[Senate Hearing 113-668]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-668
UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE
LEVANT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Connable, Ben, senior international policy analyst, Rand
Corporation, Washington, DC.................................... 59
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee.................... 3
Ford, Hon. Robert S., senior fellow, Middle East Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 55
Prepared statement........................................... 57
Kerry, Hon. John F., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator Marco Rubio..................................... 79
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions Submitted
by Senator Tom Udall....................................... 82
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Udall, U.S. Senator From New
Mexico......................................................... 79
(iii)
UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE
LEVANT
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:38 p.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons,
Durbin, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Corker, Risch, Rubio,
Johnson, Flake, McCain, Barrasso, and Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Mr.
Secretary, you have a warm welcome. Having just returned from a
coalition-building mission that will determine the breadth of
support and course of the anti-ISIL strategy in the near and
long term, you are here at a critical moment for the Iraqi and
Syrian people, for the region, and for the United States and
the world.
Let me say at the outset, in my view, the coalition you are
working hard to build will require fully engaged and fully
contributing senior partners, a coalition that must be defined
not by words, but by deeds. The United States can lead this
coalition, but our partners, particularly Sunni partners, must
be all in. And I fully acknowledge that getting skin in the
game will be different for different coalition partners, but
Congress cannot be providing a blank check for the anti-ISIL
campaign.
I am pleased by the willingness of our partners in the
Middle East to support, fund, and provide resources for this
campaign. From Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, from Cairo to Amman to
Beirut, our partners are sending the signal to ISIL that they
are not welcome, that they have a bankrupt religious ideology,
and that they will be aggressively confronted.
Above all, the problems in Iraq and Syria that created an
environment susceptible to ISIL's advance can only be solved
locally. In Iraq, this means an inclusive government with a
national agenda and leaders ready to empower the Iraqi Security
Forces and Kurdish Peshmerga forces to take the fight to ISIL.
In Syria, it means training and equipping a vetted Syrian
opposition force that shares our vision for a pluralistic free
Syria, free of ISIL and all violent extremist groups, but also
free of Assad and his regime backers. This fighting force
should be prepared to support a post Assad political structure
whatever the circumstances under which he ultimately leaves
Syria, by a negotiated settlement or other means.
The President has laid out a comprehensive, holistic
strategy that purports to integrate all the tools of U.S. power
to defeat ISIL. What I expect to hear today are some
specifics--the timeline for this mission, the scope, the
resources in personnel, funds, intelligence, military assets,
and assistance, as well as the role our coalition partners will
play. We must be clear-eyed about the risks before providing
our enduring support for this operation.
The fact is we are living in 2014, not 2003. We must not
repeat the mistakes of the past, given the nature of the threat
we face. This means clearly defining the objectives, the
political end state that we seek through this anti-ISIL
campaign. I want to hear what success looks like in Iraq and
Syria, across the region, and what conditions will indicate
when it is time to end military action.
Now this is what we know about ISIL: It has brutally,
mercilessly, barbarically followed through on its threats to
kill American hostages James Foley and Steven Sotloff. It
beheaded British aid worker David Haines on Saturday and
threatens to execute another British citizen, Alan Henning.
It promotes genocide against anyone who does not share its
warped version of Islam--moderate Sunnis, Shias, Christians,
Yazidis, minorities. It enslaves women and children. It has
seized United States and Iraqi military equipment, has built a
formidable fighting force. It is pumping oil and selling it to
the tune of $1 million a day to fund its brutal tactics, along
with kidnappings, theft or extortion, and external support.
It is recruiting disciples for its unholy war at a
frightening pace from Europe, the United States, and anywhere
they can find disaffected people. These foreign fighters are
crossing often from Turkey, which either because of fear or
maybe ideology has declined to participate to stop that flow of
fighters and to counter ISIL.
It has declared the territory it occupies a caliphate with
intent to seize more territory from United States partners and
allies from Jordan to Saudi Arabia to Lebanon. The risk to
Jordanian and Lebanese stability is real. It is urgent, and it
is grave. We would be fools not to take this threat seriously.
ISIL is an enemy of the United States and the civilized world.
Now as I have said many times, temporary and targeted
airstrikes in Iraq and Syria fall under the President's powers
as Commander in Chief, but if the military campaign lasts for
an extended period of time, which I gather it will, it is my
belief that Congress will need to approve an ISIL-specific
authorization for the use of military force. I am personally
not comfortable with reliance on either the 2001 AUMF that
relies on a thin theory that ISIL is associated with al-Qaeda
and certainly not on the 2002 Iraq AUMF, which relied on
misinformation.
I expect the administration, today and in the days ahead,
to brief this committee on its comprehensive strategy and the
operational objectives by which we will defeat ISIL so we can
draft an appropriate AUMF to address the very grave ISIL threat
we face.
Now let me be clear. I support the President's strategy and
his sense of urgency, and I commend you, Mr. Secretary, for
your efforts with allies in the region who also face violent
and destabilizing threats from ISIL. Let us not, however, make
the 9/11 mistake of rushing into an AUMF--an authorization for
the use of military force--that has become the overriding
authorization for the last 13 years, has been used for
indefinite duration, and has been used from South Asia to the
Persian Gulf to Africa and Southeast Asia.
The fact is we need to ensure that whatever authorization
for the use of military force we consider is comprehensive and
appropriate in scope and duration to meet the threat and
sustain the fight. It is our responsibility to answer three
fundamental questions. What will it ultimately take to degrade
and destroy ISIL? How does this fight end? And what end state
do we seek in the region?
We need to get it right, in my view, not just get it fast.
And in doing so, we need a bipartisan approach that puts
politics aside and the Nation first. This is a long-term
effort, and we in Congress must be very deliberate in our
consideration of any new strategy, new authorities, and new
funding that it will take to meet the new threat we face.
I believe we need to defeat ISIL before they develop the
operational capacity to perform a September 11-like attack. I
never want to lose as many citizens from my home State of New
Jersey or from the United States as we did on that day. That is
our responsibility, and it is our solemn obligation.
With that, let me turn to the ranking member, Senator
Corker, for his comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I
appreciate the full and broad opening comments that you made
and the way you have expressed many of our concerns regarding
ISIL and their capacity over time to harm Americans.
I know we are here a few days after the President publicly
addressed this, as the Nation and many others around the
Western world are--around the civilized world are outraged over
the conduct of ISIL, and I know that Americans are greatly
concerned about, over time, the effects they might have on this
Nation, as you just expressed.
We are also here exactly 1 year and 2 weeks after, in this
very room, this committee voted out an authorization for the
use of force in Syria. It was one of the bright moments, in my
opinion, of this committee. Not necessarily because of the
product, but because we all worked together in such a way to
come to an end that we thought was best for the country, much
in the light and in the tone that the chairman just laid out.
So I just want to start by welcoming our Secretary. We have
had some conversations. I appreciate his hard work. But I do
want to say, as I have said to him personally, I am very
disappointed that the administration has chosen to go about
what they are doing without explicitly seeking the
authorization of Congress.
I think that is a huge mistake. I realize that part of
that, unfortunately, has to do with the political season that
we are in, which is, to me, very unfortunate that that might be
a factor to some. I also realize that part of the strategy and
plan or big parts of it are still being created. And therefore,
it is being put together as we move along, and we are really
not in a place right now for Congress to fully ascertain what
the plan might be.
And as the chairman just mentioned, he is going to deal
with an authorization. Our committee will deal with an
authorization. But I just want to say to our Secretary, I hope
that when that is done, it is done with the administration
explicitly seeking that, not saying if Congress wants to play a
constructive role, it can and it would be welcomed. But one
where you seek it and you lay out in detail for us, in both
classified and open settings, what it is we are seeking to
achieve and how we are going to go about it.
And again, I know much of this is being made up as we go
along. I do hope that the Secretary today will outline the true
nature of the threat. I know he was in a meeting prior to
coming in here where some of that was being discussed. But I
hope that clearly today you will lay out what you think the
true nature of the threat is.
Thirdly, and just one glaring piece, I know that
Secretaries of State probably do not have the same opportunity
that Senators do to visit people in refugee camps and to see
people that we said we would support and do not. We have been
pushing, in this committee, for years or for a long time to arm
and train the vetted moderate opposition. We passed that out of
this committee a year and a half ago almost on a 15-3 vote. We
have been pushing for it for longer than that.
And in spite of the fact that there are some alleged
activities that are occurring, we have not done the things that
we said we would do. As a matter of fact, I would say that the
position that the administration has taken over this last year
and 2 weeks since we were here meeting about the authorization
and passing one has led to many of the problems that we are
facing today, many of the problems that are causing
civilization itself to be fearful.
And again, though, I appreciate the fact that the Secretary
is here today, that the administration has stepped forward and
has the beginnings of a thought process as to how to address
it.
I do want to say that what I have heard about dealing with
the moderate opposition to me is odd. I know that the
administration, especially at the White House, has stated how
generally feckless--to use a word I think that describes it--
they believe this moderate opposition to be. And yet we look at
this, and today, it is our entire ground game.
I have supported the training and arming of these rebels
for some time. I will say I was shocked yesterday to hear that
in the Armed Services testimony these rebels are actually going
to be used against ISIS. All of them that I have met with, and
things may have changed, but their focus has been taking out
Assad.
I know they have had a two-front battle or war raging as
they have tried to do that. But I am surprised that the
administration is basing their entire ground game on a group of
people that, candidly, are going to receive very little
training under the small authorization that has been put forth,
and that that is our entire ground game, which brings me back
to point two, talking about the very nature of the threat.
It seems to me the administration has placed many, many
caveats on what we will not do, and at the same time, the
rhetoric describing the threat is far greater than it seems to
me than the plan that is being put together.
And I will close with this. I know that typically when you
have a coalition, you have the coalition put together before
you announce it. I know in this case, we are announcing a
coalition, and we are attempting to put it together.
And I hope that what we are going to end up with is more
than a group of coat holders. I hope that we are going to have
people who are really going to be doing things on the ground
that matter. But I do hope the Secretary, through his hard
work, has generated commitments that will matter as it relates
to this.
This effort, we all know, is not going to be a 1- or 2-year
effort. It is going to be a multiyear effort. Some people are
saying a decade. Some people are saying a decade.
And so, I do think it is important, as our chairman laid
out, that all of us fully understand what we are undertaking,
fully understand the nature of the threat, fully understand the
commitment of this administration to deal with this threat in
the appropriate way. So I welcome you here today. I look
forward to your testimony and to our questions.
The Chairman. With that, Mr. Secretary, we welcome you back
to the committee you so ably and distinguishedly chaired. We
thank you for your service to our country.
We know that you just recently arrived from building this
coalition, and we appreciate you being here today in order to
inform members of what has been achieved, what is in front of
us. And with that, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Kerry. Well, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Corker, and members of the committee, my friends and former
colleagues, I really thank you for holding this hearing on an
issue that is obviously fraught with all the high stakes that
both the chairman and the ranking member have just described
and all the members of the committee understand deeply.
And I really look forward to this opportunity to both
define the threat that ISIL does pose, the ways in which it
does, and, of course, our strategy for defeating it. And all of
that could not be more critical for the country.
During the years that I had the privilege of serving here
and working with different administrations, it always struck me
that American foreign policy works best and is strongest when
there is a genuine discussion, a dialogue, a vetting of ideas
back and forth, really a serious discussion, much more than an
articulation of one set of ideas and then another, and they
just oppose each other and they sit out there and there is no
real effort to have a meeting of the minds.
So I want to make sure that by the time we are done here
today, I have heard from you. I know what you are thinking. And
you have heard from me, and you know what we are thinking, what
the administration is thinking. And that you have a clearer
understanding of what it is that we have done so far, of how we
see this, and how, hopefully, we can come to see it together,
what we are doing now, and where we go next.
And I state unequivocally, and it is not a passing
sentence, that I welcome the input, need the input of this
committee because it is together that we are going to be much
stronger and much more effective in guaranteeing the success of
this effort. And it is a big effort in a lot of ways. It is
about ISIL in the immediacy, but as we will, I think, discuss
today, it is about a lot more than that.
So I want to underscore at the start, you know, there are
some debates of the past 30 years, 29 of which I was privileged
to serve in the Senate, that undoubtedly will fill up books and
documentaries for a long time, and Iraq is certainly one of
them. Iraq has caused some of the most heated debates and
deepest divisions of the past decade, a series of difficult
issues and difficult choices about which people can honestly
disagree.
But I did not come here today and I hope we do not have to
rehash those debates. The issue that confronts us today is one
on which we all ought to be able to agree. ISIL must be
defeated, period. End of story. And collectively, we are all
going to be measured by how we carry out this mission.
You know, as I came in here, obviously, we had some folks
who spoke out, and I would start by saying that I understand
dissent. I have lived it. That is how I first testified in
front of this committee in 1971. I spent 2 years protesting a
policy. So I respect the right of Code Pink to protest and to
use that right.
But you know what? I also know something about Code Pink.
Code Pink was started by a woman and women who were opposed to
war, but who also thought that the Government's job was to take
care of people and to give them health care and education and
good jobs.
And if that is what you believe in, and I believe it is,
then you ought to care about fighting ISIL. Because ISIL is
killing and raping and mutilating women. And they believe women
should not have an education. They sell off girls to be sex
slaves to jihadists.
There is no negotiation with ISIL. There is nothing to
negotiate. And they are not offering anyone health care of any
kind. They are not offering education of any kind for a whole
philosophy or idea or cult, whatever you want to call it, that,
frankly, comes out of the Stone Age.
They are cold-blooded killers marauding across the Middle
East, making a mockery of a peaceful religion. And that is
precisely why we are building a coalition to try to stop them
from denying the women and the girls and the people of Iraq the
very future that they yearn for. And frankly, Code Pink and a
lot of other people need to stop and think about how you stop
them and deal with that. So I----
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. It is important for people to
understand, there is no invasion. The invasion was ISIL into
Iraq. The invasion is foreign fighters into Syria. That is the
invasion, and it is destructive to every possibility of
building a state in that region.
So even in a region that is virtually defined by division,
and every member of this committee understands the degree to
which these divisions are deep in that region. Leaders who have
viewed the last 11 years very differently have all come
together for this cause. They may agree on very little in
general, but they are more unified on this subject than
anything that I have seen them unified on in my career.
So as President Obama described last week when he spoke
directly to the American people, we do have a clear strategy to
degrade, defeat, and destroy ISIL, and it is not in its
infancy. It has been well thought through and carefully
articulated and now is being built in these coalition efforts
that began with the meeting in Jeddah and moved to Paris and
will move to the United Nations this week when I chair a U.N.
Security Council meeting on Friday.
The United States will not go it alone. That has been a
fundamental principle on which President Obama has sought to
organize this effort, and that is why we are building a
coalition, a global coalition. There are more than 50 countries
that already have agreed or are now doing something. Not every
country will decide that their role is to have some kind of
military engagement, but every country can do something. And we
will show exactly what that means.
And as I traveled around the region and Europe in the last
days, the question that foreign leaders were asking me was not
whether they should join the coalition, but how they can help.
We are also--and I emphasize this--we are not starting from
scratch. This is an effort that we have been building over
time, both on our own and with the help of our international
partners.
Even before President Obama delivered his speech last week,
nearly 40 countries had joined in contributing to the effort to
strengthen the capacity of Iraq to be able to strengthen its
military, to train, to provide humanitarian assistance. We have
been focused on ISIL since its inception as the successor to Al
Qaeda of Iraq in 2013.
And back in January, realizing that, we ramped up our
assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces, increasing our
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, or ISR, the flights
that get a better picture of the battlefield. We expedited
weapons like the Hellfire missiles for the Iraqis in order to
bring their capacity to bear in this fight.
Early this summer, the ISIL threat accelerated when it
effectively erased the Iraq-Syria border and the Mosul Dam
fell. The President acted immediately, deliberately and
decisively: We further surged the ISR missions immediately; we
set up joint operation centers in Baghdad and Erbil
immediately; and our Special Forces conducted a very detailed,
in-depth assessment of Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish
Forces.
We did that purposefully without jumping, as some people
wanted us to, because we wanted to understand what is the
capacity of the Iraqi Army to fight? How many brigades, having
seen what happened in Mosul, are still prepared to engage? Are
we getting into something that, in fact, we do not have the
answers to with respect to who can do what?
And to date, we have launched--we have supported those
Iraqi Security Forces that, by the way, helped in the
liberating of Amirli, helped in the freedom of Sinjar Mountain,
helped in taking back the Mosul Dam. And now we have launched
more than 150 airstrikes, and it is because of the platforms
that we put in place last January and even before that those
strikes have been among the most precise strikes that we have
ever taken.
The percentage, I will not go into it here, but I will tell
you, you would be astonished if you heard openly now the
accuracy of those efforts. Those were put in place back in
June, and those strikes have been extremely effective in
breaking the sieges that I described and beginning to move
confidence back into the Iraqi military.
The judgment and assessments of our military that went over
there to look at the Iraqi military came back with a judgment
of a sufficient number of brigades capable of and ready to
fight. And with the reconstitution of the military in a way
that can bring the country together and not be divided along
sectarian lines or viewed to be the army of one individual, it
is entirely likely that there will be much greater and more
rapid progress.
That has given us time to put in place the two pillars of a
comprehensive strategy against ISIL: First, an inclusive Iraqi
Government, which was essential--there would be no capacity for
success here if we had not been able to see the Iraqi
Government come together--and second, the broad international
coalition so the United States is not alone.
We redoubled our efforts, frankly, to help move the Iraqi
political process forward, and we were very clear-eyed about
the fact that the strategy of ISIL would only succeed if we had
a strong, inclusive government, and frankly, that required
transformation in the government, which the Iraqis themselves
effected. With our support and several weeks of very complex
negotiations, President Masum nominated Haider al-Abadi to
serve as Prime Minister. And shortly thereafter, Prime Minister
al-Abadi, again with our support and others, was able to form
his Cabinet and present it to the Parliament, and last week,
that government was approved.
I have to tell you, it was quite astonishing to be in
Jeddah the other day with the Saudis, Emiratis, the Bahrainis,
the Jordanians, the Qataris, the Turks, the Lebanese, and
Iraqis. Iraqis in Saudi Arabia, and everybody here in this
committee knows what that relationship has been like for the
last years.
And to hear the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, who
chaired the meeting, Saud al-Faisal, say that they were
prepared to open an immediate embassy in Baghdad. That is
transformative. The result is something also for Iraq that has
never seen before in its history, an election deemed credible
by the United Nations, followed by a peaceful transition of
power without any United States troops on the ground.
I must say I was sort of struck. Yesterday, the Wall Street
Journal had an article talking about Arab divide, but above the
Arab divide language is the Shia foreign minister of Iraq, the
Kurd president of Iraq, and the Sunni foreign minister of Saudi
Arabia, all in communication and jointly working as never
before. So I think people need to focus on what has been
accomplished here.
As you know, I went to Iraq last week. I traveled. I met
with the leaders of Iraq. And throughout the entire process, we
have been in touch with regional leaders to ensure that the new
and inclusive government is going to receive support from the
region.
With this inclusive government in place, it is time for a
defensive strategy that we and our international partners have
pursued to get things together, get the inclusive government,
know exactly where we are going, to now transition to an
offensive strategy, one that harnesses the capabilities of the
entire world to eliminate the ISIL threat once and for all.
President Obama outlined this strategy in detail. I am not
going to go through it in that detail, but I will just quickly
say--I will be quick in walking through it. At its core, our
strategy is centered on a global coalition that will
collaborate closely across a number of specific areas,
including direct and indirect military support.
Military assistance can come in a range of forms, from
training and equipping to logistics and airlift, and countries
from inside and outside of our region are already right now
providing that support in these venues. I have also no doubt
whatsoever that we will have the capabilities and the resources
we need to succeed militarily. And President Obama made clear
that we would be expanding the military campaign to take on
ISIL in Iraq, in Syria, wherever it is found. But this is not
the gulf war in 1991. It is not the Iraq war in 2003, and that
is true for a number of reasons.
Number one, U.S. ground troops will not be sent into combat
in this conflict. From the last decade, we know that a
sustainable strategy is not U.S. ground forces. It is enabling
local forces to do what they have to do for themselves and for
their country.
I want to be clear. The United States troops that have been
deployed to Iraq, do not and will not, have a combat mission.
Instead, they will support Iraq Forces on the ground as they
fight for their country against these terrorists.
And in Syria, the on-the-ground combat will be done by the
moderate opposition, which serves as the current best
counterweight in Syria to extremists like ISIL. We know that
ISIL, as it gets weaker, the moderate opposition will get
stronger. And that will be critical in our efforts to bring
about the political solution necessary to address the crisis in
Syria once and for all.
That is one of the reasons why it is so critical that
Congress authorize the opposition train-and-equip mission when
it comes to the floor, but it is also critical that the
opposition makes the most of the additional support, the kind
of support that they have been requesting now for years. And
they need to take this opportunity to prove to the world that
they can become a viable alternative to the current regime.
Number two, this is more than just a military coalition,
and I want to emphasize that. In some ways, some of the most
important aspects of what we will be doing are not military.
This mission is not just about taking out an enemy on the
battlefield. It is about taking out a network, decimating and
discrediting a militant cult masquerading as a religious
movement. It is similar to what we have been doing to al-Qaeda
these last years.
The bottom line is we will not be successful with a
military campaign alone, and we know it. Nor are we asking
every country to play a military role. We do not need every
country to engage in that kind of military action, and frankly,
we are not asking them and we do not want every country to do
that. Only a holistic campaign will accomplish our objectives.
In addition to the military campaign, it will be equally
important for the global coalition to dry up ISIL's illicit
funding. And by the way, the Bahrainis, at the meeting in
Jeddah, have offered to host a meeting--because they have been
already engaged in this--that brings people together to focus
on precisely the steps we can all take to do this, and that can
positively have an impact not just on ISIL, but on other flows
of terrorism support.
We have to stop the foreign fighters who carry passports
from countries around the world, including the United States,
and we also need, obviously, to continue to deliver urgently
needed humanitarian assistance.
And finally, and this is really--you cannot overstate this.
We must continue to repudiate the gross distortion of Islam
that ISIL is spreading. Put an end to the sermons by extremists
that brainwash young men to join these movements and commit
mass atrocities in the name of God.
I was very encouraged to hear that Saudi Arabia's top
clerics came out and declared terrorism a heinous crime under
Sharia law and that the perpetrators should be made an example
of. And I think--I might just mention--well, I will wait until
we get in the Q and A. I will come back to this, but a very
important statement was made today by the top clerics in the
region, and I want to come back to that because I think it is
critical.
But let me just emphasize that when we say global
coalition, we mean it. And this is not--Australia, other
countries, the Far East, countries in Europe have all taken on
already initial responsibilities. So, my colleagues, we are
committed to working with countries in every corner of the
globe to match the campaign with the capabilities that we need
to fight.
And I can tell you today that every single person I spoke
to, in Wales at the Wales summit, in Jeddah, in Paris, where we
had more than 30 countries and entities, they all expressed
strong support for our mission and a willingness to help in
some way. We had excellent meetings, and our meetings in
Baghdad and in Cairo and in Ankara also advanced the process.
At the conference in Paris, we took another step toward the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meetings this week. And
the UNGA meetings, unlike the meetings we have had thus far,
which have all been behind closed doors, the UNGA meetings,
these countries will be speaking out publicly at the United
Nations Security Council, and the world will begin to see what
each of these countries are prepared to do.
So we have a plan. We know the players. Our focus now is in
determining what each country's role will be and how to
coordinate those activities for success. Later this week, we
are going to have more to say about our partners and the
contributions, and we still fully expect this coalition to grow
through UNGA and beyond.
One of the things that I am most pleased about is we have
asked one of our most respected and experienced military
leaders, General John Allen, to come to the State Department
and oversee this effort. He came within 24 hours of being
asked, was at his desk at 7 o'clock in the morning, and is now
already laying out the campaign from a diplomatic point of view
for how we coordinate what will be needed for all of these
other aspects beyond the military piece.
And I had a long meeting with him yesterday, again today,
and I am confident that together with Ambassador Brett McGurk,
who will serve as his Deputy, and Assistant Secretary Anne
Patterson, who was so much a part of our effort against al-
Qaeda when she was our Ambassador to Pakistan, we have a very
experienced group of people engaged in this effort. The fact is
if we do this right, then this effort could actually become a
model for what we can do with respect to the individual
terrorist groups in other places that continue to wreak havoc
on the efforts of governments to build their states and provide
for their people.
And I am confident that with our strategy in place and our
international partners by our side, we will have all that we
need, and with the help of the Congress, we will be able to
succeed in degrading and ultimately destroying this monstrous
organization wherever it exists.
I know that was a little long, Mr. Chairman, but I wanted
to lay it out, and I appreciate your patience.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State John F. Kerry
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for holding this hearing on an issue where the
stakes are so high and a full understanding of the ISIL threat and our
strategy for defeating it is so important.
During the years I had the privilege of serving here, working with
different administrations, it always struck me that American foreign
policy works best when there's a genuine discussion, a dialogue, a
vetting of ideas back and forth between Congress and the executive
branch. So I want to make sure that by the time we're done here today,
I've heard from you, you've shared your views and ideas, and that you
also have a clear understanding of what we've done so far, what we're
doing now, and where we go next--because your input and your support
are absolutely critical to the success of this effort.
I want to underscore at the start--there are some debates of the
past 20 years that could, and probably will, fill up books and
documentaries for a long time. Iraq is one.
Iraq has caused some of the most heated debates and deepest
divisions of the past decade--a series of difficult issues about which
people can honestly disagree. But I didn't come here today to rehash
those debates. The issue that confronts us today is one on which we
should all agree: ISIL must be defeated. Period. End of story. And,
collectively, we're all going to be measured by how we carry out this
mission.
I'd also underscore--the same is true on an international level.
And even in a region that is virtually defined by division, leaders who
have viewed the last 11 years very differently--and who agree on very
little in general--are more unified on this subject than just about any
other.
So as President Obama described last week when he spoke directly to
the American people, we have a clear strategy to degrade, defeat, and
destroy ISIL. But the United States will not go it alone. That is why
we are building a global coalition. And as I traveled around the world
this week, the question foreign leaders were asking me was not whether
they should join the coalition, but how they can help.
We are also not starting from scratch. This is an effort we have
been building over time, both on our own and with the help of our
international partners: Even before President Obama delivered his
speech last week, nearly 40 countries had joined in contributing to the
effort to strengthen the capacity of Iraq including military
assistance, training, and humanitarian assistance.
We have been focused on ISIL since its inception as the successor
to AQI in 2013. Back in January we ramped up our assistance to the
Iraqi Security Forces, increasing our intelligence surveillance
reconnaissance, or ISR, flights to get a better picture of the
battlefield and expediting weapons like Hellfire missiles for the
Iraqis to bring to bear in this fight.
Early this summer, the ISIL threat accelerated when it effectively
erased the Iraq-Syria border and the Mosul Dam fell. The President
acted deliberately and decisively. We further surged our ISR missions
over Iraq. We immediately set up joint operation centers in Baghdad and
Erbil. And our special forces conducted a very detailed field
assessment of Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish forces.
By the time ISIL launched the offensive in the north, President
Obama authorized limited air strikes against ISIL and humanitarian
missions to protect American personnel, prevent major catastrophes and
support Iraqi Security Forces and Kurdish forces that were fighting
bravely to do the same. To date, we've launched more than 150
airstrikes. And it is because of the platforms we put in place back in
June that those strikes have been highly precise and incredibly
effective, including in the operations to break the siege of Sinjar
Mountain, retake Mosul Dam, and resupply the town of Amerli.
These actions blunted ISIL's momentum and created time and space
for us to put in place the two pillars of a comprehensive strategy
against ISIL: an inclusive Iraq Government, and a broad international
coalition.
