[Senate Hearing 113-694]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-694
FROM HERE TO MARS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 9, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK BEGICH, Alaska DAN COATS, Indiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN E. WALSH, Montana
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE
BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking Member
BARBARA BOXER, California ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MARCO RUBIO, Florida
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAN COATS, Indiana
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN E. WALSH, Montana
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 9, 2014.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rubio....................................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Prepared statement of Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, The
Heritage Foundation........................................ 31
Witnesses
William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration................................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Susan Eisenhower, Chairman Emeritus, Eisenhower Institute,
President, Eisenhower Group, Inc............................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Dr. Leroy Chiao, Former NASA Astronaut; Commander, International
Space Station Expedition 10; Special Advisor for Human
Spaceflight, The Space Foundation; and Chairman, National Space
Biomedical Research Institute User Panel....................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Jeffrey Manber, Managing Director, NanoRacks, LLC................ 20
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to:
William H. Gerstenmaier...................................... 49
Dr. Leroy Chiao.............................................. 50
FROM HERE TO MARS
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Science and Space,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Good morning.
Thank you all for coming. We have held, in this committee,
a number of hearings on space exploration. We've highlighted
how the technologies developed benefit our lives here on Earth.
We've discussed the potential dangers of near-Earth objects.
We've heard about the growing commercial space industry. We've
explored how NASA's efforts will eventually allow us to put an
American on Mars. We even heard last year, via downlink, from
the ISS about some of the amazing work that is going on up
there. And all of that means that we have plenty of chances to
share the excitement about the space program.
But, look. It's an empty dais. And it'll just be Senator
Rubio and me when he arrives. And he's filling in for Senator
Cruz who understandably is in Texas today for the memorial
service at the Army base there.
So we need to generate some excitement, again, among the
American people. And, of course, things give us a problem. Now
we have the tensions with Russia. Is it going to impact the
space program?
As we've seen before, the exploration of space has been the
one area in times of geopolitical conflict that we can rise
above that. So NASA's success is not only a product of
tremendous investments in technology, but also in international
cooperation. And I believe that we need to continue that
tradition.
Geopolitics may or may not affect the nation's exploration
mission. It certainly affected it back at the dawn of the Space
Race, because of the launch of Sputnik. NASA was designed, in
part, to demonstrate to the world the power of the American way
of life.
NASA's 1958 Organic Act signed by the grandfather of Susan
Eisenhower, President Eisenhower, stated that U.S. space
activities should contribute to international cooperation. When
Secretary of Defense McNamara and NASA Administrator Jim Webb
proposed a lunar mission to the Kennedy administration in 1961,
they argued that ``Our attainments (in space) are a major
element in the international competition between the Soviet
system and our own.''
And yet, NASA was a vehicle for working with the Soviets in
the midst of the Cold War with all of the ICBMs pointed at each
other with nuclear weapons. In 1975, we had Apollo-Soyuz, the
first linkup between a Soviet and U.S. spacecraft, which
President Nixon viewed as important in pursuing detente.
General Tom Stafford, the leader of that mission, with General
Alexei Leonov, they rendezvoused a Soviet space craft and an
American space craft. They docked and they lived together in
space for 9 days.
And you talk about a role model for international
cooperation. Look at the friendship today between Tom Stafford
and Alexei Leonov. And General Stafford testified here. He
called it ``The shining light during the Cold War Era in our
relationship with the Soviet Union.'' That's what Tom said
here.
And so, today, the ISS, a stunning example of engineering
and cooperation, combines the contributions of 15 partner
nations and the famous NASA-Mars Curiosity Rover carries
instruments provided by France, Canada, Germany, Russia and
Spain. So our leadership in space is a result of decades of
strategic investment. If we want to maintain that position,
then the investments that we're making today have got to be
strategic.
And yet, we're in an era of limited budgets. The space
arena now includes new players like China, India, and the
private sector.
So as we look to the future, there are a few questions that
I would like to propose. What do we get out of our investment
in being pioneers in space? Number two, how will each mission
such as the Asteroid Redirect Mission, help meet our space
exploration goals and benefit American interests? And Bill
Gerstenmaier is going to speak to that. Number three, when and
how will we cooperate with international and commercial
partners? And which partners will we exclude, and why?
Following so many decades of advancement in space and given
the high cost and amazing benefits of exploration, there's no
room for rash actions but only for very careful decisionmaking.
Those leading exploration efforts will realize it is a truth:
those that lead will realize the economic scientific and
political benefits.
And so, it's my pleasure to introduce today's witnesses.
Bill Gerstenmaier, NASA Associate Administrator for Human
Exploration and Operations. Susan Eisenhower, President of the
Eisenhower Group, author of Partners in Space, which details
U.S.-Soviet cooperation. She will discuss lessons learned. Dr.
Leroy Chiao, Special Advisor for Human Space Flight to the
Space Foundation, former Commander of the ISS and a former
member of the Augustine Commission. He will discuss the
advantages and complications associated with international
cooperation. Jeffrey Manber, Managing Director of NanoRacks and
the author of Selling Peace, a book about work with the Russian
space program. He will address the potential for commercial
involvement and expiration Beyond Low-Earth Orbit.
Mr. Gerstenmaier.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER, ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS,
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for
the opportunity to participate in this hearing entitled ``From
Here to Mars.''
I'll briefly describe NASA's approach to human spaceflight
that takes humans eventually to Mars. NASA does not see this as
a monolithic mission or a classic design reference mission
approach. NASA in this constrained and uncertain budget
environment is building the infrastructure--that's operations,
techniques, international involvements, spacecraft and
hardware--that will allow us to make sustained progress toward
a human presence on the surface of Mars.
NASA is developing capabilities and systems that will allow
a human presence off the Earth and in the solar system. We're
going off the Earth while benefiting the inhabitants of the
Earth. NASA is making significant progress. Each of our
activities are judged through the lens of being critical and
used in future Mars-class missions. We are not building a
single one-time optimized mission to Mars, but an
infrastructure that allows humans to pioneer the solar system.
NASA sees three unique regions in space: Earth-reliant,
where the ISS resides today; two, the proving ground, where the
Asteroid Redirect Mission will occur in the vicinity of the
Moon; and three, Earth-independent, or Mars-ready. These
regions for human presence require gradually increasing risk
acceptance, hardware reliability, and operational complexity.
NASA believes that its step-wise approach is superior than
attempting a Mars-class mission without proper preparation.
Just as Mercury and Gemini prepared the way for Apollo, we see
ISS, in the Earth-reliant region, and the Asteroid Redirect
Mission, a first mission in the proving ground around the Moon,
as paving the way for Mars-class missions. We also see a
significant opportunity to work with the Science Mission
Directorate and international partners on this approach.
The International Global Exploration Roadmap, developed by
12 countries, supports this approach. The roadmap provides a
framework to guide countries in their role for human
exploration. NASA's current plans are implementing those first
key pieces of that roadmap.
The ISS plays a critical role. The ISS not only benefits
life on Earth but has a critical role in exploration and
pioneering of the solar system. ISS is not only helping to
understand how the human body will adapt in the long-duration
space flight and allowing us to test high reliability hardware
such as life support for Mars-class missions, but it's allowing
us to build strong international relationships and experiment
with commercial private sector capabilities.
It's clear that international involvement will be critical
to any Mars-class mission. Jeff Manber and NanoRacks have shown
the direct benefit of utilizing the commercial sector and
nongovernmental investments to augment government-sponsored
activities. Mars-class missions will drive technology and will
require international and commercial involvement.
ISS is the first critical step in exploration. Two other
critical components are the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, SLS, and
Orion. It's clear from all studies that a Heavy Lift Launch
Vehicle is needed. When I see Russia and China beginning to
talk about the need for a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, this
reaffirms our analysis.
Orion is making tremendous progress. The avionics testing
in Florida completed yesterday for the test mission this fall.
Orion is making tremendous progress. Eighty percent of the
software and basic avionics that will be used on the test
flight this fall are the same that will be planned for future
Orion flights. The test this fall also verifies heat shield
performance.
SLS tests and manufacturing is well underway in New
Orleans. Several barrel sections and domes are complete and a
vertical weld assembly is being installed in New Orleans that
will allow these sections to be welded into a tank.
Flight hardware for the Exploration Mission 1, an un-crewed
test of SLS and Orion, is beginning to be manufactured this
year in New Orleans. The European service module for the
Exploration Mission 1 is undergoing preliminary design review
in Europe. This is tremendous progress and reflects the
international involvement lessons learned directly from ISS.
There is real hardware in manufacture for the path to Mars.
Last, teams are working on the Asteroid Redirect Mission.
Solid trades in analysis and requirements are in work. There
are concepts being investigated--one that captures an asteroid
and returns it into a distant retrograde orbit around the Moon;
and another that removes a boulder from a large, potentially
hazardous asteroid and also moves this boulder to an orbit
around the Moon.
This mission leverages off of activities that were already
in work: asteroid identification, solar electric propulsion,
and uses the basic capabilities of SLS and Orion. The solar-
electric bus used for this mission will be the bus used for
Mars cargo-class missions. This mission allows for significant
operations development in the proving ground of space near the
Moon.
If international partners or commercial companies have
interest in a lunar surface operation, the techniques, lunar
gravity assists, et cetera, developed by the Asteroid Redirect
Mission, will enable NASA to support their efforts. The
Asteroid Redirect Mission will make significant progress toward
furthering the knowledge needed for a Mars-class mission.
NASA has a strong approach that extends human presence into
the solar system. This approach starts with the International
Space Station and a firsthand knowledge gained from the ISS and
systems, human health, international, and commercial
partnerships.
There's still a lot of work for ISS. The extension of ISS
operations to at least 2024 was critical. There's also a lot of
work needed to establish Commercial Crew capability to the ISS.
The approach, ISS, SLS, Orion, and the Asteroid Redirect
Mission, coupled with commercial and international involvement,
is well underway today. We have a sound approach that is
sustainable, leading to an eventual human presence on Mars.
Human exploration and pioneering are more than a single
hardware development activity but are an integrated series of
activities all of which are required to take us from here to
Mars.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:]
Prepared Statement of William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator,
Human Exploration and Operations, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify before you on NASA's exploration efforts.
Consistent with the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, NASA's space
exploration architecture is based on capabilities that will support
multiple missions and destinations, enable private access to--and use
of--space, and complement and advance other NASA, national, and
international objectives and goals. This architecture is intended to be
sustainable over the long term and affordable. This endeavor is
responsive to changing environments, including on-ramps for new
technologies, new approaches, and other space players. We also are
tightly coupling the planning of our science and technology portfolios
with this strategy.
Our architecture is designed for long-term human exploration of our
solar system, including the goal of human missions to Mars. NASA's
near-term strategy for exploration has four prongs: using the unique
environment of International Space Station (ISS) to conduct the
research and technology demonstrations necessary to keep our crews safe
and productive on long-duration spaceflights; partnering with
commercial entities to develop the capacity to transport cargo and crew
affordably to low-Earth orbit (LEO); working in cooperation with other
NASA Directorates to better understand exploration destinations and
improve our ability to work there; and moving outward to deep space
with Orion and the Space Launch System (SLS) to take us there. Orion
and the SLS are foundational capabilities for the implementation of our
integrated human and robotic exploration strategy. We will then travel
beyond LEO to the proving ground of cis-lunar space, where we will
expand and test our capabilities in a rendezvous with a redirected
asteroid in lunar orbit. These steps will build the foundation for
further deep-space exploration. With the technologies and techniques we
develop, we will enable expeditions to multiple destinations,
ultimately allowing us to pioneer Mars and other destinations as we lay
the groundwork for permanent human settlements in the solar system.
Conceived in coordination with our international partners, this
strategy maintains America's role as the world's leader and
foundational partner in space exploration.
The International Space Station: Learning the Fundamentals in LEO
The ISS is an unparalleled asset for the conduct of research and
technology development in a unique, microgravity environment. The full
focus of ISS is on operations and research to: (1) improve our ability
to live and work in space, including enabling human exploration beyond
LEO; (2) enable development of a demand-driven commercial
transportation and research market in LEO; (3) enable science,
engineering research, and technology development in the fields of
Earth, space, life (biological and human research), and physical
sciences; and (4) derive tangible benefits for citizens on Earth.
NASA's Human Research Program continues to develop biomedical
science, technologies, countermeasures, diagnostics, and design tools
to keep crews safe and productive on long-duration space missions. The
progress in science and technology driven by this research could have
broad impacts on Earth as it advances our ability to support long-
duration human exploration.
On board the ISS, we are conducting technology demonstrations and
development efforts to advance human and robotic exploration beyond LEO
and the Station also serves as the foundation for an international
exploration partnership. As an example of both the technology
demonstration and exploration partnership aspects of the ISS, NASA is
preparing for an extended duration, year-long human mission to explore
human adaptation to space. The mission, which will involve NASA
astronaut Scott Kelly and cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko of the Russian
Federal Space Agency, is slated to launch in March of 2015. The ISS
partnership is strong, and the agencies involved continue to work
together in the mutual pursuit of peaceful space exploration. Plans
remain on track for upcoming launches to the Station and return of
astronauts to Earth. Later this year, NASA intends to select from among
American companies competing to provide crew transportation to the ISS
beginning in 2017. In the meantime, NASA and its partners will continue
to work with each other to maintain the Station, where humans have
lived continuously for more than 13 years, and we are confident that
the agencies will continue to work as closely as they have in the past.
Two U.S. companies--Space Exploration Technologies and Orbital
Sciences Corporation--are supporting the ISS under Commercial Resupply
Services (CRS) contracts. Purchasing cargo and crew transportation
services from U.S. companies allows NASA to focus its efforts on
developing the vehicles that will take our astronauts beyond LEO and to
multiple deep-space destinations.
Orion and SLS: Traveling Beyond LEO
The dedicated NASA-Industry team, working across the Nation
utilizing all of the NASA Centers and our primary industry partners,
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, ATK, and Aerojet-Rocketdyne, is making
excellent progress toward developing the next capabilities for human
and robotic space exploration missions beyond LEO. The flight test
milestones driving the schedule include the uncrewed Exploration Flight
Test-1 (EFT-1) this December, the first uncrewed launch of Orion and
SLS on Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) in FY 2018, and the first crewed
launch of Orion and SLS on Exploration Mission-2 (EM-2) in FY 2021-22.
Both Orion and SLS are being designed to enable multiple missions and
destinations rather than being optimized for one particular mission or
architecture. Early missions will explore cis-lunar space and
rendezvous with and return samples from a near-Earth asteroid, as well
as demonstrate capabilities to support deep-space human research and
exploration in a safe and sustainable manner. SLS will be evolvable to
provide progressively greater lift capability, and, with Orion, will
enable mankind to successfully navigate the proving ground of deep
space, ultimately sending humans to a variety of destinations in the
solar system, including Mars.
The Orion spacecraft will be capable of taking humans farther into
deep space than ever before, to multiple destinations as needed, and
sustaining them in this challenging environment for longer than ever
before. The Orion spacecraft includes both crew and service modules,
and a Launch Abort System that will provide for crew safety during
ascent. Orion can fly a crew of up to four for 21 days; if used in
concert with a potential future Habitation Module, Orion will be able
to support larger crews on extended-duration missions. Orion has a
focused and rigorous step-wise test campaign to validate these
capabilities in the challenging deep-space environment.
This year's EFT-1 flight test will serve as a pathfinder to
validate innovative approaches to space systems development. The test
will demonstrate spacecraft post-landing recovery procedures and the
launch vehicle adapter, which will also be used on EM-1 and EM-2. EFT-1
will allow us to test the heat shield at about 85 percent of lunar re-
entry velocity, protecting the vehicle from temperatures near 4,000
degrees Fahrenheit. The EFT-1 flight test will significantly reduce or
eliminate 10 of the top 16 risk drivers for the first crewed flight
(EM-2). The flight test will also demonstrate 47 percent of the design,
development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) required for EM-2, and
includes 50 percent of the software needed for the first crewed
mission. Not only is EFT-1 testing hardware and software, but it also
is testing key processes which will be needed for EM-2.
The SLS is a heavy-lift launch vehicle that will transport Orion,
as well as cargo and other systems, with a range of lift capabilities
from 70 metric tons, evolving to 105 metric tons and eventually up to
130 metric tons, based on future mission requirements. The evolution of
the SLS lift capability fulfills specific, important roles within the
exploration architecture, with the 130-metric-ton vehicle supporting
full capability asteroid missions and ultimately missions to Mars.
