. Have you considered terrestrial-based
timing?
General Hyten. There are a number of terrestrial-based
timing sources that are out there. eLoran [Enhanced Long Range
Navigation] is one of the ones we are looking at across the
coast. That is not a DOD system, but the Department of
Transportation and the Coast Guard, in particular, are looking
at that. That has significant benefits around our ports to
reduce vulnerability of GPS.
But in order for eLoran to work, there has to be eLoran
receivers that can take the signals off of eLoran, because if
you build eLoran and there are no receivers, it would be like
building GPS without the GPS receiver.
Mr. Garamendi. Are receivers possible to be built?
General Hyten. Yes, they are. But, again, somebody has to
invest in that money. The GPS market blossomed because there
was a huge commercial market. The question you have to ask
yourself for eLoran, and that is for somebody that is not on
this panel, that is the Department of Transportation question.
But what is the marketplace that will come for eLoran? It is
probably shipping, those kind of people.
Mr. Garamendi. Let's see. The Department of Defense is for
defense?
General Hyten. Department of Defense is for defense,
absolutely, and that is why we are----
Mr. Garamendi. So if somebody wanted to knock out our
electrical systems or our communication systems or our
financial systems, they would knock out the GPS, wouldn't they?
General Hyten. They would.
Mr. Garamendi. Is that a defense issue?
General Hyten. That is a defense issue. That is why we look
at that, that is why we are part of the national--Positioning,
Navigation and Timing EXCOM [executive committee].
Mr. Garamendi. Why did you write me a letter saying that
there is no role for the Department of Defense for the eLoran
system? Why is the Department of Defense not willing to spend,
like, I don't know, $50 million a year to provide the
foundational backup system to GPS? Why did you write that
letter to me?
Mr. Loverro. Sorry, sir. Is that to me? I didn't hear the--
who. It was addressed to me?
Mr. Garamendi. Well, your name was on it, so----
Mr. Loverro. Yeah. Okay. No. I just didn't hear if you said
that was to me or not, so--sir, so there was not--so we do not
have a Department of Defense requirement for GPS. You do know,
and I----
Mr. Garamendi. Well, we just established the fact that GPS
is a--that the absence of GPS is a defense issue.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. There are many issues that trans--
that go ahead and transition from defense issues to national
security issues. I would go ahead and----
Mr. Garamendi. Ah, the Department of Defense is not a
national security issue?
Mr. Loverro. No, sir. I----
Mr. Garamendi. Is that what you are saying to me?
Mr. Loverro. I absolutely agree it is. As you know, I have
told you that I wanted to look into this question more. I have
done that. I still owe you a written paper on this, I
understand.
My sense is that eLoran is one of several capabilities that
could help this issue, but I think the point that----
Mr. Garamendi. And the other ones are?
Mr. Loverro. The other ones are better GPS or GNSS [global
navigation satellite systems] user equipment, local time
sources. And, in fact, in many cases it is a combination of all
three.
Mr. Garamendi. Are they available?
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir, they are, because, in fact, the DOD
is--in our own timing infrastructure, those are the kind of
backups that we are putting into our infrastructure.
The point that General Hyten, though, made is very
important and I think it is instructive. You may not know that
when we created the newest version of GPS, we created a second
civil signal called L2 based upon the President's direction
back in 1996, because many people believed the commercial world
would adopt it. There are no L2 receivers available in the
world today, because nobody feels it necessary to listen to the
second civil signal.
So I think their concern isn't so much what is the source
of timing, which eLoran would be a good and appropriate source
for the continental United States; I think the question is how
do we make sure people adopt the receiver infrastructure to go
ahead and make the source?
Mr. Garamendi. I have got no time left, but let me just
pose this question. You can send it to me in writing along with
the other information you promised.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. I absolutely will.
Mr. Garamendi. Have other countries and other parts of the
world established a ground-based terrestrial timing system?
Mr. Loverro. Sir, as a matter of fact, they did, and they
have shut them down, because----
Mr. Garamendi. All of them?
Mr. Loverro. Yes. France, Norway, and----
Mr. Garamendi. Russia and China?
Mr. Loverro. Russia has a different system. I don't know
about Russia's status, but France, Norway, and the U.K. [United
Kingdom] have shut theirs down because of a lack of users. So
the same problem that we----
Mr. Garamendi. That is a longer question.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I will get into it with you again.
Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair will point out now we have been called for votes.
We are going to recognize Mr. Bridenstine from Oklahoma for 5
minutes, and then we will recess and come back after this
series of votes, which will be about 1 hour from right now.
The gentleman from Oklahoma is recognized.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hyten, the Air Force has requested funding for a
wideband SATCOM AOA [analysis of alternatives]. I think that is
perfectly appropriate. And then we received information in news
reports about the Air Force purchasing additional legacy
satellites, WGS [wideband global satellite communications]
satellites.
How do we make sure that we, as a country, are taking
advantage of the technological advances happening in the
commercial sector? Of course, the AOA is what I thought that
was what that was for, and now it doesn't necessarily appear
that that is going to be the case. Can you share with us how
you plan to make sure that we are taking advantage of the
commercial advancements?
General Hyten. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the
question.
The real issue there is that the AOA is going to answer
those questions. We have not made a commitment yet to build any
more WGS satellites, not one, not two, not three. We haven't
made any commitment along those lines. We won't make any
commitments about what we are going to build next until we have
done the analysis of alternatives.
The analysis of alternatives is being structured through
the staff right now. One of my panel members may be able to
comment on those, especially those that work in the Pentagon.
But it is critical that that AOA look at it across the board,
and we are going to be demanding customers of the AOA to make
sure that the commercial sector is properly looked at across
the board, not just from a provision of capabilities
standpoint, but from an opportunity to provide different
capabilities that we may not think about.
So that AOA is critical to defining the future. We are
putting those--we want to make sure that that is done in a very
time certain environment. We hope to get it done by March the
17th so we can meet the congressional direction there. That is
going to be a fast time to do an AOA, but the faster we do
AOAs, the better they are, because AOAs that take a long time
tend to be somewhat irrelevant by the time they are reported
out.
Mr. Bridenstine. Got it.
And, Secretary Loverro, we have heard cost estimates from
commercial operators and, of course, from the Department of
Defense on WGS, and it doesn't seem to add up that we are
getting apples-to-apples comparisons. Can you help us make sure
that we are going to get apples-to-apples comparisons on the
cost of commercial, vice military-owned and operated
satellites?
Mr. Loverro. Sir, absolutely. We have got to go ahead and
do an apples-to-apples comparison. We have got to go ahead and
include all the costs that are relevant to things like WGS.
That is not always easy to do, because some of those costs are
at third and fourth level, but we have to go ahead and do that,
because otherwise we will get a skewed result from the
analysis.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. And, Secretary Loverro, in January
in an interview with SpaceNews, you suggested that a civil
agency should perform certain day-to-day nonmilitary space
situational awareness [SSA] activities for commercial and
foreign operators.
Specifically you stated that, quote, ``The JSpOC's primary
role should be to support U.S. and allied military space
operations,'' unquote.
Do you support building the capability of a civilian agency
to obtain space situational awareness data and perform limited
SSA activities for commercial and foreign operators?
Mr. Loverro. Congressman, I do. So this is obviously a very
important question. The DOD is not going to go ahead and give
up our ability to go ahead and do SSA for our warfighting
mission.
At the same time, we recognize that to fully support our
commercial industries, we need to go ahead and put that on a
more civil footing, one that not only can go ahead and do space
traffic monitoring, which is what we do from the JSpOC today,
but some level of space traffic management. The Congress
recognized this in their legislation last year, and I think we
recognize it as well.
So I know with my colleagues up here, we are all trying to
figure out what the right balance is between that, how do we do
that. I think we all believe this has got to start off with a
crawl, a walk, and a run, which we would believe would begin
with putting probably FAA [Federal Aviation Administration]
personnel out at the JSpOC to help that function, but we
recognize that the future is going to require that a civil
agency take over this far larger and growing sector than we
should support from the DOD.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you.
And, General Hyten, as the commander of Air Force Space
Command, is performing space traffic management for the entire
world in your mission statement?
General Hyten. No, sir, it is not.
Mr. Bridenstine. If a civil agency were to perform some
space traffic management activities for non-DOD customers,
would that make it easier or harder for airmen at the JSpOC to
focus on deterring, fighting, and winning wars in space?
General Hyten. That would make it easier, but I do have one
comment about that, is that it is not in our mission to do
those things, but what you have to realize is that we have to
do those things in order for us to operate safely.
So it is critical that we continue to perform the space
situational awareness mission and critical that we have the
ability to integrate that into all of our operations, but
nonetheless, the ability to do space traffic management, like
Mr. Loverro described, is not in our mission statement. We do
it because we have to do it. Somebody has to do it for the
world, but it is more a civil function than it is a military
function.
Mr. Bridenstine. Fantastic. I have got just a few seconds
left, and so we will just take this for the record.
Space and Missile Systems Center released an RFI [request
for information] seeking input from industry on commercial
weather data and services to meet DOD requirements. And
basically it is a policy to buy data from the commercial sector
to feed our numerical weather models and predict weather.
Could DOD benefit from following NOAA's [National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration's] pilot program approach to
begin the process of establishing standards, testing
integration, and eventually buying data and services for
weather purposes?
General Hyten. We will take it for the record, sir, but the
answer is yes. We are going to use all data capabilities that
we can. But we will take that and give you a detailed answer
for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 111.]
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now calls that we will be in recess until about
4:40, when we will return to this room.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. The Chair calls the meeting back to order and
recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr. Fleming, for 5
minutes.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hyten and Mr. Weatherington, what is the Air
Force's plan for ensuring optimal U.S. investment to replace
the Russian RD-180 engine?
General Hyten. So I can talk about the top level, and then
I will let Mr. Weatherington talk about the acquisition
strategy.
But our basic overall plan is to develop public/private
partnerships with industry to leverage the capability that we
need to ensure that all the capabilities we need, for the
future launch enterprise, exists when we need them, not just as
soon as possible, to get off the RD-180.
So that includes first-stage engines, it includes upper-
stage engines, it includes solid adjunct boosters as well as
the solid main core. So we are looking at the entire enterprise
to make sure that the enterprise will be ready when we get
there.
Mr. Weatherington. Yes, Congressman, I think it is also
important to point out that for the U.S. Department of Defense,
we do not procure actual launch systems. We procure that
service. So the plan for the Department moving ahead, is to
incentivize industry to partner with us to develop launch
capability that will meet the full manifest requirements that
DOD has.
Now, as General Hyten has indicated, there are several
different technologies that we need to invest in to get there.
We need both main-stage engines, and we need upper-stage
engines. But fundamentally, we need an integrated solution that
will launch our satellites.
Again, as General Hyten said, it is about the satellite,
and the rocket will follow. So the strategy the Department has
is to incentivize team in public/private partnerships with
various commercial entities, either rocket integrators or in
some cases specific subsystems.
And the Air Force has done a great job of structuring the
other transaction authority activities currently underway to go
out and invest in those critical technologies we need with the
plan that every one of those has a path to get to a rocket
integrator and deliver us an integrated solution, likely in the
2019, 2020, 2021 timeframe.
Dr. Fleming. Are the specifications superior to the Russian
RD-180 engine? In other words, do we end up with a better
product if this flows properly?
Mr. Weatherington. Well, again, sir, because we are not
actually buying a rocket or even buying an engine, what DOD
requires is a requirement to launch our full manifest. So
today, as I think you are aware, we have two systems certified
to do that today, Atlas and Delta, several variations of each
of those systems, but they cover the entire manifest.
Delta IV Heavy, which we use for our largest systems, is a
fairly expensive system. Our goal in the development of these
future launch systems is to bring that cost down, especially at
the high end.
Dr. Fleming. Uh-huh. Okay. And how do we maintain assured
access and protect the taxpayers as we transition off that
engine, the RD-180?
General Hyten. So that is why our recommendation, sir, is
to allow us to buy enough RD-180s to cover us through the
transition period, because that will be significantly less cost
to the taxpayer. As we talked about earlier, we don't know for
sure what the cost will be if we go a different direction, for
example, a Delta-Falcon mix.
If we go a different direction, I believe that the cost
will be measured in the billions. The Secretary stated that the
estimates are up in $1.5 billion to $5 billion. That is true,
but that spread in the estimates are all based on the
assumptions. So if you make certain assumptions about where the
industry is going to be, you can drive that answer to wherever
you want. But I am confident that it will be a significant bill
to the taxpayer if we need to do something in the transition
period.
But again to emphasize the point, we want off the Russian
engine as fast as we can get, and that is why we put the
program in place that we have.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I believe the gentleman from Colorado is next up for 5
minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hyten and Lieutenant General Buck, can you discuss
how funding for the 460th Space Wing and 233rd Space Group are
prioritized within Air Force Space Command and JFCC Space
[Joint Functional Component Command for Space]? Is it a top
priority? Do you have any concerns that funding priorities will
negatively impact our missile warning mission?
General Hyten. So, I guess, the easy answer to that
question--and I will let General Buck weigh in, but the easy
answer is that missile warning is a survival mission for the
Nation. So a strategic missile warning has been and will
continue to be the highest priority mission that we have in
Space Command. That is the mission of the 460th Wing, part of
the mission of the 233rd.
So as we look at those capabilities in the future, that
will continue to be a high priority.
