[Senate Hearing 113-585]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-585
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2015
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 8, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 3
Kerry, Hon. John F., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Responses to questions submitted by the following Senators:
Robert Menendez.......................................... 47
Robert Menendez, additional set of questions............. 105
Bob Corker............................................... 107
Barbara Boxer............................................ 121
James E. Risch........................................... 124
Marco Rubio.............................................. 128
Tom Udall................................................ 137
Jeff Flake............................................... 140
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Testimony given by Secretary of State John F. Kerry at the
hearing on September 9, 2013, submitted by Senator Bob Corker.. 141
(iii)
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2015
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Udall, Murphy,
Kaine, Markey, Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, McCain,
Barrasso, and Paul.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
Mr. Secretary, welcome back to Washington. I understand you
have traveled to 44 countries and logged over 855 hours in the
air, which translates to an incredible 35 days of flying. So I
imagine it feels good to have your feet on the ground in a
familiar place like this committee that you once chaired.
We look forward to hearing your priorities for the State
Department in the coming year. As the situations in the
Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela demonstrate, never has the need
for American leadership and engagement in the world been
greater.
We understand the limitations and constraints that govern
the budgetary environment, and that getting our fiscal house in
order at home is the wellspring from which our national power
flows. But in this complex and rapidly changing global
environment, we also know that our national security interests
are priority number one and they cannot be jeopardized.
The $40.3 billion in base discretionary funding for the
Department of State and USAID, equal to the 2014 enacted level,
provides solid footing after several years of uncertainty for
our international efforts. And the $5.9 billion for overseas
contingency operations activities allows us to continue to
address challenges in the Middle East and North Africa,
including the Syrian humanitarian crisis, as well as in
Afghanistan, and other frontline states.
We also need to make sure that this budget is structured so
that our Nation is capable of meeting the new challenges and
opportunities of today's world. We face many challenging
issues--most recently, the menacing threat by Russia in
Ukraine, a challenge to its very existence. We can, and will
continue to, stand with the Ukrainian people who, by right,
will choose their own destiny.
In addition to authorizing $1 billion in loan guarantees
for Ukraine and other assistance to strengthen civil society
and security in the region, we have also given you tools to
respond to Russia in the form of sanctions. And our message to
President Putin and his cronies must be robust and swift.
On Syria, as we commemorate the third anniversary of the
uprising, I am pleased that the administration is prioritizing
assistance, both humanitarian aid and support for the Syrian
opposition. That $1.7 billion request sends an important signal
to the world and to the Syrian people of our commitment. But
this leads to a broader question. We can demonstrate U.S.
leadership on humanitarian assistance, but I would like to hear
from you, Mr. Secretary, on how we are demonstrating, and
intend to demonstrate, leadership in ending this crisis.
On Afghanistan and Pakistan, let me say that I support the
administration's efforts to right-size our investments in the
overseas contingency operations account, but in this year of
transition, I was hoping that more of the budget could be
shifted into the base budget, so we could begin to normalize
the assistance for these frontline states.
We also should take special note of the elections held in
Afghanistan last weekend. In the face of intimidation by the
Taliban, the Afghan people demonstrated their desire to shape
their destiny
of their own country. The election was a historic marker in
our engagement in Afghanistan, and we are hopeful that the
final
result will be credible and will genuinely reflect the will of
the Afghan people.
Now, there is a place that I am disappointed in the budget
and that is in the Western Hemisphere. The 2015 request is a
$358 million--a 21-percent decrease from the fiscal year 2013
budget. I am incredibly troubled that every other major account
in the Western Hemisphere is being cut and that there is not a
reinvestment of those funds where programs are coming to an
end.
I do not dispute the importance of other priorities laid
out in the administration's proposal, but I have seen year
after year after year after year a continuous cut in the
hemisphere's budget, and I believe that those cuts lead us to
lack a comprehensive approach to Latin America and the
necessary resources to back it up. Whether in Central America,
where nations are facing a crisis of criminal violence and
major challenges to governance and the rule of law, or in
Honduras and El Salvador, which continue to have the world's
highest murder rates, undercuting economic development and, in
turn, leading to high levels of emigration that directly affect
our country. And threats to democracy, freedom of expression
and human rights in our hemisphere, from Cuba to Venezuela and
Ecuador, should be a concern to us. As the volatile situation
in Venezuela has shown, undermining democracy can lead to a
political crisis and economic instability that has implications
for the entire region.
So let me close simply by saying that the overall budget
sets a strong proposed funding level, but along with my
concerns about Western Hemisphere issues, I am also concerned
that there are significant reductions in humanitarian
assistance and global health accounts. There is a nearly 5
percent cut in global health, with the largest reductions in
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and malaria.
So with those concerns--overall, I find a budget that I can
support. I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, for coming back to
the committee. We look forward to hearing your views on all of
these areas of concern. I am sure many members will have many
questions outside of the budget as well. And with that, let me
turn to Senator Corker for his remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I too want to extend my welcome back here. I know you
have been doing a lot of traveling.
And since we do not really pass budgets or reconcile them
and since we have not yet moved to authorizations, although I
think we may soon, I am not going to address the budgetary
issues but talk about some other policy issues, if I could.
Mr. Secretary, we all appreciate so much your willingness
to serve in the capacity that you are right now. We all
supported you. You had unanimous support of this committee and
everybody in the Senate to do what you are doing, and you have
certainly gone after it with a tremendous amount of energy.
I think there is probably not a person on this committee,
in spite of their appreciation for what you are doing, that
does not have concerns someplace relative to our foreign policy
in Syria.
This committee strongly supported the authorization for the
use of force to strike Assad for using chemical weapons. The
committee passed overwhelmingly support for the Syrian
opposition. And I think all of us understand today that the
smartest thing Assad did for his own self-survival was to kill
1,200 people with chemical weapons. We ended up jumping in
Syria's lap. We now sit in the back of the bus as Iran and
Russia really drive policy in Syria.
One of your assistants was up here a few weeks ago and made
some really reckless comments about a military strategy, if you
will, in Syria and said that they would brief us. We have had
no briefing. It has been 2 weeks. And as the chairman
mentioned, instead of that, we read about something last night
in the ``Wall Street Journal'' relative to disputes between you
and the Pentagon.
I do hope today that you will lay out clearly for us in
this open setting what our strategy is in Syria and hopefully
it is not just allowing people to kill each other off. Since
the chemical weapons were used, another 50,000 people have been
killed. Barrel bombs are being dropped indiscriminately on
populations there. Assad is dragging his feet on alleviating
the chemical weapons because he knows that prolongs his
survival and continues to allow us, Russia, and Iran to prop
him up.
So I know there are a lot of concerns about our Syria
policy. We have no policy from what I can tell other than,
again, allowing people to kill each other off and us making
commitments to the opposition that we do not honor and leaving
them in refugee camps and basically stranded without the
support that we committed to on the front end.
In Ukraine, you know, here we have a 40,000 troop buildup.
We know per public records Russia is basically paying people to
foment violence in the eastern part of the country. I hope that
you will address when we will implement the Executive order
relative to sectoral sanctions. And hopefully that will be this
week if they continue to have the buildup that they have. I am
confused by the policy. We castigate them on one side. On the
other hand, we are exchanging paper with them. I am confused
about what our policy really is.
In Iran, this is the first administration ever to agree
that Iran will enrich uranium. That has never happened in the
history of our country, and yet this administration has agreed
to that.
In Afghanistan, I am concerned that because of a monster
that we have created, Karzai, and his actions which are
certainly incoherent, I am afraid that we are going to pull out
and not do the things that have been so strongly recommended by
the Pentagon and others.
And in China, in the Senkakus, we have a situation where we
have unresolved disputes. We have skirmishes that are
occurring. These are the kind of things that create world wars.
And yet, our allies are concerned about where our support is.
Japan is continuing to move ahead with ways of creating their
own abilities to defend themselves.
So, Mr. Chairman--Mr. Secretary--excuse me--I have a lot of
questions. My sense is that the administration in so many ways,
through rhetoric and persuasion, seems to think that people
like the leaders of Russia and China and other places respond
to nice rhetoric. I do not think that is the case. I am
concerned about our policy, and I hope today, due to
questioning that I am sure many will have, including me, I hope
you will lay out very clearly what our policies are in these
areas.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling the hearing, and I
look forward to our witness.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
With that, Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. Your full
statement will be entered into the record, without objection.
And we look forward to your statement and then to engaging in a
dialogue.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much,
Ranking Member Corker and members of the committee. I am very
happy to be back here and appreciate enormously the committee's
indulgence to have shifted this hearing because it came at a
critical moment just before I was asked by the President to
meet with Lavrov relative to Ukraine.
And so I also want to thank everybody on the committee for
working so hard to move the nominations, which obviously is
critical. I think it is not the fault of the committee, but
with the combination of the vetting process and public process
and so forth and the combination of the slowdown on the floor
of the Senate, I think we are averaging something like 220-some
days and some people at 300 days and some over 365 days. So I
literally, only in the last month, have gotten my top team in
place 1 year in, and I am very grateful to the committee. Mr.
Chairman, you have worked really hard to make that happen and
the ranking member. Great cooperation. Senator McCain and
others helped to intervene on that. And I want to thank you all
for that.
A lot of questions, Senator Corker, that you raised, and I
really look forward to answering all of them because there is a
cohesive approach. We are living in an extremely complicated
world, unlike anything most of us grew up with. And we can talk
about that here today because it really is critical to the
question of how we deal as the United States in our budget, in
our own politics here, and in the choices we make.
Obviously--Senator Corker just brought it up--the intense
focus on Ukraine continues, and everything that we have seen in
the last 48 hours from Russian provocateurs and agents
operating in eastern Ukraine tells us that they have been sent
there determined to create chaos. And that is absolutely
unacceptable. These efforts are as ham-handed as they are
transparent frankly, and quite simply what we see from Russia
is an illegal and illegitimate effort to destabilize a
sovereign state and create a contrived crisis with paid
operatives across an international boundary engaged in this
initiative.
Russia's clear and unmistakable involvement in
destabilizing and engaging in separatist activities in the east
of Ukraine is more than deeply disturbing. No one should be
fooled--and believe me, no one is fooled--by what could
potentially be a contrived pretext for military intervention,
just as we saw in Crimea. It is clear that Russian special
forces and agents have been the catalyst behind the chaos in
the last 24 hours. Some have even been arrested and exposed.
And equally as clear must be the reality that the United States
and our allies will not hesitate to use 21st century tools to
hold Russia accountable for 19th century behavior.
We have stated again and again that our preference and the
preference of our friends and allies is de-escalation and a
diplomatic solution. But Russia should not for a single
solitary second mistake the expression of that preference as an
unwillingness to do what is necessary to stop any violation of
the international order.
At NATO last week and in all of my conversations of the
past weeks, it is clear that the United States and our closest
partners are united in this effort despite the costs and
willing to put in effect tough, new sanctions on those
orchestrating this action and on key sectors of the Russian
economy, in energy, banking, mining. They are all on the table.
And President Obama has already signed an Executive order to
implement these sanctions if Russia does not end its pressure
and aggression on Ukraine.
Now, let me make an equally important statement. It does
not have to be this way, but it will be this way if Russia
continues down this provocative path.
In my conversation yesterday with Foreign Minister Lavrov,
we agreed to meet soon in Europe, next week, with Ukraine and
our European partners to discuss de-escalation, de-
mobilization, inclusivity, support for elections, and
constitutional reform. And it is not in our judgment a small
matter that Russia has agreed to sit in this four-party status
with Ukraine at the table in an effort to try to forge a road
ahead.
Between now and then, we have made it clear that Russia
needs to take concrete steps to disavow separatist actions in
eastern Ukraine, pull back its forces outside the country,
which they say they have begun to do with the movement of one
battalion, and demonstrate that they are prepared to come to
these discussions to do what is necessary to de-escalate.
So Russia has a choice: to work with the international
community to help build an independent Ukraine that could be a
bridge between East and West, not the object of a tug of war,
that could meet the hopes and aspirations of all Ukrainians, or
they could face greater isolation and pay the costs for their
failure to see that the world is not a zero sum game.
Ukraine, and so many other ongoing, simultaneous challenges
globally, reinforce what I said a moment ago to all of you. I
think the members of this committee have long appreciated it.
That is, that this is not the bipolar, straightforward choice
of the cold war. We are living in an incredibly challenging
time where some of the things that the East-West order took for
granted most of my life are suddenly finding a world in which
American engagement is more critical and in many ways it is
more complicated because of nation state interests, balance of
power, other kinds of issues that are on the table.
You all travel. All the members of this committee do that.
And you see what I see in every place that I travel as
Secretary. On issue after issue, people depend on American
leadership to make a difference. That has been reinforced to me
more than perhaps any other single thing in the year that I
have been privileged to be Secretary, whether it is South
Sudan, a nation that many of you helped to give birth to and
now a nation struggling to survive beyond its infancy, or
Venezuela where leaders are making dangerous choices at the
expense of the people, or in Afghanistan where this weekend
millions defied the Taliban and went to the polls to choose a
new President, or on the Korean Peninsula where we are working
with our allies and our partners to make sure that we can meet
any threat and move toward the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. I think I have had five meetings with President Xi
this year and five trips to Asia already in furtherance of our
efforts to--and two of those meetings were with the President
with President Xi in an effort to further our goals there.
U.S. presence and leadership does matter, and that is why
our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has been supported and
welcomed by people throughout the region.
We also have great allies, great partners, but the fact
remains that no other nation can give people the confidence to
come together and confront some of the most difficult
challenges in the same way as we are privileged to do. I say
that without arrogance. I say it as a matter of privilege. We
have this ability. And I hear this from leaders all over the
world.
I particularly hear it about the Middle East peace process.
I read some who question why the Secretary of State is engaged
or as intense, as he might be, or why the United States should
be doing this if the parties do not want to do this. Well, the
truth is the parties say they want to continue these talks. The
truth is the parties are actually still talking to each other
in an effort to try to see if they can get over this hurdle and
make that happen.
But I have one certainty in my mind. I have yet to meet any
leader anywhere in the world who argues to me that it is going
to be easier next week or easier next month or easier next year
or easier in the next 5 years to achieve a long sought after
goal if the United States is not engaged now. There is no
Foreign Minister anywhere that I have met with, no leader. You
know, when I visited recently at the Vatican with His Eminence,
the Secretary of State, Cardinal Parolin, this is first and
foremost of people all over the world. Prime Minister Abe, the
Prime Minister of Indonesia. They ask you, do we have a chance
of making peace in the Middle East, because everywhere it is a
recruitment tool, everywhere it is a concern, everywhere it has
an impact. And the fact is that everybody volunteers gratitude
for the fact that the United States is engaged in that effort.
So whether it was NATO this past week or the G7 last week
or the Vatican itself, I have heard from minister after
minister just how much the global community has invested in
this effort. Japan just committed several hundred million
dollars to the Palestinians for assistance. The Saudis, the
Qataris, the Emiratis have each responded to our request and
committed to $150 million each to assist the Palestinians going
forward.
So this is something that has an impact on everybody, and
believe me, it has an impact on life in the United States, too.
So we will continue to the degree that the parties want to. It
is up to them. They have to make decisions, not us. They have
to come to the conclusion that it is worth it.
The same is true on Iran where every country understands
the danger that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to our national
security and to the security of our allies. And that is why we
have been so focused, along with all of you, on forging an
unprecedented coalition to impose the sanctions. From day one,
this administration has made it a foreign policy goal to
prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. To achieve this
goal, we have been clear that we will use all the elements of
our national power, including direct negotiations with Iran,
the very kind that we are engaged in as I speak. We are
approaching these talks seriously and with our eyes wide open.
That is why, as we negotiate, we continue to enforce
sanctions on Iran, not affected by the Joint Plan of Action,
not just, incidentally, over its nuclear activities but also
because of its support for terrorism. And we will press the
case on human rights and its record wherever we can. And we
will continue to urge Iran to release our American citizens,
Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini, and we will work to help find
Robert Levinson. All three should be home with their families
and that is consistently raised by us with any Iranian official
when we engage.
These are just some of the biggest issues that we are
focused on each and every day simultaneously, my colleagues.
They are not the only ones.
Senators Corker and McCain, you have both been to the
Syrian refugee camps on the border. You have seen the horrors
firsthand as I have. And this committee has focused on the
moral and security imperative that is Syria. And I am
particularly grateful for the fact that you voted the way you
did, the one body in the Congress that took that vote, and it
was a courageous and important vote.
We are focused on this every single day, and we are
currently routing increased assistance to the moderate
opposition. I know we will talk about this in the course of
this hearing. We are wrestling with these tough challenges,
even as we are moving the State Department ahead to help our
businesses succeed in a world where foreign policy is economic
policy.
One of the things that I want to emphasize. When I became
the nominee, I said to everybody on the committee that foreign
policy is economic policy. Economic policy is foreign policy in
today's world. And so we have set ourselves up in the State
Department to be increasingly geared toward helping American
businesses and toward creating new partnerships in an effort to
also promote our foreign policy goals. We are focused on jobs
diplomacy and shared prosperity. That is why Embassy Wellington
just helped a company in New Jersey land a $350 million
contract to lay fiber optics across the Pacific. It is why our
consulate in Shenyang has been so engaged to reverse tariffs
against American agricultural products. It is the challenge of
the modern State Department in a modern world, and that is to
wrestle with the challenges and opportunities that come at us
faster than ever before. It is a challenge balanced also
against security in a dangerous world, which is why this budget
implements the recommendations of the Independent
Accountability Review Board and makes additional investments
that go above and beyond what the review board recommended.
So I want to thank you, all of you, for everything you have
done for the security of our missions, and I want to thank you
for the way this committee stands up for an active,
internationalist American foreign policy that is in our
interests.
I spent enough time here in this room, as well as in the
Senate, to know that you do not call anything that costs
billions of dollars a bargain. But when you consider that the
American people pay just 1 penny of every tax dollar for the
$46.2 billion in this request, I think it is safe--and if you
add OCO, it is $50.1 billion. I think it is safe to say that in
the grand scheme of the Federal budget when it comes to the
State Department and USAID, taxpayers are getting an
extraordinary return on their investment.
So I thank you for your partnership in these efforts, and I
look forward to our conversation today. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Kerry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State John F. Kerry
Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Corker, thank you. Thank you
for your leadership of this committee, your help in moving our nominees
through toward confirmation, and thanks to all of you for your patience
and cooperation in rescheduling this hearing to accommodate some urgent
issues with respect to Ukraine.
Ukraine, and so many other ongoing, simultaneous challenges
globally, reinforce what I think members of this committee have long
appreciated--that because this is an incredibly complicated world, one
more challenging than the bipolar, East/West world order we took for
granted for most of my life, more than ever, this is a world where
American engagement is absolutely critical.
I know many of you travel, too, so you see what I see in every
place I travel as Secretary: On issue after issue, people depend on
American leadership--whether it's South Sudan, a nation some of you
helped give birth to, a nation struggling to survive beyond its
infancy--or Venezuela, where leaders are making dangerous choices at
the expense of the people--or in Afghanistan where this weekend
millions defied the Taliban and went to the polls to choose a new
President, or on the Korean Peninsula, where we are working with our
allies and partners to make sure we can meet any threat and for the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. U.S. presence and leadership
matter, which is why our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific has been
supported and welcomed throughout the region.
We have great allies, great partners, but this fact remains: No
other nation can give people the confidence to come together and
confront the most difficult challenges the way the United States can
and must, and I hear this from leaders all over the world.
I particularly hear it about the Middle East peace process--where I
have yet to meet anyone who has argued to me that it's going to be any
easier next week, next year, or 5 years from now. But I've talked to
Foreign Ministers from dozens of countries who think that this is
something the United States needs to be doing. And whether it was NATO
this week, or the G7 last week, or at the Vatican itself, I heard from
minister after minister just how much the global community is invested
in this effort--because peace would bring not only security and
opportunity to the Israelis and the Palestinians, it would bring an end
to one of the most intractable conflicts in the world.
The same is true on Iran--where every country understands the
danger a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to our national security and to
the security of our allies. That's why we've been so focused--along
with you--on forging an unprecedented coalition to impose sanctions.
From day one, this administration has sought to prevent Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. To achieve this goal, we have been clear
that we will use all elements of our national power, including direct
negotiations with Iran of the kind we are engaged in as I speak.
We are approaching these talks seriously and with our eyes wide
open. That's why, as we negotiate, we will continue to enforce
sanctions on Iran not affected by the Joint Plan of Action--not just
over its nuclear activities but because of its support for terrorism
and its gross human rights record. We will remain vigilant in
confronting Iranian illicit conduct, including any attempts at
sanctions evasion. And we will continue to urge Iran to release our
American citizens, Amir Hekmati and Saeed Abedini, and work to help
find Robert Levinson. All three should be home with their families.
These are just some of the biggest issues we're focused on each and
every day, simultaneously. They're not the only ones. Senators Corker
and McCain--you have been to the refugee camps on the Syrian border--
you've seen these horrors first hand, as I have. This committee has
focused on the moral and security imperative that is Syria--and we are
focused on it every single day.
We're wrestling with these tough, tough challenges even as we're
moving the State Department ahead to help our businesses succeed in a
world where foreign policy is economic policy. That is why we're
focused on jobs diplomacy and shared prosperity, that is why Embassy
Wellington helped a company in New Jersey land a $350 million contract
to lay fiber optics across the Pacific, and it's why our consulate in
Shenyang has been so engaged to reverse tariffs against American
agricultural products.
This is the challenge of the modern State Department in the modern
world--to wrestle with challenges and opportunities that come at us
faster than ever before.
It's a challenge balanced against security in a dangerous world,
which is why this budget implements the recommendations of the
independent Accountability Review Board and makes additional
investments that go above and beyond. I want to thank you for
everything you have done to support the security of our missions.
And I want to thank you for the way this committee stands up for an
active, internationalist American foreign policy. I spent enough time
in Congress to know not to call anything that costs billions of dollars
a bargain. But when you consider that the American people pay just one
penny of every tax dollar for the $46.2 billion in this request, I
think it's safe to say that in the grand scheme of the federal budget,
when it comes to the State Department and USAID, taxpayers are getting
an extraordinary return on their investment.
I thank you for your partnership in these efforts and I look
forward to our conversations today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that
comprehensive review of both our challenges and opportunities,
and the daily mission of the men and women of the State
Department.
I want to go to Iran. I read an article yesterday in the
Wall Street Journal entitled, ``Obama Administration Shows
Optimism on Iran Nuclear Talks.'' And despite significant
political hurdles and vastly different stated positions with
reference to Iran's nuclear programs, in public comments there
is the sense of progress and optimism. I am trying to glean
where that is from.
I am worried when I read this and other articles where it
says: ``some officials who have worked on developing the Obama
administration's negotiating position toward Tehran have
acknowledged that major concessions are needed by both sides
for a deal to be reached.'' The complete dismantling of
Tehran's uranium enrichment facilities and the Arak reactor--
the initial demand of the West--is no longer achievable. The
West is unlikely to get a complete accounting from Tehran of
the secret nuclear weapons work that the West believes it
conducted in the past.
The article goes on to suggest that the P5+1 should instead
focus on extending the time it would take for Iran to break out
and produce nuclear weapons to between 6 and 12 months.
Now, I do not think that we did everything that we have
done to only get 6 or 12 months' lead time because a deal that
would ultimately unravel the entire sanctions regime for a 6-
to 12-month lead time is not far from where we are today. And
with no sanctions regime in place, and understanding that
sanctions we have pursued have needed at least a 6-month lead
time to become enforceable--and then a greater amount of time
to actually enforce--that the only option left to the United
States--to this or any other President and to the West--would
be either to accept a nuclear-armed Iran or to have a military
option.
So I want to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, whether that is
where we believe success lies. Or is the success as outlined in
a letter by 83 Members of the Senate to the President, where we
say that we believe that we need to dismantle Iran's nuclear
weapons program and prevent it from having either a uranium or
plutonium path to a nuclear bomb. Where we believe that there
are no enrichment facility needs like Fordow and Arak, and
where we must get evidence of what happened in Parchin. I am
trying to get a sense of these parameters because, to the
extent that the administration has asked for forbearance, part
of it is going to have to be based on having an understanding
of the parameters.
And I would assume--and I ask you this question
specifically. Does the administration, if it strikes a deal,
ultimately believe that it needs to come back to the Congress
for the approval of such a deal in terms of the elements of the
law that exists today that would have to be repealed?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, good questions, all,
and entirely appropriate for us to try to dig into that a
little bit.
Let me begin by saying, first of all, I am not expressing
optimism one side or the other. I remain agnostic and
questioning even as we are just about halfway through. I talked
with our team on the ground in Vienna yesterday. They are
having serious expert, in-depth, detailed conversations about
what it takes to achieve our goal, proving that this is a
peaceful program. I think it is fair to say that I think it is
public knowledge today that we are operating with a time period
for a so-called breakout of about 2 months. That has been in
the public domain. So 6 months to 12 months is--I am not saying
that is what we would settle for, but even that is
significantly more.
Remember, ``breakout'' means that they make a decision to
race, to sort of move out of the regime that has been put in
place and overtly move to enrich sufficiently to create enough
material for one weapon. That is what breakout means. It does
not mean they have gotten to a warhead or to a delivery system
or even a test capacity or anything else. It is just having one
bomb's worth, conceivably, of material but without any
necessary capacity to put it in anything, to deliver it, to
have any mechanism to do so and otherwise.
We have amazing capacity that is being built into this
system to understand what they are doing. During just the JPOA
implementation, we are inspecting in Fordow. We have never been
in there before. We are inspecting in Natanz. We have not been
in there. We are occasionally, I think several times a month,
once or twice a month, inspecting in the Arak facility. They
cannot move anything into the Arak facility to complete its
commissioning. We are inspecting their storage of centrifuges.
We are inspecting their mining and their milling and so forth.
We have a huge track here of what they are doing.
And so the greater likelihood is at the end of this, we
hope to be able to come to you with an agreement that has the
most extensive and comprehensive and accountable verification
process that can be achieved in order to know what they are
doing.
So when we talk about the number of months, we do not know
what they are yet, but if you know--I mean, you have to think
about this. If they make a decision to break out, sanctions are
not going to be what make the difference. If they are overtly
breaking out and breaking an agreement and starting to enrich
and pursue it, they have made a huge, consequential decision.
And the greater likelihood is we are going to respond
immediately.
The Chairman. I gather what we are doing now--I have to be
honest with you--if the end result is a 6- or 12-month window
for which the sanctions regime will have fallen--and if it is
true that they decide to break out. The only question is: Is
the reason they are at the table because of the sanctions
regime? Depending on how we act, they will calculate whether or
not to make that decision based on internal consequences to
their economy, and based on concerns that the Ayatollah has
about regime change, either from the outside--which is his
constant concern--or from within, because of the economic
catalyst that can be created in Iran.
And so if 6 to 12 months is where we end up--I know that
you have not said that, but since you said that it would still
be more significant than 2 months--the bottom line is I would
hope that is not where we end up. Because with their research
and development capacity still moving forward as we speak--
allowing them to create more sophisticated centrifuges that
close the window for them, and even more quickly with their
missile development--these elements are all worrisome. It is
far different from where we started off, and what we were told,
to where I believe we are heading.
And this is why so many Members joined us in staking out a
ground so that the administration understands. Does the
administration intend to come back to the Congress if you have
a final deal for ultimately lifting some of the elements that
would be needed to be lifted under law?
Secretary Kerry. Well, of course, we would be obligated to
under the law, Mr. Chairman. We would absolutely have to. And
so clearly, what we do will have to pass muster with Congress.
We well understand that.
But let me just say very quickly all of the things you just
raised are very much contemplated. I mean, these are all part
of the conversation, the research, what kind of research,
warheads particularly. There has to be a huge level of
transparency.
Now, you mentioned the Arak reactor. We have been very
clear that there is no legitimacy to a full-on heavy water
plutonium reactor, none whatsoever, in any scheme that they
have articulated for private sector use. So that has to be
dealt with in the context of the negotiations. It will be.
The Chairman. I agree. But originally we were told that it
is going to be dismantled. Now we are told that we are going to
find a different purpose for it. It continues to morph into
different areas.
Let me ask you one final question.
Secretary Kerry. Actually, let me just clarify, Mr.
Chairman. First of all, it is written in the Joint Action Plan.
The Chairman. Nothing is agreed to----
Secretary Kerry. Correct. Nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed. This is a mosaic that is going to have to
be put together, and I can assure you that we are going to
strive to get the longest period we can get in terms of
breakout. There are a number of different options as to how it
can be managed. But the important thing is that it is not a
heavy water plutonium reactor. That is critical.
The Chairman. One final question. The Russians--we have
seen consistent iterations of a barter deal that clearly, if it
was consummated, would be sanctionable. So my question is,
number one, if such a deal actually comes into fruition, is it
the administration's intention to sanction those actions? I
look at this in our engagement with Russia. We met with Russia
to broker a deal over Syria in September, and now have a
worsening humanitarian disaster and the delay on chemical
weapons. We also met with Russia over Iran. There is an ``oil
for goods'' deal with Russia and Iran that sources say could be
worth $20 billion--then Russia annexes Crimea and destabilizes
Ukraine.
I mean, I am beginning to wonder what it is--at what point
in this relationship with Russia, particularly vis-a-vis Iran,
but even beyond, is it going to be clear that there are
consequences? I understand that Russia is an entity we are
going to have to deal with, but by the same token, right now
they seem to act in ways that are contrary to just about all of
our interests.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, the hard reality is that the
relationship with Russia produces both moments of consternation
and conflict, as well as cooperation and effect. We did, in the
course of the last years, the START treaty, and in the course
of the last years, we have cooperated on Afghanistan. We have
cooperated on Syria. We have cooperated on P5+1 on the Syria
chemical weapons.
I talked yesterday to Foreign Minister Lavrov, and I also
talked to the Director General of the OPCW. Currently 54
percent of the chemical weapons are out of Syria, and we have
major shipments that are planned at two sites near Damascus.
They should take place in the next days. But there is a general
sense that we are concerned about the slowdown, but we still
believe we could be on schedule or close to schedule. We are
pushing for that. And the Russians have indicated they are
prepared to continue to push and to try to achieve that. They
have an interest in achieving it.
So, you know, there are pluses and, yes, there are minuses,
obviously. We do not have the luxury as a country of being--you
have got to deal at this point. In one time or another, Reagan
dealt with Gorbachev. Nixon dealt with Mao. It is a reality of
the world that we try to move forward even as----
The Chairman. I appreciate that and I understand the
challenge.
Secretary Kerry. But let me say----
The Chairman. But on the barter deal--such a deal would
clearly violate the regime that has been set up. And I assume
that we need to make it very clear to the Iranians, as well as
to the Russians, that such a deal would be sanctionable if it
happened.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, we have made it clear to
both sides our deep concerns about the reported ``oil for
goods'' deal. It would raise serious concerns, as you have
said. It would be inconsistent with the terms of the P5+1 Joint
Plan of Action, and yes, it could trigger U.S. sanctions
against the entities or individuals that are involved in that
deal.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your questioning
and I am glad you took the time you did. I did want the
Secretary to see the concerns that we have about foreign policy
are very bipartisan and very sincere and very deep.
I am going to move to Syria.
I will say that it is hard for me to discern the good
things that have occurred relative to our negotiations with
Russia, although I hope over time we will be able to see those.
When the President talked about his redline back in August
2012, 30,000 Syrians were dead. Today 150,000 Syrians are dead.
We continue to talk about this shiny object, the chemical
weapons, but people daily are being killed with barrel bombs.
And I would just like for you in front of everyone, since you
are up here asking for a budget request--I would like for you
to explain to us what our Syria policy is right now.
Secretary Kerry. Sure, I would be happy to, Senator.
Senator Corker. And let me say this. We did not create the
Syrian problem. I understand that. We did not create it. But
our lack of attention in dealing with it has caused it to
fester to a point where now it is a national security threat to
our Nation. That is certainly what our leaders are saying in
that area, that the amount of extremists, which we all said
would grow, I might add--I think you even said on the front
end. But I would like for you just to explain to all of us
again what our strategy toward Syria is today in detail, if you
would.
Secretary Kerry. I would be delighted to explain what it
is, but I also want to explain what it is not because I have
heard people suggest many things. I mean, you just said the
word. Inattention to it has led it to be where it is today and
so forth. I just do not agree with that, Senator. I really do
not agree with that.
The fact is we have paid enormous attention to it. By
absolute consensus in the United States Congress last year, I
do not think there was a Member here who suggested there was a
military--maybe one or two who suggested there was a military
solution to Syria.
Senator Corker. No, but we did suggest arming, training----
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I am delighted. We are doing a
lot of things and we are deeply engaged with the opposition. We
are more engaged than we have ever been before right now and
more successfully right now.
Senator Corker. Would you be willing to tell us about that?
Secretary Kerry. Not in an open session.
Senator Corker. Well, would you commit right now to tell us
every detail of our Syrian strategy in a classified setting?
Secretary Kerry. I have always felt--as the chairman knows,
in my years as chairman of this committee, I thought one of the
great anomalies of the United States Senate was that the
Foreign Relations Committee, which has to authorize and create
foreign policy, is not part of the chain that----
Senator Corker. So you will not commit to sharing.
Secretary Kerry. No, I will. I will.
Senator Corker. You will commit to sharing every detail of
what our strategy is.
Secretary Kerry. To the degree I am allowed to under the
process of the law, I will do that. But if there are any
limitations that I am aware of, I am not sure. But we always
have these briefings down in CVC and I am happy to go through
with you.
But let me explain what I can here in open session. I want
people to understand what we are doing.
I came into this role in February, February 1st of last
year. We immediately had a meeting with the Foreign Ministers
of the so-called London 11 Support Group. We met in Rome. We
met in Amman, and we began to coordinate our efforts with the
opposition.
Then in April--I think it was April--I went to Russia, met
with President Putin, met with Foreign Minister Lavrov, and
made the argument that we needed together to try to work toward
a political solution. At that point in time, President Assad
was not faring so well, and there was a great sense of
insecurity in Syria. The Russians agreed that we needed to try
to negotiate this.
Subsequently, after agreeing to the concept of a Geneva II
meeting where you would try to have a negotiation, the
opposition began to have its own infighting, nothing we could
control, just the nature of the beast. And while they began to
have their infighting, large numbers of jihadists began to be
attracted to the effort to get rid of Assad because he was
killing Sunni, and many of them are Sunni-based.
Senator Corker. All of which everyone said was going to
happen on the front end. Very predicted.
Secretary Kerry. But what was the plan to not have that
happen, Senator? I did not notice Congress racing to the
barriers saying we are going to do something. I do not think
the American people who are going to send American----
Senator Corker. Well, let me ask you this. Do you agree
with the President's comments on CBS just recently that the
authorization for force that you asked for, that had we done
that, it would have had no effect in Syria? Do you agree with
those comments? It would have no effect after you came in and
told us the effect that it was going to have.
Secretary Kerry. That is not what the President said. What
the President said, it would not have had the effect of
changing the calculation or the course of the war. It would
have had an effect on precisely what he was asking for it for,
which was to send a message to Assad about the use of chemical
weapons.
Senator Corker. So the authorization you asked for was not
to degrade his capabilities?
Secretary Kerry. Of using chemical weapons, correct. If you
go back and read it, it was precisely targeted to reduce his
capacity to use chemical weapons.
Senator Corker. Let me ask you this.
Secretary Kerry. But let me just finish the thought here.
Everybody up here was saying we do not want to go to war.
Senator Corker. Not everybody. This committee voted to go
to war.
Secretary Kerry. No. They did not vote to go to war. They
voted to have a limited strike for the sole purpose of
degrading his capacity to deliver chemical weapons. Guess what.
Senator Corker. Did you not share with us that that
degrading would have a definite effect on his ability to carry
out strikes against the opposition? You did not tell us that?
Secretary Kerry. I think it would have had some effect on
that, Senator, but it would not have had a devastating impact
by which he had to recalculate because it was not going to last
that long. We all know that. It took 30,000 sorties and 30 days
in Bosnia to have an impact. Here we were going to have 1 or 2
days to degrade and send a message.
And guess what. Senator, we came up with a better solution,
to get all of them out by working through the diplomatic
channel with Russia, and we have an agreement which is now
working out with 54 percent removed and we are moving to more.
So what is your take? Would you rather drop a few bombs,
send a message, and then have him still with the weapons and
capacity to deliver them, or would you rather get all of them
out?
Senator Corker. Let me ask you this question. Instead of
meeting with us and laying out strategy, I have noticed the
administration is really good at leaking things to newspapers.
The chairman alluded to that 2 weeks ago when one of your
assistants was making the most reckless comments that have been
said before this committee.
But let me just ask you. Apparently there is some debate
occurring relative to military action or not. The Wall Street
Journal reports that you are for it. We got a letter from Julia
sitting right behind you. It was undated, but it said we do not
believe that there is a military solution to the Syrian crisis.
But I would like for you to share. Do you think there is or
is not? Is there a debate that is occurring right now about
military action or not? Clear it up. I would love to know
whether Anne Patterson was making something up or something is
actually occurring there.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, let me do that. I ask you
to give me the time to do it because I do want to clear it up.
But I also just want to finish quickly the notion.
If there is no military solution--and everybody at the
Pentagon would tell you there is no military solution.
Senator Corker. But apparently you think there is.
Secretary Kerry. No. I do not think there is a--I think
there is a capacity to change Assad's calculation, and so does
the President.
Senator Corker. Which is what we discussed last August.
Secretary Kerry. We will discuss in a classified session
exactly what those things are. But let me come back for a
minute because I want to answer your question.
The reality is that if you are going to have a negotiated
solution, you have to have a ripeness to the ability to be able
to come. Last May, there was more ripeness. Then the situation
changed on the ground. Today Assad feels fairly secure in
Damascus and in some of the corridor going north to the ports,
and that has been his strategy. But around him in the south
particularly, in the east, and in the north, there is not that
kind of security. In fact, the opposition has made some gains
recently.
And so the key here is how do you get the parties to a
place where they both understand that there is not going to be
a military solution that does not destroy the country
absolutely and totally but which ultimately could be
negotiated. There has to be a recognition by both of the
ripeness of that moment. It is not now. We all understand that.
So the question is can you do something in order to create
that, and that is a legitimate question for the Congress, a
legitimate question for the administration. And we talk about
that. Of course, we do.
Senator Corker. What is the answer?
Secretary Kerry. But there is no difference in our policy.
I support the choices the President has made. We need to have a
classified briefing. You need to understand where we are and
what we are doing, and I look forward to having that
conversation.
Senator Corker. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you having
this hearing.
And, Secretary Kerry, I guess, will tell after, when you
write your memoirs, whether you support the policy of the
administration or not. But we certainly get a lot of
conflicting reports. I look forward to that classified----
Secretary Kerry. I am happy to be the recipient of some
good advice. What do you believe would make the difference
right now in order to get a negotiated solution? Or do you
believe there is a military solution?
Senator Corker. So I actually strongly supported what we
passed out of committee on both occasions, which was arming the
vetted moderate opposition--I strongly supported that--with
training, doing it under the Defense Department auspice not
potentially other areas. I strongly supported that. I kind of
thought you supported that actually.
I strongly supported the limited strike that you asked for.
Instead, we took another path and we have had another 60,000
people dead there. No doubt the dynamics on the ground have
changed. We have got 10,000 al-Qaeda folks on the ground, which
we did not have at the time.
And yes, it is a lot more complicated now. It is
destabilizing Iraq. It is destabilizing other places. And we
are in a very different place. And we did not take actions at a
time when we could have made a difference. So many on this
committee wanted us to do that. So, yes, we are in a very
complicated place.
It is interesting that we are going to end up in a place
where our interests with Russia align because very soon we are
going to get to a point where, because of the extremists on the
ground there, it is a threat to their homeland and to ours.
But you are the Secretary of State, and I would love to
hear--you have to be disappointed by what has happened there.
You have to be disappointed by the lack of action. You have to
be disappointed by the indecisiveness. And candidly, we keep
hearing about these things that are coming forth that are going
to change the dynamic.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, I would say to you the fact
is we are doing more than we have ever been doing. And you do
need to be briefed. I am not sure I understand why you are not.
We have had all Senator briefings historically on issues of the
top level security. We ought to do that. I am ready to try to
make that happen. The sooner the better, because if you had
that, a lot of these questions would be answered.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I very much
appreciate not only you being here but the work that you are
doing globally for U.S. interests.
On Syria, let me just follow up one question where I would
hope there would be strong agreement. I have been very vocal in
the human rights violations that have occurred in Syria. During
war, people get hurt, but there has been an intentional
targeting of civilians by the Assad regime; 10,000 children
have already died in Syria.
At previous hearings, we have talked about the U.S. role in
making sure that those who are responsible for these gross
violations of international human rights are going to be held
accountable. And yet, I still do not see a game plan to bring
to justice those who have targeted innocent civilians for
horrible outcomes, including the use of chemical weapons.
So can you just share with us what steps the United States
is taking to make sure that we will have preserved the record
and people will be held accountable? Because I tell you the
only way that we can try to reduce this type of action in the
future is to make it clear those that are responsible are, in
fact, held accountable by the international community.
Secretary Kerry. I could not agree with you more, Senator.
And all of those incidents are being chronicled and completely
packaged, in a sense, ready for that prosecution. There are
countless entities that are preparing those cases. There is no
question in my mind or in anybody's mind I think who watches
this closely that war crimes have been committed purposely,
intentionally, ordered at the highest level. We saw that in the
case of the gas, but it goes well beyond gas. The
indiscriminate bombing of civilians, the use of starvation as a
tool of war against civilians, blockades. The torture,
documented, of more than 11,000 individuals. It is a human
disaster beyond many words in the world.
The only other place I can think of on the face of the
planet where things may be worse is North Korea. We had the
U.N. report recently on North Korea. But that is a level that
is unfathomable since the days of Hitler.
But Syria's aggression against its own people--there is no
question in my mind it has to be held accountable, and we have
said that we will.
Senator Cardin. Will you keep us totally engaged on a
regular basis as to what progress is being made in this area?
Secretary Kerry. Absolutely. Part of the difficulty right
now, obviously, is access to the country and to those
individuals. But within the course of time--that is probably
one of the reasons some of them are fighting the way they are
fighting. But over time, we have historically proven we can
bring people to accountability and we will.
Senator Cardin. You have spent a great deal of time in
regards to working with the Palestinians and Israelis on
getting the peace talks started. In the meantime, the
Palestinians have taken unilateral action dealing with
recognition that is contrary to the peace negotiations that
makes it difficult. Yet, they will not acknowledge the right of
a Jewish state.
Can you just bring us up to date as to the prognosis of
where we are in regards to the peace discussions?
Secretary Kerry. Sure. First of all, you know it is our
position the Government of the United States and the President
supports the notion of Israel being defined as a Jewish state,
and he has said that in many speeches and it is in our policy.
And we believe that that should happen.
But when it happens and how it happens has to be part of
the negotiation, obviously. It is not going to happen in the
beginning, Senator. It is really going to be one of those
narrative issues that gets resolved toward the end.
Senator Cardin. I would just point out that the
acknowledgement of a Palestinian state is up front. It seems to
me that the U.S. position is a clear--as part of the outcome,
the international recognition of a Jewish state. That is not a
negotiable point. So I do not quite understand when you say
that that will not be acknowledged up front when the
establishment of a Palestinian state is acknowledged up front.
Secretary Kerry. Well, it is and it is not. They do not
have a state yet. You have to have borders. You have to have a
defined solution to other issues before you have a state. You
have to resolve issues of demilitarization and other kinds of
things.
But here is what is really important, Senator. Both sides,
whether advertently or inadvertently, wound up in positions
where things happened that were unhelpful. Clearly, going to
these treaties is not helpful, and we have made that crystal
clear. And we need both sides to find a way to create the level
of compromise necessary to do what they both say they want to
do, which is continue the talks because they both view it as
important to the future.
Now, the irony, bitter irony, is that at this particular
moment, this fight is over process. It is not over the
substance of a final status agreement. It is over how do you
get to the discussion of a final status agreement. So our hope
is that we can work a way through this.
But in the end, the parties are going to have to make that
decision. It is not our decision. We can cajole. We can
leverage. We can offer one thing or another to try to be
helpful. They have to make the fundamental decision. And in my
judgment, both leaders have made courageous and important
decisions up until now.
You know, for Prime Minister Netanyahu to release prisoners
is a painful, difficult political step to take, enormously
hard. And the people of Israel have been incredibly supportive
and patient in giving him the space to be able to do that in
exchange for the deal being kept of the release of prisoners
and not going to the U.N. Unfortunately, the prisoners were not
released on the Saturday they were supposed to be released. And
so a day went by, day 2 went by, day 3 went by, and then in the
afternoon, when they were about to maybe get there, 700
settlement units were announced in Jerusalem and poof. That was
sort of the moment.
So we find ourselves where we are. My hope is the parties
will find a way back. We are working with them to try to do so.
Again I repeat. They have to make that fundamental decision,
and I hope they will. I believe if they do, there is a way to
get into substantive discussions now. A lot of groundwork has
been laid over the last 8 months. We do not talk about it
publicly. I am not going to go into the details here. But there
has been a narrowing of differences. Are there gaps? Yes, of
course, there are gaps. But the narrowing of where they are and
of different options of how one might deal with them is real.
And I hope the parties will be able to find a way back.
But we have an enormous amount on our plate. There are
limits to the time the President and I, obviously, can commit
to this, given the rest of the agenda, if they are not prepared
to commit to actually be there in a serious way.
So we will see what happens in the next days. Our teams are
still having some discussion on the ground. There was a long
meeting yesterday between Palestinians and Israelis. And I am
not going to suggest anything is imminent, but one always has
to remain hopeful in this very difficult, complicated process.
If it were easy, it would have happened a long time ago. Plenty
of Secretaries of State and Presidents have tried to help make
this happen.
Why is this moment perhaps different? Because at the back
end, the consequences are more stark and clear than they have
been before, and there is less space for mistakes. I hope they
will make it.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I do not envy the position you are in here
today. This is supposed to be a budget hearing where the
American people find out what they are getting for their money.
After the discussion we have had here today, I think anybody
who would come in here would have an impression that after we
have looked at the issues with Russia and Iran and North Korea
and Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, the peace process, and all
the difficulties with every one of these--I appreciate your
view that there are some things happening which are positive.
But I tell you you cannot help but get the impression that our
foreign policy is just spinning out of control and we are
losing control in virtually every area that we are trying to do
something in.
You know, we have got such limited time here to talk about
all of these problems, but probably what I want to talk about
briefly are just a couple of them.
One of the best examples is the one that is on the front
pages today, and that is the Russian issue. You know, this
administration said they were going to hit the reset button,
and I cannot help think that somebody hit the wrong button
because things have not gone well during this administration.
You know, the Russians today are misbehaving worse than
they have in decades, and nothing seems to change that. When
you look at what they did in Georgia and still remain occupying
part of Georgia, when they even agreed not to, what they have
done in the Ukraine, what they have done in Syria and are
continuing to do in Syria, plus we all know about the cheating
that is going on on the treaties that have been entered into, I
am very disappointed at what is going on. You cannot help but
be discouraged about it.
I am interested to hear your thoughts about this meeting
coming up next week because you talked about what happened in
Syria and you had a very similar meeting in Syria where you sat
down with Lavrov and supposedly you forged a road forward, and
that road forward has been a disaster. You have heard the
people talk about how many tens of thousands of people have
been killed since then. The dismantling of the chemical weapons
has slowed down.
What makes you think you are going to be able to make
better progress on the Ukraine? I mean, we have seen this movie
over and over and over again with the Russians. They misbehave.
Then we sit down at the table. We make some kind of an
agreement and they misbehave even worse after the agreement. So
maybe you could give us a little taste of what you are going to
tell Lavrov when you meet with him next week.
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me give you what I consider a
taste of reality, Senator, about our foreign policy and the
realities of the world.
Georgia happened under George Bush. Georgia happened under
George Bush, and he did not even bring a sanction. President
Obama has brought sanctions and it is having an impact.
Senator Risch. It is having an impact?
Secretary Kerry. Yes, it is having an impact. And the fact
is that it will have a far more serious impact if they cross
over or continue what is happening in east Ukraine.
Now, I do not know anybody in the United States of America
that said we ought to go to war over Crimea. Is there any
members of this committee who believes that? I do not think so.
So what are we doing? We are using 21st century tools,
which are the tools of diplomacy to bring people together in
other countries to put sanctions in place. And we now have
announced the possibility of using sector sanctions. Now that
is serious business. Serious business. It is banking. It is
energy. It is mining. It is arms. It is other things. And if
you start going down that road, it is not just them who feel
it, we will feel it too. So you have to approach these things
with some sense of responsibility. It is not just a speech. It
is a policy and it has implications in what happens. And the
fact is that we believe they take that seriously.
Now, their economy is not that strong. They do not make a
lot in Russia. They extract from the ground and sell it. And so
if we start changing energy policy and we start moving with
respect to LNG and we start moving with respect to these
sanctions, it can have a profound impact. And I think Russia
knows it. It is not the preferred way to go.
But when you say, you know, something like our foreign
policy is spinning out of control, those are great talking
points. They make for good sound bites on TV nowadays. But I
have to tell you, Senator, that is just not true. We have
helped negotiate a truce in South Sudan and helped to pull that
country back from the brink of civil war. We have helped to
create a framework for the disarming of M23 in the Great Lakes
Region of Africa. We are engaged in helping the French to quell
the Boko Haram and other people in the region of Mali and
elsewhere. We are engaged with the Chinese very directly in
helping to change their policy, which they have done, to put
greater pressure on North Korea and to deal with their route to
denuclearization. We have moved vessels into the region. We
have sent clear messages of our need and willingness to defend
the United States of America and our interests in the region.
We are the force that has been helping to bring parties
together to defend our interests in the South China Sea with
respect to Chinese claims in that region. We have been engaged
in our peace efforts in Somalia and other parts of the world in
our peacekeeping. We are engaged in Syria, as I told you,
leading nation in terms of humanitarian assistance, and we are
doing more than any other country with respect to what is
happening on the ground now with the opposition. In the Middle
East peace, we are leading the effort. In the gulf, we are
leading the effort.
I just do not agree with you. We are living in a
complicated world where there is more sectarianism, there is
more religious extremism. There are more young people. You
know, 60 to 65 percent of countries are under the age of 30; 50
percent are under the age of 21. What is the American policy
for being able to help them to be able to develop jobs in the
future and not go be extremists? There is so much we need to do
that depends on the budget, on the Congress, on our engagement
in the world, and we are more engaged than ever before, which
is why my travel schedule is what it is.
Senator Risch. Well, Secretary Kerry, the one thing I
really agree with you is the results of foreign policy are not
speeches. It is the results. It is the perception of the
American people. And you heard the list we have gone through of
the problems we have, and I agree that you have certainly done
some good things in some of the areas that you have just
indicated. But the major issues, the major initiatives that
affect the national security of this country are in a very
desperate situation in some places, and they are deteriorating.
I understand the speeches. But I am telling you the American
people believe that in these areas that we have talked about,
particularly in Russia, our situation has deteriorated.
Before the chairman cuts me off, I want to talk just
briefly about Iran. I have got a constituent and that is Pastor
Abedini who is in prison. John, you have got to do something
about this. You sit across the table from these people. There
is no reason he should be in prison today. You cut loose
hundreds of millions of dollars to those people. You have
relaxed some of the sanctions. Please help these people. Tell
them you are not going to do anything more. Tell the Iranians
you are not going to do anything more for them until they
release him and the two other people that they are holding
against all international law, against all human rights, and
against any definition of morality that you have.
And my time is up, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. So much to talk about.
Let me just offer one thank you. I recently returned from a
trip with Senator King to Israel, the West Bank, Lebanon, and
Egypt. And in direct discussions with both Prime Minister
Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas, their personal praise of you for
your efforts in trying to put the United States in the
appropriate position to try to find a difficult peace deal--
they said almost exactly the same thing about you. They were
very praiseworthy of your efforts, unprompted. And they
comments that they made are comments that I have heard from our
allies and partners in Egypt, Bahrain, the UAE, Jordan, Turkey,
Saudi Arabia.
This is a very difficult thing. It is a holy grail in
international diplomacy to try to find a solution to a problem
as vexing as this without venturing a thought on the potential
outcome. I just want to thank you for your efforts to try to do
something that would be so important in the world.
I want to ask you about Syria. Syria is complicated partly
because there is not a real consensus in this body about
military action. When we had a debate here in August, there was
a very narrow committee vote authorizing military force for a
limited purpose. The odds makers basically said had that been
taken on the floor of the House, it would have failed. In the
Senate, it might have been close. But clearly, there was
division.
But let me ask you about something where there is not
division in this body, and that is humanitarian aid to Syrians.
The United States is the largest provider of humanitarian aid
in the world to Syrians outside Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and
Turkey especially. And that is not by accident. That is because
we want to do it and it is a bipartisan priority.
Now what we need to do is focus upon the delivery of
humanitarian aid to the 9 million Syrians inside Syria who need
it. After many efforts to stonewall humanitarian resolutions,
Russia finally acceded to one, and on the 22nd of September,
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2139, which demanded that all
parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, promptly allow
rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to provide
humanitarian access to Syrians, including--and it is
specified--access across conflict lines and across borders.
Last week, the Senate, after action by this committee,
unanimously approved a Syrian humanitarian aid resolution that
was sponsored by myself and Senator Rubio. And in part, that
resolution indicated that the Senate--and it passed unanimously
on the floor--supports the immediate and full implementation of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2139 which calls for unimpeded
access of humanitarian assistance to all Syrians.
The 30-day report after the U.N. Security Council
resolution says 30 days in, there is not unimpeded access. What
is the United States going to do to help carry out the
unimpeded access provision of the U.N. Security Council
resolution that we fought for months to see pass?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we are very disappointed in that,
obviously. And you are absolutely correct. It has not been
successfully implemented. We are pushing in the region to see
if we can get a consensus about ways in which we might approach
that, and that is part of the consideration of what we should
talk about in classified session.
Senator Kaine. I view that as important. Again, just to
underscore the point, where you have division here over
something like what is the right military step, that is going
to make it complicated. But where you have unanimity that we
want to be
the largest provider of humanitarian access and we want to do
what we can to provide unimpeded access in the country, that is
a place I think where much can be done. So I look forward to
that discussion.
The next question I will ask and my last question is when
you were here a year ago, I asked you a question that is a
budgetary matter but also a policy matter. For a number of
years, the State Department had assessed that the training of
embassy security personnel needed to be done in a more thorough
way with better facilities and better coursework.
Prior to the horrible attack on Benghazi in September 2011,
the State Department had identified a training facility on a
BRACed Army base in Virginia, Fort Pickett, and it indicated
that was going to be the training facility for embassy security
personnel needs.
After the attack in Benghazi, the ARB report recommended as
a key recommendation, recommendation 17, that security training
had to be improved. The State Department in response to that
recommendation said we are going to do it and we have
identified the site. We have looked for it for years. It is
going to be at Fort Pickett, and we are going to get moving on
it.
Last winter, February or March, largely in sort of a back
and forth between the State Department and the OMB, that plan
to proceed in Fort Pickett was slowed down.
I asked you about it a year ago. We are here a year later,
and there has not been any appreciable movement on the proposal
to upgrade the security training in this instance of State
Department personnel.
If an enhanced security training facility at Fort Pickett
was a good idea before Benghazi, my assessment is in the
aftermath of Benghazi with an ARB recommendation, it is a
better idea. Why have we not moved forward on this with more
dispatch?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we are moving forward. The reason it
did not go forward as rapidly as you would have hoped or I
would have hoped was from somewhere--I am not even sure of the
details--there was a suggestion of an alternative site that had
to be evaluated. It was properly evaluated. Due diligence was
done. The Department is 100 percent determined that Fort
Pickett is the best site. It is the site that we want to work
with you to go forward on. There is no question of that. And we
want to try to do that as fast as we can. There was
coordination with the Defense Department and the intelligence
community, et cetera. Fort Pickett is the site.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chair, I would just say in our travels, when I see
these foreign security officers like in Lebanon living on a
compound and they get 6 hours a week and that is all they get
off compound, and they have to be accompanied by security, I do
not think we should be penny-wise and pound-foolish on security
training for our FSOs. I think it is an important initiative,
and the ARB report recommends with an underline and an
exclamation point that we ought to be moving more quickly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I agree with the Senator. As you know from
our embassy security bill, there are provisions as it relates
to this. And you have been the most successful member today.
You got a very direct, specific, positive answer. [Laughter.]
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for being here, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate it
very much.
I also want to thank you in your written testimony for
mentioning the crisis in Venezuela. I wanted to talk about that
briefly.
As you know, they had elections about a year ago in
Venezuela where there were credible reports of irregularities,
but even leading up to the election, the government controls
all the modes of communication, denying the opposition airtime,
meanwhile dominating the airtime for the government. Of course,
the government there has invested heavily in these armed
militias called collectivos, which are basically these
neighborhood groups armed by the government who go out
intimidating and, in fact, shooting and killing protestors in
the current protests that are going on. They have jailed
members of the opposition. They control the courts. About 90
percent of the judges in Venezuela or a significant percentage
of the judges in Venezuela serve on a provisional basis, which
means at any point they could be removed by President Maduro if
he chose to do so. In fact, they recently removed a member of
their national assembly because she, according to them, had the
gall of appearing at the Organization of American States and
traveling abroad to condemn what is happening within that
country.
