    [Senate Hearing 113-600]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 113-600

                         ANNUAL OPEN HEARING ON CURRENT
          AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                     OF THE

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                          WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 29, 2014

                                   __________

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                        SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

               [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

                     DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
                    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman

    JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West         RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
        Virginia                         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
    RON WYDEN, Oregon                    DANIEL COATS, Indiana
    BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
    MARK WARNER, Virginia                TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
    MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    ANGUS KING, Maine
                         HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
                     MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                        CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
                        JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
                                  ----------
                         David Grannis, Staff Director
                Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director
                      Desiree Thompson-Sayle, Chief Clerk

                                    CONTENTS

                                  ----------

                                JANUARY 29, 2014

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

    Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California.     1
    Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia     3

                                    WITNESS

    James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Accompanied
      by: John O. Brennan, Director, Central Intelligence AgencyJames
      B. Comey, Jr., Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lt.
      General Michael T. Flynn, Director, Defense Intelligence
      Agency, and Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National
      Counterterrorism Center........................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     8

                             SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

    Letter dated February 3, 2014, from Mr. Brennan to Senator Wyden
      regarding applicability of 18 U.S.C. 1030 to the CIA...........    64

                         ANNUAL OPEN HEARING ON CURRENT

          AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 29, 2014

                                           U.S. Senate,
                              Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
    Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
    Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss,
    Rockefeller, Wyden, Mikulski, Udall (of Colorado), Warner,
    Heinrich, King, Burr, Risch, Collins, and Rubio.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
                        SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

        Chairman Feinstein. The meeting will come to order.
        Let me say at the outset that we hold this hearing to
    provide information to the public on the intelligence
    community's assessments of threats facing our nation. I ask
    that everyone in this room remove any signs you may have and
    refrain from any disruptions during the hearing so that the
    Committee can conduct the hearing and people sitting behind you
    can see. I will ask the Capitol Police to remove anyone who
    disrupts this proceeding.
        This Committee meets today in open session to hear the
    annual report from the United States Intelligence Community on
    the range of threats to the nation's security. And let me start
    by welcoming the witnesses. They are the Director of National
    Intelligence James Clapper, the Director of the Central
    Intelligence Agency John Brennan, the Director of the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation Jim Comey, the Director of the Defense
    Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, and the
    Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Matt Olsen.
        Every year at this hearing, Members and intelligence
    officials alike talk about how the threats to the United States
    are more varied and complex than ever before, and this year is
    no exception. Rather than listing all the sources of
    instability and proliferation of weapons capable of causing
    physical and computer damage, I'd like to focus my opening
    remarks on the threat posed by terrorism.
        Thanks in large part to the efforts of the women and men of
    the Intelligence Community, there have been no terrorist
    attacks against--in the United States Homeland since our last
    threat hearing and numerous plots against United States
    interests overseas have been prevented. I'm concerned that this
    success has led to a popular misconception that the threat has
    diminished. It has not.
        The presence of terrorist groups, including those formerly
    affiliated with al-Qaeda and others, has spread over the past
    year. While the threat emanating from Pakistan's tribal areas
    has diminished due to persistent counterterrorism operations,
    the threat from other areas has increased. In fact, terrorism
    is at an all-time high worldwide.
        If you include attacks by groups like the Taliban against
    the United States military and our coalition forces, according
    to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
    Response to Terrorism, at the University of Maryland, which is
    the source for the State Department's official tallies, there
    were more than 8,400 terrorist attacks, killing 15,400 people
    in 2012.
        The instability that spread through North Africa and the
    Middle East during the Arab Spring has continued to lead to an
    increase in the terrorist presence and terrorist safe havens
    throughout the region.
        Libya, Egypt and Mali continue to see regular violence.
    Recent terrorist attacks, and controlled--control now parts of
    western Iraq are of great concern.
        While governments in Yemen and Somalia have improved, two
    of the most dangerous terrorist groups continue to find safe
    havens in these countries where they remain virulent.
        al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, known to us as AQAP,
    remains intent on attacking the United States. And al-Shaabab,
    which publicly merged with al-Qaeda in February of 2012,
    continues to plot against western targets in East Africa.
        But I think the most notable development since last year's
    hearing is actually in Syria, which has become a magnet for
    foreign fighters and for terrorist activity.
        The situation has become so dire that even al-Qaeda's
    central leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has announced the activities
    of one group as being too extreme to countenance.
        Because large swathes of the country of Syria are beyond
    the regime's control, or that of the moderate opposition, this
    leads to the major concern of the establishment of safe haven,
    and the real prospect that Syria could become a launching point
    or way station for terrorists seeking to attack the United
    States or other nations.
        Not only are fighters being drawn to Syria, but so are
    technologies and techniques that pose particular problems to
    our defenses.
        I think I am also concerned about Afghanistan and the
    drawdown of U.S. and ISAF forces. The Committee has heard the
    intelligence community's assessment of the likely outcomes for
    the future of Afghanistan, especially if the bilateral security
    agreement is not signed, and the United States is unable to
    commit significant personnel and resources beyond 2014.
        I am particularly concerned that the Afghan government will
    not be able to prevent the return of al-Qaeda elements to some
    parts of the country, and that the Taliban's control over
    Afghan territory will grow.
        The vice chairman and I were in Afghanistan in 2012, and he
    has just returned. I saw schoolgirls walking home with their
    white headdress and brilliant smiles on their faces on the
    streets of Kabul. And I also met women serving in the Afghan
    parliament. I saw their courage and devotion to their country.
        And I am deeply concerned that in the years following 2014,
    if President Karzai or someone else doesn't sign the bilateral
    security agreement, all the gains for democracy, for women's
    rights will evaporate.
        I'm going to skip some of this and put it in the record.
        As your testimony, gentlemen, makes clear today, there are
    numerous confounding and complicated threats out there that
    need devoted attention. And the Intelligence Community, with
    sequester and furloughs, has been through a very difficult
    time.
        And I'd very much like to thank the men and women of the
    United States Intelligence Community for their service to this
    country. It is very much appreciated by this Committee.
        I'd also like to note to colleagues that Director Clapper
    came before us in closed session two weeks ago and went through
    a series of classified matters. And we discussed what the I.C.
    is doing about them. He and other witnesses are available to
    answer classified questions in closed sessions. But the point
    of today's hearing is to focus on the unclassified details of
    the threats we face, and to provide the American people with a
    better sense of how our Intelligence Community views them.
        Mr. Vice Chairman.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

        Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks very much, Madam Chair, and
    I join you in welcoming all our witnesses back to this open
    hearing this morning.
        This has been an especially difficult year for the men and
    women in the Intelligence Community. The constant stream of
    press articles as a result of the largest intentional
    disclosure of classified information has, without a doubt,
    compromised our national security and complicated our foreign
    partnerships.
        As Director Olsen recently acknowledged, these disclosures
    have caused terrorist groups to change their communication
    methods and in other cases drop out of our collection
    altogether.
        But there's another piece to these leaks that each one of
    you is seeing on a daily basis. The inaccuracies and
    insinuations about intelligence activities that are in place to
    protect this country are especially frustrating and
    demoralizing to the men and women on the front lines.
        This Committee knows from our oversight that the
    Intelligence Community takes very seriously its obligation to
    preserve the rights and privacy of Americans.
        Director Clapper, I implore you to convey our thanks and
    appreciation to the entire Intelligence Community and those men
    and women that serve under each and every one of you.
        Senator Burr and I recently returned from a trip to Jordan
    and Afghanistan, where we met some of the men and women of our
    military and our Intelligence Community. Many of them are
    serving in isolated units in very dangerous parts of
    Afghanistan, and are conducting very dangerous but very
    important missions.
        In our meetings it became very clear that we cannot let
    Afghanistan suffer the same fate as Iraq. We must not withdraw
    from the fight before we finish what we went there to do.
        Recent press articles suggest that we may leave behind a
    force of 8,000 to 12,000 American military personnel, which
    would likely require continued support from the Intelligence
    Community.
        We've come a long way denying a safe haven to al-Qaeda and
    building up the security forces of our Afghan partners. But we
    must not commit the same mistake of losing what the President
    termed a must-win war.
        Assuming we have a signed bilateral security agreement, we
    must ensure that Afghanistan has adequate support and military
    assistance to ensure that it doesn't quickly go the way of
    Iraq.
        As we continue to pressure core al-Qaeda, the growth of
    local and regional affiliates remains a big concern.
        The reason we went into Afghanistan in the first place was
    to remove the safe haven that, if the Taliban--and the Taliban
    provided to al-Qaeda, yet the instability, in the Middle East
    and North Africa seems to be fueling a new breeding ground for
    terrorism, especially in places like Syria.
        As we fight these changing terrorist threats, we must not
    lose sight of the national security challenges caused by our
    nation's state adversaries, and regional instability.
        As we look to the Intelligence Community to give us a clear
    reading on what is happening now, we also expect that you will
    look over the horizon to tell us about the impending threats.
        In this context, recent discussions to limit your abilities
    to gather information are troubling. And I'd like an honest
    assessment from each of you the potential impact of each of
    these decisions.
        We have to make sure that the Community can effectively
    provide warning and protection for all of this country's
    national security interests now and in the future.
        It is the joint responsibility of Congress and the
    administration to ensure that we prioritize our efforts
    appropriately, state and nonstate cyber actors, international
    and home-grown terrorists, and an ever-evolving list of
    aggressors, proliferators and criminals will continue to try to
    do us harm.
        At any given time the Intelligence Community has to know
    which of these threats presents the greatest potential harm. I
    look forward to hearing the details of what those threats are,
    what is being done to address them, and how we, as your
    partners in this effort, can assist.
        Thanks, Madam Chair.
        Chairman Feinstein. And I thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
        I'd like to announce to the Committee that last night we
    announced that the early bird rules would prevail today.
        I want to welcome the panel. And Director Clapper, it's my
    understanding you have a joint statement for the four gentlemen
    and yourself. Please proceed.

          STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
                  INTELLIGENCE, ON BEHALF OF THE PANEL

