[Senate Hearing 113-628]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-628
#BringBackOurGirls: ADDRESSING THE
THREAT OF BOKO HARAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 15, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico RAND PAUL, Kentucky
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Abdullahi, Lantana, project manager, Search for Common Ground,
Jos, Nigeria................................................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona, opening statement... 3
Friend, Alice, Principal Director for African Affairs, U.S.
Department of Defense, Washington, DC.......................... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the
following Senators:
Christopher A. Coons..................................... 50
Benjamin L. Cardin....................................... 51
Bob Corker............................................... 51
Jeff Flake............................................... 55
Gast, Hon. Earl, Assistant Administrator for African Affairs,
U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC...... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Response to question submitted for the record to Earl Gast
and Robert Jackson by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin........... 42
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 48
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Christopher A. Coons....................................... 50
Jackson, Hon. Robert P., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Responses to questions submitted for the record by the
following Senators:
Christopher A. Coons..................................... 39
Benjamin L. Cardin....................................... 40
Robert Menendez.......................................... 43
Bob Corker............................................... 45
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement... 3
(iii)
#BringBackOurGirls: ADDRESSING THE THREAT OF BOKO HARAM
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
A. Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Coons, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Flake,
Rubio, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. Good morning. I would like to call to order
this hearing of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
Good morning. Exactly 1 month ago today, extremists in
northern Nigeria abducted nearly 300 schoolgirls in an
unconscionable act of terror. The leaders of the group
responsible, Boko Haram, are selling the girls into marriages,
forcibly converting them to Islam, and using them as a
bargaining chip in negotiations with the Nigerian Government.
It is believed the girls are today being held in a dense
tropical forest area roughly the size of West Virginia that
straddles a porous and ungoverned border with three countries.
Despite being forewarned of a possible attack, reports
indicate the local and central government did nothing to
protect them when told an attack was imminent. Parents should
not have to be afraid to send their children to school, no
child should live through the horror these girls have
experienced, and no family should have to confront these
threats alone.
Unfortunately, these are not the only families who have
suffered at the hands of Boko Haram. The same day as these
abductions, 75 more people were killed and 100 wounded in a
bombing at a bus station in the Nigerian capital city of Abuja.
More than 300 people were murdered during a Boko Haram attack
in Gamboru just last week. According to Amnesty International,
Boko Haram has killed more than 4,000 over the last 3 years,
including 1,500 people in the last year alone.
I want to welcome my partner in the Africa Subcommittee,
Senator Flake, as well as Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Corker, and other members, as we look at the response to these
kidnappings and consider the grave and growing threat presented
by Boko Haram.
This subcommittee last met to consider conditions in
Nigeria in 2012, when we looked at the persistent divides
between the north and south in economic potential, governance,
education, and social services, and the very real security
challenges created by these differences. Nigeria is an
important partner in the region, but Boko Haram has capitalized
on pervasive corruption, poor governance, and growing poverty
in the north to undermine domestic and regional stability.
Boko Haram, whose name means ``Western Education is
Sinful,'' targets public institutions, churches, and schools,
and children are the frequent victims of its vicious attacks.
As New York Times columnist Kristof wrote, just last weekend,
``The greatest threat to extremism is not drones firing
missiles, but girls reading books.'' The schoolgirls from
Chibok in Nigeria demonstrated great courage, returning to
their school to take their final exams in the face of an
explicit terrorist threat, a group that targeted them simply
because they sought an education.
Boko Haram is trying to send a message, and the world,
starting with the Nigerian Government, must respond by saying
their crimes will not be tolerated and perpetrators held
accountable.
We are holding this hearing, in part, because of the
outpouring of concern from many of my constituents and millions
of Americans. The #BringBackOurGirls hash tag, which some
pundits have mocked, has been mentioned more than 3 million
times on Twitter, and those Tweets, posts on Facebook,
Instagram, and others, were from people trying to get our
attention and trying to make sure the United States is doing
everything it reasonably can to help the Nigerians bring these
abducted girls home. Those people deserve to know that we hear
you and share your goals.
Every day these girls are missing, it becomes less likely
they will be returned home safely. It took too long for the
Nigerian government to respond to these girls' abduction. It
took too long for the Nigerian Government to accept offers of
assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
and China. And, once accepted, it took too long for that
assistance to be implemented. I am glad a U.S. team is on the
ground now, and we need to make sure not another day is wasted.
We cannot stand by while Boko Haram viciously attacks Nigerian
citizens, their freedom, their security, and their right to an
education.
So, in this hearing, we will discuss the response of the
Nigerian Government to Boko Haram both before and after the
abduction; we will consider what the United States is doing,
and can do, to help in response to the abductions and in
confronting Boko Haram; finally, we will consider the regional
implications of this growing threat and what action can and
should be taken by Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to ensure the
schoolgirls are not taken across borders and to minimize the
growing regional threat.
With that, I would like to invite an opening statement by
my ranking Senator Flake and then a statement by the full-
committee chairman, Senator Menendez.
Senator Flake.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for calling
this hearing.
Appreciate the witnesses coming forward. I look forward to
their testimony. I will not take any time here, just to say
that I agree with the chairman's comments. We want to know what
the U.S. Government is doing, what the Nigerians have asked
for, whether we can help them, or not, in this regard.
So, I look forward to the testimony, and thank you for
calling the hearing.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator. And I greatly appreciate
your cooperation and real partnership in working on this
subcommittee.
To the full-committee chairman, Senator Menendez.
Senator.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I sit here in your chair, I get the Blue Hen vibrations
coming from Delaware.
So, I appreciate your and Senator Flake's leadership on the
Africa Subcommittee on a wide range of topics. And today is a
continuation of that leadership. And we are all thankful for
the work that you do on behalf of all of us who serve on the
committee. So, thank you for your work and your leadership.
It is very rare, I should say, that I come to a
subcommittee hearing. As a matter of fact, I have not done it
in the 17 months that I have been the chairman. I remember
Senator Lugar used to do it quite often. But, this is one that
I clearly feel compelled to be a part of.
We are all appalled at the plight of nearly 300 young women
abducted in Nigeria by Boko Haram, which has been said many
times. To me, it is amazing that the phrase ``education is
forbidden,'' in the 21st century, is still a reality. Of
course, it is a phrase that is counterintuitive to those of us
who care about the future of the next generation.
Right now, these girls are separated from their families
and no doubt are terrified. I have seen the video released by
Boko Haram this week, and my thoughts, as a father, are with
the missing girls and their parents.
Frankly, in my view, the fact that incidents like this are
happening at all in the 21st century should be deeply troubling
to every human being. We must reaffirm and recommit ourselves
to the fundamental rule of law everywhere. As parents, as human
beings, we must insist that women and girls be treated with
dignity and allowed to live and learn in safety from extremists
everywhere.
Sadly, while the scale of this incident is staggering, the
Boko Haram threat is not a new one. They have led an escalating
campaign of atrocities against their own people for 5 years.
They are extremists with a gangster mentality who represent no
interest but their own, targeting young women, also young men,
churches, and schools. I believe they do not represent Islam,
and, in my view, their actions cannot go unanswered.
The mothers, activists, and concerned citizens who have
taken their outrage and grief to the streets of Abuja, London,
and Washington, and the electronic highways of Twitter and
Facebook, deserve credit for focusing the world's attention on
this crisis and insisting to the Nigerian Government, ``Bring
them home.'' Just this past Friday, I joined outraged citizens
in my own State of New Jersey, who added their voices to the
chorus and took up the cause on social media.
That said, despite offers of assistance from the United
States and other international partners, the Nigerian
Government's response to this crisis has been tragically and
unacceptably slow. I have called on President Jonathan to
demonstrate the leadership his nation is demanding. My
understanding is that our team of U.S. technical advisors is
now on the ground, supporting existing teams, conducting aerial
surveillance, and sharing commercial satellite imagery with
Nigerian authorities. Beyond what is happening on the ground as
we speak, I look forward to hearing our witnesses discuss a
plan of action for coordinating with Nigeria over the coming
days and weeks.
Finally, from a 30,000-foot view, the rise of groups like
Boko Haram do not occur in a vacuum. Nigeria has a long history
of division along ethnic and religious lines, tensions that
terrorists capitalize on by creating more distrust and more
tension. But, as much as we are appalled by the actions of Boko
Haram and their tactical effort to use societal fissures to
create chaos and distrust, we should also be troubled by a
record of excessive force and human rights abuses by Nigeria's
military.
I am pleased to see, Mr. Chairman, that you have added an
additional witness, Miss Lantana Abdullahi, who has worked in
Nigeria on interfaith violence prevention and community
reconciliation issues, and has brought together civil society
groups, government leaders, and security forces to prevent
human rights abuses in Nigeria. And we look forward to hearing
her testimony.
Finally, let me close by emphasizing the importance of
elevating the issue of women's issues globally, the question of
sexual violence, violence against women, in general, to the
international arena. I call on my colleagues in Congress to
pass the International Violence Against Women's Act that
Senator Boxer and I introduced last week. I believe the world
is watching and the time is now.
My thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, to Senator Flake and to our
witnesses. I look forward to hearing their testimony.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez.
And we all look forward to the testimony of our witnesses
today.
I would like to welcome our first panel. Ambassador Robert
Jackson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs; Earl Gast, Assistant Administrator of Africa
at USAID; and Ms. Alice Friend, a Principal Director for
African Affairs at the Department of Defense--make up our first
panel.
And our second panel will be Lantana Abdullahi, project
manager for Search for Common Ground, who is currently watching
this hearing and will be joining us later via Google Hangout,
from Jos, Nigeria. We look forward to Ms. Abdullahi's
testimony, commend her courage, and are honored by the
opportunity to hear a voice from northern Nigeria today.
I want to thank our first-panel witnesses for being here
today, and welcome your opening statements.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. JACKSON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Jackson. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake,
Chairman Menendez, other members of the committee, thank you
for inviting me to update you about U.S. efforts to address the
chilling threat that Boko Haram represents to Nigeria, one of
our most important partners in sub-Saharan Africa. Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs Thomas Greenfield regrets that
her travel schedule prevented her from being here today.
However, she will be attending the Regional Summit organized by
French President Hollande in Paris on Saturday.
It has now been 1 month since Boko Haram kidnapped the 200
young women from the town of Chibok in northeastern Nigeria. At
the time of the kidnapping, these brave young women had
returned to their high school in order to complete examinations
that would allow them to attend university. By seeking
knowledge and opportunity, they represented a challenge to Boko
Haram, since it opposes democracy and formal education. Indeed,
Boko Haram has attempted to crush the kind of faith in the
promise of education and prosperity that families in Chibok
showed.
The attack is part of a long, terrible trend. Boko Haram
fighters have repeatedly targeted schools. In February, Boko
Haram massacred at least 29 people when it destroyed a rural
boarding school in Adamawa. Boko Haram has murdered police
officers, snatched children, destroyed churches, burned
schools, attacked mosques, driven people from their homes,
challenged the government's authority, and kidnapped Westerners
in both Nigeria and neighboring Cameroon.
Since January 1, Boko Haram has killed over 1,000 people,
making Nigeria's struggle against this group one of the
deadliest conflicts in Africa today. In addition to terrorizing
the capital and other cities, Boko Haram attacks villages and
military installations. The abductions in Chibok fit into a
larger pattern of violence. Throughout northeastern Nigeria,
teachers and students have learned to fear the gunmen who come
in the night to kill young men and teachers and steal away
young women. Some of the young women from Chibok daringly
escaped their captors, but many more remained prisoners of Boko
Haram's leaders, Abubakar Shekau, and his brutal followers.
We join the world, the people of Nigeria, and the parents
of these children, in expressing our outrage of Boko Haram's
shocking acts and its perverse ideology. This tragic kidnapping
calls us to redouble our efforts to defeat a malicious
terrorist organization that has troubled Nigeria for more than
a decade. World leaders, including President Obama, have
pledged their full support to the government and people of
Nigeria as they seek to safely recover and assist these
courageous young women.
We acted swiftly to carry out the President's pledge. By
Monday, May 12, we had deployed an 18-member interagency team
to advise the Nigerian Government as it works to bring back the
young women--specifically, by advising on how to safely recover
and assist these girls, offering specialized expertise on
military and law enforcement best practices, hostage
negotiation, intelligence-gathering, strategic communications,
and how to mitigate the risk of future kidnappings. USAID has
mobilized resources to provide humanitarian assistance to those
affected by Boko Haram violence, including through the
provision of psychosocial and medical support and treatment. We
are cooperating fully with our partners--the U.K., France, and
a host of other countries--who are also dedicating significant
interagency manpower, resources, and time to this effort.
Mr. Chairman, a peaceful and stable Nigeria is crucially
important to the future of Africa, and we cannot stay on the
sidelines if it stumbles. Nigeria has the largest economy and
largest population. We look to Nigeria as an ally in our quest
to help Africans lead lives free of violence and filled with
possibility. As an engine of growth and a political giant,
Nigeria is vital to the success of President Obama's 2012
strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa. As we implement the
strategy, we are focusing on building democratic, prosperous,
and secure Nigeria.
Since Boko Haram came to the world's attention with a
massive uprising in 2009, we have been working to help Nigeria
counter this threat. We provide Nigeria with security
assistance, which goes toward professionalizing the Nigerian
military, investigating bomb sites, and enhancing border
security. We have increasingly placed our response to Boko
Haram in a regional context. Through our Trans-Saharan
Counterterrorism Partnership, the Global Counterterrorism
Forum, and our bilateral relationships with Nigeria's
neighbors, we are encouraging greater information-sharing and
border security efforts.
The importance of regional coordination is clear at a time
like this as Nigeria and its partners seek to prevent Boko
Haram from smuggling young women across the border or using
neighboring countries as safe havens. I must note, however,
that our ability to encourage regional collaboration is made
more difficult at this time, as our highly qualified nominees
to be the Ambassadors to Niger and Cameroon continue to await
confirmation by the full Senate.
We have also joined the international effort to isolate
Boko Haram. In June 2012, the State Department designated Boko
Haram's top commanders as specially designated global
terrorists. In June 2013, the State Department added Abubakar
Shekau, Boko Haram's leader, to our Rewards for Justice Program
and offered up to $7 million for information leading to his
location. In November 2013, the State Department designated
Boko Haram and Ansaru as foreign terrorist organizations. And
last week, our Ambassador met President Jonathan, and they
agreed on the importance of quick action on the U.N.
designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist group. This week,
Nigeria brought this question to the U.N. Security Council.
At the same time, we have been urging Nigeria to reform its
approach to Boko Haram. From our own difficult experiences in
Afghanistan and Iraq, we know that turning the tide of an
insurgency requires more than force. The state must demonstrate
to its citizens that it can protect them and offer them
opportunity. When soldiers destroy towns, kill civilians, and
detain innocent people with impunity, mistrust takes root. We
share these lessons with our partners in Nigeria, urging them
to ensure that security services respect human rights and
officials end a culture of impunity while people see the
benefits of government and diverse voices are heard and
represented in the capital.
We have seen some signs of reform. National Security
Advisor Sambo Dasuki's March announcement of a soft approach to
countering violent extremism was encouraging. And we have
worked through our Counterterrorism and Conflict Stabilization
Operations Bureaus to promote narratives of nonviolence in
Nigeria.
As we strike a balance between counseling and empowering
Nigeria, we regularly send high-level diplomats to Nigeria. On
May 12 and 13, our Under Secretary for Civilian Security,
Democracy, and Human Rights, Dr. Sarah Sewall, and AFRICOM
commander, General David Rodriguez, were in Nigeria to discuss
how to intensify our efforts against Boko Haram, reform human
rights practices, and pursue a comprehensive approach.
All of these policy tools--our security assistance, our
legal and sanctions actions, and our diplomatic engagement--
constitute the framework within which we are working to help
Nigeria bring back these girls kidnapped by Boko Haram.
Resolving this crisis is now one of the highest priorities of
the U.S. Government.
Nevertheless, Nigeria's conflict with Boko Haram will not
end when these young women are brought home. Consequently,
throughout this crisis, our assistance is framed by our broader
and long-term policy goal of helping the Nigerians implement a
comprehensive response to defeat Boko Haram that protects
civilians, respects human rights, and addresses the underlying
causes of conflict. We are sharing with the Government of
Nigeria practices and strategies that will bolster its future
efforts to defeat this deadly movement.
Nigeria's importance and the violent attacks committed by
Boko Haram are both growing. We cannot ignore either trend. We
welcome the committee's interest in these urgent matters, and
we look forward to continuing to work with you as we strive to
bring these young women home and to address the broader threat.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jackson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Robert P. Jackson
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me to update you about U.S. efforts to address
the chilling threat that Boko Haram represents to Nigeria, one of our
most important partners in sub-Saharan Africa.
It has now been 1 month since Boko Haram kidnapped more than 200
hundred girls from the town of Chibok in northeastern Nigeria. At the
time of the kidnapping, these brave girls had returned to their high
school in order to complete examinations that would allow them to
attend university. By seeking knowledge and opportunity, they
represented a challenge to Boko Haram in the heart of its area of
operations. As the world now knows, Boko Haram opposes democracy and
formal education. It has attempted to crush the kind of faith in the
promise of education and prosperity that families in Chibok showed.
Boko Haram, the terrorist organization that kidnapped these girls,
has shown it has no regard for human life. It has been killing innocent
people in Nigeria for some time, and the attack at Chibok is part of
that long, terrible trend. This year alone, Boko Haram has murdered
more than 1,000 innocent people in vicious attacks on schools,
churches, and mosques. Since 2013, it has targeted and systematically
kidnapped women--including these girls--seeking to deny them the
education and opportunity they deserve. The abductions in Chibok fit
into this larger pattern of violence. Throughout northeastern Nigeria,
innocent civilians are terrified by gunmen who come in the night to
kill young men and teachers and steal away young women.
Boko Haram has also retained its ability to target Abuja, as we saw
with two recent bombings at the Nyanya bus depot outside the capital.
And we're concerned by the expansion of the group's operations beyond
Nigeria, including in Cameroon where it has also conducted kidnappings.
The group is not just a Nigerian problem; it is a regional security
problem.
We join the world, the people of Nigeria, and the parents of these
children in expressing our outrage at Boko Haram's shocking acts and
its perverse ideology.
Young people, in Nigeria and across the globe, deserve the chance
to pursue their dreams without suffering the predations of violent
extremists. What happened in Nigeria resonates around the world, and
pleas to free the kidnapped schoolgirls have come from First Lady
Michelle Obama, from Pakistani activist Malala Yousafzai, U.N. Special
Envoy for Global Education Gordon Brown, and other champions of women's
right to an education.
This tragic kidnapping demands that we redouble our efforts to
defeat a Foreign Terrorist Organization that has troubled Nigeria for
more than a decade. World leaders, including President Obama, have
pledged their full support to the government and people of Nigeria as
they seek the safe return of these brave girls. We acted swiftly to
carry out the President's pledge. By Monday, May 12, the U.S.
Government had deployed an 18-member interagency team to provide
military and law enforcement assistance, as well as intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance support. We have provided commercial
imagery and are flying manned and unmanned ISR aircraft over Nigeria to
support the search. We are working closely with international partners
on the ground, including the U.K. and France, and we are pressing for
additional multilateral action, including U.N. Security Council
sanctions on Boko Haram. As the President has directed, we will do
everything possible to support the Nigerians in their efforts to find
and free these girls. But we won't stop there. We can and must continue
to work closely with Nigeria to prevent Boko Haram from harming any
more innocent people.
Given Nigeria's importance, Boko Haram cannot be allowed to
continue its array of bloody tactics: murdering police officers,
snatching children, destroying churches, burning schools, attacking
mosques, driving people from their homes, and challenging the
government's authority.
Mr. Chairman, a peaceful and stable Nigeria is crucially important
to the future of Africa, and we cannot stay on the sidelines if it
stumbles. Nigeria has the continent's largest population and biggest
economy. We look to Nigeria as a partner in our quest to help Africans
lead lives free of violence and filled with possibility. As an engine
of growth, a fountainhead of art and industry, and a political giant,
Nigeria is vital to the success of President Obama's 2012 Strategy
Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. As we implement that strategy, we are
focusing on building a democratic, prosperous, and secure Nigeria.