In addition, as you are well aware, in July 2009, the
General Accounting Office found that the so-called Bolivarian
National Guard, the Venezuelan National Guard, is deeply
involved in the trafficking of illicit narcotics. And as you
know, our Government has significant concerns about senior
Venezuelan Government officials being involved as well in
transnational criminal activities, including people like Mr.
Hugo Carvajal, Mr. Henry Rangel Silva, the former Defense
Minister and now is the Governor of Trujillo State. Mr. Tarek
el-Assami, who was the Governor of Aragua State, a Congressman
by the name of Freddy Bernal, and last but not least, the
President of their own Congress, Mr. Diosdado Cabello. All of
these are people we have concerns about in terms of their
engagement in transnational criminal activity.
So here is my question. Why cannot we just say what is
obvious to anyone who sees these facts that the Government of
Venezuela is not and does not comport itself as a democracy and
in fact, because of all of these activities and others and
violence against their own people, have lost the legitimacy of
a government? Are we prepared to say that as a matter of stated
policy of the United States?
Secretary Kerry. Senator, first of all, let me thank you
for, and congratulate you for, your leadership on this because
it is important. I appreciate enormously the clear message in
Senate Resolution 365 that deplores the repression and the
violence against the people of Venezuela. And we have spoken
out against it and criticized their ridiculously contrived
attacks on us as somehow being engaged in doing things that we
have not been engaged in and so forth.
Right now, we are very supportive of third party mediation
efforts that are aimed at trying to end the violence and see if
we cannot get an honest dialogue to address the legitimate
grievances of people in Venezuela. Even as we are sitting here
today, I think the UNASUR delegation is meeting in Caracas, and
for the first time, the government and the opposition is going
to be meeting today as we meet here. So this is a very delicate
time in the possibility of a negotiation, and I do not think we
should--I do not want to do something today that provides
cannon fodder for them to use me or us as an excuse to say this
is why they have to do things.
Senator Rubio. And I understand that concern.
I mean, my bigger concern is that our interests in
stability, which is what the hope of this negotiation would be,
somehow takes precedent over our stated foreign policy of
standing always on the side of liberty, freedom, democracy,
respect for human rights, all of which are being systematically
abused. And I think it is important for the people in Venezuela
to know that the United States condemns these acts of violence
that are going on and all the other things that I have
mentioned. And I just do not understand why we cannot look to
this and say, by the way, just because you had an election does
not make you a democracy. There are other aspects of democracy,
and this government in Venezuela does not behave like a
democracy.
Secretary Kerry. They are putting that to the test. There
is no question about it, Senator, and I do not disagree with
you. We have spoken out. I have issued statements personally. I
called the Foreign Minister some time ago to weigh in. We have
had our people, as you know, on the ground speaking out. So I
do not think there is any question for the people of Venezuela
where we stand.
The question is, Is there a way to protect those people and
earn for them the ability to be able to get out of jail,
express their rights in the political process, and fight for
the future of their country? I think let us let this meeting
take place. Let us see what happens. And there is time for me
and you and others to work on this and see if we have to go a
different road forward.
Senator Rubio. I have one more question about another part
of the hemisphere.
Last summer, the Cuban regime was caught smuggling over 240
tons of weapons to North Korea in violation of international
law. The United Nations has confirmed this. In fact, it is the
largest interdiction of weapons to or from North Korea since
the U.N. sanctions were imposed. What has been the United
States reaction to that? What have we done in reaction to this
violation of U.N. sanctions?
Secretary Kerry. We are working directly with the DPRK
Sanctions Committee at the U.N. in order to ensure a vigorous
response, to shine a light on this activity, and to get
accountability for what has happened. In our dialogue with
them, we have thus far focused on the individuals who have been
involved in this and the entities involved in it. So in March,
along with likeminded states, we pushed to make the Panel of
Experts report public on the incident. That was released. It is
the first time the Panel of Experts report has been made public
since June of last year. And we have made clear that this
violates the sanctions, and Cuba's interpretation of the U.N.
Security Council resolution is incorrect. So we intend to
review the results of the U.N. process and try to see if we can
get a united multilateral response.
Senator Rubio. Would you agree that this evidence that is
now out there before the public is strong evidence of the fact
that Cuba remains a state sponsor of terrorism?
Secretary Kerry. Well, in this sense, they have exported
weapons, and that is certainly would contribute to that
judgment. But in other respects, it is a question--you know, it
still does not fit the legal definition, Senator. But you and
I, in a common sense point of view, would say this is----
Senator Rubio. What about holding an American hostage like
Mr. Alan Gross?
Secretary Kerry. It is an act of personal terror. It is not
international terrorism under the sense of the definition that
fits for the designation.
I will tell you that I think just today Alan Gross
announced that he is going to engage in a hunger strike. We are
deeply involved in this. I met with his family just a few weeks
ago, a month ago or so. We have a number of efforts underway,
which I would be happy to talk to you about privately. But we
are very, very focused on trying to get Alan Gross out of
there. His treatment is inhumane, and he is wrongfully
imprisoned.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, let me just add--selling
weapons to North Korea in violation of Security Council
resolutions--the only country in the Western Hemisphere and the
largest such violation of the Security Council resolution by
any country--is in my view a pretty significant terrorist act.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being here and for
all of your efforts to address so many conflicts and hotspots
around the world.
I understand that nobody has yet mentioned today the recent
election in Afghanistan, and while we do not have a full report
in, the early reports are that that election was significant,
that the turnout was over 60 percent. And it is a real tribute
to the people of Afghanistan that they came out in defiance of
threats from the Taliban. It is also a tribute to all of the
military efforts on the part of the United States and the
international community and the diplomatic efforts and the
economic assistance programs that the United States has
provided to Afghanistan. So let me congratulate you and
everyone at the State Department who has worked so hard to
support the people of Afghanistan.
One of the programs that the State Department is currently
engaged in that I have worked on is the Afghan special
immigrant visa program. And as we are preparing for the
transition in Afghanistan, I believe that there is still a
continued need for us to ensure that all of those Afghans who
have helped our men and women on the ground there who are
threatened--they and their families are threatened--have the
opportunity to try and come to this country to rebuild their
lives.
And I wonder if you can update me on the status of the
program. There were some issues that were not working very well
with the program last year that I know the State Department has
been addressing. Can you give us an update on how those are
going?
Secretary Kerry. I would be delighted to, Senator. Thank
you for your comments at the beginning of your question.
Let me just say quickly about the Afghan election. I want
to join you. A couple of people did mention, sort of in
passing, that it happened.
But this is very significant, but I do not want to overblow
it because it is the first one and you have to get through the
runoff and there are still challenges. But nevertheless,
millions of Afghan men and women went to the polls, and they
voted for their next President. It is something that was
unfathomable not so long ago. People wondered if this could be
achieved.
The last couple of months in Afghanistan, there was a full
and open, flourishing debate in Afghanistan as people listened
to the candidates. And I think what is really important to
understand is this was owned and operated, managed, run by
Afghans. It was their election commission. It was their rules.
They put this together. They made this happen. And I give great
credit to President Karzai who appointed the commission, played
by the rules, helped make this happen, to all the people who
have been invested in this. And their army helped provide the
security. We helped with the planning and laid out some of the
thoughts about it, but they helped execute it. So it is very
important. It is a critical step forward.
There will be challenges ahead. I do not want anybody to
suggest this smoothes the way completely at all. There are big
challenges. But this is important.
Now, on the special immigrant visas, we have improved the
processing times. We have expanded the outreach to current and
former employees who may be eligible. We have issued more
special immigrant visas in Afghanistan and in Iraq,
incidentally, than at any time in any previous year. Since
October of last year, more than 2,000 Afghans, interpreters,
their family members, have received special immigrant visas.
There were over 700 principal applicants and more than 1,300 of
their dependent family members. And in the first 5 months of
this year, we have issued more SIVs to Afghans, to their
dependents than in all of last year. So I think there is a lot
of work being done, even as we are maintaining the standards
that you want and other people want with respect to the program
itself. And I think the current allocation of visa numbers, the
3,000 that are allocated, should get us through this year, but
it will not be enough to handle the cases in the pipeline. We
are going to have to expect that new applications are going to
have to be approved as we go forward.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I certainly look forward
to continuing to work with the State Department on that
program.
On a note that is not so positive, last week it came to
light that the State Department's Office of Inspector General
has discovered that over the past 6 years, contracts worth more
than $6 billion have lacked complete, and in some cases, no
records and that many of the files for contracts supporting our
United States mission in Iraq could not be located. So I wonder
if you could tell us what actions the State Department is
taking in response to the concerns that have been raised by the
inspector general.
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me begin by saying that we had
not had an inspector general at the State Department for 3\1/2\
years or more. There was no inspector general.
Senator Shaheen. And I appreciate your swift action to try
and finally get one hired.
Secretary Kerry. I decided that needed one. It is
important. It is an important part of oversight. And so I hired
Steve Linick who is our current inspector general who came from
FHFA, but who also has been a former Federal prosecutor. He is
an outstanding attorney and a good person for the job.
And I welcome the oversight. That is number one.
Number two, I began this process looking at the possible
sort of liabilities. It came from my time here on the
committee. When I traveled to Afghanistan, I saw the
contracting and recognized the corruption that existed in
Afghanistan itself and other problems. So when I first came in,
I told folks we got to really get a handle on what is happening
here.
What we found is and what this inspector general report
confirms is there have been some problems in just paperwork
management. No $6 billion has been lost. The money is
accountable. But it is keeping up with the paperwork. And part
of the problem is, I have learned--and this is important to the
budget process--every single entity of Government where we are
managing contracting is underresourced, understaffed, and it is
hard to be able to keep up with the paper. Now, you say why not
go electronic. Well, in some of these places, electronic is not
exactly an option in Afghanistan or other places. But it takes
people. And so we are underresourced with respect to that.
But we are on it. The Deputy Secretary of State for
Management is pursuing this completely. We will have a report
to the inspector general showing exactly where they are and
where they are going. And this is a good process. I think
people should welcome this kind of oversight and
accountability. It helps us get on top of things.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome back. You left this committee and
took on your new role at the same time I joined this committee,
and it has been a rather momentous time in history. I think
most Americans would really like to concentrate on the enormous
domestic challenges, but reality is pretty well smacking us all
in the face. Like Senator Risch, I do not envy you or the
President's tasks having to grapple with these enormous
challenges, kind of evidenced by this hearing.
I would like to concentrate on what I think is right now
the most pressing of all these problems, and it really is going
back to Ukraine and our relationship with Russia. I was part of
the bipartisan delegation that was there the day before they
took the vote in Crimea. And certainly as we were meeting with
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, you could see the stress in his face.
It was pretty sobering. I think we could also sense the
disappointment that the United States was not even willing to
offer small arms and ammunition to support the courageous
people of Ukraine.
In response to my question, I was asking, well, what can we
do. What can we do to support Ukraine? And Prime Minister
Yatsenyuk, first of all, made the statement that Vladimir Putin
will not respond to words. He only responds to action.
Now, in your testimony here, you say you have made it clear
about our deep concerns and we will not hesitate to use 21st
century tools. I just want to ask what are we going to do. What
actions are we going to take to change the calculus of Vladimir
Putin who will only respond to action? What are we going to do
to make the price high for Vladimir Putin if he continues the
provocations? You are saying it is a contrived crisis,
contrived pretexts.
Bottom line. The reason we heard from this administration
they were not willing to provide arms is we thought it would
create a provocation. Well, he does not need provocation. What
Vladimir Putin needs is deterrence. What are we going to do to
deter Vladimir Putin from going further in Ukraine?
Secretary Kerry. Well, we are doing it.
Senator Johnson. Just a minute. They mocked at our last set
of sanctions.
Secretary Kerry. I beg your pardon?
Senator Johnson. They mocked our last set of sanctions.
Secretary Kerry. The last set were not mocked. The first
round met with some--because I think people's expectations were
higher.
But, look, Senator, you know this, in dealing with human
nature and with problems, that you want to aim before you
shoot. And I think it is clear that we have huge capacity to
have an impact. You know, they are not incapable of analyzing
America's capacity here with respect to banking and finance and
movement of people and so forth.
So what we wanted to do initially was make it clear there
is going to be action. And the Europeans have marched together
with us in partnership here in unanimous form. And that has a
profound impact because Europe does a lot more business with
Russia than we do.
Senator Johnson. But Vladimir Putin, as you say, he is
creating this provocation. They are moving into cities in
Ukraine. He is setting up the exact same circumstances as he
did in Georgia, as he did in Crimea.
Secretary Kerry. Could be, but he could also not be. And I
do not have the answer to exactly what step he is going to take
when. What I do know is that we are sending a signal today of
the clarity of our intention to use whatever sanction is
necessary if they continue. Now, that is clear. And that is
taking full aim. And the question is will that have an impact
or will it not.
I think given the fact that yesterday at their initiation,
they called us to suggest that it was important to have a
meeting to try to deal with this. I am not going to place any
stock in a meeting. I am not going to place it on words. It has
got to be actions. But you got to sit down and at least find
out.
Senator Johnson. Of course, that is my point. What actions?
The former Governor of your State, Governor Romney, was pretty
well mocked by this President when he said that Russia was
America's greatest geopolitical foe. He wrote an interesting
column. I just want to read part of it. ``Why across the world
are Americans' hands so tied? Which kind of seems like we are.
A large part of the answer is our leader's terrible timing. In
virtually every foreign affairs crisis we have faced these past
5 years, there is a point when America had good choices and
good options. There was a juncture when America had the
potential to influence the event, but we failed to act at the
propitious moment. The moment having passed, we were left
without acceptable options.'' And he went on to say, ``it is
hard to name even a single country that has more respect and
admiration for America today than when President Obama took
office. And now Russia is in Ukraine.''
If you disagree with that, can you name a country that has
greater respect for America 5 years later?
Secretary Kerry. I can name lots of countries that have
greater respect for us as we are attempting to move people out
of Guantanamo, as we end a war in Iraq, as we are beginning to
draw down in Afghanistan, as we stand up for human rights, as
we are the single greatest supporter of the humanitarian effort
in Syria, as we do countless things, as we save 5 million kids'
lives in Africa with our program on AIDS. There are many things
that people admire about what we are doing.
Are there problems? Sure, there are problems. In different
parts of the world, there is greater sectarianism, greater
religious extremism, greater radical Islam presence in various
places. Are you going to dump all of that on the United States
of America? I mean, please.
This is a complicated world, my friend. And the fact is the
United States I think is doing an amazing amount with some
handicaps I might add. You know, a budget that is getting
smaller, not bigger, having to hold back on what we are doing
in certain countries, having to cut in certain places what we
have been doing to try to help people educate or change or
provide health care or do some of the things we do.
So I think you need to look carefully at this kind of talk
about the action that produces the differential. President
Putin did not decide to do what he did in Crimea because of
something the United States did or did not do. He decided to do
it because he could and it was in his interest.
Senator Johnson. And he did not feel he would pay a price.
Trust me. I totally blame Vladimir Putin. If there is blood
shed, it is because of Vladimir Putin, but we have to deter.
Secretary Kerry. You have to measure price in certain ways.
Is he paying a price? His oligarchs are not able to travel to
various places. They are losing money. The ruble has gone down
7 percent. There is an impact in Europe. I think he has had a
massive change in public opinion in Ukraine. People who once
felt better about Russia do not today. He has united many
Ukrainians, even those who are Russian speaking, against
Russia.
Senator Johnson. But he is still sending in agents under
the pretext for further action. He has not been deterred.
Secretary Kerry. Yes, he is. No, he has not stopped doing
that. That is accurate.
But there are, I think, legitimate questions, before you
pull the trigger, that need to be answered about what they may
or may not be willing to do in the next days. They are willing
to meet with Europe, with Ukrainians. That is a step forward.
They are willing to sit with the interim government of Ukraine,
with Europe, with the United States in an effort to sort of
plot a road ahead. And we have made it clear the imperative to
de-escalate, the imperative to demobilize, the imperative to
move troops. After my meeting in Paris, they did announce the
drawback of one particular battalion, not enough yet, not what
we are obviously looking for, but a first signal.
And the question now is can some of their other legitimate
interests be met in a way that is appropriate, which does not
invite illegitimate interests to also be mixed into the batch.
And that is the key. I do not know the answer to that question
yet, and I do not think we will until we meet.
But I do think that given the serious implication of the
sector sanctions, we owe it to ourselves and to everybody to
exhaust the possible remedies that the diplomatic process might
provide. We have not done that yet, and we are going to find
out.
Obviously, yesterday was a step backward. No question about
it. And we have spoken out loudly and clearly as a consequence
of it and made clear what our determination is.
Senator Johnson. America must face reality, and hope is not
a strategy. Thanks.
The Chairman. Let me congratulate Senator Murphy on behalf
of his State. He is proudly wearing his UConn pin. I know there
are other members of the committee who will not feel--but we
appreciate the excellent game of both sides, but we want to
congratulate Senator Murphy, as he is beaming today. So,
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We wear
our Huskies allegiance on our sleeve and also on our lapel.
Secretary Kerry, thank you very much for being here today.
I think there are a number of guiding principles behind
Putin's foreign policy. One of them clearly is to reestablish
control over what he calls the ``near abroad.''
But one of them also is to do whatever he can to poke a
stick in the eye of the United States. While I certainly
understand some of the arguments and some of the interests by
Members of the Senate to arm the Ukrainian military, in a lot
of ways that plays directly into his hands by creating a
military contest in Ukraine between the United States and
Russia. And if this is ultimately just a geopolitical battle
between the United States and Russia over Ukraine, we lose
because we are playing in his back yard, and we are not willing
to play by the same rules that he is willing to play by.
And so, Mr. Secretary, I guess I want to ask you a question
about how we take steps to insert the Ukrainians back into this
discussion about their future relationship with Russia. I maybe
want to ask that in sort of two ways.
One, how do we shift the diplomatic conversations from
conversations between you and Lavrov to conversations that
truly make sure that the Ukrainians are part of that
discussion?
And second, what are the things that we can do, leading up
to the May 25 elections, to make sure that they come off in a
free and fair manner and the Russians have no ability between
now and then to try to influence that choice? Clearly, we are
getting some really, really discouraging signals about some of
the actions that Russians are taking on the ground today to try
to intimidate candidates, perhaps to try to dissuade people
from coming out to the polls. What we have heard over and over
again is that this is a revolution of dignity in Ukraine, that
they want control over their destiny again. How do we put them
at the center of these political deliberations? How do we
support the upcoming elections to make sure that they actually
get to register a free and fair choice?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, thank you. Terrific
question. And congratulations on the Huskies.
We have been really working--I mean, we have been very
sensitive to and I think proactive in our efforts to make
certain that everything is emanating from the Ukrainians. And
so we have said very, very clearly that no decision will be
made for Ukraine without Ukraine.
I talk to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk regularly before I have
a meeting, after I have a meeting, and in between in order to
make sure that we are listening very, very carefully to what
they need and do not want. But they do want us engaged, and
they do want us supporting them in the way that we are through
these discussions.
Now, yesterday in my conversation with Foreign Minister
Lavrov, I said it was really important for him to have a
conversation directly with the Foreign Minister of Ukraine. And
he said I intend to call him after we have talked, and he did.
And they had a good conversation from what I understand and
agreed to sort of try to come to this meeting and see if we can
work constructively going forward.
Now, look, I have been around long enough to know that
scheduling a meeting, having a meeting, does not solve the
problem necessarily, and it cannot become a camouflage for the
realities that have to change on the ground. We all understand
that. But if you do not talk, and you do not try, to arrive at
some understanding of what the steps are that become the
actions that are measurable, you are never going to get there
and things spiral out of control and become worse.
So what we are trying to do is manage the process going
forward with a clarity that things were professed before going
into Crimea that were not upheld. Statements were made about
not violating the integrity of Ukraine, and they did. And so
all of these protests and/or proffers have to be taken with a
grain of salt pending the process.
So we will continue to work very closely with Ukrainians.
Our Ambassador on the ground, Jeff Pyatt--you guys have met
him--is terrific. He is very engaged. He is listening
carefully. And we are talking regularly with all of the members
of the interim government.
Now, with respect to the election, it is interesting that
in our last meeting in Paris, while not accepting the
legitimacy necessarily, there was no effort to change the date
of the election. There was no sense that that is not going to
go forward. Now, yesterday raises some question marks about
that, and they are concerning obviously. But we will continue
to try to work.
And I might add it is not just us. All of our European
partners, countless other people are invested in this notion
that what has happened is a violation of the international
order, a structure by which we have dealt since World War II in
recognizing boundaries of countries and sovereignty and
integrity of territory. And that is a serious issue. And so
that is all going to have to be resolved in the days ahead
going forward.
Senator Murphy. Just a quick word, Mr. Chairman, about our
Ambassador there. I do not think he has taken a day off or a
half a day off or an hour off since this crisis erupted. And I
will just note that he was voted out of this committee and out
of the Senate expeditiously so that he was on the ground in
time to know the country, learn the players so that he was
ready to go when this crisis erupted, having no idea at the
moment of his confirmation that he would be needed in this way.
It is just another advertisement for why the Senate needs to
move with all deliberate speed on nominees because you never
know when they are going to be badly needed on the ground.
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you, Senator. I appreciate
that very much. And you are right.
The Chairman. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kerry, I watched with great interest some of your
comments. May I say I think you are about to hit the trifecta?
Geneva II was a total collapse, as I predicted to you that it
would be. The only tangible result is that people who went to
Geneva for the Free Syrian National Council--their relatives
were kidnapped. The Israeli-Palestinian talks, even though you
may drag them out for a while, are finished. And I predict to
you even though we gave the Iranians the right to enrich, which
is unbelievable, those talks will collapse too. You can talk
about Mali and you can talk about other places in the world,
but on the major issues, this administration is failing very
badly.
On the issue of Ukraine, my hero, Teddy Roosevelt, used to
say talk softly but carry a big stick. What you are doing is
talking strongly and carrying a very small stick, in fact, a
twig. What has been done so far as a result of the Russian
dismemberment of Ukraine in violation of a treaty that they
signed and returned for the nuclear inventory of Ukraine, which
was then the third-largest nuclear power, some individual
sanctions, some diplomatic sanctions, suspension not removal
from the G8, and now more threats to come.
I predicted that Putin would go into Crimea because he
could not bear to give up Sevastopol because he is what he is.
And I am now very concerned, because of our lack of response,
whether he will foment discontent in the manner which he is
now, which will then demand autonomy for parts of eastern
Ukraine.
And when the Foreign Minister of Russia lies to your face
once, twice, three, four times, I would be very reluctant to
take his word for anything.
So here we are with Ukraine being destabilized, a part of
it dismembered, and we will not give them defensive weapons. I
take strong exception to Mr. Murphy's statement, we do not want
to provoke. We do not want to provoke Vladimir Putin by giving
these people the ability to defend themselves after their
country has been dismembered and there are provocations going
on? That I say to you, sir, is the logic of appeasement. The
logic of appeasement.
I want to know and I think the American people should know
and, maybe most importantly, the people of Ukraine should know
why will we not give them some defensive weapons when they are
facing another invasion, not the first, but another invasion of
their country. It is just beyond logic. And frankly, when we do
not give people assistance to defend themselves then, just as
the Syrian decision, it reverberates throughout the entire
world. I would like to know why it is not at least under
serious consideration to give them some defensive weapons with
which to defend themselves.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, let me begin with the place
that you began with your premature judgment about the failure
of everything. I guess it is pretty easy to lob those judgments
around particularly well before the verdict is in on any of
them.
Geneva II, my friend, I said will not succeed maybe for a
year or two. But if the truth is there is no military solution
and there is only a political solution, you have to have some
forum in which to achieve it. You know, the talks on Vietnam--
you know this better than anybody--went for how many years?
Years. It took them a year to design the table to sit around.
So I had no expectations that Assad's calculation is going to
change in time for the first meeting or second meeting.
But what we learned is that the Syrian regime was
completely unwilling to negotiate in any serious way, which
helps in terms of the opposition, and the opposition showed
itself to be quite capable and that was important. And 40
nations took it seriously enough, Senator, to come in order to
make it clear you needed a political solution. Now, that is a
beginning. That is all it is. I understand that.
But if Syria is ever going to be resolved, it is going to
be through a political process, and that political process,
Geneva II, is now in place, though the moment is not ripe
because we still have to change Assad's calculation. And you
know, as well as I do, because you and I have talked about
that, that that has yet to happen and it has to happen.
Secondly, Israel-Palestine. It is interesting that you
declare it dead, but the Israelis and the Palestinians do not
declare it dead. They want to continue to negotiate.
Senator McCain. We will see, will we not, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kerry. I beg your pardon?
Senator McCain. We will see.
Secretary Kerry. Well, yes, we will see.
Senator McCain. It has stopped. Recognize reality.
Secretary Kerry. We will see where the reality is as we go
down the road here. There are serious problems. It is a tough
issue. But your friend, Teddy Roosevelt, also said that the
credit belongs to the people who are in the arena who are
trying to get things done. And we are trying to get something
done. That is a Teddy Roosevelt maxim, and I abide by it. I
think it is important to do this. Sure, we may fail.
And you want to dump it on me. I may fail. I do not care.
It is worth doing. It is worth the effort. And the United
States has a responsibility to lead not always to find the
pessimism and negativity that is so easily prevalent in the
world today.
And finally, on the subject that you raise about Iran; we
are talking. The option is you can go to war. A lot of people
are ready to drop bombs all the time. We can do that. We have
the ability. But this President and this Secretary of State
believe that the United States of America has a responsibility
first to exhaust every diplomatic possibility to find out
whether we could prove what the Iranians say, that their
program is peaceful. Before you ask the American people to go
to war, we have an obligation to exhaust the remedies that are
available to us in order to legitimize whatever subsequent
action we might have to take.
Now, we are engaged in eyes-open negotiations. We have no
illusions about how tough this is. I am not predicting success,
Senator. I am not. But I know we have an obligation to go
through this process before we decide to go to war.
So that is where we are. You declare them all dead. I do
not. And we will see what the verdict is.
With respect to arming and providing assistance to the
Ukrainians, the fact is that we are currently working with
Ukraine to determine their requirements across the entire
security sector, and based on those requirements, we are going
to review the options with the Congress and find out whether or
not we are in a position to provide assistance.
But let me tell you something. If we decided today to give
them a whole bunch of assistance, you got to train them. You
got to do things. Which is the greater deterrent?
We happen to believe right now that if the deterrence you
are looking for is going to have an impact, the greatest
deterrence will come from Putin's recognition of his own
vulnerabilities in his economy and his recognition that if we
bring sector sanctions, Russia is going to really hurt. I think
that is a strong deterrent even as we consider what we do for
the long term for military assistance, which will not make a
difference fast enough to change this calculation.
Senator McCain. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. But
facts are stubborn things, as Ronald Reagan used to say. Geneva
I, there were 50,000 dead. Geneva II, there were 100,000 and
some dead in Syria. Now there are 150,000 dead. Any objective
observer will tell you that Bashar Assad is winning on the
battlefield from the time when the President of the United
States said it is not a matter of whether, it is a matter of
when Bashar Assad is going to leave. Nobody says that anymore.
Your view of what the Ukrainians need is vastly different
from what the Ukrainians think they need, which is a sovereign
right to try to defend themselves, which is something that we
have done historically, helping people who are struggling
against overwhelming odds.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Kerry. Well, John, if I can just say to you, I
just said to you we are evaluating with them exactly what their
needs are, and we will come back here and ask you----
Senator McCain. They have said what their needs are a long
time ago, and you and I could sit down in 15 minutes, knowing
what their needs are and that is defensive weapons.
The Chairman. I think you have both made your points.
Secretary Kerry. The greatest single need right now is to
get their economy moving and to be economically strong because
they will not survive otherwise.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. Secretary, you talked about the Russian-led unrest in
eastern Ukraine. There has now been an announcement that they
are going to try to have a referendum in Donetsk on May 11 in
front of the Presidential election on May 25. Clearly, the goal
of that referendum is to say that part of the country wishes to
secede and go back to Russia.
Could you talk a little bit about that as it is unfolding
as a strategy, a referendum strategy, in Russia and what the
administration is thinking about as a strategy to deal with
that?
Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you, Senator.
That may be the strategy, and if it is, it is very
dangerous. And if they proceed down that road, that will be a
second swing at a completely illegal, unconstitutional,
internationally unsupportable effort to violate the territorial
integrity of Ukraine. So nobody has any illusions about what
might come with that.
Now, the call for that I believe came from some paid
individual in Donetsk, not necessarily an announcement per se
that that is what is going to happen. And so I think it is
unclear. There are representatives of the Ukrainian Government
who have gone out there to begin to negotiate the de-occupation
of the buildings
and the process forward, and I think it is a moving target
right
now as to exactly what may or may not happen. But the issue is
whether the Russians are serious in this discussion that we
hope to have next week at resolving these kinds of questions.
Part of their complaint right now is that there is an
inadequate representation within the constitutional reform
process in Ukraine, and they allege that if there is a proper
representation and listening to people in the east and the
south that that is really what they are after. I do not know
the answer to that. If this is camouflage for this other move,
we are obviously going to watch extremely carefully, and the
President is completely poised to move forward with the sector
or other sanctions necessary to respond to this.
Senator Markey. So is the EU and the United States working
together in terms of pushing for a fair and democratic process
in this election? And what concerns do you have about the
Russians trying to interfere with this electoral process? And
what role do you think we can play with the EU to make sure
this next month----
Secretary Kerry. Well, the key is to flood the zone with
observers, make sure we have got OSCE. We have asked the U.N.
We are trying to get as many people in there who can be the
truth-tellers, the people who can inform as to exactly what is
happening and allow less maneuverability for the pretexts and
the contrived situations to try to provide a legitimacy. And I
think that is one important thing.
The second is to work with the Ukrainians themselves to
make sure that all of the instruments for a legitimate, open,
free, fair, accountable, accessible election are available.
Senator Markey. And I would like, while you are here, just
to add one more subject, and that is climate change. It is
worsening. The IPCC report actually has shown a telescoped
timeframe for the dangers that the planet is facing. Could you
talk a little bit about that as you see this impact globally?
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, I appreciate your asking
the question.
The impacts of climate change are growing enormously, not
significantly, but just enormously at a pace where you know,
Senator, very well because you have followed this for years and
been a leader on it, all of the scientific analysis that
suggested targets that we need to meet in order to hold the
carbon levels such that we can hold the warming of the earth at
2 degrees centigrade--we are in excess of them. We are moving
beyond them. And we are moving beyond them at a pace that shows
us bringing more coal-fired power plants online, more methane
being released, which is 20 times more potent than carbon,
which is the consequence of the warming that is already taking
place, more carbon dioxide going into the oceans, which is
changing the ecosystem, more fires, more floods, more different
weather patterns. I mean, there is just a profoundly impactful,
clear, scientifically proven pattern taking place. And all of
the predictions of the scientists are not just being met, they
are being exceeded both in the rapidity with which it is
happening and the level to which it is happening.
So given the most recent IPCC report by the U.N. climate
panel, really we have got to respond and we have got to respond
rapidly. The margin for error is disappearing. And when I hear
people say to me, well, you know, some people still contest the
evidence or they contest the science, without any science to
contest it, by the way, but they contest it nevertheless--and
they say, well, why should we take these measures? What if you
guys are wrong? Well, as you know, Senator, better than
anybody, if what you are proposing or countless governments
across the world are starting to do is wrong, the worst that
can happen is they have made themselves more energy
independent, they have got cleaner energy, there is less carbon
dioxide, less particulates in the air, people are healthier,
there are more jobs created in the realm of new energy,
alternative energy, renewable energy, all for the better. If
the other guys are wrong, the people saying do not listen to
it, what is the worst that can happen? The worst that can
happen is life as you know it on earth is over.
And so I think people in public life have a responsibility
to employ the precautionary principle that when you are
weighing various concepts and they are supported by science and
fact and empirical evidence, there is a responsibility to take
action, and I hope we will.
Senator Markey. Thank you for your work on that issue, Mr.
Secretary, and all the other issues that we have been
discussing here today. These are tough, tough issues.
Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it.
Senator Markey. They have to be resolved.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
As I call upon Senator Paul, let me say that Kentucky
played a really tough, defensive, exciting game, and we
appreciate them showing the Nation what Kentucky is all about.
Senator Paul. I know your consolation is sincere, and I
wish I could accept it with a better attitude. [Laughter.]
But I am still unhappy with the outcome.
Thank you, Secretary Kerry, for coming today.
One of the first things or actions that I remember as you
began your office was that you reinstated the four employees
that were involved and implicated by the review board in
Benghazi.
It has always, to me, been more of a concern about the
decisions that were made in the 6 months in advance of Benghazi
than the talking points. In fact, I think the talking points
have drowned out some really important decisions we made. We
are all human. So these people I am not saying are bad people,
but some really bad decisions were made in the 6 months leading
up.
Two of the big ones that were made I think were that there
was a 16-person security team led by Colonel Wood who said we
wanted to stay in-country and they were not allowed to stay in-
country.
And there was also a request for a plane. And apparently
that evening--you know, for a DC-3 that was denied earlier,
maybe about 6 months before the attack. That plane would have
been important. There was a struggle that evening, you know, to
get permission from the Libyans to get a plane. I think the C-
30 they were trying to get on was a Libyan plane.
So there really, I think, were some bad decisions made. And
this does not make the people who made the decisions bad
people, but they were bad decisions that were made. There were
requests for security that were turned down.
Throughout the 6 months preceding the attack on Benghazi,
though, a lot of money was spent on things that I think most
Americans would say are frivolous and maybe not part of the
immediate mission of the State Department.
I will give you a few examples: $100,000 was spent on
sending comedians to India--it was the Make Chai Not War tour;
$100,000 was spent getting an electrical charging station in
Vienna for the Ambassador so he could green up the Embassy;
$650,000 was spent on Facebook ads--these are all State
Department expenses; $700,000 was spent on landscaping for the
Embassy in Brussels; and $5 million was spent on crystal wine
glasses and crystal glassware, barware for the State Department
for embassies.
You can argue the legitimacy of these but it is hard to
argue that in the face of the disaster in Benghazi. And it is
hard to argue this in the face of people who say, well, we did
not have enough money.
The other criticism I think that ought to be considered
with regard to Benghazi is that--this is something I think the
review board did not adequately address--is whether or not in
the midst of a country coming out of war, that really the State
Department should be in charge of security, whether they can
adequately provide security.
And I think one of the biggest mistakes in decision--these
all happened from your predecessor, not you. But the biggest
decision mistake I think in Benghazi was thinking that Benghazi
was more like Paris than Baghdad. And had we treated Benghazi
as a fortress in the middle of a military base, I think we
might have had a better chance. Nobody can predict exactly what
could happen with a different outcome. But I think when we have
a civil war raging, we have to consider whether or not one of
the errors in decision was how we chose to protect or not
protect the consulate.
Why is this still important? I think it is still important
because I am concerned another attack could happen like this in
other countries that are under State Department control. I know
you are probably well aware of sort of the situation on the
ground in Libya, but I do not know that it is perfectly stable.
I am concerned whether or not we could have another attack of
this magnitude in Tripoli at the Embassy. I guess we no longer
have any consulate in Benghazi. Correct?
Secretary Kerry. We did not have one then, Senator. It was
not a consulate. It was not a consulate.
Senator Paul. Okay.
But anyway, my concern is whether or not we are adequately
protected, whether the State Department can adequately protect,
and whether or not maybe embassies in war-torn countries or
countries emerging from civil war would be better off treated
more as we did in the Embassy in Baghdad, you know, with a much
greater military presence and a much greater military oversight
of protection, and whether or not you have looked at the
expenses, and if you have not, you will look at some of these
expenses that many of us have seen in the press and are aghast
that we spent $100,000 sending some comedians to India,
$650,000 on Facebook ads, $700,000 on landscaping, $5 million
on crystal ware that really, in the face of the Benghazi
disaster, we need to reevaluate how we are spending our money
at the State Department.
Secretary Kerry. When did the comedians go to India? I am
curious.
Senator Paul. It is all previous to your tenure. I am not
blaming this on you.
Secretary Kerry. We could use a few right now. [Laughter.]
Senator Paul. I do not want to be frivolous about sending
some comedians. I mean, really, seriously. There are complaints
we do not have enough money for security.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, let me answer your question. It
is a good question and it is legitimate.
But let me dispel you of any--I keep hearing repeated again
and again that there was, quote, ``no accountability'' for
these people who were involved. Two of them were forced to
retire. They retired. And the other two were essentially
demoted and took on lesser responsibilities. That is pretty
heavy stuff for career people. So this needs to end, this
notion that there was no accountability, not just the lives
that were changed but the lives lost and the people who were a
part of that, but these people obviously paid a price and a
significant one.
In addition to that, we have gone beyond what the ARB
required in the 29 requirements. We have done even more with
respect to our embassies. Every week I--every meeting that we
have every day, as a matter of fact, we start the morning with
an 8:30 meeting. If I am here, I am there. If I am not, I am
informed. But we have a review of our threat levels, and we
have too many places where there are threats.
We have done an incredible job under the hardest of
circumstances hardening sites where they can be, taking
unbelievable precautions for our people. And we have done a lot
of different things. We have created a new Deputy Assistant
Secretary for High Threat Posts who is responsible for making
sure they get the focused attention necessary to keep people
safe. We have ensured that the staff of diplomatic security go
to regular bureau meetings and regional meetings communicating
on security issues. We have adjusted work requirements. I am
not going to go through all of it. We have got 151 new security
personnel. We have got countless Marine detachments slowly
going out to provide protection where we can. And all of this
has budget implications, obviously.
I am puzzled by some of these expenses. I am going to look
at them, and I will investigate it.
But I think there is an incredible effort underway at the
State Department to both tighten the belt but also upgrade our
capacity to provide security to all of our people. It is a
paramount responsibility of mine and the Department.
Senator Paul. Do you think it was a mistake to have the
Ambassador in Benghazi without more significant military
protection?
Secretary Kerry. Well, let me speak to--there was a request
put in for additional security for Ambassador Stevens, and it
was given to him. He had additional numbers of people that went
out there with him. The problem is it was not adequate,
obviously.
Senator Paul. Well, and quite a bit of it was sort of
unofficial militia. I mean do you think it was a good decision
to have unofficial militia who basically ran when the time
came?
Secretary Kerry. He actually had additional security
personnel official within the Department. There was an
additional, I think it was, one or two people who were
assigned. So his number when he went out there met what he had
requested in terms of official State Department personnel. But,
obviously, it was not adequate, as we all have sadly learned,
to the task of repelling what took place.
But the intelligence community has said they had no
information about that kind of attack. There was nothing
operative on which to be able to make a decision.
Senator Paul. Are we still using militias, or do we have
more of our own people doing protection?
Secretary Kerry. We have more of our own people. We have
significantly hardened up the Embassy there. I am not going to
go into the numbers, but we have a very significant increase in
American personnel on the ground. We have much more significant
emergency contingency plans, and we are working very, very hard
with other countries to work on the overall security issue.
I was just in Algeria and Morocco for the security dialogue
in the last few days of last week, and we discussed
specifically the training of personnel for a rapid response
force in Libya and the ability to be able to provide greater
training and capacity going forward. I think everybody is
concerned about Libya in the current status.
Senator Paul. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are almost at the end here.
I know that Senator Corker has a few comments to make, and then
I will close out and we will get you back to the challenges
that we all collectively face.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
I would like to ask permission that the testimony on
September the 3rd be entered into the record, especially as we
have highlighted. It tells a very different story about why the
administration was asking for the military strike, the limited
military strike, that the Secretary alluded to. It is a very
different story than the story that is now being told by the
administration.
[Editor's note.--The September 3, 2013, testimony mentioned
above can be found in the ``Additional Material Submitted for
the Record'' section at the end of the hearing.]
Senator Corker. And, Mr. Secretary, I want to say that I
know the issues in Syria are very difficult, and I look forward
to this detailed briefing we will have soon, one of many that
has been promised and has not occurred. And I do not think
there are easy solutions.
I do think that from a bipartisan standpoint, people are
very concerned right now about United States credibility, and
Syria I think was the beginning of that. I think there are
concerns about Ukraine, our actual willingness to go forward
and do something after we lost so much credibility around the
redline issue and so much credibility on the ground with just
people in the neighborhood regarding not following through on
commitments that were made. And I know that you know they were
made.
So, look, I hope the chapter is not written, and I hope we
have successes. I think everybody on this committee wants our
foreign policy to be successful, and I think under Chairman
Menendez's leadership, we have operated in a very bipartisan
way. But I will say to you that if things do not change, you in
effect could be presiding over a period of time where more U.S.
credibility is lost than anyone could have imagined and a time
when the world is becoming less safe as a result.
So I wish you well. I really do. I am very genuine in my
thoughts that I am glad you are in a position to try to affect
these things, and I have said that over and over again. But I
will tell you I think there is genuine concern here about where
we are on both sides of the aisle. I think you sensed that
today. I do hope that somehow the people that we are dealing
with get a sense that we are really willing to do the things
that are necessary.
And I hope the President will soon--we had a good
conversation a few weeks ago--look at sectoral sanctions. If we
end up having the troops on the border there much longer, it
seems to me that would be a good place to start.
But again, a lot of concerns. I thank you for your work and
I hope things turn around because I do believe that right now
our foreign policy efforts are not yielding the kind of results
that you would like to see or we would like to see, and yet, we
all want them to be successful.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, if I can comment. Having
spent 29 years on this committee, I started way over there in
that far end seat and worked my way up to where Senator
Menendez is. So I have seen the ups and downs. I have seen the
merry-go-round and the rollercoaster of American foreign policy
up close and personal.
And I will tell you that we are living in a different time.
I know the expectations are very high, but at the end of World
War II, there was only one country standing, so to speak, and
we were magnanimous enough to rebuild Germany and Japan. People
opposed it. Many people. Truman had the courage with Marshall
to make it happen. The fact is that we could make mistakes
either in policy choices or in economy and still win, and we
did for a long time.
And ultimately in 1990-1991, things changed with the Soviet
Union, and that released an enormous amount of pressure in
places like what was then Czechoslovakia, now the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. It unleashed all kinds of forces
everywhere.
And so today we are living with a far more, almost 19th
century/18th century diplomatic playing field where interests
and in some cases mercantilist interests, in other cases just
security interests or territorial interests, other kinds of
things are raising their head in ways that they did not during
the cold war because they were suppressed.
And now with the rise of radical Islam and massive numbers
of young people who are filled with aspirations because they
are in touch with everybody in the world through the media, the
social media, they know what is happening everywhere. I mean,
if you look at what happened in Tunisia, it was a fruit vendor
who was tired of being slapped around by the police and the
corruption in the country and so he self-immolated, and that
ignited a revolution and a dictator of 30 years left.
In Tahrir Square, that was not the Muslim Brotherhood. It
was not religiously driven. It was young people looking for a
future.
Syria, the same thing. Young people were looking for a
future, and when their parents came out to protest, the way
they were put down, Assad started shooting them. And that has
brought us to where we are today.
You know, the United States has power, enormous power, but
we cannot necessarily always dictate every outcome the way we
want, particularly in this world where you have rising economic
powers, China, India, Mexico, Korea, Brazil, many other people,
who are players. You know, 11 of the 15 people who used to
receive aid from IMF are now donor countries. We are living in
a changed world. And governance is not doing very well in many
places. Might I add also here, regrettably.
So we need to do--all of us--a job of looking into the
future and trying to figure out how we are going to stand up
for America's interests and promote them more effectively. And
that includes in the budget for foreign policy and in the
options that we can put on the table.
Now, one final word, if you will permit me. On Syria where
we hear this notion that somehow there was a redline and then
it was not enforced and somehow it is a sign of weakness. I beg
to differ. Facts are stubborn things. The President of the
United States made his decision. He said I am going to use
military force but he listened to people on the Hill who said
if you are going to do that, you ought to come to Congress.
Now, maybe some of them were--you know, there were some
crocodile tears in that particular plea because when he came to
the Congress to accede to the constitutional process of our
country and get them to affirm his prerogative to do what he
decided to do, there was a resounding reluctance and you fought
it. This committee was the sole exception. We know what the
Senate floor might have done, and we know what the House would
have done. So the President made his decision to use force.
But out of my discussions with Lavrov--and, might I add,
President Obama's discussions with Putin at the summit that
they had, they talked about an alternative way of doing it
without use of force. And so we came to an agreement to remove
all of the weapons, not just to degrade some of his capacity
over 1 or 2 days or whatever it was going to be.
Now, that would have had an impact, yes, on people's
thinking, but it would not have changed the fundamental course
I believe of what was going to happen. It might have had an
impact, though.
But I have to tell you the President made his decision, and
he was ready to use force. And we actually came up with a
better solution, which is to get all of the weapons out, all of
them out. And that still leaves us with other options, folks.
So I think we need to depoliticize this a little bit and
try to find a way forward for us to----
Senator Corker. Yes. I do not think when you have a
bipartisan concern that anybody is politicizing. I take
tremendous offense at you making a comment that I have concerns
as some kind of political implications when both sides of the
aisle have expressed concerns.
But let me just say----
Secretary Kerry [continuing ]. When I say depoliticize----
Senator Corker [continuing]. Well, well, let me finish.
Secretary Kerry. Senator, I am not directing that at you
personally. When I say depoliticize, I mean this whole notion
that--you know, I think there are some politics involved in
this notion that we are not pressing in enough places on enough
things. And I just think that the United States interests are
better served by us trying to find the common ground to move
forward on these things rather than falling prey to some of
these, I think, sort of stereotypes.
Senator Corker. I do not think the President made the kind
of effort that most Presidents would make in shaping opinion
within Congress, but we will let that go.
And I will just say in general I cannot imagine that you
would feel differently that our move to work with Russia in the
way that we did has certainly changed the dynamics in many
places. And certainly Iran has been the beneficiary of that.
Russia has been the beneficiary of that. We have created an air
of permissiveness. There is no question. And I do not see how
you can debate that. I mean, scholars on both sides of the
aisle understand that to be the fact, and facts are hard to
overcome.
So, look, you got a tough hand. You have been dealt a tough
hand. And I do not know what kind of support you get or not
support you get from the White House. But we wish you well. We
want to be successful in our foreign policy.
But right now I will say I think the steps that we took in
Syria have affected us in Iran. They have affected us in the
peninsula. They have affected us in Ukraine. China is watching
us. It has affected us there. And I hope that somehow during
the remainder of your tenure, you are able to turn around our
foreign policy in such a way that the statements that have been
made are not true but that we have some successes because I
think all of us are very concerned.
Secretary Kerry. Well, Senator, look, you have been a
terrific help in keeping this committee working with the
chairman and cooperating in so many different ways. And I thank
you for that. And I know this comes from a genuine concern. I
am not suggesting otherwise, I promise you.
But I would say to you that I think Russia, with all due
respect, is not acting out of strength. I do not believe that
Russia has particularly helped itself. Have they accomplished a
goal to protect Sevastopol for the time being and to, quote,
``secure Crimea'' at least in a military concept if not
legitimately in international law? Yes, but at great cost. At
great cost.
And over time, if you look at Russia's economy, there are
real challenges. They are running the risk clearly of isolating
themselves further and of losing friends around the world. They
have already lost them in Ukraine where people who were once
more supportive now feel threatened and frankly abused by what
has happened.
And if Russia were to come in, I tell you Ukrainians, I
believe, will fight over the long term. That will not be a
pretty picture, and I suspect that President Putin understands
that.
So this is not a hand of strength, and I think we need to,
all of us, stay focused on a strategy, on a long-term strategy
and recognize that Russia also has far closer ties to Ukraine
and far greater interests other than our interests in democracy
and freedom, which are huge, but in terms of history, that is
where Russian religion comes from. That is where Russian wars
of liberation were fought. And they have interests that they
are trying to assert, I think, in the wrong way, but we have
to, obviously, counter that and we are. So my hope is that we
can write a better chapter going forward, but I am not sitting
here telling you naively that that is automatically going to
happen.
Senator Corker. Yes, I would agree with you that Russia has
tremendous weaknesses. And I think our hopes are on this
committee that their move into Crimea ends up being one of the
biggest geopolitical mistakes they could possibly have made. I
think our concern is will the administration carry out policies
to ensure that that is the case.
Secretary Kerry. I think you heard me pretty clearly today,
and I do not doubt this President's resolve one iota. He is
clearly going to--he will continue. He has in the last weeks
been conversing with all of the leaders personally on the
telephone, building the support for this current level of
sanctions and for what has yet to come. And we hope it will not
have to come because I think that is a challenge for all, but
it is something we are ready to effect if we need to.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I have listened with interest to the dialogue
between you and Senator Corker, and since I gathered the desire
to engage in such a dialogue, I let it go on for a while. And I
appreciate that.
I have one final question and then a closing comment.
Mr. Secretary, I said at the very beginning of this hearing
that the one part of the budget that most worries me is the
Western Hemisphere. Year after year after year after year, we
have seen cuts to the hemisphere even though it is our own
front yard. In doing so, I think we undermine taking advantage
of the economic opportunities; underestimate the security
challenges stemming from international criminal organizations;
and do not do enough to promote development, educational
exchanges, and the consolidation of democracy and the rule of
law. When I look at Central America and the crime rate; when I
see what is happening in Venezuela, in Ecuador, in Bolivia; and
when I see the challenges in Argentina, I say to myself that
there is an enormous agenda here to pursue.
So, would you commit to working with me to figure out how
we can better position the Western Hemisphere in our budgetary
priorities, sir?
Secretary Kerry. I would be delighted to, Senator. Some of
the change is a reflection of shifting circumstances, like
Colombia is much more capable today and is doing things it was
not able to----
The Chairman. I recognize that in Colombia and Mexico it is
a fact. The problem is that we do not reinvest that money back
in the hemisphere. We send it somewhere else.
Secretary Kerry. That is a fair comment. That is true.
There are choices that have been made in the overall budget
allocation process.
There are other places like, for instance, in Haiti there
were some reductions, but that is a reflection of money in the
pipeline. When the money in the pipeline gets used, we will be
right back here asking for the same level or more.
So there are challenges, and nobody knows it better than
you do. And we are happy to sit down and work with you.
The Chairman. Well, let me close the hearing by just making
an observation.
I think, as you well know, Mr. Secretary, from your service
here that the members on this committee are passionate about
the wide range of views that they have. And these views, I
think, are generally held in very principled positions. We may
not always agree as to them, but they are held in very
principled positions. I would hate for the hearing to end
without putting that in context.
This committee, on a bipartisan basis, has passed virtually
every nomination that the administration has sent us, from the
Secretary all the way on down in a timely basis--what happens
on the floor is another challenge--but in a timely basis
overwhelmingly.
Now, this committee took one of the most significant steps
that any Member of the Senate could ever take, which is to vote
in a bipartisan way for the authorization for the use of force
in Syria. I think we all acknowledge that this was critical for
the President to get Russia to change Assad's calculation on
the use of chemical weapons.
This committee, in the aftermath of Benghazi, passed
embassy security legislation in a bipartisan way.
This committee passed OAS reform, PEPFAR reauthorization,
previous Iran sanctions that have been vigorously pursued by
the administration, and most recently, legislation on Ukraine.
So even though there are very passionate views here in the
midst of partisanship on the floor, I am happy to say that we
have had a wide breadth of bipartisanship within the committee
on the critical issues of the day, working with the
administration.
And so let me close by saying I have one disagreement with
my colleague who said that our foreign policy is spinning out
of control. We are facing some of the most intractable
challenges. And you, Mr. Secretary, and the administration have
sought to go after some of the most intractable challenges that
others could have just simply walked away from. Instead of
walking away from them, you sought to try to change the course
of events for the better.
So from the chairman, I want you to know that I have every
confidence in your intellect, in your tenacity, in your
capacity to try to meet these challenges. That does not mean we
will be successful every time, nor does it mean that we will
necessarily agree every time on how to get there, although
generally we agree on what we want to get to.
So with the gratitude of the committee for your service and
for the time you spent with us here today, I am going to leave
the record open until the close of business on Thursday.
And the hearing is adjourned.
Secretary Kerry. Mr. Chairman, could I just say you know
what a fan I am of this committee, and I appreciate enormously
the bipartisan efforts. I really do. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question #1. Venezuela.--In the past 2 months, the political unrest
in Venezuela have left at least 39 dead--including antigovernment
protesters and members of the state security forces. Amidst this
turmoil, there is evidence that should outrage the international
community that Venezuelan security forces and armed supporters of the
government have detained, beaten, tortured, and killed protesters.
Furthermore, the Venezuelan Government has also used its legal system
to arrest and silence its political opponents, as well as remove
Colombian television station NTN24 from the air. The recent visit to
Caracas by Foreign Ministers from South American countries suggests the
potential for greater regional engagement, but didn't deliver any
concrete results.
What steps can the United States take to end violence in
Venezuela and facilitate a peaceful, mediated solution to the
country's political crisis?
How can we promote greater international consensus about
the ongoing deterioration of democracy, governance, and the
rule of law in Venezuela?
Finally, what steps can we take to defend civil, political,
and human rights in Venezuela; and, is the administration
considering individualized sanctions to hold responsible those
complicit in human rights abuses?
Answer. Our immediate focus remains to bring an end to the violence
and encourage authentically inclusive dialogue to address the
Venezuelan people's legitimate grievances. We have been actively
engaging international partners to find a peaceful solution. We are
encouraged by what we have heard so far of the UNASUR-led initiative
with Vatican participation involving meetings between the government
and many parties within the political opposition. We hope this effort
will lead to an end to the violence and promote honest dialogue.
We believe the OAS, as the region's premier multilateral
institution, must assume a greater role to help find a peaceful
resolution to the crisis in Venezuela, consistent with its mandate to
promote peace, democracy, and respect for human rights in member
states, as expressed in its Charter and in the Inter-American
Democratic Charter.
We have consistently called on the Venezuelan Government to release
those it unjustly jailed, lift restrictions on freedom of the press,
respect freedoms of assembly and association, tone down its
inflammatory rhetoric, and engage in an authentically inclusive
dialogue with Venezuelans across the political spectrum. The Venezuelan
Government has an obligation to protect fundamental freedoms and the
safety of its citizens, including those who engage in peaceful protest.
The U.S. Government supports a wide range of civil society
organizations that promote and defend fundamental freedoms, democratic
processes, and nonviolent advocacy. We are studying a range of
diplomatic tools, including sanctions, to address human rights
violations that have occurred over the past few weeks. As I said last
month, we will consider all available options to help foster a peaceful
solution.
Question #2. WHA Counternarcotics/INCLE Funding.--While I fully
understand that gravity of the threats that our country faces around
the world, I would also note that some of the most pressing challenges
we face on a daily basis--including the trafficking of narcotics, arms,
people and contraband--arrive at our borders after passing through
countries in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, the threat posed by
transnational criminal organizations undercuts governance and the rule
of law in several countries throughout the hemisphere, and has fueled a
sharp rise in criminal violence that means today many of the countries
with the highest per capita homicide rates are located here in our
hemisphere. This year, the administration has requested $220 million in
cuts to International Narcotics and Law Enforcement funding for Latin
America and the Caribbean, with reductions scheduled for Central
America, Mexico, Colombia and the Caribbean.
What is the administration's assessment of security
challenges in the Western Hemisphere and does our reduced
budget prepare us to fully address these challenges?
Answer. We recognize the full range of citizen security challenges
facing our regional partners. Crime and violence, much of it fueled by
drugs and gangs, undermine our efforts to help promote economic
opportunity and strengthen democracy. We remain firmly committed to
building practical partnerships with governments, the private sector,
and civil society throughout the region to promote citizen security. We
continue to place a strong emphasis on citizen security programs to
advance U.S. interests, which account for just under half of the total
request, and include other funds in addition to INCLE.
We believe these to be the resources we need to meet our top
citizen security objectives for FY 2015 in Mexico, Colombia, Central
America, and the Caribbean. Our budget requests reflect programmatic
needs rather than a decrease in priority. Our requests for citizen
security reflect shifting circumstances and prior achievements, such as
Colombia's increased capacity to support its security and development
goals. In some countries, such as Mexico, our request reflects an
assistance pipeline in some accounts. We are working to plan for and
spend down existing pipelines.
Question #3. Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance.--The
administration's FY 2015 budget request, under the description of the
Capital Security Construction Programs and MCS Major Rehab Program,
calls for work at several posts throughout the Western Hemisphere,
including Asuncion, Paraguay; Belmopan, Belize; Guayaquil, Ecuador;
Nuevo Laredo, Mexico; Tijuana, Mexico; Matamoros, Mexico; Mexico City,
Mexico; Paramaribo, Suriname; and Georgetown, Guyana.
Please provide an overview for work at each of these
facilities. What is the total funding request scheduled for
this work?
Answer. Only three of the projects listed are included in the
Department's FY 2015 budget request (Asuncion, Matamoros, and Mexico
City). The other projects were funded in FY 2013-2014 and are in
various stages of design or construction.
FY 2013
Georgetown--Chancery compound major rehabilitation ($50.8M).
Paramaribo--New Embassy Compound ($165.8M) including chancery,
warehouse, support facilities, community facilities, utility
building, and compound access pavilions.
FY 2014
Belmopan--Marine Security Guard residence ($18.1M).
Guayaquil--Marine Security Guard residence ($30.4M).
Nuevo Laredo--New Consulate Compound ($156.0M) including consulate
office building, support annex, Marine Security Guard residence,
utility building, compound access pavilions, community facilities,
and parking.
Tijuana--Marine Security Guard residence ($17.4M).
