    [Senate Hearing 113-694]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 113-694

                               FROM HERE TO MARS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE

                                     OF THE

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 9, 2014

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

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           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
    BARBARA BOXER, California            JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           ROY BLUNT, Missouri
    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             DEAN HELLER, Nevada
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska                  DAN COATS, Indiana
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
    EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    CORY BOOKER, New Jersey              RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    JOHN E. WALSH, Montana
                        Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
                         John Williams, General Counsel
                  David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
                  Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
       Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
                                     ------

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND SPACE

    BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman       TED CRUZ, Texas, Ranking Member
    BARBARA BOXER, California            ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             DEAN HELLER, Nevada
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      DAN COATS, Indiana
    EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    JOHN E. WALSH, Montana
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on April 9, 2014....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Nelson......................................     1
    Statement of Senator Rubio.......................................    31
        Prepared statement...........................................     9
        Prepared statement of Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow, The
          Heritage Foundation........................................    31

                                   Witnesses

    William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
      Exploration and Operations, National Aeronautics and Space
      Administration.................................................     3
        Prepared statement...........................................     5
    Susan Eisenhower, Chairman Emeritus, Eisenhower Institute,
      President, Eisenhower Group, Inc...............................    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    12
    Dr. Leroy Chiao, Former NASA Astronaut; Commander, International
      Space Station Expedition 10; Special Advisor for Human
      Spaceflight, The Space Foundation; and Chairman, National Space
      Biomedical Research Institute User Panel.......................    15
        Prepared statement...........................................    18
    Jeffrey Manber, Managing Director, NanoRacks, LLC................    20
        Prepared statement...........................................    22

                                    Appendix

    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to:
        William H. Gerstenmaier......................................    49
        Dr. Leroy Chiao..............................................    50

                               FROM HERE TO MARS

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2014

                                   U.S. Senate,
                     Subcommittee on Science and Space,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Nelson. Good morning.
        Thank you all for coming. We have held, in this committee,
    a number of hearings on space exploration. We've highlighted
    how the technologies developed benefit our lives here on Earth.
    We've discussed the potential dangers of near-Earth objects.
    We've heard about the growing commercial space industry. We've
    explored how NASA's efforts will eventually allow us to put an
    American on Mars. We even heard last year, via downlink, from
    the ISS about some of the amazing work that is going on up
    there. And all of that means that we have plenty of chances to
    share the excitement about the space program.
        But, look. It's an empty dais. And it'll just be Senator
    Rubio and me when he arrives. And he's filling in for Senator
    Cruz who understandably is in Texas today for the memorial
    service at the Army base there.
        So we need to generate some excitement, again, among the
    American people. And, of course, things give us a problem. Now
    we have the tensions with Russia. Is it going to impact the
    space program?
        As we've seen before, the exploration of space has been the
    one area in times of geopolitical conflict that we can rise
    above that. So NASA's success is not only a product of
    tremendous investments in technology, but also in international
    cooperation. And I believe that we need to continue that
    tradition.
        Geopolitics may or may not affect the nation's exploration
    mission. It certainly affected it back at the dawn of the Space
    Race, because of the launch of Sputnik. NASA was designed, in
    part, to demonstrate to the world the power of the American way
    of life.
        NASA's 1958 Organic Act signed by the grandfather of Susan
    Eisenhower, President Eisenhower, stated that U.S. space
    activities should contribute to international cooperation. When
    Secretary of Defense McNamara and NASA Administrator Jim Webb
    proposed a lunar mission to the Kennedy administration in 1961,
    they argued that ``Our attainments (in space) are a major
    element in the international competition between the Soviet
    system and our own.''
        And yet, NASA was a vehicle for working with the Soviets in
    the midst of the Cold War with all of the ICBMs pointed at each
    other with nuclear weapons. In 1975, we had Apollo-Soyuz, the
    first linkup between a Soviet and U.S. spacecraft, which
    President Nixon viewed as important in pursuing detente.
    General Tom Stafford, the leader of that mission, with General
    Alexei Leonov, they rendezvoused a Soviet space craft and an
    American space craft. They docked and they lived together in
    space for 9 days.
        And you talk about a role model for international
    cooperation. Look at the friendship today between Tom Stafford
    and Alexei Leonov. And General Stafford testified here. He
    called it ``The shining light during the Cold War Era in our
    relationship with the Soviet Union.'' That's what Tom said
    here.
        And so, today, the ISS, a stunning example of engineering
    and cooperation, combines the contributions of 15 partner
    nations and the famous NASA-Mars Curiosity Rover carries
    instruments provided by France, Canada, Germany, Russia and
    Spain. So our leadership in space is a result of decades of
    strategic investment. If we want to maintain that position,
    then the investments that we're making today have got to be
    strategic.
        And yet, we're in an era of limited budgets. The space
    arena now includes new players like China, India, and the
    private sector.
        So as we look to the future, there are a few questions that
    I would like to propose. What do we get out of our investment
    in being pioneers in space? Number two, how will each mission
    such as the Asteroid Redirect Mission, help meet our space
    exploration goals and benefit American interests? And Bill
    Gerstenmaier is going to speak to that. Number three, when and
    how will we cooperate with international and commercial
    partners? And which partners will we exclude, and why?
        Following so many decades of advancement in space and given
    the high cost and amazing benefits of exploration, there's no
    room for rash actions but only for very careful decisionmaking.
    Those leading exploration efforts will realize it is a truth:
    those that lead will realize the economic scientific and
    political benefits.
        And so, it's my pleasure to introduce today's witnesses.
    Bill Gerstenmaier, NASA Associate Administrator for Human
    Exploration and Operations. Susan Eisenhower, President of the
    Eisenhower Group, author of Partners in Space, which details
    U.S.-Soviet cooperation. She will discuss lessons learned. Dr.
    Leroy Chiao, Special Advisor for Human Space Flight to the
    Space Foundation, former Commander of the ISS and a former
    member of the Augustine Commission. He will discuss the
    advantages and complications associated with international
    cooperation. Jeffrey Manber, Managing Director of NanoRacks and
    the author of Selling Peace, a book about work with the Russian
    space program. He will address the potential for commercial
    involvement and expiration Beyond Low-Earth Orbit.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier.

            STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER, ASSOCIATE

            ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS,

             NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for
    the opportunity to participate in this hearing entitled ``From
    Here to Mars.''
        I'll briefly describe NASA's approach to human spaceflight
    that takes humans eventually to Mars. NASA does not see this as
    a monolithic mission or a classic design reference mission
    approach. NASA in this constrained and uncertain budget
    environment is building the infrastructure--that's operations,
    techniques, international involvements, spacecraft and
    hardware--that will allow us to make sustained progress toward
    a human presence on the surface of Mars.
        NASA is developing capabilities and systems that will allow
    a human presence off the Earth and in the solar system. We're
    going off the Earth while benefiting the inhabitants of the
    Earth. NASA is making significant progress. Each of our
    activities are judged through the lens of being critical and
    used in future Mars-class missions. We are not building a
    single one-time optimized mission to Mars, but an
    infrastructure that allows humans to pioneer the solar system.
        NASA sees three unique regions in space: Earth-reliant,
    where the ISS resides today; two, the proving ground, where the
    Asteroid Redirect Mission will occur in the vicinity of the
    Moon; and three, Earth-independent, or Mars-ready. These
    regions for human presence require gradually increasing risk
    acceptance, hardware reliability, and operational complexity.
        NASA believes that its step-wise approach is superior than
    attempting a Mars-class mission without proper preparation.
    Just as Mercury and Gemini prepared the way for Apollo, we see
    ISS, in the Earth-reliant region, and the Asteroid Redirect
    Mission, a first mission in the proving ground around the Moon,
    as paving the way for Mars-class missions. We also see a
    significant opportunity to work with the Science Mission
    Directorate and international partners on this approach.
        The International Global Exploration Roadmap, developed by
    12 countries, supports this approach. The roadmap provides a
    framework to guide countries in their role for human
    exploration. NASA's current plans are implementing those first
    key pieces of that roadmap.
        The ISS plays a critical role. The ISS not only benefits
    life on Earth but has a critical role in exploration and
    pioneering of the solar system. ISS is not only helping to
    understand how the human body will adapt in the long-duration
    space flight and allowing us to test high reliability hardware
    such as life support for Mars-class missions, but it's allowing
    us to build strong international relationships and experiment
    with commercial private sector capabilities.
        It's clear that international involvement will be critical
    to any Mars-class mission. Jeff Manber and NanoRacks have shown
    the direct benefit of utilizing the commercial sector and
    nongovernmental investments to augment government-sponsored
    activities. Mars-class missions will drive technology and will
    require international and commercial involvement.
        ISS is the first critical step in exploration. Two other
    critical components are the Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, SLS, and
    Orion. It's clear from all studies that a Heavy Lift Launch
    Vehicle is needed. When I see Russia and China beginning to
    talk about the need for a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, this
    reaffirms our analysis.
        Orion is making tremendous progress. The avionics testing
    in Florida completed yesterday for the test mission this fall.
    Orion is making tremendous progress. Eighty percent of the
    software and basic avionics that will be used on the test
    flight this fall are the same that will be planned for future
    Orion flights. The test this fall also verifies heat shield
    performance.
        SLS tests and manufacturing is well underway in New
    Orleans. Several barrel sections and domes are complete and a
    vertical weld assembly is being installed in New Orleans that
    will allow these sections to be welded into a tank.
        Flight hardware for the Exploration Mission 1, an un-crewed
    test of SLS and Orion, is beginning to be manufactured this
    year in New Orleans. The European service module for the
    Exploration Mission 1 is undergoing preliminary design review
    in Europe. This is tremendous progress and reflects the
    international involvement lessons learned directly from ISS.
    There is real hardware in manufacture for the path to Mars.
        Last, teams are working on the Asteroid Redirect Mission.
    Solid trades in analysis and requirements are in work. There
    are concepts being investigated--one that captures an asteroid
    and returns it into a distant retrograde orbit around the Moon;
    and another that removes a boulder from a large, potentially
    hazardous asteroid and also moves this boulder to an orbit
    around the Moon.
        This mission leverages off of activities that were already
    in work: asteroid identification, solar electric propulsion,
    and uses the basic capabilities of SLS and Orion. The solar-
    electric bus used for this mission will be the bus used for
    Mars cargo-class missions. This mission allows for significant
    operations development in the proving ground of space near the
    Moon.
        If international partners or commercial companies have
    interest in a lunar surface operation, the techniques, lunar
    gravity assists, et cetera, developed by the Asteroid Redirect
    Mission, will enable NASA to support their efforts. The
    Asteroid Redirect Mission will make significant progress toward
    furthering the knowledge needed for a Mars-class mission.
        NASA has a strong approach that extends human presence into
    the solar system. This approach starts with the International
    Space Station and a firsthand knowledge gained from the ISS and
    systems, human health, international, and commercial
    partnerships.
        There's still a lot of work for ISS. The extension of ISS
    operations to at least 2024 was critical. There's also a lot of
    work needed to establish Commercial Crew capability to the ISS.
        The approach, ISS, SLS, Orion, and the Asteroid Redirect
    Mission, coupled with commercial and international involvement,
    is well underway today. We have a sound approach that is
    sustainable, leading to an eventual human presence on Mars.
    Human exploration and pioneering are more than a single
    hardware development activity but are an integrated series of
    activities all of which are required to take us from here to
    Mars.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:]

