[Senate Hearing 113-581]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-581
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH SUDAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 9, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement. 2
Responses of Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield to
Questions Submitted by Senator Bob Corker.................. 58
Knopf, Hon. Kate Almquist, adjunct faculty, Africa Center for
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC. 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Lindborg, Hon. Nancy E., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC.................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Lyman, Hon. Princeton, senior advisor, United States Institute of
Peace, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC................. 31
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Prendergast, John, cofounder, Satellite Sentinel Project, Enough
Project, Washington, DC........................................ 35
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Thomas-Greenfield, Hon. Linda, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator From
California..................................................... 57
(iii)
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH SUDAN
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 9, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:17 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy,
Kaine, Markey, Corker, Rubio, and Flake.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. Let me welcome our panelists, all of whom are as deeply
troubled as all of us are by the situation in South Sudan. The
reason for this being the first hearing of this committee of
the new year is the hope that our attention can send a message
to all parties in South Sudan that a cease-fire, a continuing
cease-fire, a political solution and reconciliation, is
critical for U.S. long-term assistance, and in doing so
hopefully we can save lives.
We have many questions about the direction in which this
young nation is headed and the greater implications of the
conflict, and I hope our panelists will provide us with deeper
insights into the situation on the ground, which I might add,
in a different context, underscores the importance of Congress
moving quickly on embassy security with our Embassy in Juba
operating at severely reduced capacity as a result of the
violence.
Looking back, the United States Government and members of
this committee were hopeful when we strongly supported South
Sudan's independence in 2011. After decades of war with the
Sudanese Government, the people of South Sudan voted in favor
of self-determination and the chance to create an inclusive,
democratic, prosperous society, and they were united toward
that goal. Now that ideal is in jeopardy. Over a thousand
people have been killed. More than 194,000 have been displaced,
and humanitarian conditions will surely deteriorate as access
to conflict areas diminishes.
I think we can all agree that it is absolutely necessary
that to avoid a downward spiral into further ethnic violence
and chaos, all armed elements must cease hostilities
immediately. A continuation of violence will only jeopardize
future U.S. engagement and further U.S. assistance.
Having said that, there is some sign for hope and reason
for some optimism. I commend the Intergovernmental Authority
for Development and other African leaders for successfully
arranging negotiations in Ethiopia, and I commend President
Kiir and former Vice President Machar for sending delegations
to talk in Addis Ababa. At the end of the day there's only one
option--let me reiterate Secretary Kerry's remarks--that all
parties must make serious efforts to seek an inclusive
political solution.
Today's panelists are here to help us better understand the
road to that political solution and the broader implications of
the current crisis. We hope to gain insight into the nature of
the rebellion--are the units cohesive? are they fragmented? how
much does Machar--control does he have over rebel forces? I
would hope our panelists can provide answers to the basic
questions before us: What is the danger of the violence
spiraling out of control? What are the underlying political and
ethnic grievances that must be addressed? What are the most
immediate humanitarian needs? What can the United States do to
play a role toward the short-term and long-term reconciliation,
and what should that reconciliation look like?
With that, let me turn to Senator Corker for his opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of
you in the second panel for being here with us today. We thank
you very much for that.
It is an understatement, I guess, to say that South Sudan
is at a critical juncture today. Our Ambassador is there. We
have beefed up security and not much in the way of other staff
members. Thirty months ago, I guess there were real
expectations about the future of South Sudan. We are seeing the
difference between a rebel movement and a government, and I
think we all understand it was that movement that united the
country and now that that has been achieved things are
deteriorating and, unfortunately, due to the lack of good
leadership. But very quickly progress could dissipate along
sectarian lines that could harden and make the conflict even
more difficult to overcome.
Khartoum is obviously benefiting from this. Given our
historical involvement, we are seen as the de facto backstop.
We have got a long history there and people expect us to be
that de facto backstop. And while Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya
are playing important roles--and obviously South Sudan is very
important to China--this is a place where obviously people
expect us to make a difference.
So in addition to the conflict that we have there that is
ongoing, that is causing murders and the kinds of things that
we hate to see taking place in any country, we also realize
that the institutional framework there is a morass and is going
to take incredible effort over a longer period of time.
So I do look forward to hearing the administration's point
of view on the situation there today and prospects for the
future. I know they share the sense of urgency that we all have
regarding this internal conflict ending and us moving on to
another phase there, and I do look forward to hearing your
comments as to where we as a nation should go from here
relative to South Sudan.
So thank you for being here, and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for having the hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Let me introduce our panelists: Linda Thomas-Greenfield,
who is the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. We
appreciate her work in her former role as well as now in this
role and to be here today. And Nancy Lindborg, the Assistant
Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Affairs at USAID.
Your full statements will be included in the record without
objection. We would ask you to synthesize those in around 5
minutes or so so we could enter into a dialogue with you. With
that, Madam Secretary, we will call upon you first.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you. Chairman Menendez,
Ranking Member Corker, members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I know that the subject before us is one in which you
and other Members of Congress are deeply concerned and that you
deeply care about the situation in Sudan. I regret that
Ambassador Booth, our Special Envoy, is unavailable to testify
before you today, as we have him in Addis working to get the
peace process under way.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, 3 years ago today--and
it is really important that it was 3 years ago today; this is
the anniversary of South Sudan's independence--on January 9,
2011, the people of South Sudan voted in overwhelming numbers
for independence from the Republic of Sudan. After decades of
war, they were peacefully and joyfully voting for separation
and for a new future. Then-Senator Kerry, my new boss, was
there to witness that historic moment. The United States played
a critical role in getting the world's youngest nation on the
map.
Today, tragically, the world's youngest country and
undoubtedly one of the most fragile democracies is in danger of
shattering. The United Nations has reported that more than
1,000 people have died, over 240,000 have fled their homes,
including a number of refugees in neighboring countries.
Political rivalries have taken on ethnic dimensions. Atrocities
are being committed. Men, women, and children are caught in the
crossfire. This is not the future for which the people of Sudan
voted 3 years ago.
South Sudan's crisis began less than a month ago on
December 15, with a political struggle that escalated into
broader violence. However, as the fighting began, a few things
became crystal clear. First, neither the United States nor the
international community will countenance the armed overthrow of
a democratically elected government.
Second, hostilities must stop. Any and all violence
directed at civilian populations must end. Those responsible
for perpetrating human rights abuses must be held accountable.
Third, this crisis will not be solved on the battlefield.
We have made that point over and over again. Although fighting
started less than 1 month ago, the roots of this conflict are
much deeper, and resolution can only come through immediate
dialogue between the two sides and a broader reconciliation.
Finally, all parties must permit immediate humanitarian
access to those in need, to the tens of thousands of South
Sudanese men, women, and children who are the real victims of
this violence.
The United States has engaged in an all-out diplomatic
effort to help bring an end to the fighting with engagement by
Secretary Kerry, National Security Adviser Susan Rice, and
other high-ranking officials with President Kiir and former
Vice President Machar, as well as with the heads of state,
foreign ministers in neighboring countries and around the
world. We have galvanized support to end hostilities and open a
broader dialogue between the two sides. We have called for
accountability for atrocities and we have sought to secure the
release of political detainees now being held in Juba.
But while we need a political settlement among the fighting
parties, the immediate security situation remains critical,
particularly for the thousands of internally displaced
civilians who have sought protection in the U.N. compounds.
This must be addressed. As the crisis began to unfold, we
proposed, and the Security Council unanimously adopted, a
resolution nearly doubling the authorized size of the UNMISS
contingent. In turn, we are now actively encouraging member
states to provide additional troops and police units to the
U.N. mission, including through the transfer of contingents
from other missions in the region.
As my colleague Assistant Administrator Lindborg will
discuss, we have committed an additional $50 million in
emergency humanitarian assistance. The President's Special
Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Ambassador Don Booth--who as I
noted could not be here today to testify because he is in
Ethiopia--Ambassador Booth has been in the region since
December 22. He has been working around the clock. He has met
repeatedly with President Kiir and other officials. He has had
lengthy discussions with Riek Machar. He has secured the first
official visit with the political detainees, and he has sat
down with local religious leaders and civil society members to
help find a solution.
This is an all-out effort on our part. Given our special
history with South Sudan, we are working closely with South
Sudan's neighbors through the East Africa Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD), who are spearheading the
mediation efforts. A special summit on South Sudan was held
just 12 days after the conflict began. Ethiopian Minister
Seyoum and Kenyan General Sumbeiywo are the two negotiators on
the side of IGAD who are leading this effort. South Sudan's
neighbors are also providing asylum to the new refugees.
These negotiations offer the best hope for South Sudan and
the region. An agreement to end hostilities will provide much-
needed time and space for dialogue to begin on the core
political and governance issues that are the root of this
crisis. Both sides must recognize that there can be no military
solution. We have made clear to the rebels that we will not
recognize a violent overthrow of a democratically elected
government. At the same time, we have made clear to the
government that they must open political space to allow for
greater inclusion.
The United States strongly believes that the political
prisoners currently being held in Juba must be released, and
each day that the conflict continues the risk of an all-out
civil war grows as ethnic tensions and more civilians are
killed, injured, are forced to flee, the humanitarian situation
grows more dire, and those who have remained on the sidelines
are pulled into the conflict.
Let me conclude by saying that I am greatly concerned that
the crisis in South Sudan has the potential to escalate even
further. While we do not know the scale of atrocities that have
been committed thus far, there is clear evidence that there are
targeted killings taking place. Dinkas are killing Nuer, Nuer
are killing Dinkas. Countless civilians, women, and children
have become victims of violence perpetrated by both the
government and the rebel forces alike. Each violent act
threatens to return South Sudan to the cycle of violence and
destruction that South Sudanese of all ethnicities and
backgrounds voted to end when they voted for independence in
2011.
In addition to calling for an end to the violence,
humanitarian access, dialogue, and the release of political
prisoners in Juba, the United States is exploring the
possibility of appropriate pressures against individuals on
both sides who interfere with peace and reconciliation in South
Sudan and those who are responsible for committing serious
human rights abuses.
Let me thank you again for giving us the opportunity to
speak before you today. Let me thank you for your commitment to
the people of Sudan and also your support for our efforts in
the region. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield
introduction
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, Members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. I know that the subject before us is one about which
you and other Members of Congress care deeply. I regret to inform you
that Special Envoy Booth is unavailable to testify today as he is in
Addis Ababa working to get the peace process underway.
situation in south sudan
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, 3 years ago today, on January
9, 2011, the people of South Sudan voted in overwhelming numbers for
independence from the Republic of Sudan. After decades of war, they
were peacefully and joyfully voting for separation and for a new
future. Then Senator Kerry was there to witness that historic moment.
The United States played a critical role in getting the world's
youngest country on the map.
Today, tragically, the world's youngest country and undoubtedly one
of its most fragile democracies is in danger of shattering. The United
Nations has reported more than a thousand people have died and over
240,000 have fled their homes including a number of refugees in
neighboring countries. Political rivalries have taken on ethnic
dimensions, atrocities are being committed, and men, women, and
children are caught in the crossfire. This is not the future for which
the people of South Sudan voted.
South Sudan's crisis began less than a month ago, on December 15,
with a political struggle that escalated into broader violence. However
the fighting began, a few things are crystal clear. First, neither the
United States nor the international community will countenance the
armed overthrow of the democratically elected government. Second,
hostilities must stop, any and all violence directed at civilian
populations must end, and those responsible for perpetrating human
rights abuses must be held accountable. Third, this crisis will not be
solved on the battlefield. Although fighting started less than 1 month
ago, the roots of this conflict are much deeper, and resolution can
only come through immediate dialogue between the two sides and an
inclusive reconciliation. Finally, all parties must permit immediate
and unconditional humanitarian access to all in need, to tens of
thousands of South Sudanese men, women, and children who are the real
victims of this violence.
The United States has engaged in an all-out diplomatic effort to
help bring an end to the fighting, with engagement by Secretary Kerry,
National Security Advisor Susan Rice, and other high-ranking officials
with President Kiir and former Vice President Machar as well as with
the heads of state and foreign ministers in neighboring countries and
around the world. We have galvanized support to end hostilities and
open a broader dialogue between the two sides; called for
accountability for atrocities; sought to secure the release of
political detainees now being held in Juba.
But while we need a political settlement among the fighting
parties, the immediate security situation remains critical--
particularly for the thousands of internally displaced civilians who
have sought the U.N.'s protection--and must be addressed as well. As
the crisis began to unfold, we proposed and the Security Council
unanimously adopted a resolution nearly doubling the authorized troop
ceiling for UNMISS. In turn, we are now actively encouraging member
states to provide additional troops and police units to the U.N.
mission, including through the transfer of contingents from other
missions in the region. As my colleague, Assistant Administrator
Lindborg will discuss, we have just committed an additional $50 million
in emergency humanitarian assistance in response to pressing new needs
arising from the crisis.
The President's Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, Ambassador
Donald Booth--who, as I noted, could not be here to testify today
because he is in Ethiopia--is actively trying to help resolve this
crisis. Ambassador Booth has been in the region since December 22,
working around the clock, as we all have in supporting his efforts. He
has met repeatedly with President Kiir and other officials, had lengthy
discussions with former Vice President Machar, secured the first
official visit with the group of political detainees, and sat down with
local religious leaders and civil society members to help find a way
out of this crisis.
This is an all-out effort on our part, and given our special
history in South Sudan, we are working closely with South Sudan's
neighbors, through East Africa's Intergovernmental Authority on
Development or IGAD, who are spearheading mediation efforts. A special
summit on South Sudan was held at the head of state level just 12 days
after the conflict began, and thanks to robust engagement,
representatives of both parties arrived in Addis for negotiations just
a few days later. We are encouraged by IGAD's leadership in convening
the parties and strongly support the efforts of former Ethiopian
Minister Seyoum Mesfin and Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo to find a
peaceful solution through political dialogue. South Sudan's neighbors
are also providing asylum for new South Sudanese refugees who may
number in the hundreds of thousands if the fighting does not end soon.
These negotiations offer the best hope for South Sudan and the
region. An agreement to end hostilities will provide much needed time
and space for dialogue to begin on the core political and governance
issues that are at the root of this crisis. Both sides must recognize
that there can be no military solution. We have made clear to the
rebels that we will not recognize a violent overthrow of a
democratically elected government. At the same time, we are encouraging
the government to open political space to allow for greater inclusion.
The United States also strongly believes that the political prisoners
currently being held in Juba must be released. These individuals should
join discussions in Addis to enlarge the chorus of those seeking
constructive solutions to resolve this growing catastrophe. Each day
that the conflict continues, the risk of all-out civil war grows as
ethnic tensions rise, more civilians are killed, injured, or forced to
flee, the humanitarian situation grows more dire, and those who have
remained on the sidelines are pulled into the conflict.
Let me conclude by saying that I am gravely concerned that the
crisis in South Sudan has the potential to escalate even further. While
we do not know the scale of atrocities that have been committed thus
far, there is clear evidence that targeted killings have taken place,
with Dinka killing Nuer, and Nuer killing Dinka. Countless civilians,
particularly women and children, have become victims of violence
perpetrated by both government and rebel forces alike. Each violent act
threatens to return South Sudan to the cycle of violence and
destruction that South Sudanese of all ethnicities and backgrounds
voted to end when they voted for independence in 2011. Stopping the
violence, and ensuring that Africa's newest nation continues to move
forward rather than backward, is of highest priority to the United
States and the international community.
In addition to calling for an end to the violence, humanitarian
access, dialogue, and the release of political prisoners in Juba, the
United States is exploring the possibility of appropriate pressures
against individuals on both sides who interfere with the peace and
reconciliation process in South Sudan or are responsible for serious
human rights abuses.
I want to thank you for your continued commitment to the people of
South Sudan, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Administrator Lindborg.
STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY E. LINDBORG, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Lindborg. Thank you. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Corker, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
thank you very much for holding the hearing today and inviting
me to testify, and thank you also for your ongoing support for
our work around the world, which continues to save millions and
millions of lives.
The United States Government, including many of you, has
been a strong supporter of the people of South Sudan for
decades, through the civil war, through the comprehensive peace
agreement, and since independence in 2011. And we are all
deeply, deeply alarmed by the horrific violence that now
threatens this hard-won struggle, especially today, as my
colleague noted, the third anniversary of independence, in
which 99 percent of the people voted to form the world's
youngest nation.
The outbreak of hostilities on December 15 has since
erupted into heavy fighting across seven of South Sudan's 10
states. The fighting is the result of longstanding, deeply
rooted grievances in a fragile, new state that has nascent
institutions that are not yet able to deliver justice or
services to its people. Coupled with this unresolved power
struggle, this has ignited tensions along ethnic lines, and we
are now seeing a renewed and vicious cycle of killing.
As this new fighting creates urgent new sets of
humanitarian needs, it also significantly complicates our
ability to meet the extensive needs that already existed across
South Sudan, one of the poorest nations on Earth. An estimated
40 percent of the country's 4.4 million people were already in
need of humanitarian assistance before the recent violence.
This is the result of two decades of civil war, communal
violence, the recurring floods and droughts, plus the influx of
over 2,000 refugees into South Sudan from Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile States since 2011.
So the lack of roads, the pervasive underdevelopment that
already made South Sudan one of the most logistically difficult
environments, further complicates our work today. There are
seasonal rains that routinely cut off access to entire regions
for months at a time.
So our challenge today is twofold, both respond to the
immediate hostility-driven needs as well as find ways to
continue our longstanding work that seeks to assist nearly half
the population already in need. The United States remains
deeply committed to the people of Sudan and today just a few
more words on what is a rapidly changing situation and our
humanitarian response. In the few weeks since the fighting
erupted, the violence has already claimed the lives of more
than a thousand people, and as of today we have seen 270,000
people driven from their homes. Of those, 60,000 have been
forced to seek protection in the eight peacekeeping bases of
the local U.N. missions, or the UNMISS compounds, which are
located in major towns around the country, and almost 39,000
have sought refuge in neighboring Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya,
which are straining the reception capacities at key border
crossings.
The town of Bor, which is just a few hours north of Juba,
is a strategic gateway to South Sudan's capital. It is caught
in a desperate tug of war between the fighting factions. It has
borne the brunt of the violence and looting. We are hearing
graphic reports of unburied bodies along the roads. More than
84,000 people have fled Bor to make a treacherous journey
across the White Nile River to seek shelter in neighboring
Awerial County, where relief agencies initially found people
living under the hot sun with very short supplies of water,
food, medical assistance. Parents are often making difficult
choices of whether to separate from their children so that they
can pay for their safe passage out of a dangerous area.
The new fighting is accelerating developments. Just
yesterday we heard new reports of several thousand displaced
people in numerous sites, including a newly discovered group of
30,000 displaced South Sudanese in Lankien, which is in Jonglei
State. People continue to flee the shifting lines of control
and the ongoing violence.
Our humanitarian response is immensely complicated by the
difficult and very chaotic conditions. The Nile River, which is
typically a major supply conduit, has been off limits for weeks
because barges have been commandeered for hostile purposes.
We currently have ample stockpiles of key supplies that
have previously been prepositioned around the country as a part
of our normal response effort. It has the security conditions
that are impeding the movement of those supplies and disrupting
supply chains. USAID stood up a disaster assistance response
team in Nairobi as well as a response management team in
Washington shortly after the violence began, and since then we
have been working closely with U.N. and humanitarian partners
to support the urgent new programs, as well as seek to plan for
the upcoming raining season.
The good news is that in the middle of this crisis there is
deep humanitarian expertise. On January 3 we announced
additional $50 million that is in addition to our ongoing
humanitarian commitment of $318 million for 2013 and 2014. The
new funding will help us do a multisector humanitarian response
operation, support the displaced, family reunification, and
most importantly, additional logistical capacity.
We have especially prioritized additional support for
flights that enable the U.N. to regularly reach seven of the
UNMISS compounds now with urgent food and supplies. We just
received confirmation that three U.N. flights reached Bor as
well, that previously we were not able to reach. To date the
U.N. reports that relief agencies have reached about 167,000
people in the bases and in the new settlements with urgent
relief.
