- NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS

[Senate Hearing 113-611]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 113-611

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
113TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON; HON. BRAD R. CARSON; DR. WILLIAM A. LaPLANTE,
JR.; HON. ROBERT O. WORK; HON. MICHAEL J. McCORD; MS. CHRISTINE E.
WORMUTH; MR. BRIAN P. McKEON; HON. DAVID B. SHEAR; MR. ERIC ROSENBACH;
GEN. PAUL J. SELVA, USAF; VADM MICHAEL S. ROGERS, USN; DR. LAURA J.
JUNOR; MR. GORDON O. TANNER; MS. DEBRA S. WADA; MS. MIRANDA A.A.
BALLENTINE; DR. MONICA C. REGALBUTO; ADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN; GEN
JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA; LTG JOSEPH L. VOTEL, USA; GEN. JOSEPH F.
DUNFORD, JR., USMC; MR. ROBERT M. SCHER; MS. ELISSA SLOTKIN; MR. DAVID
J. BERTEAU; MS. ALISSA M. STARZAK; AND ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN

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JANUARY 16; FEBRUARY 25; MARCH 11; JUNE 19; JULY 10, 17; DECEMBER 2,
2014

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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S. Hrg. 113-611

NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SECOND SESSION,
113TH CONGRESS

=======================================================================

HEARINGS

before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOMINATIONS OF

__________

JANUARY 16; FEBRUARY 25; MARCH 11; JUNE 19; JULY 10, 17; DECEMBER 2,
2014

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARK UDALL, Colorado SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
JOE DONNELLY, Indiana ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE LEE, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS KING, Maine

Peter K. Levine, Staff Director

John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Page

January 16, 2014

Nominations of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon to be Principal Deputy
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; Hon.
Brad R. Carson to be Under Secretary of the Army; and Dr.
William A. LaPlante, Jr., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Acquisition.......................................... 1

Statements of:

Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., to be Principal Deputy Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 3
Carson, Hon. Brad R., to be Under Secretary of the Army.......... 5
LaPlante, William A., Jr., Ph.D., to be Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Acquisition.................................. 6

February 25, 2014

Nominations of Hon. Robert O. Work to be Deputy Secretary of
Defense; Hon. Michael J. McCord to be Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller); Ms. Christine E. Wormuth to be Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy; Mr. Brian P. McKeon to be
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Hon.
David B. Shear to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs; and Mr. Eric Rosenbach to be
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense............

Statements of:

Warner, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia,
Retired........................................................ 155
Nunn, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from the State of Georgia, Retired.. 159
Work, Hon. Robert O., to be Deputy Secretary of Defense.......... 161
McCord, Hon. Michael J., to be Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller).................................................. 163
Wormuth, Ms. Christine E., to be Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy......................................................... 164
McKeon, Mr. Brian P., to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense For Policy............................................. 165
Shear, Hon. David B., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs............................. 167
Rosenbach, Mr. Eric, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense............................................... 168

iii

March 11, 2014

Nominations of Gen. Paul J. Selva, USAF, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commander, U.S. Transportation
Command; and VADM Michael S. Rogers, USN, to be Admiral and
Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security
Services/Commander, U.S. Cyber Command......................... 431

Statements of:

Kirk, Hon. Mark, U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois......... 433
Selva, Gen. Paul J., USAF, for reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, U.S. Transportation Command....... 434
Rogers, VADM Michael S., USN, to be Admiral and Director,
National Security Agency; Chief, Central Security Services; and
Commander, U.S. Cyber Command.................................. 435

June 19, 2014

Nominations of Dr. Laura J. Junor, to be Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Mr. Gordon O.
Tanner, to be General Counsel of the Department of the Air
Force; Ms. Debra S. Wada, to be Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Ms. Miranda A.A. Ballentine,
to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations,
Environment, and Energy; and Dr. Monica C. Regalbuto, to be
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management..... 541

Statements of:

Junor, Laura J., to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness............................ 543
Tanner, Gordon O., to be General Counsel of the Department of the
Air Force...................................................... 544
Wada, Debra S., to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs................................... 545
Ballentine, Miranda A.A., to be Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Installations, Environment, and Energy............... 545
Regalbuto, Monica C., to be Assistant Secretary of Energy for
Environmental Management....................................... 547

July 10, 2014

Nominations of ADM William E. Gortney, USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Northern
Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command;
GEN John F. Campbell, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, International Security Assistance
Force/Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan; and LTG Joseph L.
Votel, USA, to be General and Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 655

Statements of:

Gortney, ADM William E., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander,
North American Aerospace Defense Command....................... 658
Campbell, GEN John F., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of
General and to be Commander, International Security Assistance
Force/Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan...................... 659
Votel, LTG Joseph L., USA, to be General and Commander, U.S.
Special Operations Command..................................... 660

July 17, 2014

Nomination of Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, for
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commandant of
the Marine Corps............................................... 787

Statement of:

Dunford, Gen. Joseph F., Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to the
Grade of General and to be Commandant of the Marine Corps...... 789

December 2, 2014

Nominations of Mr. Robert M. Scher to be Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities; Ms. Elissa
Slotkin to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs; Mr. David J. Berteau to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness; Ms.
Alissa M. Starzak to be General Counsel of the Department of
the Army; ADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., USN, for Reappointment to
the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. 859

Statements of:

Scher, Robert M., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities.............................. 862
Slotkin, Elissa, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs................................. 863
Berteau, David J., to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness............................... 864
Starzak, Alissa M., to be General Counsel of the Department of
the Army....................................................... 865
Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr., USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of
Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.............. 865

APPENDIX......................................................... 1053

NOMINATIONS OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; HON. BRAD R.
CARSON TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY; AND DR. WILLIAM A. LaPLANTE,
JR., TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION

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THURSDAY, JANUARY 16, 2014

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
Udall, Hagan, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Kaine, King, Inhofe,
Ayotte, and Blunt.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nominations of: Madelyn Creedon to
be Principal Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA); Brad Carson to be Under
Secretary of the Army; and William LaPlante, Jr., to be
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition.
We welcome our witnesses and their families. We extend our
gratitude to the family members in particular, who are so
critically important for the support of our nominees through
the long hours that they work and the countless demands on them
as a result of their careers in public service.
To our witnesses, during your opening statements please
feel free to introduce your family members and others who are
here to support you today.
Each of our nominees has an impressive record in public
service. Ms. Creedon has served in positions of distinction
throughout her time in Government service, positions including
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic
Affairs; Assistant Administrator of the NNSA for Defense
Programs; General Counsel for the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission; and a trial attorney in the Department
of Energy (DOE); and of course, as counsel to this committee
for over 17 years. I think we're all familiar with her deep
knowledge of and passionate commitment to the national security
of our country.
Mr. Carson was a member of the House of Representatives
representing the Second District of Oklahoma from 2001 to 2005.
In 2008 and 2009 he served on Active Duty with an explosive
ordnance disposal battalion in Iraq and was awarded the Bronze
Star for his service. Mr. Carson is currently serving as the
senior-most legal advisor in the Department of the Army, the
Army General Counsel.
Dr. LaPlante began his career in the Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory. He remained at the
university for over 25 years. During that time he held a
variety of positions, including the Department Head for Global
Engagement and Associate Department Head of the National
Security Technology Department. Dr. LaPlante has been a member
of the U.S. Strategic Command Senior Advisory Group, the Naval
Research Advisory Committee, and the Defense Science Board. He
is currently the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force for Acquisition.
When they're confirmed--usually I say ``if confirmed,'' but
I'll be very optimistic this morning, so I'll say ``when
confirmed''--Ms. Creedon will take on a key leadership role in
the Nation's nuclear security apparatus, while Mr. Carson and
Dr. LaPlante will help to guide the Army and the Air Force
through the challenging fiscal environment that we now face and
will face even more so in the Department of Defense (DOD).
We look forward to the testimony of our nominees and
hopefully to their confirmation, and we now call on Senator
Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first
repeat what I've told those who are here at the table before
the hearing. Unfortunately, my effort to segregate the two
committees of the Environment and Public Works Committee and
the Armed Services Committee has been unsuccessful again. We're
simultaneously having a meeting upstairs two floors, so I will
be going back and forth.
I will use your characterization of ``when confirmed''
also.
Ms. Creedon, it's nice to see you again. It's very rare
that you get someone who has such a deep background and
interest in this. You're predictable, and we appreciate that
very much. Congress remains committed to the nuclear
modernization promises that were made back when they were
getting the votes for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) and I will be asking some questions about that.
Secretary Hagel said earlier this month in Wyoming, and
this is a quote, he said: ``We've got some work to do on
modernization and we're going to invest in the modernization we
need to keep that deterrent stronger than it's ever been. And
you have my commitment to do that.''
That's a quote by Secretary Hagel and I was very glad to
hear that. When confirmed, you'll play an important role in
overseeing the efforts to meet these modernization commitments.
NNSA's successful execution and implementation of the nuclear
modernization program will be essential to avoid delays in cost
growth. This will require the NNSA to implement changes in its
organizational culture and improve the way it manages programs.
I'm happy to see my good friend Brad Carson here from
Oklahoma. I told him in my office yesterday that Joe Westphal
has been one of my best friends long before he had the position
that Mr. Carson's going to be confirmed in. He was also from
Oklahoma. He taught at the Oklahoma State University. So as
long as we keep Okies in that position I'm happy about it, Mr.
Chairman. [Laughter.]
When I served on the House Armed Services Committee, I
remember--I think I told you this story--that my last year on
the House Armed Services Committee would have been 1949--1994--
--[Laughter.]
Anyway, at that time I remember we had witnesses that said
in 10 years we'll no longer need ground troops. I think we know
that now, that we have some real serious problems. We talked
about the drawdown, reducing the end strength from 490,000 to
420,000. No matter how many smart politicians, Pentagon
officials, or academics you put around the table, you will
never be able to predict the future and what our needs are
going to be.
Discussions are also ongoing about future mix of Active and
Reserve component forces that will have far-reaching
implications for the future of the force and its ability to
meet our national security needs.
Dr. LaPlante, the past several years have been challenging
for the Air Force's acquisition community. The lack of
accountable leadership is one of the reasons for recent
failures, including the cancellation of the Expeditionary
Combat Support System (ECSS), a program that lost $1 billion in
taxpayers' dollars. Additionally, questions remain if the Air
Force will be able to perform an audit by September 30, 2017.
Other critical programs, such as the Long-Range Strike
Bomber, are just beginning and ensuring an achievable and
affordable acquisition program will be critical to maintaining
our Nation's nuclear triad and conventional global strike
capabilities.
Now, given your experience--and I really appreciate the
time that you gave me in the office to go over things. I really
believe that you have the background where you are going to be
able to try some new things.
Specifically, I have a chart that I've already explained to
you, that we want to be sure that we explain to this committee.
I'm looking forward to working with you and with all of those
who are before us today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe.
We'll now call upon our witnesses for their opening
statements.
Secretary Creedon.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee. I'm honored to
be here today and grateful to President Obama and Secretary
Moniz for nominating me to be the Principal Deputy
Administrator at the National Nuclear Security Administration.
I would also like to introduce and thank my husband, Jim
Bracco, for being here today, but mostly for his patience over
the years, for putting up with the many long nights and
weekends at work and away from home, and with my being late to
more things than I ever want to count, but mostly for being
enthusiastically supportive of this new challenge.
I want to thank my daughter Meredith and my son John, who
have grown up to be incredible adults, for all of their
support, even though today their support is virtual. I know
that they will watch the Senate Armed Services Committee
website tonight so that they can critique me in the morning.
I also want to thank my parents, who still live in Indiana,
Marilyn and Richard Creedon. Through my dad's 35-plus years of
service in the Army Reserve and my mom's unending commitment to
volunteerism, they have instilled in me dedication to public
service and a deep commitment to my country.
My over 30 years in Government service supporting national
security have been a special privilege, and if confirmed to be
Principal Deputy Administrator, I will have the honor to serve
again with the dedicated and highly talented men and women of
the NNSA. These men and women work every day to ensure that the
U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective, to
prevent the threats from nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism, and to ensure that our nuclear-powered naval surface
ships and submarines can steam all over the world to secure our
freedoms.
The NNSA has many challenges, but I have faith in the
people of the NNSA and look forward to the opportunity, if
confirmed, to work with all of them to address these many
challenges. Just last week I had the pleasure of accompanying
Secretary Hagel as he visited the NNSA's Sandia National
Laboratory in Albuquerque, NM. While I was there in my role as
the DOD Assistant Secretary and had been to NNSA sites many
times, it was a wonderful reminder of the impressive work done
by the men and women of the nuclear security enterprise.
The NNSA's work remains as important and impressive as it
has ever been. Even in today's budget environment and with Cold
War facilities decaying around the complex, the commitment of
the NNSA remains strong. It is a privilege to be asked to
continue in public service, and particularly to be asked to
serve at the NNSA.
Maintaining nuclear security is a whole-of-government
sport. The Departments of State and Defense, as well as Members
of Congress and the personal and committee staffs, are all
necessary to ensure a bright future at NNSA. If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that this partnership remains strong.
In closing, I also want to thank Senators Reed and Nelson
and Senators Sessions and Vitter for their work on the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee when I was on the committee
staff; and now Senator Udall for his support; and for all the
continuing commitment to NNSA that all have given.
I look forward to this new challenge and to your questions,
and I thank you for your support.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much.
Now, Mr. Carson.

STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD R. CARSON, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY

Mr. Carson. Senator Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe,
distinguished Senators of the committee: I do have a prepared
statement that I would propose I submit for the record and
instead speak a bit more extemporaneously and briefly.
Chairman Levin. That would be fine.
Mr. Carson. I would like to thank President Obama for
nominating me to this position and to the Secretary of Defense
for his support of the nomination. It's been a great
professional pleasure of mine for the last 2 years to serve as
General Counsel to the Secretary of the Army, John McHugh. I
look very steeply up to the example he has set. Joe Westphal,
the Under Secretary, who Senator Inhofe has already mentioned,
is a friend and a mentor as well. To Generals Odierno and
Campbell, soldier's soldiers, combat leaders extraordinaire,
people who are respected not only within the Army but far
outside of it.
I have many friends here today from the Army's Office of
General Counsel and from across the Pentagon, and I am grateful
to be part of their team and to have been a small part of the
effort in the Army to try to do some good things.
Of course, behind me is my wife Julie, who is an attorney
herself, and she has sacrificed so much as I have pursued my
own career, often at the expense of the things that she would
have done for her own professional development. I am very
grateful to her.
The Army is an amazing place, filled with extraordinary
people. I'm reminded of this most when I see any soldier who is
under the age of 35, because I know that each of them joined
knowing that they would be sent almost immediately upon the
completion of training to Iraq or Afghanistan. They joined not
to avoid the fight, because they wanted to be in the fight at
its very hottest moments.
The Army has sacrificed much: 4,843 casualties in Iraq,
2,401 as of today in Afghanistan, tens of thousands more
wounded. All the Services have contributed much to these
conflicts, but the Army has borne more than its sad share of
those statistics. Perhaps even more notable, 15,000 Awards for
Valor, 9 Medals of Honor, 30 Distinguished Service Crosses, and
more than 600 Silver Stars. It is said when you go to Section
60 of Arlington National Cemetery you'll see all the Services
well represented, but you can't overlook the contributions that
the U.S. Army has made.
I think my background in law, politics, higher education,
and business have well prepared me to be the Under Secretary of
the Army. One thing I can assure the committee is that if I am
confirmed I won't forget the example of those people I've
mentioned and I will do my best to acquit myself in their
honor.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Brad R. Carson
Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished
members of the committee. It is a significant privilege to be
considered for the important role of Under Secretary of the Army, and I
appreciate the committee's rigor and diligence as it considers my
nomination. Before we begin, I would like to acknowledge some of the
many people who have played a part in this professional journey. I
would like to first thank President Obama for demonstrating his
continued trust in me with this second role in his administration. I am
indebted to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel for his support and
Secretary of the Army John McHugh for his strong example of leadership
and management. I am grateful to Under Secretary Joseph Westphal for
his mentorship. I would like to express my admiration for Chief of
Staff of the Army General Raymond Odierno and his Vice Chief of Staff
General John Campbell; it is only through close cooperation with
military leaders that we can accomplish the Army's important work. I
would like to recognize my current staff at the Army General Counsel's
Office for their commitment to excellence and professionalism. I would
especially like to thank my wonderful wife, Julie, who has been my
constant companion and friend.
Since 2001, soldiers have completed more than 1.7 million
deployments, with 4 in 7 deployments being to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Every soldier under the age of 35 today joined up knowing one thing for
certain: that as soon as training was complete, he or she would be
shipped half a world away and into the fight. The Army has 6,000
soldiers who have spent, quite incredibly, more than 5 whole years in
Iraq or Afghanistan, and tens of thousands more who have spent 3 or 4
years in the fight. But perhaps the best measure of the Army is found
not in these statistics, but in these: since 2001, soldiers have earned
more than 15,000 awards of valor, including 9 Medals of Honor, almost
30 Distinguished Service Crosses, and nearly 600 Silver Stars.
It is humbling to work among professionals of such strong will and
high caliber, but I believe my education and professional experiences
have equipped me well to lead them. In addition to the breadth of
experience afforded by my current post as Army General Counsel, I
believe that my extensive and diverse background within law, higher
education, politics, and business, has imbued me with all the necessary
tools, the acumen, and the judgment to serve faithfully as Under
Secretary of the Army. I recognize the honor of serving in the Army and
with the Army, and, if confirmed as Under Secretary, I assure you, I
will be untiring in my efforts to sustain the confidence placed in me.
I am thankful for your consideration and appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Carson, and thank
you for mentioning Joe Westphal, too, and Senator Inhofe did as
well, because he's a wonderful person who's done a wonderful
job. I am glad you made reference to him and I should have
actually done that when I introduced you.
Dr. LaPlante.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM A. LaPLANTE, JR., Ph.D., TO BE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION

Dr. LaPlante. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Levin,
Ranking Member Inhofe, and other members of this distinguished
committee. Thank you for having the hearing and inviting us
here to answer your questions.
I'd like to start by thanking President Obama, Secretary
Hagel, Secretary James, and Frank Kendall for their confidence
in having me as the Principal Deputy, as well as nominating me
for the Acquisition Executive. I want to offer a special thanks
to Frank Kendall and former Air Force Secretary Mike Donley for
their especially persuasive powers to bring me into the Federal
Government. I would not be here if it wasn't for them.
With me today is my family: my wife Joann, my two daughters
Clair and Caroline, Nathan, my sister Lyn, and my nephew
August, who is supposed to be in first grade in Illinois this
morning, but instead is here. August, I hope this is worth the
travel for you.
I have spent over 28 years, like many of you, around
defense systems, technologies, acquisition programs, touching
all aspects of those programs, all Services. This experience,
along with the tenure on activities like the Defense Science
Board, offers a first-hand impression of the state and the
challenges of defense acquisition. Of course, this has evolved
and changed over the years, whether it was, for me at least,
starting during the height of the Cold War in the mid-1980s,
living through the drawdown and all that we went through in the
mid-1990s with the lower force levels, the acquisition reform
initiatives, as we called them, back in the late 1990s, the
first decade of the 2000s with the wars and the rapid
acquisition that we had to do, and where we are, of course,
today, which up until extremely recently had significant budget
uncertainties.
In all that time, like all of my colleagues who've been in
those forums, I've formed impressions and opinions on the
challenges of acquisition. Also, I come, though, from a
community that desperately wants to make a difference. I come
from a community that wants to find the game-changing
technology, bring it to the warfighter, get it into production.
I come from a community that wants to invent the clever way to
do contracting so we finish a development contract on time. I
come from a community that just wants to make a difference.
It's such an opportunity for me and a privilege to
potentially be able to come into the Government and, if
confirmed, be the Acquisition Executive. I'm under no illusions
of the challenges in the system, of course. We've all seen the
successes, we've all seen the misfires. I would say coming into
the Pentagon, just in the last several months, I had my own
impressions of what to expect. Many of those impressions were
confirmed. I also found that there are nuances, of course, and
subtleties that I had no appreciation for being outside the
Government.
Finally and probably most importantly, I found some
surprising successes, some good news stories, some positive
indicators, some of which I was unaware of, that I think we can
build upon. What I would pledge to this committee is, if
confirmed, I will build upon those successes, those bright
spots, those best practices. I will directly take on the areas
that we know need help in terms of improving acquisition
outcomes. I'll be transparent in doing so and be honest as I
can be on the state of the programs.
Again, I thank the committee for having the hearing and for
inviting me here to answer your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. LaPlante.
Let me now ask all of you the standard questions that we
ask of our nominees. Have you adhered to applicable laws and
regulations governing conflicts of interest?
Ms. Creedon. I have.
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken
any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Mr. Carson. No.
Dr. LaPlante. No.
Ms. Creedon. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established for requested communications,
including questions for the record in hearings?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Ms. Creedon. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Ms. Creedon. Yes.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from
reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Ms. Creedon. Yes.
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and
testify upon request before this committee?
Ms. Creedon. Yes.
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Finally, do you agree to provide documents,
including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a
timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee,
or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any
good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Ms. Creedon. Yes.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes.
Mr. Carson. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Yes? Yes, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I have to go to the Banking
Committee. I want to just say how enthusiastic I am about the
nominees. Their service to the Nation already has been
spectacular. I look forward to their rapid confirmation.
I also want to commend the chairman on his attire today. He
looks great in that West Point tie. [Laughter.]
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Finally, if we were as composed as August,
we'd get more business done here in the Senate. That's all I
have to say. Thank you, August.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. That puts a lot of pressure on you to stay
awake. But you're allowed not to.
Okay, thank you, Senator Reed, very much.
Let's start with 7 minutes for the first round of
questions.
First let me ask you, Secretary Creedon, the Air Force
disclosed yesterday that 34 intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) officers were implicated in cheating on their monthly
proficiency tests. In your current position as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, are you
responsible for the oversight of training and equipping those
personnel?
Ms. Creedon. No, sir, I'm not. Those people fall within the
military chain of command.
Chairman Levin. You are not in that chain?
Ms. Creedon. Correct, I am not.
Chairman Levin. All right, so you are not involved in
knowledge of this. You were informed about the same time we all
were?
Ms. Creedon. Yesterday.
Chairman Levin. That's totally understandable, given what
your job is and the fact that you're not in the chain of
command.
Secretary Creedon, let me ask you this about the NNSA,
which has had a history of program delays and cost growth,
particularly with its construction projects for new facilities.
We, in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), had
a provision which establishes in the NNSA an Office of Cost
Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE). My question is the
following: If you're confirmed and when you're confirmed, will
you work without delay in standing up that office?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. The Department of Defense has a similar
office to evaluate its programs. How do you envision those two
offices working together on future projects?
Ms. Creedon. Senator, the CAPE Office in the Department of
Defense has been very helpful over the course of the past 18
months in providing assistance to the Nuclear Weapons Council
in determining some of the costing for several life extensions,
and they've also been very much involved with the NNSA, helping
the NNSA come to grips with various costing methodologies both
for life extensions and for construction projects.
I would hope, if confirmed, to be able to continue to draw
on the expertise at CAPE, particularly for their costing
experience, which is deep and extensive, as we set up a similar
organization in the NNSA.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Creedon, the NNSA is a semi-
autonomous agency in the DOE. Can you explain the relationship
between the NNSA and the DOE in setting safety and security
regulations?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. The statute that created the NNSA
made it clear that the administration reports to the Secretary
of Energy through the Deputy Secretary, and that the Secretary
of Energy sets the overarching policies for DOE, including for
the NNSA. The overarching policies and regulations that apply
to the Department also apply to the NNSA. The NNSA does have
authority to make modifications to those as necessary, should
the Administrator make that decision.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Carson, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Chief Management Officer of the
Department of Defense to establish a plan to ensure DOD's
financial statements are validated as ready for audit by not
later than September 2017. The Secretary of Defense has
established the additional goal of ensuring that the statement
of the Department's budgetary resources is validated as ready
for audit by not later than September 30th of this year. Is the
Department of the Army in your opinion on track to achieve
those objectives, particularly with regard to data quality,
internal controls, and business process reengineering?
Mr. Carson. Yes, Senator, the Army is on track to meet
those goals. There's a lot of work still being done, many
challenges to be faced, but we are on track to achieve those
goals.
Chairman Levin. Will you take all the steps you can and all
the ones that are available and needed, if confirmed, to ensure
that the Army moves to achieve these objectives without an
unaffordable or unsustainable level of one-time fixes and
manual work-arounds?
Mr. Carson. Yes, I will do everything in my power to make
sure that happens.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask you now about the servicemembers
who are wounded or injured in combat operations. I think the
American people and every one of us believe that they deserve
the highest priority from our Government for support services,
healing, recuperation, rehab, evaluation for return to duty,
and successful transition from Active Duty, if required, and
then continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.
There's a lot of challenges, obviously, that remain,
despite the enactment of a lot of legislation and a renewed
emphasis over the last few years. Can you give us your
assessment of the progress to date by the Army to improve the
care, management, and transition of seriously ill and injured
soldiers, as well as the support needed for their families?
Mr. Carson. The Army's faced a great challenge over the
last 14 years of conflict in meeting those requirements, but I
think we are world leaders and are setting examples in every
day making progress that will be followed around the world for
decades to come. We are world leaders in this particular area.
Our warrior transition units, the community-based warrior
transition units, have been very successful in delivering basic
care.
I've been involved with Secretary McHugh in ensuring the
behavioral health diagnoses for the tens of thousands of
returning soldiers who've had difficulties there are satisfied.
We are better in burn care, in rehabilitation for people with
traumatic injuries.
The Army has put forth a tremendous effort to meet this
sacred obligation to our veterans and I think there are many
lessons for other institutions to take from it.
Chairman Levin. Are you satisfied and will you take steps
to ensure that sufficient facilities and services are available
to the redeployment of troops that are coming home from
Afghanistan, particularly in the area of reintegration, medical
services, so that we can accommodate the increase in the
soldier populations at their home stations when that occurs?
Mr. Carson. I give you my word in that, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your willingness to serve,
and your families as well.
Let me start with you, Dr. LaPlante. New Hampshire is very
proud that the Air Force has selected Pease Air National Guard
Base, the home of the 157th Air Refueling Wing, as the top
National Guard base to receive the new KC-46A. We're very proud
of that, and I wanted to get an update on where we are based on
your position, your current position, and preparing for this
hearing, and your new position, on the status of the KC-46A. Is
it on track? Are we going forward?
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you, Senator. The program is on track
and this past year in September it completed a successful
critical design review with the contractor, with Boeing, and
completed that actually about a month ahead of schedule. The
program has to date had no engineering changes on the fixed
price contract in the development. A reminder, the Government's
liability, if you will, in the program is capped under that
fixed price arrangement.
We are on track to begin first flight of the KC-46 later
this year. All indications are the program is going well. I
would also like to call out the trainer that was competed for
and selected by the Air Force, the trainer for the KC-46. The
actual trainer came in about $250 million under what the
independent cost estimate was for that trainer. It's on track.
Senator Ayotte. That is music to my ears and I'm really
glad to know that that program is going so well and on track.
On another note, unfortunately I want to ask you about a
program from December 2012, where the U.S. Air Force cancelled
an information technology program called the ECSS, that it had
been working on since 2005. The Air Force scrapped the program
after putting in $1 billion into the project, with no
identifiable benefit to the military or taxpayers. There were
also reports that the project would have required an additional
$1.1 billion to fix and the system wouldn't have been completed
until 2020. That was obviously cancelled by the Air Force.
Based on your experience and your preparation for this
hearing, particularly in the position you're going into, who is
being held accountable in the Air Force for wasting $1 billion
of tax dollars into a failed Air Force acquisition program?
Dr. LaPlante. Senator, your characterization of ECSS and
the history is correct. From the accountability perspective,
the direct answer to your question is in 2011 and 2012 it's my
understanding that the program manager for that program was
removed and the program executive officer for that program was
removed.
Having said that, do you believe that we have firm
accountability in the acquisition system and are comfortable
with where it is? I am not. I think it is something, should I
be confirmed, that I will put extra emphasis on. But again,
your characterization of ECSS is correct.
Senator Ayotte. Why did it happen and how do we prevent it
from happening again?
Dr. LaPlante. The best answer to why it happened from my
perspective coming in to the Principal Deputy position and
preparing for this hearing today was achieved by careful review
of what's called the acquisition incident report. That report
should be available, has been available for the committee. It
was commissioned in the way a mishap, an airplane crash, for
example, report would be done, where an independent team came
in, did fishbone analysis, as they call it, failure analysis,
interviews, and got to root cause.
It's very, very sobering reading. It identified about six
fundamental root causes, which in my assessment were probably
baked in, unfortunately, at the very beginning. I will go
through a few examples.
There was a lack of appreciation of the complexity of the
data, the data that was going to go into this business system.
When you're going to an enterprise business system, of course,
the commodity everybody uses is the data itself. Not
understanding that data, not understanding how to get the
quality of the data, was a foundational error in the program.
Then two other quick things, but there are more: Not having
a good transition plan. In other words, going from these legacy
systems, the as-is, to the to-be vision, in some ways the to-be
vision is often the thing that's the easiest to come up with.
That's where we all dream of having a nice, seamless enterprise
business system. The hard part and the part that was not done
well was understanding the way to get from where they were with
these legacy systems and this data to that to-be. Just like
when there's construction on a major highway you have to assume
there's still going to be traffic and how's the traffic going
to use the system, the user still had to use this as it was
doing the transition.
Those are foundational errors that were baked into the
program.
Senator Ayotte. Here's why your position that you're going
into in particular is so important and why this billion dollar
loss disturbs me, as I know it disturbs all of us. The Air
Force is proposing that all Active Duty A-10s be divested by
2016, plus the Air National Guard unit in Boise, ID, and that
all Guard and Reserve units be divested by 2017, in order to
save money in 2019. A billion dollars, that's about $3.7
billion over the Future Years Defense Program.
I think of that and I think $1 billion we lost on that,
when we have the A-10s that are incredibly important for close
air support, incredibly important for search and rescue,
incredibly important to our men and women in uniform. In fact,
General Odierno has said it's the best close air support
platform we have today. Despite this effort to divest it,
General Welch has said it is the best airplane in the world at
what it does.
These are the things that you're going to be facing, that
if we waste $1 billion and then you come to us and say, divest
a plane that our men and women, especially those on the ground,
care about, they know, that it has saved lives. In your
position this is very important that this not happen again, and
we look for areas in the Air Force where you see this problem
bubbling up, so that we can not waste taxpayer dollars and we
can make sure that the dollars go to things that we know our
men and women in uniform need.
Dr. LaPlante. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your
concerns on that particular platform. As we all know, there are
very, very difficult force structure trades that are being made
by the leadership and will be presented in the President's
budget.
I would say what I'm learning in the short time on the job
is it all costs money. It costs money to keep things, to
maintain things. It also costs money actually to divest. I
think there are some very difficult choices that the leadership
is making with force structure, as you point out. I know the
Air Force, I know General Welch, is keenly aware of your
concerns, and that's the fiscal environment that they're
facing, how to go to a different force structure.
Senator Ayotte. I know my time is up, and obviously I do
not believe that the A-10 should be divested, because I believe
it's very important. It saves lives. But not just that. What we
need to avoid, stepping back from it is, it's hard to say to
the men and women on the ground, hey, we're going to eliminate
the A-10, but we wasted $1 billion on an information technology
system.
This is where you all, focusing on being better, need to
make sure that the resources we have go to where they need to
go, you'll have a very important role in this new position. I
look forward to working with you on that.
Thank you.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Good morning to all of you. It's terrific to
see all three of you here. Secretary Creedon, I want to thank
you for your long history of public service. You've taken on a
lot of daunting assignments. This is another one for you. The
NNSA is a vitally important agency. You are going to be
responsible for some of our most sensitive and important
programs. You really fit the bill in my estimation for the job
that's in front of you. I'm going to ask you some questions
about the job the assignment you have.
I'd be remiss if I didn't acknowledge my good friend Brad
Carson. We served in the House together. He's a true patriot.
If you look at Brad's biography, he's walked the walk,
including deciding at a relatively old age, I think I can say,
that he wanted to serve our country, went to Officer Training
School, was deployed in Iraq if my memory is correct.
It's just fantastic that you're going to have this
opportunity to serve us, Congressman, in the Army, along with
our friend John McHugh, with whom we also served in the House.
I'm full-throated in support of your nomination and look very
much forward to voting for you to take on this important
assignment.
Dr. LaPlante, I don't mean to ignore you, but I have close
connections with both of the other nominees. Thank you for your
willingness to serve as well.
I want to turn right to the NNSA, Secretary Creedon.
Someone suggested that if we separated the nuclear enterprise
from DOE we'd be better served. Would you share your thoughts
on that debate and that discussion we've been having?
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator Udall, and thank you very
much for those kind words. They're most appreciated.
Senator Udall. They're well deserved.
Ms. Creedon. Thank you.
Obviously, my views with respect to the NNSA at this point
in time would be my personal views. But I happen to believe
that the legislation that established the NNSA remains sound
and that it's in the long-term best interests of the NNSA to be
part of the Department of Defense. I think having a cabinet-
level agency responsible for looking out for assisting with the
NNSA is really incredible and essentially important,
particularly as we look to the long-term budget debates that we
know are going to continue in the future as the budget goes
down.
That said, there are significant internal management
challenges with the NNSA that the NNSA has to deal with. But I
think these challenges can be dealt with within the flexibility
provided in the statute and that, at least at the moment--and
obviously, if confirmed I'll know a little better when I get
back into the NNSA again. But at least at the moment, I haven't
identified any legislative changes that I think are necessary.
Senator Udall. Madam Secretary, if we could clarify for the
record, you said Department of Defense. I think you meant
Department of Energy.
Ms. Creedon. Energy, I'm sorry. The Department of Energy.
Senator Udall. You did mean Department of Energy?
Ms. Creedon. I'm sorry, I did mean Energy.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that, those insights. They're
valuable because again of your broad experience.
I'd be remiss in my second question if I didn't ask you
about the recent news reports about what happened in Malmstrom.
Do you have greater concerns about larger systemic issues
associated with our ICBM force?
Ms. Creedon. Senator, from my observation sitting where I
have over the course of the last 2\1/2\ years--and obviously,
it's the military chain of command; I'm not in that chain of
command--but it is very troubling. I think to me it's even more
troubling for all of those men and women who really do have a
commitment, who show up every day, who are dedicated.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I had the
opportunity to travel with Secretary Hagel and we also went out
to F.E. Warren Air Force Base and went out to one of the launch
control centers, talked to the crew. He then had a very long
discussion with some of the folks out there. We had lunch with
them, had some pretty good one-on-ones, talked to the 20th Air
Force commander. They are so committed and they try really
hard. They live in a very difficult environment, and we need to
support them fully, and it's just a shame when there are just
bad apples.
Senator Udall. Yes. We're going to need to work on this,
and I know you're committed to it and focused on it, as am I.
Let me turn to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
number, $350 billion. That's the estimate that we'll spend over
the next 10 years on nuclear forces, I should say. That
includes the NNSA programs. Do you think that's accurate? Could
you mention what that investment's going to purchase for us?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. I think the CBO did a pretty good
job. Obviously, determining the long-term costs of the entire
enterprise depend a little bit on what you put in and what you
put out. But I think CBO did a good job in getting what's
really at the heart of the long-term challenges.
The NNSA challenges are with respect to both the
modernization of the complex--there are two big facilities left
to address. We need plutonium, we need highly enriched uranium
processing facilities, and pretty much, NNSA needs assured,
understanding, and reliable budgets. DOD's budget bow wave is
coming in a few years and it really has to do with the
modernization of the platforms and the delivery systems--the
submarine, the bomber, and whatever is the future of the
ground-based strategic deterrent, in other words the next
Minuteman III. Those are the bulk of the costs.
Senator Udall. We're going to be working, I know, to do
what's right to maintain our nuclear posture, but also keep
control of costs. We just have to do that, and I know you
agree.
Let me turn to Congressman Carson. I'd be interested in
your thoughts about what's in front of you. I'd ask you the
traditional question: What keeps you up at night as you
anticipate taking on this important assignment?
Mr. Carson. These are extraordinary times in the U.S. Army,
where we are trying to manage coming out of two wars and the
many problems that dealing with that, that retrograde of
equipment and with soldiers who are transitioning back into
either garrison life or returning to the civilian world, along
with their families. That's an extraordinary challenge.
We have a difficult budget climate and we have a drawdown
in forces, while at the same time still trying to meet the
needs of the National military strategy, which are quite
robust. It's that overall challenge of managing the Army that
is a very difficult one.
Senator Udall. You're up to it, I know, along with John
McHugh.
Dr. LaPlante, if I might I'd like to use what time I have
remaining--and I'll truncate my question. Basically, my
question goes to the proposal that the Air Force has put forth
that would involve developing an entirely new helicopter, given
that we already have a series of machines, a group of machines,
that I think get the job done. My concern is if we spend
hundreds of millions of dollars so the Air Force has its own
unique helicopter and at the same time we're cutting funding
for the space surveillance systems and other vital programs, to
me that doesn't fit.
I'd be curious to hear your comments on this.
Dr. LaPlante. In general, on items like new starts, whether
for helicopters or airplanes, we're in an environment now where
we're having to be very careful about starting anything new,
and we're looking very carefully, as we should, at what the
tradeoffs are between something new versus extending life,
extending what we have.
I understand your concerns and I think in general the force
structure decisions that the Air Force is currently making are
going to be trading some of those very difficult things. I'll
be happy to work with you further on.
Senator Udall. I'd like to follow up with you in more
detail.
Dr. LaPlante. Absolutely. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Once confirmed, I will set up a meeting with you to discuss
modernization initiatives in greater detail.

Senator Udall. Thanks again to the panel and thank you for
your willingness to serve our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Creedon, in my opening statement I talked about our
concern, and it's not just mine. Others have the same concern.
In fact, when the New START treaty was put in place, there were
some commitments that were made and those commitments have not
become a reality. When you are confirmed what would be your
effort in terms of trying to reach the level that was agreed
upon prior to the voting on the New START treaty?
Ms. Creedon. Senator Inhofe, not only does the NNSA have
substantial budget challenges in front of it, but so obviously
does the Department of Defense in looking forward to the long-
term modernization programs and investment programs to support
the nuclear complex. The numbers that you're referring to are
what have been referred to as in the 1251 report. At least with
respect to the NNSA at the moment, the NNSA budget request for
fiscal year 2014 was a little bit under the fiscal year 2012
1251 report and a little bit over the fiscal year 2011 1251
report.
One of the challenges I think that has occurred over time
is some of the elements that were supposed to be covered by
those funds have ended up costing more. It's caused a delay of
the plutonium facility and also has caused a relook of the
approach on the uranium facility.
Senator Inhofe. I really believe that if anyone can do it,
you can do it. I think the main thing we want to hear before
this committee is that you do have a commitment to do your best
to try to get us on track for security purposes.
Ms. Creedon. I absolutely do, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Carson, we talked in the office about
you're inheriting a little bit of a mess in terms of end
strength, and it's because it's the understanding that the
Office of the Secretary of Defense believes the Army end
strength should be reduced to 420,000 from 520,000 Active, and
315,000 from 358,000 on Guard, and then a comparable Reserve
figure.
I know you've had some time to look at this, and you've
also heard from the Chief of Staff of the Army, who's been
quite outspoken on what his needs are. How are you going to
handle that?
Mr. Carson. It is a difficult challenge, of course. The
Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army
himself have talked about how the drawdown will make it more
and more difficult to meet the many requirements that are
placed upon the Army. There's really two questions there: What
are the requirements that the Nation is going to ask of the
Army, and what is the right size for the Army to meet those,
and can the country afford an Army of that particular size?
Drawdowns are always very difficult. Maintaining the right
grade play, the right mix of officers and enlisted members in
the Army as you reduce by 30,000 or 50,000 members, maintaining
soldier and family resiliency, keeping morale up, the
transition of those soldiers who are leaving to go back into
civilian life.
It's going to be a great challenge, both on these strategic
questions as well as on kind of the personnel and readiness
side, to make sure we manage this drawdown in a way that is
equitable and does justice to the sacrifice of our soldiers
over the last decade.
Senator Inhofe. It's tough, because you're going to hear
from some of the uniforms that it could increase risk. Of
course, risk is lives. It's a tough issue to deal with. I know
you will do everything you can to try to make that a reality.
Dr. LaPlante, again thank you for the time that you gave me
in my office. I have a slide that the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), the Tactical Technology Office, put
together in 2012 that shows from approximately 1975 to the
present. You see the chart here. The blue line is where it
would be with commercial aircraft. When you get into--
everything's fine up through the F-117. Then with the F-18, the
C-17, B-2, and the rest of them, you see what is going up. We
had a chance to look at this.
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Senator Inhofe. The question I would want to ask you is,
the last platform we didn't have a problem with was F-117. Have
you had time to look? Do you have an analysis or an idea of, if
we were able to do that, why that same can't be used as a model
for some of the other platforms?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, thank you, Senator. As it turns out,
being a member of the Defense Science Board, we in fact looked
at some of this in studying adaptable systems, in fact with
DARPA's help, a few years ago. Part of that, we actually looked
specifically at the F-117. A couple things I would offer that
were in my view unique in listening and interviewing the
principals who were there.
The first was that it was a very small group of empowered,
what I would call today a cross-functional team. That is, the
requirements, the user, if you will, the program manager, the
systems engineer, the lead contractor, am I told it was on the
order of six to eight people who were all empowered to make
decisions, that were in a protected environment. It was a
highly classified program, but it also had top-level support.
If you know some of the individuals that were there--and
the one I happen to know, and some of you may know, is Dr. Paul
Kaminsky, currently the Chairman of the Defense Science Board.
He was in part of that time the program manager as an Active
Duty colonel.
It was quite a talented team. When you listen to how they
did it, it's remarkable. What it was, was it started with quick
identification of what the hardest parts of the problem were,
which in their case was the signature itself and getting it to
fly, then going right to the prototyping and, if you will,
experimentation to see if they could actually make this thing
work.
They had accidents, as Paul will tell you. They had
fatalities. But within about 3 years they were able to wring
out some of the fundamental problems there and were able to go
right into production.
There's two pieces to that which I think are lessons for
us. One is the requirements side. Dr. Kaminsky will give the
story of when he was the program manager he was pressured, if
you will, by some of the leadership in the Services at the time
of why the airplane could not fly in all weather: Why don't we
add a radar so it can fly in all weather? Dr. Kaminsky knew
that was going to be a very difficult challenge and he
resisted. He said: ``No, if we do that we're not going to have
the airplane.'' He resisted it. He says to this day we wouldn't
have that airplane if he had to put that radar on it.
Senator Inhofe. He had to do that first?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. It was understanding the requirements,
resisting changes to the requirements as needed, and an
empowered team. It proves it can be done, and I think it should
be an inspiration for all of us.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. I think that's a great answer. You
certainly would be one of the rare persons who could make that
a reality.
My time has expired. I'll wait a few minutes for the second
round.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Creedon, the Ohio-class submarine is aging and we're
getting to the point where we're talking about a replacement.
Are there particular challenges as we deliver the new reactor
for the upcoming Ohio-class replacements?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, Senator. I would say the biggest
challenge, frankly, is ensuring that there is stable and
predictable funding with respect to that reactor. My
understanding is the naval reactors program has the technology
fairly well in hand at the moment, but it is a critical part of
the success of that replacement submarine.
Senator King. Is multi-year funding part of the answer?
Ms. Creedon. Senator, I'm going to have to pass on that
question. I will certainly look into it and get back to you.
The NNSA part of it is the research and development part of it
and so multi-year doesn't really fit with the research and
development part of it. The procurement side of that is on the
Navy side and so that's not an area of my expertise. I would
have to get with the Navy and get back to you on that side.
[The information referred to follows:]

Additional options may exist to reduce program costs and risks
associated with transitioning from the Ohio-class to Ohio-class
replacement. The Navy is investigating various contracting and
acquisition scenarios to increase efficiencies and reduce costs of
construction.

Senator King. You're talking about continuity of funding
for the research side year to year?
Ms. Creedon. I'm talking about the research side and the
NNSA side, yes, sir.
Senator King. Some predictable funding level from year to
year is an important part of your being able to meet this
challenge?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.
Senator King. In your prior position you were working on
countering weapons of mass destruction, nonproliferation. Do
you see that as relevant experience to what you're going to be
doing now?
Ms. Creedon. Absolutely, sir. In my current job I have the
policy responsibility for countering weapons of mass
destruction at the Department of Defense, and the Department of
Defense has primarily been focused on biological threats,
chemical threats, and the NNSA has also been primarily focused
on the nuclear threats. But there is also overlap where the two
Departments work very closely together.
Between the Department of Defense and the Department of
Energy, the NNSA, it's essential that the two Departments work
together so that we handle all aspects of the threats from
weapons of mass destruction that face this country.
Senator King. It's somewhat out of the scope of this
hearing, Mr. Chairman, but I woke up this morning suddenly
thinking about what happened in West Virginia, which was an
accident. But it certainly raises the specter of what if it
wasn't an accident and how vulnerable we are and what that did
to a third of the State of West Virginia by contaminating the
water supply. It's a daunting concept.
Ms. Creedon. It absolutely is, Senator. One of the things
that right now in my current job I'm working on is a new
strategy for the Department of Defense for countering weapons
of mass destruction.
Senator King. Godspeed.
Mr. Carson, we've all--I suspect we've all--I know I have
heard from my governor and my adjutant general. I think one of
the toughest issues we're going to face this year is the
relationship between the Guard and the Reserve and the Regular
Army. Do you have thoughts on how this force structure issue
should be approached, how do we make sense of it, bearing in
mind the interests of the States as well as the national
interest?
Mr. Carson. I think it is going to be a very vexing problem
for us, and I think the only solution is to commit not to
engage in Army fratricide about the Active component/Reserve
component mix, but instead to work together in consultation
with the governors, with the adjutant generals (TAG) in the
States, with the National Guard Bureau, and the Department of
Defense.
Everyone recognizes, myself especially as a reservist, that
the Reserve components have played a heroic incredible role
over the last 14 years of conflict, no longer simply a
strategic reserve, but an operational asset to the Army and to
the other Services, too. I don't believe we're going to go away
from that, but we do have to look at the right mix as we come
out of these wars, the right assets, what functionalities the
governors, for example, would like to see in the Guard, what
functionality we need to keep in the Active component, the kind
of boots-on-the-ground dwell ratio.
These are all very difficult questions and there's no one
solution to it other than to say you must be committed to
working with the various stakeholders in the States, in the
Guard, in the Active component, and through leadership bring
everyone together, because in the end, whatever differences we
may have seem quite superficial given the commonality of
interests that the National Guard, the Reserve component
altogether, and the Active component have.
Senator King. You see essentially a new analysis of needs
and roles, as opposed to applying a rule of thumb of a ratio of
two to one or three to two or whatever?
Mr. Carson. The Chief of Staff has talked about the
historic ratio of the Reserve component to the Active component
of about 54 percent to 46 percent respectively. There's been
some discussion by him in particular about maintaining that
role going forward. I don't think it's a new analysis. People
value the contributions that have been made by the Guard and
the U.S. Army Reserve over the last decade, the last 15 years.
It's taking what we've learned, taking that institutionalized
knowledge, and then applying it for the rather austere budget
climate we find ourselves in.
Senator King. By new analysis what I meant is we can't just
say because the ratio was 54 to 46 2 or 3 years ago that's what
it's going to be ongoing. We have to stop and look and see,
okay, what do we need and what are the roles.
Mr. Carson. That's absolutely right. We have to look at
what requirements we have in each of the components, and then
resource them accordingly.
Senator King. A second issue that we're going to have to
struggle with is personnel costs. You know the figures that
personnel costs are steadily eating up readiness and
procurement and other parts of the military. Congress learned
about a month ago how difficult it is to even touch these
issues.
Do you have thoughts about how we can deal with the
personnel cost issues without causing a firestorm of concern
among Active Duty and retired military? Should we do it all in
a prospective way, which means we don't get the savings for a
long time? How do we approach this?
Mr. Carson. It, too, is not an easy matter.
Senator King. ``Not easy'' is an understatement.
Mr. Carson. It's particularly acute in the Army, though,
because we are a people-centric Service, where about 46 percent
of our budget goes to paying our soldiers. Those problems you
talk about that are chronic in the Department of Defense are
notable in the Army especially.
I do prefer approaches that don't prejudice the interests
of people who have already made long-term commitments, whether
it's retirees, whether it's people who are close to retirement.
It is certainly better to start out on the front end, and those
savings can be manifested over years. There are other ways to
find savings.
But it's difficult--and this is my own personal view--to be
making changes that are contrary to either the explicit or
implicit promises we've made to servicemembers and for which
they have made, set expectations for the future as well. Those
are very difficult things to do, and to be avoided in the
absence of profound countervailing benefits.
Senator King. I completely agree. I believe you have an
explicit or implicit contract. People have expectations and
that's what's going to make this problem exceedingly difficult
to deal with.
I'm almost out of time or I am out of time, but, Dr.
LaPlante, I just want to call attention again to that chart
that Senator Inhofe showed. If it takes 22 years to develop
something from idea to completion in the private sector, you'd
be out of business. That's just ridiculous. By the time you get
finished, the technology's changed and you're almost by
definition building something that's not state of the art.
I think the example of the F-117 is a good example. We have
to figure out how to deal with that. It's just unacceptable to
take 20 years to develop a new weapon system. I commend to you
to keep looking at that prior example. In my experience it
takes a small group who have the power and the authority to
make decisions. The larger the committee, the lesser the
results.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, Senator, thank you, and I agree, and I
look forward to working with you. Thank you.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator King.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. LaPlante, on the A-10 issue that Senator Ayotte raised,
I'm totally in agreement with the points she made. I would have
made them if she hadn't and that might have been the principal
thing that you and I would have talked about. But that's
getting some attention, and it's particularly getting some
attention based on the comments of General Odierno and others
who understand the ground support that that particular plane
provides. I hope that's one of the things you'll look at very
carefully, and I think you said you're going to do that. I just
want to say I would have brought that issue up in more detail,
but I think Senator Ayotte did a good job of covering our
concerns about that.
Secretary Creedon, thanks for coming by one day this week
to talk about this assignment. I think the principle thing I
would just want to raise again here would be the importance of
the transfer Kansas City facility to that new campus.
Everything from moving a 6-ounce tool to an 87,000-pound piece
of milling equipment has had to happen as part of that big
transfer of what you're doing there.
Then once that transfer's completed, the other thing that
I'd like you to comment on briefly is just the importance of
what we do with the piece of property that the Federal
Government has been on for half a century and now would be
leaving, after all the work that's done there and all the kinds
of left-behind problems that that work would mean would have to
be dealt with.
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator. Yes, the new Kansas City
plant, which goes by the acronym of KCRIMS [Kansas City
Responsive Infrastructure, Manufacturing, and Sourcing], is a
very important part of the modernization plan for the NNSA's
nuclear complex. As you know very well, it's the electronics.
But the real achievement with this new facility is that it'll
be a much better place for the workforce to work and they'll be
able to do the same work in half the space, and they get out of
a building that they've been in since the late 1940s, early
1950s. It's a long time coming and it's definitely needed.
That said, after our conversation yesterday I've done a
little more looking into it and the old Bannister Federal
Facility that has both the General Services Administration, the
NNSA, and other Federal entities in it, it will be a challenge
in the future. It's absolutely something that, if confirmed, I
will take on to make sure that in the end it is the best result
for the community as well as for the NNSA to understand really
how to deal and get rid of this old Federal facility in a way
that's really beneficial.
Senator Blunt. For my colleagues on the committee, this is
a facility that, as the Secretary indicated, we've been at for
60, 70 years now. Lots of nuclear work is done there. By this
point, it's pretty well located right in the center of lots of
things and has great development potential, but only if the
Government now deals with it in a way that allows somebody to
in the future use it for that purpose. I'm pleased that
Secretary Creedon understands that in the depth that she does,
as did the nominee that had the agency that the committee
reported out again just the other day after those names had to
be dealt with another time.
Mr. Carson, nice to see you again. We served in the House
together for 4 years in districts that were pretty close
together and we were able to do some things there. This is an
important assignment for a lot of the reasons you've already
been asked about today in terms of restructuring the military.
While I'm in the mode of talking about Missouri facilities,
I would just call your attention to Fort Leonard Wood, where
General Odierno was in the last week. Secretary McHugh has
visited there recently. I know General Odierno when he went to
the chemical school, the biological school, the radiological
school, the nuclear school, all of which are there, said that
this has unique possibilities, both because of the location and
community support, to look at all of those homeland security
applications.
As everyone does when they visit there, he mentioned the
level of community support and how important this base is seen
to the people that surround it. One of the neighbors, by the
way, is the Mark Twain National Forest, which gives us even
more capacity to do some things on the base that might in other
places be seen as intrusive or troublesome. I wanted to call
his visit to your attention, but Secretary McHugh, who you and
I also served with in the House, has been there as well.
On the question that Senator King mentioned about the
integrated armed services, I've seen some reports lately that
there is a discussion of eliminating the Guard from the support
services, the helicopter services, the Kiowa, the Apache
helicopters--a lot of that has been done by Guard personnel,
and a discussion that maybe that assignment would come back to
the full-time force.
I don't know of any reason to believe that the Guard
personnel that have done that haven't done an extraordinarily
capable job there. I will just continue to look, as I think you
may have already responded to, the importance of having that
integrated Armed Forces and looking at any comments that
General Grass and others in the Guard have to make about this.
But on the support generally of air support and other
things that come to the Army from the Guard, do you want to
comment on that?
Mr. Carson. Certainly. It was a real pleasure serving with
you in Congress. I had my home in Oklahoma, of course, just
down the road from I know your home, and we worked together a
lot on issues.
Senator Blunt. Right across the border.
Mr. Carson. I hope at Fort Leonard Wood we'll have a chance
to visit that together and give me a good excuse to go back to
our neighborhood.
As has been reported, part of the Army restructuring is
going to look at the aviation, both in the Active component and
the Reserve component, with the idea of streamlining it. We
have a number of assets, like our TH-67 training helicopters,
that have to be replaced or supplanted by another airframe. The
aviation community wants to come to what they call glass
cockpit dual-engine aircraft, which are better for training and
have more uses. They want to save some money in operations and
sustainment costs that they can put into the long-term projects
for the future of vertical lift, for example, the next
generation helicopters that may some day replace the Apache and
the Blackhawk.
There is a restructuring that's being examined. There's
been no final decision that I'm aware of on those kind of
issues. As I was telling Senator King, I am confident that I
will be a part of this process if confirmed to consult with the
governors, the TAGs, and others to say, what functionality do
you need in your National Guard aviation units, the 12 aviation
brigades that are in the National Guard, what do you need here,
so we can make sure that those requirements are satisfied.
Senator Blunt. I would just suggest again that whatever you
do there I think needs to, as you've already committed, to have
the active communication with the Guard here, with the adjutant
generals and the States, looking at the impact this has on the
ongoing mission and recruiting capability and maintaining the
numbers that these units have had, and look at the performance,
as well as looking about whether that particular skill also
continues to be a valuable skill for the States to have
available in the State for the other work that the Guard does
in addition to being able to be called up and used to support
the full-time force.
I think this will be an issue that a lot of members,
including me, will take very seriously as it comes up, and I
know you will, too, and I wanted to raise it with you today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blunt.
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carson, I am very concerned about cyber security and in
particular in recruiting and retention of cyber experts. In the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, I included language that would give
career credit to newly commissioned officers with cyber
security experience. If confirmed, what additional steps will
you take to ensure that we're recruiting the best and the
brightest into the field?
Mr. Carson. It's a real challenge to recruit this highly
in-demand skill set into the military, where our pay structure
often can't compete with that of the private sector. We are
fortunate that we've established relationships with some major
universities, including the one I used to teach at, the
University of Tulsa, one of three universities that is working
closely with the military, with Cyber Command, the National
Security Agency, and others to try to recruit and train people
to come into the military.
These special programs like you mentioned can help do that.
The Army has been fortunate that we have met most of the
filling of the two new cyber brigades we've established. But
it's going to be a continuing challenge for us, simply because
these skills are so highly in demand.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you need any additional authorities
to reach your goals?
Mr. Carson. I'm not sure at this time we do need any
authorities, but I will commit to you that General Cardon, who
runs Army Cyber Command, could come in and talk to you
specifically about what our recruiting status is and if we do
need some kind of special provisions to allow that.
Senator Gillibrand. That would be helpful.
I authored a bill last year called the Cyber Warrior Act,
which leverages the talent pool that already exists within our
National Guard, and because of the National Guard's dual
mission it's an ideal place to attract those individuals. They
might be working at Google by day and could be a cyber warrior
for their Service on weekends and when their commitments are
due.
However, I've heard that this idea isn't as well received
as it might be because they think that it needs to reside
within DOD and focus should be on Active, not Reserve, forces.
My question is, please explain why, if you did create these
units with a dual status, it would be detrimental to the Army
and the overall goal of protecting our Nation against cyber
attack?
Mr. Carson. I don't think it would be detrimental. That
skill set needs to be in both the Active component and the
Reserve component without doubt. I think some of the
interesting ideas for recruiting--for example, the Navy has
allowed direct commissioning of officers who had unique skill
sets who didn't have time to spend 4 or 5 months in training
and they spread it out over time. These are the kind of things
we're going to have to look at for our cyber warriors, if you
will.
But the skill set's going to be needed in both the Active
component and the Reserve component, and I don't think that
anyone's denigrating the service of the Reserve community cyber
community in any way.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay.
Dr. LaPlante, I'm concerned that we aren't able to move as
quickly as we need to to get the best, most cutting edge
technologies, particularly in the cyber theater. What changes
would you propose in terms of implementing or improving Air
Force's cyber acquisition strategy?
Dr. LaPlante. Of course, being cyber, there's many aspects
of the problem. Let me first talk about the cyber resiliency
part and then I'll talk about the tools side.
What we need to do, and we've just begun it in the Air
Force, but much more work needs to be done, is bring the life
cycle part of the acquisition system together with the program
executive officers and to begin to, if you will, first
understand what the cyber vulnerabilities are in your weapons
system. While that sounds simple, it's actually quite
difficult, depending on what level of threat you're talking
about. Then, when you understand what it is, begin to put in
what the mitigations are.
The mitigations can be technical, but it's also important
to remind ourselves that mitigations can be just a different
way to operate the system. Very simple what I just said, but
it's a very complex endeavor and, if anything, also because of
the way programs buy things. We buy things by weapons systems,
yet cyber works by being connected. You're only as good as your
weakest link, if you will, for a weapons system.
We've already begun that. But I would say there's much more
work to be done there. Related to that, we're beginning to come
up with what I would call the beginnings of cyber resiliency
metrics. That is, things that we can give almost in a
requirements way to the program to say, you will build this
system to this resiliency against that threat.
But what I do think the Air Force and in fact the other
Services continue to need is flexibilities in dealing with
implementing new information assurance requirements. One of the
concerns that a lot of us have is that as we continue to learn
more about what the cyber threats are and we build up, let's
say, the requirements for building information assurance into
the system, by the time it actually gets to a program office it
may be 2 years later.
Senator Gillibrand. Right. That's part of the problem.
Dr. LaPlante. That's part of the problem. We know what was
a problem 2 years ago----
Senator Gillibrand. Is not a problem today.
Dr. LaPlante.--is not a problem today, and what's a problem
today we didn't even imagine 2 years ago.
Senator Gillibrand. Right.
Dr. LaPlante. Anything that will help us build the
resiliency and get the compliance part of the system to be much
quicker in reacting and not just do the normal push out
information assurance would be very helpful.
Senator Gillibrand. I think you need to, and I think you
need to make recommendations about how to do that and change
protocols accordingly.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, and I'd be happy, if confirmed, to work
on that, work on that with you.
Senator Gillibrand. Turning to mental health, Mr. Carson,
the issue of mental health, including the stigma surrounding
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as well as the rates of
suicide in our Services, is critical. I receive monthly suicide
data and I am very, very disheartened to see the number of
servicemembers who fall through the cracks in our system. If
confirmed, what are your plans to improve suicide prevention in
the Army? What will you do to ensure the Army is providing
appropriate mental health care to the servicemembers and their
families?
Mr. Carson. It is a major priority of the U.S. Army, it has
been for the last couple of years, to improve our suicide
prevention programs and forestall suicides within the ranks
among veterans who have served in the U.S. Army. We have about
125 to 180 suicides per 1,000--or for I guess 100,000 serving--
125 to 185 suicides per year of Active Duty members. That rate
of 25 or so, 22 to 25 per 100,000, is in excess of what you
find out in the civilian population at large.
It comes from a number of fronts. We've put in together
comprehensive soldier-family fitness programs, readiness and
resilience programs. We have suicide prevention hotlines. We
have suicide education standdowns. There is an almost heroic
effort to try to deal with this problem, a problem that's
difficult to understand and to grapple with and has many
different causes and is almost unique in each circumstance.
A major part of that, though, is about our behavioral
health treatment, whether it's reducing the stigma associated
with getting care and admitting to having behavioral health
conditions. Secretary McHugh has been a real leader on this in
how he's treated PTSD and making sure diagnoses are uniform and
fair and making sure that we're out in the community educating
people.
It's a multi-front war against suicide, but the Army is
seized of this issue and realizes it is a matter of paramount
importance.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To all the
witnesses, I appreciate your service.
Mr. Carson, in June the Army announced its plans to
integrate women into combat roles, opening up positions within
27 brigade combat units. Then there are other initiatives under
way, including the Soldier 2020 initiative to examine the
specifications for different billets within the Army.
If you could just talk about the status of the Army's plans
to integrate women into combat roles, I'd appreciate it.
Mr. Carson. Absolutely. We have 147 mission occupation
specialties that are not including those that are in the
Special Forces and under their control. Of those, 133 are open
to women today. There are 14 in the combat arms, combat
engineers, that are not open to women.
You have really two efforts going on. One is to look at
those 14 military occupational specialities (MOS) and establish
occupational requirements for it, to revalidate those. The Army
Research Institute, the U.S. Army Medical Research
Environmental Medicine Institute, working with the Training and
Doctrine Command, are all doing that kind of work. Over the
next few months, in anticipation of the deadlines set for us by
the Secretary of Defense, we'll be talking about what the
requirements are to serve in those particular MOSs.
At the same time, of course, we have the direct ground
combat exclusion of women. Even if it was in one of the 133
eligible MOSs, you couldn't necessarily serve in a combat unit
or one that was closely associated with it. We are in the
process right now of opening up all of those, of notifying
Congress about those. Over the next few months we'll be opening
up 33,000 positions across the Army to women in those so-called
closed positions.
We're working on both the closed occupations and the closed
positions.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you.
One program I've been impressed with in the Army is the
Soldier for Life program. My first bill, which was enacted as
part of the NDAA, was the Troop Talent Act of 2013, which
largely focused on the credentialing of Active Duty service
personnel for the skills they obtain with credentials that are
meaningful in a civilian workforce, designed to help folks get
traction quicker as they move back into the private workforce.
Could you talk a little bit about efforts under way and
your focus on that issue to assist either in Soldier for Life
or more broadly in the sort of credentialing work that's being
done within the Army?
Mr. Carson. I think working on these issues of soldiers who
are transitioning out into civilian life are extraordinarily
important ones and ones I will be very committed to work on as
the Under Secretary. The veterans unemployment rate is much
higher than the national average. You just look at it in the
unemployment payments that the Army is making. Ten years ago we
spent about $90 million a year on unemployment compensation.
Today we spend $500 million on unemployment compensation.
We're trying to deal with these problems through a number
of innovative programs, working with the Department of Labor,
others, the Veterans Opportunity to Work program, the Army
Career and Alumni programs, Soldier for Life, working with
private sector employers, to where we have close relationships
so they know the quality and the skills that soldiers have.
There's a number of programs. Again, it's a multi-front war
on this problem, and I promise as the Under Secretary I'll both
continue and work with you and others who are interested in
these issues, because that transition is a difficult one for
many soldiers and in an era of downsizing of the Army those
programs are going to be among the very most important ones
that we have.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.
Secretary Creedon, I think a question was asked on this
topic before I came in, dealing with the recent controversy
over the exam and how that's being done. I know some of the
military personnel in charge of nuclear weapons are not
directly in the oversight of NNSA, but there have been a number
of incidents sort of touching upon this issue that raise
questions about just the general morale level. These have come
up in recent media reports about the Air Force.
Are you concerned that there's a lack of focus among
officers within U.S. Strategic Command and how that has
affected attitudes and focus within the NNSA, and in particular
what do you see yourself doing to contribute to a morale
uplift? I know there's been an awful lot of reports of low
morale within some of these personnel MOSs.
Ms. Creedon. First, Senator, I have to certainly share the
disappointment with the announcement that came out yesterday
with respect to the Air Force. That said, the vast majority of
the Air Force as well as the Navy nuclear folks--and I know
it's probably not well known, but there is also a really
incredible cadre of Army nuclear folks, known as Army 59s,
that, even though the Army doesn't have nuclear weapons, they
play a key role in just making sure that the complex runs
smoothly.
But nevertheless, morale is a huge problem. I think it's
something that hurts most those who do the job best and who are
mostly committed to it, and that's something that I really want
to make sure, at least within the context of the NNSA, if
confirmed, that the NNSA sees that they are highly valued,
they're essential to maintaining a strong, effective, secure
deterrent, and that they really do play a key role. I think
sometimes they don't think that the nuclear deterrent is always
valued.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.
Dr. LaPlante, a parochial question. The Ballston area in
Northern Virginia is a real concentration of Government offices
connected to research, so DARPA, the Office of Naval Research
(ONR), the Air Force's Office of Scientific Research, National
Science Foundation, some work done down at Defense Geospatial
Intelligence Agency. What are your views about how the Air
Force can work together with DOD and these kind of allied
Federal research institutions to do more research and
development as we face the budgetary challenges that we're all
familiar with?
Dr. LaPlante. First, I would say I know Ballston well. If
anybody has been with ONR, DARPA, or the Defense Science Board,
you're actually spending time in Ballston all the time. We all
know Ballston well.
In general, obviously, the science and technology,
particularly in the times that we are in, where we're drawing
down, is, if anything, even more important. Regardless of the
geography of it, science and technology is a priority for the
Air Force and for being the superior force in 2020, 2023.
I would pledge that any community outreach, any geography
issues that the Air Force has, whether it's in science,
technology, or others, we will engage the local community and
we will be open-minded and transparent in what we do. But
again, without committing to anything, I am a fan of the
concentration in Ballston because I've experienced it myself. I
would commit to being transparent with anything that the Air
Force does.
Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Just quickly, you indicate as we draw down
these scientific and research investments will become even more
important. Could you just explain what you mean by that? I
think I know what you mean, but I'd like to make sure.
Dr. LaPlante. Sure. I think it goes somewhat as follows:
that when we're bringing force structure down, when we're
beginning to look at what is essential versus what's not
essential, what we've always relied upon in the United States
is having a superior, a technological military. We're not going
to change that.
What does it mean in today, 2014, to think about what it
will mean to be technologically superior 10 years from now?
It's going to come very, very fast. I was on a study just a few
months ago on 2030 technologies. 2030 is 16 years from now.
1998 doesn't seem very long ago.
We have to be doing that work now. We have to be doing it
in addition to perhaps something we haven't done before, which
is technology scan. The breakthroughs may be international.
They may not be domestic. This is the time, in my judgment and
many other people's judgment, that we have to be emphasizing
science and technology, for that reason.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all of you for your service to our country.
Secretary Creedon, I want you to know everyone in Indiana is
very proud of you and what you've accomplished.
Mr. Carson, it is nice to see another Blue Dog alum here
and we wish you the very best.
Dr. LaPlante, you're not from Indiana, but we're still
proud of you.
Congressman Carson, the first question I want to ask you is
about suicide prevention. It is something that we all have
worked very hard on. I certainly have had a big focus on this.
It is part of the defense bill that we moved forward that we
have a study that's coming out in February as to how to best
aid our men and women who serve in the Armed Forces.
One of the areas that we had worked on in our office was to
try to, as part of the physical health assessments that's made
of each soldier each year, that a mental health assessment be
made, and that we talk to the commander of each individual, who
is there and who sees them every day, who can tell if there's
changes, and also to do some screening.
We're supposed to get that report back in February from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense as to how this will work
moving forward. We would like to work with you, with the Army,
obviously with all of the branches, but as someone with the
Army, to try to help us in this process, because we've lost
more young men and women to suicide than in combat last year.
I want to know the Army's--I shouldn't say willingness; I'm
sure you're willing. But we'd love to have you as a great
partner in this effort to try to end this scourge.
Mr. Carson. I can assure you you will have our very much
utmost partnership in this effort.
Senator Donnelly. Additionally, Mr. Carson, you mentioned
before 46 percent of the Army budget now is personnel. In your
mind, is there a red line that we get to that, we can't cross
that line in terms of that percentage that's dedicated to
personnel, as opposed to equipment or other areas?
Mr. Carson. That number is historically rather stable in
fact, that while the Army budget has fluctuated over time, that
45, 50 percent is being spent on military personnel, not
including our civilian personnel, is more or less stable in the
Army budget. I think that's a good number. We are a people-
centric Service. We spend much more than the other Services do
on our soldiers, and that number is probably going to be one we
try to maintain.
Senator Donnelly. Do you see it remaining in that
neighborhood, that percentage, as we move forward? Because I
know there's concern, for instance with the Navy. Where it was
one third, it's about half now. Unless some changes come
through in the future, you're heading up towards two-thirds. Do
you see it in the Army as being a stable number?
Mr. Carson. I think we will budget to try to make it a
stable number. That means we have to make cuts in number of
people, let's say, or in other areas, try to make this all
balance, because the Army has a view of what a balanced Army
budget looks like, the amount we spend on procurement or
research and development. But we are greatly concerned, and the
Chief of Staff has spoken quite eloquently about this, about
the inexorable rise of compensation costs, whether it's health
care benefits, whether it is pay raises, benefits, these kinds
of things.
I know Congress is very interested in this question. We are
as well, because as the most people-centric Service to keep
that number stable we do have to get a handle on that
increasing slope of compensation.
Senator Donnelly. Secretary Creedon, don't take offense at
this, but I want to invite Mr. Carson and Dr. LaPlante to Crane
Naval Warfare Center. You're invited as well, but these two for
very specific reasons.
Dr. LaPlante, we do a lot of work on counterfeit and
counterfeit detection there in terms of parts and supplies and
equipment. Naturally, in the position that we are hoping you
are ascending to, what do you see as your role in preventing
the introduction of counterfeit parts into the Air Force
process?
Dr. LaPlante. I would tie counterfeit parts, unfortunately,
as part of the broader cyber resiliency issue. What we
typically talk about is we talk about the supply chain, and
that is understanding for our weapons systems where we're
getting the parts and that in fact these parts are truly what
we think they are.
I would view the counterfeit part issue in terms of the job
I'm nominated for to be part of building the resiliency into
that system. I think there are for selected military programs--
we have gone to Trusted Foundries, as you may know. In my view
there's a limit to how much you can do with Trusted Foundries,
only because there's a certain throughput. But I think we're
going to have to start to build resiliency into starting with
our most critical systems end to end, and that's going to
include looking at the supply chain and the parts.
Senator Donnelly. I was wondering if you are a proponent,
as I am, of more aggressive forensic measures, because, as you
said, we certainly hope they are from trusted suppliers or
whatever, but constant spot check or determination on a lot of
what we come through, because of the critical nature of making
sure these parts are reliable and perform as advertised.
Dr. LaPlante. Absolutely. We talked earlier about science
and technology. I think this is an area that we should be
investing in in science and technology, noninvasive ways of
doing surveillance testing on large populations of ships, for
example, to detect anomalies and things that are in there,
Trojan horses, whatever. I think that is an active, important
area of research that we should be doing.
Senator Donnelly. Secretary Creedon, you have done so much
work in the nuclear area and in keeping our Nation safe. Just
recently we went through some challenges with North Korea. As
we look forward, looking at the government that they have
there, the actions that have been taken there--and I'm not
asking you to be an expert on all things North Korean, but what
do you think are the key steps in making sure that we're able
to continue to move forward, continue to counter that threat,
and what do you think are the things that they respond to more
than anything?
Ms. Creedon. Senator, from my current position one of the
things that we've been very instrumental in is ensuring that
the United States is well protected from whatever the North
Koreans end up doing with respect to the development of their
long-range missiles, as well as their short-range missiles,
which are a threat to the theater and to our forces over there.
We've been very instrumental in March with respect to the
Secretary's announcement to expand the capacity and the
capability of the ground-based strategic deterrent, to add 14
additional ballistic missile defense interceptors at Fort
Greely in Alaska. The challenge now is to continue to improve
those interceptors so that they become safe and efficient.
From a nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
proliferation perspective with respect to North Korea, it's
absolutely essential that we do everything possible to prevent
them from achieving their goals in their program, from getting
the materials, the technologies. Whatever it is that they need
to advance their program, we have to work to be able to prevent
them from getting those things; also with respect to making
sure that our allies in the region also feel that our extended
assurance and deterrence is secure and viable. I think we did
that too not too long ago when we had the B-52 flyover of the
Korean Peninsula.
I think all of these things need to continue to press
forward so that we maintain a good posture with respect to
North Korea.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly.
We will have a second round. We can have perhaps 3 minutes
for the second round. If we need a third round, we will.
Senator Donnelly raised an issue of counterfeit parts and I
want to make sure, Dr. LaPlante, that you are aware of the
investigation, which was a very extensive investigation that
this committee held, into counterfeit parts. Millions,
literally millions of counterfeit parts, have found their way
into our weapons systems. I would hope that you would find out
what we had to say, that you would study what we did in the
2012 defense authorization bill, mainly in the area of holding
the contractors accountable for those parts and accountable for
the correction of those parts.
We've had a lot of effort now on the part of some
contractors to change our law and to not hold them accountable.
But hopefully that's not going to happen. We would urge you to
read this report. It's a pretty disturbing report. Mainly the
source is Chinese. We looked at the electronic parts, where
they rip apart old computers, take the parts and wash them, put
new numbers on them. They do it openly. It's quite an amazing
operation that they're running there, and we're going to do
everything we can to stop it, at least as far as weapons
systems are concerned.
Dr. LaPlante. Senator Levin, I know about the report. I
will definitely review it carefully, and I consider it
extremely important. As we say, it's part of that broader cyber
issue. I look forward to working, if confirmed, with you on
that. Thanks.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Carson, when you take this position you
will become the second Chief Management Officer of the
Department of the Army. It's only a few years ago that we said
that the position that you'll be confirmed to is the Chief
Management Officer. We did this in 2007 out of frustration with
the inability of the Military Departments to modernize their
business systems and processes. We chose to have the Under
Secretary serve concurrently as Chief Management Officer
because no other official in the Department of the Army other
than the Secretary sits at a high enough level to cut across
all the stovepipes and to be able to implement comprehensive
change.
We hope that you will make modernization of the Army's
business systems and processes a top priority.
Mr. Carson. I assure you I will consider it a very top
priority.
Chairman Levin. Do you think you have the resources and the
authority needed to carry out the business transformation of
the Department of the Army?
Mr. Carson. I do.
Chairman Levin. If you find out that that's not true, for
whatever reason, you would let us know?
Mr. Carson. Yes, of course.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. No, thank you.
Chairman Levin. All right. Then Senator King or Senator
Kaine?
Senator King. One brief follow-up. Mr. Carson, I don't
expect you to have this data at hand, but perhaps you could
supply it. I'd be interested in knowing, in that personnel cost
figure that you were talking about, the breakdown within that
figure of Active Duty versus retired in terms of costs, of
health care, retirement. Do you see what I mean?
Mr. Carson. Absolutely. I will get that to you, Senator.
Senator King. I appreciate that. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]

Army retiree expenses are paid into the Department of Defense's
retiree accrual fund, and the fund distributes payments to retirees. In
fiscal year 2013, the Army paid about $7.1 billion of the approximately
$61.1 billion in its military pay budget to the retiree accrual fund.
This represents about 11.6 percent of the Army's military pay budget in
that fiscal year.

