    [Senate Hearing 113-589]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 113-589
    .
               U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA AND
                THE THREAT POSED BY THE ISLAMIC STATE
                OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 16, 2014

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    JOE DONNELLY, Indiana                ROY BLUNT, Missouri
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              MIKE LEE, Utah
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                  TED CRUZ, Texas
    ANGUS KING, Maine

                        Peter K. Levine, Staff Director

                    John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                   __________

                               september 16, 2014

                                                                       Page

    U.S. Policy Towards Iraq and Syria and the Threat Posed by the
      Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)....................     1

    Hagel, Hon. Charles T., Secretary of Defense.....................     5
    Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.....    13
    Questions for the Record.........................................    69

                                     (iii)

    U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ AND SYRIA AND THE THREAT POSED BY THE ISLAMIC
                      STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)

                                  ----------

                          TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2014

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
    SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Nelson,
    McCaskill, Udall, Hagan, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand,
    Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Inhofe, McCain,
    Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Graham, Vitter, and Lee.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Levin. The committee will come to order. We're
    asking all the audience now to either take their seats and be
    quiet or please leave.
        This morning, the committee receives testimony from the
    Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff on the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the
    Levant, known as ISIS or ISIL, and on the President's strategy
    for addressing this threat.
        Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, we welcome you both.
    We look forward to your testimony.
        ISIS has terrorized the Iraqi and Syrian people, engaging
    in kidnappings, killings, persecutions of religious minorities,
    and attacking schools, hospitals, and cultural sites. ISIS has
    brought home its barbarity with the brutal beheading of
    American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, and
    British aid worker, David Haines.
        While ISIS is currently focused on building an Islamic
    caliphate in the Middle East, its poisonous ideology is
    hostile, not only to the region, but to the world, and there is
    real risk that the area it controls could become a launching
    pad for future terrorist attacks against the United States and
    our allies. This threat is amplified by foreign fighters who
    travel from Western countries to join with ISIS and then return
    to their countries of origin with advanced training and
    fighting experience.
        I recently returned from Iraq, where U.S. airstrikes are
    helping Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Iraqi security forces
    break ISIS's momentum. However, our military leaders and
    intelligence experts uniformly say that airstrikes alone will
    not be sufficient to defeat ISIS. A number of elements of a
    successful strategy against ISIS are embodied in the approach
    outlined by the President last week.
        First, the participation of key Arab states in the region
    will be critical to the effectiveness of any international
    coalition. If Western countries act in Iraq and Syria without
    visible participation and leadership of Arab nations, it will
    play into the propaganda pitch of the violent extremists that
    we are interested in dominating Iraq and Syria. ISIS's
    poisonous strand of Islam is a threat to all Muslim countries
    and can only be purged in a lasting way by mainstream Islam in
    the Arab world.
        The international conferences in Jeddah last week and in
    Paris yesterday were a good start, with a number of Arab states
    declaring their shared commitment to develop a strategy, ``to
    destroy ISIL wherever it is, including in both Iraq and
    Syria,'' and joining in an international pledge to use,
    ``whatever means necessary,'' to achieve this goal.
        Second, our assistance has been requested by the Government
    of Iraq, which has made a commitment to govern in an inclusive
    manner. The effort to rid Iraq of ISIS cannot be successful
    without the support of all elements of Iraqi society, including
    not only Shi'ites, Kurds, and religious minorities, but also
    the Sunni tribes, who strongly oppose the Maliki Government.
    The more the new government in Baghdad does to address the
    grievances of Iraq's Sunni communities, the more successful
    they will be in helping rid their country and the world of the
    ISIS poison.
        Third, the President has announced that combat operations
    in Iraq and Syria will be carried out by Iraqis and Syrians
    with the support of a broad international coalition. That is
    the better approach, because, in this part of the world, the
    use of military force by Western nations can be
    counterproductive if it is not done correctly. In the absence
    of a Western target on the ground, ISIS's actions will
    undermine its own cause, because its brutality will continue to
    be targeted at fellow Muslims. We should be fully engaged in
    training and equipping Iraqis, Syrians, Kurds, and other local
    forces that are willing to take on ISIS, but we should try to
    counter the narrative of fanatics who attack Western combat
    forces on the ground as an occupation.
        I believe the President, under both domestic and
    international law, has the authority to conduct the type of
    limited military campaign that he outlined last week. However,
    bipartisan, bicameral congressional support will make it easier
    for the President to build an international coalition,
    including the open and visible support of Arab countries. We
    should have the chance, before we leave, to vote on legislation
    that would authorize the U.S. military to openly train-and-
    equip the vetted moderate opposition in Syria, and I hope that
    Congress can come together to support it.
        Senator Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        After a year of the White House indecision and
    handwringing, the President finally presented to the American
    people his strategy to defeat ISIS. That was announced last
    week, however, it fell short in two vital areas that I want to
    share with you.
        First, the President again failed to acknowledge the
    seriousness of the threat that ISIS poses to the U.S. national
    security in its homeland. His claim that America is safer may
    support his political narrative, but it's not true.
        Secretary Hagel, I appreciate your honesty when you
    described ISIS on August 21 when you said that it's a imminent
    threat to every interest we have, whether it's in Iraq or
    anyplace else. I agree with you. ISIS has reported 35,000
    fighters, nearly three times larger than it was in June. It's
    tripled since June and is growing larger every day. It's
    estimated that at least 2,000 fighters hold Western passports
    and at least 100 are U.S. citizens. This, coupled with their
    vast resources, large safe haven, blood, thirst to kill more
    Americans, is a recipe for disaster. The administration
    continues to say, ``No specific evidence of plots against the
    homeland exist.'' Now, I want to remind everyone that we didn't
    have any specific evidence of plots against the homeland before
    September 11, 2001.
        Now we face an extremist organization that is larger, more
    brutal, better networked, and better funded than al Qaeda ever
    was. I believe it's critical to have in the record and that we
    establish today, how ISIS is fundamentally different from al
    Qaeda.
        First of all, al Qaeda hides in caves. ISIS takes holds of
    governments' territories the size of my State of Oklahoma.
        Second, al Qaeda has small groups of specialized fighters
    using terrorist tactics. ISIS is an army, with tanks,
    artillery, using conventional military, insurgent, and
    terrorist tactics.
        Al Qaeda is based in remote regions of the world. ISIS sits
    on Europe's doorstep.
        Al Qaeda uses the outdated propaganda and Arab-language
    media, but ISIS uses sophisticated media in multiple languages,
    including English, to spread its cause to recruit fighters.
        Al Qaeda spent $1 million--this is very significant, Mr.
    Chairman--on September 11. ISIS, we were going to say, until
    today, takes more than $1 million every day. There is an
    Associated Press story this morning that shows, very
    convincingly, that they have access to an additional $3 million
    every day.
        Now, the second thing that I think is a vital area. The
    President's strategy to defeat ISIS is fundamentally detached
    from the reality on the ground. Let's be clear. ISIS commands a
    terrorist army comprised of tens of thousands of organized
    fighters who have tanks, antitank missiles, and artillery. Its
    conventional battlefield successes have allowed it to triple
    its ranks in size in only 3 months. It will take an army to
    beat an army. However, instead, the President presented the
    limited counterterrorism strategy that he compared to his
    approach in Yemen and Somalia. The difference between al Qaeda
    in Yemen and Somalia and that of ISIS are enormous, and our
    strategy for each should reflect that reality. Taking this one-
    size-fits-all approach is destined for failure.
        General Deptula, architect of the successful U.S. air
    campaign that destroyed the Taliban army on the battlefield in
    2001, said, ``We need to institute an aggressive air campaign
    in which air power is applied like a thunderstorm, not like a
    drizzle.'' Furthermore, airstrikes can only be fully effective,
    especially in the urban areas ISIS is entrenched in, when
    paired with skills of a trained air controller on the ground.
    The President, however, already ruled out boots-on-the-ground.
    There was a collective sigh of relief at ISIS headquarters in
    Syria when they heard him say that. His claim of ``no boots-on-
    the-ground'' is an insult to the men and women in Iraq today
    who are serving in harm's way. We already have boots-on-the-
    ground, in Erbil, in Baghdad, and throughout Iraq. We should
    ask the pilots dropping bombs over Iraq whether they think they
    are in combat, pilots who have faced the real threat of having
    to eject over ISIS-held territory. I am not advocating an army
    division or combat elements on the ground, but it is foolhardy
    for the Obama administration to tie the hands and so firmly
    rule out the possibility of air controllers and special
    operators on the ground to direct airstrikes and advise fighter
    forces. It sends the wrong message to our troops, to the enemy,
    and to partners.
        Furthermore, if Congress does authorize the training and
    equipping of the Syrian moderate opposition, and then pushes
    them into combat without advisors on the ground, that effort is
    most likely to fail.
        We still don't have the answers to the most important and
    fundamental questions about what we're ultimately trying to
    accomplish. For example: What does a defeated or destroyed ISIS
    look like?
        Finally, I hope we get the answers today, not only to the
    President's strategy, but also about the current state of our
    military residents. General Dempsey, nothing significant has
    changed, but when you warned, on February 12 of last year, that
    our military is on a path where the force may become, ``so
    degraded and so unready that it would be immoral to use
    force''--when 6 years of massive budget cuts and another round
    of defense sequestration is on the horizon, we are still on
    that path. Despite this, the administration is still calling on
    our military to support its pivot to Asia, bolster our European
    allies against a growing Russian threat, successfully
    transition our missions in Afghanistan, support the response to
    the ebola as we've heard this morning, with another 3,000
    troops going to be going over there, and now to launch military
    operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Unlike what the
    President seems to believe, you can't have it both ways. You
    can't slash our defense budget, on one hand, while expecting
    our military to do it, on the other. If we want our military
    men and women to go into harm's way and defend this country, we
    need to give them the training, the tools, and the support they
    need to succeed. Without a ready, capable military, the
    President's imperfect strategy will remain what has become the
    trademark of this administration: a lot of tough talk that
    isn't backed by meaningful action.
        I was hoping we could debate these broadly important issues
    with the National Defense Authorization Act, but we have not
    been able to do that, so it looks like, Mr. Chairman, that this
    is it.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        Secretary Hagel.

        STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES T. HAGEL, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Hagel. Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of
    the committee, Chairman Dempsey and I very much appreciate the
    opportunity----
        Chairman Levin. Okay, would you--[directed to the audience]
    we're asking you again to please sit down, and, if not, we're
    going to ask you to leave. No, thank you--thank you for--would
    you please now leave? Would you please now leave? I am asking
    you to please leave. You're acting very warlike, yourself.
    Would you please leave?
        Thank you.
        Secretary Hagel.
        Secretary Hagel. Mr. Chairman, as I was saying, Chairman
    Dempsey and I very much appreciate the opportunity this morning
    to discuss the President's strategy to degrade and ultimately
    defeat ISIL.
        As you all know, today, President Obama is in Atlanta,
    meeting with CDC officials regarding the ebola crisis, and then
    will travel tonight to Tampa to receive a briefing from the
    Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General Austin, on
    operational plans to implement his ISIL strategy. I'll join the
    President tomorrow in Tampa for that briefing.
        The Department of Defense's (DOD) civilian and military
    leaders are in complete agreement that the United States and
    our allies and partners must take action against ISIL and that
    the President's strategy is the right approach. However, as
    President Obama has repeatedly made clear, American military
    power alone cannot and will not eradicate the threats posed by
    ISIL to the United States, our allies, and our friends and
    partners in the region. Iraq's continued political progress
    toward a more inclusive and representative government and its
    programs of reform and reconciliation will be critical to
    achieve the progress required. We believe that the new Iraqi
    Prime Minister Abadi is committed to bringing all Iraqis
    together against ISIL. To support him and the Iraqi people in
    their fight, the coalition will need to use all its instruments
    of power. We intend to use all of those instruments of power--
    military, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and
    intelligence--in coordination with all the countries in the
    region.
        To succeed, this strategy will also require a strong
    partnership between our executive branch and our Congress. The
    President has made it a priority to consult with congressional
    leadership on the ISIL challenge, as have Vice President Biden,
    Secretary Kerry, and many senior members of the administration.
    I have appreciated the opportunities I have had to discuss the
    President's strategy with many members of this committee and
    other members of the Senate and the House over the last couple
    of weeks. We will continue to consult closely with Congress as
    this campaign moves forward.
        ISIL poses a real threat to all countries in the Middle
    East, our European allies, and to America. In the last few
    months, the world has seen ISIL's barbarity up close as its
    fighters advanced across western and northern Iraq and
    slaughtered thousands of innocent civilians, including Sunni
    and Shi'a Muslims and Kurdish Iraqis in religious minorities.
    ISIL's murder of two U.S. journalists outraged the American
    people and exposed to the world the depravity of ISIL's
    ideology and tactics. Over the weekend, we saw ISIL's murder of
    a British citizen.
        ISIL now controls a vast swath of eastern Syria and western
    and northern Iraq, including towns and cities in all of these
    areas. ISIL has gained strength by exploiting the civil war in
    Syria and sectarian strife in Iraq, and it has seized territory
    across both countries and acquired significant resources and
    advanced weapons. ISIL has employed a violent combination of
    terrorists, insurgent and conventional military tactics. ISIL
    has been very adept at developing technology in social media to
    increase its global profile and attract tens of thousands of
    fighters. Its goal is to become the new vanguard of a global
    extremist movement and establish an extremist Islamic caliphate
    across the Middle East. It considers itself the rightful
    inheritor of Osama bin Laden's legacy.
        While ISIL clearly poses an immediate threat to American
    citizens in Iraq and our interests in the Middle East, we also
    know that thousands of foreign fighters, including Europeans
    and more than 100 Americans, have traveled to Syria with
    passports that give them relative freedom of movement. These
    fighters can exploit ISIL's safe haven to plan, coordinate, and
    carry out attacks against the United States and Europe.
        Although the Intelligence Community has not yet detected
    specific plotting against the U.S. Homeland, ISIL has global
    aspirations. As President Obama has made clear, ISIL's leaders
    have threatened America and our allies. If left unchecked, ISIL
    will directly threaten our Homeland and our allies.
        In his address to the Nation last week, President Obama
    announced that the United States will lead a broad
    multinational coalition to roll back the ISIL threat. More than
    40 nations have already expressed their willingness to
    participate in this effort, and more than 30 nations have
    indicated their readiness to offer military support. President
    Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary Kerry, and I and others
    have been working, and will continue to work, to unite and
    expand this coalition.
        At the NATO Summit in Wales, Secretary Kerry and I convened
    a meeting of key partners in the coalition. I then went to
    Georgia and Turkey. The Georgians made clear that they want to
    help. Turkey, by virtue of its geography and its common
    interest in destroying ISIL, which is holding 46 Turkish
    diplomats hostage, will play an important role in this effort.
    Turkey joined our meeting in Wales, and Secretary Kerry and I
    continue to discuss specific contributions Turkey will make.
        Secretary Kerry convened a meeting in Jeddah last week with
    the foreign ministers from the six Gulf Cooperation Council
    nations, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, and all signed a
    communique to do their share in the comprehensive fight against
    ISIL, including joining in the many aspects of a coordinated
    military campaign against ISIL.
        Also, last week 22 nations of the Arab League adopted a
    resolution at their summit in Cairo calling for comprehensive
    measures to combat ISIL.
        Yesterday, in Paris, French President Hollande, who
    traveled to Baghdad last weekend, hosted a conference attended
    by United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Permanent Members,
    European and Arab leaders, and representatives of the European
    Union, Arab League, and U.N. They all pledged to help Iraq in
    the fight against ISIL, including through military assistance.
        Key allies, such as United Kingdom, France, and Australia,
    are already contributing military support, and other partners
    have begun to make specific offers.
        At next week's U.N. General Assembly, we expect that
    additional nations will begin making commitments across the
    spectrum of capabilities, building on the strong Chapter 7 U.N.
    Security Council Resolution adopted last month, calling on all
    member states to take measures to counter ISIL and suppress the
    flow of foreign fighters to ISIL.
        Also next week, President Obama will chair a meeting of the
    U.N. Security Council to further mobilize the international
    community. As you all know, former International Security
    Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander and Acting CENTCOM Commander,
    General John Allen, has been designated to serve as Special
    Presidential Envoy for the global coalition to counter ISIL.
    President Obama is meeting with General Allen this morning.
        General Allen will work in a civilian diplomatic capacity
    to coordinate, build, and sustain the coalition, drawing on his
    extensive experience in the region. He will be the
    administration's point man to coordinate coalition
    contributions and to build support within the region. He will
    work closely with General Austin to ensure that coalition
    efforts are aligned across all elements of our strategy.
        In his address to the Nation, the President outlined the
    four elements of this strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat
    ISIL. Let me now describe how we are implementing this whole-
    of-government approach.
        First, in close coordination with the new Iraqi Government,
    we are broadening our air campaign to conduct systematic
    airstrikes against ISIL targets. To protect Americans
    threatened by ISIL's advances and to prevent humanitarian
    catastrophe, the U.S. military has already conducted more than
    160 successful airstrikes, which have killed ISIL fighters,
    destroyed weapons and equipment, and enabled Iraqi and Kurdish
    forces to get back on the offensive and secure key territory
    and critical infrastructure, including the Mosul and Haditha
    dams. These actions have disrupted ISIL tactically and have
    helped buy time for the Iraqi Government to begin forming an
    inclusive and broadbased governing coalition led by the new
    Prime Minister. That was one of President Obama's essential
    preconditions for taking further action against ISIL, because
    the Iraqi people must be united in their opposition against
    ISIL in order to defeat them. This will require a united and
    inclusive government. This is ultimately their fight.
        The new broader air campaign will include strikes against
    all ISIL targets and enable the Iraqi security forces,
    including Kurdish forces, to continue to stay on the offensive
    and recapture territory from ISIL, and hold it. Because ISIL
    operates freely across the Iraqi/Syrian border and maintains a
    safe haven in Syria, our actions will not be restrained by a
    border in name only. As the President said last week, ``If you
    threaten America, you will find no safe haven.''
        The President of the United States has the constitutional
    and the statutory authority to use military force against ISIL
    in Syria as well as Iraq. CENTCOM is refining and finalizing
    those plans, which General Austin will brief to the President
    tomorrow in Tampa. This plan includes targeted actions against
    ISIL safe havens in Syria, including its command and control,
    logistics capabilities, and infrastructure. General Dempsey and
    I have both reviewed and approved the CENTCOM plan.
        The second element of the strategy is to increase our
    support for forces fighting ISIL on the ground, the Iraqi and
    Kurdish forces and the moderate Syrian opposition. To support
    Iraqi and Kurdish forces, the President announced, last week,
    that he would deploy an additional 475 American troops to Iraq.
    Part of that number includes approximately 150 advisors and
    support personnel to supplement forces already in Iraq,
    conducting assessments of the Iraqi security forces. This
    assessment mission is now transitioning to an advise-and-assist
    mission, with more than 15 teams embedding with Iraqi Security
    Forces at the headquarters level to provide strategic and
    operational advice and assistance. The rest of the additional
    475 troops include 125 personnel to support intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions out of Erbil
    and 200 personnel to increase headquarters elements in both
    Baghdad and Erbil, helping us better coordinate military
    activities across Iraq.
        By the time all these forces arrive, there will be
    approximately 1,600 U.S. personnel in Iraq responding to the
    ISIL threat. But, as the President said last week, American
    forces will not have a combat mission. Instead, these advisors
    are supporting Iraqi and Kurdish forces and supporting the
    government's plan to stand up Iraqi national guard units to
    help Sunni communities defeat ISIL.
        The best counterweights to ISIL are local forces and the
    people of the area. In June, the President asked Congress for
    the necessary authority for DOD to train-and-equip moderate
    Syrian opposition forces, and $500 million to fund this
    program. We have now secured support from Saudi Arabia to host
    the training program for this mission. Saudi Arabia has offered
    financial and other support, as well. The $500 million request
    the President made in June for this train-and-equip program
    reflects CENTCOM's estimate of the cost to train, equip, and
    resupply more than 5,000 opposition forces over 1 year. The
    package of assistance that we initially provide would consist
    of small arms, vehicles, and basic equipment, like
    communications, as well as tactical and strategic training.
        As these forces prove their effectiveness on the
    battlefield, we would be prepared to provide increasingly
    sophisticated types of assistance to the most trusted
    commanders and capable forces. Because DOD does not currently
    have the authority to conduct a train-and-equip mission, the
    administration has asked Congress to provide the authority in
    the Continuing Resolution (CR) it is currently now considering.
    A rigorous vetting process will be critical to the success of
    this program. DOD will work closely with the Department of
    State (DOS), the Intelligence Community, and our partners in
    the region to screen and vet the forces we train-and-equip. We
    will monitor them closely to ensure that weapons do not fall
    into the hands of radical elements of the opposition, ISIL, the
    Syrian regime, or other extremist groups. There will always be
    risks in a program like this, but we believe that risk is
    justified by the imperative of destroying ISIL and the
    necessity of having capable partners on the ground in Syria.
        As we pursue this program, the United States will continue
    to press for a political resolution to the Syrian conflict
    resulting in the end of the Assad regime. Assad has lost all
    legitimacy to govern and has created the conditions that
    allowed ISIL and other terrorist groups to gain ground and
    terrorize and slaughter the Syrian population. The United
    States will not coordinate or cooperate with the Assad regime.
    We will also continue to counter Assad through diplomatic and
    economic pressure.
        The third element of the President's strategy is an all-
    inclusive approach to preventing attacks from ISIL against the
    homelands of the United States and our allies. In concert with
    our international partners, the United States will draw on
    intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, and economic tools
    to cut off ISIL's funding, improve our intelligence, strengthen
    homeland defense, and stem the flow of foreign fighters in and
    out of the region.
        The Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
    Security have launched an initiative to partner with local
    communities to counter extremist recruiting. The Department of
    Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence is
    working to disrupt ISIL's financing and expose their
    activities.
        The final element of the President's strategy is to
    continue providing humanitarian assistance to innocent
    civilians displaced or threatened by ISIL. Alongside the
    Government of Iraq, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and
    France, U.S. troops have already delivered lifesaving aid to
    thousands of threatened Iraqi civilians on Mount Sinjar and the
    Iraqi town of Amirli. In total, the U.S. military conducted 32
    airdrops of food and supplies, providing over 818,000 pounds of
    aid, including nearly 50,000 gallons of water and nearly
    122,000 Meals Ready-to-Eat in these operations. In addition to
    this assistance, last week DOS announced an additional $48
    million in aid for civilian organizations to meet the urgent
    needs of Iraqis displaced by ISIL. Our total humanitarian
    assistance to displaced Iraqis is now more than $186 million
    for fiscal year 2014.
        The United States is also the single largest donor of
    humanitarian assistance for the millions of Syrians affected by
    the civil war. Last week, Secretary Kerry announced an
    additional $500 million in humanitarian assistance. Since the
    start of the Syrian conflict, the United States has now
    committed almost $3 billion in humanitarian assistance to those
    affected by the civil war.
        All four elements of this strategy require a significant
    commitment of resources on the part of the United States and
    our coalition partners.
        Mr. Chairman, I think everyone on this committee
    understands fully, this will not be an easy or a brief effort.
    It is complicated. We are at war with ISIL, as we are with al
    Qaeda. Destroying ISIL will require more than military efforts
    alone, it will require political progress in the region and
    effective partners on the ground in Iraq and Syria. As Congress
    and the administration work together, we know this effort will
    take time. The President has outlined a clear, comprehensive,
    and workable strategy to achieve our goals and protect our
    interests.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, thank you for your continued
    support, and that of this committee, and your partnership.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Hagel follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Hon. Charles T. Hagel
        Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, members of the committee: Chairman
    Dempsey and I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the President's
    strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and
    the Levant (ISIL).
        Today President Obama is in Atlanta meeting with CDC officials
    regarding the Ebola crisis, and will then travel to Tampa to receive a
    briefing from the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General
    Lloyd J. Austin III, on operational plans to implement his ISIL
    strategy. I will join the President in Tampa tomorrow for that
    briefing.
        The Defense Department's civilian and military leaders are in
    complete agreement that the United States and our allies and partners
    must take action against ISIL, and that the President's strategy is the
    right approach.
        However, as President Obama has repeatedly made clear, American
    military power alone cannot eradicate the threats posed by ISIL to the
    United States, our allies, and our friends and partners in the region.
    Iraq's continued political progress toward a more inclusive and
    representative government--and its program of reform and
    reconciliation--will be critical. We believe that Iraq's new Prime
    Minister, Haider al-Abadi is committed to bringing all Iraqis together
    against ISIL. To support him and the Iraqi people in their fight, the
    coalition will need to use all its instruments of power--military, law
    enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and intelligence--in coordination
    with countries in the region.
        To succeed, this strategy will also require a strong partnership
    between the executive branch and Congress. The President has made it a
    priority to consult with Congressional leadership on the ISIL
    challenge, as have Vice President Biden, Secretary Kerry, and many
    senior members of the administration. I have appreciated the
    opportunities I've had to discuss the President's strategy with members
    of this committee and other members of the Senate and the House over
    the last couple of weeks. We will continue to consult closely with
    Congress as this campaign moves forward.
                      the isil threat to the united states
        ISIL poses a real threat to all countries in the Middle East, our
    European allies, and to America.
        In the last few months, the world has seen ISIL's barbarity up
    close as its fighters advanced across western and northern Iraq and
    slaughtered thousands of innocent civilians--including Sunni, Shia, and
    Kurdish Iraqis, and religious minorities. ISIL's murder of two U.S.
    journalists outraged the American people and exposed the depravity of
    ISIL's ideology and tactics to the world. Over the weekend, we saw
    ISIL's murder of a British citizen. ISIL now controls a vast swath of
    eastern Syria and western and northern Iraq, including towns and cities
    in these areas.
        ISIL has gained strength by exploiting the civil war in Syria and
    sectarian strife in Iraq. As it has seized territory across both
    countries and acquired significant resources and advanced weapons, ISIL
    has employed a violent combination of terrorist, insurgent, and
    conventional military tactics.
        ISIL has also been very adept at deploying technology and social
    media to increase its global profile and attract tens of thousands of
    fighters. Its goal is to become the new vanguard of the global
    extremist movement and establish an extremist Islamic Caliphate across
    the Middle East. It considers itself the rightful inheritor of Osama
    bin Laden's legacy.
        While ISIL clearly poses an immediate threat to American citizens
    in Iraq and our interests in the Middle East, we also know that
    thousands of foreign fighters--including Europeans and more than 100
    Americans--have traveled to Syria. With passports that give them
    relative freedom of movement, these fighters can exploit ISIL's safe
    haven to plan, coordinate, and carry out attacks against the United
    States and Europe.
        Although the Intelligence Community has not yet detected specific
    plotting against the U.S. Homeland, ISIL has global aspirations and, as
    President Obama has made clear, ISIL's leaders have threatened America
    and our allies. If left unchecked, ISIL will directly threaten our
    Homeland and our allies.
           building a coalition is key to president obama's strategy
        In his address to the Nation last week, President Obama announced
    that the United States will lead a broad multinational coalition to
    roll back the ISIL threat.
        More than 40 nations have already expressed their willingness to
    participate in this effort, and more than 30 nations have indicated
    their readiness to offer military support. President Obama, Vice
    President Biden, Secretary Kerry, and I and others have been working in
    recent weeks to unite and expand this coalition. At the NATO Summit in
    Wales, Secretary Kerry and I convened a meeting of key partners in the
    coalition. I then went to Georgia and Turkey. The Georgians made clear
    that they want to help. Turkey, by virtue of its geography and its
    common interest in destroying ISIL, which is holding 46 Turkish
    diplomats hostage, will play an important role in this effort. Turkey
    joined our meeting in Wales and Secretary Kerry and I continue to
    discuss specific contributions Turkey can make.
        Secretary Kerry convened a meeting in Jeddah last week with the
    Foreign Ministers from the six Gulf Cooperation Council nations, Egypt,
    Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon . . . and all signed a communiquee to ``do
    their share in the comprehensive fight against ISIL, including . . .
    joining in the many aspects of a coordinated military campaign against
    ISIL.''
        Also last week, the 22 nations of the Arab League adopted a
    resolution at their summit in Cairo calling for comprehensive measures
    to combat ISIL. Yesterday in Paris, President Hollande of France--who
    traveled to Iraq last weekend--hosted a conference attended by the U.N.
    Security Council permanent members, European and Arab leaders, and
    representatives of the EU, Arab League and United Nations. They all
    pledged to help Iraq in the fight against ISIL, including through
    military assistance.
        Key allies such as the United Kingdom, France, and Australia are
    already contributing military support and other partners have begun to
    make specific offers. At next week's U.N. General Assembly, we expect
    that additional nations will begin making commitments across the
    spectrum of capabilities, building on the strong Chapter VII U.N.
    Security Council Resolution adopted last month calling on all member
    states to take measures to counter ISIL and suppress the flow of
    foreign fighters to ISIL. Also, next week President Obama will chair a
    meeting of the U.N. Security Council to further mobilize the
    international community.
        Former International Security Assistance Force Commander and Acting
    CENTCOM Commander General John Allen, has been designated to serve as
    Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.
    President Obama is meeting with General Allen this morning. General
    Allen will work in a civilian, diplomatic capacity to coordinate, build
    and sustain the coalition, drawing on his extensive experience in the
    region. He will be the administration's point man to coordinate
    coalition contributions and to build support within the region. He will
    work closely with General Austin to ensure that coalition efforts are
    aligned across all elements of our strategy.
                    implementing president obama's strategy
        In his address to the Nation, the President outlined the four
    elements of this strategy to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. Let
    me now describe how we are implementing this whole-of-government
    approach.