    Prepared Statement of William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator,
       Human Exploration and Operations, National Aeronautics and Space
                                 Administration
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
    opportunity to testify before you on NASA's exploration efforts.
    Consistent with the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, NASA's space
    exploration architecture is based on capabilities that will support
    multiple missions and destinations, enable private access to--and use
    of--space, and complement and advance other NASA, national, and
    international objectives and goals. This architecture is intended to be
    sustainable over the long term and affordable. This endeavor is
    responsive to changing environments, including on-ramps for new
    technologies, new approaches, and other space players. We also are
    tightly coupling the planning of our science and technology portfolios
    with this strategy.
        Our architecture is designed for long-term human exploration of our
    solar system, including the goal of human missions to Mars. NASA's
    near-term strategy for exploration has four prongs: using the unique
    environment of International Space Station (ISS) to conduct the
    research and technology demonstrations necessary to keep our crews safe
    and productive on long-duration spaceflights; partnering with
    commercial entities to develop the capacity to transport cargo and crew
    affordably to low-Earth orbit (LEO); working in cooperation with other
    NASA Directorates to better understand exploration destinations and
    improve our ability to work there; and moving outward to deep space
    with Orion and the Space Launch System (SLS) to take us there. Orion
    and the SLS are foundational capabilities for the implementation of our
    integrated human and robotic exploration strategy. We will then travel
    beyond LEO to the proving ground of cis-lunar space, where we will
    expand and test our capabilities in a rendezvous with a redirected
    asteroid in lunar orbit. These steps will build the foundation for
    further deep-space exploration. With the technologies and techniques we
    develop, we will enable expeditions to multiple destinations,
    ultimately allowing us to pioneer Mars and other destinations as we lay
    the groundwork for permanent human settlements in the solar system.
    Conceived in coordination with our international partners, this
    strategy maintains America's role as the world's leader and
    foundational partner in space exploration.
    The International Space Station: Learning the Fundamentals in LEO
        The ISS is an unparalleled asset for the conduct of research and
    technology development in a unique, microgravity environment. The full
    focus of ISS is on operations and research to: (1) improve our ability
    to live and work in space, including enabling human exploration beyond
    LEO; (2) enable development of a demand-driven commercial
    transportation and research market in LEO; (3) enable science,
    engineering research, and technology development in the fields of
    Earth, space, life (biological and human research), and physical
    sciences; and (4) derive tangible benefits for citizens on Earth.
        NASA's Human Research Program continues to develop biomedical
    science, technologies, countermeasures, diagnostics, and design tools
    to keep crews safe and productive on long-duration space missions. The
    progress in science and technology driven by this research could have
    broad impacts on Earth as it advances our ability to support long-
    duration human exploration.
        On board the ISS, we are conducting technology demonstrations and
    development efforts to advance human and robotic exploration beyond LEO
    and the Station also serves as the foundation for an international
    exploration partnership. As an example of both the technology
    demonstration and exploration partnership aspects of the ISS, NASA is
    preparing for an extended duration, year-long human mission to explore
    human adaptation to space. The mission, which will involve NASA
    astronaut Scott Kelly and cosmonaut Mikhail Kornienko of the Russian
    Federal Space Agency, is slated to launch in March of 2015. The ISS
    partnership is strong, and the agencies involved continue to work
    together in the mutual pursuit of peaceful space exploration. Plans
    remain on track for upcoming launches to the Station and return of
    astronauts to Earth. Later this year, NASA intends to select from among
    American companies competing to provide crew transportation to the ISS
    beginning in 2017. In the meantime, NASA and its partners will continue
    to work with each other to maintain the Station, where humans have
    lived continuously for more than 13 years, and we are confident that
    the agencies will continue to work as closely as they have in the past.
        Two U.S. companies--Space Exploration Technologies and Orbital
    Sciences Corporation--are supporting the ISS under Commercial Resupply
    Services (CRS) contracts. Purchasing cargo and crew transportation
    services from U.S. companies allows NASA to focus its efforts on
    developing the vehicles that will take our astronauts beyond LEO and to
    multiple deep-space destinations.
    Orion and SLS: Traveling Beyond LEO
        The dedicated NASA-Industry team, working across the Nation
    utilizing all of the NASA Centers and our primary industry partners,
    Lockheed Martin, Boeing, ATK, and Aerojet-Rocketdyne, is making
    excellent progress toward developing the next capabilities for human
    and robotic space exploration missions beyond LEO. The flight test
    milestones driving the schedule include the uncrewed Exploration Flight
    Test-1 (EFT-1) this December, the first uncrewed launch of Orion and
    SLS on Exploration Mission-1 (EM-1) in FY 2018, and the first crewed
    launch of Orion and SLS on Exploration Mission-2 (EM-2) in FY 2021-22.
    Both Orion and SLS are being designed to enable multiple missions and
    destinations rather than being optimized for one particular mission or
    architecture. Early missions will explore cis-lunar space and
    rendezvous with and return samples from a near-Earth asteroid, as well
    as demonstrate capabilities to support deep-space human research and
    exploration in a safe and sustainable manner. SLS will be evolvable to
    provide progressively greater lift capability, and, with Orion, will
    enable mankind to successfully navigate the proving ground of deep
    space, ultimately sending humans to a variety of destinations in the
    solar system, including Mars.
        The Orion spacecraft will be capable of taking humans farther into
    deep space than ever before, to multiple destinations as needed, and
    sustaining them in this challenging environment for longer than ever
    before. The Orion spacecraft includes both crew and service modules,
    and a Launch Abort System that will provide for crew safety during
    ascent. Orion can fly a crew of up to four for 21 days; if used in
    concert with a potential future Habitation Module, Orion will be able
    to support larger crews on extended-duration missions. Orion has a
    focused and rigorous step-wise test campaign to validate these
    capabilities in the challenging deep-space environment.
        This year's EFT-1 flight test will serve as a pathfinder to
    validate innovative approaches to space systems development. The test
    will demonstrate spacecraft post-landing recovery procedures and the
    launch vehicle adapter, which will also be used on EM-1 and EM-2. EFT-1
    will allow us to test the heat shield at about 85 percent of lunar re-
    entry velocity, protecting the vehicle from temperatures near 4,000
    degrees Fahrenheit. The EFT-1 flight test will significantly reduce or
    eliminate 10 of the top 16 risk drivers for the first crewed flight
    (EM-2). The flight test will also demonstrate 47 percent of the design,
    development, test, and evaluation (DDT&E) required for EM-2, and
    includes 50 percent of the software needed for the first crewed
    mission. Not only is EFT-1 testing hardware and software, but it also
    is testing key processes which will be needed for EM-2.
        The SLS is a heavy-lift launch vehicle that will transport Orion,
    as well as cargo and other systems, with a range of lift capabilities
    from 70 metric tons, evolving to 105 metric tons and eventually up to
    130 metric tons, based on future mission requirements. The evolution of
    the SLS lift capability fulfills specific, important roles within the
    exploration architecture, with the 130-metric-ton vehicle supporting
    full capability asteroid missions and ultimately missions to Mars.
        In 2014, NASA will make significant strides in SLS development. The
    testing of the Booster Qualification Motor-1 (QM-1) will occur this
    year with a test firing of the motor, and fabrication of the QM-2 motor
    will be completed. Manufacturing will begin on key components of the
    SLS vehicle to be used for the EM-1 mission, including Boosters,
    interim cryogenic propulsion stage (ICPS), and major components of the
    Core Stage (tanks, engine structure, intertank, and forward skirt), as
    well as the associated Structural Test Articles (STAs). Additionally,
    the Vertical Assembly Center at Michoud Assembly Facility will be
    completed this spring, as well as modifications to the A-1 Test Stand
    at the Stennis Space Center for testing of the RS-25 Core Stage
    engines. The SLS Program will conduct the detailed design review
    (Critical Design Review) for the Booster and Core Stage elements.
    Definitization of SLS contracts for Core Stages and the ICPS will be
    completed this year, as well.
        The Ground Systems Development and Operations (GSDO) team at
    Kennedy Space Center (KSC) continues to make significant progress on
    the necessary Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) infrastructure design,
    development, and refurbishment to support SLS and Orion. KSC also is
    providing valuable operations expertise to the SLS and Orion teams to
    address operational issues in the design in order to help reduce
    eventual production and operations costs. This is a key aspect of
    assuring long-term sustainability for deep-space human exploration. In
    2014, construction of new platforms in the Vehicle Assembly Building at
    KSC will enable SLS and Orion stacking and preflight processing as
    planned. Refurbishment and upgrades to a crawler-transporter, to
    accommodate up to the 130-metric-ton version of SLS--a vehicle more
    powerful than the Saturn V--are being performed to support the FY 2018
    EM-1 flight of SLS and Orion.
        Orion, SLS, and EGS teams are using the latest in systems and
    manufacturing technology with the intent of developing the safe,
    affordable, and sustainable systems this country needs to extend human
    presence to Mars. For example, the Orion team is using time-triggered
    Ethernet and is taking advantage of the standards for this technology
    that are used in the automotive industry. The SLS team has mastered the
    development of friction-stir welding on large structures to build the
    SLS Core Stage, culminating in the most advanced and largest friction-
    stir weld machine in the world. The EGS team has stripped out the old
    copper cables from Pad 39B and replaced them with the latest in fiber
    optics. These are three simple examples of how NASA's Exploration
    Systems are utilizing and advancing the latest in technology.
        In developing the Orion, SLS, and EGS, NASA is seeking to build a
    sustainable National capability for the long-term human exploration of
    space. By providing more volume and mass for payloads, SLS could enable
    the simplification of the design and trajectories of future spacecraft.
    The evolving capabilities of these systems will provide the Nation with
    flexibility over the long term to achieve a variety of goals. As we
    move out into the solar system to establish footholds in a variety of
    locations, having such flexibility will be important, as future
    missions can be built on what our astronauts and robotic probes learn
    during earlier expeditions.
        NASA's Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Division is pioneering
    approaches for rapidly developing prototype systems, demonstrating key
    capabilities, and validating operational concepts for future human
    missions beyond LEO. This work is important to enable exploration
    missions and ensure that they are safe, affordable, and sustainable.
    Activities focus on crewed systems for deep space, and robotic
    precursor missions that gather critical knowledge about potential
    destinations in advance of crewed missions. Major products include
    systems development for reliable life support, asteroid capture
    mechanism risk reduction, deep space habitats, crew mobility systems,
    advanced space suits, and autonomous space operations. As prototype
    systems are developed, they are tested using NASA ground-based
    facilities or flight experiments on the ISS. The AES Division works
    with the Space Technology Mission Directorate to infuse technologies
    into exploration missions, and with the Science Mission Directorate on
    robotic precursor activities. The Space Technology Mission Directorate
    supports exploration by investing in capabilities needed for deep-space
    exploration including advanced life support, entry, descent, and
    landing technologies, advanced space robotic systems, advanced thermal
    management technologies, advanced batteries and fuel cells, lightweight
    structures, cryogenic storage and transfer capabilities, and in-situ
    resource utilization.
    Asteroid Redirect Mission: Expanding Our Capabilities for Deep Space
            Missions
        NASA will employ SLS and Orion for an early human exploration
    mission to perform pioneering human operations further from the Earth
    than ever before, rendezvousing with and returning samples from an
    asteroid redirected to at stable orbit around the Moon by the robotic
    segment of the Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM). The ARM is composed of
    three separate elements: the detection and characterization of
    candidate near-Earth asteroids; the robotic rendezvous, capture, and
    redirection of a target asteroid to a stable orbit around the Moon; and
    the crewed mission to explore and sample the captured asteroid using
    the SLS and the Orion crew capsule. Each mission element is heavily
    leveraging ongoing activities in NASA's Space Technology, Science, and
    Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorates. The mission
    integrates a variety of technologies and capabilities important to
    future crewed missions to Mars and other deep space destinations. These
    include: the acceleration of high-power solar electric propulsion
    development, which will power the ARM mission and also has future
    science, commercial, and human exploration mission applications; and
    rendezvous with and maneuver of a non-cooperative target in deep space,
    which is enabling for missions to other deep-space destinations. The
    technologies needed for this mission, for example in power, propulsion,
    guidance and navigation, life support, and EVA, will be applicable to
    future human missions to Mars.
        The ARM mission is part of the overall plan for human exploration
    and pioneering. It allows for operations in the proving ground of cis-
    lunar space, builds off of the skills learned from ISS, prepares the
    way to support potential lunar activities of our commercial or
    international partners, and builds the skills and hardware needed for
    Mars-class missions. This mission represents a technological
    challenge--raising the bar for human exploration and discovery, while
    advancing detection of near-Earth asteroids and bringing us closer to
    human missions to Mars. NASA has already identified a number of
    candidate asteroids for this mission; the Agency is also continuing to
    refine estimated costs, and, at this time, we anticipate that the
    incremental cost of the mission will be less than half of what the
    initial Keck Study projected. The ARM would affordably support and
    leverage multiple efforts across the Agency as it paves the way for
    journeys to other destinations by helping NASA prove out its new heavy-
    lift launch vehicle and exploration spacecraft in a near-term mission.
    Exploring Mars and Other Deep Space Destinations
        NASA has been executing an integrated human and robotic exploration
    strategy leading to the human exploration of Mars. The capabilities
    required for a human mission to Mars have been understood for some
    time. The implementation steps and investments, partner approaches, and
    technical pathways to Mars are varied. NASA will ramp up its
    capabilities to reach--and operate at--a series of increasingly
    demanding targets, while advancing technological capabilities with each
    step forward. This will include early test and demonstration activities
    in cis-lunar space as called for in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010.
    The Agency is tightly coupling the planning of its science and
    technology portfolios with this strategy where appropriate.
        As noted earlier, the Agency will conduct a series of test and
    demonstration flights, including EFT-1 with Orion flying uncrewed in
    2014, EM-1 with Orion and SLS flying uncrewed in FY 2018, and the
    crewed EM-2 mission with Orion and SLS in FY 2021-22. In this vein, ARM
    will exercise these and other capabilities now in development. These
    missions will help develop the foundation for longer journeys to
    destinations which could include near-Earth Asteroids, the Moon, the
    moons of Mars, and then Mars itself. NASA's Orion and SLS will enable
    the Agency to send astronauts beyond LEO for the first time since 1972
    and will provide the Nation a capability and architecture designed to
    also allow flexibility, partnering, and technological on-ramps. This
    strategy for human space exploration will ensure that the United States
    fosters a safe, robust, sustainable, and flexible space program by
    developing a set of core evolving capabilities instead of specialized,
    destination-specific hardware, to achieve human presence in
    successively farther destinations across the solar system.
        NASA's exploration strategy is consistent with the Global
    Exploration Roadmap (GER), released in August 2013 by NASA with 11 of
    our international space agency partners in the International Space
    Exploration Coordination Group. The GER helps demonstrate how NASA's
    ARM and milestones leading up to it are important steps toward
    realizing our goal of future missions to Mars together with our
    international partners. It also demonstrates that NASA, together with
    its international partners, shares a common interest in advancing a
    unified strategy of deep-space exploration, with robotic and human
    missions to destinations that include near-Earth asteroids, the Moon
    and Mars. The roadmap begins with the ISS and includes a step-wise
    expansion of human presence into the solar system, with human missions
    to the surface of Mars as a driving goal. The roadmap expands on
    missions to send humans to the lunar vicinity, a proving ground that
    allows nations to advance exploration capabilities and learn to manage
    risks while using the presence of the crew to explore asteroids and the
    Moon. Our support of the GER helps our international partners seek
    funding support for strong roles in implementing the international
    strategy.
        While there will always be challenges in involving multiple nations
    with diverse national interests in an interdependent human space
    effort, pioneering the solar system cannot effectively be undertaken by
    any one country. The partners' participation in the GER demonstrates
    their interest in an incremental, international approach to expanding
    human presence into the solar system. Utilizing the key capabilities of
    SLS and Orion, this roadmap builds on our collective successes to date,
    highlights many exploration preparatory activities underway around the
    world that will drive innovation and new technologies, and encourages
    collaboration and integration between human and robotic exploration to
    return great benefit to the global community.
        NASA is also discussing with our ISS International Partners
    exploration uses of and transition beyond the Station. These
    discussions are being held under the auspices of the Multilateral
    Coordination Board/Heads of Agencies to fully utilize the research and
    technology development capabilities of the ISS and to explore
    partnership opportunities based on the Station partnership.
    Conclusion
        NASA's exploration strategy will use an approach of pioneering
    multiple destinations in the solar system. Over time, we will move
    beyond conducting limited-duration forays to distant destinations and
    begin to lay the groundwork to establish outposts, build settlements,
    and utilize in situ resources as we expand the reach of humanity. The
    key to realizing this goal will be to channel all of the factors that
    have enabled our space achievements to date in a way that will ensure a
    sustainable foundation on which future generations can continue to
    build. So we will involve the private sector, taking advantage of
    entrepreneurial drive and business acumen to find novel solutions to
    the challenges we face. We will engage international partners, who will
    bring to the table their own unique scientific and technological
    expertise--expanding humanity's presence into space is too large a task
    for any one country to go it alone. Finally, we will strive to achieve
    the optimal balance of human and robotic exploration, taking advantage
    of what humans and machines each do best as we search for life in the
    universe and pursue a variety of objectives and goals. This long-term
    effort will expand the sphere of human life and activity, and draw upon
    the pioneering spirit and ingenuity in the face of the seemingly
    impossible that have helped make the U.S. the exceptional nation that
    it is.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to provide you with our progress and status over the past year as
    we look forward to EFT-1 and the award of Commercial Crew
    Transportation Capability later this year, and the first uncrewed SLS/
    Orion mission in FY 2018. We have a strong strategy that extends human
    presence into the solar system--beginning with Mars--in an affordable
    and sustainable manner. ISS, Commercial cargo and crew, Orion, SLS and
    the Asteroid Redirect Mission are all first steps in that strategy. I
    would be happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of
    the Subcommittee may have.

        Senator Nelson. Senator Rubio is going to submit his
    opening statement for the record. And, of course, for each of
    you in your written testimony, it will be inserted as part of
    the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Rubio follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator from Florida
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having today's hearing on the human
    exploration of space. It is important that the subcommittee examine
    NASA's plans for human exploration, including collaboration with
    international partners and commercial space opportunities. Clearly
    today's hearing is timely given the impact of national security and
    current geopolitical issues on our space program.
        NASA states that its vision is ``to reach for new heights and
    reveal the unknown so that what we do and learn will benefit all
    humankind.'' I certainly agree with this vision. But in order to
    achieve it, the agency must have a clear mission with a roadmap and
    timeline outlining how that mission will be accomplished.
        But a roadmap and timeline will only take the agency so far. NASA's
    mission must also be accompanied by a strong commitment to achieving
    it.
        Obviously one of the main factors impacting NASA's mission and its
    exploration programs is the agency's funding. The current budget
    environment is forcing NASA to balance priorities, which makes it
    difficult to achieve large exploration programs while sustaining
    commitments to other scientific efforts that do not always get NASA in
    the news.
        Given this situation, NASA has to spend wisely. This is why I
    believe that NASA must identify common sense savings to help prioritize
    and fund space operations. One area where I believe NASA can reduce
    costs is by reexamining its many underused and outdated facilities and
    properties, which cost billions of dollars to keep and maintain.
        Infrastructure that is duplicative or no longer needed for NASA's
    exploration roadmap should be reallocated to commercial users and state
    and local entities. This would result in savings for NASA, a reduction
    in the Federal Government's footprint and burden to fund space
    operations, and an incentive for commercial space activities.
        The State of Florida and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have
    already benefitted from reallocated infrastructure. But more needs to
    be done at KSC and around the country. Every facility must examine ways
    to reduce costs to ensure the agency can continue reaching new heights
    and revealing the unknown.
        One expenditure that continues to get attention and that is
    relevant to today's discussion is the $70 million NASA pays Russia to
    transport one astronaut to the International Space Station. This
    underscores the fact that the United States, the Nation that has
    accomplished more in space than any other, currently has no way of
    transporting its citizens into space. The United States should never
    have to buy tickets to space.
        Now, the purpose of today's hearing is not to prosecute this issue.
    This committee has had numerous hearings investigating why NASA has to
    pay Russia for access to space, and how the agency and its commercial
    partners are working to end this arrangement by achieving commercial
    crew capabilities.
        But that does not mean this committee should not examine who we are
    paying for access to space, especially when it is a nation and a leader
    with whom we have strong disagreements. Yesterday I highlighted the
    fact that Russia uses its energy resources as leverage over its
    neighbors, and I called for a long-term strategy to break this energy
    dependence from Russia.
        Well it would certainly seem that Russian leverage applies to
    today's discussion. Not only is it about leverage, but it is also about
    prestige. Vladimir Putin believes that Russia has lost its influence in
    the world since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and he views himself
    as a historic figure that's going to restore Russia to its rightful
    place, in his mind, as a global power.
        One way he sees to do this is to gain influence and leverage over
    other countries. When it comes to space exploration, the Russians
    clearly have leverage over the United States. The question is whether
    Russia is using this leverage to influence the United States and NASA
    and serve its own space exploration goals.
        I hope this hearing and today's witnesses will help shed light on
    that question and provide the Committee with a better understanding of
    how the geopolitical situation in Ukraine is impacting America's space
    program.
        Thanks again to Chairman Nelson, and I want to thank the witnesses
    for testifying before the Committee.

        Senator Nelson. Ms. Eisenhower.

           STATEMENT OF SUSAN EISENHOWER, CHAIRMAN EMERITUS,

                  THE EISENHOWER INSTITUTE; PRESIDENT,

                       THE EISENHOWER GROUP, INC.

        Ms. Eisenhower. Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for
    this opportunity to testify before you today. It's an honor to
    be here.
        I hope to address the geopolitical issues surrounding
    NASA's exploration efforts. It's impossible today to think
    about space exploration strategy without putting it into the
    context of today's events in Russia and Ukraine. I support
    well-targeted sanctions on Russia which will have a direct
    impact on President Putin's thinking. But for reasons I will
    outline, I believe that rolling back space cooperation could be
    counterproductive and damaging to our national security and our
    long-term space agenda.
        International cooperation is vital if missions of
    increasing complexity are on the international agenda such as
    Mars. During the Cold War, scientific and technological
    communities played a vital role in serving as a bridge between
    the United States and the Soviet Union and then Russia.
    Especially during times of crisis, many multilateral and even
    bilateral interactions survived the Soviet invasion of Hungary,
    Sputnik, the U-2 incident, the Cuban missile crisis, as well as
    the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and later Afghanistan.
    But since the Cold War ended, U.S.-Russian cooperation on
    nuclear security and in space has been at the heart of
    enhancing the United States' national security.
        The restrictive measures on space cooperation announced by
    NASA last week, however, could well threaten our achievements
    of the last 20 years. Here are three reasons why we need to
    lift last week's ban on all cooperation outside of the
    operations related to the ISS.
        Number one, our national security is greatly enhanced
    through cooperation. Since 1992, U.S.-Russian cooperation in
    space has had a positive impact on the transformation of the
    Russian aerospace industry, which was at the time of the Soviet
    Union's collapse, a bastion of Soviet hardliners. U.S.
    interaction with the Russians on the Shuttle Mir program and
    then the International Space Station brought unprecedented
    transparency and access to sensitive Russian facilities along
    with a growing adoption in Russia of Western best practices.
    Since then, the lessons we've learned together have
    strengthened our overall performance in space beyond just the
    ISS. And it provided an indispensable window into the workings
    of the Russian military industrial establishment.
        Number two, if the goal of limiting cooperation is designed
    to send a strong signal to President Putin, we need to be
    careful. It could well backfire. The Russian scientific
    community, as opposed to the Soviet aerospace industry, has
    traditionally been the most progressive of all sectors in that
    country. But today, both sectors in Russia, both the scientists
    and the aerospace industry, see themselves as our friends.
    Rather than sending a strong message to President Putin,
    suspension of cooperation will strengthen political hardliners
    who would prefer that Russia ``go it alone'' or work with
    countries more sympathetic to their views.
        Number three, safety depends on trust. Much has been said
    about our mutual dependency in space. Safety of human life
    requires cooperation. At the moment, operations on the space
    station are proceeding as normal. Trust, however, that
    invaluable yet fragile commodity, can be easily eroded. NASA's
    announcement last week that it will suspend ``the majority of
    its ongoing engagements including high-level visits, e-mail
    exchanges, and video conferencing'' could leave many of our
    friends in Russia high and dry and potentially change the more
    general atmosphere. Collective attitudes even in the Russian
    space sector could change, which might negatively impact
    working relationships on the ISS and potentially even safety.
        In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that we know
    from history that it is always easier to terminate space
    cooperation than it is to get it started again. And we will not
    be able to meet our long-term goals in space without it. We
    should consider establishing the general principle going
    forward that space cooperation should be exempt from sanctions.
    Space has the unique capacity to serve the global community. It
    can be a force for preventative diplomacy, transparency, and
    for sustaining and building bonds among those who are willing
    to put solely national pursuits aside.
        The lynchpin of this goal must be engagement. We must be
    wary of any space policy that provides only short-term symbolic
    satisfaction just as we should be cautious of those in both
    countries who might want to exploit this crisis for short-term
    commercial or political gain. They could ultimately undermine
    our long-term strategy in space and possibly jeopardize the
    enormous human and financial investment we have already made.
        Thank you very much. I look forward to questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Eisenhower follows:]

