[Senate Hearing 113-627]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-627
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING TRUCK SAFETY ON OUR HIGHWAYS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 29, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
94-253 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK BEGICH, Alaska DAN COATS, Indiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN E. WALSH, Montana
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut, ROY BLUNT, Missouri, Ranking
Chairman Member
BARBARA BOXER, California ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DEAN HELLER, Nevada
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAN COATS, Indiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN E. WALSH, Montana
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on July 29, 2014.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Booker...................................... 67
Statement of Senator Fischer..................................... 69
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 71
Statement of Senator Scott....................................... 74
Witnesses
Hon. Anne S. Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Joan Claybrook, Co-Chair, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety.. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Major David Palmer, Past President, Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance....................................................... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 33
William G. ``Jack'' Dawson, on behalf of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters....................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 45
David J. Osiecki, Executive Vice President and Chief of National
Advocacy, American Trucking Associations....................... 51
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Anne S. Ferro by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 87
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 88
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 90
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 91
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV to:
Major David Palmer........................................... 93
William G. ``Jack'' Dawson................................... 97
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John Thune to:
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, on behalf of Major David
Palmer..................................................... 98
David J. Osiecki............................................. 102
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
FOR IMPROVING TRUCK SAFETY
ON OUR HIGHWAYS
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:10 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard
Blumenthal, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Good afternoon, everyone. I am going to
call the hearing to order and apologize, first of all, for a
little late start. We just finished a vote, and I am sure we
will be joined by other colleagues for this very important
hearing.
Today, this subcommittee is focused on safety, particularly
as it relates to trucks on our Nation's roads and highways.
This issue is something that I have cared about deeply
throughout my career, and I appreciate Senator Blunt's
commitment as well. I know he has been very, very focused on
issues relating to safety.
There may be some issues that divide us but there is so
much more that we have in common, and that is why we are having
this hearing. That is why we are joined by witnesses who are
really experts on this topic from across a wide spectrum of the
Administration, safety advocacy, law enforcement, the trucking
industry, and the men and women who drive trucks.
I am eager to hear their testimony and decide what we can
do to reduce the fatalities and the injuries on our roads.
There have been a lot of headlines lately, and you have
probably seen about Tracy Morgan, who was seriously injured in
a crash in early June involving a large truck, which also
severely injured a Connecticut resident, but this hearing today
is not about one person, Tracy Morgan, or anyone else.
It is about the 4,000 people who are killed each year in
truck crashes and nearly 100,000 each year who are injured, and
there are reasons to be concerned. According to NHTSA, truck
crash injuries increased by 40 percent from 2009 to 2012.
So, the rules that have recently been implemented are front
and center. I support these rules. I believe they are a step in
the right direction, and I believe we should keep them in
place, because as one 2005 study conducted by FMCSA
demonstrated, under the old rules, 65 percent of drivers
reported feeling drowsy while driving, and 48 percent admitted
to falling asleep while driving at the same point during the
previous year.
If we are going to make any changes, they ought to be with
the proper facts and review of this committee. I strongly
caution against discarding years of careful analysis in
addition, while doing it on a strictly spending bill.
The 2013 rules were designed to prevent truck drivers from
being forced to work too many hours, becoming exhausted and
endangering themselves and other drivers on the road. That has
to be our continuing goal.
I am open to hearing the views of my colleagues as well as
the experts before us, and I think what we share here is a
common commitment to safety. The best way of doing it is the
path that we ought to choose, and for now, I would stay with
the rules that we have before us, which seem to be working, and
we should allow to work before we consider changing or
appealing them.
With that, thank you to Senator Blunt for being here, the
Ranking Member, and I turn to him.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Well, thank you, Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing today, since I think the first hearing we
had was on intermodal freight transportation, as you stepped up
and became Chairman of this subcommittee.
You and I both, I think, have a complete commitment to
doing the best we can to ensure that our transportation system
is the best one for safety on the highway, the best one to let
our economy prosper, to let people have jobs and job
opportunities, make all of that work in the best way, all those
things on trains, trucks, ports, all are important parts of
what we are talking about here.
We are glad to have this panel here. Ms. Ferro, thank you
for your service. This may be the last time you appear in this
particular job, but your commitment both in Maryland and now at
the Federal level have been significant, and thanks for the
dedication you brought to this job.
Certainly, as the Chairman mentioned, the safety of the
truck traffic and all our traffic has gotten a lot of attention
in recent days. Senator Collins on the Appropriations Committee
did offer an amendment that was approved in a bipartisan vote
that would suspend restrictions on the ability of drivers to
restart their weekly on duty time under hours-of-service rules.
I think the best argument to be made there is it puts more
people on the road during the daylight hours, and maybe the
second best argument to be made is I am not sure the proper
research was ever done to think of the other implications of
those new rules, but I am sure we will be talking about those
rules today.
The new restart provisions state that ``A restart period
must include two back to back periods from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m.''
Now, I am not a 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. guy. My mom and dad were dairy
farmers. I am a 5 a.m. to whatever time it takes after that to
get things done.
Not everybody is best suited for every job. That is maybe
one of the things we need to consider. Just because I would not
want to be on the road from 1 to 5 a.m., it is not the busiest
time on the road. Some people may choose to decide that is the
best time to do the work that they need to do and they want to
do.
The bipartisan amendment that was in the Transportation
Housing and Urban Development provision merely suspends the two
restrictions on the restart time until FMCSA could adequately
study the effects of what both of these restrictions are.
Certainly, we want to look at the testimony today. We want
to listen to the testimony and ask the questions that we need
to ask to be sure that our safety rules really do provide more
safety, that they are reasonable, that families and individuals
whose lives are lost, families whose lives are always impacted,
are getting the most protection that we can give with the
safety rules that we have.
Clearly, we are talking a lot right now as we finish up
this particular week in the Congress about transportation
funding, how important it is that we meet our obligations. It
is one of the things that from the very start the Federal
Government was thought to be an important partner in, one of
the things specifically mentioned in the Constitution--road
building, Post Offices, and Post roads.
We want to be sure that we are doing that in the best way
we can, and one of the best ways to do that is to have hearings
and ask questions and try to see that legislation follows up on
the information that we achieve.
Again, Chairman, you have been particularly vigorous in
pursuing the potential for this subcommittee, and I am glad to
be working on it with you, Senator Booker and others.
Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Senator Blunt. I
am going to introduce the witnesses and then ask them to make
their opening statements.
We are very grateful to Anne Ferro for being here today.
She is the Administrator of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. In fact, the longest serving administrator in
its history. She was appointed by President Obama in 2009.
I join Senator Blunt in expressing my regret that this is
probably your last appearance before this committee, and wish
you well in your future work.
Joan Claybrook is a witness who really needs no
introduction. She is Co-Chair for Advocates for Highway and
Auto Safety, and a frequent participant in our work and
hearings. She is the former President of Public Citizen. Prior
to becoming President of Public Citizen in 1982, she was
Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration in the Department of Transportation.
We are honored also to have David Palmer, Major David
Palmer, of the Texas Department of Public Safety. Major Palmer
is the former President and Board Member of the Commercial
Vehicle Safety Alliance, which is an international organization
that enforces commercial motor vehicle safety laws, and he is
currently a major with the Texas Department of Public Safety,
where he oversees Texas Highway Patrol Division's Highway
Safety Operations Center.
Mr. William ``Jack'' Dawson is a freight driver with UPS.
Mr. Dawson is a professional truck driver in Dallas, Texas,
where he drives for UPS. He has been a professional driver for
32 years, and he is currently a member of Teamsters Local 745.
He trains new employees in areas of safety precautions and
driver improvement.
Dave Osiecki is the Senior Vice President of Public Policy
and Regulatory Affairs at the American Trucking Associations,
and he has been in that position since January 2010.
He served as Vice President for Safety, Security and
Operations at the American Trucking Associations, and he is
instrumental in working with the ATA Safety Taskforce to
develop a progressive 18 point agenda to further improve safety
on our Nation's highways.
We are honored and grateful that all of you are with us
today. We will begin with Ms. Ferro, Administrator Ferro.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANNE S. FERRO, ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Ferro. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Blunt, thank you
both for your kind recognition of my service and for the
opportunity to be here today to talk about the progress that we
have made in raising the bar for truck safety.
The primary mission of FMCSA is to reduce crashes,
injuries, and fatalities involving large trucks and buses. It
is a mission our employees, our law enforcement partners, and
stakeholders across the Nation engage in and strive to achieve
every single day.
We know that one life lost is one too many, and the more
than 4,000 people who die each year on our roads due to truck
and bus related fatalities is unacceptably high.
One of the most important steps this agency has taken has
been to implement a new hours-of-service rule for truck
drivers. While most drivers and carriers put safety as their
number one priority, the fact remains that some are subject to
exceptionally demanding work schedules, especially compared to
working limits of the average American and compared to working
limits in some other transportation safety sectors.
For truck drivers, our rule took common sense and
reasonable steps to put limits on the most extreme schedules.
Most important is that this rule is projected to save lives and
prevent approximately 1,400 crashes and over 500 injuries. Even
if we use modest estimates of fatigue as a factor in crashes,
this rule is expected to assist in saving over 400 lives per
year.
Now, some have said the rule is causing harm to trucking
companies, and yet the truth is we have not seen documentation
of that. In fact, truck tonnage is at an all time high. Since
2009, freight shipments in the for-hire trucking industry have
increased 30 percent, and trucking profitability is on par for
record setting profits this year.
When I became administrator nearly 5 years ago, I set the
foundation for a safe operating environment for trucking,
starting with a performance based enforcement platform that we
call ``Compliance Safety Accountability'' or CSA, moving to a
ban on truck and bus drivers texting or talking on handheld
cell phones, an improved hours-of-service rule, and measures
that close loopholes that allow unsafe drivers and unsafe
companies to avoid being held accountable to important safety
standards.
All of this work was done in partnership with stakeholders
that are at this very table, and using the best available data.
Our work has been greatly enhanced by MAP-21, which added
clear requirements for electronic logging devices, improved
hours-of-service compliance through those logging devices, a
clearinghouse for drivers who test positive for drugs and
alcohol, and a strengthened registry of certified medical
examiners.
While these steps are important to improving safety, we
need to recognize that the economic pressures on trucking
companies and drivers often reward the ones that push the
limits. That is why we have been researching two closely
related issues, the impact of driver detention time and driver
compensation on safety outcomes.
Many drivers, in fact most drivers' compensation is tied to
the number of miles they drive, and excessive waiting times
associated with loading and unloading can negatively impact a
driver's schedule, their earning potential, and certainly
interfere with the driver's ability to complete deliveries and
complete that pay cycle.
In short, it creates an economic incentive for drivers to
drive beyond the legal limits, drive beyond their physical
limits, and in some cases, drive tired when they are least
safe.
For FMCSA, it comes back to safety. In fact, the dedicated,
well-trained professionals who are operating commercial
vehicles across our country deserve to be fairly compensated
for all the hours they are working, not just when the wheels
are in motion.
That is why the GROW AMERICA Act includes a proposal to
ensure that drivers are compensated for all on duty time.
Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to join you today for this important subject. In
our view, achieving safety every trip, every time, takes all of
us. For that, I am looking forward to answering any questions
you might have today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ferro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Anne S. Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the
importance of safety in the trucking industry. At the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) we are committed to reducing the
number of crashes, injuries and fatalities involving commercial motor
vehicles (CMV). The number of lives lost in large truck-and bus-related
crashes has decreased 26 percent since 2000, from 5,620 to 4,183, in
2012. Injuries decreased from an estimated 166,000 to 126,000 during
that same time period. While this represents significant progress, we
must do more to bring these numbers down.
FMCSA's Safety Mission
We have identified several serious truck safety trends that drive
up these numbers, and we are concerned with all of them. Our data show
that almost one-fifth of these fatalities were truck occupants. In many
of these crashes, the truck driver was not wearing a seat belt. Working
together to educate drivers and the motoring public, we can encourage
them to engage in safer driving behaviors. We want all drivers and the
people with whom they share the road to get home safely, and companies
want their employees to operate safely. To do that, we must make the
industry safer.
FMCSA oversees the safety operations of more than 500,000
interstate motor carriers, as well as the estimated 4 million active
commercial driver's license (CDL) holders who operate hundreds of
billions of combined miles each year. The vast majority of these
operations are crash-free. Mr. Chairman, it is our obligation to focus
on those operators that present the highest risk on our roads. To
accomplish this, we depend heavily on our State partners supported
through our grant programs and collaboration with the motor carrier
industry and safety advocacy groups, in adherence with our three core
principles: raise the bar to enter the motor carrier industry; require
high safety standards to remain in the industry; and remove high-risk
carriers, drivers, and service providers from operation. As I will
elaborate in my testimony today, the Agency's implementation of the
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) aligns well
with these priorities. To date, the Agency has implemented more than
twenty provisions of MAP-21, which gave the Agency important tools to
improve CMV safety and remove unsafe operators from the Nation's
highways. We have promulgated a number of rules that allow us to take
action against drivers and companies that violate our safety rules.
Investment in Crash Avoidance Technologies
One way to achieve increased safety is to invest in crash avoidance
technologies. FMCSA and our colleagues at the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Department's Intelligent
Transportation Systems Joint Program Office have worked closely
together to research and evaluate new technologies to help large trucks
and buses avoid crashes. Technologies such as Electronic Stability
Control (ESC) systems prevent crashes and save lives. NHTSA estimates
these systems could prevent 40 to 56 percent of untripped rollover
crashes and 14 percent of loss-of-control crashes. The NHTSA proposal
to require ESC on heavy vehicles would prevent as many as 2,300
crashes, nearly 900 injuries, and up to 60 fatalities.
Compliance, Safety, Accountability
Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) is FMCSA's compliance
model to improve CMV safety and reduce large truck and bus crashes,
injuries, and fatalities on our Nation's highways. MAP-21 included
statutory revisions and additional authorities needed to improve the
CSA model. For example, MAP-21 provided the Agency with flexibility to
allow an investigator to formally request records in writing without
the previous restriction of having to display credentials in person.
This clarifies FMCSA's authority to conduct off-site enforcement
interventions--to formally demand that a motor carrier provide records
without having to travel to the motor carrier's business location. This
has been vital to expanding FMCSA's and our State partners' enforcement
efforts to include off-site reviews and investigations, increasing our
ability to provide effective safety oversight on a larger portion of
the industry than before.
Additionally, we are focusing on a number of improvements to the
Safety Measurement System (SMS) to strengthen the identification of
unsafe companies and prioritizing them for enforcement interventions.
Launched in December 2010 as part of the Agency's CSA program, SMS uses
roadside inspection and investigation data to prioritize high risk
motor carriers for interventions before crashes occur. Recently, we
released a new study that confirmed that the SMS is more effective at
identifying both truck and bus companies for targeted enforcement than
the system it replaced. In this study, FMCSA compared the crash rates
of those carriers identified for intervention with those without
identified compliance and safety problems. Companies that the SMS
identified as high-risk for future crashes had a future crash rate of
more than double the national average. Going forward, FMCSA will use
this data to flag companies for interventions by the Agency--which
include roadside inspections, warning letters and onsite
investigations--that will lead to improved safety and fewer crashes.
FMCSA continues to improve how SMS works in order to identify motor
carriers posing the greatest risk to safety. Our responsiveness to
industry, safety advocates, oversight agencies and Congress brings
about new policies, reports, and changes to the SMS. Recently, we
announced changes to how we handle adjudicated violations. For
inspections occurring on or after August 23, 2014, motor carriers and
drivers will be able to request updates to their data to reflect when
the driver or carrier is found not guilty or a violation is changed or
dismissed in court. These changes are part of our continued effort to
improve the quality of our violation data.
We expect to complete our ``crash weighting'' research soon, which
will address several questions on the feasibility of determining the
role of the carrier in the crash. The study looks not only at the
process to conduct this type of evaluation, but also the ultimate
impact on the information on the Agency's ability to identify carrier's
at risk of future crashes. Additionally, we are working towards
publication of a proposed rule on Safety Fitness Determination that
would increase the use of inspection data in making safety fitness
determinations for motor carriers.
Passenger Carrier Safety
FMCSA continues to use its MAP-21 authorities to strengthen the
safety of passengers who ride buses throughout our Nation. In 2013, as
part of an overall motorcoach safety initiative, we dispatched more
than 50 specially trained investigators to conduct in-depth reviews of
the safety management practices of the 250 most at-risk motorcoach
companies during ``Operation Quick Strike.'' As a result, we removed 52
unsafe bus companies and 340 vehicles from the road. During the second
phase of the initiative FMCSA investigators visited more than 1,300
carriers with minimal inspection history or data with the Agency. As a
result, we identified more than 240 for follow-up investigations. Now
we train all investigators to use the enhanced investigative techniques
employed during Operation Quick Strike, and we have conducted
evaluations and gap analyses with an eye toward how best to maintain an
intensified level of oversight on the passenger carrier industry.
National Registry of Certified Medical Examiners
Another aspect of our safety program is our newly implemented
National Registry of Certified Medical Examiners. As of May 21 of this
year, only medical examiners listed on the National Registry can
conduct physical examinations of commercial drivers. This ensures that
these drivers can operate safely and be healthy while on the road. To
be listed on the registry, medical examiners must complete a training
course and pass an exam to show that they understand our medical
standards and understand the physical demands of driving a CMV when
certifying a driver's health.
Currently, there are more than 32,000 certified medical examiners
on the Registry with many more scheduled to take the exam. We expect to
have more than 40,000 certified by the end of the year. The National
Registry builds on FMCSA's 2008 final rule merging the medical
certification process with the Commercial Driver's License (CDL)
issuance and renewal process, requiring that CDL holders provide proof
of their medical qualifications to the State licensing agencies.
Obstructive Sleep Apnea
Another issue of concern in the area of driver health is
obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). FMCSA plans to address OSA through a
formal rulemaking process, but only after collecting and analyzing the
necessary data and research. Presently, we are gathering data, but have
no immediate plans to move forward with a rulemaking. At this time, a
sleep apnea test is NOT required to obtain or renew a medical
certificate. The Agency has asked our Motor Carrier Safety Advisory
Committee and our Medical Review Board to provide recommendations to
address sleep apnea, but that is just one part of what will be an
extensive data-gathering process.
Hours of Service Rules and Fatigue Management
Fatigue is a leading factor in large truck crashes and a
significant safety issue overall. The hours-of-service (HOS)
regulations for truck drivers were updated in 2013 based on extensive
research and data to ensure that drivers have the off-duty time they
need to be alert behind the wheel. There is also an education component
to preventing fatigue associated with drivers' activities when they are
off-duty and the irregular schedules they are subjected to in order to
meet the demands of shippers and receivers.
In recognition of the impact of fatigue on highway safety, FMCSA
and its Canadian counterparts led a consortium of government,
insurance, and motor carrier agencies in developing the North American
Fatigue Management Program (NAFMP). The NAFMP is designed to address
the issue of driver fatigue among CMV operators and contains valuable
information and tools that can be applied across all modes of
transportation. The program contains information on fatigue management
education for drivers and their families, carriers, shippers, and
receivers. It contains additional information on sleep disorder
screening and treatment, trip scheduling, and fatigue management
technologies. Available in English and French, the NAFMP allows for
more effective fatigue countermeasures and a comprehensive fatigue
management approach.
The revised hours-of-service (HOS) rules for truck drivers went
fully into effect on July 1, 2013. This revised rule includes two
modest changes to the optional 34-hour restart--first, limiting the
restart to once a week, and second, requiring a driver to have two
overnight periods off duty from 1 a.m. until 5 a.m. Only those drivers
working more than 60 hours in 7 days or 70 hours in 8 days are affected
by the changes, by having their work limited to a maximum average of 70
hours per week. This is still nearly double the national standard of a
40-hour work week. The once a week limit is designed to prevent
cumulative fatigue in drivers working the maximum number of hours week
after week, and the 2-overnight periods recognize that a 34 hour break
with just one overnight period does not provide adequate opportunity
for restorative sleep. Both provisions were well supported by
scientific research. The rule improves safety by reducing driver
fatigue.
Public input was a major part of this rule. Before it became final,
FMCSA held 6 public listening sessions and carefully considered
approximately 21,000 formal docket comments, many submitted by the CMV
industry, particularly drivers and carriers. This was after years of
research and public input from industry and safety advocates. The rule
in place today lists 80 sources of scientific research and data the
Agency reviewed and considered, all of this on top of hundreds of
studies regarding fatigue and hours of work that were considered in
past HOS rulemakings, including research on the appropriateness and
value of a ``restart.'' In August 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the new HOS rules (except for
the application of the 30-minute rest break requirement for short-haul
drivers), after twice overturning previous versions.
As noted, the 2011 final rule included two changes to the 34-hour
restart, which impacts less than 15 percent of drivers who work the
most extreme schedules of up to 70-hours per week. The changes limit
use of the restart to once every 168 hours (or seven days) and require
that the restart include two nighttime periods from 1-5 a.m. when
science tells us our bodies demand sleep the most. We based this
requirement on the extensive body of research that shows the
consequences of long work hours on driver health and the correlation
between long weekly work hours and a higher risk of sleep loss and
crashes. Scientific review concluded generally that long work hours
were associated with poorer health, increased work-related and non-work
related injury rates, increased illness, a greater risk of unhealthy
weight gain, cardiovascular disease, and other ailments.
Mr. Chairman, let me emphasize that a driver is never required to
use the 34-hour restart. Drivers have always been required to cease
operations when they run out of time. Such a restart is necessary only
if a long-haul truck driver wants to work longer than 60 hours in 7
days or 70 hours in 8 days. Less than 15 percent of long-haul truck
drivers--those who work the most extreme schedules--are impacted by the
current rule. Those averaging 70 hours per week or less are NOT
affected by the changes to the restart because they would never work
the number of hours that would require them to use the restart.
However, any carrier that previously allowed or required its drivers to
average up to 82 hours per week, an amount allowed under the previous
rule, must now cease this practice.
We have heard criticism that the new rule discriminates against
nighttime drivers and forces them to drive during the day and in prime
rush hours. We have seen no evidence to support this claim. The rule
does not prevent carriers and drivers from setting their own schedules,
nor does it restrict drivers from being on the road during any time of
the day. Whatever the limits on driving and work hours may be, if the
motor carrier and driver plan their schedule so tightly that the driver
can barely complete the run legally, then problems with completing runs
inevitably will occur. That fact cannot support any rollback of the
current rule.
Independent studies have shown that daytime sleep is less
beneficial than nighttime sleep, and that drivers who have two
overnight rest periods are more alert and safer than drivers who get
just one overnight period. Largely for this reason, we are concerned
about legislative efforts to increase, even temporarily, the number of
hours a truck driver could work from the 70-hour maximum on the books
today. Removing the rest requirements could expose the public to
greater risk every time they are on the road. The final rule would save
19 lives and prevent approximately 1,400 crashes and 560 injuries each
year--a significant safety benefit.
HOS Field Study
Due to the importance of driver fatigue as a safety risk, we
continue to research several issues related to hours-of-service.
Following the MAP-21 mandate, FMCSA completed the Hours-of-Service
Field Study, which examined the effectiveness of the new HOS rule,
including the modified 34-hour restart provision. Released to Congress
earlier this year, the results show that having at least two nighttime
rest periods from 1-5 a.m. helps to lessen fatigue. Specifically, this
naturalistic field study found that drivers whose weekly duty cycles
were preceded by a restart break with one nighttime period as compared
to a restart break with two or more nighttime periods--had more lapses
of attention, reported greater sleepiness and showed increased lane
deviation.
Detention Time and Split Sleep
We are researching two other issues closely related to driver hours
of service: driver detention time and split sleep. Most of us agree
that detention time, or excessive waiting times associated with loading
or unloading cargo, can negatively impact a driver's schedule and
interfere with that driver's ability to complete deliveries within the
hours-of-service regulations. We have completed phase 1 of the study,
which will provide us with a better understanding of the scope of
detention times throughout the industry. Meanwhile, we are continuing
with phase 2, which will look closely at the safety impacts of
detention time.
During many of the listening sessions we held for the hours of
service rulemaking, we heard that drivers desire greater flexibility on
some of the hours of service provisions, such as split sleep, which
divides the 10-hour off-duty period into two separate rest periods. As
a result, later this year, we will begin a pilot program to collect
data on the impacts of split sleep. The field study will measure the
impact of split sleep periods on driver alertness and sleep quantity.
We have begun discussions with our colleagues from the American
Trucking Associations, the National Association of Small Trucking
Companies, the Owner Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA),
and potential technology providers for this study effort.
Electronic Logging Devices
Closely related to HOS is our electronic logging device rulemaking,
another MAP-21 requirement. In March, we announced our proposal to
require motor carriers to use electronic logging devices to improve the
quality of logbook data and improve compliance with HOS rules. This
proposed rule would address how the Agency ensures that the use of ELDs
does not result in increased driver harassment by carriers to break the
law, help businesses cut unnecessary paperwork, and increase efficiency
for law enforcement personnel and inspectors who review drivers'
logbooks. Analysis shows that electronic logging devices would help
reduce crashes by improving compliance with HOS rules. The comment
period ended on June 26, and we are currently reviewing more than 1,700
comments that we received. We also received more than 11,300 letters
from individuals who signed The AnnaLeah & Mary Stand Up for Truck
Safety Petition. A copy of the petition is included in FMCSA's
rulemaking docket concerning electronic logging devices: http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FMCSA-2010-0167-1177. We are
working to finalize this important rule as expeditiously as possible.
Drug and Alcohol Clearinghouse
To further prevent crashes, we must ensure that drivers are
healthy, sober and drug-free. We published the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) on the Drug and Alcohol Clearinghouse (Clearinghouse)
to implement the MAP-21 provision on this subject. The Clearinghouse
would require truck and bus companies (and other entities responsible
for managing drug & alcohol testing programs) to report verified
positive drug and alcohol test results, test refusals, negative return-
to-duty test results and follow-up testing. This information would
populate a repository with positive drug and alcohol tests by CDL
holders. Once implemented, employers would be required to conduct pre-
employment searches in the repository for all new CDL drivers and
annual searches on current drivers. The comment period for the rule
closed on May 21.
Minimum Training Requirements for Entry-Level CMV Operators
MAP-21 directed the Agency to issue final regulations to require
training for entry level CDL applicants. The Agency's rulemaking must
address knowledge and skills for safe operation and other issues. Last
year, the Agency held public listening sessions on this issue. These
sessions provided the Agency with substantial information about
training for entry level CDL applicants. The Agency will soon engage
the services of a convener to assess the feasibility of conducting a
negotiated rulemaking to implement this important MAP-21 provision.
Coercion Rule
On May 13, FMCSA published an NPRM to adopt regulations that
prohibit motor carriers, shippers, receivers, or transportation
intermediaries from coercing drivers to operate CMVs in violation of
certain provisions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations--
including drivers' HOS limits and the CDL regulations and associated
drug and alcohol testing rules--or the Hazardous Materials Regulations.
In addition, the NPRM would prohibit anyone who operates a CMV in
interstate commerce from coercing a driver to violate the commercial
regulations. This NPRM includes procedures for drivers to report
incidents of coercion to FMCSA and rules of practice the Agency would
follow in response to allegations of coercion and describes penalties
that may be imposed on entities found to have coerced drivers. This
proposed rulemaking is authorized by section 32911 of MAP-21, amending
the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984. The comment period closes on
August 11.
GROW AMERICA
In May, President Obama and Secretary Foxx proposed the GROW
AMERICA Act--a four-year, $302 billion transportation bill that will
help us tackle our infrastructure deficit while improving safety and
providing the reliability that our partners at the State and local
level need. Our plan will ensure the solvency of the Highway Trust Fund
and will boost funding for highways, transit, and rail. It will invest
$5 billion in four more years of our TIGER grant program, which
supports innovative, sustainable, multimodal solutions to regional
transportation challenges. At FMCSA, GROW AMERICA would help us
streamline our grants processes to improve the efficiency of our
grantees.
One of our biggest Agency goals in GROW AMERICA is to address
driver compensation. Many over-the-road truck and bus drivers are
compensated by the mile or on a fixed-rate per load. As a result, they
are not paid for extended periods of time spent on-the-clock when they
are detained by waiting for shipments to be loaded or unloaded at
shippers' or receivers' facilities. Similarly, over-the-road motorcoach
drivers are often compensated in a manner other than an hourly wage.
Truck and bus drivers deserve to earn at least the Federal minimum fair
hourly wage for all on-duty time. Failing to pay them for time they
spend working, but are detained waiting for shipments may increase the
pressures they face, thereby, jeopardizing their safety and the safety
of others by speeding and driving tired or beyond the hours of service
as a matter of economic necessity. Furthermore, these dedicated, well-
trained professionals deserve to earn a livable, hourly wage and be
compensated fairly for their time and contributions to the vitality of
the American economy.
Finally, we propose allowing for the criminal prosecution of a
person who knowingly and willfully violates an imminent hazard out-of-
service order and operates after FMCSA has shut them down.
We hope these changes will make it easier for all of our
stakeholders, from drivers and carriers to enforcement partners to work
together toward our shared safety goals.
Conclusion
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Blunt, and members of the
Subcommittee, for allowing me to speak to you today on these important
issues relating to truck safety. We must all work together to create
the safest trucking industry possible. Together we can make a
difference for safety.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Ms. Claybrook?
STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, CO-CHAIR, ADVOCATES FOR HIGHWAY
AND AUTO SAFETY
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure to be here with you and the Subcommittee. I have my
full statement which I would like to submit for the record,
along with some other documents.
Senator Blumenthal. Without objection.
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you very much. I am representing today
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, which is a coalition of
insurance companies and consumer organizations. I serve as the
Co-Chair.
Advocates has been involved in the issue of motor carrier
safety for 25 years, and for good reasons. Truck crashes are
serious, deadly, and costly problems to families, our health
care system, and to our economy.
Government data and statistics illustrate the emotional and
economic toll that large truck crashes take on the American
public. They killed 3,921 people and injured another 100,000
people in 2012 at a cost of more than $99 billion, and truck
crash deaths and injuries are climbing.
The death toll caused by truck crashes is equivalent to a
major airline crash, every single week in this country, and we
know that Congress would not put up with a major airline crash
every single week in this country.
So, we think you need to take some steps to improve truck
safety. The death toll caused by truck crashes and the
transportation crisis that results should never be tolerated by
our elected leaders or by the Department of Transportation. And
for the public, it is a nightmare.
In almost all truck/car crashes, it is the car occupants
who are killed or severely injured 96 percent of the time.
These victims reside in every state across the country.
I would like to take a minute to introduce two parents and
a young woman to this committee who are here to personally
support improving truck safety. Larry Liberatore's teenage son,
Nick, was killed on June 9, 1997 on his way to Six Flags Great
Adventure in New Jersey. A tired trucker ran over his car when
he was on the shoulder of the highway. Larry is a Board Member
of Parents Against Tired Truckers.
Marchelle Wood's daughter, Dana, and a girlfriend were
returning to college on October 15, 2002 on I-95, and swerved
to avoid hitting a deer, coming to a stop in the right lane.
They were killed moments later by a tired trucker who ran over
their car, even though no one was in the left-hand lane.
Morgan Lake is a truck crash survivor. Last July, she was
on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge and was hit from behind by a
distracted driver. The impact pushed her car over the bridge
railing, and it plunged into the water. She freed herself from
the car and swam to a bridge pillar, and thankfully, she is
here to tell us the story of surviving this horrific crash.
My testimony this afternoon will focus on three campaigns
that would jettison truck safety and undermine progress in
reducing truck crashes, deaths and injuries. First, they
include the attack on safety reforms incorporated by the Obama
administration in the 2011 hours-of-service rule.
Second, the ongoing problems with the credibility and
reliability of the DOT comprehensive truck size and weight
study, and third, special interest legislation to preempt
states and force them to allow longer combination trucks.
Another concern is the weakening of important motor carrier
truck safety provisions in the Administration's GROW AMERICA
Act, explained in detail in my written statement.
First, fatigue. Truck driving is one of the most dangerous
occupations in the United States, and truck driver fatigue is a
major factor. Commercial drivers are exempt from maximum hours
and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
amazingly, since 1938, governing compensation for all other
employees working more than 40 hours a week.
In 2003, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
changed the hours-of-service rules. However, rather than
addressing driver fatigue for better working conditions, the
rule dramatically increased working and driving hours.
This was accomplished by allowing a so-called ``restart
provision,'' which permits drivers to restart their 60 to 70
hour driving limit at any point during the work week by taking
34 hours off duty.
The trucking industry enthusiastically embraced this change
because it increased the maximum work week to an amazing 82
hours and reduced the off duty rest time available for drivers
to one day and 10 hours.
The startling decline in driver sleep and increase in
driver fatigue was documented in a 2006 FMCSA survey of truck
drivers. It showed that nearly two-thirds of the drivers
surveyed, 65 percent, admitted to driving while tired, and
nearly half, 48 percent, reported they actually fell asleep
behind the wheel while driving in the previous year.
However, the safety reforms were finally adopted by FMCSA
after 9 years of consumer and safety litigation. In 2011, the
HOS rules, which were only implemented a year ago, in 2013, had
two positive changes that included an once per week limit on
the use of the 34-hour restart. That is you could not use it
every 5 days, you had to wait 7 days, on average, reducing the
maximum work week from 82 hours to 70 hours. These changes were
reasonable.
Also, the agency adopted a requirement for two consecutive
overnight off-duty periods between 1 and 5 a.m. to assure the
rest will contain two nighttime periods to permit a driver to
obtain the most restorative type of sleep, and these changes
ensure driver flexibility to meet the demands of the freight
business while preparing for the rigors of driving these long
hours. This applies, I want to emphasize, only to those drivers
who have maxed out on their 70 hours. So, this provision
applies not to all drivers, but just to a small percentage of
drivers.
Unfortunately, even these minimal common sense safety
improvements are under attack, and as we have already heard,
Senator Collins offered an amendment which would remove these
rules by the appropriations bill.
That is opposed by Advocates, consumer health and safety
groups, law enforcement, labor, truck crash victims, as well as
several large trucking companies and DOT.
Instead, we strongly support an amendment that strips the
Collins' amendment rule change in the bill that is sponsored by
Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey. We thank you so much,
Senator, for doing that. It is supported by a number of other
Senators, including the Chairman and Senators Boxer, Durbin,
Brown, Feinstein, Gillibrand, Hirono, Menendez, Markey, Murphy,
Rockefeller, Schatz, Schumer, and Warren.
Second, another large truck issue that threatens public
safety is the relentless and aggressive push by corporate
trucking and shipping interests to increase truck size and
weights, and it is unending. They stand alone in their support
for bigger, longer, heavier trucks, because the American public
certainly does not.
Attached to my testimony is a public opinion poll series
over the last 19 years that show consistent and strong
opposition.
In MAP-21, Congress required the Secretary of
Transportation to conduct a comprehensive study of truck size
and weight issues including safety performance and
infrastructure impact of trucks that would be bigger or heavier
than the current size and weight configurations.
This critical study will influence Federal and state
transportation policy for years to come. It will affect working
conditions for truck drivers, law enforcement, national freight
and intermodal investments, clean air, fuel economy, and the
public health and safety of our families.
Criticisms by Advocates and others were recently validated
and endorsed by a 51 page report issued in March by the Peer
Review Committee of the National Academy of Sciences on the
initial phase of the DOT study, and a summary is attached to my
testimony.
The NAS complains that the study relies on selective
voluntarily supplied data from the trucking industry that has a
clear economic interest in the outcome, but ignores significant
earlier DOT studies that show increased crash risks associated
with these trucks.
This study plans to extrapolate the operation and
performance of big rigs in sparsely populated rural states to
evaluate trucks in congested urban areas as well, which does
not make any sense.
Furthermore, DOT is basing the entire national bridge
analysis on an unpublished study by the District Government
here in Washington on truck size and weight, not peer reviewed
and hardly representative of bridges throughout America.
Because these and many other flaws are so significant and
the study lacks adequate transparency, at this time we
recommend that the study be stopped until Congress and the
public are assured that corrections are made, the findings are
unbiased, unimpeachable, and unchallengeable, and we appreciate
the assistance of you, Mr. Chairman, and other Senators,
including Senator Booker, on this effort.
Finally, longer truck trailers. I would like to state our
absolute opposition to any proposal which would dramatically
overturn and alter existing national freight policy by forcing
states to allow 33 foot trailers, which segments of the
trucking industry are pushing. It will result in longer and
more dangerous double or tandem rigs exceeding 85 feet in
length or with three trailers, 115 feet in length. These are
trains on our highways. Currently, 39 states do not allow these
longer trailers, and they should not be forced to pay for
wasteful infrastructure and upgrades to accommodate them.
So, Mr. Chairman, we deeply appreciate your having this
hearing. Truck deaths and injuries are climbing, and we need
action. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joan Claybrook, Co-Chair, Advocates for Highway
and Auto Safety
Good afternoon Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and
Members of the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. Thank you for
inviting me to testify before you today. I am Joan Claybrook, Consumer
Co-Chair of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates) and
former Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.
Founded in 1989, Advocates is a coalition of consumer, health and
safety groups and major insurance companies working together to promote
safety on our roads and highways by advocating for laws and regulations
that prevent crashes, save lives and reduce injuries. Advocates is a
unique coalition dedicated to improving traffic safety by addressing
motor vehicle crashes as a public health issue. One of our major safety
priorities is the unnecessary and unacceptable death and injury toll
caused by truck crashes. I appreciate being invited to testify before
you today on the opportunities and challenges for improving truck
safety on our highways.
Introduction
Advocates has been involved in the issue of motor carrier safety
and truck driver hours of service regulations for 25 years, and with
good reason. Truck crashes are a serious, deadly and costly problem to
families, our health care system, and to the economy. Government data
and statistics illustrate the emotional and economic toll of large
truck crashes on the public. Large truck crashes killed 3,921 people
and injured another 104,000 in 2012.\1\ Over the past decade (based on
the most recent available data from 2003 through 2012), large truck
crashes have claimed, on average, the lives of over 4,000 people and
injured nearly 100,000 each year.\2\ This is equivalent to a major
airplane crash every week all year long. In the past ten years a total
of 44,204 people have been killed and nearly one million people have
been injured in crashes involving large trucks.\3\ Despite declines in
the overall fatality and injury statistics during the 2008-2009
recession, fatalities and injuries in large truck crashes have
experienced increases every year since 2009. The fatality total has
increased by 16 percent and the number of people injured has increased
by 40 percent since the low point in 2009.\4\ Of the people killed in
crashes involving large trucks in 2012, 73 percent were occupants of
other vehicles, 18 percent were occupants of large trucks, and 10
percent were non-occupants (pedestrians, pedal cyclists, etc.).\5\ The
annual cost to society from crashes involving commercial motor vehicles
is estimated to be over $99 billion.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012 Data: Large Trucks, DOT HS 811 868,
NHTSA (May, 2014).
\2\ NHTSA Traffic Safety Facts, Large Truck fact sheets 2003
through 2012.
\3\ Id.
\4\ Id.
\5\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012 Data: Large Trucks, op cit.
