[Senate Hearing 113-652]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-652
AVIATION SAFETY: FAA'S PROGRESS ON KEY
SAFETY INITIATIVES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 16, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DEAN HELLER, Nevada
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAN COATS, Indiana
MARK WARNER, Virginia TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska TED CRUZ, Texas
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
WILLIAM COWAN, Massachusetts
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 16, 2013................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 7
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 9
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 52
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 59
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 60
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 62
Statement of Senator Coats....................................... 66
Witnesses
Hon. Michael P. Huerta, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Jeffrey B. Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector General, Office of the
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation........... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Appendix
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, prepared
statement...................................................... 75
Hon. Amy Klobuchar, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, prepared
statement...................................................... 75
Hon. Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator from New York, prepared
statement...................................................... 76
Letter dated April 12, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from
Rhonda Sivarajah, Chair, Anoka County Board of Commissioners... 76
Letter dated April 12, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from
Jack Hilbert, Douglas County Commissioner, Board of Douglas
County Commissioners........................................... 78
Letter dated April 12, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from
Marty Marchun, Douglas County Business Alliance................ 79
Letter dated April 15, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from
Jack A. Hilbert, Chair, National Association of Counties
Airports Subcommittee.......................................... 80
Letter dated April 15, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from
Mike Fitzgerald, President & CEO, Denver South Economic
Development Partnership........................................ 81
Letter dated April 15, 2013 to Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV from
Mayor Mike Waid, Town of Parker Colorado....................... 81
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Michael P. Huerta
by:
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 83
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 83
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 88
Hon. Roy Blunt............................................... 90
Hon. Kelly Ayotte............................................ 91
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Deborah A.P.
Hersman by:
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 91
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 92
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 92
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 93
Hon. Dan Coats............................................... 98
Response to written questions submitted to Gerald L. Dillingham,
Ph.D. by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 103
Hon. Dan Coats............................................... 104
Response to written questions submitted to Jeffrey B. Guzzetti
by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 105
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 106
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 107
AVIATION SAFETY: FAA'S PROGRESS ON KEY SAFETY INITIATIVES
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, this
hearing will come to order. And hopefully, there'll be some
Senators who arrive, but you've got the two best ones right
here.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Let me make my statement.
Americans take the safety of their aviation system for
granted. And they should. Given that, all too often, air travel
is a difficult experience, safety is the last thing passengers
need to worry about. There are certain expectations built into
modern air travel. Airline passengers expect their pilot is
experienced and rested, that their aircraft has been properly
maintained and the air traffic controllers will guide their
planes safely through the skies. But, the industry and
regulators should never take the safety of the system for
granted, nor should we. I know that none of us in this room
take it for granted. Everyone here today is deeply committed to
aviation safety. That's the job of many of you, and the
interest of all of us.
Our strong aviation record did not happen overnight.
Everyone involved has worked hard to cultivate a strong safety
culture. The FAA, the aircraft manufacturers, and airline
employees all hold safety as their number one priority, as do
we.
Congress has spent a considerable amount of time in the
last few years strengthening the FAA, really battling to
strengthen it, financially and substantively. It was not easy,
but we got it done. And the aviation system will become even
safer because of the FAA Modernization Reform Act, that we did,
in fact, pass last year, and the Airline Safety Act, which we
did, in fact, pass in 2010.
As you are well aware, our goal was to make certain our
aviation system continues to be the safest, most efficient and
modern in the world. The FAA has made considerable progress
implementing many of the safety initiatives in those bills, and
the agency is to be commended for that effort. But, now all of
the progress that the FAA has made is at risk.
Sequestration is not our friend, and it's affecting every
aspect of the FAA's operations, or perceived operations, as
people try to figure out what's going to happen. I also share
my colleagues' frustration with the lack of transparency,
frankly, on how the agency made this decision, and how it
intends to implement budget cuts. A great deal of attention has
been placed on the potential closure of 149 air traffic control
towers, including four in West Virginia. I've expressed my
concerns about the impact of closing those towers, on the
airports and the communities, and they've expressed their
concern to me, clearly. I know my colleagues share these
concerns, and we will likely be discussing that today.
But, again, there is frustration from some of us about the
lack of transparency on how the agency made this decision, how
it intends to implement, generally, the budget cuts. We need to
have a better understanding of the specifics. What I do know is
that if we fail to reverse the decrease in FAA's budget, we
will not have an aviation system that we need to compete in a
global economy. I made that speech last week, and I'll probably
make it again today. Why is it that we are so directly
destroying our infrastructure and our possibilities of growth
and modernization? It's incomprehensible, but there it is.
The hard choices that the FAA has to make to implement the
sequester will only be magnified this October, when the next
fiscal year begins. I know that the agency will never sacrifice
safety, but it will be forced to limit every aspect of the
system's operations. The implementation of NextGen will be
delayed. That's awful, and dangerous. But, it's going to be
delayed. Our aerospace industry will suffer as certification of
new technology and equipment is slowed. More towers could be
forced to close, and critical safety rulemaking, such as pilot
training and qualification standards, will take longer.
One of the reasons I have so aggressively advocated for
moving to a digital satellite-based system with the NextGen
program is that it will make the system safer. I know that the
FAA will never compromise safety. But, the erosion of FAA's
budget directly impacts our ability to complete NextGen and
other safety initiatives. Something has to give, somewhere. Our
problem is, we don't know what that's going to be. It threatens
our ability to make the continuous improvement to aviation
safety that we have made since the Wright Brothers.
Unlike other transportation systems, we have a
comprehensive plan to move our aviation system into the 21st
century, but our unwillingness to raise sufficient revenues to
pay for it means that we will fall further and further behind.
You fight hard like we did last year and the year before, to
move ahead. A bill passes, just barely; you get ahead. And
then, all of a sudden, we're falling behind. We face difficult
budgetary situations. We need to make the necessary investments
in our transportation networks. I don't think anybody would
dispute that. But, is it happening? No. Is there a possibility
of this happening? Maybe. But not likely.
The United States has been the world's aviation leader for
over 100 years. We risk that global leadership position if
we're unwilling to continue to invest in it. You can't invest
in something with goodwill, good wishes. It's called
``revenue.'' It's called ``money.''
The situation with the lithium battery on the Boeing 787 is
a perfect example of where the regulators identified a serious
safety problem and acted swiftly to address it. The company and
the FAA are evaluating solutions that I hope will soon be
proven workable. Although the situation with the Boeing 787 has
dominated the news, the FAA is currently working with the
aviation community to actively identify and address potential
risks before they result in an accident. The agency is working
with controllers and pilots to increase reporting of errors so
we can learn from our mistakes. We're putting the future safety
of the system at risk if we're unwilling to sustain our
commitment, if we are in the condition, that we are not willing
to sustain our commitment to these critical effects.
Everyone agrees that these are vital programs, that they
will directly improve the safety of the system. Do we really
want to slow down these initiatives? I'm not willing to settle
for the status quo on aviation safety. Maybe we'll have to.
It's a terrible situation.
I will seek to maintain the necessary level of funding for
the FAA and its critical missions as we continue our efforts to
address our broader fiscal issues. I appreciate the budgetary
situation is forcing the Federal Government to make difficult
choices, but those choices still must be smart, driven by good
policy and not damage our long-term economic competitiveness.
It's a continued commitment to safety that makes the U.S.
aviation system the safest in the world. We've seen that in
recent months. Safety has to come above all else. There is no
number two. There's only number one. And I'm confident,
somehow--for what reason, I can't explain--that this is going
to continue.
[The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
Americans take the safety of their aviation system for granted.
And, they should--given that all too often air travel is a difficult
experience, safety is the last thing passengers need to worry about.
There are certain expectations built into modern air travel. Airline
passengers expect that their pilot is experienced and rested; that
their aircraft has been properly maintained; and that air traffic
controllers will guide their plane safely through the skies. But, the
industry and regulators should never take the safety of the system for
granted. I know that none of us in this room do; everyone here today is
deeply committed to aviation safety.
Our strong aviation record did not happen overnight. Everyone
involved has worked hard to cultivate a strong safety culture. The FAA,
aircraft manufacturers, and airline employees all hold safety as their
number one priority, as I do. Congress has spent a considerable amount
of time in the last few years strengthening the FAA. It wasn't easy,
but we got it done. And, the aviation system will become even safer
because of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act we passed last year and
the Airline Safety Act we passed in 2010.
As you are well-aware, our goal was to make certain our aviation
system continues to be the safest, most efficient, and modern in the
world. The FAA has made considerable progress implementing many of the
safety initiatives in those bills, and the agency is to be commended
for their effort. But, now all of the progress the FAA has made is at
risk. Sequestration is affecting every aspect of the FAA's operations.
A great deal of attention has been placed on the potential closure
of 149 air traffic control towers, including four in West Virginia. I
have expressed my concerns about the impact of closing these towers on
the airports and the communities that depend on them. I know my
colleagues share these concerns and we will likely discuss this issue
in detail here today. I also share my colleagues' frustration with the
lack of transparency on how the agency made this decision and how it
intends to implement the budget cuts. We need to have a better
understanding of the specifics. What I do know is that if we fail to
reverse the decrease in the FAA's budget we will not have the aviation
system that we need to compete in the global economy.
The hard choices that the FAA has to make to implement the
sequester will only be magnified this October when the next fiscal year
begins. I know that the agency will never sacrifice safety, but it be
forced to limit every aspect of the system's operations. The
implementation of Next Gen will be delayed, our aerospace industry will
suffer as certification of new technology and equipment is slowed, more
towers could be forced to close, and critical safety rulemakings such
as pilot training and qualification standards will take longer. One of
the reasons I have so aggressively advocated for moving to a digital
satellite-based system with the NextGen program is that it will make
the system safer.
I know that the FAA will never compromise safety. But, the erosion
of FAA's budget directly impacts our ability to complete NextGen and
other safety initiatives. It threatens our ability to make the
continuous improvement to aviation safety we have made since the Wright
Brothers. Unlike other transportation systems, we have a comprehensive
plan to move our aviation system into the 21st Century--but our
unwillingness to raise sufficient revenues to pay for it means that we
will fall further and further behind.
We face difficult budgetary decisions. We need to make the
necessary investments in our transportation networks. The United States
has been the world's aviation leader for over 100 years--we risk that
global leadership position if we are unwilling to continue to invest in
it. The situation with the lithium battery on the Boeing 787 is a
perfect example of where the regulators identified and acted swiftly to
address a serious safety problem. The company and FAA are evaluating
solutions that I hope will soon be proven workable.
It is also a perfect example of why the FAA and the industry cannot
take safety for granted. With the ever-increasing complexity of
aircraft and the air traffic control system, we need to make sure that
our safety systems are advancing with the same speed of our
technological innovation.
Although the situation with the Boeing 787 has dominated the news,
the FAA is currently working with the aviation community to actively
identify and address potential risks before they result in an accident.
The agency is working with controllers and pilots to increase the
reporting of errors, so we can learn from our mistakes. We are putting
the future safety of the system at risk if we are unwilling to sustain
our commitment to these critical efforts.
Everyone agrees that these are vital programs that will directly
improve the safety of the system. Do we really want to slow down these
initiatives? I am not willing to settle for the status quo on aviation
safety. I will seek to maintain the necessary level of funding for the
FAA and its critical missions as we continue our efforts to address our
broader fiscal issues.
I appreciate our budgetary situation is forcing every the Federal
Government to make difficult choices, but those choices still must be
smart, driven by good policy, and not damage our long-term economic
competitiveness. It's a continued commitment to safety that makes the
U.S. aviation system the safest in the world. We've seen that in recent
months--safety has to come above all else. And I am confident that this
will continue.
The Chairman. I call upon my distinguished Ranking Member
and good friend, John Thune.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this important hearing.
Aviation safety has to be the FAA's top priority, and it's
certainly a top priority of this committee. Today's hearing is
a good opportunity to review the FAA's progress on a host of
aviation safety issues, including mandates from both the
Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010 and the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.
The first of these laws, enacted in response to the tragic
loss of life related to Colgan flight 3407, included several
safety reforms for the airline industry. The FAA has made
progress in implementing some of these reforms; most notably,
the issuance of the flight and duty time rule for airline
pilots. However, several initiatives are either behind schedule
or otherwise incomplete.
In particular, I hope that Administrator Huerta will be
able to give the Committee an update on the pilot
qualifications rulemaking, as well as a progress report on the
agency's effort to develop the pilot records database, as
directed by the law. I also look forward to hearing from the
Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General,
which has been tracking the FAA's efforts to meet the
requirements of the Airline Safety Act.
Most recently, Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012, which included additional provisions to
improve safety. Among other things, the law directed the FAA to
develop a strategic plan to address runway safety. The
Government Accountability Office has found that the rate of
runway incursions has trended steadily upwards in recent years,
and the National Transportation Safety Board has again placed
improving the safety of airport surface operations on its
``Most Wanted List.'' I look forward to hearing from all of our
witnesses about ongoing efforts to increase the safety of our
runways and what remains to be done.
Of course, we cannot examine aviation safety without
discussing the recent incidents involving the Boeing 787
Dreamliner. While the NTSB continues searching for the root
cause of the battery failures that led to a grounding of the
jets, the FAA has now approved Boeing's proposed certification
plan that will, hopefully, address factors that likely
contributed to the failures. I understand testing of the design
changes have been completed, and FAA is analyzing the results.
I'm eager to hear about the current status of the two ongoing
efforts, as well as an assessment of what this case says about
how the two entities work together.
Finally, much has been made and said in recent months
regarding the potential impact of the sequestration spending
reductions on aviation. While this is no surprise to many at
today's hearing, I'm concerned that, rather than sharpening
their pencils and finding budget reductions that inflict as
little pain as possible on the traveling public, the
administration has threatened to close air traffic control
towers, slow down air traffic, and furlough employees.
The President, the Secretary of Transportation, and the
Administrator have all issued dire warnings about the possible
impacts of the sequester. Now that the cuts are a reality, it
is my hope that agency leaders will take a second look at plans
to implement budget reductions in a way that minimizes impacts
on the traveling public and the economy. Airspace users have
paid billions in taxes and fees that support FAA operations,
and they deserve better management of services provided.
This issue did not sneak up on anyone. During Administrator
Huerta's confirmation process, the FAA failed to provide
requested information to Congress and the American public about
plans to carry out sequestration. This was true even after the
President signed legislation into law last August that I
authored, the Sequestration Transparency Act. And along with
House Transportation Infrastructure Committee Chairman
Schuster, I've sent three letters to the Department of
Transportation over the past 6 weeks to get detailed
information about their sequestration plans. Last Thursday,
Chairman Rockefeller and I sent a letter, also signed by
Aviation Subcommittee Chairwoman Cantwell and Ranking Member
Ayotte and our counterparts in the House, urging the FAA to
target lower priority spending to avoid contract tower
closures. Yet, despite my efforts and those of my colleagues,
to get straightforward information on the administration's plan
for sequester, here we are with a lack of clarity and very low
confidence that the proposed actions--widespread furloughs and
tower closures--are the best or only way forward.
A letter from Secretary LaHood, in response to only one of
the letters, delivered late last night, leaves much to be
desired in our efforts to gain more clarity on the decisions to
close contract towers and the safety analysis conducted before
administration officials decided to oppose closure of so many
air traffic facilities. I hope Administrator Huerta will take
today as an opportunity to directly answer questions on this
important topic and to work with Committee members on the best
way forward to implement the sequester reductions, which amount
to only 2.4 percent of overall Federal spending for Fiscal Year
2013.
Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing, and I thank all of our witnesses for their part in
ensuring the highest level of safety for the traveling public.
I look forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thune follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Thune, U.S. Senator from South Dakota
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing.
Aviation safety has to be the FAA's top priority, and it is certainly a
top priority of this Committee.
Today's hearing is a good opportunity to review the FAA's progress
on a host of aviation safety issues, including mandates from both the
Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010, and the FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012.
The first of these laws, enacted in response to the tragic loss of
life related to Colgan flight 3407, included several safety reforms for
the airline industry. The FAA has made progress in implementing some of
these reforms, most notably the issuance of the Flight and Duty Time
rule for airline pilots. However, several initiatives are either behind
schedule or otherwise incomplete.
In particular, I hope that Administrator Huerta will be able to
give the Committee an update on the Pilot Qualifications rulemaking, as
well as a progress report on the agency's effort to develop the pilot
records database, as directed by the law. I also look forward to
hearing from the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector
General, which has been tracking the FAA's efforts to meet the
requirements of the Airline Safety Act.
More recently, Congress enacted the FAA Modernization and Reform
Act of 2012, which included additional provisions to improve safety.
Among other things, the law directed the FAA to develop a strategic
plan to address runway safety. The Government Accountability Office has
found that the rate of runway incursions has trended steadily upwards
in recent years, and the National Transportation Safety Board has again
placed improving the safety of airport surface operations on its ``Most
Wanted List.'' I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses
about ongoing efforts to increase the safety of our runways and what
remains to be done.
Of course, we cannot examine aviation safety without discussing the
recent incidents involving the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. While the NTSB
continues searching for the root cause of the battery failures that led
to a grounding of the jets, the FAA has now approved Boeing's proposed
certification plan that will hopefully address factors that likely
contributed to the failures. I understand testing of the design changes
has been completed and FAA is analyzing the results. I am eager to hear
about the current status of the two on-going efforts, as well as an
assessment of what this case says about how the two entities work
together.
Finally, much has been said in recent months regarding the
potential impact of the sequestration spending reductions on aviation.
While this is no surprise to many at today's hearing, I am concerned
that, rather than sharpening their pencils and finding budget
reductions that inflict as little pain as possible on the traveling
public, the Administration has threatened to close air traffic control
towers, slow down air traffic, and furlough employees. The President,
the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator have all issued
dire warnings about the possible impacts of sequester.
Now that the cuts are a reality, it is my hope that agency leaders
will take a second look at plans to implement budget reductions in a
way that minimizes impacts on the traveling public and the economy.
Airspace users have paid billions in taxes and fees that support FAA
operations, and they deserve better management of services provided.
This issue did not sneak up on anyone. During Administrator
Huerta's confirmation process, the FAA failed to provide requested
information to Congress and the American public about plans to carry
out sequestration. This was true even after the President signed
legislation into law last August that I authored--the Sequestration
Transparency Act. And, along with House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee Chairman Shuster, I have sent three letters to
the Department of Transportation over the past six weeks to get
detailed information about their sequestration plans.
Last Thursday, Chairman Rockefeller and I sent a letter also signed
by Aviation Subcommittee Chairwoman Cantwell, and Ranking Member Ayotte
and our counterparts in the House, urging the FAA to target lower
priority spending to avoid contract towers closures. Yet, despite my
efforts and those of my colleagues to get straightforward information
on the Administration's plans for sequester, here we are with a lack of
clarity and very little confidence that the proposed actions--
widespread furloughs and tower closures--are the best or only way
forward. A letter from Secretary LaHood in response to only one of the
letters, delivered late last night, leaves much to be desired in our
efforts to gain more clarity on the decisions to close contract towers,
and the safety analysis conducted before Administration officials
decided to propose closure of so many air traffic control facilities.
I hope Administrator Huerta will take today as an opportunity to
directly answer questions on this important topic and work with
Committee Members on the best way forward to implement the sequester
reductions which amount to only 2.4 percent of overall Federal spending
for FY 2013.
Again, I thank the Chairman for calling this hearing, and I thank
all of the witnesses for their part in ensuring the highest level of
safety for the traveling public. I look forward to your testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Thune.
I would like to call, now, on Senator Cantwell and also on
Senator Ayotte, in sequence, because they're both Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Aviation Subcommittee, which is so
important.
Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I get started, I just want to honor the victims of
the horrific incident that happened in Boston. And I know that
all Washingtonians, my Washingtonians, but all Americans, also
stand with our friends in Massachusetts. Our thoughts and
prayers go out to the victims of this senseless tragedy, and we
honor the first responders, who helped protect the lives of
innocent Americans.
And I want to thank you, Secretary Huerta, for the FAA's
rapid response in quickly securing Boston's airspace,
establishing temporary flight restrictions over the immediate
vicinity of the explosion.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing.
And it has just been over a year since we passed the FAA
Modernization Reform Act, and there is a lot to do and talk
about when it comes to safety.
I want to thank the witnesses today, especially
Administrator Huerta and Chairwoman Hersman, for updating me
constantly on the FAA and the NTSB's review of the 787 battery
issue. I appreciate the intensity and focus that both of your
agencies have provided for the important aviation issues, and I
look forward to continuing being updated on this issue.
I also want to thank Mr. Guzzetti for his technical
assistance on the medical safety legislation, when you were at
NTSB, several years ago, and Mr. Dillingham, for your
institutional knowledge on aviation issues. They're very
welcome.
While we're here today to talk about key safety
initiatives, there is also a lot to talk about when it comes to
sequestration and the impacts on safety and operations of over
200 air traffic towers slated for closure. I appreciate my
colleague's effort, Senator Moran, to try to restore funding.
In my home state, eight towers are on the closure list, and
these closures cause major disruptions. For example, at Felts
Field, in Spokane, which is an area that serves both air
medical services for four states, and also Paine Field, in
Everett, which is the hub of a large aerospace manufacturer,
these tower closures would have an impact. So, I hope, Mr.
Chairman, we can resolve these issues.
Mr. Chairman, prior to your chairmanship, you were the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Aviation Subcommittee for
more than a decade. And, during that time period, you left a
legacy of achievements on aviation safety. As a testament to
the work of this Committee and the work of key agencies and
industry players, there have been no major domestic crashes of
major airlines in more than a decade. And, in response to the
smaller Colgan crash that has been referred to by my
colleagues, your Committee held nine hearings, and passed
meaningful reform legislation in 2010. Some of that has been
implemented, but other parts require final action. For one, the
FAA must implement the rules required by your legislation,
including pilot qualifications, pilot training, pilot mentoring
and professionalism, database issues, and other safety aviation
issues, including ensuring that regional carriers meet the same
safety standards as major airlines, addressing the air traffic
controller fatigue issues, reducing operational errors, and
including runway incursions, improving general aviation safety,
completing the medical safety rules, integrating unmanned
aerial vehicles, and improving the voluntary reporting system.
And we also must remember that there are a number of safety
initiatives in the NextGen system, so as we move forward on
that.
But, last month, the NTSB released its interim factual
report on a key issue, the lithium ion battery incident aboard
the Boeing 787, at Logan Airport, operated by Japan Airlines.
And next week, the NTSB will be holding a symposium on that
issue. The FAA has been performing a comprehensive review of
the 787's critical systems, focusing on the electrical system.
And, since April 8, the FAA has been evaluating Boeing's test
results on the modified battery. So, the NTSB ongoing
investigation is important, and the interim factual report
provides information regarding the incident at Logan Airport,
including descriptions of the damage and components, and
planned ongoing investigations.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to receiving these final
reports and recommendations by all entities. And, like everyone
else, we want these planes to return safely to flight. And yes,
there are many people in the State of Washington--over 85,000
people, directly and indirect--thousands of others, indirectly,
a part of the supply chain. I can guarantee you, they want to
get it right.
The FAA and NTSB are doing their respective jobs on this
issue, and I thank them for that, and the many hours that both
of the agencies have put forth.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you on the
myriad of these aviation issues over the next several months,
but we both know and have talked about this--we want to
continue to hold hearings on NextGen oversight, the proposed
American Airlines/U.S. Airways merger, competitiveness in the
aerospace manufacturing, development of airline strategies to
foster industry growth, and maintaining and upgrading our
important airport infrastructure. All of these issues are a
part of our safety mechanisms, as well.
So, I thank you for holding this important hearing. I look
forward to the witnesses' testimony today.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Ayotte.
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller. And I want
to thank you for the opportunity to deliver an opening
statement today.
I'm pleased that you decided to hold this hearing, and I
want to thank all of our witnesses for being here.
And I would echo the sentiments of my colleague, Senator
Cantwell, for the important work that you've done in the light
of what's happened in Boston. And certainly, my thoughts and
prayers are with all the victims in Boston and all those who,
unfortunately, were there for a very positive event that was
interrupted by such a horrific tragedy.
I want to begin my remarks, certainly, by expressing my
excitement to serve as the Ranking Member on the Aviation
Subcommittee, and I certainly look forward to working with
Senator Cantwell as we have hearings on the topics that you've
raised.
And I look forward to working with you, Senator Cantwell.
In this role, I certainly look forward, also, to working
with Ranking Member Thune in making sure that we develop--and
as well as the Chairman of the Committee--to develop sound
policy prescriptions for many of the important issues that come
before this subcommittee.
As everyone in the room understands, there are a number of
significant safety issues facing both the industry and the
traveling public, including, number one, which has already been
mentioned, the impacts of sequestration. I will also be
particularly interested to hear from Administrator Huerta on
the FAA's response to the sequester, including its decision to
close the airports, that has already been discussed--excuse
me--the air traffic control towers, like the one in at
Warfield, in my hometown of Nashua, New Hampshire. I am also a
cosponsor of legislation that would keep those towers open, the
Protect Our Skies Act, but I have to wonder if whether--why we
had to bring legislation to do this. And I would very much like
to hear what the reasoning was for closing these control towers
versus other areas of the budget, and finding savings to
address sequestration, particularly the safety impact. I've
already heard from those that are on the ground in Nashua, New
Hampshire, of the potential impact of--if we were to close that
control tower in my hometown.
The other issues that I think are very important for us to
talk about today are the simultaneous investigations by the FAA
and the NTSB into the Boeing 787 program. And I know we're all
interested in learning about the status of these investigations
by the NTSB and the FAA, and want to make sure that we
understand what the path forward is to make sure that these--
the Boeing 787 program can go forward safely. So, I appreciate
hearing about that today.
As well as the FAA's implementation of several safety
rules, including rules relating to pilot duty and rest and
pilot training, while I was not a member of this body during
the consideration of the Safety Act of 2010, I've certainly
heard a fair amount of input from interested parties about the
implementation of this Act. So, I look forward to hearing from
the FAA about the implementation and status of its pending
rulemakings.
After I was sworn in, just over 2 years ago, the first
major piece of legislation on the Senate floor was the FAA
reauthorization bill. Looking back, that was an important
exercise in this body, in the sense that we thoroughly debated
a major piece of legislation, considered amendments on both
sides, and ultimately passed a reauthorization bill that was
important to the safety of the American public. I hope, over
the course of this Congress, with my colleagues, that we will
find common ground to advance an aviation agenda that continues
to keep our airports and carriers healthy and our airspace and
the traveling public safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
And I want to thank all of you for being here and for what
you do for our country.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
The four witnesses we have are the Honorable Michael
Huerta, who's Administrator of something called the Federal
Aviation Administration. It's a wonderful job. No stress
whatsoever.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. The Honorable Deborah Hersman, who is
Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board; Dr.
Gerald Dillingham, Director of Civil Aviation Issues, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office; and Mr. Jeffrey Guzzetti,
Assistant Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General,
United States Department of Transportation. I hope that was
accurate.
Mr. Administrator, we're going to start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL P. HUERTA, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Huerta. Thank you.
The Chairman. Welcome. Welcome, welcome, welcome.
Mr. Huerta. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman
Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, members of the Committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the
FAA's progress on key safety initiatives.
As you are aware, this is my first appearance before you as
Administrator of the FAA. I appreciate the work of this
Committee, and of the full Senate, in moving my confirmation
forward. We have a great number of challenges and opportunities
ahead, and I look forward to enhancing our productive working
relationship.
The FAA's number one priority is safety. It's our mission,
and we focus on it 24 hours a day.
First, let me briefly address the Boeing 787. The company
has redesigned the internal battery components and conducted
extensive testing. This includes limited test flights, without
passengers, using the redesigned battery prototype. The FAA is
currently reviewing these test reports and analysis to make
sure that the 787's new battery system ensures the safety of
the aircraft and its passengers.
Turning next to broader safety considerations, while
aviation safety encompasses many technical issues, we cannot
overlook the role of human beings in aviation, and how they
interact with sophisticated technology. In the last few years,
Congress has given us much guidance on how to advance aviation
safety, and we have accomplished a great deal. The FAA
overhauled flight and duty rules to guarantee that airline
pilots have the opportunity to get the rest they need to
operate safely, and we're increasing the required hours of
experience a pilot must have before operating the controls of
any airline flight. We're also finalizing a rule that requires
more realistic training so that flight crews can better handle
rare but serious scenarios.
The best way to enhance safety across the board is to
improve the safety culture of an organization. Part of this
effort involves self-reporting, by our own employees, on safety
issues. We've put programs in place for air traffic controllers
and aviation technicians to report a problem or even a mistake
they may have made, and not fear retribution. This makes the
system even safer.
We're taking many other actions to enhance safety across
the board, including promoting safety management systems and
sharing more data between industry and the FAA. By analyzing
this data, we're able to identify trends and hazards across the
airspace system and mitigate issues before something happens.
As you know, we're in a very uncertain and unpredictable
fiscal environment. The sequester is requiring the FAA to make
significant cuts in services and in investments. These cuts
will impact air traffic control, NextGen implementation, and
our certification services. We're exercising all options to
reduce costs: a hiring freeze, cutting contracts, cutting
travel, and other items not related to day-to-day operations.
One of our largest contracts is the Federal Contract Tower
Program. We've notified 149 airports across the country that
Federal funding for their air traffic control towers will end
in mid-June. These airports have lower activity levels; and,
together, these contract towers handle less than 3 percent of
the commercial operations nationally, and less than 1 percent
of the passengers. Communities still have the option to keep
their tower open if they're able to providing the funding, and
the FAA stands ready to help them with that transition.
I want to emphasize that, as we undergo the difficult
process of implementing the deep cuts required by the
sequester, we refuse to sacrifice safety, even if this means
less efficient operations. In addition to contract towers,
large facilities will also be affected. To reach the figure we
need to cut from our payroll, which is our largest operating
cost, we have to furlough 47,000 of our employees for up to 11
days between now and September. The furloughs will reduce
controller work hours at all airports with FAA towers, but also
at radar facilities across the country. Again, safety is our
number one concern. We will only allow the amount of air
traffic that we can handle safely to takeoff and land. This
means that travelers will need to expect delays. Today, we are
meeting with air carriers to go over specific operational
impacts related to the furloughs, facility by facility.
Furthermore, our aviation safety inspectors will have to
focus their attention on the most pressing priorities, and will
devote their time to overseeing current activities to ensure
continued operational safety of the existing fleet. These
activities will take precedence over new projects.
Our overarching principle in making these difficult
decisions is to maintain safety and to offer the best air
traffic services to the largest number of people, both now and
in the future. It's my hope, and the hope of everyone at the
Department of Transportation, that our leaders can work
together to rally around our Nation's air transportation system
and protect the great contribution that civil aviation makes to
our economy.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I
will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Huerta follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael P. Huerta, Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration
Chairman Rockefeller, Senator Thune, members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. This is the
first time I am testifying before you as the confirmed Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). I appreciate your support
for my candidacy. It is a privilege to hold this position and I welcome
the challenges that will come with it. I hope to enjoy a long and
effective relationship with you and this Committee.
There are a number of important ongoing aviation safety-related
initiatives that I know are of interest to this Committee. We are
working hard to meet the future demands of aviation. From transitioning
to the Next Generation of Air Transportation System (NextGen) to
integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the national airspace
system (NAS), the goals we are striving to meet are challenging,
especially in light of the existing fiscal constraints. But our
workforce is dedicated and very aware that achieving these goals are
vital to FAA's ability to continue leading the world in aviation safety
and innovation.
Just over a year ago, Congress passed and the President signed the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
(Reauthorization). As the returning members of this Committee may
recall, passage of the bill followed a long odyssey that involved 23
extensions before a comprehensive bill was passed. During that period,
I spoke with Members individually about the impact the short-term
extensions were having on our programs. The Airport Improvement Program
(AIP) was adversely impacted without the stability of a long-term
authorization. Airports across the country delayed the start of
important capital projects due to the concern that funding was being
authorized in very small amounts because of the short length of the
extensions. As a consequence, during extension periods, airports were
uncertain about committing to projects of all sizes, ranging from
safety improvements to crucial infrastructure preservation to
environmental impact mitigation, including sound insulation projects.
Another impact to airport projects, as a result of multiple extensions
was the inability of engineers, construction contractors, and material
and equipment suppliers to place orders and conduct work. Reduced
amounts of funding were made available in accordance with the short-
term extensions, so committing to long-term investments was
problematic. We very much appreciated the passage of a comprehensive
authorization that promised important stability and predictability.
Sequestration
Now, just over one year later, the benefits of reauthorization are
in jeopardy due to the budget reductions imposed by sequestration. It
is essential to the effective management of FAA's programs to have
stability and predictability that can be relied upon. Sequestration
places us in the position of even greater uncertainty than the days of
multiple extensions. Our agency has been working hard to plan for and
implement the required cuts in a way that does not materially
jeopardize our ability to ensure the highest levels of safety. Seventy
percent of FAA's Operations budget is dedicated to employee salaries
and benefits, so they will bear a significant portion of the cuts. I
can assure you that safety is the FAA's top priority. If sequestration
means fewer flights can be safely accommodated in the NAS, then there
will be fewer flights.
On April 10, I issued final furlough decision letters to over
47,000 employees. The furloughs generally will be on discontinuous
days, approximately one day per bi-weekly pay period, for a maximum of
11 days between April 21 and September 30. We are also planning to
eliminate midnight shifts in over 60 towers across the country starting
this summer; cease Federal funding at 149 air traffic control towers at
airports with fewer than 150,000 flight operations or 10,000 commercial
operations per year starting June 15, and reduce preventative
maintenance and equipment provisioning and support for all NAS
equipment. All of these changes will be finalized as to scope and
details through collaborative discussions with our users and our
unions.
As a result of employee furloughs and prolonged equipment outages
resulting from lower parts inventories and fewer technicians, travelers
should expect significant delays. We are aware that these service
reductions will adversely affect commercial, corporate, and general
aviation operators and the travelling public.
Beyond the impacts to air traffic, aviation safety employees will
also experience furloughs that will impact airlines, aviation
manufacturers, and individual pilots who need FAA safety approvals and
certifications. While the agency will continue to address identified
safety risks, slowed aircraft certification and operations approval
processes due to furloughs could negatively affect all segments of the
aviation industry.
It is unfortunate that many of the positive benefits of the long-
term reauthorization are being undermined by sequestration.
FY 2014 Budget
The President released his FY 2014 Budget last week. The FAA's FY
2014 Budget request of $15.6 billion strikes a balance between
maintaining current infrastructure while deploying key NextGen benefits
to our stakeholders, upholding our critical safety programs, and
modernizing our aviation infrastructure. Our request is $351 million
lower than FY 2012. This 2.2 percent decrease supports the President's
effort to reduce the deficit. Approximately half of our funding request
is devoted to maintaining and improving the agency's safety programs.
This includes the ability to perform safety inspections and carry out
rulemaking and certification activities to move NextGen and commercial
space initiatives forward.
The budget requests $9.7 billion to provide the operation,
maintenance, and support of our air traffic control and air navigation
systems, ensure the safe operation of the airlines and certify new
aviation products, ensure the safety of the commercial space
transportation industry, and provide overall policy oversight and
management. This represents an increase of just 0.6 percent from the FY
2012 enacted level. This includes $1.2 billion to continue to promote
aviation safety by regulating and overseeing the civil aviation
industry and continued airworthiness of aircraft, as well as
certification of pilots, mechanics, and others in safety management
positions. The $2.8 billion Facilities & Equipment (F&E) request
enables FAA to meet the challenge of both maintaining the capacity and
safety of the current national airspace while keeping a comprehensive
asset modernization and transformation effort on track. The $166
million requested for Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D)
supports the continuation of work in both NextGen and other research
areas such as environmental research, safety research in areas such as
fire research, propulsion and fuel systems, unmanned aircraft, advanced
materials research, and weather research. And the $2.9 billion request
for Grants-in-Aid for Airports focuses Federal grant funding on smaller
commercial and general aviation airports that do not have access to
additional revenue or other outside sources of capital. This is coupled
with a proposed increase to Passenger Facility Charges, from the
current maximum of $4.50 to $8.00, thereby giving commercial service
airports greater flexibility to generate their own revenue. Finally, in
the Operations, F&E and RE&D requested amounts, we have included $1.002
billion for the NextGen portfolio, an increase of $67.2 million, or
approximately 7 percent, above the FY 2012 enacted level. This level of
program funding enables the FAA to continue to support near-term
NextGen commitments in a budget-constrained environment.