Chairman Levin. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. No additional questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. All right. Again, we thank you, thank you
all, for your service and for what you're embarked upon in the
new positions that you'll be confirmed to. We thank your
families, your supporters, particularly August. You've done a
wonderful job, and I know how important it is to an uncle to
have a nephew or a niece there by his side or her side. I only
have one nephew, a lot of nieces.
But it's a good thing that you skipped school today. Don't
do that too often, though. This has to be a special occasion.
But we again know how important it was to your uncle that you
be here today.
We will stand adjourned, and we will move these nominations
as quickly as possible--even quicker than usual in the Senate
these days.
[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. Section 3141 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2002 stated that the Principal Deputy Administrator
shall be appointed ``from among persons who have extensive background
in organizational management and are well-qualified to manage the
nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition programs
of the administration in a manner that advances and protects the
national security of the United States.''
What background and experience do you possess that you believe
qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have had over 30 years of experience in a variety of
executive and legislative branch positions. In addition to my current
position as an Assistant Secretary of Defense, I have served in
management positions at the Department of Energy (DOE), including as
the first Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). I also served as the General
Counsel of the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. I was
honored to serve for many years as a member of the staff of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services with responsibilities directly related to
those of the Principal Deputy Administrator of the NNSA.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy
Administrator?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on understanding the many
specific responsibilities and interactions that are necessary to ensure
that I can effectively carry out the duties of the office of the
Principal Deputy Administrator of the NNSA. I firmly believe that there
are always actions that I can take to improve my ability to perform
successfully in any position. That said, some of the key areas on which
I will focus are program and project management execution, safety and
security, maintaining science excellence and ensuring that the NNSA
meets is national security commitments.
Question. Section 3141 goes on to state that the Principal Deputy
Administrator ``shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as
the Administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of
activities among the elements of the administration.''
Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect
that the Administrator of the NNSA would prescribe for you?
Answer. While there is currently not a permanent Administrator in
place to provide guidance to this question, history would indicate that
the Principal Deputy would, among other duties and tasks, focus on the
internal workings of the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with
Congress and other departments and agencies.
Question. Are there any special projects or assignments on which
you will focus?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to work closely with the
Administrator to identify specific projects and assignments. I would
also expect that some projects would focus on restoring the trust in
and credibility of the NNSA.
major challenges and problems
Question. What is your understanding of the role that you will play
in the overall administration of the NNSA, in the event that you are
confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would expect to be focused on the internal
workings of the NNSA, the budget, and interactions with Congress and
other departments and agencies. This would be consistent with the roles
undertaken by my predecessors.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Principal Deputy Administrator?
Answer. The challenges that will confront the Principal Deputy are
the same that confront the NNSA itself. Implementation of the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) and the President's nuclear security agenda will
be significant challenges, as will ensuring the continued safety,
security, and effectiveness of the stockpile and maintaining a highly
skilled, trained, and capable workforce at NNSA, its labs and plants.
Doing all this under increasingly constrained budgets will be even more
challenging. NNSA is midway through its first major life extension
program and is beginning work on the second even more challenging life
extension program. Two major manufacturing capabilities are in need of
replacement, threats from nuclear terrorism and proliferation have
become more complex, work is underway on a new reactor for the Ohio-
class replacement submarine, and the amount of money available to
address all of these challenges is decreasing. In addition, confidence
in the management of the NNSA has been questioned.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I will
develop close working relationships with key partners at NNSA
headquarters and field offices, the labs and plants, with other
relevant executive branch partners, and with Congress, to understand
and address the various problems, issues, and concerns. I would work to
establish clear expectations, clear plans and requirements, clear lines
of communications, authority and responsibility, and generally work to
restore the credibility of and trust in the NNSA.
Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in
the performance of the functions of the Principal Deputy Administrator?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on those serious problems
mentioned above. Resolving these problems will take time and the
patience of NNSA stakeholders, as well as their support and
partnership. Reestablishing these baseline relationships will be the
key to success. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Administrator, the leadership of the NNSA and its operating
contractors, and the whole NNSA team to achieve this goal.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator of the
NNSA and the whole NNSA team, as well as other departments and
agencies, to identify, understand, and prioritize the problems facing
NNSA, and to develop appropriate timelines to resolve these problems.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Principal Deputy
Administrator?
Answer. If confirmed, and working in conjunction with the
Administrator, I would make reestablishing solid baseline relationships
an overarching priority. I believe this can be achieved while working
on the specific problems that face NNSA. In addition, if confirmed, I
would also focus on ensuring that the highly-skilled and talented NNSA
workforce is closely involved in identifying and resolving the many
challenges that face the NNSA. An additional priority would be to
establish stability in the program, budget, and workforce.
Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the NNSA's budget
and management structure to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and
credible nuclear weapons stockpile for the Nation?
Answer. Achieving this goal will become increasingly more difficult
in the face of declining budgets. As a result, focusing on improving
NNSA's overall process to accurately estimate costs, establish clear
program requirements, and execute those programs will be a priority of
mine, if confirmed. I would expect to work closely with the
Administrator, the NNSA leadership and the new Under Secretary for
Management and Performance to achieve these goals.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Principal Deputy Administrator with the following Officials:
The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.
Answer. If confirmed, I would report through the Administrator to
the Deputy Secretary and Secretary and represent the Administrator with
these officials in his absence.
Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.
Answer. If confirmed, the Administrator would be my immediate
supervisor.
Question. The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the immediate supervisor for
the Deputy Administrators for Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental
Management.
Answer. Within the NNSA, the Associate Administrator for
Infrastructure and Operations is the principal interface with the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM). If
confirmed, I would interact with the Under Secretary for Management and
Performance on EM matters, given that the Assistant Secretary for EM
reports to that Under Secretary, as well as the Assistant Secretary.
Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. NNSA's Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the
main counterpart to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs. If confirmed, I
would represent the interests of the Administrator and the NNSA with
this Deputy Administrator, as called for.
Question. The Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Answer. The Administrator is the principle interface with the
Chairman and the member of the Nuclear Weapons Council. If confirmed, I
would represent and support the interests of the Administrator and the
NNSA to the Chairman of the NWC as appropriate.
Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the
principal interface with the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. As
necessary, in the absence of the Administrator, I would represent the
interests of the Administrator and the NNSA with the Commander in Chief
of the U.S. Strategic Command.
Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is the
principal interface with the nuclear directorates of the Air Force and
Navy. As necessary, I would represent the interests of the
Administrator and the NNSA with these officials.
Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Facilities and
Operations.
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the immediate supervisor to
the Associate Administrator of NNSA for Facilities and Operations
(Infrastructure and Environment).
Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Management and
Administration (APM).
Answer. If confirmed, I would serve as the immediate supervisor to
the Associate Administrator of NNSA for Management and Administration.
Question. The DOE Director of Health, Safety, and Security.
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the interests of the
Administrator and the NNSA as called for.
Question. The Under Secretary of Energy for Science and the
Director of the Office of Science.
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the interests of the
Administrator and the NNSA as called for.
Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
Answer. If confirmed, I would represent the interests of the
Administrator and the NNSA as called for.
management of the nnsa
Question. What is the role of NNSA's Management Council and, if
confirmed, what would be your relationship with the Council?
Answer. If confirmed, as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I
understand that I would be the lead official of the NNSA Management
Council.
Question. In your view, are there any changes needed to the
management structure of the NNSA?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consult directly with the Secretary,
the Deputy Secretary, the Administrator, and the Deputy and Associate
Administrators regarding what changes need to be made to the management
structure of the NNSA.
Trust is clearly an issue that remains a challenge within the
nuclear security enterprise, between headquarters and the field. What
may assist in addressing this issue is to further clarify lines of
authority, responsibility, and accountability within the entire NNSA
enterprise. I understand the Secretary has begun to address these
management issues. It will also be critical to assess business
processes to operate more efficiently as well as NNSA's capabilities
for cost estimation and program execution.
Question. In your view are there clear lines of authorities and
responsibilities in the NNSA?
Answer. I am aware of the relationships prescribed under the NNSA
Act and know that governance of the NNSA will be a critical area to
focus on if I am confirmed. I would expect to work closely with the
Congressional Panel currently conducting a review of NNSA governance. I
understand the Secretary has begun to implement reforms that would
clarify lines of authority and responsibility specifically in the areas
of safety and security across the Department to include the NNSA, and
if confirmed would work to understand and implement these reforms.
Question. Do you believe that any changes are needed to ensure
clear lines of authority and responsibility?
Answer. I understand the Secretary has begun to implement reforms
that would clarify lines of authority and responsibility specifically
in the areas of safety and security across the Department to include
the NNSA. If confirmed, I would consult directly with the Secretary,
the Deputy Secretary, the Administrator, and the Deputy and Associate
Administrators regarding what changes need to be made to the management
structure of the NNSA.
Question. As Principal Deputy Administrator, how will you address
the findings and recommendations from the dozens of reports that have
been published in the past 2 decades regarding management problems at
NNSA/DOE?
Answer. I am very familiar with the many reports that have been
published over the years identifying management challenges at DOE and
NNSA. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and the
Administrator to continue to tackle these challenges. I would also want
to personally engage with the members of the Congressional Advisory
Panel who have been charged with examining the governance structure,
mission, and management of the nuclear security enterprise.
weapons programs work force
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for
the NNSA to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly
design capabilities, in the Federal NNSA workforce and at the labs and
the plants?
Answer. If confirmed, recruiting and retaining world class talent
within NNSA's Federal and contractor workforce will be a priority of
mine. As the Federal agency responsible for the management of the
nuclear security enterprise, including one of a kind detection and
forensic capabilities, I believe it is essential for NNSA to provide
meaningful and challenging professional opportunities that attract and
retain dedicated professionals. Central to this effort is fostering an
enterprise-wide sense of purpose in NNSA's nuclear security mission.
Particular attention must be placed on ensuring that, as the current
NNSA workforce ages, the administration maintains partnerships with the
academic and university communities through pipelines that encourage
and attract the world's best engineers, scientists, and technical
experts. Also key to the health of the Labs is maintaining the ability
to utilize the independent research and development (R&D) funds.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for
the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are
maintained in NNSA workforce and at the labs and the plants?
Answer. Successful Federal workforce planning is essential for NNSA
to retain the appropriate degree of technical skills within the
workforce. A combination of well-designed recruitment and internship
programs, academic partnerships, continued collaboration with minority
serving institutions, and outreach programs with the science and
academic community is something I believe will remain critical to
NNSA's laboratories and plants.
Question. In your view, what are the critical skills that are
needed in the NNSA complex wide?
Answer. The success of NNSA's laboratories, plants, and facilities
in large part relies upon the Federal and contractor workforce
maintaining a diverse set of critical skills. Within the national
security laboratories, as the fiscal year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Plan addresses, the critical skills and knowledge needed
include nuclear design and evaluation, computing and simulation,
manufacturing and fabrication, electrical, mechanical, and materials
engineering, project management, nuclear criticality safety engineering
and nuclear design code development. Many of these same skills are also
essential for the nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and
emergency response work of the NNSA. These are just some of the
essential skills that underpin the important work across the NNSA
complex and programs.
safeguards and security
Question. What role, if any, will you have in ensuring safety and
security in the nuclear weapons complex?
Answer. If confirmed, the safe and secure operation of the nuclear
weapons enterprise, personnel, and assets will be my top priority. I
will work in partnership with the Administrator, and in accordance with
the Secretary's vision to ensure a strong professional culture that
values security and safety. This includes executing existing security
and safety best practices and working with DOE and NNSA leadership to
provide an operationally safe and secure complex. I will also
collaborate closely with the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board
(DNFSB) to ensure that NNSA appropriately applies safety best practices
and policies throughout the nuclear security enterprise.
Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security
threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons complex?
Answer. I understand the critical importance of maintaining safety
and security at all NNSA sites. If confirmed, I will emphasize NNSA's
commitment to proactively mitigate cyber, physical, materials, and
transportation security threats, and ensure operational safety
standards are met.
Question. What role, if any, will you have in ensuring operational
nuclear safety in the nuclear weapons complex?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to the safe and secure
operation of the nuclear weapons enterprise and the dedicated
professionals serving in NNSA's Federal and contractor workforce. I
will work to ensure that NNSA sites, plants, and staff are properly
equipped and trained to effectively execute all applicable safety and
security standards and laws.
Question. What role, if any, will you have with the DNFSB?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the DNFSB on their
recommendations. I am quite familiar with the DNFSB's statutory
responsibility to review the design and ensure adequacy of operational
nuclear safety controls at defense nuclear facilities. It is critically
important for the NNSA to work proactively with the DNFSB early in the
design and execution process so as to resolve any operational nuclear
safety concerns that could later play a role in the eventual cost of
the project.
stockpile stewardship program
Question. What is your view of the Stockpile Stewardship Program's
progress towards its goal of being able to continuously certify the
U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable,
without the need for underground nuclear testing?
Answer. The Stockpile Stewardship Program has been very successful
to date in maintaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent without
the need for underground nuclear explosive testing. Some of the various
experimental facilities that underpin the success of the program are
the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory; the Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories; the Dual-
Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at Los Alamos National
Laboratory; and the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research
Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. Underlying the success
of all these facilities are the laboratory computational facilities. If
confirmed, I will visit all the sites in the NNSA enterprise to meet
the workforce and see the capabilities that assess the safety,
security, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons and the experimental
tools that contribute to broader national security. I will work to
ensure that these facilities are maintained so that the NNSA can
continue to make the necessary certifications in the absence of
underground nuclear explosive testing.
Question. In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges
confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program?
Answer. The greatest challenge that currently confronts the
Stockpile Stewardship Program is an unpredictable budget environment.
NNSA must balance planned life extension programs and infrastructure
modernization investments while maintaining the scientific research and
experimental capabilities required certifying the stockpile. I also
believe that steady, continued investments in science and engineering
at all of the sites remains a core requirement in order to maintain and
attract the high quality staff essential to the long-term mission of
maintaining the deterrent without returning to underground nuclear
explosive testing.
Question. Do you fully support the goals of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view what additional capabilities will the
Stockpile Stewardship Program need in the next 5 years?
Answer. I am not aware of any major additional capabilities
required beyond those already described in the fiscal year 2014
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, but requirements will have
to be mapped against resource constraints. NNSA needs to have the means
to ensure that new technical and policy expertise relating to nuclear
policy is ``grown'' in NNSA as the nuclear workforce continues to age.
It is also critical that NNSA have consistent and predictable funding.
life extension programs in support of the nuclear posture review
Question. As a result of the 2010 NPR, the Nuclear Weapons Council
has laid out a schedule over the next 20 years that involves numerous
demands on the NNSA, these are the B-61 life extension program, the
interoperable warhead, the W-88/87 joint fuse program, the warhead for
the long-range stand off weapon, in addition to the maintenance of the
existing stockpile systems (W-88, W-87, W-76, W-78, B-61, B-83, and W-
80).
What do you see as some of issues in this ambitious schedule that
concern you?
Answer. In my current capacity as the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, I am very much aware that nuclear
modernization work of this kind is expensive, technically demanding,
and time consuming. The Nuclear Weapons Council has developed a
strategy for managing the cost, scope, and schedule of these
modernization activities. This strategy should help refine the
concurrent nature of this work to better map our requirements, planned
resources, and workforce capabilities. Of course maintaining the budget
needed to achieve the strategy will be a challenge.
Question. Are you concerned this schedule is achievable if
sequestration continues?
Answer. I am very concerned about the effect of sequestration and
general budget constraints on this schedule. Consistent and predictable
funding is essential to maintaining the planned schedule for such
complex and technically challenging modernization programs. Given my
experience at DOD, I am well aware how sequestration, as well as
continuing resolutions, can cause crippling uncertainty for the people
and the programs.
Question. The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop
an interoperable warhead for the W-88 and W-78 systems.
If the cost of the interoperable warhead become prohibitive would
you support life extensions of the existing systems?
Answer. I believe that this decision would be in the purview of the
Nuclear Weapons Council, which has full awareness of and the statutory
responsibility to consider various technical, military, and budgetary
options and issues.
Question. Do you support the current scope of the B-61 mod 12 life
extension program?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Are you concerned about the overall cost of the B-61 mod
12 life extension program and if so what particular issues are of
concern?
Answer. The B61-12 LEP was chosen as the option that meets military
requirements at the lowest cost. If confirmed, I will continue the
NNSA's commitment to a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent.
This includes sustaining and maintaining the nuclear stockpile, and
modernizing the nuclear infrastructure and delivery systems. The
President has said that the United States will retain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear deterrent, as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Modernizing the stockpile is essential to achieving that goal but will
become more challenging in a constrained budget environment.
Question. The Senate Appropriations Committee has proposed a
reduction of $168 million to the President's fiscal year 2014 request
for the B61 Life Extension program. What impact will this have on the
B61 LEP in terms of cost and schedule? How might it affect other
planned LEPs?
Answer. A cut of this magnitude would substantially delay the
overall schedule and could jeopardize the overall effectiveness of the
weapon system. A slip to the B61-12 LEP could also adversely impact the
schedule for future LEPs.
overall management
Question. What is your view on the relationship and the relative
duties and responsibilities of the Secretary of Energy as found in the
Atomic Energy Act and the Administrator of the NNSA?
Answer. The NNSA Act states that the Secretary establishes
overarching policy for the DOE and the NNSA and may direct DOE
officials to review NNSA programs and activities. These DOE officials
can then make recommendations to the Secretary regarding administration
of the NNSA program and activities. Having served as the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs during the first year of the NNSA, I
have an appreciation for the critically important role of the Secretary
in ensuring the mission of NNSA is successfully executed, and the need
to work cooperatively with the other organizational units of the DOE.
Question. Do you believe that there are any organizational
structure issues in the NNSA that should be addressed to improve
management and operations of the NNSA, or that you would address if
confirmed?
Answer. I believe the statutory structure of the NNSA is sound and
that the primary challenge lies with implementing that structure. The
challenges related to site security and major project management have
been among the most significant. If confirmed, I will focus on
implementing and then sustaining the reforms to security that have been
put forth by Secretary Moniz and implementing additional reforms as
needed. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator, Deputy
Administrators, Associate Administrators and the leadership of the NNSA
facilities to build on improvements to NNSA's project management,
program review, and cost estimation expertise. This collaborative
effort will include creating an implementation plan to stand up NNSA's
Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation as directed by the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014.
Question. The NNSA and DOE has been plagued by cost overruns and
project cancellations related to the construction of nuclear
facilities, nuclear weapons modernization programs, and nuclear
stockpile stewardship facilities.
How serious are these cost overruns in your view?
Answer. Cost overruns are a very serious issue. NNSA is challenged
in the coming years with a significant uptick in work activity related
to modernization of the stockpile and responsive infrastructure. If
cost overruns persist, NNSA's critically important mission could be
adversely affected.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure they
are not repeated in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, and as I stated before, I will work with the
Administrator, Deputy Administrators, and Associate Administrators to
build on improvements to NNSA's project management, program review, and
cost estimation expertise in an effort to ensure we are committing to
work that can be delivered on time and on budget. This collaborative
effort will include creating an implementation plan to stand up NNSA's
Office of Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation as directed by the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014.
Question. Do you believe that the expertise of DOE personnel
serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed? If so, how
do you expect to utilize this expertise if you are confirmed?
Answer. Yes. DOE relies upon an exceptionally skilled workforce at
the laboratories, plants, and headquarters. If confirmed, I would
enthusiastically utilize the world class expertise that exists
throughout the complex to drive favorable outcomes to NNSA's toughest
challenges.
Question. Are you aware of any limitations on your authority, if
confirmed, to draw on that expertise?
Answer. No. I am not aware of any limitations on my authority, if
confirmed, to draw on the expertise that resides within DOE. If,
however, any are identified, I will work promptly with the
Administrator, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to resolve any
issues.
Question. What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is
bound by the existing rules, regulations, and directives of DOE and
what flexibility, if any, do you believe you would have in implementing
such rules, regulations, and directives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will adhere to the NNSA Act, which sets
forth the relationship between the DOE and NNSA. DOE and the NNSA have
a unique partnership in order to ensure the integrity of the nuclear
security enterprise. I anticipate working closely with the
Administrator in conjunction with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary
and the other senior leadership throughout the Department to ensure the
NNSA runs smoothly and efficiently.
advisory board
Question. The NNSA had an external advisory board, which included
technical and other subject matter experts to provide advice to the
NNSA. The charter for the board was allowed to expire. In your view is
there any benefit to reconstituting an advisory board? Why or why not?
Answer. I believe there is great value gained by receiving advice
and counsel from external groups comprised of subject matter experts.
If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to determine the most
appropriate format to utilize outside expertise.
facilities and infrastructure
Question. DOE and the NNSA have looked at, and have in some
circumstances used, third party or other alternate financing options
for construction projects.
If confirmed, would you commit to review carefully any NNSA
proposal to undertake construction projects with funding approaches
that deviate from the traditional line item funding approach?
Answer. Yes. If the NNSA finds that third party financing
arrangements are beneficial in the future, if confirmed, I would commit
to ensuring that Congress is fully informed of all plans to use third
party financing and that all projects are consistent with executive
branch and statutory requirements.
Question. In addition, would you commit to keep the committee fully
informed of any such proposals, to fully coordinate any proposal with
the Office of Management and Budget, and to ensure that any such
proposals include a business case documenting that any alternative
financing approach is in the best interests of the taxpayer?
Answer. Yes.
Question. One of the goals of the effort to modernize the nuclear
weapons complex is to reduce the number of square feet of building
space.
As the NNSA proceeds with construction projects in the future,
would you commit to support the goal, and work to include in the total
project cost of any new facility the cost to dispose of any buildings
or facilities that are being replaced?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In some instances the disposition of old buildings might
be more appropriately handled by the Office of Environmental Management
(EM). In your view under what circumstances should EM be responsible
for the disposition and under what circumstances should the NNSA be
responsible?
Answer. I support the current division of labor where EM disposes
of facilities with process-related contamination (i.e. contamination
not commonly managed in private sector operations, typically
radioactive contamination) and NNSA disposes of all other facilities. I
understand that discussions are ongoing between NNSA and EM to develop
more specific criteria for transfer, and if confirmed as Principal
Deputy Administrator, I would support this work to further clarify
roles and responsibilities in this area. I recognize that the current
inventory of process contaminated surplus facilities DOE-wide will
require substantial time and resources to disposition and these process
contaminated facilities tend to present higher risks than other surplus
facilities, so I would support looking at ways for NNSA to complete
prudent risk reduction activities while awaiting transfer to EM.
Question. Do you believe that clear criteria exist on which to make
disposition determinations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review carefully the existing criteria
for their adequacy. If necessary, I will make recommendations to the
Administrator to clarify relevant criteria.
Question. The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Plan
(FIRP) was terminated in 2013. This program was intended to reduce the
large backlog of deferred maintenance for NNSA facilities.
With the termination of FIRP, how do you believe NNSA should
continue to address its backlog of deferred maintenance?
Answer. I understand, since the termination of FIRP, NNSA's
deferred maintenance backlog has increased. If confirmed as Principal
Deputy Administrator, I would support NNSA efforts to prioritize the
existing resources and identify opportunities for enterprise-level
solutions to reduce the maintenance backlog.
Question. As Deputy Administrator, how will you ensure the deferred
maintenance backlog continues to be reduced?
Answer. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator I will
prioritize NNSA's existing resources and identify opportunities for
enterprise-level solutions to reduce the maintenance backlog.
environmental restoration and waste management
Question. What responsibility do you believe the NNSA should have
for funding, managing, and disposing of its current and future
hazardous waste streams and for future environmental restoration?
Answer. I believe that as the landlord of its eight sites, NNSA is
responsible for managing and disposing of its current and future
hazardous waste streams and ensuring that these operations do not
create future environmental restoration obligations. Environmental
restoration, however, is not a core NNSA capability--NNSA's
responsibility is to ensure that EM, the partner DOE program with that
core capability, and all NNSA stakeholders, including Congress, are
aware of NNSA's requirements. This will require close teamwork and
partnership between NNSA and EM. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
NNSA and EM work together to meet these needs.
Question. What specific steps do you believe the NNSA should take
to negotiate programmatic responsibilities for environmental activities
between the NNSA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management?
Answer. NNSA and EM are partners, each with their own core
capabilities. NNSA works with its EM counterparts at all levels to
ensure each understands the total requirement and how they will work
together to protect workers, the environment, and the public. I think
the division of responsibilities between NNSA and EM is well
understood, but if confirmed, I will commit to review this relationship
and to ensure its continued success.
Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you will play
in this process?
Answer. If confirmed I would work to ensure that environmental
restoration, waste management, and facility disposition goals are
included as appropriate in each relevant senior manager's performance
goals, including mine, and are addressed in all strategic plans and
budget submissions, and that each funding decision is fully informed by
the risks it accepts.
defense nuclear nonproliferation programs
Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements
needed in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs? If so, what
improvements would you recommend?
Answer. NNSA's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) programs are
vital to U.S. national security and are a first line of defense in
reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. If confirmed,
I would commit to working with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary,
Administrator, and Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, as well as other strategic partners, to consider the
future of the DNN programs as we move towards the goal of permanent
threat reduction where possible, vice a prevention-focused approach.
Great progress has been made to date on securing vulnerable nuclear
material worldwide, but much work remains to address the nuclear
terrorism and proliferation threat.
In this fiscally constrained environment, it will be critical to
continue to move some of our foreign cooperative relationships from
assistance to partnership. In addition, we need to engage our
international partners to ensure that work completed to date is
maintained and sustained.
Question. NNSA has significantly expanded its work in the Megaports
program in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security and to
secure vulnerable weapons usable materials worldwide, the Global
Lockdown program, which is being implemented in cooperation with the
Department of Defense (DOD).
If confirmed, would you commit to keeping Congress fully informed
as to the success of, as well as any problems with these cooperative
relationships?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would commit to keep Congress fully
informed of these cooperative relationships. From my current vantage
point as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic
Affairs, I see the tremendous interagency cooperation among the
Departments of Defense, State, Energy, and Homeland Security, the
Intelligence Community, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and if confirmed, I will work to ensure
those important relationships continue. These relationships leverage
expertise and resources and ensure there is no duplication of effort
and no major gap in addressing the broad scope of nuclear security
issues at home and abroad.
Question. The NNSA has responsibility for the bulk of the Federal
Government's basic research on radiation detection technologies as well
as other nuclear technologies, such as those used in nuclear forensics.
If confirmed, would you commit to undertake a review of the
nonproliferation R&D program to ensure that it is adequately funded and
fully coordinated with the activities of other Federal agencies?
Answer. I understand that an external review of the R&D program was
completed in May 2011, and that the recommendations from that review
have been implemented.
If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and the Deputy
Administrator for DNN to ensure these critical R&D activities are fully
supported and coordinated.
Question. The NNSA nonproliferation programs have occasionally had
implementation issues that have resulted in large carryover balances.
In your view is the management in place to implement the new Global
Lockdown program and to ensure that the funds are spent in a timely and
effective manner?
Answer. I understand there has been tremendous success in achieving
President Obama's 4-year effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material
worldwide but that much work still remains for the future. If
confirmed, I will work with the Administrator and Deputy Administrator
for DNN to ensure the continued implementation of the Global Lockdown
program and that funds are spent in a timely and effective manner.
Question. If not, what changes would you recommend?
Answer. I am not in a position to recommend any changes at this
time. If confirmed, I would discuss this further with NNSA and DNN
leadership.
national laboratories
Question. The NNSA, as the steward of the three National Security
Laboratories, has a responsibility to ensure that the labs are capable
of meeting their broad national security obligations, not just those of
the NNSA.
What is your view on the role of the three National Security
laboratories in addressing broad national security challenges and the
role of the NNSA in overseeing those activities?
Answer. The three National Security Laboratories have a unique role
in ensuring a variety of national security challenges are met.
Maintaining the vitality of the laboratories and sites and the core
competencies of the workforce at each site must be a priority for the
NNSA. NNSA laboratories and sites possess unique capabilities that
other agencies utilize to serve their national security missions.
Supporting these national security missions not only advances the
Nation's security interests, but also exercises, challenges, and
augments workforce skills and laboratory capabilities. In addition,
there are often direct benefits back to NNSA's programs. I firmly
believe in order to recruit and retain top-notch personnel you must
provide them challenging and interesting work--including national
security work--as well as world-class laboratory equipment and
facilities in which to work. NNSA has a role to enable this kind of
work and a responsibility to understand the benefits from these
efforts. NNSA also has a responsibility to oversee the work of the
laboratories to ensure they perform the work entrusted to them and they
do so safely and securely.
Question. In your view are there any changes that are needed to
facilitate or improve the work for others program at the three National
Security Laboratories?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the interagency work performed
at the three laboratories and make a recommendation to the
Administrator about any changes that may need to be made.
Question. The three NNSA laboratories are Federally Funded Research
and Development Centers (FFRDC) run under a government-owned,
contractor-operated model.
Do you see these laboratories as simply contractors, or partners in
carrying out NNSA's mission?
Answer. As FFRDCs, the three NNSA laboratories have a special long-
term relationship with NNSA. As such, they have access to information,
equipment and property beyond that of normal contractual relationships
and operate in the public interest with objectivity and independence,
free of organizational conflicts of interest. The NNSA contractor
operators of the labs and plants have special and unique national
security responsibilities. NNSA relies on the technical expertise of
the three laboratories as they are integral to the mission and
operation of NNSA. I do, however, believe the relationships between
Federal employees and the laboratories, as well as the plants, must be
strengthened.
Question. Do you believe the directors of the three NNSA
laboratories have a statutory duty to provide objective advice and
opinions to Congress? If so, how will you ensure Congress receives such
advice?
Answer. The directors of the three NNSA laboratories have a
statutory duty to provide their advice and opinions to Congress as
directed by various reporting requirements, such as the requirement at
title 50 U.S.C. Sec. 2525 to provide a Stockpile Assessment Report
which is transmitted to Congress through executive agencies and the
President. If confirmed, I will make sure these statutory requirements
are carried out.
materials dispositon program
Question. The NNSA is responsible for implementing the U.S.
commitment to the Russian Government to dispose of 34 metric tons of
weapons grade plutonium. There are many issues and challenges facing
the program including the fact that it is substantially over budget.
What role will you play in ensuring that all aspects of this
program will be on schedule and on budget and if necessary to review
alternative disposition technologies?
Answer. In my current capacity at DOD, I am aware that the
Department is conducting a review of options for plutonium disposition
and that the Secretary of Energy will make a determination on the path
forward in the near future. If confirmed, I would work with the
Secretary, Deputy Secretary, the NNSA Administrator and Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, other U.S.
Government leaders, as well as our international partners to ensure
that we are pursuing our commitments in the Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement with Russia and that the Secretary's guidance is
implemented.
Cost overruns are always a concern but even more so in today's
fiscal climate. If confirmed I will work with the Administrator to
implement the Secretary's decision effectively and efficiently.
national ignition facility
Question. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) supports nuclear
weapons experimental work but also has the capability to support a
broad range of science and energy research challenges.
If confirmed, what role, if any, will you play in ensuring the
success of the NIF and to ensure that NIF is fully utilized?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Administrator in
maintaining NIF as a central part of the NNSA enterprise. It is an
essential facility for understanding our nuclear weapons stockpile in
the absence of nuclear explosive testing to ensure a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent. NIF also contributes important
capabilities to basic science and energy research.
Question. What are the future implications to the facility and the
stockpile stewardship program if NIF does not achieve sustained
ignition?
Answer. The work at NIF is vitally important to ensuring the
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons stockpile.
All of NIF's experiments contribute to our knowledge of nuclear weapons
characteristics and, in turn, to implementing our stockpile stewardship
program.
Question. Do you believe NIF should be utilized primarily to
support stockpile stewardship activities, energy research, or basic
science?
Answer. NIF was built as a stockpile stewardship tool and I support
its use to maintain the stockpile.
contractor-operated facilities
Question. What recommendations, if any, would you make to improve
oversight of and contractor management of the facilities in the nuclear
weapons complex?
Answer. Before making any specific recommendations, and if
confirmed, I would review the existing system to understand the
existing oversight methodologies. As needed I would then work to ensure
that there are clear lines of authority, responsibility, and
accountability for both Federal and contract staff; that performance
expectations are understood to achieve mission requirements in an
efficient and effective manner; and that there is a strong emphasis on
strengthening the safety and security culture. I understand that NNSA
is making headway in its efforts to hold its contractors accountable
for performance, particularly in its capital construction projects. I
would hope to build upon these early successes.
Question. In your view what is the role of the NNSA field offices
in the oversight of the contractor-operated facilities?
Answer. The NNSA field offices, as the first line of oversight, are
best positioned to recognize potential issues before they become
problems. For them to be successful the partnerships between
headquarters and field and between Federal and contractor employees
must be strong.
Question. Do you believe that recent problems contractor-operated
facilities have resulted from too little government oversight?
Answer. The Department has been criticized for both too little and
too much oversight in regards to contractor-operated facilities. Before
I take a view on the problem in specific instances, I would need to
evaluate the situation in greater detail. I understand that NNSA is
working to improve oversight mechanisms, to include clarifying roles,
authorities, and functions for the organization. If confirmed I would
work to ensure that the right balance of oversight for the specific
activity is achieved and maintained.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy
Administrator?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
mixed oxide fuel
1. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Creedon, in his fiscal year 2014
budget request, the President sought to end the Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX)
Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site. Is this an opinion you
share and would you recommend lowered funding for MOX in the upcoming
budget cycle, if confirmed?
Ms. Creedon. The Department is committed to the U.S. Plutonium
Disposition mission and to fulfilling its obligations under the U.S.-
Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. However, the
U.S. plan to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium by irradiating
it as MOX fuel has proven more costly than anticipated. As described in
the fiscal year 2014 budget request, the administration is conducting
an analysis of disposition technology options to determine how best to
complete the mission.
I understand that the analysis has not yet been finalized. If
confirmed, and in conjunction with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and
Administrator, I commit to work closely with Congress to ensure the
United States meets its plutonium disposition obligations.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
department of energy inspector general report
2. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Creedon, according to a January 2014
Department of Energy Inspector General (IG) report on the National
Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Management of the $245 million
Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades Project (Phase II)
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the project ``suffered from a number
of project management weaknesses.'' As a result, the report said ``the
project will be delayed by approximately 1 year and will require an
additional $41 million more than anticipated to complete.'' Can you
address this IG finding?
Ms. Creedon. The Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrade
Project (NMSSUP) is a project that upgrades security at Los Alamos
National Laboratory's (LANL) Technical Area-55, a facility that houses
high-security plutonium assets and operations. I understand the project
is scheduled to be completed in the spring of 2014. The original Total
Project Cost (TPC) for NMSSUP was $245 million. The NMSSUP project is
currently tracking to deliver at or below the original TPC.
In April 2010, the original TPC was reduced to an estimated cost of
$213 million. This was done without a thorough understanding of the
risks and based on unreliable Earned Value Management System data. In
September 2012, LANL issued stop work orders to contractors due to
ongoing quality concerns with construction, and in October 2012, LANL
suspended work on the project because the expected cost would exceed
the $213 million budget.
Subsequently, after NNSA's Office of Acquisition and Project
Management (NA-APM) was established, project management responsibility
and accountability was transferred to NA-APM by the NNSA Administrator
and the Acquisition Executive. In January 2013, LANL proposed
increasing the TPC to $254 million; however, NA-APM rejected that
proposal and instead reached an agreement wherein the contractor would
absorb $10 million of the overrun. As a result, the revised TPC became
$244 million, $1 million below the original TPC.

3. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Creedon, how will you ensure there are
no more delays or cost growth in this project?
Ms. Creedon. I understand that NNSA has taken actions to foster an
improved culture of responsibility and accountability for delivering
work on time and on budget. Some of these reforms that have been
administered by NA-APM have included hiring a new Federal Project
Director (FPD) with Level 3 project management certification. NNSA
provided the new FPD with full Contracting Officer's Representative
authority. The FPD was also given additional Federal and contractor
support to execute his responsibilities. A new highly qualified
contractor project manager was also put in place on the NMSSUP project.
My understanding is that the NMSSUP project is currently in
acceptance testing. The total project cost will not be known until the
project is accepted. I understand that NNSA intends to ensure that the
contractor is held accountable for any defects and charged accordingly
as NNSA previously did with the $10M in unallowable costs.
The NMSSUP project represents a significant cultural change for the
NNSA. NA-APM and the NMSSUP Project Team demonstrated that with the
right team, focused attention to detail, and top to bottom leadership
involvement even a troubled project can be righted when clear
expectations are set and all parties accept accountability for their
role in project delivery. If confirmed, I will work to ensure there is
a successful conclusion to this and all other projects.

national security laboratories
4. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Creedon, in your responses to the
advance policy questions, you discuss the health of our three national
security laboratories. You say that, ``Maintaining vitality of the
laboratories and sites and the core competencies of the workforce at
each site must be a priority . . .'' In the past, I have heard concerns
about the loss of expertise and core competencies of our national labs
supporting our nuclear deterrent. Do you share these concerns?
Ms. Creedon. I am concerned about retaining critical skills at the
laboratories and sites because it's the people that enable the
laboratories and sites to deliver the best products for national
security. If confirmed, I will face this challenge head on by ensuring
NNSA's talented and highly skilled workforce--contractor and Federal--
is sustained through effective workforce recruitment, mentoring, and
development. This workforce is the NNSA's chief asset.

5. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Creedon, if you do share these
concerns, what is causing this problem?
Ms. Creedon. There are competing factors that stress our critical
skills. As we move further from the end of the Cold War, our ability to
recruit topflight talent into a nuclear weapons program is increasingly
challenging, as nuclear weapons are not viewed as an attractive [long-
term] career. Over time the number of scientists with certain skills,
such as testing, has significantly decreased as it has been 20 years
since the last nuclear test. I am most concerned that we ensure that
the laboratories and facilities are able to attract the best and the
brightest, and that the experiences are passed to the next generation
so that they can further develop the skills needed to maintain and
certify the stockpile in the absence of testing. Key to evolving the
skills and attracting the top talent to maintain the stockpile of the
future are the facilities, computational, and experimental capabilities
to ensure the generation charged with this responsibility will have the
skills to undertake the responsibility. If confirmed, I will examine
how to strengthen NNSA's ability to attract and retain the next
generation of scientists and engineers needed to accomplish the
mission.

6. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Creedon, how serious is this problem?
Ms. Creedon. I believe the ongoing erosion of the workforce is a
serious problem that demands an immediate and long-term strategy at the
Department. If confirmed, I intend to focus on this important
challenge.

7. Senator Ayotte. Secretary Creedon, what can we do about this
problem?
Ms. Creedon. This challenge must be met through workforce planning
to ensure that the Department is recruiting and then retaining
professionals with the core competencies, knowledge, and technical
expertise NNSA needs to execute its mission. We also have to make sure
that the NNSA, its laboratories and facilities are seen as and are the
best place to be working in the fields that are most critical. As I
addressed in my APQs, maintaining the vitality of the laboratories and
sites and the core competencies of the workforce at each site must be a
priority for the NNSA. I firmly believe in order to recruit and retain
top-notch personnel they must have challenging and interesting work as
well as world-class laboratory equipment and facilities in which to
work. Moreover, this work must be valued by the nation.
If confirmed, I will work with the laboratories, the academic
community, and other institutions that are able to assist NNSA in
meeting its responsibility to have the most talented and capable
Federal workforce.
______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 6, 2014.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon, of Indiana, to be Principal Deputy
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Neile L.
Miller, resigned.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon, which
was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
------

Biographical Sketch of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon
Madelyn Creedon was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs on August 2, 2011. In
this capacity she supports the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in
overseeing policy development and execution in the areas of countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), U.S. nuclear forces and missile
defense, and Department of Defense (DOD) cyber security and space
issues.
Prior to her confirmation, Ms. Creedon was counsel for the
Democratic staff on the Senate Committee on Armed Services and was
responsible for the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces as well as threat
reduction and nuclear nonproliferation issues.
In 2000, she left the Senate Armed Services Committee to become the
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy (DOE), and returned to
the committee in January 2001.
Prior to joining the Senate Armed Services Committee staff in March
1997, she was the Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy for National
Security Programs at the Department of Energy, beginning in October
1995.
From November 1994 through October 1995, Ms. Creedon was the
General Counsel for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. This Commission, under the Chairmanship of former Senator
Alan Dixon of Illinois, was responsible for recommending to the
President military bases for closure or realignment.
From 1990 through November 1994, Ms. Creedon was counsel for the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, under the Chairmanship of Senator
Sam Nunn. While on the committee staff she was responsible for DOE
national security programs, DOE and DOD environmental programs, and
base closure transition and implementation programs.
Before joining the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Ms. Creedon was a trial attorney and Acting Assistant General Counsel
for Special Litigation with the DOE Office of the General Counsel for
10 years.
Born and raised in Indianapolis, IN, Ms. Creedon is a graduate of
St. Louis University School of Law, where she was captain of the moot
court team. Her undergraduate degree is in political science from the
University of Evansville, Evansville, IN.
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain
senior military officers as determined by the committee, to
complete a form that details the biographical, financial and
other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon.
Madelyn R. Creedon in connection with her nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Madelyn Raub Creedon

2. Position to which nominated:
Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Energy.

3. Date of nomination:
January 6, 2014.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
November 1, 1951; Indianapolis, IN.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to James J. Bracco.

7. Names and ages of children:
Meredith Creedon Bracco; May 2, 1981.
John Edward Bracco; November 12, 1984.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Broad Ripple High School, Indianapolis IN; 1964-1969; High School
Diploma
University of Evansville, Evansville, IN; 1969-1973; BA
Tulane University School of Law, New Orleans, LA; 1973-1974
St. Louis University School of Law, St. Louis, MO; 1974-1976; JD

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, January 2001-
August 2011
Assistant Secretary of Defense/Global Strategic Affairs, U.S.
Department of Defense, August 2011-Present

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Energy, July 1980-February 1990
Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 1990-
November 1994
General Counsel, Base Closure and Realignment Commission, November
1994-October 1995
Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy,
October 1995-March 1997
Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 1997-July
2000
Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear
Security Administration, July 2000-January 2001

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an
officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative,
or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other
business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Daughters of the American Revolution
Women in Aerospace

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
Public Speaking Engagements:
1) Remarks to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Cyber and
Space Symposium, Omaha, NE, November 15, 2011
2) Remarks to the Monitor Exchange Publications and Forums 4th
Annual Deterrence Summit, Arlington, VA, February 15, 2012
3) Keynote address at the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics (AIAA) 10th Annual U.S. Missile Defense Conference,
Washington, DC, March 26, 2013
4) Featured speaker at The Space Foundation 28th National Space
Symposium, Colorado Springs, CO, April 16, 2012
5) Remarks to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Annual
Missile Defense Conference, London, UK, May 30, 2012
6) Remarks to the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) Space
Council Meeting, Washington, DC, June 14, 2012
7) Remarks to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Deterrence
Symposium, La Vista, NE, August 9, 2012
8) Keynote address at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars Workshop on Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation, Washington,
DC, November 28, 2012
9) Remarks to the Department of Defense (DOD) 20th Anniversary
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Conference, Washington, DC, December
3, 2012
10) Keynote speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution
(DAR) 112th Annual State Conference Formal Banquet, Indianapolis, IN,
May 18, 2013
11) Remarks to the Stimson Center on Deterrence, Washington, DC,
September 17, 2013

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Articles and Other Publications:
1) Madelyn R. Creedon, ``Space and Cyber: Shared Challenges,
Shared Opportunities'' Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1,
Spring 2012, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/spring/
springl2.pdf. accessed on August 12, 2013. Article attached.
2) Madelyn Creedon, ``Ash Carter Got It Right in Aspen, Top DOD
Nuclear Weapons Official Responds,'' Defense One, July 30, 2013,
available at http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/20l3/07/ash-carter-got-it-
richt-aspen-top-dod-nuclear-weapons-official-responds/67721/?oref=d-
river. accessed on August 12, 2013. Article attached.

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
(d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B-F of the
committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set
forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to
Parts B-F are contained in the committee's executive files.]
------

Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
Madelyn R. Creedon.
This 13th day of January, 2014.

[The nomination of Hon. Madelyn R. Creedon was reported to
the Senate by Chairman Levin on January 28, 2014, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2014.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Brad R. Carson by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has had a significant and
positive impact on the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army. The
framework established by the act has improved inter-Service
relationships and strengthened the ability of the Services to work with
the combatant commands. I do not see the need for any modifications.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. No modifications are needed at this time.
qualifications
Question. What background and experience do you have that you
believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I believe that, if confirmed, my diverse political,
military, legal, and business experiences have well prepared me to
execute the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army. I currently have
the honor and privilege of serving as the General Counsel of the Army,
a position in which I have had legal oversight of every issue arising
from the Army's global operations. In addition to myriad routine
matters, I have assisted Secretary of the Army John McHugh in
developing military-wide responses to particularly vexing problems and
issues, such as ensuring that soldiers with behavioral health
conditions are properly diagnosed, creating wholesome environments at
all Army child development centers, and eradicating sexual assault.
More generally, I have been asked to advise at nearly every meeting of
the Army's senior leaders, where issues of readiness, modernization,
operations, and personnel are discussed and decided.
It is helpful to also briefly summarize my education and
professional career. Before joining the Department of the Army, I was a
professor in the College of Business and the College of Law at the
University of Tulsa, where I led a research institute devoted to energy
issues and taught courses in property law, energy policy, negotiations
and game theory, and globalization. I attended Baylor University, where
I graduated with highest honors and was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa.
Studying as a Rhodes Scholar at Trinity College, Oxford, I earned a
B.A./M.A. in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. Upon returning to the
United States, I graduated from the University of Oklahoma College of
Law, where I was recognized as the Outstanding Graduate. I entered the
practice of law at Crowe & Dunlevy, the largest firm in the state of
Oklahoma. During my early years of legal work, I focused on commercial
litigation, with a particular emphasis on antitrust. From 1997 through
1998, I was a White House Fellow, serving in DOD. After completing the
White House Fellowship, I returned to practicing commercial litigation
at Crowe & Dunlevy. In 2000, I was elected to represent the 2nd
District of Oklahoma in the U.S. House of Representatives. As a
Congressman, I worked closely with other members of the Oklahoma
delegation to protect and enhance the state's military installations.
In 2005, after leaving politics, I was a fellow at the Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University. Thereafter, I was a Director and
then Chief Executive Officer of CNB, LLC, where I oversaw a company
with revenues in excess of $400 million per year. From 2008 to 2009, as
an officer in the U.S. Navy, I served in Iraq on active military duty
with the 84th Explosive Ordnance Battalion of the U.S. Army, as the
Officer-in-Charge of Weapons Intelligence Teams in Multi-National
Division-South. For my service, I was awarded the Bronze Star and Army
Achievement Medal.
I believe that these varied experiences have prepared me for the
extraordinary challenge of serving as Under Secretary of the Army. I
know first-hand the legal and policy issues facing the Department of
the Army in this time of continued war and budget austerity. If
confirmed, I will commit to using my skills and experience to
diligently and effectively perform the duties of Under Secretary.
duties
Question. Section 3015 of title 10, U.S.C., states the Under
Secretary of the Army shall perform such duties and exercise such
powers as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe.
What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under
Secretary of the Army?
Answer. By statute, the Under Secretary of the Army performs such
duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army
prescribes. By regulation, the Under Secretary is the Secretary's
principal civilian assistant and advisor. To that end, the Under
Secretary is charged with communicating and advocating Army policies,
plans, and programs to external audiences, including Congress, foreign
governments, and the American public. The Under Secretary also advises
the Secretary on the development and integration of Army programs and
the Army budget. Finally, pursuant to section 904 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the Under Secretary is
the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of the Department of the Army,
responsible for business operations. In accordance with section 908 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the
Secretary of the Army acts through the Under Secretary to carry out
initiatives necessary to the business transformation of the Army.
Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in
the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of the Army, as set
forth in section 3015 of title 10, U.S.C., or in DOD regulations
pertaining to functions of the Under Secretary of the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the duties and functions
currently assigned to, and performed by, the Under Secretary, discuss
my findings with the Secretary of the Army, and recommend to the
Secretary any changes that I believe necessary.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if
any, do you expect will be prescribed for you?
Answer. I am confident that the Secretary will assign me duties
that most appropriately support his efforts to ensure that the
Department of the Army is effectively and efficiently administered.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would be your working relationship
with:
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as head of DOD, possesses full
authority, direction, and control over all of its elements. If
confirmed, and subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of the Army, I would communicate with the Secretary of
Defense on matters involving the Department of the Army. I would
cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the
Department of the Army fulfills the administration's national defense
priorities and, mindful of my role as the Army's CMO, I would make
certain that the business operations of the Army are effectively and
efficiently organized and managed.
Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs such duties and
exercises such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe. The
Deputy Secretary is also the CMO of DOD. If confirmed, and subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army, I
would be responsible to the Secretary of Defense--and to his Deputy--
for the operation of the Army.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of DOD.
Answer. The Deputy CMO of DOD assists the Deputy Secretary of
Defense in synchronizing, integrating, and coordinating business
operations within DOD. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will work in
close coordination with the Deputy CMO on the full range of matters
involving the management of DOD.
Question. The Director of the Business Transformation Agency.
Answer. To my knowledge, the Secretary of Defense disestablished
this agency in 2011. The functions have been transferred to DOD Deputy
Chief Management Officer.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Staff, and the
Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I would cooperate fully with the
Chairman in the performance of his responsibilities.
Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff performs the
duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the
approval of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I would cooperate
fully with the Vice Chairman in the performance of his
responsibilities.
Question. The Secretary of the Army.
Answer. The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of
the Army and is responsible for, and has authority to conduct, all of
its affairs. If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the
Army would be close, direct, and supportive. As CMO, I would be
accountable to the Secretary for the effective and efficient
organization and management of the Army's business operations and for
carrying out initiatives he approves for the business transformation of
the Army. I understand that all of my actions would be subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs his duties under
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and
is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff also
performs the duties prescribed for him by law as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It is vital that all leaders of the Department of the
Army, civilian and military, work closely together as one team to face
the many challenges confronting the institution; if confirmed, I would
coordinate with the Chief of Staff of the Army in the performance of my
duties.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works has, as
a principal duty, the overall supervision of Army functions relating to
programs for conservation and development of national water resources,
including flood control, navigation, and shore protection. If
confirmed, I would continue the close professional relationship with
the Assistant Secretary that I have developed as General Counsel, and I
would cooperate fully with the Assistant Secretary to carry out the
Army's civil works activities.
Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Army.
Answer. The four other Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the
Army's strategic direction by developing and overseeing policies and
programs within their respective functional areas. If confirmed, I will
continue the close professional relationships with each of the
Assistant Secretaries that I have developed as General Counsel. I will
foster an environment of cooperative teamwork, which will ensure we
work together effectively on both the day-to-day management and long-
range planning needs of the Army. In particular, in my role as the CMO
of the Army, I will coordinate with the Assistant Secretaries in
addressing any matter related to business operations or business
transformation that may impact their respective domains.
Question. The General Counsel of the Army.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal and ethics officer
of the Department of Army and serves as counsel to the Secretary and
other Secretariat officials. The General Counsel's duties include
providing legal and policy advice to officials of the Department of the
Army, as well as determining the position of the Army on all legal
questions and procedures. If confirmed, and particularly given my
experience serving as Army General Counsel, I would establish and
maintain a close professional relationship with the new appointee, and
would actively seek his or her guidance to ensure that Army policies
and practices are in strict accord with the law and the highest
principles of ethical conduct.
Question. The Inspector General of the Army.
Answer. The Inspector General of the Army is charged with inquiring
into, and reporting on, the discipline, efficiency, economy, morale,
training, and readiness of the Army, as so directed by the Secretary of
the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Army. As General Counsel, I have
worked closely with The Inspector General. If confirmed as Under
Secretary, I am confident that this strong professional relationship
would continue.
Question. The Surgeon General of the Army.
Answer. The Surgeon General is a special advisor to the Secretary
of the Army and to the Chief of Staff of the Army on the military
health service system. In that role, The Surgeon General is charged
with maintaining a medically ready military force, as well as a trained
and ready medical force. If confirmed, I intend to continue my close
professional relationship with The Surgeon General to ensure that the
Army's health care systems and medical policies effectively and
uniformly support the Army's objectives, responsibilities, and
commitments across the total force. In particular, I plan to focus on
the advancement of key Behavioral Health (BH) initiatives, such as the
BH System of Care (which logically and cohesively unifies eleven major
BH programs into a cohesive, evidence-based system), and the BH Data
Portal (which is an nationally-recognized automated method for
collecting and displaying real-time treatment data during patient
visits).
Question. The Army Business Transformation Office.
Answer. In accordance with section 908 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Secretary of the Army
established the Office of Business Transformation to assist the CMO of
the Army in carrying out business transformation initiatives. The
Office of Business Transformation is headed by the Director of Business
Transformation, who is appointed by the Army's CMO. If confirmed, I
intend to work closely and directly with the Army Business
Transformation Office in carrying out our important duties.
Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Answer. The Judge Advocate General of the Army is the legal advisor
to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army Staff, and members of the
Army generally. In coordination with the Army General Counsel, The
Judge Advocate General serves as military legal advisor to the
Secretary of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also directs the
members of the Judge Advocate General's Corps in the performance of
their duties and, by law, is primarily responsible for providing legal
advice and services regarding the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) and the administration of military discipline. As General
Counsel, I have worked closely with the Judge Advocate General on a
wide range of matters. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I look forward
to continuing this close professional relationship.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is a principal
advisor to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, on matters involving non-Federalized National Guard
forces and on other matters as determined by the Secretary of Defense.
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau serves also as the principal
advisor to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the
Army. If confirmed, I would work with the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau to utilize the talents available in the Reserve components to
strengthen the Army.
Question. The Director of the Army National Guard.
Answer. The Director of the Army National Guard serves as the
principal advisor on National Guard matters to the Secretary of the
Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. If confirmed, I would seek the
input of the Director of the Army National Guard on all matters of
policy and procedure that would impact the more than 350,000 soldiers
in the Army National Guard.
Question. The Army Chief of Chaplains.
Answer. From the earliest days of the Army, chaplains have been an
integral part of the total force. Chaplains are often the first to
respond to incidents of death, combat casualty, suicide, and sexual
assault. The programs that the Chaplains lead serve to bolster soldier
and family resiliency in these difficult times. The Army Chief of
Chaplains leads the Army Chaplains Corps in its primary mission of
providing religious support to the Army, and advises the Secretary of
the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army on all matters of chaplaincy.
As General Counsel, I have worked closely with the Army Chief of
Chaplains, and, if confirmed as Under Secretary, I would continue this
productive partnership. I understand the importance of, and value in,
consulting with the Army Chief of Chaplains in the exercise of my
responsibilities.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges, if any, that
you would confront if confirmed as Under Secretary of the Army?
Answer. The Army stands at a critical moment in its history,
challenged to reshape into a leaner force still capable of meeting the
Nation's strategic priorities. The base budget of the Army is being
squeezed by the rising costs of compensation, health care, and, to a
lesser degree, procurement. Nonetheless, the Army's obligations remain
unchanged: training and equipping soldiers, guaranteeing high quality
medical care for wounded warriors, enhancing readiness, offering
quality housing, modernizing Cold War-era equipment, and meeting
stringent recruiting and retention goals, to name just a few examples.
If confirmed, I will do everything in my power to ensure the Army meets
these important, often sacred, obligations, no matter the fiscal
environment.
But, to meet both its near-term and long-term challenges, the Army
must create and use a new operating framework. The Army must reduce its
overhead, especially as total force structure is thinned. The Army must
pay attention not only to monetary obligations, but also to drivers of
cost. The Army must develop, publish, and monitor metrics by which the
success or failure of change can be determined. More generally, the
Army must move from a budget-based culture to a cost-based approach.
This transformation cannot take place without the active involvement of
the Army's senior leaders. The greatest challenge that I will face as
Under Secretary, if confirmed, is to assist in this process while
ensuring that soldiers are prepared and their families are protected.
Question. If confirmed, how would you prioritize and what plans
would you have, if any, for addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on my responsibilities as CMO,
which primarily lay in transforming the business operations of the
Army. As the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of the Army, I
will also prioritize issues in concert with the Secretary and the Chief
of Staff of the Army. The priorities of the Secretary of the Army and
the Chief of Staff of the Army distill to two basic challenges:
managing the drawdown of the Army, while simultaneously tending to the
Army profession.
lessons learned
Question. What do you believe are the major lessons that the
Department of the Army has and should have learned from Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) regarding its
title 10, U.S.C., responsibilities for manning, training, and equipping
the force?
Answer. Thirteen years of war have reinforced time-honored lessons,
while offering up new ones as well. I would like to highlight a few
particularly important ones here, without making any pretention to
comprehensiveness. First, OIF and OEF have shown that the Army must
continue to develop agile and adaptive leaders capable of operating
with disciplined initiative. This is especially important at the junior
level, where this capability has proven vital to mission accomplishment
throughout the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the Army's
training at the Combat Training Centers has proven to be an effective
and flexible means of ensuring the mission readiness of deploying
units. Third, physical and psychological resiliency is an important
attribute in soldiers and their families, and there is evidence that
resiliency can be improved through appropriate intervention. Fourth,
cultural knowledge of our allies and adversaries is invaluable and is a
key attribute to be developed throughout the Army. Fifth, programs such
as the Rapid Equipping Force and processes such as the Urgent
Operational Needs requests have effectively and expeditiously delivered
needed materiel to warfighters. Sixth, modern conflicts involve joint,
interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational actions, and require
a ``whole-of-government'' approach. Seventh, the All-Volunteer Force
proved capable of sustained warfighting. Eighth, the Army was able to
adapt to the many challenges it encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq
because of its institutional side, the sustaining base. Ninth,
adversaries are innovative and adaptive, learn from recent operations,
and will exploit any weaknesses. Tenth, long wars mean long-term
consequences for the Nation and the Army. Eleventh, and most generally,
the Army must always maintain its focus on continual training and the
maintenance of capabilities to meet the needs of combatant commanders.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned is leading the effort to
capture the most important lessons learned from OIF and OEF at the
strategic, operational, tactical, and institutional levels. If
confirmed, I would work to ensure that these lessons are not lost or
forgotten, but are inculcated throughout Army doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities.
Question. If confirmed, which of these lessons, if any, would you
address as a matter of urgent priority?
Answer. Although all of these priorities are important, the most
critical is that the Army has the right capabilities and the capacity
to meet the Nation's national security requirements. If confirmed, I
would work aggressively in support of the Secretary of the Army to
ensure that the Army is trained and ready to meet combatant commander
requirements.
army management and planning process
Question. Over the past several years, the Army's planning,
programming and budgeting process has not kept pace with rapidly
changing requirements. While this is more understandable for
operational events like the presidential decision to surge additional
forces into Iraq, it is less understandable with respect to long-term
programmatic decisions such as the modular conversion of Army brigades
or the more recent decision to increase Army end strength. It has
become routine for the Army to submit ``placeholders'' instead of
actual program plans in budget requests, and to purchase temporary
facilities followed almost immediately by additional funding requests
to buy permanent facilities to replace the temporary ones.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's management
and planning process and any changes or reforms of these processes
currently underway?
Answer. The Army's primary management and planning process is the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. PPBE is
a common process for the entire DOD, customized to meet the needs of
the individual Services. As required by the Government Performance and
Results Act, the Army also has a strategic plan which is monitored
through the Army Campaign Plan process. The PPBE process works best
when future conditions and fiscal projections are relatively stable;
recent events, including the drawdown of conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, sequestration, and the frequent changes in the DOD's
fiscal outlook have challenged the Army's ability to react quickly to
changing circumstances and have made Future Years Defense Program
projections less relevant. I believe the fundamentals of these
processes are sound, but it is possible that they may need to be
modified if less predictability is going to be the ``new norm''. If
confirmed, and subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Army, I
would make it my priority to assume an active and informed leadership
role in the management of the Headquarters, Department of the Army
planning, programming and budgeting process, while seeking appropriate
improvements in the systems by which we develop, prioritize, and
resource our requirements, particularly for the longer term. So, too, I
will make it a priority to streamline and improve the Army Campaign
Plan, working with the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, and other members of the Secretariat.
Question. If confirmed, what additional changes would you propose,
if any, to correct or improve management and planning processes?
Answer. If confirmed, and subject to the direction of the Secretary
of the Army, I intend to explore ways to make our processes more agile
and more responsive, so that we may react more quickly to changing
fiscal and strategic conditions. I also intend to examine the Army's
Strategic Planning Process to ensure it fully captures the priorities
of the Secretary of the Army and then employ proven performance
measurement techniques to ensure we are making progress towards our
desired outcomes.
Question. In your view, does the Army have enough people with the
right skills to manage the changes being attempted, or is the Army
undertaking more organizational change than it is capable of
accomplishing during a time of war?
Answer. I believe that the Army has the right leaders, civilian and
military, to manage the organizational change necessary to keep the
Army relevant and able to execute the demands of the National Military
Strategy. The Army has an excellent leader development program and
recognizes the value of investing in its people. Both the Secretary of
the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army have consistently made
leader education and training one of their highest priorities, and I am
confident we are heading in the right direction in this area.
Question. If confirmed, what changes in management would you
propose, if any, to reduce or eliminate the Army's chronic cash flow
challenges?
Answer. The Army does its best to accurately forecast its fiscal
needs and ensure they are represented in the President's budget
submission. Changing conditions, especially those in war zones,
unexpected pricing changes, and the delay between the time the Army
finishes work on its budget and the time it is appropriated by
Congress, have, in the past, resulted in cash flow problems. If
confirmed, I will strive to ensure Army requirements are included as
part of the President's budget request, and, then, as we enter into the
execution phase in a fiscal year, I will assist the Secretary of the
Army in monitoring that fiscal execution and participate in the
decisionmaking to reprioritize and reallocate funding to meet emergent
needs.
Over the last several years, Continuing Resolutions and
sequestration resulted in significant uncertainty in our normal budget
and execution processes. Continuing Resolutions have become routine,
having extended into or beyond the first quarter in each of the last 5
years. Continuing Resolutions initiate the fiscal year under
restrictions that disallow timely execution of planned programs and
perpetuate fiscal uncertainty. Under these circumstances, the Army must
take a conservative approach until the appropriations are known. Once
appropriations are received, the Army must then execute them within
very abbreviated timelines. This often leads to sub-optimal execution
decisions.
In order to more efficiently use the resources Congress provides
for national defense, I will work with Congress to develop a
comprehensive budget request to reflect the Army's funding
requirements, as well as emphasize the importance of receiving
appropriations on time, if I am confirmed.
duties and responsibilities as chief management officer
Question. Section 904 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008 designates the Under Secretary of the Army as the
Army's Chief Management Officer (CMO). Section 908 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires the CMO of each
of the Military Departments to carry out a comprehensive business
transformation initiative.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the Under Secretary in his capacity as CMO of the Department of the
Army?
Answer. Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008, section 904, responsibility for the business
operations of the Department of the Army is assigned to the Under
Secretary of the Army as the CMO. The Secretary of the Army has
provided all the authority necessary for the CMO to effectively and
efficiently organize and administer the business operations of the
Army. The CMO is further responsible for developing a comprehensive
business transformation plan and a business systems architecture and
transition plan.
Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?
Answer. My education and combined professional experiences as a
lawyer and professor of business law, my service as a member of the
U.S. House of Representatives, and my current position as a senior Army
leader have prepared me for the duties expected of the CMO of the Army.
In particular, as the General Counsel of the Army, I have had wide
exposure and gained intimate working knowledge of the many important
and complex issues impacting the Army.
Question. Do you believe that you have the resources and authority
needed to carry out the business transformation of the Department of
the Army?
Answer. I believe the Army has dedicated adequate resources to
business transformation. I believe, and I know Congress concurs, that
business transformation is essential to all Military Departments, and,
if confirmed, I will continue to ensure that resource constraint does
not inhibit changes needed in the Army's business operations.
If confirmed, I will also consult with the Secretary of the Army,
the Office of Business Transformation, and the Deputy CMO of DOD to
assess if any additional authorities are needed to continue to drive
the transformational effort to success.
Question. What role do you believe the CMO should play in the
planning, development, and implementation of specific business systems
by the Military Departments?
Answer. Over the last 2 years, the Army has put in place a robust
governance mechanism whereby the Army Business Council synchronizes
business activities and ensures alignment with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Army has also been steadily improving
the planning and coordination needed to comply with OSD directives and
OSD investment requirements, while at the same time maturing the Army
Business Mission Area's enterprise architecture. Just as important, the
Under Secretary's office and the Office of Business Transformation have
fully integrated business management decisions within the overall Army
Campaign Plan. If confirmed, I intend to capitalize on that success and
maintain the synchronization between OSD and the Army.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
statutory provisions establishing the position of CMO?
Answer. The Army has seen substantial benefits from the original
legislation that established the CMO and the Business Transformation
Office. Senior leaders emphasize the critical role these institutions
have played in optimizing processes, reducing systems investments, and
communicating with the DOD Deputy CMO. All of this flows from the
unique enterprise-level view that the CMO can provide across different
functions. If confirmed, and in concert with the Secretary of the Army,
I will review our current approach and then determine whether any
provisions should be recommended for amendment or change.
acquisition issues
Question. What is your assessment of the size and capability of the
Army acquisition workforce?
Answer. Over the past 5 years, the Army has made great strides in
identifying the necessary skills and in promoting the growth, training,
and development of the acquisition workforce. However, mounting fiscal
pressures may impede the Army's ability to attract, recruit, and retain
talented personnel within our acquisition workforce. As the Army
considers the size of the future force and assesses reductions in
civilian personnel, I am concerned about a consequent loss of
knowledge, critical experience, and expertise that the Army needs to
further its missions. The Army relies on an experienced and competent
acquisition workforce to oversee the development and procurement of
complex weapon systems, business systems, and other equipment and
capabilities. Continued challenges presented by sequestration, pay and
hiring freezes, and other reductions may cause attrition that would
undo the positive gains achieved over the past few years in the
development of a professional and experienced acquisition workforce.
Question. If confirmed what steps would you take to ensure that the
Department of the Army has an acquisition workforce with the size and
capability needed to manage and reverse the acquisition problem?
Answer. I fully support ongoing initiatives to grow the capacity
and capability of the Army acquisition workforce. The Army requires
critical skills in a diverse range of disciplines, to include
contracting, program management, systems engineering, cost estimating,
risk management, and test planning and management. If confirmed, I will
vigorously support and advance efforts to enhance the growth of the
acquisition workforce and cultivate its expertise in all critical
areas.
Question. Major defense acquisition programs in the Department of
the Army and the other Military Departments continue to be subject to
funding and requirements instability.
Do you believe that instability in funding and requirements drives
up program costs and leads to delays in the fielding of major weapon
systems?
Answer. The continued instability of the Army's fiscal environment
has had a significant impact on long-term program costs and fielding
schedules of major weapon systems. Major weapon systems programs
involve the expenditure of significant resources over several years to
design, develop, test, and field cutting-edge capabilities. Successful
execution of these programs calls for predictable and stable resources
in order to meet planned program milestones and timelines.
Indiscriminate reductions under the Budget Control Act, as well as
recurring funding shortfalls under Continuing Resolutions,
significantly impede the Army's ability to execute these programs.
These reductions result in fewer procurement quantities, delayed
development or testing activities, and restructuring of the Army's
program execution plans. Increased costs almost inevitably ensue.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
to address funding and requirements instability?
Answer. I believe that the single most important step the Army can
take to address funding instability is to encourage and support the
budget, appropriations, and authorization committees in Congress in
passing consistent, stable, and long-term funding and authorization
bills from which the Army can effectively and efficiently plan. If
confirmed, I will diligently communicate with Congress with respect to
the grave importance of stable funding to the Army.
Requirements stability is a prerequisite for successful acquisition
programs. The Army has made significant strides in developing processes
to review requirements in its major acquisition programs in an effort
to identify potential tradespace. These efforts must be reinforced to
ensure the success of the Army's acquisition efforts.
Question. The Comptroller General has found that DOD programs often
move forward with unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, lack
clearly defined and stable requirements, include immature technologies
that unnecessarily raise program costs and delay development and
production, and fail to solidify design and manufacturing processes at
appropriate junctures in the development process.
Do you agree with the Comptroller General's assessment?
Answer. Many of the deficiencies the Comptroller General cites are
indeed common problems. The Army has undertaken significant efforts to
prevent unrealistic program cost and schedule estimates, confront ill-
defined and unstable requirements, reduce reliance on immature
technologies, and address concerns related to any design and
manufacturing processes across all of its acquisition portfolios.
Consistent with the DOD's Better Buying Power initiative, the Army has
instituted processes to manage the review and validation of weapon
system requirements and emphasizes affordability in all acquisition
programs. If confirmed, I will advocate for sound and affordable
acquisition strategies, working in close collaboration with the Army's
requirements, resourcing, and acquisition organizations.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department of the
Army should take to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would advocate (in close collaboration with
the requirements, resourcing, and acquisition organizations within the
Army) for sound and affordable acquisition strategies to ensure that
cost growth is avoided. Moreover, I would work closely with Army
requirements, resourcing, and acquisition communities to promote cost-
informed trade-offs in system requirements in order to reduce risk and
ensure that programs remain affordable across their lifecycles.
Question. By some estimates, DOD now spends more money every year
for the acquisition of services than it does for the acquisition of
products, including major weapon systems. Yet, the Department places
far less emphasis on staffing, training, and managing the acquisition
of services than it does on the acquisition of products.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to improve
the staffing, training, and management of its acquisition of services?
Answer. The Army established an Army Senior Services Manager (SSM)
in 2010 to focus oversight and improve services acquisition. The SSM
provides governance, coordination, and comprehensive analysis of
services acquisition across all Army commands. If confirmed, I will
work with the SSM and Army commands and organizations to continue these
efforts, identify areas for improvement, and monitor progress.
Question. Do you agree that the Army should develop processes and
systems to provide managers with access to information needed to
conduct comprehensive spending analyses of services contracts on an
ongoing basis?
Answer. Yes, I agree. The Army was the first Service to initiate
the processes and systems needed to address this matter through its
implementation of the Request for Service Contract Approval Form. This
form is a checklist that helps identify inherently governmental
functions, tasks that are closely associated with inherently
governmental functions, authorized and unauthorized personal services,
and critical functions. This form was developed for use in conjunction
with the Contractor Manpower Reporting Application and Panel for
Documenting Contractors processes. The Army has worked with the Under
Secretaries of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology; and Comptroller to expand these initiatives.
This unified effort is intended to address the broader area of Total
Force Management and management of service contracts.
Question. The last decade has seen a proliferation of new types of
government-wide contracts and multi-agency contracts. DOD is by far the
largest ordering agency under these contracts, accounting for 85
percent of the dollars awarded under one of the largest programs. The
DOD Inspector General and others have identified a long series of
problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition
planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials
contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures,
and failure to monitor contractor performance.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to ensure
that its use of interagency contracts complies with applicable DOD
requirements and is in the best interests of the Department of the
Army?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy has issued policy, procedures, and guidance
concerning the use of interagency contracts. This policy directs
acquisition officials to determine whether the use of an interagency
acquisition represents the best procurement approach in terms of cost,
schedule, performance and delivery. If confirmed, I will work with the
Secretary of the Army to assess the Army's compliance with these
policies, and I will examine the Army's internal processes to ensure
that the concerns identified by the Inspector General are addressed.
Question. On November 1, 2010, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) established the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Services (DASA(S)) in
response to the September 2010 directive ``Implementation Directive for
Better Buying Power--Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in
Defense Spending'' from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
In your view, has the establishment of this position helped or
hindered that Army's ability in obtaining cost-effective and efficient
services to achieve their missions?
Answer. I believe the Army's establishment of a single responsible
official to oversee services acquisition has led to improvements in its
planning, coordination, and execution. In December 2011, as part of
Headquarters streamlining, the DASA(S) functions were realigned under
the SSM. The SSM is a member of the Senior Executive Service with a
permanent staff, and his sole mission is to improve Army services
acquisition oversight and management. The SSM office has provided
improved visibility of services requirements forecasts, funding, and
cost savings.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
to ensure that this position is necessary?
Answer. The Army has already recognized the Senior Service Manager
function as an essential component in our institutional goals to
increase efficiency and effectiveness in services acquisition. If
confirmed, I will continue to support the Army's regular review of
services requirements and execution; support the development of a
services business intelligence capability to provide Army leaders end-
to-end understanding of services acquisitions requirements,
performance, and cost; and ensure the Army continues to work with the
Defense Acquisition University to incorporate services acquisition
management practices into training courses.
auditable financial statements
Question. Section 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Chief Management Officer of DOD to
establish a plan to ensure that DOD's financial statements are
validated as ready for audit by not later than September 30, 2017. The
Secretary of Defense has established the additional goal of ensuring
that the statement of DOD's budgetary resources is validated as ready
for audit by not later than September 30, 2014.
In your opinion, is the Department of the Army on track to achieve
these objectives, particularly with regard to data quality, internal
controls, and business process re-engineering?
Answer. Yes, the Army is on track to achieve the congressionally-
mandated audit readiness objectives. The Army has been implementing and
testing internal controls and is currently achieving increasingly
higher success rates in monthly testing. Business processes have been
thoroughly examined, end-to-end, and have been re-engineered for
efficiency. At the same time, the Army is ensuring that quality data
which is accurate, complete, and documented, is successfully
transitioned from legacy systems into the Enterprise Resource Planning
environment and into financial statements.
Question. If not, what impediments may hinder the Army's ability to
achieve this goal and how would you address them?
Answer. While the Army is indeed on track to achieve the
congressionally-mandated audit readiness objectives, key challenges
should not be ignored. These challenges include maintaining: robust and
continuous leader involvement, a competent workforce, accountability
and oversight, a well-defined and streamlined business architecture,
effective internal controls, and compliant financial systems. Each of
these challenges is identified in the Army's Financial Improvement Plan
(FIP), with corrective actions identified for each noted current
deficiency. The Army FIP is consistent with the DOD Financial
Improvement and Audit Plan and is geared to remove the obstacles to a
successful audit.
Question. In your view, are the steps that the Army needs to take
to meet the 2014 goal consistent with the steps that DOD needs to take
to achieve full auditability by 2017?
Answer. Yes. The Army plan is consistent with the DOD plan.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the Army moves to achieve these objectives without an unaffordable or
unsustainable level of one-time fixes and manual work-arounds?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure accountability, leadership, and
consistent governance of this important project.
army modernization
Question. In general, major Army modernization efforts have not
been successful over the past decade or more. Since the mid-1990s, Army
modernization strategies, plans, and investment priorities have evolved
under a variety of names from Digitization, to Force XXI, to Army After
Next, to Interim Force, to Objective Force, to Future Combat System and
Modularity. Instability in funding, either as provided by DOD or
Congress, has been cited by the Army and others as a principal cause of
program instability. For the most part, however, the Army has benefited
from broad DOD and congressional support for its modernization and
readiness programs even when problems with the technical progress and
quality of management of those programs have been apparent--the Future
Combat System is a recent example.
What is your assessment, if any, of the Army's modernization
record?
Answer. The Army has had many notable successes in ensuring that
soldiers in combat have the best equipment ready and available. The
Army has fielded weapon systems that provide soldiers with improved
mobility, protection, lethality, and a decisive advantage over our
Nation's enemies. There have been some notable struggles, too, over the
past 2 decades, and the Army is committed to drawing the right lessons
from the less successful acquisition programs. If confirmed as Under
Secretary, I will work to ensure that warfighter needs are met, while
remaining fully cognizant of the lessons learned from canceled
acquisition programs.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
take to achieve a genuinely stable modernization strategy and program
for the Army?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary of the Army
and the Chief of Staff of the Army to sustain a versatile and
tailorable, yet affordable and cost-effective modernization strategy.
The Army has initiated a much longer timeframe (30 years) for review of
its modernization programs than it has had in the past. This wider lens
of review will help to stabilize programs and to better predict
investments. This change in temporal scope, in conjunction with the
continued support of Congress in providing predictable appropriations,
will help the Army achieve a stable modernization strategy and program.
If confirmed, my focus will be on ensuring that soldiers and units are
enabled, trained, and ready to meet the future challenges they may
face.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
modernization investment strategy?
Answer. Given today's significant fiscal pressures, the Army's
investment in modernized equipment and capabilities will likely see
across-the-board reductions in the near term. The Army's investment
strategy in soldier weapon systems and capabilities will focus on
making prudent investment decisions with limited resources to enable
the Army to field the best capabilities into the future. In the near
term, equipment investment will prioritize efficient acquisition, to
include multi-year procurements, scaled-down weapon system requirements
to address affordability constraints, and divestiture of outdated
legacy systems as appropriate. Limited resources will be likely
invested in key modernization programs such as the Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle (JLTV), the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV), and the
deployed network. Upgrades to existing platforms like the Apache and
Blackhawk helicopter, the Abrams tank, Bradley Infantry Fighting
Vehicle (IFV), and the Paladin Self-Propelled Howitzer (PIM) will
improve current capabilities. The Army will also continue to prioritize
long-term investment in Science and Technology to mature critical
enabling technologies that support future, next-generation capabilities
for the Army. Overall, the Army will focus its attention on investments
that provide improved force protection, mobility, lethality, and
situational awareness in combat.
Question. In your view does the Army's modernization investment
strategy appropriately or adequately address current and future
capabilities that meet requirements across the spectrum of conflict?
Answer. In my view, the Army's investment strategy in this area
does address requirements across the spectrum of operations that will
be found in current and future conflict environments. The Army's
ability to field these needed capabilities depends, however, on the
availability of stable and adequate resources.
Question. If confirmed, what other investment initiatives, if any,
would you pursue in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support ongoing efforts to ensure
that the Army's equipment modernization strategy continues to be
informed by evolving threats, emerging warfighter requirements, the
rapid pace of technological change, industry research and development,
as well as resource constraints. My efforts would strive to find the
most cost-effective ways to upgrade the Army's current combat platforms
while also making critical investments in the capabilities needed to
fight in future operational environments.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
ensure that all these initiatives are affordable within the current and
projected Army budgets?
Answer. The Army has made great strides in the past several years
in conducting portfolio affordability analysis. This effort examines
all life cycle costs, including procurement, training, and sustainment.
If confirmed, I hope to further these efforts and ensure the Army's
modernization strategy is consonant with its level of resources.
Question. In your view, what trade-offs, if any, would most likely
have to be taken should budgets fall below or costs grow above what is
planned to fund the Army's modernization efforts?
Answer. Consistent with the Secretary of the Army and Chief of
Staff of the Army's Strategic Vision, the Army will defend the Nation
against all current and emerging threats by employing a balanced
modernization strategy across all of its portfolios and by maintaining
a proper balance between current and future readiness.
Question. In your view, should the Army trade-off requirements
within a program in order to make that program affordable?
Answer. Yes, the Army already does this with all of its programs
that are in development, and should continue to do so. As part of a
program's affordability assessment, the Army must assess the individual
cost of each capability associated with the proposed system and ensure
the overall program remains affordable.
army weapon system programs
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the
following research, development, and acquisition programs?
Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
Answer. The Army's IFV is reaching the limit of its capacity to
receive upgrades that have proven critical for soldiers in combat
operations. A new IFV remains a key requirement and priority for the
Army. The GCV program is currently geared toward providing the Army
with an IFV capability for rapidly deploying an overmatching infantry
squad anywhere on the battlefield. Nevertheless, the current fiscal
realities have challenged the Army's ability to afford ongoing
development of a GCV program.
Question. Stryker Combat Vehicle, including the Stryker Mobile Gun
variant.
Answer. The Stryker Combat Vehicle is an acquisition program that
has proven to be highly successful in Iraq and Afghanistan. Blast-
deflecting double v-hull improvements on the Stryker Combat Vehicle
have saved lives in Afghanistan, and the Army continues to procure
vehicles under existing equipping plans. The Stryker Mobile Gun System
has also performed well in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV).
Answer. The JLTV is a Joint Army and Marine Corps development
program which consists of a Family of Vehicles (FoV) with companion
trailers that are capable of performing multiple mission roles. The
JLTV will be designed to provide protected, sustained, networked
mobility for personnel and payloads across the full spectrum of
military operations. JLTV addresses force protection performance and
payload limitations in current High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicles (HMMWVs), while providing more off-road mobility, fuel
efficiency, and reliability than Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected All-
Terrain Vehicles.
Question. M1 Abrams tank modernization.
Answer. The Abrams Tank remains the best tank in the world, and the
age of the current tank fleet is low--only 3 to 4 years on average. As
a result of experiences in Iraq, the Army plans incremental
improvements to the Abrams tank in order to buy back power
deficiencies, improve protection, and provide the ability to accept
future network and protection upgrades. These improvements will enable
the Abrams Tank to maintain its leading edge in measures of
survivability, lethality, and maintainability through 2050.
Question. M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle modernization.
Answer. The Bradley FoV has been an integral part of the Army's
force structure for decades, but requires modernization. The Army plans
to make incremental improvements to the Bradley variants that will
buyback power deficiencies, improve protection, and provide the ability
to accept future network and protection upgrades. These improvements
will enable the Bradley FoV to play a vital role in the Army for years
to come.
Question. Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) Self-Propelled
Howitzer modernization.
Answer. The Army is fully committed to PIM, as it is one of the
Army's most critical modernization programs. The PIM system will
replace the Army's current M109A6 Paladin Howitzer starting in fiscal
year 2017. PIM's new chassis will provide additional size, weight, and
power capacity over the current Paladin fleet. The first PIM system is
expected to be delivery in mid-2015. PIM will provide the Army Armored
Brigade Combat Team with a highly responsive indirect fire system
capable of keeping pace with the Abrams and Bradley.
Question. Armored Multipurpose Vehicle (AMPV).
Answer. The AMPV will replace the M113 FoV, which has become
operationally irrelevant due to inadequate mobility, survivability, and
force protection, as well as the lack of size, weight, power, and
cooling necessary to incorporate future technologies and the Army
network. The AMPV will replace five M113 FoV mission roles with the
following variants: Mission Command, Medical Treatment, Medical
Evacuation, General Purpose, and Mortar Carrier.
Question. OH-58D Kiowa Warrior modernization.
Answer. The Kiowa Warrior has been a reliable capability for our
Army for many years and, at this time, the Army is conducting a
holistic review of the Aviation portfolio that may potentially involve
a restructuring. It is my understanding that any restructuring of the
force would likely look to divest legacy capabilities and retain the
Army's most modern, dual-engine platforms.
Question. AH-64E Apache modernization.
Answer. The Apache is the Army's only heavy combat helicopter and
is an invaluable asset on the modern battlefield, providing an
immeasurable contribution to combat power. The Apache's history dates
back to the 1980s, and the latest version, AH-64E, is the second
remanufacture of the proven system. Remanufacturing and upgrading such
a sophisticated asset is far more economical than developing a new
system, especially since the Apache is unmatched by any other combat
helicopter in the world.
Question. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS).
Answer. The Army has explored the availability of an affordable
aircraft that will meet the AAS requirement through a series of
voluntary flight demonstrations; however, it has been determined that
there is currently no commercially available AAS alternative that would
not require significant development. At this time, the Army is
assessing the Aviation portfolio holistically to determine courses of
action to address this requirement.
Question. Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T).
Answer. The WIN-T program provides the Army a secure, high-speed,
high-capacity networking backbone for mobile, ad-hoc networks in
tactical environments, and underpins the Army's Tactical Network
modernization efforts. Developmental efforts to date have supported
successful development of key networking capabilities that have been
tested and are currently deployed and utilized by warfighters in
Afghanistan today. WIN-T is vital to the Army's endeavors to develop
and field networks for tactical environments.
Question. Joint Tactical Radio System.
Answer. These radios comprise a critical aspect of the Army's and
the DOD's network modernization effort and are the foundation of the
Army's tactical network and communications. The radios provide
manportable, vehicle-mounted, and aerial communication and data
transport services for the Army's tactical network. It is my
understanding that the Army is developing and executing a full and open
competition acquisition strategy designed to leverage industry
innovation and capability.
Question. Joint Multi-Role Rotorcraft Program.
Answer. I understand that the Joint Multi-Role Technology
Demonstrator is a Science and Technology effort to help inform
capabilities and requirements for the planned Future Vertical Lift-
Medium Program.
Question. Small arms modernization.
Answer. The Army's Small Arms Modernization Program provides for
the maturation, demonstration, testing, and evaluation of emerging
technologies in small arms. The Army is focused on developing
improvements that will enhance the lethality, target acquisition and
tracking, fire control, training effectiveness, and reliability of
weapons. Specific focus areas include maturing technologies that
demonstrate lightweight materials, wear resistant/protective/anti-
reflective coatings, observational/situational awareness improvements
and equipment enhancements. These improvements would provide benefits
to weapons, fire control equipment, optics, gun barrels, training
devices, suppressors, component mounts, weapon mounts, and weapon/
ammunition interfaces with the ultimate goal of providing soldiers
world-class weapons systems for the current and future battlefield.
Question. Personal protective equipment modernization.
Answer. The Army provides soldiers with the best protective
equipment in the world. Over the past 10 years, the Army has fielded,
and continuously improved, protective equipment that saves soldiers'
lives. Soldiers are equipped with a complementary suite of protective
capabilities (body armor/combat helmets) that guard against multiple
threats associated with ballistic, blast, and blunt force events,
including ballistic projectiles and fragmentation from Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs). The Army is committed to making additional
improvements to its current state-of-the-art personal protection
equipment, to include reductions in weight, innovative solutions like
the Pelvic Protection System, and improved performance against bodily
injuries such as traumatic brain injury.
Question. Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS).
Answer. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) provides
Army operational and tactical commanders automated intelligence
capabilities and connectivity to the Defense Intelligence Information
Enterprise (DI2E). It processes, fuses, and exploits data and
information, and provides the Army the ability to receive national,
theater, joint, and tactical sensor data; task sensors; and control
select Army sensors. DCGS-A is the Army's enterprise solution to
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) requirements.
Because DCSG-A is primarily a software system, the acquisition strategy
emphasizes evolutionary development over the life of the program.
mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the Army's
long-term strategy for the retention, disposal, utilization, and
sustainment of its large Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle
fleet?
Answer. The Army intends to keep more than 8,500 of the best
variants of MRAPs, while divesting itself of older, less capable
versions that are too costly to ship, reset, upgrade, and sustain. Some
MRAPs will be kept in CONUS for training. Others will be maintained in
pre-positioned stocks strategically placed around the globe, where they
will be ready for future contingencies. Vehicles that the Army does not
keep will be made available to other agencies, activities, and nations.
I believe the strategy for MRAPs is appropriate, and, if confirmed, I
will work with the Secretary of the Army to ensure the MRAP strategy is
continually refined and assessed.
equipment repair/reset
Question. Congress has provided the Army with billions of dollars
over the years to cover the costs to repair and replace equipment worn
out by combat operations and prepare forces for rotations in support of
operations in Afghanistan and previously in Iraq.
In your view, is this level of funding sufficient to not only
prepare Army forces for OIF/OEF but to also improve the readiness of
non-deployed forces for other potential contingencies?
Answer. A fully-funded Reset program would ensure that equipment
lost in theater is replaced and equipment degraded by prolonged use in
harsh environments is returned to a fully ready state. The extreme
temperature variations and high altitude in Afghanistan add stress to
aircraft engines and airframes as much as five times greater than the
Army's normal operations tempo, while the rugged mountain terrain in
that country accelerates wear and tear on ground equipment. The
sequestration in fiscal year 2013 negatively impacted the Army Reset
program, but the Army's fiscal year 2014 request will begin to address
funding shortfalls in the program and improve equipment readiness. Due
to the length of time required to plan and execute depot repair
programs, Reset funding must continue for 3 years after the last piece
of equipment leaves Afghanistan. Major weapon systems and equipment
requiring Reset include aircraft, weapons, radios, MRAPs, and tactical
wheeled vehicles.
Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are
operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for
reset?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Army constantly evaluates
depot production requirements and adjusts its needs to meet current and
anticipated demands and funding levels. Currently, our depots are
operating at the levels required to meet Army needs. The Army does have
extra capacity above the current operating levels and can increase
production through additional overtime or hiring actions in response to
any funded need to accelerate repair of equipment returning from
current operations.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe should be
taken to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment and make it
available for operations and training?
Answer. I do not believe that any additional steps are required at
this time to increase the Army's capacity to fix its equipment. The
industrial base, both organic and commercial, has successfully
demonstrated that it has the capacity to respond to the needs of the
Army for operations and training.
Question. What impact do you believe the decision to send
additional Army forces to Afghanistan is likely to have on equipment
available for continued operations in Iraq and for non-deployed unit
training at home?
Answer. Withdrawn by committee.
Question. What are your views regarding the Army's stated
requirement that it needs 3 years of overseas contingency operations
funding post-Afghanistan retrograde to reset the force?
Answer. The Army has a deliberate and well-considered plan to
retrograde and Reset equipment out of Afghanistan. The 3-year period is
the actual time needed for some equipment to be retrograded from
theater, inducted into a depot, and then repaired. Indeed, many of the
Army's more complex systems, such as aircraft, take more than 1 year to
complete the induction and repair process alone, and aircraft with
battle damage will often take 18-24 months to repair. Over the last
year, depot-level maintenance Reset workload has exceeded 87,000 pieces
of equipment, and the Army has Reset more than 292,000 pieces of other
equipment in that same period.
army-related defense industrial base
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the systems
and processes for identifying, evaluating, and managing risk in the
Army's organic and commercial defense industrial base?
Answer. The Army is actively engaged in several efforts to
identify, evaluate, and manage risk in its organic and commercial
defense industrial base. The Army is working with OSD's Manufacturing
and Industrial Base Policy office in the ongoing sector-by-sector,
tier-by-tier effort that is designed to establish early-warning
indicators of risk at all the defense supply-chain tiers. The Army, in
cooperation with industry, is conducting a comprehensive combat vehicle
portfolio industrial base study and a similar study for tactical
wheeled vehicles. The Army has also created a strategic plan to
identify and retain critical skill sets within the organic industrial
base. The Army recognizes that a healthy industrial base is a treasured
national security asset.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you pursue in
systems and processes to improve identification, monitoring,
assessment, and timely actions to ensure that risk in the Army-relevant
sectors of the defense industrial base is adequately managed in order
to develop, produce, and sustain technically superior, reliable, and
affordable weapons systems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would assess existing systems and processes
used to identify risk to the industrial base, monitor its overall
health, and I would implement any improvements deemed appropriate to
ensure that it remains reliable, cost-effective, and prepared to meet
strategic objectives.
army science and technology
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the role
that Army science and technology programs have played and will play in
developing capabilities for current and future Army systems?
Answer. Over more than a decade of war, the world has witnessed the
value and impact that technology brings to the battlefield and how
capabilities, enabled by technology, are critical to our warfighters.
The Army's Science and Technology mission is to enable soldiers to
continue to dominate the battlefield, today and tomorrow. To that end,
the Army has established a 30-year modernization plan to guide Science
and Technology investments. I believe that to prevent, shape, and win
future conflicts in an ever-changing world, Army Science and Technology
must deliver timely technological solutions that address top priority
capability gaps.
Question. Given the projected budget reductions, how will you
ensure that Army science and technology programs will successfully
transition to operational warfighting capabilities?
Answer. Science and Technology remains a critical investment to
ensure our soldiers maintain a technological edge over potential
adversaries. These investments are required to develop and mature
enabling technologies. If confirmed, I would support efforts to
preserve investment in this area and ensure that it successfully
transitions to the Army's current and future acquisition programs.
Given the great uncertainty about, and increasing complexity of, future
national security threats, it is especially important that the Army
also continues investing in basic research and development.
Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you use to judge the
value and the investment level in Army science and technology programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I would consider a variety of metrics to
assess the value of our investment in science and technology programs,
to include measures evaluating our success in transitioning these
efforts into fielded capabilities, as well as our effectiveness in
fully leveraging investment by industry, other Services, and other
government research institutions.
army laboratories and research, development, and engineering centers
Question. What role should Army laboratories play in supporting
current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army
missions?
Answer. Army laboratories deliver technology-enabled solutions
needed for current conflicts and help develop technologies that will
enhance the Army's future capabilities that will be needed to prevent,
shape, and win future conflicts.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army
laboratories and research and development centers have a high quality
workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so
that they can continue to support deployed forces and develop next
generation capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I promise to learn more and in great detail
about the specific issues and challenges facing Army laboratories and
centers in order to best ensure they have the necessary tools and
personnel to effectively perform their missions. I fully recognize the
important role that the science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics workforce and laboratory facilities have in facilitating
the Army of the future.
Question. Do you support the full utilization of authorities
established by Congress under the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration
program that is currently being run in many Army Research, Development,
and Engineering Centers (RDEC)?
Answer. Yes, I have been informed that the authorities established
by Congress under the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration Program have
given the laboratories and centers the flexibility and tools necessary
to manage and incentivize Army personnel performing this critical
function.
Question. Do you believe that all RDECs in the Army's Research,
Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) need enhanced personnel
authorities in order to attract and retain the finest technical
workforce? Would you support expansion of the Laboratory Personnel
Demonstration authorities to all of RDECOM's laboratories and
engineering centers?
Answer. It is my understanding that all the RDECOM laboratories and
centers are currently part of the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration,
and that this gives important management flexibility for the laboratory
directors to shape their workforce and remain competitive with the
private sector. If confirmed, I would assess the effectiveness of these
existing authorities and recommend changes as needed and appropriate.
Question. Do you believe that the Army's laboratories and
engineering centers should have a separate, dynamic personnel system,
uniquely tailored to support laboratory directors requirements to
attract and retain the highest quality scientific and engineering
talent?
Answer. If confirmed, I would fully examine this issue to better
understand the potential benefits and costs of such a system. However,
with the exception of a few organizations, it is my understanding that
the Laboratory Personnel Demonstration program provides the laboratory
directors with the ability to attract and retain the highest quality
scientific and engineering personnel.
Question. How will you assess the quality of Army laboratory
infrastructure and the adequacy of investments being made in new
military construction and sustainment of that infrastructure?
Answer. If confirmed, I would engage with the appropriate Army
organizations to better understand the challenges facing our Science
and Technology infrastructure and develop solutions to ensure we are
making the necessary investments in this important area.
army test and evaluation efforts
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's test
and evaluation infrastructure is robust enough to ensure that new
systems and technologies are tested to verify their combat
effectiveness and suitability?
Answer. If confirmed, I promise to become more keenly acquainted
with the specifics regarding test infrastructure capabilities, and I
will work to ensure the appropriate level of funding for test and
evaluation infrastructure and instrumentation is budgeted.
Question. What metrics will you use to assess the quality of the
Army's test and evaluation infrastructure?
Answer. At this time, I do not have sufficient information to
adequately answer this question; however, if confirmed, I would assess
the Army's capability to accomplish all essential testing requirements.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that weapon systems
and other technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately
operationally tested?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that operational test protocols
are observed, and I will support the continuation of the Army's current
practice of conducting independent operational testing by organizations
not associated with the programs undergoing test and evaluation.
army information technology programs
Question. What major improvements would you like to see made in the
Army's development and deployment of major information technology
systems?
Answer. Information technology (IT) is critically important to both
industry and government. For the Army, IT is an enabler that provides
warfighters an edge in combat operations. On the business side of the
Army, IT is used to automate complex, critical business processes. If
confirmed, I would work to ensure that the development and deployment
of major IT systems facilitate simplifying, streamlining, and
clarifying the interdependencies in the Army's Enterprise Architecture.
Question. How will you encourage process and cultural change in
organizations so that they maximize the benefits that new enterprise
information technology systems can offer in terms of cost savings and
efficiency?
Answer. Leadership.
Question. What is the relationship between Army efforts at
implementing enterprise information technology programs and supporting
computing services and infrastructure to support Army missions and
efforts being undertaken by the Defense Information Systems Agency?
Answer. The Army is in close, regular collaboration with the
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). As DISA's largest supported
organization, the Army believes that this partnership is critical. If
confirmed, I would continue the trend of developing Army enterprise
information technology from a joint requirements perspective. Current
examples of this approach include Defense Enterprise Email, the Joint
Information Environment and enterprise license agreements that leverage
the buying power of the entire DOD.
contract support functions
Question. DOD has engaged in the privatization of many of its
support functions. As a result, the Department now relies heavily on
contractors to perform acquisition, budget, and financial management
functions that are critical to the execution of the Department's
mission. Senior DOD officials have informed the committee both formally
and informally that, because of reductions in the acquisition work
force, the Department now lacks the capability to effectively oversee
the work performed by its support contractors.
Do you believe that the Army has become too reliant upon
contractors to perform critical functions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine this issue very closely. It is
important to ensure that inherently governmental functions are not
outsourced, and, if confirmed, I will scrutinize those areas where the
distinction may have been blurred. From an operational perspective, the
Army has processes in place to identify critical functions that should
rarely be outsourced; if an Army command believes that using
contractors for a critical function poses unacceptable operational
risk, it is able to bring that work in-house.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take
to ensure that it has the resources it needs to provide effective
oversight for its support contractors?
Answer. In order to ensure the Army has the resources it needs to
provide effective oversight for its support contractors, I believe that
an appropriately sized and sourced workforce is necessary. A critical
component of effective compliance is ensuring the Army has sufficient
organic personnel for oversight, to include a robust number of
contracting officer representatives supporting the operational and
institutional Army. If confirmed, I will work toward this end.
Question. The privatization of functions previously performed by
DOD employees now extends to many functions performed on the
battlefield. As a result, many functions that were performed by DOD
personnel as recently as the Gulf War have been performed by contractor
personnel in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Do you believe that DOD has reached, or exceeded, an appropriate
balance in providing for the performance of functions by contractors on
the battlefield?
Answer. The use of the appropriate form of labor for specific
functions is an important issue that requires constant rebalancing as
missions and priorities change. I believe that DOD needs to evaluate
functions on a case-by-case basis and source them as appropriate. The
force of the future may not look the same as yesterday's force, or even
the current force. The Army must do its part to take into account
current, specific circumstances when determining the appropriateness of
a labor source.
Question. Where do you believe that DOD should draw the line
between functions on the battlefield that can and should be performed
by contractors and functions that should only be performed by DOD
personnel?
Answer. I believe it is vital that the Army retain sufficient
critical enablers within the Active and Reserve components so that we
can reduce the need for contractors on the battlefield. The Army must
also ensure that it retains essential oversight personnel in the case
of unforeseen requirements. Any use of contractors on the battlefield
should be based on an appropriate and comprehensive assessment of risk.
Question. Do you believe that contractors on the battlefield are
subject to appropriate levels of control and accountability for their
actions, or would additional regulation be appropriate?
Answer. I believe that we must continually evaluate how effective
our policies and regulations are at maintaining appropriate levels of
control and accountability. The true challenge is ensuring proper
oversight and enforcement of our existing regulations.
private security contractors
Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
reported that Federal agencies including DOD have spent more than $5
billion for private security contractors in Iraq since 2003.
Do you believe the Army should rely upon contractors to perform
security functions that may reasonably be expected to require the use
of deadly force in highly hazardous public areas in an area of combat
operations?
Answer. Contractors have served alongside soldiers throughout our
Nation's history. While contractors may not always be the preferred
method, they sometimes provide resource options critical to meeting
commanders' requirements. The key is determining and clearly
demarcating the line between soldier and contractor responsibility
according to the situation. In certain cases, contractors may not be
appropriate. In other cases, contractors may be the best sourcing
solution to quickly fill a critical need on short notice.
I believe that unit commanders and leaders at all levels play a
valuable role in determining those missions best suited for contractors
depending upon the situation. If confirmed, I will ensure that
commanders have the training, experience, and flexibility to make these
difficult choices. For example, in particular local political
situations, capabilities such as entry control and convoy security may
be best handled by a contractor. In other locations and times, this may
not be the case.
Question. In your view, has the U.S. reliance upon private security
contractors to perform such functions risked undermining our defense
and foreign policy objectives in Iraq?
Answer. I do not believe that time has shown, or that history will
prove, the use of private security contractors to have undermined
accomplishment of our objectives in Iraq.
While contractors may augment Army organizations by freeing up
soldiers to conduct more dangerous combat operations, it is certainly
critical to ensure that contractors possess the appropriate training
and situational awareness. Contractors, just like their civilian and
military counterparts, must understand their role and consistently
function in support of operational and strategic objectives in an area.
When contractors are untrained or unaware of the impact of their
actions, they may negatively impact strategic-level objectives,
resulting in long-term consequences. (The same can also be said for
government personnel, whether civilian or military, but there is more
flexibility to quickly effect change in those populations.) I believe
that proper oversight and control mechanisms are imperative to ensure
that the actions of the military, government civilians, and contractors
are fully consistent with law and durably support the objectives of the
United States.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
any private security contractors who may continue to operate in an area
of combat operations act in a responsible manner, consistent with U.S.
defense and foreign policy objectives?
Answer. The Army and DOD have implemented policies to increase
oversight and management of Private Security Contractors (PSCs)
accompanying the force. These include contract requirements for
training PSC employees on the authorized use of force, increasing use
of past performance databases, and prosecuting contractor employees
that violate use of force laws under the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act of 2000. Successful oversight is rooted in relevant
training for contracting officers and commanders, vigilant monitoring
and enforcement of applicable laws and regulations, and awareness of
the full range of corrective measures available to the Government in
the event of non-compliance. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to
ensure we build on these past improvements.
investment in infrastructure
Question. Witnesses appearing before the committee in the past have
testified that the military services under-invest in both the
maintenance and recapitalization of facilities and infrastructure
compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in
DOD installations has led to substantial backlogs of facility
maintenance activities, created substandard living and working
conditions, and made it harder to take advantage of new technologies
that could increase productivity. These challenges have been
exacerbated by current budget pressures.
What is your assessment of Army infrastructure investment?
Answer. The majority of Army infrastructure and facilities are in
good shape. This is the result of significant investments in
sustainment and construction over the 10-year period ending in 2012.
These construction investments significantly modernized facilities that
supported the Army during transformation and realignment. However, the
Budget Control Act for 2011 reduced the Army's ability to make
continued and necessary investments in our infrastructure and
facilities. Prolonged under-investment in sustainment will cause Army
infrastructure and facilities to degrade much faster and, in turn, will
increase energy consumption and overall operating costs.
Question. If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you propose to
increase resources to reduce the backlog and improve Army facilities?
Answer. As the Army's end strength and force structure decline
alongside its available funding, millions of dollars will be spent
maintaining underutilized buildings and infrastructure. Trying to
spread a smaller budget over the same number of installations and
facilities will result in rapid decline in the condition of Army
facilities. To save money and free up resources, the Army must reduce
energy consumption at installations, reduce lease costs by moving to
facilities opened up through restationing and force reduction
decisions, and synchronize routine stationing actions to minimize
costs. Greater efficiency is the watchword.
base closure and realignments
Question. DOD has requested another Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) round.
Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why?
Answer. Yes, for the many compelling reasons stated in my answer to
question 76. If the Army is unable to make the tough decisions
necessary to identify inefficiencies and eliminate unneeded facilities,
scarce resources will be diverted away from training, readiness, and
family programs. Additionally, the quality of Army installation
services that support the warfighter will suffer.
Question. If confirmed, and if Congress were to authorize another
BRAC round, how would you go about setting priorities for
infrastructure reduction and consolidation within the Department of the
Army?
Answer. BRAC legislation provides for developing closure and
realignment recommendations based on specific selection criteria. I
would prioritize Army recommendations consistent with congressionally-
approved BRAC selection criteria, Army force structure, and stationing
plans.
Question. If confirmed and if Congress were to authorize another
BRAC round, what is your understanding of the responsibilities of the
Army in working with local communities with respect to property
disposal?
Answer. I understand that BRAC law ordinarily provides for local
communities, through designated Local Redevelopment Authorities (LRA),
to prepare reuse plans that will guide future development and use of
the property. The Army gives substantial deference to those plans in
disposing of the property. BRAC law also usually provides Economic
Development Conveyance authority, under which the Army can convey
property directly to a LRA to further enable those local reuse plans to
be implemented.
Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round
resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far
less money than originally estimated.
What is your understanding of why such cost growth and lower
realized savings have occurred?
Answer. I understand that BRAC 2005 was primarily focused on
transformation. Nearly half of the recommendations from 2005 were
intended to take advantage of opportunities that were available under
BRAC authority to move forces and functions to where they made sense,
even if doing so would not save much money. This transformation effort
cost over $29 billion and resulted in a small proportion of savings,
but it allowed the Army and DOD to redistribute its forces and
personnel within its infrastructure in a way that is typically
difficult when not in the middle of a BRAC round. The remaining
recommendations implemented under BRAC 2005 paid back in fewer than 7
years--even after experiencing cost growth.
Question. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a
future BRAC round?
Answer. Unlike BRAC 2005, which was implemented during a time that
drove the need for transformation, a future BRAC round would be
implemented as Army end strength is declining and the need for
efficiencies is paramount. Consistent with BRAC law and selection
criteria, the Army would make savings a priority in the development of
specific recommendations.
end strength reductions
Question. The Department last year laid out a defense strategy that
proposes an eventual end strength of 490,000 for the Army, which the
Army is on pace to hit by the end of 2015.
What is your understanding of the Army's ability to meet these
goals without forcing out many soldiers who have served in combat over
the past 10 years with the implicit promise that they could compete for
career service and retirement?
Answer. The Army is committed to retaining the best qualified and
most talented soldiers. Competitive selection boards and retention
programs will enable soldiers currently serving in the Army, including
those who have served in combat, to compete for continued service.
Reduction programs will focus on overstrength Military Occupational
Specialties, identifying those that should depart our ranks through a
qualitative assessment of potential for continued contribution.
Question. To what extent will the Army have to rely on involuntary
separations in 2014 through 2018? How will sequestration affect this?
Answer. I understand that the Army will rely on involuntary
separations to meet end strength goals through fiscal year 2017. The
present assessment is that continued sequestration is unlikely to
impact these programs unless current end strength targets change.
Question. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and
retiring servicemembers are as prepared as they can be as they enter a
struggling economy?
Answer. In coordination with the Department of Veterans Affairs and
the Department of Labor, the Army has developed an enhanced version of
its Transition Assistance Program. Called the Army Career and Alumni
Program (ACAP), this commander's program features soldier counseling
and training sessions, employment and career workshops, and education
opportunities, all while maintaining leadership focus on, and
involvement in, each soldier's transition process. ACAP affords
soldiers the opportunity to prepare for successful post-Service
careers.
Question. How fast can the Army responsibly and fairly reduce end
strength while maintaining the integrity and readiness of combat units?
Answer. The Army believes that it can responsibly reduce end
strength by 15,000 to 20,000 per year, while still maintaining
operational readiness.
Question. How does the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, which
restores $22 billion to the DOD budget in 2014, and an additional $9
billion in 2015, affect the Army's end strength reduction plans?
Answer. I have been informed that the Bipartisan Budget Act and the
funds it restores will not impact current personnel drawdown programs.
Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional
force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has
provided the past few years?
Answer. The Army believes that, if reduction measures are required
beyond fiscal year 2017, additional tools may be required to target
specific overstrength skills and occupational specialties.
voluntary and involuntary force shaping tools
Question. Over the past several years, Congress has provided the
services force shaping tools to allow them to accomplish their
drawdowns responsibly and humanely while maintaining grade structure
and critical specialties.
What voluntary and involuntary measures does the Army plan to use
in the next 2 years to reach and maintain its target end strength of
490,000?
Answer. The Army will continue to support requests for voluntary
separation, where possible. In some cases, service commitments may be
waived to allow soldiers to separate prior to fulfilling their
remaining obligations. Involuntary separations will continue through
fiscal year 2015 in support of a reduced end strength (490,000).
Officer Separation Boards, Selective Early Retirement Boards, Selective
Continuation, Selective Retention Boards, Qualitative Service Program,
Precision Retention and a reduction in overall accessions will allow
the Army to meet end strength goals.
Question. How will the Army ensure that it retains the best
personnel, given that these individuals often have multiple
opportunities in the private sector and may be more likely to accept
monetary or other incentives to leave early?
Answer. The Army will work to sustain robust promotion selection
rates as a means to incentivize continued service for the best-
qualified soldiers. Existing programs allow the Army to identify and
retain the best talent while releasing those soldiers serving in over-
strength skill sets. Soldiers who desire to leave the Army prior to
fulfilling remaining service obligations may request separation if they
meet criteria to participate in early release programs.
Question. How does the Army plan to attain the proper grade mix in
senior enlisted and officer communities to avoid the grade disparities
that can take years to correct? In your view, does the Army require any
additional legislative authority to allow end strength reductions by
offering early retirement or other early separation incentives?
Answer. End strength reduction programs target soldier populations
in which the inventory exceeds requirements. The Army proposes to shape
the future force based on grade and skill through a combination of
reduced promotion opportunities, involuntary losses, and decreased
demand and accessions. The Army will release soldiers in overstrength
areas based on specific current and future requirements. I have been
informed that the Army will not require any additional legislative
authority to meet end strength requirements for fiscal year 2015.
annual increase in rates of basic pay below the employment cost index
Question. The Department requested an across-the-board pay raise
for 2014 for military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8 percent rise
in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) benchmark, and has indicated that in
order to restrain the growth of personnel costs, similar below-ECI pay
raises may be necessary over the next several years.
What is your assessment of the impact on recruiting and retention
of pay raises below ECI in 2015 through 2018?
Answer. Compensation is, and has always been, an important
component in motivating men and women to join the Army and remain in
service for a career. The precise impact of lower pay raises on future
recruiting and retention efforts is unclear. But continued authority to
leverage limited bonus and targeted incentive programs may well
mitigate any adverse impact of this proposal, especially in critical
specialties.
annual increase in rates of retired pay below the consumer price index
Question. Section 403 of the recently enacted Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2013 reduces the annual cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for
military retirees under the age of 62 to CPU minus 1 percent. Monthly
retired pay for those individuals would be readjusted upward at age 62
as if the COLA reduction had not taken place and retirees would receive
full annual COLAs thereafter.
In your view how will this change to the law impact the Army's
planning and programming assumptions about projected force and end
strength requirements, retention, and advancement opportunities?
Answer. It is unclear whether or how this provision of law may
affect retention or the propensity of individuals to serve in the Army
in the future. I have been informed by experts in the Army that this
change in law will have little to no impact on current promotions,
which are based on requirements. The Army is uncertain about the impact
this provision will have on end strength, as retention is a significant
driving force of this number.
Question. What impact will this change have on the Army's annual
budget and personnel costs?
Answer. This adjustment will reduce the amount the Army is
contributing to trust funds that cover expenses related to military
retirement payments for our soldiers. While the associated Army savings
will approach $200 million per year, I am concerned about the impact on
recruiting, retention, and soldiers and their families.
Question. Do you support section 403 of the Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2013? Why or why not?
Answer. Compromise is the art of politics. I understand that the
enacted adjustment to COLA for military retirees will certainly help
DOD control the growth of military compensation costs; it is difficult
to project the degree, if any, to which this change will impact
recruiting and retention. Nonetheless, adjustments to the COLA are not,
standing alone and in absence of countervailing benefits, a
particularly desirable course.
religious guidelines
Question. In your view, do Department of the Army policies
concerning religious accommodation in the military appropriately
accommodate the free exercise of religion and other beliefs, including
individual expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have
different beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes. Army policies appropriately accommodate the varied
religious practices of soldiers, including those with no religious
belief. Army and DOD policies are intended to protect both the free
exercise of religion, while avoiding the appearance of an official
endorsement of any particular religion. If confirmed as Under
Secretary, I will ensure that these policies are strictly enforced.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and
discipline?
Answer. Yes. The Army values the rights of soldiers to observe and
practice their diverse religious faiths, or to have no religious faith
at all. Army policy permits soldiers to request waivers of regulations
when necessary to accommodate religious practices, and these waivers
will be granted unless a compelling military necessity otherwise
exists.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by Army chaplains in a variety of
formal and informal settings strike the proper balance between a
chaplain's ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious
beliefs and the rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs,
including no religious beliefs?
Answer. Yes. Army chaplains are well-trained to provide prayers in
pluralistic settings, where sensitivity to diverse religious beliefs is
at a premium. At the same time, chaplains, while providing ritualistic
services on many occasions in both private and public settings, are
never required to act in a manner inconsistent with the tenets of their
endorsing agencies or in conflict with their individual convictions,
beliefs, or religious traditions.
Question. Recent press coverage focused on two separate events
involving unit-level Army equal opportunity training at Fort Hood and
Camp Shelby that incorporated the views of an outside organization that
certain organizations were ``extremist'' because of their faith-based
opposition to same-sex relationships. The training appeared to
officially endorse the views of the outside organization because it did
not expressly state that the views of the outside organization did not
represent the views of the Department of the Army or DOD. As a result
some individuals who received the training were confused about the
official views of the Army and became concerned that their affiliation
with the organizations that were inappropriately identified as
``extremist'' could subject them to administrative or disciplinary
action in accordance with Army policy prohibiting active support to
extremist organizations. In fact, two of the organizations are included
in the annual Combined Federal Campaign to which members of the Army
may make charitable contributions.
What are your views on the permissible extent to which an
individual soldier or Army civilian employee may express, in public or
in private, sincerely-held personal views based on religious belief or
conscience to oppose recognition and acceptance of same sex
relationships or marriage?
Answer. Soldiers and Army civilian employees may express their
sincerely-held personal beliefs, whether based on religious tenet or
philosophical conviction, about the acceptance of same-sex
relationships or same-sex marriage.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to establish
policy to clearly articulate the appropriate balancing of expressions
of sincerely-held religious belief or matters of conscience by
individual soldiers or civilian employees in the Army workplace?
Answer. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will ensure that the
Army always protects the constitutional right of soldiers and Army
civilians to hold and express religious beliefs and matters of
conscience.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that
the development and presentation of training delivered within the
Department of the Army is properly supervised and does not include
views from organizations outside the Army or DOD that are inconsistent
with official policy except when including those views is essential for
the purpose of the training and are properly cited as the views of an
outside organization?
Answer. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will support and sustain
the measures, recently directed by the Secretary of the Army, that
require all training materials and instruction to reflect the official
policy of the Department of the Army. It is inappropriate for training
presentations to include material that is found on the internet or
gleaned from some other informal source which is not approved by the
Army. This action by the Secretary of the Army will ensure that
incidents such as those referenced in this question do not occur again.
Question. What is your assessment of measures taken at the U.S.
Military Academy (USMA) to ensure religious tolerance and respect?
Answer. The USMA is working diligently to create an environment in
which Cadets, faculty, and staff, are supported in their personal faith
choices, whatever those may be. USMA leaders have reached out to
members of all faiths and have implemented policies to ensure religious
tolerance and respect. If confirmed, I will see that these values of
religious tolerance and respect are realized at USMA.
recruiting and retention
Question. How would you evaluate the status of the Army in
successfully recruiting and retaining high caliber personnel?
Answer. I understand that the fiscal year 2013 Army recruiting
mission was extremely successful, attracting high-quality recruits
comprised of 98 percent High School Diploma Graduates and only 1.2
percent Category IV accessions across the Active and Reserve
components. These new soldiers are a reflection of the best of America,
highly qualified and with a genuine desire to serve.
Although consistently succeeding in meeting retention needs, the
Army retains only the most highly-qualified soldiers. This is a
remarkable feat given that, in recent years, the Army has increased
retention standards, demanding the highest qualifications and
performance from those who would remain in the force. The soldiers the
Army enlists and retains today and in the near future, are among the
smartest, most fit, and most capable young people in our Nation.
Question. How would you evaluate the recruiting and retention of
uniformed and civilian health care professionals?
Answer. The Army has a two-pronged approach for recruiting military
health professionals: directly recruiting fully-qualified health care
professionals for military health care positions and recruiting
individuals into various military health care training programs, such
as the Health Professions Scholarship Programs. The Army has been very
successful in recruiting students into these training programs, upon
completion of which the student incurs an active duty service
obligation. However, the recruitment of fully-qualified health care
providers remains a challenge, exacerbated by national shortages in
various physician subspecialties. The Army uses a variety of retention
incentives, such as Special Pays and Professional Health Education
Training opportunities that have proven very effective in retaining
military healthcare providers.
Recruiting BH professionals continues to present a particular
challenge. In 2013, more than 2,900 prescreened health care
professional candidates were referred; of these, approximately 625 were
behavioral health (BH) professionals. The ability of colleges and
universities to produce more qualified BH professionals has not kept
pace with the ever-increasing need for BH services. The Army must
compete with other government agencies, such as the Department of
Veterans Affairs, as well as the private sector, to recruit from the
field of qualified candidates. If confirmed as Under Secretary, I will
support efforts to reinforce our recruiting and retention successes,
with a view to positioning the Army to compete favorably as an employer
of choice.
Question. What initiatives would you take, if confirmed, to further
improve Army recruiting and retention, in both the Active and Reserve
components, including health care professionals?
Answer. Inevitably, the recruiting environment will become more
challenging. If confirmed, I will work to ensure accession programs are
appropriately resourced to allow the Army to continue to recruit and
retain the highest quality soldiers. I have been informed of several
promising initiatives, including working with the Department of
Education to improve recruiter access in public schools, evaluating
non-cognitive testing measures for applicant screening, and
facilitating senior leader engagement with students and leaders at top-
tier educational institutions across the Nation--particularly those
hosting undergraduate and graduate medical programs--about
opportunities for service in the Army.
gi bill benefits
Question. Congress passed the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational
Assistance Act in 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill) that created enhanced
educational benefits for servicemembers who have served at least 90
days on active duty since September 11. The maximum benefit would
roughly cover the cost of a college education at any public university
in the country. One purpose of the act was to recognize and reward the
service of those who served voluntarily after September 11,
particularly those who do not serve full careers and qualify for
retirement benefits.
What is your assessment of the impact of the Post-9/11 GI Bill on
recruiting and retention in the Army, including the provision of
transferability for continued service?
Answer. The Post-9/11 GI Bill has enhanced the Army's ability to
recruit and retain soldiers. In particular, giving soldiers the ability
to transfer their Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits has greatly aided our
effort to retain quality mid-grade and career soldiers.
management and development of the senior executive service
Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with
it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and
forward-thinking management of senior executives.
What is your vision for the management and development of the Army
senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important
areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and
technical fields?
Answer. My vision is for the Army to have a well-developed senior
executive workforce capable of partnering with senior military officers
to lead the Army in accomplishing assigned missions. The Army is
already a leader in strengthening civilian talent management,
especially through the Talent and Succession Management process. This
is an annual opportunity for communication with senior civilians, their
supervisors, and the Army regarding each person's future potential and
readiness for new assignments. If confirmed, I will continue these
measures and augment them to ensure transparency and fairness. This
will allow the Army to attract and retain the best talent for all
positions, including those in acquisition, financial management, and
the scientific and technical fields.
Question. Do you believe that the Army has the number of senior
executives it needs, with the proper skills to manage the Department
into the future?
Answer. I believe the Army presently has the number of senior
executives it needs. As with any large organization, we have a steady
influx of new talent to replace those we lose to retirement and to
other Federal agencies and the private sector. In anticipation of those
losses, the Army has implemented the Senior Enterprise Talent
Management Program, which is designed to build a bench of high-
potential GS-14 and GS-15 leaders that establishes a robust talent pool
ready and capable of assuming executive level positions in the future.
systems and support for wounded soldiers
Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat
operations deserve the highest priority from the Army and the Federal
Government for support services, healing and recuperation,
rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition
from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement
or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis
over the past several years, many challenges remain.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by the Army to
improve the care, management, and transition of seriously ill and
injured soldiers and their families?
Answer. I believe the Army has made great strides by implementing
and continuously improving three programs: the Warrior Care and
Transition Program, the Integrated Disability Evaluation System, and
the Soldier for Life program. All three programs are designed to
address the care and transition of wounded, ill, and injured soldiers.
If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to support
these vital programs for our most vulnerable soldiers and their
families.
Question. What are the strengths upon which continued progress
should be based? What are the weaknesses that need to be corrected?
Answer. The strength of the Army's Warrior Care and Transition
Program is the dedicated and highly-trained cadre of nearly 4,000
military and civilian personnel who currently staff the 29 Warrior
Transition Units, 9 Community-Based Warrior Transition Units, and 49
Soldier Family Assistance Centers. If I am confirmed, it will be a
priority for me to continue to support the efforts of the many highly-
dedicated professionals who are making a difference at these facilities
every day. They make sure Wounded Warriors are afforded the support,
guidance, and assistance they require to recover, return to the force,
or successfully transition to Veteran status, and integrate well into
their communities.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for
wounded personnel, and to monitor their progress in returning to duty
or to civilian life?
Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary
of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the leadership of the
Warrior Transition Command, and the rest of the Army to ensure that we
continue to make the changes and improvements necessary to maintain and
enhance the support to soldiers who require medical care. The Nation
and the Army owe our soldiers no less.
suicide prevention
Question. The number of suicides in the Army continues to be of
concern to the committee.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping suicide
prevention programs and policies for the Department of the Army to
prevent suicides and increase the resiliency of soldiers and their
families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on providing clear guidance,
effective policy, and sufficient resourcing for the Ready and Resilient
Campaign. One of the primary purposes of this Campaign is to reduce
suicides throughout our Army family by integrating suicide prevention
efforts across the Army and providing support to our soldiers,
civilians, and family members. I am committed to ensuring that best
practices are incorporated throughout the Army.
family readiness and support
Question. Soldiers and their families in both the Active and
Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of
the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for soldiers and their families, and, if confirmed, how would
you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately
resourced?
Answer. For more than a decade, the Army has continuously asked its
soldiers to be apart from their families during long deployments,
commit to Permanent Change of Station moves to unfamiliar climes, and
cope with the vagaries of a high operational tempo. The Army
understands that soldiers must have peace of mind that their families
are well cared-for at all times, and is therefore 100 percent committed
to ensuring family readiness. Family readiness is the state of being
prepared to effectively navigate the challenges of daily living in the
unique context of military service. The Army has invested in a wide
array of Family Programs to make this concept a reality. Initiatives
such as the Extraordinary Family Member Program (which considers family
members with special needs during the assignments process), Child
Development Centers (which provides soldiers with affordable, quality
day care), and the Financial Readiness Program (which offers soldiers
financial counseling) are just a few examples of the different ways the
Army is committed to helping its soldiers. If confirmed, I will commit
to maintaining family readiness by wholeheartedly supporting such
programs.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. If confirmed, I would not change the overall direction of
Army Family Programs. My goal would be an Army of strong and resilient
soldiers and families who will thrive as we reduce our deployed
footprint. With the restructuring of the Army and the current austere
fiscal climate, I would apply resources to programs and services that
have the greatest impact on sustaining soldier and family readiness and
resilience.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support is provided to
Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and
family readiness, as well as to Active Duty families who do not reside
near a military installation?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue the existing structured
partnership with the Guard and Reserve to support all Army families,
regardless of their component or geographic location, and to ensure the
most efficient and effective delivery of programs and services wherever
and whenever they are needed most. I will also continue to partner with
the sister Services and local communities to fill gaps in programs, to
provide alternatives to government-provided services, and to support
geographically-dispersed soldiers and families in order to reduce
stress on Army families.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to sustain Army
family support, given current fiscal constraints?
Answer. Despite the fiscal climate, I would not change the future
direction of military Family Programs. I would, however, ensure that
scarce resources are dedicated to the programs and services that have
the greatest impact on sustaining soldier and family readiness and
resilience.
morale, welfare, and recreation
Question. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs are
critical to enhancement of military life for members and their
families, especially in light of deployments. These programs must be
relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including Active-Duty
and Reserve personnel, retirees, and families.
What challenges do you foresee in sustaining Army MWR programs,
particularly in view of the current fiscal environment and, if
confirmed, are there any improvements you would seek to achieve?
Answer. Family and MWR programs provide a comprehensive network of
quality support and leisure services that enhance quality of life for
soldiers, family members, and retirees. Sustained reductions to these
programs may negatively impact future readiness and unit cohesion.
Where possible, I will strive to improve program offerings while
focusing on delivering affordable, quality services that best enhance
the readiness and resilience of the military community.
army civilian personnel workforce
Question. Section 955 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013 required the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to
reduce the size of the civilian personnel workforce by 5 percent over
the next 5 years. The plan developed by the Secretary does not meet
this objective. Since the time that section 955 was enacted, the
Department has implemented hiring freezes and furloughs due to
sequestration. As a result, the DOD civilian personnel workforce is
substantially smaller than it was when section 955 was enacted or at
the time the plan was submitted.
Do you agree that the Army civilian employee workforce plays a
vital role in the functioning of the Department of the Army?
Answer. Absolutely.
Question. How does the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, which
restores $22 billion to the Department's budget in 2014, and an
additional $9 billion in 2015, affect the Army's civilian personnel
workforce plans?
Answer. The Bipartisan Budget Act will enable the Army to avoid
further reductions in key mission areas. Civilian employees play a
vital role in nearly all missions, so the Army expects to have fewer
personnel reductions and enough funding to replenish the skills lost
through natural attrition. This will allow the Army to hire the next
generation of skilled professionals and to ensure mission-essential
trades and crafts are integrated into the future workforce. In short,
the additional funding will allow workforce planning to be accomplished
in a calculated way.
Question. In your view, would it be preferable for the Army to make
planned, prioritized reductions to the civilian workforce, or to
downsize using arbitrary reductions based on hiring freezes and
workforce attrition?
Answer. In my view, the Army must use all tools available to shape
our civilian force while ensuring that the Army remains capable of
meeting its mission objectives. As the Army transitions to a force that
is operationally adaptable, it is crucial to employ solid workforce
planning that will ensure that our civilian workforce possesses the
skills and experience necessary to sustain the Army mission. Recently,
the Army has used hiring freezes, workforce attrition, voluntary early
retirement, voluntary separation incentives, and reductions in force to
achieve the mandated civilian reductions. The use of planned,
prioritized reductions is certainly preferable, and if confirmed, this
will be one of my goals.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. In 2012, for the fourth year in a row, there were more
than 3,000 reported cases of sexual assault in the military, including
2558 unrestricted reports, and an additional 816 restricted reports.
Moreover, DOD's most recent survey indicates that the actual number of
sexual offenses could be considerably higher, as 6.1 percent of Active
Duty women and 1.2 percent of Active Duty men surveyed reported having
experienced an incident of unwanted sexual contact in the previous 12
months. This survey has been criticized by some because its conclusions
are extrapolated from an unscientific sample set and the questions
asked in the survey were too imprecise. Both former Secretary of
Defense Panetta and Secretary Hagel have implemented new initiatives
for addressing sexual assault in the military.
What is your assessment of the Army's implementation of the new
policies for addressing sexual assault offenses?
Answer. In my assessment, the leadership demonstrated by the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army in starting an
unprecedented number of program and policy initiatives to end sexual
assault--more than 20 over the past year--will have a decidedly
positive impact on the reporting, investigation, and prosecution of
these offenses; on increasing the accountability of military leaders at
all levels; and on fostering cultural change. In the last 12 months,
the Army has:

Implemented a Special Victims Counsel Program
available to all servicemembers and their dependents who are
victims of sexual assault;
Added sexual assault prevention and response as a
rated category for all officer and non-commissioned officer
evaluations;
Required Command Climate Surveys for every officer
assuming a new command;
Raised the level of leadership of the Army's Sexual
Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) office to
the Senior Executive Service level;
Instituted expedited transfer of victims;
Expanded the implementation of its special victim
capability for the investigation and prosecution of offenses by
instituting trauma-informed investigation training and
increasing the number of special victim prosecutors;
Credentialed thousands of Sexual Assault Response
Coordinators (SARCs) and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
Victim Advocates (SAPR VAs);
Required judge advocates to now serve as investigating
officers in Article 32 proceedings;
Enhanced victim participation in the post-trial
process of military courts-martial;
Required administrative separation of soldiers
convicted of sexual assault offenses; and
Improved commander awareness of soldier misconduct.

The Army also continues to develop metrics to measure its progress
in addressing sexual assault and harassment. The tools used by the Army
to evaluate its prevention programs include:

Workplace and Gender Relations Surveys;
Personnel Screening and Certification;
DOD and Department of the Army Inspector General;
Inspections, workplace inspections, and Annual Command
Assessments
Annual reports to Congress, OSD, J-1, and Army senior
leaders;
Quarterly reports to OSD, J-1, and Army senior leaders
(including statistics and analysis);
Annual OSD and USMA Assessments;
DOD Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at
the Military Service Academies;
Annual ``I. A.M. Strong'' Sexual Harassment/Assault
Prevention Summit Command Outbriefs;
Command Climate Surveys within 30 days of assuming
command, again at 6 months, and annually thereafter for the
Active component;
Command Climate Surveys within 120 days of assuming
command for the Reserve component;
Initial Entry Training Surveys;
SAPR program compliance inspections;
Department of Defense Safe Helpline feedback (for
trends);
Workplace inspections;
Army Operational Troops Survey (OTS);
Health-of-the-Force installation visits;
Senior leader-conducted focus groups;
SHARP Red Team Assessments;
Army SHARP Standdown Plan (directed by the Secretary
of the Army); and
Army Directive 2013-20, Assessing Officers and
Noncommissioned Officers on Fostering Climates of Dignity and
Respect and on Adhering to the Sexual Harassment/Assault
Response and Prevention Program.

These changes demonstrate the Army's committed, holistic approach
to effectively change culture, prevent sexual assault and harassment in
the ranks, provide world-class support for victims, and prosecute
offenders to the fullest extent of the law. Assessment of the impact of
these many policy changes, along with implementation of the provisions
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 in the
coming year, will be a top priority of mine, if confirmed.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. I firmly believe that commanders must lead the effort to
change Army culture. The Army relies on commanders to ensure that our
soldiers are properly trained, equipped, safe, and healthy. The Army
relies on commanders to ensure that standards are met or exceeded, to
maintain order in the ranks, and to instill values in our troops. The
Army also relies on commanders to discipline soldiers when these
standards are not met. As part of these responsibilities, commanders
are ultimately responsible for fostering respect within their units,
creating a climate in which sexual assaults and sexual harassment are
not tolerated, and cultivating an environment in which victims feel
comfortable reporting all forms of misconduct. To carry out their
responsibilities, commanders must have the authority and the tools to
address the problem of sexual assault in our ranks. In turn, the Army
must hold commanders accountable in the event of failures, as is
contemplated by the new rating evaluation requirement. These crimes
violate the trust that is at the core of the Army profession.
Question. In your view, what would be the impact of requiring a
judge advocate outside the chain of command to determine whether
allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted?
Answer. Requiring a judge advocate outside the chain of command to
determine whether allegations of sexual assault should be prosecuted
would in effect create a parallel justice system for sexual assault
cases, in which commanders handle some offenses but not others. In
addition to generating confusion and inefficiencies in the military
justice system, I believe that this change might undermine the Army's
efforts to change the military culture in which sexual assaults have
occurred. Within the Army, commanders are responsible for their
soldiers' performance, safety, morale, and well-being. In carrying out
their responsibilities, it is critical that commanders have the
authority and the tools to address problems within their ranks,
including sexual assault. Rather than removing commanders from their
role within the military justice system, the Army should instead hold
them accountable for ensuring that all victims feel comfortable in
reporting misconduct and all soldiers believe that the system is fair
and transparent.
Question. What is your understanding of the resources and programs
the Army has in place to provide victims of sexual assaults the
medical, psychological, and legal help that they need?
Answer. I believe that the Army is dedicated to providing sexual
assault victims with extensive medical, psychological, and legal
support services. The Army is learning from the increasing body of
peer-reviewed research about the neurobiology of trauma and how it
affects the needs, behavior, and treatment of victims of sexual assault
and other traumatic experiences. The Army is committed to both
understanding this research and in implementing innovative and
successful strategies to combat the effects of Military Sexual Trauma.
All sexual assault victims are assigned a SARC and SAPR VA. When a
victim of sexual assault presents to any Military Treatment Facility in
the Army, his or her care is managed by a Sexual Assault Clinical
Provider (SACP) and Sexual Assault Care Coordinator (SACC) from initial
presentation to completion of all follow-up visits related to the
sexual assault. The victim will be offered a Sexual Assault Forensic
Exam, and if not already accompanied by a SARC or SAPR VA, the SACP or
SACC will coordinate that process and explain reporting options. The
SARC or SAPR VA will also provide a referral to appropriate services.
With the implementation of the Special Victim Counsel Program, the
victim will also be notified of the availability of a Special Victim
Counsel by the SARC.
Question. What is your view of the steps the Army has taken to
prevent additional sexual assaults? In your view, are these steps
adequate?
Answer. In 2013, the Secretary of the Army listed the prevention of
sexual assault as first among his published priorities for the Army. In
June 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Army also stated the prevention of
sexual assault is his top priority. Conforming to this important
guidance, the Army has made the prevention of sexual assault a matter
of utmost importance. Leaders at every echelon are committed to
preventing sexual assaults and caring for victims, and the Army is
working diligently to ensure that all soldiers share these commitments.
For example, from the day they join the Army and continuing throughout
their careers, soldiers receive training on sexual assault prevention.
I recognize that training alone will not stop sexual assaults, but it
has brought unprecedented awareness of the issue to the force. To
eliminate sexual assaults, the Army must change the culture of the
force, which includes eliminating the stigma associated with reporting
these crimes, regardless of whether the reporting soldier is a victim
or a bystander. The Army continues to look for new and innovative ways
to combat the difficult problem of sexual assault. With continued
command emphasis, education throughout all of our ranks, and resources
devoted to victim care, I believe the Army will achieve the necessary
cultural change.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources the Army has in place to investigate and respond to
allegations of sexual assault?
Answer. I believe that the Army has invested a substantial amount
of resources and training toward the investigation and response to
sexual assault allegations. The U.S. Army Military Police provides
Special Victim Unit Investigative Training that focuses on memory and
trauma, common victim behaviors, alcohol-facilitated sexual assaults,
sex offender behaviors, male victimization, and the innovative victim
interviewing technique that has resulted in a more in-depth and
complete recollection of events than traditional methods of
questioning. Investigators and attorneys from all three Services, as
well as the Coast Guard and National Guard Bureau, attend this
training, and I am told that it is the best education available to
investigators and attorneys anywhere in the Federal Government.
The Army also has a dedicated group of nearly 30 Sexual Assault
Investigators (SAI) in the Criminal Investigation Command (CID), each
of whom is specially trained to ensure that allegations of sexual
assault are fully and appropriately investigated. The Judge Advocate
General also manages 23 specially-trained Special Victim Prosecutor
(SVP) Teams comprised of SVPs, paralegals, and SAPR VAs. Special Victim
Investigators collaborate closely with Special Victim Prosecutors, who
are hand-selected at the Department of the Army level for their
expertise in the courtroom and their ability to work with victims.
Developing a properly trained cadre of investigators is
extraordinarily important in our efforts to increase reporting because
victims' willingness to initiate and follow through with investigations
is directly related to whether they feel supported and believed. If
their initial contact with law enforcement is an unpleasant one,
victims' likelihood of pursuing cases is virtually nil. This is an
issue that I am particularly interested in and that I will continue to
monitor closely if confirmed as Under Secretary.
Question. Do you consider the Army's current sexual assault
policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting,
to be effective?
Answer. Yes, I believe the Army's system for receiving and
processing reports of sexual assault, including both restricted and
unrestricted reports, is effective, although this is a matter in which
I will maintain a strong interest, if confirmed. Since implementing the
``restricted'' reporting option (which does not initiate a law
enforcement investigation) in 2004, the number of total reports has
continued to increase. This option has been a very beneficial reform in
the system; anecdotally, it is credited with bringing a considerable
number of victims forward who would not have otherwise done so. Though
the Army prefers for reports to be ``unrestricted'' so that it may hold
perpetrators accountable and remove them from the ranks, by giving
victims control over triggering the investigation, the restricted
option gives them time to understand the process, seek the counseling
and care they need, and to consult with an attorney if they wish. The
conversion of restricted reports to unrestricted is continuing to
increase, which I believe to be evidence of the success of our numerous
SAPR initiatives and an indication that victims are gaining more trust
in the system. I am optimistic--although definitive data is elusive--
that the increase in reports for fiscal year 2013 reflects growing
confidence in our system. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Army
continues to look for innovative ways to combat this difficult problem.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of resources in the
Army to investigate allegations of sexual misconduct and to hold
perpetrators accountable for their actions?
Answer. I believe we have adequate numbers of and appropriate
training for criminal investigators, forensic laboratory examiners, and
prosecutors to ensure the successful investigation of sexual assaults
and to hold offenders accountable. The CID has 747 authorized agents at
71 Field Investigative Units to conduct sexual assault investigations.
The average experience level for the 22 civilian SAIs is 18.1 years and
8 more SAIs have been added this year; these investigators are
exclusively assigned to handle sexual assault cases. Roughly 76 percent
(54 of 71 Army installations with a CID office) have SVU-trained agents
assigned, and the goal is to have SVU-trained agents at all CID field
offices this year. In addition, the Commanding General of CID and the
Army Judge Advocate General have closely aligned their forces and
efforts to provide outstanding support to enable commanders to address
these serious crimes and to hold offenders appropriately accountable.
These leaders have prioritized the investigation and prosecution of
sexual assaults and have dedicated considerable resources to ensuring
that sexual assault victims receive the full efforts of the best-
trained and most experienced investigators and prosecutors.
Question. What problems, if any, are you aware of in the manner in
which the confidential reporting procedures have been put into effect?
Answer. I am not aware of any problems with regard to the way
confidential reporting procedures have been implemented. First and
foremost, the Army must ensure that each victim gets necessary care and
treatment. Toward this end, I understand the need for the restricted
option, and respect a victim's choice to select that option as he or
she sees fit. Ultimately, however, the Army's goal is to ensure that
victims feel confident enough in the Army's process to report sexual
assault through the unrestricted reporting process, which will trigger
thorough criminal investigations, ultimately allowing the military
justice system to work in a fair, impartial way. It is very important
that the Army ensures that all soldiers understand what the reporting
options are, to whom they may confidentially report, and those who have
a duty to report if they are made aware of any allegation of sexual
misconduct.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate role for senior
military and civilian leaders in the Secretariat and the Army staff in
overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating
to sexual assault?
Answer. Senior military and civilian leaders are responsible for
ensuring that all Army policies relating to sexual assault are
implemented fully. They are also responsible for evaluating the
effectiveness of these efforts, and for making changes to those
programs and policies, when appropriate. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 also contemplates that the
Secretary of the Army may review some sexual assault cases. If I am
confirmed, I will ensure that the Army continues to assess and improve
its policies and programs to combat and respond to sexual assault.
Question. Do you believe that sexual assault continues to be an
underreported crime in the Army?
Answer. Yes. The research is clear that sexual assault is one of
the most underreported crimes in society at large, and this is no less
the case in the Army or other Military Services. The Army is working
hard to foster a climate in which victims trust their chains of command
to support them if and when sexual offenses occur, victims know that
they will receive all necessary services and support from the Army,
victims are confident their allegations will be taken seriously, and
that all incidents of sexual assault and harassment will be thoroughly
investigated. The increase in reporting during this past fiscal year is
possibly reflective of victims' growing confidence in our system.
Question. If so, what are the barriers that discourage or prevent
victims from coming forward?
Answer. There are no doubt many reasons a victim does not always
come forward to report a sexual assault, whether in the civilian world
or in the military. Data from the 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations
Survey of Active Duty Members shows that victims of sexual assault
often do not come forward because of privacy concerns. Sexual assault
is the most personal and intrusive of crimes, and victims report
feeling reluctant to report this crime because they feel ashamed or
embarrassed and because they feel that others might blame them or
retaliate against them. Another one of the biggest barriers for victims
is the fear of being ostracized by their peers in the unit--and this is
an issue whose remedy lies directly in the hands of the leadership and
authority of the commander. I believe that commander-driven change in
unit culture and compassionate, thorough support of victims are
critical to address these concerns.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps would you take to
remove barriers to reporting sexual assaults?
Answer. If confirmed, I will begin by focusing on victim care and
commander accountability. The Army has made significant programmatic
changes to ensure victims receive the support they need when they come
forward to report a sexual assault. I intend to evaluate the
effectiveness of these (and related) efforts, and to look for ways to
continue to improve the Army's programs and policies for victim care. I
also believe that effective leadership training, demonstrated values
and accountability of leaders at all levels is essential.
In response to the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence
at the Military Service Academies for Academic Program Year 2011-2012,
the Secretary of Defense wrote to the Service Secretaries and the Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness stating: ``Despite our
considerable and ongoing efforts, this year's Annual Report on Sexual
Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies demonstrates
that we have a persistent problem. I am concerned that we have not
achieved greater progress in preventing sexual assault and sexual
harassment among academy cadets and midshipmen. These crimes and
abhorrent behavior are incompatible with the core values we require of
our Armed Forces' future officers. A strong and immediate response is
needed.''
Question. What has the Army done to respond to the Secretary of
Defense's requirement for a strong and immediate response?
Answer. I have been advised that, under the USMA Superintendent's
guidance, Cadets established the Cadets Against Sexual Harassment and
Assault committee, a SHARP-trained group of Cadets who are dedicated to
preventing and responding to sexual assault at the USMA. Additionally,
the Superintendent has met with all company commanders, regimental
commanders, the brigade staff, and the Corps of Cadets to address
leadership responsibilities, and he has emphasized each member's
responsibility for establishing a positive command climate in his or
her unit that is based on dignity and respect for all. The
Superintendent addressed the same subject during his briefings to the
staff and faculty at the beginning of first semester, academic year
2013-2014, and he will continue to deliver this message to cadet groups
throughout the second semester of this academic year.
Question. If confirmed, what additional steps will you take to
address the findings contained in this report?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Secretary of
the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Assistant Secretary for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the USMA Superintendent and the Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-1 to ensure that the Sexual Harassment/Assault
Response and Prevention Program, both Army-wide and at USMA, remains a
top priority for Army leaders throughout the Army.
army policies regarding drug and alcohol abuse
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
respect to disciplinary action and administrative separation of
soldiers who have been determined to have used illegal drugs? Do you
agree with this policy?
Answer. In 2012, the Secretary of the Army directed revisions to
the criteria and retention authorities for drug and alcohol-related
separations. In short, the revised policies reflect an increased
responsibility on the part of the soldier to remain resilient and
follow substance abuse rehabilitative treatment, and it holds
commanders responsible for processing administrative separations. The
revised policy directs commanders to process administrative separations
for those soldiers who commit repeated offenses, such as two serious
incidents of alcohol-related misconduct within a 12 month period, or
for soldiers who test positive for illegal drugs twice during their
careers. The decision authority for retention is now the first general
officer in the chain of command with a judge advocate or legal advisor.
These revisions make the Army policy more responsive to the drug
use and high-risk behavior trends that were identified in the Army. I
believe the revised policy is well suited to assist the Army in
identifying and retaining those soldiers who demonstrate the
responsibility and maturity to learn from their incidents of high-risk
behavior. At the same time, it provides commanders the necessary tools
to process soldiers out of the Army who are unwilling to change. I
support the current policy.
Question. What is your understanding of the Army's policy with
respect to rehabilitation and retention on Active Duty of soldiers who
have been determined to have used illegal drugs or abused alcohol or
prescription drugs? Do you agree with this policy?
Answer. My previous response concerning the Army's disciplinary
policy on illegal drug use outlines the Army's focus on both soldier
responsibility and command responsibility. The Army policy, which
allows for soldiers with a single alcohol incident or a single positive
drug test to be referred for evaluation, intensive education, or
outpatient treatment, reflects the Army's understanding of soldiers in
terms of their ages and their representation of American society at-
large. The Army understands that younger soldiers may make poor
decisions and makes allowances for this by providing commanders with
the flexibility to retain soldiers who have the potential to learn from
their mistakes and maintain Army standards. I support this policy.
Question. Do you believe that the Army has devoted sufficient
resources for implementation of its rehabilitation policies and
objectives since 2001? If not, in what ways have resources been
insufficient?
Answer. I have been advised that, while the Army has increased
resourcing over the past decade to combat the abuse and/or misuse of
both legal and illegal substances, capability gaps still exist that
require funding. These gaps primarily reside within the Reserve
component (Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve) in the
deterrence, prevention, and treatment realms. If confirmed as Under
Secretary, I will work to bridge these gaps.
detainee treatment standards
Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7,
2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating
that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. I agree with the 2006 memorandum of Deputy Secretary
England and the 2009 Executive Orders of President Obama that require
all Department of Defense directives, regulations, policies, practices,
and procedures to fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. Since 2006, the Department of the Army has reviewed and
updated all Army regulations, policies, practices, and procedures to
ensure such compliance.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. I support the standards for detainee treatment specified in
the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, and
Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E. Current Army directives
comply fully with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, as noted
above.
Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military
operations for U.S. Forces to comply fully with the requirements of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes. It is entirely appropriate and consistent with
effective military operations to comply fully with the requirements of
Common Article 3 and establish a standard for the conduct of detainee
operations that applies the Law of Armed Conflict in all military
engagements, no matter how characterized, and in all other military
operations.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the
Army?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
combat integration
1. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, in your testimony you stated
that in the next few months the Army would be opening 33,000 positions
that were previously closed to women due to the direct combat
exclusion. How many of these positions have already been opened?
Mr. Carson. The notification to Congress to open 33,000 positions
occurred in January 2014; we will open these following expiration of
the required 30 continuous days of congressional session. These 33,000
will be in addition to the approximately 22,000 positions the Army has
already opened since May 2012.

2. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, why is it taking so long to open
them?
Mr. Carson. I understand that the integration of women into
previously closed units is proceeding well. We began our work in 2012,
focusing on the 14 Military Occupational Specialties (MOS)--such as the
enlisted Combat Engineer MOS and the three enlisted MOSs in the
Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery branches--that were closed because
their missions were related to direct ground combat. Our plan calls for
all decisions on closed positions and occupations to be made by 2015,
and we are on schedule to meet that goal.

3. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, are there intermediate steps
that you feel are necessary before you make this shift?
Mr. Carson. To ensure success, the Army has directed Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to conduct a Gender Integration Study. The
Gender Integration Study surveys soldiers in formerly closed combat
arms MOSs and female soldiers currently serving in the Army. I have
been told that the results of this extensive study will help the Army
develop strategies to ensure the successful integration of women into
combat units and combat arms MOSs. I support the Gender Integration
Study as a necessary intermediate step to opening closed positions and
occupations.

4. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, you specified that the Army is
in the process of revalidating occupational standards for 14 previously
closed MOSs. How many positions are included in those closed
specialties?
Mr. Carson. I understand that there are approximately 100,000
positions in the now-closed specialties.

5. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, at what pace are you opening up
these positions?
Mr. Carson. The Army's plan has three decision points: December
2014 for the enlisted Combat Engineer MOS 12B, March 2015 for the three
Field Artillery MOSs, and July 2015 for the remaining occupations and
Army schools that are currently closed to women. We will decide to
either notify the Office of the Secretary of Defense of our intent to
open additional occupations and positions or request an exception to
policy to keep the remaining occupations and positions closed if we
cannot meet the Secretary of Defense's stated guidelines.

6. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, how many of these positions have
already been opened?
Mr. Carson. To my knowledge, the Army has opened 22,000 positions
since May 2012.

7. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, are you on schedule to meet the
timeline specified by the directive of Secretary Panetta and Chairman
Dempsey?
Mr. Carson. Yes.

8. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, in your testimony you mentioned
that the Army is revalidating the occupational requirements for the
previously restricted MOSs. Could you please describe the methodology
the Army is using to determine combat effectiveness?
Mr. Carson. Currently, TRADOC is conducting a Physical Demands
Study to establish occupation-specific accession standards for the
specialties that are currently closed to women. The U.S. Army Research
Institute of Environmental Medicine is assisting TRADOC by developing
valid, safe, legally defensible physical performance tests to assess
soldiers' abilities to perform the critical, physically demanding
duties inherent in currently closed MOSs.

9. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, is the expertise of service
women, and in particular of those women who have already participated
in combat operations and accompanied Special Forces into the field as
members of Female Engagement Teams, being sought out and utilized to
inform this process?
Mr. Carson. Yes they are. We are using a multitude of venues to
gain lessons learned from the experiences of female soldiers,
particularly those who have deployed, operated in Female Engagement
Teams, and/or been members of Cultural Support Teams. Their successes
enabled the Army to start opening positions in May 2012.

10. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Carson, in your testimony you stated
that the Army is not responsible for integrating the MOSs associated
with Special Forces. Could you clarify what role the Army has in
selecting individuals for service in its Special Forces and providing
guidance to Special Forces in ensuring that the most qualified
candidates are allowed to compete for positions, regardless of gender?
Mr. Carson. It is my understanding that Special Forces is an Army
occupational specialty and the assessment, selection, and training of
Special Forces soldiers are all conducted by Army personnel at the
certified Special Operations Forces (SOF) Center of Excellence.
However, Special Forces is funded by U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM), and the Army must coordinate changes to the Special Forces
MOSs with that combatant command. The Army, through U.S. Army Special
Operations Command, is working with SOCOM to ensure the most qualified
candidates will be able to compete for positions, regardless of gender.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
financial improvement and auditability
11. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, if confirmed, you would, of course,
serve as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) in charge of overseeing,
among other things, the Army's business transformation and financial
improvement efforts. In your testimony, in response to Chairman Levin's
question, you said that the Army is ``on track'' to meet both the
Statement of Budgetary Resources September 30, 2014, and the Financial
Statements September 30, 2017 auditability deadlines, but some
challenges remain. As to both the legislatively-required 2014 and 2017
deadlines, what are the greatest areas of risk to the Army's ability to
do so?
Mr. Carson. Though the Army has clearly achieved several
significant milestones, I understand that key challenges remain. First,
the deployment of our Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems
requires us to undergo considerable financial management changes, a
major challenge for an organization as large and complex as the Army.
Second, our dependence on service providers for significant portions of
our business processes also poses a risk to meeting these objectives. A
third challenge we face is quickly and effectively implementing any
corrective actions resulting from the ongoing audit by an independent
public accountant. Finally, funding uncertainties, government
shutdowns, and furloughs present risks to achieving auditability.

12. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, how is the Army mitigating those
risks and what additional steps would you take to adequately address
these risks?
Mr. Carson. I understand that the Army will continue the activities
that have facilitated success to date, particularly by following the
guidance established by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller). The Army will ensure change management is successful by
implementing effective controls and processes and transforming our
financial management organizations to be more effective and efficient.
We are working closely with our service providers to ensure they follow
these new controls and processes. As weaknesses from our current Exam 3
are identified, we will implement corrective action plans. The Army
leadership, both military and civilian, will continue the active
engagement that has helped establish the requisite accountability for
audit readiness support at all levels and across all Army commands.

13. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, who should be held accountable if
the Army misses either the 2014 or the 2017 deadline?
Mr. Carson. Army senior leaders, including the Under Secretary,
should be held accountable.

14. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, has the Army, in your view, been
successfully implementing Business Process Reengineering (BPR) in
connection with its auditability goals?
Mr. Carson. Yes. BPR is the centerpiece of our business process
improvement and audit readiness efforts. By leveraging our successful
deployment of the General Fund Enterprise Business System and the
results of several audit examinations, we have been continually
reengineering our processes to improve efficiency and audit readiness.
The Army Financial Improvement Plan is focused on long-term,
sustainable business process improvements rather than short-term,
manually-intensive efforts that are difficult or impossible to sustain.
This approach has resulted in several ``quick wins'' that have
confirmed the appropriateness and sustainability of the Army's plan.
Using an end-to-end process reengineering approach, we have
analyzed all Army financial and financial feeder systems, processes,
and controls to ensure comprehensive process optimization and
accountability. Also, we are linking IT portfolio optimization,
enterprise architecture, Lean Six Sigma-informed continuous process
improvement, and best business practices into a very powerful,
synergistic method of evaluation across all Army core business
processes. While we have made significant progress, there remains work
to do. However, I am confident that our efforts will broaden over the
coming years.

15. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, in June 2010, then-Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates said that the Department of Defense (DOD) must
significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its business
operations stressing the importance of changing how DOD does business.
Yet, to date, DOD has struggled to implement successful business
transformation because it has failed to fully utilize BPR. Do you agree
with Secretary Gates' comments and, if so, how will you improve the
efficiency of the Army's business operations?
Mr. Carson. Yes, I believe that this was an accurate assessment at
the time. In the years following Secretary Gates' comments, I
understand that the Army has made significant strides in BPR and in
improving the efficiency of the Army's business operations. We just
released our 2014 Business Transformation Report that highlights many
of our successful efforts in 2013. Going forward, if I am confirmed as
Under Secretary, I will continue to emphasize four efforts to improve
business operations: (1) achieving audit-readiness goals for 2014 and
2017; (2) improving the way we make cost-informed decisions for
enterprise functions; (3) ensuring the alignment of the activities of
the Headquarters, Department of the Army with those of DOD and Army
operating forces; and (4) increasing momentum in improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of our business operations. On the fourth
point, we will continue to drive costs down on the business portfolio
by reducing systems and reengineering high-cost processes. Also, we
will increase our BPR efforts to streamline processes and optimize the
systems that support it. Finally, we will maintain our support to the
Army's enterprise-wide Lean Six Sigma program in order to accelerate
Army-level BPR and help lower-level commands to make their own
processes more efficient.

16. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, how will you measure the success of
your efforts?
Mr. Carson. I think that an actively managed performance assessment
system is the key to measuring success, understanding our costs, and
helping the Army make better resource-informed decisions. The Army
Campaign Plan and the Army Business Management Strategy establish our
measures, and our business governance structure provides the mechanism
for Army leaders to routinely review progress, identify problem areas,
and develop timely strategies to overcome obstacles. In addition to
these, we will cooperate with the DOD Inspector General and Government
Accountability Office (GAO), undergo external and internal audits, and
utilize other sources of assessment to assist efforts to refine our
performance measures. If confirmed as Under Secretary and Chief
Management Officer (CMO), I will work to ensure that we have the right
performance assessment mechanisms in place to measure progress and
adjust our plans as needed.

17. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, what do you believe is the role of
ERP systems in improving how the Army does business?
Mr. Carson. The Army's four ERP systems are the backbone to a
connected and integrated Army business environment. While each ERP has
a unique functionality, they share valuable data, reduce inefficiencies
in our business activities, and provide the internal controls and
traceability required for a credible financial management system. Our
ERPs are paramount for achieving audit-readiness.

18. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, how do you plan to implement
lasting cultural change so that new processes are both welcomed and
quickly accepted by Army personnel in connection with the Army's
financial improvement/business transformation efforts?
Mr. Carson. In my opinion, active, multi-echelon change management
is the key to ensuring that Army personnel readily adopt new processes.
I believe that education and training are the most important elements
for lasting, transformative cultural change. To that end, we are
reviewing our education and leader development programs to place more
emphasis on leader roles in performance assessment and process
improvement. Likewise, we are reengineering our institutional training
programs to include hands-on training across the full range of our new
ERP systems.
I also feel that to effect change, we must also be responsive to
user and customer feedback. I am confident that our change management
plans include the right mechanisms to receive and consider user inputs
and that our culture and personnel will adapt as necessary to embrace
these new processes.

19. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, if confirmed, how would you make
the redesign of the Army's business processes, wherever warranted, a
priority?
Mr. Carson. The Army has specified the improvement of business
processes as a major objective of the Army Campaign Plan, and Under
Secretary Westphal recently published the Army Business Management
Strategy to provide detailed guidance in this area. If confirmed, I
will employ the principles in these documents to take an active role in
this important Army priority, which spans across all of our major end-
to-end processes and is driven by the development and successful
fielding of our ERP systems. I plan to press for the optimization of
business processes and the rationalization of the business Information
Technology (IT) portfolios that support them. Reducing costs and
improving effectiveness across our business operations would be among
my main priorities if I became Under Secretary.

20. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, what lessons did you learn from the
Air Force's failed Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) program?
Mr. Carson. The Air Force was very forthcoming about their ECSS
challenges when discussing ERP management with us. The biggest lesson
from ECCS--which was reinforced during our successful fielding of the
General Fund Enterprise Business System--is to reengineer existing
business processes to work within the ERP software rather than
customizing the software to fit existing processes. We also understand
the importance of having the right expertise on our government teams to
advise process owners on BPR efforts to align with the ERP software,
and not relying solely on the contracted system integrator to perform
this function. We have also taken steps to maintain stability within
our acquisition teams. Lastly, we understand the importance of internal
Army oversight processes over program duration. I am confident we have
learned the right lessons and have incorporated them into our plans to
ensure the successful fielding of Army ERPs and other business IT
systems.

21. Senator McCain. Mr. Carson, how would you ensure that the Army
effectively implements these lessons to current and future ERP
procurement efforts?
Mr. Carson. As the CMO of the Army, I would play a very hands-on
managerial role in the governance structure we have established to
continue to drive positive, meaningful change in the way the Army does
business. If confirmed, I will direct the continuation of our robust
audit and testing schedules to ensure we remain on track. I look
forward to a productive relationship and open dialog with our
acquisition executive as we apply those lessons to complete the
fielding of ERPs.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
army national guard
22. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, in your view, how has the Army
National Guard performed in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Mr. Carson. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army
Reserve (USAR) have performed admirably in Iraq and Afghanistan.

23. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, could we have accomplished the
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan without the National Guard?
Mr. Carson. No.

24. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, as the Army tries to maintain
readiness and necessary force structure under tighter budgets, do you
believe it makes sense for us to increase our reliance on the National
Guard?
Mr. Carson. It is my understanding that the Army plans to continue
its reliance on the Reserve component for operational depth and
critical expertise in meeting the National Military Strategy.

involuntary separations
25. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, to what extent has the Army
utilized involuntary separations to achieve end strength reduction
goals?
Mr. Carson. To my knowledge, the majority of end strength
reductions have been focused on reduced accessions and normal
attrition. The Army has used limited involuntary separations to meet
end strength goals for both officers and enlisted personnel.

26. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, how many enlisted soldiers and
officers have been involuntarily separated?
Mr. Carson. I have been told that under the Qualitative Service
Program (QSP), the Army selected 123 Active component (AC)
Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) and 37 NCOs from the ARNG and USAR for
denial of future service in fiscal year 2013. In fiscal year 2014, the
QSP denied continued service to 497 NCOs from the AC and 9 NCOs from
the ARNG and USAR. Under the Selective Early Retirement Board for
fiscal year 2013, 103 colonels and 136 lieutenant colonels were
selected for early retirement. 73 officers have also been identified
for early termination of selective continuation on active duty.

27. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, are the soldiers being separated
well-performing soldiers with multiple combat tours?
Mr. Carson. I understand that, in some cases, those identified for
separation were well-performing soldiers with multiple combat tours.
While it is certainly lamentable that some honorable soldiers' careers
will be truncated, the Army is also concerned that the overall force
may not have the proper rank structure or mix of specialties without
involuntary separations. The Army recognizes and appreciates the many
hard sacrifices its soldiers and their families make daily. However, we
maintain that a reasoned, measured approach to involuntary separations
is necessary to ensure that the Army's force structure can properly
meet mission needs and that we do not repeat the mistakes made during
the Cold War drawdown that left the force imbalanced.

28. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, to what extent do you anticipate
that the Army will have to use involuntary separations to achieve
future end strength reductions?
Mr. Carson. The Army will continue to use involuntary measures to
shape the force to the minimum extent possible; reduced accessions and
natural attrition will remain our primary levers to meet end strength.

29. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, setting aside the impact on a
soldier who is involuntarily separated, when soldiers see their
brothers and sisters in arms, especially those not eligible for
retirement, forced to leave the Army after multiple deployments and
years of faithful service, what impact could this have on unit morale
and readiness?
Mr. Carson. Involuntary separations remain difficult and inevitably
impact the morale of the force. As discussed above, the Army will
eschew the use of involuntary separations except when it is absolutely
necessary. We will also continue to actively communicate to the
soldiers and their families about the impact of budgetary constraints
and the possibility of involuntary separation.

30. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, do I have your commitment that you
will work to avoid involuntary separations?
Mr. Carson. Yes. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure that
lower accessions and natural attrition will remain the Army's preferred
means to meet end strength requirements. However, budgetary constraints
will likely require some involuntary separations.

31. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, are you aware of the requirement in
section 525 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 regarding reports on involuntary separation of members of the
Armed Forces?
Mr. Carson. Yes.

32. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, will you ensure the Army complies
with this reporting requirement?
Mr. Carson. Yes.

wounded warriors
33. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, recently the Army announced changes
to the organization of its Warrior Care and Transition Program. Can you
describe those changes?
Mr. Carson. Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) are located at major
Military Treatment Facilities and provide support to wounded, ill, and
injured soldiers who require at least 6 months of rehabilitative care
and complex medical management. The Army is restructuring the WTUs in
response to the scheduled withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and the
decline in the number of combat-wounded. The transition will be
completed by 30 September 2014. The changes are designed to improve
care and transition of soldiers through increased standardization,
increased cadre-to-soldier ratios, improved access to resources on
installations, and reduced delays in care. They are not related to
budget cuts, sequestration, or furloughs. The restructuring includes
inactivation of the WTUs at Fort Irwin, CA; Fort Huachuca, AZ; Fort
Jackson, SC; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; and the U.S.
Military Academy, West Point, NY. As of 21 January 2014, each location
has fewer than 35 soldiers assigned.
The restructuring plan also includes the inactivation of nine
Community Based Warrior Transition Units (CBWTUs) in Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Puerto Rico, Utah, and
Virginia. The CBWTUs currently provide services for Army Reserve and
National Guard soldiers who do not require day-to-day care, allowing
soldiers to continue their recoveries closer to home. CBWTU soldiers
will be re-assigned to 13 new Community Care Units (CCUs) at WTUs
located on Army installations. The Army will establish these CCUs at
Fort Carson, CO; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA, Forts Hood and Bliss,
TX; Fort Riley, KS; Fort Knox, KY; Forts Benning, Stewart, and Gordon,
GA; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort Belvoir, VA. Forts Belvoir and Knox will
each have two CCUs. The Puerto Rico CBWTU will become a Community Care
detachment under the mission command of the Fort Gordon Warrior
Transition Battalion. Soldiers will not have to move to those
installations or change their care plans to receive medical attention
after this reorganization.

34. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, why were those changes made?
Mr. Carson. As of 21 January 2014, the WTU population was 7,078.
This represents a decline of approximately 3,000 soldiers in the Army-
wide Warrior Care Transition Program population over the past 14
months, a result of reduced contingency operations (fewer soldiers are
arriving into WTUs/CBWTUs as fewer units deploy) and reduced
mobilization of ARNG and USAR soldiers. These changes will allow the
Army to scale the program to best meet the needs of the declining
population.

35. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, how can we sustain and improve the
quality support we are providing to our wounded warriors and their
family members?
Mr. Carson. The Army recognizes the care of our wounded, ill, and
injured soldiers as a sacred obligation. Be assured that the Army will
not falter in its commitment to the best care and transition of our
wounded warriors and their families. They will continue to receive the
best possible care and support as they transition either back to the
force or into civilian life as veterans.
The Army is constantly looking at ways to improve the care and
support for our wounded, ill, and injured soldiers and their families.
To that end, the Army has developed numerous programs. The
implementation of the Army's System of Health has empowered soldiers
and their families with tools to improve their resiliency as they heal.
The Army has also established Soldier Centered Medical Homes, which
bring health care to soldiers in need. Moreover, the Warrior Transition
Command conducts an annual review that includes all key Army
stakeholders to ensure we provide quality care to our soldiers and
their families.
The Army has also reorganized as part of ensuring that wounded
warriors receive optimum care. The force structure changes discussed
above reflect the inherent scalability of this program, which can
expand or contract while continuing to meet the evolving need. The
standardization of care and transition services brought about by the
force structure changes will continue to ensure that all soldiers
receive quality services and support across the Army.
In addition, the Army Medical Command and the Warrior Transition
Command actively participate in the congressionally-mandated
Interagency Care Coordination Committee which has studied and has made
informed recommendations for improvements to the Services' individual
programs for wounded, ill, and injured military members. These
recommendations have been incorporated into the Warrior Care and
Transition Program.
The Army also uses information gleaned from independent sources to
ensure continuous improvement; the Army Inspector General, DOD
Inspector General, Recovering Warrior Task Force, GAO, and other
auditing agencies monitor satisfaction levels of our wounded, ill, and
injured soldiers. They provide timely and accurate information that
allows the Army to continue to both sustain and improve the quality
support we are providing to our wounded warriors and their family
members.

modernization
36. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, what are the Army's top
modernization priorities?
Mr. Carson. My understanding is that, given significant fiscal
pressures, the Army's investment in modernized equipment and
capabilities will likely see reductions in the near-term. The Army will
continue to prioritize a range of investments focusing on incremental
upgrades to existing systems and new developmental programs. The Army's
top priorities include the Network, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle,
Paladin Integrated Management program, Armored Multipurpose Vehicle,
and aviation platforms such as the Apache, Chinook, and Blackhawk
helicopters.

37. Senator Ayotte. Mr. Carson, do you believe the fiscal year 2014
omnibus bill adequately resources the Army's modernization priorities?
Mr. Carson. The amount requested in the President's budget
submitted in fiscal year 2014 adequately addressed the Army's
requirements for modernization priorities. We are currently assessing
the impacts of the fiscal year 2014 appropriation on our equipment
modernization investments.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
army
38. Senator Lee. Mr. Carson, with the military's role in
Afghanistan coming to an end and reduced budgets due to sequestration,
the Army will likely need to undergo some form of restructuring. What
are the biggest factors that you will consider and will drive the way
in which Army restructures in the coming years?
Mr. Carson. The enduring priority of the Army is to preserve the
high-quality All-Volunteer Force. The Army is committed to the Total
Force Policy, in which the ARNG and USAR play key roles. In an era of
likely budget austerity, the biggest factors driving restructure will
be the need to meet the force and readiness requirements of the
National Military Strategy, while ensuring that the drawdown in Army
end strength is managed efficiently and equitably.

39. Senator Lee. Mr. Carson, the National Guard played a key and
essential role in the conflicts of the past decade. Do you believe that
its role and relationship to the Active components will change as our
troops withdraw from Afghanistan?
Mr. Carson. I believe that the ARNG provides operational
capabilities and strategic depth to meet our Nation's defense needs
across the range of military operations. It is my understanding that
there will be continuity in the relationship between the AC and Reserve
components after the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

40. Senator Lee. Mr. Carson, how should the National Guard figure
into the Army's need to cut costs in future years?
Mr. Carson. It is my understanding that the fiscal environment will
likely result in cuts to all components of the Army. If confirmed as
Under Secretary, I will work to ensure that the cuts are distributed
fairly across the components and are based solely on the best interests
of the Nation.
______

[The nomination reference of Hon. Brad R. Carson follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 6, 2014.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
Brad R. Carson, of Oklahoma, to be Under Secretary of the Army,
vice Joseph W. Westphal.
______

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Brad R. Carson, which was
transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was
referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Brad R. Carson
Education:
Baylor University

1985-1989
B.A., History

Oxford University

1989-1991
B.A./M.A., Politics, Philosophy, & Economics

University of Oklahoma

1991-1994
J.D.
Employment record:
Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C.

Attorney
September 1994-August 1997
Tulsa, OK

Department of Defense

White House Fellow
September 1997-December 1998
Washington, DC

Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C.

Attorney
January 1999-February 2000
Tulsa, OK

U.S. Congress

Congressman (2nd District - Oklahoma)
January 2001-January 2005
Washington, DC

Harvard University

Fellow, Institute of Politics
February 2005-May 2005
Cambridge, MA

Cherokee Nation Businesses, L.L.C.

Chief Executive Officer/Director of Business
Development
June 2005-November 2008
Catoosa, OK

U.S. Navy

Officer-in-Charge, MND-S, Weapons Intelligence Teams
December 2008-December 2009
Basrah, Iraq

University of Tulsa

Associate Professor & Director, National Energy Policy
Institute
January 2010-December 2011
Tulsa, OK

Department of Defense

General Counsel, U.S. Army
January 2012-present
Washington, DC
Honors and awards:
Military Awards

Bronze Star
Army Achievement Medal

Academic Awards

Rhodes Scholar
Bledsoe Award for Outstanding Law School Graduate at
the University of Oklahoma College of Law (1994)
Phi Beta Kappa
Magna cum laude, Baylor University
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain
senior military officers as determined by the committee, to
complete a form that details the biographical, financial and
other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon.
Brad R. Carson in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Brad Rogers Carson.

2. Position to which nominated:
Under Secretary, U.S. Army.

3. Date of nomination:
November 21, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
Winslow, AZ; March 11, 1967.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Julie Kruse Carson.

7. Names and ages of children:
Jack David Carson; age 8.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Baylor University, B.A., 1989, 1985-1989
Oxford University, B.A./M.A., 1991 (1989-1991)
University of Oklahoma, J.D., 1994 (1991-1994)

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
U.S. Congressman, 2nd District of Oklahoma, January 2001-January
2005, Washington, DC.
Fellow, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, February
2005-May 2005, Cambridge, MA.
CEO & President/Director, Cherokee Nation Businesses, LLC, June
2005-December 2008, Catoosa, OK.
Officer-in-Charge, Weapons Intelligence Teams, MND-S, December
2008-December 2009, Iraq.
Associate Professor of Business, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Tulsa, December 2009-January 2012, Tulsa, OK.
Director, National Energy Policy Institute, University of Tulsa,
December 2009-January 2012, Tulsa, OK.
General Counsel, U.S. Army, Department of Defense, 2011
(confirmed)/2012 (assumed duties)-present.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Oklahoma Bar Association, Member, 1994-present.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or
any public office for which you have been a candidate.
U.S. Congress, 2nd District of Oklahoma.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered
to all political parties or election committees during the last 5
years.
Obama for America National Finance Committee, 2006-2008.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign
organization, political party, political action committee, or similar
entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Williams for City Council, 2011, $500
Smith-Soap for Chief, 2011, $5,000
Obama Victory Fund, 2011, $1,000
Reid for Senate, 2010, $1,000
Edmondson for Governor, 2010, $4,000
Gumm for Senate, 2010, $1,000
Williams for House, 2010, $500
Burrage for Senate, 2010, $2,000
Boren for Congress, 2010, $2,000
Paddock for State Superintendent, 2010, $750
Adelson for Mayor, 2009, $3,000
AmeriPac, 2008, $2,500
Adelson for Senate, 2008, $2,000
Hoskin for House, 2008, $250
Rice for Senate, 2008, $250

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions
for outstanding service or achievements.
Bronze Star, 2009
Army Achievement Medal, 2009
Board of Directors, National Job Corps Association, 2005-2008
U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce Ten Outstanding Young Americans,
2002
Rhodes Scholar, 1989-1991
White House Fellow, 1997-1998
Exceptional Contribution to Legal Services of Eastern Oklahoma,
1996
Bledsoe Award for Outstanding Law School Graduate from The
University of Oklahoma, 1994
Adjunct Professor of Law (Law and Literature), University of Tulsa
College of Law, 1997
Legal Services of Eastern Oklahoma, Board of Directors, 1997

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
``The Liberal Moment What Happened?'' in Symposium Issue of
Democracy: A Journal of Ideas (along with Michael Sandel, Michael
Walzer, Danielle Allen, William Galston, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Reich,
Katha Pollit, and Joe Klein) (Spring 2010)
``The Claremore Diarist'' in The New Republic (November 22, 2004)
``Does the Democratic Party Have a Future?'' in The Weekly Standard
(September 16, 2002) (review of The Emerging Democratic Majority by
Judis and Texeira)
``Pay to Play,'' in Blueprint Magazine (May 31, 2005)
``The Fall of the House of Representatives'' in Democracy: A
Journal of Ideas (September 2006) (review of The House: A History Of
The House Of Representatives by Remini)
``Smart Development Subsidies'' in Democracy: A Journal of Ideas
(part of ``20 Ideas for the Next President'') (Spring 2008).
Tate v. Browning-Ferris Industries: Oklahoma Adepts A Common Law
Action For Employment Discrimination, 46 Okla. L. Rev. 557 (1993).
Legal Issues Facing Small Businesses And Their Owners (with Michael
Troilo) in Human Resource Management in Small Business (New Horizons In
Management) (eds. Cooper and Burke)
Federal Appellate Practice (with Robert E. Bacharach) in Appellate
Manual For Oklahoma Lawyers (eds. Muchmore & Ellis) (3 vols.) (1997)
The Economics of Renewable Energy, in The Handbook of Energy
Finance (Wiley. 2012) (ed. Simians)
Renewable Energy Economics (available at www.ssm.com)

17. Commitments regarding nomination, confirmation, and service:
(a) Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing
conflicts of interest?
Yes.
(b) Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?
No.
(c) If confirmed, will you ensure your staff complies with
deadlines established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
Yes.
d) Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
Yes.
(e) Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
Yes.
(f) Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request
before this committee?
Yes.
(g) Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Yes.
______

[The nomination of Hon. Brad R. Carson was reported to the
Senate by Chairman Levin on January 28, 2014, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on February 12, 2014.]
----------

[Prepared questions submitted to Dr. William A. LaPlante by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions, particularly with respect to the role of the service
acquisition executives?
Answer. I agree with the goals of these defense reforms; indeed
they have yielded a demonstrated improvement in the joint warfighting
capabilities of the U.S. military. I do not currently see the need for
any modifications.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. None at this time.
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition?
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition is
the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) for the Air Force, the senior
position authorized to exercise, on behalf of the Secretary, overall
responsibility for acquisition functions within the Air Force.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I possess more than 28 years of experience in defense
technology including positions at the MITRE Corporation and the Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. I have also served as
member of the Defense Science Board, a special advisor to the U.S.
Strategic Command's Senior Advisory Group and Naval Research Advisory
Committee.
Prior to entering public service, I was the Missile Defense
Portfolio Director for the MITRE Corporation. In this role, I led a
technical team providing analytic and system engineering expertise
across the Missile Defense Agency portfolio of ballistic missile
defense systems. Previously, I was the Department Head for Global
Engagement at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
(JHU/APL) where I was responsible for all of APL's work supporting
offensive military capabilities. Additionally, I was a member of APL's
Executive Council and served on many other Laboratory leadership
initiatives. As a senior manager at both MITRE and JHU/APL, I've had
the opportunity to successfully lead large organizations with
significant technical missions in support of the Department of Defense
(DOD) and its major research and acquisition programs.
In the brief time I have been in the government, I have been
extremely impressed with the dedication and professionalism of the Air
Force acquisition workforce as well as OSD. I am absolutely committed
to help the Air Force Acquisition Enterprise achieve the levels of
excellence, including improving acquisition outcomes, that I know it
can.
Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Acquisition?
Answer. No; however, if confirmed, important to my success in this
role will be my continued interaction, engagement and collaboration
with other senior leaders engaged in the defense establishment, such as
the other Component Acquisition Executives, the Defense Acquisition
Executive, and the Air Force leadership. Additionally, continued
interaction, engagement and collaboration with the scientific community
and defense industry will be a foundation of acquisition success. I
intend to heavily leverage my network of defense and technology experts
across the government, industry, and academia.
relationships
Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be
with:
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics USD(AT&L) is DOD's most senior acquisition official. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Mr. Kendall on all matters
related to acquisition, technology, and logistics programs impacting
the Department of the Air Force. In my present role, I have a very good
professional relationship with Mr. Kendall and I have found him to be
extremely effective and helpful to Air Force efforts to execute our
largest and most visible programs.
Question. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology.
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Principal
Deputy on all matters related to acquisition, technology, and logistics
programs impacting the Department of the Air Force. In my present role,
I have a very good professional relationship with Mr. Estevez and if
confirmed, I look forward to continuing that relationship.
Question. The Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for
and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the
Department of the Air Force. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
the solid working relationship of the past as a direct report
responsible to the Secretary for all acquisition, research, and
development. In my present role, I have already had significant
interaction with Secretary James and have found her to be extremely
engaged and supportive of Air Force acquisition success.
Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Air Force is authorized, subject
to the Secretary of the Air Force's direction and control, to act for
and with the authority of the Secretary of the Air Force on all matters
for which the Secretary is responsible; that is, to conduct the affairs
of the Department of the Air Force. If confirmed, I would continue to
foster a close working relationship with Mr. Fanning to ensure that
policies and resources are appropriate to meet the needs of the Air
Force.
Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Assistant
Secretaries of the Air Force and foster teamwork and information
sharing in order to carry out the goals and priorities of the
Department of the Air Force and in cross cutting areas where horizontal
integration of Air Force people and resources is required and provides
best value to DOD, the combatant commanders, and the taxpayer.
Question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force is subject to the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force,
presides over the Air Staff, and is a principal advisor to the
Secretary. In addition, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he is
a military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and
the Secretary of Defense. The relationship between the Assistant
Secretary and the Chief of Staff is extremely important. If confirmed,
I would continue to foster a close working relationship with General
Welsh to ensure that policies and resources are appropriate to meet the
needs of the Air Force and respect his additional responsibilities as a
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.
Answer. The General Counsel is the chief legal officer and chief
ethics official of the Department of the Air Force and serves as the
senior legal advisor to Air Force leaders. He is responsible, on behalf
of the Secretary of the Air Force, for the effective and efficient
provision of legal services in the Air Force. If confirmed, I will
continue to foster a good working relationship with the General
Counsel.
Question. The Service Acquisition Executives of the Army and Navy.
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing the close
working relationship with Mr. Sean Stackley and Ms. Heidi Shyu. A
strong national defense will require joint capability portfolios,
reduction of program redundancy, improved joint interoperability across
service centric platforms, and increased joint R&D and acquisition
initiatives with new organizations and processes that cut across
traditional stovepipes. As senior leaders in acquisition in the
Department, all three SAEs must work together to reshape the defense
enterprise.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will
confront the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition?
Answer. The Air Force Acquisition Enterprise is exceptionally
capable and continues to deliver the world's best and most advanced
weapons and other capabilities. After having been in the Principal
Deputy position for over 8 months, I have a much better understanding
of the challenges and opportunities facing the Air Force Acquisition
Enterprise. My initial assessment is that the Enterprise has the
following areas of concern that require attention: the challenges
linked to declining and unstable budgets as well as the need to better
manage and develop the acquisition workforce. Furthermore, while
progress has been made on acquisition improvement via initiatives such
as Better Buying Power, the Air Force acquisition community will need
to continue to improve cost and schedule performance. The often well
cited challenges to do better up front systems engineering, robust risk
management, assessment of technology maturity levels, and disciplined
approaches to requirements development and changes, are all areas that
are improving in the Air Force but still have ways to go to
systemically improve acquisition outcomes across the enterprise. This
must be sustained over a long term to have lasting impact, and if
confirmed, will be my areas of emphasis.
The budgetary environment challenges acquisitions directly by
impacting the dollars available to develop, procure, field and sustain
systems, as well as indirectly, including the recent furloughs and
government shutdown cutting into the time available for the workforce
to accomplish essential tasks. Budgetary limitations and instability
will be a fact of life for the foreseeable future. While both the Air
Force and DOD are taking steps to mitigate these challenges, there is
no doubt the current environment will impact existing programs.
Minimizing the impact to key programs like the KC-46 Tanker, F-35, the
Long-Range Strike Bomber and others, is a major challenge.
Additionally, I have witnessed how budget uncertainty has made it
extremely difficult for our program managers to manage established cost
and schedule baselines; for example driving decisions toward short term
contracts and strategies that may be less efficient for the taxpayer
than longer term ones (such as multi-year contracts).
The performance of the workforce is even more impressive given the
environment in which they are performing. With the likelihood of a
shrinking workforce, it is essential we develop a workforce structure
that is agile enough to realign program staffing and skill mix to meet
evolving mission needs. The desired end state should be to ensure solid
functional career management while permitting the flexibility to better
realign the workforce when necessary. We also need to closely monitor
the morale and associated attrition rates of our highly skilled early
career personnel--the past year has impacted our workforce in ways we
are still trying to understand, and we must minimize any negative
effect on the broader long-term effort to revitalize the acquisition
workforce.
Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for
addressing these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will focus on forcing the Enterprise to
determine if a capability requirement is worth the cost. In my current
position, I have stressed how requirements can drive cost, with the
intent of guiding the community to evaluate how changing or reducing a
requirement, even slightly, can have significant cost and schedule
ramifications. Cost/schedule versus capability trade-off curves are a
valuable tool in identifying which requirements are key cost drivers
and can assist in the assessment of which requirements can be reduced.
The Configuration Steering Boards (CSB) and the Air Force Requirements
Oversight Council (AFROC) provide two forums to evaluate requirements
priorities and trade-offs, and while the AFROC has been essential to
this task, I am seeking to increase the effectiveness of CSBs in this
regard. Finally, the acquisition community has demonstrated its
commitment to cultivating a strong working relationship with the
requirements community, and the teamwork between acquisitions and
requirements will continue to pay dividends as we face a challenging
future.
While there are a number of initiatives in work to help the Air
Force reduce the cost of programs, I think the most important thing I
can do is to increase the senior leadership emphasis on execution. I
will personally hold Program Executive Officers (PEO) and individual
program managers accountable for the outcomes of their programs. To
enable this, quarterly and Annual Acquisition Performance Assessments
of the Acquisition Enterprise are reported and assessed. These can be
an invaluable tool to evaluate the state of acquisition cost, schedule,
and performance.
Workforce qualifications are another major challenge facing the
enterprise. It will be essential that personnel in key positions have
knowledge and experience in specific program domains and phases. I have
been impressed in my short tenure as Principal Deputy in the quality of
the workforce in our key programs; challenges that need attention are
to build depth in the talent as well as building mechanisms for
increased mobility and flexibility to quickly move top talent to high
need programs.
Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would
you establish to address these challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with our new Secretary of
the Air Force as well as our Chief of Staff of the Air Force to
establish an action plan that aligns with their priorities for Air
Force Acquisition in order to address these areas. I see these
challenges as an opportunity to revamp the Air Force Acquisition
Enterprise to be more efficient and effective.
priorities
Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish
for Air Force acquisition, research, and technology?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to focus on what I consider some of
the Air Force's most challenging problems in the acquisition arena. My
preliminary assessment is that our effectiveness is often measured by
how well we execute our most visible programs; however, the discipline
and tradecraft with which we do so also makes us successful in the
execution of our less visible, smaller programs. Rightfully so,
acquisition performance will be judged by our weakest programs, not our
strongest. We must continue to develop and grow our acquisition
workforce to ensure it can keep our most critical acquisition programs
on track, but so that we can also ``own the technical baseline'' for
our weapon systems and other capabilities. We must strengthen our
organic ability to develop, produce, field and sustain the most
technologically advanced systems this world has ever known. I believe
this priority is consistent with our new Air Force Secretary's priority
to take care of people, which includes recruiting, training and shaping
a quality force.
Sound resource execution is another critical focus item so that we
can more effectively stretch the benefit of every dollar with which we
are entrusted. Our Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) has identified as
a priority the need to ensure our Air Force remains the most capable in
the world at the lowest possible cost. In this environment of declining
resources and budget uncertainty, we must be extremely efficient and
effective in how we plan to use, and ultimately spend our scarce fiscal
resources. Mr. Kendall's Better Buying Power Initiatives are a good set
of guiding principles that help us to be effective resource stewards.
Finally, we have a responsibility to develop and deliver the Air
Force capabilities required to fight and win in the 2023 timeframe and
beyond. Among other things, this means being able to fight and win in
highly contested environments, including being challenged in space,
control of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and cyber. I believe this
priority meshes well with our SECAF's priority to balance today's
readiness with tomorrow's modernization. As we preserve the Service's
current readiness posture, our Air Force must also make investment
decisions that will ensure we remain the most capable Air Force in the
world in the 2023 and beyond timeframe. This requires that we invest in
important science and technology advancements, maintain a global
technology horizon scan to identify emerging disruptive technologies,
and developing comprehensive modernization and recapitalization
strategies designed to keep our Air Force the greatest in the world.
major weapon system acquisition
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given decreasing defense budgets, the
historic cost growth trends for major systems, and the continuing costs
of ongoing contingency operations?
Answer. Yes. Air Force Acquisition is responsible to uniformed
servicemembers and the American taxpayers to ensure that they have the
best equipment at the best value. I support USD(AT&L)'s affordability
initiative to establish goals and caps to ensure funding limitations
are identified early and revalidated at milestone decisions. If
programs exceed their affordability goals, the Air Force will make a
decision to restructure the programs so they are affordable.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the
requirements and resource communities to ensure programs have clear,
achievable requirements and realistic funding profiles.
Question. What would be the impact of a decision by the Department
to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?
Answer. Air Force requirements are carefully structured to ensure
the service can support its needs based on current threats. Any
reduction of major systems will affect our overall. Any reduction of
major system purchases will result in reduced force structure. Such
reductions to planned force structure will impact the Services ability
to meet COCOM requirements, thus affecting readiness. I am committed to
ensuring that all Air Force programs meet their affordability goals to
best support the warfighter.
Question. Specifically, are sufficient funds allocated in future
years' budgets to execute the Air Force's current acquisition plans for
major systems, including, but not limited to, the F-35, KC-46, the
Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B).
Answer. The deep cuts brought on by sequestration-level funding has
forced the Air Force to make profound cuts to readiness and major
defense acquisition programs funded out of investment accounts in order
to achieve the targeted reduction amounts in the first few years of the
fiscal year defense plan. When forced to make tough decisions, I
understand the Air Force will favor new capabilities over upgrades to
legacy forces. I understand the top three acquisition priorities remain
the KC-46, the F-35, and the LRS-B. As best as possible, the Air Force
will aim to protect these programs in the current fiscal environment.
Question. Nearly half of DOD's major defense acquisition programs
have exceeded the so-called ``Nunn-McCurdy'' cost growth standards
established in section 2433 of title 10, U.S.C., to identify seriously
troubled programs. Section 206 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009 (WSARA) tightened the standards for addressing such
programs.
Answer. The Air Force is committed to reducing costs across all
acquisition programs. The Air Force closely tracks execution and
provides guidance as necessary to keep efforts ``on track''. The number
of Nunn-McCurdy breaches has declined significantly since the mid-2000s
(fiscal year 2005-2008 had 26 breaches over 14 programs). Over the past
3 years, the Air Force has had 5 programs declare a significant or
critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. Of those, three are no longer Major
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) (C-27J, C-130AMP, and National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System), one was
driven by a combination of quantity reductions and cost growth (Global
Hawk), and one resulted from restoration to MDAP status (EELV). This
past year, the Air Force had no Nunn-McCurdy breaches.
Question. In your opinion, what is the root cause for cost growth
in the Department's major weapon system programs?
Answer. The 2013 USD/AT&L Report on the Performance of the
Acquisition System lists three dominant root causes of Nunn-McCurdy
cost growth over the past 3 years. Poor Management effectiveness was
the primary root cause and included: poor systems engineering to
translate user requirements into testable specifications; ineffective
use of contractual incentives; poor risk management; and poor
situational awareness. Additional dominant root causes are unrealistic
baseline cost and schedule estimates and changes in procurement
quantities.
Question. To what extent does requirements creep and changes in
requirement quantities impact cost growth triggering Nunn-McCurdy
breaches?
Answer. These two factors may impact Unit Cost growth. Changing
requirements based on warfighter needs can lead to cost and schedule
growth. However, as the Air Force has worked to better integrate the
requirements and budgeting process, changing requirements is being seen
less as a driver, and I expect that to remain so, especially as we move
into an era of decreased budgets. Although over the past 3 years, only
22 percent of Nunn-McCurdy breeches were driven by changes in
procurement quantities, I am concerned with the impact budget
reduction-driven changes in quantities will have on Defense programs in
an environment of declining resources.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
address the out-of-control cost growth on DOD's major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. DOD, in concert with recent legislation such as WSARA, has
begun to address much of the cost growth seen in the past. This may be
evidenced by the reduced number of Nunn-McCurdy breaches over the past
few years. As a cautionary note, many of the WSARA reforms as well as
the related Better Buying Power initiatives are going to take years to
affect the final acquisition outcomes of programs; for that reason it
is critical that the enterprise be persistent in their dissemination
and application. If confirmed, I am committed to working with fellow
SAEs in supporting the Department's efforts in Better Buying Power
implementation and related foundational reforms of WSARA. The intent of
this effort is to contain cost growth to provide the warfighter
increased capability with decreased costs--truly better buying power. I
am particularly focused on controlling cost and schedule growth of
development programs as that is where we can perhaps see the biggest
impact in the near to mid-term.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe that the Air Force
should consider taking in the case of major defense acquisition
programs that exceed the critical cost growth thresholds established in
the ``Nunn-McCurdy'' provision?
Answer. Under such circumstances, there are mechanisms in place
that allow for major restructuring or termination of poorly performing
programs. While program terminations are rare, the Air Force
leadership, working in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Staff has the authority to cancel programs. In
this era of sharply declining budgets, it would not be surprising to
see program terminations used more frequently in the case of troubled
programs.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Defense Acquisition
Executive and PEOs to ensure the Air Force continues to avoid programs
exceeding thresholds. PEOs have been tasked with implementing Program
Integration precepts which organize and synchronize the analyses and
outputs that programs must carry out into a comprehensive process.
Examples of analyses are cost estimating, schedule management, earned
value management, and integrated risk analysis. The program integration
function assists them in overseeing proper and efficient execution of
the efforts within their respective portfolios.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes to the Nunn-McCurdy
provision, as revised by section 206?
Answer. I do not currently envision any required changes to the
current provision.
Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether to
recommend terminating a program that has experienced critical cost
growth under Nunn-McCurdy?
Answer. If a program has a Nunn-McCurdy breach, then OSD conducts a
review and certification process to meet the requirements as laid out
in title 10, U.S.C., section 2433. My recommendation to continue or
terminate a program would be based on an assessment of program
execution performance, remaining risk, and Air Force needs.
Question. What principles will guide your thinking on whether
someone should be held accountable for Nunn-McCurdy breaches?
Answer. An investigation into the decisions, and information
available at the time of the decisions, are considered prior to making
an accountability determination for anyone in the acquisition execution
chain. Using well established best practices, we must arrive at root
cause of acquisition failures before moving to the steps of assessing
accountability. Accountability must also be directly tied to authority
and resources. If an individual did not have the authority or the
resources to properly execute their program due to budget, cost,
schedule, technical or other factors outside of their control, then the
individual cannot and should not be held accountable. In all cases, if
confirmed I am committed to giving our program managers and PEOs the
right authorities, responsibilities, and then holding the chain of
command accountable for the outcome.
possible revisions to dodi 5000.02
Question. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics Frank Kendall has recently released revisions to
Department of Defense Instructions (DODI) 5000.02, which governs the
defense acquisition system.
What are the top five changes to this instruction you would
recommend to streamline or otherwise improve the defense acquisition
system?
Answer. I am still in the process of reviewing the recent revision
to DODI 5000.02, but if confirmed, I look forward to working with Mr.
Kendall on continuing to streamline and improve the defense acquisition
system.
Question. What is your understanding of the objectives of the
review effort?
Answer. My understanding is the objectives of the review was to
publish a revised instruction that: decreased emphasis on ``rules'' and
increases emphasis on process intent and thoughtful program planning;
provides program structures and procedures tailored to the dominant
characteristics of the product being acquired and to unique program
circumstances, (e.g., risk and urgency); enhances the discussion of
program management responsibility and key supporting disciplines; and
institutionalizes changes to statute and policy since the last issuance
of DODI 5000.02.
operating and support costs
Question. The Department estimates that operating and support (O&S)
costs account for up to 70 percent of the acquisition costs of major
weapon systems. Section 832 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 requires the Department to take a series of
steps to improve its processes for estimating, managing, and reducing
such costs.
What is the current status of the Air Force's efforts to implement
the requirements of section 832?
Answer. The Air Force has implemented the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2012, section 832 through comprehensive guidance on assessing, managing
and controlling operating and support (O&S) cost for major weapon
systems. The Air Force is working with key stake holders on readiness
and O&S funding drivers to balance readiness and cost in weapon system
sustainment strategies. Examples of ongoing section 832 related
initiatives include: implementation of guidance requiring life cycle
sustainment planning documents to include comprehensive sustainment
strategy and cost information; implementation of independent logistics
assessments to ensure effectiveness of sustainment planning; and the
establishment and monitoring of program affordability targets.
Question. What steps remain to be taken to implement section 832,
and what is the Air Force's schedule for taking these steps?
Answer. The Air Force, in a collaborative effort between
acquisition and sustainment leadership, is taking steps to increase the
effective implementation of performance based product support per
guidance from OSD (AT&L). Current actions expected to be completed in
2014 include establishing a program evaluation methodology, identifying
a high payoff target program list, and finalizing implementation
strategy recommendations.
Question. Regarding section 832(b)(8), what Air Force processes are
being performed to ensure O&S costs are reduced by ensuring the depot
maintenance considerations are part of the entire acquisition process?
What additional processes are required to further bring down O&S costs
by ensuring depot maintenance considerations are part of the entire
acquisition process?
Answer. Through implementation of statute and regulation, Air Force
guidance requires early and continuous consideration of depot
maintenance including at oversight reviews and in life cycle planning
documentation. Additionally, the Air Force is already taking steps to
shift the organizational and cultural focus of acquisition headquarters
to adopt an Integrated Life Cycle Management and portfolio perspective.
I have no additional process recommendations, but if confirmed, I will
continue to look for opportunities to reduce O&S costs.
Question. What steps, if any, are needed to ensure that the
requirements and acquisition communities fully and effectively
collaborate to understand and control the O&S costs prior to and early
in product development, when it is possible to have the most
significant impact on those costs?
Answer. In November 2012, as a direct result of the Acquisition
Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) 2.0 effort, the Air Force
implemented policy titled ``Implementation of Contractual and
Requirements Sufficiency'' to address Life Cycle Affordability Cost
versus Capability Tradeoff Analysis at all requirements and acquisition
review boards. The policy mandates cost/schedule versus capability/
design trade-off curves (metrics) throughout the life of the program.
Implementing Commands, such as Air Force Materiel Command, support the
requirements sponsor by providing the analysis for all developmental
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
documents.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the Air
Force needs to take to bring O&S costs under control?
Answer. In concert with the logistics community, Air Force
Acquisition is focusing efforts on the design, development, and
delivery of life cycle supportable and sustainable systems and the
appropriate support equipment. The goal is to enhance warfighter
mission capabilities while minimizing corrosion, environment, safety,
and occupational health risks along with minimizing life cycle system
product support costs. The Air Force is also linking weapon systems
sustainment resources to readiness measures to optimize cost versus
readiness.
systems engineering
Question. One of the premises for WSARA was that the best way to
improve acquisition outcomes is to place acquisition programs on a
sounder footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in
the early phases of the acquisition process. The Defense Science Board
Task Force on Developmental Test and Evaluation reported in May 2008
that ``the single most important step necessary'' to address high rates
of failure on defense acquisition programs is ``to ensure programs are
formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy from the
beginning.''
Do you believe that the Air Force has the systems engineering and
developmental testing organizations, resources, and capabilities needed
to ensure that there is a sound basis for key requirements,
acquisition, and budget decisions on major defense acquisition
programs?
Answer. The Air Force has been successfully building towards
achieving the systems engineering resources and capabilities required
to perform important acquisition activities. Sound systems engineering,
especially early on, is fundamental to ensuring there is a sound basis
for requirements and that they are affordable, as well as ensuring we
implement and execute a successful acquisition program strategy. To
this end, the Air Force continuously evaluates the resources and
capabilities necessary to supply systems engineering support to
acquisition programs. In the process of getting to the necessary
systems engineering workforce resource levels, the Air Force has been
consistently hitting our yearly goals and there is a plan in place for
more improvements for fiscal year 2014. In addition, there is currently
a significant enterprise-level effort to evaluate and improve
deficiencies in Air Force systems engineering capabilities to enable
high quality engineering decisions, improve engineering discipline
through technical information management and standardization, as well
as continuously address engineering workforce issues.
In terms of test and evaluation, the Air Force test personnel,
facilities, equipment are first class, adequate and efficient. The Air
Force Materiel Command reorganization to a 5-center construct has
improved management of developmental test. At this time, my concern is
that budget pressures will reduce available test resources which may
ultimately increase weapon system cost and warfighter risk.
Question. Are all the steps which the Air Force takes to ensure a
viable systems engineering strategy necessary to achieve the goals
articulated in the 2008 Report? Specifically, which processes and
procedures provide little or no value added, or for which any value
added is outweighed by the cost or schedule delay of the processes or
procedures. In addition, what elements of organizations and layers of
review are redundant and unnecessary, add cost, or create schedule
delays without adding commensurate value.
Answer. Section 102 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act
required systems engineering to support key three key requirements.