          Prepared Statement of Susan Eisenhower, Chairman Emeritus,
        The Eisenhower Institute; President, The Eisenhower Group, Inc.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
    opportunity to testify before you today. It is an honor to be here.
        I hope today to address the geopolitical issues surrounding NASA's
    exploration efforts. I served on the NASA Advisory Council for eight
    years and was also a member of the International Space Station
    Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. However, it was not until I
    wrote Partners in Space: U.S.-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War
    that I fully understood the operational and geostrategic benefits of
    U.S.-Russian cooperation in space. It is this point that I would like
    to examine with you today.
        I would like to make it clear before I begin that it is essential,
    I think, for the United States and its allies to respond to the ongoing
    situation in Ukraine with appropriate and well-targeted sanctions on
    Russia, which will have a direct impact on President Putin's thinking.
    For reasons that I will outline, I do not believe, however, that
    disengaging in space cooperation is in our national interest.
    Near and long-term goals
        It has long been NASA's strategy to engage our international
    partners, who have diverse and valuable scientific and technological
    expertise. This is vital if missions of increasing complexity are on
    the international agenda.
        This strategy has not only proven to be successful through
    cooperation on the International Space Station, I believe it will be
    the only way we can meet our long-term objectives of expanding
    mankind's presence in space. The issue then is not about long-term
    strategy, but about appropriate short-term measures--given the current
    geopolitical environment.
        As you well know, strategy has to be informed by a simple calculus.
    Do the short-term and the long-term goals mesh? Or do short-term
    actions jeopardize or pose insurmountable road blocks to meeting one's
    overarching goal?
        With those simple questions in mind, I was concerned to read NASA's
    announcement last week that, in light of the Crimean crisis, NASA will
    suspend ``the majority of its ongoing engagements'' with Russia, with
    the exception of continued U.S.-Russian cooperation on the
    International Space Station. I believe that sweeping limitations of
    this kind are a mistake. A brief review of the past is instructive for
    understanding the vital role the scientific and technical communities
    have played and can continue to play in serving as a bridge between our
    two countries, especially during times of crisis.
        With the dawn of the nuclear age and later the space age, the
    administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to avert the
    possibility of fostering an atmosphere of ``paranoid uncertainty''
    between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1953, in his Atoms
    for Peace speech, the president opened the way for the peaceful uses of
    the atom. As part of that proposal he initiated, with the scientific
    community, the Atoms for Peace conferences that brought countries
    together from across the globe to exchange papers on power generation,
    nuclear medicine and agriculture. These conferences, initiated first in
    1955, survived the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Sputnik, the U-2
    incident, the Cuban missile crisis--as well as the Soviet invasion of
    Czechoslovakia in 1968. As a result of that engagement, the Soviet
    Union declassified a whole field of nuclear science: fusion.
        In 1955, the International Council of Scientific Unions spearheaded
    an international effort to study the Earth. Scientists from the United
    States, the Soviet Union, and sixty-four other countries agreed that
    the International Geophysical Year would be marked in 1957-1958. Among
    its activities, it called for the Soviet Union and the United States to
    launch artificial satellites and it created a forum for international
    dialogue on science and the future of the Antarctic. This cooperation
    also survived those above mentioned crises. Despite this, the work of
    IGY continued and was augmented by U.S.-Soviet negotiations that led
    the way for the Antarctic Treaty, signed by the United States, the
    Soviet Union and ten other countries in 1959. This assured in
    perpetuity the demilitarized status of an entire continent, preserving
    the Antarctic for international scientific research--a benefit for all
    of mankind. Had this U.S.-Soviet cooperation been suddenly cut off, who
    knows what the impact would have been on Antarctica, then a contested
    continent.
        Even though the 1950s/60s are considered to be, perhaps, the most
    perilous times of the Cold War, U.S.-Russian ``engagement'' was seen as
    a way to gauge the thinking of our adversaries, to understand how the
    other side approaches issues, and to build bonds among those who were
    not their country's chief decision makers. In short: a way to mitigate
    the potential for ``paranoid uncertainty'' by achieving some level of
    transparency. At one point concern was such that there was not enough
    engagement, prompting the successful effort to sign a bilateral General
    Exchanges Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in
    1958. Its role was to foster and, in some cases, mandate science,
    academic and cultural exchanges. This agreement remained in force until
    the collapse of the Soviet Union.
        Space cooperation was a promising new avenue of engagement with the
    Apollo-Soyuz dock up in July 1975. But things began to change with the
    U.S. boycott of the 1980 Olympics and the suspension of other
    cooperative activities in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of
    Afghanistan. Until the Shuttle Mir programs (1992) very few people from
    the space community were schooled in the arts of East-West cooperation.
    If not for the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet/Russian
    programs might have been doomed to continue operating as rival
    entities.
        With this history in mind, let me explain at least three reasons
    why U.S.-Russian space cooperation should be continued without
    restriction.
    First, decoupling could endanger safety.
        Much has been said about our mutual dependency in space. It is not
    just our reliance on Russian crew transport that is at issue, Russia
    also relies on the United States for communications after launch and
    for ISS operations. The Russians also have scientific instruments
    integrated into our Martian and Lunar programs.
        Even in day-to-day operations, it is logical and important to note
    that safety of human life requires international cooperation. Last
    week, NASA Associate Administrator Michael O'Brien wrote a memo to
    employees explaining the termination of many important relationships:

            ``This suspension includes NASA travel to Russia and visits by
            Russian government representatives to NASA facilities,
            bilateral meetings, e-mail, and teleconferences or video
            conferences. At the present time, only operational
            International Space Station activities have been excepted.''

        But where does work on the ISS begin and where does it end?
    Continuous improvement and enhanced work on human safety and hardware
    investment is often made through tangential contacts and interaction.
    How easy will it be to draw the line between these baskets of activity
    if there cannot be visits between our two country's facilities or even
    e-mail exchanges? This could be of major significance if there is an
    emergency in space that impacts the community beyond the operational
    side of the ISS.
    Second, if the goal of suspending cooperation is designed to send a
            strong message to President Putin, we need be careful. It could
            backfire.
        While it is true that NASA and its Russian counterpart, Roscosmos,
    have maintained a professional, beneficial, and collegial working
    relationship through the various ups and downs of the broader U.S.-
    Russia relationship, we are assuming that the ISS program will be
    unaffected by the current policy. In other words, we are presuming that
    Russian forbearance in this case is ``a given.'' In recent days,
    however, there have been cries in the Russian Duma to respond to the
    cancellation of contacts with the U.S.
        Of greatest concern to me, however, is the long-term impact. The
    Russian scientific community has traditionally been the most
    progressive of all political sectors in that country. People who are
    involved in international scientific cooperation are less likely to be
    nationalists. Rather than sending a strong message to President Putin,
    suspension of cooperation will strengthen hardliners who would prefer
    that Russia ``go it alone'' or work with countries more sympathetic to
    their views, such as China.
        From a U.S. perspective, we cannot afford to lose another
    generation of people who know how to cooperate with Russia on science
    and technology, especially with baby boomers retiring.
    Finally, those who are aggressively pushing for using space as a way to
            ``punish Russia'' should be reminded that contact with
            countries that have such technical capabilities have, in the
            past, been a way to enhance transparency.
        In my book, Partners in Space: U.S.-Russian Cooperation after the
    Cold War (2004), our research revealed:

            Cooperation has had a dramatically positive impact on the
            transformation of the Soviet hardliner aerospace industry,
            bringing unprecedented transparency and a move toward western
            best practices. Increased transparency has reinforced both
            expanded commercial cooperation and the political goals of
            civil space cooperation (e.g., nonproliferation).

        Today, ``Curiosity,'' NASA's Mars Science Laboratory, has a Russian
    instrument on it that uses adapted technology from the heart of the
    Russian nuclear weapons program. This is a perfect example of how space
    cooperation has aided in providing greater transparency on the Russian
    program.
        Partners in Space also found that cooperation with Russia brought
    significant benefits, not only to our national security, but also to
    our technical knowledge--as Russians were at that time the leaders in
    long-duration space flight. Since then the lessons we have learned
    together have strengthened our overall performance in space and have
    provided an indispensable window into the workings of the Russian
    military-industrial establishment.
    Conclusion
        As we know from history, it is always easier to terminate
    scientific and technical cooperation than it is to get it started
    again. Before we codify this potential mistake, we must recall that
    there are ample historical precedents to support the value of science
    and technology cooperation, even in times of crisis. Space cooperation
    should be exempt from sanctions, just as Atoms of Peace and IGY
    survived the tumultuous ups and downs of the Cold War.
        Space cooperation is the ultimate global bridge, and international
    space has unique capacities to serve the global community. It can be a
    force for preventive diplomacy, transparency and for sustaining and
    building bonds among those who are willing to put aside solely national
    pursuits. Like terrestrial cooperation, exemplified by the
    International Geophysical Year, space cooperation can serve as a
    stabilizing factor in space.
        The lynchpin of this goal must be engagement. Through consistent
    interaction, larger goals can also be realized. This can only enhance
    America's national security. We must be wary of any space policy that
    provides only short-term symbolic satisfaction, just as we should be
    cautious of those who might want to exploit this crisis for short-term
    commercial or political gain. They could, ultimately, undermine our
    long-term strategy in space and possibly jeopardize the enormous human
    and financial investment we have already made.
        On March 27, 2014, former Senator Sam Nunn and former Secretary
    George Shultz wrote in a Washington Post op-ed, ``A key to ending the
    Cold War was the Reagan administration's rejection of the concept of
    linkage, which said that bad behavior by Moscow in one sphere had to
    lead to a freeze of cooperation in all spheres.''
        I would add that linkages between geopolitical crises and space
    should be avoided in favor of more direct ways to impose sanctions.
    Space can serve as at least one example of what it really means for the
    global community to set goals and see them through for the betterment
    of mankind.

        Senator Nelson. Mr. Gerstenmaier, which policy is NASA
    operating under? You heard what Mrs. Eisenhower just said about
    the statements and there were conflicting statements. Which is
    NASA operating under?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. NASA, as you've seen in the press
    exchanges, we've exempted ISS operations from many of the
    sanctions or any of the issues associated with activities. And
    then we're reviewing, kind of on a case-by-case basis, the need
    to go ahead and continue other activities. So there is an
    activity, a scientific event, this summer in August called
    COSPAR. That particular item has recently been accepted and
    that event will occur.
        So NASA's methodically going through each one of the events
    and activities that are scheduled and we're determining which
    ones are accepted and which ones we need to curtail.
        Senator Nelson. What about the acquisition of the engine
    RD-180?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. That's really not a NASA issue. That's
    between United Launch Alliance and their activities.
        I'm not aware of any discussion, but that's really not a
    NASA issue per se.
        Senator Nelson. OK. Well we will get into that in the Armed
    Services Committee.
        All right. Dr. Chiao.

                     STATEMENT OF DR. LEROY CHIAO,

                   FORMER NASA ASTRONAUT; COMMANDER,

               INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION EXPEDITION 10;

                 SPECIAL ADVISOR FOR HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT,

              THE SPACE FOUNDATION; AND CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL

             SPACE BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE USER PANEL

        Dr. Chiao. Chairman Nelson, Senator Rubio, thank you both
    for your service to our Nation and thank you for the
    opportunity to present my views on the future of U.S. human
    spaceflight.
        U.S. human spaceflight program drives technology
    development by employing our citizens to advance the state-of-
    the-art of several fields. Many of these technologies are
    adapted to purposes which improve the quality of life for
    people here on the Earth. These are both very good reasons to
    continue a robust human spaceflight program. But I believe that
    the biggest return on our investment is prestige and
    inspiration of the next generation, best put together by the
    mission statement of the Space Foundation, ``To advance space-
    related endeavors to inspire, enable and propel humanity.''
        Human spaceflight has become woven into the very fabric of
    our identity as a nation of explorers, innovators and
    entrepreneurs. It was exactly the endeavors of Apollo and the
    programs prior that inspired me and my generation. We must do
    the same and more for our children and grandchildren and help
    maintain our position as the world leader.
        As you pointed out, I was a member of the 2009 Review of
    U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee and the current space
    policy is based on the major elements of one of the options
    that was put together. However, the main and most important
    message of the Committee and the report was that, in any case,
    the program support needed to be robustly supported both
    politically and financially. Strong bipartisan leadership is
    needed to sustain the program across administrations otherwise
    election-cycle changes could cause confusion and waste.
        The Committee estimated back then that the 2010 NASA budget
    would have been needed to increase by $3 billion and the buying
    power of that sustained in following years, if we were going to
    have a credible Beyond-Low Earth Orbit exploration program. The
    implied message was that if we were unable to go ahead and
    increase the budget by that much, then the proper thing to do
    would have been to continue to fly space station and robustly
    support ISS.
        Unfortunately, that was not realized and NASA has been
    directed to attempt to put together a credible Beyond-Low Earth
    Orbit program within the framework of essentially a flat budget
    in terms of buying power. The challenge of this cannot be
    overstated. This is why you've seen a lot of conflicting
    proposals and different changes over the last several years
    settling now on the Asteroid Redirect Mission. But the first
    crewed flight to that asteroid is currently being planned for
    2021, which is still some years away. And that assumes that the
    SLS is developed on-time with no hiccups and no reduction and
    further reduction in budget.
        Thus, the first step, I believe, to go from here to Mars is
    to ensure that the budget is sufficient to support the program.
    The realistic sustainable funding level for Beyond-Low Earth
    Orbit maybe it should be determined a priori and then the
    program scoped accordingly. If we cannot adequately support
    both politically and financially the Beyond-Low Earth program,
    then we should not attempt it.
        The ISS is the current Low Earth Orbit human spaceflight
    program. It serves not only as a common point for the
    international partner community but as a critical part of
    development of the Beyond-Low Earth Orbit program itself. The
    most challenging aspect about flying Beyond-Low Earth Orbit is
    not a technical challenge, it's not a matter of computers or
    navigation or propulsion, but rather how do we keep astronauts
    healthy that far away from the Earth for that long of a
    duration of flights. The ISS is critical for the development
    operational medical countermeasures to ensure that we can keep
    our astronauts healthy as we contemplate these more demanding
    flights.
        The National Space Biomedical Research Institute, or NSBRI,
    was formed about 17 years ago by NASA at the recommendation of
    the National Academies. The NSBRI has built a consortium of the
    finest Biomedical Research Universities and Institutes across
    the country. And it's targeting applied research to develop
    countermeasures to enable these Beyond-Low Earth Orbit flights.
    This work maps to and adds unique value to NASA's Human
    Research Program.
        The ISS is currently scheduled for decommissioning in 2024,
    although studies have shown that it can be safely operated
    though at least 2028 and perhaps beyond. I believe that ISS's
    life should be extended to as long as practical so that we can
    go ahead and make sure that we are able to develop these
    countermeasures.
        Similarly, the NSBRI will reach its 20-year life contract
    in 2017 and I believe it also should be renewed to ensure no
    loss of continuity in these countermeasure developments.
        Commercial flights to Low Earth Orbit is a logical
    evolution. It was perhaps the most exciting yet the most
    controversial part of the new space policy but I think the
    commercial companies have made impressive strides. Already, we
    have companies delivering cargo commercially to the ISS and we
    have companies working, with NASA support, on developing the
    capability to launch astronauts to the International Space
    Station.
        In contrast to what some people think, these commercial
    efforts are not in competition with the NASA's Beyond-Low Earth
    program. They're complementary in that these commercial flights
    support the ISS which supports the Beyond-Low Earth Orbit
    program. A sustainable Beyond-Low Earth program requires a
    heavy-lift launcher. So the SLS is something that'll be
    essential, either the SLS or something like it, for our long-
    term goals in Beyond-Low Earth Orbit Space.
        However, the current budget does not support a reasonable
    plan, timeline, or complement of missions. As I mentioned
    before, the first flight with a crew onboard is only planned
    for 2021. That, again, assumes that everything goes perfectly.
        It is important during the buildup of a flight test
    program, or to have a buildup of a flight test program for a
    new development, with meaningful and consistent flight rate
    during the development of something like the Beyond-LEO
    program. This is so you can develop the ground and flight
    operations and maintain team proficiency. If the national
    budget cannot be increased to support such a plan for SLS/
    Orion, perhaps we need to start thinking about some other
    possibilities. If we think of SLS/Orion as Apollo/Saturn
    flights, maybe we need to take a look at possibly having
    something analogous to the Gemini program.
        The Orion is being currently built and the first flight, as
    you heard, is scheduled for later this year using an existing
    launch vehicle and upper stage. A similar configuration
    possibly could be human-rated and be used in a series of
    meaningful tests and development missions. Such a buildup
    flight test program using this configuration could be planned
    to thoroughly test Orion's systems, develop rendezvous and
    docking operations, and include first destinations Beyond-Low
    Earth Orbit. The latter flights will be used to characterize
    the flight environment beyond Earth's magnetosphere, to develop
    operations, and to characterize other issues as well; and test
    biomedical countermeasures.
        These flights would pave the way for the more ambitious
    SLS/Orion missions. SLS will enable robust Beyond-LEO missions
    which should include the development of a crew-tended base on
    the Moon. This base would be used as a test bed for hardware
    and operations to develop for eventual human spaceflights to
    the surface of Mars.
        While it would be technically possible to bypass the Moon
    on the way to Mars, I believe it would be imprudent and would
    add risk. The importance of thorough ground and buildup flight
    test to ensure program success is clear has been demonstrated
    many times and cannot be overstated.
        One of the principal findings of our 2009 committee was
    that the U.S. can lead a bold, new, international effort in the
    human exploration of space. Having common, very visible, civil
    space projects leads to generally better relationships between
    partner countries and provides the potential for overall cost
    savings. The ISS is a great example of such a program and
    future human spaceflight programs should expand on this model.
        Currently, for the last 3 years, the only entities able to
    launch humans into space are Russia and China. Thus, China is
    an obvious addition to the international human spaceflight
    partnership, both for the ISS program and beyond.
        China has successfully demonstrated rendezvous and docking
    capabilities, extravehicular activity, and operation of a crew-
    tended LEO space module. The Chinese have a long-term plan that
    includes construction of a space station in 2018 with full
    operational capability by 2022. China is in a unique position
    to be a unique partner and, to the people who are concerned
    about security and technology transfer concerns, I would say
    that we can handle those things the same way we have with the
    Russians. To my knowledge, there have been no improper
    transfers in either direction.
        America can and should be the clear world leader of
    international space exploration both in LEO and beyond. What is
    needed is consistent and sustained strong, political, and
    financial commitments from the White House and the Congress.
    NASA requires the resources to create a robust, integrated,
    international exploration plan that will lead us into the next
    exciting phase of human spaceflight.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Chiao follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Leroy Chiao, Ph.D., Former NASA Astronaut;
     Commander, International Space Station Expedition 10; Special Advisor
     for Human Spaceflight, the Space Foundation; Chairman, National Space
                    Biomedical Research Institute User Panel
        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Cruz, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for your service to our nation, and thank you
    for the opportunity to present my views on the future of U.S. human
    spaceflight (HSF).
        The U.S. HSF program drives technology development by employing our
    citizens to advance the state of the art in several fields. Many of
    these technologies are adapted to purposes, which improve the quality
    of life for people on the Earth. These are very good reasons for our
    Nation to maintain a robust HSF program. But I believe the biggest
    return on our investment is national prestige, and inspiration of the
    next generation, as called out in the mission statement of the Space
    Foundation: ``To advance space-related endeavors to inspire, enable and
    propel humanity.'' HSF has become woven into the very fabric of our
    identity, as a nation of explorers, innovators and entrepreneurs. It
    was exactly the endeavors of the Apollo and prior HSF programs that
    inspired me, and my generation. We must do the same and more for our
    children and grandchildren, and to help maintain our position as the
    world leader.
        I served as a member of the 2009 Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight
    Plans Committee. The Committee addressed both Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and
    Beyond-LEO (B-LEO) exploration, and presented options to the
    administration. The current space policy is based upon major elements
    of one of the options presented in the Committee report.
        However, the main and most important message of the Committee and
    report was that in any case, the chosen HSF program must be robustly
    supported, both politically and financially. Strong, bipartisan
    leadership is needed to sustain programs across administrations.
    Otherwise, election-cycle changes cause confusion and waste. If
    credible B-LEO exploration was to be a part of the HSF program, the
    Committee estimated that the 2010 NASA budget would have needed to be
    increased by three billion dollars, and that the buying power of this
    budget would need to be sustained in follow-on years. The implied
    message was that if the budget could not be increased to this level,
    then the United States should continue to operate the Space Shuttle and
    International Space Station (ISS) and delay significant work towards a
    B-LEO program.
        Unfortunately, this has not been realized, and NASA has been
    directed to attempt to plan a credible B-LEO program within the
    framework of what has essentially been a flat budget, in terms of
    buying power. The challenge of this cannot be overstated. This is why
    we have seen changing proposals of the first destination and mission
    over the last several years, settling recently on an asteroid-redirect
    mission, with the first B-LEO astronaut flight planned for 2021. During
    that mission, the crew is to fly in formation with the redirected
    asteroid in Earth-Lunar orbit. But the plans for even these modest
    goals within the schedule allow for practically no cost overruns. This
    calls the credibility of the plan into question.
        Thus, the first step to plan ``from here to Mars'' is to ensure
    that the budget is sufficient to support the program. The realistic,
    sustainable funding level for B-LEO should be determined, and then the
    program scoped accordingly. If we cannot adequately support a credible
    B-LEO program politically and financially, then we should not attempt
    it.
        The ISS defines the current LEO HSF program. It serves not only as
    a common point for the international partner community, but also is a
    critical part of the development of the B-LEO HSF program. The most
    challenging technical aspect of the B-LEO program is biomedical: How to
    maintain the health of astronauts during long-duration flight, both
    inside and beyond the Earth's magnetosphere. Research aboard ISS is
    critical to the development of operational medical countermeasures to
    ensure astronaut health during these demanding missions. Created and
    enabled by NASA at the recommendation of the National Academies, the
    National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) has formed a
    consortium of the finest biomedical research universities and
    institutes in the United States, and funds targeted, applied research
    to develop countermeasures to enable B-LEO flights. This work maps to,
    and adds unique value to NASA's Human Research Program (HRP). NSBRI
    also led to the creation of the Center for Space Medicine (CSM) at the
    Baylor College of Medicine. CSM complements government-funded research,
    both in space and Earth applications. ISS is currently scheduled for
    decommissioning in 2024, although studies indicate that it can be
    safely operated through at least 2028. ISS life should be extended to
    at least 2028, and beyond if practical, in order to adequately support
    the development of necessary technologies and countermeasures for the
    B-LEO HSF program. Similarly, NSBRI will reach its twenty-year contract
    life in 2017. It should be renewed, to ensure no loss of continuity in
    countermeasure development.
        Commercial flight to LEO is a logical evolution. NASA developed the
    technologies for flights to and from LEO, and should now focus on B-LEO
    goals, rather than LEO transportation. The commercial companies
    currently receiving NASA support have shown impressive progress with
    multiple cargo deliveries to the ISS, and progress towards crew
    transportation capabilities to ISS. These efforts should continue to
    receive full support, so that the U.S. can regain the capability to
    launch astronauts to ISS in the next few years. This commercial effort
    does not conflict with NASA's B-LEO exploration program. In fact, it
    helps to enable B-LEO missions, by supporting important, critical-path
    research and hardware test bed projects aboard ISS.
        A sustainable B-LEO program requires a heavy-lift launcher. The
    Space Launch System (SLS) is an essential part of the long-term
    program. However, the current budget does not support a reasonable
    plan, timeline or complement of missions. The optimistic schedule calls
    for a flight rate of only 0.75 times per year once operational,
    possibly in 2021, and only if development proceeds as planned with no
    schedule slip or decrease in budget. If the budget cannot be increased
    to accelerate this development and support a higher flight rate, then
    the U.S. should consider slowing, or delaying SLS development.
        It is important to have a build-up flight test plan with a
    meaningful and consistent flight rate during development of a B-LEO
    program. This is to develop both ground and flight operations, and to
    maintain team proficiency. If the national budget cannot be increased
    to support such a plan and flight rate for SLS/Orion missions in the
    next few years, alternatives should be considered. If one thinks of
    SLS/Orion as analogous to Apollo/Saturn flights, an appealing
    alternative is an analogy to the Gemini program.
        The Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV, Orion) is currently being
    built, with the first flight test (without crew) scheduled for late
    2014. The configuration for this first Exploration Flight Test (EFT-1)
    includes the use of an existing launch vehicle and upper stage. A
    similar configuration could be human rated, and be used in a series of
    meaningful test and development missions.
        Such a build-up flight test program using this configuration could
    be planned to thoroughly test Orion systems, develop rendezvous and
    docking operations, and include first destinations B-LEO. These latter
    flights would build up flight experience beyond the Earth's
    magnetosphere to develop operations, to characterize the environment,
    and to test biomedical countermeasures. These flights would pave the
    way for the more-ambitious SLS/Orion missions.
        SLS will enable robust B-LEO missions, which should include the
    development of a crew-tended base on the Moon. This base would be used
    as a test bed for hardware and operations development for eventual HSF
    flights to the Martian surface. While it would be technically possible
    to bypass the Moon on the way to Mars, I believe it would be imprudent
    and add risk. The importance of thorough ground and build-up flight
    tests to ensure program success is clear, has been demonstrated many
    times, and cannot be overstated.
        One of the principal findings of the 2009 committee was that ``The
    U.S. can lead a bold new international effort in the human exploration
    of space.'' Having common, very visible international civil projects
    generally lead to better relationships between the partner countries,
    and provides the potential for overall cost savings. The ISS program is
    an example of such a project, and future HSF programs should expand on
    this international model.
        Currently, and for nearly three years, the only entities able to
    launch humans into space are Russia and China. Thus, China is an
    obvious addition to the international HSF partnership, both for the ISS
    program and beyond. China has successfully demonstrated rendezvous and
    docking capabilities, extravehicular activity (EVA) and operation of a
    crew-tended LEO space module. The Chinese have a long-term plan that
    includes construction of a space station in 2018, with full operational
    capability by 2022. China is in a position to provide hardware and
    capability in-kind. Security and technology transfer concerns would be
    handled exactly as the U.S. does today with Russia. To my knowledge,
    there have been no improper technology transfers, in either direction.
        America can and should be the clear world leader of international
    space exploration programs, both in LEO and beyond. What is needed is
    consistent and sustained, strong political and financial commitments
    from the White House and Congress. NASA requires the resources to
    create a robust, integrated, international exploration plan that will
    lead us into the next exciting phase of HSF. It does not have it today.

        Senator Nelson. Dr. Chiao, you're not suggesting that the
    Asteroid Redirect would preclude the lunar mission?
        Dr. Chiao. No, sir. Not at all.
        In fact, if there is much to be learned from an Asteroid
    Redirect Mission and as I--to avoid any confusion--I just want
    to make clear that my statements about another program or
    subprogram would be complementary to the SLS and the Orion.
        Senator Nelson. And that was the program that you testified
    where there would be a program on the surface of the Moon.
        Dr. Chiao. Well, the Moon would be part of the SLS/Orion.
    It would be follow-on to the Asteroid Redirect Mission.
        Senator Nelson. Right. Thank you for clarifying that.
        Mr. Manber.