\6\ 2014 Pocket Guide to large Truck and Bus Statistics, FMCSA (May
2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advocates is gravely concerned with the recent increases in truck
crash deaths and injuries as these numbers continue their march toward
a return to pre-recession levels. Unfortunately, several deeply flawed
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) initiatives as well as adoption
of special interest rollbacks in safety regulations will only
contribute to the mounting death and injury toll unless changes and
course corrections are implemented. My testimony this afternoon
addresses several of these major issues related to commercial motor
carrier regulation and truck safety policy, including the attack on the
safety reforms incorporated in the 2011 hours of service rule, the on-
going problems with the credibility and reliability of the DOT
Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Limits Study and the weakening of
important motor carrier and truck provisions in the Generating Renewal,
Opportunity, and Work with Accelerated Mobility, Efficiency, and
Rebuilding of Infrastructure and Communities throughout America Act,
known as the GROW AMERICA Act, recently released by the Administration
and introduced in the House of Representatives as H.R. 4834.
Safety Reform of the 34-Hour Restart Rule Under Attack by Special
Trucking Interests
Driving a commercial motor vehicle (CMV) is a challenging,
exhausting and dangerous occupation; extremely long work weeks are just
one of many factors contributing to this reality. Truck driving
continues to be identified as one of the most dangerous occupations in
the United States.\7\ Nearly 600 drivers of large trucks were killed in
2012 and another 21,000 were injured in truck crashes.\8\ More fatal
work injuries resulted from transportation incidents than from any
other event in 2012.\9\ Roadway incidents alone accounted for one out
of every four fatal work injuries.\10\ Despite these facts, CMV drivers
are exempt from the maximum hours and overtime requirements of the Fair
Labor Standards Act \11\ which govern compensation for employees
working more than 40 hours a week. Since 1938, CMV drivers have been
limited to driving within the first 60 or 70 hours of their work week
(depending on their schedule). Prior to the 2003 final rule, a truck
driver who used all 60 or 70 driving hours was not allowed to drive
again until their 7 or 8 day work week was over and a new work week
began. This ensured that drivers were provided a full weekend off-duty
to rest and recover from the arduous driving schedule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2012
(Preliminary Results), USDL-13-1699, Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Aug.
22, 2013).
\8\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012, DOT HS 812 032, NHTSA (2014).
\9\ Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Charts, 1992-2012
(revised data), available from http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm.
\10\ Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Charts, 1992-2012
(revised data)
\11\ 29 United States Code Sec. 213(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2003 Hours of Service (HOS) final rule, however, instituted the
34-hour restart which allows drivers to restart their 60 or 70 hour
driving limit at any point during the work week by taking just 34 hours
off duty; this is in comparison with the normal weekend of about 60
hours off for people working a 9-to-5 job. The trucking industry
embraced this change because it increases the average maximum work week
to 82 hours; more than double the time the average American works. This
increase in driving and work hours enabled the industry to realize a
huge cost savings by using fewer drivers to move the same amount of
freight and eliminating 48,000 trucking jobs.\12\ Many drivers are paid
by the mile, meaning that if the truck isn't moving, the driver isn't
earning. Aside from encouraging truck drivers to drive as long and as
fast as possible, the complete opposite motivation from what is needed
from a safety viewpoint, this also means that drivers viewed the
restart as a way to increase their paychecks. In short, the
unrestricted 34-hour restart, as implemented in the 2003 final rule,
was a giveaway to the industry that allows motor carriers to cut their
bottom line, overwork drivers even more, and in the process convince
drivers that it was all for their benefit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Regulatory Impact Analysis and Small Business Analysis for
Hours of Service Options, FMCSA, Dec. 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advocates opposed the unfettered use of the 34-hour restart since
it was first adopted in the 2003 HOS final rule.\13\ The reason is that
the restart provision allows long-haul truck drivers to drive and work
more hours, and therefore get less off-duty rest, each week than was
permitted before the 2003 HOS rule was adopted. The startling decline
in driver sleep and increase in driver fatigue was documented in the
results of an anonymous 2006 survey of truck drivers sponsored by the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) which reported:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Hours of Service of Drivers; Driver Rest and Sleep for Safe
Operations, Final Rule, 68 FR 22456 (Apr. 28, 2003).
About 38 percent of the drivers said they sometimes and 6.7
percent said they often had trouble staying awake while
driving. About 13 percent reported that they often or sometimes
fall asleep while driving; 47.6 percent said they had fallen
asleep while driving in the previous year. Although only 23.4
percent said they often or sometimes felt fatigued while
driving, 65 percent reported that they often or sometimes felt
drowsy while driving. A third of the drivers reported that they
became fatigued on a half or more of their trips.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Hours of Service of Drivers, NPRM (2010 NPRM), FMCSA, 75 FR
82170 (Dec. 29, 2010), citing Dinges, D.F. & Maislin, G., ``Truck
Driver Fatigue Management Survey,'' FMCSA (May 2006), FMCSA-2004-19608-
3968.
The survey was conducted after the 2003 HOS final rule was
implemented and the unrestricted 34-hour restart provision went into
effect. The survey showed that nearly two-thirds of truck drivers
surveyed (65 percent) admitted to driving while tired and nearly half
(48 percent) reported that they actually fell asleep behind the wheel
while driving in the previous year.\15\ These self-reports, which most
likely underestimate the true extent of the fatigue problem, indicate
that many truck drivers were operating vehicles while tired or fatigued
under those HOS rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equally troubling is the fact that truck drivers reportedly
obtained far less than 7 hours of sleep each night, well below the 7 to
8 hours of sleep the agency had found drivers needed to be alert and to
perform the driving task safely. According to the FMCSA:
The studies of restricted sleep show that over days of mild,
moderate, or severe sleep restriction (1) alertness and
performance degrade as cumulative sleep debt rises; (2) even
mild sleep restriction (loss of less than 1 hour of sleep a
day) degrades performance over days. Seven to 8 hours of
consolidated night-time sleep in each 24 hours appear to
sustain performance over multiple days, if not longer, for most
people.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 2010 NPRM, 75 FR 82175 (citations omitted). The FMCSA NPRM
went on to state that the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI)
naturalistic driving study of CMV drivers operating under the 2003
rule, measured sleep averaged 6.15 to 6.28 hours (the average includes
both work days and days off); the average on work days was 5.6 hours.
See Hanowski, R.J., Hickman, J., Fumero, M.C., Olson, R.L. & Dingus,
T.A., ``The Sleep of Commercial Vehicle Drivers Under the 2003 Hours
of-Service Regulations,'' Accident, Analysis and Prevention, Vol. 39,
No. 6, November 2007, pp. 1140-1145. FMCSA-2004-19608-3977.
This scientific finding about the dangers of restricted sleep is
troubling because truck drivers were found to get less than 7 hours of
sleep each day.\17\ This fact is supported by other research that has
shown that adults in the general population who reported getting an
average of less than 7 hours of sleep a day were more than twice as
likely to report nodding off or falling asleep while driving in the
previous 30 days compared to adults who received more than 7 hours of
sleep.\18\ Lack of sleep among truck drivers explains the high levels
of driver fatigue and fatigue-related crashes that occur. Advocates has
opposed allowing the unrestricted use of a 34-hour restart because the
unrestricted 34-hour restart permits drivers to maximize their work
hours, up to 82 hours of work and driving on average each week, and
contributing to driver fatigue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ 2010 NPRM, 75 FR 82176 (``In the Virginia Tech Transportation
Institute (VTTI) naturalistic driving study of CMV drivers operating
under the 2003 rule, measured sleep averaged 6.15 to 6.28 hours (the
average includes both work days and days off); the average on work days
was 5.6 hours.'' Citing Hanowski et al.).
\18\ ``Unhealthy Sleep-Related Behaviors--12 States, 2009,''
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, MMWR vol.60/No.8, p. 236
(March 4, 2011); Adults who reported obtaining less than an average of
7 hours of sleep per 24-hour period also showed a 39 percent increase
in the likelihood that they would unintentionally fall asleep during
the day at least once in the prior 30 days compared to adults who
obtained more than an average of 7 hours of sleep.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advocates favored rescinding unfettered use of the 34-hour restart
because rather than provide workers with needed rest, it in fact
increases the hours they can drive and work from 70 to 82 hours a week.
However, since the 34-hour restart has not been rescinded, Advocates
supports the safety reforms adopted by the FMCSA in the 2011 HOS final
rule which were only implemented one year ago in 2013. The reforms
included three adjustments to the prior HOS rules: the implementation
of a half hour rest break within 8 hours of reporting for duty, and two
limitations on the use of the 34-hour restart. Prior to the 2011 final
rule, drivers were able to restart their weekly driving hour limits by
taking an abbreviated 34-hour off-duty period at any point in their
schedule. The unfettered use of the restart enabled drivers to work and
drive an average maximum work week of 82 hours. The 2011 final rule
modified the 2003 HOS rule by requiring that at least 168 hours (7
days) elapse from the start of one 34-hour restart before the next
restart can be taken. The other safety reform requires that each 34-
hour restart include two time periods between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. Both of
these reforms to the restart option ensure that long-haul truck drivers
have additional opportunities to rest and recover from their prior work
week of 60 or 70 hours of driving, and additional hours of other work,
before getting behind the wheel for the start of their next long work
week.
The FMCSA included an explanation of the necessity and benefits of
these changes in the 2011 final rule:
Because research has shown that long weekly work hours are
associated with a higher risk of crashes, sleep loss, and
negative health effects, the rule also limits the use of the
restart to once a week, which, on average, will cut the maximum
work week from 82 to 70 hours. The provision allows drivers to
work intensely for one week, but will require them to
compensate by taking more time off in the following week.
Research has long demonstrated that daytime sleep is shorter in
duration and lower in quality than nighttime sleep. The rule
requires any driver working long enough to need a restart to
take off at least 34 consecutive hours that include 2 periods
between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m., the window of circadian low. This
provision will give those drivers who both routinely work at
night and put in very long work weeks an opportunity to
overcome the chronic fatigue that can build up when working
nights.\19\
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\19\ Hours of Service of Drivers, Final Rule, FMCSA, 76 FR 81134;
81135. (2011 Final Rule).
Driver fatigue plays a significant role in a substantial number of
truck crashes. In the 2011 HOS final rule, the FMCSA relied on the
estimate that 13 percent of large truck crashes were due to fatigue.
The Agency supported this estimate in its response to comments during
the regulatory process when it identified that the Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) for the 2000 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) used a
15 percent estimate. The RIAs for the 2003 and 2007 rules also used a
15 percent estimate in the sensitivity analyses. Furthermore, the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) observed that ``truck
driver fatigue may be a contributing factor in as many as 30 to 40
percent of all heavy truck accidents.'' \20\
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\20\ 2011 Final Rule, 76 FR 81169.
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The FMCSA's estimate is based on an analysis of the Large Truck
Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) in which it found that truck driver
fatigue was coded as a factor in 13 percent of all crashes.\21\ In
2012, there were 317,000 police reported motor vehicle crashes
involving large trucks, including 3,464 fatal crashes, 73,000 injury
crashes, and 241,000 property damage only crashes.\22\ At 13 percent
involvement rate (one in eight crashes), fatigue was likely a factor in
as many as 41,000 crashes. This is likely a conservative estimate
considering that fatigue is notoriously hard to identify short of a
confession or direct observation of a sleeping driver, something the
agency acknowledged in the final rule when it noted that ``fatigue is
difficult to determine after the fact''.\23\ Because their jobs are on
the line, drivers will rarely acknowledge they were sleeping or
fatigued when driving. Regardless, the sheer scale of the problem is
clear evidence of the impact improvements in driver fatigue can have on
safety and saving lives.
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\21\ Hours of Service Rule, Regulatory Impact Analysis, FMCSA,
(Dec., 2011).
\22\ 2014 Pocket Guide to large Truck and Bus Statistics, FMCSA
(May, 2014).
\23\ 2011 NPRM, 75 FR 82176.
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Moreover, at the direction of Congress in section 32301 of the
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), Pub. L.
112-141, the FMCSA recently completed a field study of the restart
provisions in the 2011 final rule. The findings of the study were
conclusive that restarts with two or more nighttime periods, as
required under the 2011 HOS final rule, helped to mitigate fatigue when
compared with restarts with only a single nighttime period as had
previously been allowed. The study found that drivers using 34-hour
restarts with only one-nighttime period:
Exhibited more lapses of attention, especially at night.
Reported greater sleepiness, especially toward the end of
their duty cycles.
Showed increased lane deviations at night and in the morning
and afternoon.
Slept predominantly during the day.
Worked predominantly during the night.
Drove longer hours and typically at night.\24\
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\24\ Field Study on the Efficacy of the New Restart Provision for
Hours of Service, FMCSA (Jan., 2014).
In summary, the once-per-week limit on the use of the 34-hour
restart, on average, cuts the maximum work week from 82 to 70 hours.
This is still a lengthy work week which is nearly double the total work
hours of the average American. The provision also still enables drivers
to alternate extended work weeks with shorter work weeks, providing
truck drivers with the flexibility necessary to meet the demands of
today's freight industry. Similarly, the requirement to take two
overnight off-duty periods between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. ensures that if a
driver uses the 34-hour restart to extend the work week beyond the 60-
or 70-hour driving limit (depending on their work schedule) the rest
period will contain two night-time periods to permit the driver to
obtain the most restorative type of sleep. A minimum of two night-time
periods is needed to prepare him/her for the rigors of the extended
work week and the demanding job of safely operating a commercial motor
vehicle weighing 80,000 lbs. on our highways shared with other
motorists.
On June 5, 2014, the Senate Committee on Appropriations held a
Markup of the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development (THUD)
Appropriations Act for 2015,\25\ during which Senator Susan Collins (R-
ME) introduced an amendment which prohibits the DOT from enforcing the
safety reforms adopted by the FMCSA in the 2011 HOS final rule.\26\ The
amendment passed despite opposition from Advocates and child, truck and
highway safety groups, labor, truck crash victims, law enforcement,
consumer, medical and public health organizations as well as several
large trucking companies and U.S. DOT. The Collins Amendment, Section
133 of the THUD bill, would not only undermine the safety reforms to
the 34-hour restart that the expert agency, the FMCSA, has determined
improve public safety on our highways, but it would also usurp the
jurisdiction of the authorizing body, the Commerce Committee and this
Subcommittee, by legislating a substantive change in Federal law on an
appropriations bill. We oppose Section 133 of the Senate THUD bill on
both safety and jurisdictional grounds and support the Booker Amendment
which would retain a study of the 34-hour restart and strike the anti-
truck safety provisions from the Senate THUD bill. This amendment,
which was introduced by Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) on the Senate Floor
on June 18, 2014, is co-sponsored by Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-
CT), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), Richard Durbin (D-IL),
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Mazie Hirono (D-
HI), Edward Markey (D-MA), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Christopher Murphy
(D-CT), Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Charles Schumer
(D-NY) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA). The THUD bill was pulled from
consideration on the Floor on June 19, 2014.
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\25\ Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2015, S. 2438.
\26\ Section 133 would temporarily suspend enforcement of the hours
of service regulation related to the restart provisions that went into
effect on July 1, 2013 and directs the Secretary to conduct a study of
the operational, safety, health and fatigue aspects of the restart
before and after July 1, 2013. S. Rep. 113-182 (June 5, 2014).
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Opponents of the recent changes to the HOS restart provisions have
claimed that the new limitations force drivers to take a break when
they aren't tired and then, following the break, force them back on the
road all at the same exact time. These assertions are patently false
and have no factual basis. First, the HOS rules do not govern sleep,
but merely ensure that carriers must provide drivers with ample time
for drivers to obtain needed rest. Second, the HOS provisions do not
specify when a restart must be taken or when a driver must return to
duty following a restart. The rule requires only that any restart taken
must end no earlier than 5:00 a.m. at the end of the 34-hour restart
period, but the rule does not require or suggest that a driver must
start operating at that exact moment.
Furthermore, the rule does not state in any way, shape, or form
that drivers must all take their restarts at the exact same time on the
exact same day. Restarts occur on different days of the week. If the
claims of the rule's opponents were accurate, that would mean that all
5.6 million commercial motor vehicle drivers operating in the U.S.,
across the myriad of industries they serve, would all be maximizing the
use of their hours, would all be on the exact same schedule, and would
all be returning to duty at the same time and same day of the week all
year long. This just does not happen; this is not the way the system
works. The fact is the restart limitations only affect a relatively
small percentage of drivers, those operating on the most extreme
schedules, and it is those drivers who need and benefit from the 34-
hour restart safety reforms in order to be able to perform their jobs
properly and to drive their long hours safely.
Due to the high levels of fatigue self-reported by truck drivers
since the 34-hour restart was adopted, the increasing number of truck
crashes, deaths and injuries that are occurring as the economy
recovers, and the increasing level of freight tonnage being shipped by
truck, the reasonable safety reforms to curb the negative impact of the
34-hour restart are essential to protect the travelling public and the
safety of truck drivers on our highways. No other mode of freight
transportation comes close to causing the mortality and morbidity toll
of truck crashes. It is not acceptable, agreeable or reasonable that
special trucking interests are asking the public, professional truck
drivers and lawmakers to accept these enormous losses as a cost of
doing business in moving freight by trucks across our country.
Serious Problems Plague the Credibility and Reliability of the DOT
Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Limits Study
The American people are clearly opposed to having larger trucks on
the highways besides them. A May 2013 public opinion poll by Lake
Research Partners found that 68 percent of Americans oppose heavier
trucks and 88 percent of Americans do not want to pay higher taxes for
the damage caused by heavier trucks.\27\ Attached to my testimony is a
summary of public opinion polls that show the high-levels of opposition
to bigger, heavier trucks that the American public has steadily
maintained over the past 19 years. I request that this document be
placed in the hearing record. In MAP-21, Congress required the
Secretary of Transportation to conduct a comprehensive study of truck
size and weight issues (Study) including the safety performance of
trucks that would be bigger or heavier (or both) than current truck
size and weight configurations.\28\ This Study is intended to advise
Congress and the American people about whether allowing larger trucks
on the highway is a wise policy choice. That is why we are so concerned
about the incredibly inadequate manner in which this Study has been
conducted to date. The Study has run into serious problems in its
approach and methodology; these issues cannot be ignored and must be
resolved before the Study is completed.
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\27\ Memo Re: Increasing the legal weight for trucks in the U.S.,
Lake Research Partners (May 7, 2013), available at http://
www.trucksafety.org/images/sts2013/sts2013-lr-memo-tsc
.pdf.
\28\ Section 32801, Pub. L. 112-141 (Jul. 6, 2012).
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The Study is being conducted by the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA), a modal Administration within the DOT. The Study ran into
problems from the outset when the FHWA did not publish a public bid
notice or issue an open public request for proposals (RFP), but rather
sent the contract terms and solicitation to a select group of just four
contracting companies. While not exactly a ``no-bid'' contract, the
letting of the contract and restricting the pool of consultants was not
a transparent transaction. Moreover, the contractor selected through
this closed bid process came with a built-in bias against existing
truck size and weight limits. The general contractor selected has
previously performed studies for several states and, in each and every
instance, found that the states could and should increase truck size or
weight limits, or both, on state roads. The contractor's reports also
promoted and encouraged increases in Federal size and weight
limits.\29\ The prior history and record of the contractor on these
specific issues should have immediately raised red flags. The
contractor's clear track record of support for increases in truck size
and weight at the state level should have disqualified the company from
consideration as the general contractor for the Study.
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\29\ Study of Impacts Caused by Exempting the Maine Turnpike and
the New Hampshire Turnpike from Federal Truck Weight Limits, June 2004;
Northern Minnesota/Northwestern Wisconsin Regional Freight Plan, Nov.
2009; I-15 Corridor System Master Plan Freight: Trucks, June 2011; I-70
Dedicated Truck Lanes Feasibility Study Phase 2 Report, High
Productivity Vehicle (HPV) Scenario Guidance 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criticism of the Study plan has also come from the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) Peer Review Committee on the Comprehensive Truck Size
and Weight Limits Study. The NAS established a Peer Review Committee at
the request of DOT after safety groups demanded an outside review of
the DOT study plan and implementation of the Study. We believed it
necessary to have an independent review of, and check on, the work
performed by the Study contractor and the FHWA supervisory staff by
outside experts. Then-Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood agreed. The
NAS Peer Review Committee was asked to file two reports, one after the
initial phase of the Study and another after the Study is completed but
still in draft form.
The report on the initial phase of the project was issued by the
NAS Peer Review Committee in March 2014 and it critiqued the approach
taken by FHWA and its contractor in the Study plans and literature
searches (desk scans) in each of the five subject matter areas that are
part of the Study.\30\ While such initial phase reports are usually
only a few pages in length, the NAS Peer Review Committee issued an
extensive 51-page report (NAS Report) on the initial phase of the Study
finding numerous and serious problems and errors in the work
performed.\31\ The entirety of the criticisms and problems found by the
Peer Review Committee in the NAS Report are too extensive to list here.
I will provide some examples taken from the NAS Report's review of the
Highway Safety and Bridge subject matter areas. A more complete summary
of all the NAS Report criticisms of the Study are attached to my
testimony, which I also request be submitted for the hearing record.
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\30\ The five subject matter areas consist of: Highway Safety and
Truck Crash, Bridge Structure, Pavement, Modal Shift, Enforcement and
Compliance.
\31\ Review of U.S. Department of Transportation Truck Size and
Weight Study, First Report: Review of Desk Scans (NAS Report), National
Academy of Sciences, Transportation Research Board (March 31, 2014).
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With regard to Highway Safety, the NAS Report pointed out that the
Study plan and the desk scan for the Highway Safety area neglected,
without any explanation, to include a number of pertinent and well-
known studies by credible researchers on truck crash severity and brake
defects, including case-control studies that are the most valuable
means of controlling for driver experience and driving records in
analyzing crash risk.\32\ Moreover, the Study plans and desk scans also
inexplicably ignored the FHWA's own previous study of truck size and
weight issues conducted in 2000 which concluded that longer combination
vehicles have a statistically significant (11 percent) higher crash
rate than single-trailer trucks.\33\
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\32\ NAS Report, pp. 35-36.
\33\ Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Study (2000 DOT Study),
FHWA-PL-00-029, vol. III, p. VIII-5, U.S. Department of Transportation
(August, 2000).
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The NAS Report also pointed out that while the desk scans included
references to regulations in foreign countries that permit longer
combination vehicles (LCVs), ``the review of safety research does not
cover studies of the effectiveness of such regulations in mitigating
hazards associated with larger trucks.'' \34\ These are just a few of
the criticisms raised in the NAS Report in the safety area. The Study
plans and desk scans also failed to identify a more recent analysis
that indicates that double-trailer trucks have about a 15 percent
higher fatal crash rate than single-trailer combinations, and that
single-trailer trucks with six or more axles have an extremely high
fatal crash rate compared to the overall single-trailer truck fatal
crash involvement rate.\35\ The type of omissions noted in the NAS
Report indicates a distinct and seemingly deliberate pattern of
overlooking safety information and data that show the negative aspects
of longer, heavier trucks while including all information that might be
considered favorable to longer, heavier trucks.
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\34\ NAS Report, p. 33.
\35\ An Analysis of Truck Size and Weight: Phase I--Safety,
Multimodal Transportation & Infrastructure Consortium (Nov. 21, 2013).
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Advocates has criticized the reliance of the Study on voluntary
industry-supplied data provided by selected segments of the trucking
industry because it introduces bias into the Study data analysis.
Voluntary data and information cannot be independently verified and
likely exclude unfavorable negative data and information that
proponents of longer, heavier trucks may not wish to provide. Moreover,
the source of the data and information is a stakeholder with a strong
economic interest in the outcome of the Study and therefore, the use of
voluntary industry-provided data is unacceptable.
In addition, Advocates is concerned with the use of a static
``snapshot'' of freight tonnage, ignoring estimated future increases in
truck freight shipments. This assumption allows the Study to conclude
that heavier/larger trucks, which carry more freight, will make fewer
trips and result in fewer trucks on the road. This is a false premise.
The number of registered trucks in the U.S. has continually increased,
including after each past increase in truck size and weight limits.\36\
FHWA confirms this trend documenting that the number of large trucks
increased by nearly 42 percent between 1987 and 2002, and that the
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) by large trucks increased by 50 percent
over the same time period.\37\
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\36\ ``Bigger, Heavier Trucks Just Means More Trucks That Are
Bigger and Heavier,'' Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety (Dec.
2013).
\37\ Freight Facts and Figures 2011, p. 32, Table 3-7, FHWA Office
of Freight Management and Operations, FHWA-FOP-12-002 (Nov. 2011).
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For the Study, the FHWA has adopted a ``no forecasting policy''
with regard to future freight tonnage shipped by truck. This decision
contradicts the FHWA's own estimate of a significant increase in
shipments--a 63 percent increase in truck freight by 2040.\38\
Therefore, the Study is at complete odds with what will occur in the
real world--there will be more large trucks, not fewer large trucks,
carrying freight in the future, and that an appreciable percentage of
those truck trips will be made by heavier and/or larger, longer truck
combinations depending on the analysis of the Study. This fact cannot
and should not be ignored in the analysis of the Study. In addition,
since the estimated increases in freight demand also predict that
trucking will be the predominant mode for most of the increases in
freight movement--and trucking is, comparatively, the most dangerous
mode from a safety standpoint--the shift to larger/heavier trucks may
exacerbate the significant safety losses already incurred in trucking
operations.
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\38\ Freight Facts and Figures 2012, p. 9, Table 2-1, FHWA Office
of Freight Management and Operations, FHWA-FOP-13-001 (Nov. 2012).
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Failure to take expected growth of freight into account is
unrealistic and objectionable and will severely damage the validity of
the Study, limit its use as a policy tool, and provide misleading
results to Congress.
Additionally, the Study is using crash and operating data on LCVs
currently conducted in sparsely populated, rural states and carried out
under special controls and restrictions. This data cannot be readily
transferred or extrapolated for application to more densely populated
states and urban areas as the 2000 DOT Comprehensive Truck Size and
Weight Study clearly pointed out.\39\ Yet, this is exactly what FHWA
intends to do in the Study. The safety performance of extra-long double
and triple-trailer trucks operating in a state like Wyoming should not,
indeed cannot, be used to support conclusions about the safety
performance of these gigantic rigs operating in densely populated, more
urban states in the eastern United States.
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\39\ 2000 DOT Study, vol. III, p. VIII-6.
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The NAS Report also identifies many other problems in its review of
the bridge structure desk scan, and validates criticisms made by
Advocates and many others that the methods employed in the Study are
not objective or comprehensive. For example, the NAS Report:
Points out that the bridge desk scan ``does not include a
comparative evaluation of alternative methods of assessing
bridge costs of changes in size and weight limits[,]'' \40\ and
``does not review the results of past studies of the effects of
changes in truck traffic on bridges.'' \41\
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\40\ NAS Report, p. 11.
\41\ Id.
Concludes that the references supplied in the desk scan
``appear to be primarily those that are necessary to support a
predetermined plan of analysis'' \42\ rather than a search for
pertinent and related data and information on bridge
structures.
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\42\ Id.
States that the ``principal risk of changes in [weight]
limits is that the bridge inventories will decay more rapidly
than expected[,]'' \43\ yet the bridge desk scan ``does not
identify methods or data sources to support estimates of the
impacts of changes in [weight] limits on bridge barriers,
medians barriers, or railings.'' \44\
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\43\ Id., p. 12.
\44\ Id.
It appears that the Study authors do not feel the need to review or
document how they plan to estimate bridge deterioration costs that
result from any specific change in truck weight limits. Perhaps they
have a preconceived view which is not supported in the desk scan or
maybe they are making it up as they go along. The lack of transparency
in the process prevents us from knowing the answer to this conundrum.
The final example I will mention of the problems in the bridge desk
scan critiqued in the NAS Report is the fact that the Study authors
plan to base the entire national bridge analysis on the 2010 District
of Columbia Department of Transportation (DCDOT) truck size and weight
study. However, as the NAS Report points out, that particular study is
unpublished. It is unknown just how the analysis performed for an urban
jurisdiction with fewer than 300 bridges will apply to and affect the
national bridge inventory of over 600,000 bridges. Since the DCDOT
truck size and weight analysis is unpublished, it is unknown if the
methodology used in that analysis, even with modifications, has been
tested and would be successful at producing an accurate analysis and
national estimate. In short, it is ludicrous for a national, and
supposedly comprehensive, truck size and weight study to rely on a
bridge study conducted in an urbanized city and an unpublished and
unverified means of analysis for a critical and essential portion of
the Study.
The NAS Peer Review Committee Report made the following over-
arching points about deficiencies of the Study:
The available methods of analysis for use in the Study have
``significant weakness'' which have not been addressed.\45\ The
use of these compromised methods will impact the ability of the
study to predict the results of changes in truck size and
weight regulations and the Study conclusion will be of limited
use in crafting future policy.
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\45\ Id., p. 2.
The Study has been conducted in a backwards fashion, with
the Study plans and methods of analyses determined before the
desk scan review of available research and information was
performed, stating that ``in most cases the selection of
methods appears not to have been a consequence of the desk
scans.'' \46\ This calls into question the bias on the part of
the Study team to rely on pre-determined methods.
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\46\ Id., p. 1.
Each of the five desk scans, which are supposed to be the
foundation of the Study, was lacking in at least one of three
main elements; survey of current methods and synthesis of state
of the art, identification of data needs and data availability,
and synthesis of past results. ``None of the desk scans fully
provides all three of these elements.'' \47\
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\47\ Id., pp. 1-2.
Inadequate time to complete needed evaluation and
development of appropriate methods and data. ``The constrained
schedule imposed by the congressional study charge may have
precluded a more systematic approach to evaluation and
selection of methods.'' \48\
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\48\ Id., p. 1.
In summary, the FHWA should not complete the current truck size and
weight Study, and Congress should not consider, debate or adopt any
changes whatsoever in Federal truck size and weight laws, unless and
until the DOT eliminates all known and inherent biases, implements
major revisions in the approach and methodology, uses only
statistically valid data, and adopts essential corrective actions that
allow a thorough public review of all draft technical studies, reports
and public comments. This Study will influence Federal and state
transportation policy, working conditions for truck drivers and law
enforcement, national freight and intermodal investments, clean air and
fuel economy goals, and the public health and safety of our families
for decades to come. Because the flaws are so significant and the
process lacks adequate transparency, at this point in time Advocates
recommends that the Study be stopped until Congress and the public are
assured that corrections have been made, a new unbiased contractor has
been selected to manage the Study, and that the findings are unbiased,
unimpeachable and unchallengeable.
Mr. Chairman, over the past year I have had the honor of being a
member, appointed by Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood, of the
National Freight Advisory Committee (NFAC),\49\ which was established
to assist in the development of a national freight strategic plan and
which is comprised of representatives from the trucking, shipping,
aviation, rail, labor, elected officials, academia, ports,
environmental and safety communities. The NFAC was charged with making
policy recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation concerning
freight movement to advance safe and efficient freight transportation
through intermodal solutions. As part of our deliberations, we
highlighted, as a high priority, the need for research of future
forecasting that considers changes in demographics, buyer behavior,
manufacturing practices, and other factors that could restructure
current freight supply and demand patterns. The complexity of players
and stakeholders, as well as the interdependencies involved in modern
supply chains was also fundamental to our considerations. Of utmost
importance was the projected steep increase in freight demands expected
to take place by 2040. Additionally, we stressed the need for
improvements in data collection. In fact, in our recommendations
submitted to Secretary Foxx on June 12, 2014, we wrote, ``The lack of
sufficient funding and lack of access to industry raw or complete data
has persistently undercut the timeliness and completeness of freight
data as a basis for public and private sector decision-making.'' \50\
In contrast to the efforts of the Advisory Committee, the DOT appears
content with using data in its analyses of freight issues that ignore
real world conditions. In addition, DOT has taken few steps to upgrade
its data systems and tear down the silos within DOT that could result
in significant improvements in the coordinated use of transportation
data, particularly with regard to freight policy.
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\49\ Notice of Establishment of National Freight Advisory Committee
(NFAC or Committee) and Solicitation of Nominations for Membership, 78
FR 11727 (Feb. 19, 2013).
\50\ Recommendations to U.S. Department of Transportation for the
Development of the National Freight Strategic Plan, NFAC, p. 15 (June
12, 2014).
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The DOT Reauthorization Bill, GROW AMERICA Act
The Department of Transportation (DOT) surface transportation
reauthorization legislation, the GROW AMERICA Act,\51\ introduced in
the House as H.R. 4834, has a number of provisions related to motor
carrier safety that Advocates supports including: Section 5102, Motor
Carrier Operations Affecting Interstate Commerce, which clarifies the
scope of out-of-service orders; Section 5104, High-Risk Carrier
Reviews, which focuses enforcement on the highest risk motor carriers;
and, Section 5302, Jurisdiction Over Brokers of Motor Carriers of
Passengers, which extends certain aspects of the FMCSA's regulatory
jurisdiction to brokers of carriers of passengers.
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\51\ Generating Renewal, Opportunity, and Work with Accelerated
Mobility, Efficiency, and Rebuilding of Infrastructure and Communities
throughout America Act (GROW AMERICA Act), DOT proposed reauthorization
legislation, available at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/
DOT_surface_reauth-FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advocates also supports Section 5506 which would allow the DOT
Secretary to determine whether to issue regulations to govern non-motor
carrier contractors that exercise operating control over motor carrier
operations. To the extent that non-motor carriers exercise control over
motor carrier operations, they should be regulated and subject to
violations, fines and penalties for failure to adhere to safety
regulations, especially since contractors may have little or no
experience regarding commercial motor vehicle operations. However, the
provision as written, only states that the Secretary ``may'' issue such
regulations while Advocates believes that the Secretary ``should'' be
required to issue regulations to clarify that contractors are subject
to the same safety and regulatory requirements when exercising control
over motor carrier operations.
I would like to focus my testimony on three important statutory
changes that have been proposed by the U.S. DOT in the GROW AMERICA Act
which Advocates opposes.
First, Advocates opposes amending 49 U.S.C. Sec. 31144(g)(1)(A) and
(g)(1)(B) to delete the mandatory requirement that new entrant motor
carriers receive an initial safety review within a reasonable period of
time. Just two years ago, Congress established the requirement in
Section 32102 of the MAP-21 law to mandate that safety reviews of new
operators must be conducted within 12 months for new freight motor
carriers and within 120 days for new passenger-carrying motor carriers
or intercity bus companies. There is an important public safety
rationale for this requirement. While new entrant carriers should be
permitted to enter the industry, since their safety performance is
unknown, they should be subject to a timely safety review so that
unsafe motor carriers are not able to operate for extended periods of
time without any safety review. The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) has expressed concerns with delays in new entrant safety
audits for more than a decade.\52\ The NTSB has raised this concern as
recently as two years ago in a report of a crash which killed four
people and injured 58 when it stated:
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\52\ Highway Accident Report: Collision of a Greyhound Lines, Inc.
Motorcoach and Delcar Trucking Truck Tractor-Semitrailer Loraine, Texas
June 9, 2002, NTSB Report HAR-03/01, p. 37, ``The Safety Board
concludes that by conducting safety audits up to 18 months after
carriers begin operation, the FMCSA potentially allows unsafe carriers
to operate without oversight and without the benefit of the educational
and technical assistance that the FMCSA provides during the safety
audit.''
The report notes that new entrants need not demonstrate their
capability to operate safely before they begin carrying
passengers, but the safety check must occur within 18 months of
the commencement of operations. In 18 months, however, a
carrier with two 50-passenger buses running two trips a day
could have carried more than 100 thousand passengers before
having its first safety examination; and the motor carrier
involved in this accident operated for 22 months before its
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
first safety check.
The public would be appalled if airlines could carry passengers
before demonstrating their ability to do so safely. Query why a motor
carrier should be allowed to carry passengers before demonstrating its
safety fitness.\53\
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\53\ Accident Report: Motorcoach Roadway Departure and Overturn on
Interstate 95 Near Doswell, Virginia, May 31, 2011, NTSB Report HAR-12/
02.
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In proposing to change the word ``shall'' to ``may'' in Section
5105 of the GROW AMERICA Act, New Entrant Safety Audits, DOT would make
such initial safety reviews discretionary, rather than mandatory.
Adopting the proposed change would mean that an initial safety review
could be conducted at any time or not at all. Weakening the requirement
that was just enacted into law two years ago is detrimental to highway
safety, is not justified with factual arguments by DOT and should be
rejected.
Second, Advocates opposes the changing of long-standing existing
law, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 31136(a)(4), regarding the standard for safety
regulations. Current law requires that, among other things, minimum
safety regulations issued by the DOT shall ensure that ``the operation
of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the
physical condition of the operators.'' This has been the law since
first enacted in the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984,\54\ and it has a
well-established meaning that has been interpreted by the courts. The
DOT proposes to replace the words ``deleterious effect'' with
``significantly adverse effect'' which clearly appears to raise the
legal bar on challenges to Federal regulations that impact the physical
and medical condition of drivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (MCSA), Pub. L 98-554 (1984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This change is specifically intended to bar the courtroom door to
truck drivers and others who are concerned about the impact that
Federal regulations have on the physical and medical conditions of
commercial drivers. It is not a technical amendment but one clearly
aimed at making it significantly more difficult for concerns about
driver working conditions to be raised in the context of Federal
regulations. We believe it is proposed in response to the well-founded
claims raised in the HOS lawsuits that pointed out the deleterious
effect of long work hours on drivers. If enacted into law, it will
shield the Federal regulations from challenges based on the medical
evidence which shows that commercial drivers could be negatively
affected, physically or medically by a proposed regulation. The result
of the wording change will be to lower the effective level of
protection afforded commercial drivers for physical and medical
conditions under Federal regulations since challenges under section
31136(a)(4) would be limited to only the most extreme situations. This
does a disservice to truck drivers who have a difficult and physically
demanding job in one of the most dangerous occupations, and it should
be rejected by Congress.
Third, Section 5512, regarding Pre-Authority Safety Audits (PASA)
of Mexican motor carriers,\55\ proposes to eliminate the requirement,
which has been in effect for more than a decade, that a percentage of
the PASAs and other safety-related reviews for Mexican motor carriers
that wish to operate in the United States must be conducted in Mexico
at the headquarters or operations hub of the motor carrier. Safety
reviews and compliance reviews need to be conducted at the motor
carriers' headquarters so that in addition to reviewing the books and
records of the motor carrier, Federal safety inspectors can also
inspect the carriers' maintenance facilities and the condition of
available equipment. By permitting Mexican motor carriers to have
safety reviews conducted at ``any location'' selected by the FMCSA,
this may well mean that foreign motor carriers may not necessarily have
on-site inspections or safety reviews conducted at the carrier's home-
base facility as is done for U.S. domiciled motor carriers. While this
may ease the burden on DOT inspectors, it may not adequately ensure
that the safety and procedures of foreign motor carriers will be
adequately reviewed and inspected. This is especially troublesome as
the three-year cross-border pilot program of Mexican trucking
operations in the U.S. nears its end and a decision about the opening
of the southern border becomes more imminent. DOT has not provided any
adequate justification for recommending this major change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ Audits and compliance investigations of Mexico-domiciled motor
carrier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, I would also like to state our firm opposition to any
proposals which would dramatically overturn existing national freight
policy by forcing states to allow 33 foot trailers resulting in longer
and more dangerous double or tandem rigs exceeding 85 feet in length,
or three trailers exceeding 115 feet in length. Longer trucks are
inherently more dangerous to passenger cars. The sheer size of these
longer trailers--which adds at least 10 feet to the length of current
double or tandem rigs--has far reaching and significant implications
for the safe use of highways, bridges and ramps. This change could also
open the door to triple-trailer trucks using three 33 foot trailers,
which would be well over 115 feet long, compared to the average length
of a family car, which is only about 16 feet long. These excessively
long trailers threaten motorists sharing the road with trucks due to
the ``crack the whip'' effect, in which small changes in steering by
the tractor are amplified and cause large swaying effects (side-to-side
motion) in the last trailer behind the truck cab. Longer trailers will
also result in more off-tracking, in which the rear trailers cross into
adjacent lanes and interfere with oncoming traffic as well as traffic
headed in the same direction of travel. They can also swing into
opposing lanes on curves and when making right-angle turns. Moreover,
bigger trucks never result in fewer trucks despite industry's claims.