1. Acquisition and budget decisions made for each major defense
acquisition program prior to Milestone A approval and Milestone B
approval through a rigorous systems analysis and systems engineering
process.
2. Include a robust program for improving reliability,
availability, maintainability, and sustainability as an integral part
of design and development within the systems engineering master plan
for each major defense acquisition program.
3. Identify systems engineering requirements, including
reliability, availability, maintainability, and lifecycle management
and sustainability requirements, during the Joint Capabilities
Integration Development System process, and incorporate such systems
engineering requirements into contract requirements for each major
defense acquisition program.

All three of the key requirements have been implemented and I
consider value added. The program Systems Engineering Plan and the
execution of this plan is key to accomplishing the requirements. In
addition, the Air Force has streamlined program technical oversight
reviews, when determined necessary by the Air Force Chief Engineer, to
minimize added cost while being value added to ensure program success.
The Air Force assists the Deputy Assistant of Secretary of Defense
Systems Engineering Program Support Reviews which are completed for
ACAT ID, MAIS programs, and special interest programs.
Question. What is your assessment of the Air Force's implementation
to date of section 102 of WSARA, regarding systems engineering?
Answer. I am pleased by the good working relationship that Air
Force acquisition has with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Systems Engineering. We work with his staff to make improvements in
WSARA focus areas and we collaborate to document the status of Air
Force systems engineering in the annual WSARA Report.
Specifically, the Air Force is making progress implementing two
important areas cited in section 102 of WSARA, early systems
engineering and reliability. In 2013, SAF/AQ helped establish the Air
Force Requirements Review Group (AFRRG) in order to increase program
success by tightening the linkage between requirements development and
acquisition. SAF/AQ participates in the AFRRG, allowing Air Force
engineers to ensure tight linkage between requirements, technology
maturity, and accomplishment of sufficient early systems engineering to
inform cost and capability analyses.
In the area of reliability, the Air Force continues to collaborate
with OSD and the Army and Navy through the Service Leads meetings held
by DASD(SE). We have aided efforts refining the DAES Reliability Growth
Curve (RGC) reporting requirement mandated under DTM 11-003, the
development and review of the OSD R&M engineering management guide,
improving RAM-C Rationale Report Guidance, and the ongoing human
capital initiatives for the RAM workforce.
Question. What additional steps will you take, if confirmed, to
implement this provision?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to refine Air Force
engineering enterprise governance to enable high-quality engineering
decisions and seamless communication. Air Force engineers must have the
technical expertise to build a strong collaborative partnership with
industry to ensure we acquire and field the capabilities the Air Force
needs while ensuring the American taxpayers' interests remain a
priority. Furthermore, hiring the best and brightest talent is
challenging in this fiscal environment but must also continue to be a
priority. I will exercise my authority as Air Force Scientist and
Engineer Career Field Functional Authority to explore and pursue, as
cited in section 102, additional authorities or resources needed to
attract, retain, and reward systems engineers with appropriate levels
experience and technical expertise to meet Air Force needs.
technological maturity
Question. Section 2366b of title 10, U.S. Code, requires the
Milestone Decision Authority for a major defense acquisition program to
certify that critical technologies have reached an appropriate level of
maturity before Milestone B approval.
What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to make sure that
the Air Force complies with the requirements of section 2366b?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Air Force continues to
comply with 2366b certification requirements. The Air Force has
established robust compliance processes that I will monitor and
continue to improve upon. For example, the Technology Readiness
Assessment (TRA) process has been reestablished and guidance is being
published to ensure a formal, independent assessment of critical
technologies. In accordance with this guidance, TRAs will be conducted
by a team of subject matter experts, carefully selected from the
Centers' engineering and scientific community, prior to Milestone B.
These experts will verify the technologies are sufficiently mature to
meet the Milestone B 2366b certification requirement, and their TRA
report will be approved by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering before a program is
recommended to proceed to Milestone B.
Question. Are you satisfied that technology readiness assessments
adequately address systems integration and engineering issues which are
the cause of many cost overruns and schedule delays in acquisition
programs?
Answer. No. While technology readiness assessments are essential to
help avoid many cost overruns and schedule delays, they are not
sufficient as a stand-alone solution for systems integration and
engineering risks. The expertise of a professional engineering
workforce within the Air Force acquisition community to perform early
systems engineering analysis is also critical to addressing these
challenges. This workforce must balance the integration of:

(1) Overall systems engineering design and process,
(2) Concerns for operational mission requirements,
(3) The state of current available technologies (TRLs 8 & 9),
(4) Near-term technologies in laboratory development (TRLs 4-6),
and
(5) Increasingly stringent concerns for funding and schedule
realism.

An engineering workforce effectively addressing these issues
earlier in the program will help mitigate cost overruns and schedule
delays in future systems.
Question. Beyond addressing technological maturity issues in
acquisition programs, what other steps should the Air Force take to
increase accountability and discipline in the acquisition process?
Answer. It would be unreasonable to hold a program manager
accountable for program failures for which he/she has inadequate
authorities or resources to affect outcomes. If confirmed, I will
continue to improve accountability and discipline in acquisitions by
first ensuring program managers have the adequate authorities to
execute their missions. I am committed to vigorously defending the
authorities granted to the program manager and ensuring he/she
continues to have the required expertise and resources to lead our
programs successfully. Finally, the culture must allow for program
managers to be able to ``raise a flag'' if they assess the program they
are to manage is not executable.
Question. What features of an acquisition program, in your view,
contribute most to the effective maturation and integration of advanced
technologies?
Answer. Competitive prototyping, when practical and affordable, is
important because it drives technology maturation early in the
acquisition, enables effective systems engineering, and allows the
warfighter to see the potential capability demonstrated in an
operational or relevant environment. This leads to the most effective
maturation of technology with the minimization of programmatic risk.
concurrency
Question. Some of the Department's largest and most troubled
acquisition programs appear to have suffered significantly from
excessive concurrency--the effort to produce a weapon system, even as
it is still being designed.
What impact do you believe that such excessive concurrency has on
our efforts to produce major weapon systems on schedule and on budget?
Answer. With any strategy there are risks of cost growth and
schedule slippages. Concurrency is often highlighted as a reason for
cost growth. Unfortunately, research into this acquisition strategy is
sparse. A study published in the July 2011 edition of the Defense
Acquisition Research Journal found that ``concurrency by itself is
insufficient to predict cost growth''. There may be other factors, such
as quantity, requirements and budget changes that create cost growth.
Surprisingly, the study found that ``too little concurrency was
actually more problematic than too much concurrency'' and could
contribute to greater cost growth.
Mr. Kendall has spoken extensively on this subject. He has noted
that excessive concurrency can drive cost growth and result in major
schedule disruptions that produce further inefficiency. One must keep
in mind that the acceptable degree of concurrency between development
and production depends on a range of factors including the risk
associated with the development phase, the urgency of the need, and the
likely impact on cost and schedule of realizing that risk. A careful
balance must be struck on every program, taking all these factors and
others into account. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
DAE and PEOs to ensure that balance is carefully assessed and properly
managed.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to address this
issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will weigh the risks with the potential
rewards of concurrency and make informed decisions that are in the best
interest of the Air Force and the taxpayer.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that it
is useful and appropriate to require prime contractors on major defense
acquisition programs to share in concurrency costs?
Answer. If the driving reason for taking on concurrency would
benefit the prime contractor in executing the contract and the risks
and rewards were acceptable to the Air Force, I believe that both
parties should share in the concurrency costs and share in both the
risk and reward.
Question. In your view, would a requirement for such cost sharing
reduce the likelihood of excessive concurrency in the development and
production of major weapon systems?
Answer. Yes. If both parties have ``skin in the game,'' then the
likelihood of taking on concurrency will be a deliberate decision by
both parties to accept the risks and rewards.
unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations
Question. Many acquisition experts attribute the failure of DOD
acquisition programs to a cultural bias that routinely produces overly
optimistic cost and schedule estimates and unrealistic performance
expectations. Section 201 of WSARA seeks to address this problem by
promoting early consideration of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and
performance objectives in major defense acquisition programs.
Do you believe that early communication between the acquisition,
budget, and requirements communities in DOD can help ensure more
realistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
ensure such communication?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to shift the
organizational and cultural focus of acquisition headquarters to adopt
an Integrated Life Cycle Management and portfolio perspective. This
will help address WSARA section 201 and will align acquisition
headquarters with life cycle organizational changes already made in the
field headquarters and amongst the PEO organizations. The main shift
will be having our acquisition program element monitors partnering with
the O&S program element monitors and other functional staff to ensure
that all actions are a result of total life cycle deliberative process.
Question. DOD has increasingly turned to incremental acquisition
and spiral development approaches in an effort to make cost, schedule,
and performance expectations more realistic and achievable.
Do you believe that incremental acquisition and spiral development
can help improve the performance of the Air Force's major acquisition
programs?
Answer. Yes. While not a panacea, using an incremental acquisition
approach (e.g. block) can help improve program performance. This
approach is premised on knowledge-based, incremental development that
provides increasing degrees of warfighting capability with each block.
This is the preferred strategy that provides the most effective balance
of technical risk, financial resources, and the Air Forces' operational
needs.
Question. What risks do you see in the Air Force's use of
incremental acquisition and spiral development?
Answer. If implemented correctly, there would be modest to very
little technical risk to using such a strategy. If not correctly
implemented, incremental development could result in the program being
overwhelmed with frequent milestone or fielding decision points and
associated approval reviews. It is important to structure programs so
multiple activities or build phases may be approved at any given
milestone or decision point, subject to adequate planning, well-defined
exit criteria, and demonstrated progress. Having a well-trained
acquisition workforce is critical to mitigating the risk since the use
of incremental development can lead to additional complexities in all
phases of the program including testing, management, sustainment, and
security.
Question. In your view, has the Air Force's approach to incremental
acquisition and spiral development been successful? Why or why not?
Answer. The Air Force has had successes with both incremental
acquisition (Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, F-16, F-15) and
spiral development (Ops software for Air Operations Centers). We
consider both approaches fundamental in our acquisition strategies.
However, using incremental/spiral development strategies with the
emerging technologies in MDAP or MAIS programs must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis as there is no one solution that works best. We have
found that incremental acquisition/spiral development approaches using
mature technologies are critical in both IT and non-IT systems as they
allow capability to be delivered to the warfighter faster.
Question. What steps if any do you believe are needed to ensure
that the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime can
accommodate incremental acquisition and spiral development approaches?
Answer. While the Service is working to make our processes more
flexible and complementary to accommodate incremental acquisition and
spiral development approaches, more can be done to take additional
steps to make these approaches more amenable. We can start with working
on budgeting models that are more flexible to shorter timelines. This
is similar to the concerns raised in the section 804 report about the
budgeting lag and difficulty in differentiating appropriations for some
of the new technology.
For testing, we have to continue to strengthen the integrated
testing approach to ensure that we are using dollars and testing
activities more efficiently. We have made strides in the requirements
community in implementing methodologies that allow us to set high level
requirements through the formal process and standing up lower level
boards to manage requirements for increments and releases, but we need
to continue on working on setting realistic and executable requirements
up front. Finally, demanding open architecture designs for our programs
is critical to helping enable cost effective spiral development; this
leads to a need for government and industry to arrive at mutually
agreeable terms on data rights ownership.
Question. How should the Air Force ensure that the incremental
acquisition and spiral development programs have appropriate baselines
against which to measure performance?
Answer. As part of implementing statute and regulation, Air Force
guidance requires each program or increment to have a baseline
establishing program goals--thresholds and objectives--for the minimum
number of cost, schedule, supportability, and performance parameters
that describe the program over its life cycle.
funding and requirements stability
Question. The poor performance of major defense acquisition
programs has also been attributed to instability in funding and
requirements. In the past, DOD has attempted to provide greater funding
stability through the use of multi-year contracts. More recently, the
Department has sought greater requirements stability by instituting
Configuration Steering Boards (CSB) to exercise control over any
changes to requirements that would increase program costs.
Do you support the use of CSBs to increase requirements stability
on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes. In my current position, I have received a CSB briefing
on every ACAT I program. I have found them to be an effective forum for
stabilizing requirements of major defense acquisition programs. CSBs
provide a collaborative environment for rigorous scrutiny on
controlling derived requirements and I believe they will continue to be
a value-added function.
Question. What other steps if any would you recommend taking to
increase the funding and requirements stability of major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. Funding and requirements stability are critical to stable,
successful programs. The acquisition community has an obligation to
work closely with the requirements and other stakeholder communities to
ensure programs have clearly defined and achievable requirements with
realistic funding profiles. I have found that the Defense Acquisition
Management System tends to have optimism baked in (overoptimistic
schedules, cost estimates, execution plans). The acquisition community
must guard against overoptimistic planning and remain engaged with
stakeholders throughout the process to enable requirements and funding
profiles that are inherently stable because they are realistic and
affordable.
Question. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has
recently launched an initiative to ensure ``appropriate trade-offs are
made among the life-cycle cost, schedule, and performance objectives,
and procurement quantity objectives in the establishment and approval
of military requirements.'' Specifically, the JROC has issued guidance
that ``encourages Program Managers, Program Executive Officers and
Component Acquisition Executives, in coordination with the requirements
sponsor, to officially require requirements relief, through the
appropriate requirements validation authority, where Key Performance
Parameters appear out of line with an appropriate cost-benefit
analysis.''
If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure the continued
success of this initiative?
Answer. The Air Force has taken steps to incorporate the
appropriate trade-offs during the requirements development and
validation process as part of the Capability Based Analysis and
Analysis of Alternatives. During program execution, the Air Force
continues to address trade-off opportunities in CSBs and Air Force
Review Boards. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the
Secretary, Chief, and other departmental offices to foster a culture of
teamwork with the Requirements and Resource Communities to ensure the
programs started have firm cost goals in place, appropriate priorities
set, and the necessary analysis to make these informed trade-offs to
keep programs within affordable limits while meeting warfighter needs.
fixed price-type contracts
Question. Recent Congressional and DOD initiatives attempt to
reduce technical and performance risks associated with developing and
producing major defense acquisition programs so as to minimize the use
of cost-reimbursable contracts.
Do you think that the Air Force should move towards more fixed
price-type contracting in developing or procuring major defense
acquisition programs? Why or why not?
Answer. I prefer not to make blanket statements regarding the use
of contract types as I believe it's important to match the contract
type to each specific and unique circumstance. That said, cost-type
contracts are generally the best option to explore concepts, mature
technologies and buy down risk during development. Cost-type contracts
may also be appropriate during system integration when performing Low
Rate Initial Production (LRIP). Once a program is in production, fixed-
price contracts become a more appropriate contract type. What is
fundamental is to understand risk.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would
be appropriate for the Air Force to use a cost-type contract for the
production of a major weapon system?
Answer. Initial production of satellites is a situation where cost-
type contracting is often appropriate. Often in this situation, the
LRIP number is so low that the initial production space vehicles may
begin production prior to the LRIP space vehicles completing final
integration testing. Production actuals are key to an effectively
negotiated fixed-price agreement. The low production volume for
satellites does not usually allow cost visibility to be carried over
until later production lots enter production.
technology transition
Question. The Department continues to struggle with the transition
of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons
systems and platforms. Further, the Department also has struggled with
moving technologies from DOD programs or other sources rapidly into the
hands of operational users.
What impediments to technology transition do you see within the Air
Force?
Answer. I see resource constraints and risk as the greatest
impediments to technology transition. Technology transition has a cost
and in our current fiscally constrained environment, this is among the
greatest impediments. The Air Force will continue to carefully assess
costs associated with sustaining existing weapon systems vice
recapitalizing with new ones, all while ensuring we continue to meet
the needs of the warfighters. Our industry partners continue to invest
in and share incredible technological advances, but, we simply cannot
afford to pursue them all. Those the Air Force chooses to pursue
introduce risk into development programs, especially in instances where
the technology has never before been integrated into similar
capabilities or designs. It is imperative that defense program managers
perform adequate risk assessments of such technologies and develop well
thought out risk mitigation plans. Once a choice is made to pursue a
new technology, the program team must effectively utilize early systems
engineering and integration, sound technology maturation techniques and
carefully manage associated lifecycle costs.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to enhance
the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will facilitate effective communication of
capability gaps and promising technologies between the warfighter and
S&T communities. As a former member of the Defense Science Board, and a
key contributor to the recent DSB Study on ``Technology Enablers for
Military Superiority in 2030,'' I am committed to finding, developing,
and transitioning technology into our systems. I will further champion
the continued investment in innovative technologies important to
ensuring the best Air Force in the world remains the most capable in
the future. For those technologies that we pursue, I will emphasize
strong early systems engineering and integration, and when appropriate,
prototyping, to reduce schedule and cost risks. I also look to
collaborate with organizations such as small business. Small businesses
drive the majority of our technology revolutions, while our large prime
contractors lead integration, prototyping, and major program
production. If confirmed, I will place increased emphasis on large
prime contractor partnerships with innovative small business companies.
Question. What can be done from a budget, policy, and
organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies
from science and technology programs and other sources, including small
businesses, venture capital funded companies, and other non-traditional
defense contractors, into acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, with regards to policy, I will focus on
ensuring the warfighter's prioritized capability gaps are appropriately
communicated and aligned with the efforts of our laboratories and
industry partners, to include small businesses and venture capitalists.
I will continue to coordinate efforts with my counterparts in the other
Services and in OSD to maximize the return on our investment and
continue to sustain/modernize the most capable warfighting force in the
world.
With regards to budget, I will ensure appropriate cost assessments
are accomplished for technologies available for transition, enabling
effective decisions in a fiscally constrained environment. I intend to
reach out to the small business, venture capital, and non-DOD
traditional industrial base to leverage technology innovations of
benefit to the future Air Force.
Finally, if confirmed, I will continue to assess, and when
necessary, make required organizational adjustments, to maximize our
ability to effectively transition technologies from our S&T community
to the warfighter.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force's science and
technology organizations have the ability and the resources to carry
technologies to higher levels of maturity before handing them off to
acquisition programs?
Answer. The Air Force Research Laboratory has the ability to mature
technology to Technology Readiness Level (TRL)/Manufacturing Readiness
Level (MRL) 6/7 and then in partnership with our Program Executive
Officers and Centers to take that technology to TRL/MRL levels of 8 or
9 where it can be transitioned into a program of record. The Research
Laboratory does a phenomenal job balancing the resources associated
with research, applied research and technology development. If more
resources are prioritized for increasing the level of maturity, then
resources for longer-term activities decrease or fewer projects are
selected to be matured at a higher level.
A major challenge is securing funding for the demonstration and
evaluation of technology that is at TRL/MRL 6/7. This is why the role
of our Program Executive Officers is so important. They serve as the
transition agent between the lab and the warfighter.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Air Force should
take to ensure that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce
technical risk in programs so that technological maturity can be
demonstrated at the appropriate time?
Answer. With limited funding, it's critical we prioritize our
efforts and allocate resources appropriately. To accomplish this, we
must clearly understand our warfighter's capability gaps, the potential
capability inherent in the new technology, and the cost associated with
maturing, integrating and transitioning it to the warfighter. These
steps will enable effective investment in research programs that will
maximize the benefit to the warfighter and ensure the continued
national security of the United States.
Question. What role do you believe Technology Readiness Levels and
Manufacturing Readiness Levels should play in the Air Force's efforts
to enhance effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in
acquisition programs?
Answer. TRLs and MRLs play an important role in communicating the
development stage of the technology and the risk associated with
pursuing various research, development, test, and evaluation or
acquisition decisions. TRLs and MRLs are tools that should be
considered by stakeholders in determining whether to proceed with the
next stage of technology development. As a guide, TRL/MRL 6 indicates a
technology has reached the point where it should be considered for
demonstration. However, as Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall
often says, TRLs do not end the conversation about risk. TRLs may start
the risk conversation, and they may provide a convenient shorthand
benchmark, but they do not provide the answer to the question is the
risk acceptable to proceed. Mr. Kendall believes, as do I, good program
managers will take the TRL assessment and then perform a professional
risk assessment and produce well thought out risk mitigation plans
before moving forward.
Question. What is your view of the Rapid Innovation Program
established pursuant to section 1073 of the Ike Skelton NDAA for Fiscal
Year 2011?
Answer. The Rapid Innovation Program has been an excellent means
for the Air Force to communicate critical needs and solicit vendors to
respond with innovative technology solutions. The response to the
program has been overwhelming, and instrumental to the transition of
capability by small businesses. Over the last 3 years, the Air Force
has received submissions from thousands of vendors offering solutions
to critical Air Force needs. We have awarded over 60 projects directly
to small businesses and anticipate awarding another 25 by the end of
the year.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges to successful
implementation of this program?
Answer. The main challenge is centered on the overwhelming vendor
response to the program. Since the Rapid Innovation Fund started 3
years ago, we have reviewed over 2,200 white papers on innovative
solutions to our critical needs. Setting up and managing the program to
review these white papers, down-selecting only the most compelling, and
awarding contracts on the top 3 percent is challenging. We are up to
this task but it does take time to complete. The pressure on our
acquisition team, especially our contracting officers, intensifies
greatly with budget uncertainty. Last year due to the length of the
Continuing Resolution Authority, many of our contracts were not signed
until September, the final month prior to expiration of the funds.
Question. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
funds authorized and appropriated for this program are spent in the
most effective manner possible to promote the objectives of the
program?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor and improve the
established robust processes to increase the likelihood that these
technologies transition into programs of record. We have Air Force
transition agents identify critical focus areas, a fair and open
competition where subject matter experts from the field select winning
proposals, and rely on our transition agents to execute the contracts.
Ensuring direct Program Executive Office sponsorship from the beginning
is the way to guarantee a very effective use of the appropriated
monies. If confirmed, I will continue to capitalize and build on these
processes to enable decentralized execution with our transition agents
to ensure we have a high rate of success.
multi-year contracts
Question. The statement of managers accompanying section 811 of the
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 addresses the requirements for buying major
defense systems under multi-year contracts as follows: ``The conferees
agree that `substantial savings' under section 2306b(a)(1) of title 10,
U.S.C., means savings that exceed 10 percent of the total costs of
carrying out the program through annual contracts, except that multi-
year contracts for major systems providing savings estimated at less
than 10 percent should only be considered if the Department presents an
exceptionally strong case that the proposal meets the other
requirements of section 2306b(a), as amended. The conferees agree with
a Government Accountability Office (GAO) finding that any major system
that is at the end of its production line is unlikely to meet these
standards and therefore would be a poor candidate for a multi-year
procurement contract.''
What are your views on multi-year procurements? Under what
circumstances do you believe they should be used?
Answer. I believe multi-year contracts are appropriate if the
business case indicates they will provide significant savings and if
there is a strong commitment to the procurement. The economies of scale
linked to multi-years have the potential to generate substantial
savings and can present strong incentives for suppliers to reduce
negotiated price and cost. Because they create a multiple-year funding
commitment with penalties, the Business Case supporting such a
determination must clearly demonstrate an advantage to the Air Force
and the taxpayer.
Question. What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that
constitute ``substantial savings'' for purposes of the defense multi-
year procurement statute, title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 1A2306b?
Answer. There is historical support for 10 percent cost savings as
being adequate to justify the pursuit of a multi-year contract. While
this is a good rule of thumb, it is not an absolute determining factor.
Thorough analysis is required. The associated business case analysis
should demonstrate the savings associated with the contract would be
substantial in terms of the relative difference in price the Service
would pay otherwise for annual procurement and in terms of dollars
saved for the taxpayer.
Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, do you
anticipate that you would support a multi-year contract with expected
savings of less than 10 percent?
Answer. It is difficult to answer this question in absolute terms.
While generally, I would like to see a business case analysis
projection of at least 10 percent savings before proceeding, there may
be rare circumstances when I might support pursuing a multi-year with
just short of 10 percent projected savings. For example, if I had
strong confidence in the government contract negotiation team's ability
to achieve an excellent price for the Department, and if I had equal
confidence the Air Force will acquire the systems I might consider
supporting the multi-year.
Question. If confirmed, under what circumstances, if any, would you
support a multi-year contract for a major system at the end of its
production line?
Answer. I cannot imagine under what circumstances I would support a
multi-year contract for a major system at the end of its production
line; however, there may be a future situation where this would be
appropriate. The Business Case supporting such a determination would
have to clearly demonstrate an advantage to the Air Force and the
taxpayer.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a
multi-year contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that
have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost,
scheduling, or performance outcomes but which might otherwise comply
with the requirements of the defense multi-year procurement statute,
title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 2306b?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the DAE and
PEOs to correct circumstances which may have led to unsatisfactory
program histories. Once a program has demonstrated a capability to
deliver satisfactory cost, schedule, and performance outcomes, it may
become a candidate for multi-year procurement. The Business Case
supporting such a determination would have to clearly demonstrate an
advantage to the Air Force and the taxpayer.
Question. What is the impact of the Department's current budget
situation, in your view, on the feasibility and advisability of
additional multi-year procurement contracts for major weapon systems?
Answer. Given ongoing budget uncertainties, additional multi-year
procurement contracts for major weapons systems would have to be on a
longstanding program with many years remaining and the Business Case
supporting such a determination clearly demonstrates an advantage to
the Air Force and the taxpayer.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, should the Air Force
ever break a multi-year procurement?
Answer. The circumstances that I would consider ever breaking a
multi-year procurement would be if the contractor fails to perform, the
Air Force has significant changes to requirements, or the Business Case
supporting such a determination clearly demonstrates an advantage to
the Air Force and the taxpayer.
continuing competition and organizational conflicts of interest
Question. Section 202 of WSARA requires DOD to take steps to
promote continuing competition (or the option of such competition)
throughout the life of major defense acquisition programs.
What is your view on the utility of continuing competition as a
tool to achieve long-term innovation and cost savings on major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. I agree that implementing appropriate measures to ensure
competition throughout the life of a program, such as those identified
in section 202, can be a valuable tool to achieve long-term innovation
and cost savings.
Question. Do you believe that such continuing competition is a
viable option on major defense acquisition programs?
Answer. Continuing competition is a viable option on many major
defense acquisition programs, but may not be viable for all areas of
all major programs. It does require continued effort and management.
Question. If so, what steps if any can and should the Air Force
take to address this issue?
Answer. The Air Force should continue to address long-term
competitive effects of program decisions during periodic system or
program reviews.
Question. Section 203 of WSARA requires the use of competitive
prototypes for major defense acquisition programs unless the cost of
producing such prototypes would exceed the lifecycle benefits of
improved performance and increased technological and design maturity
that prototypes would achieve.
Do you support the use of competitive prototypes for major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes, I support the USD(AT&L) implemented policy changes to
address WSARA that increased focus on early and competitive prototyping
and all efforts that will result in improvements in the Defense
acquisition process. Competitive prototyping has the clear benefit of
protecting procurement flexibility by keeping multiple competitors in
the hunt during system development. In addition, it is key to
addressing several critical program issues, to include risk management,
assessment of technology maturation and integration, identification of
potential problems and assessment of the framing assumptions upon which
requirements are based. This contributes to the assessment of potential
trade-offs between requirements and cost. It is also useful in
establishing reliability growth potential and to help prepare systems
for manufacturing. Finally, it supports efforts to maintain the Defense
industrial base by funding companies to continue to develop
technologies and systems.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the use of
competitive prototypes is likely to be beneficial?
Answer. Competitive prototyping is likely to be beneficial when
more mature designs are required to begin manufacturing planning, to
reduce technological risk, to aid in developing operational
requirements, and the competition is likely to result in lower costs.
Competitive prototyping can be especially cost-effective when it can be
focused on individual subsystems and components or focused on
integration challenges, rather than prototyping full systems. Subsystem
and component prototyping is beneficial when there are critical
technologies that require significant innovation and maturation prior
to system integration. Competitive prototyping of integration issues is
valuable for programs that involve mature platforms, subsystems, and
components.
Question. Under what circumstances do you believe the cost of such
prototypes is likely to outweigh the potential benefits?
Answer. Competitive prototyping is likely to be cost prohibitive
when it requires complete prototypes of complex systems, especially
those with significant integration and technology maturation issues.
Additionally, there are certain sectors of the industrial base that are
low volume and highly technically specialized that may not support more
than a single vendor.
Question. Section 207 of WSARA required the Department to
promulgate new regulations to address organizational conflicts of
interest on major defense acquisition programs.
Do you agree that organizational conflicts of interest can reduce
the quality and value of technical support services provided to the Air
Force and undermine the integrity of the Air Force's acquisition
programs?
Answer. I agree that organizational conflicts of interest can
increase risk and that the quality and value of technical support
services provided to the Air Force would be impacted. It could also
undermine the integrity of the Air Force's acquisition programs.
Question. What is your understanding of the steps the Air Force has
taken to implement section 207 and the new regulations?
Answer. The Air Force revised acquisition policy and contracting
guidance to implement the requirements of section 207, including
reiterating restrictions on lead system integrators and inherently
government functions.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the Air Force
should take to address organizational conflicts of interest in major
defense acquisition programs?
Answer. I believe the current statutory and regulatory framework is
adequate to protect the government's interests in this area, but will
continue to look for opportunities to reduce risks to programs.
Question. What are your views on the use of system engineering and
technical assistance contractors that are affiliated with major defense
contractors to provide ``independent'' advice to the Air Force on the
acquisition of major weapon systems?
Answer. It is critical for advice to the Air Force to be truly
independent. In those instances where subject matter expertise is
required, I will seek to avoid any conflicts of interest so that advice
received is truly unbiased.
Question. What lines do you believe the Air Force should draw
between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently
governmental and those that may be performed by contractors?
Answer. It is my understanding that new Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulations Supplement provisions, coupled with heightened awareness of
the issue among the contracting workforce and changes in the defense
industrial base, have gone a long way to ameliorating the issue making
the likelihood of unmitigated Organizational Conflicts of Interests
less common. I will continue to support these efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that defense contractors do not misuse their access to sensitive and
proprietary information of the Air Force and other defense contractors?
Answer. Policies emphasize reliance upon competition at the prime
and subcontract levels to provide for innovation, flexibility, reduced
life cycle costs, and increased quality. The Air Force expects their
program managers and contracting officers to pay close scrutiny to the
government's best interests when a contractor may propose the use of
its own resources when other capabilities are available, and we Reserve
the right to consent to subcontracts to ensure that the government's
interests are adequately protected. I will continue to support these
efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what steps if any would you take to ensure
that defense contractors do not unnecessarily limit competition for
subcontracts in a manner that would disadvantage the government or
potential competitors in the private sector?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support Air Force policies that
emphasize reliance upon competition at the prime and subcontract levels
to provide for innovation, flexibility, reduced life cycle costs, and
increased quality. The Air Force expects their program managers and
contracting officers to pay close scrutiny to the government's best
interests when a contractor may propose the use of its own resources
when other capabilities are available, and the Air Force Reserves the
right to consent to subcontracts to ensure that the government's
interests are adequately protected.
contracting for services
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force can do more to reduce
spending on contract services?
Answer. The Air Force uses a mix of military, civilians and
contractors to accomplish its mission, and in today's fiscal
environment, we are looking at each for potential savings without
compromising mission effectiveness. In services acquisition, we are
examining opportunities to reduce costs through the use of enterprise-
wide vehicles as well as partnering with other Services and agencies.
We need to improve understanding of types of services being contracted
and ways they can be made more efficient.
Question. Do you believe that the current balance between
government employees (military and civilian) and contractor employees
is in the best interests of the Air Force?
Answer. I believe we must continue to examine this balance and to
ensure that inherently governmental functions are not outsourced.
Additionally, we must assess the work accomplished by military,
civilian, and contractor personnel to achieve the correct balance. For
services acquisition projects, the Air Force does have a process to
conduct these discussions during the requirements definition phase.
Question. What steps if any would you take, if confirmed, to
control the Air Force's spending on contract services?
Answer. The Air Force has made significant improvements in the
management of services acquisition--from requirements review to
contract execution. If confirmed, I will continue to refine these
processes, raise visibility and oversight, and partner with Major
Command Commanders and the Program Executive Officer for Combat and
Mission Support to maximize the effectiveness of available services
resources.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force has appropriate
organizations, capabilities, and procedures in place to manage its
service contracts?
Answer. Through the Single Manager for Services and Program
Executive Officer structures, the Air Force has successfully put in
place the right capabilities and processes to manage services
acquisition. Even with these advances, the Service is still examining
methods to increase effectiveness, such as engaging senior leaders to
improve their understanding of services related to their mission area.
We recognize this is an important area to manage and improve for the
taxpayer.
Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
develop such organizations, capabilities, and procedures?
Answer. N/A
Question. Section 863 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD
to establish a process for identifying, assessing, reviewing, and
validating requirements for the acquisition of contract services.
What is the status of the Air Force's efforts to implement the
requirements of section 863?
Answer. Focused on these same areas, the Air Force instituted a
requirements review process for services acquisitions in 2008 and
continues to refine it to address the requirements in section 863 and
meet the needs of the Service.
Question. What steps remain to be taken, and what schedule has the
Air Force established for taking these steps?
Answer. While the Major Command Commanders and SAF/AQ are involved
in the current requirements review process, the Service is expanding
the involvement of senior leaders who oversee their functional services
and expect to formalize their involvement in this process during fiscal
year 2014.
Question. What additional steps if any would you take, if
confirmed, to improve the Air Force's management of its contracts for
services?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to engage with senior leaders
within the Air Force and across the Department on requirements,
acquisition strategies and methodologies for managing the execution of
services acquisitions. I will work similarly with OSD AT&L.
Question. Do you believe that the use of Indefinite Delivery
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts are beneficial or harmful for the
acquisition of services?
Answer. If used correctly, Single- and Multiple-Award IDIQ
contracts are very beneficial. Our acquisition teams perform market
research to determine the appropriate strategy to meet the mission
requirement. In services acquisitions, the Air Force has been using
Multiple-Award IDIQ contracts extensively as they provide a continuous
opportunity for competition among a set of qualified contractors.
contractor performance of critical governmental functions
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees.
In your view, has the Air Force become too reliant on contractors
to support the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. I recognize this is an area of concern. The Service must
continue to examine mission requirements and ensure that inherently
governmental functions are not outsourced. If confirmed, I will review
the Air Force use of contractors in basic functions.
Question. Do you believe that the current extensive use of personal
services contracts is in the best interest of the Air Force?
Answer. I believe the appropriate use of personal services
contracts is in the best interest of the Air Force. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and title 10, U.S.C., section 129,
restrict the use of personal services contracts. While not extensive,
the Air Force does use it where authorized, such as in the medical
support area. If confirmed, I would continue to work with leaders
across the Air Force to ensure compliance with applicable laws and
policies.
Question. What is your view of the appropriate applicability of
personal conflict of interest standards and other ethics requirements
to contractor employees who perform functions similar to those
performed by government employees?
Answer. While they are prohibited from making decisions on behalf
of the government, I believe the rule set for these personnel should
more closely mirror the rule set of a government employee.
contracting methods
Question. In recent years, DOD has relied heavily on time-and-
materials contracts for the acquisition of services. Under such a
contract, the Department pays a set rate per hour for contractor
services, rather than paying for specific tasks to be performed. In
some cases, contractors have substituted less expensive labor under
time-and-materials contracts, while continuing to charge Federal
agencies the same hourly rates, resulting in effective contractor
profits of 25 percent or more.
What is your view of the appropriate use of time-and-materials
contracts by the Air Force?
Answer. In general, I prefer the use of almost any other type of
contract for services, but there are still limited situations where
time-and-materials contracts are appropriate. For example, time-and-
materials contracts may be appropriate when the Government lacks
historical data on the nature of work to be performed or there is a
large variation in the work to be performed. These situations prevent
the reasonable estimation of the resulting work and labor mix for an
effective task-based contract. If confirmed, I will strive to limit the
use of time-and-materials contracts to only appropriate situations and
provide effective oversight to prevent contractor abuse.
Question. What steps if any do you believe the Air Force should
take to minimize the abuse of time-and-materials contracts?
Answer. The Air Force began focusing on reducing the use of time-
and-materials contracts several years ago and if confirmed I will
continue these efforts. In fiscal year 2006, the Air Force spent
approximately $3 billion on time-and-materials contracts and that
number was reduced to $371 million in fiscal year 2013.
Question. Section 802 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 requires DOD
to promulgate regulations to ensure the review and justification of any
``pass-through'' contracts on which more than 70 percent of the work
will be performed by subcontractors.
What is your understanding of the status of the Department's
efforts to implement the requirements of section 802?
Answer. It is my understanding that a FAR case, 2013-012, was
initiated for this statutory provision. I also understand as part of
the rule making process some concerns were raised and I believe those
have been resolved and the case is moving forward in the process.
Question. What additional steps if any do you believe the Air Force
should take to address the problem of unjustified pass-through
contracts?
Answer. I support the idea of the language because it is in the
best interest of the Air Force and cost to the taxpayer.
better buying power
Question. DOD's Better Buying Power initiative provides acquisition
professionals with important guidance on how to achieve greater
efficiency, enhanced productivity and affordability in how the
Department procures goods and services.
What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the
Air Force's acquisition and contracting professionals implement this
guidance, and achieve intended results?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that all Air Force
acquisition and contracting professionals implement this guidance and
achieve the levels of success already seen to date. In my current
position, I have been actively engaged in promoting the concepts behind
Better Buying Power to our workforce, through visits to the field and
recognition of our personnel on individual successes and cost savings.
Additionally, the Air Force has set policy and guidance on a wide
variety of initiatives including Better Buying Power, and integrated
these tenets in all levels of acquisition reviews. This active
engagement is just the first step towards institutionalizing the
process and making it the new way of doing business.
Question. Which elements of this guidance, if any, do you disagree
with and would not expect to fully implement, if confirmed?
Answer. OSD's Better Buying Power initiatives are positive steps
towards achieving successful program management and acquisition
excellence. If confirmed, I look forward to working with USD(AT&L) to
implement the initiatives to the maximum extent possible.
Question. How would you measure how effectively the Air Force's
acquisition and contracting workforce is implementing the tradecraft
and best practices called for under this initiative?
Answer. Some of the initiatives are easier to measure effectiveness
than others, but one concrete example on which we are already seeing
great returns is the implementation of ``should cost''. The ``should
cost'' strategy is aimed at seeking out and eliminating low- and non-
value added aspects of program costs. Managers are then `rewarded' by
being given the opportunity to utilize those savings as additional
resources to support efforts within the program, the portfolio itself,
or elsewhere within the Department's acquisition community as deemed
appropriate and necessary.
The Air Force is actively gathering should cost data and reporting
our successes to OSD. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force realized $673
million in should-cost savings. Additionally, in fiscal year 2013, only
one program requested a should cost waiver, down from 79 percent of
programs in fiscal year 2012, which indicates that these initiatives
are becoming second nature. This is just one example of how the Air
Force has already accepted and begun to implement Better Buying Power.
If confirmed, I will continue to implement Better Buying Power to the
maximum extent possible, and I am confident we will continue to see
cost savings and other efficiency trends throughout the Air Force.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to implement the
following elements of the Better Buying Power initiative?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to the Air Force being the
leader in implementing Better Buying Power initiatives throughout DOD.
The Air Force has been at the forefront through preliminary
implementation and will continue to realize cost savings as these new
processes become more familiar.
(1) Sharing the benefits of cash flow
I agree with the Department's initiative to better align
profitability with performance goals, and with including the use of
cash flow as another incentive. If confirmed, I will emphasize training
and education for contracting officers on the benefits from cash flow
as an incentive tool during negotiations.
(2) Targeting non-value-added costs
The Air Force continues to make great progress with respect to
identifying opportunities to reduce and eliminate non-value added
costs. The Air Force is primarily doing this through our concerted
efforts aimed at implementing should cost based management practices.
The program executive officers are actively instilling a culture within
their portfolios that requires their program managers to continually
scrutinize each element of cost under their control and assess how it
can be reduced.
This should cost strategy is aimed at seeking out and eliminating
low- and non-value added aspects of program costs. Managers are then
`rewarded' by being given the opportunity to utilize those savings as
additional resources to support efforts within the program, the
portfolio itself, or elsewhere within the Department's acquisition
community as deemed appropriate and necessary.
(3) Mandating affordability as a requirement
The Air Force has already taken steps to improve management of
long-term affordability for Major Defense Acquisition Programs in the
establishment and tracking of Affordability Goals/Caps at the next
Milestone review. If confirmed, I would continue to work with the user
community to improve articulation of long-term affordability
constraints during the requirements process.
(4) Eliminating redundancy within warfighting portfolios
The staff is working hand-in-hand with the acquisition staffs of
the Navy and Army to assure everyone is meeting the intent of this
initiative. Last month the Senior Acquisition Executives provided a
status to AT&L regarding joint efforts to address this initiative. The
Air Force feels comfortable that processes and guidance are well-
established for the larger ACAT Programs across the Services. While the
Air Force believes that there are many processes in place to help
eliminate redundancy in the smaller ACAT programs, if confirmed, I will
continue to work together to assure duplication is eliminated.
interagency contracting
Question. What is your assessment of the risks and benefits
associated with the Air Force's use of interagency contracts?
Answer. A risk of interagency contracts is additional costs and
fees which could result in higher costs to the Air Force. One of the
primary benefits of interagency contracts is the ability to leverage
existing contracts to expedite contract award and delivery while
reducing duplication of effort. Interagency contracts can create an
efficient use of scarce resources and provide better support to our
warfighter. The use of existing vehicles makes sense and is encouraged
when it results in faster delivery for the warfighter at a fair and
reasonable price.
Question. Do you believe additional authority or measures are
needed to hold Air Force or other agency personnel accountable for
their use of interagency contracts?
Answer. No. The Air Force has a process that requires any Military
Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) or interagency transfer of
funds to be reviewed by the contracting officer. This ensures the
contracting officer engages the requiring activity to use the most cost
effective mechanism to receive the supply or service. This review has
been effective in ensuring the appropriate use of interagency contracts
while also maintaining control and accountability of MIPR'd funds.
Question. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for
assuring that the work requested by Air Force personnel is within the
scope of their contract?
Answer. Yes. Contractors are required by the terms and conditions
of their contract to inform the contracting officer if they believe
work is outside the scope of the contract. If asked to perform work
outside contract scope, the contractor must request the contracting
officer modify the contract and reach an agreement on the work and
resulting consideration.
acquisition of information technology
Question. Most of the Department's Major Automated Information
System (MAIS) acquisitions are substantially over budget and behind
schedule. In particular, the Department has run into unanticipated
difficulties with virtually every new business system it has tried to
field in the last 10 years. Section 804 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2010 required DOD to establish a new acquisition process for
information technology.
What role if any do you expect to play, if confirmed, in oversight
and management of the Air Force's acquisition of information
technology?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the MAIS stakeholders, to
include USD(AT&L), the Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information
Officer and functional communities, to provide rigorous oversight and
efficient management. I will actively engage in efforts to implement
important lessons learned from previous IT acquisition efforts.
Question. Do you believe that unique problems in the acquisition of
business systems require different acquisition strategies or
approaches?
Answer. Yes, I believe there are unique challenges associated with
the acquisition of information systems that call for the use of
acquisition approaches different from those normally used by the
Department for acquiring weapons and other systems. Under Secretary of
Defense Kendall often says that all acquisitions should be tailored to
the nature of the product being acquired. He has further noted that as
a class, business systems are products having characteristics that tend
to dictate a specific type of program structure. Additionally, there is
an existing requirement to keep Air Force business systems relevant
with evolving technology and ensure both current and planned systems
are meeting mission needs in a cost-effective way. In particular, the
success of the Service with these programs depends on the ability to
recognize, plan and execute to a roadmap for how each acquired system
will exchange very vast and complex sets of data within our existing
(``As-Is'') and future (``To-Be'') information architectures. Air Force
decision-makers at all levels must have clear policy and an effective
governance structure that they can translate into execution of a
tailored strategy to smartly acquire business systems--particularly at
the program manager level. Likewise, end-users must be accepting of the
changes a new business system will likely have on their operating
culture.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should
take to address these problems?
Answer. The Air Force is addressing these problems by moving away
from large-scale Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) programs, like the
former Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS), in favor of smaller-
scoped capability-based increments.
A perfect example of the Air Force's current efforts is the
Logistics Transformation Maintenance Repair and Overhaul initiative
(MROi). MROi is the first critical increment to transforming the Air
Force's entire logistics IT required functionality. Subsequent
capability initiatives will follow MROi, building upon each other to
ultimately achieve critical improvements across all areas of the Air
Force's logistics enterprise.
With both MROi and future business systems acquisition, the Air
Force will implement a more robust requirements definition process up
front that fully maps out our existing and required end-state
architectures before pursuing any materiel solution through the use of
Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) and related architecture
disciplines. Another key element of the application of these
architecture and BPR disciplines is the ability to scope the delivered
IT solution to a user-defined capability as opposed to a developer-
defined software release that may not be the most effective solution
for the user. This user focus serves as the basis for determining the
appropriate increments. The architecture and BPR disciplines provide
the means to manage and deliver smaller-scoped solutions and satisfy
mission objectives. This BPR rigor also ensures that the users'
requirements are defined correctly up front and remain stable through
the lifecycle of the program.
Question. What steps has the Air Force taken to implement the
requirements of section 804? What steps remain to be taken?
Answer. On November 26, 2013, OSD published a new DODI 5000.02 that
further clarifies policies, streamlines defense acquisition procedures
and eliminates redundant/conflicting guidance. As a result, the core
processes within DODI 5000.02 and the former Business Capability
Lifecycle (BCL) process are better aligned. The Air Force has also
strengthened the processes associated with Business Process Re-
engineering (BPR) and IT certification to further ensure acquired
capabilities meet mission needs. OSD DCMO, now working in concert with
USD(AT&L) is further refining these processes to better integrate its
key assertions into DOD acquisition guidance, in part as a result of
its previous joint efforts with the Air Force.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the Chief
Information Officer of the Air Force to take these steps?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to collaborate with our CIO
to identify and take steps needed to improve acquisition of information
technology and to leverage use of a common technology baseline across
Air Force IT systems. This common baseline will facilitate common
hosting standards and promote consistent security practices and
sustainment methods allowing us to bring new capabilities online more
quickly and at lower cost. If confirmed, I will also work with the CIO
to ensure cyber security is built into Air Force systems, leveraging
the processes of the newly defined Risk Management Framework.
Question. Some have argued that the current test and evaluation
process does not appropriately address the unique circumstances
applicable to the acquisition of information technology systems.
What steps if any do you believe the Air Force should take to
improve the test and evaluation process for information technology
systems, including their vulnerabilities in the face of a growing
cybersecurity threat environment?
Answer. The Air Force needs to better integrate developmental test,
operational test, and certification and accreditation activities to the
greatest extent practical. Programs should utilize early user
involvement, automated testing, and continuous monitoring of deployed
capabilities. To better address the growing cybersecurity threats,
programs will need to engineer and test mission assurance and cyber
security from the ground up.
Question. The Air Force planned for the Expeditionary Combat
Support System to be an ``underlying business system intended to tie .
. . [the Service's] transformation efforts together and provide a
holistic, end to end view of the . . . [Air Force's] logistics
enterprise.'' This was to be accomplished using commercial off-the-
shelf software. Unfortunately, after approximately 7 years and $1.03
billion the program was cancelled.
What lessons have you and the Air Force learned from this episode
and how will future MAIS programs be structured differently to ensure
such a result does not occur in the future?
Answer. The Air Force has learned a great deal from Expeditionary
Combat Support System (ECSS) and is following through on the specific
recommendations made in the Acquisition Incident Review (AIR) report.
Specifically, the AIR report found four contributing causes and six
root causes to the failure of ECSS. The four contributing causes were a
confusing and sometimes ineffectual governance structure; challenges
with tactics, techniques and procedures of acquisition tools;
difficulty of changing from our legacy systems; and a high rate of
churn among personnel and organizational structures. The six root
causes were the Air Force's lack of understanding of the data, lack of
understanding of the ``As-Is'' and ``To-Be'' architectures, lack of a
transition plan, lack of an execution plan, an unrealistic development
environment, and the fact that the right culture was not in place for
ECSS to be successful.
Following the release of the AIR report the Secretary of the Air
Force directed a review of existing major Air Force business systems to
determine to what extent the ECSS AIR lessons learned were being
incorporated, and recommended specific actions in addition to the AIR
report to further ensure mistakes made during ECSS are not repeated on
future programs. The Air Force is taking steps to ensure the
recommendations from both the AIR report and the Secretary of the Air
Force-directed review are fully implemented.
Several examples of Air Force actions to implement lessons learned
include: Standardizing practices to increase collaboration with
functional stakeholders earlier on in the acquisition process;
Blueprinting current architecture for our existing core logistics
systems; Applying rigorous Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) before
determining whether new materiel solutions are required and should be
pursued; Establishing Integrated Functional and Program Executive
Office teams to bolster co-accountability for program outcomes among
key stakeholders; Increasing training opportunities for end-users on
technology transition management curricula.
Question. The Department's Information Technology Enterprise
Strategy and Roadmap, dated 6 September 2011, proposes overhauling IT
policies to provide improved access to information, common identity
management, standardized Department-wide services/applications/tools,
streamlined IT acquisition, consolidated data centers, and cloud
computing services.
What reorganization, if any, do you believe will be needed in the
IT acquisition structures of the Air Force to achieve these objectives?
Answer. At this time, I do not believe the Air Force needs to
reorganize in the IT acquisition structures to achieve these
objectives. The Air Force is taking steps to clearly define roles and
responsibilities, develop common standards and to empower the CIO to
provide strategic direction and corporate investment inputs. These
steps will move us closer to these objectives and ultimately, improve
warfighting effectiveness across the cyber mission area.
Question. In your view, how fundamentally different, in ways
relevant to procuring needed defense capability effectively, is
acquiring information technology products and services from how the Air
Force more typically procures products and services?
Answer. The fundamental difference in procuring information
technology products and services is the greater use of rapidly evolving
commercial technology. Leveraging this commercial technology allows the
Department to more quickly deploy capabilities through shorter delivery
cycles, incremental and concurrent development and test, use of
established standards, use of common infrastructures and integrated
cyber-security. With shorter timelines and incremental capabilities,
there is a greater need for architecture and integration. The interim
DODI 5000.02 identifies models tailored for IT to better enable rapid
delivery and an incremental build process to reach full system
functionality.
Question. What specific changes, if any, would you recommend to
improve how the Air Force procures MAISs?
Answer. I would recommend clearly defining the roles and
responsibilities of the many MAIS stakeholders, to include AT&L, CIO,
DOT&E and the Chief Management Office. Additionally, in order for MAIS
acquisitions to be successful, there must be efficient execution
authority, improved governance and stable requirements throughout the
process.
Question. In your view, what are the implications of the challenges
and differences you discussed above on efforts by the Air Force to
procure effectively cyber-security products and services?
Answer. One implication is that much more collaboration will be
required in order to procure effective cyber-security products and
services. As we move towards more common and integrated capabilities,
the shared opportunities will be greater, but so will the shared risks.
The Air Force, other members of DOD and the Federal Agencies must act
in concert to implement cyber capabilities and security. Stakeholders
need to collaborate on everything from architectures, to acceptable
common technologies, to cyber-security strategies, and how to best
access and share information. Collaboration must be part of our
culture. Having been a member of the recent Defense Science Board Task
Force on Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat, I am
under no illusions that making our combat systems cyber resilient to a
competent adversary will be simple or easy. The magnitude of the
challenge to all of the Department here is significant and will be so
for the years ahead. We will need to systemically build resiliency in
at the beginning, continually assess end-to-end potential
vulnerabilities, and then implement countermeasures (whether they be
material solutions or new concept of operations/TTPs).
Question. Are there any special acquisition authorities not
currently available that if authorized could help address some of the
observed IT and cybersecurity-related acquisition shortfalls?
Answer. While not specifically an acquisition authority, a major
challenge with IT acquisition is the application of funding rules that
are based on traditional, non-IT weapon system procurement. As
identified in the 804 report, IT programs are currently funded with a
mix of three principal appropriations (Research and Development,
Procurement, and Operations and Maintenance), each with unique rules
and definitions that are based on funding for traditional weapon system
models. IT acquisition would benefit greatly from a specific
appropriation designed for unique IT needs and challenges. A specific
IT appropriation would also help the Air Force articulate, support and
defend the type and amount of funding needed to meet requirements.
Question. In your view, does the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) deliver enterprise computing services and provide IT
infrastructure in an operationally responsive and cost effective
manner?
Answer. It does, in most cases. Air Force systems continue to move
to the DISA services, to leverage this common, enterprise suite of
capabilities. The Air Force is working closely with DISA to
characterize Air Force IT infrastructure requirements and develop a
streamlined process for hosting Air Force systems. The Service expects
DISA to gain efficiencies through economies of scale and a la carte
menu of services.
Question. What specific recommendations would you make to improve
DISA's delivery of telecom and IT contracting, enterprise services, and
computing/application hosting?
Answer. Air Force engagement with DISA is essential to ensure that
the IT infrastructure and services DISA provides meet Service needs.
Competitive pricing, clearly defined standards and interfaces, and
increased collaborative engagement will continue to facilitate movement
to DISA services.
acquisition workforce
Question. Section 852 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008 established
an Acquisition Workforce Development Fund to help DOD address
shortcomings in its acquisition workforce. The fund provides a
continuing source of funds for this purpose.
Do you believe that the Acquisition Workforce Development Fund is
still needed to ensure that DOD has the right number of employees with
the right skills to run its acquisition programs in the most cost
effective manner for the taxpayers?
Answer. Yes. With the pressure on O&M budgets, the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF) has become even more
important to providing a highly capable acquisition workforce. As O&M
funds have been reduced, the Air Force has become much more reliant on
DAWDF to train and develop the acquisition workforce with both Defense
Acquisition University and Air Force specific courses. If confirmed, I
would also like to explore utilizing the fund to replenish skilled
personnel losses from retirements and attrition as well to adjust the
personnel skill mix as future needs dictate.
Question. What do you see as the most significant shortcomings, if
any, in the quality of the Department's acquisition and contracting
workforce?
Answer. I believe the Air Force has an exceptional workforce that
is executing very difficult tasks. The workforce receives excellent
training from Defense Acquisition University and other sources;
however, if confirmed, I intend to increase the emphasis of on-the-job
experience to put into practice the training received. The Air Force
needs to continue to address development of practical application
skills emphasizing technical and business acumen because classroom
training is not enough.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
addressing these shortcomings?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with OSD(AT&L) and Air
Force acquisition leadership at all levels to continue to improve the
training and development provided to the acquisition workforce. In my
current role, I've been directly involved in leading and communicating
workforce requirements through multiple forums including the OSD(AT&L)
acquisition workforce Senior Steering Board and Business Senior
Integration Group as well as the Air Force Leadership and Development
Review. Additionally I will continue to work closely with the Air
Force's Director, Acquisition Career Management who manages the Air
Force Acquisition Professional Development Program.
Question. How do you communicate those shortcomings to such
organizations as the Defense Acquisition University?
Answer. If confirmed, I will communicate shortcomings via the
forums identified above. Additionally, the Air Force Defense
Acquisition Career Manager and Functional Managers routinely
communicate training requirements to the Defense Acquisition University
and OSD counterparts.
Question. What specific skill sets or core competencies if any do
you believe to be vital the Department's ability to procure goods and
services effectively and are lacking within the Department's
acquisition and contracting workforce?
Answer. I believe improved business acumen is vital to acquisition
excellence. The Air Force should strive to leverage experience from
commercial industry as well as promote, track and leverage business
experience within the workforce.
Question. Do you believe that the Department's human capital plan
for the acquisition workforce includes adequate measures to acquire or
reconstitute these vital skill sets or core competencies?
Answer. Yes. I believe the incorporation of the DAWDF into the
Department's overall approach to the acquisition workforce has been the
most important addition to its human capital plan.
Question. What steps if any would you take if confirmed to improve
the Department's human capital plan for the acquisition workforce?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with OSD(AT&L) to
make replenishment of the acquisition workforce a focus of the human
capital plan. I will advocate use of the DAWDF to enable continued
entry level hiring of recent college graduates in order to backfill as
members move up, separate or retire. I will also explore modifying
existing demo programs to better target shortage skills using direct/
expedited hiring authorities.
science and technology
Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of science and
technology programs in meeting the Air Force's transformation goals and
in confronting irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive
threats?
Answer. The Air Force Science and Technology (S&T) Program prepares
and equips the warfighter to face threats in an uncertain future. The
Air Force S&T Program investigates game-changing technologies to
affordably transition the ``art-of-the possible'' into military
capabilities. The Air Force invests in research that addresses urgent,
near-term warfighter needs as well as research that will provide
revolutionary capabilities in the future.
Question. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding
funding targets and priorities for the Air Force's long-term research
efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will actively work with the Air Force S&T
Executive, the Air Force Chief Scientist and Air Force Research
Laboratory leadership to develop affordable research priorities and
resource those priorities accordingly.
Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to
assess whether the Air Force is making adequate investments in its
basic research programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Air Force's S&T
investment supports a balanced foundation of basic research, applied
research, and advanced technology development that will provide
demonstrated transition options for future warfighting capabilities.
The Air Force is currently working with OSD and Service counterparts to
identify appropriate leading indicators (such as metrics) to assess S&T
investments.
Question. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between
and among the science and technology programs of the military services
and defense agencies such as DARPA?
Answer. While there is always room for communication improvements,
I believe there is sufficient coordination. The Air Force, working with
the other Services, OSD, and their Agencies, have an extensive formal
coordination mechanism for S&T focused on areas with Defense
Department-wide utility. Currently, they have organized into 17
Communities of Interest covering technology areas such as materials and
manufacturing, cyber security, and autonomy. Service representatives
are engaged daily in nurturing and growing this formal approach to
address S&T needs and priorities.
Additionally, informal coordination, discussions, and debates that
happen at the individual researcher or program manager level with
counterparts in the other Services and Agencies through professional
societies and other avenues are just as important.
In many areas such as hypersonics, lasers, and cyber technology, AF
partnerships with DARPA, other agencies, and sister Services are
pushing the new capabilities that will keep the Air Force the best in
the world.
Question. What is the Department's role and responsibility in
addressing national issues related to science, technology, engineering,
and mathematics education and workforce development?
Answer. Nurturing the next generation of science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) professionals is an Air Force, DOD
and national concern. To maintain the U.S. military's decisive
technological edge, the Department must be able to recruit, retain and
develop a capable STEM workforce in the face of worldwide competition
for the same talent. An objective of the STEM Strategic Communication
Plan is to encourage all airmen to attract tech-savvy students to an
Air Force career.
Question. What steps if any would you take to support efforts to
ensure that the Nation has the scientific and technical workforce
needed for its national security technological and industrial base?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continue supporting efforts
to recruit, retain and develop a world-class STEM workforce for the Air
Force and the Nation. The Air Force has successfully used tools such as
the Science, Mathematics, and Research for Transformation (SMART)
Scholarship Program. Over the past 8 years, the Air Force has averaged
providing 60 scholarships per year to scientists and engineers. After
payback of the recipient's commitment, the Air Force has retained 88
percent of scholars in Air Force jobs. Additionally, the Air Force is
updating the Bright Horizons STEM workforce strategic roadmap published
in 2011. This roadmap addresses the ``people'' dimension of delivering
and operating required technology by having the right STEM qualified
people in the right place, at the right time, and with the right
skills.
Question. How would you use science and technology programs to
better reduce technical risk and therefore potentially reduce costs and
schedule problems that accrue in large acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to deliberately align
S&T planning, technology transition planning, and development planning.
The linkages between these activities are critical to initiating
acquisition programs with mature technologies and credible cost
estimates.
Question. Do you feel that the science and technology programs of
the Air Force are too near-term in focus and have over-emphasized
technology transition efforts over investing in revolutionary and
innovative research programs?
Answer. No. A top priority of the Air Force S&T Strategy is to
execute a well-balanced, integrated program. I am confident that the
Air Force S&T portfolio is properly balanced between meeting current
warfighter capability needs and discovering and developing innovative
new technology opportunities.
Question. Are you satisfied that the Air Force has a well-
articulated and actionable science and technology strategic plan?
Answer. Yes. The Air Force is currently updating the Air Force S&T
Strategy, which was signed by Air Force Leadership 2010. This flexible
strategy allows the Air Force to adapt its S&T program to dynamic
strategic, budgetary and technology environments. Additionally, the
priorities in the strategy will shape actionable S&T plans.
Question. Do you see a need for changes in areas such as hiring
authority, personnel systems, financial disclosure, and ethics
requirements, to ensure that the Air Force can recruit and retain the
highest quality scientific and technical workforce possible?
Answer. An objective of the Air Force STEM Strategic Communication
Plan is to build the understanding and recognition that the Air Force's
success is based on the innovation and technical contributions of
airmen. The Air Force is updating the Bright Horizons STEM workforce
strategic roadmap published in 2011. This roadmap is investigating
these areas and others to assure technologically superior warfighting
capabilities through attracting, recruiting/accessing, developing, and
retaining a world class STEM workforce.
Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the Military
Accessions Vital to National Interest Program to recruit non-U.S.
citizens who graduate from U.S. universities with advanced degrees in
scientific and technical fields of critical national importance?
Answer. Citizenship is required for commissioned service in the
military. The military does not commission scientists who do not meet
citizenship requirements. The Military Accessions Vital to the National
Interest Program (MAVNI) is a pilot program that could be considered
useful in its ability to utilize the limited authority provided in law
to enlist non-citizens in the military service to fill critical skills.
To date, the Air Force has only used MAVNI to enlist people with
certain language and associated culture capabilities to meet a critical
strategic need.
Question. What steps if any would you take if confirmed to ensure
the continued effectiveness of this program?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with other Air Force and DOD
leaders to ensure we are taking full advantage of all authorities
within the law to acquire military and civilian forces to meet our
science and technology needs in the Air Force.
test and evaluation
Question. The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for
failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these
systems are put into production.
What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the
Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in ensuring the success of
the Air Force's acquisition programs?
Answer. I support the independence of the Director of Operation
Test and Evaluation as granted by title 10, U.S.C., (title 10 U.S.C.
2399, Operational Test & Evaluation of Defense Acquisition Programs).
This independence is important to ensuring the Department's acquisition
systems are realistically and adequately tested in their intended
operational environment. Third party verification of system performance
is a necessary and important step in acquiring weapon systems.
Question. Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation
conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be
tested?
Answer. The level of test and evaluation conducted by contractors
in developing systems to be tested is appropriate; however, it is
important to ensure government representatives lead the testing and
perform effective oversight of all contractor test events.
Question. What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the
standard testing process? If confirmed, how will you work to ensure
that all equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is
subject to appropriate operational testing?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to ensure
capabilities provided in response to urgent operational requirements
are balanced with testing that ensures the system is reasonably safe
and effective within resource and time constraints. Many times this
balance is achieved by the combined efforts of the acquisition and
operational communities, sometimes taken to the extent of the design
engineers working side by side with the warfighter to resolve issues in
real time. In addition to meeting the urgent mission needs, the initial
operational data derived during this activity actually adds to a more
realistic, complete and robust operational test regime than an isolated
test alone. Sometimes when a capability is fielded, the innovative
warfighter effectively uses the capability in a way other than expected
or tested; this drives a constant evolution of concept of operations
and test planning and execution to maximize effectiveness.
Question. Do you believe that the developmental testing
organizations in the Air Force are adequate to ensure an appropriate
level of developmental testing, and testing oversight, on major defense
acquisition programs?
Answer. Yes. The AFMC reorganization with the 5-center construct is
an improvement in consolidating leadership and management of
development test in order to ensure an appropriate level of
developmental testing and testing oversight. The reorganization is
leading to increased test efficiency and cross flow of information
among the test organizations located at the Arnold Engineering
Development Complex, 96th Test Wing at Eglin AFB and the 412th Test
Wing at Edwards AFB. However, reduced budgets could have a negative
impact on testing as resources continue to shrink.
Question. If not, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to
address any inadequacies in such organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with AF/TE to continue to look at
Air Force test organizations to ensure structures support the Air Force
vision for 2023. Continued test efficiencies need to be investigated to
accommodate budget constraints. Part of this investigation should
include, where appropriate, increased integrated developmental and
operational testing. Duplication of test effort must be avoided to
ensure resources are used as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Question. As systems grow more sophisticated, networked, and
software-intensive, DOD's ability to test and evaluate them becomes
more difficult. Some systems-of-systems cannot be tested as a whole
until they are already bought and fielded.
Are you concerned with Air Force's ability to test these new types
of systems?
Answer. Yes. These new complex systems deserve a healthy concern
and respect so they are not underestimated and are addressed
adequately. The Air Force needs to continue to conduct robust
Developmental and Operational Test of all new systems to ensure they
are safe and meet their intended purpose.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Air Force should
take to improve its test and evaluation facilities to ensure adequate
testing of such systems?
Answer. First and foremost, the Air Force must maintain its unique
core set of T&E infrastructure and associated workforce. These must be
preserved as a national asset to provide T&E capabilities to support
national defense. The Air Force must continue to assess test facilities
to ensure they are sized, operated, and maintained appropriately to
provide for the mission.
Question. In your view, does the Air Force have sufficient
capabilities to test and evaluate the cybersecurity of its new
information technology systems and networks?
Answer. The cyber world is rapidly progressing and evolving and the
Air Force must continue to work hard to keep pace with this evolution.
``Sufficient capabilities'' is a constantly changing standard in this
rapidly changing world. Underestimating its dynamism is to be left
behind.
Question. What steps, if any, would you propose to take, if
confirmed, to enhance this capability?
Answer. We will continue to build on the Air Force Chief
Scientist's, Cyber Vision 2025, which provides a blueprint for cyber
S&T and includes test and evaluation shortfalls. In addition, the Air
Force will continue to support the tri-Service/OSD Technical Assessment
Sub-Working Group for Cyber issues.
Question. Some have argued that testing takes too long and costs
too much. Others contest this view pointing out that testing and
evaluation is an essential tool to assist in the development of weapon
systems and ensure that they perform as intended. The Armed Services
Committee has expressed concern that problems with weapons systems have
been discovered during operational testing and evaluation that should
have been discovered during developmental testing and corrected during
subsequent development.
Do you believe that major defense acquisition programs are helped
or hurt by cutting tests budgets and reducing the time available for
developmental testing?
Answer. Reduced test budgets and time are detrimental to Major
Defense Acquisition Programs and inherently increase costs over the
life of the system and delays fielding to the warfighter.
Question. What steps if any will you take, if confirmed, to ensure
that the program management community and the testing and evaluation
community work collaboratively and effectively in a way that maximizes
the likelihood that developmental testing and evaluation will detect
and identify problems timely in software and hardware to provide
opportunities to correct them before production and before operational
testing and evaluation begins?
Answer. If confirmed, to ensure that the program management
community and the test and evaluation community work collaboratively
and effectively I would continue to ensure an emphasis is placed on
integrated T&E. In my current position, I have taken steps to foster
this collaboration, meeting bi-weekly with the Air Force T&E executive.
Linkages for coordination between developmental test, operational test,
live fire test and evaluation and modeling and simulation must be
maintained through communication among the various agencies as well as
the program management office.
Question. To what extent do you think that dedicated operational
testing can be more efficiently integrated into developmental and live-
fire testing in a way that is also sufficiently rigorous?
Answer. I support increased integration of operational testing into
developmental and live-fire testing. The newly revised DODI 5000.02
emphasizes integration of developmental and operational testing where
possible. The key is early involvement of operational testers in the
development of the Test and Evaluation Master Plan. Early collaboration
between weapons designers, developmental testers and operational
testers allows test scenarios to be developed that provide the needed
data for the developer and in turn can be utilized by the operational
tester in determining operational suitability. This integration can
also uncover operational issues early in the development cycle when
resolution is possible with less impact to cost and schedule.
Question. Noted defense analysts Andrew Krepinevich and Todd
Harrison have argued the formal requirements of a weapons system should
also include a statement as to how a weapons system will be tested.
Therefore, a testing program will be identified before awarding
contracts. The purpose of this proposal is to enable the contractor to
have a much better understanding of what the military hopes to achieve.
Do you agree with this proposal?
Answer. A proposal limiting the development of test protocols to
one single stage of the acquisition process may not fully address the
complexity of the issue. However, I agree that testing should be a
consideration early in the acquisition process. There should be early
focus on the development of requirements that are operationally
relevant, technically feasible and testable. The Air Force saw this
need when forming the AFRRG in 2012. AF/TE was included in this Group
that reviews all requirements documents for new weapons development in
the future. The AFRRG tightly couples requirement, technical,
acquisition and test and this process should improve Air Force
performance in this area.
air force industrial base
Question. What is your assessment of the health and status of the
key elements of the Air Force's industrial base, including the Air
Logistic Complexes?
Answer. The readiness of the Air Force to provide the capabilities
inherent in Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power is
sustained by the products and services purchased from the national
technology and industrial base. Without the support of both the organic
and the commercial components of the industrial base, the Air Force
would not be ready to respond to the needs of the Nation. From the
laces in boots to the electronics in air, space, and cyber systems, the
Air Force draws upon a broad and diverse network of suppliers.
Through this dynamic network, the Air Force equips airmen,
maintains bases, laboratories, and ranges, modernizes current systems,
and designs, develops, and procures new capabilities to remain the
world's preeminent Air Force. I assess the overall health of this
dynamic network of suppliers and sustainers as sufficient for the
current needs of the Air Force.
As I look to the ability of the industrial base to support future
requirements in military-unique areas such as tactical aircraft and
strategic missiles, I have some concerns about whether the Air Force
can sustain the current level of these key industrial capabilities
during this period of fiscal challenges. In addressing these concerns,
the Air Force is collaborating with the other elements of the Defense
Department to ensure thorough analysis leading to informed decisions
about mitigating these concerns.
Question. In your view, is DOD's sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier
(S2T2) activity providing useful information to assist the Army in
maintaining and improving key elements of its industrial base?
Answer. The Air Force recognizes and supports the need to
understand the network of firms providing goods and services to the Air
Force and how the demands of the Air Force interact with those of the
other Services and Defense Agencies. Since the inception of the S2T2
concept, the Air Force has collaborated with OSD, the other Services,
and Defense Agencies to define, develop, and mature the S2T2 concept
into a useful tool. This is an ongoing effort. In its current state,
the S2T2 effort has been useful in validating known areas of concern
such as the industrial base supporting solid rocket motors and fuzes. I
look forward to the continued development of the S2T2 effort and its
eventual maturation.
small business innovation research program
Question. What do you see as the major successes and challenges
facing the Air Force SBIR program?
Answer. Successes and challenges exist for the Air Force SBIR
program. In terms of success, the Air Force Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) Commercialization Readiness Program (CRP) established a
successful process to mature SBIR developed technologies to acceptable
readiness levels for Air Force customers. Using this process,
transition plans have been implemented in the last several years
between innovative small businesses and customers, with 43 producing
technologies now in the hands of the warfighter. One example of a
program is enhanced communication via an ultra-light, manportable,
collapsible antenna which reduces acquisition costs by $40 million over
5 years and support costs by 90 percent. This technology has also been
utilized domestically during Hurricane Sandy and recent tornado events.
Challenges remain with matching Air Force acquisition and
sustainment programs to high risk technologies typically at the
technology and manufacturing readiness levels of 4 or 5. Program
Managers are under tight budgets and schedule constraints, and they are
more inclined to avoid risk and seek out higher readiness technologies
at the 7 or 8 levels. Although maturation is the strength of the Air
Force SBIR Commercialization Readiness Program, it remains difficult to
convince program managers to align future program dollars to a
technology that is still maturing.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the
Air Force has access to and invests in the most innovative small
businesses?
Answer. I believe the current call and response process where the
Service solicits proposals to address capability gaps can be augmented
by a more proactive, aggressive search process to seek out those small
businesses that may be new startups or unfamiliar with the SBIR
program. Enhancing the visibility of the SBIR program and our
communication channels among stakeholders will serve to enhance our
effectiveness in delivering cutting edge capabilities to our
warfighters.
In my current position, I am planning to conduct a Small Business
Roundtable next month, which for the first time will put Program
Executive Officers, major defense contractors, and SBIR and other Small
Business representatives together discussing priorities, budgets,
concerns, and communication improvements to enhance our access and
ability to invest in most innovative Small Businesses. Several targeted
Industry Days are planned this year to seek out small businesses that
have innovative solutions and capabilities for our mission needs.
If confirmed, I will continue to maintain a strong partnership with
our Air Force Small Business team and ensure our Program Executive
Officers focus their efforts to achieve our objectives with our Small
Business partners within industry.
Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that
successful SBIR research and development projects transition into
production?
Answer. If confirmed, I believe successful transition requires far
better communication between the supply and demand entities involved.
The warfighter end user must be central in articulating the demand via
the Major Commands, PEOs, laboratories, and the small business
community. We have the tools, including a network of transition agents,
to facilitate the development of innovative solutions, and I intend to
ensure that the demand function is well-articulated and to industry.
The targeted Industry Day approach previously mentioned is one such
effort, as are the multi-party roundtables.
technical data
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force has been as aggressive
as it should have been in: (1) securing ownership of technical data in
connection with items and processes associated with major weapon
systems that it procures when doing so would best serve the
Government's interests; and (2) asserting ownership rights over this
data in a manner sufficient to ensure competition for the production
and maintenance of these systems over their lifecycle?
What steps if any will you take if confirmed to ensure that the Air
Force obtains the technical data rights that it needs to avoid being
locked into unnecessary sole-source follow-on production and
sustainment to incumbents to the detriment of the taxpayer and the
warfighter?
Answer. In the past, the Air Force abrogated its rights to data
through Total System Responsibility agreements for a number of our
major weapons systems. However, for the past several years several
improvements have been made. The Air Force has been prudently pursuing
its deliverables and data (license) rights requirements in the best
interests of the government, seeking ``license rights'' vice
``ownership'' of contractor developed technical data.
If confirmed, I will continue efforts to actively implement the
Defense Department's Better Buying Power focus area of open systems
architecture enforcement and effective management of data rights in
order to ensure competition and lower lifecycle costs. I will also
continue efforts to actively secure the required deliverables and data
(license) rights as appropriate in order to promote new strategies to
compete sustainment and modernization efforts that were previously sole
source to the original contractor.
nuclear command, control and communication systems
Question. Some elements associated with the acquisition of Nuclear
Command, Control and Communications (NC3) systems are fragmented
between two Air Force acquisition organizations--Space Systems (SAF/
AQS) and Global Power Systems (SAF/AQP). The primary result of this
fragmentation is the Family of Advanced Beyond Line of Site Terminals
(FAB-T), which are to be installed in command post and airborne
platforms. SAF/AQS has oversight of the procurement while the actual
implementation in nuclear command and control platforms is found in
SAF/AQP. This mismatch between acquisition programs (and requirements)
has been documented in a recent General Accountability Office Report
``Space Acquisitions - DOD Needs More Knowledge Before It Commits to
Producing Satellite Terminal Critical to Nuclear Mission'', GAO-14-
24SU, December 2013. The primary outcome of this mismatch is that the
Air Force cannot install the FAB-T terminals its airborne platforms,
principally the B-2 and B-52 aircraft but also Navy E-6B aircraft as
well, causing a cascade of cancelled programs associated with these
aircraft that were to use the FAB-T systems.
Have you read this GAO report?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree with its findings?
Answer. I agree with the GAO's recommendations to develop and
approve a risk mitigation plan to address remaining FAB-T cost,
schedule, and performance risks, and to direct the FAB-T program to
establish agreements with user platform organizations. However, I
disagree with the recommendation to delay production decisions.
Question. Where you agree what will you do to correct the
deficiencies found in the report?
Answer. DOD initiated an updated risk mitigation plan for FAB-T in
July 2013 that addresses the risks noted in the GAO report. The FAB-T
program office continues to execute a risk mitigation process that
involves leadership, stakeholders, and the contractor. If confirmed, I
will remain committed and will work with the Program Executive Officer
and FAB-T Senior Materiel Leader to manage the key risks on this
critical program.
Additionally, the FAB-T Program Office will formally produce
Memorandums of Agreement with each platform program office to further
stabilize terminal and platform requirements. These agreements will be
finalized following the production contract award to simplify the
process for each platform.
Question. Where you disagree, please explain why.
Answer. The Department believes that programmatic actions taken to
date have reduced program risk to an acceptable level and support the
current acquisition strategy. While we appreciate the GAO concerns over
manufacturing and technology readiness, the Department is confident
that the winning bidder of the FAB-T production contract will be ready
to deliver the system. Based on over 10 years of working on the Boeing
development contract, the government has an in-depth understanding of
the design and its readiness for production. Raytheon already has three
other AEHF terminals currently in production. Delaying the down-select
decision to a production vendor will jeopardize critical national
leadership command and control capabilities and add significant cost,
effectively negating the savings created through healthy competition.
Question. Do you agree the matching of requirements and acquisition
for nuclear command, control and communications is fragmented, as
evidenced by the two acquisition organizations (SAF/AQS and SAF/AQP)
responsible for the program?
Answer. No. Matching requirements and acquisition is a fact of life
for all acquisition programs. This often must occur across Program
Executive Officers and Major Commands; however, there are robust
requirements and acquisition processes in place that ensure key
interfaces and program interrelationships are properly managed and
integrated at all levels. As with all SAF/AQ Capability Directorates,
these two staff acquisition organizations (SAF/AQS and SAF/AQP)
understand these processes in detail, and work across the acquisition
and requirements communities to ensure this integration occurs.
Question. What lessons do you think can be learned from the FAB-T
program and applied to future nuclear command and control acquisition
programs?
Answer. The lessons from the FAB-T program apply not only to NC3
programs but to all acquisition programs. They include: (1) program and
requirements instability increase system cost and delay the schedule;
(2) competition can be an effective tool to lower technical and
schedule risk, and overall program costs; and (3) life cycle costs
drive the ultimate affordability of these systems in the context of
other requirements that also must be met.
Question. If confirmed, are you committed to fixing this
acquisition problem and once confirmed will you brief the congressional
defense committees on plans to fix this structural acquisition problem?
Answer. While I disagree the SAF/AQ organizational structure was a
contributing factor to the problems the Air Force faced on FAB-T, if
confirmed I will work in cooperation with the USD(AT&L) and Congress to
continue to apply the lessons learned from FAB-T and other programs to
improve all aspects of the acquisition process.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the ASAALT?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
top acquisition priorities
1. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, please identify the Air Force's
top major systems acquisition priorities and, for each priority, please
identify what you view as the critical pathway to obtaining capability
to be delivered by those programs on time, on budget, and with the
required capability.
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force's top three priorities remain the KC-
46, the F-35, and the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B).
At this point in the development of the LRS-B, stable requirements
are essential to keeping the program on track. The capability level
requirements for the LRS-B--approved by DOD--set affordable,
achievable, realistic requirements balanced by cost considerations. In
order to reduce system and program complexity the program has minimized
new development, allowing integration of mature technologies/existing
systems. Industry is actively designing the system to stable, agreed
upon requirements. It is important that we also maintain schedule
performance to successfully achieve our program milestones.
For the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, mission software, the
Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), and reliability and
maintainability are items on the critical pathway that must be
delivered on time, on budget, and with the required capability.
Overall, flight envelope testing for Block 2B (initial warfighting
capability) mission software is 86 percent complete, and high angle of
attack testing is 70 percent complete. Looking forward in 2014, the F-
35 Joint Program Office (JPO) expects to complete Block 2B flying
qualities, weapons environment, and software testing and continue Block
3F (full warfighting capability) envelope expansion and software flight
testing. The Program Executive Officer (PEO) remains moderately
confident Block 2B will release on time in support of U.S. Marine Corps
initial operating capability (IOC) in 2015. The PEO is also moderately
confident in an on-time delivery of Block 3i (which provides updated
processors and the same operational capability as Block 2B) to support
USAF IOC in 2016. However, there is some risk with the on-time delivery
of Block 3F to support USN IOC in 2018.
Maturation of ALIS is a continuing challenge. A revised development
plan is in work and expected to be complete next month. It will include
fixes to support Block 2B fleet release and U.S. Marine Corps IOC in
2015. As a result of performance issues at Marine Corps Air Station
Yuma, the JPO implemented independent software reviews, brought in
expertise from across the Lockheed Martin enterprise, and increased
visibility (at Program Executive Officer and Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) levels). A joint government/contractor Red Team
determined in December 2013 that although there are issues, the ALIS
architecture is sound. The team is continuing to provide
recommendations to improve system performance and robustness.
Reliability and maintainability remain below projected growth
curves, but we are optimistic they will improve. The JPO and Lockheed
Martin have identified the top 20 design-controllable reliability and
maintainability ``degraders''. Revised reliability and maintainability
goals will be finalized in March 2014. Air vehicle availability and
not-mission capable for maintenance rates have improved steadily since
October 2013.
The KC-46 program remains on schedule and contract costs remain
stable. Maintaining both requirements and funding stability has been,
and will continue to be, key in ensuring the success of the KC-46
program. Requirements stability to date on the KC-46 program is
evidenced by zero engineering changes and the program having met every
contractual milestone since contract award 36 months ago. A cornerstone
of this stability has been the support provided by both DOD and
Congress in maintaining funding required to execute the program. All
four EMD aircraft are in assembly at the production facility and
preparations are well underway for flight test. The first provisional
tanker aircraft will be delivered to accomplish first flight this
summer, followed by the first KC-46 aircraft delivery and first flight
scheduled for early calendar year 2015.

2. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, at this point, do you expect any
of those programs to experience significant or critical cost growth
over their original or revised acquisition program baseline costs and
if so, why? Please explain your answer.
Dr. LaPlante. I do not anticipate any additional government cost
growth in KC-46 Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract. The
contract is a Fixed Price Incentive Firm (FPIF) vehicle which
establishes a $4.9 billion ceiling price; this is the Government's
maximum financial liability, assuming no program changes, and shields
the taxpayer from increased costs. Regarding acquisition program
baseline cost, I do anticipate some cost growth in KC-46 life cycle
Operating and Support (O&S) costs due to the Air Force decisions to
increase KC-46 crew ratios and the flying hour program post-fiscal year
2020 in order to take advantage of the enhanced capabilities of the
weapon system. These increased costs are not a result of the aircraft
development program, but simply a change in field operations. There is
no projected increase in Air Force Total Obligation Authority, as other
tanker manpower and flying hour resources will be repurposed to KC-46
in the out-years. This increase in projected O&S costs was reported in
the 2012 KC-46 Selected Acquisition Report.
I do not expect the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program to experience
significant or critical cost growth over the revised acquisition
program baseline cost. The F-35 program was rebaselined in March 2012
after declaring a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach. I believe the F-35
program was put on sound footing with a realistic budget and schedule
when it was restructured after the Nunn-McCurdy breach.
At this point in the development of the LRS-B, stable requirements
are essential to keeping the program on track. The capability level
requirements for the LRS-B--approved by DOD--set affordable,
achievable, realistic requirements balanced by cost considerations. In
order to reduce system and program complexity the program has minimized
new development, allowing integration of mature technologies/existing
systems. Industry is actively designing the system to stable, agreed
upon requirements.

major systems acquisition reform
3. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, at your confirmation hearing, in
response to Senator Ayotte's question regarding the failed $1 billion
Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) program, you conceded that
the Air Force does not have ``firm accountability in the acquisition
process.'' ECSS, in particular, had six different program managers and
five different program executive officers during its 8-year acquisition
lifecycle.
Some have proposed addressing this problem by better empowering
program managers (PM) to make decisions important to the effective
management of a given program and holding them accountable for those
decisions by aligning their tenure with key investment decision-points,
or milestones, during a given program's acquisition lifecycle. What do
you think of this proposal?
Dr. LaPlante. Wherever possible, it is my belief we should empower
PMs to proactively make key decisions and effectively manage their
programs. For there to be real accountability, we must first ensure PMs
and PEOs have the required authorities and resources to effectively
manage their programs. With those required authorities and resources,
PEOs and PMs are then in a position from which they can execute
effective programs. The PEOs and PMs have a responsibility to use the
chain of command to communicate all systemic and institutional process
issues that impede program success. Mr. Kendall's new OSD Interim
5000.02 reinforces the responsibility and accountability of the Service
Acquisition Executives (SAE), PEOs and PMs for the programs that they
manage. If confirmed I will work to ensure that our acquisition
professionals have the necessary resources and an unfettered line of
authority to be successful at program management. In instances where
programs are managed ineffectively, I will hold acquisition
professionals accountable for their failures.
I support the requirement that a major defense acquisition program
manager's tenure be aligned to key milestones during a program's
acquisition lifecycle, with provision for waivers, as called for by
title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 1734, and DOD and Air Force policy.
The Air Force has taken a number of steps to strengthen its
management of PM and PEO tenure. AFI 36-1301 specifies that for ACAT I
PMs and Deputy PMs, tenure should be through completion of the major
milestone that occurs closest in time to the date on which the person
has served in the position for 4 years; and that for all key leadership
positions, including ACAT II PMs, PEOs will recommend appropriate
tenure periods to the SAE based on program requirements. Determination
of tenure is restricted to the SAE and this responsibility is not
delegated to lower levels. Personnel selected for these key leadership
positions will not be eligible if they decline to sign the required
tenure agreement.
Our goal is to balance PM tenure and the career development demands
to grow future acquisition leaders. We are using the flexibility
provided in title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 1734, and DOD policy to tailor PM
tenure appropriately, based on the program and its point in the
acquisition life cycle.

4. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, would you be
committed to instituting such an approach?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. I support the requirement that a major defense
acquisition program manager's tenure be aligned to key milestones
during a program's acquisition lifecycle, with provision for waivers,
as called for by title 10, U.S.C., Sec. 1734, and DOD and Air Force
policy.
The Air Force has taken a number of steps to strengthen its
management of PM and PEO tenure. AFI 36-1301 specifies that for ACAT I
PMs and Deputy PMs, the tenure should be through the program milestone
closest to 4 years; and that for all key leadership positions,
including ACAT II PMs, PEOs will recommend appropriate tenure periods
to the SAE based on program requirements. Determination of tenure is
restricted to the SAE and this responsibility is not delegated to lower
levels. Personnel selected for these key leadership positions will not
be eligible if they decline to sign the required tenure agreement.
Wherever possible, I empower PMs to proactively make key decisions
and effectively manage their programs. PEOs and PMs are fully
encouraged to use the chain of command to communicate all systemic and
institutional process issues that impede program success. Additionally,
Mr. Kendall's new OSD Interim 5000.02 reinforces how Service
Acquisition Executives (SAE), PEOs and PMs are responsible and
accountable for the programs they manage. If confirmed I will hold
acquisition professionals accountable to the maxim extent possible.

5. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, how would you
otherwise ensure greater accountability for acquisition managers of the
Air Force's largest weapons procurement programs?
Dr. LaPlante. If confirmed, I would institutionalize greater
accountability in a deliberate and fair-minded manner. Ensuring greater
accountability encompasses a range of potential factors. Using well
established best practices, we must arrive at root cause of acquisition
failures before moving to the steps of assessing accountability.
Accountability must also be accompanied by appropriate authorities and
responsibilities for it to be truly real.
Of critical importance is the need to consider the extent to which
acquisition mangers do not have the authority or the resources to
properly execute their program due to budget, cost, schedule, technical
or other factors outside of their control. The culture must allow for
program managers to be able to ``raise a flag'' if they assess the
program they are to manage is not executable. In all cases, if
confirmed I am committed to giving our program managers and PEOs
appropriate authorities and responsibilities, and then holding the
chain of command accountable for the outcomes.

6. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, during your testimony, you cited
root and contributing causes to ECSS' failure identified in the ECSS
Acquisition Incident Report (AIR). In your view, how effectively is the
Air Force addressing these causes in other similar business systems or
other major automated information systems?
Dr. LaPlante. In my view, we are effectively addressing the ECSS
AIR team's findings across our defense business system portfolio. Upon
completing the ECSS AIR in mid-2013, the AIR Team briefed lessons-
learned to all levels of Air Force requirements and acquisition
organizations. The requirements community and program managers are
asked to link AIR recommendations to all applicable points in the
acquisition strategy and planned milestones. These are briefed at Air
Force governance boards, program milestone events and management
reviews to ensure any need for course correction is detected and
implemented early in the program's lifecycle.
In addition to the ongoing reviews that take place, the Under
Secretary of the Air Force directed a review of our Major Automated
Information Systems (MAIS) to analyze the extent to which the AIR
lessons-learned are being implemented and determine where the Air Force
should make additional improvements. This MAIS review was accomplished
under the direction of the Air Force Deputy Chief Management Officer in
August 2013. The review used the AIR findings as the basis for
assessment across five business systems of varying size and scope. The
review afforded the Air Force the opportunity for both internal
stakeholders (i.e., program and functional managers) and an external
group of experts to look for problems similar to those of ECSS in
existing programs. The findings (strengths, weaknesses and recommended
corrective actions) were reported to Air Force program acquisition
executives and Headquarters functional sponsors to help ensure our
major business initiatives are on a solid path to success.
The MAIS review complements work the Air Force has done to improve
business systems acquisition. As an example, with Defense Enterprise
Accounting Management System (DEAMS), the Air Force adopted a seven-
phase release strategy with each phase being comprised of small,
manageable increments. This strategy allows for the development and
deployment of must-have capabilities to meet the Financial Improvement
Audit Readiness (FIAR) goals across the Air Force and their Defense
Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS) and U.S. Transportation Command
partners.

7. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, would you take any
additional steps to make sure that these lessons have, in fact, been
learned so that ECSS' failures are not repeated?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, as the Service's Acquisition Executive, I will
make every effort to ensure the Air Force's ECSS AIR Report lessons
learned are fully considered and the right actions are taken to ensure
mistakes made during ECSS are not repeated. I will regularly review
programs that require my oversight and with specific regard to our
defense business systems I will work with Major Automated Information
System (MAIS) stakeholders, to include the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Aquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(USD(AT&L)), the Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information
Officer and functional communities to better articulate roles and
responsibilities and efficient management. I will work closely with the
functional users to ensure programs are built on a robust foundation of
documented data decomposition, carefully mapped requirements, extended
use cases, and well laid-out transition plans that move us from the
current, to the interim, and ultimately to the desired end-state
environments. I will monitor potential cost drivers in our MAIS
programs through rigorous Configuration Steering Boards (CSB) to ensure
we regularly revisit technical requirements and schedule metrics to
drive program affordability.
Additionally the AIR report pointed out shortcomings in how we
assign and tenure our Program Managers. I will ensure that our Air
Force Program Managers have the highest level of training and
experience and placed in the right jobs. Specifically, I will work with
our acquisition career management community to ensure Key Leadership
Position (KLP) tenure agreements strike the appropriate balance between
tenure and the career development demands to grow our future
acquisition leaders. I will also make sure our Program Managers are
empowered with the guidance they need to make and act on their
decisions and that our policies hold the right people accountable for
program outcomes. This is particularly relevant to the November 2013
release of DOD 5000.02 Interim acquisition policy. Upon its release, my
office promptly engaged our counterparts at Headquarters Air Force and
the Program Executive Offices to help broadcast the most critical
changes in guidance and helped reduce uncertainty among stakeholders in
how the new policy should be implemented. I plan to remain engaged on
this topic and will pursue opportunities to help shape internal reforms
within the Air Force and DOD to mitigate encumbering regulations and
will reexamine the decision processes and metrics applied at each stage
of the acquisition lifecycle to make sure we have established the most
effective tools to assess each program's value and affordability.

8. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, in May 2009, then-Secretary of the
Air Force Michael B. Donley and then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force
General Norton Schwartz released the Air Force Acquisition Improvement
Plan (AIP) to rebuild an ``acquisition culture that delivers products
and services as promised'' and ``on time''. The plan outlined five
target areas to realign the Air Force's culture with acquisition ``best
practices'', including: (1) revitalizing the Air Force acquisition
workforce; (2) improving requirements generation process; (3)
instilling budget and financial discipline; (4) improving Air Force
Major Systems source-selections; and (5) establishing clear lines of
authority and accountability within acquisition organizations. In your
view, has the AIP been fully implemented?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, it has been implemented and we requested the Air
Force Audit Agency to validate our implementation (see their report
F2011-0008-FC3000 29 July 2011). All improvement efforts must be
continuously sustained and kept in the forefront of our minds to be
effective over time. The 2012 follow-up review produced more
recommendations and our assessment was in the areas that were
applicable and had value, were largely already in work or had been
completed.
We have seen improvements in unit price, overall costs and
performance. Nunn-McCurdy breaches as well as successful protest are
measurably lower in recent years. Areas to see improvement and
requiring focus continue to be schedule--particularly during
development. If confirmed, this will be an area of emphasis.

9. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, what target areas has the Air
Force yet to address satisfactorily?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force 2009 AIP implemented 33 initiatives
across five areas (Revitalize the Acquisition Workforce; Improve
Requirements; Budget/Financial Discipline; Improve Source Selection;
Acquisition Organization) and yielded over 170 process improvements.
Although we have closed out AIP, Air Force Acquisition continues to
seek improvement opportunities.
For our workforce, we're creating succession plans for acquisition
leadership in functional specialties, working to ensure we grow our key
leaders. We continue improving the qualifications and proficiency of
the Acquisition workforce by concentrating on the development of
practical application skills, qualifications, and business and
technical acumen necessary to successfully execute the mission. At the
same time, we're concentrating on growing and strengthening our systems
engineering workforce with the right technical expertise needed to
perform early systems engineering analysis.
We continue to work on decreasing the length of time to field major
systems to the warfighter to reduce the years that it is currently
taking from the original projection to deliver capabilities.
Specifically, development programs take too long. Using an incremental
acquisition approach (e.g. block) can help improve program performance.
This approach is premised on knowledge-based, incremental development
that provides increasing degrees of warfighting capability with each
block.
An incremental acquisition approach is the preferred strategy that
provides the most effective balance of technical risk, financial
resources, and the Air Forces' operational needs. As a result, we're
implementing procedures and processes to ensure we utilize incremental
acquisition strategies with technologies that are established and
mature, while enabling technologies still in development to be injected
into future increments of the program once they have matured.
Finally, we continue to work with the requirements community to
prevent requirements creep, control costs, and scope requirements to
enable us to more successfully utilize incremental acquisition
approaches.

10. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if you are confirmed, how would
you ensure that they are addressed?
Dr. LaPlante. If confirmed, I will address these issues by creating
actionable initiatives for what I consider to be some of the Air
Force's biggest challenges in the acquisition arena.
My first priority is to ensure the Air Force's most critical
programs stay on track. To do this, we must continually assess
requirements and their costs throughout the acquisition lifecycle.
Consequently, I am working with the requirements community to ensure we
institutionalize the use of cost/capability trades, working to build
more rigor into the Developmental Planning process, and strengthening
the oversight and review processes.
The Air Force must also address Technology Development and maturity
early in the acquisition process; therefore, I am working with the
requirements community to ensure we use incremental acquisition
strategies when appropriate. Further, if confirmed I will focus on
strengthening the government program offices in gaining access to top
technical talent to manage and assess technology risk.
Sound resource execution is another critical focus item that must
be addressed so we can more effectively stretch the benefit of every
dollar with which we are entrusted. OSD's Better Buying Power (BBP)
initiatives are a good set of guiding principles that can help the Air
Force be effective resource stewards. Our acquisition workforce will
ensure the BBP 2.0 initiatives are implemented to produce the greatest
benefit in affordability, should cost, and stronger partnerships with
the requirements community.

11. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, particularly in the KC-46A tanker
replacement program, your predecessor successfully put in place a
strict change management governance approach that was intended to
freeze requirements early and ensure that this program did not
experience requirements creep, and commensurately excessive cost-
growth, during its acquisition lifecycle. Do you believe that the Air
Force should take a similar approach to other sufficiently similar
major defense acquisition programs? If so, if confirmed, how would you
institute such an approach? Or, if not, why not?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to stress the
relationship between requirements instability and cost/schedule growth
and system affordability. The KC-46 change management governance
approach is an excellent example of the commitment required to guard
against requirements creep and its deleterious effects.
As I have started in my current position, I will continue to
strengthen the role of the CSB as one of the change management
governance oversight mechanisms that enables the acquisition and
requirements communities to work in concert to shield programs from
requirements instability. In my current role, I have already reached
out to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Deputy Chief of
Staff of the Air Force for Operations, Plans and Requirements to
explore methods to more closely link the efforts of the requirements
and acquisition communities. In order to achieve true requirements
stability, there must be a strong commitment among all stakeholders.
This is an area that will yield good acquisition outcomes with proper
leadership focus.

better buying power initiative
12. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, what is your view of the BBP
initiative, started by then-USD(AT&L) (later Deputy Secretary) Ash
Carter and continued by USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall?
Dr. LaPlante. I strongly endorse AT&L's BBP initiatives, and in my
currently delegated role of Service Acquisition Executive, I have
emphasized them in my priorities for the Air Force Acquisition
Enterprise. The BBP 2.0 initiatives represent a collection of many
tried and true best practices that DOD acquisition community should be
implementing consistently. More than anything else, BBP 2.0 is a
framework to train and teach the acquisition workforce time tested
methods of acquiring systems and services.
The BBP initiatives certainly call for a significant cultural
reawakening in the acquisition workforce which has been taking place
now for several years. In fact, I have found that there are some BBP
initiatives that pockets of leaders in the Air Force Acquisition
Enterprise were executing prior to the initial publication of the AT&L
BBP initiatives.
I am pleased with the positive gains the community has made, for
example, in the implementation of Should Cost initiatives, Cost/
Capabilities Trades, Affordability initiatives and other cost control
measures. I have witnessed the benefits of BBP initiatives in our major
acquisition programs, as well as in the Air Force acquisition of
services. If confirmed, I will continue to implement BBP to the maximum
extent possible, and I am confident we will continue to see cost
savings and other efficiency trends in our Air Force acquisition
programs.

13. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, in your view, how successfully
has the Air Force acquisition workforce implemented its tenets?
Dr. LaPlante. We are actively working on the implementation of the
BBP initiatives and some efforts are easier to measure effectiveness
than others, but one concrete example on which we are already seeing
great returns is the implementation of ``should cost.'' The ``should
cost'' strategy is aimed at seeking out and eliminating low- and non-
value added aspects of program costs. Managers are then `rewarded' by
being given the opportunity to utilize those savings, if necessary, as
additional resources to manage program risk within the baseline
program, or have the funds returned to the Air Force or OSD for high
priority needs.
The Air Force is actively gathering should cost data and reporting
our successes to OSD. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force realized $673
million in should-cost savings. Additionally, in fiscal year 2013, only
one program requested a ``should cost'' waiver, down from 79 percent of
programs in fiscal year 2012, which indicates that these initiatives
are becoming second nature. This is just one example of how the Air
Force has already accepted and begun to implement BBP.
OSD's BBP initiatives are positive steps towards achieving
successful program management and acquisition excellence. If confirmed,
I will continue to implement BBP to the maximum extent possible, and I
am confident we will continue to see cost savings and other efficiency
trends throughout the Air Force.

14. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, how would you
ensure its continued implementation?
Dr. LaPlante. The BBP initiatives are a responsible framework for
improving our acquisition workforce skills and capabilities. A total of
16 initiatives have been delegated to the Service Acquisition
Executives for implementation.
If confirmed, I will continue to ensure that all Air Force
acquisition and contracting professionals implement this guidance and
achieve the levels of success already seen to date. In my current
position, I have been actively engaged in promoting the concepts behind
BBP to our workforce through visits to the field and recognition of our
personnel on individual successes and cost savings. Additionally, the
Air Force has set policy and guidance on a wide variety of initiatives
including BBP, and integrated these tenets in all levels of acquisition
reviews. This active engagement is just the first step towards
institutionalizing the process and making it the new way of doing
business.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with USD(AT&L) to implement
the initiatives to the maximum extent possible, and will assure that
the senior executives assigned to implement the initiatives are
accountable for their implementation successes.

contracting negotiators
15. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, what kinds of
experience and knowledge would you look for in the individuals who
negotiate major contracts for the Air Force?
Dr. LaPlante. I expect any Airman negotiating major Air Force
contracts to possess the appropriate and significant level of
professional training, hands-on experience, and requisite knowledge of
the specific mission area as well as tough negotiating skills. What I
also look for are individuals who think conceptually and listen
critically. I expect airmen to possess the acumen, judgment, and
character of an Air Force Contracting Professional. Above all, I look
for integrity.

16. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, do you feel the Air Force has a
sufficient number of such experts in its acquisition workforce?
Dr. LaPlante. While I feel that we have many such experts, I cannot
say that we have a sufficient number of them. Experience takes years to
build, and while we are actively doing so, retirement eligibility,
competition with other agencies and competition with industry for such
experts continues to impact our retention. I am concerned and will
focus on the mobility of Air Force contracting experts--that is our
ability to surge our best experts to emerging high priority contracting
needs. Again, if confirmed this is an area I am committed to improving.

program maturity
17. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has consistently reported that the use of insufficiently
mature technologies has resulted in significant cost and schedule
growth in the major acquisitions of the Air Force and the other
military departments. Do you believe that the use of insufficiently
mature technologies drives up program costs and leads to delays in the
fielding of major weapons systems?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. It is my goal that all Air Force major
acquisitions achieve a high level of technology maturity by the start
of system development to ensure a match between resources and
requirements. Continuing to exercise the well-established Air Force
Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) process, which includes an
independent assessment of critical technologies, will help to ensure
the necessary resource/requirements match. Understanding and then
actively managing programmatic and technical risk is foundational for
successful acquisition.

18. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, do you believe the Air Force has
made progress in ensuring the right amount of technology knowledge is
in place before embarking on major programs?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. While the Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA)
serves to ensure an alignment between resources and requirements prior
to major program initiation, the TRA by itself does not address systems
integration and engineering risks. The expertise of a professional
engineering workforce within the Air Force acquisition community to
perform early systems engineering analysis is critical before embarking
on major programs. This workforce can balance the integration of:

(1) Overall systems engineering design and process,
(2) Concerns for operational mission requirements,
(3) The state of current available technologies (Technology
Readiness Levels (TRL) 8 & 9)
(4) Near-term technologies in laboratory development (TRLs 4-6),
and
(5) Increasingly stringent concerns for funding and schedule
realism.

Effectively addressing these issues earlier in the program will
help mitigate cost overruns and schedule delays in future systems.
Again, the TRA is a successful instrument for measuring knowledge
points, but it must be augmented by a competent and professional
workforce.

19. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, as to major defense
acquisition programs, what steps would you take to make sure that
critical technologies have indeed reached an appropriate level of
maturity before Milestone B approval?
Dr. LaPlante. If confirmed, I will ensure the Air Force continues
to apply its well-established Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA)
process to ensure major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) meet the
Section 2366b of title 10, U.S. Code certification requirement that
program technology be demonstrated in a relevant environment. The
Deputy assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology and
Engineering facilitates the Air Force TRA process on my behalf and
ensures that a formal, independent assessment of critical technologies
has been completed prior to recommending a program proceed to Milestone
B.

20. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, the USD(AT&L) has also issued a
memorandum directing that the largest DOD acquisition programs undergo
competitive prototyping to ensure technological maturity, reduce
technical risk, validate designs, reduce cost estimates, evaluate
manufacturing processes, and refine requirements. Do you support this
requirement, and if so, why?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, I support the USD(AT&L) policy changes to
implement the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which provides for
early and competitive prototyping as well as other efforts to improve
the Defense acquisition process. Competitive prototyping, when
practical and affordable, drives technology maturation early in the
acquisition, enables effective systems engineering, allows the
warfighter to see the potential capability demonstrated in an
operational or relevant environment, and leads to effective maturation
of technology while minimizing programmatic risk. Wherever appropriate,
I believe prototyping should be used to directly support initial system
designs as well as experimentation.

cost growth
21. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, GAO has reported that the use of
unrealistically optimistic cost and schedule estimates by the Air Force
and the other military departments is a major contributor to cost
growth and program failure. Do you believe this is still the case
within the Air Force?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force has made great progress toward
improving the accuracy of cost and schedule estimates. In addition, Air
Force senior decision makers now consider independent cost assessments
in annual resource programming and budgeting decisions.
Since the passage of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
2009, the Air Force continues to improve the quality of cost and
schedule estimates that form the baselines for our major acquisition
programs. Independent cost estimates are developed that form the cost
baseline for all our major acquisition programs. In addition, we are
more rigorously budgeting to the cost baseline which facilitates
program stability. New policy guidance and procedures require annual,
independent cost estimates on all major acquisition programs.
In my current position, I have stressed how requirements can drive
cost by evaluating how changing or reducing a requirement, even
slightly, can have significant cost ramifications.
We have also addressed improving our cost estimating workforce in
recent years by working with the Defense Acquisition University to
improve the cost estimating curriculum required for their Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act certification. These actions and
improvements have resulted in more realistic, objective cost and
schedule estimates in support of the budget process and acquisition
decisions.
The Air Force is committed to improving cost and schedule estimates
and enhancing program success across all acquisition programs. The Air
Force closely tracks execution and provides guidance as necessary to
keep efforts ``on track''. The number of Nunn-McCurdy breaches has
declined significantly since the mid-2000s (fiscal year 2005-2008 had
26 breaches over 14 programs). Over the past 3 years, the Air Force has
had five programs declare a significant or critical Nunn-McCurdy
breach. Of those, three are no longer MDAP programs (C-27J, C-130AMP,
and National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
(NPOESS)), one was driven by a combination of quantity reductions and
cost growth (Global Hawk), and one resulted from restoration to MDAP
status (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)). This past year, the
Air Force had no Nunn-McCurdy breaches.

22. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, what steps would you take to
ensure that cost and schedule estimates are fair and independent and
provide a sound basis for Air Force programs?
Dr. LaPlante. Since the passage of the Weapon Systems Acquisition
Reform Act of 2009, the Air Force continues to improve the quality of
its cost and schedule estimates and we are more rigorously budgeting to
them. New policy guidance and procedures have been adopted that require
annual, independent cost estimates on all major acquisition programs.
Additionally, the Air Force routinely develops independent schedule
assessments on major acquisition programs. This has resulted in more
realistic, objective cost and schedule estimates in support of the
budget process and acquisition decisions. Finally, there has been a
cultural shift to emphasize starting programs where the service is
fully committed with funding and fit within affordability caps derived
from realistic budget assumptions.

information technology acquisition
23. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, in your advance policy questions,
you note that information technology (IT) acquisitions would benefit
from having a specific appropriations account. Would it be restricted
only to major defense automated systems? Please explain this concept
more fully.
Dr. LaPlante. I was expanding on a specific point that was raised
in the ``A New Approach for Delivering Information Technology
Capabilities in the Department of Defense'' report to Congress from
November 2010. The specific appropriations account was one item in a
larger response stating that, ``The PPBE system, used to build the
entire DOD budget, operates on a timeline that is mismatched to the
fast-paced IT commercial marketplace. It is unreasonable to expect the
funding process for the entire DOD to be shortened sufficiently to
respond to the rapid changes of the IT environment, yet PPBE
flexibility is needed.'' This is an example of one potential action
that could be taken to provide DOD with more flexibility in procuring
all IT, not just major automated information systems, while also
providing more oversight into the resources spent on IT. The report
stated, ``The funding appropriation would have the flexibility for
development, procurement, and operations and maintenance to permit
funding a range of potential IT materiel solutions based on a sound
business case.'' Additionally, the single IT appropriation would
contain provisions for performance-based metrics that must be
established before funds could be obligated and would offer complete
transparency to ensure accountability to oversight officials. If
aligned into a portfolio approach, the single IT appropriation would
allow flexibility when selecting options for developing and procuring a
new system. Overall, options need to be explored in how to fund IT
systems and the single IT appropriation is one example of an idea that
could be implemented to result in faster, more responsive IT.

family of advanced beyond line-of-sight terminals
24. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, significant technical challenges
on the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T)
program have led to severe schedule delays and cost increases.
Consequently, after more than a decade since program initiation,
important nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
capabilities are yet to be delivered and fielded to the warfighter.
Recently, it has been reported that the Air Force has decided to
initially move forward with producing only command post terminals (84
units) and deferring production of terminals designed to be installed
on strategic bomber aircraft (132 units). Does this reduction in
production units mean the FAB-T program will breach the Nunn-McCurdy
critical unit cost increase threshold, or are the bomber aircraft
terminals still a part of the program?
Dr. LaPlante. The Department still has a validated FAB-T
requirement to procure an AEHF capability on the 132 B-2, B-52 and RC-
135 force element platforms, but procurement has been deferred beyond
the Future Years Defense Program. We have prioritized procuring the
command post terminals first in order to deliver Presidential and
National Voice Conferencing by the fiscal year 2019 Initial Operational
Capability date. I do not foresee the potential for a Nunn-McCurdy unit
cost breach at this time

25. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, to what extent is there or should
there be a Plan B to mitigate risk and help ensure needed capabilities
are delivered in case the FAB-T program continues to experience delays
and cost increases?
Dr. LaPlante. The current Air Force acquisition strategy, approved
by the USD(AT&L) in 2012, brings an alternate source to the FAB-T
development, effectively implementing a Plan B. The decision to
complete development from both sources on firm fixed price contracts
greatly mitigates the cost, schedule, and performance risks previously
associated with the program. Further, this plan introduces competition
into the FAB-T program which is expected to provide better cost
effective capability then having a single supplier.

26. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, what assurances can you provide
that the program is on the right track?
Dr. LaPlante. I believe programmatic actions taken to date have
reduced program risk to an acceptable level and support the current
acquisition strategy. Last year, the Department initiated an updated
plan for FAB-T with a rigorous risk mitigation process involving
leadership, stakeholders, and contractors. Based on over 10 years of
working on the Boeing development contract and recent test activity on
that program, the government has an in-depth understanding of the
design and its readiness for production. Currently, Raytheon has three
other AEHF terminals in production. The FAB-T program is on track to
select a single source for production of command post terminals in the
second quarter of fiscal year 2014. I am confident the winning bidder
will be ready to deliver a system that meets requirements and
affordability goals. I look forward to working with the USD(AT&L); the
Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space; and the FAB-T program
manager to ensure the program is ready for a successful Milestone C
decision.

military space acquisitions
27. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, since 2006 DOD has funded the
fixed costs of its supplier under the EELV program under a contract
line-item known as Launch Capability. This expenditure is in excess of
$1 billion annually and is executed on a cost-plus basis today. As you
may know, in a November 2012 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM),
USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall directed the Air Force to aggressively
reintroduce competition into the EELV program. In your view, what does
the aggressive reintroduction of competition into the EELV program
mean?
Dr. LaPlante. In my opinion, ``aggressive reintroduction of
competition'' means taking steps wherever possible to establish a
competitive environment, even if that competitive environment only
covers a portion of the mission. Furthermore, it means posturing
ourselves for increased competition (competition growth) as we move
forward to 2018. The Air Force is taking steps to do this:

We will compete portions of the launch manifest each
year in 2015, 2016, and 2017 if there is even one New Entrant
ready to compete; i.e., they have successful launches and have
completed the required certification steps
We will work early with declared New Entrants to
certify their systems as ready as evidenced by our Cooperative
Research and Development Agreement with SpaceX
We will award early integration contracts supporting
timely space vehicle integration to meet launch schedules
We have added government team resources to assure
timely review of certification products, data and other
supporting information throughout the certification process

The Air Force is committed to competition within the EELV program
and is aggressively taking steps to do so while ensuring its
responsibilities to deploy National Security Space payloads into their
orbits safely and with acceptable risk.

28. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if you are confirmed, how would
you ensure that this directive is implemented in that program?
Dr. LaPlante. I will continue to work closely with the USD(AT&L),
and the Program Executive Officer for Space to introduce competition
into the EELV program. In my current role, I recently met with the
USD(AT&L) to discuss the status of the program and will continue to
provide him additional information on the competitive request for
proposal later this spring. We will continue those actions I previously
described toward strengthening the competitive environment for launch.

29. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, given that the recently revised
National Space Transportation Policy removed the previous policy that
the Secretary of Defense fund the fixed costs of its launch provider,
what actions does the Air Force plan to take to phase-out this Launch
Capability contract line item, reduce the complexity of the existing
contract structure, and establish a level playing field for all
potential offers of national security space launch?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force reduced the complexity of the EELV
contract for the current economic order quantity commitment through
consolidation of the entire effort into a single contract. In
accordance with the recently revised National Space Transportation
Policy, we ensured the new EELV contract only pays for the capability
to launch the 36-core buy and the previously purchased cores that
haven't yet launched. We are currently working on the strategy for the
next phase of the EELV-class program which will start in fiscal year
2018 with procurement of launch services for satellite launch
requirements starting in fiscal year 2020. As part of this strategy,
the Air Force does not intend the future contract to contain a contract
line item structure similar to the one currently in place. The approach
for this next phase will balance mission assurance with cost and
satellite requirements within a full-and-open competition environment
for certified providers

30. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, what additional steps, if any,
would you take in this regard, if you are confirmed?
Dr. LaPlante. If confirmed, I will continue to work with potential
competitors to understand their concerns and ensure we comply with
National Policy, Federal Acquisition Regulation, and Department of
Defense (DOD) requirements.

31. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, what do you see as the main
challenges to achieving full-and-open competition in the EELV program?
Dr. LaPlante. I see three main categories of challenges to
achieving full-and-open competition:
First, industry developments. To have full-and-open competition you
must have competitors. While New Entrants, especially SpaceX, have made
great strides in developing their launch systems, we still do not have
any other provider capable of doing the entire mission required to be
executed by the United Launch Alliance today. The new entrants have a
lot of work ahead of them and I will be watching their progress with
great interest and enthusiasm.
Second, mission assurance. We have had a tremendously successful
run in the launch business in great part because of the strong
engineering disciplines imposed upon our current launch systems. We do
not want to lower our standards. So we must find an effective way to
assure quality and mission assurance for New Entrants in a timely and
affordable way. We are well on our way with SpaceX, but there is much
work to go as mutually agreed to in our Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement with them.
Third, wise purchasing. We will be challenged to establish a fair
competition that complies with the Federal Acquisition Regulation,
treats all competitors fairly, aggressively pursues a good deal for the
U.S. Government, and at the same time postures us for success given
possible developments in the domestic and international defense and
commercial launch markets.
I think our team is up to this challenge, but it is indeed a tough
job.

32. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if confirmed, would you encourage
a move to full-and-open competition if more than one launch company was
certified to launch EELV-class payloads? If so, how so? If not, why
not?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, if confirmed I will continue to encourage a move
to competitive procurement if more than one company is certified.
However, this would in the near term be a limited competition versus
full and open, as it would be limited to the certified competitors. The
first opportunity for competition is in fiscal years 2015-2017, where a
limited number of missions are available for competition. I envision a
competitive procurement for all launches starting in fiscal year 2018
if more than one provider is certified.

33. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, as to military space procurement
generally, do you see a need for any changes/modifications to DOD's or
the Air Force's current acquisition policies? If so, what areas might
be appropriate for change, and why?
Dr. LaPlante. The USD(AT&L) recently released a revision to the DOD
instruction (known as DODI 5000.02) that governs the defense
acquisition system. I am still reviewing the instruction and how it
specifically addresses military space procurement. Overall, I agree
with its objectives that emphasize thoughtful program planning;
tailored program structures and procedures that account for unique
program circumstances, such as high-cost first article acquisitions
like space programs; and program management responsibility. I see an
opportunity under the new revision to implement changes to oversight
and program structure of our space programs such as improved cost
management and incentives. I think there are some excellent
opportunities to drive down the cost of commercial satellite
communications services through investment versus leases, and we
continue to work with AT&L to identify the specific policy changes that
might be required to implement these approaches. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the USD(AT&L) on continuing to streamline and
improve the defense acquisition system.

34. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, the Air Force has only recently
taken significant steps to gain insight into contractors and their
costs for major space and other programs. These efforts have benefitted
the Air Force, helping to lower prices for space launch services and
key satellites. If confirmed, what would you do to ensure the Air Force
continues and strengthens these efforts?
Dr. LaPlante. If confirmed, I will continue to implement USD(AT&L)
BBP initiatives to the greatest extent possible. We continue to make
excellent progress reducing and eliminating non-value added costs
especially through our ``should cost'' efforts. The ``should cost''
concept enables us to understand a system's cost elements in great
depth, and then, through prudent, cost-benefit based considerations of
the associated risks, implement measures that eliminate or reduce non-
value added costs. As an example, effective ``should cost'' management,
along with other affordability initiatives made possible by good
collaboration between DOD and Congress, enabled over $1.6 billion of
savings over buying the vehicles separately for the procurement of the
fifth and sixth Advanced Extremely High Frequency production
satellites. In addition, we must continue to grow the quality of our
workforce to ensure personnel in key positions have the right knowledge
and experience to ``own the technical baseline'' and drive these BBP
initiatives.
Additionally, the complexity and high-unit cost of space systems
creates a strong imperative for a high level of insight into our
program costs. We learned this in EELV where the commercial nature of
the original program did not provide such insight. So, as the market
contracted and costs rose we did not have the data we needed. As you
noted, we corrected that problem in EELV and have learned that lesson.
I will apply these hard-learned lessons by continuing to ensure we have
cost visibility into our expensive launch and space programs

35. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, we know that several prime space
contractors have likewise taken actions to increase efficiencies and
streamline operations. This is a welcome trend--but not without risk.
How is the Air Force staying abreast of these changes and assuring that
key areas of expertise are not being lost or that technical risks are
not significantly increased?
Dr. LaPlante. I believe our understanding of and collaboration with
the network of suppliers that provide space products and services to
the Air Force will help us manage these risks. If confirmed, I will
continue to support initiatives that accomplish this, such as the DOD's
sector-by-sector, tier-by-tier (S2T2) activity and the numerous
government-industry forums, councils, and committees the Air Force
participates in along with the National Reconnaissance Office and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
In addition, I believe we must continue our efforts to recruit,
retain and develop a world-class acquisition workforce to ensure
technical risks, regardless of origin, are properly managed. In my
current role, I've been pleased with the quality of our acquisition
workforce and their ability to manage space acquisition programs.
However, we must maintain a constant focus on growing our expertise to
ensure implementation of efficiency initiatives and streamlining does
not incur undue programmatic risk.

36. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, fixed-price contracts are a
preferred approach for satellites that are in the production phase.
Yet, for the past decade, the Air Force has maintained an acquisition
workforce that is accustomed to working in a cost-plus environment as
it recapitalized the majority of its space portfolio. If confirmed, how
would you ensure that the Air Force adjusts within this environment to
more extensively use fixed-price contracts, where their use is, in
fact, warranted and appropriate?
Dr. LaPlante. If confirmed, I will continue to support fixed-price
contracting where appropriate. In order to do this more extensively, I
will work closely with the Program Executive Officer for Space to
assess and adjust training and development opportunities for the space
acquisition workforce that continue to grow the necessary skills to
effectively implement fixed-price contracting approaches. We have begun
to manage one of our major satellites under a fixed-price contract and
are in the process of transitioning a second and preparing a third. I
am fully utilizing this opportunity to evolve the space acquisition
workforce to operate efficiently and effectively in a fixed-price
environment.

37. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, in your view, how will the Air
Force's oversight and insight into space programs change in a fixed-
price contract environment?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force is responsible for providing space
capabilities and must be an informed consumer. To accomplish this task,
we will continue to provide oversight to space programs and require
insight into contractor execution. When doing this, we must only
implement fixed-price contracts where appropriate; and even when
contracts are fixed-price, we must continue to closely monitor cost and
schedule performance, demand in-progress testing and thorough
evaluation of test results while at the same time enforce our mission
assurance engineering disciplines on our space system development
efforts. I anticipate fixed-price contracts for mature, lower-risk
acquisitions to reduce costs in government oversight and contract
execution. For example, the Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) program is an
example of a mature, low-risk acquisition where we were able to
substantiate the cost data and use a firm-fixed price contract. The
risks with providing capability to the warfighter are low and there are
other, available commercial options that provide similar capability.
These factors allowed the Air Force to successfully leverage a
commercial business model to yield efficiencies. In other cases, fixed-
price contracts for higher risk, more complex acquisitions with unique
mission requirements may require a higher level of government focus.
For instance, the FPIF contract for AEHF 5/6 still requires significant
government oversight to manage the higher risks associated with Nuclear
Command, Control and Communications requirements and where substitute
options are unavailable on the commercial market. These two programs
highlight our ability to continue to provide oversight and leverage
efficiencies from fixed-price contracts while maintaining focus on
mission assurance and system activities.

38. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, how will the size and composition
of the Air Force's acquisition workforce change in light of these
changes?
Dr. LaPlante. When considering fixed-price contracting for our
space systems, there are several factors that influence the size and
composition of the space acquisition workforce that need to be
evaluated. Some of the factors include different oversight requirements
based on contract risks, cost savings or cost/risk avoidance functions
such as ``should-cost'' analyses, and the development of more resilient
architectures. We have been able to reduce workforce requirements for
WGS by focusing on higher level oversight of cost, schedule, and
performance. This has allowed us to realign that workforce to higher
risk acquisitions that are critical to develop more affordable and
resilient space systems architectures. If confirmed, I will work with
the Program Executive Officer for Space to evaluate the size and
composition of the space acquisition workforce to ensure that we are
able to efficiently and effectively complete our missions.

39. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, many government groups have
pointed out problems in the synchronization of space systems'
development, such as ground control systems not being ready when
satellites are launched, or user equipment not being available for the
warfighter when advanced signals and information are being produced by
satellites. In some cases, the gap between the availability of a
satellite and its user equipment has added up to a delay of many years.
What are some options you think will help to reduce these problems and
improve coordination on space systems Government-wide?
Dr. LaPlante. I believe we must continue to improve the way we
manage the space enterprise and our acquisition processes to field
capabilities that are complete and useful to the warfighter. Although
we coordinate all of our capability fielding plans with the combatant
commands, budgetary limitations and instability often force changes to
these plans that can push a system's synchronization to a less optimal
state. We can help mitigate these concerns by ensuring our space
systems are affordable, and where practical, commit to longer-term
plans that stabilize capability delivery. Additionally, we must
continue to communicate and collaborate across the separate acquisition
programs that make up an end-to-end space capability.

40. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, do you believe this problem is
rooted in a lack of focused leadership for space systems? If so, how
would you address this issue if confirmed?
Dr. LaPlante. I don't believe this problem is rooted in a lack of
focused leadership for space systems. I understand that the Air Force's
Space Launch Broad Area Review (BAR) in 1999 and later, the
congressionally-directed Space Commission in 2000 took a hard look at
how space activities should be managed. The Air Force adopted many of
the BAR and Commission's key findings, to include assigning Air Force
Space Command responsibility for providing the resources to execute
space research, development, acquisition, operations and sustainment
under one four-star commander. This construct created a strong center
of advocacy for space systems and resources, and I believe maintains
the proper level of leadership focus on our space systems.

41. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, multiple organizations are
responsible for acquiring satellite communications for DOD, including
the Air Force, the Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Navy,
among others. Additionally, each Military Service is responsible for
acquiring satellite communications terminals. To what extent should
there be a single acquirer of satellite communications for DOD?
Dr. LaPlante. As you state, currently the Air Force procures
wideband and protected military space and ground control segments,
while the Navy procures narrowband military space and ground control
segments. Similarly, each individual service procures associated
terminals that best match their warfighting requirements. Finally, DISA
leases commercial satellite bandwidth to augment overall Department
capabilities. I do think the Department can do a better job delivering
these capabilities in the future. A number of ongoing activities, as
evidenced by the Protected Satellite Communication Services Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) and our commercial satellite communication
pathfinder efforts are underway.
I don't believe a single acquirer of satellite communications is
the answer to these problems. Each individual service is best equipped
to develop and procure terminals that best match their unique needs.
Similarly, there resides a level of technical expertise within the Air
Force and Navy focused on wideband and protected, and narrowband
satellite communications, respectively. While in theory that expertise
could be consolidated into a single organization, the costs associated
with consolidation may outweigh the benefits. That said, I believe
opportunities remain to increase communications, collaboration, and
integration between the separate organizations to improve the overall
efficiency, effectiveness, and synchronization of satellite
communications capabilities.

42. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, to what extent does DOD have the
knowledge it needs to determine its short-term to mid-term
communications bandwidth-needs to enable long-term leases of commercial
satellite communications bandwidth?
Dr. LaPlante. To my knowledge, DOD is following a rigorous process
to improve its knowledge and detailed understanding of its short-,
medium-, and long-term commercial SATCOM bandwidth requirements. The
DOD process accounts for the specifics of near-term requirements while
utilizing a scenario-based process that documents, prioritizes and
validates requirements for the medium- and long-term periods. This
information can enable the use of longer-term leases and potential new
acquisition approaches for more cost-effective methods to provide
commercial satellite bandwidth to the warfighter.

43. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, when will acquisition and budget
decisions need to be made on the way forward for providing space system
capabilities following the fifth and sixth Space Based Infrared System
(SBIRS) geosynchronous Earth orbit satellites, and the third and fourth
highly elliptical orbit sensors, the fifth and sixth Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) satellites, the final two Defense Meteorological
System (DWSS) program satellites, and the Space Based Space
Surveillance (SBSS) satellite?
Dr. LaPlante. The Overhead Persistent Infrared AoA is expected to
commence in 2014 to inform the way ahead to meet future requirements in
a cost-effective manner. Currently, we anticipate the AoA's preliminary
results to inform the fiscal year 2016 President's budget, with the
final results of the AoA informing the fiscal year 2017 President's
budget. The acquisition development decision is projected for fiscal
year 2018.
We expect the Protected Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Services
AOA, which will recommend how to best provision for protected military
SATCOM capabilities beyond the sixth AEHF satellite, to provide
recommendations in 2014 that will inform the fiscal year 2016 budget
formulation. Final budget and acquisition decisions will have to be
made by fiscal year 2017.
Acquisition and budget decisions are currently being considered
within the fiscal year 2015 budget process for the Weather System
Follow-on (WSF) effort. These decisions are being informed by the
Space-Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) AOA, which included an
assessment of the SBEM capabilities provided by the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), as well as civil and
international SBEM partners.
The SBSS Block 10 system is the Air Force's only dedicated,
operational space-based space situational awareness asset. Providing
over 28 percent of all deep space collects in the space surveillance
network and delivering vital mission data products to the warfighter,
it is a cornerstone capability for deep-space Space Situational
Awareness. In order to mitigate a critical capability gap post-SBSS
Block 10 end of life (September 2017), acquisition and budget decisions
are currently being considered within the fiscal year 2015 budget
process.

44. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, what are the primary schedule-
drivers for making these decisions?
Dr. LaPlante. For SBIRS, the primary schedule drivers for making
these decisions are the predicted replenishment windows to avoid
critical capability gaps to our warfighters and leadership. We also
incorporate the acquisition, budgeting, and other process timelines to
determine when decisions must be made.
For AEHF, current functional availability analysis indicates
replenishment for a four satellite AEHF constellation needs to start in
fiscal year 2027. As such, we need to make a decision no later than
fiscal year 2017. The Protected SATCOM Services AoA and a number of
ongoing risk reduction activities posture us to start that acquisition
in time.
The Air Force's path forward for the next generation weather system
(follow-on to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program) will be
informed by the Space-Based Environmental Monitoring (SBEM) AoA. The
AoA was recently completed by the Air Force and submitted to OSD CAPE
for a sufficiency review and to Joint Staff for their review and
validation process. The AoA evaluated the contribution of DOD, civil,
and international SBEM systems to fulfill the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC)-endorsed capability gaps. This analysis will
allow DOD to focus on a military solution to fulfill those capability
gaps. The Air Force is formulating this strategy to inform the fiscal
year 2015 budget.
Analyses and risk reduction efforts are underway to inform future
decisions regarding timely space situational awareness of the
geosynchronous regime. Many of these efforts should complete within the
next 1 to 2 years.

45. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, do you believe that the Air Force
should pursue a more disaggregated approach to the architectures for
its space systems, such as fielding more numerous but simpler and
smaller satellites or hosting payloads on commercial satellites? Why or
why not?
Dr. LaPlante. Disaggregation is a concept that may offer advantages
in areas of resiliency and affordability in certain situations;
however, it is premature to embark on such a sweeping architectural
solution to established mission areas without further rigorous study
and analysis. I do believe that the Air Force should consider
disaggregated approaches when determining how to best meet the mission
needs, especially in a fiscally constrained environment. We expect the
ongoing Protected SATCOM Services and soon-to-be Overhead Persistent
Infrared systems AoA will examine disaggregated and other architectures
in detail to inform the best approach to address requirements in the
future. Furthermore, the Air Force and the National Security Space
community have enacted requirements for protection as key performance
parameters on all future space systems, with space situational
awareness being a key architectural design consideration enabling our
Nation's National Security Space (NSS) systems to operate in a
contested space environment. There is no ``silver bullet'' that applies
to all situations; the right answer will possibly be a mix of
disaggregation, hosted payloads, in situ Space Situational Awareness,
commercial services, and simpler satellites architected across the
entire NSS enterprise.

46. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, if you agree that the Air Force
should take such an approach, how would you ensure that it does, if
confirmed?
Dr. LaPlante. The question of whether a disaggregated approach is
the best approach to meet a particular need should be addressed during
the materiel solution analysis phase of an acquisition program, prior
to Milestone A. The Analyses of Alternative in particular should
consider disaggregated architectures. As the Service Acquisition
Executive, I can personally ensure that disaggregated approaches will
be considered during my review at this Milestone.

47. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, considering DOD's interest in
disaggregated space systems, what efforts do you believe are needed in
the launch area to develop domestic launch capabilities that are
appropriately responsive and inexpensive in order to make
disaggregation of national security space systems effective?
Dr. LaPlante. Disaggregated space systems could mean smaller
satellites which could eliminate the need for larger boosters. The
larger boosters are more expensive, take longer to build, and require
more time on the pad. However, having multiple satellites going to
similar orbits may mean EELV-class launch vehicles provide the best
value by launching multiple satellites on the same booster. Regardless
of the outcome, having additional launch providers on contract through
the Rocket Systems Launch Program or EELV program will provide more
options for a variety of system architectures.

48. Senator McCain. Dr. LaPlante, I understand that the position of
Air Force Program Executive Officer for Space Launch may be subsumed
under the Program Executive Officer for Space. Do you believe that this
change should be made? Please explain your answer.
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, I believe this change should be made. The
program needed to get as good at the ``business of launch'' as they
were at ``day of launch.'' We separated the Program Executive Officer
(PEO) for Space Launch to achieve cost control and focus on
implementing a new acquisition strategy that maintains mission success,
reduces costs, prevents or mitigates cost or redesign impacts to space
vehicles, and sustains the program to assure access to space. This
mission was accomplished and with the award of the Launch Vehicle
Production Services and Capability contract, the program was placed
back under the Program Executive Officer for Space on December 12,
2013. This was done in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the Air Force Space
Command Commander. The EELV program is well aligned under the Program
Executive Officer for Space who, as commander of the Space and Missile
Systems Center, is also the EELV launch certification decision
authority, as well as the New Entrant certification authority. To
ensure a smooth transition, several existing members of the former PEO
for Space Launch team will continue working the program through at
least fiscal year 2015.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
air force acquisition priorities
49. Senator Chambliss. Dr. LaPlante, Air Force Chief of Staff
General Mark Welsh has made it quite clear the Air Force's top three
acquisition priorities going forward are the F-35, the KC-46, and the
LRS-B. He has also recently added a replacement for the aging E-8C
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) as another top
priority. Considering the effects of sequestration, is it realistic to
believe the Air Force will be able to execute current acquisition plans
for these major systems?
Dr. LaPlante. I believe we will be able to execute the current
acquisition plans for the F-35, KC-46, and LRS-B programs in addition
to JSTARS. As General Welsh has testified, we must recapitalize the
aging fleets these capabilities are targeting. The effects of
sequestration will undoubtedly threaten each of our top priority
programs and lower priority programs, but the Air Force leadership is
committed to ensuring the Service makes the required investments to
execute its core missions against the expected threats in the 2023 and
beyond timeframe. Budget constraints will make this challenging;
however, when faced with difficult choices we will favor
recapitalization over modernization, keeping these important programs
in the foremost of our priorities. The JSTARS acquisition will take
advantage of mature technology and more efficient commercial airframes
to reduce acquisition risk and lifecycle costs.

50. Senator Chambliss. Dr. LaPlante, how do you intend to continue
modernizing our Air Force fleet in the face of budget constraints?
Dr. LaPlante. There are some things we cannot modernize to keep it
viable against the threat after 5 or 10 years. There are some places we
have to recapitalize and that is going to take money away from the
modernization program, which is being hit by sequestration.
Continuing to modernize the Air Force fleet while living with
severe budget constraints requires sound resource execution so we can
more effectively stretch the benefit of every dollar with which we are
entrusted. Our Secretary of the Air Force has identified as a priority
the need to ensure our Air Force remains the most capable in the world
at the lowest possible cost. In this environment of declining resources
and budget constraints, we must be extremely efficient and effective in
how we plan to use, and ultimately spend our scarce fiscal resources.
The Air Force must own the technical baseline for acquisition
programs. Strong, stable program offices, augmented by experts and
reach-back to the Laboratories, Federally Funded Research and
Development Centers and University Affiliated Research Centers are
required in order for the government to own the technical baseline.
Furthermore, this process must be institutionalized into the life of
each program, rather than depending upon our industrial partners to
manage technical performance, dictate sustainment solutions and shape
evolutionary technical solutions.
I want the Air Force acquisition community to design, develop and
field systems for our Air Force that will be resilient to the
capabilities of our anticipated peer competitors of 2023 and beyond. To
do this we must make smart investment decisions and leverage
experimentation and innovation. To ensure Air Force investment
solutions and strategies support capabilities that will enable
effectiveness in the highly contested domains beyond 2023, the Air
Force must position itself through significant science and technology
and advance research investments.
We will continue our heightened focus on the high priority
programs. I am committed to launching these programs right and keeping
them on track. The Air Force currently lists F-35, KC-46 Tanker, LRS-B,
and replacement for aging E-8C JSTARS as our top priorities.

joint surveillance target attack radar system
51. Senator Chambliss. Dr. LaPlante, how will the Air Force attempt
to complete the acquisition of a replacement for JSTARS without
compromising what has become a critical intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) capability?
Dr. LaPlante. Although the primary role of JSTARS is Battle
Management Command and Control, it also provides critical Ground Moving
Target Indicator data to the ISR Enterprise. If a JSTARS replacement
program is pursued, the Air Force will continue to maintain and operate
the E-8C JSTARS fleet, with fewer aircraft in the short term, to
support mission requirements. As the JSTARS replacement aircraft become
available, the remaining E-8C legacy fleet will be brought down.

52. Senator Chambliss. Dr. LaPlante, would the Air Force consider
standing down legacy aircraft to facilitate paying for new aircraft
with the savings generated?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. Sequestration has created a very constrained
budget environment for the Air Force, forcing the Service to make some
very difficult decisions. During his testimony last year before the
Senate, General Welsh discussed as a result of sequestration impacts we
have been faced with difficult budget choices. He further stated that
in those instances we will favor recapitalization over modernization.
As the Air Force leaders make difficult force structure divestiture
decisions, they will work to ensure that they are timed such that there
will not be a loss of important capability for the warfighter.

53. Senator Chambliss. Dr. LaPlante, what would be the associated
risk of such a decision?
Dr. LaPlante. The consideration to stand down legacy aircraft in
order to facilitate paying for new aircraft with the savings generated,
would be approached with a balanced risk perspective. Ultimately, the
Air Force would retain a reduced capability to support combatant
commanders during the transition period.

54. Senator Chambliss. Dr. LaPlante, is the Air Force totally
committed to replacing the JSTARS or might we be looking at another
round of upgrades, beyond what is already taking place, to the current
fleet?
Dr. LaPlante. At this time, the AoA and other supporting analyses
support replacing the current E-8C JSTARS.

55. Senator Chambliss. Dr. LaPlante, what would be the impact of an
Air Force decision to scrap plans to replace the JSTARS in favor of
further upgrades?
Dr. LaPlante. Scrapping the JSTARS replacement would commit the Air
Force to an aircraft that is likely unaffordable in the long term.
Legacy JSTARS operations and sustainment costs are high and are
projected to continue to increase. Legacy JSTARS also has a significant
bow-wave of needed communications and avionics modernization efforts
within the FYDP, with larger bills for modernization of the radar just
outside the FYDP. In contrast, recapitalizing the JSTARS fleet will
provide the AF with a more cost-effective airframe, a modern sensor,
updated communications, and manned Battle Management. A JSTARS
replacement ensures affordable dominance of the JSTARS Battle
Management and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance mission
areas through the 2040s.

56. Senator Chambliss. Dr. LaPlante, what level of involvement has/
will combatant commanders and other consumers of J-STAR-provided ISR
play in planning for the aircraft's ultimate replacement?
Dr. LaPlante. Combatant commanders' (CCDR) requirements are
considered throughout the Joint Capability Integration and Development
Systems (JCIDS) process of developing the requirement and pursuing the
replacement capability for the E-8C JSTARS. Specifically, the CCDR's
Operational Plan requirements and Integrated Priorities Lists were
reviewed and integrated into the overall requirements development
process. Additionally, CCDRs and the military services (as force
providers) participate in all Functional Capability Boards and Joint
Capability Boards to provide input and concurrence on proposed
Capability Development Documents, Capability Production Documents, and
Acquisition plans. This coordination ensures awareness and validation
that proposed solutions will effectively meet operational needs.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
air force auditability
57. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, Secretary Hagel said that DOD
needs ``auditable statements . . . to reassure the public, and
Congress, that we are good stewards of public funds.'' Do you share
Secretary Hagel's belief that we need auditable statements to ensure
the Air Force is a good steward of our tax dollars--especially in this
period of difficult budget cuts?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes, I share Secretary Hagel's belief that the
Department needs auditable financial statements and I agree that
auditable financial statements provide Congress and the American public
confidence that the Air Force manages the taxpayer's funds in an
efficient and transparent manner. The current budget environment makes
this effort even more urgent.

58. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, as required by section 1005 of
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013, do
you understand that submitting an audit-ready statement of budgetary
resources by September 30, 2014 is not just a goal, it is the law?
Dr. LaPlante. Yes. I fully understand that section 1005 of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2013 requires an audit-ready Statement of Budgetary
Resources. If confirmed, I will actively support DOD and the Secretary
of the Air Force's continued focus on financial auditability.

59. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, I am concerned that the Air Force
may not be on track to meet the audit deadlines. Do you share this
concern?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force is on a well-designed, albeit
aggressive, path to assert audit readiness by the mandated deadline of
September 30, 2014. The Air Force plan has been reviewed and integrated
with the OSD FIAR plan that integrates the entire DOD business
environment but, it is still not without risk. However, the Air Force
is seeing successes on the path to audit readiness, to include seven
favorable opinions with two more assertions currently under
examination. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to assist in any
way I can to ensure the Air Force meets these deadlines.

60. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, what are your greatest challenges
in meeting the audit deadlines?
Dr. LaPlante. Our biggest challenge will be that the Air Force's
current 1960s accounting system does not comply with the Federal
requirement to use the standard government general ledger structure of
accounts at the detailed, transaction level. The Air Force's ultimate
solution to this challenge is to field a modern accounting system, the
DEAMS, as quickly as possible. Recent indications are that the system
is working pretty well, with dramatic performance improvements in the
last year. The interim solution for remediation of shortcomings in the
legacy environment is to use a DFAS-developed data analysis tool that
sorts and matches data from multiple systems. Furthermore, the Air
Force continues to collaborate within the Department to share lessons
learned, establish performance measures, and consolidate efforts where
applicable. Finally, some of the feeder systems to the financial
systems being used are acquisition/contract related systems. If
confirmed, those systems will fall within my purview and I will do
everything in my power to ensure they are compliant with audit
requirements.

61. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, how can Congress help the Air
Force in meeting the audit deadlines?
Dr. LaPlante. The Air Force is fully committed to meeting the
requirement of becoming audit ready. The Air Force has consistently
acknowledged to you that is the 2014 audit deadline required an
aggressive strategy that is not without risk. We do not consider any
one achievement or failure on our path to audit readiness as a defining
action. The Air Force is on an aggressive path towards audit readiness
and will not relent. Your assistance in implementing a more predictable
appropriations cycle free from protracted continuing resolutions or
government shut downs would be most helpful. This would minimize the
disruption of the government and contractor resources working to make
the Air Force audit ready.

a-10
62. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, please provide a detailed,
itemized list of how the Air Force has modernized the A-10 since
September 11, 2001. The list should clearly delineate the name of the
modernization investment, how much was spent on the modernization, the
purpose of the modernization investment, and the current status of the
modernization investment (e.g. completed or still ongoing). For each of
these modernization items, where possible, it should be made clear what
kind of life extension the modernization investment was intended to
provide. The itemized list should provide the total amount of money
spent on A-10 modernization since September 11, 2001. The list should
clearly delineate which modernization programs the Air Force has
decided to cancel, when this decision was made to cancel the program,
and what the rationale was for this decision.
Dr. LaPlante. Since 11 September 2001, the Air Force has invested
over $2.85 billion in major modernization for the A-10, for enhanced
capabilities, improved sustainment and life extension.
Note: Unless noted, program does not contribute to service life
extension. Programs are listed from oldest to current, and reflect
funding spent, to date. Estimates provided where actual figures were
not available within the time constraint.
Completed Programs:
Program Name: A-10 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)
Funding: $786 million, Weapon System Support and National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA)
Purpose: To extend service life of legacy wings to 16,000
Equivalent Flying Hours (EFH) to meet Air Combat Command Required
Service Life.
Status: Complete. 2004 wing fatigue test results determined maximum
life extension of A-10 to 13,000 EFHs, necessitating A-10 Wing
Replacement Program.
Life Extension: Extends legacy thin- and thick-skin wings from
original 8,000 EFH service life to 13,000.

Program Name: Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial
Navigation System
Funding: $39 million, Investment
Purpose: To provide enhanced capabilities to pinpoint location of
aircraft and to improve navigation.
Status: Complete.

Program Name: Multi-Function Color Display
Funding: $30 million (estimated), NGREA
Purpose: To provide ANG and AF Reserve aircraft with a moving map
capability ahead of deployment of Precision Engagement.
Status: Complete.

Program Name: Propulsion Upgrade Program
Funding: $29 million, Investment
Purpose: To provide additional thrust at low and medium altitudes
to minimize time in high-threat airspace.
Status: Complete. Efforts limited to RDT&E. Fielding estimated to
cost >$2 billion; not implemented.

Program Name: Precision Engagement Program
Funding: $546 million, Investment
Purpose: To bring smart munitions, stores management, situational
awareness and enhanced safety to the A-10. Includes aircrew training-
related devices.
Status: Complete.

Program Name: Situational Awareness Data Link
Funding: $55 million, Investment
Purpose: To provide pilots with a more detailed situational picture
of the air battle space.
Status: Complete.

Program Name: Aircraft Protection/Countermeasures Systems
Funding: $98 million, Investment
Purpose: To provide enhanced aircraft and pilot protection in high-
threat environments. Includes AAR-47, Countermeasures Dispensing and
Infrared Countermeasures programs.
Status: Complete.

Program Name: Single ARC-210 Secure Line-of-Sight/Beyond Line-of-
Sight Radio
Funding: $85 million, Investment
Purpose: Upgrades voice radio for secure line of sight and beyond
line-of-sight communications.
Status: Complete.

Program Name: On-Board Oxygen Generating System
Funding: $9 million, Investment
Purpose: To provide one Active Duty squadron with a self-contained,
continuously generating oxygen system.
Status: Complete.

Program Name: Second ARC-210 Secure Line-of-Sight/Beyond Line-of-
Sight Radio
Funding: $11 million, NGREA
Purpose: To upgrade ANG and AF Reserve aircraft with a second
secure line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight (satellite) radio to
allow near-instantaneous communications with the ground and command and
control assets/locations.
Status: Complete.
Continuing Programs:

Program Name: Operational Flight Programs (OFP)
Funding: $307 million, Weapon System Support and Investment
Purpose: To provide integration of hardware and software-based
capabilities, as well as to perform Post-Fielding Support (sustainment)
on the existing aircraft software baseline and maintain a Systems
Integration Lab.
Status: Suites 3, 4, 5, 6, 7A, and 7B are fielded. The Secretary of
the Air Force directed that Suite 8 development be continued through
fiscal year 2014. An organic Systems Integration Lab will be complete
in October 2014 at Hill AFB, UT. Post-Fielding Support continues
indefinitely.

Program Name: A-10 Wing Replacement Program
Funding: $695 million, Investment
Purpose: To procure a replacement wing for the A-10 based on the
existing thick-skin wing with targeted structural enhancements.
Status: Installs ongoing through fiscal year 2017.
Life Extension: Allows aircraft to reach 16,000 EFH Required
Service Life.

Program Name: Mode S/5
Funding: $35 million, Investment
Purpose: To provide enhanced Identification, Friend or Foe
capabilities.
Status: Mode S is complete. Mode 5 software development is ongoing
with the continuation of Suite 8 in fiscal year 2014. Mode 5 FOC
mandate is fiscal year 2020.

Program Name: Helmet-Mounted Cueing System
Funding: $46 million, Investment and NGREA
Purpose: To provide off-bore sight cueing, targeting and
situational awareness to more rapidly engage targets in the battle
space.
Status: Installs ongoing through the first quarter of fiscal year
2015.

Program Name: Lightweight Airborne Radio System V12
Funding: $17 million, NGREA
Purpose: To upgrade ANG and AF Reserve aircraft with an enhanced
combat search and rescue radio.
Status: Installs ongoing through the first quarter of fiscal year
2015.

Program Name: Turbine Engine Monitoring System/Airborne Data
Recorder (TEMS/ADR)
Funding: $11 million, Investment
Purpose: To upgrade existing TEMS units to provide enhanced engine
monitoring and reporting, as well as flight parameter reporting to
assist Aircraft Structural Integrity Program engineers in assessing
structural health.
Status: Installs ongoing through fiscal year 2014.

Program Name: Rapid Innovation Funds
Funding: $10 million, Investment
Purpose: Funds multiple, small studies to meet needs/gaps in A-10
capabilities.
Status: Ongoing through fiscal year 2014.

Program Name: Portable Aircraft Test System (PATS)-70
Funding: $50 million, Investment
Purpose: To address obsolescence issues with legacy A-10 aircraft
testers. Combines multiple legacy testers into a single unit to reduce
logistics footprint and ease maintenance burden. Planning follow-on
effort via PATS-70A to further consolidate and improve testing
capabilities.
Status: Awaiting Milestone C decision with first fielding projected
in April 2014.

Program Name: On-Board Oxygen Generating System
Funding: $4 million (estimated), NGREA
Purpose: To provide Air Force Reserve aircraft with a self-
contained, continuously generating oxygen system.
Status: Installs begin in fiscal year 2014.

Program Name: Aircraft Parking Brake
Funding: $4 million, NGREA
Purpose: To provide ANG and Air Force Reserve aircraft with an
aircraft parking brake.
Status: Acquisition and source selection ongoing with first
installs planned in fiscal year 2014.

Program Name: Covert Overt Lighting Assembly
Funding: $1.5 million, NGREA
Purpose: To provide ANG and AF Reserve aircraft with landing lights
compatible with night vision (covert) and traditional (overt)
operations.
Status: Acquisition and source selection ongoing.

63. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, is it true that Air Combat
Command has issued an official notification to cease Suite 8
development immediately with the exception of work required to preserve
and store Suite 8 work to date?
Dr. LaPlante. The Secretary of the Air Force directed that Suite 8
development be continued through fiscal year 2014.

64. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, if this is accurate, what impact
will this have on the ability to conduct future subsystem
modernization?
Dr. LaPlante. As previously stated, the Air Force will continue
development of OFP Suite 8 through fiscal year 2014. Also, in order to
facilitate integration of required software updates, the Air Force is
standing up an organic software integration laboratory (SIL). The SIL
will provide us the ability to make software updates and modifications
as required.

65. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, the Operational Flight Program
(OFP) provides the mechanism to drive the central computer and its
interface with many subsystems. Any updates to existing hardware or
software within these subsystems require an OFP update. Does this
decision represent a decision to end all future A-10 modernization
efforts?
Dr. LaPlante. As previously stated, the Air Force will continue
development of OFP Suite 8 through fiscal year 2014.

66. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, do you believe this action
violates section 143 of the NDAA for fiscal year 2014 that prohibits
DOD from using any funds to ``prepare to retire'' the A-10?
Dr. LaPlante. Because the Secretary of the Air Force has directed
that development of OFP Suite 8 continue through fiscal year 2014, we
believe this issue to be moot.

67. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, what are the operating costs per
hour for the A-10, compared to the F-15E, F-16, B-1, AC-130, and B-52?
Dr. LaPlante. The Operational Cost Per Fly Hour (OCPFH) is a
historically based metric from the Air Force Total Ownership Cost
(AFTOC) system that provides visibility into the total cost to operate
an aircraft during a specific year. The OCPFH is calculated by dividing
the total operating and sustainment costs (excluding hardware
modifications) associated with a weapon system by the total flying
hours flown in the same year. The following represents the fiscal year
2013 OCPFH (TY$):

A-10....................................................... $17,398
F-15E...................................................... $37,504
F-16....................................................... $22,954
B-1........................................................ $54,218
AC-130..................................................... $37,492
B-52....................................................... $67,475

air force acquisition programs
68. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, please provide a list of all
canceled acquisition category (ACAT) 1, 1A, and 2 Air Force acquisition
programs since September 11, 2001, in which the Air Force did not end
up procuring the item. The list should include how much the Air Force
spent on the program before it was canceled.
Dr. LaPlante. There are 12 Air Force acquisition programs (5 ACAT
I, 4 ACAT IA, and 3 ACAT II) since September 11, 2001, in which the Air
Force did not procure the item.

[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
Spend
Name Reviewed Status Prior Full Name Type ACAT
to Canx
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFNet Inc 2................... Terminated-2013 29.1 Air Force .............. IAC
(TY$). Intranet
Increment 2
(AFNet Inc 2).
AFNet Inc 3................... Terminated-2013 29.8 Air Force .............. IAC
(TY$). Intranet
Increment 3
(AFNet Inc 3).
BCS-M......................... Terminated-2009 98.8 Battle Control MAIS............ IAC
(TY$). System--Mobile
(BCS-M).
ECSS Inc 1.................... Terminated-2012 894.9 Expeditionary Unbaselined MAIS IAM
(TY$). Combat Support
System
Increment 1.
CVLSP......................... Terminated-2012 6.1 Common Vertical Pre-MDAP........ IC
(TY$). Lift Support
Platform.
NPOESS........................ Terminated-2012 2,837.6 National Polar- MDAP............ IC
(BY 2002). orbiting
Operational
Environmental
Satellite
System.
CSAR-X........................ Terminated 2009 33.0 Combat Search Pre-MDAP........ ID
(TY$). and Rescue
Replacement
Vehicle (CSAR-
X).
E-10.......................... Terminated-2007 98.2 E-10 Multi- MDAP............ ID
(TY$). Sensor Command
and Control
Aircraft
Program.
TSAT.......................... Terminated-2009 2,507.4 Transformational Pre-MDAP........ ID
(TY$). Satellite
Communications
System.
B-52 EHF...................... Terminated-2013 21.7 B-52 Extremely .............. II
(TY$). High Frequency.
B-52 SR2...................... Terminated-2013 9.8 B-52 Strategic .............. II
(TY$). Radar
Replacement.
GEMS.......................... Terminated-2011 281.3 Ground Element II
(TY$). Minimum
Essential
Emergency
Communications
Network (MEECN)
System.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

69. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, please provide a list of all ACAT
1, 1A, and 2 Air Force acquisition programs since September 11, 2001,
in which the program costs were more than 25 percent greater than
initial cost estimates. The list should include the initial cost
estimate, how much the program ended up costing, and the difference
between the two.
Dr. LaPlante. Answer:

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

air force civilian personnel
70. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, how many Air Force civilians does
the Air Force currently employ? What was this number in 2010, 2011,
2012, and 2013? What was this number on September 11, 2001?
Dr. LaPlante. The number of Air Force full-time U.S. (appropriated
funded) civilians employed by end of fiscal year:

2010....................................................... 139,428
2011....................................................... 147,861
2012....................................................... 143,351
2013....................................................... 141,253

The number of Air Force full-time U.S. civilians employed on
September 11, 2001 was 140,425.

71. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, how has the total number of Air
Force civilians changed annually over this period (2010 to present)
compared to the total number of uniformed Air Force end strength, i.e.
provide the annual total Air Force civilian number for 2010 to present,
as well as the same number for uniformed personnel?
Dr. LaPlante. The data below reflects the inventory of Air Force
full-time U.S. (appropriated funded) civilians and Active Duty military
personnel (includes officer, enlisted, and cadets) as of the end of
each fiscal year.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Civilian Military
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010.............................................. 139,428 333,113
2011.............................................. 147,861 333,243
2012.............................................. 143,351 331,880
2013.............................................. 141,253 332,320
------------------------------------------------------------------------

72. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, how many Air Force civilians
serve in each major command?
Dr. LaPlante. The number of U.S. full-time (appropriated funded)
civilians at the end of fiscal year 2013 for each major command
(Excludes Field Operating Agencies, Direct Reporting Units, Air
National Guard or HQ USAF).

Air Combat Command (ACC)................................... 9,899
Air Education and Training Command (AETC).................. 14,196
Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC).................... 2,391
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).......................... 59,146
Air Mobility Command (AMC)................................. 8,017
Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC)........................... 12,768
Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)............................ 7,317
Air Force Special Ops Command (AFSOC)...................... 1,518
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)................................. 3,058
U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE)............................. 1,667
------------
Total.................................................... 119,977

73. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, how many of these Air Force
civilians serve in the area of acquisitions?
Dr. LaPlante. As of September 30, 2013, there were 24,993 Air Force
civilian personnel serving in acquisition positions throughout the Air
Force such as program management, contracting, engineering and science,
product support/life cycle logistics and T&E.

74. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, how many of these civilians serve
in headquarters elements?
Dr. LaPlante. As of September 30, 2013, there were 762 Air Force
civilian personnel serving in management headquarters acquisition
positions throughout the Air Force.

75. Senator Ayotte. Dr. LaPlante, how many of these civilians serve
in Headquarters, Department of the Air Force?
Dr. LaPlante. As of September 30, 2013, there were 223 Air Force
civilian personnel serving in Headquarters USAF acquisition positions.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
air force acquisition
76. Senator Lee. Dr. LaPlante, there have been many reports in the
press in the past month regarding the cost of the F-35 and efforts of
both DOD and the contractors to bring these costs down. The program
manager at Lockheed Martin stated that the cost of an F-35A would be
around $75 million by 2019. What do you believe needs to be done to
make these cost projections realistic?
Dr. LaPlante. The F-35 JPO, in collaboration with the contractors,
must continue to study and pursue affordability measures that further
reduce costs. The F-35 JPO has already made significant progress in
reducing the production cost of the aircraft. Lot over lot, the unit
cost of the F-35 aircraft continues to come down. As an example, the
average aircraft unit recurring flyaway decreased 3.2 percent from low
rate initial production (LRIP) Lots 5 to 6 and 4.7 percent between LRIP
lots 6 and 7. More work needs to be done and if confirmed I will work
closely with the Navy SAE and USD(AT&L) to continue reducing the F-35A
fly-away cost.

77. Senator Lee. Dr. LaPlante, what do you believe should be done
to lower not just the acquisition costs of these aircraft but bring
down the lifecycle costs as well?
Dr. LaPlante. The F-35 JPO and the contractors are already working
on ways to lower the lifecycle costs of the program. Some of the
affordability initiatives being pursued include the stand-up of a Cost
War Room manned by F-35 JPO, Lockheed Martin, and Pratt & Whitney
personnel; injecting competition into long-term sustainment based on
Industry Day discussions (support equipment, global supply chain,
training center operations); establishing an affordability database
containing items for evaluation; and exploring contract efficiencies.
In addition, the F-35 JPO is analyzing other ways to reduce costs such
as obtaining technical data and data rights where it is cost effective
to do so; streamlining the supply chain; implementing efficiencies in
the assembly line; eliminating production scrap, rework, and repair;
and implementing process improvements.

78. Senator Lee. Dr. LaPlante, what are your biggest acquisition
priorities for the Air Force?
Dr. LaPlante. My five biggest acquisition priorities for the Air
Force acquisition community are:
First, continue our heightened focus on the high priority programs.
I am committed to launching these programs right and keeping them on
track. The Air Force currently lists F-35, KC-46 Tanker, LRS-B, and
replacement for aging E-8C JSTARS as our top priorities.
Second, continuously improve relationships and transparency with
stakeholders, including the USD(AT&L), Capitol Hill, Industry, and the
Laboratories. Through regular meetings, briefings, and other
discussions, I will lead by example, and require our acquisition
workforce to share the Air Force message with our stakeholders to help
promote a culture of transparency.
Third, the Air Force must own the technical baseline for
acquisition programs. Strong, stable program offices, augmented by
experts and reach-back to the Laboratories, Federally Funded Research
and Development Centers and University Affiliated Research Centers are
required in order for the government to own the technical baseline.
Furthermore, this process must be institutionalized into the life of
each program, rather than depending upon our industrial partners to
manage technical performance, dictate sustainment solutions and shape
evolutionary technical solutions.
Fourth, in concert with OSD, I will continue to implement highest
impact BBP 2.0 initiatives as my fourth acquisition priority. Included
in this goal are implementing ``should cost,'' building strong
partnerships with requirements, employing appropriate contract types,
eliminating unproductive processes and bureaucracy, enforcing open
system architectures and effectively managing data rights, improving
the acquisition of Services outside traditional acquisition, ensuring
technical development is used for true risk reduction, increasing the
cost consciousness of the workforce, and increasing small business
roles and opportunities.
Finally, I want the Air Force acquisition community to design,
develop and field systems for our Air Force that will be resilient to
the capabilities of our anticipated peer competitors of 2023 and
beyond. To do this we must make smart investment decisions and leverage
experimentation and innovation. To ensure Air Force investment
solutions and strategies support capabilities that will enable
effectiveness in the highly contested domains beyond 2023, the Air
Force must position itself through significant science and technology
and advance research investments. Our program office personnel must be
versed in cost and capability tradeoffs and analyses, and dedicated to
should cost and other efficiency initiatives to generate savings for
reinvestment. The result will be that all Air Force systems and
capabilities will be able to operate through degraded conditions,
including contested environments, and can withstand operational and
engineered challenges in a variety of environments, including cyber,
electronic warfare and space.

79. Senator Lee. Dr. LaPlante, how do you plan to balance the need
to acquire the best quality equipment while finding areas to save money
in the budget?
Dr. LaPlante. I have a commitment to the warfighter to acquire the
best quality equipment and to the American taxpayers, minimize costs;
and I plan to balance those priorities. In my current position, I have
stressed how requirements can drive cost, with the intent of guiding
the community, to evaluate how changing or reducing a requirement, even
slightly, can have significant cost ramifications.
Cost/schedule versus capability trade-off curves are a valuable
tool in identifying which requirements are key cost drivers and can
assist in the assessment of which requirements can be reduced. The CSBs
and the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC) provide two
forums to evaluate requirements priorities and trade-offs, and while
the AFROC has been essential to this task, I am seeking to increase the
effectiveness of CSBs in this regard. Finally, the acquisition
community has demonstrated its commitment to cultivating a strong
working relationship with the requirements community, and the teamwork
between acquisitions and requirements will continue to pay dividends as
we face a challenging future.
______

[The nomination reference of Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr.,
follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report
As In Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
January 6, 2014.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee
on Armed Services:
William A. LaPlante, Jr., of Maryland, to be Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force, vice Sue C. Payton.
______

[The biographical sketch of Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr.,
which was transmitted to the committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
Biographical Sketch of Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr.
Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr., is the Principal Deputy, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Washington, DC. He is the
senior civilian assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition). His duties include providing expert advice and guidance
on Air Force acquisition programs and procurements. Dr. LaPlante is
also responsible for development and execution of policies and
procedures in support of the operation and improvement of the Air
Force's acquisition system. He oversees an Air Force research and
development, test, production, and modernization program portfolio of
over $40 billion annually.
Dr. LaPlante has more than 28 years of experience in defense
technology including positions at the MITRE Corporation and the Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. He has also served on
the Defense Science Board (DSB), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
Senior Advisory Group and Naval Research Advisory Committee. He has
also taught as an adjunct lecturer in the Department of Mechanical
Engineering at the Catholic University of America.
Prior to entering public service, Dr. LaPlante was the Missile
Defense Portfolio Director for the MITRE Corporation. In this role, Dr.
LaPlante led a technical team providing analytic and system engineering
expertise across the Missile Defense Agency portfolio of ballistic
missile defense systems. Previously, he was the Department Head for
Global Engagement at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory (APL) where he was responsible for all of APL's work
supporting offensive military capabilities. Dr. LaPlante was a member
of APL's Executive Council and served on many other Laboratory
leadership initiatives. His earlier APL work included Associate
Department Head of the National Security Technology Department and
Program Area Manager for the Strategic Submarine Security Program.
Dr. LaPlante has also served on numerous prestigious scientific
boards. He was appointed to the Defense Science Board in 2010 where he
co-chaired a study on Enhancing the Adaptability of U.S. Military
Forces and participated in studies on technology and innovation
enablers, missile defense, cyber resiliency and contractor logistics.
Dr. LaPlante chaired a Commander, STRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group
study on nuclear planning factors and participated in various studies
sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, the Naval Research
Advisory Committee, STRATCOM and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).
Education
1985 - Bachelor of Science degree in engineering physics,
University of Illinois
1988 - Master of Science degree in applied physics, Johns Hopkins
University
1998 - Doctorate in mechanical engineering, Catholic University of
America
Career Chronology
1985, Began career at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory, Laurel, MD
1993-1998, Chief Scientist and Technical Director for several large
at-sea submarine security experiments, Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD
1998-2001, Program Area Manager for the Strategic Submarine (SSBN)
Security Program, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory,
Laurel, MD
2001-2003, Business Area Executive for Undersea Warfare and
Associate Department Head, National Security Technology Department
(Undersea Warfare, Homeland Security, and Biomedicine), Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD
2003-2011, Department Head, Global Engagement Department, Johns
Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD
2011-2013, Missile Defense Portfolio Director, MITRE Corporation,
Mclean, VA
2013-present, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition), Washington, DC
Other Achievements
Defense Science Board Member
STRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group Member
Lecturer, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Catholic University
of America
______

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals
nominated from civilian life by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate, and certain
senior military officers as determined by the committee, to
complete a form that details the biographical, financial and
other information of the nominee. The form executed by Dr.
William A. LaPlante, Jr., in connection with his nomination
follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510-6050
(202) 224-3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
Instructions to the Nominee: Complete all requested information. If
more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the
form and the question number (i.e. A-9, B-4) to which the continuation
of your answer applies.
Part A--Biographical Information
Instructions to the Nominee: Biographical information furnished in
this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for
public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in
any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
William Albert LaPlante, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition).

3. Date of nomination:
October 30, 2013.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the
committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
October 9, 1963; Philadelphia, PA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
Married to Joanne Marie Hogan.

7. Names and ages of children:
Claire LaPlante, 19
Caroline LaPlante, 14

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions,
dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1985, B.S. Engineering
Physics
Johns Hopkins University, 1988, M.S. Applied Physics
Catholic University of America, 1998, Ph.D. Mechanical Engineering

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the
last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of
job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
May 2013-Present: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Acquisition), U.S. Air Force, Pentagon, Washington DC
May 2011-May 2013: Missile Defense Portfolio Director, MITRE
Corporation, McLean, VA
1985-April 2011: Department Head, Global Engagement, Johns Hopkins
Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD
Aug. 1998-May 2013: Lecturer, Department of Mechanical Engineering,
Catholic University of America, Washington, DC

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative,
honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State,
or local governments, other than those listed above.
Member, Defense Science Board, 1/2010-5/2013
Advisor, U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group, 2005-2013
Member, National Academies Committee on Distributed Remote Sensors
for Undersea Warfare, 2005-2007
Member, Naval Research Advisory Council Committee on Protection of
Critical Undersea Infrastructure, 2007-2009
Member, Strategic Systems Steering Task Group, 2003-2011

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in
professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and
other organizations.
Member - American Society of Mechanical Engineers

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary
society memberships, military medals, and any other special
recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
None.

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of
books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have
written.
2002 - Journal of Vibration and Control, ``Active Control of
Vibration and Noise Reduction from Fluid-Loaded Cylinder using Active
Constrained Layer Damping.''
2006 - Report of the Defense Science Board, ``Information
Management for Net Centric Operations.'' Vol. I and II.
2007 - Committee on Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea
Warfare, Naval Studies Board, Division on Engineering and Physical
Sciences, National Research Council of the National Academies,
``Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare.''
2009 - Report of the Defense Science Board, ``Time Critical
Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff.''
2010 - Report of the Defense Science Board, ``Enhancing
Adaptability of U.S. Military Forces.'' Part A and B.
2011 - Report of the Defense Science Board, ``Science and
Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense
Feasibility.''

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal
speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have
copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have
been nominated.
Spoke at National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Gulf Coast
Chapter Air Armament Symposium on November 5, 2013. No written speech
was prepared and no transcript was taken.

Signature and Date
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement
on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information
provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate,
and complete.
William A. LaPlante, Jr.
This 17th day of December, 2013.

[The nomination of Dr. William A. LaPlante, Jr., was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on January 28, 2014,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 12, 2014.]