        1.  Broader Air Campaign

        First, in close coordination with the new Iraqi Government, we are
    broadening our air campaign to conduct systematic airstrikes against
    ISIL targets.
        To protect Americans threatened by ISIL's advances and to prevent
    humanitarian catastrophe, the U.S. military has already conducted more
    than 160 successful airstrikes which have killed ISIL fighters,
    destroyed weapons and equipment, and enabled Iraqi security forces and
    Kurdish forces to get back on the offensive and secure key territory
    and critical infrastructure--including the Mosul and Haditha Dams.
        These actions have disrupted ISIL tactically, and helped buy time
    for the Iraqi Government to begin forming an inclusive and broad-based
    governing coalition led by the new Prime Minister. That was one of
    President Obama's essential preconditions for taking further action
    against ISIL, because the Iraqi people must be united in their
    opposition against ISIL in order to defeat them. This will require a
    united and inclusive government. This is ultimately their fight.
        The new, broader air campaign will include strikes against all ISIL
    targets and enable the Iraqi security forces--including Kurdish
    forces--to continue to stay on the offensive and recapture territory
    from ISIL and hold it.
        Because ISIL operates freely across the Iraqi-Syrian border, and
    maintains a safe haven in Syria, our actions will not be restrained by
    a border in name only. As the President said last week, ``if you
    threaten America, you will find no safe haven.''
        The President of the United States has the constitutional and
    statutory authority to use military force against ISIL in Syria as well
    as Iraq, and CENTCOM is refining and finalizing those plans, which
    General Austin will brief to the President tomorrow in Tampa. This plan
    includes targeted actions against ISIL safe havens in Syria--including
    its command and control, logistics capabilities, and infrastructure.
    General Dempsey and I have both reviewed and approved the CENTCOM plan.

        2.  Increased Support for Iraqi Security Forces and the Syrian
    Moderate Opposition

        The second element of the strategy is to increase our support for
    forces fighting ISIL on the ground--the Iraqi forces, including Kurdish
    forces, and the moderate Syrian opposition.
        To support Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces, the President
    announced last week that we would deploy an additional 475 American
    troops to Iraq.
        Part of that number includes approximately 150 advisors and support
    personnel to supplement forces already in Iraq conducting assessments
    of the Iraqi security forces. This assessment mission is now
    transitioning to an advise-and-assist mission, with more than 15 teams
    embedding with Iraqi security forces at the headquarters level to
    provide strategic and operational advice and assistance.
        The rest of the additional 475 troops include 125 personnel to
    support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions out of
    Erbil and 200 personnel to increase headquarters elements in both
    Baghdad and Erbil . . . helping us better coordinate military
    activities across Iraq.
        By the time all these forces arrive, there will be approximately
    1,600 U.S. personnel in Iraq responding to the ISIL threat. But, as the
    President said last week, ``American forces will not have a combat
    mission.''
        Instead, these advisors are supporting Iraqi security forces and
    Kurdish forces and supporting the government's plans to stand up Iraqi
    National Guard units to help Sunni communities defeat ISIL.
        The best counterweights to ISIL are local forces and the people of
    the area. In June, the President asked Congress for the necessary
    authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to train-and-equip
    moderate Syrian opposition forces, and $500 million to fund this
    program.
        We have now secured support from Saudi Arabia to host the training
    program for this mission, and Saudi Arabia has offered financial
    support as well.
        The $500 million request the President made in June for this train-
    and-equip program reflects CENTCOM's estimate of the cost to train,
    equip, and resupply more than 5,000 opposition forces over 1 year. The
    package of assistance that we initially provide would consist of small
    arms, vehicles, and basic equipment like communications, as well as
    tactical and strategic training. As these forces prove their
    effectiveness on the battlefield, we would be prepared to provide
    increasingly sophisticated types of assistance to the most trusted
    commanders and capable forces. Because DOD does not currently have the
    authority to conduct a train-and-equip mission, the administration has
    asked Congress to provide the authority in the Continuing Resolution it
    is currently considering.
        A rigorous vetting process will be critical to the success of this
    program. DOD will work closely with the Department of State, the
    Intelligence Community, and our partners in the region to screen and
    vet the forces we train and equip. We will monitor them closely to
    ensure that weapons do not fall into the hands of radical elements of
    the opposition, ISIL, the Syrian regime, or other extremist groups.
    There will always be risk in a program like this, but we believe that
    risk is justified by the imperative of destroying ISIL--and the
    necessity of having capable partners on the ground in Syria.
        As we pursue this program, the United States will continue to press
    for a political resolution to the Syrian conflict resulting in the end
    of the Assad regime. Assad has lost all legitimacy to govern, and has
    created the conditions that allowed ISIL and other terrorist groups to
    gain ground and terrorize and slaughter the Syrian population. The
    United States will not coordinate or cooperate with the Assad regime.
    We will also continue to counter Assad through diplomatic and economic
    pressure.

        3.  Preventing Homeland Attacks

        The third element of the President's strategy is an all-inclusive
    approach to preventing attacks from ISIL against the homelands of the
    United States and our allies. In concert with our international
    partners, the United States will draw on intelligence, law enforcement,
    diplomatic, and economic tools to cut off ISIL's funding, improve our
    intelligence, strengthen homeland defense, and stem the flow of foreign
    fighters into and out of the region. The Department of Justice and the
    Department of Homeland Security have launched an initiative to partner
    with local communities to counter extremist recruiting, and the
    Department of Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
    is working to disrupt ISIL's financing and expose their activities.

        4.  Continued Humanitarian Assistance

        The final element of the President's strategy is to continue
    providing humanitarian assistance to innocent civilians displaced or
    threatened by ISIL.
        Alongside the Government of Iraq, the United Kingdom, Canada,
    Australia, and France, U.S. troops have already delivered lifesaving
    aid to thousands of threatened Iraqi civilians on Mt. Sinjar and the
    Iraqi town of Amirli. In total, the U.S. military conducted 32 airdrops
    of food and supplies, providing 818,500 pounds of aid including 45,500
    gallons of water and nearly 122,000 meals ready-to-eat in these
    operations.
        In addition to this assistance, last week the Department of State
    announced an additional $48 million in aid for civilian organizations
    to meet the urgent needs of Iraqis displaced by ISIL. Our total
    humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis is now more than $186
    million in fiscal year 2014.
        The United States is also the single largest donor of humanitarian
    assistance for the millions of Syrians affected by the civil war. Last
    week, Secretary Kerry announced an additional $500 million in
    humanitarian assistance. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, the
    United States has now committed almost $3 billion in humanitarian
    assistance to those affected by the civil war.
                               a long-term effort
        All four elements of this strategy require a significant commitment
    of resources on the part of the United States and our coalition
    partners.
        This will not be an easy or brief effort. We are at war with ISIL,
    as we are with al Qaeda. But destroying ISIL will require more than
    military efforts alone . . . it will require political progress in the
    region, and effective partners on the ground in Iraq and Syria. As
    Congress and the administration work together, we know this effort will
    take time. The President has outlined a clear, comprehensive, and
    workable strategy to achieve our goals and protect our interests. Thank
    you for your continued support and partnership.
        Thank you.

        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Hagel.
        Thank you. [Directed to the audience.] Would you please
    leave? Would you please leave the room now? We are asking you
    nicely, but--we are asking you nicely to please leave the room.
    Look, we are asking you nicely. Would you please leave the
    room? Thank you. We have asked you for the last time. Thank you
    very much. Thank you for leaving, and--thank you. Goodbye.
        Now, as soon as the noise is removed from the room.
        We would ask all of you to avoid these kind of outbursts.
    They are not doing anybody any good, including hearing what
    this testimony is, and they are not doing you and whatever your
    cause is any good, either.
        Thank you very much. Would you please--I am asking you
    nicely to please leave the room. We are asking you again. Would
    you please remove this gentleman? Thank you very much. Goodbye.
    Goodbye. Thank you.
        General Dempsey.

    STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS
                                OF STAFF