FY 2015
Asuncion--New Embassy Compound ($213.3M) including chancery, Marine
Security Guard residence, shops, warehouse, community facilities,
parking garage, and compound access pavilions.
Matamoros--New Consulate Compound ($178.1M) including chancery, Marine
Security Guard residence, shops, limited warehousing, community
facilities, parking garage, and compound access pavilions.
Mexico City--New Embassy Compound ($763.5M) including chancery, Marine
Security Guard residence, shops, warehouse, parking garage, and
five compound access pavilions.
Question #4. The Economic Statecraft Initiative within H.R.
includes $9.1 million for 23 new positions in Foreign and Civil Service
worldwide. What is the anticipated amount intended for Western
Hemisphere Foreign and Civil Service posts?
Answer. The following are FY 2015 Costs for the four Western
Hemisphere Economic Statecraft Foreign Service Overseas positions. No
Civil Service WHA positions are requested for Economic Statecraft.
American Salaries--$370,455
Bureau Managed--$1,389,355
Total--$1,759,810
The four Foreign Service positions will be deployed to Mexico,
Panama, and Brazil (one each to Mexico and Panama and two to Brazil)
toward the Department's Economic Statecraft goals. These positions will
focus on the energy market given Brazil's recent oil discovery, as well
as other trade and tourism activities. We expect new positions to start
in mid-March 2015.
Question #5-6. Public Diplomacy and Educational and Cultural
Exchanges.--(a). What is the estimated outlay intended for public
diplomacy and educational and cultural exchanges in the Western
Hemisphere? What was the final enacted amount for FY 2013?
(b). The FY 2015 request for Fulbright ($204 million) and
International Visitors Leadership ($90 million) programs intent to
focus resources on South East Asia and sub-Sahara Africa from the
Western Hemisphere and Europe. What is the expected adjustment of funds
for the Western Hemisphere? How does it compare to FY 2013 enacted
amount and estimate for FY 2014?
Answer.
WHA/PD or .7 Funds (in thousands):
FY 2013 Actual--44,134
FY 2014 Estimate--43,495
FY 2015 Request--44,312
ECE Funds (in thousands):
FY 2013 Estimate--80,000
FY 2014 Estimate--80,000
FY 2015 Estimate--75,000
The FY15 ECE funding request for the Western Hemisphere allows us
to maintain our traditional educational and cultural programs, such as
the International Visitor Leadership Program and English language
programs. We are building on those exchanges through regional and
bilateral initiatives that bring together government, academia, and
civil society to foster regionwide prosperity. The FY15 budget also
includes a new budget line called Exchanges Rapid Response (ERR) that
enables ECA to quickly scale up exchange programs to respond to
significant events. This funding could be used for programming in Latin
American and Caribbean countries, if needed.
Through the 100,000 Strong in the Americas initiative launched by
President Obama in 2011, we are focusing on promoting increased
international educational exchanges in the Americas. This initiative
focuses attention on the importance of increased international study
throughout the Western Hemisphere to address common challenges
including citizen security, economic opportunity, social inclusion, and
environmental sustainability. We are, in fact, seeing an increase in
the exchange of students between the United States and Latin America
and the Caribbean countries. Between academic year 2011-12 and 2012-13,
student exchanges to the United States from Latin America and the
Caribbean increased by 3.8 percent. The number of U.S. students
studying in Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 11.7 percent
between academic years 2010-11 and 2011-12.
Our bilateral dialogues throughout the region complement 100,000
Strong in the Americas. For instance, on her first trip abroad,
Assistant Secretary of Educational and Cultural Affairs Evan Ryan
cochaired the working group on the promotion of student mobility at the
U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Innovation, and
Research in Mexico City. This forum, along with similar bilateral
strategic dialogues with Colombia and Brazil, serve as models for
engaging all sectors of society to expand the economic gains of the
past decades through educational and cultural exchanges.
In partnership with governments throughout the region, the United
States supports the Fulbright Program and other educational exchanges
for students, scholars, and teachers. We are providing students with
accurate, comprehensive, and current information about opportunities to
studying in the United States through our EducationUSA advising
network. And, we are providing opportunities for students to learn
languages. Over the past decade, Fulbright cost-shares from foreign
governments and the private sector have almost tripled in the region--
from $11 million in 2000 to over $27 million in 2012.
Question #7. Global Health Initiative.--What percentage of the FY
2015 budget request for State Department PEPFAR worldwide will be
allocated to the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. PEPFAR has played a significant role in the Western
Hemisphere. For more information on the State Department's FY 2015
request for GHP-State funding for HIV/AIDS programs in the region,
please see Table 13h: Country/Key Interest: HIV/AIDS-FY 2015 in the
Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Assistance Summary Tables
for Fiscal Year 2015 at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
224071.pdf.
Since its inception, PEPFAR programs have been implemented in the
Caribbean, with Haiti and Guyana designated as focus countries. Since
that time, work has expanded to include a country program in the
Dominican Republic (DR), as well as two regional programs with
governments in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
The national HIV responses in general in the Latin America and
Caribbean region have been extremely strong. A 2013 analysis by the Pan
American Health Organization noticed that ``All of the Latin America
and the Caribbean countries offer free services for HIV care and
treatment, financed for the most part by national resources.'' A key
focus of PEPFAR in this region is improving the sustainability of these
programs by reducing costs and working with countries to increase
country resources that are used to finance HIV.
While PEPFAR will continue to invest in the LAC region with the aim
of reducing costs, decreasing dependence on external funders, and
promoting the needs of key populations, many of the governments in the
region are able to address their epidemics without significant PEPFAR
investment in direct services. Overall prevalence in Latin America is
0.4 percent, and has dropped significantly in the past decade. PEPFAR
maintains country programs in Haiti and Guyana, and works in the
Dominican Republic to address both the needs of the country as well as
the health needs of Haitians who seek care in the DR.
Question #8. What percentage of the FY 2015 request for USAID
Global Health Initiative will be assigned to countries in the Western
Hemisphere?
Answer. Three percent of the FY 2015 request for USAID's Global
Health Initiative will be assigned to countries in the Western
Hemisphere. Overall, there has been significant progress on key health
indicators in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region in
recent decades. Since 1990, infant mortality in LAC has declined by
more than half, from 43 to 19 deaths per 1,000 live births. Estimates
indicate that maternal mortality has declined from 140 deaths per
100,000 live births to 85. Fertility rates have fallen from over 4 to
2.2 children per woman since 1980. In addition, malaria and
tuberculosis infection rates have declined, and progress has been made
in controlling the HIV/AIDS epidemic among key populations. As the
largest health donor in the region since the 1960s, USAID has been a
major contributor to the impressive health strides in the region. As a
result, we have graduated numerous country health programs.
However, at the same time, we recognize that health progress in LAC
has not been universal and we remain committed to undertaking key
health assistance in this important region. To adapt to the contracting
of our bilateral health programming, cost-effective regional platforms
have been established, which allow us to maintain assistance in
maternal and child health, family planning and reproductive health,
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria control.
USAID has also greatly expanded the number of partnerships and
alliances it has successfully built over decades to sustain and extend
our successes in health. For example, to ensure the continuation of
voluntary family planning programs, we are working with the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and UNFPA on logistics, procurement,
and service quality issues. Further, to address the health disparities
in the region, we are working with a consortium of international health
organizations--including UNICEF, PAHO, IDB, World Bank, UNFPA and
UNAIDS, along with ministries of health, civil society, faith-based
organizations, and the private sector under the umbrella of ``A Promise
Renewed for the Americas.'' In addition, working through the regional
office of the World Health Organization, we have expanded our reach to
ensure that new developments in global health are both learned from and
shared throughout the region, as part of the new South-to-South
collaboration.
Question #9. Global Climate Change Initiative.--What percentage of
the FY 2015 budget request for State Department GCCI worldwide will be
allocated to the Western Hemisphere? Under this amount, what are the
estimated outlays for Clean Energy, Sustainable Landscapes, and
Adaptation?
Answer. The administration's FY 2015 request for the Global Climate
Change Initiative (GCCI) for the Department of State and USAID is
$506.3 million. Of this amount, the Department of State request is
$157.8 million. The Department of State's GCCI programming, requested
for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs (OES) and the Bureau of International Organizations (IO),
generally has a global focus, with many countries in the Western
Hemisphere benefiting, for example, from the Climate and Clean Air
Coalition (Clean Energy), Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes
(Sustainable Landscapes), and the Special Climate Change Fund
(Adaptation). Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Brazil are members of the
Climate and Clean Air Coalition.
The administration request includes $348.5 million for USAID, of
which $72.6 million, or 21 percent, is for Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC). The $72.6 million includes $27.5 million for
Adaptation, $15.5 million for Clean Energy, and $29.6 million for
Sustainable Landscapes.
Question #10. Security Assistance.--What is the estimated reduction
in Western Hemisphere funding for Foreign Military Financing? How does
this amount compare to FY 2013 and estimate FY 2014? What specific
programs and countries are scheduled for reductions under the FY 2015
budget request?
Answer. We remain firmly committed to partnership in the Western
Hemisphere. Our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) request reflects
budget realities and our focus on strengthening the security
capabilities of our regional partners.
The State Department requests $47.1 million in FMF for the Western
Hemisphere in FY 2015. The FY 2015 Request is a 20-percent decrease
from the FY 2013 653(a) level ($59.2M) and a 22-percent decrease from
the FY 2014 estimate level ($60.2M). The FY 2015 request includes a
$3.8M decrease for Colombia from FY 2013, which results from Colombia's
ability to increasingly support their military to provide security
throughout the country. The request also includes a $1.6M decrease for
Mexico from FY 2013, which demonstrates an appropriate level of support
to begin development of maintenance and logistics systems for the UH-
60Ls and technical training and professional military education.
Additionally, the request includes a $4.5M decrease in FMF funding for
the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) from FY 2013. CBSI FMF
is shifting focus from prior years when we procured equipment, such as
boats, toward developing maintenance and logistics systems to maintain
these assets long term. As such, our FY15 request reflects this lower
cost programmatic shift. Finally, due to complications in implementing
assistance and political challenges, the FY 2015 request does not
include funding for Ecuador and Nicaragua, which also reduced the
overall FMF level.
Question #11. Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.--Under the FY 2015
budget request for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
(DRL), what amount of funding is targeted for the Western Hemisphere,
and what percentage of global DRL funding does this account for?
Answer. DRL does not attribute funding by regions in our annual
budget request. Instead, DRL uses its annual global appropriation to
react in real-time to changing political situations by funding low cost
programs targeting democratic opportunities or challenges as they arise
in addition to addressing ongoing deficiencies in human rights or
democracy. Many of DRL's programs operate in difficult environments and
provide crucial support to human rights defenders and civil society
activists both through regional and country specific programs as well
as global rapid response mechanisms and thematic programs. DRL supports
regional and country priorities through programs that strengthen civil
society, labor unions, political parties, election and watchdog
organizations, access to justice, and independent media. In addition,
DRL supports broader global thematic programs in all regions including
for international religious freedom, Internet freedom, labor rights,
and the human rights of members of at-risk populations, which includes
women, youths, persons with disabilities, religious and ethnic
minorities, and LGBT persons. For example, for Fiscal Year 2013 Human
Rights and Democracy Funds (HRDF), DRL has around 53 percent of total
HRDF available for specific regional and country priorities, of which
approximately 8 percent of this, or around $3 million, is for the
Western Hemisphere.
The remaining FY 2013 HRDF is for our global rapid response
programs and thematic programs, some of which also support activities
in the Western Hemisphere. For example, DRL's S.A.F.E. (Securing Access
to Freedom of Expression) Initiative is a global program that promotes
journalist digital and physical safety in difficult environments. In
the Western Hemisphere, S.A.F.E. has assisted media actors in the
region to operate more safely through the provision of trainings,
tools, and individualized threat-mitigation plans. Beneficiaries also
have access to help 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for emergency
situations and receive basic assistance for coping with high stress and
emotional trauma. This initiative compliments region-specific
programming that improves the capacity of journalists to produce fact-
based, data-driven analysis of crucial issues such as corruption and
human rights.
Question #12. Populations, Refugees and Migration.--Under the FY
2015 budget request for the Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration (PRM), what amount of funding is targeted for the Western
Hemisphere, and what percentage of global PRM funding does this account
for?
Answer. The President's FY 2015 request includes $2.0 billion for
the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account, which is managed by
the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. The FY 2015 MRA
request includes $45.4 million in funding targeted for the Western
Hemisphere which equates to 2.2 percent of the total FY 2015 MRA
request.
Question #13. Ukraine.--Mr. Secretary I'd like to ask you about the
economic consequences for Russia's military intervention in Ukraine,
annexation of Crimea and, continued intimidation of its neighbors.
Today's Russian economy is obviously more interconnected with the world
than it was under communism. In response to internationally coordinated
sanctions there have been comments in Russia about retaliating by not
paying loans, seizing hard assets, and not using the dollar. There has
been an outflow of investment and a lack of foreign direct investment
in Russia for some time, which will only be exacerbated by this sort of
talk.
Answer. The goal of our sanctions is to persuade Russia to de-
escalate the situation. The President has stated that Russia must pay
an economic cost for its illegal occupation of Crimea, and he has made
clear that Russia will pay a still greater cost for any further
escalation of the situation. We have made--and continue to make--every
effort to calibrate the sanctions to Russia's actions, while to the
extent possible limiting the spillover impact on U.S. companies and the
U.S. economy. To date, the administration has imposed targeted
sanctions on three tranches of persons most directly involved in
destabilizing Ukraine and those who have provided material support to
Russian leadership. We have also designated members of Putin's inner
circle, a medium-sized bank controlled by a number of them, and a
company involved in the misappropriation of Ukrainian state assets. We
have not imposed sanctions on economic sectors or large Russian
companies. We cannot predict what actions are still to come, since what
we do will depend on what takes place on the ground. If the Russian
Government decides to escalate its intervention in Ukraine, then we
will escalate our sanctions. At the same time, we have provided Russia
an off-ramp if it is prepared to de-escalate.
Question #14. All of this must be having a very punitive effect on
the Russian economy, how badly are they hurting themselves by scaring
investment away? Is there any business or civic society pressure that
could result from the hit the Russian economy is experiencing as a
result of the military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of
Crimea? What do you think the longer term impact of this pressure will
be on Russian foreign and economic policy?
Answer. Sanctions and the threat of further sanctions weigh on
Russia's economic growth. The World Bank has warned that Russia's
economy could shrink by 1.8 percent this year. International ratings
agencies have downgraded the Russian economy, including a significant
number of state-owned firms, from a stable to negative outlook. The
Russian currency remains under pressure: between March 3 and April 14,
the Central Bank of Russia spent $26.7 billion to stabilize the ruble,
and as capital exits the country, it has resorted to emergency rate
hikes. Furthermore, Russia's actions in Crimea have caused
deterioration in foreign and international investors' confidence in
Russia, whose economy is already stagnating from a lack of investment
and reform. Stability, respect for international law, and integration
in the global economy are extremely important to investors and market
participants. Russia's actions raise doubts about its commitment to all
three, and you can see that investors are already worried.
Question #15. Ukraine and IMF Reform.--Lately we have all been
singularly focused on the crisis in Ukraine, and as events play out
there it is increasingly evident that we need a strong IMF to play the
central, anchoring role in stabilizing Ukraine's economy. Could you
please update the committee on the latest economic developments in
Ukraine, how the pledges of assistance by the United States, EU, and
other multilateral institutions will help the country, and what the
role of the IMF will be in addressing the crisis? Could you also speak
to how Russia's announcement that they are raising the price of gas for
Ukraine will affect the size and timing of IMF assistance?
Answer. While the Ukrainian economy has potential, unsustainable
economic policies under previous administrations have left Ukraine with
high current account and budget deficits, financial sector instability,
expensive nontargeted energy subsidies and noncompetitive industries.
As part of its engagement with the IMF, Ukraine has now initiated
reforms to avoid a debilitating financial crisis. To succeed, the
Ukrainian Government is working to secure sizable external financing to
help put these reforms in place. The IMF estimates those needs will
approach $27 billion in external financing over the next 2 years.
Financing of continued gas purchases from Russia and new purchases from
European companies via reverse-flow are critical short-term actions,
while fundamental institutional reform and improved efficiency are
ultimately necessary.
The United States is working closely with international partners to
develop an assistance package to ensure Ukraine has sufficient
financing to restore financial stability and return to growth. Thanks
to support from Congress and this committee, the administration signed
a $1 billion loan guarantee agreement with Ukraine on April 14, which
will complement the Government of Ukraine's IMF reform program. By
guaranteeing the principal and interest payments on Ukrainian bonds,
the loan guarantee will support Ukraine's access to capital markets on
favorable terms (lower interest rates) and, as part of a broader
international package of economic assistance, send a strong signal of
international support. This loan guarantee will bolster the Government
of Ukraine's ability to provide critical services as it implements
reforms, while protecting the most vulnerable Ukrainian households from
the impact of the necessary economic adjustment.
Beyond the loan guarantee, we also are providing technical
assistance to support Ukraine as it undertakes reforms to restore
economic stability and growth. Technical advisors from the United
States Treasury have been on the ground in Kyiv since March 9 helping
Ukrainian authorities manage immediate market pressures. USAID
technical advisors have also been working with Ukraine's National Bank,
Finance Ministry, and Deposit Guarantee Fund. In addition, USAID, the
State Department, and the Justice Department provide assistance in
areas such as energy tariff reforms, anticorruption legislation, and
private sector development that will also support the IMF program. This
assistance contributes to a broader international assistance effort,
which includes $2.2 billion from the EU in near-term budget support, up
to $11 billion in medium-term project finance from the European
Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development to enhance Ukraine's private sector and infrastructure, $3
billion from the World Bank in budget support and development
assistance, as well as a loan guarantee from Canada of $200 million.
Ukraine is in the process of finalizing a Stand-by Arrangement
program with the IMF, which will be at the center of international
assistance efforts and is best placed to support Ukraine's
implementation of robust and market-oriented reforms. The goal of the
financing and reform package agreed to by Ukraine and the IMF is to
restore macroeconomic stability and put the country on the path of
sound governance and sustainable economic growth while protecting the
vulnerable in the society. The program will focus on reforms in the
following key areas: monetary and exchange rate policies; the financial
sector; fiscal policies; the energy sector; and governance,
transparency, and the business climate. The price of imported Russian
gas is considered by the IMF as it evaluates Ukraine's financing needs
and develops its reform program.
Question #16. Afghanistan.--At $1.5 billion, the administration's
Afghanistan assistance request remains among the largest in the 150
Account. I support this funding and sustained engagement by the U.S. in
Afghanistan and the region, but accountability for these funds will
continue to be an important concern of this committee. In the past, we
have incentivized a portion of our assistance tied to specific Afghan
reforms as agreed to in the 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework.
This seems to be a good model for how we provide assistance in a
country plagued with corruption and weak governmental capacity.
Should the U.S. incentivize more of its assistance to
Afghanistan as a way toward encouraging Afghan reform and
strengthening the confidence of the international community and
U.S. taxpayer?
Answer. We agree on the importance of incentivizing positive change
in Afghanistan as called for under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework (TMAF). A $175 million, 2-year bilateral incentive fund
linked to the TMAF reforms is one part of our broader strategy to
increase accountability in our relationship with the Afghan Government.
We also support incentives offered by multilateral institutions
including the Incentive Program of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund and conditions included in the Expanded Credit Facility provided
by the International Monetary Fund. Further, we continue to include
various reform benchmarks in our direct assistance programs with Afghan
ministries, and encourage policy implementation with programs like the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's Good Performers
Initiative and Governor Led Eradication that only disburse project
funds after Afghans take action to control illicit narcotics.
Incentive programs and regular international monitoring of TMAF
reform indicators have both helped to establish a transparent and
constructive dialogue with the Afghan Government on its reform agenda.
This dialogue has produced some notable results including the passage
and implementation of an improved electoral framework that has so far
served Afghanistan well in the first round of the Presidential
election. Accountability will be a critical part of our relationship
with the new government that will come to power this year, and we plan
to continue to use all tools at our disposal to encourage improved
governance in Afghanistan.
Question #17. Secretary Kerry, current Appropriations legislation
dictates that the administration provide a spending plan for
Afghanistan programs before relevant committees allow funds to be
obligated. The current spending bill makes clear that future
programming should be directed toward efforts to strengthen rule of law
and civil society and promote women's rights and women's health. The
legislation specifically demands cuts to large scale infrastructure
projects, many of which were (in the past) beset by waste and
corruption.
Answer. We strongly believe a continued partnership between
Afghanistan and the United States is critically important to U.S.
national security and sustaining the hard won gains of the past decade.
Per the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed by Presidents Obama and
Karzai, our foreign assistance programs will continue to support better
governance and economic growth including increased opportunity for
women.
Assistance from the United States has led to major improvement in
nearly every significant indicator of Afghanistan's development.
Examples of progress facilitated by U.S. assistance includes:
Education: In 2002, there were only 900,000 Afghan children
in school, and virtually none of them were girls. Today,
approximately 8 million children are registered to attend
school and more than one-third of them are girls.
Health: Life expectancy has increased from 42 years to over
62 since 2001; the maternal mortality rate has declined by 80
percent from 1,600 deaths to 327 per 100,000 births; and child
mortality decreased from 172 to 97 deaths per 1,000 live
births.
Energy: In 2002, only 6 percent of Afghans had access to
reliable electricity. Today 18 percent do. In addition, USAID
assistance has helped put the Afghan national power company
(DABS) on a path to become fully self-sustaining. DABS
collected $220 million from the sale of electricity in 2012, an
increase of 67 percent from 2010.
Mobile Technology: In 2002, there were few fixed telephone
lines in Afghanistan, and making an international call required
a satellite phone. Today, the combined phone network covers 90
percent of the Afghan population. Eighty-five percent of women
have access to a mobile phone. The telecommunications sector is
Afghanistan's greatest source of foreign direct investment,
largest remitter of taxes to the government, and biggest licit
employer, providing jobs for 100,000 Afghans.
Women: Today, there are over 3,000 women-owned business and
associations; almost 20 percent of Afghans enrolled in higher
education are women; and women are active participants in the
Afghan political process, with three female members of the
Afghan Cabinet, 68 Members of Parliament (of the 249 seats),
and three women Vice Presidential candidates.
Infrastructure: Prudent investment in Afghanistan's
infrastructure including roads, schools, dams, and other
projects with careful measures to protect U.S. funding played a
critical enabling role in Afghanistan's development gains.
The priorities for our future assistance efforts are well aligned
with congressional guidance. We have already greatly reduced our
budgets for large-scale infrastructure projects and will continue to
strengthen our focus on building the capacity of the Afghan Government
and private sector to maintain existing investments and facilitate
inclusive private sector-led economic growth. We will continue to
support Afghan civil society and media organizations in their efforts
to reduce corruption and advocate for improved governance in a variety
of sectors. We also remain focused on improving the ability of formal
and informal Afghan justice institutions to sustainably provide
services to all Afghans.
The United States remains committed to implementing robust measures
to prevent corruption and waste of U.S. assistance funds. For example,
USAID is utilizing a multitiered monitoring approach that includes, as
appropriate, independent monitoring contractors; observation by U.S.
Government staff; reporting by implementing partners, local
nongovernmental organizations and civil society; and use of
technological tools, such as time- and date-stamped photos. The United
States also maintains stringent oversight and accountability procedures
for direct assistance projects with the Afghan Government, such as
requiring the establishment of a noncommingled, separate bank account
for each project, disbursement of funds only after a performance
milestone has been achieved, or the United States has verified accrued
costs, as well as full compliance by Afghan ministries of mitigation
measures identified by the U.S. Government prior to and through the
disbursement process. If Afghan ministries fail to adhere to these
measures, the agreements are subject to immediate suspension or
termination.
In addition, the United States will continue to seek progress on
issues affecting women as a fundamental tenet of U.S. policy in
Afghanistan and essential to Afghanistan's security, governance, and
development. Afghanistan made strong commitments in our Strategic
Partnership Agreement regarding ensuring and advancing the essential
rights of Afghan women. In support of Afghan efforts to abide by those
commitments, USAID will launch this year its standalone women's
empowerment program, ``Promote,'' and programs in health, education and
many other areas will continue to focus on expanding the gains made by
Afghan women over the last 12 years. The Department of State will
continue to support Afghan-led initiatives that increase awareness and
strengthen enforcement of the Elimination of Violence Against Women
law, particularly support to women's shelters and Violence Against
Women prosecution units. The United States will also begin this year a
program to increase awareness of the problem of trafficking in persons
in Afghanistan and build the capacity of civil society and government
to combat the problem.
Question #18. Can you pledge that the State Department, as it
crafts the 2014 spending plan and a more detailed budgetary description
for fiscal year 2015, will protect--and not cut--vital support to
women's rights groups, women's shelters, schools, and other relevant
funding for civil society? Can you pledge that the cuts will be focused
elsewhere? Can you pledge that cuts will not be made ``across the
board'' but will, as required by the legislation, focus on the big
ticket infrastructure programs that have, in the past, been so
associated with waste and corruption?
Answer. Global stability, peace, and prosperity depend on
protecting and advancing the rights of women and girls around the
world. Research shows that progress in women's employment, health, and
education can lead to greater economic growth and stronger societies.
Advancing gender equality and women's empowerment is a policy across
U.S. foreign assistance. The Department of State has mandated that
gender equality and women's empowerment be integrated into strategic
and budget planning; programming; monitoring and evaluation; and
management and training. Therefore all of these processes must and do
prioritize gender, as called for by the Secretary of State.
Question #19. The Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program has provided
an important lifeline for endangered Afghan employees of the USG in
Afghanistan. How many Afghans that worked for the State Department have
been granted SIVs? How many total SIVs have been granted in Afghanistan
since the beginning of the program? How many remain in the pipeline?
Please describe how the State Department works to ensure that the
knowledge and expertise of Afghans who receive SIVs is captured before
their departure from the country? How can this process be improved to
ensure that institutional memory and key local relationships do not
suffer as a result of the SIV program?
Answer. Through FY 2013, 2,718 Afghans and their family members had
been issued visas under the SIV program authorized by section 602(b) of
the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, as amended. In FY 2014,
through April 15, we have so far issued 3,902 SIVs to Afghans and their
dependents, including 1,457 SIVs to Afghan principal applicants. This
is more than in all the previous years combined and more than double
the total number of Afghan principal applicants issued in FY 2013
(651). Attached are issuances through the second quarter of FY 2014,
available on our public-facing Web site, travel.state.gov.
As of April 16, 10,862 Afghans and their family members have
applications pending, including 5,752 principal applicants.
Afghan Locally Employed (LE) Staff employed by the Department of
State have received 196 SIVs since 2012. The vast majority (172) have
been issued since October 2013. To date, 714 LE Staff have submitted
SIV application letters, which represents 82 percent of the currently
encumbered 868 positions. In CY 2013, we had a total of 111 LE Staff
who left the mission because of the SIV program. This year, we
anticipate another 200-250 LE Staff out of a roughly 1,000-strong LE
Staff complement will leave the U.S. mission as a result of this
program.
To ensure that the knowledge and expertise of Afghans who receive
SIVs is captured before their departure from the country, the mission
double-encumbers positions so that there is overlap between the
departing and incoming employees. The mission also promotes Portfolio
Continuity, an IT-based solution for maintaining and passing on
institutional knowledge. Post utilizes American and third-country
national staff to bolster Embassy technical and administrative
capacity, but in terms of local contacts and knowledge, there is no
equal substitute for locally engaged personnel. Since anyone we
employ--whether directly or through a contracted organization--is
eligible to apply for the SIV program after 12 months of employment
between October 7, 2001 and December 31, 2014, this limits mitigation
options available to the Embassy.
Question #20. The FY14 appropriations bill also called on the State
Department to begin planning for the transition of the office of the
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan into the Bureau of
South and Central Asia Affairs. This seems to be an important
bureaucratic step in order to better coordinate U.S. policymaking in
the region.
Have any steps been taken to prepare for the folding of
SRAP into SCA?
Answer. The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan (SRAP) was created in 2009 as a unique stand-alone office
given the critical importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan as pivotal
countries during a critical period for the United States and the world.
The course of events over the past 5 years has necessitated the
sustained focus of the SRAP office, particularly as we surged our
military and civilian presence in Afghanistan. During this period, the
SRAP office has fostered coordination throughout the interagency and
within the Department, particularly with the Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs (SCA), to meet U.S. strategic goals in the
region. It has also played the lead role in engaging NATO and other key
partners around the world who have supported these efforts.
SRAP and SCA have worked together closely to ensure the best
possible coordination to advance U.S. goals in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. From SRAP's inception, its principal deputy was also dual-
hatted as a DAS in SCA, and has shared a common EX for all management
issues and common public diplomacy team with SCA. Another SCA DAS
attends all of SRAP's senior staff meetings with the Special
Representative, typically three times per week, to ensure alignment
with SCA. Additionally, the principal deputies of both offices meet at
least biweekly to discuss common concerns, as well as regular meetings
between the SCA Assistant Secretary and the Special Representative.
There are many areas of joint effort regarding policy development. We
share a common communications team.
We have spent the past year working on the first FY15-18 Joint
Regional Strategy for internal purposes, as a collaborative resourcing
effort by SCA, SRAP, and USAID, which presents a cohesive strategy for
the entire region. On key topics such as the role of India in the
region, or regional economic connectivity, we have developed working
groups that meet regularly and have jointly drafted policy papers.
Representatives from SCA and SRAP regularly visit each other's
countries to brief on current issues (most recently in late June, when
a Deputy Special Representative traveled to Central Asia for Afghan
consultations), jointly host meetings with Embassy staff in Washington
of their countries of jurisdiction, brief the Hill together, cochair
trilateral meetings jointly, participate in the Strategic Dialogues of
the other bureau's countries, and clear all their relevant policy
papers with each other.
In short, many steps have already been taken to prepare for the
eventual folding of SRAP back into SCA. When the time is ripe for a
full integration of the two, it will not be difficult to complete.
However at this moment, with more than 30,000 U.S. troops still in
Afghanistan and the drawdown specifics still being formulated, billions
of dollars of civilian assistance still flowing to both countries which
requires careful oversight, a fragile elections process still underway
in Afghanistan, the continued robust engagement of the International
Contact Group for the over 50 international partners that have also
appointed SRAPs to facilitate their relationships in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and the sustained efforts to partner with Pakistan on core
counterterrorism concerns, there is still a critical need for an SRAP
office that exclusively focuses attention on this region and
coordinates U.S. Government policy. As long as SRAP exists, it will
continue the efforts to integrate Afghanistan into the broader region,
working closely with SCA colleagues until the Secretary decides that
the time is appropriate to formally integrate the two offices.
Question #21. The 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework
provides an important foundation for discussion with the incoming
Afghan Government on the accountability of our assistance. In the past,
we have incentivized a portion of our assistance tied to specific
Afghan reforms as agreed to in the 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework. This seems to be a good model for how we provide assistance
in a country plagued with corruption and weak governmental capacity.
Should the U.S. incentivize more of its assistance to
Afghanistan as a way toward encouraging Afghan reform and
strengthening the confidence of the international community and
U.S. taxpayer?
Answer. We agree on the importance of incentivizing positive change
in Afghanistan as called for under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability
Framework (TMAF). A $175 million, 2-year bilateral incentive fund
linked to the TMAF reforms is one part of our broader strategy to
increase accountability in our relationship with the Afghan Government.
We also support incentivization through multilateral institutions
including the Incentive Program of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust
Fund and conditions included in the Expanded Credit Facility provided
by the International Monetary Fund. Further, we continue to include
various reform benchmarks in our direct assistance programs with Afghan
ministries, and encourage policy implementation with programs like the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement's Good Performers
Initiative and Governor Led Eradication that only disburse project
funds after Afghans take action to control illicit narcotics.
Incentive programs and regular international monitoring of TMAF
reform indicators have both helped to establish a transparent and
constructive dialogue with the Afghan Government on its reform agenda.
This dialogue has produced some notable results including the passage
and implementation of an improved electoral framework that has so far
served Afghanistan well in the first round of the Presidential
election. Accountability will be a critical part of our relationship
with the new government that will come to power this year, and we plan
to continue to use all tools at our disposal to encourage improved
governance in Afghanistan.
Question #22. Has the State Department decided on its footprint for
its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan? What is the current thinking on
the scope and size of the U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan post-
2014?
Answer. The President continues to review options regarding the
size and scope of our post-2014 military presence, a decision that will
influence the scale of the State Department's activities in
Afghanistan, the size of its footprint, and the resources the
Department requires to secure its facilities and personnel post-2014.
We continue to plan for the various options under consideration to
ensure we are prepared for whatever option the President may choose.
The Department has adjusted its footprint to correspond with each phase
of the planned reduction in the overall U.S. presence. As of April, our
diplomatic presence includes the Embassy in Kabul, consulates in Herat
and Mazar-e Sharif, and six other field platforms, down from a total of
49 field platforms in January 2013. There are approximately 770 direct
hire employees and some 850 locally employed staff positions.
Question #23. Pakistan.--The U.S. incentivizes a portion of its
``on-budget'' assistance in Afghanistan. Would the administration also
consider incentivizing a portion of its assistance to Pakistan? What
would be the implications of incentivizing a portion of ``on-budget''
assistance to Pakistan?
Answer. The administration is already achieving the objective of
incentivizing assistance through a variety of means. A key goal of U.S.
assistance in Pakistan is to strengthen the capacity of the civilian
government and to support the Government of Pakistan's economic reform
efforts in close association with the IMF. The IMF program has specific
reform requirements which Pakistan must meet to receive each tranche of
funding. The United States and other major donors are all coordinate to
ensure their programs help the Government of Pakistan meet those reform
requirements.
We currently allocate approximately 35 percent of U.S. civilian
assistance to Pakistan through ``on budget'' mechanisms. The Government
of Pakistan has consistently asked that we increase this amount as much
as possible as it helps with the balance of payments, and because they
prefer that donor funds be spent on their priority programs.
``On budget,'' or government-to-government, assistance in Pakistan
is typically provided via project-specific agreements for
infrastructure and/or services, such as schools, roads, energy
projects, etc. These projects include a series of associated management
improvements or reforms such as standing up project management units to
ensure agencies can properly manage funds transparently, developing
standardized methods for monitoring and evaluating projects, policy or
structural changes that will make the project more effective or
sustainable, and improving financial management systems. These projects
are often accompanied by specialized technical assistance to help the
government implement policy reforms relevant to the given sector, and
to improve management structures and practices.
The World Bank does not have a multilateral trust fund in Pakistan
like it does in Afghanistan. Their ``incentivized'' on-budget support
comes in the form of a Development Policy Credit which requires
specified reforms to be negotiated with the government before the funds
are disbursed. The Asian Development Bank, JICA and DFID participate in
the Development Policy Credit.
In Afghanistan, our strategy to build accountability into our
engagements with the government has multiple layers. The first level of
conditionality occurs on a project-by-project basis, consistent with
what we described above. In addition, as you note, we designed a
separate, limited ``incentive program'' in Afghanistan that links the
disbursement of a portion of our overall assistance to progress on
reform benchmarks included in the Tokyo Frameworks. Incentive funds are
disbursed to the World Bank-managed funding mechanism that finances
certain recurring government civilian expenditures after progress is
verifies. Our bilateral Afghan incentive program takes advantage of the
World Bank mechanism and the agreed upon set of basic governance and
economic reforms that the Afghan Government and the International
Community agreed upon at the Tokyo Conference in 2012.
We regularly review and assess options for how U.S. assistance
could be better utilized to support reform and build host government
capacity in Pakistan. However, given that no analogous mechanism to the
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund exists in Pakistan and the fact that
we do not provide direct budget support in Pakistan, we have not
imposed policy-based conditions on our bilateral civilian assistance to
date.
Question #24. Central Asia.--The FY14 appropriations law authorized
the administration to spend up to $150 million in Afghanistan funding
for programs that support regional economic connectivity, with a focus
on Central Asia. This authorization seems to align with the
administration's stated goal of strengthening Afghanistan's economic
links with its neighbors. Does the administration have specific plans
to use FY14 appropriated Afghanistan funding for programs that promote
regional connectivity in Central Asia? I understand that the
administration is conducting a review of U.S. policy in Central Asia.
Please describe how the Central Asia policy review process will take
place within the State Department and among the interagency. In what
ways does the administration plan to involve the relevant congressional
committees in the review? How will the results of the review, once
completed, be integrated into the policymaking process?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID are currently developing
plans for the use of FY 2014 foreign assistance funding in Afghanistan,
including programs to support Afghanistan's economic integration into
the broader South and Central Asia region. We continue to support
constructive regional cooperation and mutually beneficial links between
Afghanistan and its neighbors as part of our strategy to help
Afghanistan achieve sustainable stability. We appreciate the flexible
authority provided in the FY 2014 appropriation that will allow us to
use a portion of the resources allocated to Afghanistan for regional
activities. We fully expect that, as in years past, a portion of our FY
2014 assistance portfolio in Afghanistan will be focused on increasing
Afghanistan's trade with the region and on facilitating the transit of
goods and resources across Afghan territory. For instance, we expect FY
2014 funds will support the continuation of the Afghanistan Trade and
Revenue Project that is working to finalize Afghanistan's accession to
the WTO and facilitate increased trade, including through improved
coordination with Central Asia. In addition, we are actively
considering whether funds allocated to Afghanistan will be used to
support regional initiatives, such as those developed by the
multilateral Istanbul Process or USAID's Almaty Consensus.
The Department is reviewing strategy on Central Asia as part of a
larger interagency process. We welcome continuing consultations with
Congress as that process moves forward.
Question #25. How does the recent annexation of Crimea impact the
perception of Russia among the countries of Central Asia? Does this
provide an opening for greater U.S. engagement with the countries of
Central Asia?
Answer. Central Asian states welcome greater U.S. engagement, but
at the same time are vulnerable to varying degrees to Russian political
and economic pressure. Each country has a unique relationship with
Russia and will likely view Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in
light of its own specific national interests.
In the weeks since Russia annexed Crimea, we have sought to counter
the Russian narrative on events in Ukraine by increasing our public
messaging. We translated several op-eds by independent analysts into
Russian and procured the rights to release the op-eds in Central Asia.
Central Asian media outlets have also translated and published State
Department press releases, including a recent fact sheet outlining
Russia's false claims about Ukraine.
In our interactions with our Central Asian partners, the United
States underscores our strong support for Central Asian independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity, including our belief that the
region is best served by broad partnerships with the United States,
Russia, China, EU, India, and others. The United States objective is to
provide the Central Asian states with the space necessary to make their
own political and economic decisions while reiterating the United
States enduring commitment to the region and its long-term democratic
and economic development post-2014. We have emphasized to our partners
in Central Asia that that this is not a zero-sum game between East and
West. We will continue to support the Central Asian states in areas of
mutual cooperation to promote each country's sovereignty and
territorial integrity, while reinforcing the importance of respecting
fundamental human rights within their borders.
Question #26. India.--Has the State Department conducted an
internal review on the arrest of Indian diplomat Devyani Khobragade?
What are the interagency standard operating procedures for arrest
practices for those persons accorded status under the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963? What lessons did the State Department learn from
this incident? Were any reforms in this process instituted following
this incident?
Answer. The State Department conducted a thorough review on the
arrest of Devyani Khobragade, including the applicability of the Vienna
Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations to the case.
Under international law as stated in the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963, foreign diplomatic and consular personnel are under
a duty to respect U.S. laws and regulations. At the time of her arrest,
Dr. Khobragade enjoyed immunity only for official acts undertaken in
her role as Deputy Consul General at India's Consulate General in New
York. Consequently, she did not enjoy immunity from the charges against
her at the time of her arrest, which related to her private employment
of a domestic worker.
Persons enjoying immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations cannot be arrested consistent with the Convention. The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, on the other hand, provides that
consular officers can be arrested only with a warrant and for a grave
crime, which we have long interpreted to be a felony. Consular officers
can be arrested by federal authorities or state and local authorities.
There are no set procedures applicable to the arrest of consular
officers or other members of the consular post; rather, as with any
arrest, how the relevant authorities proceed depends on the
circumstances in a particular case. The Department is committed to
improving communication and coordination with the Department of Justice
and the U.S. Marshals Service regarding the arrest and processing of
consular officers, and has been discussing that topic with those
agencies in recent months.
As the Department reflects on the period following the arrest, we
are encouraged that, even during the toughest moments, our two
countries kept open the lines of communication. We knew then and know
now that the U.S.-India partnership is too important, and too strong,
to be defined by one event. We are carrying that very important lesson
forward as we get back to the vital business at hand.
Question #27. MENA Reform.--Then State Department's FY15 request
does not seek funding for the Middle East and North Africa Incentive
Fund. Instead, funding for political and economic reform will be drawn
from the overall Economic Support Funds account.
Do you anticipate negative impacts to the effectiveness of
U.S. efforts in promoting political and economic reform by
moving funding into ESF rather than a stand-alone, specific
account?
Will this limit flexibility to respond to quickly changing
circumstances?
$225M is allocated specifically for MENA reform. How does
this break down by country and program? What State Department
priorities for the MENA region are addressed by the programs to
be funded under this account in FY 15?
How will the MENA Transition Fund reinforce and align with
the programs funding with the $225M in ESF, and how will you
work to avoid redundancies?
Answer. Given the ongoing volatility in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) and the importance of continued, active U.S. engagement,
we believe it remains critical to request funding in anticipation of
future contingencies and reform opportunities. These requested funds
would provide us, in consultation with Congress, the ability to respond
rapidly and flexibly to emerging needs and opportunities. The FY 2014
request for the MENA Incentive Fund proposed the creation of a new
account. The FY 2015 request for the MENA Initiative instead requests
funds within existing accounts, utilizing the authorities available in
the Foreign Assistance Act and annual appropriations bills. We have
identified and selected those accounts based on experience and lessons
learned over the past 3 years, and an internal review of the areas of
intervention--such as supporting private sector development and job
creation--in which U.S. assistance can advance our national interests
and support positive change in the region.
Moreover, by requesting centrally managed money for reforms we
retain the flexibility to implement those funds regionally as well as
in countries with the strongest need and greatest opportunity. We are
confident this mechanism will give us the ability to direct foreign
assistance where it can have the greatest impact. The FY 2015 MENA
Initiative request also represents a shift from a focus on national
governments to working with and empowering citizens around the region
on key transition challenges: jobs, security, democratic governance,
and human rights.
The $225 million in ESF that we have requested will focus primarily
on reforms on a regional scale. This includes $50 million for USAID's
MENA Investment Initiative, $50 million for USAID's MENA Water Security
Initiative, $70 million for economic reform programs, $40 million for
governance and civil society programs, and $15 million for programming
in human rights and rule of law. We are not breaking down MENA
Initiative funding by country, which ensures it is available for use
across the entire region in response to developments on the ground.
The MENA Investment Initiative aims to create jobs and spur private
investment by providing financing for startup and early-stage companies
and technical support for business development services. The MENA water
security initiative aims to combine economic entrepreneurship
opportunities with the development of ``water-smart'' technologies to
improve long-term, sustainable access to water. Economic reform funds
will support efforts to reduce trade barriers, change policies, and
regulations that suppress private investment, and improve revenue
management. The $70 million in MENA economic reforms request includes
$10 million for a potential U.S. contribution to the Deauville
Transition Fund. The United States sits on the Deauville Transition
Fund Steering Committee, which decides whether to approve or reject
project proposals. Steering Committee decisions are made by consensus,
which allows the United States to determine whether proposed projects
are consistent with U.S. policy objectives and legal requirements. The
U.S. position on each proposal is decided through an interagency
process, which allows the opportunity to deconflict U.S. Government
reform initiatives.
Programming in human rights and rule of law will include funds to
counter violent extremism and support security sector reform.
Governance funds will include support for elections and political
process reforms, strengthening media and internet freedom, and the
engagement of civil society with emerging leaders and democratic
institutions across the region.
Question #28. Israel.--The President's budget includes $3.1 billion
in security assistance for Israel in line with the U.S.-Israel MOU on
assistance. During his trip to Israel last year, President Obama
committed to negotiating a new aid agreement with Israel as the current
MOU expires in a few years.
Can you update us on where talks with Israel stand on a new
MOU?
How are State and DOD ensuring Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge (QME) considering huge sales of sophisticated
weaponry to other partners across the region? Are Israeli
officials concerned by continued U.S. sales of sophisticated
weapons platforms to other countries given the high degree of
instability, violence, and sectarianism sweeping the region?
Answer. Discussions with Israel are underway on a new FMF Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) MOU. Teams from Israel and the United States
and Israel have met several times over the past year both in Israel and
Washington on this issue. As we continue these discussions, we are
mindful of the mounting fiscal constraints on U.S. foreign assistance
allocations.
Israel remains, by a significant margin, the leading recipient of
FMF, and the Israel Defense Forces enjoy privileged access to the most
advanced U.S. military equipment, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
and the V-22 Osprey. The United States also provides substantial
financial and technical assistance to help Israel develop a
comprehensive air and missile defense system to protect against
rockets, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
With regard to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), this
administration has consistently reaffirmed its commitment to
maintaining Israel's QME. The administration regularly assesses the
capabilities of the region's militaries and nonstate actors, and
closely monitors regional developments. U.S. and Israeli officials meet
regularly to discuss both regional security and U.S. defense
cooperation throughout the region.
The sale of sophisticated defense equipment to the Middle East is
critical and a key part of an extensive U.S. effort to ensure our
partners in the region have credible military capabilities to respond
to potential regional threats. The administration does not proceed with
the release of U.S. defense articles or services that would threaten
our allies and partners including Israel, or compromise regional
security in the Middle East.
This administration regularly assesses the capabilities of the
region's militaries and nonstate actors and closely monitors regional
developments to ensure Israel maintains its QME. We are also taking
full advantage of the consultative and political mechanisms currently
in place to respond to and act on Israel's concerns. U.S. and Israeli
officials meet regularly to discuss both regional security and U.S.
defense cooperation throughout the region.
Question #29. Iran.--The administration has said that as part of a
final deal with Iran a significant portion of its nuclear
infrastructure will have to be dismantled. Meanwhile, Iran is saying
``no'' to any dismantlement and this week announced that it wants to
postpone discussion on the possible military dimensions of its program.
How will you address these issues that suggest Iran is not
negotiating with the P5+1 in good faith?
Do we have a set of hard requirements--a bottom line--that
we will insist upon in order to reach an agreement? What can
you tell us about these minimum requirements?
You and the President have said that we must make it
impossible for Iran to get a nuclear bomb. Will we demand that
Fordow be closed (not just that there be no enrichment there)?
Will we insist that Iran cannot have a heavy water reactor? Do
we have a figure in mind for the number of centrifuges Iran can
maintain? Can they have any advanced centrifuges?
You have indicated that a bad deal is worse than no deal.
What, in your view, would constitute a bad deal?
Given the increased responsibilities the IAEA is taking on
to monitor the Joint Plan of Action, are we providing
sufficient funds to that organization to do what it needs to
do?
Answer. The administration is working with the P5+1 and EU to reach
a comprehensive solution to the international community's concerns with
Iran's nuclear program. Our goal remains to prevent Iran from acquiring
a nuclear weapon and ensure that its nuclear program is exclusively
peaceful. Our negotiations with Iran to date have been respectful,
professional, and intense.
All of the things on which we will have to reach agreement in the
course of the negotiations are addressed in the Joint Plan of Action
(JPOA). We are looking to ensure that we have the right combination of
measures in place to ensure Iran cannot acquire a nuclear weapon.
Moreover, any long-term comprehensive solution will have to demonstrate
to the international community in a meaningful and verifiable way that
Iran's nuclear program will be used for exclusively peaceful purposes.
This is why we agreed in the JPOA that nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed in a comprehensive solution. All members of the
P5+1 must agree on any final decision, so we will be able to ensure
that an agreement meets our needs. Anything that falls short of meeting
our needs would be a bad deal.
The IAEA continues to play an essential role in verifying the
nuclear-related understandings contained in the JPOA, and we commend
the Director General and the Secretariat for their objective and
impartial effort in this enhanced verification role. The IAEA Director
General has discussed the need for extra-budgetary contributions to
support the Agency's JPOA-related activities, most recently during the
March meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, when he noted that a
shortfall still remains in the necessary additional extra-budgetary
funding. The United States is committed to working with other IAEA
Member States to provide the Agency the resources it needs for carrying
out this JPOA-related work.
The United States made a contribution of 750,000 euros in extra-
budgetary funding to the IAEA in support of the JPOA and is prepared to
contribute additional funding to ensure the Agency has the necessary
financial resources to complete its verification under the JPOA. It
does not appear that the IAEA will ultimately face a large shortfall,
but we will ensure that the IAEA has the funding it needs to finish the
job under the JPOA.
Question #30 (a-f). Egypt.--The Egyptian Government is making
progress in its self-identified roadmap for a Constitutional Referendum
and elections. However, media repression, activist intimidation,
exclusionary politics, and continued inability of the security services
to refrain from using deadly force against protestors are troubling
signs. The March 7 joint declaration by the U.N. Human Rights Council
underscores international concern about human rights abuses in Egypt.
These dynamics will not enable a sustainable, genuine democratic
transition and will likely only lead to further instability.
(a). When will the State Department certify that Egypt is
taking steps to govern democratically in order to release the
FY14 assistance? What indicators and benchmarks will you use to
make this certification?
Answer. We are not yet in a position to make the 6(A) and 6(B)
certifications required by section 7041(a) of the FY14 Appropriations
Act and do not have a specific timetable for doing so. However, we have
consistently expressed, publically and privately, that the protection
of fundamental rights and freedoms is a required benchmark of any
peaceful democratic transition. As such, we have expressed grave
concern over the politicized arrests, trials, and sentences of civil
society activists in Egypt and have urged the government to redress
unjust verdicts and provide full and transparent due process to all
accused. We continue to urge the Egyptian Government to uphold these
democratic principles, many of which are articulated in the new
Egyptian Constitution, and to build an environment free of threat and
intimidation in order to create a stable and secure country for all
Egyptians. As we monitor the situation in Egypt, we will continue to
review Egypt's progress toward meeting the 6(A) and 6(B) certification
requirements. We will continue to consult with Congress as Egypt's
political transition proceeds.
(b). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's bipartisan
Egypt Assistance Reform Act of 2014 called for a strategic
reassessment of security and economic assistance provided to
Egypt in light of new realities on the ground. Is the
administration undertaking its own review of U.S. assistance to
Egypt? If so, what is the timeline for completing this review
and will you engage Congress on your findings?
Answer. The administration undertook a careful and deliberate
review of assistance to Egypt in the aftermath of the events of early
July and is continuing to review U.S. assistance as the situation
evolves. We will continue to hold certain forms of assistance from the
Egyptian Government pending credible progress on their political
roadmap toward an inclusive, sustainable transition to a civilian-led,
democratic government through a free and transparent process. We will
continue to engage Congress over developments in Egypt.
(c). The administration has also placed policy holds on a
number of weapons systems scheduled for delivery to the
Egyptian Armed Forces. Egyptian military leaders believe the
delivery of Apache helicopters is particularly urgent for
continuing Egypt's counterterrorism campaign in the Sinai. Do
you agree with the assessment that the Apache helicopters will
help fight terrorism in the Sinai? What about the other
deliveries currently on hold?
Answer. Egypt faces a persistent and growing threat from extremist
groups. Consistent with our policy, our assistance to the Egyptian
military will continue to support our national interests in maintaining
regional peace and stability and countering transnational threats. This
includes aiding border security and supporting counterterrorism
operations. Undoubtedly, weapon systems like Apache helicopters are
significant tools in Egypt's counterterrorism campaign in the Sinai. We
believe these helicopters will help the Egyptian Government
counterextremists who threaten U.S., Egyptian, and Israeli security. We
will continue to work closely with the government to ensure that our
shared security priorities are protected, while we also push the
government to take credible steps to improve the democracy and human
rights environment.
(d). The Egyptian military campaign in the Sinai has been
criticized as heavy-handed with numerous civilian casualties,
which risks radicalizing extremist groups further. Do you
agree? What specific U.S. assistance, equipment, and guidance
are Egyptian Security Forces receiving? Is this a counterterror
campaign or a counterinsurgency campaign?
Answer. We have seen reports of possible excessive and
indiscriminate use of force by the Egyptian military during the current
campaign in the Sinai. We are looking into those reports and discussing
them with the Egyptian Government. We take allegations of any misuse of
our assistance or broaching of the standards of the Law of Armed
Conflict very seriously, and we continually review our security
assistance to ensure that it fully complies with U.S. policy
objectives. Our military assistance in Egypt is directed toward
enabling the Egyptian military to secure the country's borders and
counter legitimate terrorist threats, including in the Sinai.
(e). Please characterize the Egyptian Armed Forces' efforts
to close the tunnels into Gaza and to stabilize the Sinai.
Answer. The Egyptian military is placing a greater priority on
border security responsibilities, nonproliferation and
counterterrorism--a focus that we strongly support given its importance
to the U.S. and Israel's national security priorities. This stronger
commitment to border security has manifested itself in the past several
months as an Egyptian military campaign of tunnel destruction to limit
the flow of weapons and militants into the Sinai from Gaza, steps
Israeli officials have welcomed.
(f). The actions that the Egyptian military and interim
government has taken to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood--
especially designating it a terrorist organization--seem
guaranteed to lay the foundation for years of insurgency,
unrest, and perhaps terrorism. They are validating the
contentions of extremist groups that elections and democracy in
Egypt and elsewhere are a dead end. Can the Egyptian military,
and a military-backed government, really suppress its way to a
stable democracy? What are the long-term implications of the
policies undertaken by this interim government?
Answer. Our message to the Egyptian Government regarding
politicized arrests and the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood has
been clear: the government has the responsibility to ensure a
comprehensive, inclusive, and peaceful political transition to a
civilian-led government that respects the fundamental rights and
freedoms of all Egyptians. We believe that stability and prosperity in
Egypt can only be achieved through this approach, as a wholly security-
focused approach risks increasing radicalization and instability. Our
full provision of aid is dependent on credible progress being made
toward these goals, and we remind them of this consistently at high
levels. We will continue to urge the interim government to follow
through on its commitments to uphold democratic principles and to
ensure that all Egyptians have the ability to exercise their universal
rights and freedoms without fear of intimidation or retribution. We
have stressed that this is not only an aspiration of the Egyptian
people, but also a necessary component for long-term partnership with
the United States and for Egypt's long-term stability.
Question #31 (a-e). Iraq.--Iraq is due to hold national elections
at the end of April, but the violence particularly in western Iraq
shows no signs of stopping and bombings continue to be a daily
occurrence.
(a). Given the current level of violence, can Iraq's
elections be held on time throughout the country? What are the
prospects for any post-election coalition to be able to
effectively govern Iraq given the deep ethnic and sectarian
tensions and distrust? Will security be further undermined if
there is a prolonged government formation period?
Answer. We expect that Iraq will hold its April 30 national
elections on time throughout the country, including at polling stations
in secure areas of Anbar province. Iraq's Independent High Election
Commission (IHEC) has taken steps to ensure that people displaced by
the violence in Anbar province can vote in other provinces in Iraq. We
continue to support efforts by IHEC and the U.N. Assistance Mission in
Iraq to ensure that Iraqi citizens will be able to exercise their right
to vote in a secure and fair environment in spite of security threats
posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). At the
highest levels we continue to impress upon all of Iraq's leaders the
importance of coming together quickly after the elections to form a
government.
(b). In the FY15 budget request, Iraq is still defined as a
``front line'' state receiving funding for both U.S. operations
and assistance in the Overseas Contingency Account. The
administration envisions this funding as a downward ``glide-
path'' as Iraq becomes more stable and prosperous and is better
able to fund its own development and defense. Given the current
state of affairs in Iraq, is providing such a large amount of
U.S. assistance still in the U.S. national interest? When will
Iraq be able to fund its down security requirements?
Answer. Providing robust assistance to Iraq is not only in the best
interests of the U.S., but in our national security interest, as well.
Given the critical nature of our strategic relationship in an
increasingly volatile region, it is crucial that we provide the
necessary support to build Iraq's capacity in securing its borders,
combating nonstate-based terrorist and criminal interests, and
promoting regional stability. However, as Iraq's internal capabilities
have improved, the U.S. has consistently reduced our levels of direct
support. For example, from FY 2013 to the FY 2015 request, Iraq's
bilateral FMF account level has seen a $221.32 million dollar decrease
(^46.96 percent). Over the same period, the combined values of the
NADR, INCLE, and IMET accounts have been reduced by 20.78 percent
(^$9.51 million). Iraq still needs our help.
(c). You have requested $250 million in security assistance
for Iraq in FY15. What is your confidence level that the Iraqi
Security Forces will use U.S.-funded equipment responsibly and
effectively?
Answer. Since 2005, Iraq has received FMS equipment, training, and
support valued at $15.5 billion; more than 75 percent ($11.8 billion)
of which has been funded by the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Security
Forces are engaged in a daily battle against an ISIL threat that now
resembles more of a professional army than a terrorist organization.
The ISF are suffering significant casualties (over 1,000 dead in 2013)
and battle damage--over 50 percent of their helicopters have suffered
combat damage and several have been shot down. In recent years, the
U.S. has based its decisions to reduce Iraq assistance levels on
projections based off steadily increasing oil production, exports and
revenues. However, for 2013 and 2014, the projections for increasing
oil revenue are proving to have been overly optimistic. Iraq has
already spent a substantial amount to modernize its forces.