Boeing 787
Turning to another matter that has received a great deal of
attention, I would like to update you on the status of the review of
Boeing 787's lithium batteries. On March 12, FAA approved Boeing's
certification plan for the 787 battery system redesign. This was done
after a thorough review of the proposed modifications, as well as the
company's plan to demonstrate that the modified system will meet FAA
requirements. Approval of the certification plan was the first step in
the process to evaluate the 787's readiness for return to flight. It
required Boeing to conduct extensive testing and analysis to
demonstrate compliance with the applicable safety regulations.
The battery system improvements include a redesign of the internal
battery components to minimize risk of a short circuit within the
battery, better insulation of the cells, and the addition of a new
containment and venting system. These added protections are expected to
help prevent and contain smoke and fumes in the event that a battery
does malfunction.
Boeing flew limited non-passenger test flights of two aircraft that
had the prototype versions of the new battery containment system
installed. The purpose of the test flights included validation of the
aircraft instrumentation for the battery and testing of the battery
enclosure, in addition to product improvements for other systems.
Boeing completed all required tests and analysis to demonstrate that
the new design complies with FAA requirements. The FAA is reviewing the
test reports and analysis and will approve the redesign once we are
satisfied Boeing has shown the redesigned battery system meets FAA
requirements.
Aviation, from its very beginning, has stretched technological
boundaries. Technological change in aviation comes in waves. For more
than five decades, the FAA has compiled a proven track record of safely
introducing new technology and new aircraft. As we continue to do this,
I want to make one thing crystal clear. The FAA takes very seriously
its responsibility to establish aircraft safety standards and certify
new products and technologies.
As you know, we are moving forward with a review of the critical
systems of the Boeing 787. When we have a concern, we will analyze it
until we are satisfied. I am confident that the FAA has the expertise
needed to oversee the Dreamliner's cutting edge technology. We have the
ability to establish rigorous safety standards and to make sure that
aircraft meet them. The best way to do this is to bring together the
best minds and technical experts in aviation to work on understanding
how these new systems work and how to establish and meet appropriate
safety standards.
We enhance safety by keeping the lines of communication open
between industry and government--by fostering the ability and
willingness to share information about any challenges we might be
facing. We want to create an atmosphere where people feel they can
share what they know, all in the pursuit of safety.
We all want the same outcome. We want to harness advances in
technology to produce safe aircraft. We will never lose sight of our
respective roles, but that does not mean that there is not a seat at
the table for bright minds from industry to help inform the best way to
navigate the complex technological issues we encounter. It would be
short-sighted to overlook anyone's valuable expertise.
Reauthorization
As noted above, we were very happy when a comprehensive FAA
reauthorization was passed last year. Reauthorization required over 200
separate deliverables, nearly half of which were due within the first
year of enactment. FAA is on track to meet or has met approximately 80
percent of those action items. We have fully completed about half of
the deliverables in the law. Now, as I'm sure you can appreciate, all
action items are not created equal. Some are very complex and require a
good deal of input from our workforce and industry partners. I believe
that meaningful collaboration is the only way to achieve a workable
path forward. Doing what we need to do to get the most effective work
product is our goal, even if it means that certain deadlines are not
met.
Safety
Safety is FAA's number one mission. Nothing is more important. Our
system has never been safer. There has not been a fatal commercial
passenger accident in the United States since 2009. I am proud of the
hard work that has gone into providing a basis for achieving this level
of safety. We need to make aviation safer and smarter through risk
based approaches. The only way to prevent accidents before they happen
is to accurately identify risk areas and work to mitigate them. That is
the reason we are working hard to improve runway safety areas (RSAs) at
commercial service airports. Some of the RSA improvements include the
installation of the Engineered Materials Arrest System (EMAS). This
soft concrete block system has been installed in RSAs at 45 airports in
the U.S. These EMAS systems have already stopped eight overrunning
aircraft with no fatalities or serious injuries to passengers.
Voluntary reporting for both FAA and industry employees, safety
management systems (for both FAA and industry) and the creation of the
Aviation Safety Whistleblower Investigation Office have also helped to
prevent accidents. All of these efforts have been providing the agency
with data and information to which we have never before had access.
More information results in FAA being able to see trends and take
action to mitigate the associated risks. Adjusting the safety culture
to ensure employees that they can provide information without fear of
reprisal is a cornerstone of our approach to safety.
Prior to Reauthorization, we had been working on the requirements
of the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act
of 2010. That act mandated rulemakings to revamp flight and duty time
regulations to better address the issue of pilot fatigue, to increase
the required number of hours of flight experience before a pilot can
qualify to be a commercial pilot, and to revise pilot training to
better simulate challenging conditions so that pilots can better handle
serious, but rare situations. We completed the flight and duty time
rulemaking just over a year ago, and plan to complete our work on the
final pilot qualification rulemaking (the ``New Pilot Certification and
Qualification Requirements Final Rule'') by August 2013 and pilot
training (the ``Qualification, Service, and Use of Crewmembers and
Aircraft Dispatchers Final Rule'') by October 2013. Reauthorization has
since added a number of rulemaking requirements that we are also
pursuing.
With respect to other safety directives in Reauthorization, FAA
commissioned an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to develop
recommendations to improve our aircraft certification process: we
delivered our Report to Congress on that effort in August of last year
and have begun implementation of the report's recommendations. We also
established an ARC consisting of government and industry experts to
develop recommendations on improving the consistency of regulatory
interpretations. We are in the process of finalizing a report informing
Congress of the recommendations presented to the FAA.
Reauthorization also required a number of safety-related reports.
We have delivered the report required on runway safety alert systems
and the first annual report of the Aviation Safety Whistleblower
Investigation Office summarizing the disclosures the office has
received and how they were handled. In the upcoming weeks, we expect to
issue reports on the National Service Air Carrier Evaluation Program,
night vision goggles for helicopter pilots, improved pilot licenses,
and limiting access to the cockpits in all cargo aircraft. We are also
finalizing a report to Congress on common sources of distraction on the
flight deck.
Pursuant to Congressional direction, we have also worked with the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) to draft a
statement of policy which permits some OSHA standards to be applied to
improve workplace safety for aircraft cabin crew. We published a draft
policy statement in the Federal Register in December of 2012 for
comment, and are in the process of reviewing those comments.
Also in accordance with reauthorization, in October of last year,
the FAA, in conjunction with the Department of State, issued a cable
regarding international drug and alcohol standards for foreign repair
stations. An advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) is
currently in executive review.
Delivering Technology
Our goal in the area of delivering technology is to efficiently and
sustainably deliver benefits to our stakeholders and society. One of
the responsibilities of the Deputy Administrator is to serve as our
Chief NextGen Officer, so that is one of many reasons I hope to appoint
a Deputy relatively quickly.
Throughout Title II of the Reauthorization, there is a theme that
modernization of the system must be done in collaboration with our
industry partners. FAA wholeheartedly agrees with this concept.
Imposing technological changes without the input of the users would be
a recipe for failure. We continue to engage through our work with
Optimization of Airspace and Procedures (OAPM) initiatives, which are
being done in close collaboration with industry and stakeholders. OAPM
is actively working in nine of the 13 metroplexes identified in Phase 1
of the program. Of these, one of the metroplexes (Houston) is currently
in the implementation phase with two additional sites (Washington,
D.C., and North Texas) planned to start implementation of the new
procedures later this summer, depending on how sequestration impacts
this plan. The metroplex initiative optimizes procedures in a
geographic area where there are a number of airports, rather than
focusing on each airport separately. Through this initiative, we are
untangling our busiest airspace and creating more direct routes,
cutting fuel, and becoming more environmentally friendly. In the
congested airspace in the skies above our busiest metropolitan areas,
these new modifications are being put in place in three years, much
more quickly than the five to ten years it had taken previously. We are
also actively engaged with our industry and government partners in the
development of NextGen through the NextGen Advisory Committee (NAC).
This group is helping to guide many aspects of our air traffic
modernization work. The NAC also works with FAA on developing and
tracking performance metrics and advising on the technical challenges
of one of the new categorical exclusion provisions included in
Reauthorization.
Reauthorization also provides FAA with the ability to consider
using operational and financial incentives for commercial and general
aviation operators to equip their aircraft with NextGen technology. We
are actively engaging aircraft operators and potential private partners
to assess interest and receive feedback on equipage incentive programs
and how use of this authority could attract additional investment in
NextGen technologies and training.
FAA has completed a departure queue management pilot program that
was required in the statute in order to continue to advance plans to
enhance surface management at airports. Also, in accordance with
Reauthorization, we have issued guidance for AIP funding eligibility
that supports the importance of sustainability initiatives in the way
that airports do business, and we expect to issue further guidance in
2013. We have also initiated a new study on the National Plan of
Integrated Airport Systems, which is a long-established process for
identifying strategic investments. The new study will ensure we are
making the best use of available data in supporting our decisions to
advance safety, capacity, efficiency, and sustainability initiatives.
Finally, in February, pursuant to Reauthorization, the FAA
requested proposals for interested state and local governments,
eligible universities, and other public entities to develop six
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) test sites around the country, which
will gather information to help inform research, development,
operational and privacy issues. We expect to select the six sites by
the end of the year. These sites will conduct critical research that
will help determine how best to integrate UAS into the NAS. Once the
sites are operational, we expect to learn how UAS operate in different
environments and how they impact air traffic operations. I know this
Committee is very interested in UAS integration. Use of the six sites
will provide us with essential information to facilitate integration of
UAS into the NAS and to address outstanding issues, such as privacy.
Prior to finalizing the FAA's UAS five-year ``Roadmap'', the FAA is
coordinating the roadmap with other UAS stakeholder agencies and
ensuring alignment of that roadmap with the Joint Planning and
Development Office's Interagency Comprehensive UAS Plan.
Empower and Innovate FAA's Workforce
In the current fiscal climate, we have to find a way for FAA's
employees to work smarter and enhance our productivity. You tasked us
to undertake a thorough review of each program, office, and
organization within the agency. Our report on FAA Review and Reform
highlights 36 initiatives to improve and update processes, eliminate
duplication and waste, and make the agency more efficient and
effective. The initiatives identified cover many aspects of our
operations and include improvements to cost analysis, governance,
acquisition processes, standard operating procedures, and human
resources. Of the 36 initiatives, 16 have been implemented and 20 are
in progress. In addition, we are actively engaging our employees in the
development of recommendations for facilities consolidation and
realignment.
At your direction, we are looking closely at improvements to
staffing and training for our employees. Four studies are underway
looking at frontline manager staffing, technical training and staffing,
air traffic controller staffing and air traffic training and
scheduling. Due to the requirement to produce the plan by March 31,
2013, the interim workforce plans we submitted last month do not
reflect the potential effects of sequestration. The FAA will adjust the
actual staffing and hiring forecasts to reflect future funding levels
as they become available. Finally, in accordance with Reauthorization,
we developed staffing standards and scheduling plans for New York City
and Newark air traffic control facilities. We are in the process of
considering impacts of sequestration to staffing concerns.
Develop and Fund the Efficient FAA of the Future
FAA must not only meet our day to day responsibilities, we must
also look to the future and figure out how to shape the agency to meet
the demands and opportunities of the future. As noted earlier, the U.S.
aviation system is going through significant, even revolutionary
changes. NextGen is a major transformation which will increase our
efficiency and safety, reduce delays and reduce fuel consumption. UAS
have the potential to change the face of aviation. In the midst of
these changes, budget pressures are making us ask hard questions about
what the FAA needs to deliver in the coming years to ensure the safety
and efficiency of the NAS and how to do it most cost-effectively.
In addition, we will face major changes in our workforce in the
coming years. About one third of FAA employees will be eligible to
retire starting in 2014. So for us, succession planning remains a
crucial aspect of the agency's focus, and we realize that we will begin
to lose a vast amount of corporate knowledge in the coming years. To
prepare for that, we must impart this knowledge to today's emerging
leaders and experts to ensure a successful agency in the 21st century.
We need to embrace innovation and to work efficiently.
Efficiencies are not just for the future. Given the economic
challenges we are facing, FAA has worked very hard to find cost savings
and we have been quite successful. In Fiscal Year 2012, FAA
efficiencies and cost cutting resulted in $81 million in savings.
Prior to sequestration, we have set a target of $91 million in cost
savings for Fiscal Year 2013. We recognize that the status quo is not
an option and we will continue to strive to achieve additional
efficiencies moving forward.
Finally, we must chart innovative and collaborative ways to engage
with all segments of the aviation sector, from airlines to association
groups, to general aviation, to unions. We must embrace the opportunity
to make long-lasting changes together that ensure a vital and vibrant
aviation industry that serves the needs of this Nation.
Advance Global Collaboration
The world is increasingly interdependent, so international
collaboration is essential if we want to move forward effectively. FAA
needs to continue to work with international partners to improve global
aviation safety and sustainability. This effort will require us to
improve the harmonization and interoperability of new technology with
international aviation standards and procedures to improve safety on a
global basis. We need to work to ensure the roadmaps agreed to by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to advance
communications, navigation, and surveillance improvements for global
air navigation are compatible with our NextGen concepts and
implementation and our domestic regulatory plan. We are working at ICAO
to find practical and collaborative solutions to address aviation's
greenhouse gas emissions and are encouraged by the European Union
decision to ``stop the clock'' on application of their emissions
trading system on foreign airlines. Our international partnership will
require us to develop and begin to implement a strategic plan for
technical assistance, training, and other activities to maximize the
value of FAA's expertise and United States resources. The FAA is
committed to working proactively with countries around the world to
create the initiatives and achieve the outcomes we need in the areas of
safety, air traffic management, and the environment to foster a safe,
efficient and sustainable global aviation sector.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that it is essential to the effective
management of FAA's programs to have stability and predictability that
can be relied upon. The many extensions over the last few years took a
toll on FAA's work in certain areas. Now we face an even more extreme
uncertainty under sequestration. All of us in this room want the same
things. We want to get better at what we do, think smarter, improve
safety, streamline processes, and remain the agency that can work
collaboratively with the world to develop safer and more efficient
practices. Sequestration will not stop us from trying to attain these
goals, but it will make it much, much harder.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to take
questions at this time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Administrator.
And now, the Chair of NTSB, Deborah Hersman.
STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Ms. Hersman. Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking
Member Thune, and members of the Committee.
I appear before you today during one of the safest periods
in the history of U.S. commercial aviation. Since the 2009
Colgan air crash near Buffalo that killed 50 people, some 3
billion passengers have traveled safely on U.S. airlines.
Despite the lack of accidents in U.S. commercial aviation,
we cannot be complacent. Today, the NTSB continues to
investigate the January 7 Japan Airlines 787 battery fire at
Boston's Logan International Airport. In the more than 3 months
since that incident, the NTSB has dedicated significant
resources to the investigation. Here is what we know:
There were multiple internal short circuits in cell 6 of
the battery that initiated a thermal runaway, which progressed
to neighboring cells.
On March 7, the NTSB published an interim factual report
and released hundreds of pages of investigative material.
Last week, we held a forum to explore the use of lithium
ion battery technology across all modes of transportation. We
learned that these batteries are everywhere, and that they can
be very safe. But, risks must be managed and mitigated.
Next week, we will be holding an investigative hearing to
focus on the design and certification of the 787 battery
system. We will continue to provide factual updates on the
progress of our work.
My full testimony provides more detail on needed safety
improvements regarding pilot training, distraction, and airport
surface operations, but let me highlight for you this afternoon
two areas of civil aviation that have not realized the safety
gains of the air carriers, and discuss the use of data, an
invaluable safety tool.
The first area: Helicopter Emergency Medical Services, or
HEMS. Currently, we are investigating 11 HEMS accidents. Six of
those have occurred since December. HEMS operations are high-
pressure. Lives are on the line, and decisions about whether to
launch, or not, must be made quickly. Conducting a thorough
risk assessment, improving training, weather monitoring, and
adding additional safety equipment can help ensure the safety
of these flights.
A second area of concern is general aviation, which
accounts for nearly 1,500 accidents per year, and results in
nearly 500 fatalities annually. What is especially tragic is
that we see the same types of accidents over and over again,
and so many of them are entirely preventable. Improving the
safety of GA is on the NTSB's most-wanted list of
transportation safety improvements. As part of our education
and outreach to decrease these accidents, the Board met last
month to examine chronic problems that we see in general
aviation. We've developed five safety alerts to pinpoint
hazards and provide practical remedies. These safety alerts
have been provided to you with my testimony.
Finally, at the NTSB, we continue to use and encourage the
development of new sources of data and information to support
our safety analysis. We have seen a very positive trend in
collaborative efforts between regulators and the aviation
community to generate and share data and information which can
improve safety.
But, let me be clear, the absence of accidents does not
mean that our work is done. Safely defying gravity thousands of
time each day requires constant vigilance.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Good afternoon Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune and
Members of the Committee. I appear before you today during the safest
period of U.S. commercial aviation history. Although significant
technological advances, new and important statutory mandates and
regulatory changes, and more comprehensive crew training have greatly
contributed to aviation safety, it was not that long ago--36 years ago
last month--that the world's most deadly aviation accident occurred in
Tenerife, Canary Islands, when two jumbo jets collided on the airport
runway, killing a total of 583 passengers and crewmembers. Since that
disaster, the aviation industry has made steady progress in improving
safety and advancing technology quickly. There have been significant
technological advances, new and important statutory mandates and
regulatory changes, and more comprehensive crew training--all greatly
contributing to the current level of aviation safety.
Yet, also at this time the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) is investigating a battery incident that led to the grounding of
the 787 fleet by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (The FAA
has not grounded a fleet since 1979.) Concurrent investigations of two
separate, but similar incidents involving 787 batteries are occurring
in the United States and Japan--the coordination and sharing of
information with our international investigative partners is going
well.
Today, I will discuss current aviation safety issues being
addressed by the NTSB, including our continuing investigation of the
Boeing 787 battery smoke and fire event in Boston, airport surface
operations, general aviation safety, helicopter emergency medical
service (HEMS) operations, pilot training and distraction, flight and
duty time, and the recent Memorandum of Understanding between the NTSB,
FAA, and various aviation industry organizations to share deidentified
aggregate safety information to help prevent accidents.
The NTSB's Most Wanted List and Aviation Safety
The annual Most Wanted List identifies the NTSB's top advocacy
priorities for improving transportation safety. The current list
identifies the following five aviation safety-related issues:
Improve Safety of Airport Surface Operations, discussed
further below
Improve General Aviation Safety, also discussed below
Improve Fire Safety in Transportation
Preserving the Integrity of Transportation Infrastructure
Eliminate Distraction in Transportation, also discussed
below
For the aviation safety issues identified in its Most Wanted List,
the NTSB continues to work with the FAA, manufacturers, operators,
labor organizations, airports, and aviation safety organizations to
reduce the safety risks to the traveling public, crewmembers, and
others. Also, although NTSB data show that it has classified 113 of its
Recommendations to the FAA regarding safety issues identified in
various NTSB Most Wanted Lists as ``Open-Unacceptable Response,'' the
FAA has made steady progress in reducing the number of its overall open
safety recommendations. During calendar year 2012, the FAA reduced by
7.7 percent its total number of NTSB open safety recommendations, and
during the first three months of 2013 the FAA has further reduced the
number of open safety recommendations by 4.5 percent compared to end of
2012. I am also heartened that Administrator Huerta has made the FAA's
reduction in the number of open NTSB safety recommendations a major
priority for the agency.
Boeing 787 Battery Fire and Smoke Incident at Boston's Logan
International Airport
On January 7, 2013, a Japan Airlines (JAL) Boeing 787 was parked at
the gate at Boston's Logan International Airport after completing a
flight from Narita, Japan, when a member of the cleaning crew
discovered smoke in the rear of the cabin. At about the same time, a
maintenance manager in the cockpit observed the automatic shut down of
the auxiliary power unit (APU), which was providing power to the
aircraft at the time. A mechanic opened the rear electronic equipment
bay, which is only accessible from outside the aircraft, and reported
finding heavy smoke in the compartment and flames coming from the front
of the APU battery case which housed a lithium ion battery. Airport
firefighters were called to the plane and worked to contain the heat
generated by the battery for 1 hour and 40 minutes.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 1. Smoke emanating from the aft electronic equipment bay.
Source: Boston Herald.
As indicated above, fire safety was placed on the NTSB's Most
Wanted List of transportation safety improvements in November 2012. For
that reason, among others, the NTSB responded to the JAL event by
sending investigators to evaluate the aircraft in Boston. About a week
later, a similar event occurred while an All Nippon Airways 787 was in
flight over Japan. The NTSB is investigating the JAL event and the
Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) is investigating the ANA event,
however both agencies are cooperating and sharing investigative
information.
The lithium ion battery is comprised of 8 cells, and the nominal
charge of each cell is 3.7 volts. Flight data recorder data show that
about 36 seconds before the APU shut down, the voltage began to
fluctuate and dropped from a full charge of 32 volts to 28 volts 7
seconds before the shutdown.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 2. 787 Exemplar battery.
In the JAL event, each of the 8 cells experienced some thermal
damage, and investigators believe there were multiple short circuits in
battery cell 6 that started a thermal runaway that progressed
throughout the battery. The side of the battery where cell 6 is located
had the most extensive damage. All 8 cells have vent discs, which
rupture when the internal pressure in a cell increases to a
predetermined level. Seven of the eight discs ruptured, and the cell
with the unopened vent disc lost electrolyte liquid.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 3. Damaged APU battery highlighting cell 6, the source of
the short circuit.
In its notice of proposed Special Conditions for the Boeing 787
airplane issued in 2007, the FAA indicated that large, high capacity,
rechargeable lithium ion batteries were a novel or unusual design
feature in transport category airplanes. The FAA noted that this type
of battery has certain failure, operational, and maintenance
characteristics that differ from those of the nickel-cadmium and lead-
acid rechargeable batteries approved at that time for installation on
large transport category airplanes. As such, the FAA approved the use
of these batteries by issuing nine special conditions to provide a
level of safety equivalent to existing airworthiness regulations.
Boeing performed a series of tests to demonstrate that the battery
complied with the conditions and would not pose a higher safety risk.
It was determined that the probability of a smoke event was once in
every 10 million flight hours. However, as of January 16, 2013, when
the FAA issued its airworthiness directive grounding the 787 fleet, the
fleet had accumulated less than 52,000 in-service flight hours and had
two smoke events involving its lithium ion batteries.
The NTSB continues to devote significant resources to its
investigation of the Boston incident. We continue to serve as the
accredited representative to the JTSB investigation of the January 15,
787 battery incident in Japan. Recently, NTSB has tested exemplar
batteries and cells. Also, investigators travelled to the battery
manufacturer to observe the manufacturing process and interview
personnel, and staff has met with Thales Avionics Electrical System of
France, the company with which Boeing contracted to design and
manufacture the 787 electrical power conversion subsystem.
Last week, the NTSB held a public forum on lithium ion batteries in
transportation. We learned that lithium ion batteries are becoming more
prevalent in the various transportation modes, national defense, and
space exploration. Panelists stated that because of their high energy
density and light weight, these batteries are natural choices for
energy. These benefits, however, also are the source of safety risks.
We also heard about manufacturing auditing, robust testing, and
monitoring and protection mechanisms to prevent a catastrophic event.
Next week, we will hold an investigative hearing on the design,
certification, and manufacturing process for the 787 lithium ion
battery system. We will continue to provide factual updates as our
investigation of the Boeing 787 battery fire incident proceeds.
Airport Surface Operations
While we have seen a reduction in airborne accidents, surface
operations remain problematic, and this is the reason that Airport
Surface Operations is on the NTSB's Most Wanted List. Safety of Airport
Surface Operations includes runway incursions, runway excursions,
runway confusion, and collisions with other aircraft and/or airport
vehicles.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 4. Southwest Airlines Flight 1248, Runway excursion and
collision during landing at Chicago, Midway International Airport,
December 8, 2005.
The NTSB has over 20 open safety recommendations to the FAA
addressing airport surface safety, including 6 that we have classified
as ``Open-Unacceptable Response.'' These recommendations are as recent
as September 2012 as well as dating back to 2000 and address a myriad
of subjects that include ground safety movement systems for flight
crews, wing tip clearance safety systems, enhanced wind dissemination
information to flight crews, and pre-landing distance assessments.
General Aviation Safety
As I stated earlier, the U.S. commercial aviation system is
experiencing an unprecedented level of safety. General aviation (GA)
fatality rates have shown little movement in spite of efforts to
improve safety. There have been about 1,500 GA accidents per year for
the past decade. Although GA represents about 51 percent of the
estimated total flight time of all U.S. civil aviation, it accounted
for 97 percent of fatal accidents in 2010.\1\ The NTSB determines the
probable cause of all 1,500 of these accidents, and one thing we have
learned is that unfortunately, the same factors continue to cause most
of the accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2012/ARA1201.pdf
Figure 5. Sioux Falls, SD general aviation accident, December 9,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011.
The leading causes of GA accidents are loss of control, engine
failure, flying in conditions that are beyond the pilot or aircraft's
abilities, and collision with terrain. GA is essentially an airline or
maintenance operation of one, which means the entire aviation community
must work harder to reach each pilot or mechanic who populates this
community to address these issues and ensure this deadly cycle is
broken. GA Safety is on the NTSB's Most Wanted List for the second year
in a row in order to bring attention to the issue.
Within the last year, the Board has issued a number of safety
alerts as a way to reach the GA community to highlight many of these
high risk issue areas. For example, to address the risks associated
with flight into severe weather, the NTSB issued a safety alert to
raise awareness in the GA community about the latency of NEXRAD weather
images; that the age of the actual data used to generate the weather
images on the display could differ significantly from the age indicated
on the display screen. Just last week, we held a Board meeting to
discuss GA safety and issued 5 new safety alerts, which are included
with my testimony. The NTSB's purpose in issuing these safety alerts is
to increase awareness, education, and training for private pilots and
aviation maintenance technicians. The alerts are brief information
bulletins that pinpoint particular safety hazards and offer practical
remedies to address these risks. They will also serve to focus the
NTSB's GA outreach efforts during the coming year. The specific alerts
are:
``Reduced Visual References Require Vigilance''
``Prevent Aerodynamic Stalls at Low Altitude''
``Is Your Aircraft Talking to you? Listen!''
``Mechanics: Manage Risks to Ensure Safety''
``Pilots: Manage Risks to Ensure Safety''
Additionally, over the past several years, the NTSB has conducted
several GA safety studies. In 2012, we examined experimental aircraft,
which represents about 10 percent of the GA fleet but represent a
higher proportion of GA accidents. The NTSB recommended expansion of
documentation requirements for initial aircraft airworthiness
certification, verification of the completion of Phase I flight
testing, improvement of pilots' access to transition training,
encouragement of the use of recorded data during flight testing,
ensuring that buyers of used experimental aircraft receive necessary
operating and performance documentation, and improvement of aircraft
identification in registry records. In a study of airbag restraints in
GA aircraft, the NTSB concluded that aviation airbags can mitigate
occupant injuries in some severe but survivable crashes. In 2010, the
NTSB looked at ``glass cockpits'' in GA, which are the newer electronic
displays in some planes. The results of this study suggest that the
introduction of glass cockpits has not yet resulted in a measurable
improvement in safety when compared to similar aircraft with
conventional instruments. There is a need to ensure pilots have system
specific knowledge to safety operate aircraft with glass cockpit
avionics and to capture maintenance and operational information to
assess the reliability of glass cockpit avionics.
We will continue our efforts to improve the safety record of
general aviation and look forward to finding new and innovative ways to
communicate this message to more pilots and mechanics.
Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS)
Helicopter EMS operations provide an important service to the
public by transporting seriously ill patients or donor organs to
emergency care facilities. The pressure to safely and quickly conduct
these operations in various environmental conditions (for example,
inclement weather, at night, and unfamiliar landing sites for
helicopter operations) has the potential to create more risk for HEMS
than other passenger operations.
The NTSB has issued more than 20 safety recommendations during the
past 13 years to the FAA to improve the safety of these operations and
conducted a 4-day public hearing on HEMS safety in February 2009. In
2010, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to address
many of the NTSB's recommendations, such as the carriage of safety
related equipment, flight data recorders, operational requirements,
better weather monitoring and reporting, development and implementation
of safety management systems and flight-risk evaluation programs,
including training, and amendments to load manifest requirements for
single-engine Part 135 operations.
Section 306(a) of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
(Pub. L. 112-95) required the FAA to complete this rulemaking by June 1
of last year. Unfortunately, that rulemaking has stalled.
Last week, on April 9, the NTSB held a Sunshine Act public meeting
to discuss the crash of an EMS helicopter on August 26, 2011, near
Mosby, Missouri that resulted in the deaths of the pilot, flight nurse,
flight paramedic, and the patient. The NTSB determined that the
probable causes of this accident were the pilot's failure to confirm
that the helicopter had adequate fuel onboard to complete the mission
before departing on the mission's first leg, his improper decision to
continue the mission and make a second departure after he became aware
of a critically low fuel level, and his failure to successfully enter
an autorotation when the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion.
Contributing to the accident were (1) the pilot's distracted attention
due to personal texting during safety-critical ground and flight
operations, (2) his degraded performance due to fatigue, (3) the
operator's lack of a policy requiring that an operational control
center specialist be notified of abnormal fuel situations, and (4) the
lack of practice representative of an actual engine failure at cruise
airspeed in the pilot's autorotation training in the accident make and
model helicopter.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 6. HEMS accident in Mosby, MO, August 26, 2011.
Currently, the NTSB is investigating 12 HEMS accidents, including 6
that have occurred since December. We see the same problems in our
accident investigations and believe that if the following
recommendations are incorporated in to HEMS operations, they will be
safer.
Operate under Part 135 rules
Establish Operations Control Centers (OCC)
Perform recurrent training and testing of OCC personnel
Improve HEMS pilot training
Perform more stringent weather evaluations
Require flight risk evaluation programs
Install safety equipment on HEMS helicopters (terrain
awareness and warning systems, night vision imaging equipment,
autopilots, recorders, radio altimeters, 406 MHz emergency
locator transmitter, water safety equipment)
Receive regular instrument flight training
Establishment of Safety Management Systems for HEMS
operators
Better airspace infrastructure for low altitude helicopter
operations
Pilot Training and Distraction
The last U.S. commercial aviation accident occurred on February 12,
2009, while Colgan Air flight 3407 crashed on approach to the Buffalo
Niagara International Airport in Buffalo, NY. As a result of that
accident investigation, the NTSB made pilot training recommendations,
some of which Congress included in the Airline Safety and Federal
Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-216). The
NTSB called for crew training requirements, establishment of mentoring
and professionalism programs, and a pilots' records database. In the
Colgan Air flight 3407 accident investigation, we found that industry
changes--including two-pilot cockpits and the advent of regional
carriers-had resulted in opportunities for pilots to upgrade to captain
without having accumulated significant experience as a first officer in
a Part 121 operation. Without these important opportunities for
mentoring and observational learning, which characterize time spent in
journeyman pilot positions, it was difficult for a pilot to acquire
effective leadership skills to manage a multicrew airplane.
Also as a result of the NTSB's investigation of both Northwest
Flight 188 that overflew their destination of Minneapolis because they
were distracted by their laptops and the Colgan Air Flight 3407, we
issued a safety recommendation to the FAA to amend the Federal Aviation
Regulations to require Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to
incorporate explicit guidance to pilots prohibiting the use of personal
portable electronic devices on the flight deck. The Congress mandated
that the FAA promulgate a rule which would prohibit the use of personal
wireless communications devices and laptop computers by flight
crewmembers during all phases of flight in Part 121 operations. The FAA
is required by the statute to issue a final rule implementing the
prohibition no later than February 2014. I would note that the FAA
issued an NPRM for this requirement this past January. The NTSB
recently submitted comments to the docket in support of the proposed
rule but recommended that the final rule incorporate the broader scope
of its February 2010 safety recommendation by expanding the proposed
rule to Part 135 and 91 subpart K operators.
Flight and Duty Time
For more than 20 years, the issue of reducing accidents caused by
fatigue was on the NTSB's Most Wanted List of safety improvements. We
removed fatigue from our Most Wanted List in November 2012 to
acknowledge the new flight and duty time rules enacted by the FAA. For
the first time, the new rule recognizes the universal factors that lead
to human fatigue such as time of day, length of duty day, workload,
whether an individual is acclimated to a new time zone and the
likelihood of being able to sleep under different circumstances.
However, we remain concerned that the new rule does not apply to cargo
pilots. Fatigue is fatigue, whether you transport passengers or
pallets; it degrades every aspect of human capability. Another fatigue
issue not addressed by the new rules is pilot commuting; a concern
identified in the Colgan Air accident.
We have seen the effects of fatigue in too many of our accident
investigations. We will continue working toward one level of safety
throughout the industry.
Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) System
Aviation has experienced great improvements in safety due in part
to embracing and understanding data. As I have pointed out in speeches
over the past several years, ``data saves lives . . . and, in this era
of dynamic growth and greater complexity, data is more important than
ever.'' Also, data collection, analysis, and dissemination are
important international aviation safety issues. For example, the Safety
Information Protection Task Force of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) has been looking at the various sources of safety
information, the diverse requirements of member states regarding public
transparency and personal privacy, and the different civil and criminal
justice systems. The willingness of the FAA and the aviation industry
to share data with the NTSB will have a direct positive effect on
aviation safety and is consistent with a provision in the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 concerning public disclosure of
aggregate, de-identified aviation safety information.
As a result of almost two years of discussions, the NTSB and the
FAA and industry ASIAS Executive Board Co-Chairs signed a Memorandum of
Understanding last November that outlines the procedures, guidelines,
and roles and responsibilities for the ASIAS Executive Board to address
specific written NTSB requests for ASIAS information.\2\ The NTSB will
initiate written requests for ASIAS information related to aircraft
accidents involving U.S. air carriers that occur in the United States
and address safety issues that both the NTSB and the ASIAS board
determine are significant. The NTSB will not publicly disclose ASIAS
information it receives via the process unless the ASIAS Executive
Board agrees. In addition, the MOU requires the NTSB to share with
ASIAS its archived air carrier accident and incident flight data
recorder information related to a request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ASIAS began in 2007 and now has 44 airline members and receives
voluntary data representing 95 percent of all commercial air carrier
operations. It connects 131 data and information sources across the
industry and is integrated into the Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(CAST) process. CAST is a joint government and industry effort that
uses a data-driven strategy to reduce the risk of commercial aviation
fatalities. ASIAS uses aggregate, protected data from industry and
government voluntary reporting programs, without identifying the source
of the data, to proactively determine safety issues, identify safety
enhancements, and measure the effectiveness of solutions. ASIAS is
managed by an Executive Board and consists of representatives of
various FAA offices, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
U.S. military safety organizations (the latest membership summary shows
USAF Safety Center and Naval Air Force Atlantic as government
participants), commercial airlines, manufacturers, and labor
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Closing
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
aviation safety and I am prepared to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Hersman.
And now, Dr. Gerald Dillingham, Director of Civil Aviation
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
STATEMENT OF GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, Ph.D., DIRECTOR,
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Dr. Dillingham. Thank you, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking
Member Thune, and members of the Committee.
First, I would also like to acknowledge that we are in the
safest period of the modern aviation era. This outstanding
achievement is attributable to the dedicated and skilled men
and women at FAA working together with other key stakeholders,
including manufacturers, operators, and the oversight of the
Congress.
To build on this historic record, FAA is moving toward a
greater reliance on proactive risk-based safety approach, with
less reliance on a reactive or after-the-accident analysis of
events. This afternoon, my statement focuses on the progress
and challenges that FAA faces as it makes this shift.
The first is adapting its certification process to an ever-
evolving aviation industry. And second is the collection and
analysis of data that is critical for proactive risk
management.
With regard to FAA certification processes, from our work
we've found that, overall, FAA does an excellent job of
following its processes. However, FAA must continue to address
longstanding concerns, as well as emerging issues, about its
certification processes. For example, industry has long
expressed concerns about the variation in FAA inspectors' and
designees' interpretation of standards of certification and
approval decisions. This situation could be exacerbated in the
future by factors such as the fiscal constraints on the
government spending and the agency's ability to provide in-
service training and attract the talent necessary to maintain
up-to-date knowledge of industry changes.
For example, as aviation technology evolves, FAA will need
new skills and tools to understand new aircraft or equipment
during certification. The absence of these skills and tools
could lead to delays in certification or misinterpretation of a
regulation or a standard.
In addition, while FAA has worked to manage the
certification workload with the use of designees, there have
been some concern expressed about whether there is adequate
oversight of the designees, particularly for the new
Organizational Designation Authorities, or ODAs.