Over three decades of research and real world experience show that
allowing bigger, heavier trucks always results in more trucks on the
road. Currently 39 states (AL, AK, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, GA, HI, IL, KS,
KY, LA, ME, MD, MI, MN, MS, MO, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, PA,
RI, SC, SD, TN, TX, VT, VA, WA, WV, WI) do not allow these longer
trailers and they should not be forced to pay for expensive, wasteful
infrastructure rebuilding to accommodate these oversized rigs on
Interstate and freeway on-and off-ramps. Furthermore, industry-funded
research which is being used to support increasing the size of trailers
is neither objective nor unbiased. There have been no independent,
peer-reviewed research and studies conducted on the operational and
safety issues associated with the use of 33 foot trailers. Congress
would never consider allowing a new drug on the market for public use
solely based on one industry-sponsored study. Neither should the
motoring public be used as human test subjects to conduct this research
on longer trucks. We need look no further to see the destruction that
can result in crashes involving current double-trailer trucks than the
April 11, 2014, crash in Orland, California, when a Federal Express
double-trailer combination truck crashed into a Silverado Stages
motorcoach carrying 48 passengers, mostly high school students
traveling to visit a college; the crash injured dozens and killed ten
people including five teenagers.\56\ We strongly urge you to oppose any
increases to Federal truck length policy. It is unsafe, not supported
by data and unacceptable to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ 48 People Involved in Bus and FedEx Truck Crash on Interstate
5, CBS SF, Mercer, B., Apr. 11 2014, http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/
2014/04/11/48-people-involved-in-bus-and-fedex
-truck-crash-on-interstate-5-1-still-missing/.
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Mr. Chairman, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation led by this Subcommittee has drafted and enacted some of
the most significant lifesaving motor carrier laws that are protecting
motorists and commercial drivers from death and injury. The FMCSA
reauthorization provisions adopted in MAP-21 under the Subcommittee
leadership of the late Senator Frank Lautenberg resulted in advancing
overdue and needed reforms and improvements in truck and bus oversight
and enforcement. With truck crash deaths and injuries climbing these
past few years, it is critical to continue this legacy and address the
unfinished truck safety agenda.
We look forward to the opportunity of working with Members of this
Subcommittee to meet the challenges of enacting commonsense and cost-
effective truck safety measures in the MAP-21 reauthorization bill.
This concludes my testimony and I am prepared to answer any questions
the Subcommittee Members may have.
______
19 Years of Public Opinion Polls and the Response is Always the Same_
Consistent, Convincing and Compelling Opposition to Increasing Truck
Size and Weight Limits
2014
73 percent of Illinois residents and 77 percent of Missouri
residents oppose increasing the national cap on truck weight
from 80,000 to 97,000 pounds.
Source: SMART Heavy Truck Survey Series, March 2014
80 percent of residents of the West Virginia 3rd District
and 69 percent of Wisconsin residents oppose increasing the
national cap on truck weight from 80,000 to 97,000 pounds
Source: SMART Heavy Truck Survey Series, May 2014
2013
68 percent of Americans are opposed to heavier trucks.
88 percent of Americans oppose increased taxes to pay for
damage caused by heavier trucks.
Source: Lake Research Partners Poll, May 2013
75 percent of Kentucky residents oppose increasing the
national cap on truck weight from 80,000 to 97,000 pounds.
78 percent of the residents of the Illinois 3rd District and
74 percent of the Pennsylvania 9th District oppose increasing
the national cap on truck weight from 80,000 to 97,000 pounds.
72 percent of the residents of Kansas 1st and 2nd District,
the Iowa 3rd District, and the Colorado 4th District oppose
increasing the national cap on truck weight from 80,000 to
97,000 pounds.
Source: Poll taken 2013, SMART Heavy Truck Survey Series, May
2014
74 percent of the residents of the Indiana 4th District and
the Missouri 8th District oppose increasing the national cap on
truck weight from 80,000 to 97,000 pounds.
Source: Poll taken 2013, SMART Heavy Truck Survey Series, March
2014
2011
74 percent of Americans oppose the trucking industry's
efforts to have Congress change the current law and allow
heavier trucks on the roads.
Source: Lake Research Partners Poll, April 2011
Nearly three quarters of registered voters oppose increasing
the national cap on truck size from 80,000 to 97,000 pounds.
Source: Hart Research Associates, April 2011
2008
66 percent of Americans oppose changing the current law and
allowing trucks carrying heavier loads on U.S. highways.
``Support for the measure is anemic (only 16 percent favor the
efforts.) Opposition is deep and transcends gender, age,
political identification, and region.''
Eight out of ten (82 percent) Americans feel trucks pulling
double or triple trailers are more dangerous than those pulling
just a single trailer.
Source: Lake Research Partners Poll, May 2008
2004
By 77 percent to 16 percent, the public opposes increasing
truck weight limits.
80 percent of Americans believe that trucks with two or more
trailers are less safe than trucks with a single trailer.
Source: Lou Harris Poll, June 2004
1998
By 71 percent to 21 percent, a majority of the American
people are willing to pay higher prices for goods in exchange
for tougher truck safety standards.
Source: Lou Harris Poll, April 1998
1996
88 percent of Americans oppose allowing bigger and heavier
trucks on the highways.
80 percent are fully convinced that ``trucks pulling two or
more trailers are less safe than trucks pulling only one
trailer.''
Source: Lou Harris Poll, May 1996
Compiled by the Truck Safety Coalition, July 2014.
______
National Academies of Sciences (NAS) Peer Review Committee Report on
the FHWA Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Study Desk Scans
Highlights of NAS Report Criticisms
NAS Report Summary
1. The desk scans (literature review) were performed to support the
selected study methods rather than serving as the basis for the
selection of an analysis method, which is the an established research
practice. The desk scans often appear to be unrelated to the previously
selected methods and serves little purpose other than to provide
support for the previous determinations made in the study process.
a. ``in most cases the selection of methods appears not to have
been a consequence of the desk scans; that is, the scans were
not on the critical path of the study.'' (P. 1 of NAS Report)
2. The disconnect between the desk scans and study plans appears to
be a first example of bias or failure of the study to be conducted
properly, and may also reflect the tight schedule.
a. ``The constrained schedule imposed by the congressional
study charge may have precluded a more systematic approach to
evaluation and selection of methods.'' (P. 1)
3. Even where the method selected is the best available on-the-
shelf choice, no evaluation or comparison is made with other methods to
support the decision to use the selected method, which may be a further
indication of bias.
a. ``Nevertheless, even in cases where the best practical
method is evident, comparisons with alternatives are advisable
in order to demonstrate the superiority of the method
selected.'' (P. 1)
4. The NAS Report cited three elements that the desk scans were
missing which should be included in the final report as follows:
a. ``a synthesis of experience in applying alternative methods
of estimating each category of effect of changes in truck
characteristics, leading to an assessment of the current state
of understanding of the impact and needs for future research,
data collection, and evaluation''. (P. 2)
b. ``a critical synthesis of quantitative results of past
prospective and retrospective estimates of each category of
effect.'' (P. 2)
c. ``explain the sources of the differences between the new
USDOT estimates and those of past studies''. (P. 2)
5. None of the desk scans contained all three of the elements which
the NAS Peer Review Committee deemed necessary for the study to obtain
``full value from past work.'' This shows a lack of completeness and is
again evidence of bias.
a. ``None of the desk scans fully provides all three of these
elements.'' (P. 1-2)
6. The highway safety desk scan was lacking a method synthesis. The
safety method synthesis which did appear incorrectly in the project
plan lacked citations of the methods used. (P. 2)
7. The NAS Report states the mandated timeline may be affecting the
availability of optimal modeling approaches and data sources in a
negative manner by forcing the use of only those methods that are
readily available rather than developing better, optimal methods of
study were a longer time-frame considered an option.
a. ``In none of the five major analysis areas of the USDOT
study was the Committee able to fully identify modeling
approaches or data sources omitted from the desk scans that
would be clearly superior to those selected by the USDOT study
team (according to the descriptions of proposed analyses in the
project plans) and that would be available for use within the
congressionally imposed study deadline.'' (P. 2, emphasis
added)
8. The methods being used have significant weaknesses and
uncertainties which can have large consequences for the predicted net
impact. These methodological weaknesses were identified over a decade
ago and have not been addressed, revised or improved over the
intervening years.
a. ``The primary difficulties in projecting the consequences of
changes in truck size and weight limits are that the available
methods have significant weaknesses and that uncertainties that
are small in absolute terms (e.g., with regard to changes in
truck traffic volume and distribution resulting from a change
in regulations) can have large consequences for the net impact
of the regulatory change. For these reasons, the 2002 [National
Academy of Sciences] Transportation Research Board [TRB]
committee that reviewed past truck size and weight studies
concluded that ``it is not possible to predict the outcomes of
regulatory changes with high confidence'' (TRB 2002, 3). The
desk scans do not show that this shortcoming of such studies
has been greatly reduced. The recommended syntheses would be a
means of conveying the uncertainties in the USDOT report.'' (P.
2-3, emphasis added).
NAS Report Introduction
1. The NAS Report specifically highlights the constraints on the
study as a result of the congressional timeline.
a. ``USDOT faces significant time and resource constraints in
completing the CTSW study.'' (P. 5)
NAS Report General Observations
1. The NAS Report characterized the study plans as a ``missed
opportunity'' and found that two elements were incomplete in most of
the desk scans.
a. ``However, as a whole, the scans represent a missed
opportunity. Two elements that are incomplete in most of the
desk scans would have been most useful in conducting the CTSW
study: (a) identification of alternative methods, tools, and
data for estimating impacts of changes in size and weight
regulations that might have been applicable in the 2014 study
or in future USDOT evaluations of these regulations and (b)
syntheses of past studies that indicate reasonable ranges of
values for impact estimates and allow comparison of the 2014
study's estimates with those of past studies.'' (P. 7, emphasis
added.)
2. The NAS Report states that the study contractor appears to have
formulated the study plans first and conducted the literature review
(desk scans) second, which is the reverse of the normal procedure of
searching for all relevant and available studies, data and information
prior to making determinations about the best methods to be used. The
desk scans evidence numerous flaws. The basis for selecting certain
referenced works in the desk scans but not including other relevant
studies is unclear. Many works cited are not relevant and there is a
failure to reference the primary research literature, especially in the
highway safety desk scan (P. 35). This is further evidence of pervasive
bias and lack of objectivity and acceptable research practices. The
desk scans appear to be little more than a document dump rather than a
search for all applicable research on each topic in support of
developing an approach. In many cases, the desk scans omitted critical
research while including numerous unrelated works.
a. ``In most cases, the desk scans do not appear to have been
instrumental in developing the study team's analysis plans but
rather to have been prepared after the plans had been decided
on.'' (P. 7, emphasis added)
3. The NAS Report indicates that the time constraints of the study
may have forced the approach taken in the desk scans. However, this may
be a convenient cover for the contractor's selection of pre-determined
methods. Had the recommendations of the previous NAS/TRB study (2002)
been undertaken many of these shortcomings in the desk scans and
project plans could have been addressed.
a. ``This outcome of the desk scans may have been inevitable,
given the compressed time span of the study, which would have
necessitated early selection of analysis methods. If an ongoing
Federal program of monitoring and evaluation of trucking
regulations, as recommended by the 2002 TRB truck size and
weight study (TRB 2002, 6), had been in place, the priorities
and analysis alternatives for the 2014 study could have been
established at the outset.'' (P. 8)
4. The desk scans should have included a synthesis of findings from
past studies which would help identify ``which uncertainties [in
estimated impacts] critically hinder decision making on the
regulations'' (P. 8), and provide comparisons for findings of current
study.
5. The study needs coordination between subject areas, fails to
explain the structure of the overall study, and does not ensure
datasets used in multiple areas are used consistently (like weigh in
motion data which is used in four areas; bridge, pavement, modal shift,
enforcement).
a. ``an overall or crosscutting desk scan and plan for the CTSW
study are needed to ensure that the work is coordinated and to
allow interested parties to understand the structure of the
study.'' (P. 9)
b. ``For example, weigh-in-motion (WIM) data are needed in the
bridge, pavement, modal shift, and enforcement analyses. None
of the desk scans contains a complete discussion of WIM data
quality issues relevant to the study or of the accuracy of
weight data required for each of the study analyses.'' (P. 9)
NAS Report Comments on Individual Desk Scans
Bridge Structure
1. Thoroughness:
a. The desk scan is missing a comparison of alternative
methods, especially disconcerting in light of previous NAS/TRB
findings that methods in previous studies could not produce
satisfactory results. Without such a comparison, the
contractors are set to repeat the failures of the previous
study.
i. ``The desk scan does not include a comparative
evaluation of alternative methods of assessing bridge
costs of changes in size and weight limits. This
omission is especially unfortunate if the conclusion of
the Committee that conducted the 2002 [NAS] TRB truck
size and weight study (TRB 2002, 3) that `the methods
used in past studies have not produced satisfactory
estimates of the effect of changes in truck weights on
bridge costs' is accepted.'' (P. 11)
b. References selected appear to only support the pre-selected
method of analysis rather than being a summary of available
methods, data, etc. in support of the selection of an optimal
method. Another example of bias.
i. ``The references selected for inclusion in the
bibliography appear to be primarily those that are
necessary to support a predetermined plan of analysis
for the CTSW study.'' (P. 11, emphasis added)
c. The desk scan ignores relevant past studies.
i. ``The desk scan does not review the results of past
studies of the effects of changes in truck traffic on
bridges.'' (P. 11)
d. The desk scan does not identify data resources and methods
for carrying out all of the analyses that are required by
statute.
i. ``The desk scan does not identify resources for
carrying out each of the MAP-21 required analyses
related to bridges in the CTSW study. Estimates of the
costs to the public of the bridge impacts of changes in
truck traffic (e.g., costs of traffic disturbance of
bridge closings and bridge construction) and assessment
of the owners' abilities to recover their costs are
presumably being carried out in other tasks of the CTSW
study; methods of conducting such estimates are not
discussed in the bridge desk scan (although some of the
references cited may contain estimates of these
costs).'' (P. 12)
e. In addition, the desk scan did not identify methods or data
sources to support related analyses of impacts on barriers,
medians, or railings. (P. 12)
f. The District of Columbia Department of Transportation
(DCDOT) study, which is to serve as the basis for the bridge
analysis, is unpublished and there is no summary in the desk
scan. DC is a small largely urban region with a limited number
of bridges.
i. ``The desk scan describes a 2010 truck size and
weight study conducted for the District of Columbia
Department of Transportation (DCDOT) as (p. 18) `a
basis of this study.' The DCDOT study is unpublished,
and the absence of a summary of it in the desk scan
appears to be a significant omission.'' (P. 12,
emphasis added.)
g. The desk scan did not cite all major relevant sources that
are applicable or describe the shortcomings of the data. (P.
12) These omissions are not explained.
2. Missing Literature, Studies, Models or Data:
a. The desk scan is missing in-depth reviews of studies of
deterioration, while other cited studies aren't clearly related
to the topic.
i. ``The desk scan lacks in-depth review of studies of
causes of deck deterioration, deck deterioration
modeling, and deck deterioration quantification. The
relevance to the CTSW study of some of the references
on decks cited in Section 3.3 of the desk scan is
unclear.'' (P. 14)
b. The desk scan review regarding fatigue is focused on fatigue
vulnerability and not on expected change in fatigue life due to
increased truck loads.
c. The review of methods and results of past estimates of
bridge shear effects is insufficient.
d. The resources cited for Cost Allocation Study Methods and
Methodology appear insufficient to execute the analyses
planned.
3. Interpretation of Literature Reviewed:
a. The desk scan appears to misinterpret at least two of the
cited studies. At least one of which could offer an alternative
analysis method which should have been compared with the
selected analysis method.
4. Conclusions:
a. ``Desk scan lacks synthesis of analysis methods or of
results of past estimates concerning the effects of changes in
size and weight limits.'' (P. 15)
Pavement
1. Thoroughness:
a. A more systematic review of certain topics would have
reinforced creditability of estimates and ensure that
alternative methods were not overlooked. The errors and
omissions of the desk scan noted below reflect either
incompetence on the part of the contractor or willful omission
in support of pre-selected methods.
i. No citation of cost model being used and no
comparison with alternative models.
ii. No review of the data required for the modeling or
alternative data sources, and no discussion of
shortcomings of the data and method which could affect
reliability of impact estimates.
iii. Pavement sections identified for use in the
analysis may not be appropriate or may be outdated.
1. ``many LTPP [long-term pavement performance]
sections [which the study plans to use] are
more than 20 years old or were special test
sections, and therefore they may not be typical
of current practices.'' (P. 18)
iv. Studies and programs noted in the project plan do
not appear in the desk scan.
v. There is no discussion of the selected pavement
model program in terms of its known drawbacks and
limitations, a standard feature of good research and
scientific method. No comparison with alternative
models.
2. Missing Literature, Studies, Models or Data:
a. The committee indicated that there is research which is
ongoing and will not be available in time for the study.
b. This ongoing research should have been cited to indicate
limitations of present model and likely future improvements.
3. Interpretation of Literature Reviewed:
a. One-third of the desk scan is devoted to wide tire research
while the model selected for analysis is unable to quantify
wide tire impacts. No discussion of this contradiction is
included. The industry is moving towards increased use of wide
tires and the inability of the model selected for the analysis
to address this is a serious problem.
4. Conclusions:
a. While the NAS Report concludes that the method selected is
``reasonable'', it is not necessarily the correct, the most
appropriate, or even the best available method. The NAS Report
points out the following problems with the desk scan:
i. Synthesis of past studies is cursory.
ii. Desk scan needs synthesis of alternative methods to
compare with selected method of analysis.
iii. Desk scan needs synthesis of estimates of impacts.
iv. While the model selected for the analysis appears
correct, its success will depend on the selection of
sample pavements not being biased.
v. Desk scan mentions other analysis methods as a
backup but provides no indication that these
alternative methods are workable.
Modal Shift
1. Thoroughness:
a. The models selected have weaknesses which were identified in
the prior truck size and weight study (FHWA 2000). The
congressional timeline or bias may be leading the contractor to
use a sub-optimal method.
i. ``The diversion projections of the mode shift models
are not compared in terms of their utility or
credibility for their intended applications. This
omission is especially important in view of the
limitations of the Intermodal Transportation and
Inventory Cost (ITIC) model chosen for use in the CTSW
study.'' (P. 23)
1. No discussion/comparison of previous
results, reliability, uncertainty, or
projections with outcomes.
2. Problems with the ITIC model noted
previously in the 2000 USDOT study.
3. The committee notes that the time schedule
of the study prevents development of an
aggregate econometric model.
4. No discussion of the suitability of the ITIC
model to perform the analyses proposed.
ii. More mode choice models, beyond those only used in
past truck size and weight evaluations, must be
reviewed. Alternative methods have been overlooked.
1. No overview of fundamental concepts of modal
diversion beyond previous studies of truck size
and weight.
2. Desk scan is not comprehensive.
a. The scan includes hardly any sources
from the academic literature, which is
unfortunate since recent studies on
logistics analysis may help inform the
ITIC model.
3. Desk scan lacking in discussion and
references for effect of limit changes on
volume of freight traffic.
a. NAS Report notes an ongoing research
project which may review the ITIC model
and will be ready at the end of 2014.
iii. Methods of estimating the effects of mode shift on
other areas of the study (safety, cost, pavement, etc.)
are not adequately covered.
1. Effects on infrastructure not covered by
that topic analysis must be addressed (for
example changes to rail yards, transfer
facilities).
2. Effect on cost responsibilities to shippers,
carriers and consumers.
3. Effect on fuel efficiency: need to examine
bottom-up vs. top-down analysis which has been
shown to have problems.
4. Effect on environment focused only on
greenhouse gases but not on other particulates.
2. Missing Literature, Studies, Models or Data:
a. The NAS Report points out a number of studies which were not
referenced in terms of alternative models and estimates of
various effects.
3. Interpretation of Literature Reviewed:
a. The desk scan contained inadequate comparisons of ITIC model
and alternative models, or potential shortcomings of ITIC
model.
b. Limitations and assumptions used in the ITIC model must be
addressed.
4. Conclusions:
a. Limited synthesis of the literature.
i. Desk scan needs a synthesis of alternative methods,
reliability and applicability to establish the state of
the art.
ii. Desk scan needs a summary of past results for
comparisons with current study findings.
iii. Desk scan must support selection of the method
rather than desk scan supporting a pre-selected method.
Yet another example of the impact of bias.
1. ``The committee's overall impression of the
desk scan is that its intent is to justify a
prior decision about the method to be used in
the CTSW study. There is not a logical flow
from literature review to synthesis to
conclusion. The desk scan represents more a
listing of reports and literature, followed by
a conclusion that is likely based on
availability of models, time to complete the
study, familiarity with the methods, and
budget.'' (P. 29)
Highway Safety
1. Thoroughness:
a. The desk scan fails to document and support the methods
selected and does not account for problems with the data and
the influence of other regulations upon the safety of large
trucks.
i. Alternative methods proposed in the project plan are
not documented completely in the desk scan.
ii. While the desk scan discusses regulations in other
countries, no review of studies of the effectiveness of
these regulations is provided.
iii. NAS Report warns against comparing the safety of
alternative configurations with special rules against
current fleet without such rules for policy analysis.
iv. NAS Report advises that in light of past research,
the safety analysis must account for the driver's
influence on crash risk. Desk scan should describe the
design of past studies that have measured this effect.
v. No citation of the models to be used in the analysis
or the sources for input to these models.
vi. No examination of impact of regulatory changes on
work zone safety.
2. Missing Literature, Studies, Models or Data:
a. The NAS Report notes at least 6 relevant studies are not
cited by the desk scan, one of which specifically notes ``brake
defects may be a more serious issue with increased weight'' and
another which shows that ``crash injury is higher in double or
triple trailer than in single trailer crashes.'' (P. 35) Since
these studies all indicate the negative impact of larger
trucks, their omission is indicative of bias.
b. The desk scan completely fails to include the safety
findings of the 2000 FHWA comprehensive truck size and weight
study which found that in nationwide use multiple-trailer
configurations would have an 11 percent higher fatal crash rate
than single trailer trucks.
3. Conclusions:
a. The desk scans fails in a number of areas, providing no
justification or explanation for the selected methods or
assumptions made.
i. Fails to address critical methodological issues, and
some observations are ``open to debate''. (P. 36).
Findings regarding methods (models and data) should be
separated from results of past safety studies.
ii. Desk scan should have cited the basis for any
findings presented to allow the reader to judge the
strength of the finding.
iii. Synthesis of alternative methods and comparisons
of findings would be helpful. No critique of the
alternative case-control method and no justification
for not considering this alternative. The case-control
method is the gold standard for this type of study.
iv. Safety analysis must consider the impact of all
effects of regulatory changes (on traffic volume,
traffic distribution, enforcement, work zones etc.) on
overall safety rather than limiting the safety analysis
exclusively to changes in average crash involvement
rates by configuration.
Enforcement and Compliance
1. Thoroughness:
a. Missing discussion of future enforcement using new and
emerging technologies.
2. Missing Literature, Studies, Models or Data:
a. Insufficient sources for examining cost and effectiveness of
enforcement.
b. More detailed discussion needed of limitation of data
sources.
c. No description of how data limitations will be addressed.
d. No sources for ``potentially important categories of
enforcement costs'' (inspection times, replacing scales).
e. No discussion of economic research on optimal fine levels.
3. Interpretation of Literature Reviewed:
a. The NAS Report is concerned that that the contractor
incorrectly concludes that compliance with trucks size and
weight laws should be viewed as a cost to the industry. And
although not specifically mentioned in the NAS Report, the
contractor falsely assumes that there would be complete
compliance with any new regulatory regime.
i. ``The desk scan uncritically reports a statement of
the 2002 [NAS/]TRB truck size and weight study (TRB
2002) that rigorous weight enforcement could increase
overall truck shipping costs.'' (P. 41)
ii. ``The proceeds of illegal activities should not be
regarded as benefits to society in benefit-cost
analysis of enforcement programs (Trumbull 1990).'' (P.
41)
4. Conclusion:
a. A synthesis of results from prior studies is not presented.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Major Palmer?
STATEMENT OF MAJOR DAVID PALMER, PAST PRESIDENT, COMMERCIAL
VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE
Major Palmer. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Blunt, members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for holding this important
hearing and for inviting the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
to testify.
My name is David Palmer, and I am a Major and commissioned
law enforcement officer with the Texas Department of Public
Safety, and a past President of CVSA.
The Alliance represents state, provincial, and Federal
commercial vehicle safety officials responsible for the
enforcement of commercial motor carrier safety laws in the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.
CVSA has a number of recommendations for improving truck
and bus safety. Uniformity and consistency in enforcement are
essential cornerstones of an effective program. It is
imperative that the enforcement community be provided clear and
enforceable regulations, and exemptions must be minimized.
Changes to regulations when necessary need to be science
based and data driven. Further, much can be done to streamline
the current grant process--eliminating redundancies in the
administrative process, allowing state personnel to focus our
resources on program delivery rather than administration.
In addition, we must be given the tools to effectively
enforce those regulations and the funding that is commensurate
with the responsibilities.
As inspectors and law enforcement officers, it is critical
that we have clear enforceable regulations in order to have
uniform and effective enforcement. The recent effort to suspend
enforcement of a portion of the hours-of-service regulations
while a study is conducted is an example of practices that
needlessly complicate the regulations and enforcement. As a law
enforcement officer, if I do not understand the rules, I cannot
enforce them properly.
The hours-of-service regulations are complicated enough to
enforce as it, and the nearly constant change and uncertainty
in the rules undermines enforcement. Further, every time the
regulations change, we have to spend time and resources re-
training our officers and inspectors, taking them out of the
field, and diverting scarce resources from other tasks.
With approximately 13,000 CVSA-certified inspectors in the
field, organizing and delivering training in all 50 states is a
significant task. This is particularly wasteful considering
that after the study, the provisions may be upheld, resulting
in a new round of training and even more confusion for both
industry and enforcement.
CVSA does not oppose conducting a study. Regulations should
be written to maximize safety while not overburdening
enforcement or our Nation's critical commercial vehicle
industry, but the appropriate time to make any changes is after
sound research has demonstrated a need and not before.
While we recognize the hours-of-service regulations must be
written in a manner that meets the Nation's safety needs and is
respectful of the needs of the trucking industry, meeting these
needs by shifting the burden to the enforcement community is
not a responsible solution.
Another example of a policy that has resulted in additional
burden on the enforcement community is the covered farm vehicle
exemption included in MAP-21. Exemptions often compromise
safety and always complicate enforcement, and should therefore
only be granted in extreme cases.
The covered farm vehicle exemption was intended to exempt a
large portion of agricultural vehicles from Federal safety
regulations. However, the exemption language left a lot open to
interpretation. The end result is an exemption intended to
provide relief to the agricultural community, which has created
confusion, inconsistency, and frustration, both for industry
and enforcement. Most importantly, we do not know its impact on
safety.
Much can be done to improve CMV safety. The regulations
must be clear and enforceable. The states must be given funding
commensurate with their responsibilities. New and expanded
responsibilities mean improvements in safety, but only if we
are able to effectively implement those policies.
Grant programs must provide states with flexibility,
allowing us to meet our responsibilities through creative state
specific solutions.
The administrative burden associated with grant
applications and reports should be minimized, allowing the
states to focus on our mission. We believe there are a number
of opportunities to streamline the grants, providing relief to
the states.
We must have accurate data on which to build our programs
and to access safety technologies and systems that help us meet
our goal of saving lives, preventing crashes, and taking the
unsafe carriers off the road. Simply put, we must ensure that
the state enforcement agencies are given the tools we need to
succeed.
We look forward to working with this committee, FMCSA, and
the motor carrier industry to meet our shared goal of reduced
deaths and injuries on our Nation's roads.
I look forward to answering your questions, and I want to
just say thank you.
[The prepared statement of Major Palmer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major David Palmer, Past President,
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for holding this important hearing and for
inviting the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) to share our
thoughts on ``Opportunities and Challenges for Improving Truck Safety
on our Highways''.
My name is David Palmer and I am testifying here today in my role
as a past President and Board Member of the Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance. CVSA is an international organization representing State,
Provincial, and Federal officials responsible for the administration
and enforcement of commercial motor carrier safety laws in the United
States (U.S.), Canada and Mexico. We work to improve commercial vehicle
safety and security on the highways by bringing Federal, State,
Provincial and Local truck and bus regulatory, safety, and enforcement
agencies together with industry representatives to solve problems.
Every state in the U.S., all Canadian Provinces and Territories, the
country of Mexico, and all U.S. Territories and possessions are CVSA
members. The ultimate objective of what CVSA strives for is to save
lives.
The Federal Government entrusts the states with the responsibility
of enforcing the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) and
the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMRs). To meet that
responsibility, Congress provides funding to the states, through the
Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) and a number of other
focused safety grant programs. The states use these funds to conduct
enforcement activities, train enforcement personnel, purchase necessary
equipment, update software and other technology, and conduct outreach
and education campaigns to raise awareness related to CMV safety
issues. The funds are used, in part, to pay the salaries of more than
13,000 full and part time CMV safety professionals. These people
conduct more than 3.4 million CMV roadside inspections, 34,000 new
entrant safety audits, and 6,000 compliance reviews each year.\1\ The
goal of these programs, which are administered by the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), is to reduce CMV-involved
crashes, fatalities, and injuries through consistent, uniform, and
effective CMV safety programs. The programs seek to identify safety
defects, driver deficiencies, and unsafe motor carrier practices and
remove them from the Nation's roadways.
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\1\ Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 2012-2016 Strategic
Plan. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. May 2012.
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The good news is that the program works. The benefits of the MCSAP
are well documented, and every dollar invested in the State programs
yields a big return for taxpayers. According to research and figures
from FMCSA, CVSA estimates that the MCSAP has an estimated benefit to
cost ratio of 18:1. Every roadside inspection conducted yields an
estimated $2,400 in safety benefits. And, of course, effective
enforcement of the FMCSRs helps save lives every day, keeping dangerous
vehicles and unqualified drivers off the Nation's roads. In 2001, the
number of registered large trucks and buses was just over 8.6 million.
Since then, that number has grown 35 percent, to 11.6 million in 2010.
Despite this increase, the number of fatalities due to crashes
involving large trucks and buses has gone down 27 percent. The number
of CMV crash-related injuries also decreased over that time frame by 30
percent.\2\ These improvements in CMV safety were achieved, in part,
through investments in the MCSAP.
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\2\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2010: Final Version, FMCSA-RRA-
12-023. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. August 2012.
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While the program is effective in reducing crashes and saving
lives, there is more work to be done. Ensuring clarity in the
regulations, providing adequate funding for and improving the
efficiency of the grant programs, and establishing policies that allow
states and industry to take full advantage of technology will help
prevent crashes, minimize injuries, and save lives, ultimately making
our Nation's roadways safer.
Ensuring Clear and Enforceable Regulations
Uniformity and consistency are essential cornerstones of an
effective program. Despite this fact, however, there are a number of
policies and practices that complicate the program, undermining
uniformity and consistency, and detracting from the efficiency of the
MCSAP. Confusion and inconsistencies create more work for the
enforcement community, as well as industry. Inconsistencies and
exceptions within the regulations require more training and create more
opportunities for mistakes to be made, which in turn require additional
resources to address.
1. Improving the Regulatory Framework
The foundation of an effective regulatory enforcement program is
quality, uniform, and consistent enforcement activities. It is
imperative that those subject to Federal regulations understand their
responsibilities and that those tasked with enforcing the safety
regulations can do so effectively to ensure the quality and uniformity
of the more than four million roadside inspections conducted annually
throughout North America. Over time, additional regulatory authority,
coupled with changes to the industry and technological advancements can
result in inconsistent, outdated, and redundant regulatory language.
With each year come additional requirements from Congress, aimed at
advancing CMV safety. In addition, FMCSA receives and responds to
petitions for changes to the FMCSRs from the CMV community. As Congress
and FMCSA work to improve CMV safety, unintentional inconsistencies can
slowly work their way into the regulatory framework. These
inconsistencies can lead to confusion among both the regulated and
enforcement communities.
To address this, CVSA supports requiring FMCSA to conduct a full
review of the FMCSRs every 5 years, in collaboration with CVSA and
industry, geared towards reducing, enhancing, and streamlining the
regulations, eliminating outdated or duplicative regulations,
clarifying those that need adjustment, etc. While this puts additional
administrative burden on FMCSA, the benefits and savings that will
accrue across the country for enforcement, industry, and the public
justify the endeavor.
Furthermore, work is needed to bring the safety regulations in line
with regulatory guidance, interpretations, and policy memos issued by
the agency. At times, FMCSA issues guidance documents to correct
technical errors in published rules or to clarify vague regulatory
language within the safety regulations while improvements to the
regulations make their way through the rulemaking process, which can
take years to accomplish. However, the number of full rulemakings that
can make it through the agency in any given year is limited by staff
and funding, and a number of higher profile rules tend to push simple
technical changes back in the queue. As a result, disconnects develop
between written regulations, regulatory guidance, interpretations, and
policy. Regular review and updating of the FMCSRs and HMRs would help
to reduce these disconnects, providing an established process for
identifying and resolving inconsistencies in policy, bringing the
regulations in line with published guidance.
With regards to the various petitions for changes to the FMCSRs
from the CMV community to FMCSA, CVSA supports requiring that petitions
be published in the Federal Register upon receipt and that the agency
subsequently publish a notice of action taken on each petition. This
would benefit both the agency and the regulated community, allowing for
input early in the process, addressing potential issues before they
become problems. It will notify those interested in CMV safety and the
FMCSRs of areas of interest to others in the regulated CMV community,
which can foster conversation that could lead to solutions and
consensus building. FMCSA would benefit from input it receives in
response to petitions, which could help inform the agency's thinking on
the requested changes. FMCSA could put a process in place similar to
that found in 49 USC Sec. 31315(b)(4), which provides for notice and
comment on exemption requests received by the agency.
2. Exemptions
In general, exemptions from Federal safety regulations have the
potential to undermine safety, while also complicating the enforcement
process. First and foremost, safety regulations exist to protect those
who use our Nation's roadways. The FMCSRs and HMRs exist to ensure that
those operating in the transportation industry are equipped to do it
safely. Furthermore, every new exemption is an opportunity for
confusion and inconsistency in enforcement, diverting scarce resources
from other activities and undermining the program's effectiveness.
We recognize that there may be instances when exemptions could be
appropriate and also not compromise safety. In those instances, 49 USC
Sec. 31315(b) already provides a mechanism for those in industry to
obtain an exemption through FMCSA. This process includes providing for
an equivalent level of safety, requiring that the exemption ``would
likely achieve a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater
than, the level that would be achieved absent such exemption.'' In
addition, exemptions obtained through this process are limited to a
maximum of two years (subject to renewal), which provides oversight to
ensure that safety is not compromised, as well as an opportunity to
eliminate exemptions that have not maintained an equivalent level of
safety. This is the proper model.
In contrast, exemptions obtained through legislation do not always
include safety considerations and are difficult to remove once
established. Because a process exists for industry to pursue exemptions
through an administrative process, CVSA opposes the inclusion of
exemptions from Federal safety regulations in legislation. At the very
least, when exemptions are included in legislation, CVSA supports
requiring the inclusion of a ``safety clause'' as a part of any
exemption statutorily enacted, similar to that in 49 USC Sec. 31315(b),
providing for an equivalent level of safety, as well as language that
would allow for the elimination of the exemption if an equivalent level
of safety cannot be demonstrated.
Another approach could be to require that, before any legislative
exemption from Federal safety regulations goes into effect, a pilot
program be conducted to evaluate the safety impacts of such an
exemption. The exemption would then go into effect automatically,
unless the pilot program demonstrates that an equivalent, or enhanced,
level of safety has not been achieved. Going forward the exemption
would be monitored on a routine basis, to ensure that an equivalent
level of safety is maintained over time.
3. Hours of Service Regulations
The hours-of-service (HOS) regulations for commercial drivers are
arguably the single-most important regulation to the motor carrier
industry, sitting at the confluence of safety and productivity. As
evidence of the importance of these rules to the public, there have
been over 50,000 comments to the rulemakings on this issue over the
last 10 years, as well as numerous studies and research to improve
safety on our Nation's roads.
The HOS regulations are important because of their clear
correlation with safety. HOS violations are, by far, the most often
cited violations by inspectors during roadside inspections. HOS
violations represent seven of the top 13 violations documented during
roadside inspections thus far in 2014, including the number one
violation. These seven violations represent 41 percent of the total
driver violations documented. We also know that drivers who are cited
roadside with an HOS violation are 45 percent more likely to be in a
future crash than the average driver.\3\ In addition, driver factors
and fatigue are significant contributors to large truck and bus
crashes. In nine out of 10 instances, driver factors have some level of
contribution to the crash.\4\ This data indicates how important these
rules are to safety, and why we need to be measured in our approach to
dealing with them.
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\3\ Predicting Truck Crash Involvement: A 2011 Update. American
Transportation Research Institute. April 2011.
\4\ Report to Congress on the Large Truck Crash Causation Study.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. March 2006.
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Recently, there has been an effort to temporarily suspend
enforcement of a portion of these regulations while their impacts and
efficacy are evaluated. CVSA opposes any efforts to temporarily suspend
enforcement of any portion of the regulations. The HOS regulations are
first and foremost safety regulations, not efficiency or productivity
regulations. While the regulations certainly should and need to take
into account the economic impacts to the industry that is not what they
are principally designed to do. Legislating temporary changes to the
HOS rules creates significant uniformity and consistency problems
across the country. The impact of such an approach will create
unnecessary upheaval for the states and cause significant operational
and budgetary impacts on their enforcement efforts.
The HOS regulations are already complicated to comprehend and
enforce and any change requires that the states retrain their
inspectors. With approximately 13,000 CVSA-certified inspectors in the
field, organizing and delivering training in all 50 states is a
significant task. Each state is structured differently, and the
resources needed to develop and deliver training are significant.
Temporarily suspending enforcement of a regulation not only takes
inspection personnel away from their routine enforcement duties, which
impacts on their target enforcement goals in the State Commercial
Vehicle Safety Plans (CVSP), but it also requires the expenditure of
unplanned resources, which impacts on State budgets. Add to this any
information technology (IT) changes, such as software modifications,
and additional training to accommodate rule changes increases the
resource commitment. All for a temporary change that could very well
result in no permanent change to the regulations after the review is
complete.
In addition, constant change causes confusion for both industry and
enforcement. Compliance and the determination thereof are nearly
impossible because the rules have changed so often over the last 10
years, and have become so complicated that no one can keep pace with
the changes. This constant back and forth also has resulted in a number
of narrow interpretations on exceptions and exemptions, further
complicating enforcement and undermining uniformity.
While there certainly have been legitimate concerns raised by the
regulated industry on the impacts of the new rules, the Administrative
Procedures Act is there for a reason and it needs to be followed. The
importance of these rules cannot be understated, and to make changes
without the appropriate analysis of their impacts or without providing
appropriate due process and adequate time to implement them is
irresponsible policy.
