[Senate Hearing 113-698]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-698
OVERSIGHT OF AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
FOR THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, PRODUCT SAFETY, AND INSURANCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
95-895 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK BEGICH, Alaska DAN COATS, Indiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN E. WALSH, Montana
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, PRODUCT SAFETY,
AND INSURANCE
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri, DEAN HELLER, Nevada, Ranking
Chairman Member
BARBARA BOXER, California ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAN COATS, Indiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TED CRUZ, Texas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 16, 2014............................... 1
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 1
Statement of Senator Heller...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 22
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 23
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 25
Statement of Senator Markey...................................... 27
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 31
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 33
Witnesses
David J. Friedman, Deputy Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation....... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Joseph W. Come, Deputy Principal Assistant Inspector General for
Auditing and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Transportation..... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Jacqueline S. Gillan, President, Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety......................................................... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Kendell Poole, Chairman, Governors Highway Safety Association
(GHSA)......................................................... 64
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Robert Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle Safety and
Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers............ 69
Prepared statement........................................... 70
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to David J. Friedman by:
Hon. Claire McCaskill........................................ 93
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 99
Hon. Edward Markey........................................... 103
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Robert Strassburger............................................ 108
OVERSIGHT OF AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product
Safety, and Insurance,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:54 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Claire
McCaskill, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. We were trying to wait for Senator
Heller. He is en route and will be here momentarily, but I'm
conscious of the fact that we had votes, which has delayed the
start of this hearing, and I want to accommodate my colleagues
who are trying to work in a number of commitments they have
this afternoon. So we're going to go ahead and begin the
hearing.
The recall by General Motors earlier this year of 2.6
million vehicles for a defective ignition switch that went
largely ignored by the company and Federal auto safety
regulators for more than a decade has, once again, opened the
eyes of the American public and policymakers to the challenges
we face in keeping our vehicles and highways safe for the
driving public.
Over the past 2 years, this subcommittee has held three
previous hearings on automotive safety issues, including one
last summer on rental car safety and two this year, examining
the issues surrounding the GM recall.
Today's hearing is not about General Motors. But what we
have learned so far from the GM recall has shown us we still
have serious deficiencies in how both auto makers and auto
safety regulators tackle the task of ensuring the vehicles on
the road are as safe as they can be.
This is not unfamiliar territory. In the aftermath of the
Toyota unintended acceleration case in 2010, Congress adopted a
number of auto and highway safety reforms. Even as the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, that we commonly refer
to as NHTSA, continues to implement those reforms, it is clear
the measures enacted in 2012 have not been a comprehensive cure
for the problems of regulating automobile safety, especially
when it comes to manufacturing defects.
This hearing will examine NHTSA's implementation of the
safety provisions of those reforms, the MAP-21 reforms, assess
the efficacy and needs of NHTSA's highway safety and motor
vehicle safety programs, and consider other policy issues
related to NHTSA's authority and resources.
Just yesterday, a lengthy article in the New York Times
identified troubling trends in NHTSA's ability to identify and
respond to safety defects.
Before the GM recall earlier this year, that article laid
out that NHTSA had received 2,000 consumer complaints about
unexpected stalling in the models GM ultimately recalled. But
even a month before the recall, NHTSA was telling consumers
there was, quote, insufficient evidence to warrant opening a
safety defect investigation, end of quote.
Just as troubling, the article cites example of NHTSA's
failing to use its broad subpoena authority to compel
information from automakers when investigating safety defects
and even failing to compel answers to crucial questions about
the cause of accidents related to potential defects.
This morning, the House Energy and Commerce Committee
released a report detailing their findings of NHTSA's failures
in identifying and addressing the ignition switch defect in GM
Cobalts and other models. Much like the institutional problems
at GM that this subcommittee has explored, it appears that
NHTSA itself operated in a siloed environment, where one
division is often unaware of what may be happening in another
division.
In addition to vehicle safety, we will talk today about the
highway safety programs NHTSA administers designed to decrease
death and injuries by changing driving behavior, such as seat
belt use, drunk driving, speeding, motorcycle safety, and the
new modern threat of texting while driving.
In 2012, 31 percent of the 33,594 roadway fatalities in the
United States were attributable to alcohol-impaired driving,
and 52 percent were not wearing seat belts. Making sure drivers
are responsible behind the wheel can save tens of thousands of
lives every year.
The passenger vehicle of today looks vastly different from
my first car, a Chevy Nova with a rusted out floorboard.
Today's vehicles have airbags, crash avoidance technologies,
and dozens of onboard computers helping to navigate the
vehicle, keep the occupants safe, and reduce environmental
impacts. While the auto industry has adapted relatively quickly
as technology and consumer demand have evolved, I'm concerned
that both Congress and NHTSA have failed to keep up.
We know the industry is already moving toward vehicle-to-
vehicle technologies in which cars on the road will be talking
to each other, and engineers are already working toward fully
autonomous vehicles or a car that will drive itself. These
technologies hold enormous potential to reduce both the human
and economic toll roadway crashes have on our country.
Congress and NHTSA must ensure that the legal and
regulatory framework is in place to ensure the driving public
is able to realize the benefits of those advancements in a way
that is completely and totally safe.
Before I wrap up, I just want to say that, while I believe
Mr. Friedman has done a good job of running the Agency on an
interim basis since the last Senate-confirmed Administrator
stepped down in January, I would urge the White House to make
filling the vacancy for the nation's top auto and safety
official a priority, especially as the Agency evaluates its
personnel and financial resource needs and continues to work to
modernize in order to keep pace with an auto industry far more
technologically advanced than it.
NHTSA needs an Administrator and a Deputy Administrator,
not one person doing both jobs. I am confident that Senator
Heller and many of my Republican colleagues would work with us
to ensure the speedy consideration and confirmation of a
qualified nominee, especially as we face an environment that is
colored with a crisis of manufacturing auto recalls that have
been deadly on our roads.
I appreciate all of our witnesses being here today, and
look forward to their testimony. Senator Heller?
STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN HELLER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Heller. Madam Chairman, thank you, and good
afternoon. I appreciate you calling this hearing today. I
appreciate our witnesses being here also and look forward to
this important discussion on NHTSA and its progress of
implementing various aspects under MAP-21.
NHTSA plays a vital role in ensuring the highest standards
in motor vehicles and highway safety so that we are continually
working toward preventing crashes, and of course, keeping
motorists safe.
I think it goes without saying, both Chairman McCaskill and
I are very interested in the processes at NHTSA, especially in
light of the General Motors recall. As it relates to NHTSA, we
have paid close attention to what information NHTSA was able to
obtain from the car company, what it did with it, and what its
role was in delay of getting these cars recalled.
After multiple hearings, I've come to the conclusion that
General Motors bears the majority of the blame. NHTSA cannot be
effective when auto manufacturers withhold information. General
Motors has admitted that they did not fully understand how
their vehicles were built, which led to a decade-long delay to
understand the root cause of the airbag non-deployment, which
was an ignition switch that slipped from run to accessory much
too easily. However, NHTSA could have performed better.
Energy and Commerce Committee Republicans released a staff
report this morning that finds, among other things, that NHTSA
is struggling to keep pace with the industry it oversees. Of
course, this is not a new problem.
As some of you may know, in 2009, NHTSA was forced to
enlist the help of NASA to supplement its understanding of
computer controlled electronic systems, electromagnetic
interference, and software integrity as they related to
unintended acceleration. I hope we can use today's hearing to
identify areas for improvement at NHTSA, including its internal
process for identifying issues and connecting those dots.
I'm also concerned the President has not filled the vacancy
for the position of Administrator at NHTSA. The task of
addressing any shortcoming at the Agency and implementing any
necessary improvements may be challenging for a Deputy
Administrator without the endorsement of the President's
nomination and the Senate's confirmation.
This is all very important to highway safety across
America, but NHTSA is also becoming more important for the
State of Nevada.
Madam Chairman, you may have heard Tesla has selected
Nevada for its gigafactory. I was proud to help bring Tesla to
Nevada. The jobs it will create, coupled with the economic boom
it will cause in the state, are both welcome benefits of this
massive investment.
Tesla's factory will bring over 6,500 direct, high-paying
jobs and billions of dollars in economic impact. The project
will increase the GDP in the region by more than 20 percent.
The facility will be one of the largest in the world, with 5
million square feet of the factory devoted to battery
manufacturing. This makes Nevada the epicenter of clean vehicle
technology.
All of this means Nevada is growing. With that growth, we
will need the necessary infrastructure to move people around
safely and efficiently. That is why I'm also working on
extending Interstate I-11 beyond Las Vegas to the northwest
part of the state. It's also why I have such an interest in the
programs that it administers.
Nevada is going to need flexibility to address specific
needs, state needs, and challenges, and I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses, in particular, from the Governor of
the Highway Safety Association on how best to allocate Federal
funds to maximize state flexibility without compromising
national safety priorities.
Nevada was one of the leading states to develop a strategic
highway safety plan even before it was required by law, because
Nevada's highway safety goal is simple, zero fatalities.
Nevada has emphasized five critical areas for reduction of
fatal serious injury crashes that center on one, lane
departures; the majority of roadway fatalities in Nevada are
from lane departures; two, pedestrians; third, impaired
drivers; fourth, occupant protection; and fifth, intersections.
My point in explaining this is that other states may have
critical areas, and that state may want to allocate funding
differently than Nevada. As we work together towards a
reauthorization of NHTSA, I want the record to note how
different each state is. Therefore, we need a plan flexible
enough so each state can come up with a strategic plan best
suited for each individual state to achieve its goal of zero
fatalities on the road.
And with that, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. We have two witnesses today
in the first panel, and our first witness is David Friedman who
is the now--was the Acting Administrator and now is back to
being the Deputy, correct, because you had served the maximum
amount of time?
Mr. Friedman. Correct. I served the maximum statutory time,
but I continue to have all the authority to run and all the
support I need to run the Agency.
Senator McCaskill. And we will hear your testimony first,
and then we will hear the testimony of Mr. Come, who is the
Deputy Principal Assistant Inspector General for Auditing and
Evaluation at the U.S. Department of Transportation. If you
would begin, Mr. Friedman, thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. FRIEDMAN, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Friedman. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member
Heller, and all the members of the Committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today.
Over the past decade, NHTSA has had an impressive record of
helping to reduce highway fatalities nearly 25 percent.
Unfortunately, in 2012, fatalities increased. Much of that
increase was from crashes involving drunk drivers, large
trucks, motorcyclists, bicyclists, and pedestrians.
While I'm encouraged by preliminary estimates indicating a
decrease in crash fatalities in 2013, we still have much work
to do. Each year, crashes cause more than 30,000 lives lost,
each one a tragedy, and nearly $900 billion in economic and
societal harm. This heavy toll was firmly in mind as we
implemented MAP-21.
By consolidating grants and alleviating administrative
burdens through MAP-21, Congress helped the states to better
focus their resources on traffic safety. I'm particularly proud
of now rapidly NHTSA implemented key MAP-21 programs and
supported our stated grantees throughout the application
process.
NHTSA has also taken several actions to enhance vehicle
safety under MAP-21, a VIN lookup tool to help Americans check
their vehicles for recalls, a final rule requiring seat belts
on motorcoaches, a proposed rule to improve child seat safety
in side impact crashes, and these are just a few of the
examples of our accomplishments under MAP-21.
We also recently confronted the challenge of the General
Motors ignition switch defect. As I noted in May when we
announced unprecedented oversight of General Motors and a
maximum allowed $35 million fine, GM violated the law. They
violated the law when they failed to act at a time when airbags
were not working properly in millions of their products.
Instead of fostering a culture of safety, GM encouraged one of
denial and delay that cost lives and endangered the American
public.
We have pushed GM to accelerate the pace of this recall,
and we are ensuring that GM fundamentally alters the way it
approaches safety defects. We are also looking at lessons
learned to improve the Agency's processes, and I would be happy
to discuss them further today.
As just one example, we are changing the way we communicate
with the industry and within our own organization about the
interaction between vehicle components and systems. As part of
that effort, we obtained additional recalls from General Motors
and two recalls from Chrysler based on our new understanding of
the relationship between the ignition switch position and the
airbag deployment. When we had the information, we acted.
We are also working to establish a new normal when it comes
to industry responsiveness to recalls. I have personally met
individually with 12 major auto manufactures with a very clear
message. There is zero tolerance for a failure to quickly
notify the Agency of a safety defect. This reinforces the
message we have sent to the industry over the past 5 years
through record fines totaling more than $140 million for
failing to live up to their responsibility under the law to
find, fix, and report defects, and with the message we've sent
through the nearly 13,000 recalls, we have forced auto makers
to pursue over the last 10 years.
Moving forward, we can strengthen NHTSA's hand in our
highway safety mission with the President's long-term
reauthorization proposal, the GROW AMERICA Act. GROW AMERICA
will increase civil penalty limits nearly tenfold to $300
million. Additionally, GROW AMERICA will require rental car
companies and used car dealers to fix recalled vehicles and
equipment before making them available to the public.
To support our state partners, GROW AMERICA will increase
NHTSA's highway safety grants nearly 20 percent and enhance
state focus on pedestrian, bicycle, and older driver safety,
and emergency medical services. It will also help states in
their efforts to enact strong laws under graduated driver's
licensing, distracted driving, and ignition interlock grants in
MAP-21.
GROW AMERICA also supports the development of cutting edge
vehicle technology, such as automated vehicles and the vehicle
to vehicle communication systems that can warn drivers of
possible collisions where NHTSA has led the research path
forward. Innovations like these will help NHTSA not just to
protect people in crashes, but to avoid them altogether.
In closing, to succeed in our lifesaving work, NHTSA is
asking for additional resources in the GROW AMERICA Act and in
the President's Fiscal Year 2015 budget. And when it comes to
defects, I believe we need to go even further. We need the
latest technology to identify defects and defect trends. We
need to increase the public's awareness of the need to report
potential defects and complaints to us. And we need the
additional personnel to use these tools, analyze the data, and
investigate the problems.
I look forward to working with the Congress to obtain these
resources that are so critical for NHTSA to fulfill these and
other parts of our vital traffic safety mission as part of the
long-term surface transportation reauthorization our country
needs. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:]
Prepared Statement of David J. Friedman, Deputy Administrator, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation
Good afternoon, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, and
Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to testify
before you today on the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's programs.
I would like to first thank the members of the Subcommittee for
your work on reauthorizing the Nation's surface transportation
programs. All of you are aware of the challenges we face in ensuring
roadway safety, and I appreciate your work toward a long-term
transportation bill. I look forward to working with the Committee to
strengthen highway and vehicle safety through a comprehensive
reauthorization.
In 2012, highway fatalities totaled 33,561--1,082 more than during
the previous year. In the same year, an estimated 2.36 million people
were injured in motor vehicle traffic crashes, compared to 2.22 million
in 2011. On average, nearly 4 lives were lost and nearly 270 people
were injured on America's roadways every hour in 2012.
The majority of the increase in deaths, 72 percent, occurred in the
first quarter of the year. Most of this increase was due to increased
fatalities involving drunk drivers, large trucks, unhelmeted
motorcyclists, bicyclists and pedestrians. While this marks the first
increase in fatalities since 2005, highway deaths over the past five
years remain at historic lows. Fatalities in 2011 were at the lowest
level since 1949, and the fatality rate in 2011 was the lowest ever
recorded, at 1.10 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles traveled. Even
with the increase in 2012, fatalities remained at levels not seen since
1950. This steady progress is due in part to the safety standards
implemented by NHTSA and the continuation of key behavioral and
consumer information programs we conduct in conjunction with safety
partners across the United States. Further, continued collaboration and
coordination across the Department, with our partners in the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA),
has allowed us to make additional inroads in improving highway safety.
We are encouraged by preliminary estimates of crash fatalities for the
first half of 2013, which indicate a 4.2 percent decrease in deaths
compared to the same time-frame in 2012.
The not-so-good news is that some groups are overrepresented when
it comes to deaths and injuries. For example----
Fatalities among pedestrians and bicyclists increased by
over 6 percent. Pedestrian fatalities increased for the third
consecutive year to 4,743 lives lost (a 6.4 percent increase
over 2011). Bicyclist fatalities increased for the second
consecutive year and are the highest in 6 years with 726 lives
lost (a 6.5 percent increase over 2011).
Motorcycle rider fatalities increased for the third
consecutive year (a 7.1 percent increase over 2011).
Large-truck occupant fatalities increased for the third
consecutive year (an 8.9 percent increase over 2011).
Deaths in crashes involving drunk drivers increased 4.6
percent in 2012, taking 10,322 lives compared to 9,865 in 2011.
The majority of those crashes involved drivers with a blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.15 or higher--nearly double
the legal limit.
Nighttime seat belt use continues to be a challenge--in
nighttime crashes in 2012, almost two-thirds of the people that
died were unrestrained.
In addition to this terrible human toll, highway crashes result in
economic costs of approximately $277 billion annually, based on 2010
data. And when the human toll is factored in as well, the cost to our
Nation rises to $871 billion annually in economic loss and societal
harm. Statistics like these indicate that we still have much work to
do. I welcome the opportunity to talk about the GROW AMERICA Act, the
President's proposal to reauthorize NHTSA's programs and address the
safety challenges ahead. But first, I'd like to start with the agency's
implementation of MAP-21.
MAP-21 Implementation
MAP-21 consolidated various safety grant programs, including
impaired driving, occupant protection, and State data grants, into a
new Section 405 National Priority Safety Program, and added new grants
for distracted driving, graduated driver licensing (GDL), and ignition
interlock laws. This unified grant program provided for a single,
consolidated application and annual deadline, easing the administrative
burden on states and allowing them to focus their resources on the
life-saving mission of traffic safety.
MAP-21 has been a major priority for NHTSA and the Department. I am
proud of how quickly NHTSA staff worked to implement key programs and
get guidance out to the states. Less than two months after enactment,
we issued a Notice of Funding Availability for the distracted driving
grants, followed shortly thereafter by an interim final rule for the
National Priority Safety Program grants. We conducted webinars with the
State highway safety offices to walk them, step-by-step, through the
new grant programs and the consolidated application process.
As you know, one of the most important things a person can do to
reduce the risk of death or injury on the road is to wear a seat belt.
The most dramatic increases in seat belt use have been in the southern
States, rising to 87 percent in 2013--up from 80 percent in 2011. Seat
belt use continues to be higher in states that have primary belt laws,
which permit law enforcement officers to issue citations solely for not
wearing a seat belt without first requiring an officer to identify a
separate traffic violation.
In spite of this progress, motor vehicle traffic crashes continue
to be a leading cause of death in the nation, exacting a terrible toll
on the country, especially younger age groups. That is why programs
such as GDL are so important, and I am pleased that Congress authorized
incentive grants in MAP-21 to encourage more states to adopt such an
approach for younger, inexperienced drivers.
In establishing these programs to address graduated driver
licensing, distracted driving, and ignition interlocks, Congress sought
to incentivize states to pass and implement effective safety laws. The
eligibility criteria for these grants are based on sound safety
principles, but have proven challenging for many states to meet. In FY
2013, 8 states received distracted driving grants, no state received a
GDL grant, and 2 states received alcohol ignition interlock grants. In
FY 2014, 1 state qualified for the stricter distracted driving grants
available that year, none for a GDL grant, and 4 for ignition interlock
grants. We are eager to improve on this record, while ensuring that we
preserve the important safety benefits these programs were intended to
accomplish. GROW AMERICA contains provisions designed to do that.
On the vehicle safety side, NHTSA recently implemented a MAP-21
provision to make information about recalls available on the internet,
searchable by a vehicle's identification number or VIN. Until last
month, consumers could find general recall information on the NHTSA
website by vehicle make, model and model year. Now consumers can find
out whether their own vehicle has an open recall just by typing in
their VIN. The VIN look-up tool's ease of use will help consumers track
recalls and respond quickly to any recall involving their vehicle.
Already the tool has been enormously popular, receiving about 10,000
``hits'' per day.
Until MAP-21, the largest penalty NHTSA could assess for a single
set of circumstances related to a defect or noncompliance was $17.35
million. MAP-21 increased that amount to $35 million, and NHTSA used
that new maximum this year in assessing a $35 million penalty against
General Motors for its failure to report defects in ignition switches.
Under the Obama administration, NHTSA has been aggressive in seeking
civil penalties for timeliness issues, collecting more than $140
million in penalties since 2010.
MAP-21 also included a number of provisions focused on vehicle
safety. In addition to the VIN look-up tool mentioned earlier, we
issued a final rule requiring seat belts on motorcoaches. The agency
has proposed a rule requiring that child safety seats be upgraded to
provide better protection in side impact crashes. Many other rulemaking
and research activities required by MAP-21 are underway.
I'd like to turn now to a discussion of the GROW AMERICA Act, the
President's reauthorization proposal.
Safety and the GROW AMERICA Act
Safety is at the forefront of everything the Department does, and
the provisions in the GROW AMERICA Act will enhance NHTSA's ability to
improve safety. As many of the statistics noted earlier highlight, we
have made tremendous progress, but significant work remains to be done.
Therefore, the GROW AMERICA Act proposes a more than $7 billion
investment over four years for safety programs across all surface
transportation modes, including new infrastructure improvements that
will advance safety.
Highway Safety Programs
States are crucial partners in improving safety on our Nation's
roadways. The GROW AMERICA Act seeks to foster enhanced State safety
progress through enactment of effective drunk driving, distracted
driving, and other key safety laws. GROW AMERICA does this by giving
states additional funding and flexibility in meeting grant
requirements. It allows the Department to be more engaged in motorcycle
helmet policy discussions in states where statutory and policy
proposals are considered.
GROW AMERICA continues to support critical safety programs that
have been the backbone of our success in highway safety, such as
occupant protection and impaired driving, while providing needed
adjustments to grant programs that originated in MAP-21--distracted
driving, graduated driver licensing, and ignition interlock. It amends
the criteria for these new grant programs to provide different pathways
toward compliance, balancing the need to provide funds to the states to
deploy important safety programs with the goal of fostering enactment
of strong and effective safety laws. In addition, GROW AMERICA
continues support for administering successful high visibility
enforcement campaigns, such as ``Click It or Ticket'' and ``Drive Sober
or Get Pulled Over'' as well as new campaigns like ``U Drive. U Text. U
Pay''.
In addition to this focus on our core highway safety grant
programs, one of our priorities is to enhance efforts in support of
pedestrian and bicycle safety. Americans are increasingly embracing a
new approach to work and school commutes that includes less time behind
the wheel and more time walking or cycling. Increased use of public
transportation also means an increase in walking and bicycling to reach
bus stops and train stations. Sadly, as more Americans are leaving
their cars at home, we are also seeing an increase in deaths among
pedestrians and bicyclists. As I noted earlier, pedestrian fatalities
are up 6.4 percent over 2011, the third year in a row with an increase,
and bicyclist fatalities are the highest in six years, up 6.5 percent
over 2011. These are troubling statistics.
We need to deploy new strategies to better protect Americans when
they walk or ride bikes, and the GROW AMERICA Act does that. It
requires states to spend NHTSA grant funds on bicycle and pedestrian
safety if fatalities among these groups are elevated. DOT is putting
the issue of pedestrian safety front and center, and this spring NHTSA
awarded $1.6 million in new pedestrian safety grants to states with
cities that have the highest rates of pedestrian deaths. We have a
``Roll Model'' program that helps parents teach their young cyclists
about safety and the rules of the road. We have joined with the Federal
Highway Administration to launch ``Everyone is a Pedestrian,'' an
education initiative and accompanying website with safety tips and
resources for local leaders, city planners, and others involved in
keeping pedestrians safe. Together with FHWA and FTA, we hosted a pilot
biking and walking assessment in Ft. Worth Texas in preparation for the
Secretary's initiative to improve non-motorized safety through work
with our field offices and our stakeholders. Looking forward, we will
continue to work closely with the other modal administrations on this
initiative and are working to issue a national Action Plan. NHTSA also
plans to work with the states to implement education and enforcement
components of the Pedestrian Safety Action Plans.
Older drivers are another ongoing area of focus for the agency. As
the Baby Boomers age, research shows they are staying on the road
longer than their predecessors and account for an increasingly large
percentage of all drivers. While older drivers are safer drivers on
average, they are often more frail than their younger counterparts, and
more likely to suffer serious injury if involved in a crash. It is
important that we continue to look for ways to mitigate the risks while
maximizing the safe mobility of older citizens. The GROW AMERICA Act
includes provisions for states to address older driver safety.
Over the course of the GROW AMERICA Act, the Administration
proposes to increase NHTSA grant funding to states by nearly 20
percent. This additional funding is necessary to ensure that core
highway safety issues, such as occupant protection and impaired
driving, continue to be addressed, while also addressing growing issues
such as pedestrian, bicyclist, and older driver safety.
Spending Federal resources efficiently and effectively is a
priority for the entire Department, and NHTSA takes this responsibility
seriously in implementing our highway safety grant programs. To that
end, we have hired new financial specialists to provide the agency with
additional expertise, and we are working diligently to modernize the
electronic infrastructure that tracks and provides accounting for the
highway safety grant programs. This modernization will create a turnkey
solution for the states and for NHTSA, encompassing the life cycle of
the grant programs from application to financial oversight and
reporting. These changes, many of which were identified in coordination
with the States, will reduce the burden and increase the efficiency of
grant application and monitoring processes.
Motor Vehicle Safety
On the motor vehicle safety front, the GROW AMERICA Act will
improve the safety of America's roadways by expanding our authority to
protect consumers from vehicles and equipment with safety defects. The
Act amends the agency's recall authority to require rental companies
and used cars dealers to fix recalled vehicles and equipment before
making them available to the public. There is no reason these entities
should be allowed to pass along to consumers unremedied vehicles that
have been recalled by the auto manufacturers. And in keeping with
NHTSA's aggressive approach to adherence to the laws and regulations
governing recalls, the GROW AMERICA Act will further increase the limit
for civil penalties, from MAP-21 level of $35 million to $300 million,
to hold companies accountable for vehicle safety defects and
noncompliance. The GROW AMERICA Act will give NHTSA imminent hazard
authority to allow the agency to respond quickly to remove hazardous
vehicles and equipment from the market. And, while recent advances in
vehicle automation, including electronic steering, braking, and
throttle systems provide great promise for improving safety, we must
think ahead to protect these systems from tampering. The GROW AMERICA
Act does this by ensuring the agency's ability to seek enforcement
actions against persons who tamper remotely with electronic control
systems. Together, these changes provide valuable enhancements to the
tools in the agency's safety arsenal.
NHTSA's vehicle safety program has many facets, and reauthorization
of those programs at the levels proposed in the GROW AMERICA Act will
help us advance in many areas. As an upcoming study will demonstrate,
vehicle technology improvements have led to dramatic improvements in
vehicle safety from 1960 through 2012. Now, we see the potential to
significantly reduce the number of crashes, deaths, and injuries on our
Nation's highways through automated and vehicle-to-vehicle
communication technology. Although realizing these benefits will take
time, new technologies may shrink the death toll to a fraction of
recent levels. We are pouring energy and resources into this area to
ensure NHTSA plays a leading role in the emergence of these promising
new technologies.
We recently issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
may lead to implementation of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications
in the Nation's light vehicle fleet, based in part on the data
collected as part of the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
Connected Vehicle Safety Pilot in Ann Arbor, MI. V2V provides the
potential to address a large majority of vehicle crashes by giving
drivers pre-crash warnings of possible collisions. V2V will also enable
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) applications, which may provide
additional safety and mobility benefits and vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P)
applications, which will provide added warnings for vehicles and
pedestrians. Additional data collected as part of the Safety Pilot
along with other research efforts will be used to make an agency
decision in coming months as to pathways to advance market penetration
of V2V technology in heavy vehicles.
Our research on crash avoidance technologies (including self-
driving vehicles) continues in collaboration with our State and
industry partners, and we will soon make a decision as to pathways to
advance market penetration of one of those technologies, automatic
emergency braking, into the fleet.. We are also in the midst of a
significant upgrade to our crash data collection systems and the
underlying IT system. Also, working with EPA, we will issue a proposed
rule to enhance the fuel efficiency/greenhouse gas reduction standards
applicable to medium and heavy vehicles.
The GROW AMERICA Act supports all of these activities, which will
save lives, enhance mobility, and improve the environment.
Recalls
I would like to take a moment to address an issue that I am sure is
of interest to this Committee, and that is a matter of great importance
to the agency--the status of the General Motors ignition switch recall.
We have approached the recall from three perspectives: ensuring that
the recall is completed expeditiously to protect the motoring public;
holding GM accountable for its failure to give timely notice of the
problem and ensuring that GM improves this process for current and new
safety issues they encounter; and looking for lessons learned that the
agency can apply to its defects investigation program.
We have been closely monitoring GM to ensure that the recalled
vehicles are remedied as quickly as possible and that the public is
given correct information. I would like to thank Senator Boxer's staff
for bringing to light an issue with the GM recall website that resulted
in consumers erroneously being told their vehicle was not under recall
if the parts necessary to remedy the vehicle were not yet available. We
demanded that GM correct that issue immediately. We will continue our
efforts and vigilance to ensure that this recall is completed in an
efficient and timely fashion.
GM clearly had information available that should have prompted the
company to announce the recall much sooner than it did. We collected
the maximum civil penalty of $35 million from GM for its failure to
meet its timeliness obligations. The company also had a fundamentally
flawed process and culture, requiring wide-ranging internal changes to
improve its ability to address potential safety-related defects. So, we
also entered into a consent order with the company that provides for
our very close oversight of its defects investigation and recall
process for some time. We are exercising that oversight vigorously and
will continue to work to ensure that the changes the company has made
this year and those they continue to make are effective and lasting.
We have also looked very closely at the events leading up to and
following the GM recall to determine how we might improve the agency's
process and increase automaker compliance with the law. For example,
based on our new understanding of the relationship between ignition
switch position and airbag deployment, dialogue and new investigations
have led to additional recalls at GM and other car companies.
Further, we are now working to enhance communication with
manufacturers and suppliers, and within our own organization, on the
potential for unforeseen consequences of interrelationships between
vehicle systems and on other factors that can delay or obstruct quick
action on safety defects. We are also now requiring similar oversight
of manufacturers who fail to meet their timeliness obligations.
The safety recall system established by Congress works most
effectively when manufacturers make safety their top priority, root out
safety problems at the earliest possible opportunity, and timely inform
the agency. Further, while every company has the right to challenge our
conclusions about defects, when NHTSA raises serious safety issues with
automakers, it is critical for them to work with us to quickly ensure
the safety of their customers. In recent weeks, I have communicated
these expectations directly to senior representatives of all major
vehicle manufacturers as the agency works to establish a new normal
when it comes to how all automakers deal with safety recalls.
To ensure that NHTSA and its Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)
can continue to monitor this vast industry effectively, we have asked
for additional resources, such as more personnel. In the President's
Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Budget, NHTSA requested six additional FTEs for
ODI. Clearly, investigating defects is important to all highway users,
as is evident from the recent recalls of Toyota and General Motors
vehicles. To increase the effectiveness of ODI's work, we believe that
the following steps are necessary: enhance ODI's ability to use the
latest technology to help identify possible safety defects; increase
the public's awareness of reporting safety problems to NHTSA; and
provide ODI with the personnel resources to address potential safety
risks.
With over 250 million registered vehicles in the U.S., the data
collection and analysis burden will only continue to grow and we look
forward to working with Congress to ensure that NHTSA has additional
resources to fulfill its safety responsibilities and respond
effectively to emerging safety issues through these activities.
Conclusion
We at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration are
dedicated to our mission of safety. We will work with this Committee to
strengthen these efforts in a comprehensive reauthorization plan.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I am happy to take
any questions that you may have.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Friedman. Mr. Come?
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. COME, DEPUTY PRINCIPAL
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING AND
EVALUATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Come. Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, and
members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
testify on our recent and ongoing work on NHTSA's oversight of
vehicle safety defects and highway safety grants. My testimony
today will focus on NHTSA's efforts to identify and secure an
effective vehicle safety workforce and enhance its grant
oversight.
We testified before the Subcommittee last April on actions
we recommended NHTSA take in 2011 to improve its processes for
identifying safety defects. NHTSA has addressed nine of our ten
prior recommendations, including establishing a process for
documenting consumer complaint reviews. However, NHTSA has not
fully addressed a critical recommendation to conduct a
workforce assessment. This assessment would help the Agency
identify and secure a vehicle safety workforce which has the
right mix of skills for addressing technology advancements in
the automotive industry.
Although NHTSA has developed a new workforce training plan
and obtained a draft workforce assessment, NHTSA officials say
a final workforce assessment will not be available until
November. In addition, new concerns have prompted our office to
launch another audit of the Agency's oversight of vehicle
safety defects.
In March, Secretary Foxx asked us to undertake a review of
NHTSA's safety functions and processes as it related to the
recent GM recalls. Expanding on our prior work, we are focusing
on NHTSA's pre-investigation process, which involves the
screening of consumer complaints, external manufacturer
communications, and other information related to alleged safety
defects.
As part of our ongoing audit, we are also determining if
information on ignition switch issues or non-deploying airbags
was available to NHTSA but not used in the GM defect analysis.
We plan to issue our final report next spring.
In addition to identifying vehicle safety defects, NHTSA
promotes vehicle safety through highway safety grant programs,
such as those that target alcohol-impaired driving. Last month,
we reported that NHTSA's grantees we reviewed generally met key
Federal requirements when spending highway safety grants.
Specifically, our review of one of NHTSA's regional offices
determined that grantees used grant funds for appropriate
purposes and supported transactions with sufficient
documentation.
However, NHTSA lacks sufficient strategies for addressing
delayed expenditures of grant funds. We identified
approximately $539 million in unexpended funds across all
regional offices between Fiscal Years 2006 and 2012. These
unused funds represent potential loss through delayed
opportunities to fund programs that reduce fatalities,
injuries, and property damage.
NHTSA also needs to improve tracking mechanisms to follow
up on grantee deficiencies. The regional office we reviewed
conducted management reviews of all its state highway safety
grant programs and identified deficiencies ranging from
improper use of funds to lack of monitoring plans. However, the
office closed some findings and recommendations without
sufficient documentation of corrective actions or management
approval.
Overall, NHTSA lacks a standardized mechanism for tracking
deficiencies across all regional offices, although they have
committed to developing a new database for doing that in 2015.
Finally, we will continue to monitor NHTSA's efforts to
provide effective oversight of auto manufacturers and highway
safety grants to better ensure timely recalls of vehicles with
defects and the most efficient use of safety grants.
In our ongoing work on the GM recalls, we will carry out
the commitment made to you in April by the Inspector General to
determine what NHTSA knew of this safety defect, when it knew
it, and what actions NHTSA took to address it. In addition, we
will also identify any needed recommendations for improvement.
Chairman McCaskill, this concludes my prepared statement.
I'll be happy to answer any questions you or other members of
the Subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Come follows:]
Preprared Statement of Joseph W. Come, Deputy Principal Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing and Evaluation, U.S. Department of
Transportation
Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify on our recent and ongoing work
on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA)
oversight of vehicle safety defects and highway safety grants. NHTSA
administers highway safety and consumer programs intended to save
lives, prevent injuries, and reduce economic costs resulting from motor
vehicle crashes. In 2012, motor vehicle fatalities in the United States
totaled 33,561. To carry out its broad safety mission, NHTSA has a wide
variety of responsibilities--ranging from overseeing the automobile
industry's efforts to manufacture cars that are free of defects to
providing and overseeing grants to states and localities that fund
initiatives to mitigate safety risks on the Nation's highways.