In 2014, NASA will make significant strides in SLS development. The
testing of the Booster Qualification Motor-1 (QM-1) will occur this
year with a test firing of the motor, and fabrication of the QM-2 motor
will be completed. Manufacturing will begin on key components of the
SLS vehicle to be used for the EM-1 mission, including Boosters,
interim cryogenic propulsion stage (ICPS), and major components of the
Core Stage (tanks, engine structure, intertank, and forward skirt), as
well as the associated Structural Test Articles (STAs). Additionally,
the Vertical Assembly Center at Michoud Assembly Facility will be
completed this spring, as well as modifications to the A-1 Test Stand
at the Stennis Space Center for testing of the RS-25 Core Stage
engines. The SLS Program will conduct the detailed design review
(Critical Design Review) for the Booster and Core Stage elements.
Definitization of SLS contracts for Core Stages and the ICPS will be
completed this year, as well.
The Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) team at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) continues to make significant progress on
the necessary Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) infrastructure design,
development, and refurbishment to support SLS and Orion. KSC also is
providing valuable operations expertise to the SLS and Orion teams to
address operational issues in the design in order to help reduce
eventual production and operations costs. This is a key aspect of
assuring long-term sustainability for deep-space human exploration. In
2014, construction of new platforms in the Vehicle Assembly Building at
KSC will enable SLS and Orion stacking and preflight processing as
planned. Refurbishment and upgrades to a crawler-transporter, to
accommodate up to the 130-metric-ton version of SLS--a vehicle more
powerful than the Saturn V--are being performed to support the FY 2018
EM-1 flight of SLS and Orion.
Orion, SLS, and EGS teams are using the latest in systems and
manufacturing technology with the intent of developing the safe,
affordable, and sustainable systems this country needs to extend human
presence to Mars. For example, the Orion team is using time-triggered
Ethernet and is taking advantage of the standards for this technology
that are used in the automotive industry. The SLS team has mastered the
development of friction-stir welding on large structures to build the
SLS Core Stage, culminating in the most advanced and largest friction-
stir weld machine in the world. The EGS team has stripped out the old
copper cables from Pad 39B and replaced them with the latest in fiber
optics. These are three simple examples of how NASA's Exploration
Systems are utilizing and advancing the latest in technology.
In developing the Orion, SLS, and EGS, NASA is seeking to build a
sustainable National capability for the long-term human exploration of
space. By providing more volume and mass for payloads, SLS could enable
the simplification of the design and trajectories of future spacecraft.
The evolving capabilities of these systems will provide the Nation with
flexibility over the long term to achieve a variety of goals. As we
move out into the solar system to establish footholds in a variety of
locations, having such flexibility will be important, as future
missions can be built on what our astronauts and robotic probes learn
during earlier expeditions.
NASA's Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Division is pioneering
approaches for rapidly developing prototype systems, demonstrating key
capabilities, and validating operational concepts for future human
missions beyond LEO. This work is important to enable exploration
missions and ensure that they are safe, affordable, and sustainable.
Activities focus on crewed systems for deep space, and robotic
precursor missions that gather critical knowledge about potential
destinations in advance of crewed missions. Major products include
systems development for reliable life support, asteroid capture
mechanism risk reduction, deep space habitats, crew mobility systems,
advanced space suits, and autonomous space operations. As prototype
systems are developed, they are tested using NASA ground-based
facilities or flight experiments on the ISS. The AES Division works
with the Space Technology Mission Directorate to infuse technologies
into exploration missions, and with the Science Mission Directorate on
robotic precursor activities. The Space Technology Mission Directorate
supports exploration by investing in capabilities needed for deep-space
exploration including advanced life support, entry, descent, and
landing technologies, advanced space robotic systems, advanced thermal
management technologies, advanced batteries and fuel cells, lightweight
structures, cryogenic storage and transfer capabilities, and in-situ
resource utilization.
Asteroid Redirect Mission: Expanding Our Capabilities for Deep Space
Missions
NASA will employ SLS and Orion for an early human exploration
mission to perform pioneering human operations further from the Earth
than ever before, rendezvousing with and returning samples from an
asteroid redirected to at stable orbit around the Moon by the robotic
segment of the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM). The ARM is composed of
three separate elements: the detection and characterization of
candidate near-Earth asteroids; the robotic rendezvous, capture, and
redirection of a target asteroid to a stable orbit around the Moon; and
the crewed mission to explore and sample the captured asteroid using
the SLS and the Orion crew capsule. Each mission element is heavily
leveraging ongoing activities in NASA's Space Technology, Science, and
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorates. The mission
integrates a variety of technologies and capabilities important to
future crewed missions to Mars and other deep space destinations. These
include: the acceleration of high-power solar electric propulsion
development, which will power the ARM mission and also has future
science, commercial, and human exploration mission applications; and
rendezvous with and maneuver of a non-cooperative target in deep space,
which is enabling for missions to other deep-space destinations. The
technologies needed for this mission, for example in power, propulsion,
guidance and navigation, life support, and EVA, will be applicable to
future human missions to Mars.
The ARM mission is part of the overall plan for human exploration
and pioneering. It allows for operations in the proving ground of cis-
lunar space, builds off of the skills learned from ISS, prepares the
way to support potential lunar activities of our commercial or
international partners, and builds the skills and hardware needed for
Mars-class missions. This mission represents a technological
challenge--raising the bar for human exploration and discovery, while
advancing detection of near-Earth asteroids and bringing us closer to
human missions to Mars. NASA has already identified a number of
candidate asteroids for this mission; the Agency is also continuing to
refine estimated costs, and, at this time, we anticipate that the
incremental cost of the mission will be less than half of what the
initial Keck Study projected. The ARM would affordably support and
leverage multiple efforts across the Agency as it paves the way for
journeys to other destinations by helping NASA prove out its new heavy-
lift launch vehicle and exploration spacecraft in a near-term mission.
Exploring Mars and Other Deep Space Destinations
NASA has been executing an integrated human and robotic exploration
strategy leading to the human exploration of Mars. The capabilities
required for a human mission to Mars have been understood for some
time. The implementation steps and investments, partner approaches, and
technical pathways to Mars are varied. NASA will ramp up its
capabilities to reach--and operate at--a series of increasingly
demanding targets, while advancing technological capabilities with each
step forward. This will include early test and demonstration activities
in cis-lunar space as called for in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
The Agency is tightly coupling the planning of its science and
technology portfolios with this strategy where appropriate.
As noted earlier, the Agency will conduct a series of test and
demonstration flights, including EFT-1 with Orion flying uncrewed in
2014, EM-1 with Orion and SLS flying uncrewed in FY 2018, and the
crewed EM-2 mission with Orion and SLS in FY 2021-22. In this vein, ARM
will exercise these and other capabilities now in development. These
missions will help develop the foundation for longer journeys to
destinations which could include near-Earth Asteroids, the Moon, the
moons of Mars, and then Mars itself. NASA's Orion and SLS will enable
the Agency to send astronauts beyond LEO for the first time since 1972
and will provide the Nation a capability and architecture designed to
also allow flexibility, partnering, and technological on-ramps. This
strategy for human space exploration will ensure that the United States
fosters a safe, robust, sustainable, and flexible space program by
developing a set of core evolving capabilities instead of specialized,
destination-specific hardware, to achieve human presence in
successively farther destinations across the solar system.
NASA's exploration strategy is consistent with the Global
Exploration Roadmap (GER), released in August 2013 by NASA with 11 of
our international space agency partners in the International Space
Exploration Coordination Group. The GER helps demonstrate how NASA's
ARM and milestones leading up to it are important steps toward
realizing our goal of future missions to Mars together with our
international partners. It also demonstrates that NASA, together with
its international partners, shares a common interest in advancing a
unified strategy of deep-space exploration, with robotic and human
missions to destinations that include near-Earth asteroids, the Moon
and Mars. The roadmap begins with the ISS and includes a step-wise
expansion of human presence into the solar system, with human missions
to the surface of Mars as a driving goal. The roadmap expands on
missions to send humans to the lunar vicinity, a proving ground that
allows nations to advance exploration capabilities and learn to manage
risks while using the presence of the crew to explore asteroids and the
Moon. Our support of the GER helps our international partners seek
funding support for strong roles in implementing the international
strategy.
While there will always be challenges in involving multiple nations
with diverse national interests in an interdependent human space
effort, pioneering the solar system cannot effectively be undertaken by
any one country. The partners' participation in the GER demonstrates
their interest in an incremental, international approach to expanding
human presence into the solar system. Utilizing the key capabilities of
SLS and Orion, this roadmap builds on our collective successes to date,
highlights many exploration preparatory activities underway around the
world that will drive innovation and new technologies, and encourages
collaboration and integration between human and robotic exploration to
return great benefit to the global community.
NASA is also discussing with our ISS International Partners
exploration uses of and transition beyond the Station. These
discussions are being held under the auspices of the Multilateral
Coordination Board/Heads of Agencies to fully utilize the research and
technology development capabilities of the ISS and to explore
partnership opportunities based on the Station partnership.
Conclusion
NASA's exploration strategy will use an approach of pioneering
multiple destinations in the solar system. Over time, we will move
beyond conducting limited-duration forays to distant destinations and
begin to lay the groundwork to establish outposts, build settlements,
and utilize in situ resources as we expand the reach of humanity. The
key to realizing this goal will be to channel all of the factors that
have enabled our space achievements to date in a way that will ensure a
sustainable foundation on which future generations can continue to
build. So we will involve the private sector, taking advantage of
entrepreneurial drive and business acumen to find novel solutions to
the challenges we face. We will engage international partners, who will
bring to the table their own unique scientific and technological
expertise--expanding humanity's presence into space is too large a task
for any one country to go it alone. Finally, we will strive to achieve
the optimal balance of human and robotic exploration, taking advantage
of what humans and machines each do best as we search for life in the
universe and pursue a variety of objectives and goals. This long-term
effort will expand the sphere of human life and activity, and draw upon
the pioneering spirit and ingenuity in the face of the seemingly
impossible that have helped make the U.S. the exceptional nation that
it is.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to provide you with our progress and status over the past year as
we look forward to EFT-1 and the award of Commercial Crew
Transportation Capability later this year, and the first uncrewed SLS/
Orion mission in FY 2018. We have a strong strategy that extends human
presence into the solar system--beginning with Mars--in an affordable
and sustainable manner. ISS, Commercial cargo and crew, Orion, SLS and
the Asteroid Redirect Mission are all first steps in that strategy. I
would be happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of
the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Nelson. Senator Rubio is going to submit his
opening statement for the record. And, of course, for each of
you in your written testimony, it will be inserted as part of
the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Rubio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator from Florida
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having today's hearing on the human
exploration of space. It is important that the subcommittee examine
NASA's plans for human exploration, including collaboration with
international partners and commercial space opportunities. Clearly
today's hearing is timely given the impact of national security and
current geopolitical issues on our space program.
NASA states that its vision is ``to reach for new heights and
reveal the unknown so that what we do and learn will benefit all
humankind.'' I certainly agree with this vision. But in order to
achieve it, the agency must have a clear mission with a roadmap and
timeline outlining how that mission will be accomplished.
But a roadmap and timeline will only take the agency so far. NASA's
mission must also be accompanied by a strong commitment to achieving
it.
Obviously one of the main factors impacting NASA's mission and its
exploration programs is the agency's funding. The current budget
environment is forcing NASA to balance priorities, which makes it
difficult to achieve large exploration programs while sustaining
commitments to other scientific efforts that do not always get NASA in
the news.
Given this situation, NASA has to spend wisely. This is why I
believe that NASA must identify common sense savings to help prioritize
and fund space operations. One area where I believe NASA can reduce
costs is by reexamining its many underused and outdated facilities and
properties, which cost billions of dollars to keep and maintain.
Infrastructure that is duplicative or no longer needed for NASA's
exploration roadmap should be reallocated to commercial users and state
and local entities. This would result in savings for NASA, a reduction
in the Federal Government's footprint and burden to fund space
operations, and an incentive for commercial space activities.
The State of Florida and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have
already benefitted from reallocated infrastructure. But more needs to
be done at KSC and around the country. Every facility must examine ways
to reduce costs to ensure the agency can continue reaching new heights
and revealing the unknown.
One expenditure that continues to get attention and that is
relevant to today's discussion is the $70 million NASA pays Russia to
transport one astronaut to the International Space Station. This
underscores the fact that the United States, the Nation that has
accomplished more in space than any other, currently has no way of
transporting its citizens into space. The United States should never
have to buy tickets to space.
Now, the purpose of today's hearing is not to prosecute this issue.
This committee has had numerous hearings investigating why NASA has to
pay Russia for access to space, and how the agency and its commercial
partners are working to end this arrangement by achieving commercial
crew capabilities.
But that does not mean this committee should not examine who we are
paying for access to space, especially when it is a nation and a leader
with whom we have strong disagreements. Yesterday I highlighted the
fact that Russia uses its energy resources as leverage over its
neighbors, and I called for a long-term strategy to break this energy
dependence from Russia.
Well it would certainly seem that Russian leverage applies to
today's discussion. Not only is it about leverage, but it is also about
prestige. Vladimir Putin believes that Russia has lost its influence in
the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and he views himself
as a historic figure that's going to restore Russia to its rightful
place, in his mind, as a global power.
One way he sees to do this is to gain influence and leverage over
other countries. When it comes to space exploration, the Russians
clearly have leverage over the United States. The question is whether
Russia is using this leverage to influence the United States and NASA
and serve its own space exploration goals.
I hope this hearing and today's witnesses will help shed light on
that question and provide the Committee with a better understanding of
how the geopolitical situation in Ukraine is impacting America's space
program.
Thanks again to Chairman Nelson, and I want to thank the witnesses
for testifying before the Committee.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Eisenhower.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN EISENHOWER, CHAIRMAN EMERITUS,
THE EISENHOWER INSTITUTE; PRESIDENT,
THE EISENHOWER GROUP, INC.
Ms. Eisenhower. Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
this opportunity to testify before you today. It's an honor to
be here.
I hope to address the geopolitical issues surrounding
NASA's exploration efforts. It's impossible today to think
about space exploration strategy without putting it into the
context of today's events in Russia and Ukraine. I support
well-targeted sanctions on Russia which will have a direct
impact on President Putin's thinking. But for reasons I will
outline, I believe that rolling back space cooperation could be
counterproductive and damaging to our national security and our
long-term space agenda.
International cooperation is vital if missions of
increasing complexity are on the international agenda such as
Mars. During the Cold War, scientific and technological
communities played a vital role in serving as a bridge between
the United States and the Soviet Union and then Russia.
Especially during times of crisis, many multilateral and even
bilateral interactions survived the Soviet invasion of Hungary,
Sputnik, the U-2 incident, the Cuban missile crisis, as well as
the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and later Afghanistan.
But since the Cold War ended, U.S.-Russian cooperation on
nuclear security and in space has been at the heart of
enhancing the United States' national security.
The restrictive measures on space cooperation announced by
NASA last week, however, could well threaten our achievements
of the last 20 years. Here are three reasons why we need to
lift last week's ban on all cooperation outside of the
operations related to the ISS.
Number one, our national security is greatly enhanced
through cooperation. Since 1992, U.S.-Russian cooperation in
space has had a positive impact on the transformation of the
Russian aerospace industry, which was at the time of the Soviet
Union's collapse, a bastion of Soviet hardliners. U.S.
interaction with the Russians on the Shuttle Mir program and
then the International Space Station brought unprecedented
transparency and access to sensitive Russian facilities along
with a growing adoption in Russia of Western best practices.
Since then, the lessons we've learned together have
strengthened our overall performance in space beyond just the
ISS. And it provided an indispensable window into the workings
of the Russian military industrial establishment.
Number two, if the goal of limiting cooperation is designed
to send a strong signal to President Putin, we need to be
careful. It could well backfire. The Russian scientific
community, as opposed to the Soviet aerospace industry, has
traditionally been the most progressive of all sectors in that
country. But today, both sectors in Russia, both the scientists
and the aerospace industry, see themselves as our friends.
Rather than sending a strong message to President Putin,
suspension of cooperation will strengthen political hardliners
who would prefer that Russia ``go it alone'' or work with
countries more sympathetic to their views.
Number three, safety depends on trust. Much has been said
about our mutual dependency in space. Safety of human life
requires cooperation. At the moment, operations on the space
station are proceeding as normal. Trust, however, that
invaluable yet fragile commodity, can be easily eroded. NASA's
announcement last week that it will suspend ``the majority of
its ongoing engagements including high-level visits, e-mail
exchanges, and video conferencing'' could leave many of our
friends in Russia high and dry and potentially change the more
general atmosphere. Collective attitudes even in the Russian
space sector could change, which might negatively impact
working relationships on the ISS and potentially even safety.
In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that we know
from history that it is always easier to terminate space
cooperation than it is to get it started again. And we will not
be able to meet our long-term goals in space without it. We
should consider establishing the general principle going
forward that space cooperation should be exempt from sanctions.