General Buck. And the good news there, sir, is that we are
putting some money into the infrastructure up there, as you
know. We just replaced the UPS [universal power supply] up
there because we had power issues, as you are tracking them, I
am sure, not only in the survival of mission control center but
also in the primary mission control center. So we have got our
eye on the ball there, and we are very aware of how critical
that mission is to the warfighter.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. General Hyten, can you discuss a level
at which the Air Force makes cost, schedule, and performance
trade space decisions related to missile warning. Are there any
instances where the Air Force and STRATCOM would have to
sacrifice national missile warning responsiveness in order to
reduce cost?
General Hyten. So we will never trade off the strategic
missile warning mission, because that is a survival of the
Nation issue. So that can't be traded off. There is a
discussion worth having about how much of the secondary
missions you get from Overhead Persistent IR [infrared], in
other words how much battle space awareness, how much technical
intelligence, how much capability that you want to build.
There is also an issue about how do you want to provide
that capability. But the fundamental strategic missile warning
capability that we have to have as a Nation cannot be traded
off, and the commander of STRATCOM has told me that in person.
And those capabilities will not be traded. That is a survival
of the Nation issue.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Mr. Cardillo, last year, you released
your commercial GEOINT [geospatial intelligence] strategy,
which outlines how you intend to leverage our commercial space
imagery, services, and analysis. Can you tell us what progress
you are making so far this year, and can you tell us how your
fiscal year 2017 budget request further enables your successful
implementation of the strategy?
Mr. Cardillo. We are in the learning and investigation
phase of that overall strategy. We are doing it with our
mission partner at the NRO, because whatever we end up deciding
to do from that commercial market, as it matures and becomes
viable, we are going to have to share how we store that data,
how we move it around, how we intermingle it with our
classified systems. And we can talk more about that in closed
session.
I have been very pleased with the reaction that we have
gotten from industry to date. And so we are making small
purchases to understand data types, and sensor types, and what
kind of imagery sources they are collecting. As we learn more,
but I must say too, as they become more commercially viable to
create that market, we do intend, and in fiscal year 2017,
pending Congress' budgeting, is to expand our ability to
exploit that space.
Mr. Coffman. Mr. Calvelli, in your written statement, you
mentioned that NRO is improving space-based persistence,
creating a, quote-unquote, ``thinking system'' called Sentient
and developing a transformative future ground architecture. Can
you discuss how Buckley Air Force Base and the Aerospace Data
Facility, ADF-C [Aerospace Data Facility-Colorado], fit in
these efforts?
Mr. Calvelli. Sure. All of our ADFs are a major piece of
how we operate our systems today and will continue to be for
the future. What we are trying to do is to try to tie our
systems together more closely, so instead of stovepipes of
GEOINT or stovepipes of SIGINT [signals intelligence], it is
sort of an integrated set of sensors in space, integrated
ground providing data to our user community. The ADF-C, ADF-E
[Aerospace Data Facility-East], ADF-Southwest will all play
major roles in that in the future.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I believe the gentleman from Oklahoma has one cleanup
question. Is that what I was told?
Mr. Bridenstine. I have got a couple----
Mr. Rogers. Knock yourself out.
Mr. Bridenstine. I wanted to ask, General Hyten, Air Force
budget documents state that you will conduct an end-to-end
over-the-air demonstration of protected tactical waveform [PTW]
in mid-2019. The Air Force apparently delayed the initial
launch capability of protected tactical service [PTS] by 3
years until 2027. What factors account for the delay to PTS,
and why is there an 8-year gap between full-up PTW demo and ILC
[initial launch capability]?
General Hyten. So the answer to the question, Congressman,
is that we have yet to complete the protected SATCOM
communication system AOA, the analysis of alternatives. Before
we can start a program within the Department, we need to
complete the AOA. The AOA is imminent. We have completed it.
Mr. Kendall, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics, has signed off on it, pushed that into CAPE
[Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation]. CAPE is now
doing the sufficiency study. They have committed to completing
that by April 15.
But as we submitted our budget documents, we had to make
some assumptions of what we thought the future was going to be.
And to us, it looked clear that protected tactical waveforms
will be part of the architecture in the future; therefore, it
was important for us to pursue the pathfinder that you saw in
the budget documents. And then the rest is to be determined.
So we don't want to put a program in place without the
proper analysis having been completed, and that will be
complete here very shortly. And we will share that with the
Congress when it is complete.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Last question, I have been told that
prior to this RD-180 issue, a new low-cost, upper-stage engine
replacement had been a high priority for your national space
security launch needs. If this is true, how do you plan to
address the upper-stage replacement, and is there a way to
couple the development of this upper-stage engine, such as
those already funded and developed through the Small Business
Innovation Research program, in a matter that benefits
replacement of the RD-180?
General Hyten. So in the contracts we just let with
industry, in those contracts, in those other transactional
authority contracts, there are two pieces of it that look at
upper stages.
One is with SpaceX for their Raptor upper stage, and one is
with the ULA [United Launch Alliance] for their ACES [Advanced
Cryogenic Evolved Stage] upper stage. Both of those are
required in their business plan in the future to allow them to
access all the orbital requirements that we have to launch our
entire manifest.
So as you stated, the upper stage is extremely important.
We have recognized that for a long time, long ahead of the RD-
180 issue. It is a challenge though to get the capabilities
that we need out of those upper stages, but if we do it
correctly, we will be able to move into a different
architecture for the future that will be much more efficient
because the upper stage will be more efficient in achieving
multiple orbits.
Mr. Bridenstine. And the last question, if the chairman
will allow me, and this is for you as well, General Hyten, how
does EGS relate to the requested protected tactical enterprise
service?
General Hyten. EGS being the enterprise ground system?
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes, enterprise ground service.
General Hyten. So the enterprise ground capability, as we
look at the protected tactical waveform, what we are trying to
get to with enterprise ground is we are trying to structure the
process so that we can operate our satellites, perform
telemetry tracking and controlling off of a common
infrastructure in our ground system, so we can have our
operators focus on providing the warfighting effect to the
world to our entire force structure across the board as we look
at that.
So it is important that we move into an enterprise ground
structure because that will free up our airmen to effectively
operate the protected tactical waveform in a threatened
environment as we go through. It is not that we can't do it on
the legacy; we will be able to do it on the legacy, but in
order for us to fully use our airmen capabilities, we need to
structure the program so that we are focused on the effect that
we are creating on the battlefields of the future, not on just
flying the satellite.
Mr. Bridenstine. Got it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman from Colorado has one cleanup
question.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
Mr. Calvelli, and Mr. Cardillo, and General Hyten, are NRO,
NGA, and Air Force Space Command getting what you need from
Buckley Air Force Base in the city of Aurora? Is there anything
else Congress can do to support your efforts at ADF-C?
Mr. Calvelli. I will start and say, I think, we are in
great shape out at ADF-C, and appreciate all the support out
there from Aurora and the whole town.
Mr. Cardillo. Mr. Calvelli is my landlord. I am a happy
tenant. We are very pleased with the support we get from
Buckley.
General Hyten. And the 460th is everybody's landlord. And,
you know, the whole issue recently about encroachment was a big
concern of ours. That was just addressed this last week when we
looked at the adjacent land and how we are going to deal with
that in the future. That was the one, big issue that was
hanging out there for Buckley, because, in many of our bases in
the past, we have had encroachment issues that have really
impacted our mission. I think the actions of the last week with
the land around Buckley have really gone a long way to solving
that problem for a very, very long term, perhaps forever. And
that is where we need to be.
So thank you, Congressman, for that help there.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
General Hyten, can you tell us about the status of the
DMSP-19 [Defense Meteorological Satellite Program flight 19]?
General Hyten. So the DMSP-19 is about dead. That is about
as blunt as I could put it. A few weeks ago we lost the ability
to command the satellite. The way DMSP satellites operate is
they still broadcast tactical information, but we can't get the
recorded information down to our users because we can't task
the satellite, we can't command it anymore.
When we can't command it anymore, that also means we can't
take care of the satellite's health, keep it pointed in the
right direction, keep it safe. So in the very near future, if
we can't command it again, we will lose the satellite forever.
Mr. Rogers. So should we launch DMSP-20?
General Hyten. In a perfect world, Congressman, I would
prefer to launch DMSP-20, but we received direction from the
Congress last year to terminate that program. General Greaves
in Los Angeles issued the order to terminate on the 30th of
December, 2015. We are in that process. We will reach the point
of no return in June of this year; that, after that point, the
satellite will be torn apart and not able to be put back
together.
So I said last year in testimony that it was a difficult
decision to recommend whether we wanted flight 20 or not, but
we ended up recommending to the Congress that we launch flight
20. I wish I would have been stronger in that, because the
statement I made is that we need it if we have a failure, and
it appears now we have had a failure.
Mr. Rogers. Well, if it is important to get that capability
up there, why isn't the Air Force working on a follow-on
program to meet that capability?
General Hyten. So we are working on a follow-on program--it
is called the weather satellite follow-on capability--to meet
the three elements of the needs. We also have a new tasker from
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC. General
Selva sent us the tasker this last week to look at the first
two gaps, which are cloud characterization and theater support;
report back to him by the 1st of May whether the capabilities
we have right now, given all the changes, will be able to
support the requirements that we need. In that memo, he also
supported the launch of DMSP flight 20.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
General Hyten, I am concerned about the loss of our
transfer of spectrum and the impact on national security,
particularly when I hear the chairman of the FCC [Federal
Communications Commission] telling the satellite industry that,
quote, ``it is more practical to get on the train than being
run over by it,'' close quote.
You may recall that your predecessor, General Shelton,
testified from pretty much where you are seated right now and
warned that a proposal under consideration by the FCC would
have created extensive, harmful interference to GPS. Can you
please describe for me your views on the proposal by the
LightSquared or the company LightSquared or its successor
Ligado?
General Hyten. So I have heard Ligado has put forth a new
proposal to use that spectrum. But I will tell you,
Congressman, I have seen no data that supports the use of that
frequency spectrum other than the data I saw in 2011. So the
position of Air Force Space Command is the same as it was when
General Shelton sat in that seat.
I don't think that we should infringe on the GPS spectrum.
That is a critical capability, not just for the military
security of the Nation but for the entire economic well-being
of this Nation. We can't allow that to happen.
All that being said, is that we have an effort with the
Department of Transportation in April of this year that we are
going to go out and do some detailed testing on that spectrum
area. We will then have a peer review in May and June of this
year, and then we will go through a process where we will look
at it and see what elements of those spectrum.
Because we are trying to be good partners as we work at
that, but the partnership has to be based on real testing, real
impacts, and what the impacts on the national security are. And
we cannot do something that will infringe on our national
security, period.
Mr. Rogers. All right. That brings the open portion of this
hearing to a conclusion. We will now recess briefly while we
move upstairs to 2216 for the classified portion.
[Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 15, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 15, 2016
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 15, 2016
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 15, 2016
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE
General Hyten. The NOAA pilot program is being closely followed by
the DOD Weather Enterprise and we eagerly await the results to evaluate
where we can benefit from a data acquisition model such as this. The
DOD has already taken actions by releasing a Request for Information
(RFI), soliciting the industry's intent and ability to develop, launch,
and operate space based commercial services that could meet the 11
weather capability gaps identified in the Spaced-Based Environmental
Monitoring (SBEM) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA). Based on the industry
responses to the RFI, there seems to be a viable existing/emerging
vendor market that has the potential to provide the weather data that
can satisfy a subset of SBEM AOA weather gaps. We will continue to
evaluate the commercial data standards compared to the data currently
provided by DOD, civil and international satellites, and determine if
any changes in our DOD data enterprise would need to be made to
accommodate integration of commercial data. Additionally, we will
continue to address operational risks and long-term viability of
commercial data sources. [See page 15.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 15, 2016
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. What is the current state of the space acquisition
workforce with regard to numbers of acquisition professionals and their
acquisition management expertise? If there are shortcomings in the
acquisition workforce, what is being done about them? What efforts are
underway to enhance development of the space acquisition workforce?
General Hyten. The Department of Defense has established a
requirement for each acquisition workforce member to meet mandatory
acquisition certifications when occupying an Acquisition Professional
Development Program (APDP) Coded positions. For Space Program Managers,
97% of the Acquisition Professional Workforce is certified.
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Fund (DAWDF) implements targeted
development efforts for the acquisition workforce. These efforts
include targeted training for priority skill needs, initials skills
courses, continuous learning, recruiting, coaching, training, and
mission assistance. Over the past five years the Air Force has been
benefited by leveraging over $60M across these efforts.
Mr. Rogers. Cloud characterization and theater weather imagery are
the top two most important certified requirements regarding space-based
weather collection. What are the risks if these warfighter requirements
are not met?
General Hyten. The Air Force, other Services and Department of
Defense (DOD) continue to assess the impacts of relying on civil and
international partner for space-based environmental monitoring
capabilities to address cloud characterization (CC) and theater weather
imagery (TWI) needs, vice continuing an inherent DOD capability as a
follow-on to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).
At this time, the Joint Requirements Council (JROC) has validated
DOD materiel solution needs focused on other capability areas and
identified that reliance on civil/international partner capabilities
for CC/TWI is acceptable. However, the JROC wants to maintain awareness
of issues surrounding those partner capabilities and warfighter
concerns, primarily over the Indian Ocean region (JROCM 092-14, dated 3
September 2014). If there is no weather satellite coverage in this
theater, warfighter concerns cover the full range of military
operations, such as tropical cyclone assessments, resource protection
(i.e. warnings for thunderstorms, severe weather, and heavy
precipitation) and tactical operations (e.g. aircraft, land and naval
maneuvers).