     STATEMENT OF JEFFREY MANBER, MANAGING DIRECTOR, NanoRacks, LLC

        Mr. Manber. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Senator Rubio.
    Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on behalf of
    NanoRacks; a private firm which has developed a strong customer
    base onboard the International Space Station.
        Let me start by saying that NanoRacks' business model would
    be commonplace in any industry other than human spaceflight. We
    build our own research facilities with our own money. We market
    these facilities and our services to customers at set prices.
    We began the company 4 years ago without a NASA contract.
    Instead, we negotiated access to the real estate onboard the
    station and access to the NASA launch manifest. Critical has
    been NASA's willingness to let us attempt a new way of adding
    services and facilities to the ISS.
        I applaud Mr. Gerstenmaier and the Space Station Program
    Office, led by Mike Suffredini, for allowing a private company
    to attempt this new role.
        At NanoRacks, we are very much aware that we may lose our
    money. We may fail in the marketplace to continue attracting
    customers. Our equipment may not always work. But these risks
    are not borne by the taxpayer; they're borne by our investors.
    That is how business works in the real world and it's how it
    should also work in outer space.
        How are we doing? NanoRacks has flown 150 payloads to date.
    We have 100 more in the pipeline and we are averaging just 9
    months through the NASA safety process, a tiny fraction of the
    usual timeline. Today, I can tell you that every single day,
    NanoRacks is showing that more and more consumers, teachers,
    researchers, companies around the world, see a value in paying
    for station utilization and including station in their plans.
        For us, for our customers, for the space station, and for
    the intent of you in Congress, the payoff has been dramatic. We
    estimate that today there is close to $150 million in private
    capital from venture capital firms and personal investors now
    supporting NanoRacks and our customers.
        The resulting economic valuation is estimated to be much
    higher, with significant job creation in California, Florida,
    Texas, and elsewhere. The global recognition of the power of
    American-style open markets is perhaps the single most enduring
    result of the end of the Cold War, whether in former communist
    nations, now in Low Earth Orbit and yes, I am sure, one day on
    the Moon and Mars.
        Because of the success of companies like NanoRacks
    contributing to the International Space Station, I believe the
    viability of market economics in outer space is finally coming
    of age. NanoRacks' experience is showing there is little
    difference between a government organization here or abroad and
    a non-government institution in terms of customers. To us, they
    are all customers. Our transactions are fundamentally
    commercial in nature.
        Our customer list today includes the German Space Agency
    DLR, Romanian Space Agency, parts of ESA, and companies and
    organizations from Israel, Japan, UK, Lithuania, Vietnam and
    Saudi Arabia. In short, commercial space has become a new form
    of international cooperation. And I'm really grateful for
    everyone in the NASA International Office who's allowed
    NanoRacks to begin to play this commercial role.
        NanoRacks has already shown that the divisions and tensions
    that have sometimes characterized the government versus
    commercial debate in our industry are becoming, in our view,
    outdated. For too long, we have considered space exploration as
    an either/or proposition. Either the program is government-
    driven, government-operated, and government-funded, or it must
    be commercial. NanoRacks is showing, on space station, that
    such distinctions are unreasonable and even unproductive.
        The government can, therefore, play many different roles in
    human exploration. It can be a facilitator, a landlord, and
    almost always a customer. Depending on where we're going, the
    private role could be smaller or greater. Whether we're
    reaching for Mars or returning humans to the Moon, or exploring
    asteroids, a flexible partnership is where and how we should be
    heading. Turning to near-term Beyond Earth Orbit exploration,
    we are committed to using ISS as a launchpad for this new
    chapter in human spaceflight. We understand NASA's focused on
    Mars.
        At NanoRacks, we too may have Mars in our hearts but we
    have lunar in our business plans. We can see well, replicating
    ISS's new commercial environment with a lunar program, off-the-
    shelf hardware, commercial economic efficiencies, low-cost
    enough for student participation, market leadership in both
    technology and market savvy. Sure we can do Mars, but that's
    going to take a little more doing and understanding in the
    commercial relationships.
        Congress has stayed the course on the International Space
    Station. Thank you for that. Your reward, our reward, is a
    stable beachhead in space, both technically and now
    commercially. I mentioned about our new relationship with NASA.
    Yes, NASA is our landlord and safety official. But the space
    agency is, every day, less and less of a competitor, leaving to
    the private sector those services that we do best.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Manber follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Jeffrey Manber, Managing Director, NanoRacks LLC
        Chairman Nelson and Senator Cruz, thank you for the opportunity to
    speak today. I'm pleased to lead NanoRacks, which is developing a
    robust customer base for the U.S. National Laboratory onboard the
    International Space Station. We regard our growing private business on
    the station as a stepping stone for commercially undertaking projects
    Beyond Low-Earth Orbit in partnership with NASA and other allied space
    exploration programs.
        Personally, I've spent the last three decades working to bring
    about a more commercial space marketplace, whether by helping set up
    the first investment fund on Wall Street for commercial space ventures,
    working with PanAmSat to break open the Intelsat monopoly on
    international communications, as well as helping open the door in
    American-Russian relations on space and later assisting in the
    marketing of the Russian space station Mir. The common thread has been
    to help realize a human space enterprise that is driven by American-
    style commercial principles and practices.
        NanoRacks has for the past four years worked to realize a truly
    commercial business onboard the International Space Station, using our
    own capital and developing our own customer base. Today I'd like to
    share with you some lessons we've learned about how human spaceflight
    can be integrated into a commercial environment. In this way, everyone,
    including NASA, our international space agency partners, private
    customers and the American taxpayer can all benefit from a new approach
    to space exploration that harnesses government and commercial resources
    to achieve our goals in space.
    Attempting Traditional Business in Human Spaceflight
        Let me start by saying that NanoRacks' business model would be
    commonplace in any industry other than human spaceflight. We build our
    own research hardware with our own money. We market these facilities
    and our services to customers at set prices. To date, we have purchased
    and modified for use or built microscopes, centrifuges, biopharma
    hardware and basic research platforms. All normal business. Except our
    facilities are all located in Low Earth Orbit onboard the space
    station.
        We began the company without a NASA contract (and still don't have
    a traditional one). Instead, we did negotiate access to real-estate
    onboard the space station and access to the NASA launch manifest,
    literally first to the empty nooks and crannies on cargo vehicles
    headed to ISS. We flew our first equipment with no guarantee that
    anyone, let alone NASA, would make use of our facilities. And there had
    never been a proven commercial market for space station facilities, so
    we couldn't forecast a market based on real world data. Given these
    realities, we didn't even bother with traditional investors. We say at
    NanoRacks that our first two investors were MasterCard and Visa.
        But we believed passionately that given a permanent presence in Low
    Earth Orbit, the robust transportation to and from the space station,
    and NASA's willingness to let us attempt a new way of adding services
    and facilities to ISS, that we would be successful. Rare, if ever, does
    a market fail to develop when commercial practices are allowed to
    thrive.
        Placing our own hardware aboard a government facility is a critical
    part of our success, as it allows us to use commercial practices to
    design, manufacture and sell the facilities in what is still an
    immature market. I applaud Mr. Gerstenmaier and professionals in the
    Space Station Program office, from Mike Suffredini down to the working
    level, for allowing a private company to attempt this new role. I think
    their view when we offered to build and market our own equipment with
    no NASA funding was ``let's take a shot and see if these guys can
    produce.''
        At NanoRacks, we are very much aware that we may lose our money. We
    may fail in the marketplace to continue attracting customers. Our
    equipment may not always work. But these risks are not borne by the
    taxpayer but by our investors. That is how business works in the real
    world and should also work in outer space.
    A Pioneering and Growing Success
        So how are we doing? NanoRacks has flown 150 payloads to date, we
    have a hundred more in the pipeline, and are averaging just nine months
    through the NASA safety and payload integration process, a tiny
    fraction of the usual wait. Our prices are transparent and start low
    enough to allow parents in school districts to pool their money to fund
    a genuine space station project, and our facilities robust enough to
    attract serous academic and industrial researchers. All without NASA
    funding. When we do receive Federal dollars its because NASA or another
    agency is buying our services just like any other customer.
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        And today, I can tell you that every single day NanoRacks is
    showing that more and more consumers, teachers, researchers, companies
    and organizations around the world see a value in paying for station
    utilization.
        A final thought on the LEO market today. Just as NanoRacks has
    customers that are commercial organizations as well as space agencies,
    it also has space agencies that are competitors. One prime example is
    the Chinese Space Agency, which is today marketing its space station
    services to the international community, including my customers. One
    international client was just about ready to ``jump ship'' to work with
    China on a multi-year program. What stopped this client was the U.S.
    commitment to operate the ISS until at least 2024.
        But the Chinese space station program is already today a formidable
    competitor for NanoRacks, and we are committed to assuring prices low-
    enough, and services good enough, to thwart their efforts, not because
    they are Chinese but because that is the nature of commercial
    competition.
        NanoRacks' progress in attracting customers and helping build up
    the capabilities of space station is being noticed. For example,
    Aviation Week recently described the growing commercial utilization of
    the ISS as transforming the station from a marvel of engineering
    construction into a thriving entrepreneurial marketplace. Music to my
    ears.
        I would not argue that a purely commercial approach should be the
    only path to ISS utilization. There is always the more traditional,
    public sector approach, using taxpayer funds, via NASA or CASIS.
    Typically this involves peer review, with the highest priority given to
    projects of agreed-on national priority. Our way allows a researcher or
    entrepreneur who believes in their idea to avoid waiting and try an
    experiment as quickly as they can develop their hardware.
        For us, for our customers, for the space station and for the intent
    of Congress, the payoff has been dramatic: we estimate that today there
    is close to $150 million in private capital, from venture capital firms
    and personal investors, now supporting NanoRacks and our customers. The
    resulting economic valuation is estimated to be much higher, with
    significant job creation in California, Florida, Texas and elsewhere.
    If you add to this the private investment in commercial cargo vehicles
    from SpaceX and Orbital, and resulting value of their future launch
    markets, and the economic value of the International Space Station
    ecosystem already totals several billion dollars.
        By creating and realizing commercial value in human spaceflight I
    believe we are dramatically increasing spaceflight's economic return to
    our Nation and the world overall. And I am sure that our success in
    using private capital to leverage government space efforts is
    transferable not only to other human space stations in Earth orbit but
    beyond Earth orbit as well.
        The global recognition of the power of American-style open markets
    is perhaps the single most enduring result of the end of the Cold War,
    whether in former Communist nations, now in Low Earth Orbit and yes, I
    am sure, one day on the Moon and Mars. Because of the success of
    companies like NanoRacks working on the International Space Station, I
    believe the viability of market economics in outer space is finally
    coming of age.
    The Synergy of Commercial and International Cooperation
        NanoRacks' experience is showing that there is little difference
    between a government organization here or abroad and a non-governmental
    institution. To us they are all customers, and our transactions are
    fundamentally commercial in nature: a voluntary exchange of reciprocal
    value. Whether it's a U.S. Government R&D agency like DARPA or a
    privately funded research foundation or a startup company in Silicon
    Valley or a school in Colorado, our relationship is based on the
    commercial contract. Just like in any business on the ground that books
    a government customer for a plane ticket or purchasing software.
        NanoRacks has already shown that the divisions and tensions that
    have sometimes characterized the government vs commercial debate in our
    industry are becoming outdated. Working together, we can assure human
    spaceflight operations are undertaken in a commercially efficient
    manner and reach out to the widest customer base possible, both
    domestically and internationally, while accepting that much of the
    space utilization market still requires some public support, especially
    the first time we seek to go to Mars, or undertake an asteroid mission
    or permanently colonize the Moon.
        Our low costs, state of the art facilities, and speedy commercial
    practices are just as appreciated by our international government
    customers as by our private domestic ones. The internationals
    appreciate our ``business as usual'' approach, or as we say: ``no
    flags, just results.''
        I have no doubt that the next chapter in space exploration must
    involve a wide range of contributions from international partners, just
    as any large commercial enterprise already does, from the automobile to
    telecommunications sectors. On the space station, we have learned
    without a doubt that other nations have no hesitation to work with a
    U.S. company like NanoRacks for access to the International Space
    Station. Our current customer list includes the German Space Agency
    DLR, the Romanian Space Agency, parts of ESA, and companies and
    institutions from Israel, Japan, UK, Ireland, Peru, Lithuania, Vietnam
    and Saudi Arabia. In short, commercial space is another powerful form
    of international cooperation, and we appreciate NASA's flexibility to
    allow this new form of space diplomacy to flourish.
        Allow me to add another valuable lesson we are learning from ISS
    operations. And this is the value of the InterGovernmental Agreement
    (IGA) which is the legal and regulatory framework for managing space
    station operations among the ISS partners. This document, in my view,
    provides a solid legal foundation for future international exploration
    programs. There are certainly improvements to be made as we proceed
    outward from Earth orbit, but the basic framework and principles of the
    IGA have withstood many challenges over the past three decades and are
    extremely sound.
        Our commercial utilization of ISS is changing not just the
    perception of commercial markets in Low-Earth Orbit, but the very
    behavior of NASA and the other ISS agencies. Skepticism and
    confrontation towards working side by side with a commercial company's
    self funded hardware and services has given way to commercial
    cooperation and shared resources.
        To cite just one example, earlier this year we sought permission
    from NASA to replace the Japanese Space Agency (JAXA) small satellite
    deployers with our own, which are larger. We didn't ask NASA for
    funding. We were willing to take the risk that we could find customers
    if the deployers could hold bigger and more satellites. And we offered
    slots for NASA use at no cost.
        The result? In just seven months we designed the hardware, had it
    manufactured, passed the NASA and JAXA safety gauntlet, launched it on
    an Orbital Sciences Cygnus vehicle. With our space agency colleagues we
    just deployed 33 CubeSats, providing market leadership for three
    American companies and also introducing two nations, Peru and
    Lithuania, to the space station. All with no taxpayer funding in that
    project.
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        We saw an opportunity for using space station as a small satellite
    deployer and have invested in the necessary hardware and are finding
    the customers. Not only is there strong commercial demand for this
    service but government agencies are now taking advantage of the no-cost
    slots. That is a win-win for everyone.
    A Model for Beyond Earth Exploration
        For too long we have considered space exploration as an ``either-
    or'' proposition. Either the program is government driven, government
    operated and government funded, or the program is commercial. NanoRacks
    has shown on space station that such distinctions are unreasonable and
    even unproductive. One can well envision a Mars mission which is driven
    by the space agencies, with basic infrastructure provided by agency
    funding. The private sector would be invited to risk capital and
    develop supporting facilities and capabilities which we would then
    market to space agencies, scientific organizations, and consumers.
        The Government can therefore play many different roles in human
    exploration. It would usually be a facilitator, frequently a landlord,
    and almost always a customer. Depending on where we are going, the
    private role could be smaller or greater.
        Whether we're reaching for Mars, returning humans to the Moon,
    exploring Asteroids, or conducting science or business on commercial
    platforms of the future, a flexible partnership is where and how we
    should be heading.
        Turning to near-term beyond-earth-orbit (BEO) exploration,
    NanoRacks is committed to using ISS as launch pad for this new chapter
    in human spaceflight.
        We understand NASA is ultimately focused on Mars. At NanoRacks, we
    too may have Mars in our hearts but our business plan already includes
    cis-lunar and lunar. We see a commercial market possible with the U.S.
    Government as customer, modeled on the relationship we have developed
    aboard space station. Other governments could also be commercial
    customers--or if they want to be political partners, that is fine. But
    commerce must be allowed to flow among the partners.
        We can well see replicating ISS' new commercial environment with a
    lunar program. Off the shelf hardware. Commercial economic
    efficiencies. Low cost enough for student participation. American
    leadership in both technology and market savvy.
        For me, the key message here is that ISS is not just a science and
    technology laboratory, but a powerful management and policy testbed for
    how the government and private sectors can undertake space exploration
    together.
        And the Moon is not the only possible example. NASA could reach an
    overarching agreement with ESA on a Congressionally funded,
    administration approved, asteroid rendezvous program, for example, but
    DLR and other individual national space agencies in Europe might be
    pleased to go even further, working commercially with a company like
    NanoRacks for use of privately-funded exploration hardware for research
    and utilization aboard the visiting spacecraft. At NanoRacks, we would
    be willing to self-fund a range of research hardware and services in
    conjunction with such a mission if we were allowed to market
    commercially to the user community. As on the space station today,
    everyone gains. Less government funding and more commercial practices
    that meet customer expectations, whether the customer is a research
    organization or a space agency.
    Conclusion
        In conclusion, Congress has stayed the course on the International
    Space Station. Your reward, our reward, is a stable beachhead in space,
    both technically and now commercially. The space station is showing us
    that incorporating commercial utilization into exploration programs
    will indeed have huge benefits.
        And, as on the space station today, U.S. Government strategy should
    include a way to foster an ecosystem of commercial capabilities that
    government needs--or very often, the government doesn't know it needs.
    But given the freedom to operate, commercial will help lower the costs
    and increase the benefits to government and industry alike of an
    exploration program.
        Finally, I mentioned about our new relationship with NASA. Yes,
    NASA is our landlord and safety official. But the space agency is every
    day less and less of a competitor, leaving to the private sector those
    services we do best.
        Taken together, the ISS has emerged as a true laboratory for
    assuring that our future exploration efforts, like those now on space
    station, reflect the best values of American leadership and market
    ingenuity.
        Thank you.
                                     ______

         Bio of Jeffrey Manber, Chief Executive Officer, NanoRacks, LLC
        Jeff Manber brings together three decades of experience in
    realizing a more robust commercial space marketplace.
        Currently, as Managing Director of NanoRacks from 2009 onwards,
    Manber has steered the growth of the first company to own and market
    its own hardware and services onboard the International Space Station.
    NanoRacks enjoys a customer pipeline of over 100 payloads from both
    domestic organizations and foreign governments, has flown over 150
    payloads in the last two years and is a recognized leader in commercial
    space services from sub-orbital to low-earth orbit and beyond.
        Previous to NanoRacks, Jeff's accomplishments include:

       adviser to the chairman of PanAmSat, the first privately
            owned international satellite venture that ended the Intelsat
            monopoly on international satellite communications and enjoyed
            a billion dollar IPO;

       co-developer of the first Wall Street fund dedicated solely
            to commercial space (Shearson Lehman);

       helping create the Office of Space Commerce at U.S.
            Department of Commerce in the Reagan administration;

       Managing Director of the American office for the Russian
            space company RKK Energia. Jeff facilitated the current
            cooperation between the Russian and American space programs.
            Participant in formation of Energia-Lockheed (ILS), Energia-
            Boeing (Sea Launch) and other key U.S.-Russian space ventures;

       CEO of MirCorp. While leading MirCorp, Manber signed media
            and entertainment deals with space tourist Dennis Tito,
            Survivor television producer Mark Burnett and movie producer
            James Cameron;

        The author of numerous articles and several books, including
    ``Selling Peace,'' which chronicles Jeff's time working with the
    Russian space program. Jeff was also the recipient of the American
    Astronautical Society's 2011 Lloyd V. Berkner Award and NASA's
    Exceptional Achievement Medal in 2012.
                                     ______

                                     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Nelson. Mr. Manber, you remember, it was not too
    long ago, that the space station was supposed to cease to exist
    in 2015.
        Mr. Manber. Yes, indeed.
        Senator Nelson. And that was extended to 2020. Now,
    fortunately, the President's budget has recommended that it be
    extended to 2024. From this Senator's standpoint, that's the
    least we could do. It seems to me, it ought to go to the end of
    the decade. A $100 billion investment, with all the things that
    you have just testified, clearly is worth continuing.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier, sequester is part of the budget for the
    next 8 years unless we can change it. And there are some of us
    in bipartisan discussions right now that are trying to change
    that. But limited funding is a reality over the course of the
    next several years. So would you make the case for the record
    of why the Asteroid Redirect Mission is doable, number one?
    Number two, does not preclude a lunar mission. And number
    three, develops the technologies and procedures that ultimately
    get us to the goal of Mars in the decade of the 2030s?
        Senator Rubio, my question was for Mr. Gerstenmaier to make
    the case: with limited funding, which is a reality over the
    course of the next several years, for Mr. Gerstenmaier--who is
    the best of the best at NASA--to make the case of why the
    Asteroid Redirect Mission, number one, develops the procedures
    and the technologies ultimately going out to the goal in the
    2030s of Mars. And, number two, does not preclude a lunar
    mission as many people have spoken, it's like it's either/or.
    And doing that within the context of limited budgets.
        Go ahead, Mr. Gerstenmaier.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, if I try to go back to a little of
    what's in my testimony, the way I would describe it is, if we
    look at any other real activity, it's going to require a
    significant amount of new investment on NASA's part. So if we
    try to go to an asteroid in some distant location away from the
    Moon, we need to build some kind of habitation module to
    augment Orion; we need to do significant medical research to
    keep our crews healthy during that period of timeframe; we have
    to do significant life support development. So that's a lot of
    new development to go do an activity there.
        It has been talked about, you know, Mars fly by missions.
    The same kind of thing. If you look at the amount of investment
    that needs to occur to make that a reasonable mission to keep
    the risk down to appropriate levels, a tremendous amount of
    investment.
        So the Asteroid Redirect Mission, it moves essentially a
    piece of the solar system to a location around the Moon, which
    we can get to with Orion and SLS the way they're being designed
    today. So the first test flight of Orion, EM2, scheduled in
    Fiscal Year 2021 to 22, that mission with crew can go to the
    Moon and that vicinity with really no changes. The Asteroid
    Redirect Mission doesn't require any changes to the Orion
    capsule. Basically, we can do the spacewalk from the Orion
    capsule the way it's designed. So there's no unique hardware
    needed in that aspect.
        It also puts us in the vicinity of the Moon, which we think
    is a great proving ground to go understand how to operate in
    space. You know, we'll now be 5 days away from an immediate
    return back to the Earth. On station, we can get back in a
    couple hours. But in the Moon environment, we're going to be
    roughly 5 days away. We'll use lunar gravity assist, which will
    be an important technique to learn how to operate for missions
    to Mars and other locations.
        Also, being in the vicinity of the Moon and lunar orbit, it
    enables, if our partners want to do something on the surface of
    the Moon or commercial activities want to do things on the
    Moon, we can assist them in those activities with Orion. So it
    effectively uses exactly what's there for SLS and Orion.
        It also took advantage of what the Science Mission
    Directorate was already doing. They already had an asteroid
    observation campaign. So we did not have to build a unique
    asteroid observation campaign. We leveraged off of what they
    were doing already.
        The Space Technology Mission Directorate, it was building a
    solar electric bus to be demonstrated to look at electric
    propulsion which will be needed for Mars-class missions. We'll
    leverage off of their work that they are doing and it uses SLS
    and Orion.
        So it essentially uses all the pieces we had put together
    and allows us to make signification and real progress toward
    gaining the capabilities to go to Mars and it also enables the
    Moon. So when you put all of those together for the modest
    investment, I think it makes sense moving forward.
        And last, the bus that we used to actually go capture this
    asteroid and redirect it around the Moon, that same electric
    bus would be used for cargo missions to Mars. So that is
    extensible going forward.
        So when I look at the options in front of us, I look at the
    budget environment that you've described; the uncertainty. This
    is the way we can make significant progress moving forward that
    keeps us focused toward Mars but doesn't preclude the Moon but
    yet it keeps us moving in a positive direction and helps us
    work with our international partners and stay a leader in
    space.
        Senator Nelson. Just to close this out and it is affordable
    within that time-frame over the course of the next five to 10
    years of which, if we went directly on a mission to go back to
    the Moon's surface, you're talking about a lot more money. Is
    that correct?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes. The difference would be to go back
    to the surface of the Moon with a human-class mission. We would
    have to build a human lander to go to the Moon. We don't see
    that as necessary for Mars.
        You know, to enter into the Martian atmosphere with its
    atmosphere is much more difficult. To do entry, decent, and
    landing into Mars requires new technology development. We think
    that's where our focus ought to be for the next big lander. We
    ought to be looking at how we land a crew-size capability on
    Mars and not go back and replicate to some extent what we've
    already done on the Moon for Moon landing.
        But now, if a commercial company would like to do that or
    an international partner would like to do that, we will be
    capable with Orion to be in cis-lunar space and we can assist
    them with those activities.
        So we don't preclude that activity but, in this limited
    environment, we want to invest in the technologies that have
    not been done and the things that will help us and keep us a
    leader and keep us moving forward toward ultimately Mars-class
    missions.
        Senator Nelson. But you said, ``But we don't preclude that
    activity.''
        So if the geopolitics suddenly changed, that it was
    important to the United States to get back to the surface of
    the Moon before, say, the Chinese would with humans, if that
    were the case, we'd already have a lot of the technologies
    developed and we'd be sitting out there close to the Moon
    already. Is that correct?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes. That's correct.
        And I would say that, if you look today, countries talk
    about building an Orion-class capsule that could go to the
    vicinity of the Moon. There's no country doing that today other
    than us. And this vehicle, you can go down to Florida and you
    can see today it's getting ready for the test flight this fall,
    that is the basic capsule shape that is mostly the avionics it
    will fly, it's mostly the software that's there. So we are
    again, being a leader and we are building a capsule that allows
    us to take humans Beyond-Low Earth Orbit to the vicinity of the
    Moon.
        The SLS is also another rocket that other countries talk
    about. They've conceptualized that. They're not putting
    hardware together. You can go to New Orleans and you can
    actually see barrel sections of the oxygen and hydrogen tanks,
    actually manufactured as test articles. You can see this large
    welding equipment; the largest in the world. It will use state-
    of-the-art reaction friction stir weld to assemble tanks. We're
    moving forward. We're at the Marshal Space Flight Center today
    doing acoustic tests of scale model rockets firing solid rocket
    motors next to the model to go look at launch activities down
    in Florida. We're modifying Pad 39B to accommodate the new
    launcher capability.
        So this country again is leading and we are making real
    investments and real hardware that you can go out, see, visit,
    touch, and they all fit in this ability to get humans Beyond-
    Low Earth Orbit, which other countries talk about but we are
    still the leader in doing that and our activities will enable
    and we'll be able to cooperate with them and their activities
    as they move forward.
        And the global exploration roadmap shows their desires,
    what they would like to go do. It also shows where we fit and
    then this allows each country to kind of decide for themselves
    what their role is in in human spaceflight and how they want to
    fit and build hardware. But we are the leader with the SLS and
    Orion that we're building today.
        Senator Nelson. As I turn to Senator Rubio, would you
    describe one of the activities of a rover on the surface that
    could be controlled from Orion with Orion being in cislunar
    space?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. We see the ability of getting into the
    vicinity around the Moon, either a Lagrangian point, which is a
    gravity location around the Moon, or in a distant retrograde
    orbit. We can use crew members in Orion to actually command a
    robotic space craft or robotic rover on the surface of the Moon
    and do activities.
        There's a lot of interest on the far side of the Moon.
    There's some discussion that's occurred about putting a radio
    telescope on the far side of the Moon where it's shielded from
    the radio interference from the Earth. You could actually
    deploy that antenna on the far side of the Moon from an
    orbiting space craft from Orion orbiting the Moon and actually
    do those kinds of operations on the surface of the Moon.
        And we did a demonstration of that from space station. We
    actually used space station to drive a rover in California that
    deployed essentially a plastic antenna on a simulated lunar
    field in California to go actually see if we could go do that.
    So, when we get to this vicinity of the Moon, we can do robotic
    activities on the surface of the Moon from Orion as a temporary
    space craft in a roughly five to six day orbit around the Moon.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you very much.
        Senator Rubio.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman, for holding
    this hearing and all of you for being here.
        Let me just start by segueing from that last question that
    was asked. To be clear, as we talk about this long-term goal of
    landing on Mars in 2030, I think what you're describing is that
    all the things that we are doing now in the interim all build
    upon each other. In essence we're creating capability along the
    way. These are not separate programs though they have separate
    aims and segues. The general path, as it is with all space
    exploration, is that previous missions create technological
    platforms upon which we can build in the future. That they're
    all moving, ultimately, in the same direction. So we're not
    really duplicating efforts here, we're kind of constructing one
    on top of the other. Is that an accurate assessment?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think that's accurate. And I think the
    other thing we need to take advantage of with this group here
    is that there's also significant advantage we can get from
    international partners in this activity and also from the
    commercial sector. So we need to change our thinking a little
    bit where it used to be an only government program and look at
    creative ways we can use the commercial sector and use the
    international community to augment what we're doing.
        Senator Rubio. Well, that's what I wanted to segue to.
    Before--and I've already cleared this with the Chairman. I want
    to submit a statement for the record by Mr. Dean Cheng, who's a
    Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation. He is an
    expert in our relations with China regarding space matters.
    He's unable to participate in today's hearing but he has
    submitted his testimony and he brings forward some interesting
    perspectives on the issues we'll discuss today.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]