Since Boko Haram came to the world's attention with a massive
uprising in 2009, we have been working to help Nigeria counter this
threat. We provide Nigeria with security cooperation, which goes toward
professionalizing the Nigerian military, investigating bomb sites,
improving border security, and carrying out responsible
counterterrorism operations. As we hear reports of Boko Haram cells in
neighboring countries, we have increasingly placed our response to Boko
Haram in a regional context. Through our Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and our bilateral
relationships with Nigeria's neighbors, we are encouraging greater
information-sharing and border security efforts.
At the same time, we have been urging Nigeria to reform its
approach to Boko Haram. From our own difficult experiences in
Afghanistan and Iraq, we know that turning the tide of an insurgency
requires more than force. The state must demonstrate to its citizens
that it can protect them and offer them opportunity. When soldiers
destroy towns, kill civilians, and detain innocent people with
impunity, mistrust takes root. When governments neglect the economic
development of remote areas, confidence can falter. We share these
lessons with our partners in Nigeria, urging them to ensure that
security services respect human rights; officials end a culture of
impunity; people see the benefits of government; and diverse voices are
heard and represented in the capital. We have seen some signs of
reform--we were encouraged in March of this year to see National
Security Advisor Sambo Dasuki announce his ``soft approach'' to
countering violent extremism, though Nigeria needs to follow through on
implementing this strategy. We have also worked through our
Counterterrorism and Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureaus to
promote narratives of nonviolence in Nigeria, and we are working
broadly to protect civilians, prevent atrocities, and ensure respect
for human rights.
At the same time, we are providing law enforcement assistance,
including by training Nigerian law enforcement officials on basic
forensics, hostage negotiations, leadership, and task force
development.
To counter the spread of violent extremist ideology, we support
programs and initiatives--including job training and education--that
create economic alternatives for those vulnerable to being recruited by
terrorist organizations.
All of this is part of a coordinated effort to help strengthen
Nigeria's ability to respond responsibly and effectively to these
challenges in a way that ensures civilians are protected and human
rights are respected.
We have also joined the international effort to isolate Boko Haram.
In June 2012, the State Department designated Boko Haram's top
commanders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b)
of Executive Order 13224. In June 2013, the State Department added
Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram's official leader, to our Rewards for
Justice Program and offered up to $7 million for information leading to
his location. In November 2013, the State Department designated Boko
Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, under Section 219
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order
13224. Last week, our Ambassador met President Jonathan on the margins
of the World Economic Forum, and they agreed on the importance of quick
action on the U.N. designation of Boko Haram as a terrorist group. The
United Nations Security Council has renewed calls for regional
cooperation to address Boko Haram. This week, Nigeria brought this
question to the U.N. Security Council. And as I mentioned, we continue
to work with Nigeria and others to press for U.N. Security Council
sanctions on Boko Haram.
The importance of regional and multilateral coordination is clear
at a time like this, as Nigeria and its partners seek to prevent Boko
Haram from smuggling young women across the border or using neighboring
countries as safe havens. I must note, however, that our ability to
encourage regional collaboration is made more difficult, at this time,
as our highly qualified nominees to be the U.S. Ambassadors to Niger
and Cameroon continue to await confirmation by the full Senate.
As we strike a balance between helping empower Nigeria and
counseling its government on reform, we engage regularly with Nigeria
at all levels of our government. President Obama and Nigerian President
Jonathan discussed security issues during their bilateral meeting on
the margins of the U.N. General Assembly last September. Most recently,
our Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights,
Dr. Sarah Sewall, and U.S. Africa Command Commander General David
Rodriguez spent May 12 and 13 in Nigeria. They met senior Nigerian
security officials to discuss how to intensify efforts against Boko
Haram, reform human rights practices, and pursue a comprehensive
approach to Boko Haram. Under Secretary Sewall and General Rodriguez
devoted considerable attention to the crisis surrounding the kidnapped
women. Under Secretary Sewall called the principal of the young women's
school in Chibok to express U.S. outrage and deep concern about the
deplorable kidnapping.
All of these policy tools--our security cooperation, our legal and
sanctions actions, and our diplomatic engagement--constitute the
framework within which we are working to help Nigeria safely bring back
the women kidnapped by Boko Haram. Resolving this crisis is now one of
the highest priorities of the U.S. Government. As I mentioned when I
began, we deployed an interagency team to advise Nigerian authorities
on how to recover safely and assist these young women. Led by a senior
diplomat from our Africa Bureau, the team is liaising with counterparts
across Nigeria's Government to offer specialized expertise on military
and law enforcement best practices, hostage negotiation, intelligence
gathering, strategic communications, and how to mitigate the risks of
future kidnappings. At the same time, USAID has mobilized resources to
provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by Boko Haram
violence, including through the provision of psychosocial and medical
support and treatment. We are cooperating thoroughly with the U.K.,
France, and a host of other countries who are also dedicating
significant interagency manpower, resources, and time to this effort.
Our field team remains in close, coordinated contact with State
Department headquarters here in Washington.
Nevertheless, Nigeria's conflict with Boko Haram will not end when
these young women are bought home. Consequently, throughout this
crisis, our assistance is framed by our broader and long-term policy
goal of helping the Nigerians implement a comprehensive response to
defeating Boko Haram that protects civilians, respects human rights,
and addresses the underlying causes of the conflict. We are sharing
practices and strategies with the Government of Nigeria that will
bolster its future efforts to defeat this deadly movement.
Nigeria's importance and the violent attacks committed by Boko
Haram are both growing. We cannot ignore either trend. We welcome your
interest in these urgent matters, and we look forward to continuing to
work with you as we strive to bring these young women home and address
the broader threat posed by Boko Haram.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Ambassador Jackson.
Assistant Administrator Gast.
STATEMENT OF HON. EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Gast. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and
Chairman Menendez, thank you for the opportunity for me to
speak before you today about the brutal kidnapping of more than
250 young girls from their school just 1 month ago.
This latest brutality was not an isolated incident. For
years, Boko Haram has terrorized the people of northern
Nigeria. They have attempted to exploit northern Nigeria's low
level of infrastructure, development, and security that affects
all aspects of life, from economic growth to access to basic
services, resulting in the north's growing isolation.
This conflict has caused decreases in agricultural
production, price spikes, and serious concerns about food
security, both in the north and also in neighboring states. For
example, Niger is import-dependent and dependent on exports
from Nigeria.
In Nigeria, nearly 4.2 million persons are at risk of food
insecurity, and continued unrest will likely have long-term
impacts on nutrition, agriculture, and trade. It is projected
that by 2015 Nigeria will soon be home to the largest number of
persons worldwide living in extreme poverty.
In May 2013, due to an escalation of violence, the
Government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in Adamawa,
Borno, and Yobe states. In early 2014, attacks carried out by
Boko Haram militants killed more than 1,500 persons. According
to the U.N., violence had displaced more than a quarter of a
million persons to neighboring states by only a few months
later, in March, 70 percent of whom were women and children. In
communities hosting internally displaced persons, the presence
of additional families is straining local resources, including
already stretched water systems and basic commodities.
To determine the extent of this crisis, the U.N., along
with key international NGOs, are currently conducting a
multiagency, multisector needs assessment, and USAID is a part
of that assessment team. Last week, a team of humanitarian
professionals from the U.N. and the NGO community traveled to
the areas that are now part of the state of emergency, as well
as three bordering states that have received most of the IDPs,
the internally displaced persons. This team is meeting with
state and local officials, with the displaced persons
themselves, and other community members to establish the number
of displaced persons, where they are living, their ability to
access food, income, health care, education, and water and
hygiene. The team will also evaluate food security, nutrition,
and protection services along with identifying actors who are
on the ground and who can help develop the most effective
approaches to deliver relief.
We will use the results of this mission to shape the
provision of humanitarian assistance, in partnership with
others, to meet urgent humanitarian needs among affected
families. Assistance will include food, shelter, safe drinking
water, emergency treatment of acute malnutrition, community-
based psychosocial support, and programs target at preventing
and treating sexual and gender-based violence.
Exacerbating this humanitarian crisis is Boko Haram's
assaults on youth seeking education. A good education is a
global public good, and it is a necessary ingredient for
economic development and poverty reduction. Education enables
people to live healthier lives, fulfill their potential, and it
also contributes to open, inclusive, and vibrant societies.
These attacks undermine northern Nigeria's already precarious
educational system by destroying schools, forcing others to
close, and keeping thousands of students and teachers out of
the classroom. School attendance in the region, already well
below the national rate, will continue to suffer.
USAID has active programs in nearly all of Nigeria's
northern states, with a particular focus on Bauchi and Sokoto.
Through our education programs in the north, we have increased
access to basic education services for more than 15,000 orphans
and vulnerable children; we have strengthened the capacity of
some 24 education-related NGOs; and we have also influenced
Nigeria's Educational Research and Development Council to
include reading as a core objective of its curriculum.
USAID's conflict mitigation program, active in six states
in the north, including Borno, the state most affected by the
violence, has funded numerous community training programs on
conflict mitigation. We have supported and trained conflict
management and mitigation councils. And we have carried out, in
partnership with local organizations, phone-in interfaith
dialogues on radio and television programs.
Today, our thoughts are with the schoolgirls and their
families and the millions of Nigerians forced to live under the
threat of Boko Haram's violence every day.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Earl Gast
USAID partners around the world to end extreme poverty and promote
resilient, democratic societies, while advancing our security and
prosperity. Our work in northern Nigeria highlights the nexus between
security, stability, and poverty reduction. We are committed to working
with Nigeria to build a peaceful society that promotes inclusive
economic growth and lifts its citizens out of poverty.
One month ago, Boko Haram militants kidnapped more than 250 young
girls from their school in an attack so shocking it mobilized the world
behind returning these girls to their families. But this latest
brutality was not an isolated incident. For years, Boko Haram has
terrorized the people of northern Nigeria through bombings, kidnapping,
and sexual violence.
For decades, development in the northern part of the country has
markedly lagged behind the relative progress made in the south as is
evident through comparison of development indicators in Nigeria's six
geopolitical zones. In the three northern zones, per capita incomes are
significantly lower than the national average. Literacy in the
southwest zone is around 80 percent for girls, while in the northeast
it is only 15 percent. Health statistics paint a similar picture of
disparity. Immunization coverage in the northeast is only about 8
percent, while in the south-south it is closer to 36 percent.
In recent years, Boko Haram has attempted to exploit northern
Nigeria's low level of infrastructure, public services, and security.
Boko Haram attacks have affected all aspects of life, from economic
growth to access to basic services, and resulted in the north's growing
isolation. Commercial activity in Kano, once a national economic hub,
is estimated to have decreased by 50 percent in recent years, due in
large part to the stream of businesses that have left northern states
like Borno and Kaduna for the stability of the south.
The conflict has caused decreases in agricultural production, price
spikes, and serious concerns about food security both in the north and
neighboring states, particularly import-dependent Niger. In Nigeria,
nearly 4.2 million people are at risk of food insecurity, and continued
unrest will likely have long-term impacts on nutrition, agriculture,
and trade.
Access to health care has dramatically declined in the hardest hit
conflict areas; in Borno state, doctors are fleeing and clinics are
closing, forcing the population into neighboring Cameroon for basic
health services. Boko Haram has also been targeting cell phone towers
so people in the region have less access to communications.
As violence began to escalate, the Government of Nigeria declared a
state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in May 2013. In
early 2014, attacks carried out by Boko Haram militants killed more
than 1,500 people. According to the U.N., violence had displaced more
than a quarter million people to neighboring states by March 2014--70
percent of them women and children. An additional 61,000 people,
including returning migrants, have also fled to neighboring Niger,
Cameroon, and Chad, where they are living in host communities.
In communities hosting internally displaced persons, the presence
of additional families is straining local resources, including already-
stretched water systems and basic commodities. Increasing numbers of
female-headed households is forcing widows to become the sole providers
for their families. Such households and widows are exposed to
additional violence within host communities. In the absence of their
husbands, widows also lack access to financial resources, exacerbated
by inheritance laws, and systems that limit women's ownership of
property.
situational assessment
Due to insecurity, presence of aid workers in the most affected
areas is very limited and we do not yet have a comprehensive picture of
the overall humanitarian situation. To determine the extent of the
crisis, the U.N. along with key international nongovernmental
organizations are currently conducting a multiagency, multisector needs
assessment. Last week, a team of humanitarian professionals from the
U.N. and NGOs traveled to the areas in states of emergency (Borno,
Yobe, and Adamawa) as well as three bordering states (Bauchi, Gombe,
and Taraba) that have received the most internally displaced people.
This team is currently interviewing state and local officials and
meeting with internally displaced persons and other community members
to establish the number of displaced people, where they live, and their
level of access to food, income, health care, education, water,
sanitation, and hygiene. The team will also evaluate food security,
nutrition, and protection services, identify humanitarian actors still
on the ground, and develop the most effective approaches to deliver
relief and identify opportunities to strengthen the capacity of state
governments and local partners to monitor displacement, report, assess,
and coordinate delivery of relief.
USAID humanitarian experts have been involved in the assessment
process since the beginning, working to help define indicators and
processes. USAID humanitarian experts are currently in Nigeria and will
continue to support the work of the U.N. and other agencies. USAID will
use the results of this mission to shape the provision of humanitarian
assistance in partnership with implementing organizations to meet
urgent humanitarian needs among affected families. Assistance may
include providing food, shelter, and household items for displaced
populations; safe water in communities whose resources have been
overstretched because of an influx of new families; support to
emergency treatment of acute malnutrition; or community-based
psychosocial support and programs targeted at the prevention and
treatment of sexual and gender-based violence. USAID is also exploring
opportunities for collaboration with key Nigerian agencies, the
Nigerian National Emergency Management Agency, local emergency response
actors as well as supporting efforts to increase food security data
collection and analysis to inform potential response options.
Once completed, the U.N. and USAID assessments will give us a
better understating of the situation and how best to respond, taking
into account the operational realities of programming in Northern
Nigeria.
an attack on education
Exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, Boko Haram's assaults on
youth seeking education has become ever more brazen over the past 2
years. A good education is a global public good, and a necessary
ingredient for economic development and poverty reduction. Education
enables people to live healthier and more productive lives, allowing
them to fulfill their own potential, as well as to strengthen and
contribute to open, inclusive and economically vibrant societies.
Boko Haram's attacks on schools had consisted of destroying empty
school buildings at night, but more recently has shifted to targeting
Muslim and non-Muslim students and staff with guns, knives, and
explosives. The group has killed or wounded hundreds of students and
teachers since June 2013. The mass abduction of female students in
Chibok marked a frightening shift: While in prior attacks, Boko Haram
generally instructed female students to flee, they are now publically
calling on girls to abandon Western education or be taken as slaves.
Boko Haram is also seeking to perpetuate child marriage as an
acceptable practice and is using it to sow fear, intimidation, and
coercion.
These attacks undermine northern Nigeria's already precarious
educational system by destroying schools, forcing others to close, and
keeping thousands of students and teachers out of the classroom. School
attendance in the region, already well below the national rate, most
likely will continue to suffer.
usaid assistance
USAID has active programs in nearly all of Nigeria's northern
states, with a particular focus on Bauchi and Sokoto. Through our
education programs in the north, we have increased access to basic
education services for over 15,000 orphans and vulnerable children,
strengthened the capacity of 24 education-related nongovernmental
organizations to responsibly manage their finances, and influenced
Nigeria's Educational Research and Development Council to include
reading as a part of the education curriculum.
Through our economic growth programs, USAID has built the capacity
of export firms, helped medium-sized, small, and microenterprises gain
access to loans, and supported the development of a new customs and
excise management act to reform and modernize the Nigerian customs
service. At the same time, the Feed the Future program has helped
Nigerian farmers more than double their yields in maize, rice, and
sorghum, and leveraged millions of dollars in credit for thousands of
beneficiaries and for numerous private sector partnerships.
USAID has also helped the Sokoto and Bauchi State Houses of
Assembly pass public procurement and fiscal responsibility laws,
trained over 900 government officials in public procurement and
financial management practices, and assisted with the passing of the
federal freedom of information act and its adoption at the state
levels.
USAID's conflict mitigation program--active in six states in the
north, including Borno, the state most affected state by Boko Haram's
violence--has funded numerous community training programs on conflict
mitigation, reconstituted and trained Conflict Management and
Mitigation Regional Councils, and carried out phone-in interfaith
dialogues on radio and television programs.
Regionally, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which
USAID implements alongside the Departments of State and Defense,
includes a regional Peace for Development program in Burkina Faso,
Niger, and Chad--areas that are vulnerable as they may become fertile
ground for the expansion of violent extremist groups. This initiative
applies a holistic, community-led approach that has reached nearly 3.8
million people from at-risk groups through youth-led community
mobilization activities, radio programming, and training in management
skills, budgeting, leadership, vocational trades, and conflict
resolution. In other areas of the Sahel, USAID supports a vocational
education program in Mauritania and has expanded our program to counter
violent extremism to key areas of Northern Mali. Given the immense size
of the Sahel, interventions are limited to communities with the highest
risk factors, which have been identified through assessments conducted
by the project. A number of those target communities are in areas of
Niger and Chad that border Nigeria. These programs have led to a
noticeable rise in community action. This week, a local youth
organization in Bamako, Mali, is sponsoring a mass demonstration and
public outreach around the issue of the kidnapping of the Nigerian
schoolgirls.
Today our thoughts are with the schoolgirls, their families; and
the millions of Nigerians forced to live under the threat of Boko
Haram's violence every day.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
Principal Director Friend, thank you for joining us today.
We welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ALICE FRIEND, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Friend. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, members
of the committee, thank you for calling us together to address
the deeply disturbing abductions of over 270 schoolgirls in
northern Nigeria by the terrorist organization Boko Haram.
People of good will across the globe have been horrified by
this barbarous act and are rightly demanding that the Nigerian
authorities take immediate measures to recover the girls, and
are asking what those of us in the international community can
do to support Nigerian efforts.
Last Friday, the United States dispatched a
multidisciplinary State Department-led team of experts to Abuja
to provide the Government of Nigeria with the specialized
advice and expertise it needs to respond to these abductions.
DOD has provided four subject-matter experts from U.S. Africa
Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, to augment 10 DOD
personnel already assigned to our Embassy in Abuja as part of
this interagency team. In addition, two military officers with
extensive experience supporting the Counter-Lord's Resistance
Army Mission in Uganda also have been temporarily relocated to
Abuja to provide their advice and assistance.
In total, 16 DOD personnel with medical, intelligence,
counterterrorism, and communications expertise have been
assigned exclusively to the mission of advising the Nigerian
security forces' efforts to recover these girls. Secretary
Jackson also mentioned the concurrent visit of the commander of
Africa Command, General Rodriguez, to engage with his Nigerian
counterparts alongside Under Secretary Sewall. Their initial
efforts have been to work with Nigerian security personnel to
analyze Nigerian operations, identify gaps and shortfalls, and
otherwise provide requested expertise and information to the
Nigerian authorities, including through the use of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. We are
also working closely with other international partners,
including the U.K. and France, to coordinate multilateral
actions and maximize our collective assistance efforts.
Mr. Chairman, the threat to Nigeria from Boko Haram has
grown over the past 5 years, and mutates day by day, extending
its reach, increasing the sophistication and lethality of its
attacks, and growing its military capacity. These most recent
attacks are especially unconscionable because they were
perpetrated against innocent girls and because of the sheer
scale of the attack in Chibok.
Unfortunately, these kidnappings are only the most recent
outrages in a growing portfolio of attacks perpetrated by Boko
Haram in its war against education. On July 6, 2013, in an
attack on the secondary school in Mamudo Village, 29 students
were killed, including reports that some were burned alive when
their dormitory was deliberately set on fire. Overnight between
September 28 and 29, 2013, upward of 40 students were
slaughtered in a nighttime attack on the Yobe State College of
Agriculture. And in yet another nighttime attack, this at the
Buni Yadi Federal Government College in February of this year,
at least 59 people, including boys ranging in age from 11 to
18, were killed.
The Department has been deeply concerned for some time by
how much the Government of Nigeria has struggled to keep pace
with Boko Haram's growing lethality and capabilities.
Recognizing this threat and the need for Nigeria to adopt a
whole-of-government approach to defeating it, over the past
several years DOD has undertaken a number of initiatives to
assist Nigeria in its counter-Boko Haram efforts. For example,
we have supported the establishment of counter-IED and civil-
military operations capacity within the Nigerian Army. We have
also supported the establishment of an intelligence fusion
center in an effort to promote information-sharing among
various national security entities and, overall, to enable more
effective and responsible intelligence-driven counterterrorism
operations. More recently, we have begun working with Nigeria's
newly created Ranger Battalion to impart the specialized skills
and disciplines needed to mount effective counterterrorism
operations.