Immediate, unconditional, and full access for humanitarian
assistance throughout South Sudan is of urgent and utmost
importance. Humanitarian workers, both international and South
Sudanese, are currently working at great personal risk and they
must have safe passage to reach those in need. We need to
ensure not only that we reach those whose lives have just been
upended by new violence, but also to begin to resupply in
advance of the April rains or risk an even greater crisis with
rising hunger through the country.
Pressing for humanitarian access is a key and urgent part
of the ongoing negotiations for peace. The South Sudanese
leaders have the ability to ease the suffering of their people.
The United States remains steadfast in our decades-long
commitment to the people of Sudan, and most of all we thank you
for your ongoing support, your commitment, and your attention
to this new crisis.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nancy E. Lindborg
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on the U.S.
humanitarian response to the crisis in South Sudan. Thank you also for
your continued support for USAID's humanitarian programs around the
world, which make a positive difference every day in the lives of
millions.
introduction
The U.S. Government, including many Members of Congress, has been a
strong supporter of the welfare of the people of South Sudan for
decades--throughout Sudan's civil war, the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement period, and since independence in 2011. We are all deeply
alarmed by the horrific violence now threatening their hard-won
struggle for independence--especially today, which marks just the third
anniversary of South Sudan's referendum, in which an overwhelming 99
percent of the South Sudanese people voted to form the world's youngest
nation. The people of South Sudan have endured far too many years of
conflict and bloodshed to see peace slip away.
The outbreak of hostilities on December 15 has since erupted into
heavy fighting across 7 of South Sudan's 10 states. This fighting is
the result of longstanding, deeply rooted grievances in a fragile new
state with nascent institutions not yet able to deliver justice or
services to its people. Coupled with an unresolved power struggle that
has ignited tensions along ethnic lines, we are now seeing a vicious
cycle of targeted killings.
As this new fighting creates a new, vast set of humanitarian needs,
it also significantly complicates our ability to meet the extensive
humanitarian needs that existed across South Sudan prior to December
15. Due to decades of civil war, sporadic communal violence, and the
recurrent shocks of floods and drought, an estimated 40 percent of
South Sudan's population--up to 4.4 million people--were already in
need of humanitarian assistance. Even before the current crisis, the
lack of roads and pervasive underdevelopment made South Sudan one of
the most difficult environments to work in worldwide.
Meanwhile, South Sudan has welcomed some 230,000 refugees from
neighboring countries, including the more than 200,000 refugees who
have fled the fighting in Sudan's Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile
States since June 2011, adding to an already vast array of needs in a
country where more than half the population lives below the poverty
line, and human development indicators are among the lowest in the
world.
The humanitarian challenge today then is twofold: to respond to the
immediate needs as well as find ways to continue our longstanding,
lifesaving work targeting nearly half the population already in need.
In the face of these challenges, the United States remains committed to
working with the international community to respond to urgent needs of
the people of South Sudan.
Today, I'd like to talk about two key areas: first, an overview of
the current humanitarian conditions; and second, an update on our
response efforts and critical next steps.
current situation
In the few weeks since heavy fighting broke out in the towns of
Bor, Malakal, and Bentiu, the spreading violence in South Sudan has
claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people and driven more than
240,000 people from their homes. Until there is progress on the
urgently convened peace negotiations and political dialogue, there is
potential for additional clashes and displacement.
According to the United Nations (U.N.), approximately 60,000
people--or 30 percent of those internally displaced--have sought refuge
in at least eight peacekeeping bases of the U.N. Mission in the
Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). The town of Bor--a strategic gateway
to Juba--is caught in a desperate tug-of-war between fighting factions.
Ongoing violence and looting have caused thousands to seek safety at
one UNMISS base, where a lack of safe drinking water and poor
sanitation risk the outbreak of disease. This is the same bleak reality
being experienced in other South Sudanese towns, prompting desperate
families to seek refuge at UNMISS bases in Malakal, Bentiu, Bor, Juba,
Pariang, and Melu.
An additional 85,000 people have fled Bor to make the treacherous
journey across the White Nile River to seek shelter in neighboring
Awerial County, where relief agencies initially found many people
living under the hot, unrelenting sun with a short supply of clean
water, food, and shelter and inadequate sanitation.
Almost 39,000 displaced South Sudanese refugees are seeking safety
in neighboring Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya. New refugees are beginning
to strain reception capacity but all three governments are working
closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to address the
inflows.
These new developments come on top of recurrent environmental
hazards, violence, displacement, returnee and refugee inflows, and
macroeconomic shocks over the last 2 years since South Sudan's
independence. Nearly 160,000 individuals were displaced between January
and September 2013. Nearly 75 percent of this displacement occurred in
Jonglei State, where intercommunal violence and conflict between the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and nonstate armed actors forced
an estimated 100,000 civilians to flee to remote and difficult-to-
access rural areas.
Challenges to Aid Delivery
Current hostilities and regularly changing lines of control make it
difficult to reach both key areas newly affected by the recent violence
and areas of longstanding need, with lifesaving humanitarian
assistance. While ample stockpiles of supplies are prepositioned,
security conditions on the ground are preventing international and
nongovernmental agencies from accessing their own warehouses,
disrupting supply chains, and impeding their access to needy
populations. Caught up in the violence, some partner offices and
warehouses have been looted and vehicles taken by the groups engaged in
the violence. Commercial drivers carrying humanitarian supplies have
been killed, while our partners are routinely denied access to roads by
the SPLA and armed groups. The Nile River--typically a major conduit
for the movement of supplies--has been off limits for weeks as barges
are no longer available for humanitarian use.
u.s. government response
In the midst of these extensive constraints, the U.S. Government is
working closely with the U.N. and with our partners to examine all
possible ways to meet current, acute needs due to the worsening crisis,
while also planning ahead for the upcoming rainy season. Moreover, we
continue to work closely with the State Department to push for the
humanitarian access and respect for humanitarian workers, which is so
vital to providing urgently needed aid. The U.S. Government continues
to insist that immediate, unconditional, and unfettered humanitarian
access be allowed throughout South Sudan. Our partners have been
blocked from the Nile and from flying into Bor from Juba. The U.N. must
be given access via air, road, and river to deliver urgently needed
humanitarian supplies and personnel and to reach all populations in
need.
Immediately after the violence began on December 15, USAID stood up
an eight-member Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) of experienced
humanitarian staff based in Nairobi, Kenya, as well as a Response
Management Team (RMT) in Washington to monitor mounting needs and work
with international partners to respond to the growing numbers of
displaced persons. Despite a still highly volatile and uncertain
environment, the U.N. and some NGOs have chosen to keep staff in-
country to implement the response.
With continued support from the U.S. Government since South Sudan's
birth in 2011 and decades of work in the region, our U.N. and NGO
partners have honed the logistical and technical expertise essential to
operate in the challenging South Sudan environment to help those most
in need--where roads routinely close during the rainy season and
communities are effectively cut off for months. To date, the U.N.
reports that relief agencies have reached an estimated 167,000 newly
displaced people with humanitarian assistance, primarily those people
at UNMISS bases or in neighboring counties where security and access
have permitted the delivery of aid.
In response to the new violence, we have strategically funded the
U.N. and NGOs in support of an efficient and nimble platform, which
allows agencies to respond to increased need on the ground. Despite
access challenges posed by armed groups, humanitarian organizations are
working to overcome hurdles and optimize all means possible--including
road, air, and barge transport--to deliver life-saving assistance. On
January 3, the Department of State and USAID announced an additional
nearly $50 million in humanitarian assistance for South Sudan, bringing
the total U.S. commitment to more than $318 million for fiscal years
2013 and 2014. This new funding supports a multisector humanitarian
response operation, including the provision of food, safe drinking
water, emergency health care, vaccinations, improved sanitation, and
shelter as well as the protection of civilians and support for
survivors of violence. This new funding will also help manage sites for
the displaced, support reunification of families separated by the
fighting, and fund programs to help ensure the protection of the most
vulnerable populations, including women and children. This work will be
carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
U.N. agencies including the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food
Programme (WFP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the
U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
Importantly, this new funding also helps support additional
logistical capacity including to the U.N. Humanitarian Air Service
(UNHAS), currently ferrying aid workers and supplies to seven UNMISS
camps housing 51,000 internally displaced persons. The eighth camp in
Bor just yesterday received three flights but these are not yet
sustained and reliable.
In addition to new funds, we are using the full flexibility of our
larger humanitarian portfolio, allowing our partners to redirect or
reprogram funds to meet rapidly changing needs in a volatile
environment--and to change course to meet the most urgent needs while
still planning longer term. We know that in complex environments like
South Sudan, partners need the flexibility to redirect resources and
assess how their own programs can best adapt.
In response to a continually changing environment, in 2010 USAID
stood up a Rapid Response Fund (RRF) that allows us to quickly route
funding to international and national NGOs working on the ground as
part of our ongoing humanitarian assistance efforts for the people of
South Sudan. Since the recent crisis began, USAID has awarded nearly
$1.5 million in grants for six emergency projects through the RRF to
make an immediate difference. At the UNMISS base in Juba where tight
living conditions could risk disease outbreaks, USAID is funding two
South Sudanese NGOs through the RRF to provide emergency health care,
clean water, and improved sanitation and hygiene to internally
displaced persons. Outside Bor, in rural areas of Awerial County where
tens of thousands have sought refuge from the violence, another USAID-
funded South Sudanese NGO called AWODA is digging emergency latrines,
constructing hand-washing facilities and bathing shelters, and
distributing hygiene kits--all to prevent the spread of disease.
We are currently at the outset of the dry season, ordinarily a time
when our partners would begin to use this 5-month window of dry weather
to replenish and preposition relief supplies before roads become
impassable with the start of seasonal rains in June. The response to
this current crisis has benefited from the existing stockpile of
warehoused supplies. Looking ahead, if the violence persists, USAID
will work with partners to seek all means of identifying ways to
restock and resupply critical supply chains, both to address the
current violence as well as address the ongoing critical needs of
communities throughout one of the poorest nations on earth.
conclusion
As USAID works to meet urgent humanitarian needs in light of recent
events, we are also reviewing our portfolio of development activities--
and we look forward to staying in close contact with Congress as we
undertake this deliberative process to determine the best way forward.
Looking ahead, increased access to those in need will be the key
determinant of our success. The United States remains steadfast in our
decades-long commitment to the South Sudanese people. As my colleague,
Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield, has noted, we are using our full
diplomatic efforts to negotiate an end to the violence as well as press
all sides to respect the humanitarian supplies, personnel, and efforts
essential to saving South Sudanese lives. The South Sudanese people
deserve their rights to be protected and to live in communities free
from harm.
As President Obama aptly stated, ``too much blood has been spilled
and too many lives have been lost to allow South Sudan's moment of hope
and opportunity to slip from its grasp.''
Thank you for your time today and for the vital congressional
support that makes our life-saving work possible. I look forward to
your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me start off with you, Secretary Greenfield. What
evidence is there to suggest there are underlying--and I want
to talk about that following this first question--but what
evidence is there to suggest that the event that triggered the
crisis was a coup attempt by former Vice President Riek Machar?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Senator, thank you for that
question. I think we have looked at the situation that has been
an ongoing political situation in South Sudan for almost a
year. There were internal dynamics within the SPLM--I am sorry,
the SPLA--that started with Riek Machar's being voted out of
his Vice Presidential position.
What we have heard through many sources, all public, was
that there was a fight that occurred at the party convention
that took place on the 15th of December and that that led to
the ongoing conflict. We have not seen any evidence that this
was a coup attempt, but it certainly was the result of a huge
political riff between Riek Machar and the President.
The Chairman. So then how do you view Machar's decision to
take part in an armed rebellion against the Government of South
Sudan?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think it is an armed
rebellion against the Government of South Sudan and it started
as a result of the political riff. We think they should resolve
this through political talks, through negotiations, and not
through war. What happened on December 15 was, we understand,
an attack on Riek Machar's home, that he then left Juba, and
the armed conflict resulted after that.
The Chairman. Are we advocates of expanding the peace
process? We are all focused, obviously, on the urgency of the
moment and the attempt to create a cease-fire and save lives.
But the long-term prospects here seem to me to, in part,
fundamentally be a hope that by expanding the peace process and
creating a more inclusive process. Otherwise, a quick, and what
some might describe, quick and dirty resolution of power-
sharing between the powers that exist is not going to bring the
long-term stability that we seek.
Are we advocates of expanding the peace process and
creating a more inclusive broad-range set of participants?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Absolutely, sir. We do not
believe this is going to end with the cessation of hostilities,
that what must follow the end of the conflict is a very, very
organized political dialogue that will lay out the grievances
of the various parties so that those grievances can be taken
into account and plans can be made for the next election.
We think it is absolutely important that the 11 detainees
who are being held in Juba be released so that they can
participate in that political dialogue and bring to the table
issues that they have that they did not--they are not part of
the conflict, but they do have political grievances, and it is
important that those grievances be addressed by the current
government.
The Chairman. Are we collecting evidence of atrocities?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Because I hope not only are we vigorously
collecting evidence of atrocities, but we send a very clear
message that we will find ways to punish those who commit
atrocities.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Yes, sir. We have sent that
message to all sides. I hinted at that message in my remarks
today, but they have both heard it from Ambassador Booth and
they are hearing it from others in the region. We were pleased
to hear that the AU Peace and Security Commission has also
looked at establishing a commission of inquiry and others in
the region are as well. We are trying to bolster the U.N.'s
human rights monitoring capabilities so that again we can
collect the information we need.
But at the same time, we want to prevent atrocities, so
part of our efforts to get the U.N.'s forces built up was to
get enough troops on the ground so that they could provide
protection for the population.
The Chairman. Well, that is my next question. The U.N.
peacekeepers that are providing security to tens of thousands
of South Sudanese in the UNMISS camps is incredibly important.
What, if anything, are we doing to assist UNMISS efforts to
protect these people, the vast majority who are women and
children?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We went immediately to the
Security Council and supported the efforts of the Security
Council to increase the UNMIL (United Nations Mission in
Liberia) contingent by 5,500, and we have been working around
the clock on the phone with leaders in the region, as well as
outside of the region, to contribute to those numbers. Nepal
has provided additional troops. Bangladesh has provided
additional troops. We have a commitment from Ghana to redeploy
some of their troops from UNOCI (United Nations Operation in
Cote d'Ivoire) as well as to provide new contingents to
bolster----
The Chairman. What do you assess the ability of UNMISS to
meet its mission at this point, capability?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. It is challenging, sir. This
is why we have----
The Chairman. I know it is challenging, and I do not mean
to press you, but give me--quantify for me ``challenging''?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. They do not have enough
troops on the ground----
The Chairman. That is what I thought.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. [continuing]. To do this.
This is why we want to help them build up those troops numbers.
The Chairman. Administrator, let me ask you two quick
questions. One is, the $50 million of course is welcome under
the crisis, but looking at the nature of this crisis, how long
do you think that is going to take you? What are you doing to
work with others to join in in assistance? You mentioned
flights arriving. What about these reports of child soldiers
firing upon flights? Are children being used in this regard?
Ms. Lindborg. The $50 million is in addition to what was
already a large pipeline of humanitarian assistance, and we
have employed all of our flexibility to enable existing
partners to redirect portions of their existing programs to
meet these new needs. The World Food Programme, for example,
has been able to redirect some of their food, and we have
something called a Rapid Response Fund that we have had since
2011, that is built to be able to respond to the many different
crises that have erupted in South Sudan, including floods and
droughts.
So, for right now, we have a good pipeline to help us deal
with the existing crisis. We have also worked closely with our
other donor allies, and there is a new action plan that the
U.N. has put out that has already gotten significant resource
from the U.K., from Norway, and a few of the other donors who
have long been key supporters of South Sudan. So we have a
solid partnership with others who are stepping forward with
resources as well.
On the flights, the reports that we have received about the
firing of one of the flights was that it was potentially an
error of communications. There have been no--not further
incidents of flights. We are getting into most of the UNMISS
compounds. The big problem has been into Bor, where we were not
getting permission from the South Sudanese Government. That was
changed yesterday when we got reports this morning of two
flights going into Bor, and our hope is that that will now be a
regular occurrence that will enable us to get supplies into
that compound.
The Chairman. Do either of you have information, finally,
on the children being used as soldiers?
Ms. Lindborg. We are hearing reports of child soldiers. We
do not have confirmation of how many, and that is one of the
many issues of great concern in this rising violence.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you again both for being here and for your work on
behalf of our country.
The talks that are taking place this week, do we have the
right people at the table?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. You mean on the----
Senator Corker. From the opposing sides.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. The government has sent a
very strong delegation and we were very pleased with that. On
the Riek Machar side, he has requested that the 11 detainees be
part of his delegation. He has a delegation on the ground, but
his full delegation is not there. So I do think it is a good
team there. They are able to speak with authority for both
sides, but the Riek Machar side does not have the full
delegation that it wants.
Senator Corker. So are you sensing that without that full
delegation and yet having participants from both sides that can
speak, are you sensing that these talks are going to yield any
breakthroughs?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Not at the moment. We got
agreement, I understand from Ambassador Booth, for a cessation
of hostilities, but the Riek Machar side is still insisting
that the 11 detainees be released before they sign off on
anything. We are working both in Juba as well as in Addis as
well as here in Washington to pressure the government to
release these detainees. The two negotiators, the Kenyan and
Ethiopian negotiators, were in Juba yesterday. They met with
President Kiir and they also met with the detainees.
Senator Corker. Is there any chance that is going to occur?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We are hopeful. We heard
early, right around Christmas, that President Kiir was going to
release eight of them. That did not happen. We are still
pressing him. Secretary Kerry spoke to him several times on
this and we are hopeful that he will get the message that he is
getting from around the world, because he is getting phone
calls both from within the region as well as outside the region
to impress upon him how important it is for him to release the
detainees.
We think they will bring an added voice to the
negotiations, they will bring some political views that are
much more moderate than what we are hearing, because they are
not part of the fighting party, and they have made very, very
clear that they want dialogue; they do not want to be part of
the fighting.
Senator Corker. The prisoners?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Yes.
Senator Corker. So what would be the President's resistance
to going in and releasing them to be a part of this? If he
knows that, why would he resist releasing them?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. That is a question I cannot
answer for him, but he has accused the prisoners of being part
of the alleged coup plot and that there are legal procedures
that they have to go through before he can make the decision to
release them.
Senator Corker. So then on our side, just to understand how
this is all playing out, we have a special envoy, and I know we
have had some ups and downs, we have had vacancies there. And
then we also have an Ambassador in South Sudan. Who is actually
in charge, if you will, of U.S. policy relative to this
conflict and trying to resolve it?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We, in Washington, are in
charge of the policy. Ambassador Booth, the Special Envoy, has
the responsibility of implementing that policy in terms of the
negotiations. But our Ambassador on the ground is the person
who is the major interlocutor for the government, because she
is there 24-7. Ambassador Booth comes in and out. He is
currently full-time in Addis leading our efforts to push
forward the negotiation. Ambassador Page in Juba has continued
to have meetings with the government, continued to push the
government to release the detainees. She has had several
meetings with the detainees, and her position of being there to
keep our flag flying is an important role.
Senator Corker. So you think the arrangement we have
relative to how we have arranged for our leadership there to
be, we think it is working the way it should?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. It is working well, sir.
Senator Corker. We have invested, obviously, billions of
dollars as a country, invested a lot of time, a lot of people
have. South Sudan and Sudan in general has just had a lot of
interest from the United States. With what is happening there
now, especially after the bigger expectations that everyone had
3 years ago, as you mentioned, and certainly 30 months ago, has
the State Department at all questioned our efforts there? Has
there been any diminution in feeling like we can end up in a
place there that is good? What has this last several months--
what is the effect on the State Department efforts there?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think I can say that we are
disappointed with the way things are going in Sudan. But we are
committed to ensuring that Sudan does not fail. We are
committed to staying with the process to get them to the peace
negotiation table and committed to Sudan having a future for
their people.
They are disappointed. They have been failed by their
leaders. So we feel we have to stand with the Sudanese people
to take this to a conclusion that will lead the country back on
the right track.