On 3 March 2016, the JROC issued a memorandum titled ``Space Based
Environmental Monitoring Gap Coverage'' (JROCM 012-16) that directs the
Air Force, along with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation and the Principal DOD Space Advisor's
Office, to complete a risk assessment and determine non-materiel
options for addressing the CC and TWI gaps, taking into account recent
programmatic, threat and operating environment changes. The Air Force's
intent is to brief results to the Joint Capabilities Board no later
than 1 May 2016, as directed.
Mr. Rogers. With the delays of both GPS III and OCX, when does the
Air Force plan to deploy Military code (M-code) signal capability? What
is the risk of not sustaining the current, as well as required, levels
of GPS service, and what is being done about this risk? a. What
measures is the Air Force taking to address problems with GPS OCX
software development in order to minimize further cost and schedule
growth?
General Hyten. At this time, we currently have an M-code test-only
capability since we have 19 M-code capable satellites on orbit. In
order to deliver an initial operational M-code signal capability, we
need an M-code command and control capability in the ground system and
a global M-code monitoring network. This is planned to be delivered
with OCX Block 1 in July 2021. In order for this signal capability to
be operationally useful, we will need fielded M-code capable receivers
in DOD weapon systems. The services are mandated to procure only M-code
capable receivers after FY17.
The M-Code signal is already being broadcast by 19 satellites (12
Block IIF, 7 Block IIR-M) on orbit, which fulfills the satellite
constellation portion of an initial operational M-code capability.
While there have been delays in the GPS III program, the program is
planned to have satellites available for launch ahead of the ground
system's capability to launch them.
The Next-Generation Operational Control System (OCX) will provide
command, control and mission support for the GPS III and legacy
satellites' M-code capability using an expandable robust information
assurance architecture. OCX is critical to continuing high priority
national efforts to modernize GPS with new military and civil
positioning capabilities, including enhanced security, precision,
reliability and integrity. As a mitigation of risk for late delivery of
OCX, on 3 February, the GPS Directorate put Contingency Ops (COps) on
contract with Lockheed Martin. COps is a modification to the legacy
ground system that will allow us to command, control and operate the
GPS III satellite at a GPS IIF capability-level until OCX Block 1 is
ready for operations in July 2021. As a contingency effort, COps does
not change M-Code capability; rather, it enables growth of the M-Code
capable satellite constellation. COps delivery is planned for April
2019.
Finally, worldwide M-code signal monitoring is a required piece of
an operational M-code capability. This capability is projected to
deliver as a part of the OCX program in July 2021. We also are studying
options for a contingency worldwide M-code monitoring program that
could deliver ahead of OCX.
There is no credible risk of not sustaining the current and
required level of GPS service because the likelihood is so low. The
satellite constellation is healthy, with 31 satellites in service and
the requirement is to have a 95% probability of at least 24 operational
satellites and a 98% probability of at least 21 GPS satellite
constellation slots broadcasting a healthy signal (in order to meet
these requirements, the Air Force's practice is to maintain at least 27
operational satellites). GPS III satellites are on track to maintain
the current levels of service and provide enhanced anti-jam
capabilities for greater resilience. The current ground system is
proactively maintained to sustain current operations and shore up cyber
defense/security until OCX is operational.
The Air Force has taken a very active role in the management of OCX
in order to minimize further cost and schedule growth through three
major actions. First, the Air Force increased Government oversight at
all levels (PM-weekly, PEO--bi-weekly, AQ--monthly, USD(AT&L) & SECAF--
quarterly) to drive contractor performance. Second, we established
shoulder-to-shoulder testing with government reps in plant. This helps
eliminate coordination and approval delays and provides additional eyes
on the processes. Third, we developed technical off-ramps should poor
performance continue.
Mr. Rogers. What is the status of your efforts for consolidating
the acquisition of commercial satellite communication services across
the Department of Defense into a single program office or under the
direction of a senior DOD official?
General Hyten. The Defense Department is continuing to investigate
the courses of action concerning FY16 NDAA Sec 1610 that addressed
wideband consolidation, with the Air Force as a stakeholder.
Mr. Rogers. Please explain how implementation of the Space
Enterprise Vision will improve the affordability, resilience, and
capability of the future national security space architecture.
The Space Enterprise Vision will drive future operations,
acquisitions, and programming decisions which support the national
security space architecture. Air Force Space Command is working
directly with the National Reconnaissance Office and folding in the
Army, Navy and Joint equities per the direction of the Defense Space
Council. When AFSPC developed the SEV warfighting construct for space,
we identified the need for several follow on studies in order to
determine how to attain a resilient and affordable space enterprise
before 2030. For example, the strategic missile warning and satellite
communication study is currently underway, and will determine how we
support the nuclear command and control mission with respect to
affordability, resilience, and capability.
Mr. Rogers. Some assert that ``disaggregation'' will result in more
affordable, capable, or resilient space systems. On what specific
analysis(es) is this judgment based? Please provide a copy of the
relevant analysis(es) to the committee.
General Hyten. The Protected SATCOM Services (PSCS) Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA) Final Report recently received an assessment from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) and was provided to Congress on 18 April
2016. CAPE concluded the AOA complied with the guidance issued and is
analytically sufficient to inform future acquisition decisions. While
CAPE's assessment called out an aggregated satellite constellation as
most cost-effective, the assessment left room for a possible
disaggregated constellation based on some additional challenges that
are being addressed in two additional studies. Specifically the PSCS
AOA Follow-on for Resiliency (PAFR) study and the Space Enterprise
Vision (SEV) Strategic Missile Warning and Satellite Communications
Focused Study.
The PAFR Study is nearly complete and will provide additional
analysis and recommendations in three key areas:
1) Analyzing and costing specific survivability capabilities for
protected SATCOM architectures, 2) Further analyzing follow-on options
for the Enhanced Polar System (EPS), and finally 3) Further inform the
pros and cons for aggregated and disaggregated space systems.
The current SEV study will provide specific recommendations for a
resilient space enterprise that can deter aggression within the space
domain and prevail in any high-end conflict that extends to space. This
study is using data supplied by previously mentioned studies and the
SBIRS Follow-on AOA, and will deliver a strategy for countering threats
to the space domain that will take into account any contributions from
an aggregated or disaggregated architecture.
Upon completion and approval of the study, we will provide the
analysis to the committee.
Mr. Rogers. What are the challenges in managing multiple new
simultaneous satellite procurements?
General Hyten. The nature of the emerging threats in space will
require us to assess the risks in developing and fielding new,
resilient capabilities simultaneously. We do not have the luxury of
time to field the elements of the Space Enterprise Vision sequentially.
The simultaneous approach will enable common technical approaches for
resiliency across the various space architectures.
Managing these efforts will require programs to be adequately
resourced, both in personnel and funding, to ensure success. Limited
resources can severely affect the trade space available to address
unforeseen technical or acquisition issues all at the same time. To
mitigate this risk, Space and Missile Systems Center has implemented a
Tiered approach across the mission areas and programs to ensure
resources are allocated to our most critical programs that meet the
Space Enterprise Vision, to include both Government and Industry
resources.
Mr. Rogers. Is the Air Force Space Command and the National
Reconnaissance Office taking different approaches to improve the
resilience and assurance of the national security space architecture?
If so, why?
General Hyten. No. AFSPC and NRO are taking an integrated approach
to improve resilience and mission assurance of the national security
space architecture. AFSPC and NRO have jointly developed a Space
Enterprise Vision that describes a combined approach to improving
resilience and mission assurance. The two organizations are in the
processes of establishing a joint approach to governing the planning
and development of space mission architectures and capabilities to
realize these improvements.
Mr. Rogers. What affect will disaggregation of nuclear and non-
nuclear missions have on an adversary's risk calculus regarding
attacking U.S. space assets? Will it lead to less complicated and/or
lower the threshold for attacking space systems supporting the United
States' ability to project power with non-nuclear forces? If so, are
you concerned that disaggregation could weaken deterrence and foster
crisis instability?
General Hyten. Credible arguments have been made that support cases
both for and against disaggregation versus aggregation of nuclear and
non-nuclear missions and the potential impact this one factor could
have on adversary decision calculus to attack or refrain from attacking
U.S. space assets. Our adversaries understand the competitive advantage
we derive from space. Whether our systems are aggregated or
disaggregated, all our space systems are being put at risk by various
kinetic and non-kinetic threats. While it's possible that
disaggregation could lower the threshold for adversaries to attack
systems that only support non-nuclear forces, we also have to weigh the
possible advantages that disaggregation lowers the risk of adversary
attack to space systems dedicated to nuclear warning, and command and
control while providing additional options that could increase the
resilience capacity and survivability of space systems dedicated to
support non-nuclear forces. We need to ask ourselves to what extent
would it be prudent to continue to assume that different potential
adversaries with different strategic interests and differing decision
calculus will decide to refrain from attacking U.S. space systems that
support non-nuclear missions because they are aggregated with our space
systems that support nuclear command and control and strategic missile
warning. It can be credibly argued that aggregation, not
disaggregation, may foster increased crisis instability since U.S.
policy makers will not be able to discern an adversary's intent if an
aggregated space asset was attacked, that is whether or not such an
attack was intended to be limited to degrading U.S. non-nuclear forces
or whether such an attack was intended to purposefully degrade
strategic missile warning and nuclear command and control assets as a
prelude to attacking the United States of America with nuclear weapons.
Mr. Rogers. Do you support establishing so-called ``red lines''
through declaratory policy statements to refrain from deliberate
interference with nuclear command, control, and communications or early
warning space systems?
General Hyten. Attacks on national or military infrastructure is
always a serious matter; however, we must be cautious about formally
declaring ``redlines.'' Based on Presidential direction, there are
various degrees of consequences we can take militarily when we are
attacked, but signaling what those are, or at what point we will take a
particular action, does not enhance our deterrent posture. Maintaining
a level of opacity is to our advantage. The present state of mutually
shared thresholds in space developed over time during the Cold War. It
was well understood by all parties that interfering with nuclear
command and control or strategic warning systems was extremely risky
and could be interpreted as a prelude to conflict. This position was
reinforced through treaty agreements and national technical means that
created some level of transparency between the United States and the
former Soviet Union.
However, in the years since the Cold War, we have seen multiple new
actors with the ability to put dangerous capabilities on-orbit or
otherwise hold space assets at risk. As the days of mutual bi-lateral
balance of power in space faded, so did the ability to effectively
establish an ``off limits'' position with respect to strategic
capabilities. Well-known nuclear thresholds can be reinforced, but it
must be backed up with the ability, and national will, to respond. This
is one of the reasons we must pursue new ways of ensuring these systems
can operate effectively despite being threatened or challenged.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe that Russia or China will honor
international norms to refrain from deliberate interference with
nuclear command, control, and communications or early warning space
systems in the event of crisis or conflict with the United States?
General Hyten. Negotiations in the United Nations have shown that
Russia and China are resistant to entering into any formal
international norms agreement for space. We have seen increasing
military ``adventurism'' from both countries and feel that crossing
previously established red-lines would be considered if they felt it
was in their best interest and supported bold strategic objectives. It
is therefore up to us to deter these actions and communicate our
national will to respond.
Effective deterrence is created through a position of strength. We
are pursuing new ways to both field the ability to respond and deny the
benefits of an attack. We are also being transparent in our plans and
actions so that potential adversaries will know that hostile actions in
space will not be effective and will have very negative consequences.
Mr. Rogers. What are you doing to ensure the right policies are in
place so that emerging commercial space capabilities help our national
security and don't hurt it?
Mr. Loverro. The Department recognizes that U.S. national security
in space and elsewhere is critically dependent on a robust and
innovative commercial sector. A centerpiece of our overall space policy
and strategy is to eliminate barriers constraining that innovation. We
must balance that interest with any possible negative national security
impacts of these activities. This tension has been the focus of
departmental thinking over the last three years and is the exact reason
why the Secretary and the Administration supported relaxation of
commercial remote sensing standards in 2014. As a department, we have
aggressively worked with the intelligence community, NOAA, NASA, and
the FAA to find ways to approve activities such as on-orbit servicing,
commercial SSA, and even on-orbit imaging, establishing the right
safeguards to protect national security while enabling commercial
innovation.
Beyond simple policy changes, the Department of Defense is also
pressing forward with activities to harness better these commercial
innovations for DOD use. Such is the purpose of our funded commercial
communications pathfinder work and hosted payload concepts being
explored in many mission areas. In fact, a key element of our thinking
on disaggregation is to open up greater portions of our space
architecture to commercial-like solutions.
Finally, we are actively supporting FAA in establishing the right
oversight structure for commercial and entrepreneurial space activities
that will support necessary flight safety needs to assure that we do
not constrain the US commercial space renaissance due to future on-
orbit collision risk.
Addressing this challenge is one of the most important strategic
tasks facing the Department because too great an erosion of our
technological superiority would ultimately undermine our conventional
deterrence, contribute to crisis instability, and greatly raise the
potential cost of any future U.S. military operation. That's why the
Department is exploring new ``offset strategies''--with new
combinations of technologies, operational concepts, and organizational
constructs--to maintain our ability to project overwhelming combat
power into any theater and at the times of our own choosing. This
includes reviewing and updating appropriate policies to ensure
continuous innovation of commercial space capabilities without
adversely affecting national security.