My testimony today will focus on NHTSA's efforts to identify and
secure an effective defects workforce to oversee automobile safety and
enhance its oversight of highway safety grants.
In Summary
NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has made
progress in strengthening its investigative processes but has
not completed a workforce assessment.
Ongoing vehicle safety concerns--particularly those related
to General Motors' (GM) recalls--prompt further assessment of
NHTSA's vehicle safety defect processes.
Enhanced monitoring tools are needed to improve NHTSA's
oversight of highway safety grants.
Background
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act authorizes NHTSA
to issue vehicle safety standards and to require manufacturers to
recall vehicles and equipment that have safety-related defects or that
do not meet Federal safety standards. ODI conducts tests, inspections,
and investigations to identify safety defects in motor vehicles and
equipment. Based on its findings, NHTSA can require manufacturer
recalls notifying the public and correcting the defects. When
conducting investigations, ODI can request that manufacturers provide
data on complaints, injuries, warranty claims, modifications, parts
sales, and other items.
In 2011, we reported weaknesses in NHTSA's vehicle defect
identification processes. Specifically, ODI needed to improve its
processes for (1) recommending investigations of potential defects, (2)
determining when to use third-party assistance, (3) documenting
investigation information, and (4) ensuring an adequate and well-
trained workforce. In response to our recommendations, NHTSA has
implemented more robust defect investigation processes such as
developing a framework for obtaining third-party testing and preparing
a checklist to enhance documentation of investigative evidence.
The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21)
authorized about $1.3 billion to fund highway safety formula and
incentive grants for Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014. States distribute
these grants to a wide network of sub-grantees nationwide. NHTSA's
regional offices monitor States' and sub-grantees' use of grant funds,
such as conducting triennial management reviews and ongoing oversight.
ODI Has Made Progress In Strengthening Its Investigative Processes But
Has Not Completed A Workforce Assessment
As we reported in 2011 and testified before this committee in April
2014, ODI lacked the processes needed to ensure that manufacturers
recall vehicles and equipment with safety-related defects in a timely
manner.\1\ Notably, ODI's central database for safety defect
information did not track the disposition of consumer complaints. These
complaints are ODI's primary means for determining whether an
investigation is warranted. We identified similar weakness in ODI's
processes for determining when to use third-party assistance,
documenting investigation information, and assessing workforce needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Process Improvements Are Needed for Identifying and Addressing
Vehicle Safety Defects (OIG Report Number MH-2012-001), Oct. 6, 2011.
OIG reports are available on our website at http://www.oig.dot.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI has addressed 9 of our 10 recommendations for enhancing these
processes (see attachment). However, it has not completed a systematic
workforce assessment, as called for in the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) ``Workforce Planning Guide.'' \2\ As we
reported, conducting a comprehensive workforce assessment would enable
ODI to determine the number of staff and specialized skills needed to
ensure manufacturers recall vehicles and equipment with safety-related
defects in a timely manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ DOT's ``Workforce Planning Guide'' provides information on
assessing staffing needs for DOT Operating Administrations that can
facilitate more efficient and accurate alignment of the workforce to
meet organizational goals, commitments, and priorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2011, ODI has taken some action to analyze its workforce
needs including preparing a statement of work, identifying a
contractor, and obtaining a draft assessment. However, ODI staff
recently told us that the final workforce assessment will not be
available until November 14, 2014.
Ongoing Vehicle Safety Concerns Prompt Further AssessmentS of ODI's
Processes
Despite NHTSA's progress in improving its processes for identifying
vehicle safety defects, concerns remain--particularly in light of the
recent GM recalls. Since February 2014, GM has recalled 8.6 million
vehicles sold in the United States related to a possible defective
ignition switch that can cause the engine to shut down and disable
power steering, power brakes, and airbags. Initially, GM's recall was
limited to about 600,000 vehicles manufactured between 2005 and 2007,
but eventually expanded to a total of four separate recalls impacting
vehicles manufactured between 1997 and 2014.
In March 2014, the Secretary of Transportation asked us to
undertake a review of NHTSA's safety functions and processes related to
the GM recalls. Expanding on our prior work, we are drilling down on
NHTSA's pre-investigation process. During the pre-investigation phase,
ODI's Defect Assessment Division screens consumer complaints, external
manufacturer communications, and other information related to alleged
safety defects (see figure). The information helps ODI determine
whether to take actions, such as opening investigations or evaluating
the adequacy of safety recalls.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: OIG analysis of ODI processes
A critical part of the pre-investigation phase involves
manufacturers' early warning reporting to alert the Defect Assessment
Division of potential risks or issues. As the Inspector General
testified in April 2014, NHTSA cannot do its job effectively if auto
manufacturers withhold critical safety information--as we found to be
the case with the Toyota Motor Company.\3\ Upon showing that a
manufacturer withheld such information, NHTSA, the Department, and in
appropriate circumstances, our law enforcement and Federal
prosecutorial partners can seek sanctions against these companies for
withholding such information. In May 2014, NHTSA assessed a $35 million
civil penalty--the statutory limit--against GM for failing to report
the defective ignition switch in a timely manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Toyota admitted that it concealed and made deceptive statements
about safety issues affecting its vehicles, misleading U.S. consumers
and NHTSA. Toyota was charged with wire fraud for providing the
misleading information and forfeited $1.2 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of our ongoing audit, we are determining if information on
ignition switch issues or non-deploying airbags was available to NHTSA
but not used in the GM defect analysis.\4\ We plan to issue our final
report next spring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ As part of our review, we are also determining whether NHTSA
has effectively implemented its enhanced processes for identifying and
addressing vehicle safety defects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enhanced Monitoring Tools Are Needed to Improve Nhtsa's Oversight of
Highway Safety Grants
In addition to identifying and addressing vehicle safety defects,
NHTSA promotes vehicle safety through administration and oversight of
highway safety grants to states and sub-recipients. In August 2014, we
reported that NHTSA grantees generally met key Federal grant
requirements, but NHTSA lacks strategies for addressing delayed
expenditures of grant funds, tracking mechanisms for following up on
grantee deficiencies, or tools to identify and mitigate systemic
nationwide issues.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Enhanced Monitoring Tools Are Needed To Improve NHTSA's
Oversight of Highway Safety Grants (OIG Report Number MH-2014-088),
Aug. 21, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We focused on NHTSA's Region 5 office,\6\ which we randomly
selected from NHTSA's 10 regional offices. Where appropriate, we
identified vulnerabilities that applied across the Agency, including a
lack of guidance and monitoring mechanisms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Region 5 includes Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio,
and Wisconsin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA grantees we reviewed generally met key Federal grant
requirements. Our sample review of 66 grant expenditures (totaling $5.7
million) by Region 5 states and their sub-grantees for Fiscal Years
2011 to 2012 did not identify significant lapses in the Region's
oversight. Our review of Region 5 grantees determined that each
transaction (1) met funding parameters of the grant programs, (2) were
charged to appropriate grant funding codes, and (3) were supported by
sufficient documentation. For example, we verified two Fiscal Year 2012
expenditures by Indiana University's Automotive Safety Program for
$130,996 and $98,950. These two expenditures were made under an
$850,000 occupant protection program grant agreement, which provided
funds for child passenger safety programs. We also confirmed that
states met Federal grant administrative requirements. For example, we
verified that grantees complied with requirements for indirect costs,
such as rent and motor pools, which were charged to Federal grants.
However, NHTSA lacks an overall strategy for addressing persistent
delays in grantees' use of grant funds--a shortcoming that affects all
regional offices. For Fiscal Years 2006 through 2012, we identified
approximately $539 million in unexpended funds across all regional
offices. For Region 5 alone, the amount of unexpended funds was nearly
$67 million (or about 12 percent of the national total). Unused safety
grant funds represent potential lost or delayed opportunities to fund
programs that reduce fatalities, injuries, and property damage.
Although Region 5 has taken some action to encourage states to
liquidate these balances, NHTSA has not developed sufficient strategies
to better ensure that states use grant funds in a timely manner--such
as developing individual funding liquidation plans for each State with
specific targets and mitigation strategies.
In addition, NHTSA does not sufficiently track grantee deficiencies
identified in its triennial management reviews of grantees. From Fiscal
Years 2010 through 2012, NHTSA's Region 5 officials conducted
congressionally mandated triennial management reviews of all six of its
State grant programs. These reviews identified deficiencies, such as
improper use of funds and a lack of monitoring plans. However, some
findings and recommendations were closed without sufficient
documentation. Weaknesses ranged from NHTSA not maintaining
documentation to states not providing sufficient documentation to
support closing a recommendation. For example, Region 5 officials
closed 7 of 9 findings and 16 of 25 non-binding recommendations made in
the triennial management reviews but could not provide sufficient
documentation of States' actions to justify closing three of the
findings and recommendations. Region 5 also lacked documentation of
management's approval for closing recommendations. NHTSA's guidance and
procedures, which apply to all regional offices, do not require
documentation and management approval for key actions related to the
disposition of grantee deficiencies. In our view, improved
documentation would provide greater assurance that states are fixing
identified issues.
Finally, NHTSA lacks a standardized mechanism for tracking the
disposition of grantee deficiencies across all regional offices, which
would allow the Agency to identify and mitigate systemic issues on a
national level. In 2008, we recommended that NHTSA implement an
electronic tracking system for monitoring the disposition of oversight
recommendations to states in order to efficiently share findings,
follow up on unresolved recommendations, and enhance quality
control.\7\ In response to our recommendation, NHTSA agreed to
implement a spreadsheet tool to track the deficiencies agencywide.
However, during our recently completed audit, we identified weaknesses
in NHTSA's implementation of the spreadsheet. Notably, the spreadsheet
is not directly linked to regional offices for real-time updates, and
it lacks features to uniformly identify, classify, compare, track,
mitigate, and report on systemic or recurrent grantee deficiencies.
NHTSA committed to addressing these weaknesses by developing a database
in 2015 that will allow users to track NHTSA's findings until
resolution; conduct queries and analyses to determine State, regional,
and national trends; and produce management reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Best Practices For Improving Oversight of State Highway Safety
Programs (OIG Report Number MH-2008-046), Mar. 25, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA generally concurred with the four recommendations in our
August 2014 report to improve its stewardship and oversight of Federal
grant funds. We will continue to monitor NHTSA's implementation of our
recommendations as needed to ensure that NHTSA improves its grant
guidance and monitoring tools for greater assurance that states and
sub-grantees are using Federal resources in a timely and appropriate
manner.
Overall, NHTSA has made progress in strengthening its defect
investigation processes and ensuring that its grantees meet key Federal
grant requirements. However, successfully implementing its enhanced
processes, completing the workforce assessment, identifying and
securing an adequate workforce, and enhancing grant oversight are key
for NHTSA to carry out its broad safety mission.
Chairman McCaskill, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be
happy to answer any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee
may have.
Attachment
Status of 2011 OIG Recommendations for NHTSA's Vehicle Defect
Investigation Processes
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation Status Actions Taken
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Revise the pre- Closed ODI provided documentation
investigation processes June 19, 2012 demonstrating that:
to ensure that the Artemis tracks
review of each complaint complaint reviews (who and
is recorded and that when),
complaints are tracked all relevant
to associated complaint numbers are
investigations in included in the resume for
Artemis. each phase of an
investigation, and
investigation
process documents have been
updated to reflect these
policy changes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Establish pre- Closed ODI provided documentation
investigation processes Dec. 5, 2012 demonstrating that a
for retaining and process for using a case
storing pre- management system had been
investigation records, established to maintain pre-
such as investigation investigation data.
proposals and insurance
company data.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Require that decisions Closed ODI provided documentation
made and actions taken Dec. 5, 2012 demonstrating that:
by ODI Defect Assessment Defects Assessment
Panels are recorded, Panel minutes are added to
including justifications a standardized form and
for not proceeding to uploaded to the repository
investigations. for the relevant issue
evaluation (IE),
IEs that do not
proceed to investigation
are marked with one of two
codes: ``minimal hazard
indicated'' or ``no
actionable trend
indicated,'' and
specifics
concerning panel dates and
IE dispositions are
recorded in Artemis
annotations for the
appropriate IEs. These data
can be analyzed and
presented in report form.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Establish systematic Closed ODI provided revised office
processes for Mar. 27, 2012 procedures including a
determining when a third framework for obtaining
party or the Vehicle third-party resources.
Research Test Center
should be used to verify
manufacturer information
or assist in identifying
a potential defect.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Revise the ODI Closed ODI established processes
investigation process to Mar. 27, 2012 for justifying and
require justifications documenting investigations
for continuing or that exceed timeliness
closing investigations goals.
that exceed timeliness
goals for preliminary
evaluations and
engineering analyses.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Revise the ODI Closed ODI provided documentation
investigation process to Mar. 1, 2013 that it developed an
establish criteria for ``Investigation
documenting evidence, Documentation Checklist.''
such as associated This checklist is a process
complaints, meetings for documenting evidence
with manufacturers and collected by the ODI
other stakeholders, and investigators--including
third-party analysis or consumer complaints,
testing conducted. meetings with manufacturers
and third parties, and
testing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Strengthen ODI's Closed ODI issued a revised
redaction policy and Oct. 13, 2011 redaction policy in August
process to better 2011.
protect consumers'
personal information
from public
availability, such as by
using automated
redaction software.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Conduct a workforce Open ODI estimates that it will
assessment to determine complete its workforce
the number of staff assessment by November 14,
required to ensure that 2014.
ODI meets its objectives
and determines the most
effective mix of staff.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Develop a formal Closed ODI provided a copy of its
training program to May 29, 2013 new training plan.
assist ODI staff in According to NHTSA
acquiring knowledge and officials, this plan will
staying abreast of ODI assist ODI in the
processes and current development of its current
and new automobile and future workforce;
technologies. ensure the continuity of
institutional knowledge;
and ensure that
investigators and other ODI
staff become proficient in
new automotive,
investigative, and vehicle
safety technologies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Develop and implement Closed ODI stated that it planned
a strategy for Oct. 13, 2011 to form an informal working
increasing coordination group to discuss issues of
with foreign countries mutual interest to the
to enhance ODI's ability international enforcement
to identify safety community. NHTSA would
defects and to exchange chair the group, and the
information on foreign group would meet twice a
recalls. year--with the first
meeting taking place on
November 17, 2011.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OIG analysis of NHTSA documentation
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Mr. Friedman, let's start
with what I was most--there were a lot of things I was
concerned about as I prepared for this hearing, but one of the
things that was most concerning to me was the issue of a
question being asked of the manufacturers, what caused this
accident when there had been a death and the notion that this
was an optional answer.
Now, I know you've only been there a year and a half--a
little less than a year and a half--and you've only been in
charge since January, but can you briefly give us some
reassurance as how in the world the regulators in charge of
investigating deadly defects would say the cause of an accident
is an optional question.
Mr. Friedman. My understanding of the history of this issue
is that in 2006, under the Bush Administration, that question
was made optional in an attempt to encourage auto makers to
volunteer more information that wouldn't necessarily be subject
to confidential business information.
Once I found out about this issue, and discussed with my
staff the history of it, and discussed with them the fact that
it hasn't seemed to have helped elucidate more information from
the auto makers, I've had that practice stopped. So going
forward with the next batch of requests from the industry, that
will no longer be an optional question. I agree with you that
it should not be optional.
Senator McCaskill. Well, you understand that that reflects
on a culture that is frightening, frankly.
You know, I--it's not a secret I come from a background of
being a prosecutor, and when you want to get to the truth and
you want to find out what happened, if you make the answers to
questions optional, that's a journey that is never going to be
successful.
So let me ask you this question. How--and I think you have
evaded answering this a number of times, and I need a very
straight--I don't want to hear how many times you've requested
information. I don't want to hear how many times you've asked
for information and gotten it. I want to know how many times--
since the last time you were here you were not aware of your
subpoena power--I want to know how many times NHTSA has
exercised its subpoena power in the last decade.
Mr. Friedman. Well, Senator, some of the confusion from the
last time we discussed this was that NHTSA is exercising our
power to compel answers from car companies all the time, in
every single one of the----
Senator McCaskill. I know that. I want to know how many
times you've issued a subpoena. You have the power to issue a
subpoena. I want to know how many times you issued a subpoena,
not how many times you've compelled information or used another
method to get information.
I want to know how many times that you've reached a dead
end and not gotten the information that you need to know in
order to figure out a safety defect. How many times has a
legally binding subpoena been issued by NHTSA?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, it's my understanding that each time
we compel them to answer these questions that it is a legally
binding subpoena.
Senator McCaskill. OK. So you are not--do you have a lawyer
here?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Senator McCaskill. OK. And is the lawyer saying that when
you say we want you to give us this information and we will
compel it that that's a subpoena, but you've never gotten to a
subpoena? Because, you know, a subpoena is a discreet legal
document. It is not something that--kind of like a subpoena or
maybe it's a subpoena.
I can assure you that when a corporation gets a subpoena
from a Federal regulator, it is treated differently than a
request for information. That's what I'm trying to get at.
So your lawyers are telling you that there's no difference
between your request for information and a legally binding
subpoena?
Mr. Friedman. My understanding is that those questions,
when we issue them, are enforceable in court. We can go after
the companies for fines if they fail to answer, that we have
the full authority to force them to answer all of those
questions if they fail to----
Senator McCaskill. How many times have you been to court
for someone to answer a question?
Mr. Friedman. I don't know that we've done that in the
last--certainly 20 or 30 years, because we haven't had to, and
I think that's the power of what we do. We put the companies in
a position where they understand, if they fail to answer those
questions, there will be consequences, and so they provide us
with the answers.
I consider that a very important tool that we're able to
get those answers, rather than have to be tied up in court
before they will give them to us.
Senator McCaskill. I understand the point you're making. It
rings slightly hollow when the most important question was
considered optional by your agency. That reflects, obviously,
on an agency that is perhaps more interested in singing kumbaya
with the manufacturers than being a cop on the beat.
Mr. Friedman. Well, as I noted, I don't agree with that
practice. I've had that practice changed. My understanding of
the cultural decision and the concept behind that decision was
that it was an attempt to provide manufacturers with a way to
provide us information that wouldn't be so protected by
confidential--or was easier to protect confidential business
information so that it would come into our hands.
Every time, our goal is to get all the information from the
industry and--so that we can find and get these problems fixed.
In that case, the decision was made or the assumption was made
that we could get more information by making it optional. That
assumption turned out to be wrong, and I've changed it upon
finding out about that.
Senator McCaskill. OK. So let me ask you this quickly, can
you quickly--and we'll have another round, so I'll have a
chance to ask other questions after all my colleagues have
questioned, but can you quickly synthesize how 2,000 consumer
complaints for the same defect could come into your agency and
that the answer, in every instance, is there is not enough
information to open an investigation?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, the information in that article is
very misleading. First of all, those 2,000 complaints tended to
be associated with stalling. They were not necessarily
associated with this specific defect.
Senator McCaskill. But this defect caused stalling.
Mr. Friedman. The New York Times looked through this data,
and they came up with that number, but that number was not----
Senator McCaskill. What number have you come up with?
Mr. Friedman. We have come up with a lower number.
Senator McCaskill. What is it?
Mr. Friedman. In the three to four hundred range across a
variety of different items. But even in that case, what you're
talking about is an incident rate that is a few thousandths of
a percent. It was not a very large signal in comparison to the
stalls that we were seeing in other cases.
And we have aggressively pursued stalling cases with 31
recalls on stalling over the last decade, 42 investigations.
When we find the data that indicates that there is a defect or
a defect trend, we have followed it.
In this case, we had critical information that was missing
that indicated how hazardous this was. GM never provided that
information to us.
Senator McCaskill. I understand, and I agree with my
colleague that GM is primarily at fault here, but I'll follow
up on some of that in my next round.
Senator Heller.
Senator Heller. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Mr. Friedman,
I want to talk about traffic safety grants for just a minute.
As I mentioned, Nevada's goal is zero fatalities on the
road, and I'm assuming that Missouri has similar goals. And
yet, I'm guessing that there are two--these are two states that
have a lot in common, but they may have critical areas that
they differ in that need attention.
I was looking at your overall budget of $981 million. $643
million of NHTSA's overall budget went to the highway traffic
safety funding, is that accurate?
Mr. Friedman. Yes. That's a combination of our budget and
transfer monies from the Federal Highway Administration.
Senator Heller. OK. Do you agree that the funding needs to
be as flexible as possible to address different states specific
needs?
Mr. Friedman. Ranking Member, I agree that flexibility is
incredibly important, and the way Congress has designed these
grant programs is, there is a pot of two different grants. One
set of grants is very flexible, and we work very closely with
the states on their highway safety plans that help guide how
they spend that money. Then Congress has also set aside a
separate group of grants that are very specifically designed to
try to encourage states to set a high bar and put strong laws
in place that we know can protect consumers from serious
traffic safety problems.
Senator Heller. Here's my concern, and I appreciate the
answer to that question, if these grants are too prescriptive,
my concern is that for Nevada--it will lead to Nevada opting
out for applying to some of these grants. Is that a reasonable
concern that I should have?
Mr. Friedman. Well, Senator, in the GROW AMERICA Act, one
of the things that we've proposed for several of these grants
is to maintain what I would call kind of the platinum level
grant, the level of grant and the level of requirements that
will ensure that states implement programs that will save the
most lives possible.
But we've also proposed the system where there would grants
with somewhat fewer requirements that could help encourage
states to incrementally move toward that platinum level of
safety that I think we all agree that we need.
Senator Heller. OK. Mr. Come, you wrote that NHTSA cannot
do its job effectively if auto manufacturers withhold critical
safety information, and I agree with that. In this case, GM
withheld safety information, but it was because they were
incompetent, not because they were nefarious.
Recently, as I mentioned in my opening statement, House
Republicans have issued a report this morning stating that
NHTSA did not hold itself to the same standard in which they
hold companies that they regulate. Will your audit address
this?
Mr. Come. Our audit will address--excuse me--our audit will
address the full range of activities NHTSA is undertaking to
manage and analyze the data they receive. So yes, it will
address the question of whether they're adequately establishing
standards for analyzing that information and policies, whether
they're following those policies, whether they're enforcing
non-compliance on the part of manufacturers with responding to
that information, and whether they're accurately--you know,
getting accurate and complete information.
Senator Heller. OK.
Mr. Friedman. Ranking Member, if I may?
Senator Heller. Yes, please.
Mr. Friedman. I just want to be clear that NHTSA holds
itself to an extremely high standard. There was a clear
difference in what happened between NHTSA and General Motors in
this situation. NHTSA was actively trying to find the ball.
NHTSA--sorry, General Motors was actively trying to hide the
ball. It wasn't simply incompetence on their part.
They had policies in place to not mention the word defect
in order to shield information from NHTSA. They were actively
trying to hide the ball. NHTSA was working hard to find the
ball and was missing critical information.
Senator Heller. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Friedman. Thank you.
Senator Heller. Your report, Mr. Come--also in your report,
it stated that NHTSA is having trouble keeping pace with
technology advancements in the auto industry. Will your audit
also address this?
Mr. Come. Our prior audit was focused on this issue--in
part on--of NHTSA's workforce, and our audit will address the
degree to which they've carried out our recommendation in the
prior audit, which was that they complete a workforce
assessment which will identify the skills they need, the number
of people they need, and the force mix.
So in this current audit, assuming we get the final
workforce assessment that has been promised to us this
November, we'll look at the adequacy of that workforce
assessment using the criteria the Department has established
for these kinds of assessments.
Senator Heller. OK. Now, your report is supposed to be out
next spring, is that correct?
Mr. Come. That's correct.
Senator Heller. That's still your timeline?
Mr. Come. Yes.
Senator Heller. Thank you. Madam Chairman, thank you.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Senator Nelson is not here. I
believe my list here shows Senator Ayotte.
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chair and Ranking
Member, thank both of you for being here.
When GM's counsel--legal counsel--the head of their legal
department, Mr. Millikin, came before this committee, I had
asked him about particular examples that were given of three
situations, three fatal crashes involving the ignition switch,
in which, in fact, NHTSA inquired about with GM, because you
had received some form of notification or a complaint about
them.
And this is actually outlined in an article that was done--
if you want to look at these--in July in the New York Times.
One of them involved a fatality to the man named Gene Erickson.
But here's my--here's the issue that I brought up with the
legal counsel to GM that I would like an answer from both of
you on, which is what GM said, apparently, to the agency on
those three fatal crashes were a combination of--in answer to
your inquiries, in other words, simple questions from
regulators about what led to the crash, the answer that you got
in three different fatal crashes and questions was, in one
instance, from GM that they had not assessed the cause of the
crash. In other instances, you got a response of attorney/
client privilege prevents us from answering that question. In
another one--even more troublesome--GM said, we opt not to
respond to your inquiries.
And so here's my question. Why, when you get that answer
from a company like GM, does the agency accept that answer? If
you were making, as a regulator, an inquiry from a company like
GM with regard to a fatal crash, and, you know, we know,
obviously, we had discussed the pattern that was here, why
would you accept that answer from a company like GM?
Now, I have already taken Mr. Milliken to task for GM
answering in that way, and I, in no way, diminish their
failures here. But it seems to me, if I got that answer, I
would make me even more adamant about getting a full answer
from those that we were regulating.
Can you help me with this?
Mr. Friedman. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question.
I have held meetings with 12 major manufacturers in the
United States and around the world. And one of the things I've
said to them very clearly, you should never hide critical
safety information under the cloak of attorney/client
privilege. Period.
One of the fundamental problems with the General Motors
structure is, it's not simply that they had silos, they had
firewalls. They had firewalls which literally blocked
information from the lawyers from coming to other people in the
organization and to us.
I've made it clear to automakers that that is not
acceptable. With GM in particular, we have engaged with them
throughout some of this process and pushed back on them that
they cannot hide documents based on attorney/client privilege.
And going forward, we will certainly make sure, when they try
to do that, we will push them, and we will reach out, in some
of these cases to plaintiffs' attorneys to get their
information.
Senator Ayotte. So one thing that worries me about this is
I want to see NHTSA not accept that answer ever from a company,
because your question was a fair question, what do you know
about what caused this fatal crash?
So a company in that setting could raise attorney/client
privilege anytime that's asked if there's a risk of litigation,
which there probably always is when there's going to be a fatal
crash. So what would prevent them from actually not asserting
this in every case?
And I would also say, I would hope you wouldn't accept the
answer that the company opts not to respond, that we haven't
even assessed the cause of that crash. It seems to me that they
had a responsibility to do that.
So what I'd like to hear is a commitment that, when you
receive that, you just won't accept it, that there will be a
follow through from NHTSA from a company when that is the
response you get to a fair question.
And Mr. Come, as you do this review of the process, I hope
that you'll look at this issue in terms of how those types of
responses are dealt with by the Agency.
Mr. Come. We will. We haven't previously looked at the
death inquiry issue. It's part of the early warning reporting.
But as part of our work, we'll be asking, you know, what is
their policy, what are the stated reasons for that policy.
We'll attempt to get data that will support those reasons. And
in addition to policy, we'll be expecting the Agency to
establish guidance, training, and appropriate workforce that
can deal with those types of issues as well.
Senator Ayotte. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. Senator Nelson?
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask you, doesn't
it defy common sense that a vehicle can have a five star safety
rating and still have a safety concern? Isn't it an agency such
as yours, that it does a huge disservice to consumers by
allowing a car to have a defect, to still have the five star
ranking?
So can we get cars with serious safety concerns, as we've
seen all too many in the last year or so, can we get those
safety defects so that the star system is changed?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, those two programs are very
different programs. One program is designed to inform consumers
how that vehicle protects them in a crash. If that vehicle has
a defect, we work to inform consumers of that defect and to get
that defect fixed.
Senator Nelson. OK. Now----
Mr. Friedman. Once it's fixed, it makes sense that it's
five star.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, let me stop you right there,
because if you're a consumer, you do not understand the nuances
that you were explaining. You see five stars, you think that is
the Good Housekeeping seal of approval. And the consumer is
misled, and I think you all ought to rethink your advertising
when there becomes a safety defect that is found in the
vehicle.
Mr. Friedman. Senator, one of the things we have talked
about internally is making sure that, when there is an open
defect on a vehicle, that that can be more clearly noted within
the five star rankings. But I do want to make sure that
consumers continue to get this critical information, because it
is--it has pushed automakers to make their vehicles safer in
crashes.
So it's a critical tool, but I agree that we need to make
sure that consumers are very clear, when they're looking at
those star ratings, that there could be recalls associated with
that vehicle that they need to consider.
That said, when a consumer is buying a new car, those
recalls must, must be fixed. So it is a five-star vehicle,
because that vehicle is fixed.
I would like authority, and we've requested authority, to
make sure when a used car is sold, before it can be sold, that
those problems are fixed. So again, when they're buying it, it
will be a five-star vehicle, because the safety risk will be
addressed.
Senator Nelson. You know, when I am responsible to the
citizens of my state to have the Federal Government look out
for their interest and their safety interest, and there is
something that, as obvious as this, that is confusing to them,
it would seem to me that your response would be, there is
confusion, we're going to straighten it out.
Let me move onto something else. I want to show you a
picture of a Chinese automobile.
Now, this automobile, if it gets all of the safety and
emission upgrades and all of that, they're going to try to sell
it in this country.
Now, I want you to know that this Committee has dealt all
too much with defective Chinese toys, toxic drywall, which is
still an ongoing, huge litigation. And the Chinese government
that owns a lot of these companies says, get lost. And there
are no assets, other than the distributors, for example, of the
Chinese drywall.
OK. Now, you've got an immediate problem arising when a
Chinese company manufactures cars that are going to end up with
defects, and you try to go after them, and if they respond like
they did with Chinese drywall and Chinese toys, they're going
to tell you to get lost. That's not helping protect the
American consumer. What do you say about that?
Mr. Friedman. We're very concerned about any product that
comes into this country that has quality problems. We faced
some of the exact same issues you're talking about, in some
cases with smaller companies, and we have partnered with
Customs and Border Protection to go after these companies, to
stop these products from coming into the country, and to ensure
that, when these products do come in, that we're putting them
through our certification tests.
Senator Nelson. You better look at the Chinese.
Mr. Friedman. We are, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Because of the history of dealing with
them. Now, you do something like regional recalls, well, in an
automobile, I want you to be aware of a state like Florida. You
might say that a vehicle is--as a matter of fact, you even had
a vehicle--defects that may be caused by salt erosion, and so
you don't bother it up in the north, and then you say heat-
related defects to vehicles registered in southern states.
You know how mobile the citizenry of the United States are.
You know how we, in Florida, have a lot of snowbirds that come.
So I would suggest that you should reevaluate your regional
criteria on regional recalls. Any comments?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, I've had multiple discussions with
my staff on this issue. We generally do not grant a regional
recall, unless the automaker can provide us with sufficient
information to indicate that there is a data base reason for
that decision.
But I agree that one of the things that we need to do, and
in fact, we require them to do, is to continue looking back at
the data to see if vehicles are moving out of region and need
to be addressed by these. But I agree that this is an issue
that we need to watch very closely, because when a vehicle has
a safety defect, it needs to be fixed. And certainly, people
are mobile, so this is an area we're continuing to look at to
ensure that people are safe.
Senator McCaskill. Senator Klobuchar?
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Friedman,
when you appeared before the committee in April, I told you the
story of the woman--young, young woman--from Albert Lee,
Minnesota, Natasha Weigel, who had been killed on a Wisconsin
road when the car's electrical power suddenly went out. The car
barreled ahead at 71 miles per hour, hit a tree. She was a
passenger. She died, another died.
The report on GM found that--the big report that was done
by Mr. Valukas--found that Wisconsin state trooper, Keith
Young, conducted an investigation on his own that clearly made
the link between the defective ignition switch and the failure
of the airbag to deploy in that case. Trooper Young's report
cracked the code that seemed to evade GM and NHTSA for years.
He wrote this, ``The two front seat airbags did not deploy.
It appears the ignition switch had somehow been turned from the
run position to accessory prior to the collision with the
trees.'' But although his--the trooper's report was submitted
to NHTSA, no follow-up action was taken.
Is it true that, in 2007, NHTSA sent GM a death inquiry
related to the crash involving Natasha Weigel?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar. And did GM respond to the inquiry?
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. And what did they say? What
documents did they submit to NHTSA in response, and was Trooper
Young's report one of them?
Mr. Friedman. They provided a variety of documents,
including police accident reports, which would include some of
this information. Yes.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. So nothing--there was no follow up.
And are there any changes to the process now when you have a
state trooper that actually saw--and I remember us talking
about this last time, the issue of the deployment of airbags
and how it was confused as the reason and wasn't hooked up with
the idea of the ignition switch, but you have a guy, like one
state trooper in Wisconsin that figured it out. And I just--I
don't understand why there wasn't any follow up after that,
that it didn't make a bell go off in someone's head.
Mr. Friedman. Senator, I understand your concerns. Two
issues. First of all, we had extensive understanding of the way
these advanced airbags worked, and in the circumstances of this
crash, the most plausible explanation was that it was the
nature of the crash, off road, yielding objects, that caused
the airbags to not deploy.
Obviously, we now know that there was another piece of
information that this officer was pointing to, that we did not
have a confirmed understanding from General Motors that that
was the case. Going forward--and we discussed this a little bit
last time--we need to make sure that we have a process in
place, and we have put a process in place to make sure we
follow up on remote defect possibilities.
It's always an issue that we have to be very careful about.
Earlier, we talked about the NASA study. In that case, NHTSA
pursued a remote defect possibility of potential electronic
glitches. NHTSA found there was no issue there, and then NHTSA,
on top of that, went to the National Academy of Sciences and
NASA who simply confirmed that NHTSA understood what they were
talking about.
So there's always a balance here, but I think, no matter
what, when there is a remote defect possibility, we need to
challenge ourselves----
Senator Klobuchar. So then you change--right, because you
also--at that time, NHTSA commissioned Indiana to do--Indiana
University to look at the crash. That report also raised these
questions. So it wasn't just one trooper.
I mean, they said, ``Inadvertent contact with the ignition
switch in the 2005 Chevy Cobalt can, in fact, result in engine
shutdown and loss of power. It is not known what role this may
have played.''
So it seems this report was on your website. So what I want
to know is, given you have a report--you've got the Wisconsin
trooper report--what has changed now? If you got that
information on another car, on a different manufacturer, what
would be done differently?
Mr. Friedman. Two things that have changed now. One, even
if, like this situation, the preponderance of evidence pointed
to a different cause, we would still make sure to follow up on
that remote possibility in a couple of ways. One, reaching out
more aggressively to the manufacturer. Two, one of the things I
discussed with those 12 automakers is, they need to come into
NHTSA. We need to sit down with them with our researchers, our
rulemakers, and our defects investigators in a room, and make
sure they are giving us all the information they can about the
systems interactions in these vehicles.
Vehicles are getting more and more complicated, and we're
determined to stay ahead of that curve, but that requires us
reaching out to automakers and automakers reaching out to us to
make sure we have all the information on how these complex
systems can interact.
Senator Klobuchar. So what's the single biggest thing
Congress can do, as we hope we go into the next year and do
more things? What is the thing we could do to ensure that NHTSA
is in a state so that what happened with GM doesn't happen
again? Do you need more authority? Do you--what do you need?
Mr. Friedman. Well, Senator, I would say that this goes
beyond even the GM situation, because our goal is to ensure
that we are picking up the balls that the industry is dropping,
even though it's their responsibility to find them.
One, I think we need more authority to fine the car
companies so that they understand the heavy price that they're
going to pay if they fail to report these things. That's a
force multiplier. They have more information, more people, more
resources than us. They need to be finding these problems
before we even have to start searching for them.