Space has the unique capacity to serve the global community. It
can be a force for preventative diplomacy, transparency, and
for sustaining and building bonds among those who are willing
to put solely national pursuits aside.
The lynchpin of this goal must be engagement. We must be
wary of any space policy that provides only short-term symbolic
satisfaction just as we should be cautious of those in both
countries who might want to exploit this crisis for short-term
commercial or political gain. They could ultimately undermine
our long-term strategy in space and possibly jeopardize the
enormous human and financial investment we have already made.
Thank you very much. I look forward to questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Eisenhower follows:]
Prepared Statement of Susan Eisenhower, Chairman Emeritus,
The Eisenhower Institute; President, The Eisenhower Group, Inc.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify before you today. It is an honor to be here.
I hope today to address the geopolitical issues surrounding NASA's
exploration efforts. I served on the NASA Advisory Council for eight
years and was also a member of the International Space Station
Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. However, it was not until I
wrote Partners in Space: U.S.-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War
that I fully understood the operational and geostrategic benefits of
U.S.-Russian cooperation in space. It is this point that I would like
to examine with you today.
I would like to make it clear before I begin that it is essential,
I think, for the United States and its allies to respond to the ongoing
situation in Ukraine with appropriate and well-targeted sanctions on
Russia, which will have a direct impact on President Putin's thinking.
For reasons that I will outline, I do not believe, however, that
disengaging in space cooperation is in our national interest.
Near and long-term goals
It has long been NASA's strategy to engage our international
partners, who have diverse and valuable scientific and technological
expertise. This is vital if missions of increasing complexity are on
the international agenda.
This strategy has not only proven to be successful through
cooperation on the International Space Station, I believe it will be
the only way we can meet our long-term objectives of expanding
mankind's presence in space. The issue then is not about long-term
strategy, but about appropriate short-term measures--given the current
geopolitical environment.
As you well know, strategy has to be informed by a simple calculus.
Do the short-term and the long-term goals mesh? Or do short-term
actions jeopardize or pose insurmountable road blocks to meeting one's
overarching goal?
With those simple questions in mind, I was concerned to read NASA's
announcement last week that, in light of the Crimean crisis, NASA will
suspend ``the majority of its ongoing engagements'' with Russia, with
the exception of continued U.S.-Russian cooperation on the
International Space Station. I believe that sweeping limitations of
this kind are a mistake. A brief review of the past is instructive for
understanding the vital role the scientific and technical communities
have played and can continue to play in serving as a bridge between our
two countries, especially during times of crisis.
With the dawn of the nuclear age and later the space age, the
administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to avert the
possibility of fostering an atmosphere of ``paranoid uncertainty''
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1953, in his Atoms
for Peace speech, the president opened the way for the peaceful uses of
the atom. As part of that proposal he initiated, with the scientific
community, the Atoms for Peace conferences that brought countries
together from across the globe to exchange papers on power generation,
nuclear medicine and agriculture. These conferences, initiated first in
1955, survived the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Sputnik, the U-2
incident, the Cuban missile crisis--as well as the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968. As a result of that engagement, the Soviet
Union declassified a whole field of nuclear science: fusion.
In 1955, the International Council of Scientific Unions spearheaded
an international effort to study the Earth. Scientists from the United
States, the Soviet Union, and sixty-four other countries agreed that
the International Geophysical Year would be marked in 1957-1958. Among
its activities, it called for the Soviet Union and the United States to
launch artificial satellites and it created a forum for international
dialogue on science and the future of the Antarctic. This cooperation
also survived those above mentioned crises. Despite this, the work of
IGY continued and was augmented by U.S.-Soviet negotiations that led
the way for the Antarctic Treaty, signed by the United States, the
Soviet Union and ten other countries in 1959. This assured in
perpetuity the demilitarized status of an entire continent, preserving
the Antarctic for international scientific research--a benefit for all
of mankind. Had this U.S.-Soviet cooperation been suddenly cut off, who
knows what the impact would have been on Antarctica, then a contested
continent.
Even though the 1950s/60s are considered to be, perhaps, the most
perilous times of the Cold War, U.S.-Russian ``engagement'' was seen as
a way to gauge the thinking of our adversaries, to understand how the
other side approaches issues, and to build bonds among those who were
not their country's chief decision makers. In short: a way to mitigate
the potential for ``paranoid uncertainty'' by achieving some level of
transparency. At one point concern was such that there was not enough
engagement, prompting the successful effort to sign a bilateral General
Exchanges Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in
1958. Its role was to foster and, in some cases, mandate science,
academic and cultural exchanges. This agreement remained in force until
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Space cooperation was a promising new avenue of engagement with the
Apollo-Soyuz dock up in July 1975. But things began to change with the
U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics and the suspension of other
cooperative activities in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. Until the Shuttle Mir programs (1992) very few people from
the space community were schooled in the arts of East-West cooperation.
If not for the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet/Russian
programs might have been doomed to continue operating as rival
entities.
With this history in mind, let me explain at least three reasons
why U.S.-Russian space cooperation should be continued without
restriction.
First, decoupling could endanger safety.
Much has been said about our mutual dependency in space. It is not
just our reliance on Russian crew transport that is at issue, Russia
also relies on the United States for communications after launch and
for ISS operations. The Russians also have scientific instruments
integrated into our Martian and Lunar programs.
Even in day-to-day operations, it is logical and important to note
that safety of human life requires international cooperation. Last
week, NASA Associate Administrator Michael O'Brien wrote a memo to
employees explaining the termination of many important relationships:
``This suspension includes NASA travel to Russia and visits by
Russian government representatives to NASA facilities,
bilateral meetings, e-mail, and teleconferences or video
conferences. At the present time, only operational
International Space Station activities have been excepted.''
But where does work on the ISS begin and where does it end?
Continuous improvement and enhanced work on human safety and hardware
investment is often made through tangential contacts and interaction.
How easy will it be to draw the line between these baskets of activity
if there cannot be visits between our two country's facilities or even
e-mail exchanges? This could be of major significance if there is an
emergency in space that impacts the community beyond the operational
side of the ISS.
Second, if the goal of suspending cooperation is designed to send a
strong message to President Putin, we need be careful. It could
backfire.
While it is true that NASA and its Russian counterpart, Roscosmos,
have maintained a professional, beneficial, and collegial working
relationship through the various ups and downs of the broader U.S.-
Russia relationship, we are assuming that the ISS program will be
unaffected by the current policy. In other words, we are presuming that
Russian forbearance in this case is ``a given.'' In recent days,
however, there have been cries in the Russian Duma to respond to the
cancellation of contacts with the U.S.
Of greatest concern to me, however, is the long-term impact. The
Russian scientific community has traditionally been the most
progressive of all political sectors in that country. People who are
involved in international scientific cooperation are less likely to be
nationalists. Rather than sending a strong message to President Putin,
suspension of cooperation will strengthen hardliners who would prefer
that Russia ``go it alone'' or work with countries more sympathetic to
their views, such as China.
From a U.S. perspective, we cannot afford to lose another
generation of people who know how to cooperate with Russia on science
and technology, especially with baby boomers retiring.
Finally, those who are aggressively pushing for using space as a way to
``punish Russia'' should be reminded that contact with
countries that have such technical capabilities have, in the
past, been a way to enhance transparency.
In my book, Partners in Space: U.S.-Russian Cooperation after the
Cold War (2004), our research revealed:
Cooperation has had a dramatically positive impact on the
transformation of the Soviet hardliner aerospace industry,
bringing unprecedented transparency and a move toward western
best practices. Increased transparency has reinforced both
expanded commercial cooperation and the political goals of
civil space cooperation (e.g., nonproliferation).
Today, ``Curiosity,'' NASA's Mars Science Laboratory, has a Russian
instrument on it that uses adapted technology from the heart of the
Russian nuclear weapons program. This is a perfect example of how space
cooperation has aided in providing greater transparency on the Russian
program.
Partners in Space also found that cooperation with Russia brought
significant benefits, not only to our national security, but also to
our technical knowledge--as Russians were at that time the leaders in
long-duration space flight. Since then the lessons we have learned
together have strengthened our overall performance in space and have
provided an indispensable window into the workings of the Russian
military-industrial establishment.
Conclusion
As we know from history, it is always easier to terminate
scientific and technical cooperation than it is to get it started
again. Before we codify this potential mistake, we must recall that
there are ample historical precedents to support the value of science
and technology cooperation, even in times of crisis. Space cooperation
should be exempt from sanctions, just as Atoms of Peace and IGY
survived the tumultuous ups and downs of the Cold War.
Space cooperation is the ultimate global bridge, and international
space has unique capacities to serve the global community. It can be a
force for preventive diplomacy, transparency and for sustaining and
building bonds among those who are willing to put aside solely national
pursuits. Like terrestrial cooperation, exemplified by the
International Geophysical Year, space cooperation can serve as a
stabilizing factor in space.
The lynchpin of this goal must be engagement. Through consistent
interaction, larger goals can also be realized. This can only enhance
America's national security. We must be wary of any space policy that
provides only short-term symbolic satisfaction, just as we should be
cautious of those who might want to exploit this crisis for short-term
commercial or political gain. They could, ultimately, undermine our
long-term strategy in space and possibly jeopardize the enormous human
and financial investment we have already made.
On March 27, 2014, former Senator Sam Nunn and former Secretary
George Shultz wrote in a Washington Post op-ed, ``A key to ending the
Cold War was the Reagan administration's rejection of the concept of
linkage, which said that bad behavior by Moscow in one sphere had to
lead to a freeze of cooperation in all spheres.''
I would add that linkages between geopolitical crises and space
should be avoided in favor of more direct ways to impose sanctions.
Space can serve as at least one example of what it really means for the
global community to set goals and see them through for the betterment
of mankind.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Gerstenmaier, which policy is NASA
operating under? You heard what Mrs. Eisenhower just said about
the statements and there were conflicting statements. Which is
NASA operating under?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. NASA, as you've seen in the press
exchanges, we've exempted ISS operations from many of the
sanctions or any of the issues associated with activities. And
then we're reviewing, kind of on a case-by-case basis, the need
to go ahead and continue other activities. So there is an
activity, a scientific event, this summer in August called
COSPAR. That particular item has recently been accepted and
that event will occur.
So NASA's methodically going through each one of the events
and activities that are scheduled and we're determining which
ones are accepted and which ones we need to curtail.
Senator Nelson. What about the acquisition of the engine
RD-180?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. That's really not a NASA issue. That's
between United Launch Alliance and their activities.
I'm not aware of any discussion, but that's really not a
NASA issue per se.
Senator Nelson. OK. Well we will get into that in the Armed
Services Committee.
All right. Dr. Chiao.
STATEMENT OF DR. LEROY CHIAO,
FORMER NASA ASTRONAUT; COMMANDER,
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION EXPEDITION 10;
SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT,
THE SPACE FOUNDATION; AND CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
SPACE BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE USER PANEL
Dr. Chiao. Chairman Nelson, Senator Rubio, thank you both
for your service to our Nation and thank you for the
opportunity to present my views on the future of U.S. human
spaceflight.
U.S. human spaceflight program drives technology
development by employing our citizens to advance the state-of-
the-art of several fields. Many of these technologies are
adapted to purposes which improve the quality of life for
people here on the Earth. These are both very good reasons to
continue a robust human spaceflight program. But I believe that
the biggest return on our investment is prestige and
inspiration of the next generation, best put together by the
mission statement of the Space Foundation, ``To advance space-
related endeavors to inspire, enable and propel humanity.''
Human spaceflight has become woven into the very fabric of
our identity as a nation of explorers, innovators and
entrepreneurs. It was exactly the endeavors of Apollo and the
programs prior that inspired me and my generation. We must do
the same and more for our children and grandchildren and help
maintain our position as the world leader.
As you pointed out, I was a member of the 2009 Review of
U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee and the current space
policy is based on the major elements of one of the options
that was put together. However, the main and most important
message of the Committee and the report was that, in any case,
the program support needed to be robustly supported both
politically and financially. Strong bipartisan leadership is
needed to sustain the program across administrations otherwise
election-cycle changes could cause confusion and waste.
The Committee estimated back then that the 2010 NASA budget
would have been needed to increase by $3 billion and the buying
power of that sustained in following years, if we were going to
have a credible Beyond-Low Earth Orbit exploration program. The
implied message was that if we were unable to go ahead and
increase the budget by that much, then the proper thing to do
would have been to continue to fly space station and robustly
support ISS.
Unfortunately, that was not realized and NASA has been
directed to attempt to put together a credible Beyond-Low Earth
Orbit program within the framework of essentially a flat budget
in terms of buying power. The challenge of this cannot be
overstated. This is why you've seen a lot of conflicting
proposals and different changes over the last several years
settling now on the Asteroid Redirect Mission. But the first
crewed flight to that asteroid is currently being planned for
2021, which is still some years away. And that assumes that the
SLS is developed on-time with no hiccups and no reduction and
further reduction in budget.
Thus, the first step, I believe, to go from here to Mars is
to ensure that the budget is sufficient to support the program.
The realistic sustainable funding level for Beyond-Low Earth
Orbit maybe it should be determined a priori and then the
program scoped accordingly. If we cannot adequately support
both politically and financially the Beyond-Low Earth program,
then we should not attempt it.
The ISS is the current Low Earth Orbit human spaceflight
program. It serves not only as a common point for the
international partner community but as a critical part of
development of the Beyond-Low Earth Orbit program itself. The
most challenging aspect about flying Beyond-Low Earth Orbit is
not a technical challenge, it's not a matter of computers or
navigation or propulsion, but rather how do we keep astronauts
healthy that far away from the Earth for that long of a
duration of flights. The ISS is critical for the development
operational medical countermeasures to ensure that we can keep
our astronauts healthy as we contemplate these more demanding
flights.
The National Space Biomedical Research Institute, or NSBRI,
was formed about 17 years ago by NASA at the recommendation of
the National Academies. The NSBRI has built a consortium of the
finest Biomedical Research Universities and Institutes across
the country. And it's targeting applied research to develop
countermeasures to enable these Beyond-Low Earth Orbit flights.
This work maps to and adds unique value to NASA's Human
Research Program.
The ISS is currently scheduled for decommissioning in 2024,
although studies have shown that it can be safely operated
though at least 2028 and perhaps beyond. I believe that ISS's
life should be extended to as long as practical so that we can
go ahead and make sure that we are able to develop these
countermeasures.
Similarly, the NSBRI will reach its 20-year life contract
in 2017 and I believe it also should be renewed to ensure no
loss of continuity in these countermeasure developments.
Commercial flights to Low Earth Orbit is a logical
evolution. It was perhaps the most exciting yet the most
controversial part of the new space policy but I think the
commercial companies have made impressive strides. Already, we
have companies delivering cargo commercially to the ISS and we
have companies working, with NASA support, on developing the
capability to launch astronauts to the International Space
Station.
In contrast to what some people think, these commercial
efforts are not in competition with the NASA's Beyond-Low Earth
program. They're complementary in that these commercial flights
support the ISS which supports the Beyond-Low Earth Orbit
program. A sustainable Beyond-Low Earth program requires a
heavy-lift launcher. So the SLS is something that'll be
essential, either the SLS or something like it, for our long-
term goals in Beyond-Low Earth Orbit Space.
However, the current budget does not support a reasonable
plan, timeline, or complement of missions. As I mentioned
before, the first flight with a crew onboard is only planned
for 2021. That, again, assumes that everything goes perfectly.
It is important during the buildup of a flight test
program, or to have a buildup of a flight test program for a
new development, with meaningful and consistent flight rate
during the development of something like the Beyond-LEO
program. This is so you can develop the ground and flight
operations and maintain team proficiency. If the national
budget cannot be increased to support such a plan for SLS/
Orion, perhaps we need to start thinking about some other
possibilities. If we think of SLS/Orion as Apollo/Saturn
flights, maybe we need to take a look at possibly having
something analogous to the Gemini program.
The Orion is being currently built and the first flight, as
you heard, is scheduled for later this year using an existing
launch vehicle and upper stage. A similar configuration
possibly could be human-rated and be used in a series of
meaningful tests and development missions. Such a buildup
flight test program using this configuration could be planned
to thoroughly test Orion's systems, develop rendezvous and
docking operations, and include first destinations Beyond-Low
Earth Orbit. The latter flights will be used to characterize
the flight environment beyond Earth's magnetosphere, to develop
operations, and to characterize other issues as well; and test
biomedical countermeasures.
These flights would pave the way for the more ambitious
SLS/Orion missions. SLS will enable robust Beyond-LEO missions
which should include the development of a crew-tended base on
the Moon. This base would be used as a test bed for hardware
and operations to develop for eventual human spaceflights to
the surface of Mars.