Mr. Rogers. Some assert that ``disaggregation'' will result in more
affordable, capable, or resilient space systems. On what specific
analysis(es) is this judgment based? Please provide a copy of the
relevant analysis(es) to the committee.
Mr. Loverro. As in most areas, blanket statements on the
effectiveness of any tool needs to be carefully examined. This is
especially true for disaggregation, which has been used to mean many
things in many contexts. The DOD White Paper, ``Space Domain Mission
Assurance: A Resilience Taxonomy'' defines disaggregation as ``the
separation of dissimilar capabilities into separate platforms or
payloads''. An example of this would be separating tactical and
strategic protected satellite communications.
Disaggregation may serve many purposes, of which cost, capability,
and resilience are just some. In the DOD, most discussions of
disaggregation, first and foremost, begin with a discussion of the
policy and deterrence benefits of separating strategic nuclear
warfighting and tactical conventional warfighting capabilities and then
examine the resulting cost, capability, and resilience impact of that
architectural decision. In the protected communications example,
separating tactical and strategic protected satellite communications
may help mitigate the risk of uncontrolled escalation during a crisis
or conflict without necessarily bolstering resilience.
The exact effects of disaggregation--positive or negative--on
resilience, cost, system capability, performance, and other
considerations would depend on the specific system and the
disaggregation approach. It would be expected that in some cases,
disaggregation would actually increase the cost of the total system,
although individual system elements might be less expensive. Such was
the case in the recently delivered Analysis of Alternatives on
Protected Communication, which judged an overall increase in cost to
fulfill all protected communication requirements for a disaggregated
system, although specific elements, such as the NC3 portion, decreased
in cost substantially. On the other hand, the missile warning AOA
statement showed little to no increase in overall cost for
disaggregation. Both AOA reports have been delivered to Congress.
The bottom line is that disaggregation is just one of several
strategies for addressing tension between strategic deterrence, cost,
performance, resilience that must be foundational in our future space
activities. Disaggregation may cost more in some cases. But this added
cost may be acceptable if it restores strategic clarity, reduces the
likelihood of unintentional escalation and provides more flexibility
for addressing the rapidly changing space threat and technology
landscape we expect in the future.
Mr. Rogers. What affect will disaggregation of nuclear and non-
nuclear missions have on an adversary's risk calculus regarding
attacking U.S. space assets? Will it lead to less complicated and/or
lower the threshold for attacking space systems supporting the United
States' ability to project power with non-nuclear forces? If so, are
you concerned that disaggregation could weaken deterrence and foster
crisis instability?
Mr. Loverro. It is accurate that several observers have suggested
that disaggregating strategic and tactical space systems may lower the
threshold for attacks on the resulting non-nuclear system elements. The
converse is also correct that it would raise the threshold for attacks
on the nuclear elements. Thus, disaggregating creates greater clarity
of adversary intent, increases nuclear stability, reduces the potential
for unintended escalation, and assures the President of this ability to
command and control strategic forces, but at the expense of a
potentially lowered threshold of attack in a non-nuclear elements.
So, any decision to disaggregate must therefore address how that
potentially decreased threshold will be restored. Other elements of
space mission assurance, such as incorporation of commercial and allied
systems, defensive measures, proliferation, and diversity may be
required to address that consequence. Each of these elements provides
added strategic benefit, in addition to the ultimate benefit of
strategic clarity and avoidance of unintended escalation that current
aggregated architectures pose.
Mr. Rogers. Do you support establishing so-called ``red lines''
through declaratory policy statements to refrain from deliberate
interference with nuclear command, control, and communications or early
warning space systems?
Mr. Loverro. Removing ambiguity, especially as it relates to
nuclear command, control, and communication and missile warning, can
greatly enhance stability and reduce the likelihood of unintentional
crisis escalation. However, the method used to remove ambiguity is also
important. So called ``red lines'' have not been demonstrated to
achieve consistently the strategic benefits desired. Thoughtful and
deliberate bi-lateral discussions that ensure our position about
nuclear-related space systems is clear, complimented by clear lines of
distinction in system character, are more likely to achieve a
meaningful understanding of restraint.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe that Russia or China will honor
international norms to refrain from deliberate interference with
nuclear command, control, and communications or early warning space
systems in the event of crisis or conflict with the United States?
Mr. Loverro. Norms of behavior shape the international community's
understanding of responsible and irresponsible behavior in outer space
and of expected reactions if these norms are broken. By establishing
clear U.S. norms against purposeful interference with nuclear command,
control, and communications or early warning space systems, then a
country violating those norms would be sending a clear signal of its
intentions. The Administration would take very seriously any
interference with the nuclear command, control, and communications and
early warning space systems of the United States and our allies,
whether in peacetime, crisis, or conflict, and may consider such action
to be escalatory in nature. But we must be clear on norms in and of
themselves will not dissuade an adversary intent upon escalating
conflict to nuclear levels from attacking U.S. strategic space system.
They clarify understanding on both sides, just as it was the case
during the Cold War, but must be backed up by other means to assure
strategic space services can continue to support U.S. strategic needs
even following attack.
Mr. Rogers. The committee has been informed that the only remaining
strategic radiation hardened microelectronics foundry does not have
enough orders to remain economically viable after this year. What
options does DOD have to ensure access to strategic radiation hardened
microelectronics--both now and if this foundry closes? What level of
funding would be necessary to keep that foundry open, and what
resources would be necessary to ensure the long-term viability of that
source?
Mr. Loverro. The Department is acutely aware of this issue and
USD(AT&L) is leading the effort to actively address it. The Department
will follow its policy, guidance, and best practices as described in
DOD Instruction 5000.60, ``Defense Industrial Base Assessments,'' July
18, 2014. AT&L is pursuing a number of Department-wide and program
specific methods to address this problem such as, where appropriate,
lifetime buys or tailored assurance activities for non-US success. AT&L
is best positioned to provide details on specific strategies and
funding needs.
Mr. Rogers. What is the current state of the space acquisition
workforce with regard to numbers of acquisition professionals and their
acquisition management expertise? If there are shortcomings in the
acquisition workforce, what is being done about them? What efforts are
underway to enhance development of the space acquisition workforce?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department's budget request would ensure the
acquisition workforce remains mission capable. While the Department
tracks the qualifications and expertise of its overall acquisition
workforce, it does not subdivide the workforce by domain (e.g, ships,
aircraft, space). As such we do not track a ``space acquisition
workforce'' separately. DOD has established a requirement for each
acquisition workforce member to meet mandatory acquisition
certifications when occupying an Acquisition Professional Development
Program (APDP) Coded positions. For Space Program Managers, 97% of the
Acquisition Professional Workforce is certified.
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Fund (DAWDF) implements targeted
development efforts for the acquisition workforce. These efforts
include targeted training for priority skill needs, initials skills
courses, continuous learning, recruiting, coaching, training, and
mission assistance. Over the past five years the Air Force has been
benefited by leveraging over $60M across these efforts.
Mr. Rogers. Cloud characterization and theater weather imagery are
the top two most important certified requirements regarding space-based
weather collection. What are the risks if these warfighter requirements
are not met?
Mr. Weatherington. If these warfighter requirements are not met by
civil or international assets once the Defense Meteorological Support
Program ends, the Department of Defense may experience decreased
battlespace awareness for imaging quick-moving weather systems such as
thunderstorms, dust storms, frontal activity or tropical cyclone
assessments, and worldwide cloud forecasting. Missions such as resource
protection, transiting aircraft and shipping, anti-submarine
operations, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance collections,
and Navy/Army/Air Force Coalition tactical operations could be
moderately affected. Central Command, Pacific Command, and Africa
Command would be most impacted by the increased risk of these gaps not
being met, primarily over the Indian Ocean region. Worldwide coverage
in austere and data-sparse areas benefits most from space-based weather
collection. The Department is currently re-addressing the requirements
for cloud characterization and theater weather imagery.
Mr. Rogers. What is the status of your efforts for consolidating
the acquisition of commercial satellite communication services across
the Department of Defense into a single program office or under the
direction of a senior DOD official?
Mr. Weatherington. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Some assert that ``disaggregation'' will result in more
affordable, capable, or resilient space systems. On what specific
analysis(es) is this judgment based? Please provide a copy of the
relevant analysis(es) to the committee.
Mr. Weatherington. Disaggregation has been used to mean many things
in many contexts, resulting in considerable confusion surrounding the
term. In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security authored the
Department of Defense White Paper, `Space Domain Mission Assurance: A
Resilience Taxonomy', in order to provide a standard lexicon for space
domain mission assurance. According to this taxonomy, ``Disaggregation
is defined as the separation of dissimilar capabilities into separate
platforms or payloads. An example of this would be separating tactical
and strategic protected satellite communications. It should be noted
that disaggregation may serve, and be justified by, a variety of
purposes that are worthy in and of themselves, but which may not relate
to resilience. Separating tactical and strategic protected satellite
communications, for example, may help mitigate the risk of uncontrolled
escalation during a crisis or conflict without necessarily bolstering
resilience. Further, disaggregation can also apply in other cases to
reduce the complexity of systems, making it easier to implement other
resilience characteristics. In this respect, disaggregation is a means
to an end; not bolstering resilience directly, but allowing it to occur
more readily.''
The exact effects of disaggregation--positive or negative--on
resilience, cost, system capability, performance, and other
considerations would depend on the specific system and the
disaggregation approach. For example, two recently concluded Analyses
of Alternatives (AOA)--one for Protected Satellite Communications
Systems and a second for Space Based Infrared System Follow-on--
examined the trade-offs of some disaggregated architectures among the
possible alternatives. The final reports for these AOAs have previously
been provided to Congress.
Mr. Rogers. What are the challenges in managing multiple new
simultaneous satellite procurements?
Mr. Weatherington. Even as we complete deployment of our current
satellite constellations, we are deliberately planning for procurement
of the replenishments/replacements for our Military Satellite
Communication, missile warning, and weather capabilities. This planning
addresses a number of architectural and business challenges.
We are evaluating resiliency measures against jamming, cyber, and
on-orbit threats. We are assessing the value of disaggregation for
resiliency, strategic messaging, and reducing costs. In addition, we
are balancing the strategies of leveraging commercial and international
capabilities versus maintaining inherent U.S. Department of Defense
capabilities. We are evaluating insertion of newer technologies to meet
emerging Department needs ?versus acquiring functional equivalents,
which could result in less cost, schedule, and technical risk. As
always in our major defense acquisition programs, we are enabling
competition to the maximum extent possible and paying attention to
industrial base issues and considerations. We are assessing the
prioritization of systems in terms of risk and threats to ensure
limited Department resources are available to study, evaluate, and
execute systems. Capability options for systems selected will be
applied in the most effective and efficient manner.
Mr. Rogers. The committee has been informed that the only remaining
strategic radiation hardened microelectronics foundry does not have
enough orders to remain economically viable after this year. What
options does DOD have to ensure access to strategic radiation hardened
microelectronics--both now and if this foundry closes? What level of
funding would be necessary to keep that foundry open, and what
resources would be necessary to ensure the long-term viability of that
source?
Mr. Weatherington. No strategic radiation hardened microelectronics
foundry has notified its Department of Defense customers of a decision
to discontinue operations or the end-of-life of specific parts or
processes. If and when one does, the Department will follow defense
industrial base assessments and the diminishing manufacturing sources
and material shortages processes that provide a range of mitigation
options, such as life time buys. Estimated costs associated with
maintaining foundry capabilities and access required for the production
of the parts required by Department customers cannot be calculated
without foundries providing additional business and technical
information. These estimates vary widely and depend to a great extent
on the commercial marketplace's support of specific process
technologies, feature sizes, and performance features.
Mr. Rogers. What are the foreign threats to our space systems? What
are we doing about the growing foreign threat to our space systems?
General Buck. Today the United States' space enterprise faces a
wide spectrum threats from interference with the signals that carry
information from orbit to end users, such as GPS signals or satellite
communications, to the use of directed energy against our space-based
ISR capability, to the development of kinetic options against on-orbit
platforms . . . these threats continue to proliferate. To address these
threats, we continually seek ways to make our architectures more
resilient and able our space-based systems to `operate through' any
contested, denied, or operationally limited environment. From a more
`whole of government' approach, JFCC SPACE continues strengthen
relationships with the interagency and mature our international
partnerships with like-minded, space-faring nations toward increasing
overall deterrence by demonstrating that an attack on a U.S. space
capability is an attack on global stability and that assured access to
space by all is a global concern.
Mr. Rogers. The growing congestion in the space environment,
including the increasing number of small satellites such as cubesats,
has raised concerns about the potential for increased space debris.
What is DOD doing to track objects such as cubesats, minimize the
possibility of collision among its space assets, and improve tracking
of space debris?
General Buck. To track; and improve tracking of debris:
DOD employs the global Space Surveillance Network (SSN) to track
objects in all orbital regimes and receives on average over 400,000
observations each day. The SSN is a mix of optical, mechanical radar,
phased array radar, and space-based assets which provide the backbone
of the U.S. Satellite Catalog.
The SSN's day to day operations are managed from the JFCC SPACE's
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) that optimizes these resources to
sufficiently track and report high interest events such as human
spaceflight, potential adversary actions, launches, and reentries, in
addition to normal space flight activities. The observations on these
high interest events and objects are transmitted to the JSpOC for
analysis and used to build the total space situational awareness (SSA)
picture by layering positional information with additional sources such
as operator provided ephemeris or intelligence.