With regard to FAA's data collection and analysis for risk-
management purposes, our studies have identified a number of
areas where FAA's risk-based oversight could be improved. For
example, our research has shown that adequate data about runway
excursions are not being collected. Runway excursion can be
just as dangerous as runway incursions. But, without these
data, FAA cannot assess or mitigate the potential risk.
Similarly, the lack of complete data for incidents that
occur in the ramp area, general aviation operations, and the
inspection of initial pilot training activities limits FAA's
oversight and ability to target its scarce resources and to
understand the impact of its efforts to mitigate risk in these
areas. For example, the rate and number of operational errors
appears to have increased considerably in recent years.
However, because of multiple changes in reporting policies and
processes during that same time period, it makes it very
difficult to know the extent to which the apparent increase in
operational errors are due to more accurate reporting, an
increase in the occurrence of incidents, or both.
In response to our recommendation, congressional mandates,
in--on its own volition, FAA has efforts underway, or planned,
to address each of the areas that I've identified, as well as
others listed in our written statement.
I want to emphasize that these efforts will require
sustained attention and oversight to ensure that the agency's
ability to comprehensively and accurately assess and manage
risk is not impaired.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would urge all stakeholders not
to become complacent with the extraordinary safety record that
has been achieved to date, and continue to do whatever may be
necessary to make a safe system even safer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dillingham follows:]
Why GAO Did This Study
Even with nearly 80,000 flights each day within the national
airspace system, there has not been a fatal commercial aviation
accident in more than 4 years. The U.S. airspace system is arguably one
of the safest in the world, with key aviation stakeholders--the FAA,
airlines, airports, aircraft manufacturers, and the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)--working together to ensure these
results.
As the Federal agency responsible for regulating the safety of
civil aviation in the United States, FAA is responsible for, among
other things: setting aircraft certification standards, collecting
fleet and flight activity data, conducting safety oversight of pilot
training and general aviation operations, and safely integrating
aircraft into the national airspace. As the aviation industry evolves,
FAA must remain diligent in its efforts to ensure the continued safety
of aviation. In 2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal
Aviation Administration Extension Act, which, in part, called for FAA
to better manage safety risks.
This testimony focuses on (1) FAA's aircraft certification process
and (2) FAA's use of data to enhance safety and improve aviation
oversight. The testimony is based on GAO's previous work and updated
with industry reports and information provided by FAA officials.
GAO has previously recommended that FAA address several data
quality weaknesses. FAA concurred with most of these recommendations
and has taken steps toward addressing some.
Aviation Safety
FAA Efforts Have Improved Safety, but Challenges Remain in Key Areas
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for
approving the design and airworthiness of new aircraft and equipment
before they are introduced into service. FAA approves changes to
aircraft and equipment based on evaluation of industry submissions
against standards set forth in Federal aviation regulations and related
guidance documents. In September 2011, we reported that, overall, FAA
did a good job following its certification processes in assessing the
composite fuselage and wings of Boeing's 787 against its airworthiness
standards. However, the approval process--referred to as
certification--presents challenges for FAA in terms of resources and
maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry practices, two issues that
may hinder FAA's efforts to conduct certifications in an efficient and
timely manner. FAA is currently assessing its certification process and
identifying opportunities to streamline it.
FAA plans to continue analyzing data reactively to understand the
causes of accidents and incidents, and to augment this approach through
implementation of a safety management system (SMS). SMS is a proactive
approach that includes continually monitoring all aspects of aviation
operations and collecting and analyzing appropriate data to identify
emerging safety problems before they result in death, injury, or
significant property damage. FAA has put in place various quality
controls for its data; however, GAO has identified a number of areas
where FAA does not have comprehensive risk-based data or methods of
reporting that capture all incidents. The following are among the key
areas GAO identified as needing improved data collection and analysis.
Runway and ramp safety. Additional information about surface
incidents could help improve safety in the airport terminal
area, as data collection is currently limited to certain types
of incidents, notably runway incursions, which involve the
incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on a
runway and certain airborne incidents, and does not include
runway overruns, which occur when an aircraft veers off a
runway or incidents in ramp areas, which can involve aircraft
and airport vehicles.
Airborne operational errors. FAA's metric for airborne
losses of separation--a type of operational error--is too
narrow to account for all potential risk.
General aviation. FAA estimates of annual flight hours for
the general aviation sector, which includes all forms of
aviation except commercial and military, may not be reliable.
Pilot training. FAA does not have a comprehensive system in
place to measure its performance in meeting its annual pilot
school inspection requirements.
FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues and data
challenges in many of these areas. For example, FAA is planning to
develop a program to collect and analyze data on runway overruns, but
it will be several years before FAA has obtained enough information
about these incidents to assess risks. Sustained attention to these
data collection and analysis issues will be necessary to ensure that
FAA can more comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk.
______
Prepared Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the
Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to oversee aviation safety.
Even with nearly 80,000 flights each day within the national airspace
system (NAS), there has not been a fatal commercial aviation accident
in more than 4 years, and although hundreds of fatalities continue to
occur each year in general aviation,\1\ the number of overall general
aviation accidents has trended downward. The U.S. airspace system is
arguably one of the safest in the world, with key aviation
stakeholders--FAA, the airlines and other aircraft operators, airports,
aircraft manufacturers, and the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB)--working together to achieve these results. Nevertheless, we
must not become complacent because of the extraordinary safety record
that has been achieved to date. Congress, FAA, and other stakeholders
must remain diligent in their oversight of aviation safety.
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\1\ General aviation includes all forms of aviation except
scheduled air carriers and military.
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As the Federal agency responsible for regulating the safety of
civil aviation in the United States, FAA is responsible for, among
other things, setting aircraft certification standards and ensuring
that manufacturers and suppliers meet those standards, collecting fleet
and flight activity data, conducting safety oversight of pilot training
and general aviation operations, and safely integrating aircraft and
equipment into the national airspace. With air travel projected to
increase over the next 20 years and agencies governmentwide
experiencing budget reductions as part of the 2013 sequestration, it
will be critical for FAA to apply its limited resources in a manner
that will allow it to maintain and enhance the safety of the NAS. In
2010, Congress passed the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act (Airline Safety Act),\2\ which, in part,
called for FAA to better manage safety risks. While FAA and other
stakeholders continue to address safety concerns in a reactive fashion
by analyzing and investigating accidents and incidents, they have also
begun to address safety issues in a more proactive fashion--before
accidents or incidents occur. This proactive approach involves
identifying, analyzing, and managing safety risks that are inherent
throughout the system, and is being undertaken by FAA as part of its
implementation of safety management systems (SMS). This risk-based
oversight approach is becoming the standard throughout the global
aviation industry and is recognized by aviation leaders, such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as the next step in
the evolution of safety. In addition to SMS, FAA's certification
process attempts to ensure that safety is built into the aircraft and
equipment used in the NAS.\3\ While the agency has taken steps to
improve its oversight approach, challenges remain in key areas.
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\2\ Pub. L. No. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2348 (2010).
\3\ FAA issues certificates for new air operators, new aircraft,
and aircraft parts and equipment, and approvals, based on the
evaluation of aviation industry submissions against standards set forth
in Federal aviation regulations and related FAA guidance documents.
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My statement today highlights two areas that are important to FAA's
safety efforts: the certification process and the collection and
analysis of risk-based data as part of SMS. This statement is drawn
from a body of work that we have completed from June 2009 to October
2012 regarding FAA's safety oversight efforts. We have updated this
information through a review of FAA documents and interviews with FAA
officials. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of
this statement, along with footnoted references to these products
throughout the statement. The reports and testimonies cited in this
statement contain more detailed explanations of the methods used to
conduct our work. This body of work was conducted in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Certification is a Key Component of FAA's Aviation Safety Oversight
Among its responsibilities for aviation safety, FAA issues
certificates that approve the design and production of new aircraft and
equipment before they are introduced into service; these certificates
demonstrate that the aircraft and equipment meet FAA's airworthiness
requirements. FAA also grants approvals for such things as changes to
air operations and equipment. Certificates indicate that the aircraft,
equipment, and new air operators are safe for use or flight in the NAS.
While industry stakeholders have expressed concerns about variation in
FAA's interpretation of standards for certification and approval
decisions, stakeholders and experts that we interviewed for our 2010
report indicated that serious problems occur infrequently.\4\ In
addition, in September 2011 we reported that FAA did a good job
following its certification processes in assessing the composite
fuselage and wings of Boeing's 787 against its airworthiness
standards.\5\
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\4\ See GAO, Aviation Safety: Certification and Approval Processes
Are Generally Viewed as Working Well, but Better Evaluative Information
Needed to Improve Efficiency, GAO-11-14 (Washington, D.C.: October 7,
2010).
\5\ See GAO, Aviation Safety: Status of Action to Oversee the
Safety of Composite Airplanes, GAO-11-849 (Washington, D.C.: September
21, 2011).
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The certification process also provides an example of how FAA is
attempting to use a more proactive approach in finding solutions to a
potential problem. In the case of flammability regulations that govern
transport type aircraft, FAA has primarily developed its regulations on
a reactive basis. That is, as accidents and incidents have occurred,
their causes have been investigated, and the findings used to develop
regulations designed to prevent the future occurrence of similar
incidents or accidents. To supplement this oversight method, FAA has
proposed a new, threat-based approach for flammability regulations that
will base the flammability performance for different parts of the
aircraft upon realistic threats that could occur in-flight or in a
post-crash environment.
FAA recognizes the value of certification as a safety tool, however
the agency faces some significant challenges, including resources and
maintaining up-to-date knowledge of industry changes. According to a
report from the Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform
Aviation Rulemaking Committee,\6\ these certification challenges will
become increasingly difficult to overcome, as industry activity is
expected to continue growing and government spending for certification
resources remains relatively flat. As one means of responding to its
certification workload, FAA relies on designees,\7\ however, our prior
work has shown that there are concerns that designee oversight is
lacking, particularly with the new organizational designation
authorities in which companies rather than individuals are granted
designee status. There are also concerns that, when faced with
certification of new aircraft or equipment, FAA staff have not been
able to keep pace with industry changes and, thus, may struggle to
understand the aircraft or equipment they are tasked with
certificating.\8\ SMS implementation within FAA should reduce
certification delays and increase available resources to facilitate the
introduction of advanced technologies. In response to a provision in
the 2012 FAA Reauthorization, FAA is assessing the certification
process and identifying opportunities to streamline the process.
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\6\ ``A Report from the Aircraft Certification Process Review and
Reform Aviation Rulemaking Committee to the Federal Aviation
Administration: Recommendations on the Assessment of the Certification
and Approval Process,'' May 22, 2012.
\7\ FAA delegates many certification activities to FAA-approved
individuals and organizations (called designees) to better leverage its
resources. FAA's designees perform more than 90 percent of FAA's
certification activities.
\8\ GAO-11-849.
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Better Quality and More Complete Data Could Help FAA Further Improve
Safety Oversight
As we stated above, FAA plans to continue using data reactively to
understand the causes of accidents and incidents, and is implementing a
proactive approach--called an SMS approach--in which it analyzes data
to identify and mitigate risks before they result in accidents. FAA is
also overseeing SMS implementation throughout the aviation industry.\9\
Safety management systems are intended to continually monitor all
aspects of aviation operations and collect appropriate data to identify
emerging safety problems before they result in death, injury, or
significant property damage. Under SMS, which FAA began implementing in
2005, the agency will analyze the aviation safety data it collects to
identify conditions that could lead to aviation accidents or incidents
and to address such conditions through changes to FAA's organization,
processes, management, and culture. As we reported in September 2012,
according to FAA, the overarching goal of SMS is to improve safety by
helping ensure that the outcomes of any management or system activity
incorporate informed, risk-based decision making. FAA's business lines,
such as the Air Traffic Organization and the Aviation Safety
Organization, are currently at different stages of SMS implementation
and it is likely that full SMS implementation will take many more
years.\10\
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\9\ FAA is undertaking the transition to SMS in coordination with
the international aviation community, working with the ICAO, an agency
of the United Nations that promotes the safe and orderly development of
international civil aviation worldwide, to adopt applicable global
standards for safety management. ICAO requires SMS for the management
of safety risk in air operations, maintenance organization, air traffic
services, and airports as well as certain flight training operations
and for organizations that design or manufacture aircraft within its
member states.
\10\ See GAO, Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could Enhance
Safety Risk Management, GAO-12-898 (Washington D.C.: September 21,
2012).
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SMS relies heavily on data analysis and, while FAA has put in place
various data quality controls, it continues to experience data
challenges including limitations with some of its analyses and
limitations to or the absence of data in some areas.\11\ Data
limitations and the lack of data may inhibit FAA's ability to manage
safety risks. For example, we found that some FAA data used in risk
assessments may not be complete, meaningful, or available to decision
makers. We have also reported that the agency currently does not have
comprehensive risk-based data, sophisticated databases to perform
queries and model data, methods of reporting that capture all
incidents, or a level of coordination that facilitates the comparison
of incidents across data systems. Furthermore, technologies aimed at
improving reporting have not been fully implemented.\12\ As a result,
aviation officials managing risk using SMS have limited access to
robust FAA incident data. Implementing systems and processes that
capture accurate and complete data are critical for FAA to determine
the magnitude of safety issues, assess their potential impacts,
identify their root causes, and effectively address and mitigate them.
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\11\ On November 8, 2012, FAA signed a memorandum of agreement with
NTSB that will allow for greater sharing of safety data between the two
organizations.
\12\ See GAO, Aviation Safety: Enhanced Oversight and Improved
Availability of Risk-Based Data Could Further Improve Safety, GAO-12-24
(Washington, D.C.: Oct 5, 2011).
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Our recent work on aviation safety and FAA oversight issues has
identified a number of specific areas where FAA's risk-based oversight
could be improved through improved data collection and analysis,
including: runway and ramp safety, airborne operational errors, general
aviation, pilot training, unmanned aircraft systems, and commercial
space. FAA has taken steps to address safety oversight issues in many
of these areas, including making changes to or committing to make
changes to its data collection practices in response to our
recommendations in most of these areas. Nonetheless, sustained FAA
attention will be necessary to ensure that the agency's ability to
comprehensively and accurately assess and manage risk is not impaired.
Runway and ramp safety. Takeoffs, landings, and movement
around the surface areas of airports (the terminal area) are
critical to the safe and efficient movement of air traffic. In
a June 2011 incident at John F. Kennedy International Airport
in New York, for example, a jumbo jet carrying 286 passengers
and crew almost collided with another jumbo jet, which
reportedly missed a turn and failed to stop where it should
have to avoid the occupied runway. Safety in the terminal area
could be improved by additional information about surface
incidents, which is currently limited to certain types of
incidents, notably runway incursions and certain airborne
incidents, but does not include runway overruns or incidents in
ramp areas. Without a process to track and assess these
overruns or ramp area incidents, FAA cannot assess trends in
those areas and the risks posed to aircraft or passengers in
the terminal area. FAA is planning to develop a program to
collect and analyze data on runway overruns, something we
recommended in 2011, but it will be several years before FAA
has obtained sufficient information about these incidents to be
able to assess risks.\13\ FAA still collects no comprehensive
data on ramp area incidents and NTSB does not routinely collect
data on ramp accidents unless they result in serious injury or
substantial aircraft damage. In 2011, we recommended that FAA
extend its oversight to ramp safety and FAA concurred.
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\13\ GAO-12-24.
Airborne operational errors. Operational errors --also
referred to as losses of separation--occur when two aircraft
fly closer together than safety standards permit due to an air
traffic controller error. We reported that FAA's risk-based
process for assessing airborne losses of separation is too
narrow to account for all potential risk and changes in how
errors are reported affect FAA's ability to identify trends.
For example, FAA's current process for analyzing losses of
separation assesses only those incidents that occur between two
or more radar-tracked aircraft. By excluding incidents such as
those that occur between aircraft and terrain or aircraft and
protected airspace, FAA is not considering the systemic risks
that may be associated with many other airborne incidents. FAA
has stated that it is planning to include these incidents in
its risk assessment process before the end of 2013, something
we recommended in 2011.\14\ In addition, FAA's changes to
reporting policies affect its ability to accurately determine
safety trends. For instance, we reported in October 2011 that
the rate and number of reported airborne operational errors in
the terminal area increased considerably since 2007.\15\
However, multiple changes to reporting policies and processes
in 2009 and 2010 make it difficult to know the extent to which
the recent increases in reported operational errors are due to
more accurate data, an actual increase in the occurrence of
incidents, or both.
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\14\ GAO-12-24.
\15\ The terminal area is the area around an airport extending from
the airfield or surface to about 10,000 feet vertically and out to
about 40 miles in any direction.
General aviation. General aviation is characterized by a
diverse fleet of aircraft flown for a variety of purposes. In
2010, FAA estimated that there were more than 220,000 aircraft
in the active general aviation fleet, comprising more than 90
percent of the U.S. civil aircraft fleet. The number of
nonfatal and fatal general aviation accidents decreased from
1999 through 2011; however, more than 200 fatal accidents
occurred in each of those years. In October 2012, we reported
that general aviation flight activity data limitations impede
FAA's ability to assess general aviation safety and thereby
target risk mitigation efforts.\16\ For example, FAA estimates
of annual general aviation flight hours may not be reliable
because of methodological and conceptual limitations with the
survey upon which flight activity estimates are based. These
limitations include survey response rates below 50 percent.
Without more comprehensive reporting of general aviation flight
activity, such as requiring the reporting of flight hours at
certain intervals, FAA lacks assurance that it is basing its
policy decisions on an accurate measure of general aviation
trends, and NTSB lacks assurance that its calculations of
accident and fatality rates accurately represent the state of
general aviation safety.
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\16\ See GAO, General Aviation Safety: Additional FAA Efforts Could
Help Identify and Mitigate Safety Risks, GAO-13-36 (Washington, D.C.:
October 4, 2012).
Lack of comprehensive flight hour data is an issue we have also
identified in other segments of the aviation industry,
including helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS) and air
cargo transportation. We recommended in 2007 and 2009
respectively that FAA take action to collect comprehensive and
accurate data for HEMS and general aviation operations.\17\ In
2011, we confirmed that FAA now annually surveys all helicopter
operators and requests, among other things, information on the
total flying hours and the percentage of hours that were flown
in air ambulance operations. Our recommendations to FAA for air
cargo and general aviation data remain unaddressed.
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\17\ See GAO, Aviation Safety: Better Data and Targeted FAA Efforts
Needed to Identify and Address Safety Issues of Small Air Cargo
Carriers, GAO-09-614 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2009); GAO, Aviation
Safety: Improved Data Collection Needed for Effective Oversight of Air
Ambulance Industry, GAO-07-353 (Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2007);
and GAO-13-36.
FAA's ability to further reduce the number of fatal general
aviation accidents is hindered by a lack of key data on pilots.
For instance, we reported in October 2012 that FAA does not
maintain certain key information about general aviation pilots,
including how many are actively flying each year and whether
they participate in recurrent training in addition to FAA's
voluntary training program. Without this information, FAA
cannot determine the potential effect of the various sources
and types of training on pilot behavior, competence, and link
this to the likelihood of an accident. The lack of pilot data
also makes it difficult to identify the root causes of
accidents attributed to pilot error and determine how to
mitigate risks. We recommended in 2012 that FAA expand the data
available for root cause analyses of general aviation accidents
by collecting and maintaining data on each certificated pilot's
recurrent training and also that FAA should require the
collection of general aviation flight hours.\18\ FAA partially
concurred with both of these recommendations and stated that it
anticipates addressing these and other data collection concerns
by September 30, 2014.
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\18\ GAO-13-36.
Pilot training. There are about 3,400 pilot training
organizations in the United States. For the most part, all
pilot schools must provide training that includes both
classroom and flight training. FAA has an annual inspection
program that includes the oversight of pilot schools, pilot
examiners, and flight instructors--gatekeepers for the initial
pilot training process. Our 2011 analysis of FAA data indicated
that FAA completed the large majority of the required
inspections for the pilot schools that are certified by FAA,
which generally supply most of the pilots that fly for
scheduled commercial airlines.\19\ However, the extent to which
FAA undertakes required inspections for the thousands of
remaining pilot training organizations, which may provide
training to recreational pilots, is unclear. Our 2011 analysis
of FAA inspection data found that, while FAA requires its
inspectors to conduct on-site inspections of each of these
schools and their pilot examiners at least once per year, the
agency does not have a comprehensive system in place to
adequately measure its performance in meeting its annual
inspection requirements. Without complete data on active pilot
schools and pilot examiners, it is difficult to ensure that
regulatory compliance and safety standards are being met. In
addition, it is unclear whether required inspections for pilot
examiners were completed because FAA's data system lacks
historical information. One potential implication is the
quality of training that recreational pilot candidates receive,
which could contribute to the many general aviation accidents
in which pilot error is cited as a contributing factor.\20\ In
2011, we recommended that FAA develop a comprehensive system to
measure performance of pilot school inspections and noted that
this recommendation may require modifying or improving existing
data systems. In responding to our recommendation, FAA
officials said they agreed that improvements in oversight data
were needed and indicated that they believe efforts already in
existence or under way address our recommendations.
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\19\ See GAO, Initial Pilot Training: Better Management Controls
Are Needed to Improve FAA Oversight, GAO-12-117 (Washington, D.C.:
November 4, 2011).
\20\ According to our 2012 analysis of NTSB data, the pilot was a
cause in more than 60 percent of the general aviation accidents from
2008 through 2010.
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). FAA and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) are taking steps to
ensure the reliability of both small and large UAS by working
on certification standards specific to UAS and undertaking
research and development efforts to mitigate obstacles to the
safe and routine integration of UAS into the national airspace.
Some of these obstacles include vulnerabilities in UAS
operation that will require technical solutions.\21\ However,
we found that these research and development efforts related to
overcoming these obstacles cannot be completed and validated
without safety, reliability, and performance standards for UAS
operations, which FAA has not developed due to data
limitations.\22\ Standards for UAS operations are a key step in
the process of safely integrating regular UAS operations into
the national airspace.\23\ Once standards are developed, FAA
has indicated that it will begin to use them in UAS
regulations; until then, UAS will continue to operate as
exceptions to the regulatory framework rather than being
governed by it.
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\21\ These obstacles include the inability for UAS to sense and
avoid other aircraft and airborne objects in a manner similar to manned
aircraft and vulnerabilities in the command and control of UAS
operations.
\22\ See GAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Measuring Progress and
Addressing Potential Privacy Concerns Would Facilitate Integration Into
the National Airspace System, GAO-12-891 (Washington, D.C.: September
14, 2012).
\23\ FAA is required to issue a final rule for small UAS by August
of 2014 at the latest under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, Sec. 332(b) (2012).
Commercial space. FAA also oversees the safety of commercial
space launches that can carry cargo and eventually humans into
space. FAA is responsible for licensing and monitoring the
safety of such launches and of spaceports (sites for launching
spacecraft).\24\ However, FAA is prohibited by statute from
regulating commercial space crew and passenger safety before
2015 except in response to a serious injury or fatality or an
event that poses a high risk of causing a serious injury or
fatality.\25\ FAA has interpreted this limited authority as
allowing it to regulate crew safety in certain circumstances
and has been proactive in issuing a regulation concerning
emergency training for crews and passengers. However, FAA has
not identified data that would allow it to monitor the safety
of the developing space tourism sector and determine when to
regulate human space flight. To allow the agency to be
proactive about safety, rather than responding only after a
fatality or serious incident occurs, we recommended in 2006
that FAA identify and continually monitor indicators of space
tourism industry safety that might trigger the need to regulate
crew and passenger safety before 2015 and use it to determine
if the regulations should be revised.\26\ According to agency
officials, FAA is working with its industry advisory group, the
Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee, to develop
guidelines for human spaceflight.
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\24\ The National Aeronautics and Space Administration expects to
procure from private launch companies two manned launches per year to
the International Space Station from 2017 to 2020. To date, FAA has not
licensed any commercial space launches carrying humans.
\25\ Sec. 827, Pub. L. No. 112-95.
\26\ See GAO, Commercial Space Launches: FAA Needs Continued
Planning and Monitoring to Oversee the Safety of the Emerging Space
Tourism Industry, GAO-07-16 (Washington, D.C.: October 2006).
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Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the
Committee, this concludes my written statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you may have at this time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Dillingham.
And now, Mr. Jeffrey Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector General,
Office of the Inspector General, United States Department of
Transportation.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY B. GUZZETTI, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Guzzetti. Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Thune,
and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to
testify on FAA's safety oversight efforts.
Like the other witnesses have just indicated, FAA operates
the world's safest air transportation system. However, our
audit work continues to identify opportunities for FAA to
improve safety.
My testimony today is going to focus on three areas: One,
the need for improved air traffic safety data collection and
use; the need to strengthen risk-based oversight; and last,
progress and challenges with implementing mandated safety
requirements.
First, FAA has recently taken steps to enhance the data
collection on air traffic safety risks, including controller
and pilot errors that result in separation losses between
aircraft. However, better data collection and analysis are
needed before the agency can establish an accurate baseline of
errors, identify the trends and root causes of those errors,
and initiate strategies to prevent those errors. For example,
we found that FAA does not analyze all separation losses that
are obtained from their automated detection systems. FAA also
does not validate the losses that are reported through its
nonpunitive self-reporting system, known as ATSAP. Addressing
these challenges will become even more critical as FAA
integrates unmanned aircraft into the airspace system.
Second, FAA faces challenges to maximize the safety
inspector resources that it needs to focus its oversight on the
greatest risks. One challenge is for FAA to overhaul its
staffing model so that the agency can accurately identify the
number of inspectors it needs, and determine where they are
needed most. Currently, their model is unreliable, due to a
number of shortcomings with the data that it uses.
FAA also needs to ensure that inspectors are trained and
equipped with effective tools to perform risk assessments of
repair stations. In 2007, FAA implemented an oversight system
to target higher-risk repair stations; however, our recent
review indicates that inspectors do not always use the risk
assessment process.
FAA also needs to ensure strong oversight of its program
that delegates to private companies the authority to certify
aircraft and components. Under this program, company
representatives appoint individuals to perform this
certification work on FAA's behalf, without FAA's concurrence.
This delegation of authority reduces FAA's oversight role and
could diminish the agency's awareness of appointees'
qualifications and their performance history.
Finally, FAA has made important progress implementing
mandated safety initiatives since the tragic Colgan accident.
This includes advancing air carriers' use of voluntary safety
programs. For example, as of January 2012, FAA data showed that
70 percent of Part 121 air carriers participated in at least
one voluntary safety program, and that figure is rising.
However, work remains to implement these programs at the
smaller carriers. For example, only 12 percent of the carriers
with fewer than 15 aircraft have flight data recording programs
that monitor aircraft performance.
FAA also met an important congressional mandate by issuing
a rule that imposes stricter rest periods for pilots. However,
the new regulation does not address pilot commuting, a
potential contributing factor to fatigue, which we recommended
FAA thoroughly explore.
FAA has also encountered delays in issuing rules related to
pilot qualifications, crew training, and mentoring programs. In
addition, the agency must overcome obstacles to establish a
pilot records database so that air carriers will have better
background information on the pilots that they intend to hire.
Concerns also remain regarding implementation of safety
management systems by small carriers, and information sharing
between codeshare partners.
In conclusion, we will continue our reviews of FAA
programs, and work with the FAA and the Department to ensure
intended safety improvements are realized. While FAA has made
significant progress in many areas, we remain concerned that
serious controller errors, runway incursions, and other
incidents are on the rise. To maintain a safe airspace system,
FAA must improve its use of safety data, establish effective
risk-based approaches for oversight, and fully address
congressional mandates.
This concludes my statement. I would be happy to address
any questions you or any other members have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Guzzetti follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey B. Guzzetti, Assistant Inspector
Generalfor Aviation and Special Programs, U.S. Department of
Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify on the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) progress on safety oversight initiatives. At the
outset, let me state unequivocally that FAA operates the world's safest
air transportation system. In addition, FAA has a number of initiatives
under way to enhance safety in the National Airspace System (NAS).
However, new legislated requirements and the need to improve how the
Agency collects and uses safety data have created significant
challenges for FAA. Our completed and ongoing work has identified
opportunities for FAA to improve its safety oversight.
My testimony today will focus on FAA's (1) need for comprehensive
data collection and analysis to enhance the safety of air traffic
operations; (2) need to strengthen its risk-based oversight approach
for repair stations and manufacturers; and (3) progress and challenges
with implementing mandated safety requirements.
In Summary
Through voluntary safety programs such as the Air Traffic Safety
Analysis Program (ATSAP), FAA has taken important steps to collect
safety data on air traffic operations, including data on controller and
pilot errors that create in-flight and ground collision risks. However,
to accurately identify all safety incidents, analyze trends in safety
risks, and address their root causes, FAA needs to refine its data
collection approach by expanding and enhancing the reliability of its
key data sources. FAA faces similar challenges with establishing an
effective risk-based oversight system for repair stations and aircraft
manufacturers. To target its surveillance to the highest-risk areas,
FAA needs to better determine the number of inspectors it needs and
where to place them, and ensure risk assessments are performed.
Finally, despite commendable progress on implementing key elements of
the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010,\1\ FAA continues to
be challenged with meeting provisions for improved pilot training,
qualification, and screening requirements, as well as advancing safety
initiatives at smaller carriers.
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\1\ Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-216, August 1, 2010.
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A Lack of Integrated Data Collection and Analysis Hinders FAA's Efforts
to Enhance Air Traffic Safety
Over the past several years, FAA has rolled out numerous
initiatives to enhance the safety of air traffic control operations,
but significant challenges continue to hinder these efforts. A top
priority for FAA is to accurately count and identify trends that
contribute to operational errors--events where controllers do not
maintain safe separation between aircraft. FAA's ATSAP program--a
voluntary, non-punitive system through which controllers can report
safety incidents--has the potential to enhance safety, but system
improvements are needed before the Agency can realize expected
benefits. Other priorities that FAA must continue to address are
controller fatigue, runway incursions,\2\ and wildlife hazards. Two
significant safety-related challenges also remain: (1) FAA's progress
in developing a safety data analysis system to proactively identify
risk, and (2) introducing Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into U.S.
airspace.
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\2\ FAA defines a runway incursion as any incident involving an
unauthorized aircraft, vehicle, or person on a runway. Runway
incursions are classified into three categories: (1) operational errors
(when the actions of a controller cause an incident); (2) pilot
deviations (when the actions of a pilot cause an incident); and (3)
vehicle/pedestrian deviations (when the actions of a vehicle operator
or pedestrian cause an incident). Serious runway incursions are those
in which a collision was barely avoided.
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Data Collection and Analysis Enhancements Are Needed To Identify and
Mitigate the Root Causes of Separation Losses
FAA statistics indicate that reported operational errors \3\--when
required separation is lost due to a controller error--rose by 53
percent between Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010 (see figure 1). While total
operational errors remained at these levels in 2010 and 2011, the most
serious reported errors, those in which a collision was barely avoided,
continued to increase, from 37 in Fiscal Year 2009, to 43 in Fiscal
Year 2010, and 55 in Fiscal Year 2011. Further, since the beginning of
Fiscal Year 2012, both the total and most serious number of reported
operational errors appears to have increased.\4\
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\3\ As of Jan 30, 2012, FAA no longer uses the term ``operational
errors'' but instead tracks losses of separation as ``occurrences.''
Occurrences might not be an exact replacement for operational errors.
Occurrences may include other types of losses of separation besides
operational errors.
\4\ We have calculated, based on FAA data, that the total number of
operational errors may have increased up to 2,509 for Fiscal Year 2012,
with the most serious errors increasing up to 275, but we are unable to
state this is 100 percent accurate due to limitations in FAA data.
Specifically, FAA stopped using the term ``operational errors'' in
2012.
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Figure 1. Operational Errors for Fiscal Years 2006 Through 2011
Source: OIG analysis of FAA data.
However, the reason these increases occurred is unknown. According
to FAA, the increases are the result, in part, of its increased use of
data in the Traffic Analysis and Review Program (TARP)--an automated
system for detecting loss of separation incidents at terminal
locations. However, as we reported in February 2013,\5\ operational
errors at the high altitude en route centers--which have had an
automated system for detecting loss of separation incidents in place
for years--have also increased from 353 in Fiscal Year 2009 to 489 in
Fiscal Year 2010, suggesting that the increase in reported errors
during this period was linked in part to a rise in actual errors.
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\5\ FAA's Efforts To Track and Mitigate Air Traffic Losses of
Separation Are Limited by Data Collection and Implementation Challenges
(OIG Report No. AV-2013-046), February 27, 2013. OIG reports and
testimonies are available on our website at http://www.oig.dot.gov/.
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In January 2012, FAA issued new policies and procedures for
collecting, investigating, and reporting all separation losses.
However, their effectiveness is limited by incomplete data and the lack
of an accurate baseline on the number of separation losses. At the time
of our ATSAP review last year,\6\ approximately 50 percent of all ATSAP
event reports \7\ were classified as ``unknown,'' meaning they were not
included in FAA's Quality Assurance database when they were reviewed,
and therefore may have been excluded.\8\ Likewise, as we reported in
February, FAA does not analyze and report all separation losses
automatically flagged by TARP. Instead, FAA investigates only those
losses of separation that are within less than 70 percent of the
required separation distance.
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\6\ Long Term Success of ATSAP Will Require Improvements in
Oversight, Accountability, and Transparency (OIG Report No. AV-2012-
152), July 19, 2012.
\7\ Event reports identify actual or potential losses of
separation, including operational errors, or other situations that may
degrade air traffic safety.
\8\ FAA changed how it categorizes event reports in January 2012.
However, the committees that review ATSAP reports still do not contact
facilities if they believe an event is unknown to management.
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Significant Improvements to ATSAP Are Needed To Achieve Expected
Program
Benefits
FAA implemented ATSAP reporting at all air traffic control
facilities in October 2010 and continues to make needed improvements to
the program. As of December 31, 2012, more than 58,000 reports have
been collected through ATSAP. However, FAA's methods for analyzing the
data may not accurately identify root causes and safety trends. For
example, causal factors are reported quarterly under ATSAP using
general terms such as ``actions or plans poorly executed'' or
``training in progress during event,'' which are too broad to identify
root causes and develop specific actions to mitigate them.
We identified other weaknesses in the ATSAP program. Improvements
in these areas would enhance the Agency's ability to identify and
address risks through ATSAP. For example:
FAA has not finalized the process to effectively communicate
ATSAP data to air traffic facility managers so that safety
improvements can be made at the facility level. By December 31,
2013, FAA plans to deploy a nationwide rollout of a pilot
program to provide personnel at FAA facilities and offices
access to ATSAP data.
At the time of our review, FAA had not effectively
communicated and implemented changes to performance management
under ATSAP.
Event Review Committees (ERC)\9\ have accepted reports for
ATSAP that do not adhere to ATSAP reporting criteria, and FAA
lacks a process to review ERC decisions. For example, ERCs have
accepted reports that concern air traffic controller conduct--
rather than specific performance issues--such as a controller
watching a personal video player while on duty. These types of
conduct issues are inappropriate for inclusion in a
confidential safety program such as ATSAP, and failure to
adhere to the program's reporting criteria may lead to the
incorrect perception that ATSAP is an amnesty program.
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\9\ ERCs consist of a member from the Air Traffic Organization, a
controller union representative, and a member of FAA's Air Traffic
Safety Oversight Service. ERCs evaluate each report submitted to the
program to determine whether it meets the established criteria for
inclusion in the database. If so, the ERC accepts the report into
ATSAP.
ERCs can refer reports that include conduct issues to FAA's
Professional Standards Program (PSP)\10\ for peer counseling.
However, the PSP does not require documenting corrective
actions for accountability, transparency, and resolution. More
importantly, final decisions regarding matters referred to the
PSP are made, in many cases, by bargaining unit employees at
the facility level rather than FAA management.
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\10\ PSP is defined in Article 52 of FAA's 2009 Collective
Bargaining Agreement with the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association. It is designed to allow bargaining unit employees to
address conduct and/or performance issues of their peers before such
issues rise to a level requiring corrective action by the Agency.
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FAA Is Making Changes to Its Scheduling Practices But Continues To Face
Challenges in Mitigating Controller Fatigue
A series of high-profile incidents in early 2011 involving
controllers who were sleeping while on duty sparked public concern
about controller fatigue and prompted FAA to institute a series of
policy changes. These include placing an additional air traffic
controller on the midnight shift at certain facilities and mandating a
minimum of 9 hours off between evening and day shifts.