While it would be technically possible to bypass the Moon
on the way to Mars, I believe it would be imprudent and would
add risk. The importance of thorough ground and buildup flight
test to ensure program success is clear has been demonstrated
many times and cannot be overstated.
One of the principal findings of our 2009 committee was
that the U.S. can lead a bold, new, international effort in the
human exploration of space. Having common, very visible, civil
space projects leads to generally better relationships between
partner countries and provides the potential for overall cost
savings. The ISS is a great example of such a program and
future human spaceflight programs should expand on this model.
Currently, for the last 3 years, the only entities able to
launch humans into space are Russia and China. Thus, China is
an obvious addition to the international human spaceflight
partnership, both for the ISS program and beyond.
China has successfully demonstrated rendezvous and docking
capabilities, extravehicular activity, and operation of a crew-
tended LEO space module. The Chinese have a long-term plan that
includes construction of a space station in 2018 with full
operational capability by 2022. China is in a unique position
to be a unique partner and, to the people who are concerned
about security and technology transfer concerns, I would say
that we can handle those things the same way we have with the
Russians. To my knowledge, there have been no improper
transfers in either direction.
America can and should be the clear world leader of
international space exploration both in LEO and beyond. What is
needed is consistent and sustained strong, political, and
financial commitments from the White House and the Congress.
NASA requires the resources to create a robust, integrated,
international exploration plan that will lead us into the next
exciting phase of human spaceflight.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Chiao follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leroy Chiao, Ph.D., Former NASA Astronaut;
Commander, International Space Station Expedition 10; Special Advisor
for Human Spaceflight, the Space Foundation; Chairman, National Space
Biomedical Research Institute User Panel
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Cruz, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for your service to our nation, and thank you
for the opportunity to present my views on the future of U.S. human
spaceflight (HSF).
The U.S. HSF program drives technology development by employing our
citizens to advance the state of the art in several fields. Many of
these technologies are adapted to purposes, which improve the quality
of life for people on the Earth. These are very good reasons for our
Nation to maintain a robust HSF program. But I believe the biggest
return on our investment is national prestige, and inspiration of the
next generation, as called out in the mission statement of the Space
Foundation: ``To advance space-related endeavors to inspire, enable and
propel humanity.'' HSF has become woven into the very fabric of our
identity, as a nation of explorers, innovators and entrepreneurs. It
was exactly the endeavors of the Apollo and prior HSF programs that
inspired me, and my generation. We must do the same and more for our
children and grandchildren, and to help maintain our position as the
world leader.
I served as a member of the 2009 Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight
Plans Committee. The Committee addressed both Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and
Beyond-LEO (B-LEO) exploration, and presented options to the
administration. The current space policy is based upon major elements
of one of the options presented in the Committee report.
However, the main and most important message of the Committee and
report was that in any case, the chosen HSF program must be robustly
supported, both politically and financially. Strong, bipartisan
leadership is needed to sustain programs across administrations.
Otherwise, election-cycle changes cause confusion and waste. If
credible B-LEO exploration was to be a part of the HSF program, the
Committee estimated that the 2010 NASA budget would have needed to be
increased by three billion dollars, and that the buying power of this
budget would need to be sustained in follow-on years. The implied
message was that if the budget could not be increased to this level,
then the United States should continue to operate the Space Shuttle and
International Space Station (ISS) and delay significant work towards a
B-LEO program.
Unfortunately, this has not been realized, and NASA has been
directed to attempt to plan a credible B-LEO program within the
framework of what has essentially been a flat budget, in terms of
buying power. The challenge of this cannot be overstated. This is why
we have seen changing proposals of the first destination and mission
over the last several years, settling recently on an asteroid-redirect
mission, with the first B-LEO astronaut flight planned for 2021. During
that mission, the crew is to fly in formation with the redirected
asteroid in Earth-Lunar orbit. But the plans for even these modest
goals within the schedule allow for practically no cost overruns. This
calls the credibility of the plan into question.
Thus, the first step to plan ``from here to Mars'' is to ensure
that the budget is sufficient to support the program. The realistic,
sustainable funding level for B-LEO should be determined, and then the
program scoped accordingly. If we cannot adequately support a credible
B-LEO program politically and financially, then we should not attempt
it.
The ISS defines the current LEO HSF program. It serves not only as
a common point for the international partner community, but also is a
critical part of the development of the B-LEO HSF program. The most
challenging technical aspect of the B-LEO program is biomedical: How to
maintain the health of astronauts during long-duration flight, both
inside and beyond the Earth's magnetosphere. Research aboard ISS is
critical to the development of operational medical countermeasures to
ensure astronaut health during these demanding missions. Created and
enabled by NASA at the recommendation of the National Academies, the
National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) has formed a
consortium of the finest biomedical research universities and
institutes in the United States, and funds targeted, applied research
to develop countermeasures to enable B-LEO flights. This work maps to,
and adds unique value to NASA's Human Research Program (HRP). NSBRI
also led to the creation of the Center for Space Medicine (CSM) at the
Baylor College of Medicine. CSM complements government-funded research,
both in space and Earth applications. ISS is currently scheduled for
decommissioning in 2024, although studies indicate that it can be
safely operated through at least 2028. ISS life should be extended to
at least 2028, and beyond if practical, in order to adequately support
the development of necessary technologies and countermeasures for the
B-LEO HSF program. Similarly, NSBRI will reach its twenty-year contract
life in 2017. It should be renewed, to ensure no loss of continuity in
countermeasure development.
Commercial flight to LEO is a logical evolution. NASA developed the
technologies for flights to and from LEO, and should now focus on B-LEO
goals, rather than LEO transportation. The commercial companies
currently receiving NASA support have shown impressive progress with
multiple cargo deliveries to the ISS, and progress towards crew
transportation capabilities to ISS. These efforts should continue to
receive full support, so that the U.S. can regain the capability to
launch astronauts to ISS in the next few years. This commercial effort
does not conflict with NASA's B-LEO exploration program. In fact, it
helps to enable B-LEO missions, by supporting important, critical-path
research and hardware test bed projects aboard ISS.
A sustainable B-LEO program requires a heavy-lift launcher. The
Space Launch System (SLS) is an essential part of the long-term
program. However, the current budget does not support a reasonable
plan, timeline or complement of missions. The optimistic schedule calls
for a flight rate of only 0.75 times per year once operational,
possibly in 2021, and only if development proceeds as planned with no
schedule slip or decrease in budget. If the budget cannot be increased
to accelerate this development and support a higher flight rate, then
the U.S. should consider slowing, or delaying SLS development.
It is important to have a build-up flight test plan with a
meaningful and consistent flight rate during development of a B-LEO
program. This is to develop both ground and flight operations, and to
maintain team proficiency. If the national budget cannot be increased
to support such a plan and flight rate for SLS/Orion missions in the
next few years, alternatives should be considered. If one thinks of
SLS/Orion as analogous to Apollo/Saturn flights, an appealing
alternative is an analogy to the Gemini program.
The Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV, Orion) is currently being
built, with the first flight test (without crew) scheduled for late
2014. The configuration for this first Exploration Flight Test (EFT-1)
includes the use of an existing launch vehicle and upper stage. A
similar configuration could be human rated, and be used in a series of
meaningful test and development missions.
Such a build-up flight test program using this configuration could
be planned to thoroughly test Orion systems, develop rendezvous and
docking operations, and include first destinations B-LEO. These latter
flights would build up flight experience beyond the Earth's
magnetosphere to develop operations, to characterize the environment,
and to test biomedical countermeasures. These flights would pave the
way for the more-ambitious SLS/Orion missions.
SLS will enable robust B-LEO missions, which should include the
development of a crew-tended base on the Moon. This base would be used
as a test bed for hardware and operations development for eventual HSF
flights to the Martian surface. While it would be technically possible
to bypass the Moon on the way to Mars, I believe it would be imprudent
and add risk. The importance of thorough ground and build-up flight
tests to ensure program success is clear, has been demonstrated many
times, and cannot be overstated.
One of the principal findings of the 2009 committee was that ``The
U.S. can lead a bold new international effort in the human exploration
of space.'' Having common, very visible international civil projects
generally lead to better relationships between the partner countries,
and provides the potential for overall cost savings. The ISS program is
an example of such a project, and future HSF programs should expand on
this international model.
Currently, and for nearly three years, the only entities able to
launch humans into space are Russia and China. Thus, China is an
obvious addition to the international HSF partnership, both for the ISS
program and beyond. China has successfully demonstrated rendezvous and
docking capabilities, extravehicular activity (EVA) and operation of a
crew-tended LEO space module. The Chinese have a long-term plan that
includes construction of a space station in 2018, with full operational
capability by 2022. China is in a position to provide hardware and
capability in-kind. Security and technology transfer concerns would be
handled exactly as the U.S. does today with Russia. To my knowledge,
there have been no improper technology transfers, in either direction.
America can and should be the clear world leader of international
space exploration programs, both in LEO and beyond. What is needed is
consistent and sustained, strong political and financial commitments
from the White House and Congress. NASA requires the resources to
create a robust, integrated, international exploration plan that will
lead us into the next exciting phase of HSF. It does not have it today.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Chiao, you're not suggesting that the
Asteroid Redirect would preclude the lunar mission?
Dr. Chiao. No, sir. Not at all.
In fact, if there is much to be learned from an Asteroid
Redirect Mission and as I--to avoid any confusion--I just want
to make clear that my statements about another program or
subprogram would be complementary to the SLS and the Orion.
Senator Nelson. And that was the program that you testified
where there would be a program on the surface of the Moon.
Dr. Chiao. Well, the Moon would be part of the SLS/Orion.
It would be follow-on to the Asteroid Redirect Mission.
Senator Nelson. Right. Thank you for clarifying that.
Mr. Manber.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY MANBER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NanoRacks, LLC
Mr. Manber. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator Rubio.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of
NanoRacks; a private firm which has developed a strong customer
base onboard the International Space Station.
Let me start by saying that NanoRacks' business model would
be commonplace in any industry other than human spaceflight. We
build our own research facilities with our own money. We market
these facilities and our services to customers at set prices.
We began the company 4 years ago without a NASA contract.
Instead, we negotiated access to the real estate onboard the
station and access to the NASA launch manifest. Critical has
been NASA's willingness to let us attempt a new way of adding
services and facilities to the ISS.
I applaud Mr. Gerstenmaier and the Space Station Program
Office, led by Mike Suffredini, for allowing a private company
to attempt this new role.
At NanoRacks, we are very much aware that we may lose our
money. We may fail in the marketplace to continue attracting
customers. Our equipment may not always work. But these risks
are not borne by the taxpayer; they're borne by our investors.
That is how business works in the real world and it's how it
should also work in outer space.
How are we doing? NanoRacks has flown 150 payloads to date.
We have 100 more in the pipeline and we are averaging just 9
months through the NASA safety process, a tiny fraction of the
usual timeline. Today, I can tell you that every single day,
NanoRacks is showing that more and more consumers, teachers,
researchers, companies around the world, see a value in paying
for station utilization and including station in their plans.
For us, for our customers, for the space station, and for
the intent of you in Congress, the payoff has been dramatic. We
estimate that today there is close to $150 million in private
capital from venture capital firms and personal investors now
supporting NanoRacks and our customers.
The resulting economic valuation is estimated to be much
higher, with significant job creation in California, Florida,
Texas, and elsewhere. The global recognition of the power of
American-style open markets is perhaps the single most enduring
result of the end of the Cold War, whether in former communist
nations, now in Low Earth Orbit and yes, I am sure, one day on
the Moon and Mars.
Because of the success of companies like NanoRacks
contributing to the International Space Station, I believe the
viability of market economics in outer space is finally coming
of age. NanoRacks' experience is showing there is little
difference between a government organization here or abroad and
a non-government institution in terms of customers. To us, they
are all customers. Our transactions are fundamentally
commercial in nature.
Our customer list today includes the German Space Agency
DLR, Romanian Space Agency, parts of ESA, and companies and
organizations from Israel, Japan, UK, Lithuania, Vietnam and
Saudi Arabia. In short, commercial space has become a new form
of international cooperation. And I'm really grateful for
everyone in the NASA International Office who's allowed
NanoRacks to begin to play this commercial role.
NanoRacks has already shown that the divisions and tensions
that have sometimes characterized the government versus
commercial debate in our industry are becoming, in our view,
outdated. For too long, we have considered space exploration as
an either/or proposition. Either the program is government-
driven, government-operated, and government-funded, or it must
be commercial. NanoRacks is showing, on space station, that
such distinctions are unreasonable and even unproductive.
The government can, therefore, play many different roles in
human exploration. It can be a facilitator, a landlord, and
almost always a customer. Depending on where we're going, the
private role could be smaller or greater. Whether we're
reaching for Mars or returning humans to the Moon, or exploring
asteroids, a flexible partnership is where and how we should be
heading. Turning to near-term Beyond Earth Orbit exploration,
we are committed to using ISS as a launchpad for this new
chapter in human spaceflight. We understand NASA's focused on
Mars.
At NanoRacks, we too may have Mars in our hearts but we
have lunar in our business plans. We can see well, replicating
ISS's new commercial environment with a lunar program, off-the-
shelf hardware, commercial economic efficiencies, low-cost
enough for student participation, market leadership in both
technology and market savvy. Sure we can do Mars, but that's
going to take a little more doing and understanding in the
commercial relationships.
Congress has stayed the course on the International Space
Station. Thank you for that. Your reward, our reward, is a
stable beachhead in space, both technically and now
commercially. I mentioned about our new relationship with NASA.
Yes, NASA is our landlord and safety official. But the space
agency is, every day, less and less of a competitor, leaving to
the private sector those services that we do best.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Manber follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey Manber, Managing Director, NanoRacks LLC
Chairman Nelson and Senator Cruz, thank you for the opportunity to
speak today. I'm pleased to lead NanoRacks, which is developing a
robust customer base for the U.S. National Laboratory onboard the
International Space Station. We regard our growing private business on
the station as a stepping stone for commercially undertaking projects
Beyond Low-Earth Orbit in partnership with NASA and other allied space
exploration programs.
Personally, I've spent the last three decades working to bring
about a more commercial space marketplace, whether by helping set up
the first investment fund on Wall Street for commercial space ventures,
working with PanAmSat to break open the Intelsat monopoly on
international communications, as well as helping open the door in
American-Russian relations on space and later assisting in the
marketing of the Russian space station Mir. The common thread has been
to help realize a human space enterprise that is driven by American-
style commercial principles and practices.
NanoRacks has for the past four years worked to realize a truly
commercial business onboard the International Space Station, using our
own capital and developing our own customer base. Today I'd like to
share with you some lessons we've learned about how human spaceflight
can be integrated into a commercial environment. In this way, everyone,
including NASA, our international space agency partners, private
customers and the American taxpayer can all benefit from a new approach
to space exploration that harnesses government and commercial resources
to achieve our goals in space.
Attempting Traditional Business in Human Spaceflight
Let me start by saying that NanoRacks' business model would be
commonplace in any industry other than human spaceflight. We build our
own research hardware with our own money. We market these facilities
and our services to customers at set prices. To date, we have purchased
and modified for use or built microscopes, centrifuges, biopharma
hardware and basic research platforms. All normal business. Except our
facilities are all located in Low Earth Orbit onboard the space
station.
We began the company without a NASA contract (and still don't have
a traditional one). Instead, we did negotiate access to real-estate
onboard the space station and access to the NASA launch manifest,
literally first to the empty nooks and crannies on cargo vehicles
headed to ISS. We flew our first equipment with no guarantee that
anyone, let alone NASA, would make use of our facilities. And there had
never been a proven commercial market for space station facilities, so
we couldn't forecast a market based on real world data. Given these
realities, we didn't even bother with traditional investors. We say at
NanoRacks that our first two investors were MasterCard and Visa.
But we believed passionately that given a permanent presence in Low
Earth Orbit, the robust transportation to and from the space station,
and NASA's willingness to let us attempt a new way of adding services
and facilities to ISS, that we would be successful. Rare, if ever, does
a market fail to develop when commercial practices are allowed to
thrive.
Placing our own hardware aboard a government facility is a critical
part of our success, as it allows us to use commercial practices to
design, manufacture and sell the facilities in what is still an
immature market. I applaud Mr. Gerstenmaier and professionals in the
Space Station Program office, from Mike Suffredini down to the working
level, for allowing a private company to attempt this new role. I think
their view when we offered to build and market our own equipment with
no NASA funding was ``let's take a shot and see if these guys can
produce.''
At NanoRacks, we are very much aware that we may lose our money. We
may fail in the marketplace to continue attracting customers. Our
equipment may not always work. But these risks are not borne by the
taxpayer but by our investors. That is how business works in the real
world and should also work in outer space.