To improve overall tracking, a notable upgrade is the new Space
Fence, scheduled for operations in 2018, which I believe is the most-
significant improvement to low- and medium-earth orbit SSA capabilities
in decades. By some estimates, the Space Fence will improve our catalog
awareness from 23,000 to over 200,000 tracked objects. The delivery of
the Space Fence will provide JFCC SPACE greater coverage for detection
of near-earth objects as well as improved ability to detect unforeseen
or unannounced space events such as breakups and maneuvers.
Cubesat Tracking:
Cubesats are a unique challenge, but one that the DOD has actively
engaged with industry on for a number of years. Partnerships with
academia, NASA, and other cubesat launchers has resulted in a large
number of operators engaging with JSpOC very early in their
constellation planning to ensure they take DOD tracking techniques into
account when they deploy their objects. Ultimately, we would like to
see more active tracking techniques added to these objects to improve
responsiveness in identification.
To minimize collisions:
Collision mitigation is accomplished by JFCC SPACE through the
JSpOC by comparing the predictive locations of orbiting objects to
assess if there is a risk of close approach and, if so, what the
predicted miss distance is at the time of closest approach. This
process is referred to as Conjunction Assessment (CA). Through our
relationships with over 600 civil, commercial, and military missions
worldwide, we issue over 3,000 notifications daily to these partners
advising of possible close approaches. Not all notifications are
actionable, but for those messages in which the operator decides to
maneuver, we screen their proposed maneuver plan to ensure they do not
create new or increased risk to their satellite or others.
The CA mission continues to evolve. The JSpOC screens all active
payloads against all tracked objects multiple times a day. Current
screening data not only includes our SSN data but also includes
ephemeris and future maneuver plans from many operators. We are
constantly innovating new techniques, with the collaboration of other
military organizations, NASA, and commercial partners. With the
implementation of the JSpOC Mission System (JMS) Service Pack 2 this
year and new sensors like the Space Fence, JFCC SPACE's ability to
detect and warn of potential collisions will be improved.
Mr. Rogers. What is the plan for the Joint Interagency Combined
Space Operations Center (JICSPOC) going forward, and how does this
compare with the plan for the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC)?
General Buck. Although there has not been a final decision on the
long-term mission of the JICSpOC, we have already learned much from its
first three experiments and are using the information to determine the
future construct for unity of effort across the USG to preserve our
Nation's access to space and to provide seamless space-based
capabilities for our forces. We will continue to use the information
coming out of the JICSpOC to plan for emerging and advanced space
threats and will leverage it to provide vital information, capabilities
and effects for national leadership, allies and partners, and the Joint
Force. Like the JSpOC, JFCC SPACE's primary command and control
operations center, the JICSpOC will be assigned to JFCC SPACE; the two
centers will work in unison to ensure space-based capabilities are
delivered to our forces and to protect and defend the space domain.
Mr. Rogers. Cloud characterization and theater weather imagery are
the top two most important certified requirements regarding space-based
weather collection. What are the risks if these warfighter requirements
are not met?
General Buck. Accurate characterization of cloud tops is critical
to missile detection, missile warning and intelligence collection and
analysis. Insufficient space-based weather collection over theaters of
operation will negatively affect our ability to accurately monitor and
subsequently forecast thunderstorms, icing, turbulence, tropical
cyclones and other environmental factors affecting force maneuver and
mission execution.
Specific effects include:
Space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), required for monitoring enemy force disposition/
employment and targeting, require accurate cloud characterization for
planners to predict the best time and locations for electro-optical/
infrared (EO/IR) coverage.
Overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) collections, critical
for strategic and theater missile warning, require accurate cloud
characterization and theater weather information for collection,
monitoring and characterization.
Successful force employment to include planning,
maneuver, weapon selection, and execution timing rely on accurate
weather forecasts enabled through persistent theater weather imagery.
Time sensitive operations such as search & rescue and
medical evacuation require timely and accurate weather forecasts.
Mr. Rogers. What affect will disaggregation of nuclear and non-
nuclear missions have on an adversary's risk calculus regarding
attacking U.S. space assets? Will it lead to less complicated and/or
lower the threshold for attacking space systems supporting the United
States' ability to project power with non-nuclear forces? If so, are
you concerned that disaggregation could weaken deterrence and foster
crisis instability?
General Buck. Disaggregation of space-based missions complicates a
potential adversary's risk calculus and provides a level of resilience
to our space based capabilities. Disaggregation should be investigated
from both mission and orbital regime perspectives. Using multiple
orbital regimes for space based missions (low earth orbit, medium earth
orbit, geosynchronous earth orbit and highly elliptical orbits)
complicates an adversary's decision calculus. Focusing solely on
mission disaggregation could enable an adversary to assume non-nuclear
targeting remains below any threshold for escalating into multi-theater
armed conflict. A balanced approach to disaggregation increases overall
resilience, avoids any implication that some space capabilities can be
targeted with fewer consequences, and, as such, offers a greater
potential for deterrence and stability.
Mr. Rogers. Do you support establishing so-called ``red lines''
through declaratory policy statements to refrain from deliberate
interference with nuclear command, control, and communications or early
warning space systems?
General Buck. The United States is committed to reinforcing
positive norms of behavior to ensure the continued peaceful use of
space for all responsible nations. The establishment of ``red lines''
as posed in your question is a policy vice military decision. The
political decision on declaratory policy will likely need to weigh the
loss in flexibility with respect to an ever changing geopolitical
environment against any potential deterrence value from such a
declaration. That said, if such declarations are made, JFCC SPACE is
prepared to execute any mission received should an adversary decide to
act in abeyance of those declarations.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe that Russia or China will honor
international norms to refrain from deliberate interference with
nuclear command, control, and communications or early warning space
systems in the event of crisis or conflict with the United States?
General Buck. I believe that Russia and China will honor
international norms (and in Russia's case, its specific obligations
under the New START treaty) as long as they perceive it as in their
national interests to do so. While neither seek nuclear conflict with
the United States, it is prudent to consider that, if either regime
feels threatened, neither is likely to remove options from
consideration. That said, the degree of international cohesiveness
against aggression in the space domain will be a part of both Russian
and Chinese decision calculus. To convince them to continue to honor
those norms, we need to employ a well-rounded strategy of deterrence to
include strong partnerships with like-minded space faring nations.
Mr. Rogers. What is the current state of the space acquisition
workforce with regard to numbers of acquisition professionals and their
acquisition management expertise? If there are shortcomings in the
acquisition workforce, what is being done about them? What efforts are
underway to enhance development of the space acquisition workforce?
Mr. Calvelli. NRO has a robust complement of acquisition
professionals, including personnel from the CIA's Directorate of
Science & Technology (DS&T) Office of Space Reconnaissance (OSR),
Active Duty Air Force, Navy, and Army personnel, and NRO's new DOD
Cadre workforce. While the entirety of NRO's space acquisition
workforce is not ``formally'' designated, this diverse set of
professionals is focused on ensuring every NRO space acquisition is
successfully delivered on time and on budget. With respect to training
and expertise, personnel occupying acquisition positions are required
to pursue appropriate certifications through the Defense Acquisition
University (DAU) in accordance with DOD regulations and the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). Personnel assigned to
the NRO from other agencies are required to comply with their home
agency certification and training requirements, in addition to taking
courses offered by the NRO's Acquisition Center of Excellence (ACE).
Additionally, CIA officers can also take available CIA-specific
acquisition courses. In addition to other Intelligence Community
detailees, the CIA does not specifically code their billets as
``acquisition.'' However, the CIA's DS&T Office of Space Reconnaissance
(OSR) was formally established in 2014 to provide CIA officers a career
path focused on space and space-related acquisitions. The number of CIA
personnel assigned to the NRO is classified and will be provided
separately to your staff. At this time, I do not believe there are
shortcomings in the NRO acquisition workforce. Those acquisition coded
positions not currently occupied by appropriately certified personnel
are monitored on a monthly basis to assess their status and track their
certification progress. The NRO continues to receive tremendous support
from its military service and intelligence community partners. In
addition to Defense Acquisition University (DAU) training, the NRO has
numerous other avenues available to personnel to broaden and deepen
their acquisition skillset both formally and informally. These include
the NRO Acquisition Center of Excellence (offering NRO-unique
acquisition training); informal training/experiences; advanced
education (University of Maryland and Virginia Tech on-site Masters
programs); professional certifications (Naval Post Graduate School,
etc.), and other programs within the DOD or the Intelligence Community
(National Defense University, National Intelligence University, etc.).
Additionally, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel seeking CIA
Contracting Officer Technical Representative (COTR) certification may
take CIA-specific courses, or substitute NRO ACE courses for CIA COTR
Acquisition Training I (CAT-I) and COTR Acquisition Training II (CAT-
II).
Mr. Rogers. Please explain how implementation of the Space
Enterprise Vision will improve the affordability, resilience, and
capability of the future national security space architecture.
Mr. Calvelli. The Space Enterprise Vision (SEV) describes a shared
vision between the National Reconnaissance Office and Air Force Space
Command (AFSPC). It is a resiliency strategy that achieves robustness
through a layered defense-in-depth integrated with architectural
agility designed to promote threat denial and asymmetric cost
imposition in combination with decision superiority. The vision
developed jointly between the NRO and AFSPC is responsive to a broad
spectrum of disruptive counter space threats in all contested regimes
including space, ground, and cyber. While this vision does not call for
a shared single architecture, it describes a coordinated approach
across all space mission areas, coupling the delivery of space mission
effects to policy makers, the warfighters, and the Intelligence
Community with the ability to protect and defend space capabilities
against emerging threats. Core elements include persistent situational
awareness, protection of strategic-enabling capabilities, and agile
operations within a balanced force structure optimized to preserve
mission and enforce a deterrence posture against adversaries. The
strategy builds resiliency through an enterprise approach that
leverages a synergistic strength created by mutually supporting
capabilities, effects, and tactics.
Mr. Rogers. Is the Air Force Space Command and the National
Reconnaissance Office taking different approaches to improve the
resilience and assurance of the national security space architecture?
If so, why?
Mr. Calvelli. Although the orbital disposition and mission
composition of the NRO and Air Force space architectures are different,
they are complementary and the central tenets of achieving resiliency
are largely the same. Both organizations are evaluating the appropriate
mixture of resiliency insertion options to include hosted payloads,
off-boarding, path diversity, and disaggregation to best accomplish the
breadth of title 10 and title 50 missions in a contested environment.
Varying approaches to achieving balance between resiliency and mission
assurance at the platform and constellation level are being pursued by
the NRO and Air Force Space Command depending on mission parameters.
These systems exhibit varying degrees of interoperability within the
national security space architecture to achieve the overall performance
and resiliency goals prescribed for the SEV. In addition, both
organizations benefit from distributed indications and warning systems
working cooperatively to avoid surprise and to provide timely
attribution of threats for effective mitigation and operate-through.
Integrated decision support tools such as those demonstrated in the
JICSpOC will combine data flows derived collectively from multiple
sensor perspectives to improve threat prediction confidence, prioritize
alerts, and orchestrate responses for space control at the leading edge
of threat engagement.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. How does DOD's approach to phasing out reliance on
Russian engines best ensure rapid and reliable access to space? What
would the impact be of restricting funding to just an engine? Would
this be the optimal way forward to gain assured access to space in the
near and long-terms?
General Hyten. The optimal path to assured access to space is by
initiating public private partnerships for the development of
commercial launch systems that also meet the requirements to provide
national security space (NSS) launch services. Investment in industry's
launch services improves assured access to space for multiple reasons.
First, the DOD has insight into the development of new or upgraded
launch systems and can work directly with industry to manage the
integration of NSS requirements. Second, investment increases the
likelihood of meeting stressing NSS launch requirements using launch
systems that are also commercially viable. Commercially viable launch
service providers share the fixed costs of commercial launch services
across commercial and Government customers, reducing the overall cost
to the Government even if NSS missions cost more to meet the more
strenuous launch requirements. Engine development alone does not
guarantee a launch solution unless a launch service provider uses the
engine and could result in billions in tax-payer funds wasted if the
Government developed engine is not used by a launch provider. In
addition, implementing a ``drop in replacement'' without significantly
redesigning the launch vehicle drives inefficiencies that may make the
overall launch vehicle more expensive because it may require more fuel
or strap-on solids to take the satellites to the required orbits. Thus,
the best way near- and long-term to obtain the required performance at
a reasonable cost is to design the launch vehicle and engine together.
If authorized in FY17, the Air Force will start investing in launch
services, which will result in the development of launch systems
including completing the rocket propulsion systems, and any required
launch system infrastructure. Shared investment with launch providers
and competition for launch services is a feasible and cost-effective
approach. This type of approach was successfully demonstrated on: 1)
Original EELV program, 2) NASA Commercial Orbital Transportation
Services (COTS), and 3) NASA Commercial Crew.
Mr. Cooper. Commercial industry, including SpaceX, Orbital-ATK, ULA
and Blue Origin have are planning to make or use a methane engine in
their launch vehicle. If this type of engine is not deemed too risky
for a large part of the industry (assuming it is tested and certified),
should it be considered too risky for government?
General Hyten. The Department of Defense strategy is to invest in a
commercial launch service provider solution. Multiple providers are
considering methane engines. If an engine is acceptable in terms of
risk for the industry and it meets all our National Security Space
(NSS) requirements for launch vehicle certification, it would be
appropriate for NSS launches.