Mr. Chairman, as dedicated as the Department of Defense is
to supporting Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram and in
recovering these girls safely, we cannot ignore that Nigeria
can be an extremely challenging partner to work with. In the
face of this sophisticated threat, Nigeria's security forces
have been slow to adapt with new strategies, new doctrines, and
new tactics. Even more troubling, Nigeria's record of
atrocities perpetrated by some of its security forces during
operations against Boko Haram have been widely documented. As
we have advised the Nigerians, consistent with U.S. law and
policy, we review security-force units who may receive
assistance, and we cannot, and do not, provide assistance when
we have credible information that those units have committed
gross violations of human rights.
With this important consideration in mind, we have worked
to engage where and how we are able to in viewing our
engagements and training efforts with human rights and Law of
Armed Conflict modules and emphasizing the importance of the
broad counterinsurgency approach that we, ourselves, have spent
so much blood and treasure fulfilling. Indeed, if this tragic
episode is to end the way we all hope it will, Nigeria's
leaders must continue to match their public statements with a
serious and focused response that draws on all elements of
their government and makes maximum use of the resources
international partners are offering to them. This will not be
an easy task. We are still seeking information on whether,
where, and how the girls may have been dispersed. But, DOD is
committed to supporting Nigeria in locating these girls and
seeing them safely returned to their loved ones.
Thank you again for convening us here today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Friend follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alice Friend
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for calling us together to address the deeply disturbing
recent abductions of over 270 school girls in northern Nigeria by the
terrorist organization Boko Haram. People of good will across the globe
have been horrified by this barbarous act and are rightly demanding
that the Nigerian authorities take immediate measures to recover the
girls and are asking what those of us in the international community
can do to support Nigerian efforts.
Last Friday, the United States dispatched a multidisciplinary,
State Department-led team of experts to Abuja to provide the Government
of Nigeria with the specialized advice and expertise it needs to
respond to these abductions. DOD has provided four subject matter
experts from USAFRICOM headquarters to augment 10 DOD personnel already
assigned to our Embassy in Abuja as part of this interagency team. In
addition, two military officers with extensive experience supporting
the counter-Lord's Resistance Army mission in Uganda also have been
temporarily relocated to Abuja to provide advice and assistance. In
total, 16 DOD personnel with medical, intelligence, counterterrorism
and communications expertise have been assigned exclusively to the
mission of advising the Nigerian security forces' efforts to recover
these girls safely. Their initial efforts have been to work with
Nigerian security personnel to analyze Nigerian operations, identify
gaps and shortfalls, and otherwise provide requested expertise and
information to the Nigerian authorities, including through the use of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. We are also
working closely with other international partners, including the U.K.
and France, to coordinate multilateral actions and maximize our
collective assistance efforts.
Our intent is to support Nigerian-led efforts to recover the girls
and help catalyze greater efforts to secure the Nigerian population
from the menace of Boko Haram. The Department of Defense stands ready
to do what we can to help the Nigerian Government, but both the
immediate and the long-term solutions to the threat Boko Haram poses to
the people of Nigeria must be implemented by the Government of Nigeria
if a sustained security is ever to be reached.
Mr. Chairman, that threat to Nigeria from Boko Haram has grown over
the past 5 years and mutates day by day, extending its reach,
increasing the sophistication and lethality of its attacks, and growing
its military capacity. It has now proven on multiple occasions--for
example, through its successful attack on a Nigerian air base in which
two of the Nigerian air force's helicopters were destroyed, as well as
the coordinated, methodical and highly successful attack at Giwa
barracks--that it is now capable of directly and successfully engaging
Nigeria's Armed Forces. Its expanded reach was also convincingly and
tragically demonstrated when over 70 innocent Nigerian citizens were
killed in a vehicle-borne IED attack just outside the national capital
of Abuja.
These most recent attacks are especially unconscionable because
they were perpetrated against innocent girls and because of the sheer
scale of the attack in Chibok. Unfortunately these kidnappings are only
the most recent outrages in a growing portfolio of attacks perpetrated
by Boko Haram in its war against education. On June 16-17, 2013, seven
students and two teachers were killed when Boko Haram members attacked
the Government Secondary School in Damaturu, Yobe state. This was
followed on July 6, 2013, by an attack on the secondary school in
Mamudo village, in which 29 students were killed, including reports
that some were burned alive when their dormitory was deliberately set
on fire. On September 28-29, 2013, upward of 40 students were
slaughtered in a nighttime attack by Boko Haram on the Yobe State
College of Agriculture. And in yet another nighttime attack, this time
at the Buni Yadi Federal Government College on February 18 of this
year, at least 59 people, including boys ranging in age from 11 to 18,
were killed.
The Department has been deeply concerned for some time by how much
the Government of Nigeria has struggled to keep pace with Boko Haram's
growing capabilities. Recognizing this threat and the need for Nigeria
to adopt a whole-of-government approach to defeating it, over the past
2 years the United States has made a concerted effort to assist Nigeria
in its counter-Boko Haram efforts. For its part, DOD has undertaken a
number of initiatives. For example, we have supported the establishment
of counter-IED and civil-military operations capacity within the
Nigerian Army in order to make C-IED an integral part of Nigeria's
security doctrine. The concept is to build Nigerian institutions so
that C-IED skills are organic and can be maintained and passed along by
the Nigerians themselves. We have also supported the establishment of
an intelligence fusion center in an effort to promote information-
sharing among various national security entities and, overall, to
enable more effective and responsible intelligence-driven CT
operations. More recently, we have begun working with Nigeria's newly
created Ranger Battalion to impart the specialized skills and
disciplines needed to mount effective CT operations.
As has been demonstrated during recent Boko Haram movements and
attacks, porous borders with Nigeria's northeastern and western
neighbors can also facilitate these terrorists' operations in the
region. For this reason, DOD and the Department of State are working
closely and actively to develop a regional response to the Boko Haram
threat to enhance border security along Nigeria's common borders with
Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The concept is to build border security
capacity with, and promote better cooperation and communication among,
the security forces of each country. In some cases, assistance would go
to the military, in others the gendarmerie, and in still others
immigration forces, to more effectively detect and respond to the
movement of Boko Haram members back and forth between Nigeria and its
neighbors. If we can build these basic but critical capacities, serious
progress can be made toward halting Boko Haram's spread and reversing
some of the gains it has made.
As committed as the U.S. is to supporting Nigeria in its fight
against Boko Haram and in returning these girls safely to their
families, we cannot ignore that Nigeria can be an extremely challenging
partner to work with. In general Nigeria has failed to mount an
effective campaign against Boko Haram. In the face of a new and more
sophisticated threat than it has faced before, its security forces have
been slow to adapt with new strategies, new doctrines and new tactics.
Even more troubling, Nigeria's record of atrocities perpetrated by some
of its security forces during operations against Boko Haram has been
widely documented. As we have advised the Nigerians, consistent with
U.S. law and policy, we review security force units who may receive
assistance, and we do not provide assistance when we have credible
information that they have committed gross violations of human rights.
With this important consideration in mind, we have worked to engage
where and how we are able to, imbuing our engagements and training
efforts with human rights and law of armed conflict modules and
emphasizing the importance of the broad counterinsurgency approach that
we ourselves spent so much blood and treasure fulfilling.
No discussion of how to address the Boko Haram threat would be
complete without addressing some of the political dynamics in Nigeria
underlying the security environment. In spite of its vast oil wealth,
Nigeria continues to face enormous development challenges. These
factors combine with pervasive federal and state government corruption
and Boko Haram's brutal terrorization of the population have made
northern Nigerians susceptible to antigovernment narratives and
afforded the group a more permissive operating environment. The long-
term solution to Boko Haram does not depend exclusively on Nigeria's
military or security forces, but also requires Nigeria's national
political leaders to give serious and sustained attention to addressing
the systemic problems of corruption, the lack of effective and
equitable governance, and the country's uneven social and economic
development.
Nevertheless, we will not lose our focus on the heartrending event
that has brought us here today. The tragic situation of these girls and
the families who hope for their safe return has captured the attention
of the world. As I have highlighted already, DOD is committed to
supporting Nigeria's efforts to locate these girls and to seeing them
safely returned to their loved ones. This will not be an easy task. We
are still seeking information on whether and how the girls may have
been dispersed. Indeed, if this tragic episode is to end the way we all
hope it will, the government of Nigeria must continue to match its
public statements with a serious and focused response that draws on all
elements of its government and making maximum use of the resources
international partners are making available to it.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Principal Director Friend.
Thank you, to this panel, for your testimony.
I would like to now begin questions in 7-minute rounds. And
I will remind all of us, we have a scheduled vote at 11:15 and
following a second-panel witness.
If I might start, I would just like to begin with a direct
question to each of you. You have addressed this in longer
form, but if I could just have a, in the interest of time,
concise and direct answer. When did your agency make its first
offer of assistance after the kidnappings? What did that offer
entail? What was the Nigerian Government's response? And what
do you see as the real impediments toward the Nigerians taking
full advantage of the opportunities and resources we have
offered?
Ambassador Jackson.
Ambassador Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kerry called President Jonathan roughly 2 weeks
ago today, made the offer, which President Jonathan accepted
with alacrity. And it involved intelligence collection and
support and other resources that I described in my testimony.
Senator Coons. Assistant Administrator Gast.
Mr. Gast. Almost immediately after the incident, the
Embassy and USAID declared a state of emergency, which allowed
us to bring in additional resources and assessment teams. So,
that was one way.
The second was, our Administrator almost immediately
traveled--after the incident, traveled to Nigeria to meet with
the government as well as participate in other discussions, but
certainly did focus on this issue.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Principal Director Friend.
Ms. Friend. Sir, the State Department took the lead in
making the initial offers. However, once the Government of
Nigeria, in fact, accepted our offer of assistance--I believe
that was on the 4th of May--the Department had ISR overflight
by the 9th of May.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
If I could, Ambassador Jackson--as you mentioned in your
testimony, in 2012 the State Department deliberated over
whether to designated Boko Haram as an organization--as a
foreign terrorist organization--or to designate top leaders,
which, indeed, happened in 2012, and then the group as a whole
as an FTO the following year. But, what were the implications
of designating those three individuals in 2012? And what
additional steps have been taken by the administration to
target Boko Haram's funding and other sources of support? And
why was there not initially unanimity around designating the
whole organization?
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, the debate about whether to
designate Boko Haram dates back many years, to at least 2011.
And I think, as former Assistant Secretary Johnny Carson has
explained in media interviews, the debate was really about the
Nigerian attitude toward designation. The Government of Nigeria
feared that designating these individuals and the organizations
would bring them more attention, more publicity, and be
counterproductive.
For some time, we accepted that point of view. And the fact
that the Nigerians are only now asking the U.N. to designate
them continues to reflect Nigerian hesitancy over the impact of
these designations. But, we decided to move ahead in 2012,
precisely because we were convinced that they met the criteria
for designation.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
If you would, Assistant Administrator Gast, describe the
strategy of the Nigerian Government to address the root causes
of Boko Haram support in northern Nigeria. The hearing that we
conducted 2 years ago could almost literally be repeated today,
in terms of ongoing structural challenges that have led to this
insurgency and have created the conditions, and sustained and,
in some ways, accelerated the conditions, for Boko Haram.
Mr. Gast. As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
mentioned in his testimony, there is a realization within the
national security--among the national security group, including
the security advisor himself, Dasuki, that this is a major
concern. And so, there are two units within the National
Security Advisor's office that are working on developing plans
for the north: one, a massive, long, multiyear development
program; another one that would help address the immediate
concerns of security, community, development. We are advising
those two groups and helping identify areas where we can assist
in providing programming support.
Senator Coons. Girls in Nigeria and around the world are
risking their lives every day just to get an education. USAID
does deliver significant support for education opportunities,
and, in particular, for the inclusion of women and girls in
education. But, with a decline in USAID's funding request for
education programming, I am concerned we may not have enough
resources to do what we should and what we must in Nigeria and
elsewhere. USAID support is predominantly focused in Bauchi and
Sokoto states--as you said, a small portion of the total north.
Please speak, if you would, to the strategy for how to continue
to support education, which really is the root cause of a lot
of the violence, in this instance, the insistence on access to
education for women.
Mr. Gast. Education has always been a robust element of our
program support in Nigeria. And if one were to look at the
continent as a whole, the budget for education in Nigeria
represents about 10 percent of the entire education budget. So,
it is a significant contribution that we are making.
The question is, Are we placing the resources in the right
areas? And certainly because of access issues, it is extremely
difficult to program resources in the north. We are working
with DFID, the British development agency, and we believe we
are very close to announcing a major effort to support
education, primarily girls' education, secure education in the
north.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Principal Director Friend, tell me more, if you would,
about the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership and what we
have done regionally with other countries that are directly
affected by Boko Haram--Chad, Niger, Cameroon. And, if you
would, just as a last question--you mentioned the gross human
rights violations committed by some elements of the Nigerian
Armed Forces. We are still able to find units with which we can
partner. And it is still possible for the Nigerian military
police and security forces to take the lead in ensuring the
return--the safe return of the Nigerian schoolgirls. Is that
not correct?
Ms. Friend. Yes, sir. I will take those questions in
reverse. That is correct. I mentioned in my testimony the
Ranger Battalion that we will begin training, in fact, this
month, and pretraining programming has begun to lay in the
groundwork for that. So, we are able to find units inside the
Nigerian Armed Forces that, in fact, pass Leahy vetting, and
have passed Leahy vetting. It is, however, a persistent and
very troubling limitation on our ability to provide assistance,
particularly training assistance, that the Nigerians so badly
need. This is one of the things that we have been talking to
them about for quite some time.
Another recent engagement that was also interagency in
nature was a counterinsurgency-focused trip to Nigeria, I
believe last fall, where we were urging them to take a more
holistic approach, and a, frankly, much less brutal approach,
in the north against Boko Haram.
To your question of the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism
Partnership, it is a State Department-led effort, so I do not
want to speak out of turn for Mr. Jackson, but I will say that,
in the region, we have been working increasingly with the
Cameroonians and the Nigerians and the Chadians to talk about
the regional threat that Boko Haram poses. As you, I am sure,
have heard in the press, there is some thought that some of the
girls may have been taken over international borders. And, of
course, the border with Cameroon and Niger, in particular, is
very porous, and we do know that Boko Haram does operate back
and forth across the international border, particularly with
Cameroon. The Cameroonian Government and the Cameroonian
President, in particular, have recently been taking Boko Haram
even more seriously than previously, and we are working with
them and with the Nigerians and the Chadians to assist them and
to do everything we can to ensure that all these countries
coordinate with each other.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks for the testimony.
Ms. Friend, with our cooperation or assistance to the
military, to what extent is it complicated by some of the rules
and regulations we have about dealing with militaries that have
human rights abuses lodged against them or have problems that
way? What restrictions are we under? And how does that limit
our ability to work with them?
Ms. Friend. So, essentially, sir, under the Leahy
provision, any unit that we suspect of having committed gross
human rights violations, we cannot provide military training or
assistance to. The broader implications of your question,
however--``How much does it affect our engagement with
Nigeria?''--it affects it very much. We have struggled a great
deal, in the past, to locate units that we can work with, and,
indeed, to convince the Nigerians to change their tactics,
techniques, and procedures toward Boko Haram.
Another way that we are very, very careful to ensure that
we are only providing assistance to those who will not use it
in ways that may affect civilians or otherwise violate
international human rights standards is our intel-sharing.
Though sharing intelligence with a foreign government that is
available to--intelligence that is available to DOD would not
normally be considered assistance subject to the DOD Leahy law,
we nevertheless are exceedingly cautious when it comes to
sharing information with the Nigerians, because of their
unfortunate record. In this case, for example, we have sought
assurances from them, that Ambassador Entwistle delivered a
couple of days ago, that they will use any information that we
pass to them from this ISR support in a manner consistent with
international humanitarian and human rights law.
Senator Flake. As I understand it, we have a couple of
issues with the military. One, they have been using pretty
brutal tactics and pretty brutal justice, if you will, with
regard to Boko Haram in the north, but also there is some fear
that some of its ranks are infiltrated with Boko Haram
sympathizers. Is that a concern, as well, the latter?
Ms. Abdullahi. That is a concern, sir. I would say an even
greater concern is the incapacity of the Nigerian military and
the Nigerian Government's failure to provide leadership to the
military in a way that changes these tactics. The division in
the north that mainly is engaging with Boko Haram, the 7th
Division, has recently shown signs of real fear. They do not
have the capabilities, the training, or the equipping that Boko
Haram does. And Boko Haram is exceptionally brutal and
indiscriminate in their attacks. And so, as heavyhanded as the
forces on the Nigerian side have been, Boko Haram has been even
more brutal.
And so, we are now looking at a military force that is,
quite frankly, becoming afraid to even engage. And that is one
of the things that we are talking to the military leadership in
Abuja about right now, about how to get the training and also
the orientation of the forces under control so that they will
feel more competent to face the threat.
Senator Flake. The military's decline in effectiveness in
Nigeria is really traced to fear that the political leadership
has to military coup. And that has been the pattern that has
been followed around other countries, as well. Is that what you
trace the decline to? And is this political leadership now,
this President and those around him, do they fear strengthening
the military for that purpose, fearing a coup later? What is
the relationship right now between the political leadership and
the military?
Ms. Friend. The relationship between the political
leadership and the military itself is reasonably healthy. My
understanding is that the weakening of the Nigerian military
does trace back a couple of decades, at least, to concerns
about capability for a coup. At this point, that is not a
concern in Nigeria.
Another concern, which my colleagues can also speak to, is
that the Nigerian military has the same challenges with
corruption that every other institution in Nigeria does. Much
of the funding that goes to the Nigerian military is skimmed
off the top, if you will.
Senator Flake. Assistant Administrator Gast, reports have
been around for a while about kidnappings and whatnot in the
north. Let me just read from one report. ``For much of the past
year, Boko Haram's fighters have stalked the rugged hills of
northeastern Nigeria, forcing teenage boys into their trucks as
recruits and snatching teenage girls as sex slaves,'' said
Nigerian officials and analysts. ``Villages and small towns in
the northeast are dotted with parents who have not seen their
children in months.''
How aware has the State Department been of this activity?
And should we have been more aware of the events that might
have told us that a kidnapping of this kind was coming?
Mr. Gast. So, from AID's perspective--and I will let Deputy
Assistant Secretary Jackson address it from State--yes, we are
very aware. Access is an issue. And so, the programmatic
response that we are able to deliver is less than it would be
if we had access.
We do work with local organizations, and there are some
very, very good local organizations that can help provide
psychosocial services to families and to individuals, that can
help promote dialogue between communities. Unfortunately, the
capacity of them to expand and go into more areas and reach
more deeply into pockets of society is somewhat limited.
Senator Flake. AID usually learns of these things just
because of the programs that you do with the local population
there. Mr. Jackson, can you speak from State's perspective? How
aware were we of these kind of kidnappings and this activity
going on long before the school kidnapping?
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, we have been very aware. And,
as Ambassador to Cameroon for the last 3 years, I was witness
to the kidnappings of French citizens there, starting early
last year, and then that has expanded. We have just had a third
kidnapping earlier this year.
The kidnappings are part of this larger strategy of terror.
And consistent with what the Lord's Resistance Army has done in
Uganda, if I may venture it, I think they are actually copying
the LRA's tactics, in some respects, which is why it is useful
to have people from our military who are familiar with the
LRA's tactics, in an attempt to apply that in Nigeria.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
My time is up.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, to
you and Ranking Member Flake, for holding the hearing today.
As I think we would all agree, this kidnapping of these
young girls in Nigeria is horrible, it is outrageous. We all
are in sympathy with their families and the community that they
came from. And it is been interesting to me to see the outcry
around the world as the result of these kidnappings. And I
think it, sadly, reminds us that there are too many girls and
women around the world who are threatened, who are--for young
girls who are just trying to get an education and better
themselves, they are victims of violence. Too many children are
given as child brides. Too many women are kidnapped and sold
into slavery or sex trafficking. And we have got to do a better
job, not only in the United States, but in the world, in
combating these crimes.
And I know, this week, the International Violence Against
Women Act was filed again. I am certainly hopeful that the full
committee will take up this legislation and pass it, because we
can either allow women to continue to be victims of violence
and ignorance and repression or we can act on behalf of our
wives, our daughters, our granddaughters and make a change in
the world that will benefit everyone.