        General Dempsey. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Ranking
    Member Inhofe, members of the committee. I do appreciate the
    opportunity to appear before you this morning.
        Secretary Hagel has described in detail the elements of our
    strategy against ISIL. The role the U.S. military is taking is,
    in my judgment, appropriate. This is an Iraq-first strategy,
    but not an Iraq-only one.
        Job one is empowering the Iraqi ground forces to go on the
    offensive, which they are already beginning to demonstrate.
    This requires a partnership with a credible Iraqi Government,
    which is also showing positive signs of becoming inclusive of
    all of its population.
        Within this partnership, our advisors are intended to help
    the Iraqis develop a mindset for the offensive and to take
    actions consistent with offensive. Our military advisors will
    help the Iraqis conduct campaign planning, arrange for enabler
    and logistics support, and coordinate our coalition activities.
    If we reach the point where I believe our advisors should
    accompany Iraq troops on attacks against specific ISIL targets,
    I will recommend that to the President.
        As long as ISIL enjoys a safe haven in Syria, it will
    remain a formidable force and a threat. While this work in Iraq
    is taking place, we will simultaneously pressure ISIL in Syria.
    With coalition partners and contributions, we will begin
    building a force of vetted, trained, moderate Syrians to take
    on ISIL in Syria. We will work to ensure that they have a
    Syrian chain of command and report to a moderate political
    authority. This force will work initially at the local and
    community level and help pull together Syrians who have most
    felt the harsh hand of ISIL.
        In conjunction with that long-term effort, we will be
    prepared to strike ISIL targets in Syria that degrade ISIL's
    capabilities. This won't look like a ``shock and awe''
    campaign, because that's simply not how ISIL is organized. But,
    it will be a persistent and sustainable campaign.
        I want to emphasize that our military actions must be part
    of a whole-of-government effort that works to disrupt ISIL
    financing, interdict the movement of foreign fighters across
    borders, and undermine the ISIL message. Given a coalition of
    capable, willing regional and international partners, I believe
    we can destroy ISIL in Iraq, restore the Iraq/Syria border, and
    disrupt ISIL in Syria.
        ISIL will ultimately be defeated when their cloak of
    religious legitimacy is stripped away and the population on
    which they have imposed themselves reject them. Our actions are
    intended to move in that direction. This will require a
    sustained effort over an extended period of time. It is a
    generational problem, and we should expect that our enemies
    will adapt their tactics as we adjust our approach.
        As the situation in the Middle East evolves and continues
    to demand our attention, we are also balancing other challenges
    in other regions, ebola being the most recent, along with
    reassuring our European allies against Russian aggression and
    continuing our mission in Afghanistan. Our young men and women
    in uniform are doing so much more. They conduct hundreds of
    exercises, activities, and engagements every day, actions that
    deter conflict and reassure allies around the world. They are
    performing magnificently.
        But, I am growing increasingly uncomfortable that the will
    to provide means does not match the will to pursue ends. The
    Secretary and I are doing what we can inside DOD to bridge that
    gap, but we will need your help. If we do not depart from our
    present path, over time I will have fewer military options to
    offer to the Secretary and to the President, and that is not a
    position in which I want to find myself.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, General Dempsey.
        We are going to have a 6-minute first round. We have a lot
    of us here, and we all want to have an opportunity. Then, if we
    go around once and have a reasonable hour facing us, we will
    try to have a very short second round. But, we just won't know
    that until we get to it.
        General Dempsey, let me start by asking you for your
    professional military opinion of the military strategy which
    was announced by the President last week. Do you personally
    support the strategy?
        General Dempsey. I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Can you tell us why?
        General Dempsey. Because the nature of the threat is such
    that, as I mentioned, it will only be defeated when moderate
    Arab and Muslim populations in the region reject it. Therefore,
    the way forward seems to me to run clearly through a coalition
    of Arab and Muslim partners, and not through the ownership of
    the United States in this issue.
        The strategy does that. It seeks to build a coalition,
    encourage an inclusive government to address the grievances
    that have caused this in the first place. It applies U.S.
    military power where we have unique capability to do so. Over
    time, it allows those populations to reject ISIL.
        Chairman Levin. In terms of utilizing the ground forces
    that are Syrian and Iraqi rather than western forces, is that
    part of the thinking at this time, as well, to avoid a western
    ground force in an Arab or Muslim country, for the same reason
    that you just gave?
        General Dempsey. I do think that the approach to build a
    coalition and enable it leaves me to leverage our unique
    capabilities, which tend to be, as I mentioned, the ability to
    train and plan and provide intelligence and provide air power.
        As I said in my statement, however, my view at this point
    is that this coalition is the appropriate way forward. I
    believe that will prove true. But, if it fails to be true, and
    if there are threats to the United States, then I, of course,
    would go back to the President and make a recommendation that
    may include the use of U.S. military ground forces.
        Chairman Levin. Secretary Hagel, you've made reference to
    this, but I would like you to elaborate how important is it
    that the coalition have very strong visible participation by
    Arab and Muslim states?
        Secretary Hagel. Mr. Chairman, you just reflected, in your
    question to General Dempsey, on the point, and I would pick up
    where General Dempsey left off. This is not a west-versus-east
    issue. This is not a U.S./European coalition against Muslim
    countries or a Muslim region. It's important that the world
    see, especially the people of the Middle East see, that the
    threat that is confronting them first, and all of us, needs to
    be addressed by the people of their region as well as all
    nations and all people in the world. To have Arab Muslim
    nations be present and public about their efforts in this
    coalition helps that. It's critically important to the ultimate
    success of winning against all extremist factors and factions
    in the Middle East, specifically ISIL.
        Chairman Levin. That same approach of having the people of
    these countries basically purge the strand of Islam that is so
    poisonous that is trying to take over in their countries, is
    one argument for using indigenous national forces on the ground
    rather than outside, and particularly western forces.
        Secretary Hagel. Yes. I said in my statement, Mr. Chairman,
    that the most significant powerful force against extremism in
    the Middle East is the people, themselves, who will not accept
    this kind of barbarity and brutality. The Muslims of the world
    know that what ISIL represents in no way is what their
    religion, what their ethnicity, what their background
    represents. To have the local forces be involved, supported by
    local people, is the most significant thing I think we can do
    as we support them, as we are doing and will continue to do in
    every way, to defeat ISIL and other extremist threats.
        Chairman Levin. I believe that you have testified that, on
    the equp and training of Syrian people--that the goal is to
    train-and-equip about 5,000 in 1 year. Now, how is that going
    to match up against the ISIL numbers? Let me just start with
    that one.
        Secretary Hagel. As I have said, and the President said,
    and General Dempsey has said, and I think in our briefings
    here, in our closed session briefings we have had with members
    of the Senate and the House and our staff here this week--5,000
    is a beginning, Mr. Chairman. This is part of the reason this
    effort is going to be a long-term effort.
        We will do it right. We will be able to train-and-equip
    these forces through our ability to give them tactical, give
    them strategic guidance in leadership, the kind of equipment
    they need, where they can move not just as bands of a few
    people, but as legitimate forces. Five thousand alone is not
    going to be able to turn the tide; we recognize that on this
    side. On the ISIL side, on the different estimates that
    continue to come out, those estimates float, Mr. Chairman,
    because it is hard to pinpoint at any one time exactly what the
    strength of ISIL is. We know it's significant. We know, because
    of their successes over the last few months, they have picked
    up significant support. We also know that a lot of that support
    is forced support, ``You will either be part of this or your
    family is killed, or you will be killed.'' It is an imperfect
    process.
        But, the 5,000 per year--and we may do better; we might be
    able to do better--but, we do not want to overstate or
    overpromise, because we want the right people, our part of the
    overall strategy that I articulated here, as outlined by the
    President.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would ask that you turn the maps over. This is just for
    reference. We put this together, with the help of the military,
    with the help of some think tanks, and the colors represented
    there, the orange would be what is under ISIL control right
    now; the gray would be the Kurdish control; and then, the brown
    would be the ambitions of ISIL.
        Do you look at that map and find any problem with it,
    either one of you?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        General Dempsey. Actually, Senator, in terms of their
    ambition, I think that is probably understating their ambition.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes.
        General Dempsey. I think, if left unaddressed, they would
    aspire to restore the ancient Kingdom of al-Sham, which
    includes the current state of Israel and runs all the way down
    to Kuwait.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, we are trying to be conservative on
    this.
        General Dempsey. Yes.
        Senator Inhofe. But let people know, this is a big area.
        Secretary Hagel, do you have a problem with this?
        Secretary Hagel. No. I think General Dempsey stated it
    exactly right.
        Senator Inhofe. All right.
        Okay. According to some of the reports, the U.S.
    intelligence agencies believe that ISIL does not represent the
    immediate threat to the United States. In fact, Daniel
    Benjamin, who was President Obama's top counterterrorism
    advisor during his first term, he said, ``Members of the
    Cabinet and top military officers all over the place describing
    the threat in lurid terms that are just not justified.''
        I appreciate, Secretary Hagel, the statement you made when
    you said that ISIS poses ``an imminent threat to every interest
    we have, whether it's in Iraq or anyplace else.'' Do you still
    agree with that statement?
        Secretary Hagel. I do.
        Senator Inhofe. Do you, General Dempsey?
        General Dempsey. Yes, I do, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. One of the things that I was glad to see is
    that for the American people, there's been a wake-up call. Last
    week, there was a CNN poll that said that 70 percent of the
    people in America believe it's a threat to our Homeland. Then
    yesterday, another one came out. This was a Wall Street Journal
    poll, the same thing, 70 percent of the people. I think that
    wake-up call has taken.
        Now, when President Obama--and this gets back to some of
    the statements you made in your opening remarks--he said, ``Our
    objective is clear. We will degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL
    through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism
    strategy.'' Now, it's clear--and we have talked about this
    side--this is an army. I outlined, in my opening statement, the
    six basic differences between al Qaeda and what we are facing
    right now. Do you generally agree with that?
        General Dempsey. What I generally agree with, Senator, is
    that they have been using conventional tactics until such time
    as we applied air power, and that they're beginning to adapt
    now.
        Senator Inhofe. Now you don't agree that that strategy that
    we would impose against terrorists or some group is appropriate
    today with looking in terms of the giant army that we are
    facing.
        General Dempsey. No, I agree we have to build the
    capability of the ISAF and the Pesh to address it
    conventionally while also including a counterterrorism
    component in our strategy.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay.
        Secretary Hagel, I would like to get in the record here as
    to who is in charge of the war, because we hear people like
    Ambassador Beecroft in DOS saying that they are in a lot of the
    control. If it's CENTCOM Commander Austin, then I feel a lot
    better about it. Is that who is in control of this? It's now
    military?
        Secretary Hagel. Yes. In my opening statement, Senator, I
    tried to frame some of that up, for example, what I mentioned
    about General Allen's role, initial role, as a coordinating
    role. But, I also said that he would work directly in that
    coordination with General Austin as the CENTCOM Commander.
    That's why President Obama will be with the CENTCOM Commander
    in Tampa tomorrow to go over the plan.
        Senator Inhofe. Sure.
        Mr. Secretary, my concern is, I don't want people to be
    under the delusion that this is just another terrorist effort
    that we are going to be pursuing.
        Asked by a reporter on September 11 to define victory
    against ISIL, the White House Press Secretary said, ``I didn't
    bring my Webster's Dictionary with me up here.'' Secretary
    Hagel, you didn't bring yours, either. Can you define what
    victory looks like to the United States against ISIL?
        Secretary Hagel. I believe victory would be when we
    complete the mission of degrading and destroying, defeating
    ISIL, just as the President laid out that was his objective.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes. I understand that. I got a different
    interpretation when I listened to his speech. When he said, on
    the fight against ISIL, ``It will not involve American combat
    troops fighting on the soil. American forces will not have a
    combat mission.''
        Let me ask you two questions, General Dempsey: First, in
    your opinion, are the pilots dropping bombs in Iraq, as they're
    now doing, a direct combat mission? Second, will U.S. forces be
    prepared to provide combat search and rescue if a pilot gets
    shot down, and will they put boots-on-the-ground to make that
    rescue successful?
        General Dempsey. Yes and yes.
        Senator Inhofe. Good. I appreciate that.
        The last question I have, because I know I have gone beyond
    my time. We have been complaining about what has happened in
    the funding, and now we are looking at the sequestration and
    all of this. In light of all of this that's occurred since we
    originally started talking about the funding that would be
    necessary, do you think we are adequately funded now to take
    care of all these things that we, as I stated in my opening
    statement and you have also agreed to? Where are we on our
    funding? Are we adequate?
        Secretary Hagel. Two answers to your question. No is the
    first basic answer. But, the budget that we will be coming up
    here presenting, in a few months, will contain what we believe
    is going to be required to carry forward, for the longer term,
    this effort. In the short term, this is why we are asking for
    the $500 million authority for the train-and-equip. Plus, the
    President had asked, a few months ago, for a $5 billion
    counterterrorism partnership fund, plus a billion-dollar
    European initiative fund, as well.
        I think what General Dempsey said in his closing comments
    in his statement probably summarized pretty well. As you have
    noted, all of the different pressures that are now coming down
    on this country, residing, a good amount of it, at DOD, one of
    the things that we have been warning about is sequestration
    over the last year and a half. We will come forward in our
    budget for the next fiscal year with some new requests.
        General Dempsey. If I could just elaborate? On behalf of
    the Joint Chiefs, because we've discussed this frequently about
    our ability to balance capability, capacity, and readiness.
        Last year, we said that the size of the force that was
    projected over the course of the POM, over the Future Years
    Defense Plan, was adequate to the task if the assumptions made
    were valid. Some of the assumptions we made were about
    commitments, and some of the assumptions we made were about our
    ability to get paid compensation, healthcare changes,
    infrastructure changes, and weapon systems. We didn't get any
    of those, actually, or very few of them, and the commitments
    have increased. We do have a problem, and I think it will
    become clear through the fall. It's not a problem that we can
    solve just with overseas contingency operations (OCO). That is
    to say, the operational contingency funds. There's a base
    budget issue here, too, we have to get at.
        Senator Inhofe. I know that's true. But, you mentioned the
    Chiefs, and Odierno and the other Chiefs have come and
    testified in this room before us that, even before these things
    erupted, it was not adequate. As we all know, risk increases
    when the adequacy is not met.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
        We have a quorum here now, and so I am going to ask the
    committee to consider the list of 2,458 pending military
    nominations. They have been before the committee the required
    length of time. Is there a motion to favorably report the
    nominations?
        Senator Inhofe. I so move.
        Chairman Levin. Is there a second?
        Senator Reed. Second.
        Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
        Opposed, nay. [No response.]
        The motion carries. Thank you very much.
        [The list of nominations considered and approved by the
    committee follows:]
     Military Nominations Pending with the Senate Armed Services Committee
     Which are Proposed for the Committee's Consideration on September 16,
                                     2014.
         1. MG Gustave F. Perna, USA, to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Chief of Staff, G-4, U.S. Army (Reference No. 1465).
         2. Capt. Kathleen M. Creighton, USN, to be rear admiral (lower
    half) (Reference No. 1540).
         3. Capt. Todd J. Squire, USN to be rear admiral (lower half)
    (Reference No. 1545).
         4. In the Navy, there are three appointments to the grade of rear
    admiral (list begins with Brian B. Brown) (Reference No. 1590).
         5. In the Army, there are 417 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Stephen R. Abrams) (Reference No. 1604).
         6. In the Army, there are 420 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Isaiah C. Abbott) (Reference No. 1605).
         7. In the Army, there are 862 appointments to the grade of major
    (list begins with Jason K. Abbott) (Reference No. 1606).
         8. MG Steven L. Kwast, USAF, to be lieutenant general and
    Commander and President, Air University (Reference No. 1943).
         9. MG Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy, USAF, to be lieutenant general
    and Deputy Commander, United Nations Command Korea; Deputy Commander,
    U.S. Forces Korea; Commander, Air Component Command, Republic of Korea/
    U.S. Combined Forces Command; and Commander, Seventh Air Force, Pacific
    Air Forces (Reference No. 1944).
        10. Col. Scott G. Perry, ARNG, to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 1945).
        11. Col. Joseph J. Heck, USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference
    No. 1946).
        12. BG Mark S. Inch, USA, to be major general (Reference No. 1947).
        13. VADM Philip S. Davidson, USN, to be admiral and Commander, U.S.
    Fleet Forces Command (Reference No. 1948).
        14. RADM Dixon R. Smith, USN, to be vice admiral and Commander,
    Navy Installations Command (Reference No. 1949).
        15. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Lisa L. Adams) (Reference No. 1950).
        16. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of
    colonel (Richard D. Mink) (Reference No. 1951).
        17. In the Air Force, there are 11 appointments to the grade of
    major (list begins with David L. Allison) (Reference No. 1953).
        18. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Claudia D. Henderson) (Reference No. 1954).
        19. In the Army, there are 265 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jesse Abreu) (Reference No. 1955).
        20. In the Army, there is one appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (Sun S. Macupa) (Reference No. 1956).
        21. In the Army, there are 450 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Brian S. Adams) (Reference No.
    1957).
        22. In the Army, there are 280 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Clark C. K. Adams II) (Reference
    No. 1958).
        23. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of captain
    (Edward J. Eder) (Reference No. 1959).
        24. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (William A. Burns) (Reference No. 1960).
        25. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (Kevin L. Bell) (Reference No. 1961).
        26. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander
    (Clayton M. Pendergrass) (Reference No. 1962).
        27. In the Navy, there are two appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (Casey D. Ferguson) (Reference No. 1963).
        28. In the Navy, there are 71 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Crystal R. Aandahl) (Reference
    No. 1964).
        29. In the Navy, there are 73 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Cynthia N. Abella) (Reference
    No. 1965).
        30. In the Navy, there are 34 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Christopher A. Adams) (Reference
    No. 1966).
        31. In the Navy, there are 35 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Jesse D. Adams) (Reference No.
    1967).
        32. In the Navy, there are 30 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Jon A. Angle) (Reference No.
    1968).
        33. In the Navy, there are 67 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Todd A. Anderson) (Reference No.
    1969).
        34. In the Navy, there are 73 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Austin G. Aldridge) (Reference
    No. 1970).
        35. In the Navy, there are 182 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (list begins with Alwin L. Albert) (Reference No.
    1971).
        36. LTG Tod D. Wolters, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Deputy
    Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements, Headquarters, U.S.
    Air Force (Reference No. 2001).
        37. BG Veralinn Jamieson, USAF, to be major general (Reference No.
    2002).
        38. MG John W. Nicholson, Jr., USA, to be lieutenant general and
    Commander, Allied Land Command, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    (Reference No. 2004).
        39. BG Paul M. Benenati, USAR, to be major general (Reference No.
    2005).
        40. BG Michael A. Calhoun, ARNG, to be major general (Reference No.
    2006).
        41. BG Bret D. Daugherty, ARNG, to be major general (Reference No.
    2007).
        42. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of
    brigadier general (list begins with Raul E. Escribano) (Reference No.
    2008).
        43. In the Army Reserve, there are three appointments to the grade
    of colonel (list begins with Herbert J. Brock IV) (Reference No. 2009).
        44. In the Army, there are 125 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Syed Ahmed) (Reference No. 2010).
        45. In the Army, there are 26 appointments to the grade of
    lieutenant colonel (list begins with Bradley Aebi) (Reference No.
    2011).
        46. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (Gregory E. Oxford) (Reference No. 2012).
        47. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of
    lieutenant commander (Benjamin I. Abney) (Reference No. 2013).
        48. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of commander
    (Joel N. Peterson) (Reference No. 2014).
        49. In the Navy, there are eight appointments to the grade of
    captain (list begins with Gregory C. Cathcart) (Reference No. 2015).
        Total: 2,458.