There has not been a comprehensive analysis of the safety impacts
of the newly (2013) enacted regulations, nor has there been any
analysis comparing the existing regulations versus the previous
regulations. To enact temporary changes without having a full
understanding of these impacts through an open and transparent process
is not in the best interests of the public. We need to be data driven
and fact based in our decision making. To this end, CVSA supports a
comprehensive study on the safety and operational impacts of the HOS
regulations, during which the current rules should remain in place.
Once this analysis has been completed, only then would it be
appropriate to consider any changes or adjustments through the
rulemaking process. The rules are designed to help keep all drivers
safe, both commercial and other road users, and it is our job to
protect them.
4. Electronic Logging Devices
The rulemaking currently underway at FMCSA on electronic logging
devices (ELDs) for HOS compliance provides another example. There has
been a significant amount of attention paid to ensuring that the new
regulations take into account the needs of industry, in order to ease
the burden. However, the regulations must be written with all end users
in mind, including the enforcement community. CVSA strongly supports
the use of ELDs for HOS compliance enforcement. However, if the
regulations are not clear and designed to be enforceable, they will not
be effective. One of the key considerations is the transmission of the
HOS compliance data from the driver to the inspector. If inspectors
cannot easily and reliably retrieve data from ELDs roadside the devices
are of little value. To that end, in our comments to the docket, CVSA
recommended that, prior to implementation, FMCSA conduct a
comprehensive study of current State technology/communication
capabilities for CVSA-certified inspectors and identify what steps
would be necessary to ensure that all certified inspectors will be able
to access data roadside in an effective, efficient, and secure manner.
This study should be completed and made publicly available prior to the
agency issuing a Final Rule. The ELD rulemaking has the potential to
improve HOS compliance and enforcement, but only if the inspectors are
given the tools they need to properly utilize the devices. This fact
must be a consideration in the development of the Final Rule.
5. Truck Size and Weight Limits
There have been efforts recently to make changes to the current
Federal truck size and weight restrictions. To address this, Congress
included in the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-
21) a requirement that the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)
conduct a Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Limits Study.\5\ As
required in MAP-21, the study will provide data on accident frequency
and evaluate factors related to accident risk for vehicles that operate
in excess of size and weight limits. DOT is also directed to evaluate
the impact to the infrastructure in states that allow a vehicle to
operate in excess of size and weight limits. Additionally, DOT is
instructed to look at a number of specific vehicle configurations, as
well as existing programs and research throughout the world. Further,
Congress directed DOT to look specifically at several factors,
including the impact of various changes to restrictions on safety and
enforceability. CVSA was a strong advocate for such a study during the
reauthorization discussion prior to passage of MAP-21. DOT is currently
in the process of conducting the study and any changes to the Federal
size and/or weight limits prior to its completion would be premature.
In MAP-21, Congress recognized the need for additional research into
several specific areas before changes to the Federal CMV size and
weight limits are considered. CVSA opposes any changes to Federal CMV
size and weight limits until the study mandated by Congress in MAP-21
has been completed.
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\5\ Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act of 2012. Pub.
L. No. 112-141. Sec. 32801.
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CVSA recognizes that the discussion on commercial vehicle size and
weight limits is much broader than just safety considerations. There
are environmental, quality of life, productivity, economic
competitiveness, and impacts to infrastructure, such as roads and
bridges that must also be considered. CVSA understands that once the
study has been completed, it is possible that changes will be made to
the current limits. In these instances, CVSA supports ensuring that any
change in policy is enforceable and based on objective, scientific
evidence. Changes to the current limits must be clearly defined so that
both industry and enforcement understand what is permitted. Further,
policy should be written with enforceability in mind, ensuring that
states have the funds and tools necessary to do their job effectively.
Maintaining Effective and Fully Funded Grant Programs
With each new transportation bill, the states are tasked with
additional enforcement and oversight responsibilities. At the same
time, the motor carrier industry continues to grow. It is imperative
that states have the funds necessary to effectively develop and
implement their CMV safety programs. Flexibility within the safety
grant programs is also a key consideration, allowing states to meet
their responsibilities through creative, State-specific solutions.
There are also a number of streamlining recommendations that will
improve the efficiency of the grant programs.
1. Providing Adequate Resources
As discussed above, the MCSAP, as administered by the states, has
been successful in reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities on our
Nation's roadways, despite a steady increase in the number of CMVs
operating on those roads. In order to maintain this downward trend in
CMV crashes and fatalities, the MCSAP must be adequately funded.
According to FMCSA, the agency regulates approximately 500,000
active interstate motor carriers, including 12,000 passenger carriers,
and seven million active commercial driver licensees (CDL holders). The
State and Local agencies that receive MCSAP funding are responsible for
ensuring that those 500,000 motor carriers, vehicles, and drivers are
operating safely. Furthermore, the CMV enforcement landscape is
constantly evolving and changing as Congress and FMCSA work to refine
and improve the FMCSRs and HMRs.
The MCSAP will only continue to be successful if it is adequately
funded. New and expanded responsibilities mean improvements in safety,
but only in so much as the states are able to effectively implement
those policies. It is critical that Congress and FMCSA ensure that, as
new programs are created and new responsibilities are assigned, funding
is provided to the states, avoiding any unfunded mandates. Otherwise,
funds are spread thinly across programs, reducing effectiveness across
the board.
For example, changes made in MAP-21 set a more aggressive timeline
for conducting Safety Audits on new motor carriers, placing additional
demands on the states conducting the audits. In addition, the program
has become more rigorous over the years, with additional requirements
on tracking, reviewing, and conducting the Safety Audits. While these
changes are considered valuable, when combined with the decreasing
buying power of each dollar, the end result is that it costs states
more to implement the program each year. Meanwhile, the number of
carriers entering the industry each year is increasing, and therefore
the demand for New Entrant Safety Audits, continues to grow.\6\ In
order to meet that growing demand and ensure the success of the New
Entrant Safety Assurance Program, it is critical that the states are
provided with funding commensurate with program demand.
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\6\ Notice: New Entrant Safety Audit Assurance Program Operational
Test. FMCSA-2013-0298. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
September 4, 2013.
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To help ensure that states receive the funding necessary to fully
meet their responsibilities, CVSA recommends increasing the Federal
grant match for several of the current grant programs. This will reduce
the burden on states, while helping to ensure effective oversight of
the motor carrier industry. At the very least, moderate increases in
funding levels are necessary to keep pace with inflation, as stagnant
funding levels result in decreased buying power year to year.
While adequate funding is imperative to an effective MCSAP, we
recognize that the issue of funding for the Federal transportation
program is a complicated one, with no easy solutions. Future funding
for the MCSAP is directly tied to the long-term solvency of the Highway
Trust Fund. CVSA supports ongoing efforts to identify sustainable,
long-term revenue sources to address the Highway Trust Fund solvency,
in order to ensure stability for the MCSAP.
In the event that no new revenue is available, CVSA urges Congress
to ensure that MCSAP grant funding is not reduced, but remains at the
levels set by MAP-21. According to a report completed for FMCSA in
2007, the average ``cost'' (including wages and benefits) of a State
safety inspector was estimated at $66,052.51.\7\ This means that for
every $1 million invested in the MCSAP, 15 jobs are created or
maintained. Conversely, every $1 million reduction in MCSAP funding
results in jobs lost or positions unfilled at the State level. When
states see a reduction in their MCSAP funding, resulting in jobs lost,
their programs are reduced and fewer inspections, compliance reviews,
and safety audits are conducted, reducing the safety benefit of such
activities discussed above and undermining years of improvement in CMV
safety.
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\7\ Roadside Inspection Costs. Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. October 2007.
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2. Improving Program Flexibility
One way to improve the MCSAP is to provide states with additional
flexibility in how they spend their Basic MCSAP grant funds. CVSA
believes that explicit language limiting how a state can spend grant
funds in statute, regulation, or FMCSA policy should be minimized.
Instead, the statutory and regulatory construction, as well as policy
from FMCSA, should focus on setting broad parameters, program elements,
goals, and expected outcomes for a program and, by using the annual
CVSP as the mechanism for monitoring and evaluation, allow the states
to determine how best to meet those expectations. For example, CVSA
supports increasing the funding cap on traffic enforcement activities
not associated with an inspection from five percent to ten percent.
This will allow states to allocate their resources as they see fit,
giving them additional flexibility to address State-wide or regional
issues, such as speeding or aggressive driving, more effectively.
As another example, in 2010, FMCSA issued a policy memorandum to
State Program Managers. In the memo, FMCSA advised the states that the
recently completed Large Truck Crash Causation Study, completed in
2006, indicated that driver behavior is more likely to be the cause of
a CMV crash than any other factor. As such, the agency instructed
states to focus their inspection efforts on drivers. They instructed
states to increase the number of Level III (driver-only) inspections to
``meet or exceed the national average of 30 percent of all inspections
performed.'' \8\ In this instance, instead of prescribing rigid and
prescriptive parameters across the board that may not make sense for
every state, CVSA believes it would have been more productive and
efficient for FMCSA to identify the issue--the need for increased focus
on drivers--and instructed the states to account for how they plan to
address this challenge in their CVSP. As part of this issue
identification, the agency should supply data and research to the
states substantiating the problem area. At the end of the CVSP year,
FMCSA and the states could then evaluate how effective the states'
strategy or strategies were with respect to reducing crashes relating
to driver behavior and performance.
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\8\ Memorandum: Fiscal Year 2011 Commercial Vehicle Safety Plan.
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. April 8, 2010. http://
www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/safetyprograms/MCSAP-Planning-Memo-508.pdf
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Another program that could be improved with increased flexibility
is the Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN)
program. CVISN is a collection of information systems and
communications networks intended to support State CMV safety
operations. The CVISN network provides a series of mechanisms through
which parties engaged in motor carrier safety and regulatory
enforcement (States, Federal agencies, industry, etc.) can exchange and
use information electronically.\9\ In order for this network to
function effectively, states must achieve a level of parity and
integration in the systems they are using to gather and transmit safety
data. To meet this need, the CVISN grant program was established, in
part, to provide funds for states to update their information
technology capabilities. There are two levels of CVISN deployment--Core
CVISN and Expanded CVISN. The states are at varying levels of achieving
full Expanded CVISN deployment.
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\9\ Frequently Asked Questions, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. Accessed 7/31/13
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CVSA supports expanding and updating the items that are eligible
for reimbursement under the CVISN grant program, as well as the overall
direction of the program. Currently, eligibility within the CVISN
program is too narrow in its scope and needs to be expanded. States are
often denied CVISN grants for projects that they believe will be
valuable to motor carrier safety simply because the activity or
initiative did not fit within the existing CVISN model. However,
technology moves quickly and many of the technologies and ideas that
were identified as priorities when the CVISN program was created are
now considered standard or obsolete. For instance, use of laptops,
communications to and from the field, and even uploading files to
Federal systems from SAFETYNET are all fairly standard. Simply put, the
CVISN program has not kept pace with technological advancements, and
therefore, needs to be modernized in order to keep pace with current
and future technological trends. Rather than focusing on specific
technology and narrow scopes of use, the goal should be a performance-
based approach to enhancing the use of technology, in order to obtain a
greater level of safety. Expanding reimbursement eligibility provides
states with the flexibility they need to fully leverage State and
Federal dollars to implement and enhance effective CMV safety programs.
3. Streamlining the Grant Management Process
In addition to expanding program flexibility, CVSA has a series of
recommendations for improving the grant management process, which will
remove inefficiencies, reduce administrative burdens, and free up much
needed resources for enforcement activities.
As part of the application process for Basic MCSAP grant funds,
states are required to complete an annual CVSP. These plans document
how the state has met their safety goals for the past year and how
Basic MCSAP grant funds for the coming fiscal year will be spent. FMCSA
reviews these plans and uses them to evaluate a State's progress and
adherence to FMCSA policy. CVSPs are due towards the end of the Federal
fiscal year and must be approved by FMCSA prior to a state receiving
Basic MCSAP grant funds for the coming year. However, there are
administrative burdens and other issues that impact the effectiveness
of the CVSP process and the timely disbursement of grant funds. While
FMCSA has made some strides recently to improve this process and reduce
the administrative burden on states, more can be done.
One major concern the states have with the administration of the
MCSAP grant program is the inconsistency, year to year, region to
region, and state to state. FMCSA is constantly revamping the process,
perhaps in an effort to improve it. However, the end result is
confusion and unclear expectations for the States. Without consistency,
the states cannot properly plan for their annual CVSP and grant
application submission. Formatting requirements change year to year,
material that was acceptable one fiscal year is no longer acceptable
the next, the timeline for the grants process changes frequently, etc.
This results in constant upheaval for the states, and they end up
diverting much needed resources away from other efforts, as they are
constantly adapting, redoing, and adjusting their process to meet the
ever changing needs of FMCSA.
CVSA supports streamlining the CVSP submission process. States are
spending a significant amount of time administering the grants rather
than doing the work the grants are supposed to be paying for. Such
activities include resubmitting information, such as standard text
about the agency requesting the funds, contact information,
miscellaneous numbers and figures concerning the number of inspectors,
inspections, etc., and the amount being requested. To address this
issue, CVSA recommends that FMCSA model the CVSP submission process on
the electronic submission process used by the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) for collecting the states' annual Size and Weight
Enforcement Plans. FHWA's program is designed so that states can access
previous years' plans as a template, updating only the items that have
changed. Further, the system is done entirely online, through a secure
online portal. Replicating this approach within FMCSA's grant process
would provide FMCSA with more up-to-date information, while reducing
the workload on the states. Earlier this year, FMCSA began working on
such an approach, in collaboration with the states and we look forward
to making progress on this matter. In addition, the states are asked to
provide FMCSA with data and statistics that FMCSA already has access to
in other reports and databases. States should not be asked to spend
quality time compiling information to which the agency already has
access.
Another significant concern states have with the MCSAP is the
constant delay and lack of consistency in the timing of funding
disbursement. There are a number of factors that contribute to these
delays and result in complications for the states. The annual delays in
the Federal budget and appropriations processes are one contributing
factor. The Federal fiscal year begins October 1, and many grant
programs are set to that date. However, Congress rarely completes their
funding bills by this date, delaying the disbursement of funds to the
states. Even more frequently now, Congress relies on temporary
continuing resolutions, which results in states receiving their funds
late, and in installments. This unpredictable, piecemeal approach to
funding makes planning and management of State programs difficult.
This issue is further complicated by the fact that many states do
not follow the Federal fiscal calendar (most start July 1),
complicating the reporting and tracking process. States also believe
that once funds are available, the grant review and approval process
takes far too long, further delaying receipt of funds for safety
programs. For the most part, states have two years to spend their MCSAP
funds. However, the two year timeline begins at the beginning of the
Federal fiscal year, regardless of when funds are actually made
available. As a result, states often receive their funds well into the
time-frame of the grant and run the risk of not being able to spend the
appropriated funds responsibly before the grant expires, possibly
forcing the states to return funding that was dedicated for enforcement
and inspection activities as identified in their CVSP. To address this,
CVSA recommends adjusting the period of performance for all grants so
that the ``clock'' on a grant only begins once the funds have been
allocated to the State.
CVSA also supports increasing the transparency and accountability
within the MCSAP grant process. When applying for Federal funds, states
are given strict deadlines and parameters they must meet in order to
qualify and receive funds. However, there are no established deadlines
for FMCSA, in terms of their grant review process. CVSA recommends
setting grant application review deadlines for FMCSA. One approach
would be to model the program timing requirements after the State and
Community Highway Safety Formula Grant Program, commonly referred to as
the 402 grants, administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA). The 402 grant program has a clear timeline in
place. State applications are due to NHTSA by July 1 of each year, and
the agency has 60 days to review and respond. Using this model would,
at least for the Basic MCSAP grants, ensure that once funding is
authorized by Congress, the agency is prepared to disburse the funds
immediately, helping to reduce delays in funding disbursement. In
addition to the review deadline, more consistency is needed in the
grant review process. Grant applications are not all reviewed by the
same panel(s), resulting in inconsistencies from one grant request to
another, complicating the process for states.
In addition, CVSA recommends adjusting the period of performance
for grants and CVSPs, moving to a more long-term, three or five year,
cycle. Under this model, CVSPs would be due at the beginning of each
cycle, with annual updates in between. These changes would benefit both
the states and FMCSA, reducing the workload by requiring comprehensive
CVSPs less frequently. This approach would also provide more accurate
data on the effectiveness of the program, as larger data sets help to
normalize any anomalies that might occur within a single year. In order
to accommodate the unpredictability of funding disbursement due to
delays that can occur in the appropriations process, the period of
performance on grant funds should begin once the funds have been
awarded to the State, rather than setting the cycle on Federal fiscal
years.
Finally, as mentioned above, FMCSA uses the CVSPs to evaluate a
state's performance over the past year. This includes reviewing changes
in crash, fatality, and injury rates within the state. FMCSA uses this
information to help determine grant award amounts to the states.
However, the method by which the data is currently compiled does not
take into account that certain portions of the CMV population are
outside government oversight and the enforcement community's authority,
such as statutorily exempted vehicles like agricultural carriers
operating under the Covered Farm Vehicle exemption created in MAP-21.
Simply put, states should not be penalized for crashes, fatalities, and
incidents that occur in segments of the industry that they have no
authority over. If a state does not have authority and, as a result,
cannot exercise proper due diligence to improve safety within a sector
of industry that is exempted, it is unreasonable to include that sector
in any evaluation of the state's performance. CVSA supports removing
non-regulated crash, fatality, and injury rates from the criteria used
to determine grant award amounts for Incentive and other funds. This
relatively small adjustment to how data is collected would have a
tremendous value to the states.
Maximizing Program Effectiveness Through Technology
As budgets continue to tighten and technology continues to advance,
it is imperative that those in the safety and enforcement communities
take full advantage of technological advancements that improve safety
and demonstrate a net benefit to society.
1. Data and Information Technology Systems
Uniform, timely and accurate data is the cornerstone of the MCSAP.
Enforcement personnel, along with State and Federal agencies, use
information on a motor carrier's past performance to help prioritize
motor carriers for roadside inspections and compliance reviews.
Performance data from the CMV industry is used to identify trends and
problem areas, and to craft enforcement and education initiatives to
target specific safety problems. Data is not only used to evaluate
whether or not enforcement is being conducted uniformly, but also to
determine whether or not a particular safety program or concept is
successful. Data is used to determine whether enforcement funds are
being used in the most efficient, effective manner possible. In order
to effectively and efficiently perform these activities, the states and
the Federal Government must be able to rely on the data being compiled
in the various systems being accurate and as uniform as possible, in
order to make comparisons. Currently, however, redundant, overlapping
IT systems and outdated software applications result in inconsistencies
in the data being collected by the states and FMCSA, undermining the
safety programs and strategies being built upon them. These data
challenges hinder the inspection process and create extra, unnecessary
work for industry and enforcement alike.
For example, the Motor Carrier Management Information System
(MCMIS) is the main system for which all the data collected from State
and Federal agencies for FMCSA is housed, including inspection, crash,
compliance reviews, safety audits, carrier information and history and
numerous other data sets. Other programs, such as Safer, Query Central,
and State CVIEW systems, as well as the Compliance, Safety,
Accountability (CSA) program, extract the data from MCMIS to run their
programs. Developed in the 1980s, MCMIS is almost 30 years old. As the
program ages, it becomes harder and more expensive to make software and
program changes. The system can simply no longer meet State and Federal
data needs.
Another program very much in need of updating is Aspen, which is
the program used to collect inspection data during a roadside safety
inspection. Aspen was created in the early 1990s and has had few major
updates since its development. Most of the changes have been small
enhancements and, as a result, users are becoming more frustrated by
the system's limitations.
In addition to relying on outdated, insufficient, and inefficient
systems, FMCSA has become too focused on new software development and
is distracted by too many competing priorities. As a result, updates
and improvements to the primary data collection and management programs
on which everything rests are constantly delayed and the states are
forced to use outdated and cumbersome legacy systems. In 2009, for
example, FMCSA was reviewing the Aspen program and taking input on
necessary improvements. However, the update was cancelled so the agency
could focus on developing the CSA program. Now, the agency is focused
on creating the Unified Registration System (URS) program, yet another
priority, and still many of the improvements discussed in 2009 have not
been implemented.
FMCSA's IT program lacks focus and direction. Were FMCSA to focus
on setting parameters and functional specifications, rather than
software development, the program would improve tremendously. FMCSA
should be managing the system and software development process, rather
than doing the actual programming. The agency needs to clearly identify
challenges and solutions, as well as addressing State needs, and
establish a clear path forward to meet those needs. FMCSA must take a
step back and completely reevaluate its development process and how it
prioritizes IT projects.
To improve the quality of data collection, transmission and
analysis, CVSA encourages Congress to call for a study of the agency's
IT and data collection systems. The study should include an evaluation
of the efficacy of the existing systems and programs and their
interaction. It should identify redundancies and explore the
feasibility of consolidating data collection and processing systems.
The study should evaluate the ability of the programs and systems to
meet the needs of FMCSA, both at headquarters and in the State offices,
as well as equally the needs of the states themselves. The study should
investigate improving any and all user interfaces. The study should
take into account the systems' and programs' adaptability, in order to
make necessary future changes in an easier, timely, and more cost
efficient manner. In addition, the study should explore the necessity
and feasibility of increasing the agency's IT budget, to bring it in
line with other Federal programs.
2. Promoting Safety Technology
Technology can also improve safety from the industry side.
According to data from FMCSA, in 2011 alone, CMVs were involved in
nearly 130,000 crashes, resulting in just over 4,000 fatalities and
injuring another 80,000 people.\10\ With the forecasted growth in
population and the corresponding increase in movement of freight and
passengers, truck and bus traffic on our roadways will only continue to
rise. To help reduce CMV related crashes, fatalities, and injuries,
CVSA supports legislation and policies that encourage the deployment of
safety technology proven, through independent research, to improve CMV
safety, either through preventing crashes or mitigating the severity of
crashes. Taking full advantage of technologies that can assist in
anticipating and preventing crashes will help reduce fatality and
injury rates. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has
repeatedly called for deployment of safety technologies on both
commercial and personal vehicles to help reduce crashes and save lives.
In fact, NTSB has called on the NHTSA to establish performance
standards and mandate deployment of collision avoidance technologies on
CMVs in its annual `NTSB Most Wanted List.'
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Motor Carrier Safety Progress Report (as of September 30,
2012), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The State agencies, in collaboration with FMCSA and industry, are
working to make the Nation's roadways safer by reducing crashes,
injuries and fatalities related to CMVs. In order to do this, it is
imperative that the enforcement community be given clear, enforceable
regulations that have been developed based on sound data to improve
safety. Exemptions and exceptions must be minimized and changes to the
regulations, when necessary, should be science-based and data-driven.
Further, a great deal can be done to streamline the current grant
process, eliminating redundancies and unnecessary administrative
process, allowing State personnel to focus more of their time and
resources on the program itself, rather than its administration. In
addition, states must be given the tools they need to effectively
enforce those regulations. States need funding that is commensurate
with the responsibilities they've been tasked with, not just to run the
day to day program, but to fully equip and train their inspectors. This
includes making sure states have access to the latest technologies that
will help advance and streamline their programs. Industry should also
be encouraged to deploy advanced safety technologies that can help
prevent and mitigate crashes.
It is important to note that CVSA and the states work very closely
with FMCSA on these issues. The agency will sometimes engage the states
to seek input on various aspects of the MCSAP in an attempt to
understand where problems exist to help make improvements. For the last
several years CVSA has provided numerous comments to the agency
regarding the grant program processes and procedures. We appreciate
their willingness to listen; however, the unfortunate fact is there
still are significant improvements that are necessary and challenges
hampering program efficiency and effectiveness.
Despite these challenges, the MCSAP continues to be extremely
effective at reducing the number of crashes, injuries, and fatalities
on our Nation's roadways and the states have worked diligently to best
leverage funds while the size of the regulated industry and the number
of responsibilities continues to grow. In 1983, about the time the
MCSAP was established, there were 27,000 carriers and 2.2 million
drivers that hauled six billion in tonnage. That year there were 5,491
CMV-related fatalities, at a rate of 0.352 fatalities per 100 million
miles. In comparison, in 2011, more than 525,000 carriers and 3.1
million drivers hauled 9.4 billion in tonnage. There were 4,206 CMV-
related fatalities in 2011, or a rate of 0.136 fatalities per 100
million miles. While there have been a number of success stories
contributing to this decline over the last 30 years, the MCSAP has
clearly been a major factor in improving CMV safety.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dawson?
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM G. ``JACK'' DAWSON, ON BEHALF OF
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS
Mr. Dawson. Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and
members of the Subcommittee, my name is Jack Dawson. I have
been a professional truck driver for 32 years.
For the last 15 years, I have been working for UPS in
Dallas, Texas, where I currently serve as space and visibility
driver trainer for new employees, post-accident drivers, and
annual re-training. I am also chief shop steward for Teamsters
Local 745 and the co-chair of the Comprehensive Health and
Safety Committee.
I am representing the 1.4 million members of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, especially the 600,000
members who work on America's highways. Today, I will
concentrate my testimony on hours-of-service, truck size,
weight, and driver training.
Immediate attention on driver fatigue and hours-of-service
regulations has been extensive since the Tracy Morgan accident.
Here in the Senate, there has been an attempt to suspend two
key components of the regulations.
Let me say as a driver, those two provisions limiting the
34-hour restart to once per week and requiring two consecutive
1 a.m. to 5 a.m. rest periods go a long way in preventing
fatigue.
Actually, the Teamsters Union went to court over driving
time and the 34-hour restart provision. In fact, the Union felt
so strongly that the 34 hours did not provide adequate rest,
that a majority of our members covered through a MOU with our
employers are not subject to the 34-hour restart provision.
Other Teamsters' members like me, however, do operate under
the restart provision, but if it is used once a week, every 168
hours, it goes a long way in combating driver fatigue.
Without this limitation, the driver's hours can be
increased from the current 70 to 80 hours per week, twice the
normal 40 hour work week, and the 34-hour restart is 14 hours
short of the normal weekend that most workers have off to rest
and tend to personal business. Imagine returning to work on
Sunday afternoon instead of Monday morning. That is what truck
drivers face with the 34-hour restart.
Suspending the consecutive rest periods of 1 a.m. to 5 a.m.
is an equally dangerous step. Studies have shown that back-of-
the-clock work is more tiring and can lead to cumulative
fatigue. The consecutive rest periods are designed to give
drivers rest during their regular circadian rhythm. We oppose
suspending the rest period and restart provisions.
The Teamsters Union supports the Safe Highway and
Infrastructure Preservation Act or SHIPA. This legislation
essentially takes a snapshot of what states currently permit
and freezes those weights and lengths. We believe this action
will improve safety and protect our infrastructure.
The total stopping distance for an 80,000 pound truck
traveling at 65 miles an hour is 525 feet, compared to 316 feet
for a passenger car. Imagine judging those distances in
congested traffic. Bigger, heavier trucks cause greater wear on
highways; likewise, entrance and exit ramps are not designed
for longer, heavier trucks, and it may cause issues for drivers
attempting to get up speed in order to merge.
Thirty-three foot trailers will only add to safety
concerns. Side swipes are the second most common accident at
UPS. Those extra ten feet increase blind spots, further
aggravating the problem.
The claim that increasing truck weights will result in
fewer trucks on the road is unfounded. Each time there has been
an increase in truck weight, truck traffic has grown, as
shippers take advantage of cheaper rates and divert freight
from rail to trucks.
Due to a shortage of qualified drivers, safety standards
and training have been on the decline. I see many companies are
just trying to put a body in the seat. They want the CDL
certified driver but without the proper training. Companies are
buying vehicles with automatic transmissions and telling new
drivers they can operate these rigs like cars, but these are
not cars, they are vehicles with distinct stopping and
maneuvering characteristics.
At UPS, we are fortunate enough to have a strong training
program for our new drivers, and we have a discretion on how
long that training period link should be. My job now is to
train new hires. All of these guys have previous driving
experience but some find the safety training too difficult and
drop out. The classroom training is 20 hours and up to a week
on the road with a trainer teaching defensive driving
techniques to keep them out of accidents.
Not all companies have this type of dedication to safety
and training, but it should be mandatory. The driver shortage
is definitely affecting the quality of applicants. These days
we are seeing younger drivers with limited experience being
hired.
In conclusion, the IBT is committed to keeping our drivers
and all others with whom they share the road safe. This
committee can help and lead the way as you develop
transportation policies that recognizes and addresses the
challenges ahead.
The Teamsters Union looks forward to working with you to
help grow a transportation network that meets the future needs
of this country, move freight efficiently, and reduce the risk
of accidents and improve the safety of our Nation's highways.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear here
today, and I will be happy to answer any questions from you or
other members of the Subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dawson follows:]
Prepared Statement of William G. ``Jack'' Dawson,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
My name is William G. ``Jack'' Dawson. I have been a professional
truck driver for 32 years. For the last 15 years, I have been an
employee of United Parcel Service (UPS) in Dallas, Texas where I
currently serve as a shop steward for Teamsters Local 745 and as a
safety trainer for new employees, post-accident drivers, and annual
training in the Smith System for Driver Improvement. I am here today
representing the 1.4 million members of the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters (IBT), particularly some 600,000 members who daily perform
jobs along America's roadways. These hardworking men and women deserve
to have a workplace that is as safe as any office in America yet, they
must contend with crumbling roads, long hours, bigger trucks,
increasing congestion, insufficiently trained drivers, and in many
cases poor compensation--all of which add pressure to an already
stressful occupation. In order to protect all individuals who utilize
American roads, Congress must commit itself to providing safe, reliable
highways by passing a long-term, 6-year transportation reauthorization
bill that addresses these issues and those outlined below.
Due to a lack of proper investment, American highways are
crumbling. Poor road conditions lead to delayed shipments and lost
economic opportunities. We are falling behind in the global economy and
cannot afford to allow our infrastructure to degrade any further if
America is to stay competitive. A 6-year bill will provide the
certainty necessary to help rebuild our roads and bridges and improve
safety. Reauthorization must also consider policy issues that improve
highway safety and protect those who travel our Nation's roads.
Hours-of-Service Regulations
Commercial Motor Vehicle operators endure many pressures while
driving and already work long hours. We cannot afford to add to driver
fatigue by rolling back hours-of-service regulations which were
carefully crafted over the course of more than two decades of
rulemaking, several court challenges, thousands of pages of research
and studies on proper sleep habits, rest periods, fatigue, and the best
ways to ensure that truck drivers operate safely on our highways. No
stakeholder is entirely satisfied with the final rule, but with any
regulation, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration strived to
strike a fair balance that maintains a safe work environment for
drivers and yet isn't overly burdensome to the operations of motor
carriers. Initially, the Teamsters Union had gone to court over the
increase in driving time from 10 to 11 hours and took issue with the
34-hour restart provision. In fact, the union felt so strongly that 34
hours did not provide adequate rest, that a majority of our members
covered under our National Master Freight Agreement (NMFA) are not
subject to the 34-hour restart provision. A Memorandum of Understanding
was signed by the signatories to the NMFA that prohibits those
companies from subjecting their drivers to the restart provision. With
that exception, other Teamster members do operate under the restart
provision, but its use once a week versus continually goes a long way
in combating driver fatigue.
We have seen recently the effects of exhaustion by pushing drivers
to the limits of the hours-of-service regulations. The high-profile
accident in June which injured actor-comedian Tracy Morgan brought to
the public's attention the danger of tired sleep deprived truck drivers
operating 80,000 lb. rigs on our highways. The driver of a Walmart
tractor trailer fell asleep and rammed into the limousine bus carrying
Morgan and his entourage, causing 1 fatality and seriously injuring the
actor as well as 3 others. Despite countless other fatal accidents
involving fatigued drivers, this one accident shined a spotlight on the
issue of compliance with HOS regulations and driver fatigue. The driver
admitted that he had been awake for the previous 24 hour period and
that he fell asleep just prior to hitting Morgan's bus. According to
the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) preliminary report,
the truck driver was just 28 minutes shy of the maximum 14-hour on-duty
period when the collision occurred and had he reached his destination,
likely would have exceeded his maximum on-duty limit.\1\
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\1\ National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Highway
Investigation Preliminary Report (NTSB, 2014), http://www.ntsb.gov/
investigations/fulltext/HWY14MH012_preliminary.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Four days earlier, during a subcommittee markup, Senator Susan
Collins (R-ME) offered language to the FY 2015 Transportation HUD
Appropriations bill which would suspend two critical elements of the
HOS regulations that help mitigate driver fatigue, especially
cumulative fatigue. Unfortunately, the Collins amendment was adopted in
committee. One provision suspends the current limitation on the use of
the 34-hour restart provision, while the other suspends the mandated
two consecutive 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. rest periods. Limiting the restart to
once every 168 hours plays a key role in holding down the number of
hours that a driver can work in a week. Without this limitation, the
number of hours that a driver can work is increased from the current 70
hours per week to 80 hours per week--twice the number of hours that
most Americans work in a week's time. And the 34-hour restart is 14
hours short of the normal weekend that most workers have off to rest,
recuperate and tend to personal business. Most of us cherish our
weekend--those 2 days off that we can spend with our families but
imagine returning to work on a Sunday afternoon instead of Monday
morning. That's what truck drivers face with the 34-hour restart.
What you may not know about truck drivers is that it is exceedingly
difficult to have any sort of normal schedule. When we aren't on the
road where we are away from our homes and families, we may still be on
call. At UPS, when I am not acting as a trainer, I am subject to duty
as a driver in a group called the ``extra board.'' I am required to be
available to answer the phone at midnight, 5 a.m., 10 a.m., 1 p.m., 6
p.m., and 8 p.m. should I be needed to complete a run. These schedules
don't exactly allow for stability and the long hours we drive can wear
you down. The one tool we have at our disposal to combat the type of
exhaustion that causes accidents is the hours-of-service regulations. I
cannot imagine why anyone would want to suspend rules which are in
place to ensure the safety of everyone on the road by mitigating truck
driver fatigue.
Today, our roads are more congested than ever. Drivers have less
time to make critical decisions on changing lanes and shorter distances
to slow down or stop. Drivers must be more alert, and driving in
congested traffic is more stressful and tiring. Yet, without the
limitation on the restart provision, drivers can be forced to work
longer and longer hours, putting their safety and that of the public at
greater risk. The Teamsters Union strongly opposes this proposed change
in the current restart provision.
Suspending the required consecutive rest periods of 1 a.m. to 5
a.m. is an equally dangerous step. Numerous studies have shown that
back-of-the clock work is more tiring and can lead to cumulative
fatigue. This consecutive rest period requirement is designed to give
drivers rest when their body clock tells them they need it most--during
their regular circadian rhythm. Those advocating for suspending this
part of the regulation have argued that more trucks will be on the road
during daylight hours when roads are more congested. That would suggest
that every truck driver would start his truck at 5:15 a.m. and hit the
road simultaneously. For the most part, work and delivery schedules
vary. Not all truck drivers start their work day at the same time. In
addition, while there is less automobile traffic at night, there are
also many trucks pulled off the side of the road, in truck plazas, and
at rest stops, with drivers asleep, mostly because their body clock is
telling them that they are tired. The 1 a.m. to 5 a.m. provision is an
important element in defeating cumulative fatigue, and DOT should have
ample time to study the effects of these regulations, enacted one year
ago, before any changes are implemented that diminish highway safety.
Truck Size and Weight
In 2012 it is estimated that more than 3,802 fatalities involving
trucks occurred.\2\ That number is unacceptably high and the United
States cannot afford further compromising safety by increasing the
lengths and weight of commercial vehicles. Increased truck size and
weight not only causes greater wear on highways but also stress on
drivers who need greater stopping distances which are hard to judge and
perform on congested roadways. Likewise, entrance and exit ramps are
not designed for longer, heavier trucks and may cause issues for
drivers attempting to get up to speed in order to merge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Fatality Analysis Reporting System: Fatal Crashes by Vehicle Type
(Washington, D.C.: NHTSA, 2014), http://www.fars
.nhtsa.dot.gov/Vehicles/VehiclesAllVehicles.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Map-21 authorized a Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight study to
examine the effects of bigger heavier trucks on highway safety and the
infrastructure. That Comprehensive Study is underway, and Congress
should not be entertaining any individual state or highway exemptions
or piecemeal special interest exemptions until it sees what the results
are. To preempt this study Congress would be turning its back on a
study that it authorized. For these reasons, the Teamsters Union
opposes the exemptions for Idaho, Wisconsin and Mississippi included in
the House-passed FY 2015 Transportation HUD Appropriations bill, and
they should be soundly rejected by the Senate.
While considering ways to improve highway safety, this Committee
must also meet the challenges of rebuilding our deteriorating highway
and bridge infrastructure and meet our country's transportation needs
of the future. The issues of truck size and weight play a central role
in that decision-making process. Proponents of heavier trucks claim
that adding a sixth axle will mitigate highway pavement damage. While
that may be true if the axle is employed properly, a sixth axle does
nothing to alleviate the increased weight on our Nation's bridges, half
of which are more than 40 years old with one-in-four classified as
structurally deficient or functionally obsolete.
The claim that increasing trucks weights will result in fewer
trucks on the road is unfounded. Each time there has been an increase
in truck weight, truck traffic has grown, as shippers take advantage of
cheaper rates and divert freight from rail to trucks. Our current
highway system is not designed for bigger heavier trucks. These trucks
need longer merge lanes to get up to speed, redesigned on-and-off ramps
to accommodate longer combination vehicles, and greater stopping
distances on a highway network that becomes more congested every day.
The total stopping distance for an 80,000 lb. truck traveling at 55 mph
is 335 feet compared to 225 feet for a passenger car. At 65 mph, that
stopping distance for a truck increases to 525 feet versus 316 feet for
an automobile. As you can imagine, it is very difficult to judge those
distances in congested traffic.\3\
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\3\ National Safety Council's Defensive Driving Course for
Professional Truck Drivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The trucking industry has used its influence in the state
legislatures to increase both truck weights and trailer lengths on non-
federal highways. That in turn has led to demands from frustrated state
residents, who don't want to share their local roads with bigger trucks
to increase truck size and weight on the interstate system, so that big
truck traffic can be diverted from state roads that aren't equipped to
handle it.
The Teamsters Union continues to support the Safe Highways and
Infrastructure Preservation Act, or SHIPA. This legislation extends the
current state and Federal weight limits on the Interstate system to the
non-Interstate highways on the National Highway System and prohibits
further increases. The legislation recognizes and protects the states'
existing grandfathered rights to allow certain differences in truck
axle and gross weights than the maximum weight allowed in Federal law.
It essentially takes a ``snapshot'' of what states currently permit and
freezes those weights and lengths. We believe this action will improve
safety and protect our infrastructure investment.
Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight Study
The Teamsters Union, along with other safety community
stakeholders, has been working with the Department of Transportation to
address significant deficiencies and weaknesses in the process and
methods used to conduct the Comprehensive Truck Size and Weight study
mandated by MAP-21. This study to determine the impact of longer
heavier trucks on safety and infrastructure will be the authoritative
document on this issue for the next decade. It will guide many of the
policy decisions that Congress makes in this area for years to come.
For that reason, we have asked that significant issues raised by the
Transportation Research Board Peer Review Committee and us be
immediately addressed before the study moves forward.
Unfortunately, the provision mandated that the study be completed
in a two-year period. The last truck size and weight study took six
years to complete, and so, from the beginning, DOT was under extreme
time limitations to finish the study. As a result, the agency has taken
numerous shortcuts that have added to the questionable process and
expected results.