Second, we want--we could use additional resources, more
people, more money for more--for better technology so that we
can better sift through the information and the data that's out
here. In previous--President Obama's 2013, 2014, and the 2015
budget request, we have asked for additional resources,
especially staff, so that we could do this, and I would ask
Congress to support the President and the Secretary's efforts
to get more resources, not only on defects, but on all of the
issues that cause the more than 30,000 fatalities on our
highways each year.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you. We'll follow up on that,
and then Madam Chairman will put some questions on the record
about distracted driving. Senator Hoeven and I have a good bill
to make sure that some of the money that's been aside will
actually go out to the state so they can start working on this
important issue.
We just had a woman who was 89 years old get killed by a
girl that was doing Facebooking while she was driving 65 miles
an hour down a highway. So thank you.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Senator
Markey?
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair. Earlier today,
General Motors and I reached a substantial agreement on a
modified version of the legislation I introduced with Senator
Blumenthal that will ensure the public disclosure of
information about fatal accidents that might have caused--been
caused by safety defects. One reason why the bill is needed is
because I simply do not have the confidence that NHTSA will
take more aggressive action in the future.
Whether it is NHTSA or the NFL, there must be
accountability for any organization that turns a blind eye when
it knows a harm is being done.
Mr. Friedman, you have repeatedly said that it was GM that
stood in the way of safety, that GM failed to tell NHTSA
everything it knew about the defective ignition switches, and
that if it had, the Government would have acted differently.
It goes without saying that GM made and sold the vehicles
in which so many innocent victims were killed or injured, but I
am gravely disappointed in the Transportation Department's
failure to accept even a shred of responsibility. For an entire
decade, NHTSA had meetings, reports, secret documents submitted
by GM to the early warning reporting system that all described
fatal accidents involving ignition switches that caused cars to
stall all by themselves, but NHTSA did nothing.
And while GM's leaders have described the GM nod, which was
said to occur when everyone in a meeting all nodded their heads
but then did nothing to solve safety problems, what I see at
NHTSA is the NHTSA shrug. NHTSA shrugged when it agreed with GM
that cars stalling on their own did not pose a safety problem.
NHTSA shrugged when it read its own contractor's reports
linking the ignition switch defect in--to fatal accidents in
which airbags didn't deploy. NHTSA shrugged when it obtained
secret documents from GM that spelled out exactly what was
causing these crashes.
NHTSA has not acknowledged its own failures to take action.
It has not apologized to the families who have lost children,
siblings, spouses, and parents. And it has not yet announced
strong measures to ensure that it does not fail the American
public this way in the future.
So my first question to you is, are you prepared to
apologize for NHTSA to those families that were harmed by the
defects in these vehicles?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, in my first hearing, I expressed my
deepest sympathies and my sadness at the loss of life from each
and every one of these tragedies. But I want to be clear, NHTSA
did not shrug.
NHTSA, over the last few years, forcing Chrysler to recall
vehicles that they refused to agree were defective, is not a
shrug. NHTSA forcing Graco to recall vehicles is not a shrug.
NHTSA diving into the data on this issue, having special crash
investigators on the job on this issue, looking at the data,
following the data, is not a shrug.
NHTSA aggressively pursues these issues, and continues to
do so----
Senator Markey. And I disagree with you, Mr. Friedman. When
you agreed with GM that cars stalling on their own did not pose
a safety problem, that is wrong.
Mr. Friedman. Senator, when cars----
Senator Markey. When you did not, in fact, read your own
contractors' reports linking the ignition switch defect to
fatal accidents in which airbags did not deploy, that is on
NHTSA. You just can't say it was an airbag problem. There was a
fundamental problem with the car just stopping. It was an
ignition problem. So it's not an airbag problem. So NHTSA is
wrong there as well.
And when you did obtain the secret documents from GM that
spelled out exactly what was causing these crashes, that should
have been made public immediately. We should have understood as
a nation what these problems were.
So I just disagree with you, Mr. Friedman. OK? I just
disagree with you. I think that there was a higher duty which
you owed.
According to Mr. Valukas' report in 2004, GM and NHTSA had
a secret meeting in which the attendees inexplicably agreed
that cars stalled all by themselves, but that this was not
necessarily a safety problem.
Earlier this summer, GM CEO, Mary Barra, and others agreed
with me that the public would probably have rejected the
conclusion that cars stalling all by themselves was not a
safety problem if they had known about it. Do you also agree
that they--with Mary Barra--that the public would have rejected
that conclusion that the cars stalling on their own was, in
fact, a safety measure--a safety problem--if the public had
known?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, we have aggressively pursued
stalling issues over the years, with 42 investigations, 31
recalls, over the last 10 years. When we see a stalling
incident that creates an unreasonable risk to safety, we act,
and there's no doubt about that.
One of the things that is incredibly important to us is we
do have to----
Senator Markey. But do you agree? Will you say that NHTSA
got it wrong when it found that cars stalling on their own was
not a safety problem? Will you agree that was a mistake that
NHTSA made?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, in this GM case, the ignition switch
and the stall was linked to airbags not deploying, and that is
clearly a safety issue.
Senator Markey. Again, but it's--the safety bags not
deploying is a safety issue, but a car's ignition not working
and shutting off the car automatically is a separate safety
issue. So even if you had no airbags and you were driving in
the car, I don't think the American public would feel safe if
the car automatically was turning off, because there's an
ignition problem.
And again, I keep waiting for you to close this gap so that
you admit that there were two safety issues here. One was
airbags, but the other was the ignition shutting off and the
car just stalling out, perhaps on the highway. You do agree
that's a separate issue and that that was something that the
public should have been warned about, do you not?
Mr. Friedman. There's no doubt that stalling can be a
serious safety issue.
Senator Markey. OK.
Mr. Friedman. No doubt.
Senator Markey. And do you agree that NHTSA should have
made that clear to the American public? That's what I'm waiting
for in terms of the apology, the statement to the public that
there should have been a warning coming from the Government
once that information was in the hands of NHTSA.
Mr. Friedman. Senator, we get many, many thousands of
complaints about stalling. And in this case, when we look at
the data, these vehicles didn't stand out.
If a consumer can safely pull their vehicle over to the
side of the road and restart that vehicle, then that's a
situation where the consumer can be safe, but obviously, the
car company does need to address any stalling issue that
represents a safety risk.
Senator Markey. Well, in 2007, NHTSA asked for and received
a secret document from GM related to the death of two Wisconsin
teenagers. That document was first made public by me at our May
7 hearing, and it is referenced repeatedly in Mr. Valukas'
report.
It included a report by the Wisconsin State Patrol Academy
that said that the ignition switch defect prevented the airbags
from deploying. It also found other examples of the same
problems happening in other cars and identified a 2005 GM
warning to dealers about the issue. In short, it correctly
identified the safety defect.
Do you agree with me that GM CEO, Mary Barra, and others
that said that if the public had been able to read the secret
document and warned about its conclusions at the time, it is
possible that some of the deaths and injuries caused by this
defect could have been avoided?
Mr. Friedman. Well, Senator, the special crash
investigation report that included these same assertions was a
public document, and no one brought that issue to our
attention.
Senator Markey. No. The document that I'm talking about is
not a public document.
Mr. Friedman. I understand, but that information was in
the----
Senator Markey. Well, let's talk about the--let's talk
about this non-public document. What if this non-public
document had been made public? Do you agree that if it had been
made public that it could have avoided unnecessary deaths
having occurred?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, I agree that making this kind of
information, with privacy protected, public can be a positive
and helpful thing. What I don't agree with, though, is the--is
putting the burden for making that information public with
privacy protected should fall on NHTSA. I believe that burden
should fall onto the industry that is causing these problems.
So, in conversation with your staff, in providing technical
assistance, we suggested that we should support getting this
information out there, but the car company should be the one
responsible for the costs and the time and the effort to make
that information publicly available, because they're creating
the problems in the first place.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Markey. Well, when the document that's given to you
in 2007 by GM----
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Senator Markey.--will be made public this year, there's a
big problem. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Thank you. Senator Fischer?
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today. Mr. Friedman, I'd like to
explore another area with you.
I read June 15 in the New York Times an article indicating
that NHTSA wants to regulate mobile apps and devices. Is this a
high priority for NHTSA, and is NHTSA spending a lot of time
and resources here?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, there have been some, quite flatly,
erroneous reports in the newspaper, so we have no intent and no
plans to regulate mobile apps.
What we're doing is working to develop voluntary guidelines
to help the developers of these systems ensure that they're
developing them in ways that minimize distraction. In fact,
companies like Google and Apple are actually moving forward
with some of these exact same kinds of systems that we're
suggesting.
So we have no intention to regulate, but we do think it's
very important, because over 3,000 people die each year due to
distracted driving, many of them because of the, you know, case
we just saw about where people are looking at Facebook on their
vehicle that we need to provide those guidelines for those
developers, so they can innovate and ensure safety at the same
time.
Senator Fischer. So how do you plan to define motor vehicle
equipment when it comes to an app? You know, we're looking at
the FDA that is looking at mobile apps and trying to define
them as a medical device and have regulatory authority over
them. How are you going to go about defining a mobile app as
motor vehicle equipment, where I believe you do have authority?
Mr. Friedman. Correct.
Senator Fischer. And if you move into this new area, are
you--how do you define it, and how do you gain that authority,
which I think is questionable right now? Are you going to come
to Congress and ask for that authority?
Mr. Friedman. Well, Senator, as you know, we do explicitly
have authority over motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment,
so I think a map that has driving directions on it is very
clearly motor vehicle equipment.
Senator Fischer. Is a paper map motor vehicle equipment?
Mr. Friedman. To the best of my knowledge, paper maps, on
their own, aren't causing a distraction issue. Certainly, if
someone was holding that paper map up in front of them, that
would be a serious distraction issue.
Senator Fischer. On a mobile app, if it's voice controlled
and if it is not in view of the driver, would there be
distraction involved?
Mr. Friedman. We actually--it's an excellent question, and
what we're doing is providing guidance in three different
phases.
The first phase is for in-vehicle systems. The second phase
is for systems where people would have to take their eyes off
the road or hands off the wheel to access. The third phase is
exactly this question of audible systems. We think those can be
safer, but we do want to provide guidance to industry in how to
make sure that they're safe.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe you have the authority even
with voice commands to regulate these apps, you would consider
them mobile or motor vehicle equipment?
Mr. Friedman. Well, Senator, if it's providing something
like driving directions or another driving service, it's motor
vehicle equipment. But again, we have absolutely no intention
of regulating these apps.
We think it makes a lot more sense to provide this guidance
to consumers while at the same time pursuing aggressive efforts
to improve behavior to stop distracted driving. That's why we
just launched our new ``You Drive, You Text, You Pay'' campaign
to help stop that dangerous behavior.
Senator Fischer. Right. As you issue guidelines, so there's
no authority--or there's no impact there on innovators as they
move forward with mobile apps, they're just guidelines, they
have no effect like a regulation?
Mr. Friedman. They are not enforceable at all. I hope that
they have the effect of making it easier for them----
Senator Fischer. Why would you issue guidelines that have
no effect?
Mr. Friedman. Well, because I think that it can make it
easier for them to develop systems that are safer. We're
already seeing these impacts in the auto industry, where
they're adjusting some of their designs to make them more
safely. I think even the outlines of that first phase has been
very helpful to developers like Google and Apple for how to
design these systems.
So I think we're preserving safety in a way through these
guidelines without having to use our regulatory authority. I
think that's a win-win situation for the American public and
for the innovators.
Senator Fischer. I think it's very important that we do not
hinder our innovators as they move forward, and I can
appreciate your desire to have guidelines, but I question your
authority being able to have these guidelines, and then when do
we cross the line from a guideline to a regulation if you don't
have cooperation, voluntary cooperation, from companies or
individual innovators as we move forward?
Mr. Friedman. Well, thank you, Senator. I'm confident that
they--that we all will move forward. I think the signs are
already encouraging. And, you know, innovation is a top
priority of Secretary Foxx, innovation in vehicle-to-vehicle
technologies where we are literally, as an agency and as a
department, leading the world in the research in--on that
technology.
What we want to do is foster innovation and maintain safety
at the same time, and I think these guidelines are that perfect
balance. And we've engaged the industry very closely on this.
We've invited them to have conversations about this. We've had
public listening sessions on this. When we put out these
guidelines, we'll provide people with an opportunity to
comment. We'll take those comments into consideration before we
do this.
So we're committed to working closely with the American
public and innovators to make sure we can ensure innovation and
ensure safety.
Senator Fischer. Do you plan to engage Congress in this as
you move forward with guidelines? Is there a role for Congress?
Mr. Friedman. Certainly, we would appreciate any support
Congress can have for our efforts, whether it's through funding
or, certainly, simply helping to get your constituents to
provide comments to us.
Senator Fischer. Well, I'm happy to hear you're working on
voluntary guidelines with the industry instead of moving to
regulation. Thank you.
Mr. Friedman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. Senator Blumenthal?
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank
you for having this hearing. Thank you for your leadership on
this vitally important topic.
Normally, I agree with my colleague, Senator Markey--and by
the way, I'm very pleased that we've reached agreement with GM
on the legislation that we proposed--but I have to differ with
him on the NHTSA shrug. I don't think it was a shrug. I don't
think it was a nod. I think it was a NHTSA snooze. I think
NHTSA has nodded off on safety.
And the New York Times article that we've all read, the
investigative piece that appeared over the weekend, emphasizes
how systemic and deep-seated NHTSA's failings have become, not
just on GM, but on the unintended acceleration in Toyotas, the
fires in the Jeep fuel tanks, the airbag ruptures in Hondas,
and other problems that reached a crisis level before NHTSA
reacted. It was not proactive. It reacted. And I know you're
shaking your head.
Mr. Friedman. Sorry.
Senator Blumenthal. But the fact of the matter is that your
supposed watchdog agency had neither bark nor bite and, in
fact, led consumers to have a false sense of security through
your rating system.
I asked you in April, when you were before this
subcommittee, whether General Motors had, quote, concealed
material in significant information from NHTSA, and you
replied, that is--quote, that is exactly the subject of an open
investigation that we have into General Motors, and if we find
that they did not violate their responsibilities to report
information and act quickly, we will hold them accountable. Is
your investigation done?
Mr. Friedman. Yes, Senator. It is done and----
Senator Blumenthal. What have you found?
Mr. Friedman.--well, we found, very clearly, that General
Motors had information that they failed to share us that
hindered our investigation.
First of all, they had information that indicated when you
move the ignition switch into the accessory position, the
airbags were designed to turn off. Had we had that information,
we could have pursued this in a very different manner. And once
we had that information, we pushed GM to recall vehicles, and
we pushed Chrysler to recall vehicles. In addition----
Senator Blumenthal. And what will you do to hold them
accountable?
Mr. Friedman.--to hold them accountable, we got them to pay
the maximum possible fine of $35 million and----
Senator Blumenthal. But wouldn't you agree with me that
that maximum find is wholly inadequate as a measure of their
failure?
Mr. Friedman. Absolutely. Which is for two reasons----
Senator Blumenthal. But you would support the legislation
that I proposed to remove that cap and others on this committee
have supported it as well?
Mr. Friedman. Well, we absolutely support efforts to
increase those fines. The President and Secretary Foxx put
forward a bill to raise those fines----
Senator Blumenthal. But what about removing the cap?
Mr. Friedman. I think removing that--the cap--could give us
additional power to hold them accountable.
Senator Blumenthal. So you do support that legislation. I'm
delighted to hear that you will support it, if that's your
testimony.
Mr. Friedman. Well, we will support all efforts to increase
that cap. In addition, one of the things we've done to hold GM
accountable is we have now put them in a position where, if
they sneeze on a safety issue, they need to let us know about
it. We've instituted unprecedented oversight over General
Motors.
Hyundai was also found to be lacking when it came to
following the law. We are not putting them under unprecedented
oversight, and we're making clear to the industry, you step out
of line, we will bring you back in line.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you about the current rating
system. I see very little redeeming features in this rating
system. Why not spend the resources that you currently devote
to the rating systems to defect investigations and following up
on consumer complaints?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, we have much more resources devoted
to things like defects than we do have to this rating system.
There were--there was an incredible number of inaccuracies in
that New York Times article, and one of the things that was
inaccurate is it didn't make clear that we have ten times the
number of people focused on finding defects as we do have on
this rating program. But this rating program----
Senator Blumenthal. How do the expenditures of money,
though, compare?
Mr. Friedman. The--when you combine peak staff, the money
to support staff and the money that they use in their duties,
our--excuse me, our defects work has about a 60 percent higher
budget than the NCAP program. But I would be clear----
Senator Blumenthal. Why not use the money that you now
spend on ratings, which inherently mislead consumers, if
history is any guide, and devote it, instead, to finding about
things that are wrong with the cars and can help save lives?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, I disagree. The NCAP program has
helped make vehicles safer. It has clearly saved lives by
encouraging automakers to put more technology on board
vehicles.
We're going to be releasing a study soon that shows NHTSA's
role in----
Senator Blumenthal. Well, let me just--I have to interrupt
you, because I'm running out of time, and I know that the
Chairman wants to move on--Chairwoman, I apologize--wants to
move on.
Senator McCaskill. I go by either.
Senator Blumenthal. Madam Chair.
You know, Consumer Reports bars the car companies from
using its ratings and evaluations in their advertising. Why
does NHTSA allow itself to be exploited by the industry in
using these ratings in its ads?
Mr. Friedman. Because I wanted to set an incredibly high
bar on safety. I want to challenge the industry to put more and
more technology, more and more tools at play, to make vehicles
much safer. That's what our regulations have done. That's what
the NCAP problem has----
Senator Blumenthal. Do you think NHTSA has achieved that
objective through its rating system?
Mr. Friedman. Yes, absolutely. If you see--for example, one
of the new tests we introduced was a side pole test, a test no
one had had before. We rate those vehicles on that side pole
test, and we saw automakers demonstrably change the design of
their vehicles to improve the performance of those vehicles in
that test. That is, without a doubt, a success that saves
lives.
These are both critical programs. There's no doubt about
it. I would love to work with you, Senator, and with the
Committee and Congress on getting additional resources to NHTSA
to ensure that we can continue to do an even better job, but
what I don't want to have us do is be put in a position where
we have to tradeoff making progress on things like drunk
driving with making progress on defects.
Senator Blumenthal. And no one wants you to abandon other
real, genuine safety programs. But I think you have sensed from
the reaction of this subcommittee on both sides of the aisle
that there is a question here about the record. You can say
about it what you will, but the record shows that these ratings
have, in effect, misled consumers. And the lead paragraphs of
that New York Times investigative piece demonstrate irrefutably
along with other aspects of the record.
So I think the question in our minds is whether it's a
culture of capture, a culture of corruptions, or just
incompetence that needs to be corrected here, and that's going
to be a tough task. We look forward to working with you, but I
think that there has to be a more realistic attitude about what
the real-life consequences are of the agency's performance.
Mr. Friedman. Senator, I would encourage all of you to ask
the industry if they think we're captured. I hauled them in to
talk to them about these issues. Some resisted at first. We had
to make sure to push them to do this.
And on the Toyota case, the New York Times article is flat
wrong. NHTSA found the floor mat defect. NHTSA was in the
process of investigating and finding information on the other
pedal entrapment defect. We brought that information to Toyota,
and before we could even open our investigation, they recalled
those vehicles. They recalled those vehicles because of us.
And, and the Justice Department found when fined Toyota $1.2
billion, we found these problems even when they were hiding
information from us.
We have--we found the Toyota case, and I completely
disagree with that New York Times article. It completely
mischaracterizes the work that NHTSA did to help save lives in
the American public in that Toyota case.
It's a complete--same thing with Jeep. We forced--forced--
Chrysler to recall a vehicle that they refused to admit
initially that was a defect. We forced them to tell consumers,
in their letter to consumers, that these vehicles were
defective.
We have actively pushed these companies. Can we do more? Do
we need to invest more? Do we need to improve our processes?
Absolutely. But that New York Times article was a complete
mischaracterization of our work.
Senator Blumenthal. I have other questions, but my time is
expired, and I thank the Chair for her patience with the amount
of time that I've taken. Thank you.
Senator McCaskill. I think we're frustrated with you, Mr.
Friedman, at this point. And I understand you're here to defend
NHTSA, and no one on this committee--subcommittee believes that
there are not good, hard-working people at NHTSA that are
trying to do the right thing.
But it is very hard to sit through this hearing and watch
you rationalize and excuse a regulatory agency that, whether it
was 300, or as the article specifically said, 2,000 complaints
talking about stalling on the vehicles that were eventually
recalled, when you had a lonely highway patrolman in Wisconsin
figuring it out, when you had a study that your agency was part
of in Indiana that figured it out, and you didn't figure it
out.
And why you cannot take a measure of responsibility for
that at this hearing has frankly got us all scratching our
heads. You want to talk about resources, well, the crash-
worthiness, there was a--it had $10 million in programming
money was the--$10,372,214 to be exact in 2013. In 2014, they
enacted that amount, and in 2015, you requested $3.6 million
more for the program in programming money, a significant
increase for the crash-worthiness.
Compare and contrast that with the safety defects
investigation, 2013--by the way, this number has been constant
for a decade--the request was, in fact, $10,611,000, which had
been exactly what you'd got in 2014 and almost exactly what
you'd spent in 2013, with no increase for programming money.
Now, I know what you're going to say, you have more FTEs in
one place than the other and that you have requested--I think
one year you requested two, one year you requested four, one
year you may have requested six, and you didn't get the FTEs.
But you're paying contractors to do work now out of programming
money. You could have easily made a request for more
programming money that could've allowed you to get more
contractors. And you've got contractors now reviewing some of
these complaints as they're coming in, correct?
Mr. Friedman. Yes. They are helping process the data, but a
big part of what we need is to hire people on board who are
experts, who can be trained up and be part of our staff----
Senator McCaskill. How about people that can look at these
complaints coming in and figure out if there is any connecting
the dots that needs to go on instead of, I'm sorry, we have
insufficient information to conduct an investigation? Hundreds
of them, whether it's your hundreds or whether it's the New
York Times 2,000s, we need some admission here that this was
not done right.
Mr. Friedman. Senator, we review each----
Senator McCaskill. Was it done right? Did you all do it
right on the GM situation, when you had citizens who were
sleuthing your database on your own? They were going into your
database and figuring out that there was a pattern. They--one
of them even went to their own expense and hired a lawyer to
come to NHTSA and say, hey, we're looking at your data base,
and you've got a problem.
Still, we have insufficient information to conduct an
investigation. Now, maybe you can't see the forest for the
trees, but I can assure you, on this side of the dais, it
appears that you are digging yourself a hole of saying, ``We
did nothing wrong. We did it all right. There was not a
problem. This is all GM's fault. Shame on GM.''
Now, we've all said, ``Shame on GM,'' and we've said it
vociferously from this committee room. But you have got to take
some responsibility that this is not being handled correctly
for the American driving public within the Government
regulatory agency.
Mr. Friedman. Well, Senator, if I'm leaving that
impression, then I'm not being clear. There are clearly things
that, looking back at the history of this, that we need to
improve.
When there's a remote defect possibility that someone
brings up, even if the preponderance of evidence points to a
different direction, we need to have processes in place, and we
are putting processes in place to address that. When there is
data that doesn't get fully included in the discussions of
these situations, we need to make sure that that information is
fully included and we are moving forward with systems to try to
make sure that we can gather all that data in one place and
ensure that all that data is reviewed.
It--we did not have--we do not have, in all cases, special
crash investigator previously in the room for these
discussions. My team is now making sure that, in every case, a
special crash investigator is involved in these cases. In
addition, we have been discussing how we can more aggressively
follow up on claimant cases where they claim to have a problem.
One of the challenges in here and one of the things that I
wish had happened differently is that we had had information
from the claimants where they found, basically, a smoking gun.
Senator McCaskill. Right.
Mr. Friedman. But it was within those documents that we
need to keeping for, so it----
Senator McCaskill. That's fair. I think what--you would be
much better served by saying, ``We don't ever want this to
happen again, and we're changing things, and this is the list
of things that we're changing.'' But it appears, in question
after question, that you want to obfuscate responsibility
rather than take responsibility.
And there is some responsibility to be taken here, Mr.
Friedman. Maybe not as much as General Motors, and I think none
of us would argue about that, but there is some responsibility
to be taken here.
Let me ask you about the workforce assessment. Of all the
findings, and there were, I think, 11 of them--10 or 11. Mr.
Come, how many?
Mr. Come. We had ten recommendations.
Senator McCaskill. Ten recommendations. And the one that's
outstanding--and we were told back in April that it would be
done in May--in your internal look at whether or not you've got
the right resources. I'm worried that the programming money for
this agency has been flatlined for a decade. In light of all
the technological advances, that just doesn't compute with me.
So where is the workforce assessment that is so necessary
for us to evaluate whether or not you are properly supported
and whether we need to do a much better job to supporting you?
Mr. Friedman. We have had some delays in that effort, in
part because the quality of some of the work from a contractor,
where we were trying to make sure to use a contractor to help
leverage our resources and use the dollars that we had, there
were some fundamental problems with the product that was
delivered from that, and as a result----
Senator McCaskill. How much did you pay for that?
Mr. Friedman. I don't know that number, but we can get it
to you.
Senator McCaskill. Have we paid them a bonus yet?
Mr. Friedman. Better not have.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I say that, because I've got
experience with this. I've done a lot of oversight on
contracting. You would be amazed how many times contractors get
their bonus payments when they don't do their job.
Mr. Friedman. That would be a serious problem in my book.
Senator McCaskill. OK. Well, you better check on it.
Mr. Friedman. Will do. And in addition, though, we have
looked--you know, in looking at that effort and in looking at
some of the different things that we are considering, we have
looked at the importance of, you know, potentially, how would
20 additional staff affect our ability to do things? How would
20--$20 million in additional resources help us do things?
But one of the things, frankly, that I want to be clear on
is, at some level, we will always be understaffed and
underfunded for our ability to do our job. There's----
Senator McCaskill. Well, I don't think that's a good
answer.
Mr. Friedman. Well, but----
Senator McCaskill. And by the way, this recommendation has
been out there since 2011, and it's really troubling to me that
you are in charge of evaluating vehicle safety in this country,
and you're saying that, since 2011, you've been told by the
Inspector General that you need to do a workforce resource
analysis, whether or not your workforce is adequate, and it is
now 2014, and we still don't have a--I mean, you can't even get
across the finish line an analysis of whether or not you got
enough folks.
Mr. Friedman. It's definitely taken too long.
Senator McCaskill. When do we expect it?
Mr. Friedman. In November.
Senator McCaskill. OK. I have gone over my time, and we've
got another panel, but I want to make sure that my colleagues
that are still here have an opportunity.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Friedman, you've heard us, something is
rotten in Denmark. And I want to say that my criticism is not
just directed at you. My criticism is also directed at the
White House.
This position that you are filling as acting has been
vacant for 9 months, and that is inexcusable. So I hope this
message will get to the White House and that we can move on.
You've taken the brunt of it, because you're there, but the
agency is not functioning like it should for the protection of
the consumers.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Madam Chair. I want to
reiterate, I know there are a lot of hardworking, dedicated
folks at NHTSA, and I know that you have been at NHTSA since
just May 2013, so you are defending an agency that has failed.
You are the face of that failure, but I would have thought, as
the Chair has indicated, that you might be more forthcoming and
more receptive to the kind of reform that we feel is necessary.
And just as an indication of the kinds of failures,
systemic, far-reaching failures, another issue of concern to me
regards the use of technical service bulletins, which are
sometimes applied by automakers to avoid an expensive recall.
MAP-21 required NHTSA to make those bulletins available on
its website searchable by the public by 2013. As of May,
they're still not on the website. Can you tell me why, and can
you commit to me when NHTSA will meet that deadline--it's
already missed the deadline--when it will have them available?
Mr. Friedman. Senator, we make public--we provide online
all technical service bulletins associated with a recall, in
other words, all technical bulletins that are associated with a
safety defect.
There are additional technical service bulletins that may
be safety related. We make those available through our reading
room. There's additional technical service bulletins that
aren't related to defects or safety that we're prohibited by
copyright law from making public.
That said, we are working toward making the ones that are
related to safety more publicly available, and we're
targeting----
Senator Blumenthal. Well, can you commit to me when you
will complete that task? You've missed the deadline. When will
it be done?
Mr. Friedman. We're working to target, I believe, in the
next 6 months to try to get that information up there, but I
can get you a more solid date.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I would like a more solid date.
I'd also appreciate any contention in detail that you have
disputing the New York Times story. You said it was wrong in
numerous respects, but I'd like something in writing from you
that we can put in the record if you feel, in fact, it was in
error in any way.
Mr. Friedman. I'd be happy to do so.
Senator Blumenthal. I'd also like to ask you what you
feel--taking up Senator Klobuchar's argument--what you feel can
be done to expand the resources that you devote to
investigation of defects.
Mr. Friedman. Well, Senator, those were some of the issues
that I was discussing before. We do need additional people, is
definitely a primary tool that we need here. This is one of
those cases where simply throwing additional dollars at it is
not the key to the solution. Can we use the additional dollars?
Absolutely. Do I--do we want additional dollars? Absolutely.
But we also need additional people.
We've seen double the number of complaints come in this
year, which is fantastic. That's a critical tool that allows us
to find these problems, and we've got our folks working long
hours to try to make sure to go through each and every one of
those complaints. We needed additional authority to help make
sure that we can do this. We need additional cooperation from
industry to make sure that we can do this. And we need to
continue to improve the way NHTSA handles data and remote
defect possibilities and other key aspects associated with the
General Motors case and other issues that we've been facing
recently.
Senator Blumenthal. In the explanation given by the NHTSA
official who was quoted in the Times story that there is no
hard and fast protocol or a set of criteria regarding the type
of instance that prompts further investigation, in this
instance, in the case of GM, the phrase ``insufficient
evidence'' was used. What does that mean?
Mr. Friedman. Well, in this case, because we didn't
understand the level of hazard associated with this issue,
because we didn't have the information linked to the airbag
deployment, typically, insufficient evidence will mean either
you don't have an indication of a specific defect or you don't
have information----
Senator Blumenthal. But why should it matter whether the
airbag was not deployed if the car was stalling repeatedly?
Mr. Friedman. When stalling poses a safety risk----
Senator Blumenthal. Doesn't it pose a safety risk whenever
it occurs?
Mr. Friedman.--based on our past data, it hasn't always
posed an unreasonable safety risk.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, that's the kind of reaction, Mr.
Friedman, if I may, I mean no disrespect, but for the ordinary
consumer, a car stalling repeatedly on highways or anywhere is
a problem. You may regard it as insufficient evidence of a need
for investigation, but the ordinary consumer would feel that's
your job.
I note that I'm out of time, so I have other questions
which I'll submit for the record, but I want to thank you both
for being here today.
Mr. Friedman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. Senator--excuse me, Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair. Again, if you're in
a passing lane, and you're moving at 60 miles an hour, and you
have a flat, you're panicking. You're saying, oh, my God, I'm
just blowing a tire here, and I'm four lanes over from the
breakdown lane, and everybody is going 60 miles an hour. That's
a problem.
Well, the same thing would be true if your car, your
ignition just stops, and you're four lanes over from that
breakdown lane. That's just the bottom line on it. You're at
risk. And it could just be a 17-year-old, 18-year-old driving
the car, you know, newly given a license to be able to drive.
And so just common sense says that the circumstances that
could arise are such that it's a real danger. And whether the
airbag deploys or not when you hit a car in the next lane or
when you kind of go off the road and you're kind of not in a
crash, but you're rolling over, because the ignition has gone
off, and you're leaving the road at a high speed, well, that's
a real danger.
So again, there's just a fundamental disconnect here.
There's just a failure to understand how ordinary families
would view that kind of a situation with their son or their
daughter in that car and the likelihood that they would allow
them to drive it, especially out on the highway, if they knew
the car could turn itself off automatically.
And so this is a--again, this is a big problem, and, you
know, we go all the way back to, you know, Ralph Nader with
Unsafe at Any Speed back in the middle of the 1960s, through
all the battles that we had in Congress over seat belts, and
airbags, and making the dashboards more safe, all these things
were battled by the industry. They were fought--fought
bitterly--as an extra expense which they felt the American
public was unwilling to pay.
You know what they learned, though? They learned that when
people now get into every automobile across America, the first
thing they do is put on their seat belt. They want to be safe,
but especially their kids.
When they fought airbags and then they had to put one in,
guess what the next response was? Why isn't there one in the
passenger seat for my wife or for my husband or for my
children? They wanted more safety. They wanted to know.
And so what we have here at NHTSA is a fundamental failure
to deal with this essential issue of the priority that the
American people put on safety in automobiles. And to the extent
to which it may be their greatest fear, their kid out in a car
driving somewhere at night at a high speed coming back from
work, and that NHTSA doesn't believe that that's the issue, but
it's actually the lack of deployment of an airbag, you're
missing the point. You're missing how people view this issue.
And so all I can say to you, Mr. Friedman, is that people
really want a cop on the beat. They want an agency which is
looking at the industry that they're responsible for and making
sure that they cannot harm the public.
And there was sufficient information in the hands of the
Agency to be the early warning system, to tell the public,
there's a danger here, cars are turning off automatically, and
that you should know that as you're allowing one of your family
members into that vehicle.
So from my perspective, it's still a very troubling set of
responses that we're receiving. And I think, again, Madam
Chair, it is absolutely imperative that we pass legislation
that requires a disclosure of all of this information when it
is in the hands of the Government, and that not only is the
Agency responsible, but the company is responsible so that it
be transparent and the public knows that this vehicle could
harm some person in my family.
And so I thank you for this hearing, Madam Chair. And I
just think we've got a big responsibility to pass the laws that
make it necessary for children to look to the history books to
find if there ever was such a day when this was known by the
Government and by companies and yet, it was still allowed to
occur.
I yield back to balance my time.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Senator Markey. And now, we
want to thank Mr. Come and Mr. Friedman for your time here
today. We will continue to communicate with you as we develop
the record for this hearing and move forward with reforms that
we think are absolutely essential.
And now I would ask the second panel to come forward. I
want to thank all three of you for being here. Let me introduce
the three witnesses in this panel.
First, we have Ms. Jacqueline S. Gillan, who is President
at Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety here in Washington.
Second, we have Mr. Kendell Poole, who's the Chairman of the
Governors Highway Safety Association in Nashville, Tennessee.
And third and finally, Mr. Robert Strassburger, who is the Vice
President, Vehicle Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers in Washington, D.C.
Thank you all three. We look forward to your testimony. You
can begin, Ms. Gillan.
STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE S. GILLAN, PRESIDENT, ADVOCATES FOR
HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY
Ms. Gillan. Thank you very much. Good afternoon Chairman
McCaskill and Senator Blumenthal. I welcome this opportunity to
appear before you today on behalf of Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety to urge enactment of a strong and comprehensive
safety title in the reauthorization of MAP-21.
The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
has a long history of passing bipartisan legislation directing
agency action on numerous safety standards resulting in
airbags, safer trucks and busses, child restraints, rollover
prevention, consumer information, and rearview cameras. These
laws have saved thousands of lives, prevented millions of
injuries, and saved billions of dollars.
However, there is still an unfinished safety agenda. Each
year, motor vehicle crashes kill about 33,000 people and injure
2 million more at a cost approaching $1 trillion. There is no
question that Congressional hearings on the GM cover-up of a
deadly defect have put a bright spotlight on long-standing
problems as well as overdue reforms.