We redoubled our efforts to help move the Iraqi political process
forward. We are clear-eyed about the fact that any strategy against
ISIL would only succeed with a strong, inclusive government in Iraq,
with an ambitious national agenda, prepared to unite the country
against ISIL.
With our support, after several weeks of complex negotiations,
President Masum nominated Haider al-Abadi to serve as Prime Minister.
Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister al-Abadi--again with our support--
was able to form his Cabinet and present it to the Parliament, and,
last week, that government was approved.
This was a long and difficult process, led by the Iraqis, with our
help as needed. The result was something Iraq had never before seen in
its history: an election deemed credible by the United Nations,
followed by peaceful transition of power, without any U.S. troops on
the ground.
I traveled to Baghdad last week, immediately after the new
government was approved, to meet with Prime Minister al-Abadi and other
leaders throughout the Iraqi Government. And I was very encouraged to
hear them discuss in detail the government's National Plan to unite the
country against ISIL, and empower local communities--particularly in
Sunni areas--to mobilize, defeat ISIL, and maintain security control in
their area.
Throughout the entire process, we were in touch with regional
leaders to ensure that a new and inclusive government would receive
support from the region. Today, after years, even decades, of relative
isolation from their neighbors, the Iraqis have begun to reintegrate
with the broader Arab community. For example, last week, they were not
just invited but warmly welcomed in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis have
now said they'll reopen an embassy in Baghdad.
With this new, inclusive Iraqi Government in place, it's time for
the defensive strategy we and our international partners have pursued
thus far to transition to an offensive strategy--one that harnesses the
capabilities of the entire world to eliminate the ISIL threat, once and
for all.
President Obama outlined this strategy in detail, so--while I am
happy to answer any questions you may have--I will be brief in walking
through it again now.
At its core, our strategy is centered on a global coalition that
will collaborate closely across a number of specific areas--including,
certainly, on direct and indirect military support.
To be clear, military assistance comes in a range of forms, from
training and equipping, to logistics and airlift. And countries from
inside and outside of the region are already providing support in these
veins. So I have no doubt whatsoever we will have the capabilities and
the resources we need to succeed militarily. And President Obama made
clear we will be expanding the military campaign to take on ISIL in
Iraq, in Syria--wherever it is found.
But this is not the gulf war in 1991, and it is not the Iraq war in
2003--for a couple of reasons. Number one, U.S. ground troops will not
be sent into combat in this conflict. From the last decade we know that
a sustainable strategy is not U.S. ground forces--it is enabling local
forces to do what they must for themselves and their country. I want to
be clear: the U.S. troops that have been deployed to Iraq do not and
will not have a combat mission. Instead, they will support Iraqi Forces
on the ground as they fight for their own country against these
terrorists.
And in Syria, the on-the-ground combat will be done by the moderate
opposition--which serves as the best counterweight in Syria to
extremists like ISIL. We know that as ISIL gets weaker, this moderate
opposition will get stronger, which will be critical in our efforts to
bring about the political solution necessary to address the crisis in
Syria once and for all. That's one of the reasons why it's so critical
that Congress authorizes the opposition train-and-equip mission when it
comes to the floor. But it's also critical that the opposition makes
the most of the additional support--the kind of support they've been
requesting for years--and take this opportunity to prove to the world
that they can be a viable alternative to Assad.
Number two, this is more than just a military coalition because the
objective requires more than a military victory. This mission isn't
just about taking out an enemy on the battlefield. It's about taking
out an entire network--decimating and discrediting a militant cult
masquerading as a religious movement.
It's similar to what we have been doing to al-Qaeda these last
years.
The bottom line is we will not be successful with a military
campaign alone. Nor are we asking every country to play a military
role--we don't need every country to play a military role and we don't
want every country to play a military role.
Only a holistic campaign can accomplish our objectives. That is why
we are focused on multiple lines of effort.
In addition to the military campaign, it will be equally important
for the global coalition to dry up ISIL's illicit funding, to stop the
foreign fighters who carry passports from countries around the world
including the United States, to continue to deliver urgently needed
humanitarian assistance, and finally, to repudiate the gross distortion
of Islam that ISIL is spreading, and put an end to the sermons by
extremists that brainwash young men to join these movements and commit
mass atrocities in the name of God. I was very encouraged to hear that
Saudi Arabia's top clerics came out and declared terrorism a ``heinous
crime'' under Sharia law--and that perpetrators should be made an
example of. Preventing an individual from joining ISIL for example, or
from getting to the battle field in the first place, is the most
effective measure we can take.
I want to emphasize--when we say ``global coalition,'' we mean it.
This is not a threat that a single country or region can take on alone.
And there is a critical role for nearly every country to play.
So we are committed to working with countries in every corner of
the globe to match the campaign's requirements with the capabilities
they are willing to bring to bear.I spent the past week in the Middle
East and in Europe, meeting with dozens of leaders whose partnership
will be essential to our success.
And I can tell you today: every single person I spoke to over the
course of my trip expressed strong support for our mission and a
willingness to help in some way. We had excellent meetings, beginning
at the NATO summit in Wales, and then in Jeddah. The Jeddah Communique
represents a strong, comprehensive and unified statement of all the
ways in which the region is committed to supporting this fight. Our
meetings in Baghdad, in Cairo, and in Ankara also advanced the process.
And at the conference earlier this week in Paris, we took another step
along the road to the UNGA and the UNSC sessions next week.
We have a plan and we know the players. Our focus now is
determining what role each country will play.
Later this week we will have more to say about our partners and
contributions, and we fully expect the coalition to grow, evolve, and
coalesce well beyond UNGA. That's why we've asked one of our most
respected and experienced military leaders--Gen. John Allen--to come to
the State Department and oversee this effort. And he's already hitting
the ground running--he was at work last Friday at 7 am, less than 24
hours after we sealed the deal for him to do this job, and he and I had
a long meeting yesterday, just a few hours after I landed in D.C.
General Allen will be working with one of our foremost Iraq experts,
Ambassador Brett McGurk, as well as Assistant Secretary Anne Patterson,
who was so much a part of the effort against al-Qaeda when she was our
Ambassador in Pakistan.
The fact is that, if we do this right, then this effort could
become a global model for isolating and undermining other extremist
threats around the world. But now we must be laser-focused on ISIL. And
I'm confident that, with our strategy in place and our international
partners by our side, we will have all that we need to succeed in
degrading and ultimately destroying this monstrous organization--
wherever it exists.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me start off with I think one of the most critical
lessons that we have learned from past U.S. military
interventions abroad is that we must have a clear vision for
the end state that we are seeking and a coherent strategy that
is focused about how not only do we enter and succeed, but how
do we exit a theater of war.
So I would like to get, as succinctly as you can, a
statement from you as to what does the end goal look like. I
heard you talk about taking out a network. I get that. But
beyond that, what is the political end state conditions we are
seeking so that we will know that it is time to end military
action?
Secretary Kerry. Well, the military action ends when we
have ended the capacity of ISIL to engage in broad-based
terrorist activity that threatens the state of Iraq, threatens
the United States, threatens the region. That is our goal. And
that means ending their ability to live in ungoverned spaces,
have a safe haven, and be able to control territory and move at
will to try to attack the United States or other places.
The threat, obviously, right now is more immediate to the
Middle East and to Europe, but we have Americans over there
fighting with passports.
The Chairman. So, obviously, that does not mean we are
going to look to eliminate every person who is associated with
ISIL.
Secretary Kerry. We have not been able to eliminate every
person associated with al-Qaeda.
The Chairman. Absolutely. So then the question----
Secretary Kerry. But we have been able to reduce their
capacity to mount a major attack under the circumstances that
we are able to obviously guard against, and engage in,
preventive actions----
The Chairman. So, in Iraq, we want a sovereign Iraq whose
territorial integrity has been restored without the presence of
ISIL.
Secretary Kerry. And an independent, inclusive government
that is functioning.
The Chairman. And in Syria?
Secretary Kerry. In Syria likewise. We believe that,
ultimately, there is no solution to Syria without a political
settlement. That goal has not changed. But Assad has had little
incentive to negotiate.
The incentive that existed when I first went to Moscow last
year, and President Putin and Russia agreed to support the
Geneva process, regrettably got sidetracked by a number of
things, one of which was the in-fighting that began to take
place in the opposition itself. Two, the unexpected degree to
which Assad became an extraordinary magnet for terrorists, and
that is when you began to have this amazing flow of foreign
fighters who came to get rid of Assad.
And as Assad gassed people and barrel bombed people and
tortured and so forth, it became more evident to those global
fighters, and particularly to countries in the region, they
were focused on whatever group could get rid of Assad. And
unfortunately, tragically, ISIL is somewhat an outgrowth of
that phenomenon.
And therefore, we are today--you know, I think all the
countries in the region have recognized that there was a
mistake of judgment with respect to that process, and I think
people are bending over backwards to try to rectify it.
The Chairman. I think members of this committee who joined
together to first vote for the authorization of use of military
force as President Obama was headed to the G20 summit at the
time in Russia to deter Assad from using chemical weapons and
who subsequently voted in a bipartisan effort to arm the vetted
Syrian rebels over a year ago fully appreciate that.
It is my hope that when we refine the definition of the end
state as it relates to the campaign against ISIL that we
understand that if I am a moderate vetted rebel and I am being
asked to fight against ISIL now, I also need to fight against
Assad because that is my ultimate mission. And so, as we move
forward, I would like to hear how that is coinciding.
Let me ask you two other questions. I heard you very
clearly when you said we are not asking all of our partners to
engage in direct military actions, but I hope that there will
be, and I would like to hear from you, can we expect part of
the Sunni Arab coalition members to, in fact, be part of
military actions in this regard? Because this cannot be simply
a campaign by the West against the East.
Secretary Kerry. You are absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman.
And first of all, let me thank you and I thank the committee
for the vote that you took, the only entity in the Congress
that did. And it was an affirmative vote, and we are grateful
for that and respect it.
Currently, there are countries outside of Europe and
outside of the region committed to engage in military action.
There are countries in Europe committed to take military
action. There are countries in the region, Arab countries,
committed to take military action.
We will have sufficient levels of commitment to take
military action. It will be up to CENTCOM and General Allen and
others to work on the question of who will do what.
The Chairman. It is fair to say that this is going to be a
multiyear effort?
Secretary Kerry. Well, the President has been very clear
about that. Certain parts of it will be, absolutely. I cannot
tell you--I can tell you this. When we took them on at Mosul
Dam and the Iraqis were on the ground and took them on, we took
back Mosul Dam. When we took them on at Amirli, they moved out.
When we took them on at Sinjar Mountain, we freed the people at
Sinjar Mountain.
And we have currently enabled people to be able to hold
them off at Haditha Dam, and it is clear from the intelligence
we pick up that what we are doing now, which has fundamentally
been more defensive than offensive, has already had an impact
on them. I am convinced that with the proper effort, we can
have an impact.
The Chairman. I do not dispute that you have had in the
short term an impact to stem their advances, at least within
the region that they are in. My question, though, is no one
reasonably can come from the administration and suggest that
the ultimate goal, which is taking out this network, is not
going to be a multiyear effort?
Secretary Kerry. It is a multiyear effort. The President
has already said that.
The Chairman. With that as a reality, then let me turn to
the AUMF. How is it that the administration believes that--and
I support its efforts. But how is it that the administration
believes that the 9/11 AUMF or the Iraq AUMF provide the
authorization to move forward whether the Congress decides to
or not?
You know, it was not too long ago that members of the
administration appeared before the committee, and when I asked
them, I was headed toward repealing the Iraq AUMF. And there
were administration witnesses who believed that it should be
repealed on behalf of the administration. How is it that the
administration now thinks it can rely upon that for legal
authority?
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, how is it? It is because
good lawyers within the White House, within the State
Department, who have examined this extremely closely have come
to the conclusion across the board that the 2001 AUMF, which
says all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons responsible for 9/11, those who
harbored such organizations or persons, to prevent future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such
persons or organizations, includes al-Qaeda. It has always been
interpreted as including al-Qaeda. And al-Qaeda and----
The Chairman. Al-Qaeda threw out ISIL----
Secretary Kerry. But al-Qaeda and associated forces, that
is the language. Al-Qaeda and associated forces. Now al-Qaeda,
ISIL began as al-Qaeda. In 2005 in Iraq, 2004, ISIL was Al
Qaeda in Iraq. And it only became this thing called ISIL a year
ago, and it only became that out of convenience to separate
themselves in an internal fight, but not because their thinking
changed, not because their targets changed, not because their
actions changed.
They are the same people doing--the same people that we
were prepared to and were attacking for all of those years. And
a mere publicity stunt to separate yourself and call yourself
something else does not get you out from under the force of the
United States law----
The Chairman. I appreciate your ability as a former
prosecutor and a gifted attorney to try to make the case. I
will tell you----
Secretary Kerry. Well----
The Chairman [continuing]. That at least from the chair's
perspective you are going to need a new AUMF, and it will have
to be more tailored because I do not want to be part of 13
years later and multitude of countries that have been used in
this regard, for that to be the authority. And I think our
goals are the same. I think we need to get you a different set
of authorities, and I look forward to working with my
colleagues----
Secretary Kerry. Not only are our goals the same, Mr.
Chairman, but we know you are thinking about retooling the
AUMF, and we welcome. We would like Congress, please, do this.
We want that to happen. We are not going to make our actions
dependent on it happening, but we will work with you as closely
as we can and should in order to tailor an AUMF going forward,
and we look forward to that opportunity.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to say, as I have said to you personally, we
have three Senators--the President, Vice President, Secretary
of State--that are exercising terrible judgment right now. And
to say that you are going to do this regardless of what we say,
you are not going to ask for buy-in by the United States Senate
or House of Representatives on behalf of the American people in
a conflict that you say is going to be multiyear, some people
say a decade, taking us into another country with a different
enemy is exercising the worst judgment possible.
And so, I have said this to you as strongly as I can
personally. That is in essence what you are saying to the
chairman right now. Saying ``if Congress wants to play a
constructive role we would welcome that'' to me is a political
game. And I am disappointed that you, as Secretary of State,
after being chairman of this committee, after espousing the
views that you have espoused in the past, out of convenience
and parsing legal words would make the statement you just made.
So let me move on and say I would love--you say much has
been accomplished. That is a nice photograph on the front of
the Wall Street Journal. Tell me what has been accomplished.
What Arab Sunni nation is going to have a ground force in
Syria? What Arab Sunni country is going to be flying in and
bombing and doing missile raids with an Arab insignia on the
side of the plane? Tell me that.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, you will hear that at the
appropriate time within the next days, as John Allen and the
team work with all of these countries for the permissions, for
the basing, for all the things that will take place. I have
told you they have----
Senator Corker. Let me ask you this.
Secretary Kerry. No, no, no. Let me----
Senator Corker. Are you convinced that that will happen?
Secretary Kerry. Let me finish.
Senator Corker. Are you convinced that that will happen?
Secretary Kerry. Well, I have already said that. I----
Senator Corker. So we will have Arab Sunni countries
participating in the ground effort in Syria?
Secretary Kerry. No, I did not say the ground effort, and
you know, right now the plan is to work through the--and our
judgment is that we can be effective working in the way that we
are. Let me say a couple of things, first of all, with respect
to your----
Senator Corker. Well, you can say the answer to my
questions, okay?
Secretary Kerry. Well, no, when I----
Senator Corker. I am not going to be filibustered----
Secretary Kerry. No, I am going to answer your question. I
am going to answer your question.
Senator Corker. Okay.
Secretary Kerry. And I am sure the chair will be, you know,
happy to have the kind of dialogue I talked about earlier. It
is important to talk this through.
Senator Corker. I have got 2 minutes and 34 seconds and 4
more questions.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, you have not let me answer
any of them yet. So let me try to answer the question.
Senator Corker. Well, the question is what Arab Sunni
country is going to be putting boots on the ground in Syria
against this now-claimed army by your----
Secretary Kerry. At this moment, no country has been asked
to put boots on the ground or no country is talking of it. And
we do not think it is a good idea right now. So there is no
discussion of that at this moment.
Now with respect to the judgment about asking Congress to
do it, I am asking. Do it. Pass it. We would love to have you
do it. But we are not going to get stuck in the situation, when
we have the authority, of not exercising our authority to do
what we believe we need to do to protect the country.
So we are asking you to do it. Pass it tomorrow.
Senator Corker. You are asking us to do it, but you are not
giving any details because you do not have them.
Secretary Kerry. That is not true, Senator.
Senator Corker. Well, then share them.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I am not going to share them in
public here today. Many of these things----
Senator Corker. Share them in a classified setting.
Secretary Kerry. I am confident there will be so many
classified briefings that you will be tired of them. But at the
moment, we are not going to lay this out until John Allen has
had a chance to come to the U.N. on Friday, until we have had a
chance to work closely with all of these countries in order to
make this as effective as possible.
Senator Corker. Do you realize how unserious the things
that you have laid out and the things that were laid out
yesterday sound when you are discussing training 5,000, in your
all's own words, doctors and dentists and others in Saudi
Arabia over a year? I do not know whether they are being
trained for offensive or defensive--I would like you to clarify
that--activities. My understanding is that they will be given
higher tech equipment after they prove themselves on the
battlefield.
Do you understand how unrealistic and how that effort on
the ground where they are based, where ISIL is based, does not
match the rhetoric that the administration has laid out? And
therefore, you are asking us to approve something that we know
the way you have laid it out makes no sense.
We have a strong sense that our Army, our military leaders
have urged you to put special forces on the ground, but, no, we
are not going to do that. So this does not even seem serious.
It seems like a political answer to the United States as they
cry out about this uncivilized activity, but it does not seem
real to me.
And if you are willing to get in a classified setting and
lay out all these details and tell us which of these countries
are going to be flying their flag into Syria, they are going to
be putting people on the ground. Because we know. We know the
Free Syrian Army cannot take on ISIL. You know that.
You talk about a multiyear process. We are talking decades
if that is going to be our salvation. So I will just close with
this. I am disappointed. I was disappointed in the briefing we
had last week.
I do want us to deal with this in an effective way. You
have not laid it out in a way that meets that test. I hope when
we come back and before you put people in harm's way
unnecessarily, you have a plan that achieves the end that you
just laid out. But we know right now that is not where you are.
And again, I hope you will seek it, I hope you will say
that you are not going to do it without it, and I hope you will
lay out a plan that will convince us that you are serious about
doing the things you said you were going to do to the American
people and to us about ISIL because you have not done it now.
And I hope you will lay out a way to pay for it, to pay for it,
because we know this is going to take many, many years, and it
has to do with the safety of our citizens.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, can I, I hope, answer a
little bit here?
Senator, you know, I must say to you I really find it
somewhat surprising for you to suggest that as the President of
the United States talks to the Nation and commits to take
strikes in order to deal with ISIL, as we have come back from a
week of very serious meetings with nations around the world,
all of whom are committed to this, that you sit there and
suggest that it is not serious.
Now, with all due respect to you, Senator, let me just tell
you something point blank. The moderate opposition in Syria
has, in fact, been fighting ISIL for the last 2 years. And
since last January, the Free Syrian Army has been engaged with
ISIL in Idlib, in Aleppo, in the Damascus countryside, in Deir
al-Zor, and groups such as the Syrian Revolutionary Front have
fought off ISIL. They have expelled them from Idlib province,
which borders Turkey and includes the border crossing.
Over the past 2 months, moderate brigades have been
deployed in northern Aleppo to prevent ISIL from capturing key
border towns, including Azaz, through which a large quantity of
humanitarian assistance is now being sent. But they require our
support.
Senator McCain knows that. He has been screaming about it
for some time.
Senator Corker. We have all been screaming about it, and
you all have done nothing, or at least not much to talk about.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, let us just understand that the
fact is that what has propelled ISIS to some degree is a word
called success. And as ISIS has had success, they have used
social media and they have appealed to greater numbers of
greater fighters.
As they have now suddenly been put on their heels and as
the United States and other countries do seriously commit to
this endeavor--and believe me, what we are doing is serious--
then if success begins to turn and move toward the Free Syrian
Army and the moderate opposition, I believe you will see
greater numbers of recruits. That is why the President is
asking for that open training under Title X in order to try to
build that up as fast as possible.
Our estimates are there are now currently tens of thousands
still of fighting members of the opposition. And if you can get
more people better trained, and by the way, every month that I
have been Secretary of State, we have been adding to the effort
of what we are doing with respect to the Syrian opposition, and
most of that needs to be covered in a classified setting, as
you know.
But our assessment is that we can and, given the urgency of
the situation, begin to move this program to a greater degree.
So will it take a period of time? We have all said that; yes.
But we are confident that we have the ability to be able to
change the situation on the ground.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Secretary Kerry. By the way, I do have a list here. I am
not going to go into all of it now. But there are Albania has
sent in the last--we have had at least 18 flights that we have
taken in to Erbil. We have been providing additional weapons to
Peshmerga.
Other countries have been doing this. Australia has
committed a number of different items to this. I am not going
to go into them publicly. Bulgaria is providing aid. Canada,
several--sending various kinds of assistance. Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Saudi Arabia, Germany.
Look, there are a lot of countries here. And by the way,
they are all serious, too, or they would not be on this list.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Secretary Kerry, thank you for your tireless
work.
I think it is shocking and a sad state of affairs that we
heard just now such angry comments aimed at you, Mr. Secretary,
and through you at our President, instead of at ISI, a savage
terrorist group that decapitated two Americans and has warned--
and I quote--that they will ``quench'' their thirst for
American blood.
I think it is shocking. I am actually shaking and
trembling. This is not the time to show anger at the people who
are working night and day, whether you agree with them or not,
to protect our people.
Now I want to talk about the AUMF. I voted against the one
in 2002, which started the disastrous war in Iraq. I voted for
the one in 2001, and I have reread it about six times.
Mr. Secretary, the lawyers I have consulted with believe
that you have the authority to go after ISIL. It is very clear.
You read the parts. If people listened to you, you read the
parts that are correct.
Now that is not to say that I would not welcome working on
a new AUMF. But I want to say right now, the way things get
filibustered around this place and the way politics gets played
around this place, I am proud that you say you are going to do
your work to protect the American people.
This is just a sad opening of a hearing. I have never seen
it, and I have gone through some tough ones.
Now I want to say this. The Iraq war inflamed the long-
simmering sectarian divisions in that country. I know you do
not want to get into the past. It is fine. I think it is worth
mentioning because from my point of view, that is a war I voted
against. I am for going after ISIL because there is such a
difference.
And there are two strains of thought as people speak out
against the policy of the administration. One is they say you
are not doing enough. Go back with those ground troops, more
war, more boots on the ground. American boots, they are the
only boots that work. You have proven just with a few examples
that it is just not true, and I certainly reject that view.
And the other, the second school of thought represented by
some of the folks out there who I like and talk to all the
time, they think we should not take the fight to ISIL. Forget
it. It is too complicated. It is fraught with uncertainty. We
should sit on the sidelines. I oppose that view as well.
You cannot sit on the sidelines, at least I cannot, when
you have a group that is selling 14-year-olds, as my former
colleague said. Selling 14-year-old girls as slaves, giving
them as gifts to their fighters, murdering ethnic and religious
minorities, including Christians, Yazidis, and Shiite Turkmen.
And again, warning that their ``knife will continue to strike
the necks'' of Americans.
They have a very simple goal. They say if you do not take
our twisted version of Islam, you either flee, you convert, or
you die. So, no, I am not going to sit idly by.
Mr. Secretary, I have a question for you. I was being
interviewed, and I was expressing these views that I was just
expressed that there were certain areas where it is gray, and
there are certain areas where it is clear to me. I mean,
everyone takes their own lens to the question.
And I was asked this question. How can we make sure that
the Syrian moderates we help are the right ones? And this
particular reporter said, well, we have heard reports that the
Syrian moderates signed a nonaggression pact with ISIL.
My answer to that was there are all kinds of Syrian
moderate groups, and we are certainly not working with those
who do not see it our way. Could you expand on that answer or--
--
Secretary Kerry. I would be delighted to. Let me just say
to you that is disinformation fundamentally put out by ISIL.
The moderate opposition recently restated its commitment as a
national movement to fighting extremism generally and including
ISIL. And a recent statement that they had reached a truce is
simply baseless, not accurate, and they have not. And they will
not.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
And then just, I mean, I do not have enough time to ask
everything. So I will ask one last question. What roles do Iran
and Russia play in this conflict, and how do the interests of
these two countries factor into the President's counter-ISIL
strategy? I know it is very delicate, but how would you respond
to that?
Secretary Kerry. Well, you know, Russia, obviously, is a
principal line of support to Assad, and Assad, as we all know,
has neither proven the willingness nor the capacity to go after
ISIL. And Russia was at the meeting in Paris. China was at the
meeting in Paris. Both spoke out powerfully about the need to
stand up to ISIL.
And Iran, as you know, there was the subject of whether or
not they might have been invited. There were certain problems
in trying to make that happen because of country objections
with respect to their presence, et cetera, and it did not
happen. But Iran, obviously, is deeply opposed to ISIL.
Now we are not coordinating militarily or doing anything,
but we have had brief conversations on the side of our
negotiations that are taking place, the P5+1 Iran nuclear
negotiations. And we are prepared to see whether or not Iran
can contribute in a constructive way. But that would require
also changing what is happening in Syria, where their IRGC is
on the ground and supporting Assad and been engaged in
activities, Hezbollah on their behalf, whom they support.
So there are a lot of areas of twisted conflict in the
relationships here, and we are looking--you know, it would be
negligent not to be open to listening to some change in the
dynamic or some possibility of constructive activity. But we
are not relying on it, waiting for it, organizing around it, or
in fact coordinating with it at this point in time.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
The Chairman. Before I turn to Mr. Risch, Senator Risch,
let me just say to the Secretary on this subject I heard what
you said. But to me, Iran is a regional instigator. It is a
patron of the murderous Assad regime. It is a sponsor of
sectarian divisions inside of Iraq.
It uses Iraq's airspace to send troops and men into Syria,
and some of us are really concerned that, first of all, their
end purposes are not our end purposes. And secondly, that some
of us are concerned that negotiations with Iran, you know, are
affected by to the extent that they express any desire to be
helpful, they want to do it at the cost of concessions at the
negotiating table.
I know you are shaking your head, and I would not expect
anything else.
Secretary Kerry. Not going to happen.
The Chairman. But I have to be honest with you, when we
hear all these back channel efforts and then they get outed by
the Ayatollah, it creates uncertainty in that process. So I do
not want to take more time from my colleague, but Senator
Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
John, I share some of the anger of Senator Boxer when it
comes to what has been going on with the beheading of
Americans. I mean, this is a tough time for America--for
Americans to be watching their fellow citizens being beheaded
by these savage people, and something has got to be done about
it.
And I fully empathize with the problem you have got to
where it is happening is such a complex situation with complex
cultures and what have you, and you have got to do something
about it. I want to throw in with the chairman. He mentioned
three points, I think, in his opening that he was hoping he
would hear, and I have not heard yet.
And that is he talked about hearing the plan that you have,
and he wanted to hear what success looks like, and he wanted to
hear some metrics as to how we measure progress. And John, I am
just not there yet. I am not convinced.
And this is particularly true where I think everyone is in
agreement. The President is in agreement. Congress is in
agreement. The American people are in agreement. Nobody wants
boots, American boots on the ground. I mean, that just is not
going to happen. There is nobody--nobody going to go there with
that.
In fact, had the President come here and said that, look, I
want authorization for airstrikes. You and I both know how
effective the drone program has been and how good it has been
as far as accomplishing the goals that we have in Yemen, in
Pakistan, and in other places. If he would have come here for
that, you would have had no problem with me.
