[Senate Hearing 113-656]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-656
IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS:
OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 24, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Barbero, Michael D., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army [Retired],
Washington, DC................................................. 51
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 2
Jeffrey, Hon. James F., Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting
Fellow, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Washington, DC................................................. 47
Prepared statement........................................... 49
McGurk, Brett, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State for Iraq and
Iran, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Response to question submitted by Senator Tim Kaine.......... 72
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Jeff Flake....... 72
Responses to questions submitted by Senator John Barrasso.... 76
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey.............. 1
Pollack, Kenneth M., senior fellow, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, Brookings Institute, Washington, DC.................... 56
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Slotkin, Elissa, performing the duties of the Principal Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, U.S. Department Of Defense, Washington, DC............ 14
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Jeff Flake....... 75
Responses to questions submitted by Senator John Barrasso.... 78
(iii)
IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS:
OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 24, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons,
Durbin, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson,
Flake, McCain, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. Today we focus on Iraq and U.S. policy options, but to
fully examine the crisis in Iraq we must acknowledge the
broader context of developments across the region. Earlier this
year I held a hearing on the spillover from the Syria conflict
to examine the implications of continued violence in Syria and
how it would impact the stability and security of neighboring
countries. Now we are seeing the very dangerous results of that
spillover with the advancement of ISIS, the increase in
sectarian violence, underscored by the dissolution of any real
border between Iraq and Syria, and the designation by ISIS of a
caliphate across Syria and Iraq that is threatening to create a
security vacuum in the heart of the Middle East.
While today's hearing will not focus specifically on the
regional threat posed by ISIS or on United States-Syria policy,
I want to take this opportunity to restate my long-held
position that we must enhance our support to the moderate
Syrian opposition, the only ones willing to challenge ISIS and
other al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria. It seems to me at the end
of the day supporting these moderate forces must be one pillar
of a broader U.S. policy in the
region.
No one should be surprised that Iraq is the victim of this
spillover, but we should be extremely concerned by the rapid
expansion of ISIS and alarmed by Iran's clear involvement in
Iraq. And we should be dismayed by the convenient alignment of
Iranian, Russian, and Syrian interests in response to recent
developments,
especially in Iraq. At its core, this alignment is about self-
preservation of rogue actors that seek to maintain power by
destabilizing others and keeping weak governments susceptible
to malign
influence.
In my view, Iraq does not have to proceed down this path
and it is up to Iraq's leaders to chart a different course for
their
country.
I am deeply disappointed that, after years of United States
investment in time and resources, the loss of thousands of
American lives, and the commitment of billions of dollars to
support Iraq's political development and the creation of a
responsible, capable Iraqi Security Force, that they deserted
the communities they were responsible for protecting, abandoned
United States military equipment, and fled from ISIS fighters.
At the same time, ISIS's expansion across Iraq and its
reception by Iraq's Sunni communities and tribes would not have
been possible except for the accumulation of years of
destructive sectarian, corrupt policies by the central
government in Baghdad. Iraq has the potential to be an
economically prosperous, diverse, and politically
representative model for others in the region, but Iraqi
leaders have focused on their own sectarian and ethnic
interests for too long, at the expense of building an Iraq for
all Iraqis.
The time is now for Iraq's elected leaders to form a
national unity government that is truly representative. I
applaud the recent progress in nominating a Speaker and two
Deputy Speakers for Iraq's Parliament and today's promising
news that a President has been named. I encourage Iraq's
leaders to continue this critical work and finalize the
government with leaders committed to leading an Iraq for all
Iraqis.
While Iraq's leaders continue negotiations to form the next
government, the Department of Defense has completed the
assessment of Iraqi Security Forces. I look forward to hearing
from our administration witness on the findings and
recommendations provided by U.S. advisers and plans going
forward to counter the threat from ISIS and Congress' role in
this effort.
Let me take a moment to highlight the particularly
dangerous situation of minority communities in Iraq and
particularly Iraqi Christians. I recently joined Senator
Stabenow in a meeting with Archbishop Bashar Warda from the
Chaldean Diocese of Erbil. His description of the terror that
ISIS has inflicted in Iraqi Christian communities is truly
horrifying, and I hope that our witnesses today will share with
us steps the administration is taking to address the urgent and
unique situation of Iraqi Christians.
I hope to hear from our administration witnesses today
whether or not they believe Iraqi leaders are capable, or able,
I should say, to form a more representative government, what is
required to turn the tide against ISIS, and if there is a new
national unity government in Baghdad what should we do to
demonstrate support.
With that, Senator Corker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
our witnesses for being here.
Iraq seems to be disintegrating as the terrorist
organization ISIS now controls Mosul, Iraq's second-largest
city, Fallujah, and much of Ramadi, parts of Baiji, Tikrit.
Though significantly outnumbered, ISIS managed to overwhelm
entire divisions of the Iraqi Army, many of whom removed their
uniforms and ran. ISIS also has claimed credit for a recent
string of bombings in Baghdad, is responsible for systemic
persecution of Christians, thousands of whom are being forced
to flee their homes under penalty of death if they do not
convert and pay a tax.
The U.N. reports that last month was the deadliest in Iraq
since 2008, with 2,400 Iraqis killed, two-thirds of which were
civilians.
For those of us who were here during the debate over the
hard-won gains of the surge, this is hardly an outcome that
would have been imagined back then. Though our intelligence
picture in Iraq is woefully inadequate, the situation should
not surprise us, for two reasons. The crisis is connected to
the disaster in Syria, which our country has largely ignored.
Sunni militants have long enjoyed freedom of movement across
the porous border in Anbar province and had been in control of
Fallujah and key parts of Ramadi for months prior to the
takeover of Mosul.
Since 2009, Maliki has systematically shredded and
politicized the entire structure of the Iraqi Security Forces,
replacing competent commanders with incompetent, yet loyal,
commanders and creating a more sectarian institution that
scares the average Iraqi as much as ISIS.
Despite the connection to Syria, it is important to note
that this is not just an invasion from foreign fighters. ISIS
simply cannot hold this much territory in Iraq while
maintaining operations in Syria without help on the ground.
Whether we can look--rather, we can look at this as a civil and
sectarian war being exacerbated and exploited by a growing
terrorist threat. This is yet another signal of how badly Prime
Minister Maliki has alienated the Sunni population.
Even if Maliki leaves, without political reconciliation
among Iraq's key communities no amount of military support can
make a difference. But on the other hand, if we do not help the
Iraqi Government survive and hold territory now, there is a
possibility we will not be discussing political reconciliation
in a few months because the country could break apart.
Today in this hearing I hope we can confront this dilemma
head on. I hope we can start to identify the right mix of
security assistance and political steps that will help get the
country back on the right track. I am open to working with the
administration to determine what we can do as a nation to help
shore up the defenses
of the Iraqis and encourage political reconciliation among
Iraqi
leaders.
I want to thank you for being here today. I look forward to
this hearing and I look forward to us weighing in on what we
believe are the most appropriate steps forward. Thank you very
much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Let me introduce our first panel. With us today is Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq and Iran, Brett McGurk,
who has just returned from a 6-week trip to Iraq, where he was
assisting the Embassy team; and Ms. Elissa Slotkin, performing
the duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, whose experience on Iraq ranges from the
intelligence community to the National Security Council to the
State Department, and now to the Defense Department.
Let me remind both of you that your full statements will be
included in the record without objection. I would ask you to
summarize in about 5 minutes or so, so that the members of the
committee can engage with you in a dialogue. With that, we will
start with you, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF BRETT McGURK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR IRAQ AND IRAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. McGurk. Thank you. Good morning. Chairman Menendez,
Ranking Member Corker, members of this committee, I thank you
for inviting us to discuss the situation in Iraq, with a focus
on U.S. response since the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
attacked Mosul nearly 7 weeks ago.
Let me first review the bidding on why this matters. ISIL
is al-Qaeda. It may have changed its name, it may have broken
with senior al-Qaeda leadership such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, but
it is al-Qaeda in its doctrine, ambition, and increasingly in
its threat to U.S. interests. Should there be any question
about the intentions of this group, simply read what its
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, says. And it is important to pay
attention to what he says because we cannot risk
underestimating the goals, capacity, and reach of this
organization.
Baghdadi in May 2011 eulogized the death of Osama bin Laden
and promised a violent response. ISIL training camps in Syria
are named after Osama bin Laden. In his audio statements
Baghdadi regularly issues veiled threats against the United
States, promising a direct confrontation. And, in his feud with
al-Zawahiri. Baghdadi is clearly seeking to lead the global
jihad.
Additionally, ISIL is no longer simply a terrorist
organization. It is now a full-blown army, seeking to establish
a self-governing state through the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys
in what is now Syria and Iraq. It now controls much of eastern
Syria. In January in Iraq it moved into Anbar province, taking
control of Fallujah, and on June 10 it moved on Mosul.
I arrived in Erbil, 80 kilometers east of Mosul, on June 7
and I will begin there. In meetings with local officials from
Mosul and with Kurdish officials on June 7, we received early
indications that ISIL was moving in force from Syria into Iraq
and staging forces in western Mosul. We immediately asked and
received permission from Kurdish leaders to deploy Peshmerga
forces on the eastern side of the city, but the Government of
Baghdad did not share the same sense of urgency and refused the
deployments.
Iraqi military commanders promised to send nine brigades of
force to Mosul in response to our warnings. We stressed,
however, that the forces might not arrive in time.
On June 9, the situation remained extremely tense and we
continued to urge the immediate deployment of additional
security forces to protect against an ISIL attack from west to
east. In the early hours of June 10, ISIL launched a complex
suicide bomb attack across a strategic bridge and poured forces
into the eastern part of the city. Iraqi resistance totally
collapsed, which led to a panic and a snowballing effect
southward through the Tigris Valley and to the cities of
Tikrit, Samarra, and Bilad.
The result was catastrophic. Five divisions nearly
dissolved and the approaches to Baghdad were immediately under
threat. I flew to Baghdad first thing that morning with a focus
on ensuring our people were safe, working with Ambassador
Beecroft and our team, and working with the Iraqis to ensure
the northern approaches to Baghdad were bolstered.
My written testimony sets forth in detail the critical
elements of our crisis response. We first made certain that our
people would be safe, including contractors working on bases
outside of Baghdad, who were evacuated with the help of the
Iraqi Air Force. At the Embassy and at the airport, we
rebalanced staff to manage the crisis and brought in additional
Department of Defense resources to ensure the security of our
facilities.
In parallel, at the President's direction, we worked to
urgently improve our intelligence pictures throughout western
and northcentral Iraq, surging surveillance flights,
establishing joint operations centers, and deploying Special
Operations Forces to assist Iraqi units around the capital.
These intelligence and security initiatives were undertaken in
parallel with regional diplomacy led by Secretary Kerry to
better focus attention on the serious threat.
We finally sought to stabilize the Iraqi political process,
recognizing that this attack took place at the most vulnerable
moment, following national elections that were held on April 30
in which 14 million Iraqis voted, but prior to the formation of
a new government. This process remains extremely challenging,
but now has some traction. A new Speaker of Parliament was
chosen last week. He is a moderate Sunni Arab named Salim
Jabouri, elected with the overwhelming support from all major
components in the new Iraqi Parliament.
Today, just about 2 hours ago, the new Iraqi Parliament
elected Fuad Masum, a distinguished Kurdish statesman, to serve
as the new President of Iraq. He, too, was elected
overwhelmingly, with support from all major components in the
newly elected Parliament. Iraqis are now proceeding along their
constitutional timeline to choose a Prime Minister, which must
happen within 15 days.
As the President has said, it is not the place of the
United States to choose Iraq's leaders. It is clear, though,
that only leaders who can govern with an inclusive agenda are
going to be able to pull the country together and guide the
Iraqi people through this crisis.
The current situation today in Iraq remains extremely,
extremely, serious. ISIL remains in control of Mosul and it is
targeting all Iraqis--Sunni, Shia, Christian, Kurds, Turkoman,
Yazidi, Shaveks--who disagree with its twisted vision of a
seventh century caliphate. It has also joined in an unholy
alliance with militant wings of the former Baath Party, known
as the Naqshbandi Network, and with some former insurgent
groups, such as the Islamic Army of Iraq.
Going forward, the Iraqis, with our support, must seek to
split these latter groups from ISIL and to isolate ISIL and the
hard-core militant groups from the population. The platforms we
have established through the immediate crisis response are now
providing additional information to inform the President and
our national security team as we develop options to protect our
interests in Iraq. Any further decisions in this regard will be
made in full consultation with this committee and with the
Congress.
Any efforts we take, moreover, must be in conjunction with
Iraqi efforts to isolate ISIL from the population. This is
because, while we have a serious counterterrorism challenge in
Iraq, Iraq has a serious counterinsurgency challenge, and the
two are inextricably linked.
Based on my last 7 weeks on the ground in Iraq, there is
now a clear recognition by Iraqis from all communities that
substantial reforms must be undertaken. This will require the
formation of a new government, together with restructuring of
the security services. An emerging consensus in Iraq, which we
can fully support, is a functioning federalism consistent with
Iraq's Constitution, based on the new realities on the ground,
and focused on the following five principles.
First, local citizens must be in the lead in securing local
areas.
Second, these local citizens defending their communities
must be provided state benefits and state resources, perhaps
modeled along the lines of a National Guard-type force
structure.
Third, the Iraq Army must be restructured. Commanders who
failed in Mosul have since been fired and they have been
replaced with new commanders, who we are working very closely
with. The federal army should also focus on federal functions,
such as protecting borders, and rarely deploy inside cities,
while providing overwatch support when necessary.
Fourth principle: There must be close cooperation between
local, regional, and national security services to gradually
reduce operational space for ISIL, particularly in Nineveh
province.
And, finally, the Federal Government, through its new
Parliament and a new Cabinet, must work diligently on a package
of reforms that can address legitimate grievances from all
communities and ensure adequate resources to these restructured
security services.
These five principles can begin to address many of the core
grievances in the Sunni majority areas of Iraq while also,
importantly, denying space for ISIL to operate and thereby
protect the Shia majority and other vulnerable groups from ISIL
attack. Restoring stability and degrading ISIL will require a
smart, integrated central, regional, and provincial approach
led by a new Iraq Government, with an appropriate level of
United States support and assistance.
Iraqi leaders from all communities have asked for
assistance
in implementing this program and General Austin, our Commander
of CENTCOM, is on the ground today to further assess the
situation and discuss concrete ways in which our assistance
might be effective.
This model of a functioning federalism is achievable and it
is essential if we hope to deny space for ISIL within the
borders of Iraq.
I look forward once again to discussing more details in the
answers to your questions, and I thank you again for the
opportunity to testify this morning.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McGurk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brett McGurk
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the U.S. response to
the crisis in Iraq. I just returned from Iraq after spending the past 7
weeks in Baghdad and Erbil helping to manage our crisis response with
Ambassador Beecroft and our diplomatic and military team on the ground,
which is serving with courage and dedication. We were assisted by the
tireless efforts of Secretary Kerry, including a visit to Iraq at a
critical moment, and the entire national security team, including the
daily attention of the President and Vice President.
My testimony today will provide a firsthand account of the U.S.
response In Iraq to date, and the foundations we are building to
protect U.S. interests over the months ahead.
i. the fall of mosul
I arrived in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region, on June 7,
3 days before Mosul fell to militants led by the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL). We had been concerned about Mosul for the past
year, as it had become the primary financial hub for ISIL, generating
nearly $12 million per month in revenues through extortion and
smuggling rackets. From all of our contacts in Mosul, including Iraqi
security and local officials, the city by day would appear normal, but
at night, ISIL controlled the streets.
One of my first meetings in Erbil on the morning of June 8th was
with the Governor of Ninewa province, Atheel Nujaifi. His news was
alarming. Over the past 72 hours, he told me, hundreds of ISIL gun
trucks, carrying fighters and heavy weapons, had crossed the Iraq-Syria
border near the town of Rabiya, then passed north of Tal Afar, before
staging on the outskirts of west Mosul. The Iraqi Army agreed to
provide assistance to Mosul, but Iraqi commanders did not seem to
appreciate the urgency of the situation, and stated that reinforcements
might not arrive for a week.
We checked this information with sources in western Ninewa near the
Syrian border crossings, and confirmed that ISIL appeared to be coming
across in force. We also met immediately with Karim Sinjari, the
Minister of Interior of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), who
confirmed with real-time information that neighborhoods in western
Mosul were under immediate threat, as well as reports from the border
regions about a steady stream of ISIL reinforcements crossing into Iraq
from Syria. During this meeting, Minister Sinjari spoke to President
Masoud Barzani and received authorization to deploy Kurdish Peshmerga
units into eastern Mosul to help reinforce Iraqi Forces and deter any
ISIL advance east across the Tigris. He said the Peshmerga were ready
to help, but under the constitution, first required authority from the
Government of Iraq.
We sent an immediate and urgent message to Baghdad, including to
the Acting Minister of Defense, and directly to Prime Minister Maliki
through his chief of staff. They responded that the situation was under
control, and that nine Iraqi Army brigades would soon be relocated to
Mosul. We questioned that information, and encouraged Baghdad to
request assistance from Peshmerga forces immediately, as the Peshmerga
was able to reinforce the city rapidly, and there was precedent for
their helping to protect Mosul, including many years ago against ISIL's
earlier incarnation, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The Minister of Defense
ultimately agreed, but the Prime Minister asked for a confirmation from
Erbil that any deployed Peshmerga units would withdraw after army units
arrived.
On June 9, the situation remained static, and the Government in
Iraq expressed confidence that Mosul was not under a serious threat.
Throughout the day, however, Mosul's western-most neighborhoods began
to fall to ISIL. Its fighters began attacking checkpoints and killing
resisters, seeking to establish psychological dominance over Iraqi
security units in the city. Together with the United Nations team in
Baghdad, we worked to help establish a mechanism whereby Peshmerga
units would be authorized to reinforce the eastern half of the city
pending the arrival of Iraqi units from the south, and then withdraw
after the situation stabilized. Baghdad asked to further review the
proposal.
In the early morning hours of June 10, ISIL detonated a suicide
truck bomb at a checkpoint across a strategic bridge and began to flow
forces into the eastern side of the city. The next few hours would
prove fateful. Iraqi units abandoned their posts, and ISIL swept
through the city, seizing control of the provincial council building,
the airport, and then, ultimately, Iraqi military bases. Nearly
500,000--out of a total population of 2 million Iraqis--fled, seeking
refuge in Kurdish-controlled areas. Around 3 a.m., we received
distressed messages from Iraqi officials in Baghdad, requesting the
Kurdish Peshmerga to move into Mosul as soon as possible. The Iraqi
request came too late.
The fall of Iraq's second-largest city to ISIL was combined with a
social media campaign indicating that ISIL columns would soon be
heading down the Tigris River Valley to Baghdad with no mercy for
anyone who resisted. The result was a devastating collapse of the Iraqi
Security Forces from Mosul to Tikrit. Nearly five Iraqi Army and
Federal Police divisions (out of 18 total) would disintegrate over the
next 48 hours. This snowballing effect immediately threatened Baghdad,
with serious concern that Iraqi Forces guarding its northern approaches
might also collapse.
Over the next 3 days, in meetings with our Embassy team and
videoconferences with President Obama and the National Security
Council, we immediately prepared and executed our crisis response. We
also worked closely with Iraqi officials to organize the defenses of
Baghdad and restore some of the confidence that had been battered.
ii. u.s. response
Our response to the immediate crisis proceeded along three parallel
tracks. First, and most importantly, we worked to ensure the security
of our own personnel and facilities. Second, in parallel, we both
relocated and surged U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military
resources to develop strategic options for the President with real-time
and accurate information. Third, we worked with Iraqi officials to
strengthen their defenses of strategic locations, and set the political
process on track, with a focus on forming a new government following
national elections.
The key elements of this response plan included the following eight
steps, which, taken as a whole, encompassed security, intelligence,
political, and diplomatic measures:
(1) Ensuring the Safety of U.S. Personnel and U.S. Citizens
Our first priority was ensuring the safety of U.S. personnel. This
required relocating some personnel and adding additional security
capabilities at the Embassy compound and the airport. Additionally,
there were a number of American contractors at Balad Air Base working
on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. Reports from near Balad, which
later proved false, suggested the base faced an imminent ISIL attack.
After the contractors encountered delays securing their own charter
aircraft, the Iraqi Air Force helped evacuate nearly 500 U.S. citizens
and third-country nationals on June 14 aboard Iraqi C-130 aircraft. All
contractors left safely, and we are grateful to the Iraqi Government
and its pilots, most of whom we trained, for their assistance during
this crisis period, particularly given their own competing demands.\1\
At the same time, we took extraordinary measures to ensure the
safety of our Baghdad-based personnel. The entire National Security
Council team, from the President on down, focused intensively to deploy
Department of Defense security assets from elsewhere in the region
while the Country Team worked intensively with Washington to relocate
some personnel to safer areas. Within 72 hours we brought significant
defensive capacity into our facilities and rebalanced staff to help
manage the crisis. These early moves proved essential to ensuring that
U.S. diplomats could continue to do their jobs and protect U.S.
interests.
Today, even as the immediate crisis has passed, we are constantly
reviewing our footprint to ensure the safety and security of our
personnel and facilities.
(2) Improving Intelligence Picture on ISIL
Another immediate need was to get a better intelligence picture.
From Erbil, even before Mosul fell, I was in touch with General Austin
who recognized the urgency of the situation and prepared to deploy
additional intelligence assets. In the earliest days, however, when
asked about the situation, we had to acknowledge that we were operating
in a fog. Rumors of ISIL convoys approaching Baghdad could not be
discounted and there were tense moments as we sought to separate rumor
and propaganda from fact without immediate eyes on the ground. Today,
this fog has lifted--quite dramatically--thanks to immediate decisions
taken by the President.
In response to these early developments, we dedicated a substantial
amount of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to fly
over Iraq. These missions have enhanced our intelligence picture and
provided critical information to Iraqi Forces defending strategic
locations, while at the same time helping to establish a foundation
from which the President can assess the merit of additional measures.
(3) Assessing the Capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces
In the early hours of the crisis, we worked quickly to reverse the
collapsing morale of Iraqi Security Forces, reconstitute key units, and
ensure the units deployed around Baghdad could adequately defend the
capital. Our sight picture was imprecise, and the prerequisite to
concrete action was acquiring a firsthand, eyes-on accounting of the
situation. In my meetings with Iraqi officials, they said they would
welcome U.S. Special Operations Forces to assess Iraqi force
capabilities.
The President authorized the deployment of six Special Operations
Forces ``assessment teams'' to augment efforts that were previously
underway through our Office of Security Cooperation. These teams have
recently completed an initial, 2-week assessment of Iraqi units in and
around the greater Baghdad area, examining each unit's capabilities and
potential for a closer U.S. partnership. This mission has already
provided greater visibility into the situation on the ground, and will
help the national security team calibrate additional and tailored
measures.
The Department of Defense is currently reviewing this comprehensive
assessment, which, as the President has said, is designed help
determine ``how we can best train, advise, and support Iraqi Security
Forces going forward.''
(4) Establishing Joint Operations Centers in Baghdad and Erbil
To harness an improving intelligence picture, we have stood up two
combined Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) in Baghdad and Erbil. These
JOCs help ensure a constant 24/7 flow of real-time intelligence
information from across Iraq. We are now able to coordinate closely
with Iraqi Security Forces, the Ministry of Defense, and the Baghdad
Operations Center (BOC).
The Baghdad JOC is fully functional and has dramatically improved
our ability to understand and assess the situation on the ground. I
visited the JOC shortly before departing Baghdad last week, and it is
an impressive operation, which began from scratch only 6 weeks ago.
Most of our military personnel operating the facility have extensive
experience and relationships inside Iraq. They report that their Iraqi
counterparts have fully embraced our assistance and are asking for
more, hoping that the United States will serve as their essential
partner in the fight against ISIL.
The Government of Iraq has also made some welcome decisions in
recent
weeks to improve this bilateral coordination, including appointment of
new commanders, many with longstanding ties and relationships with
their U.S. military
counterparts.
(5) Positioning U.S. Military Assets in the Region
In the immediate wake of the crisis, the Department of Defense
reinforced assets in the region to prepare for multiple contingencies,
including the possibility of targeted and precise military action
against targets associated with ISIL. On June 16, Secretary Hagel
ordered the USS Mesa Verde, carrying a complement of MV-22
Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, into the gulf. Its presence added to that
of other U.S. naval ships in the Gulf--including the aircraft carrier
USS George H.W. Bush, a cruiser, and three destroyers. These assets
will provide our senior leaders with additional options in the event
military action is deemed necessary to protect U.S. interests as the
situation develops. They also complement the substantial defensive
capabilities now on the ground to ensure the safety and security of our
personnel and facilities.
(6) Getting the Political Process on Track
ISIL attacked Mosul at a time of extreme political volatility. On
April 30, 2 months before the crisis, Iraq conducted credible national
elections, in which 62 percent of Iraq's eligible voters participated.
This high turnout included Ninewa, where Mosul is the capital, with
nearly 1.1 million voters turning out (54.4 percent), despite explicit
ISIL threats to kill anyone who participates in the political process.
When ISIL moved in force into Mosul on June 10, the votes had been
counted but not yet certified. The 4-year Parliament's term had ended,
and a new Parliament, with its 328 Members chosen in the election, had
yet to convene. The attack, thus, took place during a political vacuum,
and purposefully so. ISIL clearly took a play from its earlier
incarnation, AQI, which led the devastating Samarra mosque attack
shortly after December 2005 elections, triggering years of sectarian
conflict. Their long-stated aim has always been to spark a collapse of
the political process.\2\
We worked immediately to ensure ISIL could not succeed in
destroying the Iraqi political process. First, we urged Iraq's
Government to finalize the election results, which would set in place a
series of timelines for forming a new government. This required judges
who had fled Baghdad to return. They did so, and ratified the election,
on June 16. The next day, Iraqi religious and political leaders from
all major communities declared ISIL ``an enemy of all Iraqis'' and
requested international assistance to combat the threat. Second, we
worked with the U.N. to press Iraqi leaders to convene the Parliament
on time, no later than July 1, which it did. Third, we pressed all
newly elected political blocs to choose their leaders for key posts,
pursuant to the constitutional timeline for forming a new government.
This process now has some traction. On July 15, the Parliament
confirmed a new Speaker, which is the first position to be named
pursuant to the constitutional steps required to form a new government.
The moderate Sunni leader, Salim al-Jabouri, received votes from all
major political blocs and was confirmed overwhelmingly, together with
two deputies. The next step is confirming a President, which may happen
as early as this coming week. Once there is a President, there will be
a 15-day deadline to charge a Prime Minister nominee to form a
government.
It is not the job of the United States to choose Iraq's leaders. We
neither want to, nor have the power to do so. Iraq has a parliamentary
system, and the next Prime Minister of Iraq must secure a 165-seat
majority to form a new government. We do have an obligation, however,
pursuant to our Strategic Framework Agreement, to ``support and
strengthen Iraq's democracy.'' Thus, from the moment this crisis began,
we have actively prodded the process forward, serving as a neutral
broker, and encouraging all Iraqi leaders to form a new government with
leaders who reflect a broad national consensus between component
communities.
The administration has been engaged on this issue from the outset,
including the visit from Secretary Kerry to Baghdad on June 23, and to
Erbil on June 24. The Secretary and the Vice President have also made
regular phone calls to Iraqi leaders and to our regional partners to
discuss the emerging situation and to help broker compromises where
necessary to advance the political process and keep the system on
track.
As President Obama has made clear, the Iraqi people deserve a
government that represents the legitimate interests of all Iraqis. We
are cautiously hopeful that Iraq's newly elected leaders are on their
way to forming such a government, and as they do, they will find a
committed partner in the United States.
(7) Building Regional Coalescence Against ISIL
At its root, ISIL is not strictly an Iraq problem. It is a regional
and international problem. The Government of Iraq has requested
international assistance, and it has stated clearly that it cannot
manage this problem on its own, particularly with an open border and
ISIL safe havens and staging areas in Syria. Accordingly, we have been
regularly engaged with Iraq's neighbors and our key partners. The U.N.
Security Council, European Union, Arab League, and NATO have strongly
condemned ISIL's actions and expressed strong support for the people of
Iraq.