NOMINATIONS OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
HON. MICHAEL J. McCORD TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER);
MS. CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY;
MR. BRIAN P. McKEON TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR POLICY; HON. DAVID B. SHEAR TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS; AND MR. ERIC ROSENBACH TO BE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

----------

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2014

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, McCaskill,
Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Kaine,
King, Inhofe, McCain, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, and Fischer.
Other Senators present: Senators Nunn and Warner.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The committee
meets today to consider the nominations of Robert Work to be
Deputy Secretary of Defense; Michael McCord to be Under
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; Christine Wormuth to be
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Brian McKeon to be
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; David
Shear to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs; and Eric Rosenbach to be Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
I thank everybody for their understanding of the scheduling
difficulties that we faced between last week's snowstorm and
this morning's floor votes and the need to shift the hearing to
a 9 o'clock start.
We welcome our nominees and their families. We thank them
for the support that those families provide to our nominees.
Our nominees should feel free, during their opening statements,
to introduce the family members who are here to support them
today.
We're also delighted, all of us, to welcome back two dear
friends and former chairmen of this committee, Senators Nunn
and Warner. They're here to introduce two of our nominees.
Senators Nunn and Warner have an extraordinary record of
public service, including, between the two of them, more than
50 years of service on this committee. By the way, Senator
Warner first appeared before this committee 45 years ago,
almost to the day, for a February 6, 1969, hearing on his
nomination to the position of Under Secretary of the Navy.
Now, I'm not exactly sure why our nominees here this
morning, all stood until the gavel banged. That's never
happened before. I finally figured it out. It's because
Senators Warner and Nunn were here. I think it's in your honor,
not in ours, that we saw our nominees standing here this
morning. In any rate, we're all delighted to have you back here
with us.
Mr. Work is well known to us from his service as Under
Secretary of the Navy from 2009 to 2013.
Mr. McCord has spent almost 30 years in service to our
country, including 5 years as the Department of Defense's (DOD)
Deputy Comptroller; before that, of course, Mike spent 21 years
on the staff of this committee, and many of us remember his
great expertise, his work ethic, and his commitment. They
qualify him well for this job.
Ms. Wormuth has served in senior national security
positions in the executive branch from 1996 to 2002 and from
2009 to the present; most recently, as Special Assistant to the
President for Defense Policy and Strategy, and as Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Force
Development.
Mr. McKeon has spent the majority of his 29-year career in
national security affairs, including 12 years on the
professional staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
and he is currently the Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff
of the National Security Council.
Mr. Shear spent his 31-year career in the Foreign Service
and serves currently as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam.
Mr. Rosenbach has held a variety of national security-
related positions in academia and in the private sector, and
has served our country as an intelligence officer in the Army,
as a professional staff member of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, and as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Cyber Policy.
The security challenges that we face as a Nation are
complex, and they're growing. Our nominees are going to be
asked to help manage them in a time of decreased budgetary
resources and increased budgetary uncertainty. I believe
they're all well qualified to do just that.
Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd echo the same remarks about Senator Warner and Senator
Nunn. Nice to have you back. You haven't changed a bit, either
one of you.
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Clapper stated,
on February 12, ``Looking back over my now more than a half
century in intelligence, I've not experienced a time when we've
been beset by more crises and threats around the globe.'' Based
on what I've seen and heard in many travels over the years, I
think that's exactly right. Yet, over the last few years,
massive cuts to our military, our national security, including
half a trillion dollars cut before sequestration took effect
have resulted in deep decline in military readiness and
capabilities.
We know what's happened to the Navy and the Air Force and
the Army, in terms of the cuts in end strength. It's something
that's disturbing. I think, particularly the speech that was
made yesterday by Secretary Hagel. I'm going to read one of the
quotes that I wrote down. He said, ``American dominance on the
seas, in the skies, and in space can no longer be taken for
granted.'' I never thought I'd see that, but, that was the
statement. Even though the recent budget deal provides some
minor sequester relief, our military is still subject to nearly
$77 billion in sequester cuts in 2014 and 2015. Protecting the
United States is more than just the resource levels, however.
Resourcing must directly address the threats that we face using
an effective and comprehensive strategy. Instead, the President
and his administration continue to base their strategy and
justify cutting national security spending on the naive world
view that, ``the tide of the war is receding'' and ``al Qaeda
is on the run and on a path to defeat''. If you look across the
Middle East and northern Africa, we know better than that. Even
the top intelligence official, Director Clapper, told us,
during testimony, that al Qaeda isn't on the run and, instead,
is morphing and franchising. Tragically, this is what happens
when strategy is driven by hope rather than reality.
We've talked about this before, and I won't go into any
detail now, as I was going to, but, in terms of the defense
acquisition process, making sense of a convoluted and
cumbersome acquisition process and instituting commonsense
reforms will be a vital step towards maximizing taxpayer
dollars and delivering necessary technology, on budget and on
schedule.
I'm also deeply concerned about recent headlines that
depict ethical and leadership failings of some of our military
leaders. I know firsthand that the vast majority of our
military cadre are strong and ethical leaders who serve our
Nation with distinction. However, the failings of some have the
potential to undermine the service of the rest.
I expect the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, and all of the senior officers to renew their
commitment to integrity and to firmly address failures in a
transparent manner. If confirmed, the nominees today will be
responsible for addressing these challenges. I look forward to
the hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe.
We're first going to call on Senator Warner, who's going to
be introducing the nominee for Deputy Secretary, and then we're
going to turn over to Senator Nunn to introduce Mr. McCord.
John Warner, welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA

Senator Warner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
ranking member, and colleagues and friends of many, many years.
It's a special occasion for me, and I thank the chair for his
thoughtful recollection that 45 years ago I did appear here.
It's the symbolism of the wonderful Nation that we have and are
preserving today to give the opportunity to people for public
service. My Nation has been more than generous to me in that
opportunity to have public service.
We're here today, my friend Sam Nunn and I, to introduce
two individuals, one of whom I associate myself with your
remarks, even though I haven't read them about Mike McCord.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McCord served on our committee 21 years, and did a
marvelous job, and he's here today with his family.
Bob Work, I've come to know, because he was, by parallel,
Under Secretary of the Navy, the position I held under Melvin
Laird and David Packard. As I reflected last night on the
Laird-Packard team, Bob Work is much like David Packard.
Packard founded Hewlett-Packard. Bob Work spent 27 years in the
U.S. Marine Corps, advancing through all the positions of
officer. He was number two in his basic class. I hasten to
mention, I was in the Marine Corps, but I didn't rank number
two. He was number one in his field artillery class. I went to
communications school, and again, I was not number one. We have
one parallel; we both served as Under Secretary. But, his
career is far more distinguished in uniform than mine. He went
on to take over positions of his skill, for which he was known
in the Marine Corps, as an absolute expert analyst, an absolute
hands-on manager. He carried those learning experiences of the
Marine Corps right straight through as Under Secretary of the
Navy.
There's an old saying in our business, Is this person a
workhorse or a show horse? I don't know about his showmanship,
but I do know that Bob Work is a workhorse. He's well known.
His writings are prolific on the subjects of military, the most
arcane aspects of our military. He's well known on taking on
budgets. Given the dramatic announcements by the Secretary of
Defense yesterday and the goals that the administration has set
for the Defense Department, Bob Work and, I believe, Mike
McCord, are the two right individuals to be in partnership with
Secretary of Defense Hagel and get this job done.
Gentlemen of the committee and ladies of the committee, I
thank you for the privilege of appearing this morning. I've
rarely seen--and I examined the biographic achievement of all
these nominees--a better qualified group to come before the
Senate and seek confirmation and to serve in public service. On
behalf of the men and women of the Armed Forces, I would simply
say, in the case of Bob Work, that we're very pleased, Bob,
that you and your lovely wife have reenlisted.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Warner.
Senator Nunn.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF GEORGIA

Senator Nunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, Senator McCain, Senator Reed,
other members of the committee. I'm delighted and honored to be
here.
I associate myself with the remarks of Senator Warner about
Bob Work, and all of these nominees. I'm here to introduce a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff, as has
been mentioned, for 21 years, Mike McCord. I'm very, very proud
to have a chance to be with Mike and to meet his new bride and
to see his family, and to be with all the members of the
committee.
Being here with Senator Warner does bring back a lot of
memories. One of those memories that I have so vividly was an
individual by the name of Ed Braswell. I just received notice
yesterday that Ed died, in the last couple of days, and I have
certainly been in touch with his family. But, Ed served this
committee with distinction as the chief of staff--general
counsel, we called the leader, back in those days, of the
staff. It reminded me of Ed's tremendous service to the
committee and to the Senate and to the Nation, and it also
reminded me of the work we often take for granted of all of our
staff people that have done such a tremendous job in the last
40 years while I followed this committee, and even before that,
in, basically, putting the security of our Nation first. I
thank Ed for his service, and certainly, Mr. Chairman, I would
hope someone would put something in the record about Ed's
service, because he was indeed a tremendous leader here, a man
of great, great integrity.
Senator Warner. May I associate myself with the remarks
about Ed Braswell? I remember him very well, as we all did. He
exemplified the type of person that joins the staff of the
Senate Armed Services Committee. He set the gold standard.
Senator Nunn. That's exactly right.
Mr. Chairman, I have a great pleasure of introducing Mike
McCord today. Mike currently serves as the DOD's Deputy
Comptroller, a position he's held for approximately 5 years.
He's fully prepared for his critical role, if he is confirmed,
as our Nation's Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller.
Mike is well-known to the committee, having served 21 years
here. Mike joined the Senate Armed Services Committee staff
when I became chairman in 1987. He was recruited by a couple of
people that I know that Senator McCain and Senator Levin and
other members of this committee may recall, and that's Arnold
Punaro and John Hamre. Of course, John went on from a position
that Mike has been nominated for, as Comptroller, to be the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and now Chair of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, and he's served our
country with great distinction.
Mike, John's path is a pretty good one to follow, there,
and you're doing it with tremendous skills.
I believe our Nation is fortunate to have a nominee with
the experience, the knowledge, and the credibility that Mike
brings to this position, particularly at a critical time for
the Department of Defense budget, as you all know.
First, Mike brings a background and spirit of
nonpartisanship and a long history of working both sides of the
aisle. While at this committee, he served more than 10 years in
the majority and more than 10 years in the minority. He served
under four chairmen--Senator Thurmond, Senator Warner, Senator
Levin, and myself. At the Defense Department, he served under
both political party Secretaries, Bob Gates, Leon Panetta, and
Chuck Hagel. He's worked in the same nonpartisan fashion over
the years with both the Budget Committee and the Appropriations
Committee, two other key committees, where he has built respect
and goodwill.
Second point is that Mike has served our Nation for almost
30 years in a number of critical national security and
budgetary positions. His career spans from the last years of
the Cold War through the fall of the Berlin Wall, Operation
Desert Storm, the post-Cold War drawdowns of the 1990s, Bosnia
and Kosovo, September 11, as well as our wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Mike has seen buildups, he's seen wars, and he's
seen drawdowns at the conclusion of wars.
Mike was a key member of this staff during the turbulent
years of the post-Cold War period when our budgets--not only
our budgets, but indeed our strategic views and map of the
world was rearranged. While here at the Armed Services
Committee, his oversight responsibilities included defense
budget matters, oversight of the Department's Quadrennial
Defense Review, supplemental funding for contingent operations
and natural disasters, ensuring compliance with discretionary
and mandatory spending targets, and advising the committee on
fiscal and budget policy issues.
During our work together on this committee when I was
chairman, Mike also exhibited his deep understanding of our
broader fiscal challenges in his work with me on entitlement,
spending caps, and budget resolutions over many years. We all
know the Defense Department's place in the overall budget is
enormously important, but it gets squeezed in many directions
because of other matters beyond the Defense Department. Mike's
knowledge there, I think, will serve his position as
Comptroller very well.
In his current role as Deputy Comptroller, Mike provides
guidance to the Comptroller, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Deputy Secretary of Defense on all budget, fiscal, and
financial management matters. He's a member of numerous senior-
level decisionmaking bodies inside the Department on budget,
program, strategy, financial management, and legislative
matters.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, with Mike's depth of
experience and leadership skills, I can't think of anyone who's
better prepared or equipped to serve our Nation as the
Department of Defense's Comptroller. The committee wisely
confirmed Michael McCord several years ago for his current
position, and I urge you to do so again, and I urge his
confirmation by the full Senate.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Senator Nunn.
Both you and Senator Warner's words mean, I know, a great
deal to the nominees and to this committee, and we appreciate
your being here. We're privileged to be in your presence, as
always. We look forward to many, many future years of being
associated with both of you in some way or another.
Of course, you have busy lives to lead and schedules to
follow, so you're free to leave, should you deem fit, at any
time.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a word
about Bob Work. I dwelled on the Marine Corps, because of
personal reasons, with him. But, he went on into the private
sector to do extensive analytical work, and is now Chief
Executive Officer of the Center for New American Security. We
worked very closely together, both when he was Under Secretary
and in his new position. Again, this man looks into the future
and is able to make the tough decisions and priorities that are
facing this Department right now.
Chairman Levin. Thank you again. Thank you both.
We're going to be calling on the witnesses, for their
opening comments and any introductions that they wish to make,
in the order that they're listed on the notice of this hearing.
Before that, though, I will ask all of you to answer, at one
time, the following questions, which are standard questions we
ask of all our civilian nominees:
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which
would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation
process?
[All six witnesses answered in the negative.]
Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines
established for requested communications, including questions
for the record in hearings?
[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in
response to congressional requests?
[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their
testimony or briefings?
[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon
request, before this committee?
[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when
requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with
the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or
denial in providing such documents?
[All six witnesses answered in the affirmative.]
Thank you very much.
First, we will call upon Mr. Work.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT O. WORK, TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

Mr. Work. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished
members of the committee, I'm really honored to appear before
you today as President Obama's nominee as the Deputy Secretary
of Defense. I firmly believe there is no higher calling than
serving one's nation, and I am deeply humbled by the confidence
that the President and Secretary Hagel have shown in me by
nominating me for this demanding role.
Before continuing, I would like to thank several people
here today. First, I'd like to thank Senator Warner for doing
me the honor of introducing me, and for his kind remarks, and
for both Senator Warner and Senator Nunn for everything they
have done in service of this hallowed institution, as well as
this great Nation.
I'd next like to introduce and thank my wife of 35 years,
Cassandra, and my wonderful daughter, Kendyl, for being by my
side today and for supporting me as I once again am being
considered for demanding years in Government service.
I'd also like to recognize my younger brother, Skip. He
retired as a Marine Master Sergeant, and I really appreciate
his presence and support here today, as well as those of my
colleagues from the Center for a New American Security, some of
whom actually made it here today. I thank them.
Finally, I appreciate my five friends and colleagues here
for joining me on this panel, as well as for volunteering to
serve 3 more years in the administration, and especially for
agreeing to answer all of the hard questions that I'm certain
are surely to come.
I think the next 3 years are really going to be a period of
extraordinary challenge and opportunity for the Department of
Defense. The decision made by the administration, Congress, and
the Department will impact the capabilities and capacities of
our Armed Forces far into the future.
To reach the best decisions, I think all concerned will
need to address these issues deliberatively, collaboratively,
and with a spirit of cooperative purpose. For my part, if
confirmed, I pledge to you, the President, Secretary Hagel, and
all of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians,
contractors, and their families, that I will spend every waking
day doing everything humanly possible to address forthrightly
the pressing national security challenges that face our
country, and to improve both the warfighting capabilities and
health, welfare, and resiliency of our superb total force.
While so doing, I will continuously strive to improve the
Department's management, programming, and budgeting processes,
guided by the principle that fiscal discipline and
accountability can coexist with prudent discussions on national
defense without harming national security or threatening
commitments made to our servicemembers, past and present.
In closing, if the Senate chooses to confirm me as the next
Deputy Secretary of Defense, I will make every effort to
justify your decision, and I vow to work with every Member of
Congress to maintain what I believe to be the greatest military
in the world, so help me God.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering the
committee's questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Work.
Mike McCord, welcome back to the committee.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL J. McCORD, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

Mr. McCord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Inhofe,
members of the committee.
I have so much to be thankful for, being here today. First,
I am grateful to the President for nominating me to this
important position, and to Secretary Hagel for his confidence
in me. It's been an honor and a privilege to serve with
Secretary Hagel and with former Secretaries Gates and Panetta
over the past 5 years.
I'm also thankful to the President and the Secretary for
choosing Bob Work to be our next Deputy, and Christine Wormuth
to be our Under Secretary for Policy. I've enjoyed a great
working relationship with both of them over the past several
years. I have not worked as closely with Brian, Eric, or
Ambassador Shear yet, but it's a real pleasure to be here with
them and all our nominees today.
It's especially meaningful to me to be back here with the
committee, where I served on the staff for 21 years and had the
opportunity to learn from the outstanding Senators who have led
this committee as Chairman and Ranking Member during my time
here. Mr. Chairman, you, Senator McCain, who joined this
committee, I notice, the same day I joined the staff, back in
1987, and our two former chairmen, Senator Warner and Senator
Nunn. I'm very honored they're here today, and I'm especially
grateful to Senator Nunn for making the trip all the way here
and for his kind introduction.
Chairman Levin, it's an honor to be part of your staff for
11 years. Although it's too early to start saying goodbye, I
want to recognize not just what you've done as a Senator, but
the way you've done it, with the highest standards of
integrity. I'm always proud to tell people that I worked for
Sam Nunn and Carl Levin.
Senator Inhofe, I saw your dedication to our country and
our military firsthand as chairman and ranking member of the
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, back when I was
supporting Senators Chuck Robb and Daniel Akaka. It's a
pleasure to work with you again.
I also want to recognize my former colleagues on the staff,
led by Peter Levine and John Bonsell, for the work they do to
uphold the committee's high standards of bipartisanship and
dedication, and especially the 52-year winning streak.
Most importantly, I want to thank my family. First and
foremost, my wife, Donna--other shoulder. [Laughter.]
I could not serve without her love and support, and I'm so
lucky today and every day to have her. My mother, Ann, and
sister, Cathy, have joined us today. This is their second trip
from Ohio in 2 weeks for this hearing, and I thank them for
that. Donna and our daughter-in-law, Kim, and granddaughter,
Charlotte Rose, are here. Charlotte's in the front row. My
wife's law partner and friend, Ann Jones. I'm so happy all of
them are here to share this important day in my life.
Finally, I want to recognize Bob Hale, who is not here, but
for the outstanding job he's done as our Comptroller for the
past 5 years. He's given the job his all, and he's been a great
friend and mentor to me. The team that Bob and I lead take
great pride in what we do. Our people work extremely hard to
ensure the Department accomplishes its missions; in particular,
meeting the needs of a military at war. These past few years
have been especially challenging, as we work through the
longest continuing resolutions in the Department's history, a
sequester and a shutdown and furloughs, all while supporting
the demands of our wartime operations.
Should I be confirmed, I'll continue to lead our
Comptroller organization as we support our military and our
Nation. We face many challenges, going forward, in this era of
dynamic security changes and constrained resources, but I'm
confident we'll continue to meet those challenges.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mike.
Charlotte, as a grandfather, I know how important it is to
your grandpa that you're here today supporting him.
Ms. Wormuth.

STATEMENT OF MS. CHRISTINE E. WORMUTH, TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Ms. Wormuth. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and members of the committee.
It's a privilege to appear before you this morning. I very
much appreciate the opportunity to answer any questions you may
have regarding my nomination as Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.
I'd like to thank President Obama and Secretary Hagel for
their support of my nomination. I've had the privilege to serve
President Obama, former Secretaries Gates and Panetta, and now
Secretary Hagel, for the past 5 years, and, if the Senate
chooses to confirm me for this position, I look forward to
continuing to support the men and women of the U.S. military.
I began my service in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense in 1995, and was a member of the career Civil Service
for 7 years. I grew up professionally in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy, and, over the years in and
out of government, I've continued to be very impressed with the
quality of our national security workforce. They're
hardworking, patriotic individuals who serve with dedication
alongside their military colleagues. I'm very humbled and
honored by the opportunity to serve with them as Under
Secretary, if confirmed.
I wouldn't be here before you today as someone who's
pursued a career in international affairs and public service
without the support and inspiration I've drawn from my mother,
Deanna Wormuth. I'd also like to thank other members of my
immediate family, who are such an important part of my life and
who, in many ways, have made my service in Government possible.
My sister, Jennifer Wormuth, who's a surgeon in Baltimore, is
here. My husband, Drew Kuepper, who also works in Government
and is a retired Navy officer. Finally, I'd like to thank my
two amazing daughters, Rachel and Madeleine, who keep me
grounded and remind me every day what matters in life. Thank
you all for being here today and for being with me every day.
Senators, we live in a globalized, rapidly changing world
at a time when the United States faces a number of challenges,
as Senator Inhofe noted, but there are also opportunities to
shape a more peaceful world. If confirmed, I would look forward
to working with you all in Congress, with this committee, in
particular, and with the executive branch, to advance U.S.
national security interests in this environment.
I would support Secretary Hagel in building and sustaining
strong defense relationships with countries around the world,
with a goal of preventing crises wherever possible and ensuring
our military is ready to respond to crisis, if needed.
I would also make it a priority to provide day-to-day
leadership and management of the Office of Secretary of Defense
Policy organization so that it continues to provide excellent
support to Secretary Hagel and to the President.
Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee,
I'm grateful for your consideration this morning, and I look
forward to your questions. I will make every effort to live up
to the confidence that's been placed in me with this
nomination.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ms. Wormuth.
Mr. McKeon.

STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN P. McKEON, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, I've submitted a slightly longer
statement, for the record, which I will try to abbreviate now.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the
committee, it's a distinct honor to appear before you as the
President's nominee to be the Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy. I would like to thank the President and
the Secretary of Defense for their confidence in me in
selecting me for this position. I would also like to express my
deep appreciation to the Vice President, for whom I worked for
nearly 25 years in the Senate and in the White House, and who's
been a great mentor and friend to me.
I would not be here today without the strong support of my
family, particularly my parents and my wife. I owe a great debt
of gratitude to them, particularly my wife. She spent nearly 25
years working for five different Senators, so she understands
and has patiently tolerated the long hours required of working
in the Senate and in the White House.
I'm also joined today by my mother-in-law, Hope, and my
nephew, who shares my name and works here in the Senate for one
of your colleagues.
I've been fortunate to spend my professional life working
in all three branches of the Federal Government. In addition to
working here in the Senate and the White House, I clerked for a
Federal judge who was put on the bench by Senator Warner, so I
should thank him, since he is here, for appointing Judge
Doumar. It gave me a great opportunity.
My over 20 years of service in this chamber, and 5 years in
the executive branch, have given me a strong appreciation for
the challenges that confront our country, long experience in
national security policy, and a deep knowledge of how the two
political branches operate. I believe I have demonstrated an
ability to manage people as well as complex policy issues to
get things done and to work well across party lines.
I also continue to have great respect for the role of
Congress in national security. The most seminal change in the
American defense establishment in the last several decades, the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, would not have occurred without the
persistence of Congress.
The debates in this chamber on the Gulf and Balkan wars, in
significant treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion, were
among the most memorable of my time here. They were also among
the most important, for, in a democratic society, matters of
war and peace must be publicly debated and require the informed
consent of the American people through their representatives
here in Congress.
I'm fully aware that not all wisdom resides in the
executive branch, and I recognize that we will not always
agree, but we are all motivated by the same commitment to
protecting the country in our national interests, and I pledge
that, if confirmed, I will help the Department to maintain a
regular dialogue with the committee and its well-respected
professional staff.
In my time at the White House, I've worked closely with
many OSD Policy employees, including Ms. Wormuth. Just as the
ranks of the uniformed military are filled with highly
dedicated professionals, so too is OSD Policy. These women and
men have gone through a difficult period in the last year with
widespread furloughs resulting from sequestration, followed by
the shutdown of the Government in October. Our Government is
only as strong as its people, so an important priority, if
confirmed, will be to focus on our human capital.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]
Prepared Statement by Mr. Brian P. McKeon
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inhofe, members of the committee, it
is a distinct honor to appear before you as the President's nominee to
be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
I would like to thank the President and the Secretary of Defense
for their confidence in me in selecting me for this position. I would
like also to express my appreciation to the Vice President, for whom I
worked for nearly 25 years in the Senate and in the White House and who
has been a great teacher, mentor, and friend. I should also thank
former National Security Adviser Tom Donilon for giving me the chance
to serve in my current position on the National Security Council staff,
and to Susan Rice for keeping me on when she succeeded Mr. Donilon and
for supporting my possible move to a position in the Department of
Defense.
I would not be here today without the strong support of my family,
particularly my parents and my wife. My father, who hitchhiked from his
home in New York to Michigan to attend college and paid for his studies
by working in an auto factory at night--taught me the value of hard
work, that every day brings new opportunities, and that politics is a
noble profession. My mother, as much as anyone, drove me to succeed in
school and to reach my full potential. My wife, who spent nearly 25
years working in this chamber for five different Senators, has, simply
put, made me a better person. She has provided unstinting love,
support, and friendship, while patiently tolerating the long hours
required of working in the Senate and the White House, for which I am
deeply grateful.
Finally, I would like to thank the committee and its staff for
scheduling this hearing today, so soon after the nomination was
submitted. I worked on hundreds of nominations in my time on the staff
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, so I fully appreciate the
preparatory work required to convene a hearing of this nature.
I have been fortunate to spend my professional life working in all
three branches of the Federal Government. My over 20 years of service
in this chamber and 5 years in the executive branch have given me a
strong appreciation for the many challenges that confront our country,
long experience in national security policy, and a deep knowledge of
how the two political branches operate. I believe I have demonstrated
an ability to manage people as well complex policy issues, to get
things done and to work well across party lines.
I also have great respect for the role of Congress in national
security. The most seminal change in the American defense establishment
in the last several decades--the Goldwater-Nichols Act--would not have
occurred without the initiative and persistence of Congress. The
debates in this chamber in the 1990s on matters such as the Gulf War,
the Balkan conflicts, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the expansion
of the North Atlantic Alliance were among the most memorable of my time
here, and among the most important, for in a democratic society,
matters of war and peace must be publicly debated and require the
informed consent of the American people, through their representatives
in Congress. I am fully aware that not all wisdom resides in the
executive branch, and I recognize that we will not always agree. But we
are all motivated by the same commitment to protecting the country and
our national interests. I pledge to you that, if confirmed, I will help
the Department maintain a regular dialogue with the committee and its
professional staff. Throughout my tenure working in the Senate, this
committee had a well-deserved reputation for bipartisanship,
productivity and a strong professional staff, a reputation that
continues today.
In my time in the White House, I have worked closely with many
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Policy employees. Just as the
ranks of the uniformed military are filled with highly dedicated
professionals, so, too, is OSD Policy. The women and men of OSD Policy
have gone through a difficult period in the last year, with widespread
furloughs resulting from sequestration, followed by the shutdown of
most government operations in October. Our Government is only as strong
as its people, so an important priority, if confirmed, will be to focus
on our human capital, as did Under Secretaries Flournoy and Miller, so
that we can continue to recruit and retain talented professionals.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. McKeon.
Now Ambassador Shear.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID B. SHEAR, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

Ambassador Shear. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and members of the committee. I'm honored to appear
before you today, and I appreciate the opportunity to answer
questions you may have regarding my nomination to serve as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
Affairs.
I wish to thank the President for nominating me for this
position and to thank Secretary Hagel for supporting my
nomination.
I'd also like to thank my family and friends for their
strong support. My wife, Barbara, and my daughter, Jennifer,
could not be with us today, but they're here in spirit.
I'm joined, instead, by my big brother, George, his wife,
Diana, and their daughter, Laura. My brother, George, has
served as an inspiration to me throughout my life, but
particularly in my youth, when he was a U.S. Navy officer.
I'd like to thank the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines with whom I've worked closely throughout my career.
Their commitment to our Nation is a testament to the continued
strength of our military traditions. If confirmed, it would be
an honor for me to help build on those traditions.
The mission of the Asian and Pacific Security Affairs
Office is critical to our Nation's security. The Asia-Pacific
region boasts over half the world's population, half the
world's gross domestic product, and nearly half the world's
trade. It presents the United States with profound challenges
and opportunities. These include the continued fight against
terrorism, the military and political transition in
Afghanistan, the rise of China, and the need to strengthen our
alliances and partnerships.
The administration has responded to these challenges and
opportunities in East Asia by implementing the rebalance, a
whole-of-government approach to strengthening our economic,
diplomatic, and military positions in the region. If confirmed,
I hope to help implement the balance as we draw down from
Afghanistan, support a stable Afghan political transition, and
continue to fight al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
Mr. Chairman, I've worked closely with the military
throughout my Foreign Service career. I believe my work
demonstrates that close coordination between the diplomatic
corps and the military ensures the effective execution of
national security policy.
At the Embassy in Tokyo, I worked with U.S. forces to
strengthen our alliance while adjusting our presence in Japan.
While serving with the State Department's Office of Korean
Affairs, I coordinated U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance issues
with OSD and the Joint Staff. Most recently, as Ambassador to
Vietnam, I helped to build a new partnership that includes a
growing security cooperation component, adding both Navy and
Coast Guard officers to our Defense Attache office. The Pacific
Command has been a partner throughout my career.
My assignment as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuala Lumpur
and as Ambassador to Vietnam have allowed me to hone my skills
as a leader and manager of large groups of people in a
constrained fiscal environment. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with this committee and the whole of Congress to
address the national security challenges we face in order to
keep America safe, secure, and prosperous. I will make every
effort to live up to the confidence that has been placed in me.
I'm grateful for your consideration, and I look forward to your
questions.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Ambassador.
Mr. Rosenbach.

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC ROSENBACH, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

Mr. Rosenbach. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Inhofe. Thank you very much for the privilege of appearing
before you in the committee today. I appreciate everything that
you and the other members of the Senate Armed Services
Committee do to help our military, and I look forward to
answering your questions about my nomination for Assistant
Secretary of Defense.
I'd like to start by thanking my family. First of all, my
wife, Alexa, and my two kids, Max and Sophia, who are here
today. Their support and understanding, in particular over the
last several years when I've been in the Pentagon, has been
heartwarming and essential to me surviving.
I'd also like to thank my parents, Bill and Colleen, who
are here. Without them, I wouldn't be here today. It's their
love and hard work that got me here.
I also would like to explicitly thank the service men and
women of the U.S. military. The last decade has been hard on
the country, but particularly hard on them and their families.
We should always remember what they do.
Mr. Chairman, I've been in and around the military my
entire life. My father served in Vietnam. I was born--and
raised--at the U.S. Air Force Academy. I moved to and grew up
in Gettysburg, and the battlefields there. I served on Active
Duty in the Army in the military. I'm now working in the
Pentagon. I can say, with all honesty, I see no higher honor
than serving as Assistant Secretary of Defense and focusing, in
particular, on Homeland defense and defending our country and
working closely with the National Guard, U.S. Northern Command,
U.S. Cyber Command, and U.S. Strategic Command, in particular.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and your
staffs, in particular. As a former member of the Senate staff,
I know that's important. I'll make every effort, if confirmed,
to live up to your expectations. I look forward to your
questions.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
We're going to have a 7-minute first round of questions. I
think we're still, with that number of minutes, able to make
our 11:15 expected cutoff time, since the Senate will begin a
series of votes at that time.
Let me start with you, Mr. Work. Secretary Hagel,
yesterday, previewed the Department's 2015 budget request,
which is not going to be released in full until a few days from
now. He included numerous personnel-related proposals that are
intended to slow the growth of personnel costs. Among those
proposals are a 1-percent pay raise for most military
personnel, which is lower than the currently projected 1.8
percent that would take effect under current law; a pay freeze
for 1 year for general and flag officers; a reduction in the
growth of the housing allowance over time to 95 percent of
housing expenses rather than the 100 percent currently covered;
a phased-in reduction in the annual direct subsidy provided to
military commissaries; changes to the TRICARE health program to
encourage greater use of the most affordable means of care;
some fee increases for retirees in TRICARE; and, of course, the
reduction in the Army's Active Duty end strength to 450,000,
down from the currently planned 490,000.
Let me ask you, Mr. Work, what is the relationship between
those proposals and our need to invest in modernization and
readiness?
Mr. Work. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is one of the big issues that I dealt with as the
Under Secretary of the Navy, and I expect it will be one of the
issues that I'll deal with, if confirmed, as Deputy Secretary.
The rate of increase in personnel costs, especially since
2001, has been far above the rate of inflation. As a result,
today, by at least all accounts, our servicemembers, men and
women, are being compensated about 10 percent above their
average civilian counterpart. I think what Secretary Hagel--and
Chairman Dempsey--are trying to signal is that we want to
compensate our men and women for everything that they do for
their Nation, but we need to slow down the growth of personnel
compensation so that we can spend more money on readiness and
modernization. There is a direct link. It's a very, very
important and difficult issue, but one, if confirmed, I look
forward to working with the committee and the members of the
Department on trying to come to the right answer.
Chairman Levin. Mr. McCord, do you have a comment on that?
Mr. McCord. Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with Mr. Work's
comments. I think the chiefs wrestle with this when we go
through our budget deliberations in the building, and the
tradeoff is exactly as you state. They very directly feel it's
the people who have to train and equip the force for today, as
well as tomorrow, that there is a direct tradeoff between
military capability and being able to control our compensation
costs. I think the Secretary made clear that we are totally
respecting the work that our warfighters do, we are just trying
to restrain the growth a little bit. The compensation of our
military is about a third of our budget; including military and
civilian, it's about half. We cannot leave that area completely
untouched. However, as has been the case every year that we
have made some proposals in this area, they are
disproportionately small. We are relatively protecting
compensation, just recognizing the need that we have to make
some savings there to do what we need to do.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Work, the National Commission on the Structure of the
Air Force has concluded that the Department can and should
place greater reliance on the Air Reserve components more than
we have previously planned to do, and that a shift to placing a
larger portion of the Air Force's capability in the Air Reserve
component should be made even if we weren't facing these budget
reductions.
These are strong positions that were unanimously adopted by
the Commission, which included a former Secretary of the Air
Force and a former Under Secretary of the Air Force. I'm
wondering whether you have been briefed on the Commission's
report, and, if so, what your reaction is.
Mr. Work. Mr. Chairman, I haven't been briefed, but I have
read the report in full, and have digested it.
In essence, the Commission recommends shifting about 28,000
Active Duty airmen to the Reserve, primarily in the areas of
cyber, pilot training, space, and special ops. This would save
about $2.1 billion a year, and would increase the proportion of
the Reserve contribution to the U.S. Air Force total force from
about 35 percent to 42 percent.
If confirmed, I will work with the Department to try to
understand whether all of these recommendations could be
implemented, but the general thrust of the report, that we need
to take a very close look at, the balance between the Active
and the Reserve Force, is an important one, and one that I
wholly endorse.
Chairman Levin. Mr. Work, last year, Secretary Hagel began
to implement his plan to reduce the Department of Defense staff
by 20 percent. Last year's authorization act contains a
provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan
for streamlining Department of Defense management headquarters
by reducing the size of staffs, eliminating tiers of
management, cutting functions that provide little value--or
little additional value, consolidating overlapping and
duplicative program offices. The objective is to reduce
aggregate spending for management headquarters by not less than
$40 billion, beginning in fiscal year 2015.
What is your view on reductions to the size and composition
of the Department's management headquarters?
Mr. Work. I fully endorse Secretary Hagel's thrust here. We
have long been focused, in the Department--or when I was the
Under Secretary, we were long focused on taking overhead and
taking forces out of what we would refer to as ``tail'' and put
it into ``tooth'', combat power. This is a first step, I
believe. The 20-percent reduction that Secretary Hagel has
ordered, all of the Department staffs as well as the combatant
commander staffs, is an important first step and will reap
important savings that we'll be able to plow back into
capabilities and capacities that our warfighters need.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Wormuth, thank you for the time we spent together
yesterday to go over some of these problems that we have.
I do want to concentrate my questions on the current
strategy that we have, but, before doing that, just one
comment, and if it's going to be longer, we can do it for the
record. Mr. Work, this is addressing the acquisition reform
problem that we've been talking about for years and years, and
that you've been close to. Do you have any comments on what
your ideas are, in the near future, on that type of reform?
Mr. Work. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
Under Secretary of Defense Kendall, who is really being
aggressive in this regard. I think we have to take a look at
the way we generate requirements. I think all of us realize
that sometimes we overshoot the mark on requirements, which add
costs. All of the better business buying approaches that
Secretary Kendall is asking for, I fully endorse.
Senator Inhofe. Okay, that's good, Mr. Work. If you don't
mind, for the record, getting as much detail as you can to give
us your recommendations as to how to address this type of
reform.
Mr. Work. I will do so, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]

I understand that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Honorable Frank Kendall,
directed a number of parallel efforts to institute a continuous
improvement process for the defense acquisition system and I support
this ongoing effort. Prominent elements include: Better Buying Power
2.0 initiatives, an interim policy update to the Department of Defense
Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, ``Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System,'' a more dynamic coupling of military requirements and defense
acquisition processes, and a review of current statutes aimed at
suggesting a comprehensive consolidation and streamlining of
legislative prescriptions for defense acquisition. If confirmed I will
review this work, which is described in more detail below, and will
seek out additional steps to improve defense acquisition.
better buying power
Better Buying Power (BBP) 2.0, which is a second iteration of the
BBP initiatives that were introduced by Dr. Ashton Carter when he was
the USD(AT&L), identifies efficiencies and improvements across the
Defense of Defense (DOD) acquisition system. It focuses Defense-wide
review of critical process elements ranging from requirements
generation to system engineering, cost control, and life-cycle
sustainment. It also addresses professional training and shaping of the
Defense Acquisition Workforce (DAW). Stimulated by problem
identification, definition, and resolution, BBP is also a pragmatic
forum actively pursuing incremental efficiencies solicited from the
entire DAW. Proposals for improvement are tested and refined before
implementation into a growing body of acquisition best practices. The
goal is to deliver better value to the taxpayer and improve the way the
Department acquires goods and services in support of the warfighter.
BBP 2.0 consists of 34 initiatives organized into 7 focus areas:

Achieve affordable programs
Control costs throughout the product life cycle
Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry
and Government
Eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy
Promote effective competition
Upgrade tradecraft in acquisition of services
Improve the professionalism of the total acquisition
workforce

One notable addition is a new focus area on increasing the
professionalism of DOD's acquisition workforce. BBP 2.0 recognizes that
people are essential to changing the way DOD provides critical
capabilities to the warfighters. Within this area, Mr. Kendall is
introducing four new initiatives: (1) establish higher standards for
key leadership positions; (2) establish stronger professional
qualification requirements for all acquisition specialties; (3)
increase the recognition of excellence in acquisition management; and
(4) continue to increase the cost consciousness of the acquisition
workforce by focusing on culture change.
dodi 5000.02 update
Interim DODI 5000.02, ``Operation of the Defense Acquisition
System,'' provides fundamental guidance for Defense components. This
interim policy released on November 25, 2013:

Promotes best practices and flexibility to produce
improved acquisition outcomes; and
Reflects many of the BBP initiatives to include a
substantially increased emphasis on improved business
arrangements, program affordability, and what a program
``should cost'' the government, rather than what the
expectations are that it ``will cost'' the government if no
cost savings initiatives are attempted.

The product of close collaboration with DOD acquisition,
requirements, and resource experts, this interim policy includes a
series of program acquisition models that are tailored to the unique
characteristics of the product being acquired and to the totality of
circumstances associated with the program, including operational
urgency and risk factors.
dynamic interaction of military requirements and defense acquisition
In previous years, enhancements to the Defense acquisition process
resulted in synchronization of requirements documentation at specific
contractual milestones in product design, development, and production.
BBP initiatives pursue a more profound integration of requirements and
acquisition within Services and agencies to promote a dialogue to
refine needs apace with evolving knowledge of product design and
limitations.
Interim DODI 5000.02 adds a checkpoint immediately before the
Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase to ensure that military
needs and acquisition activities are fully aligned. This new decision
point confirms that Requests For Proposals from potential contractors
are informed by the latest validated requirements of joint military
needs authority.
The BBP process also fosters expansion of the use of Configuration
Steering Boards across the Department to ensure continuous examination
of requirements, resources, and associated acquisition activities
within the defense component organizations. This dynamic interaction of
the principal authorities involved in investment decisions for
warfighting capabilities aims to deliver affordable solutions by
focusing on tradespace and increasing knowledge of technology options
and associated costs.
at&l legislative proposal
The process of updating DODI 5000.02 revealed that the current body
of laws associated with major system acquisition has placed an
unnecessarily complex burden upon Program Managers. As a result,
USD(AT&L) initiated an effort to comprehensively review current
applicable statutes and regulations and is drafting a legislative
proposal to simplify the existing body of acquisition law and
regulations while maintaining the overall intent of existing statutes.
In a February 2014 Defense News article, Mr. Kendall reaffirmed that
this initiative ``is not to really change any of the intent behind the
existing laws, but just to simplify that body of law, make it more
comprehensible, make it easier to implement and make it something that
is much more focused on results and not as confusing and complex for
everybody.''
Using the interim DODI 5000.02 as a starting point, the proposal
will focus on areas such as Milestone certification, oversight regime
overlap, duplicative documentation and reports, and proposed changes to
the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the DOD FAR Supplement, and service
supplement. Service program deep dive case studies will highlight key
areas of interest and provide specific examples of statutory burden.
Congressional and industry-targeted engagement will also inform the
effort. In order to ensure coordination and transparency, meetings have
occurred with Senate and House Armed Services Committees professional
staff and leadership. These engagements, in addition to industry-
targeted opportunities, will continue.
The proposal should be finalized in time to be included in the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016;
however, some elements may be included in the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2015.

Senator Inhofe. Ms. Wormuth, you've had these positions
working very closely with the administration. The President's
letter, at the front of the January 2012 Defense Strategy
Guidance, he stated that we have, ``put al Qaeda on a path to
defeat''. In opening statement, I mentioned other statements
that he made, ``The tide of war is receding,'' ``We have al
Qaeda on the run,'' and all of that. But, when we asked the
Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, if al Qaeda
is on the run, on a path to defeat, he answered, ``No, it is
morphing and franchising.'' General Michael Flynn, who is also
on the same panel--this was a couple of weeks ago--the Director
of Defense Intelligence Agency, said, simply, ``They are not.''
If you look at the chart over here, Ms. Wormuth, this shows
what they're concerned with, what's happening with al Qaeda.
Does it look like to you, that they are on the run or these
statements that are made by the President?
[The chart referred to follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Ms. Wormuth. Senator, in my view, I would say that we have
significantly degraded the core of al Qaeda, but I would
certainly agree with Director Clapper that the broad al Qaeda
threat has metastasized, and we are very concerned about the
threat posed by, for example, al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, al Qaeda and Associated Movements, and other groups.
This is, I believe, a significant threat that we, in the
Department, have to be very, very attentive to.
Senator Inhofe. You do agree, though, with James Clapper?
Ms. Wormuth. I agree that the threat has metastasized, yes.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, okay. All right, that's a good
question. Metastasized, does that mean it's bigger or smaller?
Ms. Wormuth. I think it has spread and it's a nodal threat.
Senator Inhofe. We think al Qaeda--you can follow up on
that--is spreading. North Korea has the nuclear weapons. We all
know what's happening out there and the threats that are
different today than they've ever been in the past. Under the
current strategy, I don't think that the strategy is working,
and also, when you hear statements by General Odierno, who
talks about what is happening with the current strategy, the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Greenert, his
statement saying that we will preclude our ability to execute
the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, both in the near term and
the long term. The same thing with General Amos. We will have
fewer forces to provide less trained and arrive later in the
fight.
I would say, to all of you, that, with the strategy that I
think clearly is not working, we would have, maybe, one of two
choices, to either change the strategy to try to enhance our
abilities, and that would cost more--that would be more
resources, or it would be to lower the expectations of the
American people that we've always had. I will repeat the
question. I'll ask each one of you if you agree with the
statement that was made yesterday by Secretary Hagel when he
took option number two--he said, ``The American dominance on
the seas, in the skies, and in space can no longer be taken for
granted.'' Do you agree with that?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I think what Secretary Hagel is
perhaps getting at there is that we are not taking for granted
our position in the world, and, in fact, are doing everything
we can to make sure that we have the capabilities we need and
the ready forces we need to confront challenges.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I don't agree with that. I read this
thing, that ``can no longer be taken for granted''.
Anyone else want to comment on that? [No response.]
Nobody?
Mr. Work. Sir, there is a broad proliferation of guided
weapons. The United States has enjoyed a monopoly in guided
weapons for about 20 years. That monopoly is eroding. When that
happens, operations in the air and on the surface of the ocean
and under the surface of the ocean become much more
challenging.
I think what Secretary Hagel is saying is, given the
current trends, we really have to be careful or we will be
faced with a situation where, when we fight, we could take more
losses. That's one of the reasons why one of his key themes was
to maintain technological superiority, and he made such a big
issue of that in his speech.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, but I would say that it's the strategy
that I look at this and I say we're going to have to change,
because this expectation is there. All the Chiefs that I quoted
a minute ago, they know that the problems that are out there,
and they are greater. That means greater risk, which means loss
of more lives. This is a great concern to me, and I'd like to
have any of you, for the record, to respond in any more detail
than you already have, because, to me, it's very simple. When
he made the statement, he said, ``American dominance of the
seas, in the skies, and in space can no longer be taken for
granted.'' I'd like to get that for the record, and I'm not
really satisfied at the responses we've had.
[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Work. As I said in my testimony, the United States is losing
the virtual monopoly that it has enjoyed in precision-guided weapons.
In recent years, a number of adversaries and potential adversaries have
fielded military systems that can target and strike our ships and
aircraft, as well as the forward bases from which they operate. Space
is no longer a sanctuary and increasingly sophisticated adversaries are
seeking to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in
space.
For these reasons, it is essential that our defense program sustain
investments in the types of capabilities that will be required to
address these proliferating threats. Priorities for investment, in my
opinion, include defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles, fifth-
generation combat aircraft, undersea warfare platforms, standoff attack
weapons, and more resilient systems for intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), communications, and timing and positioning. The
joint force must also develop new operational concepts for maintaining
freedom of action in the face of anti-access/area denial threats.
Mr. McCord. The Department of Defense (DOD) can no longer afford to
conduct business as usual given the dynamic security and fiscal
environments we face. DOD has protected its investments in capabilities
to counter anti-access/area-denial threats as well as those who seek to
constrain the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely across domains.
Ensuring we can continue to counter such threats is motivating many of
the Department's modernization efforts. If the Department does not
invest in new capabilities and develop new ways of operating, the Joint
Force likely will face challenges projecting power in the future.
Ms. Wormuth. Yes. Over the past decade or more we have witnessed
the proliferation of advanced technologies to a number of states and
even to non-state actors, including U.S. adversaries. Systems such as
guided anti-ship weapons, quiet submarines, advanced surface-to-air
missiles, modern fighter aircraft and air-to-air missiles, long-range
ballistic and cruise missiles, sensor platforms, and command and
control systems can be used by adversaries to impede U.S. access to
theaters of operation, threaten forces at forward bases, and contest
for control of access to sea and airspace and potentially interfere
with U.S. operations. For example, China has successfully tested a
direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon and, along with other countries, is
developing electronic warfare and laser systems that can interfere with
the operation of U.S. military satellites.
As a result, U.S. power projection operations are facing threats
that we did not encounter in the past. It will take substantial and
sustained investments in new capabilities, operating concepts, and
infrastructure to maintain U.S. flexibility and the freedom to operate
in these areas. The Department is paying close attention to these
developments and is making needed investments to ensure that U.S.
forces can operate in non-permissive environments.
Mr. McKeon. I agree that we cannot assume that adversaries will not
seek to challenge our dominance in these spheres. Based on the
trajectory of current trends in the threat environment, if the
Department does not invest in new capabilities and develop new ways of
operating, the Joint Force will face challenges projecting power into
some environments. I understand that the need to counter these threats
is motivating many of the Department's modernization efforts.
Mr. Rosenbach. I agree that the United States cannot assume that
significant U.S. conventional capabilities will go unchallenged in the
future. The diffusion of advanced technology enables potential
adversaries--state and non-state actors alike--to try to blunt
traditional U.S. power projection capabilities. Those seeking to deny
U.S. forces operational access across the air, maritime, cyber, and
space domains are growing in sophistication and in number. As a result,
the Department must prioritize investments in capabilities needed to
overcome these challenges.
Mr. Shear. I agree that we cannot take our position in Asia for
granted and that improving it will require constant effort. Actors in
the Asia-Pacific region, as elsewhere across the globe, seek to
constrain the ability of U.S. forces to operate freely across domains.
For this reason, the Department has been engaging China, strengthening
our alliances, and seeking new partners. I also understand that the
Department is doing everything it can to ensure that the United States
possesses adequate capabilities that can counter anti-access/area-
denial threats.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Let me now call on Senator Reed, and also turn the gavel
over to him for the balance of this morning's hearing.
Thank you.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Thank you all for your commitment to serve the Nation.
I first want to recognize Senator Warner and Senator Nunn,
whose bipartisan, thoughtful, and patriotic leadership has set
the standard for this committee. Thank you, Senators.
I also have to commend the people whose shoes you are
stepping into. Ash Carter, Bob Hale, and Christine Fox have
done a superb job at the Department of Defense. All of you have
predecessors who you can be proud of and you can match your
effort against theirs and they're a good target to aim for.
The questions we've been debating go toward the heart of a
fundamental issue. Do budgets drive strategy, or do strategies
drive budgets?
Mr. Work, you've indicated that you don't feel, given the
Budget Control Act (BCA), as modified by the Ryan-and-Murray
agreement, which this Congress supports--in fact, we give you
the resources--is adequate to fully carry out the strategy. Is
that a fair comment of your position?
Mr. Work. I very much agree with the statements of
Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey, yesterday, who said that
if we go to the full BCA levels from 2016 and beyond, that the
risks will be elevated, and our ability to perform all parts of
the strategy, which I believe is a very coherent strategy, as
published in January 2012, being able to fully implement that
strategy would be very difficult at the BCA levels.
Senator Reed. That is a direct result of the budgets that
Congress has agreed to, so far?
Mr. Work. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Reed. Part of the response to the threats around
the globe is to at least reevaluate the budget priorities that
we've given the Department of Defense--we, in Congress, have
legislated. Is that fair?
Mr. Work. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Now, let's take the other side of the
question. We've dealt with the budget. In your view, it seems
to be less than adequate to meet the strategy. What are the
threats? Because I would like to think, simply, that you take
the threats, you craft a strategy, and then you come to us and
we give you adequate resources. Can you just briefly describe
what you think the threats are to us, and how DOD is
responding?
Mr. Work. There's a broad range of threats, Senator. A
rising power in the Asia-Pacific--it's rising very quickly. It
has the means to compete with us militarily in a way that many
of our former competitors have not. We have a broad problem in
the Middle East that we can see the results of the Arab Spring
and all of the problems that are happening in Syria, and the
attendant reactions--or the attendant results on terrorism. We
are focused very much on Iran and preventing Iran from becoming
a nuclear power. We have a lot of small-scale contingencies
around the world in which we must watch carefully.
Counterterrorism, cyber terrorism--or cyber warfare--rising
powers, potential nuclear regional powers, these are all very,
very big challenges that the Department has to face.
Senator Reed. In some respects, we are in a world--and
that's why it's much more complicated than perhaps in
retrospect, the Cold War--where we have a range of challenges.
Senator Inhofe's description, accurately, of the dispersion of
al Qaeda, raises a special operations challenge, an
intelligence challenge, a cyber challenge, et cetera. A lot
different than a rising maritime power requiring surface
vessels and major fleets and aircraft, or a conventional force,
like the North Koreans. We are now at a stage where we have to
cover down on all our bets. Is that one of the things that
complicates your life, in terms of strategizing?
Mr. Work. It certainly complicated my life as the Under
Secretary of the Navy as we tried to balance all of the
requirements with force structure. If confirmed, it would just
be magnified as we take a look at the joint force and all of
the capabilities and capacities that we need to address these
threats.
Senator Reed. Let me follow up, one of the points, I think,
of the many that Senator Inhofe made that were right on target,
which is the acquisition process. Fortunately, you had great
support from people like Sean Stackley, et cetera, in your
service in the Navy, but there are programs in the Navy that
are consuming significant resources and have yet to produce the
kind of results that were anticipated when the programs were
initiated. A lot of discussion recently is about the littoral
combat ship (LCS), but this acquisition process is something
that everyone in your job has worked on, every Secretary of
Defense has worked on. We haven't got it right yet. I would
join Senator Inhofe in urging you to specifically focus, along
with Secretary Kendall, on improving that. There's no silver
bullet, in terms of saving resources and shifting them, but
that's something we have to do, and have to do better.
Mr. Work. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Mr. McCord, I'd again, thank you for your
extensive work. You have a valuable role. One is to make sure
that the money is well and wisely spent. The goal is to have as
they say, a clean audit of the Department of Defense. Can you
give us an idea of any initiatives that you're going to
undertake to improve the auditing quality and the financial
controls in the Department of Defense?
Mr. McCord. Thank you, Senator Reed, yes. That effort's
very important to us, and one of the things that's very helpful
to us is that it's a shared goal between us and Congress and
the Armed Services Committees. We have a goal that Secretary
Panetta set for 2014 for the Statement of Budgetary Resources,
and we have a larger goal for 2017.
I believe that we're on track, we're making progress toward
those goals. The plan that we have in place, that Mr. Hale's
put in place, I support that plan. I'm going to stay with that
plan, as long as I see that it's making the kind of progress
that we've been making recently with the Marine Corps audit,
for example. But, certainly I will come back to you and I will
work within the Department to change that plan if I see that we
are off track. But, right now, I believe we're on track.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCord, welcome back. Do you remember the first year we
passed a requirement for an audit?
Mr. McCord. I was here at that time, Senator, yes.
Senator McCain. Was it in the 1980s?
Mr. McCord. I'm remembering it's 1990, but I might be
mistaken, sir.
Senator McCain. You understand there might be a slight germ
of doubt or cynicism about this latest claim that this year
we're going to have a clean audit?
Welcome, our old friend, Chairman Warner, and Senator Nunn.
It's great to see these two great public servants with us.
Ms. Wormuth, I've heard a lot of good names--``nodal
threat''--it's a ``nodal threat,'' is that what al Qaeda is?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, what I meant by that was, it's
diffused, and there are cells that are----
Senator McCain. I see.
Ms. Wormuth.--geographically distributed----
Senator McCain. You still didn't answer the question,
whether it's growing or receding. Is the threat of al Qaeda
growing or receding? I note your statement about, ``core al
Qaeda,'' whatever that is worth. Is it growing or receding?
Ms. Wormuth. I would describe----
Senator McCain. Is the tide of war receding or growing?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I would describe it as a persistent
threat.
Senator McCain. You won't answer the question, is that it?
It's a simple question. Is it receding or growing? It's not a
very complicated question.
Ms. Wormuth. I think it's persistent.
Senator McCain. You won't answer the question. Is that it?
I'm asking you, again, for the third time. Is it receding or
growing?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I think, in saying it's persistent,
I'm attempting to answer your question. I think there are----
Senator McCain. Actually----
Ms. Wormuth.--there are elements----
Senator McCain. Actually, you----
Ms. Wormuth.--of al Qaeda----
Senator McCain.--are not. Actually, you are not. It's a
pretty simple question. We look at al Qaeda, and we decide,
over the past few years, whether it is a receding threat or a
growing threat. Since you keep saying ``persistent,'' you're in
disagreement with the Director of National Intelligence, which
either means you refuse to answer the question or you're not
well informed.
Ms. Wormuth. There are elements of the threat posed by al
Qaeda that I would say are growing.
Senator McCain. Which parts would you say are growing?
Ms. Wormuth. But, just for example, al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, the activities in Yemen, that is a growing threat, I
think, of considerable concern to us.
Senator McCain. Obviously you don't agree with the map that
Senator Inhofe just put up, because it's spreading all over
North Africa, Ms. Wormuth. Anybody who doesn't know that has
either been somewhere else or not knowing what's going on in
the world.
Mr. Work, as the former Navy Under Secretary, you wrote a
very candid paper about the LCS program. I have a memorandum
from Secretary Hagel to the Chief of Naval Operations. I don't
know if you're aware of it, or not. He says, ``Therefore, no
new contract negotiations beyond 32 ships will go forward,''
talking about the LCS. Do you agree with that assessment?
Mr. Work. As I understand it, what the assessment is saying
is, we will stop building the flight-zero-plus LCS at 32 ships,
and we will consider follow-on ships, small combatants. A
modified LCS could be one of the options. A domestic or foreign
design could be one of the options.
I think this is very normal with Navy shipbuilding. We
build----
Senator McCain. You think it's normal? You think it's
normal that the cost overruns associated with this ship, the
fact that we don't even know what the mission is, that there's
been this whole idea of moving different modules off and on--
you disagree with the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
statement, regarding the cost overruns? This is normal, Mr.
Work?
Mr. Work. Sir, up until 2007, 2008, 2009, when the program
almost imploded, there were significant cost overruns. When
Secretary Mabus, Secretary Stackley, and I arrived in the
Department of the Navy in 2009, I believe, since then, the
program has met its cost targets. In 2001, the guidance to the
Department of the Navy was to be able to build three LCSs for
the price of one Arleigh Burke. The Department of the Navy is
doing that today.
I think you have to look at the performance of the----
Senator McCain. Sort of makes it hard to understand why
Secretary Hagel would assess at 32 when the original plans, as
presented to Congress for their approval, was 52 ships.
By the way, was anybody ever held responsible for these
failures in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010?
Mr. Work. Those happened in the administration prior to
ours, so I don't know what----
Senator McCain. Everything's been fine under this
administration, as far as the LCS is concerned?
Mr. Work. I believe that the program is on solid ground and
is meeting its cost targets, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. You do believe that?
Mr. Work. Yes, sir.
Senator McCain. You're in direct contradiction to the
Government Accountability Office study of 2013.
Mr. Work. I haven't read that particular----
Senator McCain. You haven't read it?
Mr. Work. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Wow. I'm stunned that you haven't. But, the
fact is that the ship has still not had a clear mission, the
modules that were supposed to be moving back and forth have
not. We have not pursued the fly-before-you-buy policy, and do
you remember the original cost estimate for an LCS?
Mr. Work. It was $220 million for the C frame, Senator,
and, depending on the number of modules that you would buy, the
total cost for a missionized LCS, average cost, was supposed to
be no more than $400 million, in fiscal year 2005 dollars.
Senator McCain. What is it now?
Mr. Work. I haven't been briefed on the most recent cost.
I'll do that, if confirmed, and look at it. But, I know that
we're on track----
Senator McCain. Thank you for doing that. What's the cost
now? You don't even know the cost now, Mr. Work?
Mr. Work. I believe the average cost, with modules, is
about $450 million, but not in fiscal year 2005 dollars. If you
take a look at the original costing factors, I believe the cost
of today's LCSs are very close to the costs that were set, back
in 2002-2003.
Senator McCain. Given that, then it's hard to understand
why the Secretary of Defense would curtail the production of it
by some 24 ships. Mr. Work, every objective study, whether it
be the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the
Government Accountability Office, every other objective
observer, the LCS has not been anywhere near what it was
presented to for Congress by funding. This, again, makes me
wonder about your qualifications, because the one thing that we
are plagued with is significant cost overruns and lack of
capability.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Warner, Senator Nunn, thank you for your tremendous
service. I am blessed to follow Senator Lugar, and he and
Senator Nunn will be in my home State tonight to talk about
these issues. Thank you for everything you've done for our
country.
Mr. Work, what I'd like to start off with is that article
yesterday in Reuters, ``Iraq Signs Deal to Buy Arms from
Iran''. Now, they have come here and talked to us about
possible arms purchases. One of the big problems has been, how
do you sell arms to a country where the army is 93 percent Shia
and they have purchased them from Iran? Where does that leave
us there now?
Mr. Work. Sir, I haven't been briefed on the particulars of
the report. If confirmed, I would take a look seriously at
these and work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
as well as the other Under Secretaries, to look at this issue
very closely.
Senator Donnelly. In this position, what are your ideas on
how to get Iraq in a better place in regards to how we view it,
the sectarianism just seems to continue to grow, which will, as
it looks, if it continues that way, lead to a possible
implosion there?
Mr. Work. The sectarian violence in Iraq is very troubling.
I know that the Department is looking at different aid packages
for the Iraqi security forces, and, if confirmed, I would look
very hard at this issue. But, I have not been briefed on any
particular plans in this regard.
Senator Donnelly. Let me ask you about Syria and the
presence of al-Nusra and other al Qaeda-related forces. Do you
see those forces growing in Syria right now? What strategies do
you have in mind as to how to deal with that?
Mr. Work. As DNI Clapper has said, Syria is now the magnet
for many of the foreign fighters of the global jihadi movement.
You even see different types of al Qaeda affiliates, or people
who are associated with the movement, starting to fight against
themselves. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) in the Levant, are
actually fighting against al-Nusra. This is a very big problem,
as DNI Clapper has stated. If confirmed, I'd look forward to
working with Ms. Wormuth, if she is confirmed, and also the
uniformed officers, to look at all military options that are on
the table.
Senator Donnelly. Ms. Wormuth, do you have any ideas on
this?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I would agree with Mr. Work, that we
would want to work, I think, carefully with our interagency
partners, with our European partners who share our concerns
about the growing extremism in the region. We've already been
doing quite a bit of work with the Jordanian armed forces and
the Lebanese armed forces to try to help them enhance their
border security. But, we're certainly concerned about the flow
of foreign fighters into Syria.
Senator Donnelly. Let me ask you, Ms. Wormuth, about
military suicide, as well. I see this as an incredible
challenge, an incredible problem, and an obligation we have to
eliminate. I was wondering your views on how we can reduce it
to zero.
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I share your view that this is a
terrible problem, and it's a very perplexing problem, I think,
that the Department of Defense has been putting a lot of energy
in, in the last several years.
If I were to be confirmed, I would certainly want to do
everything possible to work with the Under Secretary
Organization for Personnel and Readiness (P&R) to try to find
as many solutions as possible. I think we need to look at the
number of providers we have to provide counseling, to try to
look at what we can do to help servicemembers deal with some of
what we think are the underlying causes of suicide--financial
issues, substance abuse, for example. But, it's a very
difficult problem, but one, I think, that we have to continue
to put energy against.
Senator Donnelly. As I mentioned to you yesterday, we are
expecting a report from DOD, in line with a piece of
legislation I have authored. Your assistance in helping to
provide that to us, I would appreciate it a great deal, because
this is a problem not only for those who are deployed, but also
at home, as well. It seems, when we lost more young men and
women to suicide than in combat in 2012, this would be right at
the very top of the plate of everything we're trying to do.
Mr. McCord, one of the things that, in reviewing numbers,
has seemed to become clear is that, in many cases, the Guard
can do it for a lower cost. When the Reserve or the Guard
operates at about one-third of the cost of Active Duty, how
will this factor into your recommendations, going forward, as
we look at some of the changes that Secretary Hagel and others
have talked about and in the budget environment we're in?
Mr. McCord. Senator, you're correct that cost is one of the
factors that we have absolutely taken into account as we've
gone through the recommendations, starting last summer, with
these so-called Strategic Choices and Management Review leading
on into, then, the budget that will be delivered to you next
week. As you say, the Reserve component forces are less
expensive when they're not mobilized. That difference tends to
shrink quite a bit once called up.
The other main factor that we're considering, though, is
the deployment times, the so-called ``dwell times'' that are
the standard and the understanding that things like 1-to-3, 1-
to-5 ratios--that we have to balance what's realistic of what
we get out of the Reserve components while still maintaining
the dwell-time commitments that we'd like to make with them.
Senator Donnelly. Okay.
Ambassador Shear, when we look at North Korea, we see
possibly a string of some of the most unstable decisions one
could look at. What is your impression of the decisionmaking
chain there, how those decisions are made? Who will we reach
out to, to try to put some influence on decisions that are made
there?
Ambassador Shear. Senator, I think the decisionmaking chain
in North Korea is extremely unclear. They are in the midst of a
succession, a political succession in which Kim Jong-un is
trying to secure his leadership. We will be watching that very
closely, of course. We want a complete verifiable and
irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, through
authentic and credible negotiations. We consistently reach out
to the Chinese, among others, to encourage them to use what
leverage they have with North Korea to encourage the North
Koreans to be more moderate.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Donnelly.
Senator Wicker, please.
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, for Mr. Work, you are a former Marine Corps officer
and former Under Secretary of the Navy, so you know a lot about
amphibious warships. I have a yes-or-no question to ask you,
but let me preface it by saying I believe they are a necessity
to project American influence in regions such as the Asia-
Pacific. I hope you agree. Amphibious ships are versatile,
interoperable, and survivable platforms that are able to meet
the full range of military and humanitarian missions abroad.
I do remain seriously concerned that our Navy may be unable
to support all requests for amphibious ship support from our
combatant commanders. I secured a provision in the most recent
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that calls for the
Commandant of the Marine Corps to report to Congress on the
number of amphibious ships required for the Marine Corps to
execute the President's national security strategy. This
committee eagerly awaits the Commandant's findings later this
year.
Mr. Work, if you are confirmed, will you pledge to meet
with me and other members of the committee within 30 days to
discuss, in plain English, the Department of Defense's plan to
provide sufficient amphibious ships to execute the full range
of operational requirements from the combatant commanders?
Mr. Work. Yes, sir, I will.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. I appreciate that, and
I look forward to a further conversation.
Mr. Work. Sir, if I could make one correction, for the
record. I am a marine and a former Under Secretary.
Senator Wicker. When I was reading that statement, I
expected to be challenged. [Laughter.]
At least in the minds of all the marines in the audience
and within the sound of my voice. Thank you for clarifying
that. If I had seen Senator Roberts on the floor, he would have
made that correction, also.
Now, let me move to Mr. McKeon. There's been some publicity
about a letter that Senator Ayotte and I wrote to you on
February 20, 2014, citing, at the outset, a January 29, 2014,
New York Times report that the Obama administration has known,
for years, about potential Russian violations of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the INF Treaty, that
bans testing, production, and possession of medium-range
missiles. Apparently, American officials believe Russia began
conducting flight tests of a new ground-launched cruise
missile, in violation of the INF Treaty, as early as 2008. Now,
this would have been very helpful information to the Senate
when we were discussing the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) in 2010.
Senator Ayotte and I wrote a letter asking, in part, ``As
the Senate Armed Services Committee considers your nomination
to be Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
we request that you provide the committee with answers to the
following questions. Number one, were you aware of any
intelligence regarding potential Russian violations of the INF
Treaty in 2010, when we were considering the new treaty with
the Russian Federation?'' Which has apparently violated the
previous treaty. ``Number two, do you believe that the Senate
should have been made aware of any potential Russian violations
of the INF Treaty during consideration of the New START treaty?
Number three, do you believe the Senate was made aware of any
potential Russian violations of the INF Treaty during
consideration of the New START treaty? If so, please provide
details.'' And, ``Number four, questions of how to respond to
arms-control cheating and noncompliance are ultimately policy
decisions. One year from now, if Russia is not in compliance
with this treaty, in your current position or in the position
for which you are nominated, do you believe the United States
should continue to comply with the older treaty, the INF
Treaty?''
We sent this to you on February 20, 2014, in anticipation
of this hearing, and, at the close of business yesterday, we
still did not have an answer to this letter. Turns out that,
around 8 p.m. last night, after most staff had left, and after
the Senate had finished voting and people were on their way
home, a letter was delivered to the committee, in answer to
Senator Ayotte's and my letter. It was delivered at the
codeword security level [TS/SCI].
Senator Ayotte and I are under some very serious
constraints in asking you about this letter today. If I were
cynical, I would wonder why this letter was not responded to
earlier so that Senator Ayotte and I and our staffs and people
with codeword security clearance who advise us on this side of
the aisle in the committee could thoroughly look at the letter,
consider the answers, and ask you questions in a non-classified
manner. If I were cynical, I would question the fact that the
response was delivered so late and in such a way that we're
really not able to get into the answers to our questions in
this hearing.
Let me just ask you in this way, Mr. McKeon. President
Obama recently gave a speech calling for further cuts to our
nuclear deterrent. He stated, ``We need to work with Russia on
new arms-control agreements that go beyond New START levels.''
Did you play a role in drafting this speech, sir?
Mr. McKeon. Senator, I probably saw drafts of the speech. I
think you're referring to the speech that he gave in Berlin
during his trip to Germany last June?
Senator Wicker. Yes, I am.
Mr. McKeon. I probably saw drafts, and maybe I made
comments, but I don't recall with any specificity.
Senator Wicker. Can you say whether the President knew
about these major violations of the arms control agreement at
the same time he was making a speech calling for further cuts
and for further working with the Russian Federation on arms
control?
Mr. McKeon. I don't know when the President has been
informed of the issue that you've described. I'd have to check
on----
Senator Wicker. You don't know what the President knew, and
when he knew it?
Mr. McKeon. That's correct.
If I could answer, briefly, your reference to the letter, I
apologize that it got here so late last night. I very much
wanted to get it here earlier. I was coordinating with the
committee staff to inform them of our progress to try to get it
here. One of the great joys of working in the executive branch,
as opposed to the legislative branch, is, you get to coordinate
your letters with about 50 people, and the clearance process
took longer than I would have liked. I apologize that you got
the letter so late.
What I can say about that issue, sir, is, as you know from
the letter, which I hope you've read by now, is that we are
concerned about the Russian activity that appears to be
inconsistent with the INF Treaty. We've raised this with the
Russians. The Russians have come back to us with an answer
which we do not consider to be satisfactory, and we've told
them the issue is not closed.
Senator Wicker. When did you raise it with the Russians?
Mr. McKeon. It's been raised with the Russians by several
officials--this particular issue that you're referring to--over
the course of the last 6 to 8 months, but I don't know the
specific dates. I'd have to check on that.
Senator Wicker. If you can supply that to the committee in
a non-classified answer, I would appreciate it.
[The information referred to follows:]

This matter was raised by senior administration officials in three
meetings with Russian officials in May 2013, including by Deputy
Secretary of State William J. Burns and Acting Under Secretary of State
Rose Gottemoeller. It was raised with a Russian official by Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller in December 2013. It was
also raised in meetings with Russian officials by Acting Under
Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller in June 2013, August 2013, October
2013, November 2013, and February 2014.

Senator Wicker. Let me just say--I don't know whether you
can answer this or not, based on the letter that you sent, but
if you had such information during the context and during the
timeframe of the 2010 deliberations on the New START treaty,
you would have felt dutybound to give that information to
members of the Senate who were voting on the treaty, would you
not?
Mr. McKeon. Sir, as you may recall during September 2010,
on the eve of the vote in the Foreign Relations Committee in
mid-September, there was an issue that the Intelligence
Community (IC) flagged for us and for this committee and the
Foreign Relations Committee, and I believe it was literally the
day before the committee's vote. General Clapper, when he
appeared in an all-Senators briefing, late that month, which
was focused primarily on the National Intelligence Estimate on
the IC's ability to monitor New START, raised this issue, as
well, and told that the Senators that were there in the Senate
briefing about this issue that had been raised in the middle of
September that implicated possibly New START, possibly INF.
I believe, sir, that the IC and the executive branch were
committed to providing timely information about potential
concerns.
Senator Wicker. I don't think I can ask you the substance
of what was told to the committee, can I, in this setting?
Mr. McKeon. No, I'm afraid not.
Senator Wicker. Yes, okay.
You can understand the position that places the committee
today.
Mr. McKeon. I do, sir, and I can't really get around it.
The information that is involved here is highly classified. As
General Clapper said when he was here 2 weeks ago for the
threats hearing when he was asked about this issue, he said a
lot less than I did and wanted to defer all of it to a closed
session, which I believe you are having later this week.
Senator Wicker. Let me just say that I have very serious
concerns about this, and I will alert members of the committee
and members of the Senate that I do not believe this committee
and this body was provided with all of the information that you
had and that we needed to know to cast a fully informed vote on
the New START treaty. But, we will follow up in the proper
context.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for your service to our Nation, both in your
past and what you will do when you're confirmed, which I assume
will happen, and I'm proud to be here and to support your
nomination.
Mr. Work, let me begin with you and ask you a couple of
questions about the HH-60G Pave Hawk combat rescue helicopter.
The NDAA included the replacement of the aging 30-year-old
helicopters that have served to rescue our downed warfighters
in the past--in that measure. The Senate approved it. It has
also included it in the budget, $330-plus million, for this
fiscal year, to support the development of the replacement
airframe. I'd like a commitment from you that this program will
be carried forward, as is the intent and mandate of Congress.
Mr. Work. Senator, I don't know if I can make a firm
commitment. I promise and I'd vow to work with Congress to work
through this issue. As it was briefed to me, the Department is
struggling to try to come up with the overall size and
capability and capacities of the combat rescue force. It may be
that the Department would come back and recommend some changes.
But, I will promise and vow that I will work closely with you
and all members of the committee and Members of Congress to
make sure that this issue is looked at very carefully.
Senator Blumenthal. You'd agree, wouldn't you, that the
mission of rescuing our warfighters in peril is one of
predominant urgency?
Mr. Work. It's a very, very high priority mission. Yes,
sir.
Senator Blumenthal. The 30-year-old helicopters that now do
that mission have to be replaced, do they not?
Mr. Work. Yes, sir, they do.
Senator Blumenthal. It would seem that this project is one
that has to be reauthorized and that the spending has to be
made in some form, does it not?
Mr. Work. Yes, sir. I spoke with the Vice Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, and they are looking at this very hard. I look
forward to being briefed fully on it, if confirmed. I look
forward to working with you.
Senator Blumenthal. I would like your commitment, on behalf
of myself and other colleagues who are very intent that the
will of Congress be carried out, that this project go forward.
Mr. Work. I commit that anything in the law, Department of
Defense will follow through. There will be cases where we might
come back and recommend alternatives, but the mission remains
the same. There will be systems purchased, and I guarantee you
that we will work with Congress to find the right answer.
Senator Blumenthal. The question will be one of perhaps
timing and alternative forms of the contract that's authorized,
but the mission has to be accomplished, and the helicopters
have to be replaced.
Mr. Work. That is correct, is my understanding, yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Turning to the base realignment and closure (BRAC) proposal
that the Secretary of Defense made yesterday--and I'm not going
to expect that you would contradict the Secretary of Defense.
The recommendation made last go-around was not adopted by the
Senate or Congress. The reason is, quite simply, in my view,
BRAC is not cost-efficient. Do you have some facts that would
contradict that contention?
Mr. Work. Sir, I believe all of the prior BRAC rounds, up
to 2005, did achieve savings, and the 2005 BRAC round was
broken up between what was called a ``transformational BRAC''
and an ``efficiencies BRAC''. The efficiencies BRAC did achieve
significant savings. I believe what the Department of Defense
is asking is, in the future, if we are granted the authority
for a BRAC, that we would approach the problem in that regard.
I would expect to see savings.
Senator Blumenthal. Isn't there excess capacity in overseas
military installations?
Mr. Work. I believe there is. I have not been briefed
fully, but I understand that the Department is looking
carefully at the laydown of bases in Europe and will be coming
back and making recommendations on modifications to that.
Senator Blumenthal. Has any actual action been taken to
eliminate that excess capacity?
Mr. Work. Since 2001, I don't know the exact figures, sir.
I will get back to you, on the record. But, since 2001, there
has been significant reductions in basing structure overseas,
but I just don't know the numbers off the top of my head.
Senator Blumenthal. I'd appreciate the numbers, if you can
provide them. Thank you, Mr. Work.
[The information referred to follows:]

Between 2000 and 2011, the Department decreased the number of sites
in Europe from 523 to 366 (a 30-percent reduction). Of the 366, an
additional 70 sites were in the process of being returned to host
nations, with another 62 identified for possible return. These returns
are being validated through the European Infrastructure Consolidation
(EIC) process, along with options for additional reductions. Once the
EIC initiative is complete the Department expects the number of
European sites will have decreased by more than 55 percent since 2000.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Senator Blumenthal. Just to finish on this topic, shouldn't
we be closing or eliminating that excess capacity before we
talk about another round of BRAC, which, in many ways, has been
extraordinarily costly? I would appreciate, also, the numbers
on BRAC that support its supposed cost-effectiveness.
Mr. Work. Yes, sir. I believe Secretary Hagel and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs believe that these can work in
parallel, that there is over-capacity both in our continental
U.S. infrastructure as well as overseas, and that we would hope
to work with Congress in a parallel fashion to reduce it.
[The information referred to follows:]

I understand that historically savings from Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) have been substantial. The first four rounds of BRAC
(1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995) are producing a total of about $8 billion
in savings, and BRAC 2005 is producing an additional $4 billion in
annual, recurring savings.
I understand that even though the BRAC 2005 round required an
investment of $35 billion, that investment is paying the Department $4
billion a year--in perpetuity. Thirty-five billion dollars is a
significant investment, but also an aberration when compared to the
cost of BRACs generally. BRAC 2005 were higher because half of the
recommendations were not designed to save money but to achieve other
goals. This portion of BRAC 2005--the so-called ``Transformation
BRAC''--was comprised of reorganizations and movements of functions to
transform infrastructure (and of a nature that could only be
accomplished as part of the BRAC process). This portion of BRAC 2005
cost $29 billion and is saving $1 billion annually--but these
recommendations were pursued because of their transformational value to
the Department, regardless of the cost.
If one isolates the remainder of the BRAC 2005 (the Efficiency BRAC
portion of BRAC 2005), these recommendations had a payback of less than
7 years--one sees a [one time] cost of $6 billion and savings of $3
billion per year in perpetuity. This is similar to what the Department
experienced in the 1993/1995 rounds, and it is what I understand the
Department expects from the BRAC 2017 round it is requesting.

Senator Blumenthal. Turning to the utilization of our
National Guard and Reserve in force, Ms. Wormuth, I'd like to
ask you to take a very close look as to whether Executive Order
13223, which was enacted on September 14, 2001, by President
Bush, is still necessary. As you probably know, the order
enables up to 1 million members of the Reserve component to be
called up for Active Duty for up to 2 years. This year, we're
completing our major force presence in Afghanistan. That's the
action that necessitated the order. Although the Department has
good force management plans now in place, I think that
rescission of this Executive order, the withdrawal of it, would
be a powerful symbol of the stability to guardsmen, their
family, and their employers. I'd ask for your comment.
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I would be happy to go back to the
Department, if confirmed, and work with, again, P&R--in
particular, the Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs--to
look at that order and to assess whether we continue to need
those authorities. We also have additional mechanisms to access
the Reserve component. I think it's very fair to go back and
look at the range of callup authorities we have, to see which
ones continue to be useful in the future.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that rescission of that
one would send a message about the stability and the new era
that we're entering to our National Guard and Reserve?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I would want to look carefully at the
Executive order before making a final recommendation to the
Secretary. I certainly think we are looking to find policy ways
to move off of the perpetual war footing that we've had for the
last 10 years. But, again, without looking in detail at the
Executive order, I wouldn't want to make a commitment at this
time. I'd commit to look at it for you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Thank you very much. My time has expired. I have a lot more
questions. I may submit some more for the record. I thank all
of you for being here today and for your very helpful and
informative answers.
Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Ayotte, please.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.
Let me follow up, Mr. Work, on the question that Senator
Blumenthal asked you with regard to BRAC. I would like you to
give us a commitment that the Department of Defense will not
undertake BRAC without the approval of Congress, and will also
not try to undertake BRAC through a workaround that undermines
the will of Congress without seeking our approval for a BRAC
round. Will you give me that commitment?
Mr. Work. Senator, as I understand, the wording of the
speech yesterday was that Secretary Hagel believes that there
are some authorities that the Department could use, but I don't
know what those authorities are. I commit to you that, if
confirmed, I will work with the Department to get back to you.
Of course, we would not start a BRAC unless we are given
explicit approval in the law.
Senator Ayotte. I take that as a lack of commitment. That
troubles me, because I believe that Congress should be in the
position to approve BRAC and that there should not be a
runaround done. That troubled me in the Secretary's comments
yesterday, and I believe this is a very important issue for the
authority of this committee, in particular, that Congress
should be the body to approve a BRAC round, not for the
Department of Defense to undertake this on its own initiative
without the full approval of Congress. I do expect an answer on
that.
I would like to know, from the Secretary, in particular,
what authority he believes he does have, so that we can be
aware of it here, so that we can exercise appropriate authority
to make sure that our voices are heard here on the policy
matters. I think this is a very important issue, and I would
like a followup answer to that.
Mr. Work. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]

I understand that the Department only has authority to undertake a
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round if Congress authorizes it to
do so; that is why the Department has repeatedly submitted legislation
to authorize a BRAC round.
I also understand that the Secretary of Defense has the authority
to close and realign military installations outside of a traditional
BRAC round, provided that action does not trigger the thresholds
established in section 2687 of title 10, U.S.C. If the action exceeds
the thresholds in the statute, the Secretary still has the authority to
undertake the action, but only after satisfying the study and
congressional reporting requirements and waiting the specified period
of time. This is the authority to which the Secretary referred.

Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Mr. McKeon, I wanted to follow up on some of the questions
that my colleague Senator Wicker asked you with regard to the
INF--potential Russian INF Treaty violation. I understand that
the answer, in terms of what you said to this committee, is
that, in fact, there was information provided--I believe it
would have been to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--that
would be addressing the potential New START treaty in September
2010. But, obviously, we can't discuss the substance of that
information in this setting. Is that what you just testified
to, that there was information provided to that committee about
potential matters related to the INF right before--and that was
on the eve of the vote, I believe you said?
Mr. McKeon. What I said, Senator, was, there was a briefing
by the Intelligence Community. I am informed by a former
colleague from the Foreign Relations Committee that it was for
the senior staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, the
Intelligence Committee, and this committee, as well as the
Senate leadership, and that was on or about September 15, 2010.
Later that month, after the committee had voted, General
Clapper appeared, in a all-Senators briefing, where he raised
the same issue.
Senator Ayotte. Now, without getting into the substance of
the material that was provided, just to be clear, that wasn't
all the information that the Intelligence Community possessed
at the time that may have related to potential Russian INF
violations, was it, Mr. McKeon?
Mr. McKeon. Senator, I'm hesitant to get into any more
detail about this issue. I've laid it out in great detail in my
3-page letter to you.
Senator Ayotte. Let me reframe the question. In a more
generic fashion, one of the responsibilities that is very
important is that we receive a compliance report on treaties,
correct? There's a compliance reporting mechanism that comes
forward to Congress?
Mr. McKeon. That's correct. There's a statutory provision
that requires it.
Senator Ayotte. That's right. When there is a situation
where there is ambiguity as to whether a particular country has
complied with a treaty of the United States, do you believe,
when there's an ambiguity, that the Intelligence Community has
a responsibility to brief policymakers, and that policymakers,
in turn, have a responsibility to brief the U.S. Senate,
whether they are calling it ambiguity or not? How do you know,
and when do you then brief the U.S. Senate?
I think this is a very important issue for us, particularly
when we are considering new treaties, when the Intelligence
Community may be aware, even if they are unsure what it means.
How do you draw that line?
Mr. McKeon. Senator, as somebody who worked up here for 20
years, I think it's essential that there be a regular dialogue
between the executive branch and Congress on issues. The
administration, as I understand it, the State Department in
particular, regularly updates the Foreign Relations Committee
on compliance-related issues, and has done so throughout the
tenure of President Obama.
When we came into office, the compliance report, the annual
report that you referred to, had not been submitted for several
years, so we had some work to do to make up for the work that
had not been done in the last few years of the Bush
administration. As a general matter, I agree with you that we
have to have a regular dialogue with the national security
committees on compliance issues.
Senator Ayotte. Can you tell me, in answer to my specific
question, if there is a potential violation of a treaty,
generically, and the Intelligence Community has information
that exists that they're not sure whether it is a violation or
it isn't a violation--in other words, it could potentially be a
violation--do you believe that's the type of information that
should be provided to Congress?
Mr. McKeon. Senator, that's a fairly broad and abstract
question, and I'd rather get into a specific issue with you in
a closed session or in private, if you would permit me. Because
I know what you're getting at, and I don't think it's right for
me to talk about it in an unclassified forum.
Senator Ayotte. Fair enough. We will get into it in a
classified forum.
Let me just say, for the record, that I believe that we
were not fully informed--meaning, I wasn't even in the U.S.
Senate then, when the New START treaty was taken up, and that,
regardless of how the Intelligence Community viewed particular
information, that Congress should be fully informed. I do look
forward to taking up the specific issue with you, in a
classified setting, but it's not just you. Mr. McKeon, I
appreciate that you're here before us today. There were
certainly other individuals that certainly should be questioned
about this. I don't mean to single you out, here. This is a
very important issue for Congress.
I have other questions that I will submit for the record.
I know my time is up, but, very quickly--would you agree
with me that a violation of the INF Treaty is a serious matter?
Mr. McKeon. Yes, I would.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you very much, and I thank all the
witnesses for being here today.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Work, industrial base. What sections of the industrial
base do you believe are under the greatest threat as we go
through this continued period of budget tightness, budget
austerity? Do you see mitigation measures we can take so that
we have the industrial base that we need when we need it?
Mr. Work. Senator, I think there are large portions of the
industrial base that are in threat simply because the amount of
spending and investments and research and development (R&D)
have been coming down. The aerospace community, right now, has
two tactical fighter production lines. We've stopped building
our wide-body aircraft. We do have the bomber coming online, as
well as new unmanned systems. I don't know the exact state. If
confirmed, I'd have to ask Secretary Kendall.
The shipbuilding industrial base right now is, I think,
solid, but it is under pressure because of lower investments.
Once again, if confirmed, I'd work with Secretary Kendall, who
has a very, very good feel for this, and would work with
Members of Congress to address industrial-base issues.
Senator King. Do you agree that this is a significant issue
that we need to pay attention to, just as we do compensation,
training, and other matters under the jurisdiction of this
committee?
Mr. Work. I absolutely do, yes, sir.
Senator King. Ms. Wormuth, what's your opinion of the
appropriate force level and capacities that the United States
should retain in Afghanistan after 2014? What's your
understanding of the latest date that we can wait until in
order to get some resolution of that important policy question?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, I think the President is still
reviewing options for what our enduring presence should be
after 2014, but I think we're looking at the kinds of
capabilities we need to both pursue our counterterrorism
objectives in Afghanistan, but also our train-and-advise
mission with the Afghan national security forces. As we look at
that, we are, again, weighing the options, and there are a
variety under consideration.
It is very important that we sign a bilateral security
agreement with Afghanistan. My understanding is that the
President will be speaking with President Karzai this morning
and will be raising that topic, and there will be a readout of
that call.
Senator King. I'd like to listen in on that call. That'll
be a pretty interesting call, I suspect.
Ms. Wormuth. I think as we move further into the spring and
early summer, we are going to come to some decision points, in
terms of our ability to move forces out of the region. Even
more than our own forces, our coalition partners, who don't
necessarily have the same flexible logistics system, they are
going to be approaching decision points, in terms of very much
needing to have that agreement or having to make decisions to
move forces out.
Senator King. As a policy advisor, what is your personal
opinion? Do you believe we're going to have to maintain some
force in Afghanistan after 2014?
Ms. Wormuth. I think it's important that we find ways to
support the Afghan security forces and the government, in terms
of bringing more stability to the region. I haven't been fully
briefed on the options that are being considered, but we need
to, I think, pursue a variety of mechanisms to be able to help
the Afghans have stability. Again, we have significant
contributions and commitments from international partners that
I think are going to be important, in addition to what military
capabilities we may retain in place.
Senator King. The counterterrorism basis is an important
consideration, as well.
Ms. Wormuth. Yes, Senator, absolutely.
Senator King. Mr. McKeon, we just received a worldwide
threats briefing from the leaders of the Intelligence
Community, and a common theme was cybersecurity. In fact, I
think every hearing in defense and intelligence that I've been
in, practically for the past year, has talked about
cybersecurity. If confirmed, will this be a high priority for
you in dealing with this threat? What do you consider the
appropriate role for the Department to play in defending
commercial assets from cybersecurity threats?
Mr. McKeon. Senator, as a general matter, I agree with you
about the concern of the threat. As to the specific duties that
I may undertake, if Ms. Wormuth and I are both confirmed, I
think we have discussed, in general terms, about having a
division of labor so each of us are focusing on a set of
issues, but we've not completed those discussions. Since she
outranks me, she'll get the first choice, I suspect, of which
issue she would like to work on.
In terms of our protection of the defense industrial base,
I've not been deeply briefed on the DOD programs on this, sir,
so I'd have to get back to you on that.
Senator King. I just hope that this is a priority for this
panel, for this administration, because I think this is our
area of maximum exposure. The incident that occurred--I see
Senator Manchin is no longer here--but, the incident that
occurred in West Virginia was an accident, and it could have
easily been an act of some kind of sabotage akin to a cyber
attack. We're vulnerable, and your title is the Department of
Defense, and I hope that you will take this as a very serious
threat before it materializes.
Ambassador Shear, southeast Asia. What's our role in these
territorial conflicts that are in the region in the South and
East China Sea? My concern is, we have mutual defense treaties
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and I would certainly
hate to see a Guns of August situation, where minor conflicts
escalate into something which engages us in a major conflict in
that region.
Ambassador Shear. Senator, we are very concerned about the
possible effects those territorial claims could have on
regional peace and stability. We watch it very closely. We, of
course, support a peaceful negotiated solution to those
conflicting claims. We would look with great concern on the use
of force or coercion in the region. While we don't take sides
in those territorial disputes, we do believe that claims should
be based on customary international law, and that claims should
be generated from land features, and that they should be
consistent with international law.
We, of course, consult very closely with the Chinese as
well as with our allies, on this issue.
Senator King. Thank you very much.
I'll have other questions I'll be submitting for the
record.
Thank you all.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
Senator Fischer, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My thanks also to
the Ranking Member and to the panel for being here today. I
appreciate it.
Mr. Work, in your previous position with the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, you wrote about making
some significant changes to the Navy's force structure,
particularly about focusing on smaller platforms, as opposed to
large surface ships. Do you think that we need any kind of
paradigm shift for our nuclear forces?
Mr. Work. Senator, I believe the current plan for our
nuclear forces is very sound. Secretary Hagel is committed to
the triad and having a safe, secure nuclear deterrent. We're
moving to a three-plus-two warhead scheme in which we go to
three interoperable warheads for our intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM) and our submarine-launch ballistic missiles,
and only two air-delivered weapons. I think this is a very
sound approach. We need to really focus in on costs now, and I
applaud Congress for writing into the 2014 NDAA to establish an
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)-like
capability at the NNSA so that we can reduce costs as we pursue
this plan.
Senator Fischer. You would share the views of your
predecessor, Dr. Carter? When he was here before the committee,
he and I had a conversation on this, and he stated that the
impact of sequestration on the deterrent was the last thing
that we would want to do serious damage to. Would you agree
with his assessment on that?
Mr. Work. Yes, ma'am, I would. Secretary Hagel indicated
that keeping the nuclear deterrent safe was job number one.
Senator Fischer. I was encouraged to hear the Secretary say
that in his comments yesterday, in support of all the legs of
the triad.
Do you know if there is any contemplation in the future at
looking at changing any of the structure on the triad, any of
the emphasis on any of the different legs of the triad?
Mr. Work. Ma'am, I'm not aware of it. If confirmed, this is
one of the issues that I expect I would be centrally involved
in.
Senator Fischer. With our nuclear forces, it's not a big
part of the budget. I'm sure you know it's about 4 percent of
the national defense spending in 2014. Do you think we're
getting a good bang for our buck on that?
Mr. Work. I believe we do. I think we should always look at
every part of our program, and our nuclear deterrent is
absolutely at the top of the list. Pursuing that in the most
cost-effective way I think is a principle that we should all
aspire to.
Senator Fischer. How do you think we're doing on
modernization?
Mr. Work. I believe the Ohio replacement program is
proceeding apace. That is going to be a very difficult program,
simply because of the costs, and the impacts on the Navy's
shipbuilding budget are a matter of concern, I think, for
everyone in the Department. I understand that moving with the
B-61 is proceeding--the air-delivered bomb. Also, there is a
well-thought-out plan. I believe the plan is well resourced
right now. It's under stress, like all of the other parts of
the budget. If confirmed, I vow to work with you and other
Members of Congress to make sure we have a safe nuclear
deterrent.
Senator Fischer. Thank you for that. Do you believe there
are ways around sequestration so we can make sure that we do
maintain the strength of our nuclear deterrent? If so, can you
share those?
Mr. Work. At the full BCA sequestration levels,
prioritization is key. Secretary Hagel said the nuclear
deterrent is at the very top of the priority list. I would
expect it to remain there. The workaround in sequestration is
really being ruthless about your prioritization.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
I think this next question would apply to the nominations
of Ms. Wormuth and also Mr. McKeon. I'd like for you to provide
me with a written explanation of the Department's understanding
of section 8128 of the omnibus appropriations bill. I'm going
to make a statement, here, more so than a question.
It's clear to me that this section prohibits the Department
from undertaking any environmental studies related to the ICBM
silos. If the Department has any different interpretation or is
taking any action to the contrary, I want to know.
I'll get you that question for the record so that you can
respond in writing. I would urge you to do so quickly. Would
you please get me an answer to that when you receive it, then?
Ms. Wormuth. We will do so, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
Mr. Work?
Mr. Work. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Mr. McKeon?
Mr. McKeon. Yes, Senator, we'll do that.
Senator Fischer. Okay. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Fischer.
Before I recognize Senator McCaskill--I've conferred with
Senator Inhofe--we have votes beginning at 11:15 a.m.--about
five votes. We're going to continue the hearing. Senator Inhofe
and I will go to the floor as quickly as possible, and return.
In the interim, I would ask my colleagues, based on seniority,
to take the chair in my absence. We will allow everyone to ask
their questions before we adjourn the hearing. If a Republican
colleague returns, obviously we will alternate back and forth.
With that general plan, Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you all. You have an amazing responsibility in front
of you. I appreciate, as all Americans do, your willingness to
serve.
We have been grappling with the tenacious and overwhelming
problem of sexual assault in the military. Senator Gillibrand
and I have worked together on a number of historic reforms that
have been signed into law that you will have the responsibility
of implementing. I know I can speak for her in this regard,
that we're going to hold you accountable, that we're going to
be paying very close attention to how all of this is done.
I wanted to take, though, a minute to ask some technical
questions about the Gillibrand proposal, in terms of where we
do have a policy disagreement which would remove the command
from any disposition authority on any crimes in the military,
with a few exceptions--but, the vast majority of crimes,
including writing bad checks and bunk theft and all of the
things that currently are handled within the system with the
current command disposition authority.
I have read the letter, from Elizabeth King, where she
talks about the requirement that we would now have to have O-
6s--colonels or Navy captains--in all of these new offices that
would have to be stood up, the disposition offices. For some
inexplicable reason, the amendment does not allow any new
resources to be spent. Which means we would have to pull these
O-6s from existing billets.
What I need from you, Mr. Work--and you're probably not
prepared to answer it today--I need numbers. I need to know how
short we are. The head of legislative affairs for the Defense
Department says there's not enough O-6s to do it and that they
would have to be pulled from positions they now hold as judges
and as trial counsel and as supervising victim advocates. We
would still be short, in terms of how many O-6s we have.
The question is, how would we do this if we have no new
resources? Has there been any estimates done of the
administrative costs of standing up these offices, which
clearly--justice delayed is justice denied--if we're going to
be trying to handle a bunk theft, a barracks theft in
Afghanistan out of an office in the United States, has there
been any calculation done of the time it was going to take for
these decisions to be made? Or are we envisioning standing up
these new disposition authority offices around the globe? Are
these going to be new Judge Advocate General (JAG) offices that
will be put various places?
I know some thought has to have been given to this, and I
think it would be important for us to know the technical
ramifications of no new resources being allowed to be used for
this if, in fact, this were to pass into law.
Mr. Work, if you would make a commitment to try to get
those numbers back to this committee, I think it would be very
helpful.
Mr. Work. I absolutely will, yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]

I understand that the Services have considered how they would
implement a system that would require judge advocates in the grade of
O-6 or higher to exercise prosecutorial discretion over many offenses
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. I also understand that the
Services have estimated that this would require at least 74 O-6 judge
advocate disposition authorities. That accounts for approximately one-
fifth of all authorized O-6 judge advocates across the Services. The
requirement that these 74 new billets be filled by O-6 judge advocates
who ``have significant experience in trials by general or special
court-martial'' would further limit the pool of O-6s who can be
detailed to those new billets. As there are no Active Duty O-6 judge
advocates without current assignments, reassigning 74 O-6 judge
advocates to duties required by the bill would necessarily remove these
senior judge advocates from critical billets as military judges,
supervisory prosecutors and defense attorneys, and staff judge
advocates. Additionally, I understand that many junior judge advocates
and support personnel would also be required to staff these new
offices.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
On Prisoner of War/Missing-in-Action (POW/MIA). Ms.
Wormuth, are you familiar with the long problems we've had in
this area?
Ms. Wormuth. Senator, yes, I'm broadly familiar with the
issues with Guantanamo Bay (GTMO).
Senator McCaskill. No, we're talking about--not GTMO--we're
talking about recovering remains.
Ms. Wormuth. I apologize, Senator. Yes, I'm familiar
broadly, with that area, as well.
Senator McCaskill. We get daily complaints about the
dysfunction at Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command. I have never
seen a more inexcusable turf war in my life than the turf war
that has gone on within this important responsibility within
the military. Here's the problem we have right now. By the way,
you know how long we've been talking about this? Decades. For
decades, we have been talking about this. It's embarrassing, if
you go back and read old GAO reports and old committee hearings
on this subject, how long this problem has been identified and
not fixed. Here's what you have. It's a little bit like
Arlington National Cemetery. When you have too many cooks in
the kitchen, when there's a problem, guess what everybody does?
That's what you have going on right now. You have one function
blaming the other function, and one part of the office blaming
the other part of the office. I've taken enough time to get
into this that, I will tell you, it is a mess. You have an
opportunity to clean this up. You have an opportunity to do a
clear chain of command and accountability in this area. It is
costing millions of dollars for every recovery we have.
Millions.
Now, I don't think any American will begrudge us spending
this money to recover remains of our fallen. But, there's just
a lot of work to be done here, and I want to be comfortable,
Ms. Wormuth, that you are aware of it, because I believe it's
going to fall in your folder.
Ms. Wormuth. Yes, Senator, it will. It is a very solemn
obligation. It's one that I take seriously, it's one the
Department takes seriously. Certainly, we do have significant
problems in this area. My understanding is that Secretary Hagel
has very recently required that the Acting Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy provide recommendations to him, within 30
days, on how we would propose to restructure the community to
make it more effective and to have greater accountability.
I would be happy, if confirmed, to work with you and talk
with you about the results of those recommendations. As you
probably are also aware, we have other studies that our CAPE
organization has undertaken in this area very recently.
Senator McCaskill. Yes, I'm aware of the CAPE study. My
subcommittee that has looked at this really closely will be
happy--it's on the Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Subcommittee--but, we'd be happy to share with you, not only
all the information we have, but, obviously, protecting
whistleblowers giving you a taste of how bad it is.
Finally, Mr. Work, I want to just quickly go to our
airborne electronic attack capability. If we have radar and
surface-to-air missile batteries, if we have an anti-access
aerial denial contested environment, right now, the only
aircraft that can provide the capability of an airborne
electronic attack, which is pretty important for our country to
have, is the EA-18 Growler. With these challenges on the
horizon and the need for our capability in this area of
electronic attack, can you talk about how we would benefit from
additional electronic warfare capabilities?
Mr. Work. Senator, airborne electronic attack, and all
aspects of electronic attack, are going to be absolutely
critical in this area of proliferating threats, as you have
said. These type of capabilities are absolutely critical to
support our aviation component, as well as other components of
the joint force. The EA-18G is one critical component. It's a
world-class platform. There are other capabilities that the
Department is considering, such as stand-in jammers and other
expendable decoys, et cetera. It's a very, very important
subject. If confirmed, I would look very carefully at this,
along with all other aspects of the force structure, to
determine we have the proper mix of capabilities and capacities
to meet our requirements.
Senator McCaskill. If we were to abandon the Growler, I
would be anxious to hear what the capabilities would be to
replace it, and where they are in the pipeline. I want to make
sure that we do not leave ourself exposed in this critical
area, going forward.
Mr. Work. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you all very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the witnesses, thank you for your service and for being
here today.
Mr. McCord, I'd like to ask you some questions and really
focus on the speech that was delivered by Secretary Hagel
yesterday, to just make sure I follow the concept. We do not
have the budget. Secretary Hagel will be here next week, so I'm
not going to get into line items, but just the concept in the
speech in the one particular area that he mentioned.
My read of the speech is that a lot of the speech is about
the continuing effect that full sequester cuts would have on
the military budget, but also on the national security strategy
of the Nation. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. McCord. That's correct. I think the Secretary did,
yesterday, and will continue to try and distinguish between the
path that we're going to present to you in the budget and a
strict adherence to the BCA caps for the remainder of the
period through 2021, and what a difference that's going to make
to us.
Senator Kaine. Mr. McCord, I gather, from reading the
speech, that, just as you indicate, the intent, when the budget
comes, is to present us with alternative scenarios. A first
scenario would be the full-sequester version, acknowledging the
relief that the 2-year budget provided, to the tune of about
$30 billion in 2014 and 2015, but then, assuming that there's
no additional sequester relief, that will be the budget that is
presented, the full-sequester version. Then there's also an
intention to deliver an alternative, which I would call the
national security version, which would take the sequester
version, but provide an additional $115 billion of relief from
sequester cuts, at least through the end of 2019. Is that your
understanding?
Mr. McCord. Senator, that's pretty accurate. Let me just
rephrase it a little bit, though.
The budget that we'll present is the higher level. That
will be the President's budget, the higher level. The sequester
alternative would really be described as a notional
alternative, to illustrate the differences. But, there's not
going to be two budgets.
Senator Kaine. I see.
Mr. McCord. There will be one, and it will be higher than
the BCA caps for 2019.
Senator Kaine. But, the committee members and the public
and all of the Senate will be able to look at the submission
with both the President's budget submission and the discussion
of what full sequester would mean, and see, essentially, the
delta, in key line items and programs, between a full sequester
and this sort of national security version that adds $115
billion back. Is that correct?
Mr. McCord. We would certainly attempt--the Secretary and
the Chiefs that will follow him, the Service Secretaries--to
illustrate the major differences. As you say, not an
excruciating line-item differential, but the major import of
that difference. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. Just for the record, I would note that I
think the format of this budget sounds like it will be very
helpful, and it was a format that was, I think, suggested in a
letter from Senators Levin and Inhofe to Secretary Hagel last
summer. We really need to see what the delta is between an
optimum and full sequester. I look forward to it.
My quick reading of the math on this would suggest, if we
just go by what the Secretary said in his speech yesterday,
that, if we opt for the President's budget--just wave a magic
wand and say we'll do it, the national security version--DOD
would still have absorbed over 60 percent of the sequester
cuts, even if you add back in the $115 billion and the $30
billion that we provided as sequester relief in the 2014-2015
budget we just passed. Is that your general understanding?
Mr. McCord. That sounds accurate, Senator, and I could
certainly provide detailed figures for the record if you
desire.
Senator Kaine. I will ask that question in writing--because
I think it's important to know that, based on the reading of
the speech of the Secretary, DOD is not coming with a
presidential budget submission asking for the elimination of
sequester. I think what we will see is a budget where DOD and
the President are saying, ``We'll take 60 percent of the
sequester cuts--whether we like them or not, we'll take 60
percent of the sequester cuts. Give us, in addition to what has
already been done, additional sequester relief to avoid 40
percent of the sequester, in the interests of national
security.'' It sounds like that's what we'll see with the
presentation of the budget coming later in the week or next
week.
Mr. McCord. Yes, Senator, since the BCA was passed, every
year we have gotten some relief in some form from the absolute
cap, but we've also gotten much less than we requested, every
single year, from 2012, 2013, 2014. We've been cut about $80
billion--over $80 billion below what we requested each in those
years. However, we have gotten about $40 billion more than the
absolute worst-case, lowest BCA caps, which were delayed 1
year, and then, as you alluded to, modified by the Murray-Ryan
proposal in 2014-2015. There's been a middle ground that has
been where we have taken a substantial part, more than half of
the total sequestration cuts, but not the entire amount. That
informs the look, going forward in our budget, that is above
the absolute sequester, but certainly mindful of the fiscal
realities that we're going to take reductions from what we had
proposed before.
Senator Kaine. Let me just use one example that I spoke
with you and Mr. Work about yesterday. Then I'll ask each of
you a question. This deals with carriers.
Secretary Hagel, in his speech yesterday, said, ``The
spending levels proposed under the President's budget plan
would also enable the Navy to maintain 11 carrier strike
groups. However, we will have to make a final decision on the
future of the George Washington aircraft carrier in the 2016
budget submission. If sequestration spending levels remain in
place in fiscal year 2016, she would need to be retired before
her scheduled nuclear refueling and overhaul. That would leave
the Navy with 10 carrier strike groups. But, keeping the George
Washington in the fleet would cost $6 billion, so we would have
no other choice than to retire her, should sequestration-level
cuts be reimposed. At the President's budget level, we would
pay for the overhaul and maintain 11 carriers.''
I'd like to ask both Mr. Work and Mr. McCord this. Do you
support the presidential position, as outlined in the
Secretary's speech, about the importance of maintaining an 11-
carrier Navy?
Mr. Work. Yes, Senator, I do. The law of the land requires
11 carriers, and, if we had to go to the full sequestration
level, we would have to get relief from the law. Secretary
Hagel has made clear that, if we can remain at the President's
budget, that we would retain 11 carriers.
Senator Kaine. Mr. McCord?
Mr. McCord. I would agree with that, and this is going to
be one of those most clear differences that we've been
discussing about sequester path versus the President's budget
path.
Senator Kaine. Just to clarify what Mr. Work said, the
maintaining of an 11-carrier Navy is not just a presidential
policy that we will see in the budget, as elaborated yesterday
by the Secretary, it is also a statutory requirement. Correct?
Mr. McCord. Yes, sir.
Mr. Work. Yes, sir.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'll look forward to seeing how the presidential budget
supports this statutory policy of the 11-carrier Navy. I
appreciate your testimony.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up from Senator McCaskill's questions. We
had information that there's too many JAGs, actually. This is a
letter from Dana Chipman, Lieutenant General USA, Judge
Advocate General, and he writes, ``As our Army begins to take
the steps necessary to draw down to 490,000 Active component
(AC) end strength, the JAG Corps must rebalance appropriately
and be postured for the future. Historically high promotion and
retention rates in recent years have created an excess of Judge
Advocate Generals. Deliberate steps taken in a thoughtful
manner will retain our ability to support the Army and the
joint force. To do so, I have requested authority to conduct
selective early retirement for a portion of our JAGs.''
As you do your analysis for Senator McCaskill, please
recognize that, according to our information, we have an excess
of JAGs. Isn't it true, though, that JAGs are stationed all
over the world, not just in the United States?
Mr. Work. Yes, ma'am, it certainly is.
Senator Gillibrand. Isn't it true that, today, when there
is a serious crime that's taken place, there are sufficient
lawyers to investigate those crimes, there's investigative
units, and the lawyers, in fact, do recommend to their
commanding officers how to proceed in the cases?
Mr. Work. I believe that is correct, yes, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Those same lawyers can be used today,
but just not in their own chain of command?
Mr. Work. Yes, ma'am. I haven't been fully briefed on the
laydown of JAGs so I would have to get back to you. But, what
you have described is what I understand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Moving to a related issue, do you think it's appropriate
for a commander to ignore the advice of counsel or an Article
32 investigating officer when they recommend proceeding to
prosecution, based on evidence supporting a sexual assault
crime?
Mr. Work. No, ma'am. I believe the commanding officer
should be able to make those type of decisions.
Senator Gillibrand. Do you think he should disregard the
advice of counsel in an Article 32 hearing that says there's
evidence a serious crime has been committed?
Mr. Work. Ma'am, I believe the commander always listens to
the JAG and to the advice of counsel and makes the best
judgment that he or she can to make sure that justice is
served.
Senator Gillibrand. If you believe he can decide not to
pursue a prosecution if there is sufficient evidence that a
crime has been committed, on what basis do you think he should
make that decision?
Mr. Work. I know of no cases where personally, a commanding
officer knew of enough evidence to pursue prosecution, and
elected not to do so.
Senator Gillibrand. There are documented cases. In fact,
recently, both the Washington Post and the Associated Press
(AP) have run stories on ethical issues, and senior leaders
specifically. The AP, after a 4-year Freedom of Information Act
request, finally got documentation for a base in Japan, and
found at least two cases where the attorney's judgment in the
Article 32 hearing was disregarded, where the recommendations
were to go forward, based on the evidence, and commanders
declined to prosecute. There's at least two cases that the AP
was able to report. I daresay--and I fully request all cases
from the military, where counsel was disregarded or where a
commander chose not to move forward after an Article 32 hearing
where there was evidence that a crime had been committed and
the recommendation was to go forward. I'd like you to
investigate that and submit that information for the record.
Mr. Work. Yes, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]

I understand that, based on a preliminary review of recent cases
across the Services, in 2012, sexual assault-related charges were
referred to court-martial in every case in which a staff judge advocate
recommended that the case go forward. At this time, however, I do not
have any information about instances in which a convening authority
disagreed with the recommendations of an Article 32 investigating
officer, or in which a convening officer decided to refer charges after
a staff judge advocate or Article 32 investigating officer recommended
against doing so.

Senator Gillibrand. Because, just because you've never seen
it doesn't mean it doesn't happen. In fact, one victim survivor
that I spoke to said she was supposed to go to trial and 4 days
before the trial, her command changed, and her new commander
looked at the file and said, ``I don't think a crime has been
committed. He might not have been a gentleman, but it wasn't a
rape.'' He decided the trial would not go forward. There's a
third example that I, at least, know about, anecdotally.
I'd like you to do a full review of all cases when that
happens, because, to say it's never happened, we have evidence
of three cases where it exactly did happen and that's
concerning. I'd like you to investigate that.
Mr. Work. Ma'am, I totally agree. I just don't know of any
personal instances. But, I read the exact same report about
Japan that you referred to, and it's extremely troubling. If
confirmed, this is one of the top priorities of the Department,
and I assure you that everyone is looking at this very closely.
Senator Gillibrand. If a commander decided not to
prosecute, despite the evidence, what would be permissible
reasons or acceptable reasons, in your mind, for him not to
proceed?
Mr. Work. Ma'am, it's a hypothetical question. I would have
to know the exact nature of the evidence against them and to
talk with the commander and see what the judgment would be. A
commander should listen to the JAG, make his best judgment, as
the commander, on how to proceed. I believe, in most cases, if
the JAG feels there is enough evidence, that most commanders
would proceed.
Senator Gillibrand. But, what about the instances where
they don't proceed or wouldn't proceed? What do you think are
legitimate reasons not to proceed, when the evidence says a
crime's been committed?
Mr. Work. Ma'am, when I was the Under Secretary of the
Navy, we looked at this very, very closely, and the only time
that this happens is when a JAG feels that the evidence is not
sufficient to move forward. In most cases, or in many cases,
the commander decides to go forward, even if the JAG feels that
there is not enough evidence to support an ultimate conviction.
It works both ways. It's important for us to understand that
the commanders are trying to make the best judgment that they
can.
Senator Gillibrand. Yes, but I'm not interested in cases
where innocent accused are convicted. I'm not interested in
cases going forward where there is no evidence that a serious
crime's been committed. Just moving forward because you want to
be perceived as being tough on sexual assault is not the right
answer.
Mr. Work. I didn't----
Senator Gillibrand. You have to understand. In this
country, justice is blind. You do not tip the scales of justice
in favor of a victim or an accused. You have to have blind
justice. My question to you is specific. What possible reason
would a commander disregard facts and evidence that trained
prosecutors have already developed through an Article 32
hearing to say, ``I don't think we should go forward''? Do you
think morale is a reason why you shouldn't go forward? Do you
think the fact that the accused may be popular or well
decorated or a great soldier--are those good reasons why you
don't go forward to trial? Because if you think they are, that
is the point of why this reform is so necessary.
I do not believe the commander should overrule the judgment
based on evidence. I believe the decision should only be based
on the evidence. If there's evidence a serious crime has been
committed, you move forward. If there's not evidence that a
serious crime has been committed, you don't move forward. Not
based on politics, not based on who you like better, not based
on who's more effective for your unit, not based on who you
just happen to like. It's not relevant, and it's not
appropriate. This is why victims and survivors have told us
over and over again, ``We don't trust the system. We don't
trust the chain of command. We don't believe justice will be
done.''
The last DOD survey specifically said the number-one reason
why victims did not report these crimes is because they
believed that nothing would be done. The second reason cited
is, they believed they would be retaliated against if they
report it.
That's where the breach of trust has been. I really want to
hear from you why you think that discretion is needed, whether
there's evidence or no evidence. Why do you need discretion if
there's evidence of a serious crime? What kind of discretion do
you think is legitimate?
Mr. Work. Ma'am, again, it's a hypothetical question, and I
believe that the record shows that JAGs are more likely to
press forward on prosecutions than their civilian counterparts.
I believe that most commanders are----
Senator Gillibrand. There's no evidence of that, sir. The
only evidence we have are 100 cases where the decision about
whether to keep it by the DOD's prosecution was made. You don't
know if the civilian system said, ``If you want jurisdiction,
take it. It's your judgment.'' You don't know that those cases
were reviewed. That information is not provided. That evidence
is misleading, and your conviction rate for some of those cases
was closer to 50 percent. Today in the military, your
conviction rate is about 95 percent for the cases that you take
up. Arguably, you didn't perform as well as you needed to,
because there wasn't evidence; or maybe there were innocent
accused.
I do not think you can say that with a straight face. There
are no facts or evidence that back that up. If you have it,
please send it to me.
Mr. Work. Very well, ma'am.
[The information referred to follows:]

I understand that on July 23, 2013, the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff sent a letter to Chairman Levin indicating that, in the
previous 2 years, commanders had exercised jurisdiction in 93 sexual
assault cases after civilian authorities had either failed to pursue a
full investigation or formally declined to prosecute. I also understand
that because the military justice system has some military-specific
offenses without civilian counterparts, there are sometimes instances
where the military can bring a prosecution when civilians cannot.
Additionally, I understand that the Vice Chairman noted that the 93
sexual assault cases referred to above include 73 in which courts-
martial had been completed, resulting in 52 convictions, a 71 percent
conviction rate.

Senator Gillibrand. I'm going to submit a question for the
record, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McCord, it's just specifically for
you. We've heard reports that you are restructuring how the
Army uses the Defense Finance and Accounting Services (DFAS),
and the plan could severely impact the effect on civilian
employees working in DFAS sites, like the one in Rome, NY. What
I would like is a commitment from you to give me information in
advance of these kinds of decisions. I don't want to have to
hear this kind of report through back channels. Do I have your
assurance that my office will be kept apprised of all future
action relating to changes to the DFAS's mission and force
structure?
Mr. McCord. Senator, yes, I'll work with the Army in that.
The Army is the one really undertaking the study, and the Army
is the customer, and so, DFAS does work for the Army. The Army
is looking at how to possibly revise some of their operations
but, we will work together with them to get you information on
any conclusions that they reach. I understand they are not at
that stage yet.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I'm going to submit, for the record,
questions about cyber.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
There being no further questions, thank you, ladies and
gentlemen, for your testimony.
Senator Inhofe. One question.
Senator Reed. Certainly, Senator Inhofe. Please go ahead.
Senator Inhofe. Just quickly.
There's not time to pursue this, Mr. Work, but I've been
concerned about the changes that take place with the Director
of Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E), Dr. Gilmore--
coming along and changing the standards after the fact. I would
like to ask if you would just respond, in some detail, for the
record. What is the proper managerial relationship between the
Deputy Secretary and the DOT&E? Would you do that?
Mr. Work. Yes, sir. The DOT&E is a direct report to the
Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He
works closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for the----
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that, but I would like to
have you talk about the problems that I see that are taking
place, that you have a set of standards that is set, and then
you come along later, change that set of standards, when
decisions have already been made predicated on the standards
that came out of the legitimate process. That's my concern.
Mr. Work. It's a very valid question, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Go ahead.
Mr. Work. Essentially, I think DOT&E should work with the
established criteria, like the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council (JROC), to come forward and say, ``I believe a
requirement isn't correct.'' If the JROC agrees with him, they
can make that change so that the entire system then is working
towards a common requirement.
[The information referred to follows:]

I understand that by statute, the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation is the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
on operational test and evaluation, providing, among other
responsibilities, independent and objective evaluations of the
operational effectiveness and suitability for use in combat of weapons,
equipment, and munitions. If I am confirmed, I will meet regularly with
the Director with respect to issues associated with the operational and
live-fire testing being conducted by the Department. I believe that the
Director plays a critical role in validating system performance, and
ensuring the effective stewardship of our resources.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Again, thank you to the witnesses.
There are votes pending. With that, I adjourn the hearing
and thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Robert O. Work by
Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied
follow:]
Questions and Responses
defense reforms
Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have
strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have
enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain
of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant
commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments
to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment
to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act
provisions?
Answer. I do not believe that modifications to the Goldwater-
Nichols Act provisions are necessary at this time. However, if
confirmed and appointed, I will consider this question as I perform my
duties as Deputy Secretary of Defense. If I come to believe that
modifications are necessary, I will recommend appropriate amendments to
the act.
Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to
address in these modifications?
Answer. I do not believe that modifications to the Goldwater-
Nichols Act provisions are necessary at this time.
relationships
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the following?
The Secretary of Defense.
Answer. The Secretary of Defense assigns the duties performed by
the Deputy Secretary and is the Deputy Secretary's immediate superior.
The Deputy Secretary performs the duties of the Secretary of Defense
when the Secretary is unable to do so. The Deputy Secretary serves as
the Department's Chief Operating and Management Officer (COO/CMO) and
focuses primarily on the daily activities of the Department, including
financial management, acquisition, civilian and military personnel
policy and the implementation of policy and strategy decisions. As a
result, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary must have a close working
relationship and the Secretary must be able to rely completely on the
Deputy Secretary.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. The five Under Secretaries establish policy and provide
oversight over major Departmental functions, subject to the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy
Secretary oversees the Under Secretaries and coordinates their
activities. The Deputy Secretary must work closely with the Under
Secretaries, ensuring that they understand the Secretary's guidance and
implement that guidance faithfully. The Deputy Secretary must also
resolve differences of opinion between or among the Under Secretaries,
referring to the Secretary those important issues that require his
decision.
Question. The Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of
Defense (DOD).
Answer. The Deputy Secretary, who is the Chief Management Officer,
supervises the Deputy Chief Management Officer, assigning tasks,
providing oversight, and ensuring accountability. The Deputy Secretary
must be able to rely on the Deputy Chief Management Officer to monitor
the Department's performance in attaining management goals and keep the
Deputy Secretary informed. The two must keep in constant communication
to ensure seamless oversight of the Department's management program,
and immediate intervention when required.
Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. There are two categories of Assistant Secretaries. Most of
the Assistant Secretaries fall under the authority, direction, and
control of the Under Secretaries. For those Assistant Secretaries, the
Deputy Secretary exercises oversight through the Under Secretaries. For
Assistant Secretaries who report directly to the Secretary, the Deputy
Secretary should exercise a broader and more direct oversight, working
closely together to ensure the Secretary's guidance is accomplished
efficiently and effectively.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Answer. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary must have complete
confidence in the professional military advice of the Chairman and Vice
Chairman, work closely with them, and communicate direction to the
combatant commanders through them. The Deputy Secretary works most
closely with the Vice Chairman, particularly on matters regarding
budgeting, programming, and requirements.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The Secretaries of the Military Departments are under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The
Deputy Secretary assists the Secretary in providing direction to and
oversight of the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Deputy
Secretary also helps resolve differences of opinion between the
Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Under Secretaries of
Defense.
Question. The Chief Management Officers of the Military
Departments.
Answer. The Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments
are the Under Secretaries of the Army, Air Force and Navy. They report
to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Deputy Secretary
and Deputy Chief Management Officer of DOD work closely with the Chief
Management Officers of the Military Departments to ensure that the
management program of DOD, as implemented in the respective Military
Departments, is carried out consistently with the direction of the
Secretary of Defense.
Question. The Service Acquisition Executives.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L) perform essential
roles in the Department's acquisition program, including providing
guidance to, and oversight of, the Service Acquisition Executives. The
Deputy Secretary works primarily through the USD(AT&L) when dealing
with the Service Acquisition Executives.
Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services.
Answer. The Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services perform two
vital roles for the Department. In their roles as Service Chiefs, they
normally work with the Deputy Secretary through the Secretaries of the
Military Departments. In their roles as members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, they normally work with the Deputy Secretary through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy Secretary seeks to
ensure that the Chiefs of Staff in both of their roles have the
resources necessary to accomplish their assigned missions and that they
have ample opportunity to provide their professional military advice on
significant matters.
Question. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary works closely with the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau on important issues regarding the States and the
National Guard. The Deputy Secretary relies on the Chief of the
National Guard to be a clear and persuasive channel of communication
between the Department and the States on all National Guard matters.
Question. The Judge Advocates General of the Services.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary normally works through the General
Counsel of DOD in dealing with the Judge Advocates General and the
Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Because the
Judge Advocates General have an important role in providing legal
advice to senior officials, military and civilian, in the Military
Departments, the Deputy Secretary ensures that the Judge Advocates
General are able to perform that vital function.
Question. The Inspector General of DOD.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary relies on the Inspector General to
provide candid information on significant issues addressed by the
auditors, inspectors, and investigators in the Inspector General's
office. The Deputy Secretary plays a direct role in ensuring the
independence of the Inspector General.
Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
Answer. The Deputy Secretary receives legal advice on all issues
from the General Counsel, so he or she must have a close and candid
relationship with the General Counsel. The General Counsel must feel
that he or she may approach the Deputy Secretary with legal advice at
any time, on any issue.
Question. The Director of National Intelligence.
Answer. When addressing matters of significance affecting both the
Department and the Intelligence Community, the Deputy Secretary works
with the Director of National Intelligence. The Under Secretary for
Intelligence assists the Deputy Secretary in maintaining a close
relationship with the Director of National Intelligence.
duties of the deputy secretary of defense
Question. Section 132 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the duties
of the Deputy Secretary of Defense are to be prescribed by the
Secretary of Defense.
Assuming that you are confirmed, what duties do you expect the
Secretary to prescribe for you?
Answer. I expect the Secretary to assign me the primary duties of
being prepared to perform his duties in his absence, assisting him in
leading the Department, providing him my best professional and candid
advice, and performing the statutory duties of Chief Management
Officer. In addition, I expect that the Secretary will assign me
additional duties in areas that will assist him in accomplishing his
many missions.
Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have either been a part of or analyzed and studied DOD
and the armed services my entire life.
My first 17 years were spent as military dependent in a Marine
Corps family. I learned first-hand what it was like moving every 2 to 4
years, sometimes unexpectedly. I lived on bases, off bases, and in
foreign countries. I changed neighborhoods and schools, lost track of
old friends and made new ones, and watched my Mom cope with my Dad's
long absences.
After 4 years of preparing for a commission in the U.S. Marine
Corps through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps, I spent 27
years as a Marine artillery officer, retiring at the rank of colonel. I
commanded at the platoon, battery, battalion, and training base level.
At different times I served as the personnel, intelligence, and
assistant operations officer in an artillery battalion, assistant
operations and logistics officer in an infantry regiment, and
operations officer in an artillery regiment. I also spent time on the
Headquarters Marine Corps staff as the Enlisted Force Planner and
director of Marine Corps space plans and operations. As the head of the
Strategic Initiatives Group, I provided analytical support to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps on a variety of issues, including during
the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). My time in the Marine Corps
taught me much about leadership, strategy, operations, tactics,
programming, and budgeting.
I was married for 23 of my 27 years in the Marine Corps, and was a
father for 11. I watched my wife cope with frequent moves and the
stresses of me being away. I missed some of her birthdays and our
anniversaries. Then, I missed some my daughter's birthdays, school
plays, and dance recitals. As a former member of a military family, I
knew how hard it was to be constantly on the move and not having my dad
around. But now it was me often leaving my wife and daughter to take
care of themselves.
My last 2 years on Active Duty was spent as the Military Assistant
and Senior Aide to Richard Danzig, 71st Secretary of the Navy. During
this time, I observed what it was like to lead a Military Department,
where strategy, Service culture, politics, programming, and budgeting
come into play. I observed the 2001 QDR from the Department of Navy
level, recognizing the Navy-Marine Corps Team was very much more than
the sum of its two parts. In the process, I became an ardent
Departmentalist, seeking cooperation and understanding across
institutional boundaries.
After retiring, I spent most of the next 8 years at the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a national security Think Tank,
first as a Senior Fellow and later as Vice President for Strategic
Studies. I studied, wrote, and spoke extensively on strategy, global
posture, revolutions in war, and maritime affairs. I assisted the Red
Team for the 2006 QDR, testing key assumptions and challenging major
objectives.
This body of experience prepared me well to be Under Secretary of
the Navy. The Department of the Navy is a microcosm of DOD, with two
Services (the Navy and Marine Corps) and a $140-$160 billion annual
budget. As Under Secretary, I was the principal deputy and advisor to
the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief Operating/Management Officer of
the Department, and Chief of Staff for the Navy Secretariat. As such, I
assisted the Secretary in pursuing his priorities and agenda,
supervising the organize, train, and equip function of both the Navy
and Marine Corps; developing Departmental policy, capabilities, and
capacities; and fashioning a balanced program. I worked extensively
with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries of Defense,
the Director of Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation, the Chief and
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant and Assistant Commandant
of the Marine Corps, the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and Under
Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and the senior military
leadership of the Army and Air Force. I learned the rhythm and
processes of the Pentagon, and how to make things happen. I led the
Department's efforts on the 2010 QDR, and participated in the 2011
Strategic Review. Throughout this time, I gained a great appreciation
for DOD civilians, who are a vital part of the Total Force.
For the last year, I have been the Chief Executive Officer for the
Center for a New American Security, where I have tried to build a
series of programs that view the entire range of national security
issues, including strategy and statecraft; responsible defense;
technology and national security; energy, environment and security;
military, veterans and society; and Middle East and Asian studies.
Throughout my career, I have valued and sought out opportunities to
better educate myself. I have a Masters in Science in Systems
Management, a Masters of Systems Technology (Space Systems Operations);
and a Masters in International Public Policy.
Although no job will ever prepare someone for the expansive
responsibilities of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I believe this
body of experience qualifies and prepares me to tackle the duties of
the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed and appointed, I would begin immediately
to establish close working relationships with those whom I will work
daily on national security issues, including:

Secretary Hagel and his personal staff;
The Under Secretaries of Defense, Director of Cost
Evaluation and Program Evaluation (CAPE), the Deputy Chief
Management and Information Officers, and other senior officials
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and senior leadership in the four armed services;
The three Service Secretaries and Under Secretaries;
Senior leadership at the Office of Management and
Budget and the Cabinet departments who work national security
issues;
Senior leadership in the White House and on the
National Security Council staff; and
Leadership in Congress, particularly those who sit on
the congressional defense committees.

I would review the analysis and conclusions of the Strategic
Choices and Management Review and the 2013 QDR in order to understand
what had happened and the OSD decisions made since I left my job as
Under Secretary of the Navy in March 2013.
I would also begin detailed study of the fiscal, administrative,
and operational issues that the Secretary assigns to me. I would spend
time analyzing the business processes of the Department so that I could
evaluate whether any changes may be appropriate and so advise the
Secretary.
Question. What changes to section 132, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. I would not recommend any changes to section 132 at this
time; I believe section 132 adequately provides for the duties of the
Deputy Secretary. If I am confirmed and appointed, I will consider this
issue while performing my duties, and if I determine that changes may
be necessary, I will suggest them to the Secretary for consideration as
a legislative proposal.
national security budget reductions
Question. Section 132 was amended by section 904 of the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, to provide that
the Deputy Secretary serves as the Chief Management Officer (CMO) of
DOD. The Deputy Secretary is to be assisted in this capacity by a
Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO).
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO of DOD?
Answer. The primary duty of the Chief Management Officer is to
provide leadership and to ensure accountability for the business
operations of DOD. These operations involve all of the Department's
components and cut across the responsibilities of the Under Secretaries
of Defense. As such, they require leadership and accountability at a
high level. In this role, the CMO should ensure that the business
functions of the Department are optimally aligned to support the
warfighter, that they form a simplified, efficient, and effective
business environment, and that DOD maintains a strategic perspective
and has the capacity to carry out its plans.
In addition, the CMO's role is to lead, oversee, and support the
roles of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and agency heads
in managing their business operations, as well as provide direction to
DOD's Deputy CMO and the CMOs of the Military Departments.
Question. What background and expertise do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties and responsibilities?
Answer. As the former Under Secretary and CMO of the Navy, I am
very familiar with the array of management and business challenges that
continue to confront DOD. Additionally, I spent my previous career,
first as a military officer and then as a member of a number of think-
tanks and academia, analyzing defense issues such as transformation,
strategy, and programs. This experience has provided me with the
background and expertise to serve as the Department's CMO.
Question. Do you believe that the CMO and DCMO have the resources
and authority needed to carry out the business transformation of DOD?
Answer. My understanding is that the Secretary of Defense has
recently announced a series of reforms following his Organizational
Review to further strengthen the Deputy CMO to provide full spectrum
oversight of OSD and DOD management, administration, and compliance. I
am not currently in a position to determine if the CMO and Deputy CMO
have the appropriate authority and resources to carry out their roles
in light of these changes. If confirmed, I will examine the authorities
and resources available to both functions to determine if they fully
address the need.
Question. What role do you believe the DCMO of DOD should play in
the planning, development, and implementation of specific business
systems by the Military Departments?
Answer. The most important role the Deputy CMO can play regarding
specific business systems is to ensure that the Department's
overarching and functional business strategies and standards are
clearly articulated at all levels and the Military Department's systems
implementation plans will achieve these strategies. On occasion, there
may be specific business systems that require the attention of the
Deputy CMO to ensure alignment and resource prioritization across the
budget horizon.
Beyond defense business systems, however, there is a significant
role the Office of the Deputy CMO can play in helping the Deputy
Secretary lead efforts across the Department to increase its efficiency
and effectiveness. I have read the Secretary's December 4th public
statement that strengthens the role of the Office. This is an important
step in gaining better control and oversight of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Defense agencies and activities, and the
Department as a whole. If confirmed, I will review the decisions made
and make new ones, if necessary, to strengthen to the role of the
Deputy CMO.
Question. Do you believe that the DCMO should have clearly defined
decisionmaking authorities, or should the DCMO serve exclusively as an
advisor to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as CMO?
Answer. I believe that the Deputy CMO should meet the statutory
responsibilities currently in law, as well as have the responsibilities
assigned by the CMO and the Secretary of Defense. There may be areas or
circumstances where it would be appropriate for the Deputy CMO's duties
to include independent decisionmaking authority and others where it
would not be appropriate. This should be determined by the CMO or the
Secretary.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the
statutory provisions establishing the positions of CMO and DCMO?
Answer. At this time, I believe the statutory authorities for the
positions of the Chief Management Officer and the Deputy Chief
Management Officer are sufficient. If confirmed, I would inform
Congress if I determined that any changes in statute were necessary to
more effectively perform the duties of this office.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. Clearly, the first challenge and responsibility is to get
the entire Department working behind the Secretary's priorities. While
doing so, the Deputy Secretary must be cognizant that the Department
confronts a broadening range of missions within a complex strategic
environment while it must carefully manage its diminished resources.
Indeed, the dynamic fiscal environment is a major challenge since it
relates to the principal function of the Deputy and CMO roles.
Continued fiscal uncertainty generates potentially cascading effects
across all elements of the Department enterprise. Having a stable
fiscal picture will help the Department avoid inefficiencies and
maximize the resources allocated to it. Another challenge will be the
implementation of our National Security Strategy, consciously and
deliberately managing risk and applying resources in accordance with
the priorities of that strategy. This includes successful
implementation of our plans in Afghanistan and adapting our force
posture in the Asia-Pacific region.
I also foresee the need to carefully manage our Science &
Technology investments. I agree with recent comments from the Under
Secretary for AT&L about not taking our technological dominance for
granted. We should deliberately prioritize our long-term needs and
carefully allocate funding to key programs and potential game-changing
technologies that meet our strategic requirements.
Another major challenge is the need to assess and define our force
structure design in accordance with our strategy and to make resource-
informed decisions about our force levels. A force sizing construct
will be a key aspect of the upcoming QDR to help define those force
levels, against various levels of risk. Finally, as we go forward with
force level cuts and management overhead reductions, we must keep faith
with our Total Force. We cannot overlook the contributions that have
been made by our servicemembers, civilians, and their families over the
last decade of conflict.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Secretary
and the senior leadership of the Department and the components in
addressing these myriad challenges. I would anticipate that the
deliberations of the QDR, and the insights offered by Congress and the
National Defense Panel, will help generate solutions to them.
Question. What broad priorities would you establish, if confirmed,
with respect to issues which must be addressed by DOD?
Answer. Secretary Hagel has defined a set of broad priorities that
establish the essential framework for resolving the Department's
critical challenges.
The first involves a focus on institutional reform. We can set an
example here for the components by scaling back our headquarters and
adopting better business practices. We need to direct more resources to
invest in concrete military capabilities and readiness, as well as make
Defense organizations flatter and more responsive to today's threats
and priorities.
Next we must re-evaluate our force planning and force-sizing
construct. We need to ensure our strategy is aligned with how the
Military Departments are organizing, training and equipping the force.
The QDR will provide direction for that, with a force planning
construct reflecting priorities and modern threats.
The Secretary's third priority is avoiding a long-term readiness
challenge. This mandates finding a balance between force size,
investment accounts, and readiness levels. Sequestration fell hard on
the Department's future readiness accounts. The parameters for force
planning in the QDR should assist the Department in precluding a
readiness crisis and identifying the implications for Congress.
Fourth, the Department must protect investments in critical
military capabilities. This challenge requires us to preserve and
extend emerging priority capabilities-especially space, cyber, special
operations and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). A
critical aspect of this challenge is the ability to maintain access in
traditional and emergent domains. Our access is being increasingly
contested. We must recognize that future adversaries will learn much
from the last decade of war and avoid our traditional advantages.
Maintaining a technological edge will be key to our ability to maintain
access and secure our interests.
Fifth, we must achieve a balanced strategic posture. This will
include a capability/capacity balance for the military. In particular,
defining the right balance of Active and Reserve components is
necessary. We should leverage the potential of our Reserve component,
ensuring that we define the training readiness, responsiveness and
mobilization timelines required for their deployment. Balancing the
military properly will also include an examination of forward-stationed
and home-based forces. The force must also be balanced between its
readiness for conventional, irregular, and unconventional warfare. The
QDR will help define the balance required for general purpose and
Special Operations Forces.
Finally, personnel and compensation policy is a priority. We must
find the proper balance between compensation and other defense
priorities in a time of scarce resources. The Department and Congress
will need to work together to find comprehensive solutions that allow
us to recruit and retain the quality of today's force, while also
providing the resources to train and equip that force for their
missions.
Question. The Budget Control Act, as amended by the recent Murray-
Ryan budget agreement, calls for reductions in defense spending in
excess of $900 billion.
Do you believe that a national security spending reduction of this
magnitude can be accomplished without significant adverse impact on our
national security?
Answer. Based on my experience as Navy Under Secretary, and as an
outside analyst, my answer would be ``no''. I believe the Department
has expressed similar views. The BCA-level of funding will require
significant force structure reductions, undermine readiness and delay
modernization. My understanding is that the Department believes these
actions will leave it unable to meet fully the current Defense
Strategy.
Question. If confirmed, will you report to the committee on the
impact of these reductions personnel, readiness, infrastructure, and
modernization?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will continue to work with Congress to
define the impacts of potential reductions to the Defense budget and
its impact on all the inter-related pillars of our security.
streamlining headquarters
Question. Last December, Secretary Hagel began implementation of
his plan to reduce DOD staff by 20 percent. He expects this effort to
save $1.0 billion over a 5-year period by eliminating contract and
civilian workers while reorganizing certain offices, such as the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Policy.
Answer. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 contains a provision
requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for streamlining
DOD management headquarters by reducing the size of staffs, eliminating
tiers of management, cutting functions that provide little or no
addition value, and consolidating overlapping and duplicative program
offices. The objective is to reduce aggregate spending for management
headquarters by not less than $40.0 billion beginning in fiscal year
2015.
Question. What is your view on reductions to the size and
composition of DOD management headquarters?
Answer. I understand Secretary Hagel said he expected to save at
least $1 billion over the next 5 years. Given the fiscal challenges the
Department faces, I fully support his efforts to reduce the size of
headquarters. I am not familiar with the specifics of headquarters
reduction plans, but, if confirmed, I believe it would be prudent to
review these reductions to determine if additional savings can be
achieved, and also to ensure these reductions do not create
unacceptable risks to our national security interests.
Question. What role do you expect to play, if confirmed, in
ensuring that the expected savings are achieved?
Answer. Again, I am not familiar with the specifics of headquarters
reduction plans. However, if confirmed, it will be my responsibility to
make sure these savings are realized.
Question. Do you believe that DOD can achieve significant
additional savings in this area?
Answer. I do believe the Department can achieve savings by reducing
headquarters. If confirmed, I look forward to ensuring that happens.
Until given the opportunity to review those plans and the associated
risk, however, I think it would be unwise to speculate on a specific
savings number without understanding the functions involved and
potential downsides in acquisition, cyber-security, intelligence, et
cetera.
management issues
Question. GAO recently reported that ``the DOD systems environment
that supports [its] business functions is overly complex and error
prone, and is characterized by: (1) little standardization across the
department; (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks; (3) the
same data stored in multiple systems; and (4) the need for data to be
entered manually into multiple systems. . . . According to the
department's systems inventory, this environment is composed of 2,258
business systems and includes 335 financial management, 709 human
resource management, 645 logistics, 243 real property and installation,
and 281 weapon acquisition management systems.''
If confirmed, what key management performance goals would you want
to accomplish, and what standards or metrics would you use to judge
whether you have accomplished them?
Answer. If confirmed, I would strive to achieve the four key goals
and five guiding principles that are identified in the Department's
Strategic Management Plan. Each goal has associated performance
measures to track progress. If confirmed, I would use the plan's
upcoming development cycle to carefully review the strategic goals,
initiatives, and performance measures included in the plan. I will
ensure that future plans demonstrate clear alignment with the
Department's strategic objectives and that initiatives and measures are
clear, consistent, relevant and outcome-based.
Question. Would you agree that the Department will not be able to
put its financial house in order until it effectively addresses this
problem?
Answer. While I would agree that a simpler DOD systems environment
will make it easier to achieve financial objectives such as audit
readiness, it is only part of the holistic approach to financial
management that is needed to achieve the Department's goals. The
Department has reported that it is making better business management a
priority with a simpler business system environment as a component of
the broader agenda for improvement.
Question. Do you believe that a comprehensive, integrated,
enterprise-wide architecture and transition plan is essential to the
successful transformation of DOD's business systems?
Answer. Yes, I believe these are elements of what is required for
overseeing such a large and complex organization. However, I would
caution anyone from underestimating the challenges of changing DOD's
business practices and processes by just looking at technical systems.
The Department is far more complicated and requires far more than these
technical tools for simplifying, strengthening, and leaning out the
business environment.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
DOD's enterprise architecture and transition plan meet the requirements
of section 2222?
Answer. It is my understanding that strengthening DOD's business
processes and tools is a goal of the OSD transition plan. If confirmed,
I will review those plans and ensure we are meeting the full intent of
section 2222 in our revised organization structure and processes.
Question. What are your views on the importance and role of timely
and accurate financial and business information in managing operations
and holding managers accountable?
Answer. Timely and accurate financial and business information is
very important to the overall management of DOD's business operations.
It allows senior leaders to make fact-based decisions about the most
effective and efficient allocation of resources, while ensuring good
stewardship of the taxpayers' dollars. If confirmed, I will continue to
emphasize the Department's on-going efforts to improve our business
processes and systems which will better enable effective leadership and
management.
Question. What role do you envision playing, if confirmed, in
managing or providing oversight over the improvement of the financial
and business information available to DOD managers?
Answer. If confirmed, I would take my role as Chief Management
Officer/Chief Operating Officer and chair of the Deputy's Management
Action Group seriously. In these roles, I would hold the Department's
senior leaders accountable for meeting DOD's objectives, including
those identified in the Strategic Management Plan and Financial
Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan that are directly linked to
improving financial and business information.
audit readiness
Question. Former Secretary Panetta stated: ``While we have
reasonable controls over much of our budgetary information, it is
unacceptable to me that DOD cannot produce a financial statement that
passes all financial audit standards. That will change. I have directed
that this requirement be put in place as soon as possible. America
deserves nothing less.''
What is your understanding of the efforts and progress that have
been made in DOD toward the goal of being able to produce a clean
audit?
Answer. My understanding is that DOD, as an agency, has made
significant progress, particularly in the last 4 years. Secretary Hale
worked with the Services and agencies to provide a coherent set of
priorities and Secretary Hagel is fully engaging the entire leadership
team. In my former position as the Department of Navy CMO, I saw how
challenging this effort can be, and am gratified to see the Marine
Corps recently achieve an important initial milestone (an unqualified
opinion on the current year of their budget statement). If confirmed, I
intend to sustain the leadership emphasis in this area.
Question. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory
goal to achieve an auditable Statement of Budgetary Resources by the
end of fiscal year 2014 or are additional steps necessary? If so, what
are those steps?
Answer. I understand that the Department has told Congress that,
while it is too soon to know for sure because remediation efforts are
ongoing, they expect most budget statements to be ready for audit by
September 2014. Because of years of budget turmoil and other problems,
some may not be ready. Once the audit begins, I understand that the
Department plans to conduct the audit in a cost-effective manner by
starting with the current year. I also know that this whole project
will be extremely challenging.
Question. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory
goal and achieve an auditable financial statement by the end of fiscal
year 2017 or are additional steps needed? If so, what are those steps?
Answer. I know from my time as Navy Under Secretary that the
Department is fully committed to this goal and has a plan to meet the
target. I understand that the Department believes it is on track to
meet this target despite the technical complexity of the problem and
the scale of the Department's resources. However, I am not currently in
a position to make a specific prediction about timing.
Question. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory
goal ``to ensure a full audit is performed on the financial statements
of DOD . . . '' for fiscal year 2018 and that audit will be completed
by September 30, 2018 or are additional steps needed? If so what are
those steps?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department is fully committed
to this goal and timing and believes it is on track to meet the goal.
However, I am not currently in a position to make a specific prediction
about timing.
Question. Do you believe the Department will meet its statutory
goal and submit to Congress the results of the audit to be completed by
September 30, 2018 or are additional steps needed? If so, what are
those steps?
Answer. My understanding is that the Department is fully committed
to this goal and timing and believes it is on track to meet the
targets. However, I am not currently in a position to make a specific
prediction about timing.
Question. Do you believe in order to meet its statutory goal to
conduct a full audit that the Department will have to place a monetary
value on all of its property?
Answer. Yes. My understanding is that the Department will need to
follow the government accounting and auditing rules, as well as its own
policies. Those rules require property valuation. I know that the
policies also provide some flexibility to make sure that the cost of
accomplishing this valuation does not exceed the value of the
information.
Question. Do you believe that the Department can achieve a clean
audit opinion through better accounting and auditing, or is the
systematic improvement of the Department's business systems and
processes a prerequisite?
Answer. I believe that the Defense Department will need to do both.
Over the past 5 years, the Department has made significant progress in
audit readiness, despite the fact that it doesn't have modern business
systems across the enterprise. However, the Department needs to
continue efforts to improve and streamline the systems environment for
operational efficiency, as well as to sustain cost effective annual
financial audits.
Question. When do you believe the Department can achieve a clean
audit?
Answer. The Department is fully committed to the goal of having
audit ready statements by September 2017. After achieving audit
readiness, experience in other Federal agencies suggests that it
usually takes several years to secure a clean audit opinion.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to sustain the
commitment of the Department's top leadership to the long-term goal of
transforming the Department's financial management?
Answer. I understand the Department has made substantial progress
in transforming business operations, to include financial management.
This progress is most visible in the audit readiness area, but I
understand progress has also been made in reducing improper payments
and the number of Anti-Deficiency Act violations reported. However,
there is still a long way to go. Sustaining gains will continue to
demand the attention and commitment of senior leadership. When I served
as CMO in the Department of the Navy, I knew how difficult the problem
appeared at the beginning, but we pressed forward and made solid
progress. If confirmed, I intend to continue to make this a priority,
not only for the Comptroller, but for all DOD leaders.
Question. Do you think that having the Deputy Secretary of Defense
``dual-hatted'' as the CMO is consistent with the prioritization and
sustained day-to-day focus needed for the success of the Department's
financial improvement efforts?
Answer. Yes, based on my 4 years as Under Secretary of the Navy
where I had both ``hats'' in a $140 billion enterprise. While demanding
in terms of management time, this ``dual-hat'' approach provides the
high-level attention necessary to make progress on important but
difficult initiatives such as financial improvement. Progress on
financial initiatives also requires a close working relationship
between the Comptroller and the CMO/DCMO leadership. I believe that
relationship is working today and if confirmed, I will work to sustain
it into the future.
business transformation
Question. Since 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
has designated DOD's approach to business transformation as ``high
risk'' due to its vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse and
mismanagement. However, GAO has recently found that the Department's
senior leadership has shown commitment to transforming business system
operations and has made progress in establishing management oversight
and developing a strategic plan to guide transformation efforts.
Nonetheless, in GAO's view, the Department needs to take additional
action to further define management roles and responsibilities and to
strengthen strategic planning.
Do you believe that the Department needs to more clearly define
roles and responsibilities, as well as relationships among key
positions and governance entities?
Answer. The Department has clearly defined roles and
responsibilities among key positions and governance entities; however,
I understand that Secretary Hagel recently announced a plan to realign
certain reporting relationships and functions to the Deputy CMO to
provide full spectrum oversight of OSD and DOD management,
administration, and compliance. He further seeks to strengthen the role
of the CIO in the Department. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the Secretary to implement those changes so that the Department
can best meet the challenges that lie ahead.
Question. If so, what steps do you believe the Department should
take to achieve this objective?
Answer. I believe that Secretary Hagel's plan will improve the
Department's ability to transform its business operations and its
systems. My understanding is that the plan is intended to strengthen
both the Deputy CMO's role in full spectrum management and the DOD
Chief Information Officer's role in overarching IT oversight. If
confirmed, I look forward to driving implementation of the Secretary's
announced realignments so that management improves not only for
business systems, but also across the Department.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to
further refine strategic goals, performance measures, and other
elements of the Department's strategic management plan?
Answer. The Department's Strategic Management Plan is updated on a
regular basis. If confirmed, I would use the plan's upcoming
development cycle to carefully review the strategic goals, initiatives,
and performance measures included in the plan. I will make sure that
future plans demonstrate clear alignment with the Department's
strategic objectives and that initiatives and measures are clear,
consistent, relevant and outcome-based.
Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to more
clearly define the Department's strategic planning process, including
mechanisms to guide and synchronize efforts to develop strategic plans;
monitor the implementation of reform initiatives; and report progress,
on a periodic basis, towards achieving established goals?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that initiatives and
measures are clearly linked to the overall strategic objectives of the
Department. I believe establishing clear and meaningful outcome-based
performance measures, periodic reporting, and use of these measures to
inform management decisions is critical to success. Achieving these
goals requires coordination among all of the Department's senior
leaders.
Question. Do you believe that the Deputy Chief Management Officer
should have control over funds for the components' business systems
programs to ensure that the components follow guidance from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense on the Department's business transformation
efforts?
Answer. I believe the components should maintain control over their
funds for business systems programs; however, the Deputy Chief
Management Officer needs to be able to confirm that components are
following Department processes and guidance. As the Navy Chief
Management Officer, it was my experience that the Deputy Chief
Management Officer had sufficient ability to ensure components followed
guidance on business transformation through the Defense Business
Council. However, if confirmed, I would notify Congress if I assess
that further controls over funds were necessary.
acquisition of business systems
Question. Most of the Department's business transformation programs
are substantially over budget and behind schedule. At the request of
the Armed Services Committee, GAO reviewed DOD's 9 largest Enterprise
Resource Programs (ERP), which are intended to replace more than 500
outdated business systems, and reported that 6 of the 9 had experienced
schedule delays ranging from 2 to 12 years and incurred cost increases
ranging from $530.0 million to $2.4 billion. GAO reported that DOD has
failed to follow good management practices for developing schedules and
cost estimates for many of these programs.
If confirmed, how would you work with the Deputy Chief Management
Officer, the Chief Management Officers of the Military Departments, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
(AT&L), the Chief Information Officer (CIO), and the Under Secretaries
of Defense to address these problems?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work directly with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L),
the Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Management Officers of
the Military Departments, the Under Secretaries of Defense, and the DOD
Chief Information Officer to implement better management practices and
lessons learned. Successful ERP implementations require integrated,
end-to-end thinking and therefore must consider policy, business
process, and acquisition equities. Each of these officials has an
important role to play in addressing the planning, implementation, and
change management challenges that historically have hamstrung the
Department's ability to deliver programs such as ERPs in accordance
with established cost and schedule baselines.
Question. What lessons can be learned from acquisition management
of the Air Force's now cancelled Expeditionary Combat Support System?
Answer. I am not familiar with the details as to what happened
regarding the Expeditionary Combat Support System. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Department implements a full range of management controls to
our business systems modernization efforts and will ensure that the
lessons learned from Expeditionary Combat Support System are
incorporated into our processes.
Question. DOD must implement a full range of business systems
modernization management controls to ensure that its business system
investments are the right solutions for addressing its business needs;
that these investments are being managed to produce expected
capabilities efficiently and cost-effectively; and that, ultimately,
its business stakeholders are satisfied.
What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed to ensure
that both the corporate and component investment management processes
are appropriately defined and institutionalized?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Department's senior
leadership to ensure our collective investment processes are balanced
and focused on achieving the enterprise needs of the Department. I will
review the Department's investment review process for business systems
and ensure it provides the necessary framework so that component
investments are aligned with the Department's strategy.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed
to ensure that business system investments are managed with the kind of
acquisition management rigor and discipline that is embodied in
relevant guidance and best practices, so that each investment will
deliver expected benefits and capabilities on time and within budget?
Answer. I am not aware of any additional steps being necessary at
this time. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Deputy Chief
Management Officer, the Chief Information Officer, and the Military
Departments to identify opportunities to strengthen business system
development acquisition processes and practices to improve our
investment outcomes.
Question. Do you believe that unique challenges to acquiring
services related to information-technology (IT) systems may require an
acquisition strategy or approach different from those used for
acquiring property or services unrelated to IT systems?
Answer. I believe DOD should ensure acquisition strategies or
approaches are structured and tailored to best suit the required
product, including information technology systems. If confirmed, I will
ensure that we appropriately manage business system requirements
development and acquisition.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed
to ensure that requirements management, systems testing, and data
quality are improved and to help resolve other problems that have
continued to hinder the Department's efforts to implement its automated
systems on schedule, within cost and with the intended capabilities?
Answer. I believe the Department must place appropriate management
emphasis on the entire business system process, from requirements
development to fielding. If confirmed, I will work with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the
Deputy Chief Management Officer, the Chief Information Officer, and the
Military Departments to strengthen our efforts in this area.
defense acquisition reform
Question. Congress enacted the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act of 2009 (WSARA), without a dissenting vote in either House. WSARA
is designed to ensure that new defense acquisition programs start on a
sound footing, to avoid the high cost of fixing problems late in the
acquisition process.
What are your views regarding WSARA and the need for improvements
in the Defense acquisition process?
Answer. When I first took office as the Under Secretary of the Navy
in 2009, Congress had just passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform
Act, which has become a valuable tool for the Department. I supported
the implementation of WSARA at that time, and I continue to support the
improvements in the area of Defense acquisition organization and
policy. If confirmed, I would continue to support the efforts to
improve the defense acquisition system consistent with the direction
provided in WSARA.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve all three aspects of
the acquisition process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. My time as the Under Secretary of the Navy taught me the
value of strong communications and interactions between the
requirements, acquisition, and financial communities. Given the complex
nature of the acquisition process, it is important to review all three
aspects of the process holistically and not independently. If
confirmed, I will work to effectively synchronize these processes to
balance warfighters needs with budget and acquisition realities.
Question. If confirmed, how would you improve acquisition
accountability?
Answer. Short, clear lines of authority and accountability for
acquisition were established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I emphasized
this chain as Under Secretary of the Navy and would continue to do so,
if confirmed. Further I will hold those responsible for establishing
requirements, budgets, and acquisition programs accountable for meeting
the needs of the warfighter. I also believe our industry partners must
be held accountable for their performance as well, and that incentives
and rewards should align with actual performance and outcomes.
Question. Do you believe that the current investment budget for
major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in
major systems, costs of current operations, and asset recapitalization?
Answer. I believe it is critical that we ensure major systems are
affordable. The constrained budget environment facing the Department
for the foreseeable future increases the pressure on the Department to
maintain affordability. If confirmed, I will examine the cost balance
between current operations, readiness and weapon system acquisition and
assess our risks in those areas. I will work with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to manage weapon
system cost growth.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and
guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to manage weapon
system cost growth. We must spend the Department's resources prudently
given our projected top line. That is why I support steps, such as
those included in the Department's Better Buying Power initiatives, to
manage requirements, improve affordability, and ensure completion where
possible.
Question. Do you believe that the Department has adequately
addressed its shortfalls in systems engineering and developmental
testing capabilities, or does more remain to be done in these areas?
Answer. Systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation
are essential to weapon system program success. Based on my experience
in the Navy, I believe the Department has strengthened its system
engineering and developmental test capabilities. If confirmed, I will
work with the Secretary and other stakeholders in the Department to
evaluate what more needs to be done to ensure that the Department has
adequate systems engineering and developmental testing capabilities.
Question. Do you believe that additional steps are needed to ensure
that WSARA principles are implemented on current major programs like
the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program?
Answer. Maintaining major acquisition programs on schedule and
within budget is a high priority for me and the Department. If
confirmed, in conjunction with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, I will review major programs,
to include the JSF program, to assess whether WSARA principles have
been implemented, and will determine if additional steps are required.
Question. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics) Frank Kendall recently released an updated Defense
Department Instruction 5000.02. He has stated that the rewrite had ``to
do with the need for a requirements decision point during what is the
risk-reduction phase, the technology demonstration phase.'' The latest
version of 5000.02 is to put a ``place to finalize requirements . . .
we added a new decision point, which I'll participate in for major
programs, but it's largely a Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
Joint Staff, service, requirements community decision'' between
Milestone A and Milestone B.
Are you familiar with Under Secretary Kendall's rewrite of DODI
5000.02?
Answer. I am generally familiar with Under Secretary Kendall's
focus on strengthening our acquisition process, but I am not familiar
with the recent rewrite of DODI 5000.02.
Question. Do you believe a new decision point is necessary to
finalize requirements between Milestone A and Milestone B?
Answer. I believe that we need to fully assess requirements and
cost trades before finalizing requirements and committing to full scale
development. If confirmed, I will review the new decision point with
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics.
Question. Does having a new decision point between Milestone A and
Milestone B risk creating a new bureaucratic hurdle in the acquisition
process that will slow the process?
Answer. I believe it is important that major cost and performance
trades have been completed and we have appropriately reduced risk
before committing to full scale development. If confirmed, I will
review the new decision point with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology & Logistics to ensure it does not unnecessarily
add bureaucracy and slow the acquisition process.
Question. Recently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
issued guidance which ``encourages Program Managers, Program Executive
Officers and Component Acquisition Executives, in coordination with the
requirements sponsor, to officially request requirements relief,
through the appropriate requirements validation authority, where Key
Performance Parameters appear out of line with an appropriate cost-
benefit analysis.''
Do you agree with this reform?
Answer. Yes. It is important to ensure that major cost and
performance trades are made in order to control costs of our weapon
systems.
Question. Do you support the JROC's review of the analysis of
alternatives prior to Milestone A as was called for in the Government
Accountability Office's June 2011 report titled DOD Weapon Systems:
Missed Trade-off Opportunities During Requirements Reviews?
Answer. I am not familiar with this report, but if confirmed, I
will review it and consider the recommendation.
role of service secretaries and chiefs in the acquisition process
Question. Some have suggested that the Service Secretaries and
Chiefs should be given a different or expanded role in the acquisition
of major systems. Others have expressed concern that such a change
would reverse efforts in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation to reduce
the layers between the Under Secretary and the program managers, and
ensure that there was a dynamic tension between those who defined
requirements (Service Chiefs) and those who filled the requirements
(Service Acquisition Executives).
What do you believe is the appropriate role for Service Chiefs in
the acquisition of major systems?
Answer. Service Chiefs must play a major role in acquisition
through their deep involvement in the requirements, manpower, and
budget processes. I believe that the Service Chiefs profoundly affect
the acquisition process through the way they and their organizations
generate, prioritize, and review requirements, program budgets, manage
workforce, and interact with the Acquisition Enterprise.
Question. Do you believe there is value in having greater
participation of the Service Secretaries and Chiefs involved in the
acquisition process?
Answer. I believe that the Service Chiefs and Service Secretaries
must play a role in the acquisition process since they ensure the
requirements development process, the manpower process, and the budget
processes are properly managed and integrated with the acquisition
process. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Service Chiefs and
Service Secretaries to ensure effective interactions between the
requirements, budgeting, staffing, and acquisition systems.
contracting for services
Question. Over the last decade, DOD's spending on contract services
has more than doubled. As a result, the Department now spends more for
the purchase of services than it does for products (including major
weapon systems). When he was USD(AT&L), former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter testified that ``the low-hanging fruit really is
[in contract services]. There's a lot of money. There has been a very,
very high rate of growth over the last decade, in services. They have
grown faster than everything else . . . . So, there's a lot we can do.
I think great savings can be had there, across the Services' spend.
It's essential that we look there, because that's half the money.''
Do you believe that the cuts made to contract services have fully
addressed the issues of waste and inefficiency in this area, or are
further reductions possible?
Answer. While the Department has made progress, I believe more can
be done. With the current fiscal realities facing the Department, we
need to look for efficiencies in our service contracts. The Department
needs to strengthen oversight of the requirements for services
contracts, improve both competition and small business utilization, and
strengthen the professionalism of those outside the acquisition
workforce that are principally engaged in buying services. If
confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics and the Military Departments to
improve the processes and procedures to manage contracted services.
Question. What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to
control the Department's spending on contract services?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current efforts in the
Department to improve our visibility into, and accountability for,
contracted services and focus on improving our insight into the
appropriate utilization, cost effectiveness, and alignment of
contracted services in support of the Department's mission. If
confirmed, I will also support additional steps to ensure the
Department's acquisition of services is more efficient and effective.
contractor performance of critical governmental functions
Question. Over the last decade, the Department has become
progressively more reliant upon contractors to perform functions that
were once performed exclusively by government employees. As a result,
contractors now play an integral role in areas as diverse as the
management and oversight of weapons programs, the development of
personnel policies, and the collection and analysis of intelligence. In
many cases, contractor employees work in the same offices, serve on the
same projects and task forces, and perform many of the same functions
as DOD employees.
In your view, is DOD still too reliant on contractors to support
the basic functions of the Department?
Answer. The Department uses a Total Force approach to manage its
workload. Contractors are an important element of the Total Force and
provide flexibility and technical competence.
However, we must be careful to ensure work is appropriately
assigned to military personnel (Active/Reserve), civilian employees,
and contract support.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department continues
efforts to implement a Total Force strategy that aligns functions and
work to military, civilian, and contract support in a cost effective
and balanced manner consistent with workload requirements, funding
availability, laws, and regulations.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe are needed
to reduce the Department's reliance on contractors to perform critical
functions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the acquisition and
personnel communities to review our current use of contractor support
and reduce such use where appropriate.
base realignment and closure
Question. DOD has requested another Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) round.
Do you believe another BRAC round is necessary? If so, why?
Answer. With declining budgets and shrinking force structure, I
believe the Department's supporting infrastructure must be examined;
both for alignment with strategic needs, and opportunities to reduce
unneeded capacity. BRAC provides a fair and comprehensive way to do
that.
Question. It has been noted repeatedly that the 2005 BRAC round
resulted in major and unanticipated implementation costs and saved far
less money than originally estimated. What is your understanding of why
such cost growth and lower realized savings have occurred?
Answer. I did not participate in the BRAC 2005 process. However, it
is my understanding that the 2005 BRAC round was not designed
specifically to save money. A good portion of the recommendations were
focused on transformation, jointness, and relocating forces from
overseas to the United States. These recommendations increased the
costs of that BRAC round.
Question. How do you believe such issues could be addressed in a
future BRAC round?
Given the Department's limited resources, I expect that a future
BRAC round would be similar to the 1993/1995 rounds in which DOD cut
excess capacity and achieved a relatively quick payback. That should be
the focus of a future round should Congress provide that authority.
strategic reviews
Question. What is your understanding and evaluation of DOD's
processes for strategic assessment, analysis, decisionmaking, and
reporting for each of the following strategic reviews?
Answer. The processes for these reviews are important tools to help
the Department's senior leaders provide strategic guidance across the
Department in keeping with defense objectives in the broader National
Security Strategy. They help the Military Department and other
Components prioritize efforts and resources to achieve the Department's
objectives effectively and efficiently in light of the changing
security and fiscal environment.
I have been involved directly and indirectly in many of these
reviews at different points throughout my career. The Secretary of
Defense determines how best to oversee these review processes. I have
seen various approaches used over the years--each differs based on
strategic changes, timing, and leadership preferences. However, each
Defense review should be based on candid deliberations and advice from
across the military and civilian leadership, supported by rigorous data
and analysis. This analytical rigor and intense engagement are critical
for the Department and the country's national security.
Question. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (section 118 of
title 10, U.S.C.);
Answer. The QDR articulates the Nation's defense strategy in
support of the President's national security strategy. Specifically,
title 10 U.S.C. section 118, requires the Department to conduct a
comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force
structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and
other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States
with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of
the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20
years. In my experience, effective QDRs include a wide range of
stakeholders and help to ensure the defense strategy guides U.S.
military force structure, plans, and programs.
Question. The National Military Strategy (section 153 of title 10,
U.S.C.);
Answer. The Chairman prepares the National Military Strategy as a
means to delineate how the armed services support the National Defense
Strategy, and to convey the military's views on strategic priorities
and associated risks.
Question. Global Defense Posture Review (section 2687a of title 10,
U.S.C.);
Answer. In my previous role as Under Secretary of the Navy, I
participated in the Department's continuous review process for global
defense posture. I have witnessed how this process is informed by the
strategy and the Department's operational needs. The annual report to
Congress encapsulates the Department's current overseas defense posture
and the collaborative process by which the Department makes posture
decisions.
Question. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (section 118b
of title 10, U.S.C.).
Answer. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) describes
how the Department intends to align organizational responsibilities and
military capabilities to carry out assigned missions. Specifically,
title 10 U.S.C., section 118b, requires the Department to complete a
comprehensive assessment of the roles and missions of the Armed Forces
and the core competencies and capabilities of the Department to perform
and support such roles and missions. In the past, conclusions reached
during the QDR significantly influenced the Department's assessment of
its military roles and missions.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if
any, to change title 10, U.S.C., that would update, improve, or make
these reviews more useful to the Department and to Congress?
Answer. The QDR and associated reviews serve a useful function for
the Department by helping make sure that at least every 4 years the
Department deliberately reassesses and, if necessary, adjusts the
Nation's defense strategy, defense capabilities, and force structure in
line with national security interests, the future security environment,
and available resources. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
Members of Congress to help make the specific requirements and
information the Department provides in these reviews as relevant and
useful as possible.
Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make, if
any, to improve DOD's processes for strategic assessment, analysis,
policy formulation, and decisionmaking relative to each review above?
Answer. From previous experience, I find that the following factors
contribute to successful strategic reviews:

The Secretary or Deputy Secretary provide clear
initial guidance and maintain ``hands-on'' oversight of the
review from start to finish.
All relevant DOD stakeholders are a part of the formal
review and decisionmaking fora. These stakeholders generally
include senior leaders within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, military and civilian leadership from
the Military Department and Services and the combatant
commands.
Working groups and review groups are co-led by the
offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Staff, allowing for the most relevant expertise and
involvement in the issue areas being examined.
The working groups' deliberations and findings are
transparent and vetted with the key stakeholders.