I wonder--and I am not sure who to direct this question
to--
I understand that there have been a number of offers of
assistance to Nigeria--from France, from Britain; I understand
that Israel and China have also offered to help. Can someone
describe the extent to which those offers are being taken up
and how the coordination is happening?
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, I would be happy to take that
question. In fact, we have a fusion cell, as we call it, in
Abuja, the Nigerian capital, where the British, the French, the
Americans, and the Nigerians are working together to develop
the information that we have been able to gather through our
various activities. We are also in touch with the Israelis and
the Chinese, to a much lesser extent, but we are talking with
them, to find out what is being provided. And I spoke with our
team leader, just before coming to this hearing. He is very
satisfied with the cooperation, and he is looking forward to
expanding it this weekend, when the regional leaders meet in
Paris.
Senator Shaheen. And are there any Muslim countries that
have offered assistance?
Ambassador Jackson. A number of Muslim countries have
spoken out, and certainly Niger, which is predominantly Muslim,
has offered its assistance to its neighbor, Nigeria, as has
Chad.
Senator Shaheen. And when you say there are a number that
have spoken out, have spoken out to condemn what has happened?
Ambassador Jackson. Absolutely. And the message that all
the Muslim leaders who have spoken out--whether religious
leaders or political leaders, have passed is that this is not
about Islam. And I think that is a very important point. Boko
Haram's philosophy is not an Islamic philosophy.
Senator Shaheen. I agree, and I am glad that you made that
point. Clearly, we need to make sure that Islam is not confused
with some of these horrible terrorist acts that have been and
continue to be perpetrated by terrorist groups.
Mr. Gast, can I ask you to elaborate a little bit on the
question that Senator Coons posed about what we are doing to
help address women and girls in Nigeria, where two-thirds of
women in northern Nigeria receive no education, only 1 out of
20 women has a high school education, and where half of
Nigerian women are reportedly married at age 15? Can you talk
to what more we can do to address the circumstances there and
cooperate with those organizations in Nigeria who share the
values of trying to support getting an education for women?
Mr. Gast. Senator, I'd be pleased to take your question.
If one were to look at the development indicators between
the north and south, it is almost looking at two different
countries. And that is one of the reasons why we are targeting
a lot of our assistance in health. In fact, 60 percent of that
which is not related to the HIV/AIDS epidemic is targeted
toward the north--the northwest as well as the northeast--and
for education, as well, because we know that education access
for AIDS are very low, and, in fact, in comparison with the
rest of the continent, also near the bottom. And part of the
problem is that educators themselves do not meet standards--
less than 50 percent of the teachers in the north do not meet
the federal standards.
So, we are helping the ministry with teachers' training, we
are also helping with access to education.
The problem is--there are many problems, impediments along
the way. One is security. And we do not want to do harm, we do
not want to--in a very insecure environment, where we know Boko
Haram is operating and where they are targeting girls, we do
not want to encourage girls to go to schools. So, we are
looking at alternative ways--at-home education, radio
education, things of that sort.
We are also very focused, and we are supporting the
government's program of saving 1 million lives, which is
targeted toward maternal mortality and child mortality. And
again----
Senator Shaheen. That is great.
Mr. Gast [continuing]. Both of those programs are in the
north.
Senator Shaheen. And I guess--this is probably for Mr.
Jackson--do you expect, or do we expect, either State or DOD to
request additional funding to help with the situation in
Nigeria?
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, that is an excellent question.
I think we will have to see how the operation evolves and how
quickly we are able to develop good intelligence, based on our
overflights. And we will get back to you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Before I turn to Senator Rubio, I just want to remind all
of us, we have a scheduled 11:15 vote. We have a second witness
waiting to participate, live from Nigeria. And we will do what
questions we can of her after hearing her opening statement.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here today and for your attention
to this horrifying crime that has been committed.
Ambassador Jackson, from your testimony, from much of the
media reporting on this, the perception is being created--and I
wanted to ask you--is the prime motivator here of this
instance, in your opinion--is the prime motivator the desire to
deny young women access to education and empowerment?
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, I actually think the prime
motivator is to raise more funds for Boko Haram through a
ransom. However, the fact that Boko Haram opposes Western
education is certainly a reason why these girls were targeted.
Senator Rubio. Well, can I suggest that I think there is
another motivation that is not getting nearly enough attention?
And that is that this is clearly motivated by an anti-Christian
attitude of this group.
And I want to read you the comments from the leader of Boko
Haram. I am sure you are aware of it, because the whole world
has seen it. It is a grotesque statement. But, it is--
basically, it concludes by saying, ``To the people of the
world, everybody should know his status. It is either you are
with Mujahideen or you are with the Christians. We know what is
happening in this world. It is a jihad war against Christians
and Christianity. It is a war against Western education,
democracy, and constitution. We have not started. Next time, we
are going inside Abuja. We are going to a refinery and town of
Christians. Do you know me? I have no problem with Jonathan.
This is what I know in Quran, this is a war against Christians
and democracy and their constitution. Allah says we should
finish them when we get them.''
I do not think there is any doubt about what is motivating
them, or one of their leading motivators here is--this is not
simply--and I am--there is no doubt that this is a part of it,
but this is not just about girls going to school, and it is not
just about raising money. There is a strong anti-Christian
element of this organization and of this activity. Am I right
in saying that?
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, there is a strong anti-
Christian element, but I would offer that more of the thousands
of people who have died as a result of Boko Haram's activities
are Muslim than Christian.
Senator Rubio. Well, again, I mean, I think when you commit
these horrifying atrocities, you are going to target numerous
people. But, from the very statement that he said, we should
not ignore the fact that there is a religious-persecution
aspect of this that is very significant and deserves attention,
especially in light of what we are seeing, not just in this
part of the world, but multiple areas of the world, where we
are seeing horrifying instances of religious persecution
against Christians, which, in my opinion, has been
underreported.
So, would you agree that this is one such instance in which
anti-Christian motivations are a strong component of what
drives this organization to target--for example, my
understanding is, according to one pastor, a Nigerian
evangelist, most of the 200-plus schoolgirls kidnapped are
Christians. Is that--so, clearly, anti-Christianity is a strong
motivator in this effort.
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, I respectfully suggest that,
while anti-Christian sentiment is a strong motivator, the fact
of the matter is that Boko Haram is trying to portray its
philosophy as being a Muslim philosophy. And that is just not
accurate. What both----
Senator Rubio. I have not said it is a Muslim philosophy,
but obviously it is a radical philosophy dressed up in a
perversion of the tenets of a faith they claim to be adherents
to.
I am not claiming that this is somehow driven by legitimate
teachings of Islam. What I am arguing is that there is a strong
anti-Christian element to this, and that it is part of a
broader anti-Christian persecution that we are seeing
repeatedly throughout the world. Would you disagree with that
statement?
Ambassador Jackson. I do not disagree, but I continue to
want to emphasize that Boko Haram terrorizes all people.
Senator Rubio. Okay. And I do not think that is in dispute.
I guess my question is, just from the very statement that I
have read here to you today, clearly he has featured
Christianity as a key component that motivates who they are
targeting and why they are targeting them.
Ambassador Jackson. They are. But, if I may take the
example of the schoolgirls, about 85 percent of the girls who
were kidnapped were Christian, the other 15 percent were
Muslim, but they are all hostages.
Senator Rubio. Well, I just do not--okay, I do not--I think
that we would stipulate that there are non-Christians that are
being impacted by this, and it is horrifying just as well. A
crime against Muslims is no less worse or less bad than a crime
against Christians.
What I am trying to put aside--what I am trying to put
forward here is that we cannot continue to ignore that
persecution of Christians is a leading motivator, not just of
what is happening in Boko Haram, but in other parts of the
world, as well, but, in this specific instance, they are
clearly motivated by anti-Christian attitudes and anti-
Christian beliefs. And I do not think that is even debatable,
given their very own statement.
Here is my other question. In your opinion, in hindsight--
and I know that hindsight's 20/20--was it a mistake not to
designate this organization as a terrorist organization
earlier?
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, as I explained, I think we had
a healthy debate. We are respectful of the Nigerian attitude
toward Boko Haram and the fact that they feared that
designating the organization would bring it more publicity. In
retrospect, we might have done it earlier. I think the
important thing is that we have done it and that we have
offered a reward for the leadership of Boko Haram's location.
Senator Rubio. I would just--for future reference, do you
think there is a lesson here that, when we make decisions about
designating groups as terrorists, they should not simply be--
either you are a terrorist group or you are not, and that
perhaps, in the future, we should not so heavily rely upon some
government's input with regards to whether an organization that
happens to be operating within their territory should be
designated, or not? Is there any lessons there for the future?
Ambassador Jackson. I think, Senator, that there is
definitely a lesson here, and I think that we will be quicker
to act to make designations based on our own assessments
earlier on, based on this----
Senator Rubio. Okay. And my last question has to do with a
broader theme with regards to the risk of global jihadists and
terrorism at large. There was a narrative not long ago--and I
do not want to get into the politics of it--but, there was a
narrative not long ago that al-Qaeda was on the run, that it
was dissipating, but, in fact, what--a new risk has emerged,
and this--want to rely, here, on the testimony of Director
Clapper before the Senate Committee on Intelligence, of which I
sit, where he said, ``The decentralization of al-Qaeda movement
has led to the emergence of new power centers and an increase
in threats by networks of like-minded extremists with
allegiances to multiple groups,'' of which it is clear that
AQIM, which is the--there appears to be some links or ties, at
least with some elements of Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb.
So, my question is, What do we know, at this point, about
that? Do we have any indications, at this stage, that you could
reveal in a setting of this type, that, in fact, this is a
group whose aspirations potentially involve attacks outside of
Nigerian territory against Western interests either elsewhere
in Africa or potentially in Europe and the Western world? What
do we know about that at this stage?
Ambassador Jackson. We have definitely determined that
there are links between al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb and
Boko Haram. They have probably provided at least training,
perhaps financial support. But, more importantly, to the second
part of your question, Boko Haram has become a regional threat.
It has kidnapped a French family in Cameroon, it has most
recently kidnapped a Canadian priest--a Canadian nun and two
Italian priests, and it kidnapped a French priest, several
months ago, who was liberated. This is an organization that is
becoming an international threat and needs to be dealt with
through international cooperation.
Senator Rubio. I just have a 15-second followup, Mr.
Chairman.
Is it fair to begin to hold this--is it fair to hold this
group up as yet another example of what Secretary Clapper was--
Dr. Clapper was talking about, when he said that the
decentralization of
al-Qaeda and the emergence of these different groups in
different regions poses the new face of the al-Qaeda threat in
the 21st century? This group is just one more example of those
types of groups that are popping up in different parts of the
world that pose a different challenge in nature from the al-
Qaeda we confronted during the 9/11 period.
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, yes.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
Chairman Menendez has returned. Do you have a question for
this panel?
The Chairman. I do, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
was in a Banking markup, but appreciate the opportunity.
Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary. It is my understanding that
Nigeria has not been cooperative with us in our efforts to
designate Boko Haram as a terrorist group at the United
Nations. Is that the case?
Ambassador Jackson. Until very recently, they were very
reluctant to designate them at the United Nations. However,
this week their Permanent Representative did consult with the
Security Council about designation, and I expect that will
happen imminently.
The Chairman. Okay. So, we finally got them to see the
light now. It is a shame that it took the abduction of 300
girls to get them to understand that they should have joined us
at the United Nations.
But, you said ``consulted.'' Does that mean that we are
headed toward a designation? They are going to support us in
our designation at the United Nations?
Ambassador Jackson. Yes, Senator, we have been informed
that they will work with us and other members of the Security
Council to designate Boko Haram----
The Chairman. Good.
Ambassador Jackson [continuing]. By the United Nations.
The Chairman. Well, that is a good development.
Now, we all want--even though the delay, I fear, may cause
challenges to getting each and every one of these girls back,
but that is our goal, and that is why I sent a letter to
President Jonathan, calling on him to demonstrate leadership.
But, what is your level of confidence that the Nigerian
Government, after an indefensible delay, now has the political
will and the military capacity to ensure a swift and effective
response that utilizes international support to the fullest,
and is in line with human rights standards?
Ambassador Jackson. Senator, if I may, I will answer the
political-will department and defer to my colleague for the
Defense piece.
The Chairman. That is fine.
Ambassador Jackson. We do believe that the political will
now exists. President Jonathan is seized with the issue. In
fact, I just learned, this morning, that he is on his way to
Chibok to visit the school and meet with the families of the
kidnapped girls.
Ms. Friend. Mr. Senator, if I may. After the social media
campaign was underway in earnest, we found, in our engagements
with the Nigerian military in particular, an unprecedented
level of access and frankness with them. So, our impression
from the Department of Defense is that they are quite
certainly, for the first time in recent memory, taking this
threat very seriously and engaging with us very seriously.
The Chairman. Well, what is their capacity? Because I see
that we are spending a significant amount of money engaging
them, in terms of creating capacity. I also see what happened
at the school, and the notice they had and the lack of
response. So, the question is, what is their capacity? Even if
I accept that President Jonathan is now, because of
international outrage, willing to do something, if we were to
share, at some point, intelligence, assuming we had it and came
upon it and could have actionable intelligence, what is their
capacity to execute such an effort?
Ms. Friend. Senator, it is hard for me to answer that
question right now, because we do not know what kind of
situation we are facing, we cannot isolate particular courses
of military action that might be appropriate for a rescue of
the girls, because we do not know where they are.
There are two answers to your question. One is their
capacity overall to handle the threat from Boko Haram, to take
defensive measures, as you alluded to, at the school. There was
also a recent prison-break equivalent at the Giwa barracks, I
believe in March, that was virtually undefended by the Nigerian
military. Again, as I spoke of earlier, the Nigerian military
in the north has significant capacity challenges.
Our aim right now is to support them as much as possible,
to get them training and assistance, where possible, and
again----
The Chairman. Well, here is my problem, Ms.----
Ms. Friend [continuing]. We have an unprecedented level----
The Chairman. Here is my problem, Ms. Friend.
Ms. Friend [continuing]. Of cooperation.
The Chairman. We are going to support them as much as
possible. But, if we found actionable intelligence that
identified where a large part, or all, of the girls are, and we
do not believe, or we do not know, if they have the capacity to
act on it, what good will that be?
Ms. Friend. I cannot speculate on that, Senator. I do not
want to give you speculative information. I do not----
The Chairman. Well----
Ms. Friend [continuing]. Know what kind of----
The Chairman [continuing]. That is a problem.
Ms. Friend [continuing]. Actionable information that might
be.
The Chairman. I need you to go back to the Department and
bring back to the committee a better answer than that.
Ms. Friend. I would be happy to, sir.
The Chairman. Because it is impossible to fathom that we
might actually have actionable intelligence and that we would
not have the wherewithal, either by the Nigerians themselves,
or by other entities helping the Nigerians, to be able to
conduct a rescue mission. And so, all of this would be
worthless unless we know the Nigerians are capable of
executing, or, in the absence of their ability to execute, that
we have some other way to be able to effectuate an effective
rescue.
So, I would like for you to go back to the Department, at
whatever level is necessary, to give the committee a better
answer than that, because, otherwise, some of us will question
all of our efforts if they cannot be executed upon.
Ms. Friend. Sir, as we gather more information with the
Nigerians, we would be happy to come back and talk to you about
that.
The Chairman. Well, I would like, yes, from the Nigerians,
but I want to know our own assessment. I want to have the
Department of Defense's assessment as to what would be the
capacity of the Nigerian military and/or security to effectuate
a rescue mission, assuming that that opportunity unveils
itself. We are not going to wait until finding out that we have
actionable intelligence and then find out we do not have the
capacity to do this.
Ms. Friend. I would be happy to come back to you with that
information, sir.
The Chairman. Wow.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Chairman Menendez, any further questions?
We are trying to work out the logistics of a vote that is
about to be called, and a second-panel witness. Senator Cardin
has questions for this panel. At the forbearance of the
witnesses, I am going to invite Senator Cardin to question this
panel. Senator Flake and I are going to go to the floor, cast
our votes, and come promptly back, and Senator Cardin will
transition to the introduction of our witness if we are not
back within 7 minutes, which I suspect we will be.
Senator Cardin. And I do not expect to take 7 minutes, so I
will keep it moving.
Senator Coons. We will move as quickly as we can.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Right. I understand the
challenges. As I think the chairman has pointed out, the floor
has a series of votes starting at 11:15, so I will do my best
to keep things moving along.
This is a matter of urgency globally, as I think has been
expressed here. These Nigerian girls were not in the wrong
place at the wrong time, they were in the right place at the
right time. And what happened there is just beyond description.
So, this is not a U.S. interest, this is a global
humanitarian interest. The United States has certain unique
capabilities, and the international community has certain
capabilities. We are not yet clear as to the capacity of the
Nigerian Government to act. We do believe that the
international focus on this issue has given greater strength to
the Nigerian Government to take the appropriate steps to ensure
the safe return of the girls.
So, I was listening to the comments of my colleagues, and I
know it is frustrating when we know how long these girls have
been held captive. So, I guess my only observation, not so much
as a question, is that this is not about what we read in the
paper, this is about getting the girls back safely. This is not
about the United States or the United States being visible or
invisible. It is about getting the girls home safely. And we
want to do everything we possibly can in that regard.
There is also the issue, generally in Nigeria, of how they
handle opposition, how they handle the stability in their own
country, which is of concern to the United States. And what I
think most of us are concerned about is that we do not want the
safety of these girls confused with the outrageous terrorist
acts and we do not want to give these actors any legitimacy
whatsoever. And I think that is a point that, again, it is not
just U.S. interests, but it is a matter of global humanitarian
interest. So, this is that balance that we are seeking. How can
we be constructive and how can we be forceful in helping bring
back these girls safely?
And I thank you all for your testimonies today. And we know
these are difficult, anxious moments. But, we want to be as
constructive as we possibly can. We want to be very clear about
the outrageous conduct of terrorists that go beyond the pale of
anything any of us can imagine and that we recognize that this
is a global matter that the Nigerians must handle, but they
should seek help from the international community, and we are
ready to assist.
Thank you all very much.
I would now invite up Ms. Lantana Abdullahi. I assume I
mispronounced that.
STATEMENT OF LANTANA ABDULLAHI, PROJECT MANAGER, SEARCH FOR
COMMON GROUND, JOS, NIGERIA
Ms. Abdullahi [via videocast from Nigeria]. Hello. Members
of the Senate. Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Hello?
Senator Cardin. We hear you fine. Can you hear us?
Ms. Abdullahi. Oh, good. Members of the Senate--Ladies and
gentlemen, good morning. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake,
members of the committee, thank you for convening this
important and timely meeting and for giving me the opportunity
to speak today.
I thank other witnesses today--Honorable Mr. Jackson,
Honorable Mr. Gast, and Ms. Friend--for their all testimonies.
I thank all of you for your leadership, commitment, and efforts
to help Nigerians respond to the growing crisis in our country.
My name is Lantana Abdullahi, and I work on country
transformation and violence prevention with Search for Common
Ground in Nigeria. The testimony that follows reflects my own
views and informed by my experiences first as a mother with
five children, as a Nigerian, and as a peace-builder.
I will begin by briefly speaking how on the events that
have brought us here today, the causes of the current crisis,
and offer some practical recommendations.
You will all recall that today marks the 30th day that is
over 200 Christian and Muslim girls were abducted from a school
in Chibok, north Nigeria. Of course this means a whole
generation is apparently at risk. This is only one of many
attacks which Boko Haram has claimed responsibility.
The group was created in 2002 with the sole purpose of
imposing a version of Islamic law throughout Nigeria. So far,
the attacks have claimed more than 2,000 people, to date, and
displaced tens of thousands of people, and more than 10 million
people are currently at risk if you combine the population of
Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno states.
And, in addition to one of the comments made about the goal
of Boko Haram, about their anti-Christianity stance, I want to
say that, of course, it is a ploy to pit Christians and Muslims
against each other, and, of course, also seek, sympathy among
some Muslims.
This abduction just serves as a reminder, a sad reminder,
of the longstanding challenges at play in Nigeria that may also
produce a negative impact throughout the greater region.
Currently, the lack of information on the current level of
response from the government and armed forces is a great source
of worry for many Nigerians. Nigerians are also very much
frustrated by the history and current level of corruption in
the government, associated, of course, with bad governance and
impunity.