As directed by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012,\11\ we
are assessing these new controller scheduling practices with a focus on
safety considerations during schedule development, the cost
effectiveness of scheduling practices, and the impact of scheduling
practices on air traffic controller performance.
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\11\ Pub. L. No. 112-95 (2012).
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Sustained Focus on Efforts To Reduce Serious Runway Incursions Is
Needed
Reducing runway incursions--potential ground collisions--is a key
performance goal for FAA that requires heightened attention at all
levels of the Agency. As we noted in our report to this Committee in
July 2010,\12\ the number of the most serious runway incursions--
incidents in which a collision was barely avoided--decreased after
runway safety initiatives detailed in FAA's August 2007 Call to Action
plan were implemented.\13\ However, between Fiscal Years 2010 and 2012,
reported serious runway incursions tripled from 6 in Fiscal Year 2010
to 18 in Fiscal Year 2012.
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\12\ Review of FAA's Call to Action Plan for Runway Safety (OIG
Report No. AV-2010-071), July 21, 2010.
\13\ Specifically, these incidents declined from 25 reported in
Fiscal Year 2008 to 6 reported in Fiscal Year 2010.
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Additionally, the total number of all runway incursions increased
21 percent between Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, from 954 to 1,150, and
the total number of incidents continues to increase. For the period of
October through December 2012, total incursions increased by
approximately 20 percent compared to the same period in 2011. (See
figure 2.)
Figure 2. Runway Incursions, Fiscal Year 2006 Through Fiscal Year 2012
Source: OIG analysis of FAA data.
More concerning is that this increase occurred during a period when
total air traffic operations declined by 1 percent (between Fiscal
Years 2011 and 2012). As a result of these concerns, we plan to
initiate another review of FAA's Runway Safety Program next month.
Over the past several years, FAA has worked to deploy technology
that could help prevent runway incursions. For example, in Fiscal Year
2011, FAA deployed the Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X
(ASDE-X) system at 35 major airports. ASDE-X enhances runway safety by
providing detailed information to air traffic controllers regarding
aircraft operations on runways and taxiways. However, while ASDE-X is a
step in the right direction, it does not provide alerts directly to
pilots, which has been a longstanding recommendation by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). To address this shortcoming, FAA is
planning to integrate the use of ASDE-X with two other systems--Runway
Status Lights (RWSL) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B)--to provide simultaneous alerts to controllers and pilots of
potential ground collisions. Progress in achieving these enhancements
will be impacted by a number of issues, such as establishing
requirements for technical upgrades, testing to verify system
integrity, and determining whether the ASDE-X capabilities will meet
FAA's goals of increasing capacity while improving safety. We have
initiated an audit into this area to assess FAA's progress in
integrating ASDE-X with other technologies such as RWSL and ADS-B to
improve runway safety.
FAA Must Step Up Its Efforts To Reduce Wildlife Hazards at or Near
Airports
The threat of wildlife hazards to aviation safety was evident in
the January 2009 wildlife strike involving U.S. Airways Flight 1549
shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport, which forced the flight
crew to land the airplane in the Hudson River. In addition to creating
major safety risks, strikes can cause significant downtime and damage
to aircraft--estimated to be over 600,000 hours of aircraft downtime
and $625 million in damages annually. Over the past 2 decades, reported
wildlife-aircraft strikes have quadrupled from 1,770 in 1990 to 9,463
in 2012.\14\
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\14\ These totals exclude wildlife strike reports from military
operations and foreign or unknown states.
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While FAA's Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Program seeks to reduce
wildlife hazards, we recently reported that the Agency cannot fully
assess how effective its policies and guidance are at reducing the
number and severity of wildlife strikes because reporting wildlife
strikes is voluntary.\15\ A 2009 study commissioned by FAA concluded
that only 39 percent of actual strikes were reported. Consequently, it
is unclear whether increases in reported strikes are due to increases
in actual strikes or increased reporting. Similarly, it is unclear
whether any decreases in strike reports are a result of achieving
program goals or a lack of industry reporting.
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\15\ FAA Has Not Effectively Implemented Its Wildlife Hazard
Mitigation Program (OIG Report No. AV-2012-170), August 22, 2012.
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Without full reporting and complete data on wildlife strikes, it is
difficult to fully analyze the magnitude of safety issues, the nature
of the problems, and the economic cost of wildlife strikes. FAA
reported that wildlife strikes are probably one of the most pressing
issues facing air traffic in the vicinity of airports and concluded
that the lack of good data is one of the biggest challenges that
managers at airports face.\16\ Accordingly, it is incumbent on FAA to
address the gaps in strike data by improving oversight and enforcement
of its Wildlife Hazard Mitigation Program requirements. Otherwise, the
Agency will not be able to ensure that the $366 million in increased
program spending over the next 20 years will be used effectively to
track and analyze trends in wildlife strikes, identify potential new
hazards, and mitigate their risk.
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\16\ FAA Safety Briefing, `` `Accidental' Meetings Between
Airplanes and Wildlife,'' November/December 2011.
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FAA Faces Challenges With Developing a Comprehensive Safety Data
Collection and Analysis System for Proactive Identification of
Risk
To help maintain our Nation's aviation safety record and further
reduce the number of aviation accidents, FAA has been moving toward a
data-driven approach for airline safety oversight. In 2007, FAA
implemented the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
(ASIAS) system, a tool that collects and analyzes data from multiple
databases to proactively identify and address risks that may lead to
accidents. ASIAS enables authorized users to obtain data from
confidential databases--including voluntary safety programs such as the
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program and the Aviation
Safety Action Program (ASAP)--as well as from publicly available data
sources such as NTSB's Accident and Incident Reports database. Although
ASIAS was never intended as a surveillance tool, it can still play a
role in air carrier risk identification and mitigation. However, access
to the confidential ASIAS data for FAA and industry representatives has
been limited due to airline proprietary concerns.
In the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010, Congress
directed our office to assess FAA's ability to establish a
comprehensive information repository that can accommodate multiple data
sources and be accessible to FAA aviation safety inspectors and
analysts who oversee air carriers. Accordingly, we are currently
assessing FAA's progress in implementing ASIAS, its process and plan
for allowing system access at both field and headquarters levels, and
its use of ASIAS data to assist in commercial air carrier risk
identification and mitigation. We expect to issue our report later this
year.
Introducing UAS Within U.S. Airspace Presents Significant New
Challenges in FAA's Safety Oversight
FAA predicts there will be roughly 10,000 active UAS in the United
States in 5 years, with more than $89 billion in worldwide UAS spending
over the next 10 years. However, FAA has approved these operations only
on a limited, case-by-case basis, due in part to the safety risks
associated with UAS integration into the NAS. While the capabilities of
unmanned aircraft have significantly improved, they have a limited
ability to detect, sense, and avoid other air traffic. Given the
growing interest and potential safety issues associated with UAS
flights, Congress recently directed the Secretary of Transportation, in
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, to develop a
comprehensive plan for integrating UAS into the NAS no later than
September 30, 2015. At the request of the Chairmen and Ranking Members
of this Committee and the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, as well as their Aviation Subcommittees, we are
currently assessing FAA's progress on integrating UAS into the NAS. We
expect to issue a report later this year.
Implementing Risk-Based Oversight is Critical to Ensure Safety in the
Aviation Industry
To maximize its safety inspector resources, FAA needs to target its
oversight of the aviation industry, including repair stations, air
carriers, and manufacturers, to address the greatest risks. However,
shifting to risk-based oversight of the aviation industry continues to
be a challenge for FAA. FAA deployed a new oversight system for repair
stations in 2007, but it lacks the data and full implementation needed
to be a true risk-based system. FAA is also increasingly delegating
certain functions, such as approving new aircraft designs, to aircraft
manufacturers and other private companies but has not fully addressed
weaknesses in its delegation program. Further, the Agency has not fully
implemented a risk-based tool used to identify which aircraft
certification projects represent the highest risk.
FAA Lacks a Reliable Model for Determining How Many Inspectors It Needs
To effectively oversee a dynamic aviation industry, it is critical
that FAA place its approximately 4,300 safety inspectors where they are
most needed. A 2006 National Research Council (NRC) study,\17\
conducted at the direction of Congress, found that FAA's methodology
for allocating aviation safety inspector resources was ineffective. NRC
determined this was partially because FAA's method (1) did not predict
the consequences of staffing shortfalls (that is, what inspections are
not being accomplished due to staffing); (2) failed to account for some
important factors affecting inspector workload, such as designee
oversight; and (3) relied on expert judgment rather than validated data
to reach conclusions. NRC recommended that FAA develop a new approach,
and, in response, FAA introduced a new staffing model in October 2009.
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\17\ ``Staffing Standards for Aviation Safety Inspectors,''
September 20, 2006.
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We have evaluated the model as part of an ongoing audit of
inspector staffing, as requested by Congress.\18\ Thus far, FAA
officials are not confident in the accuracy of the model's staffing
projections and therefore have not fully relied on the number projected
by the model when requesting additional inspectors during the annual
budget process. As of January 2013, FAA reported the results of its
staffing model six times, with each iteration showing very different
nationwide employee shortages (see figure 3).\19\
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\18\ Congress directed our office to review inspector and analyst
staffing issues in Section 205 of the Airline Safety and FAA Extension
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-216, enacted August 1, 2010.
\19\ Based on our analysis of FAA data, these fluctuations appear
to be caused by a number of underlying issues such as inaccurate and
outdated data.
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FAA is working to further refine the model so that it more
effectively identifies the number of inspectors needed and where they
should be placed to address the greatest safety risks. We expect to
issue our report on inspector staffing later this year.
Figure 3. FAA's Model-Projected Safety Employee Shortfalls
Source: OIG analysis of FAA data.
Oversight of Repair Stations Remains a Concern
FAA's oversight of aircraft repair stations has been a longstanding
concern. According to FAA, there are nearly 4,800 FAA-certificated
repair stations worldwide that perform maintenance for U.S.-registered
aircraft. Since 2003, we have recommended that FAA strengthen its
oversight of air carriers' contracted maintenance providers by
developing a comprehensive, standardized approach to repair station
oversight and targeting inspector resources based on risk assessments.
In response, FAA implemented a new risk-based system in 2007 to target
surveillance efforts to facilities based on risk.
However, our review indicates that the system continues to rely on
inspectors completing mandatory inspections rather than inspections
based on risk. Additionally, some inspectors do not use the risk
assessment process at all; those that do are hindered in their ability
to assess risk due in part to limitations in data availability and
quality. As a result, FAA has been ineffective at conducting risk-based
oversight.
FAA's surveillance at foreign and domestic repair stations also
lacks the rigor needed to identify deficiencies and verify they have
been addressed. Systemic problems we identified during our 2003
review--such as inadequate mechanic training, outdated tool calibration
checks, and inaccurate work order documentation--persist at the repair
stations we recently visited. FAA guidance requires inspectors to
review these specific areas during repair station inspections, but
inspectors overlooked these types of deficiencies. Given U.S. air
carriers' continued reliance on repair stations to perform their
aircraft maintenance domestically and abroad, it is imperative that FAA
improve its risk-based system to provide more rigorous oversight of
this industry. We plan to issue our report on FAA's oversight of repair
stations later this month.
Ineffective Oversight of Organizations With Designated Authority
Weakens FAA's Role in Aircraft Certification
Through its Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program,
implemented in 2009, FAA delegates to aircraft manufacturers and other
private companies the approval of individuals to certify aircraft or
components on FAA's behalf. Once FAA approves the company's selection
process,\20\ ODA company representatives appoint personnel who perform
work on FAA's behalf without FAA concurrence, significantly reducing
FAA's role in approving these personnel. While FAA maintains some
involvement with the selection process during an ODA holder's first 2
years, it is unclear how FAA is involved beyond that timeframe.
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\20\ If ODAs fail to comply with regulations or fail to pass an FAA
audit, FAA can remove them from the program.
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FAA has not yet provided its certification offices with clear,
written guidance on how to oversee ODAs' personnel appointments. As a
result, certification offices are currently left to define FAA's role
in tracking these personnel and to determine how companies select them.
For example, only three of the five FAA certification offices we
visited consulted an FAA database to pre-screen prospective ODA
employees' performance histories, and FAA's certification engineers in
the field expressed confusion about whether this check would continue
beyond an ODA's first 2 years. With less FAA involvement in the
selection process, there is the risk that an ODA company could appoint
certification responsibilities to individuals whose qualifications are
inadequate or who have a history of poor performance. We identified
instances of FAA engineers experiencing pushback from ODA companies
when trying to take corrective actions against appointed personnel.
This has led to individuals with performance problems continuing to
perform important certification functions. In response to our June 2011
report,\21\ FAA is developing and implementing policies, procedures,
guidance, and training to address the deficiencies we identified with
the Agency's oversight of ODA.
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\21\ FAA Needs To Strengthen Its Risk Assessment and Oversight
Approach for Organization Designation Authorization and Risk-Based
Resource Targeting Programs (OIG Report No. AV-2011-136), June 29,
2011.
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In September 2007, as another way to leverage limited FAA
engineering resources, FAA implemented use of the Risk-Based Resource
Targeting (RBRT) system, which is designed to identify higher risk
aircraft certification projects. However, RBRT has not effectively
measured risk because it relies primarily on subjective input from FAA
certification engineers, does not contain detailed data, and has
experienced repeated technical difficulties. For example, engineers
reported numerous problems with the system, including a tendency to
identify projects as low risk regardless of inputs that suggested
higher risk factors, such as a company's lack of experience with the
design of aircraft to which they have assigned personnel to certify. In
response to our June 2011 report, FAA is developing processes to
incrementally improve the RBRT system.
FAA Has Made Progress in Implementing Mandated Safety Initiatives, But
Significant Challenges Remain
Since the Airline Safety Act was passed in 2010, FAA has improved
pilot rest requirements and made strides in advancing voluntary safety
programs. However, challenges remain for enhancing pilot qualification
standards and training, establishing mentoring programs, and developing
a pilot records database to improve the screening process for pilot
applicants.
FAA Met Requirements to Address Pilot Fatigue and Improve Participation
in
Voluntary Safety Programs
FAA has made important progress in meeting key elements of the Act,
including issuing a final rule on pilot rest requirements and
increasing air carrier use of voluntary safety programs. We have some
concerns regarding pilot commuting, however, as detailed below.
In January 2012, FAA updated its flight and duty time regulations
for Part 121 \22\ air carrier pilots to better ensure pilots are well
rested when they fly. This is a significant achievement for the Agency
given that these were the first modifications to the regulations since
1985 and that the proposed rule received over 8,000 comments from the
aviation industry, mostly opposing the proposed requirements. Under the
new regulations, pilots are required to affirmatively state that they
are fit to fly and are prohibited from flying during a scheduled duty
period when they report fatigue. Other key changes include requiring a
10-hour minimum rest period prior to duty--a 2-hour increase over the
previous rule--and 30 consecutive hours free from duty per week--an
increase of 25 percent over the previous requirements.
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\22\ 14 CFR Part 121, Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and
Supplemental Operations.
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While these changes could substantially enhance safety, the
regulations do not address pilot commuting--a factor that may
significantly contribute to fatigue, as many pilots in the industry
reside hundreds or even thousands of miles from their duty locations.
In September 2011, we recommended that FAA collect and analyze
information on pilot domicile and commuting to better target solutions
to reduce pilot fatigue.\23\ The Agency agreed to complete by February
2013 a ``scan of available data'' on pilot commuting and determine
whether additional data could offer significant safety benefits.
However, FAA recently updated its response stating that it had
determined that collecting and analyzing data on pilot commuting was
not warranted because pilots have an obligation to be fit for duty.
Despite this stance, FAA indicated that our recommendation has now been
substantially addressed. The Agency also cited a September 2012 study
by its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute regarding flight attendant
commuting that found ``no significant relationship between commute
times and flight attendant performance.'' While we are currently
evaluating FAA's response, we remain concerned that the Agency is not
adequately addressing pilot commuting.
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\23\ FAA and Industry Are Taking Action To Address Pilot Fatigue,
but More Information on Pilot Commuting Is Needed (OIG Report No. AV-
2011-176), September 2011.
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In addition to its rule on pilot fatigue, FAA has made commendable
progress in advancing voluntary safety programs at air carriers,
another key component of the Act. For example, as required by the Act,
FAA provided Congress with a report \24\ on air carrier use of three
voluntary safety programs that the Agency oversees. Data gathered
through these voluntary programs can be used to identify the trends and
patterns that represent safety risks:
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\24\ Voluntary Safety Programs, Response to P.L. 111-216, Sec. 213,
January 28, 2011.
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)--A joint FAA/industry
program that allows aviation employees to self-report safety
violations to air carriers and FAA without fear of reprisal
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through legal or disciplinary actions.
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA)--A program for
the routine collection and analysis of digital flight data
generated during aircraft operations.
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP)--A voluntary
alternative to traditional pilot training regulations that
replaces programmed hours with proficiency-based training, and
incorporates data-driven processes enabling air carriers to
refine training based on identified individual needs.
As of January 2012, FAA data showed that 70 percent \25\ of Part
121 air carriers participated in at least one voluntary safety program
and just under half of those carriers used more than one. The highest
concentration of new growth for these air carriers has been with the
ASAP and FOQA programs.
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\25\ FAA recently reported that air carrier participation in
voluntary safety programs continues to increase.
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However, work remains to implement these programs at smaller
carriers. While all carriers with more than 50 aircraft in their fleet
have implemented ASAP, only 41 percent of carriers with 15 or fewer
aircraft have adopted the system (see table 1). Similarly, just 12
percent of these small carriers have FOQA, and only 7 percent have
advanced qualification programs for pilot training.
Table 1.--Air Carrier Voluntary Safety Program Participation
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Number of
Program Carriers Large Carriers (more Medium Carriers (16 to Small Carriers (15 or
Participating than 50 aircraft) 50 aircraft) fewer aircraft)
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ASAP 60 of 88 24 of 24 19 of 23 17 of 41
(68%) (100%) (83%) (41%)
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FOQA 38 of 88 22 of 24 11 of 23 5 of 41
(43%) (92%) (48%) (12%)
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AQP 19 of 88 13 of 24 3 of 23 3 of 41
(22%) (54%) (13%) (7%)
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Source: OIG analysis of FAA data as of January 2012.
Challenges Remain in Meeting Key Pilot-Related Provisions and Ensuring
Air
Carriers Meet Safety Standards
Despite the important progress FAA has made in implementing the
Act's requirements, the Agency has encountered delays in issuing key
rules impacting pilots--specifically those addressing new screening and
qualification enhancements, air carrier training standards, and
mentoring and leadership programs. The Agency also faces challenges in
establishing a new centralized, electronic pilot records database to
provide air carriers with better background information on pilots they
intend to hire. Finally, FAA will need to address concerns regarding
establishing safety management systems and information sharing and
mentoring between code share partners.
Pilot Qualifications. FAA is behind schedule in meeting the Act's
requirement to substantially raise airline pilot qualifications. FAA
expects to issue a final rule by August 2013--1 year after the Act's
deadline. As mandated by the Act, FAA's proposed rule (issued in
February 2012) would require all Part 121 pilots to hold an Airline
Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate,\26\ which is currently required only
for Pilots-in-Command. First Officers would need 1,500 hours of flight
time to obtain an ATP certificate--six times the current minimum of 250
hours needed for a commercial pilot's certificate. Although FAA's
proposed rule would provide some flexibility in meeting these
requirements for pilots with relevant degrees or military flight
experience, air carrier representatives remain opposed to the rule
because they feel a pilot's quality and type of flying experience
should be weighted more heavily than the number of flight hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ An Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) Certificate is the highest
level of pilot certification. Pilots certified as ATP are authorized to
act as pilot-in-command of an aircraft in commercial airline service.
Additional eligibility requirements are contained in 14 CFR 61.153.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA's delayed rulemaking is a particular concern because, under the
terms of the Act, the requirement that all pilots possess ATP
certificates will automatically take effect if FAA cannot issue a final
rule by August 2013. If this happens, air carriers would not be allowed
the flexibility provided in FAA's proposed rule. As a result, air
carriers may not have adequate time to make necessary adjustments to
their pilot training and qualification programs to meet the new
requirements by the Act's deadline.
Crew Training. FAA is more than 18 months overdue on issuing a
final rule revising pilot training requirements, due in part to
significant industry opposition to the rule. FAA's current proposed
rule (issued in May 2011) is an important safety initiative that will
require pilot training programs to incorporate flight simulators and
enhance pilots' abilities to work together during emergencies, as well
as how to recognize and recover from stalls.
With advancements in pilot training on the horizon, it is important
that FAA enhance its oversight practices. For example, under the new
rule, carriers will be required to provide remedial training for pilots
with performance deficiencies. However, it will be difficult for FAA to
gauge the effectiveness of this training unless it corrects weaknesses
we reported in December 2011.\27\ Specifically, we reported that FAA
was not tracking poorly performing pilots due to inadequate guidance
for its inspectors on how to gather data on pilot performance.
Currently, FAA guidance requires inspectors to compare pilot
proficiency checks that they have performed against those conducted by
the carriers' check airmen.\28\ However, we questioned the viability of
this requirement since nearly all pilot proficiency checks are
conducted by check airmen, not FAA inspectors. As a result, FAA
inspectors may not have sufficient data to make a meaningful
comparison.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ New Approaches Are Needed To Strengthen FAA Oversight of Air
Carrier Training Programs and Pilot Performance (OIG Report No. AV-
2012-027), December 20, 2011.
\28\ Check airmen are pilots employed by air carriers who evaluate
a pilot's proficiency during examinations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot Mentoring. FAA is also more than 20 months overdue in meeting
a mandated timeline to issue a proposed rule requiring air carriers to
establish pilot mentoring, leadership, and professional development
committees to improve pilot performance. The delay is due in part to
setbacks in developing an appropriate balance between the costs and
benefits of these programs.
While FAA intends to issue a proposed rule that would reinforce
safe flying practices, air carriers are reluctant to allocate resources
to implement these new safety programs without a final rule and FAA
guidance. As we reported in January 2013,\29\ seven of nine carriers we
visited did not have formal mentoring programs, and none had
professional development programs for their pilots.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ FAA and Industry Are Advancing the Airline Safety Act, But
Challenges Remain to Achieve Its Full Measure (OIG Report No. AV-2013-
037), January 31, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot Records Database. FAA achieved an early milestone to begin
developing the electronic database for pilot screening by October 2010.
Additionally, in July 2011, an advisory committee provided FAA with
recommendations on the database's design and functionality. However,
the Act did not establish a milestone for completion and FAA has yet to
make long-term implementation decisions. To achieve the goal of
enhancing the screening process of newly hired pilots, FAA must
overcome three key challenges:
First, FAA must determine the level of detail that should be
captured from air carrier pilot training records, such as
recurrent flight training data. The Act stipulates that
comments and evaluations made by check airmen be included in
the database; however, industry is highly protective of these
data and opposes their inclusion. FAA must also address how to
include historical air carrier pilot training records into its
new system.
Second, the Agency will need to develop a strategy to
transition to the new database while ensuring air carriers
receive all available data in the interim. Since database
implementation is years away, we are concerned whether air
carriers can currently obtain all relevant information on
pilots before they are hired.
Finally, FAA identified multiple challenges for accessing
records from the National Driver Register (NDR)\30\ and
incorporating them into the database. For example, FAA must
decide how to ensure data reliability of pilot records and
resolve conflicting data retention policies for the database
versus NDR data sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ NDR is a central information system that allows States to
electronically exchange information on licensed drivers through a
computerized network.
Safety Management Systems. FAA did not meet an August 2012 deadline
for issuing a final rule to require that all Part 121 air carriers
implement Safety Management Systems (SMS). SMS, which is currently
voluntary, provides air carriers with a comprehensive process for
managing safety risks and integrating safety activities into normal,
day-to-day operations. Specifically, SMS provides operators with
business processes and management tools to examine data from everyday
operations, isolate trends that may be precursors to incidents and
accidents, and develop and carry out appropriate risk mitigation
strategies.
Since 2007, FAA has taken steps to assist air carriers in
developing these systems through a pilot program designed to promote
voluntary air carrier adoption of SMS and develop implementation
strategies. As of January 2013, 95 percent of all Part 121 air carriers
(80 of 84) are participating in the pilot program.
When fully implemented across all carriers, SMS has the potential
to significantly advance safety. However, there is industry concern
that the SMS rule will not be scalable for air carriers of varying size
and operations, making it more costly and difficult for smaller
carriers to integrate into their operations. In addition, FAA's
proposed rule (issued in November 2010) does not address concerns from
air carriers and NTSB about public disclosure of SMS-collected data.
Most of these concerns focus on whether the data can be used in
litigation. NTSB is also concerned that air carrier employees may be
discouraged from providing important safety information due to a lack
of SMS data protection.
Code Sharing. The 2009 Colgan accident raised important questions
about code sharing--when a mainline air carrier contracts with a
smaller regional carrier to provide flights to its hub airports--
including how closely the mainline carriers monitor the operations of
their regional counterparts. FAA's 2009 Call to Action plan for airline
safety encouraged mainline and regional carriers to collaborate on code
share safety programs and mentoring. Yet, FAA does not have procedures
to advance the Agency's commitment to ensure an equivalent level of
safety between mainline air carriers and their code share partners.
In February 2013, we reported that while FAA sponsors biannual
information sharing events across the industry, it has not taken steps
to encourage mainline carriers to share safety information and best
practices with their code share partners.\31\ As a result, some safety
programs developed internally between code sharing partners are more
robust than others. For example, one major carrier meets with its code
share partners on a monthly basis to discuss safety practices, while
other carriers we reviewed only met quarterly with their code share
partners. Further, because FAA does not review domestic code share
arrangements, the Agency has not assessed whether certain aspects of
these agreements, such as financial incentives based on performance,
could have unintended safety consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Growth of Code Sharing Warrants Increased Attention (OIG
Report No. AV-2013-045), February 14, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
With an increasingly complex air system--one that relies on rapidly
evolving technologies, specialized services, and expanding
partnerships--maintaining a safe and viable NAS is a challenging
mission. While FAA has taken noteworthy action to address safety
concerns raised by Congress, our office, NTSB, and others, we have
noted that further opportunities remain to mitigate safety risks. These
include improving collection and analysis of air traffic safety data,
establishing an effective risk-based approach for overseeing repair
stations and manufacturers, and fully addressing provisions of the
Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010 and the FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012. We will continue our work with FAA and the
Department to ensure intended air safety improvements are realized.
This concludes my statement. I would be happy to address any
questions from the Chairman or Members of the Committee at this time.
Source: OIG analysis of FAA-reported data.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
We will proceed to questions, based upon the order of
arrival.
And so, the first one, Administrator Huerta, is to you.
You've got to cut $627 million from the FAA budget for the
remaining 6 months of this fiscal year. Initial cuts include
closing of more than 100 contracted air traffic control towers
and the elimination of midnight shifts at 60 other air traffic
towers. The agency will also have to furlough its employees for
11 days, starting April 21. In addition, the FAA recently
provided information indicating that they need to make cuts of
$486 million to the operations account, $142 million from the
facilities and equipment account--that's NextGen. NextGen
programs are getting cut by about $3 million, but furloughs
will have an even greater impact on that program because
hundreds of subject-matter experts, including air traffic
controllers, will have to forego their work in this area to
return to their core activities, if I'm correct on that.
So, my question to you, sir, is, How will the sequestration
cuts and furloughs affect critical safety activity, such as
oversight of airline operations, of the implementation of
NextGen, and the certification activities of the agency, or any
other concerns you may have?
Mr. Huerta. Mr. Chairman, two principles have guided us as
we have looked at the impact of the sequester in the current
Fiscal Year. As you pointed out, we have to identify cuts
totaling $637 million in the remaining 6 months of the year. As
an operating agency, 70 percent of our operations budget is
people, 84 percent of our people are in the field, in the
facilities that actually deal with the flying public.
Sequester, as you know, is designed to be a blunt
instrument, and we have limited flexibility, in terms of how we
can implement it. We have to apply it by program, project, and
activity within the various accounts within the FAA's budget.
Our overriding principle is, first and foremost, to
maintain the highest levels of safety; and, second, to minimize
its impact on the maximum number of passengers. Our approach
has been to focus, first, in contractual areas and out-of-
pocket expenses. We have had tremendous cost reductions in such
things as travel, training, and information technology
services. In addition, we're also focusing on how we can look
at our contract base to see if there are cuts that we can take
that would enable us to maintain the safety of the system
while, at the same time, preserving essential people-related
services. Nonetheless, we have also been forced to look at
reductions in service at facilities that have lower levels of
activity.
When we looked at air traffic control towers, what we
focused on were towers that had less than 150,000 annual
operations and 10,000 commercial operations. I should point out
that we have thousands of public-use airports that operate in
the country every day in a non-towered capacity, including
several thousand public-use airports. It is not unsafe, but the
rules of how such a facility operates are different. In order
to maintain the highest levels of safety, what you sacrifice is
efficiency.
In addition to focusing on these lower-activity facilities
that are covered by contracts, we have to look for other cuts.
Given the large percentage of our budget that is made up of
payroll expenses, the only way we can get to the number we need
to cut is to focus on reducing our payroll expense, and that's
what brings us to the furlough.
The furlough affects all of our personnel across the FAA,
except those that are exempted by statute, which is our Airport
Improvement Program. Air traffic controllers, technicians that
maintain aviation equipment, and aviation safety inspectors are
all subject to the furlough.
The impacts on large facilities will be a reduction of
about 10 percent in available hours to operate at those
facilities.
The Chairman. Could you say that again, please, sir?
Mr. Huerta. A reduction of about 10 percent of available
controller hours. That's 1 furlough day pay for every 2-week
pay period. Those instructions have been provided to the
facilities to build facility schedules, based on availability
of controller hours.
We would expect that schedule reductions will result in
significant delays in the larger facilities. The actual impact
is very specific to the airport in question. It depends on the
airport's configuration, how it is staffed, and what its
traffic count looks like. But, you've heard me say, in the
past, that large hub airports could expect delays of up to 90
minutes in peak travel periods.
We are faced with a series of bad choices, but the way the
sequester law is designed, we have limited flexibility in
moving funds between accounts.
You asked about the impacts on NextGen. In order to
preserve hours for the core operation we have pulled back
individuals that work in collaborative workgroups to plan for
the implementations of new technology back to their home
facilities. We need them to be available to work traffic and to
provide needed safety oversight. What that means is, a lot of
the operational testing that we do to implement new
technologies is something that gets delayed as a result.
These are all difficult decisions that we need to make, so
we are hopeful that we will be able to resolve the sequester as
we go into Fiscal Year 2014, or even later this year. We would
like to be able to recover some of the lost ground that is the
result of sequestration. Aviation, as you know, contributes
$1.3 trillion to our national economy, so we need to do
everything that we can to support it.
The Chairman. But, if things get better, as you say, you're
still constrained by a budget previously passed, are you not?
Mr. Huerta. For Fiscal Year 2013, our budget is effectively
the continuing resolution amount, which is the fiscal 2012
level, minus the amount of the sequester. The President has put
forward a proposed budget for 2014 that, if adopted, would
provide adequate resources to maintain the operations of the
FAA and the needed investments in NextGen. But, we have to see
how the----
The Chairman. As they were last year?
Mr. Huerta. I'm sorry?
The Chairman. As they were in the last fiscal year?
Mr. Huerta. Yes.
The Chairman. OK.
Oh, I'm way over my time. I apologize.
To you, Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. You're the Chairman. Do you want to keep
going?
The Chairman. No. No.
[Laughter.]
Senator Thune. OK. All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to, if I could, get a response to a question
having to do with the Colgan 3407 accident that happened 4
years ago. Congress directed the FAA to conduct several
rulemakings to improve airline safety; among them was the pilot
qualifications rule. The bill we passed required the FAA to
issue a rule within 3 years to increase pilot-experience hours
to a minimum of 1,500 hours. The law allowed the FAA to give
credit toward this minimum-hours requirement to those with
relevant academic training. Without the final rule, the 1,500-
hour requirement will go into effect without the equivalences
included in the law, and that is not what Congress intended.
And my question is, Will the FAA publish a final rule
before the August 1, 2013 deadline with such equivalences?
Mr. Huerta. Yes.
Senator Thune. Good.
I'd like to follow up on these budget issues and
sequestration issues, which I think that the Chairman touched
on several levels. But, there have been a number of questions
that have been posed, by myself and other members of this
committee, requesting more detailed support for FAA's claims on
its sequester reductions. And those requests for information
have, at best, been answered with what I would characterize as
incomplete responses. And so, my question Mr. Administrator,
is, how can you expect Congress and the public to trust the
soundness of your decisions when you don't offer up concrete
details to back up claims regarding the impact of sequestration
on the National Airspace System?
Mr. Huerta. Senator Thune, the sequester law requires that
we provide a detailed report. We do intend to provide that
report once we've completed our work on the implementation.
However, I will say that, as I indicated in my opening
statement and in response to Chairman Rockefeller's question,
our focus has been to maintain aviation services and to
minimize impact on the maximum number of travelers.
Much has been made about: Can't the FAA reduce its contract
expenditures? Well, at the direction of this committee and with
the support of industry, we have contracted out a large number
of service operations that represent greater partnership with
the private sector to carry out the needs of the aviation
system. For example, our largest contract, close to $250
million, is FAA's telecommunications infrastructure system.
That is the communication system that allows all air traffic
facilities to communicate with one another. That function was
previously performed by Federal employees; that's now done by
contractors.
Our second largest contract was as a result of the
privatization of flight service station activities. These are
essential services that give pilots briefings on weather and
flight conditions that enable them to have important
information before they take a flight.
And our third largest contract area, as I mentioned, is
contract towers.
We have achieved savings in areas--36 million dollars, this
year, for IT. We've reduced our travel budget by 30 percent. We
have completely eliminated training for an air traffic control
support during the summer months. That saves us money this
year. The decision may create a staffing problem for us in the
years ahead. But, we have to figure out how to manage through
that.
Even with all of this, because our budget is primarily
driven by people, and people providing services, we have no
choice but to look at furloughs of our employees.
As we reduce hours of employees that are available to
perform essential services, our primary and overriding focus is
going to be on safety. And so, in order to maintain the safety
of the operation, it will become more inefficient in high-
traffic periods. It's just the way the numbers work. We are a
very people-heavy organization, and an organization that is
focused on providing essential safety-related services to the
traveling public. To maintain safety, we have to run a less
efficient operation.
Senator Thune. Well, let me ask you if you would consider,
or are you considering, making use of existing reprogramming
and transfer authorities, when it comes to reducing the impacts
of sequestration on air traffic control functions?
Mr. Huerta. Yes. We have an existing authority, as you
mentioned, in order to transfer up to 2 percent within a
particular type of funding to fund essential services. And we
have taken full advantage of that flexibility in order to get
our furlough impact on our critical safety functions down to 11
days. And it would be my hope to buy back more of those
furlough days as we see how we--how the system plays itself out
and how we're able to manage and find savings on a continuous
basis. This is not a one-shot deal; we're managing this on a
weekly basis. And our efforts are, again, How do we minimize
the impact on the maximum number of travelers?
Senator Thune. What does the FAA plan to do in FY14 when it
comes to the proposed contract tower closures this year? For
instance, would the FAA continue those closures next year, or
utilize the flexibility it has to manage where those budget
reductions come from?
Mr. Huerta. The President's budget, which has been put
forward for Fiscal Year 2014, assumes that the sequester has
been resolved. If the President's budget is adopted by the
Congress, we would have adequate funding for a contract-tower
program.
Senator Thune. How about if that budget is not adopted?
Mr. Huerta. Then it depends on what the appropriators
provide to us.
Senator Thune. But, you would use that flexibility, in a
future year, if the appropriators give you that flexibility.
Mr. Huerta. If, in a future year, appropriators provided
budgetary flexibility, we would have to see how it's allocated,
what it looks like and what flexibilities we actually have to
move money around. Whatever Congress provides to us, we will
work within it.
Senator Ayotte. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Blunt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Huerta, you mentioned that you had worked to find
enough flexibility so that essential employees would have fewer
furloughed days. Is that right?
Mr. Huerta. Not exactly, sir. What the Sequester Act
provides for us, and what our Appropriations Act provides, is
funding flexibility to move 2 percent of available
appropriations across accounts.
Senator Blunt. Right.
Mr. Huerta. In doing that, what we did was balance out
accounts within the FAA with the focus on maximizing the
availability of air traffic controllers and aviation safety----
Senator Blunt. So, are there some people at the FAA that
will have more furlough days than 11?
Mr. Huerta. No.
Senator Blunt. So, there was no priority for essential
employees, just a priority for all employees, if you could
achieve it.