Secretary Kerry's extensive trip to the region, capped by a
quadrilateral meeting in Paris with the Foreign Ministers of Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and UAE, and then a visit to Riyadh for a meeting with
King Abdullah, led to a new commonality of effort against ISIL. Shortly
after Secretary Kerry visited Riyadh, Saudi Arabia pledged $500 million
to U.N. relief agencies managing the humanitarian response in Iraq. In
parallel, we are working with all of our regional partners to close
down foreign fighter networks that continue to send thousands of
terrorists into Syria, many of whom make their way to Iraq, with up to
50 per-month becoming suicide bombers.
We are also mindful of Iran's influence in Iraq and have seen Iran
and Russia work to fill a security vacuum in the early weeks of the
crisis. These activities are part of our daily conversations with Iraqi
political and military officials, and we are confident that most Iraqi
leaders want to retain strategic independence, while also grappling
desperately with the serious threats to the Iraqi capital and the Iraqi
people.
(8) Coordinating Humanitarian Relief Efforts and Protecting Religious
Minorities
Finally, ISIL's advances have exacerbated a humanitarian crisis.
The U.N. estimates that more than 1.2 million Iraqis have been
displaced in fighting since ISIL moved into major cities in Anbar
earlier this year. More than 300,000 Iraqis have fled to the Iraqi
Kurdistan region since the fall of Mosul on June 10. We have praised
the efforts of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in dealing with
the situation, and call on the KRG to continue these efforts, as well
as the Government of Iraq to assist the KRG with additional resources.
As noted, numerous countries have come forward and donated to the
U.N.'s appeal for humanitarian assistance. In addition to Saudi Arabia,
other contributors include Kuwait, Japan, New Zealand, and a number of
others. The United States to date has contributed $13.8 million in
humanitarian assistance in response to this crisis, and we are working
closely with the U.N. team in Iraq to coordinate the response.
We are also particularly concerned about the state of the Christian
community in Iraq, including in Mosul where this ancient community is
being expelled by ISIL on threat of execution. There are now reports of
the community's full scale departure, which saddens us deeply. We have
also seen reporting of ISIL blinding and killing 13 Yezidi men when
they refused to convert to Islam and the kidnapping of two Chaldean
nuns and three teenage orphans in Mosul. We denounce these brutal
actions vigorously. These actions by ISIL in Mosul--killing Christians,
burning churches, killing moderate Sunnis, destroying Islamic tombs--
prove to the world the barbarity of their objectives and why they must
be stopped before their roots deepen.
Over the past 2 weeks alone, I met with the Christian leadership in
Iraq, including Chaldean Patriarch Louis Raphael Sako in Baghdad, and
Archbishop Bashar Warda in Erbil. I am always impressed by the deep
faith and resilience of these leaders. In Baghdad, Patriarch Sako,
shortly before my visit, presided over a mass with nearly 500
worshipers from across the capital. Both leaders also expressed
detailed concerns about the plight of Christians in northern Iraq, and
we are working with them and KRG leaders to ensure new Christian
enclaves are protected and secured.
Finally, we are deeply troubled by ISIL's treatment of women as we
receive a steady stream of reporting regarding women being deprived of
their basic rights and subjected to gross violations of their freedom.
iii. current situation
It is now 7 weeks since this crisis began. Mosul remains in the
hands of ISIL. Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, gave a sermon on July
4, at one of Mosul's oldest mosques, an act made possible after ISIL
executed its moderate Imam and 13 other leading clerics in the city.
The Iraq-Syria border, hundreds of miles between the Kurdish region and
Jordan, is controlled on both sides by ISIL. Weapons and fighters now
flow freely between Iraq and Syria, resupplying ISIL units fighting on
both fronts. To say this situation is extremely serious would be an
understatement. The situation is dire, and it presents a direct threat
to all the Iraqi people, the region, and to U.S. interests.
Our immediate response, however, helped provide a barrier against
further deterioration, and may offer a new foundation on which to begin
fighting back. Since the first week of the crisis, the Iraqis--working
closely with us--managed to absorb the shock, restore some morale, and
began to push back, albeit with halting and uneven steps.
On the security front, an immediate focus was restoring control of
portions of Highway One, which runs parallel to the Tigris River from
Baghdad to Mosul. Iraqi Forces during the third week of the crisis
managed to clear the highway from Baghdad to Samarra, ensuring a steady
resupply for the historic shrine city. During the fourth week of the
crisis, they cleared most of the highway from Samarra to Tikrit,
although sophisticated IED emplacements, ISIL snipers, and repeated
suicide attacks have halted progress.\3\
These operations remain extremely challenging, and we have differed
with the Iraqis on some of their tactical objectives, such as moving
into the city of Tikrit, which did not seem militarily essential given
the need to focus on supply routes. They have, however, gradually
allowed the Iraqis to move out of a defensive crouch and pressure the
ISIL networks north of Baghdad, which had been poised to advance
further to the south toward the capital. We are also urging the Iraqis
to immediately focus security efforts to the west, where tribes
continue to hold out against ISIL near Haditha, blunting what had been
a rapid ISIL advance following the fall of Al Qaim, on the Syria
border, on June 21.
The tribal situation in western and north-central Iraq remains
fluid. Many tribes are now actively fighting ISIL--but lack the
resources to do so effectively. According to our regular contacts in
these areas ISIL is able to overmatch any lightly armed tribal force.
The complete withdrawal of the Iraqi Army from these areas, together
with the lack of coverage by Iraqi aviation in the border regions,
provides ISIL free rein to move manpower and heavy weapons to areas
where tribes resist.
The result has been many long-standing enemies of ISIL and its
earlier incarnation AQI--such as Albu Mahal tribe in western Anbar;
Shammar in western Ninewa; Obeidi south of Kirkuk; and Jabbouri in
central Salah ad-Din--risk making accommodations to ISIL due primarily
to the reality of battlefield dynamics. These tribes may have issues
with the central government, but that alone is not why ISIL infiltrated
their areas. In Al Qaim, for example, the Albu Mahal resisted ISIL for
months, before the town ultimately fell after waves of attacks from
across the Syrian border weakened Iraqi defense forces.
A tangible example of this dynamic is the Sunni town of Zowiya,
near Tikrit in north-central Iraq. The residents there, a mix of
Jabbouri and other tribes, resisted ISIL and would not accept their
presence in the town. The result, as reported in the media and
confirmed by our own contacts, was an ISIL military assault to kill all
the residents of the village, starting with an hour-long artillery
barrage. ISIL fighters then swept into the village, forcing surviving
residents to flee, and sending the message to surrounding areas that
any tribal resistance to their movement would be futile--and crushed.
As a result, absent some military pressure on ISIL, we are unlikely
to see a broad-based tribal uprising against the movement, as happened
between 2007 and 2008. This tribal uprising was enabled by U.S.
military forces, which applied consistent and relentless pressure on
then-AQI leadership networks, staging areas, and supply routes. While
the Iraqis will never match this level of pressure, we must help enable
their forces to better deny safe haven to ISIL within Iraqi territory.
The Iraqis must also focus on training and equipping locally grown
units to secure local areas. As the President said in his June 19
statement on the situation in Iraq, ``the best and most effective
response to a threat like ISIL will ultimately involve partnerships
where local forces, like Iraqis, take the lead.''
The Iraqis recognize this principle, as well, and they have
undertaken a reassessment of how their security forces are structured
and might be reconstituted. Based on our most recent meetings with
Iraqi security commanders, this effort will proceed in three phases.
First, the Iraqis have begun to recall soldiers from dissolved units
for retraining at two sites north of Baghdad. They report that nearly
10,000 have answered this call. Second, they are recruiting from
existing units and from new volunteers for elite counterterrorism
forces, similar to those we train through our Office of Security
Cooperation. Third, they are looking to dramatically restructure their
security services, with units recruited locally to secure local areas,
while the national army provides overwatch support.
Such a program may take many months to demonstrate results, and
years to provide a lasting foundation for sustainable security. It will
also be linked to the process of forming a new government, requiring a
full national commitment and national resource base to ensure effective
execution. It remains in our interest, together with such a national
commitment from a new government, to provide appropriate assistance and
help this process unfold in a manner that can eliminate space for ISIL
over the long term.
iv. emerging way forward--a functioning federalism
The crisis response described above, together with Iraqi efforts
over the past month, contain the elements of a longer term strategy to
deny space for ISIL. Any such strategy, to be effective, must be
deliberate, long term, and multifaceted. In my discussions with Iraqi
leaders from all communities over the past 6 weeks, there is an
emerging political-military approach that might begin to address the
root causes of the current crisis.
First, it is important to focus at the outset on why this matters.
The situation we confront is not simply about stabilizing Iraq, though
that alone is an important interest. Rather, it is about ensuring that
a movement with ambitions and capabilities greater than the al-Qaeda
that we knew over the past decade does not grow permanent roots in the
heart of the Middle East. Flush with thousands of foreign fighters and
suicide bombers, ISIL in Syria and Iraq increasingly represents a
serious threat to U.S. interests.
Indeed, ISIL's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, seeks to follow in the
footsteps of Osama bin Laden as the leader of a global jihad, but with
further reach--from his own terrorist state in the heart of the Middle
East. After Osama bin Laden was killed in May 2011, Baghdadi eulogized
his death and promised ``violent retaliation.'' His audio messages
routinely contain thinly veiled threats against the United States, and
he has promised in a ``message to the Americans'' that ``we will be in
direct confrontation.'' The ISIL suicide bombers--still averaging 30 to
50 per month--are increasingly Western passport holders. Days ago, ISIL
boasted that an Australian and a German blew themselves up in Baghdad,
and it is a matter of time before these suicide bombers are directed
elsewhere.
To combat this threat, we must proceed along three tracks. First,
ISIL must be starved of resources, manpower, and foreign fighters. This
requires working with our partners around the globe and especially with
Turkey to seal the Syrian border from ISIL recruits. Second, the safe
havens and training camps in Syria must be isolated and disrupted,
preferably by the moderate opposition, enabled by U.S. training. Third,
Iraqis must be enabled to control their sovereign space and
reconstitute their western border with Syria, through capacity
development, tribal engagement, and targeted military pressure.
This third element is essential, and achievable. It will require
commitments from Iraq and support from the United States. Our
perspectives may not always be the same, but our efforts must be
mutually reinforcing. This is because, while ISIL
presents a serious counterterrorism challenge to the United States, the
Government of Iraq also faces a serious counterinsurgency challenge,
and the two are inextricably linked. Our combined focus must be on
isolating ISIL from the broader population and empowering tribes and
other local actors to effectively combat it. This will require a
combination of political and security measures, based on the principle
of a ``functioning federalism'' as defined in the Iraqi Constitution--
but never fully and effectively implemented.
In our view, a functioning federalism would empower local
populations to secure their own areas with the full resources of the
state in terms of benefits, salaries, and equipment. The national army,
under this concept, would focus on securing international borders and
providing overwatch support where necessary to combat hardened
terrorist networks. Other critical reforms, such as an amnesty for
those detained without trial, amendments to the criminal procedure
laws, and addressing other legitimate grievances from the Iraqi people
including those related to de-Ba'athification, will also be necessary
elements to strengthen and empower local actors to stand and fight
ISIL.\4\
While these concepts remain embryonic, and ultimately will require
a new government to flesh out and develop, the five core principles can
be summarized as follows:
1. Local citizens must be in the lead in securing local
areas;
2. Local citizens defending their communities must be
provided state benefits and resources (modeled along the lines
of a National Guard type force
structure);
3. The Iraqi Army will rarely deploy inside cities, but will
remain outside
in an overwatch posture and to carry out federal functions
(such as protecting
borders);
4. There must be close cooperation between local, regional
(KRG), and
national security services to gradually reduce operational
space for ISIL;
5. The Federal Government must work diligently on a package
of reforms that can address legitimate grievances and deny any
pretext for ISIL activities.
These five principles can begin to address many of the core
grievances in the Sunni-majority areas of Iraq, while also,
importantly, denying space for ISIL to operate and thereby protect the
Shia majority and other groups from ISIL attacks. Cooperation will be
essential. The Government of Iraq from the center cannot restore
stability in many areas that ISIL now controls, nor can local actors do
so--without support and national-level resources--given ISIL's
demonstrated capacity. Restoring stability and degrading ISIL will
require a smart, integrated (central-regional-provincial) approach, led
by a new Iraqi Government with an appropriate level of U.S. support and
assistance.
Conclusion
The situation in Iraq remains extremely serious. While our
immediate crisis response may have blunted the initial security crisis,
ISIL represents a growing threat to U.S. interests in the region, local
populations, and the homeland. Countering this threat will require
close coordination between the administration and the Congress, and
between the U.S. and our regional partners. I look forward to working
closely with this committee to ensure that we are doing all we can to
address this vital national security challenge.
----------------
Notes
\1\ This cooperation is one of many examples of why it remains a
vital interest for the United States to maintain our relationships with
the Iraqi Security Forces, whether through our foreign military sales
programs or training and advisory missions. The Iraqi Security Forces
today face an existential threat, yet the quality of units varies
widely from the highly proficient and professional to the incompetent
and corrupt. The Iraqis recognize the serious work they must do to
further professionalize the force, and they have asked for our
assistance. It is in our interest to provide such assistance where we
assess it can be effective, both to help confront the immediate crisis
more effectively, and to build the long-term partnerships that are
essential to maintaining strategic influence.
\2\ The AQI attack on Samarra came at precisely the same moment in
the political process as the 2014 ISIL move into Mosul: 2 months after
national elections, after the expiration of full-term institutions, and
before the selection of new leadership. The pace of signature AQI (now
ISIL) attacks--measured by suicide and vehicle bombs--were also nearly
identical in the months before the 2006 and 2010 elections, running at
nearly 80 per month. In the 30 days prior to the April 2014 elections,
ISIL launched over 50 suicide attacks inside Iraq with nearly all of
the suicide bombers, according to our assessments and ISIL's own
statements, foreign fighters who enter Iraq from Syria.
\3\ During this period of crisis, Iraqi forces have increasingly
relied on volunteers from southern Iraq to hold stretches of the
highway cleared by security forces. Many of these volunteers have
affiliations with Shia militia groups, and in the earliest weeks of the
crisis, they operated in the open for the first time in years. Since
then, Grand Ayatollah Sistani has stated clearly that any volunteers
should only join established state security services, and emphasized
that militias or individual gunmen should not be accepted on the
streets. The United States will continue to encourage Iraqi leaders to
establish legal and practical mechanisms to incorporate volunteers,
including tribal fighters, into the state security structures, where
they can be trained to protect the population consistent with the rule
of law.
\4\ There are three fighting groups in the Sunni areas of Iraq. To
be effective, any political-military initiative must focus on each of
them. First, and most prominently, is ISIL. While there is no political
solution to ISIL, political initiatives can help isolate ISIL from
other associated groups. The second group is Jaysh al-Tariqa al-
Naqshabandi (JRTN). JRTN is a militant wing of the former Ba'ath Party,
now led by Saddam's former Vice President, Izzat al-Douri. While the
most militant core of JRTN will remain nonresponsive to political
initiatives, such initiatives can help minimize that core and degrade
the network. The third group includes national insurgent movements,
such as the Islamic Army, with some associated tribes. These groups
mostly want local security control, and rarely launch offensive
operations outside of their local areas. For them, there is a political
solution, and through some of the reforms discussed above, these groups
can probably be harnessed to protect local areas from ISIL infiltration
over time.
The Chairman. Ms. Slotkin.
STATEMENT OF ELISSA SLOTKIN, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF THE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, AND
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Corker, and distinguished members of the committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss the administration's
response to the current security situation. My remarks will
focus on what the Department of Defense is particularly doing.
I just want to foot-stomp some of the things that Brett
just said. The United States does have a vital national
security interest in ensuring that Iraq or any other country
does not become a safe haven for terrorists who could threaten
the United States homeland, our United States citizens, or our
interests abroad.
As the President has said, ISIL's advance across Iraqi
territory in recent weeks, and particularly its ability to
establish safe haven in the region, poses a threat to United
States interests and the Middle East. I do not restrict my
views and my comments today just to Iraq, the geographic
borders of Iraq. I do believe we have a real regional problem
on our hands.
As Brett has said, the situation on the ground is complex
and fluid. We are therefore taking a responsible, deliberate,
and flexible approach to the crisis. But I do want to be clear:
There is no exclusively military solution to the threat posed
by ISIL. The Iraqis must do the heavy lifting. In the meantime,
the Department of Defense remains postured should the President
decide to use military force as part of a broader strategy.
Our immediate goals, as announced on June 19, are to: one,
protect the people and property, our people and property in
Iraq; two, to gain a better understanding of how we might
train, advise, and support the Iraqi Security Forces should we
decide to do that; and number three, to expand our
understanding, particularly via intelligence, of ISIL. All
three are critical to any future U.S. strategy vis-a-vis Iraq.
To that end, we have done four things in the Department of
Defense. We have added forces to protect our people. The safety
of our citizens obviously is our highest priority. The
Department has met the requests of the Department of State. As
described in the
war powers notification we have transmitted, the Department of
Defense has sent what is called a Fleet Antiterrorism Security
Team, what we call a FAST Team, a crisis response element, and
additional military assets and personnel to reinforce security
both at our diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and at the Baghdad
International Airport.
The Secretary of Defense has also ordered the amphibious
transport ship USS Mesa Verde into the Arabian Gulf. Its
presence in the gulf is added to other naval ships, including
the U.S. aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, and provides
the President additional options to protect American citizens
and interests in Iraq should he choose to use them.
Number two, we have vastly increased our intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, ISR, assets. At the request
of the Government of Iraq, we have surged ISR over Iraq since
the fall of Mosul and increased our information-sharing
activities. These ISR sorties, which are up to 50-plus per day,
give us a much better understanding of ISIL operations and
disposition and allow us to help the ISF counter ISIL. We are
now capable of around-the-clock coverage of Iraq and have been
focusing our efforts on ISIL-controlled territory as well as
Baghdad. We have also sent in U.S. assessment teams and stood
up joint operations centers.
On June 19 the President announced these additional
measures, including the deployment of just about 300 additional
U.S. military advisers to evaluate how we might best train,
advise, and support the ISF. These small teams of Special
Forces are working to evaluate the ISF in and around Baghdad in
particular. The teams are armed for self-defense, but they do
not have an offensive mission. And then the two joint
operations centers, one in Baghdad, one in Erbil in northern
Iraq. They have both been established to help support our
efforts on the ground.
A quick word about the assessments. I know that is of
interest. Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey received the
draft assessment of the ISF last week from Central Command.
Department leaders are undertaking a deliberate and rigorous
review of the assessment, which will inform recommendations to
the President. Meanwhile, additional assessment work continues.
As you heard, General Austin is on the ground today with
respect to the developing situation on the ground.
In closing, I just want to reiterate that we have a vital
security interest in ensuring that Iraq or any other country
not become a safe haven for terrorists. We do need a regional
approach, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Slotkin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elissa Slotkin
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
administration's response to the current security situation in Iraq. My
remarks today will focus on two areas: (1) An overview of our national
security interests in Iraq, and (2) a review of President Obama's
current policy toward Iraq.
u.s. national security interests
The U.S. has a vital national interest in ensuring that Iraq, or
any other country, does not become a destabilized safe haven for
terrorists who could threaten our homeland or U.S. interests and
citizens abroad. As the President has said, ISIL's advance across Iraqi
territory in recent weeks, and particularly its ability to
continue to establish a safe haven in the region, poses a threat to
both U.S. interests and the Middle East. In considering the ISIL
threat, we don't restrict our view of the threat to specific geographic
boundaries.
current u.s. efforts in iraq
Despite this complex and fluid situation, we are taking a
responsible, deliberate, and flexible approach to this crisis. I want
to be clear that there is no exclusively military solution to the
threats posed by ISIL in Iraq. However, DOD remains postured should the
President decide to use military force as part of a broader strategy.
Our immediate goals, as announced on June 19, are to (1) protect our
people and property in Iraq; (2) gain a better understanding of how we
might best train, advise, and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
capabilities should we decide to support the ISF going forward; and (3)
expand our understanding--particularly via intelligence--of ISIL. All
three are critical to any future U.S. strategy vis-a-vis Iraq. To that
end we have done the following four things.
Added Forces to Protect our People
First, we have added forces to protect U.S. personnel in Iraq. The
safety of U.S. citizens and personnel in Baghdad and throughout Iraq is
our highest priority. The Department of Defense is meeting all requests
from the Department of State for security support to U.S. Embassy
Baghdad. As described in the War Powers notifications we transmitted to
Congress on June 16 and 26, DOD has sent a Fleet Antiterrorism Security
Team (FAST), a Crisis Response Element (CRE), and additional military
assets and personnel to reinforce security at our diplomatic facilities
in Baghdad and the Baghdad International Airport.
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also ordered the amphibious
transport ship USS Mesa Verde into the Arabian Gulf. Its presence in
the gulf adds to that of other U.S. naval ships--including the aircraft
carrier USS George HW Bush--and provides the President additional
options to protect American citizens and interests in Iraq, should he
choose to use them.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Second, as part of this effort, we have surged intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in Iraq. At the
request of the Government of Iraq, we surged ISR over Iraq after the
fall of Mosul and also increased information-sharing initiatives. These
ISR sorties provide us a better understanding of ISIL operations and
disposition and allow us to help the ISF counter ISIL. We are now
capable of around-the-clock coverage over Iraq and have been focusing
our efforts on ISIL-controlled territory as well as Baghdad.
U.S. Assessment Teams and Joint Operations Centers (JOCs)
Third, we continue to assess the capabilities of the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF). On June 19, the President announced additional measures--
including the deployment of up to 300 additional U.S. military advisors
to evaluate how we might best train, advise, and support the ISF. These
small teams of special forces are working to evaluate the Iraqi
Security Forces in and around Baghdad. They are armed for self-
defense--but do not have an offensive mission.
And fourth, following the President's direction, two Joint
Operation Centers (JOCs), one in Baghdad and one in northern Iraq, have
been established to help support our efforts on the ground.
The initial assessment mission is not unlike many others that DOD
performs around the world. We currently maintain special operators in
more than 70 countries, in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. Furthermore,
since the U.S. troop
drawdown in December 2011, a small presence of military personnel has
been located at the Embassy in Baghdad, consistent with the 2008
Strategic Framework Agreement.
Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey received the draft assessment
of the ISF last week from Central Command. Department leaders are
undertaking a deliberate and rigorous review of the assessment, which
will inform recommendations to the President. Meanwhile, additional
assessment work continues with respect to the developing situation on
the ground.
In closing, I want to reiterate that there is no exclusively
military solution to the threats posed by ISIL. However, we do have a
vital security interest in ensuring that Iraq, nor any other country,
becomes a safe haven for terrorists who could threaten our homeland or
U.S. interests and citizens abroad.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Yesterday, during yesterday's hearing with the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, you both argued that the policy of
the United States should be for a unified Iraq with a strong
Baghdad-based Federal Government. But many look and say that
what is happening on the ground is accelerating toward a
breakup of Iraq because too many of Iraq's communities no
longer trust the Maliki government, and the question is whether
there is anything we can do to prevent it.
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we testified
clearly and in my written statement, as well, that the model is
a functioning federalism under the Iraqi Constitution. So
nobody is trying to fit a square peg into a round hole that
simply will not work. There is a model within the constitution
for this functioning federalism, in which you recognize a very
substantial devolution of authorities, the principles of local
security control. That is something that I found in my last 7
weeks: there is an emerging consensus around.
Through the process of forming a new government, I think
the details will be fleshed out. I know General Austin is
discussing some of these concepts as we speak, particularly
when it comes to restructuring the security forces.
So I do not think anyone is trying to create a strong
central government that is going to retain control all over the
country. In fact, I think everybody recognizes now that from
the center out you are not going to be able to retain control
in all parts of the country, but also, most importantly, locals
and tribes on their own will not be able to deny space for
ISIL, because of ISIL's very significant military capability.
So you need a principle of local security control, but with a
national resource base, and that is all within the federalist
model of the constitution.
The Chairman. The question is, though, can you even get to
a federalist model the way things are evolving in Iraq?
Mr. McGurk. I think you can, because of----
The Chairman. What needs to happen?
Mr. McGurk. Well, first we have to get a new government
formed, and that is very important because the new government
will obviously be the body that directs where the resources go.
The Chairman. What do we envision the timeframe of that
being? It is past due, right?
Mr. McGurk. Under the constitutional framework and the time
lines, as soon as there is a new President, which just
happened, there is now a 15-day timeline to charge a Prime
Minister to form a government. So, we will know within 15 days
the Prime Minister nominee. Whoever that is, he then has 30
days to name a Cabinet and present the Cabinet to Parliament
for a vote.
Those timelines, however, can be substantially accelerated.
For example, under the constitution, once there is a Speaker,
there are 30 days to name a President. They did that in, I
think, about 8 days. We are working very hard to accelerate
those timelines.
The Chairman. Now, if it ends up being Prime Minister
Maliki, how do you think that you keep this government
together, this nation together?
Mr. McGurk. As I mentioned in my statement, as the
President has said, it is not our job to pick the leaders, but
the leaders do have to have a very inclusive agenda and pull
the country together.
The Chairman. I am not asking you to pick, nor do I suggest
we should. The question is that if that is the result by their
own choice it seems to me that it is very difficult, based upon
what has happened so far, based upon Sunni responses to ISIS,
at least in the context of their grievances with the present
national government, that--is not the likely outcome that we
may see a divided Iraq?
Mr. McGurk. The Prime Minister will be chosen from the Shia
political blocs, and Grand Ayatollah Sistani, interestingly,
over the last month has been very active, and he has laid down
some guideposts for how to form the next government: first, it
has to correct the mistakes of the past, meaning it cannot look
anything like the current government; second, you need new
leaders that reflect a national consensus. We have had that now
with the Speaker and the President, and so the Prime Minister
will also have to reflect that emerging national consensus. It
remains to be seen whether the existing Prime Minister could
build such a consensus, but that remains very much in question.
The Chairman. You commented in the House hearing yesterday
that options being developed for the President are more
concrete and specific as a result of the U.S. military advisers
on the ground and increased intelligence collection. What
guidance have you received in terms of timing for these
decisions and how will the political and security conditions on
the ground influence the President's decisions?
Ms. Slotkin. Well, as I said, the assessments came in last
week. They are dense, they are significant. So we are still
working through those. After we have done that, the Secretary
and the Chairman will make informed recommendations to the
President.
The Chairman. Are you going to be able to tell us anything
more than I read in the New York Times, which is more than I
knew before you came here?
Ms. Slotkin. I understand. I would caution against using a
leaked half-report in the New York Times as your basis for
understanding it.
The Chairman. Well, the absence of having information leads
me to only publicly reported resources. So when do you intend
to come to us, in whatever setting, to advise the Congress? You
know, this committee has jurisdiction over arms sales, and my
reticence to arms sales to Iraq has in some respects been
proven true when, in fact, we have had much of our equipment
abandoned and now in the hands of ISIS.
So unless you are going to give us a sense of where the
security forces are at moving forward, this Chair is not going
to be willing to approve more arms sales so they can be
abandoned to go to the hands of those who we are seriously
concerned about in terms of our own national security
interests.
Ms. Slotkin. Sir, I understand and our intent is to come
and brief Congress at the time when we have piled through it
ourselves. We have kept the Congress very informed. I know I
have been up at least twice a week for our committees. We are
committed to remaining in close contact with you and there is
no attempt to hide it from you.
Mr. McGurk. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that I think we
are in a race against time, there is no question.
The Chairman. Well, that is my point.
Mr. McGurk. And one thing that we have found, first of all,
by surging Special Forces teams, by surging intelligence
assets, as you mentioned, we do know an awful lot more than we
knew even 6 weeks ago.
Security forces around Baghdad and particularly north of
Baghdad--I described this in some of my written testimony--are
trying to do some things to fight back. They have taken nearly
a thousand casualties in the last month. These units,
particularly units that we have relationships with, are
fighting, they are capable. And those are the types of units
that we are looking at ways to further assist.
But again, this is all being discussed by the national
security team.
The Chairman. Well, you have influences here. My
understanding is Assad has been part of bombing ISIS in Iraq.
Of course, you have Iran here. How is that going to complicate
or instruct what you might be willing to do?
Mr. McGurk. It is part of the overall assessment, and I can
only speak from my own firsthand experience in the initial days
of this crisis as ISIL, it looked like, was moving down the
Tigris Valley; our information was very sketchy, there was a
bit of a panic throughout the Iraqi Security Forces, and we had
to bolster them and try to create a circuit breaker so that
that advance halted.