Boko Haram argues that corruption is the result of
democracy, a Western import that has failed. This description
resonates well with marginalized groups if you look at their
recruitment efforts and rife.
Northern Nigeria, as we all know, has been historically
disadvantaged, in comparison to the south--to the more
developed south. Boko Haram took advantage of this to make
inroads with local population by offering food, shelter, and
free Quranic education. We must also acknowledge the porous
nature of our borders near Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states,
where violence has originated and allowed Boko Haram to traffic
victims as well as escape prosecution by seeking refuge abroad.
We have all been deeply touched by the attention--of the
girls' kidnapping--that has been received, but I think there is
still a need for more to be done to end this crisis. Affected
citizens have on-the-ground response. While securing the girls'
release will be a short-term gain, ensuring lasting peace in
the region requires the militancy issue to be addressed from
multiple angles with engagement of all stakeholders to prevent
future atrocities.
Despite the recent escalation of Boko Haram violent
actions, there are a few reasons to be hopeful. First, we have
witnessed a decrease in reprisal attacks, especially coming
from regions like the north central Nigeria, and in particular,
plateau state, Jos, where I come from.
During earlier periods of the insurgency, victims appealed
to their own communities to gain retribution. More recently, we
have seen more and more Christians and Muslims working
together, as seen by the #BringBackOurGirls movement, and
driven, as was seen, of course, by Nigerians.
In the past, there has been poor international
coordination. However, the global attention generated by the
abduction of these girls and the World Economic Forum for
Africa, hosted in Nigeria, have created an opportunity for the
United States and other foreign technical assistance.
With this in mind, I will want to make the following
recommendations. There is an urgent need for humanitarian
assistance and support to prevent further marginalization of
the populations who are at risk of being recruited into
militancy. There is also urgent need for trauma counseling and
psychosocial support to victims of violence in northeast
Nigeria.
Other recommendations support an original approach. Like
all other witnesses have said, there is a need to have a
regional collaboration between Nigeria and its neighbors,
particularly Niger Republic, Cameroon, and Chad. Securing the
borders will limit terrorist activities and prevent the spread
of militancy. We need also to support a robust community-
focused approach to improving human security. How do we ensure
communities are also engaged in this? We also need to prevent
and monitor human rights abuses by security forces. More
importantly, we know that the level of presence of military and
armed forces in most conflict locations have also increased the
level of violations of human rights of citizens. We need to
consolidate the gains in peace-building effort throughout
Nigeria.
Inasmuch as we want to concentrate on the current crisis in
the northeast region particularly on the Boko Haram terrorist
activities, we should not also forget the issues in the Niger
Delta, the middle--and, of course, the upcoming general
elections.
I would like to close with a personal story. Three years
ago, I was at a wedding in Maiduguri, Boko Haram's place of
birth. As soon as I arrived, I heard multiple explosions,
serving as a painful reminder of the violence affecting the
residents. Their ability to move freely was heavily restricted.
Even during joyous celebrations, they were constantly made
aware of the lack of security. Yet, it also warmed my heart to
see how resilient my family were, as well as their friends and
neighbors. Despite the terror, women still went to the market,
and children courageously still attended school. My visit to
Maiduguri strengthened my commitment as a peace-builder to
ensure that all Nigerians, both Christians and Muslims, can
work together and live free of fear.
I tell you this story to remind you that my experience is
not unique. Millions of other people throughout northeastern
Nigeria and, indeed, Nigeria are affected by this violence. I
hope my testimony today represents them all.
I also want to thank the U.S. Senate for this opportunity
to speak and for showing interest to support us to overcome
these challenges. In particular, I also wish to appreciate and
thank the American people for joining the global movement to
#BringBackOurGirls and end terrorism. We must continue in this
spirit until the war is won.
Thank you, and I await your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Abdullahi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lantana Adbullahi
Members of the Senate, ladies, and gentlemen, good morning.
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, members of the committee, I would
like to begin by thanking you for convening this important and timely
meeting, and for giving me the opportunity to speak today on this
crisis. I also thank the Honorable Mr. Jackson, Hon. Ms. Gast, and Ms.
Friend for their testimonies today. I thank all of you for your
leadership, commitment, and efforts to help Nigerians respond to the
growing crisis in our country.
My name is Lantana Abdullahi and I work on conflict transformation
and violence prevention with Search for Common Ground in Nigeria. Since
2004, we have been developing innovative media and community projects
that encourage mutual understanding across ethnic, religious, and
gender lines. I recently led a project to empower Muslim and Christian
girls from northern Nigeria and promote them as peace-builders, and
currently work with communities, women, youth, and civil society groups
to prevent violence and promote peace. The testimony that follows
reflects my own views, which are informed by my experiences as a
mother, a Nigerian, as well as a peace-builder.
I will begin by speaking briefly on the events that have brought us
together today, some of the causes of the current crisis, and conclude
with some practical actions that can be taken in order to respond to
the immediate crisis and bring about long-term solutions.
the current state of affairs
On April 14, 2014, the Islamist militant group Boko Haram abducted
more than 200 girls from a school in Chibok, a town in northeastern
Nigeria. While the identity of the girls is still being confirmed, the
abductees included both Muslim and Christian girls. This abduction was
just one of the latest attacks for which the militant group Boko Haram
has claimed responsibility. The group began its insurgency in 2009,
with the aim of imposing its own version of Islamic law throughout
Nigeria. In the past 5 years, the group has targeted the United Nations
headquarters in Abuja, churches, the police, markets, and schools
throughout northeastern Nigeria, and has regularly engaged in bloody
combat with the Nigerian military and police forces. These attacks have
led to over 3,000 deaths--(World Report 2013: Nigeria)--a state of
emergency declaration in May 2013 in three northeastern states, and the
displacement of tens of thousands of my fellow citizens. In all, Boko
Haram's actions have affected more than 10 million people. It risks
becoming a regional crisis, and placing serious strains on Nigeria's
relations with neighboring Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.
underlying challenges
The abduction of the Chibok school girls last month is a sad
escalation of the terror the Nigerian people have witnessed since 2009.
This crisis comes as a result of four long-running challenges that not
only affect the northeastern parts of the country, but have the
possibility to produce widespread impact across all of Nigeria and in
the neighboring countries.
The first challenge is that of corruption and lack of confidence in
government in Nigeria. Many Nigerians are frustrated, and feel that
there is a high degree of corruption in the country. Boko Haram argues
that corruption is the result of democracy and Western influences.
According to this argument, democracy is a Western import that has not
succeeded in Nigeria. Past elections have resulted in violence, and
militants argue that this contradicts the principles of Islamic sharia
law--given by God. This has a certain resonance with frustrated, poor,
and desperate people who perceive a growing gap between rich and poor,
and suspect that politicians are using their public offices to secure
private wealth.
The second challenge is chronic poverty. This is of particular
concern in northern Nigeria, which is historically disadvantaged with
regards to the more developed south. The effects of poverty on the
population are pervasive: without a strong economy or income-generating
activities, many parents send their children to the only schools
available. An exclusively Koranic school education without other
practical training offers limited opportunities for students when they
graduate--as it leaves out subjects such as mathematics, science, and
the liberal arts--leaving them unprepared and unable to find adequate
employment. Thus these youngsters are more susceptible to recruitment
into violent groups. Additionally, Boko Haram first made in-roads with
the local population by offering food and shelter, thereby taking
advantage of people's vulnerability as a result of poverty.
The third challenge stems from the geographical location of the
Boko Haram insurgency. Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states--where this
violence has originated--are located along Nigeria's border with Niger,
Chad, and Cameroon. Weak borders and governance in the remote region
allow for the trafficking of individuals and arms across countries.
Boko Haram can not only facilitate the trafficking of victims, but it
can also escape persecution and seek refuge in neighboring countries
when the situation becomes too precarious for them in Nigeria.
Finally, these challenges go hand in hand with the lack of a strong
civil society and media presence. In recent years, many different local
and international organizations have been moving to the region but have
yet to deliver a strong impact. Media programs and outlets continue to
have limited reach compared to the rest of the country, and citizens
have few opportunities to make their voices heard on national issues.
Consequently, the local population does not trust available news
sources, leaving no suitable outlets for popular expression.
Key Opportunities and Recommendations
I have been deeply touched by the attention the tragedy of the
Chibok Girls' kidnapping has garnered both in Nigeria and in the world.
Their kidnapping comes after a long wave of killings, kidnappings, and
abuses, and underscores the need for new approaches to the crisis. Thus
far, citizens living in the most-affected areas have seen little on-
the-ground response to the crisis apart from the current offensive
undertaken by security forces. Yet despite these operations, the
insurgency persists, and human rights groups have presented grave
reports of extremely serious abuses committed by the security actors.
While securing the girls' release will be a short-term gain, ensuring
lasting peace in the region requires the militancy issue be addressed
from multiple angles. It also requires the engagement of all
stakeholders--communities, civil society, government, and its
international partners--to ensure context-specific and sustainable
solutions to improve human security, peace-building, and the prevention
of future atrocities.
While the violent actions perpetrated by Boko Haram have increased
in scale, quantity, frequency, there are a few reasons to be hopeful.
First, we have witnessed a decrease in reprisal violence within
affected communities. During earlier periods of the insurgency, victims
of violence appealed to their own communities, often divided along
religious and ethnic lines, in order to attain justice or retribution.
Recently we have seen more and more Christians and Muslims working
together, supporting one another, and recognizing the need to unite to
prevent violence. With the #Bringbackourgirls campaign, we have also
seen a more concerted effort by Nigerians across the country to
recognize the tragic consequences of the conflict in the northeast.
Secondly, in the past, there has been poor coordination with the
international community, as well as with neighboring countries.
However, the global attention generated by the abductions of the girls
and the campaign by CSOs, as well as the World Economic Forum for
Africa hosted in Nigeria, have created an opportunity for foreign
technical assistance from the U.S., UK, and France.
These two changes present an opportunity for the U.S. Government to
support Nigerians as they try to respond to this crisis.
The challenges and opportunities call for a running engagement and
specific actions to face longstanding problems. With this in mind, I
make the recommendation for practical courses of action.
The first set is focused on addressing the human consequences of
the current crisis in three key ways:
a. There is an immediate need for trauma healing and psychosocial
support to victims of violence in northeast Nigeria. The psychological
legacies of violence will create long-term scars, both for these girls,
as well as the thousands of their fellow citizens who have lost loved
ones, experienced abuses, lost their homes, and otherwise suffered as a
result of the violence.
b. There is an urgent need for humanitarian support. Tens of
thousands of people have fled in fear, becoming refugees in neighboring
countries and fleeing to other parts of Nigeria. In some places the
influx of refugees has overtaxed local water and food supplies,
overcrowded schools and clinics, and competes with locals for economic
opportunities. There is a need to ensure the protection of women and
children fleeing the violence, to ensure they are not exposed to sexual
exploitation. There is a need to work with the displaced people to
ensure that in their desperation, they do not themselves become
recruited into militancy and violence.
c. Finally, there is need to begin planning for early recovery. The
Nigerian Government and its international partners should begin working
with local communities to begin planning for how to rebuild from the
devastation, including repairing infrastructure and homes that have
been destroyed, creating economic livelihoods opportunities, and
implementing emergency programs, such as catchup education programs for
those whose schooling has been disrupted by war.
Even while addressing its consequences, the international community
can also undertake specific steps to help bring the crisis to an end in
four ways:
a. Support a regional approach to prevent the Boko Haram militancy
from becoming a broader crisis. There needs to be regional
collaboration to work with border communities and governments to
improve security along the borders between Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon,
and Chad. The porous borders between these countries have facilitated
human trafficking, arms and drug trade, and the movement of
mercenaries. Securing the borders will limit terrorist activities and
prevent the spread of militancy. The regional collaboration should not
be limited to the formal security forces, but can involve local
leaders, civil society, media, and governments in all four countries to
recognize a shared interest in more secure and productive communities,
with a particular focus on youth. Actions can include strategic
livelihoods programming, community empowerment, and supporting
pluralistic platforms for dialogue on diversity and tolerance through
the media sector.
b. Allocate adequate funding to support a robust community-focused
approach to improving human security in northeastern Nigeria. The U.S.
strategy to support northeastern Nigeria should focus on empowering
women, youth, local leaders and religious groups within the conflict-
affected areas of the northeast. Building cohesive, empowered, and
resilient local communities will help reduce the risk of recruitment,
create alternative ways for local residents to raise their concerns to
government officials, and help reduce the risk of recruitment of young
people. Such an approach should also include civil society capacity-
building and media engagement to document security conditions and
monitor allegations of human rights abuses.
c. Work with civil society, religious and local leaders, Nigerian
authorities, the security forces and the National Human Rights
Commission to prevent and mon-
itor human rights abuses. This includes providing support platform
building to strengthen relationships between civil society groups and
the NHRC to prevent abuses in the north. Operations have been marked by
reports of grave human rights abuses, and ensuring that there is a
transparent process for addressing these grievances, agreed upon by all
stakeholders, will prevent the allegations of abuses from becoming new
grievances.
d. Consolidate the gains in peace-building throughout Nigeria.
Alongside the crisis in the northeast, Nigeria is facing a series of
other violent conflicts in the Niger Delta, as well as in the Middle
Belt. Additionally, the nation will be looking forward to elections
next year. Even as we focus on resolving the crisis in the northeast,
it is critical that sufficient funds should be allocated to continue to
support the consolidation of peace in the Niger Delta, interfaith peace
efforts in the Middle Belt, and support the electoral process.
conclusion
I would like to close with a personal story. Three years ago, I was
in Maiduguri. As soon as I arrived, I was shocked to hear explosions
all around us, serving as a painful reminder of the violence that my
relatives, friends, and fellow citizens are subjected to on a regular
basis. Witnessing the routine violation of my relatives' rights and
liberty particularly saddened me. Their ability to move freely was
heavily restricted--even during joyous celebrations they were
constantly made aware of their lack of freedom. Yet it also warmed my
heart of see how resilient my family was, as well as their friends,
neighbors, and communities. Despite the terror, women still went to the
market. Children courageously still attended school. My fellow
Nigerians were going about their lives in spite of the violence that
surrounded them.
My visit to Maiduguri strengthened my commitment to work as a
peace-builder in Nigeria, to ensure that all Nigerians, both Christians
and Muslims, can work together and live free of fear. I am reminded
today that my experience is not unique and millions of people
throughout northeastern Nigeria are affected by violence and gross
violations of their individual rights and freedoms.
Thank you once again for giving this opportunity and for your
interest in supporting us to overcome the challenges facing our
country.
Senator Coons [presiding]. Thank you very much for your
testimony, Lantana Abdullahi. We are grateful for you joining
us today.
You have experienced so much as someone from the north and
as an advocate for peace-building. How has Boko Haram impacted
your life, the community around you in the north? And what
message would you like to send to the perpetrators of these
vicious attacks?
Ms. Abdullahi. I think I want to talk, first, as a Muslim.
I want to say the activities of Boko Haram has actually
affected almost all Muslims, you know, in Nigeria, because we
have been left to actually start, you know, talking about
defending our faith and, you know, educating and sensitizing
people that Boko Haram do not actually represent Islam and do
not represent the interests of Muslims in Nigeria.
And, of course, coming from where we are, we are dealing
with other conflicts in other locations, like the north-central
region, where we are dealing more with issues of ethnic and
religious conflicts. You know, Boko Haram has also taken
advantage of that to also try to, you know, perpetrate some of
the terrorist activities, you know, in some of these locations,
and it has taken, you know, a lot of, you know, our efforts to
make sure we localize the context and not allow Boko Haram to
actually hijack the process and the work we are doing in
Nigeria.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
As you know, many Americans have taken to the Internet to
express their outrage with Boko Haram and their support for
safely returning--for bringing back the girls. And today's
hearing is an expression, in part, of American concern and
solidarity and commitment to support the families and the
girls. What message do you have for us, for the U.S. Government
and the American people, as we consider what more we could do
to support peace and security in Nigeria?
Ms. Abdullahi. I think, very importantly, we want to
acknowledge the American people and government for coming to
our rescue at this moment. We know of the military cooperation
currently going on between America and Nigerian Government.
Even though, of course, the support of the--from Nigerian
Government for such support is coming late, but we still
believe that the time is now to actually act.
And, in particular, we also need to look at other
nonmilitary support from the American Government, particularly
when we are looking at other community-driven, peace-building
strategies and approach to also consolidate on the post-
abduction stage. We need to do that to rebuild the communities,
but, more importantly, we need to acknowledge that the
northeast region is the one of the most backward, you know,
regions in Nigeria. There is, you know, a weak media presence,
there is weak civil society presence, and this means that we
need to actually push to empowered communities to speak their
voice, not to allow some people or institutions to speak for
them. So, that is why we are pushing to see how we can have
community-level, you know, -driven radio stations, even though,
at this moment, there is actually no license. The government is
not issuing such license. But, we think that the time has come
to have community radios to work with young girls and to work
with also women and youth.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you for those comments.
If you could tell us what other initiatives, in addition to
the radio conversation, that your organization, the
organization for which you work, Search for Common Ground, has
taken. And, as a peace-builder, Lantana, what are the most
important steps you have taken to encourage reconciliation and
dialogue amongst the communities in the north? What are the
most positive steps you have seen so far? And what
recommendations do you have for us about how we can best
support peace-building efforts in the north?
Ms. Abdullahi. As you know, Search for Common Ground is an
organization that is very innovative. It meets peace-building
efforts around the world. And that innovation and uniqueness is
what we have brought to deal with conflicts in many parts of
Nigeria. Currently, we are working basically more in the middle
belt region, trying to bring, you know, ethnic groups together
to look at their common grounds values, and to work on their
differences. We are also, of course, supporting the federal
government to work on the militancy problem and stability in
the Niger delta region. We have been supporting communities to
sit and, you know, dialogue over their differences using their
own local initiatives. We have also been empowering them with
skills and knowledge, particularly on conflict transformation,
to be able to deal with those issues constructively.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Lantana.
I am going to yield to Senator Flake so that he also has an
opportunity to ask questions before we must return for our next
vote.
Thank you so much for your testimony today.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you. And I am sorry if I am
asking questions that have already been answered.
But, with regard to the government's response to what is
going on in the north, have there been any initiatives by the
government that have been effective in diminishing the
attractiveness of Boko Haram for recruiting or for their
activities? Is the government winning this battle, or not, at
this point?
Ms. Abdullahi. Of course, it is obvious that if young--you
know, over 200 young girls can actually be abducted right, you
know, in the presence of the Nigerian Government, and remain
missing for 30 days, it means that we have lost it somewhere.
It is obvious that there is still some lack of capacity to
actually deal with the problem we are currently facing. It also
seems that, since the advent of the Boko Haram in 2002, the
government were not actually prepared to actually deal with the
issue. And, of course, they have, for us, most Nigerians, there
have been many analysts, many arguments, about, you know, the
position of government on using just, you know, the military
offensive to deal with the Boko Haram in suggest the--instead
of, you know, trying to address some of the root causes, you
know, that brought about the advent of Boko Haram in the first
instance.
Of course, recently, we have had some announcements by the
government about, you know, some grants to northeast region to
try to provide some sustainable and livelihoods--you know,
address some of the livelihood and concerns of the region, to
address the widespread poverty and the low educational level
and political, you know, marginalization of that region. But,
of course, we have also not seen anything happening in regard
to the money that was meant for that.
Senator Flake. One other question. I think we were struck,
here, and the international community was struck, at how slow
the Nigerian Government reacted to these kidnappings. Does that
suggest that they simply are not ready and willing to address
the issues, whether they are the root causes or more immediate
concerns? And are they only acting because the international
community is putting pressure on them now?
Ms. Abdullahi. Yes, I think that they were slow, of course,
you know, responding to the crisis. And, of course, we also
have to acknowledge the role played by Nigerians. They have
been daily, you know, coming out to actually push and, you
know, talk about the current, you know, crisis.
Of course, we also have to acknowledge that there have been
many, you know, push by the international community to come in
and support, but the government were very skeptical, they were
very, you know, slow in accepting those offers. But, I think
Nigerians have actually pushed for that, and we have seen it,
you know, happening now, and we hope that, apart from just
wanting to have the girls released, we also want, beyond, you
know, the abduction, to address, you know, those root causes.
Senator Flake. All right. Thank you. I will turn it back to
the chairman. Thank you for your participation. We really
appreciate you doing this.
Ms. Abdullahi. Thank you so much.
