[Senate Hearing 113-635]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-635
ASSESSING VENEZUELA'S POLITICAL CRISIS: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
BEYOND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 2
Duddy, Hon. Patrick D., visiting faculty, The Fuqua School of
Business, Duke University, Durham, NC.......................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Jacobson, Hon. Roberta S., Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Malinowski, Hon. Tomasz P., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey.............. 1
Naim, Moises, Ph.D., senior associate, International Economics
Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, DC................................................. 37
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Vivanco, Jose Miguel, executive director, Americas Division,
Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC............................. 43
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letters Sent to Senators Robert Menendez and Bob Corker from
Roberta Jacobson re: The Role of Sanctions in Venezuela's
Policy......................................................... 65
(iii)
ASSESSING VENEZUELA'S POLITICAL CRISIS: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND
BEYOND
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 8, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Durbin, Kaine, Markey, Corker,
Rubio, Johnson, and McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Before I welcome our panelists, let me welcome Senator
Nelson of Florida who has expressed to the Chair a very deep
interest in what is happening in Venezuela, and we welcome him
here today to be with us.
Let me welcome today's panelists from the Department of
State, Duke University, the Carnegie Endowment, and Human
Rights Watch, which this week released a deeply troubling
report on the scale of human rights violations in Venezuela, a
report documenting human rights abuses far worse than I had
anticipated.
The report documents how Venezuelan security forces, often
in collaboration with colectivos, armed pro-government gangs,
have systematically violated the rights of students, women,
men, members of the political opposition, and journalists. They
have severely beaten unarmed Venezuelans, and fired live
ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas canisters
indiscriminately into crowds.
The report documents Venezuelan security forces subjecting
detained protestors to severe physical abuse. I will not go
into great detail, but I urge those who are interested to read
the report. In one case, members of the National Guard detained
a young protestor and, quoting from the report, kicked him,
beat him and fired a rubber pellet from point-blank range into
his right thigh. He was driven to a military installation where
a guardsman who saw his bleeding leg inserted his finger into
the open wound, removed it, and then inserted it again.
The report goes on to say that the guards handcuffed him to
a metal pole, gave him electric shock treatments, kicked him,
and called him a fascist.
Apparently, in some cases, prosecutors and judicial
officials have been complicit in these reported human rights
violations, and when governments degrade and politicize a
justice system long enough, as the Chavez and Maduro
administrations have done, the rule of law is abandoned and the
judiciary becomes yet another tool of oppression.
In fact, not a single member of the security forces have
been sentenced for their role in these widespread human rights
violations, but the courts have been used to remove and jail
opposition mayors and imprison opposition leader Leopoldo
Lopez.
We should not overlook the fact that there has been
violence on both sides, but we should be perfectly clear that
the primary responsibility for the excessive, unjustified use
of force rests with the Maduro administration.
We must also be perfectly clear that a foreign power is
acting openly in Venezuela, fueling the country's instability
and economic and political crisis. The Cuban Government, its
advisors, and its intelligence officers have penetrated and are
influencing senior levels of the Venezuelan Government. This
cannot be overlooked.
Today's hearing is an opportunity for us to understand what
role the United States has played and should play, given the
current crisis in Venezuela.
In the face of widespread human rights abuses in Venezuela
and the lack of accountability for those crimes, I have
introduced legislation, along with Senator Rubio and Senator
Nelson, which calls for targeted sanctions on individuals
responsible for rights violations.
We also need to analyze what, in my view, has been a very
weak response from the Organization of American States, look at
what other South American governments are doing to mediate
dialogue between the Venezuelan Government and members of the
opposition, and explore other options, including action at the
United Nations.
We must also look at the future implications of the
deteriorating political and economic conditions in Venezuela,
and its potential impact on Caribbean and Central American
nations that have benefited from Venezuelan subsidized oil
shipments.
Finally, we must assess the destabilizing role that Cuba is
playing in Venezuela and the very real security challenges from
transnational criminal enterprises operating in the country, as
well as the signs of their collusion with members of the
Venezuelan Government.
With that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Corker, for his remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for your leadership on this issue and for having this
hearing.
I want to thank Senator Nelson for his interest and being
here. I know he used to be on the committee. I think that is
correct. Anyway, we appreciate having him here.
And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.
All of us, I think, have had briefings on the human rights
violations that are taking place under the Maduro government,
and they are quite startling, no doubt, especially with this
most recent report. So thank you for shedding light on that
today.
We have had a number of foreign policy meetings, as we
always do, and it has been difficult at times to understand
exactly what the administration's policies are toward the areas
where we are having issues. And so I do look forward today to
the testimony to help understand us what the administration's
core policy goals are as it relates to Venezuela.
And again, I thank the witnesses for being here.
Venezuela is a deeply troubled country. Forty-one people
are dead. The stories of torture and other abuses that our
chairman so eloquently laid out certainly cause all of us to be
concerned and want to be involved in helping shape a better
future there.
The economy is in shambles. The country is very divided
right now, which makes it even more difficult, I know, to move
ahead in a way that makes a lot of sense.
So I do look forward to the testimony today, and hopefully
it will shed light on us here in America putting forth a
coherent policy that helps the country move ahead, although we
understand they are going to have to do that themselves but
with our help. So thank you very much for being here. I look
forward to your testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Well, let me introduce our first panel today. We have
Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Roberta
Jacobson; and Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Tom Malinowski. I believe
this is your first appearance before the committee. So, we
welcome you to your relatively new post.
And with that, let me say that both of your statements will
be fully included in the record, without objection. We ask that
you summarize your statements in about 5 minutes or so, so that
we can have in a dialogue with you. Madam Secretary, we will
start off with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez,
Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee. Thank you for
this opportunity to speak with you about Venezuela.
As you know, we continue to be very concerned about the
situation in Venezuela where legitimate political, economic,
and social grievances and a lack of adequate democratic space
and respect for human rights have brought protests and,
unfortunately, violence. The United States has called on the
Venezuelan Government to respect human rights, uphold the rule
of law, and engage in peaceful, inclusive dialogue with
Venezuelans across the political spectrum to alleviate the
tension. We have consistently called on the Venezuelan
Government to release those it has unjustly jailed, lift
restrictions on freedom of the press, and respect freedom of
assembly.
Assistant Secretary Malinowski will discuss the human
rights situation in greater depth, while I will discuss what we
are doing diplomatically to bring an end to the violence and
encourage respect for democratic processes and human rights. I
know this committee shares our concern, and we welcome your
strong support for democracy in Venezuela.
This is not a United States-Venezuela issue. It is an
internal Venezuelan issue. We have been clear all along that
the future of Venezuela is for the Venezuelan people to decide,
and we have strongly resisted attempts to be used as a
distraction from Venezuela's real problems. Our focus has been
to encourage an end to the violence and an authentically
inclusive dialogue to address the Venezuelan people's
legitimate grievances. We have been actively engaging
international partners to find a peaceful solution. We are
encouraged by the Union of South American Nations-led
initiative with Vatican participation involving meetings
between the government and many parties of the political
opposition.
While we are encouraged by the UNASUR (Union of South
American Nations) and Vatican efforts, we must have realistic
expectations. The Venezuelan Government has so far resisted
obvious demonstrations of good will: the release of political
prisoners or disarming of the government-sponsored vigilante
groups. Nevertheless, those opposition elements engaged in the
dialogue are, for the first time in a long time, able to speak
truth to power in a setting where the government must listen.
That is not a panacea, but it could be a beginning.
We also need to recognize that the Venezuelan opposition is
not monolithic. Important elements of that opposition and
student leaders remain outside the dialogue and are deeply
skeptical of it. Protestors remain on the streets. They too
need to be heard. We should respect the diversity of opinion
within the Venezuelan opposition, meaning both those who have
declined to enter the dialogue and those who believe that by
doing so they can achieve some progress regarding human rights,
democracy, and Venezuela's economic and social problems. This
may be a slow process, and it may fail. But for now,
significant elements of the opposition consider the effort
worthwhile.
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Vatican are expending
significant effort to facilitate this dialogue, and we believe
it behooves us to respect the effort. If this dialogue does not
begin to solve Venezuela's chronic problems, then the country's
long-term outlook for stability is extremely poor. Leaving
aside the ongoing political turmoil, Venezuela's economy is
stalling, the government is struggling to meet its financial
obligations, and massive fiscal adjustments are urgently
needed. The failure of the current dialogue process would
result in an even more troubled Venezuela and would redouble
its need for honest brokers from the international community to
help Venezuela find its way.
We share the concern of many in the region that the current
dynamics, especially economic, raise doubts about Venezuela's
long-term stability. However, I want to emphasize the
following: While we regard the current dialogue underway with
cautious optimism, one thing we will not do is remain silent in
the face of Venezuelan Government assaults on fundamental
freedoms. Freedom of expression and peaceful assembly are
universal human rights. They are essential to a functioning
democracy.
Venezuela's problems cannot be solved by criminalizing
dissent. There must be space in Venezuelan society for those
who do not agree with the government to express their views.
We have strong historic and cultural ties with the
Venezuelan people, and we remain committed to our relationship
with them. But the future of Venezuela is for the Venezuelan
people to decide. And they have real concerns that must be
addressed. Venezuela's serious and worsening and economic and
social problems require democratic solutions.
We remain committed to working with member states to
utilize the OAS in conjunction with other regional and
subregional, as well as international efforts to advance real
dialogue in Venezuela. The OAS, as the region's premier
multilateral institution, can and should assume a greater role
to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Venezuela,
consistent with its mandate to promote peace, democracy, and
respect for human rights in member states, as expressed in its
charter and in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to end by saying that I
sincerely appreciate the support that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has provided to our core foreign policy
interests in Venezuela and in the hemisphere. We all seek to
advance democracy, human rights, social development, security,
and economic prosperity in the region.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Roberta S. Jacobson
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee,
thank you for this opportunity to speak with you about Venezuela. I
appreciate your interest in Venezuela and your support for U.S.
assistance and our policies and engagement there.
We continue to be preoccupied by the situation in Venezuela, where
legitimate political, economic, and social grievances and a lack of
adequate democratic space and respect for human rights have brought
protests and, unfortunately, violence. The United States has called on
the Venezuelan Government to respect human rights, uphold the rule of
law, and engage in a peaceful, inclusive dialogue with Venezuelans
across the political spectrum to alleviate the current tension. We have
consistently called on the Venezuelan Government to release those it
unjustly jailed, lift restrictions on freedom of the press, and respect
freedoms of assembly and association. Assistant Secretary Malinowski
will discuss the human rights situation in greater depth, while I will
focus on what we are doing diplomatically to bring an end to the
violence and respect for democratic processes and human rights. I know
this committee shares our concerns, and we welcome your strong support
for democracy in Venezuela.
This is not a U.S.-Venezuela issue, it is an internal Venezuelan
issue. We've been clear all along that the future of Venezuela is for
the Venezuelan people to decide. We have strongly resisted attempts to
be used as a distraction from Venezuela's real problems. Our focus has
been to encourage an end to the violence and authentically inclusive
dialogue to address the Venezuelan people's legitimate grievances. We
have been actively engaging international partners to find a peaceful
solution. We are encouraged by the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR)-led initiative with Vatican participation involving meetings
between the government and many parties within the political
opposition.
While we are encouraged by the efforts of UNASUR and the Vatican,
we must have realistic expectations. The Venezuelan Government has so
far resisted two obvious demonstrations of good will: the release of
political prisoners and disarming the government-supported vigilante
groups. Nevertheless, those opposition elements engaged in the dialogue
are, for the first time in a long time, able to speak truth to power in
a setting where the government must listen. That of course is not a
panacea, but it could be a beginning. We also need to recognize the
Venezuelan opposition is not monolithic. Important elements of the
opposition, and student leaders, remain outside the dialogue, and are
deeply skeptical of it. Protestors remain on the streets. They, too,
all need to be heard. We should respect the diversity of opinion within
the Venezuelan opposition--meaning both those who have declined to
enter the dialogue and those who believe that by doing so they can
achieve some progress regarding human rights, democracy, and
Venezuela's economic and social problems. This may be a slow process;
it may fail, but for now significant elements of the opposition
consider the effort worthwhile.
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and the Vatican are expending
significant time and effort to facilitate this dialogue. It behooves us
to respect and to support, as we have been doing, this effort. If this
dialogue does not begin to solve Venezuela's chronic problems, both
democratic and economic, then the country's long-term outlook for
stability is extremely poor. Leaving aside the ongoing political
turmoil, Venezuela's economy is stalling, the government is struggling
to meet its financial obligations, and massive fiscal adjustments are
urgently needed. The failure of the current dialogue process will
result in an even more troubled Venezuela, and will redouble its need
for honest brokers from the international community to help Venezuela
find its way.
We share the concern of many in the region that current dynamics,
especially economic, raise doubts about Venezuela's long-term
stability. However, I want to emphasize the following: While we regard
the dialogue currently underway with cautious optimism, one thing we
will not do is remain silent in the face of Venezuelan Government
assaults on fundamental freedoms.
Freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly are universal human
rights. They are essential to a functioning democracy, and the
Venezuelan Government has an obligation to protect fundamental freedoms
and the safety of its citizens, including those who engage in peaceful
protest.
Venezuela's problems cannot be solved by criminalizing dissent;
there must be space in Venezuelan society for those who do not agree
with the government to express their views.
We are not alone--the U.N. Secretary General, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights and six U.N. special rapporteurs, the EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and others--have called on the
Venezuelan Government to respect the universal human rights and
fundamental freedoms of its citizens.
We have strong historic and cultural ties with the Venezuelan
people, and we remain committed to our relationship with them. But the
future of Venezuela is for the Venezuelan people to decide. They have
real concerns that deserve to be addressed. Venezuela's serious and
worsening economic and social problems require democratic solutions.
We defend human rights activists and fundamental freedoms around
the world, including in Venezuela. Our commitment to democracy and
human rights is unwavering and remains the center of gravity for our
strategy in the region.
We remain committed to working with member states to utilize the
OAS, in conjunction with other regional and subregional efforts, to
advance real dialogue in Venezuela. The OAS, as the region's premier
multilateral institution, can and should assume a greater role to find
a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Venezuela, consistent with its
mandate to promote peace, democracy, and respect for human rights in
member states, as expressed in its Charter and in the Inter-American
Democratic Charter.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to end by saying that I sincerely
appreciate the support that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
provided to our core foreign policy interests in Venezuela and the
hemisphere. We are united in our core strategic goals. We all seek to
advance democracy, human rights, social development, security, and
economic prosperity in the region. There is strong, bipartisan
cooperation where it matters most between the State Department and this
committee, as well as among this committee's members and staff, to the
great benefit of our country.
The Chairman. Secretary Malinowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOMASZ P. MALINOWSKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Corker, Senator Rubio. Thank you for having us here today and
for all of your efforts to make sure that the spotlight
continues to shine on Venezuela, even as we face so many other
crises around the world.
I want to start by putting this in a broader context and
remarking that in the last several decades, democracy and
respect for human rights have spread dramatically in Latin
America. This has been one of the most extraordinarily positive
transformations that we have seen anywhere in the world. As a
result of it, we have been able to resolve armed conflicts.
Prosperity has grown and is benefiting more people throughout
the region. There are more opportunities for countries in the
Americas to cooperate than ever before.
And the United States has worked extremely hard to support
this progress over the years and to push back when it is
challenged. We have done so with countries that are our friends
like Mexico and Colombia. We have done so with countries with
which we have more strained relationships. We have done so by
providing direct support to empower local communities and give
citizens a voice in government. We have done so by championing
the Inter-American institutions that are supposed to protect
this progress and to hold every country in the region to the
same high standards.
But democracy is still under threat in Latin America. This
progress is still under threat. And what is happening in
Venezuela illustrates the threat perfectly. Venezuela reminds
us that democracy is nothing without checks on government
power. It requires a strong, independent judiciary, a free
press, separation of powers, and respect for individual rights.
The idea that winning an election gives the winner the power to
impose his will without any institutional limits is as
dangerous to democracy as a military coup, a point that we have
occasion to make in many parts of the world these days. If that
idea is legitimized in Venezuela, the region could go back to a
time when states and societies were in conflict, as we are
seeing on the streets of Venezuela today.
So those are the stakes for us. That is why this is
important.
Well before the current crisis, as you know, successive
rulers in Venezuela eroded respect for democratic principles in
several stark ways, engineering the takeover of television
stations, blocking Internet sites, stripping opposition
parliamentarians of their immunity, politicizing the judicial
system and using it to intimidate and punish selectively
critics of the government. When judges have resisted government
pressure, they have been punished, for example, the case of
Judge Maria Afiuni who was imprisoned, abused, spent 4 years
under house arrest, and remains on trial as we sit here today
because she tried to do her job and enforce the law in
Venezuela.
The protests in February began as a reaction to increased
crime, but they quickly evolved into a movement to restore the
democratic freedoms that Venezuelans have lost. The government
has responded, as you mentioned, with tear gas, with plastic
bullets, leaving more than 40 people dead and hundreds injured.
It has empowered armed civilian thugs to intimidate and kill
those Venezuelans who continue to march, harassed and
intimidated television and radio stations, newspaper staffs and
independent journalists, prosecuted political opponents like
Leopoldo Lopez, shut down the Colombian television station
NTN24 to stop its widely viewed live broadcasts of opposition
protests.
The administration has consistently condemned these human
rights abuses and called for the restoration of democratic
rights and freedoms in Venezuela. Just yesterday, Secretary
Kerry did so again saying that the people in the streets have
legitimate grievances that deserve to be addressed.
We have encouraged constructive pressure and involvement by
other countries in the region, and to that end, Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you for your help in raising Venezuela with
Mexico's President during your visit there in February. We have
pressed the case at the OAS, at the U.N. We have continued to
support targeted programs in Venezuela that promote democratic
participation and help people overcome restrictions on freedom
of expression, and we will not be deterred from continuing
those programs.
As Assistant Secretary Jacobson described in detail, the
United States has also supported the mediated talks led by
UNASUR with Vatican engagement. But we do not view dialogue as
endless or as an end in itself. It is a means to an end, the
restoration of the rights and freedoms Venezuelans have been
denied for a generation. As Secretary Kerry said yesterday we
will not stop defending those rights.
So, Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you and others
on this committee for raising awareness of the crisis. We are
grateful for your longstanding commitment to advancing human
rights and democracy in this hemisphere, and I would be happy
to join Assistant Secretary Jacobson in answering any questions
you have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Malinowski
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee,
I am glad for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
the deteriorating human rights situation in Venezuela. I join my friend
Roberta Jacobson in welcoming your strong support for human rights,
democracy, and rule of law in Venezuela.
In the last several decades, democracy and respect for human rights
have spread dramatically in Latin America. Dictatorships have fallen,
and civil society has risen. As a result, a number of armed conflicts
have been resolved. Prosperity has grown and is benefiting more people.
There are more opportunities for countries in the Americas to cooperate
to grow our economies and increase the security of our people than ever
before.
The United States has worked hard to support this extraordinary
democratic progress, and push back when it is challenged. We've done so
with friends such as Colombia and Mexico as well as with countries
where our diplomatic relationships have been more strained. We have
done so by providing direct support to people and nongovernmental
organizations working across the hemisphere, from the bottom up, to
empower local communities and give citizens a voice in government.
Under Roberta's leadership, we have done so by championing the Inter-
American institutions, including the OAS and its Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and Inter-American Court, which protect this
progress and hold every country in the region to the same set of
standards.
But democracy is still under threat in Latin America, and what is
happening in Venezuela illustrates the threat perfectly. Venezuela
reminds us that democracy is nothing without checks on government
power; it requires a strong, independent judiciary, a free press,
separation of powers, and respect for individual rights. The idea that
winning an election gives the winner the power to impose his will on
society without institutional limits is as dangerous to democracy as a
military coup. This idea is at war with the basic principles that
champions of human rights in Latin America have fought to enshrine in
their national constitutions, and in Inter-American institutions. We
have a stake in standing up for the principle, as President Obama put
it speaking in Santiago, Chile, ``that simply holding power does not
give a leader the right to suppress the rights of others, and that
leaders must maintain power through consent, and not coercion.'' If
that principle is undermined, the region could go back to a time when
states and societies were in conflict, as we are seeing in Venezuela
today.
The government has shut off all avenues of recourse,
politicizing the judicial system, and using the judiciary to
intimidate and selectively prosecute political, organized
labor, and civil society leaders who were critical of
government policies or actions. One judge who tried to rule
according to law, Judge Maria Afiuni, was imprisoned, abused,
spent 4 years under house arrest and remains on trial as we sit
here today. Her crime? Ordering the release of a prisoner who
had already served the maximum sentence without ever having
been tried.
Last May the government engineered a takeover of the
opposition-oriented Globovision television station by a company
with government ties. Globovision has now, of course, lost its
editorial independence.
In November, President Maduro announced that the government
blocked seven Internet sites that post dollar- and euro-
currency exchange rates other than the government's official
rate. Maduro accused these Web sites of creating economic
instability and stated his intent to crack down on businesses
that inflate prices to equal the unofficial rate.
Also in November, the National Assembly revoked the
parliamentary immunity of opposition National Assembly Deputy
Maria Aranguren and charged her with corruption, money
laundering, and embezzlement. That action paved the way for
President Maduro to pass a bill authorizing him to rule by
decree for 1 year.
The Department has for the last several years consistently
highlighted the steady erosion of democracy and human rights in
Venezuela, first under the Chavez and now Maduro administrations. The
annual Country Reports on Human Rights submitted to Congress each year
documents this trajectory publicly.
In the current crisis, the government has intensified its assault
on the rights of citizens to organize and express themselves freely.
This time around President Maduro has made the media a particular focus
of suppression, recognizing that an informed Venezuelan populace would
present a threat to the government's power and control.
Though protests in February were launched primarily as a reaction
to increased crime, they have since spurred a full-fledged movement
aiming for the restoration of democratic institutions, and for some,
the resignation of President Maduro.
The government has in turn responded with tear gas and plastic
bullets, leaving more than 40 people dead and hundreds injured. The
government has harassed and intimidated television and radio stations,
newspaper staff, and independent journalists, along with political
activists and opposition leaders.
The Maduro administration continues to persecute political
opponents, such as Leopoldo Lopez, who last week spent his 43rd
birthday in a military prison after surrendering himself to
authorities nearly 3 months ago. He still awaits a hearing, and
is all but guaranteed to be found guilty for spurious charges
fabricated by the government.