There was a security vacuum, that there is no question that
our strategic competitors sought to step in and fill. Iraq
lacks any capacity to do deep strikes in their border regions.
Countries show up at their door and say, hey, we can help you
with that. The Iraqis have pushed back in some regards, but in
some respects they have accepted support.
The Chairman. They have accepted Assad bombing, have they
not?
Mr. McGurk. No, no. We have no indication that there is any
coordination with the Assad regime when it comes to security
cooperation. But they are very concerned about the collapse of
their border, particularly the collapse of Al-Qaim, which was a
strategic border town which fell about 3 weeks ago.
The Chairman. They have accepted Iranian support?
Mr. McGurk. They have accepted low-level Iranian support;
there is no question, yes.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just along those lines, how do you assess U.S. influence
right now? I know there are a number of other regional
interests that are playing a role. I know that those of us who
have visited recently know that before this all occurred U.S.
influence was at an all-time low and really almost not present.
I know that has changed some, but where would you assess our
influence to be in Iraq right now?
Mr. McGurk. Senator, since this crisis, particularly in
Mosul, we have been embraced, particularly our military
personnel who have come in. I was at the joint operations
center, which we have set up now. I was there on Thursday
speaking with all of our military personnel there, all of whom
have years of experience in relationships in Iraq. We have been
embraced by their military, particularly the Special Forces
assessment team.
The Iraqis have given us full access to their air space for
our intelligence flights we want to do. They have given us the
legal requirements we need to be there. So we have been
embraced, and I think there is an opportunity because they
certainly want our assistance. They want our equipment, they
want our training. Our FMS package is about $15 billion total.
They have paid about $11 billion of that. They put $193 million
in the Federal Reserve into that account just last week.
So the Iraqis are very eager, under our strategic framework
agreement, for U.S. assistance to be the backbone of their
response. But, of course, there are things that they need to do
as well and that is the conversation we are having with them.
Senator Corker. Are there competing interests? I mean, as
you are deepening the relationship again and helping in the way
that we are, are there conflicts or competing interests that
you are dealing with there on the ground?
Mr. McGurk. Yes, and in fact some of the tactics that the
Iraqis pursue we totally do not agree with. In fact, I think by
moving in aggressively as we have over the last 6 weeks, we
will increasingly increase our influence over some of those
tactics.
We have advised the Iraqis, for example, not go to into
urban areas--lessons that we learned. The Iraqis made a
decision to go into Tikrit. We did not really support that
decision. We have advised the Iraqis since January not to go
into Fallujah. They have not gone into Fallujah. But there is a
military conversation, which is a little bit outside of my
expertise and that is why General Austin is on the ground as we
speak, talking to their new military commanders.
Just a point on our influence: I have had a number of
conversations with the Prime Minister on down since January and
have said: Your generals, Mr. Prime Minister, are not telling
you the truth about the situation. That clearly was true,
particularly in Mosul. Those commanders are now gone and they
have appointed a series of new commanders, who we happen to
work very closely with, and we hope that that type of
relationship can continue.
Senator Corker. I think that kind of involvement that we
had and then we lost, where we were able to have the shuttle
diplomacy and have the kind of activity that is now taking
place, has helped create the situation that is on the ground,
no doubt. On the other hand, Prime Minister Maliki has not been
the kind of Prime Minister to create any kind of sense that a
central government can resolve the ethnic and civil issues that
exist there.
Do you really believe, bottom of your heart, there is
somebody in Iraq of the Shia sect that can do that as Prime
Minister if we move through this process?
Mr. McGurk. Senator, we have had extreme frustrations with
the Iraqi Government, particularly over the last year, and that
is one reason we have focused most decisively on making sure
elections happen, they happen on time, and they were credible.
And they did happen. They happened on April 30. They have
created a new Parliament and through that Parliament new
leaders will emerge.
There are a handful of very capable leaders who may emerge
as the next Prime Minister of Iraq, but we are going to have to
see. This will unfold fairly rapidly over the coming days.
Senator Corker. Ms. Slotkin, I know there was a little
discussion between you and the chairman relative to the
assessment that is taking place. Can you just broadly tell us
of anything that you have learned over the last 3 weeks that
you did not know prior to the assessment?
Ms. Slotkin. Sure. I think the thing when we put the
assessors on the ground that was the biggest open question,
given the march ISIL had had across and into Mosul and down,
was what was the status of Baghdad? Would the ISF be able to
successfully defend Baghdad? That was our critical first
question, especially given the size of our mission there.
I think one of the early things that we saw as we got on
the ground was that there was a stiffening of the Iraqi
Security Forces in and around Baghdad to protect the capital,
which we thought was critically important. So we certainly were
not aware until we got on the ground.
I do think some of the early indications are, frankly,
mixed. There are some very capable units that have high morale
and that are willing and capable of fighting, and there are
other units where morale is lower, where there may not be as
much capability and willingness to actually fight. It is
sorting out the details of that that we are working on right
now.
Senator Corker. If you were to surmise after you do this
assessment, what do you think the range of options will be that
will be presented to the President relative to our activities
militarily in Iraq?
Ms. Slotkin. I think, without crowding any decision space,
all the military options we could possibly consider have to fit
into a much wider regional strategy that is not a lead by the
military.
Senator Corker. Tell me what that means? I know you have
said that in your opening comments.
Ms. Slotkin. Sure.
Senator Corker. I think most people in this committee have
been concerned. We had very, very strong support for efforts in
Syria. Are you referring to Syria and Iraq? Is that basically
the
region?
Ms. Slotkin. It is Syria and Iraq, given ISIL's march. But
then in particular it is making sure that we do not see a
further spread. I mean, I know everyone was concerned----
Senator Corker. Jordan.
Ms. Slotkin. Exactly. Jordan has been particularly a focus
for us, given the border area right there with Iraq. But this
is part of the administration's attempt to try and create this
counterterrorism partnership fund to shore up particularly the
neighbors of Iraq and Syria, to make sure that they have a
flexible way to respond to the threats, to make sure we do not
see that spread, and then to ask for funding for training the
vetted Syrian moderate opposition so we have some sort of
attempt from the inside of Syria to secure up those areas as
well.
So it is impossible to just look at the ISIL threat at Iraq
only because, as I said yesterday, it is kind of like air in a
balloon; you squeeze on one end, it just goes somewhere else.
We need a comprehensive approach outside in and inside out.
Senator Corker. It is interesting you say that. I think
people on this committee have been saying for like a year and a
half that when the time was right, when we could have taken
steps in Syria that could have prevented this, they were not
taken. So now it is interesting that the administration is
looking at a regional approach. Is that solely because now
there is this counterterrorism issue, that the situation has
gotten so bad--it did not have to, but it has gotten so bad now
that it is a threat to the homeland and that is the reason you
are looking at a regional approach?
What do you think it is that has taken so long, with so
many people crying out on both sides of the aisle to, please do
something relative to the moderate opposition in Syria, knowing
that there is no border there, knowing that it was
destabilizing Iraq? Is it this counterterrorism issue solely
that has now caused the administration to look at it
regionally?
Ms. Slotkin. I think the administration has been looking at
this regionally for a while.
Senator Corker. But it has been looking at it.
Ms. Slotkin. Well, I actually do not think that is fair. I
think that we have invested heavily in some serious border
security work with Jordan. We have done programs with Lebanon,
we have done programs with Turkey. This is not beginning from
anew here.
But I do think that the thing that surprised us, frankly,
was the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in and around
Mosul and four divisions essentially melting away. If you would
have asked me that a year ago, I would have not assessed that.
I think that the spread of ISIL, given the number of foreign
passport holders that we know have traveled back and forth to
Syria, Western passport holders, it does focus the mind.
Senator Corker. If I could just ask one last question, or
make a statement. We had a really, really strong vote here and
a great debate on supporting the moderate opposition, and I was
glad to get the call that the White House is now looking at I
guess $500 million in actual Defense Department support for
these moderates.
I have to say--and the first time I have said it out loud--
I have now gotten to the point where I question--I hate to say
it--how effective that is going to be at this point. I think
there was a point in time when it could have been really
effective. I now question whether now at this point, with all
that has happened, knowing that ISIS has taken such a large
part of the territory in Syria, I now question the
effectiveness. And yet the administration really feels like
that small amount at this late date still has the possibility
to do real good in Syria.
Ms. Slotkin. Sir, I think you cannot fight something with
nothing. So I think that it is important to start.
Senator Corker. Well, we have been doing that for a long
time. So it is interesting. So I agree with you and I think
everybody here does. I guess the question is, can you fight
something with almost nothing at this point, when it has
festered into this type of
situation?
The Chairman. And then we will have to move to Senator
Boxer.
Ms. Slotkin. I do think it is important. We have put
together a program that is scaleable. You can start small and
move up significantly in the numbers and scale of the program,
and we think it is critical that we start.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
I look at things just a little bit differently than a lot
of folks here. I think the Iraqis had a chance of a lifetime
and America's blood and treasure gave them that chance of a
lifetime, a chance at unity, a chance at peace, and with their
natural resources a chance at a growing economy. And clearly
those of us, a minority of 23, who predicted this if we went to
war, we did not prevail and that is life. You do not prevail,
so you move on.
And then later when then-Senator Biden, who was the
chairman of this committee, proposed more autonomy for the
Sunnis and for the Kurds--and by the way--more than 70 Senators
voted for that. The then-Bush administration laughed at it,
kind of like people laugh right now. That is a lot of laughing.
And that was turned away.
So the situation in Iraq I think is dire now, and I am not
about to reinvest more lives and treasure. The United States
has sacrificed too much. The war cost us $2 trillion. People
predicted it would be over in weeks, months. More than 4,400
Americans were killed, their families never the same, 32,000
wounded during the course of the war. And we all know, and I
praise Senators Sanders and McCain for battling to get help for
those who are suffering from physical and mental injuries.
So I am pleased that President Obama said unequivocally
``American Forces will not be returning to combat in Iraq,''
and I want to record to show that I will never vote to send
more combat forces in. You know, you get so many chances in a
lifetime.
I want to ask you about the Kurds, both of you. I do not
know which one. Either of you could answer. The Kurds in
northern Iraq have long been a strong ally of the United
States, and they have played an important role in countering
the rapid advance of ISIS. When I went to Iraq a very long time
ago, the bullets were flying. The Kurds, I found them to get
what this was all about.
There is so much prejudice against the Kurds. The Kurdish
militia offered to support Iraqi Security Forces when ISIS
began its
offensive in Mosul. Kurdish forces have kept much of northern
Iraq out of terrorist hands. Iraqi Kurdistan has become a
destination for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fleeing from
ISIS-controlled territory.
I have to say, as I watch Mr. Maliki, I do not think he
appreciates it. As the Iraqis continue to work to determine
their future, I am asking you, what role can the Kurds continue
to play, and should the United States acknowledge that the
Kurds should have a significant amount of autonomy in a future
Iraq? I think they have earned it, and I wondered what the
administration's position is vis-a-vis the Kurds and more
autonomy for the Kurds.
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Senator. We are in a very active
conversation with all the Kurdish leaders about their future.
There are some realities that they are grappling with, the
geostrategic realities and geographic realities, also their
economic realities. They need about $14 billion to sustain
themselves operationally. Their share of the budget this year,
which is pending in Baghdad, is about $17 billion. We think
there is a deal there within the constitutional framework that
is in the best interests of the Kurds and also our interests
both in northern Iraq and Iraq as a whole.
However, since this crisis began--and we recognize we are
dealing with new realities on the ground that we have to
recognize and deal with. We have established a joint operations
center in Erbil to work with the Kurdish forces and with the
Peshmerga to make sure, because they have about 1,000
kilometers now with ISIS on a good chunk of their border and
they are going to need some help.
But that will work most effectively if it is done in
cooperation and coordination with Baghdad, of course with us
providing a mediating role where necessary. So we are in a very
active conversation with them. They have a good deal of
autonomy now and I am sure that they will ask for more through
the government formation process, and that will all be done
under the constitution.
President Barzani has been on the phone a number of times
with our Vice President Biden to talk about these issues.
Barzani has made it clear to us he wants to act through the
constitutional framework for resolving some of the disputed
boundaries in which the Peshmerga have moved by necessity over
the last 6 weeks.
So the short answer to your question, we are in a very
active conversation with the Kurds about this, and I am happy
to follow up with you as it unfolds over the coming months.
Senator Boxer. And the United States will support more
autonomy for the Kurds then, I assume?
Mr. McGurk. Well, through the government formation process
there will be an active debate. I will just say we very much
support the Kurds on particular critical issues. Baghdad about
4 or 5 months ago cut funding for salaries of workers in the
Kurdish region. We have made very clear that is completely,
totally, unacceptable and that has to be reversed.
The Kurds have also done some things in some cases in which
we have said that might exacerbate tensions in a way that would
not be particularly constructive. That is why we are in a very
active conversation. But, we support autonomy within the
constitutional framework, certainly.
Senator Boxer. I am just saying, I do not know what the
future is of that constitutional framework, but we all hope it
works.
The last question is: Are you confident we have adequate
personnel on the ground to truly protect our Embassy and the
Americans in Baghdad?
Mr. McGurk. Senator, yes. We have moved in substantial
assets both to the airport and also into the Embassy. I was
just there as late as Thursday and we are confident that our
defensive perimeters and everything, that our people will be
safe. Our Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security just
visited Baghdad last week
to do his own assessment and we have also had teams on the
ground from CENTCOM. This is an ongoing assessment. And our
intelligence assets have the entire, everything, all around the
perimeter of the city of Baghdad, the airport, and our Embassy
very well covered. So we are confident.
Senator Boxer. Can you tell us how many people we have at
the Embassy, or is that something that you do not want to
discuss in open session?
Mr. McGurk. We have a total in Baghdad of about 2,500 now.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McGurk, let us quickly go back to the Kurds. I have
been made aware of the fact that the Baghdad Government is
basically in arrears on the Kurds' budget by about $6 billion.
Is that pretty accurate?
Mr. McGurk. There are a lot of ways to do the accounting
and the math. Baghdad claims the Kurds owe them money, the
Kurds claim that Baghdad owes them money, and in that space is
where a deal lies. I think that is going to be part of the
conversation in forming a new government.
Senator Johnson. If it is true that Baghdad owes them as
much as $6 billion, would the United States support the Kurds'
ability to export oil and obtain that revenue so they can keep
themselves going?
Mr. McGurk. We want to get as much oil onto international
markets as possible from all parts of Iraq, and that is
something that we very strongly support. We worked very hard
over the last 6 months to get a deal on the table by which the
Kurds would have exported as much oil as they possibly could
through some of the existing arrangements, with the revenue-
sharing allocations that exist. And that deal almost succeeded,
but it ran up against the election timeframe, and once you had
an election it was very difficult to close the deal.
But I think we will be able to get that back on the table.
But we want as much oil from Iraq north to south onto
international markets as soon as possible.
Senator Johnson. Now, I appreciate the fact that we are
going through assessments and we are studying the problem. You
have to recognize reality before you really develop a strategy.
But, I really do want to just compare where we are now versus
where we were prior to the 2007 surge.
Mr. McGurk, you have been involved in this for quite some
time. What was the level of the Iraqi Forces back in 2007? I
really want some relatively quick answers here because I want
to get some data points.
Mr. McGurk. How do you measure the level?
Senator Johnson. How many people were in the Iraqi Security
Forces back in 2007?
Mr. McGurk. I do not have the figure, but it was not a
highly effective force in early 2007.
Senator Johnson. America, we had about 132,000 at the start
of the surge and we surged to about 168,000, correct?
Mr. McGurk. That is right.
Senator Johnson. What were we up against in terms of enemy
fighters back in 2007?
Mr. McGurk. We assess that the main enemy then was al-Qaeda
in Iraq, which is ISIL. It is the same organization.
Senator Johnson. And about how many people were we up
against?
Mr. McGurk. These figures are always very difficult.
Senator Johnson. I understand.
Mr. McGurk. We had assessments of 6 to 8,000 at the time,
but probably more.
Senator Johnson. So what do we think current ISIL forces
are?
Mr. McGurk. Currently, the assessments we have seen--but
again they are very difficult to measure--15,000 or so, in Iraq
far less.
Senator Johnson. But basically double of what we had in
2007?
Mr. McGurk. ISIL today, according to our assessments, is
far more capable in manpower resources and fighting
effectiveness than the AQI that we fought, yes.
Senator Johnson. That is my point. U.S. troop levels right
now in Iraq are how many?
Mr. McGurk. Total now about----
Ms. Slotkin. We have inserted 775 or so and we have about
100 that were associated with our Office of Security
Cooperation.
Senator Johnson. So less than a thousand?
Ms. Slotkin. Less than a thousand.
Senator Johnson. Less than a thousand now. Back in 2007,
prior to a pretty difficult battle, in terms of the surge, we
had 168,000 at the height of that. And ISIL now is double the
size that it was back in 2007 and they have some of our
weapons; their capabilities are much higher.
Mr. McGurk. That is right.
Senator Johnson. What was the size of the Iraqi military
force in June 2014, prior to ISIL's move into Iraq? What was
our estimate there?
Mr. McGurk. I do not have that figure, but I can get it for
you.
Senator Johnson. Are we talking hundreds of thousands?
Mr. McGurk. Hundreds of thousands, but we try to look at
capable and effective forces, and one of the purposes of the
assessment was to determine which units are effective, which
are ineffective. There are some units, quite frankly, that are
totally ineffective and there are some units that are highly
capable and effective.
Senator Johnson. Ms. Slotkin, do you have that information?
Ms. Slotkin. I think it is just shy of 200,000.
Senator Johnson. Two hundred thousand prior to the
intrusion, the invasion?
Ms. Slotkin. I believe so.
Senator Johnson. How many now do you think there are? You
said that they lost four divisions. How many would that
represent that have just melted into the background?
Ms. Slotkin. Again, I do not have the exact number, but it
is probably closer to 160-ish.
Senator Johnson. Do you have any sense of what percentage
of that force would have any effectiveness in terms of
fighting?
Mr. McGurk. In terms of the dissolved units, it was about
30,000. The Iraqis have since recalled about 10,000 and,
according to our OSCI assessments, there are about 10,000 who
have come back and are going through about a 3-week training
course now.
Senator Johnson. The effectiveness of the Iraqi Security
Forces versus U.S. fighting forces? Not even comparable, right?
Mr. McGurk. You cannot even compare them, no.
Senator Johnson. We have got a real problem on our hands.
We talked a little bit about the threat to our homeland
that ISIL in Syria and Iraq represent. Can you describe what
the threat to the homeland is because of the situation? Can you
make the American people aware of why this matters?
Mr. McGurk. What really concerns our counterterrorism
experts and also concerns us is this rise in very dedicated
global jihadist fighters coming from all over the world, many
with Western passports. In Baghdad, just this week there was a
suicide bomber. There was a German, there was an Australian.
ISIL is able to funnel about 30 to 50 suicide bombers a month
into Iraq. These are, we assess, almost all foreign fighters.
It would be very easy for ISIL to decide to funnel that
cadre of dedicated suicide bombers, global jihadis, into other
capitals around the region, or Europe or, worse, here. So that
is a very significant, significant concern. They have training
bases in Syria and they are recruiting on social media and the
Internet, and it is something that we have never seen before.
Senator Johnson. A year ago the President declared the war
on terror was over. Do you believe the war on terror is over?
Mr. McGurk. I think we have a very significant fight on our
hands with ISIL, which we have to manage.
Senator Johnson. I have no further questions.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank both of you for your appearance here today and
for your service to our country. I certainly agree that the
United States has a vital interest in containing ISIS' growth
and its threat to our homeland and to our allies. I also agree
that we have a direct interest in dealing with a Government in
Iraq that represents all the ethnic communities fairly with an
effective government that gives confidence to moderates that
their voices can be heard within the Iraqi Government.
But it was interesting. I was listening to Senator Johnson
go through some of the comparisons on the strength of the
terrorist networks. He was drawing a comparison over the last 7
years. But if you go back to before the U.S. troop invasion in
2001, at least my understanding was there was virtually no al-
Qaeda, no terrorist network that was a direct threat to our
homeland, in Iraq. So it does raise a lot of the questions that
Senator Boxer raised initially, that our use of military force
back in 2001 was ill-advised.
We do not want to repeat the mistakes that we have made in
the past. That is the reason I bring it up. But I started with
the fact that we have a vital interest in dealing with the
current circumstances that are on the ground in Iraq.
I know this hearing is focused on Iraq, but I want to move
a little bit to Syria and what impact ISIS is having on the
opposition
effectiveness in Syria and whether we are finding that any of
the support for the opposition is strengthening ISIS' capacity
within Iraq. The network between the moderate Gulf States and
the opposition in Syria, are we confident that that equipment
is not finding its way to the terrorist networks now operating
in Iraq?
Ms. Slotkin. Obviously, the connection between ISIL--
between the threat in Iraq and Syria is pretty significant. I
do not personally know of any reports of opposition support
then being funneled to ISIL. I think they are in a pretty
bitter fight against both the regime and the terrorists, who
have taken over territory particularly in eastern and northern
Syria. So I do not have any reports of that equipment and that
support that has been provided getting into their hands, but it
is always a risk.
Senator Cardin. What precautions have we taken with
moderate Arab States and with our own support for the
opposition in Syria to make sure that we are not finding
American support or moderate Arab State support ending up
encouraging terrorist activities now moving into Iraq?
Ms. Slotkin. This is something obviously we talk to our
gulf partners about quite a bit, certainly over the period of
the past couple of years, and we just urge them to make sure,
similar to the way we do end use monitoring, that they have
some way of telling who they are providing things to, in what
capacity, et cetera, et cetera. We urge them to follow up the
way we would want them to follow up.
Senator Cardin. Mr. McGurk, how is the impasse in Syria,
the failure to be able to have a workable plan in Syria,
impacting stability in Iraq?
Mr. McGurk. It is a very good question, Senator. The
Iraqis, since the beginning of the Syria crisis--and this is
really all Iraqis--have had a different conception of the Syria
crisis than we have had. They have been very concerned that,
based upon their own experience, that were you to see the fall
of the Assad regime, that it would unleash just chaos on their
borders. And they take what is happening within that frame.
There is a Kurdish dimension to the Syria crisis. There is
a central government in Iraq dimension to the Syria crisis.
There is a tribal dimension to the Syria crisis. And it has
just accelerated the centrifugal forces that are tearing at the
fabric of Iraq. So it is very hard to even state the impact
that the Syria crisis has had in Iraq, in particular the rise
of the suicide bombings and car bombings, all of which we
assess are ISIL. They come month after month and they are
targeted--and this is ISIL's doctrine and ideology; you can go
back to the writings of Zarqawi in 2004--to tear at the fabric
of Iraq, to attack Shia civilians in their marketplaces, their
playgrounds, their mosques, repeatedly, to attack Sunni tribal
leaders who disagree with them. And that is why, in February,
almost 86 percent of the suicide bombings that ISIL brought
into Iraq were all focused on the Euphrates Valley and Anbar
province, attacking Sunnis who disagreed with their ideology,
and then to attack the Kurds in the disputed boundary
territories in the north. That is what ISIL is trying to do.
We got that suicide bomber number down to about 5 to 10 a
month in 2011-2012 and last year and this year it went up to 30
to 50 a month, and it has a devastating effect on the entire
psychology of the country.
Senator Cardin. Do we have any numbers on how many Iraqis
have been displaced, either within Iraq or outside in other
countries since June?
Mr. McGurk. Immediately, in Mosul there are about 500,000
IDP's, and since this crisis really started earlier this year,
the IDP number is over a million.
Senator Cardin. Are they in Iraq or are they in Iran or are
they in other countries?
Mr. McGurk. Most of them are in Iraq and most of them have
fled to the Kurdish region in the north. We have worked very
closely with our regional partners and with our U.N. partners
in Iraq to manage this crisis. Secretary Kerry, after he was in
Baghdad, went to Paris to meet the Foreign Ministers of UAE,
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, and then went to Riyadh to see King
Abdullah, and the Saudis right after that meeting very
generously contributed $500 million to the U.N. agencies
working in Iraq, which was a much-needed contribution.
We have contributed since the crisis began in Mosul, about
$18 million, and we are working very closely, particularly with
our Kurdish partners, to manage the crisis.
Senator Cardin. I take it that very few of these people
have returned because it is not safe at this moment?
Mr. McGurk. Yes, that is right.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
How long have we known that ISIL was a threat to the extent
that they are now? How long has the State Department assessed
it as a threat?
Mr. McGurk. We have known this organization since 2003. It
is Zarqawi, Al Qaeda in Iraq. We have known it. We have watched
it.
Senator Flake. I know we have known it, but at what point
did we think that there was a threat that they would take over
Mosul?
Mr. McGurk. Well, in Mosul they have had this modus vivendi
in which they run racketeering schemes and they self-generate
funding for about $12 million a month in Mosul. We have known
that has been going on. Their open assault into Mosul, we did
not have indications of that until a few days beforehand.
Senator Flake. Just a few days before that. When did we
give warning to the Iraqi Government that this was a threat, or
did they--has their intelligence network been sufficient to
know this before it was a problem?
Mr. McGurk. It is a very good question, Senator. In fact,
we have been giving warnings and expressing concern to the
Iraqi Government about the security environment, not just in
Mosul but in northern Ninewah, going back about the last year.
And it was a part of the conversation that I know our Vice
President had with Prime Minister Maliki, when Maliki was here
in November.
We have been very concerned about it and are trying to work
with the Kurds and with the Iraqi Security Forces in those
areas to have some coordination, because ISIL comes through
that border crossing south of a town called Rabia, and they
have filled that space gradually over the last year.
Senator Flake. Without our military there actually
conducting ground operations, our efforts have been in the
diplomatic field, one, to try to convince the Iraqis to be more
inclusive and to not give rise to this kind of activity or
space for that kind of activity to happen, but, two, to warn
them and help them combat this.
It seems to me we have been spectacularly unsuccessful in
the diplomatic arena in that regard. Do you have any response
to that? Or how hard are we working there? What intelligence do
we have? Are we passing it on? Is the Iraqi Government simply
unresponsive? What has been the issue here?
Mr. McGurk. In terms of intelligence cooperation, sharing
with Iraqi Forces and cooperation with Iraqi Forces, right now,
as we speak, it is at a level we have not seen since our troops
left in 2011. So there are some opportunities there for us.
Since we really started focusing on the al-Qaeda-ISIL
threat in Iraq, really going back to last summer, you can see
some statements that the State Department issued about
Baghdadi, the fact that he is the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq,
he is now in Syria, and ISIL is an increasing threat to Iraq.
We have developed platforms with the Iraqis to try to develop a
better intelligence picture. But a lot of it was slow going.
On the political side, we were very focused when the crisis
began in Anbar to make clear, very clear, that any tribal
fighters rising up to fight this group will get full benefits
and resources of the state. The Iraqis also agreed to train
about 1,000 native Fallujans. They gave them 3 months of
training and then they actually mobilized and there was an
operation in northern Fallujah and, quite frankly, those
fighters lost, and they lost because the ISIL networks,
particularly in Fallujah, with snipers, with IED's, with their
military sophistication, are able to overmatch any tribal force
that comes to confront it. That is the situation right now.
It was also the situation in northern Ninewah, because we
do have tribal contacts up there with the Shamar Tribe, which
is the main tribe up there. And over time, given the
infiltrations from Syria, given the amount of force that ISIL
can bring to bear, it was very difficult for locals to stand up
to them.
Senator Flake. You say cooperation with the Iraqi
Government was slow in coming. Where does the fault lie with
that? Were we slow to recognize the threat of ISIS or was the
Iraqi Government simply slow to heed the warnings that we were
giving or the cooperation that we offered?
Mr. McGurk. I think we started moving fairly aggressively
in the summer. The Iraqis wanted to do things on their own.
They did not really formally request direct U.S. military
assistance until May, although there was a conversation about
the possibility of such assistance earlier than May. But the
formal request came in May.
The Iraqis are very proud of their sovereignty. We have a
strategic framework agreement with them, which allows us to do
an awful lot. But the notion of flying surveillance drones over
Iraqi skies, quite frankly, was something that was
controversial at first. So we had to develop the mechanisms and
the procedures for doing these things, and we have those now
well in place.
Senator Flake. Our role in Congress, one of our main roles,
obviously is to provide funding for these conflicts, for
intelligence, for diplomatic efforts. Aside from thousands of
lives lost, we have spent about $800 billion at last count in
Iraq, just in Iraq. What can we tell our constituents that we
have gotten out of that? Where are we now that we would not be
had we not spent $800 billion?