Senator Coons. So, Ms. Abdullahi, if you have any closing
comments you would like to make to us--we have to go back to
the Senate floor in just a moment for another vote. I know it
was a little disjointed, between Senator Cardin, Senator Flake,
and myself. If there is any closing comments you have for us,
suggestions about how we can most be helpful in supporting
reconciliation and development in the north that will address
some of the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency or that
can address some of the root causes of violence and of
difficulties between communities, I would welcome that. And if
you have any other suggestions for how we can best support the
Nigerian schoolgirls who have been kidnapped and their
families, we would welcome that, as well.
Thank you so much for your testimony. We look forward to a
closing comment from you.
Ms. Abdullahi. Thank you so much for the opportunity to
actually talk today. And, of course, like I said, we need a lot
of support. There is currently weak presence of the civil
society on ground to actually support the current crisis in the
region, so we want the U.S. Senate to push to see how we can
have more of the civil actions going on right now in the region
by, you know, sorting out the humanitarian issues immediately,
but also looking out to plan long-term interventions, working
with youth groups, women groups, and young girls to promote
civilian protection and also promote human rights respect by
armed forces and also on a community-driven approach.
Senator Coons. Thank you so much. Thank you for your focus
on peace-building, on respecting human rights, and on
reconciliation. We are grateful----
Ms. Abdullahi. Thank you.
Senator Coons [continuing]. For the effort that you made to
testify before us today.
I will leave the record open for an additional week, until
the close of business, Thursday, May 22, for any members of
this committee who were not able to attend but who have
questions either for our first or second panel.
We greatly appreciate the testimony that was offered today
by all four of our witnesses and the very hard work that many
are doing here in the Capitol of the United States to provide
support and assistance to the Nigerian schoolgirls and their
families, to the people of Nigeria, and to all who are working
for peace and reconciliation in Nigeria.
Thank you. And, with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador Robert P. Jackson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons
Question. Human Rights Violations.--To what degree has Nigeria's
poor track record with regard to human rights limited bilateral
cooperation with the military and police? What steps has the Nigerian
Government taken to address this issue. Specifically, how have Leahy
restrictions on U.S. security assistance limited assistance offered to
Nigeria's police and military in the past, and what are the current
plans for providing military and police support moving forward?
Answer. The military's heavy-handed approach to combating Boko
Haram and the resulting gross violations of human rights have prevented
the United States from assisting some units. Nevertheless, despite
these challenges, we continue to work with eligible units to help the
Nigerian Government to locate and liberate the kidnapped school girls,
and to combat Boko Haram. In 2013, we vetted and approved 1,108
individuals and units from the Nigerian security forces that were
nominated to receive training, equipment, and other forms of
assistance. There are currently 187 Nigerian military units and 173
Nigerian police units that have been Leahy vetted and approved, and are
cleared to receive U.S. assistance and training, including soldiers
from Nigeria's elite Special Boat Service (SBS) commando unit, the
101st and 143rd counterterrorism units.
We help the Nigerian Government professionalize its military and
security services, improve its ability to participate in peacekeeping
operations and conduct maritime security to improve its
counterimprovised explosive device (IED) capacity, and carry-out
responsible and effective counterterrorism (CT) operations. We also
provide law enforcement assistance, including by training Nigerian law
enforcement officials on CT investigations, border security, counter
IED and post-blast investigations, tactical operations, and crisis
management. All of this assistance is part of a coordinated effort to
help strengthen Nigeria's ability to respond responsibly and
effectively to their security challenges in a way that ensures
civilians are protected, human rights are respected, and violators are
held accountable in accordance with the Leahy law and our foreign
policy objectives.
We have referenced the Leahy law in engaging with senior-level
Nigerian officials, in our efforts to encourage the Nigerian Government
to adopt a smarter approach to fighting Boko Haram and to
professionalize their forces. These efforts have led to difficult but
productive discussions on the damage that human rights violations can
do to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, and the
importance of accountability for those responsible. We have seen some
signs of progress, like President Jonathan's February 24 order to
include more human rights training for officers, but we expect more as
we continue to engage Nigerians on these challenging issues while also
providing assistance in critical areas in accordance with our laws and
policies.
Under the Leahy laws, and consistent with U.S. policy to seek
rights-respecting security partners, we do not provide assistance,
including training, to security force units when we have credible
information that they have committed gross violations of human rights,
including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance, rape, and
torture, unless the host government is taking effective steps to bring
those responsible to justice. Even if the Leahy Law did not exist, we
recognize that such abuses undermine the fight against Boko Haram by
alienating the civilians that the Nigerian military and security
services should be protecting, and whose allegiance the Nigerian
Federal Government needs to defeat the terrorists.
The U.S. decision to provide assistance to any military, security,
or law enforcement unit is driven both by overall policy considerations
as well as the Leahy laws. We continue to urge the Nigerian Government
to adopt a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that includes action
both to hold the perpetrators of human violations accountable and to
curtail further human rights abuses by security forces. Such actions by
the Nigerian Government will also allow us to deepen our partnership
with the Nigerian Government in its fight against Boko Haram.
Question. Police.--You mentioned in your testimony that you are
providing law enforcement basic forensics, hostage negotiations,
leadership, and task force development. When did this assistance begin?
It does not appear that International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funds were requested for Nigeria in FY13, FY14, or
FY15. Given the important role played by the police in civilian
protection, why hasn't U.S. police assistance been prioritized for
Nigeria, and what police assistance is planned moving forward?
Answer. Since 2012, the Department has provided law enforcement and
rule of law INCLE-funded assistance to Nigeria under the West Africa
Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI), a whole-of-government effort
to increase global security by addressing transnational organized crime
in West Africa. WACSI receives International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funds under the State Africa Regional account
(funded in the West Africa Regional Security Initiative Program line),
rather than a bilateral INCLE funding line for Nigeria.
In recent discussions with INL, high-level Nigerian Police Force
officials expressed willingness to engage on institutional reform at
their training academies. Future INL programming will focus on building
the long-term institutional capacity of the police to perform their
duties, while meeting international standards and human rights norms.
As part of this effort, INL plans to initiate a Police Training
Modernization project at Nigerian police academies in late 2014 and a
regional project to facilitate community and police dialogues utilizing
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) funding allocated for
police reform in Nigeria.
______
Responses of Ambassador Robert P. Jackson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. While there is strong civil society and interreligious
commitments to peace-building elsewhere in Nigeria, there has been
little on-the-ground response to the crisis in northeastern Nigeria
apart from the security forces.
A security-only approach has led to both an out-of-control
insurgency and atrocious human rights abuses, and as we've seen time
and again across the Middle East and North Africa, including in Mali,
will not successfully counter violent extremism. And yet, since the
global public outrage on the abduction of the school girls, the
administration has focused disproportionately on security assistance to
the Government of Nigeria.
How are we supporting local civil society organizations,
including local and international interreligious and peace-
building organizations, to ensure a balanced, well-rounded
approach to protect civilians from and prevent the further
emboldening of Boko Haram?
What are some of the major underlying grievances among
civilian populations in northern Nigeria and what can the U.S.
do to help address these challenges?
How have issues related to resource-scarcity and climate-
impacted communities throughout Nigeria and particularly in the
north?
Answer. The administration continues to press the Nigerian
Government to implement a comprehensive approach to combating violent
extremism and insecurity in northeastern Nigeria that addresses the
underlying causes of the conflict and grievances of northern
populations while concomitantly emphasizing civilian protection,
respect for human rights, the rule of law, and accountable security
forces.
Operating in the poorest part of Nigeria, Boko Haram exploits the
northern population's legitimate grievances to garner recruits and
support. Heavily reliant on subsistence agriculture, the Northeast
already faces issues of resource scarcity and climate change. However,
the population's most serious grievances include lack of employment,
infrastructure, sanitation, health care, education, and political
marginalization. Corruption, patronage networks, and weak institutions
have resulted in the systemic poor performance of the Federal, State,
and local governments to meet basic citizen needs. These unfulfilled
demands are exacerbated when resources allocated to address these
issues are misappropriated, also impeding development and investment.
Heavy-handed tactics by security forces against the civilian population
has tended further compound the alienation from the government of
people living in northeast Nigeria.
We are taking a number of steps to help alleviate these grievances:
We are working with the Nigerian Government to more
effectively engage communities vulnerable to extremist violence
and promote practices among its security forces that protect
civilians, respect human rights, and do not further alienate
already aggrieved communities.
The U.S. Embassy supports local religious leaders who reach
across sectarian lines and promote human rights, social
justice, and conflict resolution. USAID has conducted conflict
mitigation and management interventions to lessen sectarian and
intercommunal tensions and to increase interfaith civic
engagement and tolerance among flashpoint communities.
USAID is helping to strengthen education management systems;
improve the reading skills of 5.5 million northern Nigerian
primary school students; improve the quality of education for
teachers to teach reading, and increase access of orphans and
vulnerable children, including itinerant Qur'anic youth
(Almajiri), and girls, to basic education. These programs focus
on the northern states of Bauchi and Sokoto.
USAID is supporting economic growth and poverty alleviation
by improving agricultural productivity and expanding jobs in
the rural sector through the Feed the Future initiative.
Through President Obama's ``Power Africa'' initiative, the
United States will continue to partner with Nigeria to ensure
that the Nigerian people have greater access to electricity.
In the health sector in northern Nigeria, USAID supports
increased access to quality family planning, immunization, and
maternal health services. USAID also supports efforts to
decrease the number of malaria-related deaths in pregnant women
and children by increasing access to treatment, insecticide-
treated bed nets, and retreatment kits. USAID provides HIV/AIDs
prevention, care, and treatment services as well as services to
orphans and vulnerable children.
We are working with civil society to advance transparent and
accountable governance. In 2013, the State Department launched
a 2-year pilot program to build the capacity of civil society
(including media) to increase citizens' access to government-
held information.
USAID works with state and local governments to improve
budget preparation and fiscal oversight to ensure adequate
service delivery. Working with a diverse group of civil society
organizations, USAID strengthens their ability to advocate and
engage with government officials to deliver quality social
services.
The Department also is running a project in Nigeria to
educate civil society, extractive industry leaders, and
government officials about human rights and promote the
incorporation of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights, which apply to the extractive sector.
In the runup to Nigeria's February 2015 elections, the
United States is reinforcing the electoral process through
support to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)
and political parties. We also continue to stress our concerns
to INEC and the Nigerian Government that any suspension of
democratic or electoral processes in northeastern Nigeria could
undermine the integrity of the elections.
USAID also facilitates dialogue among government
institutions, civil society, political parties, faith-based
organizations, and other stakeholders to prevent, manage, and
mitigate the impact of conflict, including election-related
conflict.
All these initiatives are part of a coordinated effort to help
strengthen Nigeria's ability to respond responsibly and effectively to
these challenges in a way that ensures civilians are protected and
human rights are respected.
Question. According to the State Department, corruption in Nigeria
is ``massive, widespread and pervasive.''
How have allegations of corruption and lack of transparency
affected civilians views of the Nigerian Government?
Has this led to distrust and/or animosity?
How does this corruption impact our relationship with the
Nigerian Government?
Answer. Pervasive corruption remains a central impediment to
effective governance, economic development and stability in Nigeria.
Public demands for meaningful reforms and an end to impunity for
corrupt officials have grown over the past year, to include an ongoing
campaign to pressure President Jonathan to publically declare his
personal assets. Nigerians consistently view their public institutions
as corrupt and cite the police and national government officials as the
most corrupt. This perception fuels public distrust in government
institutions. For example, reliable polling conducted in 2013
illustrated that 85 percent of Nigerians believe there is at least a
fair amount of corruption among the police and as a result only 23
percent of the public trust the police. The Nigerian military is not
immune to the Nigeria's broader corruption challenges, and corruption
within the military erodes the effectiveness of security forces engaged
in combating Boko Haram.
To reduce the culture of impunity for those who engage in
corruption, we support Nigerian anticorruption agencies, such as the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, to develop the capacity to
investigate and prosecute cases relating to high-level corruption or
financial crime. We are also working with civil society to advance
transparent and accountable governance. In 2013, the State Department
launched a 2-year pilot program that will build the capacity of civil
society (including media) to work with government agencies to fight
corruption and transnational organized crime by leveraging citizens'
access to government-held information. We also continue to promote
anticorruption and human rights norms through engagement with high-
level officials from the Nigerian Police Force on the subject of
restarting bilateral police training. In 2006 we had to end trainings
after the former Inspector General of Police was convicted of stealing
$83 million from the Police Force.
Question. Amnesty International has reported that thousands of
people suspected of links to Boko Haram have been extrajudicially
executed or unlawfully killed by security forces, and thousands of
suspects have died in military or police custody.
How have these abuses fueled the conflict and how do they
constrain our ability to help the Nigerian Government respond
to this crisis?
Answer. Boko Haram has carried out a brutal campaign of terror that
has killed over 1,500 innocent civilians since the beginning of the
year. It has attacked churches, mosques and schools, burned villages,
killed political official and security officers, and kidnapped innocent
children. Unfortunately, the Nigerian security forces have responded to
this brutality with their own heavy-handed tactics. These tactics have
involved human rights violations that include extrajudicial killings
and prisoner deaths. The continued lack of accountability for these
violations has reinforced preexisting perceptions of many northerners
that the Nigerian Government does not care about them. This situation
can compromise the credibility of those international partners who
attempt to help the Government of Nigeria address the legitimate need
to combat violent extremism if the partners are perceived as condoning
or overlooking the heavy-handed tactics of the Nigerian security
forces. In turn, criminal terrorist groups such as Boko Haram use these
circumstances to exploit the grievances of the northern population to
garner recruits and public support.
Consequently, the United States continues to encourage the
Government of Nigeria to implement a comprehensive approach to
combating Boko Haram that addresses the underlying causes of the
conflict and grievances of northern populations while at the same time
emphasizing civilian protection, respect for human rights, the rule of
law, and accountable security forces. Defeating Boko Haram requires
much more than a military response; it also requires coordination among
civilian law enforcement entities, civic and political outreach, and
development that addresses the legitimate concerns of the people of
northern Nigeria.
______
Response of Earl Gast and Ambassador Robert P. Jackson to Question
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. There are girls in Nigeria and around the world risking
their lives every day to get an education--it is time for the
administration to stand behind them in the long term. Under Goal 3 of
the Education Strategy, USAID has pledged to expand access to education
for children and youth living in conflict and crisis situations.
Currently there are more than 57 million primary school-aged children
who are not in school worldwide and half of them live in countries
affected by armed conflict.
Will the U.S. step up its leadership role by significantly
increasing support for the Global Partnership for Education
(GPE) replenishment conference in June?
What steps can the U.S. take to promote better and safer
access to education in Nigeria, particularly in the North?
Answer. USAID will participate in the GPE replenishment conference
at the end of June. USAID is currently in the process of planning its
budget for the release of FY 2014 funds, and the U.S. contribution to
the GPE is part of that budget strategy. While we anticipate that the
FY 2014 contribution to the GPE will increase, final determinations on
FY 2014 allocations have not yet been made. We would be happy to follow
up with you and/or your staff once the amount in FY 2014 allocations
are finalized.
USAID currently focuses the vast majority of education program
resources for Nigeria in the northern region of the country, where
national education indicators are the lowest. USAID is coordinating
education activities in northern Nigeria with the United Kingdom's
Department for International Development (DFID), to ensure the maximum
impact and geographical coverage. Additionally, USAID is developing a
new program that will specifically address equitable access to quality
education in the areas that are affected by conflict and safety
concerns. Last, it is important to note that USAID has some education
related programs that are not in the north. These programs support
nationwide household and schooling data collection and a national
children's television program.
______
Responses of Ambassador Robert Jackson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Human Rights Abuses by Nigerian Military.--Despite
Nigeria's strategic importance as Africa's most populous nation and
largest economy, our security assistance has historically been
constrained by human rights abuses committed by Nigerian soldiers in
their campaign against Boko Haram. These have been well documented in,
for example, the State Department's 2013 Human Rights Report.
How are we working with the government to correct this
troubling record in order to ensure that the Nigerian people
have a military they can trust and that the international
community has a stable security partner moving forward? What
accountability measures are we pushing the Nigerian Government
to implement?
Answer. The United States has been very open about our concerns
about Nigeria's human rights record. We continue to encourage the
Government of Nigeria to implement a comprehensive approach to
combating Boko Haram that addresses the underlying causes of conflict
and valid grievances of northern populations while emphasizing civilian
protection, respect for human rights, rule of law, and accountability
of security forces. We ensure that promoting respect for human rights
is a key aspect of any assistance we provide to Nigerian security
forces.
We have urged the Government of Nigeria to work with the families
of victims and their communities in order to bring to justice not only
those responsible for acts of terrorism, but also Nigerian security
officials responsible for unlawful violence and abuses against civilian
populations, including detainees. Impartial accountability for serious
crimes committed by all sides is necessary to break the cycle of
violence. We continue to push the Government of Nigeria to take steps
to ensure accountability for security forces by conducting credible
investigations and prosecuting the individuals responsible.
Question. U.S. Efforts to Address the Boko Haram Threat.--I hope
this is the last time we have a conversation about such a horrific
event at the hands of Boko Haram, but, realistically, it probably won't
be. The chaos and brutality perpetrated by Boko Haram is not isolated
to this incident and is increasing.
Does the changing nature of the threat put U.S. interests
at additional risk?
Of our significant bilateral assistance (some $700
million), a relatively small portion (an estimated $10-20
million) is devoted to counterterrorism efforts--is this
adequate?
Answer. To date, Boko Haram has not specifically targeted U.S.
citizens in its attacks. However, in his public statements Boko Haram's
leader, Abubakar Shekau, has threatened to attack U.S. interests, and
we remain concerned about the growing threat to our interests in the
region as Boko Haram expands the geographic scope of its operations.
The U.S. mission in Nigeria monitors closely any such threats to
official and private American citizens and their interests, and
provides guidance accordingly.
The administration continues to encourage the Nigerian Government
to implement a comprehensive approach toward combating violent
extremism and insecurity in northeastern Nigeria, which stresses
addressing legitimate grievances of northern populations. As a result,
the majority of our bilateral assistance focuses on the Nigerian
population's most serious grievances. These include unemployment,
infrastructure, sanitation, health care, education, political
marginalization, and corruption.
Additionally, Nigeria benefits from centrally managed assistance
through programs such as the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) and the West Africa Regional Security Initiative (WARSI), which
are not reflected in the country's bilateral funding levels.
Our current levels of security assistance devoted to counter
terrorism in Nigeria are appropriate, contingent upon the Nigerian
Government's ability to absorb the assistance, emphasize civilian
protection, respect human rights and the rule of law, and develop
accountable security forces.
Question. Support to Civil Society.--A security-centric approach
has led to an out-of-control insurgency and repeated human rights
abuses in the Middle East, Mali, and elsewhere. And yet, since the
abductions, the international community has been primarily focused on
security assistance to the Nigerian Government.
How is the United States supporting local civil society
organizations, including local and international interreligious
and peace-building organizations, to ensure a balanced, well-
rounded approach to protect civilians and prevent Boko Haram
from becoming even more emboldened?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy supports local religious leaders who reach
across sectarian lines and promote human rights, social justice, and
conflict resolution. USAID has conducted conflict mitigation and
management interventions to lessen sectarian and intercommunal tensions
and to increase interfaith civic engagement and tolerance among
flashpoint communities.
In May 2014, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) held a series of video conferences with leading
Nigerian Islamic leaders representing a wide range of Muslim
communities in Nigeria to discuss strategies for countering Boko
Haram's narrative. USAID is also providing training to religious and
traditional leaders to help increase stability in Nigeria by enhancing
the legitimacy and capacity of governance structures to defend
religious freedom.
USAID is helping to strengthen education management systems;
improve the reading skills of 5.5 million northern Nigerian primary
school students; improve the quality of education for teachers to teach
reading, and increase access of orphans and vulnerable children,
including itinerant Qur'anic youth (Almajiri), and girls, to basic
education. These programs focus on the northern states of Bauchi and
Sokoto.
The United States is working with civil society to advance
transparent and accountable governance. In 2013, the State Department
launched a 2-year pilot program to build the capacity of civil society
(including media) to increase citizens' access to government-held
information. The State Department also is running a project in Nigeria
to educate civil society, extractive industry leaders, and government
officials about human rights and promote the incorporation of the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, which apply to the
extractive sector. Through a pilot program in the Niger Delta, the
State Department is working with civil society organizations to enhance
nonviolent problem-solving between communities and government through a
multimedia campaign and targeted assistance. The engagement counters
the narrative that violence is the only effective means to create
change. USAID also works with civil society to strengthen its ability
to influence the development and implementation of key democratic
reforms at national, state, and local levels.