        Director Clapper. Madam Chairman, Vice Chairman, panelists
    and distinguished Members of the Committee, my colleagues and I
    here today present the intelligence community's worldwide
    threat assessment as we do every year. I'll cover five topics
    in about eight minutes on behalf of all of us.
        As DNI, this is my fourth appearance before the Committee
    to discuss the threats we face. I've made this next assertion
    previously, but it is, if anything, even more evident and
    relevant today.
        Looking back over my more than half a century in
    intelligence I have not experienced a time when we've been
    beset by more crises and threats around the globe. My list is
    long.
        It includes the scourge and diversification of terrorism,
    loosely connected and now globally dispersed to include here at
    home as exemplified by the Boston Marathon bombing; the
    sectarian war in Syria, its attraction as a growing center of
    radical extremism and the potential threat this poses to the
    Homeland; the spillover of conflict in the neighboring Lebanon
    and Iraq; the destabilizing flood of refugees in Jordan, Turkey
    and Lebanon; the implications of the drawdown in Afghanistan;
    the deteriorating internal security posture in Iraq; the growth
    of foreign cyber capabilities; the proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction, aggressive nation state intelligence efforts
    against us; an assertive Russia, a competitive China, a
    dangerous, unpredictable North Korea, a challenging Iran,
    lingering ethnic divisions in the Balkans, perpetual conflict
    and extremism in Africa, violent political struggles, and among
    others the Ukraine, Burma, Thailand and Bangladesh; the specter
    of mass atrocities, the increasing stress of burgeoning
    populations, the urgent demands for energy, water and food, the
    increasing sophistication of transnational crime, the tragedy
    and magnitude of human trafficking, the insidious rot of
    inventive synthetic drugs, the potential for pandemic disease
    occasioned by the growth of drug-resistant bacteria.
        I could go on with this litany but suffice to say we live
    in a complex, dangerous world. And the statements for the
    record that we've submitted, particularly the classified
    version, provide a comprehensive review of these and other
    daunting challenges.
        My second topic is what has consumed extraordinary time and
    energy for much of the past year in the Intelligence Community
    and the Congress and the White House, and, of course, in the
    public square.
        I'm speaking, of course, about the most massive and most
    damaging theft of intelligence information in our history by
    Edward Snowden and the ensuing avalanche of revelations
    published and broadcast around the world.
        I won't dwell on the debate about Snowden's motives or
    legal standing, or on the supreme ironies associated with his
    choice of freedom-loving nations and beacons of free expression
    from which to rail about what an Orwellian state he thinks this
    country has become.
        But what I do want to speak to as the nation's senior
    intelligence officer is the profound damage that his
    disclosures have caused and continue to cause. As a
    consequence, the nation is less safe and its people less
    secure.
        What Snowden has stolen and exposed has gone way, way
    beyond his professed concerns with so-called domestic
    surveillance programs. As a result, we've lost critical foreign
    intelligence collection sources, including some shared with us
    by valued partners.
        Terrorists and other adversaries of this country are going
    to school on U.S. intelligence sources' methods and trade craft
    and the insights that they are gaining are making our job much,
    much harder.
        And this includes putting the lives of members or assets of
    the Intelligence Community at risk, as well as our armed
    forces, diplomats, and our citizens. We're beginning to see
    changes in the communications behavior of adversaries, which
    you alluded to, particularly terrorists, a disturbing trend
    which I anticipate will continue.
        Snowden claims that he's won and that his mission is
    accomplished. If that is so, I call on him and his accomplices
    to facilitate the return of the remaining stolen documents that
    have not yet been exposed to prevent even more damage to U.S.
    security.
        As a third related point I want to comment on the ensuing
    fallout. It pains me greatly that the National Security Agency
    and its magnificent workforce have been pilloried in public
    commentary.
        I started in the intelligence profession 50 years ago in
    SIGINT, and members of my family and I have worked at NSA, so
    this is deeply personal to me. The real facts are, as the
    President noted in his speech on the 17th, that the men and
    women who work at NSA, both military and civilian, have done
    their utmost to protect this country and do so in a lawful
    manner.
        As I and other leaders in the Community have said many
    times, NSA's job is not to target the e-mails and phone calls
    of U.S. citizens. The agency does collect foreign intelligence,
    the whole reason an NSA has existed since 1952, performing
    critical missions that I'm sure the American people want it to
    carry out.
        Moreover, the effects of the unauthorized disclosures hurt
    the entire Intelligence Community, not just NSA. Critical
    intelligence capabilities in which the United States has
    invested billions of dollars are at risk, or likely to be
    curtailed or eliminated either because of compromise or
    conscious decision.
        Moreover, the impact of the losses caused by the
    disclosures will be amplified by the substantial budget
    reductions we're incurring. The stark consequences of this
    perfect storm are plainly evident. The Intelligence Community
    is going to have less capacity to protect our nation, and its
    allies, than we've had.
        And this connection I'm also compelled to note the negative
    morale impact this perfect storm has had on the I.C. workforce
    which are compounded by sequestration furloughs, the shutdown,
    and salary freezes. And in that regard, I very much
    appreciate--we all do--your tributes to the women and men of
    the Intelligence Community. And we will certainly convey that
    to all of them.
        This leads me to my fourth point. We are thus faced with
    collectively--and by collectively I mean this Committee, the
    Congress at large, the executive branch, and most acutely, all
    of us in the Intelligence Community--is the inescapable
    imperative to accept more risk. It's a plain hard fact, and a
    circumstance the Community must, and will manage, together with
    you and those we support in the executive branch.
        But, if dealing with reduced capacities is what we need to
    ensure the faith and confidence of the American people and
    their elected representatives, then we in the Intelligence
    Community will work as hard as we can to meet the expectations
    before us.
        And that brings me to my fifth and final point. The major
    take away for us, certainly for me, from the past several
    months is that we must lean in the direction of transparency,
    wherever and whenever we can. With greater transparency about
    these intelligence programs, the American people may be more
    likely to accept them. The President set the tone and direction
    for us in his speech, as well as in his landmark presidential
    policy directive, a major hallmark of which is transparency.
        I have specific tasking, in conjunction with the Attorney
    General, to conduct further declassification to develop
    additional protections under Section 702 of the FISA Act, to
    modify how we develop bulk collection of telephone metadata