Senator Corker. I know Chairman Menendez was asking a
little bit about the U.N. forces. I know many of us have been
to Darfur and have seen the mandate that the U.N. has there and
have been frustrated in the past by that. Does UNMISS have the
right mandate on the ground in South Sudan right now?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We think they do, but we have
looked at that mandate and it is certainly--given the current
situation on the ground, I think we need to make sure we beef
up their mandate, particularly on the peacekeeping side. They
are there as a protection force. Certainly in terms of their
numbers and capacity, they are not at a place now to handle the
current situation. It is our hope that we can build that up
rather quickly.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you
both.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, first thanks for conducting
this hearing.
Let me thank both of our witnesses for what you do to
promote U.S. interests under extremely challenging
circumstances. I thank you very much, and strongly support the
framework that you have laid out. No. 1, we need to protect the
population against continued violence. The U.N. peacekeeping
force there needs to be critically evaluated to make sure that
there are adequate resources to implement, we hope, some form
of a cessation of violence.
The humanitarian issues are incredibly difficult, with the
NGO community not able to operate as they did prior to the
violence. It raises significant challenges as to whether the
resources and aid will get to the people who really need it. I
expect the United States will play a major role in trying to
sort that out.
And you are correct, 3 years ago as the elections started
for independence in South Sudan the United States and the
international community were cheering for this new nation. The
last 2\1/2\ years, we have not spent enough time dealing with
the institutions of good governance that can deal with the
challenges of the country. I hope that we will understand that
it is not just acknowledging a new country, but working to make
sure that they have the institutions necessary to protect all
citizens from the challenges of ethnic diversity.
But I want to talk about one point that Chairman Menendez
mentioned. Your response was what I expected to hear. In your
written statement you say, and you said verbally, that those
responsible for perpetrating human rights abuses must be held
accountable. I have heard this before. We have been through
Rwanda, we have been through Bosnia, we have been through
Syria, we have been through Darfur, and now we are dealing with
South Sudan. It seems to me that as we start negotiating and we
say we are getting documentation and we are going to make sure
that tribunals are formed--that this becomes an afterthought
rather than a primary thought.
Quite frankly, I think one of the problems that we have is
that those who perpetrate ethnic cleansing do not believe the
international community will ever hold them accountable for
their crimes against humanity. Unless we make this a real
priority, unless we talk about it, and do not put it on the
side and say, oh, no, we have got to take care of stopping the
violence, we have got to get the parties talking, and we do not
want to bring up issues that might be divisive, we are never
going to get the type of attention to accountability for those
who commit crimes against humanity that we need.
I have been here for too many of these ethnic cleansing
problems around the world, and the response for those who
perpetrated it has been weak at best. So what can you tell this
committee about how the United States, which has always been
the leader on these issues, will make sure that those who
committed atrocities will be held accountable by the
international community?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you for that question,
and my answer I am not sure will satisfy you, because it is not
going to satisfy me. It is hard, but having worked in Africa
for many years, we have some examples where we have succeeded.
If we look at Liberia and look at the fact that Charles Taylor
was held accountable and is serving the rest of his life in
prison, that is the example that I want to follow for us in
Sudan as we look at how to be successful in holding people
accountable.
But it is hard. I cannot say that this is something that we
will be able to accomplish easily, but I can say it is
something that we are committed to making every effort to
accomplish.
Senator Cardin. Let me just point out, if the United States
does not make this the priority issue it will not be a priority
issue. It is up to us. So you are responsible for putting
together the agenda on these international meetings. And I do
appreciate the fact that we are documenting and providing, I
hope, the legal information that will be necessary to present
to the appropriate tribunals.
But it seems to me that your public statements at every
opportunity should be about how we are going to make sure that
people are held accountable--and I just hope that when I look
at the headlines in the papers and see how these negotiations
are taking place, that I see this theme consistently
throughout, because if not, as sure as we are here today, there
will be another country where we are going to see the same type
of atrocities committed against people because of their
ethnicity. And that cannot be tolerated by the international
community.
Unless we hold people accountable and make sure that there
can be no peace without accountability, it will happen again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I want to thank the distinguished Senator for
being a long-time advocate in this regard. I am wholeheartedly
with you in this regard. This is why Magnitsky, one element of
it was incredibly important, and your work on the Helsinki
Commission is incredibly important. I look forward as the chair
to work with you to press this issue, not only in South Sudan,
but elsewhere as well.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing, and to the ranking member as well.
Secretary Greenfield, I want to ask you, in light of
tragedies that have occurred over the last couple years, first
and foremost, what are we doing to ensure the security of our
personnel in South Sudan? I know that on the 21st of December
of this year a U.S. military aircraft was fired upon. The
aircraft had been dispatched to rescue people in South Sudan, I
believe they were Americans. They had to abort the mission, and
four U.S. service men and women--I do not know the details--
were injured.
So a multipronged question. How confident are we that our
personnel in South Sudan are safe? And second, do we know, and
do we have plans in place to hold accountable those who fired
upon our aircraft and injured our personnel?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Senator, thank you for that
question. Let me just start by saying that the security of our
personnel for me, for the Department, for the administration,
is our highest priority. We watch the security situation on the
ground in Juba almost on an hourly basis. We have a 24-hour
task force. As you know, our staff at the Embassy are down to
the minimal levels. Right now it is the Ambassador, being
supported by two staff, and the rest of them are security
people. We have 9 DS officers, 7 Marines, and 45 forces from
the East Africa Response Unit to provide that support.
Again, on almost an hourly basis we are looking at the
security situation with the concern of the Ambassador and the
rest of the team, their security in mind.
The attack on our planes, I know that AFRICOM is looking
into that. We do not know who shot at those planes, but that is
something that we are in the process of investigating.
We want to keep our Embassy open. We think it is important
to keep our Embassy open. We think it is important for us to
have a diplomatic presence on the ground, to continue to engage
all of the parties. But it is also having our flag flying. It
is also a symbol for the people of Sudan. We do not want to
abandon them. But at any moment where we determine that the
situation is not secure for our Ambassador to remain, we are
prepared to get them out of there before the situation is at a
point where we have to get them out in extreme conditions.
Senator Rubio. My second question is a followup to a
question Senator Corker asked about whether we have the right
people in place in South Sudan. There have been media reports
about armed civilian groups that may or may not be responsive
to some of the folks that are at the table in these
conversations. How concerned are we about that? Because there
have been reports of these community-based groups that are
armed, who allegedly may have participated in some ethnic
targeting. How big of a problem could that pose in terms of
reaching a resolution to this in terms of--how big a problem
are these armed civilian groups that are out there conducting
attacks and other operations?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. That is a big problem,
because our concern is that they are not under the command and
control of any of the leaders there. So that is a problem I
think we have to be very, very conscious of.
Senator Rubio. So it is a real problem.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. It is a real problem.
Senator Rubio. The last question has to do with our
national interest, because any time we deal with issues
happening abroad the fundamental question for many people is,
we understand it is a horrible tragedy and it is a terrible
thing, but why should the United States care? I mean, this is
not our business. I hear that from some.
Obviously, I believe the humanitarian issues that we have
outlined here today in both your testimony and then Ms.
Lindborg's testimony, and we must heard Senator Cardin's
comments as well--I agree with all of those things. I think
those things in and of themselves are an interest to the United
States.
But beyond that, I want to talk a little bit about regional
stability and get your input on this. It is ironic to see the
leaders of Sudan and South Sudan desperate to get this thing
figured out because of the oil exports. So this independence
somewhat put a strain on Sudan's economy because of the loss of
the oil fields. My understanding is that domestically in Sudan
it created some internal controversy with regard to that.
Talk to us a little bit about the threat that this poses to
Sudan and ultimately to other nations in the region, in
particular the loss of oil revenues in those fields that are
undermined, and also the flow of refugees that I imagine are
pouring over the border back into Sudan from South Sudan.
What is the possibility, if this conflict is not resolved,
of this undermining and spreading, creating real problems
within Sudan, and then ultimately the entire region becoming
unstable, and we all know what instability leads to in
operational space for real bad actors. So describe a little bit
about that threat of spiraling into that.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. The situation in South Sudan
can really swell into problems for all of its neighbors. But I
think particularly the fact that we saw President Bashir visit
South Sudan last week--he clearly is concerned about the impact
of that situation on what is happening in Sudan, but
particularly on the flow of oil.
We had heard that there had been discussions about Sudan
providing military support to South Sudan. The press reports
that have come out have indicated that they do not plan to do
that; they are going to provide experts to assist in the oil
fields, and we can interpret that in many, many different ways.
The Government of Uganda has indicated that they have real
concerns about the impact of the situation in South Sudan on
Uganda. Kenya already has a very large, and Uganda, very large
refugee camp with Sudanese refugees, both from the south and
the north. As you heard from my colleague, we are seeing more
refugees flow across the border. Ethiopia I think also has some
concerns.
What I am concerned about is if these countries get
involved in the conflict in any way that this conflict could
spread.
Senator Rubio. I just would wrap up by asking about the
refugees because in addition the loss of the oil revenues to
Sudan would create extraordinary domestic pressures within
Sudan, thereby creating the potential of a problem there as
well. If you could just describe briefly the ramifications of
having these camps and other installations crossing over into
other countries, but particularly Sudan, the risk the refugees
are at and the risk it poses of violence in those other
countries as well? I mean, that is a real thing we are
concerned about as well, and that would clearly be in our
national interest to prevent.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think if I can turn to my
colleague here to talk about the refugee situations and the
impact. But from the political standpoint, having outflows of
populations into neighboring countries takes the problems from
the country into the neighboring countries, and I think that
that is a concern that all of South Sudan's neighbors have.
Having been neighbors of Sudan during the conflict of more than
30 years, they know the impact that refugees will have on their
societies, on their economies.
Ms. Lindborg. I would just add that it is a region that has
had significant displacement for several decades, and you have
got a neighboring country of Central African Republic that is
dealing with its own serious spiraling crisis as well. Two
hundred thousand people have come from Sudan from the two areas
of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile into South Sudan just in the
last 2 years. So those people are now doubly imperiled.
As people continue to move across these borders, there is
always greater danger once families are displaced and once they
are moving into countries where they have fewer resources, and
some of them are already fragile because of the pressures of
dealing with so many displaced populations.
The Chairman. Thank you.
As I call upon Senator Coons, let me thank you as the chair
of the Africa Subcommittee and Senator Flake as the ranking
member for having done some tremendous work over the last year
on the issues facing the African Continent. We are thrilled
with the work that you do on behalf of the full committee, and
at this time recognize you.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez.
Thank you for your leadership of the committee. And I would
like to thank the witnesses for sharing your insights today.
In 2011 I sponsored a resolution welcoming the independence
of South Sudan, urging that its leaders address some of the
longstanding internal challenges in order to put them on a path
toward long-term stability. Just 3 years now from the date of
the referendum, as you mentioned, Madam Secretary, I am deeply
disappointed by the senseless violence, by the widespread
humanitarian challenge, and by the rapidly expanding political
challenge in South Sudan.
I want to commend you and the administration for your
prompt response and thorough engagement, for the leadership
that you have shown and that Ambassador Booth is showing, and
for our ability to step up to the plate quickly.
Start, if you would, for me, Madam Secretary, with just a
quick summary as to why South Sudan matters to the United
States, why this crisis matters to the people of the United
States?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you for that question.
For 30 years the United States has been supporting the people
of South Sudan, even before South Sudan became an entity,
supporting their right to exist, their right to freedom of
religion, and their fight against the Government of Sudan. We
birthed this nation. There are Americans from all walks of
life--my e-mail has been burning up since this started on
December 15 from Americans who are concerned about what is
happening in Sudan. I have not gotten a single e-mail from
someone saying do not spend your time working on this.
We do care as a nation about South Sudan. We also have a
significant population of Sudanese-Americans who have thrived
in our country, but who have an abiding interest in the success
of Sudan. So I think it goes without saying that we care. We
have an interest. But we also have an interest in maintaining
peace in the region and making sure that there is no ungoverned
space that extremist groups can take advantage of. While that
has not been an issue thus far in South Sudan, I think if we
leave it it could become a problem, and then it becomes a
bigger problem for us.
Senator Coons. I appreciate your putting it that way. I
think I agree with you that we have both values priorities--a
new, somewhat fragile democracy we want to see not just
birthed, but launched and healthy and vibrant and successful,
but it has regional implications and it also has leadership
implications. Does the United States stay the course? Do we
address not just immediate or emergent humanitarian crises, but
do we remain engaged in a leadership role as we fight for
democracy on what is in many ways one of the most important
continents on Earth?
As the ongoing negotiations in Addis are moving forward, my
sense from your testimony was that there is a cease-fire focus
immediately, and I am hoping that once there is a full team
from both sides there will be a broader focus on a broader
range of issues, including corruption, which was one of the
main challenges in Juba. What role might the United States be
asked to play in monitoring or implementing the cease-fire?
What additional resources might we bring to the table or be
called upon to bring to the table to make sure that UNMISS is
successful? And what additional resources, I might ask both you
and Assistant Administrator Lindborg, do we need to be
deploying in order to be effective in our humanitarian relief
efforts with our vital allies?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Again, thank you for that
question, and I will turn to my colleague. We have been viewed
by both sides as an honest broker. We have been accused by both
sides of supporting each of the other sides. So I think we have
probably got it right. We are looking at how we can support the
efforts to ensure that there is peace and that each side honors
commitments to a cease-fire. So we are looking at what
resources we may have available in our South Sudan account to
support that effort.
Ms. Lindborg. On the humanitarian side, as I mentioned
earlier, we have added another $50 million in addition to what
was already a $318 million portfolio. If this conflict
persists, if the needs continue to be this urgent, we will
start running into some tough choices, given the rising crises
that we have globally with Syria, Central Africa Republic, the
typhoon that we just responded to.
So thanks to the very important support of Congress, we
were able to do what we needed to do last year. As we look
ahead, there will be again tough decisions and the need for the
support of all of you in order for us to maintain global
humanitarian leadership.
Senator Coons. I think this was a great example of how the
rapid response capability that you were given makes it possible
for you to indeed effectively and rapidly respond.
My last question has to do with both a regional actor and
then a global actor. Museveni and Uganda have played a fairly
active role here in support of the government of Salva Kiir.
What sort of messages are we sending to him about the role we
welcome or we hope that Uganda might play, and what do you make
of his motives and what are the challenges with Uganda?
My last question would be: What role is China playing? The
Chinese have been quite active in this region and could be seen
to be transitioning to supporting ability rather than picking
sides. How might we more effectively engage the Chinese in a
positive way in supporting long-term stability?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. On Uganda, Uganda initially
went into South Sudan to support needed infrastructure. So they
provided troops to secure the airport and to secure the Juba
road to Nimule to ensure that their citizens were able to come
out safely. We do know--and this has come up as an issue at the
talks in Addis--that the Ugandans have indicated, and they have
said it publicly, that they support the government of Salva
Kiir, that they have an interest in the region, and they want
to ensure that a democratically elected government is not
overthrown by violence.
It has, as I mentioned, caused an issue because they are
part of IGAD and IGAD is the negotiating party. But IGAD
announced very early on after their heads of state summit that
they would support stability in the region and would be
prepared to do so militarily. So this is something that we are
watching very, very closely. We have cautioned Ugandan friends
that they do have to be careful and need to be conscious of
their actions and that their actions do not lead to greater
conflict. They have indicated to us that they strongly support
the peace process, they support the negotiations, but in the
mean time they will continue to provide a stabilizing force in
Juba.
Senator Coons. And as to China and China's potential?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. On China, there is a Chinese
Special Envoy who is in Addis. He has been working very closely
with Ambassador Booth, and China seems to be playing a very
positive role in supporting the peace process. They have
interest.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Chairman Menendez.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
I appreciate working with Senator Coons on these issues. He
had many of the same questions that I wanted to ask. With
regard to Uganda, they moved in quickly with troops to secure
exit of their citizens and whatever else. Was that always under
the U.N. auspices or was that simply them moving in troops?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. It was not under the U.N.
auspices. They did it as a neighbor and at the request of the
Government of South Sudan they were asked to come in.
Senator Flake. The peacekeeping troops in there, what
countries make up those forces right now?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We have, just recently,
Bangladeshis; we have some Kenyans; we have Nigerians; and we
are expecting Ghanaians to come in. I can get back to you with
the full list of which countries are participating.
[A written reply by Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield supplying
the requested information follows:]
The U.N. Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) currently has military
personnel from the following countries: Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Denmark, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Mongolia,
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United
Republic of Tanzania, United States, Yemen and Zambia.
Additionally, UNMISS has police personnel from the following
countries: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Brazil, China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Germany,
Ghana, India, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
With regard to the oil revenue, there are some reports that
I see that say that production is down 20 percent, others
saying it stopped completely. What do we know at this point?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. The latest information I have
is that many of the oil wells have been stopped. I do not know
what the percentage is. There is some oil left in the pipeline,
but most of the pumping has ceased.
Senator Flake. The only option--these pipelines go through
Sudan proper or overland via truck to the coast. That is not
much of an option, never was. So this--and no other industry in
the country to speak of, really. I think the largest industry
outside the oil industry is a brewery. There is not much to
fall back on.
In terms of U.S. aid, this is one of the first examples I
have seen where the United States has actually taken the
prohibition that the Congress has placed on aid to countries
that undergo a coup or new governments by virtue of a coup and
have said basically--and tell me if I am wrong--we have said
that if this is a coup and if it succeeds, that there will be a
cutoff of aid. Has that been our policy? Are we using that as
leverage now against those opposition forces?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. We have said to the
opposition that we will not support their efforts to violently
overthrow this government, and I think that would include aid
programs. But when I say aid programs, I have to be very
careful because we are not talking about the programs that
support the people of Sudan. Right now all of our support to
the Government of South Sudan, all of that support, it is not
being implemented because we cannot implement it. So we are not
doing any programs right now. But I would suspect that at a
point if this violence continues that we would suspend that
support.
Senator Flake. Those programs, if they were to be
implemented now, what percentage of them are in the
humanitarian area that would not be affected by our
restrictions? Is it a real threat to those in opposition, the
Vice President's forces or whatever, that aid will be cut off?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. You know, I do not think it
is a threat that works, because if either of these sides cared
about their people they would not be fighting. We have told
them that they stand the chance of losing all support from the
U.S. Government and the fighting has continued. But again, on
the humanitarian side, if I may turn to my colleague.
Ms. Lindborg. Just to make a sharp distinction between the
humanitarian funds that go directly to support people who are
in acute need from the development activities, some of which
went directly to support government capacity-building and
standing up of the new institutions. They are put in very
separate categories.
Senator Flake. Some of those, development categories to
improve the lot of the people, is that a fuzzy area or is there
a clear distinction as to what is humanitarian and what is not?
Ms. Lindborg. Well, there is always a consideration of the
kinds of programs under the development portfolio that directly
assist people, such as health facilities or health programs, or
even some of the community-based reconciliation programs that
we have conducted. So that is exactly the kind of consideration
that would come into play should we need to.
Senator Flake. Can you give me some idea? I mean, if we are
saying we are going to cut off aid if this coup succeeds, for
example, if this coup does succeed how much of our aid will
still flow? Do you know? Can you give me any percentage? I know
there is some fuzziness and that is why I am wondering what
will still go from the United States to a new government if one
comes in.
Ms. Lindborg. Let us get back to you with that information,
because to be more precise I think will take additional
consideration. But we will definitely be happy to get back to
you on that.
There is an inability to conduct some of the programs right
now in any case, just because of the confusion and the violence
that is under way. It is the humanitarian programs that we are
continuing to push out and are able to ensure that aid is
getting to people.
Senator Flake. Follow up on another one of Senator Coons'
questions, with regard to China, this is the first time that I
can see that China has actually issued even a statement with
regard to security concerns there. China tends to, when they
invest, they invest human capital as well and have personnel
there. Is their concern the safety of workers there or have
there been casualties among those who are in the country,
foreign workers?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I have not heard that there
have been any casualties that the Chinese have suffered. But
many of them are working in the areas of oil production, and
all of those people have been evacuated out. So for that
reason, the oil wells are not operating.