In February, the government shut down the Colombian
television station NTN24, to stop its widely viewed live
broadcasts of opposition protests. The station is now only
available via the Internet.
The Maduro government stripped National Assembly Deputy
Maria Corina Machado of her seat in retaliation for her
presence at the OAS in March.
The government has jailed two opposition mayors, Daniel
Ceballos and Enzo Scarano, the first sentenced to a year in
prison on charges of ``civil rebellion'' and ``conspiracy'';
the second sentenced to 10 months in prison for failing to
dismantle barricades.
While dismantling the independent media and jailing local officials
who dare to dissent, the Maduro government is simultaneously empowering
armed civilian thugs, or ``colectivos'' to intimidate and kill those
Venezuelans who continue to march.
In turning to what we can do in response to the worsening situation
in Venezuela, I remind this committee of Secretary Kerry's speech
before the OAS in November 2013, where he stated that ``Successful
democracies depend on all citizens having a voice and on respecting
those voices, and all governments having the courage and the capacity
to listen to those voices.'' The United States as Assistant Secretary
Jacobson has described in detail continues to call for a dialogue with
all Venezuelans in a climate of mutual respect. In that vein, we are
encouraged by the mediated talks led by UNASUR, with Vatican
engagement.
Constructive involvement by Venezuela's neighbors will be essential
to helping this highly polarized society reconcile. Regional civil
society and media can also play a valuable role in supporting
Venezuelan efforts for democracy and reporting on government abuses.
One encouraging example was when several news outlets in Colombia
shipped newsprint to Venezuela, after local newspapers were unable to
restock their supplies due to government currency controls. We
encourage Latin American civil society to continue supporting the
Venezuelan people and to advocate their own governments to speak out as
the situation deteriorates. To that end, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank
you for your help in raising the situation in Venezuela with Mexican
President Enrique Pena Nieto during your visit in February.
We also press Venezuela diplomatically in the multinational arena.
During the March session of the U.N. Human Rights Council, we raised
Venezuela several times. We are hopeful that the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights can bring regional pressure to bear. Last
month, the Commission released its 2013 report, which included special
reports on the situations of some member states, including Venezuela.
The Commission declared that the Venezuelan Government is in serious
breach of the core requirements and institutions of representative
democracy outlined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and
detailed the abuses and deterioration of democracy I have mentioned
already. In March, the Commission held hearings on the situation in
Venezuela, at which human rights defenders and other members of civil
society were able to formally report the violations they have
witnessed.
In close coordination with our other State Department colleagues,
my Bureau, DRL, focuses on generating and providing support for human
rights and democratic governance in Venezuela. We continue to run
targeted programs that promote public participation in democratic
processes and highlights restrictions on the freedom of expression. Our
programs are available to all individuals regardless of political
affiliation, and their fundamental purpose has been and will continue
to be to promote the universal freedoms and rights Venezuelans have
been denied for almost a generation.
Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you and others on this
committee for raising awareness of the crisis in Venezuela, which is
often overshadowed by other world crises.
We are grateful for your longstanding commitment to advancing human
rights and democracy in this hemisphere. I am happy to answer any
questions you may have.
The Chairman. All right. Well, thank you both for your
testimony.
Madam Secretary, I know that the Obama administration, as
is evidenced again today by your testimony, has supported the
UNASUR-mediated negotiations between the Venezuelan Government
and the opposition. And while expectations may have been very
high during the public initial meetings, very few results have
been produced.
Meanwhile, members of the opposition, including Leopoldo
Lopez, remain in prison. We now have documented evidence of
systemic human rights abuses and cases of torture, and just
this morning--this morning--250 students were arrested in
Caracas.
So can you tell me the specific diplomatic efforts beyond
that which you testified? I hear that we have things going on
behind the scenes. Well, what is going on that we have faith
in?
I heard you say--and I understand when you say we do not
want to be a distraction, meaning we, the United States. We do
not want the Maduro government to use the United States as a
distraction. At the same time, we will not remain silent as it
relates to human rights. It seems to me that we run the risk of
doing what many of our South American neighbors do, which is
that we do not want to, ``intervene in the internal affairs of
another country.'' In the interim, people get arrested,
tortured, and jailed. I do not know how long I am personally
willing to wait for those set of circumstances to continue
without pursuing a more vigorous action such as the sanctions
that several of us have called for.
So talk to me in the context of that set of circumstances.
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think all of us are frustrated in the sense that--you are
right--there were very high expectations as the two sides sat
down to talk, really the first time in at least a decade that
the opposition and the government had the opportunity--
certainly that the opposition had the opportunity to sit down
and talk about some of the grievances that they had on
democracy, on human rights and, indeed, in the first meeting
that they had to do so on live broadcast TV and have those
grievances heard by the majority of Venezuelans. And so that
raised a lot of expectations.
Those expectations have clearly not been met with results
quickly. And I think that there is impatience from the
international community and from Venezuelans themselves that
some results need to be seen. And you are absolutely right. So
far, we have not seen results. We have seen the arrests this
morning of students who were protesting in four different
locations in Caracas, and I think we have got to condemn those
arrests in the strongest possible terms. Those were peaceful
protests.
But we also have to recognize that the Brazilian and
Colombian and Ecuadorian Foreign Ministers who are helping to
support this process and mediate this process, as well as the
Vatican Nuncio, are actively engaged in working on all four
parts of the agenda that the two sides have agreed to, that
they believe there continue to be reasons for optimism, that
movement is possible, as do the opposition members taking part
in the technical working groups on the different agenda items.
Again, I do not think--and I want to emphasize that the process
is important because it is the first time they have had such a
process, but it cannot be endless.
The Chairman. Well, that is my point. That is what I want
to know.
How many more people have to be tortured? How many more
have to be arrested? How many more have to be fired upon before
we say, well, guess what, the process is not working? Because
when you are in the midst of supposedly a dialogue and you
arrest 250 peaceful protestors, you are not sending a message
that such dialogue is moving in a direction in which you intend
to ultimately ensure that a possibility for a negotiated
settlement will be achieved. And when President Maduro puts op-
eds here in the United States that say, please, do not
intervene, while he systematically abuses the rights of his own
citizens, I just think that we are at a point in time where the
actions belie the words.
And so I appreciate what those countries are doing, even
though I must say in the case of some of those countries, you
know, it is difficult for Colombia when there are several
million Colombians in Venezuela and when they are hosting the
discussions with the FARC under the auspices, even though they
are not hosting it--the Cubans are hosting it, the discussions
with the FARC--for them to pressure the Venezuelan Government
very much.
Ms. Jacobson. You know, I think one of the things that is
most important, as these talks move forward, is whether or not
significant elements of the opposition remain committed to
those talks. What we do not want to do is something that would
abandon their effort in those talks. You are absolutely right.
The actions taken by the Venezuelan Government today do not
support the efforts at the dialogue table. They are not the
kinds of efforts that members in a dialogue, in a negotiation
take to give confidence to that process. And I want to be clear
about that. And you are right. We need to be clear about that
regardless of whether that is viewed as interference. So we are
not going to----
The Chairman. Where is the administration's calibration?
Where is the point or sense--I am not asking for a redline
because that creates all types of trouble. But I am asking for
some sense of when is it that we say, well, you continue to
arrest students, you continue to torture people, you use the
judiciary system as a system of oppression, not a system of
justice, you can have dialogues endlessly while you go ahead
and do all those things--when is it that we think that it is
time to take a more affirmative stance such as targeted
sanctions?
Ms. Jacobson. I think that point comes--and I do not know
that I want to lay out the exact criteria that would be the
equivalent of a redline. But I do think it does not come 1
month after they started, which is what we are at. I also do
not think it comes while there are significant members of the
opposition believing that there still is a possibility for
positive movement. So I think it comes in consultation with
people who are engaged in the talks themselves.
The Chairman. Is time the question? Let us give it 2
months, 3 months, 4 months? Is it the number of people who get
arrested? Is it when those who are participating say, you know
what, this is not going anywhere?
Mr. Malinowski. I think there are many factors, Mr.
Chairman, but the most important factor for me, as I approach
these problems, whether it is in Venezuela, whether it is in
Russia, whether it is in Burma, whether it is in any country
that is undergoing this kind of internal conflict over
fundamental issues of democracy and human rights--for me, the
most important question is the judgment of the people who are
trying to help on the ground. And that is also not a black and
white question because, as we all know, there are differences
within the opposition.
But I can say that the judgments that we have made and that
we are making on literally a day-by-day basis are informed by
consultation with very, very brave and dedicated people in
Venezuela who have chosen for now to give this dialogue a
chance and who may not choose to give it a chance next week or
the week after if these arrests continue. So I think it is
fundamentally their judgment to make, first and foremost, at
what point do we as an opposition give this dialogue another
day, another week, given what is happening, and in consultation
with them, informed by their judgment, we will make our
judgment.
The Chairman. Do you believe that Venezuela's student
movement and other sectors of civil society should be included
in the dialogues between the government and the opposition?
Ms. Jacobson. We have been very clear, and I think I
mentioned this in the testimony. We absolutely believe that
they have to be heard. They are a very important voice. They
are not at the table. Including those who are at the table, the
MUD (Democratic Unity Roundtable), the members of the
opposition who are participating in the dialogue have said they
believe the voices of the students have got to be heard in this
discussion. So absolutely, their voice is critical.
The Chairman. Well, let me just say, as I turn to Senator
Corker, my personal patience is waning. I do not want to sit by
and see hundreds arrested, people tortured. I think the human
rights report, unless you want to dispute it here, is pretty
exacting. We will hear from them in the second panel.
I would really urge members to read the report because if
you can read the report and believe that nothing should be
done, then there is something wrong.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again for having
this hearing, and I appreciate the leadership you and Senator
Rubio have shown on this issue and causing this to happen. And
I especially appreciate having a hearing in that I know there
is some legislation that is proposed right now. I know the
administration officials always come in here and thank us for
our help, but they really do not want it at the end of the day
and do what they can to keep that from occurring.
So what I would like to ask today, because I know at some
point we will need to be dealing with some legislation that has
been put forth, is to, first, understand where we are today,
where it is that if you had the ability to affect--I know we
have this dialogue underway. I know the country is deeply
divided. I know they have got all kinds of economic issues. And
it is really at a critical juncture.
What are the steps that you would like to see the country
move through over the course of the next 6 months? What is it
you are trying to make happen over this next 6 months?
And then I want to move to some of the tools that Menendez
and Rubio have put forth and understand how they would or would
not be effective from your standpoint.
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Let me start out by saying that the central goal that we
have is to help Venezuelans move their country toward
democracy, toward respect for human rights. Ultimately the
steps that are taken to get there are for Venezuelans to
decide, but you can see in the agenda item of this dialogue
some of the issues that we would like to see move forward. They
are things like a real discussion and movement on the political
prisoners, the many people who have been detained and should be
released, a real discussion on the incidents of violence that
took place during these protests. That is the reason a truth
commission has been set up as part of--or will be set up as
part of the dialogue.
There is also the issue--and I think this was a crucial one
as part of the dialogue. It has been called the ``rebalancing''
of public institutions, the notion that positions on the
Supreme Court, the electoral tribunal, indeed, the management
of the national assembly are vacant because the government has
not allowed elections to be held for those jobs and they have
packed those entities with government officials such that the
opposition has no voice in those institutions who run the
branches of government in the elections that are held in
Venezuela. So a level playing field is critical for future
elections and legislation.
Those are some of the kinds of steps. Obviously,
commitments to respect human rights, to reduce the violence are
critical as we move forward. Easing and ending the restrictions
on freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly,
the crackdown on civil society I will leave to Tom who is a
greater expert on some of those aspects. But those are the
kinds of steps that have to be taken, it seems to us, for us to
achieve the goal. Again, that is for the Venezuelans to have a
discussion on moving towards greater democracy.
Senator Corker. So, for instance, we, as you well know,
have had discussions about Ukraine and sanctions. We actually
passed some out of this committee and may be looking at more. I
hope we are. But the discussions have been around really sort
of tangible things that you can see and touch and feel and you
understand whether they are happening or not.
The things you just laid out, obviously, are very, very
important. There is no fine line in each of those. In some
cases, maybe the release of prisoners and that kind of thing.
That is a fine line.
So as you look at two members of our committee that care
deeply about this and others who want to make sure we
understand the issue more fully and want to look seriously at
what it is they propose, sanctions are one of the tools that
have been put forth. And could you talk to me a little bit
about how from your perspective targeted sanctions--first of
all, what kind of targeted sanctions would you believe, if any,
would work in this case? And again, what would be those things
that you would measure relative to whether they were being
effective or needed to be applied? A little bit of a twist on
the question that Chairman Menendez asked.
Ms. Jacobson. You know, I would like to ask Tom to address
this as well because he has a great deal of experience.
One of the specific issues, obviously, that has been raised
in the draft legislation is the use of sanctions in the
specific area of human rights abuses and those who have either
directed or been part of human rights abuses. We have certainly
looked at and have been very forthright about the fact that we
are obviously considering and consider part of the tools of our
foreign policy and diplomacy sanctions, if you will, such as
revocation of visas and other economic sanctions, whether it is
asset blocking or other things, under the authorities that we
have, that we already have.
Senator Corker. I think sometimes, you know, Congress feels
like that even though you have those authorities, which we are
witnessing in other countries right now, they are not utilized,
and sometimes Congress wants to push you along. So if we were
going to nudge you along, how would you like to be nudged in
that regard?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I think you will not necessarily be
surprised to hear me say that we actually think we do not
necessarily need the nudge. We are considering these things. We
do think that right now they would be counterproductive, that
they would enable the Venezuelan Government to go back to that
sort of victim mentality using us, but there may well come a
time at some point in the future when they would be useful if
there has not been movement at the table. I may leave to my
colleague to express when he believes they would be useful.
Targeted sanctions have been useful around the issue of human
rights in other cases. But I think they would have to be very
specific, and we would have to be looking at a sticking point
in an area of negotiation where things were not moving forward.
Senator Corker. So you would be concerned that they today
might be a unifying thing within the government versus
something that would be helpful towards moving them along,
before we move to Tom.
Ms. Jacobson. Absolutely. Unfortunately, I do think they
would be a unifying factor in the government, and I think they
would serve to reinforce the narrative of this being about the
Venezuelan Government standing up to the United States,
unfortunately, which is not a narrative we want to see. This is
about the Venezuelans standing up for their own rights.
Mr. Malinowski. I am a big believer in targeted sanctions,
as many of you know. We have employed them in a number of
contexts that are not entirely different from this one. I would
point to Burma over the years as a place where targeted
sanctions were particularly effective in not just highlighting
human rights abuses, because that is symbolic, but in
empowering an opposition to pursue success in dialogue with an
authoritarian regime. We are employing them in Russia and
Ukraine in a somewhat different context but one that is rooted
in a human rights crisis. They work in some places. They do not
work everywhere. Timing is extremely important.
And as I mentioned before, I think one of the most
important factors that we have to consider, again on a day-by-
day, week-by-week basis, is what are the people on the ground
telling us. What is going to be helpful to them? What is going
to empower them? What do they think is going to be effective as
a way of dividing the government in question from its support
base? What is going to give them leverage?
So for me, this is really a day-by-day, week-by-week
question in Venezuela. I have absolutely no objection in
principle to the use of targeted sanction, and I have got no
objection to being nudged because that is Congress' role. But I
do want to make sure that if we do this, we do it at a time----
The Chairman. This is refreshing.
Mr. Malinowski [continuing]. That is going to give us the
best chance of achieving our objectives.
Let me suggest one other factor, and that is that wherever
we have used targeted sanctions, it has been extremely
important to try to make the pressure that we apply as
multilateral as possible, whether that is getting other
countries to apply sanctions of their own or just diplomatic
pressure. And that is another element of the timing here. I
want to make sure that if and when we take this step, if we
feel that we need to, we do it at a moment where it will be
best timed to generate multilateral pressure. And I think a
question that some of our partners will ask is have we given
this dialogue enough of a chance. Now, one may feel that that
time has come. One may feel that that time has not yet come
yet, but that is an extremely important consideration I think
we have to take into consideration.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I want to thank you, Tom, for the tremendous efforts you
have put forth in other arenas relative to human rights. It
seems to me there may be a little daylight between the two of
you in your presentations today, and my guess is other members
of the committee may exploit that. But we thank you both for
being here and we look forward to----
Mr. Malinowski. We both agree that this is not the time to
use the tool, and I think we both agree that it is a
potentially effective tool. It is a question of picking the
right time to make sure that we achieve the effect that we
want.
The Chairman. Before I call on Senator Durbin, let me just
make two observations--I cannot resist--especially for the
ranking member, who I think will appreciate one of these
observations.
I have never had the administration--this or other ones,
not just this administration, to be very fair--ever look at me
on the question of sanctions and suggest to me that it is not a
unifying factor for the government that is targeted. I heard
that about Iran. We have heard it to some degree about Russia.
So that question of a unifying factor for the government that
is targeted is always going to be a reality. They will always
feel like this is the United States and others trying to impact
us. So I am not greatly moved by that.
And to the extent they will consider themselves victims,
well, the only victims are the members of civil society who are
suffering in jails. The only victims being tortured are members
of civil society. The only people who are victims are political
leaders who are in jail simply because they have a different
view than the government. They are the ultimate victims here.
So I am not too worried about Maduro feeling like a victim,
although I do appreciate the issue of timing, but we may have a
difference at some point in time as to when that is the
appropriate time.
Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your testimony.
Senator McCain and I and others on the panel visited
Ukraine 6 or so weeks ago, and I came back to Chicago to report
to the Ukrainian Americans--and we have a lot of them, maybe
the most in the country--in Ukrainian Village, a section of
Chicago. And I have noted that there were many, many
Ukrainians, 500 or more, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians,
Estonians, Georgians, and Venezuelans. And we talked for a few
minutes afterward, and I could not help but be struck by some
parallels and similarities when we look at realpolitik in the
21st century between Nicolas Maduro and Vladimir Putin. Both of
them have the military and the police force behind them, but
their club, their political club, their source of extortion is
energy.
And then I take a look at the vote in the United Nations
when it comes to condemning Vladimir Putin's aggression in
Ukraine. And the list of the nations that voted against us on
the side of Putin include Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba,
Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Many of these
nations have suffered under military regimes, but they were
prepared to look the other way when it came to Vladimir Putin
in the Ukraine. And I think it has a lot to do with the fact
that they are under the same pressure when it comes to energy
and when it comes to Venezuelan oil.
We saw the same thing in the closing of the OAS meeting
which I think was an indication that they feel the pressure
that comes on them from the oil exports from Venezuela.
I would like to ask you, either or both, to comment on
that, but I would like you to also comment on something else.
One of the major customers when it comes to Venezuelan oil and
the purchase of that commodity is the United States of America.
How do we reconcile this notion that we are trying to at least
indirectly pressure Venezuela into positive political change
while we subscribe to--or at least while we are part of the
support of his economy through the purchase of oil? Would that
not be very obvious for us to lessen our dependence on
Venezuelan oil as an indication of our feelings about their
political regime?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
Let me start out by saying that, not being an expert on oil
or the administration's point person on energy policy, I have
long ago recognized that I dare not venture too far into making
comments about our energy policy or who we purchase oil from to
mess up the energy market. So I am going to be a little
tentative there.
But I will say that one of the things I think is important
over the last couple of years is you have seen a steady
downward trend in imports from Venezuela, United States imports
of Venezuelan oil, a steady downward trend. I believe the
percentage over the last decade or so is 10 percent or more
reduction in Venezuelan oil coming into the United States. And
I think that is likely to continue as U.S. production
increases.
So I do think that our dependence and our purchase of
Venezuelan oil is likely to continue to decrease. It is one of
the reasons the Venezuelans have been seeking other markets,
including the Chinese.
On the question of the vote in the United Nations, in
particular, and also in the OAS, let me say that in the U.N.,
the countries that you mentioned--I would split them a little
bit because the ones that I think we are really talking about
are the Caribbean countries and some of the Central American
countries who are highly dependent on imported oil, which has
been a serious problem for those countries for a long time. It
has been a problem because of cost, which is why they are so
attracted to subsidized heavy oil, but it has also been a
problem because of simple dependence on one source of energy.
And it has been something that we have been working with those
countries on for a long time, but I think it has become a more
acute problem as we have all realized over the last few years
that it is not just an economic problem and an environmental
problem. It is also a political problem.
And so we have been talking to those countries about how
they diversify their sources of energy, about how we can help
them with that process. And we have also begun to talk with
neighbors who can play a role in that process. When the
President was in Toluca in Mexico in March for the North
American Leaders Summit, he talked extensively with the leaders
of Canada and Mexico about how we could work together to help
the countries of Central America and the Caribbean because all
of us are increasing our energy production. And the countries
in those two subregions can only really increase their own
attractiveness to investors, whether it is in other forms of
fossil fuel like natural gas or it is in renewables, as a
regional market.
Senator Durbin. You are taking this off in an area which is
very interesting and should be the subject of a hearing. What I
am asking you is when it comes to our importing Venezuelan
oil--you have said we have lessened our imports because we are
producing more. We now have an intervening situation, post-
Chavez. We have a situation in Venezuela that we are trying to
show some leadership in suggesting they democratize their own
nation. I do not think the natural diminishing of our imports,
as we have more fracking in the United States, is what I am
talking about. I am talking about whether or not we make a
statement or prepare to make a statement that if Venezuela is
not going to be more forthcoming in negotiations or in
democratization, we are going to start not gradually but
eliminating our import of Venezuelan oil. Why would we not say
that?
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, I do not know what the cutoff in our
purchase of Venezuelan oil would do to oil and gas prices in
the United States, and I do not know what our policy--the
impact on our economy would be of no longer purchasing
Venezuelan oil. We have a long, and our oil companies have
long, commercial relationships with Venezuela. So I just cannot
tell you that that would be something that economically from
one day to the next would be something we would do.
Senator Durbin. You have just made such an argument against
sanctions by saying this could hurt our country if we impose
sanctions on Venezuela. How are we ever going to rally
countries around the world to join us in any sanctions regime
related to Ukraine or related to Venezuela if the first line of
defense is, please, I do not want to inconvenience us? Now you
have just said sanctions are really not going to be worth the
conversation. We cannot have it both ways. I do not want to see
our military engaged around the world. I want to see effective
sanctions regimes, but if you start saying, you know, we may
feel this if we impose some sanctions, for goodness sakes, is
that not what it is all about, that we feel it, at least
temporarily to solve a problem so we avoid sending in military
force?