    under Section 215 of the Patriot Act and to ensure more
    oversight of sensitive collection activities. And clearly we'll
    need your support in making these changes.
        Through all of this, we must and will sustain our
    professional trade craft and integrity. And we must continue to
    protect our crown jewel sources and methods so that we can
    accomplish what we've always been chartered to do, protect the
    lives of American citizens here and abroad from the myriad
    threats I described at the beginning of this statement.
        With that, I'll conclude and we're ready to address your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much Director Clapper,
    and thank you for being so up front.
        I wanted to ask you one question about Syria, and then Mr.
    Olsen, a question about Sochi.
        Your written statement for the record I believe states,
    Director Clapper, that Syria has become a significant location
    for independent or al-Qaeda aligned groups to recruit, train
    and equip a growing number of extremists, some of whom might
    conduct external attacks.
        Could you respond to this, and how concerned should we be
    also about Europeans or even Americans training in Syria and
    traveling back to the West to carry out attacks?
        Director Clapper. Well we should be very concerned about
    this, Senator Feinstein. Syria has become a huge magnet for
    extremists.
        First those groups who are engaged in Syria itself, some
    1,600 different groups. We estimate somewhere in the
    neighborhood of between 75,000 and 110,000, of which about
    26,000 we grade as extremists. We estimate, at this point, an
    excess of 7,000 foreign fighters have been attracted from some
    50 countries, many of them in Europe and the Mideast.
        And this is of great concern not only to us, but to those
    countries.
        And our recent engagements with our foreign interlocutors,
    and particularly in Europe, tremendous concern here for those
    extremists who are attracted to Syria, engage in combat, get
    training, and we're seeing now the appearance of training
    complexes in Syria to train people to go back to their
    countries, and, of course, conduct more terrorist acts.
        So this is a huge concern to all of us.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Mr. Olsen, on
    Sochi, I'd like to know what your assessment is of the threat
    to the Olympic Games and whether you believe our athletes will
    be safe.
        And I'd like Director Comey to respond to the level of
    cooperation between the Russians, and the FBI, with respect to
    security at the Olympic Games.
        Mr. Olsen.
        Director Olsen. Yes, thank you very much, Madam Chairman
    and Vice Chairman.
        Let me just say at the outset, I appreciate your
    leadership, and in particular your focus on terrorism, and
    leadership of the entire Committee.
        And if I may say just as well, I fully agree with Director
    Clapper's assessment of the situation in Syria. And as you laid
    out in your opening statement, the combination of a permissive
    environment, extremist groups like Al Nusra and the number of
    foreign fighters combine to make Syria a place that we are very
    concerned about, in particular the potential for terrorist
    attacks emanating from Syria to the West.
        Now, with respect to your question about Sochi, we are very
    focused on the Sochi Olympics and we have seen an up-tick in
    the threat reporting regarding Sochi. And this is what we
    expected given where the Olympics are located.
        There are a number of extremists in that area and in
    particular, a group, Emirate Caucasus, which is probably the
    most prominent terrorist group in Russia.
        The leader of the group, last July, announced in a public
    message that the group would intend to carry out attacks in
    Sochi in connection with the Olympics. And we've seen a number
    of attacks stemming from last fall's suicide bombings in
    Volgograd that took a number of lives.
        So we're very focused on the problem of terrorism in the
    run-up to the Olympics. I would add that I traveled to Sochi
    last December, and met with Russian security officials. They
    understand the threat. They are very focused on this, and
    devoting substantial resources.
        The biggest issue from my perspective is not the games
    themselves, the venues themselves. There's extensive security
    at those locations, the sites of the events. The greater threat
    is to softer targets in the greater Sochi area, and in the
    outskirts beyond Sochi, where there is a substantial potential
    for a terrorist attack.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Comey, would you tell us what you can about cooperation
    between Russia and your organization?
        Director Comey. Certainly. Senator, the cooperation between
    the FSB and the FBI in particular has been steadily improving
    over the last year. We've had exchanges at all levels,
    particularly in connection with Sochi, including me directly to
    my counterpart at FSB. And I think that we have a good level of
    cooperation there.
        It can always improve. We're looking for ways to improve
    it, as are they. But this, as Director Olsen said, remains a
    big focus of the FBI.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
        Mr. Vice Chairman.
        Vice Chairman Chambliss. Thanks, Madam Chair.
        Director Clapper, you assess in your statement for the
    record that core al-Qaeda has been on a downward trajectory
    since 2008, and that their ability to conduct complex,
    sophisticated, and large-scale attacks against the Homeland is
    significantly degraded.
        However, at the same time, you assess that AQAP poses a
    significant threat and remains intent on targeting the United
    States and U.S. interests overseas. What I'd like to do is to
    have you first start off Director Clapper, but I want kind of a
    general discussion about al-Qaeda, not just core al-Qaeda, but
    their threat to the United States, both domestically as well as
    overseas.
        And each of you have kind of a different interest there.
    Even down to you, Director Comey, obviously with respect to
    homegrown terrorists, and the future there. So these are kind
    of the questions I'd like for you to address.
        One, how would you characterize the probability of an al-
    Qaeda-sponsored or -inspired attack against U.S. Homeland
    today, as compared to 2001?
        If al-Qaeda is evolving from a centralized core group to a
    decentralized global movement of multiple organizations,
    capable of attacking the United States, would you say the
    threat has decreased or increased?
        Third has the terrorist threat against the U.S. interests
    overseas increased or diminished over the past decade?
        And then lastly, what--what is the impact on limitations
    that are proposed on Sections 215 and 702 likely to have on the
    future of the Intelligence Community with regard to collection.
        Vice Chairman Chambliss. Director Clapper.
        Director Clapper. Thank you, Vice Chairman Chambliss.
        Let me start, and then I'll turn to others.
        I think--in fact NCTC probably said it best recently that
    the--one of--the ideological center of al-Qaeda movement I
    think still remains in the FATA. The operational locus and the
    locus for operational planning has dispersed. There are some
    five different franchises at least, and in 12 countries that
    this movement has morphed into. And we see sort of chapters of
    it, of course, in Yemen, Somalia, in North Africa, in Syria, et
    cetera.
        And many of these movements, while essentially locally
    focused, probably the most--still, I think, the most prominent
    one that has an external focus and specifically on the Homeland