Advocates strongly supports enactment of several Senate
bills sponsored by members of this committee and others,
including S. 2760, sponsored by Chairman McCaskill, S. 2559,
sponsored by Committee Chairman Rockefeller, S. 2151, sponsored
by Senators Markey and Blumenthal, and S. 2398, sponsored by
Senators Blumenthal, Markey, and Nelson. These bills are
critical.
My written testimony goes into greater detail about the
importance of each bill. NHTSA needs to be given the financial
and staff resources necessary to effectively oversee the auto
industry. However, the Agency cannot be permitted to continue
practices that have obstructed public oversight of defect
investigations and result in backroom deals with the auto
industry.
Stronger penalties are long overdue and essential to deter
automakers from knowingly installing defective parts and then
hiding the problems from the Agency and the public.
Consumers also must be assured that, when they walk into a
rental car company or a used car dealership, that they walk out
with keys to a car that has been repaired if subject to a
safety recall.
NHTSA's vehicle safety programs are grossly underfunded.
Last year, the entire operations and research budget was only
$248 million. This equates to NHTSA spending a mere $0.94 for
each of the 266 million registered vehicles on the road.
Accounting for inflation, NHTSA's operation and research budget
is effectively 9 percent less than it was a decade ago, even
though the number of vehicles on the road has grown by 23
percent. NHTSA's meager budget is also hindering the issuance
of several safety rules and standards mandated by MAP-21.
Another critical safety issue is pedestrian safety.
Pedestrian deaths and injuries are growing. S. 2284, sponsored
by Senator Gillibrand and others, takes a comprehensive
approach to implementing safety measures to protect pedestrians
and bicyclists. The portion of the bill involving roadway
improvements has already passed the Environment and Public
Works Committee, and we urge the Commerce Committee to adopt
the provisions directing NHTSA action on motor vehicle safety
improvements to reduce the severity of injuries suffered when a
pedestrian or bicyclist is hit by a car.
My written testimony also addresses other important issues
worthy of Congressional action. These include upgrading seat
belt protection for occupants in a rollover crash as well as
the safety standard for seat back strength which was issued 45
years ago.
Additionally, NHTSA crash data collection needs to be
modernized. The current budget limits the agency's ability to
collect sufficient data, and this, in turn, limits their
ability to identify safety problems and develop safety
solutions.
Sadly, this summer, we were all made aware that tragic
deaths of infants and small children left in hot cars continues
to occur. Since 1998, more than 600 children have died from
heat stroke, because they were left in a car.
Just as with the issue of rear visibility, education
campaigns alone are not enough to stop these preventable
deaths. We urge the Committee to direct NHTSA to aggressively
pursue a technological solution to this deadly problem.
Finally, far too many states are still missing key traffic
safety laws that can save lives and prevent injuries. We
support continuing incentive grant programs to encourage state
adoption of laws addressing teen, impaired, distracted driving
and occupant protection with some changes to these programs.
In conclusion, many of the legislative proposals, sponsored
by members of this committee and strongly supported by safety
groups, were considered in the aftermath of the Ford Firestone
tire defect and then the Toyota acceleration defect. Now, we
have the GM ignition defect.
Every day, there are more revelations about vehicle safety
defects. Unless Congress enacts these essential reforms, like
the legislation I have mentioned in my statement, it is almost
certain that similar preventable tragedies will occur over, and
over, and over again.
Thank you, and I'm happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gillan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jacqueline S. Gillan, President,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
Introduction
Good afternoon Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, and
members of the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product
Safety, and Insurance. I am Jacqueline Gillan, President of Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates). Advocates is a coalition of
public health, safety, and consumer organizations, insurers and
insurance agents that promotes highway and auto safety through the
adoption of safety policies and regulations, and the enactment of state
and Federal traffic safety laws. Advocates is a unique coalition
dedicated to improving traffic safety by addressing motor vehicle
crashes as a public health issue.
According to the Federal Government, each year motor vehicle
crashes claim more than 33,000 lives and millions more are injured.
Each day, approximately 90 people die and more than 5,000 suffer
injuries on America's highways. Every minute four people are injured
and every 17 minutes a life is lost in a crash.\1\ In the span of this
hearing alone, seven people, more than the number of people on this
witness panel, will have become victims of a fatal traffic collision
and more than 450 will have been injured. The annual comprehensive cost
of motor vehicle crashes is approaching one trillion dollars,\2\
including productivity losses, property damage, medical costs,
rehabilitation costs, congestion costs, legal and court costs emergency
services such as medical, police, and fire services, insurance
administration costs, costs to employers, and values for more
intangible consequences such as physical pain and lost quality-of-life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012, A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash
Data form the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General
Estimates System (Traffic Safety Facts 2012), DOT HS 812 032, U.S. DOT,
NHTSA (2014).
\2\ The current figure is $870.8 billion according to the Economic
and Societal Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes, 2010, U.S. DOT, NHTSA,
DOT HS 812 013 (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
under the leadership of Democrats and Republicans, has been responsible
for some of the most significant advances in highway and auto safety
beginning with the drafting and passage of legislation in 1966, leading
to the creation of what is now the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). Over the last 20 years, this Committee has
passed other lifesaving measures requiring airbags as standard
equipment in the front seat of all passenger vehicles as well as
directing agency action on numerous vehicle safety standards on tire
safety, child restraints, rollover protection, anti-ejection
prevention, electronic stability control, roof crush strength, side
impact protection, and rearview cameras.
Additionally, the safety title of the Moving Ahead for Progress in
the 21st Century Act,\3\ or MAP-21, was another important bill
advancing safety. It included vehicle and traffic safety provisions
directing agency actions on key lifesaving measures including occupant
protection, teen driving, distracted driving, and impaired driving. In
particular, this Committee held hearings and pushed passage of a
comprehensive motorcoach safety bill based on numerous overdue and
ignored recommendations, many of them decades old, issued by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to improve occupant
protection and operational safety of intercity bus travel. Several
safety accomplishments include a seat belt installation requirement
which was issued in November 2013,\4\ as well as directing that final
rules be issued on roof strength, anti-ejection glazing and rollover
crash avoidance. I am attaching a list and a chart showing the status
of key requirements enacted in MAP-21 to my testimony. These issues
languished for years until specific deadlines for agency action were
included in the recent reauthorization bills.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Pub. L. 112-141 (July 6, 2012).
\4\ Occupant Crash Protection; Final Rule, 78 Federal Register
70416 (Nov. 25, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even now, deadlines for the issuance of a number of final rules and
other actions required by MAP-21 are delayed and will not be completed
on time, including final rules on several key motorcoach safety issues
for roof strength, anti-ejection protection and rollover crash
avoidance,\5\ as well as for improvement of child restraint systems
also known as Lower Anchorages and Tethers for Children (LATCH), the
criteria for increased civil penalties, and the study on the need for a
vehicle electronics standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Since the NHTSA did not issue a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) on Bus Rollover Structural Integrity until August 6, 2014, 79
Federal Register 46090, and public comments are not due until October
6, 2014, it is evident that the agency will not meet the October 1,
2014 deadline for issuance of this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite these important safety gains, there is still an unfinished
safety agenda. The reauthorization of MAP-21 provides an opportunity to
address these safety concerns and take action to forge solutions. There
is no question that hearings by this Subcommittee on the General Motors
(GM) cover-up of a deadly defect in the ignition key switch have put a
bright spotlight on outstanding problems and solutions that are needed.
We cannot allow a lack of strong auto regulatory laws to combat
industry failures, a lack of sufficient resources, a lack of
accountability and a lackluster performance by NHTSA to jeopardize the
safety of the public.
I welcome this opportunity to appear before you today to strongly
endorse several important bills that have been introduced to address
these defects in the law and deficiencies by NHTSA including Chairman
McCaskill's comprehensive six-year reauthorization bill, the Motor
Vehicle and Highway Safety Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 2760. This bill
contains needed safety provisions and funding authorization levels to
continue improvement of highway safety and reduction of traffic
fatalities. I will discuss the need for this legislation as well as
other bills pending before the Committee including The Early Warning
Reporting System Improvement Act of 2014, S. 2151, The Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 2014, S. 2559, The Automaker Accountability Act of 2014,
S. 2398, and The Pedestrian Safety Act of 2014, S. 2284, as well as
issues not yet introduced as legislation that are worthy of your
support and leadership. We are very grateful to the Chairman and also
Subcommittee Members Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Brian Schatz
(D-HI) and Cory Booker (D-NJ), as well as Commerce Committee Members
Senators Bill Nelson (D-FL) and Edward Markey (D-MA), and Senators
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) for cosponsoring
these lifesaving pieces of legislation.
Lives Saved by Safety Systems and Programs
When Congress acts, NHTSA reacts and lives are saved. Laws passed
by Congress, including those that originated with this Committee, and
subsequent rules issued by NHTSA requiring vehicle safety standards and
technologies have saved thousands of lives. NHTSA studies show that
since 1975 motor vehicle safety technologies have saved nearly 418,000
lives.\6\ For example, frontal air bags, a safety technology that this
Committee championed in 1991,\7\ saved 2,213 lives in 2012 and have
saved nearly 37,000 people since 1991.\8\ Seat belts saved the lives of
an estimated 12,174 people over the age of four in 2012, and nearly
305,000 lives since 1975.\9\ Child restraints saved the lives of 284
children age four and under in 2012 and more than 10,000 young children
since 1975.\10\ These safety measures have the potential to save many
additional lives and prevent costly injuries if they are used to
protect everyone at risk who needs them. For example, in 2012 if all
passenger vehicle occupants age five and over had worn seat belts, an
additional 3,031 lives could have been saved, and a 100 percent
motorcycle helmet use rate would have saved an additional 781 lives in
motorcycle crashes.\11\ In addition to laws requiring safety
technologies, laws such as the 21-year-old minimum drinking age law
saved 525 lives in 2012.\12\ In 2012, electronic stability control
(ESC) saved an estimated 1,144 lives among passenger vehicle
occupants.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
\7\ Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991
(ISTEA), Title II, Part B, Sec. 2508, Pub. L. 102-240 (Dec. 18, 1991).
\8\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
\9\ Id.
\10\ Id.
\11\ Id.
\12\ Id.
\13\ Traffic Safety Facts: Research Note, Estimating Lives Saved By
Electronic Stability Control 2008-2012, U.S. DOT, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 042
(June, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A comprehensive NHTSA reauthorization bill with sufficient agency
funding and requiring additional commonsense and cost-effective safety
improvements will allow NHTSA to fulfill its statutory mission to
prevent death and injuries and economic losses from motor vehicle
crashes.
Sufficient Resources for NHTSA is Essential
NHTSA's funding and staffing levels have suffered over the years.
Today, 94 percent of transportation-related fatalities and 99 percent
of transportation injuries \14\ occur on our streets and highways and
yet, NHTSA receives only one percent of the overall U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) budget.\15\ NHTSA is responsible for the safety of
over 300 million Americans who drive or ride in or are around more than
265 million registered motor vehicles that use our Nation's
highways.\16\ Even with the recent downturn in motor vehicle traffic
fatalities, approximately 32,850 people were killed in 2013 on our
highways \17\ and millions more were injured at an annual comprehensive
cost of more than $870 billion.\18\ Motor vehicle crashes are the
leading cause of death for all Americans ages five to 24, and the
second leading cause of death among children ages one to four and
adults 25 to 44 years of age.\19\ In order to maintain safety gains and
improve the agency's efforts in detecting and investigating safety
threats, a justified and necessary increase in funding is essential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ National Transportation Statistics 2013, U.S. DOT, RITA, BTS,
Tables 2-2, and 2-4 (2014).
\15\ Budget Highlights Fiscal Year 2014, U.S. DOT.
\16\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012, A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data form the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General
Estimates System, U.S. DOT, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 032 (2014).
\17\ Traffic Safety Facts: Crash Stats, Early Estimates of Motor
Vehicle Traffic Fatalities in 2013, U.S. DOT, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 024
(2014).
\18\ The Economic and Societal Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes,
2010, U.S. DOT, NHTSA, DOT HS 812 013 (2014).
\19\ 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, United States--2011,
and 10 Leading Causes of Injury Deaths by Age Group Highlighting
Unintentional Injury Deaths, United States--2011, CDC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The current agency budget for motor vehicle safety activities and
research is a small portion of NHTSA's overall budget. Current funding
for NHTSA's operations and research covering the Nation's entire
vehicle safety program was only $248 million for Fiscal Year (FY)
2013.\20\ This total is grossly inadequate in the face of the agency's
mission and safety responsibilities that affect every American and
every registered motor vehicle on our roads. Moreover, this paltry sum
has barely increased over the past decade.\21\ When accounting for
inflation over that same time period, NHTSA has effectively experienced
a 9 percent decrease in funding for operations and research activities.
The agency's operations and research budget of $248 million equates to
NHTSA receiving less than a dollar for each of the 266 million
registered vehicles on the road in the U.S.\22\ (94 cents to be exact).
While NHTSA's safety budget has shrunk, the number of vehicles on the
road the agency must regulate has increased by 23 percent, from 217
million vehicles in 2000 to 266 million in 2012.\23\ NHTSA remains
woefully under-resourced and the agency's ability to keep up with
technology and crash and injury trends is imperiled by the lack of
sufficient resources. There are hundreds of other Federal programs of
far less significance with higher budgets that NHTSA's. This is
unacceptable in light of the important lifesaving mission of this
agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Fiscal Year
2015 Budget Overview, Exhibit II-2, U.S. DOT, NHTSA (2014).
\21\ United States Department of Transportation Fiscal Year 2006
Budget in Brief, U.S. DOT, p.36.
\22\ Id.; see also Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
\23\ Compare Traffic Safety Facts 2000, A Compilation of Motor
Vehicle Crash Data form the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the
General Estimates System, DOT HS 809 337, U.S. DOT, NHTSA (2001) with
Traffic Safety Facts 2012, A Compilation of Motor Vehicle Crash Data
form the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General Estimates
System, DOT HS 812 032, U.S. DOT, NHTSA (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agency budget for vehicle safety should reflect its important
lifesaving mission. In order to provide a solid foundation for NHTSA to
address the safety of current and future vehicles, I urge the Committee
to assure this small agency is given the funds needed to do its job.
Laws and programs administered by NHTSA are responsible for saving at
least an estimated 418,000 lives since 1975.\24\ NHTSA authorization
for operations and research should be substantially increased in
acknowledgement of the daunting task the agency faces and tremendous
beneficial impact the agency's work has on the lives of so many
Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Bills Which Should be Included in the Safety Title
NHTSA is over 40 years old \25\ and should be given authority and
powers commensurate with the agency's experience and safety mandate.
This responsibility should be coupled with powers that permit the
agency to fully perform its duties and allow the agency to exercise its
enforcement authority to ensure the safety of vehicles on our streets
and highways. For this reason Advocates supports amending several
Federal laws to provide NHTSA with enhanced authority to address
existing safety challenges with 21st Century approaches that will allow
the agency to leverage its resources to protect the American public.
Advocates strongly supports the following legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ NHTSA was formally established by the Highway Safety Act of
1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Motor Vehicle and Highway Safety Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 2760
We commend Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee
on Consumer Protection, Produce Safety, and Insurance Chairman Claire
McCaskill (D-MO) for introducing the Motor Vehicle and Highway Safety
Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 2760, and strongly support its enactment.
This bill provides for a six-year reauthorization of highway and auto
safety funding at NHTSA and doubles NHTSA's funding for vehicle safety
over that time period. It provides the agency the enhanced resources
and authorities necessary to keep Americans safe on our roads and holds
accountable those who willfully ignore or violate safety laws and
regulations.
Specifically, Advocates supports the increases to the highway
safety grant funds and the addition of eligibility to use the funds to
reduce injuries and deaths to older drivers, to improve emergency
medical services response to crash sites, and to create countermeasures
designed to decrease deaths and injuries to pedestrians and bicyclists
traveling in the roadways. More pedestrians were killed in motor
vehicle crashes in 2012 than in any of the previous four years.
Pedestrian fatalities have increased by 15 percent and the number of
pedestrians injured has increased by 29 percent since the recent low in
2009.\26\ In 2012, the latest year of data available, there were 4,743
pedestrian deaths and 76,000 pedestrians injured. Vulnerable
populations make up a significant share of pedestrian fatalities. More
than one-fifth of children ages five to 15 who were killed in traffic
crashes were pedestrians. Older pedestrians (age 65+) accounted for 20
percent (935) of all pedestrian fatalities in 2012. Moreover, the
fatality rate for older pedestrians (age 65+) was 2.17 per 100,000
population--higher than the rate for all the other ages under 65. In
2010, pedestrian crashes resulted in $67 billion in comprehensive
costs.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
\27\ The Economic and Societal Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes,
2010, HS 812 013, U.S. DOT, NHTSA (2014), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812013.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, we support the revision of the criteria states must
meet to receive grant funding for enacting ignition interlock device
(IID) laws. Currently, the grant program as interpreted by NHTSA after
enacted in MAP-21, is overly prescriptive and hence ineffective. While
24 states have all-offender IID laws or laws required for the first
offense of an offender with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .08
percent, only two states received grant funding in FY 2013 and four
states received grant funding in FY 2014. The commonsense changes
contained in S. 2760 will help encourage states to enact IID laws which
are effective and reduce the number of repeat offenders by 64
percent.\28\ Since 50 to 75 percent of convicted drunk drivers continue
to drive on a suspended license, it is essential that all drivers
convicted of impairment be required to use an IID in order to prevent
them from driving drunk in the future.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Ignition Interlocks -What You Need to Know, A Toolkit for
Policymakers, Highway Safety Professionals, And Advocates, DOT HS 811
246, NHTSA (Nov., 2009).
\29\ Peck, R.C., Wilson, R. J., and Sutton, ``Driver license
strategies for controlling the persistent DUI offender, Strategies for
Dealing with the intent Drinking Driver.'' Transportation Research
Board, Transportation Research Circular No. 437 (1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2012, an average of one alcohol-impaired driving fatality
occurred every 51 minutes in our country resulting in a total of 10,322
deaths or almost a third of all traffic fatalities for the year.\30\
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
adults drank too much and got behind the wheel to drive about 112
million times in 2010--the equivalent of nearly 300,000 incidents of
drinking and driving each day in America.\31\ Nationally, every two
minutes, a person is injured in a drunk driving crash and, on average,
one in three people will be involved in a drunk driving crash in their
lifetime.\32\ Along with the unacceptable loss of life caused by drunk
driving crashes, the financial costs are staggering. Nationally, drunk
driving costs exceed $206 billion annually.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012 Data: Alcohol-Impaired Driving, DOT
HS 811870, NHTSA (Dec., 2013), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811870.pdf.
\31\ CDC Vital Signs, Drinking and Driving: A Threat to Everyone
(Oct., 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/
DrinkingAndDriving/index.html.
\32\ The Economic and Societal Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes, op
cit.
\33\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convincing and compelling studies show states that have adopted IID
laws for all offenders are saving lives and reducing injuries. Arizona,
Oregon, Louisiana and New Mexico have experienced dramatic decreases in
drunk driving deaths of more than 30 percent after these states enacted
an all-offender IID law.\34\ In addition, when West Virginia adopted
its IID program, recidivism was reduced by 77 percent among first-time
offenders.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Sober to Start,
Available at http://www.madd
.org/drunk-driving/ignition-interlocks/.
\35\ Tippetts, A., Scott and Robert Voas, ``The Effectiveness of
the West Virginia Interlock Program.'' Journal of Traffic Medicine 26
(1-2) (1998): 19-24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IIDs are proven technological vaccines that help to save lives and
prevent the disease of drunk driving recidivism. Nearly eight in 10
Americans support requiring IIDs for all offenders convicted of driving
while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), even if it is their first
conviction.\36\ Furthermore, 82 percent of offenders themselves believe
the IID was effective in preventing them from driving after
drinking.\37\ We urge the Subcommittee to support this essential
improvement to the current criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Caution Ahead: New Year's Ranks As Deadliest Day On U.S.
Roads, Dec. 26, 2012, AAA article available at http://newsroom.aaa.com/
tag/ignition-interlock-devices/.
\37\ Morse, B.J. and Elliott, D.S., Hamilton County Drinking and
Driving Study: 30 Month Report. Boulder, Colorado: University of
Colorado (1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bill also addresses inadequacies in laws and regulations
brought into the national spotlight by the GM ignition switch debacle.
Current law covers manufacturers in bankruptcy reorganization
proceedings but does not cover liquidation bankruptcies. This bill
would close that loophole, ensuring further protections for consumers
against auto safety defects. Moreover, the bill increases the per
violation cap on civil penalties from $5,000 to $25,000 and eliminates
the maximum total penalty cap, which is currently set at $35 million.
Further, the bill also expands civil penalties to cover not only those
who violate auto safety laws or regulations, but also those who cause
violations to occur as well. Critically important is the provision that
gives Federal prosecutors greater discretion, where warranted, to bring
criminal prosecutions for auto safety violations and increase the
possible penalties, including up to life in prison for violations that
result in death.
Additionally, Advocates supports the advancement of The Raechel and
Jacqueline Houck Safe Rental Car Act of 2013, S. 921, of which a
modified version is included in S.2760. This bill is sponsored by
Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) and cosponsored by a number of Senators
from both sides of the aisle including Subcommittee Chairman Claire
McCaskill (D-MO) and Subcommittee Members Senators Barbara Boxer (D-
CA), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), and Brian Schatz (D-HI). This
legislation will ensure recalled rental vehicles are fixed before a
consumer gets behind the wheel. The measure is named in memory of
Raechel and Jacqueline Houck, daughters of Carol (Cally) Houck, who
were killed in a recalled rental car due to a defect in a steering
component that caused an under-hood fire and led to the loss of
steering control. The car had been recalled but had not been repaired
before it was rented to the public. Raechel and Jacqueline were ages 24
and 20. The intent of the bill is to prevent future tragedies and to
allow consumers who rent or purchase rental cars, either new or used
vehicles, to do so with confidence that the vehicles do not have latent
safety defects that are subject to a safety recall. The following
support this legislation: Carol (Cally) Houck, Consumers for Auto
Reliability and Safety, Center for Auto Safety, Consumer Action,
Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, National Association
of Consumer Advocates, Trauma Foundation, Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety, and others (see attachment).
The Early Warning Reporting System Improvement Act of 2014, S. 2151,
and The Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2014, S. 2559
Revelations about the failure of GM to timely recall vehicles with
ignition defects, which led to at least 13 deaths, brought a spotlight
on inadequacies with NHTSA's recall process, consumer information,
corporate and agency transparency, and penalties. Advocates commends
Senators Edward Markey (D-MA) and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) for
introducing The Early Warning Reporting System Improvement Act of 2014,
S. 2151, and Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Chairman
Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) for introducing The Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
2014, S. 2559. Both of these bills include numerous provisions which
are needed to reform agency practice and allow adequate public access
to important agency records, and they are long overdue.
Currently, NHTSA is not making documents and investigations readily
available to the public. In recent years the agency has reduced the
size of, and access to, its technical library, discarded thousands of
documents and reports of historical importance, and prevented public
access to information by overly classifying records as confidential or
requiring the public to seek records through lengthy Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) proceedings.\38\ By making documents readily
available to the public, NHTSA will reduce costs and resource burdens
by eliminating the necessity for the public to needlessly file FOIA
requests to obtain basic information. These two bills address many of
the problems and failures identified in the GM oversight hearings held
by this Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Title 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These bills include provisions which:
Require NHTSA to Post Publicly Available Documents on the
Agency Website: NHTSA information and interaction with the
public over vehicle safety recalls will be vastly improved if
more information about recalls and defects is available. NHTSA
should be required to post on its website all agency records
and documents in the agency's possession that are not
confidential.
Revamp the NHTSA Website to Make it User-Friendly: The NHTSA
website is difficult to use and it is hard to find information
on the site. Many consumers have trouble understanding whether
their vehicle, or a used vehicle they wish to purchase, has
been the subject of a safety recall. The search engine
generally does not locate items, even if the document is
identified by name.
Require Early Warning Reporting (EWR) to Include Fatal
Incident Claims: The intent of the Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act \39\
was to ensure that the DOT Secretary receives all reports of
fatal traffic incidents that are alleged or proven to have been
caused by a possible motor vehicle defect. However, under
current NHTSA regulation, manufacturers need only indicate that
a fatal crash occurred and do not have to provide copies of the
underlying claim, notice or articles that inform the
manufacturer that a defect-related fatality involving one of
its vehicles had taken place. The EWR law should be amended to
require that for incidents involving a fatality, the vehicle
manufacturer must submit to the DOT Secretary all claims or
notice documents, and any amendments and supplements to those
documents, other than medical bills, medical documents and
information related solely to property damage, that notified
the vehicle manufacturer of the incident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Pub. L. 106-414 (Nov. 1, 2000).
Require that EWR Information be Posted Online in a
Searchable Format: The EWR information and data should be
provided to the public in a searchable website that allows the
public to pull together data by make and model from a series of
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EWR reporting periods.
Reverse Presumption Against Release of All Early Warning
Information: NHTSA would be required to amend its regulations
to establish a presumption in favor of the public disclosure of
all EWR data unless otherwise exempt from disclosure under
Federal law. The TREAD Act requires automobile and auto
equipment manufacturers to submit EWR reports on crashes,
fatalities and injuries to NHTSA to allow for early
identification of incident and defect patterns. The EWR data
was intended to be made public but the agency decided to
classify most EWR data as confidential business information.
The agency classification created a presumption that provides a
blanket exemption from disclosure without any requirement or
need for the submitter to certify or file any justification
that the EWR data actually contains confidential business
information. Much of the EWR data is non-privileged factual
information that has nothing to do with protected confidential
business information. The agency classification mislabels EWR
data as presumptively confidential in order to prevent it from
being released to the public.
Require ``Issue Evaluation'' Files Be Made Public (Secret
Investigations): Formal defect investigations are required to
be made public. NHTSA has created new nomenclature for its
preliminary defect investigations in order to avoid having to
disclose information to the public. ``Issue Evaluation'' and
other agency investigation files should be considered part of
the agency's formal defect investigation process and should be
required to be made public.
In addition to these provisions, S. 2151 also includes provisions
which:
Require NHTSA to Utilize EWR Data in Defect Proceedings:
NHTSA does not utilize EWR information in its investigations as
a matter of course. The agency should be required to use EWR
data as a source of information, when relevant, on any defect
investigation.
Require Manufacturers Make Communications about Defects
Public: The bill amends current law to require that
manufacturers, not DOT, make copies of internal manufacturer
and dealer communications about defects and noncompliance
publicly accessible on the Internet.
In addition to these provisions, S. 2559 also includes provisions
which:
Authorize Judicial Review of Safety Defect Proceedings: In
light of the weak response of the agency to reported defect
problems with sudden unintended acceleration, essential changes
should be required in the manner in which the agency decides
how and when to grant defect petitions and the basis for
opening and closing preliminary investigations and engineering
evaluations. These final agency decisions should be subject to
judicial review as is the standard practice for any other final
agency order or decision.
Limit Assertions of Confidentiality to Trade Secrets: NHTSA
approves overly broad requests for confidentiality from
manufacturers regardless of whether the information is truly
confidential. The agency should be required to grant
confidentiality only for specific data and information that is
genuinely a corporate trade secret.
Authorize NHTSA to Expedite Procedures when Imminent Hazard
Posed: NHTSA should be authorized to expedite procedures for
requiring a recall when there is an imminent hazard.
Create Corporate Responsibility for NHTSA Reports: The bill
would amend current law to direct that a rule must be issued to
require senior corporate safety officials to affirm that
responses provided to NHTSA are true and correct. Current law
leaves this decision to the discretion of the agency.
Require Reports to Congress: The DOT Inspector General (IG)
is required to file four biannual Congressional reports on
utilization of EWR information. Additionally, the DOT Secretary
must report to Congress on the operations of the Council for
Vehicle Electronics, Vehicle Software and Emerging
Technologies.
Restrict Covered Vehicle Safety Officials: Except for
providing testimony, former DOT and vehicle safety officials
are prohibited, for a period of one year, from any
communication regarding any matter involving vehicle safety
that seeks official action by any current NHTSA officer or
employee on behalf of a regulated manufacturer.
Create a Vehicle Safety User Fee: Starting one year after
enactment, the DOT Secretary is to assess a user fee for each
vehicle certified as compliant by a manufacturer. User fees are
to be set at $3 per vehicle in the first year, $6 in the second
year, and $9 in the third year and each subsequent year,
adjusted for inflation. The implementing regulation is to be
issued in nine months.
Create Authorization Levels: To carry out the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 2014, the bill authorizes $200 million for FY
2015, $240 million for FY 2016, and $280 million for FY 2017.
We believe that these levels should be substantially increased
for effective implementation.
Prohibit Preemption of State Law: The bill prohibits the DOT
Secretary, when issuing safety standards, from addressing the
issue of preemption of state law regarding damages for personal
injury, death, or property damage unless expressly authorized
by Congress. It also declares prior preemption statements
issued during the years 2005 to 2008 shall not be considered in
determining whether state law has been preempted.
The Automaker Accountability Act of 2014, S. 2398
Recent safety defect issues have once again raised concerns about
the authority of NHTSA to deter safety defects, to insist companies
disclose safety defects once they are known to the company, and to
impose appropriate sanctions on persons and companies that perpetuate
safety defects. NHTSA's current civil penalty authority allows
imposition of a maximum civil fine of only $35 million (adjusted for
inflation). This is far too small a sum to deter major international
vehicle manufacturers from violating the requirements of the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act.
The cap on civil penalty authority should be removed, and the
maximum civil penalty per vehicle should be raised to the average sale
price of a particular vehicle model, and criteria for imposition of at
least a minimum level of civil fines should be required for violations
based on annual worldwide motor vehicle sales and/or on the number of
vehicles affected by a safety recall or voluntary safety campaign.
Advocates strongly supports The Automaker Accountability Act of
2014, S. 2398, introduced by Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Edward
Markey (D-MA), and Bill Nelson (D-FL), which removes the cap and
increases civil penalties for a series of violations of Federal motor
vehicle safety requirements. Additionally, it subjects individuals who
fail or refuse to perform an inspection, investigation, and record-
keeping requirements pertaining to defective or noncompliant motor
vehicles or motor vehicle equipment to fines of up to $25,000 per
violation. It should be noted that the Motor Vehicle and Highway Safety
Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 2770, also removes the cap on civil
penalties and increases the per violation penalty amount.
The Pedestrian Safety Act of 2014, S. 2284
On average, every two hours a pedestrian is killed and every seven
minutes a pedestrian is injured.\40\ The Pedestrian Safety Act takes a
comprehensive approach to implementing safety improvements to prevent
needless deaths and injuries to pedestrians and bicyclists. A broad
coalition representing consumer, health and safety groups, children and
older adults, pediatricians, emergency nurses and walking and biking
advocates (list of coalition is attached) supports the solutions
proposed in S. 2284, sponsored by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) and
cosponsored by Subcommittee Members Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT),
Brian Schatz (D-HI) and Cory Booker (D-NJ), to improve safety for those
who are walking or biking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Traffic Safety Facts, 2012 Data, Pedestrians, DOT HS 811 888;
p. 1, U.S. DOT, NHTSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, more pedestrians were killed in motor vehicle
crashes in 2012 than in any of the previous four years. In 2012, 4,743
pedestrian were killed and 76,000 injured. Similarly, there was a six
percent increase in the number of fatalities of bicyclists and other
cyclists from 2011 to 2012. In 2012, there were 726 bicyclists and
other cyclists killed and an additional 49,000 injured. Vulnerable
populations make up a significant share of pedestrian fatalities. In
2010, pedestrian/cyclist crashes resulted in an economic cost of $19
billion. The comprehensive cost for these crashes was $90 billion.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ The Economic and Societal Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes, op
cit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address this significant public health concern, improvements to
both the vehicle and the roadway are needed to promote safety for
pedestrians, bicyclists and motorists. It takes the comprehensive
approach proposed in S. 2284 to effectively reduce preventable deaths
and injuries. The MAP-21 Reauthorization Act, S. 2322, reported out by
the Committee on Environment and Public Works, includes a provision in
S. 2284 to add pedestrian safety roadway improvements to the list of
safety projects that are eligible for 100 percent Federal funding.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Title 23 U.S.C. Sec. 120.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Being hit by a car does not have to be a death sentence. Advocates
and supporters of the bill urge the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, which has jurisdiction over requirements in the bill
addressing motor vehicle safety improvements, to support enactment of
provisions in S. 2284 directing the DOT to issue a final rule
establishing standards for the hood and bumper areas of motor vehicles
in order to reduce the severity of injuries suffered by pedestrians and
bicyclists that frequently result in death and lifelong disabilities.
Just as added padding and restraint systems provide occupant protection
inside the vehicle in the event of a crash, design improvements to the
hood and bumper, which are already available on some makes and models
sold in the U.S., can protect pedestrians and bicyclists on the outside
of the vehicle in the event of a crash. As we encourage people to get
out of their cars and to walk and bike, it is essential that we create
a safe environment for children and adults who choose this mode of
transportation.
Traffic Safety Programs
For nearly 20 years, through four separate authorization laws, the
Nation has spent billions of dollars on traffic safety programs and
various issue-specific incentive grant programs.\43\ The highway safety
and incentive grant programs have supported many worthwhile efforts,
especially state and local enforcement campaigns that have been the
cornerstone of local safety initiatives. Also, several states have
adopted optimal safety laws in response to the incentive grant
programs. However, while there has been progress in adoption of
lifesaving traffic safety laws, far too many states have failed to
enact numerous safety statutes resulting in an arbitrary patchwork
quilt of laws across the Nation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21) Act,
Pub. L. 112-141 (July 6, 2012); the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU),
Pub. L. 109-59 (Aug. 10, 2005); the Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. 105-178 (June 9, 1998); and, the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), Pub.
L. 102-240 (Dec. 18, 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1989, when Advocates was founded, only six states had a seat
belt law subject to primary enforcement and no state's law covered rear
seat occupants. In addition, not one state had enacted a statute
requiring IIDs for drunk drivers or booster seats for children. Today,
33 states and the District of Columbia (D.C) have a seat belt law
subject to primary enforcement and 17 of those states and D.C. extend
the law to cover all occupants. Thirty-one states and D.C. have booster
seat laws that cover children through age seven. IIDs for all drunk
drivers are required in 24 states.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Ohio's booster seat law covers children through age 7 but is
subject to secondary enforcement and is not included in this statistic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1989, 22 states and D.C. had laws requiring all motorcycle
riders to wear helmets; however, that number has unfortunately
decreased over the years to 19 states in 2014 leading to a tremendous
rise in motorcycle rider deaths. The number of motorcycle crash
fatalities has more than doubled since a low of 2,116 in 1997.\45\ The
use of electronic devices in motor vehicles was not yet common in 1989
but today 39 states and D.C. have recognized the significant public
safety threat posed by distracted driving and have enacted all-driver
texting bans subject to primary enforcement. Yet, despite some
progress, far too many states still lack basic highway safety laws that
have been proven to reduce occupant and motorcyclist fatalities,
protect novice teen drivers, prevent drunk drivers from getting behind
the wheel, and curb crashes due to distracted driving.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012: A Compilation of Motor Vehicle
Crash Data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System and the General
Estimates System, DOT HS 812 032, NHTSA (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, the majority of states (33) do not have a seat belt law that
is subject to primary enforcement for all occupants of a motor vehicle.