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Is China doing any more than
simply making a statement? Like I said, that is the first time
they have gone that far, but have they done anything else?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. They are actively involved in
the peace process in Addis. I understand that they have been
holding meetings with the various parties there, and they
certainly have been working very, very closely with Ambassador
Booth.
Senator Flake. Well, thank you both. With CAR and South
Sudan, it is tough duty and I know you are working very hard at
this. So thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here. I am sorry that I missed
your testimony, so you may have already talked more about this.
As you talk about the additional humanitarian aid and the
redirection of that, can you talk about to what extent we are
cooperating with the U.N. and other groups on the ground there
and how that is working and whether there are ways to improve
that, or how concerned are you about what is happening there?
Ms. Lindborg. We are working very closely with the U.N.,
with our NGO partners, and with our key allies, including those
who have been long, strong partners on South Sudan--the U.K.,
the EU, Canada. We are in almost daily contact, both at the
Juba level and in Nairobi and through our headquarters
conversations. The U.N. country team is leading the charge in
terms of coordinating the overall assistance, seeing when the
opportunities arise to get aid into the UNMISS compounds. The
NGO community is very courageously still operating many of
their programs. There are NGOs that are doing protection
patrols inside some of the UNMISS compounds, for example.
So there is active close coordination. As I did say
earlier, one of the bright spots in the middle of a lot of bad
news is that there is a long history of very strong
humanitarian action in South Sudan, born of necessity, but it
gives us the capacity to respond rapidly and as effectively as
one can in tough situations.
Senator Shaheen. Obviously, some of the stories that have
come out have been about the atrocities against women and the
particular challenges facing children--women and children. Can
you talk about whether there are specific efforts around the
humanitarian assistance to address some of those concerns?
Ms. Lindborg. Yes. Again, against a backdrop of a lot of
security constraints and impeded access, to the degree that
humanitarian workers are able to reach some of these
populations there has been an effort like these protection
patrols, so that you have the aid workers actually in with the
displaced communities. Some of the real effort has been to get
medical supplies, food, and water to these spontaneous
settlements of displaced people, including 30,000 who were just
discovered yesterday.
So the humanitarian and the protection needs are hand in
hand. One of the most important things that we can do is
improve the security situation overall, which my colleague
spoke about in terms of increasing UNMISS troops and, most of
all, having improved access and peace negotiations.
Senator Shaheen. There was a report on the news this
morning criticizing our efforts in South Sudan as our having
not been tough enough--I do not remember the exact phrasing,
but that was the gist of what it was saying--on some of the new
leaders and not expecting enough of them.
Can you respond to that and whether there are other things
that we can do that will help put pressure on those leaders to
encourage them to resolve the situation?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you. I think we have to
keep the pressure on and we have been tough with them at every
level from the start of this. But even before this started, our
Ambassador had made numerous statements concerning her concerns
about the situation. She has been in regular contact with the
government as the political situation started to unravel almost
a year ago. She was making those statements. One of my
colleagues has indicated to me that he in congressional
testimony in June expressed concerns about this publicly, and
also we have continued to express those concerns both to Riek
Machar as well as to Salva Kiir.
Senator Shaheen. You talked about Uganda and the role that
they have played. Are there other regional players that are
influencing the situation, either for good or bad, that we
should be concerned about?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think we should thank the
Ethiopian Government and the Kenyan Government, who have been
actively involved in the negotiations and working to bring both
parties to the peace table. President Haile Mariam and
President Kenyatta visited South Sudan, visited Juba, and
impressed upon the President the importance of sending a
delegation. I know that they are speaking on a regular basis
with the government and pushing particularly the government to
release the detainees. They have been working very closely with
us looking at ways that we can support their efforts. So I
think their efforts have been extraordinarily positive.
We have also talked to many countries in the region
concerning contributing additional troops for the U.N., and all
of them are looking at ways that they might either move troops
from another peacekeeping force to provide support to the U.N.
in South Sudan. Pretty much we are asking them to rob from one
crisis to contribute to another.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine, who has been patiently waiting
for his opportunity.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Menendez. And if you
patiently wait, your colleagues ask all your questions, which
is not a bad thing. You get to hear the answers to the
questions you wanted to ask.
But just a few things. To what extent is control of the oil
resources a motivating factor in the conflict, or is it more of
a collateral consequence of the conflict?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I think it is probably both.
I know that the fighting in the north, the rebel forces clearly
want to maintain or gain control of the oil resources, and the
government is certainly fighting tooth and nail to retain those
resources. Certainly any government that wants to take over
power will be looking at those oil resources as resources that
they would want to have contribute to their efforts.
We have made very, very clear that if there is a violent
takeover those oil resources will certainly be sanctioned.
Senator Kaine. Then, Administrator Lindborg, to pick up on
questions that Senator Shaheen was asking about, the delivery
of humanitarian aid, some of your written testimony dealt with
that. I just want to make sure I understand. It sounds like the
challenges with the delivery of humanitarian aid right now are
mostly security challenges. There is not other kinds of
challenges that are making it hard to deliver the humanitarian
aid that we want to, that we want to deliver? Do I understand
your testimony correctly on that?
Ms. Lindborg. I would say security plus logistical, because
it is a very complicated logistical environment even before
this renewed violence.
Senator Kaine. Could you talk a little bit about that? I
think you have testified about the security side. That would be
helpful.
Ms. Lindborg. The Nile, for example, is a virtual highway
for moving supplies around, and all the barges have been
commandeered and are unavailable to move relief supplies. There
are very few roads, and we are having to work up against the
upcoming rainy season. Typically, on an annual basis this is
the dry season. This is the period during which we need to
preposition critical relief supplies around the country----
Senator Kaine. That can be used throughout the rainy
season.
Ms. Lindborg [continuing]. In the regions that are shut off
during the rainy season. So there is a lot of those logistical
supplies. We have funded additional flights so that the U.N.
can fly to the UNMISS bases, where we have got a concentration
of displaced people, because they are otherwise not very easily
reached. So those flights are happening. We have augmented that
capacity. It is expensive and it does not let us move as much
as quickly.
So it is security compounded by the difficult logistics.
Senator Kaine. When does the rainy season start?
Ms. Lindborg. It will start in May. So we have until May
both to position for the following year or we will be facing
increased hunger around the country in addition to the
consequences of this violence.
Senator Kaine. I would love it if USAID and you could keep
the committee informed about steps that we should be taking, or
that we should be working with the administration, to promote
and to facilitate the delivery of the humanitarian aid.
Ms. Lindborg. Great. Thank you for your support, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Ambassador, there have been reports of atrocities by all
sides of the conflict in South Sudan, with at least several
mass graves discovered and reports of both Dinka and Nuer
civilians being murdered for belonging to the wrong ethnic
group. I was especially saddened and disturbed by a December
Human Rights Watch report that members of the South Sudanese
Army had targeted Nuer civilians in Juba on the basis of their
ethnicity.
Given the hundreds of millions of dollars in security
assistance that the United States has provided to the South
Sudanese forces since 2005, this raises some disturbing
questions. The United States has now suspended security
assistance and training in December. My question is, Under what
circumstances will this security assistance be allowed to
resume, and will there be consideration now paid to the fact
that we need assurances that our assistance and training will
not be used to commit human rights violations?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. Thank you for that question.
We have been really saddened by the events that have clearly
turned this fight into a battle that is ethnic in nature, and
particularly that it is happening inside of the military. We
have asked the U.N. about the information on mass graves. They
have not been able to confirm those. We hope to help them get
their human rights monitors out in the field so that we can
collect that kind of evidence and be prepared to deal with the
evidence in terms of holding people accountable. But we have
not seen yet the evidence of the mass graves.
We do know that there have been extraordinary killings both
of Dinkas in the north and of Nuer in and around Juba. This is
something that has all of us very worried.
Our security assistance I think raises some serious
questions on how we will implement programs that provide
training to the Sudanese military after some of these actions
have been made public.
Senator Markey. So here is my question to you. In January
2012, President Obama added South Sudan to the list of
countries eligible to buy weapons from the United States.
During fiscal year 2012 the State Department reported that it
had authorized commercial sales of $9 million worth of U.S.-
made military equipment to South Sudan, including military
electronics and missile-related technology. More than $3
million worth of equipment was actually shipped. In contrast,
the European Union continued to maintain an arms embargo since
July 2011.
The question is, Will the State Department suspend or limit
future weapons sales to South Sudan, given the risk of United
States weapons being used to commit atrocities?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. At the moment we are not
implementing any of those programs, but let me get back to you
with a full answer to that. My inclination is to say that that
is likely going to be the case, but I would prefer to get back
to you with more detail.
Senator Markey. Well, the administration in general is in
the process of loosening the regulations that govern arms
exports. Under the new rules, most types of weapons and
equipment could be exported without a license and without a
legal requirement that the State Department first review the
proposed sales to ensure that they will not fuel armed conflict
or harm human rights. The press has reported at one point the
administration was seriously considering loosening the controls
on guns and ammunition since they were not critical to
maintaining a military or intelligence advantage of the United
States.
Can you give us your opinion, Madam Ambassador, whether or
not we do need a very careful review of arms exports in general
to assess the potential for them to be used to commit human
rights violations that is critical to protecting civilians,
both in South Sudan, but in other countries in the world?
Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield. I can speak on South Sudan
and I certainly will take your question back, but my view is in
South Sudan we are suspending right now the implementation of
all of those programs and we will be looking very closely at
any kinds of support that we provide the South Sudan military
in the future.
[A written reply by Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield supplying
the requested information follows:]
While the administration is in the process of reform, it is not
``loosening'' our export control regulations. The revisions made to
this effort will not result in reduced control over the release of
military items. These revisions involve transitioning less sensitive
military hardware to the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.
While some of the least sensitive of these items may be eligible for
export under a license exception to the governments of our closest
allies, we will still require a license issued by the Department of
Commerce with input by the Department of State and Department of
Defense. The Department of State has not published any proposed
revisions to the categories covering firearms, guns, or ammunition. As
described by the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,
updated by the President on January 15, 2014, oversight of arms exports
is a vital tool of our national security and foreign policy, including
ensuring human rights abroad. This has not and will not change as a
result of the revisions being made to our export controls. Rather, the
controls will allow the Department of State to more closely scrutinize
those items that are critical to national security, while transitioning
less sensitive items to the Department of Commerce where they will
still require a license, except under limited circumstance when
exported to the governments of our closest allies. The Department of
State will still review those license applications to screen them for
foreign policy considerations, including human rights. To reiterate,
the U.S. Government has never sold weapons to South Sudan and has no
plans to do so.
Senator Markey. For my part, I think the European Union is
closer to where we should be on these issues. I think the
United States has to step back, because the long-term
implication of anything that we do can be profound. If we start
selling nuclear power plants to countries that have long-term
instability issues or we sell arms to countries that we know
have a much higher probability than not of being turned around
and used for purposes other than those which were originally
intended, then we have the responsibility of reevaluating
whether or not that makes any sense going forward.
Finally, the overwhelming majority of the South Sudanese
people depend on natural resources for their livelihoods.
Temperatures have increased, rainfall has decreased in the area
over the last several decades, with negative consequences for
agriculture and food security. We know that that then creates a
threat multiplier inside of countries like Sudan. Can you talk
a little bit about that, in your opinion as to what we can do
as a country to help to reduce the long-term impact of climate
change on a country like Sudan?
Ms. Lindborg. Senator, thank you for that question. We have
actually for the last 2 years had an intensive initiative in
East Africa on building greater resilience specifically in
areas that have chronic poverty overlaid with these continual
shocks of droughts and floods and the changes that you are
identifying. We have made great progress in Kenya and Ethiopia
and even Somalia, and we were moving forward in South Sudan.
What we are seeing is the disruption of all of that, which
is all too often the case when you have conflict that rolls
back progress and gains. Hopefully, we will be able to resume
that, which enables greater management of risk and greater
adaptation to these kinds of changes, so that we get ahead of
the kind of natural disaster cycles.
Senator Markey. You get into a very bad negative feedback
loop, where the very thing that caused the problem, the
instability or the food insecurity, fighting for smaller and
smaller and smaller amounts of natural resources, then lead to
the conflict. It then makes it more difficult for you to solve
the problem that was the original cause of the problem.
Ms. Lindborg. That is absolutely right. Understanding how
to manage and mitigate the risk of conflict is critical for
these programs. We have done a lot of that work at the
community level throughout South Sudan. I would just note that
we are not getting widespread reports of violence among
communities. So far it is armed actors who are perpetrating
most of the violence.
We want to continue to be able to do that, and would love
to come brief you on the resilience programs.
Senator Markey. The only problem is, as we know, is that
the absence of the natural resources that are related to
climate change then further exacerbates the ethnic conflicts.
They are fighting over less and less, which makes it easier for
the armed forces to enlist their ethnic brethren in a fight
over those limited resources. So the climate change at the end
comes back as a major factor.
Again, I would just urge that human rights be a factor that
is much higher in priority in terms of arms exports from the
United States, I think. It is just time for us to have that
reevaluation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Let me thank you. I think you have raised
some very important critical issues. Some of the questions that
have been raised here about who and our continuation of
assistance is why this committee voted 16 to 1 in a bipartisan
basis to create language to deal with these circumstances. It
is my hope as the omnibus bill moves forward that the
Appropriations Committee will look at that language and, if
not, that we will have an opportunity to consider that language
on the floor.
I think the State Department cannot be in a position of
picking and choosing, but having a standard that is universal,
with the options for national security. I think that is
incredibly important.
The thanks of the committee--do you have something else?
Sorry, Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. I would like to just say thank you again
for your testimony. I am just listening to a lot of questions
here. I know in the opening comments you mentioned that, or the
opening questioning, that Machar did not undertake a coup in
your opinion, that forces went to his home, he left, and then
this began.
Then I have heard you on a continued basis talk about no
aid would flow if there was a coup of any kind or a violent
takeover. I hope--and I have seen Uganda is reported to have
thousands of troops maybe helping the regime. I hope that all
the international players, the neighbors, and ourselves, are
applying enough pressure on Salva Kiir to want to solve this,
because as I listen to all the questioning and answering it
feels like most of the pressure is on the other side. I just
hope that the pressure is being applied in a very balanced way.
You do not have to respond to that, but just in listening
to the answers I am not sure that would come out in this
testimony.
The Chairman. With the thanks of the committee for your
appearance here today and your work, we will move on to our
second panel. Thank you. You are excused.
With thanks to our next panel, I will introduce, for their
patience and the input that they will have before the committee
now, Ambassador Princeton Lyman, who has served as the U.S.
Special Envoy for Sudan from 2011 to 2013 and previously served
as the U.S. senior adviser on North-South negotiations; Mr.
John Prendergast, a prominent human rights activist, author,
and cofounder of the Enough Project to end genocide and crimes
against humanity, particularly on the continent of Africa; and
Kate Almquist Knopf, who has served as USAID Assistant
Administrator for Africa and Sudan Mission Director.
Let me--evidently, you all know each other very well.
Handshakes and kisses are being shared.
Let me again thank you for your patience, but your
testimony is incredibly important here. We ask you to summarize
your statements in about 5 minutes so we can have a dialogue
with you. Your full statements will be included in the record
without objection.
Ambassador Lyman, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. PRINCETON LYMAN, SENIOR ADVISOR, UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Ambassador Lyman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to
Senator Corker and all the members of the committee here. This
is a tragic situation and it is important----
The Chairman. One moment.
If we could ask those who are leaving to do so quietly and
exit so we can hear these witnesses.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Lyman. I was asked to talk about the context and
origins of this crisis, but let me make, if I can, two comments
about some of the issues raised earlier. I think the importance
of strengthening UNMISS, the U.N. peacekeeping operation, as
was discussed here--it is absolutely vital that the people who
have sought protection under the U.N. be protected, and that
structure there needs a great deal of help. It will take more
than the U.N. resolution, a lot of work, and I hope the United
States can provide logistic and other support to get the added
troops there.
The mandate is there, but it needs to be activated. There
has to be a much more aggressive role in protecting civilians
and eventually monitoring the cease-fire. So I appreciate the
attention that has been given to that.
The second thing is I want to point out that the work of
the special envoy, Don Booth, and the work of Ambassador Susan
Page in Juba is very important. They are on the ground working
with this issue all the time. But their presence there in both
places sends a message that the United States is not walking
away from this crisis. On the ground, as difficult as it is,
the support to Ambassador Page in Juba as well as to the
special envoy is very, very important and I am glad it was
emphasized in the testimony.
I want to talk about the runup to this crisis to illustrate
the weaknesses of the institutions, the political and the
military institutions in South Sudan, because it is important
that as we look ahead to how these issues are resolved it is
not simply a reconciliation between two men or even return to
the status quo, because the underlying issues, the underlying
weaknesses, are going to take something much more, and it is
going to take a much more active role by the international
community in solving these problems than we had before.
Let me just describe two trends, two developments that led
to this crisis. One, going back a year and a half or more, was
the uneasiness and worry within the ruling party about the way
the country was being governed. There was not attention to the
party by President Kiir, not even to the Cabinet. He was ruling
more on the basis of a small group of advisers and, even more
disturbing, relying more and more on intelligence and security
people to harass opponents. Journalists were assassinated,
others being pushed out of the country.
It became a major concern in our relations with South
Sudan. So there was a real concern about bad governance.
Then the second challenge came from Riek Machar signaling
that he was going to challenge the President for leadership of
the party and for the Presidency. Now, Machar is a very
controversial figure. He had split from the SPLM in the
nineties, fought against it. There was a major massacre of the
Dinka. These things have not been forgotten.
So the party was faced with a dilemma. If you give him--if
you do not give him a path to the Presidency, there could be a
crisis and a split. If you do give him a path to the
Presidency, other people will be very upset. This was the
dilemma the party had to deal with.
Instead of having a party capable of doing it, President
Kiir went the other direction. He froze and eventually
dissolved all the party mechanisms. He treated the elements
from both of these crises as just direct challenges to him and
as inciting unrest.
What it did was bring these two together, the dissenters in
the party and Riek Machar, not because these people now mostly
in detention were supporting Riek Machar's Presidency, but they
came together to criticize the way these issues were not being
addressed. Instead, by December President Kiir dissolved many
of the policy institutions and it was very clear there was no
resolution taking place. Then we had the incidents of December
15 and all the unraveling.
Now, I emphasize this because when we look ahead it is not
enough to say, well, just reconcile. There needs to be a
process that gets at the basic structures of governance in
South Sudan: enough protection for democracy and human rights,
for how parties are supposed to operate, et cetera. The
constitutional process in South Sudan has not moved forward,
and that gives us a vehicle for dealing with a lot of
participation from civil society, the churches, et cetera, in a
new constitution for South Sudan that would be developed and
would precede the next elections and maybe bring new leadership
to the country.
But the international community is going to have to play a
bigger role here. There should be international experts
involved. There should be an advisory committee from the United
Nations, the United States, African Union, et cetera.
The same goes for the economy. This is an oil-driven
economy. The oil now is uncertain. There has to be a much more
dynamic relationship between the international community and
South Sudan over the management of the economy and how people
can be helped.
This is going to be a new, much more active involvement.
But otherwise, going back to the old institutions will not be
sufficient. So it is a challenge.
But we have invested, the United States, heavily in this
process. Between Sudan and South Sudan, since 2005 the United
States has spent, I estimate, around $12 billion in
peacekeeping, in Darfur, in humanitarian activities and the
birthing of South Sudan. Important American constituencies have
been heavily involved in South Sudan's move to independence.
We cannot turn back on this. It is going to take a lot of
time and effort. If we recognize the fundamental weaknesses in
these institutions, we and our partners can start to address
this over the next several years.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lyman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Princeton N. Lyman
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the conflict in South
Sudan. As you know I have had a long experience in Africa and in
particular over the past 3 years with Sudan and South Sudan. Earlier in
my career, I served as U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria and to South Africa.