A Pioneering and Growing Success
So how are we doing? NanoRacks has flown 150 payloads to date, we
have a hundred more in the pipeline, and are averaging just nine months
through the NASA safety and payload integration process, a tiny
fraction of the usual wait. Our prices are transparent and start low
enough to allow parents in school districts to pool their money to fund
a genuine space station project, and our facilities robust enough to
attract serous academic and industrial researchers. All without NASA
funding. When we do receive Federal dollars its because NASA or another
agency is buying our services just like any other customer.
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And today, I can tell you that every single day NanoRacks is
showing that more and more consumers, teachers, researchers, companies
and organizations around the world see a value in paying for station
utilization.
A final thought on the LEO market today. Just as NanoRacks has
customers that are commercial organizations as well as space agencies,
it also has space agencies that are competitors. One prime example is
the Chinese Space Agency, which is today marketing its space station
services to the international community, including my customers. One
international client was just about ready to ``jump ship'' to work with
China on a multi-year program. What stopped this client was the U.S.
commitment to operate the ISS until at least 2024.
But the Chinese space station program is already today a formidable
competitor for NanoRacks, and we are committed to assuring prices low-
enough, and services good enough, to thwart their efforts, not because
they are Chinese but because that is the nature of commercial
competition.
NanoRacks' progress in attracting customers and helping build up
the capabilities of space station is being noticed. For example,
Aviation Week recently described the growing commercial utilization of
the ISS as transforming the station from a marvel of engineering
construction into a thriving entrepreneurial marketplace. Music to my
ears.
I would not argue that a purely commercial approach should be the
only path to ISS utilization. There is always the more traditional,
public sector approach, using taxpayer funds, via NASA or CASIS.
Typically this involves peer review, with the highest priority given to
projects of agreed-on national priority. Our way allows a researcher or
entrepreneur who believes in their idea to avoid waiting and try an
experiment as quickly as they can develop their hardware.
For us, for our customers, for the space station and for the intent
of Congress, the payoff has been dramatic: we estimate that today there
is close to $150 million in private capital, from venture capital firms
and personal investors, now supporting NanoRacks and our customers. The
resulting economic valuation is estimated to be much higher, with
significant job creation in California, Florida, Texas and elsewhere.
If you add to this the private investment in commercial cargo vehicles
from SpaceX and Orbital, and resulting value of their future launch
markets, and the economic value of the International Space Station
ecosystem already totals several billion dollars.
By creating and realizing commercial value in human spaceflight I
believe we are dramatically increasing spaceflight's economic return to
our Nation and the world overall. And I am sure that our success in
using private capital to leverage government space efforts is
transferable not only to other human space stations in Earth orbit but
beyond Earth orbit as well.
The global recognition of the power of American-style open markets
is perhaps the single most enduring result of the end of the Cold War,
whether in former Communist nations, now in Low Earth Orbit and yes, I
am sure, one day on the Moon and Mars. Because of the success of
companies like NanoRacks working on the International Space Station, I
believe the viability of market economics in outer space is finally
coming of age.
The Synergy of Commercial and International Cooperation
NanoRacks' experience is showing that there is little difference
between a government organization here or abroad and a non-governmental
institution. To us they are all customers, and our transactions are
fundamentally commercial in nature: a voluntary exchange of reciprocal
value. Whether it's a U.S. Government R&D agency like DARPA or a
privately funded research foundation or a startup company in Silicon
Valley or a school in Colorado, our relationship is based on the
commercial contract. Just like in any business on the ground that books
a government customer for a plane ticket or purchasing software.
NanoRacks has already shown that the divisions and tensions that
have sometimes characterized the government vs commercial debate in our
industry are becoming outdated. Working together, we can assure human
spaceflight operations are undertaken in a commercially efficient
manner and reach out to the widest customer base possible, both
domestically and internationally, while accepting that much of the
space utilization market still requires some public support, especially
the first time we seek to go to Mars, or undertake an asteroid mission
or permanently colonize the Moon.
Our low costs, state of the art facilities, and speedy commercial
practices are just as appreciated by our international government
customers as by our private domestic ones. The internationals
appreciate our ``business as usual'' approach, or as we say: ``no
flags, just results.''
I have no doubt that the next chapter in space exploration must
involve a wide range of contributions from international partners, just
as any large commercial enterprise already does, from the automobile to
telecommunications sectors. On the space station, we have learned
without a doubt that other nations have no hesitation to work with a
U.S. company like NanoRacks for access to the International Space
Station. Our current customer list includes the German Space Agency
DLR, the Romanian Space Agency, parts of ESA, and companies and
institutions from Israel, Japan, UK, Ireland, Peru, Lithuania, Vietnam
and Saudi Arabia. In short, commercial space is another powerful form
of international cooperation, and we appreciate NASA's flexibility to
allow this new form of space diplomacy to flourish.
Allow me to add another valuable lesson we are learning from ISS
operations. And this is the value of the InterGovernmental Agreement
(IGA) which is the legal and regulatory framework for managing space
station operations among the ISS partners. This document, in my view,
provides a solid legal foundation for future international exploration
programs. There are certainly improvements to be made as we proceed
outward from Earth orbit, but the basic framework and principles of the
IGA have withstood many challenges over the past three decades and are
extremely sound.
Our commercial utilization of ISS is changing not just the
perception of commercial markets in Low-Earth Orbit, but the very
behavior of NASA and the other ISS agencies. Skepticism and
confrontation towards working side by side with a commercial company's
self funded hardware and services has given way to commercial
cooperation and shared resources.
To cite just one example, earlier this year we sought permission
from NASA to replace the Japanese Space Agency (JAXA) small satellite
deployers with our own, which are larger. We didn't ask NASA for
funding. We were willing to take the risk that we could find customers
if the deployers could hold bigger and more satellites. And we offered
slots for NASA use at no cost.
The result? In just seven months we designed the hardware, had it
manufactured, passed the NASA and JAXA safety gauntlet, launched it on
an Orbital Sciences Cygnus vehicle. With our space agency colleagues we
just deployed 33 CubeSats, providing market leadership for three
American companies and also introducing two nations, Peru and
Lithuania, to the space station. All with no taxpayer funding in that
project.
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We saw an opportunity for using space station as a small satellite
deployer and have invested in the necessary hardware and are finding
the customers. Not only is there strong commercial demand for this
service but government agencies are now taking advantage of the no-cost
slots. That is a win-win for everyone.
A Model for Beyond Earth Exploration
For too long we have considered space exploration as an ``either-
or'' proposition. Either the program is government driven, government
operated and government funded, or the program is commercial. NanoRacks
has shown on space station that such distinctions are unreasonable and
even unproductive. One can well envision a Mars mission which is driven
by the space agencies, with basic infrastructure provided by agency
funding. The private sector would be invited to risk capital and
develop supporting facilities and capabilities which we would then
market to space agencies, scientific organizations, and consumers.
The Government can therefore play many different roles in human
exploration. It would usually be a facilitator, frequently a landlord,
and almost always a customer. Depending on where we are going, the
private role could be smaller or greater.
Whether we're reaching for Mars, returning humans to the Moon,
exploring Asteroids, or conducting science or business on commercial
platforms of the future, a flexible partnership is where and how we
should be heading.
Turning to near-term beyond-earth-orbit (BEO) exploration,
NanoRacks is committed to using ISS as launch pad for this new chapter
in human spaceflight.
We understand NASA is ultimately focused on Mars. At NanoRacks, we
too may have Mars in our hearts but our business plan already includes
cis-lunar and lunar. We see a commercial market possible with the U.S.
Government as customer, modeled on the relationship we have developed
aboard space station. Other governments could also be commercial
customers--or if they want to be political partners, that is fine. But
commerce must be allowed to flow among the partners.
We can well see replicating ISS' new commercial environment with a
lunar program. Off the shelf hardware. Commercial economic
efficiencies. Low cost enough for student participation. American
leadership in both technology and market savvy.
For me, the key message here is that ISS is not just a science and
technology laboratory, but a powerful management and policy testbed for
how the government and private sectors can undertake space exploration
together.
And the Moon is not the only possible example. NASA could reach an
overarching agreement with ESA on a Congressionally funded,
administration approved, asteroid rendezvous program, for example, but
DLR and other individual national space agencies in Europe might be
pleased to go even further, working commercially with a company like
NanoRacks for use of privately-funded exploration hardware for research
and utilization aboard the visiting spacecraft. At NanoRacks, we would
be willing to self-fund a range of research hardware and services in
conjunction with such a mission if we were allowed to market
commercially to the user community. As on the space station today,
everyone gains. Less government funding and more commercial practices
that meet customer expectations, whether the customer is a research
organization or a space agency.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Congress has stayed the course on the International
Space Station. Your reward, our reward, is a stable beachhead in space,
both technically and now commercially. The space station is showing us
that incorporating commercial utilization into exploration programs
will indeed have huge benefits.
And, as on the space station today, U.S. Government strategy should
include a way to foster an ecosystem of commercial capabilities that
government needs--or very often, the government doesn't know it needs.
But given the freedom to operate, commercial will help lower the costs
and increase the benefits to government and industry alike of an
exploration program.
Finally, I mentioned about our new relationship with NASA. Yes,
NASA is our landlord and safety official. But the space agency is every
day less and less of a competitor, leaving to the private sector those
services we do best.
Taken together, the ISS has emerged as a true laboratory for
assuring that our future exploration efforts, like those now on space
station, reflect the best values of American leadership and market
ingenuity.
Thank you.
______
Bio of Jeffrey Manber, Chief Executive Officer, NanoRacks, LLC
Jeff Manber brings together three decades of experience in
realizing a more robust commercial space marketplace.
Currently, as Managing Director of NanoRacks from 2009 onwards,
Manber has steered the growth of the first company to own and market
its own hardware and services onboard the International Space Station.
NanoRacks enjoys a customer pipeline of over 100 payloads from both
domestic organizations and foreign governments, has flown over 150
payloads in the last two years and is a recognized leader in commercial
space services from sub-orbital to low-earth orbit and beyond.
Previous to NanoRacks, Jeff's accomplishments include:
adviser to the chairman of PanAmSat, the first privately
owned international satellite venture that ended the Intelsat
monopoly on international satellite communications and enjoyed
a billion dollar IPO;
co-developer of the first Wall Street fund dedicated solely
to commercial space (Shearson Lehman);
helping create the Office of Space Commerce at U.S.
Department of Commerce in the Reagan administration;
Managing Director of the American office for the Russian
space company RKK Energia. Jeff facilitated the current
cooperation between the Russian and American space programs.
Participant in formation of Energia-Lockheed (ILS), Energia-
Boeing (Sea Launch) and other key U.S.-Russian space ventures;
CEO of MirCorp. While leading MirCorp, Manber signed media
and entertainment deals with space tourist Dennis Tito,
Survivor television producer Mark Burnett and movie producer
James Cameron;
The author of numerous articles and several books, including
``Selling Peace,'' which chronicles Jeff's time working with the
Russian space program. Jeff was also the recipient of the American
Astronautical Society's 2011 Lloyd V. Berkner Award and NASA's
Exceptional Achievement Medal in 2012.
______
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Nelson. Mr. Manber, you remember, it was not too
long ago, that the space station was supposed to cease to exist
in 2015.
Mr. Manber. Yes, indeed.
Senator Nelson. And that was extended to 2020. Now,
fortunately, the President's budget has recommended that it be
extended to 2024. From this Senator's standpoint, that's the
least we could do. It seems to me, it ought to go to the end of
the decade. A $100 billion investment, with all the things that
you have just testified, clearly is worth continuing.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, sequester is part of the budget for the
next 8 years unless we can change it. And there are some of us
in bipartisan discussions right now that are trying to change
that. But limited funding is a reality over the course of the
next several years. So would you make the case for the record
of why the Asteroid Redirect Mission is doable, number one?
Number two, does not preclude a lunar mission. And number
three, develops the technologies and procedures that ultimately
get us to the goal of Mars in the decade of the 2030s?
Senator Rubio, my question was for Mr. Gerstenmaier to make
the case: with limited funding, which is a reality over the
course of the next several years, for Mr. Gerstenmaier--who is
the best of the best at NASA--to make the case of why the
Asteroid Redirect Mission, number one, develops the procedures
and the technologies ultimately going out to the goal in the
2030s of Mars. And, number two, does not preclude a lunar
mission as many people have spoken, it's like it's either/or.
And doing that within the context of limited budgets.
Go ahead, Mr. Gerstenmaier.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, if I try to go back to a little of
what's in my testimony, the way I would describe it is, if we
look at any other real activity, it's going to require a
significant amount of new investment on NASA's part. So if we
try to go to an asteroid in some distant location away from the
Moon, we need to build some kind of habitation module to
augment Orion; we need to do significant medical research to
keep our crews healthy during that period of timeframe; we have
to do significant life support development. So that's a lot of
new development to go do an activity there.
It has been talked about, you know, Mars fly by missions.
The same kind of thing. If you look at the amount of investment
that needs to occur to make that a reasonable mission to keep
the risk down to appropriate levels, a tremendous amount of
investment.
So the Asteroid Redirect Mission, it moves essentially a
piece of the solar system to a location around the Moon, which
we can get to with Orion and SLS the way they're being designed
today. So the first test flight of Orion, EM2, scheduled in
Fiscal Year 2021 to 22, that mission with crew can go to the
Moon and that vicinity with really no changes. The Asteroid
Redirect Mission doesn't require any changes to the Orion
capsule. Basically, we can do the spacewalk from the Orion
capsule the way it's designed. So there's no unique hardware
needed in that aspect.
It also puts us in the vicinity of the Moon, which we think
is a great proving ground to go understand how to operate in
space. You know, we'll now be 5 days away from an immediate
return back to the Earth. On station, we can get back in a
couple hours. But in the Moon environment, we're going to be
roughly 5 days away. We'll use lunar gravity assist, which will
be an important technique to learn how to operate for missions
to Mars and other locations.
Also, being in the vicinity of the Moon and lunar orbit, it
enables, if our partners want to do something on the surface of
the Moon or commercial activities want to do things on the
Moon, we can assist them in those activities with Orion. So it
effectively uses exactly what's there for SLS and Orion.
It also took advantage of what the Science Mission
Directorate was already doing. They already had an asteroid
observation campaign. So we did not have to build a unique
asteroid observation campaign. We leveraged off of what they
were doing already.
The Space Technology Mission Directorate, it was building a
solar electric bus to be demonstrated to look at electric
propulsion which will be needed for Mars-class missions. We'll
leverage off of their work that they are doing and it uses SLS
and Orion.
So it essentially uses all the pieces we had put together
and allows us to make signification and real progress toward
gaining the capabilities to go to Mars and it also enables the
Moon. So when you put all of those together for the modest
investment, I think it makes sense moving forward.
And last, the bus that we used to actually go capture this
asteroid and redirect it around the Moon, that same electric
bus would be used for cargo missions to Mars. So that is
extensible going forward.
So when I look at the options in front of us, I look at the
budget environment that you've described; the uncertainty. This
is the way we can make significant progress moving forward that
keeps us focused toward Mars but doesn't preclude the Moon but
yet it keeps us moving in a positive direction and helps us
work with our international partners and stay a leader in
space.
Senator Nelson. Just to close this out and it is affordable
within that time-frame over the course of the next five to 10
years of which, if we went directly on a mission to go back to
the Moon's surface, you're talking about a lot more money. Is
that correct?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes. The difference would be to go back
to the surface of the Moon with a human-class mission. We would
have to build a human lander to go to the Moon. We don't see
that as necessary for Mars.
You know, to enter into the Martian atmosphere with its
atmosphere is much more difficult. To do entry, decent, and
landing into Mars requires new technology development. We think
that's where our focus ought to be for the next big lander. We
ought to be looking at how we land a crew-size capability on
Mars and not go back and replicate to some extent what we've
already done on the Moon for Moon landing.
But now, if a commercial company would like to do that or
an international partner would like to do that, we will be
capable with Orion to be in cis-lunar space and we can assist
them with those activities.
So we don't preclude that activity but, in this limited
environment, we want to invest in the technologies that have
not been done and the things that will help us and keep us a
leader and keep us moving forward toward ultimately Mars-class
missions.
Senator Nelson. But you said, ``But we don't preclude that
activity.''
So if the geopolitics suddenly changed, that it was
important to the United States to get back to the surface of
the Moon before, say, the Chinese would with humans, if that
were the case, we'd already have a lot of the technologies
developed and we'd be sitting out there close to the Moon
already. Is that correct?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes. That's correct.
And I would say that, if you look today, countries talk
about building an Orion-class capsule that could go to the
vicinity of the Moon. There's no country doing that today other
than us. And this vehicle, you can go down to Florida and you
can see today it's getting ready for the test flight this fall,
that is the basic capsule shape that is mostly the avionics it
will fly, it's mostly the software that's there. So we are
again, being a leader and we are building a capsule that allows
us to take humans Beyond-Low Earth Orbit to the vicinity of the
Moon.