Mr. Malinowski. In the conversation about sanctions, energy
sanctions are the nuclear option in all of these contexts, and
it is true in the Russia-Ukraine situation as well, as you
know, Senator, where we have started with targeted
individualized sanctions on individuals, then on entities, then
on companies, and have made clear that we are prepared to go to
much deeper sanctions against sectors, one of which, in the
case of Russia, is the energy sector, if the situation demands
it, but recognizing that of all the sanctions that one can
consider in a situation like that, that would be the one with
the greatest economic costs, not just for us but for the global
economy. All sanctions have costs, and absolutely you cannot
have an effective sanction that does not hurt anybody. But one
does have to take into account the costs, and I think in any of
these situations, if we go down the sanctions route, I think we
would probably begin with carefully targeted and calibrated
sanctions which I think generally tend to be effective on their
own.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Ms. Jacobson. Can I have one more point? I am sorry,
Senator.
That is exactly right. But part of the reason that we have
not looked at that is really not just about us. It is about the
Venezuelan people that would be hurt by such a cutoff as well.
Senator Durbin. I think you continue to make arguments
against sanctions. And I have to ask you, What is your
alternative? I mean, as Senator Menendez has said, every time
we start to impose sanctions, they say, well, you are just
going to unify the country that we are targeting for sanctions.
And if we start with the premise that we cannot do anything
that might affect the Venezuelan economy because it will hurt
innocent people, we find ourselves, at the end of the day,
saying, well, there just are not many sanctions. You know,
prohibiting John McCain from visiting Russia I am sure was a
great blow, but he has somehow weathered that storm. But we
have to think in terms of if we are not going to use military
force, what are sanctions that might result in a positive
outcome.
The Chairman. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and the ranking
member, for holding this hearing.
I want to bring some clarity to this hearing. I appreciate
very much Senator Durbin's voice on this issue, and I agree
with just about everything he has said. But I want to refocus
us back on what this hearing is about.
The purpose of this hearing is that there has been a bill
filed in the Congress to sanction individuals related to and in
the Government of Venezuela for human rights violations
committed against their own people. People have been murdered
in Venezuela. People are detained indefinitely in Venezuela.
Even as we speak, Leopoldo Lopez--his hearing has, once again,
been indefinitely postponed. There was a young man sodomized in
Venezuela by government forces. Women have been threatened,
threatened with rape in Venezuela by government forces and
those aligned with the government.
What we are talking about here are sanctions against
individuals responsible for human rights violations. It is
typical in this process to set up these straw men, oh, we are
not going to send boots on the ground, we are not going to
sanction the oil industry. The bill we have filed does not do
any of that. We have filed a piece of legislation, and the
purpose of this hearing is to call attention to human rights
violations in Venezuela. And what we are saying is we should
sanction human rights violators who, by the way, happen to be
people that travel to the United States with impunity, buy
properties in the United States, laugh at us along the way,
invest in our banks, send their kids to our schools. They have
zero respect for this Government.
What I have heard here today in responses, we do not want
to sanction these people because it might unite them against
us. Let me give you a brief bulletin: They are already united
against us, other than when they come here to benefit from our
free society on weekends in Miami and then go back and live off
their newfound millions and billions that they have stolen from
the people of Venezuela.
This is not a hearing on oil sanctions. There is no bill
before us to sanction oil in Venezuela. This is a bill that we
are hopefully going to get to to sanction human rights
violators in Venezuela. What I heard today is we should not
sanction human rights violators because it might disrupt the
process that is going on in Venezuela. Well, we sanctioned
human rights violators in Russia. Why is what is happening in
Russia more important than what is happening in Venezuela? We
sanction human rights violators all the time, personally,
individually, and we have their names. These are not even hard
to find. These people brag about what they are doing in
Venezuela. The only difference between those sanctions, those
people and others, is they spend their weekends in Miami. They
spend their weekends in Florida.
Mr. Malinowski, you have in your statement--you talk about
Globovision, which was once an independent television operation
in Venezuela that actually covered news. What happened to
Globovision? It was given over to allies of the Maduro regime
and the Chavez regime. It is now a propaganda arm of Venezuela.
Do you know where they live? Do you know where they live? They
live in Miami. They own a multimillion dollar mansion in
Cocoplum, in a very exclusive neighborhood in Miami. They drive
up and down the streets in their fancy cars. They laugh at you
and they laugh at us because they know they can get away with
these things.
So, let me ask you this. Who in the opposition in Venezuela
has asked you not to impose sanctions against human rights
violators because it might disrupt the dialogue? Who has asked
you not to do that? Either one of you. Who has asked you not to
impose sanctions against human rights violators among the
opposition in Venezuela?
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, I am just not comfortable sitting
here and giving you individual names. Members of the MUD who
are participating in the dialogue have discussed this with us.
Senator Rubio. Listen to what you just told me: You are not
comfortable telling me their names because you fear for their
safety. What kind of dialogue is that? What kind of dialogue is
that where the people that are involved in the dialogue cannot
tell you what they really believe? That is a fake dialogue.
So is it the policy now of the United States that as long
as this dialogue is somewhat successful, we are going to forget
the human rights violations? So we will just send a statement
to condemn them, but we will not do anything about it.
Ms. Jacobson. Absolutely not, and I think we have both said
that we will speak out, we will make statements, but we will
also consider those sanctions. As Assistant Secretary
Malinowski said, we will keep considering that and we will use
those when we think the time is right.
Senator Rubio. So there is a timing element when it comes
to human rights violations? In essence, there is a time when
human rights violations are ripe?
Ms. Jacobson. There is a timing element when it comes to
the response of a particular tactic on human rights violations,
not our condemnation.
Senator Rubio. Give me an example where we have held back
on human rights violations sanctions because of timing anywhere
else in the world. Give me an example of when the United States
has said, we know you have committed human rights violations,
but we are not going to sanction you because we are waiting for
something else to happen. Give me an example of when we have
done that successfully. Mr. Malinowski, you have been involved
in this.
Mr. Malinowski. I mentioned Burma as a case where we have
applied sanctions very effectively over time. There are still
human rights violations going on in Burma, but we have a
process. We have a democratic process, a process of dialogue.
And in consultation with the opposition, we have not continued
to impose additional targeted sanctions over the last couple of
years but remain ready----
Senator Rubio. Why did the dialogue happen in Burma?
Mr. Malinowski. In Burma?
Senator Rubio. Yes. What was one of the things that led to
the dialogue being successful?
Mr. Malinowski. As I acknowledged a few moments ago,
sanctions in that case did. We had an opposition in Burma that
made very, very clear that at that point it was important and
useful and effective for the United States----
Senator Rubio. I agree with what you said. This is not a
United States-Venezuela issue. This is for the Venezuelan
people to decide what they want to do with the future of their
politics. The purpose of our policy here is not the change the
government of Venezuela, despite Maduro's claims. That is not
for us to decide. That is for the people of Venezuela to
decide. What we are saying is we have individuals that benefit
greatly from the economy of the United States, particularly in
my State. They benefit greatly from what they do in this
country with our banks, our schools, our businesses. They
invest with impunity throughout Florida and the country. These
people also happen to be human rights violators or the
associates of human rights violators. And all I am saying is we
should sanction them for what they did. This is not about
changing the government in Venezuela. That is up to the people
of Venezuela to decide. This is about punishing and shaming
individuals responsible for human rights violations.
And I guess, to your point, Mr. Malinowski--I mean, I know
your reputation. The first time we met was in a prison in
Libya. We were not living there, either one of us. I mean, we
met there, as we were touring it. [Laughter.]
This is what you have dedicated your life to. I know you
are not here today to argue that we should somehow look the
other way on human rights sanctions----
Mr. Malinowski. I am not.
Senator Rubio [continuing]. Until the appropriate time.
Mr. Malinowski. Sanctions serve two purposes in a situation
like this.
One is accountability, and there are times when we impose
sanctions on people who have done horrible things because they
have done horrible things and because it is the only thing we
can do to make sure that they pay a price.
There are other times when we impose sanctions and we
determine the timing of the imposition of sanctions because we
think there is a chance to make the kind of political progress
that will end those human rights violations.
Now, in a country like North Korea, for example, there is
not a scintilla of a chance that I see of political progress
that is going to free people from concentration camps. In a
situation like that, the role of sanctions is to highlight the
problem and to impose accountability.
On Russia, there is no dialogue.
Senator Rubio. I know, but I cannot believe that your
position, given your history, is that the United States must
now--so now our message to the people of Venezuela and to those
who have suffered at the hands of these brutal oppressors is I
am so sorry that you were sodomized by a pipe or by the butt of
a rifle, but we think, for the sake of your country, that we
are going to hold off shaming the people and sanctioning the
people responsible for ordering that because we think there
might be some sort of dialogue that may one day allow you to
own one newspaper that is free in Venezuela, or we think there
might be a day where you might technically allow them to let
you protest somewhere at a time of their choosing and of their
way.
How can that be our policy? How can the United States not
firmly be on the side of people who are being violated in this
systemic way? I just do not understand how our foreign policy
can be about that.
We are not asking for sanctions. We are not calling for an
oil embargo or anything of that nature. We are calling on
identifying human rights violators in Venezuela, naming them by
name, and sanctioning them for what they have done. And I just
do not understand how we can sit here and say that the time is
not right to do that. I do not understand how we can say we
should wait for some point in the future when the timing might
be right to do that because by admission, what you are saying
is that if the Venezuelan Government does certain things over
the next few months, that day may never come. And I just do not
understand how that could be our foreign policy.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And to the witnesses, I hope I do not trod ground that was
on before I walked in. But I am a little interested in your
take on the Venezuelan economy right now. I view much of the
unrest as being driven by kind of an autocratic, oil-dominated
economy where corrupt people at the top skim off a lot, but it
is probably an unsustainable economic model. And I would view
that as driving increasing political unrest and creating a
demand for and opportunity for political change in Venezuela.
But if you could begin there. Talk a little bit about the state
of the economy in the early months of this new Maduro
government.
Ms. Jacobson. I think that the economic situation, Senator,
is indeed increasingly unsustainable. You have a situation in
which I think the latest inflation figures are 57.3 percent,
and continuing to go up, among the highest in the world.
Senator Kaine. In a world where inflation is generally
very, very low right now.
Ms. Jacobson. Correct. And you have recent wage increases
that have been granted, which cannot possibly keep up with
inflation like that and, therefore, will not really satisfy the
needs of Venezuelans. But moreover, you have a situation in
which Venezuelans cannot find basic foodstuffs. A country with
among the largest, if not the largest oil reserves in the world
where people cannot find basic goods on the shelves, even if
they had the money to buy them.
So you also have a situation in which foreign businesses
cannot get the exchange to take their----
Senator Kaine. Holdings out of the country.
Ms. Jacobson. Foreign exchange out of the country. They
cannot operate productively in the country.
Senator Kaine. So foreign direct investment must have
slowed.
Ms. Jacobson. It is drying up significantly. There is
really a serious problem that foreign businesses are having,
but Venezuelan businesses are having difficulty. That is why
there is an economic dialogue that is taking place at the same
time to try and come up with solutions, but so far the
government's exhortations in that conversation have largely
been to increase national production. There is no incentive at
this point to do so. Major economic changes have to be made,
and I am sure you will hear from Moises Naim a bit more about
that. It is not sustainable.
Senator Kaine. And the changes generally do not get made if
the autocrats feel like they can use their natural resource
revenues to just kind of keep things limping along. You have
all kinds of structural changes that need to be made.
Ms. Jacobson. Right, and I think high oil prices,
obviously, have enabled this to continue, and most of the
analysts suggest that this is not a situation that can change
overnight. This is going to take serious structural changes in
Venezuela and some time. And I am concerned that without a
democratic space in which people feel they have an opportunity
to express their opinion, to speak freely, hard economic
changes are not going to be accepted by people if you cannot
have a debate and a dialogue about them.
Senator Kaine. What is the current government saying about
making economic reforms or doing fundamental economic change?
Is it just not even on the radar screen?
Ms. Jacobson. I have to tell you so far we are seeing very
little acceptance that real change is necessary. There is a
willingness for the first time to acknowledge discussion has to
be had. What we are not seeing yet is a willingness to discuss
real economic policy change. As I say, so far there has been an
exhortation to greater national production by manufacturers and
industry, not yet really changes in economic policy, which we
have understood to have been urged by many of their neighbors
as well because this is impacting the region too.
Senator Kaine. What is the current practice of the
government with respect to oil subsidies to other nations? They
seemed like they were purchasing foreign policy alliances
through subsidized oil. But with a challenged economy and
inflation being high and people not having basic foodstuffs,
devoting resources to adventurism in foreign policy would seem
to be less and less tenable economically. Is the Maduro
government changing the Chavez practice with respect to trying
to buy friends through subsidized exports?
Ms. Jacobson. My understanding is that that is a
fundamental part of Venezuelan policy that continues, Petro
Caribe continues, although it is difficult to sustain
economically. It has been cut back. There have been reductions
in the amount of oil that some countries are receiving under
Petro Caribe. There has been a reduction in the generosity of
terms that new agreements have provided, and some countries
have chosen not to go into the agreement because of that, but
it continues in many cases. And it clearly puts a strain on the
government in some cases to continue these kinds of deals.
Senator Kaine. Here is a question that is probably
impossible to answer, but to kind of get me just oriented, I
would like each of your opinions.
The civil unrest in Venezuela is driven primarily by
resistance to an autocratic government that abuses human rights
or driven primarily by popular understanding that the economy
is in real trouble and people do not have the economic
opportunities that they want?
Ms. Jacobson. My answer would be absolutely both, and I
think the two, unfortunately, are now in a very bad reinforcing
cycle.
Mr. Malinowski. It is the interplay between the two I
think. People protest when they feel that the economic
conditions that they are suffering are, in part, the result of
not having representation, not having accountability, not
having transparency when they sense there is a political cause
for economic suffering.
Senator Kaine. So there is a political cause for economic
suffering and the leaders are not taking the steps needed and
not tackling the fundamental changes necessary to change the
economic situation. That will continue to embolden opposition,
deepen the roots----
Ms. Jacobson. And there is no political space. None of the
institutions give the opposition political space to represent
those views.
Senator Kaine. When the elections were held and Maduro won
over the opposition, I think I was in a tiny camp that was not
sure it would be a good for the opposition to win these
elections because the accumulated economic challenges were so
massive that there was going to be some kind of a collapse and
then a blame game, and it would be better for the people to get
blamed who actually put in place all the economic policies that
are fomenting the collapse rather than have somebody get in and
then be blamed for a collapse that they frankly did not create.
I am not 100 percent sure of my confidence level of my own
opinion about that because, obviously, you see all the things
that the Maduro government is doing that are so horrible.
But I think the economic situation we are seeing is going
to continue to get worse and worse and worse. There is going to
be a resistance to change and an attempt to use kind of strong
words and carisma as a substitute for policy change. It is
going to continue to make the economy worse and worse, and that
is going to create even more momentum on the opposition side.
And we have to find the policies where we can--again, it is for
the Venezuelan people to decide. But this opposition is going
to just assume more and more momentum because of these economic
factors, and if there is a targeted set of strategies that we
can embrace to paint a different vision for the Venezuelan
economy, I think that would be a good thing for us to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine just used the words ``it is for the
Venezuelan people to decide,'' but what prospect do they really
have of actually making an informed decision?
Senator Durbin made the connection, and I was with him in
Ukraine and also with Senator McCain in Moldova. And one of the
takeaways from those trips is that the propaganda of Vladimir
Putin is incredibly effective and that America, the West, has
pretty well unilaterally withdrawn from efforts of trying to
inform those populations that are subjected to that propaganda.
So let me really start there.
To what extent is there any free press still existing in
Venezuela?
Mr. Malinowski. Well, I think as we both outlined in our
testimony, one of the central strategies of the Venezuelan
Government under both Chavez and Maduro has been to steadily
dismantle the free press, particularly on television, which is
what, as in many countries, most people get their news from, by
shutting down stations, by forcing them to take new ownership,
through threats, intimidation, by beating up people on the
streets who are taking video which eventually is then evidence
that the TV stations use of abuses that are being committed.
And that creates a climate in which the government is able to
act with greater impunity and fewer checks.
Senator Johnson. Correct. My question is, Is there an
existence of any counter to that within Venezuela or from
without?
Ms. Jacobson. The only thing that I would say is there
are--I mean, one of the reasons you saw Colombia's NTN24
expelled and then reinvited into Colombia--I am not sure if
they are operating at this point--is that foreign stations
were, of course, still operating. And so for those who had
cable or had packages that had foreign stations, they were
still able to see Venezuelan news being broadcast by foreign
stations. This is not the way Venezuelans should be getting
their news, obviously. So there are ways still or via the
Internet or other things. But in terms of the mass of
Venezuelans to have complete access to media within Venezuela,
it is very difficult. There are still ways, but it is not
massive and broadcast.
Senator Johnson. Again, so I agree with Senator Rubio that
I think targeted sanctions to highlight these gross abuses of
human rights is a good thing. We should implement them
immediately.
But the point I am trying to make is I think a statement
by--one of the witnesses said we have to speak out, we have to
make statements. Well, that is good for speaking out and making
statements here in America, but how does it get to the people
in Venezuela? What is the United States doing not only just in
Venezuela but also in the rest of South America and Central
America where certainly over my lifetime my impression is we
are not moving in a direction of democracy? We are moving away
from democracy. We are moving toward greater socialism. What is
America doing in terms of a robust effort to provide
information to the population of those countries so they are
not subject to the propaganda?
Mr. Malinowski. There are some things that we can do and we
do actually have programs inside Venezuela--I do not want to go
into detail here, but we can come and talk to you about them--
that do help civil society groups, NGO's, activists get access
to information, particularly online. They do get information
through social media. That is not shut down. My Twitter feed
today is full of messages from Venezuelans who know about this
hearing, and they are going to know every word that was spoken
here. So it is not a closed information space. This is a
contested space in which the Venezuelan opposition and civil
society with support from their friends outside of Venezuela
are still holding their own.
Senator Johnson. What is the percentage of the population
of Venezuela that has access to social media?
Mr. Malinowski. I do not have a number for that, but I
think among activists, it is extremely high. This is how they
organize.
Senator Johnson. But, I mean, the general population that
are going to be voting--how many of those individuals actually
have access to that type of information? I mean, is it high? Is
it 90 percent? Is it 10 percent? And I guess my point was
should we not know?
Is there any attempt to broadcast over the airwaves, either
TV or radio, more information in a far more robust fashion? And
do you think that would be a good idea and not only in
Venezuela, into other areas of South and Central America?
Should America start broadcasting its values of freedom and
democracy to the rest of the world? Have we withdrawn from the
world from that standpoint? That is the impression I get.
Ms. Jacobson. Senator, there is still a great of
information that we get out, whether it is through Voice of
America, Spanish language throughout the hemisphere, whether it
is statements and other things that we get picked up on
commercial stations throughout the hemisphere. I think our
message is being picked up throughout the hemisphere both on
commercial and other media. And I think it is absolutely true,
as Tom says, that there are still media that people have access
to in Venezuela. I do think also that the word gets around
throughout Venezuelan society when we say things and when we
make statements beyond activists in the population.
Senator Johnson. Is it your impression that our efforts are
winning that information war?
Ms. Jacobson. No, I would not say that we are winning that
information war yet because it is one of the reasons why,
obviously, we continue to be disturbed about the restrictions
on press freedom. It is not as open, obviously, a society as it
should be.
Senator Johnson. So that is my point. I think we are losing
the information war whether it is in Eastern Europe, whether it
is eastern Ukraine, whether it is in South and Central America,
or whether it is in Venezuela. We are losing the war. I think
we have to recognize that reality, and I think we have to beef
up our efforts to a far greater extent. Would you agree or
disagree with that?
Mr. Malinowski. I would agree that we need to do more in
Eastern Europe, for example, where we have a new threat that 5,
10, 15 years ago, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, many
people in the United States hoped we would not face again. I
was just in the Baltic States. I know it is not the subject of
this hearing, but people were talking about this, the
propaganda coming from Russia and the need for all of us to
come together with a plan to counter it. We are doing a great
deal, but as the threat rises, we need to do more. There is no
question.
Senator Johnson. Anyway, my point to the authors of the
bill would be I think that would be a good component of this
bill. Add a section there for more robust activity in terms of
information into Venezuela.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
I would note I just noticed that this morning there were
four camps of protestors that were broken up and 283 students
arrested. The repression of the government continues.
I thank you, the witnesses, for being here.
I would point out that on the issue of sanctions, the Burma
sanctions originated in the Congress. The Iran sanctions
initiated with the Congress over the objections of the
administration. The North Korea sanctions were relaxed during
the Bush administration in a vane hope that there would be an
agreement on North Korea. We have now relaxed sanctions on Iran
in what I believe will be the failed mission to achieve an
enforceable and viable agreement with Iran on nuclear issues.
So it sometimes is a bit entertaining when administration
witnesses come forward and talk about how tough various
administrations have been on sanctions when, by and large, they
have initiated with the Congress. I particularly point to the
Iran sanctions were vigorously opposed by the administration.
I am curious. The witnesses, either one, would like to
say--Cuba is heavily involved in Venezuela and in their
activities. Maybe you could give the committee a quick readout
on what the Cubans are doing in Venezuela.
Ms. Jacobson. Well, what I can tell you, Senator, is that
obviously what we know from media reporting, including
Venezuelan-influenced government reporting----
Senator McCain. I hope you have information besides what is
in the media.
Ms. Jacobson. The information that I have besides what is
in the media I probably cannot discuss in this setting.
But what we do know is that there are about----
Senator McCain. Let me get this straight. You cannot
discuss what Cuba is doing in Venezuela in an open hearing?
Ms. Jacobson. To the extent that there was information that
we have from intelligence sources, no, I would not. But the
extent that we have information from other sources, that is
what I am going to tell you.