DOT has failed to meet mandatory deadlines imposed by Congress on
dozens of regulatory proceedings and other studies. Why the agency has
chosen this particular study to meet its deadline requirements is
questionable.
The DOT study is not considering the effects of Turnpike Doubles or
Rocky Mountain Doubles on our highways. These are the most common
longer combination vehicles on our highways, especially in the east.
Instead, DOT is examining triple trailers which operate in a limited
number of states (13) in the west under very different driving and
highway conditions than in other parts of the country, especially the
east coast. You can't compare driving on Interstate 95 in Virginia or
the Capital Beltway where there are exits every mile and heavy
congestion with a four-lane highway in Montana where traffic is lighter
and exits are more spread out. Yet, the data gathered in the study may
be used to potentially justify longer, heavier trucks. Another issue is
that there has been no attempt to obtain input from drivers. Who better
knows about the operation of these trucks than the drivers themselves?
The study is also taking a static picture of freight volume and not
accounting for the enormous freight increase projected for the future.
The Federal Highway Administration predicts a 48 percent freight
tonnage increase by 2040. And the study is predicated on the false
assumption that bigger, heavier trucks will mean fewer trucks on the
highway. The more freight you can put on one truck, the cheaper it
becomes compared to rail and other modes. More freight will be diverted
to trucks, which means more, not fewer trucks on the road.
Historically, that's exactly what has happened every time there has
been an increase in truck size and weight.
Vehicle Stability Systems/Advanced Safety Technologies
While avoiding fatigue in drivers and preventing bigger, heavier
trucks from operating on our Nation's roads is important to ensuring
highway safety, it is equally important that the vehicles truck drivers
operate have the necessary safety equipment installed. Equipping trucks
with the latest safety technologies will eventually help reduce truck
crashes. Brake Stroke Monitoring Systems, Vehicle Stability Systems,
Lane Departure Warning Systems and Collision Warning Systems are all
devices that can help drivers avoid accidents. However, it is important
to provide the proper training so that these systems are not a
distraction to the driver, that the driver understands the warning
signal(s), knows what evasive action to take, and the driver does not
overcompensate or defeat the assistance of the device. These systems
must be used for the purpose for which they are designed and not as a
tool to harass the driver.
Training
Due to a shortage of qualified drivers, safety standards and
training have been on the decline. From what I have seen, many
companies are just trying to put a body in the seat--they want the CDL
certified driver without the proper training. These companies are
outfitting vehicles with automatic transmissions and telling new
drivers to operate the rigs like a car--but these aren't cars, these
are vehicles with long stopping distances that are complicated to
maneuver.
At UPS, we are fortunate enough to have a strong training program
for our new drivers. And our local union gives us discretion as to how
long that training period length should be. Additionally, we require
all drivers to have a retraining period annually. Most of my time
lately has been spent working with new hires. All of these guys have
previous driving experience but many drop out after a day of training
because they think it's too hard. Our training program includes 16 to
24 hours, depending on skill level, behind the wheel with the trainee
teaching them defensive driving techniques to keep them out of an
accident. Not all companies have this type of dedication to safety and
training, but it should be mandatory.
Expanded training for all motor carriers helps to promote safe
roads and there should be money available to properly train the drivers
who transport goods and people. The Administration's bill, The GROW
AMERICA Act, establishes a grant program that provides funds for
commercial motor vehicle driver training which the Teamsters
wholeheartedly support as a necessary means to increase the number of
safe truck drivers on the road.
Detention Time
The driver shortage may also be derived from the poor compensation
and working conditions that truckers receive. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics estimates that the average yearly salary for a full time
truck driver is $36,970. When considering the long, stressful, and
erratic work schedules these drivers have, the compensation drivers
collect may not be enough to attract new drivers to the industry.
Detention times especially may cut into the pay a truck driver
receives. The prospect of drivers waiting long periods to have their
trailers loaded or unloaded at shipping and receiving facilities is
becoming more the norm rather than the exception. For the most part,
Teamster drivers are compensated for the time they are left waiting,
and for that reason, detention time is not as prevalent in the union
trucking sector. Unfortunately, that is not the case with owner-
operators or non-union drivers. The longer they wait, the more time
they lose in on-duty time, which can then effect the time they have
left to drive. Drivers then feel pressured to drive beyond their Hours-
of-Service limits, risking highway safety by driving fatigued. Those
fatigued drivers are then sharing the road with our members. A
Government Accountability Office study from 2011 indicated that about
80 percent of the drivers who are ``detained'' indicated that detention
time impacts their capability to comply with Hours-of-Service
regulations.\4\
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\4\ Government Accountability Office, Commercial Motor Carriers:
More Could Be Done to Determine Impact of Excessive Loading and
Unloading Wait Times on Hours of Service Violations (DC: Government
Accountability Office, 2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/315297.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reasons for detention time vary, from lack of sufficient loading
facilities to products not being ready for shipment. Whatever the
reason, drivers suffer the consequences--reduced driving time and lost
revenue for drivers and carriers.
The Teamsters Union was pleased that the Administration's bill, the
GROW AMERICA Act, attempts to address the problem of detention by
authorizing the Secretary to require property and passenger motor
carriers to compensate drivers under certain circumstances for on-duty
(not driving) periods at no less than the minimum wage. This may
encourage shipping and receiving facilities to create better
efficiencies, but it doesn't fully solve the problem. Those drivers
that are independent owner operators, for example, have no employer to
pay them for detention time. These are sometimes the drivers who
experience the longest delays. Especially in the ports, whether they
are misclassified independent owner-operators or employees of motor
carriers, drivers line up and can wait for hours to pick up a
container. While we are encouraged by the Administration's proposal,
the Teamsters Union would suggest that the Administration find some way
to cover all drivers including independent owner-operators and that the
Secretary ``shall'', not ``may'' by regulation require motor carriers
to compensate drivers at not less than the minimum wage for detention
time.
Hair Testing
Improving truck safety includes keeping drivers who are unfit for
duty off the road which includes testing drivers for substance abuse.
The method of drug and alcohol testing using hair presents some
interesting challenges for the trucking industry. While not necessarily
linking the use of drugs and alcohol to impairment, it does give
prospective employers the opportunity to identify those prospective
drivers that may show a proclivity to abuse drugs. For that reason, we
could support the use of hair testing for drug use in pre-employment
testing if the science supports this method of testing and is certified
by the Department of Health and Human Services. Since there are
numerous questions about racial bias, hair color bias, effect of hair
treatments, privacy issues and certain patented processes for testing,
we would strongly oppose any end-around approval of this method of
testing by congressional action, without the express approval of this
method by the agencies designated to properly review and evaluate this
testing procedure through the regulatory process.
Mexico Cross-Border Trucking Pilot Program
Out of concern for roadway safety in the United States, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters has consistently been opposed to
broadly opening our Nation's highways to Mexico domiciled trucking
companies until we can be assured that Mexican trucks and drivers meet
U.S. safety standards and can operate safely on our highways As the
Mexican Cross-Border Trucking Pilot Program approaches a three-year
statutory limitation in October, the IBT is concerned about the data
collected during the program's duration and the potential use of the
data in justifying an opening of the border to all Mexico domiciled
motor carriers. In the three years of the pilot program, the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has had difficulty
obtaining the number of participating companies and data the agency
originally indicated would be necessary for accurate results. The DOT
Inspector General estimated that at least 46 carriers would be needed
to obtain a target of 4,100 inspections within 3 years to provide a
statistically valid analysis of program participants' safety
performance. With only three months to go in the study, there are only
13 participants, mostly very small carriers with one or two trucks and
one or two drivers. This is not a representative sample of the Mexican
trucking industry. And, while FMCSA has exceeded the number of
inspections needed by approximately 1,000, 84 percent of the
inspections come from only 2 trucking companies. Before we grant
Mexican trucking companies broader operating authority, FMCSA and
Congress must ensure that statistically valid data supports that
action.
The Teamsters Union is also very concerned about the provision in
the GROW AMERICA Act that removes the requirement that certain safety
audits and compliance investigations of Mexico-domiciled motor carriers
be conducted on-site in Mexico. While we can appreciate the DOT's
concern for safety of its personnel, in light of State Department
travel warnings and alerts for the safety and security of Agency
personnel, an on-site visit can reveal much more about the safety
culture of a motor carrier than simply reviewing a stack of paperwork.
Maintenance and repair facilities can be examined, for example, along
with personal observations that agency personnel can make seeing
drivers and their trucks first hand. The fact that the lives of agency
personnel may be in danger by conducting on-site visits to Mexico-
domiciled motor carriers perhaps answers another question as to why
U.S. motor carriers have not taken advantage of the reciprocity of the
pilot program. This suggested shortcut does nothing to enhance the
safety of Mexico-domiciled carriers and drivers.
Minimum Insurance for Motor Carriers
For too long, the minimum insurance for motor carriers has remained
at $750,000. Since that standard was passed 34 years ago, the minimum
insurance would need to be increased to $4.4 million to keep up with
the inflation of medical costs and property damage. Accidents involving
motor carriers and passenger vehicles can easily reach into the
millions of dollars. The Teamsters support a bill introduced by Rep.
Matt Cartwright to raise liability coverage to $4,422,000 and index it
to inflation of medical costs to prevent any future degradation of
value.
National Hiring Standard for Motor Carriers
The Teamsters Union has serious concerns about legislation that has
been introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R. 4727, to create a
National Hiring Standard for Motor Carriers. While we appreciate the
concern and frustration that shippers and brokers experience in
different states in determining what constitutes a safe motor carrier,
the legislation is overly broad in that it imposes no liability at all
for negligent selection of a motor carrier or ``a claim or cause of
action related to negligent selection under state or Federal law, which
seems to broaden the potential scope of the exemption from liability.
We are not aware of any situation in which Congress has simply banned
states from imposing liability where there is no corresponding Federal
remedy for the potential injury. While there are insurance coverage
mandates in most states, there can be and are circumstances in which
coverage either doesn't exist or is inadequate. We fail to see how this
legislation would contribute to any increase in motor carrier or
highway safety. Merely relying on the Department of Transportation's
(DOT) safety rating system in hiring a motor carrier should not
necessarily excuse anyone from liability in the event of an accident.
DOT has many other data bases that provide information concerning the
safety record of motor carriers that can be utilized
Safety Standards for Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers
The primary mission of the FMCSA is to prevent Commercial Motor
Vehicle (CMV)-related fatalities and injuries. There should be a
reasonable expectation that the regulations, especially regulations
designed to improve the safety and health of workers/drivers and the
public not have an adverse effect on drivers. While there are many
provisions of the Administration's GROW AMERICA Act that we support,
the Teamsters Union disagrees with the Administration's proposal to
change the minimum safety standards regulations regarding the physical
condition of motor carrier operators. The Administration claims that
``virtually all occupations have some deleterious effect on the
physical condition of those employed and the effects of the job are
often difficult to separate from the effects of personal behavior,
aging or even genetic disposition,'' are at odds with the position of
most competent health and safety experts. Most experts agree that
virtually all occupations have work-related hazards that have the
potential to cause work-related illnesses or injuries, if such hazards
are not eliminated or controlled. Any rulemaking to control such
hazards must consider factors such as age, genetic disposition, etc.,
to ensure that the rule is protective for most exposed workers. The
change to the CMV safety standard language requiring that the work not
have a ``significantly adverse effect on the physical condition of the
operators'' does very little to eliminate the debate on the issue. How
is ``Significantly adverse effect'' defined? This is a solution in
search of a problem. And this proposed change will cause many to think
that the standard is significantly less stringent.
Financial Reporting
The IBT also disagrees with the Administration's repeal of
financial reporting in the motor carrier title of the GROW AMERICA Act.
One section of the financial reporting form includes maintenance and
vehicle parts costs. The expenditures that carriers make on maintaining
their fleet may be indicative of their attention to vehicle safety.
It is unreasonable to claim that reporting is overly burdensome and
insufficiently useful. The reporting requirements were just revised to
eliminate quarterly reporting so the carriers already received
significant relief. Also, we and others use the annual reports to
assess the state of the industry over time. It's the only valid,
continuous data source that tracks carrier performance available to the
public since deregulation. The reports can be manually completed online
in a matter of minutes and are not arduous due to technological
improvements. All Class I motor carriers capture these data at least
annually as part of routine data collection and much, such as miles
driven info, is often legally required by other reporting systems
anyway (vehicle use tax, etc.). The problem is the data is not
available online to the public as it should be--it's an access issue if
it is not being used. The data is valuable to a whole range of users,
from academics to insurance companies, and does not expose any trade
secrets as it currently stands--it has undergone numerous revisions
over time to eliminate that possibility. Furthermore, motor carriers
can request confidentiality (competitive harm) if necessary and there
are several exemptions that have already been thoroughly vetted by
FMCSA and rulemaking. We believe that FMCSA should beef up enforcement
and make the data more useful to the public.
Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee
The Teamsters Union supports the provision in the GROW AMERICA Act
that codifies the obligation of the DOT Secretary to maintain the Motor
Carrier Safety Advisory Committee (MCSAC). This committee, established
by provisions in SAFETEA-LU, has allowed stakeholders to provide
significant expertise to the DOT on a variety of issues. The current
makeup of the Committee is balanced, and this provision identifying
specific stakeholders to be represented on the panel will ensure that
all sectors of the industry have a voice in advising the Department on
vital motor carrier safety issues.
Conclusion
Our members, through collective bargaining, receive better,
extended training, more favorable duty periods, and the ability to
refuse to operate a vehicle that is not in a safe operating condition
which ultimately reduces risks and increases safety. In fact, a 2012
study entitled Safety Performance Differences between Unionized and
Non-union Motor Carriers concluded that Union Membership has a positive
impact on safety and results in fewer crashes compared to non-union
carriers. Clearly, the IBT is committed to keeping our drivers and all
others with whom they share the road safe. This Committee can help lead
the way as you develop transportation policy that recognizes and
addresses the challenges ahead. The Teamsters Union looks forward to
working with you to help grow a transportation network that meets the
future needs of this country, moves freight efficiently and reduces the
risks of accidents and improves the safety of our Nation's highways.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Osiecki?
STATEMENT OF DAVID J. OSIECKI, EXECUTIVE VICE
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF NATIONAL ADVOCACY,
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS
Mr. Osiecki. Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt,
Subcommittee members, I am Dave Osiecki, Chief of Advocacy for
the American Trucking Associations. ATA, as you may know, is
the largest trade association for the trucking industry. We
represent more than 30,000 carrier members. Thanks for this
opportunity, and I would ask that my full statement be made
part of the record.
Senator Blumenthal. Without objection.
Mr. Osiecki. Thank you. The trucking industry places safety
at the top of its priority list. Our industry actually spends
more than $7.5 billion annually on safety, and that investment
is making a difference.
Over the past decade, the number of large trucks involved
in fatal crashes has dropped by 17 percent, even with the
industry operating an additional 2.7 million trucks, operating
an additional 54 billion miles. More trucks, billions more
miles, fewer crashes.
As mentioned at the outset, however, over the last three
years, we have seen increasing crashes over the historic lows
in 2009 during the recession. We must refocus our efforts to
maintain the longer term positive safety trend.
Refocusing our collective efforts, industry, Federal, and
state efforts require a better lens through which to view
safety. That lens must better focus on the primary causes of
truck involved crashes and our collective investment must
center on countermeasures aimed at those primary causes.
There has been tremendous focus by government on hours-of-
service rules in recent years, despite the fact that fatigue
causes about ten, perhaps less than ten percent of truck
crashes. Significant truck safety improvements will require
greater focus on the cause of the other 90 plus percent of
crashes.
Driver error causes most crashes. I think we have probably
all heard that. More specifically, driver mistakes and driver
misbehaviors, by both professional drivers and passenger
vehicle drivers. In fact, car drivers contribute significantly
to truck crashes.
If the regulatory enforcement and safety program lens is
focused properly on the most common mistakes and misbehaviors
by all involved in the safety equation, big safety gains are
achievable.
The leading factor in crashes, that is the most common
misbehavior causing both car and truck crashes is vehicle
speed. Yet, our regulatory and enforcement apparatus largely
turns a blind eye. In 2006, about 8 years ago, ATA and another
safety group petitioned FMCSA and NHTSA to issue a rule
electronically limiting the top speed of large trucks. Neither
FMCSA nor NHTSA has issued a proposed rule requiring speed
limiters.
In lieu of working on the hours-of-service regulation, in
2010, ATA lobbied FMCSA and DOT to first focus on implementing
electronic logging devices industry-wide. They chose not to.
While the rulemaking process is now underway on ELDs, it
will be several years until full implementation. We would like
an electronic logging device rulemaking yesterday, and it will
address the misbehaviors of some drivers exceeding the driving
limits.
NHTSA's upcoming vehicle based stability control rule for
new large trucks is another rule that will save lives because
it will mitigate driver mistakes. We hope that rule is
forthcoming sooner rather than later.
Shifting to enforcement, FMCSA's 2013 program effectiveness
report found that on road traffic enforcement activity, that
which focuses on truck driver misbehaviors, is at least four
times more effective at preventing crashes than roadside
vehicle inspections. Those focus mainly on vehicle components
and defects. Vehicle defects cause less than 10 percent of
crashes.
In almost 90 percent of the Federal/state on-road traffic
and on-road enforcement activity under MCSAP is directed to
vehicle inspections. More effective traffic enforcement
activity, that activity directed toward unsafe driving behavior
by commercial drivers, represents only 10 percent of the MCSAP
on road traffic enforcement activity. This type of enforcement
has declined dramatically over the last 4 years. Again, the
lens needs a better focus in our view.
Quickly, turning to technology. It is clearly a big part of
the safety solution in our view. Properly focused rules and
enforcement can achieve only so much. Accelerated adoption of
active safety technologies in both trucks and cars can lead to
even larger highway safety improvements--collision mitigation,
active braking systems, exception based video camera
technologies and others hold great promise.
Trucking fleets are adopting many of these, and adoption
can be accelerated with meaningful incentives. This is an idea
on which ATA and CVSA are fully aligned. We hope and trust
FMCSA agrees.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to offer our
views on how the safety lens should be better focused to
improve truck safety. We can do more. We know that. It needs to
be the right ``more.'' Better targeted rules, even more
effective enforcement, and more quick deployment of active
safety technologies. That will result in meaningful safety
gains.
Thanks, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Osiecki follows:]
Prepared Statement of David J. Osiecki, Executive Vice-President and
Chief of National Advocacy, American Trucking Associations
Introduction
Chairman Blumenthal, Senator Blunt, members of the Subcommittee, my
name is Dave Osiecki, and I am the Chief of National Advocacy for the
American Trucking Associations (ATA). ATA is the national trade
association for the trucking industry and is a federation of affiliated
State trucking associations, conferences, and organizations that
together have more than 30,000 motor carrier members representing every
type and class of motor carrier in the country. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify.
Today, I will speak about the trucking industry's safety record and
measures ATA supports to continue the industry's long-term, positive
safety trend. I will also talk about a fundamental change in the
government's approach to truck safety enforcement that is needed to
make further, significant gains in truck safety. To bring about further
meaningful improvements will require an acknowledgement of the
principle causes of truck crashes and a commitment to making
appropriate countermeasures the highest priority.
In addition, I will discuss some of the trucking industry's views
on regulatory issues such as hours of service, electronic logging
devices, and FMCSA's safety monitoring, measurement, and enforcement
prioritization system: Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA). These
issues have been the focus of much attention recently, so it is
important to clarify the industry's views on them. Finally, I will
discuss some of the many industry-supported safety initiatives, such as
the recently proposed drug and alcohol clearinghouse.
The Industry's Safety Commitment and Safety Record \1\
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\1\ 2012 is the most recent year for which such data are available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The trucking industry places both driver safety and public highway
safety at the top of its priority list each and every day. In fact, ATA
conservatively estimates the trucking industry spends at least $7.5
billion per year on safety. As a result, the industry has an impressive
safety record and is near its safest point in history. For example:
The truck-involved fatality rate has decreased 74 percent
since 1975, the first year the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) began keeping records.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2012, Trends chapter, Tables 4,
page 7, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov
/files/docs/Large-Truck-Bus-Crash-Facts-2012.pdf.
From 2002 to 2012, the number of truck-involved fatalities
fell by 21 percent and the number of truck-involved injuries
fell by 20 percent.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2012, Trends chapter, Tables 4
& 7, pages 7 and 13, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
Washington, D.C. http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/
docs/Large-Truck-Bus-Crash-Facts-2012.pdf.
From 2002 to 2012, the truck-involved fatality rate per 100
million vehicle miles traveled dropped 37 percent \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2012, Trends chapter, Tables 4,
page 7, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot
.gov/files/docs/Large-Truck-Bus-Crash-Facts-2012.pdf.
In actual numbers, there were 1,018 fewer fatalities in 2012
than in 2002--very good progress in light of the trucking
industry operating 2.7 million additional trucks and 54 billion
more miles in 2012 (compared to 2002).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid.
The truck-involved injury rate has decreased 59 percent
since 1988, the first year USDOT began keeping records.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2012, Trends chapter, Tables 7,
page 13, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot
.gov/files/docs/Large-Truck-Bus-Crash-Facts-2012.pdf.
Over the past decade alone, the truck-involved injury rate
dropped by 31 percent.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid.
Despite these long-term trends and safety accomplishments, the
trucking industry knows it can continue to improve its highway safety
performance, and works daily to reduce its share of the larger crash
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
problem on our highways.
Note: The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) implemented an
enhanced methodology for estimating registered vehicle miles traveled
by vehicle type beginning with data from 2007. As a result, involvement
rates may differ, and in some cases significantly, from earlier years.
Some May Try to Distort Trucking's Safety Record
Despite the industry's safety accomplishments, industry critics
continue to use selective figures in an attempt to paint a far
different picture. Sometimes they do so to justify inappropriate or
unnecessary policy changes. Here's an example:
Like the stock market, highway safety trends can rarely be depicted
with straight lines. There is always some short term variability.
Looking at the long term, however, it is clear to see what is taking
place. However, industry critics choose a portion of that period,
2009--2012 as an example, in an attempt to create a different
perception.
As the chart below reflecting truck related fatalities over the
last decade shows, focusing on the most recent three years is
misleading since the drop in truck related fatalities from 2007-2009
was unusually steep (in part due to the economic recession) and since a
selective focus on the three years since then ignores the long term
safety picture.
The suggestion that the recent figures point to some sort of truck
safety crisis is not only wrong, as demonstrated by the trucking
industry's long term safety record, but ignores what the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration has said about these figures:
``Note that the number of fatal crashes involving large trucks
is relatively small, so such variability in the number of
fatalities is not unexpected.'' \8\
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\8\ 2012 Motor Vehicle Crashes Overview, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, Washington, D.C. 2014, http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811856.pdf.
The focus on large truck related fatalities alone ignores the fact
that the long term drop in truck-related fatalities has occurred
despite the increase in exposure. To accurately measure whether or not
roadways are getting ``safer'' from one year to the next, analysts must
put raw crash numbers in the context of some exposure measure, such as
miles driven (e.g., crashes per 100 million vehicle miles traveled).
This is the generally accepted measure used by highway safety
professionals. For example, it would be foolish to contend that trucks
operating in Delaware are somehow safer than those operating in
California because there are fewer truck crashes in Delaware. There are
far more trucks traveling many more miles in California than in
Delaware. To make a meaningful comparison, we must compare these states
in terms of miles driven.
This sort of comparison from year to year on a national level
reveals some meaningful and significant observations. Specifically,
though the number of truck-related fatalities has dropped 21 percent
over the past decade (2002--2012), the decline in the large truck
fatality rate is even steeper. Moreover, from 2002--2012 the truck-
involved fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled dropped
37 percent.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2012, Trends chapter, Tables 4,
page 7, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov
/files/docs/Large-Truck-Bus-Crash-Facts-2012.pdf.
Also, according to a recent FMCSA report,\10\ consistent with other
research on the subject,\11\ 70 percent of fatal crashes involving a
large truck and a passenger vehicle are initiated by the actions of
passenger vehicle operators. For instance, large trucks are three times
more likely to be struck in the rear in two-vehicle fatal crashes.\12\
Also, in 91 percent of fatal head-on collisions between a large truck
and a passenger vehicle, the passenger vehicle crossed the median into
the truck's lane of travel.\13\ Moreover, large trucks have an overall
crash rate almost half that of other vehicles.\14\
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\10\ Financial Responsibility Requirements for Commercial Motor
Vehicles, See Footnote 2, page xii, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C., January 2013. http://
www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Financial-
Responsibility-Study.pdf
\11\ Relative Contribution/Fault in Car-Truck Crashes, American
Trucking Associations, Arlington, VA, February, 2013.
\12\ Traffic Safety Facts 2012 Data: Large Trucks, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/
811868.pdf
\13\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2012, Vehicle chapter, Tables
9, page 60, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Washington,
D.C. http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov
/files/docs/Large-Truck-Bus-Crash-Facts-2012.pdf.
\14\ Large Truck and Bus Crash Facts 2012, Trends chapter, Tables
4, 6, 7 9, 10 11, pages 7-21, Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, Washington, D.C. http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/
fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Large-Truck-Bus-Crash-Facts-2012.pdf
Some may also try to distort the long-term truck safety picture by
telling Congress and the public that large trucks are over-involved in
fatal crashes. Such statements are purposefully misleading. When large
truck crashes occur they are generally more severe than light vehicle
crashes, due to size and weight differences between large trucks and
passenger vehicles. Trucks are not more likely to be involved in a
crash, but when such a crash does occur it is slightly more likely to
result in a fatality. This is the case not because trucks are less
safe, as some would have you believe, but due to simple Newtonian
physics.
The long-term improvement in truck safety is due, in part, to
industry-supported initiatives. For example, ATA was an early advocate
of mandatory drug and alcohol testing, the commercial driver's license
program, a ban on radar detectors in trucks, and the recently proposed
clearinghouse of drug and alcohol test results. The industry continues
to promote additional regulatory initiatives that will improve safety,
such as the mandatory use of electronic logging devices to track hours
of service compliance, the mandatory use of speed limiters on trucks,
stability control systems on new trucks, and a national system to alert
employers of drivers' moving violations in a timely fashion.
ATA also supports and promotes the voluntary adoption and use of
cost-beneficial active safety technologies such as collision mitigation
systems, active braking technologies and video-based systems designed
to address driver behavior issues.
Continued Improvement Requires a Focus on Crash Causation
Continued improvements in truck safety require an understanding of
the causes of truck crashes and a clear, determined focus on
appropriate countermeasures. Specifically, according to multiple
studies, data, and other indicators, the vast majority of large truck
crashes are the result of driver behaviors and errors. Only a small
percentage of large truck crashes are attributable to vehicle defects.
FMCSA's Large Truck Crash Causation Study, for example, found that
driver error was the ``critical reason'' behind 87 percent of crashes
studied.\15\ Similarly, the Unsafe Driving BASIC in FMCSA's CSA Safety
Measurement System, which captures moving violations and other unsafe
driving behaviors, is the measurement category with the strongest
correlation to crash risk. A recent FMCSA study found that, on average,
fleets with high scores \16\ in this category have 93 percent higher
future crash rates than fleets with low scores.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Report to Congress on the Large Truck Crash Causation Study,
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Washington, D.C., November
2005, http://ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/ltccs/data/documents/
reportcongress_11_05.pdf.
\16\ High scores in this context means above the threshold for
enforcement intervention selection which, for most carriers, is set at
the 65th percentile.
\17\ Below CSA enforcement intervention selection thresholds.
Given this knowledge, it is not surprising that other FMCSA data,
specifically the agency's Safety Program Effectiveness Measurement
reports, shows that on-road traffic enforcement activity is far more
effective at preventing future crashes than standard roadside vehicle
inspection activity. The latter typically involves a vehicle inspection
to detect component defects and a review of driver's paper work (e.g.,
hours of service records of duty status) and credentials (e.g., license
and medical examiner's certificate). The former, traffic enforcement,
consists of on-road monitoring of unsafe driver behavior (e.g., moving
violations) coupled with some form of inspection activity (e.g., a
``walk-around'' inspection of vehicle components). FMCSA's data
reflects that for every 1,000 traffic enforcements 12.05 crashes are
prevented compared to 2.7 crashes per 1,000 standard roadside
inspections. Similarly, .41 lives are saved per 1,000 traffic
enforcements compared with only .09 lives per 1,000 roadside
inspections. In other words, traffic enforcements are more than four
times more effective at preventing crashes and saving lives. \18\
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\18\ FMCSA Safety Program Effectiveness Measurement: Intervention
Model Fiscal Year 2009, FMCSA, April 2013, Page 10, http://
ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/CarrierResearchResults/PDFs/13-039-Intervention-FY-
2009.pdf.
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The following table, taken from the FMCSA effectiveness report,
shows the breakdown of crashes and injuries avoided and lives saved by
roadside inspections and traffic enforcements respectively.
Given this compelling data, it's logical to place more emphasis on
traffic enforcements than on roadside inspections. However, figures
available on FMCSA's website demonstrate that traffic enforcements only
comprise a small portion of field enforcement interventions. For
instance, in Fiscal Year 2013, traffic enforcements represented only 10
percent of all such activities. Further, this same website (screenshot
shown below) reflects that the portion of field enforcement activity
devoted to traffic enforcements has been declining dramatically,
despite FMCSA research finding that it is more than four times more
beneficial. For instance, the number of traffic enforcements in FY 2010
totaled 637,385, but dropped a whopping 39 percent to 388,004 in FY
2013. This is disturbing for a number of reasons, including the fact
that traffic enforcement violation data feeds the CSA Unsafe Driving
BASIC. As mentioned above, this BASIC has the strongest correlation to
future crash risk of any CSA measurement category. Fewer traffic
enforcements means less data in the Unsafe Driving BASIC which, in
turn, hampers FMCSA's oversight efforts.
FMCSA's program effectiveness document points out that the
``evaluation provides FMCSA and State MCSAP partners with a
quantitative basis for optimizing the allocation of safety resources in
the field.'' This statement is true, but it appears as though FMCSA and
its state partners have not actually used the evaluation for this
purpose. If the agency and states had done so, we would have observed
an increase in traffic enforcement activity, not a decline. This
troubling decline begs the question: ``How many lives would not have
been lost if traffic enforcement activity had remained constant or
increased over the last several years?''
It is clear from this data that FMCSA and its state partners have a
substantial opportunity to improve truck safety through a more
effective allocation of enforcement resources. However, seizing on this
opportunity will require difficult choices and a willingness to
challenge traditional approaches to enforcement. A shift from roadside
inspections to more traffic enforcement will have personnel and
structural impacts at the state level. For instance, since many state
officials who conduct vehicle inspections don't have traffic
enforcement authority, their livelihoods may be threatened. Further,
since some of the lead state commercial motor vehicle enforcement
agencies don't have traffic enforcement responsibility, they will have
to either yield resources, or entire management of the state's
commercial motor vehicle enforcement program, to another state agency.
However, it is clear from the data that these difficult steps that must
be embraced and implemented in the interest of further reducing crashes
and saving lives.
Improvements in truck safety are also encumbered by program
prioritization. Though the principle causes of crashes are known,
FMCSA's priorities and resources are not always well aligned with them.
For example, because the leading factor in crashes is vehicle speed, in
2006 ATA and Roadsafe America petitioned the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) and FMCSA to require that speed limiters
be set on all commercial motor vehicles over 26,000 lbs. In late 2010,
over four years later, NHTSA granted the petitions and agreed to
conduct a rulemaking to require that limiters on new vehicles be set.
FMCSA later announced it would conduct a companion rulemaking,
presumably to require that limiters be set on existing vehicles and to
prohibit device tampering. However, neither agency has issued a
proposed rule to address this leading cause of crashes, and eight years
have passed since ATA and Roadsafe America petitioned them to do so.
In contrast, over the past four years FMCSA has spent more time,
energy and resources on the hours of service (HOS) rulemaking than any
other. Yet, by the agency's own admission, changes to the HOS rules
recently imposed will prevent less than 1 percent of truck involved
fatalities.\19\ Given this relatively modest benefit, the agency
justified the rulemaking by making the speculative claim that the new
rules will improve driver health and longevity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ 2010-2011 Hours of Service Rule Regulatory Impact Analysis,
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.,
December, 2011, page 6-7 (102), http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/
fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/2011_HOS_Final_Rule_RIA.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Necessary Steps for Continued Improvement
In evaluating ways to further improve truck safety, FMCSA should
consider the primary causes of truck crashes and appropriate
countermeasures, including those advocated by the trucking industry.
For instance, since the vast majority of crashes are caused by driver
error and since moving violations are strong predictors of future
crashes, ATA has long called for a national system to promptly notify
employers of drivers' convictions for moving violations. Such employer
notification systems (ENS) are available in some states, like
California, but not in all. Accordingly, ATA has urged implementation
of a national system. In MAP-21, Congress mandated that FMCSA develop a
plan for a national system.
Similarly, since the late 1990s ATA has urged FMCSA to establish
and deploy a national clearinghouse of drivers' positive drug and
alcohol tests and refusals. Such a database would close an existing
loophole that allows drivers who violate the drug and alcohol
regulations to evade the consequences of their actions by merely
obtaining employment elsewhere. As a result of a MAP-21 requirement,
FMCSA recently proposed to establish a national clearinghouse, a decade
after the agency's report to Congress said that a database of this sort
was feasible and would be beneficial.\20\
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\20\ A Report to Congress On the Feasibility and Merits of
Reporting Verified Positive Federal Controlled Substance Test Results
To the States and Requiring FMCSA-Regulated Employers to Query the
State Databases Before Hiring a Commercial Drivers License (CDL)
Holder, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, March 2004, Pg. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATA has proposed a number of other beneficial safety initiatives as
well. For instance, ATA supports the use of more effective hair tests
to meet FMCSA drug testing requirements, broader third party access to
FMCSA's Pre-Employment Screening Program (PSP), and the aforementioned
speed limiter mandates. Each of these initiatives is supported by data
demonstrating crash reduction efficacy.
ATA's Views on Current Regulatory Issues
Given the context of this hearing, it is appropriate to offer ATA's
views on other truck safety issues. In particular, I will focus on the
following:
Hours of Service
Compliance, Safety, Accountability
Electronic Logging Devices
1. Hours of Service
As discussed above, ATA has been critical of FMCSA's continued
focus on changes to the hours of service regulations. Operating under
the previous hours of service regulations, the number and rate of truck
involved crashes, injuries and fatalities all declined dramatically.
Accordingly, ATA advocated for retention of those rules rather than the
changes FMCSA implemented in 2013.
It is important to point out that ATA supports five of the six main
components of the rules, including the 11-hour limit on driving time
per shift, the maximum 14-hour driving window, the minimum off-duty
period of at least 10 consecutive hours, the cumulative (or weekly) on-
duty time limits, and the mandatory rest break provision. ATA's only
quarrel is with the restrictions recently placed on use of the restart
provision. These restrictions are unwarranted, have unintended economic
impacts, and may actually increase risk. For instance, a recent FMCSA
study shows that drivers operating under the new restart rules are more
likely to operate during the daytime, when the risk of vehicle
interaction and crashes is higher.\21\ For these reasons, ATA supports
legislation to suspend enforcement of the recent restart restrictions
pending a study of their unintended safety and economic impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Field Study on the Efficacy of the New Restart Provision for
Hours of Service, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,
Washington, D.C. January, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATA also supports the current Government Accountability Office
review of the Congressionally-mandated FMCSA field study of the restart
rules and the agency's regulatory impact analysis used to justify the
new rules. This independent, third-party review is welcomed by ATA.
Lastly, ATA feels strongly about the need for additional
flexibility in what are commonly called the ``split sleeper berth
rules.'' Given FMCSA's recent research on this issue, ATA is optimistic
that FMCSA is willing to conduct a pilot program and perhaps consider
reasonable changes to this part of the rules.
2. Compliance, Safety, Accountability
Since its inception, ATA has been publicly supportive of the
objectives of CSA and has worked cooperatively with FMCSA to address
concerns with the program. ATA believes in a data-driven approach to
identifying unsafe operators and focusing FMCSA's limited resources on
those that pose the greatest safety risk. Unfortunately, ATA has
serious apprehension about CSA's ability to accurately identify the
least safe motor carriers.
Many of ATA's concerns were recently highlighted by the Government
Accountability Office's report Modifying the Compliance, Safety,
Accountability Program Would Improve the Ability to Identify High Risk
Carriers.\22\ The study confirmed many shortcomings of the program
including: a dearth of data which results in a great majority of motor
carriers not being scored; a lack of a statistical correlation between
the vast majority of regulatory violations and crash risk, and the fact
that small carriers are far more likely to be negatively impacted by
CSA. Moreover, GAO found that CSA is an imprecise tool that cannot
accurately identify an individual fleet's crash risk, and that until
deficiencies are addressed, it is inappropriate to pursue a rulemaking
to tie safety fitness determinations to CSA safety measurement system
scores.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Modifying the Compliance, Safety, Accountability Program Would
Improve the Ability to Identify High Risk Carriers, Government
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, February 2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660610.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These limitations are of great concern to the trucking industry
because third parties (e.g., shippers, brokers, insurers, banks, etc.)
use publicly available CSA scores to make important business decisions.
In these cases, inaccurate scores can have serious business
implications. As such, ATA supports and is advocates removing CSA
scores from public view until peer reviewed research confirms a strong
statistical correlation between individual fleets' scores in each BASIC
and future crash risk.
Additionally, ATA believes that CSA should only include crashes
that were caused by commercial motor vehicle drivers. Intuitively, if a
driver did not cause and could not have prevented a crash from
happening, the occurrence is not indicative of his/her employer's
safety management controls. Unfortunately, CSA currently considers all
crashes, regardless of fault. FMCSA responded to this concern by
conducting a study of the efficacy of using police accident reports to
make crash accountability determinations. Though the study and its peer
reviews are complete, FMCSA has delayed its release. ATA calls on FMCSA
to release the results of their analysis and to immediately begin work
on identifying and removing from CSA crashes not caused by commercial
drivers.
3. Electronic Logging Devices
ATA supports FMCSA's efforts to mandate electronic logging devices
(ELDs) for all drivers required to maintain records of duty status.
ELDs are the most reliable and accurate way to track compliance with
the HOS regulations. ATA applauds FMCSA on the February publication of
its Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on this matter and
encourages the agency to work toward swift publication of a defensible
final rule.
Overall, ATA is pleased with the agency's proposal and has provided
a few suggestions for improvement. Among others, ATA warned FMCSA of
the potentially chilling effect on voluntary early adoption should
FMCSA proceed with its proposed two-year period for grandfathering of
existing equipment. ATA suggests allowing existing, compliant,
Automatic On-Board Recording Devices (AOBRD) to be used for the
remainder of the service life of the vehicles in which they are
installed. ATA also feels the proposed supporting documents
requirements are excessive and unnecessary given the accuracy with
which ELDs automatically track driving time.
Finally, ATA urges FMCSA to explore ways that the agency can
actively promote voluntary ELD adoption through the use of incentives.
Given the known benefits of ELD use and recognizing that a mandatory
adoption is still several years away, incentives for voluntary adoption
are appropriate.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to offer our views on
how we can further improve truck and highway safety. As I mentioned at
the beginning of my testimony, the trucking industry is justifiably
proud of its commitment to safety and long-term safety record. However,
continuation of this trend will require an acknowledgement of the
principle causes of truck crashes and a commitment to implementing
appropriate countermeasures to address them. Moreover, it will require
the agency to prioritize its action based not on political or other
interests, but on sound safety benefit data.