Although Iraq's host-nation funded FMS program is significant at
$15.5 billion, nearly all of Iraq's available defense spending is
focused on supporting the immediate and substantial needs for the
counterterrorism fight. Over the past 6 months, Iraq has paid $250
million in FMS to fund an urgent request to expedite, with the help of
Congress, deliveries of small arms, ammunition and other munitions.
(d). I remain concerned about the safety and security of
the residents at Camp Liberty, who continue to be in danger
from rocket attacks and already survived a horrific attack at
Camp Ashraf last summer. The Iraqi Government has reiterated
its commitment to their protection while we continue to work on
resettlement outside of Iraq.
Answer. Our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) request for FY 2015 of
$250 million is a critical piece of the ISF's defense funding strategy.
While FMF provides specific counterterrorism and niche needs, the bulk
of the program focuses on longer term professionalization and logistics
capacity-building efforts. We take end-use monitoring of all U.S.-
provided equipment seriously. OSC-I works closely with senior Iraqi MOD
leadership to stress the importance of responsible use and stringent
management of all weapons systems, and the GOI continues to strengthen
its relevant security procedures. OSC-I regularly conducts inspections
on U.S.-provided systems already fielded in Iraq and thus far have
found no end use violations.
(e). i--Has the Iraqi Government completed the installation
of T-walls at Camp Liberty? If not, what is the timeline for
completion and what actions is the U.S. Government undertaking
to hasten this progress?
(e). ii--The U.S. is contributing $1 million to a United
Nations trust fund for the resettlement of MEK members outside
of Iraq. Please provide an update on (1) status of this
funding, (2) status of Iraqi Government donations to the trust
fund, and (3) next steps and timeline for resettlement of MEK
members outside of Iraq.
Answer. We continue to work with the GOI and the U.N. to ensure the
protection of those currently residing at Camp Hurriya. U.N. monitors
also visit the camp daily in accordance with the MOU to assess human
rights and humanitarian conditions at the camp, which meet and exceed
international humanitarian standards.
T-wall installation at Camp Hurriya, in accordance with a mutually
agreed plan between the GOI and the residents, is ongoing. Currently,
there are over 1,488 large T-walls, 520 bunkers, nearly 700 small T-
walls and 95,000 sandbags in the camp.
On March 20, Congress cleared the Congressional Notification for
the U.S. Government's $1 million grant to the United Nations trust fund
for the resettlement of Camp Hurriya residents outside of Iraq. The
funds will soon be available so that NEA can finalize the grant
agreement with the U.N.
The Iraqi Government pledged $500,000 to the United Nations trust
fund for the resettlement of Camp Hurriya residents outside of Iraq.
The transfer of funds is still in process, keeping in mind that the GOI
has not yet passed its 2014 budget.
We intend that an interagency interview team will begin evaluating
candidates for U.S. resettlement in May 2014. Our initial goal is to
identify at least 100 qualified individuals for U.S. resettlement,
subject to security conditions, cooperation of the MEK, and
availability of interested candidates. However, we cannot predict how
many candidates will successfully complete the interview vetting and
robust security vetting process. The earliest possible date that fully
cleared candidates for U.S. resettlement may arrive in the United
States is summer 2014. We will continue to keep Congress informed of
the results of the interviews and security vetting.
The Senior Advisor for MEK Resettlement will continue to hold
discussions with a number of countries, primarily in Europe, regarding
the possibility of accepting Camp Hurriya residents.
The timing of complete relocation of Camp Hurriya residents depends
on how quickly countries will agree to offer places for relocation,
process individual cases, and issue entry permits as well as continued
cooperation.
Question #32 (a-j). My committee provided the administration with
Authorization for Use of Military Force last year. It is clear that a
credible military threat paved the way for a deal on Syria's chemical
weapons stockpile. Now, 6 months later, the Assad regime continues to
miss deadlines for the removal of its chemical weapons, the Geneva 2
process has failed to realize the goal of transitional governing body,
and a stalemate on the ground in Syria persists between Assad and rebel
forces. Meanwhile, Syria is a magnet for violent extremists and
millions of Syrian inside and outside the country are in critical need
of humanitarian aid. The current policy is not working.
(a). Do you agree with this assessment? What can be done to
shift the stalemate on the ground in Syria?
Answer. We share your deep concern that the conflict in Syria
continues to worsen. While we have already taken important steps across
multiple lines of effort, we must do more. We are looking at what more
we can do and also at what our international partners can do to support
the moderate opposition more effectively and to change the realities on
the ground, but we must reiterate that a political solution--and not a
military solution--offers the best means to resolve the Syrian crisis.
(b). What is the administration's strategy for ending the
Syrian war?
Answer. Our policy in Syria is to isolate and degrade violent
extremist networks and to facilitate an orderly, negotiated end to the
conflict, through a clear transition to a new, competent, and
representative authority. We have identified and are working to advance
the following six specific policy interests: (1) countering violent
extremism and preventing the establishment of a terrorist safe-haven in
Syria; (2) avoiding the collapse of the Syrian state and its
institutions; (3) preventing the transfer or use of chemical weapons
(CW); (4) providing support to Syria's neighbors; (5) alleviating
humanitarian suffering resulting from the conflict; and (6) helping
foster a negotiated transition leading to a representative government
that is responsive to the needs of the Syrian people.
Our strategy for achieving these policy goals is to leverage
pressure on the regime so that it views a political agreement with the
moderate Syrian opposition as its only viable exit plan.
We have made some important progress. Over the past few months the
State Department and USAID have stepped up efforts to channel resources
from the $260 million in our nonlethal assistance programs directly to
local and provincial governments and civil society groups, as well as
to the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC). In towns and cities under
opposition control, we are beginning to provide stipends to local law
enforcement and teachers to help them stay on the job rather than
ceding the ground to extremist groups. We continue to train local
councils and civil society organizations in administration and local
governance. We are also providing equipment and supplies to help them
provide basic services, including heavy equipment such as generators,
cranes, trucks, and ambulances. This assistance includes $80 million in
nonlethal support to the Supreme Military Command (SMC). Providing this
support to groups engaged in a highly fluid battle zone has been
challenging, but remains an important part of our strategy nonetheless.
We recognize that our nonlethal assistance will not directly
determine outcomes on the battlefield nor will it, on its own, force
Assad to change his calculus about trying to hold on to power. However,
our assistance does provide needed equipment and supplies, while
sending a signal both to those inside and outside Syria of our strong
support for the moderate opposition. Our assistance also helps maintain
basic administrative institutions, helps prevent the formation of
vacuums in services and security that extremists exploit, and helps
create relationships with moderates who can, when this conflict is
over, form the basis of a transitional government.
As the situation in Syria remains dynamic, so too must our
approach. We are assessing our tools to better achieve our policy
goals. We are working more closely with regional partners to maximize
the impact of our collective assistance at the same time that we are
improving our own assistance channels. Importantly, we share a common
understanding with our gulf partners regarding the importance of
ensuring that extremists not benefit from external assistance.
(c). The FY15 budget request includes $155 million for
support to the Syrian opposition. Please describe the types of
support that this funding will provide. How will this
assistance directly contribute to shifting the stalemate on the
ground?
Answer. The FY 2015 request of $155 million will continue ongoing
opposition support efforts, including support to national- and local-
level opposition groups as they strive to achieve and implement a
negotiated political solution. As negotiations progress, and should a
transition occur, U.S. nonlethal assistance will help consolidate the
political transition, support democratic processes, strengthen criminal
justice institutions within Syria, and enable reconstruction and
recovery efforts, in coordination with the other international donors.
Some of these funds may also be used to help mitigate the economic,
security, and infrastructure impacts this ongoing crisis and its
refugee flows have on neighboring countries.
(d). The Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) performed
admirably at Geneva, but lacks street credibility and key local
relationships with communities on the ground. What is the
administration doing to help the SOC develop these links and
gain credibility?
Answer. We share your assessment of the importance of strengthening
ties between the SOC and communities inside Syria. We are addressing
this issue diplomatically in senior-level meetings with SOC leadership
and through our foreign assistance programs. We seek every opportunity
to involve the SOC in public fora with Syrian civil society leaders and
local media and have successfully facilitated multiple SOC meetings
with local councils, media outlets, and grassroots organizations over
the past year.
We have pledged $10 million to support local councils across Syria,
an initiative that is implemented in close coordination with SOC's
Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU)--and we have provided approximately
$700,000 to help the ACU strengthen its ability to respond to the needs
of Syrians and conduct outreach inside Syria. With our help, the SOC's
ACU has taken a lead role in determining the distribution of $17.5
million in USG-purchased and SOC/ACU-branded equipment, such as fire
trucks, water bladders, ambulances, food baskets, and winterization and
school supplies. In January 2014, the State Department finalized a $2
million grant to the SOC that provided operational support and
resources to increase their connectivity to local actors. These funds
supported their participation in the Geneva II process and will allow
for SOC leaders to host townhall meetings, travel regularly to Syria,
and open offices across Syria.
(e). What new initiatives and assistance is the
administration planning to provide to the Syrian opposition as
a direct result of President Obama's visit to Saudi Arabia?
Answer. President Obama's recent trip to Saudi Arabia was intended
to enhance our consultation with regional allies regarding the Syria
conflict along with other issues. We are actively evaluating what more
we can do and what our partners can do to support the moderate
opposition more effectively and to change the realities on the ground.
The President and King Abdullah discussed Syria extensively, including
our shared objectives of bringing about a political transition,
supporting the moderate opposition, and isolating violent extremists.
Our cooperation on these efforts continues to improve.
(f). How will the U.S. Government respond if Assad fails to
implement the legally binding requirements set out in U.N.
Security Council Resolution 2139?
Answer. Under Resolution 2139, the Security Council intends ``to
take further steps in the case of noncompliance.'' We are working with
our like-minded countries on the Security Council on what further steps
are available to ensure full implementation of the resolution's
provisions. As Ambassador Power recently said, ``we are obliged to
pursue action not just by the seriousness with which we approach our
Security Council mandate and the commitments we make, but also, of
course, out of a basic sense of decency.''
(g). What are the prospects that Assad will run in Syria's
elections projected to take place in June 2014? Will he win?
Answer. As we noted in our joint press release with London 11
partners on April 3, ``recent actions by the Assad regime to pave the
way for Presidential elections in the coming months, including the
promulgation of a new electoral law, have no credibility. Bashar al-
Assad intends these elections to sustain his dictatorship. They would
be conducted in the midst of a conflict, only in regime-controlled
areas, and with millions of Syrians disenfranchised, displaced from
their homes, or in refugee camps.'' A sham electoral process led by
Assad, who has overseen a regime that the independent international
commission of inquiry has concluded has committed war crimes and crimes
against humanity, mocks the innocent lives lost in the conflict.
If the Assad regime goes forward with this display of elections, it
will announce Bashar al-Assad as the winner and that most of the
international community will recognize the absurdity and invalidity of
this exercise.
(h). Recent reports out of Iran suggest that voices within
the Iranian Government, academia and society may be in the
early stages of conflict fatigue, questioning the wisdom of
supporting Assad in a long conflict. Do we have any evidence
that the Iranians may now view Assad as expendable, while
remaining supportive of the regime?
Answer. Iranian politicians, academics, and other private citizens,
have made public statements voicing their criticism of Iran's Syria
policy or support to Assad at various times since the conflict began.
Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs Amir Abdollahian,
who oversees the Syria portfolio in Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
is cited in April 2 media reports as saying that Iran does not want
Assad to stay in power indefinitely.
After Iran announced the sending of 30,000 tons of food aid to
Syria, many Iranian citizens voiced opposition to the move, pointing to
the contradiction of Iran sending food to Syria when domestic food
needs were unmet.
(i). Most accounts now hold that the Assad regime is no
longer fully cooperating with the agreement on removing their
chemical weapons, certainly doing the barest minimum to comply.
Please provide an update on the status of this agreement
and its implementation. What consequences will Assad face
for not living up to the agreement?
Answer. As of April 8, 2014, just over 54 percent of all declared
chemicals have been removed from Syria, and 93 percent of the regime's
stockpile of isopropanol (a binary component of the nerve agent sarin)
has been destroyed in country. In addition, the OPCW has verified the
functional destruction of Syria's chemical weapons production, mixing,
and filling equipment. Still, much work remains to be done.
We continue to work with the international community to maintain
pressure on the regime to deliver all of the remaining chemicals for
removal by the international community as urgently as possible. We
believe the Syrians are fully capable of fulfilling their obligation to
complete the removal effort by late April, and, if they do, we believe
the June 30 target date for the complete elimination of the program
remains achievable.
We continue to monitor the regime's compliance with its obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention, UNSCR 2118, and related OPCW
Executive Council decisions closely. Those obligations are clear, and
we will continue to underscore the importance of the Assad regime's
continued cooperation. The Security Council decided in UNSCR 2118 to
impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the
event of noncompliance with the resolution.
(j). Russia continues to undermine efforts to reach
meaningful progress and a negotiated transition in Syria. What
actions is the U.S. prepared to take to counter Russia's
continued supply of weapons and support to Syria?
Answer. We are very concerned about Russia's arms supplies to the
Assad regime, as they serve to reinforce the regime and make a
negotiated political solution more elusive. What is clearly needed is
for Russia to push harder on the Assad regime and to recognize what's
at stake is not just for Syria but for the whole region. We have made
this clear to the Russians. We continue to evaluate all available
options that would exert strong pressure on the regime and countries
that support it to bring about an end to the violence and enable a
democratic transition. I assure you that we continue to work in
coordination with our international partners to force a shift in the
regime's behavior.
Question #33 (a-b). Jordan.--Jordan is a reliable partner and a
stabilizing presence in a difficult region. It is one of only two Arab
countries to have signed a peace treaty with Israel and establish full
diplomatic relations. At the same time, Jordan faces serious economic
strains made worse by an ongoing wave of Syrian refugees who are taxing
Jordan's infrastructure and competing with Jordanians for jobs.
(a). What impact is the flood of Syrian refugees having on
Jordan's political and economic stability? How is U.S.
assistance specifically supporting Jordan in hosting such a
high level of refugees?
Answer. Jordan currently hosts approximately 600,000 Syrian
refugees; approximately 85 percent live in host communities with access
to subsidized food, energy, health, and education. The influx of Syrian
refugees into Jordanian communities has strained government-provided
services, and generated complaints from host communities directed at
the government. Schools are overcrowded, even with double-shifting of
classes. Already grappling with water conservation issues prior to the
influx, municipalities in northern Jordan are unable to meet increased
demands on water and sanitation systems. Refugees from Syria represent
9 percent of health needs in northern Jordan, leading to shortages in
medical supplies and medications.
Jordanian authorities are also concerned about the potential for
the export of extremism from Syria into Jordan.
The United States has provided more than $268 million in
humanitarian assistance to international organizations and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to support refugees from Syria and
related host country needs in Jordan since the start of the Syria
crisis. For example, USAID has built five new schools in northern
Jordan, is expanding 67 existing schools to accommodate the influx of
Syrian children and youth, and is supporting teacher training to
prepare educators for the challenges of crowded classrooms and students
with very different educational and psychosocial needs. Additionally,
USAID has expanded programs for water conservation, water catchment and
storage, and water infrastructure repair and maintenance.
In addition to significant amounts of bilateral development and
economic assistance, the United States provided an additional $300
million in direct budget support to mitigate costs associated with the
Syria crisis. We have also provided a $1.25 billion, 7-year sovereign
loan guarantee to Jordan. Additionally, the administration announced
its intention to provide Jordan with a follow-on $1 billion loan
guarantee in 2014. These guarantees strengthen the Government of
Jordan's ability to maintain access to international financing, while
enabling it to achieve its economic development and reform goals--even
while addressing the costs of hosting 600,000 refugees from Syria.
(b). Is the assistance that we are providing to Jordan to
secure their border with Syria sufficient?
Answer. The administration is committed to enhancing Jordan's
border security, particularly in light of threats stemming from the
Syria crisis. Both the Departments of State and Defense have committed
funding to these efforts and we believe that, once completed, these
programs will contribute substantially to strengthening Jordan's
capability to defend its borders. The main effort driven by the State
Department is the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP), which is a
three-phase project designed to secure Jordan's borders with Syria
(Phases 1 and 2) and Iraq (Phase 3). This program has provided critical
support to Jordan's border security, including by providing detection
equipment along the border, to enable security forces to identify and
respond to threats.
Question #34 (a-e). As Deputy Assistant Secretary Lawrence
Silverman stated on February 26, ``the February 15 formation of a
government by Prime Minister Suleiman after 10 months of gridlock, is a
welcome development for the Lebanese people, and an opportunity for the
United States and Lebanon to work together to achieve shared goals.''
(a). What are the U.S.-Lebanon shared goals? How has U.S.
assistance contributed to advancing these shared goals?
Answer. Our shared goals are the sovereignty, security, stability,
and independence of the Lebanese state as it plays a constructive role
in achieving regional peace and prosperity. We share the goal of the
development of Lebanese democracy and economic growth. The Lebanese
people are rightly proud of their long democratic tradition since
independence in 1948. This democracy has been tested through war and
conflict, but with our assistance the state has demonstrated an ability
to represent the interests of all Lebanese people, even in the face of
entities that threaten the state's sovereignty, including but not
limited to Hezbollah. U.S. support strengthens Lebanon's state
institutions, including the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the
Internal Security Forces (ISF), which not only helps stabilize Lebanon,
but also provides the mechanisms for the Lebanese to address the
country's political, economic, and social future collectively. We also
support democracy in Lebanon by encouraging the functioning of the
processes outlined in the Lebanese Constitution, exemplified by the
recently formed Cabinet, and now the call for a Presidential election
on time free of foreign interference.
(b). Lebanon hosts more Syrian refugees than any other
country in the region. Last week that number passed 1 million
Syrian refugees in Lebanon. What impact is the flood of Syrian
refugees having on Lebanon's political and economic stability?
How is U.S. assistance specifically supporting Lebanon in
hosting such a high level of refugees?
Answer. There is not a single Lebanese community that has not been
affected by the refugee crisis; the Syrian refugees reside in 1,600
communities in Lebanon. With refugee arrivals continuing unabated, the
sheer volume of need has overwhelmed the ability of the central
government and local municipalities to respond to the enormous
challenge of providing public services to this large and growing
population. The United States is the single-largest contributor of
humanitarian assistance to the Syria humanitarian response, providing
more than $1.7 billion to date, of which more than $340 million
supports humanitarian organizations assisting those in need in Lebanon.
International agencies and nongovernmental organizations use
contributions from the United States and other major donors to provide
food, clean water, emergency shelter, health care, and education for
refugees. These contributions help keep refugees safe and help
alleviate the burden on communities generously hosting refugees.
We are directly assisting host communities that bear the burden of
the refugees. For example, we provide support via U.N. agencies to 27
Ministry of Social Affairs Social Development Centers serving both
local communities and refugees. These centers, which provide primary
health care, education, vocational training and activities for Lebanese
children in local communities, have been designated as focal points for
refugee service delivery as well. Beyond serving as platforms for
programs, these centers bring local residents and refugees together to
build a sense of community and reduce social tensions. In addition to
our humanitarian assistance, the United States provides Lebanon with
annual development and economic assistance that supports Lebanon's
long-term development priorities and addresses needs in communities
that are hosting refugees from Syria.
(c). What actions has the State Department taken to mediate
the maritime boundary dispute between Israel and Lebanon?
Answer. The most promising economic sector in Lebanon in the
medium- to long-term is the hydrocarbons industry. Lebanon may have
substantial reserves of offshore natural gas and maybe even oil
deposits. However, the lengthy political stalemate of the last
caretaker government, as well as an unresolved maritime boundary with
Israel, has prevented Lebanon from further exploring its offshore
resources. No exploration has taken place, and any potential finds
would take a number of years to begin producing, but U.S. companies are
interested in this potential new sector.
The United States engages both the Lebanese and Israelis to
encourage an arrangement, without prejudice to competing claims over
maritime boundaries, whereby international petroleum companies can have
the confidence to explore and develop Lebanon's resources. We hope the
new government will continue efforts to find such an arrangement, and
we hope the Lebanese people will be able to enjoy the benefits of these
resources. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Amos Hochstein has been
engaged with Lebanese officials and was in Beirut earlier this month
for discussions with the new government. We continue to make progress
toward a mutual understanding between Israel and Lebanon and continue
to encourage both sides to avoid activity in the disputed area.
(d). The Government Accountability Office reported in March
2013 (``Security Assistance: Evaluations Needed to Determine
Effectiveness of U.S. Aid to Lebanon's Security Forces'' (GAO-
13-289) that State had evaluated only one of its security
assistance programs for Lebanon (the INCLE program); neither
State nor DOD had completed plans or established timeframes to
evaluate the other programs. State's evaluation policy requires
that certain programs be evaluated periodically. Without such
evaluations, State and DOD have little objective evidence to
show that the programs have been effective or what the proper
mix of programs should be.
What steps have State and DOD taken since March 2013 to
evaluate the effectiveness of its security-related
assistance programs in Lebanon?
Without such evaluations, how do State and DOD assess that
their security-related assistance programs are achieving
their goals?
Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs (PM) is in the process of contracting a program evaluation of
State-funded military grant assistance programs in Lebanon. The 6-month
evaluation is expected to start in the spring of 2014. As we noted in
our formal response to the GAO, State relies on feedback from our DOD
implementers and the Lebanese Armed Forces to shape our military
assistance programs. PM uses this feedback, in concert with planning
documents from Embassy Beirut and DOD, to direct security assistance
funding allocations each year. Additionally, State relies on the annual
Performance Plan and Report, which assesses all State-funded assistance
to Lebanon, to provide additional information on program success. Many
of our individual programs have evaluation criteria and indicators
built into their implementing mechanisms. In short, State uses all
available information to inform the direction of our assistance and
adjust the programs if found to be deficient. We believe that this
information provides a limited, but significant, evaluative role in
determining the effectiveness of our assistance.
(e). Press accounts at the end of 2013 reported that Saudi
Arabia is promising to provide Lebanon with $3 billion for the
purchase of weapons and equipment from a third party.
Does such a large increase of funding complement or
conflict with the much smaller total of U.S security-
related funding of $671 million allocated for Lebanese
security forces from FY09-13?
Can the Lebanese Armed Forces effectively absorb the
amount of equipment such funding would provide?
Answer. We have long encouraged our partners who are interested in
a secure and sovereign Lebanon to support the LAF, a key national
institution and a guarantor of Lebanese stability. We are talking with
Saudi Arabia and France about how their assistance can best help
enhance LAF capabilities. Saudi Arabia's announcement of a $3 billion
package, to be dispersed over several years, does not replace and
should not preclude U.S. efforts to bolster the LAF. U.S. FMF is being
used to underwrite part of a 5-year $1.5 billion Capabilities
Development Plan developed by DOD and the LAF, with defined priorities
from the Joint Capabilities Review. We have consulted closely with our
partners who have an interest in supporting Lebanon's stability to
ensure that all of our assistance is complementary. We recently
participated in a meeting of the International Support Group for
Lebanon in Rome that focused the attention of donor countries on
Lebanon's security sector needs, in order to ensure that assistance is
complementary and focused on enhancing the LAF's capabilities.
In general, our FMF assistance has been essential to rebuilding the
LAF from a broken institution after the civil war into the military
force it is now--we provide equipment and training to help the LAF
become a stronger force. We are a trusted partner for the LAF.
U.S. security assistance is also crucial to help the LAF achieve
its long-term objective to become the sole legitimate defender of
Lebanon's sovereignty as called for by UNSCR 1701. Our sustained
support--through FMF, 1206, and IMET, among other funds--is critical to
maintaining and improving the LAF's ability to respond to threats,
including increasing extremist violence in Lebanon. Already this year,
several suicide bombs have detonated around the country, and violence
from Syria continues to spill over and threatens to destabilize
Lebanon. The LAF is the best state institution to counter this threat.
Question #35. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).-- The U.S.-Gulf
relationship is rooted in decades of cooperation and partnership as
Deputy Secretary Burns recently noted.
A pillar of U.S. engagement with gulf countries has focused on
building a capable, unified, and effective regional security
architecture. A new U.S. initiative announced by Secretary Hagel in
December is Foreign Military Sales to the GCC as a collective. Please
provide an update on this initiative. How have gulf countries responded
to this initiative? How will the recent recall of Saudi, UAE, and
Bahrain's Ambassadors from Qatar impact this initiative? What about the
impact on other regional policies, such as coordination on Iran and
Syria?
Our gulf partners have made clear that Iran's illicit nuclear
program is only one concern. A potentially greater threat is Iran's
destabilizing asymmetric activities and support for terrorism across
the region. How is the administration responding to security concerns
raised by gulf partners? What are we doing to reassure gulf partners in
light of these concerns?
Answer. The President's December 16 designation of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) as an international organization eligible to
procure U.S. defense articles and services complements U.S. foreign
policy goals to promote security and stability throughout the gulf. Our
objectives include enhancing the military professionalism of key U.S.
allies, strengthening multilateral ballistic missile defense
cooperation with all six Gulf States, and improving the collective GCC
capacity to deter terrorists and address humanitarian emergencies. The
regional response to the designation itself has been positive, though
no new cases have been developed at this time.
Recent intra-GCC tensions have not altered our overarching foreign
policy objectives in the region. To cite one recent example,
counterterrorism and border security experts from the United States and
all six Gulf States met in Riyadh on April 3 to discuss expanding
multilateral cooperation. Likewise, Secretary of Defense Hagel will
convene a U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial in the region this spring. That
said, we have encouraged our GCC partners to work out their policy
differences. They have made good progress in doing so, and agreed on a
set of principles recently to manage the issues in question.
We share the Gulf States' concerns regarding Iran's destabilizing
regional behavior. The administration regularly briefs senior gulf
officials on the status of P5+1 negotiations. These conversations and
senior-level travel to and from the region, most prominently the
President's March 28-29 visit to Riyadh, demonstrate our sustained
commitment to the security of the gulf region.
Progress on the nuclear issue does not change our resolve in
pushing back against Iranian support for terrorism, threats against our
friends and partners, and violations of human rights. As the President
said on November 23, 2013, ``As we go forward, the resolve of the
United States will remain firm, as will our commitment to our friends
and allies--particularly Israel and our gulf partners, who have good
reason to be skeptical about Iran's intentions.''
Question #36. The system of kafala, or employer sponsorship, is
prevalent in many GCC countries. Foreign workers under the kafala
system are often subject to abuses such as wage theft, substandard
housing and dangerous working conditions. I have written letters to
you, Mr. Kerry, and International Federation of Association Football
(FIFA) President Sepp Blatter highlighting my concerns.
I am particularly worried by the deaths of 44 Nepalese
workers in Qatar last year. How is the State Department
engaging with the Qatari Government to ensure that protections
for workers under Qatari law are enforced and that workers
building infrastructure for the 2022 World Cup are not
subjected to the same conditions that led to the deaths of
those 44 Nepalese?
How is the State Department engaging with other GCC
countries to ensure that rights of foreign workers are
protected?
Answer. Advancing the protection of labor rights, particularly for
migrant workers, is a priority of our diplomatic engagement with the
governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The
Department's annual Human Rights and Trafficking in Persons Reports
discuss these challenges, highlighting both progress and areas where
additional action is needed by the governments of the GCC countries.
The sponsorship system binds foreign workers to their designated
employers, giving them the unilateral authority to cancel residency
permits, deny workers' ability to change employers, and deny permission
to leave the country. This leaves workers vulnerable to abuse and
exploitation, some of which amounts to human trafficking.
We carefully followed the reports of Nepalese worker deaths in
Qatar last summer with great concern. We engage the Government of Qatar
regularly on these issues, and the U.S. Ambassador has consistently
raised concerns about the restrictive nature of the sponsorship system
and encouraged more robust enforcement of the labor and antitrafficking
laws with senior Qatari officials. Over the past year, the Government
of Qatar has taken steps to strengthen its legal framework and improve
protections for foreign workers, but clearly more needs to be done. We
will continue to urge greater Qatari efforts to enforce its laws
vigorously and to reform existing laws and practices to ensure the
thorough protection of workers' fundamental labor rights in Qatar. Our
Embassies undertake similar discussions in each of the GCC countries,
pressing for enforcement of existing labor and antitrafficking laws and
reforms to those laws in cases when they do not provide sufficient
protections.
Additionally, we are working with international organizations to
increase awareness in countries of origin about workers' rights and the
risks associated with working abroad, including human trafficking.
Addressing the problems along the migration trajectory, in origin and
destination countries, is critical to protecting human rights of
migrant workers wherever they are.
Question #37 (a-d). Tunisia.--In another hopeful sign for an
inclusive, peaceful democratic transition, on March 6 the Tunisian
President lifted the State of Emergency which had been in effect since
the initial revolution began in 2011. The State Department has now
lifted its Travel Warning as well. Tunisia remains perhaps the best
hope for successful democratic transition in the MENA region, but
serious economic challenges lie ahead.
(a). What are the U.S. political, economic, and security
interests in, and goals for, Tunisia? How does the U.S.
strategy for engagement and assistance align with these
objectives?
(b). What types of U.S. assistance, security and otherwise,
have been most effective since 2011 in addressing Tunisia'
security challenges and promoting economic and political
reform, and an active civil society?
(c). Tunisian officials tell us they would like a public
declaration of support for the eventual start of Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) negotiations. What is the administration's
position on a U.S.-Tunisia FTA?
(d). The FY15 request for bilateral ESF to Tunisia is $30
million, which also includes $20 million in support of the
Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund. Tunisia was not a recipient
of a significant bilateral assistance package from the U.S.
prior to 2011; as a result, funds had to be mobilized from a
variety of other accounts to support Tunisia's transition.
Secretary Kerry noted recently that ``since the revolution
began, the United States has committed more than 400 million in
foreign assistance for the transition.''
However, the FY15 request of $30 million is far below the
administration's FY14 request of $61 million for bilateral
assistance to Tunisia. Given the extremely important and
significant political progress Tunisia has achieved in the
past few months, why is the administration decreasing
Tunisia's bilateral aid package?
Answer. We are working closely with the Tunisians to support their
democratic transition and help them become a stable and prosperous
country. Tunisian Prime Minister Jomaa led a high-level delegation to
Washington to hold the first-ever U.S.-Tunisia Strategic Dialogue on
April 3 to discuss our strategic bilateral priorities in the areas of
economics and investment, security, and governance and partnerships
over the next year. President Obama and Prime Minister Jomaa met at the
White House on April 4 to further these discussions.
The United States is providing more than $400 million in assistance
intended to support Tunisia's democratic transition and includes
security, economic, and governance components. Our security assistance
bolsters Tunisia's capacity to address internal and external threats,
particularly on countering regional terrorist groups, including
improving the Tunisian Military's ability to obtain and maintain
equipment necessary to secure its borders and locate terrorist
suspects. Our Foreign Military Financing and International Military
Education and Training programs provide leadership and counterterrorism
training to Ministry of Defense officials. Similarly, International
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)- and Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA)-funded programs have been effective in supporting
leadership development and police reform at the Ministries of Interior
and Justice. Specifically, the assistance provided to date has been
effective in improving the capacity of the police to respond to
hostage-rescue situations, provide crowd control support in a safe and
humane manner, and improve corrections management and emergency
response.
The Government of Tunisia continues to face daunting economic
challenges. The estimated 2.8-percent growth rate for 2014 is not
expected to reduce the overall unemployment rate of 16 percent. The
United States prioritizes our economic assistance to support Tunisia's
fiscal needs as well as provide for overall economic growth and job
creation, particularly in the small and medium enterprise sector.
For example, our Information and Communications Technology
Development program generated more than 2,600 Tunisian jobs and
assisted in Tunisian Tax Code reform. Other U.S. programs have focused
on developing Tunisia's small and medium sized enterprises and creating
the market space for this sector to flourish, including facilitating
loans to small enterprises. To respond to Tunisia's near-term fiscal
challenges and support a reform agenda, the administration announced
its intention, pending congressional approval, to provide Tunisia with
a second loan guarantee allowing the government to raise approximately
$500 million from international capital markets at favorable rates.
Governance programming also remains an assistance priority. During
2014, we plan to provide assistance to support Tunisia's upcoming
Presidential and parliamentary elections. U.S.-funded activities will
include nonpartisan domestic election observation and parallel vote
tabulation, as well as international observation conducted through our
partners the National Democratic Institute and International Republican
Institute. U.S. assistance to Tunisia has also furthered our
partnership with Tunisian civil society and advanced the rule of law
and human rights. We remain actively engaged with Tunisian civil
society and are providing capacity-building and civic engagement
trainings.
The United States and Tunisia seek to broaden and deepen trade and
business relations. We have conveyed to Tunisia that, while we are
ready to deepen our engagement, raise the visibility of our
relationship, and pursue concrete outcomes, we are not in a position to
enter into or announce FTA negotiations at this time. To that end, the
bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) Council is
scheduled to meet in June in Tunis. The Council plans to address
specific issues aimed at facilitating trade and investment, including
in the areas of market access, entrepreneurship, information and
communication technology services, and intellectual property. We will
also discuss how to build a more robust bilateral trade and investment
relationship and liberalize the exchange of goods and services.
Our FY 2015 request for Tunisia represents an increase--not a
decrease--from the administration's FY 2014 request. The total FY 2014
request for Tunisia is approximately $62 million, including ESF and
other bilateral security assistance accounts, and the FY 2015 request
is approximately $66 million. While both requests include $30 million
in Economic Support Fund (ESF)--of which $20 million is for the
Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund--the FY 2015 request includes an
increase in security assistance reflecting the prioritization of and
increased need for U.S. security assistance to Tunisia.
Question #38. Algeria.--Algeria is the Maghreb's economic, energy
and security powerhouse, with tremendous potential. Yet an ailing
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is seeking an unprecedented fourth term
in the April 17 elections, which could undermine others seeking greater
political and economic reform.
What are the U.S. political, economic, and security
interests in, and goals for, Algeria? How does the U.S.
strategy for engagement and assistance align with these
objectives?
What steps is the State Department pursuing to encourage
greater political and economic openness in Algeria?
Answer. Algeria has a very important role to play in working to
improve security in North Africa and the Sahel and one of the principle
objectives of my visit to Algiers last week, and of the Strategic
Dialogue that I cochaired there with Algerian Foreign Minister
Lamamara, was to identify ways that the United States and Algeria can
work together to assist other partners in the region to secure their
borders, strengthen rule of law, and build strong and stable democratic
institutions. We look forward to continuing our programs to build
capacity among Algerian security services, including providing training
on judicial reform, terrorist investigation, crisis management, border
security, and countering terrorist finance through reforms to the legal
system. Working together, we can ensure that the Algerian security
services have the tools and training they need to defeat Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb and other terrorist groups. Algeria and the United
States have been strong partners together in the Global Counter
Terrorism Forum, which unites like-minded countries in the fight
against terrorism and violent extremist organizations. Algeria is also
a member of the U.S. Government's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), which is a program focused on improving the
individual and collective capability of its member states to defeat
terrorist organizations.
U.S.-Algerian cooperation goes beyond the traditional realm of
security cooperation as we work to enhance political and economic ties
across a range of issues. We look forward to Algerian participation in
the U.S.-Africa summit scheduled for later this year. Through the
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), we have expanded support for
Algerian citizens' engagement on political and economic reforms. For
example, MEPI launched a training program for new women
parliamentarians elected in 2011 and is providing employment skills
training for youth at universities across the country. Algeria has
committed to registering the National Democratic Institute (NDI) which
is one step toward improving freedom of association in Algeria, and
will advance civil society and the U.S.-Algerian relationship. We look
forward to continuing to work with Algeria to advance political and
economic reforms.
On the economic front Algeria is one of United States largest
trading partners in the North African region. We are working with
Algeria to enhance the business and economic climate by encouraging
reconsideration of certain regulations on foreign direct investment.
The U.S. Government is encouraged by the Government of Algeria's
continuing interest in joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). We
believe that the added predictability, transparency, and openness
associated with WTO compliance will make the Algerian market more
attractive for business.
Question #39 (a-c). Libya.--At the Rome conference you attended in
March, you noted that Libya is at a ``pivotal moment'' and pledged U.S.
support for the country going forward. Some experts, however, would say
the country is closer to collapse, given that security has deteriorated
in several parts of the country while arbitrary detention, unlawful
killing, and kidnapping have reached alarming levels.
(a). What are the U.S. political, economic, and security
interests in, and goals for, Libya? How does the U.S. strategy
for engagement and assistance align with these objectives?
(b). The FY15 budget includes Libya as an eligible country
for the ``MENA Transition Fund'' and the administration has
already agreed to support a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to help
train and support a General Purpose Force for some 5,000-8,000
Libyans. But those two programs alone don't seem sufficient to
help move the country toward national reconciliation while
addressing persistent instability and impunity. With the Prime
Minister just recently ousted by a no-confidence vote in
Parliament, could you clarify what role you see the
administration playing and what other types of support will be
involved to help Libya walk back from the brink of collapse?
(c). Please provide an update on the effort to train and
develop a General Purpose Force (GPF).
Answer. The United States has a strategic opportunity to forge a
strong and mutually beneficial relationship with this country that is
now emerging from decades of oppressive, authoritarian rule. Libya,
regional stability, our battle against extremism, and our support for
democracy would lose from a further slide toward violence and
instability there. Indeed, protracted instability in the Sahel and
Maghreb region risks making the region a staging ground for attacks by
terrorists and other extremists on our allies and U.S. interests.
Transitions to democracy are notoriously difficult endeavors. It is in
our interest to remain engaged with the Libyan Government as it pursues
its transition to a more open, democratic, tolerant society.
We have two strategic goals in Libya: (1) to support the government
in developing a capability to secure its own borders and maintain
stability in the face of internal and regional challenges; and (2) to
maintain progress on Libya's transition to a sustainable, inclusive
democracy accountable to the Libyan people. To that end, we are
focusing our diplomatic engagement and assistance to support four lines
of effort: Libya's security and stability; its transition to a
democratic and effective government; the strengthening of Libyan
Government institutions; and the development of a robust and diverse
economy.
Libya has asked a number of countries, including the United States,
for assistance training its armed forces in order to better protect the
Libyan people. The Government of Libya committed to fund the training,
and Turkey and Italy are already training troops for this General
Purpose Force (GPF). We expect the U.K. to begin its training regimen
shortly. A small U.S. team is in Libya to work with the Ministry of
Defense on this GPF effort, in line with our shared strategic goals for
Libya. U.S. training is scheduled to begin later this year, outside
Libya. We are coordinating this training mission closely with not only
the Government of Libya, but with our partners in the U.K., Italy, and
Turkey as well.
U.S. policy is to support Libya's democratic institutions. That
support is not tied to any particular leader, so long as that
individual leads on the basis of the country's legitimate political
processes and respects the values of the Libyan people and our own. I
met with the new, interim Prime Minister, al-Thanaie, at the Rome
Ministerial March 6, when he was serving as Defense Minister, and
Ambassador Jones is in frequent contact with him and his staff in
Tripoli. However, we are concerned by the difficulty Libyan leaders
have had in achieving needed political agreements to build consensus
and keep the country on track. We are considering how we could take a
more proactive role in engaging a range of Libyans to push for
constructive political dialogue, working closely with counterparts from
the EU, U.K., and Arab League.
Question #40 (a-f). Support to Palestinian Authority.--The FY15
budget request includes $370 million in economic assistance for the
West Bank and Gaza which supports economic development, humanitarian
needs in Gaza as well as increasing the capacity of the Palestinian
Authority (PA) to meet the needs of its own people through budget
support.
(a). What are the prospects for the Palestinian economy's
near-term improvement?
Answer. The prospects for the Palestinian economy's near-term
improvement depends heavily on the continued implementation of reforms
by the PA, the easing of Israeli restrictions on the movement and
access of goods and people, and the exploitation of natural resources
in the West Bank. These issues are tied to the status and outcome of
the ongoing negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.
Economic growth was weaker than expected in 2013, in part due to the
uncertainty of individuals and businesses regarding the prospects for
peace. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently revised downward
its forecast for real GDP growth in 2014 from around 4 percent to now
around 3 percent.
(b). What have Arab States contributed to help the PA in
recent years?
Answer. Between 2007 and 2013, members of the Arab League have
contributed on average 36 percent of the donor budget support received
by the PA--compared to 40 percent for the EU and EU member states and
13 percent for the United States.
BUDGET SUPPORT TO THE PA (2007-2013)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saudi Arabia................................. $127,704,197 $234,053,786 $241,056,731 $145,633,071 $179,693,900 $100,000,000 $260,265,649
United Arab Emirates......................... $110,000,000 $134,221,750 $173,930,947 $42,906,703 $42,500,000 $85,486,120 $50,000,000
Arab league.................................. $0 $99,895 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Oman......................................... $0 $0 $2,909,431 $0 $10,000,000 $0 $5,000,000
Algeria...................................... $52,799,969 $62,943,959 $25,969,871 $29,574,309 $52,799,920 $26,400,000 $26,399,982
Kuwait....................................... $33,415,814 $80,000,000 $0 $50,000,000 $50,000,000 $50,000,000 $50,000,000
Iraq......................................... $10,000,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $25,000,000 $28,749,980
Egypt........................................ $0 $14,628,676 $17,831,750 $7,895,200 $5,014,828 $3,175,861 $0
Qatar........................................ $110,076,873 $0 $0 $9,658,120 $0 $30,000,000 $8,999,982
Arab League.................................. $443,996,853 $525,948,066 $461,698,730 $285,667,403 $340,008,648 $320,061,981 $429,415,593
EU and EU Members............................ $522,256,300 $749,735,298 $510,780,986 $492,407,663 $303,787,960 $327,128,287 $347,850,320
United States................................ $4,705,897 $302,261,822 $275,000,000 $222,864,771 $50,000,000 $0 $348,000,000
Other Donors................................. $41,069,651 $185,475,653 $100,709,599 $144,457,229 $67,898,799 $178,867,227 $125,699,960
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL.................................... $1,012,028,701 $1,763,420,839 $1,348,189,315 $1,145,397,066 $761,695,407 $826,057,495 $1,250,965,873
==================================================================================================================================================
United States as % of Total.................. 0% 17% 20% 19% 7% 0% 28%
EU/EU Members as % of Total.................. 52% 43% 38% 43% 40% 40% 28%
Arab League as % of Total.................... 44% 30% 34% 25% 45% 39% 34%
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c). Given that the PA has grown more capable over the
years and is the governing institution for important services
in the West Bank, what do you see as the continued role of
UNRWA operating schools and clinics in the West Bank?
Answer. The status of Palestinian refugees is one of the most
sensitive final status issues confronting Israel and the Palestinians.
The Department of State does not support any action that would
circumvent final status issues, including phasing out the role of UNRWA
by transferring services to the PA. Such action would damage confidence
between the parties at a particularly fragile time, undercut our
ability to act as a mediator and peace facilitator, and generate strong
negative reaction from Palestinians and from our allies, including
Jordan.
UNRWA provides essential humanitarian and education support to
refugees in the PA-controlled West Bank that is simply beyond the
financial and organizational capacity of the PA at present. While UNRWA
has faced funding shortfalls, the PA faces a deeper fiscal crisis and
does not have the resources to take on responsibility for the 174
installations UNRWA operates nearly 750 or the more than 725,000
registered refugees that UNRWA supports in the West Bank.
We look forward to the day that UNRWA is no longer needed, but the
need will continue absent resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue
in the context of a negotiated peace deal. Decreasing international
community support, including U.S. funding to UNRWA, could signal a
dimunition of support for the Palestinian people, and could raise host
country concerns that international support for UNRWA elsewhere is also
decreasing. While host governments in the region have been generous in
hosting Palestinian refugees, these governments cannot bear the burden
alone.
(d). The President requested $70 million for security
assistance for the Palestinian Authority to provide training,
equipment, and infrastructure support to the Palestinian
security forces.
Can you provide an update on the status of Vice Admiral
Paul Bushong's efforts to train Palestinian security
forces? Have his efforts been successful to date? How many
personnel have been trained and are capable of imposing
order?
What equipment will be provided to the security forces and
under what safeguards?
Answer. To date, nine full National Security Force (NSF) Special
Battalions, with approximately 500 personnel each, and two Presidential
Guard (PG) Battalions, with approximately 400 personnel each, have been
trained at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC).
With the completion of initial battalion training in September 2012,
Vice Admiral Bushong and his team have transitioned to sustaining and
maintaining improvements in the performance of the Palestinian security
forces. U.S. assistance provides refresher training for select
companies, advanced training for small groups, and individual basic
training for new personnel recruited due to attrition. More than 6,643
NSF and 2,116 PG personnel have received U.S.-funded training. In
addition, 897 members of the Palestinian Civil Defense (PCD), including
firefighters and other emergency service personnel, have been trained
at the Jordanian Academy of Civil Protection. Members of all
Palestinian security services have participated in joint leadership and
specialized courses, chiefly at the Central Training Institute (CTI) in
Jericho.
The NSF battalions that have been trained and equipped by the
United States have been instrumental to the Palestinian Authority's
ongoing law-and-order campaigns, by conducting operations in restive
cities and refugee camps and by successfully managing popular
demonstrations and other activities in the West Bank. According to
Israeli data, there has been a dramatic decline in the number of
terrorist attacks emanating from the West Bank since the beginning of
U.S. assistance to the PASF, and Israeli security officials have
praised the PASF's professionalism and commitment to fighting
terrorism. Moving forward, we will increase our assistance to the
Palestinian Civil Police and the justice and corrections sectors, to
ensure that the Palestinian Authority can effectively and transparently
prosecute those responsible for terrorism and serious crime, in
accordance with the rule of law.
The United States has provided nonlethal equipment to the
Palestinian security forces. This includes vehicles, riot shields,
helmets, office equipment, and other nonlethal equipment a battalion
needs to be operational. We conduct regular end-use monitoring visits
to PASF facilities across the West Bank and have assisted the
Palestinian Authority's development of a monitoring database that
tracks the location and use of donor-provided equipment and will serve
as the foundation for a comprehensive inventory management system. We
have also worked with the PA to develop transparent disposal procedures
for depleted equipment. Israeli authorities review all proposed U.S.
provision of equipment to the Palestinian security forces.
PASF are predominantly trained by Jordanian and Palestinian
personnel with U.S. oversight. The U.S. does not pay PASF salaries; the
PA pays them directly through a combination of tax revenue and non-U.S.
foreign assistance.
(e). For many years, U.S. assistance was provided to the PA
knowing that Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad had a
reputation of fighting internal corruption, building
responsible governing institutions and working closely with
Israel on security cooperation. Has the new Palestinian
leadership similarly proved its willingness to confront
corruption?
Answer. Under the leadership of President Abbas and Prime Minister
Hamdallah, the Palestinian Authority continues to make significant
strides in reforming its institutions to better serve the Palestinian
people, and the PA remains committed to and continues to promote and
support full transparency and anticorruption efforts.
The U.S. Government supports these efforts in myriad ways,
including under the Palestinian Justice Enhancement Program (PJEP). By
developing the capabilities of the High Judicial Council and the
Ministry of Justice, improving legal education for judges and future
lawyers, and increasing public understanding of the justice system by
raising public awareness of legal rights and responsibilities and how
the justice system operates, PJEP strengthens public confidence and
respect for justice sector institutions and the rule of law in the West
Bank. This program complements the efforts of the United States
Security Coordinator to strengthen the Palestinian justice sector by
building the capacity of public prosecutors and criminal investigators.
(f). In the FY14 Omnibus appropriations bill, new language
was included linking disbursement of economic aid to a
certification by the Secretary of State that the PA is acting
to counter incitement of violence against Israelis and is
supporting activities aimed at promoting peace, coexistence,
and security cooperation with Israel. Can you please update us
on whether the PA is in fact countering incitement of violence?
Answer. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is taking steps to condition
the environment for peace and to counter incitement to violence.
President Abbas regularly speaks publicly in support of tolerance and
nonviolence. In mid-February, Abbas hosted 300 Israeli students in
Ramallah, where he emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his remarks, which were later
broadcast on Palestinian television, he discussed several final status
issues including Jerusalem, borders, recognition of Israel as a Jewish
state, and refugees.
Abbas also appointed Mohammed al-Madani to serve as the head of the
``Palestinian Committee for Interaction with Israeli Society.'' Al-
Madani facilitated the first visit of Palestinian officials to the
Knesset in July 2013, and recent meetings between Fatah and Israeli
officials in Ramallah and Budapest.
The impact of the PA's effort is visible throughout Palestinian
society. For example, in the education sector, the PA has made
significant progress in the past two decades by revising official PA
textbooks in order to remove instances of incitement to violence. As
part of the post-Oslo process, between 1996 and 2005, the PA began
introducing new textbooks that included many references to promoting
values of reconciliation, human rights, religious tolerance, respect
for the law, diversity, and environmental awareness, and has replaced
textbooks for all 12 grades. A succession of studies has found that the
new textbooks represent a significant improvement and constitute a
valuable contribution to the education of young Palestinians, and in
general, concluded that the new textbooks eliminated a number of
negative references to Israel and Jews and made attempts to promote
tolerance.
The PA also monitors the content of Friday sermons delivered in
over 1,600 West Bank mosques to ensure they do not endorse incitement
to violence. The PA Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs prohibits
speech that is likely to lead to incitement to violence.
The PA leadership, under President Mahmoud Abbas, remains committed
to nonviolence and a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has recognized
the existence of the State of Israel since 1993, and in international
fora and in bilateral contacts the PA leadership has insisted on
recognition of Israel even while others have sought to delegitimize
Israel. Abbas stated in his September 2012 speech at the United Nations
General Assembly that ``The two-State solution, i.e., the State of
Palestine coexisting alongside the State of Israel, represents the
spirit and essence of the historic compromise embodied in the Oslo
Declaration of Principles.''
Question #41. Yemen recently concluded a National Dialogue and
embarked on the process of drafting and ratifying a new constitution
and preparing for elections. Yemen still faces considerable hurdles,
from combating Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to the
continued alienation from the central government of Houthi rebels in
the North and separatists in the South. Moreover, chronic economic
problems, resource shortages, and significant unemployment will
challenge the central government. It is estimated that Yemen may run
out of groundwater by 2025.
Yemen has set an ambitious timeline to hold a
constitutional referendum within 12 months of the end of the
National Dialogue and elections within 21 months. Is this
timeline is achievable? What assistance are providing to help
the Yemeni Government keep to this timeline?
How is U.S. assistance helping Yemen cope with its water
shortage?
Answer. The U.S. Government has provided nearly $39 million to
train National Dialogue delegates, previously disenfranchised groups,
including women and the youth, and strengthen civic engagement. The
outcomes from this conference are currently guiding the work of the
constitutional drafting committee, which will produce a new
constitution for referendum. The transition will conclude with national
elections.
We are in close coordination with the Yemeni Government and
international partners to encourage transition progress. Technical
preparations for the upcoming referendum and national elections are
ongoing, and we are supporting the government's efforts to update the
voter registry and prepare for upcoming election. We will also conduct
civic education and get-out-the-vote activities, and will support
elections monitoring. President Hadi has signaled a strong commitment
to advancing the political transition and timely elections in Yemen.
Water scarcity is one of the most important natural resource issues
facing Yemen. There have been several reliable estimates predicting
Yemen's water resources will run out before 2035. Much of Yemen's water
problems trace back to poor agriculture management practices, which
account for 90 percent of water use. USAID works cooperatively with the
Yemeni Government and local entities to improve water management
techniques in individual and agricultural use through a combination of
modern and traditional methods.
The U.S. Government allocated more than $100 million in FY 2012 and
FY 2013 toward economic growth and development in Yemen, including
projects to support sustainable agriculture. We have also brought
Yemeni leaders to the United States to study water resource management,
and hosted a Yemeni trade delegation that explored business
opportunities in alternative energy and water.
Question #42 (a-b). Mauritania.--Mauritania is a key
counterterrorism partner, but ranked number one on 2013's Global
Slavery Index for the systemic persistence of various forms of slavery
and human trafficking. It has consistently been in Tier 3 in the State
Department's annual Trafficking in Persons report. I sent a letter in
February to President Abdel Aziz, cosigned by 11 of my colleagues,
urging more aggressive action to implement their 2007 antislavery law
and provide support to antislavery NGOs. This month, we see the
government has released a roadmap to address these concerns.
(a). What are the primary goals and geographic focus areas
for our CT cooperation with Mauritania? How would you assess
this cooperation?
Answer. Through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) and related initiatives, the United States supports regional
efforts to contain, degrade, and ultimately defeat al-Qaeda and its
affiliates and allies in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa.
Mauritania is a TSCTP member and has demonstrated strong will to
counter terrorism.
The Mauritanian military has effectively countered Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other extremist groups in the past. It has
been well over a year since the last terrorist attack in Mauritania.
Mauritania's two tactical defeats of AQIM, using U.S. and French
training and equipment, stymied AQIM aspirational goals in Mauritania.
We continue to work to enhance Mauritania's military and law
enforcement capabilities to detect, deter, degrade, and disrupt
terrorist operations and secure Mauritania's borders, particularly its
long eastern border with Mali. We also continue to provide assistance
for regional efforts to build resilience and counter violent extremist
messaging and recruitment throughout the Sahel. Our assessment of the
partnership is that it is effective to the extent that the Mauritanians
consistently demonstrate the will--if not always the wherewithal and
technical expertise--to confront regional terrorist threats.
(b). Has there been any significant improvement in the
Mauritanian Government's efforts to address slavery issues
since late 2013?
Answer. On March 6, 2014, the Government of Mauritania adopted the
U.N. Special Rapporteur for Contemporary Forms of Slavery's ``roadmap''
to hasten an end to slavery in Mauritania. While this is a positive
step, what matters most is implementation of the report's
recommendations. The government has not yet taken concrete action in
key areas. Legal authorities, for example, have not pressed charges
against any accused slaveholders or made efforts to improve victims'
protection.
Question #43. Burma.--Please list all programs or activities which
involve dialogue or other interactions with Burmese military or police
officials or personnel, including programs outside of Burma--specific
requests (for instance, regional programs.) Please explain the goals
and purposes of such programs and detail what pledges or deliverable
reforms, if any, were requested from Burmese authorities in exchange
for these military-to-military interactions.
Answer. All programs or activities which involve dialogue or other
interaction with Burmese military or police officials or personnel,
including programs outside of Burma, are as follows:
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS):
The Department of Defense (DOD), in coordination with the State
Department, sent a Defense Institute of International Legal
Studies (DIILS) delegation to Burma in July 2013 for a scoping
visit and conducted initial exchanges on law of armed conflict
and international humanitarian law in August 2013 and February
2014 with the Burmese military's judge advocate corps. The team
has repeatedly met with opposition leaders, ethnic groups, and
civil society representatives to discuss this engagement and
the current human rights situation in Burma. DIILS' engagement
is designed to promote knowledge of, and respect for, human
rights and rule of law--a shared U.S. Government and GOB
objective. Aung San Suu Kyi, Generation 88, civil society, and
ethnic representatives widely indicated their support for the
engagement. The DIILS program is funded by DOD Title 10
funding.
Human Rights Dialogue: In October 2012, the United States
held the first-ever Human Rights Dialogue (HRD) in Naypyitaw,
led by then-Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor Michael Posner. The large delegation included
then-Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense (DASD) for South
and Southeast Asia Vikram Singh and then-Lieutenant General
Frank Wiercinski, Commander, U.S. Army, Pacific. The dialogue
included an exchange between DOD representatives and their
Burmese counterparts as part of a broad interagency discussion
of human rights and reform. The next dialogue is planned for
late 2014.
Diplomatic Meetings: In order to begin a dialogue with the
Burmese military on issues related to human rights, rule of
law, and civilian control, Department of Defense officials have
met with Burmese officials on the margins of multilateral
forums. Secretary of Defense Hagel engaged in a 10-minute pull
aside with his Burmese counterpart Lieutenant General Wai Lwin
on the margins of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus in
Brunei in 2013, where he relayed the U.S. desire to see the
reform movement continue and to establish contact ahead of
Burma's 2014 chairmanship of ASEAN. The Secretary subsequently
hosted the Defense Ministers Meeting in Honolulu in April 2014.
In addition, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs Mark Lippert and DASD Singh met with
their Burmese counterparts at the Fullerton Forum in Singapore
in February 2013 and January 2014, respectively. Finally, DOD
officials have working-level contacts with members of the
Burmese Embassy Defense Attachee's Office in Washington. In
late 2012, DOD officials began attending relevant Burmese
Embassy receptions.
The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS): APCSS
is a Department of Defense academic institute in Honolulu,
Hawaii. APCSS addresses regional and global security issues,
inviting military and civilian representatives of the United
States and Asia-Pacific nations to its comprehensive program of
executive education and workshops, both in Hawaii and
throughout the Asia-Pacific region. APCSS has invited a small
number of Burmese participants to multilateral workshops (e.g.,
``Water Future of South Asia'') While most of the Burmese
participants have been GOB civilians, two military officers
have taken part in APCSS workshops. The purpose of these
multicountry APCSS workshops is to promote the Government of
Burma's exposure to internationally respected counterparts and
to discuss nontraditional security issues, improve civil
military relations, and promote human rights and civilian
oversight.