        Chairman Levin. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.
        General Dempsey, we have had a debate going on and on about
    no boots-on-the-ground, some boots-on-the-ground, no boots-on-
    the-ground. It might help us all if you would clarify precisely
    what our forces are doing in Iraq today. You all suggested that
    if the situation changes, you might recommend or come to us
    with a recommendation that they would enhance their mission or
    change their mission. But, can you clarify what they are doing?
        General Dempsey. Yes, I can. Thanks for asking, Senator.
        First of all, I think everyone should be aware, when we
    talk about combat forces, that's all we grow. When we bring a
    young man or woman into the military, they come in to be a
    combat soldier or a combat marine--we don't bring them in to be
    anything other than combat-capable. But, that is different than
    how we use them. In the case of our contributions in Iraq right
    now, the airmen, as the ranking member mentioned, are very much
    in a combat role. The folks on the ground are very much in a
    combat advisory role. They are not participating in direct
    combat. There is no intention for them to do so. I have
    mentioned, though, that if I found that circumstance evolving,
    that I would, of course, change my recommendation.
        An example. If the Iraqi security forces and the Pesh were
    at some point ready to retake Mosul, a mission that I would
    find to be extraordinarily complex, it could very well be part
    of that particular mission to provide close combat advising or
    accompanying for that mission. But, for the day-to-day
    activities that I anticipate will evolve over time, I don't see
    it to be necessary right now.
        Senator Reed. One of the presumptions would be, because we
    are using air power, that there is sufficient capacity in the
    Iraqi forces to coordinate that air power on the ground? Is
    that the issue you are looking at, or that is an issue?
        General Dempsey. No, we have, Senator. Let me use the Mosul
    Dam operation as a great example of that. On the ground, we had
    the Peshmerga, and we had the counterterrorist service from the
    Iraqi security forces, and then, in an operation center in
    Erbil, we had our own folks, using predator feeds and a system
    we call the ROVER to be able to help the Iraqis manage the
    battle on the ground. Incredibly complex. Three languages:
    English, Kurdish, and Arab. We worked through it. It was a real
    challenge, but we worked through it. As we did, we learned some
    things about how to use advisors from remote locations.
        I am not saying this will work every place, every time.
    But, we pulled that mission off, and I think it's a good
    template for future operations.
        Senator Reed. I presume one of the areas you are really
    looking at is these capable Iraqis who can communicate and
    coordinate on the ground, their special forces particularly.
        General Dempsey. Trained by us, that's right.
        Senator Reed. Right.
        Mr. Secretary, the President's proposing to train about
    5,000 individuals a year to go back into Syria. The Saudis have
    agreed to host it in some manner. How do you integrate these
    forces back into Syria? Will they go in as units? What's the
    plan after they are trained? Because I think that is part of
    the issue.
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, one of the points that I made a
    couple of minutes ago, in answering Senator Inhofe's question,
    was the point about training them as units so they can operate
    as units, which is, with your military experience, critically
    important as you build an effective opposition force, not just
    a hit-and-run group of rebels, but an effective force--command-
    control, tactics, strategy. So, yes, that is the fundamental
    training principle of how we begin.
        The length of the time here depends on a number of things,
    but we are probably talking about 8 weeks per cycle. That might
    move, within a week or 2, but that's the intent of how they
    would train up.
        The CENTCOM leaders are already focused on that, are
    already structured to do that, are preparing. One of the things
    the President will get tomorrow, as he spends the day with
    General Austin and the CENTCOM planners and commanders in
    Tampa, is taking him through that entire structure.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Dempsey, I think in your remarks, or the
    Secretary's remarks, you suggested that the immediate
    operations will probably most likely be in Iraq, simply because
    we have the Iraqi National Security Forces, we are already
    partnering them, we just conducted strike. That will put ISIL
    in the position of, as we hopefully become more effective, of
    making a decision to reinforce or to respond in Iraq and weaken
    them in Syria or to pull back into Syria. I think your strategy
    is probably the most effective use of what we have at the time,
    but would you like to comment on that?
        General Dempsey. The strategy is to squeeze ISIL from
    multiple directions so that they can't do what they have been
    doing, which is maneuver places where they're not under
    pressure. If we can get the Government of Iraq to reach out to
    these populations that have been disadvantaged during the
    Maliki regime so that the ISIL doesn't have a free-flowing
    stream in which to float, and if we can get the ISAF--and we
    have done an assessment of the 50 brigades of the ISAF around
    Baghdad, we know which ones are capable of partnering and
    improving their capabilities--if we can get enough of them to
    go on the offensive, both west and north, get the Peshmerga to
    squeeze from north to south, and then find a way, over time, in
    Syria initially to disrupt using air power, and eventually to
    pressure using a moderate opposition, then I think we place
    ISIL in an untenable position. In the middle of that, restore
    the border so they can't flow back and forth freely.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank the witnesses.
        I understand that, according to your testimony, we will be
    training and equipping approximately 5,000 in 1 year. Is that
    correct?
        Secretary Hagel. Yes.
        Senator McCain. The estimates for ISIL now are that there
    are some 31,000 metastasizing in a very rapid fashion into a
    much larger force. To many of us, that seems like an inadequate
    response to what----
        Chairman Levin. [Directed to the audience.] Would you
    please be quiet. I am asking you now to please leave the room.
    Please remove this lady. Please remove her. The disruptions are
    not going to be acceptable to anybody. They are not helping you
    in any way. Please remove the lady from the room. Thank you
    very much, to our Capitol Police officers. Thank you.
        Senator McCain. I always appreciate special attention from
    this group, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Obviously, this group of 5,000, as you
    mentioned, in unit-sized deployments will be back in Syria,
    fighting against ISIL. They will also be fighting against
    Bashar Assad, which they have been doing for a number of years
    before ISIL was ever a significant factor. Now, they will be
    fighting against Bashar Assad. Bashar Assad will attack them
    from the air, which he has done, and with significant success,
    not only against them, but there's been 192,000 people who have
    been slaughtered in Syria since the onset. If one of the Free
    Syrian Army is fighting against Bashar Assad, and he is
    attacking them from the air, would we take action to prevent
    them from being attacked by Bashar Assad?
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, let me begin. To the first part
    of your question, the 5,000.
        Senator McCain. Dispense with that. I'd like to answer the
    question. If the Free Syrian Army units are attacked from the
    air by Bashar Assad, will we prevent those attacks from taking
    place and take out Bashar Assad's air assets, both helicopter
    and fixed wing, that will be attacking the Free Syrian Army
    units?
        Secretary Hagel. We're, first of all, not there yet, but
    our focus is on ISIL. That is the threat----
        Senator McCain. So we heard.
        Secretary Hagel.--right now to our country and to our
    interests and to the people of the region. What we are training
    these units for, yes, is a stabilizing force in Syria, as an
    option, but the first focus is, as I just said, as the
    President laid out in his statement to the country----
        Senator McCain. I take it from your answer that we are now
    recruiting these young men to go and fight in Syria against
    ISIL, but if they are attacked by Bashar Assad, we are not
    going to help them. Is that correct?
        Secretary Hagel. They will defend themselves, Senator.
        Senator McCain. Will we help them against Assad's air----
        Secretary Hagel. We will help them, and we will support
    them as we have trained them.
        Senator McCain. Will we repel Bashar Assad's air assets
    that will be attacking them?
        Secretary Hagel. Any attack on those that we have trained
    who are supporting us, we will help them.
        Senator McCain. I guess I am not going to get an answer. It
    seems to me that you have to neutralize Bashar Assad's air
    assets if you are going to protect these people that we are
    arming and training and sending in to fight.
        Is that inaccurate, General Dempsey?
        General Dempsey. The coalition we are forming, Senator,
    won't form unless--if we were to take Assad off the table, we
    would have a much more difficult time forming a coalition. I
    think what you are hearing us express is an ISIL-first
    strategy. I don't think we'll find ourselves in that situation,
    given what we intend to do with----
        Senator McCain. You don't think that the Free Syrian Army
    is going to fight against Bashar Assad, who has been decimating
    them? You think that these people you are training will only go
    back to fight against ISIL? Do you really believe that,
    General?
        General Dempsey. What I believe, Senator, is that, as we
    train them and develop a military chain of command linked to a
    political structure, that we can establish objectives that
    defer that challenge into the future. We do not have to deal
    with it now.
        Senator McCain. That's a fundamental misunderstanding of
    the entire concept and motivation of the Free Syrian Army. It
    is Bashar Assad that has killed many more of them than ISIL
    has.
        General Dempsey. I agree.
        Senator McCain. For us to say that we are going to go in
    and help and train-and-equip these people, and only to fight
    against ISIL, you're not going to get many recruits to do that,
    General. I guarantee you that. That's a fundamental fallacy in
    everything you are presenting this committee today.
        Secretary Hagel, was the President right, in 2012, when he
    overruled most of his national security team and refused to
    train-and-equip the moderate opposition in Syria at that time?
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, I was not there at the time, so I
    am limited----
        Senator McCain. I'll ask General Dempsey, then. He was
    there at the time.
        General Dempsey. I am sorry, Senator, when you asked the
    question----
        Senator McCain. Was the President right, in 2012, when he
    overruled his Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and
    Director of the CIA, and refused to train-and-equip the
    moderate opposition forces in Syria, which, according to your
    testimony, we are doing today?
        General Dempsey. Senator, you know that I recommended that
    we train them; and you know that, for policy reasons, the
    decision was taken in another direction.
        Senator McCain. Thank you.
        Are you concerned, Secretary Hagel, about our southern
    border? We received testimony from our Homeland security people
    that our border is porous and the people who are now free to
    travel to the United States and also other radical elements
    might cross our southern border to attack the United States?
        Secretary Hagel. I am always concerned about our borders.
        Senator McCain. I mean, is that a serious concern of yours?
        Secretary Hagel. I think we have to always look at these
    things as serious concerns.
        Senator McCain. In other words, do you think we have to
    improve our border security, especially on the southern border?
        Secretary Hagel. We can improve our border security.
        Senator McCain. Thank you.
        My time is expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Nelson. Senator McCain, you're aware that there
    were published reports of covert training.
        Senator McCain. I am aware of it. I am also aware of the
    scale of the training that was required. I am also aware of the
    situation today. I am also aware 192,000 people have been
    slaughtered, a lot of them with these so-called ``barrel
    bombs,'' and the use of chlorine gas, which has caused a
    humanitarian disaster of incredible proportions. Yes, I am
    aware of that.
        Senator Nelson. General Dempsey, are you aware of the
    published reports of covert training?
        General Dempsey. Senator, we don't comment in public about
    any aspect of covert training.
        Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I believe that the President
    has the constitutional authority to go on and attack ISIS. This
    is going to be for the long haul. Eventually, this issue will
    have to come to Congress for authorization for the use of
    military force. You all have an appropriations request right
    now.
        My question is, if Congress does not approve--and I have
    heard some Members of Congress say that they are not going to
    vote to approve this $500 million request--if they did that and
    refused before we adjourn to go home for the election, what
    kind of message do you think that sends?
        Secretary Hagel. I think that message would be very
    seriously misunderstood and misinterpreted by our allies, our
    friends, our partners around the world, and our adversaries.
    This is a clear threat, what the President has talked about,
    the threat to this country from ISIL, and what his request is,
    and reaching out to Congress for partnership as he has done, in
    consultation with many Members of Congress, to be partners in
    this effort to protect this country. If Congress would not
    agree to that request, it would be a pretty devastating message
    that we send to the world.
        Chairman Levin. [Directed to the audience.] All right, all
    right, would you please not take advantage of the freedom of
    this place? Will you please remove this lady from the room?
    Thank you. This disruption is not helping either the facts to
    be known or helping your cause in any way.
        Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, I've taken this position
    that I think the President has the constitutional authority to
    go on and attack inside Syria. The fact that you're making this
    request, and, as you've testified here today, that you'll train
    up 5,000 over the course of the next year, does that basically
    mean any kind of coordinated effort on the ground in Syria is
    delayed for a year?
        Secretary Hagel. If we don't have ground capability in a
    moderate opposition, yes, it affects a rather significant
    dimension of the overall strategy.
        Senator Nelson. Some people are saying that attacking ISIS,
    both in Iraq and Syria, is playing into their hands by them
    using that to divide Muslims against us. What is your opinion?
        Secretary Hagel. This is why the coalition, including, out
    front, publicly, Muslim Arab countries, is so critical to this.
    I think in one or two of my answers this morning, as well as in
    my testimony, I noted that.
        Senator Nelson. Can you shed any more light--as ISIS, as
    one of the two of you have testified, recedes into an urban
    area and takes shelter there among a civilian population, how,
    in Iraq, for example, can the Iraqi security forces be able to
    root them out of that civilian territory?
        Secretary Hagel. This, again, is why we need the people,
    themselves, in Iraq, in Syria, to support a unified unity,
    inclusive, representative government in Iraq to help them do
    that. The Sunni tribes are critical to this. What's allowed so
    much of this to happen, Senator, as you visited there many
    times, is--the last government in Iraq, over the last 5 years,
    have actually exacerbated the effort and intentionally
    destroyed the capability of a unity government to bring in the
    Sunni/Shia/Kurdish populations to a government that they would
    trust, that they could have confidence in, that they knew would
    work in everyone's interest. Your question cuts directly to the
    overall effort, here, of what the President talked about in a
    new, inclusive unity government, which we have some confidence
    in, but we believe that a body will do. So far, in his
    appointments to his cabinet, we have seen evidence of that
    inclusiveness.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today.
        Here's how I view it. The surge in Iraq, ordered by
    President George W. Bush, worked. President Obama rejected the
    advice of many of his top military leaders to leave a residual
    force. Our administration did not make every effort that it
    possibly could to gain a Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq. We
    completely withdrew. Now ISIS is there, controlling large parts
    of the territory and wreaking the havoc that the President's
    responding to.
        I am willing to help the President, and to help you
    gentlemen, take this hill again if I believe there is a plan
    that will work and be successful. If training 5,000 troops by
    the end of 1 year is going to help us be successful against
    something that's already metastasized, and at 31,000, which is
    the size of ISIS now, I want to help, if we can be convinced it
    will work, and also if we can have some assurance that we will
    not throw away our gains this time, as we did after the surge
    worked.
        General Dempsey, in answer to the question by the chairman
    of this committee, ``Do you support the President's strategy?''
    you say that you do. Now, the Washington Post reports that Mr.
    Obama has rejected the recommendation of his top military
    commanders that U.S. Special Operation Forces be deployed to
    assist Iraqi army units in fighting the rebels. Is that report
    by Rajiv Chandrasekaran correct, in the Washington Post? Where
    did you come down on that recommendation?
        General Dempsey. No, that report is not correct. Where I
    came down on the recommendation, in terms of having advisors
    accompany--this is the issue we're describing, whether
    advisors, who are already there and generally resident in
    headquarters--whether they would accompany the Iraqi security
    forces into combat. I have not come to an occasion where I
    believe that's necessary. They are doing fine. We're able to
    provide them air power using full motion video and systems----
        Senator Wicker. Who is doing fine?
        General Dempsey. The Iraqi security forces and the
    Peshmerga are moving back on the offensive.
        As I said, Senator, if I get to the point where, for a
    particular mission, I think they should accompany, I'll make
    that recommendation.
        Senator Wicker. Yes, and I did hear you say that, and I at
    least appreciate that.
        Let me submit for the record a column in today's Washington
    Post, Mr. Chairman, by Marc Thiessen, wherein he talks about
    General Lloyd Austin, a top commander, U.S. Forces in the
    Middle East. To quote Mr. Thiessen, ``In 2010, General Austin
    advised President Obama against withdrawing all U.S. forces
    from Iraq, recommending that the President instead leave 24,000
    U.S. troops to secure the military gains made in the surge and
    to prevent a terrorist resurgence. Had Obama listened to
    Austin's counsel, the rise of the Islamic State could have been
    stopped.'' Where did you come down on that debate, General
    Dempsey, at that point?
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        General Dempsey. Actually, Senator, we don't debate
    anything in the military. We provide options and let our
    elected officials make their decisions.
        It's well known that all military leaders believed we
    needed to leave some residual force in Iraq to continue the
    development of the security forces. There is a debate, in which
    I am not a participant, about whether we tried as hard as we
    could to leave it there. That's a debate that will continue, I
    believe. But, I thought we should have left forces there. I
    traveled to Iraq, as the Chief of Staff of the Army at the
    time, and I discussed it with the Prime Minister.
        Look, I don't know how history will exactly describe this.
    Let me describe Nouri al-Maliki as a very difficult partner
    most of the time, and in particular on that issue.
        Senator Wicker. On the issue of trying hard enough, I think
    anybody that's really observed the situation would acknowledge
    that a U.S. Government that can go into Iraq today and persuade
    the Prime Minister to step down could certainly have mustered
    the skills to get them to sign a Status of Forces Agreement.
    It's obvious to me that we didn't try very hard.
        Let me just reiterate to you, I want us to win. I want us
    to defeat ISIS. But, I want a plan that can be successful, and
    I am not sure 5,000 trained in a year can be successful against
    31,000. I want to make sure that we don't make the same mistake
    again by throwing those gains away.
        One quick question to you, Secretary Hagel. In reading your
    testimony about what the coalition partners are going to do, I
    have no idea specifically what we are asking of them or what we
    can expect. They've expressed their willingness, they've
    indicated their readiness, they want to help, to do their
    share, begin making commitments, take measures to suppress the
    flow. I have no idea, based on your testimony, what our
    coalition partners are expected to do, or even what we want
    them to do.
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, my intent was not to give you
    that inventory this morning and go through that.
        Senator Wicker. Are you able to?
        Secretary Hagel. We can do that privately, in closed
    session, with a number of countries. That's what we're doing
    right now. We're in the process of doing that right now. As I
    mentioned, over the last 2 weeks, we've been building the
    coalition. We've been organizing the coalition. General Allen's
    main job, as I noted in my testimony, is doing that right now.
    He's meeting with the President this morning. We have all
    finalized that effort. We have a list of over 40 nations who we
    have talked to. Most have come to us, who have volunteered
    specific areas of expertise, what they would do. We'll make
    specific requests. That's ongoing right now. That's part of the
    plan the President discussed.
        Senator Wicker. Will Saudi pilots in Saudi jets be involved
    in airstrikes?
        Secretary Hagel. Like I said, it's part of the plan, and I
    don't want to get into the specifics of that in an open
    hearing. But, as I said in my testimony, as Secretary Kerry has
    said as recently as yesterday, we have Middle Eastern allies
    who have said that they will be involved in military operations
    with us. For right now, at an open hearing, let me leave it
    that way.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary Hagel. Let me assure you that that is going on
    right now, and it's a key part of what we need to do.
        General Dempsey. If I could assure the Senator that, when
    Lloyd Austin and I convene a Chief of Defense Conference soon,
    after the President approves the campaign plan, there's a
    couple of things we have to accomplish. One is, we need to make
    the campaign plan the Iraqi campaign plan, not CENTCOM's
    campaign plan. Second, the contributions of, in particular, the
    Arab nations need to be real. This is military, now. I'm not
    looking for political support, I'm looking for special forces
    advisors, I'm looking for trainers, I'm looking for tankers,
    I'm looking for ISR, and I'm looking for strike aircraft.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker.
        Senator Wicker. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator McCaskill?
        Senator McCaskill. Just to clarify a different set of
    circumstances, when Maliki and the Government of Iraq told us
    to get out and refused to do a Status of Forces Agreement, I am
    pretty sure Iran was with them on that, correct? Iran was very
    close to Maliki, and Iran wanted us out of Iraq as much as the
    Iraqi Government did at that point in time. Is that a correct
    assessment, Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey?
        General Dempsey. Yes, I guess I'm stuck with this one
    because I was the one here, right? Here I am, I said I did not
    want to get into the debate; now I am in the debate.
        You know what? Who knows what was going through Prime
    Minister Maliki's head at the time. I can tell you from
    personal contact with him, he had a almost obsessive notion of
    his sovereignty and wanting to establish it. Was he influenced
    by Iran? Undoubtedly.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        General Dempsey. It is pretty hard to say, Senator. But,
    what I will tell you, he was a very reluctant partner.
        Senator McCaskill. I guess the point I am trying to make
    is, it's a much different situation now, in terms of getting
    Maliki to step down. Iran was very concerned about ISIL taking
    over Iraq and what that meant. Clearly there was pressure being
    exerted for Maliki to step down, by Iran. I think, for us to
    take credit for getting Maliki to step down is unrealistic, in
    light of what the geopolitical forces were in their neck of the
    woods at that point in time.
        Secretary Hagel. I was here, on this episode, and I can
    tell that it wasn't the United States that pushed Maliki out;
    it was his own people, Iran being part of that. It wasn't the
    United States dictating that Maliki stay or not stay. Let's not
    forget that Iraq is a sovereign nation, it has elections. We
    may not like the outcomes, but it is a sovereign country. That
    was the entire point when President Bush signed the December
    2008 agreement to leave Iraq.
        Senator McCaskill. Right.
        Secretary Hagel. It was a sovereign nation. The United
    States didn't force or push, through some new system of
    influence, Maliki out. It was the people that made that
    decision.
        Senator McCaskill. I want to touch on the issue of the Shia
    militia. As we looked at the surge, one of our successes in the
    surge was certainly our ability to bring over moderate Sunnis.
    That was noted at the time and talked about a great deal, about
    our ability to finally get the cooperation of a lot of moderate
    Sunnis. Clearly, the moderate Sunnis have thrown in with ISIL
    because of the political problems that they were confronted
    with, in terms of exclusion from the Iraqi Government. The
    clerics put out the call to repel ISIL to the Shia militias,
    and they have been partially responsible for the successes that
    have occurred on the ground.
        What are we doing? This is just one of many complex
    problems that presents itself in this tangle that we are in.
    One of the most complex is, how are we going to deal with the
    empowerment of the Shia militia within the Iraqi security
    forces, moving forward, as we try to ultimately get a political
    solution, which is a unified government and security forces
    that represent all parts of that country?
        General Dempsey. Couple of things, Senator. One is, I'm a
    little reluctant--in fact, I try not to ever talk about ``the
    Sunni'' as a monolithic block. If the Senator's chart was still
    up there, it looks like ISIL has geographic objectives. It
    actually has tribal objectives. It eats its way tribe by tribe,
    wherever it goes. The fact that it ends up in Mosul is actually
    more happenstance of the tribe they are trying to pursue. If we
    showed the tribes on that slide, there would probably be 48 to
    54 different tribes that ISIL has, in some ways, coerced or co-
    opted or driven away. The Sunni are not monolithic in any
    sense, and we have to remember that.
        The second thing is, on your question about the Shia
    militia. I think our offer of support, here, will be
    conditional. For example, there were 50 Iraqi brigades that we
    assessed, 26 of them we assessed to be reputable partners. That
    is, to say, they have remained multi-confessional, they are
    well-led, they still have their equipment, they seem to have a
    certain cohesion and a commitment to the central government.
    The other 24 concerned us a bit on the issue of infiltration
    and leadership and sectarianism.
        We can apply our support conditionally, and that's the way
    we influence the outcome I think you're discussing.
        Senator McCaskill. Finally, I'm assuming that this is a
    contingency operation and wanted to point out that the new
    provisions of the war contracting legislation that have been
    put into law should be applicable for this effort. I know that
    there is some talk that you've asked for cost estimates for
    security assistance mentors and advisors in Iraq through a
    contracting platform. I don't know, are we building training
    facilities in Saudi, the American Government? If so, I just
    wanted to sound the alarm now, before rather than after, that
    all these contracting provisions that we've worked so hard to
    get into place, that we don't go down the road of mistakes that
    we have traveled so frequently around this contracting space in
    contingencies.
        Secretary Hagel. I can assure you, Senator, that any
    commitments we made, in contracting or anything else, we will
    follow the law clearly and consult with Congress.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank both of you for your service during these
    challenging times.
        I wanted to follow up, General Dempsey, on a question that
    Senator Wicker had asked you about, about providing our
    advisors or our Special Forces, embedding them with the Iraqi
    forces. I believe you said that you don't believe that that is
    necessary right now. Would you agree with me, though, that
    airstrikes are much more effective with having our Special
    Forces, or having a Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC)
    capability, in terms of the effectiveness of strikes on the
    ground, with our people?
        General Dempsey. It depends on the kind of contact that the
    two forces are having. Please let me explain.
        When the two forces are separate, when ISIL is at some
    geographic separation from the Iraqi security forces, it's not
    very difficult at all to discriminate between the targets.
        Senator Ayotte. Sure. Isn't our problem with when they are
    not out in open space, when we have to distinguish between, for
    example, civilian targets and military targets, that our people
    are very effective at that?
        General Dempsey. Yes, absolutely. That is where I was
    headed. If we get into a circumstance where the forces are very
    intermingled, then the target discrimination becomes more
    difficult.
        I will say, this isn't a light switch, either you do it or
    you don't. There are technologies available, that we didn't
    have 5 years ago, that allow us to actually apply force and to
    see the situation on the ground in ways we couldn't before. I'm
    not walking away from what I said. If we get to the point where
    I think we need the JTAC with the Iraqi security forces, I'll
    make the recommendation. But, I'm not there.
        Senator Ayotte. You do not think we need that at this time?
        General Dempsey. I do not.
        Senator Ayotte. Can I ask you a question? What was General
    Austin's thought on this, given that he's the CENTCOM Commander
    and his prior experience in Iraq?
        General Dempsey. On the Mosul Dam operation, the one I
    described earlier, which was very complicated, of the two
    different forces speaking two different languages, he did
    suggest that we should use the JTACs in an accompanying role.
    As we discussed it and worked through it, he found a way to do
    it, as I described it to you.
        Senator Ayotte. He has not made recommendations, beyond the
    Mosul Dam operation, that we should embed our Special Forces
    or, certainly, JTAC capability with the forces?
        General Dempsey. Not at this time. No, he shares my view
    that there will be circumstances when we think that'll be
    necessary, but we haven't encountered one yet.
        Senator Ayotte. I think we've had experience with this,
    though, haven't we, prior in Iraq, with having our forces
    embedded, and also with Afghanistan, of our people being quite
    effective, in terms of targeting the airstrikes? You would
    agree with me?
        General Dempsey. Absolutely. We know how to do that.
        Senator Ayotte. Yes. Thinking about as we are dealing with
    civilian populations, I'm not confident how this is going to
    happen without the assistance of our trained special operators
    on the ground, here.
        But, I appreciate that you've said that you have not ruled
    this out.
        General Dempsey. I have not, in terms of recommendations.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you. Has the President ruled it out?
        General Dempsey. At this point, his stated policy is that
    we will not have U.S. ground forces in direct combat. So, yes.
        Senator Ayotte. Including operators and JTAC embedded on
    the ground.
        General Dempsey. That's correct. But, he has told me, as
    well, to come back to him on a case-by-case basis.
        Senator Ayotte. Let me ask you about the threat that we
    face, Secretary Hagel, General Dempsey. So, General Allen, who
    I have great respect for, and I know both of you do, as well,
    he has been appointed the Special Presidential Envoy for the
    global coalition to counter ISIL. We all know his experience,
    not only in Iraq, but in Afghanistan. He has described in
    August ISIL as a clear and present danger to the United States.
    Do you agree with his characterization?
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, I was asked the question earlier,
    whether I agreed, still, with what I had said. My words were
    quoted back to me about an imminent threat to America's
    interests around the world. I said, yes, I do, ISIL is a threat
    to America, our allies, our interests around the world. I'm not
    going to answer for General Allen, but I think we all agree, at
    least within the administration--General Allen, General
    Dempsey, General Austin, me, the President, others--that ISIL
    is a threat. I said that in my testimony. The President of the
    United States said it last week in his speech.
        Senator Ayotte. Do you believe it's a present threat to us?
        Secretary Hagel. A present threat, meaning they murdered
    two Americans over the last couple of weeks. I'd say that's a
    pretty imminent threat.
        Other threats that they have in--and how they threaten us--
    --
        Senator Ayotte. Yes, I would agree. Our prayers continue to
    go out to the Foley and Sotloff families, who--Jim Foley was
    from New Hampshire, and Steven Sotloff went to school in New
    Hampshire, so I believe it's an absolute clear and present
    threat to us.
        Let me ask you about the Americans who have joined. In the
    Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
    last week, we had testimony from our top Homeland security
    officials, as well as from the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI), about the 100 Americans that have either gone to Syria
    or attempted to go to Syria. What I learned was that this is
    not a firm number. How confident are we that we have track of
    these individuals, that we know that there's only 100 involved?
        I would ask the same question with regard to those who are
    holding Western passports, where we know that many of those
    countries--unfortunately, Jim Foley's murderer had a British
    accent, and we have a visa waiver program with Great Britain.
    How confident are we in those numbers, as we look at this
    Homeland threat, the ability and track of those individuals to
    come back to the United States of America in some way.
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, I think, like any of these
    threats, they always present imperfect situations. When you ask
    ``how confident,'' we are as confident as we can be, but you're
    constantly working at trying to make it better, more secure. I
    announced today in my testimony, it was announced a couple of
    days ago, what we're doing with Homeland security, what we're
    doing with the Deparment of Justice, what we're doing with our
    Border Patrol, in coordination with all of these other nations,
    on identifying these individuals that we do know, or we are
    pretty sure of, are in the Middle East, Syria, or wherever.
    There may be some we don't know. We're constantly refining and
    focusing on this. I don't think we can ever be too confident
    that we have it all. But, we have some confidence that we do
    have the numbers about right.
        Senator Ayotte. I thank you. My time is up. What I heard in
    the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
    last week did not give me a great degree of confidence, in
    terms of what we don't know, because the FBI has basically said
    that 100 number could be many more; and also we know less,
    even, about those where we do not always have full
    intelligence-sharing with all the Western passport-holders.
        Secretary Hagel. No, that's right.
        Senator Ayotte. I think this is a real issue for us.
        Secretary Hagel. It is an issue.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        Secretary Hagel. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Wicker made a request that I failed to acknowledge,
    that a column from the Washington Post be inserted in the
    record. It will be inserted in the record.
        I will also insert in the record Secretary Gates's
    paragraph, which reads as follows in his book: ``In the end,
    the Iraqi leadership did not try to get an agreement through
    their parliament that would have made possible a continued U.S.
    military presence after December 31. Maliki was just too
    fearful of the political consequences. Most Iraqis wanted us
    gone.''
        Senator Udall.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning, gentlemen.
        It is very clear that ISIL presents a very serious threat
    to U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East, and the
    group's actions have left no doubt that it's going to take both
    brains and brawn to defeat them. We have to hit them hard. We
    have to deny them safe haven. We have to bring strategic
    capabilities of the United States and a committed international
    alliance to bear against them. We need to work with our
    partners on the ground to eliminate the conditions that have
    allowed this cancer to spread so quickly. The rise of ISIL
    should serve as a warning to leaders throughout the Middle
    East. I would urge, as I think we all have, that the new Iraqi
    Government must take immediate steps to move past the
    shortsighted and harmful policies that have contributed to the
    current crisis.
        This is going to take our best effort. I know we have it in
    us. We do need to get it right.
        General Dempsey, in that spirit, let me direct a question
    to you. In order to defeat this enemy, we will need to be tough
    and smart. You noted, last month, that defeating ISIL will
    require all application of all tools of national power:
    diplomatic, economic, information, and military. Could you
    describe how these tools would be used as part of a well-
    planned international effort to confront this threat?
        General Dempsey. First, let me align myself with your
    assertion that an inclusive Government of Iraq that reconciles
    the three major groups--Sunni, Shia, and Kurd--is absolutely a
    necessary precondition to the defeat of ISIL inside of Iraq.
        To your point, there has to be an integration of
    diplomatic, economic, in the sense of support for the
    Government of Iraq, as well as counterfinancing efforts so that
    the money that a Senator previously described that ISIL is
    garnering every day can be interdicted, tracked, and disrupted,
    the flow of foreign fighters. Those are strategic regional
    issues, really, because ISIL knows no boundaries, knows no
    borders. It's not a matter of convenience that we form a
    coalition, it's a matter of necessity.
        Strategically and tactically, we have to get enough of the
    Iraqi security forces and enough of the Peshmerga to go from
    defense to offense, to put it about as bluntly as we can. As we
    do, the Government of Iraq has to fill in behind that.
        To be candid, the three big risks that I would mention to
    you are if the Government of Iraq fails to become inclusive--
    and, though the signs are promising, they haven't yet fully
    delivered; second, if a coalition forms, but doesn't have
    endurance--because this is going to take several years; and
    then the third risk is retribution--when we encourage and
    assist the Iraqi security forces and the Pesh to regain lost
    territory, we have to be alert for the fact that, unless the
    Government of Iraq is there to embrace the people and show that
    they work together, there could be some retribution on the part
    of those who may have been seen as complicit with ISIL.
        We have some challenges ahead, but we are open-eyed to
    them, and I think we have a good campaign plan.
        Senator Udall. I'd follow up on that. You have significant
    experience on the ground in Iraq, and I think you know the
    region as well as anyone. Our military will be able to provide
    advice and assistance, clearly, but can you explain the reasons
    why it's important for the Iraqi security forces to take the
    lead in fighting back against ISIL on the ground?
        General Dempsey. The author, Tom Friedman, has a famous
    saying that, ``no one in the history of mankind has ever washed
    their rental car.'' I find that to be a good way to remember
    that ownership is ultimately what measures commitment. I think
    it's clear that they have to own this--with our help and with
    the help of regional partners, but they have to own it.
        Senator Udall. I talked with Senator Graham last week, and
    we were discussing the fact that it's, I think, now time for
    the Arab leaders to really, truly step up. If this isn't an
    existential threat to them, it's certainly close to one. I
    think that's what you are saying and what we're saying, as the
    United States.
        Mr. Secretary, good to see you. Do you consider ISIL to be
    an associated force of al Qaeda? Could you explain your
    reasoning?
        Secretary Hagel. It has been an associated force of al
    Qaeda. It has, over time, essentially displaced al Qaeda. But,
    there are still affiliations, to this day. However, it has been
    associated with al Qaeda.
        Senator Udall. General Dempsey, let me turn back to you.
    We've been talking about Syria. It's, I think, one of the most
    complex military environments we've ever seen. As you plan the
    mission to train-and-equip moderate Syrian opposition forces,
    how does DOD define ``moderate,'' and how do we take further
    steps to ensure that the weapons and the training we provide
    won't fall into the hands of these extremists groups?
        General Dempsey. Senator, I'd suggest to you that, though I
    recommended doing this a couple of years ago, we've learned a
    lot in the intervening time. We've learned a lot because of the
    nonlethal assistance we've provided, because we've had to make
    contacts with certain groups in order to flow that nonlethal
    assistance. We've learned a lot, as well, from our coalition
    partners who have been interacting with the Free Syrian Army.
    We also have learned some lessons in vetting in places like
    Iraq and Afghanistan. We are very closely partnered with our
    intelligence agencies. I would suggest to you that we've come a
    long way in our ability to vet.
        In terms of defining a moderate opposition, I don't think
    that'll be as difficult, actually. The region has become so
    polarized that those who are radical in their ideologies have
    made their move, and those that have not have actually
    demonstrated great courage in not making a move.
        I think we'll be able to find the moderate opposition. I
    hope we can find them in the right numbers.
        By the way, the 5,400 is capacity. It's just what we can
    throughput at several training bases in the course of a year.
    As the Secretary said, it's not the desired end state for a
    moderate Syrian opposition.
        One last thing about developing a Syrian opposition. It
    really needs to be developed with a chain of command responsive
    to some Syrian political structure, not responsive to us. These
    can't be simply surrogates and proxies; they have to be tied,
    linked to some political structure that ultimately could assist
    in the governing of Syria when, finally, the Assad regime is
    either overthrown or, through the negotiation, is changed.
        The important difference in what we're trying to do, here,
    is build a force that can, over time, actually contribute to
    stability in Syria, not just fight.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Udall.
        Senator Vitter.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service, very much.
        Did either or both of you give the President any advice
    regarding a possible new Authorization for Use of Military
    Force (AUMF)? If so, what was it?
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, obviously the question of
    authority was asked early on as we developed a strategy and our
    advice to the President. Does he have the constitutional
    authority which he believes he does? His legal counsel told him
    he did. Does he have the statutory authority, which he believes
    he does, and he has said that as to his legal counsel saying
    the same thing. We believe that he has both statutory and
    constitutional authority. That was a recommendation that I
    made.
        He also noted, as you recall from last week's statement to
    the American public, that he welcomed any additional authority
    that the President would give him, because he, feeling strongly
    that it is important that a strong partnership between Congress
    and the President always be established and always be seen in
    the eyes of the world.
        Senator Vitter. Let me restate my question. You're saying
    he has legal authority without a new AUMF. A new AUMF could,
    nevertheless, be helpful. Did either or both of you give him
    advice about whether to seek one?
        Secretary Hagel. I'll speak for myself, and the Chairman
    can answer it. I did not advise him to seek any additional
    authority. I asked our general counsel and our attorneys what
    they thought, but I did not specifically say to----
        Senator Vitter. General?
        General Dempsey. No, I haven't had a conversation in the
    interagency about what a new AUMF would look like.
        Senator Vitter. Okay. The current estimate of ISIS fighters
    is about 35,000. Is that correct?
        General Dempsey. I think the last number I saw was actually
    31,000, but it's an inexact science because of the fact that
    there are tribes that are coopted.
        Senator Vitter. Right.
        General Dempsey. Sometimes they would be counted in that
    number, but their heart's not in it. But, the latest number is
    31,000. Right.
        Senator Vitter. That number in the low- to mid-30s is
    clearly a huge growth over the last several months, correct?
        General Dempsey. It is. I assess it's growth because of
    their success. The reporting probably lags facts on the ground.
    When that report was assembled, they were at their height of
    success.
        Senator Vitter. What's your best guesstimate about what it
    might be a year from now?
        General Dempsey. I haven't formed one, so I'd be happy to
    take that one for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The environment that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
    (ISIL) will find themselves operating in the next year combined with
    the continuing pressure by coalition forces will influence the size and
    reach of ISIL in 2015. We have low confidence in the current estimate
    of 31,000 ISIL members and armed Sunni supporters. Continued pressure
    by coalition forces through military operations, reinforced with
    efforts to stem recruitment and deny movement of foreign fighters,
    could cause ISIL's size to fall below current estimates.