Information that we have is that there are about 40,000
Cuban advisors in Venezuela. Those advisors are doctors,
teachers. They are in military and other areas. The Maduro
government has made clear that they will continue what they
consider a strategic alliance with the Cuban Government. So, we
know there are a lot of Cuban officials and Cuban citizens in
Venezuela. We do not know exactly what other fields they may be
active in, but we do know there are a lot of Cuban officials in
Venezuela and they are very, very active, including within the
government.
Senator McCain. And that is an issue of significant
concern?
Ms. Jacobson. Yes, certainly.
The Chairman. Senator McCain, would you yield for a moment?
Senator McCain. Please.
The Chairman. Let me tell you what the State Department
seems unwilling to tell you. If you travel to Venezuela, at the
airport you will probably go through Cuban security agents to
get into the country. Rapid response brigades, which are
perfected in Cuba, where state security dressed as civilians to
make it look like the civilian population is responding to
protests, are actively engaged on behalf of the Venezuelan
Government in these activities. And that is just the beginning
of the list. So, to your question, it is a very prominent role
and it is not just about advisors either.
Senator McCain. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you and Senator Rubio for your active involvement and
commitment to trying to see that Venezuelan people are given a
better government. Our witnesses have testified that the
economy continues to deteriorate. That is not because of
anything the United States has done. It is because of the
corrupt government and the Chavezista, I think was what it was
called. Tom, I have forgotten the exact name.
Mr. Malinowski. Your Spanish is better than mine, I am
afraid.
Senator McCain. You gave a book to President Obama at one
of the gatherings early in the administration. I am sure that
the President got a lot out of it.
Here is the situation I think as my two colleagues stated
in a far more articulate fashion than I can. We see a
deteriorating situation. We see further arrests. We see further
repression. We see penetration of Cuba throughout Venezuela,
including in their, quote, ``law enforcement and military
activities.'' And yes, it has been overshadowed by Ukraine and
Syria and other issues. But in our own hemisphere, it seems to
me that we should be paying a lot more attention. We should be
considering a lot more actions without asking you to draw red
lines.
But is it not really unusual for us to basically sit and
watch the situation in Venezuela continue to deteriorate to the
great suffering of the people of Venezuela, not to mention
suppression of all those freedoms?
So I would argue that maybe the message that we are trying
to send is that if you do not act in some fashion, then again
this committee will probably feel that we are forced to act.
And I do not count votes very well, but under the leadership of
our chairman and Senator Corker and Senator Rubio's active
involvement, I think a strong case has been made for us to at
least consider sanctions. And I think it would be far better
for us to work together in that effort rather than to just say,
well, we are going to wait and see.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I have just one final question. There is a vote going on,
so I would like to finish with this panel, bring up the next,
start the testimony, and then recess for a little bit.
Madam Secretary, President Obama has determined that
Venezuela has failed to meet its obligation under international
narcotics agreements. The Treasury Department has designated
members of the Venezuelan Government and military as kingpins,
and the drugs flowing out of Venezuela have debilitating
effects on levels of violence, governance, and the rule of law
in Central America and the Caribbean. Given widespread signs of
collusion between drug trafficking and the Venezuelan
Government, does the situation in Venezuela constitute a
national security threat to the United States?
Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Senator, for that question because
it is a great concern.
I think the answer to that question is that it is a very
serious concern to us, a national security threat. I think the
answer is we are extremely concerned about the amount of drugs
coming out of Venezuela. We are particularly concerned about
the impact on countries in Central America, Honduras in
particular, but frankly Hispaniola, both the Dominican Republic
and Haiti. There is a lot more that needs to be done.
The Chairman. So does it constitute a national security
threat?
Ms. Jacobson. To the United States?
The Chairman. Yes. If you have drugs flowing out of
Venezuela into the hemisphere and I would say ultimately, from
the routes of trafficking that I have seen, ultimately make it
to the United States, either through ports or through boundary
crossings or whatnot, is it a national security threat to the
United States when elements of the government itself are
involved, not because I say it, but because the administration
says it?
Ms. Jacobson. I think we have said often that the amount of
drugs coming from the region, the effect of those drugs on
governments and societies in terms of the corruption, the
violence that they bring with them overall in the hemisphere is
certainly a threat to the United States, a national security
threat.
The Chairman. Is the money that we are spending in Central
America not--why? Because we are concerned about the violence,
about the narcotics trafficking, about the gangs that all flow
from this. Do we not view that as a threat to the national
security of the United States?
Ms. Jacobson. Yes. That is what I just said at the end of
my statement, that I think if you look at the impact of the
drug issue writ large and the impact it has, whether it is
Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, it is in fact a
national security threat. That is why we spend the funds we do
because it hollows out governments, institutions because it
provokes the violence on the streets, because of the impact it
has on our own society on the streets of the United States.
The Chairman. Do you think that it affects the security of
other countries in the region?
Ms. Jacobson. Certainly.
The Chairman. And do you think those countries understand
that threat?
Ms. Jacobson. Yes, I do.
The Chairman. Let me ask you one final question. Without
naming names, because I know in response to Senator Rubio, you
said you were reticent to name names, can you tell the
committee under the testimony that you have given that you have
been specifically asked by members of the civil society that
are in negotiations or not in negotiations not to pursue human
rights sanctions?
Ms. Jacobson. We have been specifically asked not to pursue
sanctions at this time.
The Chairman. No, I did not say that.
Ms. Jacobson. I am sorry. Not to pursue them----
The Chairman. Let me repeat it because maybe my English is
a little difficult. Have you been asked by members of civil
society, whether those who are at the negotiating or those who
are not, not to pursue human rights violations sanctions? Yes
or no?
Ms. Jacobson. I am not sure exactly what you mean, if you
mean as the bill now stands, economic sanctions against human
rights--for human rights violators? Is that what you mean?
The Chairman. Sanctions against human rights violators.
Mr. Malinowski. The qualification is ``at this time.''
Ms. Jacobson. The answer is yes, if you mean, yes, they
have asked us not to pursue them at this time.
The Chairman. Human rights violations sanctions.
Ms. Jacobson. Yes.
Mr. Malinowski. Those are the sanctions that are on the
table.
Ms. Jacobson. That are on the table, yes.
The Chairman. Well, in a different setting then, we are
going to find out who are the people who asked you. And I would
love to hear from the civil society inside of Venezuela that
they do not want to see sanctions against human rights
violators. I would find that incredible, but if that is what
the leadership of Venezuela of civil society wants, then I
would be happy to hear it.
Ms. Jacobson. I would never characterize it as civil
society in Venezuela because I am well aware that there are
many who do, and I respect that view as well.
The Chairman. Okay. So now I am confused. Is it that there
are some members of civil society who say do not violate civil
rights and there are others who do say violate?
Ms. Jacobson. Yes. There is a diversity of opinion on that
subject.
The Chairman. That is a little different.
Ms. Jacobson. Yes. I would certainly acknowledge that.
The Chairman. With the appreciation of the committee, this
panel is excused.
Let me call up a very important panel that we have, and I
would like to get them set up. I welcome Patrick Duddy, who is
the former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela and visiting faculty at
the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, Mr.
Ambassador, thank you for joining us; Moises Naim, who is a
senior International Economics Associate of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace; and Jose Miguel Vivanco, who
is the executive director of the Americas Division at Human
Rights Watch. Thank you all for being here.
Let me remind all of you that your full statements will be
included in the record, without objection.
We have got what I hope will be about 10 minutes or so
before our deadline to catch the first vote. So I think we can
get the first of the testimony here, and then we will have to
have a brief recess and come back for the rest.
And with that, Ambassador Duddy, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK D. DUDDY, VISITING FACULTY, THE FUQUA
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, DUKE UNIVERSITY, DURHAM, NC
Ambassador Duddy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, Senator Rubio. I appreciate having the opportunity
to share my observations today on the current situation.
As we have heard, since President Chavez's death last
March, circumstances in Venezuela have markedly deteriorated.
The economy, in particular, was in terrible shape when Maduro
took over. It is worse now. The murder rate in 2012, for
instance, was startlingly high. By the end of 2013, it was even
higher. In February of this year, the popular discontent with
the deteriorating conditions boiled over into the most
widespread antigovernment demonstrations the country has seen
in more than a decade. The government of President Nicolas
Maduro was clearly alarmed by the scope and intensity of the
mass rallies and reacted brutally to the demonstrators.
Now, in response to rising levels of international concern
and the determination of the antigovernment protestors to
continue to demonstrate, the Maduro administration agreed to
participate in the talks we have heard referenced today,
mediated by the Union of South American Nations, UNASUR, and
the Vatican. Like most observers, I hope that this effort is
successful in ending the violence and that it facilitates the
development of a genuine dialogue. I do believe it is going to
be difficult and the arrests, which again were mentioned this
morning, underscore just how very difficult that may well be.
Not all of the leadership of the opposition is
participating, and the government continues to demonize the
opposition and to suggest that the country has been the target
economic warfare. And even since the beginning of these UNASUR-
sponsored talks, the Chavista-dominated Supreme Court announced
a ruling asserting that the right to peacefully protest, quote/
unquote, ``without prior permission'' is not absolute,
notwithstanding the language of article 68 of the Venezuelan
constitution, a move which analysts have characterized as a
clear effort to criminalize dissent.
As we consider the current situation in Venezuela, I think
it is important to recognize some of the factors that militate
against an early solution. In this context, the dismal state of
the economy is critical. Last year, Venezuela grew, according
to some estimates, at an anemic 1.3 percent. I have seen
estimates that were even lower. Most analysts expect the
economy to be worse next year. The Central Bank's own figures
for inflation suggest it has now climbed to 59 percent. And the
scarcity of basic consumer goods has become so acute that
standing in lines to buy foodstuffs has become a part of the
daily routine for millions of Venezuelans. I might add to that
as we consider the issue of the opposition, but also the larger
public, staying in the street and continuing to put pressure on
the government--this is one of the things that scarcity is
doing.
Now, recent polling suggests that the Venezuelan public is
overwhelmingly unhappy with the current state of the country.
According to a Datanalisis poll released just the other day,
their unhappiness is at approximately 79.5 percent, and by a
large majority, about 59.2 percent, they blame the Maduro
administration for the mess.
Increasingly, however, according to most of the polling I
have seen, the public's unhappiness has not yet evolved into
unambiguous majority support for the opposition. While support
for Maduro has fallen, Chavismo retains a strong base even if
it does not now enjoy majority support. Support for the
opposition is also solid but not monolithic. And emblematic of
their situation is the fact that some groups are not
participating in the UNASUR-mediated dialogue.
The bottom line, however, I think for our purposes is that
Venezuela remains both deeply polarized and also nearly equally
divided. Supporters of the government are not just vested but
dependent on the social programs of the government. Supporters
of the opposition are united in their belief that the
government is taking the country in the wrong direction, that
the country's political institutions have been compromised, and
that the economy is in a freefall.
They have yet, however, to articulate convincingly an
economic alternative that would reassure both the business
community and the Chavista base. And I want to stress that I
think these economic considerations are fundamental as we look
toward the possibility or the prospects for the future. I think
the likelihood of further clashes is great and is alarming, and
it is particularly alarming because of how the government has
responded to the protests to date.
So where does this leave the United States? What are our
interests? What are our options? We have spent decades in the
hemisphere trying to restore and consolidate democracy. We have
made human rights a cornerstone of our political engagement.
The hollowing out of Venezuela's political institutions is
cause for deep concern, as well as the reports of systematic
human rights abuse. The government's use of force with the
demonstrators, the refusal to disarm the colectivos, the
increasing hostility toward the independent media should, of
course, be a concern not just for us but for all of the
hemisphere. It is also true that we have tried to promote the
notion of hemispheric cooperation, and it remains to be seen if
the UNASUR can and will foster a genuine dialogue. Certainly
the vote recently at the OAS, which closed the session in which
the Venezuelan legislator Maria Carina Machado was scheduled to
speak, was I think very disappointing to many of us.
In the meantime, we need to be aware that the Maduro
administration and indeed----
The Chairman. Ambassador, I am going to ask you to just
hold there. I want you to finish your statement, but the time
for the vote has expired. They are just holding it for Senator
Rubio and I. So we will recess. There are three votes. This is
the first. So it will be another 20 minutes. So we will recess
for about 20 minutes. We will return and listen to the rest. To
the extent that you need to make any calls, it might be a good
time. The committee stands in recess subject to the call of the
chair.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. This hearing will come back to order. With
apologies to our witnesses, unfortunately, there were more
votes than I thought. We regret the delay, but your testimony
is very important to us. So, Ambassador Duddy, you were
concluding, and I want to hear your conclusions.
Ambassador Duddy. Thank you, sir.
I left off saying with the question where does the current
situation leave us, what are our interests, what are our
options. I noted that we have spent decades working on
democracy and human rights in the region, but also on the
concept or on mechanisms for collective action. And I noted my
concern that the recent vote at--or my observation that the
recent vote at the OAS was very disappointing.
A couple of things that I would like to just revisit. We
need to be aware that as the Maduro administration and, indeed,
Chavez's whole Bolivarian experiment have foundered, Maduro and
company have looked to blame the United States. And, indeed,
anti-Americanism has long been a central tenet of the
Bolivarian revolution. In the current circumstance, the Maduro
government would clearly love to turn their domestic crisis
into a bilateral one, and we should not be sucked into that
dynamic by taking steps unilaterally at this point that would
validate Maduro's wild accusations. After 15 years in power the
government owns this crisis. They made it and it is theirs.
Unilateral action would risk rallying both the Chavista base
and much of the region.
So I know that there are some who have already dismissed
the notion of economic sanctions, and that, sir, is not on your
agenda. But I did want to touch on one or two things before
ceding to my fellow panelists.
It is true that the United States still has a robust trade
relationship with Caracas. 2013 bilateral trade apparently
totaled more than $45 billion, and Venezuela remains the
fourth-largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States.
But the total volume of oil sales to the United States fell to
less than 800,000 barrels a day last year and with increased
production, reduced domestic consumption and increased supplies
from Canada and elsewhere, Venezuela's oil imports to the
United States are substantially less important to us than they
used to be.
They remain, however, immensely important to Venezuela's
economy, and the country's very vulnerability on that score is
one of the reasons I think why we probably do not want to use a
doomsday tactic like economic sanctions against that sector to
coerce the Venezuelan Government into changing its behavior.
Economic sanctions could well collapse an already staggering,
imploding economy and cause great suffering to the Venezuelan
people, as well as harming many of the smaller nations of the
Caribbean which, through the Petro Caribe program, depend on
Venezuela's concessionary financing for oil imports. And more
importantly, such a course would not necessarily yield an
improved human rights situation, greater respect for the
Venezuelan opposition's political rights, or restore the
country's debilitated political institutions.
So does that mean we can do nothing? No. We can
aggressively hold individual political and military figures
responsible for promoting violence, condoning or committing
human rights violations or, in extremis, attempting to subvert
democracy. We can hold them responsible. We can identify key
organizations complicit in abuse and hold all of their members
responsible. This would put them on notice that even
association with certain behaviors will make them into
international pariahs. Beyond this, I think we could and should
continue to work with the institutions of the inter-American
system to bring pressure to bear on the Venezuelan state.
I think how we do both parts of what I recommend will be
critically important. Obviously, it is my view that unilateral
action would not be successful. At the same time, it seems to
me that after decades of engagement on human rights, making
clear that certain activities are beyond the pale is consistent
with our own foreign policy and our own interests, and I think
that we can engage others in the hemisphere to work with us to
try and change the reality on the ground.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Duddy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Patrick Duddy
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, members of the committee,
thank you for giving me this opportunity to share my observations on
the current situation in Venezuela. It is an honor to appear before you
today.
Since President Chavez's death in March of last year, circumstances
in Venezuela have markedly deteriorated. By the end of 2013, inflation
had spiked to over 56 percent. The Central Bank's own scarcity index
confirmed that more than 25 percent of basic goods, including,
importantly, many food items, were not available at any given time. The
country with the world's largest conventional oil reserves had proven
itself demonstrably incapable of keeping the shelves in the local
grocery stores stocked. Hard currency was in short supply and the
dollar was trading on the black market at 10 times the official rate.
Criminal violence was at alarming levels with one major survey ranking
Venezuela the second most violent country in the world. Caracas was
arguably the world's most dangerous capital city. The economy was in
bad shape when Maduro took over; it's in worse shape now. The murder
rate in 2012 was startlingly high. By the end of 2013 it was even
higher.
In February of this year, popular discontent with the deteriorating
conditions in the country boiled over into the most widespread
antigovernment demonstrations the country has seen in more than a
decade. The government of President Nicolas Maduro was clearly alarmed
by the scope and intensity of the mass rallies. Maduro, who was sworn
in after a disputed special election victory last April following
Chavez's death, characterized the demonstrators as ``fascists'' allied
with right-wing elements in exile and encouraged by the United States.
The government's response to the demonstrators was not just
vilification but bullyboy repression. Since February more than 40
people have been killed, hundreds injured and many more arrested.
Several important opposition leaders have been jailed. Another has been
expelled from the Chavista controlled legislature and stripped of her
parliamentary immunity. Reports of human rights abuses and even torture
of demonstrators who were detained by security forces have circulated
widely. Video footage of uniformed security forces and armed gangs of
government supporters on motorcycles generally called ``motorizados''
or ``colectivos'' violently repressing unarmed protestors have alarmed
concerned observers in Venezuela and around the world.
Although events in Venezuela have largely been overshadowed by
crises elsewhere, calls for restraint have been issued by a number of
legislative bodies as well as by a variety of NGOs. In response to the
rising level international concern and the determination of the
antigovernment protestors to continue to demonstrate, the Maduro
administration agreed to participate in talks mediated by the Union of
South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Vatican. Like most observers I
hope that this effort is successful in ending the violence and that it
facilitates the development of genuine dialogue.
It is going to be difficult. Not all of the opposition leadership
is participating. Leopoldo Lopez is still in jail. The government
continues to demonize the opposition and to suggest that the country
has been the target of economic warfare. Even since the beginning of
the UNASUR sponsored talks, the Chavista-dominated Supreme Court
announced a ruling asserting that the right to peacefully protest
``without prior permission'' is not absolute, notwithstanding the
language of Article 68 of the Venezuelan Constitution, a move analysts
have characterized as an effort to criminalize dissent.
President Maduro has publically warned that the response of the
Chavista base to the defeat or replacement of the Bolivarian Revolution
would be a general uprising (``pueblo en armas'' El Universal, May 1).
Maduro has also repeatedly cited evidence of conspiracy and accused the
United States of interfering in Venezuela's internal affairs and
plotting the overthrow of the government and the jettisoning of the
Chavez-era social programs.
As we consider the current unsustainable situation in Venezuela I
think it is important to recognize some of the factors that militate
against an early solution. In this context, the dismal state of the
economy is critical. Last year, Venezuela grew by an anemic 1.3
percent. Most analysts expect the economy to be worse this year and
probably next. Scarcity of basic goods and the need to stand in long
lines to buy consumables--when they can be found--has become daily
routine for millions of Venezuelans. The latest Central Bank figures
for inflation suggest it continues to climb and is likely already
running at an annualized rate of 59 percent. In what will almost
certainly prove to be another failed effort to get the unraveling
retail sector under control and prevent hoarding, the government has
eased some price controls and announced plans to introduce what they
are calling a ``Secure Food Supply'' card, essentially a ration card
intended to suppress and control consumption.
One might assume that the problems with scarcity, inflation, and
currency flight would compel the government to walk back from the
economic policies that have eviscerated most of the nonpetroleum
industries and resulted in stagnation even in the vitally important oil
sector. While the government has, in fact, reached out to the private
sector and tried to reassure business leaders and enlist them in
efforts to reverse the trend lines, there has been no serious
reconsideration of the direction in which Maduro and company are taking
the country. Arguably this is in part because the direction was set by
Chavez and Maduro ran as Chavez's anointed successor. Even if one
accepts the official government figures on the April vote count, Maduro
barely squeaked out a win despite Chavez's endorsement and the fact
that he began the abbreviated campaign with a double digit lead in the
polls. Maduro may believe he does not have the political capital within
Chavismo to change course. Further to that point, Chavez and Maduro
have vastly expanded the number of Venezuelans who depend directly or
indirectly on the government. As a consequence, the base would be
alarmed if substantial economic or political concessions are made to an
opposition that Maduro himself has accused of plotting to dismantle
Chavista-era social programs in order to restore their own economic
fortunes.
Recent polling suggests that the Venezuelan public is overwhelming
unhappy with the current state of the country (79.5 percent according
Datanalisis as cited by El Universal on May 5) and by a large majority
(59.2 percent) blame the Maduro administration for the mess.
Interestingly, however, according to most of the polling I've seen, the
public's unhappiness has not yet evolved into unambiguous majority
support for the opposition. While support for Maduro has fallen,
Chavismo retains a strong base, even if it does not now enjoy majority
support. Support for the opposition is also solid but not monolithlic.
Emblematic of their situation is the fact that some groups are
participating in the UNASUR mediated dialogue and some are not. The
bottom line, however, is that Venezuela remains both polarized and
nearly equally divided. Supporters of the government are not just
vested but dependent on the social programs of the government.
Supporters of the opposition are united in their belief that the
government is taking the country in the wrong direction, that the
country's political institutions have been compromised and that the
economy is in free fall. They have yet, however, to articulate
convincingly an economic alternative that would reassure both the
business community and the Chavista base.
The current situation in Venezuela is unsustainable. The opposition
and government have settled into a sullen standoff. The economy is
sinking and an economic collapse is not unthinkable. As circumstances
get worse on the ground, as people become more and more frustrated with
shortages, blackouts, and violent crime, further demonstrations
demanding a more honest, competent, and democratic government are
likely if the dialogue now under way fails to deliver results. The
prospect of further clashes is alarming, as this government's response
to legitimate protest to date does not augur well for the future.
Where does this leave the U.S.? What are our interests? What are
our options? We have spent decades trying to restore and consolidate
democracy in the region. We have made human rights a cornerstone of our
political engagement. The hollowing out of Venezuela's political
institutions is cause for deep concern. The government's use of force
with the demonstrators, the refusal to disarm the colectivos, the
increasing hostility toward the independent media should concern all of
the democratic governments of the hemisphere, not just us. And, it is
also true that the U.S. has promoted the notion of hemispheric
cooperation. It remains to be seen if the UNASUR can and will foster a
genuine dialogue but it seems to me that we should all hope that effort
is successful.