In addition, the DOD has initiated engine studies as part of the
effort to reduce the biggest risks to engine development, including the
use of methane as a fuel. These results are already being shared with
industry to increase the chances of engine development success. While
there is much interest in an oxygen rich staged combustion (ORSC)
methane engine, the difficulty in developing one cannot be dependably
characterized yet. With little American experience with methane and
kerosene ORSC engines, there are many opinions, and no solid evidence
regarding the pros or cons of ORSC methane engines. For this reason, we
are pursuing both methane and kerosene engine technologies until they
are demonstrated.
Mr. Cooper. How much funding is there in FY17 to enhance resilience
in space?
General Hyten. The current U.S. space enterprise is not resilient
enough to survive all threats that extend into space. The entire FY17
Presidents Budget for the Air Force Space portfolio directly or
indirectly supports resilient capabilities, agile defense,
reconstitution, and robust Command, Control and Communications (C3) to
provide Space Superiority. All systems we are requesting in the budget
are being designed to improve the resiliency of the space enterprise.
Examples of these efforts include investments in a more standardized,
agile, and cyber-secure enterprise ground architecture; improved Space
Situational Awareness capabilities; battle management and command and
control experimentation; and a range of development initiatives focused
on resilience of the Air Force Space portfolio of capabilities.
Mr. Cooper. Absent the launch of DMSP-20, beyond 2020 (estimated
lifespan of DMSP-19), how does the Air Force plan to provide the
capabilities DMSP-20 would have provided? With DMSP-19 failing
recently, would there now be renewed utility to launch DMSP-20?
General Hyten. Consistent with Joint Requirements Council (JROC)
validation of the Space-Based Environmental Monitoring Analysis of
Alternatives (JROCM 092-14, dated 3 September 2014) the Department of
Defense (DOD) has been working to address microwave imaging and space
weather satellite anomaly assessment capabilities with a DOD materiel
solution acquisition, the Weather System Follow-on. The JROC directed
leveraging civil/international partner capabilities, as well as
possible non-materiel solution options, for the remaining space weather
and electro optical/infrared sensing needs (such as cloud
characterization and theater weather imagery). Per Congressional
direction in the FY15 & FY16 National Defense Authorization Acts
(NDAA), the FY16 Consolidated Appropriations Act, and in coordination
with stakeholders, the DMSP Program Executive Officer and Milestone
Decision Authority (Lt Gen Greaves) signed a Termination Acquisition
Decision Memorandum on 30 December 2015. The Termination ADM initiates
a set of activities and specific tasks defined in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation. Specific timelines are specified in the FAR for
completion of those efforts and an integrated program schedule has been
developed to manage those efforts, resulting in space vehicle
disposition by 20 December, 2016. While the implementation of
termination is underway, Lt Gen Greaves directed the program office to
take no irreversible action for the moment to allow the AF, DOD, and
Congress an opportunity to evaluate the utility of launching DMSP-20.
Bottom line is that the Air Force is executing the termination plan per
the FAR and has until 1 June 2016 to make a decision on DMSP 20 without
affecting the 20 December 2016 mandate.
Mr. Cooper. Are we willing and sufficiently prepared to be able to
rely on allied space launch capability in an emergency case where U.S.
launch providers would not be available?
General Hyten. The National Space Transportation Policy states:
``United States Government payloads shall be launched on vehicles
manufactured in the United States unless an exemption is coordinated by
the Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor and the
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and Director of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy through an interagency
process.'' In addition to this, 51 USC 50131 states, ``. . . the
Federal Government shall acquire space transportation services from
United States commercial providers whenever such services are required
in the course of its activities. To the maximum extent practicable, the
Federal Government shall plan missions to accommodate the space
transportation services capabilities of United States commercial
providers.''
It may be necessary in an emergency to use allied launch services,
but each of the NSS satellite program offices and customers (AFSPC and
NRO) have specific detailed technical interface and security
requirements that would have to be met and accommodated by the allied
launch service, which would be difficult to achieve on short notice.
The Air Force and The Aerospace Corporation conducted a very general
study in late 2013 which found nothing to preclude an allied launch
provider, Arianespace, from potentially launching NSS payloads. The Air
Force plans to conduct a more in-depth study/assessment during 2016 in
collaboration with Arianespace. This study will focus on collecting
data and a detailed assessment of Arianespace launch vehicles as a
backup capability for NSS missions. When the study is complete, we will
have a much better idea of what it will take (time, resources, and
technical resources) to launch NSS payloads using allied launch
services. If it is determined that launch of a mission payload on a
foreign launch service is in the national security interests of the
U.S. due to the unavailability of a domestic launch capability, the Air
Force would comply with the National Space Transportation Policy
exemption guidelines.
Mr. Cooper. Last year during the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
launch hearing, both SpaceX and ULA testified that they did not require
any government funds to develop a new engine. What are the incentives
for private industry to develop a new engine and what is the value of
planned expenditures by DOD that these companies would compete for in
the national security market once they have developed an engine? What
is the right balance in a public/private partnership in terms of
funding a new engine?
Mr. Loverro. The Department's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) and Launch Services Investment
(LSI) programs represent an integrated approach in which the Department
partners with industry to develop not only domestically designed and
manufactured liquid- and solid-fuel based propulsion systems, but more
importantly, new and improved launch services capabilities. The
Department is funding these activities in an effort to ensure that
current and future launch service providers focus on developing systems
that meet all of the Department's requirements, not just those driven
by the commercial market place. The Department's requirements are
typically much more demanding than those of commercial customers.
Because of the Department's innovative use of Other Transaction
Authority (OTA) on the RPS program, industry is required, by statute,
to provide at least one-third of the funding for the project. The
Department is encouraging our OTA industry partners to contribute at a
level higher than one-third. Even at a one-third contribution, however,
the Department is receiving an excellent return on its RPS investments.
The ultimate incentives for those investments is clearly access to the
future National Security launch market, which CAPE estimated at $80B in
2013.
Mr. Cooper. How can we better take advantage of emerging commercial
capabilities, whether it be imagery or space situational awareness?
Mr. Loverro. As I testified in my hearing and in response to
HASCSF-03-12, leveraging U.S. commercial entrepreneurial developments
is a center piece of our overall space strategy. From a policy
perspective, we have focused on efforts to eliminate unnecessary and
outdated barriers to commercial innovation while still assuring
national security protections. From an architectural basis, we are
carefully studying whether we can disaggregate previously aggregated
strategic and tactical space systems to allow greater utilization of
commercial capability to meet those tactical needs. Most challenging
are the acquisition and business impediments to utilizing commercial
space capabilities, which we are trying to address with innovative
business arrangements such as the commercial SatCom Pathfinder
activities and more intensive use of other transaction authorities.
In the specific area of remote sensing and commercial SSA, we have
two main efforts. For remote sensing, NGA has built a strategy for
commercial utilization which they are rapidly pursuing. On the SSA
side, Air Force Space Command and STRATCOM have embraced the Commercial
Space Operations Center (ComSpoc from AGI) as a foundational element
within the JICSPoC experiment to see how it might address current
shortfalls.
We welcome and embrace these emerging innovations; however, rather
than focusing on outdated policy barriers, the Department must improve
its ability to exploit innovative approaches while maintaining national
security.
Mr. Cooper. How does DOD's approach to phasing out reliance on
Russian engines best ensure rapid and reliable access to space? What
would the impact be of restricting funding to just an engine? Would
this be the optimal way forward to gain assured access to space in the
near and long-terms?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department continues to be dedicated to
ending use of the Russian manufactured RD-180 engine as soon as
reasonably possible, but still believes that access to the RD-180 while
transitioning to new and improved launch service capabilities is the
optimal way forward to meet statutory and Department policy
requirements for assured access to space in both the near and long
term. The Department also continues to focus on the development of new
and improved launch service capabilities as this approach allows launch
service providers to perform the design and optimization trades
necessary to offer commercially viable launch services, using domestic
propulsion systems, capable of meeting the Department's space launch
requirements. Any new engine still has to be incorporated into a launch
vehicle. The Department does not want to be in a position where
significant resources have been expended on an engine and no commercial
provider has built the necessary vehicle to use that engine.
Restricting funding to engine development only would likely drive the
development of an engine designed for a specific rocket, and at least
initially, provide an advantage to a single launch service provider.
Mr. Cooper. Last year during the Strategic Forces Subcommittee
launch hearing, both SpaceX and ULA testified that they did not require
any government funds to develop a new engine. What are the incentives
for private industry to develop a new engine and what is the value of
planned expenditures by DOD that these companies would compete for in
the national security market once they have developed an engine? What
is the right balance in a public/private partnership in terms of
funding a new engine?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department's long-term goal is to field new
and improved launch service capabilities that will result in two or
more commercially viable launch service providers utilizing
domestically manufactured propulsion systems, that can support National
Security Space missions to all 8 Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) reference orbits.
The Department's EELV Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) and Launch
Services Investment programs are designed to incentivize industry to
develop not only domestically designed and manufactured liquid and
solid fuel based propulsion systems, but more importantly, new and
improved launch services capabilities. The Department is funding these
activities in an effort to ensure current and future launch service
providers focus on developing systems that meet all of the Department's
requirements, that being able to place missions to all 8 EELV reference
orbits, and not just those driven by the commercial market place. The
Department's requirements are typically much more demanding than those
of commercial customers.
The Department is utilizing innovative use of Other Transaction
Authority (OTA) agreements on the RPS program. The OTA agreements
awarded by the Air Force require industry performers, by statute, to
provide at least one third of the funding for the project. The
Department is encouraging our OTA industry partners to contribute at a
higher percentage. Even at a one third contribution, the Department is
receiving an excellent return on its RPS investments. Additionally, a
launch service provider who develops a system that meets the
Department's requirements will have the opportunity to bid on up to 23
Air Force missions valued up to $8B over the FYDP.
Mr. Cooper. Commercial industry, including SpaceX, Orbital-ATK, ULA
and Blue Origin have are planning to make or use a methane engine in
their launch vehicle. If this type of engine is not deemed too risky
for a large part of the industry (assuming it is tested and certified),
should it be considered too risky for government?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department does not deem a methane based
engine as too risky for government use based on current knowledge. To
date, there has not been a methane based engine developed, tested, and
certified of the size necessary to power to an Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle (EELV) class launch vehicle. The Blue Origin BE-4
engine, currently under development and planned for possible use in the
ULA next-generation Vulcan launch vehicle, is a methane based engine
designed to use an oxygen-rich staged combustion (ORSC) engine cycle,
similar to that used by the RD-180. While there has been international
manufacturing of ORSC engines for many years, U.S industry has never
designed, manufactured, and fielded an ORSC engine, either methane or
kerosene based, capable of powering an EELV class launch vehicle. In
order to reduce program risk and build U.S. manufacturing expertise in
the ORSC area, the Department recently awarded four Other Transaction
Authority agreements to fund multiple liquid and solid propulsion
system development approaches as part of the EELV Rocket Propulsion
System program.
Mr. Cooper. Has the advent of new entrants in national security
space launch benefited national security and the taxpayers? On what
basis do you make this assessment?
Mr. Weatherington. The emergence of new entrants provides the
Department with an additional path to space, for some of our missions,
which enables us to preserve assured access to space and benefits
national security. The Department recently announced award of the
GPSIII-2 launch service; this award achieves a balance between mission
success, meeting operational needs, lowering launch costs, and
reintroducing competition for National Security Space missions. The Air
Force expects to compete three more launch services in FY 2016. The
Department will be better able to quantify the cost reduction benefit
to the taxpayer after these contracts have been awarded. While the cost
reductions associated with competition are extremely important,
ensuring that all certified EELV providers and potential EELV new
entrants meet the Department's rigorous mission assurance standards and
are able to reliably fly to all eight EELV mission orbits remains our
top priority.
Mr. Cooper. The request includes $30M for pathfinder activities to
improve the acquisition of commercial satellite communications. There
is support to bring additional commercial capabilities to DOD, better
value to taxpayers and new approaches to acquiring COMSATCOM. However,
there are questions about the extent to which the Air Force is
leveraging the latest technology to its full capability, and whether it
is heeding the direction in the FY16 NDAA which required a pilot
program to demonstrate orders-of-magnitude improvements in capability
and capacity. Why are investments in this type of pathfinder not
planned until the 2020s instead of in the next few years?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department's wideband satellite
communication (SATCOM) pathfinder activities have already started and
include five Air Force and five Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) pathfinders. The first four DISA and the first Air Force
pathfinder activities have either been completed or are providing
useful data. The last DISA and the second Air Force pathfinder efforts
should be on contract by the end of FY 2016. The FY 2017 President's
Budget requested funds for the Air Force's last three pathfinder
efforts, which should be awarded in FY 2017 through FY 2019. These
pathfinder activities are part of the pilot program for providing a
cost-effective and strategic method to acquire commercial SATCOM
services directed by the FY 2016 NDAA.
Mr. Cooper. Are we willing and sufficiently prepared to be able to
rely on allied space launch capability in an emergency case where U.S.
launch providers would not be available?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department is required by statute and policy
to fly National Security Space (NSS) payloads on U.S. manufactured
launch vehicles. While there has been some preliminary investigation
into the use of the Ariane V vehicle for use by NSS payloads, a
significant amount of follow-up work would be required before any
definitive conclusions could be made. In the case of a national
emergency, this analysis could become a priority, but it is difficult
to imagine a situation where the entire U.S space launch capability was
grounded for a period long enough to allow the reintegration of an NSS
payload to a new launch vehicle. The first time integration of a
satellite onto a launch vehicle is a process that typically takes 2 to
3 years.