        Senator Vitter. Okay. Given that number, and presumably
    increasing numbers, I take it everyone agrees some fighting
    force on the ground on the other side is necessary. What do you
    think that number has to be over time?
        General Dempsey. Do you mean the other side of the border,
    sir, or do you mean----
        Senator Vitter. No, no, no. I mean our side of the fight
    against ISIS.
        General Dempsey. In Iraq, I think the combined forces of
    that part of the Iraqi Security Forces remain viable, and the
    Pesh, is adequate to the task of defeating ISIL in Iraq. I have
    concerns about the Syria side of this, for obvious reasons.
        Senator Vitter. Again, what do you think the Syrian number
    on our side of the fight needs to move to?
        General Dempsey. The problem on the Syrian side is less
    about how big the moderate opposition should become and more
    about how the lack of an inclusive government in Damascus
    affects the equation. In other words, the environment inside of
    Syria remains ripe for groups like ISIS because of the
    unwillingness of the Syrian regime to reach out to the Sunni
    population, which makes it challenging to determine how big a
    ground force would have to be.
        Senator Vitter. I mean, do you have any number in mind, any
    guesstimate about, as we speak, what would be a minimal optimal
    ground force?
        General Dempsey. Some time ago when this came up, in
    looking at the kind of tasks that we might assign to a force of
    that size, to include, for example, restoring the Syrian side
    of the Iraq/Syria border, the number that our military planners
    were considering was about 12,000.
        Senator Vitter. Okay. Besides training up Syrians on our
    side, what are the plans to add to that number to come up with
    a significant fighting force on our side in Syria?
        General Dempsey. Besides the train-and-equip mission we've
    just described--or we're describing?
        Senator Vitter. I mean, I take it the train-and-equip
    mission we're all in favor of can't approach that number
    anytime soon, that we know of.
        General Dempsey. That's why I've said, consistently, this
    takes a persistent and enduring commitment. But, not anytime
    soon, that's correct.
        But, I'll tell you, if you're asking me, ``How does the
    opposition in Syria finally prevail against ISIL?''--I think
    it's going to require the assistance of, in particular,
    Jordanians and probably some of the Syrian Kurds and probably
    the Turks.
        Senator Vitter. Going back to the overall ISIS number of
    31,000 or 35,000, what percentage of that would you guesstimate
    is in Syria?
        General Dempsey. About two-thirds.
        Senator Vitter. So, great majority in Syria.
        Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
        Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, thank you for your
    service.
        I am pleased that the strategy that the administration has
    developed for defeating ISIS does include the training and
    equipping the moderate Syrian opposition. This is something
    that I've pushed for over a year, in part to prevent the power
    vacuum among the rebels that would allow a group like ISIS to
    gain strength. Air power alone, while important, does not win a
    conflict like this.
        Reports of nearly 40 nations agreeing to support the fight
    against ISIS are a promising signal. While ISIS presents a
    severe threat to our national security, it also threatens many
    countries around the world, especially those in the Middle
    East. The United States cannot bear this fight alone, and a
    strong coalition, including the neighboring Arab states, is
    obviously critical to destroying ISIS.
        Secretary Hagel, what is the administration's plan for
    going after the funding streams that are supporting ISIS? For
    example, it's been reported recently that anywhere between $1
    to $2 million a day is revenue that's coming in to ISIS from
    oilfields and refineries that they have taken over and that
    they now control. Moving this oil doesn't happen in a vacuum.
    Can you share if and how the United States is going after this
    funding stream and then any other funds that are available to
    ISIS?
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, as you recall in my testimony
    this morning, I mentioned specifically what the Treasury
    Department is doing to coordinate this effort to go after the
    funding sources of ISIL. You mentioned oil, black-marketing oil
    through porous borders. That's one of the obvious areas of
    funding. As you, I'm sure, know, ISIL has gotten control of
    small oilfields, and that's obviously where it starts. But,
    they are multisourced through kidnapping and ransom and as they
    have gone into towns and cities over the last few months and
    decimated those areas, and raided banks and taken possession of
    great numbers of equities.
        There is no one answer. It is a multinational effort that
    our Treasury Department is leading, along with our DOS. Be
    assured that it is a premium focus to cut off resources for
    ISIL. It's a premium focus for our strategy.
        Senator Hagan. I think that's very important, because it
    certainly would degrade their capability.
        I also think it's critical that the people of Syria have an
    alternative other than ISIS or other radical terrorist groups
    like it or the Assad regime. That's why I have been pushing the
    administration to empower and arm the moderate Syrian
    opposition. While a strong moderate military force is
    essential, I do believe success on the battlefield can only set
    the condition for the political solution in Syria.
        General Dempsey, you were just speaking about this, in
    particular, who will actually be the leader of this moderate
    Syrian opposition force. My question is, who is ultimately
    going to lead the force that the U.S. and our partner nations
    train-and-equip, both politically and military? What is your
    current assessment of these capabilities? Then, what are the
    plans to develop the leaders that would form the backbone of a
    longer-term government?
        General Dempsey. Thanks, Senator. We believe, one of the
    advantages of undertaking an overt--we call it ``Title 10''--
    train-and-equip mission is, it's going to force that issue.
    It's going to force the Syrian Opposition Committee, the Syrian
    National Congress, to find some way to establish a responsible
    political architecture into which this military force can plug
    in a way that the other effort has never actually forced. The
    other effort, largely dealt with through intelligence channels,
    doesn't have the--kind of the forcing function that an overt
    program will have.
        I think the first step is to conduct an overt program.
    Second, as part of the program, I can assure you that we will
    not only be training riflemen, but also training leaders so
    that there is a military chain of command to whom these Syrian
    fighters are responsive. They're not responsive to General
    Dempsey or Captain Dempsey, they're going to be responsive to
    Syrians. Because, again, the effort, here, is to allow them to
    take ownership for this in a way that, heretofore, I don't
    think they've had the opportunity to do so.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        News reports suggest that there could be many Westerners,
    even Americans, that might be fighting with ISIS. Needless to
    say, that's a serious concern, since it certainly has the
    potential to create more of a direct threat to the United
    States and our Western--European allies. Do you see the
    presence of radicalized Westerners fighting with ISIS and the
    Khorasan as a threat to the United States? If so, is there a
    part of our strategy that seeks to disrupt their ability to
    recruit new members from the west?
        General Dempsey.
        General Dempsey. Of course, I see it as a threat. The thing
    that sets ISIL apart is, in fact, its radical ideology. There's
    another question about whether they're an affiliate of al
    Qaeda. They have been al Qaeda. They were al Qaeda in Iraq.
    But, they became so radical that, actually, al Qaeda rejected
    them. I still consider them to be part of the al Qaeda
    ideology, but with a much more apocalyptic, if you will, world
    view.
        I don't think--it's not all 31,000, clearly. But, enough of
    them that, were they to be able to achieve it--and unless some
    of the governments in the region can find a way to address the
    social issues inside of their countries, then the seductive
    nature of that vision becomes actually the most dangerous part
    of it, which is why their momentum has to be reversed.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
        Senator Hagan. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for the challenges that you're facing
    and the options you're presenting to Congress on this.
        General Dempsey, Congress is being asked to fund training
    for about 5,000 moderate Syrian rebels. If Congress would
    provide that funding immediately, how long do you think it
    would take before a program's going to be up and running? I
    realize there is a lot of variables involved in this. You need
    to find the folks that we're going to be training. You need to
    thoroughly vet them to make sure they are the fighters that we
    need and that we desire.
        Also, how do the moderates leave the field of battle? How
    are they going to defend that territory in Syria while they're
    being trained? How are they going to defend that against Assad?
    If you could address that, please.
        General Dempsey. To the first part of your question,
    Senator, we think 3 to 5 months to establish the program. Some
    of that is consumed by contracting for equipment. It's not as
    much maneuvering people into the right place. But, during that
    period of time, as well, we would have to, with the help of, in
    particular, some of our regional partners, recruit and vet.
    But, 3 to 5 months, and then deliver a capability sometime
    between 8 and 12 months. That's the timeframe that we're
    working toward.
        To your question about, ``Will they come to be trained?''--
    in many cases, they've already been driven out of their homes
    and out of their villages by ISIL, or by the regime, in some
    cases, so we think we'll be recruiting mostly from displaced
    populations. Therefore, it won't be as though they're giving up
    the security of their families to come and train with us.
        Senator Fischer. Sir, I believe this is the first request
    from the administration, but it will not be the last. We're
    looking at 5,000 fighters now. We're looking at a growing force
    by ISIL that, as you've estimated, is 31,000. Over this period
    of months where we're going to be training--finding people,
    vetting, training them, that will only grow, in my opinion.
        As we look at this request, I believe it should be separate
    from the CR. I think it's very important that Congress have a
    full debate on it. I know you probably have nothing to say on
    how we do our business here, but I believe we need to be honest
    with the American people on what lies ahead. With the request
    as it is, we are not being honest with the American people.
        If we truly are going to defeat ISIL, to degrade them and
    to defeat them, it's not just this one request. Do you
    anticipate that the President will be sending more requests to
    Congress? If so, when may we expect to see those?
        I know you're anxious to answer.
        Secretary Hagel. I always like to respond to a fellow
    Nebraskan.
        The reason that I'm going to answer first is because this
    really puts the general in a more difficult position than he
    should be in. So, he may want to add something, but let me
    answer this way.
        First, because I do know a little something about your
    institution, if it was a perfect world and if we didn't have
    the time constraints that we all are under, and you weren't all
    scheduled to go out of session, here, in a couple of days, and
    the world was more perfect, I agree, this should have a
    thorough airing with the American people.
        Senator Fischer. If I can just interrupt you on that.
        Secretary Hagel. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. Just because we're scheduled to go out on
    Thursday, we don't have to go out on Thursday, do we, sir?
        Secretary Hagel. That's not a decision for me to make, nor
    a recommendation. That falls clearly on your side of the dais.
        But, that said, if we would not get the authority now, we
    would lose a considerable amount of time. I know it's
    imperfect. It was never meant to jam anyone or to put anybody
    in a tough spot. But, it is my opinion--I think the President's
    been pretty clear on this--that the time is of the essence,
    here. When Congress comes back--and obviously when you come
    back, I assume there will have been an election and start
    forming a new Congress--there will be a debate, there should be
    a debate about this.
        As to your questions, ``What further requests might be
    coming?'' Senator, right now the President has been as
    straightforward and honest with you, with the American people,
    as I have been. There's no hidden agenda, here, or we're
    waiting for another shoe to drop in a--on a request. No. I
    can't guarantee you, at all--I don't think you would want your
    Secretary of Defense to say, ``I'm sorry, there--this is the
    end. No more.'' I think General Dempsey's point in some of his
    answers this--here this morning, he certainly will recommend if
    he thinks we need some more capabilities somewhere.
        Senator Fischer. Right.
        Secretary Hagel. That's what you want.
        Senator Fischer. Right.
        Secretary Hagel. That's the way I would answer your
    question.
        Senator Fischer. I would say, as a fellow Nebraskan, that,
    when I traveled the State for 3 weeks in August, all across the
    State, for the first time I heard Nebraskans talk about foreign
    policy and ask questions about foreign policy. We didn't hear
    that in any campaign, any debates, any forums. But, people in
    Nebraska are focused on this, they know it's a concern. They
    are frightened, but they want this addressed in a way that we
    know the enemy is going to be defeated. They expect us to do
    our job. If that means staying here longer, then we need to do
    that.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Manchin.
        Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank both of you all for your continued service
    to the great country.
        I agree with my Senator--my colleague, Senator Fischer--I
    agree wholeheartedly with her. We should stay here, and it
    should be separated. It's a big enough issue for us to have a
    policy discussion and not be tied into the funding discussion
    that we're going to have with the CR. But, with that being
    said, it is what it is.
        I have a hard time with all of this. My problem is--and I
    think I've spoke to both of you--when I go home to West
    Virginia, the same as Nebraska, the same as anywhere else in
    the country, people say, ``What do you expect to be different
    than what you've done in that region of the world for 13 years?
    If money or military might hasn't changed it, what makes you
    think you can change it now?'' When you start looking at what
    we've spent, almost $20 billion, trying to build up a 280,000-
    person army in Iraq, and the first time they were tested, they
    turned tail and ran, turned over the arsenal that we equipped
    them with, now is being used against us. Anyone seeing the
    video of ISIS taking all that back into Syria--it is absolutely
    appalling for us to look at that. Then when you look at what we
    have done in that part of the world, a total of, in Iraq, $818
    billion has been spent, $747 in Afghanistan, and growing; $1.6
    trillion to date, and growing; 4,400 lives lost in Iraq, 36,000
    wounded; 2,200 lives in Afghanistan, and 21,000 wounded.
        I understand Syria. It's a sectarian conflict against the
    Assad regime. Everybody in there, whoever they may be, are
    fighting Assad, the way I understand it. If they're all
    fighting Assad, even though they might not be united--they all
    know they're trying to get rid of the Assad regime--we're
    supposed to carve out 5,000, 3,000, 5,000. At $100,000 per
    person, if my math is correct--$5 billion--or $500 million for
    5,000, correct? Okay. So, that's $100,000 per person that we're
    supposed to do. Only thing that I know that we're assured of
    is, that training and those weapons will probably be used
    against us at some time in the future if everything that's
    happened in the past--I have a hard time understanding why all
    of a sudden we're going to convince these 5,000 to turn and
    fight ISIS, who's fighting the same religious war that they're
    fighting against the Assad regime. Doesn't make any sense.
        I'm in total support of air support, of using our tactical
    and our technology, as we have, for superiority. I think it
    should be the Arab Muslim ground game, if you would. That
    should be theirs. If we can booster them up a little bit--and
    you said we had to go back in, then either we've done a poor
    job of training in the beginning or Maliki was able to undo
    everything we did in the first 2 years that we've been gone. If
    it's that quickly undone, how can I go home to West Virginia
    and make sense out of this at all?
        Anybody want to take a shot at this? It just doesn't make
    sense to me.
        Secretary Hagel. If you put it that way, Senator.
    [Laughter.]
        First, I understand, I think, a lot of the complications.
    We are dealing with the same issue. I don't minimize at all
    what you're saying as you try to explain this to the people you
    represent. Let me make a couple of points.
        First, it's not the United States alone that's going to
    change all this. This is the whole point of what the President
    talked about in his statement to the American public last week.
    We are going to help empower the people of Iraq. We are going
    to do everything we can to support their efforts with a new
    government, inclusive government. You mentioned the squandering
    of the last 5 years of the Maliki Government, which has brought
    a great deal of this on.
        Senator Manchin. But, you said that they're a sovereign
    nation, so we don't like the outcome, but they have a process.
        Secretary Hagel. They have a process.
        Senator Manchin. That can be changing. That can change
    continuously.
        Secretary Hagel. That's right. We're hopeful that this new
    government is going to put them back on a road of responsible,
    responsive, representative government. We are not going to have
    ground forces on the ground to do it for them. As you said, it
    should be the people of that region, of the country. As the
    chairman noted, the Peshmerga, Iraqi security forces have been
    able to get back on the offensive, with our assistance.
        Senator Manchin. But, those forces are able--and I'm so
    sorry, Mr. Secretary, I know how time runs here--those forces
    have been able, let's say, to maybe hold the ground a little
    bit in their own territories, but they're not going to be
    moving into Syria.
        Secretary Hagel. That's why we need a ground game in
    Syria----
        Senator Manchin. But, ISIS hasn't been----
        Secretary Hagel.--of the people there.
        Senator Manchin.--ISIS hasn't been able to--they've tried
    to take out Assad, correct? Is it fair to say that ISIS has
    tried to take out Assad?
        Secretary Hagel. ISIS has tried to take out everybody and--
    --
        Senator Manchin. But, Assad. They have----
        Secretary Hagel.--everyone around it, but----
        Senator Manchin.--they failed----
        Secretary Hagel.--they're a threat to us. I think that's
    the main point that--Senator, that is important for you, but
    for all of us. ISIS is a--ISIL is a threat to the United
    States.
        Senator Manchin. But, Assad is not a threat to the United
    States.
        Secretary Hagel. It's not the same kind of threat. What
    he's allowed to happen in his own country is why we have a
    problem in Syria.
        Senator Manchin. I agree, it's--it's barbaric also.
        But, here's what I'm saying. I'm concerned about the United
    States of America. I'm concerned about West Virginia and all 49
    other States and everybody that lives in those States. I'm
    concerned about how we're keeping them, from here, to do harm
    to America or Americans are planning. I'm for all of that.
    Attack wherever may be. But, I'm just saying, our past
    performance for 13 years in that region hasn't given us the
    results. We took out Saddam. We thought that would change.
    Iraq's in worse shape. We've--take out Qaddafi. We thought that
    would change. It got so bad in Libya, we've had to pull out our
    own Embassy and our people in our Embassy. They're wanting to
    take out--these barbaric dictators are unbelievable, but it
    seems like that's what rules. If it's not one, it'll be
    another. We're taking out a person--are turning our efforts to
    ISIS, who were Assad. I'm not supporting, any way, shape, or
    form, Assad. I think he should be gone. But, as long as he's
    able to remain there, he's fighting the same people that we're
    asking the people to train to fight that we're going to spend
    $500 million. Makes no sense to me, and I can't sell it. I've
    tried, you can't sell this stuff. No one believes the outcome
    will be any different.
        General, do you have anything to add to that?
        General Dempsey. Yes, could I, Mr. Chairman?
        Chairman Levin. Of course.
        General Dempsey. This is important enough that I think we
    probably need to bleed over a little bit.
        If you look back, I've been in the job now 3 years. When
    you look back over the course of that time, I've been pretty
    clear that we have a generational problem, which is to say a
    20-year problem. If it was 3 years ago, okay, maybe it's a 17-
    year problem in the Middle East as these strongmen have been
    overthrown. What appeared to be for a moment in time a bit of a
    fledgling democratic movement has been hijacked, and it's been
    hijacked by some extraordinarily dangerous people--dangerous
    not just to the region, but transregionally and globally, as
    well.
        One of the things you can count on the U.S. military to
    recommend is that to belabor the metaphor of ground game and
    other sports analogies--I'm always going to come to you and
    tell you what we need to play an away game. I don't want to
    play a home game.
        I will promise you this. Left unaddressed, the issues in
    the Middle East will affect probably our European allies far
    more than us initially. I believe they're awakening to that
    reality, by the way. There will be a period of unrest in the
    Middle East that initially will probably just be an economic
    challenge, but could ultimately actually threaten us directly
    here in the Homeland.
        So, we don't have a choice. If I could wall up the
    continental United States and somehow assure you that the
    people of West Virginia will remain safe, I would do it,
    Senator. But, we can't.
        We have three tools in the military arsenal. First, we can
    do things ourselves. We call direct action. Second, we can
    build partners. Third, we can enable others, like we're doing
    with the French in Mali.
        What we've tried to do over the past few years is do less
    ourselves, more with partners, and enable others. That's the
    right path. We should do less ourselves, enable partners, and
    build partners. But, if we fail to address all three, we're
    back to doing it all ourselves. What we're suggesting here is a
    strategy, where we can get others, not only to do some of the
    lifting, but maybe pay for it, as well.
        I think that's the message to the people of West Virginia.
    We have to be engaged, because we are antithetical. Most of
    ISIL's ideology is antithetical to our values. You just can't
    let them fester.
        Question is, do we do it ourselves or try to do it with
    others? We're trying to do it with others. I think it's the
    right path.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Manchin.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. I think that's a good way to begin. I
    couldn't agree with you more. The goal is to destroy ISIL and
    all they represent. Is that correct?
        General Dempsey. It is.
        Senator Graham. Very briefly, describe what destroying ISIL
    would look like, General Dempsey.
        General Dempsey. Yes, I'm probably going to be a little
    more articulate about that in Iraq, because we have a partner
    and we have a credible ground force to enable.
        Defeating or destroying ISIL in Iraq will require the
    combined forces of ISF and Pesh to go offensive, to regain lost
    territory, while concurrently--and this is the important part--
    the Government of Iraq fills in behind with inclusive policies
    addressing the complaints of the Kurds and----
        Senator Graham. Can't we just maybe speed up the----
        General Dempsey. Then we restore the border and then
    they're defeated.
        Senator Graham. No, I'm with you. You take all the
    territory they hold, you take Mosul and Fallujah away from
    them, you put an Iraqi military on the ground that will be
    loyal to the Iraqi people, not just to the Shi'as, you have an
    inclusive government in Baghdad, where the Sunni tribes will
    feel like they're better off playing politics in Baghdad than
    siding with ISIL. That's destroying their ability to regenerate
    in Iraq. Syria, we'll talk about in a minute. But, I want to
    continue the theme about why all this matters.
        Is there any doubt in your mind, each of you, that if ISIL
    had the capability to kill millions of Americans, they would do
    so?
        General Dempsey. There's no doubt in my mind. They'll kill
    anybody who doesn't conform to their narrow ideological bent.
        Secretary Hagel. I agree.
        Senator Graham. So, really, it's mankind against ISIL, it's
    just not us against ISIL or Sunni Arab states against ISIL. If
    you're a Christian in the region, they will kill you very
    quickly. Is that correct?
        General Dempsey. Unless you convert.
        Senator Graham. Okay. Now, I guess what I'm trying to
    persuade my colleagues, that these problems only get worse over
    time. But, are they limited to the Mideast? Are there radical
    Islamists that we should worry about in Africa?
        General Dempsey. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. Does the authorization to use military
    force allow this administration to go in to attack al Qaeda in
    the Arab Peninsula in Yemen without a new authorization?
        General Dempsey. It does. Anything affiliated with al
    Qaeda.
        Senator Graham. Okay. I'm going to write you a letter and
    name the organization that we could not attack without a new
    AUMF. I just want to see how far this goes. I'm a very robust
    Article 2 guy, but I think this is a pretty robust reading of
    the current AUMF. But, I'm not going to stand in your way. We
    need to get this right.
        Now, areas of agreement. Training the Free Syrian Army, you
    recommend we do that, with all of the complications that go
    with it.
        General Dempsey. With a coalition, I do.
        Senator Graham. Okay. So, now let's get to Syria. To
    destroy ISIL if two-thirds of ISIL is in Syria, do you agree
    that somebody has to go in on the ground and dig them out
    eventually?
        General Dempsey. Somebody, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. It's better for us to be part of that
    somebody than just to be the only ones doing it.
        General Dempsey. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. Can you think of an Arab army that you
    could form in the next year that you would have confidence that
    could go in and destroy ISIL in Syria, hold the territory
    without substantial American support?
        General Dempsey. There are partners in the region who have
    very capable special operating forces, and I think the campaign
    would envision that they would participate. That would
    certainly be our ask of them to participate in a ground
    campaign.
        Senator Graham. My question is, can you envision a
    coalition of Arab states that have the capabilities to go into
    Syria, defeat ISIL, hold the territory without substantial U.S.
    military support?
        General Dempsey. As long as, Senator, you'll elaborate on
    what you mean by ``substantial U.S. military support.''
        Senator Graham. Getting them to the battlefield. How do
    they get there? What does it take to maintain a large army in
    the field? Do they have the intelligence capability if we don't
    help them? Do they have sufficient air power to win the day
    without our support? Do they have the special forces
    capabilities to go and kill the leaders of ISIL without us
    being on the ground?
        General Dempsey. I was with you until ``without us being on
    the ground.'' Because, as I mentioned in previous testimony,
    I----
        Senator Graham. It's easy. If you think they can do it
    without us being on the ground, just say yes.
        General Dempsey. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Okay. What if they lose?
        General Dempsey. Any campaign is built on assumptions. I
    just made one. If the assumption proves invalid, then you have
    to readjust your----
        Senator Graham. What are the consequences of an Arab army
    going into Syria virtually on their own and getting beat by
    ISIL, to us?
        General Dempsey. Yes, I wouldn't suggest virtually on your
    own. I think they'll be enabling support that we would have----
        Senator Graham. By us?
        General Dempsey. Yes, I do think, yes.
        Senator Graham. Okay. We're having a semantic problem here.
    But, the bottom line is, What does it mean to the world if we
    take on ISIL and they defeat the people we send in to take them
    all? That's a bad day for us, do you agree?
        General Dempsey. It's a bad day for the region. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. It's a bad day for the world, isn't it?
        General Dempsey. It is.
        Senator Graham. Do you agree with me this is probably our
    last best chance to put these guys in a box and keep them
    there?
        General Dempsey. I think it's our last best chance to
    convince regional governments that if they don't solve their
    internal problems, we can't do it for them, and they'd better
    get serious about it.
        Senator Graham. What if the following happens: The regional
    players say that, ``I don't trust the United States, because
    you've been so unreliable. You have drawn red lines and done
    nothing. You withdrew from Iraq and left the place in shambles,
    that I really don't want to follow your leadership, because I
    don't think you're capable of winning the war, because you
    don't have the resolve''? What if they tell us, ``We're not
    going to do anything other than maybe drop a few bombs''? Would
    you consider the recommendation to the President that allowing
    ISIL to maintain a safe haven in Syria and to grow in
    capability over time is a major threat to the United States?
    Could you envision yourself recommending to the President, if
    nobody else will help us, that we go in on the ground and clean
    these guys out in Syria? If we had to.
        General Dempsey. I haven't confronted that question yet,
    Senator, but I'll react to it. I don't think that, even if we
    were to go in on the ground, armored divisions with flags at
    furl----
        Senator Graham. The full weight of the military.
        General Dempsey. I don't think we would do anything more
    than push this problem further to the right. This has to be--to
    your point, if we don't get the kind of coalition I'm
    describing, then we're into a very narrow CT framework, in my
    view.
        Senator Graham. Okay. If I may just follow this point. So,
    our national defense, in terms of stopping ISIL from killing
    thousands or millions of Americans if they get the capability
    really comes down to whether or not we can convince the Arab
    world to go in there and defeat these guys?
        General Dempsey. It really comes down to building a
    coalition so that what the Arab Muslim world sees is them
    rejecting ISIS, not us defeating them.
        Senator Graham. They already reject ISIL. Do you know any
    major Arab ally that embraces ISIL?
        General Dempsey. I know major Arab allies who fund them.
        Senator Graham. Yes, but do they embrace--they fund them
    because the Free Syrian Army couldn't fight Assad. They were
    trying to beat Assad. I think they realize the folly of their
    ways.
        Don't taint the Mideast unfairly. Is it fair to say that
    most Syrians have two things in common: they don't like ISIL
    and they don't like Assad? Most Syrians.
        General Dempsey. I agree.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that most Muslims reject
    what ISIL does in the name of their religion?
        General Dempsey. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Is it fair to say that if we don't contain
    this threat and eventually destroy it, that it gets worse over
    time and, a year from now, if they're still flourishing in
    Syria and this coalition hasn't come about, America is more in
    danger of a major attack than we are today?
        General Dempsey. Yes.
        Senator Graham. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Okay.
        Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, both for
    being here this morning and for your service.
        I would like to direct my question, first, in a different
    direction. I think the barbarism and the threat that ISIL poses
    really became real for people in this country, certainly for
    people in New Hampshire, with the brutal murders of James Foley
    and Steven Sotloff. As Senator Ayotte has said, Jim Foley is
    from New Hampshire, and Steven Sotloff went to school there, so
    we saw that very personally, in terms of what happened.
        I know that it has been reported that there was an effort
    to rescue the hostages who were being held by ISIL that was not
    successful. I certainly commend all of the courageous
    servicemembers who were part of that effort. There have been
    reports, in recent news stories, from the Foley family that
    really raise, I think, very troubling and serious questions
    about the support that our Government provided to the families
    and to the effort to free Jim Foley and Steven Sotloff and the
    other hostages who are currently being held who are American
    citizens. Is there more that our Government can and should be
    doing to support the families and to looking at how we can help
    free hostages when they're being held in this situation?
        Secretary Hagel. First, like all Americans, our thoughts
    and prayers go out to the families.
        As to your question, Senator, DOD does not have the direct
    responsibility on this.
        Senator Shaheen. Right. I understand that.
        Secretary Hagel. However, that said, thank you for your
    comments about the rescue mission. Because it's an open
    hearing, we don't want to say too much more about it, but it's
    been in the press.
        To your point about, ``Can we do better and do more and is
    there an effort to address some of the more human dimensions of
    this?''--I'm not going to prejudge any of our departments and
    agencies in how they handle it, but I think we all must be
    mindful of the humanity, here, involved if it was our children
    or any of us personally in this situation. I know our law
    enforcement people, those who have responsibility for dealing
    with this, it's a tough responsibility. They follow the law. I
    think we could and should maybe revisit some of these
    practices.
        Our national security policy directive is very clear on
    ransom. That's been in place for many years through different
    administrations. I'm not suggesting we change that, by the way.
        Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that.
        Secretary Hagel. I think that maybe there are some areas
    that we could do a little better with, as far as in dealing
    with families and the human part of this. Again, that's not
    meant as criticism for any of our agencies or departments,
    because I don't know all the facts on how it was handled.
        General Dempsey. Just because you mentioned the mission,
    itself. I've been at this a long time. That was the most
    complex, highest-risk mission we've ever undertaken. That
    should give the families some solace and you some confidence
    that, as a military, we are very focused on this. We have some
    limitations in our ability to collect intelligence inside of
    Syria. But, when we had the opportunity to do so, we tried to
    get them.
        Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that. I do hope, though,
    given what we've heard from the Foleys and from the other
    families, that there will be a reassessment of how our
    government supports families facing this kind of a crisis.
        Next, I want to go to the estimate of ISIL's troop
    strengthen, because it's been as you reported, 31,000 is the
    most recent estimate. How could it have grown to that size
    without our intelligence recognizing the threat? What is part
    of our plan to address the recruitment? There have been a lot
    of reports about how effective the messaging is that ISIL has
    been using to recruit young people, particularly westerners.
    How is that part of our plan? Why is our intelligence not
    picking up the extent to which this effort has been growing?
        General Dempsey. I can't speak for the Intelligence
    Community or the intelligence agencies. I'll tell you they're
    focused on it. The way they grow, though--I mentioned that
    ISIL's strategy is actually to consume tribes. They may be in a
    conflict with a tribe one day, and then overcome it the next,
    which might increase their numbers by 3,000, 4,000, 5,000. Once
    the tribal leader pledges allegiance, the entire thing shifts
    over.
        That's part of it, I think. They've also sprung a few
    thousand prisoners from different prisons inside of Iraq that
    were very hardened terrorists.
        They are growing. But, again, the numbers that are reported
    were estimated based on the free rein that, at the time, ISIL
    was having in Iraq. I think we're going to see some shift in
    that. That's part of our strategy, actually. The public
    diplomacy part of this, which is not a military line of effort,
    but it has to be part of our strategy. We have to point out to
    Arab and Muslim youth--and Western youth, for that matter--the
    risk posed by this ideology.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. My time is up, but I just want
    to close by saying I certainly intend to support the request
    for funding to train-and-equip vetted opposition groups in
    Syria. I do believe that it would be a mistake for us not, in
    Congress, to have a debate about a long-term, broader strategy
    to go after ISIL. I think it's very important for us to have a
    bipartisan, bicameral support for that effort and a debate here
    that the American people can be part of. I know that the
    chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is working
    on a specific authorization for use of military force, which I
    intend to work with him on. I certainly hope there will be an
    effort on the part of the administration to work with Congress
    on that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Lee.
        Senator Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thanks, to both of you, for being here today and for all
    you do for our country and all you do to keep us safe. This is
    an exceptionally important issue as it relates to our national
    security.
        I think the President, last week, quite accurately
    portrayed the threats that we're facing from ISIS, that it's a
    threat to the Middle East with aspirations to attack global
    targets, including the United States. The President should, in
    my opinion, do everything he possibly can to protect Americans
    and to protect U.S. facilities in Iraq and Syria from ISIS and
    from other terrorist activity.
        I believe, however, like many of my colleagues on both
    sides of the aisle, that the President should seek
    congressional authorization for his expanded campaign to
    degrade and destroy ISIS. I also do not believe that we should
    authorize parts of this conflict through a CR. This is a
    serious and important discussion about our national security,
    and it should be debated and discussed and ultimately voted on
    within Congress, based on its own merits, and it shouldn't be
    lumped in with a much broader discussion about a lot of other
    things. I think we owe it to those who valiantly put their own
    lives on the line, to make sure that this is debated and
    discussed, and that the parameters are properly set in its own
    context.
        Secretary Hagel, I have a question for you as it relates to
    some of this discussion as it relates to some of the things
    that President Obama has said in recent weeks about ISIS. In an
    interview that I believe he had with Thomas Friedman at the New
    York Times, just barely a month ago, he stated that the notion
    of arming Syrian rebels has ``always been a fantasy. This idea
    that we could provide some light arms or even sophisticated
    arms to what was essentially an opposition made up of former
    doctors, farmers, pharmacists, and so forth, and that they were
    going to be able to be able to battle not only a well-armed
    state, but also a well-armed state backed by Russia, backed by
    Iran, a battle-hardened Hezbollah, that was never in the
    cards.''
        Now, the President, hardly a month later, is seeking
    authorization to do basically that. So, Mr. Secretary, what has
    changed? Why does the President, who apparently didn't think
    that would work, and described that as some sort of fantasy
    about a month ago. What has changed to make him think that it
    will work now?
        Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Senator. First, at the risk of
    interpreting what the President meant when he said that, I
    recognize that is always risky, as I have said. But, let me
    address your question this way.
        What's changed now is the urgency of what has occurred in
    the Middle East, specifically in Iraq and Syria, the murder of
    two Americans, now a third, a brutal murder of a British
    citizen, the different dimensions that we've seen, the last 5
    weeks especially, unfold, what ISIL has been able to achieve in
    a relatively short amount of time, the changing of a
    government, the leaving of one Iraqi Government with a new
    government coming in. Over about a 6-week period, Senator,
    there was, and were, a number of occurrences that came together
    that I do think presented a whole new picture of realities, of
    urgency, of dangers, of threats. Let me stop there and see if
    that helps you a little bit.
        I saw the interview, and I read the interview. But, again,
    at the risk of trying to interpret what he meant, I offer that.
        Senator Lee. I appreciate that. I do understand that there
    were some developments that have occurred since then that have
    brought this appropriately to our attention, to the attention
    of the world. I would be curious to know, though,
    strategically, how that changes something that he previously
    described as a kind of fantasy into something that could be
    realistic. But, I understand that that's difficult for you to
    answer in this context. I'd love to be able to talk more about
    that on another occasion if we can.
        Can you describe what the end objective in Syria is for the
    United States? In other words, do we still contend that Assad
    must go, that he cannot stay in power, and also, what the
    objective is as it relates to the moderate groups that the
    President would like to see lead this. What does the post-Assad
    Syria look like that we are after? Or is that our objective at
    all?
        Secretary Hagel. The issue on our position with Assad
    remains very clear. The President stated it, I said it in my
    testimony here this morning. The President has said, many
    times, still strongly believes, that Assad has lost the
    legitimacy to govern his own people. We have a country, Syria,
    in complete chaos and upheaval because of Assad. That's the
    individual responsible for creating what is occurring and has
    been occurring.
        Your question about the end state in Syria. I think what
    we, the administration, I think the American people, would want
    to see and--the Syrian people, as a free Syria, where men and
    women and their families have rights to choose and have rights
    to determine their own leaders and their own futures. I think
    that is really the essence of the ultimate objective we'd like
    to see in Syria.
        Senator Lee. Okay. I see my time is expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lee.
        Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, to both Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey,
    for again being with us and for your explanation and very
    forthright testimony here today and, in the past, both publicly
    and privately, to members of this committee and the Senate.
        I want to say to you, first, Secretary Hagel, how much I
    appreciate the decision that you made recently to change DOD
    policy on reviewing other-than-honorable discharges for
    veterans suffering, at the time of their discharge, from post-
    traumatic stress, and most especially, my thanks to you on
    behalf of the 80,000 Vietnam-era veterans who will benefit by
    that policy change to give them liberal consideration as they
    apply to the discharge review boards. These veterans who
    suffered, at the time of their discharge, from post-traumatic
    stress often received less-than-honorable discharges because of
    the injuries that they suffered in combat, at war. They've
    lived with the stigma and the blackmark on their records for
    decades, many of them became homeless and jobless as a result.
    I want to thank you for committing to me, when we first met,
    that you would do the right thing, and then, in fact, doing the
    right thing. I really appreciate your policy change in that
    regard.
         I want to, perhaps unfairly, quote to you something that
    you said on the floor of the Senate in 2002, in October, at the
    time that the Senate voted in favor, and you voted in favor, of
    Senate Joint Resolution 45, which was the resolution that
    authorized the use of force in Iraq. You said, ``In authorizing
    the use of force against Iraq, we are at the beginning of a
    road that has no clear end.'' You went on to say, ``While I
    cannot predict the future, I believe that what we decide in
    this chamber this week will influence America's security and
    role in the world for the coming decades. It will serve as the
    framework, both intentionally and unintentionally, for the
    future''--and then you said, quite wisely, in my view, as it
    turns out--``for an intensification of engagement with Iraq in
    the Middle East, a world which we know very little and whose
    destiny will now be directly tied to ours.''
        We've lived with the framework that came from that vote.
    We've suffered, as Americans, greatly in both the loss of
    people and the sacrifice of treasure, money. That is the reason
    why Americans now feel so conflicted, often ambivalent, about
    the brutality of the action that we've witnessed--the
    beheading, shockingly, repulsively, of these two brave
    individuals--and yet, the war weariness that many Americans
    feel at this point.
        General Dempsey mentioned earlier the quote from Thomas
    Friedman, that nobody ever washed a used car. But, a lot of
    people have rented unwashed cars. It seems to me we are, in
    effect, renting an unwashed car, insofar as we want to make
    sure that it's serviceable and it works, but do not want to go
    into a situation where there's no clearly defined exit
    strategy.
        Can you tell us what the threat is to the United States
    that we will eliminate by degrading and defeating ISIL?
        Secretary Hagel. That's always the problem of giving a
    speech on the floor of the Senate, that it is on the record.
    [Laughter.]
        Let me just comment on that, because it is going to reflect
    on my answer to your question.
        I put a lot of time into thinking about that speech,
    Senator, and I recall writing it. The part of it that you read
    back, I do not disassociate myself from at all. For those words
    that you read back, I'm even more mindful, as Secretary of
    Defense, of my responsibilities. Doesn't mean I'm right, but
    I'm even more mindful than I might otherwise be of what I saw
    occur, starting in 2001-2002, and I was part of. That's first.
        Second, to the real question, what is the threat, and how
    will it change? I think we are in a different situation today,
    in what the President has laid out to the American people as to
    what his objectives are, versus where we were in 2002. Main
    reason is that ISIL is a very clear threat to the United States
    of America, to our people. You mentioned the two brutal murders
    of two Americans. That's not just a threat, that's an action
    that was taken.
        There are a number of other examples. To our allies. I
    thought General Dempsey's commentary to answer a difficult
    question that Senator Manchin posed, was full of a lot of
    thoughtful and wise thinking on where this is all going to go
    if we don't do what we should do and need to do now. I think
    that's different from where we were in 2002.
        Now, because I do think ISIL is a threat, and a very clear
    threat, to the United States, to our interests, to our people,
    to our allies--and we could spend a lot more time this morning
    going through that case and making that case--I think what the
    President's laid out, what I strongly support, is the right
    thing to do, because it is in the interest, clearly, of our
    country.
        One last point on this. What General Dempsey said about
    ``If we don't do something now''--and I think the way the
    President has framed that ``something,'' how we're going to do
    it--we can't do it alone. I think it's been clear in a lot of
    the testimony this morning, in the questions, that this
    country, the United States of America, as much as we have
    engaged, as much as we have bled, the treasure and the lives
    that we have left behind, we still haven't fixed the problem.
    We can't fix the problem alone. That's why all the dimensions
    of what the President's talking about, to me, make sense. I
    think if we can do what we intend to do and what we believe we
    can do, bringing all these groups together, the very people who
    are most at risk, then we can be successful at averting this
    great threat to this country. That's what's different. That's
    what I think the threat is.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
        Senator Cruz.
        Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Thank you for
    your service, especially during these challenging times.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to start with you. If ISIS is able to
    consolidate power and to create and dominate a nation-state and
    to retain access to, potentially, billions of dollars in oil
    revenue, over time what is the specific danger to America if
    they are able to use that nation-state to project jihad here?
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, as you have expressed it and
    asked the question, over time if ISIL is not stopped, and with
    the economic power that it has now, then what I would foresee
    happening, not only an immediate threat to United States
    citizens and our people, our interests, but I think you could
    very well find Jordan go down as the country that we know it
    today. I think Saudi Arabia could well be beyond just
    threatened, their oilfields. I think the expansion of where
    this could go in the Middle East, dominating oil production.
    Lebanon is also in a very tentative state. Libya is in chaos.
    Everywhere you look in the Middle East, there is trouble. If a
    force like ISIL, in my opinion, is allowed to continue with its
    ideology, with its resources, with its capability, then, as
    General Dempsey said, there's no doubt, it will impact this
    country and the world economy. Now, this is down the road, if
    this is not stopped. But, I think that's what we're looking at
    here, Senator. It's an immediate threat to our interests, as
    well.
        Senator Cruz. General Dempsey, worst-case scenario, if ISIS
    were allowed to consolidate power, in your judgment what would
    be the worst-case specific risk to the Homeland and to the
    lives of American citizens?
        General Dempsey. Yes, Senator. The combination of radical
    ideology plus a youth bulge--the entire region is suffering a
    youth bulge--inequitable distribution of resources and a state
    of Islamic radicalization would, first of all, almost surely
    trigger a confrontation with Iran into which the rest of the
    world would be drawn, for obvious reason, but also provides
    them with this combination of resources plus radical ideology
    that we actually haven't seen. Most of the radical ideologies
    are resource-starved, or at least resource-limited. A resource-
    rich radical ideology must become a threat. It's just
    inconceivable that it wouldn't be.
        Senator Cruz. Do you believe, if they were able to
    consolidate that power, that there would be a risk of their
    attempting, and perhaps even succeeding, with a terrorist
    attack of the magnitude of that that occurred on September 11,
    2001, or potentially an even greater terrorist attack?
        General Dempsey. I'd phrase it this way. Given what they've
    already demonstrated, in terms of brutality and utter disregard
    for human life, other than that which adheres to their
    ideology, whatever weapon system they would have in their
    possession, there's no doubt in my mind they'd use it, to
    include weapons of mass destruction.
        Senator Cruz. It's been reported that upwards of 100
    Americans are fighting alongside ISIS, have affiliated
    themselves with ISIS. How would you assess the risk of
    Americans with U.S. passports coming back to the United States
    to carry out acts of terror here?
        General Dempsey. Yes, we've actually been in close contact
    with both the intelligence communities and law enforcement. The
    risk will increase unless their momentum is reversed and unless
    their dominance of the media space--they are actually quite
    capable in social media and other forms of messaging. So,
    unless their momentum is blunted, which will begin to strip
    away this myth that they've surrounded themselves with, and
    unless we counter them in the media space, then the risk of
    radicalization through things like the Internet will continue
    to rise.
        Senator Cruz. But, you would characterize the risks of
    Americans coming back from ISIS with U.S. passports as
    significant? Is that fair?
        General Dempsey. I do. That view is shared by our European
    allies, as well.
        Senator Cruz. If the objective were to destroy ISIS--not to
    just degrade them, but to destroy them within 90 days, what
    would be required militarily to carry that out?
        General Dempsey. It's not possible, Senator, because
    militarily, we could confront them, we could destroy a lot of
    equipment, we could drive them underground, if you will. But,
    as I said, they will only be defeated or destroyed once they're
    rejected by the populations in which they hide. Truly, there is
    no military solution to ISIL.
        Senator Cruz. What would be required to kill those who are
    taking up arms right now?
        General Dempsey. Actually, I think that's the path we're
    on, which is to say using our unique capabilities, our
    counterterror capabilities, our ISR capabilities, our air
    capabilities, while working on the rest of the equation, which
    is this coalition of willing allied partners, or willing Arab
    partners. It may be a tough pill to swallow, but there is no
    military solution. It has to be part of a broader whole-of-
    government regional campaign.
        Senator Cruz. One final question, Secretary Hagel. The
    President, as I understand it, has laid out what could be an
    extended military operation that could extend many months, or
    even years. In my view, carrying out such an operation, not
    responding to immediate exigency, requires congressional
    authorization. I think Congress would be prepared to grant that
    authorization if a specific case were made with clear
    objectives. What is your position as to the legal authority of
    the administration to carry out an extended military campaign
    for years, potentially, absent congressional authorization?
        Secretary Hagel. I believe the President has the statutory
    and constitutional authority to take the action that he is
    doing to protect this country as he laid it out to the American
    people last week.
        Senator Cruz. What is the legal authority that you're
    basing that on?
        Secretary Hagel. The statutory authority is the AUMF of
    2001, and if you wanted to add something to that, it would
    probably be the AUMF of 2002.
        Senator Cruz. My time is expired.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I assume that you meant there's no purely military solution
    to ISIL. When you said there's no military--because you're
    seeking----
        General Dempsey. Yes, there's no purely military solution.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        General Dempsey. Right.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Now, we're going to need to stick very carefully to the 6-
    minute rule, because we have--one, two, three, four, five, at
    least. We have to be out of here at exactly 1 p.m., so please,
    watch that clock, everybody.
        Senator Donnelly. I'm not your problem. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Levin. Senator Donnelly. I didn't mean to----
        Senator Donnelly. No, no, I know that. I know that, Mr.
    Chairman. Thank you.
        I want to thank both of you for everything you've done and
    for your service to our country.
        I want to get back to what you were talking about as to
    having to have partners and to have buy-in. I've heard the role
    that General Allen is going to play. Is a big part of that
    role, in your minds, working with the Sunni tribal leadership,
    the people they've worked with before, to try to get them to
    get back to a place almost that they were before, which is
    working together with us and, in effect, almost a second
    Awakening?
        General Dempsey. Yes, that's one of the reasons General
    Allen was such an attractive figure for that role. General
    Lloyd Austin, the Commander of CENTCOM, was in Iraq, as well,
    and he has incredible regional relationships, though this
    coalition will be beyond the region. We're looking for European
    partners, and maybe even nontraditional partners. But, General
    Allen is certainly going to focus on the tribes.
        Senator Donnelly. General Austin has done a tremendous job,
    but it doesn't hurt to have someone else in the lineup to help
    him with it, I would think. When we look at this, what are the
    kinds of things that General Allen can do, in effect, to start
    to get the tribes to look at this differently, to say, ``Look,
    our interests are more aligned with this coalition that's being
    put together than with this group, ISIS''?
        General Dempsey. At the national level, I think he will,
    along with our diplomats, encourage the new Iraqi Government to
    answer some of the grievances that both the Sunnis and the
    Kurds have had for years, actually, since 2004. I think there's
    some indication that there's reason to believe that that could
    occur.
        The Sunni tribes in al-Anbar aspire to form a national
    guard for some time. I think that's one of the capabilities
    that might actually contribute significantly to that outcome.
    The Maliki Government was actually, as you might expect them to
    be, very much against the idea of a national guard in al-Anbar,
    believing they were already dealing with a national guard of
    sorts in the Peshmerga in Kurdistan. I think this government
    may be more open to it, and I think that'll be one of the lines
    of effort.
        Senator Donnelly. Is this something that we can get done in
    Iraq if we don't get buy-in from the Sunnis?
        General Dempsey. As I said in an earlier question, Senator,
    every campaign plan makes assumptions, and then, if those
    assumptions are valid, you stay on path; if the assumption is
    rendered invalid, you deviate. One of the really important
    assumptions of this campaign is that we can, in fact, separate
    the moderate Sunni tribes from the ISIL ideology. If that
    proves untrue, we have to go back to the drawing board.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. You had talked before about taking
    back Mosul, and the effort to do that. It would involve ISF, in
    that we're working with the best parts of ISF, or trying to. I
    guess this touches back again on that same subject, which is
    getting the Sunnis to accept those parts of ISF. Is that part
    of what General Allen is going to do, and what General Austin
    is working on?
        General Dempsey. Absolutely, yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. This is, again, for either of you.
    There are reports that you mentioned, financially, about ISIS
    getting income of $3 to $5 million per day, is what we've
    heard, that they are the best-financed terrorist group. So many
    of them have tried to put shoelaces and chewing gum together.
    That's not the case here. What is the plan, or what are we
    working on, to try to cut off their financing? Because the oil
    they're selling has to be going somewhere, and someone has to
    be paying them. So, how are we going to do that?
        Secretary Hagel. Senator, I mentioned this in two previous
    answers here.
        Senator Donnelly. I apologize, I wasn't here for that.
        Secretary Hagel. But, it's an important question. I also
    noted it in my testimony, that the administration has put
    together a focus, working with our Treasury Department as the
    key interagency department, with all other allies and partners
    around the world. You mentioned oil, the black marketing of oil
    has been, recently, a very significant resource for them.
        Senator Donnelly. Right.
        Secretary Hagel. They have taken small oilfields in Syria
    and Iraq. That's something that we can address through what
    we're looking at on some of our strategic focus outside of the
    Treasury Department. The ransom, the terrorism, all of the ways
    they finance themselves, we have a task force, working through
    the Treasury Department, to focus on this. But, that has to be,
    and is, a major part of our overall strategy, to cut off that
    funding and flow of resources.
        Senator Donnelly. The last thing I'll ask is about
    coordination with our European allies in regards to the people
    with European passports who can get visa waivers and other
    things, the efforts that are going into that. Is that being
    done with all of our European allies over there?
        Secretary Hagel. That, too, is a major part of the
    coordination, not only with our allies, but it is part of the
    overall strategic focus of our interagency departments, and we
    are working on all that. That's law enforcement, that's DOS,
    it's all the other agencies coming together to focus on it. We
    took it up, by the way, at Wales, at the NATO Summit, 2 weeks
    ago, when we were together, as we will continue to do. But,
    it's a very significant part of the overall strategy.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you both.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, gentlemen, both for your
    service. We're dealing with some difficult times.
        But, General Dempsey, you served in combat in Iraq, you
    were in charge of training the Iraqi troops. How many years ago
    was that?
        General Dempsey. 2005 to 2007, sir.
        Senator Sessions. That's several years we've been training
    the Iraqi troops. Will they fight?
        General Dempsey. Yes, they will fight, if they are well led
    and believe that their government is looking out for, not only
    their best interests, but their families.
        Senator Sessions. Will they be encouraged if they felt they
    had U.S. air support?
        General Dempsey. Absolutely.
        Senator Sessions. I believe you said earlier that our first
    priority should be ISIL. Is that correct?
        General Dempsey. I did, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. I agree with that. There's no doubt about
    that in my mind. Don't we have a commitment, to the Kurds, the
    Shia, the Sunnis, that we worked with for 10 years in war and
    helped them establish, at least for a time, a government that
    functioned in Iraq? Don't we have, as a nation, some sort of
    relationship, a bond between our two nations, even though we've
    had difficulties in recent years?
        General Dempsey. I can tell you that those who have served
    there obviously feel that bond.
        Senator Sessions. I certainly hear that from people who
    have served there. I think we owe those who have served and who
    have suffered to be successful, if we can be successful. I
    think we can be successful.
        We've had a lot of questions about Syria. There are many
    complications in Syria. But, if we're going to make ISIL the
    first priority, shouldn't we emphasize our relationship with
    our friends, the Kurds, in Baghdad, and the Iraqis, and begin
    to work with them to turn the tide? In terms of strategy, where
    you begin, wouldn't the first place to be to put ISIL on the
    defensive in our ally, Iraq?
        General Dempsey. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. I want your military opinion, but if we
    embedded a number of Special Forces with the Iraqi military,
    and they knew that they had access to intelligence from the
    United States and air support from the United States, wouldn't
    that encourage them to be more effective, militarily?
        General Dempsey. As I mentioned in my opening statement,
    there may be times when I believe that would be necessary in
    order to make the mission successful. I don't think so on a
    day-to-day basis.
        Senator Sessions. Let me just ask you directly. If there's
    a military unit in Iraq today, an Iraqi unit, and they had
    United States military embedded with them, and they were asked
    to undertake an offensive operation, would they not be more
    emboldened and encouraged to know that they had Americans there
    with them?
        General Dempsey. In those cases where I would assess the
    mission to be complex enough that it would absolutely require
    our expertise forward, I'll make a recommendation to do it. We
    also don't want them to become dependent upon us. There's a
    fine line to be drawn there.
        Senator Sessions. They've become a bit dependent on U.S.
    air, I acknowledge. I do believe you're correct, that they will
    fight. But, I don't think they will have the kind of morale
    boost that we'd like them to have if they don't have confidence
    that they have air support, and that is enhanced with embedded
    soldiers. Surely, that's true, is it not?
        General Dempsey. I would love to find an occasion where we
    might have Jordanian Special Forces embedded, and Emirati
    Special Forces embedded.
        Senator Sessions. If we all had horses, we'd take a ride.
    We don't have that.
        General Dempsey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. We're talking about down the road. You
    said several times, we need to blunt the momentum, we need to
    change the momentum on the battlefield. Don't we need to start
    taking back a territory in Iraq--those of us who share that
    view----
        General Dempsey. Yes, absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Sessions.--and can't we get----
        General Dempsey. But, your premise is that we have to have
    U.S. embedded advisors forward. I don't share that premise, at
    this point.
        Senator Sessions. Did we use embedded people when they took
    the Haditha Dam back?
        General Dempsey. We did not.
        Senator Sessions. How did we assist them in that instance?
        General Dempsey. We have advisors embedded in headquarters
    that can help direct, using overhead imagery, full-motion
    video, and direct strikes.
        Senator Sessions. Would it be in our advantage to, sooner
    rather than later, encourage the Iraqis to get on the move?
        General Dempsey. Absolutely. But, we want to make sure
    they're ready, as well.
        Senator Sessions. You started training them in 2007, and
    it's been a number of months now, and we've had only--I just
    think we're in a position to start taking some advances. I
    think it's necessary to blunt the momentum.
        Secretary Hagel, briefly, I notice that the House put in
    their CR, $91 billion for the OCO funding. The President had
    asked for $58 billion. Is that money going to be used to--in
    addition to the $550 million for training and equipping the
    Free Syrian Army? Is that going to be used to carry out
    military operations in the region?
        Secretary Hagel. I haven't seen what the House did, and I
    think our Comptroller may be here. If I might take a second to
    ask Michael McCord, who you all know, Mr. Chairman----
        Chairman Levin. Have to make it real quick, because we have
    four more----
        Secretary Hagel. Okay, because I haven't seen what the
    House did. I don't want to say or respond to that until I know.
        Senator Sessions. Could you respond in writing on what your
    position is with regard to this?
        Secretary Hagel. We can do it for the record.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary Hagel. I'll provide it for the record.
        Chairman Levin. If we could get that this afternoon.
    Because, obviously, it's important what the administration's
    position is.
        Secretary Hagel. We will.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Yes, the President's $58.6 billion fiscal year 2015 Overseas
    Contingency Operations (OCO) request will be used primarily to support
    the continued military operations in Afghanistan operations. The
    request also includes a new initiative, the $4 billion Counterterrorism
    Partnerships Fund (CTPF), which builds on existing tools and
    authorities to respond to a range of terrorist threats and crisis
    response scenarios and to support the Syrian opposition. The CTPF will
    have three broad purposes:

        (1)  $1.0 billion to provide support to Syria and its neighbors
    through a Regional Stabilization Initiative to provide assistance to
    the Syrian opposition. The request includes a proposed authority to
    train-and-equip vetted elements of the Syrian armed opposition to help
    defend the Syrian people, stabilize areas under opposition control and
    facilitate the provision of essential services, counter terrorist
    threats, and promote conditions for a negotiated settlement.
    Additionally the funds are to be used to provide greater support to
    Syria's neighbors--Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey--as we work
    together to confront the growing challenges presented by the Islamic
    State of Iraq and the Levant, al-Nusrah Front, and other violent
    extremist groups.
        (2)  $2.5 billion to provide counterterrorism support to partner
    nations, including capacity-building and enabling support, a two-track
    framework for allocating CTPF dollars for specific mitigating efforts:
    expanding our efforts to provide direct support to partners in those
    countries and regions where terrorist threats pose the greatest
    challenge to U.S., allied, and partner security interests; and
    augmenting U.S. military capabilities needed to sustain a higher-level
    of partnership activity globally and enabling partners to perform their
    own security operations.
        (3)  $0.5 billion to help the Department of Defense (DOD) respond
    to unexpected crises. The volatile situation in Iraq is just one
    situation that underscores the importance of reserving funds that can
    be allocated based on unforeseen needs. A crisis response fund would
    facilitate flexibility and speed in responding to this or other
    contingencies (after appropriate congressional notification), and would
    allow DOD to maintain balance between responding to emergency
    requirements and being ready to respond to future contingencies.