As far as the boots on the ground, who do you get to do it?
Well, we know the Iraqis cannot do it. They dropped their guns
and uniforms and went home at the slightest bit of threat. With
all due respect, I know everybody talks about the moderates,
opposition and the rebels. We have been through this for over a
year, and I am just not convinced that there is such a group
there.
So you said let us talk about this, and let us see if we
cannot come up with some way to do this. You know, the best
group around to be able to do this for boots on the ground are
the Kurds. They have been incredibly successful. They have been
a reliable--they have been reliable to us. They are great
fighters.
I mean, if anybody is going to succeed on the ground in
Iraq or, for that matter, in Syria, it is going to be the
Kurds. Have you guys given thought to partnering up with them?
What am I missing here?
Secretary Kerry. Well, you are not, Senator. They have been
extraordinary, and that was our first line of effort,
obviously. That is why we put the joint operation center in
Erbil right away. And that is why we elicited immediate
support. We really had to hold that line.
That was critical, and that is why the President was
prepared to use some strikes, actually, to help guarantee that
that happened. And there is a huge flow of weaponry. As I said,
18 flights that I know of from us have gone in now to Erbil.
There are flights coming from other countries, too. Italians,
others, lots of countries have been supporting the Kurds in
this effort.
And you know, I think this is the work that John Allen
needs a chance to sort of develop a little bit, see how it is
going to go. The bottom line is the commitment to destroy ISIL,
and that means what I described earlier today. And for the
moment, growing the moderate opposition is one way of coming at
it, and we will see, you know, what else may be possible as we
go forward.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that, and it is encouraging for
me to hear that you have engaged the Kurds. I think that----
Secretary Kerry. Oh, very, very much so.
Senator Risch. Let me with the little time I have left, I
just want to make absolutely certain of your testimony. You
originally said when you were meeting with these other
countries, they have said, and I am quoting you, ``What can we
do to help?'' But you have also said that nobody has agreed to
put boots on the ground. And then I think you said that you
have not asked them to put boots on the ground.
So let me be very clear about airstrikes. Has anybody
committed that they would fly their flag in and do airstrikes
into Syria?
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
Senator Risch. And they are committed to do that?
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
Senator Risch. Okay. That is good. In a classified setting,
we will be able to get who those people are?
Secretary Kerry. Yes.
Senator Risch. That is much more encouraging. Thank you.
And with that, my time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, Secretary Kerry, first of all, thank
you for your incredible service.
And what you have stated expresses my view on the need for
international action against a barbaric terrorist organization,
ISIL. It requires an international response. I think President
Obama has been effective, particularly in the actions in Iraq.
The military strikes have been very effective in pulling back
ISIL's advancements, and I think the President deserves credit
for doing that and certainly has my support.
You have been effective in bringing about an international
coalition, and that is extremely important. Whenever we are
involved in missions like this, it must include an
international presence. And you have been very clear that we
will not have combat ground troops as part of this campaign.
And I support each of those statements.
So I want to get back to the point that the chairman
mentioned, and I guess just about every one of us have
mentioned, in regard to the authorization of force because I am
not clear what we will do in Syria, and I am not comfortable
yet as to what we will do in Syria. And I am looking forward to
more information being made available to us.
But my concern, I would really like to get your thoughts on
this, is that the authorizations that were passed in 2001 and
2002 were clearly aimed at a different circumstance. And if
your lawyers' interpretations are correct, they are open-ended
indefinitely, well beyond the Obama administration and could be
used for long-term commitments, including ground force
commitments in the future.
And that certainly was not congressional intent. I did not
support the 2002 resolution. As the chairman said, it was based
upon misinformation. And 2001 was clearly aimed at the
circumstances in Afghanistan. It was not intended to deal with
the current circumstances in Syria. I would hope we would all
agree to that.
So I think it is absolutely essential that we come together
and revisit the authorization issues. More than that you would
welcome congressional involvement, I think it is imperative
that we attempt to clarify the authorizations on the use of
force to meet the current needs.
In Iraq, I do not think that is going to be difficult. I
think you have been invited in by another country. I think we
can----
Senator Boxer. You mean Iraq.
Senator Cardin. I mean Iraq. Excuse me, in Iraq. I do not
think it is difficult in Iraq. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
We have been invited in by the host country. It is clear we
are not going to put combat troops on the ground there.
Syria is going to be more difficult because there are many
of us who are not prepared to authorize the use of force in
Syria with the information we currently have. But that is
something I think we have to work with.
You have Article II power, and the President has Article II
power. So he always has the right for a short period of time to
defend the interests of this Nation as he sees fit, and that is
his responsibility as Commander in Chief.
So I do not think there is any immediate urgency for
congressional action. But I just think it is vital for the
appropriate role of Congress and for moving forward beyond just
the Obama administration because, as you pointed out, these
circumstances are not going to end in the next 2 years. And I
would just welcome your thoughts as to how you think we should
proceed with an authorization that can pass Congress and give
you the comfort level that you need to protect us against any
lengthy combat involvements in these countries in the future
should ultimately be done by their own military?
Secretary Kerry. Sure. Well, Senator, thank you very much.
Thank you for your comments.
But, look, I would not sit here comfortably and suggest to
you--nor would President Obama, by that token, I know--suggest
to you that this ought to go on indefinitely and that there
should not be an effort with Congress to define this. Of
course, there should be.
I think the American people want it, deserve it, and it is
appropriate role for both branches to play, to work together to
articulate that going forward. The President has made it
crystal clear he is ready to do that. We know the chairman has
announced that he is going to begin work to define that. We
look forward to working with you to define it. That is how we
go about it is to work effectively to do it.
Now in the immediate moment, we have a Prime Minister--do
you have the comments of Prime Minister Abadi from the press
conference the other day? Get those out for me, please.
[Pause.]
Secretary Kerry. In my meeting with Prime Minister Abadi,
at the end we met with the press, and I will just read you what
Prime Minister Abadi said as an opening comment, not even
prompted or part of a question. He said, ``ISIL is a terrorist
nation. It is mobilizing its international network to recruit
people from all over the world. They have funds from all across
the region. We are fighting these people. These people are--''
and then something inaudible about our communities attacking or
something, minorities, women, children. ``They already--'' and
then it was inaudible about women and killing or raping. ``They
are a challenge to the whole region, to the international
community. They are coming to Iraq from across the border from
neighboring Syria. Of course, our role is to defend our
country, but the international community is responsible to
protect Iraq and protect Iraqis and the whole region.
``What is happening in Syria is coming across to Iraq. We
cannot cross that border.'' That is on an international basis.
But he says, ''It is an international border, but there is a
role for the international community, for the United Nations,
to do that role and the United States to act immediately to
stop the spread of this cancer. ``This cancer is spreading in
the whole region, and we have the resolution to fight the
cancer in Iraq. We Iraqis will have both an inclusive
government now, and we can do this job properly, everybody as
whole.''
And he goes on to talk about how they will do it. But he
specifically asks for the United States of America to help in
this role.
Now our lawyers also are clear that Iraq has the right of
self-defense, and Iraq is exercising its right of self-defense
and asking the United States to help it. And we already have a
military agreement with them with respect to that. And so, Iraq
is asking us to help them.
And as a matter of right, if they are being attacked from
outside their country, you have a right of hot pursuit. You
have a right to be able to attack those people who are
attacking you as a matter of self-defense.
So we believe there is a full justification here, and
obviously, that will be laid out further. But is it better to
have a greater statement of that? Is it better to have the
Congress of the United States defining this going forward? We
agree. But we need to move and to move rapidly because of the
urgency of this danger.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Secretary Kerry, I was struck by the language in your
opening statement. ``ISIL must be defeated, period. End of
story. And collectively, we are all going to be measured by how
we carry out this mission.''
Now from a military perspective, the plan of carrying out
this mission involves a combination of Iraqi Forces in Iraq,
from the military perspective more capacity; of course, the
Kurds; moderate rebels in Syria; and American airpower. No
combat boots on the ground on the part of the United States.
But over the last few days since the President has made
that announcement, there has been real doubts expressed by
military experts over whether that strategy will achieve what
you have defined as our goal. The Washington Post reported that
the top U.S. commander in the Middle East advised the President
that we needed a modest contingent of American troops,
especially Special Operation Forces, to advise and assist Iraqi
army units.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs yesterday in the Armed
Services Committee said that if local forces do not work, he
would recommend U.S. ground troops potentially to the
President. So my question is if it becomes clear that the only
way to achieve the defeat of ISIL, period, end of story, is for
the engagement of American ground troops, will that be
something the President will consider at that time?
Secretary Kerry. The President will not put American ground
troops into Iraq, and the President made it clear again today
in a statement that he made at CENTCOM that America can make a
decisive--I am quoting the President. ``We can make a decisive
difference, but I want to be clear. The troops that have been
deployed to Iraq do not, and will not, have a combat mission.''
Now we believe--and we are not going to deal with
hypotheticals about what happens if and this and this. We
believe there are any number of options as to how one can
guarantee the effect on ISIL long before you were to get to the
hypothetical conversation about Americans.
So I understand the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
whose job it is to look at it from his perspective in terms of
his military and his judgment. But the President has made a
judgment as Commander in Chief that that is not in the cards,
and that is where we are.
Senator Rubio. So even if the only way, with the military
expert----
Secretary Kerry. I am not going to deal with a
hypothetical. I do not believe it is the only way.
Senator Rubio. Well, it is not a hypothetical. It is
actually--it appears to be, quite frankly, we are relying on a
military strategy built on rebels who, at this point, are under
assault not just by ISIS, but by the Assad regime, by local
Iraqi Forces, of which some testimony say up to half, are
incapable of fighting at this stage, and Kurds that have been
great fighters but are only willing to protect their territory.
This is a very clearly stated goal, and the reason why it
is not a hypothetical is there may come a point where what you
are saying is that if the only thing that can solve this
problem is U.S. combat forces, we are not going to do that, and
ISIL gets to stay.
Secretary Kerry. But I think we are so far away from that
quote being the only way in a hypothetical. I mean, honestly.
Senator Rubio. Then let me ask you this.
Secretary Kerry. No, let me just--let me just finish that.
I mean, you know, I am not going to get into hypotheticals, but
you are presuming that Iran and Syria do not have any capacity
to take on ISIL. I mean, who knows? I am not going to get--I do
not know what is going to happen here. Let us start down this
road and see what happens.
Senator Rubio. Well, let me ask you about that then. So
what you are saying now is that there is the opportunity, the
potential that the United States would be coordinating with
Iran?
Secretary Kerry. No, I never said anything about
coordinating. If we are failing and failing miserably, who
knows what choice they might make. You prepositioned this on
the notion we are failing. I do not believe we are going to
fail.
Senator Rubio. I did not preposition on----
Secretary Kerry. And we are not setting out----
Senator Rubio. I am prepositioning on the state of the
military----
Secretary Kerry. You did. You said if we fail we cannot do
that.
Senator Rubio. Well, again, I will go back to the report. I
mean, a number of people, including former Defense Secretary
Gates has expressed his belief that it is not possible. A
number of highly qualified military experts have said they do
not believe that the goal you have stated in your opening
statement is achievable without a U.S. presence.
Secretary Kerry. There are lots of possibilities. There are
lots of possibilities between here and there. The President has
said he is not going to put American troops----
Senator Rubio. Well, you mentioned Iran. And you know, Iran
yesterday said that not that it was on the sidelines of these
negotiations. They claim that the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq
reached out to the Iranian Ambassador in Iraq and asked to
discuss some sort of level of coordination.
And the Iranians already gave us our answer. You said you
were open to some sort of dialogue with them if it had any sort
of promise to be productive. He has already answered the
question. He says he sees no point in coordinating with a
country whose hands are dirty. That is what he said about us.
He says, quite frankly, that--he said this, not me, please.
He said that you are lying, that we did not exclude them from
the talks to join the coalition. They excluded themselves, that
they refused to participate. And he went on to say that in
Iraq, the United States goal is to turn it into a playground
where we can enter freely and bomb at will.
I would just say that any hopes of coordinating with Iran,
who I consider to be just as evil as ISIS, is something that I
would discourage for a number of different reasons. But I want
to ask you just one more question, and it has to do with the
rebels in Syria.
Later today, Ambassador Ford is going to testify that the
biggest enemy that moderate opposition faces is the Assad
regime. In fact, there are credible reports today that the
Assad regime has stepped up its targeting of moderate rebel or
non-ISIS rebel forces in the hopes of wiping them out so that
they, the Assad regime, will be the only alternative left in
Syria.
If we are interested in supporting the moderate rebels,
will it not require us to protect them from Syria as well, from
the Assad regime as well, if we hope that they can develop into
a credible fighting force?
Secretary Kerry. ISIL first. That is our policy.
Senator Rubio. Well, but Ambassador Ford is going to
testify later today that the biggest enemy they face is the
Assad regime bombing them, and there are reports today,
credible reports, that Assad has stepped up his campaign
attacking these moderate rebels. They may not be there for us
to arm.
Secretary Kerry. That is not our judgment, but we obviously
recognize that there are serious challenges with the Assad
regime, and our policy has not changed of opposing the Assad
regime and helping the moderate opposition. And in classified
forum, I think we have a better opportunity to discuss what we
are doing additionally in order to do that.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here
and for all of your tireless efforts to address the ISIS
threat.
That is a threat that I believe was really brought home to
the American people by the barbarous and heinous murders of
James Foley and Steven Sotloff. And as you may know, Jim Foley
grew up in New Hampshire, and Steven Sotloff went to prep
school there. And so, they both have ties to my State, and I
think people in New Hampshire and across the country really
felt very personally those murders.
I appreciate and I said this yesterday at the Armed
Services hearing with General Dempsey and Secretary Hagel that
I appreciate the efforts of our men and women in the military
to make a rescue attempt to free those--James Foley and Steven
Sotloff and the other Americans--being held hostage. But I have
been very troubled by the comments from the Foley family that
have been reported about their concern that they were not
communicated with and did not have support from our government
as they were trying to deal with the hostage situation for
their son.
And I wonder if you could--well, let me rephrase this. I
hope that post the murders that this administration and future
administrations will seriously reassess what can better be done
to support families who are dealing with this kind of a crisis.
Some of the reports have pointed out that there are other
countries who have different ways of dealing with the families,
and I certainly hope that you will help in this effort as we
look at how we can better support those families.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator Shaheen--excuse me. Senator
Shaheen, first of all, let me begin by saying that I know how
personally deeply involved you were in Jim's case and in
working with us to try to keep the focus on it. I know how
close you were to the family, and I know how much effort when
into the prior effort when Jim was in Libya. I worked on that
personally and on this subsequent effort.
We raised it with country after country to try to get a
Foreign Minister or some contact in the country. Is there a way
to get proof of life? Is there a way to find out where he is?
Is there a way to negotiate the release?
Most recently, even in the last 2 months before he was
barbarously killed, I was talking with people in one of the
Middle Eastern countries who traveled to Syria on our behalf in
order to try to find out whether there was a way to secure the
release of these hostages. And we--I know that you also made an
incredible effort to reach out to country after country. I know
the Czech Republic, others, you were very much active in this
and engaged in that.
And when we got him out of Libya, which we worked hard to
do, I was in touch with people on global posts who I know very
closely. I mean, they are friends of mine who are part of that
effort. So they were always in touch with me and talking
personally about it.
Now I have read these accounts of things that have happened
or their judgment. I talked to Diane and John Foley after Jim
was killed. I think everybody here would just shudder at what
they have to go through.
So this is something we feel very deeply, so much so that I
remember the hours we sat in the situation room in the White
House working with our brilliant military, who did a remarkable
job of designing a rescue mission, and the President made the
difficult decision. Because it is always difficult. You are
putting American service people at risk going into another
country. They have air defense. You do not know what is going
to happen. And you know you are going in where there is ISIL.
And I sat in the White House in the situation room and
watched that entire mission unfold and was amazed by the
capacity of our military people to do what they did. A high-
risk mission performed flawlessly. And the intelligence was
correct to every degree that they went the right place. They
did things correctly. It just was empty.
They had moved them ahead of time, and we do not know
exactly how soon or when. And you have no idea how just the
feeling in that room changed when the message came from our
people on the ground saying nobody is there. So we felt that
and feel it to this day.
But you know, if they feel unhappy somehow that it was not
worked properly, whatever agency it was, we have to make sure
in the future that we are going to make sure that that is just
not a feeling--I mean, first of all, we hope no other family
has to suffer that and go through it.
But to whatever degree that is a possibility or an
eventuality, we have got to make sure that people feel better
about the process. And I can assure you the President on down,
everybody feels that sensitivity.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. And
for the hostages who are still being held, I hope there will be
an effort to look at how those families are being supported.
Mr. Chairman, I know that my time is up. But I just wanted
to make one more comment because I know, Mr. Secretary, that
you have repeated the President's argument that this military
campaign does not require a separate authorization for the use
of military force. But I certainly believe that if we are going
to commit to a long-term effort to address ISIS that having
specific congressional action that is bipartisan to support
that effort is very important.
And I believe we should undertake that, and I know the
chairman has said that he intends to do that, regardless of
whether the White House and the administration comes to
Congress or not. So I certainly support that, and I hope that
the administration will work with us as we do that.
Secretary Kerry. Yes. Well, we are coming to Congress. We
are here, and we welcome it, and we look forward to working
with you on it.
The Chairman. Thank you. And Senator Shaheen has expressed
to me on more than one occasion already her desire to work with
the chair and others on behalf of such an AUMF, and we look
forward to working you and other colleagues as well.
Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
obviously these are pretty complex issues. I do not envy you
and the President your task at all. You are in my prayers. The
President is in my prayers. Actually, I ask all Americans to
include you in their prayers because if you succeed--we all
want you to succeed--that means America and Americans remain
safe.
I have been listening to you and the President very
carefully. I am sure the world has been as well, and words have
real meaning. So I appreciate the fact that you have testified
today here that ISIL must be defeated period, end of story.
You know, the President in his speech to the Nation said
that the goal here is to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS,
but here is my concern. Here is my problem. In the final--in
the final two paragraphs of his speech to the Nation, President
Obama said, ``Our own safety, our own security depends on our
willingness to do what it takes to defend this Nation.'' But,
Mr. Secretary, by taking options off the table, is President
Obama not really saying to do what it takes up to a point?
And as Secretary of State, as you are dealing with
potential coalition partners who are also listening, if we
state a goal and the world does not believe we are 100 percent
committed to it, is that going to be very difficult for you to
get the kind of commitment out of our potential partners to do
what they need to do to actually achieve that ultimate goal?
Secretary Kerry. That is a very fair and a really good
question. And by the way, thank you for your comments and your
prayers. The answer is that the President and the military
folks currently believe we have the capacity, we have the plan,
and we have the coalition to be able to do the job. Now, you
know, there are a lot of countries in the region who have
capacity going forward who, in our judgment, if somebody is
necessary to be on the ground, ought to be lining up first. So
there are a lot of options here before we start getting to the
talk that the President has taken off the table.
Senator Johnson. So, okay. We have covered--we have covered
that ground. Let me ask you. In our discussions with, for
example, Saudi Arabia, do the potential Arab States, do they
understand how fragile American public opinion will be toward
this effort, toward this destruction, if they do not fully
commit?
And when I think of fully commit, I am thinking back to the
first gulf war when America only had to pay for about 15
percent of that, and almost 50 percent of that war effort was
paid for by Gulf States. The other portion was paid for Germany
and Japan. I mean, do they understand why it is so important
for them to step up to the plate and visibly support this
effort?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, and, in fact, King Abdullah said to
me, personally, ``We will do whatever is needed to be done. We
are committed fully to this effort,'' and they have been. Now,
there are bigger complications than just sitting here and
talking about having the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia put its troops
on the ground in Syria next door to Iran with all of the
extraordinary complications of the region regarding Shia,
Sunni, and other geostrategic challenges.
So we need to be working at this very carefully with all of
the nations that are part of the coalition, recognizing we have
to win. And we are just getting started at that. So I can tell
you we are not going into this in order to fail, and nor are
any of these other people who are signing up, so.
Senator Johnson. Well, let me offer, I will be in--up in
New York next week representing the United States at the U.N.
with Senator Cardin. I would like to offer, you know, whatever
I can do to help convince those Arab States that they do need
to be fully committed to this battle.
Let me ask you another question. An analogy I have been
using, and here is another concern of mine. If this is going to
literally take years, the analogy I have been using is if you
identify a hornet's nest in your backyard, you realize you have
got to take care of that. But if what we are really doing is
just going in the backyard and poking that hornet's nest with a
stick, is that not a concern right now if we are not fully
committed to wipe out ISIS quickly?
You mentioned Brett McGurk, who provided powerful testimony
to this committee back at the end of July about the threat that
ISIS really does represent, being able to funnel 30 to 50
suicide bombers into Iraq per month. Now, we have seen those
suicide bombers come from Australia and Germany and America
with passports. And Mr. McGurk's comment was they could easily
funnel those suicide bombers into the West, into America.
So that is my concern about allowing this--not being fully
committed, not getting in there, not cleaning up that hornet's
nest as quickly as possible. Do we not just increase the time
where we are really under threat and danger?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we hope not, Senator. Obviously that
is not our strategy. I mean, look, ISIL--why do we have to
focus first on ISIL and focus on it in the way that we are?
Because they are seizing and holding thousands of square miles
of territory; because they are claiming to be a state--they are
not a state in so many ways, and we can go through that. They
are confronting and defeating thus far a conventional army with
conventional tactics. They have--they are avowed genocidists--
avowed genocidists--who have already practiced genocidal
activities at a certain level--Yazidis, Shia, people that they
have decided to go after along the way--Christians. And they
have a very large amount of money, unlike lots of other
terrorist organizations because they cleaned out the banks, and
they have sold oil, and done other things in the process.
And so, even al-Qaeda, bold as they were in what they
decided to do, did not exhibit these characteristics and did
not have those capacities. And that is why we believe--and we
think most of the region has come to understand this, including
the moderate opposition, who are already fighting ISIL.
So we believe we have the makings of an ability to be able
to have a very, very significant impact. And already, by the
way, France and the United Kingdom are flying with us over
Iraq, and several other countries are now starting to be
willing to join that. So we think we have the building of an
ability to be able to turn that around.
I guarantee you the President's goal is to defeat them. And
as you and we see this unfold and make judgments about how well
we are doing, we can have further discussions about what else
it may or may not take to get the job done. But at the moment,
these are the judgments that are being made.
Senator Johnson. Well, thank you. You have made a strong
case for defeating ISIS and being fully committed to doing it.
The sooner the better. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary. Mr. Secretary, as I look at this challenge from
ISIL, I think there are two distinctly different parts to it
relating to Iraq and Syria. I do not believe there is any
future for Iraq unless Iraq is committed to that future.
The new leadership there has given us some hope, but
ultimately we have to trust that we can either train or provide
the skills and support to the Iraq Army that, in fact, they
will not be so overrun with corruption that they cannot be an
effective fighting force. That is--it is a big task, but I
think it is--at least we are hopeful it is within our grasp.
I look at Syria and see a totally different circumstance
there. Syria is a dog's breakfast of violence, and terrorism,
and deceit, and carnage that has gone on for three years. Here
we are talking about arming or equipping and training a
moderate force within Syria. I have read the language that is
being considered in the House, unless it has been changed in
the last day or so. Never mentions the word ``Assad'' once when
it talks about what we are trying to achieve in Syria.
It comes down to this basic question. It looks to me that
there are at least three identifiable forces in Syria: Assad,
ISIL, and what we hope are moderate opposition forces we can
work with. But I am also told and have been told there are up
1,500 different militia in that country. Some are neighborhood
militia.
How can we chart a course here that defeats ISIL in Syria
and does not in the end strengthen Assad's hand? How can we
find the so-called moderate opposition in Syria and believe
that something will merge there that results in Syrians
deciding that their own fate and future is their
responsibility?
Secretary Kerry. A very good question. The calculation is
that even with the difficulties that they have faced over the
last year and a half particularly--I remember when I first came
in, February of last year, the opposition in Syria was actually
in a slightly better position with respect to Assad and the
other groups. And there were not as many of the other groups at
that moment in time.
And then regrettably, they started to squabble politically
as well as to which military group would do what, and they lost
some momentum with that, number one. Number two, they did not
get enough supplies at that point in time. Number three, the
country began to be flooded with these external fighters from
the outside, and some countries in the region who wanted to get
rid of Assad started funding people who seemed to be tougher
fighters who morphed into either al-Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham, or
ISIL, and then they began to fight. And so the concentration on
Assad just dissipated, and during that time some of the support
that was coming from countries in the region was frankly also
very badly directed and managed.
All of that has changed now. We have upped our support and
our engagement, our training, things that we are doing. Other
countries have upped it. They have worked out many of the
leadership issues that existed. There seems to be--even despite
these difficulties, they have been able to fight ISIL, and move
ISIL out of certain areas, and keep fighting Assad. You have
seen this continuing.
Our belief, therefore, is that as the principal antagonist
to their presence--more so than Assad in some ways--starts to
take hits and they gain greater strength, greater training,
greater equipment, greater capacity, the success will bring to
them, we think, a larger structure as well as a greater know-
how and ability. And if ISIL is defeated, they are going to be
taking that experience in the same direction that they
originally set out to, which is to deal with Assad.
Senator Durbin. I would like to ask one last question. We
know, and you have said it in this testimony, that Russia is
supplying Assad. We have known in the past when there have been
sources of money, equipment, and other support for our enemies.
As we look at ISIL today, you told us in testimony that
Russia--you mentioned Russia--and China, and we know by its
nature Iran is a Shia nation--oppose ISIL. Who are the
countries--which countries are aiding and abetting the ISIL
cause either by providing resources, equipment, and arms to
them, or allowing their trade to create resources and wealth so
that they can continue the fight?
Secretary Kerry. We do not believe at this point that it is
state supported. What we believe is that because of their
success in particularly getting the bank in Mosul and other
success along the way, as well as in selling oil----
Senator Durbin. Let me stop you there. Who are they selling
it to? Which countries are transiting----
Secretary Kerry. I was just about to get to you. We have
raised with a number of countries in the region the question of
how they could possibly be getting oil out of the country. It
is being smuggled out. And that is part of the approach here is
to deal----
Senator Durbin. Through which countries do you believe it
is being smuggled out?
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is being smuggled out from the
border countries of Syria obviously, which means either through
Turkey or through Lebanon or south. That is how----
Senator Durbin. Now, are they joining us in the effort to
stop the smuggling?
Secretary Kerry. They are, but obviously Turkey has
difficulties right now, has 49 hostages that are being held,
and they have talked about that publicly. And Turkey is--you
know, we have had some conversations with them, and those
conversations will continue.
Senator Durbin. The sooner we can cut them off from their
sources of funds and----
Secretary Kerry. That is exactly what the objective--now, a
lot of the money----
Senator Durbin [continuing]. Arms.
Secretary Kerry. There is other money that comes through
social media, Internet appeals, through individual fundraising.
We have been able to trace a one-time lump sum, $140,000, that
came through one country from an individual in the region. And
that is why we are going to have this immediate focus on the
movement of money, and begin to really get tough in shutting
down that flow of funds.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for
laying out the strategy. I think you know where this committee
is and where I am in terms of wanting to give the President and
the administration the authority and the wherewithal to move
ahead and succeed in this mission and all our foreign policy
missions.
But I am a little confused at the position that is being
taken by the administration now that AUMF is not required,
would be desired, but not required now. I look back at one of
the last hearings that you appeared in. It was with regard to
Syria and chemical weapons. The President, as you know, had
drawn a redline and said that he would act if they went beyond
it. They went beyond it, and then the President came to
Congress and said what do you want me to do.