Ms. Slotkin. I think, as Senator Boxer said, we gave them
an opportunity and we hope that this is not the end of the
story in Iraq. We believe that there is still an opportunity
for the Iraqis to form a government and do something about this
problem, and we are urging them to get on with it.
I think that we still believe in a way forward in Iraq.
They just have to take the opportunity.
Senator Flake. Is it possible at all in the State
Department's view to move ahead with Maliki in charge? Will
there be sufficient trust, any trust, in the Sunni population
that he will be inclusive enough, his government? Or does our
strategy rely on somebody else coming in?
Mr. McGurk. Again, it is going to be very difficult for him
to form a government, and so they are facing that question now,
now that the President has been elected, to face the question
of the Prime Minister. Any Prime Minister, in order to form a
government, is going to have to pull the country together. So
whoever the leader is is someone that is going to have to
demonstrate that, just to get the votes he needs to remain or
to be sworn into office.
So that is something that is going to evolve fairly rapidly
over the coming days. Again, there is a 15-day timeline to
nominate
a Prime Minister, and then whoever the nominee is still has to
then form a Cabinet and present it to the Parliament to form a
government.
The Speaker of the Parliament, again, was elected
overwhelmingly with support from all major groups, as was the
President, and we would anticipate the Prime Minister. As we
have said, as the President has said, it has to be somebody
that has a very inclusive agenda and that can bring all the
component groups together. Otherwise he will not be able to
govern.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Flake.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you. I want to thank Senator Menendez
for chairing this hearing, and Senator Kaine and Senator Corker
for your leadership on this committee as well, and thank our
witnesses for your testimony today. I will follow on Senator
Flake's questioning in a moment.
I share the administration's ultimate goal as you have just
been testifying to of encouraging the creation of an inclusive
Iraqi Government that is supported by all of Iraq's different
sectarian groups, that has some hope of a secure and stable
Iraq going forward, given how much has been sacrificed over how
many years.
But I will also renew a theme you have heard from several
Senators, that I do not support a return of active U.S. combat
troop presence in Iraq. I am concerned about the security of
our Embassy and our personnel and I am very concerned about the
region and about some of our vital regional allies. So first I
think we do need to deal with defeating ISIS and the regional
threat here in the regional context, as you testified. And I
think it is imperative that we have to find a way to move
forward that has some reasonable chance of resolving the
ongoing crisis in both Iraq and Syria to the best interests of
the United States, of Israel, of Jordan, of Turkey, of all of
our regional allies.
First, on the point you were just discussing, what do you
see as the prospects, the path forward for a political solution
here in these next 15 days? Have you met with anyone who
strikes you as a promising potential Prime Minister, who really
could bridge these divides? Given reports of high-level
delegations of Iranian military officials and diplomats meeting
in Baghdad and in Najaf, I am concerned that there are fewer
and fewer realistic chances of a broad-based, inclusive
government being formed, given active interference and
engagement from Iran.
Mr. McGurk. I can speak a little bit to the process. This
was Iraq's third national election they held on April 30. It
was one of the best elections they have held in terms of the
turnout. In 2006 it took about 7 months to form a government
and was an extremely difficult process, and what they did was
they built this very bloated government with every seat filled
and then voted it into office.
In 2010 it wound up being the same thing. It took 9 months, and
again they built a very bloated structure and then swore it
into
office.
This year, this time, they are proceeding quite
differently. They are moving through their constitutional
timeline: Speaker, President, now Prime Minister. It is moving
much faster than ever
before. Nine months in 2010. We are less than 3 months out from
the April elections and we are now on the step for the prime
ministership.
I would be hesitant to put timelines on it because it is a
very complicated process. The 328 members in the Iraqi
Parliament represent the entire spectrum of political thought
in Iraq, and so it is very difficult to get full unity on any
one person or any one issue. So there will be a very strong
debate. It is not beanbag,
the political process there. Now they are starting to focus on
the
most critical question of who is going to lead the coiunty as
the chief executive.
Senator Coons. Your riveting description of the fall of
Mosul suggests that a lack of urgency, a lack of reality, about
the situation on the ground was outcome determinative, led to a
failure to act in a timely way and to ISIS sweeping across much
of the center of the country. Do you think there is a sense of
urgency, a sense of reality, both as to the defense posture
that ISF now faces and to the political challenges that they
face?
Mr. McGurk. Yes. There is a culture in Iraq that sometimes
folks do not want to give their leaders bad news, and sometimes
we are the ones who have to deliver the bad news and say ``you
face a very urgent situation.'' Mosul was a good example of
that. The generals up there were not saying that it was
particularly urgent. So we are often the ones that have to do
that.
Now, given the information we have, given the relationships
we have on the ground, military relationships, we are able to
give them a very clear picture of the situation they face. The
relative tactical success they have had in clearing some of the
highways north of Baghdad--and relative because it remains very
difficult, but the highway--it is Highway 1 that goes all the
way, up north through the Tigris Valley from Baghdad to
Samarra. They did clear that. That was partially on their own,
but partially because we helped them with some information.
Then, the next stretch, from Samarra to Tikrit, the same thing.
As I mentioned, we did not advise them to go into Tikrit City
itself because that is a very difficult military environment to
operate in.
But, again, that is why General Austin is on the ground, to
discuss with their new commanders, who we have very good
relationships with, and with the Iraqi political leaders, how
we can better approach this going forward in a more cooperative
way.
Senator Coons. Ms. Slotkin, there has been widespread
reports of Sunnis sort of bristling under ISIS rule. They are
extreme, they conduct not just terror attacks and suicide
bombings and targeted assassinations, but they also are
imposing a particularly harsh form of sharia. What prospects
are there for outreach, for reengagement with elements of the
Sunni community that might assist the Iraqi Security Forces,
might play some role in rising up against ISIS in a replay of
what happened previously?
Ms. Slotkin. I think we have seen this story before in our
own experience in Iraq, that many of these groups who may give
tacit support to terrorist organizations in their
neighborhoods, as soon as there is some prospect of turning
against them and they know they have some support from their
central government to do it, then they will turn on them. They
do not like living under sometimes the sharia law that has been
imposed on them.
So I think the prospects are still there. But I think
ultimately it will come down to whether they feel like they
have a partner in the central government of Iraq, there is
something to break away for. And that is up to the Iraqi
Government. The new government will have to attract the Sunnis
away from ISIS and ISIL and toward them. The security forces
have to be a part of that, but at the end of the day it is
about a political compromise that they strike in Baghdad and
lure those Sunnis away.
Senator Coons. I am particularly concerned about our vital
ally in the region Jordan, about their both military and
economic and strategic stability, given the flood of refugees
that they have already been taking in as a result of the Syrian
crisis, and about the open, increasingly porous borders. What
concrete steps are we taking to reinforce and to ensure the
stability and vibrancy of Jordan, and how does the announced
intent to deliver support to the vetted moderate Syrian
resistance strengthen that?
Ms. Slotkin. I think the most important thing is that the
Jordanian military is a very capable military force. So we are
very focused on the threat right on their border, but so are
they. They have reinforced their troops on their border with
Iraq, and we have a very close relationship, military to
military relationship, with the Jordanians and talk with them
on a daily basis.
Again, because of the Syria crisis the United States
already had a robust presence in the country. We have F-16's
there, we have a Patriot battery there. We have a $300 million
FMF program. We do education with them. It is a strong
relationship, one of the strongest in the region. So I feel
confident that we are doing everything we can in response to
any request that they have to help them with their situation on
the border.
I think the idea of supporting moderate, vetted opposition
in Syria is only more positive. The United States needs capable
partners and platforms in the region to deal with this very
fluid threat. The Jordanians are a big part of that and so will
the Syrian moderate opposition.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Coons.
Senator Risch defers his questioning for now to Senator
Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Let me begin with my--I think our priority for everyone
here is the safety and security of our personnel, including
Department of Defense personnel and certainly the State
Department personnel at the embassy, given recent events. So
there has been increased reporting that the ISF is increasingly
linked or intermingled with Shia militia forces, that some of
these Shia militia forces are actually now wearing ISF
uniforms, but it is becoming increasingly
difficult to distinguish between a Shia militia fighter and an
ISF
personnel.
We have seen open source reporting that the Shia militia
could pose a threat to our personnel, including potentially our
military trainers and others. Can you briefly describe, number
one, how we assess the threat of these militia and what are we
doing to mitigate the risks that they could pose to our
personnel, given the fact that they are now basically embedded
and intermingled with the Iraqi Security Force personnel that
we are working side by side potentially with?
Ms. Slotkin. Sure. This is exactly what we were trying to
assess by going over there and looking unit by unit in and
around Baghdad at things like command and control, morale, and
in particular infiltration of Shia militias. Grand Ayatollah
Sistani put out a very public call for volunteers to join the
military, so one thing we watched very closely was as all these
new folks came in where would their allegiances be? Would they
respond to the commanders of their unit or someone else?
I think that is what we have been trying to figure out, and
I think the picture, honestly, is mixed. In some areas we have
good morale, strong adherence to command and control through
the military channels, and in other places it is more of an
open question. Those are the kinds of units that we do not want
to be working with and why we are taking this very sort of
deliberate approach.
Senator Rubio. Well, but there is the real risk, is there
not, that Shia militia that are there could just as easily be
the ones firing on our Embassy and on our personnel as ISIL
personnel could be, unless they are somehow otherwise
constrained?
Mr. McGurk. Senator, the Shia militias are something we
watch very closely. There has been a cease-fire. The Shia
militias have had a cease-fire in place since 2009 against
their own government forces, a cease-fire. We have not had any
attacks from Shia militias since 2011. But it is something that
we watch extremely closely.
The assessment assessed every unit around Baghdad and,
without getting into the details, some units are infiltrated
and dangerous. Some of them, however, are very capable, very
effective, and have close relationships with us.
Senator Rubio. I wanted to get to a broader question, and
you touched upon it in your statement and you do even more so
in the written statement that you have submitted. But here is
the question that we get from people, and that is people are
outraged by what is happening, especially the reports coming
out about the different things that ISIL is doing. By no means
is this a group that is popular and I think Americans
understand this is a terrible, radical group of violent
individuals.
That being said, public opinion polls and just from the
phone calls we get in our offices, the attitude of much of the
American public is it is a mess, but it is their problem, let
them figure it out. I have personally said that this is not
even about Iraq at this point; it is about the long-term
security of the United States, and that the threat that ISIL
poses to the United States, especially if they are able to
establish a safe haven of operations similar to what al-Qaeda
did, in fact, even worse than what al-Qaeda was able to do in
Afghanistan.
But I was hoping that from the administration's point of
view and from the State Department and the Department of
Defense's point of view you could perhaps use this as an
opportunity to explain to my constituents in Florida why this
matters to America, why something happening halfway around the
world, in a country that people, quite frankly, think
increasingly perhaps we should not have gotten involved in? Why
does this matter? Why should people care about what is
happening in Iraq, given the problems we have here at home?
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Senator. Let me say a couple of
things. I, of course, address the ISIL threat in my written and
opening statement, and that is a very serious counterterrorism
threat, and that is number one.
But these are vital, vita,l United States interests in
Iraq. Number one: the counterterrorism, the al-Qaeda threat.
Number two: just the supply of energy resources to global
markets. Iraq through 2035 will account for 45 percent of all
of the growth in oil energy exports. If Iraq were to collapse
in a major civil war and sectarian war, the effects to our own
economy here at home would be quite serious.
Every single faultline crossing through the Middle East--
Arab-Persian, moderate, extremist, Shia-Sunni, Arab-Kurd--
everything meets in Iraq. So were ISIL to get into, for
example, the mosque city of Samarra, which it wanted to do, and
to unleash a cauldron of sectarian violence, it would spread
throughout the Middle East, with devastating effects for our
economy here at home.
So vital interests, from al-Qaeda to energy resources and
our own economy, are at stake.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Did you want to add something?
Ms. Slotkin. I would just foot-stomp the ISIL threat. They
are self-funded. They have control of significant territory.
They are tested in battle. They are a serious threat. And while
we do not assess right now that they are doing distinct
homeland plotting, they have certainly said rhetorically--they
are open about it--that they are coming for the United States.
In my experience as a Defense official, I do not want that
to fester. I want to do something about that.
Senator Rubio. I thank you for that. I think you have done
a good job of outlining the reason why we should care and why
this matters. This is not simply about Iraq. This is about the
United States.
Could you then briefly--if I brought some people in here
from Florida or they are watching or I were to share this
video, could you explain to them what our plan is? What are we
doing? What are the two or three things that we are doing to
address this threat, which as you have described is a very
significant one to our country? What is the plan?
Mr. McGurk. Let me focus on ISIL. We need to do three
things. We need to strangle their entire network. That means
their foreign fighter flow in particular. We just had a meeting
all day yesterday with the Turks to focus on that. We have to
strangle their foreign fighter flow network into Syria.
Number two, we have to begin to deny space and safe haven
and sanctuary, which they have in Syria, which gets into why we
are training, planning on, hoping to train the moderate
opposition with a train and equip program.
Number three, we have to help the Iraqis take control of
their sovereign space. To do that, as I explained in my
testimony, a functioning federal system in which we do recruit
locally, with local tribal structures, but with the resources
of the central government, because there was a conversation
about recruiting tribes, which is what we want to do. But we
have to recognize that unless the local people and local tribes
have the resources of the central government or national-based
resources, they are not going to be able to defeat this
organization.
Senator Rubio. What are we specifically doing and going to
be doing to crush their networks and prevent them from having
safe havens? Operationally, what are we going to do to
accomplish those goals that you have outlined as part of our
plan?
Mr. McGurk. Well, I can speak to the Iraq portion of this,
and this is why, since this crisis began in early June, we
immediately surged in a significant surge of intelligence
assets into Iraq, to get a better picture of the situation. We
put special forces on the ground to get eyes on. We are now at
the point where we have collected all the information and we
have a fairly concrete, precise, picture and we are coming up
with options for doing just that. So this will be an ongoing
conversation with this committee and the Congress over the days
and weeks ahead.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here. I want to follow up a little
bit on the line of questioning that Senator Rubio was following
and your response, because you mentioned in your testimony, Mr.
McGurk, that we need to work with our partners in the region,
especially Turkey, to seal the border to Syria from foreign
fighters and ISL recruits. So can you talk a little bit more--I
know you are limited to some extent--about how this is
proceeding and what other partners we might engage to address
this concern?
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Senator. We have some experience in
doing this in the late 2006, 2007 timeframe, where it was the
same foreign fighter network. At the time they were all flying
into Damascus, going to Aleppo, and following a rat line into
Iraq. We squeezed it. We did an anaconda strategy to squeeze
the entire network from the source capitals, where they were
getting on airplanes, to get them off the airplanes.
We are now doing a similar effort, and Ambassador Bradtke
is Senior Adviser at the State Department under the CT Bureau,
focused on the foreign fighter network. It is two parts: Turkey
has a very long border. It is very hard to control. Turkey is
doing some things to strengthen its own border and focus on
this problem; also, the source capitals in which young
military-age males are getting on airplanes and going to
certain airports in Turkey.
So we are working very carefully through our entire
interagency and the folks that are really expert in this, with
the source capitals in which people are getting on airplanes
and coming into Syria, and with the Turks. It is Europe, it is
North Africa, and it is the gulf region.
Senator Shaheen. Can you talk about how long we have been
doing that and whether we are seeing any results as a result of
that effort?
Mr. McGurk. Senator, we have been doing it for some time
now. I can follow up with you after speaking with the experts
dealing with this and have a written response.
Senator Shaheen. I would appreciate that, and probably
sharing it with the committee would be very helpful as well.
You also talk about the tremendous effort on the part of
the Kurdistan government to accommodate the internally
displaced people fleeing from other parts of Iraq. I wonder if
you could talk about the extent to which the Government in
Baghdad recognizes the strain this is causing and has been
willing to work with the Kurds at all to help address this.
Mr. McGurk. One promising sign, Senator, in what is a very
dark landscape--I want to be very clear. This humanitarian
situation is extremely serious and it is heartbreaking,
particularly when it comes to the Christian minorities and
other vulnerable groups. I met with the Christian leadership in
Erbil and Baghdad, throughout my last trip, about how we can do
a better job helping these people, who are under a very serious
threat.
The Iraqi Government could do more to help the Kurdish
Regional Government, particularly with state resources and
state funding. The Iraqi Parliament, which is just meeting
because it just convened for the first time, it is a brand-new
Parliament. It has a brand-new Speaker. The first session
really was yesterday, and one of the first things they did,
first they all united in condemnation of what is happening to
Christians in northern Nineveh province. And they also formed a
very broad committee from all the major groups to figure out
how to direct state resources--and,
remember, Iraq has significant resources. There is a budget
pending in the Parliament for $140 billion, and that is
something that the government has to tap into to help these
people.
So they just formed a committee yesterday to figure out
some things to do, and we are obviously actively engaged with
them to try to influence that process.
Senator Shaheen. So does the selection of a Kurdish
President help with this effort?
Mr. McGurk. Certainly. We look forward to working with the
new President, with President Fuad Masum, on these issues.
Again, he won an overwhelming victory on the vote today on the
floor of the Iraqi Parliament. So it is a good step forward.
But we work with all the Kurdish leadership in Erbil and
Sulaymaniyah, and also in Baghdad.
Senator Shaheen. But I would assume that, given his
election, that he might have some influence in the Parliament
that could be very helpful. Has he made statements about the
need to help address what has happened to Christians?
Mr. McGurk. Well, he was just elected as I was coming over
here in the car. So I have not seen the statements that he has
made yet. But we will be immediately working with him and,
again, all the leaders to get the resources up to the north
that the Kurds need to deal with the humanitarian crisis.
Senator Shaheen. Finally, again I think this is for you,
Mr. McGurk, but, Ms. Slotkin, if you would like to weigh in,
please do. One of the things that has not gotten a whole lot of
attention, but has--you mention it in your testimony and
certainly we have seen it in other places where extremist Islam
has been in charge--the plight of Iraqi women and girls has
borne the brunt of a lot of the violence as they have advanced
through Iraq.
Can you talk about what we can do and what is being done to
help address this?
Mr. McGurk. Well, first, Senator, the fact that you are
asking the question is number one, because we have to put
international focus and attention on this very serious problem.
In Mosul the situation with ISIL goes from bad to worst. They
have first gone after the Christians, then they have gone after
Kurds. They are now going after women and, particularly, young
women.
This is a serious international problem. The Government of
Iraq, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, wrote a letter to the
Secretary General of the United Nations asking for
international assistance against this threat to their people.
So it is something that we need the entire efforts of the
entire world to focus on, because, frankly, the Iraqis cannot
deal with it on their own.
So, first we have to give it international attention. Then
we have to find a way to really address it. But in my
testimony, particularly in Mosul, where ISIL is setting up
really its capital of its caliphate--that is what it is trying
to do--we have to find a way to work effectively with local
tribal forces to be able to make sure that they can stand
effectively against ISIL, which right now, frankly, they
cannot, and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, because Mosul is in a
pocket in the Kurdish region, and eventually federal forces, to
be able to slowly squeeze and take back these areas.
This is going to be a long-term effort, but, especially for
the sake of the people living in these areas, we have to give
it everything we have.
Senator Shaheen. Finally, I am almost out of time, but this
may have been asked and I apologize if you have already
answered it. But there was a report in the New York Times on
July 13 that suggested that only about half of Iraq's
operational units are capable enough for us to advise them. Can
either of you speak to whether--without revealing classified
information--whether we are concerned about this, the substance
of this report being accurate?
Ms. Slotkin. Sure. It was mentioned briefly and I just
cautioned against relying solely on a leak in the New York
Times. That was a critical thing that we were looking at in
these assessments. They are still in draft. I think what is
accurate is that the picture is mixed. I do not know if it is
exactly half, but I think that we are finding units where that
is a real problem and units where it is not a problem.
And we are trying to understand how to process that. What
does it mean if certain units we can work with and they are
ambitious and they want to do things to take back their
territory and others are not the right units for us to be
working with. What should our policy be in that case? That is
complicated and that is why we are taking our time to think
about it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Slotkin, we learn more from the New York Times and from
the Wall Street Journal than we do from any briefing that we
have ever had with you. I do not agree with you very often, but
I certainly do agree with your statement you cannot fight
something with nothing, because that is what we have been
doing, nothing.
This situation in Iraq was predicted by us and predictable,
and now we find ourselves in a situation where, Mr. McGurk, the
Director of Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General have
all stated publicly that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,
or ISIS or ISIL, whichever one you want to call it, pose a
direct threat to the United States. Do you agree?
Mr. McGurk. Yes.
Senator McCain. You do agree. Well, would you agree that
Iraq and Syria are now effectively one conflict, that we cannot
address ISIS in Iraq without also addressing it in Syria, and
vice versa, particularly with reports that we see, published
reports of equipment that was captured in Iraq now showing up
in Syria?
Mr. McGurk. I think it is one theater. It is the Tigris and
Euphrates Valley theater, yes.
Senator McCain. So you do believe that this caliphate, the
richest and largest base of terrorism that I know of, is both
Iraq and Syria, this enclave?
Mr. McGurk. That is exactly what it is trying to do. It is
trying to establish that.
Senator McCain. Have they achieved it pretty well so far?
Mr. McGurk. Since June, the Iraq-Syria border has more or
less collapsed.
Senator McCain. So that means really then, if we are going
to take action in Iraq we should also take action in Syria;
would you agree?
Mr. McGurk. Again, these are all options that are being
looked at, Senator.
Senator McCain. I am just wondering if you would agree with
that. I am not asking whether you are examining options or not.
Mr. McGurk. I think, Senator, as I mentioned, in order to
really get at this network and learning from the past with Al
Qaeda in Iraq, we have to squeeze the entire network. That is
the foreign fighter flow, that is denying safe haven in Syria,
and helping the Iraqis control their sovereign territory.
Senator McCain. So if we did initiate an air-to-ground
campaign without including Syria, they would have a sanctuary
in Syria. Would you agree with that?
Mr. McGurk. One of the reasons--and again, I would defer to
my colleague Elissa--but we are focused on training the
moderate opposition, to have a force that is able to deny safe
haven and deny space to the ISL networks in Syria.
Senator McCain. Well, probably so. But the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have both
stated publicly that the Iraqi Security Forces are not capable
of regaining the territory they have lost to ISIS on their own
without external assistance. Do you agree with the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?
Mr. McGurk. The Iraqi Security Forces have moved a little
bit out of--we had the snowballing effect----
Senator McCain. I am again asking if you agree or disagree
with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, who both stated publicly that the Iraq Security Forces
are not capable of regaining the territory they have lost to
ISIS on their own without external assistance. Do you agree or
disagree?
Mr. McGurk. They cannot conduct combined arms-type
operations, which is what it would take, without some enabling
support.
Senator McCain. So since we all rule out boots on the
ground, that might mean use of air power as a way of assisting
them. Would you agree with that?
Mr. McGurk. Senator, all of these options and potential
options for the President are being looked at and, as Elissa
said, we are not going to crowd the decision space.
Senator McCain. How long have we been ``looking at'' them
now, Mr. McGurk?
Mr. McGurk. Well----
Ms. Slotkin. Sir, the assessments came in last week.
Senator McCain. So the assessments came in last week. How
long have we been assessing?
Ms. Slotkin. I think we assessed for two solid weeks.
Senator McCain. Oh, I think it has been longer than that
since the collapse of the Iraqi military, Ms. Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. I think the President made his announcement on
June 19 and then he instructed that assessors go to Baghdad.
They flew there and began their assessments immediately.
Senator McCain. I see. And so far we have launched no air
strikes in any part of Iraq, right?
Ms. Slotkin. That is correct.
Senator McCain. And you stated before that we did not have
sufficient information to know which targets to hit, is that
correct?
Ms. Slotkin. I think we have radically improved our
intelligence picture.
Senator McCain. But at the time in your view we did not
have sufficient information capability in order to launch air
strikes?
Ms. Slotkin. I think that, given our extremely deliberate
process about launching any air strike, we would--
Senator McCain. You know, it is interesting. I asked do you
think at that time we did not have sufficient information to
launch air strikes against ISIS.
Ms. Slotkin. I think, given the standards the United States
has for dropping ordnance, no, we did not have the intelligence
we would ever want at that time.
Senator McCain. I find that interesting because none of the
military that I have talked to that served there and even those
who flew there--they are absolutely convinced, as I am, that
when you have convoys moving across the desert in open terrain
you can identify them and strike them. We know that they were
operating out of bases in Syria, out in the open in the desert.
So those of us who have some military experience in the
efficacy of air power, we heartily disagree. And that is not
just me. It comes from military leaders who served there.
Mr. McGurk, published media reports indicate that the
Islamic State has an estimated 10,000 foreign fighters, 7,000
in Syria and 3,000 in Iraq. Does that sound right?
Mr. McGurk. These estimates are very difficult to discern,
but that is an estimate that we routinely see, yes.
Senator McCain. And of those foreign fighters, many of them
are from European countries, right?
Mr. McGurk. Yes.
Senator McCain. Who when returning to their countries do
not require a visa to come to this country, which is why, as I
say, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the
FBI, and
the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General
have all stated that this poses a direct threat to the United
States of
America.
In light of that, do you think we are--so far, that we have
had a proportionate response to that threat?
Mr. McGurk. I just want to say on the direct threat, if
that is a direct quote from them, I obviously defer to them on
the quote. One thing that we have done, I want to--in your
questioning of Ms. Slotkin. When this crisis started the Iraqis
had zero Hellfire missiles in their arsenal. We have delivered
to them, since this crisis began in June, hundreds of Hellfire
missiles. And with our new intelligence, with the joint
operations center, the Iraqis have deployed those missiles with
precision and accuracy. It has made a difference, and I would
be happy to follow up to----
Senator McCain. Excuse me. What difference has it made?
Mr. McGurk. Well, it blunted some of----
Senator McCain. Certainly not in the areas of Iraq that the
ISIS has been able to gain control over.
Mr. McGurk. It began to blunt some of the momentum.
Seriously, we certainly have a lot more----
Senator McCain. You did not really believe that they could
take Baghdad, did you? No one in their right mind would.
Mr. McGurk. In the initial days of this crisis, there was a
very deep concern that Iraqi Security Forces could, in the
approaches to Baghdad, substantially weaken and that was a real
concern of ours.
Senator McCain. Well, there might have been on your part,
but it certainly was not on those of us who understand Iraq and
population and Shia and Sunni.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I have overstayed my time. I thank you,
but I really agree with you, Ms. Slotkin, when you said you
cannot fight something with nothing. You are exactly right.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Odds and ends because most of my questions have been asked
already by my colleagues. But give me the status on the safety
of the American Embassy in Baghdad and our consuls in Iraq?
Mr. McGurk. Senator, thank you. It is our foremost
priority. It is something we watch every day very closely. That
is why we have rebalanced our security apparatus at the
Embassy. We have brought in substantial Department of Defense
capabilities into the Embassy and into the airport. Our
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security was there last
week, and we feel very confident about the protection of our
people. But it is something that we watch literally every
second of every day.
Our knowledge and our understanding of the defense of
Baghdad, in particular, is night and day different from where
it was just 6 weeks ago.
Senator Kaine. Because of the deployment of the advisers,
as you were discussing?
Mr. McGurk. Yes.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask about this, the Iranian influence
in Iraq. Beyond political influence, how about Iranian
expenditures in Iraq, whether it is to back up the military or
provide training and assistance? What is Iran doing in Iraq
right now that is costing them money?
Mr. McGurk. I do not have a figure on the expenditures. All
I can say is that the Iraqis again, they want the United States
to be the backbone of their military force, and that is why
they have looked to the FMS program to be that backbone. Where
we have developed relationships with Iraqi military officers,
even in times of extreme crisis, it has proven essential. An
example in my testimony is that when we had to get about 500
contractors out of Bilad, it was the Iraqi Air Force, even
despite the extreme crisis they were dealing with, that flew
their own C-130s with their own pilots to get our people out.
That is the kind of relationship that we need to continue to
invest in.
Senator Kaine. I just want to, because I am going in a
particular direction with this. You do not have an expenditure
figure on what Iran is spending in Iraq, but are they likely
spending significant resources or is the influence just more
kind of more on the political and relationship side?
Mr. McGurk. They are expending resources. They were
particularly concerned about the defense of Samarra, where the
Golden Dome Al-Askari Mosque is. And in the early weeks of the
crisis, they did invest resources to try to protect that area
of Samarra.