        Chairman Levin. Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, to both of you for your service.
        You and the President have made a very strong case that
    ISIL, if left unchecked, will be a threat to Europe and to the
    United States. They are attracting recruits from all over the
    world, including the United States.
        General Dempsey, you noted that, as we were looking at that
    map, what looks like territorial gains by ISIL is really a
    tribal-by-tribal overcoming. My question to you, General
    Dempsey, is, even as we are asked to provide the authorization
    to arm and equip the Free Syrian Army, how important is it that
    we work with the Sunni tribal leaders to enable them to fight
    off ISIL in both Syria and Iraq?
        General Dempsey. It's absolutely an integral part of the
    campaign plan.
        Senator Hirono. What exactly are we doing working with the
    Sunni tribal leaders to enable them to fend off ISIL?
        General Dempsey. This probably requires the integration of
    several things. I mentioned, already, the fact that the Iraqi
    Government has to demonstrate that it actually cares about the
    Sunni tribes and not to just fence them off in al-Anbar
    Province. That's one line of effort. The other is the effort of
    General Allen, as he goes forward using some of his previous
    relationships to meet with the tribal leaders and begin the
    formation of a national guard for al-Anbar Province. Then, I
    think it'll be a matter of regional partners who have Sunni
    Government providing some of the--maybe most, actually--of the
    funding and materiel support to that organization.
        Senator Hirono. Do you see evidence that this kind of
    effort is working, that these tribal leaders that have been
    marginalized or excluded are now going to trust what we're
    doing?
        General Dempsey. I can't make that report yet, Senator.
    What I will tell you is that, while ISIL was making these
    broad, sweeping movements across Iraq, many of the Sunni tribes
    completely got discouraged and they didn't feel like they had
    any reason or capability to stand up to ISIL.
        Now that ISIL momentum has been slowed, it hasn't been
    stopped and it hasn't been reversed, but it's been slowed--and
    we did see, today, actually, an ISF unit moving south of
    Baghdad, near Jurf al-Sakhar, for the first movement south of
    Baghdad. Now all of a sudden we're getting tribal leaders
    reaching out, saying, ``Okay, if you're going to be serious
    about this, then we'll talk to you.''
        I think it was a necessary first step that we showed them
    we really were serious.
        Senator Hirono. There were some earlier questions about
    concerns being raised about the Free Syrian Army that has been
    fighting Assad. What makes us believe that, when we train-and-
    equip them, that they will turn their attention to fighting
    ISIL? Do we have some kind of an agreement with the 5,000
    forces--Syrian army forces that we are going to vet and train
    that--do we have some kind of an agreement that says, ``You
    will fight ISIL and you're not going to be fighting Assad''?
        General Dempsey. No. We do not have any agreements at all,
    because we haven't begun the recruiting effort. We don't have
    the authority to begin, so we haven't really done anything but
    come up with a concept.
        Senator Hirono. Let's say that you do get the authority.
    Then what kind of terms would you put forth to enable us, as
    much as possible--we realize there are risks, here--to have us
    conclude that the people we are recruiting are actually going
    to fight ISIL and not Assad?
        General Dempsey. The important part of an overt program is,
    we'll link it to a political structure over which we will have
    a certain amount of influence because of their dependence upon
    us for supplies, ammunition, and so forth--as well as the fact
    that the regional partners, in particular, I think, as long as
    they're--if the regional partners believe we're just going to
    ignore Assad and just leave him there in perpetuity, then we're
    going to have a problem with building a coalition. But, we can,
    it seems to me, coalesce around the idea that ISIL is the
    immediate threat and, therefore, should be addressed first.
        Senator Hirono. Of course, there is the question of, what
    is Assad going to be doing while the Free Syrian Army is busy
    attacking ISIL? There are a lot of complexities involving
    Syria.
        General Dempsey. There are.
        Senator Hirono. Secretary Hagel, we know that ISIL is
    attracting recruits from all over the world, including from the
    United States. I note, in your testimony, that you said that
    the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security
    have launched an initiative to partner with local communities
    to counter extremist recruiting. Can you talk a little bit more
    about what this constitutes, what this initiative is all about?
        Secretary Hagel. First, thank you for pointing that out,
    because as I noted in one of my earlier answers, it's a very
    important component of the overall strategy here to deal with
    ISIL. Since I'm not involved in that part of the strategy and
    the operations, I can't go too deep into how they're doing it,
    exactly. The point being is to enlist local communities' law
    enforcement awareness of who's in their communities, who's
    coming in and out of their communities, just be more alert of
    things that are out there that will help our Homeland Security
    people, our law enforcement individuals be more aware of things
    that may be occurring, shouldn't occur, and then also working
    with our international partners as we trade information on
    individuals who are flowing in and out of these countries. We
    know, as you have mentioned, and I think Marty mentioned and I
    mentioned, that there are thousands of Europeans that we know
    are in Syria and the Middle East, and these people all have
    passports which allow them access to our country, to different
    countries in the world. It's a combination of using those
    sources and coordinating that effort.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Senator Kaine.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, to the witnesses, for your helpful testimony
    today.
        I believe the President's four-pillar plan, announced last
    Wednesday night, is generally reasonable, but I have one
    significant point of disagreement that I want to spend some
    time on, and that is the question of whether the President has
    the authority, without additional congressional authorization,
    to carry out the mission, as described.
        Secretary Hagel, you have used the phrase ``war against
    ISIL'' today, and others in the administration have used that
    phrase. General Dempsey, you have talked about a multiyear
    effort, and others in the administration have expressed the
    same concern. I believe very strongly, and I don't think that
    it's just a theoretical or law-professor argument, that the
    President does need the authority of Congress to conduct the
    mission that he described and you've discussed today.
        In a matter like this, the President's power is basically
    composed of two kinds of powers--and you've alluded to them--
    constitutional or statutory. The constitutional power is under
    Article 2, as powers Commander in Chief. While there's some
    gray area that's been debated often since 1787, the general
    understanding of the power of a Commander in Chief under
    Article 2 is to defend the Nation. An offensive military action
    then triggers the need to go into Article 1 and have Congress
    declare war. That was first tested by a Virginia President,
    Thomas Jefferson, when fighting a terrorist organization of his
    day in the same general region, the Barbary pirates. He had the
    authority, and believed he did, to repel attacks, one after the
    next. But, when he decided he needed to go on offense, ``Let's
    wipe out this threat so we don't have to just keep repelling
    attacks,'' he stated plainly that, ``I can't do that. I can't
    go on offense without Congress.''
        Senator Obama made the same point very clearly in 2007,
    ``The President does not have power under the Constitution to
    unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that
    does not involve stopping an actual ongoing or imminent threat
    against the Nation.'' Within the last 2 weeks, the Director of
    National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew Olson, said, ``At
    this point, there is no credible information that ISIL is
    planning to attack the United States.'' I understood the
    President's comments last week, and other comments, to suggest
    that ISIL is a significant threat, a serious threat, a growing
    threat, but, in terms of an imminent threat to attack the
    United States that would trigger the Article 2 defense powers,
    it does not seem to exist at this point.
        Then there are statutory powers. The White House has cited
    both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs. 2001 AUMF, it's important to
    remember not only what Congress authorized, but what Congress
    refused to authorize. The Bush administration approached
    Congress and said, ``We would like the power to undertake
    military action against terrorist groups in order to prevent
    terrorist attacks on the United States.'' If Congress had
    granted that AUMF, it clearly would have covered this threat.
    But, Congress overwhelmingly rejected that wording of the AUMF,
    did not believe in a preemptive war doctrine, did not want to
    hand the power to an executive to unilaterally determine who to
    go after. Instead, Congress narrowed the AUMF to have it be
    with respect to the perpetrators of the attacks of September
    11. ISIL was formed after September 11. There's been an
    administrative gloss by both administrations, the Bush and
    Obama administrations, to go beyond the perpetrators of
    September 11 to talk about associated forces with al Qaeda. Has
    there been a time which ISIL has been associated with al Qaeda?
    There was a time. But, they are not associated now. They've
    disclaimed each other. They're even battling in some theaters.
        Could a lawyer make a broad argument, a really creative
    argument that the AUMF covered ISIL? I suppose. I'm a lawyer,
    I've made creative arguments. But, this President spoke at the
    National Defense University in May 2013, and he argued against
    broadening the open-ended AUMF and said, instead, what we
    should be doing as a Nation, and what he was committed to, was
    not broadening the open-ended AUMF, but trying to refine it,
    narrow it, and ultimately repeal it. I don't know why we would
    take an open-ended AUMF and try to broaden it further when the
    President has made a commitment that it should be narrowed and
    refined.
        Finally, there was the AUMF with respect to Iraq that was
    passed in 2002. It was designed to topple a government that is
    long gone. There have been many successive governments since
    the Hussein Government was toppled. The administration
    testified, in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in
    May, that the 2002 AUMF was obsolete and should be repealed.
    Again, to try to take these two statutory elements and stretch
    them so broadly, I think, is a significant problem, and it will
    create a precedent that, if we go along with it in Congress, we
    will live to regret, and possibly regret very soon.
        That said, I think the mission, as described, is
    reasonable. But, I think Congress is necessary. The President,
    last week, and you, today, have said, obviously, you would
    welcome Congress, because we're stronger if we do it together,
    not just as an institution. We're stronger in the support we
    provide to the men and women that we ask to bear the risk of
    battle. If we ask them to bear the risk of battle in a war that
    may take a number of years, that will have aspects that we
    can't currently predict, some will be hurt, some will lose
    their lives, some will see bad things happen to their comrades
    in arms. If we're going to ask them to risk that, then we
    should do our job to bless the mission and say that it's worth
    it. If we're not willing to do our job as Congress, bless the
    mission and say that it's worth it, we shouldn't be asking
    people to risk everything.
        It is my hope that this body will grapple with this four-
    point plan, will ask tough questions, will refine it, but will
    give our imprimatur to it so that we are not asking men and
    women to serve and potentially risk everything without us doing
    the job that we're supposed to do in order to demonstrate the
    national support for the mission that we're asking them to
    carry out.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Kaine.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. I'm in complete agreement with Senator Kaine,
    and I'm glad he went before me, because he articulated it much
    more clearly and forcefully than I would have.
        I would only touch a bit on the history. The Constitution
    is very clear, and it wasn't an afterthought or a minor comma
    here or there, ``Congress shall declare war.'' In fact, the
    interesting thing is, the first draft of the Constitution said,
    ``Congress shall make war.'' They had an--they argued about an
    amendment to change ``make'' to ``declare,'' because they
    realized it was impractical for Congress to execute the war, so
    they changed it to ``declare'' to leave the power of execution
    to the President. But, they were very explicit about why they
    did that. If you look at the 69th Federalist, it talks about
    the differences between the President and the King or other
    executives--and this is one of the principal things they
    pointed to--and the risk of having the power of war exclusively
    vested in the executive.
        In Madison's notes to the Constitution on--I think it's
    August 17, 1787--Madison talks about this discussion of the
    declaration of war, and George Mason used a wonderful phrase.
    He said, ``It is our intention--it is our goal--our goal here
    is clogging rather than facilitating war.'' That's an
    interesting term. They wanted it to be a deliberate decision.
        I believe, along with Senator Kaine, that stretching the
    AUMF from 2001 or 2002 to cover this situation renders the
    constitutional clause a nullity. I just believe, and the danger
    here is, as this happens year-by-year, war-by-war, conflict-by-
    conflict, eventually there's nothing left of that provision,
    and we have, in fact, transferred to the executive the
    unilateral power to commit American forces. That's not good for
    this country. We may like this President. There may be a
    President down the road we don't like and we don't want to have
    this power. The more precedent we establish--and it started
    with Harry Truman in Korea, where there was no declaration--I
    think the stronger that precedent becomes embedded, the more
    dangerous it is for the country.
        I think it's significant that the administration is now
    using the word ``war.'' I won't go further, but I think it's an
    important point. I totally agree that Congress has to act, and
    it's our responsibility to act. It's our responsibility to act.
    It will strengthen the President's hand, it will strengthen the
    coalition, it will strengthen our ability to draw coalition
    partners if we are a unified country and we're not--Congress
    isn't doing what it usually does, which is criticize and
    second-guess, and instead is a participant in the decision.
        Second point. We need to be thinking about three levels of
    strategy here, it seems to me. One is the plan the President
    articulated, which I believe was a coherent, thoughtful, and
    strong position. The President has articulated a plan. The
    question is, as General Dempsey has alluded to today, what's
    Plan B if the coalition doesn't stand up? What happens if
    Turkey and Saudi Arabia or all the other countries decide that
    they're just not going to participate, and then we're in a
    position of the West waging war on Islam?--which is exactly
    what ISIL wants. We cannot be in that position. We've already
    quoted Tom Friedman today. I'll do it again. He had a wonderful
    phrase, and I'd paraphrase it applying to Turkey. ``They're
    with us on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. They're against us on
    Tuesday and Thursday. They take the weekends off.'' These other
    countries have to get engaged in this struggle. Turkey is one
    of the prime candidates, because that's the jihadi interstate,
    that's how the people are getting into Syria and getting to
    ISIL. The strategic question is, what if they don't stand up?
    Are we going to do it by ourselves? I think the answer has to
    be, we can't, not only because the American people aren't
    interested in it, but also because it isn't going to work. This
    war has to have a coalition face.
        The third strategic question, forgetting about this current
    battle, this is a battle in a long-term war. The real question,
    to me, is, what is our strategy for dealing with radical
    jihadism, generally, not just ISIL? We have al Qaeda, ISIL, al-
    Shabaab, Boko Haram, AQAP, al-Nusra. This is geopolitical
    whack-a-mole, and we have to have a strategy to get to the
    bottom of why are young people joining these organizations?
    What's motivating them? How do we counter their message that is
    attracting people into this radical death-oriented philosophy?
        The administration has to deal with the current crisis, I
    understand that. I think ISIL is a threat. But, we also have to
    deal with, what happens if the Iraqi army doesn't stand up
    adequately? What happens if our troops that we train in Syria
    are unable to really take the fight to ISIL?
        The third question which I think is important is, we have
    to have a longer term, more broad strategy to deal with this
    threat. Otherwise, this is going to be a 100-year war. I just
    don't think it's in anyone's interest to contemplate such a
    terrible outcome.
        Again, I want to thank you, gentlemen, and your testimony
    has been very helpful today, both of you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you both for your service and being here today.
        Secretary Hagel, much has been talked about the role of
    Turkey and concerns about foreign fighters using their
    territory to cross in to aid the fighting. When you were in
    Turkey last week, what can you tell us about our engagement
    with Turkey to help stream the tide of the foreign fighter
    flow? Also, Turkey really hasn't committed publicly to what it
    will do as part of the core coalition. What can you tell us
    about their intentions with regard to this effort?
        Secretary Hagel. Thank you, Senator. I know, as you have
    expressed it, other Senators, the importance of Turkey, here.
    We agree.
        First, you know that ISIL is currently holding 46 Turkish
    diplomats hostage. In my conversations with President Erdogan
    and the new Prime Minister, Davutoglu, all their senior
    leaders, this obviously was at the top of their priority list,
    which it would be. Secretary Kerry was there a few days after I
    was there.
        Now, that said, Turkey recognizes, as much as any country,
    the threat that ISIL poses as other extremist groups. They are
    working with us now, will continue to work with us. Obviously,
    in an open hearing, I can't go too far down into this. We'd be
    glad to give you more in a closed session.
        Senator Gillibrand. Also, the oil on the black market.
        Secretary Hagel. That's another issue that----
        Senator Gillibrand. It's a huge financing stream for them.
        Secretary Hagel.--it's another issue that we talk to them
    about. They're not unaware of that. They know that it's a
    threat. They know that it's a major funding source of ISIL.
    They are moving to deal with some of these same issues. Our
    interests are common and clear. I think it's important to
    recognize, again, that Turkey has been an invaluable member of
    NATO, still is. We have a NATO base there. We have a lot going
    on with Turkey, as do other NATO countries. Their interests are
    clear, and they understand that in this fight.
        Senator Gillibrand. Many of the members of this committee
    have talked about the effectiveness of arming the moderate
    rebels. Senator Hirono just had a line of questioning about
    what agreements do they have with them? The Sotloff family have
    made certain questions about what information the moderates may
    have given to ISIL about their son. I'm concerned about how we
    assess their abilities, their effectiveness. When I met some of
    these opposition fighters the last time I was overseas, they
    wouldn't even agree to locking down and securing chemical
    weapons, when they were found, and turning them over to an
    international body. How can you engage them? How can you truly
    vet them? How can we have any hope that, if they do agree to
    fight ISIL on some level, not just Assad, that they will
    continue to do so and not align themselves with ISIL when they
    feel like Assad is in their sights?
        Secretary Hagel. I think a couple of points need to be
    reemphasized to answer your question. General Dempsey has
    talked about it today. I have. In both our testimonies. First,
    it goes back to a couple of recent questions that were asked
    here in the last few minutes. The United States cannot do any
    of this alone. This is why the local efforts, local
    organization has to be involved in this.
        Second, confidence and trust in their governments. When you
    really look at--with some intensity here, what's going on in
    Syria, how did this happen, why was it allowed to happen in
    Iraq, how did the Sunni tribes just walk away from the
    government, three divisions of the Iraqi security forces
    dropping their weapons and running--why did all that happen?
    General Dempsey--I know it's complicated, but he made a very
    important point. When people are disenfranchised, they don't
    trust their government, they don't have confidence in their
    government, their will to fight and to do the things that
    you're talking about won't be there. To reestablish trust and
    confidence coming from the locals, helping sustain them, build
    them, development, is really, I think, the answer to the
    question as much as anyone thinks.
        Senator Gillibrand. But, the moderate fighters,
    specifically, their goals are to unseat Assad. That is their
    primary reason for fighting. If we add this additional mission
    to them, ``We are going to help you, but you must help defeat
    ISIL,'' I don't know what makes them trade off one mission for
    the other. I don't know what hook you have that says, ``You
    have to help us defeat ISIL, and we'll assist in this'' in a
    way that they don't, at some point, say, ``No, our goal is to
    defeat Assad, and the way to defeat Assad is give all the
    weapons you just gave us to these better fighters that are
    represented by ISIL.''
        Secretary Hagel. I don't think they see it as an either/or.
    ISIL is a clear threat to them. What ISIL has done to them, to
    their people, their families, decimated their villages, the
    atrocities that ISIL has perpetrated on these people in Syria--
    it isn't a matter of, ``We'll fight either ISIL or Assad.''
        What I believe--and I think we have pretty clear
    intelligence on this, and the responsibility that we all have
    of understanding the people, first, is--it's pretty clear they
    want a future for their families, they want to live in some
    peace and stability, with possibilities and jobs for their
    families. One of the points that was made here earlier this
    morning--and I think General Dempsey made it--until there's
    some clarification on these millions of disenfranchised young
    men in North Africa, the Middle East, with no jobs, no
    possibilities, nothing, no hope, despair, then one country
    isn't going to be able to fix this problem. This is a deep,
    wide problem. I think it really does reflect back on your
    question.
        We can't do it alone. It is a long-term effort. But, the
    threats to us are so clear now, and to these people, that we
    have to deal with it.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        I just want to clarify one number I think you both have
    used, a 5,000 goal for the DOD train-and-equip program. If--and
    this is an ``if'' as published reports indicate, there's a
    covert program--I'm saying ``if''--any numbers involved in that
    covert program would not be involved in the 5,000. Is that
    correct?
        General Dempsey. That's correct.
        Chairman Levin. Thank you.
        We thank you very much for being here, for your testimony.
        We stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:09 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
               Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
                    status of u-2 divestiture certification
        1. Senator Blumenthal. [Deleted.]
        Secretary Hagel. [Deleted.]