    remains AQAP, which I think we--we still continue to view as,
    of all the franchises, the one that has the most--poses the
    most immediate threat to--for a potential attack on the
    Homeland.
        The probability of attack now compared to 2001 is, at least
    for me, a very hard question to answer because--principally
    because of this very dispersion and diffusion of the threat.
    Whereas we were very, very focused initially, particularly in
    that--in that time period on al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda core. Now, we
    are facing a much more dispersed threat.
        The--what we spoke about before in Syria, what's going on
    there is in maybe some respects a new FATA for us. And the--and
    what's going on there and the attraction of these foreign
    fighters is very, very worrisome. Aspirationally, al-Nusra
    Front, to name one, is--does have aspirations for attacks on
    the Homeland.
        So, I can't say that--that, you know, the threat is any
    less. I--I think our ability to discern it is much improved
    over what it was in the--in the early part of--the 2000 period.
    So, I think that dispersion and decentralization actually
    creates a different threat and a harder one to watch and detect
    because of its dispersion.
        It's clear as well that our collection capabilities are not
    as robust, perhaps, as they were because the terrorists--and
    this is not specifically because of the Snowden revelations--
    but generally have gotten smarter about how we go about our
    business and how we use trade-craft to detect them and to
    thwart them.
        As far as what impacts the changes that will accrue,
    hopefully we can, particularly with respect to 215 and the
    other tools that we have, we can minimize the threat by--as we
    make these modifications and alterations. But in general, this
    is big hand/little map, we are in total going to certainly have
    less capacity than we had in the past. And that's occasioned by
    the changes we're going to make, as well as, you know, the
    significant budget cuts we're taking.
        And those two things together, as I alluded to in my oral
    statement, kind of the perfect storm that we're going to--we're
    going to contend with. And the bottom line, at least for me, is
    that we're going to have to identify and--and be eyes wide
    open--I say ``we''--all of us--about identifying risk and
    managing it.
        Let me turn to my colleagues.
        John.
        Director Brennan. Just agree with General Clapper. The
    diversity and dispersion have made it much more challenging for
    us. We need to rely heavily on partners and building up
    capacity in a number of countries throughout the world.
        The terrorists are becoming more sophisticated and they're
    going to school on the repeated disclosures and leaks so that
    it has allowed them to burrow in--has made it much more
    difficult for us to find them and to address the threats that
    they pose.
        So, when I look at the threat relative to 9/11, we as a
    country have done I think a great job of addressing some of the
    vulnerabilities that exist in our system and putting together
    an information-sharing architecture that allows us to move
    information very quickly, but you never know what you don't
    know. And with the increasing diversity of the threat and with
    the growth, as you pointed out, of terrorist elements in places
    like Syria and Yemen, we have a number of fronts that we need
    to confront simultaneously.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Vice Chairman.
        Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman.
        Thank you all for joining us today, and I want to thank you
    for participating in this open hearing on worldwide threats. I
    know it's not always easy to talk about some of these things in
    an unclassified setting, but I certainly appreciate your
    willingness to try.
        I also want to publicly thank the men and women of the
    Intelligence Community who day-in and day-out dedicate
    themselves to keeping us all safe. It's a thankless job that a
    simple expression of gratitude can't fully capture, but we
    deeply appreciate their efforts.
        Before I get to my questions today, Mr. Brennan, I just
    want to publicly note my continued disappointment of how the
    CIA under your leadership has chosen to engage and interact
    with this Committee, especially as it relates to the
    Committee's study of the CIA's detention and interrogation
    program.
        Recent efforts undertaken by the CIA, including but not
    limited to inaccurate public statements about the Committee
    study, are meant to intimidate, deflect, and thwart legitimate
    oversight. It only makes me firmer in my conviction that the
    Committee should release and declassify the full 6,300-page
    study with minimal redactions so that the public can judge the
    facts for themselves.
        I want to applaud my colleague, Senator Rockefeller, for
    making significant efforts to bridge the chasm between the
    Committee and Director Brennan on some of these issues. But it
    doesn't appear to be in the director's nature to accept these
    overtures, frankly. And I think that's incredibly unfortunate.
    I am fully confident in the factual accuracy of the report and
    nothing in your response so far has persuaded me otherwise.
        Director Brennan, let me get to a few questions. On March
    16th, 2009, one of your predecessors, CIA Director Leon
    Panetta, announced the creation of a Director's Review Group
    for Rendition, Detention and Interrogation, to be led by a
    well-respected senior CIA officer and advised by Senator Warren
    Rudman, who passed away, as you know, in 2012.
        According to the press release at the time, the group was
    tasked with assembling data and formulating positions on the
    ``complex, often controversial questions that define rendition,
    detention and interrogation.''
        Do you know when and why the Panetta review group was
    disbanded?
        Director Brennan. Senator, first of all, I respectfully but
    vehemently disagree with your characterization of the CIA's
    cooperation with this Committee. I am fully prepared to come
    forward to this Committee at any time that requests my
    appearance, to talk about that study.
        And I think, related to the issue that you just raised in
    terms of the question, all Committee Members are in receipt of
    some information that I have provided recently to the chairman
    and vice chairman on this issue. And I look forward to
    addressing these matters with the Committee at the appropriate
    time and not at a threat assessment--
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Brennan. I believe
    that's appropriate.
        Senator Heinrich. Actually, it doesn't fully answer the
    question of whether--and I'm not sure that I do know actually
    when and why the Panetta review group was disbanded.
        Director Brennan [continuing]. I'll be happy to address
    that question at the time when the Committee leadership
    requests that information from me.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. I think that's appropriate,
    Senator, for a classified session.
        Senator Heinrich. OK. Let me move on to Director Clapper
    and change gears a little bit to Edward Snowden. The
    revelations by Edward Snowden regarding U.S. intelligence
    collection have obviously caused some tensions with our
    European allies. Have our European allies ever collected
    intelligence against U.S. officials or business people, or
    those of other allied nations?
        Director Clapper. Yes, they have. I could go into more
    detail on that in a classified session.
        Senator Heinrich. That's fine, Director Clapper.
        Russia recently announced that it would extend Edward
    Snowden's asylum and not force him to leave their country. Do