           Prepared Statement of Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow,
                            The Heritage Foundation

                   Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation

        My name is Dean Cheng. I am the Senior Research Fellow for Chinese
    political and security affairs at The Heritage Foundation. The views I
    express in this testimony are my own, and should not be construed as
    representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation.
        My comments today pertain to prospects for cooperation with the
    People's Republic of China (PRC) in outer space. While the United
    States should not avoid cooperation with any country out of fear, at
    the same time, it is vital that cooperation occur with full
    understanding and awareness of whom we are cooperating with, and that
    such cooperation serve American interests.
        In the case of the PRC, the combination of an opaque Chinese space
    management structure, a heavy military role in what has been observed,
    and an asymmetric set of capabilities and interests raise fundamental
    questions about the potential benefits from cooperation between the two
    countries in this vital arena.
        To this end, it is essential to recognize a few key characteristics
    of China's space program.
        First, that China possesses a significant space capability in its
    own right, and therefore is not necessarily in need of cooperation with
    the United States. Too often, there is an assumption that the PRC is
    still in the early stages of space development, and that we are doing
    them a favor by cooperating with them.
        Second, that the Chinese space program is closely tied to the
    Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), their military. Therefore, any
    cooperation with the PRC in terms of space must mean interacting, at
    some level, with the PLA.
        Third, that the Chinese space program has enjoyed high-level
    political support, is a source of national pride, and is therefore not
    likely to be easily swayed or influenced by the United States, or any
    other foreign actor.
        These three issues, in combination, suggest that any effort at
    cooperation between the United States and the PRC will confront serious
    obstacles, and entail significant risks.
    A Brief Overview of China's Space Program
        The PRC is a major space power, by which we mean that the PRC has
    the range of space-related capabilities to be able to access and
    exploit space for its own purposes, at times and places of its own
    choosing. Indeed, the PRC has a range of space capabilities that
    arguably equal or exceed those of Europe, and places it ahead of every
    other Asian country.
        China possesses three space launch facilities (Jiuquan, Taiyuan,
    and Xichang), and is building a fourth on Hainan Island, in the
    southernmost province of China. From their current launch facilities,
    they can place satellites into low, middle, and geosynchronous orbit,
    relying entirely on the Chinese-manufactured Long March family of
    launch vehicles. It is expected that China will be launching the new
    Long March 5 heavy lift vehicle from the new Hainan facility.
        Satellites. China fields a significant array of satellites.

       It has a communications satellite array that includes both
            domestically produced and foreign satellites, including at
            least two military communications satellite constellations: the
            Shentong and Fenghuo systems.

       It is only the third country to field a satellite navigation
            and positioning system, the Beidou/Compass system. The Beidou
            system was first orbited in 2000, with several satellites in
            geostationary orbit. This was an active system which required
            the user to transmit a signal to help determine the user's
            location. This active signal also provided a communications
            channel, which could handle messages of up to 140 characters.
            The Compass portion (sometimes referred to as Beidou-2) is
            comprised of 35 mid-earth orbit satellites. The Compass portion
            is currently being deployed and is in regional service.

       It has a weather satellite constellation that includes both
            sun-synchronous and geosynchronous meteorological satellites
            (the Fengyun series). There has been discussion in the United
            States of relying on China for weather satellite data, due to
            repeated delays in replacing American meteorological
            satellites. The Chinese 2007 ASAT test involved a defunct FY-1C
            weather satellite in Low Earth Orbit.

       It fields a number of earth observation and reconnaissance
            satellites. The Ziyuan series was the first Chinese observation
            satellite to be able to beam their data to Earth. It is the
            product of a joint development effort between the PRC and
            Brazil (in the form of the China-Brazil Earth Resources
            Satellite, or CBERS).

       China has also fielded a large array of small satellites,
            including the ``Practice,'' ``Experiment,'' ``Gaofen,'' and
            ``Innovation'' series. These have carried a variety of
            payloads, including synthetic aperture radars (SAR), electro-
            optical imaging equipment, and monitoring equipment believed to
            support military intelligence requirements. A Chinese small
            satellite, believed to be from the ``Experiment'' series, was
            recently launched with a robotic arm. Previously in 2010, two
            ``Practice'' satellites deliberately ``bumped'' each other in
            orbit.

        Manned Space Program. China has an active manned mission program
    that involves the Shenzhou manned spacecraft, which has now had ten
    successful flights (five manned, five unmanned), and the Tiangong space
    lab. With the completion of the 2013 Shenzhou-X mission, China has also
    successfully demonstrated docking capabilities between the Shenzhou and
    Tiangong spacecraft, as well as relatively extended duration missions.
    (Shenzhou-X lasted 15 days.)
        To support the manned program, China established its first overseas
    bases with mission support facilities in Swakopmund, Namibia, and
    Kiribati in the South Pacific. Chinese documents have indicated that a
    space station, perhaps in the 60-80 ton range (smaller than the U.S.
    Skylab) is expected to be deployed by 2020.
        Lunar Exploration Program. The Chinese lunar exploration program
    has launched two lunar orbiters (Chang'e-1 and -2), as well as a lunar
    rover (the Jade Rabbit on Chang'e-3) since 2007. The lunar rover has
    exhibited erratic performance, but is still considered fairly
    successful. The final part of the Chang'e program is expected to be a
    lunar sample retrieval mission in the 2017-2018 time frame.
        At this point in time, there is no official indication of plans for
    a manned mission to the moon. In the 2011 Chinese white paper on space,
    it was indicated that initial studies were now underway to explore the
    requirements for such a mission.
        Supporting these various space efforts is a major space industrial
    complex mainly comprising two state-owned enterprises (SOEs): the China
    Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the China
    Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). Each of these SOEs
    is believed to employ over 100,000 people and is dedicated to producing
    aerospace and missile-related systems. Thus, unlike their American
    counterparts (e.g., Boeing and Lockheed-Martin), these companies do not
    manufacture aircraft or helicopters. On the other hand, not only do
    they produce rockets and satellites, but also ground test equipment and
    specialized vehicles associated with space launch, etc. In this regard,
    they somewhat resemble large, vertically integrated corporations.
        The two SOEs are also responsible for manufacturing missiles for
    China's Second Artillery, the equivalent of the Soviet Union's
    Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as tactical missile systems for the
    PLA as a whole. Thus, subordinate research academies within the CASC
    manufacture not only the Long March space launch vehicle, but also the
    DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which comes in an anti-
    carrier variant (the DF-21D) and serves as the launch vehicle for the
    Chinese anti-satellite system (the SC-19).\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Sean O'Connor, ``PLA Ballistic Missiles,'' Air Power Australia,
    APA-TR-2010-0802, April 2012, http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-
    Ballistic-Missiles.html#mozTocId274945 (accessed April 7, 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PLA and China's Space Program
        The close links between the Chinese military and space are not
    restricted to the Chinese military and space industrial complexes. The
    PLA has consistently played a key role in the Chinese space effort, and
    China's space program is closely identified with the military. Indeed,
    the Chinese space program dates its creation to October 8, 1956, with
    the establishment of the Fifth Academy of the Ministry of Defense by
    Dr. Qian Xuesen.
        Since then, the Chinese military has played an essential role in
    the management of various Chinese space programs. This is reflected
    today in the continuing role of the General Armaments Department (GAD)
    in Chinese space affairs. The GAD is one of the four General
    Departments of the PLA (along with the General Staff Department,
    General Political Department, and General Armaments Department) that
    form the core of the Central Military Commission (CMC). It is the CMC
    that actually manages the military. The Ministry of Defense, by
    contrast, has little authority, compared with the two uniformed vice
    chairmen of the CMC.
        All of China's space launch facilities, mission control facilities,
    and tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) facilities, including its
    fleet of space tracking ships, are all subsumed within the GAD. Indeed,
    the facilities are typically referred to by their base number in
    Chinese literature: Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center is Base 25, while
    the Xichang Satellite Launch Center is Base 27. Not surprisingly, the
    various facilities and ships are all staffed by units of the GAD. The
    personnel are trained at the Academy of Command Equipment and
    Technology, which is a subsidiary organization of the GAD.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ ``2007 Researcher Application Form,'' Academy of Equipment
    Command and Technology, China, http://yz.chsi.com.cn/adv/zbxuyjs.htm
    (accessed April 7, 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, China's manned space program is managed through the
    GAD. The website of the China Manned Space Engineering Office (CMSEO)
    lists the chief commander of the program as Zhang Youxia. General Zhang
    Youxia was appointed director of the GAD in October 2012.\3\ Another
    deputy chief commander (apparently the senior deputy) of the program is
    Major General Niu Hongguang, one of the deputy directors of the PLA
    General Armaments Department. Other deputy chief commanders are drawn
    from the military and space industrial complex, reflecting the
    integrated nature of this key industrial sector.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ ``Management,'' China Manned Space Engineering, http://
    en.cmse.gov.cn/list.php?catid=40 (accessed April 7, 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Indeed, it is useful to recall that the U.S. prohibitions currently
    limiting the ability of the PRC to launch any satellites containing
    American parts, under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations
    (ITAR), were put in place due to the transfer of aerospace-related
    information to Chinese companies in the 1990s. As the Cox Commission
    report noted, information that was given to China regarding items such
    as the fairing on the Long March-2E space launch vehicle led to
    improvements for Chinese ballistic missile programs. In particular, it
    led to changes in both rocket design and Chinese operations that
    improved the reliability of all Chinese rocket launches.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/
    Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, The Cox Report
    (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1999), pp. 220 and 221-222.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Meanwhile, China's satellite programs are often linked to military,
    as well as civilian, users. Like the United States, for example,
    China's satellite navigation system (Beidou) is linked to the
    military--specifically, the General Staff Department Satellite
    Navigation Station.\5\ There is even a website celebrating this
    organization's achievements.\6\ Military officers from key GSD
    departments apparently were part of the design effort for the Chinese
    weather satellite system. Military participation in space efforts is
    hardly unique to the PRC, but should serve as a reminder that any
    interaction with the Chinese space program will almost certainly mean a
    PLA role and presence.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ ``A Record of the General Staff Department Satellite Navigation
    Station's Commitment to the Beidou Navigation System,'' Xinhua,
    November 9, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/09/content_2524730.htm
    (accessed April 7, 2014).
        \6\ ``The Stars in the Sky Join Beidou,'' http://
    military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/71065/370766/ (accessed April 7, 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        More to the point, there is no obvious civilian counterpart to the
    PLA in terms of China's space efforts. The most regularly mentioned
    equivalent to NASA is the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA).
    But the head of CNSA is typically described in Chinese writings and
    press coverage first as a vice minister of the Ministry of Industry and
    Information Technology (MIIT), then as a deputy director of the State
    Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National
    Defense (SASTIND), before being mentioned as the head of the CNSA. This
    suggests that the position of the CNSA is a third-tier bureaucracy,
    standing below the key super-ministry for advanced technologies, and
    the managing authority for China's military industries (SASTIND).
        By contrast, the PLA is a key part of the Chinese power structure.
    One of the key positions for the top Chinese leader (Xi Jinping, Hu
    Jintao, Jiang Zemin) is the chairmanship of the Central Military
    Commission. That role, along with being General Secretary of the
    Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is what vests Xi, Hu, and Jiang with
    their power--head of the Party and head of the military. In short,
    bureaucratically the CNSA is dwarfed by the Chinese military (which may
    explain the CNSA's absence from the top echelon of Chinese manned space
    management).
    The Importance of Space to the Chinese Leadership
        As early as 1958, months after Sputnik was placed into orbit,
    Chinese leaders saw the development of space capabilities as reflecting
    on China's place in the international order. In May 1958, Chairman Mao
    Zedong advocated the creation of a Chinese space program, declaring at
    the Second Plenum of the Eighth Party Congress, ``We should also
    manufacture satellites.'' \7\ This high-level support has varied at
    times, but space has generally been seen as contributing to
    ``comprehensive national power'' by facilitating national economic
    development, strengthening military modernization, and supporting the
    legitimacy of the CCP. It is therefore not surprising that senior
    Chinese leaders have made sure that they are present for key events
    such as the inauguration of satellite communications in the 1970s, or
    the launch of China's first manned spacecraft, the Shenzhou-V.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Deng Liqun, ed., China Today: Defense Science and Technology,
    Vol. I (Beijing: National Defence Industry Press, 1993), p. 356.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For China, its space program is emblematic of its steady
    advancement since 1949, especially since most of it has been
    accomplished through its own efforts. When the Sino-Soviet split
    occurred in 1960, Chinese access to foreign technology was abruptly
    ended. As a result, China had to rely on its own efforts, in what
    became known as the ``two bomb, one satellite'' program. This effort
    saw the Chinese focus their national energies to develop an atomic
    bomb, a hydrogen bomb, and a satellite. This reflected the long-
    standing dual-use nature of China's space efforts--if China was to have
    a full-fledged nuclear deterrent, it would have to develop a delivery
    system, which in turn could also serve as a space launch vehicle.
        ``Two bombs, one satellite'' went beyond a programmatic objective,
    however. The term also referred to the idea of homegrown development of
    advanced capabilities. Because of the Sino-Soviet split, as well as the
    ongoing Cold War with the United States and broader isolationist
    policies pursued by Beijing, Chinese development of these capabilities
    would have to wholly rely on their own resources. The phrase ``two
    bombs, one satellite,'' therefore, came to also be associated with the
    idea of indigenous development and self-reliance. These characteristics
    remain hallmarks of today's Chinese space program. For the same reason,
    Chinese ``firsts'' (e.g., the first satellite and first manned mission)
    tend to be of longer duration and incorporate more extensive tasks than
    other nations' firsts.
        Moreover, in keeping with the Chinese memory of the ``Century of
    Humiliation,'' Beijing will want any cooperative venture to be, at a
    minimum, on a co-equal basis. For the PRC to be treated as anything
    other than a full member in any program or effort would smack of the
    ``unequal treaties'' that marked China's interactions with the rest of
    the world between 1839 and 1949. For the same reason, China has
    generally been reluctant to join any organization or regime in which it
    was not party to negotiating. For the CCP, whose political legitimacy
    rests, in part, on the idea that it has restored Chinese pride and
    greatness, this is likely to be a significant part of any calculation.
        At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant
    political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their
    writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to
    establish ``space dominance,'' in order to fight and win ``local wars
    under informationized conditions.'' \8\ The two SOEs are seen as key
    parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the
    opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems
    engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China's
    commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of
    China's aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.\9\
    From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on
    preserving its interests.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ For a more extensive discussion of this topic, please see Dean
    Cheng, ``China's Military Role in Space,'' Strategic Studies Quarterly
    (Spring 2012), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/spring/cheng.pdf
    (accessed April 7, 2014).
        \9\ Mark Stokes, ``China's Commercial Aviation Sector Looks to the
    Future,'' Futuregram 09-002, Project 2049, http://project2049.net/
    documents/chinas_commercial_aviation_sector_
    looks_to_the_future.pdf (accessed April 7, 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China's space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as
    much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and
    foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in
    space, these reflect positively on both China's growing power and
    respect (internationally) and the CCP's legitimacy (internally).
    Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to
    be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As
    China has progressed to the point of being the world's second-largest
    economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to
    why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on
    anything other than its own terms.
    Prospects for Cooperation
        Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation
    with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited.
    China's past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures
    (Sino-Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.-China cooperation in the
    1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino-European space cooperation on the
    Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of
    the joint Russian-Chinese Phobos-Grunt mission is likely seen in
    Beijing as further evidence that a ``go-it-alone'' approach is
    preferable.
        Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant
    interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial
    complex in expanding cooperation.\10\ Moreover, as long as China's
    economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values
    space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space
    expenditures--making international cooperation far less urgent for the
    PRC than most other space-faring states.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ It is worth noting here that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
    Affairs is not a part of the CCP Politburo, a key power center in
    China. Thus, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is muted, at
    best, in any internal debate on policy.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in
    Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones.
    China's space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world.
    Even such basic data as China's annual space expenditures is lacking--
    with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important,
    China's decision-making processes are little understood, especially in
    the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite
    (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision,
    and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at
    cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners
    and ultimate beneficiaries--with a real likelihood that the PLA would
    be one of them.
        It is possible that the Chinese could be induced to be more
    transparent when it comes to space, although the unwillingness of
    Beijing to engage in substantive discussions on space during the last
    several Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) would cast doubt on
    this. But this would argue for a ``go-slow'' approach, at best. There
    is room for greater interaction, especially in the sharing of already
    collected data, such as geodesy information. As both sides set their
    sights on the moon, exchanges of data about lunar conditions and the
    lunar surface and composition all might help create a pattern of
    interaction that might lower some of the barriers to information
    exchange. Even there, however, concerns on both sides about information
    security and electronic espionage, etc., is likely to raise serious
    doubts about how freely one should incorporate data provided by the
    other side.
        The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in
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    Foundation upon request.