The Embassy in Abuja is about to launch a portfolio of activities
totaling $1.7 million targeting northern, at-risk youth. These projects
will be implemented through the public affairs and political sections,
and will build upon a new multiyear Hausa language satellite television
initiative (Arewa 24) and ongoing VOA radio programming. These youth-
oriented projects will transmit information on job skills as well as
entrepreneurial and employment opportunities, and will address concepts
of cultural tolerance and communication. The Embassy is working through
local NGOs to address the scourge of children pressed into street
begging. Our efforts support ongoing local stakeholder efforts to stamp
out these abuses that too often result in children (the so-called ``al-
majiri'') being vulnerable to recruitment into violent gangs and
networks as they get older, including Boko Haram.
All these initiatives are part of a coordinated effort to
strengthen Nigeria's ability to respond responsibly and effectively to
these challenges in a way that ensures civilians are protected and
human rights are respected.
______
Responses of Ambassador Robert Jackson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question. 1. The administration has provided numerous assessments
of Boko Haram's threat as limited to Nigeria and an occasional regional
outreach as was seen recently in its involvement in Mali and ongoing
safe haven and sporadic violence in neighboring Niger, Chad, and
Cameroon. Nonetheless, internally it has become more sophisticated and
lethal with over 1,500 Nigerians killed since the first of the year,
hundreds of children and others abducted for ransom and trafficking,
and the recent threat to western hotels in Abuja.
Even though Boko Haram's place in the global threat matrix
might appear less relevant to the U.S. given its limited reach
beyond Nigeria, should the United States take a more strategic
approach to limiting its further influence in the face of this
mounting capacity to destabilize a large regional power?
Given the Nigerian Government's lack of capacity and
political willingness to engage Boko Haram and its own
reluctance to effectively cooperate with international
partners, what have we learned that would improve the U.S.
pursuit of its interests in the region?
What practical limitations exist to U.S. cooperation with
Nigeria?
Please provide the waivers and exceptions to legal
limitations that are permitted and how they are determined to
be utilized.
Have any waivers or exceptions been utilized as it relates
to security cooperation with Nigeria? Have any waivers or
exceptions been utilized as it relates to security cooperation
with any countries in Africa?
Answer. The United States continues to reiterate privately and
publically to Nigeria that we will do all we can to support the
Nigerian Government to meet its responsibility for the safety and
security of its own citizens. We are urging the Nigerian Government to
ensure that it brings all resources to bear in a concerted, effective,
and responsible effort to ensure the safe return of the abductees. The
United States continues to encourage the Government of Nigeria to
implement a comprehensive approach to combating Boko Haram, which
addresses grievances of northern populations, and emphasizes civilian
protection, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the
accountability of security forces. The United States has been open
about our concerns regarding Nigeria's human rights record. We must
ensure that promoting respect for human rights remains a key aspect of
any assistance we provide to Nigerian security forces. Unless action is
taken to severely reduce Boko Haram's capabilities, it will carry out
more atrocities. At a minimum, we must work with Nigeria's neighbors
and partners to prevent Boko Haram from continuing to threaten peace
and security in the region.
On Leahy restrictions, the Department understands that the only
possibility of resuming assistance to a unit once credible allegations
of a gross violation of human rights are identified is for the host
government to take effective steps to bring the responsible parties to
justice. The Leahy law affecting the Department of State does not
include any ability to waive Leahy restrictions. The Leahy law
affecting the Department of Defense includes certain waiver provisions;
we would refer you to the Department of Defense for more information.
We have not yet exercised any waivers or exceptions in fiscal year
2014 for Nigeria related to security cooperation under State Department
authorities, nor have we determined yet that the immediate
circumstances would warrant such action.
Assistance to other countries in Africa is subject to a number of
restrictions; these restrictions include both country-specific
restrictions as well as restrictions triggered by a failure to meet
certain statutory standards. Fiscal year waivers for the latter
category include the following:
The Department applied restrictions under the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) in fiscal year 2014 to the
Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau,
Mauritania, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Full waivers of these
restrictions were granted to CAR, Guinea-Bissau, and
Mauritania, while partial waivers were granted to the others.
The restrictions were not waived for Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, or Zimbabwe.
The Department applied restrictions under the Child Soldier
Protection Act (CSPA) in fiscal year 2014 to CAR, Chad, DRC,
Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Full waivers of these
restrictions were granted to Chad and South Sudan. Partial
waivers of restrictions on security assistance were granted to
DRC and Somalia. No waivers were granted to CAR, Rwanda or
Sudan.
Question. Direct cooperation on security with Nigeria and its
neighbors encompasses a variety of programs and sources but little
clarity on the coherence across or even within U.S. agencies. Testimony
provided at the hearing intimated at a fairly robust cooperation in CT
which appears less than apparent from funding and program reviews.
Provide information on the broader U.S. security
cooperation with Nigeria since 2009 and outline more recent
changes and the funding sources that will be utilized, to
include training or equipping, mentoring, technical assistance
or other program that provides for:
Intelligence sharing;
Training to a new unit known as the 143rd Ranger
Battalion;
Training to the 101st CT battalion and the 111th Special
Operations Group;
C-IED training and civ-mil training;
Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC);
And remaining GSCF funding or its replacement.
Incorporate regional training and equipping programming and
plans into the above strategic approach to helping Nigeria and
the broader region counter militant extremists, including to
provide training to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (Chad,
Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria).
What if any additional outcomes emerged from the summit of
heads of state that was convened by President Hollande in
France on May 17 regarding the region.
Answer. The Department of State uses bilateral and regional funding
from the following foreign assistance accounts to advance U.S. security
cooperation with Nigeria: (1) Foreign Military Financing (FMF); (2)
International Military Education and Training (IMET); (3) Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO); (4) International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE); and (5) Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining
and Related Programs (NADR).
Since 2009, Nigeria has received FMF, IMET, and/or PKO funding for
enhancing capabilities for counterterrorism, peacekeeping, maritime
security, and/or professionalism. Nigeria has also consistently
received INCLE and NADR funding to strengthen the professionalism and
capacity of select law enforcement and judicial entities, with a focus
on countering terrorism and combating financial crimes. The Department
of Defense also uses title 10 authorities (e.g., section 1206) to
enhance cooperation with the Nigerian military.
In the face of the growing threat posed by Boko Haram, we are
seeking to increase several lines of security assistance to help
Nigeria pursue a more comprehensive approach toward the Boko Haram
threat. For example, we have obligated $4.5 million of FY 2014 PKO
funding allocated as part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP) to build Nigerian military capabilities for civil-
military operations and countering improvised explosive devices. We are
also planning to increase FY 2014 NADR funding allocated to TSCTP to
expand Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training for Nigerian law
enforcement agencies. Separately, we are using prior year FMF funding
obligated for Nigeria to support U.S. training of Nigeria's 143rd
Ranger Battalion and possibly other vetted units of the Nigerian
military.
In addition to building Nigeria's counterterrorism capabilities, we
continue to promote enhanced regional cooperation and capacity to
counter the Boko Haram threat. We are encouraging Cameroon, Chad,
Niger, and Nigeria to follow through on their commitments to establish
a regional task force to combat Boko Haram, building on regional
mechanisms such as the Multinational Joint Task Force for Lake Chad
(MNJTF). We will seek to support these efforts as much as possible.
Through TSCTP, we continue to provide a range of bilateral and regional
assistance to Niger and Chad to enhance their counterterrorism
capabilities. We added Cameroon as a member of TSCTP earlier this year,
which will enable its participation in this programming. In addition,
State and DOD are finalizing a plan for a proposed $40 million program
to help the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria develop
institutional and tactical capabilities to enhance joint efforts to
counter Boko Haram and to lay the groundwork for increased cross-border
cooperation to counter Boko Haram.
As a result of the May 17 summit in Paris, Nigeria and its
neighbors agreed to do the following, with international assistance:
Implement coordinated patrols with the aim of combating Boko
Haram and locating the missing school girls;
Establish a system to pool intelligence in order to support
this operation;
Establish mechanisms for information exchange on trafficking
of weapons and bolster measures to secure weapons stockpiles;
Establish mechanisms for border surveillance;
Establish an intelligence pooling unit; and
Create a dedicated team to identify means of implementation
and draw up, during a second phase, a regional counterterrorism
strategy.
Nigeria's neighbors and friends in the international community have
maintained a strong, united resolve in helping Nigeria and its
neighbors combat and defeat violent extremism. We are committed to a
comprehensive, long-term approach, while also working to see the
kidnapped girls return home safely.
Question. The continuing challenge for the United States is that
our efforts will have to be creative and coordinated, not only with a
partner in Nigeria who is reluctant to do so, but with regional
neighbors who have much to lose if this violent militancy spreads, as
reports indicate it can.
What is the state of U.S. cooperation with neighbors in
Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and set it against the domestic
capacity of these three countries to address the border
security threat as well as the respective governments efforts
to address internal tensions that may mirror Nigeria's current
situation?
How have we utilized the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership and other Countering Violent Extremism and other CT
programs in the region to address the growing Boko Haram threat
and how are they to be augmented if at all? What office or
vehicle for coordination exists to harmonize such regionally
significant programs as CT-CVE?
Answer. As a result of the May 17 regional summit in Paris, Nigeria
and its neighbors agreed to do the following, with international
assistance:
Implement coordinated patrols with the aim of combating Boko
Haram and locating the missing school girls;
Establish a system to pool intelligence in order to support
this operation;
Establish mechanisms for information exchange on trafficking
of weapons and bolster measures to secure weapons stockpiles;
Establish mechanisms for border surveillance;
Establish an intelligence pooling unit; and
Create a dedicated team to identify means of implementation
and draw up, during a second phase, a regional counterterrorism
strategy.
With support from the Government of France, Nigeria has recently
attempted
to establish border security cooperation agreements with its neighbors
and to strengthen the Multinational Joint Task Force for Lake Chad
(MNJTF). However, actual cross-border cooperation remains ad hoc.
Alongside the French, the United Kingdom, and other international
partners, we are working to encourage the development of stronger
regional mechanisms to counter Boko Haram and other cross-border
threats. We are also developing new programs to assist Nigeria, Niger,
Chad, and Cameroon to develop enhanced border security capabilities
(e.g., command-and-control, communications, logistics, and tactical
reconnaissance). All four countries need significant assistance in
developing these capabilities.
Through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the
United States seeks to build the capacity and resilience of military,
law enforcement, and civilian actors across the Sahel and Maghreb
regions to counter terrorist groups, including Boko Haram. The State
Department's Bureau of African Affairs oversees TSCTP and chairs an
interagency working group to align programs and strategies. Chad,
Niger, and Nigeria are longstanding TSCTP partners and have benefited
from various TSCTP's programs. Earlier this year, the United States
added Cameroon as a TSCTP partner nation, which will enable it to
participate in future TSCTP programming.
The Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism oversees a variety of
programs to help defeat Boko Haram (and Ansaru) under the framework of
TSCTP. Through the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, the
Department trains law enforcement in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and soon in
Cameroon, to counter the threat posed by Boko Haram and effectively
respond to and manage terrorist attacks. ATA training and associated
equipment grants build the capacity of police, Gendarme, and other law
enforcement CT-focused units on border security, investigations
(including post-blast investigations), and critical incident
management.
Our Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs aim to limit
recruits to Boko Haram by reducing sympathy and support for its
operations, through three primary objectives: (1) building resilience
among communities most at risk of recruitment and radicalization to
violence; (2) countering Boko Haram narratives and messaging; and (3)
building the CVE capacity of government and civil society. Such efforts
include promoting engagement between law enforcement and citizens, and
elevating the role of women civil society leaders in CVE.
These efforts include USAID support to promote conflict mitigation
and reconciliation programs in six Nigerian states. Further, the Public
Affairs Section at U.S. Embassy in Abuja and USAID work with northern
Nigerian youth, women through mass media education programs with
countering violent extremism messaging. USAID and Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) programs focus on development of health, agricultural,
and educational programs in nearly all states of Northern Nigeria. The
Bureau of Counterterrorism and Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications (CSCC) have developed a strong partnership with the
Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA)'s Strategic
Communications/CVE office and, in conjunction with the United Kingdom,
provided assistance on developing a comprehensive communications
strategy.
USAID's current TSCTP activities include a regional Peace for
Development (PDEV II) program in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. PDEV II
is a 5-year $60 million initiative launched in November 2011 that
applies a holistic, community-led approach. PDEV II covers a large
number of geographically distant and often culturally, linguistically,
and socioeconomically diverse communities. Given the immensity of the
Sahel, interventions are limited to communities with the highest
violent extremism risk factors, determined through assessments
conducted by the project. A number of those target communities are in
areas of both Niger and Chad that border Nigeria. To date, nearly 3.8
million people from at-risk groups have been reached through various
USAID PDEV II activities, including youth-led community mobilization
activities; radio programming; and training in management skills,
budgeting, leadership, vocational trades, and conflict resolution.
We also work closely with Nigeria within the Global
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) framework--an informal, multilateral
counterterrorism (CT) platform that focuses on identifying critical
civilian CT needs, mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to
address such needs and enhance global cooperation. As one of the member
states of the GCTF, Nigeria has cohosted with us several regional
workshops focusing on human rights and law enforcement issues. Nigeria
has also agreed to become a pilot country to the Global Community
Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), a GCTF-inspired initiative
announced by Secretary Kerry at the September 2013 GCTF ministerial.
This will enable community-based organizations in Nigeria to receive
grants from the GCERF to carry out grassroots CVE projects.
Furthermore, Nigeria will be one of the founding members of the
International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law in Malta, whose
primary mission will be to train justice and security sector officials
on how to prevent and respond to terrorist activity and other
transnational criminal activity within a rule of law framework.
______
Responses of Earl Gast to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
humanitarian and development assistance in the north
I am particularly interested in U.S. efforts in the isolated
northeast, where there is an ongoing state of emergency and where
development indicators are especially concerning and have contributed
to a sense of alienation.
Question. What specific efforts are underway to support the people
of Nigeria to overcome key social and economic drivers of instability,
such as entrenched poverty, corruption, displacement, ethnic and
religious strife, and poor service delivery?
Answer. USAID programming in northern Nigeria is designed to help
the Government of Nigeria (GON) address sources of disenfranchisement
by improving its ability to promote private-sector-led economic growth
and provide basic services to its citizens. The USAID portfolio in the
north is comprehensive, ranging from agriculture to health to education
to governance. Several large projects are geographically colocated in
the states of Bauchi and Sokoto--states with heightened developmental
need--in an effort to maximize developmental impact. It is important to
note that USAID is currently implementing activities in states adjacent
to the ``State of Emergency'' states--states which are receiving
significant numbers of internally displaced persons who place
additional stress on already weak social service provision. Expansion
of USAID programming into State of Emergency states would depend
entirely on the security situation.
In addition to the following programs in northern Nigeria, USAID is
currently carrying out an assessment of all mission programs and
activities to improve understanding of the drivers and mitigating
factors of armed conflict in Nigeria, ensure all USAID programming
minimizes the risk of exacerbating conflict dynamics, and to the degree
possible, mitigates drivers of conflict over issues that intersect with
sectors such as health, education, and agriculture.
Democracy and Governance
USAID works with state and local governments to improve budget
preparation and fiscal oversight to ensure adequate service delivery.
Working with a diverse group of civil society organizations, USAID
strengthens their ability to advocate and engage with government
officials to deliver quality social services. USAID also facilitates
dialogue among government institutions, civil society, political
parties, faith-based organizations, and other stakeholders to prevent,
manage, and mitigate the impact of conflict.
Health and HIV/AIDS
USAID supports increased access to quality family planning and
reproductive health services, immunization and polio eradication, and
maternal health services. USAID also supports efforts to decrease the
number of malaria-related deaths in pregnant women and children each
year by increasing access to and availability of treatment,
insecticide-treated bed nets, and retreatment kits. USAID provides
HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment services, as well as services
to orphans and vulnerable children. Detection and treatment services
for tuberculosis are also provided.
Education
USAID provides technical assistance at all levels of government in
the two northern Nigerian states of Bauchi and Sokoto to ensure that
the human and financial resources are available and mobilized for the
education sector. USAID programs support equitable access to quality
basic education through teacher training, support for girls' learning,
infrastructure improvement, community involvement, and reading and
literacy skills development. The programs target public schools, as
well as Islamiyyah schools, which provide both secular and religious
education.
Economic Growth
USAID supports Nigeria's poverty alleviation efforts by improving
agricultural productivity and expanding jobs in the rural sector.
USAID's program supports market-based solutions and privatization of
the energy sector for improved efficiency. Additionally, USAID helps to
improve access to safe drinking water and reduce morbidity and
mortality due to water-borne and sanitation-related illnesses.
Question. What kind of humanitarian and development programming is
possible to both assist Nigerians and counter Boko Haram's false and
inflammatory rhetoric that the United States is at war with Islam?
Answer. In mid-2013, USAID commissioned an assessment of violent
extremism in Nigeria. The study provides the underlying historical,
economic, political, and cultural forces that led to the formation of
Boko Haram. Due to the high level of instability in the most affected
states, as well as the complexity of the Government of Nigeria
response, the assessment recommends development assistance
interventions that indirectly counter violent extremism by enhancing
economic opportunity for young men in the agricultural sector or
improving the curriculum and education options offered at semiformal
Koranic schools. This report was shared with USAID's counterparts in
the Government of Nigeria formulating a development component to their
counterterrorism strategy.
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has also sent a team to
assess the situation in northeastern Nigeria as it relates to political
instability, violence, and lawlessness brought about by the growing
threat of Boko Haram throughout the region. This assessment will
provide OTI with a better understanding of the situation and its effect
on political stability in the region, allow OTI, USAID/Nigeria, and the
interagency to consider holistic approaches for a coherent and
comprehensive response to Boko Haram-related issues, and consider the
feasibility of any programming recommendations given security
conditions in the target region.
Question. We have heard that USAID is planning to move OFDA money
to address needs in the northeast region of Nigeria. Could you please
provide more details on the types of projects those funds will support?
Answer. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is
working with other donors to determine the humanitarian needs of those
affected by this crisis. OFDA has already provided $100,000 to support
trauma counseling and psychosocial assistance in Borno State for the
abducted girls upon their return as well as for their families. USAID/
OFDA has also committed $750,000 to the International Organization for
Migration to improve the timely tracking and monitoring of internally
displaced persons and humanitarian needs in conflict affected areas,
which will help improve the delivery of critical, appropriate
humanitarian assistance for affected populations. OFDA expects to
provide additional humanitarian assistance that will target internally
displaced people and their host communities. Anticipated humanitarian
needs include: food and nonfood items, food security, protection/
psychosocial support, livelihoods, shelter, emergency education,
livelihoods, water, sanitation, and hygiene.
Within the last several months, OFDA staff has traveled to Gombe,
Bauchi, and Adamawa states, and has a strong understanding of the
humanitarian needs in those areas. To date, support to those affected
by the conflict has been hindered due to the increase in frequency of
violent attacks in 2014. Currently, humanitarian access is possible,
albeit precarious due to the volatile nature of the security threat.
______
Responses of Earl Gast to Questions
Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons
Question. Electricity.--Since towns such as Chibok have limited to
no electricity, what is USAID doing to bring electricity to the North?
Obviously, Nigeria is one of the six Power Africa focus countries. Are
there any Power Africa projects in the North, and what more could we do
to partner with the Nigerian Government to address energy poverty?
Answer. The Government of Nigeria, and in particular, the Ministry
of Power, has prioritized expanding electricity access in the North
through renewable and other approaches. The Nigerian Bulk Electricity
Trader (NBET) had presented the North Solar Capital Project as one of
their priority efforts. There are significant challenges with this
project due to security issues and the ability of private investors and
financial institutions to effectively carry out due diligence and
monitor the project.
The Minister of Power, Mr. Chinedu Nebo, has approached USAID and
other donors with ideas on how to support off grid and mini-grid
projects in the North as part of a nationwide effort to bring access
through off-grid and mini-grid projects to areas that lack access.
Working with other donors, USAID can potentially look at what
incentives and risk mitigation measures can be put into place to
encourage development of projects in the North, but it will be a
complex and challenging process. USAID and the Power Africa team are
also providing technical advice to renewable energy project developers
on how to navigate the various government agencies while developing
bankable and sound proposals.