Senator Kaine. The reason I am asking this question is
separately we are having this intense discussion about the
Iranian nuclear negotiation and what is the effect of the
sanctions on Iran and to what extent any sanctions relief is
giving them breathing room. And we are being told from many
quarters that the Iranian economy is still suffering very
greatly. They seem to be pretty deeply in, in terms of
expenditures in Syria and they seem to be pretty deeply in in
terms of expenditures in Iraq, and that makes me think either
they are incredibly stretched or maybe their economy and
resources are a little bit stronger than some of the reports to
us suggest. And that is relevant in terms of the negotiations
that are underway with respect to the nuclear program. I will
follow that up with others.
This is a question that you might not be able to answer on
the record, and if so I will submit it--or in public--I will
submit it for the record. What are the efforts under way by the
United States to disrupt ISIL financing?
Ms. Slotkin. Sir, I think we should take it off the record
if you do not mind, just in a classified session. I would be
happy to provide that to you.
Senator Kaine. We have had testimony in these hearings
before about some kinds of financing that I think can be talked
about publicly. They do extortion, they do kidnapping. They go
to merchants and say: Pay us X. That has been discussed
publicly. But there has also been reports about others who are
funding ISIL operations, often others--maybe not the
government, but people who are connected with governments that
are allies of ours. And I would like to know in a classified
setting--and we will submit a written question--what are we
doing to disrupt ISIL financing?
The persecution of the Christian minority in Iraq, like the
persecution of any religious minority, is of significance.
Could you talk about your recent discussions on the persecution
of Christians when you were in Baghdad, Mr. McGurk?
Mr. McGurk. Thank you, Senator. I went to the home of the
Chaldean patriarch, Archbishop Sako in Mansour in Baghdad, to
discuss this directly with him, and then also in Erbil with
Bishop Warda. It is an extremely serious situation. What is so
inspiring when you visit them is that Archbishop Sako, shortly
before I saw him, had just had a service with about 500
worshippers from across the city of Baghdad in his church. This
past Sunday he had a service in which Muslims and Christians
came together in his church to say: ``We are all Christians, we
all stand for the Christians, we are all Iraqis, these are all
our people, to stand against ISIL.''
Bishop Warda in Erbil is focused on the refugees that have
left Mosul and he has asked us for some specific help with the
Kurdish Regional Government to ensure they have the protection
they need, and that is something that we followed up with
President Barzani immediately after that meeting, to ensure
that they do have that protection. And it is something we are
working on every day.
But it is a very serious situation, and it reveals what is
happening to the Christians in Mosul, it reveals what ISIL is
all about and why it is such a threat to the region and to us.
Senator Kaine. Again, we should feel deeply--since the
United States stands so strongly for religious liberty, we
should feel deeply about the persecution of any religious
minority. Mass has been said in Mosul for more than 1,800
years, but for the first time that has been broken. Weekly mass
is not being celebrated there. That is a pretty significant
thing.
I have been critical of us, the Senate, for slowness in
ambassadorial approvals, but I will just put one on the
administration. You also have got to get us names. And I will
just say this for the record: The Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom post has been vacant since
October 2013. The White House has not sent us a name, at a time
in the world, whether it might be Christians or Ahmadiyya
Muslims or Jews in some nations that are suffering because of
the persecution of religious minorities. And sadly, while the
United States is an example of religious diversity, we see
these persecution of minorities probably on the increase in the
world.
It is a core value of ours. We have such a good story to
tell. That should not be a position that is vacant. I encourage
the administration to send us a nominee promptly.
With that, Mr. Chair, I have no more questions.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
I would like to focus on the role of energy resources in
the conflict with ISIS and in the Iraqi leadership's struggle
to maintain a workable political system. ISIS has taken over
the oil fields near Mosul and Tikrit and continues to have its
sights set on the Baiji oil refinery, Iraq's largest. The group
continues to control oil fields in northeast Syria. Smuggling
this oil into the black market has reportedly brought ISIS
millions in revenues, perhaps a million dollars a day it is
being reported.
With the group's ambition to take on the trappings of an
actual state, how does capturing energy resources and
infrastructure fit into their broader strategy?
Mr. McGurk. They need the resources to survive. One reason
they are coming with everything they have at the Baiji refinery
is because they need the energy resources that are stored in
those tanks in order to keep Mosul running. The Baiji refinery
battle has now been going on for a month. There is a unit of
Iraq's Counterterrorism Service Forces there, people that we
know and that we have trained, who have been fighting
incredibly heroically.
ISIL has sent waves of car bombs and suicide bombers at the
refinery. So far the Iraqis continue to hold it, although it is
a very desperate struggle. But strategically it desperately
needs these resources to, as you said, be able to build----
Senator Markey. What further steps need to be taken in
order to protect against ISIS taking over the Baiji refinery?
That is a critical moment in the whole struggle if they are
successful in doing that, the largest single refinery in the
country. What can
be done, what needs to be done, in order to prevent that from
happening?
Mr. McGurk. Well, in fact, as I mentioned briefly in the
answer to some of Senator McCain's questions, when we did get
the Hellfire missiles into the country, one of the first places
they were deployed was around the Baiji refinery, to begin to
clear out some of the attacking ISL fighters. So that is one
example.
As we continue to assess the situation in Iraq, we have
identified particular strategic sites that we are concerned
about and that we want to make sure the Iraqis have whatever
capabilities they might need to be able to defend them.
Senator Markey. Let me move on to the Kurdish Regional
Government in the north. The Kurds are sitting on an estimated
reserve of 45 billion barrels of oil and have now captured the
oil fields around Kirkuk as well. They appear to be more and
more intent on selling their own oil abroad without
coordinating those exports through the central authorities in
Baghdad, and Baghdad seems unwilling to equitably distribute
the country's oil resources.
How can we help the Iraqi Government to better manage its
energy resources and preserve a federal system that works for
all Iraqis? Right now that seems to be collapsing and the
collapse is over the oil revenue issue. How can we play a
bigger role?
Mr. McGurk. Well, this is something where we can play a
direct role, and it is one reason we had to get through the
election and start to get a new government formed, so we can
get some traction on this issue. Again, the numbers really tell
the story. The Kurds need about $14 billion in order to really
sustain themselves. Their own exports right now, they approach
a little less than half of that probably. That will change over
the future.
The budget that is pending in Baghdad, that is before the
Parliament, is a $140 billion budget. The Kurdish share of that
would be a little more than $17 billion. So the numbers really
tell the story and the numbers give the trade space for how we
can work out a deal.
Again, there are new realities on the ground that we have
to deal with, but it is in the interest of all Iraqis to export
as much oil as possible under a revenue-sharing framework,
particularly for the Sunni areas of Iraq, which do not have any
of these natural resources. And that is the type of compact
that I think a new Government, and particularly the new
Parliament, which has proven to be very effective--and they
just set up a committee to try to resolve this--can get some
traction on.
But we have to be actively engaged because we are the one
neutral broker between all of these parties, and without us
they will not get there.
Senator Markey. Again, oil is always at the core of this?
Cherchez the oil, that is pretty much what it is all about.
That is why the British wanted the country constructed the way
it was. They wanted those oil resources, especially up in the
north, added, even though it was going to cause longer term
instability. But that is what they were fighting for. That is
what they were demanding in those negotiations 80 years ago, 90
years ago. And we are still living with the consequences of
those decisions.
Let me just move on then and ask, what is the current
relationship between ISIS and al-Qaeda? What has happened to
that relationship in the course of especially the last 3 or 4
months?
Mr. McGurk. Well, it is my understanding Al Qaeda in Iraq,
of course, was Zarqawi's group and it had pledged adherence and
allegiance to al-Qaeda central in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
When it moved into Syria it split into two groups, the al-Nusra
Front and what has become the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant had ambitions
across borders between Iraq and Syria and that is something
that senior al-Qaeda leaders such as Zawahiri did not agree
with and he issued an edict saying: I do not agree with that;
you should all work as one, or ISIS should work in Iraq and
Nusra works in Syria. And Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said: I do not
agree with you on that, so I am going to go my own way. And
that is what led to the split.
But ISIL is proving to be in many ways even more effective
in terms of organizing and developing a state structure than
even core al-Qaeda, and that is why it is more than just a
terrorist organization. It certainly does not have the global
reach in terms of terrorist capacity as core al-Qaeda, but it
has the sophistication to develop what is really becoming a
state-like sanctuary for a global jihadist movement. And
Baghdadi has now made clear he is reaching for the mantle of
the global jihad, and trying to recruit those who share that
ideology from all around the world.
Senator Markey. So what does that competitive dynamic
between the leaders of both groups ultimately potentially lead
to?
Mr. McGurk. Well, the risk is that, in terms of that
competition, they will look to external attack plotting in
order to do spectacular type attacks to further draw worldwide
recruits. That is the risk.
Senator Markey. I think you have already answered the
questions about recruiting. Let me just ask a final question
and that is about Iraqi Forces' capacity to defend their own
civilians. Could you just give us a brief summary of where you
believe they are right now in accomplishing that goal?
Mr. McGurk. Well, one reason I said in my testimony, we
have a counterterrorism challenge; Iraq has a counterinsurgency
challenge. A counterinsurgency challenge means they have to be
able to control their own population and that is why they have
to recruit locally and work with tribes that control local
areas.
Right now that has really broken apart, and it has broken
apart for a number of reasons, but primarily the force that
ISIL is able to bring to bear in some of the Sunni areas of
Iraq. They go after anybody that disagrees with them. They have
a bit of an alliance with the Naqshbandi and the Baath Party
networks, but even
that is starting to fray. So this is why we have to work with
the Iraqis to be able to protect their population against the
most violent groups and then work on the political compact to
make sure that all areas of Iraq have the resources they need
to sustain
themselves.
Senator Markey. Again, I want to commend you for your focus
on diplomacy. I agree with Ryan Crocker that it is not too late
for diplomacy, but we just have to be intervening in a very,
very aggressive way to make sure that diplomacy is truly given
a chance to be successful.
Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Thank you to the witnesses. We will leave the record open
until 5 o'clock tomorrow for the submission of questions. We
would appreciate your prompt responses. Thank you for your
testimony.
We have a superb second panel and I would ask them to come
forward now. As we are setting up for the second panel, let me
just let all know who we will have. We are fortunate to have:
former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffrey, who is currently at
the Washington Institute on Near East Policy; Lieutenant
General Michael Barbero, who served nearly 4 years in Iraq over
three tours. General Barbero has traveled to Iraq six times in
the last year while serving as the Director of the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. Finally, no
stranger to the committee, Dr. Ken Pollack, who has been a
respected voice on Iraq and the gulf from his time in the CIA,
the National Security Council, now at the Brookings Institute.
This is a superb panel and we are glad to have everyone
here. Let me just, to the panel and the audience, I apologize.
The challenge of being on the second panel, everybody comes and
has a million questions and then about lunch time races off,
and it is unfortunate that all will not be here to hear you
live. But we really do appreciate you being here today because
your experiences each give you something very important to add.
Your written statements, which were very strong, will be
obviously included in the entire record. We would like to ask
each to take about 5 minutes to summarize, and I will have you
speak in the order I introduced you, beginning with Ambassador
Jeffrey and moving from my right to left. Ambassador Jeffrey,
welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. JEFFREY, PHILIP SOLONDZ
DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Jeffrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Acting
Chairman.
To follow up on what we heard this morning, the
establishment of the Islamic State by the ISIL in Iraq and in
parts of Syria is changing the geostrategy of the entire Middle
East and represents a dramatic setback to United States policy
and interests and requires an immediate response from
Washington. The situation is complicated by the fact that in
the fix we are presently in in the Middle East we have not one,
but two, hegemonic radical forces in the region, from Gaza to
Iran, that are trying to upset the established order throughout
the Middle East, and we have to deal with all of them in a
comprehensive way.
The President's plan to support a unified Iraq in this
crisis as laid out on June 19 is reasonable, but over a month
has gone by, as we discussed earlier today, and very little has
happened. In government formation, we have had two important
but secondary steps, the selection of the Speaker and the
selection of a President from the Kurdish community. Those are
important, but those are basically the preliminaries. The key
issue is the selection of a Prime Minister and a new
Government.
Meanwhile, on the ground, while the initial ISIL drive on
Baghdad and on the strategic areas has been slowed, we are
seeing new offensive capabilities by that organization. The
Institute for the Study of War came out yesterday with a survey
of attacks, both suicide and what we call VBIEDs, vehicle
bombs, inside Baghdad and efforts to try to cut off the city.
Senator McCain was right that you cannot take Baghdad, but, as
almost happened to us with over 100,000 troops in 2004, you can
isolate the city, and they seem to be trying to do that.
Meanwhile, they are pushing against the Kurds all along the
400-mile front from the Iranian border to north of Mosul and
they are trying to seize strategic infrastructure. Baiji we
talked about, but also the Haditha Dam west of Ramadi and the
Mosul Dam on the Tigris River to the northeast of Mosul. These
are extraordinarily important infrastructure targets for them.
So we do have an offensive threat from that organization.
The President's plan is based upon, above all, a new
inclusive government. As I said, while we have done the
preliminaries with the Speaker and with the President, we have
not gotten to the key issue of who is going to govern the
country, because the Prime Minister essentially governs the
country. In my view the inclusive government that the President
has correctly said is a prerequisite to any real action cannot
be a government headed by Prime Minister Maliki. He simply has
not shown the ability to bring in the Kurdish and the Sunni
communities, and that is needed right now because there is a
huge division of both trust and geographic division in the
country today.
We also need to encourage the Kurds, as Mr. McGurk
described in some detail, to remain within the republic and try
to regain trust among the Sunnis. Again, I see this as only
possible if we have a new Prime Minister and a new Government.
Simultaneously, I think that, while the President is right
that we cannot do a major campaign until we get an inclusive
government that can provide essentially people on the ground,
local forces, we need to do limited strikes. General Dempsey
talked about some of the possibilities, going after key leaders
and strategic infrastructure. We need to do a little bit of
that now, in part to encourage everybody to come together.
Mr. McGurk talked about the Sunni tribes that are trying to
fight ISIS, but they are outgunned. Helping them would not be
undercutting a new government. The Kurds are fighting all along
the front and they need help. We heard about some of these
highly trained, effective Iraqi units that are still in the
fight, particularly north of Baghdad. They could benefit from
help, too.
We are striking al-Qaeda right now in Pakistan, Yemen, and
with direct actions at times in Somalia and Libya. I see no
reason why we could not--if we have the targets and we are
getting the data now--start doing some strikes both in Iraq and
in Syria.
Meanwhile, we have to be ready, though. If this does not
work out, if the Iranians remain influential in Baghdad, if Mr.
Maliki remains in power, if the groups cannot come together, we
have to start thinking about how are we going to deal if we do
have three separate entities--a Kurdistan that will be a magnet
for Kurds throughout the region; effectively a Taliban-like
Islamic State in the middle of the Levant; and a rump Iraq that
is ever more under the control or under the influence of Iran.
That is a huge new problem for us if we do not act very, very
quickly.
So my bottom line here today, sir, is that we need to act
as quickly as we can.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jeffrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador James Franklin Jeffrey
The establishment of the Islamic State (IS) by the Al Qaeda in Iraq
offshoot group Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) changes the
geostrategy of the entire Middle East, represents a dramatic setback to
U.S. policy and interests, and requires an immediate response from
Washington. The creation of an extremist quasi-state, analogous to
Afghanistan under the Taliban, carries the risk of further escalation
including a regional Sunni-Shia conflict, and an irreparable loss in
U.S. influence. But the rise of the ISIL first in Syria and now in Iraq
reflects in part the nefarious effort by Iran to exploit sectarian
divides to achieve regional hegemony. The U.S. Government must counter
both the IS threat and Iran's quest for domination, bearing in mind
that Iran is not our ally in the campaign against al-Qaeda terror.
Above all, the U.S. must recognize that we are in a full blown crisis
that requires action, even if politically risky.
the situation
The rise of the IS, with control over up to 5 million people and
massive military equipment and funding, in close proximity to some of
the largest oil fields in the world, and bordering our NATO ally Turkey
and security partners Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, threatens three
of the four vital interests President Obama laid out in his U.N.
General Assembly speech last September: threats to or allies and
partners, rise of terrorist organizations, and threats to international
flow of oil. The situation if it deteriorates further will likely
threaten the fourth, development of weapons of mass destruction, as
Iran, in part influenced by events in Iraq, is balking at a compromise
outcome of the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1.
A traditional approach to IS based on maintaining a unified Iraq,
while building up the Iraqi Government, the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG), and Sunni elements willing to resist ISIL, is the
best option, but it may not long be attainable. Despite the election of
a moderate Sunni Arab speaker of the Iraqi Parliament 2 weeks ago,
there is no certainty that Iraqi political leaders and Parliament can
overcome their deep divisions to create an inclusive new government as
rightly demanded by the U.S. Government. For starters, any such
government must not be headed by PM Maliki. He has lost the trust of
many of his citizens, including a great many Shia Arabs, yet is still
trying to hold on to power. In this uncertain situation, while pushing
the traditional approach, we must simultaneously prepare to deal with
an Iraq semipermanently split into three separate political entities,
and to shape our approach to the Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, and Kurdish
populations and to the central government on that basis.
But with either the traditional or this possible new approach,
American military force under certain circumstances must be used
against ISIL, for political as well as military and counterterrorism
reasons, and everyone in the U.S. must understand that we are in an
emergency. The costs of doing little or nothing now are greater than
the risks of most actions short of committing ground troops.
continuing our traditional policies
The President's course of action outlined in his Iraq speech of
June 19 is reasonable: protect our Baghdad Embassy, strengthen our
intelligence and military presence in and around Iraq, increase
assistance to the Iraqi military, and press the Iraqi political system
to support a new, inclusive government which can reach out to estranged
Sunni Arabs and Kurds and maintain the country's unity; only then with
our help can it begin to retake areas held by the IS. This approach,
reflecting our traditional policy toward a united Iraq, remains the
best option, but over a month has passed since the President laid out
this policy, and we have had little followthrough beyond better
intelligence collection and on-the-ground coordination. That is
important but not sufficient, and now it is not clear if we still have
time to carry out this course of action.
To maximize the chances of a unified, inclusive Iraq to which we
can provide significant new military assistance including air strikes,
the following needs to occur in the days ahead:
--The Iraqi Parliament, charged with forming a new government after the
March elections, must decide on a Prime Minister other than Nuri
al-Maliki. Few Sunni Arabs or Kurds will believe that any Iraqi
Government is inclusive and would consider their interests if
Maliki remains its leader. Promises to be inclusive and
nonsectarian are cheap in Baghdad, but followthrough usually
lacking. The most convincing proof that politicians have gotten the
``be inclusive'' message is for Maliki to step down, or be forced
out by his own and other Shia parties. Removing Maliki is not a
direct U.S. responsibility, and too obvious a U.S. push would be
counterproductive. But we must make clear to all parties that
decisive American support can only come with an inclusive
government and buy-in by all major sectarian groups, and that this
is not possible with Maliki.
--The Kurdistan Regional Government must forgo its threats of
independence in return for a government that will consider their
interests. Finding a replacement for Maliki is necessary but not
sufficient to win the Kurds back. This will require compromises on
Kurdish oil exports building on a December 2013 agreement on
calculating oil shares, and renewed payment by Baghdad of the
Kurds' 17 percent share of southern oil exports. The Kurds in turn
will have to share their oil proceeds 17-83 percent between
themselves and Baghdad, which they claim they will do, and exercise
restraint on the status of the Kirkuk field, which they have not
committed to do. The U.S. should push for such a solution by
pressing both the Kurds directly and through their informal
partner, Turkey, to engage fully the central government. Kurdish
thirst for independence is understandable, but under current
circumstances it is a recipe for reduced hydrocarbons income to the
KRG for years, turmoil with the rest of Iraq, and resistance from
regional states. It is thus a last option, not a first choice.
--Any new Iraqi leadership must also win over Sunni Arabs. A commitment
to provide significant oil revenue earnings to individual provinces
(as has occurred already with the KRG, Basra, Najaf, and Kirkuk
provinces) would provide concrete evidence of outreach to Sunni
Arabs, and promote Iraq's federal system and probably government
efficiency at the same time.
--A new Defense Minister from the Sunni Arab community, with very
strong commitments by all parties to lead the military in fact,
must be quickly selected once a new Prime Minister is chosen.
--As noted above, the U.S. cannot consider decisive U.S. strikes until
Iraq has an inclusive government which will resonate with many
Sunni Arabs. The administration, in line with the President's June
19 remarks, clearly is using possible U.S. military action as
leverage to ensure such a government. That makes sense, but it is
not incompatible with limited U.S. strikes for objectives similar
to those General Dempsey spelled out recently--to protect
population centers and strategic infrastructure and target ISIL
leadership. Limited strikes now for such strategic purposes make
sense. Any day is a good day to strike an al-Qaeda offshoot as
dangerous as this one. People to whom we have given commitments,
not just the Iraqi military but many Sunni Arabs and the Kurdish
Peshmerga, are today locked in combat with ISIL, and need help.
Especially given the recent record of American reticence in using
force, limited strikes avoiding civilian areas now would increase,
not decrease, our political leverage.
--The U.S. should rapidly deploy its $500 million committed to train
and equip the Syrian opposition. The U.S. should also strike
against IS in Syria.
--Once these steps have been taken, the U.S. can plan with the Iraqi
Government, KRG, friendly Iraqi Sunni Arabs, and regional partners,
to retake those Iraqi areas now held by the IS. Such a
counterinsurgency plan would include aggressive U.S. training,
equipping, and coordinating, intelligence, and air strikes, along
with action by Sunni Arabs willing with our help to take on IS.
a divided iraq?
While the above is aligned with administration policy, and in
theory offers the best way forward, it may be too late to implement it,
as the divisions between the various Iraqi groups deepen, sectarian
slaughter especially of Sunni Arabs in and around Baghdad continues,
and the KRG moves toward virtual independence, all with Maliki still in
office.
Were this to occur, the U.S. must deal with three separate
entities, all posing significant problems for American interests: an IS
threatening us, as well as our allies and partners, and a magnet for
jihadist supporters world-wide; a KRG moving toward a de jure breakup
with Baghdad, raising the specter of a Near East-wide quest for a
Kurdish nation-state which would undermine existing borders; and a rump
Iraq, dominated by Shia religious parties heavily influenced by Iran,
and controlling what the International Energy Agency believes could
well be exports of 6 million barrels of oil by 2020--almost two-thirds
of Saudi Arabia's exports.
If this materializes, the U.S. must de facto abandon a policy
prioritizing Iraqi unity. The first priority rather should be to deter
and if necessary defeat IS attacks on Jordan, the KRG, and other
partners and allies. Policy coordination with Turkey, Jordan, Israel,
the KRG, and the Gulf States, important in any scenario, would be vital
in this one, first as a shield for vulnerable states and groups, and
then as a platform to destroy the IS. Such coordination would require
much greater U.S. support for the Syrian opposition, caution with
outreach to the KRG, whose independent status is anathema not just to
Baghdad but to Arab States, and continued containment of Iran. It would
also require U.S. strikes against IS in both Iraq and Syria.
In such a scenario, U.S. policy toward Baghdad would inevitably
evolve. To the extent the rump central government is willing to
cooperate with us, and avoid provoking the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs
further, then limited U.S. military support under the FMS program
should continue, as should direct U.S. military action against IS
attacks against Shia population centers. This policy will require
constant review depending upon how influential Iran is in Baghdad, and
how Baghdad treats its Kurdish and Sunni Arab citizens. The experience
with Maliki in the past several months gives little hope that such
treatment would improve as long as he remains in power.
iran
The U.S. can talk with Iran about Iraq, emphasizing common
interests such as unity of the state and the fight against IS, but we
do not share common goals. In the fix we are presently in we have not
one but two hegemonic Islamic radical forces intent on overthrowing the
prevailing nation-state order in the region--al-Qaeda especially IS,
and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And our allies in the common struggle
for stability--Turkey, Israel, and the Sunni Arab States--see Iran as
at least an equal threat to their survival as al-Qaeda.
But we also must do everything possible to avoid a regional ``Sunni
versus Shia'' conflict. Such a conflict would tear the region apart,
and any U.S. involvement would have us violating our ``we fight for
liberal principles, not sectarian interests'' policy that we have been
able to maintain in the region and elsewhere, such as in the Balkans.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Ambassador Jeffrey.
General Barbero.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. BARBERO, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. ARMY
[RETIRED], WASHINGTON, DC
General Barbero. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Chairman, Ranking
Member Corker. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
situation in Iraq and some options moving forward. I will focus
my comments on the security sector, the Iraqi Security Forces,
and some recommendations therein.
But first I would like to start with several observations
on the current situation. Time accrues to the benefit of ISIS.
While we assess, they maintain the momentum, they grow
stronger, and their hold on the population intensifies. ISIS
has established control across a contiguous area in both Syria
and Iraq and, as we discussed in the previous panel, it must be
considered as an Iraq-Syria front.
ISIS poses a formidable regional threat. What is most
frightening is as they swept into Iraq they continued their
expansion into Syria. They did not have to thin the lines to do
that.
The Iraqi Security Forces have regrouped. However, these
forces have serious fundamental flaws and will require
significant assistance to be able to undertake
counteroffensives to dislodge and roll back ISIS control.
Finally, ISIS is an existential threat to both Baghdad and
the Kurds. The Kurds have a 1,000-plus kilometer border or
front with ISIS and they are largely on their own.
Chairman Menendez asked at the outset, what is required to
turn back the tide of ISIS? Well, it is clearly the Iraqi
Security Forces. But my estimation is in their present state
they cannot successfully meet this ISIS threat, let alone mount
a major and effective counteroffensive without significant
assistance. The capabilities necessary to counter ISIS do not
exist today in Iraq and they will not likely materialize on
their own.
I am not talking in the future about ground combat forces
from the United States. I am talking about advising and
assisting in certain key areas. Let me cover those. The first
is intelligence, and we have started that, developing tactical
intelligence and targetable, actionable intelligence on the
ground. We have started that. Now we need to turn that into
action.
But the second intelligence component is the ISIS network
in Iraq, Syria, and their regional supporters must be a
national collection and analysis priority for our entire
intelligence community.
Second, we should establish a training program for the ISF
to develop sufficient combined arms capability in order to
effectively conduct offensive operations to dislodge ISIS from
the areas they now control. The ISF has been largely a
checkpoint army. Since 2011 their operations have been
defensive in nature, static in disposition, and disjointed in
execution. They need training.
Third, they need assistance in establishing an effective
wartime sustainment structure and process. Their existing one
is a peacetime system and they have experienced significant
decline in equipment readiness over the years, and this will be
a daunting process, but it can be done.
Fourth, they require changes to their command and control
network. As we know, the system now in place is one put in by
Prime Minister Maliki of area commands directly reporting to
him. As we have seen, there needs to be changes in commanders
and changes to develop an effective combat command and control
capability.
Fifth, the ISF continues to need weapons and equipment. We
have done some good work to rush some equipment there, but we
need to do more. Just this week Iraq's Ambassador to the United
States lamented the slow pace of our support when compared to
the rapid support from Iran and Russia. We should quickly
approve, ship, and enable material support to Iraq.
Sixth, we should support the ISF with air strikes in order
to degrade ISIS capabilities. But let me be clear. You cannot
air strike or drone strike your way out of this. Air strikes
must be part of a cohesive and coherent counteroffensive in
order to attack ISIS.
Seventh, we should support the Kurds and enable them to
defend against this existential threat from ISIS. The Pesh
Merga are an effective, determined, well-led force. However,
they are lightly armed and underequipped. They are stretched
very thin, and when ISIS turns on them they will be outgunned
and overmatched.
Now, there is a complex relationship between Baghdad and
Erbil. I understand that. But why would we not, from a purely
tactical and security perspective, why would we not rapidly
enable the Kurds to defend northern Iraq from ISIS, prevent the
oil-rich north from falling into ISIS hands, and force ISIS to
fight on two fronts in Iraq?
Finally, this all depends on two things: a willing partner
in Baghdad that is willing to accept these changes and to help
develop an effective ISF; and second, as we all discussed,
there must be a political climate where the Sunni and Kurds
feel accommodation for them and they could join in a unified
military action.