        Senator Rubio. Let me begin with Mr. Chiao.
        You mentioned at the close of your statement about
    cooperation with China. Let me step back for a second and make
    this statement. We Americans have always viewed the space
    program, certainly over the last 30 years, as the sort of
    cooperative effort that certainly helps our country but
    benefits all mankind. We have viewed it as a peaceful endeavor,
    as one that can unite people. And we've seen the fruits of it.
        But I think we have to be cautious that not every other
    nation has the same view. And I think China, in particular,
    potentially poses a pretty interesting dilemma for us.
    Certainly, their space program has military components but our
    space program is largely driven by civilians and has civilian
    methodology and civilian purposes behind it. Everything in
    China, but certainly the space program, is deeply linked with
    the PLA and we've seen evidence of that.
        I would like to further expand on your statement. I don't
    necessarily disagree. I think in an ideal world we'd want
    cooperation with China because I think three major powers:
    Russia, China, the United States, and others working in
    conjunction if in fact we all have the same goals could
    certainly get some of these things accomplished quicker than
    any nation on its own.
        But I also think we have to be careful and realistic that
    we not somehow ascribe our motivations and our way of thinking
    to that of another nation that perhaps has different aims and
    goals for their space program. And one of the things
    highlighted in Mr. Cheng's written testimony is warnings about
    that. About the threat of potentially seeing China use
    sensitive information to improve its ballistic missile
    capability and so forth but also its desire to quite frankly
    achieve what they have termed in their own documents and what
    they've called ``publicly spaced dominance'' which is not our
    view. The U.S. may not necessarily want to be the most
    predominant space power in the world but we don't view it as a
    dominance thing, we view it as something that great nations do
    great things.
        So here's my question. In your experience, and certainly
    because you've mentioned it in your statement, do you see any
    potential pitfalls in terms of the Chinese attitude toward the
    space program that, in essence, places them in an incompatible
    position to our own view to what space would be about?
        Dr. Chiao. Well, as you mentioned, and it's certainly true
    that the Chinese space program is part of the PLA. Now
    operationally-wise and that's kind of the way I think, you
    know, I understand the distinction but functionally it
    shouldn't make that big of a difference because we're going to
    be working on civil space together. And they have a clearly
    delineated civil space part of their organization. So I don't
    see any roadblocks if you were or stumbling blocks.
        And as far as sensitive information is concerned, we have
    the safeguards that we can put in place to make sure that there
    are no technology transfers. And, you know, frankly from a, you
    know, guidance system, ballistic missile, those aren't things
    that we work on at NASA. We don't develop the guidance systems.
    We certainly don't transfer it to our partners, information
    like that. So it can be controlled and, as far as I know, it
    has been very successfully controlled with our relationship
    with the Russians.
        Senator Rubio. And again, the ideal scenario is that we
    will be able to work with them cooperatively. I'm just always
    concerned that somehow we ascribe to other countries the same
    motivations as we have for the space program and sometimes that
    those things don't add up. And I just want to make sure we're
    cautious about it.
        But I think we all share your goal that it's achievable
    which I pivot now to Ms. Eisenhower. Your testimony was about
    Russia. And I think you've raised some interesting points in
    your testimony about things like, for example, Russian
    scientists associated with the space program are among the most
    progressive elements in their society. We've enjoyed a
    depoliticized relationship with them. There are safety concerns
    about cutting off interaction with them. And then, there is
    also the geopolitical realities of what's in the headlines
    today.
        Maybe you can expand a little more about how we balance
    those two things. Because, on the one hand, there are
    geopolitical realities. I think when Americans see what's
    happening in Ukraine, we're uncomfortable about the fact that
    we're paying the Russians, what is it, $70 million to go to the
    International Space Station. Does that sound right?
        Ms. Eisenhower. $70 million, sorry?
        Senator Rubio. To get a seat on those flights to the
    Russians. And we depend on them now, for being able to launch
    our astronauts into space. So you can understand the political
    implications of that domestically. And on the other hand,
    you've raised some interesting points--that we don't want to
    cut off the scientific community in Russia that quite frankly
    has been either apolitical or in many instances progressive in
    their thought process in terms of our ongoing relationship. And
    it seems to be a relationship that has some significant degree
    of cooperation. It has been able to overcome whatever is
    happening politically elsewhere in the world.
        So perhaps you can describe that a little bit better for
    us, in terms of what that actually looks like and maybe a
    roadmap moving forward. How do we navigate this, for a lack of
    better term, minefield that we find ourselves in?
        Ms. Eisenhower. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio. And
    it's an honor to be able to be here and to share my thoughts on
    this.
        I think this requires, this particular situation, requires
    a really very nuanced strategy, which of course is extremely
    difficult in today's world where everything is given a bumper
    sticker.
        But, nevertheless, I think a nuanced approach is important
    for the simple reason that we want to make sure that we express
    our displeasure with Russian behavior and we do so in a way
    that's going to count with the regime and not punish our
    friends. Everybody here would back me up by saying that the
    Russian space program is much more important, or space in
    general, is much more important in Russia than it is in this
    country. If this were a Duma committee you would have a full
    room. And so, yes, it has a very big symbolic impact but we
    have made extraordinary strides in the last 20 years in
    bringing what was a very, very hardline aerospace community
    into a fully cooperative relationship as we've seen over the
    last years.
        If I were in charge, I would be organizing sanctions to hit
    exactly at the heart of the regime itself: the people that
    interact most directly with Vladimir Putin and others. If the
    scientific community had that kind of influence with Vladimir
    Putin, they would not have lost their recent political struggle
    over the future of the Russian Academy of Sciences. So I do
    think that that is the political reality on the ground.
        And then, the other point I would make is that none of this
    interaction--maybe this'll actually have some reference to Dr.
    Chiao's comments too, about China. I think we engaged the
    Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, not
    to do them a favor, but to do us a favor. We gained
    unprecedented access to some of their most sensitive
    facilities. And I think, if you look at the China situation, we
    could well gain every bit as much as they might in terms of
    understanding how our two societies view this area; this
    important area. And also, to give us that kind of access in
    China. Bill Gerstenmaier played a leadership role in
    negotiating the agreements with the Russians at that time.
        By the way, I have supplied a copy of Partners in Space for
    both of your committees. But, in any case, I think this is
    really about enhancing our national security and we want to
    make sure that we don't jeopardize our national security and
    lose access to those important communities while we're
    legitimately trying to express our displeasure to the Russian
    government.
        Senator Rubio. And for my last question, I'm going to go
    back to you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. Because I think in your written
    testimony--but this is open to any of you that want to answer
    this because I think this is a more, big picture, broader
    question. In your statement you talked about, ``To channel all
    of the factors that have enabled our space achievements to date
    in a way that will ensure a sustainable foundation under which
    future generations can continue to build.''
        I think the key part for me of that statement is ``future
    generations,'' and the notion that we, the scientists, and
    engineers, many of the people who will work on a 2030 mission,
    for example, to Mars are probably in college right now or
    thinking about what they're going to major in in college. And
    maybe I'm wrong, but my sense is that on a broader public
    level, we have lost some of the public awareness and/or
    enthusiasm of what the space program means for the country and
    I would like some ideas from you, I guess--from all of you, is
    on how we can reinvigorate that.
        I think if you go back to 1960 when President Kennedy made
    that promise that we would land a man on the Moon and return
    him safely to Earth by the end of the decade. That invigorated
    the American scientific community to pursue with a singularity
    of mind that in addition to getting a man on the Moon and back
    safely--also, by the way, held all sorts of commercial and
    technological advances that were made that benefited our
    economy and society as a whole.
        How can we reinvigorate a new generation of people to
    pursue or go into these fields that are so critical? And, more
    importantly, this comes at a time when we have so many young
    people looking for what fields they can go into that will
    provide stable middle and higher income jobs that have
    opportunities in the twenty-first century.
        So my question is, from a public relations standpoint, what
    can we do more of to excite people about what space can mean
    for the future and get more people interested in the fields
    that are the backbone of any successful endeavor?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. That's a really difficult question. You
    know, my experience has been, when I expose folks to what we're
    doing, and by folks I think of high school kids and maybe even
    grade school kids, they really get excited about what we're
    doing. And sometimes, when I'm kind of down in the mouth and
    I'm worried about sequester and budgets and I look at all the
    wonderful things we could do if we just had more budget, I
    forget what we're really doing with what budget we have. And
    when I go expose some of the younger students and some of the
    other folks to what we're doing, that excitement comes back and
    then I get reenergized again and then I'm ready to go back.
        So one thing is I think we need to talk to them unashamedly
    about what we're doing and capture some of the excitement. If
    you think about what we're doing with the Asteroid Redirect
    Mission, we're going to grab a piece of the solar system. We're
    going to deflect it around the Earth to deflect it around the
    Moon and insert it into a distant retrograde orbit around the
    Moon where our crews can go visit with the Orion capsule.
        You know, that seems kind of boring to some folks when I
    say all that, but if you talk to some kids that are still
    excited and they think about what we're really doing. That has
    a really big deal. I mean, to think we are moving a piece of
    the solar system for our use that will allow us to learn skills
    and techniques that we need to push human presence into the
    solar system, that's a pretty awe-inspiring statement.
        But I think we get so jaded because we talk about, well,
    why don't we go to the Moon or let's go to Mars or let's do
    some other activity. We have kind of, you know, buyer's
    neglect, right? It's when you order your food in the cafeteria
    and you look over and you see what somebody else ordered and
    immediately what's in front of you isn't appetizing enough. You
    wish you would have ordered what that person next to you did. I
    think we have to ignore that a little bit and look at what
    we've got in front of us with what this country can do and not
    be ashamed about what we're doing moving forward.
        Senator Rubio. And by the way, I agree. I don't have a
    public polling on this, but I would venture to guess that an
    extraordinary majority of Americans are unaware of the
    existence of that program. Certainly, a majority of our young
    students and even in college are. And I think we can rally
    people around a goal like that. But I think it's incumbent upon
    us in public office who hold these positions and have these
    forums to make people aware of what we are actually working on;
    what's there and what's tangible.
        I think people would be very excited about thinking that
    they can be a part of an effort like that or the subsequent
    efforts that will lead off from that. But, I just think a lot
    of people don't even know we're doing that.
        Dr. Chiao. Yes.
        If I could just add a few comments. I think the key to
    stoking public interest is flying more and flying sooner. And
    that's why, in part of my remarks, I talked about the need for
    possibly a new subprogram of earlier flights that'll get us
    Beyond-Low Earth Orbit more quickly.
        Now, as I mentioned also, for a sustainable program we do
    need a heavy-lift like SLS and Orion. And as Mr. Gerstenmaier
    has said in his remarks, I think it's absolutely possible that
    we can do these kinds of missions in partnership with
    commercial and with international and just do it maybe without
    a lot of big increases in the NASA budget.
        So I'm hopeful that somewhere in the near to mid-term we
    could be flying more often and doing missions that will develop
    the capabilities to go back to the Moon one day and then on to
    Mars. And this could be done in partnership context that might
    be very creative and synergistic, and I think that's the way we
    get the public interested in space flight.
        Senator Nelson. That is correct. Once you start putting
    Americans on American rockets, the interest in this country is
    going to accelerate. How many people have come up to me and
    said, ``Did you see the movie `Gravity'?''
        They were really gripped by it. Well, they'll be gripped
    when you see an American climbing in and strapping into an
    American rocket. And that's the good news. The bad news is that
    it's going to be 2017, in a commercial rocket getting to the
    space station (unless you believe some of the commercial
    companies that it can be 2016) and then Orion, it's not going
    to be until 2021. But these things are complicated. And so,
    that excitement will return, but we've got to keep pressing on.
        We have a vote that is called right now. I'm going to
    recess and quickly run over and vote and come right back. It's
    not a series of votes. It should be just one vote. And then
    we'll continue with the questions.
        Thank you so much.
        The Committee will stand in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Senator Nelson. The Committee will resume.
        I want to ask a quick question to a couple of you about the
    Commercial Crew Program.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier, would additional funding allow us to
    speed up the start of domestic flights to the ISS?
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think probably the most critical
    thing, right now, is to get the funding that we've requested in
    the President's budget in 2015. We have a pretty solid plan.
    Our goal is to select a commercial provider in the August-
    September timeframe of this year. But to make that happen and
    to be there by the end of 2017, as we've talked about, I really
    think we absolutely need the funding level that the President
    has requested. 2015 is probably one of the more critical years
    in terms of where we are in development and activities. This is
    really the paramount year of when we need funding for
    Commercial Crew.
        So any support we can get to the President's budget for
    that activity is absolutely what we need.
        Senator Nelson. So the answer to that question is yes,
    because the President had requested about $850 million for
    Commercial Crew and over the years, it had gone from $300
    million to $500 million to develop Commercial Crew, start the
    competition, et cetera. Then, to about $700 million and now,
    for Fiscal Year 2015, which starts October the first, to about
    $850 million. I agree with you. And so, the answer is yes.
        All right. Dr. Chiao, how does commercial access to Low
    Earth Orbit support further exploration?
        Dr. Chiao. Well, thank you for the question, Senator.
        Commercial Crew will ensure access for Americans to the
    International Space Station. And, as you know, the ISS is
    designed to be operated internationally. That is we need the
    crews on the ground and in the station working together in
    conjunction in order to effectively operate the space station.
        The space station is critical for developing the medical,
    biomedical countermeasures that we need to develop and test
    before we can send crews Beyond-Low Earth Orbit for any
    significant period of time. The station also, of course, serves
    as a test bed for technology, although, new things that we're
    going to be developing and proving out before we can start
    sending crewed missions farther from the Earth for longer
    durations. And so, in that way Commercial Crew very directly
    supports the station which directly supports the Beyond-Low
    Earth Orbit program.
        Senator Nelson. Ms. Eisenhower, what lessons might we take
    away from the lapse of, what you mentioned in your testimony,
    of the need for engagement even during diplomatic uncertainty?
    The space cooperation agreement between the U.S. and the then-
    Soviet Union lapsed in the years following the Soviet invasion
    of Afghanistan. So, given from that lapse, what was the key to
    managing the relationship through the many crises of the Cold
    War?
        Ms. Eisenhower. Yes. Well, that lapse between Apollo-Soyuz
    and 1992, when the Shuttle Mir program began, I think the
    biggest impact is that a generation of people were lost who
    actually knew how to engage in this kind of cooperation. Even
    though Apollo-Soyuz was not a huge program, there just wasn't
    the interactive culture that we see today. And one reason I'm
    concerned about space being involved in some of the measures we
    may take in response to the current crisis, is that it would be
    very sad to see anyone disengaged in this process because long-
    term space cooperation is going to require the Russians, long-
    term. So I think that gap does have workforce implications.
        As I said in my testimony too, the Eisenhower
    Administration, which was the administration in power during
    the dawn of the space age, was also at a crucial stage at the
    early part of the dawn of the nuclear age. The administration's
    greatest concern was the development of what might be called
    ``paranoid uncertainty.'' And so, these kinds of programs, that
    would be the Atoms for Peace conferences and later work around
    the International Geophysical Year, as being stabilizing.
    Precisely because of those crises.
        It's remarkable that, after Sputnik actually, the United
    States and the Soviet Union engaged in private negotiations
    over the future of Antarctica. And it was as a result of the
    International Geophysical Year and the fact that that
    cooperation had not suspended that we managed to demilitarize
    an entire world continent, which is the Antarctic, which is,
    today a real test bed and laboratory for the scientific
    community.
        So I think I know that, as NASA understandably goes through
    reviewing all of its programs, that it should not underestimate
    the importance of these conferences because the conferences, in
    fact, at least in the past, played a very significant role.
        Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Nelson. Would you think that that kind of
    collaboration that you're talking about, would that ultimately
    apply to our relationship with other up-and-coming space-faring
    nations, such as China and India?
        Ms. Eisenhower. Well, I must say that since cooperation
    with Russia since 1992 has been so successful, I really do
    think that it makes a lot of sense to be able to look at
    engaging other countries more deeply. As I said earlier, we
    didn't do it for them, we did it for us.
        We not only had an opportunity to create more transparency,
    but actually, in the book Partners in Space, which I've left a
    copy for you, we learned a lot from the Russians too. They had
    some very, very elegant ways of handling complex situations on
    a very tight budget; which actually could be quite a useful
    discipline these days. I'm sure the Chinese have very
    interesting and creative ways of looking at solving exactly the
    same kind of problems in space.
        And that's why I alluded to the fact that we in fact have a
    much more robust effort in space today because we did share
    ideas about how to solve some of these common problems. What
    came together, actually, at the end was something that was
    really not like the way it was for anybody before, because we
    put different scientific and technological perspectives
    together to create something very robust and strong.
        Senator Nelson. I must admit that I am shaped in part by my
    past experiences, for example, in the 1980s. Out of an
    administration policy in the 80s, they started allowing
    American satellites to be launched on Chinese Long March
    rockets. And basically, there was supposed to be a firewall
    there so that they couldn't get our technology and, of course,
    they got it.
        It's many years later and we're confronted with a different
    situation but I personally think that the United States was
    taken advantage of by the Chinese, because of some well-meaning
    folks in the administration at the time. They were so well-
    meaning, in my judgment, they were naive. But it is what it is.
    And here we are in the year 2014. What do you think, Dr. Chiao,
    about the international collaboration? And do you think we can
    best engage now with these up-and-coming space-faring nations?
        Dr. Chiao. Well, Senator, I have to admit, in the early
    90s, you know, I grew up during the Cold War. And so, during
    the early 90s I was one of the skeptics of working with the
    Russians and I was wondering why we were doing this. But after
    I went over there and started working with these folks and
    started seeing the advantages and the big picture of
    international relations and bettering things not only between,
    you know, cooperating in space but just between our two
    countries, I became a big believer in international
    collaboration.
        And so, I think there will always be risks. I mean, first
    of all, you know, it's clear to everyone, I think, that the
    Russians are trying to spy on us, you know, the Chinese are
    trying to spy on us. We're spying on everyone. Everyone is
    spying on everyone else. So there are going to be attempts to
    get technology from all sides. And I think the safeguards that
    we have in place, that we put in place with the Russians, as I
    mentioned earlier, I'm not aware of a single instance where
    there has been an inappropriate transfer of technology.
        Now, to your point about the Chinese missile technology
    being benefited from some American advice, unfortunately, that
    was due to naivete at the time I think. It was not anything
    directly to do with launching satellites on their vehicles
    except that in the post-accident investigation some American
    experts naively gave them some advice which probably helped
    improve their rockets. That's something we've learned from I
    think. And as I mentioned, the safeguards that can be part of
    the safeguards that I think will make the benefits of
    cooperating more outweigh the risks of possibly losing some
    technology.
        As Ms. Eisenhower mentioned, you know, we can gain great
    insights into the Chinese program. I've been over and seen
    their technology. I've seen their rocket factories and their
    space center, their control center, and it's impressive.
    They're doing some really impressive things. And I think we
    would gain a lot of insight into what they're doing in this
    relationship if it were to happen.
        Senator Nelson. Ms. Eisenhower, do you have an additional
    comment on how did the United States still manage to benefit
    from the Russian technologies even though we beat them to the
    Moon? As a matter of fact, they had a big rocket and it blew up
    on the pad. And it was their Moon rocket.
        Ms. Eisenhower. Are you talking about the period after----
        Senator Nelson. Back then.
        Ms. Eisenhower.--started cooperation? Yes.
        Senator Nelson. Right.
        Ms. Eisenhower. Well----
        Senator Nelson. With the Soviet Union.
        Ms. Eisenhower.--first of all, some of this is outlined in
    my book. But I think we learned, for instance, a number of
    things that the Russians, for instance--and actually probably
    Bill ought to be answering this question in large measure. But
    we learned a lot about how a completely different group of
    people would launch rockets. They were organizing their rocket
    launches--having their rockets horizontally maintained and then
    hoisting them up and launching them. I think we learned a lot
    about redundancy. Help me here, Bill. It's been a long time
    since I wrote that book, but we used numerical redundancy. They
    used functional redundancy. Would you like to maybe--could I
    cede my----
        Senator Nelson. Absolutely.
        Mr. Gerstenmaier. I'd just say, again, we've learned an
    awful lot and both Jeff and Leroy can also add their own
    experience.
        When you solve the same physical problems and you see
    another country, another group of engineers, solve that same
    physical problem, and because you've been isolated, you see
    their solution to that problem in a very different light. And
    that gives you tremendous exposure. And that's one of the true
    advantages of cooperation.
        Space station is amazing. If you look at the heat shield,
    the debris shields on the outside of a space station, there's a
    Russian design for--and we're all protecting ourselves from
    micrometeorites; small penetrations of the pressure shell.
        You can see how the Russians solved the problem; you can
    see how the Italians solved the problem; you can see how the
    Europeans solved the problem; how the Japanese solved the
    problems; and how the U.S. solves the problems. And every one
    of them does exactly the same job but they do it in a very
    different manner, fundamentally. So you gain a tremendous
    experience and a new way of thinking that really helps you
    become innovative and creative as you try to build your next
    program.
        Dr. Chiao. Yes. I would totally agree with all of those
    comments. You know, during my experience with the Russians, as
    I mentioned earlier, my going in position was why are we doing
    this, our stuff is so much better. What do we have to learn
    from them? But the fact is, as Mr. Gerstenmaier just said, the
    fact is that when you see perspectives, you know, different
    cultures, different entities, solve the same technical problems
    from a different approach, it really broadens your own
    perspective. And personally, having done spacewalk using both
    American spacesuits and Russian spacesuits, I really came to
    admire certain elements of their design, the approach and it's
    really been eye-opening. And that's just one example.
        Senator Nelson. So did Sandra Bullock in ``Gravity.''
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Nelson. Another example, I think, is the Russian
    engine, RD-180. It creates temperatures and pressures because
    of some alloys that they are very, very good at. That it's an
    extraordinary engine. And we have the license to it, but we
    don't know all the techniques of how they blend all those
    metals to be able to have that kind of thrust in an engine.
        Mr. Manber, tell me about--why do you, or do you think that
    we are nearing a point where commercial exploration could
    become viable?
        Mr. Manber. I know we are, because I have a lot of
    customers.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Nelson. And why is that, that we're nearing that
    point?
        Mr. Manber. Well, apologies, Mr. Senator.
        I think the primary reason is the stability we enjoy and
    policy in Low Earth Orbit. We have actually reached a moment in
    the midst of all the politics we have in Washington where this
    Congress has given us, in the space community, at least the 10-
    year horizon. And that is extraordinary.
        And we were about to lose a significant foreign customer,
    in fact, to the Chinese. And the reason was, they were looking
    at a long-term project onboard space station and we were
    planning to bring down the station in 2020 and the Chinese are
    out there commercially marketing this space station now. And
    when the announcement was made that we're extending it to at
    least 2024, they came back.
        And so, I think the answer to the question, and I think
    it's a lesson for us as we look at Beyond-Low Earth Orbit, is
    we have a stable policy now. We have robust transportation to
    and from the station. We have bipartisan agreement that the
    station should be continued. We have NASA not competing with
    the private sector. And we have a very good regulatory
    framework; the IGA, the Intergovernmental Agreement which lays
    out the rules of the road. In that environment, I'm willing, my
    investors are willing, to make investments, and customers are
    willing to make plans.
        So the answer to the question is we have a stable policy
    and existing hardware in space.
        Senator Nelson. And do you have any suggestions what NASA
    could learn from the commercial partners?
        Mr. Manber. Oh, do I.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Manber. Yes.
        What government does best, as Mr. Gerstenmaier has said in
    these hearings so many times--what government does best, what
    NASA does best, is plan and develop. The government does not do
    operations that well in any industry. They don't run our
    airlines, they don't, you know, they don't operate our car
    industry. You don't rent a car from a government agency.
        And so, I think what NASA can learn from the experience we
    are having together on the space station, is to relax a little
    bit. If they can provide, with congressional funding, the
    infrastructure, let the commercial sector in on it.
        We have a small satellite program now on space station. We
    just deployed 33 small satellites on the station with no
    additional taxpayer funding. We took the risk, we invested the
    money, we built the hardware, we got it through the NASA safety
    process and the Japanese Space Agency safety process, and it's
    all working fine. And I think what we're learning is: NASA
    should not be trying to do the bells and whistles. Provide the
    opportunity, provide the infrastructure if that's, you know,
    the basic facilities, and then let the commercial sector invest
    its own funds. We still don't have a NASA contract,
    unfortunately.
        But no, we still don't have a NASA contract. And we're very
    happy with that because they don't design our hardware and we
    take the risk. And so, I think the lesson for both sides to
    learn is let the commercial sector do what we do best in any
    market including space.
        Senator Nelson. What can the commercial efforts do to
    generate more excitement among young people until we can
    actually get American bodies in American rockets flying back?
        Mr. Manber. When we started NanoRacks, we did not start to
    do education. I'm not a teacher. I didn't think of education.
    Today, we have an unbelievable program at NanoRacks where,
    through our educational partners, we've flown over 45 or 50
    school districts in America. We're flying Florida high schools,
    universities--there's a program in California at Valley
    Christian which is now 14 Christian high schools.
        It's even gone international. We fly Israeli high schools.
    All with no NASA funding. It's not a NASA program. NASA is the
    landlord. NASA is the safety. NASA and the taxpayers have given
    us this opportunity. And I will say that, you know, NanoRacks
    is a small company. We're not in ``Space News'' and the
    industry publications that often. But we're in the, you know,
    ``Albany This'' and all these small-town newspapers where we're
    giving these kids the opportunities. We have parents doing bake
    sales to fly on the space station. And we have some students,
    now, that have gone from high school to Stanford and other
    national universities.
        And both at the high school level and in university,
    they're doing projects on space station through us. And so, I
    guess the answer to your question is we move so quickly, we're
    able to do these student projects in one school-year. And it
    takes NASA, unfortunately, far longer to get through the
    process and the payload integration for whatever reason.
        And so, I think the answer is just with us willing to
    invest our own hardware, education, partner with educational
    schools, we're partnering with CASIS now, the nongovernmental
    organization, to do even more schools. And I think at times
    people get bothered when you put the word ``commercial'' and
    ``education'' in the same sentence.
        But I think what we're seeing is we move so quickly, we
    invest our facilities, the teachers say that kids never forget
    that opportunity. So the more that we--we're not an educational
    company--the more folks who come to us to do it, the more
    schools, high schools, homeschooling (we're even reaching out
    to now), the better it is. And I think there's a lot of
    excitement under the surface.
        What Senator Rubio was talking about, I think, under the
    surface there's a lot of excitement on station. We shouldn't
    forget about space station.
        Senator Nelson. You dealt in commercialization with the
    Russian station, Mir. Is that correct?
        Mr. Manber. Yes, it is. I admit it.
        Senator Nelson. From that experience and your ISS
    experience, what would you anticipate would be your challenges
    on a Chinese station?
        Mr. Manber. You mean, commercially or----
        Senator Nelson. Commercially.
        Mr. Manber. Well, the Chinese are now competing against us
    now, and I'm trying to match, already, what I know what their
    prices to be.
        First, what I've learned from the experience with Mir is
    you can market a space station. That was where we learned you
    can.
        And second, you can work with a government's agency even
    if, and in this case it was Russian, a different government. I
    think what we'll learn is that, from all indications we're
    seeing at NanoRacks, is that the Chinese will pursue a
    commercial pathway. They're offering, already, opportunities
    with other sovereign nations in exchange for minerals or
    exchange for other opportunities.
        And so, I think what I'm taking away from the experience on
    Mir and ISS is that the Chinese will be a formidable commercial
    competitor. I want to win in the marketplace not because
    they're Chinese but because they're a competitor to us. We can
    work with them but I think the lesson we have got to be clear
    on in this country is that space stations are commercial
    platforms. They have political purposes as well. They're
    important. They're going to be more important. And we need one.
        And I did fight in the 1990s to ensure that the Mir did not
    come down. And I lost that battle. But now, I'm fighting to
    make sure the ISS doesn't come down. And for many of the same
    reasons. It's extraordinarily critical that we keep the ISS
    going as long as it's technically feasible because it has
    political implications and it has commercial implications, as
    well, for us.
        Senator Nelson. We're going to try to do that in a NASA
    authorization bill if we can ever get over the problems of
    sequester.
        Mr. Manber. Yes. I appreciate that.
        Senator Nelson. Any final comments from anybody on the
    panel?
        Thank you. It's been most illuminating. Thank you for your
    expertise and your testimony. And thank you for your devotion
    to our space program.
        The meeting is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                A P P E N D I X