I began working on Sudan in the fall of 2010 as a special advisor
helping assure the success of the referendum in South Sudan that led to
its independence. From March 2011 to March 2013 I was the U.S. Special
Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. I am currently senior advisor to the
president of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The views expressed in this
testimony are my own and not those of the U.S. Institute of Peace,
which does not take policy positions.
The situation in Sudan is a tragedy in every sense of the word,
first of all for the people who are suffering and those who have
already lost family members and friends; second because the
independence for which South Sudanese fought for so many years is being
wasted on internal warfare rather devoted to the needs of the people.
I have been asked to address the larger context of this conflict,
its historic and political roots. This conflict has several underlying
causes. But to focus on some basic factors, it arises from two distinct
contentious political developments over the past 2 years which became
intertwined. Those developments took place within a fragile political
and military structure and rather than being addressed and resolved
were allowed to fester and eventually lead to the situation we have
today.
Those two developments were growing dissention within the ruling
party over the way the country was being governed, and the decision by
Vice President Riek Machar to challenge President Kiir for the
leadership of the SPLM and then the Presidency in 2015.
South Sudan achieved its independence in 2011 led by the leading
liberation movement, the Southern People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).
The SPLM and its national army, the SPLA, however are fragile
coalitions of various militia and political entities that often fought
against each other during the previous civil war. President Kiir did an
admirable job in bringing almost all these factions and militia
together in the final run up to independence. Several other holdouts
were brought in later. But much of this coalition-building was achieved
by adding the various militias to the national army, but never fully
integrating them. Political alliances were covered over but did not
resolve competing political claims. Both the party and the army were
unable to contain the competing ambitions and dissensions that have now
come into the open.
The first of the developments that led to today's conflict was
growing unhappiness within the government about the way President Kiir
was managing affairs. Some leading members of the ruling party in
particular felt that the President ignored the party in filling
positions, ignored in fact the Cabinet, and made decisions based on the
advice of a narrow group of advisors from his home area, Northern Bar
El Ghazal. Parallel with these concerns were growing violations of
human rights by the regime. Human rights advocates, journalists, and
NGOs--both indigenous and international--were being harassed. A
prominent journalist was assassinated in late 2012 with the government
security apparatus suspected. President Kiir initially accepted, but
later rejected, the U.S. offer of FBI help for investigating the
matter. The U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan, Susan Page, was outspoken
about these matters during the fall of 2012. They were the subject of
my last visit to Juba in December 2012.
At the same time as these problems were growing, the party faced
another internal crisis. Vice President Riek Machar indicated that he
was moving to challenge President Kiir for the SPLM leadership and
thereafter for the Presidency in the election of 2015. That challenge
would come to a head at the party conference scheduled for 2014.
Machar is extremely controversial within the SPLM. A leader of the
Nuer, the second largest ethnic group in South Sudan, he had split from
the SPLM and fought against it for years during the civil war. In 1991
his forces were involved in a major massacre of Dinkas, the largest
ethnic group in South Sudan. That has never been forgotten, even after
Machar united back with the SPLM in 2001. President Kiir subsequently
invited Machar to be Vice President. But theirs was a difficult
relationship. Kiir assigned Machar only limited authority or
responsibilities.
Machar's ambitions thus posed a major challenge for the SPLM.
Denied a path to the Presidency, Machar could be a threat, either by
leaving the SPLM and forming an opposition party, or worse, by drawing
on his Nuer forces from within the SPLA and posing a military threat.
On the other hand, providing him a path to the Presidency would surely
arouse strong opposition within the SPLM.
The tragedy is that the party, the SPLM, was not up to meeting this
challenge. Kiir, in particular, chose not to use the party machinery to
try to defuse or resolve it. Throughout 2013, he bypassed or delayed
party mechanisms. In July he dismissed Machar and the entire Cabinet.
The Secretary General of the party, Pagan Amum, was suspended and put
under investigation for inciting unrest.
And there is where the two developments began to intertwine.
Dissenters within the SPLM, frustrated by their differences with Kiir,
drifted toward Machar not as Presidential candidate, but as an ally in
calling for more party democracy and authority. They also chose, in a
joint press conference on December 6, 2013, to accuse the government of
giving away too much in the negotiations with Sudan, an odd charge
coming from among others Pagan Amum, who had also been the chief
negotiator with Sudan for the SPLM. This alliance, if you can call it
that, was diverse ethnically as well as in terms of factions, including
for example the widow of SPLM leader John Garang. Kiir considered all
of them hostile to his Presidency and more of them than Machar
harboring Presidential ambitions. There was no meeting of the minds.
Things spiraled thereafter out of control. Whatever the origin of
the fighting that started on December 15, President Kiir saw this as a
coup by Machar's forces. Whether it was or not is not entirely clear.
In any case, Machar's compound was attacked, and the party dissenters
were jailed. Machar fled to the field and his army supporters left the
SPLA to fight for him. Another sometime integrated, sometime outsider
militia leader, Peter Gadet, joined Machar's forces. A former Governor
of Unity State, who had been dismissed by Kiir, also joined Machar and
is now the lead negotiator for Machar in the talks in Addis. The
coalition and unity that Kiir had painstakingly built in the runup to
independence has been unraveling.
In this situation of course, ethnic factors have played a role and
once fighting began, became even more prominent. The fact that Kiir and
most of the SPLM leadership is Dinka, and Machar is a leader of the
Nuer, is not irrelevant. And once the dogs of war have been let loose,
ethnic differences become the vehicle of mobilization, and the source
of massacres, human rights violations and hatred. But it is important
to remember that the sources of discontent within the SPLM were not
ethnically based, and the most prominent of those who sided with Machar
in the press conference of December 6, and are now in prison, are not
Nuer. The underlying political issues that need to be addressed go
beyond ethnicity.
The weakness of South Sudan's political institutions will be a
continuing factor in addressing these needs. A comparison with South
Africa is perhaps useful. The ANC in South Africa had decades of
political development before coming to power in 1994. The ANC was a
political movement with an armed wing that was developed much later.
The SPLM was born from the decades of fighting in the bush. It is an
army with a political wing. The SPLM government that took office in
2010 was in many ways still more a liberation army than a government.
The weakness of political institutions, the overlap of party and
government, and party and army, all contributed to the inability of the
SPLM as a party to resolve these growing developments. Again by
comparison, the ANC faced and resolved a major challenge to its
leadership in 2008, even causing the resignation of the president,
Thabo Mbeki, without bloodshed or unrest. The SPLM was not at all able
to manage such a crisis.
In looking ahead, the immediate need is to stop the fighting and
allow for humanitarian access to all who need it, with protection for
all those within UNMISS camps. But the political talks that follow need
to address the underlying issues that led to this disaster. There
cannot be a simple return to the status quo ante, with Machar once
again Vice President all the rest. There has been too much blood, and
it would not solve anything.
The hard task ahead is to develop a new political structure,
defining more clearly the democratic rights of all South Sudanese, that
lays down the rules of political competition, and which allows for
development of stronger political institutions, not only the leading
party, the SPLM, but others. South Sudan has not yet developed a
permanent constitution. This process, if placed under independent
leadership, such as by a Supreme Court Judge, could be such a vehicle.
But the process will have to be opened up much wider than previously,
with active citizen, church, and civil society participation.
Meanwhile, the long process of integrating, disarming, and ultimately
reducing the size of the military forces and militia must be
undertaken. But that can only be undertaken in a context within which
fighting has stopped, the cease-fire is well monitored, and a credible
political process is under way. All of these are hard tasks and they
will demand a much more active and participating role of the
international community than heretofore. Institutions take time to
develop and without proactive outside participation, South Sudan's
institutions, demonstrably weak, are not likely alone to be up to these
demands. A new partnership between South Sudan and the international
community must now be forged to preserve all that has been invested in
this new nation.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Prendergast.
STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, COFOUNDER, SATELLITE SENTINEL
PROJECT, ENOUGH PROJECT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Prendergast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Corker. This committee in particular has been crucial to the
development of United States policy to Sudan for now years,
even decades, and it sends, I think, having this hearing right
now sends a really important signal to the people of South
Sudan that we care and that we are watching very closely. So I
thank you for that.
I want to move right to the solutions, on page four of my
testimony. I want to propose four ways that the administration
and Congress can help right now in stabilizing the country and
supporting the broader peace process that many of you have
talked about.
The first way that the United States can help, I think, is
to help expand this peace process beyond just a deal between
the guys with the biggest guns. This goes to the heart of what
you were saying, Senator Menendez, in your initial questions.
The United States can play I think a major role in helping to
ensure that the current process that is unfolding in Addis does
not repeat the mistakes of past mediation efforts in Sudan and
South Sudan. And the mistakes are legion and I have tried to
document some of them in the written testimony earlier.
This will require, I think, a team of diplomats that can be
accompanying our current special envoy. Let me just say that
Sudan has itself, not South Sudan, Sudan itself has no peace
process to speak of. There are stovepipe efforts with Darfur,
with the Nuba Mountains, with Blue Nile, eastern Sudan. All
these places, particularly the first three, there are huge
conflicts with thousands and thousands of deaths over the
course of the last year alone and hundreds of thousands of
displaced, newly displaced people over the course of the last
year alone. Nothing is happening on that front.
So we need a team, a cell, I think, in Addis of people to
work with our special envoy, to be able to help deepen these
processes. Particularly on the south, I want to associate
myself very strongly with what Ambassador Lyman said. There are
a number of layers to the peace process. there is the immediate
cessation of hostilities, which does involve the guys with the
biggest guns, but then you have to bring in others. You have to
get involved in the governance reforms that have to be part of
this process.
There are reasons why the war erupted so quickly, whether
it was a coup or not, and spread to all the different regions
of the country. Well, there is a lot of problems, and so they
are not being addressed through the regular channels, the
political channels. There needs to be reform.
The intercommunal reconciliation efforts that sort of
petered out need to be really revived as part of this process.
The constitutional process that Princeton talked about, and
then, of course, support for army reform and DDR. We can talk
more about that if you want in the Q and A, because I think it
is really important, the kind of things that we were talking
about, Senator Kaine.
So I think their work gets backed, of course, by Susan Rice
and Secretary Kerry and President Obama himself, Ambassador
Power. They have all been making contributions in a good way,
just like in past administrations we have seen that from
Secretary Powell and others and Secretary Rice in the CPA
negotiation. That needs to continue. But I think it is really
the team, having the team on the ground.
For its part, Congress can be helpful in ensuring that
these resources are available for the diplomatic efforts for
building that kind of a team, to be able to undertake
protracted negotiation, because that is what it is going to
require for the peace to potentially have a chance in South
Sudan and in Sudan, so make it a package.
The second way the United States can help is I think to
reinvest the troika. The troika involved the three countries,
the United States, Britain, and Norway, and it went back to the
late nineties, over three administrations. It played a crucial
role in supporting the mediation process leading up to the 2005
comprehensive peace agreement and its implementation.
I think the troika can play an even important role, more
important role, in the new peace efforts in South Sudan and in
the ongoing effort to try to build a peace process in Sudan
itself if they added another member, and that is China.
Bringing China into the tent in a more formal way would
increase the troika's influence on the process and the parties.
We need leverage, and engaging even India, with major oil
involvement in this regard, would also be potentially
productive.
So I think a high-level White House effort should be
undertaken with Beijing to find common ground on what our two
countries can support together in South Sudan. A lot of work
has already been done. I do not want to undermine or say
anything negative about that. But a very high-level specific
effort to try to figure out how the United States and China can
work together. I think they can do that in the context of what
could be a revived troika or quartet if we want to formalize
it.
For its part, I think China--the Congress, sorry, can help
by engaging directly with some officials from China and
exploring the ways that the United States and China can work
together for peace in the Sudan.
The third way for the United States to help is to collect
evidence of atrocities and to sanction the perpetrators. This
goes to the heart of what Senator Cardin was talking about
earlier. I think we all know what that means, but there are two
ways you can do it. You can collect the evidence and use that
evidence immediately to impose targeted sanctions against
individuals who are found to be perpetrating, suspected of
perpetrating mass atrocities and leading these kind of things.
And you can collect that evidence and turn it over to bodies
and work for the creation of bodies or the existing bodies like
the ICC, but the creation of bodies like a mixed court in South
Sudan that could work to begin to end this cycle of impunity
and begin to prosecute those that are committing these kinds of
atrocities.
As I think everyone on this committee and on this panel
thinks, if we do not start to deal with those kinds of
questions it just leads to a deepening of a cycle of violence
and impunity that we have seen not only in South Sudan, but, as
was mentioned already, in a number of other places in Africa
and around the world.
For its part, I think Congress could ask for regular
briefings from the administration, formal briefings on the
evidence of atrocities and how specifically the United States
is responding on these two areas--targeted sanctions and
prosecutions--what are we doing?
The fourth way the United States can help is to help
negotiate humanitarian access. I think the United States has
been admirable, going all the way back to when Kate was running
things, admirable in the way we have responded to the
humanitarian crises. We have a long history of negotiated
access agreements in South Sudan that we can build on. I think
we do not want to wait a long time before we get those
negotiated access agreements to get to people.
Particularly, there are people all over South Sudan, but I
want to highlight one group of people that are extremely at
risk. Those are those refugees from Sudan, from the Nuba
Mountains and Blue Nile, who are in South Sudan, and no aid
right now. They have no resources to call upon, and their home
areas in Sudan are the subject right now of intensive bombing
campaigns and offensives by the Government of Sudan in the Nuba
Mountains and Blue Nile today. So being able to negotiate the
access up to those areas and ensure that the parties uphold
those agreements is terribly important.
In conclusion, the track record of this Congress I think,
particularly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has been
clear over the last three administrations regarding Sudan and
South Sudan. I know I speak for my fellow panelists and so many
others in expressing really our deep appreciation for your
continuing advocacy on behalf of the people of Sudan and South
Sudan.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Prendergast
Thank you, Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Corker, for the
opportunity to testify at this turning point for South Sudan. The full
committee's dedicated attention to this issue is very helpful. This
body--including your predecessors Senators Kerry and Lugar--has played
a pivotal role in the development of U.S. policy on both Sudans, and it
is good that is continuing.
I would like to focus my prepared remarks on the way forward for
South Sudan. The U.S. Government has already shown a welcome level of
attention and engagement on this issue. Still, there is always much
more that can and should be done to help stop the fighting, secure a
durable peace, protect civilians, hold perpetrators accountable, and
start to heal this new country in its rocky process of state formation.
Before I begin, I want to reveal a controlling bias in my
testimony. I believe that the United States and broader international
community can finally learn the lessons from past failed peace efforts,
and that a new process can evolve in Addis Ababa that takes into
account the structural and substantive deficits of previous
initiatives. And I believe that the United States can play a crucial
role in helping to construct a more effective process, and then help
build the international leverage necessary to see it through to
successful completion.
what needs to happen to forge a negotiated political solution?
The ``good'' news is that we already know what doesn't work. We
have seen too many peace conferences that kept civil society, religious
leaders, grassroots activists and women out of the room. Our collective
experience has shown that partial and noninclusive peace agreements
that are negotiated among only those with the biggest guns don't lead
to lasting peace. Additionally, superficial power-sharing agreements
don't work if they do not include professional, transparent, and well-
funded efforts at army reform and the demobilization and reintegration
of former combatants back into society. South Sudan's struggle to
establish its own national reconciliation and dialogue process offers a
vivid example of the need to address these issues within the text of
binding peace agreements too. Otherwise, DDR, SSR, and TRCs just become
buzzword acronyms without any impact.
The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement stopped the fighting between
Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in the South. In
terms of providing a stoppage of the primary North-South war, it was
successful. But the internal wars within North and South were left
unaddressed. Deadly conflict has
re-erupted in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, with Darfur last
year having one of the highest rates of newly displaced people in the
world. Similarly, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and what followed
did not tackle the deep fissures within South Sudan itself,
particularly within the ruling party and the army, but also between
local communities who had borne the brunt of the war.
What is needed to address the crisis in South Sudan is a broad
expansion beyond the approach taken by those who negotiated the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and those that are trying to broker
isolated deals in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, and Eastern
Sudan. In South Sudan, of course a deal between the combatant forces
for a cessation of hostilities is a first order priority, but what
follows needs to be much more inclusive, transparent, and multilayered
than any of the processes that have come before if sustainable peace is
to have a chance in South Sudan. This requires a broadening of both
substance and structure.
In terms of structuring talks for a lasting political solution, the
South Sudan peace process will have to become much more inclusive.
Women and youth, who have been notably absent from the Addis process,
must be welcomed. The release of the 11 senior level ruling party
officials being detained by their government, representing significant
political constituencies, and their subsequent involvement in Addis
will be essential for the credibility of these talks. Church leaders
who have played a major role in previous communal reconciliation
initiatives need to be part of the process as well. Furthermore, it
will be necessary over time to find a way to engage potential spoilers,
whether armed groups or disaffected constituencies from different
regions in South Sudan.
South Sudanese have already gone through an extensive consultative
process around the New Deal Compact, which focused on both peace-
building and state-building goals. Additionally, the National
Democratic Institute conducted a nationwide survey on views about the
constitution. Most recently, 1,200 people were surveyed by the South
Sudanese NGO, the Community Empowerment for Progress Organization at
the end of December 2013, after fighting started in Juba. Among other
questions, they were asked their views on the roadmap for peace and
stability in South Sudan. These efforts have already gathered valuable
perspectives from those most affected by the violence: civilians and
average citizens. Negotiators should take them into account.
what would a sustainable deal potentially look like?
A quick and dirty power-sharing deal is not the answer to South
Sudan's problems. Simply redistributing power to combatant factions on
the basis of the territory under their control would be a huge error.
Similarly, essentializing South Sudanese political constituencies into
their ethnic component parts would also be a mistake. A deal that
overemphasizes sharing power between ethnic groups misses the root
causes of this violence. Any interim arrangements or transitional
government structure should seek to avoid these pitfalls. There will be
great temptation to speed to a conclusion of the talks, which would
leave major conflict drivers unaddressed.
A truly multilayered approach would address the following
priorities in different formats:
Broad, inclusive, national dialogue process: The regional IGAD
mediation team needs to shepherd an inclusive process focused on a
broad national dialogue process and governance reform. For too long,
the ruling party's structures have languished due to infighting and
neglect. Instead, patronage networks based on individual proximity to
power, military might, and wealth evolved. As a consequence, a
political challenge which could have been resolved through dialogue
mutated into armed conflict that has since engulfed the country. Only a
truly inclusive national dialogue process will prevent that from
happening again, one that addresses governance structures, ruling party
cleavages, a legitimate constitution process, and security sector
reform. All of this should happen BEFORE there are elections with a
level playing field. Otherwise, South Sudan will continue to suffer
from their leaders' perception that taking up arms is the easiest or
only way to gain power or leverage.
Accountability: Since South Sudan lacks a functioning judicial
system, the specter of impunity or rushed military prosecutions is very
real. Credibly holding perpetrators responsible for crimes committed in
the past 3 weeks will require setting up independent mechanisms for
investigation and prosecution. Otherwise a culture of impunity will
prevail, preventing future reconciliation. The proposal for a mixed
court, which would involve South Sudanese and international justice
sector personnel should receive some discussion, as it has in other
post-conflict settings.
Reconciliation: Church-led grassroots reconciliation and truth-
telling efforts would help complement more formal judicial proceedings.
Intercommunal cleavages have been once again inflamed over the last
month. Long-term processes aimed at coexistence and cooperation will be
critical to sustainable peace.
Army reform and DDR: One of the main unaddressed fault lines in
South Sudan existed within the army, and that erupted at the first sign
of stress in December. As part of any peace implementation process,
much greater effort and transparency must go into reforming the army
and police force. Also, any deal will require a serious demobilization
and reintegration program for ex-combatants, with real livelihood
options for those leaving armed groups.
how can the united states help stabilize the country
and support the peace process?