In addition to making choices about policy priorities, FMCSA and
its state partners must confront the tough decisions and fundamental
organizational changes needed to embrace a more effective enforcement
program in the field. Specifically, to leverage additional safety
benefits from funding of on-road enforcement programs, FMCSA and state
partners will need to place additional emphasis on traffic enforcement
activities. Doing so may impact state organizations, but is ultimately
necessary is order to achieve the greatest safety dividends from
limited enforcement resources.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Osiecki.
I want to say that we have put your full statement in the
record, and it contains a great deal of very important and
useful information, and I thank you for it. I am going to
recommend to my colleagues that they read the full statement
because there is a lot of very significant data.
I join you in the hope that there will in fact be better
rules concerning speed and electronic logging devices. I think
we can agree that whatever the cause or however many crashes
and fatalities and injuries are caused by driver fatigue,
whether it is 10 percent or 90 percent, every one of those
crashes, every one of those deaths and injuries is too many.
Mr. Osiecki. Absolutely.
Senator Blumenthal. In that spirit, I hope that you will
agree that these hours-of-service regulations that were adopted
in 2013 or became effective on that date will continue to be in
effect even as we gather data on how effective they have been.
Mr. Osiecki. I would be happy to respond to that if you
would like for me to respond.
Senator Blumenthal. Please.
Mr. Osiecki. I think it is important to point out at the
outset that we support five of the six components. In fact, we
actually support a third of the sixth component, and that is
the restart. We can talk about those five major components of
the rules that we do support if you would like. But, in terms
of the legitimate goal of the government to try to reduce
fatigue related crashes at night during these 1 a.m. to 5 a.m.
hours that we are talking about, versus the offsetting
potential crashes during the daylight hours because truck
traffic is being pushed, not being forced, into daylight hours.
The result of these rules is pushing truck traffic into the
daylight hours--there is an offset there.
The question is what is that offset. Are there actually
more crashes during the day than the fatigue crashes that are
potentially being prevented. That is our concern.
Senator Blumenthal. We have just heard testimony from a
number of our experts here as to the importance of that
component of the hours-of-service rule in preventing crashes,
testimony from Mr. Dawson about their need and effectiveness,
and from Ms. Ferro.
Let me ask Ms. Ferro, in issuing these rules, my
understanding from your testimony is there was a great deal of
fact gathering, scientific analysis, and other research and
data driven consideration that in fact led the courts to uphold
these rules as being rational and factual based; is that
correct?
Ms. Ferro. Mr. Chairman, that is correct. It was a very
robust rulemaking with regard to over 80 scientific studies
that we reviewed, at least 50 that we cited in our regulatory
evaluation, sleep lab studies specific to the 1 a.m. to 5 a.m.
and the benefits of two nights rest over one, and extensive
public listening sessions, as well as analysis of over 20,000
comments. It was an extremely robust process, and as you say,
research based, scientifically approached.
Senator Blumenthal. You have heard Major Palmer emphasize
the importance of consistency.
Ms. Ferro. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. And enforceability of regulations. Is
there a public interest in continuing these regulations even as
more data and experience is gathered?
Ms. Ferro. It is very much in the public interest, for the
reasons Major Palmer identified in terms of uniformity,
consistency of enforcement, from the perspective of ensuring
that the focus on minimizing the risk of fatigue related
crashes is upheld while additional analysis is completed.
Senator Blumenthal. I have said that the purpose of these
regulations is to take tired truckers off the road, not take
trucks off the road, and to protect truckers as well as the
public in general.
Mr. Dawson, let me ask you what these regulations mean to
you and your fellow drivers who really are on the front line,
so to speak, in preventing accidents or crashes that are indeed
avoidable.
Mr. Dawson. Mr. Chairman, I would say in my experience, any
time you have more rest or more opportunity to be at home and
get your rest, especially in those critical 1 a.m. to 5 a.m.
periods, it is essential to getting your proper rest and not
being fatigued when you are on duty trying to do your job.
Senator Blumenthal. Without these rules, is there pressure
on truckers from perhaps their employers?
Mr. Dawson. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. How does that pressure get expressed?
Mr. Dawson. It would get expressed in your dispatches
where, when your 34 hours are up, they could just run you right
back out on the road, on another run, put you back on duty. You
would not have the hours-of-service to protect you. They could
discharge you in some instances, at some jobs, if you did not
follow through with those.
I think the protection that the hours-of-service offers a
driver against those things is very important.
Senator Blumenthal. Ms. Claybrook, is that consistent with
your experience?
Ms. Claybrook. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
correct something that was said by the American Trucking
Associations. The purpose of this rule is not to reduce
nighttime crashes.
The purpose of this rule is for drivers, and it is not all
drivers, the drivers who reach the maximum of 70 hours of
driving, that when they take their 34-hour restart, that they
have two nights where they can get rest/sleep, that is, so they
can get the kind of sleep that you get which is better than
when you sleep during the daytime.
So, first, it affects a small number or a modest number of
drivers. Second of all, the purpose is so you get sleep at
night, not to prevent crashes at night.
Another issue that has been raised by the trucking
association is that all these trucks will come back on the road
at 5 a.m. and 6 a.m. in the morning when kids are going to
school, and yet, this is the first time I have ever heard the
trucking association ever be concerned about children being
killed in truck crashes. There are over 200 children killed
every year in truck crashes, and 9,000-some children injured.
First of all, I think it is a false assumption or
assertion, and second of all, I would love to work with the
trucking industry on reducing truck crashes, and particularly
children being harmed, but this is not an example where
children are likely to be harmed.
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Osiecki, I am going to make sure
that you have an opportunity to respond. My time has expired
and I want to be sensitive to the time of my colleagues. I am
grateful to all of my colleagues.
I am a co-sponsor with Senator Booker, by the way, Ms.
Claybrook.
Ms. Claybrook. Yes, and thank you so much.
Senator Blumenthal. Grateful to Senator Nelson, Senator
Fischer, Senator Ayotte, and Senator Blunt for being here
today. I am going to turn to Senator Blunt, and if he is still
here, go to Senator Nelson.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. Ms. Claybrook, I heard
you say you would like to work with the trucking association
for safety for children. I think I heard you say that two
sentences after you said something like this is the first time
you had ever heard the trucking association say they cared
about whether children were hurt by trucks or not.
I would think those two things probably do not work out
very well together. I am sure nobody here wants children to be
hurt by trucks. I am also sure that if you put more people on
the road at 5 in the morning, more people are going to be on
the road when kids go to school. I just do not think there is
any way you can argue against that.
I am sensitive to Mr. Dawson's point that people who are
working different shifts all the time get into a rest pattern
that is significant. A lot of people work the night shift all
the time, so somehow they have figured out how to sleep during
the day, and have done that for a long time.
Mr. Osiecki, I heard your safety efforts. What are the best
safety things that you think can be done that are not being
done now or need more focus?
Mr. Osiecki. Thank you, Ranking Member Blunt. There is not
a person in this room, there is not a person in the trucking
industry that wants to harm somebody when they operate. Drivers
are professionals. They attempt to do their jobs moving
America's freight as safely and efficiently as possible, and
the folks that I represent, I know that.
Now, in terms of responding to your question, as I
indicated in my oral remarks, we really need to not minimize
the smaller types of problems in our industry, but we have to
maximize our resources and our efforts, and maximizing our
resources and our efforts really leads us to the technology
solutions that I mentioned earlier, safety technologies, that
address unintentional mistakes, sometimes unintentional
misbehaviors, and sometimes there are misbehaviors that truck
drivers and car drivers undertake willfully.
But technologies, the ability to have enforcement focus on
those misbehaviors, and to the extent they can, the mistakes.
But that is tougher, and we need rules that really will make a
difference.
The electronic stability control rulemaking that NHTSA has
been working on for several years will save, according to
NHTSA, at least three times as many lives as the hours-of-
service rules.
In terms of priorities, that rule should have come first.
That rule should be out there. We should be living under that
rule for new trucks. There are a host of other examples I can
discuss, but I will leave it at that for the time being.
Senator Blunt. Major Palmer, in your opinion, what is the
most effective tool of law enforcement for preventing truck
related crashes? I am going to let you answer that. It could be
stopping trucks on the road. It could be safety inspections. I
am just wondering what you think the most effective tool is to
work on this topic.
Major Palmer. Yes, sir. That is an excellent question. What
it is, it is difficult to identify from an enforcement
perspective one thing that is the solution to the big problem.
It is a comprehensive program, what it takes.
For example, each state, including Texas, obviously where I
am from, we have a comprehensive enforcement program to try to
address commercial vehicle safety issues, and highway safety
issues as a whole, which includes all vehicles on the highway.
So, it is partly roadside inspections of commercial
vehicles. It is inspections at fixed facilities, which
sometimes are different, that are a different environment than
at roadside.
It also is a comprehensive program, such as our compliance
review program, to be able to look at motor carriers that have
a propensity to have safety issues, and it is also an
aggressive traffic enforcement program that does not
necessarily just focus on commercial vehicles.
Statistically speaking, 70 percent of the commercial
vehicle related crashes, the primary contributing factor tends
to go back to the non-commercial vehicle.
For example, in Texas alone--I cannot speak off the cuff on
most states--in Texas alone, in 2013, all of these citations
and warnings were not uploaded to FMCSA because they were not
done on an inspection report.
We did, in addition to all of our activities that we did as
part of our commercial vehicle enforcement program, issued a
little over--in 2013, a little over 900,000 traffic enforcement
citations, and a little over two million warnings. Those are
the ones that did not get uploaded to FMCSA as a part of
inspection.
So, to answer your question, sir, it really is a
comprehensive program of a lot of different areas that we try
to look at, because one area alone is not going to get us where
we need to be.
One of our primary focuses in Texas and along with all the
other states is to ultimately reduce these fatalities and these
serious injury crashes. It does not matter whether it is one
life or 100, we do not want to lose one. Every life that we can
save is a victory from our perspective.
Senator Blunt. That 70 percent number, is that a national
number or a Texas number?
Major Palmer. We have looked at it from a Texas
perspective, and it works for Texas, but I have also seen some
things that it has been used on a broader perspective as well.
Senator Blunt. Just one last question, Ms. Ferro. I think I
have in my notes somewhere I noticed, I do not see it in front
of me right now, but there is no differentiation in the
statistics of truck related accidents, whether the trucker was
at fault or not. When you used that big number, that is just
the number of total accidents involving a commercial truck; is
that correct?
Ms. Ferro. Senator Blunt, that is correct. It is an
aggregate crash number.
Senator Blunt. Do you have anything that verifies the
Major's sense that this is more than the 70 percent number?
Ms. Ferro. We have. The dataset was done through the large
truck crash causation analysis about eight to ten years ago, so
it is not as current as we would like it to be. I believe, and
I will follow up for the record, it was 35 percent attributable
to the professional driver in fatalities, and closer to 45 to
50 percent in all crashes.
[FMCSA reply:]
According to the Large Truck Crash Causation Study, the critical
reason was assigned to the large truck in 55 percent of the crashes
(Note: this includes single vehicle crashes). In large truck crashes
involving one truck and one car, the critical reason was assigned to
the large truck in 44 percent of the crashes. In crashes involving
fatalities, the critical reason was assigned to the large truck in 28
percent of those crashes.
Ms. Ferro. So, 35 to 40 on fatalities and higher
attributable or about 50/50 in injury and tow away crashes.
Senator Blunt. Quite a bit of difference.
Ms. Claybrook. Senator Blunt, can I comment on that? Would
you mind?
Senator Blunt. I am out of time.
Senator Blumenthal. We will come back to you. Thank you.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Senator Blunt.
Senator Booker?
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY BOOKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Booker. Thank you very much. I first want to thank
the Chairman and the Ranking Member, two gentlemen that are
really pragmatic, constructive, and with clarity, have thought
about these issues. I appreciate both of your leaderships and
how you are addressing what is the end, which is to keep our
highways safe.
If I can very quickly just turn again to hours-of-service.
First of all, Mr. Osiecki, I really appreciate your testimony
because you had a lot of very constructive data based ideas
about how to keep our highways safe.
When I was mayor, I used to have a saying, ``In God we
trust, I am a man of faith, but everybody else bring me data.''
What I do not want to fall in the trap of is when it comes
to safety initiatives, having tyranny of or, I would rather
have the liberation of the and, do them all. That is why I want
to get back to the hours-of-service just real quick because I
think there is a substantive question that was put on the
table.
I know these efforts were brought about through--when I
look through all the data and the studies, there is so much
sound evidence that you all went through, and the 20,000
comments, to all that, but a point of assertion has been put on
the table that if we persist with these rules, it is going to
force more people into the daytime traffic, thus, making it
more congested, and thus, creating more crashes.
All I am asking is very objectively, is there any data yet
to make that statement or that assertion or that possibility
true? I would love the Honorable Ferro and Honorable Claybrook
quickly to give answers because I want to jump on to the next
issue.
Ms. Ferro. Sir, there has been no data presented to us that
demonstrates that fact, nor does anything in the rule limit the
ability of the industry to set its schedules as it deems
necessary to satisfy the freight demands of its customers.
Senator Booker. OK.
Ms. Claybrook. The Collins' amendment does have a study
included, but it also eliminated these provisions, so it was
sort of a contradiction, that is you cannot do a study if you
do not have provisions in effect.
Our position supports what you would do, leave the
provisions in effect but conduct a study, and I think that is
fine.
Senator Booker. So, removing the restrictions and doing a
study. What are you actually studying to see if there is any
substance and fact to----
Ms. Claybrook. That is right. The other thing to point out
is in addition to there not being a requirement as to when the
truckers have to come back on the highway it only affects maybe
15 percent of the truck drivers, those who have maxed out on
the 70 hours.
Senator Booker. That is where I want to jump in, because it
is a small portion, it is those that have maxed out. There has
been a tremendous decline--this is where Mr. Dawson, I think,
can get my last answer in--there has been a tremendous decline
in income for drivers.
A few decades ago, unionized truck drivers made about
$44.83 an hour. This is a solid middle class job, well
compensated drivers, and I know from truck drivers in the port
area they are grueling hours they are putting in. We are
talking about 70/80 plus hours with a little bit, as you said,
a truncated weekend.
Today truck drivers are lucky though to make half of that.
One study by Rutgers found independent contractors in New
Jersey reported earning less than $10 an hour.
So, truck accidents are on the rise while wages are on the
decline, and we are now paying the folks responsible for moving
our goods and services very low salaries. These men and women
have now pushed themselves in order to make enough money to
provide for their families. They have pushed themselves through
hour limits in order to try to make ends meet.
Under conditions like this, it is no wonder that a recent
FMCSA study that was cited found an astounding 65 percent of
truck drivers reported that they sometimes feel drowsy.
So, if we want our roads to be safer, I believe we need to
start compensating these folks in a way that they can make
means meet without pushing themselves to the limits of human
exhaustion; just so they can meet the minimum basic needs to
keep their family above the poverty line.
So, Mr. Dawson, do you agree with my assessment, given your
years of experience as a driver, and can you provide me any
insight about the issue of drivers' wages in this context of
safety and if so, in your opinion, what steps can Congress and
key stakeholders in the trucking industry take to address this
compensation issue?
Mr. Dawson. I think one of the key components in the income
as far as the detention time, I can tell you when I was working
for a private carrier, we had a program where you picked up
your freight, and you picked it up for $1 a 1,000, so if you
were there and you picked up 46,000 pounds, that is what you
made if it was 1 hour or 15 hours that you were there picking
it up.
I can also add to that, Senator, that when I went to work
from a private carrier to an unionized carrier, I got a $26,000
raise that day. So, there is quite a difference in the Union
and the non-Union sector.
I think the detention time and the wages are a key
component in getting qualified candidates and good experienced
drivers that are going to stick with it and not drift in and
out of the industry.
Senator Booker. So, higher pay might make the people
pushing fatigue less? Higher pay might make this idea that
drivers have to push further to make enough money to support
their family less?
Mr. Dawson. Absolutely, sir. It would reduce the push
factor that you are talking about to make the ends meet at home
if the wages were higher, then you would not have the need to
exceed the hours-of-service.
Senator Booker. I would continue but the chairmanship has
passed, I think, to Kelly Ayotte, and I was told by my staff
that I am going to yield to Senator Fischer.
[Laughter.]
Senator Booker. My dear friend, and give you the
chairpersonship as well of the Committee. No, Senator
Blumenthal is back.
[Laughter.]
Senator Booker. I exceeded my allotted time, so if you
would like to reprimand me, you may. I know Senator Fischer is
eager to go.
Senator Blumenthal. I appreciate your graciousness in
yielding just as I was coming in, and appreciate your patience
with a quick visit I had to make with someone who came. Senator
Fischer?
STATEMENT OF HON. DEB FISCHER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Fischer. Mr. Chairman, I hope you also heard that I
declined the chairmanship. I wanted you to take note of that.
[Laughter.]
Senator Blumenthal. I noticed the emerging anarchy that
was----
[Laughter.]
Senator Fischer. You stepped back in at just the right
time; yes. As a member of the Nebraska legislature, I served as
Chair of the Transportation and Telecommunications Committee.
Every year, we would have hearings on safety issues. Those were
always very emotional hearings. We would have the families of
accident victims there, so I just would like to recognize those
families and express my condolences to you.
I also want to thank our drivers and truckers. Everyone
here is looking for ways that we can make our roads safer. That
is the purpose here. I think we are all united in that purpose
as we do move forward in looking to make our highways safer.
Administrator Ferro, after a recent hearing at which
Secretary Foxx testified, I submitted a question for the record
on the impacts of the hours-of-service rules, and
unfortunately, the answer I received was less responsive than I
was hoping for, so I am going to try again and see how you do
on the answer, and maybe you can clear some things up for us.
What specific plans does your agency have to measure and
confirm the speculative health benefits that FMCSA proposed as
part of its hours-of-service cost/benefit analysis, and also
what do you have to study and evaluate the safety impacts of
that additional daytime driving that many of us believe is the
result of those restart rules?
Ms. Ferro. Senator, thank you for giving us another chance
to answer the question for you. I appreciate the opportunity.
With regard to health benefits and minimizing the health
impact of the rules we put in place, health impact on drivers
and their ability to operate safely, we incorporated and
analyzed and assessed an extensive body of data, as well as a
more recent survey and set of surveys conducted by the National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health.
So, in the body of research on which we based part of this
rule, which is the restart provision, is this whole concept of
excessively long work hours and their impact on a driver's
chronic health conditions, and thus the ability to operate
safely.
So, there is a full set of research I will be happy to
provide with regard to that specific rule.
[The information referred to follows:]
In our regulatory analysis, the Agency determined that the changes
to the hours of service rule would yield not only safety benefits in
lives saved but also long-term benefits to driver health, mainly in the
form of increased life-expectancy. The FMCSA is exploring a number of
approaches to more precisely assess the impact of the rulemaking on the
long-term health of commercial motor vehicle drivers and the operations
of the motor carrier industry. However, because those benefits were
expected to be realized over a period of decades, it is difficult to
estimate their effects in the brief time since the hours-of-service
rule went into effect in 2013. Recently, we have engaged in several
conversations regarding these issues with industry organizations,
Congressional staff, and safety advocates. FMCSA has also engaged the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health in discussions
related to conducting a longitudinal study of commercial motor vehicle
operators to monitor driver health. We are also working with the
Government Accountability Office to identify methods and data sources
that could help us monitor the new hours of service provisions on
driver health and daytime driving. Evaluating possible increases in
daytime driving is also difficult because there are no clear baseline
(i.e., pre-2013) data against which to measure the current level of
daytime driving, which is not really known.
Ms. Ferro. Going forward, we have several efforts underway.
The first is a very specific contract with the National Academy
of Sciences to examine the broad spectrum of fatigue and health
impacts of the condition of operating heavy duty vehicles, and
identifying the best data sources, new data sources, new
mechanisms for data collection, as well as existing resources
that we might not have known to tap into.
There is a third component, and I apologize for taking so
long, which is that we have reached out to all the stakeholders
to say we all have core questions we want to know about this
rule. There is a very robust study proposed in Senator Collins'
amendment that Ms. Claybrook indicated is best exercised with
the current rule in place in order to capture the full data.
We also see that there are many sources of data that
industry has and we are encouraged that industry may be
interested in sharing, which is really aggregated on board
fleet management device data that gives us a better sense of
what hour of driving an incident might occur, and compare
apples to apples, not apples to oranges.
Senator Fischer. Which I believe Mr. Osiecki is
recommending as well, to have some of that electronic data to
be provided on board. You had mentioned earlier, sir, a number
of programs that you are implementing in trying to improve
safety, which as I said, we are all trying to do here.
If you could elaborate on those and also you looked like
you wanted to respond to Senator Booker when he was asking a
question of some other witnesses with regard to the daytime
hours, so I will give you an opportunity to respond to that as
well.
Mr. Osiecki. Thanks. Thank you, Senator. If I may, I will
answer the second one first and then get back to the first one.
In terms of Senator Booker's question about truck traffic being
shifted to the daytime hours, FMCSA's study, commonly known as
the ``restart study,'' issued in January 2014, January of this
year, I would point the Committee to Figures 5 and 6.
Figures 5 and 6, and it is very difficult to see, but they
demonstrate that the two or more night sleepers under the new
restart compared to the one night sleepers, it demonstrates,
those two charts, that the truck traffic is more distributed
through the daytime hours between 8:00 a.m. and approximately 8
p.m. at night, so it is in FMCSA's own study. We have also
provided some data, some information to the Administration
taking a look at that.
Now, with respect to your first question, there are a lot
of ways to answer that because there are a lot of things going
on in the industry, I will address it from the technology
standpoint.
There are lane departure warning systems. There are
collision mitigation systems. There are active braking systems.
More recently and very recently, these onboard camera systems
that are not designed to view the truck driver in a negative
way, but designed to capture the environment of what is going
on in near crashes and crash events to determine what happened,
whether that is an opportunity to coach the professional driver
or in a lot of cases, to get the professional driver off the
hook given what has happened.
Those are improving safety. There is demonstrated evidence
that those systems work in addition to all these other sort of
vehicle based technologies that alert the driver and so forth.
Senator Fischer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator
Ayotte?
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman. I wanted to
ask you, Mr. Osiecki, in terms of--I really appreciate the hard
work that our truck drivers do. I think it is important to
point out--I have met a lot of them in my state, and a lot of
them own their own business and are small businesses,
independent operators as well that are working pretty hard.
They are competing against rail and other things, so it is
an important job and it is highly competitive. Frankly, one of
the concerns they have raised with me is that it is becoming
more and more costly to own your own business and to be a
smaller operator in this context, with not only some of the
things that are being issued that we are talking about today,
but also some of the new technology that is being required.
Would you not agree it is harder for the smaller operators
in this context?
Mr. Osiecki. I think there is when there are mandated
technologies, I think that is the case. Much of what I was
speaking about was voluntarily adopted technologies, and
incentives to drive that voluntary adoption.
Folks who have worked around this and FMCSA for years know
it takes many, many years, in fact, it takes decades, when you
implement a new mandated technology, on new equipment, it
literally takes two to three, sometimes four decades for the
entire fleet to turn over. So, incentives to drive voluntary
adoption is one way to do that.
Now I will sort of put an asterisk on, we do support the
mandated electronic logging devices, and there may be some
difference in the industry on that point, but the cost is
coming down on those.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you. I wanted to ask Administrator
Ferro, I know you are leaving soon, so thank you for all your
work at the agency, appreciate it. When you last appeared
before this committee on the hours-of-service rule, you had
testified that based on a FMCSA study, essentially there was
evidence that more trucks, larger trucks, would be on the road
during the daytime hours, because of the new hours-of-service
rules.
Do you dispute that?
Ms. Ferro. I spoke to the logic that we used to analyze
what that might be, looking at the 15 percent impact, and
identifying that by virtue of the logical analysis, about
250,000----
Senator Ayotte. So, by logic, we are going to have more
large trucks on the road during the daytime?
Ms. Ferro. Well, in fact, the follow-up point on that is
that 250,000 is barely a drop in the bucket when you look at
the 10 million----
Senator Ayotte. Have we fully analyzed--as I understand it,
we have not fully analyzed, and that is one of the purposes of
the Collins' study, to have a full analysis of what will be the
impact during daytime hours in terms of truck traffic, and as
you and I have talked about in the past, we already do have
evidence that more accidents occur during the daytime hours
because of the congestion that is natural during the daytime
hours in and of itself.
So, I think one of the things that I know the chairman and
others have said, the study of this has been robust, it has
been scientific, but it strikes me that we have not answered a
fundamental question that is important in terms of people's
safety, which is if we change the restart rules in the way they
have been proposed, how many more trucks will be on the road
during those daytime hours, what will be the safety impact of
having those trucks, more of them on the road during the
daytime hours.
To delay the rule while we understand that question to me
seems logical, because if we know that there is more congestion
during the daytime and more likely evidence there are more
accidents during that period, would we not want to know before
we go forward with this exactly what the public safety impact
is about the added truck traffic during that period?
It seems to me we have all been talking about science and
data, but it is important for us to have that science and data
before we implement a very significant rule that could in fact,
we do not know, have the unintended consequence of actually
creating more public safety issues.
I think that is really where the Collins' amendment is
coming from, and I fully support it. I think it makes logical
sense. The feedback that I have heard from this rule which we
have talked about before, I know the Collins' amendment will
also analyze the economic impacts of this rule, but I know we
have heard a lot of discussion today about why not just go
forward with the rule.
Well, this is a fundamental question that we should have
answered, it seems to me, for the American people, before we go
forward with a pretty significant rule change.
Ms. Ferro. If I might comment, just for purposes of
clarification, the final rule was issued in December of 2011
and went into effect a year ago. So, the full rule is underway.
Senator Ayotte. Right. I do not know why we went forward
with a rule without having those questions answered, and it
seems to me the Collins' amendment, from having received the
feedback of the concerns that people have that are legitimate
concerns, strikes the right balance. It suspends the rule until
we know the answer to that very important question of how much
more daytime traffic, what will be the impact in terms of
potential accidents during the daytime.
To me, the fact that we issued this rule before we actually
had the clear answers to those very important questions is
something that should not have happened.
So, I think what the Collins' amendment does is really
restart where we should be until we have those answers, and
then if the answers are there is not a public safety impact,
then you certainly are in a position where the rule can be
reissued.
Ms. Ferro. Thank you for clarifying. There is a public
safety impact of rolling back this rule. The rule today that is
in place today, based on the scientific evidence, based on
analysis, based on an enormous amount of public input, is
projected, is currently expected to be saving lives, reducing
crashes, and that is based on the health benefits, the analysis
through the sleep lab studies, and the field study that Dave
Osiecki mentioned actually was referencing traffic patterns
prior to July of 2013, as Congress had mandated we analyze.
Senator Ayotte. When you were last--I know my time is up--
when you were last before this committee and I asked you about
the field study in particular and the number of drivers that
were analyzed, as I understand it, my recollection is it was 21
or so over--you can tell me--106 drivers over 21 hours.
Ms. Ferro. 106.
Senator Ayotte. We think about the number of drivers on the
road across this country, 106 drivers over a 21 day period;
correct?
Ms. Ferro. That is correct.
Senator Ayotte. I am doing this off the top of my head. I
remember it. That is not that many when you think about how
many drivers are on the road. Most importantly, what I wanted
to point out was when you were last before this hearing, you
had agreed and you had said to me when we had this discussion
about the study, that your agency was constrained from doing
the kind of broader, naturalistic analysis that they are going
to be doing going forward.
Ms. Ferro. That is right.
Senator Ayotte. So, if you were constrained in doing that
kind of analysis, I think one thing we are in agreement on
around this room is that the Collins' study as proposed is
quite comprehensive. This would allow us to have this
information to understand the full impact of particularly the
daytime traffic as a result of this rule, and to really suspend
what I think is--I know from my constituents--I have said
before, not only have I heard from truck drivers but I have
heard from wholesalers of groceries that this is going to cost
them millions and millions of dollars, and their concern that
it will actually add to the impact of potential safety concerns
during the day.
We need to understand these answers. So, I wanted to just
express that I appreciate Senator Collins' leadership on this.
I think her amendment makes a lot of sense. It is unfortunate
that we did not have this information before the rule was
actually issued and implemented.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Ayotte. Just to
clarify before I call on Senator Scott, the rule that we are
discussing here has been in effect for one year; correct?
Ms. Ferro. That is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. There are studies underway about its
effectiveness; correct?
Ms. Ferro. That is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. The Collins' amendment insofar as it
requires additional study would produce perhaps additional
data, but it goes beyond the study to actually roll back the
rule.
Ms. Ferro. Let me clarify. There are efforts underway,
including meetings with stakeholders, to identify the data
sources to answer the questions, many of which again Senator
Ayotte very clearly outlined, moving forward.
We have a fatigue research and analysis body of work being
done through the National Academy of Sciences. Our full intent
is to be able to take advantage of aggregated data from onboard
fleet management devices with the help of industry and other
sources to analyze the day to day impacts.
Senator Blumenthal. My understanding is you will be
receiving data from the states as well that can be used in this
work.
Ms. Ferro. We routinely, through our motor carrier
assistance grants system and crash reporting, violation
reporting, roadside inspection work, collect data and use that
to analyze the effects of our work; that is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. So, it sounds like there is a very
robust, intensive, active, energetic effort underway to assess
the effectiveness of the rules while they are in effect now.
Ms. Ferro. That is absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Scott--Senator Scott? Sorry.
STATEMENT OF HON. TIM SCOTT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
panelists, for being a part of such an important hearing as we
discuss safety and the trucking industry.
Frankly, I will tell you that as I was watching you all on
TV, this was a long robust conversation on a number of topics,
hours-of-service being one priority, and certainly safety being
another.
Over the last couple of years I have had the opportunity to
meet with the ATA president, Phil Byrd, who is from my home
town of North Charleston, and talk with him a lot about the
safety issues and the progress being made.
I believe we find ourselves in the position where we have
seen significant progress made over the last several years and
certainly look forward to seeing more progress made as we know
it is important. We are talking about saving lives, and that is
really job number one.
I do have a couple of questions, Administrator Ferro, for
you. I spent too much time in the insurance industry, to tell
you the truth, nearly 25 years. I am only 30 years old, so
since I was 5 years old.
[Laughter.]
Senator Scott. It was not that funny. Anyway, for the last
couple of decades, I have spent my professional life owning an
insurance agency, and was interested in the correlation perhaps
between higher limits and fewer accidents, and if in fact the
rulemaking that we see coming forward speaks to any real
evidence of that correlation.
I will read the question to you to start the conversation
between the two of us. I understand that currently more than 99
percent of commercial vehicle accidents are easily covered
under the current insurance requirements, yet you have
initiated a new rulemaking to raise these requirements, these
limits.
Will your rulemaking include any kind of assessment of the
financial impact the increased requirements would have on small
businesses? First question.
How do you feel raising truck insurance limits would help
fulfill the mission of the agency, which of course is to reduce
crashes, injuries and fatalities involving larger trucks and
buses?
My question really comes from having limited exposure,
albeit most of mine was on the private sector side, on the
everyday family cars and only about 10 to 12 percent of my time
was spent on commercial insurance, commercial vehicles, so not
a lot of exposure there.
I was unaware of any specific studies that created a
correlation on increasing the limits of liability and reducing
fatalities, the crashes or the incidents, frankly.
I know as a small business owner who had employees that
when the rulemaking and/or legislative/regulatory environment
increases the thresholds of my coverage, it takes more money
out of our pockets to do more things for safety and for
employee retention.
So, my question is: was there any analysis on the impact
the rulemaking would have on small businesses, and/or on
businesses overall?
Ms. Ferro. Well, Senator Scott, the first step in the
rulemaking process actually will be just what you are
describing, the analysis component.
With regard to financial responsibility limits or I should
say minimums for the commercial vehicle industry, truck and
bus, those limits--the minimums were set by Congress 30 years
ago and prevail today. The minimum is still $750,000 for a
trucking company. It goes up depending on if you are carrying
passengers as a passenger carrier or carrying hazardous
materials as a trucking company, but again, the minimum is
$750,000 for your basic trucking provider.
When Congress introduced those minimums, it was done in the
context of deregulation and with an expressed appreciation for
the impact that risk-based insurance might have on safety
behaviors from their customers. In other words, if you minimize
risk, you are likely to be a good cover, and you are going to
have more reasonable rates, and I think it is probably
practiced the same on the private side.
So, in those 30 years, there has been no change in those
minimum levels. At the same time, the premium rates have
actually not changed either. They have actually softened a bit.
Consumer Price Index, Medical Price Index, all of those
components have gone up significantly.
So, through MAP-21, Congress directed the agency to
analyze, to look at, and report back to Congress on those
minimum levels of insurance, if they were adequate, and provide
recommendations, and then look every 4 years at those minimums,
starting with the report you just referenced.
In our analysis, we recognize that for all the factors I
just identified, it is appropriate for the agency at this time
to press forward on an anticipated or--it is called an
``ANPRM,'' it is a something proposed rulemaking, and I am
forgetting the term--sorry--advanced notice of proposed
rulemaking.
So that we can ask the audience of insurance providers, the
litigation world, medical, stakeholders from industry, and the
victim side, all to weigh in on and provide us data and
information to determine what those next steps should be before
moving on to a notice of proposed rulemaking. So, the first
step will be an ANPRM within the next 30 to 60 days.
Senator Scott. Thank you, ma'am. Mr. Osiecki, let me turn
to you, basically with the same question, different stream of
consciousness, as we think through--as we analyze the
information on risk versus reward, so we are talking about
carrots and sticks.
You create a stick that says if you raise the thresholds
the companies will become more prudent and more responsible,
their drivers, but my assumption is that is already happening.
I would love to hear your perspective on the impact of
higher limits on (a) the business system itself, and (b)
whether or not that would be an impediment to more incidents.
Mr. Osiecki. Thank you, Senator. I guess I would like to
start off by reiterating the Volpe study, the Volpe
Transportation Systems Center study that FMCSA sponsored and
recently put out, did indeed highlight that 99.9 percent of the
crashes and costs of those crashes for which trucks were
responsible for, the 30 percent that the Major highlighted
earlier, are covered under the existing limits.
So, 99.9 percent. There is only one-tenth of one percent
that are not covered. So, the question really becomes what is
our mission in raising the limits. Is there a link to safety? I
will tell you that there is almost a dearth or void of research
that links insurance limits, minimum insurance limits, to
safety outcomes.
Now, getting to the part of your question about business
impacts and the market, the market will clearly be impacted
dramatically if the limits are upped dramatically. If it goes
from $750,000 to $1 million, maybe not so much. Some are
talking about $750,000 minimum to perhaps $4 million or even
higher.
That will dramatically change the cost of insurance. It
will dramatically change the number of players in the truck
insurance marketplace, of which there are only a handful to
begin with.
So, it really becomes a very difficult question for the
industry to deal with, particularly if there is no link to
improved safety outcomes. There is a lot more to be said on
that, but I guess we are heartened by the fact that the first
step will be an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking as
opposed to a proposed rule.
Senator Scott. A final question, Mr. Osiecki, on the issue
of traffic enforcement activities versus roadside inspections,
and what will move us in the right direction. I would like to
hear your comments on what are the types of programs or
initiatives that you feel would be most effective at saving
lives on our Nation's highways.
At the end of the day, as we have said, the lifeblood of
our economy really is in those vehicles. As we see the
lifeblood of our economy moving through those vehicles and at
the same time we are looking for ways to reduce casualties and
catastrophic occurrences in an attempt to save more lives, help
me see a path forward, and if you are aware of any other
programs or initiatives that might be helpful.
Mr. Osiecki. It is really about getting the biggest bang
for your safety buck, and the safety buck is Federal dollars,
state dollars, and industry dollars. In terms of the traffic
enforcement activity versus roadside inspection activity, the
MCSAP program, the motor carrier safety assistance program, is
about a $200 million per year Federal/state grant program, and
the vast majority of that money goes toward roadside vehicle
inspections, focused on vehicle related defects and components,
as I mentioned earlier.
Now, there is a driver component to that. That driver
component, typically paperwork, license, and so forth, so there
is a driver piece. Let me be clear.
But in terms of the actual benefit, traffic enforcement,
according to FMCSA's own analysis, is at least four times more
effective. Traffic enforcement is stopping a commercial driver
for speeding, or an unsafe lane change, those types of unsafe
behaviors.
If that is four and a half times more effective than
roadside vehicle inspections, why are we spending 90 percent of
our MCSAP dollars on roadside inspections. It really should be
a different balance. I am not here to tell you what the balance
should be, but we do feel strongly that the balance should be
more effective--more balanced toward the more effective
countermeasure, that is traffic enforcement.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, appreciate the
time.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Scott. I have a few
follow-up questions. First of all, I was surprised to see in
your testimony, Ms. Ferro, that there is no test now for sleep
apnea; is that correct?
Ms. Ferro. Yes, sir. There is no requirement that a driver
be tested for sleep apnea to hold a CDL; that is correct.
Senator Blumenthal. Should there not be one?
Ms. Ferro. The process of assessing a driver's
qualifications, medical qualifications, for holding a CDL, is
something that we call the ``DOT physical.'' That happens at a
minimum every 2 years, sometimes more frequently, depending on
the driver's health condition.
Over the years, the agency, working with our medical review
board and expert panel, medical panels, that they have
appointed or I should say asked for feedback from, we have
consistently identified key elements within the guidance to be
looking at when they are carrying out--a medical examiner is
carrying out the DOT physical.
That includes respiratory conditions, and that brings me
back to obstructive sleep apnea, which is considered among the
respiratory conditions that a medical examiner is expected to
assess.
If in that medical examiner's line of practice, their
protocols help them identify that a driver warrants further
screening, then those medical examiners will likely refer that
driver for further screening.
It is not a requirement today. The requirement is that the
medical examiner ensure that driver meets the qualifications to
be safe and alert behind the wheel.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, you have given me a very full
answer, but I am asking you----
Ms. Ferro. Should it be.
Senator Blumenthal.--as to whether it should be required?
Frankly, I would think it is kind of basic. I am saying it as a
layman, not as an expert. I would be interested in other expert
views.
Ms. Ferro. Right.
Senator Blumenthal. Given the history of some crashes, and
those----
Ms. Ferro. Fatigue.
Senator Blumenthal. Those include railroad crashes, I would
think it should be part of whatever medical certificate is
required.
Ms. Ferro. Our medical review board and safety advisory
committee would recommend the same. Consequently, we will be,
adhering to congressional mandate, taking the next steps to
develop a rulemaking on obstructive sleep apnea starting with a
notice that asks a series of questions to gather additional
data and assess whether a rulemaking is the right next step,
but it can only be done through a rulemaking.
Senator Blumenthal. Do any of our witnesses disagree with
the proposition that sleep apnea ought to be tested before
someone is permitted to drive commercially?
[No response.]
Senator Blumenthal. The record will show there is no
objection or no disagreement.
Let me ask you, because I think you have made some very
good points, Mr. Osiecki, about speed limits and electronic
logging devices. We do not have a representative of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration here, but your
organization has petitioned for a rulemaking in that area.
Mr. Osiecki. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Has there been a response? Again, I
would agree with you that there ought to be.
Mr. Osiecki. Yes, Mr. Chairman. In 2010, NHTSA responded to
our petition as well as to the petition of another safety
advocacy group. There were two of us in 2006 that petitioned.
They said they would go forward with a rulemaking. That
rulemaking was originally anticipated to occur in 2012, and
unfortunately, it has not yet been proposed.