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
                            William H. Gerstenmaier
        Question 1. Due to budgetary constraints, NASA has previously had
    to withdraw from international collaborations, with notable examples
    including the ExoMars mission and, recently, the proposed suspension of
    the SOFIA airborne telescope. What steps can the government take to
    better protect its relationships with international partners during
    long-term mission planning?
        Answer. NASA has a long history of very successful cooperation with
    nations around the world, and part of that history has from time to
    time included actions taken by NASA and some by our international
    partners to re-phase, redesign, or even terminate planned cooperative
    activities. Even the most robust space partnerships, such as those
    among the International Space Station partners, have weathered such
    developments. Our partners are very aware that in all instances our
    cooperation is based on the availability of appropriated funds, just as
    we are aware that their participation has similar funding constraints.
        Currently, NASA has over 600 active agreements with over 120
    countries and anticipates that international cooperation will remain a
    cornerstone of all of its future activities. As international
    collaboration in space exploration continues to increase (as resources
    remain constrained world-wide), maintaining an open, frank dialogue
    with partners and potential partners will be a key component of sound
    international partnership practice.

        Question 2. Based on your substantial experience with and knowledge
    of international space exploration efforts, how might NASA's
    international partners collaborate with the United States on the
    asteroid redirect mission?
        Answer. NASA has identified a number of areas where international
    collaboration on the asteroid redirect mission could provide mutual
    benefit. Examples could include:

       Data sharing and lessons learned analysis involving other
            asteroid/small body missions;

       Asteroid identification and characterization, both near term
            as NASA works to down-select candidate asteroid targets, and
            longer term to support preparation for the selected asteroid;

       Asteroid capture system contributions including both
            deployable structures and autonomous robotic manipulators;

       Rendezvous sensor contributions that could be used for a
            wide range of mission applications including automated
            rendezvous and docking and asteroid characterization and
            proximity operations; and

       Secondary payload contributions to either the Asteroid
            Retrieval Vehicle or the SLS that could advance either science
            or future exploration capabilities.

        Question 2a. How might that collaboration benefit both partner
    space programs and our own?
        Answer. There is global consensus of the value of human and robotic
    exploration--with Mars as the ultimate destination--as reflected in the
    Global Exploration Roadmap released by the space agencies in the
    International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG) in August
    2013. The ISECG member agencies further recognize that collaborative
    efforts toward this goal are necessary to maximize success in this
    multi-decadal endeavor while also strategically managing investments
    across national economies. Coupled with the need for space agencies to
    demonstrate near term, specific and collaborative steps toward that
    long-term goal, NASA feels that significant mutual benefit can be
    realized in each of the areas outlined above.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
                                Dr. Leroy Chiao
        Question 1. Based on your substantial experience with and knowledge
    of international space exploration efforts, how might NASA's
    international partners collaborate with the United States on the
    asteroid redirect mission?
        Answer. International partners will collaborate with NASA on all
    Beyond-Low-Earth-Orbit (B-LEO) exploration missions, as an extension to
    the current collaboration on the International Space Station (ISS).
    Their astronauts will have future opportunities to fly on these
    missions. They will also contribute to hardware for the exploration
    programs. As an example, the European Space Agency (ESA) is currently
    developing the Service Module (SM) for the Orion spacecraft, which will
    enable it to maneuver in LEO. In addition, there will be opportunities
    to collaborate on an Earth Departure Stage and other hardware in
    support of the redirect mission.

        Question 2. How might that collaboration benefit both partner space
    programs and our own?
        Answer. International collaboration benefits all partners in many
    ways. First, it allows partners to have a stake in, and develop
    different components of the exploration program. This serves as
    technology drivers in their own countries, while providing employment
    in the aerospace and other high-technology sectors. Second, similar
    capabilities provide redundancies that have proven to be critical in
    the past. For example, the U.S. Space Shuttle supported the Russian MIR
    space station during the late 1990s. Similarly, the Russia Soyuz
    supported the ISS after the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. Third,
    working together on a very visible civil space program helps to improve
    overall relations between the partners, as they are all focused on a
    common goal. Furthermore, the partners are highly motivated to be
    successful, for the overall benefit of all partners. The ISS is a
    shining example of this.

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