Mr. Huerta. Actually, what we were trying to do was get
down to 11 for the critical safety-related functions. Without
moving money around, the number of days would actually have a
higher number.
Senator Blunt. Right. But, you're telling me nobody is
going to be furloughed more than 11 days.
Mr. Huerta. That is correct.
Senator Blunt. Right. So, it was all functions, not just--
it helped with the critical functions, since your view, at this
point----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Blunt.--is, you treat everybody equally.
Mr. Huerta. Yes. There is an overriding principle of
fairness----
Senator Blunt. Right.
Mr. Huerta.--that we have to look at, as well.
Senator Blunt. Well, now, there's no overriding principle
of fairness if it's a bad weather day. You have a list of
employees who have to show up, as a priority.
Mr. Huerta. Sure. And----
Senator Blunt. There's no overriding principle of fairness
that day.
Mr. Huerta. Let's take a bad weather day. One of the things
that we have looked at is, How do we significantly reduce what
we spend on overtime? That's a very costly way to staff
facilities. What we're preserving overtime for is exactly those
sorts of situations--bad weather days.
Senator Blunt. All right. Well, what I'm going to do is--
I've got a piece of legislation that I've offered as an
amendment to the CR, and I'll offer it again, which does
prioritize the employees--and you have a lot of them--that are
essential safety employees. I think President Obama, in April
2011, sent a directive out, ``If there's a government shutdown,
here are the employees that have to show up.'' President
Clinton did the same thing when there was a government
shutdown, in 1995. And you might--I ask--I'm going to ask you
just to look at that and see if it's something that you would
be able to look at and maybe even be supportive of, because it
just essentially does allow some priority for essential
employees. My view is that the law will probably stand. And we
can not have a sequester if we just appropriate money below
that number, or if we appropriate money above the number, then
I'd like to see what we could do to make this more workable.
On towers--have you got--had safety reports on the towers
that you've closed?
Mr. Huerta. Yes, we have.
Senator Blunt. Could I get a copy of those?
Mr. Huerta. What we've done, in looking at the tower
closures is, we have considered whether there are safety
impacts----
Senator Blunt. I'm going to run out of time. Is that a yes
or a no? Can I get a copy of those?
Mr. Huerta. We can provide you a response for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The FAA developed a national safety case to determine what needed
to be done to convert Towered airports into non-Towered airports and
captured those standards into a Safety Risk Management Document (SRMD).
That process identified approximately 20 mitigations that would have to
be applied at each airport. That airport-by-airport information was
captured as part of the SRMD and could be made available to the
Senator.
Senator Blunt. And, Mr. Dillingham, on towers that affect
civil aviation, most of those towers also have a combination of
general aviation and commercial. How important is it to have
that visual sense of the ground?
Dr. Dillingham. The opinion varies, but--but, the majority
of people that we've talked to are very concerned that their
tower will be closed, and that we're not--we're not at the
point where remote operations are as safe--or appear to be as
safe as if you had that vision on the ground. Because the
weather can be one way at that airport, but if you're a long
ways away and you don't have the appropriate weather equipment,
you won't be able to advise the pilot, and it--the situation is
reduced, as such.
Senator Blunt. But, I think we also--you're looking to
figure out, on commercial aviation, how you can have another
tower handling takeoffs and landings in a commercial site that
you would--the tower would be closed in. Is that right, Mr.
Huerta?
Mr. Huerta. You would use what's called the TRACON,
Terminal Radar Approach Control. There are three levels of
facilities: the tower on the airport, the TRACON, which
provides approach control, and a center which provides high
altitude traffic separation. And the TRACON would control
traffic approaching a non-towered airport.
Senator Blunt. And what you wouldn't have there would be
the visual sense of the field. But, with some safe--some
standards--and what I want to be sure we do here is, if some of
these airports continue to have commercial travel----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Blunt.--that don't have a tower, I want that to be
as safe as it can possibly be, but I don't want us to lead
people to believe that it's less safe than it is by saying a
tower would be better but we could do it another way.
Mr. Huerta. We're not doing anything that is not safe, but
what it does change is how the airport operates. In general,
what it means is that there is greater separation between
flights that are operating in a non-towered environment in
order to provide a safe operation, but, as I said, it is less
efficient.
Senator Blunt. And my last question would be, You will
direct your staff to get the tower safety reports to me and
anybody else who has asked for them as quickly as you can?
Mr. Huerta. We will provide you a response for the record.
Senator Blunt. OK, thank you.
The Chairman. You got your yes.
Senator Blunt. I usually stop at ``yes.''
The Chairman. Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Huerta, I truly appreciate your willingness
to become FAA Administrator.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cantwell. And it would have been enough of a
commitment to be FAA Administrator under the implementation of
NextGen. That, in and of itself, would have been a herculean
task. To take on this task in the midst of sequestration, in
addition, is just another twist and turn. And you have gained a
reputation in this town for being a straight shooter. My
interactions with you, you've always been very information-
rich. And so, I was hoping I could follow on with what some of
my colleagues were talking about, at least in this first round,
about this tower issue. Because----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Cantwell.--first of all, the Department of
Transportation, with so many protected programs, it seems to me
that the FAA is getting a disproportionate share of the impact.
Is that a accurate assessment?
Mr. Huerta. That is correct. The way the sequester law is
written, it exempts about three-quarters of the budget of the
Department of Transportation; essentially, all the grant
programs, which are primarily the Federal Highway
Administration, Federal Transit Administration. It also exempts
our airport improvement program, which is about $3.35 billion.
Therefore, the impact does fall disproportionately on the
operating parts of DOT, and notably the FAA.
Senator Cantwell. And unlike, you know, some of the floor
activity, we had to do more surgical approaches with various
aspects of the budget. The Moran amendment, which might have
helped in this area, wasn't brought up. So, you've been having
to deal with this in a very blunt way. And so, I have a couple
of questions about that.
On this tower issue, I think I've mentioned both to you--
and I did in my statement, earlier--about both Paine Field, in
the middle of a big commercial aviation manufacturer, and Felts
Field, in Spokane, which is in the same proximity of the
Spokane Airport, and Fairchild Air Force Base. So, they may
have gotten beat out by some California cities in suing the
Federal Government over proposed closures, but they are going
to be close behind or join that case, because they feel very
strongly about this. You and I have had a chance to talk about
this issue as it relates to your analysis. But, I have a
question: prior to the agency's decision, and then revoking it
and then saying it'll be implemented in June, was it the FAA's
intention to remove the equipment from these towers?
Mr. Huerta. No. We're working through all of those
decisions on a case-by-case basis. In some instances, local
airports and sponsors have asked if they could retain
equipment. In some instances, there is an interrelationship
between, for example, communications equipment in the tower and
how it relates to the communication equipment at the airport.
So, we're working through those with individual airport
sponsors.
Senator Cantwell. Well, wouldn't that be very devastating,
to have this equipment removed? Because then if either the
sequester issue was resolved or a community response was
activated, how would you deal with this loss of equipment? So,
I think we need a clear answer----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Cantwell.--about equipment, as well. We hope the
answer is that the equipment stays.
Mr. Huerta. For the most part, the equipment stays. But,
there are certain limited circumstances where we might come to
a different conclusion, and we can talk about those specific
facilities.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think, as my colleagues have
mentioned, this is a very important issue. When a community of
a significant size says they're going to sue over this issue, I
take it very seriously.
And I hope that, Mr. Chairman, we can resolve this issue,
either on the floor or some instance, because I think--while
the public understands tightening of the belt, I don't know
that they understand that the FAA, within the Department of
Transportation, is taking a very direct hit on this. And I
think that it has various communities in my State concerned
about it.
Mr. Guzzetti mentioned that part of the safety culture and
regime that we have to establish is implementing the mandates
of Congress. And so, obviously, we did, in a major piece of
safety legislation, ask for various rules on qualification of
pilots and training and mentoring and database issues and, you
know, a whole sort of other things. Mr. Dillingham mentioned
this issue of runway incursions and getting the right data.
So, is the sequestration going to impact us getting those
rules?
Mr. Huerta. Well, the rules have different schedules. I was
already asked about the issue of pilot qualifications, and I
said that we would make the August deadline, and we will.
Another rule that is an extremely high priority for us is
the rule related to crewmember training. You'll recall, at my
confirmation hearing last year, I committed to completing that
rule by October of this year. We are on track, and we will
complete that rule by October of this year.
Senator Cantwell. Will the sequestration affect any of the
rulemaking?
Mr. Huerta. In other rulemakings, I would expect to see
delays. But it depends on the availability of hours I have for
people in the rulemaking office and across the agency to do the
needed work in a timely fashion. If I have fewer hours
available to me, it does affect the full scope of everything
the FAA does.
Senator Cantwell. Well, as Mr. Guzzetti said, it's
important to get these mandates fulfilled.
So, anyway, Mr. Chairman, I think we need to keep looking
at this issue. I know my time is expired, but it's important to
understand what isn't going to get done during sequestration as
these important rules that we mandated--we want to see them
implemented.
I didn't even mention the cargo, you know, issue. You know,
we've implemented rules, but people who are flying in our skies
want to know that those who are flying cargo planes also meet
the same kind of standards as other pilots for fatigue and
operation.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Huerta, I wanted to ask you again, also--I
know you've been asked about the tower closure issue, but
there's something that I'm trying--I'm struggling with, in
terms of your criteria of which towers were closed. And let me
give you an example, in my own state:
Warfield, in Nashua, New Hampshire, that tower was slated
for closure; now it has been extended to June.
Mr. Huerta. Correct.
Senator Ayotte. We also have an airport, in Lebanon, New
Hampshire, that has a contract tower--is operated in a contract
tower. And it is my understanding that Lebanon has less traffic
operations than Nashua. Can you explain to me why one, and not
the other, and what--how you distinguish between certain
towers, why one was closed and why was--why one wasn't?
I will also add, just as a sort of overlay to all this,
Lebanon happens to be an airport that receives about 2.3
million in essential air subsidies every year, despite being
only 67 or--76 miles, so about an hour and 10 minutes away from
our much more--larger airport, the Manchester Regional--Boston
Regional Airport, in Manchester, New Hampshire. And so, can you
help me understand, What's the distinction? Why close Nashua's
tower? I certainly don't want you to close Lebanon's, too, but
it seems a little arbitrary to me.
Mr. Huerta. We have two categories of contract towers. We
have the Federal Contract Tower Program and then we have the
Federal Cost Share Contract Tower Program. If Lebanon is in the
Federal Cost Share Contract Tower Program, they have funding
that extends through the Fiscal Year, and we would need to make
a decision at that point. I will need to get back to you as to
whether Lebanon falls into that category.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Nashua, NH FAA Contract Tower (FCT) was identified for
defunding since it did not have 150K total operations or 10K commercial
operations in FY2012. The Lebanon, NH FCT was not considered since it
had more than 10K commercial operations in FY2012. DOD/DHS identified
no impacts associated with the defunding of this FCT. Neither of these
FCTs are part of the Cost Share program.
Mr. Huerta. With respect to Nashua, though, like all the
other 148 contract towers, it was a tower that fell below the
150,000 annual operations and 10,000 commercial operations.
Senator Ayotte. Do you have operations that fall below the
standard that you just identified that are not contract towers,
but actually run the--controlling is done by FAA employees?
Mr. Huerta. We do.
Senator Ayotte. So, in fact, I think, the initial list
proposed for closure would have had about 238 towers, under
that standard. Is that right?
Mr. Huerta. That would be correct.
Senator Ayotte. So, why was the decision made to close all
the contracting towers, versus the towers that had the FAA
employees that perhaps could have gone on to do other work?
Mr. Huerta. It's a question of timing. We would treat all
towers having similar operations the same way. The contract
towers enable us to achieve savings because of the contractual
nature in the current fiscal year. It takes longer to close an
FAA-staffed tower.
Senator Ayotte. How much does it cost to run--do the--in
terms of the FAA-employed tower versus the contract tower, what
is more expensive, in terms of operations?
Mr. Huerta. I think, in general, they are comparable, but
they depend on how the facility is specifically staffed. Every
tower is staffed with positions up--set up differently.
Senator Ayotte. OK. I would ask, for the record, for a more
detailed analysis of what the----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Ayotte.--cost differential is between those.
[The information referred to follows:]
The DOT Inspector General stated in a November 2012 Report (AV-
2013-009) that the average contract tower costs about $1.5 million less
to operate than a comparable FAA tower.
Senator Ayotte. And is--was Essential Air Services exempted
from the sequestration?
Mr. Huerta. We don't administer Essential Air Services at
the FAA.
Senator Ayotte. So, DOT administers it?
Mr. Huerta. DOT administers it. It's in the FAA's budget,
but it's administered by the Department.
Senator Ayotte. So, you don't know whether or not that was
exempt from sequestration?
Mr. Huerta. I do not.
Senator Ayotte. OK. I would appreciate an answer to that,
because there is over--of course, as I understand it, in
looking how much is in Essential Air Services, that's a pretty
substantial amount of funding on an annual basis, particularly
when we're looking at--in fact, we're $218 million on the
books, to serve 117 communities for Essential Air Services, and
yet we're looking for $45 million to $50 million to keep the
contract towers open, isn't that right?
Mr. Huerta. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. OK. Appreciate your getting back to me on
that. And also, the answer on why Lebanon versus----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Ayotte.--Nashua, and the cost differential.
Do you expect that we'll have to pay damages in the suits--
the lawsuits from these communities?
Mr. Huerta. I can't really comment on the outcome of
pending litigation.
Senator Ayotte. And if, hypothetically, we were to pay
damages for breach of contract under these communities, it
could potentially cost us more than the closures, depending on
the level of the damages.
Mr. Huerta. As I said, I can't really comment on pending
litigation.
Senator Ayotte. OK. Well, I appreciate your being here
today, and I look forward to the follow-up answers.
And thank you all for being here.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. We, of course, are trying to get results,
Mr. Administrator. Would you consider cost-sharing with the
local governments on these contract towers?
Mr. Huerta. Senator Nelson, about 50 communities have made
proposals to pick up the costs associated with the Contract
Tower Program. In discussions with those communities, we're
willing to look at whatever proposal a community wants to make.
Senator Nelson. But, your problem is one of dollars.
Mr. Huerta. My problem is one of dollars. In the----
Senator Nelson. Just don't have the dollars.
Mr. Huerta.--current fiscal environment, I have to find the
same amount of savings.
Senator Nelson. So, the proposals that you have in front of
you on cost sharing, you have not rejected.
Mr. Huerta. The proposals that have been made, for the most
part, are to pick up the cost of the operating tower, as
opposed to a cost-share scenario. The local communities have
asked if we would be willing to negotiate an orderly transition
so that there wouldn't be a gap in service. They asked if they
could somehow put together a proposal that would enable them to
secure local funding, would we arrange a handoff that would
ensure no interruption in air traffic control services? Those
discussions had a lot to do with our decision to delay closure
until June 15 to allow ample opportunity for communities to
consider options such as those.
Senator Nelson. By you delaying until June, are you still
going to be able to save the money that you have to under the
sequester?
Mr. Huerta. It does reduce our savings by about $8 million.
Senator Nelson. As you well know, there are airports and
then there are airports. And some of these airports come from a
wealthy community with a fairly sizable tax base, and then
others do not. Is that something that you would consider with
regard to cost sharing?
Mr. Huerta. We will consider what a community puts forward,
but it comes back to the question of the total number of
savings that I need to achieve. I think that the other thing we
have to consider is treating communities equitably as we look
at the full scope of impacts resulting from sequester.
Senator Nelson. Well, you don't give me a lot to report
back to my 14 airports. They are very grateful, by the way,
that some of them that were going to be closed in April are not
going to be closed until June. And so, we'll continue to work
on this. And unfortunately, I think most of us think that this
sequester's not going to go away until the new fiscal year, so
we are facing a problem--as we would say in Florida, ``a
problema.''
Madam Chairman, I want to ask you--you've got a pilot study
going on, at the Orlando Airport, on runway status lights so
that if, suddenly, an airplane gets onto an active runway that
also has an inbound flight, that the lights change color. It's
to alert the inbound aircraft. Has this proved to be a useful
tool for pilots?
Ms. Hersman. The NTSB has made runway safety and surface
operations a priority. It's on our most-wanted list. But, the
specific study you have mentioned is being handled by the FAA.
We do think runway status lights can help prevent runway
incursions. And I'll defer to the Administrator to address it.
Senator Nelson. OK. Well, while you're still talking, let
me just ask you, Since you're the head of safety, what do you
think about the closure of the contract towers?
Ms. Hersman. The FAA is faced with many difficult
decisions, as all of us are, as our budgets are impacted. The
NTSB has not looked at the safety of towered versus non-towered
airports, specifically.
But, the reason we enjoy such a good safety record in
aviation is because of the redundancies, the multiple layers of
safety. One of the things that we do know is, when you
eliminate those layers, you can introduce risk into the
environment. We have investigated accidents that occurred with
commercial service at non-towered airports. There are safety
benefits in the aviation system, and those redundancies are
important.
Senator Nelson. Runway status lights?
Mr. Huerta. Senator Nelson, yes, runway status lights do
show great promise. We have a number of studies around the
country. It is a difficult program to implement, because they
have to be carefully sequenced with construction programs at
the airport. As the Chairman mentioned, runway incursions are
an area of high priority, not just for the NTSB, but also for
the FAA. We have a number of technologies that we're testing.
They do show great promise for reducing runway incursions.
The Chairman. Senator Pryor.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
your leadership and concern about these issues.
I want to thank our panel for being here today. I know that
you've been asked quite a bit about the contract tower program,
but let me follow up just a couple of questions there.
What--and if this has been asked already, I apologize, Mr.
Huerta--but, what communication is the FAA currently having
with the contract towers selected for closing? Are you talking
to them at all?
Mr. Huerta. We've had a lot of discussions when we made the
initial announcement, and we've had individual discussions with
specific communities about how they would like to move forward.
A number of communities--around 50 or so--have spoken with us
very directly about our willingness to work with them on a
handoff of responsibility for funding. That is something that
we've been taking quite seriously, because if a community does
want to step up and cover the cost of funding their tower, we
very much want to work with them in that regard.
Senator Pryor. OK. But, have you talked to all the
communities that have been impacted?
Mr. Huerta. Well, we've had a number of conference calls
with the association that represents all the contract towers,
and we have provided regular communication to all the
communities.
Senator Pryor. All right. Let me ask about your criteria
and the things you consider when you do this. We have one
example in Arkansas, Texarkana, Arkansas, which straddles the
line between Texas and Arkansas. And that airport has a limited
line of sight. And did you all take that into consideration
when you made the decision about how important the tower is to
that particular airport?
Mr. Huerta. In addition to the criteria mentioned, such as
the number of operations, number of commercial operations, how
they serve or benefit an adjacent hub airport, how they might
relate in serving broader interstate objectives, we are looking
at the facility itself. How it actually operates within the
framework of overall day-to-day operations.
It is important to point out that every one of these
towers, except one, is closed for a significant portion of
every day. So, they have existing rules of how to operate in a
non-towered capacity. Therefore, when they convert to 24-hour
non-towered operations, they simply revert to those established
rules.
Yes, it does have impacts on efficiency, as I've talked
about, but there are close to 5,000 public-use airports in the
country that operate every day in a non-towered capacity. The
important thing is making sure that you have the procedures in
place to operate in a safe fashion.
Senator Pryor. OK. Well, you mentioned one of the factors
you considered was whether they have commercial flights, et
cetera.
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Pryor. This particular airport, in Texarkana, also
handles 5,000 military transits a year. You didn't mention the
military in your statement. And this runway 04 has the only ILS
back-course approach within range of several military training
bases. So, did you take military usage of the Texarkana Airport
into account?
Mr. Huerta. We consulted with the Defense Department, and
we did accept every one of the priority contract towers that
they felt needed to be kept open.
Senator Pryor. OK. We have a similar situation at the
Fayetteville, Arkansas, Airport. The Little Rock Air Force Base
is, I don't know, 150 or so nautical miles from there, and the
Little Rock Air Force Base is a C-130 training base. They like
to land in Fayetteville, because it's a little more urban; it's
in a hillier, mountainous environment, and it does have a
shorter runway. So, did you consult with the Air Force before
you made that decision, on Fayetteville?
Mr. Huerta. We consulted with the Air Force to identify
their priority towers, nationwide, and we accepted every one
that they identified.
Senator Pryor. OK. Have you shared the criteria that you've
used with the airports? And the reason I ask is because the
City of Fayetteville has told me that they've been unable to
get your criteria that you used. And, in fact, they've
indicated that you really haven't shared much information with
them at all.
Mr. Huerta. 150,000 flight operations, 10,000 commercial
operations, that's the first cut; below that threshold. Second,
do they serve a function that supports a large hub airport.
Third, are there national security or national defense
considerations that we determined, in consultation with the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security,
should be considered. One thing that we did not consider is
impact on a local community. We did look at impacts that exist
far beyond a local community.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
And now, Senator McCaskill----
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And--
--
The Chairman.--who has returned----
Senator McCaskill. Beg your pardon?
The Chairman.--from a conversation, giving advice to the
White House. Am I right? I'm impressed.
Senator McCaskill. No. I was not----
The Chairman. No?
Senator McCaskill.--giving advice to the White House. I
was----
The Chairman. I thought you----
Senator McCaskill. I was yelling at someone.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. OK. Well, that's the same thing.
[Laughter.]
Senator McCaskill. And I came back to yell at poor Mr.
Huerta, now.
[Laughter.]
Senator McCaskill. I just got warmed up.
First, thank you all for being here. I appreciate it very
much.
I have a thing about rules in the government, and that is,
they only work if they're respected. And if the rationale for a
rule is specious or arbitrary, it not only is frustrating for
people who are impacted by the rule, it undermines every other
rule that is promulgated by the government.
Which brings me to the rule on personal electronic devices
on airplanes. It appears to me to not be grounded in any kind
of data or evidence whatsoever. And so, I would first ask you,
Mr. Huerta--I have searched, I have asked, I have interviewed
many, many experts. My staff has. Is there some scientific data
that is hiding from my staff that would indicate a Kindle being
on during takeoff could have any possibility whatsoever of
interfering with the electronics of an airplane?
Mr. Huerta. The question has more to do with--first of all,
let me back up.
This is a matter that is of great personal interest to me.
One of the things that I have asked our staff for, through an
aviation rulemaking committee, is to look into the nature of
these rules. Are there things that we could do to change them
in the future?
The rules that currently govern the use of portable
electronic devices have been around, as you mentioned, for a
very long time. The current rulemaking framework is set up such
that any airline can conduct tests to determine that there is
no interference. If that is determined, then they would be free
to adopt a program for portable electronic----
Senator McCaskill. And I'm----
Mr. Huerta.--devices.
Senator McCaskill.--aware of all that. It's, as you know,
very impractical, for each individual airline to take on the
cost of testing each individual instrument and making some
certification to you on each individual interest--instrument by
each individual airline.
Let me ask it this way. Is the rule supposed to apply to
general aviation?
Mr. Huerta. That's a good question. The rule, as it's
currently designed, focuses on commercial aviation. I don't
know. I'll have to get back to you with that.
[The information referred to follows:]
Regulations for PED use apply to general aviation (see part 14 CFR
Sec. 91.21) with one major difference. In general aviation, the
operator of the aircraft (who is also the pilot) can allow PED use if
the pilot has determined that it will not interfere with the
communication and navigation systems on the aircraft. For all other
operations, the airline (part 119 certificate holder, termed ``the
operator'') must make this determination. In general aviation, the
pilot is concerned with the individual aircraft. Responsibility for the
control of PED use as well as any impact the PED may have is placed on
the pilot. In an airline, the air carrier must take responsibility
because the public is placing its trust in the airline to ensure
passenger safety during flight.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I will tell you that it is not
followed in general aviation. People are not told to turn off
their electronic devices. Because everyone who flies those
airplanes knows that they're not a risk.
Let me tell you this story. This happened many, many times
as I was on a lot of airplanes, the last 2 years. A woman who
clearly was flying for the first time. We were going out to the
runway, and almost tearfully, she grabbed the flight attendant
as she went by and said, ``Oh, my God, I have left my cell
phone on, and it's in the overhead.'' She was very upset. And
the flight attendant, of course, said what I've heard flight
attendants say a million times, ``Don't worry about it. Stay
seated and in your seatbelt.'' Right? So, she knew that phone
was on, up in the overhead, and we were taking off. She was
crying in her seat, because she was sure she was going to bring
down that airplane.
And, as you well know, there are dozens of people that
inadvertently leave their phones on during takeoff and landing,
or leave on something else during takeoff and landing. The
pilots are using iPads right now. These electromagnetic signals
do not stack. There's not any difference, scientifically,
between one iPad in the cockpit and 400 in the airplane. And
your people are still telling us that, even if the ARC makes a
rule recommendation, that they're still going to recommend
``not during takeoff and landing,'' even if it's just for a few
minutes.
In your rule, you actually say that it's about distraction
and missing significant safety announcements and personal
injury. I've never had a flight attendant say, ``Put down your
copy of `War and Peace,' '' which would be a much bigger
personal injury and just as much of a distraction as reading
`War and Peace' on a Kindle, except a Kindle would be a lot
safer.
So, this is a great example of a rule that really is
arbitrary, at this point, and I am anxious for someone to
document to me why there is any reason that the flying public
should be made to be feel insecure about someone next to them
who hasn't turned it off quickly enough. I don't think you
realize the tension that's on an airplane around this. I mean,
the flight attendants get tense. The people who don't turn them
off--somebody sitting next to you, they haven't turned them
off, they get worried; they think they're going to crash.
I just feel really strongly that this is a great example of
a rule that needs to go away. And so, I would ask you if there
is scientific data that is going to support continuing this
rule in any way beyond the ARC's recommendation, which I
understand is going to come in July. And, by the way, I would
like you to make that process open. They're closed now. There's
no reason. Their consideration should not be closed; they
should be open. If we're not going to be able to have a new
rule by Christmas, I would really like something in writing
from you on the record as to what the problem would be around
that.
Mr. Huerta. Certainly. As you said, the ARC will complete
its rule during the summer. The reason that we convened the
rulemaking committee was to look at precisely the question that
you're talking about. The ARC is made up of all of the
interests, not just those that are in support, but also those
that have operational concerns about how any changes would be
implemented. And I'm very much looking forward to the findings,
and we will act on them.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Portable Electronic Device Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PED
ARC), which was convened to review current policies and procedures, is
completing its review and will submit its recommendations to the FAA by
July 31, 2013.
The major impediment to allowing unlimited use of PEDs in flight by
December 2013, if this is an ARC recommendation, is that all existing
technical guidance for demonstrating acceptable use of portable
electronic devices in flight (i.e., non-interference with key systems)
requires aircraft operators to perform aircraft tests and evaluations.
This guidance, prepared by technical committees of experts from
aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and avionics manufacturers, requires
detailed airplane tests and evaluations to ensure safety of the
operation. Most airlines, with a number of different airplane models in
their fleets, would have difficulty completing these tests and
evaluations to allow unlimited use of PEDs for the entire flight,
including take-off and landing, by December 2013. We would expect ARC
recommendations for streamlined testing and analysis of critical
aircraft systems that can be done by the airline, to allow expanded use
of PEDs.
Senator McCaskill. And when you look into the GA question
that I asked, if you would also look into whether or not there
is an announcement made on Air Force One that all devices must
be turned off.
Mr. Huerta. Certainly.
[The information referred to follows:]
Air Force One is owned and operated by the Department of Defense
(DOD). DOD has authority to approve its own operations.
Senator McCaskill. Because if it's safe enough for the
President of the United States, it's safe enough for the flying
public.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator McCaskill, I don't care what the
White House said to you or you said to them. This has been a
treasured 5 minutes.
[Laughter.]
Senator McCaskill. He's a good guy. He's working hard, but
I want that rule changed.
The Chairman. You--more than any human being on the face of
the Earth, you want this rule changed.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. And I think she may have a point. I don't
know anything about it, but I'd like to ask Chairwoman Hersman:
We're terrific at putting in rules and regulations and just
leaving them, because they're sort of the safe thing to do when
you start out. I have heard the same thing, that pilots are
using iPhones, or whatever--iPads--in the aviation cockpit.
I've heard people who argue, exactly like she does, and I sort
of return to my, ``Oh, no, this is what we do in aviation.''
And Senator McCaskill is sort of moving me on this subject. And
I think it's good that she is, because it drastically affects
so many people.
Now, you could say, ``Well, what if everybody was using it?
Would that make a difference?'' And I don't know the answer to
that. But, I think it's a fair question.
Excuse me, Senator Coats, I interrupted your turn.
I think it's a fair question. I think she deserves an
answer.
And, Chairwoman Hersman, I think, to the extent that you
have views on this, I'd like to know what they are. Because if
it sounds like a safety rule--I don't need to know now, because
I've interrupted Senator Coats--but, we do have a practice of
making rules and regulations, and sort of sticking by them. No
matter if the technology or the facts, or human nature,
whatever it is, takes us to quite another place. I think it's a
fair question to raise, would have tremendous significance to
an awful lot of people. And if there is any danger in it, I
don't think she would want to touch it--Senator McCaskill--any
more than I would. But, if it allows people to get a lot more
work done or a lot more accomplished in their own trip, then I
think it's worth taking a look.
Let me just ask you--and, again, I apologize to the good
Senator--is there a way to find out, conclusively, if it
interferes with flight? The process, the carrying out of
flight? Does that exist?
Either one.
Ms. Hersman. In our accident or incident investigations, we
have never identified a personal electronic device in the cabin
affecting the safety of flight. But, we have identified
situations where the cockpit crew have been distracted by their
devices. In fact, we just had a----
The Chairman. Well, that's like distracting the pilot.
Ms. Hersman.--helicopter EMS accident, where we had a
texting helicopter pilot.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ms. Hersman. We have identified portable electronic
devices, in the cockpit, being a distraction, but have not
identified safety issues with their use in the cabin.
The Chairman. But, there's a huge difference there, because
the pilot's flying an airplane.
Mr. Huerta. He's flying the plane.
Ms. Hersman. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Senator----
Ms. Hersman. Absolutely.
The Chairman. OK.
Well, I'd like to pursue it, but I can't, because Senator
Coats is a very dear friend of mine, and he has a chance to be
heard.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Coats. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd be--this is an interesting topic, and I'd be willing to
yield some of my time if you want to consume more.
But, I am--I'm anxious to hear what the results of the
study are, because I have--you know, we now have to carry two
electronic devices, one for official use and one for personal
use. And several times, I've found my--one of them in my
briefcase, still turned on, when I'm on an airplane. I had--I
didn't break into tears, but I was a little concerned that
maybe I was interfering with somebody's communications.
It's comforting to hear that there are no incidences of
interference from the passengers, but--whether it's us texting
when we drive or pilots texting while they're flying, that is a
concern. Now I've got to worry, not only about the person in
front of me shutting off their device, and me shutting off my
device, I have to worry about the pilot shutting off his
device. So, hopefully you can get us that answer, sooner rather
than later.
I want to ask you a question, Administrator Huerta. First
of all, let me commend the FAA, the way you handled the process
in reconsidering the exemption for cargo carriers for pilot
flight time, duty, and rest regulations. I guess--it's my
understanding there was some errors that may have been made in
developing the cost-benefit justification, but the FAA did do
the right thing, and did its due diligence to make sure that it
got it right. So, I think we commend you for that, taking that
action.
But, along those lines, as you know, the pilot training
regulations passed in the 2010 legislation--and some executive
orders were issued by the President--both President Clinton and
President Obama--clarifying that the agency specifically must
adopt a regulation--I'm quoting now--``only upon a reasoned
determination that its benefits justify the costs.''
So, my question is this. Has FAA conducted that study on
increased pilot training and experience requirements? And, if
so, what did you learn?
Mr. Huerta. That is still an ongoing rulemaking. Part of
the work that we do, with every rule, is the development of a
cost-benefit analysis. That is work that we've had underway for
a while.
It is our expectation--and I've committed to this--that we
will complete that rule by October of this year, and make it
available for everyone to see at that time.
Senator Coats. OK, thank you.
Talk to me a little bit about the relationship, in hiring
pilots, between flight hours and proficiency. Is there
flexibility there? I mean, it a--just a hard line, in terms of,
``You're going to fly this kind of plane, you've got to have
this many hours, no matter how proficient you might have been
in the testing, in the procedures, in the knowledge, et
cetera''?
Mr. Huerta. That is also the subject of an ongoing
rulemaking. Congress called upon us to develop a new pilot
qualification rule by August of this year. The provisions of
law under which that rule is developed become self-executing on
August 1. Unless we promulgate a rule, then 1,500 hours becomes
the required number of flight hours of experience that a pilot
has to have to pilot a commercial aircraft.
Now, the rule that we are currently looking at considers
things such as military experience, that can count toward
meeting of the hours requirement. And that rule will be
completed before August 1.
Senator Coats. And would you concede, though, that it's
possible that--two candidates; one could have 1,500 hours and
really not be proficient, and another could have 1,200 hours
and be very proficient. How do you adjust for that kind of
thing, particularly at a time when some people are saying we
may have shortage in hiring qualified pilots?
Mr. Huerta. That is certainly a possibility, but becoming a
pilot requires more than just experience. That's where the
training becomes important, that's where the rules that we've
promulgated relating to flight duty and rest become important.
How does--all--how does an individual conduct themselves in all
aspects of carrying out their job, to ensure that they're
proficient and are maintaining the highest levels of safety?
Senator Coats. But, the 1,500 is a bottom--minimal
requirement, regardless----
Mr. Huerta. It's----
Senator Coats.--of how that person has performed in every
other category.
Mr. Huerta. As the law was passed by Congress, unless we
complete our rulemaking and that rulemaking provides for things
that can serve as credit against the 1,500 hours, then, on
August 1, 1,500 hours becomes self-executing.
Senator Coats. I see. So, that's possible, that your
rulemaking would allow some flexibility for that.
Mr. Huerta. That is correct.
Senator Coats. Thank you.
Time's expired, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coats.
Senator Thune has a question.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to wrap up here, pretty quickly, but first want
to drill down on a couple of these budget questions.
I also want to say to the Senator from Missouri's proposal,
that I will lend bipartisan support to her request that we
revisit this issue of banning the use of hand-held devices on
airplanes.
And, at a minimum, I was telling you, Mr. Chairman, that,
in my part of the country, we de-ice a lot, and, when the door
closes, even if you're going to the de-icing pad, they tell you
that you have to shut these devices down. And it just seems
like that these ``rules for rules' sake'' sometimes really go
beyond what's even practical, let alone safe.
So, let me, if I might, just ask the question. Mr.
Administrator, I mentioned, earlier in a question about the
transfer authority that you have, allowing for 2 percent
transfers between activities. That does not require advance
permission----
Mr. Huerta. That's correct.
Senator Thune.--correct? OK. So, in the rest of this year,
fiscal 2013 and FY-2014, would you utilize that 2 percent
transfer authority to protect airspace users from furloughs and
tower closures?
Mr. Huerta. That doesn't provide for enough resources to
protect us from furloughs and tower closures.
Senator Thune. In addition to that 2 percent transfer
authority, would you request permission to reprogram funding to
protect airspace users from tower closures and furloughs, as
soon as possible? That's also something that you can ask for.
Mr. Huerta. We can ask the Appropriations Committee for
reprogramming authority. That also would not get us there
completely.
Senator Thune. OK. You have, in your budget within the
operations account $179 million for travel, $134 million for
supplies, and $541 million for consultants. And I guess my
question is, since those two things don't get you there, are
these areas in which you would be willing to find some savings
to offset the sequester cuts so that the towers don't have to
close?
Mr. Huerta. We've reduced travel by 30 percent by
eliminating all but operational travel. For example, a radar
technician needing to travel to a site to repair a radar that
might go out, or travel associated with an aviation inspector
needing to inspect a manufacturer of avionics or some other
aviation equipment would be the type of travel that is
permitted.
The $500 million that you talk about with respect to
consultant contracts, that is a budgetary category that takes
account of everything which is a non-construction contract. The
largest single contract in that category is the services
contract that I previously mentioned, which is FAA's
telecommunications infrastructure, the communication network
that a private company provides for use at all the FAA
facilities. That accounts for about half of the amount.
The next largest contract is for the services for flight
service stations. Those are services that are provided to
pilots.
The third largest contract is for the contract towers that
have generated so much concern. Of the amount you mentioned,
that is actually what you would call ``traditional consultant
services,'' is around $20 million. And yes, we have gotten rid
of the vast majority of that.