In the meantime, we need to be aware that as the Maduro
administration and, indeed Chavez's Bolivarian experiment have
foundered, Maduro and company have looked to blame the U.S. Indeed,
anti-Americanism has long been a central tenet of the Bolivarian
Revolution. In the current circumstance, the Maduro government would
clearly love to turn their domestic crisis into a bilateral one. We
should not be sucked into that dynamic by taking steps unilaterally at
this point that would validate Maduro's wild accusations. After 15
years in power, the government owns this crisis: they made it; it's
theirs. Unilateral action would risk rallying both the Chavista base
and much of the region to Maduro's side.
So, should the U.S. consider levying economic sanctions on
Venezuela if the current situation doesn't improve? At this point, I
don't think so. It is true, of course, the U.S. still has a robust
trade relationship with Caracas. In 2013 bilateral trade totaled more
than 45 billion dollars and Venezuela remains the fourth-largest
foreign supplier of oil to the U.S. But total volume of oil sales to
the U.S. fell to less than 800,00 barrels per day last year and with
increased U.S., production, reduced domestic consumption and increased
supplies from Canada and elsewhere, Venezuela's oil exports to the U.S.
are substantially less important to us than they used to be. They
remain, however, immensely important to Venezuela's economy and the
country's very vulnerability is one reason to refrain from what would
certainly be seen as a doomsday tactic to coerce change in the
Venezuelan government's behavior. We could well collapse what is
already an imploding economy and cause great suffering to the
Venezuelan people as well as harming many of the small economies of the
region which have become Venezuela's Petro Caribe clients. And such a
course would not necessarily yield an improved human rights situation,
greater respect for the Venezuelan opposition's political rights or
restoration of the country's debilitated political institutions.
So, does that mean we can do nothing? No. We can aggressively hold
individual political and military figures responsible for promoting
violence, condoning or committing human rights violations or, in
extremis, attempting to subvert democracy. We can identify key
organizations complicit in abuse and hold all of their members
responsible; this would put them on notice that even association with
certain behaviors will make them into international pariahs. Beyond
this we could and should work with the institutions of the Inter
American system to bring pressure to bear on the Venezuelan State. At
the end of the day, I think collective action has the best chance of
success.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Naim.
STATEMENT OF MOISES NAIM, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Naim. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Senator Rubio.
Thanks for inviting me here today.
Let me please start with a personal note. What is going on
in Venezuela today is very personal for me. I will be as
dispassionate as possible in my analysis and recommendations on
United States policy toward Venezuela, but I come to this task
today with a heavy heart. To witness how widespread human
suffering mounts on a daily basis is nothing less than a
personal tragedy for me, for my family, and of course, and most
importantly, for the Venezuelan people.
Venezuela today has an authoritarian government that knows
how to impersonate a democracy and tries to look democratic,
and in many aspects, it has been successful at impersonating a
democracy while rigging elections, stifling the media,
repressing the opposition, and undermining checks and balances
and concentrating as much power as possible.
Just one example to illustrate this is that in the 14 years
of Chavez's rule and 1 year of Maduro's government, there is
not one instance when the legislative or the judiciary branches
have stopped the Government or the President from doing exactly
what he wants when he wants it as he wants it.
More should be done to make it apparent to the rest of the
world that Venezuela today just impersonates a democracy and is
not a democracy.
It is important, however, to stress that I deeply believe
what others have said here and that the needed changes in
Venezuela can and should only be brought about by Venezuelans.
And I deeply believe that the United States cannot and should
not be a main protagonist of what is going on there.
I do have five concrete steps that I recommend, and they
are aimed at clarifying a situation that the Venezuelan
authorities are deliberately obscuring and also sanctioning
those who are guilty of massive corruption and human rights
violations.
Unfortunately, as we speak here today, there is another
improbable and surprising external power calling the shots in
Venezuela and interfering with the will of the people there,
Cuba. I hope that this committee and you, Chairman Menendez,
Senator Rubio, will do more to try to clarify to the rest of
the world what is the role of the Cuban Government in
Venezuela. Havana now controls very important functions of the
Venezuelan state, and we need to understand better the extent
and the scope of that interference and that presence of the
Cuban authorities in Venezuela.
But the context for the concrete recommendations that I am
going to offer is a severe and ill-understood human rights
crisis. The most important clash in today's Venezuela is not
that of the left versus the right, the rich versus the poor,
the United States against others, or even good ideas versus bad
ideas on how to run a country. No. The defining issue of
current-day Venezuela is the wholesale, state-sanctioned, and
amply documented violation of human rights of those who oppose
the government.
We are very lucky to have today with us here Jose Miguel
Vivanco. The organization, Human Rights Watch, as you know,
just released yesterday a very significant and well-documented
report to which he is going to refer, and therefore, I do not
need to dwell on it.
The five recommendations I will suggest in this testimony
are aimed at clarifying the deliberately obfuscated situation,
as I said. Let me briefly describe each one of them.
First is fight lies with facts. The Venezuelan Government
routinely manipulates and hides basic information about the
situation of the country. Critical data about the economic,
social, and political situation is either hidden or
manipulated. After 15 years of the Chavez model of governing,
it is still impossible to have an objective assessment of its
impact.
I urge you to encourage different branches of the U.S.
Government and use a vote that the United States has in
organizations like the United Nations and the IDB, the World
Bank, the IMF, and others to collect and present serious,
systematic, and objective evaluations of the situation in
Venezuela. I am referring to the societal impact of the Chavez
style of governing and the approach. After 15 years, the
Venezuelan people and others deserve to have a better
understanding of what happens when a nation adopts the kinds of
policies that have been in place in Venezuela for so long.
My second proposal is that the United States should help
uncover and publicize the level of corruption and foreign
interference in the current Government of Venezuela. Let us
hear the names of individuals and groups most guilty of massive
corruption in Venezuela and widespread violation of human
rights there. These are the narcotraffickers and the government
accomplices and the meddling Cuban authorities and their
government associates and those that steal from the public
funds. And of course, we want to know more and identify the
perpetrators of the horrible human rights abuses that have
become so common.
My recommendation in this sense is that the United States
consider the possibility of having an audit of all intelligence
and law enforcement reports that it has and that can illuminate
the Venezuelan situation and that it releases the information
that can be made public without damaging the intelligence
community's need to protect sources and methods. I am sure that
such audit will find that the U.S. Government holds secret
information whose revelation can shed important light into the
workings of the Venezuelan Government and its Cuban partners or
the narcotraffickers in its midst without causing any lasting
damage to the United States intelligence community.
Third, United States should target the Bolivarian oligarchs
and their partners. And in this sense, I fully support the
initiative that you and Senator Rubio have taken on sanctioning
individuals and their associates that are guilty of corruption
and other misdeeds.
The only additional thing that I will urge you is that when
these individuals are sanctioned, it be very clear why. It is
not enough to tell the world that a high-ranking government
official has been denied a visa in the United States. It is
very important that you explain and tell the world what is the
evidence and what is the kind of information that has led the
United States Government to do such a thing.
Fourth, the United States must avoid the anti-imperialist
trap. I strongly oppose and urge against any United States oil
embargo of Venezuela. This action will be seen as a typical
U.S. strong-arm tactic to harass poor Venezuela, a nation that,
in quotes, is valiantly challenging this evil empire which
longs to control its massive oil reserves. This is the
narrative long nurtured by Chavez and his acolytes, and it is
widely accepted and believed in Venezuela and firmly believed
by millions of others around the world. If the United States
imposes a unilateral total or partial oil embargo or generic
economic sanctions, it will instantly incur the blame for all
the ills that now befall Venezuela. United States sanctions
will be a reward for the government of Caracas and the
Government of Cuba.
No sanction imposed by the United States, no generalized
sanctions imposed by this Government can cause more damage or
be as politically destabilizing for the Venezuelan Government
as the sanctions that are currently being imposed by the Maduro
administration on the Venezuelans or what the Cuban Government
is already extracting from the nation.
Fifth and to conclude, the United States should rally other
Latin American leaders to condemn human rights violations in
Venezuela and demand the freedom of political prisoners. A
unified call from Latin American allies will be an important
force in promoting liberty for those unjustly jailed and, in
some cases, tortured. Those that are in jails include Leopoldo
Lopez, obviously a prisoner of conscience, a well-known
opposition leader of course, and Ivan Simonovis, a long-held
political prisoner, and all of the young people who have been
swept up by government forces. ``Free the prisoners now'' ought
to become a rallying cry for all the freedom-loving governments
in Latin America.
Venezuela's brutality should be a stain on the conscience
of other Latin American nations that have looked the other way
for too long. The United States should make indifference and
inaction harder to sustain, and even if the United States must
stand alone in denouncing these abuses, it can and should do
so. Failure to do it will be an abdication of U.S. values and
principles.
For the sake of Venezuela and the Venezuelan people I hold
so dear, I hope that these and other actions can help make
progress towards a better future possible.
Thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Naim follows:]
Prepared Statement of Moises Naim
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of
the committee, for inviting me to appear before you today. It is an
honor to be here.
I would like to begin on a personal note. I spend most of my work
days analyzing global economic and political trends and the capacity of
nations to successfully accomplish their societal goals. The case of
Venezuela is different for me. I grew up there, studied there, taught
there and in the early nineties worked with an extraordinary team of
government officials as Minister of Trade and Industry to bring
prosperity to a country that had a defective but vibrant democracy. For
over 40 years in Venezuela the results of elections were largely
unpredictable, term limits were enforced and checks and balances helped
contain the concentration of power.
I will be as dispassionate as possible in my analysis and
recommendation on U.S. policy toward Venezuela. But I come to this task
with a heavy heart. I see a country I love, and which gave so much to
me and my family, spiral downward into economic chaos, fighting in the
streets, a deeply divided society, massive government abuses and
unimaginable corruption. To have this fine country acquire many of the
characteristics common to much poorer and failed states, and to witness
how human suffering mounts is nothing less than a personal tragedy for
me, my family and, of course, and most importantly, for the Venezuelan
people.
Venezuela today is not a democracy, and it clearly is an economic
failure. Politically, it is a post-modern autocracy. What is this? It
is an authoritarian government that knows how to look democratic while
rigging elections, stifling the media, repressing the opposition and
undermining checks and balances, thus concentrating power while keeping
the appearance of a democracy. Just one example can illustrate this: in
the 14 years of Chavez' rule and 1 year of Maduro's government, there
is no single instance when the legislative or the judiciary branches
have opposed a government initiative or stopped the president from
doing exactly what he wants, when he wants.
The government has stealthily and effectively annulled any checks
and balances on the power of the executive. Governmental accountability
and transparency have been systematically eroded and, for all practical
purposes, ceased to exist years ago. That said, I will share with you
five practical steps I believe could be taken by the U.S. Government
that would make a positive contribution to understanding the Venezuelan
reality, alleviating this suffering and assisting an important nation
in our hemisphere to move beyond this horrendous situation.
It is important, however, to stress that I deeply believe the
conflicts in Venezuela can only be solved by Venezuelans, and that the
United States cannot, and should not, be a protagonist in what is going
on there. The steps I recommend are aimed at facilitating the
resolution of the conflicts and at clarifying a situation that the
Venezuelan authorities are deliberately obscuring.
Unfortunately, as we speak there is another improbable and
surprising external power calling the shots in Venezuela and
interfering with the will of the people there: Cuba. I hope that this
committee will discuss Cuba's defining role in Venezuela in a future
hearing.
The context for the steps I recommend is a severe and ill-
understood human rights crisis. I am fully aware of the extent of
arbitrary arrests, lack of judicial oversight, kidnappings, beatings,
threats, restrictions of the media and the jailing of young protesters
in horrible prisons for hardened criminals. I know you will receive a
comprehensive and reliable report on these and other human rights
violations from Jose Miguel Vivanco of Human Rights Watch so I will not
enumerate them here, except to comment that my fondest hope was that
these practices were left behind with the end of the dark days of
brutal military dictatorships in Latin America. Sadly, they have come
back in Venezuela. The most important clash in today's Venezuela is not
that of the left versus right, rich versus poor, socialism versus
capitalism, oligarchs versus the people or even good ideas versus bad
ideas on how to run a country. No; the defining issue of current day
Venezuela is the wholesale, state-sanctioned and amply documented
violation of the human rights of those who oppose the government;
violations carried out by the national guard and well trained and
thuggish civilian militias, the infamous ``colectivos.''
Under these circumstances, it is a challenge for the U.S. to
intervene in a constructive way. At best, the U.S. can take positive
steps that will help support the central drivers of a change for the
better: the Venezuelan people.
The five steps I recommend are:
(1) Help Venezuelans and the world understand the real impact
of 15 years of the model of governing that Hugo Chavez put in
place;
(2) Help uncover and publicize the level of corruption and
foreign influence in the present government;
(3) Sanction those responsible for human rights abuses, as
well as the oligarchs connected to the Chavez elite who have
amassed unimaginable fortunes through corrupt deals and
criminal undertakings;
(4) Prevent measures which will fuel the ``blame others''
tactic of avoiding responsibility for a failed state and a
collapsing economy that the Venezuelan Government and its
apologists at home and abroad so often use; and
(5) Encourage Latin American allies to abandon their silence
about government abuses in Venezuela that they would not
tolerate in their own country. I am not asking Venezuela's
neighbors or the Organization of American States (OAS) to
intervene in Venezuela's politics. But it is absolutely valid
to expect decent governments--and decent leaders--not to remain
indifferent as the Venezuelan Government brutally represses its
opponents.
Next, I will briefly elaborate on each of these five proposals.
(1) fight lies with facts
One of the most potent tools the Venezuelan Government has used is
the manipulation and the hiding of social, economic, political, and
institutional information.
To confront this reality, I recommend the U.S. Government exert the
significant influence it has in international and national institutions
which collect data and publish reports on the state of the country's
economy, society, political liberties, international relations, and
national and international security. Use the vote of the U.S.
representatives in international organizations such as the United
Nations, the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, the
Inter-American Development Bank and even the shamefully ineffectual OAS
to push for quality research on the Venezuelan reality. U.S. national
institutions such as the Congressional Research Service, private
foundations and NGOs could also be engaged.
The first casualty in a dictatorship is often truth. The Venezuelan
reality is not being presented by the government as data is not
reported, is manipulated or fabricated. There are legitimate doubts
regarding the accuracy of the data concerning poverty and inequality,
no objective assessment of the social programs has been carried out,
the public ignores how much the massive foreign aid programs cost or
the nature of the obligations the nation has acquired with countries
like China, Russia, or Belarus. We don't even have reliable information
about homicides, kidnappings, and crime. The government ably exploits
for propaganda purposes its doctored figures and benefits from the
information vacuum. Recently, for example, the Governor of the Central
Bank announced that the data about scarcity of consumer goods and
medicines would no longer be published.
Shining a light on the true conditions of poverty, inequality,
labor practices, productivity, oil production, fiscal and monetary
balances, censorship, and, of course, human rights will help reveal the
failure of the Venezuelan leadership to pursue an economic and social
path that serves its people.
I am not asking that the U.S. explicitly ``classify'' the
Venezuelan Government as a dictatorship, but that the U.S. use its
power to fight an abusive regime with the force of information: to get
the real facts out for everyone to see and debate. It is imperative to
make it harder for the regime and its apologists to lie about what is
going on in the country and to hide the devastating impact of their
policies.
(2) uncover the dirty secrets
Rumors, individual cases, whispered revelations, confessions by
Venezuelan Government operatives, wild accusations and sporadic reports
all tell of the Cuban influence on Venezuelan Government policies, of
the enormous influence of narcotraffickers or their accomplices in the
government and of the massive corruption in the use of government
revenues and contracting. The U.S. security and financial agencies are
well-informed on each of these realities. My recommendation is to
conduct an information audit of all intelligence and law enforcement
reports that illuminate the Venezuelan situation and to release the
information that can be made public without threatening security assets
or damaging the intelligence community's need to protect sources and
methods. I am sure that such audit will find that the U.S. Government
holds secret information whose revelation can shed important light into
the workings of the Venezuelan Government and its Cuban partners
(or the narcotraffickers in its midst) without causing any lasting
damage to U.S. intelligence.
It is critically necessary to present information about the level
of foreign influence, illegal money flows, government criminality and
corrupt practices in Venezuela and to document how its government has
become an important enabler of the illicit trade in drugs, people, and
weapons. Under conditions of widespread media censorship and coercion,
the potential for manipulating the public with false information is
high. Again, the U.S. Government could take an important step in
countering this misinformation by systematically revealing what it
knows about these corrupt practices.
(3) target the bolivarian oligarchs and their partners
The U.S. has a number of tools to sanction individuals who enter
U.S. territory. It is well known that the same corrupt individuals who
steal from government coffers, take kick-backs on contracts and launder
drug money while loudly condemning the United States, also come here to
enjoy this country's goods and services. These new billionaires, who
have amassed unimaginable personal fortunes by criminally tapping into
public funds, travel in private jets to the U.S., take advantage of
top-flight U.S. health services, send their children to U.S. colleges
and spend their holidays shopping in New York, skiing in Aspen or
yachting in Florida. They are also heavy users of the U.S. banks and
invest their misbegotten gains in real estate and other investment
instruments under U.S. jurisdiction.
My concrete proposal is to broaden the scope and reach of the
microtargeted sanctions against specific individuals and their families
and business partners. Since Hugo Chavez came to power, 15 years ago,
it has become almost impossible to thrive in the private sector in
Venezuela without entering into business deals with the government.
Rarely are these deals conducted at arm's length and without
corruption. There is a long and growing list of obscenely and
inexplicably affluent Venezuelans who pass for ``business people'' but
are nothing more than criminals who enriched themselves on the backs of
the Venezuelan poor that the Bolivarian Government so ardently claims
to represent. These crooks and their associates should be targeted with
individual sanctions. The U.S. government knows who they are.
Denying a visa, freezing bank accounts, and limiting the access of
the Chavez oligarchs and their families to the U.S. will obviously have
a direct impact on these individuals. As important, it will make public
the corrupt nature of the regime and will identify some of its wealthy
beneficiaries. Demonstrating that the U.S. does not condone this kind
of corrupt and illegal behavior will show these individuals, and the
world, what it stands for and what it stands against.
(4) avoid the anti-imperialist trap
There has been much discussion of using the oil trade with
Venezuela as a tool to sanction the country. I strongly oppose this
proposal for two reasons. First, as others have said, cutting off the
most important source of revenue for the Venezuelan economy hurts all
Venezuelans, most of whom have no influence in government decisions and
certainly no ability to tap into public revenues for private gain.
Second, and in this politically charged environment a key factor, a
U.S. oil embargo on Venezuela or any kind of nationwide economic
sanction would instantly be painted as Yankee imperialism, intervention
and a typical U.S. strong-arm tactic to harass poor Venezuela--a nation
that is valiantly challenging this evil empire which longs to control
its massive oil reserves. This is the narrative that Chavez and his
acolytes in and outside Venezuela have nurtured for a long time. The
tenets of this narrative are firmly believed by Latin Americans and
millions of others around the world--it is also widely accepted in
Venezuela. If the U.S. imposes a total or partial oil embargo or
otherwise uses heavy-handed, generalized economic sanctions, it would
be committing a clumsy and self-inflicted wound. The U.S. would
instantly become the cause of all Venezuelan ills, from the lack of
basic goods at the grocery store to the deaths of children in hospitals
without medicines.
No sanction imposed by the U.S. can cause more damage or be as
politically destabilizing for the Venezuelan government as the
sanctions that the Maduro administration and its Cuban handlers are
currently imposing on the Venezuelan people.
Oil sanctions by the U.S. Government would be a reward for the
Caracas Government and its Cuban partners, since they are desperately
looking for someone to blame for the economic crisis they have created.
So it is my strong recommendation NOT to do something that has been
discussed by some Members of Congress. Don't fall into the Anti-
Imperialist trap.
(5) rally latin american government voices to condemn of human rights
violations in venezuela and demand the freedom of political prisoners
Finally, I would like to make a recommendation for action in the
area of human rights. Even though the U.S. has lost influence in Latin
America, it still does have supporters and allies in the region. I
recommend rallying these allies to get political prisoners such as
Leopoldo Lopez, the opposition leader, Ivan Simonovis, the long-held
political prisoner, and all of the young people who have been swept up
by the government forces out of prison. A unified call for living up to
the most basic of human rights, the right to due process under the law,
from friends of the U.S. across the continent would be an important
force in gaining liberty for those unjustly jailed and in some cases
tortured.
U.S. leadership in mobilizing a group of countries to denounce the
old but not forgotten tactic of governments to jail and harass their
critics would be a loud voice in saying enough is enough. Release the
prisoners!
Venezuela's brutality should be a stain on the conscience of other
Latin American nations that have looked the other way for too long. The
U.S. should make indifference and bystanding harder to sustain.
Additionally, the U.S. should engage and encourage in the very
innovative process spontaneously taking place in Latin America where
opposition forces are taking a public stand against their governments'
complacency toward the Venezuelan situation. In Brazil, Argentina,
Chile, and Peru, elected legislators have openly challenged their own
governments for their passive stand toward Venezuela. This is a process
that should be welcomed and encouraged by the U.S. It is very important
to have elected officials who are members of nonruling parties
throughout Latin America shaming their own governments out of their
silence regarding the abuses taking place in Venezuela.
To conclude, I would like to reiterate that these recommendations
are based on the idea that real information and its broad dissemination
are powerful tools in confronting deception and corruption. They
embrace the idea that those culpable of wrongdoing should bear the
brunt of punishment. They take into account the special role of the
U.S. in the region and in the world, and they strive to bring nations
together to defend modern practices of real democracies in protecting
and defending all citizens. For the sake of Venezuela, and the
Venezuelan people I hold dear, I hope these and other actions can help
make progress toward a better future.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me, before I turn to Mr. Vivanco, say there is nothing
in the legislation that Senator Rubio and I are considering
that has anything to do with oil embargos, and that is very
clear. So let us eliminate that right off the bat. I know that
Senator Durbin mentioned it as an item, but there is nothing in
our legislation that speaks about that, so that we do not begin
to obfuscate the differences.
Mr. Vivanco.
STATEMENT OF JOSE MIGUEL VIVANCO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAS
DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Vivanco. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio.