USPACOM's Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting
Command (JPAC): Though a humanitarian rather than military
engagement, the Government of Burma and the Burmese military
respect U.S. efforts to locate, recover, and identify the
remains of missing U.S. personnel from World War II and other
conflicts. JPAC resumed operations in Burma in 2013 and
completed three successful bilateral investigations. To aid
investigations, JPAC initiated an ``Outreach'' program which
placed ads in Burmese newspapers from March to May 2013 and
established a call center in Rangoon. The call center received
over 1,200 calls yielding over 370 potential leads. In April
2012, JPAC and Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office
representatives visited Burma to discuss resuming World War II
accounting operations. In August 2012, an eight-person Burmese
military delegation visited JPAC to learn about U.S. remains
recovery techniques and discuss recovery operations in Burma.
Cobra Gold: Thailand invited two Burmese Armed Forces
officers to observe humanitarian aspects only of the
multinational Cobra Gold exercise in 2013 and again in 2014.
The Burmese spent 1 day observing peace enforcement,
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and medical portions
of the Cobra Gold exercise, which the United States cohosts
with Thailand. Burma self-funded their participation in this
observer program. The intent of inviting Burma to the observer
program is to expose the Burmese military to internationally
respected military counterparts and demonstrate how these
militaries inculcate international standards--especially the
respect for human rights--into their planning and operational
execution.
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA): The State
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) supported training for 42 senior
counternarcotics officials at ILEA in Bangkok in 2013. In 2014,
INL is introducing basic, yet targeted training opportunities
for Burmese police officials at ILEA.
Humanitarian Landmine Action: Embassy Rangoon, with the
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, frequently
consulted with senior Burmese Government officials in the
Burmese Army Engineering Corps (the Burmese military office
responsible for landmine removal) on best practices for mine
risk education and survivor assistance as part of a pilot
initiative to support humanitarian landmine action and build
trust between and within disparate communities in Burma's
conflict-affected Kayah State. These conversations also served
to expand civil society's limited contacts with the Burmese
military.
In pursuing the President's strategic objective in Southeast Asia,
the U.S. Department of Defense has attempted to strengthen its ties
with ASEAN and other multilateral fora. In that multilateral context,
DOD regularly engages its ASEAN counterparts to discuss regional
security issues and identify new cooperative activities that support
stability and interoperability in the region. Burma is the chair of
ASEAN in 2014. The following multilateral programs or activities
involve dialogue or other interaction with Burmese military or police
officials or personnel:
ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise: Biennially
the ARF holds a disaster relief exercise to improve the
capacity of regional states and actors to reduce risk, prepare
for and respond to disasters and crises. The next exercise will
be held in Malaysia February 2015. As this is a joint civil-
military exercise, and Burma is a member of ASEAN, its military
and civilian sectors will be invited and will most likely
participate.
ASEAN Regional Forum meetings and the ASEAN Regional Forum
Defense Officials Dialogue: The ASEAN Regional Forum is a
security forum where civilian agencies normally lead the
discussion but military members are often present and have a
voice. Topics generally discussed include, but are not limited
to, maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief,
nonproliferation and disarmament, space security, cyber
security, counterterrorism, and international crime. In
addition, ARF hosts defense officials three times a year for a
strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific region at the ARF
Defence Official's Dialogue. This regional discussion of the 26
member nations plus the EU ranges from peacekeeping to the
region's most pressing security issues. As Burma is the chair
of ASEAN this year, Burma chairs this discussion along with the
EU.
ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus: The ADMM-plus is a
platform for ASEAN and its eight Dialogue Partners to
strengthen security and defense cooperation for peace,
stability, and development in the region. The ADMM-plus
conducts exercises and has expert working groups on maritime
security, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance/disaster
management, peacekeeping, military medicine, and humanitarian
mine action.
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP): This is a
regional government-to-government agreement to promote and
enhance cooperation to combat piracy and armed robbery in Asia.
The ReCAAP's Information Sharing Center (ISC), located in
Singapore, is an international organization that serves as a
platform for information exchange among contracting parties.
The ISC improves incident response and facilitates capacity-
building efforts to enhance the capability of contracting
parties to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in the
region. Through its periodic reports to the shipping community,
the ISC helps ships in the region avoid and deter piracy and
armed robbery attacks. The ISC has a Governing Council,
composed of 19 contracting parties, including Burma, which
typically sends an official from their navy as a representative
at the annual Governing Council Meeting. The United States is
an external participant seeking membership to ReCAAP and
currently shares information with the ISC through established
channels in the DOD and attends open sessions of the annual
Governing Council Meeting. U.S. participation in ReCAAP
improves our ability to share and receive information and
allows for U.S. representation on the Governing Council and
participation in ReCAAP's various capacity-building events.
U.S. participation and membership also aligns with the U.S.
Government's goal of strengthening regional organizations,
signals our commitment to long-term cooperation in this
organization, and strengthens our efforts to counter piracy and
robbery at sea.
Goals and Purposes
U.S. engagement with Burma's military is intended to support our
broader policy objective of ensuring the success of the country's
democratic transition and building appropriate institutions. Our goal
is to cultivate a professional military under civilian control that
operates in accordance with international law, as well as with
standards of transparency and accountability; that ends the unlawful
recruitment and use of child soldiers; that withdraws from politics and
the economy; that severs arms-related ties with the DPRK and that
supports Burma's peace process. Absent efforts to reform, the Burmese
Armed Forces have the potential to hinder the peace process, good
governance, protection of human rights, a successful transition to
democracy, and equitable economic growth.
Through all of our engagements, we underscore the need for Burma's
military to undertake meaningful reforms in order for our engagement to
continue and expand over the long term. Indicators of a strengthening
military commitment to reform might include:
Increased professionalism/transparency (e.g., establishing
and consistently applying a military code of conduct based on
international best practices, creating a transparent process
for military procurement, etc.);
Implementation of, and compliance with, international law,
including international humanitarian law (e.g., creating and
implementing a training plan for all military troops and
commanders on applicable treaty obligations, including the 1949
Geneva Conventions; ceasing the unlawful recruitment and use of
children; ending abusive tactics, etc.), and granting
international monitors full access to military installations to
monitor implementation of processes for the identification and
demobilization of child soldiers, as agreed upon in the U.N.
Child Soldier Action Plan;
Nonproliferation (e.g., avoiding all engagement with North
Korea on military procurement and fully adhering to all U.N.
Security Council Resolutions, etc.);
Supporting the peace process (e.g., completing work on and
signing a mutually acceptable nationwide cease-fire agreement
with the ethnic groups that leads quickly to a political
dialogue on core issues; repositioning troops away from
villages and religious sites in regions controlled by such
ethnic groups, and withdrawing from conflict zones, etc.);
Stepping back from politics (e.g., constitutional reform
that ends the requirement that the military hold 25 percent of
the seats in Parliament and key ministry leadership positions,
as well as supports greater local autonomy rights for ethnic
nationalities, etc.);
Disengaging from an active role in the economy (e.g.,
bringing all off-budget military revenue streams formally into
the Union budget and adjusting military appropriations
accordingly; divesting from businesses that compete with
private enterprise in a transparent and legal manner, etc.)
Question #44. Multilateral Investment Fund.--Further to the
disappointment I have already mentioned over the fact that the current
budget request calls for significant cuts to Western Hemisphere
programs, I noticed that the administration did not request funding to
pay our $29 million in arrears to the Inter-American Development Bank's
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF). This lack of funding is sure to
undermine the MIF's operations. The MIF does critical work in promoting
private sector-led economic development in Latin America and the
Caribbean and I believe it deserves the full support of the U.S.
Government.
Could you please explain why the administration did not
request any funding at all for the MIF?
Answer. In last year's budget, Treasury requested and Congress
appropriated $6.3 million to clear a portion of the outstanding U.S.
arrears to the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF). While the
administration would like to have requested additional funds in FY
2015, we were unable to include funding for the MIF in the budget
request given the very difficult budget environment and numerous
competing development priorities. The U.S. continues to be an active
and vocal supporter of the MIF. We were the primary force behind its
creation in 1993 and remain its largest shareholder. We continue to
strongly support the MIF's critical work and valuable contributions to
development in Latin America.
Question #45. Economic Statecraft.--I announced recently during my
trip to Mexico that I am developing an Economic Statecraft initiative
aimed at boosting U.S. jobs and exports by empowering our export and
investment promotion agencies so they can level the playing field for
U.S. companies operating abroad. A key component of this initiative is
to increase funding to these agencies and enhance their coordination in
support of our international economic priorities. I applaud the
administration's continuing efforts to increase American exports, and a
critical element of this is devoting adequate resources to our export
and investment promotion agencies, which create thousands of American
jobs, support billions of dollars of exports, further U.S. foreign
economic policy goals, while also returning hundreds of millions of
dollars per year to the Treasury.
Given the tremendous importance of exports in generating
American jobs and economic growth, could you please explain the
status of the State Department's Economic Statecraft
initiative, your efforts to improve coordination with all the
agencies that promote U.S. exports and investment, and what
concrete steps the Department plans to take over the coming
year to elevate the importance of economic issues in our
diplomatic engagement?
Answer. Secretary Kerry has placed a high priority on supporting
U.S. jobs and exports, and has made supporting U.S. business an
important part of his work in Washington and his overseas trips. Under
the policy leadership of Catherine A. Novelli, Under Secretary of State
for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, the Department of
State is fully committed to utilizing economic diplomacy to generate
American jobs and economic growth. Both Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs (EB), Charles Rivkin, and Special
Representative for Commercial and Business Affairs, Scott Nathan, are
specifically engaged on improving coordination between the Department
of State and the Commerce Department, and more broadly all the agencies
that promote U.S. exports and investment.
The prior initiative known as Economic Statecraft, has been
expanded and rebranded as the Shared Prosperity Agenda (SPA). Led by
Senior Advisor to the Secretary (SRA) David Thorne, the SPA is working
to elevate economic approaches to foreign policy challenges throughout
the Department of State. The SPA task force convenes several cross-
functional working groups focused on specific economic diplomacy
related issues including but not limited to the following: Human
Capital, Knowledge Platforms, Jobs Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy and
Entrepreneurship.
Officers at all levels in E, EB, ENR, and the regional bureaus are
implementing the Secretary's vision for commercial advocacy and
elevating economics in U.S. foreign policy through multiple lines of
activity, including the following:
The Department of State is taking a more focused and
systematic advocacy effort with the Department of Commerce on
behalf of U.S. companies. This approach was launched at last
year's United National General Assembly meetings and continued
at the recent World Bank-International Monetary Fund meetings.
As part of this, the Department of State advocated for $15
billion in U.S. export content on behalf of over a dozen of our
firms. Additionally, we facilitated direct advocacy by the
Commerce Department at the APEC Ministerial, where cases
totaling $19 billion in U.S. export content were raised.
The State-Commerce Department Partnership Post program
allows State Department personnel to provide commercial
services in 60 countries. These services, such as the popular
Gold Key Matching Service, are marketed to American companies
by personnel from domestic Department of Commerce U.S. Export
Assistance Centers. Commerce and State organize interagency
trainings (including Ex-Im, OPIC, and USTDA) to equip State
officers to provide high-quality services and promote the range
of U.S. Government resources available to companies. Such
training is conducted by region with the last major session for
23 sub-Saharan Africa posts in Johannesburg, South Africa, in
March 2014.
The State Department is working to assure that U.S. firms,
which are leaders in cutting edge energy technologies, benefit
from global investment needs in the power sector that exceed
$17 trillion dollars by 2035.
Promoting and institutionalizing a regional trade and
investment framework with market-oriented rules that promote
open, transparent, and fair trade is our primary economic
objective in the Asia-Pacific region. State officers are
coleading BIT talks with China, India, and other key countries,
which offer an avenue for increasing access for U.S. firms to
large and significant foreign markets.
State officers, domestically and in the field, including
Ambassadors, are working closely with USTR to finalize the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, which will
increase U.S. export opportunities in Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, Vietnam and Japan.
The U.S. coordinating office for the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum, which is within State, works with the
interagency to achieve U.S. priorities that help facilitate
trade and investment with the Asia-Pacific region, such as
improvements in regional supply chain performance; reduction in
tariffs on environmental goods; and work to address the
pervasive problem of corruption.
Under the U.S.-ASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement
initiative, we are working on specific cooperative activities
to expand trade and investment ties between the United States
and the ASEAN countries, including through more efficient trade
flows and supply chains, as well as to create new business
opportunities and jobs on both sides.
In cooperation with the interagency, we are maximizing
investment opportunities through the U.S.-Asia-Pacific
Comprehensive Energy Partnership, which provides up to $5
billion in export credit financing from Export-Import Bank of
the United States and up to $1 billion in Overseas Private
Investment Corporation financing. This financing increases
access to American technology, services, equipment, and
investment, in support of projects providing access to cleaner
and more reliable sources of energy in the region. In addition,
the State Department is funding the Asia-Pacific Clean Energy
Program, which will colocate OPIC and U.S. Trade and
Development Agency personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok to
better identify regional energy projects that could benefit
from U.S. financing and investment.
Launched in 2011, the New Silk Road vision is an integral
part of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia, reflecting
growing regional support for closer economic cooperation and
connectivity. We have embraced these policy goals as a way for
countries in the region to strengthen economic linkages, reduce
regional instability, promote foreign investment, and increase
access to energy resources. The New Silk Road concept was first
envisioned as a means for Afghanistan to integrate further into
the fabric of the region via the resumption of traditional
trading routes and the reconstruction of significant
infrastructure links, broken by decades of conflict. Today,
Afghanistan and its neighbors are championing the New Silk Road
vision, creating new North-South transit and trade routes that
complement vibrant East-West connections across Eurasia. The
region is leading efforts to reduce barriers to trade, invest
in each other's economies, and support international
development and cross-border projects.
In June 2013, during the President's trip to South Africa,
he announced his intention to host a summit in Washington with
African heads of state. The U.S.-Africa Leaders summit will
take place August 5-6, 2014, in Washington, DC. This summit,
the first of its kind, will be the largest event that any U.S.
President has ever convened with African heads of state. The
summit is intended to catalyze USG and other efforts in sub-
Saharan and North Africa--to advance economic growth, trade,
and investment; good governance and strong democratic
institutions; inclusive development; youth engagement; and
peace and security.
The State Department is working with the private sector and
our European partners to spur needed investments in energy
conservation and efficiency there, as well as on energy
infrastructure investments that can foster greater energy
diversity. The U.S. is working closely with European partners
to help achieve a secure energy future. We will not let any
country use energy as a political weapon. Diversification,
transparency and private investment are key. We need to work
with European partners to create the conditions--including
controlling corruption--to attract the private investment
needed for expansion of energy production.
The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs and its overseas
posts engage frequently with foreign governments to promote
policies advantageous to U.S. businesses through bilateral
dialogues as well as multilateral engagements, among which the
North American Leaders summit, the Summit of the Americas, and
the Pacific Alliance. Priority issues for 2014 include
deepening regulatory cooperation, accelerating regional
integration, easing barriers to trade for small and medium
enterprises, promoting increased public-private consultations,
and improving regional energy market efficiency.
Chiefs of mission and economic and commercial teams at U.S.
embassies and consulates in the Western Hemisphere work
collaboratively to assist U.S. businesses to export and invest.
Commerce's Advocacy Center has 23 pending infrastructure
projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, with total project
value of $57 billion, including $17 billion in U.S. export
content. State coordinates closely with Commerce to assist
businesses as they bid on these projects. Through 18 Direct
Line webinars and conference calls in 2013, State provided
market information to nearly 1,000 U.S. companies interested in
doing business in the Western Hemisphere.
The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and it posts abroad
work closely with interagency partners to promote the U.S.
exports to the Middle-East and North Africa region, aligning
with the goals of the National Export Initiative. For example,
in 2013, in collaboration with the U.S. Foreign Commercial
Service, the Department of Commerce, the Department of
Agriculture, and other stakeholders, Mission UAE helped
organize and support the participation of more than 200 U.S.
businesses in two large trade shows, the ``Arab Health'' and
``Gulfood'' trade shows. At the ``Arab Health'' trade show,
U.S. companies signed contracts worth $196 million in sales--
five times more than the year before, while the ``Gulfood''
show generated an additional $106.7 million in onsite sales.
NEA is working with USTR to revise and establish new trade
and investment protocols and accords in the region. For
instance, we are currently supporting the enactment of a Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the Gulf
Cooperation Council, while also strengthening discussions with
Tunisia, Iraq, and others under the TIFA framework.
As the above examples demonstrate, the Department of State is fully
committed to deepening our alignment and coordination with the
Department of Commerce to advance our commercial interests abroad. We
are specifically exploring shared technology platforms to reduce
duplication of efforts in the field, and to equip State's economic
officers to serve as effective commercial officers at posts which do
not have a Department of Commerce presence. The development of these
systems will provide a mechanism for sharing business leads and
economic information among all interagency partners focused on
supporting U.S. exports, including the Foreign Agriculture Service, the
Ex-Im Bank, OPIC, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.
Question #46 (a-c). USIP.--For more than 10 years, the U.S.
Institute of Peace has produced detailed analysis and ideas for
mitigating the effects of the internal armed conflict that Colombia has
suffered for more than a half century.
(a). As the Colombian Government is negotiating with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), what role does
USIP play in influencing the U.S. Government's posture toward
these negotiations; what role can it play in providing
technical support to the Colombian Government and the Colombian
people; and what role will it play in defining how U.S. policy
could support a potential peace agreement? Given the scale of
the $9 billion the U.S. has invested in Colombia in security,
intelligence, development, governance assistance over the past
15 years, what role do the much more modestly resourced USIP
programs play in helping to leverage and support a possible
agreement and the hope of a lasting peace?
Answer. The State Department views the U.S. Institute of Peace
(USIP) as an experienced and helpful resource as we support President
Santos' efforts to bring an end to decades of conflict in Colombia.
USIP's expertise in helping nations move toward a post-conflict phase
of rebuilding and transformation is especially relevant to Colombia.
Its sponsorship of the Colombia Peace Forum provides a valuable
opportunity for policymakers from across the U.S. Government and civil
society to discuss the link between human rights and the peace process.
This is particularly true as the Colombian people begin to seek out
justice for past abuses and reconciliation.
USIP has looked toward supporting a post-peace agreement for
Colombia, and offered candid analysis of common pitfalls and
challenging issues surrounding peace negotiations, transitional
justice, demobilization and reintegration, truth commissions, etc. The
State Department looks to USIP to generate creative, expert ideas of
how the United States can play a constructive role in ensuring that a
potential agreement in Colombia leads to a durable peace.
USIP has carried out a number of valuable programs to support
Colombia's search for peace and efforts to address the conflict and the
needs of its victims over the years, including workshops on long-term
conflict mitigation and community-based reconciliation. In particular,
we appreciate USIP's sponsorship and participation in the Department of
Arauca's first International Forum on Peace and Reconciliation in May
2012, which launched Citizen Commissions for Reconciliation--a model
and replicable tool to help mitigate violence, strengthen local peace-
building processes, and engage communities living in conflict zones in
the search for nonviolent solutions.
(b). As the United States ``rebalances'' toward the Asia-
Pacific, how is this reflected in USIP's programming and
activities?
Answer. The State Department views the U.S. Institute of Peace
(USIP) as an experienced and helpful resource in the Asia-Pacific
region, especially with regard to our ongoing rebalance to this dynamic
region. With higher risk of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region and the
region's growing significance for U.S. security, economic, political
and diplomatic interests, USIP activities are having a meaningful
impact in line with the Institute's mandate to prevent, mitigate, and
resolve conflict.
The USIP provides a useful forum for policymakers from across the
U.S. Government and civil society to discuss how to maintain peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region. USIP also brings Northeast Asian
and U.S. officials together to discuss conflict prevention at the Track
1.5 level. Since 2012, USIP has also been working in Burma to
strengthen rule of law community projects that support tolerance and
mutual understanding. This work is in the beginning stages and USIP
plans to augment it through programing in crisis management, conflict
prevention and reconciliation strategies in the Asia-Pacific, in order
to better address rising regional tensions.
(c). With the political and security transition in
Afghanistan this year, how will USIP's programming contribute
to the work of the High Peace Council and the reconciliation
process?
Answer. The United States Institute of Peace is not a part of the
U. S. Department of State, but rather an independent institution
created and funded by Congress that has been advancing U.S. interests
and fulfilling its congressional mandate to prevent, mitigate, and
resolve conflict around the world for nearly 30 years. For specific
questions regarding their programming and activities, we would refer
you to USIP directly. Our USIP colleagues have provided the following
information:
The United States Institute of Peace has played an important
role in
Afghanistan for more than 10 years. The Institute's work ranges
from improving peaceful dispute resolution mechanisms, to
strengthening civil society organizations' efforts to advance
the rule of law, to promoting peaceful elections like the one
just held. USIP also convened the Afghanistan Working Group led
by now White House Chief of Staff John Podesta and USIP Board
Chair and former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.
USIP is poised to contribute to the work of the High Peace
Council (HPC) and the reconciliation process in several ways.
The Institute maintains a permanent office in Kabul with three
expatriate staff and 10 local professional staff. This office
serves as a point of contact in Afghanistan between USIP and
HPC representatives. USIP has relationships with key members of
the Council, including the Chairman of the HPC Secretariat,
Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, who was a fellow at USIP from 2007
to 2009, and the Chairman of the Council, Salahuddin Rabbani.
USIP continues its congressional mandate to produce applied
research on promoting peace. The Institute's wide-ranging
research agenda includes issues that are directly relevant to
the work of the Council. Previous research on this topic,
including proposed designs for a peace process and suggestions
on post-negotiation institutional arrangements, was compiled in
a volume published in 2013, Getting it Right in Afghanistan.
This volume includes an essay by Mr. Stanekzai that became the
blueprint for the reintegration program now being implemented
in Afghanistan.
USIP has issued a standing invitation to the HPC to make use
of the institute's training capacity for negotiations. Until
now, the peace process has mostly been characterized by
delicate negotiations, often conducted through quiet contacts
and the search for confidence-building measures. Should the
process reach the phase of structured, face-to-face
negotiations, USIP expects to play a role in supporting the HPC
members who conduct those negotiations. It is worth noting that
the HPC was a creation of President Karzai, and is not a
constitutional body. The next government may wish to pursue
negotiations with the Taliban, but using a different mechanism.
USIP also supported the 2014 Afghan election process in
several ways. USIP and the Center for American Progress, under
the cochairmanship of Stephen Hadley and John Podesta,
organized three working groups bringing together principals
from the State Department, the NSC, the Pentagon, and USAID,
along with Afghanistan experts, to offer advice on how to
ensure that policy was coordinated between the election and
reconciliation processes. The working group focused attention
on the electoral process, recommending funding for preelection
polling and strengthening efforts to increase voter
participation--factors that proved critical to the perceived
legitimacy of the result and limiting the potential impact of
fraud.
To increase participation, USIP's Peaceful Education Campaign
reached out to young and old voters in Afghanistan, in rural
and urban areas, with a variety of techniques, for example,
sponsoring Afghanistan's national soccer tournament, hosting a
1-minute film competition as well as an election anthem
competition, promoting traditional and popular poetry readings
in rural areas, and a number of other innovative methods. This
program was implemented through USIP's office in Kabul with
full-time Afghan and international staff who are generally able
to move around the country. USIP also produced numerous
research publications in the lead-up to the election providing
timely analysis based on inputs from the field across the
country. USIP intends to conduct a Peaceful Election Campaign
for next year's parliamentary election, as well as continue its
election-related research and advisory activities.
USIP is committed to remaining in Afghanistan after the U.S.
troop drawdown and to working with the new Afghan Government
and with USIP's Afghan partners to promote peace and
reconciliation and build on the significant progress
Afghanistan has made since 2001.
Question #47. International Monetary Fund.--As we all know, just a
few weeks ago this committee passed a bill with a strong bipartisan
vote, which in addition to providing aid to Ukraine, authorized U.S.
acceptance of the 2010 IMF reforms. When that bill ultimately reached
the Senate floor, however, the IMF reform provisions were removed due
to the opposition of some members who apparently disagree that these
reforms are in the interest of the United States.
Could you please state for the record the administration's
position on why approving the 2010 IMF reform package is in our
national interest, and what you think the impact of our failure
to approve the reforms would be to U.S. credibility and
international leadership and to the IMF's ability to respond to
global financial crises?
Answer. The Administration supports IMF reform because it would
give the IMF greater flexibility and resources to respond to crises of
geopolitical and economic significance, preserve the U.S. veto over
important institutional decisions, and do so without increasing the
U.S. financial commitment to the IMF. In 2010, G20 Leaders and the IMF
membership decided on a set of quota and governance reforms designed to
strengthen the IMF's role and effectiveness. The 2010 reforms increase
the permanent resources of the IMF and modernize its governance
structure to better reflect countries' economic weights in the global
economy and keep emerging economies anchored in the multilateral system
that the United States helped design and continues to lead. The reforms
would put the IMF's finances on a more stable long-term footing, which
would provide the institution with more financial flexibility in
lending additional resources to countries in economic crisis such as
Ukraine. We are the last major economy to act and our approval is the
only remaining step for these important reforms to go into effect. We
appreciate the committee's support for hese forms.
U.S. leadership in the IMF promotes American core interests in
three ways: protecting the U.S. economy with the IMF as the first
responder when financial crises abroad threaten jobs and growth at
home; strengthening our national security; and designing and promoting
rules for an open global trade and financial system. The IMF promotes
financial stability and economic growth abroad, which in turn supports
U.S. jobs and exports, foreign direct investment in the United States,
and America's economic health and prosperity. The IMF reforms are
necessary to maintain our strong leadership position and influence in
the IMF and to maintain the integrity of the IMF's financial structure.
Inaction on quota reform has caused other IMF members to question
our commitment to the institution and to the multilateral system that
we helped create. At the IMF spring meetings this year, an increasing
number of countries called for identifying ways to move forward on IMF
quota and governance reforms without the United States.
As the United States has delayed approving the 2010 reforms, other
countries have sought to increase their influence in the institution,
outside of the IMF's quota-based financial and governance structures in
which the United States exercises its leadership role. Furthermore, if
Congress does not authorize acceptance of the 2010 reforms, it could
harm our influence and overall credibility not only at the IMF, but
also at the G20 and with emerging economies. A failure to reform the
IMF could also give new momentum to regional alternatives such as a
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) development bank
and currency support arrangements. These would divert resources from
the IMF and exclude the United States. Congressional approval of U.S.
support for the 2010 reforms is necessary to reaffirm the U.S.
leadership position and reinforce the IMF's central position in the
global financial system, at a time when emerging economies explore
establishing new and parallel financial institutions.
Question #48. Intellectual Property.--We have an economy
increasingly driven by innovation, and this has created millions of
jobs, spurred stronger economic growth, and enabled the United States
to remain among the most economically competitive countries in the
world. However, I have serious concerns about the inadequate protection
of property rights in a number of important emerging economies, and
even by some of our closest allies. The administration has made an
effort to encourage stronger IP protections, including direct
interventions by the President and Vice President, multiple Cabinet
Secretaries and, of course, yourself. However, many American U.S.
companies continue to struggle with unfair treatment in many markets
around the world.
Given the increasing importance of innovative sectors of
our economy, is the administration considering a whole-of-
government strategy to ensure the fruits of American innovation
are properly protected?
Answer. Protecting the fruits of American innovation is a high
priority for the administration, and we use a whole-of-government
strategy with this aim. The State Department partners with other U.S.
Government agencies and works with international organizations,
including the World Intellectual Property Organization and the World
Trade Organization, to promote laws and enforcement of laws that
protect patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets around the
world. In coordination with the Office of the Intellectual Property
Enforcement Coordinator, the State Department is facilitating
Intellectual Property Enforcement Working Groups at 17 key embassies to
bring together all agencies at post to better coordinate U.S.
Government resources devoted to protected U.S. intellectual property.
This coordination is also evident in State's funding of intellectual
property rights enforcement and technical assistance training provided
by the Department of Justice, Customs and Border Protection, and the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. We encourage businesses to use the
tools available to register their intellectual property, and we
advocate for them when their rights are violated. We also conduct
public diplomacy campaigns, often with content stakeholder support, to
spread the word that respecting intellectual property is in everyone's
interest if they want a world that benefits from innovation and
creativity.
Question #49. Global Health.
Over the past few years, PEPFAR has emphasized the country
ownership model, whereby partner countries commit to investing
in their own health care systems. Please give some examples of
steps countries have taken to demonstrate political commitment
to fighting HIV/AIDS and investing in national HIV/AIDS plans.
What is the United States doing to encourage and facilitate the
development of policies that strengthen health systems in
recipient countries?
PEPFAR funding is essential to the development and
strengthening of health care systems worldwide. What do you
anticipate will be the impact of the reduction? Are these
reductions tied to the country ownership model?
Answer. Greater country ownership is key to ensuring that the
PEPFAR investments, systems, and capacities that have been established
in the program to date continue in the long-term. Through our
partnerships, we have saved millions of lives, and our paramount
responsibility is ensuring that those to whom we provide treatment and
care continue to receive treatment and care during our transitions.
Under PEPFAR we have learned that political leadership, local
management and technical capabilities, supportive public health
institutions and communities, and mutual accountability are factors
that affect the degree to which countries are ready to assume
responsibility for the prevention, treatment, and care of people
dependent on services that the United States has been providing. With
our partner countries, we need to share the common goal of using
scientific data with adequate financing to invest in proven
interventions and key populations to achieve continued progress toward
an AIDS-free generation.
In countries where PEPFAR funds have been used to provide support
for direct service delivery in prevention, care, and treatment
programs, PEPFAR teams have delivered transition successes in
conjunction with their country counterparts. Health care workers
previously trained and funded by PEPFAR are now funded by the
government. Delivery of clinical services has transitioned from
international NGOs to the Ministry of Health, local NGOs, and faith-
based local providers. National procurement and delivery of commodities
are funded by domestic resources. In all cases, these successes have
been possible due to strong partnerships and sustained because of
strong political will and commitment. In addition, across multiple
countries, PEPFAR has registered successful transfers of
responsibilities for the care of key populations--groups that may have
difficulties accessing health and support services--to local civil
society.
Across former focus countries, district- and provincial-level
government and nongovernmental entities have assumed the role of direct
service provider, enabling efficiencies and maintaining or improving
performance. We are monitoring the use and impact of evidenced-based
scientific interventions through our newly launched quality strategy.
To optimize the impact of investments, expand population coverage, and
retain more patients in care, PEPFAR is developing, in partnership with
host countries, strategies for strengthening the quality of clinical
services with a focus on improving linkage, engagement, and retention
in care. These strategies are rooted in sound international standards
and locally relevant strategies for quality management so that the best
possible results are achieved from PEPFAR and domestic investments.
PEPFAR is also monitoring the readiness for and impact of
transitions through a series of joint assessments with countries that
will be taking on additional responsibility. These assessments focus on
identifying what additional capacities are required for local
partners--governments, research, development, and academic
institutions, NGOs, the private sector, and civil society networks and
communities--to lead, manage, and monitor internal and external efforts
to address HIV/AIDS in country. Part of this process includes
supporting a country's ability to drive the process to identify,
source, and manage ongoing capacity-building efforts as a sustained
government-led effort to target change, facilitated by capacity-
building frameworks and indicators developed by PEPFAR in conjunction
with our partners.
Our health partnership with South Africa is a model we are learning
from, and continue to evolve with our partners in other countries, for
transition to greater country ownership. Throughout the evolution of
all of our partnerships, we have never lost sight of our shared goals:
to enable more people in need of HIV/AIDS services to receive them, and
ensure that those who already receive these services continue doing so.
Strong partnerships with many diverse stakeholders are vital to
achieving these goals. Where we face challenges, we work jointly to
address them. For example, as some patients move from one facility to
another, they can get lost in the system. Preventing this ``loss to
followup'' is a challenge in any health system, including within the
United States. PEPFAR continues to work closely with our South African
partners to support the rollout of monitoring systems to ensure
patients are properly tracked over time and retained in care.
As PEPFAR moves from an emergency to a sustainability response, we
are extremely cognizant of the challenges that partner nations face as
we make this transition. Every country is situated at a different point
on the continuum of country ownership, with a different range of needs
and strengths. Advancing sustainability in a way that is tailored to
each specific circumstance will require time and careful planning.
PEPFAR is committed to ensuring that the eventual transfer of program
management, implementation, and ownership to the host country occurs
smoothly and at a pace appropriate to the local context. There is not a
one-size-fits-all approach to country ownership. The eventual
transition of PEPFAR program activities to host countries will occur in
a step-wise manner, at a pace appropriate to their local context. In
all countries, PEPFAR's goal is to support the country in achieving an
AIDS-free generation, increasing the impact of core interventions, as
well as protecting our investments and the patients on the ground.
Question #50. Gender Based Violence.--Gender-based violence remains
a rampant problem in many of the world's conflicts, including Syria,
Burma, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Please provide an update
on implementation of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and
Security.
How, if at all, has implementation of the Administration's
National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security made a
difference in these countries?
Answer. The Department of State is devoted to supporting the United
States unqualified commitment to protect and empower women in countries
threatened and affected by war and conflict, violence and insecurity.
Through the Department's leadership role in U.S. diplomatic engagement,
its foreign assistance programming, and robust relationships with civil
society actors across the globe, during fiscal year 2013 we built on
longstanding efforts to integrate women's views and perspectives into
our diplomatic, security and development efforts in Syria, Burma, the
DRC and dozens of other countries. In line with the protection and
relief and recovery pillars of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women,
Peace and Security, in 2013, the State Department and USAID launched a
new initiative, Safe from the Start, to strengthen the humanitarian
system's capacity to prevent and respond to gender-based violence from
the onset of an emergency. Safe from the Start was launched with an
initial commitment of $10 million. The first partners to receive
funding were UNHCR and ICRC in 2013. This funding will go toward hiring
specialized staff, launching new programs, and developing innovative
methods to protect women and girls at the onset of emergencies
worldwide.
Syria
Guided by the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and
Security, which articulates a link between protection and
prevention, the Department and USAID are working to support a
resolution to the conflict in Syria in which women can be
active participants in peace-building in Syria. Toward this
end, the Department and USAID continue to support a range of
efforts aimed not only at protecting these vulnerable
populations, but ensuring all Syrians have the opportunity to
participate in conversations about the future of their country.
The Department continues to advocate for the protection of
vulnerable populations, including women and girls, in this and
all other situations by working with our partners to prevent
and respond to gender-based violence (GBV), including sexual
violence. Through our support to U.N. agencies and NGOs, the
Department and USAID are providing assistance to gender-based
violence survivors in Syria and to those who have fled to
neighboring countries. Both our U.N. and NGO partners work with
refugee hosting governments to develop capacity in the health
sector, to increase awareness of gender-based violence and to
meet the specific needs of survivors.
Protecting and supporting women in meeting their unique
needs is an important component of the National Action Plan's
commitment to women becoming active participants in conflict
resolution. We continue to incorporate women with Department-
funded training and workshops related to peace processes, local
governance, civil society capacity building, and countering
violent extremism. Working with Syrians and several
international actors, the Department played an important role
in advocating for the inclusion of women at the negotiations
table at the Geneva II conference in January.
Lastly, the National Action Plan articulates a link between
prevention and protection in holding perpetrators of mass
atrocities, including GBV, accountable. An integral part of the
Department's investments in accountability is supporting
documentation of violations committed by all sides for use in
future Syrian led transitional justice and accountability
processes.
Burma
The Department continues to engage the Government of Burma,
civil society and particularly women's groups to support
greater women's representation in the peace process. Our
activities include small grants to women's organizations to
fortify trust across religious and ethnic divides, strengthen
community resiliency, and increase agency to more directly
contribute to the nationwide peace process.
These efforts are often paired with localized outreach to
women's civil society groups gauging women's views and concerns
about their role in public life. Additionally, the Department
elevated women's participation in conflict resolution and
political leadership through a small grants program supported
by the Abbot Fund's partnership and the Secretary of State's
International Fund for Women and Girls.
The Department, under the leadership of the Trafficking in
Persons Office, engaged with international partners to develop
common policy frameworks for combating human trafficking. For
example, diplomatic efforts led by Ambassador CdeBaca and a
U.S. delegation to the inaugural bilateral dialogue on human
trafficking with Burma in August allowed an open exchange of
ideas and best practices as well as funding for technical
assistance to the Government of Burma's newly established
antihuman trafficking division.
DRC
We remain concerned about the continuing epidemic of gender-
based violence (GBV) throughout the DRC, including sexual
violence and the use of mass rape as a tactic of war. The U.S.
Government is committed to preventing and responding to GBV
through diplomatic and foreign assistance initiatives, pursuant
to both the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security
and the U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based
Violence Globally.
For example, democracy and governance programs seek to fight
impunity, including through national-level legal reforms, while
community awareness activities educate and mobilize local
communities to promote women's rights and protection for the
entire community. USAID has allocated millions to respond to
and prevent GBV across the DRC, providing care and treatment
services for GBV survivors, including access to medical care,
counseling and family mediation, social and economic
reintegration support, as well as legal aid. The President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is also investing
significantly in the DRC to address GBV across HIV prevention,
care and treatment platforms.
In addition to direct services for survivors, the United
States is working to strengthen institutions and promote rule
of law through our contributions to U.N. peacekeeping
operations. The Department continues to highlight the security
of vulnerable populations, including protection from GBV, as a
core component of civilian protection mandates in U.N.
missions. Furthermore, the Department led international efforts
to ensure successful implementation of the U.N.'s policy of
zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N.
personnel. In an effort to improve the effectiveness of the
databases used to screen personnel, our Department funded the
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo's (MONUSCO) profiling project,
which compiles data on perpetrators of human rights abuses in
DRC.
The Department emphasized the relationship between prospects
for justice and accountability for GBV and women's
participation in conflict resolution and judicial processes. In
the DRC, the Department, led by the Special Envoy for the Great
Lakes and backed by the Office of Global Criminal Justice,
engaged with signatories to a peace declaration outlining
specific limitations on amnesty for sexual violence crimes. The
agreement set a clear international marker ensuring that
accountability for sexual violence crimes constitutes an
integral part of peacebuilding and conflict resolution.
In addition to providing specialized training for law
enforcement and judicial actors, the Department assisted the
DRC in establishing specialized judicial infrastructure to
address GBV and developed tools to strengthen the capacity of
these initiatives. Our Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) supported the American Bar
Association's mobile courts program which has provided legal
counseling to 2,275 survivors of SGBV and filed 1,930 cases
with local authorities, resulting in 461 trials and 378
convictions in the North and South Kivu provinces. The program
also included medical support for victims and reinforced the
link between access to services and access to justice by
training medical and legal professionals on the documentation
of evidence for prosecution.
Question #51. Gender Based Conflict.--What is the breakdown of
resources the Department has obligated and disbursed toward the
implementation of the Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based
Violence Globally for the remainder of FY 2014 given the $150 million
appropriation in the FY 2014 Consolidated Appropriations bill? Does the
Department plan to allocate similar funds in FY 2015 to maintain the
work?
Answer. Based on our current allocations, we expect to exceed $150
million for gender-based violence programming in FY 2014. Our FY 2015
Request includes $139 million to continue these programs that implement
the Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based Violence Globally.
Maintaining the commitment to respond and reduce gender-based violence
is a strategic priority for U.S. foreign assistance.
Question #52. Trafficking.--NGOs report that exploitation and abuse
of domestic workers brought to the U.S. by diplomats and consular
officials is commonplace, and the Khobragade case is just the tip of
the iceberg. For example, a new civil case was just filed against the
Consulate General of Bangladesh for similar abuses. What strategies is
the Department of State developing to help prevent trafficking, both
labor and sex exploitation, of workers coming in on nonimmigrant visas,
specifically domestic workers by their diplomat employers?
Answer. The State Department takes very seriously its
responsibility to prevent the abuse of domestic workers employed by
diplomats and consular officials and its obligation to address
allegations of abuse of these workers. The Department has implemented
safeguards to prevent abuse, including requiring foreign missions to
``pre-notify'' the Office of Protocol or the United States Mission to
the United Nations (USUN), of any prospective domestic worker who may
accompany or join a diplomat. This ensures that the Department has an
up-to-date record of all domestic workers working for diplomatic
personnel in the United States. Before domestic workers are issued A-3
or G-5 visas, they must be interviewed by a U.S. consular officer
abroad, and are required to present a written contract in a language
the domestic worker understands. At the visa interview, they are given
a ``Know Your Rights'' pamphlet, which provides them with information
on how to contact an assistance hotline in the United States. We have
also recently released a ``Know Your Rights'' video to be shown in
consular waiting rooms worldwide, initially available in 39 languages,
with additional translations to follow.
In recent years, the Department has prohibited cash payments of
wages to domestic workers of diplomats and consular officials. These
domestic workers must be paid by check or direct deposit into a local
bank account to which only they have access. Wage deductions for any
expenses, including meals and lodging, are also now prohibited.
The Department immediately responds to allegations of abuse of
domestic workers. We place an immediate hold on the employing
diplomat's file so that he or she may not obtain any subsequent A-3/G-5
employees until the matter has been resolved to the satisfaction of the
Department. The Department's Office of Protocol and USUN take
allegations of abuse very seriously, conveying concern about each and
every serious allegation in writing to the chief of the respective
diplomatic mission and requesting a timely reply to the issues raised.
The trafficking experts within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's
Criminal Investigations Division, working closely with Protocol or
USUN, will initiate an investigation into such allegations, often
requesting that the Chief of Mission make available the subject of the
investigation for a voluntary interview. In the conduct of these
investigations, the State Department works closely with the Department
of Justice.
The Department of State monitors allegations of abuse with an
interbureau internal working group comprised of representatives of the
Office of Protocol, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in
Persons, USUN, the Office of Foreign of Missions, the Office of the
Legal Adviser, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, and representatives of regional bureaus with active
allegations. The Bureau of Consular Affairs regularly trains consular
officers and periodically updates the Foreign Affairs Manual to provide
consular officers with education and support in order to better
recognize human trafficking indicators, and the Office of Protocol
sends circular notes to the diplomatic community regarding their
obligations with respect to the employment of domestic workers.
In addition, the Office of Protocol provides annual briefings to
the Deputy Chiefs of diplomatic missions on the issue of trafficking in
persons and the legal and policy requirements for the employment of
domestic workers by foreign mission personnel. USUN recently conducted
such a briefing for the heads of missions to the United Nations. The
Office of Protocol launched its first briefing of domestic workers in
the Washington, DC, area in 2012 and will provide such briefings
annually to ensure that domestic workers understand their rights and
responsibilities, as well as the resources available to them should
they suffer abuse or mistreatment. The Office of Protocol has also
engaged nongovernmental organizations in discussions about the
Department's requirements related to the employment of domestic workers
by diplomatic personnel.
Questions #53, #54, #55.
53. Civilian Security.--There are reports that indicate
evidence of official policies of persecution by the Government
of Burma against the minority Muslim Rohingya ethnic group and
warning signs of genocide. Are you concerned about the risk of
genocide in Burma and what is the administration doing to
address the concerns around ongoing persecution of Muslims and
other ethnic minority groups in Burma?
54. Human Rights Watch and other NGOs have reported on
evidence of official policies of persecution by the Government
of Myanmar or Burma against the minority Muslim Rohingya ethnic
group and warned about red flags for possible atrocities and
ethnic cleansing. Are you concerned about the risk of mass
atrocities against the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar? What is the
administration doing to address the concerns around ongoing
persecution of Muslims and other ethnic minority groups in that
country?
55. The Rohingya.--The Rohingya, a Muslim minority long
resident in Burma, are essentially stateless, and lack basic
rights, including the rights to work, travel, and marry. They
routinely suffer forced labor, confiscation of property,
arbitrary arrest and detention, and physical and sexual
violence. In addition, several hundred thousand reside in
squalid conditions in Bangladeshi camps. Please describe recent
efforts by the Department to address the multiple crises facing
the Rohingya, and the concrete results of those efforts.
Answer. This answer addresses QFR numbers 53, 54, and 55 on the
Rohingya.
The administration has long been active in pressing the Government
of Burma to address the problems surrounding discrimination toward
ethnic minorities including the Rohingya. While we continue to assess
that Burma's overall reform efforts are positive, the situation in
Rakhine State is deteriorating. We are greatly concerned about the risk
for further violence, and are using all the tools at our disposal to
try to prevent further violence. The departure of INGOs in particular
greatly concerns us, not only because of the dire humanitarian
implications, but also because the absence of eye and ears on the
ground increases the risk of violence.
The situation was exacerbated when ethnic Rakhine mobs attacked
U.N. and INGO offices and warehouses on March 26-27, resulting in the
departure of U.N. and INGO staff from Rakhine State, extensive damage
to humanitarian assets, and the temporary suspension of nearly all
humanitarian operations throughout Rakhine State. Despite the recent
return of U.N. and INGO staff, humanitarian access remains limited and
U.N. and INGOs have not been able to resume full operations to provide
life-saving services to vulnerable populations in Rakhine.
The humanitarian situation is compounded by the government's
overall inadequate management of Rakhine State. The stateless Muslim
Rohingya, who are largely regarded as illegal immigrants, have for
decades been targeted with discriminatory laws and practices, including
birth limitation policies, restrictions on freedom of movement, and
stripping of citizenship. The central Burmese Government has failed to
address the underlying issues related to discrimination, security,
access to justice, provision of humanitarian assistance, and
reconciliation. The increasingly segregated local communities each view
the other as a threat. Conditions in camps for over 140,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and other vulnerable people in Rakhine State
are worsening, as many lack access to life-saving medical services, as
well as sufficient water, sanitation, and food. Burma's monsoon season
begins in May exposing tens of thousands of vulnerable populations to
additional risk from incoming cyclones and torrential rain.
We are very concerned the limited humanitarian space and poor
conditions in the IDP camps raise the risk of violence. The situation
in Rakhine State is also exacerbating nationalist anti-Muslim sentiment
elsewhere in the country, which could intensify as 2015 election
campaigning ramps up.
We raise our concerns with the highest levels of government at
every opportunity, travel regularly to Rakhine State, and are in
constant communication in Washington and in Burma with INGOs and the
U.N. For example, EAP Assistant Secretary Danny Russel recently met
with President Thein Sein to discuss the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine
State in depth, and urged the central government to take full
responsibility of the crisis, hold accountable those individuals
responsible for the violence, and to take immediate steps toward
providing necessary security to facilitate the full return of INGOs and
resumption of aid delivery. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Wendy
Sherman likewise raised concerns about the situation in Rakhine State
and the status of INGOs and delivery of aid in all of her government
meetings during her March visit. In Rangoon, Ambassador Mitchell
regularly chairs diplomatic roundtables to help align positions among
international community representatives in the field. We are pressing
the government to strengthen the rule of law and to articulate a clear
plan for achieving durable solutions, to include implementing a path to
citizenship for the Rohingya.
The State Department, through PRM, supports the work of two primary
partners in the region, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). UNHCR
continues to work toward resolving the protracted situation of Burmese
refugees and asylum seekers in Thailand, Rohingya in Bangladesh, and
other vulnerable Burmese populations in Malaysia, China, India and
elsewhere throughout the region. Durable solutions include voluntary
return and reintegration, local integration, and third country
resettlement.
State/PRM also supports the International Organization for
Migration to improve the capacity of governments to protect and assist
vulnerable migrants by drafting a national trafficking action plan with
the Burmese Government, establish bilateral standard operating
procedures for repatriation and reintegration of victims of trafficking
between Burma and neighboring countries, and train Thai Government
officials on trafficking victim identification and counseling.
In 2012-2013, USAID's Office of Food for Peace and Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance provided nearly $15 million in humanitarian
assistance to support the populations displaced by conflict in Rakhine
State. This assistance was used to deliver food, water, sanitation and
nutritional supplies to displaced populations. In FY 2013, PRM provided
over $39.2 million in humanitarian assistance for Burmese IDPs in Burma
and Burmese refugees and asylum seekers, including the Rohingya, in
neighboring countries in the region.
Question #56. CSO.--A recent Inspector General report on the Bureau
of Conflict and Stabilization Operations highlighted some key
challenges. What's being done to follow up on the report's
recommendations, including the lack of clarity surrounding the CSO
Bureau's strategic direction?
Answer. CSO submitted its official response to the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) on April 23, 2014.
CSO takes the OIG inspection seriously and is addressing the
report's recommendations. CSO developed detailed action plans for each
of its 35 assigned recommendations and has already implemented 18 of
the 35 recommendations. CSO is working with our partners in the State
Department to implement the recommendations assigned to them.
CSO is committed to professionalizing the Bureau's administrative
practices. Since October 2013, CSO has hired experienced Human
Resources and Finance Directors who have been charged with aligning
Bureau policies with Department regulations. CSO has brought on board
an experienced IT advisor to correct our IT deficiencies.
CSO has taken several steps to clarify and refine its mission.
During the time of the inspection, CSO developed its Functional Bureau
Strategy, part of a regular State Department planning process. This
update of CSO mission and goals involved extensive consultations with
the staff of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and
Human Rights (J), the J bureaus, the regional bureaus, Ambassadors
stationed in conflict countries, and State Department leadership. To
further integrate our mission into the broader State Department
mission, CSO participated in the drafting of the Fragile States section
of the State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan and is working with J on the
development of a strategic plan for the J family of bureaus. Finally,
CSO created an internal working group to build consensus around CSO's
mission, capabilities, and operations.
CSO is committed to working with the interagency and expanding our
capacity to deploy experts to conflict areas. In the coming months, CSO
and J will consult with the State Department's Bureau of Legislative
Affairs, the Office of the Legal Advisor, and the National Security
Council to refine our understanding of the ``whole-of-government''
approach to conflict prevention and response, and will further clarify
CSO's responsibilities related to interagency coordination. CSO will
develop and implement action plans to address CSO's coordination and
surge responsibilities as dictated by the defined ``whole-of-
government'' approach.
As these efforts bear fruit, CSO will execute a strategic
communications plan to explain its mission, capabilities, and
operations within the State Department, to Congress and to the public.
CSO would welcome your ideas on our strategic direction and would be
pleased to provide you or your staff with more information or a
briefing.
Question #57. Atrocity Prevention.--This month marks the 20th
anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and 2 years since the establishment
of the Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board. Since the Atrocities
Prevention Board's inception, what reforms has the Department of State
undertaken to strengthen its capacity to prevent mass atrocities and
how was this reflected in your FY 2015 budget request to Congress?
Moving forward, what other key reforms must be institutionalized and
how can Congress best support you in fulfilling U.S. commitments with
regard to preventing mass atrocities and protecting civilians?
Answer. Since the inception of the Atrocities Prevention Board
(APB), the Department of State has identified its existing political,
economic, diplomatic tools relevant to atrocity prevention work, and
has worked on implementing and, where relevant, enhancing these tools
for effective atrocity prevention. The State Department has also taken
steps to expand the pool of civilian expertise to identify and enhance
tools and assess and respond to risks of mass atrocities within the
U.S. Government.
The State Department developed a Diplomatic Engagement strategy,
which centers on increased collaboration with the multilateral,
regional, and civil society organizations, as well as partner
governments. Conversations on enhancing prevention work have begun with
the United Nations in both Geneva and New York, with the European
Union, and dialogues will take place later this year with NATO, the OAS
and the AU. We have also enhanced partnerships with the Office of the
Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human rights, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, Justice Rapid Response, and the American Bar Association
Rule of Law Initiative.
The State Department introduced a new tool in the War Crimes
Rewards legislation that the President signed in January. Acting on
this new authority, the State Department recently designated Joseph
Kony and other senior leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army, as well as
Sylvestre Mudacumura from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda, for rewards of up to $5 million.
The Atrocities Prevention Board interagency provided policy
guidance on resource reallocation to six main priority areas, which is
also reflected in the Department's FY 2015 budget submissions. These
priority areas include work related to: (1) promoting early warning of
atrocity threats; (2) isolating perpetrators of atrocities; (3) surging
specialized skills and expertise to address emerging atrocity threats;
(4) strengthening local and regional processes and institutions that
address core grievances and mitigate potential threats; (5) building
capacity in multilateral organizations and institutions; and (6)
ensuring training and learning within the U.S. Government. Most bureaus
incorporated work related to atrocity prevention in their bureau
strategy, and U.S. embassies did the same in their integrated country
strategies. Staying in line with the APB's function outlined in
Presidential Study Directive 10, the FY 2015 requests did not reflect
additional requests for funding but rather re-allocated existing Bureau
and Department funding to efforts related to atrocity prevention.
In 2013, the Atrocities Prevention Board and partners completed the
first National Intelligence Estimate on Global Risks of Mass Atrocities
and Prospects for International Response. The National Intelligence
Estimate guides the interagency's prevention and response efforts in
medium risk countries, high risk countries, and countries where
atrocities are already taking place.
The Department has developed an atrocity assessment framework in
conjunction with our USAID colleagues, which highlights the need to
identify and understand the means and motives of potential
perpetrators, targeted groups and third parties. The Department
developed a monitoring tool that helps country watchers systematically
track an escalation of short-term atrocity risks over time. Finally,
the Department developed ways to target U.S. leverage for atrocity
prevention, including use of early warning, economic leverage,
diplomatic engagement, community outreach, as well as accountability
and reconciliation efforts.
Question #58 (a-e). South Sudan.--The Intergovernmental Authority
on Development (IGAD) has been essential to the negotiation process
thus far, and is now proposing the deployment of a regional
stabilization force to enforce the cessation of hostilities.
(a). What is your assessment of this stabilization force?
How will it complement or complicate the work of the IGAD
monitoring mission in South Sudan?
Answer. We deeply appreciate the leadership of IGAD in seeking a
peaceful resolution to the crisis in South Sudan. We welcome the
region's work to support implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities
(CoH) agreement in South Sudan, including through IGAD's proposal to
deploy a force to South Sudan comprised of troops from IGAD and other
regional states. We believe that this force must deploy under the U.N.
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to provide force protection for the
Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) and to reinforce UNMISS's
protection of civilians mandate. IGAD and the U.N.'s Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) are finalizing agreement on the
deployment of this force under UNMISS.
(b). Last month, the African Union announced the formation
of the Commission of Inquiry, to be headed by former Nigerian
President Obasanjo. As you know, many of us in Congress are
very concerned about the issue of accountability for human
rights abuses. How does the administration plan to support the
work of the Commission? Is such support taken into account as
part of the FY15 budget request?
Answer. The United States welcomes the creation of the African
Union (AU) Commission of Inquiry (COI). The AU's announcement sets
forth ambitious and commendable goals for the COI that include
determining the causes of the current conflict, establishing the facts
regarding possible violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law, and making recommendations for justice,
accountability, and reconciliation. We will closely watch how the COI
moves forward in fulfilling its mandate.
The U.S. Government stands ready to support COI efforts to carry
out its goals. We have offered an array of tools to support to the COI,
including providing technical experts with experience in international
criminal investigations and the collection, preservation, and analysis
of forensic evidence; identifying and sharing information relevant to
the COI's mandate; providing advice and support to the Commission on
engaging in public outreach; and facilitating the inclusion of South
Sudanese civil society voices into the work of the COI which could be
supported within the administration's FY15 budget request.
We strongly believe that the investigation and prosecution of
atrocity crimes is fundamental to dealing with a legacy of mass abuses,
preventing future violence, and establishing a lasting peace. We
welcome this announcement as a key step in opening space for inclusive
discussions on justice that will help address deep grievances in South
Sudan. We will also continue to support efforts that seek to bring
peace, justice and reconciliation to the people of South Sudan.
(c). According to the U.N. officials, independent human
rights monitors, and even the State Department's own recent
annual Human Rights report, grave human rights abuses have been
attributed to South Sudan's security forces, both in the
context of the current conflict and prior to the outbreak of
hostilities in December. In the context of these allegations
and the apparent lack of accountability under President Kiir's
administration, under what conditions would the State
Department propose to resume security assistance, now halted,
for the country's security forces?
Answer. The State Department will not consider resuming military
assistance to South Sudan until: a peace agreement has been signed and
implemented; the parties have demonstrated that the conditions
underlying the current fighting are being addressed; and there is
commitment to ending human rights abuses, violations and atrocities,
and holding perpetrators accountable. If or when military assistance
resumes, proposed recipients will be vetted for gross violations of
human rights in accordance with the Leahy Law and State Department
Leahy Law implementation policy. We value a security partnership with
South Sudan that is based on mutual commitments to peace, human rights,
and democracy.
(d). Given the numerous responsibilities of UNMISS and the
increasingly negative view of the mission in country, what do
you believe is the proper role of UNMISS moving forward? What
role, if any, should UNMISS play in monitoring the cessation of
hostilities agreement and why?
Answer. The United States has begun negotiations within the U.N.
Security Council (UNSC) on a revised UNMISS mandate that emphasizes
protection of civilians, in response to recommendations in the U.N.
Secretary General's March 6, 2014, report. UNSC members broadly agree
that the mission should reprioritize its activities around the
protection of civilians, supporting the delivery of humanitarian
assistance, and human rights monitoring and investigation. In addition,
IGAD and other countries from the region likely will deploy forces to
UNMISS that, in addition to supporting the core tasks of the mission
described above, will provide force protection for the MVM in its
activities related to implementation of the CoH.
(e). It seems that negotiations in Addis Ababa are at a
standstill. What is the status of talks and what pressure
should the U.S. consider applying to encourage meaningful
progress?
Answer. The President's Special Envoy is in Addis Ababa pressing
all sides involved in the conflict to respect the Cessation of
Hostilities agreement and to seriously engage in good faith in the
IGAD-led peace process immediately. Additionally, we are engaging and
coordinating our efforts with our partners in the region and with our
Troika and EU partners to further increase pressure upon all parties
for meaningful progress. In the Secretary's recent trip to South Sudan,
he pressed President Kiir and subsequently Riek Machar, by phone, to
travel to Addis Ababa themselves.