States that have passed a primary enforcement seat belt law have seen
dramatic increases in belt use rates. In 2013, states with primary
enforcement seat belt laws had a use rate of 91 percent, while states
with secondary enforcement laws or without seat belt laws had a seat
belt use rate of 80 percent.\46\ Seat belt use, reinforced by effective
safety belt laws, is a proven lifesaver. Lap-shoulder belts, when used,
reduce the risk of fatal injury to front seat car occupants by 45
percent and the risk of moderate-to-critical injuries by 50 percent.
For light truck occupants, seat belts reduce the risk of fatal injury
by 60 percent and moderate-to-critical injury by 65 percent.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Traffic Safety Facts Research Note: Seat Belt Use in 2013--
Overall Results, DOT HS 811 875, NHTSA (Jan., 2014), available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811875.pdf.
\47\ Traffic Safety Facts: 2012 Data, Occupant Protection, DOT HS
811 892, NHTSA (Mar., 2014), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/
Pubs/811892.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, 19 states do not have a booster seat law that covers
children through age seven although using a booster seat with a seat
belt instead of a seat belt alone reduces a child's risk of injury in a
crash by 59 percent.\48\ Furthermore, expanded child restraint laws
covering children through ages seven and eight were associated with a
five percent reduction in the rate of children with injuries of any
severity, a 17 percent reduction in the rate of children with fatal and
incapacitating injuries, and a six percent increase in the number of
booster-age children seated in the rear of the vehicle where children
are more protected.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Ohio's booster seat law does cover children through age 7 but
it is subject to secondary enforcement and is included as one of the 19
states cited above. Durbin, D.R., Elliott, M.R. and Winston, F.K.,
Belt-positioning booster seats and reduction in risk of injury among
children in vehicle crashes, Journal of the American Medical
Association, 289:2835-40 (2003).
\49\ Kids in Crashes Far Better IF States Have Tough Restraint
laws, IIHS Status Report, V. 46, No. 9 (Oct. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to a 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report,
``laws requiring all motorcyclists to wear helmets are the only
strategy proved to be effective in reducing motorcyclist fatalities.''
\50\ However, only 19 states and D.C. currently require all motorcycle
riders to wear a helmet despite the fact that motorcyclist fatalities
have more than doubled since a low of 2,116 motorcycle crash deaths in
1997.\51\ Moreover, according to the latest statistics from NHTSA, in
2012, there were 10 times as many unhelmeted fatalities (1,858) in
states without a universal helmet law compared to states with a
universal helmet law (178 deaths).\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Motorcycle Safety: Increasing Federal Flexibility and
Identifying Research Priorities Would Help Support States' Safety
Efforts, Report No. GAO-13-42, 2012, pg. 16, Government Accountability
Office (GAO), (2012).
\51\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
\52\ These states were nearly equivalent with respect to total
resident populations. Traffic Safety Facts: Research Note: 2012 Motor
Vehicle Crashes Overview, p. 5, DOT HS 811 856, NHTSA (Nov., 2013),
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811856.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motor vehicle crashes are the number one killer of American
teens.\53\ On average, more than seven teens were killed in the United
States each day of 2012 as a result of motor vehicle crashes.\54\ Teen
drivers are far more likely to be involved in fatal crashes because
they lack driving experience and tend to take greater risks, but there
is a proven solution. States that have adopted graduated driver
licensing (GDL) programs that introduce teens to the driving experience
gradually by phasing in full driving privileges over time and in lower
risk settings, have had overall crash reductions among teen drivers of
about 10 to 30 percent.\55\ However, at present, there is no state in
the Nation that has enacted all of the optimal GDL provisions
recommended by Advocates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Teen Driver: Fact
Sheet, citing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Web-based
Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS) [Online] (2012).
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (producer). [Cited 2012 Sept 28], available at
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/teen_drivers/
teendrivers_factsheet.html.
\54\ Teenagers: Fatality Facts: 2012, IIHS, available at http://
www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/teenagers/fatalityfacts/teenagers.
\55\ Graduated Licensing Laws and Fatal Crashes of Teenage Drivers:
A National Study, Insurance Institute For Highway Safety (June, 2010),
available at http://www.iihs.org/research/topics/pdf/r1122.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drinking and driving continues to be a national scourge on our
highways. An average of one alcohol-impaired driving fatality occurred
every 51 minutes in 2012.\56\ Yet, the majority of states (26) do not
require all drunk driving offenders to install an IID even though 82
percent of offenders themselves believe the IID was effective in
preventing them from driving after drinking.\57\ In addition, when IIDs
are installed, they are associated with an approximately 70 percent
reduction in arrest rates for impaired driving.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012 Data: Alcohol-Impaired Driving; DOT
HS 811870, NHTSA (Dec., 2013), available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811870.pdf.
\57\ Morse, BJ and DS Elliott. Hamilton County Drinking and Driving
Study: 30 Month Report. Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado
(1990).
\58\ Injury Prevention & Control: Motor Vehicle Safety, Impaired
Driving: Get the Facts website, CDC, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired
-drv_factsheet.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, it is clear from a growing body of safety research,
studies and data that the use of electronic devices for
telecommunications (such as mobile phones and text messaging),
telematics and entertainment can readily distract drivers from the
driving task. In fact, sending or receiving a text message causes the
driver's eyes to be off the road for an average of 4.6 seconds. When
driving 55 miles per hour, this is the equivalent of driving the entire
length of a football field blind.\59\ Yet, 11 states still do not have
a ban on texting while driving that is subject to primary enforcement
and covers all drivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Distraction.gov: Frequently Asked Questions, DOT NHTSA,
available at http://www
.distraction.gov/content/get-the-facts/faq.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advocates supports the National Priority Safety Programs, contained
in Section 31105 of MAP-21,\60\ that provide incentive grants to the
states to pass these lifesaving safety laws. These grants are helpful
to encourage action in state legislatures to pass measures that will
reduce fatalities on our Nation's roads. However, Advocates believes
that the current requirements must be modified so that these grants
serve as a true incentive to the states to strengthen their statutes.
For both the 2013 and 2014 fiscal years, not one state qualified for a
GDL grant and only eight states received Federal funding to combat
distracted driving including just one state in 2014. While Advocates
urges Congress to amend these grant requirements so that they encourage
states to enact these highway safety laws, modifications must not
dilute requirements that have been proven to be effective in reducing
deaths and injuries on our Nation's roads. We would like to work with
this Subcommittee to implement changes to achieve that balance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Codified at Title 23 U.S.C. Sec. 405.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Advocates applauds NHTSA for reorganizing the oversight of
its grant programs to the states including monies disbursed under the
National Priority Safety Programs, the recent report by the DOT IG
shows that there is still much work to be done. The IG report found
that from FY 2006 to FY 2012 there was $539 million in unexpended grant
funds including $331 million in 2012 alone.\61\ As the DOT IG report
notes, funds left unused represent opportunities missed to support
programs that reduce deaths and injuries. In addition, the DOT IG
report also determined that NHTSA lacks a strategy to address delays in
states using the funds that have already been distributed. Thus, for
the National Priority Safety Programs to achieve beneficial results and
exert positive impacts on safety, the grant requirements must be
modified and NHTSA must do a better job in administering this critical
initiative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Enhanced Monitoring Tools Are Needed To Improve NHTSA's
oversight of Highway Safety Grants, Report No: MH-2014-088, U.S. DOT,
Office of the Inspector General (Aug. 21, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional Needed Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
The safety title of the MAP-21 reauthorization bill will influence
our Nation's safety agenda for years to come as well as the death and
injury toll on our highways. There are several issues Advocates would
like to bring to your attention for consideration and work with the
Committee in advancing several key safety provisions. Every one of
these issues represents an opportunity to address a serious and deadly
problem.
Seatbelt Protection in Rollover Crashes
In 2012 alone, occupant protection measures including child
restraints, seatbelts, frontal airbags and motorcycle helmets have
saved at least 16,000 lives.\62\ Seatbelts have been proven to be
effective at reducing the risk of injuries and fatalities in crashes in
a large number of studies, in many cases cutting the risk in half.\63\
In 2012 over 12,000 lives were saved by seatbelt use, and another 3,031
could have been saved with 100 percent seatbelt use.\64\ Although seat
belt use rates reached 86 percent in 2012,\65\ nearly 45 percent of all
car and light truck occupants killed in that year were using some form
of restraint.\66\ Upgrades to seat belt systems can improve seat belt
performance and reduce the number of restrained occupants who are
killed in motor vehicle crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
\63\ Fatality Reduction by Safety Belts for Front-Seat Occupants of
Cars and Light Trucks, DOT HS 809 199, NHTSA (Dec. 2000); Dissanayake,
S. and Ratnayake, I., Effectiveness of Seat Belts in Reducing Injuries:
A Different Approach Based on KABCO Injury Severity Scale, Journal of
the Transportation Research Forum, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 135-146 (Fall
2008); Evand, L., Safety-Belt Effectiveness: The Influence of Crash
Severity and Selective Recruitment, Accid. Anal. and Prev., Vol. 28,
No. 4, pp. 423-433 (1996).
\64\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
\65\ Traffic Safety Facts Research Note: Seat Belt Use in 2012--
Overall Results, DOT HS 811 691, NHTSA (Nov. 2012).
\66\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rollover crashes have accounted for more than a third of all
fatalities in these vehicles annually since 2005.\67\ In 2012, 7,500
passenger car and light truck occupants were killed in rollover
crashes, amounting to 35 percent of all fatalities in light
vehicles.\68\ Little has been done to improve occupant restraint system
protection in rollover crashes. Improvements in vehicle design, and the
adoption of regulations for ESC, roof strength, and ejection
mitigation, which address some causes of rollover crashes and injuries,
have not eliminated rollovers as a major source of serious head and
other occupant injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Id.
\68\ Id., Table 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current seatbelts systems are designed to provide safety in a
frontal crash but do not retain the occupant in a safe position in the
vehicle seat during a rollover crash. According to NHTSA data, 13
percent of fatal occupants and 27 percent of seriously injured non-
fatal occupants who were partially or completely ejected through side
windows in rollovers were belted.\69\ These statistics reflect the
inability of current seatbelts to perform effectively in rollover
crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Ejection Mitigation;
Phase-In Reporting Requirements; Incorporation by Reference, Final
Rule; NHTSA, 76 Federal Register 3212, 3217 Table 7 (Jan. 19, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the large number of rollover deaths and injuries that could
be prevented or mitigated, NHTSA should be directed to issue a final
rule to establish vehicle seatbelt rollover crash performance
requirements, based on occupant excursion or other safety performance
measures that require the use of existing technology, such as pre-
tensioners, emergency locking retractors, and other belt-based safety
devices to reduce occupant motion relative to the vehicle in the event
of a rollover crash.
Electronics Safety Standard
In recent years, nearly all vital functions of motor vehicles have
become reliant on electronic systems and computer controls. Critical
safety systems such as the vehicle transmission, throttle control,
braking and power window systems, as well as occupant restraint
systems, among other functions, are dependent on electronics and are
monitored and governed by electronic control units. Vehicle electronics
are vital to the proper operation of all new passenger motor vehicle
models. Modern motor vehicles are built using, on average, 40
electronic controllers, five miles of wiring that support numerous
functions and are monitored and regulated by 10 million lines of
software code.\70\ MAP-21 requires the DOT Secretary to complete an
examination of the need for safety standards to ensure a minimum level
of performance by electronic systems in passenger vehicles. The study
is required to consider electronic components and the interaction of
those components, the security needs for electronic systems to prevent
unauthorized access and the effect of the surrounding environment on
the vehicle electronic systems.\71\ The NHTSA study is still in
progress and will not be submitted to Congress by the September 30,
2014 deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Klier, T.H., and Rubenstein, J.M., Making Cars Smarter: The
Growing Role of Electronics in Automobiles, Chicago Fed Letter, No.
291a, The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Oct. 2011) available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/chicago_fed_letter/
2011/october_291a.cfm.
\71\ Electronic Systems Performance, Sec. 31402, MAP-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the on-going study, Advocates is concerned that the failure
to adopt minimum standards for complex electronic functions will lead
to potentially serious safety problems. In the past six months alone,
manufacturers have twice filed petitions requesting a decision of
inconsequential noncompliance regarding interference with vehicle
displays by non-safety systems such as accessing the radio, an mp3
player, or Bluetooth connected phone. In each case the use of a non-
safety function interfered with a vehicle safety function causing a
non-compliance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS).
While these two situations may not have seriously compromised safe
operation of the vehicles involved, they are clear examples of the need
for a safety standard. At a minimum, such a standard for vehicle
electronics should ensure that the proper functioning of safety systems
cannot be degraded, inhibited, or interfered with by non-safety
features.
Seatback Strength
The safety standard for seatback performance has not been upgraded
since it was first adopted in 1967. When the driver or front passenger
seatback fails or collapses in a crash, it endangers both the front and
rear seat occupants. Regulatory compliance rear impact crash tests for
fuel system integrity (FMVSS 301), conducted by NHTSA, reveal that
almost every seatback fails, allowing a front seat occupant to be
propelled into the rear seating area. Seat belt systems that are
effective in frontal crashes are not designed to keep front seat
occupants from slipping out of the belt system when the seatback
collapses, leading to an increase in the risk of injury to the front
seat occupant, often paraplegia or quadriplegia.
Parents have long been advised to secure young children in the rear
seat. Also, as the U.S. passenger vehicle fleet gradually downsizes in
response to more costly fuels as well as environmental concerns, the
distance between front seats and rear seated occupants will be reduced.
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP) has determined that
collapsing seatbacks are a serious threat to children seated behind
adult occupants in the front seats. Many children were found to have
been injured in crashes in which seatbacks collapse or there is
excessive seat deformation. The failure of a seatback directly in front
of a child places the child at risk, and when there is an occupant in
the seat that fails there is double risk of injury to the child.\72\
NHTSA noted in a 1997 study that an examination of the interaction
between front seatback failures and injuries to rear seat occupants may
be important to assess the entirety of the occupant protection
implications of seatback failure.\73\ NHTSA has stated that the weight
of a passenger when added to the weight of the seatback itself will,
even in a low severity crash, produce loads exceeding the level
required by FMVSS 207.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Jermakian, J.S., Arbogast, K. B., Durbin, D.R. and Kallan,
M.J. Injury Risk for Children in Rear Impacts: Role of the Front Seat
Ocucpant, Ann. Adv. Automot. Med., 52:109-16 (Oct., 2008).
\73\ Preliminary Assessment of NASS CDS Data Related to Rearward
Seat Collapse and Occupant Injury; U.S. DOT, NHTSA (May, 1997).
\74\ Performance of Seating Systems in a FMVSS No. 301 Rear Impact
Crash Test, ESV Paper No. 18-00248, U.S. DOT, NHTSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of this information and the lack of action by the agency,
we strongly urge this Committee to direct the DOT to upgrade the
performance of vehicle seatbacks, including head restraints, to
increase the protection of children and adults in passenger motor
vehicle crashes. The seat back standard is more than 45 years old and
needs to be upgraded.
Consumers Must Be Able to Purchase Safety Equipment as Stand-Alone
Options
Safety systems that are not required as standard equipment by
Federal regulation are promoted by vehicle manufacturers as optional
equipment, but are often sold bundled together with non-safety features
and only in certain vehicle model trim levels. For example, in 2012,
consumers could not purchase a rearview or back-up camera system on the
basic model of the highest selling passenger car.\75\,\76\
Back-up camera systems, which are not yet required in all vehicle
models until the new standard takes effect in 2018,\77\ were available
only in a pricier version of many vehicle model lines, and then only as
part of an expensive options package including many non-safety upgrades
such as a power moon-roof, push button engine start, auto dimming
mirrors, and leather trimmed seats that cost as much as $5,175.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ To 10 Best-Selling Cars of 2012, Car.Com website http://
blogs.cars.com/kickingtires/2013/01/top-10-best-selling-cars-of-
2012.html.
\76\ Toyota.com Camry and Camry Hybrid 2014 models webpage,
accessed July 14, 2013, http://www.toyota.com/camry/features.html#!/
interior/2514/2532/2546/2540.
\77\ Rear Visibility Final Rule, 79 Federal Register 19178, 19228
(Apr. 7, 2014).
\78\ Toyota.com ``Build A Camry'' tool, accessed Jul. 14, 2013,
http://www.toyota.com/configu
rator/#!/series/camry/grade/SE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this example, a safety conscious consumer looking to buy what at
that time was the country's most popular passenger car would have to
pay a 28 percent premium over the base price for improved rear
visibility that could save the life of a child or pedestrian. This
additional cost for consumers is even more shocking considering that
NHTSA has already concluded that installation of rearview cameras would
cost no more than $203.\79\ The current practice of bundling identified
safety technologies into convenience packages that include non-safety
features benefits the manufacturer's bottom line, but not the wallet of
consumers. It forces consumers either to risk their safety and the
safety of others to avoid paying extremely high prices for critical
safety features not yet required by Federal safety rules or to purchase
non-safety features and equipment they do not want in order to get a
desired safety protection feature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis, Backover Crash
Avoidance Technologies, NPRM, FMVSS No. 111, NHTSA (Nov. 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety conscious consumers should not be limited to the marketing
campaigns of vehicle manufacturers when it comes to safety equipment.
We urge the Committee to support amending Federal law to authorize and
direct the DOT to issue a final rule requiring that manufacturers must
offer for sale as a stand-alone option (separately from any other
technology or options package) any safety device, feature or technology
that is listed by NHTSA as a recommended safety feature by the New Car
Assessment Program (NCAP). Any such safety device, feature or
technology that is offered on any trim level of a vehicle model must be
offered on all trim levels of that vehicle model.
Crash Avoidance Technology Can Reduce Large Truck Crash Involvement
In 2012, there were over 5.6 million crashes on U.S. roads which
injured over 2.3 million people and claimed the lives of over 33,500
people.\80\ Despite representing only 4 percent of registered vehicles,
collisions involving large trucks accounted for 12 percent of all
fatalities in 2012.\81\ Nearly 60 percent of all large trucks involved
in fatal collisions in 2012 were in frontal impacts. Frontal impacts
also accounted for 45 percent of all large trucks in injury crashes,
and 36 percent of all large trucks in property damage only crashes.\82\
In fatal two-vehicle crashes involving a large truck, the front of the
vehicle was the impact point on the large truck in 62 percent of the
cases.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012.
\81\ Id.
\82\ Id.
\83\ Traffic Safety Facts, 2012 Data, Large Trucks, DOT HS 811 868,
NHTSA (May, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crash imminent braking (CIB), also called an autonomous emergency
braking system (AEBS), is a crash avoidance system that can detect
objects or obstacles in the vehicle path and apply the brakes
automatically to prevent or mitigate frontal collisions. It is
important to note that these systems do not take control of braking
away from the driver unless a collision is imminent and almost
unavoidable. This type of automatic braking system would both alert the
driver and automatically begin braking in cases where the driver is not
alert to the emergency nature of the situation.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) found one vehicle
manufacturer's CIB system reduced bodily injury claims by 18 to 33
percent, property damage liability claims by 15 to 16 percent, and
collision claims by nine to 20 percent.\84\ Research by the European
New Car Assessment Program (EuroNCAP) suggests that CIB systems can
reduce crashes by up to 27 percent.\85\ A 2009 report on Forward
Collision Warning Systems for trucks (which are basic CIB systems that
only warn but do not autonomously brake the vehicle) found that these
systems could prevent as many as 18,000 rear-end crashes of trucks into
other vehicle.\86\ The NTSB previously included a mandate for CIB
systems as part of its 2013 Most Wanted List,\87\ and the European
Union requires these systems on new heavy trucks and buses which were
phased in beginning in 2013 and will apply to all trucks and buses by
the end of 2015.\88\ Even where CIB systems cannot completely prevent a
collision, the technology provides a significant benefit by reducing
the impact speed at which a collision would otherwise have occurred,
resulting in less severe injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Volvo City Safety loss experience--Update, IIHS Highway Loss
Data Institute, Bulletin Vol. 29, No. 23 (Dec. 2012).
\85\ Euro NCAP to drive availability of Autonomous Emergency
Braking systems for safer cars in Europe, Euro NCAP press release, Jun.
2012, http://www.euroncap.com/Content-Web-Article/c79b2bdc-f914-4ad0-
8d49-54254cda0ddc/euro-ncap-to-drive-availability-of-autonomous-
emer.aspx.
\86\ Analysis of Benefits and Costs of Forward Collision Warning
Systems for the Trucking Industry, FMCSA (Feb., 2009).
\87\ Mandate Motor Vehicle Collision Avoidance Technologies, NTSB,
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl10_2012.html.
\88\ Regulation (EC) No. 661/2009 and Commission Regulation (EU)
No. 347/2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advocates urges Congress to expedite the installation of this
safety technology by directing DOT to establish a safety standard that
sets performance requirements for CIB systems and requires the
installation of CIB systems that meet the performance requirements in
trucks and buses.
Reminders to Prevent Unattended Child Deaths
All too often, adults inadvertently leave infants and young
children in child restraint systems in the rear seats of passenger
vehicles and many of these incidents tragically lead to death. Among
parents with only a child or children age three and under, 23 percent
said that they had mistakenly left a child in a locked and parked
vehicle.\89\ Exposure of young children, particularly in hot and cold
weather, leads to hyperthermia and hypothermia that can result in death
or severe injuries. In 2013 alone, 44 children in the U.S. died of
heatstroke.\90\ Over the period 1998 to 2013, 606 children were killed
from heatstroke.\91\ This is the leading cause of non-crash-related
deaths among children 14 and younger.\92\ Of these needless deaths, 52
percent occurred when children were forgotten in the vehicle.\93\ This
risk of heatstroke is higher among children than adults because a
child's temperature heats up three to five times faster and risk is
exacerbated if the child is too young to communicate.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ ``New Study: 14 percent of Parents Say They Have Left A Child
Alone Inside Parked Vehicle Despite the Risks of
Heatstroke,'' Safe Kids Worldwide, April 2014, available at http://
www.safekids.org/press-release/new-study-14-parents-say-they-have-left-
child-alone-inside-parked-vehicle-despite
\90\ Kids in Hot Cars: Heat Stroke Fact Sheet, NHTSA, accessed at
http://www.safercar.gov/parents/heat-involved.html on 9/11/2014.
\91\ Id.
\92\ Id.
\93\ Id.
\94\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just as with the issue of rear visibility and the inability of
drivers to see in blind zones behind a motor vehicle, educational
campaigns alone are not enough to stop these preventable deaths. Such
inadvertent deaths can be avoided by equipping vehicles with sensors to
detect the presence of the child and sound a warning at the time the
driver locks the vehicle with a child inside. This is not rocket
science. Similar warning features currently remind drivers when they
have left the key in the ignition, left the headlamps on, and when a
door or trunk is open while the vehicle is in motion. We urge the
Committee to support a technological solution to this deadly problem
including requiring the agency to issue a final rule by a deadline date
within the next few years.
NHTSA Crash Data Collection Improvements--Need for Use of Cameras
Crash data collection is among the many critical areas under
NHTSA's jurisdiction that urgently need to be modernized. Presently the
agency oversees the collection of crash data for three related
databases; the General Estimates System (GES) and the Crashworthiness
Data System (CDS) which together are known as the National Automotive
Sampling System, or NASS, and the Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS). The data collected for these systems form the bedrock of almost
every safety analysis conducted by NHTSA and other Federal agencies,
and form the foundation for safety initiatives and rulemaking. Despite
the fact that these databases are critical to identifying safety
problems and developing safety countermeasures, the crash data systems
have been woefully underfunded.\95\ This has limited the collection and
availability of data and the strength of research needed to improve
vehicle safety to address the injuries sustained by more than 2 million
people and the more than 33,000 deaths that occur each year in traffic-
related collisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ The NHTSA Fiscal Year 2015 budget overview indicates that the
total budget for the National Center for Statistics and Analysis
(NCSA), which operates the FARS, GES and CDS databases, is $28.5
million with less than that apportioned for crash data collection,
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/administration/pdf/
Budgets/NHTSA_Budget_Highlights_
FY2015.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The underlying original source for the data used in the NHTSA crash
data systems are police accident reports (PARs) generated by law
enforcement officers responding to motor vehicle crashes. NHTSA
collects information from police reports in every fatal crash in the
FARS database, providing a census of all fatal crashes each year. The
agency also collects information from police reports on a statistically
based sample of approximately 50,000 non-fatal crashes, out of the more
than 5 million crashes reported annually, in the GES database in order
to develop an overview of motor vehicle crashes. The agency then
investigates a selected sample of these cases to obtain in-depth data
beyond the information contained in the police reports, as part of the
NASS-CDS database for the analysis and development of safety
countermeasures.
The CDS system, as originally conceived, was intended to conduct
extensive investigations of a sample of 19,000 of the cases selected
from the GES. As of 2012, the number of cases investigated has fallen
below 4,000 and the agency has predicted that just over 3,000 cases
were investigated in 2013. Budget limitations have severely reduced the
capability of the program to less than a quarter of the original design
size that was considered necessary as a minimum requirement to provide
a robust sample of crashes involving recent vehicle models. This lack
of funding seriously compromises the usefulness of the data that is
critical to issuance of Federal motor vehicle safety standards.
The modernization and improvement of the PARs which form the basis
of the entire data collection system is a critical and necessary step.
Considering the significantly limited number of cases which the agency
is currently able to investigate, it is imperative that the agency be
able to identify the most important cases which will provide meaningful
data from a safety research standpoint. This modernization should
include universal and improved electronic recording of PARs using
laptops or handheld computing platforms already available to most law
enforcement agencies. Such a change could improve the accuracy of PARs
and provide a platform for increased transfer of information to state
and Federal crash databases.
The addition of digital photographs of vehicles involved in each
police-reported collision, appended to the electronic police report, is
another essential and inexpensive improvement that would provide a
substantial benefit for crash data collection. Such a system would
assist NHTSA investigators in selecting significant cases and would
also benefit law enforcement at the local level by providing officers
with visual documentation of conditions during an investigation.
Although Advocates has strong reservations about relying solely on the
PARs to make administrative ad hoc determinations of culpability for a
crash, these modernizations would be focused on improving the amount
and accuracy of information provided in PARs which will result in
direct improvements in national safety data.
Advocates calls on Congress to provide the funding to modernize
national motor vehicle crash data collection and to direct the DOT to
initiate a pilot program to examine the cost effectiveness of
modernizing PARS and improving the design and statistical basis of the
NASS databases.
Conclusion
The quality of life for all Americans depends on a safe, reliable,
and economical surface transportation system. Transportation solutions
to promote mobility and the economy must involve not only financial
investments, but also investments in safety as well. Highway crashes
cost our Nation more than $870 billion in comprehensive costs annually.
This is money that could be better spent on addressing surface
transportation needs.
The decrease in highway fatalities that has occurred over the last
six years affords an opportunity to continue the downward trend and
make substantial and lasting reductions in annual fatalities. The
tragedies caused by GM's inadequate recall process sounded the alarm on
lapses in procedures to identify and disclose safety defects and laws
to deter corporate actions that result in needless deaths and injuries.
Now is the time to take direct and swift action by advancing The Motor
Vehicle and Highway Safety Enhancement Act of 2014, S. 2760, The Early
Warning Reporting System Improvement Act, S. 2151, The Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 2014, S. 2559, and The Automaker Accountability Act of
2014, S. 2398. Additionally, the recent and dramatic increase in
pedestrian fatalities calls for the advancement of The Pedestrian
Safety Act of 2013, S. 2284. There are no acceptable excuses for
delaying any longer the adoption of lifesaving laws, consumer
protections, increased penalties for corporate misbehavior,
strengthening NHTSA's authority and resources, and improved vehicle
safety standards that can save lives and reduce injuries, especially
when the solutions are at hand as we have highlighted today.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today and I am
pleased to answer your questions.
______
Organizations in Support of The Pedestrian Safety Act of 2014, S. 2284
AARP
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
Alliance for Biking & Walking
America Walks
American Academy of Pediatrics
Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (AMPO)
Child Injury Prevention Alliance
Citizens for Reliable and Safety Highways (CRASH)
Consumer Federation of America
Emergency Nurses Association
KidsAndCars.org
League of American Bicyclists
National Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
Parents Against Tired Truckers (P.A.T.T.)
Public Citizen
Society for the Advancement of Violence and Injury Research
Trauma Foundation
Truck Safety Coalition
______
MAP-21 Motorcoach Safety Action Items and Schedule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action Taken (In
Issue Section Action Required Action Date Italics)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcoach Safety Rules-- 32703(a) NHTSA to issue final rule on 10/1/2013 Final rule issued
Improved Occupant seat belts (1 year) 8/2013.
Protection
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(b) NHTSA to issue final rules on 10/1/2014 Proposed rule (NPRM) on
Roof strength (2 years) roof strength and
Anti-ejection glazing interior occupant
Rollover crash protection issued 8/6/
avoidance 14. Addresses roof
strength, luggage
racks and requires
windows on opposite
side of coach from the
crash to remain in
place in tip over
test, but does not
require installation
of break-proof
laminated glass. Does
not include rollover
crash avoidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(c) NHTSA to issue final rule 10/1/2015 Final rule must be
requiring tire pressure (3 years) issued unless agency
monitoring systems or report determines standard is
to Congress reasons for not not practicable, does
prescribing safety standard not meet the need for
motor vehicle safety
and cannot be stated
in objective terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(d) NHTSA to consider need to 10/1/2015 Final rule must be
issue final rule to upgrade (3 years) issued unless agency
tire performance standard determines standard is
not practicable, does
not meet need for
motor vehicle safety
and cannot be stated
in objective terms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(e) NHTSA to report to Congress on 10/1/2014 (2 NHTSA determined that
feasibility of retrofit of years) seat belt retrofit is
seat belts and ejection not feasible. Decision
safety countermeasures on retrofit of
ejection
countermeasures is
pending.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fire Prevention and 32704 NHTSA to issue final rules 10/1/2015 Final rules must be
Mitigation Standards for: (3 years) issued unless agency
Flammability of determines standards
exterior parts are not practicable,
Smoke suppression do not meet need for
Wheel well fires motor vehicle safety
Automatic fire and cannot be stated
suppression in objective terms.
Passenger evacuation
Causation &
prevention of fires
Improved fire
extinguishers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAP-21 Motorcoach Safety Action Items and Schedule--Continued
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action Taken (In
Issue Section Action Required Action Date Italics)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Occupant Protection, 32705 Complete research/testing on: 10/1/2015 NHTSA to complete
Collision Avoidance, Interior impact (3 years) research on each
Fire Causation and Fire protection topic.
Extinguisher Research & Compartmentalization
Testing Collision avoidance
systems
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA to issue final rules on 10/1/2017 Final rules must be
above topics. (5 years) issued unless agency
determines standards
are not practicable,
do not meet need for
motor vehicle safety
and cannot be stated
in objective terms.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcoach Service 32707(a) FMCSA to assign safety ratings 10/1/2014 Assign safety ratings
Provider: Safety to passenger and freight (2 years) for new entrants
Reviews motor carriers
-----------------------------------------
10/1/2015 Assign safety ratings
(3 years) for existing providers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motorcoach Service 32707(b) FMCSA to consider improved 10/1/2013 FMCSA provides
Provider: Disclosure of public access of passenger (1 year) information on
Safety Ratings motor carrier safety passenger motor
information by requiring carrier safety
public posting of safety measurement scores and
rating in each motorcoach, released an Internet
terminal and all points of ``app''--Look Before
sale of motorcoach services. You Book--to expedite
consumer access to
this information
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report on System of 32708 FMCSA to report to Congress on 10/1/2014 Status of report
Certification of feasibility of establishing (2 years) unknown. FMCSA
Training Programs certification system for withdrew NPRM on entry-
schools and motor carriers level driver training
that provide driver training. in 2013 and in
September 2014
requested views on
whether to initiate a
negotiated rulemaking
on topic.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CDL Passenger 32709(a) FMCSA study to assess current 10/1/2014
Endorsement CDL passenger endorsement (2 years)
knowledge and skills testing
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32709(b) FMCSA to report to Congress on 1/27/2015 (120
recommendations for changes days after
to CDL passenger endorsement study)
testing
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Inspection 32710 FMCSA to consider issuing 10/1/2015
Program for CMVs of final rule requiring States (3 years)
Passengers to establish annual program
for inspection of passenger-
carrying CMVs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
List of Acronyms Used in Chart:
CMV: Commercial motor vehicle
NHTSA: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
FMCSA: Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
CDL: Commercial Driver's License
______
NHTSA Overdue & At-Risk Safety Regulations
Statutory Deadlines Missed and At-Risk
Improved Child LATCH Restraint System (OVERDUE--Sept. 30, 2013)
Mandated in MAP-21 (Sec. 31502);
Congressional deadline for initiating rulemaking--Sept 30,
2013;
NHTSA has not issued an NPRM.
Civil Penalty Criteria (OVERDUE--Sept. 30, 2013)
Mandated in MAP-21 (Sec. 31203).
Congressional deadline for issuing Final Rule--Sept 30,
2013;
NHTSA has not issued a final rule.
Electronics Systems Performance (REPORT DUE--Sept. 30, 2014)
Mandated in MAP-21 (Sec. 31402)
Examination of issue to be completed by Sept. 30, 2014
Research ongoing; public notice will be issued after
deadline for report
Motorcoach Safety Rules: See Separate Chart
Roof Strength/Crush Resistance (FINAL RULE DUE--Sept. 30, 2014)
Mandated in MAP-21 (Sec. 32703(b)(1)).
Congressional deadline for issuance of Final Rule--Sept. 30,
2014;
NPRM issued August 6, 2014.
Anti-Ejection Countermeasures (FINAL RULE DUE--Sept. 30, 2014)
Mandated in MAP-21 (Sec. 32703(b)(2)).
Congressional deadline for issuance of Final Rule--Sept. 30,
2014.
NPRM issued August 6, 2014.
Anti-Ejection Retrofit (FINAL RULE DUE--Sept. 30, 2014)
Mandated in MAP-21 (Sec. 32703(e)(2)).
Congressional deadline for issuance of Final Rule--Sept. 30,
2014.
NPRM issued August 6, 2014.
Rollover Crash Avoidance (FINAL RULE DUE--Sept. 30, 2014)
Mandated in MAP-21 (Sec. 32703(b)(3)).
Congressional deadline for issuance of Final Rule--Sept. 30,
2014.
No NPRM has been issued.
______
Carol (Cally) Houck, Mother of Raechel and Jacqueline
Houck; Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety; Advocates
for Highway and Auto Safety; Center for Auto Safety;
Consumer Action; Consumer Federation of America; Consumers
Union; National Association of Consumer Advocates; Trauma
Foundation
May 9, 2013
Hon. Jay Rockefeller,
Chairman,
Hon. John Thune,
Ranking Member,
United States Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Re: Support for the Raechel and Jacqueline Houck Safe Rental Car Act
Dear Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Thune:
On behalf of each of our organizations, we write in support of the
Raechel and Jacqueline Houck Safe Rental Car Act, sponsored by Sens.
Charles Schumer, Lisa Murkowski, Barbara Boxer and Claire McCaskill.
This bipartisan legislation will require that rental car companies
ground vehicles that are subject to a safety recall until they are
fixed.
This measure is named in memory of Raechel and Jacqueline Houck,
daughters of Carol (Cally) Houck, who were killed by a rental car that
was recalled due to a defect in a steering component, which caused an
under-hood fire and loss of steering control. The car had not been
repaired before it was rented out. Raechel and Jacqueline were ages 24
and 20.
In addition to our organizations, the legislation is also supported
by all the major rental car companies and the American Car Rental
Association, which represents the major rental car companies and most
of the smaller rental car companies. To have leading national auto
safety organizations and the rental car industry in agreement on
legislation that would place rental car companies under Federal safety
regulation for the first time is truly historic. Other supporters
include the Truck Renting and Leasing Association, the American
Automobile Association, and State Farm Insurance Company.