I will respectfully request that Human Rights Watch's full
report titled ``Punished for Protesting'' be included in the
written record of this hearing.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Vivanco. In late March, Human Rights Watch went to
Venezuela to investigate reports of serious human rights
violations committed in the context of massive public protests,
which began on February 12. Our experts traveled to Caracas and
three states, conducting more than 90 interviews with victims,
the doctors who attended them, eyewitnesses, journalists, and
human rights defenders. We also gathered extensive evidence,
including photographs, videos, medical reports, and judicial
documents.
The scale of rights violations we found and the range of
security forces and justice officials committing them shows,
without question, that these are not isolated incidents or the
excesses of a few rogue actors. Rather, they are part of an
alarming pattern of abuse that is the worst we have seen in
Venezuela in years.
The most serious abuses we found are: first, the routine
use of unlawful force against unarmed protestors and even
bystanders, including severe beatings, firing live ammunition,
rubber bullets, and tear gas indiscriminately into crowds,
firing rubber bullets deliberately at pointblank range at
unarmed individuals already in custody. The fact that these
abuses were carried out repeatedly by multiple security forces,
including the national guard, national police, and the state
police, in multiple locations across the country and over the
6-week period we examined led us to conclude that these human
rights violations were part of a systematic practice by
Venezuelan security forces.
Second, we found a range of serious abuses committed
against detainees who were often held incommunicado on military
bases for 48 hours or more before being presented before a
judge. This included beatings with helmets and firearms,
electric shock and burns, being forced to squat or kneel
without moving for hours at a time, being handcuffed to other
detainees sometimes in human chains of over 30 people for hours
at a time, and extended periods of extreme heat or cold. In at
least 10 cases, we concluded the abuses we have documented
constituted torture.
Third, we found that rather than fulfill its role as a
safeguard against abuse of power, justice officials were party
to serious due process violations. Virtually every victim we
interviewed was denied access to a lawyer until minutes before
their hearings, which were often scheduled in the middle of the
night. Prosecutors and judges routinely turned a blind eye to
evidence suggesting the detainees had been physically abused or
that evidence against them had been planted by security forces.
Fourth, we found that security forces deliberately targeted
journalists and others photographing and filming the repression
against protestors.
And fifth, we found that security forces tolerated and
sometimes collaborated directly with armed pro-government gangs
that attacked protestors with total impunity.
Now, President Maduro and Attorney General Ortega have
acknowledged that security forces have committed human rights
violations, and they have pledged to investigate these cases.
However, there are good reasons to doubt their credibility.
Why?
First, because justice officials are themselves directly
implicated in serious due process violations. So any proper
investigation will require these institutions to investigate
themselves, a recipe for impunity.
Second, because the Venezuelan judiciary has ceased to
function as an independent branch of government.
And third, because the President and Attorney General
Ortega have repeatedly made public statements downplaying the
abuses while, at the same time, celebrating the security forces
that have carried out systematic violations.
Given this reality, the international community should
demand that people who have been unlawfully detained for
exercising their fundamental rights should immediately and
unconditionally be released; that President Maduro should cease
all rhetoric that incites violence; that all human rights
violations should be promptly and impartially investigated and
those responsible brought to justice; and that Venezuela take
steps to restore the independence of the judiciary beginning
with the supreme court.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vivanco follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jose Miguel Vivanco
Mr. Chairman, committee members, thank you for the invitation to
appear before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on behalf of
Human Rights Watch (HRW) to discuss the alarming human rights situation
in Venezuela today. On May 5, Human Rights Watch released a report
titled ``Punished for Protesting: Rights Violations in Venezuela's
Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice System.'' Based on extensive
research conducted on the ground in Caracas and three states, the
report documents violations committed by Venezuelan security forces and
justice officials in the context of protests since February 12, 2014.
The findings of that report--the full version of which I have formally
submitted to the committee, and which I would respectfully request be
included in the record of this hearing--are the basis for my testimony
today.
findings of hrw report ``punished for protesting''
On February 12, 2014, thousands of people across Venezuela
participated in marches and public demonstrations to protest the
policies of the government of President Nicolas Maduro. In Caracas and
several other cities, violent clashes broke out between government
security forces and protesters. Three people were killed, dozens
seriously injured, and hundreds arrested. Since then, the protests have
continued and the number of casualties and arrests has grown.
In the days and weeks after February 12, Human Rights Watch
received reports of serious human rights violations, including abuses
committed during government operations aimed at containing protest
activity, as well as in the treatment of people detained at or near
protests.
To investigate these allegations of abuse, Human Rights Watch
carried out a fact-finding investigation in Venezuela in March. We
visited Caracas and three states--Carabobo, Lara, and Miranda--and
conducted scores of interviews with abuse victims, their families,
eyewitnesses, medical professionals, journalists, and human rights
defenders. We also gathered extensive material evidence, including
photographs, video footage, medical reports, judicial rulings, and case
files. In addition, we collected and reviewed government reports and
official statements regarding protest activity and the response of
security forces.
What we found during our in-country investigation and subsequent
research is a pattern of serious abuse. In 45 cases, we found strong
evidence of serious human rights violations committed by Venezuelan
security forces, which included violations of the right to life; the
prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; the
rights to bodily integrity, security, and liberty; and due process
rights. These violations were compounded by members of the Attorney
General's Office and the judiciary who knew of, participated in, or
otherwise tolerated abuses against protesters and detainees, including
serious violations of their due process rights.
The accounts of the victims in these 45 cases--together with
corroborating evidence assembled from a diverse range of sources--
provided credible evidence that more than 150 people were victims of
serious abuses in related incidents. (For more on how we conducted our
research and documented cases, see the ``Methodology'' section in this
report.)
In most of the cases we documented, security forces employed
unlawful force, including shooting and severely beating unarmed
individuals. Nearly all of the victims were also arrested and, while in
detention, subjected to physical and psychological abuse. In at least
10 cases, the abuses clearly constituted torture.
In all three states, as well as in Caracas, security forces allowed
armed pro-government gangs to assault unarmed civilians, and in some
cases openly collaborated with them in the attacks, our research found.
The Venezuelan Government has characterized the protests taking
place throughout the country as violent. There is no doubt that some
protesters have used violence, including throwing rocks and Molotov
cocktails at security forces. More than 200 security force members and
government officials have been injured in the context of the protests,
and at least nine have died, according to the government. All crimes--
including those committed against security forces, protesters, and
bystanders--require rigorous investigation, and those responsible
should be brought to justice. Moreover, security forces have a
responsibility to detain people caught in the act of committing crimes.
However, in the 45 cases of human rights violations we documented,
the evidence indicated that the victims of unlawful force and other
abuses were not engaging in acts of violence or other criminal activity
at the time they were targeted by Venezuelan security forces. On the
contrary, eyewitness testimony, video footage, photographs and other
evidence suggest victims were unarmed and nonviolent. Indeed, some of
the worst abuses we documented were committed against people who were
not even participating in demonstrations, or were already in detention
and fully under the control of security forces.
The nature and timing of many of these abuses--as well as the
frequent use of political epithets by the perpetrators--suggests that
their aim was not to enforce the law or disperse protests, but rather
to punish people for their political views or perceived views.
In many instances, the aim of the abuse appears to have been to
prevent individuals from documenting the tactics being employed by
security forces, or to punish those attempting to do so. In 13 of the
cases we investigated, security forces targeted individuals who had
been taking photographs or filming security force confrontations with
protesters. Roughly half of these individuals were professional
journalists, while the other half were protesters or bystanders using
cell phones to document use of force by security forces.
In addition to the unlawful use of force and arbitrary arrests,
nearly all of the 45 cases involved violations of due process
guarantees. These included holding detainees incommunicado, denying
them access to lawyers until minutes before they were presented to
judges, and in several cases planting evidence on them before charging
them with crimes. Judges often confirmed charges against detainees
based on dubious evidence presented by prosecutors, without subjecting
the evidence to rigorous review or inquiring into how suspects
presented before them had sustained visible injuries.
Prosecutors and judges routinely turned a blind eye to evidence
suggesting that detainees had been subject to abuses while in
detention, such as ignoring obvious signs of physical abuse, or
interrogating detainees in military installations, where it was clear
they did not have access to lawyers.
High-ranking Venezuelan Government officials, including President
Nicolas Maduro and the attorney general, have acknowledged that
government security forces have committed human rights violations in
responding to demonstrations since February 12. They have pledged that
those responsible for abuses will be investigated and prosecuted, and
the Attorney General's Office recently reported that it is conducting
145 investigations into alleged human rights violations and that 17
security officials had been detained for their alleged involvement in
these cases. At the same time, President Maduro, the attorney general,
and numerous others government officials have also repeatedly claimed
that human rights abuses are isolated incidents, rather than evidence
of a broader pattern of abuse.
While it was not possible for Human Rights Watch's investigation to
determine the full scope of human rights violations committed in
Venezuela in response to protests since February 12, our research leads
us to conclude that the abuses were not isolated cases or excesses by
rogue security force members, but rather part of a broader pattern,
which senior officers and officials must or should have known about,
and seem at a minimum to have tolerated. The fact that the abuses by
members of security forces were carried out repeatedly, by multiple
security forces, in multiple locations across three states and the
capital (including in controlled environments such as military
installations and other state institutions), and over the 6-week period
covered in this report, supports the conclusion that the abuses were
part of a systematic practice by the Venezuelan authorities.
Prosecutors and justice officials who should have operated
independently from security forces--and whose role should have led them
to identify and intervene to stop violations against detainees--instead
turned a blind eye, and were in some cases actively complicit in the
human rights violations being committed by security forces. Prosecutors
contributed to various due process violations, such as participating in
interrogations without a defense lawyer present, which is contrary to
Venezuelan law. Both prosecutors and judges failed to scrutinize
evidence that had been planted or fabricated by security forces, and
held hearings to determine charges for multiple detainees who did not
have prior adequate access to legal counsel.
The scope of the due process violations that occurred in multiple
jurisdictions across several states--and that persisted, at the very
least, over the 6-week period examined by this report--highlights the
failure of the judicial body to fulfill its role as a safeguard against
abuse of state power. It also reinforces the conclusion that
Venezuela's judiciary has been transformed from an independent branch
of government to a highly politicized body, as has been previously
documented in multiple reports by Human Rights Watch.
violence by protesters
Human Rights Watch reviewed government statements alleging that
protesters engaged in acts of violence and other crimes in various
parts of the country since February 12. We also collected and analyzed
media reports, video footage, and photographs posted online purporting
to shows acts of violence committed by protesters during
demonstrations. As noted below, according to the Venezuelan Government
there have been 41 fatalities connected to the protests, most of which
the government attributes to protesters.
The most common crime attributed to protesters was the obstruction
of roadways and other transit, either by fixed barricades or the
presence of demonstrators who did not seek official permits for their
activities. In addition, on multiple occasions, people participating in
protests have attacked security forces with rocks, Molotov cocktails,
and slingshots. In a handful of incidents, there were reports of
protesters shooting homemade mortars.
For example, photographs taken by a Reuters photographer on April
6, 2014, show young men who appear to be protesters firing what looks
like an improvised mortar device. The photograph's caption reads:
``Anti-government protesters fire a rudimentary mortar at police during
riots in Caracas April 6, 2014.'' Other photographs taken by the same
photographer show different masked men holding and shooting what appear
to be homemade mortar tubes on February 26 and 27, 2014. According to
the photographs' captions, the men holding the mortar tubes were
antigovernment protesters participating in protests in San Cristobal,
Tachira state.
Human Rights Watch also found multiple photographs and videos that
reportedly show antigovernment protesters throwing Molotov cocktails at
security forces. Some images show the Molotov cocktails setting
security force members or their vehicles on fire. For example, NTN24
posted online a cell phone video showing several people throwing
Molotov cocktails at an armored government vehicle, setting it on fire.
NTN24 reported that the vehicle had been shooting water and teargas as
it aimed at demolishing street barricades in Caracas.
Another video posted on YouTube shows around a dozen security force
members retreating on a street as rocks are being thrown at them. A
flaming object lands at their feet and explodes, temporarily setting at
least a few of them on fire. The video was uploaded on YouTube on
February 21 by a user who said it was taken on February 18, 2014, in
Tachira state, and described the explosive as a Molotov cocktail. The
video does not show who threw the rocks or explosive, but several news
reports that covered the video alleged that they had been thrown by
protesters.
According to the Attorney General's Office, there have been 41
fatalities in the context of the protests since February 12. Those 41
deaths were classified as follows: 27 caused by firearms; 6 caused by
motorcycle or car crashes attributed to the presence of barricades; 5
caused by ``other circumstances'' (which are not defined); 2 people
killed by being run over by vehicles; and 1 person who died of stab
wounds. Publicly available information indicates that of these 41
reported cases, 9 were members of the security forces or government
officials, at least 10 were civilians who participated in or supported
the protests, and roughly 4 were civilian government supporters.
President Maduro has blamed the opposition for most of the protest-
related deaths. However, to date, the government has not made public
evidence to support this claim. In fact, based on official reports and
credible media accounts, there are strong reasons to believe that
security forces and armed pro-government gangs have been responsible
for some of the killings. Indeed, several security force members have
been arrested for their alleged role in some of these cases.
In those cases where public officials have presented evidence
purporting to demonstrate protesters' responsibility for killings, that
evidence has been far from conclusive. For example, in one case, a
governor affiliated with President Maduro's political party presented
video footage showing two masked men on a rooftop who appear to be
shooting a rifle or rifles in the direction of the street. The governor
claimed the gunmen were antigovernment protesters and suggested they
were responsible for the shooting death of a state worker, Juan Orlando
Labrador Castiblanco. In a separate speech, President Maduro said
Labrador had been killed by ``right-wing snipers.'' The video shown by
the governor does not indicate whether the men on the roof were
antigovernment protesters, nor is it possible to determine based on the
footage whether the shots apparently fired from the rooftop hit anyone
(Labrador is not shown in the video). No evidence was supplied
regarding the trajectory of the bullet or bullets that killed Labrador.
Several press reports confirming Labrador's death during or around the
time of a protest (which was taking place at the time on the Avenida
Cardenal Quintero) included accounts--from neighbors and the mayor--
claiming that armed pro-government gangs, allegedly acting in tandem
with government security forces, had shot him dead. In the face of
contradictory claims, the importance of a thorough, impartial, credible
investigation that includes all available forensic and crime scene
evidence and witness accounts is critical.
unlawful use of force
Security forces routinely used unlawful force against unarmed
protesters and other people in the vicinity of demonstrations. The
perpetrators included members of the National Guard, the National
Police, the Guard of the People, and various state police agencies. The
most common abuses included:
Severely beating unarmed individuals;
Firing live ammunition, rubber bullets, and teargas
canisters indiscriminately into crowds; and
Firing rubber bullets deliberately, at point-blank range, at
unarmed individuals, including, in some cases, individuals
already in custody.
When the restaurant where he worked in a shopping mall in El
Carrizal closed on March 5 due to nearby protests, Moises Guanchez, 19,
left to go home. But he found himself trapped in an enclosed parking
lot behind the mall with around 40 other people, as members of the
National Guard fired teargas canisters and rubber bullets in their
direction. When Guanchez attempted to flee the lot, a guardsman blocked
his way and shot toward his head with rubber bullets. The shot hit
Guanchez's arm, which he had raised to protect his face, and he was
knocked to the ground. Though Guanchez offered no resistance, two
guardsmen picked him up and took turns punching him, until a third
approached and shot him point blank with rubber bullets in his groin.
He would need three blood transfusions and operations on his arm, leg,
and one of his testicles.
Willie David Arma, 29, was detained on March 7 in the street
outside his home in Barquisimeto, a few blocks away from an
antigovernment protest. He was shot repeatedly with rubber bullets,
some at point-blank range, then subjected to a prolonged beating with
rifle butts and helmets by three national guardsmen who asked him:
``Who is your president?''
Under international law, government security forces may use force
in crowd control operations as a last resort and in proportion to the
seriousness of the offense they are seeking to prevent. They may use
lethal force only as self-defense or defense of others against the
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. They may use teargas
only when necessary and in a proportionate and nondiscriminatory
manner--and should not use it in a confined area or against anyone in
detention or already under the control of law enforcement.
Human Rights Watch found that Venezuelan security forces repeatedly
resorted to force--including lethal force--in situations in which it
was wholly unjustified. In a majority of the cases documented by Human
Rights Watch, the use of force occurred in the context of protests that
were peaceful, according to victims, eyewitnesses, lawyers, and
journalists, who in many instances shared video footage and photographs
corroborating their accounts.
In several of the cases we investigated, small groups of
individuals committed acts of violence at the protests, such as
throwing stones or bottles, or burning vehicles. In some instances, the
evidence suggests these acts were committed without provocation; in
others, they appear to have been committed in response to aggression by
security forces. Regardless, eyewitnesses and journalists who observed
the protests consistently told Human Rights Watch that the people who
committed acts of violence at protests were a very small minority--
usually less than a dozen people out of scores or hundreds of people
present.
Yet despite the fact that acts of violence were isolated to small
groups, security forces responded by indiscriminately attacking entire
demonstrations, and in some cases, bystanders. In at least six
incidents we documented, the indiscriminate use of force endangered
people in nearby hospitals, universities, apartment buildings, and
shopping malls. These actions by security forces threatened the well-
being of hundreds of bystanders--children among them.
Rodrigo Perez, 21, felt several rubber pellets strike his back and
head as he was running away from state police officials who had opened
fire with rubber bullets at demonstrators. The demonstrators had been
partially blocking traffic in Puerto La Cruz on March 7 to protest the
government. Perez--who was hit as he ran into a nearby mall's parking
lot--hid in a store after being wounded, and saw several members of
government security forces enter the mall's food court and fire at
unarmed, fleeing civilians, injuring two others.
arbitrary arrests
In the scores of cases of detentions documented by Human Rights
Watch, the majority of the detainees were participating in protests at
the time of their arrests. However, the government routinely failed to
present credible evidence that these protesters were committing crimes
at the time they were arrested, which is a requirement under Venezuelan
law when detaining someone without an arrest warrant. On the contrary,
victim and eyewitness accounts, videos, photographs, and other evidence
indicate that victims were participating peacefully in demonstrations
and not engaging in any criminal activity.
Some of the people detained, moreover, were simply in the vicinity
of protests but not participating in them. This group of detainees
included people who were passing through areas where protests were
taking place, or were in public places nearby. Others were detained on
private property such as apartment buildings. In every case in which
individuals were detained on private property, security forces entered
buildings without search orders, often forcing their way in by breaking
down doors.
Luis Augusto Matheus Chirinos, 21, was detained on February 21 in
Valencia by approximately 10 members of the National Guard at the
entrance of a housing complex (urbanizacion), where he was standing,
waiting for a friend he had gone to pick up. An antigovernment
demonstration was taking place nearby. He was taken to a military
complex of the Guard of the People, where he was beaten, threatened,
and told to repeat that Nicolas Maduro was the President of Venezuela.
Matheus was held incommunicado for 2 days and subsequently charged with
several crimes, based on what our research strongly suggests was
planted evidence and a police report that says he was arrested two
blocks away from where he was actually detained.
Pedro Gonzalez, 24, was visiting a friend on March 3 who lives in
an apartment building near a public square in Caracas where a
demonstration was taking place. When teargas began wafting into the
apartment, Gonzalez went to the building's enclosed courtyard to get
some air. Minutes later, police burst into the building's entrance,
pursuing a protester. They grabbed Gonzalez, threw him to the ground,
and dragged him out of the building, arresting him for no apparent
reason.
Jose Romero, 17, was stopped on March 18 by national guardsmen when
he was coming out of a metro station in downtown Caracas. A guardsman
asked to see his ID and, when Romero presented it, slapped him across
the face. Romero was detained without explanation and taken to a
nondescript building, where he was held incommunicado, threatened with
death, beaten, and burned.
targeting of journalists and others documenting the violence
In 13 of the cases of physical abuse documented by Human Rights
Watch, security forces targeted individuals who had been taking
photographs or filming protests. All but two were then arbitrarily
arrested. Roughly half of these individuals were professional
journalists, while the other half were protesters or bystanders using
cell phones to document use of force by security forces.
In these cases, when assaulting or arresting the victims, security
force members reprimanded them for taking pictures or filming. In
several instances, security force members told victims they were
getting what they deserved for trying to undermine the reputation of
security forces, or told them they did not want the images circulating
online.
Dayana Mendez Andrade, 24, a journalist, was covering a
demonstration in Barquisimeto on March 20 wearing a vest with the word
``Press'' written in large letters across the front, when national
guardsmen began firing teargas and rubber bullets at protesters. Mendez
fled but was cornered together with a photographer--Luis Rodriguez
Malpica, 26--by several guardsmen. When she and Rodriguez put up their
hands and yelled that they were journalists, a guardsman responded,
``You're taking photos of me! You're the ones that send the photos
saying `SOS Venezuela.' You cause problems for the National Guard.''
Then, from a distance of a few meters, the guardsman fired at them with
rubber bullets, striking Mendez in her left hip and leg.
Angel de Jesus Gonzalez, 19, was taking photographs of a burnt out
car after a march in Caracas on February 12 when he was approached by
four armed men in plainclothes. One of the men told him to hand over
his phone, which he did. Then the men (who Gonzalez later learned were
government security agents) began to beat him for no apparent reason,
and detained him.
In these cases--as well as others involving the detention of
protesters and bystanders--national guardsmen and police routinely
confiscated the cell phones and cameras of the detainees. In the rare
instances when detainees had these devices returned to them, they
routinely found that their photographs or video had been deleted.
collusion with armed pro-government gangs
Security forces repeatedly allowed armed pro-government gangs to
attack protesters, journalists, students, or people they believed to be
opponents of the government with security forces just meters away. In
some cases, the security forces openly collaborated with the pro-
government attackers.
(Armed pro-government gangs that carry out these attacks are often
referred as ``colectivos,'' a term also used in Venezuela to refer to a
wide range of social organizations that support and, in some cases,
help to implement the government's policies. The vast majority of these
groups have not engaged in violent behavior. For this reason, this
report uses the term ``armed pro-government gangs'' to refer to groups
that carry out violent attacks that appear to be motivated by loyalty
to the government. Where the term ``colectivo'' has been used, it is
with the aim of accurately reflecting the way it was used by a source.)
The response of government security forces to armed pro-government
gangs ranged from acquiescence and omission to direct collaboration. In
some instances, security forces were present when armed gangs attacked
protesters, but did nothing to disarm the gangs or protect their
victims. Rather, security forces stood by idly, or left an area shortly
before pro-government gangs attacked.