        2. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Hagel, the U-2 currently provides
    75 percent of our actionable intelligence. Several combatant commanders
    are on record supporting the capabilities of the U-2 over the Global
    Hawk, based on the U-2's multispectral capability and superior electro-
    optical infrared sensor. In the 2007 and 2012 National Defense
    Authorization Acts (NDAA), Congress precluded the retirement of the U-2
    until intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gaps caused
    by the retirement of the U-2 are fully mitigated. The law further
    stipulates that ``until the capability to be fielded at the same time
    or before the U-2 aircraft retirement would result in equal or greater
    capability available to the commanders of the combatant commands.'' It
    does not seem prudent to be retiring a capable platform for a less
    capable platform at a time when we are using our ISR assets at their
    highest operational tempo ever. What is your current plan to comply
    with the statutory requirement, upgrade the multispectral capabilities
    of the Global Hawk sensor, and fully fund a transition plan to move
    from reliance on the U-2 to only the Global Hawk without creating an
    ISR gap?
        Secretary Hagel. The plan to upgrade the capabilities of the Global
    Hawk sensor and transition ISR missions from the U-2 to the Global Hawk
    is detailed in the office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation's
    (CAPE) classified report to Congress. This report was prepared in
    response to section 143(c) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 and was
    briefed to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee on September
    3, 2014. The Department of Defense Special Access Program Central
    Office is coordinating with your office to arrange a discussion in
    which CAPE can review with you the classified details of the plan.

                             executive order 13223
        3. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Hagel, on September 14, 2001,
    President Bush signed Executive Order 13223, authorizing under 10
    U.S.C. 12302 a partial mobilization of up to 1 million Reserve and
    National Guard personnel. He delegated this authority to the Secretary
    of Defense. Will you use this authority to mobilize members of the
    Reserve components for new regional challenges in Syria and Iraq?
        Secretary Hagel. Over the past 13 years, the Reserve component has
    proven to be a capable and vital part of the Total Force. If the
    Service Chiefs determine there is a need to use Reserve component
    assets to combat the current challenges in Syria and Iraq, or
    elsewhere, then I would consider exercising my authority under 10
    U.S.C. 12302, pursuant to Executive Order 13223.

        4. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Hagel, what is the plan for the
    Department of Defense (DOD) to end the partial mobilization of the
    Reserve components?
        Secretary Hagel. DOD recommended to the President in August of this
    year that he continue the state of national emergency, initially
    declared on September 14, 2001, and the authority to continue partial
    mobilization of the Reserve component for another year. The President
    did so on September 4, 2014. We will reevaluate this issue again in
    2015 and determine if partial mobilization continues to be required.

        5. Senator Blumenthal. Secretary Hagel, can you use authority under
    10 U.S.C. 12304 to maintain an operational reserve for current missions
    and deployments?
        Secretary Hagel. We have been using the broader mobilization
    authority provided by 10 U.S.C. 12302 to support current terrorist
    response missions and deployments. We are evaluating whether 10 U.S.C.
    12304 would provide adequate authority to support these missions.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
                    amphibious ships being used for missions
        6. Senator Wicker. General Dempsey, last week it was reported that
    Marine Corps Harriers operating off the USS Bataan carried out a strike
    against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). This marked the
    first time that our marines have participated in operations against
    ISIL, although they had been conducting ISR missions since the end of
    July. Also, the deployment of this Amphibious Ready Group was extended
    by 21 days in order to meet the needs of the combatant commander. These
    operations, and the extension of the ships' deployment, reinforce the
    fact that amphibious ships give commanders the flexibility they need to
    carry out a variety of missions, and underscore my concern that we do
    not have enough of these ships. The incoming Commandant of the Marine
    Corps, General Dunford, expressed those concerns to this committee
    during his confirmation hearing. I would like to hear your thoughts on
    this too. Specifically, do you have enough amphibious ships to meet the
    growing requirements?
        General Dempsey. I agree that we do not have enough of these
    amphibious ships, which give commanders more flexibility to carry out a
    variety of missions. To meet all Combatant Command Marine daily
    ``presence'' requirements with only amphibious ships DOD would require
    more than 50 ships. However, that solution would not be affordable or
    prudent. DOD's surge requirement is 38 amphibious ships, with 33 being
    the affordable number to execute the strategy with acceptable risk. At
    31, our current inventory is just short of that number. We do not have
    enough amphibious ships but given today's fiscal environment and budget
    uncertainty, the current plan provides the best balance of assets in
    this period of limited resources and diminishing flexibility.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
                                 syrian rebels
        7. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel, in an article from the newspaper,
    The Daily Star of Lebanon, on September 8, 2014, a Free Syrian Army
    commander, Bassel Idriss, is quoted stating: ``We are collaborating
    with the Islamic State and the Nursa Front by attacking the Syrian
    Army's gatherings in Qalamoun.'' The Hill newspaper reported on Friday
    that according to human rights groups monitoring the situation, a group
    of moderate rebels signed a cease-fire deal with ISIL. The Washington
    Post recently reported that Islamic State militants were using anti-
    tank weapons once held by moderate Syrian rebels. These reports were
    all in the past 2 weeks. How do you reconcile reports like this with
    the President's plan to train and arm these fighters?
        Secretary Hagel. The moderate Syrian opposition is caught in a two-
    front war against the Assad regime and terrorist groups such as ISIL
    and al-Nusrah Front. In some cases, moderate Syrian opposition units
    may have cooperated with extremists at the tactical level. Tactical
    cooperation does not indicate that moderate groups subscribe to the
    extremists' ideology. In other cases, we know that extremist
    organizations, like ISIL, have posted false reports about collaboration
    with the moderate opposition, including claims of cease fires.
    Likewise, we also know that extremist groups like ISIL have attacked
    moderate groups in order to steal their weapons and equipment. We will
    work closely with the Intelligence Community and foreign partners to
    screen recruits for any ties to extremist organizations.
        These anecdotes highlight--vice diminish--the need for a robust
    program to train-and-equip the moderate Syrian opposition to fight
    against groups like ISIL. With training they will be more effective in
    maintaining control of the weapons and equipment we give them.

        8. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel, if the moderate rebels we train
    and arm in Syria do not perform as well as you hope and need additional
    force to combat either ISIL or Assad, will the United States escalate
    our involvement to assist them?
        Secretary Hagel. We intend to carefully weigh the level of U.S.
    support against a range of factors as we move forward with this
    program, including the circumstances on the ground, the ability to
    achieve U.S. objectives, and the related costs, risks, and
    opportunities. At this time, we neither want to limit ourselves nor
    over-commit to levels of support, given the variable operating
    environment.

                     combating the flow of foreign fighters
        9. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel, in the President's speech last
    week, he discussed combating the flow of foreign fighters whose western
    passports allow for easier travel into the Western Hemisphere and the
    United States. I believe that the threat of these fighters returning
    from the battlefield to carry out attacks, such as the shootings on May
    24, 2014, at the Jewish Museum in Belgium, are an issue that we must be
    addressing now. How is DOD coordinating with other U.S. Government
    agencies and our allies to identify, track, and prevent these fighters
    from leaving the battlefield and threatening the U.S. Homeland?
        Secretary Hagel. DOD remains concerned about the foreign (i.e.,
    non-Syrian) fighters traveling to and from Iraq and Syria. This concern
    is particularly acute with respect to those individuals from visa
    waiver countries, whose passports could allow them to enter the United
    States with limited scrutiny. DOD has a relatively small, but
    important, role in the U.S. Government's effort to address this
    important challenge. DOD is currently focused on gaining a better
    understanding of the scope and complexity of the problem set and
    communicating insights to U.S. Government departments and agencies and
    foreign governments best situated to interdict these foreign fighters,
    such as through investigation and arrest.

        10. Senator Lee. Secretary Hagel, is the administration working
    with the Government of Turkey to disrupt the networks through their
    country that ISIL and other extremist recruits use to be smuggled into
    and out of Syria?
        Secretary Hagel. The flow of foreign fighters (i.e., non-Syrian) to
    and from Syria remains a significant concern for DOD and many of our
    allies and partners including Turkey, a North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization ally. The Government of Turkey is a critical partner in
    the coalition of nations that seek to address the threats emanating
    from Iraq and Syria. Over the past months, DOD has conducted a number
    of high-level engagements with Turkish officials to pursue expanded
    cooperation in combating ISIL and stemming the flow of foreign
    fighters. These engagements include my most recent visit to Ankara on
    September 8, 2014. On foreign fighter issues, we have seen some
    progress already, and believe the Government of Turkey will soon
    further increase its own efforts, and will continue to collaborate with
    the international community to address this challenge. However, the
    effort to stem the flow of foreign fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria
    extends well beyond Turkey, to include source countries and other
    transit points in the region. DOD continues to collaborate with other
    U.S. Government departments and agencies, and to engage with
    international partners following the President's speech at the United
    Nations General Assembly to ensure that we are supporting the broader
    international effort to address this challenge globally.

        11. Senator Lee. General Dempsey, President Obama stated that we do
    not have intelligence of specific attacks against the United States
    being planned by ISIL, but that they have the desire and ambition to do
    so. Where does the al Qaeda threat against the United States measure up
    against the threats we are currently seeing from ISIL?
        General Dempsey. Al Qaeda's goal has had a greater focus on direct,
    larger scale attacks against the United States, while ISIL is more
    focused on smaller scale attacks that may not necessarily be directed
    against the Homeland but still target Americans and westerners
    throughout the world.
        Due to their fight in Syria and Iraq and public calls for avenging
    strikes, ISIL has broader influence and appeal than al-Qaeda,
    increasing the possibility for inspired, individual attacks against the
    Homeland and Western interests.

                      iraqi government and security forces
        12. Senator Lee. General Dempsey, I am especially concerned that
    the Iraqi Security Forces lost large quantities of U.S.-provided
    weapons to ISIL forces when they retreated from northern Iraq this
    summer. As you well know, we spent many years and billions of dollars
    training these forces. What is your current assessment of the Iraqi
    Security Forces and how are you working to prevent another collapse of
    their willingness to fight and secure the weapons we are giving them?
        General Dempsey. The collapse of portions of the Iraqi Security
    Forces can in part be attributed to poor leadership and mismanagement
    by a Shia dominated Government of Iraq. This is why military assistance
    from the U.S. Government and the coalition has been, and will continue
    to be, predicated upon the formation of an inclusive Iraqi government
    that includes representation from Sunni, Shia, and Kurds. An inclusive
    Government of Iraq will facilitate the proper management of the Iraqi
    Security Forces and prevent another collapse like the one that occurred
    this summer. Additionally, the Coalition to Counter-ISIL will institute
    a train, advise, and assist plan intended to improve the capabilities
    of the Iraqi Security Forces, increasing their willingness to go on the
    offensive and take back lost terrain from ISIL.

        13. Senator Lee. General Dempsey, the Kurdish Peshmerga are proving
    so far to be reliable and efficient at pushing back against ISIL in
    northern Iraq. Are the Peshmerga and Kurdish political leaders
    supportive of a unified and stable government in Baghdad, or do their
    intentions against ISIL extend only as far as protecting their people
    and Kurdish territory?
        General Dempsey. The Kurdistan Regional Government has expressed
    support for and willingness to participate in the new Government of
    Iraq headed by Prime Minister Abadi. Its leaders have declared they
    will work with Baghdad to bring Iraq's different communities together
    to confront the country's political, economic, and security challenges.
    Kurdish and Peshmerga political leaders support a unified and inclusive
    Government of Iraq that operates in accordance with the Iraqi
    constitution.

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