Question #59. Central African Republic.--The U.S. response to the
humanitarian, political, and security crisis in the Central African
Republic (CAR) has increased dramatically in recent months,
particularly as the crisis in CAR has become more desperate. While the
response to the immediate crisis has been critical, the protracted
nature of the situation in CAR will require sustained United States and
international support.
The FY15 request sets aside $150 million to respond to
unanticipated requirements of peacekeeping missions. Would this
amount be sufficient should a U.N. mission be established in
CAR? Do we have any sense of what a mission such as that
proposed by the U.N. Secretary General might cost?
As I understand it, BINUCA--the U.N. political mission in
the Central African Republic--is still acquiring the
appropriate staff and resources to function effectively. The
mission will no doubt be integral to the interim government as
they reestablish law and order in the country. What is the
status of BINUCA's operations and what specifically is the
mission's focus over the next 6 months?
The number of women, adolescents, and children in the CAR
and South Sudan that have been killed, injured, subjected to
gender-based violence, and/or forcibly recruited into armed
forces and groups is astounding. What is the U.S. Government
doing to urge all armed forces and groups in CAR and South
Sudan to immediately cease grave violations against civilians,
especially women and children?
Answer. Based on preliminary estimates, the annual cost of the new
U.N. peacekeeping operation in CAR, once it reaches full operating
capacity some time well into 2015, could cost between $1 billion to
$1.2 billion. The U.S. assessed share at the current rate of 28.36
percent would therefore be roughly $283 million to $340 million per
annum. The $150 million Peacekeeping Response Mechanism (PKRM) request
is intended to address urgent and unanticipated requirements, whether
assessed or voluntary, where funding is urgently needed in response to
new or changing requirements. Some of the startup costs or initial
assessments associated with the U.N. peacekeeping operation in CAR
might be met appropriately with the PKRM. However, in determining
whether and how to use the PKRM, the Department would need to consider
a range of future needs, inclusive of U.N. missions and African-led
regional operations.
Pursuant to UNSC resolution 2149 (April 2014), BINUCA was
immediately subsumed into the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA). MINUSCA is
tasked with supporting the transitional government to reestablish law
and order and to take the leading role in assisting the transitional
government with the political transition and the electoral process, as
well in mediation and reconciliation processes. The mission will also
continue to monitor and report on the human rights situation. On
September 15, 2014, when its military component will be deployed,
MINUSCA will begin to implement its mandated tasks, including the
protection of civilians, facilitating access for humanitarian
assistance, supporting the creation of local policing capability, and
developing and implementing security sector reform and Disarmament,
Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR) processes.
The Security Council has requested that the U.N. Secretary General
accelerate the deployment of MINUSCA civilian personnel, including the
deployment of Child Protection and Women Protection Advisors. Moreover,
the U.N. Security Council has also authorized the deployment of
contractors as well as U.N. military enablers prior to September 15,
with the purpose of preparing the groundwork for the full deployment of
MINUSCA so that the mission will be up-and-running on time.
The United States believes that the quickest and most effective way
to prevent further atrocities, improve the security situation, and
increase humanitarian access is to support the African Union-led
International Support Mission in CAR (MISCA) and the French forces
during this interim period leading to the deployment of MINUSCA's
military component. The United States has committed up to $100 million
to transport French forces and to transport, to equip, and to train
MISCA forces in order to restore security and end the dire humanitarian
crisis that jeopardizes the lives of millions throughout the country.
We have airlifted Burundian and Rwandan troops to Bangui and will
continue to transport, equip, and train additional troops that are
identified. In early April, we delivered to MISCA the first tranche of
vehicles to improve mobility of MISCA's elements.
The United States also strongly supports targeted U.N. and U.S.
sanctions against those who threaten the peace, stability, and security
of the Central African Republic, including through human rights
violations and abuses. We believe that sanctioning these individuals
sends a strong message that supporting violence in CAR will not be
tolerated by the international community. We will continue to work with
our international partners to hold accountable all individuals
responsible for atrocities committed in CAR.
We also continue to support efforts to mitigate conflict and to
promote reconciliation between the varied communities, ethnic groups,
and religions in CAR. We have supported activities to promote religious
tolerance, including the April 8 visit by an interfaith delegation of
U.S. religious leaders to Bangui, which concluded with the signing by
CAR Government and religious leaders, civil society, and
representatives of the armed groups of a declaration supporting efforts
to promote reconciliation and peace in CAR and denouncing the use of
violence. We welcomed a delegation of CAR religious leaders to the
United States, which followed up on a State Department-hosted
interfaith dialogue in January, making clear our strong support for
efforts by CAR residents to encourage interfaith dialogue and oppose
religious violence.
Of course our humanitarian efforts continue, including an emphasis
on addressing the health consequences of widespread gender-based
violence as well as efforts to combat such violence in the first place.
Question #60. Democratic Republic of the Congo.--What kinds of
bilateral military assistance are planned for FY 2015? What conditions
has the administration placed on military aid to DRC, for example
regarding the demobilization of child soldiers and the prosecution of
human rights abusers within the DRC armed forces?
Answer. In FY 2013 and 2014, Foreign Military Financing and Sales
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Government were
restricted due to Presidential Determinations under the Child Soldiers
Prevention Act (CSPA) and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA). Partial waivers of restrictions in the CSPA and TVPA were
granted on the basis of U.S. national interest in both years, which
resulted in continuation of International Military Education and
Training (IMET), nonlethal Excess Defense Articles, issuance of
licenses for commercial sales of nonlethal defense articles, and
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funding. In 2013, the administration
recognized the important steps the DRC Government has taken to prevent
the recruitment of and demobilization of child soldiers, like signing
and implementing a national action plan. The administration notes that
the DRC Government has also begun to take steps to hold human rights
abusers within the DRC Armed Forces accountable for their actions. We
continue to work with the government to strengthen its efforts.
In FY 2015, in the absence of CSPA and TVPA restrictions, military
assistance would support institutional reform and professionalization
of the DRC Armed Forces. This includes building the capacity of the
military justice system, assisting in the development of the military
training and logistics systems and capabilities, and conducting
training to improve command and control of the military and relations
between the military and the civilian population.
Question #61. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).--Over the
last year, the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (MONUSCO) has seen two important innovations: the deployment
of an ``Intervention Brigade'' with a strong mandate to neutralize
armed groups in eastern Congo; and the deployment of unarmed unmanned
aerial vehicles (UUAVs) to help improve the situational awareness of
peacekeepers on the ground, potentially enhancing their ability to
protect civilians.
What are the potential implications of these recent
innovations for MONUSCO and U.N. peacekeeping in general? What
is your view regarding the U.N.'s willingness to adapt new
strategies and technologies?
Answer. MONUSCO is a critical part of the effort to stabilize the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and to create the security
conditions in eastern DRC necessary for lasting stability. In January
2013, the U.N. Security Council approved the use of force multipliers
such as UUAVs to improve MONUSCO's situational awareness, and to
promote force protection and advanced analysis and surveillance
capabilities. The administration strongly supported this effort. While
the U.N. has a learning curve with respect to this innovation, the
introduction of the UUAVs has already helped MONUSCO respond to threats
to the civilian population and to the mission itself.
The administration also supported the U.N. Security Council's
approval of the Intervention Brigade (IB) within MONUSCO tasked with
neutralizing and disarming armed groups. MONUSCO has long had the
authority within its mandate to use force to protect civilians from the
predations of armed groups. U.N. Security Council Resolution 2098
(March 2013) did not change that authority or the mission; instead, it
made it more explicit, by adding a brigade that is trained, organized,
and equipped to deal specifically with the array of armed groups and
other threats to civilians unique to eastern DRC. The Intervention
Brigade played a key role in the DRC military's and MONUSCO's joint
defeat of the M23 rebel group last fall.
The deployment of UUAVs and the creation of the Intervention
Brigade are examples of the U.N.'s willingness to embrace new ideas and
new technologies to better protect civilians and to give missions the
capabilities needed to carry out their mandates more effectively. The
U.N., with full U.S. support, is seeking to use technologies and
capacities in a more efficient way. To this aim, it created a
Capabilities Steering Group that is exploring new solutions, such as
intermission cooperation, to address challenges posed by new threat
environments and financial shortfalls.
Question #62 (a-b). Somalia.--We have heard repeated reports that
al-Shabaab is on its last legs, yet the number and boldness of the
organization's attacks have increased over the past several months. The
assault on Villa Somalia and the intimidation of Internet service
providers in their areas of control are especially troubling.
(a). What is your assessment of al-Shabaab's strength?
Answer. While al-Shabaab has lost territory and the ability to
govern most urban areas in Somalia, it remains a lethal terrorist group
with the intent and capability to attack civilians, government
officials, and U.S. interests in Somalia and the region.
Al-Shabaab continues to exploit divisions within Somalia and commit
asymmetric attacks to destabilize the country. In 2013, al-Shabaab
executed a wide spectrum of attacks in Mogadishu and throughout
Somalia, including sophisticated, asymmetrical attacks and
assassinations, and destruction of property.
Somalia remains a safe haven for al-Shabaab and the group continues
to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring
countries, particularly in Kenya. However, despite its successes, al-
Shabaab continues to face pressure from AMISOM and the Somali National
Security Forces and experience internal leadership disputes.
Working with our African partners to defeat al-Shabaab remains one
of our top priorities.
(b). How does the administration plan to support AMISOM in
its combined efforts to eradicate al-Shabaab in theater? What
measures does the administration plan to take in order to
prevent a security and service-provision vacuum once AMISOM has
cleared an area?
Answer. The United States provides nonlethal equipment, food, fuel,
and training advisors to support AMISOM and Somalia National Army (SNA)
soldiers. Since 2007, the United States has obligated over $512 million
in support of AMISOM. In October 2013, the Department of Defense
established a Military Coordination Cell in Somalia to provide planning
and advisory support to AMISOM and to coordinate with the SNA.
As AMISOM and the SNA work together in their offensive against al-
Shabaab, the Federal Government of Somalia, with support from the
international community, is implementing a stabilization plan that
provides interim governance and paves the way for humanitarian
assistance in areas free from al-Shabaab's control. The United States
will continue to coordinate with the Federal Government of Somalia and
international donors on stabilization efforts, specifically supporting
community driven quick impact activities in areas identified by the
stabilization plan.
Question #63. Cuts to Humanitarian Assistance.--Congress provided
robust funding for the humanitarian accounts, including the Migration
and Refugee Assistance Account in the FY 2014 appropriations bill as
the world faces unprecedented crises in Syria and the Middle East.
However, the FY 2015 request cuts the Migration and Refugee Account by
33 percent from the FY 2014 enacted levels. Recognizing there may be
some carry over from FY 2014 into FY 2015, we are still facing a
protracted crisis in Syria, simmering conflict in South Sudan, a
humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic and huge
uncertainty in Afghanistan.
The budget requests notes the USG will be able to respond
to the Syrian crisis with this requested level, but what about
other crises around the world like the Central African
Republic?
Are you confident that there are sufficient funds to
respond to a natural disaster or new emergency in FY 2015?
Answer. The administration remains dedicated to providing robust
support for humanitarian programs worldwide. The President's FY 2015
request includes $2.097 billion for the Migration Refugee Assistance
and the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance accounts and $1.3
billion for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account. The
Department of State and the United States Agency for International
Development plan to carry over significant FY 2014 funding into FY 2015
to support humanitarian assistance needs. Taken together, we anticipate
having the funds needed to support our humanitarian assistance goals in
Syria, Africa, and elsewhere. The President's FY 2015 request reflects
the administration's ongoing commitment to humanitarian programs, while
taking into account the current constrained budget environment.
Question #64. United Nations.--What is the current status of the
Palestinian effort to seek international recognition as a state in U.N.
fora? Please comment on recent reports that Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud
Abbas has submitted letters of accession for 15 multilateral treaties
or conventions.
Do you anticipate that the Palestinians will continue
efforts to pursue such recognition? How is the United States
working to address this issue?
Answer. The Palestinians have not pursued any additional
recognition efforts since President Abbas submitted letters of
accession to various conventions and treaties on April 1, 2014.
The United States continues to strongly oppose unilateral actions
that seek to circumvent or prejudge the very outcomes that can only be
negotiated. We believe the only way to a two-state solution is through
direct negotiations between the two sides.
We are disappointed by unilateral actions by either side and seek
to maintain an atmosphere conducive for ongoing negotiations. There is
still room for the Israelis and Palestinians to engage with one
another, and we are encouraging all sides to make the hard decisions
necessary to move negotiations forward. Meetings between the
negotiators continue, and the parties are engaging in serious and
intensive efforts.
Question #65. According to Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ``United Nations peacekeepers help promote
stability and help reduce the risks that major U.S. military
interventions may be required to restore stability in a country or
region. Therefore, the success of these operations is very much in our
national interest.''
Do you agree with this statement? From a diplomatic
perspective, why is it important for the United States to
continue to support U.N. peacekeeping?
Answer. I agree wholeheartedly with Admiral Mullen. We cannot nor
should we respond unilaterally to every crisis around the world. When
it is appropriate, the United States supports sending U.N. peacekeepers
as part of an agreed to, and cooperative multilateral strategy for,
restoring peace and stability. Under the right circumstances, a U.N.
peacekeeping operation may indeed be the best and the only response to
a crisis. In addition, U.N. peacekeeping helps spread the costs as well
as the risks. For example, a 2006 GAO study concluded that the cost to
the United States of conducting its own peace operation in a low-threat
environment like Haiti would be nearly eight times as much as what we
pay through U.N. assessments.
As one of the five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council,
we play a key role in formulating the Security Council's responses to
international crises. In many cases U.N. peacekeeping plays the right
role. However, it is not the only option. For example, the U.N.
Security Council currently has 16 sanctions regimes.
From a diplomatic perspective, our participation in, and support
for, U.N. peacekeeping operations means that we are working with 192
other member states to promote and maintain international peace and
stability. This close cooperation is integral to building mutual
respect and understanding, and to forging better relationships with a
wide range of partners.
Question #66. Maintaining stability in Sudan and South Sudan is a
key priority for the United States. Currently, we support three
separate peacekeeping missions in the region, but all are underfunded.
Due to the legislative cap on peacekeeping contributions that is
currently in place, the United States has not paid its full assessed
rate for any peacekeeping mission in fiscal years 2013 or 2014. This
has amounted to a shortfall of nearly $80 million for all three
peacekeeping missions currently operating in Sudan and South Sudan. The
President's FY 2015 request calls for Congress to allow us to pay our
peacekeeping dues at the full assessed rate of 28.3 percent.
How important is full funding to the missions in South
Sudan and elsewhere? And what does it say to troop contributing
countries when we don't fully pay for missions we voted for in
the Security Council?
Answer. Peacekeeping missions are critical tools to maintain
international peace and security, and to advance U.S. interests around
the world in places such as Haiti, Liberia, South Sudan, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali. The U.N. Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS) is currently sheltering over 68,000 civilians in the midst of
a conflict that has displaced over 1 million people, and is supporting
the delivery of humanitarian assistance in an environment of severe
food insecurity. Full funding of U.S. contributions is essential to
support mission operations and deployments, to curb accumulation of
funding shortfalls and potential arrears, and to allow continued U.S.
leadership in U.N. peacekeeping activities. Any reduction strains vital
U.N. peacekeeping operations and causes delays in reimbursements to
troop contributing countries that can affect future troop rotations. In
South Sudan, such shortfalls would significantly undermine efforts to
reinforce the mission during its greatest time of crisis.
The U.N.'s current assessment rate for the United States for
calendar year 2014 is 28.36 percent. However, at present, the
Department only has the authority to make payments from appropriated
funds at the calendar year 2012 assessed rate of 27.14 percent. Due to
the difference in the amount assessed and the amount authorized to pay
with appropriated funds, the United States has already accrued $117
million in new arrears stemming from FY 2013 assessments. Additional
arrears will continue to accrue for FY 2014. We are looking at
potential options to reduce or mitigate those arrears before they
impact mission operations, as well as to encourage the U.N. to further
pursue cost saving measures and efficiencies. However, budget
shortfalls strain vital U.N. peacekeeping operations and can cause
delays in reimbursements to troop contributing countries that affect
future troop rotations. As they accumulate over time, arrears will
begin to affect overall mission effectiveness and erode U.S.
negotiating strength in U.N. peacekeeping budget deliberations.
Question #67. U.N. Peacekeeping.--The President's FY 2015 budget
requests a sizable increase in funding for U.N. peacekeeping missions
next year. The FY 2014 omnibus appropriations bill significantly
underfunded our peacekeeping commitments by: (1) failing to provide any
funding for the U.N.'s new peacekeeping mission in Mali; (2) including
no language allowing the U.S. to pay its peacekeeping dues at the full
assessed rate. The combined effect of these and other shortfalls left
us at least $350 million short on our peacekeeping dues in FY 2014. As
a result, while the FY 2015 budget request does get us much closer to
fulfilling our financial obligations to U.N. peacekeeping, we still
have a good amount of ground to make up. The United States is now
suggesting there be a new mission in the Central African Republic
(CAR).
How do we do that if we are not fulfilling our financial
obligations to peacekeeping operations that are already in the
field, such as the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)?
Answer. The FY 2014 appropriations act creates challenges for the
United States to pay our anticipated U.N. peacekeeping assessments on
time and in full, to which the President and the administration remain
committed. We expect additional assessments during FY 2014 as a result
of the U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) troop surge in response to
the ongoing crisis there. Additionally, because the President's FY 2014
request was submitted to Congress prior to the creation of the MINUSMA,
it did not include a request for CIPA funds for the mission.
Accordingly, Congress did not appropriate any such funds in the FY 2014
appropriations act.
Similarly, on April 8--after the President submitted his FY 2015
budget request to Congress--the U.N. Security Council authorized the
U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic (MINUSCA). Due to the timing of the U.N.
authorization, the FY 2015 Budget does not include a request for CIPA
funds for MINUSCA. However, the President's FY 2015 Budget Request for
State and Foreign Operations does include $100 million in FY 2015 CIPA
funds to help offset FY 2014 MINUSMA assessments. The budget also
includes a $150 million request for a proposed Peacekeeping Response
Mechanism (PKRM), an account that would ensure the United States has
the ability going forward to respond to urgent and unexpected
peacekeeping requirements involving U.N., regional security
organizations, or coalition efforts, either assessed or voluntary,
without impacting ongoing, planned peacekeeping activities--exactly the
circumstance presented by MINUSMA for FY 2014 and MINUSCA for FY 2015.
Given the critical role that U.N. peacekeeping missions play in
protecting civilians under threat of physical violence, facilitating
the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance, and helping create
the conditions for lasting peace in countries emerging from conflict,
U.S. leadership demands that we continue to meet our treaty obligations
to pay in full our U.N. peacekeeping assessments and so avoid any
damage to mission operations and the risk that would pose for civilian
protection and international peace and security. We hope that Congress
will fully fund the President's FY 2015 request, including the
establishment and funding of the PKRM.
Furthermore, we continually press the U.N. to pursue cost saving
measures and new efficiencies in peacekeeping missions as well as keep
missions under regular review to determine where we may be able to
close or downsize them as appropriate.
Question #68. In addition to funding traditional peacekeeping-
related accounts, the administration's FY 2015 request also calls for
the establishment of a $150 million Peacekeeping Response Mechanism
(PKRM) ``to support initial urgent and unexpected requirements of new
U.N. and non-U.N. missions without compromising support for existing
U.S. peacekeeping commitments.'' This mechanism would give the United
States the financial flexibility to respond quickly to emerging crises
around the world that fall outside of the normal budgetary cycle. While
the PKRM is not tied to a specific country or region, the serious
funding challenges that have faced the U.N. peacekeeping mission in
Mali (MINUSMA) demonstrate the wisdom of creating a mechanism for
flexible peacekeeping funding. Last year, as the President's budget did
not include a request for MINUSMA, Congress declined to fund the
mission in the FY 2014 omnibus, leaving a hole of nearly $250 million
in our U.N. peacekeeping commitments. Clearly, crises requiring the
authorization of new or expanded peacekeeping operations can arise at
any time, without regard to our normal budgetary procedures. Failing to
adequately fund these missions, which we vote for as a permanent member
of the Security Council, can have a negative impact on U.S. strategic
interests.
As a result, please discuss the importance of having a
source of flexible funding to address unanticipated
peacekeeping needs that emerge outside of the regular budget
cycle?
Answer. The purpose of the Peacekeeping Response Mechanism is to
ensure that the United States has the ability to respond to urgent and
unexpected peacekeeping requirements without impacting ongoing, planned
peacekeeping activities. There are numerous historical examples when
the Department has had to shift funding between programs to meet
requirements (e.g., Darfur, Somalia, Mali, and the Central African
Republic) and experience indicates that the time required to identify
and reprogram funding is an impediment to responding quickly and
effectively. Delays in financing the startup of new missions or
emergency expansion of existing ones not only endangers lives of
vulnerable civilians during the critical initial period of mission
deployment, but it might also lead to the need for a more costly and
lengthier intervention than might otherwise be the case if the response
is quicker.
The PKRM would be assessed on an as-needed basis as requirements
are identified. All relevant bureaus would coordinate to determine
requirements and use of PKRM funding would be subject to a
determination by the Secretary that additional resources are necessary.
Additionally, the use of PKRM funds would be subject to existing
congressional notification procedures, and we would consult with
committee staff on the use of this mechanism.
Unexpected peacekeeping requirements often arise in a timeframe
that does not allow us to address them through the normal budget
process. In some cases we are able to cover such costs without
impacting ongoing peacekeeping activities. However, we cannot assume
this will always be the case, especially as overall requirements for
U.N. peacekeeping have been increasing. At the same time, our own
budgets are decreasing, leaving less space for tradeoffs and transfers
from other accounts. Over the past 2 years, we have transferred more
than $200 million in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding from
other accounts into the Peacekeeping Operations Account in response to
unanticipated or rapidly changing peacekeeping requirements. The PKRM
would help to ensure that we have funding available to respond rapidly
to urgent and unexpected requirements without the risk of impacting
critical, ongoing, budgeted peacekeeping efforts.
Question #69. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.--
In December 2011, the White House released the United States National
Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (NAP) with the goal of
empowering women as equal partners in preventing conflict and building
peace in countries threatened by conflict and insecurity. This plan
represents a government-wide strategy, let by the Department of State,
Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International
Development, under the guidance of the National Security Advisor.
Implementation relies on proactive engagement with partner governments
and civil society to ensure women's inclusion in all aspects of
conflict-prevention and peace-building.
What is the status of the 2013 annual review of the
National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security and the
Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based Violence
Globally, and will any results be made publicly available?
Answer. The Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues takes the
lead for the Department in coordinating input from all relevant offices
and bureaus, as well as with our embassies in the field, for both the
National Action Plan and Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-
based Violence Globally. These reports enable the Department to reflect
on progress, challenges, lessons learned and recommendations for moving
forward.
In 2015, the National Security Council Staff will lead a process to
update this National Action Plan, based on inputs provided by
implementing agencies and in consultation with Congress, international
partners, and civil society.
As for reporting on implementation of the National Action Plan for
calendar and fiscal year 2013, the Department of State annually reports
to the National Security Council staff on its implementation of the
National Action Plan, in accordance with Executive Order 13595. The
Executive Summaries of both reports will be made available for the
public.
Question #70. How is the Department ``advocating for the
integration of women and gender perspectives'' in peace processes in
which the U.S. is involved, such as the Geneva negotiations on Syria or
the Middle East peace talks, as mandated by the National Action Plan on
Women, Peace and Security?
Answer. Recognizing that peace and security outcomes are more
resilient when women are afforded an equal seat at the table, the
Department is committed to integrating women's meaningful participation
in peace processes and conflict resolution. As I noted in Montreaux in
January, the journey of Syrian women is one of courage and
perseverance. They are rallying civil society to the cause of peace,
negotiating cease-fires, delivering relief, advocating for detainees,
and countering extremism. We have seen the women of Syria working to
bring about a political transition and envisioning a new future for a
pluralistic, free and democratic Syria. These stories carry a simple
message: No country can succeed if it leaves half its people behind.
Women bring important perspectives to conflict resolution, and no peace
can endure if women are not afforded a central role.
In Syria, the Department has played a sustained role in integrating
women into its efforts to support of the opposition and civil society
actors. Moreover, in our diplomatic engagement we have actively
integrated women as participants and agents of change in resolving the
conflict in Syria by providing Syrian women's groups with training and
diplomatic support to prepare for future peace processes and promote
their involvement in track one negotiations.
Question #71. Despite the fact that policewomen have proven to
greatly increase the operational effectiveness of police forces and are
critical assets in efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism,
women currently compromise only 1 percent of Pakistani forces.
What efforts has the United States undertaken to increase
the recruitment and retention of policewomen in Pakistan and
how does the U.S. intend to highlight this issue in the U.S.-
Pakistan Strategic Dialogue's Law Enforcement and
Counterterrorism Working Group?
Answer. Advancing the status of women and girls is a central
element of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration. The
United States has strategic interests in supporting the Government of
Pakistan's efforts to improve security, working conditions, and
professional standards for policewomen in Pakistan through adequate
recruitment, training, equipment, and infrastructure assistance.
Since 2011, the Department of State's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has renovated women's
police stations in Islamabad and Karachi and a women's police barracks
outside of Islamabad. INL also has provided equipment and vehicles to
women police officers and police stations in Islamabad, Sindh, and
Balochistan. INL-supported training, conferences and exchanges for
policewomen, including a conference in Islamabad on March 25, 2014, in
celebration of International Women's Day, are advancing the skills and
opportunities for women police. To improve the quality of cases brought
to trial, promote the importance of women in the criminal justice
system, and expand skill sets, INL has also supported two women-only
police-prosecutor trainings for female police and prosecutors from all
over Pakistan during the past 6 months.
We continue to work with the Government of Pakistan to set a date
for the Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Working Group. We plan to
raise this issue as part of our broader discussion on law enforcement
training, assistance, and reform during the 2014 session.
Question #72. Power Africa.--Why wasn't the Power Africa Initiative
given its own line item in the budget? Without such a line item it is
very difficult to determine what resources are being sought for the
effort and as a result it seems as if the initiative is less important
than other initiatives that have received their own line item.
Answer. Consistent with other Presidential Initiatives, funding is
sourced from a combination of bilateral and regional development
assistance funds. We justify and report on Presidential Initiatives and
key areas of interest in the Congressional Budget Justification,
including a specific funding breakdown of where the funds are located
(bilateral or regional) and accompanying narratives that explain
programming priorities and what the requested funding will accomplish.
Question #73. I would like to better understand the plan to double
access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa as part of the Power Africa
Initiative. The initiative is described as a private sector,
transaction-based program, but, at least at this point, there are few
opportunities for U.S. businesses to invest in transmission and
distribution services in Power Africa countries.
How does the initiative plan on creating private investment
in transmission and distribution? If private investment in
distribution infrastructure is unlikely, how can the initiative
support rural cooperatives or other mechanisms to bring power
to rural areas? Finally, how does the initiative plan on
supporting the growing, but capital constrained, off-grid
lighting and power sector in sub-Saharan Africa? Success of the
Power Africa Initiative cannot just be measured in megawatts,
but also must be measured in the number of people getting
access to power.
Answer. Power Africa anticipates that over 100 million Africans
will benefit from the Initiative's efforts by 2020. Power Africa plans
to do this by facilitating public-private partnerships and unlocking
investment potential through host government policy reforms. Instead of
taking years or even decades to create an enabling environment for
energy sector investment, Power Africa takes a transaction-centered
approach that provides incentives to host governments, the private
sector, and donors. These incentives galvanize collaboration, producing
near-term results and driving systemic reforms that pave the way to
future investment.
To achieve these ambitions, Power Africa includes:
An interagency Transactions Solutions Team to provide the
catalysts needed to bring power generation, transmission and
distribution investments to fruition. The team does this by
leveraging financing, insurance, technical assistance, and
grant tools from across the U.S. Government and our private
sector partners.
Field-based Transaction Advisors to help governments
prioritize, coordinate, and expedite the implementation of
power projects, while simultaneously building the capacity of
existing host government ministries to deliver results. These
Advisors have already begun their work in each of Power
Africa's partner countries.
Increased Efficiency through Privatization
Nigeria
In addition to working on facilitating new generation transactions
that will lead to higher availability of power, and thus enable greater
access, Power Africa has also been working in selected countries to
improve transmission and distribution services. Most notable of these
is Nigeria, where USAID has been involved in assisting the Government
of Nigeria in its landmark power sector privatization program after
power sector assets were unbundled into a series of successor
companies. As a result of the privatization, 10 distribution companies
(DISCOs) were successfully privatized and their assets transferred to
the private sector in late 2013. The new owners are now sizing up the
strengths and weaknesses of these companies and are planning major
management improvements and capital expenditures to help reduce
technical and financial losses. As these distribution companies are
operated in a more efficient manner, their financial viability will
improve significantly, allowing them to extend their services to many
more customers.
The weak state of Nigeria's transmission system has emerged as a
major risk to the bold power sector privatization and reform initiative
in Nigeria. The government has appointed Manitoba Hydro International
(MHI) of Canada as a management contractor for the Transmission Company
of Nigeria (TCN) in 2013, which is considered a step in the right
direction to commercialize TCN. However, the contract is undersized
relative to the challenges. USAID-funded experts have bolstered the
management ranks and are helping implement critical priority
initiatives. Additionally, the experts will help develop and implement
a network expansion blueprint; assist in financial and economic
planning, modeling, budgeting, and development of a cost-reflective
transmission tariff and a corporate business plan; conduct power system
reliability and other studies; and assist with responsibilities for
transitional electricity markets.
Ghana
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a key Power Africa
implementation agency. As a part of its second compact negotiations,
MCC is actively engaged with the Government of Ghana to encourage it to
induct the private sector in its power distribution sector, in
particular the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG). MCC is offering an
incentive in the form of grant assistance to the Electricity Company of
Ghana for this purpose. MCC has already engaged the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, to perform
a private sector participation options analysis for ECG and the
Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCO), a small distribution
entity in Ghana.
Rural Electrification
Regarding rural electrification, USAID supports community
consultation on projects as well as models for communities owning,
operating, and maintaining power systems. For example, in Liberia,
Power Africa is supporting the establishment of local community
cooperatives to own and operate renewable energy microgrids. Through
the U.S. African Development Fund and GE's Off Grid Challenge, Power
Africa awarded six $100,000 grants to support sustainable renewable
power generation initiatives at the community level. For example,
Kenyan suppliers will expand delivery of pay-as-you-go lighting options
to households in rural areas, while TransAfrica Gas and Electric will
power cold storage facilities with solar systems for farmers and
fishermen. Afrisol Energy's bio-digester will produce electricity for
small businesses in Nairobi's urban settlements. The Off Grid Challenge
has enabled a high level of innovation and community participation, and
will be expanded to all six Power Africa countries later this year with
USAID support.
______
Responses of Secretary Kerry to Additional Set of Questions Concerning
Northern Ireland Submitted by Senator Menendez
northern ireland peace and reconciliation process
Beginning in 1986, the United States has provided assistance for
the peace and reconciliation process in Northern Ireland through the
International Fund for Ireland, and most recently through the Economic
Support Fund for Europe and Eurasia. This assistance helped support
economic regeneration and social development projects in those areas
most affected by the instability in Northern Ireland. Over the years,
focus has shifted from supporting economic development programs toward
programs that promote community reconciliation.
A. How has the State Department directed these funds to support the
goal of reconciliation in Northern Ireland and where have the funds had
the greatest impact?
B. How is the United States Government working with our partners in
the European Union and England to leverage the resources we provide to
the effort?
C. In FY15, what changes will be made to State Department's goals
and programming in Northern Ireland?
Question A. How has the State Department directed these funds to
support the goal of reconciliation in Northern Ireland and where have
the funds had the greatest impact?
Answer. Since 1986, the United States has provided over $500
million in assistance to the International Fund for Ireland (IFI),
which has supported remarkable progress in Northern Irish society:
Full Implementation of the ``Good Friday Agreement''--The
implementation of the ``Good Friday Agreement'' was completed
with the devolution of policing and justice powers from the
central U.K. Government in London to the Northern Ireland
Executive in 2010.
Northern Irish Economy Strengthened--At the height of the
``Troubles,'' the unemployment rate for Catholic males in
Northern Ireland was 30 percent, leaving a sizable proportion
of the population vulnerable to paramilitary recruitment.
Thanks, in part, to the 55,000 jobs the IFI helped create over
its lifetime, the unemployment rate in Northern Ireland today
is nearly identical to what it is in the United States. During
the period from October to December 2013, the Northern Ireland
unemployment rate averaged 7.3 percent, and the U.S.
unemployment rate averaged 7.0 percent.
Education Reform Mainstreamed in Northern Ireland--In
response to the success of past IFI programming, the Northern
Ireland Executive recently committed to making integrated
education opportunities available to all interested Northern
Ireland students. Access to cross-community (Catholic/
Protestant) educational opportunities is a critical component
of the U.S. Government's commitment to a ``Shared Future'' for
Northern Ireland.
Question B. How is the United States Government working with our
partners in the European Union and the United Kingdom to leverage the
resources we provide to the effort?
Answer. The State Department works closely with the U.K. Government
to support the Northern Ireland peace process. Recently, during St.
Patrick's Day events in March in Washington, the State Department's
Director of Policy Planning David McKean met with U.K. Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers to discuss ways to
encourage cooperation among Northern Ireland leaders following the
conclusion of the All-Party Talks. He also met with Sinn Fein President
and member of the Irish, Dail Gerry Adams, while officials from the
Bureau of European Affairs met with political and community
stakeholders.
Working closely with the Department of Commerce, U.S. Embassy
London and U.S. Consulate General Belfast provided assistance for the
U.K. Government's G8 investors' conference in Northern Ireland, held
October 2013. Forty-four U.S. companies traveled to Belfast to build
the investment linkages needed to create jobs for Americans and the
people of Northern Ireland.
Both the United Kingdom and the European Union are leveraging the
resources the United States provides to the International Fund for
Ireland (IFI). Throughout the duration of the IFI's ``Strategic
Framework for Action (2012-2015),'' the British Government will
contribute roughly $400,000 per year toward the administrative costs of
the programming the United States supports through its Economic Support
Funds. The IFI Board also expects the IFI will receive an additional
payment of =3 million ($4.1 million USD) from the EU sometime during
calendar year 2015.
Question C. In FY15, what changes will be made to State
Department's goals and programming in Northern Ireland?
Answer. Supporting the Northern Ireland peace process is a U.S.
foreign policy priority. Helping the people of Northern Ireland achieve
the goal of a lasting and prosperous peace, the State Department
continues extensive diplomatic engagement through the U.S. Consulate
General in Belfast and the U.S. Embassies in London and Dublin. We
promote economic development through fostering of public/private
partnerships and the advancement of science and innovation
collaboration. Northern Ireland civil society leaders and government
officials also benefit from State Department cultural and educational
exchanges. The administration did not request financial support for the
International Fund for Ireland (IFI) in FY 2015 because of significant
budget constraints and the need to focus scarce resources on the
highest priorities globally. With the funding it expects to provide
from Fiscal Years (FY) 2011-2014, the Department is confident the
United States will be able to fulfill the U.S. commitment of $7.5
million toward the IFI's ``Community Transformation: Strategic
Framework for Action'' for Calendar Years 2012-2015. We will also
review additional assistance if the situation on the ground warrants.
(All of the assistance that the United States has committed toward the
``Strategic Framework for Action'' for Calendar Years 2012-2015 is
being provided in the form of a grant of Economic Support Funds to the
IFI for specific activities that reduce sectarian differences and
foster economic revival, targeting those communities in Northern
Ireland and the border counties of Ireland that have not realized the
benefits of the peace process.)
In January 2014, Special Representative O'Brien chose Northern
Ireland as the first location for the new Partnership Opportunity
Delegations initiative. Representative O'Brien led a delegation of U.S.
investors, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, members of the Irish
diaspora, and representatives from academia and civil society to
identify potential partnership opportunities to boost Science,
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics education, promote
entrepreneurship, and increase overall economic growth. This visit has
already yielded promising partnerships between U.S. and Northern
Ireland institutions to bring educational and entrepreneurial
opportunities to disadvantaged communities.
The U.S.-Ireland Research and Development Partnership furthers
economic development in Northern Ireland. The Partnership encourages
research collaboration among scientists from the United States,
Ireland, and Northern Ireland in five priority areas: health, sensor
technology, nanotechnology, telecommunications, and energy and
sustainability. The Partnership Steering Committee will hold its next
meeting in Belfast in September 2014. In November 2013, the Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Bureau Assistant
Secretary Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones, who serves as U.S. cochair of the
Partnership Steering Committee, traveled to Belfast to meet with
government officials and discuss opportunities to further economic
growth and cross-community youth development in Northern Ireland
through science and technology cooperation.
Hundreds of students and scholars from the United States and
Northern Ireland also participate in the Fulbright Program. Senior
public sector employees from Northern Ireland benefit from the
Fulbright Northern Ireland Public Sector Award. In addition, Northern
Ireland students, civil society leaders, legislators, artists, and
activists, participate in State Department educational and professional
exchange programs.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question. Since Secretary of State Clinton announced in 2011 that
the U.S. would join the International Aid Transparency Initiative
(IATI), the State Department (which oversees the Foreign Assistance
Dashboard) has not published any data, either on the Dashboard or to
the IATI Registry.
Please provide the plan for meeting the U.S. commitments,
including timeline and specific steps. What steps will you take
specifically to ensure that the data is of high quality and is
able to be accessed and used by both domestic and partner
country stakeholders?
Answer. The Department of State has been publishing data to
ForeignAssistance.gov and the IATI registry since December 2010.
Additional data is being phased in over time, with Department of State
financial data and additional data for PEPFAR scheduled for release in
mid-2014. Gathering large amounts of data from systems not designed to
gather that data presents technical challenges, but we are working to
overcome those hurdles to publish greater quantity and quality of data
with improved access, usability, and in compliance with all U.S.
transparency commitments. Because of the complexity of this challenge,
a more detailed discussion of specific steps and timelines can best be
achieved through briefing of relevant staff, which State Department
stands ready to provide.
Question. There are currently 16 United Nations peacekeeping
operations worldwide. Many of them have existed for decades, and the
mission in Cyprus just ``celebrated'' its 50th anniversary. The
President is requesting a billion dollars more this year for CIPA and
the Peacekeeping Response Mechanism.
What is the administration's plan to reduce the number of
U.N. peacekeeping missions and reduce the burden of supporting
those missions?
Answer. The United States supports U.N. peacekeeping operations to
address crises and to help countries emerge from violent conflict. By
nature, these missions are challenging and their number and costs
fluctuate depending on the crisis. First, for FY 2014 appropriation for
Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account
provided less than the requested amount, which reflected known
requirements at the time the budget request was submitted to Congress.
The appropriation also did not include funding for the new U.N.
Multidimensional Stabilization for Mali (MINUSMA), which was
established by the U.N. Security Council after the President submitted
his FY 2014 budget request, or for the reinforcements of the U.N.
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in response to the ongoing crisis that
started on December 15, 2013. The President's budget request for FY
2015, however, reflects funding necessary to make up some of these
shortfalls.
Second, unexpected peacekeeping requirements often arise in a
timeframe that does not allow us to address them through the normal
budget process. In some cases we are able to cover such costs without
impacting ongoing peacekeeping activities. However, we cannot assume
this will always be the case, especially as overall requirements for
U.N. peacekeeping have been increasing. At the same time, our own
budgets are decreasing, leaving less space for tradeoffs and transfers
from other accounts. Over the past 2 years, we have transferred more
than $200 million in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding from
other accounts into the Peacekeeping Operations Account in response to
unanticipated or rapidly changing peacekeeping requirements.
The Peacekeeping Response Mechanism (PKRM) would help to ensure
that we have funding available to respond rapidly to urgent and
unexpected requirements without the risk of impacting critical,
ongoing, budgeted peacekeeping efforts. The PKRM would be accessed on
an as-needed basis as requirements are identified. Additionally, the
use of PKRM funds would be subject to existing congressional
notification procedures, and we would consult with committee staff on
the use of this mechanism.
Through both our mission to the U.N. in New York and at State in
Washington, we continually press the U.N. to pursue cost saving
measures and new efficiencies in peacekeeping missions as well as to
keep missions under regular review to determine where we may be able to
downsize, close, or transition them to a peace-building arrangement, as
appropriate. We have succeeded in having the U.N. establish the
equivalent of an inspector general for U.N. peacekeeping forces that
will help insure troops are meeting established standards and
performing at acceptable levels, thereby improving a mission's ability
to fulfill its mandate. Not satisfied with relying only on assessments
and recommendations of the U.N. Secretariat on such matters, we have
developed a more rigorous approach and have started conducting our own
field visits to U.N. missions to help inform interagency considerations
regarding whether and how to best adjust a mission's mandate and
performance when it comes up for renewal.
With exception of the small peacekeeping missions in Cyprus
(UNFICYP), which is partly funded by the governments of Greece and
Cyprus, and Western Sahara--both of which are still needed pending a
political solution to their respective crises--most U.N. peacekeeping
missions are dynamic. In recent years, the U.N. missions in East Timor
and Sierra Leone have closed altogether. The peacekeeping missions in
Haiti (MINUSTAH), Liberia (UNMIL), Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), and Darfur
(UNAMID) are undergoing Security Council-directed structured drawdowns
in line with the security and political situation on the ground. In
some cases, we have had to temporarily raise the troop levels to
address crises--such as in UNMISS--or to take advantage of
opportunities to create security conditions that promote a political
solution, such as deployment of the Intervention Brigade in the U.N.
mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and its
successful operations against armed groups.
Overall, U.N. peacekeeping is a cost-effective tool for the United
States to contribute to international peace and stability. As one of
the five Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, we play a key
role in formulating the best possible U.N. Security Council responses
to international crises. In certain circumstances, a U.N. peacekeeping
operation may indeed be the most efficient and the only functional
response. U.N. peacekeeping helps to spread the costs as well as the
risks. A 2006 GAO study concluded that the cost to the United States of
conducting its own peace operation in a low-threat environment like
Haiti would be nearly eight times as much as what we pay through U.N.
peacekeeping assessments. However, U.N. peacekeeping is not the only
option. In many cases, peace operations led by regional security
organizations such as NATO and the African Union, or coalitions are
better suited to the challenge.
Question. What type of action would the Kremlin have to pursue to
trigger sectoral sanctions against the Russian economy?
Answer. What we do next depends on what Russia does to end the
crisis in Ukraine. It is in Putin's hands. If Russia decides to
escalate its intervention in Ukraine, then we will escalate our
sanctions. We have been consistently clear, in the event that Russia
does not take steps to de-escalate tensions in Ukraine, the United
States, working in tandem with the EU and G7 partners, is prepared to
launch additional sanctions affecting certain sectors of the Russian
Federation economy, including the defense, energy, and financial
sectors. At the recent April 17 Quad talks in Geneva, Russia agreed to
diplomatic options to de-escalate the situation in Ukraine. We are
watching very closely to see whether Russia meets its commitments to
use its influence to get pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine to
disarm and abandon public buildings they had seized. If it does not, we
will impose great cost on Russia in response.
Question. Because of the close cultural links between Ukraine and
Russia, I believe that a free, democratic, and prosperous Ukraine would
demonstrate to the Russian people that similar change is possible in
their country. In addition to supporting Ukraine's democracy, how can
we more effectively help stimulate positive change in Russia? How is
this objective reflected in the President's budget?
Answer. The U.S. Government's commitment to democracy and civil
society in Russia remains firm despite the enactment of laws and
practices in Russia that restrict fundamental freedoms and the ability
of Russian NGOs to receive international support. The U.S. Government
has made clear our concerns about these restrictions, conveyed our
support for a legal framework that does not restrict fundamental
freedoms, and underscored that democratic principles and a vibrant
civil society are essential to Russia's development. We continue to
support the Russian people's aspirations to live in a modern country
with transparent and accountable governance, a free marketplace of
ideas, free and fair elections, and the ability to exercise their
universally recognized human rights without fear of retribution.
Although the traditional routes for support in these areas have
been challenged, Russian organizations, universities, and individuals
continue to express a desire to engage with the United States. As a
result, the U.S. Government is developing new ways to increase direct
interactions between Russians and Americans, including by establishing
peer-to-peer and other regional programs that support exchanges of best
practices on themes of mutual interest. Further opportunities for
interaction include educational and cultural exchanges that provide
opportunities for Russians to have firsthand experiences in the United
States or attend events with Americans that travel to Russia through
U.S. Government sponsored programs.
The State Department will continue to consult key congressional
committees on further efforts.
Question. State Department Management and Accountability.--In
recent conversations surrounding statutorily required reports to
Congress, my staff was told that the State Department observes a policy
that limits the overall length of reports sent to Congress to 10 pages
or fewer. Is there a Department policy that places a limit on
congressional reports, and if so why?
Answer. Effectively and fully communicating with Congress,
including through congressionally mandated reports, is one of the
Department's most important responsibilities. Each year, the Department
submits several hundred legislatively required reports to Congress.
Supporting this critical function consumes significant resources that
we have an important responsibility to conserve by keeping reports
streamlined, concise and avoiding redundancy while, above all, ensuring
that the information provided is relevant and useful to Congress.
Therefore, as a general matter, the State Department strives to
maintain a concise reporting format, aiming to keep Congress informed
in a more effective and timely manner while prudently managing the
resources that go into report preparation and consistent with our
shared interest in using taxpayer resources wisely. Our approach
strives to avoid repeating the content of previously reported
information, to include links to previously reported information, and
to cross-reference to congressional budget justification materials and
other reports. There are general exceptions for certain highly regarded
global reports on human rights, counter terrorism international
religious freedom, and trafficking in persons.
These efforts are part of a broader report reform initiative aimed
at providing the most relevant and useful information while ensuring
taxpayer resources are effectively used by State and USAID for both its
important programmatic functions as well as for reporting on the same.
We would welcome the opportunity to discuss legislative initiatives
which would assist us working together to eliminate outdated and
duplicative reports.
Question. Diplomatic Security Abroad.--Given the State Department's
global footprint and the expense associated with providing adequate
security for the State Department's global workforce, has the State
Department ever conducted an internal feasibility review or other
planning process of the possibility of reducing the number of U.S.
consular facilities worldwide?
If the State Department has not attempted any such study or review
to date, please provide a list of all consular facilities that are in
high-risk, high-threat countries, and an assessment of whether
elimination of any number of these consular facilities might improve
the State Department's ability to better manage the security needs of
State Department personnel in the absence of additional funding.
Answer. In today's 21st century world, diplomacy and development
are more important than ever in protecting U.S. interests at home and
abroad. Relationships with our overseas partners promote peace, foster
economic growth, support security cooperation, and encourage
environmental security, which all lead to greater prosperity and safety
in the United States. Diplomacy, by nature, must be practiced in
dangerous places.
Following the cold war, the United States diplomatic presence
expanded overseas, and the principle of universality has been adhered
to since the time of George Shultz, Secretary of State for President
Reagan, and by all administrations since then. We have looked at our
presence within a country, and closed some locations that are no longer
needed, e.g., Lille, France in 2008; Cluj-Napoca, Romania in 2007.
With regard to high-threat, high-risk posts, the United States has
consulates at the following such posts: Lagos, Nigeria; Basrah, Iraq;
Erbil, Iraq; Alexandria, Egypt; Lahore, Pakistan; Peshawar, Pakistan;
Karachi, Pakistan; Herat, Afghanistan; and Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan
(located on military base).
Hard decisions must be made when it comes to whether the United
States should operate in dangerous overseas locations. To manage the
balance between risk and advancing core U.S. national interests at our
most dangerous posts overseas, the Department has developed an
institutionalized, repeatable, transparent, and corporate process to
ensure we have the ability and resources required to mitigate risk to
an acceptable level. This process will also address the personnel and
resources required to maintain a post while taking into account the
importance of U.S. programs and mission in that location. We can
provide a briefing on this process in an appropriate setting.
Question. Last week, Congress passed (and the President signed) S.
2183, which seeks to ensure that both the Voice of America and Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty increase their radio and other broadcasts
into Ukraine, Moldova, and other Russia-influenced areas. Please
provide a summary of some of the Russian-led efforts to prevent
external broadcasts (including broadcasts of the Voice of America and
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) from reaching people in Russia,
Ukraine, Moldova, and other regional neighbors.
Answer. An integral part of Russia's strategy in and around Ukraine
is an expanding propaganda campaign to justify its actions to local
residents, its population back home, and the world. This has included
undermining independent media by intimidating the leadership of and, in
some cases, taking over the facilities of Ukrainian TV and radio
stations. An array of VOA and RFE/RL programs remain available on some
of the leading media in the region, but on April 8 Crimean authorities
acting on orders from Moscow shut down the Crimea-based transmitter for
RFE/RL Ukrainian affiliate Radio Era.
There have also been numerous incidents in which journalists
working for VOA and RFE/RL have been threatened, assaulted, and
arrested by armed forces wearing Russian uniforms; these incidents have
included forcing a reporter who was covering a demonstration to kneel
and kiss a Russian flag, seizing video cameras, and severe beatings.
Additionally, journalists covering Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have
received explicit warnings, both officially and anonymously, to stop
this coverage.
Within Russia, there has been a recent escalation of a years-long
campaign to intimidate and censor U.S. international broadcasting. In
late March, the information agency Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today)
abruptly ended a contractual arrangement for VOA programs in Russian
and English-language lessons to be heard on a local AM station, the
last vestige of VOA radio programming broadcast on Russian soil. The
move comes amid a fast-moving campaign to target opposition and
independent media. Lists of ``traitors'' have been circulating in
Moscow, among them RFE/RL's Russian Service, Radio Liberty. Beginning
in 2006, Moscow forced a substantial number of Radio Liberty and VOA
radio and TV affiliates to stop carrying such programs or face the loss
of their licenses. In 2012, Russian authorities forced Radio Liberty
off its last remaining domestic radio outlet in Moscow.
Question. Funding for democracy support in Venezuela is to be cut
by $800,000 in FY 2015, and USAID has had to withdraw from Ecuador. At
a time when civil society is under increasing pressure, why doesn't the
budget submission provide support for a coherent strategy in Western
Hemisphere countries where democracy is threatened?
Answer. Our commitment to support human rights and democracy,
including in challenging environments of the Western Hemisphere,
remains strong.
Our assistance request reflects no decrease in priority toward
these areas. We have the resources we need to advance U.S. objectives
and support democracy and human rights in countries of concern.
For Venezuela and Ecuador, the U.S. Government will support ongoing
assistance for civil society to push for public accountability, defend
human rights, and increase the public's access to independent
information. We will continue to monitor events and circumstances
closely.
Question. I was surprised to see that the budget justification does
not include any allocation of funding to at least plan for support of
the implementation of the peace process in Colombia. What role do you
foresee the U.S. playing in the peace process and have you calculated
the magnitude of resources we might wish to commit?
Answer. The United States has been strongly engaged in support of
peace in Colombia, both as an advocate for negotiations and in laying
the groundwork for a negotiated settlement.
In his December meeting with President Santos, the President
praised the ``bold and brave efforts to bring about a lasting and just
peace inside of Colombia.''
Our ongoing foreign assistance has helped the Colombian Government
initiate talks and prepare for a peace agreement, and laid the
groundwork to sustain an agreement once it is finalized.
Counternarcotics programs have reduced cocaine production, thereby
reducing illicit funding to terrorist groups, including the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). U.S. programs engage
government, civil society, and the private sector to strengthen
Colombia's ability to implement a sustainable and inclusive peace. This
includes initiatives to support conflict victims, reduce impunity,
develop rule of law, bring government services to rural areas
previously controlled by the FARC, and improve land tenure and
livelihoods in rural areas. By supporting efforts by the Colombian
people to secure justice and good governance, we help lay the ground
work for the accountability, stability, and reconciliation necessary
for any peace deal to be successful.
We are in regular, close contact with the government about the
status of peace talks and have encouraged the government to inform us
of possible assistance the United States may offer in support of a
final peace agreement. We will stay in contact with the Committee as we
receive requests from the Colombian government and develop proposals to
respond. Assistance to Colombia has declined in recent years due to
both budgetary constraints and Colombia's success in improving
security. In the event of a peace deal, we should be prepared to
increase funding to demonstrate our commitment to the Colombian people.
Our programs should continue to promote justice and strengthen the
security so the people of Colombia quickly see the benefits of peace,
and so organized crime is not strengthened as the FARC demobilize.
Question. Do we have a policy to persuade China to pursue
constructive rather than antagonistic relations with its neighbors in
the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. The United States welcomes a stable and prosperous China
that plays a responsible role in regional and world affairs and adheres
to international law and standards in its activities and relations with
its neighbors. There are some security concerns in Asia that require
our consistent engagement with China. These concerns include the
importance of de-escalation of tensions among China and its neighbors
over territorial and maritime disputes and the restoration of healthy
Chinese relations with U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines. Our most
senior leaders consistently and frankly discuss these issues with
Chinese leaders. Positive relations between China and its neighbors are
beneficial not only to our Asian partners, including China, but also to
the United States.
Question. When the President travels to Tokyo and Seoul next month,
what message will he deliver to two of our most important allies on the
U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. We are firmly committed to the rebalance toward the Asia-
Pacific, and the President's visit demonstrates our continued
engagement with our allies and partners in the region. Our rebalance
strategy stems from the recognition that the Asia-Pacific region is not
only important now but that it will become increasingly vital to U.S.
security and economic interests as the center of global politics and
economics continues to shift toward this dynamic region.
We have a broad, productive, and important agenda with Japan and
the Republic of Korea. Our alliances with Japan and the Republic of
Korea are stronger than ever. Japan has long been the cornerstone of
peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2013, we celebrated
the 60th anniversary of our alliance with the Republic of Korea, the
linchpin of peace and prosperity in the region. We see the President's
visit as an opportunity to reaffirm our increasingly comprehensive,
global cooperation with Japan and the Republic of Korea and discuss a
wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues of mutual
interest.
The United States remains firmly committed to the defense of the
Republic of Korea and of Japan. We will enhance our close coordination
with both countries on responding to the threat from the DPRK,
including our common approach to denuclearize the DPRK. One of the key
messages that the President will reiterate in both capitals is the
importance of trilateral security cooperation.
We also remain intently focused on North Korea's deplorable human
rights situation. All three countries cooperated to cosponsor the most
recent U.N. Human Rights Council resolution on the DPRK, which
condemned the DPRK for its ongoing human rights violations and
highlighted the work of the U.N. Commission of Inquiry, which we helped
establish. The President and other senior U.S. officials will continue
to engage their ROK and Japanese counterparts on this growing issue of
international concern.
We will work with the Republic of Korea to enhance our economic
partnership, invest in a future of shared prosperity, and fully
implement the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The
President will also work to strengthen our economic ties with Japan,
encourage continued structural reforms, and seek to advance our
critical Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement negotiations. We
will highlight our increasingly global partnership, from cooperation on
climate change to humanitarian assistance, and we will underscore the
critical role of people-to-people ties, including educational and
cultural exchanges, in supporting the alliances between the United
States and Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Question. What message have you delivered to Chinese leadership on
the declared ADIZ over the East China Sea and any future potential
declarations over the South China Sea? Have you affirmed that the
United States neither recognizes nor accepts China's declared ADIZ?
Answer. Since the Chinese first made their provocative declaration
of an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), U.S.
officials at the highest levels, including during Vice President
Biden's December 2013 trip to China, have publicly and privately raised
our deep concerns. The United States does not recognize and does not
accept the ADIZ, which we believe was a provocative and destabilizing
measure. We have called on China to not implement the ADIZ.
Publicly and in private discussions with Chinese officials, we have
also made clear to China that it should refrain from taking similar
actions elsewhere in the region, including in the South China Sea. We
have encouraged China to work with all of its neighbors to address the
dangers its recent declaration has created, to deescalate tensions, and
to support crisis management procedures that could manage incidents if
and when they arise in the East China and South China Seas.
Question. Would you agree that any Chinese claim to maritime rights
not based on claimed land features is inconsistent with international
law?
Answer. Yes. While the United States does not take a position on
which country or countries enjoy sovereignty over land features in the
South China Sea, we do take a position on whether maritime claims are
in accordance with international law and on how countries pursue their
claims. We strongly oppose the use of coercive measures by any party to
advance their territorial and maritime claims. All claims to maritime
space in the South China Sea, such as China's Nine-Dash Line, must be
derived from land features in the manner set out under the
international law of the sea, as reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention. Any claim to maritime space in the South China Sea not
based on land features, in accordance with the maritime zones accorded
to such features under the international law of the sea, would not
align with international law. The international community would welcome
China to clarify or modify its ambiguous Nine-Dash Line claim to make
it consistent with the international law of the sea.
We also continue to urge the Senate to ratify the Law of the Sea
Convention, which, among other things, would boost U.S. diplomatic
efforts to ensure that countries around the world properly implement
their international obligations.
Question. Given that all three frontrunners in the Afghan election
have made clear they support signing the BSA, will the President still
wait until September to firmly establish the appropriate policy toward
our national security interests in Afghanistan? Will the President
publicly acknowledge and support the recommended 8,000-12,000 U.S.
forces recommended by our military commanders in Afghanistan? Does the
State Department support those levels?