Expand the peace process: The United States can play a major role
in helping to ensure that the current peace process unfolding in Addis
does not repeat the mistakes of past mediation efforts in Sudan and
South Sudan. This will require a team of diplomats led by our current
special envoy but supplemented by issue and process experts who can
help work all of the layers of peacemaking: the immediate cessation of
hostilities and its monitoring, the national dialogue and governance
reform processes, the constitution process, the intercommunal
reconciliation efforts, and the support for army reform and DDR. Their
work should be backed by continuing high level engagement by key U.S.
officials, including President Obama, National Security Adviser Rice,
Secretary Kerry, and Ambassador Power, all of whom have already made
important contributions to preventing further conflagration.
Development assistance should support grassroots peace initiatives.
Already, South Sudanese have established a decentralized think tank
called Fresh Start South Sudan to discuss governance, peace-building,
social services and future prosperity. Others are engaged in campaigns
that emphasize alternatives to violence, including ``I Choose Peace''
and ``My Tribe Is South Sudan.'' These initiatives deserve greater
attention and our logistical and financial support as well.
Congress can be helpful in ensuring that the resources are
available for these diplomatic efforts, which for it to have a chance
at success will have to be protracted and sustained.
Reinvent the Troika: The Troika (United Kingdom, Norway, and the
United States) played a crucial role in supporting the mediation
process leading up to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its
implementation. The Troika countries could play an even more important
role in supporting the new peace effort in South Sudan if it expanded
its membership by one: China. Bringing China into the tent would
increase the Troika's influence on the process and the parties.
Engaging India in this regard would also be potentially productive. A
high-level White House effort should be undertaken with Beijing to find
common ground on what our two countries can support together in South
Sudan (and Sudan as well), and then integrate those understandings into
a revived Troika, or Quartet.
Congress can help by engaging Chinese officials as well in
exploring ways the United States and China can work together for peace
in the Sudans.
Collect and punish evidence of atrocities: The United States should
begin collecting evidence of human rights crimes and instances where
humanitarian aid workers are prevented from doing their work. The
African Union has already expressed a willingness to impose targeted
sanctions on any party implicated in ``inciting people to violence,
including along ethnic lines, continuing hostilities, undermining the
envisaged inclusive dialogue, hindering humanitarian operations,
undermining the protection mandate of UMISS and carry out acts of
violence against civilians and unarmed combatants.'' The United States
should follow suit, and work within the U.N. Security Council to begin
consultations around passing a resolution establishing a targeted
sanctions regime, as conceptualized by the African Union. Drawing on
the Syrian example, they should also push actively for the creation of
an Independent International Commission of Inquiry into crimes
committed by all factions and combatants. While both the South Sudanese
Government and the U.N. peacekeeping mission have already begun these
documentation efforts, an independent commission will allow findings to
be depoliticized. Further, the United States should support the
establishment of a mixed court, drawing on both South Sudanese and
international law, to ensure fair trials and prosecutions.
Congress could help by asking for regular briefings by the
administration on evidence of atrocities and how the United States is
responding. If patterns of serious abuses are being found to be
perpetrated by South Sudan Government forces, this should lead to a
reevaluation of our nonhumanitarian aid programs.
Negotiate humanitarian access: The humanitarian situation in South
Sudan is dire, and it has a direct impact on neighboring areas inside
Sudan as well, particularly in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile
regions. Negotiating an access framework, notwithstanding zones of
control, is essential and must proceed along a parallel track, with
potential U.S. leadership. It would be a mistake to connect
humanitarian access negotiations to the broader political mediation.
All South Sudanese deserve consistent and unimpeded humanitarian
assistance, regardless of if they live in areas held by rebel or
government forces. Refugees from Sudan living in camps along the
border, especially in Yida and Maban, deserve special attention.
Following the evacuation of international staff and the U.N. mission,
these concentrations of civilians near the Sudan/South Sudan are
particularly vulnerable. They are trapped between two active conflict
zones, have nowhere to run, and their supplies are nearly exhausted.
Congress can raise the alarm bells regarding specific at-risk
populations throughout South Sudan, as well as those in Yida camp,
Maban camp and trapped across the border in war-torn Nuba and Blue
Nile, and continue to ensure the funding is available for innovative
relief interventions that will no doubt continue saving countless South
Sudanese and Sudanese lives.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Knopf.
STATEMENT OF HON. KATE ALMQUIST KNOPF, ADJUNCT FACULTY, AFRICA
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Knopf. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Corker, and members of the committee, for the opportunity to
testify before you today.
In the space of nearly 4 weeks, more than a decade of
humanitarian and development progress to improve the lives of
the people of South Sudan has been undone by the outbreak of
violence between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and
former Vice President Riek Machar. As others have indicated
today, the violence could devolve further into full-scale civil
war, resulting in immense human suffering with severe
implications for regional peace and security. I would like to
offer a few observations on the current crisis and then make
several recommendations.
Let me be clear from the outset. Upon South Sudan's
independence in 2011, the United States pledged its commitment
to stand by its people, to continue to stand by its people. We
should remain resolute in this commitment, not flinching in the
face of recent developments. The United States has unique
influence and a deep reservoir of good will in South Sudan that
gives it an indispensable role in overcoming the current
crisis.
My first observation is that this crisis was neither
inevitable nor ethnically motivated. It is a political crisis
precipitated by the failure of President Salva Kiir and former
Vice President Riek Machar to settle their political
differences without resort to violence. They can stop it, and
the first priority is inducing them to do so.
Secondly, institutional development takes decades.
Political transitions are inherently messy and it is not a
surprise that there is a crisis in governance. It is in fact to
be expected. While there is a great temptation to play the
blame game, it is important to recognize that South Sudan was
not afforded self-determination based on its capacity for self-
rule. It won self-determination to liberate South Sudanese from
oppression and end decades of war.
South Sudan must develop its political institutions
indigenously and from the ground up. It is unreasonable to
expect these institutions to develop and take root in 2\1/2\
years.
Sadly, the government's record since independence is one of
deliberate undermining and erosion of the nascent mechanisms of
accountability between state and society by those who hold
power. This is the root of the current crisis and the
fundamental issue that must be addressed if and when the
fighting ends.
Thirdly, the United States has deep relationships with the
protagonists, an unparalleled degree of influence, and the
responsibility to use that influence to broker a return to
nonviolent political competition. This is not a time for
incremental approaches. While the regional IGAD and AU
processes to mediate between the parties are to be supported,
the United States must continue to deploy the full weight of
its diplomatic capabilities on the parties directly and
multilaterally, including through the U.N. Security Council.
The United States should move to invoke the President's
authorities to institute travel bans and asset freezes on
senior leadership on both sides, as well as prepare to extend
those sanctions multilaterally through a resolution in the U.N.
Security Council, if the following actions are not imminently
forthcoming:
One, a cessation of fighting without further stalling or
delay. The United States and other international partners must
foreclose the military option for either side, including by
explicitly discouraging regional actors, such as Uganda and
Sudan, from directly or indirectly participating in the
conflict.
Two, a release of the 11 political detainees arrested
following the outbreak of fighting in Juba. They have been
targeted on the basis of their public dissent with President
Kiir and their participation in the Addis Ababa talks is vital
to reaching a political arrangement.
Three, the impartial delivery of urgently needed
humanitarian aid, including providing humanitarian actors
fully, unimpeded access to all those in need, not just in the
protected enclaves of UNMISS bases, and most especially to
civilians caught in active conflict zones, such as in the
cities of Bor and Bentiu.
Four, full cooperation with the humanitarian monitoring,
including with a formal U.N. commission of inquiry which should
be established to investigate and document human rights abuses.
Neither Salva Kiir nor Riek Machar is indispensable to a
stable, peaceful, democratic South Sudan. Courageous leadership
is required, however, to rise above personal ambitions and
animosities to achieve a cease-fire and an interim political
settlement. Escaping cycles of violence is hard, but it can be
done.
If an interim political settlement is reached, the South
Sudanese leadership will need to dedicate itself to three
critical tasks to restore confidence and demonstrate
accountability to its people: building coalitions to support
key institutional reforms in citizen security, justice, and
jobs; expanding space for independent voices so a national
dialogue is possible; and tangibly demonstrating the state's
responsiveness to its citizens, particularly by drafting and
adopting a permanent constitution, fostering national and local
reconciliation, and conducting fair and peaceful elections.
Prioritizing road networks and radio communications is a must
to achieve any of these tasks.
The United States is the largest bilateral donor to South
Sudan and it should remain so. Significant areas of the
country, in fact, are peaceful and government, community, and
church leaders in these areas are to be commended and supported
in their efforts to stem the conflict's spread, including
through the continuation of development partnerships. An abrupt
stop to development assistance will only worsen the national
crisis, not alleviate it.
USAID has been providing development assistance to South
Sudan continuously since 1998, first in supporting stability
through international and local partners and eventually through
the newly independent government. The gains from these programs
should not be jettisoned hastily or unnecessarily. Doing so
will only make the task of stabilization and reconstruction
that much harder if and when a political settlement is reached,
further harming the people of South Sudan.
Let me conclude on a practical note. The U.S. Government's
ability to respond effectively to this crisis, whether through
diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, or development, will be
significantly handicapped without the presence of Americans
with deep knowledge and relationships in South Sudan. As the
former head of USAID's Africa Bureau and the former mission
director in Sudan, I understand all too well the tradeoffs
between security and impact. It is imperative that the U.S.
Government staff be allowed to return to South Sudan as quickly
as possible.
Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Knopf follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kate Almquist Knopf
introduction
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on
the fluid situation in South Sudan. It is an honor to appear before the
committee again.
In the space of 3 short weeks, more than a decade of humanitarian
and development progress to improve the lives of the people of South
Sudan has been undone due to the outbreak of violence between forces
loyal to President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar.
And the very real potential exists for the tragedy to grow far worse.
Over the course of the 1983-2005 civil war, some 2 million lives were
lost, 4 million were internally displaced, and over 600,000 were forced
to flee the country. Much of this human suffering resulted from
internecine southern fighting, even more so than it resulted from
conflict between north and south. While the full impact cannot yet be
fully assessed, the current crisis has easily claimed thousands of
lives, displaced hundreds of thousands from their homes, and forced
tens of thousands to flee across borders. If not immediately curtailed,
the violence could devolve into full-scale civil war with far-ranging
implications for regional peace and stability and immense human
suffering.
I first visited South Sudan in 1995 while working for the
international NGO World Vision. I later had the honor to work on the
Sudan and Darfur peace processes for 8 years as an official at the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), including serving as the
first director of the USAID/Sudan mission after 14 years of closure,
the first U.S. representative to the international Assessment and
Evaluation Commission monitoring implementation of the CPA, and
subsequently as assistant administrator for Africa. I will offer a few
observations on the current crisis and then make several
recommendations both for immediate priorities and for stabilization
strategies if and when an interim political settlement is reached,
including the role of the United States and other international donors.
observations
1. The current crisis is neither inevitable nor unstoppable. It is
political and ultimately a failure of South Sudanese leadership. The
leaders who started the crisis can stop it.
South Sudan began its independence in 2011 with both great promise
and great peril. Promise from the abundance of its natural resources,
the outpouring of international support, and its uncontested
legitimacy, even from the Government of Sudan (GOS) in Khartoum. Peril
from its unresolved issues with Khartoum, including over oil and
borders; the deep wounds of 22 years of civil war, including trauma
from bitter intercommunal fighting; virtually no institutional legacy
of self-governance to draw on; extremely limited physical and
telecommunications networks to connect the country; and a very youthful
and well-armed citizenry.
The existence of these conflict risk factors did not predetermine
the current crisis, however. Rather, it is the direct result of the
failure of President Salva Kiir and former Vice President Riek Machar
to avoid resorting to violence to settle political differences.
Ultimately, it is the absence of institutional alternatives in South
Sudan to conflict resolution through violence that makes a crisis on
this scale possible. While deep ethnic conflict fault lines exist and
violence has arisen along some of these lines--whether spontaneously,
tacitly, or explicitly at the behest of the embattled leadership
remains to be determined--the underlying political dispute is not
ethnically based or motivated. Nor is it the case that the entire
country has devolved into political or ethnic violence. Significant
areas of the country, in fact, remain peaceful, and government,
community, and church leaders in these areas are to be commended for
and should be urged to continue their efforts to stem the conflict's
spread.
In parts of the country where violence is threatening massive
numbers of civilians--in Juba and Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile States
most especially--it is on the leaders of both sides of the conflict to
immediately cease fighting. Irrespective of the grievances regarding
undemocratic practices and the usurpation of internal SPLM party
processes leveled at President Kiir and of the allegations of an
attempted coup leveled at Dr. Machar, recourse to violence resulting in
the bloodshed and humanitarian distress that has ensued since December
15 is unjustified and unacceptable. The longer the violence continues,
the harder it will be to stop given patterns of retribution among
communities in South Sudan.
2. Institutional development takes decades, and political
transitions are inherently messy.
In moments of crisis and catastrophe, there is a great temptation
to play the blame game--who is at fault, what could have been done
differently to prevent the current developments from coming to pass. In
this regard, many have already commented on the governance failures of
the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) since independence
and on the inadequacy of the response to those failures by the
international community, including the United States. While these
debates will continue, it is important to recognize that South Sudan
was not afforded self-determination based on its capacity for self-
rule; it won self-determination to liberate South Sudanese from
oppression and end decades of war. Because of South Sudan's particular
history, the process of state formation under way there is arguably
unique--it is not a situation of post-colonial independence or of
recovering earlier systems and traditions of self-government. It is an
exercise in building a new nation and state from the ground up.
Empirical evidence on state formation and institution-building tells us
that it takes decades for institutions of governance to develop and
that these institutions cannot simply be borrowed or imported from
elsewhere. South Sudanese must develop them for themselves. It is not
reasonable, therefore, to expect political institutions to develop and
take root in 2 years (or even 8, if one counts the 6-year interim
period) time.
Just as the institutions of accountability and governance are in
their earliest stages of development, the political leadership of South
Sudan is undergoing an arduous transition from liberation movement to
civilian government. Again, experience from democratic transitions
elsewhere is clear--in the short term, these transitions are
contentious processes as old orders of power and control are challenged
and replaced with new ones. No amount of external intervention or
influence can smooth out all the bumps of such a transition. So while
the messiness of South Sudan's transition is not a surprise--and is, in
fact, to be expected--the country is not doomed to years of instability
and conflict; progress can be made during the transitional period given
responsible leadership.
It is reasonable to expect the young government to demonstrate
efforts toward instituting principles of fairness, transparency,
inclusiveness, and respect for basic human rights, and for the
country's international partners to support and reinforce these
principles. Sadly, the government's record of the past 2.5 years since
independence is the opposite: one of deliberate undermining and erosion
of nascent mechanisms of accountability between state and society by
those who hold power. This is the root of the current crisis and the
fundamental issue that must be addressed once the fighting ends.
3. The United States has unparalleled influence in South Sudan and
therefore a responsibility to intervene diplomatically.
When the political transition becomes violent, a moral imperative
to help facilitate a return to nonviolent political processes becomes
paramount. In this regard, the United States is uniquely positioned to
intervene diplomatically to help end the violence and prevent an even
worse catastrophe. Having initiated and championed the peace process
that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and ultimately the
independence of South Sudan, as well as invested billions of dollars in
humanitarian, development, and security assistance to support these
ends, the United States has deep relationships with the protagonists, a
reservoir of good will among South Sudanese, an unparalleled degree of
influence, and the responsibility to use that influence to broker a
return to nonviolent political competition. This is not a time for
incremental approaches or sequencing of efforts. While the regional
IGAD and AU processes to mediate between the parties are to be
supported, the United States must continue to deploy the full weight of
its diplomatic capabilities on the parties directly and through the
U.N. Security Council. The tireless efforts of Ambassador Susan Page
and Special Envoy Don Booth to respond to the crisis must continue to
be supported by the highest levels of the Obama administration,
including continued direct interventions by Secretary of State John
Kerry and National Security Adviser Susan Rice, both of whom have
important personal relationships with the protagonists.
immediate priorities
President Kiir and Dr. Machar both must match their words with
actions without any further delay, excuses, or stalling. The United
States and the international community should move to impose penalties
on both sides if the following actions are not immediately forthcoming:
1. End the fighting
Utmost pressure must be brought to bear on both parties to end the
violence immediately. Specifically, the United States and other
international partners must foreclose a military option for either
side. The United States and the U.N. Security Council should explicitly
discourage regional actors from directly or indirectly participating in
the conflict, including prohibiting the transfer or sale of arms and
weaponry that could further fuel it. Inviting Ugandan or other regional
forces to intervene will only escalate and prolong the conflict as well
as compromise the ability of IGAD to mediate between the parties
(especially President Museveni, who could play a valuable role in this
regard). If the Government of the Republic of South Sudan needs
assistance to secure the capital, Juba, it could request the U.N.
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) take control of the
city's security. The U.N. Security Council should then ensure that
UNMISS has the capacity to do so while holding it accountable for fully
exercising its Chapter VII mandate throughout the country. Regardless,
the RSS must accept the immediate deployment of additional UNMISS
forces without further delay.
2. Release the 11 political detainees to the ICRC
The RSS should immediately release to the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) the 11 political detainees arrested following
the outbreak of fighting in Juba. These 11 individuals are senior
members of the SPLM, many of them were key to the negotiations that led
to South Sudan's independence, and they have clearly been targeted on
the basis of their public dissent over SPLM party deliberations. Their
participation in talks on a political arrangement going forward is
vital to bridging the divide between President Kiir and Dr. Machar. As
well, their release would signal the government's renewed commitment to
a genuine political process to manage the country's forthcoming
leadership transition.
3. Allow full and unimpeded access for humanitarian response
It is of utmost importance that the protagonists compel their
forces to respect the delivery of humanitarian aid on the principles of
impartiality and neutrality, including providing humanitarian actors
full, unimpeded access to all those in need--not just in the protected
enclaves of UNMISS bases and compounds and most especially to civilians
caught in active conflict zones such as in the cities of Bor and
Bentiu. Establishing additional ``humanitarian safe zones'' would, in
my view, be problematic and inadvisable. They would be practically
infeasible to establish and defend; they would divert attention from
the majority of the displaced and conflict-affected population who are
not in or able to make it to these designated areas; their creation
would risk encouraging greater population displacement and dependency;
and they would cede the logic of a protracted crisis to the
protagonists.
The United Nations has moved swiftly and expertly to respond to the
tremendous civilian protection and humanitarian needs ensuing from the
outbreak of fighting. U.N. Deputy Special Representative Toby Lanzer
and the entire U.N., international, and NGO community still present in
South Sudan--particularly South Sudanese staff and organizations--are
to be commended for their heroic work thus far to meet the escalating
needs, often at great personal risk. The United States should continue
to support these efforts to its utmost ability. I also commend the
United States swift establishment of a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) in Nairobi and the provision of $49.8 million in additional
humanitarian funding to address the grave and growing humanitarian
needs. Going forward, the U.S. Government's ability to respond more
effectively will be significantly handicapped without the presence of
Americans who have deep knowledge and history of such operations in
South Sudan. Understanding the risks involved, U.S. Government (USG)
humanitarian staff should be allowed (and American implementing
partners should be encouraged) to return to South Sudan as quickly as
possible to better support these efforts.
4. Accept a U.N. Commission of Inquiry to document human rights abuses
The efforts of UNMISS and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights should be augmented by the establishment of a formal U.N.
Commission of Inquiry to investigate and document allegations of
atrocities and human rights abuses. The United States and the
international community should demand full access and cooperation with
members of the commission and other international human rights monitors
as a signal to the people of South Sudan of commitment to stopping
atrocities and holding perpetrators of crimes against civilians
accountable.
To reinforce these four priorities, the administration should
prepare to invoke the President's authorities in the International
Economic Powers Act and National Emergencies Act to institute travel
bans and asset freezes on senior leadership on both sides. In addition,
the United States should prepare to table a resolution at the U.N.