Finally, it should be noted that Ariane V has not demonstrated the
capability to fly to all eight of the NSS required orbits.
The FY 2016 NDAA Sec. 1607, Joint Explanatory Statement (JES)
included a congressional briefing requirement for an executable backup
plan for assured access to space. The JES directs the Department to
evaluate options for an executable backup plan for assured access to
space that maintains competition as feasible. The Air Force is in the
initial rounds of coordinating the draft briefing and plans to deliver
it to the Congressional Defense Committees by the end of July 2016.
Mr. Cooper. How can we better take advantage of emerging commercial
capabilities, whether it be imagery or space situational awareness?
Mr. Cardillo. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. How have you leveraged commercial capabilities and open
source analysis to augment traditional collection? Do you need
additional authorities for this?
Mr. Cardillo. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. How much funding is there in FY17 to enhance resilience
in space?
Mr. Calvelli. A classified, detailed breakdown of NRO's funding for
resiliency will be provided separately via secure means.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ``Future
Operating Concept'', a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants
to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking
vignettes. One vignette, titled ``Space Control Challenged'' envisions
a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates air,
space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air
Force Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack
on one of our commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data
fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response.
As the battle continues, he is able to have real-time situational
awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. In another
vignette, called ``Satellites On-Demand'', an F-35 pilot responds to an
adversary's offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by
launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the
F-35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular
satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where it deploys into
a dispersed network formation of micro-sat's complete with
electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-
control actions. The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an
area of interest and supports a strike package inbound to attack
targets in enemy territory. My question is, what's being done to make
this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? How can
we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this
represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really
have to wait 20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What's
stopping us from doing it faster?
General Hyten. JICSpOC experimentation, the Space Mission Force
(SMF), and development of a threat-informed Space Enterprise Vision
(SEV) are the foundational elements to implement the Air Force
strategic vision described in the ``Future Operating Concept.'' These
initiatives will enable our space mission forces to more effectively
respond to counterspace threats, enhance space crew readiness with
advanced training and tools, integrate space into agile, multi-domain
operations, and increase the resilience of the space enterprise.
Mr. Lamborn. How can we help you achieve your vision?
General Hyten. Consistent funding over time; more specifically,
your continued support toward experimentation activities, embodied in
the current JICSpOC effort, is extremely important. The JICSpOC will
not only inform us how to better operate with current capabilities, but
will also identify any materiel gaps requiring additional acquisition
and funding requirements.
Current gap assessments identify the need for a fully funded,
joint, and combined Space Battle Management Command, Control, and
Communications (BMC3) system to assure continued access to space for
the U.S. and its partners and allies. Another key initiative is our
shift toward a Space Mission Force as we advance the skillsets of our
space crews to operate in a contested environment. Finally,
congressional support toward the Enterprise Ground Services initiative
is necessary as we move to a common interface environment for our
Airmen so they may focus on improved mission and warfighter effects
vice routine tasks.
While the Bipartisan Budget Act provides much needed stability and
predictability, we would reiterate the Secretary of the Air Force's
call for a permanent lift to sequestration. Ultimately, continued
support for the FY17 Air Force budget request is an important step
toward arresting the erosion of our competitive advantage.
Mr. Lamborn. Also, given that this represents where the Air Force
would like to be in 2035, do we really have to wait 20 years to see
these concepts become a reality?
General Hyten. Given today's space and cyberspace threats and
projected future threats, we cannot afford to wait 20 years. Some
nations are aggressively expanding their pursuit of counterspace
technologies now. They are adapting quickly to hold U.S. space and
cyberspace capabilities at risk. It is imperative that we respond more
rapidly to changing threats in space.
Mr. Lamborn. What's stopping us from doing it faster?''
General Hyten. The challenge is significant, and the largest
barrier to faster progress is a lack of mature technology. We are
actively pursuing technologies in support of the Air Force future
concept, such as development of a shared common operating picture that
will allow automated information sharing and integration across
multiple domains and security levels. Development of this technology is
a priority. Further, we are engaged in interagency and international
forums, exercises, and experiments to explore synergistic efforts/
technologies that may address shared and pervasive needs in the space
arena. This investment of time also allows examination of potential
solution sets, current operational limitations, and capture of mature
requirements needed to develop the requisite capabilities and highly-
trained forces needed to fulfill the vision and accelerate concept
implementation. Inculcating greater threat awareness into a space force
that has traditionally operated platforms in the relatively safe,
benign environment of space will also take time, but we are tackling
that with the Space Mission Force initiative.
Mr. Lamborn. Can you please provide some more detail about your
Space Training Transformation Initiative? During the four-month periods
when space operators are ``off-crew'', where, and how, does advanced
training take place?
General Hyten. The Space Training Transformation (STT) Initiative
implements guidance from CORONA Top 2012 and the Space Professional
Functional Authority to develop and implement a more robust Air
Education and Training Command (AETC) Officer and Enlisted
Undergraduate Space Training (UST) expanding the course from 33 to 76
training days. STT also transitions the responsibility for space weapon
system specific training from AETC to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
Through the realignment of resources and organizational
responsibilities, STT functions will allow for rapid unit training
content updates and enable the most cost-effective use of Air Force
resources while increasing technical understanding of the space domain.
The second part of the question is part of our separate, but
related, Space Mission Force (SMF)/Ready Spacecrew Program (RSP)
Initiative. During the four-month periods when space operators are
``off-crew'', they will receive advanced training at their local units/
wings. Advanced training is the set of formal training requirements,
beyond weapon system qualification and continuation training, to
advance the skills required to ensure mission accomplishment in a
contested, degraded and operationally-limited (CDO) environment.
Advanced training events will include classroom, simulator and exercise
sessions focusing on CDO challenges, defensive tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs), system and operations integration, and mission
planning and debriefing for the current and future threat environment.
Advanced training events will push operators to their limits and drive
them to improve and discover new and better ways to conduct operations.
Mr. Lamborn. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ``Future
Operating Concept'', a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants
to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking
vignettes. One vignette, titled ``Space Control Challenged'' envisions
a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates air,
space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air
Force Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack
on one of our commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data
fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response.
As the battle continues, he is able to have real-time situational
awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. In another
vignette, called ``Satellites On-Demand'', an F-35 pilot responds to an
adversary's offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by
launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the
F-35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular
satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where it deploys into
a dispersed network formation of micro-sat's complete with
electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-
control actions. The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an
area of interest and supports a strike package inbound to attack
targets in enemy territory. My question is, what's being done to make
this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? How can
we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this
represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really
have to wait 20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What's
stopping us from doing it faster?
Mr. Loverro. In 2015, the Air Force published the Air Force
Strategy, ``Call to the Future, the Air Force Future Operating
Concept,'' which provides an explanation of a notional end-state; and
the Strategic Master Plan (SMP), which includes a 20-year roadmap to
achieve the Air Force Future Operating Concept (AFFOC) end-state. The
SMP has five vectors (21st Century Deterrence, Global Integrated
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Multi-Domain
Approach, Full-Spectrum Capable, High-End Focused Force, and Game-
Changing Technologies); these vectors represent the path to get to the
AFFOC end-state. Implementing the strategy will be a long process that
crosses all of the core missions and every organization and that uses
all major corporate processes including resourcing, manpower,
acquisition, training and education, and technology development. The
Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air
Force have appointed 3-star ``Champions'' for each of the vectors to
provide the strategic leadership and synchronize the tactical tasks
associated with implementing the SMP Goals and associated Objectives.
They are using the Air Force Council as the forum to institutionalize
senior leader dialogue and the strategic focus that will be required to
implement the Air Force strategy.
From an OSD perspective, we view these vectors as important glide-
paths to future warfighting concepts, but we all recognize that bold
vision such as these will mature and evolve over time and that it may
not be technologically possible to achieve those goals sooner than the
Air Force estimates.
Mr. Lamborn. In establishing the Principal DOD Advisor for Space
position, DEPSECDEF noted that the Executive Agent for Space construct
did not work as planned because it was essentially a coordinating body
with little authority. What reason is there to believe that the PDSA
will not suffer the same fate, especially when it does not have any
budget authority? What, if any, are the current challenges with the
PDSA structure?
Mr. Loverro. The Deputy Secretary has designated the Secretary of
the Air Force as the Principal DOD Space Advisor (PDSA) and has
expanded her authorities and responsibilities to provide independent
assessments and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the
Deputies Management Action Group regarding space programs, budgets, and
activities.
This is an important step to improve governance of DOD space
programs, and the Department believes that the PDSA has sufficient
authority to accomplish the task. The Deputy Secretary has been clear
that we will evaluate the effectiveness of the PDSA over time and, if
necessary, adjust authorities to fully meet the intent of the PDSA
structure.
Mr. Lamborn. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ``Future
Operating Concept'', a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants
to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking
vignettes. One vignette, titled ``Space Control Challenged'' envisions
a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates air,
space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air
Force Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack
on one of our commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data
fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response.
As the battle continues, he is able to have real-time situational
awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. In another
vignette, called ``Satellites On-Demand'', an F-35 pilot responds to an
adversary's offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by
launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the
F-35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular
satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where it deploys into
a dispersed network formation of micro-sat's complete with
electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-
control actions. The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an
area of interest and supports a strike package inbound to attack
targets in enemy territory. My question is, what's being done to make
this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? How can
we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this
represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really
have to wait 20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What's
stopping us from doing it faster?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department's efforts to transition to an
operationally agile, fully integrated, multi-domain force are being
supported by on-going technology development, experimentation,
wargaming, and use of open architecture and network centric engineering
principles. We are developing network enabled command and control
systems (i.e., Air Operations Center, Joint Space Operations Center
Mission System) that incorporate open architecture principles to enable
interoperability and operational flexibility. In parallel, the
Department has implemented the Joint Interagency Combined Space
Operations Center to facilitate joint experimentation to ensure we can
effectively access, fuse, and analyze all sources of information to
enable effective decision making in peacetime and in crisis. This
effort will refine optimum command and control relationships, concepts
of operations, and materiel solution requirements to achieve
operational agility. Achieving this vision will take time to mature
these concepts and supporting technology.
This transition will also require a balanced resourcing strategy to
ensure the Department can continue to meet current requirements while
implementing the force structure of the future. The Department is
assessing options to improve resiliency in the next generation of our
current systems (i.e., Space Based Infrared System and Military
Satellite Communications) while conducting technology development for
next generation capabilities. To guide efforts to improve resilience of
the national security space enterprise, Air Force Space Command
recently released its ``Space Enterprise Vision''. This vision
establishes a new ``resiliency capacity'' concept that takes into
account how well a capability can address a current threat and how
quickly they can adapt to counter future threats. This resiliency
capacity metric will replace the traditional ``functional
availability'' metric that has been used to characterize and evaluate
space capabilities. Implementing the Air Force's Future Operating
Concept will also require continued investment in technology
development and advances to address future threats. An example of this
technology development is the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency's continuing effort to develop a significantly less expensive
approach for routinely and rapidly launching small satellites into low
Earth orbit.
Mr. Lamborn. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ``Future
Operating Concept'', a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants
to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking
vignettes. One vignette, titled ``Space Control Challenged'' envisions
a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates air,
space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air
Force Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack
on one of our commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data
fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response.
As the battle continues, he is able to have real-time situational
awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. In another
vignette, called ``Satellites On-Demand'', an F-35 pilot responds to an
adversary's offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by
launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the
F-35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular
satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where it deploys into
a dispersed network formation of micro-sat's complete with
electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-
control actions. The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an
area of interest and supports a strike package inbound to attack
targets in enemy territory. My question is, what's being done to make
this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? How can
we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this
represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really
have to wait 20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What's
stopping us from doing it faster?
What's being done to make these vignettes reality?
General Buck. The synergistic Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force
space team at the Joint Functional Component Command for Space and its
Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) forms the basis for future
warfighting enhancements along the lines of a Multi-Domain Operations
Center (MDOC). By definition, a true MDOC must not only integrate the
Air, Space and Cyber domains within the Air Force but integrate the
Land and Maritime domains as well.
A current and ongoing endeavor to better integrate the Joint and
Interagency space enterprise is the Joint Interagency Combined Space
Operations Center (JICSpOC) experimentation to determine the necessary
constructs and processes for unity of effort across the USG. In
addition to Joint and Interagency lines of effort, the US Air Force is
implementing the Space Mission Force (SMF) and developing a threat-
informed Space Enterprise Vision that will increase the resilience
capacity of the space enterprise and prepare our space mission forces
to effectively respond to space threats. In addition, the SMF and Space
Enterprise Vision (SEV) are the foundational elements for developing
and implementing the AF strategic vision described in the ``Future
Operating Concept,'' to including building a more resilient space
enterprise and providing advanced tools and training to increase space
crew readiness in order to fully integrate space operations into agile,
multi-domain operations.
Mr. Lamborn. How can we help you achieve your vision?
General Buck. Predictable funding for capability improvements and
increased resilience helps enable the Joint space enterprise focus on
refining and developing new tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Experimentation efforts, like the current JICSpOC activities, are
extremely important in identifying not only how to better operate with
current capabilities but also to identify any material gaps requiring
acquisition and funding. Current gap assessments identify the need for
a fully-funded Space Battle Management Command and Control (BMC2)
system. We also face a shortfall in Indications and Warning for the
space domain in addition to a shortage of space trained and focused
intelligence personnel.