In conclusion, it is an existential threat to Iraq. The
longer we wait to decide on our response to Iraq's request for
support, the stronger they become. Finally, if the prevention
of an ISIS-controlled Iraq is in the national interest of the
United States, then we should act to aid and enable Iraq and
the Kurds to defeat this threat as quickly as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of General Barbero follows:]
Statement of LTG Michael D. Barbero
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today
to discuss the situation in Iraq and options for U.S. policy there.
One year ago I retired following 38 years of Active Duty, during
which I spent three tours of duty in Iraq, spending a total of 46
months in Iraq. Since my retirement, over the past year, I have been
back to Iraq--in Erbil, Baghdad, and Basra--6 times, maintaining close
contact with many Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders. So, Iraq and its
future is a subject of great personal importance to me.
I am especially honored to appear with these two distinguished
fellow panelists who are respected experts on the subject of today's
hearing. And given the broad and deep expertise of Ambassador Jeffrey
and Doctor Pollack, I will focus my remarks on the security sector--the
current security situation and recommendations on options for our
security policy moving forward.
I would like begin with several overall observations on the current
security situation; followed by an assessment of the ISIS threat, and
finishing with recommendations on assistance to Iraq's security needs.
observations on the current situation
Time accrues to the benefit of ISIS; while we ``assess''
they maintain the momentum, they grow stronger, and their hold
on the population intensifies. ISIS continues to exert its
control, consolidate gains, and build a state.
ISIS has established control across a contiguous area in
both Syria and Iraq and we must realize it is the Iraq-Syria
front, not just think in terms of Iraq.
ISIS poses a formidable regional threat. As it executed its
sweeping campaign in Iraq, ISIS simultaneously continued its
campaign expansion in Eastern Syria and has the strategy and
capabilities to continue the offensive.
The Iraqi Security Forces have regrouped and stopped the
ISIS advance. However these forces have serious, fundamental
flaws and will require significant assistance to be able to
undertake a counteroffensive to dislodge and roll back ISIS
control.
ISIS is an existential threat to both Baghdad and the Kurds.
The Kurds have a 1,000+ KM border/front with ISIS and they are
largely on their own. It is time to assist and enable the Kurds
in their fight with ISIS.
Now, I would like to elaborate on these points and discuss the
security situation in Iraq.
ISIS and the Syria-Iraq Front
ISIS seeks to create an Islamic Caliphate extending across Syria
and Iraq by first destroying the existing state boundaries of Iraq and
Syria and expanding the territory under their control. It is a mistake
to consider ISIS actions in Iraq in isolation. Rather, ISIS must be
viewed in the new reality that it has established control over major,
contiguous areas of Syria and Iraq.
In Syria, following the declaration of a caliphate by ISIS leader
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a cascade of surrenders by rebel and tribal
brigades in Syria's Deir ez-Zour province conferred large swaths of
territorial control to ISIS. Beginning on July 2, these advances
dramatically changed the balance of power within the
province and provided ISIS the opportunity to achieve territorial
continuity along the Euphrates River into Iraq's al-Anbar province.
ISIS has successfully linked its territorial control between its ar-
Raqqa stronghold and Deir ez-Zour City, solidifying an ISIS control
zone that stretches from ar-Raqqa into Iraq's al-Anbar province. ISIS
seized control of eight towns located northwest of Deir ez-Zour city
from the al-Bosarya tribe on July 18. This advance comes as Jabhat al-
Nusra (JN) and Ahrar al-Sham forces surrendered control of the towns of
as-Shametia and Jabal Kabous to ISIS, abandoned their local
headquarters and withdrawing from the province.
The surrender of a large number of local rebel and tribal brigades
to ISIS in Syria's Deir ez-Zour province was a reflection and result of
ISIS success in Iraq. Driven by apprehension in the wake of ISIS's
success in Iraq, a number of local leaders sought to avoid an armed
takeover by reinvigorated ISIS forces and agreed to a set of ISIS-
imposed conditions for the peaceful surrender of rebel forces. These
agreements allowed ISIS to quickly and efficiently assert full control
over a large swath of territory whose armed takeover would have
otherwise required a significant and costly ISIS ground offensive.
Critically, further surrenders have occurred as ISIS began to
consolidate. In addition to providing an additional windfall of
weaponry, these surrenders have expanded ISIS's zones of control and
sustained the current ISIS momentum within the province.
According to some reports ISIS now controls 35 percent of Syrian
territory and the Syrian regime has been unable to meaningfully
challenge the ISIS advance.
In Iraq, as evidence that actions in Syria and in Iraq are closely
linked, ISIS completed its military operation to connect its line of
communication between its strongholds in ar-Raqqa, Deir ez-Zour and
Mosul, Iraq. For example, ISIS has extended its campaign against
primarily Kurdish-protected areas by attacking in Sinjar. Sinjar, which
has been quiet since Tal Afar fell, may become a more significant focus
for ISIS.
In Baghdad, ISIS's Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices
(VBIED) campaign is active again, relaunching its signature wave of
VBIEDs attacks. Multiple, near-simultaneous attacks are the signature
strategy that ISIS pursued as it gained strength in 2012 and 2013. In
the first significant use of VBIEDs since a wave of attacks occurred on
May 13, 2014, last Saturday on 19 July, multiple VBIEDs detonated in
Baghdad's Shia neighborhoods. I believe these actions portend an ISIS
campaign to attack Baghdad as part of its strategic campaign the secure
Baghdad. Spectacular attacks in the form of VBIED and indirect fire
attacks against Shia and Government targets in Baghdad, including
Baghdad International Airport will be accompanied by ``conventional''
ground attacks to turn Baghdad into a war zone.
Across the Syria-Iraq front, ISIS possesses the momentum in all
areas and will continue its operations to assert control over occupied
territories, continue its assault in Iraq to secure its lines of
communication and expand its control over strategic objectives.
Iraqi Security Forces
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), in their present state, cannot
successfully meet this ISIS threat, let alone mount a major and
effective counteroffensive, without significant assistance. Preparing
ISF for an effective counteroffensive operation requires extensive
preparation; it cannot be thrown together in days or weeks. The
capabilities necessary to counter ISIS do not exist today in Iraq and
they will not likely materialize on their own anytime soon.
Let me be clear--I am not talking about a direct ground combat role
for U.S. Forces. However, enabling the ISF to be successful against
ISIS will require robust advising and enabling by American Forces, and
this effort must be started immediately and executed simultaneously in
several critical areas.
First, the decisive way to defeat an ISIS force is to attack its
entire network: its leaders, financiers, suppliers and key operators,
combat capabilities and front line fighters. However, generating
targetable intelligence to attack ISIS requires a deep understanding of
the network, which is only gained through a robust and effective
intelligence effort over time. This intelligence support has two
components. First, this requires an investment of personnel and
technical intelligence capabilities in Iraq to develop an intelligence
system that integrates all types of intelligence from all sources. The
ISF need support in tactical intelligence collection, analysis and
dissemination in order to understand the ISIS structure and develop
targets. In the absence of this actionable intelligence, independent
ground operations or isolated airstrikes, as we have seen from the ISF
in recent days and weeks, will remain ineffective in producing the
desired effect of seriously degrading the ISIS network.
To support operations in Iraq, there must be a second intelligence
component--the collection and analysis effort of ISIS and their
external support network must be made a priority for our National
Intelligence Community. The ISIS network in Iraq, Syria, and the
regional support network external to the Iraq-Syria front must be a
national collection and analysis priority. And one of the prime
objectives of this collection is to identify and target ISIS finances
and financial support. While ISIS is reported to be very well resourced
from their recent asset seizures in Iraq, these resources must be
replenished. We must identify all sources of income and employ all of
the Counter Threat Finance tools that our Interagency brings to this
fight in order to target and limit the free flow of funding to ISIS.
This targeting must include any regional government and nongovernment
entities.
Second, we should establish a training program for ISF to improve
their basic combat skills to develop modest combined arms capability in
order to effectively conduct offensive operations by conventional
forces to dislodge ISIS from the occupied areas under ISIS control. The
ISF are largely a ``checkpoint army.'' Since 2011 their operations have
been defensive in nature, static in disposition and disjointed in
execution. They need training to develop the skills required to fight
this ISIS army, as recent tactical failures against ISIS clearly
indicate. We also need to enhance the capabilities of ISF Special
Operations Forces. While these are the most competent and most
effective of the ISF, they will need to greatly improve their
capabilities in order to conduct the unrelenting, precise strike
operations against critical ISIS targets.
Third, the ISF need assistance in establishing effective wartime
sustainment structure and process. The existing sustainment system of
the ISF is a peacetime system, designed to support fielding of military
systems while dealing with a low-level insurgency. In 2010, we
identified ISF sustainment as being a significant shortfall and that if
it was not addressed, the readiness of ISF equipment would soon be in a
``death spiral'' where the backlog of deferred maintenance would
overwhelm their abilities to field effective, modern forces. Reversing
years of decline in equipment readiness will be a daunting, but not
impossible process.
Fourth, The ISF require a decentralized command and control system
that can rapidly process information and enable tactical decisions. The
system that is in place in Iraq, one of Area Operations Commands
emplaced by, and reporting directly to, Prime Minister Maliki, is a
peacetime structure to ensure centralized control, with leaders chosen
by the Prime Minister for loyalty over combat competence. The ISF
require a command and control structure for sustained combat operations
against a capable enemy.
Fifth, the ISF need the weaponry and equipment necessary for
sustained combat operations. We have rushed some weapons and armaments
to Iraq, however we need to do more. Most of our military aid to Iraq
is moving at the glacial pace of our Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
process. Iraq's Ambassador to the United States has lamented that the
slow pace of our support when compared to the rapid support from Iran
and Russia. We should quickly approve, ship, and enable material
support to Iraq.
Sixth, we should support the ISF with airstrikes in order to
degrade ISIS capabilities. But, let me be clear--isolated drone and air
strikes in the absence of these other capabilities will be marginally
effective. One cannot drone-strike or airstrike one's way out of this.
These strikes will serve as an important part of a coordinated approach
to this ISIS threat, but in isolation they will achieve fleeting
effects. They must be integrated into the overall counteroffensive.
Also, to produce effective airstrikes, especially against an enemy
among the population, one needs to have air controllers on the ground
to call in precise strikes and to control the effects. The Iraqis do
not possess the capability to serve in this role. And no amount of
isolated airstrikes will turn the current tactical situation in Iraq
and produce decisive effects on their own.
Seventh, we should support the Kurds and enable them to defend
against this existential threat of ISIS. The Peshmerga are an
effective, determined and well-led force. However, they are lightly
armed, inadequately equipped and insufficiently trained to counter the
better-equipped ISIS force. They are stretched very thin over their
1,050-kilometer front with ISIS and, when ISIS turns on them, they will
be outgunned and overmatched. The Kurds have proven to be loyal friends
and allies to the United States and they have recently asked for
material and nonmaterial support from us and we should expedite this
support to them.
Understanding the complex relationship between Erbil and Baghdad,
our ``one Iraq'' policy, and the arguments against aiding the Kurdish
Region apart from the central government, the realities on the ground
make this an exigent requirement. From a purely tactical and security
perspective, why wouldn't we enable the Kurds to defend northern Iraq
from ISIS, prevent the oil-rich north from falling into ISIS hands, and
force ISIS to fight on two fronts in Iraq?
Security Depends on a Political Arrangement That Includes Sunnis and
Kurds
However, for this security support to succeed, we need two things
from Baghdad. First, we need a willing partner, one that is committed
to accepting this assistance and to making the systemic and structural
changes necessary to the Iraqi security structure in order to build the
ISF into an effective force. Second, underpinning these military
operations is the most critical requirement, a political accommodation
of the Sunnis and the Kurds. In order to separate ISIS from their
greatest advantage, an acquiescent Sunni population, there needs to be
a political arrangement in Baghdad that the Sunnis can broadly accept.
This political arrangement must also accommodate the Kurds and create
the proper conditions for the Kurds to participate. However, as the
recent political activities in Baghdad prove, a political agreement
that satisfies all parties of Iraq could be the toughest impediment to
reversing this existential threat to Iraq. But, in order for any hope
of success, there must be some sort of political accommodation and an
acceptable arrangement, which allows the Sunnis and Kurds to join in a
unified military action.
conclusion
ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq and a significant threat to
the region. Iraq and its security forces have proven unable to defeat
this threat in their present condition and with their present
capabilities. The longer we wait to decide on our response to Iraq's
requests for support, the stronger ISIS becomes. If the prevention of
an ISIS-controlled Iraq is in the interest of the United States, then
we should act to aid and enable Iraq and the Kurds to defeat this
threat as quickly as possible.
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished members
of the committee, again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General Barbero.
Dr. Pollack.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK, SENIOR FELLOW, SABAN CENTER
FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Pollack. Mr. Chairman, Senator, it is always a great
honor to appear before this committee.
I want to start by talking a little bit about some of the
realities that we face in Iraq, because I think they are
critical in understanding where we are and what the
possibilities are moving forward. I want to just talk about
two. First, we need to recognize that American influence in
Iraq has attenuated very significantly, to the point where I
would argue that at this point the United States interests
exceed our influence.
Second, we need to come to grips with the fact that what we
face in Iraq today is a civil war. Iraq is not on the brink, it
is not sliding into it. It is a civil war, and the dynamics of
intercommunal civil wars now apply, and those make intervention
by third powers very difficult.
With that in mind, I think that the current approach of the
administration, with a few tweaks, is probably the best one
plausible. It is the only one, and that is the idea of forging
a new political leadership and reforming Iraq's political
system. It is the only option that we have that does offer the
prospect of ending Iraq's civil war in a matter of months
rather than years, and of preserving American interests in a
whole variety of other ways.
But nevertheless, we need to recognize that it will be very
difficult, and it goes well beyond merely replacing the current
Iraqi political leadership. It is going to mean restructuring
Iraq's politics in a way that will encompass the desires and
aspirations and the fears of all of Iraq's communities, and
that is not going to be easy.
If it fails, Iraq's civil war is going to roll on and, as I
have already suggested, the dynamics of an intercommunal civil
war were to take hold and those are very hard to break.
But we will have some options. Unfortunately, those options
are all awful. I think the first one is to recognize, as any
number of us and some of the Senators have made the point
earlier, that Iraq and Syria are now a single civil war. And
the problem that we will face in Iraq is that we will have a
very complex situation. We will be looking to support both
moderate Sunnis and moderate Shia against their extremists and
hoping to forge a new peace between them. That is very hard.
Syria offers a little bit of clarity, in that we hate the
regime, are not looking to support them in any way, and that at
least opens up the prospect of developing a Syria-first policy,
by which we would build a new Syrian opposition army that might
be able to defeat both the regime and the extremists, stabilize
the country, and serve as both a bridge and a model to Sunni
moderates inside Iraq.
I see that option as entirely feasible, but it is not
guaranteed to work and it is several steps beyond what the
United States has been willing to consider so far. In fact, it
will take years if it works at all and it will require a
commitment of resources, probably including air power, that the
United States has so far been unwilling to make.
If we are not willing to commit that level of resources to
actually bring the civil war to a close, another option is
partition, something that has been talked about very
frequently. I will say that I think that if we do not bring
this to a rapid close we will find that partition is the de
facto outcome in Iraq. It will be divided up into a Sunnistan
and a Shiastan and the Kurds will undoubtedly go their own way.
The question for us would be, can we find ways to turn de
facto partition into de jure partition and somehow use it to
bring about peace. Again, I think that is possible, but
nevertheless it will be extremely difficult, far more difficult
than I think many of its pundits and partisans around town are
making it out to be. In fact, I would say that there is a
dangerous mythology suggesting that partition of Iraq could be
quick and easy and relatively bloodless.
In fact, Iraq's communities remain deeply intermingled. The
different militias have made claims on territory currently held
by the others. The fear that overwhelms Iraqis will remain and,
what is more, dividing up Iraq's water, oil, and other
resources will be enormously difficult. So the likelihood is
that trying to bring about partition will take years and
hundreds of thousands of lives lost.
The last alternative that we will have will be to follow a
policy of containment, of trying to prevent the spillover from
the Iraqi-Syrian civil war onto Iraq's other neighbors and from
harming American interests in the region in that way. Again,
this is certainly a possible alternative for the United States,
but we need to remember that containment is exceptionally
difficult. It has rarely succeeded in the past, and I think
that the fall of Mosul is perhaps the most graphic illustration
of just how hard it is to contain the spillover from one civil
war from affecting another.
The last point I would make is simply that to do nothing
would be the worst choice of all.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pollack follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth M. Pollack
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, I am honored to be able to
appear before you to discuss possible options to address the grave
situation in Iraq.
I think it important to start any such conversation with an
acknowledgement of the realities we face. First, it is painful, but
necessary, to recognize that the United States has only very limited
influence in Iraq today. The George W. Bush administration, by its many
disastrous mistakes, squandered a great deal of the influence we once
had there. The Obama administration, by its misguided neglect,
surrendered most of what we had left. Indeed, Iraq now constitutes the
hardest of situations for Americans to confront: it is a crisis in
which our interests exceed our influence. Consequently, the options we
consider moving forward must include methods to help increase U.S.
influence to improve our ability to defend our interests.
Second, it is equally critical that we accept the reality that Iraq
has fallen once more into civil war. It is not ``on the brink of civil
war.'' It is not ``sliding into civil war.'' It is not ``at risk of a
new civil war.'' It is in a civil war. This is what civil war looks
like. And civil wars have certain dynamics that need to be understood
if they are to be ended, or even merely survived.
Iraq's current situation is the recurrence of the civil war of
2006-2008. In 2007-2008, the United States committed tremendous
military and economic resources to pull Iraq out of that first instance
of civil war. This time around, Washington has made clear that it will
not devote anything like the same resources and there is no other
country that can.
This second point is important because intercommunal civil wars
like Iraq's are difficult for external powers to end without either a
significant commitment of resources or a terrible slaughter by one or
more of the combatants. Given the American public's understandable
unwillingness to recommit the kind of resources we did in 2007-2008, we
are unlikely to bring the Iraqi civil war to a speedy end with minimal
bloodshed and still safeguard the range of American interests engaged
there. For those reasons, the hard truth we face is that, in the
circumstances we currently find ourselves in, our options range from
bad to awful.
Nevertheless, doing nothing because all of the options are
unpalatable would be the worst choice of all. Civil wars do not just go
away if they are ignored. They burn on and on. They also have a bad
habit of infecting neighboring states--just as the Syrian civil war has
helped reignite the Iraqi civil war. If we try to turn our back on Iraq
once again, it will affect its neighbors. It could easily affect the
international oil market (and through it, the U.S. economy, which
remains heavily dependent on the price of oil no matter how much we may
frack). It will also generate terrorists who will seek to kill
Americans. So our option may be awful, but we have no choice but to try
to make them work.
plan a: rebuilding a (somewhat) unified iraq
Although I believe that the Obama administration's Iraq policy has
been disastrous, and a critical factor in the rekindling of Iraq's
civil war,\1\ I find myself largely in agreement with the approach they
have adopted to deal with the revived civil war. Our first priority
should be to try to engineer a new Iraqi Government that Kurds, Shia
and moderate Sunnis can all embrace, so that they can then wage a
unified military campaign (with American support) against ISIS and the
other Sunni militant groups.\2\
That needs to remain Washington's priority until it fails because
it is the best outcome for all concerned, including the United States.
Doing so would be the most likely way to dampen or eliminate the
current conflict, and create the fewest causes for future violence. It
could also succeed relatively quickly--in a matter of months rather
than years like all of the other options. However, it will be extremely
difficult to pull off.
The keys to this strategy will be to convince the Kurds not to
break from Iraq and convince moderate Sunnis to remain part of the
Iraqi political process--and to turn on ISIS and the other Sunni
militant groups. As I and other experts on Iraq have written, this will
require both a new political leadership and a drastic overhaul of
Iraq's political system. With regard to the former condition, at this
point, it seems highly unlikely that Nuri al-Maliki can remain Prime
Minister and retain either the Kurds or meaningful Sunni representation
in his government. However, even if he were removed and new, more
acceptable leaders chosen, there would still be a long way to go.\3\
Even moderate Sunni leaders are not going to go back to the status
quo ante. They now insist on decentralizing power from the center to
the periphery, a redistribution of power within the Federal Government,
and a thorough depoliticization of the Iraqi security services so that
they cannot be used as a source of repression by what will inevitably
be a Shia-dominated central government. They are likely to demand to be
allowed to form a federal region like the Kurdistan Regional
Government, complete with a separate budget and their own military
forces akin to the Kurdish Peshmerga.
For their part, the Kurds will want even more than that. At this
point, given the extensive autonomy that the KRG already enjoys,
coupled with the territorial and administrative gains it has won in the
wake of the ISIS offensive, greater federalism probably won't be an
adequate alternative to independence for the Kurds. If the Kurds can be
prevented from seceding, it will probably require Baghdad to accept a
confederal arrangement with Erbil.
The difference here is that in a typical federal system, resources
and authorities are generated from the center and delegated to the
periphery for all but a limited number of constrained functions.
However, keeping the Kurds on board will likely necessitate a shift to
one in which resources and authority begin in the periphery and then
are shared with the center for specific purposes and under specific
constraints.
The Kurds are likely to insist that the KRG maintain the current
lines of control in disputed territories unchanged until a referendum
can be conducted in accordance with article 140 of the Iraqi
Constitution. Baghdad will have to recognize Erbil's right to develop
and market the oil it produces as the new status quo. As for oil
revenues, Erbil will demand that it be allowed to keep the Kirkuk oil
fields it has now secured, and agree that Baghdad and Erbil each be
allowed to pump as much oil as they like and pay all of their own
expenses from those revenues.
Assuming that moderate Sunnis, Kurds and moderate Shia can all
agree on these various changes, we could see the resurrection of a
unified Iraqi polity. It is reasonable to assume that in those happy
circumstances, many Sunni tribes will be ready to fight ISIS and the
other Sunni militant groups--and to accept assistance from the United
States to do so. (Although they have made clear that they will not
accept assistance from the Iraqi Security Forces until they have been
thoroughly depoliticized.) Moreover, these are really the only
circumstances in which the United States should be willing to provide
large-scale military assistance to the Iraqi Government to fight ISIS
and the other militant groups. Only in those circumstances will such
assistance be seen as nonpartisan, meant to help all Iraqis and not
just the Shia (and their Iranian allies).
However, what is important to note about this scenario is that
replacing Prime Minister Maliki, if that can be accomplished at all, is
a necessary but not sufficient condition to end the conflict on the
best terms imaginable for the United States (and Iraq). Even after
Maliki is removed, the Iraqis will have to sort out far-reaching
reforms and redistributions of power and wealth. As hard as all of that
will be, there is the added danger that given the overwhelming distrust
among all of the Iraqi parties, the Sunnis tribes will refuse to take
any action against the Sunni militants until all of the political
negotiations have been concluded. Having been burned so many times in
the past, that will be a reasonable inclination on their part. However,
if they do so, it could be months or years before they work things out
and are ready to turn on ISIS and the other militants. By then it would
be much harder to rid the country of the Sunni militants and those
groups may well have done a great deal of damage already, including
possibly mounting terrorist attacks abroad.
One area in which I think that the Obama administration could be
doing a better job to foster this approach to the revived Iraqi civil
war would be to lean in, rather than leaning back. What I mean by this
is that moderate Iraqis from across the political and ethnosectarian
spectrum have complained that while the administration is loudly
demanding a wide range of changes in Iraq's political leadership and
reforms of the Iraqi political process, they have so far been vague and
equivocal in describing what the United States would do to help a new
and reformed Iraqi Government. Given how many Iraqis already believe
that President Obama wants nothing to do with Iraq and will never
provide meaningful assistance, such reserve only undercuts what little
influence the United States has left in Iraq.
Instead, the only way to increase American leverage with the Iraqis
is to enumerate plainly the kinds of support that the United States
would be willing to provide to a reformed, reunified Iraqi Government.
This support should include drone strikes, the provision of weapons and
reconnaissance assets, greater intelligence support and targeting
assistance, improved and expanded training for Iraqi forces, and
potentially even manned airstrikes. Better still, it could include a
commitment to make the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement into the kind
of across-the-board bilateral assistance relationship always
envisioned, but never actually implemented by the Obama administration.
This would entail technical, administrative, and possibly even
financial assistance for the full panoply of Iraqis needs--military,
agriculture, education, energy, telecommunications, transportation,
diplomatic, and virtually anything else the Iraqis might need. An
American commitment to provide such assistance would be enormously
popular among average Iraqis, and therefore would buy Washington
considerable influence with their leaders. It would also galvanize
Iraq's economy and help knit its fractured society back together--two
more keys to preventing yet another outbreak of civil war.
plan b: syria first
If the United States, working in conjunction with our regional
allies, the Iraqis themselves and (necessarily) the Iranians cannot
forge a new Iraqi national consensus and power-sharing arrangement, the
civil war will worsen.
Intercommunal civil wars like Iraq's share a number of unhelpful
qualities. First, they tend to stalemate along the internal
ethnosectarian dividing lines of the country. Those divides become the
front lines, and they tend to be very, very bloody. Second, they tend
to empower the worst elements in every society. It is the radicals who
take advantage of the chaos and the fear, using it to kill off or drown
out moderate rivals who are typically not ruthless enough to retain
power. Of course, the radicals typically prosper from the conflict and
have little interest in seeing it end except in complete victory.
Third, in part for that reason, intercommunal civil wars tend to
burn on for years, sometimes even decades. The Algerian civil war ran
from 1991 to 2002. The Lebanese civil war lasted from 1975-1991 and
ended only because of Syrian intervention. The Congolese civil war has
been roiling on since 1994. Somalia since 1991. Afghanistan has
arguably careened from civil war to civil war since 1979, or more
conventionally since 1989.
And fourth, they always produce spillover.\4\ Spillover typically
takes six different forms: terrorism, refugees, secessionism,
radicalization of neighboring populations, economic downturns, and
intervention by neighboring states. At its worst, spillover from an
intercommunal civil war can help cause a civil war in another state (as
spillover from Lebanon caused the 1976-1982 Syrian civil war, and the
current Syrian civil war helped reignite the Iraqi civil war). Or it
can metastasize into a regional war as neighboring states intervene to
halt the other manifestations of spillover and/or to secure their
interests against the predations of other states. That's how Israel and
Syria came to blows over Lebanon in the 1980s and why seven different
African states intervened in Congo, producing what is often referred to
as ``Africa's world war.'' For a variety of reasons, spillover from a
protracted Iraqi civil war could be very bad, threatening U.S. allies
like Turkey and Jordan and critical oil producers like Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Iran.
For all of these reasons, I believe that even if the current gambit
fails, the United States will have a strong interest in seeing the
civil war there ended. The problem, once again, is that doing so will
be even harder with the limited resources that the U.S. is willing to
employ. It will mean finding ways to appeal to both moderate Shia and
moderate Sunnis in Iraq, help them to defeat their own radicals and
then convince them to make peace with one another--and ideally forge a
new power-sharing arrangement that would preserve a relatively unified
Iraq. (Or a relatively unified Arab Iraq since it is highly unlikely
the Kurds will refrain from independence under conditions of all-out
civil war in Arab Iraq.)
Doing so in Iraq would probably mean starting in Syria. That may
seem counterintuitive, but Syria offers an important clarity lacking in
current Iraq. If Iraq is engulfed in full-scale civil war with no hope
that political change in Baghdad could end the conflict, the United
States will have a particularly problematic dilemma: we will have mixed
feelings about both the Shia-dominated government and the Sunni-
dominated opposition. We will hate ISIS and the Sunni radicals, but not
the Sunni tribes and moderates allied with them. We will hate the Shia
radicals and mistrust their Iranian allies, but not the Shia moderates
who will inevitably have to join their coreligionists. Supplying both
sides in any civil war is a nonstarter, but in Iraq those circumstances
will make it (or should make it) impossible to decide which side to
back. In that one respect, Syria is much easier. There the United
States unequivocally backs the Sunni-dominated opposition against the
Shia-dominated regime.
That situation would enable the United States to make a
significantly greater effort to build a new, conventionally trained,
armed, and organized Syrian
opposition army. One that could defeat the forces of both the regime
and the Sunni Islamist radicals.\5\ Although such an effort would
likely take anywhere from 2-5 years, it has a number of important
advantages. First, it is entirely feasible--especially if coupled with
Western air power. It would create the best conditions for a stable
Syria, which would eliminate the spillover into Iraq, including the
ability of ISIS and other radical groups to employ Syria as a base and
recruiting ground to support operations in Iraq. Moreover, it would
create a moderate, nonpartisan but largely Sunni force that could
appeal to moderate Sunni tribesmen in Iraq. Indeed, a moderate, mostly
Sunni, opposition army triumphing in Syria would be a tremendous draw
for the Sunnis of Iraq--a model of what they might become if they rid
themselves of ISIS, as well as an ally in that fight.