This legislation represents a major improvement in auto safety,
particularly since rental car companies are the largest purchasers of
new vehicles in the Nation. We hope that with enactment of this
measure, consumers who rent or purchase rental cars, either as new or
used vehicles, can do so with confidence that the vehicles do not have
latent safety defects that are subject to a safety recall.
We respectfully request that you support the bill and work
diligently with us, the sponsors, the rental car industry, the AAA and
other supporters to enact the legislation this year. Thank you for your
consideration of our views.
Sincerely,
Carol (Cally) Houck,
Mother of Raechel and Jacqueline Houck.
Rosemary Shahan,
President,
Consumers for Auto Reliability and Safety.
Clarence Ditlow,
Executive Director,
Center for Auto Safety.
Jacqueline S. Gillan,
President,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety.
Ken McEldowney,
Executive Director,
Consumer Action.
Ami V. Gadhia,
Senior Policy Counsel,
Consumers Union.
Jack Gillis,
Public Affairs Director,
Consumer Federation of America.
Ira Rheingold,
Executive Director,
National Association of Consumer Advocates.
Ben Kelley,
Director, Injury Control Policy,
Trauma Foundation.
Cc: Sen. Charles Schumer
Members of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Ms. Gillan. Mr. Poole?
STATEMENT OF KENDELL POOLE, CHAIRMAN, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY
ASSOCIATION (GHSA)
Mr. Poole. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill and members of the
Committee for allowing us the opportunity to testify. I'm
Kendell Poole. I am the Chairman of the Governors Highway
Safety Association. I also serve as the Director of the
Governors Highway Safety Office in the State of Tennessee.
The Governors Highway Safety Association represents state
highway safety offices in all 50 states, the District of
Columbia, and also U.S. territories. GHSA members administer
the Behavioral Highway Safety Grant programs under MAP-21.
And although we've made some significant progress over the
last several years, there were still over 33,000 traffic-
related fatalities and more than 2 million injuries in 2012.
Addition--in addition to the mental and emotional toll on
families, NHTSA has found that crashes cost the nation an
estimated $871 billion in economic loss and societal harm
annually.
To address this problem, the Federal Government must make
the reduction of highway fatalities and injuries a national
priority and play a strong role in developing highway safety
policies and programs. And I might note that NHTSA has also
estimated that over 90 percent of our fatalities can be
attributed to driver behavior.
States have been administering grants under MAP-21 for
nearly 2 years now. MAP-21 brought in new administrative
processes that were not present in SAFETEA-LU--and there was
little to no time for the states or NHTSA to get the processes
fully developed before having to implement them. When you
discuss the challenges of implementing MAP-21, the biggest
challenge was actually condensing five years of program
development and implementation into two fiscal years.
Given the limited staff that many state highway safety
offices have, developing and implementing highway safety
programs can be difficult. When you add in the condensed
timeframe of MAP-21 and the prescriptive nature of many grant
programs, the administrative burden faced was nearly
overwhelming.
GHSA members spend a disproportionate amount of time
providing required maintenance of effort, or MOE, documentation
as well as going back and forth with NHTSA regional offices and
NHTSA headquarters on the exact grant requirements and grant
uses. The Administration recognized the burdensome nature of
these maintenance of effort requirements, and in GROW AMERICA,
the provisions were removed. At a minimum, the MOE requirements
need to be modified to recognize that the state highway safety
offices have no control over many of the state agency budgets
that are used to calculate the MOE.
The recent DOT OIG report showed that grantees fulfilled
their grant requirements, and there were no lapses in
oversight, and grantee transactions met all funding parameters.
This shows that the state highway safety offices and NHTSA have
a very effective relationship and are using funds in an
appropriate manner to tackle difficult highway safety issues.
But the report did miss that there are many complicating
factors for states to use their funds. This includes variances
in State budget processes and the unpredictable nature of
Federal funding. Many states cannot begin a project until a
full year's funding is available, and with short-term
extensions only providing partial funding for programs,
programs would be delayed until full funding would be
available.
GHSA understands the need for oversight, but the
recommendations made by the OIG would go beyond appropriate and
create additional and unnecessary administrative burdens.
As Congress discusses the next transportation bill, GHSA
and its members support a long-term reauthorization that has
similar format to what is found in MAP-21. Two years makes it
difficult for states to plan and attain performance targets.
MAP-21 made changes in the Behavioral Safety Programs, and
for the most part, consolidation has been welcome by the state
highway safety offices. GHSA recommends that Section 402, the
State and Community Highway Safety Grant Program, receive a
bulk of this funding. Section 402 is our building block of
highway safety, and it's the pillar grant program that we deal
with.
The funds in Section 402 allow the states the needed
flexibility to address old and new challenges with research-
based solutions. My written testimony provides suggestions on
how to modify the Section 405 National Priority Safety Program
to better assist and encourage states to reach for the
specified highway safety standards.
Any changes that Congress does make to the Behavioral
Safety Programs, GHSA only asks that adequate time be provided
to the states so they can best implement the changes.
GHSA members are committed to saving lives and reducing
injuries on our Nation's highways. It is important to recognize
that each state has different needs and concerns, and there is
a danger in treating each state the same. The more programs and
initiatives mandated, the less flexibility states have in
tackling the issues of greatest concern to them.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to provide testimony,
and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Poole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kendell Poole, Chairman, Governors Highway Safety
Association (GHSA)
I. Introduction
Good afternoon. My name is Kendell Poole and I am the Chairman of
the Governors Highway Safety Association (GHSA) and the Director of the
Tennessee Governor's Highway Safety Office. GHSA is a nonprofit
association representing the highway safety offices of states,
territories, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Our State
Highway Safety Office members administer Federal behavioral highway
safety grant programs. Areas of focus include: impaired driving;
inadequate occupant protection; speeding and aggressive driving;
distracted driving; younger and older drivers; bicycle, motorcycle and
pedestrian safety; traffic records and highway safety workforce
development.
Traffic-related fatalities and injuries continue to be a major
public health problem in this country. Although we have made some
significant progress, we experienced 33,561 fatalities and 2.36 million
injuries in 2012, the most recent year for which complete statistics
are available. Traffic crashes are not only devastating to family and
communities, they are economically burdensome. A recent study from the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) looked at crash
data from 2010 and found that the economic loss and societal harm from
motor vehicle crashes cost the United States $871 billion.
To address this, the Federal Government must continue to be a
leader and make the reduction of highway fatalities and injuries a
national priority. Working together with state and local partners, the
Federal Government plays a key role in influencing and supporting
highway safety policies and programs.
States now have two years of experience with the recent
transportation authorization known as MAP-21 (Moving Ahead for Progress
in the 21st Century). This authorization provided critical resources to
states to allow them to address dangerous driver behaviors.
II. MAP-21 Implementation
When MAP-21 was passed, there was very little time for State
Highway Safety Offices (SHSO) to fully prepare for new guidelines and
regulations needed to implement highway safety programs. The same can
be said for our Federal partners at NHTSA. NHTSA worked cooperatively
with GHSA to host webinars, answer questions and develop necessary
materials to facilitate program approvals for the first year of MAP-21,
FY 2013. This was all accomplished without any finalized regulations in
place. The framework was acknowledged and SHSOs had an idea of the
regulations to come, but it wasn't until well into FY 2013 that the
Interim Final Rules (IFR) were issued. Given the deadlines associated
with the compressed first year of MAP-21, states only had two months to
address any potential legislative or administrative issues that, based
on the IFR, would disqualify them from receiving certain incentive
grants. That is very little time, and in many states an unreasonable
expectation given the fact they may not have had a legislative session
or would have missed key deadlines of their state's short session. To
compound the issues the states were facing, the deadline for FY 2014
grants was only months after the FY 2013 grant deadline. That
essentially left states with one chance to address concerns in order to
qualify for grants. Under ideal circumstances, it is difficult to
encourage legislative action, much less with such a short time frame.
As states began to create their FY 2015 Highway Safety Plans (HSP)
and grant applications, there was not only uncertainty on the status of
MAP-21, but they were still operating under the IFR because no final
rules had been issued yet. After providing comments on the IFR and
sharing concerns about the overly prescriptive nature of the rules,
GHSA and its members expected to see final rules that would take those
concerns into account. Given the relative speed at which the IFR were
drafted, it has been surprising that no final rules have been issued.
Why ask states for their feedback on an interim final rule if no final
rule is going to be issued?
GHSA appreciates working with our Federal partners and values our
collaborative relationship. But as regulations, rule-makings, and
agency interpretation become more prescriptive, it makes it hard for
states with limited staff to implement incentive programs that have
been established to address safety on their roadways. Many of the
delays and unnecessary administrative burdens of implementing MAP-21
were related to the short time frame, inconsistent communication, and
differing interpretations of legislative language as they related to
incentive grant applications.
For most states, they spend months preparing their HSP and grant
applications, follow the strict guidelines for submitting the
documents, and after NHTSA review they are notified they did not meet
the qualifications for an incentive grant. This is often after working
with their regional office and providing additional information that is
not necessarily required by statute or rulemaking. In the hopes of
addressing the disqualifying criteria, states would seek guidance from
NHTSA on what legislative actions would be needed in order to qualify
for the grant in future years. Unfortunately, once a disqualifying
criteria was identified, analysis was stopped on the incentive grant
application and no further review was provided.
All of the incentive grants are extremely important to highway
safety and it is understandable that there are states that may not
qualify for a specific incentive grant, particularly since the criteria
are designed to encourage legislative action in states so they can
reach the next level in highway safety. But not knowing what
legislative action is needed to qualify makes it difficult for a state
to recommend changes to their Governor or legislature. While states
could do their best and guess what is needed, it is up to the
interpretation and decision of NHTSA that ultimately determines if a
state qualifies.
III. NHTSA Oversight
Recently, the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector
General (DOT OIG) released a report examining the oversight of the
highway safety grants, Enhanced Monitoring Tools Are Needed To Improve
NHTSA's Oversight of Highway Safety Grants. GHSA was pleased to see
that the DOT OIG report confirms that NHTSA and the SHSOs have an
effective relationship by finding that grantees fulfilled their grant
requirements, there were no lapses in oversight, and grantee
transactions met all funding parameters. Developing and implementing
research-based programs in the most efficient manner possible is a key
responsibility of a SHSO.
The DOT OIG report did note that states sometimes do not expend
grant funds immediately, but it did not fully note the reasons. The
delay is often due to the unpredictable amount and unknown timing of
Federal funding and the requirements of the state budgeting processes.
Fortunately, this has been taken into account within Federal statutes
which allow expenditures to cover multiple fiscal years. Federal grant
funds have been allocated to the states as late as 10 months into a
Fiscal Year. That leaves no time for a state to properly plan how to
effectively and efficiently liquidate the funds. And given that many of
the funds are often earmarked for specific issues, it takes even longer
to develop appropriate programs. GHSA understands and supports an
appropriate level of NHTSA oversight, but the recommendations suggested
by the DOT OIG would go beyond appropriate and create an additional
burden to states which already must operate under a heavy
administrative load.
IV. Recommendations for Reauthorization
As Congress discusses the future of highway safety programs, GHSA
supports a long-term reauthorization that has a similar format to what
is currently found in MAP-21, with minor changes. MAP-21 was only
authorized for two years and it is difficult for states to adequately
plan and forecast future needs as well as attain performance targets
when funding and program authority are uncertain.
Adjust Behavioral Safety Program Funding Percentages
MAP-21 consolidated the behavioral highway safety programs into two
programs: the long-standing Section 402 State and Community Highway
Safety grant program and the new Section 405 National Priority Safety
Program. With the consolidations of the two behavioral safety programs,
Congress also adjusted funding levels for the programs. Section 402 is
the pillar grant program and known as the ``building block'' of highway
safety. However, Section 405 programs receive the bulk of behavioral
safety funding. While Section 405 programs are important, their scope
is limited to specifics of the individual incentives. The limited funds
available in Section 402 have significant responsibility to address a
wide spectrum of highway safety issues. The Section 402 funds allows
states the needed flexibility to address unique and new challenges,
such as drug impaired driving, with research based solutions. GHSA
recommends that Section 402 should receive a greater percentage of the
funding available.
Allow States to Spend More Time on Programing, Less Time on Non-
critical
Administration
The consolidation of the behavioral safety programs also authorized
a single grant application. GHSA appreciates the consolidation and
urges Congress to maintain that approach. However, even with
consolidation, states are continuing to spend too much time preparing
the grant application and administering the program. GHSA surveyed
states on the process for FY 2013 Highway Safety Plans and found that
state applications averaged 127 pages, with some that were more than
200 pages. And this does not include the many pages of attachments that
were also required.
This process can be improved by:
Allowing the states to submit required attachments through
electronic links;
Clarifying that the required problem identification and data
analysis information should be written completely, but in a
brief format; and
Permitting the required project list to be submitted up to
60 days after the September 1 plan approval deadline.
Administrative burden needs to be reduced in both the Section 402
and Section 405 programs. As an example, even though funding for the
motorcycle safety incentive tier in Section 405 was significantly
reduced in MAP-21, the amount of paperwork and background material
required to qualify was significantly increased. At least a few states
determined that it was not a good use of their time to expend so much
effort for such a small grant program, so they decided to not even
apply for these funds. GHSA urges Congress to continue efforts to
simplify grant processes so states can spend as much time as possible
on programming.
For most states, the Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirement is
increasingly burdensome. The Association understands and fully supports
the need for a Federal MOE requirement to show proof that there is no
supplanting with Federal funds. However, it is also necessary to
acknowledge that many states continue to struggle economically.
Furthermore, it is impossible for the states to identify and track
local sources of expenditures. To remedy this, one approach could be to
establish a waiver period with specific criteria that states would have
to meet, and eliminate the requirement to maintain local expenditure
sources. GHSA recommends that Congress alter the current MOE
requirements in order to provide relief to economically distressed
states.
Improve Effectiveness of Safety Outcomes by Allowing Use of More Timely
Data
MAP-21 requires states to use the most recent final Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS) data to set performance targets in
highway safety plans. However, FARS data continues to be finalized very
slowly.
As states develop their highway safety plans, they are forced to
use Federal fatality data that may be outdated by as much as two years.
For instance, when states were working on their FY 2015 plans, the most
recent final Federal fatality data available was from calendar year
2012--despite the fact that 2013 state data is now available in many
states. To improve effectiveness of safety programs, states should be
given the option of using the most recent state or Federal data in
their highway safety plans. GHSA also urges NHTSA to continue its work
in improving the timeliness of FARS.
Restructure Section 405 National Priority Safety Program
MAP-21 created a consolidated incentive program in Section 405 that
covers six different areas: occupant protection, traffic records,
impaired driving, motorcyclist safety, distracted driving and state GDL
laws. It created tiers by designating a portion of the consolidated
program for each area. States receive funding for each tier by
satisfying rigorous eligibility criteria which require a significant
investment of time to provide the necessary information. GHSA supports
continuing the occupant protection and traffic records tiers. However,
Congress should make significant changes to tiers addressing impaired
driving, motorcyclist safety, distracted driving and graduated drivers
licensing. And the states should be given adequate time to react to any
changes made. This will allow them to work with their legislatures, and
others, to address incentive requirements.
Impaired Driving
Fifteen percent of the impaired driving incentive tier is earmarked
for states that adopt and enforce an ignition interlock law for all
persons convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. While
eighteen states have these laws for all offenders, only a handful of
states (four in FY 2014) qualified for these funds, as NHTSA has
disqualified states that grant rare exemptions for medical and work
issues. To address this, Congress should allow for state laws that
grant reasonable, rare exemptions and successfully require interlocks
for nearly all offenders.
Distracted Driving Grants
Eight-and-a-half percent of Section 405 funds are earmarked to
reward states with strong distracted driving laws. However, to qualify,
states must meet rigorous definitions and criteria, including laws with
minimum fines for first offense, increased fines for subsequent
offenses as well as a state statute requiring distracted driving issues
to be tested as part of the drivers license exam. The criteria are so
strict that even though 37 states are enforcing primary texting bans,
only one state qualified for this funding in FY 2014. To remedy this,
Congress should modify the definitions, simplify this program and
reward states that are enforcing primary texting bans for all drivers
and complete cell phone bans for novice drivers.
Motorcyclist Safety
One-and-a-half percent of the tier is earmarked for states that
adopt and implement effective programs to reduce the number of
motorcycle crashes. While the large majority of states qualify for this
funding, the funds can only be spent on motorcycle training and
awareness programs. NHTSA's National Agenda for Motorcycle Safety and a
recent General Accountability Office review of this issue both called
for a broader approach to motorcycle safety. This approach includes
licensing, education and training, protective gear, roadway safety,
public information programs on speeding and impairment, vehicle
improvements and share the road programs. Congress should change this
tier to allow for a more comprehensive approach to motorcycle safety.
Graduated Drivers Licensing (GDL)
The GDL tier should be completely reexamined, as no state qualified
in either FY 2013 or FY 2014. Every state has some form of a three-
stage GDL System. These laws have been widely credited for the dramatic
reduction in teen driving deaths over the last 15 years. States should
be rewarded for enacting and enforcing strong, research-based laws.
That's not the case with the current incentive.
V. Conclusion
GHSA members are committed every day to save lives and reduce
injuries on our Nation's highways and have contributed to the
substantial reduction in fatalities the country has experienced. This
reduction in fatalities did not happen on its own. It came about
because SHSOs analyzed their data and trends and responded to their
state's identified safety needs with appropriate and proven programs.
It's important to recognize that each state has different needs and
concerns. There is a danger in treating every state the same and this
is what is happening as more initiatives and programs are mandated by
Congress and agency regulations. To successfully continue to lower
fatalities and prevent injuries in our nation, states must have greater
flexibility in tackling the issues of greatest concern to them. As more
funds are being tied to specific issues, states could be mandated to
create a program for an issue that is minimal or doesn't exist in their
state. This diverts limited funding away from the real problems facing
a state and their communities.
Thank you for holding this hearing and for the opportunity to share
the Association's views before the Committee. GHSA looks forward to
working with the Committee on the next surface transportation
reauthorization.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Poole. Mr. Strassburger?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT STRASSBURGER, VICE PRESIDENT,
VEHICLE SAFETY AND HARMONIZATION,
ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS
Mr. Strassburger. Thank you, Chairman McCaskill, Ranking
Member Heller, and members of this Subcommittee.
As we have already heard this afternoon, the nation
continues to record declines in traffic fatalities. In fact,
driving has never been safer. Deaths have declined by 20
percent since 2007, and preliminary estimates by NHTSA and
others project continued declines in 2014. However, in an era
of limited resources, we have a difficult task ahead if we are
to ensure continued progress.
As this committee moves forward with the reauthorization of
NHTSA, we urge you to focus on those provisions that will
provide the greatest safety benefits. The Alliance has the
following recommendations.
First, approximately a third of traffic fatalities continue
to involve drunk drivers. We need to redouble our efforts to
reduce impaired driving. The Alliance supports making alcohol
ignition interlock grants more usable by states. The Alliance
also supports continued funding of research of advanced vehicle
integrated technology, known as DADSS, that holds promise to
significantly reduce drunk driving. And the Alliance supports
including resources for NHTSA to study the potential impacts of
legalizing marijuana on traffic safety and giving states
flexibility to use Federal grants to tackle this issue.
Second, according to NHTSA, more than 90 percent of all
crashes are a result of driver error. The future of vehicle
safety must include crash avoidance technologies that help to
avoid of mitigate crashes. There are about 20 different crash
avoidance technologies available on today's cars and trucks,
and more are coming.
Looking toward the future, cars that communicate wirelessly
with one another and the infrastructure may provide additional
crash avoidance opportunities. This committee can help realize
the promised crash avoidance technologies in several ways.
One, the Alliance urges this committee to use this
reauthorization to preserve the ability to use the 5.9
gigahertz radio frequency spectrum designated for vehicle-to-
vehicle communications unless and until rigorous testing shows
that auto safety will not be compromised if this spectrum is
shared.
Two, the Alliance also recommends that this committee
provide resources to help establish an ISAC for the auto sector
to exchange cyber threat information.
Three, the Alliance recommends that this committee fully
evaluate the model needed for creating and operating a robust
security certificate management system that is necessary for
the implementation of vehicle-to-vehicle communications.
And four, this committee can help to accelerate the
adoption of crash avoidance technologies by directing NHTSA to
provide fuel economy compliance credits when these technologies
are installed. Credits are a win for safety, for the
environment, and for consumers.
Finally, distracted driving remains a concern. Almost 18
months ago, NHTSA issued driver distraction design guidelines
for vehicle integrated systems. Similar guidance for handheld
smartphones are critical to avoid adverse traffic safety
consequences. The Alliance urges this committee to use this
reauthorization to make clear NHTSA's authority to regulate
portable handheld devices when used in motor vehicles.
In closing, reducing injuries and fatalities from auto
crashes is a significant public health challenge. We appreciate
the leadership shown by members of this subcommittee to address
these issues. We look forward to continuing to work with you to
make our roads the safest in the world.
Chairman McCaskill, Ranking Member Heller, and members of
the Subcommittee, I would be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Strassburger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle
Safety and Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
On behalf of the twelve automakers who are members of the Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance), thank you for this opportunity
to provide the Committee with an update on the state of motor vehicle
safety and our industry's thoughts on developing a reauthorization
proposal.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Alliance is a trade association of twelve car and light
truck manufacturers comprised of BMW Group, Chrysler Group LLC, Ford
Motor Company, General Motors Company, Jaguar Land Rover, Mazda,
Mercedes-Benz USA, Mitsubishi Motors, Porsche Cars, Toyota, Volkswagen
Group, and Volvo Cars. Together, Alliance members account for roughly
three out of every four new vehicles sold in the U.S. each year. Auto
manufacturing is a cornerstone of the U.S. economy, supporting eight
million private-sector jobs, $500 billion in annual compensation, and
$70 billion in personal income-tax revenues
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to recognize that this is the safest time in our
Nation's history in terms of motor vehicle safety. From 2007 to 2013,
traffic fatalities fell by 20 percent.\2\ Preliminary estimates
released last month by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) and the National Safety Council project
continued declines in 2014.\3\,\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Early Estimate of Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities for the
First Quarter of 2014,'' NHTSA, DOT HS 812 055 (August 2014)
\3\ Ibid.
\4\ ``Motor-vehicle deaths down 4 percent in first six months of
2014,'' National Safety Council (August 2014)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These are not just declines in the rate of traffic deaths (which is
measured per 100 million vehicle miles traveled), but more remarkably,
an absolute decline in the number of fatalities, even as the ``exposure
rate''--the number of Americans driving and vehicle miles driven--has
increased dramatically. Nearly 18,000 fewer people died in traffic
related crashes in 2012 than in 1980, even though there are
approximately twice as many licensed drivers driving about twice as
many vehicle miles as there were three decades ago.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Chart VMT 421-C,'' FHWA, Office of Highway Policy Statistics
(2012)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is another facet of this success story of which auto
manufacturers and the eight million Americans working in the auto
sector are justifiably proud--motor vehicle occupant deaths have
declined at a faster pace than the overall decline in traffic deaths.
In 2007, 70 percent of people killed in traffic crashes were in
passenger vehicles. By 2012, 65 percent were in passenger vehicles. At
the same time overall traffic deaths were declining by 19 percent,
deaths in passenger vehicles declined by 26 percent.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Analysis of ``Passenger Vehicle Occupant Fatalities: The
Decline for Six Years in a Row From 2005 to 2011,'' NHTSA, DOT HS 812
034 (June 2014) and ``Traffic Safety Facts 2012,'' NHTSA, DOT HS 812
032 (2014)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A recent study by NHTSA confirms that automakers deserve a
significant portion of the credit for the reduction of deaths and
serious injuries for occupants of motor vehicles. In an analysis of
fatal crashes in MY 1985 through MY 2012 vehicles, NHTSA found that
drivers of MY 1985--MY 1992 vehicles were 76 percent more likely to be
killed in a crash than drivers of MY 2008--MY 2012 vehicles.\7\
Similarly, drivers of MY 2003--MY 2007 vehicles were 20 percent more
likely to be killed in a crash than drivers of MY 2008--MY 2012
vehicles. These numbers represent dramatic improvements, but even so,
motor vehicle safety remains a top concern for all Alliance members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``How Vehicle Age and Model Year Relate to Driver Injury
Severity in Fatal Crashes,'' NHTSA, DOT HS 811 825 (August 2013)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More than 90 percent of all crashes are a result of driver error,
according to a recent NHTSA study of crash causation.\8\ Thus, if our
shared goal is to continue to reduce traffic fatalities and injuries,
we need to continue our efforts on ways to reduce driver error or
mitigate its effects. Moving forward, this is clearly the industry's
focus--one we hope is shared by NHTSA and the Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey; Report to
Congress,'' NHTSA DOT HS 811 059 (July 2008)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The future of vehicle safety is evolving to include ``crash
avoidance'' technology that helps prevent or mitigate crashes. Crash
avoidance systems employ sophisticated software to interpret data from
sensors, cameras, global positioning devices, and/or radar-based
technologies that allow vehicles to sense the environment around them.
Their features assist drivers to be aware of impending dangers, in some
cases even taking over for drivers to help avoid accidents. There are
about twenty different crash avoidance technologies available already
on today's vehicles, with more coming. Notably, all of these systems
are being initiated and developed by automakers and suppliers and
installed on vehicles--not as the result of government mandates.
Intervention technologies include electronic stability control and
anti-lock brakes that help the driver keep the vehicle under control.
These two technologies are present in nearly every new passenger car
sold in America. In addition to these systems, new technologies, such
as crash imminent braking and dynamic brake support, are being
introduced to assist drivers to avoid or mitigate crashes in emergency
situations. According to recent data compiled by the Highway Loss Data
Institute, vehicles that brake automatically are expected to offer
significant safety benefits.\9\ Drivers of vehicles with these systems
file 15-25 percent fewer property damage claims, and they are 33
percent less likely to file claims for crash injuries than the owners
of similar, but unequipped, vehicles.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Collision Avoidance Features: Initial Results,'' Matthew
Moore (Highway Loss Data Institute) and David Zuby (Insurance Institute
for Highway Safety), ESV Paper Number 13-0126
\10\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Warning technologies--including blind spot warnings, lane departure
warnings, cross traffic alerts, and forward collision warnings--provide
audio, visual or other sensory alerts to help drivers take corrective
action to avoid a crash. While drivers have the means to operate a
vehicle safely without these features, these systems provide early
warnings so that drivers can react to situations prior to a crisis or
emergency developing.
Active driver assistance technologies may include lane keeping
systems, adaptive cruise control, and automatic high beams. Drivers
decide when to activate these systems, which then may assist the driver
during routine driving tasks, provided road and environmental
conditions permit.
As we move into the future, continuing to develop and implement
crash avoidance beyond the constraints of a discrete vehicle by
developing infrastructure and vehicles that communicate with each other
has the potential to further enhance road safety. According to NHTSA,
when fully deployed, connected vehicle technology could potentially
address approximately 80 percent of crash scenarios involving non-
impaired drivers. Connected vehicles also may help to enhance or enable
a host of critical crash avoidance technologies.
The promise of a connected vehicle transportation system, however,
requires the successful resolution of a number of complex policy and
technical issues that will require unprecedented coordination between
the public and private sectors and among disparate Federal agencies for
such things as governance, funding, implementation, and enforcement.
Among the issues that Congress should be watching in this area are:
infrastructure for connected vehicle security networks; governance of
connected vehicle security certificates for safety; protection of
consumer privacy, including data ownership, for connected vehicle data
generation, transmission, and use (proper use and misuse); sustainable
funding for implementation, and ongoing operations, governance, and
maintenance of a connected vehicle infrastructure; international cross
border needs and agreements; liability risk and intellectual property
protection; and security licensing requirements.
Auto manufacturers are doing a great deal to usher in a new era in
motor vehicle safety. As you consider the next NHTSA reauthorization
bill, we recommend that the Committee focus on how the legislation can
help NHTSA and the industry continue to improve traffic safety. The
Alliance does not believe that increasing fines for the auto sector or
potentially criminalizing interactions between auto manufacturers,
suppliers and NHTSA will help make vehicles safer. Our overall record
and approach speaks to our commitment to traffic safety, and the
dramatic reduction in motor vehicle deaths confirms we are doing the
right things.
Earlier this year the Department of Justice announced a fine
against one automaker that vastly exceeded the civil penalty cap
authorized under Title 49, demonstrating that the government already
has adequate authority to address situations where it feels larger
penalties are appropriate. We believe it a much more useful exercise to
focus efforts on public policies that are critical to the broader
safety goal of reducing driver errors that lead to fatal crashes on our
Nation's roads.
There are several things we believe that Congress can do to help
expand auto safety.
First, protecting the radio frequency spectrum reserved for
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communications is critical. With the recent release of its ANPRM for
V2V systems, the DOT has initiated rulemaking to require the industry
to develop and implement these systems. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) is proposing to open the 5.9 GHz band of spectrum to
unlicensed users. To support the mission of reducing traffic
fatalities, the FCC should adopt a ``do-no-harm'' policy of preserving
this band of spectrum for V2V use unless and until rigorous testing has
shown that auto safety potential will not be compromised.
The Alliance believes that the potential exists to achieve a good
public policy outcome both for vehicle safety and for expanded wireless
access; however, the requisite interference testing must be completed,
and any outstanding issues must be resolved before a final rule is
issued by the FCC. We encourage this Committee--which has jurisdiction
over both agencies--to use the reauthorization to make very clear where
it stands on this critical public safety issue.
Second, there needs to be renewed focus on reducing impaired
driving and support of enhanced enforcement efforts. Impairment is a
leading cause of driver error, and by far the leading cause of fatal
crashes. Eliminating impaired driving would significantly help to
reduce the number of people who die on our roads each year. For years,
our primary focus--for obvious reasons--has been on reducing the number
of alcohol-related crashes. The Alliance supports section 103 of S.
2760, which would make alcohol interlock grants more usable by states.
In addition, Alliance members have been working in partnership with
NHTSA to research advanced in-vehicle technology (a program called
``DADSS'')--that holds promise to help greatly reduce drunk driving.
The Alliance appreciates the leadership role taken by this Committee in
the last reauthorization to support this effort.
Looking ahead, we are concerned that the recent move by some states
to legalize marijuana may open new challenges in the fight to stem
impaired driving. We feel that any reauthorization should include
resources for NHTSA to study this emerging issue and explicit
additional flexibility for states to use Federal safety grants to
tackle this issue prior to the next reauthorization cycle.
Third, we urge you to continue to focus on distracted driving. As
you are aware, NHTSA is only one-third of the way through its proposed
strategy to address sources of distraction in motor vehicles. Almost 18
months ago, NHTSA published guidelines for in-vehicle systems, based on
similar guidelines developed by Alliance members a decade ago. The
Agency's stated next step is to develop similar guidelines for portable
devices, such as smartphones and portable navigation systems, when they
are used by drivers. Failing to develop such complementary guidelines
could have significant adverse safety consequences because it likely
will incentivize drivers to use unregulated, hand-held devices rather
than more limited, hands-free in-vehicle systems.
One reason for the apparent delay in progress on portable device
guidelines is the question over NHTSA's authority to regulate such
devices, even when used in vehicles. Former Administrator Strickland
has said that the Agency has that authority, and we agree. The DOT
requested that Congress further clarify the Department's authority in
Section 4105 of the reauthorization proposal it submitted to Congress.
We encourage the Committee to provide the requested clarification or
otherwise clearly delineate the Agency's authority to carry out this
important task. We live in a world where smart phones and other
portable devices are far more ubiquitous than in-vehicle systems, and
policies should be developed to address this key factor of the
distracted driving problem.
Fourth, we encourage the Committee to set aside some resources to
help address the growing need for cybersecurity measures in the auto
sector. The implementation of advanced computer systems has resulted in
significant improvements to vehicle safety and the overall driving
experience; however, it also raises our awareness that bad actors could
try to hack into vehicle systems. The industry as a whole has
demonstrated its clear intent to address possible future threats.
Recently, the Alliance and Global Automakers announced that we are
jointly investigating the development of a cyber-threat information-
sharing platform, such as an Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(ISAC), which further demonstrates our members' collective and
proactive approach. Setting up a properly functioning ISAC or other
comparable program is a significant undertaking, as evidenced by the
recent announcements by the aviation and oil and gas industries. Those
industries are expected to stand up their ISACs later this year after a
thorough 12-18 month process. Historically, the Federal Government has
provided seed money in partnership with the private sector to help
jump-start the process and in recognition that protecting against
cyber-attack is a shared responsibility and a public good.
In the coming years, NHTSA and the auto sector will also have to
ensure that safety critical applications, such as V2V communications,
are secure, particularly given that those systems depend on
transmission and receipt of data outside the vehicle. A properly
functioning V2V system will require a robust security certificate
management system (SCMS). NHTSA's research report has indicated that
the initial costs of setting up a SCMS just for V2V will run into the
tens of millions of dollars. The SMCS in effect will function as a
highway version of an air traffic control system. An SCMS that
additionally comprehends wireless connections between vehicles and
infrastructure, as well as between vehicles and other devices, will
require a much larger SCMS that will have to manage a significantly
more complex security space. As such, it will cost even more and
require more oversight. Given that the potential societal benefits will
be to public roads, the funding model and rule structure for creating
and operating the SCMS should be fully evaluated.
Finally, we encourage the Committee to accelerate the proliferation
of crash avoidance technologies in the new car fleet by directing NHTSA
to provide fuel economy compliance credits for the installation of
these technologies. In a recent white paper, NHTSA noted that ``Vehicle
control systems that automatically accelerate and brake with the flow
of traffic can conserve fuel more efficiently than the average driver.
By eliminating a large number of vehicle crashes, highly effective
crash avoidance technologies can reduce fuel consumption by also
eliminating the traffic congestion that crashes cause every day on our
roads.'' \11\ The Federal Highway Administration estimates that 25
percent of congestion is attributable to traffic incidents, around half
of which are crashes.\12\ The addition of crash avoidance technologies
has the potential to reduce crashes, which will in turn reduce
congestion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (May 30, 2013)
Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles.
Washington, D.C.
\12\ Federal Highway Administration (2005). Traffic Congestion and
Reliability: Linking Solutions to Problems. Washington, D.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NHTSA should be directed to estimate potential fuel savings of
crash avoidance technologies and to incorporate equivalent credits into
manufacturers' fuel economy compliance. The credits are a win for
safety, for the environment, and for consumers, who will see the
proliferation of such systems sooner and at a lower price point, if
installing them helps to offset the costs of fuel economy compliance.
The Alliance believes that the future of driving safety is very
bright, and with the right public policies in place, industry and
government can work together to continue the reduction in fatalities
and serious injuries that we have been seeing. Getting there will
require many pieces of a complex policy puzzle to fit together in
addition to the technological advancements the industry is making.
Working together, we can make this vision reality.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much. Let me begin. I
assume, Mr. Poole, you--since you referenced it in your
testimony--you've looked at the Inspector General's report that
just came out a few weeks ago.
I was surprised that there was a half a billion dollars of
highway safety funds that have been allocated to states that
had not yet been expended, that, during the same period of
time, $4.2 billion in funds had been allocated to those
programs, meaning that we've got 13 percent of the money over a
six year period not being spent.
That represents, at worst, a lost opportunity to fund
programs or a delayed opportunity, which is also problematic.
Why--can you explain why states are leaving this money on the
table and why this money is not getting expended?