I questioned whether or not that was a wise move. And you
said to me--these are your words--``It is somewhat surprising
to me that a member of Congress, particularly one on the
Foreign Relations Committee, is going to question the President
for fulfilling the vision of the Founding Fathers when they
wrote the Constitution, divided power in foreign policy, to
have the President come over here and honor the original intent
of the Founding Fathers in ways that do not do anything to
distract from the mission itself.''
Now, I would argue, and I think others would as well, that
that did distract from the mission itself. In fact, it
torpedoed it, coming to Congress when we said we were going to
strike and what was described as a 10-day or 2-week mission to
degrade the ability to use chemical weapons. But then in this
case, in what you, yourself, today describe as what will be a
multiyear effort, say that you do not need--you desire, but do
not need congressional buy-in.
It is best when we speak with one voice. Our allies know
that. And in order to build the kind of coalition that is going
to be required to, one, defeat ISIL, and, two, sustain that
defeat over time, our coalition partners and our adversaries
have to believe our threats and our promises. And I would
submit that it helps for us to be together. So I question the
unwillingness to come and ask for a renewed AUMF. Can you
enlighten me as to why the change of heart from the last
hearing?
Secretary Kerry. There is no change of heart, Senator,
honestly. There is a big difference between the authorities
that are available. We did not have authority in any form
sufficient without Congress passing it, except for Article 2--
excuse me. We had Article 2 authority for the President of the
United States, which is always there, and nobody has ever
gotten to the question of whether or not he would have
exercised it had Congress not passed it.
But the fact is the President did make a decision to
strike. He made a decision and publicly announced it. He said,
I have made a decision to strike. Then, as you know, there were
a lot of requests in our briefings with Congress to come to
Congress. And since we did not have authority beyond Article 2,
and that is the distinction between then and now.
Then the 2001 AUMF did not cover chemical weapons with
Assad. It covered terrorism and al-Qaeda. And so, if it were
not ISIL that was this direct component of al-Qaeda, and we
were talking about, for instance, one of the other entities
there, we might not have the same capacity here. But we are
looking at an entity that was al-Qaeda from 2004 or 2005 all
the way through until 2013, and then tried to disassociate
itself by name, but continued to do the very same things it was
doing with al-Qaeda the entire time. That is not true of what
happened with Assad.
Now, it also happened, and I remember this distinctly,
obviously, that during the walk-up to the process of the
request for the AUMF, President Putin and President Obama had a
conversation in St. Petersburg regarding the removal of
weapons. Prime Minister Netanyahu had called me, and we had
talked about the possibility of removal of weapons.
Senator Flake. I have just got a few seconds here, but I
appreciate that history. But I hope we have a better
explanation than that when we go to our allies and say that we
are going to be in it for the long haul, and that we are united
in this mission.
Secretary Kerry. And that is why we want Congress to pass
AUMF. And I think five times in the course of this hearing I
have said we welcome the effort work with you to refine the
AUMF going forward, and, yes, we will be stronger and better
with the passage of an AUMF and with Congress involved in it.
But we are not going to put ourselves in the position of not
being able to do what we believe we need to do with legitimacy
at this moment in time. But we welcome it.
Senator Flake. With respect, I would argue that is what we
did to ourselves before. We put ourselves in a position where
we drew a redline, and then were not willing to do what it
takes to go and enforce that redline.
Secretary Kerry. Well, but----
Senator Flake. And that is going to affect our ability to
move forward and build the kind of coalitions that we need to
do this mission. And that is why I am saying I think there is
an inconsistency here. I hope that the administration will
change its mind and ask firmly for an AUMF, and I hope Congress
gives it. With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
Kerry, thank you for your tireless, committed, caring approach
to these international issues, all of the ones which are so
pressing today. And I think you are probably one of the most
traveled Secretaries we have ever had. And I think all of us
wish you the very best in your endeavors.
Chairman Menendez, I would like to thank you for this
hearing. I think it is very important that we carefully weigh
the President's request. We must address the very real threat
presented by ISIS. A little over a year ago, we were in this
same room talking about air strikes on the Assad regime and
arming rebels to fight it, and due to Assad's use of chemical
weapons. Today Assad's weapons are gone, and thank you,
Secretary Kerry, I think, for your diplomatic efforts there.
And we are debating now, air strikes on ISIS and arming
rebels to fight that. That is really, in a way, quite a
turnaround. The American people deserve a full debate and
explanation about this new plan that you have presented. And we
have heard today a number of Senators--ISIS--talk about this.
ISIS is a brutal terrorist organization. It must be stopped.
And that is a subject I think we can all agree on. And I would
associate myself with all of the comments--the previous
comments about their brutality and their murderous ways. I do
think there is any doubt about that.
We have a clear responsibility to continue to work with
local groups, with our allies in the region, and for as long as
it takes. We must use strategic force, I believe, to stop ISIS
and end its murderous path, but let me be clear here. I do not
want us to lose sight of the forest from the trees. There are
calls for more and more direct U.S. military intervention in
the Middle East, putting us back on a very risky course.
ISIS has thrived on the chaos, on the instability, the
unintended consequences of America's failed policy in Iraq for
the past 13 years, and this is the crucial point. Military
power is one tool, one among many tools, that will be needed to
bring stability to the region. ISIS emerged from disorder, from
dysfunction, and alienation, and the divide between Sunni and
Shia followers of Islam. Those conditions will remain without a
comprehensive strategy of diplomacy, development, and
commitment to long-term stability.
We must destroy ISIS, but we cannot put ourselves in the
situation of creating a void, one that could then be filled by
other extremists or by an Iranian-controlled regime. We should
support the Iraqi Government, as well as the Kurdish and other
moderate forces. However, I remain skeptical about the so-
called moderate forces. And, Secretary Kerry, you have heard
several times here this issue about moderate forces and are
there moderate forces.
And I think one of the key issues for us is the
effectiveness of the moderate forces that are there on the
ground now. And my question to you has to do with--and this all
public information, and everybody is well aware there has been
a covert operation operating in the region to train forces,
moderate forces, to go into Syria and to be out there. We have
been doing this the last 2 years.
And probably the most true measure of the effectiveness of
moderate forces would be what has been the effectiveness over
that last 2 years of this covert operation of training two to
3,000 of these moderates. Are they a growing force? Have they
gained ground? How effective are they? What can you tell us
about this effort that has gone on, and has it been a part of
the success that you see that you are presenting this new plan
on?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I hate to do this, but I know it
has been written about in the public domain that there is ``a
covert operation,'' but I cannot confirm or deny whatever that
has been written about it, and I cannot really go into any kind
of possible program.
Senator Udall. Okay. Well, I want to say to Chairman
Menendez, I mean, to me, the key here on effectiveness is what
has happened these past 2 years. And so, I think we should have
a briefing by our committee specifically on what has gone on in
that area from our intelligence people.
And just one final thing. ISIS is already in possession of
U.S. weapons paid for by U.S. taxpayers that extremists seized
from United States-trained Iraqi Forces and Syrian rebels. How
will you guarantee or assure that the weapons and resources you
are requesting now will now end up in the hands of radical
Sunni insurgents?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we have been following that very,
very closely, and our folks who have been involved in this at
all levels. And, again, this probably ought to be in the
classified session for various reasons. But what we have been
doing is providing various kinds of support to them, nonlethal,
as I think you know. And we are vetting people very, very
carefully.
And our folks who do that, because this is something we
have really watched very carefully. The President has been very
concerned about this question of downstream and impact. There
are a couple of instances of an overrun of a warehouse up in
the north and Aleppo and one instance a couple of things. But
by and large, we have found the vetting to be pretty effective.
Our guys have been doing it for about 20 years now, you know,
for better or worse, and they have gotten pretty good at it.
Senator Udall. Thank you. And I would also agree with, and
I appreciate your offer to work with us on an authorization of
force. I think we have to have one with what you are
describing, and I hope that we can get to that as soon as
possible. I yield back.
The Chairman. Senator Udall, let me take your request and
say, first of all, we will have as robust intelligence
briefings as we can. However, to the core question that you
raise, this is a problem that both the administration as well
as the Senate leadership must be willing to deal with because
when it comes to questions of being briefed on covert
operations, this committee does not have access to that
information. Yet it is charged with the responsibility of
determining whether or not the people of the United States
should, through their representatives, support an authorization
for the use of military force.
It is unfathomable to me to understand how this committee
is going to get to those conclusions without understanding all
of the elements of military engagement both overtly and
covertly. And so, I am four square with you, but this is a
challenge--I will call it for lack of a better term--a
procedural hurdle that we are going to have to overcome if we
want the information to make an informed judgment and to get
members on board.
Before I turn to Senator McCain, let me just recognize some
distinguished members of the Kurdish delegation and the Iraqi
Ambassador, Lukman Faily. I appreciate your being here. And in
the Kurdish delegation, the chief of staff to President
Barzani, Fuad Hussein, as well as the Minister of Foreign
Affairs for the Kurdistan regional government, Falah Bakir. So
thank you both for being here.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
recognize our Kurdish friends who have been such steadfast and
good allies for so long.
Mr. Secretary, today, September 17, Secretary Gates said
the following--former Secretary of Defense Gates. ``The reality
is they are not going to be able to be successful against ISIS
strictly from the air or strictly depending on the Iraqi Forces
or the Peshmerga or the Sunni tribes acting on their own.''
Gates said, ``So there will be boots on the ground if there is
to be any hope of success in the strategy. And I think that by
containing--by continuing to repeat that that the U.S. will not
put boots on the ground, the President, in effect, traps
himself.''
Now, Mr. Secretary, I have talked to so many people who are
military experienced, who have been on both sides on this
issue. They all agree with Secretary Gates' assessment, and
that is just the reality. And there are some of us that place a
great deal of confidence in the opinion of people like
Secretary Gates, General Keane, the architects of the surge, so
many others. Now, is it your view that the Syrian opposition is
viable? Hello?
Secretary Kerry. Hello, Senator. I am taking you so
seriously I am writing notes.
Senator McCain. Is it your view the Syrian opposition is
viable?
Secretary Kerry. The Syrian opposition has been viable
enough to be able to survive under difficult circumstances----
Senator McCain. Are you----
Secretary Kerry [continuing]. But not yet--but they still
have some distance to go, and we need to help them go that
distance.
Senator McCain. Right. And they obviously need our
assistance in weapons and training, which you are going to
embark on. Are you surprised sometimes at the degree of
disinformation that Members of Congress will swallow whole,
like there has been a cease-fire agreement between the Free
Syrian Army and ISIS put out by ISIS? Does that surprise you
sometimes?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, sometimes.
Senator McCain. No, it does not surprise you. It does not
surprise you. I got it.
Secretary Kerry. No, no, no.
Senator McCain. The hero of this piece so far in my view is
a guy who is going to testify here after you, Robert Ford--
Ambassador Ford. He did a magnificent job at the risk of his
own life riding around Damascus in support of the Free Syrian
Army. Now, here is what he is going to say in his testimony.
``The moderate armed opposition's biggest enemy is not the
Islamic State. It is the Assad regime, which has killed far
more Syrians than has the detestable Islamic State. And they
will not stop fighting the Assad regime even as they advance
against the Islamic State.''
But you are saying ISIL first. So we are going to train and
equip the Free Syrian Army, and they are going to be fighting
against Assad, who they view as their number one enemy. I agree
with Ambassador Ford's assessment, but you are saying ISIL
first.
So if this--so we are telling a young Syrian today, I want
you to join the Free Syrian Army. You go to fight ISIL first.
And, by the way, those barrel bombs that are being dropped on
you and these attacks from the air that have massacred so many
Syrians, we are not going to do anything about that. I think at
least we owe the Free Syrian Army to negate the air attacks
that they will be subjected to when they finish their training
and equipping, and go into the fight.
So why is it that we will not at least neutralize Bashir
Assad's air activity, which has slaughtered thousands and
thousands and thousands--192,000 dead, 3 million refugees? And
we are not going to do anything about Assad's air capabilities?
And finally, ISIL first, that is what you are telling these
young men who really view Assad as the one who has slaughtered
their family members, not ISIL, as bad as ISIL is. So how do
you square that circle, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Kerry. Well, you square it this way, Senator.
And, first of all, let me just say a word. I think everybody
knows I had the pleasure of working with Robert Ford in the
Department from the day I arrived there.
Senator McCain. We share admiration for him, yes.
Secretary Kerry. And we worked very closely together. I
have huge respect and admiration for him. And he and I worked
many long hours with the Syrian opposition, and I respect his
opinion, et cetera. He is correct that they will not stop
fighting the Assad regime. I understand that. We understand.
Senator McCain. They not only will not stop fighting, it is
their primary goal.
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is except that----
Senator McCain. I know too many of them, John. Go ahead.
Secretary Kerry. I understand. It is. I am not denying
that. But they also are fighting ISIL. They are up in Aleppo
right now fighting ISIL. They are fighting ISIL in other
places. They threw them out of Idlib province. They are engaged
in fighting ISIL. And our belief is, I think--I bet you--I hope
Robert Ford believes that they will actually get stronger as a
result of ISIL being removed from the field.
Senator McCain. Are you not going to protect them from air
strikes?
Secretary Kerry. I think what we need--yes. And I think
what we need--that is a legitimate concern, and it is a concern
that I would need to address with you in a classified session
for reasons I think you well understand, and I think Robert
Ford well understands that.
Senator McCain. I think the Free Syrian Army would like to
understand, too.
Secretary Kerry. And if we have a good classified session
and other good things happen, who knows. The important thing is
for us to recognize that if ISIL continues doing what it is
doing, and I think you know this, without being stopped, and if
we had not stood up when we did stand up and work with the
Peshmerga and help them to push back and retake Mosul Dam and
so forth--they were threatening Baghdad, and they were
threatening more. And if they did that sufficiently----
Senator McCain. John, we are talking about Syria and----
Secretary Kerry. No, I know, but I am about to come back.
Senator McCain [continuing]. The Free Syrian Army.
Secretary Kerry. I am about to come because that----
Senator McCain. Thank you. Thank you. I am running out of
time.
Secretary Kerry. That pertains to their capacity then to
focus on Assad, and it might be not the Free Syrian Army, but
ISIL that you see in Damascus, and ISIL bringing al-Nusra and
other people to them because of the level of their success.
Clearly many people have told us in the region success breeds
success, and many of the people who have come to ISIL have come
because it seems as if they were not being opposed. Well, we
believe that transition works to the benefit of the moderate
opposition, works ultimately to all of our benefit by removing
ISIL from the field.
Senator McCain. You cannot ask people to go and fight and
die unless you promise them that we will defeat their enemy and
defeat them right away. You cannot say wait until we defeat
ISIL. People will not volunteer for such things.
Secretary Kerry. I do not believe that is going to be
ultimately a wait and see because I do not believe, number one,
that the people supporting the opposition in various parts of
the region are ever going to stop until the Assad problem is
resolved. And number two, I do not believe ISIL is going to--I
do not believe that the moderate opposition will obviously stop
in that effort. So, therefore, there will be these two prongs.
There is no way to avoid that.
Senator McCain. I hope there are two prongs and not ISIL
first, that that message is not given to these brave young
people who we are asking to sacrifice----
Secretary Kerry. Well, if we do not stop ISIL first, there
may not be much left of the other prong.
Senator McCain. John----
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator McCain. That means we cannot take on two
adversaries at once.
Secretary Kerry. It is not us.
Senator McCain. That is bogus and false.
The Chairman. I know you two colleagues would like to go at
it for the rest of the session, but----
Secretary Kerry. No, no, no. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. We have other--I am sorry.
Secretary Kerry. We have a great tradition. I believe in
John's adage that a fight not joined is a fight not enjoyed. So
we always have a great time.
The Chairman. Senator Coons. I am sorry.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank you,
Secretary Kerry, for appearing, and for outlining, and for
discussing with us in detail the strategy to degrade and
destroy ISIL. And, I, too, want to thank Ambassador Ford for
his commendable service and his ongoing commitment to the
people of Syria.
I share your grave concern about ISIL, the threat it poses
to our regional allies and to the United States, and the
actions that they took in the massacring of Christians,
Yazidis, Turkoman. And I am proud that we have stood up to
them, and I am eager to hear and learn more about the strategy
and exactly how it will play out.
First, Mr. Secretary, if I might, in your visit to Baghdad
last week, the Prime Minister announced a proposal to establish
a national guard style force of Sunnis that would reclaim and
protect predominantly Sunni areas. And I think reconciliation
between Shia and Sunni in the formal government and in the
underground conditions in Iraq is absolutely essential to our
having a prospect of success.
Can you explain how long it will take to establish this
national guard style Sunni force on the ground in Iraq, how
this model will work, and if there would be any role for our
National Guard in training or equipping or supporting this
Iraqi national guard?
Secretary Kerry. Senator Coons, that is a really good
question, and I do not have all those answers at this point in
time. I mean, there are military decisions with respect to who
is going to be involved in training them and whether there is
room for some National Guard input, et cetera. I am confident
that the military folks would not dream of advising and
assisting with respect to the National Guard structure without
using their experience within our military as to how it has
worked here and how it has been effective.
Senator Coons. Then let me ask a related question.
Secretary Kerry. That said--but that said, let me just say
very quickly. The theory of it is to try to localize capacity
in a way, as I think you know, that deals with this sectarian
divide. One of the reason that the ``Iraq army,'' as it has
been called, folded in Mosul and before the wave of ISIL was
frankly that the--some of the officers abandoned the men who
were left behind. And there was a real sense of sectarian
divide there.
Senator Coons. Right.
Secretary Kerry. They left because they were perceived by
many people, and this was part of the problem with Iraq at that
time, that there was a Sunni--there was a Sunni-Shia divide,
sectarian divide within the construct of the military itself.
And people to some degree felt even that it went so far as to
be the prime minister's personal military entity, and there was
not a stake in it.
So it was the absence of that commitment that motivated
people to take off, and that has to be done away with, and
there has be a unity. So whatever this national guard is, it is
going to have to still be unified and connected to the state to
ensure a sense of national enterprise, but made up of people
who are--have a greater stake in their local community in their
region, which was absent previously.
Senator Coons. I strongly agree and support your hard work
on the diplomacy side of trying to address the challenges in
Iraq, because if we have a Shia-only government and military,
it is not sustainable, and that is in some ways what created
the vacuum.
Let me move on to two regional questions, if I could. Has
the campaign against ISIL affected our ongoing negotiations to
end Iran's illicit nuclear program? And how has a potentially
expanded military campaign against ISIL made it more difficult
to find a final deal between Iran and the P5+1, the deadline
coming in November, or have the mutual interests of Iraq and
some of the P5+1 members provided a common point of interest
for ongoing dialogue? How has it affected our----
Secretary Kerry. Well, we hope it is going to be the
latter. We hope obviously very much it will be the latter part
of your question that it has not affected it, that it can
continue. Our P5+1 folks left for New York this afternoon. We
will be engaging in that activity over the course of the next
days, and we will get a better sense of it.
My belief is that the nuclear issue is so huge in its
consequences, not just to Iran, but to the region, to the
world, to all of us, the interest in getting rid of the
sanctions, which is the end goal here with respect to Iran and
our end goal of being able to reach an agreement is significant
enough. And to the credit of people in the P5+1, thus far there
has been a compartmentalization. Russia and China are both very
constructively continuing to be active and involved in the
negotiations and constructive with them. And our hope is that
that will prevail going forward, but the answer is not yet
defined fully.
Senator Coons. Let me make sure you are not misunderstood
because I do not think you meant exactly what you just said.
The end goal is not to end the sanctions. The end goal is not
to reach----
Secretary Kerry. The end goal is to end the nuclear
possibility, but what I said is their end--I think I said their
end goal.
Senator Coons. I thought that might be a helpful
clarification.
Secretary Kerry. No, no, no. I said there--I thought I said
their desire is to obviously get the sanctions. You cannot do
that--you cannot lift the sanctions without absolutely
guaranteeing that the four pathways to a nuclear weapon have
been closed off. And that is what we are working at.
Senator Coons. Last question. I am very concerned about the
stability, security, safety of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
our vital ally in the region, which has borne so much of the
challenge and the burden of the refugees from Syria. And I am
concerned that ISIL has had efforts to infiltrate Jordan, and
there have been some isolated outbreaks of violence in Jordan
related to ISIL. What are we doing and what more can we do to
strengthen King Abdullah and to partner with him and work with
him as we expand the mission we are talking about here as it
has some impact, not just in Syria and Iraq, but also in
Jordan?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we are working very, very closely
with our friends in Jordan. And I was in Jordan, and I met with
King Abdullah a few days ago--last week, I think Wednesday
night after I had been to Iraq. We spent the evening talking
about the various things we need to do together. They are
determined to be helpful to us, and we are determined to be
helpful to them, and we will be.
We are committing additional funds. We are committing
additional equipment and capacity. And, you know, everybody
shares concerns with all the neighbors in the region. I mean,
ISIL--that is one of the reasons why this is so critical. And I
can assure that you that an already extremely robust mil-to-
mil, intel-to-intel and, you know, supply assistance program
and economic program will be even more robust going forward.
And you all have the budget, and you know what we are trying to
do.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
thank you very much for coming. Yesterday's New York Times
headline, ``Kerry Says U.S. is Open to Talking to Iran.'' And
you just--and I agree with your comments about the nuclear
issue is so huge. You do talk about compartmentalization and
also that Iran's goal is to eliminate the sanctions.
We have already seen the administration roll back
sanctions--January, $7 billion in sanction relief. The
administration recently introduced and announced another $2.8
billion in Iran sanction release. There are serious concerns
that the administration could further relieve and remove
sanctions in terms of trying to get concessions relating to
Iran and the fight in Syria or Iraq. Clearly Iran and the
United States do not have the same goals that we have in Syria,
so I am curious, what are you hoping to achieve by reaching out
to Iran regarding ISIL?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, let me clarify something
because it is very important to understand it. Every aspect of
the interim agreement that we arrived at with Iran, which
required Iran to do certain things, they have done, every
aspect. And the5 thing that is outstanding still is the IAEA
compliance where a recent meeting was not as forthcoming as
people would have liked. But with respect to the agreement they
entered into with the United States, they have done all the
things they said they would do.
We have people daily inspecting in Fordow. Before that
agreement, we had none. We have people daily inspecting Natanz.
Before the agreement, we had none. We have people in Iraq on a
periodic basis with the plans being delivered to us with the
commissioning completely halted, and before that that was not
true. I mean, I can run down a list.
We have had access to centrifuges, centrifuge production,
centrifuge storage. We have mining and milling and, you know, a
clarity here as to their activities that simply did not exist.
That is what we have gotten out of this. Their program has been
halted where it was when we began. And they have reduced their
stockpile of 20 percent going down to zero. That is an
extraordinary thing. For all the people who frankly said to us
it is never going to work, the sanctions will come apart, that
is not what has happened. The sanctions regime has not only
held, there have been additional sanctions.
Now, yes, was there an agreement to release a portion of an
initial round of some of the money that had been escrowed and
held? Yes, $4.6 billion. Was there an agreement for the
extension of a plan that continued this cooperation of $2.8?
Yes. That is a total of about, what, $7 billion over, what, 9
months or something. The fact is that during that same amount
of time, tens of billions of dollars have been withheld. There
is more than a hundred--I forget the exact figures--more than a
hundred and some billion that Iran believes it has a right to
and wants that is being held in a freeze account until this
gets resolved.
So I would have to say to you, Senator, this has been an
enormous success thus far. Our hope is that in exchange for
whatever schedule might be worked out, all of which will have
to be subject to public scrutiny and a final agreement, any
pathway to a bomb will be eliminated with a sufficient breakout
time that we have the ability to come to you and say the world
is safer, our allies in the region are safer, and this is a
deal that people believe can be upheld. That is the goal.
We are not there yet. I do not know if we can get there. I
hope we can get there because the alternatives are, you know,
more complicated.
Senator Barrasso. I do not want to get to a point where the
sanctions have been removed and they are still on a path to
producing a bomb.
Secretary Kerry. That will not happen.
Senator Barrasso. Switching a little bit to follow up with
Senator McCain, do we have any intelligence on how the Assad
regime is going to react should the coalition launch airstrikes
on ISIS targets in Syria in terms of commitments that Assad
will not intervene specifically? We know ISIS does not have the
capability to shoot down our jet bombers, but Syria does. And
are there precautions in place to prevent that?
Secretary Kerry. The answer is, Senator, we are going to
take precautions, but what I need to do is take it up with you
in a classified session.
Senator Barrasso. A couple of final questions on hostages.
Do you know how many American hostages we believe are being
held by ISIS or militant groups right now?
Secretary Kerry. Somewhere about three or four. I do not
want to get--I think we have got to be careful on the numbers.
Senator Barrasso. The concern is that, you know, after the
barbaric murder of James Foley, the operational details of
rescue attempts were leaked to the press, including the special
operations unit. And I just wanted to make sure that the
administration is committed to working to stop leaking
classified information that undermines our military operations.
Secretary Kerry. I honestly do not know where it came from.
I cannot tell you that. We have a problem in this city with
leaks in every department of government. And we try, believe
me, to stop that.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The
world today is more complicated, more dangerous than at any
time during our lifetimes. And I wake up every day thankful
that we have leaders like you and President Obama, thoughtful,
strategic, guiding our way through it. So thank you for all the
work that you are doing and for enduring this process for as
long as you have.
It strikes me that we are dealing with a fundamentally new
problem in a frustratingly familiar context. The new problem is
ISIL. They are on the verge of becoming the world's first
autonomous terrorist state if they are successful. I have no
doubt that they will turn their focus on the United States and
our allies. But the familiar new problem is the Middle East,
and if we have learned anything over the last 12 years of war
it is that the Middle East seems largely immune from U.S.
efforts to bend it to our will.
And so, that is not an excuse to idly by. It is just a
reason why we have to be very careful about crafting a strategy
that is not just well intentioned, but realistic. And so, I
think that you and the President have got it largely right. I
think I am broadly supportive of the strategy that you have
laid with one exception, and so I want to just bring us back to
the question about arming and trading with Syrian rebels.
When we talked about this in open session a year ago, we
raised concerns about the potential for the Free Syrian Army to
coordinate with the al-Nusra wing of al-Qaeda, and there was
confidence that that would not end up being the case. But we
have a variety of reports that that indeed has been the
practice, most recently in a joint effort between the Free
Syrian Army and al-Nusra fronts to take a border post between
Syria and Israel.
So let me ask you that question. You answered Senator
Udall's question about the ways in which we can keep arms from
flowing to Islamic extremist groups. But why are you
confident--how can you give us confidence that we are not going
to train a fighting force that is then going to enter a battle
with a known affiliate of al-Qaeda? And how confident are we
that ultimately when they get on the field of battle that they
are not going to look to ISIS, who is fighting the same enemy
that they originally entered into battle against, Assad, in
common cause?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, there is no fail-safe
obviously. As I said earlier in answer to an earlier question,
our guys have gotten much, much better at the vetting. And now
that we are doing the training to some degree and hopefully do
it openly, we are going to be in a much better position to do
command and control, to do, you know, much greater in-depth
accountability, if you will.
In the end, there probably will be some strange bedfellow
moments in the course of this kind of battle. I would be crazy
if I sat here and just said to you, oh, it will never happen,
there is nobody--you know. There are exigencies and
circumstances that we do not always control. But by and large,
we are beginning to get a much better handle with other players
in the region on the funding streams, for instance, to al-
Nusra.
Different countries that have played the angles with
certain groups are now coalescing together. And we see a shift,
and I think that is going to be to our benefit to be able to
exercise at least a greater amount of control. Fail-safe, I
cannot sit here and promise you that, but we are going to do
the best we can.