Security Council establishing a sanctions regime that would further
demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to holding the
protagonists accountable. They must clearly understand that the only
way to forestall such measures would be an immediate release of the 11
political detainees to the ICRC and simultaneous enactment of a cease-
fire to be monitored by UNMISS. Ongoing cooperation with humanitarian
response efforts and human rights monitoring should also be made
requisite for remaining ``off the list.''
stabilization priorities after an interim political settlement
While empirical evidence tells us that escaping cycles of violence
is hard--one of the greatest predictors of future violence is a history
of past violence--it can be done. The World Bank's 2011 World
Development Report captures the experiences of countries that have
successfully exited from cycles of violence and provides a framework
for prioritizing state-building and reconstruction efforts in South
Sudan--if and when the immediate fighting ends and an interim political
settlement is reached. It finds:
To break cycles of insecurity and reduce the risk of their
recurrence, national reformers and their international partners
need to build the legitimate institutions that can provide a
sustained level of citizen security, justice, and jobs--
offering a stake in society to groups that may otherwise
receive more respect and recognition from engaging in armed
violence than in lawful activities, and punishing infractions
capably and fairly. (8)
Such institutional transformation, however, takes time--a best-case
scenario is within a generation--and requires first a restoration of
confidence and trust in government and across communities. For South
Sudan, therefore, it will be imperative to address the underlying
issues of political accountability of the executive branch and ruling
political party that precipitated the outbreak of fighting and to
repair the damage to state-society relations and intercommunal social
cohesion that the fighting has caused.
For this to happen, the current political leadership faces a
critical choice: to use the crisis to recommit itself to developing
inclusive, accountable institutions by ceasing actions that perpetuate
the dominance of the executive branch and the current executive, or to
continue to alienate society from the state through the pursuit of what
appears increasingly to be cults of indispensability. Neither Salva
Kiir nor Riek Machar is indispensable to a stable, peaceful, democratic
South Sudan, but either one can doom it to decades more death and
destruction. Courageous leadership is required to rise above personal
ambitions and animosities to embrace accountability mechanisms\1\ and
transparent political processes that can generate renewed confidence in
the state.
Political leadership that is serious about restoring confidence in
the state and ending cycles of violence would dedicate itself to three
critical tasks: building inclusive-enough coalitions to support key
institutional reforms, expanding space for independent voices so as to
enable a national dialogue, and realizing tangible successes to
demonstrate the state's responsiveness to citizen expectations,
particularly with respect to drafting a permanent constitution,
fostering national and local reconciliation, and conducting fair and
peaceful elections. I have written more extensively about what these
tasks would entail in ``Fragility and State-Society Relations in South
Sudan,'' a research paper available from the Africa Center for
Strategic Studies.\2\ A summary of the key points follows.
Inclusive-Enough Coalitions
The state needs to make a more concerted and genuine effort to
build collaborative partnerships beyond the class of elites who have
dominated South Sudan's political arena thus far. The partnership-
building process must also transcend societal fault lines and engage
youth. By partnering with trusted institutions in society such as
churches and nongovernmental and civil society organizations,
identifying mutually beneficial priorities and complementary strengths,
such a strategy would improve the government's engagements with local
communities. Greater engagement with societal actors by the government
would simultaneously diminish the justification for violence by
communities that feel they have been excluded from the political
process. Whether it involves matters of security, political processes,
development needs, or other issues, the practice of building inclusive
coalitions would make initiatives and reforms more viable, sustainable,
and effective while fostering trust for future state-building efforts.
Expanding Space for Independent Voices
Access to independent information is indispensable to establishing
accountability mechanisms on which a stable, democratic, developmental
state depends. Beyond actively cultivating coalitions and inclusivity,
the state must protect space for citizens and communities to express
themselves if the processes of a state-society dialogue are to gain
traction. Drawing on the experience of other democratic transitions, a
massive civic education and public outreach campaign is required to
sensitize the population to key democratic values and principles, such
as:
The responsibility of all citizens to participate in
political and policy debates so that citizen preferences can be
heard;
Tolerance for opposing points of view;
Freedom of speech, media, and assembly;
Equality before the law;
The inalienability of rights for minority groups and
parties;
Protection of private property rights.
In addition to state actors, this effort should enlist the
participation of religious leaders, traditional authorities, civil
society, the media, opposition political parties, and international
partners. These groups have the trust of various constituencies in
society and, collectively, can reach the largest percentage of citizens
possible.
Rather than trying to monopolize state-society relations, the RSS
and the SPLM should recognize independent civil society actors as
representing authentic perspectives of citizens that can contribute to
a stronger and more stable South Sudan. Harassing, intimidating, or
otherwise inhibiting these voices sends exactly the opposite message--
that the state does not want a genuine discussion with its citizens and
intends to continue to dominate access to power and wealth. The outcome
of such an approach is perpetual resistance and instability.
Media bills to protect freedom of speech should be passed and
signed into law. Security services should be prohibited from
persecuting the media, civil society, and international human rights
monitors. Credible, independent investigations into all cases of
intimidation and violence against journalists, human rights activists,
and civil society leaders should be conducted and the results made
public. The perpetrators should be tried publicly under due process of
law. These are all immediate, consequential, and concrete signals that
the government could send of its serious intent to become a government
responsive to its citizens.
Since the challenge of building a national consciousness is as much
a cultural exercise as it is a political one, efforts to foster a new
South Sudanese identity should complement reforms to protect and expand
political and civil rights. South Sudan's heterogeneity provides deep
reservoirs of culture that, if appreciated and respected for their
diversity, can foster a new national identity.
Tangible Gains Responding to Citizen Priorities
Achieving modest improvements on key popular priorities is a
tangible demonstration that the government has the interests of
citizens at heart. Beyond the outcomes generated is the process
adopted, for this signals how committed a government is to citizen
participation and input--and ultimately accountability. Four strategic
priorities integral to the state-building process provide focal points
for generating confidence in the state so that vital institutional
reforms in security, justice, and jobs can proceed.
1. National Constitutional Review. The current transitional
constitution gives extraordinary powers to the President with almost no
checks afforded to other branches of government. The President cannot
be impeached. He can dismiss the national and state assemblies and
remove the Vice President and State Governors from office, as well as
any justice or judge. A national constitutional review process was to
have been completed by January 2013, leading to a final, permanent
constitution soon thereafter. The review process is considerably behind
schedule, so much so that the transitional constitution had to be
amended to extend the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC)
mandate for an additional 2 years to December 2014. Even before the
outbreak of fighting, this raised serious questions about the adoption
of a new permanent constitution before the current terms of the
President and national assembly expire in July 2015.
The national constitutional review process is an opportunity to
educate citizens about what a constitution is and solicit views about
what kind of checks and balances the people of South Sudan want on
their government. Instead, the path provided for in the transitional
constitution--a permanent constitution drafted by the NCRC, reviewed by
an appointed National Constitutional Conference, and then passed by the
National Legislative Assembly for adoption--seems set to replicate the
ruling party's vision for how it should govern the country. It also
leaves the product forever open to serious challenges to its
legitimacy.
In light of the current crisis, the timeline for adopting a new
permanent constitution and conducting national elections will need to
be revised further. This affords the opportunity to make this process
more inclusive, participatory, and transparent. In addition to
institutionalizing more consultative engagement with civil society and
communities, the draft constitution should be put to a popular
referendum to demonstrate societal commitment to this political course
while significantly boosting the legitimacy of the new state. An open
and legitimate constitutional review process represents the most
significant opportunity to lay an enduring foundation for national
unity. A closed and exclusive process, however, will result in extended
political grievances and perceptions of injustice. It will also
seriously call into question the state leadership's commitment to
democracy.
The independence referendum of 2011 was perhaps the most unifying
and participatory experience in South Sudan--a compelling demonstration
of the capacity and will of the people of South Sudan for political
participation. They should be afforded the opportunity to recapture and
reinvigorate this citizen participation in governance through a
constitutional referendum.
2. National Reconciliation. Although not mandated in the CPA or the
transitional constitution, the RSS announced in early 2013 an
initiative for a national reconciliation process in recognition of the
country's long history of intercommunal fighting and grievances. The
further deterioration of intercommunal relations and new grievances
spawned by the current outbreak of fighting renders this initiative of
utmost importance.
Delayed by early disagreements over the reconciliation committee's
mandate and membership, a new Committee for National Healing, Peace and
Reconciliation led by church leaders was established in April 2013.
Archbishop Daniel Deng of the Episcopal Church of South Sudan chairs
the process supported by Archbishop Emeritus Paride Taban of the
Catholic Church. As representatives of the most trusted institutions in
South Sudanese society, church leaders now have a significant
opportunity to lead the country in a process of national healing.
Church leaders should be asked to witness the current negotiations as
representatives of civil society and they should insist on the
inclusion of an integrated process of truth-telling, justice, and
reconciliation in any negotiated agreement.\3\
An integrated process of national reconciliation, truth-telling,
and justice holds the potential to help drive progress toward citizen
security and justice, two critical sectors highlighted by the 2011
World Development Report. The stakes are high, however, since a poorly
managed process will provide further justification for violence to
``address'' grievances, while delegitimizing future initiatives to
address intercommunal differences. Extensive public consultation and
communication on why a process is necessary, how it should proceed, and
what role state and nonstate actors will play will be critical to the
success of the initiative. It is imperative that the process be
apolitical and managed by independent and trusted nongovernmental
institutions given the roles of many of the senior RSS leaders not just
in the current crisis but in the long history of south-south violence.
Ensuring every community has an opportunity to air its grievances will
be vital to the credibility of the process. The difficult question of
whether and what forms of justice will be administered in response to
the findings of the reconciliation dialogue comprises another
significant challenge for the committee, political leadership, and
society at large.
Beyond the formal process for national reconciliation, promoting a
culture of tolerance among youth and community leaders should be
priorities. Numerous grassroots and civil society initiatives have
attempted to do this during and since the war. However, some have
neglected to include youth actors most central to perpetuating specific
conflict dynamics, such as with the Murle and Lou Nuer youth in Jonglei
state. Unless and until initiatives include stakeholders connected to
these actors and familiar with their motives and interests, success in
reversing the increasing reliance on violence is unlikely.
3. National Elections. An equitable and transparent electoral
process represents an inimitable opportunity to rebuild confidence and
foster citizen participation and the legitimization of a governance
agenda and will be critical to preventing further instability and
violence in South Sudan. The next round of national, state, and local
elections should follow a healing period during which agreement on the
rules of the game is decided through the constitutional review process
and political party reform.
Specifically, how national elections and internal SPLM candidacy
issues are handled going forward will determine whether these contests
will continue to be seen as winner-take-all competitions that heighten
the likelihood of violence. As is currently being demonstrated, how
candidates for office are selected and whether the losers in the SPLM
chairmanship contest and the Presidential election accept the results
peacefully will impact profoundly on the state's quest for legitimacy
and viability. A key consideration in the lead up to elections for both
the SPLM and the RSS will be to guarantee protections and space for the
losers in the political process after the elections. A related
consideration will be to ensure space for other political parties to
develop and compete in electoral contests.
Elections should not proceed without first restoring some
confidence in the country's political processes, namely through a
credible and participatory process to draft and adopt a new permanent
constitution, through the adoption of internal SPLM party reforms to
restore democratic procedures and transparent vetting and selection of
candidates for office, and through the provision of space for other
political parties to organize and develop their capacities. Progress on
national reconciliation and healing should also precede elections.
4. Connecting the Country through Roads and Radio. These critical
processes----national constitutional review, national reconciliation,
and preparations for national, state, and local elections--and all
other efforts to repair state-society relations all require the free
and regular flow of information to citizens in even the most remote
parts of the country. South Sudan's sheer lack of physical
infrastructure to enable the movement of people, goods, and services
across the vast country, including during rainy seasons, will continue
to be a severe obstacle to every political, security, economic, and
development objective.\4\ Upon the start of the CPA interim period in
July 2005, SPLM founder Dr. John Garang told Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick that his priorities were ``roads, roads, and roads.''
While some effort has been made to build the country's communications
and transportation networks since 2005, roads and radio coverage must
be extended to every region of South Sudan as quickly as possible. So
long as communities remain cut off from each other and from the
government--physically and through the exchange of information--
insecurity and political exclusion will persist.
As the current crisis so vividly illustrates, the foundation of the
state cannot be an afterthought. Generating renewed confidence in
state-society relations through these critical tasks and forthcoming
opportunities will provide the social capital needed to build the
institutions most central to preventing a recurrence of the current
crisis: citizen security, justice, and jobs.
the role for donors
The United States is the largest bilateral donor to South Sudan,
and it should remain so. At independence in 2011, the United States
pledged to continue to stand by the people of South Sudan. The United
States should remain resolute in this commitment and not balk in the
face of recent developments, however severe they may be. Diplomatic
actions should focus on influencing the choices of the political
leadership, including, if necessary, targeted sanctions on travel and
asset freezes and other punitive actions in the face of ongoing
recalcitrance to end the fighting and reach an interim political
settlement.
While the size of the United States development program affords
significant leverage with the government and leadership, it should be
used in coordination with other donors to incentivize a return to
nonviolent political processes and renewed commitment to meeting the
needs of its citizens. Short of the current government being unseated
militarily, the United States should not cut off development assistance
to South Sudan--doing so will only further harm the people of South
Sudan. Needless to say, Dr. Machar should be under no illusions of
international donor support or legitimacy if he persists in his pursuit
of power militarily.
USAID and other donor partners should nevertheless reexamine their
aid programs and delivery modalities in light of the unfolding
situation; so long as fighting ensues and the need persists, priority
must be given to expediting life-saving humanitarian aid. At the same
time, however, development activities in parts of the country that
remain peaceful should continue--an abrupt stop to the delivery of
services and an interruption in political processes that these
activities support will only worsen the national crisis, not alleviate
it. Greater use of local systems for delivery of services should be
explored in stable areas. A key objective should be to prevent a total
return to a parallel system of delivering basic services, such as
health, through international humanitarian agencies.
In preparation for an end to the fighting and an interim political
settlement, USAID and other donors should reexamine their development
programs and strategies against the framework for ending violence and
promoting state-building provided in the 2011 World Development Report.
There cannot be a return to the same development plans that preceded
the crisis. Specifically, donors should seek to support South Sudanese-
led efforts to restore state-society relations through the critical
tasks identified in the previous section. Giving priority to supporting
these confidence-building measures, particularly the political
processes needed to restore trust and accountability and the physical
infrastructure needed to connect the country, is of utmost importance.
This should entail thoughtful support to civil society and other
nonstate sources of accountability and legitimacy, though with caution
not to overwhelm them nor draw the further ire of the state to clamp
down on them.
Focusing state-building and development efforts on the institutions
of security, justice, and economic livelihoods is the next order of
priorities. Each of these sectors will require serious reexamination to
recalibrate assistance to account for the further challenges wrought by
the present crisis. Supporting efforts to build a professional,
integrated national army, for instance, and to provide judicial
recourse for violent crimes at grassroots as well as national levels,
will be particularly important. So, too, will extending the economic
benefits of South Sudan's huge natural resource base to the entire
population, not just an elite few. A related challenge will be tying
the government's revenue base to its citizenry through taxation rather
than oil rents or donor assistance.
Throughout, it will be important to recognize that aid cannot
substitute for nor drive the political processes or institutional
reforms needed to end violence and bring democracy and development to
South Sudan. It can support them technically, but they are not for
external actors to design, negotiate, or implement. The issues are
political, not technical ones of expertise, capacity, or resources,
which are secondary challenges. So long as basic human rights are being
respected, South Sudanese must be allowed to identify their problems
and try out solutions that work best in the South Sudanese context. At
the same time, neither should donor support be a blank check. It is
reasonable to expect to see evidence of commitment to principles of
accountability and efforts to enshrine institutional legitimacy, not
cults of indispensability.
USAID missions are predicated on cooperative development
partnerships with host governments as legitimate representatives of
their people. The recent actions of the political leadership in South
Sudan on both sides of the conflict in precipitating and perpetuating
the use of violence raise grave doubts as to the legitimacy of the
political elite in representing the people of South Sudan. Unless clear
actions are taken to uphold principles of accountable, transparent,
inclusive, and responsive governance, then even more fundamental
changes to the structure and objectives of the aid program to support
restoration of these principles will be needed. In this scenario,
development assistance should be focused entirely on supporting
subnational government, civil society, and the political processes that
could restore accountable and responsive governance at the national
level. Ultimately aid is a commitment to the people of South Sudan, not
the current regime.
On a practical note, an effective aid program requires nuanced
contextual knowledge that can only come from presence and
relationships. This is rendered even more difficult with the drawdown
of USG and implementing partner staff. Even when security permits a
return to Juba, USAID and the State Department will both continue to be
handicapped with constant staff rotations due to short, 1-year tour
cycles. If these security constraints cannot be overcome and tour
lengths extended, then expectations for what the USG can accomplish
diplomatically or through its economic assistance must be significantly
moderated.
conclusion
Most immediately, the fighting must end, political detainees must
be released, humanitarian aid must reach all needy populations, and
human rights abuses must be accounted for. The United States and the
international community should deploy all diplomatic measures available
to them to impress these priorities upon President Kiir and Dr. Machar,
both of whom are culpable for the devastation and suffering wrought by
the past 3 weeks of fighting.
Going forward, South Sudan's leadership can set a new course toward
legitimacy, stability, and sustained development if it prioritizes
above all else building trust, accountability, and social cohesion with
and across the South Sudanese citizenry. There is no more essential
state-building task than this.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ State-based accountability mechanisms include: constitutions,
elections, legislatures, courts, political parties, subnational
government, a merit-based civil service, and a professional security
sector, among others. Society-based accountability mechanisms include:
independent media and access to information, civil society, social
capital, and external norms and standards. The development of any
particular mechanism is less important than the density, or layering,
of accountability mechanisms across the state and society.
\2\ http://africacenter.org/2013/09/fragility-and-state-society-
relations-in-south-sudan/.
\3\ See http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/08/an-integrated-
response-to-justice-and-reconciliation-in-south-sudan-by-david-deng-
and-elizabeth-deng/.
\4\ In a territory approximately the size of Afghanistan, there is
only one paved highway running roughly 120 miles from Juba to the
Ugandan border, constructed by USAID. Huge swathes of the country
remain inaccessible by road during rainy seasons, including many of the
most conflict-prone regions of the country.
The Chairman. Well, thank you all for your testimony. Some
very important insights.
Let me ask you, Ambassador Lyman. You referred to Machar
and other SPLM leaders and their grievances. Was there popular
support for those views, the views that they were espousing,
among South Sudanese?
Ambassador Lyman. I doubt it. Those were kind of inside,
what we would call here inside-the-Beltway kind of arguments,
over authorities and power, et cetera. One area that was
getting quite a bit of popular attention was the harassment of
human rights workers, of journalists, et cetera. That was
raising a great deal of concern inside South Sudan.
The challenge from Riek Machar did, of course, reverberate
through because of the history. I think people recognized that
that challenge was going to be a major one to be managed by the
government, as became more evident.
The Chairman. Now, the composition of the government
delegation is interesting to me, particularly since Nhial Deng
Nhial was once part of a faction that opposed John Garang and
Salva Kiir's vision for South Sudan. What might the composition
of the delegation mean in terms of the larger regional
dynamics?
Ambassador Lyman. You know, you have really three parties
here. You have President Kiir's supporters, you have Riek
Machar's supporters, and you have this group of detainees who
are not either. That is, they are looking for a broader party
role, a broader use of the party mechanisms and authorities.
To make them part of the negotiations in Addis means you
have to enlarge those negotiations to allow for views other
than just the two contending parties. But you need to do that
to give them a role, because there are two things that have to
happen. After a cease-fire, you have to have an understanding
as to what the government's going to look like for the next 2
years. That means that those people, now detained, and
President Kiir and people from Machar's side have to agree on
the structure of a government over the next 2 years.
Meanwhile, you have this, what I think a broad
constitutional process that delves into the longer term issues
of democracy, human rights, and governance. So this is a
complicated negotiation that has to take place, and it needs to
involve people who represent the several different points of
view, both from the ruling party and outside.
The Chairman. That observation brings me to Mr.
Prendergast. After the Security Council's approval of
additional peacekeeping troops for South Sudan last month, you
commented that the political and diplomatic elements of
international responses to most African conflicts have been
slow and ineffective, which has put more pressure on
peacekeeping missions than they have the wherewithal to fulfill
the objectives, for which they are totally unprepared.