Now to be fair, it is our understanding that it is being
worked on and it is being worked on in conjunction with FMCSA,
I believe, and perhaps the administrator could comment.
So, it is moving. I think in our view it is moving at a
snail's pace. Speed is the biggest factor, causation or
contributing factor to car and truck crashes. If we want to
make a difference, it is kind of like the old gentleman who
said why do you rob banks? That is where the money is. The way
to address safety and reduce crashes, you go to where the big
numbers are.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I appreciate your point. I might
add that one of my grievances about Federal agency and Federal
rulemaking is that it has been too laggard, too lengthy in
time, and that pertains to a variety of Federal agencies and
Federal rulemakings. I appreciate your raising that point.
I might ask you also since we are on the subject of
rulemaking, perhaps you can tell us a little bit more about
electronic logging devices.
Mr. Osiecki. Certainly. The electronic logging devices is,
as it sounds, a technology that allows truck drivers to
electronically capture their hours-of-service. They are very
accurate for driving time limits. There is still a driver input
or manual input into the device for when they are working but
not driving.
Overall, they are effective at what they do. Initially,
they were costly. They were in the $1,000 to $1,500 range. They
are coming down in price, which is good.
As I testified, we would prefer to see a final regulation
yesterday with an implementation date. It is going to take some
time. It will still be at least three to 4 years before that
mandate kicks in, and we would like to see incentives to drive
the voluntary adoption, because the voluntary adoption will
slow down the closer we get because of the potential changes in
performance specifications.
Senator Blumenthal. And that is a method of making sure
that the rules, whatever the rules are, are enforced
effectively and consistently.
Mr. Osiecki. Yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask you, Major Palmer, I think
you spoke very well to this point, but I just want to make sure
I understand it. You made the point about variation in rules
and consistency and reliability in effect in rulemaking being
very important to enforcement. As a law enforcer myself before
I came here for quite a few years, that point hit home to me.
So, it seemed to me that point would argue strongly in
favor of not rolling back or retracting rules already in effect
while their effectiveness is under study in case they might
have to be re-imposed again, but leaving them in effect so that
they can continue to be enforced, so that folks on the highways
could continue to rely on them, even as their effectiveness is
studied.
Am I interpreting correctly your view?
Major Palmer. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, that is what we want.
What we would prefer is not to have to deal with retraining and
readjusting for something that could be temporary.
You know, it is not our position to get involved in the
choice of what the rule is. As you know, it is our job to
enforce what is in place, and all we are asking from an
enforcement perspective is to maintain the rule that has been
in effect for a year until those studies are completed, and
that way, whatever changes are going to be made can be made at
one time.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. That completes my questions.
Senator Blunt?
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. On the other side of
that one year, of course, if we find out a year from now that
it does put a lot more people on the highway at a time when the
highway is already clogged up, that is another year of that.
We will see how this all works out. Clearly, this is going
to be dealt with by the House and the Senate, and Senate
appropriations bill. We will see if it stays there.
Mr. Osiecki, my understanding is like with just a normal
car or truck with a sync system--I was talking to an insurance
person about this the other day--you can connect that sync
system to their monitoring system for the people they have
insured, and based on your driving behavior, they will give you
a better rate.
So, I am assuming that if a sync system from a normal car,
somebody at a distant location can tell if I am starting or
stopping too fast, or if I am driving too fast, I guess that
same information, kind of information is available if you have
the electronic logging system.
Mr. Osiecki. It is, Senator, and many fleets have that
today. The safety manager, safety director, sitting at their
computer, at their desk, get real time alerts with hard braking
events, perhaps steering out of context events, those types of
things. They can directly intervene with the driver through a
message or if not, intervene with a message to stop, intervene
with a message to pull over and contact us.
So, that is there and there is a benefit from these
vehicle-based technologies, and it is being used again in the
industry fairly widespread. I would like to see it more widely
used. They are costly, however.
Senator Blunt. That was my other question. You mentioned
cost. This is from the independent owner/operator out there in
his own truck looking for work, that has always been their
concern, that they could not quite afford to compete at that
level of equipment, but I assume that has gotten quite a bit
less expensive.
Mr. Osiecki. Yes, it is kind of like the cell phone
scenario where the cell phone cost goes down and the real cost
is in the over the air or the monthly charge. That scenario has
played out in trucking as well.
Technology device costs have come down. The cost is over
the air. Those are still real.
Senator Blunt. Those are still real costs to the
independent operator.
Mr. Osiecki. Yes they are, sir.
Senator Blunt. That would explain some of their reluctance,
or hey look, I am a safe driver, look at my record, why should
I have to have a logging system. I am of the view that you are,
that if there is a way to monitor this--liability is something
that nobody should want to just run to embrace. You want to do
everything you can not to have that liability.
Ms. Ferro, I think since 2003, highway fatalities involving
trucks decreased?
Ms. Ferro. Up through 2009, 2009 was the lowest year on
record, and they have crept up since that time.
Senator Blunt. They have gone up a little bit since that
time?
Ms. Ferro. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. Do you have a reason for that? Do you know
why that would be the case, if they would have decreased for
six or 7 years and then they crept back up a little bit?
Ms. Ferro. We attribute part of it to the intensifying
traffic on our roadways. Let me preface that by saying that is
part and parcel why we are working today to get better data
that incorporates fleet management device data with crash data
and incident data, so we can better analyze when crashes are
happening, why they are happening, and the net effect of the
range of measures that have been taken.
But at the end of the day, economic growth and the
intensity of pressure on the industry to deliver and the
growing traffic volumes all, we feel, have contributed to those
increasing crash rates.
Senator Blunt. So, does traffic volume become a factor in
trying to figure out your regulations for drivers, delivery and
other things, if traffic volume is one of the concerns here?
Ms. Ferro. How the vehicles are being operated in the
traffic is at the source of our concern. How the driver is
behaving, how the company is managing the equipment and the
driver, and the other demands in the supply chain that are
putting pressures on that driver.
A real compounding factor in driver pressure and driver
stress is detention time. We touched on it a little bit with
regard to compensation. At the end of the day, the time that a
driver is sitting is unpaid time, and it is putting pressure on
that driver to complete the delivery of that load.
Until we can address this detention time issue, if it is
unpaid by the shipping industry, if it is unpaid by the
employer, then it is free to everybody and they do not care to
tighten it up.
So, the impacts of that also absolutely, as our economy
grows and detention time grows, those kinds of things do impact
a driver's ability to be safe, because they are pressing legal
and physical limits to get that load completed, to get on to
their next destination.
Senator Blunt. Do you have a sense of what the 2013 numbers
are going to look like, in terms of fatalities?
Ms. Ferro. In terms of fatalities? We are watching them
closely.
Senator Blunt. You have those numbers. You are now going
back and trying to analyze them over the last six months?
Ms. Ferro. And we are trying to get to the point where it
is a robust dataset. Traditionally, the data, the crash data,
both fatal, injury and tow away crash data that we gather, that
is reported through the states, takes 20 to 24 months before we
are satisfied that we have 100 percent of the crash data in.
I have been fairly criticized by my staff in the past for
getting out of the box too early on some of the data because it
does change over time.
So, we are watching. We are looking at the first six months
of the hours-of-service rule transition between July and
December of last year, and watching closely as to when we will
be close to 100 percent of the data, crash data, from the
states, which we expect will be at least another six months,
just for that particular period.
I will be pleased to report back. I apologize, I will not
be here. I know the agency will be very committed to reporting
back as we continue to monitor that.
Senator Blunt. Now easy for you to say, right, since you
are going----
Ms. Ferro. Bittersweet, I might add.
Senator Blunt. Exactly.
[Laughter.]
Senator Blunt. I am sure that is right. One last line of
questions. Every transportation company has to do drug and
alcohol testing. That is pretty broadly based, I believe, 50
percent within the course of a year, 50 percent of their
drivers have to be tested.
Ms. Ferro. That is correct, 50 percent of their drivers
need to be tested for drugs and then alcohol is 10 percent,
randomized.
Senator Blunt. Randomized. Then if they have results that
are positive, there is some point where that number goes down
to 25 percent, if it is less than 1 percent over 2 years, I
believe it is.
Ms. Ferro. Yes. I think you are speaking to the authority
of the agency, if the overall rate of positive testing is
significantly below that threshold that you identified, the
random population size can be reduced.
So, after 2 years of surveys, we are identifying that it is
lower. It has continued to come down or stayed low. I want to
say it is below an 1 percent threshold for testing positive.
So, the agency is assessing all the different components of
what it would mean if in fact we lowered the random population
from 50 to 25 percent, but those are factors that are under
review today, so it would be premature for me to comment beyond
that. In fact, the discussion is underway.
Senator Blunt. Mr. Osiecki, do you have anything you want
to say about that?
Mr. Osiecki. Senator, the trucking industry has tried
really hard to get its drug testing positive rate below that 1
percent. We have tried all different types of things, moving to
various types of testing. 2011 was the first year in which our
industry dropped below that sort of magic threshold of one
percent. 2012, we do not yet know the data although the
Administrator just indicated that it may be below that
threshold again.
That really brings the question if all of the other modes,
FAA, Federal Railroad, Federal Transit, if they have already
reduced their industry's random population from 50 percent to
25 percent, why wouldn't the trucking industry be in that same
category, particularly since this was set up as an incentive
based program many years ago.
So, we essentially met the incentive as I understand it,
and we are not being rewarded, as I understand it.
Senator Blunt. You met the incentive that was in the
initial incentive package, that if you can keep below one
percent for 2 years, then you have to do fewer samples, but you
still have to report.
Mr. Osiecki. That is correct; yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. Well, it does seem to me that if you change
the incentive after you go through the process, then you cannot
expect the process to be quite as cooperative the second time.
Whether we are evaluating what the new incentive should be
or we are evaluating what the facts are that the second year
produces would be something I would be very interested in, and
I will let you respond now or for the record on that, either
one.
Ms. Ferro. Thank you, Senator. I will respond for the
record, but I do want to reinforce, we are looking at all of
those questions today, and as Mr. Osiecki indicated, we have
not released the final number. I probably let that cat out of
the bag, that is too late.
Please know this is a very serious topic and we are taking
all factors into consideration, so we will follow up more
clearly on the record.
[The FMCSA Response follows:]
Pursuant to 49 CFR 382.305(f), the FMCSA Administrator's decision
to increase or decrease the minimum annual percentage rate for
controlled substances testing is based on the reported positive rate
for the entire motor carrier industry. All information used for this
determination is drawn from the controlled substances management
information system (MIS) reports required by 49 CFR 382.403. In order
to ensure the reliability of the data, the Administrator may obtain
additional information or reports from employers, and may make
appropriate modifications in calculating the industry positive rate. If
the Administrator determines that the data received under the reporting
requirements for two consecutive calendar years indicate that the
positive rate is less than 1.0 percent, the minimum annual percentage
rate for random controlled substances can be reduced from 50 percent to
25 percent of all driver positions.
FMCSA is currently analyzing data from 2011, 2012, and 2013 to make
an informed decision on whether or not to maintain or lower the annual
random controlled substances testing rate for calendar year 2015. In
the event the FMCSA Administrator decides to change the minimum annual
random controlled substances testing percentage rate, the Agency will
publish notice of the change in the Federal Register. Any new testing
rate would be effective starting January 1, 2015.
Senator Blunt. Well, it should be, and again, if you are
going to set an incentive for the industry to meet, and here is
the incentive that you are trying to achieve, you cannot then
go back later and say well, OK, you met the incentive, you met
the requirements, we do not think that is the right reward,
because they still are going to have to report, the question is
how many people they have to check, and then if it goes back
up, I assume it works the other way.
Thank you, Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Blunt, for those
excellent questions. I want to thank the panel. Before we
close, there are a couple of issues, and I was going to ask Ms.
Claybrook whether you had any kind of closing comments on some
of the issues that Senator Blunt has just raised.
Ms. Claybrook. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
would just like to mention there were no studies that supported
the old restart provision. So, now there is concern that there
are no studies that have evaluated the change that Senator
Collins is trying to remove.
In fact, she wants to study it, but if you remove those
provisions, they are not going to be able to be studied. So, it
is very hard to evaluate what kind of change is going to occur
if you do not have the changes in place to study.
So, that is the reason we support your co-sponsorship of
the Booker amendment which says let's leave them in place, they
have been in for a year, it is very complicated to change them
at this moment because the industry has already started to
implement them, and let's study them even further.
What we do have scientific data about, however, very
clearly, and a lot of study has been done, is on the hours-of-
service nighttime shifts, daytime shifts, and the importance of
getting nighttime sleep. So, there is no question about that,
as far as I know. Those studies are very, very robust and
substantial.
So, in our view, in the safety advocates' view, the real
issue is that the restart should be eliminated. We think the
whole restart concept of allowing people to restart their hours
with only a weekend--part of a weekend off after driving 70
hours a week is much too little.
Further, I would say the real problem here, and it goes to
Senator Booker's concern about the payment, the pay that the
drivers are getting, is they are not paid overtime. They drive
11 hours a day and can work up to 14 hours. They do not get
paid overtime. They have an incentive to drive as fast as they
possibly can because they are paid on the basis of the number
of miles that they travel, so the whole system is kaflooey, if
I can say it that way, because it has an incentive to drive
faster and it does not protect the drivers.
In addition, the whole issue that Ms. Ferro raised of a
driver having to sit and wait for the freight to be loaded and
unloaded is not paid time. Drivers can be required to wait up
to 3 hours.
So, you are talking about 11 hours of driving and three
hours of waiting, and then 10 hours to sleep, and then they
start that process all over again, up to 70 hours a week of
work, and then they get 34 hours off.
That is inhumane in our view. There is a large turnover
among drivers because of low pay and difficult hours, and
advantage is taken of the drivers.
I would like to also just comment if I could briefly on the
issue of 70 percent of the truck crashes are caused by the car
drivers. The fact is that 96 percent of the time the car
drivers are dead, and dead men do not talk.
So, when the police come to investigate the crash,
naturally the truck driver is going to say well, it was not my
fault because they want to retain their jobs, and we understand
that. The people who were involved in that crash on the other
side, the car drivers, they are deceased or badly injured and
are not able to comment or explain. The police do not have the
time to do a full fledged investigation. They are moving
traffic. Sometimes traffic is backed up for hours as a result
of these truck crashes.
So, the studies that have been done on this, I think, have
been inadequate and minimal. I do not know, I think you agree
with that.
Ms. Ferro. Minimal; yes.
Ms. Claybrook. Minimal. So, I think that number is not a
number that should be used. I would like to say that I agree
with the ATA about having more technology in vehicles, but that
does not in any way in my view undermine the need to correct
the hours-of-service rules.
They are two different issues. They are both really
important. We completely support technology improvements, but I
will say the technology is costly for the smaller independent
truckers, and they do not like them and they oppose them.
The final thing I would like to comment on, if you do not
mind one more minute, is the insurance. The insurance number of
$750,000 is totally inadequate for a major truck crash, and
insurance is designed to protect the people who are harmed. It
is not designed necessarily to assure there is going to be more
safety. There are other things that can be done to do that, as
we have discussed at this hearing.
Insurance should be at least brought up to inflation
numbers, which would bring it up to several million. One of the
problems is that a lot of truck companies, the big truck
companies, do have more insurance, which is great, but smaller
companies do not, and so if you happen to be hit by a small
truck company, you are never going to get the kind of
compensation you deserve.
With Mexican trucks coming into play, they only have to
meet our minimum rules, which is $750,000, and you will never
be able to get more than that, if there is a major truck crash
caused by a Mexican truck.
So, I think the rules need to be changed and the minimum
insurance level should be substantially increased to several
million, four or five million.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. We are going to allow the
record to remain open. I know that some of our witnesses may
want to respond to points that have been made by other members
of the panel.
We are going to keep the record open for a week--I am
sorry, 2 weeks. The Judiciary Committee is a week. I guess
lawyers can talk quicker or write quicker. Maybe they do not
have as much to say. That is not true, definitely.
So, thank you very, very much. It has been an excellent
panel. I want to thank my colleagues, particularly Senator
Blunt, for their really excellent participation and their
differing points of view on this panel and among us as
colleagues, but I think what we have in common is the goal of
increasing safety on our roads, and we have explored some areas
where I think we have very definitely common ground, and where
the Federal Government can play a more constructive role.
Again, thank you so much and I look forward to working with
every one of our members of the panel in exploring and
advancing these areas. Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. During the hearing, the American Trucking Associations
argued that states should be focusing more of their MCSAP resources on
traffic enforcement instead of roadside inspections. Do you agree with
this statement? If not, please explain why.
Answer. As an Agency, we would not agree with this argument.
Currently, there are approximately 500,000 law enforcement officers
nationwide who conduct traffic enforcement on the Nation's highways.
Only about 12,000 of these officers are qualified to conduct
inspections on commercial motor vehicles. As a result, it is imperative
that these resources, funded through the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program (MCSAP), are used for this purpose. Data from MCSAP
officers conducting inspection demonstration that 20 percent of the
trucks operating on our highways have a mechanical condition so severe
that the vehicle must be placed immediately out-of-service. We must
maintain a strong inspection presence with the certified officers while
encouraging states to use their other highway safety resources to
conduct traffic enforcement. To achieve this end, FMCSA is working with
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to encourage
more law enforcement to conduct traffic enforcement and to develop and
deploy training aimed at getting law enforcement qualified and
comfortable pulling over a commercial motor vehicle for a traffic
enforcement stop.
In addition, flexibility within the MCSAP program already exists.
FMCSA's MCSAP program permits the states to request the use of more
MCSAP funding for traffic enforcement if the state can document a
problem that needs this solution.
Question 2. The American Trucking Associations (ATA) support
changes that would stop enforcement of current hours of service (HOS)
rules. Does all of the trucking industry support ATA's position? What
have other trucking companies said about the rules? What administrative
steps can you take to address these concerns?
Answer. Based on discussions between the senior leadership of FMCSA
and the ATA on May 8, 2014, the ATA's primary concerns about the HOS
rule are the 2013 changes to the 34-hour restart provision.
Specifically, ATA expressed concerns about limiting the use of the 34-
hour restart to once every 168 hours, and requiring that the restart
include two nighttime periods between 1:00 and 5:00 am.
FMCSA does not believe that all segments of the industry support
the ATA's position because the Agency estimated that the changes to the
34-hour restart impacted approximately 15 percent of drivers. Many of
these drivers work the most intensive schedules and prior to July 1,
2013, they could average more than 80 hours of work per week. No other
segment of the transportation industry is allowed to work such grueling
schedules. With the implementation of the rules on July 1, 2013, the
average work week for these drivers was limited to approximately 70
hours.
Other segments of the industry are concerned primarily about the
December 2011 final rule requirement for the 30-minute rest break
during the work day. For certain segments (e.g., livestock, and
carriers transporting specific types of freight for the Departments of
Defense and Energy) that are not covered by the short-haul exceptions
to the 30-minute break rule, the Agency has granted limited 2-year
exemptions based on its authority under 49 U.S.C. 31135.
On December 16, 2014, the Congress enacted the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, which contained a
provision that suspended enforcement of certain provisions of the 34-
hour restart. FMCSA issued a notice in the Federal Register on December
17--effective the date of the law's enactment--suspending the
requirements regarding the restart of a driver's 60- or 70-hour limit
with which drivers were required to comply beginning July 1, 2013. The
restart provisions have no force or effect from the date of enactment
of the Appropriations Act through the period of suspension, and are
replaced with the previous restart provisions that were in effect on
June 30, 2013. FMCSA notified motor carriers, commercial drivers, State
Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program grant recipients and other law
enforcement personnel of these immediate enforcement changes.
Question 3. How do the HOS regulations for truckers differ from
other modes of transportation (i.e., rail and aviation)?
Answer. It's difficult to compare the modes because the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and Federal Rail Administration (FRA)
both have monthly limits and FAA has annual limits. Neither has a
``restart'' per se.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restart or Time Off-
On-Duty/Driving or Weekly Limits Duty Required per Monthly Limits Yearly Limits
Flight Time Limits week
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAA* 9-14 Flight Duty 60 FDP/168 10 hours before FDP/ 100 hrs Flight/ 1,000 flight
Period (FDP)/8-9 Eight uninterrupted 190 FDP time
flight sleep**
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA/Freight 12/12 -must have Requires time off 48 hours after 6 276 hours on None
10 hours off-duty after 6 days on duty/72 duty
in previous 24 consecutive days hours after 7 days
hour period on-duty on duty***
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FMCSA 14/11 60/7 or 70/8 34-hour restart None None
every 168 hours
with two nighttime
periods
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* FAA may approve alternative fatigue management programs
** Previous rule required 24 hours off per 7 day period
*** 49 U.S.C. Sec. 21103 allows employees to work a seventh consecutive day if they must do so in order to
return to their home terminal
Question 4. Administrator Ferro, as you know, the Department is
currently conducting an extensive truck size and weight study. As part
of that study, DOT is looking at whether adding weight to a truck could
cause the truck equipment such as brakes or tires or suspensions to
wear out faster and thereby make the heavier trucks more dangerous.
That seems like a very important safety factor and I know the law
enforcement community has cited this as one of its major concerns. It
is my understanding that CVSA recently completed a joint data
collection effort with FMCSA to see if there is any correlation between
the weight of a truck and out of service violations due to bad brakes
or other equipment problems. Can you tell us the results of this
effort? Do you believe this to be a serious safety issue?
Answer. FMCSA has been working cooperatively with both the
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) and the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) in a Heavy Vehicle Data Collection Effort. This
3-year data gathering activity was initiated by CVSA in January 2012
and data collection will continue through January 15, 2015. The effort
is focused on gathering Level 1 vehicle inspection data on commercial
straight trucks and tractor-semitrailer combination vehicles.
Preliminary analysis conducted at the 30-month point indicates that the
vehicle out-of-service rate for vehicles that had been issued weight
citations is higher than the national average for all vehicles, and a
complete analysis will be conducted at the conclusion of the data
collection period. FMCSA believes that commercial trucks need to be
operated and maintained in a safe condition at all times, which
includes proper inspection, repair, and maintenance of all vehicle
braking systems. As a data driven Agency, we will obviously take an
objective view of the result of this research before making a
declarative statement on truck size and weights.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question. Truck driver fatigue is a serious problem in the
transportation sector and is too often the cause of horrific crashes
and needless fatalities. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration's (FMCSA) hours of service regulations help to ensure
that truck drivers have an opportunity to get adequate rest and are
less tired when they get behind the wheel, thus preventing dangerous
fatigue-related trucking accidents on our roads and highways. FMCSA
recently instituted revised hours of service regulations that became
effective on July 1, 2013. The new rules include a number of important
safety provisions, but some have recently been working to stop
enforcement of the specific changes.
The new regulations require that after hitting the limit on hours
in a week, a driver must rest for 34 consecutive hours--or ``re-
start''--and this time period has two conditions: (a) it must include
at least two consecutive periods from 1:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m.--time when
the circadian rhythm demands rest most; and (b) it can only be taken
after a full week (or 168 hours from the beginning of the driver's last
re-start). Many have claimed that preventing enforcement of these two
provisions would be a ``small'' and ``reasonable'' change to the
current safety regimen.
If the new rules were changed and these two provisions were
effectively repealed, how would safety on our roads and highways be
compromised? How many more hours in a seven-day week would a driver be
able to drive than under the current system? How many more hours in a
month would a driver be able to drive than under the current system?
How many more hours in a calendar year would a driver be able to drive
than under the current system?
What other information should Congress consider as changes to the
new regulations are debated? What problems could arise if Congress
changes the rules through legislation instead of allowing FMCSA to
address these issues through the regulatory process?
Those working to stop enforcement of the new safety provisions have
claimed that the new rules will prevent truck drivers from driving
during nighttime hours and will lead to an increase in the number of
truck drivers on the road during morning hours. Do the new hours of
service regulations prevent truck drivers from driving during nighttime
hours? Have the new regulations led to an increase in highway traffic
during morning hours? If all drivers affected by the new rules began
driving after 5:00 a.m., how would daytime traffic congestion on our
roads be affected? How would nighttime traffic on our roads be
affected?
Some claim that the provisions in the new rules were implemented
before proper research, data and analysis were conducted on their
potential impact. What research did FMCSA conduct in support of these
changes? What positive safety impacts has FMCSA discovered since the
rules became effective? What further research and analysis is FMCSA
conducting to evaluate the ongoing effectiveness of the new rules? What
data does FMCSA rely on to carry out these analyses? What challenges,
if any, does FMCSA face in obtaining data that could help in evaluating
the new rules?
The ``re-start'' concept was first instituted in hours of service
regulations that were made effective in 2003. If the changes to the
hours of service rules that were recently made effective in 2013, i.e.,
the two consecutive 1:00 to 5:00 a.m. rest periods and the 168-hour
waiting period between re-starts, are scaled back, then the hours of
service regulations will essentially return to where they were in 2003.
What scientific research and analysis were conducted before the re-
start provision was first instituted in 2003? What specific research
and analysis were conducted to ensure that daytime congestion did not
increase after the re-start became effective? What specific research
and analysis were conducted to ensure that daytime fatalities and
injuries did not increase?
Answer. FMCSA acknowledges that the 2013 change in the restart
provision of the hours of service (HOS) rule affected night-time
drivers primarily with the 1:00- 5:00 a.m. requirement. However, the
rule did not force nighttime drivers to shift their schedules to
daytime operations other than satisfying the two nighttime off-duty
periods. The rule did not prevent carriers and drivers from setting
their own schedules nor did it restrict drivers from being on the road
during any time of the day. The impact on daytime driving is difficult
to estimate because there are no baseline (i.e., pre-2013) data against
which to measure the current level of daytime driving, which is not
really known. The information about daytime driving and traffic
congestion are more anecdotal than statistical. Although the Agency has
heard criticism that the new rule discriminated against nighttime
drivers and forced them to drive during the day and in prime rush
hours, we are not aware of any evidence to support this claim.
In assessing the impact of the 2013 changes in the HOS rule, the
Agency estimated that only 15 percent of interstate drivers would be
required to change their work schedules to comply with the new
requirements. Our information indicates that this group relied
routinely on the use of the 34-hour restart to work in excess of 80
hours per week. Only those drivers who were working more than 70 hours
per week are affected by having their work limited to an average of 70
hours per week, which is still nearly double the national standard of a
40-hour work week.
In our regulatory analysis, the Agency determined that the changes
to the hours of service rule would provide $280 million in safety
benefits from fewer crashes, with 19 lives saved per year. And the rule
provides $350 million (primary estimate discounted at 7 percent) in
savings from improved driver health. The benefits of the rule are not
speculative. They have been validated through long-term scientific
studies of the relationship between increased sleep (for sleep-deprived
groups, like truck drivers) and increased life expectancy. Allowing
FMCSA to address this issue through the regulatory process would allow
a scientific, data-driven outcome that considers the views of all
relevant stakeholders.
Prior to finalizing the 2013 rule, FMCSA held six public listening
sessions, an online question and answer forum and carefully considered
approximately 21,000 comments that were also submitted from drivers,
carriers, and industry associations.
The 2011 final rule lists 80 sources of scientific research and
data considered by the Agency and the Regulatory Impact Analysis cited
nearly 50 scientific sources. All of this was on top of hundreds of
studies regarding fatigue and hours of work that were considered in
past HOS rulemakings. Additionally, the Agency ordered the conducting
of a third-party naturalistic field study that measured fatigue among
CMV drivers. The study concluded the current 34-hour restart provision
is more effective at combatting fatigue than the previous version. In
the study, researchers measured sleep, reaction time, subjective
sleepiness and driving performance, finding that drivers who began
their work week with just one nighttime period of rest, as compared to
the two nights in the updated 34-hour restart break exhibit the
following conditions:
More lapses of attention, especially at night;
Greater sleepiness, especially toward the end of their duty
periods; and
Increased lane deviation in the morning, afternoon, and at
night.
Despite this research, on December 16, 2014, the Congress enacted
the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015,
which contained a provision that suspended enforcement of the 34-hour
restart. FMCSA issued a notice in the Federal Register on December 17--
effective the date of the law's enactment--suspending the requirements
regarding the restart of a driver's 60- or 70-hour limit with which
drivers were required to comply beginning July 1, 2013. The restart
provisions have no force or effect from the date of enactment of the
Appropriations Act through the period of suspension, and are replaced
with the previous restart provisions that were in effect on June 30,
2013. FMCSA notified motor carriers, commercial drivers, State Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Program grant recipients and other law
enforcement personnel of these immediate enforcement changes. For
further information see FMCSA's Federal Register notice:
www.fmcsa.dot.gov/regulations/hours-service/hours-service-drivers.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. In your evaluation of the potential impacts of the 2011
Hours of Service rules, which specific metrics or studies did the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) use to assess the
impacts of daytime driving due to the schedule shifts caused by the
restart provisions?
Answer. In assessing the impact of changes in the hours of service
rule, the Agency estimated the percentage of interstate drivers that
would be required to make changes to their work schedules in order to
comply with the new requirements. The Agency estimated that the changes
to the 34-hour restart would impact approximately 15 percent of
interstate drivers. Our information indicated that this group routinely
relied upon the use of the 34-hour restart to work in excess of 80
hours per week. The changes to the 34-hour restart forced them to
reduce their average work week to approximately 70 hours. FMCSA
acknowledges that the change in the restart provision primarily affects
night-time drivers with the 1:00 a.m.-5:00 a.m. requirement. However,
the rule does not force nighttime drivers to shift their schedules to
daytime operations other than satisfying the two nighttime periods off-
duty. The rule does not prevent carriers and drivers from setting their
own schedules, nor does it restrict drivers from being on the road
during any time of the day. The impact on daytime driving is difficult
to estimate because there are no baseline (i.e., pre-2013) data against
which to measure the current level of daytime driving, which is not
really known. Based on information provided to us by industry and
others during development of the HOS rule, the information about
daytime driving is more anecdotal than statistical.
Question 2. Please provide a detailed status update on the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations provided in the
GAO report entitled ``Modifying the Compliance, Safety, Accountability
Program Would Improve the Ability to Identify High Risk Carriers.''
When does FMCSA anticipate closing out these recommendations?
Answer. FMCSA responded to the GAO report on April 3, 2014, and
explained the Agency's significant concerns regarding its findings and
proposed metrics. FMCSA disagrees with the GAO recommendation that the
Agency should ``Revise the SMS methodology to better account for
limitations in drawing comparisons of safety performance across
carriers.'' The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has significant
concerns and unresolved disputes regarding GAO's findings and analysis
metrics, and DOT previously responded to GAO regarding its report. Most
notably, the data sufficiency level that GAO recommends for SMS would
limit FMCSA to overseeing just the largest motor carriers, leaving
approximately 90 percent of the motor carrier industry outside of the
Agency's monitoring and enforcement programs.
In addition, GAO's metric focuses on those carriers that have
already had a crash. The FMCSA uses SMS to prioritize its enforcement
resources and proactively intervene early and quickly to identify
unsafe compliance patterns before crashes occur. The assumption that a
motor carrier that has no crashes during a limited observation period
also has no crash risk, irrespective of demonstrated poor on-road
performance and safety compliance across multiple inspections, is
incorrect. The GAO's analysis runs contrary to recommendations given to
the Agency by the National Transportation Safety Board, which has urged
the Agency to take significant action on motor carriers identified by
SMS as having unsafe compliance patterns before a crash takes place.
A number of independent reports have confirmed the effectiveness of
SMS, including reports by the University of Michigan Transportation
Research Institute, the American Transportation Research Institute, and
FMCSA's own analysis of SMS. These studies validate that SMS is
reliable for its stated purpose and objective of prioritizing carriers
for interventions. Most importantly, since FMCSA's implementation of
SMS in December 2010, overall violation rates have decreased by 14
percent and driver violation rates have decreased by 17 percent, the
most dramatic decreases observed in over a decade.
FMCSA remains committed to considering further changes to SMS
provided such changes improve the Agency's ability to proactively
identify unsafe motor carriers for interventions before a crash.
Recently, the Agency made significant changes to SMS's public display
in response to stakeholder feedback. This new version, released on
August 4, 2014, consolidates information from multiple sites into an
easy-to-use interface, clarifies the relationship of Behavior Analysis
and Safety Improvement Categories (BASIC) to crash risk, and increases
focus on SMS as a prioritization tool.
Regarding GAO's second recommendation on FMCSA's safety fitness
determination (SFD), a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) is
currently under development--scheduled for publication in early 2015.
GAO recommended that the Agency ensure that any determination of a
carrier's safety fitness account for limitations in the data. FMCSA
concurred with the GAO recommendation, which was consistent with the
Agency's publicly-stated position. As a result, the SFD NPRM will
reflect the requirement for sufficient data.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Hon. Anne S. Ferro
Question 1. I have heard from Nebraska truckers who are concerned
about the CSA program. In our June hearing, Senator Thune asked you
about the GAO and the OIG reports and how FMCSA is implementing the
recommended changes to the CSA program. You said that you were
``utilizing the recommendations from both agencies in continuing to
improve the CSA program.'' Can you give us a more specific status
update on implementing these changes?
Answer. FMCSA responded to the GAO report on April 3, 2014, and
explained the Agency's significant concerns regarding its findings and
proposed metrics. FMCSA disagrees with the GAO recommendation that the
Agency should ``Revise the SMS methodology to better account for
limitations in drawing comparisons of safety performance across
carriers.'' The methodology suggested by the GAO would result in a
prioritization scheme that assesses the safety risks of only 10 percent
of the industry while leaving the Agency with no prioritization scheme
for the majority--90 percent--of active interstate carriers. The GAO
methodology is reactive and inconsistent with recommendations from NTSB
in that GAO prioritizes carriers that have had crashes, rather than
proactive, by identifying carriers that are at an increased risk of
having a crash by virtue of their pattern of safety violations observed
during roadside inspections.
FMCSA remains committed to considering further changes to SMS
provided such changes improve the Agency's ability to proactively
identify unsafe motor carriers for interventions before a crash.
Recently, the Agency made significant changes to SMS' public display in
response to stakeholder feedback. This new version, released on August
4, 2014, consolidates information from multiple sites into an easy to
use interface, clarifies the relationship of Behavior Analysis and
Safety Improvement Categories (BASIC) to crash risk, and increases
focus on SMS as a prioritization tool.
Regarding GAO's second recommendation on FMCSA's safety fitness
determination (SFD), a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) is
currently under development--scheduled for publication in early 2015.
GAO recommended that the Agency ensure that any determination of a
carrier's safety fitness account for limitations in the data. FMCSA
concurred with the GAO recommendation, which was consistent with the
Agency's publicly-stated position. As a result, the SFD NPRM will
reflect the requirement for sufficient data.
With regard to the OIG report, FMCSA responded to the Office of the
Inspector General on February 27, 2014, concurring with all 6
recommendations. Since issuance of the report, the Agency has
officially closed the following four recommendations with documented
action fulfilling the intent of the recommendations:
MH-2014-032-A02--Implement Process for Deactivating DOT
Numbers--Closed 4/09/2014--In March 2014, FMCSA began
deactivating USDOT numbers of carriers and intermodal equipment
providers that did not complete their biennial update by the
filing deadline.
MH-2014-032-C01--Update Carrier Safety Measurement System
(CSMS) Requirements Document--Closed 8/15/2014--FMCSA provided
an updated document.
MH-2014-032-C02--Develop and Implement Process for Managing
CSMS System Documentation--Closed 7/30/2014--FMCSA provided
documentation on the process for managing the CSMS System.
MH-2014-032-C03--Develop and Implement Configuration
Management Policy--Closed 7/28/2014--FMCSA provided a
Configuration Management policy, dated May 6, 2014, which
included change management and testing.
FMCSA continues its work on the remaining two recommendations;
their status is described below:
MH-2014-032-A01--Issue Updated DataQs Guidance - FMCSA is
preparing to issue its updated DataQs guidance in the Fall of
2014 to reflect implementation of its new adjudicated citations
policy that became effective on August 23, 2014.
MH-2014-032-B01--Develop Comprehensive Plan to fully
implement CSA Program in remaining States--In advance of the
final phase of a national CSA rollout slated for 2015, on June
5, 2014, the Agency launched a Continuous Improvement
Initiative: (1) to gather information and conduct analysis on
how the existing program elements are working, especially CSA
Prioritization and Interventions, and (2) to recommend
modifications to coincide with the final phase of the national
rollout that align various information technology system
releases with other FMCSA initiatives. Under this effort, FMCSA
is also considering input from the other sources: Office of
Inspector General, Government Accountability Office, the
National Transportation Safety Board, an independent peer
evaluator, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Motor
Carrier Safety Advisory Committee.
Question 2. Regarding your truck safety grant program--the Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Program--can you explain why traffic
enforcement inspections are more effective than roadside vehicle
inspection at reducing crashes?
Answer. An inspection conducted as a result of traffic enforcement
includes focused attention on observed vehicle deficiencies and driver
behaviors. Therefore, it is expected that it would be more effective in
identifying problems and requiring correction before a crash can occur.
This has been confirmed through the Agency's effectiveness studies.
Additionally, when an inspection occurs because of traffic enforcement
for a high risk behavior or condition--such as speeding--this has been
shown to have an even greater effect on the reduction of crashes.
Question 2a. Can you also detail why traffic enforcement
inspections have gone down by 40 percent over the last 4 years given
their effectiveness in relation to vehicle inspections? What is FMCSA
doing in the MCSAP program to reverse that trend?
Answer. SAFETEA-LU provided states the authority to conduct traffic
enforcement activities without accompanying inspections. Based on this,
FMCSA began encouraging states to conduct more traffic enforcement
activities without necessarily conducting the accompanying inspection
based on the knowledge that the most important step was stopping the
unsafe behavior or condition. As a result, the Agency now has a force
multiplier of 500,000 law enforcement officers who are stopping unsafe
vehicles and drivers to supplement the 14,000 officers who are
certified to conduct comprehensive driver and vehicle inspections. As a
result, the number of unsafe vehicles and drivers that are stopped as
part of the national commercial motor vehicle enforcement program has
grown significantly. FMCSA is working with states to capture the non-
inspection traffic enforcement data, so that it can be included in
future reporting and analysis. This will more accurately reflect the
activities conducted by states.
FMCSA also makes traffic enforcement activities a specific element
of the MCSAP High Priority grant program and in FY 2013 awarded funds
to support over 250,000 traffic contacts by State and local law
enforcement agencies. To support this effort, FMCSA has been producing
training videos for non-MCSAP officers to increase their skills and
knowledge for conducting traffic enforcement stops on trucks.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Major David Palmer
Question 1. During the hearing, the American Trucking Associations
argued that states should be focusing more of their resources on
traffic enforcement instead of roadside inspections. Do you agree with
this statement? If not, please explain why.
Answer. This is a complicated issue that cannot be answered with a
simple yes or no. We agree that traffic enforcement is a critical piece
of each State's commercial vehicle safety program. However, it is just
that, a piece. A State's commercial vehicle safety program is comprised
of a number of aspects, including roadside inspections, traffic
enforcement on commercial vehicles, compliance reviews, safety audits,
targeted strike forces, educational activities and even traffic
enforcement on non-commercial vehicles--the private citizens operating
dangerously around commercial vehicles. The appropriate level for each
activity will likely vary from state to state and will change over time
within any given state.
States need more flexibility in how they spend their resources, not
more restrictive parameters. Rather than prescribing what percentage
must be spent on traffic enforcement versus roadside inspections alone,
Congress and FMCSA should focus on setting broad parameters, program
elements, goals, and expected outcomes for a program. Then, we should
use a State's knowledge and expertise through their Commercial Vehicle
Safety Plan as the mechanism for monitoring and evaluation to ensure
the crash reduction targets are being met. Simply saying states should
focus more on traffic enforcement ignores the complexity and diversity
of each state's CMV safety program.