Answer. The White House has made clear that we are leaving open the
possibility of concluding a BSA later this year with a committed Afghan
Government. However, the longer we go without a BSA, the more
challenging it will be to plan and execute any U.S. mission. Should we
have a BSA and a willing and committed partner in the Afghan
Government, the administration has been clear that a limited post-2014
mission focused on training, advising, and assisting Afghan forces and
going after the remnants of core al-Qaeda could be in the interests of
the United States and Afghanistan. The President is reviewing options
regarding the size and scope of our post-2014 presence and has not made
a final decision. The State Department is working closely with the
White House to ensure that the President has a range of options and to
ensure that we are prepared to support whatever option he may choose.
Question. What is our strategy for countering Iranian influence in
the Middle East? How do military support, State, and USAID programs
provided in the Middle East serve to counter the influence of Iran and
its proxies?
Answer. The United States strategy to counter Iran's destabilizing
regional activities involves a number of elements designed to disrupt
and deter threats from Iran by working in close concert with our
regional partners. We prioritize efforts to uncover and expose the
malign activities of Iran and its proxies, and to share this
information with our regional partners. We also dedicate diplomatic,
military, intelligence, and law enforcement resources to assist and
enable our regional allies to counter aggressive actions by Iran or its
proxies. We implement sanctions and designate individuals and entities
to impede Iran's movement of illicit material or money. In all these
dimensions, the State Department works closely with our colleagues at
the Departments of Defense and Treasury to make sure our strategies to
counter the influence of Iran and its proxies are synched. Below are
two examples of recent steps we have taken:
In March 2014, we worked with Israeli naval forces to
interdict the Klos C cargo ship in the Red Sea along the border
of Sudan and Eritrea. The Klos C was carrying Iranian weapons
and explosives, including long-range M-302 rockets, likely
destined for Palestinian militant organizations in Gaza.
In February 2014, the Department of Treasury announced a
number of new terrorism-related designations linked to Iran.
Among these were various entities and individuals linked to
Mahan Air, a private Iranian airline that was designated in
October 2011 for its support to the terrorist activities of
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp-Quds Force (IRGC-QF).
Also designated were various IRGC-QF individuals associated
with Iran's activities in Afghanistan. Finally, an individual
known for supporting al-Qaeda's facilitation network in Iran
was also designated.
Similarly, our State and USAID programs counter the Iranian
Government's negative policies by providing capacity-building training
to Iranian civil society activists to hold their government accountable
to international standards and Iran's international commitments. Since
2004, the administration has supported projects to help Iranian civil
society make its voice heard in calling for greater freedoms,
accountability, transparency, and rule of law from its government.
Additional efforts provide access to uncensored information to
Iranians, allowing Iranian citizens to make informed decisions about
their government's policies and actions.
Question. Does this budget request reflect a hard look at the $1.3
billion in FMF and what it gets us? How? Have you considered how we
might take steps to modernize the Egyptian military and restructure our
relationship over the long-term? What are our ``shared security
interests'' and how does your budget refocus FMF around those
interests?
Answer. We continue to assess FMF to Egypt as part of the ongoing
assistance review that was directed by the President last August. Our
request for $1.3 billion in FMF supports our shared security interests
in maintaining regional peace and stability and countering
transnational threats. This includes aiding border security; countering
terrorism; weapons and contraband smuggling, including in the Sinai;
promoting secure passage through the Suez Canal; and preparing Egyptian
forces to participate in peacekeeping operations. Additionally, FMF
serves to support the Egyptian military with modern equipment and
training.
We remain deeply concerned about the serious security threats Egypt
faces and their potential to destabilize the region. Our assistance is
a critical factor in ensuring safety and security for Egypt and the
region at large, which is a key U.S. national security interest.
Question. Do you anticipate being able to certify that the
Government of Egypt ``is supporting a democratic transition,'' as the
latest appropriations act requires? What does the reduction in ESF say
about our ability to influence the progress of democracy and governance
in Egypt?
Answer. The Egyptian Government is well aware that certification
and continued aid depends on credible progress toward an inclusive,
peaceful, and democratic transition to a civilian-led government by way
of a free and transparent election process. We have serious concerns
about restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association,
as well as abuses by security forces that have not been held
accountable, and an ongoing lack of inclusivity in the political
process. We have reiterated these concerns at high levels consistently
in public and private, and we will continue to urge Egypt to make
progress on these fronts. While a timetable has not been tied to
certification, we continue to evaluate whether the interim government
is taking steps to meet the conditions outlined in the Appropriations
Act.
As conditions in Egypt continue to change, we have continued to
reevaluate how assistance best supports our objectives. While the
dollar amount of assistance is often seen as the primary metric by
which our commitment to our goals is measured, a better approach is to
focus on what our assistance can accomplish and where U.S. support is
most effective. We have retargeted our economic assistance to support
the Egyptian people more directly in areas of economic growth,
education, health, democracy promotion and improved governance. We
believe that with this targeted approach, the prior year resources
available to us for economic assistance, combined with the FY 2015
request, provides us sufficient resources to achieve these objectives
in the near term. The decision to request a reduced amount from the
Economic Support Fund (ESF) pipeline for Egypt in FY 2015 was
budgetary, and reflects constraints on our economic assistance writ
large. We will continue to press for democratic progress in Egypt and
believe our FY 2015 request is a sufficient funding level.
Question. What are you doing to coordinate interagency efforts for
the Power Africa initiative in order to avoid redundancies, use
government resources to the best possible effect, and provide a clear
line of accountability for outcomes?
Answer. As the Secretariat, USAID coordinates the efforts of the
Power Africa Working Group, which is comprised of all 12 of the Power
Africa U.S. Government agencies. Together, we work to identify
strategic power generation projects and coordinate efforts based on
agency core competencies. Each power generation project requires
various inputs. For example, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency has
provided extensive support for feasibility studies for potential
distribution and transmission lines that can connect remote villages.
OPIC and EX-IM have considerable financing power; a necessary component
to achieving long term infrastructure development. Additionally, USAID
has been instrumental in providing technical assistance in host
governments to encourage policy reforms. This combined effort helps
advance projects toward financial close and commissioning.
Regarding accountability, USAID chairs the monitoring and
evaluation subworking group, coordinating performance monitoring and
developing shared indicators. The common metrics reflect the
initiative's whole-of-government approach. Over the last year, USAID
has worked extensively with partner agencies to develop these metrics
and a common reporting platform to maintain consistency in data
collection across the U.S. Government.
Question. Is the addition of 23 new positions for the Department's
``Economic Statecraft'' initiative representative of a broader trend to
raise the importance of economic statecraft within the State
Department, and if so, specifically how will these new positions
support that goal?
Answer. The Department has placed a high priority on elevating the
importance of economic and commercial issues in our foreign policy,
including supporting U.S. jobs and exports, and has made supporting
U.S. business an important part of both his work in Washington and his
overseas trips. We are convinced that foreign policy is economic
policy. The U.S. economy is increasingly dependent on exports, and we
need to strengthen economic relationships across the world. United
States foreign policy must reflect a world in which economic concerns
and economic power cannot be separated from political and strategic
imperatives. Furthermore, as we have seen in the Middle East, lack of
economic and social opportunities can breed continuing and broader
instability that threaten U.S. national interests. It is thus in the
interests of the United States to leverage our economic toolkit to work
with governments and societies abroad to bolster job growth and
economic stability in their respective countries. Renewing the U.S.
economy at home must go hand in hand with enhancing U.S. economic
leadership around the world. Across a wide range of foreign policy
challenges, the Department must harness markets and economic forces to
create the stability and prosperity globally that would allow
advancement of our strategic and political goals.
The 23 new positions for the ``Economic Statecraft'' initiative,
will support our broad Economic Diplomacy efforts, and the ``Shared
Prosperity Agenda,''--the expanded and rebranded ``Economic
Statecraft.'' These new positions will increase the number of officers
throughout the Department who are implementing our critical economic
policy work through multiple initiatives, including:
A more focused and systematic advocacy effort with the
Department of Commerce on behalf of U.S. companies;
Promoting and institutionalizing a regional trade and
investment framework with market-oriented rules that promote
open, transparent, and fair trade in the Asia-Pacific region;
Working closely with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to
finalize the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations,
which will increase U.S. export opportunities in Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan;
Supporting expanded domestic U.S. employment and economic
growth through increased U.S. exports under the auspices of the
National Export Initiative; expanded facilitation of foreign
direct investment in the United States through the SelectUSA
program, and promotion and facilitation of tourism to the
United States.
To better equip the State Department to effectively implement our
economic priorities abroad, the majority of the 23 new positions would
be assigned to embassies in key locations around the globe. Many of the
issues the new positions will focus on include:
Boosting Trade and Investment: Officers will negotiate to
reduce regulatory and tariff barriers to trade in order to
level the playing field for U.S. companies and help U.S.
exports reach foreign consumers.
Commercial Advocacy: Officers will identify specific export
opportunities and provide assistance to U.S. exporters facing
challenges in foreign markets, complementing the efforts of the
foreign commercial service (FCS) where they are present and
serving as a primary commercial liaison where FCS is absent.
Market Analyses: Officers will monitor business and
regulatory conditions abroad and provide general guidance to
potential U.S. exporters new to overseas markets.
Foreign Direct Investment: New officers will facilitate
investment into the United States by foreign individuals and
companies, creating more jobs for Americans and expanding the
tax base.
Internet Freedom: Engage with foreign regulators,
multilateral agencies and civil-society to ensure that the
Internet remains free from undue governmental control and
restrictions and that there is wider access to new technologies
and to the digital economy.
Entrepreneurship: Encourage public-private partnerships that
catalyze and coordinate nongovernmental partners around
activities that create jobs and improve economic conditions and
political stability worldwide.
Open Skies: Negotiate air transport agreements that link
American cities with the rest of the world; work to alleviate
burdensome measures on U.S. air carriers; and create more
competition in the airline industry, resulting in lower
airfares.
Intellectual Property Rights: Increase public understanding
and government enforcement of intellectual property rights
concerns.
In Africa, the new Economic and Commercial officer will support our
mission in Tanzania's increased engagement under the Partnership for
Growth, the Power Africa initiative with the Tanzanian energy sector
and also contribute to the realization of the Trade Africa initiative.
The additional Foreign Service officers requested for the Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) will help further the critical economic
policy priorities at our missions in the region. NEA and its posts
abroad work closely with interagency partners to promote U.S. exports
to the Middle-East and North Africa region. In addition, the shared
economic prosperity that will benefit these countries shall provide
viable and productive alternatives to the lure of extremism. In the
UAE, for example, extra officers will be critical to help facilitate
and boost economic and commercial engagements in a market that attracts
approximately $22 billion in U.S. exports and in which over 1,000 U.S.
companies operated in 2013. In other countries, increased numbers of
economic officers are required to adequately cover economic
developments and promote progress on economic reforms that help boost
jobs and stability. Creating greater economic opportunity will help
cement democratic change and enhance confidence in local governments,
thus increasing stability and reducing the attractiveness of extremism.
Four overseas positions will be assigned to various missions in
Europe. The recent events in Ukraine have highlighted the importance of
economic diplomacy in assuring a secure energy future and in preventing
the use of energy as a political weapon. The United States is working
closely with European partners to help Ukraine achieve energy security,
for which, diversification, transparency, and private investment are
key. We need to work with Ukraine to create the conditions--to control
corruption--to attract the private investment it needs to double its
gas production by 2020.
The addition of four Foreign Service economic positions in the
Western Hemisphere will enhance the Department's ability to take
advantage of new opportunities in the region. The Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs and its overseas posts engage frequently with
foreign governments to promote policies advantageous to U.S. businesses
through bilateral dialogues as well as multilateral engagements,
including the North American Leaders Summit and the Summit of the
Americas. Priority issues for 2014 include deepening regulatory
cooperation, accelerating regional integration, easing barriers to
trade for small and medium enterprises, promoting increased public-
private consultations, and improving regional energy market efficiency.
Positions will be added to missions in key trading partners, such
as Mexico, Brazil, and India. Domestically, new positions will enhance
the Office of the Chief Economist; strengthen our ties with
international organizations; and strengthen the regional bureaus'
ability to support the Secretary's broad vision of shared prosperity.
Question. Last week, Ugandan police reportedly raided the PEPFAR-
supported Makerere University Walter Reed Project in Kampala, forcing
it to suspend its operations. What is the current diplomatic strategy
to ensure the implementation of this law does not undermine U.S.
efforts to reach all Ugandans who need access to HIV/AIDS treatment?
Answer. Uganda's decision to enact the Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA)
runs counter to universal human rights and dignity. Now that the law
has been enacted, we are looking closely at its implications. At the
same time and where appropriate, we are adjusting some of our
activities and engagements to ensure intended goals.
None of this diminishes our commitment to the people of Uganda, and
in particular our commitment to promoting regional security and justice
and accountability for perpetrators of atrocities like the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) and ensuring that lifesaving treatment for HIV/
AIDS continues to be effective and can reach those in need.
We have expressed our deep concern over this legislation and have
been in touch with senior Ugandan Government officials and LGBT leaders
since this legislation was first introduced in 2009. Since the AHA's
enactment, we have sought--though yet to receive--unequivocal
assurances from the highest levels of the Ugandan Government that
nondiscriminatory HIV services provision for all individuals will
continue. It is critical that Uganda's leaders recognize that support
to all individuals with HIV/AIDS must continue in order to be effective
so that lifesaving services are not interrupted for those who depend on
the United States for medications and treatment.
Passage of the law complicates our ability to provide these and
other services effectively to those in need and to support efforts to
control the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda. Where necessary and
appropriate we will take steps to ensure that our programs can still be
effective and conducted in a nondiscriminatory manner, fully cognizant
of our ethical responsibility to the patients that depend on U.S.
assistance for their survival. We want our efforts to advance our
policy objective, which is to promote and protect the universal rights
and fundamental freedoms of all Ugandans, including LGBT individuals.
At the same time, we will not shy away from expressing U.S.
Government views on this law, and on the importance we place on
ensuring respect for human rights--including those of members of the
LGBT community. We will continue to make clear our view that this
abhorrent law should be repealed.
Question. Last year, the Democratic Republic of the Congo suspended
its issuance of Exit Letters for international adoptions. This decision
has put in jeopardy over 100 adoption cases of Congolese children by
American families, including 54 cases which have been fully finalized
by the DRC courts, the DRC Government authorities, and the U.S.
Embassy. Unfortunately, this is a situation that is not unique to the
DRC and has happened in too many countries over the years.
(a). What is the State Department's plan to rectify this
situation in the DRC?
Answer. While several countries have suspended adoptions for a
variety of reasons in recent years, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo's (DRC) decision to implement a 1-year suspension on exit permit
issuances is unique in that it is the first country in which the
national government has opted to review the work of its lower adoption
offices and courts after the adoption decrees are issued. The DRC is
also the first country in which the courts continue to grant adoption
decrees in new cases, even though the adopted children will not be
allowed to leave the country during the exit permit suspension. The DRC
has indicated that the purpose of the suspension is to allow the
national government to investigate press reports of abuses and re-
homing of Congolese adopted children in receiving countries, as well as
to conduct a review of all internal adoption processes after the
discovery of some cases that DRC authorities believe involved fraud,
corruption, and potential child-buying. To address this challenge in
the DRC, the Department of State has taken a multipronged approach,
including engagement with the Congolese Government, efforts to address
the root causes for the suspension, and thorough information-sharing
with U.S. families, adoption service providers, and congressional
offices.
The announcement of the suspension on exit permit issuances for
adopted Congolese children was followed by extensive engagement by U.S.
Government officials, including Ambassador Swan, with the most senior
officials in the various Congolese Ministries responsible for the
decision. When it became clear that the DRC Government would not lift
the suspension immediately, Embassy Kinshasa sought concessions for the
families who already had their adoption decrees and U.S. immigrant
visas for the children. Following high-level meetings, Embassy Kinshasa
was able to secure an agreement by the Congolese Government in October
to grandfather in those families who had received a bordereaux letter
certifying the validity of the adoption from the Congolese Ministry of
Gender and Family's interministerial adoption committee prior to
September 25, 2013. Thirteen children adopted by U.S. families
benefited from this concession before Congolese immigration authorities
(the General Directorate of Migration, DGM) discovered an allegedly
backdated bordereaux letter submitted by a U.S. family in November.
Since then, the DGM has subjected the remaining grandfathered cases to
increased scrutiny and has not issued exit permits to any adopted
children.
The U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa's staff has also raised the suspension
with prominent local NGOs and with embassies of other countries in the
DRC affected by the suspension. USAID in Kinshasa continues to engage
with Congolese officials and local NGOs on child welfare issues.
Additionally, high-level engagement by the Department with the DRC's
Ambassador in Washington led to a reversal last fall of the DRC's
decision to suspend tourist visas for adoptive families wishing to
travel to the DRC to visit their children.
The second prong of the strategy to resolve the suspension on exit
permit issuances has been to address the root concerns about
intercountry adoptions held by the Congolese Government. By assuaging
these concerns in relation to U.S. adoptions specifically, offering
assistance and expertise in intercountry adoptions to Congolese
authorities, and actively encouraging Congolese authorities to increase
their capacity to process ethical and transparent adoptions, we are
striving to accelerate the lifting of the suspension.
On March 10, the Department of State and the Department of Homeland
Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) sent a
delegation to Kinshasa to discuss the U.S. adoption process, to
highlight how intensely Embassy Kinshasa investigates an adopted
child's background in order to verify that the child is an ``orphan''
prior to issuing an immigrant visa, and to encourage Congolese
authorities to end the suspension. The delegation also discussed the
U.S. Pre-Adoption Immigration Review program, which, if adopted by the
DRC, would ensure that Embassy Kinshasa would conduct its
investigations prior to adoptions being finalized in Congolese courts.
The program may help provide Congolese authorities greater confidence
in the validity of adoptions to the United States.
The Department also invited Congolese authorities to send two
delegations to the United States on Department-funded Voluntary Visitor
programs April 11-May 2 and April 16-26. The Congolese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, DGM, Ministry of Social Welfare, and Children's Court
participants were scheduled to meet with U.S. federal and state
officials regarding the U.S. intercountry adoption process and U.S.
child welfare protections for adopted children. The Department arranged
additional meetings with U.S. families with children adopted from the
DRC living in the United States, U.S. adoption service providers, and
U.S. stakeholder organizations. These meetings were designed to address
the Congolese authorities' concerns about the intercountry adoption
process and the welfare of children adopted from the DRC by U.S.
citizen parents. Unfortunately, Embassy Kinshasa was informed by the
Congolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 15 and 16 that the
delegations' visits would need to be postponed due to several urgent
issues in the DRC. The Department remains convinced of the value of the
programs and looks forward to rescheduling the DRC authorities' visits
to the United States.
The third prong of the Department's strategy entails thorough
information-sharing with adoptive parents, prospective adoptive
parents, the United States Congress, adoption service providers, and
the public. The Department has published six adoption notices, most
recently on April 16, promptly advising all parties about new
developments related to the suspension on exit permits since September
2013. The Department has also held at least nine telephone and in-
person briefings for adoptive parents, adoption service providers, and
congressional members and their staffs since the suspension on exit
permit issuances. Embassy Kinshasa staff, including Ambassador Swan,
have personally met with adoptive families in the DRC and with adoption
service providers to brief them on the situation and what the
Department is doing to address the suspension. Further, on April 18,
the Special Advisor for Children's Issues and officers from the Office
of Children's Issues met with families who adopted from the DRC.
Despite these efforts and some successes, the suspension remains in
place, and the prospect for it ending is uncertain. The issue of
intercountry adoptions is a very sensitive subject for the Congolese
people and government, who perceive child welfare as a fundamental
issue of national sovereignty. The Congolese Government has asked all
affected countries to give it the time necessary to review its adoption
policies and processes following an unprecedented rise in the number of
adoptions since 2008 and growing Congolese concerns about potential
fraud, corruption, and child-buying in the adoption process. Given
these sensitivities and concerns, Congolese Government officials have
not responded favorably to perceived foreign pressure. We are aware of
families from other receiving countries who were prohibited from
remaining in the DRC with their children and who have not been allowed
to visit the children after their governments took a more aggressive
stance on the issue of adoptions. Despite these challenges, we will
continue to press actively for the lifting of the suspension,
independently and in coordination with the 14 other affected countries,
so that adopted children may travel to join their families in the
United States. We plan to send another delegation to the DRC in May or
June of 2014.
(b). What is the State Department's overall strategy to
improve the international adoptions process and provide a
consistent policy on international adoption that American
families can rely on as they go through the process?
Answer. The Department of State supports intercountry adoption as
an essential part of a fully developed child welfare system. We promote
ethical and transparent adoption processes for prospective adoptive
parents, birth families, and children involved in intercountry
adoptions, a process that tries to ensure that an adoption is completed
when it is in the best interests of the child and when a domestic
placement in the child's home country is not possible. The Office of
Children's Issues, within the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs,
engages bilaterally with foreign governments and collaborates with
stakeholders in the adoption community and with our interagency
partners on intercountry adoption to promote these policy objectives.
The Hague Adoption Convention (Convention) is an important tool in
support of this goal. Ninety-three countries are currently party to the
Convention, including the United States.
Working with our partners at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), Congress, and other stakeholders, the Department
helped to create innovative means to further ethical adoption practices
and to prepare non-Convention countries to move seamlessly to
Convention implementation with no disruption in adoptions. Two such
innovations are the Universal Accreditation Act (UAA) and the U.S. Pre-
Adoption Immigration Review (PAIR) program. UAA adds protections for
families adopting in countries that are not parties to the Convention.
Under the UAA, all U.S. adoption service providers (ASPs) providing
adoption services in Convention and non-Convention cases must be
accredited, approved, supervised, or exempted from the requirement. An
accredited or approved ASP must act as a primary provider in each case
covered by the UAA. After July 14, 2014, the conduct of all ASPs must
meet the same standards of practice and will be subject to the same
accountability provisions that now apply in Convention cases. Right
now, more than half of all U.S. intercountry adoptions fall under non-
Convention processes.
Through the PAIR process, State and USCIS provide U.S. citizens
with a method of processing intercountry adoptions that incorporates a
Convention-like procedure for establishing the child's adoptability and
likely immigration eligibility prior to the issuance of an adoption
decree. Choosing to participate in this process can ease the transition
for partnering countries toward implementation of a Convention system.
PAIR serves as a precursor to the eventual implementation of a
Convention-compliant system by the foreign government.
On September 1, 2013, Ethiopia implemented PAIR. PAIR represents a
joint effort between the U.S. Government and the Government of Ethiopia
to help ensure that every adoption by a U.S. family is ethical,
transparent, and in the best interests of the child. The Ethiopian
Government has a long-term plan for joining the Convention. The
Department is working closely with Ethiopian counterparts to emphasize
the importance of gradual implementation of Convention principles prior
to accession, improving safeguards for intercountry adoptions while
preserving the ability for intercountry adoption to proceed in the
interim. There were 1,567 adoptions from Ethiopia to the United States
in FY 2012, and 993 in FY 2013.
Another example of our efforts to ensure that U.S. families have a
consistent intercountry adoption process is our work with the U.S.
clients of the ASP International Adoption Guides (IAG) following the
indictment of several IAG employees. The Office of Children's Issues
established and maintained a dialogue via e-mail and conference calls
with U.S. clients of IAG who sought answers to their questions when the
ASP essentially folded overnight as a result of the indictment and
arrests. Due to the large number of adoptions IAG was processing in
Ethiopia (affecting approximately 50 U.S. families, with more families
interested in initiating new cases), consular officers at U.S. Embassy
Addis Ababa, as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, immediately
engaged with the Government of Ethiopia to request guidance for
affected families on whether and how they could proceed with their
adoptions. Through our coordination with the Government of Ethiopia,
the Office of Children's Issues and the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, we
were able to provide clear guidance to families and to address
Ethiopian concerns about the indictment. Our intervention persuaded the
Minister of Women, Children, and Youth Affairs to allow families to
continue with a new ASP, preventing any impact from the indictment on
Ethiopian intercountry adoptions as a whole.
As the U.S. Central Authority for the Convention, the Department of
State must certify that each adoption from a Convention country was
made in compliance with the Convention and the Intercountry Adoption
Act of 2000. If a country's adoption system does not uphold the
safeguards of the Convention, adoptions finalized in such country would
not be considered compliant. It is therefore instrumental for the
Department to assess each country's ability to implement procedural
safeguards and governing structures consistent with Convention
standards.
The Department reviews laws, procedures, practices, and
infrastructure to assess each country's ability to implement procedural
safeguards consistent with Convention standards. Our Web site provides
a thorough description of our approach (http://adoption.state.gov/
hague_convention/overview.php). If the Department determines that a
country does not meet the required standards, it will strongly
encourage the country to first implement the necessary legal framework
and procedures to uphold the Convention's standards and principles
before becoming a party to the Convention. The Department will also
encourage the country's officials to consider establishing procedures
to allow adoptions initiated prior to the Convention's entry into force
to be completed through the pre-Convention procedures. The Department's
goal is to prevent a disruption in adoptions and ensure that there is
no unnecessary delay in processing pending adoptions due to the
Convention entering into force.
Haiti is a great example of the Department's success in encouraging
a country to transition to the Convention while preventing
interruptions to processing so that intercountry adoption by U.S.
families remains an option for Haitian children. The Department and
U.S. Embassy Port-au-Prince have worked closely with officials in Haiti
since 2010 to encourage Haiti's smooth transition to the Convention.
Working in coordination with other receiving countries, we encouraged
the Haitian Government to sign the Convention and to develop
implementing legislation. We reviewed Haiti's proposed legislation in
draft form, and the guidance we provided ensured that there would not
be problems once the Convention's entry into force was imminent. We
provided answers to Haitian officials' questions and worked with the
Hague Permanent Bureau to encourage the Haitian Government to seek
resources there. Senior State and USCIS officials have traveled to
Haiti several times to raise the importance of intercountry adoptions
through the Convention. In February, Special Advisor for Children's
Issues Susan Jacobs and Chief of USCIS' International Operations Joanna
Ruppel met with the Director of Haiti's Central Authority, UNICEF
representatives, and diplomatic officials from the French Embassy in
Haiti to discuss Haiti's capacity to implement the new adoption law
(which Haiti passed in November 2013), to receive updates on child
welfare projects in Haiti, and to discuss challenges that Haiti
currently faces and ways to best address its needs. The Convention
entered into force in Haiti on April 1, 2014. In light of Haiti's
progress, the Department announced in March on the adoption.state.gov
Web site that consular officers will be able to verify on a case-by-
case basis that an intercountry adoption case from Haiti conforms with
the Convention and the Intercountry Adoption Act.
The Department's efforts in Vietnam are also noteworthy. Resuming
adoptions with Vietnam has been among State's highest priorities, and
Special Advisor for Children's Issues Susan Jacobs has traveled to meet
with Vietnamese adoption officials four times since 2010 to encourage
the development of successful reforms. Though the Convention entered
into force on February 1, 2012, Vietnam has only recently trained its
central and provincial adoption officials on the Convention and
Vietnam's new law. USAID support for UNICEF on adoptions has been
instrumental in improving Vietnam's legal and regulatory system.
Currently, the Department is working toward establishing a limited
adoption program for children with special needs, children aged 5 and
older, and children in biological sibling groups. The Government of
Vietnam is currently vetting U.S. adoption service providers and has
indicated that it plans to authorize two. (For more information, please
see our September ``Adoption Notice.'') The Department is hopeful that
we will be able to announce our ability to issue Hague Certificates for
adoptions from Vietnam later this year.
Question. In the administration's Implementation Plan for the
National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the State Department is listed
as the lead agency for six programs: Promote International Law and
Freedom of the Seas; Prevent Unregulated Arctic High Seas Fisheries;
Develop a Robust Agenda for the U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic
Council; Accede to the Law of the Sea Convention; Delineate the Outer
Limit of the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf; and Resolve Beaufort Sea
Maritime Boundary. The Department was also designated as a supporting
agency for numerous other projects. The intent of having multiple
agencies involved is to avoid duplication, make the Federal
Government's role in the Arctic more efficient and effective, and
enhance the potential for government support by showing the interest
across agencies.
Could you tell me what funding is included in your
Department's budget request for the six projects the State
Department is the lead agency for as well as any other projects
the Department is involved in for the Arctic region?
What is the United States agenda for its chairmanship of
the Arctic Council?
When do you anticipate naming a Special Representative to
the Arctic Region?
What do you expect the Special Representative's role and
authority to be within the State Department, within the Federal
Government as a whole, and within the international Arctic
community?
Answer. The FY 2015 budget request for the Arctic Council
Chairmanship and the Extended Continental Shelf project is $2.622
million. The U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council spans fiscal years
2015, 2016, and 2017. Future budget requests will be made for fiscal
years 2016 and 2017. Regarding the four other leadership areas and
other Arctic activities, there is no budget request other than travel
funding to attend meetings.
The agenda for the U.S. Chairmanship is still under development. We
expect that the agenda will align with objectives identified in the
National Strategy for the Arctic Region and its Implementation Plan.
The Special Representative for the Arctic Region will be named
within the coming weeks and will play a critical role in advancing
American interests across the Arctic. The role and authority of the
Special Representative are still being refined and will take into
account the current Arctic governance structures within the State
Department, the Federal Government, and the international community.
Question. Do you or do you not support increasing military training
for the vetted, moderate opposition in Syria?
Answer. As you know, our support to the moderate armed opposition
is limited to nonlethal equipment. We have worked with Congress to
provide this assistance through the regular notification process, and
we greatly appreciate your support in these areas. We continue to look
for ways to bolster moderates and will consult with the Congress,
including with this committee, as we move forward.
Question. Do you believe that increase training for the rebels
would change the situation on the ground in Syria for the better?
Answer. The conflict in Syria must ultimately be resolved by the
parties through negotiations. The State Department provides training to
the civilian leaders of Syria's moderate opposition to support them as
they govern liberated areas and fight a two-pronged war against the
regime and extremists. With this in mind, we continue to look for ways
to bolster moderates and will consult with the Congress, including with
this committee, as we move forward.
Question. Have you met with Salim Idriss's replacement as the head
of the Syrian opposition's Supreme Military Council and what is your
assessment of him and his leadership potential?
Answer. Assistant Secretary of State Anne Patterson, Special Envoy
Rubinstein, and other Department officials have met with Abdelillah al-
Bashir, the newly named Chief of Staff of the Supreme Military Council.
He impressed them as a commander with battlefield experience who shares
our concerns with the destructive role extremists have played in
distracting the moderate opposition from the fight with the Syrian
regime and abhors those groups' violent attacks on Syrian civilians. We
look forward to working with him as we continue to deliver our
nonlethal assistance, and as he helps identify priority needs and
recipients.
Question. Recently, the energy security calculus for Europe has
shifted with the Russian annexation of Crimea and threats to cut off
natural gas to Europe. What is the State Department doing to encourage,
promote, or facilitate the expedited export of natural gas to our
European allies from our energy allies, including Azerbaijan, which is
currently working to complete the Southern Gas Corridor that is
intended to deliver natural gas to Europe? What is the State Department
doing to facilitate or encourage U.S. natural gas companies to provide
technical assistance and other aid to help Ukraine extract more of
their own gas? Finally, is the State Department engaged in efforts to
restructure energy laws within Ukraine to eliminate corruption and
improve energy efficiency?
Answer. Ukraine's energy security, and the commitment of the United
States to support Ukraine, was at the forefront of the U.S.-European
Union (EU) Energy Council meeting which I chaired with EU High
Representative Ashton, EU Energy Commissioner Oettinger, and U.S.
Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman on April 2.
The United States is working with Ukraine, its western neighbors,
the EU, and the private sector to provide gas from European companies
to Ukraine to offset its reliance on Russian imports. We have long
supported diversification of energy supply and energy routes to Europe,
including the Southern Corridor. We are seeking to provide urgently
needed international financial support to Ukraine and encouraging
Ukraine to use its foreign exchange reserves to finance gas purchases.
In addition to these short-term measures, we are working with other
donors and the private sector to help Ukraine bridge to long-term
increased self-sufficiency in gas by raising domestic production,
through modernization of existing conventional fields and contracts
negotiated in 2013 for unconventional gas development. On LNG, the
Department of Energy has now conditionally approved LNG export permits
for 9.3 billion cubic feet per day that can be exported both to
countries with which we have Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and to those
where we do not, such as European countries. However, the destination
and price for LNG exports will not be earmarked and will be determined
by the market.
The United States is also working closely with the Government of
Ukraine to increase energy efficiency practices, which will further
decrease reliance on energy imports. The $1 billion in loan guarantees
provided by the United States will be available to help the Ukrainian
Government ensure that increased energy costs, which will go into
effect as early as May 1 as part of a reform package mandated by the
IMF, will not adversely impact Ukraine's most vulnerable energy
consumers.
The United States is also working with Ukraine on anticorruption
across the board. We have identified significant funding from existing
budgets to enhance fiscal transparency and natural resource management
and Embassy Kyiv has created an anticorruption roadmap to support the
Ukrainian Government in tackling this issue in all sectors.
Under the auspices of the U.S.-Ukraine Energy Security Working
Group, the U.S. Special Envoy for International Energy Affairs Carlos
Pascual and Ukrainian Minister of Energy Yuriy Prodan, will continue to
advance these initiatives.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. Afghan Women--In elections this weekend in Afghanistan,
initial reports show that 35 percent of the estimated 7 million voters
were women. A record 300 women ran for provincial council seats. And
three of the Presidential candidates chose female vice Presidential
running mates.
In addition, the three frontrunners for President have all made
commitments to support women's rights. In fact, one of the Presidential
frontrunners--Abdullah Abdullah--told a British newspaper, ``If you
want to see this country or any other country even being able to deal
with the challenges and develop, it cannot happen without the role of
half the population.''
These advances are important, but they are also fragile. And Afghan
women continue to face barriers in all aspects of society.
How can the United States work to ensure that Afghanistan's
new government makes women's rights a priority?
As the United States draws down its military presence in
Afghanistan, how can we help protect the hard-fought gains made
by Afghan women over the past decade?
Answer. Afghanistan has made enormous strides since 2001, and no
one has benefited more than Afghan women, minorities, and civil society
groups. Most recently, women turned out in large numbers to vote in
Afghanistan's provincial and Presidential elections. They also served
as candidates and searchers, demonstrating the enormous potential for
the sustained advancement of women. As the Presidential elections move
forward, the United States will continue to support initiatives for
Afghan women and girls as it is clear the advancement of women's rights
is critical to political, social, and economic progress and to ensuring
a stable and secure future for Afghanistan. In particular, continued
support by the United States--including through grants--and other
international donors for Afghan civil society organizations and Afghan
women's networks will be key to ensuring that views and voices of
Afghan women are incorporated into the new government's priorities. It
will also be essential to continue emphasizing the vital role of women
at the decisionmaking table, particularly as the new government takes
root at the national, provincial, and district levels.
As the transition process moves forward, the United States will
remain committed to supporting and expanding a strong role for Afghan
women by continuing to prioritize women's issues through our
programmatic and policy efforts. For instance, the U.S.-Afghanistan
Strategic Partnership Agreement and the 2012 Tokyo Mutual
Accountability Framework speak to the mutual commitments of the United
States and the Afghan Government in protecting and promoting women's
rights and role in society. Also, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul adopted a
new ``Gender Strategy'' in 2012 that highlights the need to continue to
mainstream gender issues into all policies and programs through
transition and beyond. The U.S. gender strategy focuses missionwide
resources on five key areas: health, education, economic development,
leadership opportunities, and security and access to justice, which are
consistent with the five cross-cutting priorities set by the Afghan
Government's National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA)
and is consistent with the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace
and Security, launched in December 2011. Implementation of the gender
strategy will also help to ensure that women are not disproportionately
affected by any decreases in U.S. funding in Afghanistan.
Additionally, over the past decade U.S. Government programming has
helped Afghan women and girls achieve dramatic progress in the areas of
health, education, and access to justice. At this critical moment of
transition, USAID is making a long-term commitment to build upon
current and past programs to advance opportunities for women to help
ensure that Afghanistan has a critical mass women who are political,
economic, and civil society leaders in public, private, and civil
society sectors. For example, Promote, which commits up to $216 million
to Afghanistan over a 5-year period, is USAID's largest gender program
and is a symbol of the U.S. Government's commitment to empowering
Afghan women. It aims to encourage educated young women to enter and
advance into mid-high level positions in all sectors of society--
business, government, academia, nonprofits, and even politics. The
program builds on earlier investments in the education, health,
democratic governance and economic growth sectors and will assist
75,000 women between 18 and 30 years of age who have completed
secondary education to enter and advance into decisionmaking positions
in Afghanistan's public, private and civil society sectors.
Question. In January, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan signed a
bill that criminalizes same-sex relationships. A month later, Ugandan
President Museveni signed a law that imposes a lifetime jail sentence
for the crime of ``aggravated homosexuality.''
Both these laws are deplorable and represent a discouraging trend
globally where LGBT individuals are harassed, attacked, and have had
legal protections removed.
I appreciate that you strongly condemned the passage of the anti-
LGBT laws in Nigeria and Uganda. But sadly, despite strong
international opposition, these laws were enacted.
What more can the United States do to hold countries like
Nigeria and Uganda accountable for actions that infringe on the
basic human rights of LGBT individuals?
Answer. We share your concern about the impact of anti-LGBT
legislation on the human rights of all persons, including members of
the LGBT community. We continue our close work with LGBT and other
human rights organizations throughout the world to advance the
fundamental tenet that LGBT rights are human rights.
In assessing our approach, we are considering how best to
demonstrate our support for the LGBT communities in countries where
their rights are infringed and abuses occur, deter other countries from
enacting similar laws, and reinforce our commitment to the promotion
and defense of human rights for all people--including LGBT
individuals--as a U.S. priority.
We continue to look at additional steps we may take to work to
protect LGBT individuals from violence and discrimination, and to urge
the repeal of such abhorrent laws in countries where they have been
enacted.
Question. In March, al-Qaeda-linked fighters attacked Kessab,
Syria--a town near the Turkish border populated by ethnic Armenians.
The violence and fighting in Kessab put its Armenian community at risk
and forced many to flee their homes. In light of this attack, I am
deeply concerned about the safety and well-being of ethnic Armenians in
Syria.
Can you provide some additional information about the
attack?
What is the United States doing to ensure the safety of
ethnic Armenians and other minorities in Syria?
Answer. The tragedy in Syria is indeed heartbreaking. The Assad
regime's actions have created a humanitarian catastrophe of enormous
proportion. Helping to end the tragic suffering of all Syrian people
remains a top priority for the United States. To that end we are
devoting significant resources to address the humanitarian situation,
including assisting refugees and internally displaced persons. We also
recognize the importance of ensuring that Armenian Christians can
continue to live and flourish in the land of their ancestors, and we
understand that the situation in Kessab is particularly fraught.
We have reached out broadly to gather more information regarding
events in Kessab. On April 9, officials from our consulate in Adana,
Turkey, met with 21 Syrian Armenians from Kessab in the Turkish village
of Vakifli to ensure they were receiving quality care. Turkish
residents in Vakifli, with help from the Turkish Government, are
providing food, clothing, and services for the refugees.
As we have said throughout this conflict, we deplore threats
against Christians and other minorities in Syria. We note that the
Syrian groups fighting in Kessab have issued statements saying they
will not target civilians and will respect minorities and holy places.
We expect those commitments to be upheld.
Question. A legacy of this administration has been its focus on
women and girls as a cornerstone of foreign policy. I was pleased that
the President's budget request continues to prioritize investments in
international family planning and reproductive health.
How are family planning programs supporting broader global
health outcomes and achieving the goals of equality and
empowerment of women and girls worldwide?
Answer. There is solid evidence that demonstrates that access to
family planning, particularly modern contraception, not only saves
lives but also empowers women and reduces poverty. Recent research from
the Guttmacher Institute and U.N. Population Fund (UNFPA) shows that
meeting the current unmet need for family planning would have dramatic
effects: unintended pregnancy would decline by two-thirds globally and
there would be 1.1 million fewer infant deaths. Further, research
published in The Lancet shows that family planning could prevent up to
30 percent of the estimated 287,000 maternal deaths that occur every
year, by enabling women to delay their first pregnancy and space later
pregnancies at the safest intervals. The prevention of unintended
pregnancies through family planning is also one of the four prongs of
the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, a crucial
intervention for the U.S. Government goal of Creating an AIDS-Free
Generation. More often than not, women who can time, plan, and space
their pregnancies give birth to and raise healthier children; this can
lead to a reduction of the economic burden on their families and enable
them to invest more in each child's care and schooling. This in turn
helps to break the cycle of poverty.
Many believe that access to family planning is the single greatest
liberator of women in the last century, allowing important progress
toward equality and empowerment. Having access to family planning
services not only directly reduces maternal and child mortality, but
also supports girls' and women's rights. If girls and women are allowed
to delay childbearing and achieve their desired family size, they are
more likely to stay in school, find meaningful employment, and fully
participate in society. The evidence is overwhelming that gender
equality and women's meaningful empowerment is inextricably tied to
promoting women's rights, including their right to choose if, when, and
how often to have children and their right to have control over and
decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality.
Moreover, poor sexual and reproductive health has a negative impact on
the overall health and sustainability of a community, including lower
enrollment in school, reduced labor productivity, and unpredictability
in structure and size of a population.
Therefore, it is a U.S. foreign policy priority that women and
girls everywhere are able to decide for themselves on matters related
to their own reproductive lives. Through USAID, the U.S. Government
advances and supports voluntary family planning and reproductive health
programs in more than 45 countries around the globe. As a core partner
in the Family Planning 2020 Initiative, the U.S. Government is
committed to working with the global community to reach an additional
120 million women and girls with family planning information,
contraceptives and other commodities, and services by 2020. The U.S.
Government will continue to support access to sexual and reproductive
health services for girls and women, especially voluntary family
planning, as essential to advancing gender equality, promoting
sustainable economic development, and contributing to the U.S.
Government's goals of Ending Preventable Child and Maternal Deaths and
Creating an AIDS-free Generation.
Question. Keystone XL Pipeline--More and more health groups--
including National Nurses United, the American Public Health
Association, and the National Association of County and City Health
Officials--are joining the call Senator Whitehouse and I made for an
in-depth health impact study on the effects of more tar sands oil
coming into our country.
Clearly, the Keystone XL pipeline will greatly increase the amount
of this dirty, filthy carbon polluting oil entering the country.
Doctors from Canada are telling us that there have been increased
incidents of certain cancers in the region close to tar sands mining.
In our country, community activists have come forward publicly to talk
about the illnesses and other negative impacts from tar sands oil
refining in places like Port Arthur, TX, and the open storage of the
tar sands waste byproduct pet coke in places like Chicago.
Knowing of your deep concern for the health and safety of the
American people and your understanding that your decision must be in
the ``national interest,'' I am assuming that you will take this
request for an in-depth health impact study to heart and will not make
a decision on the Keystone XL pipeline until such an in-depth study is
completed.
Will you comment on this?
Answer. The Department of State has considered the potential for
impacts on human health throughout its review of the Keystone XL
Presidential Permit application. The Final Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement includes information about potential health impacts of
the project. The best available science on potential health impacts
pertaining to the proposed project will be considered as part of the
National Interest Determination, along with many other factors.
The Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Final
Supplemental EIS) took peer-reviewed research into account to examine
the proposed Project's potential impacts on human health in several
areas. Section 4.13, Potential Releases, examines potential health
risks associated with exposure to crude oil and other relevant
chemicals, were there to be a spill. Section 4.12, Air Quality and
Noise, addresses air pollution that would be associated with the
construction and operation of the proposed Project. Section 4.15,
Cumulative Effects Assessment and Extraterritorial Concerns, describes
potential changes in pollution associated with refineries. Section 4.15
also examines potential human health impacts in Canada associated with
oil sand development and pipeline construction and operation.
The current phase of the Presidential Permit review process focuses
on whether the proposed project would serve the national interest. In
addition to considering the best available science, the Department is
taking into account information provided by federal agencies and other
interested parties as well as comments submitted during the public
comment period. The Department is consulting with the eight agencies
identified in Executive Order 13337: the Departments of Defense,
Justice, Interior, Commerce, Transportation, Energy, Homeland Security,
and the Environmental Protection Agency. We are also reviewing and
appropriately considering the unprecedented number of new submissions,
approximately 2.5 million, received during the public comment period
that closed on March 7, 2014.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. As you are aware one of the national security gems that
we have in Idaho is the Idaho National Lab (INL). At INL they have a
project called the Wireless Test Bed, which allows different government
agencies to go out and test how devices that are just that--wireless.
We can't get into all the details in this setting, but my understanding
is that the State Department is looking at making a small investment in
the test bed and going out and using it to conduct some force
protection type of tests.
Would you be able to check on the status of this and get me
an update on that?
Answer. There are ongoing discussions between the U.S. Army Program
Office for Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
Electronic Warfare and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Organization regarding the need for ``Wireless Test Bed Technology.''
While the Department may make use of ``Wireless Test Bed Technology,''
the Department will not be investing in the test bed infrastructure at
the Idaho National Lab. The Idaho National Lab test facilities and
required infrastructure the Department uses are owned and operated by
the Department of Defense.
Question. The President's budget request included $370 million in
economic assistance for the West Bank and Gaza which supports economic
development, humanitarian needs in Gaza as well as increasing the
capacity of the PA to meet the needs of its own people through budget
support. In light of President Abbas' decision last week to return to
unilateral measures, if the Palestinians continue forward in the
international arena, what will be the consequences for U.S. assistance
to the Palestinians?
Answer. Assistance to the Palestinian people is an essential part
of the U.S. commitment to a negotiated two-state solution for
Palestinians and Israelis, promoting a comprehensive peace in the
Middle East. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure these
efforts continue as they help to build a more democratic, stable,
prosperous and secure region.
The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2014 enables continued economic
assistance to the Palestinian Authority. We continue to abide by the
complex legal authorities with respect to providing foreign assistance
to the PA.
The United States continues to strongly oppose unilateral actions
that seek to circumvent or prejudge outcomes that can only be reached
through negotiations, including Palestinian statehood. As President
Obama has said, there are no shortcuts to statehood. We oppose such
measures and believe the only way to a two-state solution is through
direct negotiations between the two parties.
U.S. economic assistance serves as a critical stabilizing force for
the PA, enabling it to leverage contributions from other donors. Our
economic assistance also supports an economically viable PA and
Palestinian state-building, through programs that advance democracy and
good governance; security and rule of law; education; health and
humanitarian assistance; private enterprise; and water resources and
infrastructure. U.S. security assistance is helping to create
professional and competent Palestinian Authority Security Forces that
can enhance stability and combat terrorism in the West Bank, which
serves our overall policy goal of achieving a two-state solution. Taken
together, U.S. assistance is essential to ensuring that the necessary
Palestinian institutions are developed that will help build a more
democratic, stable, and secure region.
Question. In the FY14 Omnibus appropriations bill, we included new
language linking any disbursement of economic aid to the Palestinians
to a certification by you that the Palestinian Authority is acting to
counter incitement of violence against Israelis and is supporting
activities aimed at promoting peace, coexistence, and security
cooperation with Israel.
What steps is the PA taking that will help to condition the
environment for peace?
In what ways are they reaching out to prepare their own
people for peace--for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state,
for compromise on important final status issues like refugees
and Jerusalem?
Answer. The Palestinian Authority (PA) is taking steps to condition
the environment for peace and to counter incitement to violence.
President Abbas regularly speaks publicly in support of tolerance and
nonviolence. In mid-February, Abbas hosted 300 Israeli students in
Ramallah, where he emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his remarks, which were later
broadcast on Palestinian television, he discussed several final status
issues including Jerusalem, borders, recognition of Israel as a Jewish
state, and refugees.
Abbas also appointed Mohammed al-Madani to serve as the head of the
``Palestinian Committee for Interaction with Israeli Society.'' Al-
Madani facilitated the first visit of Palestinian officials to the
Knesset in July 2013, and recent meetings between Fatah and Israeli
officials in Ramallah and Budapest.
The impact of the PA's effort is visible throughout Palestinian
society. For example, in the education sector, the PA has made
significant progress in the past two decades by revising official PA
textbooks in order to remove instances of incitement to violence. As
part of the post-Oslo process, between 1996 and 2005, the PA began
introducing new textbooks that included many references to promoting
values of reconciliation, human rights, religious tolerance, respect
for the law, diversity, and environmental awareness, and has replaced
textbooks for all 12 grades. A succession of studies has found that the
new textbooks represent a significant improvement and constitute a
valuable contribution to the education of young Palestinians, and in
general, concluded that the new textbooks eliminated a number of
negative references to Israel and Jews and made attempts to promote
tolerance.
The PA also monitors the content of Friday sermons delivered in
over 1,600 West Bank mosques to ensure they do not endorse incitement
to violence. The PA Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs prohibits
speech that is likely to lead to incitement to violence.
The PA leadership, under President Mahmoud Abbas, remains committed
to nonviolence and a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has recognized
the existence of the State of Israel since 1993, and in international
fora and in bilateral contacts the PA leadership has insisted on
recognition of Israel even while others have sought to delegitimize
Israel. Abbas stated in his September 2012 speech at the United Nations
General Assembly that ``The two-State solution, i.e., the State of
Palestine coexisting alongside the State of Israel, represents the
spirit and essence of the historic compromise embodied in the Oslo
Declaration of Principles.''
Question. In the past we've discussed an issue with the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As you know, this is
something that my colleagues and I take very seriously. While I don't
want to get into the classified portion of this, I would like to know
whether you have personally spoken with your counterpart, Foreign
Minister Lavrov about this important issue? And if not will you raise
this issue with him the next time you both meet?
Answer. I have personally raised treaty compliance issues broadly
with Russia, and Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller has
discussed our specific INF concerns directly with her Russian
counterpart. Other senior officials have also raised the matter with
Russia and will continue to do so. We will continue to press Russia for
clear answers, at senior levels, in an effort to resolve our concerns.
We are committed to keeping Congress informed of treaty compliance
matters and developments, and will stay in close touch with you and
your colleagues on these matters.
Question. I'm concerned about harassment of U.S. personnel working
out of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow by local Russian security services.
My understanding is that incidents are at an all-time high and that
it's not just U.S. personnel working in the embassies, but also extends
to their families. Isn't it time that we take steps to reduce this? A
good start would be by replacing some of the locally hired security
force, especially the supervisors, with cleared U.S. personnel. When
will we do this--I hope it isn't after harassment crosses the line into
violence.
Answer. The safety of U.S. citizens abroad, including our Chief of
Mission personnel and their families, is of the utmost importance to
the Department of State. The administration is deeply troubled by
harassment of U.S. Embassy personnel by Russian security services, and
we have repeatedly expressed these concerns to the Russian Government.
In response to your specific question, I am pleased to inform you
that, like other U.S. embassies, the Local Guard Force (LGF) in Russia
is already supervised by cleared American personnel. The Regional
Security Officer (RSO), a Diplomatic Security Special Agent, manages
security operations at U.S. missions abroad, including overseeing the
vetting, hiring, training, and supervision of local guard personnel.
We are happy to offer a more in-depth briefing on this important
issue in an appropriate setting.
Question. Given Russia's recent and increasingly belligerent
actions on the world stage, do you believe that the U.S. should be
making any concessions to Russia vis-a-vis the Open Skies Treaty?
Answer. Today, the Open Skies Treaty contributes to European
security and aids the efforts of the United States and our partners by
providing releasable images and information on Russian and other
forces. The United States and other countries have conducted Open Skies
Treaty flights throughout the Ukraine crisis, providing insight into
Russian military activity. In addition, Russia accepted an
extraordinary flight by Ukraine in mid-March. At Kyiv's request, the
United States and other Treaty Partners have also conducted multiple
Open Skies flights over Ukraine to provide insight into developments in
the eastern part of the country. Open Skies flights provide a source of
unclassified images and information on Russian military deployments and
the ongoing situation in Ukraine that we can share with Treaty
Partners. A fully functioning Open Skies Treaty is one of the few
transparency and confidence-building tools available to the United
States and our allies during this crisis.
The United States has emphasized to Russia at senior levels that
implementation of arms control agreements should continue, even in
difficult political times. In the case of the Open Skies Treaty,
continued implementation, including good-faith consideration of
Russia's certification of digital sensors, serves both current and
future U.S. interests. The transition to digital sensors represents
normal implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. The Open Skies Treaty
permits the introduction of new sensor technology, and since the Second
Review Conference for the Open Skies Treaty in June 2010, the States
Parties, including the United States, have recognized that the
transition from obsolete wet film-based cameras to digital sensors is
key to maintaining the long-term viability of the Treaty. Many Treaty
parties, including the United States and several NATO allies, as well
as Russia, are planning to develop and certify digital sensors in the
next few years.
Question. The current developments in Ukraine point to the
importance of the principle of territorial integrity for the stability
of the international legal order. It is very concerning that Russia
uses and supports separatist movements in Nagorno-Karabakh, South
Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and now Crimea to leverage former
Soviet Republics and hinder their integration to the Euro-Atlantic
institutions, with the hope of eventually forcing them into the
Eurasian Union. To counter this, the U.S. should consistently stand for
the territorial integrity of our partners in this region and provide
them with the necessary support against Russian intimidation. Our
consistency in upholding the principle of territorial integrity is
crucial to make it credible.
Given these issues, what policy changes is the
administration taking to counter Russian pressure to undermine
sovereignty and territorial integrity of our partners like
Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova?
Answer. The United States stands firmly behind the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of our partners in the region, and has made clear
our strong and public support of these principles. We are actively
engaged in negotiations that seek to resolve each partner's territorial
conflicts in a manner consistent with the core principles of the U.N.
Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. With respect to Moldova's
Transnistrian region, the United States is actively encouraging the
parties to the 5+2 format to reach a comprehensive settlement that
affirms Moldova's sovereignty and territorial integrity, while
providing a special status for Transnistria. As a participant in the
Geneva International Discussions on the conflict in Georgia, we are
working to hold Russia to its 2008 cease-fire commitments, improve the
security situation along the administrative boundary lines, and address
the humanitarian needs of people living in conflict-affected areas. As
a cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States is working to help
the sides reach a durable and peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.
In the case of Russia's occupation of Crimea, we have sanctioned
Russia and worked to isolate it globally to make it clear to Moscow
that its actions are unacceptable. Our strong support for the March 24,
2014, United Nations General Assembly resolution on the territorial
integrity of Ukraine was but the latest opportunity to reaffirm this
position, and to join the General Assembly in calling on all states to
desist and refrain from actions aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Question. In Georgia we have witnessed an increasing trend of
interrogations and prosecutions of current and former government
officials for what appears to be political reasons. At the same time
Georgia continues to ask for a NATO Membership Action Plan with the
hope of ultimately becoming a member. Do you believe issues regarding
the rule of law and political prosecutions could jeopardize Georgia's
aspirations? What measures should the U.S. use to help Georgia avert
this outcome?
Answer. Answer: We are closely following the investigations and
prosecutions of former and current Georgian officials. We continue to
stress to the highest levels of the Georgian Government the importance
of conducting investigations and prosecutions of serious allegations
with full transparency and respect for due process and the rule of law,
as well as the importance of promoting justice while avoiding any
perception or reality of political retribution.
At the recent meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the NATO
Foreign Ministerial, the United States made clear to the Georgians that
the nature and timing of their recent actions are problematic. Other
allies echoed this sentiment.
The alliance committed in Bucharest to supporting Georgia's
aspirations to join NATO. To assist in attaining that goal, it provides
mentorship through the development of mutually agreed Annual National
Programs, evaluation processes, and support for internal reforms. The
United States supplements NATO's efforts with bilateral support of
Georgian defense modernization, professionalization of the armed
forces, and anticorruption initiatives. In Tbilisi, our Embassy and the
NATO Liaison Office cooperate in efforts to support the Georgians in
their pursuit of NATO membership.
We continue to support Georgia's efforts to build consensus within
the alliance for granting it a Membership Action Plan.
Question. In May 2012, then Secretary of State Clinton said, ``I
believe this [NATO] summit should be the last summit that is not an
enlargement summit.'' While some nations are in various stages along
the path to membership, Montenegro appears to be an ideal candidate to
make the summit in Wales an enlargement summit, having made significant
progress in security and defense reforms, the rule of law and public
support.
What specifically do you believe Montenegro still needs to
do to qualify for an invitation in September? Will you commit
to U.S. leadership in supporting Montenegro to overcome any
remaining issues, and in mobilizing allies to secure an
invitation at the Wales summit?
Answer. The United States and our allies remain committed to the
Open Door policy and look forward to welcoming new members when they
are ready. We fully support Montenegro's path to NATO membership.
Through NATO and bilateral channels, including during the recent visit
to the United States of Prime Minister Djukanovic, we have encouraged
Montenegro to make further progress in the areas of judicial reform. In
addition, Montenegrin public support for NATO remains weak. We have
commended the current government on its campaign to increase public
awareness on the benefits and responsibilities of NATO membership, but
additional work is necessary.
Montenegro has made great strides in the passing of legislation to
address corruption and organized crime; the government now needs to
focus on implementation of this legislation. Our Embassy in Podgorica
is providing guidance and mentorship in all of these areas.
The NATO International Staff will present a report on each
aspirant's progress toward NATO membership at the NATO Foreign
Ministers' meeting in June. At that time we and other allies look
forward to a facts-based debate on the readiness of Montenegro and the
three other aspirant nations.
Question. There has been a long standing dispute with Argentina and
its refusal to settle debts it owes to U.S. investors. As you know,
Argentina has refused to even negotiate with its creditors--presenting
them only with take-it-or-leave it offer. In addition, Argentina has
evaded U.S. court judgments it has pledged to respect, openly vowed to
disobey future court rulings, and even passed a domestic law forbidding
itself from paying investors what it owes.