Senator Thune. Well, as you know, there's a bill up here
that's got substantial bipartisan support--I think, 29
bipartisan cosponsors on that particular issue. And it seems,
to me at least, when you look at the FAA budget, and you break
it down, and you look at the personnel accounts, which is about
70 percent, you still have about 30 percent of your budget that
is in these other categories. And I certainly would hope that
you would give careful scrutiny and scrub those areas of the
budget to see what might be done to prevent something from
happening that many people up here certainly are concerned
about, as well as people all across the country.
So, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cantwell.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Administrator Huerta, could we add to this list, too,
What is the impact on NextGen implementation from
sequestration? If you have a general idea, you can tell me
now--if you want to get back to us--but, what will the impact
on that be?
Mr. Huerta. I'll provide you a general sense of what we're
seeing this year, and then, for the record, provide a more
detailed response.
[The information referred to follows:]
President Obama has proposed a workable solution to our Nation's
budget challenge and the FAA's 2014 budget request of $15.6 billion is
part of that. This budget request supports our critical safety
programs, modernizes our aviation infrastructure, and strikes a balance
between maintaining current infrastructure while deploying key NextGen
programs to support the growth and changes in aviation. It does all
this at funding levels that are $351 million lower than FY 2012. This
is a 2.2 percent decrease, which is part of the President's effort to
reduce the deficit.
If the President's Budget is not adopted, FAA will have to consider
all of the severe cost-saving measures debated this year, including
employee furloughs, which in turn could have an impact on the
development and implementation of NextGen. In addition, given the
limited number of days employees can be furloughed, reductions in force
will also be considered for all segments of FAA's workforce.
Mr. Huerta. Within the current year, the principal impact
we will see is related to the need to bring operational
personnel back to their home facilities to work on day-to-day
operations. What that means is that we're pulling individuals
off of what we call collaborative workgroups. These are
workgroups that we set up with FAA employees to work with
contractors and to work with our engineering and planning
staffs that are deploying NextGen. Their job is to actually
work through the details of how is the system going to handle
live traffic.
This is an extremely important aspect of what we do. In the
past, the agency hadn't done as much of this. That has gotten
the FAA into trouble on large programs. For example, a few
years ago, there was a program called DRAM, which is the
modernization of our en route platform. Once we adopted these
collaborative workgroups, we found that we had a much more
seamless transition to new technology. So, the need to pull
back resources and personnel from these activities will delay
the implementation of some of these new technologies.
Senator Cantwell. Aren't----
Mr. Huerta. We're viewing that----
Senator Cantwell. Aren't there some competitiveness issues
with us getting NextGen implemented?
Mr. Huerta. Well, where it affects us right now is in our
program called the Optimization of Airspace Procedures. That's
the deployment of performance-based navigation that has the
ability to reduce fuel burn, reduce costs, reduce emissions and
noise impacts in local communities. We have a number of these
procedures around the country. You have probably one of the
best known up there in Seattle, an initiative called Greener
Skies.
It does slow down the deployment of those procedures, for
two reasons. One is, we don't have the people that can work
through the operational details so that we're able to deploy
them between now and the end of the fiscal year. The second
reason that developing and maintaining procedures, in and of
itself, is an expenditure: it involves paying for contractors,
for design, for publication and training.
Senator Cantwell. So, I'd love to get more details----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Cantwell.--I mean, a written response, so that we
could share that with our colleagues, about what the impact on
that is.
I'd like to turn--so, what is the--what are the mechanisms
the FAA is going to use to resolve the adverse conditions on
the 787 issue? And how will you--I mean, is that something the
Secretary does as an official final decision, or how do you
decide about ETOP issues, all of that? Could you give us some
idea?
Mr. Huerta. Sure. What Boeing presented to us last month
was a certification plan. The certification plan had several
components to it, but it essentially resulted in a redesign of
the battery systems within the airplane, and a containment
system to provide another layer of safety. We asked for certain
thresholds to be met, in order to maintain the highest levels
of safety. Once the certification plan was approved by us last
month, Boeing embarked on a series of tests that we required,
about 20 distinct tests, to prove that the system would operate
as designed.
Boeing has completed the testing, and has provided a very
extensive set of documents to the FAA. Those documents are
currently under review. That review will result in us making a
final determination as to whether the aircraft can return to
flight.
Coincident with that review was a review where we went back
and looked at our original determination relating to ETOPS
flight. The question there is, when the airplane was grounded,
it was certified for ETOPS of 180 minutes. So, the question for
us was, Would we return it to service at that level? That
review is a concurrent review that is ongoing. When we make our
final determination with respect to return to flight, we will
also address that question.
Senator Cantwell. So, is this something the Secretary
decides, or the FAA decides, or----
Mr. Huerta. This is a determination and a recommendation
that's made by all technical experts. It was my decision to
ground the fleet, and I would be the one making the
recommendation, going forward.
Senator Cantwell. I see my time is expired, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Actually, so is mine.
Senator Cantwell. Oh.
The Chairman. The--I've got a cybersecurity thing that I
have to be at. And what you can do, Senator Cantwell, is to
close out this hearing and continue your line of questioning,
because they can't move.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Would you like to do that?
Senator Cantwell. I----
Mr. Huerta. That's fine.
The Chairman. I think you would.
[Laughter.]
Senator Cantwell. Well, there are many issues, Mr.
Chairman, that we could continue to go over, but--I've asked my
questions for today, but--I don't know whether the Ranking
Member wants to stay. And I'm happy to stay, if that's the----
The Chairman. Oh, my schedule just changed.
Senator Cantwell.--if that's----
The Chairman. So, you go right ahead.
Senator Cantwell. And continue and ask questions, Mr.
Chairman? Or----
The Chairman. Probably not. I mean, I--you don't want to
get me started on general aviation, do you? But, you go ahead.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Well, the only other question I had was for Mr. Dillingham
about the process for--with composites. We were very involved
with composite manufacturing and getting the FAA Center of
Excellence established, which was a program to help
collaboration between research institutions, the FAA, and
manufacturers identify issues. And I think you did a report, on
that certification process, in which you think that that worked
well. Is that----
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, that's what----
Senator Cantwell.--the model for what we should be doing?
Is that what----
Dr. Dillingham. We looked in depth at the certification of
the composite aspect of the Dreamliner 787. And, in all cases,
we found that FAA did an excellent job. It could be a model
for, you know, future situations, such as Attlee does. Clearly,
composites are going to be an ever-increasing part of aviation
manufacture, as it has been for decades now; it will continue
to grow.
Senator Cantwell. And, Mr. Secretary, in all the balancing
of these issues--NextGen, the towers, sequestrations, battery
issues, all of that--how do you prioritize these rulemakings
that Mr. Guzzetti was talking about being so essential? Do you
prioritize them in a ranking?
Mr. Chairman, having oversight of the Coast Guard Committee
for a while, and then being challenged with the implementation
of the--what was then called Deepwater Acquisition program, we
got to a point where so many members had so many interests in
these various priorities--and I could go into this issue of the
helicopter and medical issue.
But, do you prioritize these rulemakings within the agency
so that we can give members some idea of their prioritization?
Mr. Huerta. We go through a regular process of identifying
what the deadlines are for rulemakings, given available
resources. Every rulemaking requires a level of technical
expertise associated with developing and ultimately
promulgating and implementing a rule. Those actions rely on
staff that are available or contractors that are available to
perform the needed cost-benefit analysis that Senator Coats
asked about. It's marrying the technical expertise that we have
with the timetables that have been developed, the complexity of
the rule, and then evaluates the benefit that the rule will
enable us to achieve as a result of its implementation. That's
a regular process that we do go through.
Senator Cantwell. Well, it would be, I think, nice for the
larger aviation community to have a sense of the prioritization
of those rules. I mean, I'm sure some of it can be
simultaneously, but----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Cantwell.--in the context of people being able to
weigh in on that prioritization, so we just have a little more
definition about what's coming next, and when. And I know----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Cantwell.--that you commented today, which was
great, on the actual pilot rules that had to be implemented,
and their timeframe. But, since we just went through this
entire list of things that you're responsible for in a
shrinking budget, I think part of our challenge is to
communicate what--exactly what that means from a timeframe to
our constituents. So----
Mr. Huerta. Sure.
Senator Cantwell.--I would appreciate that.
[The information referred to follows:]
FAA Priority Rules for 2013
1. Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements (Final Rule)--
This rule amends the eligibility and qualification requirement
for pilots engaged in Part 121 air carrier operations and
modifies requirements for an airline transport pilot
certificate (ATP). Addresses requirements of PL 111-216, the
Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension
Act of 2010, which also has a self-enacting provision requiring
ATP that will go into effect August 2, 2013.
2. Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations (Final Rule)--
The rule addresses 13 NTSB recommendations and the causes of
over 150 helicopter air ambulance and commercial helicopter
accidents that occurred between 1991 and 2010 in which over 250
people died. Addresses requirements of FAA Reauthorization.
3. Safety Management Systems (SMS) for Part 121 Certificate Holders
(Final Rule)--This rule would require 14 CFR Part 121
certificate holders to establish a safety management system. It
responds to requirements of PL 111-216, The Airline Safety and
Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010.
Qualifications, Service and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft
Dispatchers--N&O (Final Rule) - This rule will amend training
programs by requiring training in areas that are critical to
safety. Addresses requirements of L 111-216, The Airline Safety
and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010.
4. Small UAS (NPRM)--The notice proposes specific rules for the
operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) in the
National Airspace System (NAS). Currently, public and civil
aircraft (commercial and for hire only) operations must be
approved on a case-by-case basis to operate in the NAS.
Addresses requirements of FAA reauthorization.
5. Drug and Alcohol Testing for Foreign Repair Stations (ANPRM)--This
proposed rule would require controlled substance testing of
some employees working in foreign repair stations. Addresses
requirements of FAA reauthorization.
6. Supercooled Large Droplet Icing Conditions (Final Rule)--This
action addresses safety concerns about the adequacy of icing
certification standards. It would address two NTSB safety
recommendations.
7. Airport SMS (SNPRM)--This proposal would require certain
certificate holders under 14 CFR part 139 to establish a safety
management system (SMS) for its entire airfield environment
(movement and non-movement areas) to improve safety at airports
hosting air carrier operations.
8. Flight Simulation Training Device Qualifications and Standards
(NPRM)--This proposal would modify the flight simulation
training device qualifications requirements to improve
evaluation and testing methods for extended envelope training
tasks. This rulemaking will support the training tasks required
in the training rulemaking.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. All right.
I'm going to defer on general aviation, although I did, in
the briefing, read their statistics, as compared to legacy
aviation, and I was stunned by the difference with respect to
safety deaths, the rest of it.
This was an important hearing. I don't think that we
totally connected, the way I would have liked.
And, Mr. Administrator, I think we really do want to find
out--I'm pretty sure I speak for Senator Thune on this--that--
what sequestration actually does. And what we got was a series
of things, as opposed to a prioritized laundry list of
sacrifices, which, in the end--I mean, in other words, we
could--I come out of this hearing with the feeling we can do
it, we can make it, somehow. And I'm not sure if I'm coming out
with the right feeling, if sequestration sticks around. And--
but, I don't say that to elicit a response; I simply say that
to--it's difficult, on a subject like this, to make it
resonate, and particularly when it affects so many people,
potentially, and it's such a large problem.
But, anyway, we've worked at it, and grinding away is part
of the deal in the U.S. Congress. And we have done that. And I
thank all of you very much.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator from New Jersey
Mr. Chairman, the past few years have been the safest in history
for America's aviation system. Although industry fatality rates are at
all-time lows, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recently
had to address several high profile safety incidents, reminding us that
we must remain vigilant and never let safety take a back seat.
One major threat to aviation safety is sequestration. Because of
the sequester's cuts, the FAA will furlough air traffic controllers and
limit hours or close down service at some towers, including at Newark
Liberty, Atlantic City, and Trenton-Mercer Airports in New Jersey.
These furloughs and closings will harm local communities, affect
working families, and strain a system that already suffers from too
many delays.
The FAA predicts that due to budget cuts, passengers at major
airports-such as Newark Liberty--could experience delays of up to 90
minutes during peak hours. I opposed the bill that created
sequestration because I was concerned about these types of damaging
consequences. And we are now seeing them in every program. Whether from
cuts to Head Start, medical research, or our aviation system,
sequestration is bad for Americans.
While the FAA works to cope with sequestration's cuts, the agency
must also continue its critical safety missions without interruption.
For example, understanding and fixing the lithium ion batteries on
Boeing 787s must be a top priority. We must continue to be thorough in
this investigation and analysis to ensure that this risk is eliminated,
and that in the future we catch these kinds of problems before the
planes are in the skies.
And we must also act quickly to implement all of the
recommendations from the ``Airline Safety Act'' that Congress passed in
response to the Colgan Air crash four years ago. The FAA has made
significant progress in implementing the new law. However, more work
needs to be done to complete all safety requirements and ensure the
traveling public knows pilots are always well-trained and well-rested.
Tragically, the Colgan crash showed us these are matters of life and
death, and we must take further action to improve the safety of our
aviation system. We simply can't afford to ignore the lessons from past
accidents and crashes.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on an issue that
affects all Americans. And I thank our witnesses for testifying about
how we can continue to ensure the safety of our aviation system as we
cope with the impacts of sequestration.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Amy Klobuchar, U.S. Senator from Minnesota
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing focusing
on the safety of our air transportation system.
I held a hearing in the Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee reviewing
the announced merger between U.S. Airlines and American last month. As
the commercial aviation industry continues to change, safety and the
protection of passengers is essential.
Safety in our skies and on our tarmacs is necessary to the flow of
commerce and to keep the public safe. In fact, 2012's safety
performance was the best in history for commercial aviation.
However, we have some serious issues in front of us and more can
still be done to improve the safety on the ground and in our airspace
for commercial as well as general aviation.
With sequestration many agencies are making decisions on where to
cut, and the FAA is no different. While the FAA has been clear that the
agency will make certain the aviation system continues to operate
safely, I am concerned about the long-term impacts of these cuts.
I have some concerns regarding the FAA's progress on safety rulings
and decision to close air traffic control towers. I appreciate the
opportunity to talk to you, Administrator Huerta, as well as all of the
investigators and overseers about maintaining safe operations from the
manufacturing process, on the runway and at airports, as well as in the
air.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Charles E. Schumer,
U.S. Senator from New York
I would like to thank Chairman Rockefeller and Ranking Member Thune
for holding this important hearing on the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) progress on safety initiatives. I have worked
tirelessly with my colleagues on the Commerce Committee and the
Families of Flight 3407 to ensure that the important reforms the
Congress mandated in the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act (PL 111-
216) are implemented I in a timely fashion. Unfortunately, critical
rulemakings required by this legislation have missed a series of
deadlines over the past three years. Despite these shortcomings, I was
recently encouraged to receive a letter from FAA Administrator Huerta
that committed the agency to completing their work on the Pilot
Qualifications and Flight Crew Member training rules by August and
October of this year, respectively.
However, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation's (DOT)
April 2013 Significant Rulemakings report, the FAA was delayed by
nearly thirty days in the submission of the Pilot Qualifications rule
to the DOT for review. While this delay concerns me and the many
stakeholders involved in this issue, I remain optimistic that the DOT
and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will review, clear, and
publish this rule by the July 26 deadline outlined in the report. I
implore the Administrator and his counterparts at DOT and OMB to make a
steadfast commitment to this schedule.
In addition, the Flight Crew Member training rule is expected to be
sent to DOT for review by June 3, 2013. I urge the Administrator to
assure the Committee that this deadline will also be met in a timely
fashion. When it comes to aviation safety and making sure the mistakes
made on Flight 3407 can never be allowed to happen again, these rules
are the cornerstones of achieving that reform. Therefore, the flying
public can ill afford any deviation from these deadlines.
Thank you to Administrator Huerta for his testimony today and I
again thank the Chair and Ranking Member for their leadership on this
important issue.
______
County of Anoka
Office of County Board of Commissioners
Anoka, MN, April 12, 2013
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Chairman Rockefeller:
I am writing on behalf of the Anoka County Board of Commissioners
to request that this letter be submitted for the record in your
upcoming hearing titled, ``Aviation Safety: FAA's Progress on Key
Safety Initiatives.'' It is our sincere hope that you will take the
opportunity afforded by this hearing to discuss with FAA Administrator
Michael Huerta the negative impact of the planned air traffic control
tower closures on not only local communities like ours, but also on the
national interest.
In a March 5, 2013 letter, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) advised affected contractors and facilities that the
administration expects to cease funding air traffic control services on
a vast majority of the contract air traffic control towers throughout
the United States. This cessation of funding is necessary for the FAA
to implement the budget sequestration. The tower at the Anoka County-
Blaine Airport (ANE) is one of 149 towers expected to be closed.
The Anoka County-Blaine Airport (ANE) is one of six reliever
airports in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area and is a
reliever airport for Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP).
ANE is the only large reliever airport in the north metro area and its
closing would be devastating not only to the economic vitality of the
northern portions of the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, but
also on the national economy. The congestion and flight delays that
would likely increase at MSP as a result of the loss of a viable
alternative airport would adversely affect the commercial airline
industry nationwide.
In addition to the detrimental effects of the cuts on the
commercial airline industry, closing the tower at ANE would hurt some
of Minnesota's largest companies, including several Fortune 500
companies, like Medtronic and Cargill, and the vendors that serve them.
As these large companies operate nationwide and worldwide, reduced or
more costly access to necessary transportation facilities would not
only affect local and state economies, but also the national economy.
On a purely local level, the Anoka County-Blaine Airport has a
significant economic impact. The most recent study of the reliever
airports in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area was completed by
the Wilder Foundation in 2005. It reported that nearly 110,000
operations occurred at the Anoka County-Blaine Airport in 2004. Also,
there were 12 businesses leasing land and reporting income in excess of
$5 million in non-revenue receipts. It was estimated in that study that
41,000 visitors arrived in the metro area via ANE and 350 jobs were
dependent on airport operations. The total economic impact of ANE in
2004 was estimated at just over $35 million annually.
Since the study was completed there have been significant
improvements to the airport. Anoka County invested nearly $20 million
in runway expansions, an Instrument Landing System, lighting
improvements and necessary taxiways and ramp areas. A new Fixed Based
Operation has been constructed by our private partner, Key Air of
Minnesota, who also invested millions of dollars in a new facility on
the northwest quadrant of the airport. This business has brought many
new jobs to the area and the operator reported more than $7 million in
revenue to the Metropolitan Airports Commission in 2012.
In addition to the negative economic impact of the tower closures,
the closures also have significant implications for aviation safety. I
have attached a photograph of the Anoka County-Blaine Airport and would
like to note the following points. ANE airfield has two runways that
are approximately at 90 degrees to each other. They are about the same
length: one is 5,000 feet; the other is 4,800 feet in length. These two
runways intersect near their midpoint (see photograph). There is an
instrument landing system available on the East-West runway, which
means most jet traffic will land and take off in an east-west direction
using the instrument landing system. Prop aircraft, however, normally
take off into the wind and often will choose to use the North-South
runway. While there are procedures in place that each pilot must
follow, operating without a control tower to manage the flow is an
accident waiting to happen.
In addition, most airports have a sight line from the ends of each
runway to the others. At ANE, as you can see from the photo, this is
not the case. From Runway 36-18 you cannot see either end of Runway 9-
27, and of course either end of Runway 9-27 cannot see the beginning of
Runway 36-18. Also it is doubtful that there is an open line of sight
between Runways 18-36 and 2-79 for most of the year, compounding this
issue. Consequently, a jet landing on Runway 2-79 or 9-27 as the case
may be, depending on the direction of approach, would not be seen by a
plane attempting to take off from Runway 18-36. The situation could
arise where a crash would occur at the intersection of these two
runways.
As a final point, we would like to note that it does not appear
that FAA exercised good judgment in determining which airports should
remain towered and at which airports the towers should close. Of the
251 contract towers nationwide, ANE ranks number 46 from an operations
perspective at just under 80,000 operations in 2012. There are 75
towers scheduled to remain open that have fewer operations than ANE and
34 of those scheduled to remain open have less than half as many
operations as ANE. Of the 149 towers slated to close, only 21 had more
operations in 2012 than ANE.
This distressing news comes at a time when we should be adding jobs
and strengthening our economy; not taking jobs away and weakening our
position for future growth. Consequently, we request that Congress
reallocate the sequestered cuts to ensure that the tower at ANE and
many other towers throughout the reliever airport system throughout the
country remain operational. Please act immediately to help us keep the
Anoka County-Blaine Airport operating at its peak efficiency.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
Rhonda Sivarajah,
Chair,
Anoka County Board of Commissioners.
Attachment: Photograph
Copies To:
The Honorable John Thune, Ranking Member
U.S. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
560 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
The Honorable Amy Klobuchar
302 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20024
The Honorable Al Franken
309 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20024
The Honorable Michelle Bachman
2417 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
The Honorable Erik Paulsen
127 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20003
Gary Schmidt
Director of Reliever Airports, Metropolitan Airports Commission
______
Douglas County Colorado--Office of the County Commissioners
April 12, 2013, Castle Rock, CO
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller,
I am writing on behalf of the Douglas County Board of Commissioners
to request that this letter be submitted for the record in your
upcoming hearing titled, ``Aviation Safety: FAA's Progress on Key
Safety Initiatives.'' We hope that you will take the opportunity
afforded by this hearing to seek clarification from FAA Administrator
Michael Huerta on the planned elimination of overnight shifts at
certain air traffic control towers, and to share with Administrator
Huerta the negative impact of this plan.
On February 22, FAA released a list of 72 air traffic control
towers at which they would eliminate overnight shifts in response to
budget cuts imposed by the sequester. Included on that list was
Centennial Airport (APA) in Arapahoe County, Colorado.
Since releasing the list in February, FAA has not made available
any details on the planned cuts. Airports on the list still do not know
when the cuts will take effect, or even if FAA still plans to move
forward with the cuts in light of the recent legal action taken against
the administration regarding its plan to outright close 149 control
towers. Clarification on this matter would be extremely helpful so that
all involved parties can develop a plan to mitigate the damage done by
the elimination of the overnight shift at APA.
Eliminating the night shift at Centennial Airport would have a
significant impact on both the local and national economies. APA is the
second busiest general aviation airport and the 35th busiest U.S.
airport, producing over $800 million of economic output per year and
supporting over 10,000 jobs. The airport is also one of the few self-
sustaining general aviation airports in the country. One source of
revenue for APA comes from international flights, 40 of which land at
the airport at night in an average year. With the loss of nighttime
customs services as a result of these cuts, APA would be unable to
accommodate those flights, costing fixed-base operators at the airport
between $800,000 and $1.3 million in annual sales. The loss of revenue
from just this one source alone outweighs the cost savings from
eliminating the nighttime shift.
In addition to the direct impact of airport activities on the
economy, APA is the only reliever airport for Denver International
Airport (DEN) that has a staffed nighttime control tower. Most airlines
will not land at an airport without a control tower, meaning planes
would have to be diverted out of the state of Colorado in the event of
a problem at DEN. Additionally, if flights that would ordinarily land
at APA have to land at DEN as a result of the unmanned control tower,
congestion and flight delays at DEN could very well increase, creating
an adverse economic impact on airline operations across the country.
Not only will the elimination of nighttime shifts have a negative
impact on the economy, it will also create a number of safety concerns.
Because of Centennial Airport's proximity to Denver International
Airport, flights taking off from APA sometimes inadvertently enter
DEN's Class B airspace without contacting the proper air traffic staff
at DEN. Today, when air traffic controllers at the APA tower observe a
plane approaching Class B airspace, they radio a warning to the pilot
to watch his altitude.
Absent those warnings, planes from APA will likely enter DEN
airspace fairly regularly, threatening the safety of those planes and
the numerous commercial flights taking off and landing at DEN.
APA also serves as a significant hub for air ambulance companies
and state, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies. Such aircraft
are necessarily on-call 24/7, and rely on the assistance of air traffic
controllers to direct traffic flow during stressful emergency missions.
The loss of such assistance poses a safety risk not only to first
responders, but also to those people that they are rushing to help.
It is for these reasons that we strongly urge FAA to reconsider its
decision to eliminate the overnight shift at Centennial Airport. And
while we believe that Centennial Airport has a particularly strong
case, many other airports included on FAA's list have numerous
compelling reasons why they should continue to be fully funded as well.
The Douglas County Board of Commissioners respectfully requests that
Congress and FAA take any and all necessary steps to avoid these
economically harmful and dangerous cuts.
Sincerely,
Jack Hilbert,
Douglas County Commissioner,
Board of Douglas County Commissioners.
______
Douglas County Business Alliance
Castle Rock, CO, April 12, 2013
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller,
I am writing on behalf of the Douglas County Business Alliance to
request that this letter be submitted for the record in your upcoming
hearing titled, ``Aviation Safety: FAA's Progress on Key Safety
Initiatives.'' We hope that you will take the opportunity afforded by
this hearing to seek clarification from FAA Administrator Michael
Huerta on the planned elimination of overnight shifts at certain air
traffic control towers, and to share with Administrator Huerta the
negative impact of this plan.
On February 22, FAA released a list of 72 air traffic control
towers at which they would eliminate overnight shifts in response to
budget cuts imposed by the sequester. Included on that list was
Centennial Airport (APA) in Arapahoe County, Colorado.
Since releasing the list in February, FAA has not made available
any details on the planned cuts. Airports on the list still do not know
when the cuts will take effect, or even if FAA still plans to move
forward with the cuts in light of the recent legal action taken against
the administration regarding its plan to outright close 149 control
towers. Clarification on this matter would be extremely helpful so that
all involved parties can develop a plan to mitigate the damage done by
the elimination of the overnight shift at APA.
Eliminating the night shift at Centennial Airport would have a
significant impact on both the local and national economies. APA is the
second busiest general aviation airport and the 35th busiest U.S.
airport, producing over $800 million of economic output per year and
supporting over 10,000 jobs. The airport is also one of the few self-
sustaining general aviation airports in the country. One source of
revenue for APA comes from international flights, 40 of which land at
the airport at night in an average year. With the loss of nighttime
customs services as a result of these cuts, APA would be unable to
accommodate those flights, costing fixed-base operators at the airport
between $800,000 and $1.3 million in annual sales. The loss of revenue
from just this one source alone outweighs the cost savings from
eliminating the nighttime shift.
In addition to the direct impact of airport activities on the
economy, APA is the only reliever airport for Denver International
Airport (DEN) that has a staffed nighttime control tower. Most airlines
will not land at an airport without a control tower, meaning planes
would have to be diverted out of the state of Colorado in the event of
a problem at DEN. Additionally, if flights that would ordinarily land
at APA have to land at DEN as a result of the unmanned control tower,
congestion and flight delays at DEN could very well increase, creating
an adverse economic impact on airline operations across the country.
Not only will the elimination of nighttime shifts have a negative
impact on the economy, it will also create a number of safety concerns.
Because of Centennial Airport's proximity to Denver International
Airport, flights taking off from APA sometimes inadvertently enter
DEN's Class B airspace without contacting the proper air traffic staff
at DEN. Today, when air traffic controllers at the APA tower observe a
plane approaching Class B airspace, they radio a warning to the pilot
to watch his altitude. Absent those warnings, planes from APA will
likely enter DEN airspace fairly regularly, threatening the safety of
those planes and the numerous commercial flights taking off and landing
at DEN.
APA also serves as a significant hub for air ambulance companies
and state, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies. Such aircraft
are necessarily on-call 24/7, and rely on the assistance of air traffic
controllers to direct traffic flow during stressful emergency missions.
The loss of such assistance poses a safety risk not only to first
responders, but also to those people that they are rushing to help.
It is for these reasons that we strongly urge FAA to reconsider its
decision to eliminate the overnight shift at Centennial Airport. And
while we believe that Centennial Airport has a particularly strong
case, many other airports included on FAA's list have numerous
compelling reasons why they should continue to be fully funded as well.
The Douglas County Business Alliance respectfully requests that
Congress and FAA take any and all necessary steps to avoid these
economically harmful and dangerous cuts.
Sincerely,
Mary Marchun,
Douglas County Business Alliance.
______
Douglas County, Colorado--Office of the County
Commissioners
Castle Rock, CO, April 15, 2013
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller:
As Chair of the National Association of Counties Airports
Subcommittee, I lend my support to Douglas County's efforts to express
its concerns about the proposed FAA cuts to air traffic control tower
shifts across the country, as outlined in the attached letter.
And, from a national level position, I also ask that you speak
against these cuts. On a national level, we have the same concerns that
this will significantly impact the safety of our citizens and will
result in more adverse economic impacts in the areas targeted. Surely,
cuts can be found that will not be as far reaching as this.
Thank you for your consideration of this request.
Sincerely,
Jack A. Hilbert,
Chair,
National Association of Counties Airports Subcommittee.
______
Denver South Economic Development Partnership
Englewood, CO, April 15, 2013
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller,
The Denver South Economic Development Partnership is an
organization of government and business leaders committed to the
economic vitality and sustainability of the South Metro Denver region.
I am writing today, on behalf of this community, to request that this
letter be submitted for the record in your upcoming hearing, ``Aviation
Safety: FAA's Progress on Key Safety Initiatives.'' We hope that you
will take this opportunity to seek clarification from FAA Administrator
Michael Huerta on the planned elimination of overnight shifts at
certain air traffic control towers, and to share with Administrator
Huerta the negative impact of this plan.
On February 22, FAA released a list of 72 air traffic control
towers at which they would eliminate overnight shifts in response to
budget cuts imposed by the sequester. Included on that list was
Centennial Airport (APA) in Arapahoe County, Colorado.
Since releasing the list in February, FAA has not made available
any details on the planned cuts. Airports on the list do not know when
the cuts will take effect, or even if FAA still plans to move forward.
Clarification on this matter would be extremely helpful so that all
involved parties can develop a plan to mitigate the loss of the
overnight shift at APA.
Eliminating the night shift at Centennial Airport would have a
significant economic impact. APA is the second busiest general aviation
airport and the 35th busiest U.S. airport, producing over $800 million
of economic output per year and supporting over 10,000 jobs.
APA serves many international flights, 40 of which land at the
airport at night in an average year. Without nighttime customs
services, as a result of these cuts, APA would be unable to accommodate
those flights, costing fixed-base operators at the airport between
$800,000 and $1.3 million in annual sales. The loss of revenue from
just this one source alone outweighs the cost savings from eliminating
the nighttime shift.
In addition to the direct impact of airport activities on the
economy, APA is the only reliever airport for Denver International
Airport (DEN) that has a staffed nighttime control tower. Most airlines
will not land at an airport without a control tower, meaning planes
would have to be diverted out of the state of Colorado in the event of
a problem at DEN.
APA also serves as a significant hub for air ambulance companies
and state, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies. Such aircraft
are necessarily on-call 24/7, and rely on the assistance of air traffic
controllers to direct traffic flow during emergency missions. The loss
of such assistance poses a safety risk not only to first responders,
but also to those they are rushing to help.
It is for these reasons that we respectfully request FAA to
reconsider its decision to eliminate the overnight shift at Centennial
Airport.
Sincerely,
Mike Fitzgerald,
President & CEO,
Denver South Economic Development Partnership.
______
Town of Parker Colorado
Parker, CO, April 15, 2013
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller,
I am writing on behalf of the Town of Parker Town Council to
request that this letter be submitted for the record in your upcoming
hearing titled, ``Aviation Safety: FAA's Progress on Key Safety
Initiatives.'' We hope that you will take the opportunity afforded by
this hearing to seek clarification from FAA Administrator Michael
Huerta on the planned elimination of overnight shifts at certain air
traffic control towers, and to share with Administrator Huerta the
negative impact of this plan.
On February 22, FAA released a list of 72 air traffic control
towers at which they would eliminate overnight shifts in response to
budget cuts imposed by the sequester. Included on that list was
Centennial Airport (APA) in Arapahoe County, Colorado.
Since releasing the list in February, FAA has not made available
any details on the planned cuts. Airports on the list still do not know
when the cuts will take effect, or even if FAA still plans to move
forward with the cuts in light of the recent legal action taken against
the administration regarding its plan to outright close 149 control
towers. Clarification on this matter would be extremely helpful so that
all involved parties can develop a plan to mitigate the damage done by
the elimination of the overnight shift at APA.
Eliminating the night shift at Centennial Airport would have a
significant impact on both the local and national economies. APA is the
second busiest general aviation airport and the 35th busiest U.S.
airport, producing over $800 million of economic output per year and
supporting over 10,000 jobs. The airport is also one of the few self-
sustaining general aviation airports in the country. One source of
revenue for APA comes from international flights, 40 of which land at
the airport at night in an average year. With the loss of nighttime
customs services as a result of these cuts, APA would be unable to
accommodate those flights, costing fixed-base operators at the airport
between $800,000 and $1.3 million in annual sales. The loss of revenue
from just this one source alone outweighs the cost savings from
eliminating the nighttime shift.
In addition to the direct impact of airport activities on the
economy, APA is the only reliever airport for Denver International
Airport (DEN) that has a staffed nighttime control tower. Most airlines
will not land at an airport without a control tower, meaning planes
would have to be diverted out of the state of Colorado in the event of
a problem at DEN. Additionally, if flights that would ordinarily land
at APA have to land at DEN as a result of the unmanned control tower,
congestion and flight delays at DEN could very well increase, creating
an adverse economic impact on airline operations across the country.
Not only will the elimination of nighttime shifts have a negative
impact on the economy, it will also create a number of safety concerns.
Because of Centennial Airport's proximity to Denver International
Airport, flights taking off from APA sometimes inadvertently enter
DEN's Class B airspace without contacting the proper air traffic staff
at DEN. Today, when air traffic controllers at the APA tower observe a
plane approaching Class B airspace, they radio a warning to the pilot
to watch his altitude. Absent those warnings, planes from APA will
likely enter DEN airspace fairly regularly, threatening the safety of
those planes and the numerous commercial flights taking off and landing
at DEN.
APA also serves as a significant hub for air ambulance companies
and state, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies. Such aircraft
are necessarily on-call 24/7, and rely on the assistance of air traffic
controllers to direct traffic flow during stressful emergency missions.
The loss of such assistance poses a safety risk not only to first
responders, but also to those people that they are rushing to help.
It is for these reasons that we strongly urge FAA to reconsider its
decision to eliminate the overnight shift at Centennial Airport. And
while we believe that Centennial Airport has a particularly strong
case, many other airports included on FAA's list have numerous
compelling reasons why they should continue to be fully funded as well.
The Town of Parker Town Council respectfully requests that Congress and
FAA take any and all necessary steps to avoid these economically
harmful and dangerous cuts.
Respectfully,
Mike Waid,
Mayor,
Town of Parker.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Michael P. Huerta
Regarding the Potential Need for Secondary Barriers to Protect the
Flight Deck
Question 1. The fortified flight deck door was mandated on
commercial aircraft in the aftermath of the attacks on September 2001.
What actions have been taken to address the residual risks of a flight
deck breach when the fortified flight deck door is opened in flight?
Answer. FAA regulations (14 CFR 121.584) require that the cabin be
secure before the flight deck door can be opened during flight. The FAA
requires that each air carrier document its door transition procedures
for compliance with the regulation in its Flight Operations Manual
(FOM), which it is required to submit to the FAA for approval. The
FAA's principal operations inspector (POI) for the carrier signs the
FOM, which is the air carrier's ``binding contract'' with the FAA on
how it will comply with all applicable regulations.
Question 2. A number of years ago, the FAA endorsed the concept of
installed secondary flight deck barriers on aircraft to ICAO and in
2011 facilitated the publication of guidance on their design and
performance. Has the FAA encouraged the airlines to use this guidance
and install these devices? If not, does the FAA have plans to encourage
the airlines to do so?
Answer. The FAA worked with RTCA Committee 221, chaired by Boeing
and United Airlines and comprised of air carrier, manufacturer, and
labor representatives, to evaluate the viability of effective secondary
barriers. The group sponsored extensive testing of possible procedures
and equipment at the Federal Air Marshal Training Center in Atlantic
City, describing its findings in a report (DO-329) that included
suggested best practices for use by flight and cabin crewmembers. This
document is available to operators for use in developing Flight
Operations Manual (FOM) procedures, as well as to FAA inspectors who
must review and sign the carrier's FOM. The FAA encourages all
operators to use these findings in developing procedures.
Safety Rules Related to Pilot Training
Question 3. Administrator Huerta, I am very concerned about
potential delays on important safety regulations that the FAA is
working to finalize regarding pilot qualifications and training. Will
your agency complete these critical safety rules on time?