In other incidents, we found compelling evidence of uniformed
security forces and pro-government gangs attacking protesters side by
side.
National guardsmen and national police opened fire with teargas and
rubber bullets on students who were demonstrating in and around the
campus of the University Centro Occidental Lisandro Alvarado in
Barquisimeto on March 11. Wladimir Diaz, 20, who participated in the
protest, said government security forces operated side by side with
more than 50 civilians, many of whom were armed with pistols and fired
live ammunition at the students. Diaz was shot in the abdomen when a
mixed group of government security forces and armed, masked civilians
opened fire on the university building where he was taking shelter.
In some cases documented by Human Rights Watch, armed pro-
government gangs detained people at or near protests, and then handed
them over to security forces. Those security forces, in turn, falsely
claimed to have caught the abducted individuals in the act of
committing a crime, and prosecutors subsequently charged them before a
judge.
Jose Alfredo Martin Ostermann, 41, and Carlos Spinetti, 39, were
detained on March 12 by armed civilians as they walked near a pro-
government rally in Caracas. The victims were taken in plain sight of
three national guardsmen, who did nothing to intervene. The armed men
beat Ostermann and Spinetti, shouted insults at them that were
political in tone (for example, accusing them of being ``traitors to
the fatherland''), threatened to kill them, and photographed Spinetti
holding a planted weapon, before handing them over to police. Rather
than questioning the armed civilians, police detained the two victims.
Sandro Rivas, 30, left a demonstration and was getting a ride home
on the back of a motorcycle when he and the driver were stopped by four
armed men driving a pickup truck. The plainclothes men forced Rivas and
the driver into the back of the pickup, where they punched and kicked
them repeatedly and threatened to kill them. Then they drove them to a
National Guard checkpoint, where they told officers the detainees had
been ``guarimbeando''--slang the government often uses to refer to
protesters who block roads. The guardsmen arrested the two men without
once questioning the armed men.
All of the people we interviewed who were abducted, or taken
captive, or attacked by pro-government gangs told us they were beaten
severely, or subjected to threats or insults that were political in
nature.
Despite credible evidence of crimes carried out by these armed pro-
government gangs, high-ranking officials called directly on groups to
confront protesters through speeches, interviews, and tweets. President
Maduro himself has on multiple occasions called on civilian groups
loyal to the government to ``extinguish the flame'' of what he
characterized as ``fascist'' protesters. For example, in a speech on
March 5 transmitted live as a mandatory broadcast (cadena nacional),
Maduro said: ``. . . These groups of guarimberos, fascists and violent
[people], and today now other sectors of the country's population as
well have gone out on the streets, I call on the UBCh, on the communal
councils, on communities, on colectivos: flame that is lit, flame that
is extinguished.''
Similarly, on February 16, the governor of the state of Carabobo,
Francisco Ameliach, issued a tweet calling on the Unidades de Batalla
Bolivar-Chavez (UBCh)--a civilian group formed, according to the
government, as a ``tool of the people to defend its conquests, to
continue fighting for the expansion of the Venezuelan Revolution''--to
launch a rapid counterattack against protesters. Ameliach said the
order would come from the president of the National Assembly, Diosdado
Cabello, a close ally of President Maduro. The February 16 tweet, which
was later deleted from his feed, said: UBCH get ready for the swift
counterattack. Diosdado will give the order.
#GringosAndFascistsShowRespect
abuses in detention facilities
In most of the cases documented by Human Rights Watch, detainees
were held incommunicado for up to 48 hours, before being presented to a
judge. In many instances they were held in military installations.
During this period, security forces subjected detainees to severe
physical abuse, including:
Beatings with fists, helmets, and firearms;
Electric shocks or burns;
Being forced to squat or kneel, without moving, for hours at
a time;
Being handcuffed to other detainees, sometimes in pairs and
others in human chains of dozens of people, for hours at a
time; and
Extended periods of extreme cold or heat.
Maurizio Ottaviani Rodriguez, 20, was detained on February 28 when
he was leaving a demonstration in Plaza Altamira in Caracas. Despite
having offered no resistance during the arrest, Ottaviani told Human
Rights Watch, the guardsmen beat, kicked, and stepped on him. He was
forced to board a school bus with more than 40 other detainees,
including several women and three minors. Each detainee was handcuffed
to the person on his or her side, and they were held on the bus for 2
hours, during which time they were not allowed to open the windows to
alleviate the heat inside, which was stifling. The guardsmen hit people
inside the bus with batons, threatened to throw a teargas canister
inside the bus, and told detainees they would be sent to a violent
prison. Detainees were then taken to the military base Fuerte Tiuna,
where they were held for almost a day, and were not allowed to speak
with their families or lawyers. As soon as they arrived, they were all
taken to a chapel and separated into three groups: men, women, and the
three minors. During this time, the men were handcuffed to each other
in a human chain.
Detainees also described being subjected to intrusive physical
exams by guardsmen, ostensibly to search for weapons or drugs, which
involved removing their clothes and being forced to perform squats
while naked. At least one of the detainees subjected to these degrading
exams was a boy.
Detainees with serious injuries--such as wounds from rubber bullets
and broken bones from severe beatings--were denied or delayed access to
medical attention, exacerbating their suffering, despite their repeated
requests to see a doctor.
In the few instances in which detainees with serious injuries were
taken to a hospital or clinic, security officials interfered with their
medical care. Security officials refused to leave restricted medical
areas when asked; denied doctors the right to speak privately with
patients or carry out medical procedures without national guardsmen or
police present; and in some instances tried to take detainees out of
facilities before they had received adequate treatment or their
condition had stabilized, against doctors' advice.
On February 19, a national guardsman fired at the face of Gengis
Pinto, 36, from point blank range with rubber bullets, despite the fact
that he had already been detained and was offering no resistance. Pinto
had been participating in an antigovernment rally in San Antonio de los
Altos, where hundreds of protesters had blocked off part of a highway.
Pinto raised his arm to block the shot, which struck his hand, badly
mangling several of his fingers, and embedded several pellets in his
forearm. Despite serious pain, loss of blood, and several requests,
guardsmen refused to take Pinto to a doctor. Instead, they beat him,
threatened to kill him, and took him to a military base for
questioning. Approximately 6 hours after being shot, guardsmen took
Pinto to an emergency clinic, where they refused to let the doctor
examine him privately. Though the doctor told guardsmen that Pinto
needed immediate specialty care that the clinic could not provide,
guardsmen ignored his advice and took Pinto back to the military base.
There, he was handcuffed to another detainee and made to sit in the sun
for roughly 10 more hours before being taken to a private clinic where
he was operated on.
In several cases, national guardsmen and police also subjected
detainees to severe psychological abuse, threatening them with death
and rape, and telling them they would be transferred to the country's
extremely violent prisons, even though they had yet to be charged with
a crime.
In other cases, guardsmen and police warned victims not to denounce
the abuses they had suffered, suggesting false stories that detainees
should use to explain the physical injuries they had suffered at the
hands of security forces.
In at least 10 cases, Human Rights Watch believes that the
combination of abusive tactics employed by security forces constitutes
torture.
Clipso Alberto Martinez Romero, 19, was participating in a
demonstration in Valencia on March 20 when national guardsmen on
motorcycles rode toward the crowd firing teargas and rubber bullets. He
was knocked to the ground by guardsmen and kicked repeatedly, though he
and several eyewitnesses said he offered no resistance. Then a
guardsman stepped on Martinez's head and fired rubber bullets at point-
blank range in his thigh. The shot struck a set of keys in his pocket,
dispersing metal shards as well as rubber pellets into his leg. Despite
the serious pain it caused, guardsmen forced Martinez to jog, then took
him to a military facility where he was made to strip naked for an
invasive body search. Officers repeatedly forced Martinez to clean his
blood off of the floor with his own t-shirt. He repeatedly asked to see
a doctor, but was instead forced to kneel with other detainees for
several hours. The room where they were held was kept at a very cold
temperature by an air conditioner. When Martinez asked an officer to
turn it down, the officer responded by turning it up full blast.
Guardsmen came into the room where Martinez was being held to mock him,
and several took photographs of his bullet wound on their cell phones.
He was not taken to an emergency medical clinic until roughly 3 hours
after he had been shot. There, the medical professional said he was
suffering from hypothermia and heart arrhythmia likely caused by
trauma, and that he had lost so much blood that he would die if he was
not immediately treated at a hospital.
Juan Sanchez, 22, was detained by national guardsmen when he was
walking to the bank on the outskirts of Caracas on March 5. Earlier
that day, Sanchez had participated in a protest in the neighborhood.
Without warning, the guardsmen kicked him, beat him, and fired a rubber
bullet from point-blank range into his right thigh. One of the
guardsmen said, ``Finally we got one. He'll be our trophy so these
brats stop fucking around.'' Sanchez was driven to a military
installation, where a dozen guardsmen forced him to take off his
clothes. One guardsman, who saw his bleeding leg, asked: ``Does this
injury hurt?'' and inserted his finger into the open wound, removed it,
and then inserted it again. The second time he took something out of
his leg, but Sanchez could not see if it was muscle tissue or a rubber
bullet. Three guardsmen then handcuffed him to a metal pole, gave him
electric shocks twice, and demanded that he tell them who his
accomplices were. Afterward, the guardsmen took Sanchez to a patio
where he was forced to fight with one of them, while the rest watched,
laughing and cheering. Sanchez was taken to a hospital, where the
guardsmen interfered with the doctor's efforts to treat him, and then
was driven back to the military installation, where guardsmen called
him a ``fascist'' and continued to kick him, threatening to send him to
one of Venezuela's most violent prisons.
due process violations
Under Venezuelan law, a detainee arrested while committing a crime
should be brought before a prosecutor within 12 hours of his or her
arrest. The prosecutor has up to 36 additional hours to investigate the
case and bring the detainee before a judge at a hearing, in which the
detainee may be charged with a crime or released. During this period,
detainees have the right to communicate with their families, lawyer, or
person of trust, and to be immediately informed of the charges against
them.
Human Rights Watch found that these fundamental due process
guarantees were violated in the vast majority of cases documented in
this report.
The detainees were routinely held incommunicado for extended
periods of time, usually up to 48 hours, and sometimes longer. While,
in a few exceptional cases documented by Human Rights Watch, detainees
were released before being brought before a judge, in the overwhelming
majority of cases prosecutors charged them with several crimes,
regardless of whether there was any evidence the accused had committed
a crime.
Six people, two of them children, were detained on February 18 for
allegedly vandalizing the property of CANTV, the government telephone
and Internet provider, in Barquisimeto. Yet while police reports
claimed the accused were caught fleeing the CANTV offices, various
witnesses and a video show at least four of the detainees were detained
in a different location. Apart from the police report, the only
evidence presented by the prosecutor against the detainees was an
abandoned gas container found near CANTV. In spite of the lack of
evidence, a judge charged the detainees with eight crimes, including
damages to public property, the use of an adolescent to commit a crime,
and instigation to hate.
In virtually all of the cases we investigated, detainees were not
permitted to contact their families during the initial 48 hours of
their detention despite repeated requests to do so. Meanwhile,
relatives of detainees were routinely denied access to information
regarding whether family members had been detained and, even when they
knew detentions had taken place, where they were being held. Family
members described traveling from one security force facility to another
in search of their loved ones, only to be told they were not there. In
several instances, authorities deliberately misled families and lawyers
regarding the whereabouts of detainees. When families were able to
determine the location of detainees--most often through the unrelenting
searches of lawyers and local human rights defenders--they were
consistently denied access to them, even when those detained were
adolescents.
Albany Ottaviani went to a military installation in Caracas on
February 28 to inquire about the whereabouts of her brother, Maurizio
Ottaviani Rodriguez, 20. He had been detained earlier that day at a
protest by national guardsmen. At the installation, she said a colonel
told her and 15 other family members waiting outside that they could be
arrested for standing in a military zone. The family members promptly
left for fear their presence might lead to retaliation against their
relatives, who they believed were being detained on the base. The
following morning, family members returned to the base, where guardsmen
told them they would provide a bus to take the families to a
courthouse, where the detainees were going to be tried. Families got on
the bus, but guardsmen instead drove them around the city for several
hours before dropping them off at a location that was not where
hearings were to be held.
Angelica Rodriguez went to look for her husband, Jesus Maria Toval,
on a military installation in Barquisimeto on February 21--the day
after he had been detained by an armed pro-government gang and handed
over to national guardsmen. She said a guardsman told her that there
was no list with names of detainees being held there, so they could not
tell her where her husband was on the base. Two hours later--only after
Rodriguez broke down crying--a different guardsman approached her and
quietly told her that Toval was indeed being held at the base. Yet
Rodriguez and her husband's lawyer were not allowed to see Toval until
2 days later, when he was brought before a judge for his hearing.
Lawyers told Human Rights Watch that detainees were routinely moved
from one detention center to another during their incommunicado
detention--a practice referred to as ``taxi driving'' (ruleteo)--
without informing detainees, their families, or lawyers where they were
being taken, or when they would be taken before a judge.
Detainees were also denied access to legal counsel during their
detention. Lawyers who were able to determine where detainees were
being held--in many cases by deducing where they would be taken based
on eyewitnesses' accounts of where they had been detained, and by which
security force--were not allowed to meet with them, despite repeated
requests.
Virtually all detainees were not allowed to meet with their defense
lawyers until minutes before their initial hearing before a judge.
Lawyers and detainees alike told Human Rights Watch that these meetings
usually occurred in the hallways outside of courtrooms, in front of
police and court officials as well as other detainees (to whom they
were sometimes handcuffed), denying their right to a private audience.
Lawyers, like detainees, usually learned of the charges against
detainees at the hearings, or at the earliest, minutes before they
began. They had virtually no time to review relevant court documents,
such as police arrest reports or inventories of supposed evidence,
which was critical to defend their clients. Lawyers told Human Rights
Watch that this access was denied even in cases in which hearings were
delayed for hours--time during which they could have met with detainees
or reviewed case files.
Hearings were routinely and inexplicably held in the middle of the
night, a practice that lawyers interviewed by Human Rights Watch had
not experienced in other types of cases. Lawyers told Human Rights
Watch that, night after night, they were forced to wait for hours in
courts, in military facilities, or in other where places hearings were
held, without receiving any plausible justification for the delay. This
routine was physically exhausting, wasted time they could have
dedicated to defending other detainees, and made it even harder for
them to provide an adequate defense.
According to various lawyers and detainees--as well as judicial
files to which Human Rights Watch had access--prosecutors' accusations,
and the eventual charges brought against detainees, were based almost
exclusively on police reports and, in several instances, on what
detainees plausibly said was planted evidence. In addition, individuals
who were detained separately, at different times or in different
locations--and who in many cases did not even know each other--were
sometimes charged by prosecutors in a single hearing with the same
crimes, sometimes using the same piece of evidence for all of the
accused, such as a piece of barbed wire.
Instead of thoroughly reviewing the evidence provided by
prosecutors and detainees--the latter's physical appearance alone in
many cases provided compelling evidence of abuse--judges routinely
rubber-stamped the charges presented by prosecutors.
While most of those charged were granted conditional liberty in the
cases we investigated, judges repeatedly placed conditions (medidas
cautelares) on detainees' freedom that prevented them from exercising
their fundamental rights to freedom of assembly and expression, such as
prohibiting them from participating in demonstrations or talking to the
media.
Marco Aurellio Coello, 18; Luis Felipe Boada, 25; Cristian Holdack,
34; Nelson Gil, 22; Demian Martin, 19; and Angel de Jesus Gonzalez, 19;
were arbitrarily detained on February 12 in six different places in or
around Carabobo Park in Caracas, where a largely peaceful demonstration
ended in violent incidents that led to at least three deaths, dozens of
people injured, and the burning of several official vehicles. The six
men--who did not know each other before that day--were subject to
severe physical abuse during their arrest and at the headquarters of
the investigative police in the area, where they were all held
incommunicado for 48 hours. During their detention, they did not have
access to their lawyers and were not permitted to see their families.
At 11 p.m. on February 14, they were brought before a judge and charged
with several crimes based on evidence presented by the prosecution that
included clothes that security officials had stained with gasoline, and
photographs of unidentifiable individuals engaged in confrontations
with security forces placed alongside the men's mug shots taken at the
police station. At 5:30 a.m. on February 15, the judge confirmed the
prosecution of the six men and ordered their pretrial detention. Four
of them were granted conditional liberty on April 1, and released while
awaiting trial.
Dozens of lawyers and human rights defenders told Human Rights
Watch that, in a country where prosecutorial and judicial independence
has been significantly undermined in recent years, they had grown
accustomed to encountering obstacles to defending detainees. However,
all said the situation had worsened dramatically after February 12.
Never before, they said, had they encountered such a comprehensive
battery of obstacles affecting so many cases.
officials and security forces who intervened to help detainees
It is important to note that not all of the security force members
or justice officials encountered by the victims in these cases
participated in the abusive practices. Indeed, in some of the cases,
victims told Human Rights Watch that security officials and doctors in
public hospitals had surreptitiously intervened to help them or to ease
their suffering.
In a few instances, national guardsmen quietly passed a cell phone
to detainees being held incommunicado, so that they could call their
families and tell them where they were, or snuck them food or water.
Some security officials furtively told human rights lawyers the
whereabouts of detainees, or tipped them off as to when the detainees
would be brought before a judge. In several cases, doctors and nurses
in public hospitals--and even those serving in military clinics--stood
up to armed security forces, who wanted to deny medical care to
seriously wounded detainees. They insisted detainees receive urgent
medical care, in spite of direct threats--interventions that may have
saved victims' lives.
fear of reporting abuses
Many victims and family members we spoke with said they believed
they might face reprisals if they reported abuses by police, guardsmen,
or armed pro-government gangs. Victims also expressed fear that, were
they to report abuses, the Attorney General's Office would fabricate
charges against them, or--in cases in which victims had already been
accused of crimes--that judges would punish them by wrongfully
convicting them, or revoking their conditional liberty if it already
had been granted.
A lawyer from the Catholic University Andres Bello, who coordinates
the work of a team of criminal lawyers who have assisted hundreds of
detainees in Caracas, told Human Rights Watch that ``in almost no
cases'' do victims have the confidence to file a complaint with the
Attorney General's Office. He added, ``People don't bring complaints
because they don't trust institutions. They fear who will protect them
if they do.''
Many victims traced these fears to threats they received from
security forces during their detentions. Not only were detainees
subject to repeated death threats, but several victims of severe
physical abuse said that security forces had explicitly told them not
to say how they had been hurt. In several cases we investigated,
government security forces even went so far as to suggest false stories
that victims of abuse should use to explain how their injuries had been
sustained. Others were told they would not be released unless they
signed documents saying they had not been abused during their
detentions. Victims saw these exchanges as a clear threat not tell the
truth about what had happened to them.
Guardsmen told Gengis Pinto, 36, who had been beaten, given
electric shocks, and shot at point-blank range by guardsmen after being
detained at a protest, to say that he had run into a post and been hit
in the face with a bottle by a fellow demonstrator.
Nelson Gil, 22, who was beaten by plainclothes police, was told by
investigative police who observed his injuries to say he fell and was
punched by fellow protesters.
Keyla Brito, 41, her 17-year old daughter, and six other women who
were detained in a military installation where they were beaten and
threatened by guardswomen, were forced to sign a document saying they
had not been abused in exchange for authorities releasing them without
charging them with a crime.
Lisandro Barazarte, 40, a photographer for the newspaper
``Notitarde'' in Valencia, said he feared for his life after his
photographs of armed pro-government supporters firing pistols on
protesters were published. Barazarte received multiple death threats
after the photos appeared in the newspaper. ``I live in suspense,
because I don't know from where they are going to shoot at me,'' he
said. ``At any moment something could happen to me.'' At the time he
spoke to Human Rights Watch, he had not placed a complaint about the
threats with officials, out of fear he would be targeted for revenge
attacks.
Several victims expressed fear that reporting crimes could lead to
the loss of employment for them or their family members who worked for
the government. In several instances, these threats were made explicit.
A victim who was beaten, shot, and threatened with death after
being arbitrarily detained by national guardsmen told Human Rights
Watch that, not long after he was released, members of the intelligence
services (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional, SEBIN) brought
in his father for questioning. The victim said his father was a career
officer in the Venezuelan military. SEBIN officers told the father that
if his son continued to take part in demonstrations or filed a
complaint, the father would be considered a ``counterrevolutionary''
and would lose his job. The victim said that he had stopped
participating in demonstrations since his father's conversation with
SEBIN, and would not file a complaint with authorities for the abuses
he had suffered, for fear it would cost his father's job.
Another victim who was arbitrarily detained and beaten by an armed
pro-government gang said one of the reasons he had not filed a
complaint was out of concern he could lose his job. An employee of a
government ministry, he told Human Rights Watch, ``I know that at any
moment they could fire me.'' He said he had intentionally steered clear
of political activities since the incident.
The reluctance to report abuses is compounded by a deep and
widespread distrust of the justice system itself. Victims and their
lawyers were extremely skeptical that prosecutors and judges who belong
to the same institutions as those who had violated their rights would
act with impartiality and professionalism when handling their abuse
claims.
Jose Alfredo Martin Ostermann, 41, who was abducted by members of
an armed gang as he walked with a friend near a pro-government rally in
Caracas, beaten in plain view of national guardsmen, and then handed
over to police, said he did not plan to file a complaint with
authorities because they were collaborating directly with his abusers.
``I was beaten, threatened, and detained in front of the National
Guard--which is supposed to be a state body--and they simply turned
around and walked away.'' He added, ``They know [about this] at the
prosecutors' office and the police, and they are not doing anything.''
Placing a complaint, he said, ``may even be counterproductive. It could
lead to vengeance.''
Victims' lack of confidence in the justice system was underscored
by cases in which government officials informed detainees and their
families that the cases against them were being pursued on political
grounds.
obstacles to accountability
The Venezuelan state should ensure that any acts of violence or
serious crimes are rigorously investigated and that those responsible
for them are held accountable. These include crimes allegedly committed
by protesters, as well as abuses committed by government security
forces.
Under international law, the Venezuelan Government also has an
obligation to conduct prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations of
human rights violations, including those documented in this report, as
well as other abuses reported by victims and local human rights
defenders and abuses reported in the press.