Now, let me just say to you--all of you here a couple of
things. One, the House just passed the Syria Train and Assist
and Equip bill, and obviously we hope the House having done
that, that the Senate will follow suit in short order. I also
want to just correct one thing I said earlier. I was talking
about the JPOA, the agreement, and John is gone. But I just
want to emphasize, I did not mean to say we did not have any
inspection before. We did not have daily inspection. We had
some inspection through our process, but now we have the daily,
and we did not have a sufficient level to have guarantees in a
place like Fordow that we have a comfort level.
One other thing can I just say because you raised this,
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. It is fine.
Secretary Kerry. Okay.
Senator Murphy. Go ahead.
Secretary Kerry. No, go ahead. I will answer it following
your question.
Senator Murphy. Well, here is my--I guess my only followup
is this. I understand that there are going to be strange
bedfellows, but to the extent that the strange bedfellows are
the Free Syrian Army fighting alongside al-Nusra, which is a
wing and affiliate of al Qaeda, I hope that is not a reality
that we are prepared to accept. We have had all sorts of talk
about ISIL, but it is important to remember that the only major
terrorist organization that has plans and stated intentions to
carry them out against the United States today is al Qaeda. So
I just want to make sure that we have a specific focus on that
particular set of strange bedfellows.
Secretary Kerry. I am with you 100 percent, and we will to
the greatest degree possible, absolutely. But what I wanted to
say to everybody here is you mentioned something very important
a moment ago, which was about ISIL being a terrorist state and
so forth. This is one of the things that I ran into very
strongly with all the meetings I had in the region. And I want
to just share with you this, that one of the key parts of this
strategy is to not ever give them the legitimacy that they are
trying to seek as to being a state. They have no legitimacy.
They are not an Islamic state, and they are not in the vein of
any other state in that region that tries to give meaning to
the concept of Islamism as they celebrate it with their
citizens and their countries.
And this is important for us because, you know, Islam does
not produce--no legitimacy in Islam produces the butchers who
killed Steven Sotoloff or David Haines or, you know, Jim Foley.
That is not Islam, and Islam is not ISIL. And increasingly all
of the voices in the region are really starting to feel that
they have a need to speak out and to reclaim Islam, and that is
one of the most important things that could come out of this.
And we are working on ways to do that.
So ISIL is not a state obviously. It is not remotely like a
state, and what we need to do is make that more clear. So let
me just share with you two important things. The Grand Mufti of
Saudi Arabia, the home of Mecca and Medina, which, by the way,
are in the target scale of ISIS, these are Islam's most holy
cities, they said of these murderers they are enemy number one
of Islam. That comes from the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.
And today, Saudi Arabia's top clerical council, all 21
members, the only institution in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
that is authorized to issue fatwahs, invoking Muhammad, using
the words of the Koran itself, today they said that ISIL are
killers. They are thugs. They should be singled out and
punished as apostates under Sharia, and made an example of. And
they said they were not following the Prophet, but that these--
and these are their words, not mine. They are following the
order of Satan.
Now, that is what you are beginning to hear from the
region, and that is a key part of this strategy. And obviously
we do not have the legitimacy to do what people in the region
can do to de-legitimize, but we are certainly going to do
everything in our power to help encourage that and make sure
that people are aware of it.
The Chairman. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Thank you, and thank you for your testimony.
I agree with you and with the President that we must confront
and destroy ISIL. I think that, you know, I am well on record
as being very skeptical about our interventions in the Middle
East. I think that the original war in Iraq has led to more
chaos and less stability. I think the President's war in Libya
as well as your intervention in Syria have led to less
stability and more radical Islam throughout the country, and
have actually enabled ISIL.
I do also and have been a frequent critic of Secretary
Clinton for not providing adequate security, though, for
Benghazi and for the consulate. So I do think that there is an
American interest in defending our Embassy in Baghdad as well
as our consulate in Erbil. And I want there to be some message
going forward from this hearing today that there is obviously
bipartisan support for defending American interests in Iraq.
However, I am very disappointed, though, in the President
for not obeying the Constitution. The Constitution is very
clear. It gave the power to declare war to Congress. And you
can say, hey, we are going to come back when it is convenient,
but we are going to be committing war for the next 3 or 4
months, and we will do as we please. That is not what the
Constitution intended.
The interesting thing about the creative logic that used to
say that a vote in 2001 has anything to do with today is that
it seems to be acknowledged that, well, that allows you to do
anything with forces that may be associated with terrorism or
al-Qaeda. One of the interesting things is if you look at
Ambassador Ford's testimony, he will say that ``Moderate forces
have and will tactically coordinate with al-Qaeda, with al-
Qaeda linked to al-Nusra.'' So the interesting thing, if we use
your logic and say the 2001 AUMF can be used to justify this,
well, the 2001 AUMF could be used to justify going after the
moderate Syrian rebels who are associated with al-Qaeda.
So I think really anybody who is intellectually honest
would say that the people who voted in 2001 to go to war with
the people who attacked us on 9/11, the people who congregated
in Afghanistan, has absolutely nothing to do with this. And
really this committee, Congress, Senate, and the President are
all abdicating the responsibility to vote for a new use of
authorization of force, and that what you are doing now is
illegal and unconstitutional.
I think also from a practical point of view, it would be
better to bring the country together. I think we would
galvanize more support. It would be a bipartisan war. And had
the President been a great leader, he should have come before a
joint Congress instead of going on TV. He should have come
before a joint Congress and immediately asked for a resolution,
and there should have been a vote. That would have been true
leadership. There would have been true bipartisan support, and
then really there would be less carping on both sides.
The President also used to believe this. The President ran,
and it was one of the large reasons the public went for the
President initially, is he said no President should
unilaterally go to war without the authority of Congress. So I
liked the President as a candidate on this issue, but not so
much as the President.
The other problem with this is that, you know, who are
these moderate people? Are there really moderate, you know,
Islamic rebels in Syria? Here is a quote, and I would like your
comment on this. Ryan Crocker, the distinguished former United
States Ambassador to both Iraq and Syria, said, that ``The
administration's knowledge about the non-ISIS opposition in
Syria is that we need to do everything we can to figure out''--
this is Crocker. ``We need to do everything we can to figure
out who the non-ISIS opposition is because, frankly, we do not
have a clue.''
You know, most of the weapons we have been giving to the
moderate rebels, they are sort of at a stopping place. That is
where they stopped briefly before ISIS takes the weapons. Some
of these, the Syrian National Revolutionary Front have signed--
have signed a cease-fire. Maybe not all of the vetted rebels
are, but the Syrian Revolutionary Front has signed a cease-
fire.
So really, I argue, and I would believe, and I would like
to hear your comment. I think we have allowed there to be more
of a safe haven for ISIL in giving weapons to the so-called
moderate rebels because really that has taken pressure off
them. It has kept Assad at bay. And I think, contrary to what
others have said here, had we bombed Assad last year, ISIL
would be in Damascus.
So I think we are lucky we did not bomb Assad last year,
and that we should be very careful about arming any Islamic
rebels in Syria because the weapons may not stay where they are
intended, and they may have the unintended consequence of
actually enabling ISIL. Your comments?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we are not planning to, nor do we
want to, nor have we armed Islamic folks in Syria. The United
States does not do that, and we have opposed it, and Robert
Ford will tell you. And Robert Ford worked very hard to make
sure that we were not doing that.
I also think it is good that you are going to hear from
Robert Ford because he will give you about as good an analysis
of who the non-ISIS opposition is, and he will break it down
point for point because he did that for me on many occasions
and articulated who they were and so forth. But he was also a
passionate supporter of making certain that the moderate
opposition got support. And he fought hard to get it more
support than they did get, absolutely. So I think he should do
that for you.
But let me just make it clear that the--I mean, I am glad
that you can guarantee that there would be a vote if the
President sent up here. I have got 60 nominees, some of whom
have been waiting more than a year to get a vote up here. And
the chair and the ranking member have been terrific in helping
to try to break them out, but they cannot get a vote. So if you
can tell the President you can absolutely guarantee a vote, I
would be really amazed.
Senator Paul. I find it unbelievable that if the President
came before a joint session of Congress and asked for use of
force, that he would not get a vote. I find it unthinkable.
There is absolutely no way that you can imagine that he would
not get a vote if he asked for it, so really, let us be honest.
Politics are engaged here. People do not want to have a vote
before the election. They are afraid of this vote. People are
petrified, not of the enemy, but petrified of the electorate.
That is why we are not having a vote.
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me answer the first part of your
question so that we make it crystal clear why the President is
doing what he is doing, because you are not insinuating. You
are stating quite declaratively that the President has violated
the Constitution. The President absolutely, clearly, by almost
any legal standard that I can imagine is not violating the
Constitution. He is upholding it. Article 2 gives the President
the power to do what he is doing. He has lived by the War
Powers Act. He has sent countless notices up to the Congress.
And I think every legal analysis suggests that while you may
not like it----
Senator Paul. If Article 2 gives unlimited power, why come
at all?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, let me just finish. Because he
believes that the Congress ought to do this, and no one has----
Senator Paul. But he does not believe he is bound.
Secretary Kerry. The President has the right as the
President under Article 2 to defend this Nation and to take the
steps necessary to do so. The War Powers Act declares the terms
under which you do that, Senator. You know that. And he has
lived absolutely within that constitutional prerogative.
Secondly, like it or not, and I can agree. I think you can
find reasons to be uncomfortable. That does not mean it is not
legal. And the chairman of this committee is appropriately
going to try to recalibrate the AUMF, which we support
entirely. We welcome the opportunity to have it recalibrated.
It should be. But for the moment, the President believes we
need to move now, and that is a full and appropriate exercise
of constitutional power.
Senator Paul. And for the record, that will be after the
election.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary
for your testimony. It has been an illuminating back and forth.
I also want to thank Ambassador Ford and Mr. Connable, the
written testimony that you each prepared. Very instructive. I
often walk away from hearings older, but not smarter. I am
walking away from this one older and smarter, so thank you for
that.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your comments at the
beginning with respect to the authorization. A number of us
feel like additional congressional authorization for the
mission as described by the President is mandatory. Some of us
do not feel that. But all of us, I think, on both sides of the
dais believe it is advisable. And your commitment to crafting
that in an appropriate way is notable and important.
I have introduced a draft, and others have as well, that we
know will be forwarded to this committee as we look to try to
put something together that is, in fact, bipartisan, and it
should be. Based on the statements around the table, it should
be.
An observation. Tomorrow in Portsmouth, VA, a container
ship, the MV Cape Ray, is returning to the Commonwealth of
Virginia. It is a merchant marine ship with merchant marines
and DOD personnel, and it is the ship that has been in the
Mediterranean involved in the complete destruction of the
declared Syrian chemical weapons stockpile. That is a good news
day tomorrow. And I think it is something that we ought to just
contemplate as we are thinking about U.S. power, that there was
a diplomatic breakthrough that led to the destruction of one of
the largest chemical weapons stockpiles in the world. The
United States played a critical role and this committee played
a critical role.
The diplomatic breakthrough, a factor in that was the
willingness to use military force. Diplomacy is important.
Often you get a much better result if you are really willing to
use military force. Some interpret what happened last year as
the President stepped away from a redline. No, there was a
redline. We will take action against you if you use chemical
weapons. We were prepared to take military action. Had we taken
military action, the best we were going to get from the mission
as described was convincing the Assad regime not to use
chemical weapons again. But we were not going to get their
complete destruction.
Those chemical weapons still would have been out there,
possibly to have been seized by ISIL or other elements. What we
now have, because of a willingness to use military force as a
factor, is the complete destruction of a stockpile that is
widely viewed as a real positive, especially by neighbors in
the region. So as we move forward, diplomacy is important.
Credible military threat is important. Those things can work
together.
Mr. Secretary, you talked a lot about this. We are very
deeply concerned about the extent of the coalition, and we
understand as it is still coming together, the purpose for the
hearing today is not to describe every Nation and what their
role is. But just to sort of put it on the table for you and
others, it is incredibly important that this coalition not just
be vast, but that it also be public at the appropriate point,
and that the participation of Arab nations, nations in the
region, be public. They have often been willing to support the
United States playing the lead in a financial way where they
have not wanted to be public in condemning atrocities within
their own region.
I do not think the American public, and I do not think
Congress, will support the United States policing a region that
will not police itself. And so, it is critically important for
the success of the mission and for the success of both of
getting bipartisan support and supporting the American public
that the coalition be vast, but especially with the nations
that their participation not be, you know, we will help finance
it, but we do not want to be public about it. They have to be
full public partners for this mission to be successful.
In addition, the importance of their public participation
is critical to the success of the mission on the ground because
if this is a campaign of the West against ISIL or the United
States against ISIL, in a bizarre way, we will potentially
legitimize ISIL even more. But if it is, and you read the
quotes earlier that are helpful, if it is a public campaign by
leaders in the region, whether they be religious leaders or
clerics and certainly nations against ISIL.
This is not about Islam. You are a profanation of Islam in
what you are doing. So the more public that is, the more ISIL
is de-legitimized, and the ultimate success of this mission is
not just a military success, it is a de-legitimization strategy
that will strip away the pretense that this is an organization
that has anything to do with Islam and demonstrating to the
public that they need to back away from it and condemn it. And
so, that is why the coalition thing is so critical, and the
public nature of the coalition is important. And if you just
want to comment on that briefly, please.
Secretary Kerry. Well, no, Senator, look, you have said it,
and I think I have said it in the course of the hearing. We
completely understand that. We do not want this just to be--
this is not just an American effort. That is one of the reasons
why the President took the time to make sure that the Iraqi
Government was in place, that we were going to build a
coalition, that we took the time to do what was necessary
because we all understand that no one is advantaged by this
being perceived of as just an American effort, and it is not.
There are many other countries. I mean, France helped, stepped
up, and bringing people to Paris the other day for a larger
conference, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia hosted that meeting. And
countries that had not sat at the table together for some
period of time were at that table.
One of the things that people really have not, I think,
sufficiently focused on in this story is the Iraqi story. I
mean, Iraq was on the brink 2 months ago, and many people were
talking about, oh, my god, is it going to break up? Can it hold
together? What is going to happen? We worked very, very closely
with Iraqis, and Iraqis led that effort, all of them, you know.
The Sunni folks who had bitter feelings about what happened in
the last years came together, picked a new speaker.
The Kurds, who had plenty of reasons to be mistrustful and
not, you know, be certain of the future, came together and
elected a new president. And that new president had the courage
to choose somebody other than the current Prime Minister to say
you try to form a government. That could have faltered. It did
not. They came together, put together that new government,
actually ratified the new Prime Minister. The new Prime
Minister has been continuing to put the government together.
His Foreign Minister was in Jeddah, was in Paris.
So, you know, this photograph I pointed out of a, you know,
of a Kurd President, of a, you know, Saudi Arabian Foreign
Minister of a Shia-Iraqi Foreign Minister, all together
conferring about how they are going to deal with ISIL tells you
the story of an amazing transformation that has taken place.
And I think people need to recognize that that is a big step
forward. Now, we have to build on it.
The second thing I would just say about the Cape Ray coming
back, I want to thank your people. I wish you would extend the
huge gratitude of the administration and of the world for this
incredible job well done. And you are absolutely correct. The
President announced he was going to strike. We had already been
talking with the Russians and others about how to get the
weapons out, and then the deal came together and took away the
necessity for the President to make a judgment he still would
have made, whether or not to strike under his constitutional
power based on the announcement he made.
But clearly getting 100 percent of the declared weapons
out--we still have some questions about a few other things. But
100 percent, 1,300 tons of weapons out completely and destroyed
is the first time that has ever happened in a time of conflict
in any part of the world.
And I will tell you, ask Prime Minister Netanyahu, ask
people in the region, they will tell you they are safer. You
have an X factor that has now been eliminated from this whole
equation of what we may or may not do in Syria as a consequence
of that action.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, and thank you for the excellent
job which you are doing, Mr. Secretary. Turkey--Turkey does not
want to become part of our combat operations because ISIL has
hostages from Turkey. But at the same time, Turkey has become
the destination for the oil which has been captured by the ISIL
army in both Iraq and in Syria. And it is upward of a million
to $3 million a day, $300 million to a billion dollars in the
course of a year. In fact, the smuggled oil has now become the
lifeblood of the ISIL army.
So talk a little bit about Turkey and what our efforts are
going to be to just shut this down, because without that money,
they do not have the money to produce Hollywood-style videos.
They do not have the money to pay their soldiers. They do not
have the money to take care of these cities and towns that they
are taking over. Talk about what we have to do with Turkey to
just get them to shut this down.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, it is a very, very relevant
question and one that we are working on very hard obviously. We
really do understand the sensitivities that Turkey has. I do
not want to talk about it too much publicly, to be honest with
you, because of that. I think we are better off having a
classified conversation about this. But I have hopes that as we
move forward here over time, that the current dynamic may be
able to shift in a way that will help us deal with that a lot
more.
Turkey understands the challenges, believe me, and we have
had some very candid conversations about it. But Turkey will
have to make its decisions in the days ahead, and we will see
what happens.
Senator Markey. It is unconscionable that Turkey has become
the principal source of funding for ISIL, and if we can shut
that down, we do almost immeasurable damage to their ability to
finance this war. And I just think we have to put Turkey right
front and center and have the world say to them, they must stop
it.
Let me move on. The language which is in the resolution
says that one of the goals is to promote the conditions for a
negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria. We will be
voting on that. So experts are saying that it will take upwards
of 3 years to resecure the border between Iraq and Syria. And
experts are also saying that it will take up to 10 years to
create the conditions on the ground in Syria to bring Assad to
the table in order to, in fact, have a negotiated settlement.
So I would ask you talk about those two timelines that
experts are talking realistically given the weakness of the
Free Syrian Army, how long it will take to build them up, how
long it will take for us to push the ISIL army out of Iraq. The
American people, I think, want to know how long we are going to
be engaged in this effort toward the end game.
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me talk macro in a sense here,
Senator, if I can. First of all, I have read various accounts
of summaries of various experts, some of whom are experts and
some of whom are called experts. And there is only one expert
right now that I am looking to, and that is Gen. John Allen. He
has the responsibility here. He is putting together his team
very rapidly. He is having meetings, and I will listen to him
very carefully before I start pushing out timelines.
Now, that said, President Obama has already said it is
going to take a number of years to do the broad-based effort
that we are at. And when I say that, you know, I think you can
do a lot to ISIL fairly quickly, and then you have a longer
fight as you begin to really go into the, you know, full
destruction and defeat mode, so to speak.
But I got to tell you, and this is something that I expect
to be talking about more with this committee and with Congress
over the course of the next months. The fight of our generation
is a combined fight against the immediate challenge of radical,
religious extremism and its exploitation in various parts of
the world, and large, unemployed populations of young people
without good governance surrounding them and without
opportunity, without dignity, respect. And this is a challenge
we face, all of us, and all countries that consider themselves,
you know, developed, and near-developed, and civilized.
It is our challenge, and we need to figure out how we are
going to do all the things we need to do. And this is part of
what President Obama talked about when he went to West Point,
and about the focus on counterterrorism, and the need to talk
more as we go forward in the days ahead about exactly how we
are going to fill out the full agenda of our country to be safe
in the long term.
It is a big, long-term operation, and that part of it is
going to take years. And the United States, I think it is
clear, is going to have to help lead that effort, and that is
going to require a different attitude about foreign policy and
engagement than a lot of people have been willing to embrace. I
look forward to that discussion very much, and we are doing our
homework to be able to come to you with thoughtful ideas about
how we can deal with it.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We are very
fortunate to have you as the person sitting in that seat. Thank
you.
Secretary Kerry. Well, you are because you are now in my
seat. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. The most fortunate of them all. Well, Mr.
Secretary, thank you for your engagement here today. You became
the Secretary of State at a time in which I have never seen in
22 years in the Congress such a confluence of challenges
globally as they exist right now, the topic we have been
discussing here for the last 3 hours: the challenge of ISIL,
the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the challenges of Ebola in
Africa, the reality of our continuing challenge with Iran and
its search for nuclear weapons, and the list goes on and on.
And your service comes at an extraordinarily important time, so
we want to salute you.
I do want to make one or two final comments. Number one is
this is going to be an issue in which more information and a
steady flow of information and briefings will be critical to
having the congressional understanding and the ultimate support
for what I believe is our mutual mission to defeat ISIL. And I
just want to say that on various occasions, you have
legitimately said that we need to have some of these
conversations in classified settings. I will say that I look
forward and intend to hold those classified hearings, but I
hope it is going to be as robust so that when we get into a
classified hearing, we do not have to hear, well, I cannot talk
about that in that context. That will be problematic.
Secondly, there have been many--I do not question anybody's
intentions here. I believe that there are many legitimate
questions, and there are certainly legitimate questions when we
think about putting America's sons and daughters into harm's
way. We are strongest in the national challenge that we face
when we speak with one voice, as Democrats, Republicans, and
Independents together as Americans. And it is that unity of
purpose I think that will be critical--a critical element of
our success against ISIL. This is a moment in which politics
must stop at the water's edge.
This committee for the last 2 years has taken on a whole
host of major foreign policy and national security challenges
in a bipartisan way, and I look forward to working with my
colleagues to come together again to do that in this most
critical case. I think we can.
And finally, I remind those who are concerned about the use
of U.S. military might in a foreign country, that we face the
world as it is, not as we wish it to be. I do not know how you
negotiate with an entity that beheads Americans.
So thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony and
engagement for what I expect will be a continuing engagement.
And before you have a parting word, I do want to urge
colleagues, we have an important panel coming up with a lot of
information, and I hope members will be able to stay or come
back.
Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. I will be very, very brief. Just thank you
very much. I look forward to having those discussions. And one
coda, I think you know this. I long believed as chairman that
the chairman and ranking member should have the same input as
the chair and ranking member of the other committees--Armed
Services, et cetera, Intel--because of the policy
considerations. And I have advocated for that within this
administration, and it is something that I think ought to
happen.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you.
The Chairman. We appreciate your testimony. Let me call up
our second panel today as the Secretary leaves. And I----
[Disturbance in hearing room.]
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I will ask
the Capital Police to remove individuals who will not come to
order.
Our second panel today is Robert Ford, senior fellow of the
Middle East Institute. And Ambassador Ford, of course, has a
long and distinguished history in the Foreign Service of the
United States, which he did so exceptionally well in Syria. And
Ben Connable, the senior international policy analyst at the
RAND Corporation here in Washington. I appreciate both of you.
Both of your written statements will be included in the record
in its entirety without objection.
And I appreciate your willingness to hang in there for the
last several hours and to still be here to provide what I think
is some critical testimony and insights. So with the thanks of
the committee to both of you, I will recommend--I mean, I will
recognize Senator--I mean, I will recognize Ambassador Ford
first, and then we will turn to Mr. Connable.
Ambassador Ford.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. FORD, SENIOR FELLOW, MIDDLE EAST
INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Ford. Mr. Chairman, Senator Johnson, and other
distinguished guests and members of the committee. It is a very
big honor to be with you today, and I thank you for the
invitation. And as you noted, I submitted a written statement.
And so, let me just make a few opening remarks, and then I will
turn it over to my copanelist, Ben.
Many have spoken about the dangers of the Islamic State
against us and against our allies in the region. And I would
simply note that I have been looking on Arabic social media
sites in Arabic language, and some of the language is blood-
curdling, the threats against us. And I take these people at
their word, and they do present a serious danger to us.
The administration's proposal to increase assistance to
moderate elements of the armed opposition in Syria will be
useful as one part of addressing the Islamic State threat, and
the administration's proposal deserves congressional support. I
understand from you--well, Secretary Kerry that the House has
voted, and I hope the Senate does as well as soon as possible.
Let me just make three points. First, and I heard it again
today here. People question whether there is a moderate armed
opposition, but there is, and it is already fighting the
Islamic State. I put some details about some of the groups in
my written testimony, Mr. Chairman. When I say ``moderate,''
what I mean by that word is that its leaders--the leaders of
these groups do not seek to impose a religious state on Syrian
society by force. Many of them are Islamists, Mr. Chairman, but
they do not seek to impose a religious state by force.
That said, there are no angels in the Syrian war now.
However, the moderate groups emanate from what were peaceful
protest movements around Syria in 2011. These were the protest
movements that I myself saw. And their leaders accept the idea
that there has to be an eventual political deal in Syria. That
also makes them moderate. Some of these groups, in fact,
including groups in my written testimony, had representatives
at the talks in Geneva where Secretary Kerry was present.
My second point is these moderates now are fighting the
Islamic State. They lost badly in eastern Syria. They lost very
badly. That is how the Islamic State took control of oil
fields. They are holding their own right now in northern Syria
not far from the Turkish border, but it is a hard fight. It is
a desperate fight, and they would definitely benefit from
greater and more reliable material aid in those battles against
the Islamic State in northern Syria.
We just had a delegation here from the Iraqi Kurdish
Government. Like the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga who are fighting
the Islamic State on the Iraq side of the border, the moderate
armed opposition in Syria would benefit as well from American
airstrikes against Islamic state targets. And they would
benefit more than Assad because those airstrikes up in northern
Syria would help the moderates we are trying to help secure the
moderates' vital supply lines. Assad does not even have forces
that far north in Syria anyway.
My last point is that we have to go into this with our eyes
open. The moderates in the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian
armed opposition, their primary enemy is indeed still the Assad
regime, which has killed far more Syrians than has the Islamic
State, as awful and terrible as the Islamic State is. And so,
as we try to work with them, they will always be thinking about
how to manage their two-front war--the Islamic State on one
side, the Assad regime on the other.
But as their resources from the entire coalition of
countries that Secretary Kerry and the administration is
assembling, as their total resources increase, they will have
more resources to devote against the Islamic State, but I doubt
that all of their new resources from all of the countries are
going to be used only against the Islamic State. I think we
have to understand that going in.
Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to take questions later, and
thank you again for your invitation.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert S. Ford
Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, members of the committee, it is an
honor to be invited to speak with you today about what we should do in
the face of a growing threat from the Islamic State.
I spent almost 5 years working within Baghdad as the senior
political advisor and later deputy to Ambassadors John Negroponte,
Zalmay Khalilzad, Ryan Crocker, and finally Chris Hill. I left Iraq in
2010.
And I then served on the ground in Damascus for a year before we
had to close the Embassy in February 2012 and I returned home to head,
for 2 years, the State Department team working on the Syria crisis.
It's been a grim 3 years, but I see some positive signs in Iraq
that suggest guideposts as we think about next steps in Syria.
These signs result from policy approaches to contain and reduce
extremist groups that also worked when I was in Iraq years ago.
Over the past several months in Iraq we identified groups on the
ground in Iraq that rejected the Islamic State and that were sturdy
enough to build upon.
The Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga were not extremely well organized in
June 2014--they had multiple command chains and there was confusion at
the time of the fall of Mosul. And to be clear, the political goal of
an independent Kurdistan shared by many Kurds is not one that the U.S.
Government has endorsed.
Still, the Peshmerga represented a reliable core group that could
use our help to confront the Islamic State's fighters on the ground.
And despite the collapse of many Iraqi army units, there were
reliable special operations army units that again could usefully
utilize our help to fight the Islamic State.
These Peshmerga and Iraqi Special Operations Forces together with a
limited, judicious use of airstrikes pushed Islamic State fighters away
from the Mosul Dam, from Erbil and Kirku parts of Diyala province.
The fight is not at all over, but the Islamic State's advance in
Iraq has been blunted.
It's going to be a long fight.
The President, very wisely in my opinion, insisted that we could
not fight the Iraqi battle against the Islamic State for them, however.
He conditioned big American help on the Iraqis finding a political deal
to set up a new government--a sort of unity government--that could
rally all Iraqis to fight the Islamic State.