The SLS is also another rocket that other countries talk
about. They've conceptualized that. They're not putting
hardware together. You can go to New Orleans and you can
actually see barrel sections of the oxygen and hydrogen tanks,
actually manufactured as test articles. You can see this large
welding equipment; the largest in the world. It will use state-
of-the-art reaction friction stir weld to assemble tanks. We're
moving forward. We're at the Marshal Space Flight Center today
doing acoustic tests of scale model rockets firing solid rocket
motors next to the model to go look at launch activities down
in Florida. We're modifying Pad 39B to accommodate the new
launcher capability.
So this country again is leading and we are making real
investments and real hardware that you can go out, see, visit,
touch, and they all fit in this ability to get humans Beyond-
Low Earth Orbit, which other countries talk about but we are
still the leader in doing that and our activities will enable
and we'll be able to cooperate with them and their activities
as they move forward.
And the global exploration roadmap shows their desires,
what they would like to go do. It also shows where we fit and
then this allows each country to kind of decide for themselves
what their role is in in human spaceflight and how they want to
fit and build hardware. But we are the leader with the SLS and
Orion that we're building today.
Senator Nelson. As I turn to Senator Rubio, would you
describe one of the activities of a rover on the surface that
could be controlled from Orion with Orion being in cislunar
space?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We see the ability of getting into the
vicinity around the Moon, either a Lagrangian point, which is a
gravity location around the Moon, or in a distant retrograde
orbit. We can use crew members in Orion to actually command a
robotic space craft or robotic rover on the surface of the Moon
and do activities.
There's a lot of interest on the far side of the Moon.
There's some discussion that's occurred about putting a radio
telescope on the far side of the Moon where it's shielded from
the radio interference from the Earth. You could actually
deploy that antenna on the far side of the Moon from an
orbiting space craft from Orion orbiting the Moon and actually
do those kinds of operations on the surface of the Moon.
And we did a demonstration of that from space station. We
actually used space station to drive a rover in California that
deployed essentially a plastic antenna on a simulated lunar
field in California to go actually see if we could go do that.
So, when we get to this vicinity of the Moon, we can do robotic
activities on the surface of the Moon from Orion as a temporary
space craft in a roughly five to six day orbit around the Moon.
Senator Nelson. Thank you very much.
Senator Rubio.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman, for holding
this hearing and all of you for being here.
Let me just start by segueing from that last question that
was asked. To be clear, as we talk about this long-term goal of
landing on Mars in 2030, I think what you're describing is that
all the things that we are doing now in the interim all build
upon each other. In essence we're creating capability along the
way. These are not separate programs though they have separate
aims and segues. The general path, as it is with all space
exploration, is that previous missions create technological
platforms upon which we can build in the future. That they're
all moving, ultimately, in the same direction. So we're not
really duplicating efforts here, we're kind of constructing one
on top of the other. Is that an accurate assessment?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think that's accurate. And I think the
other thing we need to take advantage of with this group here
is that there's also significant advantage we can get from
international partners in this activity and also from the
commercial sector. So we need to change our thinking a little
bit where it used to be an only government program and look at
creative ways we can use the commercial sector and use the
international community to augment what we're doing.
Senator Rubio. Well, that's what I wanted to segue to.
Before--and I've already cleared this with the Chairman. I want
to submit a statement for the record by Mr. Dean Cheng, who's a
Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He is an
expert in our relations with China regarding space matters.
He's unable to participate in today's hearing but he has
submitted his testimony and he brings forward some interesting
perspectives on the issues we'll discuss today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow,
The Heritage Foundation
Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation
My name is Dean Cheng. I am the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese
political and security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. The views I
express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as
representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.
My comments today pertain to prospects for cooperation with the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in outer space. While the United
States should not avoid cooperation with any country out of fear, at
the same time, it is vital that cooperation occur with full
understanding and awareness of whom we are cooperating with, and that
such cooperation serve American interests.
In the case of the PRC, the combination of an opaque Chinese space
management structure, a heavy military role in what has been observed,
and an asymmetric set of capabilities and interests raise fundamental
questions about the potential benefits from cooperation between the two
countries in this vital arena.
To this end, it is essential to recognize a few key characteristics
of China's space program.
First, that China possesses a significant space capability in its
own right, and therefore is not necessarily in need of cooperation with
the United States. Too often, there is an assumption that the PRC is
still in the early stages of space development, and that we are doing
them a favor by cooperating with them.
Second, that the Chinese space program is closely tied to the
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), their military. Therefore, any
cooperation with the PRC in terms of space must mean interacting, at
some level, with the PLA.
Third, that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level
political support, is a source of national pride, and is therefore not
likely to be easily swayed or influenced by the United States, or any
other foreign actor.
These three issues, in combination, suggest that any effort at
cooperation between the United States and the PRC will confront serious
obstacles, and entail significant risks.
A Brief Overview of China's Space Program
The PRC is a major space power, by which we mean that the PRC has
the range of space-related capabilities to be able to access and
exploit space for its own purposes, at times and places of its own
choosing. Indeed, the PRC has a range of space capabilities that
arguably equal or exceed those of Europe, and places it ahead of every
other Asian country.
China possesses three space launch facilities (Jiuquan, Taiyuan,
and Xichang), and is building a fourth on Hainan Island, in the
southernmost province of China. From their current launch facilities,
they can place satellites into low, middle, and geosynchronous orbit,
relying entirely on the Chinese-manufactured Long March family of
launch vehicles. It is expected that China will be launching the new
Long March 5 heavy lift vehicle from the new Hainan facility.
Satellites. China fields a significant array of satellites.
It has a communications satellite array that includes both
domestically produced and foreign satellites, including at
least two military communications satellite constellations: the
Shentong and Fenghuo systems.
It is only the third country to field a satellite navigation
and positioning system, the Beidou/Compass system. The Beidou
system was first orbited in 2000, with several satellites in
geostationary orbit. This was an active system which required
the user to transmit a signal to help determine the user's
location. This active signal also provided a communications
channel, which could handle messages of up to 140 characters.
The Compass portion (sometimes referred to as Beidou-2) is
comprised of 35 mid-earth orbit satellites. The Compass portion
is currently being deployed and is in regional service.
It has a weather satellite constellation that includes both
sun-synchronous and geosynchronous meteorological satellites
(the Fengyun series). There has been discussion in the United
States of relying on China for weather satellite data, due to
repeated delays in replacing American meteorological
satellites. The Chinese 2007 ASAT test involved a defunct FY-1C
weather satellite in Low Earth Orbit.
It fields a number of earth observation and reconnaissance
satellites. The Ziyuan series was the first Chinese observation
satellite to be able to beam their data to Earth. It is the
product of a joint development effort between the PRC and
Brazil (in the form of the China-Brazil Earth Resources
Satellite, or CBERS).
China has also fielded a large array of small satellites,
including the ``Practice,'' ``Experiment,'' ``Gaofen,'' and
``Innovation'' series. These have carried a variety of
payloads, including synthetic aperture radars (SAR), electro-
optical imaging equipment, and monitoring equipment believed to
support military intelligence requirements. A Chinese small
satellite, believed to be from the ``Experiment'' series, was
recently launched with a robotic arm. Previously in 2010, two
``Practice'' satellites deliberately ``bumped'' each other in
orbit.
Manned Space Program. China has an active manned mission program
that involves the Shenzhou manned spacecraft, which has now had ten
successful flights (five manned, five unmanned), and the Tiangong space
lab. With the completion of the 2013 Shenzhou-X mission, China has also
successfully demonstrated docking capabilities between the Shenzhou and
Tiangong spacecraft, as well as relatively extended duration missions.
(Shenzhou-X lasted 15 days.)
To support the manned program, China established its first overseas
bases with mission support facilities in Swakopmund, Namibia, and
Kiribati in the South Pacific. Chinese documents have indicated that a
space station, perhaps in the 60-80 ton range (smaller than the U.S.
Skylab) is expected to be deployed by 2020.
Lunar Exploration Program. The Chinese lunar exploration program
has launched two lunar orbiters (Chang'e-1 and -2), as well as a lunar
rover (the Jade Rabbit on Chang'e-3) since 2007. The lunar rover has
exhibited erratic performance, but is still considered fairly
successful. The final part of the Chang'e program is expected to be a
lunar sample retrieval mission in the 2017-2018 time frame.
At this point in time, there is no official indication of plans for
a manned mission to the moon. In the 2011 Chinese white paper on space,
it was indicated that initial studies were now underway to explore the
requirements for such a mission.
Supporting these various space efforts is a major space industrial
complex mainly comprising two state-owned enterprises (SOEs): the China
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China
Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). Each of these SOEs
is believed to employ over 100,000 people and is dedicated to producing
aerospace and missile-related systems. Thus, unlike their American
counterparts (e.g., Boeing and Lockheed-Martin), these companies do not
manufacture aircraft or helicopters. On the other hand, not only do
they produce rockets and satellites, but also ground test equipment and
specialized vehicles associated with space launch, etc. In this regard,
they somewhat resemble large, vertically integrated corporations.
The two SOEs are also responsible for manufacturing missiles for
China's Second Artillery, the equivalent of the Soviet Union's
Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as tactical missile systems for the
PLA as a whole. Thus, subordinate research academies within the CASC
manufacture not only the Long March space launch vehicle, but also the
DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which comes in an anti-
carrier variant (the DF-21D) and serves as the launch vehicle for the
Chinese anti-satellite system (the SC-19).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sean O'Connor, ``PLA Ballistic Missiles,'' Air Power Australia,
APA-TR-2010-0802, April 2012, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-
Ballistic-Missiles.html#mozTocId274945 (accessed April 7, 2014).
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The PLA and China's Space Program
The close links between the Chinese military and space are not
restricted to the Chinese military and space industrial complexes. The
PLA has consistently played a key role in the Chinese space effort, and
China's space program is closely identified with the military. Indeed,
the Chinese space program dates its creation to October 8, 1956, with
the establishment of the Fifth Academy of the Ministry of Defense by
Dr. Qian Xuesen.
Since then, the Chinese military has played an essential role in
the management of various Chinese space programs. This is reflected
today in the continuing role of the General Armaments Department (GAD)
in Chinese space affairs. The GAD is one of the four General
Departments of the PLA (along with the General Staff Department,
General Political Department, and General Armaments Department) that
form the core of the Central Military Commission (CMC). It is the CMC
that actually manages the military. The Ministry of Defense, by
contrast, has little authority, compared with the two uniformed vice
chairmen of the CMC.
All of China's space launch facilities, mission control facilities,
and tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) facilities, including its
fleet of space tracking ships, are all subsumed within the GAD. Indeed,
the facilities are typically referred to by their base number in
Chinese literature: Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center is Base 25, while
the Xichang Satellite Launch Center is Base 27. Not surprisingly, the
various facilities and ships are all staffed by units of the GAD. The
personnel are trained at the Academy of Command Equipment and
Technology, which is a subsidiary organization of the GAD.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``2007 Researcher Application Form,'' Academy of Equipment
Command and Technology, China, http://yz.chsi.com.cn/adv/zbxuyjs.htm
(accessed April 7, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, China's manned space program is managed through the
GAD. The website of the China Manned Space Engineering Office (CMSEO)
lists the chief commander of the program as Zhang Youxia. General Zhang
Youxia was appointed director of the GAD in October 2012.\3\ Another
deputy chief commander (apparently the senior deputy) of the program is
Major General Niu Hongguang, one of the deputy directors of the PLA
General Armaments Department. Other deputy chief commanders are drawn
from the military and space industrial complex, reflecting the
integrated nature of this key industrial sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Management,'' China Manned Space Engineering, http://
en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=40 (accessed April 7, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, it is useful to recall that the U.S. prohibitions currently
limiting the ability of the PRC to launch any satellites containing
American parts, under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations
(ITAR), were put in place due to the transfer of aerospace-related
information to Chinese companies in the 1990s. As the Cox Commission
report noted, information that was given to China regarding items such
as the fairing on the Long March-2E space launch vehicle led to
improvements for Chinese ballistic missile programs. In particular, it
led to changes in both rocket design and Chinese operations that
improved the reliability of all Chinese rocket launches.\4\
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\4\ Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, The Cox Report
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1999), pp. 220 and 221-222.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Meanwhile, China's satellite programs are often linked to military,
as well as civilian, users. Like the United States, for example,
China's satellite navigation system (Beidou) is linked to the
military--specifically, the General Staff Department Satellite
Navigation Station.\5\ There is even a website celebrating this
organization's achievements.\6\ Military officers from key GSD
departments apparently were part of the design effort for the Chinese
weather satellite system. Military participation in space efforts is
hardly unique to the PRC, but should serve as a reminder that any
interaction with the Chinese space program will almost certainly mean a
PLA role and presence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``A Record of the General Staff Department Satellite Navigation
Station's Commitment to the Beidou Navigation System,'' Xinhua,
November 9, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/09/content_2524730.htm
(accessed April 7, 2014).
\6\ ``The Stars in the Sky Join Beidou,'' http://
military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/71065/370766/ (accessed April 7, 2014).
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More to the point, there is no obvious civilian counterpart to the
PLA in terms of China's space efforts. The most regularly mentioned
equivalent to NASA is the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA).
But the head of CNSA is typically described in Chinese writings and
press coverage first as a vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology (MIIT), then as a deputy director of the State
Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National
Defense (SASTIND), before being mentioned as the head of the CNSA. This
suggests that the position of the CNSA is a third-tier bureaucracy,
standing below the key super-ministry for advanced technologies, and
the managing authority for China's military industries (SASTIND).
By contrast, the PLA is a key part of the Chinese power structure.
One of the key positions for the top Chinese leader (Xi Jinping, Hu
Jintao, Jiang Zemin) is the chairmanship of the Central Military
Commission. That role, along with being General Secretary of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is what vests Xi, Hu, and Jiang with
their power--head of the Party and head of the military. In short,
bureaucratically the CNSA is dwarfed by the Chinese military (which may
explain the CNSA's absence from the top echelon of Chinese manned space
management).
The Importance of Space to the Chinese Leadership
As early as 1958, months after Sputnik was placed into orbit,
Chinese leaders saw the development of space capabilities as reflecting
on China's place in the international order. In May 1958, Chairman Mao
Zedong advocated the creation of a Chinese space program, declaring at
the Second Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress, ``We should also
manufacture satellites.'' \7\ This high-level support has varied at
times, but space has generally been seen as contributing to
``comprehensive national power'' by facilitating national economic
development, strengthening military modernization, and supporting the
legitimacy of the CCP. It is therefore not surprising that senior
Chinese leaders have made sure that they are present for key events
such as the inauguration of satellite communications in the 1970s, or
the launch of China's first manned spacecraft, the Shenzhou-V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Deng Liqun, ed., China Today: Defense Science and Technology,
Vol. I (Beijing: National Defence Industry Press, 1993), p. 356.
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For China, its space program is emblematic of its steady
advancement since 1949, especially since most of it has been
accomplished through its own efforts. When the Sino-Soviet split
occurred in 1960, Chinese access to foreign technology was abruptly
ended. As a result, China had to rely on its own efforts, in what
became known as the ``two bomb, one satellite'' program. This effort
saw the Chinese focus their national energies to develop an atomic
bomb, a hydrogen bomb, and a satellite. This reflected the long-
standing dual-use nature of China's space efforts--if China was to have
a full-fledged nuclear deterrent, it would have to develop a delivery
system, which in turn could also serve as a space launch vehicle.
``Two bombs, one satellite'' went beyond a programmatic objective,
however. The term also referred to the idea of homegrown development of
advanced capabilities. Because of the Sino-Soviet split, as well as the
ongoing Cold War with the United States and broader isolationist
policies pursued by Beijing, Chinese development of these capabilities
would have to wholly rely on their own resources. The phrase ``two
bombs, one satellite,'' therefore, came to also be associated with the
idea of indigenous development and self-reliance. These characteristics
remain hallmarks of today's Chinese space program. For the same reason,
Chinese ``firsts'' (e.g., the first satellite and first manned mission)
tend to be of longer duration and incorporate more extensive tasks than
other nations' firsts.
Moreover, in keeping with the Chinese memory of the ``Century of
Humiliation,'' Beijing will want any cooperative venture to be, at a
minimum, on a co-equal basis. For the PRC to be treated as anything
other than a full member in any program or effort would smack of the
``unequal treaties'' that marked China's interactions with the rest of
the world between 1839 and 1949. For the same reason, China has
generally been reluctant to join any organization or regime in which it
was not party to negotiating. For the CCP, whose political legitimacy
rests, in part, on the idea that it has restored Chinese pride and
greatness, this is likely to be a significant part of any calculation.