As Commander, JFCC SPACE, I am relying on two significant efforts
from Air Force Space Command. First, the SMF focuses operations
personnel on providing space effects in contested, degraded and
operationally limited (CDO) environments. Second, the Enterprise Ground
Services (EGS) initiative provides the common environment from which we
can access space and ground asset data gathered at the tactical level
of space and provide insight to the operational level of space to
determine if we are in a CDO environment and implement actions to
mitigate effects. The SMF and EGS will work together to give us insight
into the space environment which we simply don't have today. Finally,
we're creating a culture of experimentation and change in satellite
operations and space warfare to get ahead of the adversaries. We're
doing this on the operations side through the Joint Space Operations
Center (JSpOC) and support to the JICSpOC experimentation.
Mr. Lamborn. Also, given that this represents where the Air Force
would like to be in 2035, do we really have to wait 20 years to see
these concepts become a reality?
General Buck. If we are to maintain our competitive and operational
advantages in, through and from space, it is imperative that we respond
and field systems on faster and more agile timelines.
Mr. Lamborn. What's stopping us from doing it faster?''
General Buck. Rapidly evolving threats and technologies coupled
with a dynamic environment are outpacing our deliberate acquisition
processes. We need the ability to observe, orient, decide, and act
faster than our adversary through resilient and responsive future space
capabilities and tactics. Leveraging near-term experiments in space
along with enterprise ground systems will ensure rapid development and
maturation of much needed requirements. Establishing resilient
Enterprise Ground Systems and developing and fielding robust BMC2
capabilities to fight on operationally-relevant timelines are critical.
In this endeavor, we should explore rapid prototyping, automation,
machine-to-machine interfaces and artificial intelligence.
Mr. Lamborn. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ``Future
Operating Concept'', a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants
to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking
vignettes. One vignette, titled ``Space Control Challenged'' envisions
a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates air,
space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air
Force Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack
on one of our commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data
fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response.
As the battle continues, he is able to have real-time situational
awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. In another
vignette, called ``Satellites On-Demand'', an F-35 pilot responds to an
adversary's offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by
launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the
F-35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular
satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where it deploys into
a dispersed network formation of micro-sat's complete with
electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-
control actions. The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an
area of interest and supports a strike package inbound to attack
targets in enemy territory. My question is, what's being done to make
this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? How can
we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this
represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really
have to wait 20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What's
stopping us from doing it faster?
Mr. Cardillo. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Lamborn. Last Fall, the Air Force released its ``Future
Operating Concept'', a strategic vision for where the Air Force wants
to go in the next 20 years. It contains several thought-provoking
vignettes. One vignette, titled ``Space Control Challenged'' envisions
a Multi-Domain Operations Center which combines and integrates air,
space, and cyberspace information and operations. At the MDOC, an Air
Force Captain receives warning of an imminent ground-based laser attack
on one of our commercial imagery satellites, and then uses big data
fusion, analytics and simulation to select an offense cyber response.
As the battle continues, he is able to have real-time situational
awareness and command and control to fight the war in space. In another
vignette, called ``Satellites On-Demand'', an F-35 pilot responds to an
adversary's offensive degradation of U.S. space capabilities by
launching an on-demand rapid reconstitution satellite cluster. Once the
F-35 releases the satellite cluster at high altitude, a modular
satellite booster propels the cluster into orbit, where it deploys into
a dispersed network formation of micro-sat's complete with
electromagnetic-spectrum measures, which complicates adversary space-
control actions. The cluster is thus able to focus its sensors on an
area of interest and supports a strike package inbound to attack
targets in enemy territory. My question is, what's being done to make
this vision a reality across the national security enterprise? How can
we work with you to help you achieve your vision? Also, given that this
represents where the Air Force would like to be in 2035, do we really
have to wait 20 years to see these concepts become a reality? What's
stopping us from doing it faster?
Mr. Calvelli. The NRO's Advanced Systems & Technology (AS&T)
Directorate's research and development in the area of time-dominant
intelligence collection using the SENTIENT automated mission management
schema has promoted new opportunities for future ground architectures.
SENTIENT modernizes intelligence collection by introducing modular big-
data analytic services in a highly automated, multi-INT system,
employing a ground architecture controlling various sensors (strategic,
tactical, commercial and specialized systems). In addition to
transitioning SENTIENT capabilities into ground architectures, the NRO
maintains a SENTIENT research infrastructure and research methodology
enabling proof-of-concept demonstrations for prototype capabilities and
works closely with the joint community to transition additional
capabilities into operational baselines. The Congress, and this
committee specifically, have repeatedly provided the NRO the
authorization, encouragement, and resources it needs to meet the
demands of a contested space environment. Your continued support of
this efforts and your partnership in the future is appreciated. The NRO
researches and develops new technologies and capabilities to
operationalize on a variety of timescales. The NRO is committed to
inserting new capabilities and products into the joint architecture
routinely in order to assist maturation towards the objective 2035
architecture. Ultimately, the objective architecture may take 20 years
before it is a reality, but piece-parts will be delivered along the way
as technologies and systems mature. I'm not aware of any limitations at
NRO that are inhibiting the Air Force's ``Future Operating Concept.''
The NRO, working through the Department of Defense and the Intelligence
Community, are committed to providing U.S. policymakers and warfighters
the collection capabilities and tools necessary to meet national
security demands today, tomorrow, and beyond.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. Is there a synergy that could be had between NASA and
the Air Force on the development of a new-technology upper stage engine
at significantly lower life cycle cost? Could improvements to the upper
stage engine support the goal of assured access to space? How does your
4-step acquisition strategy include these opportunities that could
benefit not only the AF and NASA, but also the American taxpayer?
General Hyten. Yes, there is considerable potential synergy with
NASA in the development of booster upper stage propulsion. NASA's Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) missions, such as LEO science missions, International
Space Station (ISS) resupply and commercial crew, fall within the Air
Force's mission requirements. NASA's Commercial Crew organization has
expressed some interest in how the Air Force executes mission
assurance. Additionally, NASA's large Space Launch System (SLS) will
utilize an upper stage based on the United Launch Alliance (ULA)'s RL10
engine. The SLS configuration will use a two-engine RL10, while ULA is
developing the SLS Exploration upper stage with up to four RL10s. The
Air Force's deep experience with RL10 can potentially help NASA's SLS
development. However, directing a specific engine is not compatible
with the principle of full and open competition and is not part of the
Air Force's strategy. If authorized in FY17, the Air Force plans to
transition away from using the RD-180 engine by competitively awarding
Launch Service Investment (LSI) Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs) to
partner with industry on their commercial launch system development
efforts while ensuring that their launch systems also meet National
Security System (NSS) requirements.
Mr. Coffman. Is there a synergy that could be had between NASA and
the Air Force on the development of a new-technology upper stage engine
at significantly lower life cycle cost? Could improvements to the upper
stage engine support the goal of assured access to space? How does your
4-step acquisition strategy include these opportunities that could
benefit not only the AF and NASA, but also the American taxpayer?
Mr. Loverro. I believe that the Air Force is most suited to address
this question for the record. I defer to the Air Force to provide
additional information.
Mr. Coffman. Once awarded, will the Department's propulsion system
provider or providers be the only options for decades to come. How do
you plan to continually asset and pursue new and innovative launch
technologies?
Mr. Loverro. I believe that the Air Force is most suited to address
this question for the record. I defer to the Air Force to provide
additional information.
Mr. Coffman. How would you adjust your 4-step approach to permit
the full benefit of competition for the entire rocket stack? Can you
ensure that truly new and innovative propulsion providers--some with
dramatically new technologies--are made part of your acquisition
approach for launch services? What are the on-ramps that you will make
available?
Mr. Loverro. I believe that the Air Force is most suited to address
this question for the record. I defer to the Air Force to provide
additional information.
Mr. Coffman. How is the Department going to ensure, in its desire
to procure a launch service, that the taxpayer receives the full
benefit of open competition across the rocket stack, to include the
upper stage?
Mr. Loverro. I believe that the Air Force is most suited to address
this question for the record. I defer to the Air Force to provide
additional information.
Mr. Coffman. How does the Department's 4-step approach address
finding and promoting innovative rocket engine providers, some of whom
the government has already invested in via the SBIR program?
Mr. Weatherington. The first step in the Department's multi-step
process to field new and improved launch service capabilities was to
issue a Broad Area Announcement (BAA). The BAAs solicited ideas and
project proposals that would provide risk reduction and technical
maturation in support of future domestic liquid rocket engine and solid
rocket motor development activities. The Air Force issued a total of 10
BAA awards to a combination of academic institutions, small and large
businesses. The projects include a number of innovated additive
manufacturing process development activities for individual rocket
engine components, as well as developing test and qualification
standards for those new processes. Opportunities for innovation
continue with step 2 investments at Orbital ATK, SpaceX, United Launch
Alliance, and Aerojet Rocketdyne through the use of Other Transaction
Authority agreements. All these projects will support the broader
industry propulsion system development efforts. The final 2 steps of
the approach will culminate in the development of new and improved
launch service capabilities that will be available to the Department in
FY 22.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. During the hearing it was stated that the Department of
Defense is not pursuing launch systems, but instead pursuing launch
services that consist of an integrated solution that addresses the
components of main and upper stage engines. How does this approach
ensure that new entrants are not shut out because the launch service
provider has chosen their own solution?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department's Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) New Entrant process is designed to ensure every company
that wishes to become a certified EELV launch service provider (LSP),
has an opportunity to do so. The New Entrant Certification Guide
(NECG), issued by the Air Force in October 2011, delineates the top
level requirements all prospective New Entrants must meet. The NECG is
focused on the LSP requirements and not at the component provider
level. The Department's expectation is the LSP will offer an
integration solution for the government to evaluate to include
incorporating innovative solutions from the 2nd/3rd tier technology
base. In addition, the Department presumes the LSP will work with its
vendor base to incorporate any and all new and innovative components
into their final vehicle design. The Department is already funding some
of these technology improvements as part of our Rocket Propulsion
System (RPS) program. For example the funded RPS development activities
include; the Aerojet AR-1 and Blue Origin BE-4 engines, improved solid
rocket motors and launch vehicle upper stage design.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PETERS
Mr. Peters. Last year's NDAA had a provision that requires DOD to
undertake a Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Pilot program to test out
the best commercial SATCOM services. Section 1612, requires that these
Pilots are supposed to be separate and different from the Pathfinder
program. They were supposed to be ``orders of magnitude'' better that
tested new technology, like high capacity satellites. The Air Force's
plan in the FY 17 Budget seems to ignore this Pilot program and it
appears there is no plan for testing high capacity SATCOM technology
this year, or next year. Does the Air Force have a plan to implement
the ComSat ``Pilot program'' and test this new high capacity
technology? And in order to get this new technology to the warfighter,
will you expedite the testing of high throughput/high capacity
technology?
General Hyten. The Air Force plans to implement five pathfinders as
part of its pilot program. Currently, we are studying life cycle cost
affordability implications and potential impacts to Joint Service
terminals. Pathfinder #3, which is planned for FY17, will reduce risk
by investigating interoperability issues between DOD infrastructure and
High-Capacity Satellite ground stations. Pathfinder #5 will incorporate
results from the Pathfinder #3 and #4 efforts to further demonstrate
interoperability with High Capacity Satellites.
Mr. Peters. We understand the Department's Purpose-Built and leased
Satellite solutions don't take advantage of newer, less expensive
technology, like high capacity Satellites: this new technology could
enable capabilities, like in-flight tele-medicine for aeromedical
evacuation, and ultra-high definition sensors for tactical ISR
aircraft. Is there a way to accelerate the Commercial Satellite Pilot
program efforts so that these demos or tests of high capacity ComSats,
can contribute to the upcoming AOA? If so, will they address
countermeasures to jamming and cyber threats?
General Hyten. As discussed in the answer to the previous question
(#65), the Air Force's Pathfinder program is investigating the use of
COMSATCOM outside traditional leasing methods, including Pathfinder #5
with high capacity satellites. As we work through these non-traditional
acquisitions, we are investigating policy, regulatory, and life-cycle
cost implications. The Air Force and the Department expect to
incorporate lessons learned from the completed and ongoing Pathfinder
efforts in the upcoming Wideband SATCOM AOA. Additionally, the Air
Force is addressing jamming threats through other demonstrations like
the protected tactical waveform that can be used over COMSATCOM.
Mr. Peters. We understand the Department's Purpose-Built and leased
Satellite solutions don't take advantage of newer, less expensive
technology, like high capacity Satellites: this new technology could
enable capabilities, like in-flight tele-medicine for aeromedical
evacuation, and ultra-high definition sensors for tactical ISR
aircraft. Is there a way to accelerate the Commercial Satellite Pilot
program efforts so that these demos or tests of high capacity ComSats,
can contribute to the upcoming AOA? If so, will they address
countermeasures to jamming and cyber threats?
Mr. Weatherington. The Department's commercial satellite
communication (SATCOM) pilot program includes five Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA) and five Air Force pathfinder activities. The Air
Force pathfinder program is investigating the use of commercial SATCOM
outside of traditional leasing methods, including pathfinder #5 with
high capacity satellites. The Department expects to incorporate lessons
learned from the completed and ongoing pathfinder efforts in the
upcoming wideband SATCOM Analysis of Alternatives. Additionally, the
Air Force is addressing jamming threats through other demonstrations
like the protected tactical waveform that can be incorporated into
commercial SATCOM architectures.
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