President Maduro and Attorney General Luisa Ortega Diaz have
acknowledged that security forces have committed human rights
violations in the context of demonstrations since February 12. Both
have pledged that those responsible for abuses will be investigated and
prosecuted. According to the government, as of April 25, the Attorney
General's Office was conducting 145 investigations into alleged human
rights violations, in which 17 security officials had been detained for
their alleged involvement in these cases.
While these investigations are a welcome start, there are good
reasons to doubt the ability of Venezuelan authorities to ensure that
the abuses are investigated in an impartial and thorough manner and
that those responsible for them are brought to justice.
One reason is that many abuses are likely to go unreported because
of the widespread and well-founded fear and distrust that victims feel
toward the Venezuelan justice system.
Another reason is that, in many of these cases, the investigative
police, the Attorney General's Office, and the judiciary are themselves
implicated in serious due process violations, as well as in failing to
intervene to address abuses by security forces against detainees.
Consequently, any thorough investigation will require these
institutions to investigate their own misconduct--which is likely to
give rise to serious conflicts of interest and severely compromise the
credibility of their findings.
A third reason is the fact that the Venezuelan judiciary has
largely ceased to function as an independent branch of government. As
Human Rights Watch has documented in past reports, the Supreme Court
has effectively rejected its role as a guarantor of fundamental rights,
with several justices publicly committing themselves to supporting the
political agenda of the government. Lower-court judges are under
intense pressure to avoid rulings that could upset government
officials, as most have temporary or provisional appointments and risk
being summarily fired by the Supreme Court if they rule in favor people
perceived to be opponents of the government.
Given the chronic underreporting of abuses and lack of independence
of Venezuelan investigative and judicial institutions, it is troubling
that the president, the attorney general, and other senior government
officials--while acknowledging the need for accountability--have
repeatedly said abuses against protesters have been rare and publicly
defended the conduct of security forces. The attorney general, for
example, claimed abuses by security forces were ``isolated incidents''
and that security forces generally ``respect human rights.'' Meanwhile,
President Maduro said that only a ``very small number of security
forces personnel have also been accused of engaging in violence,'' and
that the government had ``responded by arresting those suspected.''
It is also troubling that the government has repeatedly sought to
blame its political opponents, or simply the opposition as a whole, for
the violence without providing credible evidence. For example, on March
14, President Maduro said that, ``[a]ll of the cases of people who have
been killed are the responsibility of the violence from protests (la
violencia guarimbera)--all of them--from the first to the last.''
While, at that time, Maduro said the investigation into these and other
crimes had made significant progress and provided numbers of alleged
protesters detained, he did not indicate that anyone had been convicted
for the crimes. On March 15, President Maduro said that, ``practically
all Venezuelans who have died, regretfully, are the responsibility of
the violence of the right.''
Similarly, despite compelling evidence of attacks by armed pro-
government gangs on civilians, ranking government officials have denied
their existence, or accused them of pertaining to the opposition. For
example, on April 13, President Maduro said that, ``the opposition had
not provided any evidence that shows that the revolutionary colectivos
are responsible for violent actions.'' He added that, in contrast, the
government had detained ``supporters of the right [wing] for committing
terrorist acts.''
Cabello also said on April 10 that the only ``armed colectivos''
belonged to the opposition, and are the ones ``who kill people at the
guarimbas.'' His statement implied not only that there were no armed
pro-government gangs, but also that killings at barricades had been
committed by antigovernment armed groups, an assertion for which he did
not provide proof, such as cases in which people had been convicted for
these crimes.
In another example of blaming the opposition for the violence, the
government accused Leopoldo Lopez, a prominent opposition leader, of
being the ``intellectual author'' of the protest-related deaths on
February 12. The Attorney General's Office promptly sought his arrest
for several alleged crimes--initially including homicide, a charge it
was forced to drop when video footage appeared showing security force
members shooting at unarmed protesters on the date in question. Lopez
has been held in pretrial detention on a military base for more than 2
months despite the government's failure to produce credible evidence
that he committed any crime. The Attorney General's Office has also
obtained arrest warrants for Carlos Vecchio and other opposition
figures, while the Supreme Court has summarily tried and sentenced two
opposition mayors to prison terms, in judicial proceedings that
violated basic due process guarantees. The Supreme Court's rulings are
not subject to appeal, which violates the right to appeal against a
criminal conviction.
Mr. Chairman and committee members, thank you for your attention to
this critical issue, and for including this submission.
[Editor's note.--To read the entire Human Rights Watch's
report, ``Punished for Protesting: Rights Violations in
Venezuela's Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice System:
http://www.hrw.org/node/125192. A copy of the report will also
be maintained in the permanent record of the committee.]
The Chairman. Well, thank you all for your testimony.
And, Mr. Vivanco, thank you and your organization for what
is an incredible piece of work that I think is eye-opening, and
hopefully will shape the conscience of leaders within the
hemisphere and beyond.
Let me ask you, given the broad pattern of behavior that
you just described in your testimony, as well as in the report,
how can the international community discern who is responsible
for authorizing or encouraging the use of violence against
protestors, specifically when not one member of the security
forces has received a sentence for their role in human rights
violations?
Mr. Vivanco. Mr. Chairman, I think it is doable. You need
to start by looking at who was in command in the location where
abuses took place. We do have that information. We were able to
include that information in our report. There are several
testimonies of individuals who were subject to arbitrary
detention and abuses and then they were moved to a military
facility where they suffered additional abuses. And those names
and the location of those security forces are in the record,
are available, and I think they are mostly responsible--the
officials who are in charge of those forces are clearly
directly responsible for these abuses.
The Chairman. Now, let me ask you, given the fact that the
report states that judicial officials did not provide a check
on abuses committed by the Venezuelan security forces, and in
some cases actually were complicit in human rights violations,
can you provide some greater detail in the collusion between
justice officials and the security forces?
Mr. Vivanco. Mr. Chairman, in our report, we refer to
several fundamental violations of due process like, for
instance, prosecutors who, according to the evidence that we
collected, interrogated detainees while being held
incommunicado in a military installation without a defense
attorney, and judges and also prosecutors that openly ignore
allegations and complaints about physical abuse, including
torture. There is a clear failure on the part of the judiciary
to conduct a rigorous and independent investigation on cases so
far of obvious and evident abuse.
According to the report that we published, judges were
holding hearings in the middle of the night and only 5 minutes
before the hearing they gave access to the attorneys
representing the victims their file and the evidence that was
included in the file to support the charges against them.
Unfortunately, the judicial system in Venezuela--and that
includes the prosecutors, not only the prosecutors but also the
justice system--and I am referring to the judiciary in
general--has been captured since 2004, thanks to a reform
promoted by the administration of President Chavez. What they
did in 2004 was to change the structure of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court at that point had only 20 justices, and
overnight using a slim majority that the government had at
Congress at that time, six or seven votes, they managed to
change the structure from 20 to 32 justices, and they added 12
justices who are clearly on the side of the government. Since
then, the Supreme Court for more than 10 years has been ruling
systematically every decision on the side of the government.
And on top of everything else, 80 percent of the judges in
Venezuela are provisional judges. They do not have tenure in
their position. They could be fired with basically no due
process overnight, including the judge that is investing the
case against Leopoldo Lopez is a provisional judge who could
lose her job just by a decision of the Supreme Court which is
completely on the side of the government.
The Chairman. So now, with the report, which I have some
good sense of, and with all of your testimony, I would say to
any one of you, all three of you actually, do you oppose
targeted sanctions against individuals who can be documented to
have committed human rights abuses at this time?
Mr. Vivanco.
Mr. Vivanco. The targeted sanctions is certainly a valid
option against those involved in human rights abuses, and that
should be a public policy option for this country as well as
any other democratic country in the world.
The key question is, How do you adopt a policy that could
be effective on the ground and could change conditions there?
My sense is that the ideal option is to strategize with
democratic governments in the region and to try to develop a
creative common ground, a unified vision with democracies in
the region but also in other regions, in Europe specifically,
that could exercise effective pressure on the government of
Maduro to address these human rights abuses.
The Chairman. Mr. Naim.
Dr. Naim. Yes, Chairman. As I said in my testimony, I
strongly support targeted sanctions against individuals that
are violators of human rights but also those incurred in
massive economic crimes and corruption.
The Chairman. Ambassador Duddy.
Ambassador Duddy. I do not oppose targeted sanctions
against individuals. I note, as did Senator Rubio earlier, that
Venezuelans of all political stripes continue to enjoy access
to the United States, and that, indeed, being singled out, as
has happened with a number of people designated as kingpins,
will in some cases result in shrill defiance but will be
understood by the individuals involved as something that they
are going to need to deal with. It would be a formidable step.
Once again, to return to an earlier point I made, how
exactly we do and how we talk about it with our friends in the
region will be critical. I think that we continue to enjoy very
broad access with all of the democratic governments of the
region, and as political officers, military attaches, and
others engage with other governments in the region, I think we
need to be clear that we are sanctioning behavior which should
be objectionable, is indeed objectionable to all of us.
The Chairman. I would just make an observation here that,
based on the OAS performance, I know we want to engage in a
hemispheric response, but if you cannot even get the
appropriate resolutions passed at the OAS, which are far from
sanctions, you wonder where that hemispheric response is going
to be. In my experience, for 21 years now between the House and
the Senate, where I have pursued sanctions at different times
as one of the handful of peaceful diplomatic tools that exist
for any given country, if you are going to pursue nonmilitary
options in any given set of circumstances in the world, you
have the use of international opinion, to the extent that a
country and/or a dictator or authoritarian figure will be moved
by that international opinion. You have the use of your aid and
trade to induce a country to act a certain way, and, in the
absence of that achieving something, then you have the denial
of aid or trade, which is in essence sanctions.
And the problem is that we consistently often have to lead
to get other countries to then join us, such as with Iran. The
European Union was not there first. It then joined us as we led
an effort and showed that we were willing to engage. We are
doing it in the question of the Ukraine, where we led with the
first round of individual sanctions, and then the Europeans
followed us.
So I certainly would love to see a stronger hemispheric
response. I just do not know how long one waits upon other
countries to get to the point that they will acknowledge and do
something about what is vividly before their eyes in their own
neighborhood.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing, for all of you for being a part of it.
I would want to summarize what your testimony has been here
today, and that is largely that in fact there are systemic
human rights violations happening within Venezuela on behalf of
the government as a part of a strategy.
Number two, you have stated that you do not find an
objection--and in fact, many of you have advocated in favor of
targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for these
human rights violations. We have heard testimony from the State
Department saying that they do not think it is the right time
to do it. I strongly disagree, as I think most of the members
who were here today would as well. It is never the wrong time
to condemn and sanction individuals responsible for grotesque
human rights violations.
And to that end, I wanted to use my time here today to
share with you the name of 23 individuals in Venezuela who I
think we should nominate for that sort of sanction based on
many of the different things that you have all testified here
today and others.
I begin with Gabriela Ramirez, an ombudsman, a person who
is in charge of defending people and in fact has been
cooperating with the government; next are two people involved
with the Department of Armaments and Explosives, Aref Eduardo
Richany Jimenez y Julio Cesar Morales Prieto, individuals who
in my opinion should be sanctioned.
Third is one of the prosecutors there who has also acted
unfairly and participated in these human rights violations,
Luisa Ortega Diaz; the Chief of the Region number 8 of the
National Armed Forces, Luis Alberto Arrayago Coronel; also the
chief of a region of strategic defense, Miguel Vivas Landino.
Then a number of governors for regions where there has been
an unbelievable amount of human rights violations who have been
cooperative in those activities, Francisco Rangel Gomez of the
State of Bolivar; the Governor of the State of Tachira, Jose
Gregorio Vielma Mora; and the Governor of the State of
Trujillo, Henry Rangel Silva.
Beyond that, there are a number of others, a commander of a
regiment of what they call la Guardia del Pueblo, the commander
of la Guardia del Pueblo regiment, Aquiles Rojas Patino.
Another couple of individuals associated with the National
Guard: Justo Jose Noguera Pietri; Sergio Rivero Marcano, the
Director of Operations for that National Guard; also
responsible for violations of human rights, Antonio Benavides
Torres.
The Chief of Region No. 1 of the Regional Command of the
Bolivarian National Guard, Franklin Garcia Duque; the Chief of
Region No. 2 of the National Guard, Arquimedes Herrera Ruso;
the Chief of Region No. 3 for the National Guard, Manuel Jose
Graterol Colmenarez; the Chief of Region No. 4 of the National
Guard, Octavio Chacon; the Chief of Region No. 5 for the
National Guard, Manuel Quevedo.
One of the Ministers of Interior, Justice and Peace--there
is anything but peace or justice in Venezuela today--who is
directly responsible for many of these violations, not just
encouraging them but looking the other way is Miguel Rodriquez
Torres; another vice minister in the same Interior Ministry,
Marcos Rojas Figueroa; the Director of the National Bolivarian
Police, someone who has actively participated in controlling
and directing human rights violations, Manuel Eduardo Perez
Urdaneta.
The Director General of their intelligence system, which
has been deeply involved in these activities is Gustavo Enrique
Gonzalez Lopez, and associated with him as well, Manuel
Gregorio Bernal Martinez.
These are just 23 names. The list goes on and we will
continue to collect those names of individuals who I believe
should be nominated for sanctions by this Government at
multiple levels.
Beyond that, I would ask the comments of the panel. What
about these individuals that have made themselves millionaires
and billionaires because of the access they have to the
government? What about individuals that have cooperated and
enriched themselves as the process of that who now actively
parade up and down the streets of the United States mocking us,
quite frankly acting with impunity, in many instances openly
laughing at this Nation's inability to reach them or do
anything about it? Do you have any opinion on what we should do
with private individuals who have facilitated what the
government and these 23 individuals have been able to carry out
within Venezuela?
Dr. Naim. I support the sanctioning of individuals that
have committed economic crimes, that are guilty of massive
abuses and corruption. I, however, encourage that whatever
sanctions are imposed on those individuals are well documented
and let the world understand what have they done and why they
are being sanctioned.
Ambassador Duddy. I would simply add to that what we are
seeing still in Venezuela is the greatest waste of an
incredible era of windfall profits. I would emphasize that it
is astounding, the country with the largest proven oil reserves
in the world sees every morning millions of Venezuelans
streaming out to find basic consumables in the supermarkets. So
there is a really extraordinary set of circumstances on the
ground.
I think that there is some real utility. Exactly how we do
it, legally speaking, I am not sure, but there is some utility
in underscoring the degree to which some people have pirated
the resources of the state and, in doing so, frittered away an
opportunity to Venezuela to make a real leap forward
economically.
Mr. Vivanco. Senator Rubio, even targeted sanctions could
be in some cases counterproductive. So I agree with Moises Naim
that if any country in the world used that option, it is
essential to be as transparent as you can in order to explain
what you justify to the public and disclose as much information
why who have been sanctioned and exactly what are the grounds.
Senator Rubio. And I hope we would as well because it makes
them stronger.
By the way, let me just clarify that list is by no means
comprehensive. It is a list of 23 people. I would list 50
people, if I could, today but at least 23 people that today I
wanted to share with you and everyone that I believe should be
candidates for sanctions. And certainly any sort of sanctions
would carry with them strong evidence of what these individuals
have been responsible for.
And I would just close by taking this moment, because I
know that this will be listened to by government officials in
Venezuela. I do believe there are people within the Government
of Venezuela--in fact, I know there are people within the
Government Venezuela that are quite uncomfortable with the
direction that Nicolas Maduro and those around him have taken
this country, not just because of the economic realities, but
because of these violations. I know that there are professional
military officers within the armed forces there that never
signed up to be used as a way to repress their own people.
And I would just say to them the intention and the policy
of the United States is not to interfere in the internal
affairs of any nation. The future of Venezuela belongs to the
people of Venezuela. They must determine the direction of that
country and what sort of system of government and economics
they want.
What we also want them to understand is that the United
States will not stand by an idly watch as the rights of people,
with whom we share this hemisphere, are systematically violated
by an anti-American government, to top it all off, and ignore
their plight. And we will endeavor to use and I think in a
bipartisan way, I hope--and I know on this committee, that will
be the case--to use the influence and the power of the United
States of America to firmly line up on the side of those who
aspire to liberty, to freedom, and to respect of human rights.
And that is our intention here, and I pray and hope that that
is the direction that we go in the weeks to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Two final questions, one to Mr. Naim and one to Mr.
Vivanco.
You mentioned and have written repeatedly about Cuba's
widespread detrimental influence in Venezuela. Can you provide
a synopsis of the way that the Cuban regime and its advisors
infiltrate the Venezuelan Government?
Dr. Naim. At this point, what we have is evidence of the
presence of Cuban public servants in Venezuela's Government.
There is also ample evidence that the important functions of
the Venezuelan state are being shaped or influenced or even
decided by the Cuban Government.
The Chairman. And does that include security forces?
Dr. Naim. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Finally, Mr. Vivanco, maybe I am
mischaracterizing this, so tell me if I am. In your answers, I
hear a reticence to the question of even targeted sanctions
against human rights abuses. So what is it that you think can
happen that can be created both from these hearings, your
organization's reports, as well as others, to change the course
of events in Venezuela.
Mr. Vivanco. Mr. Chairman, let me be as candid as I can. I
hope that this type of hearing will encourage the
administration to do more for democracy, for human rights, for
the promotion of fundamental freedoms in this hemisphere. I
think the administration has a chance and there is a space to
develop a more robust policy toward the region and working
closely with democratic governments, starting with the big
ones, Mexico and Brazil--those governments have also
responsibility to lead and to defend these freedoms and human
rights. And I think the administration has not done enough so
far to establish these goals as a clear priority in this
region.
The Chairman. When we talk about engaging in democracy and
human rights, what specifically would you want to see, because,
you know, when I visit the hemisphere and I talk to leaders,
there is this Latin American sense of non-interference in their
neighbor. So when we talk about hemispheric responsibility so
that countries within the hemisphere who are democratic like
Mexico, like Colombia, like Chile, just to mention some, feel,
well, I should not talk about my neighbor even though I think
they are doing horrible things. What is the U.S. going to do
with that?
Mr. Vivanco. Unfortunately, my sense is that you are right.
The region is deeply fragmented. The basic consensus that was
established in the 1990s in support of democracy and human
rights to collectively defend those principles, unfortunately,
is no longer present.
And if there is one democracy in the region that could
reinforce these principles, it is the U.S. Government and the
Obama administration. I think it is in a unique position to
work much more closely with Brazil. Brazil has tremendous
influence in South America, and Brazil is very reluctant to
publicly take a position on these issues. As a matter of fact,
on the Venezuelan crisis, it has been pretty silent, and that
silence needs to be, I think, changed for not only statements
but also action like, for instance, to demand the release of
all of those ones who have been under arbitrary detention or
have an open file against them just because they exercised
their fundamental rights. And I think the administration could
be more aggressive in terms of engaging in the region with a
strategy that defends these fundamental freedoms and rights.
The Chairman. Last comments. I see you both have your hands
raised. Mr. Naim.
Dr. Naim. Mr. Chairman, you are right that there is the
propensity of Latin American countries not to want to interfere
in the domestic affairs of their neighbors.
But they have been very selective in doing that, and what
we have seen, for example, in the case of Brazil that has
maintained a very loud silence for all these years, there has
not been one comment by the Brazilian authorities about what is
going on in Venezuela even though Brazil is presided by a woman
that, as a result of her opposition to a military government,
was tortured and repressed. But we have not heard from her any
comment about the same things that are happening to young women
in Venezuela today.
But in the case of Brazil, for example, they have been very
active in the crisis in Honduras, and they were very active in
the crisis in Paraguay. So we have seen a certain selectivity
in the case of Brazil.
But I want to point out a trend that I think is welcome and
encouraging that is taking place in Latin America where
opposition forces are taking a public stand against their
government's complacency toward the Venezuelan situation. In
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru, elected legislators have
openly challenged their own governments for their passive
stance towards Venezuela. This is a process that ought to be
welcomed and encouraged. It is very important to have elected
officials who are members of non-ruling parties throughout
Latin America shaming their own governments out of their
silence regarding the abuse that is taking place in Venezuela.
The Chairman. Ambassador Duddy.
Ambassador Duddy. Yes, sir, just a final comment. First of
all, I think that a hearing like this is useful, and as one of
the earlier panelists said, I am sure that people in Venezuela
will be following this. While we may be criticized collectively
and individually for various things that have been said here
this morning, the Venezuelan people will hear it.
I would encourage you and other elected officials to
continue to travel to the region and not only just talk to
leaders, but to speak with foreign media, emphasizing our
concern with human rights, as well as with the deteriorating
economic situation. And I return to the deteriorating economic
situation, which I hope will become an increasing part of our
official dialogue in private with governments around the
region, because what we need for others to understand is that
as the situation on the ground spins out of control, all of the
region stands to be affected, the Caribbean arguably most
immediately, but Brazil has many, many businesses on the
ground, as do others. They will all be affected, and we need to
make sure that to the extent that we can--and we are in the
best position to do so--that folks understand that this is not
merely a matter of the United States interfering in a domestic
political squabble, that it is bigger and much more serious
than that.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate all of your insights.
Two final observations. One is it was my hope that the
democratic charter of the OAS, the effort that was combined
collectively, was going to be a vehicle for hemispheric
engagement in promoting democracy and human rights within the
region. That has been, unfortunately, not the vehicle that I
anticipated it being. And it is up to the leaders of the
hemisphere to make that a vehicle, which they agreed to and
ratified as a vehicle for collective action, which is not the
interference of one country or another, but the standards that
are held hemispherically and, I would say, globally.
And the last point that I would make is that it is the
intention of the committee that this not be the end of our
engagement on the question of Venezuela. There are many, many
different dimensions of that, and certainly the human rights
issue, which has been the centerpiece of our focus today, is
critical. I would suspect that the results of what we have
heard here today will move some of us to action in a way that
hopefully will be both constructive and, at the same time, give
both the administration, as well as those in Venezuela who are
committing human rights abuses, a clear knowledge of what is
headed their way.
And with that and the appreciation of the committee, this
hearing will remain open until the close of business tomorrow.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letters Sent to Senators Robert Menendez and Bob Corker From Roberta
Jacobson re: The Role of Sanctions in Venezuela's Policy
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