At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant
political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their
writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to
establish ``space dominance,'' in order to fight and win ``local wars
under informationized conditions.'' \8\ The two SOEs are seen as key
parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the
opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems
engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China's
commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of
China's aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.\9\
From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on
preserving its interests.
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\8\ For a more extensive discussion of this topic, please see Dean
Cheng, ``China's Military Role in Space,'' Strategic Studies Quarterly
(Spring 2012), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/spring/cheng.pdf
(accessed April 7, 2014).
\9\ Mark Stokes, ``China's Commercial Aviation Sector Looks to the
Future,'' Futuregram 09-002, Project 2049, http://project2049.net/
documents/chinas_commercial_aviation_sector_
looks_to_the_future.pdf (accessed April 7, 2014).
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China's space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as
much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and
foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in
space, these reflect positively on both China's growing power and
respect (internationally) and the CCP's legitimacy (internally).
Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to
be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As
China has progressed to the point of being the world's second-largest
economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to
why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on
anything other than its own terms.
Prospects for Cooperation
Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation
with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited.
China's past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures
(Sino-Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.-China cooperation in the
1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino-European space cooperation on the
Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of
the joint Russian-Chinese Phobos-Grunt mission is likely seen in
Beijing as further evidence that a ``go-it-alone'' approach is
preferable.
Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant
interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial
complex in expanding cooperation.\10\ Moreover, as long as China's
economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values
space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space
expenditures--making international cooperation far less urgent for the
PRC than most other space-faring states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ It is worth noting here that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs is not a part of the CCP Politburo, a key power center in
China. Thus, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is muted, at
best, in any internal debate on policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in
Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones.
China's space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world.
Even such basic data as China's annual space expenditures is lacking--
with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important,
China's decision-making processes are little understood, especially in
the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite
(ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision,
and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at
cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners
and ultimate beneficiaries--with a real likelihood that the PLA would
be one of them.
It is possible that the Chinese could be induced to be more
transparent when it comes to space, although the unwillingness of
Beijing to engage in substantive discussions on space during the last
several Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) would cast doubt on
this. But this would argue for a ``go-slow'' approach, at best. There
is room for greater interaction, especially in the sharing of already
collected data, such as geodesy information. As both sides set their
sights on the moon, exchanges of data about lunar conditions and the
lunar surface and composition all might help create a pattern of
interaction that might lower some of the barriers to information
exchange. Even there, however, concerns on both sides about information
security and electronic espionage, etc., is likely to raise serious
doubts about how freely one should incorporate data provided by the
other side.
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Foundation upon request.
Senator Rubio. Let me begin with Mr. Chiao.
You mentioned at the close of your statement about
cooperation with China. Let me step back for a second and make
this statement. We Americans have always viewed the space
program, certainly over the last 30 years, as the sort of
cooperative effort that certainly helps our country but
benefits all mankind. We have viewed it as a peaceful endeavor,
as one that can unite people. And we've seen the fruits of it.
But I think we have to be cautious that not every other
nation has the same view. And I think China, in particular,
potentially poses a pretty interesting dilemma for us.
Certainly, their space program has military components but our
space program is largely driven by civilians and has civilian
methodology and civilian purposes behind it. Everything in
China, but certainly the space program, is deeply linked with
the PLA and we've seen evidence of that.
I would like to further expand on your statement. I don't
necessarily disagree. I think in an ideal world we'd want
cooperation with China because I think three major powers:
Russia, China, the United States, and others working in
conjunction if in fact we all have the same goals could
certainly get some of these things accomplished quicker than
any nation on its own.
But I also think we have to be careful and realistic that
we not somehow ascribe our motivations and our way of thinking
to that of another nation that perhaps has different aims and
goals for their space program. And one of the things
highlighted in Mr. Cheng's written testimony is warnings about
that. About the threat of potentially seeing China use
sensitive information to improve its ballistic missile
capability and so forth but also its desire to quite frankly
achieve what they have termed in their own documents and what
they've called ``publicly spaced dominance'' which is not our
view. The U.S. may not necessarily want to be the most
predominant space power in the world but we don't view it as a
dominance thing, we view it as something that great nations do
great things.
So here's my question. In your experience, and certainly
because you've mentioned it in your statement, do you see any
potential pitfalls in terms of the Chinese attitude toward the
space program that, in essence, places them in an incompatible
position to our own view to what space would be about?
Dr. Chiao. Well, as you mentioned, and it's certainly true
that the Chinese space program is part of the PLA. Now
operationally-wise and that's kind of the way I think, you
know, I understand the distinction but functionally it
shouldn't make that big of a difference because we're going to
be working on civil space together. And they have a clearly
delineated civil space part of their organization. So I don't
see any roadblocks if you were or stumbling blocks.
And as far as sensitive information is concerned, we have
the safeguards that we can put in place to make sure that there
are no technology transfers. And, you know, frankly from a, you
know, guidance system, ballistic missile, those aren't things
that we work on at NASA. We don't develop the guidance systems.
We certainly don't transfer it to our partners, information
like that. So it can be controlled and, as far as I know, it
has been very successfully controlled with our relationship
with the Russians.
Senator Rubio. And again, the ideal scenario is that we
will be able to work with them cooperatively. I'm just always
concerned that somehow we ascribe to other countries the same
motivations as we have for the space program and sometimes that
those things don't add up. And I just want to make sure we're
cautious about it.
But I think we all share your goal that it's achievable
which I pivot now to Ms. Eisenhower. Your testimony was about
Russia. And I think you've raised some interesting points in
your testimony about things like, for example, Russian
scientists associated with the space program are among the most
progressive elements in their society. We've enjoyed a
depoliticized relationship with them. There are safety concerns
about cutting off interaction with them. And then, there is
also the geopolitical realities of what's in the headlines
today.
Maybe you can expand a little more about how we balance
those two things. Because, on the one hand, there are
geopolitical realities. I think when Americans see what's
happening in Ukraine, we're uncomfortable about the fact that
we're paying the Russians, what is it, $70 million to go to the
International Space Station. Does that sound right?
Ms. Eisenhower. $70 million, sorry?
Senator Rubio. To get a seat on those flights to the
Russians. And we depend on them now, for being able to launch
our astronauts into space. So you can understand the political
implications of that domestically. And on the other hand,
you've raised some interesting points--that we don't want to
cut off the scientific community in Russia that quite frankly
has been either apolitical or in many instances progressive in
their thought process in terms of our ongoing relationship. And
it seems to be a relationship that has some significant degree
of cooperation. It has been able to overcome whatever is
happening politically elsewhere in the world.
So perhaps you can describe that a little bit better for
us, in terms of what that actually looks like and maybe a
roadmap moving forward. How do we navigate this, for a lack of
better term, minefield that we find ourselves in?
Ms. Eisenhower. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio. And
it's an honor to be able to be here and to share my thoughts on
this.
I think this requires, this particular situation, requires
a really very nuanced strategy, which of course is extremely
difficult in today's world where everything is given a bumper
sticker.
But, nevertheless, I think a nuanced approach is important
for the simple reason that we want to make sure that we express
our displeasure with Russian behavior and we do so in a way
that's going to count with the regime and not punish our
friends. Everybody here would back me up by saying that the
Russian space program is much more important, or space in
general, is much more important in Russia than it is in this
country. If this were a Duma committee you would have a full
room. And so, yes, it has a very big symbolic impact but we
have made extraordinary strides in the last 20 years in
bringing what was a very, very hardline aerospace community
into a fully cooperative relationship as we've seen over the
last years.
If I were in charge, I would be organizing sanctions to hit
exactly at the heart of the regime itself: the people that
interact most directly with Vladimir Putin and others. If the
scientific community had that kind of influence with Vladimir
Putin, they would not have lost their recent political struggle
over the future of the Russian Academy of Sciences. So I do
think that that is the political reality on the ground.
And then, the other point I would make is that none of this
interaction--maybe this'll actually have some reference to Dr.
Chiao's comments too, about China. I think we engaged the
Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, not
to do them a favor, but to do us a favor. We gained
unprecedented access to some of their most sensitive
facilities. And I think, if you look at the China situation, we
could well gain every bit as much as they might in terms of
understanding how our two societies view this area; this
important area. And also, to give us that kind of access in
China. Bill Gerstenmaier played a leadership role in
negotiating the agreements with the Russians at that time.
By the way, I have supplied a copy of Partners in Space for
both of your committees. But, in any case, I think this is
really about enhancing our national security and we want to
make sure that we don't jeopardize our national security and
lose access to those important communities while we're
legitimately trying to express our displeasure to the Russian
government.
Senator Rubio. And for my last question, I'm going to go
back to you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. Because I think in your written
testimony--but this is open to any of you that want to answer
this because I think this is a more, big picture, broader
question. In your statement you talked about, ``To channel all
of the factors that have enabled our space achievements to date
in a way that will ensure a sustainable foundation under which
future generations can continue to build.''
I think the key part for me of that statement is ``future
generations,'' and the notion that we, the scientists, and
engineers, many of the people who will work on a 2030 mission,
for example, to Mars are probably in college right now or
thinking about what they're going to major in in college. And
maybe I'm wrong, but my sense is that on a broader public
level, we have lost some of the public awareness and/or
enthusiasm of what the space program means for the country and
I would like some ideas from you, I guess--from all of you, is
on how we can reinvigorate that.
I think if you go back to 1960 when President Kennedy made
that promise that we would land a man on the Moon and return
him safely to Earth by the end of the decade. That invigorated
the American scientific community to pursue with a singularity
of mind that in addition to getting a man on the Moon and back
safely--also, by the way, held all sorts of commercial and
technological advances that were made that benefited our
economy and society as a whole.
How can we reinvigorate a new generation of people to
pursue or go into these fields that are so critical? And, more
importantly, this comes at a time when we have so many young
people looking for what fields they can go into that will
provide stable middle and higher income jobs that have
opportunities in the twenty-first century.
So my question is, from a public relations standpoint, what
can we do more of to excite people about what space can mean
for the future and get more people interested in the fields
that are the backbone of any successful endeavor?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. That's a really difficult question. You
know, my experience has been, when I expose folks to what we're
doing, and by folks I think of high school kids and maybe even
grade school kids, they really get excited about what we're
doing. And sometimes, when I'm kind of down in the mouth and
I'm worried about sequester and budgets and I look at all the
wonderful things we could do if we just had more budget, I
forget what we're really doing with what budget we have. And
when I go expose some of the younger students and some of the
other folks to what we're doing, that excitement comes back and
then I get reenergized again and then I'm ready to go back.
So one thing is I think we need to talk to them unashamedly
about what we're doing and capture some of the excitement. If
you think about what we're doing with the Asteroid Redirect
Mission, we're going to grab a piece of the solar system. We're
going to deflect it around the Earth to deflect it around the
Moon and insert it into a distant retrograde orbit around the
Moon where our crews can go visit with the Orion capsule.
You know, that seems kind of boring to some folks when I
say all that, but if you talk to some kids that are still
excited and they think about what we're really doing. That has
a really big deal. I mean, to think we are moving a piece of
the solar system for our use that will allow us to learn skills
and techniques that we need to push human presence into the
solar system, that's a pretty awe-inspiring statement.
But I think we get so jaded because we talk about, well,
why don't we go to the Moon or let's go to Mars or let's do
some other activity. We have kind of, you know, buyer's
neglect, right? It's when you order your food in the cafeteria
and you look over and you see what somebody else ordered and
immediately what's in front of you isn't appetizing enough. You
wish you would have ordered what that person next to you did. I
think we have to ignore that a little bit and look at what
we've got in front of us with what this country can do and not
be ashamed about what we're doing moving forward.
Senator Rubio. And by the way, I agree. I don't have a
public polling on this, but I would venture to guess that an
extraordinary majority of Americans are unaware of the
existence of that program. Certainly, a majority of our young
students and even in college are. And I think we can rally
people around a goal like that. But I think it's incumbent upon
us in public office who hold these positions and have these
forums to make people aware of what we are actually working on;
what's there and what's tangible.
I think people would be very excited about thinking that
they can be a part of an effort like that or the subsequent
efforts that will lead off from that. But, I just think a lot
of people don't even know we're doing that.
Dr. Chiao. Yes.
If I could just add a few comments. I think the key to
stoking public interest is flying more and flying sooner. And
that's why, in part of my remarks, I talked about the need for
possibly a new subprogram of earlier flights that'll get us
Beyond-Low Earth Orbit more quickly.
Now, as I mentioned also, for a sustainable program we do
need a heavy-lift like SLS and Orion. And as Mr. Gerstenmaier
has said in his remarks, I think it's absolutely possible that
we can do these kinds of missions in partnership with
commercial and with international and just do it maybe without
a lot of big increases in the NASA budget.
So I'm hopeful that somewhere in the near to mid-term we
could be flying more often and doing missions that will develop
the capabilities to go back to the Moon one day and then on to
Mars. And this could be done in partnership context that might
be very creative and synergistic, and I think that's the way we
get the public interested in space flight.
Senator Nelson. That is correct. Once you start putting
Americans on American rockets, the interest in this country is
going to accelerate. How many people have come up to me and
said, ``Did you see the movie `Gravity'?''
They were really gripped by it. Well, they'll be gripped
when you see an American climbing in and strapping into an
American rocket. And that's the good news. The bad news is that
it's going to be 2017, in a commercial rocket getting to the
space station (unless you believe some of the commercial
companies that it can be 2016) and then Orion, it's not going
to be until 2021. But these things are complicated. And so,
that excitement will return, but we've got to keep pressing on.
We have a vote that is called right now. I'm going to
recess and quickly run over and vote and come right back. It's
not a series of votes. It should be just one vote. And then
we'll continue with the questions.
Thank you so much.
The Committee will stand in recess.
[Recess.]
Senator Nelson. The Committee will resume.
I want to ask a quick question to a couple of you about the
Commercial Crew Program.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, would additional funding allow us to
speed up the start of domestic flights to the ISS?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think probably the most critical
thing, right now, is to get the funding that we've requested in
the President's budget in 2015. We have a pretty solid plan.
Our goal is to select a commercial provider in the August-
September timeframe of this year. But to make that happen and
to be there by the end of 2017, as we've talked about, I really
think we absolutely need the funding level that the President
has requested. 2015 is probably one of the more critical years
in terms of where we are in development and activities. This is
really the paramount year of when we need funding for
Commercial Crew.
So any support we can get to the President's budget for
that activity is absolutely what we need.
Senator Nelson. So the answer to that question is yes,
because the President had requested about $850 million for
Commercial Crew and over the years, it had gone from $300
million to $500 million to develop Commercial Crew, start the
competition, et cetera. Then, to about $700 million and now,
for Fiscal Year 2015, which starts October the first, to about
$850 million. I agree with you. And so, the answer is yes.
All right. Dr. Chiao, how does commercial access to Low
Earth Orbit support further exploration?
Dr. Chiao. Well, thank you for the question, Senator.
Commercial Crew will ensure access for Americans to the
International Space Station. And, as you know, the ISS is
designed to be operated internationally. That is we need the
crews on the ground and in the station working together in
conjunction in order to effectively operate the space station.
The space station is critical for developing the medical,
biomedical countermeasures that we need to develop and test
before we can send crews Beyond-Low Earth Orbit for any
significant period of time. The station also, of course, serves
as a test bed for technology, although, new things that we're
going to be developing and proving out before we can start
sending crewed missions farther from the Earth for longer
durations. And so, in that way Commercial Crew very directly
supports the station which directly supports the Beyond-Low
Earth Orbit program.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Eisenhower, what lessons might we take
away from the lapse of, what you mentioned in your testimony,
of the need for engagement even during diplomatic uncertainty?
The space cooperation agreement between the U.S. and the then-
Soviet Union lapsed in the years following the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. So, given from that lapse, what was the key to
managing the relationship through the many crises of the Cold
War?
Ms. Eisenhower. Yes. Well, that lapse between Apollo-Soyuz
and 1992, when the Shuttle Mir program began, I think the
biggest impact is that a generation of people were lost who
actually knew how to engage in this kind of cooperation. Even
though Apollo-Soyuz was not a huge program, there just wasn't
the interactive culture that we see today. And one reason I'm
concerned about space being involved in some of the measures we
may take in response to the current crisis, is that it would be
very sad to see anyone disengaged in this process because long-
term space cooperation is going to require the Russians, long-
term. So I think that gap does have workforce implications.
As I said in my testimony too, the Eisenhower
Administration, which was the administration in power during
the dawn of the space age, was also at a crucial stage at the
early part of the dawn of the nuclear age. The administration's
greatest concern was the development of what might be called
``paranoid uncertainty.'' And so, these kinds of programs, that
would be the Atoms for Peace conferences and later work around
the International Geophysical Year, as being stabilizing.