    you believe that the Russians have gained access to the
    documents that Edward Snowden stole, which obviously--many of
    which have not been released publicly, fortunately?
        Director Clapper. I think this might be best left to a
    classified session and I don't want to do any--say or do
    anything that would jeopardize a current investigation.
        Senator Heinrich. That's fine, Director.
        Thank you, Chair.
        Chairman Feinstein. Senator Wyden.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        Let me start by saying that the men and women of America's
    intelligence agencies are overwhelmingly dedicated
    professionals and they deserve to have leadership that is
    trusted by the American people.
        Unfortunately, that trust has been seriously undermined by
    senior officials' reckless reliance on secret interpretations
    of the law and battered by years of misleading and deceptive
    statements senior officials made to the American people.
        These statements did not protect sources and methods that
    were useful in fighting terror. Instead, they hid bad policy
    choices and violations of the liberties of the American people.
        For example, the director of the NSA said publicly that the
    NSA doesn't hold data on U.S. citizens. That was obviously
    untrue.
        Justice Department officials testified that Section 215 of
    the PATRIOT Act is analogous to grand jury subpoena authority.
    And that deceptive statement was made on multiple occasions.
        Officials also suggested that the NSA doesn't have the
    authority to read Americans' e-mails without a warrant. But the
    FISA court opinions declassified last August showed that wasn't
    true either.
        So, for purposes of trying to move this dialogue along,
    because I don't think this culture of misinformation is going
    to be easily fixed, I'd like to get into several other areas
    where the government's interpretation of the law is still
    unclear.
        Director Clapper, law-abiding Americans want to protect the
    privacy of their communications, and I see a clear need to
    strengthen protections for informations--for information sent
    over the web or stored in the cloud.
        Declassified court documents show that in 2011, the NSA
    sought and obtained the authority to go through communications
    collected with respect to Section 702 of the Foreign
    Intelligence and Surveillance Act, and conduct warrantless
    searches for the communications of specific Americans.
        Can you tell us today whether any searches have ever been
    conducted?
        Director Clapper. Senator Wyden, I think at a threat
    hearing this would--I would prefer not to discuss this, and
    have this as a separate subject that--because there are very
    complex legal issues here that I just don't think this is the
    appropriate time to discuss them.
        Senator Wyden. When would that time be? I tried with
    written questions, Director Clapper, a year ago, to get
    answers. And we were stonewalled on that. And this Committee
    can't do oversight if we can't get direct answers.
        So when will you give the American people a unclassified
    answer to that question that relates directly to their privacy?
        Director Clapper. As soon as we can--soon, sir. I'll commit
    to that.
        Senator Wyden. What would be wrong with 30 days?
        Director Clapper. That's fine.
        Senator Wyden. All right. Thank you. That's making some
    progress.
        Director Brennan, a question with respect to policy. Does
    the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act apply to the CIA?
    Seems to me that's a yes-or-no question.
        Director Brennan. I would have to look into what that act
    actually calls for and its applicability to CIA's authorities.
    I'll be happy to get back to you, Senator, on that.
        Senator Wyden. How long would that take?
        Director Brennan. I'll be happy to get back to you as soon
    as possible. But certainly no longer than--
        Senator Wyden. A week?
        Director Brennan [continuing]. I think that I could get
    that back to you, yes.
        Senator Wyden. Very good.
        Let me ask a question of you, then, if I might, Director
    Comey. I'd like to ask you about the government's authority to
    track individuals using things like cell site location
    information and smartphone applications.
        Last fall, the NSA director testified that we, the NSA,
    identify a number we can give that to the FBI. When they get
    their probable cause, then they can get the locational
    information they need.
        I've been asking the NSA to publicly clarify these remarks,
    but it hasn't happened yet.
        So, is the FBI required to have probable cause in order to
    acquire Americans' cell site location information for
    intelligence purposes?
        Director Comey. I don't believe so, Senator. In almost all
    circumstances we have to obtain a court order, but the showing
    is a reasonable basis to believe it's relevant to the
    investigation.
        Senator Wyden. So you don't have to show probable cause,
    you have cited another standard. Is that standard different if
    the government is collecting the location information from a
    smartphone app rather than a cell phone tower?
        Director Comey. I don't think I know--I probably ought to
    ask someone who is a little smarter on what the standard is
    that governs those. I don't know the answer sitting here,
        Senator Wyden. My time is up. Can I have an answer to that
    within a week?
        Director Comey. You sure can.
        Senator Wyden. All right.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Wyden.
        Senator Udall let me apologize to you, I inadvertently
    skipped over your name and called on Senator Wyden, but it's
    your moment.
        Senator Udall. No apologies, Madam Chair.
        Good morning to all of you. Thank you for being here.
        I, too, want to make it clear how much this Committee
    respects and admires the hardworking members of the
    Intelligence Community. And I know everyone on this Committee
    keeps this worldwide threat assessment handy.
        It's not reading that puts you to sleep; it's reading that
    gets your attention. I want to thank you and your teams for
    putting this together.
        I did want to pick up on Senator Heinrich's line of
    questioning.
        Director Brennan, you know the long history of this
    committee's study of our detention interrogation programs. I'd
    like to put my statement in the record that walks us through
    that--that record, but I did want to focus initially on the CIA
    internal review, some people call it the Panetta review.
        Were you aware of this CIA internal review when you
    provided the CIA's official response to this Committee in June
    of last year? I don't have much time, so I'd appreciate a yes-
    or-no answer.
        Director Brennan. It wasn't a review, Senator, it was a
    summary. And at the time, no, I had not gone through it.
        Senator Udall. It strikes me as a bit improbable, given
    that you knew about the internal review, and you spoke to us
    and stated that your obligation as the CIA director was to make
    sure that the CIA's response was as thorough and accurate as
    possible.
        But, in that context, let me move to the next question,
    does the information in the internal review contradict any of
    the positions included in your June 2013 response to the
    Committee?
        Director Brennan. Senator, I'd respectfully like to say
    that I don't think this is the proper format for that
    discussion, because our responses to your report were in
    classified form. And I look forward to addressing these
    questions with the Committee at the appropriate time.
        Senator Udall. Let me make sure I understand. Are you