Question 2. Do you agree that crash investigations and their
subsequent reporting is often times poorly conducted, and consequently
can serve as an unreliable source of data for determining crash
causation?
Answer. No, we do not believe crash investigations and reporting is
being done poorly. However, we do agree that, in their current form,
they are an unreliable source of data for determining crash causation
and fault. The unreliability does not come from poor or faulty
investigations and reporting from the states, but rather from the
variability in how crashes are reported and what is reported state to
state. States have different policies and protocols in terms of what is
required to be part of the report, which results in inconsistencies in
the data, when trying to compare from one jurisdiction to the next. The
larger issue here is the fact that most crashes do not get investigated
or reported by law enforcement official(s) who are CVSA Certified or
have been trained to investigate commercial vehicle crashes. This
exacerbates the uniformity conundrum. Lastly, in many states the
investigating officer does not determine fault in the crash, they
report the facts, and in Texas' case, the factors believed to have
contributed to the crash. The determination of fault is left to be
determined by the insurance companies and/or the courts.
Question 3. Major Palmer, during your testimony, you mentioned the
enforcement challenges associated with the changes to the hours of
service rules proposed in the Senate THUD Appropriations bill. Could
you elaborate on those concerns?
Answer. We see a number of challenges associated with the proposed
temporary suspension of a portion of the current hours of service (HOS)
rules. Legislating temporary changes to the HOS rules creates
significant uniformity and consistency problems across the country. The
impact of such an approach will create unnecessary upheaval for the
states and cause significant operational and budgetary impacts on their
enforcement efforts.
The HOS regulations are already complicated to comprehend and
enforce and any change requires the states to retrain their inspectors.
With approximately 13,000 CVSA-certified inspectors in the field,
organizing and delivering training in all 50 states is a significant
task. Each state is structured differently, and the resources needed to
develop and deliver training are significant. It would also require the
expenditure of unplanned resources, which impacts on State budgets. Add
to this any information technology (IT) changes, such as software
modifications, and additional training to accommodate rule changes
increases the resource commitment. In addition, temporarily suspending
enforcement of a regulation takes inspection personnel away from their
critical enforcement duties. Equally concerning, we could go through
all of this for a temporary change that could very well result in no
permanent change to the regulations after the review is complete.
Constant change causes confusion for both industry and enforcement.
Compliance and the determination thereof are nearly impossible because
the rules have changed so often over the last 10 years, and have become
so complicated that it is exceptionally difficult to keep pace with the
changes. This constant back and forth has also resulted in a number of
narrow interpretations on exceptions and exemptions, further
complicating enforcement and undermining uniformity.
We need to be data driven and fact based in our decision making. To
this end, CVSA supports a comprehensive study on the safety and
operational impacts of the HOS regulations, during which the current
rules should remain in place. Once this analysis has been completed,
only then would it be appropriate to consider any changes or
adjustments through the rulemaking process. The rules are designed to
help keep all drivers safe, both commercial and other road users, and
it is our job to protect them.
Furthermore, to our knowledge, there is not a safety-related,
science-based justification that has been presented for changing the
current HOS rules. We are not aware of a comprehensive analysis of the
safety impacts of the current regulations, nor has there been any
analysis comparing the existing regulations versus the previous
regulations. While we agree that regulations should be written with
industry needs in mind, the fact remains that they are safety
regulations, not efficiency regulations and changes should be made
based on a demonstrated need and clear, science based data. While the
Alliance opposes any efforts to temporarily suspend enforcement, CVSA
supports calls from industry to evaluate the rules to determine if
changes are necessary or warranted.
There is one final challenge that is more administrative in nature.
Technically, states do not enforce the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations (FMCSRs). Instead, they enforce their own State laws and,
as part of the MCSAP program, the states agree to make their own rules
mirror the Federal ones. States are given up to three years to adopt
changes made to the FMCSRs. This is because the states adopt the
changes through different mechanisms and, depending on the method, time
is necessary. For example, states that adopt through legislation have
to wait until the next State legislative cycle to bring the matter up.
It's difficult to determine how a temporary change that is intended to
be immediate will work in practice, given the process necessary for the
states to adopt changes to the Federal rules.
Question 4. The Administration has proposed a consolidation of the
grant programs. Can you tell us more about the administrative hurdles
within the MCSAP grant process?
Answer. There are number of administrative challenges with the
current MCSAP grant process, which are outlined in detail in our
written testimony. In summary, the process is overly prescriptive, with
insufficient accountability requirements placed on FMCSA. The two most
significant challenges are the unpredictability of the program and the
micromanagement by FMCSA.
States continue to be frustrated with the inconsistency, year to
year, region to region, and state to state. FMCSA is constantly
revamping the process, perhaps in an attempt to improve it. However,
the end result is confusion and unclear expectations for the states.
Without consistency, the states cannot properly plan for their annual
Commercial Vehicle Safety Plan (CVSP) and grant application submission.
Formatting requirements change year to year, material that was
acceptable one fiscal year is no longer acceptable the next, the
timeline for the grants process changes frequently, etc. Often, the
results of a grant application depend more on who is reviewing the
application, rather than the content. Grant applications are not all
reviewed by the same panel(s), resulting in inconsistencies from one
grant request to another, complicating the process for states. All this
results in constant upheaval for the states, and they end up diverting
much needed resources away from other efforts, as they are constantly
adapting, redoing, and adjusting their process to meet the ever
changing needs of FMCSA.
In addition, funding disbursement is unreliable, making it
difficult for states to plan. There are a number of factors that
contribute to these delays and result in complications for the states.
The annual delays in the Federal budget and appropriations processes
are one contributing factor. The Federal fiscal year begins October 1,
and many grant programs are set to that date. However, Congress rarely
completes their funding bills by this date, delaying the disbursement
of funds to the states. Even more frequently now, Congress relies on
temporary continuing resolutions, which results in states receiving
their funds late, and in installments. This unpredictable, piecemeal
approach to funding makes planning and management of State programs
difficult. This issue is further complicated by the fact that many
states do not follow the Federal fiscal calendar (most start July 1),
complicating the reporting and tracking process. States also believe
that once funds are available, the grant review and approval process
takes far too long, further delaying receipt of funds for safety
programs.
In addition to the challenges caused by inconsistency, there is a
lack of transparency and accountability within the MCSAP grant process
when it comes to FMCSA. When applying for Federal funds, states are
given strict deadlines and parameters they must meet in order to
qualify and receive funds. However, there are no established deadlines
for FMCSA, in terms of their grant review process. CVSA recommends
setting grant application review deadlines for FMCSA, possibly modeled
on the State and Community Highway Safety Formula Grant Program,
commonly referred to as the 402 grants, administered by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The 402 grant program
has a clear timeline in place and using a similar model would, at least
for the Basic MCSAP grants, ensure that once funding is authorized by
Congress, the agency is prepared to disburse the funds immediately,
helping to reduce delays in funding disbursement.
Question 5. Major Palmer, in your testimony, you mentioned IT
needs. What steps are necessary to improve data collection and
transmission? What benefits would that have?
Answer. Uniform, timely and accurate data is the cornerstone of the
MCSAP. Enforcement Personnel, along with State and Federal agencies,
use information on a motor carrier's past performance to help
prioritize motor carriers for roadside inspections and compliance
reviews. Performance data from the commercial motor vehicle industry is
used to identify trends and problem areas, and to craft enforcement and
education initiatives to target specific safety problems. Data is not
only used to evaluate whether or not enforcement is being conducted
uniformly, but also to determine whether or not a particular safety
program or concept is successful. Data is used to determine whether
enforcement funds are being used in the most efficient, effective
manner possible. In order to effectively and efficiently perform these
activities, the states and the Federal Government must be able to rely
on the data compiled in the various systems to be as accurate and as
uniform as possible, in order to make comparisons. As technology
continues to advance, we will become even more reliant on the data
being inputted into various systems. Because of this, it is critical
that the data is being processed and transmitted accurately.
Currently, however, redundant, overlapping information technology
(IT) systems and outdated software applications result in
inconsistencies in the data being collected, undermining the safety
programs and strategies being built upon them. These data challenges
hinder the inspection process and create extra, unnecessary work for
industry and enforcement alike.
As an example, the Motor Carrier Management Information System
(MCMIS) is the main system for which all the data collected from State
and Federal agencies for FMCSA is housed, including inspection, crash,
compliance reviews, safety audits, carrier information and history and
numerous other data sets. Other programs, such as SAFER, Query Central,
and State CVIEW systems, as well as the Compliance, Safety,
Accountability (CSA) program, extract the data from MCMIS to run their
programs. Developed in the 1980s, MCMIS is almost 30 years old. As the
program ages, it becomes harder and more expensive to make software and
program changes. The system can simply no longer meet State and Federal
data needs.
In addition to relying on outdated, insufficient systems, FMCSA has
become too focused on new software development and is distracted by too
many competing priorities. As a result, updates and improvements to the
primary data collection and management programs on which everything
rests are constantly delayed and the states are forced to use outdated
and cumbersome legacy systems.
All this undermines safety--for example, a driver's license could
have been suspended. However, because of system incompatibility, the
Commercial Driver's License Information System (CDLIS) may show one
status, while the Nlets system, used by law enforcement, may show a
different status. Depending on which system is accurate and which is
accessed, it's possible that an unqualified driver, whose license has
been suspended, will be stopped, inspected, and then allowed to
continue driving.
Simply put, FMCSA's IT program lacks focus and direction. Were
FMCSA to focus on setting parameters and functional specifications,
rather than software development, the program would improve
tremendously. FMCSA should be managing the system and software
development process, rather than doing the actual programming. The
Agency needs to clearly identify challenges and solutions, as well as
address State needs, and establish a clear path forward to meet those
needs. FMCSA must take a step back and completely reevaluate its
development process and how it prioritizes IT projects.
CVSA believes it is necessary for Congress to call for an
independent study of the Agency's IT and data collection systems. The
study should include an evaluation of the efficacy of the existing
systems and programs and their interaction. It should identify
redundancies and explore the feasibility of consolidating data
collection and processing systems. The study should evaluate the
ability of the programs and systems to meet the needs of FMCSA, both at
headquarters and in the State offices, as well as equally the needs of
the states themselves. The study should investigate improving any and
all user interfaces. The study should take into account the systems'
and programs' adaptability, in order to make necessary future changes
in an easier, timely, and more cost efficient manner. In addition, the
study should explore the necessity and feasibility of increasing the
Agency's IT budget, to bring it in line with other Federal programs.
Once completed, FMCSA will have a clear path forward and can begin
implementing the recommendations developed in the report. The result
will be better data quality and improved use of that data by both
enforcement as well as the regulated industry. It will improve safety
and efficiency in the field. States and FMCSA will have current and
reliable data to help make decisions and industry will have a greater
level of confidence in the data and the programs that are built upon
it.
Question 6. As you know, the Department is currently conducting an
extensive truck size and weight study. As part of that study, DOT is
looking at whether adding weight to a truck could cause the truck
equipment such as brakes or tires or suspensions to wear out faster and
thereby make the heavier trucks more dangerous. That seems like a very
important safety factor and I know the law enforcement community has
cited this as one of its major concerns. It is my understanding that
CVSA recently completed a joint data collection effort with FMCSA to
see if there is any correlation between the weight of a truck and out
of service violations due to bad brakes or other equipment problems.
Can you tell us the results of this effort? Do you believe this to be a
serious safety issue?
Answer. In recent years, there has been a significant amount of
interest by many in industry to advocate in the U.S. Congress for
increasing the legal weight limits for trucks, and to a lesser extent,
for changes to truck size limits. As a result of this increased level
of interest, many questions have arisen. With CVSA's commitment to
commercial motor vehicle safety and enforcement, it is important for
CVSA to take a leadership role in helping to shape the policy debate on
what issues are to be considered for changes currently being
contemplated to truck size and weight policy in the United States. To
help reach this goal, and after a review of available literature
indicated safety data was lacking, CVSA's Executive Committee
instructed their Size & Weight Committee to work with DOT officials to
develop a safety data collection program. The Heavy Vehicle Data
Collection Effort is one means with which we believe the Alliance can
further inform the debate on this issue.
The data collection effort, which began in January 2012, is
designed to collect safety data from roadside inspections on vehicles
exceeding certain weight levels. The goal is to gather data that will
help us determine what impact, if any, heavier vehicle weights have on
a vehicle's structural components, motor carrier safety violations, and
overall safety. By gathering this data, the Alliance will be able to
get a sense for whether or not there are any correlations between
higher vehicle weights and specific motor carrier safety violations,
particularly those with out-of-service conditions. CVSA partnered with
the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration on the effort, with the agencies agreeing to conduct the
data analysis.
In order to participate in the study, CVSA asked that inspectors
conduct their inspection activities per their standard operating
procedures. When inspectors identify a vehicle that is over the
allowable axle, axle group, or gross vehicle weight or if the vehicle
is operating under a special weight permit, the project guidance asked
that they flag the inspection report for inclusion in the study. The
project asked that inspectors distinguish between permitted vehicles
(e.g., operating legally) and those overweight illegally, in order to
better understand the data.
Initially approved for one year, the study been extended twice, and
is now set to run through January of 2015. Participation in the study
is voluntary and is open to U.S. jurisdictions able and willing to
participate. CVSA encouraged all member jurisdictions to consider
participating in the study in order to produce an adequate data sample.
By the end of the second full year, 30 states were participating in the
study, having conducted nearly 10,000 inspections under the study. The
majority of the inspected vehicles under the study were non-permitted
combination vehicles, which also represent a majority of the vehicles
operating on Interstate highways.
The data collected suggests a correlation between vehicle equipment
violations and overweight vehicles. After two years, vehicles included
in the study had an out of service rate of 36.63 percent, well above
the national average of about 20 percent. Not surprisingly, brake
violations accounted for the largest portion of the violations
identified as part of the study, followed by alignment and tire issues.
These types of violations increase the likelihood of a vehicle not
being able to stop in a timely manner, or not having full control of a
vehicle in the event of an emergency stop or maneuver, especially in
inclement weather.
The data collected also suggests a correlation between vehicle
defects, particularly related to braking systems, and weight, and
therefore safety. As more force is required to stop or slow a vehicle
in the same distance and time as the weight of the vehicle increases,
it is important that the vehicle components, particularly the brakes,
be in proper working order to reduce the potential for crashes. Again,
braking defects were the most common type of violation cited under the
study, which suggests that heavy vehicles do tend to create additional
wear on braking components.
The study will continue through January of 2015, at which point
CVSA will determine what next steps are most appropriate. DOT is
currently working on assembling the final two year report, which we
will provide, once completed.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to William G. ``Jack'' Dawson
Question 1. Some have argued that drivers get used to working at
night and the 2 rest periods of 1am to 5am are actually disruptive to
those drivers. Do you have any practical experience driving at night?
What effect have nighttime rest periods had on you?
Answer. In my current position as a trainer for UPS, my work takes
place largely at night which means I typically sleep during the day,
but on my days off I switch to a night time sleep schedule because I
find that it leaves me more rested than my daytime sleep patterns.
Additionally, as I stated in my testimony, when I am not acting as
a trainer, I am subject to duty as a driver in a group called the
``extra board.'' I am required to be available to answer the phone at
midnight, 5am, 10am, 1pm, 6pm, and 8pm should I be needed to complete a
run. Because of the erratic nature of the extra board, a regular
schedule does not really exist for drivers. The one tool we have at our
disposal to combat the type of exhaustion that causes accidents is the
hours-of-service regulations. Allowing drivers to have two rest periods
from 1am to 5am where they can sleep at home in their own bed instead
of their cab is not unreasonable and helps promote rest during one's
natural circadian rhythm.
Question 2. You mentioned in your statement that some Teamster
members are subject to the 34-hour restart and some are not, and that
you, in fact, are subject to the restart. What has been your experience
with it? Do you think it provides sufficient rest?
Answer. While I know that there have been efforts in Congress to
roll back the 34-hour restart, I believe these efforts are misguided.
The 34-hour restart causes minimal disruption to a drivers work week as
we are still able to work up to 60 hours in 7 days or 70 hours in 8
days but we are given the opportunity to take a day and a half off
every week when we need it.
While it would be preferable to have a longer period of rest
available as truck driving is a stressful and exhausting job, the
regulations are effective in their current form. Any opportunity you
have to be at home with family instead of on the road helps you
recuperate from the cumulative fatigue created by driving long hours on
America's increasingly congested roadways.
Question 3. You mentioned that prior to working at UPS, you drove
for a private carrier and often experienced detention time while
waiting for a trailer to be loaded or unloaded, and that detention time
is not as prevalent in the unionized less-than-truckload sector. Can
you explain why that is the case?
Answer. When I worked for a non-union carrier, during load up I was
paid $1 per 1,000 pounds with loads typically ranging from 6 to 20
tons. I often waited up to 12 hours to receive a load which meant that
for my detention time, I was frequently paid between $1 and $3.33 per
hour, well under minimum wage. However, detention time under a union
contract is paid at or considerably above minimum wage so the shipper
or receiver paying for that time has an incentive to keep detention
times low.
Question 4. Recent reports show that the trucking industry is
facing an increasingly large shortage of drivers. What are some of the
reasons for this shortage?
Answer. I think in much of the industry, the issue is a pay
shortage rather than a driver shortage--if you pay people enough, there
will be people willing to perform the job. The other issue is that you
have a tough job with plenty of disadvantages and very few perks. As a
driver, we often work 70 hour weeks which is nearly twice the average
American work week but our compensation does not reflect this.
Likewise, we are often away from home for extended periods of time
making family life difficult. Moreover, the job is demanding and we are
constantly maneuvering our rigs to avoid accidents. There are many jobs
in which the pay is equal to ours but doesn't require as much time,
training, or responsibility. When you factor in the pay for all that
you have to do, the job isn't very desirable. Commercial driving also
comes with its own set of hazards. In 2012, according to FMCSA, in
crashes involving large trucks, 697 occupants of those trucks were
killed (the highest number since 2007).
From my perspective, unlike much of the industry, UPS does not have
as much of a problem attracting applicants because UPS is the top of
the industry in terms of pay. However, UPS is also the most rigorous in
their training program which presents other hiring challenges. The
number of road drivers at the UPS freight facility in Dallas, TX where
I work is 156. In the past 10 years, our facility has hired only 5
people, in the last 8 weeks, however, UPS has set out to fill 20 new
positions. So far, we have hired 30-35 people at this point. About 15
of those hires no longer work for UPS. Of that 15, half have not made
it through the safety training and the other half were let go because
they didn't want to do the work. Even with reducing the age and
experience requirements, UPS freight is having trouble attracting
dedicated, qualified drivers. The commitment UPS makes to safety
training may seem tedious and unattractive to hirees but it is
necessary for keeping our roads safe.
Question 5. You have previously driven twin-28 foot trailers. Do
you have concerns with allowing even longer twin-33 foot trailers on
the road? If so, why?
Answer. I am fortunate that I have never had to drive twin 33's as
they are prohibited in Texas, but driving twin 28's is difficult enough
to control in traffic. As a driver, I am constantly practicing safety
techniques to keep me from colliding with other vehicles. When you add
an extra ten feet to the truck, your stopping distance increases as
does your blind spot which makes preventing accidents all the more
difficult.
Moreover, the roads were not built to accommodate bigger, heavier
trucks--adding to the size and weight of the trucks increases wear and
tear on roads. Then, too, entrance and exit ramps on America's highways
are not long enough to accommodate the increased trailer lengths. This
can create dangerous situations when these larger, heavier trucks are
attempting to get up to speed and merge onto highways.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, on behalf of Major David Palmer
Question 1. We have heard that states face significant
administrative challenges in obtaining and administering Motor Carrier
Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) grant funds. Can you provide examples
of these challenges?
Answer. There are a number of challenges associated with
administering the MCSAP program, which as you know supplements State
funds invested in commercial motor vehicle (CMV) safety and
enforcement. There is excessive red tape and process, micromanagement
of funds, inconsistencies in the process, and a lack of reliability in
terms of the funding schedule.
The red tape and unnecessary process has steadily increased over
the past few years. The grant application process itself is cumbersome
and involves many layers of review. However, one of the biggest
concerns is the inconsistency. Every year the process changes, what's
required of the states changes, what is deemed acceptable in the plan
or an eligible expense under any given program can change. Approved
expenses even vary depending on who reviews the grant applications,
meaning that an expense approved in one state would be rejected in
another. It's impossible to properly plan for, and the states end up
reinventing the wheel each year with their application and spending
inordinate amounts of time and resources administering the grants. It's
to the point now where some states simply do not apply for some grants
because it's not worth the energy required or the unnecessary and
unreasonable scrutiny. Unfortunately, states are turning away
potentially lifesaving Federal assistance.
As Texas examples of micromanagement and a lack of understanding of
state enforcement requirements and practices, the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (FMCSA) determined standard issue Tasers and long
guns, rifles and shotguns, issued to our grant funded commercial
vehicle enforcement (CVE) troopers are not eligible expenditures
under any FMCSA designated grants. It is quite perplexing, and
frustrating, that FMCSA chooses not to fund all of the required
equipment necessary for MCSAP or Border Enforcement Program funded CVE
officers, even though they will fund the trooper's required side arm
(hand gun). Additionally, FMCSA has refused to fund portable breath
alcohol testing (PBT) devices under our Border Enforcement Program
grant even though one of their own regulations, 49 CFR Sec. 392.5,
provides various restrictions and prohibition on alcohol use when
operating a CMV. Finally, although less significant but clearly
representative of many of the states' concerns, FMCSA questioned why
our MCSAP Grants captain needed a cellular phone as part of his duties.
Unfortunately, the mere question reflects FMCSA's lack of
understanding, and points directly to the micromanagement of a State's
CMV program, which required unnecessary additional justification.
Another major concern states have with the MCSAP program is the
constant delay in funding disbursement. There are a number of factors
that contribute to these delays and result in complications for the
states. The annual delays in the Federal budget and appropriations
processes are one contributing factor. The Federal fiscal year begins
October 1, and many grant programs are set to that date. However,
Congress rarely completes their funding bills by this date, delaying
the disbursement of funds to the states. Even more frequently now,
Congress relies on temporary continuing resolutions, which results in
states receiving their funds late, and in installments. This
unpredictable, piecemeal approach to funding makes planning and
management of State programs difficult. This issue is further
complicated by the fact that many states do not follow the Federal
fiscal calendar (most start July 1), complicating the reporting and
tracking process. States also believe that once funds are available,
the grant review and approval process takes far too long, further
delaying receipt of funds for safety programs. As a result, states
often receive their funds well into the time-frame of the grant and are
not able to spend the appropriated funds responsibly before the grant
expires, forcing the states to return much needed funding that was
dedicated for enforcement and inspection activities as identified in
their Commercial Vehicle Safety Plan (CVSP).
While a reasonable amount of oversight is, of course, necessary and
appropriate, a manageable, consistent and uniform program is essential.
There are a number of changes that could be made that would alleviate
the burden on states and free up time for FMCSA as well. We make
several recommendations in our written testimony. In addition, the
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) is currently working with
FMCSA to find additional solutions to these challenges and looks
forward to working with the Committee to ensure that these changes take
place, allowing the states to focus on doing the work of the grant
programs, rather than administering them.
Question 2. In your written testimony you note that there are ``a
number of policies and practices that complicate the [MCSAP] program,
undermining uniformity and consistency, and detracting from the
efficiency'' of the program. Can you provide examples of guidance or
policy documents that create confusion and possible suggestion on how
they can be fixed?
Answer. This is a critical issue that gets very little attention.
The foundation of an effective safety program is quality, uniform, and
consistent enforcement activities. As stated in my testimony, if an
inspector does not understand the regulations, he/she cannot
effectively enforce them. States and industry need clear, concise and
enforceable regulations. Challenges include inconsistent and outdated
regulations, complications that come with exemptions, and changes to
the rules that do not take into account the impacts to the states and
enforcement.
New regulations, coupled with changes to the industry and
technological advancements can result in inconsistent, outdated, and
redundant regulatory language. With each year come additional
requirements from Congress, aimed at advancing CMV safety. In addition,
FMCSA receives and responds to petitions for changes to the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) from the CMV community. As
Congress and FMCSA work to improve CMV safety, unintentional
inconsistencies can slowly work their way into the regulatory
framework. These inconsistencies can lead to confusion among both the
regulated and enforcement communities.
Further complicating the matter is the fact that, technically,
states do not enforce the FMCSRs. Instead, they enforce their own State
laws and, as part of the MCSAP program, the states agree to make their
own rules mirror the Federal ones. States are given up to three years
to adopt changes made to the FMCSRs. This is because the states adopt
the changes through different mechanisms and, depending on the method,
time is necessary. For example, states that adopt through legislation
have to wait until the next State legislative cycle to bring the matter
up.
Interpretations and regulatory guidance can also create challenges.
Essentially, when issues arise in the field that need to be addressed
quickly, FMCSA issues an interpretation or guidance or policy memo to
let inspectors know what the short term solution is. It's important
that the agency be able to do this, because the rulemaking process is a
long one. These documents are generally intended to address technical
errors in published rules or to clarify vague regulatory language
within the safety regulations. As these interpretations, guidance
documents and memos are issued, the goal is to ultimately ensure the
regulatory language is then brought up to date. However, the number of
full rulemakings that can make it through the agency in any given year
is limited by staff and funding, and a number of higher profile rules
tend to push simple technical changes down in the queue. As a result,
disconnects have developed between written regulations, regulatory
guidance and interpretations, leaving industry and enforcement
wondering which position is the ``correct'' one, resulting in
inconsistent enforcement.
For example, there is inconsistency in the regulations regarding
when a driver whose license has been suspended should be disqualified
by an inspector. The original regulation (FMCSR Sec. 383.51) states
that a driver whose license has been suspended must be disqualified,
regardless of the reason. However, later, FMCSA added an interpretation
(FMCSR Sec. 383.51--Question 6), indicating that the agency was in the
process of undergoing a rulemaking (FMCSA-00-7382) to change this, so
that only those drivers whose licenses have been suspended for a safety
related reason should be disqualified. The rule was completed in 2002,
and the definition of ``disqualification'' was updated in FMCSR
Sec. 383.5. However, the corresponding sections in FMCSR Sec. 383 and
Sec. 391 were not updated, and still contain interpretations that
reference a rule that was completed more than a decade ago. This has
resulted in inconsistencies in the enforcement of driver
disqualifications.
To address this issue, CVSA supports requiring FMCSA to conduct a
full review of the FMCSRs every five years, in collaboration with CVSA
and the affected industry, geared towards reducing, enhancing, and
streamlining the regulations, eliminating outdated or duplicative
regulations, clarifying those that need adjustment, etc.
Exemptions are another way that enforcement is complicated.
Exemptions can, at times, compromise safety, and they always complicate
enforcement. We recognize that there may be instances when exemptions
could be appropriate and not compromise safety. In those instances, 49
USC Sec. 31315(b) already provides a mechanism for those in industry to
obtain an exemption through FMCSA. This process includes providing for
an equivalent level of safety, requiring that the exemption ``would
likely achieve a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater
than, the level that would be achieved absent such exemption.'' In
addition, exemptions obtained through this process are limited to a
maximum of two years (subject to renewal), which provides oversight to
ensure that safety is not compromised, as well as an opportunity to
eliminate exemptions that have not maintained an equivalent level of
safety. This is the proper model.
In contrast, exemptions obtained through legislation do not always
include safety considerations and are difficult to remove once
established. Because a process exists for industry to pursue exemptions
through an administrative process, CVSA opposes the inclusion of
exemptions from Federal safety regulations in legislation. At the very
least, when exemptions are included in legislation, CVSA supports
requiring the inclusion of a ``safety clause'' as a part of any
exemption statutorily enacted, similar to that in 49 USC Sec. 31315(b),
providing for an equivalent level of safety, as well as language that
would allow for the elimination of the exemption if an equivalent level
of safety cannot be demonstrated.
Regulations must also be enforceable. Regardless of the intent of a
new rule or requirement, if there is not a way to enforce it roadside,
it is not going to be an effective regulation. The current electronic
logging device (ELD) rulemaking is an example of a good concept that,
if not executed properly, will not have its intended results. There has
been a significant amount of attention paid to ensuring that the new
regulations take into account the needs of industry, in order to ease
the burden, but very little time spent on how the enforcement community
will access the devices and incorporate them into the inspection
process. If inspectors cannot easily and reliably retrieve data from
ELDs at roadside the devices are of little value. The ELD rulemaking
has the potential to improve hours of service (HOS) compliance and
enforcement, but only if the inspectors are given the tools they need
to properly use the devices. This fact must be a consideration in the
development of the Final Rule.
Far too often, the impact to the enforcement community is not taken
into consideration. The ongoing effort to temporarily defund a portion
of the HOS rule is a good example. The HOS requirements are first and
foremost safety regulations, not efficiency or productivity
regulations. However, we strongly agree that the regulations must be
written in a manner that meets the needs of the trucking industry as
well. But pushing the burden from industry to the enforcement community
is not a responsible solution. A temporary suspension of a portion of
the regulations will require that we retrain all 13,000 CVSA-certified
inspectors, which is no small feat. In addition, while they're being
retrained, for the second time in as many years on the HOS rules, they
cannot be out in the field. Retraining would also require the use of
additional resources that had been slated for other expenses, not to
mention the cost of updating software and other administrative
activities associated with changes in regulation.
In addition, constant change causes confusion for both industry and
enforcement. Compliance and the determination thereof are nearly
impossible because the rules have changed so often over the last 10
years, and have become so complicated that no one can keep pace with
the changes. This constant back and forth also has resulted in a number
of narrow interpretations on exceptions and exemptions, further
complicating enforcement and undermining uniformity.
CVSA has no objection to examining the regulations and making sure
the right rules are in place, we only ask that any changes to current
regulations be conducted after the research has been completed and not
before.
Question 3. The Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA) supports
increasing the funding cap on MCSAP grant funds to provide additional
traffic enforcement activities to address safety concerns including
aggressive driving or speeding. Do you believe these activities are
more effective uses of state safety dollars than roadside inspections?
Answer. Traffic enforcement is a critical component in any State's
comprehensive CMV enforcement program. Each State's program is
constructed, in collaboration with FMCSA, to meet a State's individual
needs and includes things like roadside inspections, weigh station
inspections, compliance reviews, safety audits, and yes, traffic
enforcement on both CMVs and non-CMVs. There is no one solution to the
Nation's traffic safety challenge. While reasonable Federal oversight
and guidance is important, each state has individual needs and
challenges that are only known and understood by them, and therefore
can only be addressed by that state.
Furthermore, it should be noted that in the data cited by the
American Trucking Associations in their testimony, the traffic
enforcement being referred to is being conducted in conjunction with a
roadside inspection. We are not aware of any analysis that has been
done to determine how much value each activity brings individually when
they are being conducted together.
We are not opposed to states conducting more traffic enforcement
activities if they believe that is a strategy that will work to drive
down crashes in their state. As I mentioned in my testimony, another
important point is there is a lot of traffic enforcement activity on
commercial vehicles that currently is not being accounted for in the
FMCSA statistics. This is because a roadside inspection does not
accompany many of the traffic infractions cited by law enforcement, the
MCSAP, appropriately, does not require this information to be made
available to FMCSA.
Also, a note of clarification regarding the Alliance's
recommendation related to increasing the cap on MCSAP grant funds to
provide additional traffic enforcement activities. This recommendation
does not pertain to traffic enforcement on CMVs, instead, it is
specific to the amount of traffic enforcement a state can do on non-
CMVs. The current program caps the amount states can spend on traffic
enforcement on personal vehicles at 5 percent. CVSA is seeking an
increase in that cap, to allow states who choose to do so to spend up
to 10 percent of their Basic MCSAP funds targeting individuals who
drive unsafely around CMVs, recognizing that, often, it is the drivers
operating around the CMVs that create dangerous conditions and cause
crashes.
In Texas, we are constantly evaluating our programs and making
adjustments based on the needs we see in our state and I know my
colleagues in the other states do the same. Our purpose is to reduce
crashes and fatalities and get the dangerous motor carriers, vehicles
and drivers off the road and we are committed to doing that. In order
to do it effectively, states need more flexibility to create CMV
enforcement programs that suit their own unique needs, not more
prescriptive requirements from FMCSA. CVSA's recommendation to increase
the non-CMV traffic enforcement cap is part of a larger argument for
more flexibility for the states. CVSA opposes any efforts to dictate to
the states what portion of their MCSAP funds must be spent on any
particular activity.
Question 4. The Compliance, Safety, Accountability (CSA) program
provides inspection and safety data about carriers to the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration. Can you please describe how individual
safety enforcement organizations use the data to enhance safety? Do you
have concerns about the reliability of the data or the absence of data
for many carriers?
Answer. The goal of the roadside inspection program is to target
high risk carriers and get dangerous vehicles and carriers off the
road. CSA was designed to serve as a screening tool for enforcement, to
better target time and resources on carriers that are more likely to
have safety issues. However, it is merely one tool in the toolbox, so
to speak, that enforcement uses to identify which vehicles they need to
inspect or what carriers to visit for a compliance review. To that end,
it is a useful tool. It provides inspectors and investigators with a
snap shot of the motor carrier's performance. Other factors including
observed driver behavior, such as speeding or changing lanes without a
signal, visual vehicle defects, such as missing signage or a visibly
flat tire on the vehicle, contribute to an inspector's decision to stop
a vehicle. In addition, inspector experience factors in, meaning that
an inspector's interaction with a particular carrier might factor into
their decision to pull a vehicle aside for inspection. If, for example,
the inspector knows from experience that a certain company has a
history of hours of service violations, while another motor carrier has
a proven safety track record and rarely demonstrates problems, the
inspector is more likely to focus on the former carrier.
While there are indeed data sufficiency issues, because there are a
number of factors that go into an inspector's selection decision, those
issues are not a major concern for the enforcement community. However,
work should continue to improve the amount of data in the system.
Finally, on the subject of data reliability, CVSA does not believe
that there is a data reliability issue. The data being collected
roadside is, to a great extent, uniform and credible data. FMCSA's own
reviews of the states' data quality performance routinely put most
states in the ``green'' category. Further, the data being collected is
not being challenged at a high rate. In fact, inspection data is barely
being challenged at all. From 2010 through June of 2013, of the 12.5
million inspections conducted, less than 1 percent were challenged
through the DataQs process. This demonstrates that, with few
exceptions, the violations being documented roadside are accurate.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
David J. Osiecki
Question. In your written testimony you note that Compliance,
Safety, Accountability data does not provide a strong statistical
correlation between the score and future crash risk. How can the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration improve its data set and
methodology?
Answer. ATA's many concerns with FMCSA's Compliance, Safety,
Accountability program can be broadly categorized as follows: data
sufficiency, system accuracy, and crash accountability.
Data sufficiency: Every study conducted on CSA to date has
recognized the dearth of data used to measure motor carriers. CSA
currently has enough data to score 18 percent of motor carriers in at
least one Behavior Analysis & Safety Improvement Category (BASIC). Even
fewer are scored in most categories and very few in all categories.
This creates vast discrepancies in the way motor carriers with scores
are compared to those without.
System accuracy: Many organizations have studied this relationship
and all have come to similar conclusions: while some BASIC scores
correlate closely to crash risk, other exhibit weak, negative, or
indiscernible relationships. This is a departure from the intent of the
program. Throughout the CSA methodology are references stating that the
intent of the system is to identify behavior that leads to crashes.
With some BASICs, this is impossible.
This inaccuracy is the result of the fundamental methodological
dysfunction which pervades the model. It begins with flawed assumptions
regarding the relationship between regulatory violations and crash
risk, continues with concerns about the veracity of the data being
provided to FMCSA by its state partners and ends with the unaccounted
for regional enforcement disparities which can have significant impact
on motor carriers scores depending on the region in which the motor
carrier operates.
Furthermore, even in categories that exhibit a positive correlation
to crash risk (on average), thousands of exceptions exist.
Specifically, many motor carriers have poor BASIC scores but low crash
rates. Unfortunately, these otherwise safe carriers are being
erroneously labeled as unsafe. Conversely, and perhaps more
importantly, unsafe carriers may have a poor safety culture cloaked by
good BASIC scores (i.e., good scores but high crash rates).
Crash Accountability: Currently, CSA collects, analyzes and
displays all motor carrier accidents, regardless of fault or
preventability. This is counter-intuitive. If a driver for a motor
carrier did not cause an accident and could have done nothing to
prevent it then it is clearly not indicative of a company's safety
culture and should not be used to measure safety or compliance.
In other words, non-preventable crashes should not be used to
target fleets and fleets as more likely to cause crashes.
ATA has been focused on providing appropriate, pragmatic
suggestions for improvement of CSA. Below is a listing of ideas ATA
feels will create a more effective and equitable safety measurement
system.
1. Acquire more data: FMCSA must take a strategic approach to
gathering data on a greater percentage of the industry.
Moreover, the agency must work with its law enforcement
partners to move resources from the interstate highway system
and other areas where fleets are inspected repeatedly, to those
areas where they are not. Doing so will help gather data on
more fleets, especially those whose safety performance is
unmeasured.
2. Measure safety performance based on relative risk of crash
involvement: In several categories carriers scores do not bear
a positive statistical relationship to crash risk. In fact,
FMCSA cannot demonstrate a statistical relationship between the
vast majority of violations used to score carriers and crashes.
The agency defends this practice saying they are measures of
``compliance.'' Since the highest priority should be on
preventing crashes and saving lives, the system should focus on
violations that have a statistical correlation to crash risk.
Further, the goal should be to identify fleets that are most
likely to be involved in a future crash.
3. Adjust the methodology to account for regional enforcement
disparity: Where a motor carrier operates can have as big an
impact on an SMS scores as how a motor carrier operates. While
ATA would agree that state law enforcement agencies should
maintain the prerogative to focus on regulations that address
the unique challenges of their state, doing so creates
unfairness in SMS. Motor carrier scores should be normalized
based on a carrier's operational presence in a particular
state, as measured by millions of miles traveled through
violation weighting. For example, violations could be weighted
to account for any disproportionate use in a particular state,
based on national averages.
4. Create dynamic peer groups: CSA is a system that scores motor
carriers relative to their peers as measured by exposure (e.g.,
size of fleet or number of inspections). However, when a motor
carrier exposure measure changes, the resulting shift in
``safety event'' (peer) group can produce drastic swings in CSA
percentile scores. This is not because the fleet's performance
has changed necessarily, just that the point of reference has
changed to a different group of ``peers.'' This can be a
significant problem for motor carriers who operate near a peer
group threshold. To correct this problem and provide more
meaningful scores, FMCSA should implement a system that
compares motor carriers only to those with relatively similar
numbers of inspections instead of assigning them a group based
on arbitrarily designated static bounds. Rather than comparing
a fleet against others with up to 100 inspections (101-200, and
so on), it should always compare the fleet against others that
have, for example, between 10 more and 10 fewer inspections.
Doing so will ensure a more reliable point of reference.
5. Remove crashes not caused by the motor carrier: FMCSA should
remove from the system those crashes that a motor carrier did
not cause or could not have prevented. Moreover, these crashes
should not be displayed in the system nor used to measure
carrier performance.
6. Remove CSA scores from public view: Until the aforementioned
changes can be made and all SMS BASIC scores can reliably
predict the crash risk of individual motor carriers relative to
those of similar operations, CSA scores should be removed from
public view.
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