Finally, if the United States were to help create such a new model
Syrian opposition army, one that could then serve as a conduit for
American assistance to Iraqi Sunnis as well, Washington would then be
ideally placed to reach out to moderate Shia groups in Iraq. The defeat
of the Assad regime in Syria would doubtless terrify many Iraqi Shia
that the Syrian opposition army planned to turn on them as well. As
their trainers, advisors, paymasters, and weapons suppliers, the United
States could then offer to rein in the new Syrian Army and even to
provide similar assistance to moderate Iraqi Shia groups to enable them
to defeat their own radicals. If they accepted, and they would have
strong incentives to do so, they too would be beholden to the United
States, creating the best circumstances possible for the U.S. to broker
a deal between the moderate Sunnis and the moderate Shia (of both Iraq
and Syria).
plan c: seeking a stable partition
Building a new Syrian Army and helping it to defeat both the Assad
regime and the Sunni militants would be time-consuming and require more
resources than the U.S. has so far committed there, but it is hardly
impossible. If we succeeded, then using that force to help Iraqi Sunnis
turn on their own militants would also be a realistic aspiration. And
if that too succeeded, then it is reasonable to believe that those
circumstances could then be employed to convince Iraq's Shia to do the
same. Finally making possible a negotiated settlement in Iraq.
Certainly there is no reason that any of this is impossible. But
none of it will be easy. And each additional step adds degrees of time,
cost, and difficulty. Even if we were willing to invest the time and
resources to give this strategy the greatest likelihood of succeeding,
it could take many years to seal the final deal. And there is no
guarantee that every link in the chain would succeed enough to make the
next link plausible.
With that in mind, I believe that the U.S. should also consider a
more straightforward alternative, namely to try to end the fighting by
convincing all sides to recognize the de facto division of the country
that is likely to take place. As noted, the battle lines between Sunni
and Shia militias are likely to run roughly along the blurry dividing
lines between their communities. Tragically, those lines are likely to
sharpen as a result of the widespread ethnic cleansing that will
accompany the fighting and that has already begun again. The Kurds,
will almost certainly opt for independence under these circumstances,
and even if they refrain from a formal declaration, they will be
independent in all but name.
In theory, a simpler alternative to trying to put Iraq back
together again, would be to recognize its partition and convince the
parties to accept that reality and stop fighting. Of course, what seems
simple and obvious in theory often proves anything but that in
practice.
Indeed, there is a dangerous mythology taking hold in Washington
that partition might be easy because Iraq has since been sorted out
into neat, easily divided cantonments. That is simply false. While
there are far fewer mixed towns and neighborhoods, they still exist,
and even the homogeneous towns and neighborhoods remain heavily
intermingled across central Iraq, including in Baghdad. Moreover, both
the Sunni and the Shia militias are claiming territory largely
inhabited by the sects of the other. All of that indicates that it
would probably take years of horrible bloodshed to convince both the
Sunni and Shia leaderships to agree to partition, let alone on where to
divide the country.
Thus, the challenge for the United States would be how to assist a
process by which the various Iraqi factions recognized that continued
fighting was fruitless and they should agree to a cease-fire and a
functional division of the country to end the war altogether. That too
will not be easy. Again, the key will be to empower moderates on both
sides (Sunni and Shia) to enable them to defeat the radicals and then
strike a workable deal with one another. (By definition, a moderate in
an intercommunal civil war is someone willing to work with the other
side.)
In theory, (there's that phrase again), the United States might
provide military support to both Sunni and Shia moderates to help them
triumph over their respective extremists in their respective
cantonments. In practice, they are just as likely to try to use that
assistance against each other as against the extremists. And if
military assistance is not the right way to influence such groups
waging an all-out civil war, it is even harder to imagine that any
other form of assistance would have greater sway with them.
Historically, only the threat of punishment has carried that kind of
weight in such circumstances, but that would require a willingness on
the part of the United States to become very heavily involved in the
Iraqi civil war, quite possibly including with combat troops, which
makes it a nonstarter.
Thus, the reality of a partition strategy is that, absent a
willingness on the part of the U.S. to impose it by cracking heads, we
will probably find ourselves on the sidelines, waiting and hoping that
the Iraqi militia leaders will eventually recognize the futility of
their combat and agree to accept Americans (or others) to step in as
mediators and broker a disengagement and partition. That's not
impossible. But typically, it is a long time coming, and in the
meantime Iraqis will die while the region will suffer all of the
effects of spillover. Partition may ultimately be the outcome in Iraq,
but absent a plausible mechanism for the United States to convince the
militias to agree to it in the near term, it will be difficult to adopt
it is an actual strategy. As Colin Powell famously remarked, ``Hope is
not a strategy,'' and hoping that Iraqi militia leaders recognize the
error of their ways is not a good way to safeguard American interests
in the region.
plan d: containment
Inevitably, America's last option would be containment.\6\ We could
simply opt to leave Iraq to its fate and try as best we might to block
or mitigate the spillover onto its neighbors. In fact, unless and until
we could find a way to convince the militias to stop fighting, the
``partition'' approach described above would have to rely on
containment. To some extent, so too would a strategy of remaking Iraqi
politics by building a new Syrian opposition army that could stabilize
Syria and then help stabilize Iraq since that would be a long time in
the making if it succeeded at all. In short, the United States is
probably going to rely on at least some aspects of a containment
strategy toward Iraq under any circumstances unless we are able to help
forge a new Iraqi political leadership and power-sharing agreement that
stops the civil war in its tracks.
The problem with containment is that it does not work very well.
Historically, few nations have been able to stave off the worst aspects
of spillover from an intercommunal civil war for very long. Most
countries find themselves suffering worse and worse, and often getting
drawn into the civil wars the longer they drag on. It is harder to find
good cases of neighboring countries that successfully minimized the
impact of spillover on themselves.
In many cases states have simply tried to weather the storm and
paid a heavy price for doing so. Others have been driven to do what
they could to end the conflict instead. Syria spent at least 8 years
trying to end the Lebanese civil war before the 1989 Ta'if accords and
the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War gave it the opportunity to finally do so.
Israel's 1982 invasion was also a bid to end the Lebanese civil war
after its previous efforts to contain it had failed, and when this too
failed Jerusalem tried to go back to managing spillover. By 2000, it
was clear that this was again ineffective and so Israel simply pulled
out of Lebanon altogether in a vain effort to prevent further
spillover. Withdrawing from Lebanon was smart for Israel for many
reasons, but it has not put an end to its Lebanon problem. In the
Balkans, the United States and its NATO Allies realized that it was
impossible to manage the Bosnian or Kosovar civil wars and so in both
cases they employed coercion--including the deployment of massive
ground forces--to bring them to an end. Pakistan opted to try to end
the Afghan civil war by building and encouraging the Taliban, an effort
that, 20 years later, has left Pakistan riven by internal conflict of
its own.
Nevertheless, we may well have nothing left but to try to contain
the spillover from an Iraqi civil war. From America's perspective that
will require pursuing a number of critical courses of action.
Provide Whatever Assistance We Can to Iraqi Civilians and Refugees.
In this scenario Iraq's civil war will rage on, fueled by its militias
and, unfortunately, its neighbors. The biggest losers will be the
people of Iraq themselves. Hundreds of thousands are likely to die.
Millions will be forced to flee their homes and suffer other tragedies.
Those people represent both a moral responsibility and a strategic
threat since they constitute ideal recruitment pools for militias and
terrorists. Especially if the United States opts not to do anything to
try to bring the civil war to a rapid end, but also if we are merely
forced to wait for other aspects of our strategy to gain traction, we
should and must provide what support we can to the people of Iraq, both
those who remain and those who flee. Undoubtedly various international
NGOs and U.N. agencies will do what they can, but without the resources
of nation-states, they will not be able to do much.
Provide Support to Iraq's Neighbors. The historical evidence from
other intercommunal civil war suggests that the United States should
provide assistance to Iraq's neighbors to reduce the likelihood that
their own deprivation will create sympathy for, or incite emulation of,
the actions of their compatriots in Iraq. The more content the people
of neighboring states, the less likely they will be to want to get
involved in someone else's civil war. Aid also provides some leverage
with the government in question, making them more likely to hesitate
before going against U.S. wishes. Generous aid packages can be
explicitly provided with the proviso that they will be stopped (and
sanctions possibly applied instead) if the receiving country intervenes
in the Iraqi conflict.
That would mean continuing and even expanding the roughly $660
million in aid the United States is providing Jordan this year. It will
probably mean increased assistance to Turkey to help it deal with both
refugees and terrorism emanating from the intertwined Iraqi-Syrian
civil wars.
The more difficult questions will be how to help Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia. Neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia need American financial
assistance, although both might need greater security cooperation to
deal with terrorists and militiamen spilling over their borders in
search of either targets or sanctuary.
However, the bigger problem that both Kuwait and Saudi are likely
to face will be the radicalization of their populations, a problem both
were beginning to face in 2006 before the U.S. ``Surge'' shut down the
first manifestation of civil war in Iraq. Saudi and Kuwaiti Shia
minorities will doubtless sympathize with--and be galvanized by--the
Shia of Iraq and Syria. Their Sunni majorities will side with the Sunni
oppositions in both and will demand that their governments do ever more
to support the Sunni fighters. It will almost certainly lead to
widespread gulf covert support to the Sunni militias in Iraq and Syria,
potentially including ISIS and the other militant groups. Historically,
such covert support can backfire against the country providing the
support, as Pakistani support for the Taliban, Jordanian support for
the PLO, and Turkish support for the Syrian opposition has. It can also
lead to conventional interventions into the civil war when the covert
support proves inadequate to the task. That's how Syria and Israel got
sucked into Lebanon.
Dissuade Intervention. Consequently, the United States, hopefully
along with its European and Asian allies, will have to make a major
effort to convince Iraq's neighbors not to intervene in an Iraqi civil
war. Given the extent of their involvement already, this will be
difficult to do. Our efforts should include the economic aid described
above, as well as specific benefits tailored to the needs of individual
countries. For Jordan and Saudi Arabia it might be yet another quixotic
tilt at an Israeli-Palestinian peace, thereby addressing another of
their major concerns. For Turkey, it might be financial aid or NATO
security assistance. Again, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would be the
biggest challenges and the best Washington might do would be merely to
try to convince them that it would be counterproductive and unnecessary
to intervene--unnecessary because the U.S. and its allies will make a
major effort to keep Iran from intervening, which will be their
greatest worry.
Preventing Iran from intervening, especially given how much it is
already involved in Iraqi affairs, is going to be the biggest headache
of all. Given Iran's immense interests in Iraq, deepening Iranian
intervention is likely to go hand in hand with a worsening civil war.
And that is a foregone conclusion in a scenario of containment. For
Tehran, the United States may have to lay down ``redlines'' regarding
what is absolutely impermissible--like sending uniformed Iranian
military units into Iraq or annexing Iraqi territory, both of which
could prompt the Sunni Arab states to do the same. Of course, the U.S.
and its allies would also have to lay out what they would do to Iran if
it were to cross any of those redlines and that will inevitably be
complicated by the status of nuclear negotiations with Tehran,
regardless of the status of those negotiations.
Direct Strikes at the Terrorist Infrastructure in Iraq. If the
United States opts merely to contain an Iraqi civil war, we will have
to accept some level of terrorist activity there. However, we would
have to try to limit the ability of terrorists (Sunni and possibly Shia
as well) to use Iraq as a haven for attacks outside the country. That
will mean reliance on the kind of approach that Vice President Biden
purportedly favored in Afghanistan rather than the ``surge'' of troops
that President Obama opted for instead. It would mean employing air
assets (manned and unmanned), special operations forces, and all manner
of intelligence and reconnaissance systems to identify and strike key
terrorists and their infrastructure (training camps, bomb factories,
arms caches, etc.) before they could pose a danger to Americans. Thus,
the U.S. would continue to make intelligence collection in Iraq a high
priority, and whenever such a facility was identified, Shia or Sunni,
American forces would move in quickly to destroy it.
Of course, such an effort would need bases to operate. Jordan and
Kuwait are obvious candidates. However, in this scenario, Iraqi
Kurdistan would probably be the best of all. Indeed, the United States
could tie its willingness to recognize an independent Kurdistan (and
provide them with the kind of military support they will need to hold
off Iran as well as ISIS and the Sunni Arab militant groups) to Erbil's
willingness to host American counterterrorism (CT) forces. It seems
highly likely that the Kurds would jump at that opportunity, making it
far more palatable to run a discrete CT campaign from independent Iraqi
Kurdistan than anywhere else.
learning the lesson of iraq
Mr. Chairman, as I reflect on the list of options I have described
above, I find myself deeply depressed. This is a miserable set of
choices. But they reflect the reality of our circumstances in Iraq.
Whatever options we choose to pursue there, I find myself hoping
that at the very least, we will recognize that the best option of all
was to have never allowed ourselves and the Iraqis to get to this
point. They have been sucked into a civil war that feeds upon itself,
and we are left with almost nothing we can do, either to save them or
prevent that maelstrom from wrecking vital American interests. The
mistakes of both the Bush '43 and Obama administrations led us to this
point because neither was willing to acknowledge that we cannot break a
country in a vital part of the world and then walk away from it. And
neither was willing to practice the sage aphorism that an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure. Today we have but an ounce of cure
for a malady raging out of control, one that could easily kill the
patient and who knows what else. Perhaps the best that might come of it
would be if we learn not to do so again.
----------------
Notes
\1\ This should not be taken to imply that I believe Iraq's current
problems are entirely the fault of the Obama administration. Quite the
contrary. I believe that the George W. Bush administration is at least
equally to blame, and arguably more so.
\2\ Full disclosure: I proposed that the United States adopt this
policy the day after Mosul fell and before the administration embraced
it. See Kenneth M. Pollack, ``How to Pull Iraq Back from the Abyss,''
The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2014.
\3\ For a fuller description of the political reforms that would be
required to make this scenario work, see Zalmay Khalilzad and Kenneth
M. Pollack, ``How to Save Iraq,'' The New Republic Online, July 22,
2014.
\4\ On spillover from intercommunal civil wars, its causes,
manifestations and efforts to stem it, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth
M. Pollack, ``Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi
Civil War'' (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2006).
\5\ For a fuller description of this strategy, see Kenneth M.
Pollack, ``An Army to Defeat Assad: How to Turn Syria's Opposition into
a Real Fighting Force,'' forthcoming, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 5
(September/October 2014). Also see, Daniel L. Byman, Michael Doran,
Kenneth M. Pollack and Salman Shaikh, ``Saving Syria: Assessing Options
for Regime Change,'' Middle East Memo No. 21, The Saban Center for
Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, March 15, 2012.
\6\ For more on the methodologies of containment, see Byman and
Pollack, ``Things Fall Apart,'' op. cit.
The Chairman [presiding]. Well, thank you all for your
testimony. I am sorry I had to step out, but we had the benefit
of having your testimony in advance.
Let me ask you, Ambassador Jeffrey, if Maliki is the
problem and Maliki somehow rises to be Prime Minister again,
what is the course of events for us?
Ambassador Jeffrey. First of all, it is not going to be
easy for him to hang on as Prime Minister, because he will need
the votes, as Mr. McGurk said, of at least part of the Sunni
community and part of the Kurdish community to get above the
165 that is needed. What I fear is that there will be a long
delay, and that is what we had in 2010, where he will be the
Acting Prime Minister for many months and people will get more
discouraged.
So I think the first thing is for us to press for this
process to go forward, because I think that most Iraqis,
including many of the Shia parties, do believe that they need a
new leader. If he does stay in power, then our options are far
more along the lines that Dr. Pollack has suggested at the end,
of containing the problem and dealing with Iraq and Syria from
Jordan, from Kurdistan, with Turkey to the extent that is
possible, to try to both contain the danger and go after some
of these ISIL elements that we think are threatening us or
threatening the stability of the region.
It will be very hard to work with a government in Baghdad
that does not have the buy-in of the Sunnis and the Kurds, and
it will not be possible to assist in any retakeover of those
Sunni areas by an army that does not represent the people of
the region.
The Chairman. And if the flip side of that happens, that in
fact he does not continue as Prime Minister, what are the
immediate things that the next government will have to do in
order to create the type of national unity that can fight ISIS
and not have the country disintegrate?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I have my own list. We all have lists,
and frankly the Iraqis have their lists as well, Mr. Chairman.
But a few things are crucial. First of all, to keep the Kurds
in there has to be a deal. Brett McGurk--on oil. Brett McGurk
talked about some of the options. He has negotiated a lot of
them--they are ready, they are on the shelf--that would give
them a bigger slice of overall resources while bringing them
back into the system. That is very important.
There needs to be real revenue-sharing. They already have
tried this. Up until recently, the Kurds were getting 17
percent. Some of the either oil-producing provinces--Basra,
Kirkuk--or those with a lot of pilgrims--Najaf--were getting
slices of the Iraqi central government budget to execute their
own programs, and they were very, very successful, particularly
in Najaf and Kirkuk. So there is a model also on the shelf to
have more economic federalism.
So it is not just lists of things. If you want
inclusiveness you get rid of the guy who represents a lack of
inclusiveness. That will do more than any action plan. If you
want to have economic federalism, then you introduce financial
and energy policies that will see to that. And if you want to
have a security force that is capable of doing what General
Barbero said, let us have a new Defense Minister who actually
does have command and control over his forces, which is not the
case now.
The Chairman. Dr. Pollack, do you have anything to add?
Dr. Pollack. I would just add one point to, I think, the
excellent points that Ambassador Jeffrey just raised, which is
that I think the United States needs to do a lot more to put on
offer to the Iraqis, to make clear what we would do to help
them if they actually took the steps that we are looking for.
Right now my sense from Iraqis is we are demanding a great deal
from them, but we are not actually letting them know what we
would do for them if they took what are actually very difficult
steps for them.
That gets to Ambassador Jeffrey's point about how we need
to be pressuring them, how we need to be pushing this process
forward. Getting rid of Prime Minister Maliki is going to be
very difficult and I think the Iraqis need to understand in
much more concrete terms, rather than the more vague promises
that they seem to be hearing, at least that they are hearing,
from the administration about what they would get if they did
it.
The Chairman. General Barbero, I am really hesitant to
continue to authorize sales or to approve sales--it is up to
the administration to authorize them, but to approve sales--
when I have seen what has happened so far with some very
critical armament that has fallen to the hands of ISIS as a
result of it being abandoned on the battlefield. So how, in
light of your comments that we need to respond to Iraqis'
requests for help, which I assume in part is possibly air
strikes, but also they are looking for equipment, how do we
create the safeguards so that if we are going to help we do not
end up having our weaponry fall in the hands of ISIS and used
against the very forces that we want to defeat them?
General Barbero. Mr. Chairman, as you look at every
conflict there has been--it is not an antiseptic environment
where--you will have loss of equipment. It just will happen.
The Chairman. But not to the tune that----
General Barbero. Not to the tune that we had, not with the
rout in Mosul, I agree, and I share your concern and dismay
over that. I think from this assessment we look at which are
the good units of the Iraqi Security Forces and we invest
heavily in them with advice, training, whatever they need, and
then take a hard look at what they have asked for and what we
are willing to share with them and make some decisions.
But a senior Iraqi military leader last week said to me:
Where is America? The Russians are performing and supporting
us. The Iranians are here. We want the Americans. You are our
friends.
They are frustrated. We can ship all the Hellfires we want.
They have three fixed-wing aircraft to fire Hellfires. It
sounds great, briefs well. You cannot, as I said, air strike
your way out of this.
So I would pick the right units from this assessment and I
would invest in them with the weapons and equipment that we
feel that would help.
The Chairman. Well, I would say to the Iraqis, billions of
dollars, hundreds of lives, that is where America has been. And
I would also remind them that they were unwilling to pursue a
status of forces agreement which might have created the
wherewithal to continue to solidify the Iraqi Security Forces.
So I think they have to think about the decisions that they
have made, not to relive them, but to instruct them moving
forward.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you for being here. I think a lot of times our
second panels are actually better than the first, but by that
time people have other business. You are more independent
voices, and again we thank you so much for your help.
Dr. Pollack, you responded, facially anyway, when Senator
Menendez just mentioned that they were unwilling to pursue a
status of forces agreement. I was just wondering what you were
hoping to say, but did it instead with an expression?
Dr. Pollack. I think that what was going through my head,
Senator, was that that was a moment when I think both the
United States and Iraq both failed each other and themselves.
It was a moment when I think that Prime Minister Maliki was at
best ambivalent about whether or not he wanted an American
presence, which history has proven would have been beneficial
to him. And I think that it was a time when the United States
was ambivalent at best about whether or not it wanted to stay,
and I think that history has once again proven that it would
have been better had we done so.
Senator Corker. I know our focus needs to be on the future,
but I know Ambassador Jeffrey had sort of a give and take
publicly in writing with folks regarding this. Is that your
impression of what happened during that time, just very
briefly? I want to move on to some other things.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Very briefly, the administration,
following the recommendation of its military leaders and my
recommendation, in 2010 offered to keep troops on. In essence,
the Maliki government and most of the political parties except
the Sadrists agreed to have troops. We got hung up on the
question of a status of forces agreement. Maliki was reluctant
to do this. Iyad Allawi, who controlled the Sunnis in
Parliament, said that he would not move any further than Maliki
would move. That undercut how we had done the deal back in 2008
when we had gotten the earlier agreement, and, frankly, time
ran out.
In terms of how enthusiastic the administration was about
it, I had my instructions, which were to try to get an
agreement.
Senator Corker. I notice--thank you both for that
clarification--that there has been sort of a discussion of the
order of steps that need to take place, and there has been a
heavy emphasis on getting the right political situation. I
think all of you agree with that. Some of you would like to see
us go ahead and take some steps now.
Let me ask you, General, what do you think--what are some
of the elements of debate that are taking place now relative
to, if you were guessing--and my guess is you actually talk
with some of these people from time to time--prior to us
knowing if they are going to have an inclusive government,
someone other than Maliki, what do you think are some of the
elements of the debate that are taking place inside the
administration relative to taking some small steps, not
something sustained, but some of those small steps that I think
you have mentioned might build morale at a minimum and maybe
stave off some of the steps that ISIL is taking?
General Barbero. I think there has been a reliance on this,
as Ms. Slotkin said, a very deliberate process, in a very
exigent situation. This process has in my view become a way to
not take action, and we are in a situation where ISIS, as I
said, is an existential threat to Baghdad, the Kurds, and in
the region, and they are gaining strength.
I think there has been discussion of air strikes, and you
can take air strikes on targets without having precision if you
see these entities out in the desert. That will only be for
fleeting effects. It must be part of a sustained effort. So
just doing air strikes or drone strikes can have some effect,
but it will not be lasting or decisive.
I think there is great reluctance to reintroduce American
Forces. I get that. I understand. But if this is an existential
threat, if, as we have heard, it is in the national interest of
the United States, this situation, and if the Iraqi Security
Forces are the way to deal with this, and these Iraqi Security
Forces are not prepared or capable of dealing with it, then it
is a dichotomous situation. You cannot close that circle
without some external assistance to these forces.
So I hope it is not a question of if we should support the
Iraqi Security Forces and introduce the steps that I said; it
is a question of when and, now that we have had this
assessment, how quickly.
Senator Corker. So the fear would be paralysis through
purposeful long-term analysis. That would be the fear, just
analyzing this forever and not taking action.
I also agree with you there is some reticence to get back
involved too militarily. But things are dissipating quickly.
Let me ask you this. Maliki obviously, he may not have been
a good Prime Minister, but he understands the debate that is
taking place in our country and knows that him being gone,
while we might not have laid out as clearly--and I think it is
a great comment from you for us to share with them specifically
what we would do if they had this inclusive government. I think
that is a great point.
But can you tell if there is any leveraging taking place by
Maliki right now, knowing that we are not going to get involved
in any kind of big way if he is still there? Is there any
activity that is occurring there relative to him trying to
leverage us in other ways?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Dr. Pollack might have information as
well. I think that, first of all, he points out correctly that
he did very well in the last elections several months ago,
winning personally 700,000 votes, which was even more than he
did in 2010. His party came in first. Under the constitution,
he should be given by the new President selected today within
15 days an opportunity to form a government. And under the
constitutional process, if he cannot form it--and I think it
will be hard for him to form it--after 30 days the mandate has
to pass to another party.
Now, that is a lot of time to consume doing this. I think
that as a minimum he is going to want to play this out. He also
may feel that in the end the Americans, having sent, what was
it, 775 additional forces to Iraq, are ready to help them out
regardless of what happens. Again, I think I and many others
have said under certain circumstances right now striking ISIL
where they pose a danger is important, but we cannot provide
the whole gamut, the whole breadth of support that they need
absolutely unless we have an inclusive government that can
bring in the Sunnis and bring in the Kurds, and it will not
happen with him, sir.
Senator Corker. Just one last question. I know my time is
up and I know all of us probably have to be places. But I know
there is discussion--and you have said this--about this being a
regional approach and Syria and Iraq obviously having no border
between them any more. What are some of the dynamics on the
Syrian side that as we look at this regionally--I know you are
just focused on Iraq now--that complicate, with Assad being in
power there, complicate our ability to look at it regionally?
Dr. Pollack. I am glad to start, Senator. I think one of
the most obvious problems is the one that I have already
mentioned, which is that when you look only at Syria we look at
it and we say, we do not like the Assad regime, we want it
gone, therefore the question is simply how best to help the
opposition. When we look at Iraq we have a situation where you
have a Shia group in charge of the government, they are likely
to remain in charge of the government, and we are going to want
to maintain good ties with them. Simultaneously, we have got a
Sunni opposition that includes some people we really dislike--
ISIS and the militants--and others who we very much like. So
there is a complexity that is involved, and therefore any
support to one of these groups becomes complicated by the
opposite effect that it has with the other.
So if we are providing enormous support to Sunni
oppositionists in Syria, inevitably some of that support is
going to flow to opposition--to Sunni groups in Iraq, some of
whom we may not like. The more that we are helping the Maliki
government in Baghdad, the more it is going to be seen by folks
in the region as supporting the wider Shia cause, which also
encompasses the Assad government.
Obviously, that is only the tip of the iceberg. There is a
lot more to talk about. But we do need to recognize the
complexity that has now been introduced into this situation by
having simultaneously civil wars in Iraq and Syria that are by
and large merged, which the region sees in a very simple way as
a Sunni-Shia fight, but which we see in a much more complex
way.
Senator Corker. Would anybody like to add to that?
General Barbero. If I could, Senator. As far as a regional
approach, we know that ISIS is--they are awash in money. But
the way to choke these organizations is to go after their
financing. Now, for the near term they have got plenty of that.
However, we know there are regional actors supporting them,
supporting ISIS, and we should employ, as I said in my
statement, our intelligence community to identify those actors
and then use every tool we have in the interagency--Department
of Commerce, Department of Treasury--to go after those actors
and these sources of funding.
We know, have a good idea, where it is coming from. Let us
identify them and target them as part of a regional approach to
this growing problem.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here.
The Chairman. One last set of questions. General, you
served in Iraq. You led our mission to train and equip Iraqi
Forces. When U.S. Forces left Iraq it seemed that Iraqi Forces
were on their way to becoming a capable force. So that begs the
question: What happened? Why did the ISF's capability and
capacity erode so quickly?
General Barbero. Senator, tough question, and it is tough
to see what has happened, and it is tough to see what has been
happening over the last few years. I have been back to Iraq
many times over the last year since I left active duty.
But the ISF was built to handle a low-level insurgency and
our goal was to get them to a state where they were good
enough. Frankly, when I was there in 2009 and 2010 and into
2011, the assumption we had as we did our development plan,
there would be a residual force of advisers and trainers to
continue this development. I did an assessment in the summer of
2010 for then-General Odierno, which we briefed to everyone in
Iraq and every Iraqi leader, saying: Here is where your forces
are going to be in December 2011. We wanted to convince them
and show them the capabilities and the shortfalls of their
forces.
The shortfalls we identified, some were very obvious. They
could not control their own air space nor defend it. But we
said: You have a sustainment problem, your military readiness
of your equipment is in a death spiral. Unless you do something
very seriously, you will not be able to field an army. Your
command and control structure is not workable. This peacetime
for command and control of the population directly to the Prime
Minister, it has to change. You do not have an NCO corps.