Question. Education.--Given that children are risking their lives
to go to school because education is so important, can you address the
administration's decision to cut funding for international basic
education programs by 33 percent from the current levels?
Answer. In response to the very robust appropriation for education
funding in FY 2013, the Nigeria education program received a 24-percent
increase in funds above their prior year levels. However, because of
the fragile security environment and difficulties in operating in
northern Nigeria where education funds are needed most, USAID adjusted
some activities and temporarily drew down its work pending a change in
the security environment. Currently, USAID is addressing this by
pursuing new programming options which specifically focus on increasing
access to education and improving reading performance through
institutional strengthening activities. In response to the major
increase in FY 2013 education funds, and to ensure that the Nigeria
program has the resources it requires to sustain other critical
investments, including democracy and governance programs, the Agency
proposed a lower level of education funding for Nigeria in FY 2014.
That level increases in the FY 2015 request by 15 percent as the prior
year education funds on hand are drawn down.
______
Response of Alice Friend to Question
Submitted by Senator Christopher A. Coons
Question. Professionalization of the Military.--It has been
mentioned that U.S. support for the professionalization of Nigeria's
military has been ongoing. What improvements have you seen as a result
of that support? Since professionalization of the military is so
important to addressing Boko Haram, why is the FY15 request for Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) for Nigerian $400,000 less than it was in
FY14?
Answer. Promoting professionalization among foreign militaries is a
long-term, even generational, process. In the case of Nigeria, DOD
believes that our progress to date manifests itself in two distinct
ways. The first is the deliberate and ongoing effort to provide
Nigerian officers, noncommissioned officers, and other military
personnel examples of what military professionals look like and how
they conduct themselves. We consider every training event, exercise,
and day-to-day interaction to be a powerful and important opportunity
to influence and shape the behavior of Nigeria's military. Second,
under the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), DOD is supporting
Nigerian efforts to overhaul and expand the curricula at two of its
professional military education institutions. Once complete, this
initiative will provide Nigeria with its own organic capability to
promote a more professional officer corps across its armed forces, now
and into the future. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) levels alone are
an insufficient metric to gauge DOD's resolve or commitment to helping
Nigeria professionalize its military. A wide range of other authorities
and funding sources are brought to bear to address the
professionalization challenge, including International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and section 1206 authorities, for
example.
______
Responses of Alice Friend to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Extrajudicial Executions and Unlawful Killings by
Security Forces.--Amnesty International has reported that thousands of
people suspected of links to Boko Haram have been extrajudicially
executed or unlawfully killed by security forces, and thousands of
suspects have died in military or police custody.
How have these abuses fueled the conflict and how do they
constrain our ability to help the Nigerian Government respond
to this crisis?
Answer. The reported abuses committed by Nigeria's security forces
actively feed the very extremist ideology Nigeria is attempting to
defeat, and thus undermine its counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover,
such abuses trigger provisions of U.S. domestic law that preclude the
United States from providing assistance and training to units about
which there is credible information that a member of the unit has
committed a gross violation of human rights. As a result, we are
limited in our ability to help develop the expertise, skills, and
abilities Nigeria lacks and that are indispensable to its success
against Boko Haram. A significant percentage of Nigeria's Army,
including the 7th Division, which has been assigned to northeast
Nigeria to conduct counter-Boko Haram operations, is excluded from U.S.
counterterrorism (CT) capacity-building assistance due to its failure
to be successfully vetted under the DOD ``Leahy law.'' The Nigerian
Special Boat Service has been a notable exception and has been
successfully vetted, as there is no credible information that this unit
has committed gross violations of human rights. Similarly, a newly
created Nigerian ``Ranger Battalion'' has been successfully vetted, and
U.S. Africa Command personnel are currently conducting training on
basic individual and unit military skills.
Question. Long-Term U.S. Strategy.--What is the long-term U.S.
strategy for countering Boko Haram in Nigeria? In your opinion, how
receptive is Nigeria to U.S. technical assistance? How much can we
really do within the confines of our laws?
Answer. U.S. Africa Command forces are presently laying the
groundwork for a regional, partner force-led counterterrorism effort in
Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad that focuses on border security.
Continued congressional support for various uncodified National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) provisions authorizing DOD support to foreign
forces is critical to the success of this effort. The U.S. strategy is
to promote a Nigerian whole-of-government approach that addresses the
full range of social, economic, governance, security, and other factors
that contribute to Nigeria's instability and insecurity, particularly
in the north. We have consistently advised the Government of Nigeria
that although security capacity-building is an indispensable element of
its counter-Boko Haram efforts, a force-centric approach that fails to
address legitimate northern Nigerian grievances will ultimately be
unsuccessful. The receptivity of Nigeria's military to U.S. assistance
varies within its Navy and Air Force, with some elements being more
receptive to train-and-equip efforts than others. The Nigerian
military's well-documented record of human rights abuses has rendered
approximately 50 percent of its army ``off limits'' for purposes of
U.S. train-and-equip efforts. We do engage and will continue to engage
with those units that have been successfully vetted for human rights
abuses, including its Special Boat Service and, most recently, the
143rd Infantry Battalion.
______
Responses of Alice Friend to Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question. Threat Assessment.--The administration has provided
numerous assessments of Boko Haram's threat as limited to Nigeria and
an occasional regional outreach as was seen recently in its involvement
in Mali and ongoing safe haven and sporadic violence in neighboring
Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Nonetheless, internally it has become more
sophisticated and lethal with over 1,500 Nigerians killed since the
first of the year, hundreds of children and others abducted for ransom
and trafficking, and the recent threat to Western hotels in Abuja.
Even though Boko Haram's place in the global threat matrix
might appear less relevant to the U.S. given its limited reach
beyond Nigeria, should the United States take a more strategic
approach to limiting its further influence in the face of this
mounting capacity to destabilize a large regional power?
Given the Nigerian Government's lack of capacity and
political willingness to engage Boko Haram and its own
reluctance to effectively cooperate with international
partners, what have we learned that would improve the U.S.
pursuit of its interests in the region?
What practical limitations exist to U.S. cooperation with
Nigeria?
Please provide the waivers and exceptions to legal
limitations that are permitted and how they are determined to
be utilized.
Have any waivers or exceptions been utilized as it relates
to security cooperation with Nigeria? Have any waivers or
exceptions been utilized as it relates to security cooperation
with any countries in Africa?
Answer. Although it has only come to the public's notice since the
tragic kidnapping of school girls from Chibok, DOD has recognized the
relevance and growing threat of Boko Haram since 2009 when it reemerged
in a new and more lethal form after going dormant for several years.
Indeed, in June 2012, then-commander of U.S. Africa Command General
Carter Ham, described Boko Haram as one of the three most dangerous
groups operating in Africa.
Moreover, Boko Haram's transnational nature and linkages have long
been recognized and known to be growing. As it has grown as a regional
threat and as Nigeria's limitations in combating the group have become
clearer, we have adjusted our engagement efforts accordingly. As a
practical example, DOD and the Department of State have collaborated to
develop a $40M package using the Global Security Contingency Fund
(GSCF) authority to train border security forces in Chad, Cameroon,
Niger, and Nigeria, to check Boko Haram's largely unfettered movement
back and forth across regional borders. We anticipate this proposal
being notified to the relevant congressional committees soon, and we
look forward to collaborating closely with Congress on this important
initiative.
Nigeria presents the United States with a range of challenges and
limitations as a counterterrorism (CT) partner. The baseline capacities
of its security forces to take on the sophisticated threat Boko Haram
represents was and remains extremely low. Nigeria has never faced a
terrorism or insurgency threat as intense as it currently faces, and
has been slow to adapt new security strategies, tactics, and doctrines
to support more effective operations.
Similarly, Nigeria has failed to adopt a whole-of-government
approach that takes into account the legitimate grievances of its
population, particularly in the north, thereby failing to pursue an
indispensable element of any successful counterinsurgency strategy.
And, perhaps most debilitating, it has conducted brutal and often
indiscriminate military campaigns that have victimized its own
citizens; Nigeria's security forces are believed to be responsible for
the deaths of nearly as many innocent civilians as Boko Haram itself.
Beyond these factors, a scarcity of political will and rampant
corruption at all levels and within all elements of government limit
the United States ability to bring about necessary change.
DOD has not sought waivers that would permit more robust security
cooperation with Nigeria and is not convinced that Nigeria is a good
candidate for such waivers. Even if waivers were granted, it is not
clear that the engagement opportunities that would be made available
through the waiver process would produce significant improvement in
Nigeria's ability to combat Boko Haram. Although Nigeria's record of
human rights violations does significantly limit the units DOD is able
to train and equip, the other factors noted above are at least as
limiting in terms of the U.S. ability to build the necessary CT
capacities.
Question. Cooperation with Nigeria.--Direct cooperation on security
with Nigeria and its neighbors encompasses a variety of programs and
sources but little clarity on the coherence across or even within U.S.
agencies. Testimony provided at the hearing intimated at a fairly
robust cooperation in CT which appears less than apparent from funding
and program reviews.
Provide information on the broader U.S. security
cooperation with Nigeria since 2009 and outline more recent
changes and the funding sources that will be utilized, to
include training or equipping, mentoring, technical assistance
or other program that provides for:
Intelligence-sharing;
Training to a new unit known as the 143d Ranger Battalion;
Training to the 101st CT battalion and the 111th Special
Operations Group;
C-IED training and civ-mil training;
Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC);
And remaining GSCF funding or its replacement.
Incorporate regional training and equipping programming and
plans into the above strategic approach to helping Nigeria and
the broader region counter militant extremists, including to
provide training to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (Chad,
Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria).
What if any additional outcomes emerged from the summit of
heads of state that was convened by President Hollande in
France on May 17 regarding the region.
Answer. USSOCOM-SOCAF CT/COIN Lessons Learned Exchange: From
January 13-18, 2014, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA)
personnel participated in a counterterrorism/counterinsurgency (CT/
COIN) seminar with Nigerian Army and Navy representatives at Wu Bassey
Barracks in Abuja. The seminar discussed U.S. and Nigerian successes,
mistakes, and lessons learned in CT/COIN operations during their
respective campaigns against terrorism. Each topic was introduced and
taught by both U.S. and Nigerian instructors, after which participants
broke into workgroups to discuss the topic and how it could be
interpreted and put to use in Nigeria's current situation. The CT/COIN
seminar reflected upon past experiences--both positive and negative--
and emphasized key lessons to be applied in future operations.
Intelligence Fusion Center: U.S. Africa Command and other DOD
elements are supporting interagency efforts to develop a Nigerian
National Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) in Abuja. The IFC mission
will be to synchronize efforts of Nigerian intelligence and security
communities, institutionalize collaborative communications among
national defense, foreign relations, CT, and law enforcement
organizations, and improve Nigeria's ability to detect and preempt
terrorist activities. This is a modest train-and-equip program
utilizing counternarcotics funding in light of the ``narco'' nexus with
Nigeria's National Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA).
143d Infantry Battalion (INF BN): On April 23, 2014, U.S. Army
Africa began a 4-week series of familiarization events with key 143 INF
BN staff leading to a 5-week Foreign Military Sales (FMS)-funded field
training period on individual and units tasks. The FMS portion will
include communication, land navigation, squad and platoon tactics, law
of armed conflict, and human rights training. Company-level training
will include urban operations, cordon and search, reconnaissance, and
MEDEVAC. Specialized staff training includes the military
decisionmaking process, fires integration, and intelligence-driven
targeting. The training period will culminate in a battalion training
exercise to apply gained knowledge.
Section 1206 human rights training and equipment transfer to the
101st CT Battalion (CT BN). This $2.25M FY 2009 Section 1206 Light
Infantry Company redirected from Chad to Nigeria (plus supplemental
package) was originally an FY 2007 funded section 1206 program for
Chad, which could not be executed. The case was redirected to Nigeria
in FY 2009, but the training was postponed because of human rights
concerns. Nigeria was unable to establish an acceptable national CT
unit that could successfully be vetted until November 2013, with the
establishment and vetting of the 101st CT BN. A Defense Institute of
International Legal Studies (DIILS) team went to Abuja May 6-9, 2014,
to provide Law of Armed Conflict and human rights training required in
connection with this equipment transfer. The section 1206-authorized
equipment (6x 8-ton trucks, 15x Land Cruisers, 2x ambulance trucks, 5x
trucks, communications equipment, as well as various uniform and field
equipment items) was transferred to the 101st CT BN on May 9, 2014,
immediately following completion of the training.
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) Detainee
Operations Engagement: (FOUO) DIILS, with additional engagement team
support from the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshall General
(OPMG), plans to conduct a 3-5-day Legal Aspects of Detention
Operations Workshop and Exchange at the Infantry Training School
Headquarters at Jaji Camp in Kaduna, Nigeria in August 2014. The
intended Nigerian audience is approximately 50 operational-level
Nigerian Army detention facility commanders and staff personnel.
Nigerian interest in FMS purchases through the Excess Defense
Articles (EDA) program. (FOUO) The Nigerian Navy has had great success
in purchasing needed vessels through the EDA program, most notably USCG
Cutters Chase (now NNS Thunder) and Gallatin (now NNS OKPABANA,
transferred to the Nigerian Navy on May 7, 2014, in Charleston, SC).
Most recently, the Nigerian Army expressed interest in purchasing
several EDA equipment items, including 5x rotary-wing assets (2x
gunship, 2x transport, 1x MEDEVAC); up to 50x HMMWVs; and up to 60x
Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles.
C-IED Training: USAFRICOM has received $3.5M in TSCTP funding, to
be executed through Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), to support the
training of Nigerian Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) instructors
at the Nigerian Army Engineer School in Makurdi, Nigeria. The Navy
International Programs Office (NIPO) is coordinating the transfer of
equipment to enable NAVAF to execute the program effectively.
Civil-Military Operations: USAFRICOM, through the Special
Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) Civil-Military Support Element
(CMSE) in Abuja, has been working with the Nigerian Army (NA)
Department of Civil Military Affairs (DCMA), which serves as a
coordinating and advising body for the Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) on
civil-military relations. These efforts include CMSE support to
Nigerian Army development of Civil Affairs doctrine as well as planned
training for Nigerian Army Civil-Military planners and advisors
deployed to each of the seven NA divisions.
USAFRICOM has received $1M for Nigeria Civil-Military Operations
(CMO) development through the State Department's Trans-Sahara Counter
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The engagement plan includes two primary
streams of training:
1. Training in CMO for the currently untrained CMO planners at the
divisions is planned to begin in late June 2014 and continue through
the end of 2015.
2. Training in CMO for a pool of existing instructors at several
Army training institutions, based on CMO doctrine and curriculum. This
would begin in late 2014 and continue through the end of 2015.
NASOC: USAFRICOM, through SOCAFRICA, has been providing an advisory
element to the proposed commander of the Nigerian Army Special
Operations Command (NASOC). The new Chief of Army Staff has placed
NASOC development efforts on indefinite hold, citing several factors
including ongoing offensives against Boko Haram; however, engagement
efforts with the vetted units are continuing in earnest awaiting
resolution of where they will now fall in the Nigerian Army structure.
GSCF: DOD and DOS have collaborated to develop a $40M Global
Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) assistance program to train border
security forces in Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, to disrupt Boko
Haram's largely unfettered movement back and forth across regional
borders. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Lake Chad is the
most viable organization with which to engage and is the focus of U.S.
efforts. DOD anticipates the proposal being notified to relevant
congressional committees soon, and we look forward to collaborating
closely for approval of this important initiative.
Summit Outcomes: Discussions at the May 17 summit were in keeping
with the themes of a regional approach utilizing the MNJTF Lake Chad.
--Participants agreed that over the medium term a coordinated program
for economic development in the region is required. The Lake Chad
Basin Commission (LCBC) might play a role in these efforts.
--The Multinational Joint Task Force, a part of the LCBC, was also
suggested as a vehicle for enhanced regional security cooperation
and assistance. This will be pursued; however, Cameroon is not
currently a member of the MNJTF.
Question. U.S. Cooperation with Foreign Governments.--The
continuing challenge for the United States is that our efforts will
have to be creative and coordinated, not only with a partner in Nigeria
who is reluctant to do so, but with regional neighbors who have much to
lose if this violent militancy spreads, as reports indicate it can.
What is the state of U.S. cooperation with neighbors in
Niger, Chad and Cameroon and set it against the domestic
capacity of these three countries to address the border
security threat as well as the respective governments efforts
to address internal tensions that may mirror Nigeria's current
situation?
How have we utilized the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism
Partnership and other Countering Violent Extremism and other CT
programs in the region to address the growing Boko Haram threat
and how are they to be augmented if at all? What office or
vehicle for coordination exists to harmonize such regionally
significant programs as CT-CVE?
Answer. The United States has experienced good counterterrorism
(CT) cooperation with Chad and Niger, although their focus has been on
CT threats elsewhere in their countries where the AQIM threat has been,
until recently, more visible and more direct. In both cases, Boko Haram
has been viewed as ``Nigeria's problem,'' presenting only a limited and
localized threat to their own security. With the group's expansion this
perception has changed and, along with it, we are seeing a willingness
to reallocate security resources away from other missions and toward
Boko Haram's operating areas along their respective common borders with
Nigeria. In short, both countries are capable, and their will to
counter the Boko Haram threat is growing, but both also lack adequate
resources. With respect to Cameroon, DOD's cooperation with Cameroon is
also robust, but regional collaboration is hampered by strained
relations with Nigeria. Like Chad and Niger, Cameroon was slow to
acknowledge the threat of Boko Haram, but fully recognizes it now and
is dedicating national resources to control its border with Nigeria
more effectively and to conduct operations against the group. Also,
like Chad and Niger, Cameroon has capable security forces that are
nevertheless resource-constrained and overextended. To capitalize on
this increasing awareness of Boko Haram as a regional threat, the
United States has developed a $40M proposal under the Global Security
Contingency Fund authority designed to build all four countries'
respective border security capacity. Along with our interagency
partners, DOD will continue to seek opportunities to promote and
materially support regional collaboration, cooperation, and
deconfliction of efforts against Boko Haram. The Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a State Department-led
mechanism by which the USG coordinates support to regional efforts to
contain, degrade, and ultimately defeat AQAA, including Boko Haram, in
the region. Although Nigeria only recently became a TSCTP partner, DOD
has received $1M in TSCTP funding to help establish a civil-military
operations (CMO) capacity within the Nigerian military, including
establishing organic Nigerian capability to train and sustain CMO
skills into the future.
______
Response of Alice Friend to Question Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question. U.S. Cooperation with Foreign Governments.--I asked a
question regarding the ability of the United States to cooperate with
the Nigerian Government in the security sector and though a response
was given that there are restrictions on U.S. assistance in law,
including the Leahy amendment restrictions on the provision of
assistance, training, and equipment, you did not discuss the exceptions
and waivers associated with these restrictions.
Please describe the legal restrictions, as well as any
waivers or exceptions allowed by the so-called ``Leahy
amendment.'' Have any waivers or restrictions been utilized
under these provisions in Nigeria?
Answer. The DOD Leahy law provides that DOD appropriated funds may
not be used for training, equipment, or other assistance for the
members of a foreign security force if there is credible information on
a gross violation of human rights. The Leahy law also includes two
exceptions and a waiver provision to the general prohibition. The
exceptions apply if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with
the Secretary of State, determines that the government of the proposed
recipient country has taken all necessary corrective steps; or if the
equipment or other assistance is necessary to assist in disaster relief
operations or other humanitarian or national security emergencies. DOD
does not believe that the Nigerian Government, to date, has met the
requirements to apply the first exception in that it has not taken
meaningful corrective steps to address the problem of gross human
rights violations or to identify and discipline those responsible. The
waiver applies if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the
Secretary of State, determines that such waiver is required by
extraordinary circumstances. Although the current circumstances in
Nigeria are certainly extraordinary, we do not believe they are of such
a nature as to warrant use of an exception to, or waiver of, U.S. human
rights requirements. Further, even if Leahy restrictions were waived or
excepted from, DOD believes that other factors, including corruption
and a pervasive lack of political will, would still inhibit building
the capacities that Nigeria requires.
DOD has not, to date, relied on an exception or the waiver
provision to the general prohibition. To pursue such an exception or
waiver, a Combatant Command or Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Policy) office would prepare and coordinate a proposal for Secretary
of Defense consideration and decision.
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