The President rightly understands that it is vital to undercut
extremist recruiting among the disaffected Sunni Arab population by
means of Iraqi political leaders figuring out a political deal.
I am very encouraged that various tribal figures in Anbar and
Hawija, elected provincial councils in Mosul and Salah ad-Din all have
come forward to offer to mobilize Sunni Arab fighters against the
Islamic State if the new government in Baghdad will join with them. The
initial statements I have seen from the new Prime Minister are also
encouraging.
The regional states pledging to act with us in Iraq is also
encouraging--and something we didn't really have when I was in Iraq
years ago. Just the symbolism of the Iraqi Foreign Minister--a senior
Shia politician--appearing in Riyadh at Saudi invitation with other
Sunni states' representatives was very positive. We're in a better spot
in this regard than we were in 2003 or 2007.
But as I said, if there are encouraging signs, we also need to
understand that just as it took years to contain and reduce Al Qaeda in
Iraq, so it will take years again in Iraq. Patience and firm insistence
on our political conditions are vital.
Turning to Syria, it's a much harder problem than Iraq and we are
long past the chance to find easy answers or sure bets. Still, the same
elements used in Iraq offer the best path forward:
We need to identify friendly forces on the ground and boost
their ability to fight the Islamic State;
We may need to use, judiciously, our own airpower;
As in Iraq the real fighting will be on the ground, so
equipment, ammunition, logistics, and even cash matter just as
much if not more;
A sustainable solution requires a new Syrian government via
negotiations
between Syrians with outside encouragement.
Many Americans question whether there are any moderates left in the
Syrian armed opposition. There are. They are fighting the Islamic State
and the Assad regime both, they are, not surprisingly, hard pressed,
and they could very much use our help.
I find it odd that the media don't talk about them much. Units like
the Hazem Brigade fighting in northwestern Syria that actually helped
expel the Islamic State out of that part of Syria last spring. The
Hazem Brigade issued a manifesto last March saying it was fighting for
a pluralistic Syria where minorities' rights would be protected. Or
units like the 101st and 13th divisions, fighting in both northern and
southern Syria, led by former Syrian military officers. Or units like
the Omari and Yarmouk brigades which are fighting regime forces in
southern Syria. There are others too, of course.
Right now, some of these units, and others are locked in battle
with the Islamic State near Aleppo in northern Syria.It's a hard
fight--U.S. equipment the Islamic State captured from the Iraqi Army is
being used against those Free Syrian Army fighters. However, these
units also have received help from outside and they have fought the
Islamic State to a standstill in that part of Syria. It's a desperate
fight--the Islamic State is trying to capture vital supply lines for
the moderate armed opposition coming down from Turkey.
Helping those units, right now, around Aleppo could secure supply
routes and boost the morale of the moderate fighters. Assad's forces
are some distance away and far too stretched already to hold ground
northeast of Aleppo. Thus, we and our friends ramping up help there
would not benefit Assad nearly as much as the moderate opposition.
We do need multiple changes in approach. Larger, more reliable
logistics help, including provision of ammunition and cash, are a must
if we hope to make any headway against the Islamic State. And just as
important, regional allies must stop competing with each other for
influence by provisioning different groups in an uncoordinated fashion
and instead blend their efforts in a broader strategic plan with the
Syrian fighters' commanders.
And we must understand two vital points going in:
--The moderate armed opposition's biggest enemy is not the Islamic
State. It is the Assad regime which has killed far more Syrians
than has the detestable Islamic State. And they won't stop fighting
the Assad regime even as they advance against the Islamic State.
--Moreover, in the desperately hard-fought battle against the Assad
regime, moderate forces have, and will, tactically coordinate with
the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front on the ground. This is due to
operational necessity, made more urgent by the shortage of
supplies.
This coordination has nothing to do with ideological sympathy--
indeed, groups such as the ones I mentioned have criticized the Nusra
Front's politics and even refused to work with its leaders in towns
recaptured from the regime.
Until the moderate elements are so strong that they don't need
Nusra to pressure the regime successfully, the moderate elements will
accept working militarily with Nusra.
As we think medium- and longer-term, a large moderate opposition
force will be vital to holding ground seized back from the Islamic
State. It will also be necessary to contain the Nusra Front one day. I
do not see any other force that could do this short of a U.S.-led
foreign force and even that would be extremely hard to sell politically
in the region and in the broader international arena. I therefore
welcome the administration's proposal to move to a Title 10 program.
However, just as in Iraq, the sustainable solution is to find a way
to rally more Syrians against the Islamic State. The Assad regime's
brutality has helped the Islamic State's rapid growth in Syria. Working
with the Assad regime would be a golden gift to help the Islamic
State's recruiting in Syria and beyond. And there aren't Assad forces
to spare for central and eastern Syria anyway.
Instead, as in Iraq, the endgame in Syria has to be a new
government able to rally the armed opposition and the remaining regime
forces together to fight the Islamic State.
And we should know from the Libya experience, and our Iraq
experience, that negotiating the creation of that new government in
Syria, not trying to topple it, is the only way to preserve what
remains of the Syrian state.
Getting to negotiations will be very, very hard. Our Geneva efforts
failed quickly. But 7 months later, the regime's forces have taken
heavy casualties at the hands of the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic
State. Assad's remaining forces are more stretched and tired. There are
new signs of dissent among Assad's ranks.
Asad's supporters may be tired but they don't see a place to jump.
They fear extermination at the hands of the Islamic State and the al-
Qaeda-linked Nusra Front. I don't blame them.
The best way to give them a sense that there is a third way for a
new government--one that is neither the current regime nor an Islamic
extremist state--is for the moderate opposition to reach out to Assad's
supporters and to put forward ideas about how together they could
assemble a new government.
Asad won't like this, but that's not the point. The point is that
others inside the regime's ranks should and could drag the top Syrian
leadership back to negotiations.
Thus, as we ramp up help to the Syrian moderate armed opposition,
we also should insist that the opposition redouble efforts to reach out
to regime elements and pursue discussions about a deal for a new
government. There are steps the moderate opposition could take right
now to send the right signal--treating prisoners well and offering to
exchange them would be an excellent start.
I do not think any of this will be fast or easy. I do think that
both sides are tiring, and that could help get to the negotiations for
a new government. The conclusion of a few local cease-fire deals here
and there indicates that local commanders at least are willing to talk.
Lastly, I welcome the administration's decision which, when
implemented with real resources and actions, will gain support of
regional allies. In Iraq when I was there we worked without regional
support with the exception of Kuwait. The administration is making a
strong pitch for regional political and material backing. If we show
determination, the regional states who have long wanted to see the
Syrian crisis resolved will back us, even if some necessarily do it
quietly.
Going forward, we have be determined and committed.The first step
is for the Congress to approve the President's proposal to help Syrian
moderate armed groups. And as we begin our efforts under Title X and
back moderate fighters on the ground, we will need to be strategically
patient and very tough with our allies and the moderate opposition when
they stray outside the agreed lines of scrimmage. The Islamic State
problem has grown over the course of 3 years. Putting it down again in
Iraq and Syria likely will last years more. But based on what I saw in
Iraq years ago, it is achievable.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Connable.
STATEMENT OF BEN CONNABLE, SENIOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYST,
RAND CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Connable. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and
distinguished committee members, thank you for allowing me
testify before you today on this critical topic. Ambassador
Ford, it is an honor.
I have been engaging with Sunni Iraqis since 2003 first as
a Marine intelligence officer in Iraq, then as an attache in
Amman, Jordan, and most recently in support of my research on
Sunni-Iraqi perceptions at RAND. My remarks are based on those
relationships and on my research.
This afternoon, I will outline options the United States
and its allies can take in order to help free northern and
western Iraq from Islamic State dominance. The thrust of my
proposition here is that the success or failure of any
coalition effort to defeat Islamic State and ultimately to
stabilize Iraq hinges not on tactical consideration or tribal
engagement efforts, but on the more critical issue of Sunni-
Iraqi reconciliation.
IS has been able to dominate millions of Sunni with only a
few thousand fighters because they generate considerable fear,
but also because the ongoing Sunni revolt against the
Government of Iraq has given IS a perfect opportunity to latch
onto the Sunni host in a part parasitic, part symbiotic
relationship. IS serves the purposes of the Sunni polity by
fighting against the government, and the Sunni provide IS with
at least a temporary accommodation.
In late 2014, we now have a situation in Iraq that closely
resembles that in late 2004. Sunni Iraqis are disenfranchised
from their government. They fear Iranian influence, and they do
not yet trust the coalition. But underlying all of this is the
desire to turn out the extremists. Tolerance of IS in Iraq is
temporary. The ways in which they may be ejected, however,
matter a great deal.
The coalition counterterrorism approach, which we use
together with coalition airstrikes, Iraqi operations, and Sunni
militia support, will certainly reduce IS influence and power
in Iraq. Yet the coalition plan to defeat and destroy IS faces
a range of challenges. I will enumerate three of those for you
now.
First, the recent tactical victories in northern Iraq came
only with the help of local sectarian and ethnic militias. It
is possible, but unlikely, that these groups will directly
support Iraqi army advances further west into the almost
wholly-Sunni province of Al Anbar. There are limits to Iraqi
collaboration.
Second, the offensive capability of the Iraqi army is
questionable at best. They may well be able to mount a
successful campaign into Mosul and Al Anbar, but it is more
likely that they will move slowly, haltingly, and that they
will have an insufficient force to overcome many of the
hardened urban objectives they will face.
And third, the Iraqi army is not structured, trained, or
inclined to conduct the kind of thoughtful counterinsurgency
campaign that appears necessary in the Sunni provinces.
Instead, they are likely to conduct the kind of tactical
campaign they executed in Al Anbar in the first half of 2014.
This military-centric approach is unlikely to generate
grassroots Sunni support for the government.
Sunni popular and militia support, though, are critical to
the success of the coalition campaign. This kind of uprising or
revolt against IS is central to the possible solution I am
laying before you this afternoon. To achieve this, some hope to
force a reprise of the 2006 to 2008 awakening movement by
aggressively incentivizing Sunni with financing and military
aid. Yet simply paying or otherwise incentivizing Sunni to
fight at the local level absent national reconciliation is
likely to perpetuate rather than reduce instability in Iraq. If
not addressed, the ongoing Sunni revolt will continue even if
IS is ejected, in this event the second awakening is likely to
end in the same was as the first, with Sunni fighters turning
against the government in a recurring cycle of violence.
President Obama and senior administration officials have
correctly stressed that success against IS is dependent on
Iraqi reconciliation and positive Iraqi leadership. I recommend
two mutually supporting approaches, one solely Iraqi and one
for the broader coalition to capitalize on this strategic
assumption. Prime Minister al-Abadi has a window of opportunity
now in the early stages of the campaign to make unequivocal
moves towards genuine reconciliation. The coalition should
encourage him to enact all grievance resolution measures within
his authority in one fell swoop.
Following this top-level Iraqi action, all coalition
activities should be predicated on reconciliation. This may
mean taking some tactical risk, but these risks will be taken
in the hope of achieving long-term stability rather than short-
term tactical success. Stopping IS now is wise. Current anti-IS
action should be applied aggressively to keep the organization
on its heels. In the case of IS, military force is necessary.
Yet addressing root causes of any insurgency has also
historically proven to be the best and most lasting way to
defeat insurgent groups. Leveraging reconciliation and using
military force to support reconciliation rather than using
reconciliation to support military force seems to be the least
costly and possibly the only way to defeat Islamic State in
Iraq and to stabilize that country.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Connable follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ben Connable
Chairman \1\ Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished
committee members, thank you for allowing me to testify before you
today on this critical topic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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This afternoon I will first discuss how the self-described Islamic
State, or IS, was able to sweep through northwestern Iraq with such
rapidity, and then I will outline options the U.S. and its coalition
allies might take in order to attempt to free northern and western Iraq
from IS dominance. The thrust of my proposition here is that the
success or failure of any coalition effort to defeat IS--and ultimately
to stabilize Iraq--hinges not on tactical considerations or tribal
engagement efforts, but on the more critical issue of Sunni Iraqi
reconciliation. I believe the new anti-IS coalition can succeed if it
predicates all of its actions in Iraq on national reconciliation
between Sunni and Shia Iraqis. If political reconciliation is not the
core aspect of an anti-IS strategy then coalition efforts are likely to
fail in the long run.
islamic state sweeps into northern iraq
There are many tactical, or perhaps localized reasons why IS and
its temporary nationalist insurgent allies were able to achieve so much
success in June and July. These include a patient yet aggressive
infiltration of IS assets into northern Iraq through the spring, major
gaps in Iraqi Security Force (ISF) capabilities in Nineweh province,
and also a series of IS victories in Syria and western Iraq that
generated operational momentum. The Iraqi Army units in the Mosul area
had alienated local Iraqis and lost nearly all vestiges of popular
support. These units may have also been stripped of some of their
equipment and personnel to shore up units fighting in Anbar province.
Morale in the northern Iraqi Army Forces was low, leadership was weak,
and IS capitalized brilliantly on their own operational surprise. Other
Iraqi Army units that might have responded to the IS invasion of Mosul
were tied down in the west or were simply incapable of the kind of
rapid planning and movement required for operational-level quick
reaction. IS succeeded in part because of Iraqi Army weakness, but also
in great part due to their own military competence and elan.
All of these military factors were important to the IS sweep into
northern Iraq. However, they do not fully explain why IS has been so
successful in dominating millions of Sunni with only a few thousand
fighters. The mostly Sunni Iraqi provinces of Anbar, Salah al-Din, and
Nineweh are known for rejecting outside influence and repelling
invaders. But while most Sunni Iraqis reject IS methods and philosophy,
only a few have turned against IS and tried to push them out of the
Sunni provinces. The ongoing Sunni revolt against the Government of
Iraq (GoI) has given IS a perfect opportunity to latch on to the Sunni
host in a part parasitic, part symbiotic relationship. IS serves the
purposes of the Sunni polity by fighting against the government, and
the Sunni provide IS with at least a temporary accommodation.
underlying sunni issues present opportunities to extremists
and to the coalition
A similar phenomenon took place between 2003 and 2006, the period
after the U.S.-led coalition invasion of Iraq. Millions of Sunni Iraqis
suffered the growth and ultimately the dominance of AQI while quietly
and fearfully rejecting the al-Qaeda methods and philosophy. They
underwent years of murder and intimidation, beheadings, robbery, and
rape because at least in part they viewed AQI as the lesser of three
evils: the extremist group did not present as great an existential
threat as either a Shia-led government or the foreign coalition. During
this period many nationalist, or Ba'athist fighters reached temporary
deals with AQI and even supported some of its military activities.
AQI's power culminated in early 2006 after the destruction of the
Golden Mosque in Samaara; they exploited the fear of Shia oppression
and took on the role of ``defenders of the faithful'' to fight for the
Sunni.
Yet in late 2006 the Sunni Iraqis turned against AQI. Despite their
best efforts to play on Sunni fears and sectarian animosities, AQI had
worn out its welcome. Most Sunni Iraqi did not want to be part of an
AQI caliphate and were only willing to accept AQI presence as long as
the balance of fear kept them in check. The Awakening movement was the
outward expression of the Sunni's turn against AQI. They accepted the
promises of support and protection made by both the coalition and the
government of Prime Minister al-Maliki. Many members of AQI turned
against the group itself, other insurgents rose up to fight AQI emirs,
and in very short order AQI was defeated. While coalition and Iraqi
Army military power helped turn the tide, the key to success in 2006
and 2007 was the shift in popular Sunni sentiment against extremism and
against outsider domination.
Unfortunately, Prime Minister al-Maliki abused the trust of the
Sunni and undertook an active campaign to disenfranchise them. Between
2006 and 2013, the Sunni again lost faith in what they saw as an
Iranian-influenced government. They again grudgingly allowed a foreign-
led Sunni extremist group to enter and dominate their provinces, partly
out of fear of IS and greatly out of fear of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF). In late 2014 we now have a situation that closely resembles late
2004: Sunni Iraqis are disenfranchised from their government, they fear
Iranian influence, and they do not yet trust the coalition. But
underlying all of this is a desire to turn out the extremists. For now
the members of IS float on the surface of the Sunni Iraqi polity; but
they will never be integral nor will the Sunni Iraqis accept the IS
caliphate. Tolerance of IS in Iraq is temporary. The ways in which they
might be ejected, however, matter a great deal.
a military centric anti-is effort faces formidable challenges
In his 10 September speech, President Obama described a primarily
military-focused effort designed to eject IS from Iraq and ultimately
destroy them across the globe. This counterterrorism approach, which
weaves together coalition airstrikes, Iraqi Army operations, and Sunni
militia support, will certainly reduce IS influence and power in Iraq.
Within months we can expect that IS armor, large artillery pieces,
technical gun trucks, and overt fixed military positions will be
reduced or eliminated inside of Iraq; they will no longer have the
ability to conduct large-scale offensives of the kind we saw in Mosul
and Tikrit. It does not necessarily follow, however, that IS will be
weakened to the point of defeat. While many pundits and analysts have
focused on IS technical and financial assets, their fighting power
derives primarily from their overall morale and their aggressive,
motivated small infantry units. Some of these can be destroyed from the
air, but most can and probably will position themselves close to the
civilian population in an effort to survive and increase chances of
civilian casualties from airstrikes. As a result, airstrikes are
insufficient to defeat or destroy IS.
The coalition plan also calls for increased support to the Iraqi
Army, which will then help to drive IS out of Iraq. Equipment and
trainers are already being prepared and deployed, and intelligence and
air control support have already played critical roles in places like
the Mosul Dam. All of these technical efforts will help Army units get
back on their feet, and they will stiffen the resolve of some units
that may be faltering. Consistent, overt U.S. military support can
strengthen an allied partner in ways that cannot be measured and should
not be underestimated. However, there are several reasons why the Iraqi
Army will be challenged to achieve immediate or even long-term success
against IS. I propose three of what I think are the most important
reasons for doubt.
First, the recent tactical victories in northern Iraq came only
with the help of combined Kurdish and Shia militia support. Iraqi Army
units fought alongside Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) units, Peshmerga
units, and some sectarian Shia fighters. It is possible but unlikely
that Kurdish forces will directly support Iraqi Army advances into the
mostly Sunni city of Mosul. It is even less likely they will support
offensive thrusts further west into the almost wholly Sunni province of
Anbar. They are most interested in protecting the Kurdish north.
Similarly, Shia fighters are most interested in protecting their
sectarian cantonments in Diyala and other mixed provinces. While some
Shia militia may accompany Iraqi Army units west, their presence will
only serve to reinforce the increasingly widespread--if perhaps
exaggerated--belief amongst Sunni that the Iraqi Army is a Shia-
dominated, Iranian-directed force bent on eliminating Sunni Arabs.
There are limits to Iraqi collaboration.
Second, the offensive capability of the Iraqi Army is questionable
at best. They may well be able to mount a successful campaign into
Mosul and Anbar, but it is more likely that they will move slowly,
haltingly, and that they will have insufficient force to overcome
hardened urban objectives. They remain, as some experts have noted,
logistically challenged; this problem will require years of
remediation. Iraqi special operations forces that have carried out the
most aggressive and successful actions against Sunni insurgents are
exhausted from nearly a year of constant combat, and they are too few
in number to generate the kind of combat power necessary to seize a
large urban area like Mosul, Fallujah, or Ramadi.
And third, the Iraqi Army is not structured, trained, or inclined
to conduct the kind of thoughtful counterinsurgency campaign that
appears necessary in the Sunni provinces. Instead they are likely to
conduct the kind of counterguerrilla campaign they executed in Anbar in
the first half of 2014. Counterinsurgency campaigns are designed to win
support of the population by building government legitimacy and
applying force in careful measure. Counterguerrilla campaigns are
designed to kill guerrillas, or in this case IS. In early 2014 Iraqi
Army units conducted Vietnam War era ``sweep and clear'' missions
across Anbar province with very little success. When they moved against
the insurgent stronghold in Fallujah they used excessive force and
still failed to retake the city. Surely they will be more successful at
killing IS fighters with coalition air support and intelligence, but
they will probably be no more successful at winning popular support
than they were earlier this year.
There are also aspects of IS that will affect the likelihood of
military success. I stated previously that they are militarily
competent and resilient. They may collapse in the face of airstrikes
and ground offensives, but it seems more likely that they will adapt
their tactics and dig into dense urban areas. They will also probably
accelerate their use of terror attacks against both military and
civilian targets in order to weaken political support for the coalition
and to degrade Iraqi Army morale.
But while IS has many strengths it also has weaknesses. As pressure
mounts against the group, and as young and unbalanced IS fighters are
forced to manage hundreds of thousands of Sunni civilians, the
likelihood that IS will alienate the Sunni Iraqis increases. And while
IS may have a robust force of tens of thousands of fighters across Iraq
and Syria, some IS fighters were either forcibly conscripted or have
stronger loyalties to Iraqi nationalist insurgent groups like the Jaysh
al-Rijal al-Tariqeh al-Naqshibandieh, or JRTN. These conscripts and
nationalist fighters can be peeled away from IS with the right pressure
and incentives. This will make the job of the Iraqi Army somewhat
easier.
what about the tribes? considering a second awakening movement
There are challenges to an Iraqi Army offensive, even if it is
supported by coalition airstrikes and intelligence. But there are three
proposed legs to the anti-IS military plan: airstrikes, Iraqi Army
operations, and Sunni popular support. Ostensibly the Iraqi Government
and the coalition will try to rally Sunni support to turn against IS
and, at the very least, defend their local areas to create space for
the Iraqi Army to maneuver. Some hope to see a reprise of the 2006-08
Awakening Movement. A mass Sunni uprising against IS would probably
shift the balance of power in favor of the government and might rapidly
push IS back across the international border to Syria. Indeed, this
uprising, or revolt against IS is central to the possible solution I am
laying before you this afternoon. However, it is important to eliminate
misconceptions about the first Awakening movement before trying to
encourage a second.
Conditions in 2006 and early 2007 were perfect for an Awakening.
AQI had alienated the population, the U.S. had demonstrated its
commitment to the Iraqis by announcing a surge of troops, and the Iraqi
Government pledged millions of dollars in reconstruction support to
Sunni areas stricken by years of heavy combat. Finely tuned special
operations targeting raids kept the insurgents on their heels while
U.S. infantry and armored forces created safe zones for civilians and
for burgeoning yet vulnerable Sons of Iraq militias. Prime Minister al-
Maliki offered reconciliation to the Sunni and seemed to prove his
nonsectarian bona fides by moving against Shia militias. And probably
millions of dollars changed hands through local reconstruction deals
and direct payments to fund and motivate Sunni militia leadership.
What did not happen is just as important as what did happen. While
Sattar Albu Risha did lead the Awakening council and was a charismatic
figure, he was not a unifying figure for all Sunni nor did he generate
the Awakening. At no point did U.S. interlocutors find ``the right
person'' to talk with, thereby energizing a Sunni revolt against AQI.
Instead, Albu Risha was a convenient public face for a broad grassroots
shift in popular sentiment. And while the U.S. troop surge played an
important moral and physical role in defeating AQI, the troop surge was
not the critical component in the Awakening. While it would have been
far more difficult, and would have taken longer, it is possible that
the Awakening might have succeeded against AQI even with less U.S. or
coalition support. Iraqi Sunni are competent and sometimes aggressive
fighters. They nearly ejected the coalition from Iraq, and perhaps
ultimately they could have ejected AQI from Sunni-dominated areas.
Conditions today are different in several critical ways. IS has
alienated many Sunni, but it still has some support in various Sunni
areas. There are some strong local Sunni leaders and even potential
national leaders, but the Sunni political class is badly fragmented.
Even tribal leaders have very limited influential power over their own
tribal members, and many tribes are if anything more divided than they
were in 2006. There are no U.S. ground troops to create ``oil spots''
of stability for fledgling militia forces, and ostensibly none of the
supremely capable U.S. special operations direct action forces will
help pick apart IS leadership in the dense urban or maze-like rural
swathes of Anbar. Most importantly, though, is the absence of proof--so
far--that the new Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, is serious
about reconciliation.
Finding ``the right person'' to talk to amongst Iraq's Sunnis and
handing over bags of cash to stand up militias or encourage Sunni to
join a new national guard may lead to real short-term tactical success
in some Sunni areas of Iraq. There may be visible signs of Sunni
resistance against IS as tribal leaders come to the fore and, cash in
hand, pledge to work alongside the Iraqi Army. It is possible that over
time, with coalition airpower, the Iraqi Army and Sunni militiamen may
be able to push IS out of Iraq without national reconciliation of any
kind.
Ultimately, though, this quick tactical approach is likely to
perpetuate rather than reduce instability in Iraq. While the world
focuses on IS, it is important to remember that IS floats above the
Sunni population and does not represent enduring Sunni grievances or
narratives. There is an ongoing Sunni revolt against the Iraqi
Government that, if not addressed, will continue even if IS is ejected.
In this event the second Awakening is likely to end in the same way
as the first: with armed, angry Sunni fighters turning against the
government in a recurring cycle of violence.
I propose there is a way to encourage the Sunni to turn against IS
in a way that will be more tactically effective, more cost effective,
and ultimately more enduring than inducing quick and temporary
allegiances with cash and military aid. I also propose that this
approach will obviate the weaknesses inherent in a primarily military
or counterterror approach to the IS problem.
reconciliation is the best and least costly option for success
The Iraqi state that existed in early 2014 now exists only in the
Iraqi Constitution. There is a de facto split of Iraq along
ethnosectarian lines: Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. It may or may not be
possible to bring the Kurds fully back into the Iraqi state. Chances
for successful Sunni-Shia reconciliation are probably quite low.
However, my interactions with Sunni Iraqis since 2003, and my targeted
research on Sunni Iraqi perceptions over the past year indicate that
all strata of the Sunni Iraqi population wish to remain within the
state.
They tend to view their revolt against the government as an anti-
Iranian rather than an anti-Shia movement. Most are nationalists who
believe they should play a prominent role in the central state.
Further, the natural resources in the Sunni provinces are
inconsequential in comparison to Kurdish and Shia resources, and Sunni
do not believe decentralization will result in equitable sharing. While
they want more local power, they do not want to be permanently
marginalized and disenfranchised from the state. It is therefore
possible to leverage Sunni nationalism to foster lasting
reconciliation.
One approach to Sunni reconciliation would be through negotiation.
This might require finding a charismatic Sunni leader who represents a
large majority, or at least large plurality, of the Sunni population.
His influence would have to be sufficient to encourage tens of
thousands of Sunni to turn against IS. As of late-2014, though, this
leader has not emerged and the Sunni do not seem disposed to follow a
single political figure. Another approach would be dispersed
engagement, with coalition and Iraqi leaders fanning out across Iraq to
drum up local support. I argue this approach will lead to tactical
success but strategic failure. Instead, I propose that only intensive,
one-sided national reconciliation efforts aimed at the broad Sunni
population will lead to lasting success.
Earlier this month Prime Minister al-Abadi enumerated a list of
grievance resolution measures he intended to take in order to win Sunni
support. These include general amnesty for innocent Sunni caught up in
the counterguerrilla campaign, a depoliticized justice system,
amendments to antiterror laws, reconstruction of damaged Sunni areas,
the formation of a National Guard, and increased regional authorities.
Sunni leaders have listed other grievances and want the immediate
release of all female prisoners and Sunni politicians, restoration of
full retirement pay for former regime officers, and other measures to
reduce the impact of de-Ba'athification laws that have been used to
target Sunni leadership. Some of these actions will require political
ratification, but others will not.