Answer.
The FAA issued the Pilot Certification and Qualification
Requirements for Air Carrier Operations notice of proposed
rulemaking on February 29, 2012, to address the provisions in
Public Law (P.L) 111-216, the Airline Safety and Federal
Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, that would
require all pilots in Part 121 operations have an airline
transport pilot certificate. The final rule is in the Executive
Branch review process; FAA anticipates the rule will be
published by July 31, 2013.
The FAA issued a Supplemental Notice for Proposed Rulemaking
for Qualification, Service and Use of Crewmembers and Aircraft
Dispatchers May 20, 2011. The comment period ended on September
19, 2011.
The FAA expects to publish the final rule in October 2013.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Michael P. Huerta
Impacts of Sequester and the President's FY 2014 Proposed Budget
Question 1. Administrator Huerta, if the President's FY 2014 budget
for the FAA is not adopted, should the public expect to see the
furloughing of FAA staff, closure of some contract and federally
staffed control towers, the overnight closure of certain air traffic
control towers, etc. starting October 1, 2013?
Since agencies are limited in the numbers of days they can furlough
staff during a fiscal year, if the President's budget is not adopted
will the FAA have to consider the possibility of having to reduce-in
force some of its safety personnel?
Question 1a. If it appears that the FAA may have to revisit the
potential closure of air traffic control towers this fall, during the
intervening time, will it conduct an airport-by-airport assessment of
the safety impacts of closing individual towers? Similarly, has or will
the FAA undertake any studies into how overnight closure of nearly 150
air traffic control towers will impact safety or efficiency within the
broader aviation system?
Question 1b. Are there safety-related elements of NextGen that are
getting delayed as a result of sequestration?
Answer. The Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-9)
provided FAA with the budget flexibility needed to end employee
furloughs across the agency and keep 149 low-activity contract towers
originally slated for closure in June open for the remainder of Fiscal
Year 2013. This legislation, however, is not a complete solution to
sequestration for FAA, much less for the rest of the Federal
Government. The transfer authority allows us to forestall some of the
most acute impacts of sequestration to the flying public. Nonetheless,
we remain obligated to slash $637 million from the FAA's budget by the
end of the fiscal year. That means that other cost saving measures we
have implemented (a hiring freeze; contract reductions; suspension of
bonuses and awards; and reduced spending on overtime, training, travel,
supplies, and information technology) will continue.
Without additional Congressional action, on October 1 the FAA will
again face the prospect of reductions to aviation services to achieve
the long-term funding reductions called for in the Budget Control Act.
That is why the FY 2014 President's Budget replaces the across the
board spending cuts required by sequestration with a balanced approach
to solving our Nation's budgetary challenges.
If the President's Budget is not adopted, FAA will have to consider
all of the severe cost-saving measures debated this year, including
employee furloughs, closure of low activity air traffic control
facilities, and reductions to overnight staffing at some control
towers. In addition, given the limited number of days employees can be
furloughed, reductions in force will also be considered for all
segments of FAA's workforce.
The FAA conducted a safety study of the potential impact of closing
149 towers. That study identified that approximately 70 towers were
likely to remain open as a result of local funding and that additional
evaluation was required at a few facilities to determine the impact of
their closure on the controlling FAA facility and to mitigate any
identified impacts. Efficiency impacts were considered out of scope
from a safety point of view and clearly anticipated as a result of
withdrawing funds and the potential absence of air traffic control
services. We would conduct the same type of safety assessment if we
consider closing facilities in the future.
Safety will not be compromised by sequestration. NextGen funding
for the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing program, which
provides data for NextGen, has not been impacted.
Rulemaking on Pilot Qualifications
Question 2. Administrator Huerta, this committee helped pass
significant safety legislation after the crash of Colgan Air Flight
3407 aimed at improving the level of safety for our Nation's regional
airlines.
The pilot qualifications rule and the pilot training rule are long
overdue. It was a topic of discussion at your confirmation hearing.
If the FAA doesn't issue a final rule before August 1, 2013, the
default is that all pilots, including the first officer, will be
required to have 1,500 hours of flight experience in order to receive
the Air Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate that is required to fly
commercial aircraft.
The FAA sent the proposed final rule to Secretary LaHood's Office
on March 19, 2013. When does the Secretary's office have to send the
final rule OMB to meet the August 1, 2013 deadline?
Answer. OST passed the rule to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) on April 30, 2013.
Question 2a. Bottom line is this: will the FAA issue its final rule
on pilot qualifications before August 1, 2013 and what happens if the
FAA is late?
Answer. The FAA expects the Pilot Certification and Qualification
Requirements for Air Carrier Operations final rule will be published by
July 31, 2013. If the rule is not published before August 2, 2013, the
self-enacting provision of P.L 111-216, the Airline Safety and Federal
Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010, that requires all pilots
in Part 121 operations have an airline transport pilot (ATP)
certificate, including the associated flight experience of 1,500 hours,
will go into effect.
Question 2b. If the co-pilot experience requirement ends up being
1,500 hours, do you expect there to be a pilot shortage as I have heard
some airlines argue?
Answer. The FAA specifically sought input in the Pilot
Certification and Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations
notice of proposal rulemaking on the effect the ATP requirement would
have on pilot supply. In the NPRM, the FAA took advantage of the
relieving option within P.L 11-216, which would permit some pilots to
obtain the ATP certificate with less than 1,500 hours. The FAA
determined this proposal may address some of the pilot supply concerns
expressed by some carriers.
Question 2c. What preparations is the agency making to implement
either the default rule or the new pilot qualifications rule?
Answer. The FAA expects to publish the Pilot Certification and
Qualification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations final rule before
August 2, 2013. The final rule is in external executive review. In
additional to drafting the final rule, the FAA has prepared new and
updated existing guidance material associated with the final rule.
One Level of Safety Across Major Airlines and Regional Air Carriers
Question 3. Administrator Huerta, for years the FAA has spoken of
``one level of safety'' across all airlines, from the large major air
carriers to their small regional code-share partners.
It has been over four years since the Colgan airlines crash and I
am still not convinced that in practice all regional carriers operate
at the same levels of safety as the major airlines do.
When you define ``one level of safety'' does it mean the exact same
level of safety or an equivalent level of safety that regional carriers
can convince the agency of? Doesn't the flexibility of allowing an
equivalent level of safety defeat the idea behind ``one''?
Answer. FAA does not make a distinction between ``major'' and
``regional'' carriers, as all Part 121 air carriers are required to
meet the same standards of 14 CFR Part 121. Each carrier holds its own
air carrier certificate, is required to meet the same regulatory
standards, and is overseen by the FAA under the same system of
oversight. The FAA believes that all carriers operating in accordance
with the regulations meet an appropriate level of safety.
Question 3a. Do you believe that mainline air carriers are finding
ways to ensure that their regional code-share partners implement the
most effective safety practices?
Answer. In its audit ``Growth of Domestic Airline Code Sharing
Warrants Increased Attention'', the DOT OIG recommended the FAA publish
best practices for the sharing of safety information between Part 121
air carriers in a code share relationship. In our response to the OIG,
we noted the recommendation would be addressed through the
implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS). An SMS is a
comprehensive, process-oriented approach to managing safety throughout
an organization that includes: an organization-wide safety policy;
formal methods for identifying hazards, controlling, and continually
assessing risk; and promotion of a safety culture. SMS stresses not
only compliance with technical standards but increased emphasis on the
overall safety performance of the organization. SMS's proactive
emphasis on hazard identification and mitigation, and on communication
of safety issues, would provide certificate holders robust tools to
improve safety. The OIG agreed the implementation of SMS would meet the
intent of its recommendation. The FAA expects to publish the final rule
requiring carriers to implement SMS in October 2013.
Question 3b. In February 2013, the USDOT IG issued a report that
recommended that the FAA take a closer look at the code-sharing
agreements between major airlines and their regional partners. The IG
expressed concern about the potential impact that contractual
obligations, such as those for on-time performance, may have on the
safety of a mainline air carrier's code-share partner. Does the FAA
examine code-sharing agreements to see whether contractual obligations
may put greater pressure on regional carriers to take risks?
Answer. The FAA recognizes that financial conditions may adversely
impact safety and for that reason, the FAA has a process and guidance
for inspectors on the enhancement of surveillance when an air carrier
experiences labor unrest, financial distress or changes in the air
carrier's operations (such as adopting a new code-share agreement). To
support this process, the FAA asks air carriers to provide to their FAA
Certificate Management Offices (CMO) their contract performance
metrics, to include any penalties for failure to meet those metrics.
This information will be used by the CMO in the development of
surveillance programs or to modify existing surveillance programs to
address any risk created by the metrics. However, the FAA will also
issue a request by Aug 1, 2013 to air carriers not experiencing the
difficulties outlined above, to provide current contract metrics. We
will also request future metric changes or new contract metrics be
provided as they arise. The FAA will use this information in
development of FY14 surveillance programs. Any changes to that
information will be reviewed for potential modifications to an air
carrier's existing surveillance program.
Status of the Pilot Records Database
Question 4. Administrator Huerta, the USDOT IG's January 2013
report on Airline Safety Act implementation discusses the delays
associated with the creation of a pilot records database.
If you recall, Colgan Air was not aware of a number of failed check
rides by each of the crew members on Flight 3407 when they were hired.
The Committee looked to address this by requiring the creation of an
electronic pilot training record database in the Airline Safety Act.
The report raised concerns about the FAA's implementation of this
database regarding the timeline for completion and also for what
information needs to be included--such as the importance of requiring
written comments when a pilot fails a check ride.
Administrator Huerta, can you address the IG's concerns, both in
regards to a timeline for implementing this database, as well as making
sure the information it contains is as comprehensive as possible?
Answer. Our timeline for implementation of the Pilot Records
Database (PRD) requirement is dependent on completing rulemaking to
require use of PRD by appropriate operators and the development of an
information technology (IT) capability to support the database. We are
planning for a final rule by the end of FY15. For the IT database
required to support a PRD, assuming no major changes to our functional
requirements are needed as a result of rulemaking and available funding
for system development and fielding, we expect to begin deployment of
the PRD in mid FY17.
PL 111-216 requires the FAA to capture certain training records and
pilot evaluator (``check airman'') comments maintained by the air
carrier. The FAA is continuing to evaluate methods of complying with
Congressional intent in a manner that is cost beneficial and does not
create any undue burdens on the airline industry.
Voluntary Safety Actions and Calls-to-Action
Question 5. Administrator Huerta, your predecessor Administrator
Babbitt had a voluntary call-to-action for pilots after the Colgan Air
crash and a voluntary call-to-action for air traffic controllers after
a number of incidents of unprofessional behavior. Do you think these
two voluntary calls-to-action were fully successful, partially
successful, or not successful, and why?
Answer. We believe our Call to Action for the use of voluntary
safety actions has been successful. We convened an aviation rulemaking
committee (ARC) on flight and duty time limitations. Its work led to a
change in flight duty time and rest regulations. We verified that all
Part 121 air carriers had methods to identify and better train poor-
performing pilots. We saw a substantial increase in participation in
both the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) and Flight Operations
Quality Assurance (FOQA) program. Additionally, all of the major pilot
labor organizations agreed to develop guidelines on discipline in the
flight deck, professionalism in the pilot workforce and best practices
for mentoring.
We accelerated implementation of a Professional Standards program
for air traffic controllers modeled on the successful program in the
airlines which is now fully implemented;
We conducted studies on air traffic controller and technician
fatigue and made changes to scheduling practices and established
Fatigue Risk Management System, and asked an Independent Review Panel
(IRP) to review the selection, assignment, and training of air traffic
controllers. The Panel produced a report outlining 49 recommendations
to the agency. We accepted the report in its entirety and are working
to implement all 49 recommendations.
Air Medical Safety
Question 6. Several years ago I worked with both Chairwoman Hersman
and Mr. Guzzetti on legislation to improve the safety of Helicopter
Emergency Medical Services (HEMS). My legislation built on several NTSB
recommendations.
It took a year with several fatal air medical service accidents for
the FAA to initiate a rulemaking in 2010. The FAA Modernization and
Reform bill included a large section piece of my Air Medical Safety
Improvement and instructed the FAA to complete its rulemaking.
Regrettably, there have been several air medical crashes over the
past year. Last week, the NTSB met to determine the probable cause of
an August 2011 HEMS crash. One of the safety issues identified is the
need for HEMS pilots to receive flight training in a simulator to train
in skills that are too risky to perform in a helicopter.
Administrator Huerta, what is the status of the final rule on the
air medical service standards and when will the final rule to be
issued?
Answer. The Air Ambulance and Commercial Helicopter Operations
(Final Rule) addresses 13 NTSB recommendations and the causes of over
150 helicopter air ambulance and commercial helicopter accidents that
occurred between 1991 and 2010 in which over 250 people died. It
addresses the requirements of the FAA Reauthorization. The final rule
is in executive review and we anticipate it will be issued in August
2013.
Certification Process and Global Supply Chains
Question 7. Administrator Huerta, transport aircraft manufacturers,
business jet manufacturers, and general aviation manufacturers
increasingly design and produce their new products in multiple
countries. As you know, the supply chains for these new aircraft are
also increasingly global in nature. It presents a number of challenges
to regulators. There are a series of bilateral treaties in place which
helps to the extent that specific instances and situations have been
identified and addressed. As treaties are products of their time, new
issues arise that were not envisioned and lead to open questions.
What, if any, are the differences between how the FAA oversees
manufacturing facilities and how its European counterpart, EASA,
oversees manufacturing facilities?
Answer. The FAA and EASA oversight processes are similar. Both
oversee manufacturing and quality systems and yield the same results.
The FAA focuses more oversight at the product level to ensure product/
article conformance to approved design. EASA applies more of a systems
approach; it issues and oversees its Production Organisation Approvals
(POAs) based on an organizational production system.
Question 7a. Administrator Huerta, the EASA-FAA bilateral for
Technical Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness and Environmental
Certification, section 1.1.6 states that projects involving a separate
country of design and country of manufacture are an open question as to
regulatory jurisdiction, and shall be settled through working
arrangements by EASA, FAA, and the applicants. When did this topic
first come up? Why was an agreement not reached during negotiations
regarding these types of situations?
Answer. A scenario where the State of Design (SoD) is different
from the State of Manufacture (SoM) can have many unique aspects
influenced by industry business arrangements and corresponding
regulator oversight standards. Bilateral agreements facilitate
oversight of such arrangements and require that appropriate working
procedures are established to document the roles and responsibilities
of each authority, acting as either SoD or SoM. Having the flexibility
to customize a working arrangement to the particular situation is
preferred, since all possible scenarios cannot be envisioned when
establishing the bilateral agreement.
The issue of splitting SoD and SoM oversight responsibilities has
been addressed during the evolution of the FAA/EASA Bilateral Aviation
Safety Agreement (BASA) and its predecessor agreements. We do not have
a specific date to cite when EASA and FAA resolved to address the SoD/
SoM issues through working arrangements.
Question 7b. In the case of the new Airbus facility in Mobile, has
the FAA started discussions with EASA and Airbus as to which regulatory
regime will be responsible for certifying the production facility and
the aircraft produced at said facility?
What type of certifications will be required for Airbus to assemble
at Mobile? Is it a production certificate?
Answer. Production and design certification will be handled by EASA
and the Mobile final assembly line (FAL) will function as an extension
of the EASA Production Organization Approval (POA). No FAA
certifications will be required for the facility in Mobile. The FAA may
be asked to assist Airbus with oversight of the facility under the
auspices of the FAA/EASA bilateral aviation safety agreement, although
the FAA has not yet received any such request.
Question 7c. Will an airworthiness certificate be required for
every airplane produced?
Answer. For aircraft destined for American operators, the airplane
will be ``exported'' from the EASA system to the FAA system, and an
airworthiness certificate will be issued by FAA. In cases where the
final airplane is destined for another country, a standard
airworthiness certificate will be issued by the destination country.
Question 7d. It is my understanding that Airbus intends for EASA,
not the FAA, to certify its future manufacturing facility at Mobile? If
true, is the FAA considering giving up its jurisdiction to a foreign
regulator in the case of Mobile? And if so, can you explain why?
Answer. Airbus intends to apply to EASA for an extension of its
EASA-issued Production Organization Approval (POA), thereby remaining
under EASA's jurisdiction. The facility in Mobile will act as an
extension of the existing Airbus POA and, as such, State of Manufacture
responsibilities lie with EASA as the technical agent for France, the
State of Design.
Question 7e. Assuming that the FAA retains its responsibility to
oversee production at Mobile, what organization within the aircraft
certification office (AIR) would be responsible for conducting that
oversight? What impact would this have on resources in the AIR office?
Answer. The FAA has not received any request from EASA to assist
with oversight. If the FAA is requested to assist with oversight of the
Mobile facility, then the geographic manufacturing inspection office
would be responsible (under the FAA's Central Region Small Airplane
Directorate).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. Michael P. Huerta
Question 1. I am committed to investing in our Nation's
infrastructure and making sure we have the safest airports at all our
airports, large and small. That is why I have cosponsored the Protect
Our Skies Act led by Senators Moran and Blumenthal that would keep our
air traffic control towers open. There are four air traffic control
towers slated for closure in Minnesota. Two towers are FAA operated at
Flying Cloud, Eden Prairie while the two towers at Janes Field in Anoka
County and St. Cloud Regional are contract towers. Anoka County has
written a letter about why their tower is important to the community
and I request that it be submitted for the record.
Administrator Huerta--What do fewer towers mean for aviation safety
and the economies of local communities? What about those towers at
airports acting as relievers for large airports like Minneapolis/St.
Paul? How is the FAA engaging with communities who are desperately
working to keep their towers and operations open?
Answer. The Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-9)
provided FAA with the budget flexibility needed to end employee
furloughs across the agency and keep 149 low-activity contract towers
originally slated for closure in June open for the remainder of Fiscal
Year 2013. This legislation, however, is not a complete solution to
sequestration for FAA, much less for the rest of the Federal
Government. The transfer authority allows us to forestall some of the
most acute impacts of sequestration to the flying public. Nonetheless,
we remain obligated to slash $637 million from the FAA's budget by the
end of the fiscal year. That means that other cost saving measures we
have implemented (a hiring freeze; contract reductions; and reduced
spending on overtime, training, travel, supplies, and information
technology) will continue.
The FAA conducted a safety study of the potential impact of closing
149 towers. That study identified that approximately 70 towers were
likely to remain open as a result of local funding and that additional
evaluation was required at a few facilities to determine the impact of
their closure on the controlling FAA facility and to mitigate any
identified impacts. Efficiency and local economic impacts were
considered out of scope from a safety point of view and are clearly
anticipated as a result of withdrawing funds and the potential absence
of air traffic control services.
Prior to the enactment of P.L. 113-9, the FAA worked closely with
communities to enable non-Federal tower operations to continue by
assisting with arrangements to transfer equipment and other maintenance
and logistics support to local authorities.
Question 2. Administrator Huerta--Transitioning our air traffic
system to NextGen technologies will provide numerous benefits to our
aviation system increased capacity, fewer delays, greater fuel
efficiency, and reduced emissions. Additionally, NextGen systems allow
for increased safety for passengers and aircraft of all types.
Implementation of NextGen technologies, including approach and
departure technologies known as RNAV, are of interest to airport
communities like the Minneapolis/St. Paul metro area. While the goal is
to make our airports safer it is also important for the FAA and airport
officials to talk to the public about impacts, including environmental
impacts.
Can you talk about the FAA's role when it comes to public outreach
and the way the FAA involves stakeholders including operators and
communities? Does this include sharing information about any
environmental analysis conducted to establish changes in procedures?
Will you commit to working with the communities surrounding airports,
such as the Twin Cities metro area?
Answer. The FAA engages in a multi-dimensional process for such
activities; these dimensions can be better described as being formal
and informal processes.
Formally, FAA is in full compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and other national and local laws and directives that
require public notification and engagement regarding the notification
of activities or initiatives and the impacts from such activities or
initiatives through either the Rulemaking processes or other directed-
venues like public-notice announcements. Another formal venue is our
collaborative teams formed by our technical staff and specialists,
local aviation stakeholders including local airport personnel, and
National Airspace System (NAS) users. These diverse groups come
together to design and implement new procedures utilizing new
technologies that make up our NextGen program's portfolio. Examples
include the on-going Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the
Metroplex (OAPM) as well as our 3rd Party Vendor procedures design
projects.
The FAA continues to engage these stakeholders so they will provide
us with valuable input, gain confidence in our path forward and make
the necessary financial investments for NextGen to succeed. The FAA has
a long history of working closely with a broad cross section of
industry partners either directly or through RTCA (a group that
facilitates expert advice to the agency on technical issues) to build
consensus and incorporate important recommendations in our NextGen
planning.
One example of our partnerships for NextGen is the Greener Skies
initiative in Seattle, Washington, where we are partnering with Alaska
Airlines, the Port of Seattle and the Boeing Company. We have created
new NextGen, satellite-based approaches for all airlines flying into
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SeaTac). These flight tracks are
shorter, more fuel efficient and environmentally-friendly.
Informally, the FAA provides information to the public though our
public websites like http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/. Here, descriptions
and current statuses of many of our NextGen programs are made
available, including the NextGen Implementation Plan (NGIP). This plan
is the FAA's primary outreach document for keeping the aviation
community, Congress, the flying public and other stakeholders informed
about NextGen, along with public media news articles and interviews.
This public outreach is not only conducted by our national leadership
but also by our regional and local field personnel within the
communities where they work and live. For example, at the kick-off
event of every OAPM Study team, public outreach is conducted through
the local media, who are invited to participate in the kick-off event.
The FAA participates in these activities at the highest levels and
engage in an open and frank Q & A session about NextGen with the local
media. Local interest groups, communities, and the general public have
the opportunity to also express their views and join in the discussion
through the regular and official venues already established in their
areas for matters related to aviation and through their elected
officials.
Also, we have an on-going initiative in collaboration with some
major airports for an interactive display designed to educate
passengers about the scope and benefits of NextGen. The Dallas/Fort
Worth (DFW) International Airport interactive kiosk located at Terminal
C, Gate 17, is designed to educate the public about NextGen and the
benefits it will create. The NextGen interactive kiosk was jointly
developed by the FAA and DFW Airport.
More specifically, in reference to Minneapolis, the FAA has worked
closely with the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) and their
citizens-based Noise Oversight Committee (NOC) on the design and
implementation of NextGen Performance-Based Navigation (PBN) arrival
and departure procedures. The FAA continues to partner with the MAC and
NOC, relying on their extensive experience with communities around
Minneapolis-St Paul International Airport (MSP) on effective ways to
solicit and address the community's issues related to environmental and
operational matters. These efforts will continue as we move forward in
delivering the benefits of NextGen to MSP and the entire Minneapolis
metropolitan area.
Lastly, the FAA has joined with industry stakeholders and community
representatives through the Airport Cooperative Research Program
(ACRP), led by the Transportation Research Board (TRB), to develop a
template on ``best practices'' for engaging and informing the aviation
community/public on the impacts and benefits of the various elements of
NextGen technologies.
Our on-going commitment to work with the NextGen stakeholders and
the communities surrounding airports is represented by the expansive
and inclusive formal and informal process described in this response.
In the FAA, we all are part of the communities that we serve, where we
work and live, and feel that our efforts will bring about positive and
lasting benefits for all.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to
Hon. Michael P. Huerta
Question 1. Mr. Huerta, you've warned air travelers about the
potential for significant delays due to air traffic reductions
necessitated by air traffic controller furloughs. Can you explain why
30-to 40-percent reductions in air traffic at certain airports may
occur given that the agency's sequestration cut is 10 percent, and the
agency's controller workforce has grown by approximately 600
controllers--from 14,537 in 2007 to 15,041 today--while airline
operations have dropped by 12 percent during this same period?
Answer. While traffic is down overall, there are some markets where
traffic has increased. The National Airspace System is truly a system
of interdependent operations and seemingly small reductions of
available controllers can significantly affect the operations at a
particular airport or facility. In addition, we face staffing
challenges at some of our major facilities and that was compounded by
the furlough. Each facility operates differently and may have differing
impacts depending on the specific traffic conditions at that airport.
Commonly, a small reduction in available certified controllers prevents
an individual facility from staffing an operational position which, in
turn, reduces efficiency.
There were no good options for achieving the savings required by
sequester. We stopped all hiring and promotions and reduced spending to
include contracts, training, travel, information technology, and all
other categories, but that left us significantly short of the savings
target. The only option remaining was to furlough all employees so we
targeted eleven furlough days beginning April 21 through the end of the
year, which would have resulted in one furlough day per pay period. We
allocated furlough days equally across the whole system. From an
operational standpoint, that resulted in a reduction of 10 percent of
the available hours that an employee was available to work.
Question 2. You and I have spoken multiple times previously, most
recently last November, about the status of the solicitation for the
new FAA training facility. Given that the FAA is currently conducting
training activities at a temporary facility, can you tell me what the
current timeline is and when you expect a decision to be announced?
Answer. We anticipate awarding a contract for FAA training services
in the second or third quarter of Fiscal Year 2014.
Question 3. On April 1, I asked the head of the Air Traffic Control
Tower Program at the FAA for the safety mitigation studies that the FAA
has completed for the five contract towers currently operating in
Missouri, of which four are slated to be closed. I know Senator Thune
previously made a similar request for the studies for all domestic
contract towers to be made available to him as well. When can I expect
those?
Answer. The FAA developed a national safety case to determine what
needed to be done to convert Towered airports into non-Towered airports
and captured those standards into a Safety Risk Management Document
(SRMD). That process identified approximately 20 mitigations that would
have to be applied at each airport. That airport-by-airport information
was captured as part of the SRMD.
Question 4. I understand that the safety studies conducted by the
FAA regarding the effects of closing these towers on airport operations
were preliminary in nature and that the FAA is currently undertaking
in-depth safety mitigation studies of all of these towers. Why were the
contracts for these towers revoked before the official, complete safety
studies were completed? Where is the FAA in the process of completing
these in-depth studies?
Answer. Safety analyses were performed, consistent with the Safety
Management System used by the Air Traffic Organization (ATO). It is
important to recognize that changes to the National Airspace System
(NAS), such as defunding the contract towers, require several steps in
the safety review process before any change is actually made. A
decision to move forward with a change does not, by itself, impose any
change in the NAS, but it does trigger a further assessment of the
safety issues and risks associated with implementing the change and an
analysis of the necessary risk mitigation steps. Changes to the NAS are
not actually made without an approved implementation plan that properly
manages any safety risks. This is the process that was followed with
the decision to defund contract towers.
The FAA developed a national safety case to determine what needed
to be done to convert Towered airports into non-Towered airports and
captured those standards into a Safety Risk Management Document (SRMD).
That process identified approximately 20 mitigations that would have to
be applied at each airport. That airport-by-airport information was
captured as part of the SRMD.
Question 5. As a bi-product of pushing back the closing dates for
the Contract Towers at airports, the FAA has had to find new off-sets
to comply with the sequester. Where did the FAA cut commensurate
spending to comply with the sequester?
Answer. With the enactment of P.L. 133-9 (Reducing Flight Delays
Act of 2013), the FAA was allowed to transfer $253 million from
accounts previously exempted from sequestration. This infusion of funds
allowed the agency to cancel a scheduled 11 day furlough for all
employees and keep the 149 low activity contract towers originally
slated for closure in June open for the remainder of Fiscal Year 2013.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kelly Ayotte to
Hon. Michael P. Huerta
Question 1. In the hearing, I asked you to clarify the FAA's
decision to close the contract tower in Nashua, New Hampshire, and to
keep open the contract tower in Lebanon, New Hampshire. Since both
towers are non-cost share, contract towers and since Lebanon has less
traffic than Nashua, explain the FAA's decision to close the tower at
Nashua and to keep open the tower at Lebanon. What is the distinction?
Answer. The Nashua, NH FAA Contract Tower (FCT) was identified for
defunding since it did not have 150K total operations or 10K commercial
operations in FY 2012. The Lebanon, NH FCT was not considered since it
had more than 10K commercial operations in FY 2012.
Question 2. Is the Essential Air Service (EAS) program subject to
sequestration? If so, has any portion of EAS been cut pursuant to
sequestration? How much?
Answer. The EAS program is subject to a sequester of approximately
5 percent, however, the funding mechanisms in place for the program
provide the Department with sufficient authority to cover the Fiscal
Year 2013 requirements. For this reason, we do not believe, at this
time, that EAS will experience a shortfall due to sequestration.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question. The NTSB has investigated several crashes of planes that
were operating under contracts with Federal agencies, including the
Department of Defense and the U.S. Forest Service (for firefighting).
What recommendations has the NTSB made to improve the clarity,
consistency and effectiveness of aircraft that are under contract for
public use? What steps should the FAA and/or other agencies be taking
to prevent future tragedies?
Answer. The NTSB has been on record for years calling for clear
lines of oversight and regulation for these special operations to
ensure the safety of the operators and the public. In 2011, the NTSB
held a forum to discuss public aircraft, their use and oversight.
Many of the FAA regulations do not apply to aircraft operating
under public aircraft operations. However, several government agencies
contract with private companies for services as public aircraft, but
require FAA certification as part of the contract. In the FAA's current
guidance, any aircraft or airman certified by the FAA is subject to the
FAA's normal surveillance activities regardless of whether operating
under civil or public operations.
In a recent investigation of an accident involving a Department of
Defense (DOD) contractor, the flight operations were governed by the
military requirements when it operated as specified in its contract,
but in the same contract, was also required to use aircraft with a
valid FAA airworthiness certificate. The operator met the requirements
of the contract with an FAA Special Airworthiness Certificate--
Experimental. FAA regulations governing Experimental certificates
state:
``Experimental certificates are issued for the following
purposes: (a) Research and development. Testing new aircraft
design concepts, new aircraft equipment, new aircraft
installations, new aircraft operating techniques, or new uses
for aircraft.
(b) Showing compliance with regulations. Conducting flight
tests and other operations to show compliance with the
airworthiness regulations including flights to show compliance
for issuance of type and supplemental type certificates,
flights to substantiate major design changes, and flights to
show compliance with the function and reliability requirements
of the regulations.
(c) Crew training. Training of the applicant's flight crews.
(d) Exhibition. Exhibiting the aircraft's flight capabilities,
performance, or unusual characteristics at air shows, motion
picture, television, and similar productions, and the
maintenance of exhibition flight proficiency, including (for
persons exhibiting aircraft) flying to and from such air shows
and productions.
(e) Air racing. Participating in air races, including (for such
participants) practicing for such air races and flying to and
from racing events.
(f) Market surveys. Use of aircraft for purposes of conducting
market surveys, sales demonstrations, and customer crew
training only as provided in Sec. 21.195.''
These regulations also prohibit the use of an aircraft with an
experimental certificate to carry persons or property ``for
compensation or hire.'' Therefore, flights under the provisions of the
contract were conducted as public aircraft operations.
The NTSB has recommended that the FAA:
Take appropriate actions to clarify FAA authority over public
aircraft, as well as identify and document where such oversight
responsibilities reside in the absence of FAA authority. (A-10-
150)
Also, the NTSB has asked the FAA to:
Develop and implement a surveillance program specifically for
14 CFR Part 135 operators with aircraft that can operate both
as public aircraft and as civil aircraft to maintain continual
oversight ensuring compliance with 14 CFR Part 135
requirements. (A-10-149)
We believe if these recommendations are implemented and if the FAA
exercises its current oversight authority, public aircraft operations
will be safer.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. In the last five years, how many aviation accidents
have occurred at or around airports with air traffic controllers and at
airport without air traffic controllers on duty (non-towered airports)?
Answer. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, in
2011 (latest available information) there were over 19,000 civil-use
airports in the United States. Of that number, approximately 510 have
at least part-time air traffic control (ATC) towers. In the data the
NTSB does collect about aviation accidents, we do not track the number
of accidents occurring at towered airports versus non-towered airports.
The causes of many of our accidents are operational and mechanical and
we continue to see these types of accidents. For this reason, we have
Improve General Aviation Safety on our Most Wanted List: http://
www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl.html. Also, most recently, we issued six Safety
Alerts to the general aviation community--pilots and mechanics--in
hopes preventing those accidents we see too often.
Question 2. Based on the aviation accidents that the National
Transportation Safety Board has investigated during your chairmanship,
do you think non-towered airports pose an elevated risk for incidents?
Answer. We have no evidence that there is a higher rate of
accidents and incidents at non-towered airports. However, the aviation
system is complex with multiple layers of safety, and control towers
are another layer of safety in the system.
Question 3. Does the NTSB consider the air traffic control tower
status during investigations, whether as a contributing factor to the
cause or the efficiency and quality of the response?
Answer. When investigating any accident or incident where air
traffic control services are involved, we always evaluate the role of
ATC in both its primary role of traffic separation and its support role
of improving safety by providing other weather and advisory services to
pilots. We note both positive and negative aspects, and document any
areas that are exemplary or need improvement.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
General Aviation Safety
Question. Chairwoman Hersman, in your testimony you said that
general aviation fatality rates have shown little movement in recent
years despite of efforts to improve safety.
You cite several leading causes that continue to cause most of the
accidents. These are loss of control, engine failure, flying in
conditions that are beyond the pilot or aircraft's abilities and
collision with terrain. What can be done beyond the improved safety
alerts?
Answer. General aviation (GA) is a recreational activity that
relies on the pilot community to make good decisions before, during,
and after flight. Over the past 10 years, the accident rate for GA has
averaged 6.7 accidents per 100,000 flight hours, which in 2012 equated
to 1,470 accidents. Because of this stubborn average, in June 2011, the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) added Improve General
Aviation Safety to its Most Wanted List (MWL), and we renewed our
commitment to this issue by also including it on our 2013 MWL. We
believe that our focus on the topic has increased awareness of the
safety issues related to being a pilot or mechanic in GA.
Additionally, in June 2012, the NTSB conducted a 2-day forum,
``General Aviation Safety: Climbing to the Next Level,'' that focused
on key safety issues such as pilot training and performance; pilot
access to and use of weather-related information; and aircraft design,
maintenance, and certification. Panelists included representatives from
industry, government, academia, and professional associations. The
forum was well attended and received considerable media coverage. In
addition, throughout the year, staff educated general aviation pilots
through briefings and seminars.
To increase educational efforts, the NTSB will be producing videos
for our website to accompany and enhance the GA safety alerts. We will
also distribute them to type clubs and flight schools.
In early April, we met with various Federal agencies, academia, and
appropriate organizations to determine what additional information NTSB
staff can collect during accident investigations that would assist in
the development of safety improvements by not just the NTSB but outside
entities as well. Finally, we plan to work with outside organizations
such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University as they develop training aids for general
aviation pilots.
We welcome the opportunity to work with policymakers, like you, to
find additional ways to sharpen the focus on improving GA safety--an
area in which we see the same accidents over and over. Through
education, I believe we can make a positive difference in the rate and
number of accidents and fatalities in recreational flying.
______
Response to Written Questions Provided by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. During the FAA's initial certification of the 787
aircraft, Boeing claimed that its batteries would emit smoke less than
once in every 10 million hours of flight. However, the 787 fleet
experienced two batteries emitting smoke in less than just 100,000
hours of flight.
Given the disparity between the predicted smoke events and the
actual events, did the FAA certification process work as intended to
mitigate the risk of equipment malfunction?
Answer. The ongoing NTSB investigation is examining the
certification process for the lithium ion battery used in the 787. The
certification process acknowledges that equipment malfunctions can
occur and, as a result, requires the development of a design safety
assessment for all equipment on the aircraft to understand and mitigate
the risks of equipment malfunction. As part of the safety assessment
process, the manufacturer takes steps to identify foreseeable failures
and analyze their safety effect on the passengers, crew, and aircraft.
Evaluating this information as part of the design certification process
allows the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to ensure that the
manufacturer incorporates sufficient design features, warning
indications, and/or flight crew procedures to effectively mitigate the
risks such failures pose to the aircraft and those on board.
Correspondingly, the design safety assessment is a critical step in the
certification process.
As part of the certification process of the 787-8 Electrical Power
System, Boeing performed a design safety assessment of the main and
auxiliary power unit (APU) lithium-ion battery to determine the
potential hazards that battery failures could introduce to the airplane
and its occupants and to demonstrate that the risk associated with
these failures was sufficiently mitigated. Boeing anticipated that the
combined group of failures that could result in battery venting with
smoke could occur less than once in every 10 million flight hours.