Mr. Poole. Yes, Senator. There are delays in funding,
particularly when we have MAP-21 where the funding comes to us
in increments. Sometimes, it's as late as 10 or 11 months into
the fiscal year before we receive that money. That is what we
call carry forward funding, and the carry forward funding can
be attributed to the next year when we receive it late in that
Federal fiscal year.
In addition to that, there is transfer monies that are
available to the states, for instance, through Section 154 or
164, that are generally split with the state engineering or
state safety offices, and those projects for the hazard
elimination projects also show up as carry forward money when,
obviously, that is a construction issue. It takes a little
longer to get that money out on their side. But it's the delays
in funding, Senator, that cause us to carry forward money.
I'll use an example from the State of Tennessee. Because we
received money so late this past Federal fiscal year under MAP-
21, we have a carry forward of $3 million that we will be
utilizing for Fiscal Year 2015 just in the Behavioral Grant
Programs.
Senator McCaskill. So you're using last year's money this
year, and you're using this month's--this year's money next
year, and next year's money the following year?
Mr. Poole. Sometimes that does happen, yes. When we have
late funding that comes in, we have to get that programmed out.
Senator McCaskill. So and I assume when the money is late,
you inquire why the money is late. Is this a problem with
Washington, that they're just not getting their job done
quickly enough?
Mr. Poole. Our membership does view it that way. When we--
when MAP-21 has a Continuing Resolution and the funding comes
incrementally, we have projects that have to be fully funded
before they're implemented.
Senator McCaskill. Before you can begin them.
Mr. Poole. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. OK. Let me ask you, Mr. Strassburger,
last year I held a legislative hearing on Senate Bill 921, the
Raechel and Jacqueline Houck Safe Rental Car Bill introduced by
Senator Schumer, Senator Boxer, myself and others.
The bill has the support of many safety advocates and the
rental car industry. However, at the hearing, your president
and CEO, Mitch Bainwol, testified that your organization
opposed the bill, because it potentially affected loss of
liability use for your member companies.
Since then, there have been two key developments. First,
General Motors has agreed to support the bill, one of your
largest member companies, and second, Senators Schumer, Boxer,
and I have reintroduced our bill with a provision that
explicitly states that the bill will have no effect on any
state liability issue.
So given these developments, can we expect you to weigh in
with the endorsement of the Auto Alliance momentarily?
Mr. Strassburger. Senator, when a vehicle is recalled, we
want that vehicle repaired as quickly as possible, and to do
that, we think that all customers need to be treated equally
and fairly. And at the present time, we have not seen that--
such in the legislation that we've seen.
We are fully committed to working with this committee and--
--
Senator McCaskill. How are they not being treated equally
and fairly? Could you articulate that for the Committee?
Mr. Strassburger. I'm sorry, repeat that, please.
Senator McCaskill. How are they not being treated equally
and fairly? What is the unfairness or the lack of equality that
you think is embraced by this legislation?
Mr. Strassburger. We don't think the current draft of the
legislation, either as introduced or the more recent language--
we appreciate the effort----
Senator McCaskill. Let's stick with the recent language,
since we've improved to try to address your concerns.
Mr. Strassburger. OK. And we appreciate the efforts to try
to address our concerns. Our members don't feel that they have
been addressed. We still think there's disproportionate
treatment, and we are committed to working with this committee
to resolve all of the concerns of all of the stakeholders in
fact----
Senator McCaskill. I need to know what disproportionate
means. Who's getting treated better, and who's getting treated
worse? You're saying it's unequal. I need you to articulate
what the--what inequality it is that you're referring to.
Mr. Strassburger. I think at the moment, the way it's
structured, the--our understanding is that there is no
intention by anybody involved to disturb or change the
relationship between the manufacturer and the rental car
company.
We think the language, the newest language, while
attempting to try to preserve that relationship, doesn't go far
enough yet.
Senator McCaskill. OK. You're still--I don't--I'm not
following you. Is there something you're afraid to say or--I
mean, what is the--can you--the fact that it doesn't go far
enough, what is it--what would you like it to say?
Mr. Strassburger. We still think that it creates
disproportionate treatment, that it strives--that it gets
involved in the relationship with the vehicle manufacturer and
the rental car company. If we have a balanced language there
that doesn't do that, that preserves the relationship of those
two parties, which we understand is the intent of everybody
involved, then that is legislation that we would support.
Senator McCaskill. OK. Have you offered language that you
think would fix that?
Mr. Strassburger. I believe--let me take that back. If we
have not, then we will certainly do that.
Senator McCaskill. Be great to get it by Friday.
Mr. Strassburger. OK.
Senator McCaskill. I mean, I'm confused at--you know,
General Motors has now signed off, the rental car companies
have now signed off. Clearly, this is a safety issue, and with
all of the discussion about safety of vehicles on the road
right now, I think the remaining manufacturers that are holding
out on this bill are doing a great disservice to the driving
public. And it's time for you to come with language that you
think would address the problem and protect the manufacturers
instead of just throwing up roadblocks to everything we try to
do. It's frustrating.
So I'll look forward to hearing from the manufacturers,
other than GM, which has--and let's hope that it doesn't take a
crisis in these other companies to get them to come along,
because, you know, obviously, General Motors took another view
of this after they were confronted with an incredible public
relations crisis in terms of the safety of their cars. I would
hope it wouldn't take that for the other manufacturers to get
them to be willing to address what is a serious safety concern
for the driving public that is renting cars.
And finally, Ms. Gillan, the Justice Department recently
settled a criminal lawsuit with Toyota. I think it's important
to remember this was a criminal lawsuit. They paid $1.2 billion
in connection with a criminal prosecution.
Doesn't it make more sense to deter companies from
withholding safety information from NHTSA by providing NHTSA
with better criminal penalty authority and with bigger civil
penalty stick rather than with the acrobatics of a DOJ
settlement for wire fraud? I mean, it appears to me they used a
criminal prosecution to get to the place where they could have
a meaningful fine for the level of misconduct that was
discovered around the Toyota problem.
Wouldn't we deter more effectively if all manufacturers saw
the possibility of higher fines and criminal prosecutions at
the level of a NHTSA enforcement?
Ms. Gillan. Ah, absolutely, Senator McCaskill. The safety
community strongly supports criminal penalties. Other
regulatory agencies have the ability. It doesn't make sense to
have to go to the Justice Department and have them find some
other avenue to impose that.
We also support the provision to completely eliminate the
cap on civil penalties. We want NHTSA to be a watchdog and to
carry a big club. We've got to give them the enforcement
authority to do that. And I was surprised when I looked at the
auto industry's testimony that they want to keep the $35
million cap as well as not impose any additional penalties.
In light of all of these defects and both Toyota and now,
GM, and every day there's a new revelation--why we wouldn't
want to go ahead and give the Agency the authority to impose
criminal penalties.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you for being here.
And let me just say--I didn't say it during the last panel--
that one of the very sobering factual backgrounds for this
hearing is the news released yesterday by Ken Feinberg that, in
fact, he has found 19 deaths, which is far higher than the 13
the company has acknowledged, as a result of a defect that GM
concealed. And that is only his first report. The eventual
number is likely to be multiples of the 13 that the company
acknowledged.
So that's a very chilling reminder that this issue has life
and death consequences for Americans. We're not talking about
abstractions. We're talking about real impacts on real people's
lives.
And so let me ask you, Ms. Gillan, I know you mentioned the
issue of resources in your testimony, do you think that NHTSA
is devoting its resources properly, and do you think it should
have more resources?
Ms. Gillan. Senator, this has been an issue that the safety
community has been concerned about, particularly Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety.
Right now, 94 percent of all transportation related
fatalities and 99 percent of all transportation related
injuries occur as a result of motor vehicle crashes, but NHTSA
has 1 percent--only 1 percent--of the entire DOT budget.
Now, granted, money may not be the complete answer, and I
think that there are a lot of changes that the agency needs,
but we're not giving them the resources to do the job. Senator
McCaskill mentioned the Office of Defects Investigation has
been flatline budgeted at $10 million.
In my statement, I talk about their budget. If you look
back a decade, their operations and budgets experienced a 9
percent decrease in the last decade, and yet, there has been
over 23 percent growth in the number of cars on the road.
I think that the public wants this agency to have the
resources that they need, and I think it's very frightening for
all of us when we read about these safety defects which seem to
be occurring on a daily basis.
Senator Blumenthal. Do you agree, Mr. Strassburger?
Mr. Strassburger. The Alliance has historically said that
the Agency should be adequately resourced, both in staff----
Senator Blumenthal. You think it needs more resources?
Mr. Strassburger. Let me say, again, that we have said that
the agency should be adequately resourced, both dollar wise and
staffing wise, etc. Beyond that, I think we don't have the data
to say that they need X number of staff versus another. That
is----
Senator Blumenthal. Well, you've just heard Ms. Gillan, and
you're familiar with the agency's systematic record of failure,
which is attributed, at least in part, to lack of resources.
Isn't that pretty compelling evidence that the current level is
inadequate and therefore, that your position that it should be
adequately staffed should lead you to say more resources--many
more resources--are necessary.
Mr. Strassburger. I don't have sufficient data. For
example, how--the staffing report that's in abeyance that's
been recommended by the IG, etc., without that kind of date,
I'm not in a position to say it should have X number of staff
versus Y.
What we have said repeatedly and consistently is that this
agency should be adequately resourced, both staffing and dollar
wise. And beyond that, the data is in your hands to determine
how those--what those resources are and how they should be
allocated.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me switch topics slightly. On the
issue of car safety, a number of you have talked about aspects
of car defects, drunk driving, and distracted driving.
I want to raise the issue of cars that essentially provide
dangers to children, because they may be left in those cars.
Young children, when they are left in cars, can succumb to
hypothermia or heat stroke. There have been a number of
incidents in Connecticut just this summer. There is a surge,
apparently, nationwide in the number of, in quotes, ``hot
car,'' deaths or injuries resulting from careless or neglectful
parents or caregivers, and many involve parents who simply
forgot about their child in the back seat.
We had a very tragic instance in Connecticut--without
attributing blame, because there hasn't been a finding yet
officially. Benjamin Seitz, a young child, died in a car in
Connecticut.
But one of the solutions that's been proposed is that NHTSA
or DOT consider requiring that car seats alert drivers that a
child is present if they are left in the car without anyone
present. That kind of warning would be similar to the
requirement for backup cameras that will warn that a driver is
going to run over a child.
Whether it's that solution or another, I'd like to ask the
panel, and perhaps I should do it in writing, because we're--
I'm over my time, but whether you have any views as to what can
be done to prevent this kind of tragic instance, which may not
be, in number, comparable to the frequency of defective car
deaths of injuries, but certainly, whenever it occurs, it is a
searing and horrific loss for a family.
Ms. Gillan?
Ms. Gillan. Senator, first of all, I want to say, I am not
an engineer, but I'm married to an engineer. I will tell you
that, just as with rearview cameras, at first the response was
to educate parents to look behind the car--and that wasn't
going to solve the problem.
And it took legislation passed out of this committee, the
Cameron Gulbransen Act, of setting a deadline for NHTSA to act,
which they just did and issued that final rule this year
requiring rearview cameras. That is really the solution to
saving children.
We can educate parents, but we can't rely on education
alone. And it's really important. The development of sensor
technology is increasing yearly. We have sensors that tell us
we forgot our keys. We have sensors that remind us that our
lights were left on. And I firmly believe that we can solve
this problem through technology.
This committee had hearings years ago about distracted
driving. We now see that technology is probably our best answer
to preventing people from texting and other distractions. And
so we firmly believe and support a requirement that NHTSA move
forward and look at a technological solution.
Senator Blumenthal. My time is up, but I might just note as
a footnote or maybe a bookmark into this conversation that
NHTSA is late issuing the rule on rearview visibility and yet
another example of a gap in meeting the needs of car safety.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. I just have one question
before we adjourn the hearing. Ms. Gillan, is it true that
deaths and serious injuries from distracted driving, driving
while texting, driving while trying to do a Facebook post using
a handheld device while you're driving, has now gone above
driving while impaired due to alcohol in terms of safety risks
on the highway?
Ms. Gillan. No. About a third of all traffic fatalities
involve alcohol. And the Department of Transportation's
estimate on distracted driving is about, I believe, 4,000
deaths a year.
The comparison with alcohol is that when you take your eyes
off the road it is impairment and when you're trying to text
and talk on the phone, it's a cognitive distraction. So I think
that's where the two are compared.
But clearly it's a serious problem with the issue of
distraction as well as impaired driving. And those are issues
that we still, in the next reauthorization bill, need to
continue to look for opportunities to bring those deaths down.
Senator McCaskill. I agree. I want to thank all three of
you for being here today. I appreciate it very much. Sorry to
put you on the spot, Mr. Strassburger, but that's the nature of
the beast. If I don't put you on the spot, we'll never get to a
place we can get this bill passed, and I want to get this bill
passed. We're going to get this bill passed with you or without
you. I'd rather be with you.
Mr. Strassburger. I appreciate your willingness to work
with us.
Ms. Gillan. Senator McCaskill, before you close the
hearing, I wanted to know if we could submit some documents to
the hearing record. I know there was a lot of discussion with
the first panel about this issue of the agency needing to find
a trend, and there has been a lot of debate about this in the
Department of Transportation.
NHTSA's former general counsel during the 1970s issued an
enforcement memo on the ``per se'' theory that I think is
really important to address. You do not need a trend to
identify a defect.
Senator McCaskill. Absolutely. We would welcome those
additions to the record, and if any of the other witnesses have
additions you would--they would like to put in the record, we
would welcome those.
[Ms. Gillan submitted the following:]
Attachment C--NHTSA Chief Counsel Berndt Per Se Defect Policy
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Gillan. Thank you very much.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
David J. Friedman
Question 1. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act
(MAP-21) required the agency to issue a number of new safety
regulations, many of which are far behind schedule and have missed
statutory deadlines. Attachments included with Ms. Gillan's testimony
on behalf of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety detail these
mandates (``NHTSA Overdue & At-Risk Safety Regulations'' on page 23 and
``MAP-21 Motorcoach Safety Action Items and Schedule'' on pages 24-26).
For each regulation outlined in Ms. Gillan's testimony, please
provide a status update, including an anticipated date of completion.
Answer. At NHTSA, the safety of the motoring public is our top
priority, and we work to allocate our resources strategically to ensure
the maximum focus on saving lives. NHTSA is working diligently to
implement the various motor vehicle and highway safety improvements
contained in MAP-21, as well as other rulemaking, enforcement, vehicle
research, and highway safety activities that significantly reduce
highway injuries and deaths. For example, in 2013, NHTSA issued two
final rules that fulfill MAP-21 mandates to improve motor vehicle
safety. One rule requires seatbelts on motorcoaches, and the other
requires all major automakers and motorcycle manufacturers to provide
consumers with online access to vehicle recall information that is
searchable by the vehicle identification number. NHTSA also recently
issued two notices of proposed rulemaking in response to MAP-21
mandates. One notice proposes to establish improved roof and roof
support standards for motorcoaches to prevent injuries in rollover
crashes, and the other notice proposes upgrades to the Federal motor
vehicle safety standard for child-restraint systems to ensure child
passengers are protected in side crashes. In addition to the rulemaking
activities responsive to MAP-21, NHTSA has also completed several
important activities in the past two years. Just a few examples of
these include releasing guidelines to minimize in-vehicle distractions,
proposing new minimum sound requirements for hybrid and electric
vehicles, and completing a rule to significantly reduce the risk of
fatalities and serious injuries caused by backover accidents by
requiring rear visibility technology in all new passenger vehicles.
Finally, NHTSA continues to look towards the future. Earlier this year
we announced the decision to move forward with vehicle-to-vehicle
communication technology for passenger vehicles followed by the
publication of an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in August. The
following table provides the status of the MAP-21 requirements outlined
in Ms. Gillan's testimony:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAP-21 Section Requirement Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
31203 Civil Final rule by 1 year In a February 6th letter,
penalties after date of Secretary Foxx informed
enactment (10/1/2013). Congress that we would not
Date extended to 1/31/ meet the deadline for this
2015. final rule and established
a new deadline of January
31, 2015 as provided by MAP-
21 Section 31505.
Currently, NHTSA is working
towards issuing a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
in 2015 and plans to notify
Congress of a new deadline
for the final rule as soon
as possible. Note: This
rule concerns penalty
assessment criteria. MAP-21
allowed the agency to
employ the new maximum
civil penalty amounts after
one year even if this
rulemaking was not
complete. We have exercised
that authority and imposed
the maximum allowable $35
million dollar fine as
appropriate.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
31402 Electronic Complete an examination On October 7th, NHTSA
systems of the need for safety published a Request for
performance standards by 2 years Comments on automotive
after date of electronic control systems
enactment (10/1/2014). safety and security in the
Upon completion of the Federal Register. The
examination, including Request for Comments
public comment, the presents the agency's
Secretary shall submit progress in conducting the
a report to Congress. examination. We illustrate
how we conducted the
examination in each of the
areas in section 31402 and
seek public comment on that
examination. We intend to
incorporate the comments
received in our report to
Congress identifying the
need for safety standards.
We expect to submit the
report to Congress in 2015.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
31502 Child Initiate rulemaking by NHTSA expects to issue an
restraint 1 year after date of NPRM in early 2015. NHTSA
anchorage enactment (10/1/2013). will determine a schedule
systems Final rule or Report for the final rule after
to Congress describing publishing the NPRM and
why the Secretary is reviewing public comments
not issuing a final on the proposal.
rule by 3 years after
date of enactment (10/
1/2015).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(a) Safety Final rule by 1 year Complete. Final rule
belts after date of requiring seatbelts on
enactment (10/1/2013). motorcoaches issued in
November 2013.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(b)(1) Roof Final rule by 2 years On July 30, NHTSA issued an
strength and after date of NPRM to set requirements
crush resistance enactment if the for motorcoach structural
Secretary determines integrity during rollovers.
that such standards The comment period for this
meet the requirements proposal ended October 6,
and considerations set and NHTSA will set a
forth in the Vehicle schedule for the final rule
Safety Act (10/1/ after analyzing the public
2014). comments.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(b)(2) Anti- Final rule by 2 years NHTSA is currently drafting
ejection safety after date of a proposal and expects to
countermeasures enactment if the issue an NPRM in 2015.
Secretary determines
that such standards
meet the requirements
and considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act (10/1/
2014).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(b)(3) Final rule by 2 years NHTSA issued an NPRM in
Rollover crash after date of 2012. NHTSA is working on
avoidance enactment if the the final rule and expects
Secretary determines to publish the final rule
that such standards in early 2015.
meet the requirements
and considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act (10/1/
2014).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(c) Final rule by 3 years NHTSA is currently
Commercial motor after date of determining the most
vehicle tire enactment if the appropriate next steps.
pressure Secretary determines
monitoring that such standards
systems meet the requirements
and considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act (10/1/
2015).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(d) Tire Final rule or Report to In 2013, NHTSA issued a
performance Congress describing supplemental NPRM to
standard why the Secretary is upgrade the safety standard
not issuing a final for new pneumatic tires for
rule by 3 years after motor vehicles with a Gross
date of enactment (10/ Vehicle Weight Rating of
1/2015). over 10,000 pounds, such as
motorcoaches, and we intend
to meet the statutory
deadline.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(e)(2) Report to Congress by 2 NHTSA expects to submit a
Retrofit for years after date of report to Congress on
existing enactment (10/1/2014). seatbelt retrofit in 2015.
motorcoaches The report to Congress on
anti-ejection safety
countermeasure retrofits is
contingent upon completion
of the final rule under
Section 32703(b)(2) above.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32704 Fire Final rule by 3 years NHTSA expects to complete
prevention and after date of the research by the end of
mitigation enactment of this Act this year and will then
if the Secretary determine appropriate next
determines that such steps.
standards meet the
requirements and
considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act (10/1/
2015).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32705 Occupant Complete research and NHTSA research is ongoing,
protection, testing by 3 years and we will determine
collision after date of appropriate agency actions
avoidance, fire enactment (10/1/2015). upon the completion of the
causation and Final rule by 2 years required research and
fire after completion of testing.
extinguisher each research and
research & testing initiative if
testing the Secretary
determines that such
standards meet the
requirements and
considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attachment--Items for the Record
David J. Friedman, Deputy Administrator
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation
1. Subpoena power
Senator McCaskill. How many times have you been to court for
someone to answer a question?
Mr. Friedman. I don't know that we've done that in the last--
certainly 20 or 30 years, because we haven't had to, and I think that's
the power of what we do. We put the companies in a position where they
understand, if they fail to answer those questions, there will be
consequences, and so they provide us with the answers. I consider that
a very important tool that we're able to get those answers, rather than
have to be tied up in court before they will give them to us.
RESPONSE: NHTSA's authority to compel manufacturers to provide
information is provided in 49 U.S.C. Sec. 30166. NHTSA routinely
compels manufacturers to answer questions under penalty of law. While
NHTSA has not issued a demand styled as a ``subpoena'' to a
manufacturer in a defect investigation in the last twenty years, NHTSA
regularly invokes 49 U.S.C. Sec. 30166(e) by issuing ``information
requests.'' NHTSA also invokes 49 U.S.C. Sec. 30166(g)(1) to issue a
special order to compel witnesses or entities to appear or produce
answers or records regardless of whether the recipient may have
violated the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. A manufacturer is subject to
substantial penalties if it fails to respond to the agency's requests
for information or respond truthfully under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 30166(e) and
(g)(1). See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 30165(a)(3) and (a)(4). Since the 1990s and
without having to go to court, NHTSA has in fact obtained civil
penalties from the following manufacturers for failing to respond
completely and truthfully to NHTSA's information requests:
GM in 2014: $441,000;
Piaggio in 2009: $100,000;
Grote Manufacturing in 1999: $32,000;
Ford in 1999: $425,000;
Mack Truck in 1990: $1,000.
Information requests or special orders provide the agency with
broader authority than subpoenas as they can compel manufacturers to
provide answers to written questions in addition to compelling
appearance or providing documents, records, or things.
2. TSB deadline
Senator Blumenthal. . . . MAP-21 required NHTSA to make those
bulletins available on its website searchable by the public by 2013. As
of May, they're still not on the website. Can you tell me why, and can
you commit to me when NHTSA will meet that deadline--it's already
missed the deadline--when it will have them available? Well, can you
commit to me when you will complete that task? You've missed the
deadline. When will it be done?
Mr. Friedman. We're working to target, I believe, in the next six
months to try to get that information up there, but I can get you a
more solid date.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I would like a more solid date.
RESPONSE: MAP-21 Section 31303 requires a manufacturer to give
copies of communications with dealers and owners about a defect or
noncompliance with a motor vehicle safety standard and an index of
those communications to NHTSA. MAP-21 also requires NHTSA to make these
available on a publicly accessible Internet website. While MAP-21 does
not specify a deadline for these requirements, NHTSA is preparing to
compel the indexes from manufacturers, and intends to make sure this
information is searchable from those indexes and available to the
public within 6 months.
3. NYT article inaccuracies
Senator Blumenthal. . . . I'd also appreciate any contention in
detail that you have disputing the New York Times story. You said it
was wrong in numerous respects, but I'd like something in writing from
you that we can put in the record if you feel, in fact, it was in error
in any way.
Mr. Friedman. I'd be happy to do so.
RESPONSE: The New York Times article, ``Regulator Slow to Respond
to Deadly Vehicle Defects'' (September 15, 2014), inaccurately
discussed the following issues:
NCAP
The New York Times article falsely characterizes the New Car
Assessment Program (NCAP) as a misuse of agency resources. The
New York Times article shows little knowledge and understanding
of the origins and evolution of NCAP. NCAP is an effective
program for generating and providing information that enables
consumers to identify top performing products and thereby
inducing the manufacturers of those products to compete with
one another in improving their safety performance to meet
consumer demand.
NHTSA established NCAP in response to Congress' enactment of
the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act of 1972.
Title II of the Cost Savings Act requires the Secretary to
maintain a program for developing the following
information on passenger motor vehicles:
. . .
(2) crashworthiness, crash avoidance, and any other
areas the Secretary determines will improve the safety
of passenger motor vehicles.
and to provide that information to consumers.
The rationale for generating and disclosing product information
was well described by former OIRA Administrator Cass Sunstein
in a June 18, 2010 memorandum to the heads of executive
departments and agencies:
Sometimes Congress requires or authorizes agencies to
impose disclosure requirements instead of, or in
addition to, mandates, subsidies, or bans. For example,
automobile companies are required by law to disclose
miles per gallon (MPG) ratings for new vehicles, and a
standardized Nutrition Facts panel must be included on
most food packages. The goal of disclosing such
information is to provide members of the public with
relevant information at the right moment in time,
usually when a decision is made.
Administrator Sunstein amplified his comments in a September 8,
2011 memorandum entitled ``Informing Consumers by Smart
Disclosure.''
Under the leadership of then NHTSA Administrator Joan
Claybrook, model year 1979 vehicles were the first vehicles
tested and rated for NCAP. After the Senate and Conference
Appropriations Reports for Fiscal Year 1992 requested that
NHTSA improve its methods of informing consumers about NCAP
results, the agency established the five-star rating system,
which was first used for MY 1994 vehicles.
To ensure that consumers shopping for new motor vehicles have
easy access to the safety ratings, Congress enacted legislation
(``Stars on Cars'') in 2005 amending the Automobile Information
Disclosure Act to require that motor vehicle manufacturers
place the safety ratings on the ``Monroney'' price sticker on
each new vehicle.
Other countries and regions have followed NHTSA's example.
There are now NCAP programs in Latin America, the European
Union, China, Japan, Korea, the ASEAN countries and Australia.
In addition, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety began
its program for generating and disseminating safety ratings in
the mid-1990s.
The article also incorrectly implies that the ratings from the
NCAP program are not useful indicators of safety, but rather
that the ratings are only a marketing tool for manufacturers.
In actuality, the NCAP ratings have enabled consumers to push
automakers to improve vehicle safety features. NHTSA
periodically updates NCAP, pushing the bar for high ratings
even higher most recently in model year 2011. The agency made
frontal and side crash ratings criteria more stringent by
upgrading test dummies, establishing new injury criteria,
adding a new side pole crash test, and creating a single
overall vehicle score that reflects a vehicle's combined
frontal crash, side crash, and rollover ratings. The MY 2011
upgrade also added recommended crash avoidance technologies to
the NCAP program. This upgrade indicates to consumers which
vehicles have recommended advanced technology features and
which do not so they can more easily find vehicles with the
increased levels of safety they prefer. This year NHTSA has
added rear visibility cameras as a recommended advanced
technology.
In the first year of the more stringent program, fewer than 20
percent of vehicles received the top level of 5 stars in the
overall safety rating. By MY 2014, over 60 percent of vehicles
received 5 stars in the overall safety rating. In other words,
manufacturers have quickly improved their vehicle designs in
response to the more stringent tests, providing extra margins
of safety beyond what is required in several important areas.
Along with NHTSA's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and
efforts to reduce dangerous driving behaviors, these consumer-
information-driven vehicle safety improvements have helped the
motor vehicle fatality rate in the United States to reach
record lows.
Finally, the article incorrectly claims that ``the agency
spend[s] about as much money rating new cars--a favorite
marketing tool for automakers--as it does investigating
potentially deadly manufacturing defects''.
NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) has a budget of
$17 million--nearly 60 percent higher than the NCAP budget of
$10.6 million when all resources are accounted for (i.e., both
the contract dollars and the money to pay staff). Human capital
is key to NHTSA's success and ODI has 10 times the staff as
NCAP--51 employees in ODI but only five employees in NCAP. The
NCAP budget is primarily used to purchase and test new vehicles
to help push automakers to produce vehicles that provide better
protection in a crash.
Defects Investigation Budget
The article says that ``[t]he agency's budget for safety
defects investigation has hovered around 1 percent of its total
budget for each of the last 6 years.'' This statement is very
misleading.
The relevant number is seven (7) percent. Of NHTSA's $819
million budget in Fiscal Year 2014, by statute, $561.5 million
of funds is provided directly to states as grants for their own
highway safety programs. Of the remaining $257.5 million, which
is under the direct control of NHTSA, the safety defects budget
stands at seven (7) percent, including both safety defects
program expenses as well as defects investigation staff
salaries and benefits.
Stalling
Throughout the New York Times article, stalling issues and
complaints of stalling issues are depicted as being a direct
result of ignition switch problems. (``. . . the agency had
received more than 5,000 complaints about the ignition
problems, including more than 2,000 about unexpected stalling .
. .'')
A gross count, such as the one employed by the New York Times,
misleads readers to believe that all 5,000 ignition complaints
were related to unintended key rotation and 2,000 complaints
were related to stalling as a result of unintended ignition key
rotation.
An analysis of over 470,000 consumer complaints from calendar
year 2003--2013 shows considerably smaller numbers than those
cited by the New York Times. Our review, when focused on the
vehicles recalled by GM for the ignition switch defect,
identified approximately 135 consumer complaints of stalling
from 2003 to 2013 where the consumer stated that the ignition
switch was involved in the incident and where the vehicles were
subsequently recalled by GM. These 135 complaints were received
in an 11-year period. In any one of those years, NHTSA received
no more than five complaints for any one of the recalled models
for any single model year. The New York Times failed to
consider the full scope of relevant information in its article.
NHTSA was aggressively pursuing stalling complaints during this
same time period. From 2003 to 2013, NHTSA opened 10
investigations of stalling in GM vehicles that led to eight
recalls of almost 800,000 vehicles and 44 stalling
investigations overall, leading to recalls of approximately 5.1
million vehicles.
We note that there are many reasons for vehicle stalling.
Vehicles may stall from lack of maintenance. They may also
stall from contaminated fuel. Failures or intermittent faults
in engine sensors, engine management computers, fuel systems
and onboard vapor recovery systems can all cause stalling.
Software in the various computers and network issues within a
vehicle may also cause a stall. Many of the broader stalling
complaints received by NHTSA appear to relate to such issues
that are unrelated to the ignition switch issue that led to the
air bag safety risk in affected GM vehicles.
Jeep Grand Cherokee and Liberty Fuel Tank Recalls
The New York Times article also falsely claims that the recent
Jeep Grand Cherokee/Jeep Liberty recall illustrated NHTSA's
failure to act with vigor. The article claims that the agency
``scaled back'' its recall request after Chrysler ``balked'' at
recalling all the vehicles encompassed by the agency's recall
request letter. The Times also stated that NHTSA ``agreed to
Chrysler's demand that the automaker not be required to say the
vehicles had a safety defect;'' and that the agency agreed to
``Mr. Marchionne's demand that it stop describing the vehicles
as defective.''
This information is false and inconsistent with public record.
After NHTSA issued a recall request letter to Chrysler, the
company took the unprecedented step of immediately issuing a
public refusal to perform a recall. However, NHTSA continued to
demand a recall of Jeep vehicles that posed an unreasonable
risk to safety. Because of Chrysler's resistance to NHTSA
active pursuit of the vehicles with safety defects, it appeared
that resolution of the dispute would require years of
protracted litigation, during which no vehicles would either be
recalled or remedied.
Engagement by NHTSA with Sergio Marchionne, the CEO of
Chrysler's parent corporation, Fiat, opened the door to a
safety recall of all vehicles that posed an unreasonable risk
to safety. As a result, a settlement was reached. Under this
settlement, the defective vehicles, those at risk for fuel tank
fires in low to moderate speed impacts were recalled and
remedied. Additionally, some newer Grand Cherokee models were
not part of the recall because data did not demonstrate an
unreasonable risk to safety in the same low to moderate speed
impacts. Despite that fact, NHTSA was able to get Chrysler to
agree to inspect these vehicles as part of a service campaign.
The New York Times article also inaccurately states that NHTSA
agreed to a demand by Chrysler to stop describing the recalled
vehicles as defective. This is simply not true. NHTSA
classifies this issue as a safety defect and required Chrysler
to use the term safety defect in its owner notification
letters. (See owner letter http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/
cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM
462519/RCONL-13V252-6248.pdf).
The agency's defect investigation of the affected Chrysler
vehicles is not closed, and we will continue to monitor these
vehicles for defects.
Open Investigations from the 90s
The article states that, ``33 investigations from the 1990s
remain open.''
This information is inaccurate. NHTSA's public records show a
closed date for all 34 (not 33) investigations opened during
the 1990s. We believe the New York Times made this error partly
because of a database issue. The agency deployed a new database
system in late 2002. The migration from the legacy system to
the new system inadvertently created a database update error
that listed the investigation status field as ``open'' even
though the closed date was properly set to a valid date. Had
the New York Times examined the actual case files in the public
database they would have seen that these investigations were
closed. We are working to correct the database error.
Invoking Legal Authority
The New York Times article claims that ``[i]t has been 35 years
since the regulator has invoked its legal authority to order a
company to recall cars.''
That is incorrect. In June 1996, NHTSA ordered Chrysler to
recall certain Chrysler Cirrus and Dodge Stratus vehicles for
noncompliance with the safety standard for seat belt
anchorages. The United States subsequently filed suit in
Federal court in D.C. to enforce NHTSA's order.
More recently, in 2012, NHTSA issued orders to two three-
wheeled motorcycle manufacturers, finding their recalls
inadequate and requiring them to take specified steps to carry
out effective recalls. The United States sued both of these
manufacturers to compel them to comply with the agency's
orders.
More importantly, the need to explicitly exercise legal
authority to order a recall is a poor and misleading measure of
NHTSA's effectiveness in getting safety defects quickly
addressed by manufacturers. In the very many cases where NHTSA
``influences'' a recall, the agency regularly pressures
reluctant manufacturers to recall vehicles by invoking its
legal authority to order a recall. It is quicker, and better
protects the American public, to pressure the manufacturer to
conduct a recall than it is to go through the formal process of
a written determination of a defect, holding a public hearing,
and issuing a final determination that can be challenged and
tied up in court.
IG Audit
The New York Times article omits the fact that the Inspector
General's (IG) audit was conducted at the Department's own
request, and supplements an internal due diligence effort
started by NHTSA and called for by the Secretary. The Secretary
officially requested the audit soon after GM recalled the
subject vehicles. NHTSA's due diligence is focused on
understanding past events and implementing improvements going
forward.
4. Contractor bonus for workforce assessment
Senator McCaskill. Ten recommendations. And the one that's
outstanding--and we were told back in April that it would be done in
May--in your internal look at whether or not you've got the right
resources. I'm worried that the programming money for this Agency has
been flatlined for a decade. In light of all the technological
advances, that just doesn't compute with me. So where is the workforce
assessment that is so necessary for us to evaluate whether or not you
are properly supported and whether we need to do a much better job to
supporting you?
Mr. Friedman. We have had some delays in that effort, in part
because the quality of some of the work from a contractor, where we
were trying to make sure to use a contractor to help leverage our
resources and use the dollars that we had, there were some fundamental
problems with the product that was delivered from that, and as a
result----
Senator McCaskill. How much did you pay for that?
Mr. Friedman. I don't know that number, but we can get it to you.
Senator McCaskill. Have we paid them a bonus yet?
RESPONSE: The contractor was not and will not be paid a bonus for
the work. NHTSA paid $400,000 for services associated with the ODI
workforce assessment. NHTSA determined that the work met the minimum
contract requirements, but nonetheless required considerable
refinement. NHTSA is currently finalizing the assessment and will
complete the workforce assessment by mid-November.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
David J. Friedman
Issue: Whether NHTSA has adequate resources
Question 1. The administration requested $851 million for NHTSA in
its budget request for fiscal 2015. Of that amount, $20 million is for
enforcement. But only about half of that amount--$10.6 million--is
targeted for defects investigations. In Fiscal Year 2014, NHTSA spent
about the same amount, or $10.6 million, for investigations of safety
defects. The president's budget request would keep NHTSA's level of
investigators at roughly 50--despite the growing safety defects issues
that come to light every day. Does the administration's budget request
accurately reflect the oversight mission that NHTSA is tasked with
carrying out?