President Obama and senior administration officials have correctly
stressed that success against IS is dependent on Iraqi reconciliation
and on positive Iraqi leadership. Prime Minister al-Abadi has a window
of opportunity now, in the early stages of the campaign, to make
unequivocal moves toward genuine reconciliation. The coalition should
encourage him to enact all grievance resolution measures within his
authority in one fell swoop. This action, which should include prisoner
releases and the real-time transfer of money for reconstruction and
retirement pay, would demonstrate that he is taking a different path
than his predecessor. At this point in the year-long Sunni revolt, only
real and dramatic action on the above-named fronts will be sufficient
to convince the Sunni that the more tangible things--cash payments,
equipment--are part of a broader strategy to reunite the state.
Following this top-level Iraqi action, all coalition activities
should be predicated on reconciliation. Every engagement should hinge
on some kind of local or regional reconciliation measure, and every
tactical military action should be planned to preserve and improve
relationships between the Sunni and the state. This may mean taking
some tactical risk, including strictly limiting damage to Sunni urban
areas and curtailing aerial targeting. Advisors will find themselves in
difficult positions as they attempt to rein in Iraqi Army air and
artillery support. This approach will certainly preclude the use of
Shia and Kurdish militias in support of Iraqi Army combat actions in
Sunni areas. Reconciliation first and foremost, in conjunction with
coalition support, and Iraqi military and government efforts must be
woven together into a holistic strategy with a definitive envisioned
end-state.
There are many hurdles to successful reconciliation. Divisions in
the Sunni polity will continue to undermine Sunni cohesion and may
hinder efforts to develop militia support. Prime Minister al-Abadi may
not be willing or able to make the kind of dramatic measures necessary
to gain Sunni trust. And IS and some of its allies will probably make
every effort to foster discord between Sunni and Shia in order to
maintain Sunni support. They already conduct terror attacks that seem
designed to deepen the divide between Sunni and Shia Iraqis. However,
there are also some positive underlying factors. While there are
divisions between Sunni and Shia Iraqis, there are also strong inter-
and intra-tribal bonds between the two sectarian groups. Sunni leaders
I have spoken with in the last year repeatedly emphasized their belief
that Sunni and Shia Iraqis are first and foremost Iraqis.
conclusion
As I stated earlier, chances of genuine and lasting reconciliation
in Iraq are admittedly low. However, reconciliation also offers the
best and perhaps only chance to reconstitute the admittedly limited
successes of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn. Absent
reconciliation we can expect lasting instability in Iraq. We may
physically defeat IS, but the ideas that cause young Iraqi men to
support groups like IS and al-Qaeda will live on. The group name will
change--there were over 100 identified insurgent groups in Iraq during
the 2003-11 war--but the violence will continue to destabilize the
region, give space for international terror groups, and deprive
millions of Iraqis of even a modicum of normal life.
Stopping IS now is wise; current anti-IS actions should be applied
aggressively to keep the group on its heels. In the case of IS,
military force is necessary. Yet addressing root causes of any
insurgency is also historically proven to be the best and most lasting
way to defeat insurgent groups. Leveraging reconciliation--and using
military force to support reconciliation rather than using
reconciliation to support military force--seems to be the least costly
and possibly the only way to defeat IS in Iraq and stabilize that
country.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony.
Ambassador Ford, let me start with you. One of the main
arguments that the administration has presented in addressing
members of Congress' concerns about the vetting for the
fighters that we seek to train and equip--the so-called
moderate vetted Syrian rebels--is we know them. We know them.
And I can tell you that as this issue has come forward that I
am constantly called by colleagues for which this is one of
their central questions--not their only question, but it is one
of their central questions, particularly as this vote comes up.
So my questions to you are: do we really know these
fighters would receive U.S. training and equipping if Congress
provides the authority? And are there enough willing, capable
fighters that would pass U.S. vetting standards, do you
believe?
Ambassador Ford. The answer to the second question is a
simple, yes, there will be enough. Actually the problem has
always been, Senator Menendez, that there have been more
willing fighters in the Free Syrian Army than they have
material guns, ammunition, et cetera.
So a different question is, do we know them? Two things I
would say. First, we do not know all 1,500 groups because some
of the groups are just two or three guys and, you know, they
have a video camera, and, wow, you are, you know, a group of
freedom fighters. There is actually a pretty small number of
serious groups, and when I say ``serious,'' I mean that have a
thousand, two, five, 7,000. That number of groups is actually
pretty small. It would not pass more than about 15 to 20. Funny
how that is never mentioned in the press.
Those groups, we do not work with all of them. Some of them
are beyond the pale politically in terms of not being moderate
the way I mentioned, like Ahrar ash-Sham, which has sectarian
tendencies and might well try to impose a state. And that is a
big group. So I have met Ahrar ash-Sham, but we do not in any
way provide assistance to them.
But the other groups and the ones that, for example, the
State Department was providing nonlethal assistance to, yes, we
know them. Not a secret that I have met them on occasion in
places like Turkey, and I went over the border and met them in
Syria about 14 months ago. We know them, and we have talked
politics with them. We have talked about the Nusra Front with
them. Those, I think, we know, and we have had more experience
just in the last 7, 8, 9, 10 months with them as well. So I
think the groups that we need to help that will have an impact
on the ground, we know them.
The Chairman. Okay. So we know them, and you believe that a
sufficient number of capable fighters would pass U.S. vetting
standards.
Ambassador Ford. Yes, I feel very strongly about that.
The Chairman. All right. Well, that is very important to
know. Now, in an article in Sunday's New York Times, there was
a report that said, ``Mr. Assad and his closest advisors have
looked at the American decision to undertake anti-ISIL military
strikes in Syria as representing a victory for their
longstanding strategy, which is obliterating any moderate
opposition to its rule, and persuading the world that it faces
a stark choice between him and the Islamist militants who
threaten the West.''
How do we respond to those who raise that concern? How do
we prevent Assad and his Iranian- and Russian-backed forces
from seizing back territory from ISIL after military strikes,
further squeezing the moderate vetted Syrian rebels?
Ambassador Ford. Two comments on that very quickly,
Senator. First, Assad does not have enough forces. He has been
seriously depleted. That is why he could not hold the air base
in Tabqa, for example, where they actually flew some of their
senior officers out and then left hundreds of their soldiers to
be murdered by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant. And they
could not hold other parts of eastern Syria, for example.
He does not have the troops to put back in. His forces are
very stretched. He was depending a lot on Hezbollah and Iraqi
Shia militia. The Iraqi Shia militiaq has flown home to deal
with ISIL inside Iraq.
So I would not worry so much, especially in north and
eastern Syria about Assad benefiting very much. The moderate
armed opposition will benefit greatly more, especially as they
try to secure their supply lines. It is interesting to me that
ISIL is trying to cut their supply lines coming down from
Turkey. So they need to--they need help to secure those lines.
One other comment about Bashir al-Assad. I think his
strategy all along has been to sort of destroy the political
opposition--the moderate political opposition and the armed
fighters attached to it. If we do not go forward on this
proposal to help the moderate armed opposition, I think he will
say indeed my strategy is working, the Americans will come
around and eventually deal with me. And that will actually make
it even harder to get a resolution to the Syrian crisis.
The Chairman. Which is, in part, why we had an
authorization in the committee a year ago, which supported your
view. Part of what I want to do here is try to get some of the
concerns of my colleagues responded to by virtue of your
expertise.
Secondly--thirdly, the authorization language submitted by
the administration in order to stand up, train, and equip the
effort for the Syrian moderate opposition articulates three
purposes: one, defending the Syrian people from attacks by ISIL
and the Syrian regime, facilitating the provisions of essential
services and stabilizing territory controlled by the
opposition; two, protecting the United States, its friends and
allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by
terrorists in Syria; and, three, promoting the conditions of a
negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria. Do you
agree that those should be the stated purposes? Would you
change or add anything to them?
Ambassador Ford. Sorry. I had not seen the language. Yes.
These seem reasonable to me, but I would just caution that
getting to negotiations is going to be a very long and hard
process. I would not want to pretend that we could get there
quickly. Geneva was a bad failure, and until the regime feels
more pressure--it is already under pressure. What is
interesting is in Assad's own community now, there are
demonstrations against him. There is a whole campaign called
Sarkhet al-Watan--``Scream of the nation''--just criticizing
Assad for keeping his throne, they call it, and sending young
Alawis to their graves. So there is--there are cracks which we
did not see before. But I do not think this is going to be
fast, Senator.
So the first goal of containing and starting to roll back
ISIL and defending the Syrian people, and also as well
protecting us, those are in the short term things we have to
work on right way. Negotiations are going to come later.
The Chairman. Right. And do you think--I think--oh, Senator
McCain is back, so he is probably going to ask this question on
his own, but I think it is an important one. Do you envision
the moderate vetted Syrian rebels understanding that if we are
training and equipping them with our focus being ISIL that they
will look toward that fight even as their main goal is to
displace Assad?
Ambassador Ford. Absolutely they will for two reasons. One,
the Islamists, or ISIL, is actually threatening their supply
lines right now, and has butchered hundreds of members of the
moderate Syrian opposition, and I mean butchered. Cut their
throats, video, the whole nine yards. So there is no--there is
a lot of bad blood between them. That is the first reason.
The second reason is, in places where ISIL was in
authority, especially in northwestern Syria in the Idlib
province, there was a popular reaction against them. And that
public popular support helped the moderate armed opposition
actually eject ISIL fighters out of that province. And also the
same thing happened in Aleppo to the west of the city.
There was also an uprising, Senator, a very big uprising
against ISIL. In Deir ez-Zor province, an entire tribe, called
Shaitat tribe, rose up against them, but they did not--they did
not get any help. And that is not a criticism of us per se, but
they just--they lost a military battle, and ISIL killed--I have
seen estimates of as many as a thousand of the tribesmen
afterwards in retaliation. So there will be constant problems
and fighting between the moderate armed opposition and ISIL. I
do not see any way that that is going to end.
Syrians just in general are Mediterranean people, and they
do not go for this kind of very heavy duty, conservative Salafi
type state. They are just not that kind of fundamentalist
religiously.
The Chairman. Well, these insights are very important. Mr.
Connable, I do have questions for you, but my time has run out.
In deference to my colleagues, I will come back to you at the
end.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, again, thank
you for this hearing today. Thank you both for your testimony.
Ambassador Ford, I think we have all experienced being in--or
most of us--refugee camps looking into the eyes of Syrians who
had counted on us to do a lot of things that we said we were
going to do and did not do. And their brothers, and cousins,
and uncles were butchered, and we never supported them like we
said we would.
You actually encouraged them out doing your patriotic duty.
We encouraged them out. And, in fact, we did not follow up with
much that they thought was coming, and when we did, it was
delayed. And I want to thank you for your service also and your
leadership in Syria. And I think all of us on this panel
probably wish to do so.
My question to you is, what is the mentality now of the
Syrian opposition having seen, you know, promised support, it
not being what was envisioned? What is their mentality, their
attitude, toward the United States right now relative to
helping them, if you will, against Assad?
Ambassador Ford. Senator Corker, thank you. First, just a
comment to be clear on the record, we did not encourage, and I
certainly as Ambassador did not encourage Syrians to protest.
But I did defend their right to protest peacefully. And, in
fact, when I was in the country I said, do not resort to
violence because it will cause problems even for us if you do
that. That is ancient history. But just to be clear what we
did, we did not encourage them out, but we absolutely stood for
their right to protest peacefully in accord with rights under
the U.N. Charter for Human Rights.
What is the mentality of the Syrian opposition now toward
us? I think you and I both know that there is a lot of
bitterness. Two hundred, maybe more--200,000 maybe more have
died. I think there is very great anger that the United States
did not intervene militarily to stop that. There is a belief
that we could have stopped it. I am not sure that belief is
accurate, but in any case it is widely held. And so, we have a
credibility problem, and we have a credibility problem, Senator
Corker, with some of these groups even.
You do not regain credibility overnight. It is based on new
shared experiences. And so, were we to go forward with the
administration's proposal, and I certainly hope we do, I think
with the passage of time, credibility and confidence can be
restored. But I think it will be bumpy at the start.
Senator Corker. One of the things that people--thank you
for that. One of the things--one of the things that people have
said, and by the way, I strongly supported, as most people did
here, arming, especially back in May, but even before, a year
and a half ago. And I think we might be in a different
situation, and I would say we would be in a different situation
today if we had taken action at a more--at a better time. I
still support what is getting ready to happen, although I have
a lot of questions relative to the moderate opposition being
trained and armed.
Some people have said who have been close to this issue
that there are not enough--I know you answered a question
specifically to Menendez, but there are not enough, and it is
very difficult and expensive to train these people, that 5,000
troops over the next year, short-term training in Saudi Arabia,
getting more sophisticated weapons after they have proven
themselves on the ground is something that is not going to be
particularly effective. Could you respond to that?
Ambassador Ford. Syria is a big country, Senator, and 5,000
is not a lot for a country that size. The Syrian armed
opposition, however, is a lot bigger than 5,000. I think the
latest numbers I have seen for the non-Nusra, non-ISIL groups
is still in the range of 80 to 100,000. I think most people now
are saying it is more on the lower end of that, so say 80,000.
Some say higher. The Islamic State--you probably saw the same
things in the press I did. They have somewhere 20 to 30,000, of
which some are in Iraq and some are in Syria.
So it is not as if the 5,000 would be the only ones on the
field. I think there will be a lot of others on the field. And
although we are not helping some of the harder line Islamist
groups, like Ahrar ash-Sham, Ahrar ash-Sham is also fighting
ISIL right now, and ISIL killed a number of Ahrar ash-Sham
prisoners. And so we are not in that exact fight, and the
groups that we have helped are not in that fight. But there are
other people also fighting the Islamic State. So I do not look
at it as only 5,000.
Senator Corker. Knowing what you know about the way things
are on the ground, is what is being laid out something that
will evolve into an effective ground strategy, or are there
additional components that you knowing the country the way you
do are necessary--if we really want to destroy and defeat ISIL
are necessary to make that happen?
Ambassador Ford. I would think we are going to get into a
longer-term relationship with some of these groups that I
mentioned. It needs to be really carefully coordinated with
other countries in the region that have been funneling in help.
And it has got to be centralized in a way, Senator. There is
too much stuff going to too many disparate groups, and it
actually has made the job of the armed opposition much more
difficult. So we are going to have to be pretty tough with some
of our regional allies. That is on the diplomatic political
side.
On the ground, Senator, as ISIL is pushed out of places, it
will be really important to try to get help into the civil
administrations. The Syrian Government will not go into those
places. And, again, these are in a sense the political side of
the opposition linked to the moderate armed opposition. And so,
the State Department has worked in some places with these
people, and I think there is going to have to be a dedication
of resources and program money to backfill as ISIL is pushed
out of places so that the lights stay on some hours a day, so
that there is clean water some hours of the day, maybe so
schools can reopen in some places, that kind of thing.
Senator Corker. Just one more question. I know time is
short. We put a lot of stock in Idris, and many of us got to
know him, and yet we did not support him. We left him hanging.
Trucks that were supposed to be delivered to him were delivered
months late. The things--I mean, it was almost like a--I do not
even want to use the word because it is just a negative
connotation toward the activities that we undertook. Has there
been a command and control established for the moderate
opposition that is workable after we, in essence, again,
undermined by not really doing the things we said we would do,
not that Idris was General Patton. But do we have someone
there, an organization there, that has the ability to deal with
command and control?
Ambassador Ford. I think this is a question that you will
want to be asking as you go forward. You are right, Idris was
never empowered not only by us, Senator, but by other regional
states that were funneling assistance in. And so, he was always
in a very difficult position. And I think going forward, if we
want the moderate armed opposition to be successful, we are
going to have to figure out a way to get a more centralized
command structure. And aid goes through that structure, and all
countries must support that structure and not help friendly
group over here or friendly group over there.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you both for being here,
and thank you, Ambassador. A couple of points that I wanted
to--first, I do not want to go back in time simply for purposes
of pointing fingers or saying who was wrong and who was right,
but I think it is important to learn lessons from this.
It was my impression early in this conflict that when this
arose, and by the way, it is important to remind everyone that
this was not a U.S.-instigated thing. These were Syrians who
wanted to get rid of Assad. And in the initial stages, the
rebellion were Syrians, but the lack of--the decision not to go
in and empower them early created a vacuum that attracted
foreign fighters from all over the world to kind of pour in and
take advantage of that situation.
In your opinion, had we been more forceful early on--if we
could go back two and half years in time knowing what we know
especially and had empowered those groups early on to be more
capable, do you think that it is possible that you would--that
that space that was left there for ISIL may never have existed?
In essence, having a more forceful group on the ground, you
know, the Syrian military defectors early on would have closed
off the opening for some of these more radical foreign fighters
to be able to come in and take advantage of the chaos on the
ground?
Ambassador Ford. Senator, I do think that. I have said that
publicly before. And in particular, three things: cash,
ammunition, and food. And had more of the moderate groups I am
talking about that are not seeking to impose an Islamic state
by force, had they had these things--cash, ammo, food--in
greater supplies in, say, second half of 2012, it would have
been very hard for Nusra to gain recruits. I heard that
repeatedly from members of the Syrian opposition, including
from the Free Syrian Army, that they could not pay salaries.
The other guys could.
I would say, well, I mean, you are a liberation movement;
why do you need salaries? And they would say, you have got to
understand, the fighters have families. They have got kids.
They have got parents they have to take care of. So, yes, if
there had been more back then, I think the problem today would
be smaller, but I am encouraged at least that now I think there
is an understanding of that. And if this program goes forward,
I think that will actually help reduce the recruiting of ISIL
and Nusra.
Senator Rubio. Now, the second question I wanted to ask,
and it touches upon a theme that Senator McCain has also
explored is, so these groups that are on the ground that we
want to work with now, as you said in your testimony, the
biggest threat that they face, the people who are targeting
them right now the most, although they will fight ISIL. But the
group that is doing the most damage to them militarily is
Assad.
It seems from here to appear to be that Assad is
undertaking a very deliberate strategy of trying to wipe out
what we could call moderate forces so that the world is left
with a very simple choice: if you want to defeat ISIL in Syria,
you have to align yourself with Assad. He is the only
alternative to them, if he can wipe these more moderate groups
out.
And then, in fact, it seems like over the last few hours,
days, and weeks, he has ramped up the effort to wipe them out
in pursuance of that strategy. Do you agree that is the
calculation he has made? And, if so, how could any effort to
equip and empower and capacitate these groups, how could any
effort to do that be successful if we do not protect them from
the assault that is being undertaken against them?
As I asked the Secretary when he was here, I guess, 2 hours
ago now, when I asked him questions, there may not be anyone
left for us to arm or train if Assad is continued to be given
free rein to target them and try to eviscerate them.
Ambassador Ford. I do think that is Assad's strategy, and I
think it is very evident. Just kind of looking at what he is
doing day by day, it is clear. I do think the moderate armed
opposition has some staying power, and if the administration's
proposals are adopted and go forward, I think that will help
bolster them, and they will be in the field for the long term.
But absolutely they are going to fight Bashir al-Assad. I
think the idea that they would somehow turn away from that
fight, the original fight, and focus solely on ISIL is simply
not realistic.
Senator Rubio. Well, they cannot ignore the fact they are
being attacked.
Ambassador Ford. Right, precisely. And in the end, I talked
about the bad blood between ISIL and the armed moderate
opposition, but there is plenty of bad blood between them and
the Assad regime, too, not to mention the airstrikes you are
talking about.
I do take heart, Senator Rubio, that the armed moderate
opposition, I think they have gotten more supplies, though. I
am not sure where from. But they have been making some gains on
the ground, and, in particular, against the Syrian regime, and
in particular, up in the area between Damascus and Aleppo, Hama
and Homs up there. There is a lot of heavy fighting, and also
along the Lebanese border in a place called Qalamoun where the
moderate armed opposition suffered a big defeat in May and June
2013. They have actually retaken a lot of those places. And I
think part of it is Hezbollah had to re-deploy to other places,
and this just goes back to the manpower shortage of the regime
itself.
So as we go to the American people and we make the argument
we need to do this, and I am in favor of doing this. I have
actually called for this for quite a while, and I was part of
those on this committee that voted to do that a while back. The
American people best understand when they--either a face or a
name that they know. Right now it is just kind of a generic
term, ``moderate rebels,'' but we do not know who they are. And
in the absence of being able to point to who they are, it
leaves it open to all sorts of misinformation that I have seen
in the press, including from members of Congress who have made
claims that, quite frankly, are not only inaccurate, but
outrageous with regards to who some of these groups are and who
we would be working with.
Could you help navigate a couple of the organizations? I
mean, I know there are some groups out there that we have
heard. The Steadfastness Movement is one. I do not know if you
are familiar with them. Harakat Hazm, but other groups like
this. I mean, I do not know if that is the right example, but
who exactly are some of these groups that you think fit the
bill of what we would look to work with?
Ambassador Ford. Yes. So let me--I will just very quickly
name a few, and they are in my written testimony, and I am
happy to provide members of your staffs more information later.
Harakat Hazm, the Hazzm Movement, which operate mainly in
northern Syria, but also has fighters in the south. They are
one of the groups. They actually are kind of more or less
fighting the Nusra front right now, as well as the Islamic
State and the regime. And so, they are in it up to their
eyeballs.
There are two units of the moderate opposition that are
mainly officered by recently defected Syrian army officers. One
is called the 101st Division, although I do not think it has
anywhere near a division's worth of men. I think it is in the
range of 3,000 to 4,000. The 101st--it is kind of ironic--too
bad Dave is not here. And then the 13th Division as well,
again, led primarily by recently defected army officers.
You might remember, Senator Rubio, there was a Syrian air
force pilot who flew his plane to Jordan a couple of years ago.
That pilot is the commander of the 13th Division now. But it is
not a division in terms of, like, 14, 15,000. There are a
couple of thousand.
The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Ford,
you mentioned a word that really--I really want to be the crux
of my questioning, is ``credibility.'' I want to explore the
credibility of our commitment and the credibility of our
strategy.
So, first of all, in my questioning of Secretary Kerry, I
quoted the President when he said that ``Our safety, our
security depends on our willingness to do whatever it takes to
defend this Nation.'' And, of course, by taking off--a number
of options off the table, I certainly am concerned about that,
the credibility of our commitment.
What is your view in terms of our potential coalition
partners? I mean, they are listening to this as well. Do they
feel there is any credibility to our commitment to the defeat
of ISIS?
Ambassador Ford. I think the meeting in Riyadh was really
interesting--I am sorry--in Jeddah. I was really struck that
the Saudis brought the Iraqi Foreign Minister there, and that
was something when I was working in Iraq for 5 years under--
during the war with all of our ambassadors there, we could
never get the Saudis to do that. Never could get the Saudis to
do that. So I think that is a change, and it is significant. It
is symbolic, but it is a start.
I think ultimately, Senator Johnson, our credibility by
countries in that region--Saudi, Emirates, Qatar, Turkey--will
be judged by what we do ourselves in the next few weeks and
months. If the proposal to help the Syrian armed opposition
does not move forward out of Washington this week and then gets
bogged down, I think our credibility will suffer not only with
the Syrian opposition, but it will suffer with countries in the
region.
Senator Johnson. So let me quickly ask, is it true that the
Saudis are willing to base as well as pay for that training
effort?
Ambassador Ford. I have not received any classified
briefings since I left government, Senator Johnson, but it
seems everything I am seeing in both Arabic language media as
well as English language media says it is the case.
Senator Johnson. I mean, if that is the case, then let us
face it, the moderate-vetted Syrian rebels will be armed and
trained. So would it make sense--that being the case, would it
not be better for the United States to be involved in that
training, especially if we do not have to pay for it?
Ambassador Ford. Completely. Totally.
Senator Johnson. Okay. Again, I think that is the political
argument for voting for that authorization.
Ambassador Ford. I am assuming--again, I have not received
any classified briefings. You all will know more than I do, but
I am assuming that there will be U.S. personnel working on this
with Saudis and other coalition partners in Saudi Arabia.
Senator Johnson. Yes, I would just make that point
because--I make that point. I understand our colleagues'
concern about who are we really training, but they are going to
be trained anyway. I would rather be involved in that process,
probably reduce the chance that the wrong individuals will be
trained by whoever.
Ambassador Ford. We will be much safer from ISIL in the
future if we lead this effort rather than hand it off to
someone else.
Senator Johnson. Mr. Connable, you have been sitting here.
There you go. I do want to actually utilize you in the
testimony here. I want to really talk about the credibility of
the strategy. From my standpoint, there is really two major
steps to the offense. I mean, first of all, it is to drive ISIS
out of Iraq and secure Iraq again, and then, of course, we have
got the whole mess in terms of Syria.
Let us go back in history. I think both you gentlemen were
there in Iraq during the surge. We had Brett McGurk before us,
and I was just trying to kind of put this thing in context
using some numbers. We had about 68,000 Al Qaeda in Iraq at
that point in time were the estimates, and we had 130,000--
surged over 160,000 U.S. troops to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq. Now
we have got 31,000 ISIS. We have 1,500 noncombat troops on the
ground. We have got an Iraqi Security Force. We have the
Kurdish Peshmerga. How credible is it that we are going to be
able to, first of all, just get ISIS out of Iraq with that
force?
Mr. Connable. I would start by saying I do not put a lot of
credence in the numbers that we had either in the first Iraq
war that we have now. I do not believe we have any degree of
accuracy there, so assuming we are within some kind of order of
magnitude there.
I do not think the key to this in 2006, 2007, and 2008 was
necessarily the surge. The announcement of the surge helped
strengthen our allies on the ground. Really I believe it was
the Sunni population turning against Al Qaeda in Iraq that was
the key to victory there. And I think that is going to be the
key to victory now.
So whether there are 10,000 IS in Iraq or 30,000, I think
over time that becomes less relevant when you look at how much
territory they have to control. If that is hostile territory,
they are going to have a real hard time doing that. Just
bombing them and trying to drive them out with Iraqi army
units, I think our chances are much lower.
Senator Johnson. So which gets you basically to your point
that the key here is reconciliation between the Sunni and the
Shia in Iraq. And I guess the question I wanted to ask either
one of you or both of you--I am trying to think of the exact
term you used--the grievance resolution measures. Is the Shia
government threat enough to actually do what you think is
necessary to pass those grievance resolution measures to bring
the Sunnis back into the government?
Mr. Connable. Frankly, I think the chances of
reconciliation are low. I think it is the best strategy, and it
is probably the one that is going to lead to long-term success.
But Haider al-Abadi is in a very difficult position. He has got
the Iranians there providing direct support. They have no
enthusiasm for reconciliation with Iraqi-Sunni. He has got
other fragmented elements of the Shia polity that he has to
deal with. They just voted down a couple of his nominations for
key posts in his cabinet. So I do not hold out a great deal of
hope, but I do think that that is where we need to put all our
emphasis.
Senator Johnson. So in other words--go ahead, Ambassador
Ford.
Ambassador Ford. I totally agree with what Ben said, that
the key to the success in Iraq back in the period 2007, 2008,
2009 was getting Sunni Arab support. The presence of our troops
was vital, but the most important part, the key part, was to
get the buy-in from the local populations.
Just one little thing on your question about are the Shia
today, 2014, are they sobered. Ben is absolutely right. The
nominees for Defense and Interior Minister are such sensitive
positions in the cabinet that were just disapproved by the
Iraqi Parliament yesterday. Not a good sign. However, I have
also seen Prime Minister al-Abadi say they will not send the
Iraqi Army deep into Sunni regions again, and that they are
going to try to build a national guard. I have seen him say
that.
So I think now what they are arguing about in Iraq, if I
understand it is, who do they trust enough from among the Shia
and the Sunni to do that mission. So the proof will be in the
pudding. Having spent 5 years in Iraq, I have learned to trust
nothing at first look. But I at least was encouraged that Abadi
said we will not send the Iraqi Army deep into the Sunni
province. Again, we will get a national guard.