However, within about 58,000 flight hours, the 787-8 fleet experienced
two (one main and one APU) battery failures that resulted in smoke
emission from the battery. Based on testimony provided at the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) April 2013 investigative hearing
on Boeing 787 battery design and certification, the testing and
analysis performed as part of the certification process did not
accurately predict how often a single cell would vent, resulting in the
emission of smoke and electrolyte, or that the venting of a single cell
could propagate to the other seven cells inside the battery case,
causing the release of smoke and electrolyte from the battery.
Although the probability of this battery failure condition was not
accurately assessed as part of the certification process, neither the
Japan Airlines battery fire incident at Boston Logan International
Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, or the All Nippon Airways battery smoke
incident at Takamatsu, Japan, resulted in injury to the passengers or
crew or significant damage to the airplane. In the Japan Airlines
battery fire incident, smoke entered the cabin of the airplane after
the airplane's only electrical power source, the APU, shut down in
response to the battery failure, as it was designed to do. This event
was after all passengers and crew had disembarked the plane. The
cleaning personnel on the airplane at the time the smoke began to enter
the cabin quickly exited without harm.
According to information released by the Japan Transport Safety
Board regarding the circumstances of the All Nippon Airways battery
smoke incident, passengers reported odor but not smoke in the main
cabin during the incident flight. The airplane did not lose electrical
power during the incident, thereby allowing the ventilation system in
the forward electrical equipment bay to function as designed to exhaust
smoke released from the battery outside the airplane.
Although the impact of the battery smoke emissions in these
incidents was minimal, given the importance of probability analyses to
the accuracy of design safety assessments used in the FAA's
certification process, the NTSB believes that the underlying factors
driving the inaccuracy of the failure predictions must be identified to
ensure that safety risks in future certification programs are
accurately defined and understood.
Question 2. What steps should be taken to improve the FAA
certification process to prevent this type of incident from happening
again?
Answer. As part of its investigation, the NTSB is examining a
number of factors affecting the accuracy of Boeing's probability
assessment for a battery venting with smoke. The NTSB investigation is
also examining the methods, data, and expertise used in the
certification process to determine that the battery met all applicable
FAA safety requirements, in particular the nine Special Conditions
defined by the FAA in 25-359-SC, which are attached.
Based on its findings to date, the NTSB believes that examination
of these factors is the first step needed to support the development of
useful improvements to the FAA certification process. The NTSB will
look for vulnerabilities in the underlying processes used to evaluate
and approve airplane systems and equipment certified under Special
Conditions, as well as potential implementation shortcomings that may
be unique to the 787 APU and main lithium-ion battery system
certification program. The NTSB will make safety recommendations, as
warranted, aimed at preventing similar incidents or accidents in the
future, and I will share these recommendations with you when they are
issued.
Attachment
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Dan Coats to
Hon. Deborah A.P. Hersman
Question 1. Chairman Hersman: Watching the 787 investigation from
the outside, it seems there are four distinct investigations going on,
at the JTSB, the NTSB, the FAA, and Boeing. Since there hasn't been an
accident, who has cognizance and authority over the outcome of these
investigations?
Answer. Senator Coats, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) is responsible for the investigation of the January 7 JAL
battery fire that occurred at Boston's Logan International airport.
Fire on board an aircraft is a safety of flight issue, and as such, the
NTSB is reviewing the certification and testing of the battery, the
manufacturing process used for the battery, and other issues relevant
to the battery fire. The NTSB issued an interim factual report on March
7, containing initial factual information about the battery
examination. We hope to complete our final report in the next 6 months
and issue recommendations to keep this type of fire on board an
aircraft from happening again.
In accordance with international agreements, the JTSB is conducting
an investigation in to the January 16 ANA battery event. The FAA is
conducting separate certification reviews, and Boeing is leading its
own independent review. They are the best entities to respond to
questions about their on-going reviews and investigations. I can tell
you, however, that the JTSB, FAA, and Boeing are all parties to our
limited battery fire investigation, and the parties are working
together to provide factual information related to the January 7 fire,
and their participation will result in a more complete final report.
Question 2. Chairman Hersman: As you know Congress passed
legislation in 2010 that enacted regulations making it tougher to
become an airline pilot. Specifically, the bill required the FAA to
draft and enact a number of regulations with regards to the experience
a pilot must have before they can be hired to engage in airline (Part
121) flying. At the core of the proposed regulations is that all
airline pilots--captains and first officers--must have an Airline
Transport Pilot Certificate by August of 2013. The ATP certificate
comes with a new eligibility requirement of between 750 and 1,500 hours
of total flight time (the ``1,500 hour rule''), with 750 hours applying
to military pilots and 1,500 hours applying to most civilian pilots.
For civilian-trained pilots, this represents about a 700-hour increase
over current airline hiring minimums. I'm not an expert in this area,
but I imagine that given a choice an airline will hire pilots who show
proficiency, rather than a specific number of hours.
By forcing airlines to look for such high hours, do you reduce the
pool of candidates to such a degree that it has an unintended, negative
safety consequence?
Answer. The NTSB has focused our recommendations on crew
proficiency on specific procedures and training, needed regulations,
and needed guidance to crews and operators rather than flight hour
minimums. For greater insight on these issues, I have attached NTSB
comments to the recent NPRM the FAA issued on the topic.
Question 2a. How would you characterize the impact this potential
rule has on the pool of qualified applicants available to commercial
airlines?
Answer. It would be difficult to determine the impact of this
potential rule on the pool of qualified applicants. The NTSB has
consistently advocated that qualification as an airline flight
crewmember should be based on knowledge, skills, professionalism, and
proficiency.
Question 3. Chairman Hersman: In your written testimony you stated
``industry changes--including two pilot cockpits and the advent of
regional carriers had resulted in opportunities for pilots to upgrade
to captain without having accumulated significant experience as a first
officer in a Part 121 operation.''
In your tenure as Chairman, what correlation have you seen between
low hours and accidents at regional and mainline carriers?
Answer. In several of our investigations, the NTSB has seen airline
pilots with various levels of flight hours who make mistakes. As a
result, the NTSB has issued recommendations that we believe will
improve the knowledge, skills, professionalism, and proficiency of
flight crew.
Question 3a. Can you please share with us the specific accidents at
Part 121 carriers that occurred as a result of pilots upgrading to
captain without accumulating experience in Part 121 operations?
Answer. Unfortunately, we have not yet conducted a more in depth
search of all our aviation investigations in which pilot training was a
leading or contributing factor.
Question 4. Chairman Hersman: As you may know Purdue University's
College of Technology has a very highly regarded flight training
program. Universities like Purdue are producing competent pilots, who
are flying in Part 121 environments, who will have about 400-500 hours
upon graduation. How will these pilots bridge the gap between their
current training and the hour expectations of the anticipated rule?
Answer. The NTSB believes that a combination of focused academic
training and structured flight training can benefit aspiring pilots.
The FAA's recent NPRM does not address how to define, conduct oversight
of, and apply this academic credit. We believe these issues must be
addressed to fully evaluate how academic class time can be treated as
training.
Question 4a. Has any thought been given to pilots who entered
flight training assured that they would be eligible for hire upon
graduation, who will now have to go and spend years outside of the
structured training environment?
Answer. As stated previously, the NTSB believes that appropriate
knowledge, skills, professionalism, and proficiency are attributes a
new pilot should have.
Question 4b. Is there a danger that they will lose some of their
knowledge and training during this period of time?
Answer. Programs should increase and enhance pilots' knowledge,
skills, proficiency, and professionalism.
Question 4c. There is, already, an enormous cost burden on future
pilots. Will this rule put the cost of training out of reach for
aspiring pilots?
Answer. The NTSB does not conduct cost-benefit analysis, but
through our investigations, awareness of industry training technology,
standards, and initiatives, we know that flight training devices and
simulators, if used appropriately, may decrease the cost of training
and provide a structured training environment for the development of
airmanship skills, honing procedures, and learning how to address
abnormalities and emergencies.
In addition, during a May 2010, forum on pilot professionalism in
aviation, ab initio training, which allows prospective pilots selected
by an airline to participate in training ranging from basic ground to
flight training to develop the pilot's line qualifications, was
discussed. Ab intitio is practiced in other countries. This approach to
training lessens the cost to the pilot and exposes them to the airlines
culture and the multi-crew concept from the very beginning of their
career.
Last, we know of accredited university gateway programs that
provide pilots with a career path through mentoring and training from
the university level to the airlines. Although we have not conducted
analyses of the costs of these approaches, or the cost of additional
hours of experience, we believe there exist innovative and technically
competent ways to address this issue at the industry level.
______
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC, April 30, 2012
Office of the Chairman,
Docket Operations, M-30,
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Attention: Rules Docket No. FAA-2010-0100
Dear Sir or Madam:
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has reviewed the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) titled ``Pilot Certification and Qualification Requirements for
Air Carrier Operations,'' which was published at 77 Federal Register
(FR) 12374 on February 29, 2012. The notice proposes to create new
certification requirements for pilots in air carrier operations,
including requiring that first officers in 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 121 operations hold an airline transport pilot
(ATP) certificate and type rating for the aircraft to be flown;
allowing pilots with an aviation degree or military pilot experience
but fewer than 1,500 hours total time as a pilot to obtain an ATP
certificate with restricted privileges; and requiring at least 1,000
flight hours in air carrier operations to serve as pilot-in command
(PIC) in Part 121 air carrier operations. The notice also proposes to
modify the requirements for obtaining an ATP certificate with an
airplane category multiengine class rating or type rating to require 50
hours of multiengine flight experience and completion of a new FAA-
approved ATP certificate training program that would include academic
training and training in a flight simulation training device. According
to the NPRM, these changes would help to ensure that pilots entering an
air carrier environment have the training and aeronautical experience
necessary to adapt to a complex, multicrew environment in a variety of
operating conditions.\1\
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\1\ According to the NPRM, the PIC requirements would affect pilots
operating under Part 121, as well as those operating under Part 135 and
Part 91, subpart K. In addition, the proposed ATP certification
training program would affect certificate holders under Parts 121, 135,
141, or 142 if they offer the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NPRM cites the 2009 Colgan Air accident near Buffalo, New York,
as an event that focused public, congressional, and industry attention
on flight crew experience requirements and training for conducting Part
121 air carrier operations. In February 2010, the FAA published an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), titled ``New Pilot
Certification Requirements for Air Carrier Operations'' (75 FR 6164,
February 8, 2010) that sought input on current Part 121 eligibility,
training, and qualification requirements for seconds-in-command
(SICs).\2\ The current NPRM is based on comments in response to the
ANPRM, input received from an aviation rulemaking committee established
in July 2010, and statutory requirements for modifying ATP
certification outlined in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation
Administration Extension Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-216).
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\2\ On April 8, 2010, the NTSB submitted comments on the ANPRM;
citing the increasing complexity of the operating environment and the
airplanes that are flown today, the NTSB indicated general support for
the proposed changes in requirements for eligibility, training, and
qualifications for air carrier pilots operating under Part 121. The
NTSB's comments also identified the need to ensure these changes would
apply to all revenue air carrier operations, including those conducted
under Part 135. Finally, the NTSB acknowledged that the FAA must
provide the personnel required to support oversight of the changes
discussed in the ANPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adding to that foundation, the NPRM states that the FAA conducted a
study of 61 NTSB investigation reports from Fiscal Year (FY) 2001
through FY 20 10 (31 Part 121 accidents and 30 Part 135 air carrier
accidents, with 107 fatalities, 28 serious injuries, and 44 minor
injuries). The study showed that the accidents examined involved pilot
deficiencies in aircraft handling, including stall and upset
recognition and recovery, high altitude training, active pilot
monitoring skills, effective crew resource management (CRM), stabilized
approaches, operations in icing conditions, and hypoxia training. The
NPRM asserts that the changes to air carrier pilot qualification would
address, in part, 21 NTSB safety recommendations in the following
areas:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Safety Issue Recommendations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training flight crews to respond to A-96-120, A-04-62, A-07-3, and A-09-
sudden, unusual, or unexpected 113
aircraft upsets
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Developing and conducting stall A-1 0-22 and -23
recovery training and providing
stickpusher familiarization
training for pilots of stickpusher-
equipped aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training in high altitude A-07-1 and -2
operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training and guidance for rudder A-02-2
use in transport-category aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Airport situational awareness A-07-44
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stabilized approach concept A-01-69 and A-08-18
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Landing performance calculations A-07-59 and A-08-41
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRM training A-03-52
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilot monitoring duties A-10-10
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements for flight crewmember A-1 0-15
academic training regarding
leadership and professionalism
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training in icing conditions A-07-14
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hypoxia awareness training A-00-110
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training in landing and taking off A-10-110 and -111
in crosswinds with gusts
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB is generally supportive of the proposed rule as it relates
to many of the issues previously identified in our safety
recommendations. Specific comments on several areas of the NPRM follow.
Academic Credit To Reduce Flight Experience Requirements
Although the NTSB has not made recommendations for flight hour
m1rumums for air carrier pilots (instead focusing its recommendations
on specific procedures and training, needed regulations, and needed
guidance to crews and operators), we stated in our comments on the
ANPRM that:
Ensuring a high level of knowledge, skills, and professionalism
for flight crewmembers is essential, but total flight hours or
an airline transport pilot certificate does not necessarily
equate to the level of knowledge, skills, and professionalism
required for consistently safe flight operations.
The comments went on to state that, ``the NTSB recognizes the value
of academic training for air carrier pilots, but the NTSB also believes
that academic training is not a substitute for practical experience.''
An important tenet in the recent NPRM is the concept that, ``in
certain circumstances, the combination of focused academic training and
structured flight training can substitute for actual flight
experience'' (p. 12379). The NTSB concurs with the FAA's
acknowledgement that there may be multiple pathways to becoming a
qualified air carrier pilot. However, there remain unresolved issues
for how academic credit should be applied, including student
performance within an accredited academic program and the type of
degree conferred. These issues are not addressed in the NPRM and
require more evaluation before this proposal is implemented. It is
essential that the content and rigor involved in academic training be
clearly defined and, most importantly, appropriate resources allocated
to conduct evaluation and oversight of these alternative methods of
qualification.
ATP Certification Training Program
The NPRM discusses the establishment of an FAA-approved ATP
certificate training program for a multiengine class ATP or type
rating. The proposed training program outlined under section 61.154
would include 24 hours of classroom training and 16 hours of simulator
training (8 in a full flight simulator of at least Level C standards)
and is intended to provide pilots with the core knowledge and
understanding in areas critical to operating high performance aircraft
in a complex and high altitude environment. The training would be
provided by an authorized training provider and would be required to be
completed before a pilot would be eligible to take the ATP knowledge
test. Issued as part of the NPRM, draft Advisory Circular (AC) 61-ATP,
``Airline Transport Pilot Certification Training Program for Airplane
Category Multiengine Class Rating or Type Rating,'' contains an outline
of the curriculum topics and objectives for both the classroom and
simulator training making up this training program. The AC is intended
for use by training providers when developing the program and by the
FAA when reviewing and approving the programs.
Many of the topics contained in the draft AC address issues from
NTSB safety recommendations; in fact, the FAA notes that most of the 21
recommendations cited in the NPRM are addressed, in part, by the
proposed amendments and advisory material. Although the NTSB concurs
with the FAA's assessment that, in most cases, the topics addressed
will serve to partially satisfy the action requested in existing
recommendations, the amount of specificity provided in the proposed
rule and AC does not allow a comprehensive review of the degree to
which the FAA's proposed actions would satisfY the intent of the NTSB's
recommendations. In some instances, neither document provides evidence
that a recommendation topic is addressed.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Many of the recommendations cited in the NPRM contain explicit
requirements for procedural change or apply more broadly to other
operational areas in the industry. For example, although Safety
Recommendation A-07-44 identifies the need for specific callouts to be
used during ground operations when entering a runway before takeoff,
the training outlined in the NPRM and AC only specifies that
situational awareness on the ground be covered as a topic area. In
addition, Safety Recommendation A-08-18 identifies the need for
specific action regarding go-around callouts, but neither the NPRM nor
the AC contains any clearly identifiable reference to go-arounds.
Finally, Safety Recommendation A-10-23 identifies the need for
stickpusher familiarization training for pilots of stickpusher-equipped
aircraft, but neither the NPRM nor the AC specifically outlines
stickpusher familiarization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB notes that recent safety recommendations in this area have
focused on attempts to improve crew response to in-flight emergencies,
including task prioritization and training.\4\ While AC 61-ATP does
include a classroom training objective named ``differences between
emergency and non-normal checklist procedures and checklists,'' the
guidance on emergency procedures should be made more explicit to
incorporate the issues identified in these NTSB recommendations. CRM is
another topic relevant to previous NTSB recommendations and outlined in
AC 61-ATP. However, the list of proposed topics in the AC does not
explicitly refer to the importance of first officer assertiveness,
which is an issue addressed in Safety Recommendation A-11-39.\5\ This
recommendation is not cited in the NPRM, but the NTSB believes that it
is within the scope of the draft advisory material and suggests
amending the AC to include information consistent with Safety
Recommendation A-11-39 to help support this important aspect of CRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ For example, Safety Recommendation A-09-22 asks the FAA to
``require principal operations inspectors to review their operators'
pilot guidance and training on task allocation and workload management
during emergency situations to verify that they state that, to the
extent practicable, the pilot running the checklists should not engage
in additional nonessential operational tasks, such as radio
communications.'' Safety Recommendations A-09-24 and -25, respectively,
ask the FAA to ``establish best practices for conducting both single
and multiple emergency and abnormal situations training'' and ``. . .
require that these best practices be incorporated into all operators'
approved training programs.''
\5\ Safety Recommendation A-11-39 asks the FAA to ``require that
role-playing or simulator-based exercises that teach first officers to
assertively voice their concerns and that teach captains to develop a
leadership style that supports first officer assertiveness be included
as part of the already required crew resource management training for
14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K
pilots.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB is encouraged that the NPRM proposes to centralize the
process for approving ATP certification training programs.
Specifically, the NPRM states that only authorized training providers
can administer the training required under section 61.154. These
providers can be certificate holders providing training and operating
under Parts 141, 142, 121, or 135, and each provider must receive
approval of their ATP certification training program by the FAA Air
Transportation Division (AFS-200). The NTSB notes that, theoretically,
centralization should help to ensure standardization of these programs,
but suggests that additional guidance documentation with more specific
and robust detail about the content of the proposed training is
necessary to provide a solid foundation on which the FAA can evaluate
the program content (and to assist training providers to develop
courses likely to receive FAA approval). For example, additional
detail, such as cross-referencing material from draft AC 120-STALL,
would be appropriate in the discussion of stall training in AC 61-ATP.
In addition, the FAA will need to provide the appropriate oversight
resources to these programs-not only in their initial approval but also
to conduct ongoing oversight to demonstrate that the content delivered
is consistent with the approved program. The rigor with which these
programs are implemented and overseen will determine their ultimate
influence on improving safety in air carrier operations.
Pilot-in-Command Requirements for Air Carrier Operations
The NPRM proposes primarily experience-based requirements for new
PICs in air carrier operations. However, the NTSB has previously issued
safety recommendations addressing the need for a specific leadership
training course for upgrading captains.\6\ Although the NPRM cites
Safety Recommendation A-10-15 \7\ and describes it as applicable to
leadership and professionalism training, it addresses only the latter
topic. The NPRM does not mention Safety Recommendations A-10-13 and -
14, which were issued with -15, but the NTSB believes that a leadership
training course for upgrading captains is within the scope of the
proposed rulemaking and that section 121.436 should be amended to
include a specific requirement for such a course.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Safety Recommendation A-10-13 asks the FAA to ``issue an
advisory circular with guidance on leadership training for upgrading
captains at 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K
operators, including methods and techniques for effective leadership;
professional standards of conduct; strategies for briefing and
debriefing; reinforcement and correction skills; and other knowledge,
skills, and abilities that are critical for air carrier operations.''
Safety Recommendation A-10-14 asks the FAA to, ``require all 14 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to provide a
specific course on leadership training to their upgrading captains that
is consistent with the advisory circular requested in Safety
Recommendation A-10-13.''
\7\ Safety Recommendation A-10-15 asks the FAA to ``develop, and
distribute to all pilots, multimedia guidance materials on
professionalism in aircraft operations that contain standards of
performance for professionalism; best practices for sterile cockpit
adherence; techniques for assessing and correcting pilot deviations;
examples and scenarios; and a detailed review of accidents involving
breakdowns in sterile cockpit and other procedures, including this
accident Obtain the input of operators and air carrier and general
aviation pilot groups in the development and distribution of these
guidance materials.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the requirements already outlined in section
121.434, the NTSB has recommended that Part 135 pilots who need a type
rating for the aircraft they fly be required to have a minimum level of
initial operating experience.\8\ Given the applicability of the NPRM to
Part 135 pilots who are engaged in air carrier operations, the NTSB
believes it would be appropriate to incorporate similar experience
requirements for these pilots as exist for Part 121 pilots.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Specifically, Safety Recommendation A-10-57 asks the FAA to
''require that pilots who fly in 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 135 operations in aircraft that require a type rating gain a
minimum level of initial operating experience, similar to that
specified in 14 CFR 121.434, taking into consideration the unique
characteristics of Part 135 operations.'' Safety Recommendation A-10-58
asks the FAA to ''require that pilots who fly in 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 135 operations in an aircraft that requires a
type rating gain a minimum level of flight time in that aircraft type,
similar to that described in 14 CFR 121.434, taking into consideration
the unique characteristics of Part 135 operations, to obtain
consolidation of knowledge and skills.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB supports the use of simulators in training environments
and notes that the training program outlined in the NPRM specifies that
training on topics such as low energy states/stalls and upset recovery
techniques will be conducted in a Level C or higher full-flight
simulator. Simulators, regardless of their fidelity, are dependent on
their physical limits of motion, as well as the efficacy of the
available computer programs (which are often limited in issues of upset
training because of the lack of flight test data at the extreme areas
of the flight envelope). Simulators are not always adequate in
portraying upsets and stalls and may inadvertently introduce negative
training. Consistent with Safety Recommendation A-04-62,\9\ the FAA
should allow flexibility in determining what level of simulation or
automation is appropriate for specific training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Safety Recommendation A-04-62 asks the FAA to ``. . . evaluate
issues concerning the level of automation appropriate to teaching upset
training and develop and disseminate guidance that will promote
standardization and minimize the danger of inappropriate simulator
training.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary Observations
This NPRM addresses many training issues applicable to becoming an
air carrier pilot, including some critical issues demonstrated in
recent accident history to be responsible for accidents. The NTSB is
encouraged that its recommendations were considered in the development
of this proposed rule, especially as the issue areas relate to the core
content to be provided to new entrant pilots through the ATP
certification training program. However, the intent of our
recommendations in this area is for all pilots to receive training in
these topics. Therefore, it is important that air carriers provide
equally robust training in these topic areas for their current air
carrier pilots on a recurrent basis.
The NTSB appreciates the opportunity to comment on this NPRM.
Sincerely,
Deborah A.P. Hersman,
Chairman.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Question 1. In September 2011, the GAO released a report entitled
``Status of FAA's Actions to Oversee the Safety of Composite
Airplanes''. Did the GAO find that FAA followed its certification
process in assessing the Boeing 787 airplane's composite fuselage and
wings against applicable FAA airworthiness standards?
Answer. GAO found that FAA followed its certification process in
assessing the Boeing 787 airplane's composite fuselage and wings
against applicable FAA airworthiness standards.\1\ FAA applied five
special conditions when it found that its airworthiness standards were
not adequate to ensure that the composite structures would comply with
existing safety levels. These special conditions, which relate to novel
features of the airplane's composite fuselage and wings, require Boeing
to take additional steps to demonstrate the 787's structures meet
current performance standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Aviation Safety: Status of FAA's Actions to Oversee the
Safety of Composite Airplanes, GAO-11-849 (Washington, D.C.: September
21, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA evaluated technical issues related to the composite feature,
identified regulatory standards that may not be adequate, consulted
with technical and scientific experts, and documented Boeing's
position. FAA documented its evaluation of the airplane's design issues
and gaps in the regulatory standards. We also found sufficient evidence
that in developing each of the special conditions, FAA involved
technical specialists and, in some cases, relied on research done at
its technical research center. In addition, we found that, consistent
with FAA policy, FAA adequately documented the implications of the
composite features on safety, why the existing airworthiness standards
were not adequate, and how the special conditions would enable the 787
airplane to meet the current level of safety.
Question 2. FAA applied five special conditions when it found that
its existing airworthiness standards were not adequate to ensure that
the composite structures would comply with existing safety levels. Did
the GAO find that the FAA followed its processes which included
monitoring Boeing's compliance with these special conditions?
Answer. On the basis of our review of FAA's documentation and
discussion with FAA officials about its activities in developing the
five special conditions, we found that FAA followed the special
conditions process.\2\ Specifically, we found that FAA followed its
process by documenting the technical issues related to the design of
the composite fuselage and wings, determining the special conditions
and equivalent level of safety finding, obtaining public comments on
draft special conditions, and monitoring Boeing's compliance with those
conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ FAA also developed five means of compliance issues papers that
described how Boeing would demonstrate compliance of the 787's
composite fuselage and wings with regulatory standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We found that FAA tracked the status of the deliverables Boeing
provided in order to determine that the manufacturer complied with the
special conditions and was demonstrating that it could meet safety
levels. We found that FAA tracked the dates each deliverable was
received and approved. For most deliverables, FAA staff, rather than a
designee, was responsible for approving the deliverable, especially for
more significant tests and documents. Although FAA desginees were the
responsible officials for witnessing the certification tests, Boeing
representatives invited FAA staff to observe the tests as well, and FAA
staff attended many of them. Boeing tested full-scale structures, such
as a portion of the wing span, the horizontal stabilizer, and the
fuselage. Some of these tests were conducted to simulate how certain
composite structures would perform in a crash. One such test, which FAA
technical staff monitored, involved vertically dropping a section of a
composite fuselage from a height and at a rate that FAA required. The
test validated the analytical model used to assess the behavior of the
787 fuselage for all the design conditions required under the special
conditions.
The scope of our review was limited to the special conditions
applied to the design of the 787 composite airplane's wings and
fuselage. We focused on the special conditions and equivalent safety
level finding because we were interested in determining whether FAA
followed it process for developing them and the information was
publicly available. We did not conduct a comprehensive review of all of
the airworthiness standards that affect the composite fuselage or wings
nor did we make an assessment of whether FAA should have created
special conditions for the composite features in addition to those
identified by FAA. We did not review the formulation, testing, or
certification of any other special conditions, nor did we evaluate the
inspection process for the production of aircraft post-certification.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Dan Coats to
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Question. Dr. Dillingham, you have a strong research-based
background in the area of pilot training metrics. Based on your
previous research, do you think that a pilot shortage would play out
unevenly across the country, impacting smaller and more remote
communities the hardest?
Answer. Our previous research in this area, from 2011, highlighted
various industry concerns about a potential pilot shortage but found
the existing evidence mixed as to whether a shortage was occurring or
might occur in the future. Further, our research did not explicitly
address how or whether a potential pilot shortage might differently
impact various markets across the country.
Nonetheless, we reported in 2011 that regional airlines told us
they were expecting legislative changes to pilot requirements and rest
rules to impact their ability to hire qualified entry-level pilots. In
particular, the new rules will require pilots to have adequate rest
between shifts, and have more flying hours before they can become
qualified to work as commercial pilots, thus increasing the cost and
time it takes for people be enter this occupation. Labor economics
literature suggests that, if an employer cannot find adequate labor at
the wage and working conditions it is offering, the employer can change
those conditions to attract more workers. At this time, it is unknown
whether regional airlines serving smaller and more remote communities
will respond to any difficulties finding appropriately trained pilots--
if those problems develop--by offering higher pay, or assistance with
training costs in order to attract their desired workforce. Such
activities will raise costs for these carriers, who are then likely to
pass some or most of those costs on to passengers in the form of higher
fares. It follows then, that because higher fares will likely lead to
some curtailment in demand, any developing shortage of pilots may be
somewhat mitigated by a reduction in the level of aviation service.
Whether that dynamic would play out differently across different sized
communities is unknown at this time.
Looked at more broadly however, many factors, beyond the
availability of pilots, affect the services that airlines choose to
provide. For example, high and volatile fuel prices, lack of demand
resulting from difficult economic conditions, changes in fleet
composition, among other factors can all affect whether airlines choose
to serve various communities. These factors may play a more important
role in how services to these markets are impacted than the possible
impacts of a potential pilot shortage.
We have work currently underway to revisit these issues in light of
continued industry concerns and reports about a pilot shortage, and the
impending implementation of pilot rest rules and new pilot
requirements.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Jeffrey B. Guzzetti
Challenges to FAA Finalizing Rulemaking Required Under the Airline
Safety Act
Question 1. Mr. Guzzetti, the IG's January 2013 status report on
the implementation of the Airline Safety Act says, ``FAA faces
significant challenges to fully implement the Act, such as meeting
timelines for rulemaking efforts while balancing competing interests of
stakeholders involved with controversial safety measures.''
For example, FAA is experiencing lengthy delays and considerable
industry opposition in issuing and finalizing rules that will enhance
pilot qualification standards, revise crew training requirements, and
establish mentoring and professionalism programs.''
What can the FAA do to overcome these hurdles and issue final rules
for pilot qualification standards, crew training requirements, and
mentoring and professionalism programs that reflect the intent of the
authorizing legislation?
Answer. It is important for FAA to do all they can to expedite
these rulemaking efforts.
The success of FAA's efforts to issue final rules on pilot
qualification standards, crew training requirements, and mentoring and
professionalism depends on the Agency's ability to work with air
carriers, industry associations, and other agencies to resolve their
concerns, if possible, in a timely manner.
However, we note that rulemaking activities are complex, require
extensive public notification and comment periods, and can encounter
significant industry opposition. For example, FAA encountered
significant industry pushback due to the increase in flight hours the
Act mandates for pilots. Similarly, industry is concerned that the
proposed crew training rule imposes overly prescriptive training hours
rather than basing pilot training on skills most needed to safely
perform flight operations. Finally, FAA has encountered a lengthy delay
in issuing a proposed rule establishing mentoring and leadership
programs, due in part to challenges in developing the appropriate
balance between the costs and benefits of these programs.
To overcome these challenges, FAA will need to work with the
various stakeholders to address these issues without losing the intent
of the legislation.
Code-Sharing Between Mainline and Regional Carriers
Question 2. Mr. Guzzetti, do you believe that mainline air carriers
are finding ways to ensure that their regional code-share partners
implement the most effective safety practices?
Answer. We found that mainline carriers have begun implementing
safety information sharing practices with their code-sharing partners.
However, the amount, type, and frequency of shared information vary
greatly.
We are concerned that FAA has not provided guidance to the industry
on how to implement safety information-sharing programs or outlined its
expectations for sharing best practices on code share partnerships. In
our recent audit report regarding FAA's role in domestic airline code
sharing, we issued a recommendation to FAA to provide this guidance.
FAA responded to our recommendation by stating that it intends to
require each Part 121 air carrier to implement a safety management
system (SMS). SMS is a comprehensive, process-oriented approach to
managing safety that includes an organization-wide safety policy;
formal methods for identifying hazards, controlling, and continually
assessing risk; and promotion of a safety culture. FAA believes that a
tailored SMS program within each airline will be an effective method
for safety information sharing. FAA projects that the SMS rule will be
issued this September, but it is uncertain when it will be fully
implemented. Notwithstanding the expected benefits of SMS, we believe
that continued FAA oversight is needed to ensure mainline carriers are
working with their regional partners and implementing the most
effective safety practices.
Question 3. In your February 14th report on code-sharing, you
recommended that the Office of the Secretary and the FAA takes a closer
look at the code-sharing agreements between major airlines and their
regional partners for the potential impact that requirements for
contractual obligation such as on-time performance may have on safety.
Can you explain the concerns that your office may have, and what
your investigation uncovered in terms of DOT and FAA having awareness
of what actually is written into these code share agreements?
Answer. We found that DOT's Office of the Secretary (OST) and FAA
do not review most domestic code share agreements. Therefore, DOT and
FAA have a limited awareness of what is contained in these agreements,
despite the fact that the increased use of code share agreements
between U.S. air carriers has changed the aviation landscape.
OST is required to assess potential economic impacts on competition
for domestic code share agreements only between two major carriers.
However, because just 20 percent of active Part 121 carriers are
considered ``major,'' the number of agreements that OST is required to
review is limited. OST does not voluntarily review other ``non-major''
agreements because it believes that agreements between major carriers
are the only ones with the potential to adversely impact the market.
However, the addition or cancellation of code share agreements between
major carriers and non-major carriers may affect competition and
consumer access in smaller markets. For example, after its merger with
Northwest Airlines, Delta Air Lines announced that it was suspending
its Delta Connection service to 24 smaller markets as the carrier
sought to adjust service to these markets. As we noted in our February
2013 report, OST may be missing competitive and economic impacts on
smaller markets.
FAA--the safety regulator--is not required by law to review any
domestic code share agreements and does not voluntarily do so. FAA
considers domestic code share agreements to be purely financial
arrangements and relies on its oversight of individual carriers to
ensure the safe operation of passenger flights. Even so, in its 2009
Call to Action on Aviation Safety and Pilot Training, the FAA committed
to work with DOT ``to develop the authority to review agreements
between air carriers and their regional partners.'' Despite this
commitment, FAA did not pursue this effort. Our work shows that FAA can
and should take a more active role. Specifically, we found that FAA
does not review performance metrics contained in code share agreements
to ensure they do not have an adverse impact on safety. These metrics,
such as incentives for on time performance, may have unintended safety
implications. As a result, FAA must take a more active role in
reviewing these agreements.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Jeffrey B. Guzzetti
Question. Following the Colgan Air crash outside Buffalo, New York,
Congress required the FAA to increase pilot qualifications so that
first officers have a minimum of 1,500 hours of flight time. The final
rule on pilot qualifications is substantially overdue. What impacts
will there be on pilots, and passengers, if the FAA does not complete
the rule quickly?
Answer. Without FAA's final rule, air carrier pilots will have to
meet the more stringent qualification requirements of the Act that will
automatically take effect on August 1, 2013. This means that air
carriers will have to remove any pilot from their duties if they do not
hold a valid Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate; which requires
a minimum of 1,500 hours of flight time. We do not know, and neither
does FAA, how many pilots this would affect, or the impact on flight
cancellations. Our recent audit report regarding FAA's progress on the
Act addresses this, and cites our recommendation that FAA determine how
many pilots do not meet the heightened qualification standards required
by the Act, and assess the data for the potential impact on FAA and air
carrier operations.
Through a rulemaking, FAA has the opportunity to provide
flexibility on the pilot flight hour and advanced certificate
prerequisites. For example, the proposed rule enables FAA to allow
pilots with a 4-year aviation degree or military flight experience to
obtain the new, restricted ATP for Co-Pilots/Second-In-Command as an
alternative to the 1,500 hour requirement.
FAA's delayed rulemaking is a particular concern because air
carriers may not have adequate time to make necessary adjustments to
their pilot training and qualification programs to meet the new
requirements by the Act's deadline. As we have stated, the impact on
passengers is uncertain, and is an important watch item for this
Committee.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Jeffrey B. Guzzetti
Question. I am committed to investing in our Nation's
infrastructure and making sure we have the safest airports at all our
airports, large and small. That is why I have cosponsored the Protect
Our Skies Act led by Senators Moran and Blumenthal that would keep our
air traffic control towers open. There are four air traffic control
towers slated for closure in Minnesota. Two towers are FAA operated at
Flying Cloud, Eden Prairie while the two towers at Janes Field in Anoka
County and St. Cloud Regional are contract towers. Anoka County has
written a letter about why their tower is important to the community
and I request that it be submitted for the record. Can you talk about
the need for more air traffic controllers to address fatigue and
improve safety?
Answer. Air traffic controllers are an important component to the
safe operation of air traffic in the air and on the ground. As such,
ensuring a well-rested, alert controller workforce is critical to the
safe and efficient operation of the National Airspace System (NAS).
FAA currently has more than 15,000 controllers to guide pilots
through the NAS. In response to a number of incidents of sleeping or
unresponsive controllers in 2011, FAA has taken action to mitigate the
impact of fatigue on controllers by revising its scheduling policies.
For example, the Agency increased the minimum rest periods between
shifts and increased the number of controllers assigned to midnight
shifts.
At this time, FAA is still determining how many controllers it
needs. We believe it is critical that FAA establish proper staffing
levels for each of its air traffic control facilities to ensure it has
the appropriate number of controllers at the appropriate location.
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