    saying that the CIA officers who were asked to produce this
    internal review got it wrong, just like you've said, the
    Committee got it wrong? We had 6,300 pages, 6 million
    documents, 35,000 footnotes.
        Director Brennan. Senator, as you well know, I didn't say
    that the Committee got it wrong. I said there were things in
    that report that I disagreed with, there were things in that
    report that I agreed with. And I look forward to working with
    the Committee on the next steps in that report.
        And I stand by my statement. I'm prepared to deal with the
    Committee to make sure that we're able to address the issue of
    the detention, rendition interrogation program at the
    appropriate time.
        Look forward to it.
        Senator Udall. Madam Chair, I still have two minutes
    remaining.
        Chairman Feinstein. You do; I beg your pardon.
        Senator Udall. Let me move to the Snowden disclosures and
    what I think has been clearly outlined as a trust deficit that
    exists between the public and the Intelligence Community.
        This Committee was created to address a severe breach of
    trust that developed. When it was revealed that the CIA was
    conducting unlawful domestic searches, the Church Committee
    went to work, found that to be true.
        I want to be able to reassure the American people,
    especially given what's been happening, that the CIA and the
    director understand the limits of their mission and of its
    authorities.
        We all are well aware of Executive Order 12333. That order
    prohibits the CIA from engaging in domestic spying and searches
    of U.S. citizens within our borders.
        Can you assure the Committee that the CIA does not conduct
    such domestic spying and searches?
        Director Brennan. I can assure the Committee that the CIA
    follows the letter and spirit of the law, in terms of what
    CIA's authorities are, in terms of its responsibilities to
    collect intelligence that keep this country safe. Yes, Senator,
    I do.
        Senator Udall. Let me--let me finish on this note; I think
    we have an important opportunity when it comes to this vital
    review that we undertook. We can set the record straight.
        America is at its best when we acknowledge our mistakes and
    learn from those mistakes.
        It's clear that the detention, rendition and interrogation
    programs of the CIA went over the line over last--during the
    first decade of this century.
        Director Brennan, I don't understand why we can't work
    together to clarify the record, to move forward. And, in so
    doing, acknowledge the tremendous work of those you lead, and
    those that were tasked on this Committee to oversee.
        I'm hopeful that we can find our way forward on this
    important, important act. Thank you.
        Director Brennan. I hope we can, too, Senator.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, very much.
        I want to apologize to Senator Collins, because I didn't
    indicate initially that we would go back and forth. So the list
    is actually who got here first, but it's Senator Mikulski next,
    and then Senator Collins.
        Senator Mikulski. I would be happy to yield to Senator
    Collins.
        Senator Collins. The chairman of the Appropriations
    Committee always goes first.
        Chairman Feinstein. Senator, please proceed.
        Senator Mikulski. First of all, to those here on the panel
    and other members of agencies representing the Intelligence
    Community, like Homeland Security, I too, want to echo my
    thanks and support for all employees who work in the
    Intelligence Community.
        And General Clapper, I want to say to you, I recall in last
    year's hearing you asked for flexibility for the Intel
    Committee as we faced sequester. During this at times even
    intense hearing today, I want you to know that even the
    chairman and vice chairman supported by the entire Members of
    this Committee worked with me to try to get flexibility for
    you.
        We were stopped by the House of Representatives during the
    CR to get you that flexibility. But I want you to know today,
    we were united to try to get you, and therefore the
    Intelligence Community, that.
        So we're on the side of the employees facing furloughs,
    sequester, and so on. Thanks now to the budget agreement, and
    what we were able to do in the consolidated appropriations, we
    think that part is behind. So we look forward to working with
    you as we listen to those needs.
        I want to come, though, to the employees there. And no
    group of employees has been battered more than the men and
    women who work at the National Security Agency because of the
    illegal leaks by Edward Snowden. NSA has been battered, and by
    de facto, so have the employees of the National Security
    Agency.
        We're all well aware that the morale is extremely low there
    because of budget impacts and the impacts of Snowden.
        Let me go to my point, though. The men and women who work
    at the National Security Agency truly believe that what they
    do, particularly under 215 and 702, is constitutional, is
    legal, was authorized, and was necessary.
        So they felt they were doing a good job defending America.
    I would like to come to the constitutionality and engage your
    support and get your reviews.
        There are now several legal opinions about the
    constitutionality of these programs, and now, as we engage upon
    the reform effort, which--I support review and reform--being
    led by many members of this Committee, that we need to
    determine the constitutionality.
        Would you--because if it's not constitutional, that's it--
    General Clapper, would you, consulting with the Department of
    Justice, the White House, ask for an expedited review by the
    Supreme Court of the United States to determine the
    constitutionality of these programs so that we don't
    continually shop for the legal opinion that we want, either one
    side or the other?
        Director Clapper. I'll discuss this with the Attorney
    General. I am not up on what the protocol is for us seeking a
    reading by the Supreme Court, but--
        Senator Mikulski. Is there a sense of urgency within the
    administration to seek such a constitutional determination?
        Director Clapper [continuing]. I think there's--well, I
    can't speak for the administration. I don't know. I would think
    there would be, since we, to your point, think throughout all
    of this and with all the controversy that we all felt, and
    still feel, that what we were doing was legal, was oversighted,
    both by all three branches of the government.
        There is a current court ruling on the Fourth Amendment
    ruling which, of course, if data is provided to a third party,
    it doesn't--
        Senator Mikulski. General Clapper, there are 36 different
    legal opinions.
        Director Clapper [continuing]. I realize that.
        Senator Mikulski. Thirty-six say the program is
    constitutional.
        Director Clapper. And--
        Senator Mikulski. Judge Leon said it's not. I'm not a--
        Director Clapper [continuing]. Nor are we.
        Senator Mikulski [continuing]. And I respect the appeals
    process, but I think we've got to get a constitutional ruling
    on this as quickly as possible.
        I think the American people are entitled to knowing that,
    and I think the men and women who work at NSA need to know
    that. And I think those of you who want final review on reform
    need to know that.
        Director Clapper. I couldn't agree with you more about the
    need for clarity on these issues for the women and men of the
    Intelligence Community who are trying to do the right thing.
        Senator Mikulski. Now, I would like to come to
    cybersecurity. And Director Comey, as you know, Target's been