What I think most fundamentally is, we told the Iraqis: You
must invest in training. Good armies train continuously. And we
did not see that before we left and I have not seen any
evidence of that since then.
So the short answer is the development that needed to take
place with the Iraqi Security Forces from December 2011 to July
2014 has not taken place. We can go back and forth about
advisers and trainers, but they just have not developed as they
should.
The Chairman. So if that is the case, then what will
advisers now be able to do at this stage that will make a
difference on the ground with Iraqi Forces?
General Barbero. Well, when we were on the ground with them
and advising and training, it did make a difference. I think
first we can stop the bleeding. They are under severe duress
with the VBIED campaign that has started in Baghdad. Indirect
fire is coming. ISIS is not going to let up. So if this is in
our interest, then we need to get something in there to help
them, A, stop the bleeding, and then start building these
forces.
But this will not take weeks or months. This is going to
take a while to get them to a state--as I said in my comments,
unless we have an Iraqi Government that is willing to accept
these changes and willing to emplace these changes into their
structure and the way they do business, then I would question
whether we should
do it.
The Chairman. Two last questions. Can air strikes alone--I
think you alluded to this in your answer to one of Senator
Corker's questions. But can air strikes alone make a difference
in pushing back ISIS, or would doing them now just be in
essence giving the Iraqis a boost?
General Barbero. Air strikes can make a difference,
tactical
difference. They can help enable Iraqi Forces. They can help
relieve pressure. They can help degrade ISIS capabilities. But
my point is we cannot think that just through air strikes and
drone strikes we can solve this problem or, I would argue, even
hold it in abey-
ance. They would make a difference. It would not be a decisive
difference.
The Chairman. So the flip, the other side of this, then is
training and assisting Iraqi Forces, can they possibly recover
the country, even with the training and assisting?
General Barbero. I think they could.
The Chairman. You think they could?
General Barbero. I think they could.
The Chairman. We are talking about what period of time?
General Barbero. Months. It is not going to happen
overnight.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Senator, if I could support General
Barbero. I have seen it myself. I was in Vietnam as an Army
officer in 1972. The South Vietnamese Army, when the North
Vietnamese regular army invaded for the first time, they
started melting worse than Mosul. Millions, billions of dollars
of U.S. equipment was lost within days. Then when we started
air strikes it changed the psychology of those forces almost
overnight, and within 3 months they had recovered almost the
entire country.
We saw in Libya, we saw in Kosovo, and we saw in Bosnia
where air strikes can provide lightly equipped, sometimes not
too well trained forces the difference in taking on better
equipped forces. As Brett McGurk I think three times described
earlier today, dealing with the Shamar Tribe up near Mosul,
dealing with the people, and I know Governor Delami is still
holding out in Ramadi, a Sunni governor, against ISIL, they are
outgunned. He described how they had volunteers to go into
northern Fallujah, but they lost in a battle to ISIL because
the ISIL people were better equipped and better trained.
So a combination of air strikes and advisers, not boots on
the ground, can make a huge difference, sir.
The Chairman. One last question for you, General. Are you
surprised by the alarming reports of Iraqi Security Forces'
abuses, infiltration by Shia militias, and lack of
accountability? And how do we engage with the Iraqi Forces to
deal with those challenges?
General Barbero. Senator, I was in Erbil and Baghdad in
late May, so the developments in Mosul and what has happened
after that I think was a shock in Mosul and Baghdad and
Washington. I was shocked by it.
But as I drive around Baghdad or Basra or other places over
the last year, it is a checkpoint army. I have said that. You
cannot take on an ISIS if you have been in static positions on
the defense and not trained for offensive operations.
What is troubling is as you ride up to these army
checkpoints there are Shia religious banners almost at every
one across Baghdad, certainly in Basra. So there must be a
fundamental change in the nature of these forces, not only the
government, but the forces, to allow participation by Sunni and
Kurds in this unified effort that it would require.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate your insights. I am not a
military guy, but I will say that when an American soldier
volunteers, he fights for a cause, for a principle, for a set
of values, and he fights for his nation, he or she fights for
their nation. If the job is just a job, then it does not turn
out the same way. And it is difficult to get an Iraqi Army if
you do not feel you are fighting for the totality of a
country--Shia, Sunni, and Kurd. And that is a real problem.
Anyhow, I appreciate all of your insights as we grapple
with the choices we have to make.
This record will remain open until the close of business
tomorrow. With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of Brett McGurk to Question Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. The Islamic State (formerly ISIS) is among the most well-
financed terrorist organizations in the world, with financial flows
running into tens of millions of dollars. Please describe the status of
Islamic State finances, including internal sources (oil revenue, taxes,
smuggling) as well as any external flows and what the U.S is doing to
counter IS financing.
Answer. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) derives the
majority of its financing from criminal activities including smuggling,
robberies, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom, as well as raiding
villages and towns. ISIL controls some smaller oil and gas fields,
pipelines, and related infrastructure in Iraq, but not Iraq's major oil
fields, which are in territory under the control of the Government of
Iraq in the south and the Kurdish Regional Government forces in the
north. ISIL receives some money from outside donors, but that pales in
comparison to its self-funding through criminal and terrorist
activities.
The issue of preventing private financing of violent extremists
remains an important priority in our discussions with all states in the
region. We are working closely with our partners in the region to halt
the sale of ISIL-sourced oil, and prevent external financial support
for terrorists from crossing their borders.
The United States and other key players in the international
financial system pay extremely close attention to the risks associated
with terrorist financing. We approach these issues with partners in the
global financial system, such as the intergovernmental Financial Action
Task Force, with financial regulators, and with financial institutions
and their compliance officers.
______
Responses of Brett McGurk to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question. The administration has blamed Baghdad for not heeding
U.S. warnings about ISIL's impending advance into Mosul.
(a) Was it a surprise when ISIL took control over Fallujah
earlier this year?
Answer. We have maintained a close watch on Iraq's security
situation since the stand-up of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in 2004.
The threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its
effect on Iraq's overall security situation was neither a surprise nor
a sudden event. We have watched and warned of ISIL's growing strength
and its threat to Iraq and U.S. interests in the region--and now to
Europe and the U.S. homeland--since the group's resurgence in 2012,
largely due to the escalating conflict in Syria.
(b) Did the administration warn Baghdad or share
intelligence with officials there preceding the ISIL takeover
of Fallujah?
Answer. The Government of Iraq has long been aware of the threat
that ISIL poses, and during Prime Minister Maliki's meetings in
Washington last fall the need to develop a holistic strategy to counter
its rise was a topic of discussion at several of PM Maliki's meetings
with USG officials. As the ISIL threat increased, we took several steps
to increase counterterrorism assistance with Iraq and to build a
foundation for future, expanded cooperation. We enhanced information-
sharing relationships, expanded training in Iraq and Jordan, provided
military advice, and sought opportunities to increase border security.
After the withdrawal of U.S. Forces in 2011, we maintained a close
partnership with Iraq's military intelligence, Directorate General for
Intelligence and Security, and other intelligence agencies across the
government and Ministry of Defense. Information and intelligence-
sharing has been and remains crucial to the fight against ISIL.
(c) How long has ISIL been of concern to the
administration?
Answer. From the moment this administration took office, ISIL--
formerly Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)--has been a concern. This organization
has posed a threat since the Bush administration when it was known as
Al Qaeda in Iraq under the direction of Zarqawi. Since the start of the
Syrian conflict, we watched with growing concern as ISIL took advantage
of the escalating war to establish a safe-haven in Syria's eastern
desert. With ample resources, recruits, weapons, and training, ISIL
slowly began to execute its strategy to create an Islamic caliphate
across the Syrian border into Iraq. Violence in Iraq began to increase
toward the end of 2012, but did not gain momentum until early 2013,
with a marked rise in ISIL suicide bombings. Taking advantage of the
instability it was causing, ISIL then seized parts of Anbar province,
including the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, in early January 2014. The
Government of Iraq then initiated a concerted counterterrorism campaign
against ISIL, which has continued to this day. Although ISIL has long
operated in Mosul and northern Iraq, its sudden, large-scale offensive
there in June escalated the fight, dramatically demonstrating the
existential threat to Iraq posed by ISIL.
Question. The United States has sat back and watched while ISIL
took control of Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit, and moved into Diyala
province. The U.S. has sent 300 advisors to Iraq and air strikes remain
an option still under review. According to CRS, ``U.S. officials
express increasing confidence that the IS-led offensive will not be
able to capture [Baghdad] outright, although the ISF might yet lose
parts of the city.''
(a) What are the administration's goals in Iraq? What does
it hope to achieve with the sending of advisors to aid the ISF?
(b) Are we content with letting ISIL maintain control over
the territory it's already claimed?
Answer. Our goals in Iraq remain promoting the emergence of a safe,
peaceful, and politically inclusive state, which supports our approach
for regional security. Iraq needs to move forward quickly to assemble a
new government that will respect the rights, aspirations, and
legitimate concerns of all Iraqis. We are in constant communication
with Iraq's leaders, urging them to come together and take a united
stand against violent extremism.
We also are exploring more ways to assist the Iraqi Security Forces
in the battle against ISIL. Over the last 6 months, we surged U.S.
diplomatic, intelligence, and military resources to develop strategic
options supported by real-time and accurate information. More recently,
a team of U.S. military advisors conducted an assessment of the Iraqi
Security Forces, which we will use to determine of how we can best
assist the Iraqis in the ongoing fight.
As Secretary Kerry remarked in June, supporting Iraq in its
struggle against violent extremism supports our strategic interests and
responsibilities, including providing security for the American people,
fighting terrorism, and standing by our allies. We will do what is
necessary and what is in our national interest to confront ISIL and the
threat that it poses to the security of the region, to our allies in
Europe, and to our own security here in the United States.
Question. After the withdrawal from Iraq of U.S. forces at the end
of 2011, sectarian strife grew stronger as Prime Minister Maliki
targeted his Sunni adversaries who, in turn began talking about
Maliki's ``power grab.'' President Obama has made it clear that he
views the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces as a failure of Iraqi
leaders to build an inclusive government.
(a) How hard did the administration work after the
withdrawal of U.S. forces to help Maliki maintain an inclusive
government?
Answer. Advancing Iraq's democracy is a key component of our
relationship under the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, and we
continue to work with Iraqis across the political spectrum and civil
society to advance that agenda. We have repeatedly urged the Iraqi
Government to uphold its commitments to due process and the rule of law
as enshrined in its constitution and to avoid any actions that
exacerbate sectarian tensions.
(b) How long did this diplomatic effort remain a priority
for the administration?
Answer. The need for inclusive government and political
reconciliation has been a focus of our conversations with Prime
Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders since PM Maliki's government
was first formed, and we have used high-level meeting, including Prime
Minister Maliki's visits to Washington in January 2012 and November
2013, to reinforce that message.
(c) Who specifically is the administration working with now
in the Sunni community to restore credibility to the central
government?
Answer. We believe that the only way to restore credibility to the
central government in Iraq is through the formation of an inclusive
government, and to this end we have been fully engaged with Iraqi
officials, politicians, civil society leaders, and religious leaders
from all components of Iraqi society. Following Iraq's successful
parliamentary elections on April 30, our priority has been to ensure
that the government formation process stays on track, especially in
light of the threat that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) poses to Iraq. To support this goal, Vice President Biden and
former Speaker Nujaifi spoke over the telephone in June about the
continued need for political reconciliation and an inclusive
government, and Deputy Assistant Secretary McGurk met repeatedly with
Iraqi leaders in June and July to ensure that the government formation
process followed the constitutionally mandated timeline.
Within the Iraqi Sunni community we continue to engage with
national and local Sunni officials and tribal leaders to promote the
formation of an inclusive government that would address Sunni
grievances. That message has been reinforced, in coordination with
international partners, by encouraging Iraq's Sunni neighbors to
support Iraqi Sunni participation in the government formation process.
Question. The void created by the withdrawal of American troops at
the end of 2011 was supposed to be filled by a robust diplomatic
presence at our state-of-the-art Embassy in Baghdad, and two consulates
in Basrah and Erbil. In 2012, personnel numbered above 12,000. In 2013,
we were at 10,500, and current reports suggest that there are 5,500
personnel there, including contractors, though the State Department has
apparently declined to disclose the official numbers of diplomatic
personnel in Iraq.
(a) What are the official numbers of diplomatic personnel--
including contractors--in Iraq for 2012, 2013 and at present?
Answer. In January 2012, at the time of the transition, the number
of all personnel (U.S., third country national, and local staff--both
direct hire and contractor) under Chief of Mission authority was about
16,000. This decreased to about 10,500 by September 2013 and further to
about 5,500 in May 2014. After the relocation of personnel from Baghdad
over the past 6 weeks, as of July 24 our on-the-ground staffing for
Chief of Mission personnel countrywide is about 4,700, including 740
direct hires and 3,960 contractors. Of these 4,700, about 1,860 are
Americans.
(b) What effort was made by this diplomatic corps to work
with the central government to remain an inclusive body?
Answer. Our mission is fully engaged with Iraqi officials,
politicians, and religious and social leaders at all levels and across
the political spectrum. U.S. engagement remains focused on supporting
the constitutional system and strengthening institutions which
transcend the interests of individuals, political parties, or sectarian
components of Iraqi society. Despite the dangers, over the past few
months our diplomatic staff on the ground in Iraq have been focused on
first ensuring that the April elections were timely, transparent, and
secure, and now continue to play a crucial role in keeping the process
for forming a new, inclusive Iraqi Government on track. I personally
spent 7 weeks on the ground during the early stages of the ISIL
incursion into Ninewah province and worked with leaders on all sides to
ensure swift and inclusive government formation. As a result of our
collective efforts, the Iraqi Government remains on track to choose a
Prime Minister and continue the constitutionally driven government
formation process.
More broadly, the United States continues to play an important role
by encouraging direct dialogue between Iraq's leaders and political
parties. Our political role in Iraq is as a trusted party that provides
advice, facilitates communication within and between the various
factions, and urges all sides to work together for constructive change.
Under the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, we cooperate with
Iraqis across a broad range of issues, including security and defense,
economics/trade, and education/culture.
(c) Why did the numbers of personnel in Iraq decline so
quickly, particularly after the amount of money that was spent
to construct our diplomatic facilities there?
Answer. From January 2012 to January 2014, we made significant
strides in reducing Chief of Mission personnel throughout Iraq. We
reduced our footprint from 13 sites, including those for Office of
Security Cooperation and Foreign Military Sales operations, to 4. We
streamlined programs and right-sized our staff. In the summer of 2013,
we switched from a DOD-legacy life support contractor to a State-
sponsored contractor, significantly reducing the number of contractors
countrywide. Although we have significantly reduced overall numbers of
personnel, all of our diplomatic facilities remain fully utilized since
we have pulled personnel in to operate from these sites as peripheral
sites have been closed.
______
Responses of Elissa Slotkin to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
isil advance into mosul
Question. The administration has blamed Baghdad for not heeding
U.S. warnings about ISIL's impending advance into Mosul.
Was it a surprise when ISIL took control over Fallujah
earlier this year?
Did the administration warn Baghdad or share intelligence
with officials there preceding the ISIL takeover of Fallujah?
How long has ISIL been of concern to the administration?
Answer. We were surprised by the speed at which four Iraqi
divisions melted away in some areas, and some areas where they simply
did not fight, in contrast to western Iraq where Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) put up a serious fight. Rather than a lack of capability, these
actions revealed that some units within the ISF lack either the will or
the direction to fight. Understanding these matters better is critical
in deciding on any future plans to pursue in Iraq. That is why we have
U.S. Forces on the ground right now trying to figure that out.
Regarding whether we shared intelligence with Baghdad, I defer to my
State colleague. We have long considered ISIL a concern, and we began
working with the Government of Iraq in early January to bolster their
ability to counter ISIL through increased security cooperation and
expedited sales of defense articles.
u.s. goals in iraq
Question. The United States has sat back and watched while ISIL
took control of Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit, and moved into Diyala
province. The U.S. has sent 300 advisors to Iraq and air strikes remain
an option still under review. According to CRS, ``U.S. officials
express increasing confidence that the IS-led offensive will not be
able to capture [Baghdad] outright, although the ISF might yet lose
parts of the city.''
What are the administration's goals in Iraq?
What does it hope to achieve with the sending of advisors
to aid the ISF?
Are we content with letting ISIL maintain control over the
territory it's already claimed?
Answer. As the President said on July 19, the administration is
focused on maintaining and ensuring the security of the U.S. Embassy
and U.S. personnel operating inside of Iraq; increasing the U.S.
intelligence picture of the situation in Iraq; and setting up the
infrastructure to support the Iraqis through shared intelligence and
coordinating planning to counter ISIL. The U.S. Central Command
assessment team is working to identify and evaluate viable partners
within the Iraqi Security Forces. The assessment team will identify
viable partners for the United States to support in their fight against
this threat.
The intelligence community has assessed that ISIL currently poses a
threat to our regional interests and allies. If left unchecked, ISIL
may eventually threaten the homeland. It is not in the interest of the
United States to allow ISIL to maintain the territory it seized. A safe
haven will allow ISIL to consolidate further and continue to threaten
the United States and its allies.
u.s. withdrawal from iraq
Question. After the withdrawal from Iraq of U.S. forces at the end
of 2011, sectarian strife grew stronger as Prime Minister Maliki
targeted his Sunni adversaries who, in turn began talking about
Maliki's ``power grab.'' President Obama has made it clear that he
views the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces as a failure of Iraqi
leaders to build an inclusive government.
How hard did the administration work after the withdrawal
of U.S. forces to help Maliki maintain an inclusive government?
For how long did this diplomatic effort remain a priority
for the administration?
Who specifically is the administration working with now in
the Sunni community to restore credibility to the central
government?
Answer. These are primarily diplomatic matters, and I defer to my
State Department colleagues to provide more information.
Question. The void created by the withdrawal of American troops at
the end of 2011 was supposed to be filled by a robust diplomatic
presence at our state-of-the-art Embassy in Baghdad, and two consulates
in Basrah and Erbil. In 2012, personnel numbered above 12,000. In 2013,
we were at 10,500, and current reports suggest that there are 5,500
personnel there, including contractors, though the State Department has
apparently declined to disclose the official numbers of diplomatic
personnel in Iraq.
What are the official numbers of diplomatic personnel--
including contractors--in Iraq for 2012, 2013, and at present?
What effort was made by this diplomatic corps to work with
the central government to remain an inclusive body?
Why did the numbers of personnel in Iraq decline so
quickly, particularly after the amount of money that was spent
to construct our diplomatic facilities there?
Answer. These are primarily diplomatic matters, and I defer to my
State Department colleagues to provide more information.
______
Responses of Brett McGurk to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
political situation
On July 15, the Iraqi Parliament elected a moderate Sunni to the
Speaker of Parliament.
In the coming days, we expect the Parliament to elect a President
that will replace Talibani.
It appears to me that the security situation in Iraq will not
improve until a new Prime Minister is elected.
The Iraq Constitution requires the Parliament to pick a Prime
Minister within 75 days from when date of when it convenes.
The last time Parliament met to pick a Prime Minister, it took
nearly 10 months.
Question. What timeline are we looking at for a new Prime Minister?
Answer. Iraq's Constitution lays out a brisk set of timeline for
the country's government formation process, including selection of a
new Prime Minister. Those constitutional were not adhered too closely
by Iraqi leaders following Iraq's general elections in 2010. In
contrast with 2010 and in part reflecting our robust diplomatic
engagement with top leaders across Iraq's political spectrum, Iraq's
new Council of Representatives (COR) has been meeting its
constitutional timelines--for example, by convening its first session
on July 1 and electing new COR Speaker Salim al-Jabouri, a widely
respected Sunni leader, on July 16.
On July 24, the same day as this hearing and well within
constitutional timelines, the COR elected senior Kurdish political
leader Fuad Masum to succeed Jelal Talabani as President of Iraq.
Masum's election represents another key milestone in Iraq's Government
formation process and an important compromise among Iraq's
ethnosectarian political blocs. We fully expect President Masum to
execute his constitutional responsibilities by directing the largest
bloc in the COR to form a new Cabinet, including a new Prime Minister,
for the COR's approval by September 8 in accordance with Iraq's
constitutional timelines.
Question. As long as President al-Maliki is in power, what is your
assessment of the chances to reconstitute the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF)?
Answer. There continues to be significant opposition to electing
Nuri al-Maliki for a third term as Prime Minister, which could
complicate efforts to build broad-based political support for the ISF's
reconstitution. However, Maliki will remain Iraq's Prime Minister until
newly elected President of Iraq Fuad Masum directs the largest bloc in
Iraq's Council of Representatives (COR) to nominate a new Prime
Minister for the COR's approval, under Iraq's Constitution by September
8, and the COR confirms the nominee. We continue to engage with Iraqi
leaders from all ethnoreligious blocs to come together around a
candidate for Prime Minister who can unify Iraq against the Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Until a new Prime Minister is
elected, we must and will continue working with Prime Minister Maliki
to ensure the ISF's swift reconstitution, which is supported by all
major political parties inside and outside Prime Minister Maliki's
coalition.
Question. In your assessment, what are the chances of Maliki
stepping down?
Answer. Nuri al-Maliki will remain Iraq's Prime Minister until
newly elected President of Iraq Fuad Massum directs the largest bloc in
Iraq's Council of Representatives (COR) to nominate a new Prime
Minister for the COR's approval, by September 8 under Iraq's
Constitution, and the COR confirms that nominee. Buoyed by a record
721,000 personal votes in Iraq's historic general elections on April
30, Prime Minister Maliki continues to insist publicly that he will
seek another term as Prime Minister. Meanwhile, there appears to be
growing sentiment within all of Iraq's societal components that Iraq
would be more unified with new leadership--a sentiment Maliki at times
seems to acknowledge to some extent.
We continue to engage with top Iraqi political, civic, and
religious leaders from all blocs to come together around a candidate
for Prime Minister who can unify Iraq against the Islamic State in Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL). Until a new Prime Minister is elected, we must
and will continue working with Prime Minister Maliki in aiding the
Government of Iraq in defending Iraq's territorial integrity against
ISIL, which is supported by all major political parties inside and
outside Prime Minister Maliki's coalition. If Iraqis' duly elected
representatives choose another Prime Minister, the United States will
continue its support for Iraq to that same end.
Question. Are we seeing any efforts within Iraq and the Shiite
population to pressure the President Maliki to step down?
Answer. There appears to be growing sentiment within all of Iraq's
societal components, including Iraq's Shia population, that Iraq would
be more unified with new leadership. For example, Grand Ayatollah Ali
Husayni al-Sistani, Iraq's most senior Shia cleric, has repeatedly
called for the formation of a new Iraqi Government and in a recent
sermon admonished Iraqi leaders against sacrificing the country's
future for their own political interests--sentiments echoed in a
statement from Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party that same day. Despite
pressure from many in Iraq's Shia community, Maliki seemingly remains
buoyed by his record 721,000 personal votes in Iraq's historic general
elections on April 30 and continues to insist publicly that he will
seek another term as Prime Minister.
We continue to engage with top Iraqi political, civic, and
religious leaders from all blocs, including Iraq's Shia community, to
come together around a candidate for Prime Minister who can unify Iraq
against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). However, that
decision must be made by Iraqi lawmakers. Until a new Prime Minister is
elected, we must and will continue working with Prime Minister Maliki
in aiding the Government of Iraq in defending Iraq's territorial
integrity against ISIL.
Question. Should Maliki step down, who are the likely successors to
take over?
Answer. When newly elected President of Iraq Fuad Masum directs the
largest bloc within Iraq's Council of Representatives (COR) to form a
new Cabinet, that bloc will almost certainly be composed of primarily
Shia parties, which can be expected to nominate a Shia leader for the
COR to confirm as Iraq's Prime Minister. Should current Prime Minister
Maliki decline his renomination or the largest COR bloc identifies
another candidate, there a number of frequently mentioned
alternatives--including several senior leaders within Prime Minister
Maliki's State of Law coalition--which performed well in Iraq's
historic general elections on April 30.
Regardless of party or ethnoreligious affiliation, we will continue
to press all political blocs to support a candidate for Prime Minister
who can govern inclusively and thereby unify all Iraqis against the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.
air strikes
Question. For years the Iraqis have been asking for our assistance
in providing military aircraft to combat al-Qaeda and ISIS fighters
throughout Iraq. This year and reportedly in 2013, the Iraqis have
requested our assistance to launch air strikes against ISIS.
Recently, Mr. McGurk stated before House Foreign Affairs Committee
that Iraq did not formally request air support until May 2013.
Did the Iraqis request air support to combat ISIS forces in
2013?
Can you please differentiate between formal and informal
requests for air support?
What are the current options for airstrikes on ISIS forces?
How do we plan on differentiating Iraq Security Forces,
Kurdish Security Forces, and Iran Security Forces from the
ISIS?
With the United States, Iraq, Iran, and Russia currently
operating in Iraq airspace, how are we currently deconflicting
our Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
operations?
Answer. The Iraqis formally requested air support in May 2014.
Prior to the formal requests, Iraqi officials made informal inquiries
regarding capabilities, to include airstrikes, but these conversations
never escalated to the requisite level of coordination necessary within
the GOI. With the formal request, airspace permissions, coordination
and GOI political support, the President authorized prompt action, to
include combat operations by U.S. aircraft, and CENTCOM surged ISR
flights over the region.
Since that time, President Obama has made it clear that he will
take action, including military action, at a time and place of our
choosing, if and when it is necessary to defend our national security
interests. We are continuing to improve our intelligence picture of the
situation on the ground so we can assess potential options. The two
Joint Operations Centers in Baghdad and Erbil are augmenting this
effort as they enhance information-sharing relationships. Airstrikes
without the necessary intelligence would be irresponsible and would not
make any operational impact on the ground.
We would defer to DOD for specifics for airspace deconfliction.
______
Responses of Elissa Slotkin to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
assessment of iraq security forces
Question. How long do we assess that it will take to recruit,
train, and equip new forces to reconstitute the four divisions that
have been reduced?
Answer. The U.S. Central Command assessment team is still in the
process of identifying and assessing potential partners within the
Iraqi Security Forces. We continue to update the initial assessment
that the team provided the week of July 14, and developing options, but
it is too early in that process to provide more detail.
Question. Please outline President al Maliki's actions that led to
the crumbling of the Iraqi Security Forces under his leadership?
Answer. The Iraq Security Forces' (ISF) losses are the result of
Iraqi political divisions and leadership challenges. As the President
said on June 19, it's not any secret that there are deep divisions
between Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders, and those divisions made it
difficult for the Government of Iraq (GOI) to command the ISF directly
in its efforts to combat ISIL. We are focused now on encouraging the
GOI to move forward with the government formation process, and in
ensuring that competent military leaders are put in place in key posts.
Question. Does the Pentagon have a timeline on when it will make
its recommendations to the President on how to proceed in Iraq?
Answer. The Secretary of Defense has provided his views regularly
to the President on how to proceed in Iraq. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff has provided his best military advice. This advice
informs the options available to the President on future action in
Iraq. The National Security Council will make recommendations to the
President.
air strikes
Question. For years the Iraqis have been asking for our assistance
in providing military aircraft to combat al-Qaeda and ISIS fighters
throughout Iraq. This year and reportedly in 2013, the Iraqis have
requested our assistance to launch air strikes against ISIS. Recently,
Mr. McGurk stated before House Foreign Affairs Committee that Iraq did
not formally request air support until May 2013.
Did the Iraqis request air support to combat ISIS forces in
2013?
Can you please differentiate between formal and informal
requests for air support?
What are the current options for airstrikes on ISIS forces?
How do we plan on differentiating Iraq Security Forces,
Kurdish Security Forces, and Iran Security Forces from the
ISIS?
With the U.S., Iraq, Iran, and Russia currently operating
in Iraq airspace, how we are currently de-conflicting our
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
operations?
Answer. The Iraqis did not request air support in 2013. U.S.
Government representatives had regular conversations with GOI
counterparts on how best to counter ISIL. As the security situation in
Iraq deteriorated, the Government of Iraq (GOI) requested expedited
defense equipment and increased training, which the United States
provided.
But the GOI did not formally request air strikes until recently. As
directed by the President, we are looking at the full range of options
on future action in Iraq, to include air support.
We are in continuous contact with the Iraqis to ensure close
coordination on our activities. But to be clear, we are not
coordinating military activity with Iran or Russia.
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