Precisely because of those crises.
It's remarkable that, after Sputnik actually, the United
States and the Soviet Union engaged in private negotiations
over the future of Antarctica. And it was as a result of the
International Geophysical Year and the fact that that
cooperation had not suspended that we managed to demilitarize
an entire world continent, which is the Antarctic, which is,
today a real test bed and laboratory for the scientific
community.
So I think I know that, as NASA understandably goes through
reviewing all of its programs, that it should not underestimate
the importance of these conferences because the conferences, in
fact, at least in the past, played a very significant role.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Would you think that that kind of
collaboration that you're talking about, would that ultimately
apply to our relationship with other up-and-coming space-faring
nations, such as China and India?
Ms. Eisenhower. Well, I must say that since cooperation
with Russia since 1992 has been so successful, I really do
think that it makes a lot of sense to be able to look at
engaging other countries more deeply. As I said earlier, we
didn't do it for them, we did it for us.
We not only had an opportunity to create more transparency,
but actually, in the book Partners in Space, which I've left a
copy for you, we learned a lot from the Russians too. They had
some very, very elegant ways of handling complex situations on
a very tight budget; which actually could be quite a useful
discipline these days. I'm sure the Chinese have very
interesting and creative ways of looking at solving exactly the
same kind of problems in space.
And that's why I alluded to the fact that we in fact have a
much more robust effort in space today because we did share
ideas about how to solve some of these common problems. What
came together, actually, at the end was something that was
really not like the way it was for anybody before, because we
put different scientific and technological perspectives
together to create something very robust and strong.
Senator Nelson. I must admit that I am shaped in part by my
past experiences, for example, in the 1980s. Out of an
administration policy in the 80s, they started allowing
American satellites to be launched on Chinese Long March
rockets. And basically, there was supposed to be a firewall
there so that they couldn't get our technology and, of course,
they got it.
It's many years later and we're confronted with a different
situation but I personally think that the United States was
taken advantage of by the Chinese, because of some well-meaning
folks in the administration at the time. They were so well-
meaning, in my judgment, they were naive. But it is what it is.
And here we are in the year 2014. What do you think, Dr. Chiao,
about the international collaboration? And do you think we can
best engage now with these up-and-coming space-faring nations?
Dr. Chiao. Well, Senator, I have to admit, in the early
90s, you know, I grew up during the Cold War. And so, during
the early 90s I was one of the skeptics of working with the
Russians and I was wondering why we were doing this. But after
I went over there and started working with these folks and
started seeing the advantages and the big picture of
international relations and bettering things not only between,
you know, cooperating in space but just between our two
countries, I became a big believer in international
collaboration.
And so, I think there will always be risks. I mean, first
of all, you know, it's clear to everyone, I think, that the
Russians are trying to spy on us, you know, the Chinese are
trying to spy on us. We're spying on everyone. Everyone is
spying on everyone else. So there are going to be attempts to
get technology from all sides. And I think the safeguards that
we have in place, that we put in place with the Russians, as I
mentioned earlier, I'm not aware of a single instance where
there has been an inappropriate transfer of technology.
Now, to your point about the Chinese missile technology
being benefited from some American advice, unfortunately, that
was due to naivete at the time I think. It was not anything
directly to do with launching satellites on their vehicles
except that in the post-accident investigation some American
experts naively gave them some advice which probably helped
improve their rockets. That's something we've learned from I
think. And as I mentioned, the safeguards that can be part of
the safeguards that I think will make the benefits of
cooperating more outweigh the risks of possibly losing some
technology.
As Ms. Eisenhower mentioned, you know, we can gain great
insights into the Chinese program. I've been over and seen
their technology. I've seen their rocket factories and their
space center, their control center, and it's impressive.
They're doing some really impressive things. And I think we
would gain a lot of insight into what they're doing in this
relationship if it were to happen.
Senator Nelson. Ms. Eisenhower, do you have an additional
comment on how did the United States still manage to benefit
from the Russian technologies even though we beat them to the
Moon? As a matter of fact, they had a big rocket and it blew up
on the pad. And it was their Moon rocket.
Ms. Eisenhower. Are you talking about the period after----
Senator Nelson. Back then.
Ms. Eisenhower.--started cooperation? Yes.
Senator Nelson. Right.
Ms. Eisenhower. Well----
Senator Nelson. With the Soviet Union.
Ms. Eisenhower.--first of all, some of this is outlined in
my book. But I think we learned, for instance, a number of
things that the Russians, for instance--and actually probably
Bill ought to be answering this question in large measure. But
we learned a lot about how a completely different group of
people would launch rockets. They were organizing their rocket
launches--having their rockets horizontally maintained and then
hoisting them up and launching them. I think we learned a lot
about redundancy. Help me here, Bill. It's been a long time
since I wrote that book, but we used numerical redundancy. They
used functional redundancy. Would you like to maybe--could I
cede my----
Senator Nelson. Absolutely.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I'd just say, again, we've learned an
awful lot and both Jeff and Leroy can also add their own
experience.
When you solve the same physical problems and you see
another country, another group of engineers, solve that same
physical problem, and because you've been isolated, you see
their solution to that problem in a very different light. And
that gives you tremendous exposure. And that's one of the true
advantages of cooperation.
Space station is amazing. If you look at the heat shield,
the debris shields on the outside of a space station, there's a
Russian design for--and we're all protecting ourselves from
micrometeorites; small penetrations of the pressure shell.
You can see how the Russians solved the problem; you can
see how the Italians solved the problem; you can see how the
Europeans solved the problem; how the Japanese solved the
problems; and how the U.S. solves the problems. And every one
of them does exactly the same job but they do it in a very
different manner, fundamentally. So you gain a tremendous
experience and a new way of thinking that really helps you
become innovative and creative as you try to build your next
program.
Dr. Chiao. Yes. I would totally agree with all of those
comments. You know, during my experience with the Russians, as
I mentioned earlier, my going in position was why are we doing
this, our stuff is so much better. What do we have to learn
from them? But the fact is, as Mr. Gerstenmaier just said, the
fact is that when you see perspectives, you know, different
cultures, different entities, solve the same technical problems
from a different approach, it really broadens your own
perspective. And personally, having done spacewalk using both
American spacesuits and Russian spacesuits, I really came to
admire certain elements of their design, the approach and it's
really been eye-opening. And that's just one example.
Senator Nelson. So did Sandra Bullock in ``Gravity.''
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. Another example, I think, is the Russian
engine, RD-180. It creates temperatures and pressures because
of some alloys that they are very, very good at. That it's an
extraordinary engine. And we have the license to it, but we
don't know all the techniques of how they blend all those
metals to be able to have that kind of thrust in an engine.
Mr. Manber, tell me about--why do you, or do you think that
we are nearing a point where commercial exploration could
become viable?
Mr. Manber. I know we are, because I have a lot of
customers.
[Laughter.]
Senator Nelson. And why is that, that we're nearing that
point?
Mr. Manber. Well, apologies, Mr. Senator.
I think the primary reason is the stability we enjoy and
policy in Low Earth Orbit. We have actually reached a moment in
the midst of all the politics we have in Washington where this
Congress has given us, in the space community, at least the 10-
year horizon. And that is extraordinary.
And we were about to lose a significant foreign customer,
in fact, to the Chinese. And the reason was, they were looking
at a long-term project onboard space station and we were
planning to bring down the station in 2020 and the Chinese are
out there commercially marketing this space station now. And
when the announcement was made that we're extending it to at
least 2024, they came back.
And so, I think the answer to the question, and I think
it's a lesson for us as we look at Beyond-Low Earth Orbit, is
we have a stable policy now. We have robust transportation to
and from the station. We have bipartisan agreement that the
station should be continued. We have NASA not competing with
the private sector. And we have a very good regulatory
framework; the IGA, the Intergovernmental Agreement which lays
out the rules of the road. In that environment, I'm willing, my
investors are willing, to make investments, and customers are
willing to make plans.
So the answer to the question is we have a stable policy
and existing hardware in space.
Senator Nelson. And do you have any suggestions what NASA
could learn from the commercial partners?
Mr. Manber. Oh, do I.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Manber. Yes.
What government does best, as Mr. Gerstenmaier has said in
these hearings so many times--what government does best, what
NASA does best, is plan and develop. The government does not do
operations that well in any industry. They don't run our
airlines, they don't, you know, they don't operate our car
industry. You don't rent a car from a government agency.
And so, I think what NASA can learn from the experience we
are having together on the space station, is to relax a little
bit. If they can provide, with congressional funding, the
infrastructure, let the commercial sector in on it.
We have a small satellite program now on space station. We
just deployed 33 small satellites on the station with no
additional taxpayer funding. We took the risk, we invested the
money, we built the hardware, we got it through the NASA safety
process and the Japanese Space Agency safety process, and it's
all working fine. And I think what we're learning is: NASA
should not be trying to do the bells and whistles. Provide the
opportunity, provide the infrastructure if that's, you know,
the basic facilities, and then let the commercial sector invest
its own funds. We still don't have a NASA contract,
unfortunately.
But no, we still don't have a NASA contract. And we're very
happy with that because they don't design our hardware and we
take the risk. And so, I think the lesson for both sides to
learn is let the commercial sector do what we do best in any
market including space.
Senator Nelson. What can the commercial efforts do to
generate more excitement among young people until we can
actually get American bodies in American rockets flying back?
Mr. Manber. When we started NanoRacks, we did not start to
do education. I'm not a teacher. I didn't think of education.
Today, we have an unbelievable program at NanoRacks where,
through our educational partners, we've flown over 45 or 50
school districts in America. We're flying Florida high schools,
universities--there's a program in California at Valley
Christian which is now 14 Christian high schools.
It's even gone international. We fly Israeli high schools.
All with no NASA funding. It's not a NASA program. NASA is the
landlord. NASA is the safety. NASA and the taxpayers have given
us this opportunity. And I will say that, you know, NanoRacks
is a small company. We're not in ``Space News'' and the
industry publications that often. But we're in the, you know,
``Albany This'' and all these small-town newspapers where we're
giving these kids the opportunities. We have parents doing bake
sales to fly on the space station. And we have some students,
now, that have gone from high school to Stanford and other
national universities.
And both at the high school level and in university,
they're doing projects on space station through us. And so, I
guess the answer to your question is we move so quickly, we're
able to do these student projects in one school-year. And it
takes NASA, unfortunately, far longer to get through the
process and the payload integration for whatever reason.
And so, I think the answer is just with us willing to
invest our own hardware, education, partner with educational
schools, we're partnering with CASIS now, the nongovernmental
organization, to do even more schools. And I think at times
people get bothered when you put the word ``commercial'' and
``education'' in the same sentence.
But I think what we're seeing is we move so quickly, we
invest our facilities, the teachers say that kids never forget
that opportunity. So the more that we--we're not an educational
company--the more folks who come to us to do it, the more
schools, high schools, homeschooling (we're even reaching out
to now), the better it is. And I think there's a lot of
excitement under the surface.
What Senator Rubio was talking about, I think, under the
surface there's a lot of excitement on station. We shouldn't
forget about space station.
Senator Nelson. You dealt in commercialization with the
Russian station, Mir. Is that correct?
Mr. Manber. Yes, it is. I admit it.
Senator Nelson. From that experience and your ISS
experience, what would you anticipate would be your challenges
on a Chinese station?
Mr. Manber. You mean, commercially or----
Senator Nelson. Commercially.
Mr. Manber. Well, the Chinese are now competing against us
now, and I'm trying to match, already, what I know what their
prices to be.
First, what I've learned from the experience with Mir is
you can market a space station. That was where we learned you
can.
And second, you can work with a government's agency even
if, and in this case it was Russian, a different government. I
think what we'll learn is that, from all indications we're
seeing at NanoRacks, is that the Chinese will pursue a
commercial pathway. They're offering, already, opportunities
with other sovereign nations in exchange for minerals or
exchange for other opportunities.
And so, I think what I'm taking away from the experience on
Mir and ISS is that the Chinese will be a formidable commercial
competitor. I want to win in the marketplace not because
they're Chinese but because they're a competitor to us. We can
work with them but I think the lesson we have got to be clear
on in this country is that space stations are commercial
platforms. They have political purposes as well. They're
important. They're going to be more important. And we need one.
And I did fight in the 1990s to ensure that the Mir did not
come down. And I lost that battle. But now, I'm fighting to
make sure the ISS doesn't come down. And for many of the same
reasons. It's extraordinarily critical that we keep the ISS
going as long as it's technically feasible because it has
political implications and it has commercial implications, as
well, for us.
Senator Nelson. We're going to try to do that in a NASA
authorization bill if we can ever get over the problems of
sequester.
Mr. Manber. Yes. I appreciate that.
Senator Nelson. Any final comments from anybody on the
panel?
Thank you. It's been most illuminating. Thank you for your
expertise and your testimony. And thank you for your devotion
to our space program.
The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
William H. Gerstenmaier
Question 1. Due to budgetary constraints, NASA has previously had
to withdraw from international collaborations, with notable examples
including the ExoMars mission and, recently, the proposed suspension of
the SOFIA airborne telescope. What steps can the government take to
better protect its relationships with international partners during
long-term mission planning?
Answer. NASA has a long history of very successful cooperation with
nations around the world, and part of that history has from time to
time included actions taken by NASA and some by our international
partners to re-phase, redesign, or even terminate planned cooperative
activities. Even the most robust space partnerships, such as those
among the International Space Station partners, have weathered such
developments. Our partners are very aware that in all instances our
cooperation is based on the availability of appropriated funds, just as
we are aware that their participation has similar funding constraints.
Currently, NASA has over 600 active agreements with over 120
countries and anticipates that international cooperation will remain a
cornerstone of all of its future activities. As international
collaboration in space exploration continues to increase (as resources
remain constrained world-wide), maintaining an open, frank dialogue
with partners and potential partners will be a key component of sound
international partnership practice.
Question 2. Based on your substantial experience with and knowledge
of international space exploration efforts, how might NASA's
international partners collaborate with the United States on the
asteroid redirect mission?
Answer. NASA has identified a number of areas where international
collaboration on the asteroid redirect mission could provide mutual
benefit. Examples could include:
Data sharing and lessons learned analysis involving other
asteroid/small body missions;
Asteroid identification and characterization, both near term
as NASA works to down-select candidate asteroid targets, and
longer term to support preparation for the selected asteroid;
Asteroid capture system contributions including both
deployable structures and autonomous robotic manipulators;
Rendezvous sensor contributions that could be used for a
wide range of mission applications including automated
rendezvous and docking and asteroid characterization and
proximity operations; and
Secondary payload contributions to either the Asteroid
Retrieval Vehicle or the SLS that could advance either science
or future exploration capabilities.
Question 2a. How might that collaboration benefit both partner
space programs and our own?
Answer. There is global consensus of the value of human and robotic
exploration--with Mars as the ultimate destination--as reflected in the
Global Exploration Roadmap released by the space agencies in the
International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) in August
2013. The ISECG member agencies further recognize that collaborative
efforts toward this goal are necessary to maximize success in this
multi-decadal endeavor while also strategically managing investments
across national economies. Coupled with the need for space agencies to
demonstrate near term, specific and collaborative steps toward that
long-term goal, NASA feels that significant mutual benefit can be
realized in each of the areas outlined above.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Dr. Leroy Chiao
Question 1. Based on your substantial experience with and knowledge
of international space exploration efforts, how might NASA's
international partners collaborate with the United States on the
asteroid redirect mission?
Answer. International partners will collaborate with NASA on all
Beyond-Low-Earth-Orbit (B-LEO) exploration missions, as an extension to
the current collaboration on the International Space Station (ISS).
Their astronauts will have future opportunities to fly on these
missions. They will also contribute to hardware for the exploration
programs. As an example, the European Space Agency (ESA) is currently
developing the Service Module (SM) for the Orion spacecraft, which will
enable it to maneuver in LEO. In addition, there will be opportunities
to collaborate on an Earth Departure Stage and other hardware in
support of the redirect mission.
Question 2. How might that collaboration benefit both partner space
programs and our own?
Answer. International collaboration benefits all partners in many
ways. First, it allows partners to have a stake in, and develop
different components of the exploration program. This serves as
technology drivers in their own countries, while providing employment
in the aerospace and other high-technology sectors. Second, similar
capabilities provide redundancies that have proven to be critical in
the past. For example, the U.S. Space Shuttle supported the Russian MIR
space station during the late 1990s. Similarly, the Russia Soyuz
supported the ISS after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Third,
working together on a very visible civil space program helps to improve
overall relations between the partners, as they are all focused on a
common goal. Furthermore, the partners are highly motivated to be
successful, for the overall benefit of all partners. The ISS is a
shining example of this.
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