Can you talk about this? I think you have somewhat, but I
would like you to go into greater depth on the context of the
current situation in South Sudan and why it is important for
the deployment of peacekeeping missions to be accompanied by
very rigorous diplomatic engagement from members of the
international community, particularly the United States.
Mr. Prendergast. Thank you, Senator. You look at the three
biggest missions today on the African Continent--South Sudan,
Darfur, and eastern Congo--the American taxpayer is on the hook
for almost 30 percent of well over $3 billion a year in
supporting peacekeeping missions there. But in all three of
those cases, you could argue that the commensurate, the
corresponding political investment, was not equal to the
investment in the deployment of military force.
In South Sudan, everyone has discussed that there was
probably not enough international efforts undertaken to try to
prevent the conflagration between--and I agree totally with my
two fellow panelists--this political dispute, which goes back
of course decades, between the two factions that are now
battling. The lack of an international engagement, a deep
engagement, a transparent engagement to try to prevent
conflict, I think is something we need to look at.
In Congo we did not have much of a political process for
years, until finally the United Nations appointed Mary Robinson
and the United States appointed Senator Feingold, one of the
former members of this committee, and now we are starting to
see the construction, A, of a credible, serious peace process
and, B, the deployment of real force that helps change the game
on the ground in eastern Congo.
In Darfur we have this endless peacekeeping mission, and
where we have made absolutely no progress in dealing with the
political roots, the political drivers of violence throughout
Sudan.
So I think that is where we really are missing. We have
invested quite a great deal. It is sort of the old military
adage: If all you have got is a hammer, everything looks like a
nail. We just keep throwing these peacekeeping forces into
these situations without investing in preventive diplomacy.
Now, Princeton was the special envoy for the United States
and when he was in office until March 2013 he was actively
engaging with the parties in South Sudan in helping to prevent
a deterioration. But there was a long gap between his, the end
of his term, and the beginning of the next one, and there is
not another country that is really engaged like we are in that
kind of preventive diplomacy. It gets no headlines. Nobody
cares that people are out there doing that stuff and you do not
get any credit if you actually prevent something. But that is
what we need to be investing in and that is what really did not
happen in South Sudan and it is not happening in Sudan, because
we just have not invested the resources in helping to build
that real serious political process and putting the emphasis,
the public international emphasis, on building a peace process
that will allow for the resolution of these horrible, deadly
conflicts.
The Chairman. I smiled when you said you do not get any
credit for preventing things. That is so true, but yet it is
probably the most successful element of anything that we do, is
preventing.
The final question, Ms. Knopf. You made an interesting
observation there toward the end that for us to be successful
in South Sudan you have to have parties that have a history,
have an understanding, have an engagement. So I would assume,
based upon that comment--maybe I am wrong--that, maybe, we do
not have all the parties that would bring us to the successful
conclusion.
Are there some missing parties or types of resources we
should be bringing that are not there right now?
Ms. Knopf. The critical issue at the moment is the drawdown
of the U.S. Embassy and USAID staff. Without having diplomats
on the ground resident there, talking to parties across all
sides of this crisis, and getting out beyond Juba and the
capital as well, that becomes very, very difficult just to do
shuttle diplomacy in Addis or by remote control, to deliver our
messages and to understand what is really happening there.
Secondly, for aid programs to be effective we also need
both development experts and the humanitarian professionals,
most especially at this moment in time, to be as close to the
situations that they are trying to ameliorate as possible, and
to be in constant contact with local partners, with the South
Sudanese who are at risk here and in need of the assistance,
and then daily and hourly coordination with the other elements
of the international humanitarian response.
Doing this offshore, from Nairobi at the moment, where the
disaster assistance response team is based, it takes us back
to, I do not even know, before 2002, 2001, in terms of how we
used to manage humanitarian response in southern Sudan. It is
woefully inadequate and it will impact our ability to be
effective in the long run.
We have deep, deep expertise, as Assistant Administrator
Lindborg said, in the U.S. Government and in the international
community, and with Americans and implementing partners, such
as NGOs and other international organizations, they need to be
there in order to respond.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Sorry I missed the testimony. I am told that
you talked a little about this being a division of ethnicity as
well, of course. That is often the case. What is the percentage
of the President's--well, the Dinka tribe constitutes what
percentage of the country?
Ambassador Lyman. I do not have that figure right in mind,
but it is the largest group, although there are a lot of
subgroups of the Dinka.
Senator Flake. Right.
Ambassador Lyman. And that too is a factor. The Nuer are
the second-largest group and that is the group that largely
supported, is supporting, Riek Machar. The Shilluk are the
third. But I do not have the percentages, I am sorry, but I can
get them for you.
Mr. Prendergast. We were just consulting; 30, 35 percent is
Dinka, and then the rest is, there are 65 tribes or ethnic
groups in South Sudan.
Senator Flake. Sixty-five.
I was there and questioned the other panel, but some of the
questions there--the U.N. peacekeeping forces that are there
now and others, how effective are they at preventing bloodshed,
or what can we do to help that group? Is it just a matter of
numbers or mission or what can we do at this point?
Ambassador Lyman. Well, let me comment on that and my
colleagues comment. But it is both of the things you have
mentioned. First of all, they do not have enough troops there,
and the action by the Security Council was important, but it is
very hard to get countries to contribute and find air support
and equipment. That just has to take a lot of intensive effort
by us and others to make sure they get there.
But second, it has to be made very clear that they are
going to be aggressively protecting civilians, which means that
those compounds will not be allowed to be breached and they are
prepared to defend them with weapons if that takes place. They
have to be aggressively patrolling.
Now, they have not played that role up until now. They have
not seen that as their mission. But I think that has to become
part of it, and they have to look ahead to how they will
monitor a cease-fire and how they will be out there
aggressively doing so and reporting violations to the Security
Council.
So these are things they have not been doing. It was not in
their original thought. They were largely a state-building
operation when they went to South Sudan, helping create
capacity, et cetera. Now they have got a new, desperately
important protection role and they need more people and they
need a very aggressive mandate.
Senator Flake. Any differences there or comments?
Mr. Prendergast. I totally agree. The 30-second footnote
is--and again, it is a wider phenomenon. We send peacekeeping
forces, missions, to do a laundry list of things and then when
the stuff hits the fan we want them to protect civilians. If
they are not prepared to do that, you have to organize, as you
know, and deploy, provision, and have the expertise to
undertake a civilian protection mission. These guys were not
ready for that, so now they have to get up to speed, and that
is going to take a while.
Senator Flake. Yes?
Ms. Knopf. I guess my two cents on this would be: UNMISS
has a chapter 7 mandate. They have what they need to be able to
go out and do these things, to defend and to patrol and to
monitor cease-fires. But the world turned upside down in just
under 4 weeks in South Sudan. This is not what they were
initially there to do. While the potential for conflict of
course has been there and is not a surprise, the fact that it
has fallen apart just so quickly and so dramatically, it takes
a moment, I think, for everybody to adjust and to understand
and retool for the new challenges and the new realities.
So I do not think UNMISS--there is lots that one can say
about UNMISS's performance heretofore, but they were there to
do a state-building mission. Now they have to do a very
different mission and that does take some shifting.
Senator Flake. So they have got the mandate; it is a
numbers issue for the most part.
Ambassador Lyman. The irony is that South Sudan opposed the
chapter 7 mandate when UNMISS was created. They said: We do not
have any internal security problems. Fortunately, the Security
Council saw otherwise.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
With regard to U.S. assistance, whether state-building or
humanitarian, does that represent leverage that is effective at
all? Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield seemed to think not. With the
restrictions that we have here in Congress in terms of aid and
assistance after a coup, does that represent leverage that we
can use? Is it effective at all, or just on the margins or not
at all?
Ambassador Lyman. I think it was a very important statement
by the United States that we would not recognize a military
takeover. President Kiir, for all his faults, is the
democratically elected President, and you have to build on
that. And just saying anybody can come in and take over is
going to undermine a lot of things.
So I think it was important. Whether the aid levels matter
to people like Riek Machar, it is hard to say. I think
Assistant Secretary Greenfield suggested that probably in
itself is not. But international recognition is important
support. So I think making that statement is important.
But then the burden falls on President Kiir to play his
role much more effectively. Here is another irony. President
Kiir was proud of the fact and admired for the fact that he was
the one that created the unity of all these different groups in
the runup to independence. He brought in all these factions, et
cetera. He created a broad-based government. He invited Riek
Machar to be Vice President. It was one of his accomplishments.
It was one of the reasons he was so supported.
Unfortunately, he has moved in a different direction. He
sees all his critics as enemies. He is relying on intelligence
people and harassers, et cetera. It is unfortunate because his
original contribution is being lost.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Ms. Knopf. If I can just add, my personal knowledge of the
two main parties here is the threat to cut off our assistance,
our development assistance, is not what is going to motivate
them to come to the table and get the cease-fire done and
arrive at an interim political settlement. It will hurt the
people of South Sudan.
I made the point that we have been providing development
assistance continuously since 1998. We know how to do it in the
midst of conflict. We know how--we have many modalities for how
to provide assistance, either with the cooperation of the
government or working through other avenues, local and
international partners and subnational levels of government.
There are stable areas of the country. We should not stop
development assistance in the stable areas of the country. It
is very important to help keep the conflict from spreading and
to not lose the gains that we have already made in that regard.
As well, U.S. assistance has been vital underpinning the
economy with the Central Bank of South Sudan and a number of
other key financial institutions. Picking up the pieces
economically when this is all done will be much, much harder if
we pull that support out now. So I do think that it is
important and imperative that development assistance continue,
that the modalities be examined, that the strategies be updated
as the situation changes, but that we keep the commitment to
the people of South Sudan and not harm them further.
Senator Flake. Thanks.
Mr. Prendergast. One last point. Building leverage is
critical. That is what we have got to be looking for all the
time. The aid does not--I think I agree, the aid does not make
a big difference to these guys. But it does make a big
difference to the people of South Sudan and to the building of
institutions in the long run. Pulling that away now would
really undermine the long-term stability of the place.
Our leverage I think should focus on individual
culpability--the targeted sanctions, prosecution of people who
are found to have committed, committing or planning atrocities
and patterns of atrocities. The additional leverage comes if we
work much more closely and transparently and publicly with
China in figuring out ways to collectively pressure, working
with the region and with other countries that have any kind of
influence, collectively pressure the parties when there are
key-point moments in the negotiations that there needs to be a
push.
Again, I just view a very high-level White House to State
House in Beijing engagement on South Sudan and, of course, on
Sudan to be a critical thing to do right now in order to show
that united front internationally to the parties, that we are
really going to be pushing for peace and those that undermine
peace are going to have some kind of particular sanction.
Senator Flake. Is it your assessment that China is willing
to step up to the plate in that regard?
Mr. Prendergast. Not as publicly as us. But I think
definitely their interests are actually much deeper in terms of
national security than ours are, and so let us figure out--and
I think that the good news is that our interests in terms of
what the end game is line up very clearly with China. So let us
take advantage of that moment--it does not happen often
globally--and figure out how we can more deeply work with them.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
One last question on that issue that Mr. Prendergast
mentioned about looking for leverage and targeted sanctions of
those who commit human rights violations. Since you have been
intimately involved until very recently in these efforts and
negotiations, what do you view--do you view that as a good,
among others, a good leverage point?
Ambassador Lyman. I think it is going to be extremely
important in another way. I think personally that in a process
over the next 2 years of writing a new constitution and laying
a new foundation, that that creates the basis for eliminating
from future power a lot of people who are responsible. So
whether it is in the process of prosecution or some other kind
of commission, a lot of people who are very guilty of the kind
of terrible violations should not be part of a new government
after 2015. I think that is one of the outcomes that we should
see.
The Chairman. Well, with the thanks of the committee for
your invaluable testimony, I expect that the Africa
Subcommittee as well as the full committee will lend continuing
attention to the challenges in South Sudan. Leaders on all
sides need to recognize that reality versus not a singular
hearing at a singular moment. The attention of the committee
will be focused on them continuously.
The record will be open until the close of business
tomorrow. With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator From California
Mr. Chairman and Senator Corker--thank you for holding this
important hearing.
Like my colleagues, I am deeply concerned about the violence that
has spread across South Sudan over the last few weeks and what it means
for the future of the world's newest country.
Three years ago, the people of South Sudan voted overwhelmingly to
secede from Sudan and become an independent nation. This historic vote
ended decades of civil war and brought hope for a bright and peaceful
future for South Sudan.
Tragically, violence in South Sudan now threatens to tear apart
this new nation. Over the past month, at least 1,000 people have died
and more than 200,000 have been forced to flee their homes.
The humanitarian situation grows more serious with each passing
day.
I am especially concerned about the disproportionate impact of this
conflict on the women and children of South Sudan.
According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the
majority of those who have been displaced are women and children.
UNICEF also estimates that hundreds of children have been separated
from their families and are surviving on their own. These children are
particularly vulnerable to malnutrition and disease.
Women and girls are also at risk of sexual and gender-based
violence in the camps for refugees and displaced persons. According to
Wendy Taeuber, the head of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in
South Sudan, ``There's no safe space for women in the camps.''
The United States and the international community must continue
efforts to support women and children who have been affected by the
ongoing violence--particularly those who have been victims of gender-
based violence.
We must also support those in South Sudan who have demanded that
women play a significant and meaningful role in the peace process.
The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and
Security states that, ``Evidence from around the world and across
cultures shows that integrating women and gender considerations into
peace-building processes helps promote democratic governance and long-
term stability.'' I could not agree more.
Three years ago, the people of South Sudan voted to start a new
chapter in their history--a chapter of peace, not violence. I want to
echo comments made by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Linda Thomas-Greenfield in her written testimony, ``Stopping the
violence, and ensuring that Africa's newest nation continues to move
forward rather than backward, is of highest priority to the United
States and the international community.''
Thank you.
______
Responses of Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question. In the past, peace talks and arrangements focused mostly
on Southern Sudanese self-determination and North-South violence and
did not effectively address some of the most important questions about
governance inside South Sudan. Many observers warn that again failing
to address critical governance questions would simply paper over the
cracks and invite future conflict.
Will the peace talks in Addis Ababa (or successor talks)
address changes to governance structures?
What institutional shortcomings and governance failures
must be addressed for the long-term viability of South Sudan?
Can these shortcoming and failures be addressed with the
current South Sudanese leadership?
What outside parties would be essential to making such
long-term agreement viable, and what kind of assurances or
guarantees would be required?
Answer. Our position from a very early point in the crisis has been
that this is a political crisis requiring a political solution. The
U.S. Special Envoy has been in the region since mid-December working
with the parties and with our regional partners. Political aspects of
the crisis have been a key focus of his engagement, including working
tirelessly to facilitate the release and participation of the political
detainees. Participation of the political detainees provides for an
opportunity to start a more inclusive dialogue, which should also
include a dynamic and comprehensive reconciliation process as well.
The current crisis has laid bare more than just a struggle within
the ruling party: it has exposed a centralization of power, weak
institutions and the exclusion of much of the population from access to
democratic governance and the peace dividends envisioned in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). These shortcomings were not a new
revelation, but they have taken on a new urgency. Addressing these
issues will require an inclusive process that goes beyond existing
systems for constitutional review and national reconciliation. We will
continue to work closely with the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) and other partners to encourage a national dialogue
process that includes a broad spectrum of South Sudanese society
including opposition parties, civil society, women and youth that goes
beyond accommodating the fissures among the elite, and seeks to address
these deeper issues.
In the immediate term, protection of civilians remains critical,
and we have sought to strengthen UNMISS in numbers and capability. Full
deployment of additional forces will take time, but we hope that it
will contribute, along with the implementation of the January 23rd
cessation of hostilities agreement, to improved security that can
provide some space for the political process. Furthermore, a critical
part of the UNMISS mandate is to facilitate and support
accountability--a key aspect that we feel must be a core undertaking
when South Sudan begins the process of moving beyond this crisis.
Additionally, we firmly believe that the process must address the
needs of the South Sudanese people. As many have noted, South Sudan's
infrastructure remains critically weak and prevents the country from
harnessing its vast resources. Together, lack of infrastructure and
human capacity have combined with the lack of commitment by the state
to provide basic services.
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which led
negotiations for the cessation of hostilities, remains the primary
forum for negotiations for a larger political resolution.
Question. How have the events in South Sudan and CAR affected the
counter-LRA efforts, to include any redeployment or curtailment of
efforts/forces of U.S. and Ugandan personnel? Does Uganda remain fully
committed to the counter-LRA mission? How has the African Union
increased its role in the counter-LRA mission, if at all?
Answer. Despite recent events in South Sudan and the Central
African Republic (CAR), the African Union Regional Task Force (AU-RTF)
continues to conduct operations and pursue the remaining LRA leaders.
We believe that the LRA is facing significant internal pressure as a
result of the AU-RTF's operations. In December 2013, 19 individuals,
including 9 Ugandan fighters, defected from the LRA in the CAR--the
largest single defection in several years. In the first weeks of
January 2014, Ugandan and Congolese contingents of the AU-RTF conducted
targeted operations to disrupt LRA camps and promote defections. U.S.
military advisors continue to work with the AU-RTF to enhance these
operations.
At this time, Uganda remains committed to the counter-LRA mission
and Ugandan forces continue to conduct counter-LRA operations in the
CAR. However, it is possible that if the situation in South Sudan
worsens, Uganda may shift some of its resources. South Sudan has
recalled most of its battalion assigned to the AU-RTF, as one of the
effects of broader divisions within the Sudan People's Liberation Army
and the ongoing conflict. South Sudan retains a small contingent in
Nzara, South Sudan, which continues to work with the AU-RTF. We remain
concerned that these crises--if they remain unresolved--could create
new difficulties for the counter-LRA effort and slow, or potentially
reverse, the momentum that has been achieved over the past several
months. Furthermore, as we have seen in the past, the LRA may seek to
use the instability to evade military pressure and regroup.
We continue to assess the regional situation and consult with the
Ugandans about their commitments. We also continue to work closely with
the African Union (AU). Over recent months, the AU has played an
increasingly important role in strengthening the AU-RTF--both
diplomatically and operationally. The AU Special Envoy for the LRA
Issue Francisco Madeira has worked with the CAR and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) authorities to solidify their commitment to
the AU-RTF and expand the AU-RTF's access. On the ground, the AU-RTF
Commander has played an increasing role in directing the training and
operational planning of the different AU-RTF contingents, improving
coordination and information-sharing. As a direct result of these
efforts, the number and geographic reach of counter-LRA operations
expanded significantly in the second half of 2013.
Question. Witnesses seemed to be in broad agreement that the poor
decisionmaking and self-interest of leaders in South Sudan has brought
the country to the brink of civil war. The second panel of witnesses
indicated that our assistance to South Sudan would provide little or no
leverage to compel those leaders to change course.
What leverage do we have? Would the administration be
willing to identify and use individually targeted sanctions--
such as asset freeze and travel bans on individuals--to compel
changes in South Sudan?
Answer. The administration is closely examining all options for
applying pressure to individuals who are prolonging this conflict as
well as any potential spoilers to a future peace process. We are
calling on the parties to implement the cessation of hostilities
agreement and to provide greater humanitarian access. We are working
closely with our close allies like the United Kingdom (U.K.), Norway,
the European Union (EU), the regional states of Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Uganda, and others in the international community to explore, identify,
and utilize every point of access and leverage. The Troika Special
Envoys (the United States, U.K., and Norway) have been in the region
working closely with one another and synchronizing messaging and
engagement throughout the crisis. Additionally, the U.S. Special Envoy
recognized the importance of the regional voice in this crisis as well.
As mentioned earlier, he has remained in the region on a continuous
basis in order to assist and facilitate a unified and coordinated
international voice. This has been key is sustaining political pressure
on the parties. This political pressure has resulted in moving the
Parties closer to a cessation of hostilities. We see this as a positive
and useful step and a direct result of the international community and
key regional partners speaking with one voice. This same degree of
coordinated pressure will be needed as we move forward with the long
task of addressing the root causes of this crisis.
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