Senator Johnson. Okay. I have got a lot more questions, but
I am out of time. So thank you.
The Chairman. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank the witnesses, and I thank you, Mr.
Connable, for being here. And, Ambassador Ford, thank you for
your outstanding service. Mr. Connable, if I have got you
right, the Iranians are in a position of significant influence
in Baghdad right now, is that correct?
Mr. Connable. I believe that to be true.
Senator McCain. That cannot be good for our interests over
time.
Mr. Connable. I agree with you.
Senator McCain. And another legacy of total withdrawal.
Mr. Connable. I think that would have happened anyway. I
think it was exacerbated by the fact that the western and
northern parts of Iraq collapsed. I cannot attribute it
directly to our withdrawal.
Senator McCain. Ambassador Ford, is there any doubt about
the viability if given the proper training and equipment, and
you mentioned--my understanding is that ISIS has given them as
much as $2,000 a month because they have got plenty of money;
that there is no doubt in your mind about if we do it right,
that the FSA is viable.
Ambassador Ford. With much less support than what we have
been giving, they have actually held ground and advanced in a
few places.
Senator McCain. And I share that view, and the thing that
is frustrating to me sometimes is all of this stuff that people
accept--they have made a deal with ISIS, they cannot fight. And
having known them, as you have known them a lot better than I
do, they will fight, and they need our support in order to do
that successfully. But they are not about to become part of
ISIS or even al-Nusra if from time to time they have to
cooperation because of their straightened circumstances.
Ambassador Ford. That is absolutely true that they are in a
tough situation. A two-front war is never fun. But I am very
impressed that they have held up as well as they have despite
the difficult circumstances.
Senator McCain. So in my view, I conclude that it is an
excuse that people use, frankly, to not have us involved. And I
do not expect you to comment on that, but here we are. Again, I
want to sort of pursue what I was pursuing--a line that I was--
with Secretary Kerry. We are going to train them. We are going
to equip them. But we are not going to protect them from these
airstrikes that are so devastating to their capability--the
barrel bombs, the helicopters, the fixed wing, which, by the
way, as you know, is the main way for Bashir al-Assad to move
his people and material around Iraq.
So is it not--we are asking them to fight. We are asking
them to risk their lives, and yet we will not give them the
protection from the air attacks, which would be the major
source of casualties for them. Make sense of that for me.
Ambassador Ford. Well, I think we both know that there are
concerns that if we provide surface-to-air missiles, that they
will be somehow transferred to the Nusra front or to ISIL or
something like that. One encouraging sign I take from the
recent fighting, Senator McCain, up in Hama, which is a city
between Damascus and Aleppo, the regime has a very important
air base. And using stand-off weapons, mortars and such things,
the Free Syrian Army was actually able to bring most of the air
traffic at the Hama military airport to a stop.
Senator McCain. I am impressed with what they do, but if I
am a Syrian and I am being armed and trained and asked to go
into battle, and I see that we are not giving us the capability
even, much less the United States taking out that air power, it
is not great for my morale.
Ambassador Ford. Our refusal to provide surface-to-air
missiles has been a gigantic irritant not only to the armed
opposition fighters, but to the population in generation that
is getting barrel bombed. There is no doubt of that.
Senator McCain. Did you see--I am sure you saw the quote I
gave from Secretary Gates, his comment today that we really
cannot succeed without boots on the ground is basically what he
was saying.
Ambassador Ford. I did not see Secretary Gates' remarks.
Senator McCain. Well, I guess I could read it to you again,
but do you think that in your estimate that the 5,000 being
trained and not taking out Bashir al-Assad's air assets,
telling everybody that it is ISIL as if we cannot address two
adversaries at the same time, that the chances of success
without much more significant involvement on the ground, and it
does not mean combat units, but forward air controllers,
special forces, et cetera, that we are going to have to--
basically Secretary Gates was saying we are going to have to do
that over time.
Ambassador Ford. I think several things on this, Senator
McCain. First, 5,000 is obviously not enough. Syria is a really
big country. But I think there is going to be more than 5,000.
And I think already elements of the armed opposition, excluding
Nusra and ISIL, 80,000 plus. The 5,000 might be one of the
better parts, and it might be the part that we would have more
influence with. But frankly, we will have more influence if we
provide more weapons and cash anyway.
Second point, with respect to ISIL first or not, I just
think realistically, of course, the armed opposition is going
to fight Assad even as they fight the Islamic State. We would
be foolish to think otherwise. So----
Senator McCain. The question is, Do we help them to do
that?
Ambassador Ford. Well, I think we----
Senator McCain. The way we help them to do that is you
neutralize the air assets.
Ambassador Ford. Yes. But we have not neutralized the air
assets obviously, and there have been horrific barrel bombs
attacks almost daily. We have been providing other help. We
suffer credibility problems, Senator McCain. I am not going to
argue with you on that.
We have been providing other help, which they use against
the regime. I would actually argue that help that we have
provided has actually enabled them to make advances in places
like southern Syria and northern Syria. And the aid has
actually been effective that way.
Senator McCain. And there is no doubt in your mind they are
not going to join forces with any extremist organization.
Ambassador Ford. As I mentioned--I am glad you asked that
question. I actually have raised with them when I was working
at the State Department the problem that Nusra poses for us,
and I get a very consistent answer. I got a very consistent
answer, which is we do not like them either. We do not like al-
Qaeda. Now, these are defected army officers or, you know,
people who were civilians, but were high up in the Syrian
military before they went into civilian life, and then they
became leaders in the Free Syrian Army.
They say, we do not like them either, but you cannot ask us
to not deal with them when they are over in the next
neighborhood, and we are pushing against the regime, and they
are pushing, and not coordinate with them. They said, that is
not reasonable because we do not have enough stuff to do this
by ourselves. And they were very blunt with it. They said, you
give us more stuff, we will not have to deal with them.
Senator McCain. Mr. Connable, do you have a comment on that
aspect of it?
Mr. Connable. In regards to Syrian air power, I think it
would be very interesting to see if we eventually do put Title
10 advisors on the ground on Syria, what effect that will have
on the Assad regime's decision on whether or not to attack the
Syrian opposition. So if our special forces teams are providing
higher level advice there, I think the Syrian Government will
be very reluctant to attack those forces.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. One last question, Mr.
Connable. You made a very pointed effort to make the case that
it was the Sunni awakening that was the critical element in the
success. Yes, the surge. Yes, the other elements. But that
without the Sunni awakening, we might not have had the success
that we ultimately achieve there.
So what steps must, in your view, the Iraqi Government take
to facilitate reconciliation with the alienated Sunni tribes in
Anbar province and other Sunni majority areas in order to
reduce political support for ISIL and to get them to have a
second awakening?
Mr. Connable. Yes. As I have stated, Mr. Chairman, that is
the fundamental question. There is one major problem and, I
think, one major opportunity. The major problem is the Sunni
polity and the political leadership are so badly fragmented,
that there is really no hope for some kind of negotiated
settlement at the top level or even with regional leaders.
There simply is not enough credibility there in the Sunni
leadership to allow that to happen.
However, the real opportunity is that the Sunni, in a very
kind of dispersed way, have very clearly enumerated a lot of
the grievances that they think are most critical to them, and
it is almost like a laundry list. I listed a few of them in
my--in my written testimony.
But I think the good news here is that Prime Minister al-
Abadi also listed another laundry list of these when he assumed
office and put his government together, and that was a very
positive step. So he has already announced the things that need
to be done. The trick is executing. And I think about 50
percent of the things that he identified, and you could
probably add in another small group of things that would be
really critical, he could probably do with the stroke of a pen.
The others would require deliberation of the government.
I think he should do whatever he can under his own
authority immediately and together. If he is able to do that,
then Sunni that I have spoken to, I think, would react quite
favorably to that. It is a first step, but it is an important
one.
The Chairman. So even though the Sunni leadership, as you
described it, is fragmented, there are some universal issues
that they have raised that if addressed as part of
reconciliation would be cross-cutting.
Mr. Connable. I think Prime Minister al-Abadi is speaking
to the Sunni people, not to Sunni leaders. I think they are
cross-cutting, yes.
The Chairman. Well, this has been very helpful. You have
the thanks of the committee for your insights.
This record will remain open until the close of business on
Friday.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. On Iran.--Secretary Kerry, several days ago, you
indicated that the United States might be open to including Iran in the
coalition being organized to challenge ISIL.
Have there been any conversations with Iranian officials
regarding potential cooperation against ISIL?
Answer. If we believe that it would be useful to discuss counter-
ISIL efforts with Iran, we may do that on the margins of the P5+1
talks, as we have done in the past. We are open to engagement with
Iranian officials in specific circumstances when doing so could help to
advance U.S. interests. But let me be clear that the nuclear
negotiation is a separate issue from actions regarding ISIL.
Would you describe Iran as a state that furthers or
undermines regional stability?
Answer. While Iran has, in common with the emerging international
consensus, a strong interest in seeing ISIL defeated, we remain deeply
concerned about many aspects of Iran's foreign policy in the region. In
particular, we continue to express our concerns about Iran's
destabilizing activities in Syria where it, along with Lebanese
Hezbollah (LH), continues to support the Assad regime by providing
weapons, training, and material assistance to Assad's forces.
Under what scenarios would the Obama administration
cooperate with Iran against ISIL?
Answer. As previously mentioned, if and when there are specific
circumstances in which engagement with Iran would advance our interests
in countering ISIL, we are open to such engagement. However, let me be
clear that the United States will not coordinate military action with
Iran.
As military actions against ISIL expand, what actions will
the United States take to avoid implicitly supporting Iranian
or Syrian forces currently combating ISIL?
Answer. We are not coordinating with the Assad regime or Iran
regarding any planning that the U.S. military is developing. The
President has emphasized repeatedly that Bashar al-Assad has lost
legitimacy in Syria and should go. Supporting the moderate opposition
will support our goal of degrading and destroying ISIL and our goal of
pressuring Assad to accept a negotiated political settlement. As we've
made very clear, the United States will take lawful action when our
people are threatened, regardless of geographic boundaries.
Question. On the Strategy.--The President compared his strategy to
confront ISIL to very limited counterterror operations carried out in
Yemen and Somalia.
Are Yemen and Somalia today the model of stability the
President seeks to achieve in Iraq?
Is the threat posed by ISIL in the territories it controls
in Iraq and Syria comparable to that of al-Shabab in Somalia or
AQ in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen?
Answer. The U.S. strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) involves five interdependent lines of effort: (1)
providing military support to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and to
the moderate Syrian opposition; (2) cutting off the flow of foreign
terrorist fighters to ISIL; (3) countering ISIL's financing and
funding; (4) addressing humanitarian crises; and (5) de-legitimizing
ISIL's ideology. Simultaneously, we will support the efforts of the
Government of Iraq to govern inclusively. This is a broad strategy,
which builds on the model the President announced at the National
Defense University and at West Point, with many elements that will
require a long-term commitment to achieve success. We are not
indicating that the threats emanating from Somalia and Yemen are
entirely parallel to those of Iraq and Syria, nor are we holding up
Yemen and Somalia as our end-state goal for Iraq and Syria in years to
come. Rather, the administration has pointed to these lines of effort
as examples of where the United States has used a comprehensive
strategy and had seen some successes.
In Yemen and Somalia, the United States has taken steps to build up
the capacity of forces on the ground to take the fight to terrorists in
their own country, and we have used our military and intelligence
capabilities to support the efforts of those indigenous forces. With
our support, al-Shabaab has been pushed out of nearly all major urban
areas in Somalia by local Somali forces and the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM). Across the country, Somalis have chosen peace,
local governance, and a national identity instead of al-Shabaab. In
April and May, the Yemeni military conducted an offensive that drove Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) from its safe havens in Abyan and
Shabwah governorates. While AQAP remains a lethal threat, it no longer
openly controls large swaths of territory.
Beyond our military and intelligence activities, the administration
has also worked with partners inside and outside these regions and even
in the United States to prevent the flow of foreign terrorist fighters
to Yemen and Somalia. The U.S. Government has used its financial tools
and mobilized international efforts to cut off external contributions
to AQAP and al-Shabaab. We have provided alternative messages to their
hateful propaganda. Our counterterrorism efforts in both countries have
been underpinned by a comprehensive strategy to support the government
and the people as they pursue challenging but important reforms through
their political transition processes, recognizing that stability and
security also depend on continued political, economic, and humanitarian
progress. While severe challenges remain in both countries, we strongly
believe that our counterterrorism efforts will only succeed in the
context of broader political and economic advancement.
Using this model in Yemen and Somalia, we have been able to contain
the threat to the U.S. homeland, degrade those terrorist-affiliated
organizations, and in some instances, eliminated their top leadership.
Like these efforts, the fight against ISIL will be waged through a
steady, relentless effort to take out ISIL wherever it exists, using
our air power, support from a growing coalition of foreign partners,
and our support for partner forces on the ground, complemented by a
broader campaign that brings all elements of national power to bear in
countering this threat.
Question. Former U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, said in
June: ``We need, and we have long needed, to help moderates in the
Syrian opposition with both weapons and other nonlethal assistance. Had
we done that a couple of years ago, had we ramped it up, frankly, the
al-Qaeda groups that have been winning adherents would have been unable
to comply with the moderates.''
Do you agree with Ambassador Ford that the failure to
provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to the mainstream
Syrian opposition helped give rise to ISIS and other jihadist
groups?
Wouldn't we have better options before us now if he had
taken that route early on?
Answer. We have been providing nonlethal assistance to the moderate
opposition since 2013; with the rise of ISIL, we are increasing
nonlethal assistance as well as moving forward with the train and equip
program, along with our regional partners. The moderate opposition is
being squeezed from both sides, forced to confront ISIL, other
extremists, and the Assad regime. In order to degrade and ultimately
defeat ISIL, as well as to counter the Assad regime, we need to
strengthen the moderate opposition, and will do so with a joint State
Department and DOD train and equip program as authorized by Congress.
With this new effort, we'll provide training and equipment to help the
moderate opposition grow stronger and take on ISIL terrorists inside
Syria. This program will be hosted outside of Syria, in partnership
with allies, and it will be matched by our increasing support for Iraqi
Government and Kurdish Forces in Iraq.
Question. A month ago, the President referred to the moderate
Syrian opposition as ``former doctors, farmers, pharmacists, and so
forth.'' He went on to say ``There's not as much capacity as you would
hope.''
Can you describe what changed the President's assessment of
the opposition since then to such an extent that he now hopes
to provide them lethal assistance?
What percentage of the opposition in Syria is made up of
extremist or terrorist elements and what percentage would you
deem moderates that we can work with?
Is it still possible for the non-jihadist rebels to topple
Assad and gain control of the entire country? In essence, will
they be able to not just take over Damascus, but also drive the
jihadists out of northern Syria? If it is, what will it take
for that to happen?
Answer. As the President said in his ``60 Minutes'' interview that
was broadcast on September 28: ``Keep in mind my statement referred to
the outlook 2 years ago. The point that I made then, which is
absolutely true, is that for us to just start arming inexperienced
fighters who we hadn't vetted would leave us in a situation where we
didn't know and couldn't sort out who was a potential ISIL or al-Nusra
member and who was somebody that we could work with. For us to just go
blind on that would have been counterproductive and would not have
helped the situation.''
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is a term to describe various armed
groups that share the goal of overthrowing the Assad regime, and
includes secularists as well as moderate Islamist fighting groups. The
FSA has proven its will and ability to stand up against ISIL, at the
same time Assad's air force was attacking them with ground forces and
barrel bombs.
Estimates of the total number of violent extremist fighters or the
moderate opposition are complex, and the most detailed estimates are
based on sensitive information. The most recent relevant analysis of
ISIL is that it has between 20,000 and 31,000 fighters. By way of
comparison, estimates of the moderate opposition are larger: tens of
thousands of nationalist Syrian fighters committed to facing ISIL are
present today in Aleppo, Idlib, Deir al-Zor, and Daraa.
The United States is already supporting some of these fighters with
nonlethal assistance, but the train and equip program will enable us to
increase our support. It could also help deter ISIL recruitment efforts
as the moderate opposition demonstrates greater support from abroad.
Together with our partners, the United States is supporting the Syrian
opposition to be a counterweight to the terrorists of ISIL and the
brutality of the Assad regime.
Question. What role is Qatar playing in our coalition against ISIL?
How do you respond to concerns that Qatar is playing a double game,
trying to work with the United States, while simultaneously retaining
ties to terrorist groups inside of Syria?
Answer. Qatar is an important partner in the coalition to degrade
and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As a
signatory to the Jeddah Communique, Qatar joined a host of countries in
the region and the United States in pledging to support a comprehensive
strategy to fight ISIL. Qatar has been outspoken in its condemnations
of ISIL, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Khalid bin Mohammed Al
Attiyah stating that he is ``repelled by their [ISIL's] views, their
violent methods, and their ambitions.'' The Qatari Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has also issued statements congratulating the new Iraqi Prime
Minister Haidar al-Abadi on his appointment and welcoming the formation
of a new Iraqi Government, helping to establish the regional legitimacy
of the fledgling government.
Qatar joined the United States in initiating airstrikes in Syria,
and hosts the
al-Udeid Air Base, a critical military facility for the coalition's air
campaign against ISIL. We continue to work closely with Qatar on other
issues related to terrorism, including efforts to combat contributions
from private citizens in the region to violent extremist groups. On
September 16, Qatar announced a new law regulating charities that, if
fully implemented and deployed, will be an important step in its
progress in cracking down on terror financing.
Question. Press reports indicate that ISIL receives significant
funding from cross-border smuggling of oil into Turkey. Many foreign
jihadists that have joined ISIL's ranks also have transited through
Turkey on their way to Syria.
How would you characterize your discussions with Turkey
about both of these challenges? Is the Turkish Government doing
enough to address both of these issues?
Answer. We have raised with Turkish officials at the highest level
our serious concerns regarding ISIL financing via black market oil
sales and smuggling in the region. While Turkish officials have already
taken some action to curb oil smuggling, they realize more needs to be
done and have promised to take additional steps, including bolstering
the Customs Ministry's role in antismuggling efforts. U.S. and Turkish
agencies have also stepped up the exchange of analysis and intelligence
on oil smuggling and other ISIL financial activity to assist Turkey in
taking more effective action.
Similarly, we are working closely with Turkey and other European
partners to stem the flow of foreign fighters into Syria. Turkish
Government leaders acknowledge that the extremist presence in Syria
poses a threat to Turkey, the region, and the home countries of foreign
fighters. Turkey faces particular challenges given its geographical
location and the high volume of legitimate travelers. As the conflict
in Syria has continued, the threat posed by violent extremist elements
has prompted stronger action by the Turkish Government to counter
foreign fighter travel across its borders. For example, the Turkish
Government is working to tighten entry and exit controls.
We have an ongoing, robust dialogue with Turkey on ways to improve
our counterterrorism cooperation, including better information-sharing,
curbing of terrorism finance more effectively, and stronger border
security. Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to
Counter ISIL John Allen traveled to Turkey October 8-10 to discuss
coalition efforts to degrade and defeat ISIL through a variety of
means, including efforts to stop terrorist financing and countering the
flow of foreign fighters.
______
Responses of Secretary John Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Question. How much has food insecurity contributed to ISIS' rise,
and what is the international community and USAID doing to help ensure
that access to food is protected among refugees, displaced populations,
and even the Iraqi military?
Answer. ISIL has preyed upon grievances and vulnerabilities within
Syrian communities. We have not been tracking food insecurity
specifically, but needs continue to expand. The international
humanitarian community, with the U.S. Government as the largest donor,
continues to feed millions of Syrians every month, both inside the
country and in neighboring countries. In August, the U.N. World Food
Programme (WFP), USAID's primary partner in the region, delivered food
assistance to more than 4.1 million people inside Syria in August--the
largest number of people reached in 1 month since the conflict began.
Distributions by WFP were taking place in areas that ISIS has since
conquered, and WFP can now no longer access these areas. Gathering the
necessary public health data to assess acute malnutrition rates in a
war zone is difficult. Comprehensive food security and nutrition
surveys have not been possible since 2010 due to the conflict, but
there have not been reports of the emergency-level acute malnutrition
rates that would indicate severe food insecurity inside Syria during
the conflict. While food prices in Syria have risen dramatically, Syria
had better-than-expected harvests in 2012 and 2013 despite the
conflict; those harvests, along with international food assistance,
helped offset what would otherwise have been a more severe decline in
food security due to the war.
USAID-funded food assistance to internally displaced and conflict-
affected Syrians inside the country and to Syrian refugees in
neighboring countries is very carefully targeted and distributed to
ensure that it reaches only intended beneficiaries and is not used for
nonhumanitarian purposes. Inside Syria, USAID-funded WFP food parcels
reach specific, vulnerable communities, and our NGO partners deliver
food parcels directly to beneficiary households and provide flour to
bakeries that benefit affected communities. In neighboring countries,
WFP provides USAID-funded food assistance to Syrian refugees in strict
accordance with refugee registration lists; assistance is provided
either via voucher, for which refugees must prove their identity, or
via food distribution to specific households.
In Iraq, the Public Distribution Systems (PDS), managed by the
Iraqi Government, used to provide basic food rations to nearly all
food-insecure Iraqi families on a regular basis, including in areas
that ISIS now controls. In those areas PDS has now been suspended. We
have not heard any reports of the excessively high food prices in Iraq,
or of the emergency-level acute malnutrition rates. Malnutrition rates
are generally very low in Iraq and there are no indications that this
has changed recently or that food insecurity has led to increased
support for ISIS. The food security situation has been stable in recent
years and USAID had not needed to contribute food assistance since
2008.
Due to a generous contribution from Saudi Arabia, WFP's emergency
food operations in Iraq are covered through December. Ensuring food
assistance reaches those in need remains a priority, and WFP has
consistently increased the geographic and numeric reach of its
operations since conflict intensified in June. USAID will consider
support for WFP in coming months as necessary based on review of WFP's
pipeline and assessment of need.
USAID does not provide food assistance to the Iraqi military or
indeed to any military.
Question. The conflict in Syria has continued for over 3 years and
taken nearly 200,000 lives. If ISIS is beaten back in Syria but the
underlying conditions of the Syrian civil war remain, should we expect
another radical Islamic group to emerge?
Answer. We have long been working to lay the basis for effective
peace negotiations and a post-Asasd Syrian government. Our ongoing
support to local communities, together with the political leadership of
the opposition help opposition-held areas effectively govern, rebuild,
and establish law and order. This is why we continue to support the
local councils, civil defense brigades, and teachers in opposition-held
areas. The moderate opposition is already benefiting from this help as
it administers areas in Aleppo, Hama, Northern Lattakia, Idlib, Daraa,
and some areas around Damascus, while building credibility with
citizens of their communities. While no plan is risk-proof, our goal is
to empower civilian institutions, together with vetted brigades on the
ground, in partnership with local communities we support, to fill in
any space that is vacated by ISIL.
Supporting the moderate opposition is essential to our political
strategy. There is no military solution to the conflict. Increasing
support to the moderate opposition can put pressure on the regime and
promote more conducive conditions for a negotiated political
settlement. The regime has created the present instability and the
conditions for the growth of violent extremism among an otherwise
nonextremist population.
The administration has built an international coalition against
ISIL working across multiple lines of effort. In coordination with our
international partners, we will also redouble efforts to cut off
funding flows to ISIL; enhance intelligence collection on ISIL; counter
the group's violent, extremist ideology; and stem the flow of foreign
fighters into the area. Additionally, the President committed to
working with our international partners to continue providing
humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians who have been displaced,
to stabilize a potentially vulnerable population. The United States
will also continue to work to help prevent mass atrocities,
particularly against vulnerable religious and ethnic minorities, since
these can also be destabilizing and lead to a cycle of violence.
Question. One year ago many of us were concerned about plans to arm
these so-called Syrian moderates because weapons could get in the hands
of al-Nusra, which is a powerful rebel group allied with al-Qaeda. Who
is backing al-Nusra in the region and what is the administration's
strategy for dealing with them should ISIS be degraded and destroyed?
Answer. The support structure of violent extremist organizations is
complex and diverse. Al-Nusra Front, which is a mix of foreign fighters
and Syrian nationals, like ISIL, has received its financial support
from criminal activities, abuse of nonprofit organizations, looting of
cultural heritage sites, and some external support. The recent
legislation authorizing the train-and-equip program requires us to vet
out, at a minimum, those associated with terrorist groups, including,
but not limited to, ISIL, al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham and other al-
Qaeda related groups, and Hezbollah.
Question a,b,c. If we look around the Middle East, there are
radical Islamic elements in many nations that have lost central
government control. We have been fighting the Taliban for over a
decade, long after driving them from power and eliminating the senior
al-Qaeda leaders responsible for 9/11. Libya is in a civil war. Iraq is
in a civil and sectarian war. Similar situations persist in Yemen and
Somalia and Sudan. Syria is perhaps the worst example. We seem to be
engaging in many of these conflicts in one way or another.
With our engagement in each of these areas, are we focusing
on individuals and groups that are seeking to attack American
interests and our homeland?
Answer (a). The Taliban (Afghanistan).--The President has been
clear that while our combat mission will be over by the end of the
year, we will continue to pursue our objective in Afghanistan of
disrupting threats posed by al-Qaeda. We will advance that objective
with a twofold mission of supporting counterterrorism operations
against the remnants of al-Qaeda as well as a broader effort to train
and equip Afghan Forces to ensure that Afghanistan does not again
become a safe haven for al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.
Answer (b). Somalia.--The United States has designated the Somalia-
based group al-Shabaab a terrorist organization. Al-Shabaab's leaders
have publicly pledged allegiance with al-Qaeda and have called for
attacks against the United States and U.S. citizens abroad. The group
leverages its regional network to conduct terrorist operations.
U.S. counterterrorism programs are aligned with strategic regional
priorities to assist Somalia's efforts in monitoring and securing its
own borders, detecting and disrupting terrorist plots, and
investigating terrorist incidents. We have funded programs to build
capacity in law enforcement, crisis response, border security, and
strengthening the rule of law.
The Federal Government of Somalia works in partnership with the
United States and other regional partners to deny and disrupt al-
Shabaab operations within Somalia. We have also conducted unilateral
strikes against targets, including against former al-Shabaab emir Ahmed
Abdi ``Godane.'' A key focus of our engagement is to strengthen the
Somali Government's capacity to provide sustainable security that will
eliminate al-Shabaab's ability to regroup and regain footholds in
Somalia.
Answer (c). Syria.--Yes, that is always the primary concern. For
example, that is why in Syria we have been tracking for several years
the al-Nusra Front and the ``Khorasan Group,'' a term sometimes used to
refer to a network of al-Nusra Front and al-Qaeda core terrorists who
share a history of training operatives, facilitating fighters and
money, and planning attacks against U.S. and Western targets. These
operatives are seasoned and very dangerous individuals who have fought
and lived together in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran,
Yemen, and North Africa. They have many years, if not decades, of
experience conducting and planning attacks against innocents, and they
have brought advanced skill sets to Syria.
ISIL also poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria, and the
broader Middle East--including American citizens, personnel and
facilities. If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing
threat beyond that region, including to the United States. While we
have not yet detected specific plotting against our homeland, ISIL
leaders have threatened America and our allies. Our Intelligence
Community believes that thousands of foreigners--including Europeans
and some Americans--have joined them in Syria and Iraq. Trained and
battle-hardened, these fighters could try to return to their home
countries and carry out deadly attacks.
Success for us is working to methodically target such
organizations, their external plotters, and operatives to prevent
attacks as best we can, particularly any plotting against U.S.
interests or the homeland, and to set the conditions in place so that
these groups are defeated in the long run. This will have to be done in
concert with partners on the ground.
[all]