Question 1a. Would $10 million and 50 investigators really allow
your agency to address the growing challenges that continue to arise in
auto safety?
Answer. We appreciate the opportunity to discuss the budget request
for the safety defects investigation program. In the President's Fiscal
Year (FY) 2015 Budget, NHTSA requested $10.6 million for the safety
defects investigations program, which is consistent with the FY 2014
request. However, this request is for program costs and does not
include salaries and benefits for Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)
employees. While NHTSA did not ask for additional program dollars in
the FY 2015 request, the Agency requested six additional positions for
ODI. And in the President's FY 2014 Budget, the Agency requested four
additional positions for ODI. The ``Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2014'' and ``Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2015'' did not provide NHTSA with the full level of funding in its
budget proposals to support the additional personnel requested in its
FY 2014 and FY 2015 budgets.
ODI's work is important to all highway users, as is evident from
the recent recalls of Toyota and General Motors vehicles and vehicles
with defective Takata air bags. To increase the effectiveness of ODI's
work, we believe that the following steps are necessary: enhance ODI's
ability to use the latest technology to help identify possible safety
defects; increase the public's awareness of reporting safety problems
with their vehicles or vehicle equipment to NHTSA; and provide ODI with
the personnel resources to address potential safety risks.
Looking ahead, areas of new opportunities for safety defect
investigations could include an advanced data mining and analytical
tool, incorporation of business intelligence to enhance the ability of
defect screeners and investigators to identify new defect trends. On
another front, in the future NHTSA may wish to undertake a consumer
awareness and outreach campaign as a large portion of the data received
about defects comes from consumers.
Having a sufficient number of qualified staff is critical to an
effective safety defects investigation program. ODI currently has eight
defect screeners and four Early Warning data analysts to identify
potential safety defects, and 16 investigators to conduct formal
investigations. The over 250 million registered vehicles in the U.S.
creates tremendous data collection and analysis demands on ODI staff
that will only continue to grow due to a significant increase in the
number of consumer complaints received and the number of recalls.
We look forward to working with Congress on the FY2016 Budget to
ensure that NHTSA has the additional resources it needs to be
adequately funded to fulfill its safety responsibilities and respond
effectively to emerging safety issues through these and other
activities.
Issue: Whether NHTSA is adequately addressing the problem of ``hot
cars''
Question 2. In recent years, we've begun witnessing a growing
phenomenon during summer months: the death of children in so-called
``hot cars'' succumbing to hyperthermia or heat stroke. This is also a
problem during spring and fall months, too. About thirty children die a
year in these tragedies, including many in Connecticut, where we've
seen a number of heartbreaking incidents in recent months. The 2012
surface transportation reauthorization law, MAP-21, gave DOT and NHTSA
the authority to ``initiate research into effective ways to minimize''
this problem, including the use of technology and public awareness
campaigns. What efforts has NHTSA taken to address this problem since
MAP-21 was enacted over two years ago?
Answer. NHTSA has led the nationwide efforts to address childhood
heatstroke for the past 6 years. NHTSA has been actively working to
educate the public over that time on the dangers of leaving a child
unattended in a car and has also been engaged on technologies that
could supplement such educational activities to prevent these tragic
incidents. Since 2012, we have issued public safety advisories during
warmer months to alert parents and caregivers of the safety risks
involved, and we work closely with State and Federal partners to spread
the word.
In April 2012, the Department launched ``Where's Baby? Look Before
You Lock,'' the first-ever national campaign to draw public attention
to this issue and has continued the campaign in each subsequent year.
Since the campaign started, ``Where's Baby?'' has been supported by a
total of $4.6 million media campaign focused on radio and Internet
programming that runs from early May to late September. We have since
carried the message to communities across the country, including
Connecticut, through more than a dozen in-person events, television and
radio interviews across the country, social media messaging, and
through our many partners in this cause. Our ad buy includes ads that
are being heard on stations covering Connecticut. The Connecticut State
Highway Safety Office is using NHTSA grant funds to support a ``Look
Before You Lock'' Campaign with the Connecticut Children's Medical
Center. In addition, we have developed public awareness tools that our
partners can use in their communities, businesses, day care centers,
parking lots, and other places that reach a large audience. We have
also partnered with the Department of Health and Human Services to
increase outreach to day care centers.
As discussed in response to question 2b, we have also been
conducting research to evaluate the effectiveness of and establish
standard performance tests for technological solutions to the tragic
risk of children left in cars unattended.
Question 2a. What technological solutions are available to address
this problem? If technology can let us know when we need to buckle a
seat belt, can't it let us know that there's a child in a back seat?
Answer. On the technology side, we sponsored a research project in
2012 that surveyed the marketplace and evaluated products intended to
provide reminders to prevent children from being left behind in parked
vehicles. The research determined that these devices were not
sufficiently reliable and could provide a false sense of security to
the caregiver using them. Since 2012, we have been cataloguing newer
devices on the market, as well as monitoring design concepts, and are
developing test procedures to evaluate the performance of these devices
objectively. We expect to finish that work in 2015. Once finalized, it
will help accelerate the development of effective systems by making
clear to developers how they can design for and demonstrate a system
that could warn of a child that is unintentionally left in a vehicle.
Such systems could help with about one-half of the fatalities
associated with childhood heatstroke in a vehicle--cases where children
were unintentionally left in cars. Another 20 percent were
intentionally left in a vehicle and 30 percent gained access to an
unlocked vehicle.
The technology used for seat belt reminders is based upon pressure
on the seat and provides a warning to the driver while the vehicle is
in motion. Such technology is likely not appropriate for identifying
children in hot vehicles. The technology to address children in hot
vehicles would need to differentiate between children alone in a
vehicle versus an unoccupied child seat or other items frequently
placed on a back seat and would need to reliably provide an alert to
adults who are outside of the vehicle. NHTSA has catalogued several
proposed technological solutions involving child seats and various
aftermarket devices, but at this point we are not aware of any that are
sufficiently reliable or effectively address the problem.
Question 2b. Is legislation needed to prevent children from dying
in hot cars?
Answer. At this time, given the practical and technological
challenges that exist, NHTSA does not believe that legislation
requiring technological solutions would effectively address the problem
yet and recommends continued support for NHTSA's public education,
technology evaluation, and test procedure development efforts.
Issue: Whether NHTSA is moving swiftly to promulgate regulations on
speed limiters for commercial trucks
Question 3. Devices known as ``speed limiters'' can restrict a
truck's speed to a pre-programmed maximum level. Research has shown
that these devices may significantly reduce the number of crashes
involving heavy duty commercial trucks. NHTSA has been working for
several years to implement a rule that mandates these devices for
certain vehicles, but a rule has not yet been released. Safety
advocates and members of the trucking industry have voiced their
support for such a mandate, and just recently a representative of the
American Trucking Associations testified before the Senate Commerce
Committee's Surface Transportation Subcommittee advocating for a speed
limiter rulemaking. What is the status of the proposed rule?
Answer. In response to a petition from the American Trucking
Associations and Road Safe America to initiate rulemaking to require
manufacturers to limit the speed of heavy vehicles, NHTSA published a
notice on January 3, 2011, granting the petition and announcing that
the agency would initiate the rulemaking process with a notice of
proposed rulemaking. Because this rulemaking would apply to many
commercial vehicles that are regulated by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (FMCSA), NHTSA and FMCSA decided that the most
effective approach to improve roadway safety would be to issue a joint
rulemaking proposal that will include both a Federal motor vehicle
safety standard and a Federal motor carrier safety regulation. Although
developing a joint rulemaking has required additional time and
coordination, FMCSA's involvement will help ensure effective
enforcement. A proposed rule is currently under Departmental review,
and we expect to issue this proposal for public comment in the near
future. http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaMain?operation=OPERATION_GET_AGENCY_RULE_LIST¤tPu
b=true&agencyCode=&showStage=active&agencyCd=2100&Image58.x=26&Image58
.y=10
Question 3a. When will a final rule be issued?
Answer. The expected date for the final rule will be determined
after analyzing public comments on the proposal.
Question 3b. What vehicles will be governed by the final rule? Will
it apply to new vehicles or existing ones as well?
Answer. After analyzing public comments on the proposal, NHTSA will
determine what vehicles will be included in the final rule.
Issue: Whether NHTSA is moving swiftly to promulgate regulations on
motorcoach safety
Question 4. MAP-21 included important vehicle and traffic safety
provisions directing agency action on key lifesaving measures,
including many recommendations issued by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) to improve occupant protection and operational
safety in motorcoach travel. These issues languished for years until
specific deadlines for agency action were included in the surface
transportation bill. What is status of the rulemakings concerning
motorcoach safety that were mandated in MAP-21?
Question 4a. When will NHTSA complete the issuance of final rules
on the motorcoach safety provisions?
Answer. At NHTSA, the safety of the motoring public is our top
priority, and we work to allocate our resources strategically to ensure
the maximum focus on saving lives. NHTSA is working diligently to
implement the various motor vehicle and highway safety improvements
contained in MAP-21, as well as other rulemaking, enforcement, vehicle
research, and highway safety activities that significantly reduce
highway injuries and deaths. For example, in 2013, NHTSA issued two
final rules that fulfill MAP-21 mandates to improve motor vehicle
safety. One rule requires seatbelts on motorcoaches, and the other
requires all major automakers and motorcycle manufacturers to provide
consumers with online access to vehicle recall information that is
searchable by the vehicle identification number. NHTSA also recently
issued two notices of proposed rulemaking in response to MAP-21
mandates. One notice proposes to establish improved roof and roof
support standards for motorcoaches to prevent injuries in rollover
crashes, and the other notice proposes upgrades to the Federal motor
vehicle safety standard for child restraint systems to ensure child
passengers are protected in side crashes. In addition to the rulemaking
activities responsive to MAP-21, NHTSA has also completed several
important activities in the past two years, including releasing
guidelines to minimize in-vehicle distractions, proposing new minimum
sound requirements for hybrid and electric vehicles, and completing a
rule requiring rear visibility technology in all new passenger
vehicles, which will significantly reduce the risk of fatalities and
serious injuries caused by backover accidents. Finally, NHTSA continues
to look towards the future. Earlier this year we announced the decision
to move forward with vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology for
passenger vehicles followed by the publication of an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in August.
The following table provides the status of the MAP-21 motorcoach
rulemakings. In many cases, the dates for final rules are not indicated
because they will depend upon public comments received on proposals or
because issuance of a final rule is dependent upon a determination of
whether such rule would meet the requirements and considerations set
forth in the Vehicle Safety Act.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAP-21 Section Requirement Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(a) Safety Final rule by 1 year Complete. Final rule
belts after date of requiring seatbelts on
enactment (10/1/2013). motorcoaches issued in
November 2013.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(b)(1) Roof Final rule by 2 years On July 30, NHTSA issued an
strength and after date of NPRM to set requirements
crush resistance enactment if the for motorcoach structural
Secretary determines integrity during rollovers.
that such standards The comment period for this
meet the requirements proposal ended October 6,
and considerations set and NHTSA will set a
forth in the Vehicle schedule for the final rule
Safety Act (10/1/ after analyzing the public
2014). comments.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(b)(2) Anti- Final rule by 2 years NHTSA is currently drafting
ejection safety after date of a proposal and expects to
countermeasures enactment if the issue an NPRM in 2015.
Secretary determines
that such standards
meet the requirements
and considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act (10/1/
2014).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(b)(3) Final rule by 2 years NHTSA issued an NPRM in
Rollover crash after date of 2012. NHTSA is working on
avoidance enactment if the the final rule and expects
Secretary determines to publish the final rule
that such standards in early 2015.
meet the requirements
and considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act (10/1/
2014).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(c) Final rule by 3 years NHTSA is currently
Commercial motor after date of determining the most
vehicle tire enactment if the appropriate next steps.
pressure Secretary determines
monitoring that such standards
systems meet the requirements
and considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act (10/1/
2015).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32703(d) Tire Final rule or Report to In 2013, NHTSA issued a
performance Congress describing supplemental NPRM to
standard why the Secretary is upgrade the safety standard
not issuing a final for new pneumatic tires for
rule by 3 years after motor vehicles with a Gross
date of enactment (10/ Vehicle Weight Rating of
1/2015). over 10,000 pounds, such as
motorcoaches, and we intend
to meet the statutory
deadline.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32704 Fire Final rule by 3 years NHTSA expects to complete
prevention and after date of the research by the end of
mitigation enactment of this Act this year and will then
if the Secretary determine appropriate next
determines that such steps.
standards meet the
requirements and
considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act (10/1/
2015).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
32705 Occupant Complete research and NHTSA research is ongoing,
protection, testing by 3 years and we will determine
collision after date of appropriate agency actions
avoidance, fire enactment (10/1/2015). upon the completion of the
causation and Final rule by 2 years required research and
fire after completion of testing.
extinguisher each research and
research & testing initiative if
testing the Secretary
determines that such
standards meet the
requirements and
considerations set
forth in the Vehicle
Safety Act.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
David J. Friedman
Question 1. According to the Valukas report, in 2004, GM and NHTSA
had a secret meeting in which the attendees inexplicably agreed that
cars stalled all by themselves, but that this was not necessarily a
safety problem. During the hearing, I asked you whether you believed
NHTSA erred in 2004. In response to this and other related questions,
you said ``Senator, in this GM case, the ignition switch and the stall
was linked to airbags not deploying, and that is clearly a safety
issue,'' that ``There's no doubt that stalling can be a serious safety
issue'' but also that ``If a consumer can safely pull their vehicle
over to the side of the road and restart that vehicle, then that's a
situation where the consumer can be safe, but obviously, the car
company does need to address any stalling issue that represents a
safety risk'' and that stalling ``hasn't always posed an unreasonable
safety risk.''
Some of the victims who were killed after their GM vehicles stalled
were driving in cars that were, at the time of the stall, i) traveling
at high speeds, or ii) in the middle of making a turn at an
intersection before being struck by another car traveling in another
direction. Is it NHTSA's position that drivers should be able to pull a
car that stalls in such circumstances over to the side of the road and
restart it so that ``the consumer can be safe''?
Answer. No. Stalls represent an unreasonable risk to safety
depending on when, where and how often they occur. NHTSA's numerous
stalling investigations and the stalling recalls influenced by these
investigations demonstrate that NHTSA would consider stalling to be a
safety issue under the conditions you describe. While the Valukas
report discusses communications between NHTSA and GM about stalling on
pages 74 and 75, the report finds that there is ``no documentary
evidence'' of any agreement between NHTSA and GM regarding stalling,
and the evidence showed that the agency rejected the approach adopted
by GM toward stalls as a safety problem.
Question 1a. Given your statement that it was only the linkage
between the ignition switch defect and the airbags not deploying that
was ``clearly a safety issue,'' is it NHTSA's position that the GM
ignition switch defect would not have posed a safety problem as long as
a consumer could either ``safely pull their vehicle over to the side of
the road and restart the vehicle'' or be assured that the airbags would
have deployed as designed?
Answer. As the record shows, NHTSA did not open an investigation on
stalling for these vehicles, so we have not performed the evaluation
that would be needed to take a position on your question. Note,
however, that subsequent examination of the available complaint data
does not demonstrate that the recalled GM vehicles exhibited high rates
of stalling compared to peer vehicles.
Question 1b. Does NHTSA believe that passengers sitting in the back
seats of the recalled vehicles hit by other cars traveling at high
speeds would be protected by airbags, even if the airbags did deploy as
designed?
Answer. Frontal airbags do not provide a safety benefit to rear
seat occupants in frontal crashes.
Question 1c. If the response to either a, b or c is no, then why
can't you state simply that in 2004, NHTSA should not have agreed with
GM that cars stalling all by themselves did not necessarily pose a
safety problem?
Answer. There was no ``agreement'' between GM and NHTSA on
stalling. The Valukas report does not conclude that such agreement
existed, and in fact, supports the conclusion that such an
``agreement'' did not exist.
Question 1d. Does NHTSA today believe that a defect that causes
cars to stall on their own is a safety problem, irrespective of whether
there are actions drivers can take to avoid a fatal accident and
whether the airbags deploy in the event the accident occurs?
Answer. NHTSA does not believe that all stalls represent a safety
problem. The Safety Act requires the recall and remedy of safety-
related defects when such defects present an unreasonable risk of death
or injury in an accident. Stalls create an unreasonable safety risk
depending on where, when and how often the stalls occur.
Question 2. In 2007, NHTSA asked for and received a secret document
from GM related to the death of two Wisconsin teenagers. That document
was first made public by me at our May 7 hearing, and it is referenced
repeatedly in Mr. Valukas's report. This response to NHTSA's Death
Inquiry included a report by the Wisconsin State Patrol Academy that
said that the ignition switch defect prevented the airbags from
deploying. It also found other examples of the same problem happening
in other cars and identified a 2005 GM warning to dealers about the
issue. In short, it correctly identified the safety defect. During the
hearing you seemed to confuse this document that NHTSA requested and
received with a different Special Crash Investigation document, stating
that ``Well, Senator, the special crash investigation report that
included these same assertions was a public document, and no one
brought that issue to our attention.'' In fact, the document I was
referring to was NOT a public document. That document, which NHTSA
obtained in 2007 but kept secret until it provided it to me in 2014,
was DI07-044, requested by NHTSA upon its review of the Early Warning
Report submitted by GM on the Wisconsin accident. The 2007 report
established the very linkage between the ignition switch defect and
airbag non-deployment that you have claimed repeatedly that NHTSA
lacked--but would have taken action to address if only it had had
access to such linkage--until early 2014. Do you acknowledge that NHTSA
requested and received this document in 2007 as part of a Death
Inquiry, but neither took action on its contents nor made it publicly
available?
Answer. NHTSA received the police accident report for the October
2006 Wisconsin incident as part of GM's responses to DI07-044 in June
2007. The Wisconsin report was reviewed by NHTSA staff. The agency
considered the circumstances of the Wisconsin crash as part of its
investigation of the issue, but did not believe that the position of
the ignition switch would prevent airbags from deploying on reserve
power. Because of privacy issues, the agency does not typically make
DIs available to the public and did not make the Wisconsin police
accident report available to the public. However, the Wisconsin police
accident report is discussed in the Special Crash Investigations (SCI)
report which was posted on NHTSA's public website. Furthermore, the
Wisconsin police accident report could be obtained by the public from
Wisconsin authorities.
Question 2a. Do you agree with me, GM CEO Mary Barra and others
that if the public had been able to read this secret document and
warned about its conclusions at the time, it is possible that some of
the deaths and injuries caused by the ignition switch defect could have
been avoided?
Answer. No. The Wisconsin police accident report could be obtained
by the public from Wisconsin authorities and was directly referenced in
the publicly released SCI report on April 2, 2008. The SCI report
contains a full recitation of the facts based on observations made
regarding the ignition switch issue described in the Wisconsin police
accident report. Although it is possible that people or organizations
outside of NHTSA could have brought greater attention to the issue by
reviewing the SCI report and obtaining the Wisconsin police accident
report from Wisconsin authorities, the record indicates that did not
happen and it is unclear that making the information available through
a third venue would have altered the outcome.
Question 2b. During the hearing, in response to my question about
whether documents such as this and other EWR information should be
publicly released in the future, you stated that you ``agree that
making this kind of information, with privacy protections, public can
be a positive and helpful thing. What I don't agree with, though, is
the--is putting the burden for making that information public with
privacy protections should fall on NHTSA. I believe that burden should
fall onto the industry who is causing these problems.'' You also stated
at many points during the hearing that GM ``hid the ball,'' encouraged
a culture of ``denial and delay that cost lives and endangered the
American public'' and that GM never provided key information to NHTSA.
Why does NHTSA believe that automakers, rather than the agency that,
according to its webpage, ``is dedicated to achieving the highest
standards of excellence in motor vehicle and highway safety'', would be
in a better position and could be trusted to fully inform the public
about potentially deadly automobile defects?
Answer. If an automaker were intent on hiding information that a
law required them to make public, requiring NHTSA to make such
information public would not help. If the automaker's intent was to not
fully inform the public and the law required NHTSA to make such
information public, it is unclear why the automaker would not also fail
to provide that information to NHTSA in its EWR submission. As a
result, NHTSA would not have that information and therefore would not
have it in order to make public. We share your concern about the
potential for automakers to be less than forthright, which is why GROW
AMERICA includes a provision to substantially increase maximum fines to
$300 million to increase NHTSA's ability to deter such actions. In 2014
alone, NHTSA has aggressively used the limited financial penalties
available to issue record fines of more than $126 million in civil
penalties, exceeding the total amount collected by the agency during
its forty-three year history.
As a Federal agency, NHTSA is subject to a number of laws, such as
the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, that limit the
disclosure of personal information. To make such information public
with privacy protected would create significant costs for taxpayers and
a significant burden on NHTSA staff, diverting resources from other
efforts, including pursuing enforcement activities that regularly save
lives and prevent injuries. These GM recalls are a lesson learned not
only for GM but for other automobile manufacturers--good corporate
governance requires compliance with the law, especially with regard to
the safety of the motoring public. With NHTSA oversight, requiring the
manufacturers to disclose information publicly will be less expensive
for taxpayers and would make it available to the public faster since it
would eliminate the added step of NHTSA processing the information
first.
Question 2c. Why couldn't NHTSA require automakers to provide the
additional information and documents required in S. 2151 in a form that
redacted personally identifiable information or information properly
classified as confidential business information to NHTSA, which would
require the use of NHTSA resources only to validate the automakers'
redactions? In fact, NHTSA staff informed my office that this was the
process NHTSA utilized when it publicly released the lengthy Valukas
report after receiving it a few hours before posting it online.
Answer. The Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act require
NHTSA to maintain the privacy of individuals and ensure that personal
privacy information is not disclosed without consent. The additional
documents required in S. 2151 such as court complaints and police
accident reports are laden with personal privacy information.
Accordingly, NHTSA would still have to devote significant resources to
ensure that the information it receives pursuant to S. 2151 has all
personal privacy information removed in order to make the information
publicly available. In contrast, manufacturers bear the burden of
protecting their confidential business information from public
disclosure by submitting redacted copies of documents to NHTSA, as
required by NHTSA's regulation on confidential business information.
Unlike privacy information, where potential liability for disclosure
rests with the agency, manufacturers have a self-interest in ensuring
the accuracy of their redactions of confidential business information.
Question 2d. For each of years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, how many
fatality reports were submitted to NHTSA's Early Warning Reporting
system?
Answer. See attached file that contains the count of fatality
incidents and the sum of the numeric values reported in each incident
submitted to NHTSA's Early Warning Reporting system for each of the
years specified above.
Question 3. A recent Detroit News article \1\ referenced some
140,000 missing vehicles that GM could not account for at the time of
publication. While it is possible that some of these vehicles are owned
by a second or third owner and thus more difficult to track, it is also
possible that some of the vehicles are in automotive recycling or
salvage facilities. How specifically does NHTSA enable the
identification of vehicles with safety recalls that are found in
automotive recycling/salvage facilities so that they can be factored
into the Agency's remedy rate calculations? How can one be assured that
a recalled part from a vehicle found in a recycling or salvage facility
is not used to repair another vehicle without the consumer's knowledge?
In what manner are automakers expected to work with the owners of
recycling and salvage facilities to ensure that such situations do not
occur? Shouldn't any VIN database include the ability to track vehicles
from cradle to grave, and if not, why not? Shouldn't automakers ensure
that information that includes the recalled part numbers, remedy part
numbers, and other data/direction that could be needed by recyclers or
salvagers is provided in a usable format, and if not, why not?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20140807/AUTO0103/
308070116#ixzz3EFrvBSJm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. Automakers should ensure that information about recalled
part numbers, remedy part numbers, and such data that would help
identify vehicles with safety defects is made available directly to
recyclers and salvagers. NHTSA, however, does not collect, and does not
have feasible means or resources to collect information on specific
vehicles that may reside in scrap yards or other salvage facilities.
Nevertheless, as part of their quarterly reporting on a recall,
manufacturers are required to report the number of vehicles or items of
equipment determined to be unreachable for inspection due to export,
theft, scrapping, or other reasons. From this information, NHTSA
adjusts the population of vehicles covered by a safety recall to more
accurately reflect the numbers of vehicles potentially affected on U.S.
roadways.
Sales of defective parts are strictly prohibited under the Vehicle
Safety Act. See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 31020(j). NHTSA can use its
investigative and enforcement authorities to take actions against a
person selling defective parts for installation on a motor vehicle if
evidence is available to support such action.
NHTSA does not agree that its VIN look up tool should be expanded
to include information concerning the life cycle of a vehicle. First,
we believe the tool should be focused on the information for which it
was originally intended--a quick and easy check for recalls that have
not been completed on a vehicle. Second, this information would be
redundant of other Federal and State resources for this information,
namely the National Motor Vehicle Titling and Information System, as
well as the State departments of motor vehicles. If NHTSA were to start
engaging in tracking and disseminating this information, there is also
a risk that an owner could obtain inconsistent and confusing results
between systems due to incompatibilities and variances in data quality
and data timing.
Question 4. The Tire Pressure Monitoring System provisions in the
TREAD Act were added by me during House consideration of that bill.
NHTSA's implementation of the TPMS provisions (FMVSS No. 138 is the
implementing rule for the TPMS provision in TREAD) has been the subject
of litigation and a court decision that the rule was arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure[] Act. Of particular
concern in these court cases was the manner in which the rule addressed
indirect TPMS technology.
In November 2012, NHTSA published a report entitled Evaluation of
the Effectiveness of TPMS in Proper Tire Pressure Maintenance.\2\ The
study found that severe under-inflation of tires is 21 percent less
common in vehicles equipped with direct systems than those equipped
with indirect systems.\3\ Further, NHTSA stated in the study that the
agency ``did not collect sufficient data from post-FMVSS No. 138
indirect systems to evaluate their effectiveness.'' \4\ What has NHTSA
done since this report was written to (i) collect the data it lacked in
2012 that would have enabled it to evaluate the post-FMVSS No. 138
indirect systems and (ii) consider a revision to FMVSS No. 138 to
ensure that ineffective systems are no longer allowed? If no such
efforts have been undertaken, why not?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811681.pdf
\3\ http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811681.pdf Page 20.
\4\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Answer. NHTSA's 2012 report ``Evaluation of the Effectiveness of
TPMS in Proper Tire Pressure Maintenance'' found that that the rate of
severe tire under-inflation, defined as one or more tires with pressure
25 percent or more below the vehicle manufacturer's recommended value,
was 12 percent for passenger vehicles with direct TPMS systems and 15
percent for vehicles with indirect TPMS systems. Given that the rate of
severe under-inflation was 23 percent for vehicles without TPMS, the
report indicates that both systems are effective at reducing severe
under-inflation.
All of the vehicles in the study with indirect TPMS were from model
years prior to the requirements of FMVSS No. 138. The report
hypothesizes that the performance of indirect TPMS systems that meet
the requirements of FMVSS No. 138 may be as effective as direct systems
because of changes made to the indirect systems to become compliant
with the standard. However, our preliminary analysis indicates that
there is not sufficient fleet penetration of FMVSS No. 138 compliant
indirect systems to conduct a meaningful comparison of the real-world
performance of the two systems at this point.
Question 4a. Please provide me with a list of all waivers from the
requirements of FMVSS No. 138 that have been requested for TPMS
systems, indicating for each such waiver i) which manufacturer
requested the waiver, ii) whether the waiver was for indirect or direct
TPMS, iii) whether the waiver was granted, rejected or is still pending
and iv) for waivers that were granted, the safety basis NHTSA relied on
to allow the non-compliant system to be used.
Answer. NHTSA has not received any requests pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 30113 to exempt any vehicle from any requirement of FMVSS No. 138.
NHTSA has received the following FMVSS No. 138 petitions for
inconsequential noncompliance:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
If granted, safety
NHTSA basis for
Docket Manufacturer TPMS Type Status inconsequential
No. decision
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009-0084 Honda Direct Granted TPMS telltale required
to activate at 27 psi
for optional tire but
not reset from 25
psi, optional tire
able to support
greater load.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010-0095 Volkswagen Indirect Granted Malfunction telltale
not illuminated on
2nd start, vehicle
speed 6-12.5 mph for
5 minutes or less
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012-0007 Mercedes Direct Rejected NA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012-0118 Mazda Direct Granted Owner's manuals for
except vehicles delivered in
255 Puerto Rico missing
Indirect TPMS instructions in
English but available
on Mazda website
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012-0147 Honda Direct Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013-0139 Aston Martin Direct Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-0034 Maserati Direct Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-0035 McLaren Direct Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-0077 Lamborghini Direct Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-0094 Ferrari Direct Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-0096 Tesla Direct Pending
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4b. Has NHTSA obtained, produced or reviewed additional
data on or reports of other potential incidences of non-compliance of
indirect TPMS? Please list any such data or reports, along with any
enforcement or regulatory determination NHTSA made following its review
thereof. Does NHTSA plan on revising FMVSS No. 138 or the associated
testing procedure, TP 138-03, in response to its review of any such
data or reports? Has NHTSA conducted any testing of its own on vehicles
that utilize indirect TMPS, and if so, please describe the nature of
that testing, including the vehicle(s) that were tested and the results
of the tests.
Answer. NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) tested
four vehicles with indirect TPMS to FMVSS No. 138 as a part of the
Model Year 2014 compliance program. The vehicles tested were a
Volkswagen Beetle, a Honda CR-V, a Honda Accord, and a Mazda 6. The
Volkswagen Beetle and the Honda CR-V passed all requirements. The Honda
Accord passed all requirements except one test simulating a
malfunction. We have informed Honda of the issue and plan to continue
with our investigation. To date, NHTSA has received test results from
Honda on the Honda Accord, Civic and CR-V showing that only the Accord
failed the malfunction test.
NHTSA received test information from Schrader, a TPMS equipment
manufacturer, identifying a potential safety issue with the Mazda 6's
indirect TPMS using a test procedure that is not included in the
current test procedure TP-138. OVSC conducted a similar test on all
four vehicles. Although the Mazda 6 passed the TP-138 tests, it failed
the additional test by not illuminating a telltale warning when all
four tires were gradually deflated below the required activation
threshold of 25 percent below Mazda's recommended inflation pressure.
The other three vehicles correctly produced a low pressure telltale
warning in the additional test. Mazda submitted test results confirming
the failure of the Mazda 6. It also provided test data for the Mazda 3
and CX-5 showing passing results. On October 24, Mazda submitted a Part
573 noncompliance report to NHTSA. The test reports for all of these
vehicles are currently being finalized. No decision has been made at
this time regarding changes to the Standard or TP-138.
Question 4c. Indirect TPMS requires a calibration system to compare
tires' rotational speeds and from that, extrapolate their inflation
levels. Currently, NHTSA's TPMS testing protocol allows for a manual
reset/recalibration button to be placed on the dashboard, which could
result in the inadvertent recalibration of a TPMS system to set the
baseline to be an unsafe tire pressure level if a driver hits the
button by mistake. Has NHTSA obtained any consumer complaints, EWR
submittals or other reports of such an occurrence? If so, please
describe the quantity and nature of these complaints, submittals or
reports. Please also describe any other efforts NHTSA has made to
assess this risk.
Answer. NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation reviewed complaints
for all vehicles where manufacturers indicated the models are equipped
with the TPMS reset switches. There were no complaints indicating a
failure resulting from inadvertent recalibration of the TPMS switch. A
number of complaints against the 2014 Honda CR-V describe the TPMS
light repeatedly coming on--the consumer checks the tire pressure,
which is at the required pressure, and then resets the switch. No
complaint describes recalibrating the TPMS setting to a lower tire
pressure. NHTSA will continue to monitor the situation to determine
whether a defect exists that presents an unreasonable risk to safety.
On July 24, 2014, OVSC sent information requests to 19 vehicle
manufacturers to obtain data on manual reset/recalibration buttons.
OVSC is in the process of reviewing the information and determining
appropriate next steps.
Attachment
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Edward Markey to
Robert Strassburger
Question 1. According to the Valukas report, in 2004, GM and NHTSA
had a secret meeting in which the attendees inexplicably agreed that
cars stalled all by themselves, and that this was not necessarily a
safety problem. Do you disagree that many members of the public would
probably have rejected this conclusion if they had known about it, and
if so, why?
Answer. According to the Valukas report, in a meeting on June 3,
2004, GM officials described a number of factors that should be
considered in assessing stalls, and NHTSA officials responded that the
factors ``should be considered but did not necessarily `immunize' a
manufacturer from conducting a safety recall'' indicating that NHTSA
believed that stalling could indicate a safety problem. (pg. 73)
Question 2. Mr. Valukas's report describes warnings of accidents
that GM was aware of involving their vehicles, but some of these
warnings and reports were not publicly disclosed or acted on. Do you
disagree that if the public knew about these reports of cars stalling
on their own at the time, it is possible that some of the deaths and
injuries caused by this defect could have been avoided, and if so, why?
Answer. It is not clear which ``warnings of accidents'' the
question refers to, but under the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) system,
auto manufacturers are required by law to provide ``all data necessary
to assist in the identification of safety-related defects,'' which
includes notifying the agency of death and injury claims/notices
involving its vehicles. Information about these reports is publicly
available on NHTSA's website.
In a March 26, 2014 letter to Acting Administrator David Friedman,
Clarence Ditlow of the Center for Auto Safety alleged that NHTSA
``turned a blind eye to the ignition switch defect,'' because the
agency did not act on information it possessed, ranging ``[f]rom
consumer complaints to Technical Service Bulletins to Special Crash
Investigations to Early Warning Reporting death claims'' (emphasis
added). Notably, all of the information cited by Mr. Ditlow is publicly
available on NHTSA's website.
Question 3. In 2006 and 2007, NHTSA received investigative reports
from its contractors relating to two fatal crashes involving GM
Cobalts. Both of these reports described airbags that did not deploy in
cars because ignition switches had turned off. Do you disagree that if
NHTSA had reviewed these reports and informed the public about the
safety defect, it is possible that some of the deaths and injuries
caused by the defect could have been avoided, and if so, why?
Answer. NHTSA officials testified that the agency reviewed the
investigative reports from its contractors; however, it does not appear
that the agency concluded that the reports identified a safety defect.
Had NHTSA concluded that the reports identified a safety defect, it
presumably would have conveyed this finding to the company; if the
company did not initiate a recall, NHTSA would have used its existing
broad authority to compel the company to do so.
Question 4. In 2007, NHTSA asked for and received a document from
GM related to the death of two Wisconsin teenagers. That document was
first made public by me at our May 7 hearing, and it is referenced
repeatedly in Mr. Valukas's report. It included a report by the
Wisconsin State Patrol Academy that said that the ignition switch
defect prevented the airbags from deploying. It also found other
examples of the same problem happening in other cars and identified a
2005 GM warning to dealers about the issue. In short, it correctly
identified the safety defect. Do you disagree that if the public had
been told about this document and warned about its conclusions at the
time, it is possible that some of the deaths and injuries caused by
this defect could have been avoided, and if so, why?
Answer. According to the Valukas report, GM provided State Trooper
Young's report to NHTSA as part of its quarterly EWR submission. (pg.
117-8) In his report, Trooper Young cited consumer complaints and 2005
and 2006 Technical Service Bulletins related to Cobalt ignition
switches. Trooper Young found these documents on NHTSA's publicly
available EWR website. (pg. 115)
[all]