Do you agree this makes Argentina a ``uniquely recalcitrant
debtor,'' as the Court of Appeals has ruled? What specific
steps are you taking to encourage Argentina to normalize
relations with its creditors?
Answer. At every opportunity, the Department urges Argentina to
repay its debts to the U.S. Government and to engage with its
creditors, both public and private. Argentina owes the U.S. Government
$600 million and the Department is doing everything it can to recover
those funds. Thanks in part to our efforts, Argentina recently made a
repayment proposal to the Paris Club, which is currently under
consideration. The Paris Club, including the United States, has invited
Argentina for further discussions in May.
Faced with Argentina's failure to honor its international financial
obligations, we have opposed most multilateral development bank lending
to Argentina (except projects that benefit the poorest). We have
encouraged Argentina to repair its relationship with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States and other Paris Club members
have also stopped offering export credits to the Argentine Government.
We will continue to use these and other policy tools to urge Argentina
to fulfill its international financial responsibilities and normalize
its relationship with creditors.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Cuba.--According to Human Rights Watch's 2014 Annual
report: ``The Cuban Government continues to repress individuals and
groups who criticize the government or call for basic human rights . .
. The government controls all media outlets in Cuba and tightly
restricts access to outside information, severely limiting the right to
freedom of expression.''
Do you agree with that statement?
Answer. While we welcomed the Cuban Government's decision in 2010
and 2011 to release dozens of political prisoners with the support of
the Spanish Government and the Catholic Church, human rights conditions
in Cuba remain poor. The Cuban Government continues to limit
fundamental freedoms, including freedoms of expression and peaceful
assembly. We remain deeply concerned by the Cuban Government's repeated
use of arbitrary detention, at times with violence, to silence critics,
disrupt peaceful assembly, intimidate independent civil society, and
stifle peaceful dissent. We condemn the use of force against citizens
peacefully exercising their human rights, and we believe all Cuban
citizens should have a voice in determining their own future.
Question. Cuba.--Last week, the Associated Press published a
sensationalist and ill-informed report on USAID efforts to help the
Cuban people freely communicate with each other.
Is it in the U.S.' interests to provide the Cuban people
the means to exercise freedom of speech in a way available to
any student in the free world?
Is it in the U.S.' interests to provide law-abiding
citizens the means to communicate freely without government
censorship?
Is it in the interests of the United States to give people
a way to voice their opinions without fear of repression by the
security apparatus of one of the oldest dictatorships in the
world today?
Would you agree that Cubans working to build an independent
civil society and hold the Cuban regime accountable for its
violations of internationally accepted human rights risk their
lives?
Has the administration taken any steps to investigate the
leak of USAID's efforts to help Cubans communicate freely with
each other?
Answer. President Obama has made clear that the primary U.S. policy
objective in Cuba is to support the Cuban people's desire to freely
determine their future. The administration has improved conditions for
Cuban citizens through initiatives aimed at increasing the free flow of
information to, from, and within the island
Cuban authorities continue to deny the Cuban people their human
rights, including through repression of Cubans seeking to advance
peacefully civil society and human rights. President Obama stated that
he will continue to stand up for those rights and encourage others to
do so as well. The Cuban Government limits access to the Internet to a
small number of professionals and party faithful, and employs
monitoring and blocking technologies to further restrict Internet
freedom, making Cuba among the least-connected countries in the world.
The Cuban people deserve the right to freely express themselves and
the right to petition their government. U.S. assistance supports the
Cuban people's desire to freely determine their future through programs
that promote democratic principles, foster the development and training
of independent Cuban civil society, provide humanitarian assistance to
victims of political repression and their families, support Cuban-led
efforts to promote increased respect for human rights and document
human rights violations, and promote fundamental freedoms.
We continue to think creatively about how to provide people in Cuba
with the information and tools they need to facilitate a vibrant civil
society, to enhance their ability to determine their own future, and to
secure their human rights. We look forward to the day when all Cubans
can freely express their ideas and opinions and assemble freely.
Question. Cuba.--American humanitarian worker Alan Gross has now
been a hostage of the Cuban Government for 1,588 days, almost 4\1/2\
years. Mr. Gross has been unjustly imprisoned for helping the Jewish
community in Cuba get uncensored access to the Internet. Despite his
fragile health, Mr. Gross has been on hunger strike for at least a week
in protest for the inaction of our government to resolve his ordeal.
Has the time come for the U.S. Government to begin applying
pressure on the Cuban Government to unconditionally release
Alan Gross?
Answer. Alan Gross has been imprisoned by Cuban authorities for
more than 4 years for facilitating uncensored Internet access between a
small religious community on the island and the rest of the world. The
State Department has kept Mr. Gross' case at the forefront of
discussions with the Cuban Government and made clear the importance the
United States places on his welfare. President Obama has engaged
foreign leaders and other international figures to use their influence
with Cuba to call for Mr. Gross' release so he can be reunited with his
family. We have made abundantly clear to Cuban officials our position
that Mr. Gross ought to be released immediately and will continue our
diplomatic efforts to achieve this.
Question. Cuba.--Last summer, the Cuban regime was caught smuggling
over 240 tons of weapons to North Korea, in violation of international
law. This was the largest interdiction of weapons to or from North
Korea since United Nations sanctions were imposed. Moreover, it was the
first time a country in the Americas has been found guilty of violating
international sanctions. We continue hearing about Iranian and Russian
activities in the Western Hemisphere, about which we should remain
vigilant. However, it seems clear that if we allow this egregious
violation pass without consequences, it would only embolden other rogue
actors to pursue and foment dangerous and illegal activities in the
Western Hemisphere.
What is the effect of Cuban-North Korean actions on the
international nonproliferation regime?
What changes to U.S. policy toward Cuba and North Korea
have occurred because of this violation of multiple U.N.
Security Council resolutions?
Answer. The Chong Chon Gang case was a clear attempt by North Korea
to violate U.N. sanctions and circumvent the international
nonproliferation regime, but because of the responsible actions of
Panama, the shipment was discovered and disrupted. North Korea and Cuba
were embarrassed on the world stage and paid a significant price in
terms of seized cargo and other financial penalties.
We used this incident to advance our nonproliferation objectives.
We continue to work closely with the U.N. Security Council's DPRK
Sanctions Committee to shine a light on all aspects of this violation
and to ensure that all violators of U.N. sanctions are held accountable
for their actions.
In March, the United States along with like-minded states, pushed
to make the Panel of Experts annual Final Report on the incident
public. This report described the Panel findings on the Chong Chon Gang
violation, including details demonstrating that the actors involved in
the shipment tried to conceal its illicit nature. The report was
released in March and is on the committee's Web site.
We, along with several U.N. member states, made clear that this
shipment violated sanctions and that Cuba's interpretation of U.N.
Security Council resolutions is incorrect. Over the last few months, we
have been consulting with Council members about an appropriate
response. We will review the final results of the U.N. process before
considering other policy steps, but we anticipate the Security
Council's DPRK Sanctions Committee will take some actions, including
the release of a public statement on the incident that will rebuke
Cuba's position. U.S. policy remains insistent that all countries,
including Cuba, implement fully their legal obligations to enforce U.N.
sanctions.
Question. At a hearing last week, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel was unwilling to reaffirm
that President Reagan's so-called ``Six Assurances'' regarding Taiwan,
although he clarified his comments after the hearing when asked about
the same question by journalists. Given recent efforts by China to
imply that U.S. policy toward Taiwan has changed, I wanted to get your
comments regarding this on the record.
Can you reaffirm that this administration remains committed
to President Reagan's ``Six Assurances'' as a core component of
our policy toward Taiwan?
Answer. The United States remains firmly committed to the one-China
policy, the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and our
responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States also
remains firmly committed to its ``Six Assurances'' to Taiwan. Taken
together, these commitments and assurances form the foundation of our
unofficial relations with Taiwan.
The United States has long maintained that cross-strait differences
are matters to be resolved peacefully, without the threat or use of
force, and in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait. There is no change in our position. Our commitments and
assurances to Taiwan are firm and long-standing.
Question. As you know, Prime Minister Abe is exploring the
possibility of a change to the interpretation of Japan's Constitution
which would allow Japan to carry out military activities to provide for
collective self-defense. This would benefit U.S. and other allied
militaries in crisis situations given that the Japan Self Defense
Forces are currently not allowed to intervene to defend allied
militaries unless they are directly attacked.
Is this administration supportive of this effort?
Answer. Constitutional revision or reinterpretation is strictly a
matter for Japan to decide for itself. With that being said, the United
States recognizes Japan's long-standing commitment to regional and
global peace and stability, and we welcome Japan's efforts to play a
more proactive role in the alliance, including by reexamining the
interpretation of its constitution relating to the exercise of the
right of collective self-defense. To be clear, collective self-defense
is a right that is enshrined for all nations in the U.N. charter. It
allows for a nation to act to protect a second nation against
aggression by a third. Since Japan's Constitution renounces war as an
instrument of foreign policy, some have interpreted this as limiting
Japan's exercise of its right of collective self-defense, and this is
what the Japanese Government is studying.
We also support expanding the role of the Japan Self Defense Forces
within the framework of the alliance, investing in cutting-edge
capabilities, improving interoperability, modernizing force structure,
and adapting alliance roles and missions to meet contemporary and
future security realities. We note Japan's outreach to explain its
security policies, including by sending officials to foreign capitals.
We appreciate these efforts by Japan to be transparent as it implements
its evolving defense policies. However, overall we see this as an
example of the Government of Japan taking positive steps to increase
its ability to contribute to the alliance and to international and
regional security and stability.
Question. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COI) on human rights in
North Korea issued its report last month, finding that there was
``abundant evidence'' of crimes against humanity in that country. What
is the administration doing to follow through on the report's
recommendations?
Answer. We remain deeply concerned about the deplorable human
rights situation in the DPRK and the welfare of the North Korean
people. We strongly support the Commission's final report, including
its calls for accountability for the perpetrators of the ongoing,
widespread, and systematic violations of human rights taking place in
North Korea. In March 2013, the United States cosponsored, along with
Japan, the European Union, and the Republic of Korea, the U.N. Human
Rights Council (HRC) resolution that established the Commission. On
March 28 this year, the United States was proud to cosponsor the HRC
resolution that passed overwhelmingly. In the resolution, the HRC
condemned the DPRK's abuses, renewed the mandate of the Special U.N.'s
Rapporteur for human rights abuses, and called for accountability for
those responsible for human rights violations.
We support the Human Rights Council recommendation that the U.N.
General Assembly forward the Commission's final report to the U.N.
Security Council for its consideration, and we continue to work closely
with a broad range of partners across the international community to
sustain attention on the deplorable human rights situation in North
Korea and to seek ways to hold the regime accountable for its abuses.
Our Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, Robert King, has urged
the Office of the High Commissioner to establish a field-based
mechanism to follow up on the Commission's important work by continuing
to monitor and document human rights abuses in the DPRK. Deputy
Secretary William Burns met April 14 with the Hon. Michael Kirby,
former chair of the COI, to discuss how to sustain international
attention on the issue and how to hold accountable those responsible
for human rights violations in the DPRK. And on April 17, Ambassador
Samantha Power, representing the United States--together with French
and Australian officials--convened an Arria-formula meeting for U.N.
Security Council members to discuss the DPRK human rights situation
with the Commissioners. This meeting was a further testament to the
growing international consensus that the human rights situation in the
DPRK is unacceptable.
Question. The administration's sanctions against Russia seem to
have paused, even though Russian provocations continue. When will the
next round of sanctions occur and what is the administration doing to
increase pressure on Moscow?
Answer. We are continuing to apply pressure on Russia for its
military intervention in Ukraine, purported annexation of Crimea,
ongoing violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity,
breach of core obligations under international law, and threat to
international peace and stability. We will not recognize Russia's
purported annexation of Ukraine's territory. On April 11, we
significantly escalated sanctions to include Crimean separatist leaders
and a company that was involved with the misappropriation of Ukrainian
state assets. The consequent uncertain business climate has already
had, and will continue to have, significant consequences for Russian
interests. Whenever necessary to advance our goals, we will continue to
increase the pressure and the costs for actors associated with Russia's
occupation of Ukraine and work closely with our allies and partners so
that sanctioned individuals will experience the full costs of the
sanctions. We are applying sanctions and diplomatic pressure in an
effort to persuade Russia to de-escalate the situation. Russia's
implementation of de-escalation measures will be key. Russia must know
that further escalation will only isolate it further from the
international community.
Question. What is the status of the administration's response to
Ukraine's reported request for lethal assistance to its military? What
will have to happen before we are willing to send a strong message of
support to the interim government in Kiev about our willingness to
stand by them in their time of need?
Answer. On April 22, 2014, the White House announced the provision
of $8 million of nonlethal military assistance to allow the Ukrainian
Armed Forces and State Border Guard Service to fulfill their core
security missions, including explosive ordinance disposal equipment,
handheld radios, engineering equipment, communications equipment,
vehicles, and nonlethal individual tactical gear. Additionally, the
United States is moving forward on a plan to deliver an additional $3.5
million in assistance to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to include
medical equipment, water purification systems, and other basic
nonlethal items. On March 29, the U.S. delivered about 330,000 MRE
rations to Ukraine. We continue to review possible additional
assistance as well.
Since 1997, the United States has provided military assistance to
Ukraine through Foreign Military Financing (FMF). FMF in recent years
has focused on supporting defense reforms, increasing the
interoperability of Ukrainian forces, and expanding Ukraine's
deployable peacekeeping capabilities. We continue to work with Ukraine
to determine requirements across the security sector. Based on those
requirements, we will review additional options for providing security
assistance where needed.
Question. The New York Times and The Daily Beast have recently
reported on Russian violations of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) with the United States, which were not
previously disclosed by the Obama administration. The INF Treaty bans
Russia from testing, producing, and possessing medium-range missiles
capable of carrying nuclear warheads--in other words, nuclear-armed
missiles that would most directly threaten our allies in Europe. The
Obama administration has reportedly known about Russia's violations
since 2012.
Why were Russia's alleged or actual violations of the INF
Treaty not disclosed in the State Department's unclassified
compliance reports?
Have you personally raised these concerns about Russian
compliance with your Russian counterpart? If so, what has been
the response?
If Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty, why should the
United States remain a party to this treaty?
Answer. The Administration takes treaty compliance very seriously
and, as directed by law, produces the Annual Report to Congress on
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. This administration has
produced this Compliance Report every year since taking office. The
2014 Compliance Report, in both classified and unclassified versions,
will be delivered later this spring. We will keep Congress informed
through briefings with relevant congressional committees.
Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller has discussed our
specific INF concerns directly with her Russian counterpart. Other
senior officials have also raised the matter with Russia and will
continue to do so. We will continue to work with Russia to resolve this
issue.
We value the INF Treaty and believe that the treaty benefits the
security of the United States, our allies, and Russia. For that reason,
we will make every effort to resolve any concerns we have about Russian
compliance and to ensure the continued viability of the treaty.
Question. What steps are you taking to break the logjam on NATO
accession and ensure that NATO remains open for new members at the
summit in September?
Answer. The United States and our allies remain committed to the
Open Door policy and look forward to welcoming new members, when they
are ready. The alliance's standards are high and should remain so.
However, the alliance does not leave aspirant nations stranded or
without guidance. It mentors aspirants through the development of
mutually agreed Annual National Programs, evaluation processes, and
support for internal reforms. NATO takes a tailored approach with its
mentorship, recognizing that each aspirant's path to NATO membership is
unique. Following a U.S. Government proposal, the NATO International
Staff will present a report on each aspirant's progress toward NATO
membership at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in June.
Question. There have been press reports that the administration has
decided to accede to the Ottawa Treaty. What is the status of the
administration's review of this issue? Do you share the view of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Dempsey recent testimony that landmines
are ``an important tool in the arsenal of the Armed Forces of the
United States?''
Answer. With respect to consideration of U.S. landmine policy, as
we indicated at the most recent Ottawa Meeting of States Parties in
December 2013, we are pressing forward to bring that work to closure.
While I cannot comment on internal deliberations, I can confirm we are
carefully considering all issues related to antipersonnel landmines,
including military utility and humanitarian concerns.
Question. Earlier this year, DNI Clapper testified to Congress that
``Hezbollah has increased its global terrorist activity in recent years
to a level that we have not seen since the 1990s.'' As I'm sure you
know, Hezbollah is a proxy of Iran. Has Iranian support for terrorism
changed in any way since the Joint Plan of Action between the P5+1
countries and Iran was agreed to in late November?
Answer. We do not believe there has been a change in Iran's
behavior since the Joint Plan of Action was agreed to last November.
Iran continues to support terrorism, promote regional instability, and
provide the Assad regime in Syria with financial, material, and
personnel support. In December 2013, the Bahraini Coast Guard
interdicted a speedboat filled with Iranian weapons and explosives,
likely destined for Shia oppositionists in Bahrain. The Bahraini Chief
Prosecutor stated the suspects detained received paramilitary training
in Iran prior to smuggling the weapons and explosives.
In March 2014, Israeli naval forces interdicted the Klos C cargo
ship in the Red Sea along the border of Sudan and Eritrea. The Klos C
was carrying Iranian weapons and explosives, including long-range M-302
rockets, likely destined for Palestinian militant organizations in
Gaza. Iran has denied being behind either of these smuggling attempts.
Question. In their briefings about the Geneva agreement, White
House officials specifically said that nothing in the agreement
prevented the United States ``from imposing new sanctions targeting
Iran's sponsorship of terrorism or its abysmal human rights record.''
What actions has the administration taken on either front
since November 24?
Answer. In February 2014, the Department of Treasury announced a
number of new terrorism-related designations linked to Iran. Among
these were various entities and individuals linked to Mahan Air, a
private Iranian airline that was designated in October 2011 for its
support to the terrorist activities of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corp-Quds Force (IRGC-QF). Also designated were various IRGC-QF
individuals associated with Iran's activities in Afghanistan. Finally,
an individual known for supporting al-Qaeda's facilitation network in
Iran was also designated.
Question. What does the administration plan to do to address the
fact that if anything, Iran's actions regarding terrorism and human
rights have not improved, and in some respects, even worsened, over the
last 2 months?
Answer. The U.S. Government continues to raise its voice in support
of the Iranian people and their desire for greater respect for human
rights and the rule of law. With our allies, we will continue to
highlight and condemn Iran's ongoing human rights abuses, which include
the unlawful killing, torture, and imprisoning of its own people,
executions in the absence of due process, politically motivated
repression, harassment of members of ethnic and religious minority
communities, and its excessive limitations on freedom of expression.
As part of this work, the United States led lobbying efforts in
support of the successful March 28 vote on the U.N. Human Rights
Council resolution extending the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on
human rights in Iran, a mandate we were instrumental in establishing.
We will continue to urge the international community to press Iran to
allow the Special Rapporteur to visit the country and observe its human
rights conditions directly and freely. We will also continue to lobby
for the U.N. General Assembly's annual resolution condemning Iran's
human rights practices. Additionally, we will remain committed to
documenting Iran's human rights abuses in our annual Human Rights and
International Religious Freedom Reports, drawing attention to, and
raising awareness of, the regime's actions.
Question. Since November 24, has there been any progress in
obtaining the releases of Americans imprisoned or missing in Iran such
as Pastor Saeed Abedini, Robert Levinson, or Amir Hekmati?
Answer. The U.S. Government is dedicated to the return of U.S.-
Iranian dual nationals Saeed Abedini and Amir Hekmati, and U.S. citizen
Robert Levinson. The President, the Secretary, and Under Secretary
Wendy Sherman have raised the cases directly with the Iranian
Government. We have made clear that we are calling on Iran to release
Mr. Abedini and Mr. Hekmati, to ensure that Mr. Abedini receives
necessary medical care, and to work cooperatively with us to locate Mr.
Levinson, so they can be reunited with their families. At our request,
the Swiss Government, in its role as our protecting power, has also
continued to raise the issue on our behalf, as have other countries
that we have asked to press Iran to cooperate on these cases.
On March 3, Mr. Abedini was transferred to a private hospital for
medical tests and treatment, although he has not yet received treatment
or been informed of the results of his tests. His family is permitted
to visit him during his stay in the hospital. We will continue to
pursue all available options until all three Americans return home
safely.
Question. Last month, you said during testimony in front of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the administration would make a
decision about certification of FY14 assistance to Egypt in the
``coming days.'' Given the ongoing arrests and harassment of NGOs and
civil society activists, do you think that Egypt meets the requirement
of ``taking steps to support a democratic transition'' to receive this
certification?
Answer. We have consistently expressed, in public and private, that
the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms is a required
component of any roadmap to a peaceful democratic transition. We also
believe that a vibrant and unfettered civil society is necessary for
Egypt to build the accountable and responsive democratic institutions
that its citizens have demanded. As such, we have expressed grave
concern over the politicized arrests, trials, and sentences of civil
society activists in Egypt and have urged the government to redress
unjust verdicts, including through pardons, and provide full and
transparent due process to all accused. We continue to urge the
Egyptian Government to uphold these democratic principles, many of
which are enshrined in the new Egyptian Constitution, and to build an
environment free of threat and intimidation in order to create a stable
and secure country for all Egyptians. As we monitor the situation in
Egypt, we will continue to consult with Congress.
Question. Do you believe that General el-Sisi's decision to step
down as Minister of Defense and announce his Presidential candidacy
makes it more or less likely that Egypt will continue to make progress
in its transition to democracy?
Answer. We believe that Egypt's next President has another critical
opportunity to shape Egypt's future for the better. However, this will
only be possible if they are elected through a credible and transparent
process, and commit to governing democratically and inclusively and
upholding the universal rights of all Egyptians. For the past 3 years
Egyptians have demanded responsive and accountable governance, and
Egypt's next President has an obligation to meet those aspirations, and
to ensure that all Egyptians have the ability to exercise their
universal rights and freedoms without fear of intimidation or
retribution. We continue to urge Mr. el-Sisi, as well as all other
Presidential candidates, to remain faithful to the interim government's
commitment to an inclusive, democratic and peaceful transition as they
engage in their Presidential campaigns.
Question. I and other members of the Senate have called for the
establishment of an overt train-and-equip program by the Department of
Defense to identify and train moderate elements of the Syrian
opposition. Would you support such an effort?
Answer. Any Department of Defense effort to train and equip
elements of the Syrian opposition would be a significant undertaking.
The President has repeatedly stated that no options have been taken off
the table in our pursuit of a political settlement and a durable end to
the violence in Syria, and I will work to preserve his flexibility and
policymaking prerogatives as we evaluate the numerous options under
discussion.
The administration acknowledges that there can be no military
solution to the conflict, but we are working with our partners to
ensure that Syria's moderate opposition gets the help it needs to
protect civilian populations from regime assault, stabilize territory
it controls, enable civilian governance and service delivery, and drive
out extremists. For the Department of State's part, we are providing
approximately $80 million in nonlethal assistance to vetted, moderate
armed groups in coordination with the Supreme Military Council (SMC).
To date this aid has included cargo and pickup trucks, ambulances,
food, communications gear, generators, tents, blankets, mattresses,
medical kits and equipment, and specialized equipment such as forklifts
and backhoes to units in both the north and south of Syria.
Question. The proposed budget includes $4.35 billion for PEPFAR--
the same amount allocated under fiscal year 2014. With dried up
pipeline funding, and continued flat funding, the proposed budget
leaves in question how PEPFAR will scale up treatment and other life-
saving HIV/AIDS services and fulfill the goals set out in the Blueprint
for an AIDS-Free Generation.
With continued flat-funding for PEPFAR, will we be able to
reach our goal of an AIDS-free Generation?
Answer. The President is strongly committed to creating an AIDS-
free generation and stated on World AIDS Day that ``the United States
of America will remain the global leader in the fight against HIV and
AIDS.'' The U.S. provides more than 60 percent of all donor government
funding to address the pandemic through PEPFAR, in terms of both
bilateral assistance and multilateral investments through the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
However, reaching an AIDS-free generation is a shared goal. No one
country can do it alone. While we cannot continue alone at the pace we
were at, with millions more now on treatment, we will continue to
support all patients who we have initiated on therapy and enroll as
many new people as we can. We anticipate that countries and other
entities, including the Global Fund, will work with the United States
to provide prevention, care, and treatment services.
Question. In February, the administration announced plans to create
a new Global Health Security Agenda to prioritize building the global
capacity to detect global health risks rapidly, prevent them when
possible, and respond effectively when they occur.
Although this agenda is being primarily lead by the CDC,
how will State and USAID partner with CDC on this new Agenda?
Answer. The Global Health Security (GHS) Agenda is a multifaceted
interagency effort that includes the State Department and USAID;
several elements of the Department of Health and Human Services,
including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the
Departments of Defense and Agriculture; and the National Security
Council (NSC). Representatives from these and several other U.S.
agencies meet regularly and collaboratively under NSC auspices to
develop and advance the GHS Agenda. The GHS Agenda is intended to first
and foremost build on existing U.S. Government and international
investments and commitments, drawing from a diverse pool of U.S.
Government expertise. The multiple U.S. Government agencies involved in
the GHS Agenda work closely together not only in Washington, but also
with host governments overseas under the leadership of the Chief of
Mission to maximize coordination and cross-agency synergies for maximum
contribution to the GHS Agenda objectives.
The State Department has played a particularly active role in
adapting the GHS Agenda to the global geopolitical context, advising
which countries and international organizations to invite as partners,
having our embassies and missions worldwide approach partners through
diplomatic channels, planning international meetings to advance the
Agenda, and preparing written materials to support the effort.
USAID has been a leader over the past decade in promoting an agenda
of ``prevent, detect, and respond'' that is fully consistent with nine
objectives elaborated under the GHS Agenda. USAID has taken part in the
interagency process from the beginning, and has provided input based on
its long experience in health-related development, as well as how its
existing and planned assistance programs fit into and advance the GHS
agenda.
Attachment:
Additional Detail on USAID Activities
USAID has been a leader over the past decade in promoting an agenda
of ``prevent, detect, and respond'' that is fully consistent with nine
objectives elaborated under the GHS Agenda. The hallmark of the GHS
Agenda is its bold commitment to a multisector approach as it
recognizes that the source of new infectious diseases is most commonly
found in events and practices that fall outside the scope of
traditional public health initiatives.
USAID has a unique and central role among our U.S. Government
counterparts in implementing the GHS Agenda. The Agency's broad
bilateral partnerships and its multisector capacities--spanning human
health, agriculture, food security, the environment, economic growth,
and education--are the basis for this role. The nine GHS objectives
accord well with USAID's capacities, and its standing engagement with
multiple Ministries, underscoring the GHS Agenda's broad multisector
scope. USAID is now actively identifying opportunities where enhanced
coordination across its portfolio can directly contribute to the GHS
Agenda. For example, activities to strengthen surveillance for diseases
in livestock may be linked to public health disease surveillance. Such
cross-sector linkages could enable earlier identification and
mitigation of potential infectious diseases originating in animals
before they pose a significant threat to human populations. Other areas
of USAID strengths that applicable to GHS Agenda include:
In the agriculture sector, support for livestock production
and biosecurity, animal markets and value chains, training
veterinarians and agricultural extension workers, strengthening
livestock disease surveillance and veterinary laboratories, and
addressing the use of antibiotics in animal feed.
Food security and livelihoods.
In the environmental sector, activities supporting wildlife
conservation, conserving biodiversity and forests, sustainable
land management, transboundary water management, habitat and
climate change.
In higher education, strengthening capacities of
professional schools for public health, veterinary medicine,
human medicine, and environment.
Disaster preparedness and response.
In human health, immunization, emerging infectious diseases,
laboratory strengthening (particularly in the areas of
diagnostic capacities, biosafety and quality assurance), and
antimicrobial resistance (particularly for antimalarials and TB
drugs, and prescriber/user practices).
In addition, USAID's Emerging Pandemic Threats Program has
been specifically designed to address the GHS objectives. Its
team of technical experts is actively working with USAID
missions across the globe to determine how best to link the
elements of their bilateral portfolio to maximize opportunities
to prevent, detect, and respond to emerging infectious disease
threats.
Question. As part of the Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services
for Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States for 2013-2017,
the State Department is supposed to develop procedures for in-person
registration of domestic workers employed by diplomatic personnel in
Washington, DC. What is the status of these procedures?
Answer. Procedures for in-person registration of domestic workers
employed by diplomatic personnel have been continually discussed at the
State Department in an interbureau internal working group. The
Department continues its efforts to implement in-person registration
while addressing the need for the system to be operational for the many
non-English speaking domestic workers employed by foreign diplomatic
personnel. This effort will likely entail additional resources and
budgetary discussions. However, in the interim the Department is
preparing to hold a briefing for domestic workers in the Washington,
DC, area in the fall. This briefing will ensure that domestic workers
understand their rights and responsibilities, as well as the resources
available to them should they suffer abuse or mistreatment.
Question. When does the State Department plan to expand the program
to domestic workers employed by diplomatic personnel all over the
United States?
Answer. The Department does not currently have a date for
nationwide implementation of an in-person registration system as the
Department is still working to address language management for the
multinational population of domestic workers employed by foreign
diplomatic personnel.
Question. The Ambassador At Large for International Religious
Freedom post has been vacant for 6 months. When will this important
position be filled?
Answer. Thank you for your leadership in international religious
freedom. I agree with you on the need to fill this important position.
The White House is actively working to nominate a strong leader as soon
as possible.
In the meantime, the Department continues to work to advance
religious freedom worldwide through a wide range of efforts, including
dialogue with foreign government counterparts and ongoing discussion
with civil society, including religious leaders, people of faith, and
NGO representatives. Promoting religious freedom is a whole-of-
government effort, and the President and other senior Department
officials, including myself, our Assistant Secretaries and our
ambassadors, regularly raise religious freedom concerns around the
world.
Question. Due to Pakistan's engagement and toleration of
systematic, ongoing and egregious violations of freedom of religion,
would you support the designation of Pakistan as a Country of
Particular Concern for religious freedom?
Answer. We are currently reviewing all countries for possible CPC
designations and I take note of your recommendation to designate
Pakistan.
We continue to engage with the Government of Pakistan regarding our
concerns about the state of religious freedom there. In keeping with
President Obama's comments at the National Prayer Breakfast making
clear our opposition to blasphemy laws, we continue to encourage the
Pakistani Government to work toward repealing discriminatory laws,
including the blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws. We continue to express
our concerns to Pakistani authorities about the poor state of religious
freedom. A recent example occurred when Principal Deputy Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Jones visited
Islamabad during the last week of February. We also encourage the
government to take further concrete action to combat sectarian violence
and bring perpetrators to justice, and we consistently urge officials
to ensure that all Pakistanis are free to exercise their universal
rights, including freedoms of religion, expression, association, and
assembly.
In Pakistan, the State Department is funding a variety of programs
to promote respect for human rights. These programs include projects
funded by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor that support
victims of religion-based persecution; promote peaceful coexistence
between religious groups; and develop school curricula and training
materials to advance religious freedom, promote mutual respect and
tolerance, and combat violent extremism.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Question. The problems in Central America increasingly reverberate
into the U.S. For example, according to a Los Angeles Times Report from
last December, the United States is seeing a surge in Central American
asylum seekers attempting to escape the violence in the region.
According to the article, over the last 5 years, ``Credible Fear
applications have increased sevenfold, from just under 5,000 to more
than 36,000, driven largely by an influx from El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala.''
The problem in Central America is complex. While the headlines
point to drug trafficking and gang violence, the roots of these
problems are in the lack of educational and economic opportunities, and
the lack of a strong judicial and law enforcement system that is
resistant to corruption and can hold violent criminals accountable.
(a). When we have worked with our friends in the region to
combat these problems, our work has had results. The Merida
initiative in Mexico and Plan Colombia are two such examples.
But Central America is not a success story. Why isn't a
similar, regional and coordinated approach which deals with
economic development, law enforcement and judicial reform to
prevent violence on the Department's agenda?
(b). How will a $15 million cut in funding for the Central
America Regional Security Initiative over FY13 levels impact
our efforts to reduce violence and improve rule of law in the
region?
Answer. Central America faces serious challenges that directly
impact the United States and our hemispheric goal of economically
integrated democratic nations collaborating in peace and prosperity.
Central America suffers from deep poverty, the world's highest murder
rates, severe judicial impunity, poor governance, drug- and gang-fueled
violence, and corruption.
We employ a coordinated approach to combat these systemic problems,
working with Central American nations through the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) to strengthen institutions to
counter the effects of organized crime, uphold the rule of law, and
protect human rights. We believe that the region's needs fall into
three categories: security, governance, and prosperity. We continually
refine our engagement to meet the complex and evolving challenges the
region faces so our assistance will best address regional and
individual country circumstances.
U.S. assistance in Central America is complemented by our work with
North American and other partners under mechanisms such as the North
America-Central American Integration System (SICA) Security Dialogue
and the Group of Friends of Central America. The United States and its
partners consult on how best to combine our resources and work with
SICA to improve citizen security and combat transnational organized
crime while enhancing the effectiveness of our bilateral assistance.
The decrease to the FY 2015 CARSI request does not reflect a
decrease in the priority the United States places on Central America.
We are requesting a 19-percent increase for USAID programs from the
$50.6 million FY 2013 level. The increase will enable us to support
community-based approaches to preventing youth violence and
strengthening criminal justice systems in the region. The 26-percent
decrease from the $95 million FY 2013 level in International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance reflects the conclusion
or nationalization of various projects, a strategic shift from
procurement-heavy to training-specific projects, and our capacity to
draw from existing resources in pipeline. The request will sustain
current and planned programing. We are mindful that our future requests
need to reflect our efforts to refocus and refine engagement to promote
prosperity and good governance in addition to security.
Question. Russia has significant leverage over Europe through its
natural gas resources. Natural gas also has potential to be a valuable
tool in reducing carbon emission--if we do it right. What is the State
Department's view on LNG exports in general and for the European
situation in particular?
Answer. The Department of Energy has regulatory authority over
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exports and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission has regulatory authority over the construction of LNG export
facilities. To date, the Energy Department has conditionally approved
seven LNG permits for 9.3 billion cubic feet per day that can be
exported both to countries with which we have Free Trade Agreements and
to those where we do not, such as in Europe.
These are significant volumes. To put it in perspective, the
amounts conditionally approved to date, i.e., which the Department of
Energy has said it will approve assuming the satisfactory completion of
environmental review processes and compliance with any and all
preventative and mitigative measures imposed by federal or state
agencies, including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, are more
than double the amount of LNG that Europe imported in 2013.
The first project to export this gas is not expected to come online
until late 2015. DOE will continue to make public interest
determinations on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate, considering
economic, energy security, environmental and geopolitical impacts,
among other factors. FERC has approved one LNG export facility, is in
the process of reviewing other applications to construct LNG export
facilities, and expects more companies to apply for approval to build
LNG export facilities in the near future.
In sum, we are committed to putting gas onto the global market in a
way that is consistent with U.S. public interest because we know that
increased global supplies help our European allies and other strategic
partners.
Question. As you know, the Colombian Government is currently
negotiating with the FARC to resolve longstanding issues. Do you
believe the U.S. should continue to stay on the sidelines or is there
room for possible U.S. engagement?
Answer. The United States has been strongly engaged in support of
peace in Colombia, as an advocate for negotiations and in laying the
groundwork for a negotiated settlement.
Most recently the Secretary, in public remarks with Foreign
Minister Holguin on February 28, noted that it is ``so important to
bring a lasting peace to Colombia once and for all'' for the benefit of
the Colombian people. In his December meeting with President Santos,
the President praised the ``bold and brave efforts to bring about a
lasting and just peace inside of Colombia.''
Our ongoing foreign assistance has helped the Colombian Government
initiate talks and prepare for a peace agreement, and laid the ground
work that will sustain an agreement once it is finalized.
Counternarcotics programs have reduced cocaine production, thereby
reducing illicit funding to terrorist groups, including the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colobmbia (FARC). In addition, U.S.
programs currently engage government, civil society, and the private
sector to strengthen Colombia's ability to implement a sustainable and
inclusive peace. This includes initiatives to support conflict victims,
reduce impunity, develop rule of law, bring government services to
rural areas previously controlled by the FARC, and improve land tenure
and livelihoods in rural areas. By supporting efforts by the Colombian
people to secure justice and good governance, we help lay the ground
work for the accountability, stability, and reconciliation necessary
for any peace deal to be successful.
We are in regular, close contact with the government about the
status of the peace talks and have encouraged the government to inform
us of possible assistance the United States may offer in support of a
final peace agreement.
Question. The situation in Venezuela has been alarming, especially
as President Maduro attempts to distract individuals in Venezuela by
blaming the problems on the United States.
(a). What can we do to encourage a greater respect for
democracy and human rights in the region without inciting the
ideological paranoia that the United States is attempting to
interfere in Latin America?
Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned by the
government's response to ongoing protests in Venezuela. The
government's arbitrary detention and excessive use of force against
protesters and journalists, lack of due process, and the shutdown of
foreign media and Internet endanger human rights. We join with the
international community to call for an end to violence, respect for
human rights, support for the freedoms of expression and peaceful
assembly, due process of law, and release of those detained for
exercising their right to peaceful protest and free expression.
This is not a U.S.-Venezuela issue, it is an internal Venezuelan
issue. We've been clear all along that the future of Venezuela is for
the Venezuelan people to decide. That is why our focus has been to
bring an end to the violence and encourage an authentically inclusive
dialogue to address the Venezuelan people's legitimate grievances. We
have been actively engaging international partners to find a peaceful
solution.
The U.S. Government supports a wide range of civil society
organizations that promote and defend fundamental freedoms, democratic
processes, and nonviolent advocacy. Civil society organizations play an
important role in the promotion and effective exercise of democracy and
accountable governance.
(b). What more should the OAS be doing to help restore calm
in Venezuela and highlight human rights violations?
Answer. We believe the Organization of American States (OAS), as
the region's premier multilateral institution, must assume a greater
role to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Venezuela,
consistent with its mandate to promote peace, democracy, and respect
for human rights in member states, as expressed in the OAS Charter and
in the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights continues to focus
attention on the situation in Venezuela, including during recent
sessions, and we welcome its views and recommendations.
(c). The President is proposing a cut of $800 thousand in
democracy assistance, despite an increasingly complicated
political situation. How is this helpful to U.S. democracy
goals in the region?
Answer. Our commitment to support human rights and democracy,
including in challenging environments in the Western Hemisphere,
remains strong.
Our assistance request reflects no decrease in priority toward
these areas. We have the resources we need to advance U.S. objectives
and support democracy and human rights in countries of concern.
For Venezuela, the U.S. Government will support ongoing assistance
for civil society to push for public accountability, defend human
rights, and increase the public's access to independent information. We
will continue to monitor events and circumstances closely.
Question. Your leadership on climate change is commendable. While
climate change is a global problem, it is a problem with serious local
implications. In New Mexico and the Southwest, we are starting to see
the impacts of climate change in the form of decreased snowpack and
rainfall, and more intense droughts. Unless we act on a global scale,
climate models show an increasingly dry future for the American West.
We understand however that negotiations through the UNFCCC remain
difficult.
Please provide detail on how the Department's funding
request for climate change will help accelerate these talks,
and U.S. efforts to address this important issue?
Answer. Funding through the President's Global Climate Change
Initiative (GCCI) not only directly supports efforts with partners
around the world to reduce emissions and help the world's most
vulnerable communities adapt to climate change, these funds also
provide important leverage and facilitation toward an ambitious global
agreement.
Through GCCI funding, the United States has made low-emissions,
climate-resilient sustainable economic growth a priority in our
diplomacy and development. Our efforts involve two major areas of
engagement: (1) lowering the atmospheric accumulation rate of
greenhouse gases that cause climate change; and (2) helping societies
anticipate and incorporate plans for responding to potential climate
change impacts.
The Enhancing Capacity for Low Emission Development Strategies (EC-
LEDS) program is an important example. EC-LEDS is an interagency
program led by the Department of State and USAID that blends our
respective strengths in diplomacy and development. EC-LEDS seeks to
guide policymakers in developing countries to analyze greenhouse gas
emissions and economic trends and pursue policies that enable economic
growth along a lower emission pathway. This program directly supports
partner countries in developing the technical expertise required to
make and keep emission reduction commitments. It not only has emission
reduction benefits, it also builds on the recognition that all
countries must be and can be a part of the climate change solution.
Additionally, this program builds confidence in developing countries
that tackling climate change can, at the same time, boost job creation
and economic competitiveness.
EC-LEDS stands as a key element of U.S. support, alongside other
critical efforts including the Major Economies Forum, Clean Energy
Ministerial, Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Tropical Forest Alliance
2020, and a range of multilateral funds, such as the Climate Investment
Funds and funds focusing on adaptation such as the Least Developed
Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund.
Question. The new Global Development lab is an exciting and
important pillar in our approach to development globally. Innovation,
entrepreneurship, and job creation are critical to U.S. economic
competitiveness as well. Just last year 75 U.S. industries classified
as intellectual property intensive added $5.8 trillion to U.S. output.
Technology transfer, which accelerates innovations from the lab to the
market, is critical to maintaining our role as a leader in science and
technology, and developing solutions to complex global challenges such
as disease, pollution, and access to energy. Our National Labs
including Sandia and Los Alamos in New Mexico are actively involved in
basic and applied research, and examining ways to accelerate tech
transfer.
How will you ensure that the research and technologies you
support through the lab mature into viable businesses, and are
scaled up to benefit those in need around the world?
How will this new lab link with other agencies such as the
Department of Energy, Small Business Administration, and
Department of Commerce, also focused on innovation?
Answer. The U.S. Global Development Lab (The Lab) is building
directly off of the successes of its two predecessor organizations--the
Office of Innovation and Development Alliances and the Office of
Science and Technology. Those two offices were able to generate
hundreds of new innovative and cost-effective approaches to solving
long-standing development challenges. Where the Lab seeks to improve is
in the area of making sure the most promising of those solutions are
taken to global scale, impacting hundreds of millions of people. This
can only be done if these efforts become sustainable. For a large
subset of these solutions, it means ensuring that they become viable
businesses.
The Lab will do this in two ways. First, we will provide staged
financing, making increased investments to those solutions where there
is solid evidence of a sound business model that will enable global
impact. Second, the Lab is establishing innovative financing models and
other tools for nascent development enterprises, and connecting
entrepreneurs with accelerators like the USAID Higher Education
Solutions Network Health Accelerator at Duke University and USAID
partnerships like LAUNCH (Department of State, NASA, and Nike) that
connect entrepreneurs with business advisory services. Successful
examples include: the Odon Device, which will be manufactured by
Becton, Dickinson and Company, of Franklin Lakes, NJ; Subsurface Vapor
Transfer Irrigation, which has licensed the technology to Dupont; and
d.Light, which just closed on $11 million in Series C venture capital
financing.
The Lab has created a strong network of partners with whom it will
work from the outset to help scale proven solutions. The Lab's
cornerstone partner network includes corporations, foundations, donors,
universities, and nongovernmental organizations. The Lab also has a
close network of U.S. Government Partners that we are already working
with to help the Lab design and implement programs. This list includes
the State Department, USDA, NASA, the U.S. Geological Survey, the
National Science Foundation, the Millennial Challenge Corporation, the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.
______
Responses of Secretary of State John F. Kerry to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Flake
Question. Department of State Contract Files Missing.--According to
a report from the Associated Press, an inspector general recently found
that the files for more than $6 billion in State Department contracts
over the past 6 years are either missing or incomplete. The State
Department has called the issue a ``bureaucratic'' one, and stated that
it is addressing the matter.
When does the State Department expect to explain its
inability to account for $6 billion in contracts over the last
6 years?
Does this matter call into question any of the State
Department's methods for tracking and retaining files?
Answer. The OIG Management Alert did not state that moneys were
missing or contracts were otherwise unaccounted for. The OIG Management
Alert letter advised the Department that over the past 6 years the OIG
had identified Department of State contracts with a total value of more
than $6 billion in which contract files were incomplete or could not be
located and noted that, in the IG's opinion, inadequate files ``exposes
the Department to significant financial risk . . .''
Please note that the OIG Management Alert is a compilation of
audits, inspections, and investigations previously completed over the
past 6 years. What the OIG Management Alert did not mention are the
many changes implemented over the past several years to improve
contract management nor did it mention current efforts--such as a pilot
for electronic filing that has been underway at several posts for the
past several months. When completed, we will have a better idea of the
overall feasibility and resources required to develop, deploy, and
maintain such a system, both domestically and at our over 280 posts
worldwide.
Question.OCO Funding.--DOD OCO funding has been plussed up
significantly over the past decade. In the past few years, however, the
State Department has also begun requesting OCO funding outside of the
base budget. It is unclear what this precedent this will set for future
years after Iraq and Afghanistan.
Do you believe that it will be the new status quo for the
State Department to come up with a base estimate for responding
to humanitarian crises across the globe, and then to also
submit an OCO request for ``unforeseen'' expenses?
Answer. The OCO request of $5.9 billion for the Department of State
and USAID is consistent with the practice of the past 3 years and
allows the Department the flexibility to respond to extraordinary needs
and contingencies that are critical to immediate U.S. national security
objectives without unnecessarily undermining funding for longer term
efforts to sustain global order and tackle transnational challenges.
The OCO request funds exceptional operations and assistance expenses in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; our response to ongoing challenges
presented by the Syria crisis; and emergent peacekeeping needs.
The OCO request for humanitarian needs in Syria ($1.1 billion) is
consistent with appropriations since FY 2012, which have included
significant amounts of OCO for humanitarian expenses and enabled us to
respond appropriately to crises worldwide, including in and around
Syria. The entire $4.8 billion humanitarian assistance request--base
and OCO--will allow us to respond to the unprecedented Syria crisis and
other humanitarian needs around the world. The administration will
continue to seek the necessary flexibility to enable the most
appropriate U.S. response to these and other crises.
______
Testimony Given By Secretary of State John F. Kerry at The Hearing on
September 9, 2013, Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee,
Ranking Member Corker, thank you very, very much for having us here
today. We look forward to this opportunity to be able to share with you
President Obama's vision with respect to not just this action but, as
Senator Corker has inquired appropriately, about Syria itself and the
course of action in the Middle East.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for welcoming Teresa. This is her first
public event since early July. So we are all happy she is here.
As we convene for this debate, it is not an exaggeration to say to
you--all of you, my former colleagues--that the world is watching not
just to see what we decide, but it is watching to see how we make this
decision, whether in a dangerous world we can still make our Government
speak with one voice. They want to know if America will rise to this
moment and make a difference.
And the question of whether to authorize our Nation to take
military action is, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, and you have
echoed, Mr. Ranking Member, this is obviously one of the most important
decisions, one of the most important responsibilities of this committee
or of any Senator in the course of a career.
The President and the administration appreciate that you have
returned quickly to the Nation's capital to address it and that you are
appropriately beginning a process of focusing with great care and great
precision, which is the only way to approach the potential use of
military power.
Ranking Member Corker, I know that you want to discuss, as you
said, why Syria matters to our national security and our strategic
interests beyond the compelling humanitarian reasons, and I look
forward, with Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey, to laying that out
here this afternoon.
But first, it is important to explain to the American people why we
are here. It is important for people who may not have caught every
component of the news over the course of the Labor Day weekend to join
us, all of us, in focusing in on what is at stake here. That is why the
President of the United States made the decision as he did, contrary to
what many people thought he would do, of asking the Congress to join in
this decision. We are stronger as a Nation when we do that.
So we are here because against multiple warnings from the President
of the United States, from the Congress, from our friends and allies
around the world, and even from Russia and Iran, the Assad regime, and
only undeniably the Assad regime, unleashed an outrageous chemical
attack against its own citizens. We are here because a dictator and his
family's personal enterprise, in their lust to hold onto power, were
willing to infect the air of Damascus with a poison that killed
innocent mothers, and fathers, and hundreds of their children, their
lives all snuffed out by gas in the early morning of August 21st.
Now, some people here and there amazingly have questioned the
evidence of this assault on conscience. I repeat here again today that
only the most willful desire to avoid reality can assert that this did
not occur as described, or that the regime did not do it. It did
happen, and the Assad regime did it.
Now, I remember Iraq. Secretary Hagel remembers Iraq. General
Dempsey especially remembers Iraq. But Secretary Hagel and I and many
of you sitting on the dais remember Iraq in a special way because we
were here for that vote. We voted. And so we are especially sensitive,
Chuck and I, to never again asking any member to take a vote on faulty
intelligence.
And that is why our intelligence community has scrubbed and re-
scrubbed the evidence. We have declassified unprecedented amounts of
information, and we ask the American people and the rest of the world
to judge that information. We can tell you beyond any reasonable doubt
that our evidence proves the Assad regime prepared for this attack,
issued instructions to prepare for this attack and warned its own
forces to use gas masks. And we have physical evidence of where the
rockets came from and when. Not one rocket landed in regime-controlled
territory, not one. All of them landed in opposition-controlled or
contested territory.
We have a map, physical evidence, showing every geographical point
of impact, and that is concrete. Within minutes of the attack--90 I
think to be precise, maybe slightly shorter--the social media exploded
with horrific images of the damage that had been caused, men and women,
the elderly, and children sprawled on a hospital floor with no wounds,
no blood, but all dead. Those scenes of human chaos and desperation
were not contrived. They were real. No one could contrive such a scene.
We are certain that none of the opposition has the weapons or
capacity to affect a strike of this scale, particularly from the heart
of regime territory. Just think about it in logical terms, common
sense. With high confidence, our intelligence community tells us that
after the strike, the regime issued orders to stop, and then fretted
openly, we know, about the possibility of U.N. inspectors discovering
evidence.
So then, they began to systematically try to destroy it, contrary
to my discussion with their foreign minister, who said we have nothing
to hide. I said, if you have nothing to hide, then let the inspectors
in today and let it be unrestricted. It was not. They did not. It took
four days of shelling before they finally allowed them in under a
constrained pre-arranged structure. And we now have learned that the
hair and blood samples from first responders in East Damascus has
tested positive for signatures of sarin.
So, my colleagues, we know what happened. For all the lawyers, for
all the former prosecutors, for all those who have sat on a jury, I can
tell you that we know these things beyond the reasonable doubt that is
the standard by which we send people to jail for the rest of their
lives.
So we are here because of what happened two weeks ago, but we are
also here because of what happened nearly a century ago in the darkest
moments of World War I and after the horror of gas warfare when the
vast majority of the world came together to declare in no uncertain
terms that chemical weapons crossed the line of conscience, and they
must be banned from use forever. Over the years that followed, over 180
countries, including Iran, Iraq, and Russia, agreed, and they joined
the Chemical Weapons Convention. Even countries with whom we agree on
little agreed on that conviction.
Now, some have tried to suggest that the debate we are having today
is about President Obama's red line. I could not more forcefully state
that is just plain and simply wrong. This debate is about the world's
red line. It is about humanity's red line. And it is a red line that
anyone with a conscience ought to draw.
This debate is also about Congress' own red line. You, the United
States Congress, agreed to the Chemical Weapons Convention. You, the
United States Congress, passed the Syria Accountability Act, which says
Syria's chemical weapons ``threaten the security of the Middle East and
the national security interests of the United States.'' You, the
Congress, have spoken out about grave consequences if Assad, in
particular, used chemical weapons. So I say to you, Senator Corker,
that is one of the reasons why Syria is important.
And as we debate and the world watches, as you decide and the world
wonders, not whether Assad's regime executed the worst chemical weapons
attack of the 21st century. That fact, I think, is now beyond question.
The world wonders whether the United States of America will consent
through silence to standing aside while this kind of brutality is
allowed to happen without consequence.
In the nearly 100 years since the first global commitment against
chemical weapons, only two tyrants dared to cross the world's brightest
line. Now Bashar al-Assad has become the third. And I think all of you
know that history holds nothing but infamy for those criminals, and
history reserves also very little sympathy for their enablers. So the
reality is the gravity of this moment. That is the importance of the
decision that this Congress faces and that the world is waiting to
learn about in these next days.
Now, Ranking Member Corker asked a central question: Why should
Americans care beyond what I have just said, which ought to be enough
in the judgment of the President and this administration. Well, it is
clear that in addition to what I have just mentioned about the Syria
Accountability Act and the threat to the Middle East, we cannot
overlook the impact of chemical weapons and the danger that they pose
to a particularly volatile area of the world in which we have been
deeply invested for years because we have great friends there. We have
allies there. We have deep interests there.
Since President Obama's policy is that Assad must go, it is not
insignificant that to deprive Assad of the capacity to use chemical
weapons, or to degrade the capacity to use those chemical weapons,
actually deprives him of a lethal weapon in this ongoing civil war, and
that has an impact. That can help to stabilize the region ultimately.
In addition, we have other important strategic national security
interests, not just in the prevention of the proliferation of chemical
weapons, but to avoid the creation of a safe haven in Syria or a base
of operations for extremists to use these weapons against our friends.
All of us know that the extremes of both sides are there waiting in the
wings, working and pushing and fighting. They would be desperate to get
their hands on these materials. And the fact is that if nothing happens
to begin to change the equation or the current calculation, that area
can become even more so an area of ungoverned space where those
extremists threaten even the United States and, more immediately, if
they get their hands on their weapons, allies and friends of ours, like
Jordan, or Israel, or Lebanon, or others.
Forcing Assad to change his calculation about his ability to act
with impunity can contribute to his realization that he cannot gas or
shoot his way out of his predicament. And as I think you know, it has
been the President's primary goal to achieve a negotiated resolution,
but you got to have parties prepared to negotiate to achieve that.
Syria is also important because, quite simply, and I cannot put
this to you more plainly than to just ask each of you to ask
yourselves, if you are Assad or if you are any one of the other despots
in that region, and the United States steps back from this moment
together with our other allies and friends, what is the message? The
message is that he has been granted impunity, the freedom to choose to
use the weapons again or force us to go through this cycle again with
who knows what outcome after once refusing it. We would have granted
him the capacity to use these weapons against more people with greater
levels of damage because we would have stood and stepped away.
As confidently as we know what happened in Damascus, my friends, on
August 21st, we know that Assad would read our stepping away or our
silence as an invitation to use those weapons with impunity. And in
creating impunity, we will be creating opportunity, the opportunity for
other dictators and/or terrorists to pursue their own weapon of mass
destruction, including nuclear weapons.
I will tell you there are some people hoping that the United States
Congress does not vote for this very limited request the President has
put before you. Iran is hoping you look the other way. Our inaction
would surely give them a permission slip for them to at least
misinterpret our intention, if not to put it to the test. Hezbollah is
hoping that isolationism will prevail. North Korea is hoping that
ambivalence carries the day. They are all listening for our silence.
And if we do not answer Assad today, we will erode a standard that
has existed for those 100 years. In fact, we will erode a standard that
has protected our own troops in war, and we will invite even more
dangerous tests down the road.
Our allies and our partners are also counting on us in this
situation--the people of Israel, of Jordan, of Turkey. Each look next
door and they see that they are one stiff breeze away from the
potential of being hurt, of their civilians being killed as a
consequence of choices Assad might make in the absence of action. They
anxiously await our assurance that our word means something. They await
the assurance that if the children lined up in un-bloodied burial
shrouds for their own children, that we would keep the world's promise.
That is what they are hoping.
So the authorization that President Obama seeks is definitely in
our national security interests. We need to send to Syria and to the
world, to dictators and terrorists, to allies, and to civilians alike
the unmistakable message that when the United States of America and the
world say ``never again,'' we do not mean sometimes, we do not mean
somewhere. Never means never.
So this is a vote for accountability. Norms and laws that keep the
civilized world civil mean nothing if they are not enforced. As Justice
Jackson said in his opening statement at the Nuremberg trials, ``The
ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in a
system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible
to the law.'' If the world's worst despots see that they can flout with
impunity prohibitions against the world's worst weapons, then those
prohibitions are just pieces of paper. That is what we mean by
accountability, and that is what we mean by we cannot be silent.
So let me be clear. President Obama is not asking America to go to
war. And I say that sitting next to two men, Secretary Hagel and
Chairman Dempsey, who know what war is. Senator McCain knows what war
is. They know the difference between going to war and what President
Obama is requesting now. We all agree there will be no American boots
on the ground. The President has made crystal clear we have no
intention of assuming responsibility for Syria's civil war. He is
asking only for the power to make clear, to make certain, that the
United States means what we say, that the world, when we join together
in a multilateral statement, mean what we say. He is asking for
authorization to degrade and deter Bashar al-Assad's capacity to use
chemical weapons.
Now, some will undoubtedly ask, and I think appropriately, what
about the unintended consequences of action? Some fear a retaliation
that leads to a larger conflict. Well, let me put it bluntly. If Assad
is arrogant enough, and I would say foolish enough, to retaliate to the
consequences of his own criminal activity, the United States and our
allies have ample ways to make him regret that decision without going
to war. Even Assad's supporters, Russia and Iran, say publicly that the
use of chemical weapons is unacceptable.
Now, some will also question the extent of our responsibility. To
them I say, when someone kills and injures hundreds of children with a
weapon the world has banned, we are all responsible. That is true
because of treaties like the Geneva Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and, for us, the Syria Accountability Act. But it is also
true because we share a common humanity and a common decency.
This is not the time for arm chair isolationism. This is not the
time to be spectators to slaughter. Neither our country nor our
conscience can afford the cost of silence. We have spoken up against
unspeakable horror many times in the past. Now we must stand up and
act, and we must protect our security, protect our values, and lead the
world with conviction that is clear about our responsibility.
Thank you.
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