If confirmed, I would recommend that insights gained from previous
reviews, along the lines of those outlined above, be applied to
additional reviews that the Department undertakes.
Question. The law requires the QDR to identify the budget plan that
would be required to provide sufficient resources to execute
successfully the full range of missions called for in that national
defense strategy at a low to moderate level of risk, and any additional
resources (beyond those programmed in the current Future Years Defense
Program) required to achieve such a level of risk. The law also
requires the QDR to make recommendations that are not constrained to
comply with and are fully independent of the budget submitted to
Congress by the President.
What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's QDR
analysis and decisionmaking processes to address these two
requirements?
Answer. The QDR assessment should be strategy-driven and resource-
informed to determine the best mix of capabilities and investment
portfolios for the Department to pursue in these complex and uncertain
times. However, the Department should not be so constrained by this
approach as to overlook gaps and risks in resource allocation or
changes to the strategy.
Question. In your view, is there analytical and/or practical value
in a defense strategy that is unconstrained by or independent of the
current budget request or fiscal environment?
Answer. No. One of the first rules of strategy is that all
resources are scarce. An effective defense strategy should take a
comprehensive view of the future security environment to assess and
prepare the Department prudently for a range of missions and associated
risks to U.S. national interests. By definition, a strategy seeks to
identify ways to meet policy goals, and allocate projected resources
and means in response to perceived risks. As such, the QDR process
ensures a broad review of the trends, threats, challenges, and
opportunities that shape that environment. Although this assessment is
strategy-driven, particularly in this fiscal environment, the defense
strategy should also be resource-informed to ensure the Department
sufficiently prioritizes its efforts and addresses trade-offs in the
needed capabilities, activities, and posture of the future force.
iraq
Question. What in your view are the key U.S. strategic interests
with regard to Iraq?
Answer. I have not been given a thorough update on developments in
Iraq. However, I believe it is imperative that the United States
maintain a long-term security partnership with Iraq as part of a
broader enduring commitment to regional peace and security. The United
States has invested and sacrificed heavily in Iraq. Iraq's strategic
location, oil production capacity, and work to counter violent
extremism make Iraq an important regional partner. As such, the United
States has a strategic interest in ensuring that Iraq remains stable,
sovereign, and secure. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the
Department's relationship with Iraq, by maintaining consultation on
security issues, continuing to develop Iraq's military capabilities
through foreign military sales (FMS), and deepening Iraq's integration
into the region.
Question. What do you see as the major areas, if any, of common
security interest between the United States and Iraq?
Answer. I see areas of mutual strategic interest in partnership
with a sovereign, stable, and democratic Iraq in several areas,
including: countering Iran's aggression and pursuit of nuclear weapons
capability, mitigating destabilizing effects on the region from
violence in Syria, cooperating with regional allies and partners to
reduce the capacity of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS),
maintaining stable production of petroleum exports, and actively
participating in regional multilateral exercises.
Question. In what areas, if any, do you see U.S. and Iraqi security
interests diverging?
Answer. Both Iraq and the United States have an interest in
fighting terrorism, securing borders, combating undesirable external
influence, and routing extremist militias to ensure the peace and
security of Iraq and the stability of the Middle East region. The
United States has an interest in Iraq remaining a close partner, and
although our approaches may sometimes differ, our interests tend to be
aligned.
Question. What do you see as the greatest challenges for the U.S.-
Iraq security relationship over the coming years?
Answer. The greatest challenge facing the U.S.-Iraq security
relationship is the successful transition to a more traditional
security cooperation relationship--with a robust bilateral and
multilateral training and exercise program--despite the complicated
history we share, persistent sectarian violence, and tensions over
Iranian support to Syria and proxy forces in the region. If confirmed,
I will support efforts to work with the Iraqis to make sure that we
maintain and expand our bilateral security relationship and will seek
to bolster the U.S.-Iraq defense partnership on a wide array of
security matters.
Question. Iraq faces a resurgent violent extremist threat that has
sought to exploit popular discontent with the current Maliki
Government, particularly within Sunni communities in western Iraq.
What role, if any, should the United States play in assisting the
Government of Iraq in confronting the threat of violent extremism?
Answer. Iraq is the lead in providing for its own security, but the
United States plays an important role in providing Iraq with security
assistance to counter violent extremism. Information sharing, non-
operational training and advice to the Iraqi Counterterrorism Services,
and provision of key defense systems through the foreign military sales
program play an important role in improving the capability of the Iraqi
military in its campaign against extremists.
Question. In your view, what conditions, if any, should the United
States place on the provision of equipment or assistance to the
Government of Iraq in its fight against violent extremism?
Answer. I believe we already have sufficient conditions in place.
All countries receiving defense equipment and assistance through the
foreign military sales program are required to abide by stringent end-
use monitoring (EUM) protocols that govern the use and application of
military equipment. I understand that the United States holds Iraq to
the same EUM standards of accountability and proper use of equipment as
with other U.S. defense partners, and the Department makes it clear
that cooperation is contingent on the proper use of these systems.
afghanistan
Question. In your view, has the military campaign in Afghanistan
been successful in achieving its objectives?
Answer. Although I have not received a full briefing on the current
situation in Afghanistan, I believe the campaign has made significant
progress. Coalition and Afghan partners were successful against the
insurgency's summer offensive for the second consecutive year. The
progress made by ISAF and the ANSF over the past 3 years has put the
Government of Afghanistan in control of all of Afghanistan's major
cities and 34 provincial capitals, and has driven the insurgency into
the countryside. I understand that the Department continues to pursue
counterterrorism objectives. Afghanistan continues to face many
challenges, but has made positive strides.
Question. What is your assessment of the performance of the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) in assuming the lead for security
throughout Afghanistan?
Answer. I understand that Afghan security forces are now providing
security for their own people, fighting their own battles, and holding
their own against the Taliban. This is a fundamental shift in the
course of the conflict. The ANSF now conduct the vast majority of
operations in Afghanistan. However, ANSF capabilities are not yet fully
self-sustainable, and they require continued support to make lasting
progress.
Question. Do you support the retention of a limited U.S. military
presence in Afghanistan after 2014?
Answer. I understand that the United States and coalition partners
are on track to bring the ISAF mission to a close by the end of 2014
and transition to a new, post-2014 NATO train, advise, and assist (TAA)
mission. Beyond the TAA mission, I understand that the United States
also plans to conduct a narrowly focused counterterrorism mission
against al Qaeda and its affiliates.
As the President has made clear, however, the United States must
secure an agreement that protects U.S. Forces and must have an
invitation from the Afghan Government in order to remain in
Afghanistan.
My view is that the United States is, and should remain, committed
to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan. The United States'
fundamental goal in Afghanistan remains to defeat al Qaeda and disrupt
other extremists who present a serious threat to the United States, its
overseas interests, and its allies and partners.
Question. If the United States and Afghanistan are unable to
conclude a Bilateral Security Agreement that ensures legal protections
for such residual U.S. Forces after 2014, should the United States
withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan?
Answer. The President has made clear that the United States must
have an invitation from the Afghan Government and must secure an
agreement that protects U.S. personnel.
It is my understanding that the current Status of Forces Agreement
between the United States and Afghanistan does not have an expiration
date. However, further consultation would be necessary if the United
States were to rely on it after 2014.
My understanding is that the administration's position continues to
be that if we cannot conclude a BSA promptly, we will initiate planning
for a post-2014 future with no U.S. or NATO forces in Afghanistan. It
continues to be up to the Afghans to determine what is in their
interests.
That is not a future I will seek, and it is not in Afghanistan's
interests. However, the further this slips into 2014 without a signed
agreement, the more likely this outcome becomes.
Question. On Thursday, January 27, 2014, the Karzai Government
announced it will release 37 Bagram detainees whom the United States
has classified as `` . . . legitimate threats to security''.
How will you ensure that detainees held in Afghanistan which are
thought to be threats to our security will continue to be held by the
Afghan Government?
Answer. I understand that the Department is working through the
mechanisms established by the Detention-related Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with Afghanistan to resolve the matter. The MOU
provides a process for the United States to object to releases that it
deems inappropriate. Ultimately, however, the decision to release
detainees is with the Government of Afghanistan.
Question. The current end strength of the ANSF is around 350,000
personnel. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in
Chicago in May 2012, coalition participants discussed a proposal to
reduce the future size of the ANSF to around 230,000, with an annual
cost of $4.1 billion.
Do you agree that any future reductions in the ANSF from the
352,000 troop level should be based on the security conditions in
Afghanistan at the time the reductions would occur?
Answer. It is my understanding that the ANSF force structure is
regularly evaluated to ensure the ANSF is right-sized based on
operational and security conditions. If confirmed, I would review any
plans for the final size and structure of the ANSF, including an
appropriate force reduction.
Question. Would you support reinvesting a portion of the savings
from the drawdown of U.S. Forces into sustaining the Afghanistan
security forces at an end strength at or near their current level of
350,000 if necessary to maintain security in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review the recommendations of the
military commanders on the ground regarding the force structure and
requisite funding of the Afghan National Security Forces.
Question. What do you see as the United States' long-term strategic
interests in Afghanistan after 2014?
Answer. My view is that the United States should remain committed
to a long-term relationship with Afghanistan. The United States'
fundamental goal in Afghanistan remains to defeat al Qaeda and disrupt
other extremists who present a serious threat to the United States, its
overseas interests, and its allies and partners. As the President said
in the January 2014 State of the Union address, after 2014, the United
States will support a unified Afghanistan as it takes responsibility
for its own future. If the Afghan Government signs the Bilateral
Security Agreement with the United States, a small force of U.S.
personnel could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to carry out two
narrow missions: training and assisting Afghan forces, and
counterterrorism operations to pursue any remnants of al Qaeda.
pakistan
Question. What is your assessment of the current relationship
between the United States and Pakistan?
Answer. My understanding is that since Pakistan reopened the Ground
Lines of Communication to Afghanistan, the defense relationship with
Pakistan has improved significantly. The United States has refocused
the bilateral defense relationship on shared security interests,
including promoting peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, finishing
the job of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its
affiliates, and supporting Pakistan's fight against the militant and
terrorist networks that threaten both the United States and Pakistan.
However, if confirmed, I would ensure that the Department continues to
engage on issues where there is discord, particularly the need for
stronger and more effective action against insurgent groups--especially
the Haqqani Network--that threaten U.S. personnel and their Afghan
counterparts.
Question. Do you see opportunities for expanded U.S.-Pakistan
cooperation on security issues? If so, how would you prioritize these
areas of cooperation?
Answer. I believe the United States should continue to shape the
defense relationship by taking a pragmatic approach, focused on
cooperation in areas of shared interests, such as the fight against al
Qaeda and other militant and terrorist networks. Doing so would involve
supporting Pakistan military efforts to counter the threat of militant
and insurgent groups along the border with Afghanistan. It may also
mean working with Pakistan to develop longer-term solutions to
Pakistan's militant challenge.
If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department engages with
Pakistan where strategic interests diverge, such as the direction of
the Pakistani nuclear program and support for proxy militant
organizations.
Question. What is your assessment of Pakistan's efforts to combat
the threat of international terrorism?
Answer. Pakistan continues to make a major contribution to the
fight against terrorism. I understand that thousands of Pakistani
troops are engaged in counterinsurgency operations along the border
with Afghanistan. The enormous casualties Pakistan has suffered in the
fight against terrorism demonstrate Pakistan's strong commitment.
However, I believe Pakistan also needs to counter militant and
terrorist groups operating within its territory that do not directly
threaten the Pakistani state, especially the Haqqani Network. These
networks pose a direct threat to U.S. personnel, threaten regional
security, endanger the prospects for a settlement in Afghanistan, and
undermine Pakistan's own stability.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe Pakistan
should take to address the threat posed by violent extremist groups
such as the Haqqani Network and the Taliban Quetta Shura that currently
use their safe haven in Pakistan to launch cross-border attacks on
U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces?
Answer. I believe Pakistan needs to curtail the ability of these
violent extremist groups to plan and execute attacks against U.S.
service men and women, coalition forces, and Afghan National Security
Forces. Pakistan should take additional steps to target these groups
with military and law enforcement assets, improve its efforts to
interdict improvised explosive device precursor materials, and prevent
these groups from moving freely throughout the country and across the
Afghan border. At the same time, Pakistan needs to continue to support
reconciliation efforts to promote a political settlement that bring
peace and stability to Afghanistan.
Question. What conditions, if any, should the United States place
on its security assistance to Pakistan?
Answer. It is difficult to make a comprehensive statement about the
impact of conditions on security assistance to Pakistan. The United
States and Pakistan do work together on areas of common interest, but
it is important to be cautious about explicit conditions on assistance
to encourage or require Pakistani cooperation. Any prospective
conditions on U.S. assistance should be carefully examined to ensure
they advance U.S. strategic interests.
Question. In your view, what impact will the conclusion of the
International Security Assistance Force mission at the end of 2014 have
on the U.S.-Pakistan relationship?
Answer. Following the conclusion of the ISAF mission at the end of
2014, the United States and Pakistan will still need to work to promote
peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, cooperate in the fight to
defeat al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other militant groups, and improve
regional security. U.S. Force reductions in Afghanistan will amplify
the importance of Pakistani support for these efforts. It is,
therefore, critical that the United States sustain its defense
relationship with Pakistan, through 2014 and beyond.
china
Question. From your perspective, what effect is China's expanding
economy and growing military having on the region at-large and how is
that growth influencing the U.S. security posture in Asia and the
Pacific?
Answer. China's rapid economic growth is welcomed by many
neighboring states as a driving force of economic dynamism and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, the scale and
character of China's military growth is increasingly becoming a source
of concern. China's annual defense budget is growing faster than its
economy--with average annual increases in defense spending topping 10
percent over the past decade. In certain respects, China's growing
military capabilities create opportunities to partner and cooperate
where our interests and those of China converge. However, China's rapid
rise and the relative lack of transparency surrounding its intentions
are increasingly perceived as threatening in the region, especially as
its modernization efforts emphasize advanced anti-access and area
denial (A2/AD) capabilities. I understand the Department has been
making investments focused on countering A2/AD environments around the
world, including in the Asia-Pacific region. If confirmed, I would
evaluate the impact of these developments--as well as the impact of
other security trends--on requirements for the U.S. defense posture in
the region.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of China's
military modernization program?
Answer. As I understand it, China is pursuing a long-term,
comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the
capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-
intensity conflicts along its periphery, and to counter third party
intervention. China's near-term focus appears to be preparing for
potential contingencies involving Taiwan, and deterring or denying
effective third party intervention in a cross-Strait conflict. China is
also devoting increasing attention and resources to conducting
operations beyond Taiwan and China's immediate periphery. This broader
focus includes military missions such as humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, military medicine, peacekeeping, and counter-piracy.
Lastly, China is strengthening its nuclear deterrent and enhancing its
strategic strike capabilities through the modernization of its nuclear
forces, and is improving other strategic capabilities, such as in
space, counter-space, and computer network operations.
Question. How do you believe the United States should respond to
China's military modernization program?
Answer. I believe the scope and pace of China's military
modernization and China's relative lack of transparency with respect to
its military plans and programs require that the United States closely
monitor the evolution of China's armed forces. It is my understanding
that the President's strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region
seeks, in part, to ensure that the United States remains the preeminent
military power in the Asia-Pacific region so that we can continue to
help preserve peace and prosperity. I believe the U.S. response to
China's military modernization should be comprehensive and encompass
changes to U.S. Force posture in the region, the strengthening of
Alliances and partnerships, the maintenance of global presence and
access for U.S. Forces, and the modernization of key capabilities in
such areas as countering anti-access and area denial capabilities.
Question. U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue has been
strained over the past several years and efforts to establish and
maintain mutually beneficial military relations has been hampered by
China's propensity for not responding to requests for military
engagements, although there are signs that China has been more inclined
to engage in the past 2 years.
What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China
military-to-military relations and what would be your intention, if
confirmed, regarding these relations?
Answer. I understand that the U.S.-China military-to-military
relationship has experienced positive momentum over the past year. If
confirmed, I would look for ways to strengthen the U.S.-China military-
to-military relationship consistent with U.S. interests and values, in
pursuit of sustained, substantive dialogue; concrete, practical
cooperation; and enhanced risk reduction measures to manage our
differences responsibly. At the same time, I would seek to ensure that
we balance these exchanges with continued, robust interactions with
allies and partners across the region.
Question. What is your view of the relative importance of sustained
military-to-military relations with China?
Answer. I believe there is value in sustained and substantive
military dialogue with China as a way to improve mutual understanding
and reduce the risk of miscommunication and miscalculation. I believe
we should continue to use military engagement with China as one of
several means to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security and
stability of the Asia-Pacific region, to encourage China to play a
constructive role in the region, to discuss the peacetime interaction
of our respective military forces with a view to minimizing the risk of
accidents, and to urge China to partner with the United States and our
allies and partners in addressing common security challenges.
Question. Do you believe that we should make any changes in the
quality or quantity of our military relations with China? If so, what
changes and why?
Answer. I believe that military exchanges with China can be
valuable, but can only truly move the relationship forward if China is
equally committed to open and regular exchanges. If confirmed, I would
support deepening and enhancing our military-to-military relationship
with China. I would also continue to encourage China to act
responsibly, both regionally and globally.
north korea
Question. What is your assessment of the current security situation
on the Korean peninsula?
Answer. Nearly a year has passed since the last period of
heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula, but North Korea continues
to be a serious concern for the United States and our allies and
partners in the region.
North Korea's December 2012 missile launch and February 2013
nuclear test were highly provocative acts that undermined regional
stability, violated North Korea's obligations under numerous U.N.
Security Council resolutions, and contravened its commitments under the
September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.
My understanding is that Kim Jong Un remains in full control and is
consolidating his power. There is a strong possibility of more North
Korean provocations, as Kim Jong Un continues to consolidate his power
and Pyongyang attempts to coerce us back into negotiations on its own
terms.
If confirmed, I would continue to monitor the situation closely and
work with our allies and partners to maintain peace and stability in
the region.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United
States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD
capabilities and the export of those capabilities?
Answer. North Korea's missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs, and its proliferation activities, continue to pose a direct
and serious threat to U.S. Forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region
as well as our regional allies and partners. Although these programs
are largely untested at longer ranges, they could pose a direct threat
to U.S. territory.
If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department draws upon the
full range of our capabilities to protect against, and, if necessary,
to respond to, these threats.
Question. In your view are there additional steps that DOD could
take to ensure that North Korea does not proliferate missile and
weapons technology to Syria, Iran, and others?
Answer. I understand that DOD, with its interagency partners, has
taken several steps to prevent North Korea's proliferation of weapons-
related technology. These steps include strengthening proliferation
control regimes, advancing international nonproliferation norms, and
promoting cooperation with partners to interdict vessels and aircraft
suspected of transporting items of proliferation concern. Despite these
efforts, I believe North Korea will continue to attempt weapons-related
shipments via new and increasingly complex proliferation networks. If
confirmed, I would work to enhance DOD's countering WMD, partner
capacity-building programs and the Department's ability to discover and
disrupt these illicit networks.
law of the sea convention
Question. What is your view on whether or not the United States
should join the Law of the Sea convention?
Answer. I support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
I believe that accession to the Convention would demonstrate a U.S.
commitment to upholding the established legal order that codifies the
rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace, including those
that are critical to the global mobility of U.S. military forces.
Question. How would being a party to the Law of the Sea convention
help or hinder the United States' security posture in the Asia-Pacific
region?
Answer. I believe that becoming a party to the Law of the Sea
Convention would enhance the U.S. security posture around the globe,
including in the Asia-Pacific region, in several ways. First, it would
enable the United States to reinforce all of the rights, freedoms, and
uses of the sea codified in the Convention, including those that are
critical to the global mobility of U.S. Forces. A significant portion
of the world's oceans are located in the Asia-Pacific region, and the
ability for U.S. Forces to respond to situations depends upon the
freedom of the seas. Second, it would help the United States promote a
common, rules-based approach among other nations to resolve their
territorial and maritime disputes peacefully, including those in the
Asia-Pacific region. Third, it would reassure some nations that have
expressed concerns about the legal basis of cooperative security
efforts that the United States supports, such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative.
department of defense counternarcotics
Question. On an annual basis, DOD's counternarcotics (CN) program
expends approximately $1.5 billion to support the Department's CN
operations, building the capacity of certain foreign governments around
the globe, and analyzing intelligence on CN-related matters. In a
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, GAO found that
DOD ``does not have an effective performance measurement system to
track the progress of its counternarcotics activities.'' This is the
second such finding relating to DOD CN in the last decade.
What is your assessment of the DOD CN program?
Answer. I am not familiar with all aspects of the DOD CN program.
However, I know that the CN program should provide policy guidance and
fiscal resources to perform this important mission, and it has been
successful in identifying networks and preventing illicit drugs from
entering this country. I understand the Department concurred in the
2010 GAO study that cited a need to improve performance measurement,
and that DOD continues to work closely with the Office of National Drug
Control Policy to refine these processes. If confirmed, I would ensure
that the CN program continues to take concrete steps to improve its
evaluation system.
Question. In your view, should DOD continue to play a role in
attempting to stem the flow of illegal narcotics?
Answer. Yes. In my view, DOD should continue to play a role in
detecting and monitoring drug trafficking. Because of its links to
terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime, drug
trafficking has become a major national security challenge. The
Department's efforts to build the counternarcotics capacity of partner
nation security forces have helped them prevent and deter global
trafficking of illegal narcotics.
Question. In your view, should DOD continue to fund the National
Guard Counterdrug Program for Youth Intervention and local law
enforcement education programs that may be duplicative of the efforts
of other agencies, using CN funds?
Answer. I am aware that, in light of the fiscal environment, the
National Guard has had to limit its Counterdrug youth outreach program
in recent years. If confirmed, I would work with the National Guard
Bureau to assess CN programs and to ensure they remain effective and
efficient.
building partner capacity (bpc)
Question. In the past few years, Congress has provided DOD a number
of temporary authorities to provide security assistance to partner
nations, including the global train and equip authority (section 1206)
and the Global Security Contingency Fund.
In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in building
the capacities of partner nations?
Answer. My understanding is that these temporary DOD authorities
are intended to address emerging threats, and as such the Department's
primary objective should be to develop near-term capacity for partners
to take effective actions against these threats. From a strategic
perspective, the Department's objective should be to help partner
countries develop effective and legitimate defense and security
institutions that can provide for their countries' internal security.
Doing so reduces the burden on U.S. Forces responding to security
threats outside the United States and promotes interoperability between
U.S. Forces and allied and partner forces. If confirmed, it would be my
aim to ensure that DOD security assistance programs will fulfill
defined strategic requirements and close vitally important capability
gaps.
special operations forces
Question. The previous two QDRs have mandated significant growth in
our Special Operations Forces and enablers that directly support their
operations.
Do you believe QDR-directed growth in the size of Special
Operations Forces can and should be maintained in light of current
fiscal challenges?
Answer. The United States has grown Special Operations Forces
substantially since 2001--doubling the size of the force and tripling
the budget. As U.S. Forces draw down in Afghanistan, where Special
Operations Forces have been heavily committed, the Department has an
opportunity to rebalance the force to align it better with our overall
strategy and declining resources. If confirmed, I would work with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) and the Commander, SOCOM to
understand more fully the issues associated with developing, employing,
and resourcing our Special Operations Forces.
Question. Special Operations Forces heavily rely on enabling
capabilities provided by the general purpose forces to be successful in
their missions.
In light of current fiscal challenges, do you believe sufficient
enabling capabilities can be maintained within the general purpose
forces and that such capabilities will remain available to Special
Operations Forces when needed?
Answer. It is my experience that U.S. Special Operations Forces
(SOF) receive excellent support from the Services. As the Department
reshapes and resizes overall force structure, it needs to ensure proper
balance, including the right density of enabling capabilities such as
intelligence, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, and medical
support that are essential to both SOF and General Purpose Forces. If
confirmed, I would work closely with our Service Chiefs and the
Commander, SOCOM, to ensure the Department has the right balance across
the entire force.
Question. Do you believe Special Operations Forces should develop
additional organic enabling capabilities in addition or in place of
those currently provided by the general purpose forces?
Answer. I believe organic enablers assigned to SOCOM should be
purposely designed for ``SOF-specific'' requirements. Service-common
capabilities should fill the rest of SOF's enabler requirements. This
arrangement allows the Department to focus its Special Operations
funding on SOF-specific requirements and avoids duplication with the
Services.
Question. The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
has sought more control over the deployment and utilization of Special
Operations Forces. For example, the Secretary of Defense modified
policy guidance for the combatant commands earlier this year that gave
SOCOM, for the first time, responsibility for resourcing, organizing,
and providing guidance to the Theater Special Operations Commands of
the geographic combatant commanders and Special Operations Forces
assigned to them. It has been reported that the Commander of SOCOM is
also seeking new authorities that would allow him to more rapidly move
Special Operations Forces between geographic combatant commands.
Please provide your assessment of whether such changes are
appropriate and can be made without conflicting with civilian control
of the military, infringing upon authorities provided to the geographic
combatant commanders, or raising concerns with the State Department.
Answer. It's appropriate always to look for ways to manage the
force more efficiently and effectively, and in this time of transition
and declining resources this is increasingly important. At the same
time, I believe the Department should maintain a proper degree of
oversight and control of force deployments, as it does with
conventional forces. I understand the Department will continue to rely
on our geographic combatant commanders to oversee activities in their
respective areas of responsibility, similar to how they oversee
Service-led activities overseas. If confirmed, I would work closely
with interagency colleagues to ensure deployments of Special Operations
Forces are fully coordinated and synchronized with the geographic
combatant commanders and the Chiefs of Mission and Chiefs of Station in
the affected countries.
Question. Do you believe SOCOM is appropriately resourced to
adequately support the Theater Special Operations Commands and Special
Operations Forces assigned to them?
Answer. I have not been briefed on any gap between SOCOM requests
and available resources. I believe SOCOM is appropriately resourced to
support the forces assigned to them. I understand a recent change gave
SOCOM increased responsibility for the Theater Special Operations
Commands (TSOCs), which also receive funding and support from the
Geographic Combatant Commands through their respective Service support
activities. If confirmed, I would ensure the division of responsibility
for TSOC resourcing is properly divided between SOCOM and the Services.
section 1208 operations
Question. Section 1208 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law
108-375), as amended, authorizes the provision of support (including
training, funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces,
and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations by U.S.
Special Operations Forces to combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. Section 1208 provides the Secretary of Defense with
authority to combat terrorism in a wide range of operational
environments--often where Special Operations Forces are operating under
austere conditions and require specialized support from indigenous
forces or persons. Although I have not been briefed on the particulars
of these activities, I understand that combatant commanders and chiefs
of mission place a high value on this program, and if confirmed, I
would make it a priority to gain a deeper understanding of the costs,
benefits, and risks associated with activities conducted under section
1208 authority.
dod's cooperative threat reduction program
Question. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was
historically focused primarily on eliminating Cold War era WMD in the
states of the former Soviet Union and Russia. The bilateral agreement
with Russia has now ended.
What are the principal issues remaining to be addressed in this
program with the former Soviet states?
Answer. I believe the principal issue that the CTR program needs to
address in the former Soviet States is the threat posed by WMD
terrorism. It is my understanding that the CTR Program has made
significant progress to reduce the dangerous legacy of the Cold War-era
WMD. In addition, I understand there is important work that could be
done to assist partners within the former Soviet States to achieve the
biosecurity measures referenced in the newly released Global Health
Security Agenda.
Question. What are the principal issues with this program in the
Middle East and North Africa?
Answer. I believe that reducing the threat from WMD should be the
principal driver for the program in the Middle East and North Africa.
One great example of this work that I am aware of is the Libyan
Government's recent announcement that it had completed destruction of
its chemical weapons stockpile with the help from the U.S. Government
through the CTR Program and from the German Government.
Question. Do you think the CTR program is well coordinated among
the U.S. Government agencies that engage in threat reduction efforts,
including DOD, the Department of Energy, and the State Department?
Answer. My understanding is that the CTR Program and other non-
proliferation programs executed by Federal agencies are coordinated
well through the National Security Council staff. If confirmed, one of
my priorities would be to ensure that all of the Department's
activities in this area are well-coordinated with interagency partners.
Question. As the CTR program expands to geographic regions beyond
the states of the former Soviet Union, in your view what proliferation
and threat reduction goals should the DOD establish?
Answer. My understanding is that the President has highlighted
nuclear and biological terrorism as key threats, and that the CTR
Program strongly supports these priorities with particular emphasis on
biological threats. I agree with these priorities and, if confirmed, I
would work to make countering these threats a DOD priority. I
understand that in the near term, one of the high-priority efforts of
the CTR Program is the destruction of the Syrian Chemical weapons and
production materiel.
prompt global strike
Question. The 2010 QDR concluded that the United States will
continue to experiment with prompt global strike prototypes. There has
been no decision to field a prompt global strike capability as the
effort is early in the technology and testing phase.
In your view, is there a role for a conventional prompt global
strike capability in addressing the key threats to U.S. national
security in the near future?
Answer. Yes, I believe there is a role. Prompt global strike
weapons can provide a means for striking high value, time sensitive and
defended targets from ranges beyond the capabilities of existing
weapons or in situations where other forces are unavailable. The DOD
technology development program is designed to determine whether the
Department can achieve that desired capability at an affordable cost.
Question. What approach to implementation of this capability would
you expect to pursue if confirmed?
Answer. I have not had the opportunity to review the status of
current technology efforts that support this capability. If confirmed,
I will monitor progress, and evaluate costs and options for
implementation.
Question. In your view what, if any, improvements in intelligence
capabilities would be needed to support a prompt global strike
capability?
Answer. Discussion of intelligence capabilities and their
limitations is classified. If confirmed, I will seek to understand and
identify what improvement in intelligence capabilities would be needed
in the context of a prompt global strike capability.
nuclear weapons and stockpile stewardship
Question. Congress established the Stockpile Stewardship Program
with the aim of creating the computational capabilities and
experimental tools needed to allow for the continued certification of
the nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable without the
need for nuclear weapons testing. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy
are statutorily required to certify annually to Congress the continued
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
As the stockpile continues to age, what do you view as the greatest
challenges with respect to assuring the safety, reliability, and
security of the stockpile?
Answer. I believe the greatest challenge for an aging stockpile in
today's fiscal environment is maintaining a balanced program to ensure
that the current stockpile can be maintained and the infrastructure
modernized, and that the science and technology program that underpins
the program is adequate to meet current and future tasks. It is my
understanding that the most recent stockpile assessment reports from
our Nation's Weapons Laboratory Directors and the Commander of STRATCOM
indicate that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. However, the
average age of U.S. nuclear weapons is 27 years, and the nuclear
weapons complex includes facilities that date back to the Manhattan
project. As the stockpile continues to age, efforts to sustain and
certify the deterrent through warhead surveillance activities will
become even more challenging.
I understand that DOD and the Department of Energy have made
significant investments in the nuclear complex since the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review. If confirmed, I would continue to work with Congress
and the Department of Energy to update and execute a long-term
modernization strategy that will continue to ensure the safety,
reliability, security and effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile.
Question. If the technical conclusions and data from the Stockpile
Stewardship Program could no longer confidently support the annual
certification of the stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, would you
recommend the resumption of underground nuclear testing?
Answer. My understanding is that the administration's investments
in the nuclear enterprise, including the Department of Energy's
Stockpile Stewardship Program, continue to provide us confidence in the
nuclear stockpile. If confirmed, I will look into this issue and take
whatever steps are necessary to ensure that our nuclear stockpile is
safe, secure, and reliable.
Question. Do you agree that the full funding of the President's
plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, commonly referred to
as the 1251 report, is a critical national security priority?
Answer. Maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile
is a critical national security priority. If confirmed, I would
advocate for the required funding to do so. The section 1043 report,
which I understand has superseded the section 1251 report, describes
the administration's plan for sustainment and modernization of nuclear
deterrent capability, including how the plan will be funded. It is my
understanding that DOD works closely with the Department of Energy, and
other relevant agencies, to prioritize modernization efforts and align
them with funding realities. If confirmed, I would continue that
cooperation.
Question. Can DOD afford the plan set out in the report?
Answer. Modernizing the nuclear weapons complex is imperative to
our Nation's security, and, if confirmed, I would work to ensure
adequate funding for this critical national security priority. The
current plan includes extending the life of nuclear weapons and
investing in weapons infrastructure through refurbishment of existing
facilities and construction of new facilities. I understand that DOD
and the National Nuclear Security Administration are funding the B61
gravity bomb, the W76 warhead for Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missiles, and the W88 warhead for Submarine Launched Ballistic
Missiles. In the near future, cruise missile warheads and ICBM warheads
must also be refurbished. The Nation's nuclear weapons complex also
requires investment in new plutonium and uranium processing facilities
to guarantee that critical nuclear components are available for warhead
modernization programs. Even in a constrained budget environment, DOD
and the Department of Energy, acting through the Nuclear Weapons
Council, must work to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
stockpile.
Question. Do you support the nuclear employment strategy released
in June of 2013?
Answer. Yes, based on what I've seen in unclassified forms, I
support the President's new guidance that aligns U.S. nuclear policies
to the 21st century security environment. If confirmed, I would make
sure that DOD takes the steps necessary to implement this policy.
Consistent with the President's new guidance, I would support
maintaining a credible deterrent, capable of convincing potential
adversaries that the adverse consequences of attacking the United
States or our allies and partners far outweigh any potential benefit
they may seek to gain through an attack.
Question. Prior to completing this modernization effort, do you
believe it would be prudent to consider reductions below New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) limits for the deployed stockpile of
nuclear weapons? If so, what are the potential risks and benefits
associated with further reductions?
Answer. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concludes: ``The United
States will retain the smallest possible nuclear stockpile consistent
with our need to deter adversaries, reassure our allies, and hedge
against technical or geopolitical surprise.'' The President has stated
his willingness to next reduce U.S. nuclear forces by up to one-third
over New START treaty limits. I believe such reductions below the New
START treaty limits should only be done on a mutually negotiated basis,
subject to the trajectory of other potential threats.
Question. If confirmed will you commit to participating in
exercises involved with the nuclear command, communications, and
control system in facilities and platforms outside the Pentagon?
Answer. Yes.
tactical fighter programs
Question. Perhaps the largest modernization effort that we will
face over the next several years is the set of programs to modernize
our tactical aviation forces with fifth generation tactical aircraft
equipped with stealth technology, to include the JSF.
Based on current and projected threats, what are your views on the
requirements for and timing of these programs?
Answer. I believe the Department needs to transition to a fifth
generation capability. We need the F-35 capability to address advanced
threats world-wide, especially in the stressing electronic warfare
environments of the future. If confirmed, I will review the Departments
tactical aviation modernization programs.
Question. What is your view on the affordability of these programs?
Answer. I believe affordability is critical to these programs, as
well as with all of our acquisition programs and services. If
confirmed, this is an area I will be reviewing closely to assess these
programs in the context of the overall DOD program, and make
appropriate adjustments in consultation with the Secretary and other
Department leadership.
Question. Even if all of the current aircraft modernization
programs execute as planned, the average age of the tactical,
strategic, and tanker fleet will increase. Aging aircraft require ever-
increasing maintenance, but even with these increasing maintenance
costs, readiness levels continue to decline.
Can both the maintenance of the legacy force and the modernization
efforts be affordable at anywhere near the expected budget levels?
Answer. Given expected budget levels, balancing the costs of
maintaining an aging aircraft fleet while recapitalizing and
modernizing that fleet is an area I would examine closely, if
confirmed. I expect risk-informed tradeoffs to be necessary. The
Department will have to continue to assess where trades are required to
meet those readiness and modernization needs.
Question. Some critics believe that there is still too much service
parochial duplication in procuring new systems.
Do you agree with these critics?
Answer. I believe that the Department has improved in this area,
but it is an area that requires continued vigilance and oversight to
ensure the Department is not wasting scarce resources on duplicative
systems. Service investments should be complementary to benefit the
entire department
Question. What steps will you take as Deputy Secretary to reduce
such duplication?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure Service investments are
complementary, and that any duplication I find is reduced
appropriately.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe the
Department should take in the future?
Answer. If confirmed, I will investigate what levels of readiness
exist and any reasons why readiness does not match investments in
maintenance. I will then determine what additional actions to take.
unmanned systems
Question. Congress has established a goal that by 2015, one-third
of the aircraft in the operational deep strike force aircraft fleet and
one-third of operational ground combat vehicles will be unmanned.
Do you support this goal?
Answer. I support the goal of fielding unmanned systems with
greater capability for the future, especially as our National Defense
Strategy shifts to one focused on the Pacific Region and more
sophisticated operating environments than what we have experienced over
the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question. What is your assessment of DOD's ability to achieve this
goal?
Answer. Based on what I know, I think the 2015 goal is overly
optimistic. If confirmed, I will assess the ability of DOD to achieve
this goal.
Question. What steps do you believe the Department should take to
achieve this goal?
Answer. The Department should continue to focus on research and
development efforts related to UAS and ground robotics technology, as
well as on the development of concepts of operations and requirements
for unmanned systems. This is vital to realizing increased unmanned
capabilities that are properly aligned with evolving warfighter needs,
at affordable cost. At the same time, if confirmed I will ensure the
Department remains focused on being responsive in fielding urgently
needed capabilities to meet the needs of today's warfighter.
shipbuilding budget
Question. With about half of the Navy's construction and
development dollars being needed to build nuclear submarines, the
Navy's commitment to building new submarines could crowd out funding
needed to modernize the surface fleet.
In your view, will the level of funding in the shipbuilding budget
and certain high-cost programs force the Department to make requirement
decisions in a constrained budget environment that may not be in the
best interest for our national security?
Answer. There are multiple options to make the shipbuilding budget
support our national security including new procurements, modernizing
legacy systems and security cooperation with other navies. It will take
a balanced approach to sustain a maritime force structure adequate for
national defense with acceptable risk. If confirmed, I will assess the
shipbuilding budgets and programs and the potential consequences to
operational capabilities over time, to include the industrial base.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should
take to address this concern and ensure adequate funding for the
ballistic missile submarine replacement program?
Answer. I believe the strategic deterrence value of the Ohio
Replacement Program remains valid. If confirmed, I will evaluate the
need for, and level of, funding. I understand the Navy is working to
manage the affordability of the Ohio replacement by managing
requirements and leveraging advantages of the Virginia submarine
program.
Question. Do you believe that certain high cost ``national assets''
should be funded outside the services' budgets where they do not have
to compete with other critical weapon systems modernization needs of
the Services?
Answer. At this time, I do not believe that moving programs outside
of the Service budgets will protect programs or reduce pressure on the
Department's topline. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to
properly fund prioritized programs within the overall defense budget.
cyber security
Question. Deputy Secretary Lynn and Deputy Secretary Carter were
heavily involved in developing the DOD cyber strategy.
If confirmed will you also play a major role in DOD cyber issues?
Answer. In 2013, for the second year in a row, Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper named cyber as a top-tier threat to the
Nation. If confirmed, I would invest significant time and attention to
cybersecurity and to DOD's ability to operate effectively in
cyberspace. I would work closely with the Secretary of Defense and
others to make certain that DOD can accomplish its three principal
cyber missions: to defend the Nation from strategic cyber-attack;
conduct effective cyber operations in support of combatant commanders,
when directed; and defend DOD networks.
test and evaluation
Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance
between the desire to reduce acquisition cycle times and the need to
perform adequate testing?
Answer. Testing is needed to validate system performance, and I
believe it is a necessary part of the acquisition process. The optimal
balance of cycle time and testing is likely unique to each system, and,
if confirmed, I would seek to examine opportunities to achieve this
goal.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe we
should procure weapon systems and equipment that has not been
demonstrated through test and evaluation to be operationally effective,
suitable, and survivable?
Answer. Systems should demonstrate their effectiveness, suitability
and survivability through operational testing prior to a full rate
production decision. In specific cases, based on the nature and
seriousness of the deficiencies found in testing, it may be acceptable
to continue production while the deficiencies are corrected. There can
be circumstances when it might also be necessary to field a system
prior to operational testing in order to address an urgent need in a
critical capability, especially in those circumstances when the system
is better than anything already in the field. Even then, operational
evaluation should still be done at the earliest opportunity to assess
the system's capabilities and limitations and identify any deficiencies
that might need to be corrected.
funding for science and technology investments
Question. In the past, the QDR and the Department's leaders have
endorsed the statutory goal of investing 3 percent of the Department's
budget into science and technology programs.
Do you support that investment goal?
Answer. Yes. I recognize the critical importance of a robust
science and technology program that can develop and deliver near-term
capabilities and maintain long-term options for the Department. As we
consider the Department's future budget situation, every part of the
budget must be assessed to identify the appropriate level of investment
consistent with the Departments' needs and long-term strategy.
Question. How will you assess whether the science and technology
investment portfolio is adequate to meet the current and future needs
of the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Secretary, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Services, and others to establish
guidelines for investment priorities. Based on these priorities, I
would work through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics to assess the adequacy of the current science
and technology investment portfolio and to identify any changes
required in the planned program to address the Department's priorities.
Congress established the position of Director of Operational Test
and Evaluation to serve as an independent voice on matters relating to
operational testing of weapons systems. As established, the Director
has a unique and direct relationship with Congress which allows him to
preserve his independence.
Question. What is your view on the responsibility of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense to provide oversight of the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation?
Answer. If confirmed, I will rely on the Director of Operational
Test and Evaluation to provide both me and the Secretary independent
and objective evaluations of system key performance parameters and
their effectiveness and suitability for the Department's systems. This
function is critical to advancing our acquisition priorities and
ensuring the effective stewardship of our resources. I will meet
regularly with the Director to review the scope, content, and findings
of the operational and live-fire testing being conducted by the
Department.
Question. Do you support the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation's ability to speak freely and independently with Congress?
Answer. Yes.
ballistic missile defense
Question. Do you support the policies, strategies, and priorities
set forth in the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review and, if
confirmed, will you implement them?
Answer. Yes, I support the conclusions of the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The policy priorities laid out in the
BMDR are still valid, and, if confirmed, I would continue U.S. efforts
already underway to implement them.
Question. Do you agree that operationally effective and cost-
effective ballistic missile defenses are essential for both Homeland
defense and regional defense and security?
Answer. Yes, even in these days of tight budgets, it is important
that we invest in effective, affordable missile defense systems. If
confirmed, I would support the U.S. commitment, described in the 2010
BMDR, to deploying capabilities that have been proven through extensive
testing and assessment and that are affordable over the long term.
Question. The two most recent attempted intercept flight tests of
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system failed to intercept
their targets, one in December 2010, using a Capability Enhancement-2
(CE-2) kill vehicle, and one in July 2013, using the older CE-1 kill
vehicle. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has inducted
that MDA's highest priority is correcting the problems that caused
these flight test failures, and that such corrections need to be
demonstrated through successful intercept flight testing.
Do you agree that it is essential to demonstrate through successful
and operationally realistic intercept flight testing that the problems
that caused these flight test failures have been corrected, and that
the GMD system will work as intended, with both the CE-1 and CE-2 kill
vehicles?
Answer. Yes, I agree.
Question. On March 15, 2013, Secretary Hagel announced plans to
improve our Homeland ballistic missile defense capability to stay ahead
of ballistic missile threats from North Korea and Iran, including the
deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) at Fort
Greely, AK, by 2017. Secretary Hagel stated that, prior to deploying
these 14 additional GBIs, there would need to be confidence that the
system would work as intended, through successful testing of the GMD
system with the CE-2 kill vehicle.
Do you agree with Secretary Hagel's ``fly before you buy'' approach
that the GMD system needs to demonstrate successful operationally
realistic intercept flight test results before we deploy any additional
GBIs?
Answer. Yes, I agree.
Question. In a recent report, the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation said that the GMD flight test failures had raised questions
about the robustness of the EKV design and recommended that the
Department consider redesigning the EKV to be more robust. The
Department is already planning a re-designed EKV, and Congress
supported the funding requested for fiscal year 2014 to develop Common
Kill Vehicle Technology.
Do you agree there is a need to improve the GMD system, including
through development and testing of a re-designed EKV and improvements
to sensor and discrimination capabilities, to increase the reliability
and performance of the system against evolving homeland missile threats
from North Korea and Iran?
Answer. Yes, I agree.
Question. DOD has successfully completed deployment of Phase 1 of
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense and is
proceeding toward planned deployment of Phases 2 and 3 in 2015 and
2018, respectively, to protect all of NATO European territory against
Iranian missiles.
Do you support the EPAA and other similar United States regional
missile defense efforts and, if confirmed, will you work to implement
them?
Answer. Yes. Our regional missile defenses are an important element
of our deterrence and defense strategies, and provide an essential
capability for defending U.S. Forces and presence abroad, and our
allies and partners. If confirmed, I would continue to support the
European Phased Adaptive Approach as well as other regional missile
defense efforts.
readiness funding
Question. After almost a decade of combat operations, each of the
military Services faces a rising bill for maintenance and repair. The
Army has stated that reset funding will be needed for at least 2 to 3
years beyond the end of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The
Marine Corps leadership has acknowledged that a $10 billion bill awaits
at the end of combat operations, but has requested only $250 million
for reset this year. The Navy has identified a 1-year backlog of
deferred ship and aircraft depot maintenance. The Air Force has
requested funding for only 84 percent of needed aircraft repairs this
year.
What level of priority do you place on reset and reconstitution
funding for the Military Services?
Answer. Reset and reconstitution are important to the Services as
they transition from a counterinsurgency-focused force to a force ready
and capable of operating across a full range of operations across the
globe. Reset activities are funded out of the OCO budget. The
Department needs these funds, and I understand that OCO funding, or
some similar funding mechanism, will need to continue for several
years. Some equipment can be repaired and some will have to be replaced
if required for future contingencies. Reset and reconstitution
requirements must be carefully managed to ensure these funds contribute
to future readiness. If confirmed, I will work to ensure this happens.
Other maintenance needs are funded out of the base budget. Given
the magnitude of sequestration reductions and despite some relief as a
result of the BBA of 2013, the Military Services will have to make
tough choices to balance their budgets to maintain the All-Volunteer
Force, maintain readiness, and sustain infrastructure and modernization
investments in equipment while continuing to give priority support to
troops deployed in combat. If confirmed, I will make every effort to
ensure adequate funding for these initiatives, consistent with the
budget limitations that Congress places on the Department.
Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address
maintenance backlogs and ensure that the military departments request
adequate funding for reset, reconstitution, and other maintenance
requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to monitor readiness
reporting and work with the service secretaries and other components to
ensure DOD is prepared to achieve the National Security Strategy goals.
protection against internal threats
Question. DOD has fallen victim to numerous internal threats,
leading both to physical attacks and loss of life, and the theft and
exposure of huge amounts of sensitive and classified information. The
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 included legislation mandating reforms of the
personnel security system and integration of that reformed system with
other elements of a coordinated insider threat program. Prior NDAAs
mandated comprehensive insider threat protection programs coordinated
with cybersecurity systems. The President issued a memorandum in late
2012 directing all departments and agencies to build and maintain an
insider threat analytic capability that is integrated across many
different domains and functions, including personnel security,
personnel records, counterintelligence, law enforcement, information
assurance, and computer network auditing. These requirements present a
daunting information technology acquisition and integration challenge.
What type of management structure, resources, and authorities do
you believe is necessary to succeed in this endeavor?
Answer. I believe the Department must take a very deliberative
approach to understanding and evaluating potential threats posed by
insiders while simultaneously ensuring that privacy and civil liberties
are preserved. As I understand it, DOD is working both internally and
with OMB, OPM, and other agencies to develop better approaches to guard
against insider threats. I believe this challenge, and the associated
challenges of information technology acquisition and integration,
require the sustained attention of the Department's leadership. If I am
confirmed, I will utilize the tools and procedures available to me as
the Department's Chief Management Officer to ensure that the Department
meets these critical challenges
annual increase in rates of basic pay below the employment cost index
Question. The Department requested an across-the-board pay raise
for 2014 for military personnel of 1 percent, versus a 1.8 percent rise
in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) benchmark, and has indicated that in
order to restrain the growth of personnel costs, similar below-ECI pay
raises may be necessary over the next several years.
What is your assessment of the impact on recruiting and retention
of pay raises below the increase in ECI in 2015 through 2018?
Answer. From my time as Under Secretary of the Navy, I know our
military compensation package is and must remain highly competitive in
order to recruit and retain the high quality men and women who make up
our Nation's military.
I understand that even under the Department's plan to slow the
growth of military compensation, military members continue to receive a
robust package of pay and benefits that compares favorably with
private-sector compensation. Thus, I do not assess the below-ECI level
pay raise as materially impacting our recruiting or retention efforts.
If confirmed, I will monitor this issue and remain vigilant to
ensure our military pay levels remain appropriate and ensure the
Department remains good stewards of the funds provided by Congress and
the American taxpayers.
religious accommodation in the armed forces
Question. In your view, do DOD policies concerning religious
accommodation in the military appropriately accommodate the free
exercise of religion and other beliefs, including individual
expressions of belief, without impinging on those who have different
beliefs, including no religious belief?
Answer. Yes. From my previous experience as a Marine Corps Officer
and Under Secretary of the Navy, I believe the Department is fully
committed to the free exercise of religion.
Question. Under current law and policy, are individual expressions
of belief accommodated so long as they do not impact good order and
discipline?
Answer. Yes. That is my understanding of the current law and
policy.
Question. In your view, do existing policies and practices
regarding public prayers offered by chaplains in a variety of formal
and informal settings strike the proper balance between a chaplain's
ability to pray in accordance with his or her religious beliefs and the
rights of other servicemembers with different beliefs, including no
religious beliefs?
Answer. Yes. I have had numerous opportunities during my decades of
service in the Department to observe firsthand how chaplains strike
this balance by considering their audience and the tenets of their
faith before addressing groups in formal and informal settings.
Question. DOD Instruction 1300.17, ``Accommodation of Religious
Practices Within the Military Services'' provides that servicemembers
submitting requests for waiver of religious practices will comply with
the policy, practice or duty from which they are requesting
accommodation, including refraining from unauthorized grooming and
appearance practices unless and until the request is approved.
In your view, does the requirement to comply with the policy from
which the servicemember is seeking a waiver unless and until it is
approved interfere with the accommodation of religious faith of a
person, such as a male of the Sikh faith whose faith requires an
unshorn beard, if that servicemember must comply with grooming
standards that require that he shave his beard pending a determination
of the waiver?
Answer. Servicemembers accept the standards of service upon entry
into the military.
My understanding is the Department has recently updated its policy
in this area to provide more latitude for members in favor of
accommodation which can be approved on a case-by-case basis as long as
those waivers do not affect mission accomplishment, military readiness,
unit cohesion, good order, discipline, health and safety.
If confirmed, I look forward to receiving an update on the
Department's revised policy.
Question. Section 774 of title 10, U.S.C., authorizes members of
the Armed Forces to wear items of religious apparel, such as the Jewish
yarmulke, while wearing their uniform so long as the items are neat and
conservative and do not interfere with the performance of military
duties.
Does DOD policy presumptively allow the wear of religious apparel
or do servicemembers have to request approval in every instance, even
for the wear of apparel that is neat and conservative and that does not
interfere with the performance of military duties?
Answer. My understanding is that servicemembers must comply with
the uniform policies of their individual Service.
Question. Do you believe that requests to waive grooming and
appearance standards and to wear of items of religious apparel are more
appropriately addressed prior to the member's entry into military
service?
Answer. My understanding of the Department policy is that it does
allow members to request waivers at any time during their service.
Question. Under what circumstances would you consider it
appropriate to grant waivers for grooming and appearance standards and
for wear of religious apparel for all members of a specific faith
group?
Answer. Given my concern for the safety and well-being of our
personnel and the often dangerous and austere conditions in which they
operate, I cannot envision a set of circumstances that would make for a
blanket waiver from military standards advisable. I believe the best
approach is a case-by-case examination for each servicemember and duty
station or service specialty.
Question. Under what circumstances would you consider it
appropriate to grant waivers for grooming and appearance standards and
for wear of religious apparel for a member of a faith group that could
remain in place regardless of new assignment, transfer of duty
stations, or other significant change in circumstances, including
deployment?
Answer. Given my concern for the safety and well-being of our
personnel and the often dangerous and austere conditions in which they
operate, I cannot envision a set of circumstances that would make a
blanket waiver from military standards for an entire career advisable.
I believe the best approach is a case-by-case examination for each
servicemember and duty station.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role in assisting
the Department to develop policy for religious accommodation for the
following:
The Armed Forces Chaplains Board?
Answer. To inform and advise Department policies.
Question. Ecclesiastical Endorsing Agents?
Answer. To provide advice on specific religious practices.
Question. Civil organizations?
Answer. I understand the Department often receives information from
various private organizations and this information helps inform us
regarding the views of the public.
Question. Section 533 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 (P.L. 112-
239) protects rights of conscience of members of the Armed Forces and
chaplains of such members, and prohibits, so far as possible, use of
such beliefs as the basis of any adverse personnel action,
discrimination, or denial of promotion, schooling, training, or
assignment. Members of some religious denominations have sincerely held
beliefs in opposition to same-sex marriage.
In your view, may a member of the armed forces who has a sincerely
held belief in opposition to same-sex marriage be subject to adverse
personnel action or similar other adverse action, if he or she shares
those personal views on the subject in an official capacity?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department has a
longstanding practice of generally not supporting the expression of
personal views in one's official capacity because of the likelihood of
confusion between the two.
Question. Can he or she be subject to adverse personnel action if
they express personal views on same sex marriage in their personal
capacity?
Answer. My understanding is the Department does not inhibit the
rights of members to talk about their beliefs, as long as such speech
is free of compulsion or coercion and does not encroach upon the
dignity and respect of others who do not hold the same moral or
religious views.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. On December 20, 2013, the President commended the
Pentagon leadership for moving ahead with a broad range of initiatives
to address sexual assault in the military, including reforms to the
military justice system, improving and expanding prevention programs,
and enhancing support for victims. The President directed the Secretary
of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to continue their efforts
and to report back to him by December 1, 2014, with a full-scale review
of their progress.
What is the Department's plan for complying with the President's
directive?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department is working
collaboratively with the White House to ensure the report reflects its
progress toward satisfying the President's goal of detailing major
improvements in the prevention and response to sexual assault,
demonstrates the Department's efforts and leadership on the issue, and
shows clear measures of progress--both quantitative and qualitative.
Question. If confirmed, do you expect to participate in the
progress review directed by the President?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will actively, and vigorously,
participate in and support this review process.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your role in the Department's
effort to prevent and respond to sexual assault in the military?
Answer. The Secretary has made it very clear that eliminating
sexual assault from the armed forces is a priority. I share his
commitment. Sexual assault is a crime and since it erodes the trust and
cohesion that is central to our values and our operational mission
effectiveness, it has no place in our Nation's military.
If confirmed, I intend to be an active participant in the
Secretary's comprehensive efforts to prevent this crime from occurring,
and if it does occur, ensuring we protect victims' privacy, provide
responsive care, professionally investigate these crimes, and hold
offenders appropriately accountable.
The Department must sustain its focus and current level of emphasis
on this issue and continue fielding solutions that inspire victim
confidence. If confirmed, I will support these efforts wholeheartedly.
Question. What is your view of the role of the chain of command in
addressing sexual assault in the military?
Answer. I support the Department's position on the importance of
retaining the Chain of Command as an integral part of an effective
response to sexual assault.
Commanders make countless important decisions every day, both in
and out of combat that impact the lives and careers of servicemembers
and their families. They are accountable for mission accomplishment as
well as the health, welfare, and readiness of those under their
command. Having a defined role in the administration of justice helps
commanders carry out these critical responsibilities.
end strength reductions
Question. What is your understanding of the Army and Marine Corps'
ability to meet their end strength reduction goals without forcing out
soldiers and marines who want an opportunity to compete for career
service and retirement?
Answer. I understand that the Army will continue to use lowered
accessions and natural voluntary attrition as the primary levers to
reduce end strength. Involuntary measures, however, are necessary to
achieve lowered end strength goals. The Army has taken a proactive and
transparent approach to communicating the drawdown to the force. The
Army is committed to a fair board process and will work to ensure an
equitable process for transitioning soldiers and families by affording
them the maximum amount of time to transition while connecting them
with opportunities for continued service in the Reserve component,
civilian employment, education, and healthcare prior to separation.
Similarly, I understand the Marine Corps is maximizing voluntary
incentives to meet its end-strength goals. The Commandant of the Marine
Corps provided testimony in November that he intended to work with
Congress to ``map out a resource strategy that protects our global
interests as a nation, keeps faith with our servicemembers, and
provides the greatest value to the American people.'' The NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2014 increased the allowable rate of drawdown for the
Marine Corps to 7,500 per year.
If confirmed, I will be committed to achieving the highest quality
force within our allocated end strength.
Question. What programs are in place to ensure that separating and
retiring servicemembers are as prepared as they can be as they enter a
struggling economy?
Answer. It is my understanding that the Department's current
Transition Assistance Program (TAP) provides information and training
to ensure servicemembers leaving military service are prepared for
their next step--whether pursuing additional education, finding a job
in the public or private sector, or starting their own business.
Question. What impact, if any, will the additional budget authority
for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act
have on the end strengths of the Services?
Answer. If the Budget Control Act's sequestration-level cuts remain
the law of the land, not only would they force deep reductions in force
structure, they would also starve the Department of funds for readiness
and maintaining our technological edge. I understand that Budget
Control Act spending caps remain in place for fiscal year 2016 and
beyond and there is significant lead-time involved in adjusting
military end strength levels. This may inhibit the Military Services
from using any of the additional fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015
budget authority provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act for this
purpose.
Question. What is your understanding of the need for additional
force shaping tools requiring legislation beyond what Congress has
provided the past 2 years?
Answer. Based on my experience as the Under Secretary of the Navy,
I believe the Department has been granted the necessary force shaping
tools to meet the drawdown in its current plan.
However, continued budget reductions may make it necessary to
review the size of all components of the Total Force--the Active and
Reserve components, DOD civilians and contractors.
If confirmed, I am committed to studying this issue in detail.
recruiting standards
Question. Recruiting highly qualified individuals for military
service during wartime in a cost-constrained environment presents
unique challenges.
What is your assessment of the adequacy of current standards
regarding qualifications for enlistment in the Armed Forces?
Answer. I believe our qualification standards are appropriate with
respect to aptitude, medical fitness, and adaptability. Today, our
measures of quality are at some of the highest rates over the history
of the All-Volunteer Force.
In my experience, the All-Volunteer Force continues to perform
exceptionally well. Over the past 12 years of protracted conflict, the
military has proven its ability to accomplish the mission when tasked.
These standards have helped to ensure we have the strongest and most
respected military in the world.
Question. In your view, is there any way to increase the pool of
eligible enlistees without sacrificing quality?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage the Military Departments to
make certain our policies are not overly restrictive and allow us to
recruit a diverse force drawn from the best and the brightest of our
youth.
Question. In your view, are there any enlistment requirements or
standards that are overly restrictive or which do not directly
correlate to successful military service?
Answer. I am not aware that the Department's military enlistment
standards are overly restrictive. The Services employ medical fitness,
adaptability, and aptitude standards that correlate to the physical,
disciplined, regulated lifestyle and cognitive demands needed to
succeed in the Armed Forces. We continually assess and modify our
policies based on empirical data or changes in law.
assignment policies for women in the military
Question. The Department in January rescinded the policy
restricting the assignment of women to certain units which have the
primary mission of engaging in direct ground combat operations, and has
given the Military Services until January 1, 2016, to open all
positions currently closed to women, or to request an exception to
policy to keep a position closed beyond that date, an exception that
must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense. The services are working now to develop gender-
free physical and mental standards for all military occupations,
presumably with the goal of allowing individuals, regardless of gender,
to serve in those positions if they can meet those standards.
If confirmed, what role will you play in the development of these
standards?
Answer. The Services and Special Operations Command are conducting
the review and validation of their occupational standards.
If confirmed, along with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will monitor their progress toward
integration of female servicemembers into previously closed positions,
in accordance with each of their implementation plans.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the standards are
realistic and preserve, or enhance, military readiness and mission
capability?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed I will ensure I will monitor the progress
of the Military Departments in terms of reviewing and validating their
occupational standards to ensure the standards are current,
definitively tied to an operational requirement, and gender-neutral.
Question. Do you believe that decisions to open positions should be
based on bona fide military requirements? If so, what steps would you
take to ensure that such decisions are made on this basis?
Answer. Yes, it is in the best interest of the Department to allow
both men and women who meet the validated standards for military
positions and units to compete for them on the merits.
If confirmed, I will ensure I monitor the progress of the Military
Departments.
rising costs of medical care
Question. The President's budget request for the Department's
Unified Medical Program has grown from $19 billion in fiscal year 2001
to $49.4 billion in fiscal year 2014. In recent years, the Department
has attempted to address this growth through fee increases for military
retirees, while also attempting to identify and implement other means
to ensure the viability of the military health system in the future.
Do you agree with the health care efficiencies proposed by the
Department over the past few years?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to keeping faith with our
troops and will continue to review military health care and be
transparent about any proposed changes. Efficiencies that preserve care
and resources should be our first move. Given today's budget
environment, we must continue to look for savings opportunities, and
given the dramatic cost increases, this should include military health
care.
Question. What reforms in infrastructure, benefits, or benefit
management, if any, do you think should be examined in order to control
the costs of military health care?
Answer. I understand the Department included proposals in the
fiscal year 2014 President's budget that would slow the growth of
healthcare costs while preserving and enhancing the quality and range
of health care. If confirmed, I will continue this comprehensive review
of all initiatives that would help control the costs of military health
care.
Question. What is your assessment of the long-term impact of rising
medical costs on future DOD plans?
Answer. As I understand the situation, health care consumes nearly
10 percent of the Department's budget and could grow considerably over
the next decade taking an ever larger bite of our ability to invest in
our people or in enhanced warfighting capability. I realize the
healthcare benefit is a key component of retention for our men and
women so I will work closely with the healthcare leadership in DOD to
find reasonable and responsible ways to stem this growth without
breaking faith with our troops and their families.
systems and support for wounded warriors
Question. Servicemembers who are wounded or injured in combat
operations deserve the highest priority from their Service and the
Federal Government for support services, healing and recuperation,
rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition
from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement
or discharge. Despite the enactment of legislation and renewed emphasis
over the past several years, many challenges remain.
What is your assessment of the progress made to date by DOD and the
Services to improve the care, management, and transition of seriously
ill and injured servicemembers and their families?
Answer. The Walter Reed revelations in 2007 were a sobering moment
for the Department. I believe we have made significant progress in how
we support our recovering servicemembers. However, there is still more
to learn, and more to be done. As the military continues to draw down
forces in Afghanistan and moves to a new readiness posture, the focus
will be to ensure current practices are maintained and updated to
prevent us having to relearn the lessons of the last decade.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department's
healthcare professionals to better understand both the visible and
invisible wounds of war, and continue to support advancements in how we
support servicemembers and their families through treatment, recovery,
rehabilitation, and possibly transition out of service.
Question. If confirmed, are there additional strategies and
resources that you would pursue to increase support for wounded
servicemembers and their families, and to monitor their progress in
returning to duty or to civilian life?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be a proactive participant in making
certain the necessary resources are in place to properly take care of
our recovering wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their
families. I am particularly interested in understanding the research
initiatives we have in place to evaluate the effects of PTSD and TBI,
making certain we are addressing these signature injuries of our most
recent conflicts in a meaningful way.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you expect to play in
ensuring that the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs achieve
the administration's objectives in DOD and VA collaboration?
Answer. I understand and support the Department's commitment to
continually improve DOD-VA collaboration and ensure our support to
servicemembers and veterans. Secretary Hagel has made it clear that he
intends to strengthen efforts with Secretary Shinseki to accelerate
improvements to our interoperable systems and processes. I understand
the Department has cooperated with VA and assisted in reducing VA's
disability claims backlog from nearly 611,000 to 400,000 during the
course of 2013 and the hope is it will continue to be reduced in 2014.
If confirmed, I will support efforts to improve cooperation on joint
initiatives such as the electronic health record, care coordination,
medical care and transition issues. I look forward to working with the
veterans community as well in identifying ways of reducing our claims
backlog and outreach.
suicide prevention
Question. The numbers of suicides in each of the services continue
to be of great concern to the committee.
If confirmed, what role would you play in shaping DOD policies to
help prevent suicides both in garrison and in theater and to increase
the resiliency of all servicemembers and their families?
Answer. Suicide is influenced by many factors: stressed
relationships, mental health, substance misuse, legal and financial
issues, exposure to trauma, social isolation, and many other influences
from the broader social, cultural, economic, and physical environments.
Suicide is a serious problem that causes immeasurable pain,
suffering, and loss to individuals, families, survivors, military
formations, and to military communities.
The health and resilience of the force, our military members, and
our Family members increase our combat effectiveness, and our overall
readiness.
I know the Department has placed a significant amount of emphasis
on implementing a wide variety of resilience programs in place to help
our servicemembers.
Suicide prevention requires our best efforts, and the attention of
leaders at all levels. Thus, if confirmed, I look forward to learning
more about these efforts and it would be my intent to become engaged
in, and supportive of, these important programs.
military quality of life
Question. The committee is concerned about the sustainment of key
quality of life programs for military families, such as family support,
childcare, education, employment support, health care, and morale,
welfare and recreation services, especially as DOD's budget declines.
How do you perceive the relationship between military recruitment
and retention and quality of life programs and your own top priorities
for the Armed Forces?
Answer. Quality of life programs improve the well-being and
resilience of our servicemembers and military families and enhance the
Department's ability to recruit an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). We cannot
sustain the quality and readiness of today's AVF without also
supporting their family adequately. It is part of an overall holistic
approach to both readiness and personnel compensation.
Taking care of our servicemembers and their families is one of the
Department's top priorities. If confirmed, I will continue to
prioritize those quality of life programs that effectively meet our
servicemembers' needs and that of their families.
Question. If confirmed, what military quality of life programs
would you consider a priority, and how do you envision working with the
Services, combatant commanders, family advocacy groups, and Congress to
sustain them?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Services to sustain key
quality of life programs that support mission and family readiness. The
benefits of core programs such as family support, child and youth
programs, spouse employment and education, and Morale, Welfare and
Recreation programs are invaluable to the well-being and readiness of
military families and deserve the support of the Department and
Congress.
I will strive to enhance cooperative relationships with advocacy
groups to leverage resources that optimize support for the military
community.
family readiness and support
Question. Servicemembers and their families in both the Active and
Reserve components have made, and continue to make, tremendous
sacrifices in support of operational deployments. Senior military
leaders have warned of concerns among military families as a result of
the stress of deployments and the separations that go with them.
What do you consider to be the most important family readiness
issues for servicemembers and their families, and, if confirmed, how
would you ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and
adequately resourced, especially in light of current fiscal
constraints?
Answer. I believe the Department has a responsibility to help
prepare families to face the challenges inherent with military service
and deployments. Focusing on the social, financial, educational, and
psychological well-being of military families will help to build and
sustain resilient families.
If confirmed, I will prioritize sustainment of family resilience
programs in the current fiscally constrained environment, while
continuing to review and adapt them to improve efficiency and to
maximize support from non-government sources.
Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in
light of global rebasing, deployments, and future reductions in end
strength?
Answer. Family readiness services including health care, non-
medical counseling, education, and employment support must be available
to families wherever they reside. Innovative solutions, such as web-
based delivery systems, allow the Department to be more flexible and
responsive to the diverse needs of the population.
The Department should continue to engage with Federal agencies, as
well as local governments, businesses, and non-profit stakeholders to
address the myriad aspects of military life, and work together to
provide the necessary resources.
If confirmed, I will consider these impacts on our military
families to ensure their needs are met.
medical marijuana
Question. What is your assessment on the need for legitimate
scientific study of the efficacy of medical marijuana in alleviating
the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by
servicemembers and veterans?
Answer. This is not something I have studied in detail. I would
look to our medical leadership for an assessment. I understand that the
Federal Government's position is that marijuana does not have a valid
medical purpose, but some research efforts have been undertaken.
human capital planning
Question. Section 115b of title 10, U.S.C., requires the Secretary
of Defense to develop and annually update a strategic human capital
plan that specifically identifies gaps in the Department's civilian
workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps. DOD has not yet
produced a strategic human capital plan that meets the requirements of
these provisions.
Would you agree that a strategic human capital plan that identifies
gaps in the workforce and strategies for addressing those gaps is a key
step toward ensuring that the Department has the skills and
capabilities needed to meet future challenges?
Answer. I believe this type of plan, and the workforce skill
assessments required to develop it, would be of significant assistance
to the Department's efforts relative to acquiring developing, and
retaining the workforce needed to meet current and future mission
challenges.
Question. Do you see the need for any changes in the requirements
of section 115b regarding the requirement for a strategic human capital
plan?
Answer. I will, if confirmed, ensure that the Department strives to
meet the human capital plan under section 115b and assess the need for
any changes.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD fully complies
with these requirements?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will continue to work toward ensuring
the Department fully complies with statutory strategic workforce
planning requirements.
detainee treatment policy
Question. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006,
memorandum issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that all
relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and
procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions?
Answer. Yes. I believe the proper treatment of detainees is of
paramount importance to ensuring the Department has principled,
credible, and sustainable detention policies and procedures.
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment
specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-
22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the
Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. The Department must ensure that it holds its personnel
to the highest standards of treatment while detaining individuals in
the context of armed conflict. Gaining intelligence from captured enemy
forces is paramount to the war effort, and it must be done in a manner
consistent with our values. Early in his first term, President Obama
established the Army Field Manual on Interrogation as the ``standard''
for all U.S. Government agencies to adhere to. It is my understanding
that this has been strictly adhered to throughout all DOD agencies,
Services, and commands.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies
promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence
interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply
with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field
Manual on Interrogations?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Department
continues to implement policies that are consistent with its current
humane treatment standards.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other
appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony,
briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before
this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes, without reservation.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this
committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide
information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection,
with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Secretary of
Defense?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I am committed to provide information
relating to my position and the performance of the Department.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and
other communications of information are provided to this committee and
its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes, and I look forward to working with the committee and
staff on advancing the Nation's security.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of
electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by
a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing
such documents?
Answer. Yes.
______

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
strategic dispersal
1. Senator Nelson. Mr. Work, since 2005, congressional and military
leadership have reaffirmed the importance of dispersing the Atlantic
Fleet in two ports. In February 2005, then Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO), Admiral Clark, stated that it was his view that, ``over-
centralization of the [carrier] port structure is not a good strategic
move . . . the Navy should have two carrier-capable homeports on each
coast.'' He went on to say, `` . . . it is my belief that it would be a
serious strategic mistake to have all of those key assets of our Navy
tied up in one port.'' Despite current fiscal constraints, both the
current CNO, Admiral Greenert, and the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary
Mabus, have affirmed their commitment to accomplishing strategic
dispersal of the east coast fleet.
The principle of strategic dispersal is decades old. What is your
understanding of the principle of strategic dispersal and what are your
thoughts regarding the priority of accomplishing strategic dispersal on
the east coast?
Mr. Work. It is my understanding that the Navy remains committed to
the concept of strategic dispersal. Strategic dispersal ensures that
the fleet's ships and aircraft, their crews, supporting maintenance,
training-critical infrastructure, and the public/private skilled labor
force required to keep these assets running, are located at different
locations in the continental United States, Hawaii and Alaska, U.S.
territories, and overseas to the greatest degree possible consistent
with available resources. I supported the general idea of strategic
dispersal as Under Secretary of the Navy, and continue to do so.
It is my understanding that the Navy's goal remains to
strategically disperse its east coast fleet to the maximum extent
practical. At this point, there are two major surface fleet
concentration areas on the east coast, including the Hampton Roads area
of Virginia and Mayport, FL. Submarine bases are likewise distributed
on the east coast in Groton, CT and King's Bay, GA. At this point in
time, however, all east coast carriers and support infrastructure are
consolidated within a 15 nautical mile radius in the Hampton Roads
area. The Navy remains committed to strategic dispersal of east coast
carriers, and I believe the Navy would still like to homeport a carrier
in Mayport in the future. Due to fiscal constraints, the Navy has been
forced to defer the investment required to homeport a carrier in
Mayport at this time.
If confirmed, I will continue to monitor Navy plans for strategic
dispersal, particularly with regard to the east coast carrier fleet.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
cyber security
2. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Work, the National Commission on the
Structure of the Air Force recently released their findings, which
highlighted the importance of the National Guard and Reserve in the
U.S. cyber mission. Specifically, it noted that the Guard and Reserve
were uniquely positioned, because of their part-time status, to attract
and retain the best and the brightest in the cyber field. I have long-
agreed with this assessment, and introduced the Cyber Warrior Act which
would establish National Guard cyber teams in each State to leverage
this talent pool. In addition to the Air Force Commission review, I
know that DOD is also looking at the role of the Reserve component in
U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). If confirmed, do I have your commitment
to look at the role of the Reserve component beyond CYBERCOM?
Mr. Work. I agree that the National Guard and Reserves provide the
Joint Force with a wide array of talents in cyber and a variety of
other important joint capability areas. As such, if confirmed, I commit
to looking at the role of the Reserve component in supporting CYBERCOM.
Although not fully briefed on the initiative, I understand the
Department is currently conducting a mission analysis looking at this
very subject in response to section 933 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014. If confirmed, I look
forward to working across the Department to ensure that the mission
analysis is both rigorous and thorough, and meets congressional
timelines.

3. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Work, I want to be helpful to DOD in
recruiting the best talent and acquiring the best tools for our cyber
mission. In your opinion, what can Congress do to assist DOD in this
effort?
Mr. Work. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014's requirement for CYBERCOM
to build infrastructure to conduct military-specific operations was a
critical step for equipping the cyber mission force with the tools
necessary to fulfill its missions. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with Congress to ensure that cyber capabilities for CYBERCOM,
the Military Departments, and the Services are appropriately resourced
and efficiently managed.
As part of this effort, I would monitor Departmental efforts to
recruit and retain highly-qualified personnel in our officer, enlisted,
and civilian cyber workforces. However, I understand there are
challenges to organizing and equipping the total cyberspace workforce.
For example, although the Services have plans to retain their most
talented uniformed cyberspace operators, I have been told that the
recruitment and retention of our civilian cyberspace workers is
lagging. One way to tackle this problem is to encourage more students
to enter Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematical (STEM)
fields, and to incentivize some of them to pursue a career in the DOD
cyber workforce cyber career. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with Congress and the acquisition community within DOD to advance STEM
education and recruit highly skilled personnel from less technical
educational backgrounds as well.

4. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Work, what do you believe DOD needs in
order to remain on the cutting edge of cyber defense?
Mr. Work. The quality of our people--Active, Reserve, civilian, and
contractors--is what sets the U.S. military apart from all others. This
is especially true in the realm of cyber warfare. To remain on the
cutting edge of cyber defense, DOD needs to continue to invest in an
elite, highly trained military and civilian workforce to carry out its
missions of defending the Nation against strategic cyberattack,
supporting combatant commands, and defending DOD networks. In addition
to investing in quality people, DOD needs to continue investing in the
tools, technical infrastructure, and intelligence capabilities
necessary for conducting effective cyberspace operations.
In my view, DOD must also build information systems that are more
difficult to attack and easier to defend. Over the coming years, DOD is
planning to invest in the Joint Information Environment, an information
system composed of consolidated data centers, enterprise services, and
a single security architecture. In achieving those goals, the Joint
Information Environment should make it easier for DOD to see threats,
prevent intrusions, and improve network defense operations.
Finally, cyber is a true national and international team sport. DOD
needs to maintain strong partnerships with other government agencies,
with the private sector, and with international allies and partners to
defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and other Members
of Congress to ensure DOD's cyber capabilities remain unequalled in the
world.

5. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Work, in your advance policy questions
you were asked about ways to increase the pool of eligible enlistees
without sacrificing quality. I think this is an especially important
question as it pertains to our cyber workforce. If confirmed, will you
look at some of the requirements for emerging missions, such as cyber,
to determine if there are alternative requirements that we might
consider in order to truly attract the best and the brightest?
Mr. Work. Success in cyberspace will rely on our people--just as it
does in other domains. The Services have a long history of excellence
in recruitment, and I am confident that they will attract the best and
brightest enlisted personnel to this growing career field. If
confirmed, I will work with the Services to ensure that they can
recruit and retain highly skilled cyber personnel who remain
competitive, in both rank and position, with military personnel in
other career specialties.

sexual assault
6. Senator Gillibrand. Mr. Work, would you please share with me
information about all the cases in which a convening authority did not
follow the legal advice of his or her staff judge advocate or Article
32 investigating officer about whether to prefer charges for sexual
assault, rape, or sodomy, or attempts, conspiracies, or solicitations,
to commit these crimes?
Mr. Work. Sexual assault is a major problem in our military that
must be aggressively addressed. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with you, Secretary Hagel, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Military Services, and all Members of Congress to improve the
Department's ability to determine the scope of the sexual assault
issue, to increase awareness and improve DOD policies so that victims
feel confident reporting incidents, and to hold accountable those that
perpetrate these crimes.
Based on a preliminary review of recent cases across the Services
in 2012, sexual assault-related charges were referred to court-martial
in every case in which a staff judge advocate recommended that the case
go forward. At this time, however, I do not have any information about
instances in which a convening authority disagreed with the
recommendations of an Article 32 investigating officer, or in which a
convening officer decided to refer charges after a staff judge advocate
or Article 32 investigating officer recommended against doing so.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
department of defense medical record system
7. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Work, DOD was charged with modernizing
its health record infrastructure almost 7 years ago. To date, over $1
billion has been spent in the effort. Although many Secretaries have
directed the action, DOD is still using the legacy Armed Forces Health
Longitudinal Technology Application. The improvements made to date seem
to be superficial and overly expensive. The health records are still
not interoperable with the current Veterans Affairs (VA) system. System
modernization cost estimates are said to be $28 billion. What will you
do to ensure that DOD will modernize its health record system quickly?
Mr. Work. Providing high-quality healthcare for current
servicemembers and their dependents, and facilitating high-quality
healthcare for our veterans are among our Nation's and DOD's highest
priorities. I fully support Secretary Hagel's decision to pursue a
competitive acquisition strategy for a new DOD electronic health record
that is compatible with VA electronic health records. I also support
Secretary Hagel's decision to assign acquisition oversight of the
program to Under Secretary Kendall.
I am not aware of the combined amount that both Departments (DOD
and VA) have spent to date on the effort to improve health record
infrastructure. If confirmed, I will support efforts to improve
cooperation on joint initiatives with the VA, such as electronic health
records, with two distinct goals: (1) Modernize the software supporting
our clinicians; and (2) ensure health data interoperability among VA,
DOD, and the private sector. The Department's commitment to achieving
these goals in the most efficient and effective way possible is
demonstrated by the ongoing personal engagement of Secretary Hagel. I
also plan to be personally engaged and ensure this priority program
remains on track.

8. Senator Blumenthal. Mr. Work, is DOD currently reviewing any
system modernization methods that could occur at significantly lower
cost (such as adopting VA records infrastructure)?
Mr. Work. DOD is pursuing a competitive acquisition strategy for
electronic health records that will consider commercial alternatives
that may offer reduced cost, reduced schedule and technical risk, as
well as access to increased capability and capacity by leveraging
ongoing advances in the commercial marketplace.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
department of defense sequestration cuts
9. Senator Hirono. Mr. Work, the Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA)
reduced the impact of sequestration by $22 billion in fiscal year 2014
and $9 billion in fiscal year 2015. With this additional funding as a
result of this agreement, how will DOD prioritize readiness funding
levels for these fiscal years--by program or capacity, and what will
the readiness impacts be for fiscal year 2016, should sequestration
remain a reality?
Mr. Work. I have not had the opportunity to review the President's
budget for 2015. However, Secretary Hagel has said the BBA enabled the
Department to mitigate the most serious cuts in readiness and
modernization accounts in both fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015.
Nevertheless, some challenges remain at the fiscal year 2015 budget
levels. As Secretary Hagel announced on 24 February, after careful
deliberation, the administration has proposed a $26 billion investment
``bridge'' in fiscal year 2015. As I understand it, approximately 40
percent of this added investment would be devoted to readiness; 40
percent would be devoted to modernization; 2 percent would be devoted
to infrastructure; and the remainder for other pressing needs.
As for fiscal year 2016 and out, Secretary Hagel has stated for the
record that full sequestration level funding generates unacceptable
levels of risk to our national security. The administration's budget
proposal includes an additional $115 billion across the remainder of
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). This $141 billion total
increase to the current budget caps ($26 billion in fiscal year 2015,
and an additional $115 billion across the FYDP) will help to preserve
force readiness as DOD shifts from a wartime footing to a more
sustainable peacetime posture.
I cannot tell you at this point exactly how DOD is planning to
prioritize its readiness funding. However, if confirmed I will do my
best to ensure that resources are prioritized to support the readiness
requirements for our warfighters worldwide. I lived through the
``hollow force'' of the late 1970s, and have no desire to do so again.
If confirmed, I will do everything humanly possible to make sure we
retain a force ready to respond to any contingency.
______

Question Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
department of defense sequestration cuts
10. Senator Kaine. Mr. Work, the Budget Control Act (BCA)
originally placed DOD under reduced discretionary spending caps that
have since been adjusted by the American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) and
the BBA. These across-the-board cuts have had significant negative
implications for readiness, operational capacity, and our military
personnel and their families. Fortunately, the President's budget
request for fiscal year 2015 aims to ease the strain on DOD by $26
billion in 2015 and $115 billion over the next 5 years. Considering the
adjustments that have been made with respect to ATRA and BBA, and with
the proposed cap adjustments in the President's fiscal year 2015 budget
request, how much of the original sequestration cuts is DOD proposing
to absorb?
Mr. Work. As you indicate, after careful deliberation, the
administration has proposed an additional $26 billion defense
investment ``bridge'' on top of the BBA fiscal year 2015 caps, and an
additional $115 billion in defense spending above BCA levels across the
remainder of the FYDP. How much DOD will absorb of sequestration
depends on future congressional action.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
sequestration
11. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, I believe we can all agree that
sequestration has had a devastating impact on our Nation's military
readiness. However, I also believe many are under the mistaken
impression the Ryan/Murray agreement solved this problem. It did not.
It helped, but DOD is still subject to $76.96 billion in sequester cuts
in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015. Even with the small relief in
fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, do you think we can execute the
current Defense Strategic Guidance? If you believe we can execute the
strategy but with greater risk, can you explain what you mean by risk?
To me, risk equals lives, the lives of our men and women in uniform.
Mr. Work. As Under Secretary for the Navy, I participated in the
Strategic Review that followed the passage of the 2011 Budget Control
Act. This review sought to balance strategic ends, ways and means with
the $487 billion reduction in planned defense spending over a 10-year
period. I believe the results of that review, as outlined in Sustaining
U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense and the
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance that followed, maintained an excellent
balance between strategic aims and expected resources.
I left the Department of the Navy in March 2013, just as DOD was
coming to grips with the impact of an additional $500 billion in cuts
necessitated by sequestration. I am aware that the Strategic Choices
and Management Review (SCMR) ordered by Secretary Hagel, and the
subsequent fiscal year 2015 budget review, looked closely at ways to
accommodate potential reductions. Based on Secretary Hagel's
recommendations, the President proposes to budget at the cap level in
fiscal year 2015 but at levels that exceed the caps by a total of $115
billion for the years fiscal year 2016 through 2019. The President also
proposes, and Secretary Hagel supports, a government-wide initiative to
add some funding in fiscal year 2015.
I have not yet seen or been able to analyze the defense strategy in
the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which, as I understand, will
update the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Nor have I seen the
Chairman's Risk Assessment associated with the QDR. However, if
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the Department of Defense (DOD)
identifies and clearly communicates with Congress the risks and
strategic choices associated with resourcing the strategy.

alternatives to the quadrennial defense review
12. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, you are currently the Chief Executive
Officer of the Center for New American Security (CNAS). CNAS recently
participated in a joint think-tank exercise which offered alternatives
to the QDR and proposals for the fiscal year 2015 defense budget.
Though the author was another CNAS analyst, CNAS's recommendations
appear to draw upon work you had previously conducted. For example, in
a May 29, 2013, briefing, you proposed a smaller Army, smaller tactical
air forces, a smaller Navy, an expeditionary-focused Marine Corps,
while retaining a special operations force and air and sea mobility
forces, which are comparable in size to current levels. In addition,
you proposed to invest in technologies such as electromagnetic rail
guns, unmanned systems, cyber, and directed energy weapons. I must say,
this sounds much like the 2001 all over again. Specifically, Secretary
Rumsfeld's Transformation Initiative advocated for smaller forces using
new technologies. Therefore, are these positions incorporated in the
fiscal year 2015 defense budget?
Mr. Work. As Secretary Hagel stated at his press conference on
February 24, 2014, the Department's fiscal year 2015 budget supports
the joint force's ability to defend the United States against all
strategic threats, build security globally by projecting U.S. influence
and deterring aggression, and remain prepared to win decisively against
any adversary should deterrence fail. Although I am not aware of the
details of the fiscal year 2015 budget proposal, the broad outlines
highlighted in the Secretary's speech seem consistent not only with the
approach I advocated in my CNAS work, but also with the requirements of
U.S. Forces in this dynamic security environment. It seems to me that
DOD has chosen to take selective reductions in end strength and force
structure in order to sustain investments in readiness and
modernization. As a result, although the joint force will be smaller,
it will become more modern and more ready to confront a broad range of
future defense challenges. I think this is the right overall approach.

13. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, would it not be more prudent to
reduce the size of our forces after we have developed the technologies
you envision?
Mr. Work. I believe the Department must begin to act now to ensure
that it can rebalance the force for the future. This will require
difficult tradeoffs between near-term capacities and future
capabilities that Secretary Hagel has been discussing since the
Strategic Choices and Management Review.
Given reduced resources, in practical terms this means that if we
want a force that is ready while it continues to modernize, it will
likely be necessary to scale back force structure. Only by reducing
some parts of the force now will we have the resources necessary to
develop the systems and capabilities that the future force will need to
confront a broad range of challenges. From what I understand, the
fiscal year 2015 President's budget submission follows this general
approach.

14. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, over the last 50 years, time and
again we have seen assumptions regarding our national security proven
wrong. Given today's current security environment, can we afford to bet
it all on a smaller force?
Mr. Work. Some degree of uncertainty is unavoidable in defense
planning, as we must always make choices in the present that will limit
some future options. The challenge is to strive for a force that is
well-trained, well-led, well-equipped, ready to adapt to unforeseen
circumstances, and with the will to win, despite the odds or level of
adversity. Such a force depends first and foremost on the quality of
the people, not on technology or force structure--that is why the U.S.
Armed Forces stand apart from all others.
Said another way, continuing to invest in a robust joint force with
diverse capabilities and a broad set of missions is one means of
hedging against uncertainty. But equally, if not more important, is
ensuring that the U.S. Armed Forces continue to attract the Nation's
most capable, adaptable, and dedicated professionals. Maintaining force
structure per se does not ensure that we will retain a capable force.
Indeed, were the Department to retain more forces than it could afford
to keep trained, ready, and well-equipped, it would risk undermining
the quality and readiness of its force and, hence, its adaptability.
If confirmed, I intend to work tirelessly with other Department
leaders to continually weigh the risks of fielding too small a force
against those associated with holding onto force structure at the cost
of underfunding training, readiness, and modernization.

national security and defense strategy
15. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, a new QDR should be published soon.
This is a critical document which sets DOD's strategies and priorities.
Recently, DOD conducted a Strategic Choices Management Review, commonly
called the Skimmer. The Skimmer explored different military
capabilities based upon various funding scenarios. Both of you have
watched the Skimmer process closely and Ms. Wormuth you have worked on
the QDR itself. Many are concerned that in an effort to seek defense
cuts, the new QDR will expose the United States to risks which recently
would have been unthinkable. Therefore, will the QDR articulate where
we are going to be taking additional risks?
Mr. Work. I did not participate in the development of the 2014 QDR
nor have I been briefed on it. However, the QDR statute requires an
assessment of risk, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
required to submit his own assessment of the review, including his
assessment of risk and a description of the capabilities needed to
address such risk. If confirmed, I will closely review both the QDR
report and the Chairman's risk assessment to understand the levels of
risk assumed in our strategy, and how it seeks to reduce, hedge
against, or mitigate them.
That said, based on his recent speech, Secretary Hagel has said
that under the PB15 proposals, the military can protect the United
States and fulfill the President's defense strategy--but with some
increased levels of risk. His speech provides more detail on those
risks.

16. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, will the defense cuts cause major
changes to our National Security Strategy and National Military
Strategy?
Mr. Work. It is my understanding that the National Security
Strategy and National Military Strategy are under development. I have
not been briefed on either of them and therefore do not know their
current status. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the National Military Strategy and with
interagency counterparts on the National Security Strategy.

17. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, how can you tell when a strategy has
gone from being budget-informed to being budget-driven?
Mr. Work. A budget-informed strategy begins by defining one's
objectives; assessing threats, challenges, and opportunities impinging
upon those objectives; and then determining how best to harness
available resources in the pursuit of them. A budget-driven strategy is
not really a strategy at all but rather an exercise through which the
force is developed to fit a given funding level. The former approach
has several advantages because it enables decisionmakers to set
priorities, make tradeoffs, and adjust investments in ways appropriate
to the demands of the security environment and the strategy. Such an
approach also helps one to understand more clearly the risks associated
with the choices one has made. Budget-informed strategy and planning
cannot eliminate risks but offer a proven means of making best use of
the resources available. Such an approach is especially important in
times of diminished resources.

18. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, how are our risks affected when you
change from being budget-informed to being budget-driven?
Mr. Work. In a budget-informed approach, risk is identified by
comparing what the force can or cannot do in terms of national security
objectives. Risk is characterized in terms of the ability (or
inability) of military forces to conduct all missions called for by the
defense strategy. That ability can be defined in terms of the expected
time and/or costs associated with conducting required missions. It can
also define the level of risk associated with executing the mission
successfully (high, moderate, or low).
A budget-driven approach simply identifies what the force can do,
making risks more difficult to identify, mitigate, or manage. It is
also more likely to miss opportunities to pursue innovative mixes of
investments and approaches to accomplish desired objectives.

roles and functions
19. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, included in last year's Senate
version of the NDAA was a provision to create a new position, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Management, which would replace the existing
DOD Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) and combine them with the
DOD's Chief Information Officer (CIO) functions. The purpose was to
empower the modernization effort of DOD's business/back office
functions. However, many believe such duties should rest/have rested
with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Do you believe we should create
an Under Secretary for Management which combines the DCMO and CIO
functions?
Mr. Work. I have not yet had the opportunity to study the
recommendation you refer to, or understand its intent. I therefore am
not comfortable offering an opinion at this time. In the most general
sense, however, I agree more attention on the DOD's business/back
office functions is required-especially in this time of scarce defense
resources. I believe reducing overhead and becoming more efficient
should be top priorities for all senior DOD managers. If confirmed, I
plan to aggressively pursue this belief. The Secretary took important
steps last December to strengthen the Office of the DCMO, which I
support. I believe that we should allow these reforms to be implemented
and mature before we decide to establish a sixth Under Secretary of
Defense.

20. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, what will be the role of the DCMO if
you are confirmed?
Mr. Work. It is too early for me to answer this question
definitively. If confirmed, I must first assess the progress made on
Secretary Hagel's most recent headquarters review, as well as the
capability of the DCMO organization. I would likely first focus the
DCMO on strengthening, streamlining and cutting the costs of those
business activities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and
in the Defense agencies. These organizations include about 45 separate
organizations with about 110,000 civilian, military, and contract
employees. They currently account for approximately $84 billion of
annual defense appropriations ($34 billion on Defense Health Program
alone). It is these organizations that make up what Secretary referred
to last November as the ``world's largest back office.''
Because the scope, scale and complexity of these 45 agencies
currently exceeds what can reasonably be expected to be overseen by the
Department's five Under Secretaries, my sense is that their business
operations are ``under-governed.'' If confirmed, I would focus the DCMO
on assessing the defense agencies' business operations in direct
support of the Under Secretaries, so as to strengthen their authority
to provide direction and control over the related policy matters of
those entities. By taking steps to strengthen the management of the OSD
staff and defense agencies, as well as the rest of the Department,
through an empowered DCMO function, I would aim to help Secretary Hagel
deliver a higher level of service to the military departments at lower
cost to the American taxpayer.

compensation and benefits
21. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, Congress established the Military
Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission to review military
compensation and retirement systems and to make recommendations to
modernize those systems. The Commission will report its recommendations
in February 2015. Do you believe the administration should propose
fragmented changes to personnel compensation and benefits before the
Commission makes public its recommendations in 2015?
Mr. Work. Based on my time as Under Secretary of the Navy, I
believe the Department has ample analyses and information to request
changes in some forms of military compensation. I also believe the
Department must strive to find the proper balance between competitive
pay and benefits and sustaining a force equipped with the latest
technology and ready to meet current and future challenges. If
confirmed, I would work with Secretary Hagel, the administration, and
Congress to find that balance.
Due to the complexity of the military retirement system, however, I
agree that changes in this area should not be fragmented. They should
only be considered and evaluated in the context of a holistic, top-to-
bottom review of the system, such as the one being conducted by the
Commission.

22. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, how would development of a piecemeal
package of retirement benefits and compensation reforms get us to an
optimal solution for controlling DOD's sky-rocketing personnel costs?
Mr. Work. Finding the appropriate balance between providing the men
and women who serve our great nation a competitive package of pay and
benefits while also providing them the best possible training and
equipment is a monumental challenge in the current fiscal environment.
Based on my experience as Under Secretary of the Navy, I can readily
see how adjusting some military personnel compensation costs now would
allow the Department to achieve the balance it seeks, and that our men
and women deserve.
However, due to the complexity of the military retirement system, I
believe changes should not be made in this area until the Military
Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission completes its work
and any recommendations it might make can be reviewed and evaluated by
the President, the Department, and Congress.

23. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, Congress and the President have both
promised our men and women in uniform that they would be grandfathered
from any changes in the military retirement system. Do you support
grandfathering those currently retired and those serving from any
proposed changes?
Mr. Work. Yes, I do. I believe that any retirement changes should
be grandfathered; to do otherwise would break faith with our members.

24. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, do you feel that current
servicemembers should also be grandfathered for all changes to proposed
military benefits? Why or why not?
Mr. Work. If confirmed, I will remain committed to ensuring that
any proposed changes keep faith with those who are serving today and
with those who have served in the past. That said, I will also remain
committed to ensuring that the Department finds the proper balance to
maintain force structure, readiness, and modernization capabilities
while adequately compensating personnel. These will require hard
choices in all parts of the defense program, including military
benefits.

missile defense
25. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, do you agree there is a need to
improve the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system against
evolving Homeland missile threats from North Korea and Iran?
Mr. Work. Yes, based on my understanding of the evolving threat, I
think we need to improve the GMD system. If confirmed, I would look at
the options and make recommendations to Secretary Hagel.

26. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, would you support funding for the
development of a redesigned kill vehicle for the ground-based
interceptor and improvements to sensor and discrimination capabilities?
Mr. Work. Yes.

nuclear modernization
27. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, last month during a visit to Wyoming,
Secretary Hagel said, ``it's clear that we have some work to do on
[nuclear] modernization.'' Secretary Hagel also said ``we're going to
invest in the modernization we need to keep the deterrent stronger than
it's ever been, and you have my commitment to that.'' If confirmed,
would we have your commitment to modernize our nuclear triad?
Mr. Work. Yes. Our nuclear forces make vital contributions to the
national security of the United States and our allies and partners. The
2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the report on the President's June 2013
Nuclear Employment Strategy make clear the President's commitment to
maintain the nuclear Triad and a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
stockpile and infrastructure.
Accordingly, if confirmed, I will vigorously support the
President's and the Secretary's commitment to modernize U.S. nuclear
forces, the nuclear stockpile, and its associated infrastructure.

28. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, your predecessor, Dr. Ashton Carter,
observed that nuclear weapons are ``not a big swinger in our budget''.
Were you aware that, according to recently released Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) figures, total DOD and Department of Energy (DOE)
funding for nuclear forces accounts for only 4 percent of national
defense spending in 2014?
Mr. Work. I am aware of the CBO Report and the figures reported.

29. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, do you consider this to be a
reasonable and necessary investment in U.S. national security?
Mr. Work. Yes. Based on my experience, I believe the planned
investment in our nuclear forces is both reasonable and necessary. Our
nuclear forces deter strategic attack on the United States, provide
extended deterrence to our allies and partners, and contribute to
strategic stability writ large. If confirmed, I will maintain the
Department's focus on, and prioritization of, this vital component of
our national security.

integrity and accountability
30. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, two recent reports on cheating
suggest a disturbing problem with integrity in the Armed Forces. The
Navy reported on February 4 that 30 senior sailors serving as
instructors cheated on written exams at the Navy Nuclear Power School.
This follows a recent Air Force incident in which 92 airmen at
Malmstrom Air Force Base were implicated in a cheating incident
involving intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) readiness
examinations. Both incidents are under investigation. But they follow
recent reports of senior officers and officials who behaved as if
ethics rules didn't apply to them or who mistook toxic leadership for
effective leadership. I view the recent failures of junior personnel as
a failure of leadership. Do you agree and if so, why?
Mr. Work. At this time, I am not privy to anything more than
newspaper reports about these troubling incidents. It would therefore
be premature and inappropriate for me to attribute the underlying
justification or causation of these incidents.
What I can say unequivocally is that integrity, personal courage
and accountability are the hallmarks of the U.S. military, and must be
reinforced-particularly when it comes to our strategic forces. Senior
leaders, both civilian and military, must model and reinforce the
highest standards of behavior. If confirmed, I will promote a work
environment that exemplifies these ideals.

31. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, if you are confirmed, what would be
your role in restoring integrity and accountability?
Mr. Work. If confirmed, I will work to implement Secretary Hagel's
efforts to foster a culture of ethical values-based decisionmaking and
stewardship among senior DOD leaders and their staffs. I will also work
with General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
to implement his general and flag officer professional character
initiatives, which are aimed at maintaining the integrity of the
military profession and preserving the public trust.

total force
32. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Work, as we enter a time of end strength
drawdowns, we must consider the total force structure and how to best
use our servicemembers in the Active, Reserve, and Guard components.
How do you envision the composition of the total force as we begin
troop drawdowns and wind down from the wartime efforts?
Mr. Work. I support our Total Force policy and, if confirmed, would
welcome the opportunity to evaluate how we can best meet our security
requirements using the Active, Reserve, and Guard components. When
determining the composition of the Total Force, the Department looks at
the expected demands and seeks a solution that will meet our national
strategic goals, account for the strengths of each of the components,
and fit within the budget topline.
If I am confirmed, and as the Department steps down from its war
footing, I will work to ensure the Department considers and implements
force shifts and drawdowns, and adopts the Total Force composition and
capacity best suited for our strategy and available resources.
Considerations of risk, readiness and responsiveness across the full
range of military operations, which involves supporting the homeland,
quickly responding to contingencies, and providing global presence,
will be incorporated in these deliberations.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
credible threat of force
33. Senator Wicker. Mr. Work, combined with diplomacy and
sanctions, the credible threat of military force has been a key
component of the U.S. strategy to prevent Iran from developing a
nuclear weapon. President Obama has repeatedly said ``all options are
on the table'' to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and
America ``will do what is necessary to prevent Iran from getting the
world's worst weapons''. As diplomacy moves forward with Iran, a
process I hope succeeds, I believe it is crucial that Iran understand
both that additional sanctions will be forthcoming if an agreement is
not reached and that we remain committed to using military force if all
else fails to stop their nuclear weapons ambition. Will it remain U.S.
policy that all options, including military force, remain on the table
to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon?
Mr. Work. The President has been very clear on this issue-the
United States is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear
weapon, and all options remain on the table to achieve this objective.
These options include tough-minded diplomacy and economic sanctions and
pressure, reinforced and complemented by credible military capabilities
and options. If confirmed, I will fully and faithfully support this
policy.

34. Senator Wicker. Mr. Work, if confirmed, will you ensure that
o