    hit, Neiman Marcus has been hit, Michael's, who knows what
    else.
        What I find is in the public's mind there's confusion now
    between cybersecurity and surveillance. They've kind of
    comingled these words, but my question to you is two things.
        Is the impact of the Snowden affair slowing us down in our
    work to be more aggressive in the cybersecurity area,
    particularly as it relates to American people, identity, the
    safety of their credit cards, our grid, et cetera?
        And has the failure of us to pass cybersecurity regulatory
    efforts really aided and abetted these--has been a contributing
    factor to the fact that international prime is now targeting
    us?
        Director Comey. Thank you, Senator.
        With respect to the work being done by the men and women in
    law enforcement to respond to cyber threats, especially those
    around financial fraud and theft, we're working as hard as ever
    to try to address those threats.
        What the storm around surveillance and the leaks has done
    is just complicated the discussion about what tools we use to
    do that. So in that respect, it's made our life more
    complicated. I think that people need to realize there is
    threat of fraud and theft, because we've connected our entire
    lives to the Internet. And that's a place where we, using our
    law enforcement authorities, have to be able to respond
    robustly.
        Senator Mikulski. Do you think Congress needs to pass
    legislation in this area?
        Director Comey. Yes, I do.
        Senator Mikulski. Do you feel that there's an urgency
    around that and we should review those original legislation,
    even as a starting point for negotiation?
        Director Comey. There is. One of the critical parts of
    responding to cyber criminals is information sharing. The
    private sector sees the bad guys coming in. We need to make
    sure that the private sector understands the rules of the road
    and how they share that information with the government.
        Senator Mikulski. My time is up.
        I just want to say also, during the sequester and so on, I
    read these wonderful documents that came from voluntary
    organizations associated with the FBI. It was called, ``Voices
    from the field.'' They were quite poignant, and it shows that
    when they say with sequester they didn't want to exempt the
    feds, when our first line of defense, in many ways, is what we
    see at this table.
        So would you thank the agents for us?
        Director Comey. I will. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Feinstein. Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        General Flynn, thus far in the discussion today and in
    general, there has been very little focus on the damage that
    Edwin (sic) Snowden has done to our military. I read the DIA
    assessment, and it is evident to me that most of the documents
    stolen by Mr. Snowden have nothing to do with the privacy
    rights and civil liberties of American citizens, or even the
    NSA collection programs.
        Indeed, these documents--and we've heard the number, 1.7
    million documents--are in many cases multipages. If you printed
    them all and stacked them, they would be more than three miles
    high.
        I say that to give the public more information about how
    extraordinarily extensive the documents that he stole were. And
    they don't just pertain to the NSA; they pertain to the entire
    Intelligence Community and include information about military
    intelligence, our defense capabilities, the defense industry.
        Now, you are the leader of military intelligence. You have
    also been deployed for extensive periods in Iraq. You know what
    the impact is on the military.
        Could you share with the Committee your assessment of the
    impact that the damage that Edward Snowden has done to our
    military? And in particular, has he placed our men and women in
    uniform at greater risk?
        Lt. General Flynn. Senator Collins, thanks for that
    question. And on the report that you're--you're indicating or
    highlighting, we do have a--I believe a session in about a week
    for this Committee to go through the entire report.
        The--the strongest--the strongest word that I can use to
    describe, you know, how bad this is, this has caused grave
    damage to our national security. I think another way to
    address, you know, your question is, you know, what is--what
    are the costs that we are going to incur because of the scale
    and the scope of what has been taken by Snowden.
        And I won't put a dollar figure, but I know that the scale
    or the cost to our nation, you know, obviously in treasure, in
    capabilities that are going to have to be examined, reexamined
    and potentially adjusted. But I think that the greatest cost
    that is unknown today, but we will likely face is the cost in
    human lives on tomorrow's battlefield or in some place where we
    will put our military forces, you know, when we ask them to go
    into harm's way. And I think that's the greatest cost that we
    face with the disclosures that have been presented so far.
        And like I said, the strongest word that I can use is this
    has caused grave damage to our national security.
        Senator Collins. So it has caused grave damage to our
    national security. And you would agree that it puts at risk
    potentially the lives of our troops. Is that accurate?
        Lt. General Flynn. Yes--yes, ma'am.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Mr. Olsen, it's good to see you again. We've worked
    extensively when I was on the Homeland Security Committee. I
    want to turn to the impact of the Snowden leaks on our nation's
    ability to connect the dots and to protect our citizens from
    terrorism attacks.
        You addressed this issue at a recent conference. Have you
    seen terrorist groups change their methods as a direct result
    of the disclosures of the stolen documents that Mr. Snowden
    has?
        Director Olsen. Senator Collins, the answer to that is yes.
    As we've been discussing, the terrorist landscape has become
    increasingly complex. We've seen the geographic diffusion of
    groups and networks. And that places a premium on our ability
    to monitor communications. And what we've seen in the last six
    to eight months is an awareness by these groups, and they're
    increasingly sophisticated, an awareness of our ability to
    monitor communications and specific instances where they've
    changed the ways in which they communicate, to avoid being
    surveilled or being subject to our surveillance tactics.
        Senator Collins. And obviously that puts us at greater risk
    of an attack.
        Director Olsen. It certainly puts us at risk of missing
    something that we are trying to see, which could lead to
    putting us at risk of an attack, yes.
        Senator Collins. And just to quote you back to yourself,
    you said, ``This is not an exaggeration; this is a fact.'' And
    you stand by that.
        Director Olsen. I absolutely do, yes.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Chairman Feinstein. Senator Warner.
        Senator Warner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        And I want to start actually picking up with what Senator
    Mikulski said. And I think most of us have made these comments,
    at least at the outset, even if some of our colleagues have
    very distinct policy differences, which is we need to be, I
    think, continue to express our support for the men and women of
    the Intelligence Community who do these jobs in thankless
    ways--and in dangerous ways.
        And they have been under challenge, with concerns about the
    NSA programs, the Snowden affair, the effects of sequestration.
    And they're disproportionately, perhaps, in Virginia and
    Maryland, but they're all across the country.
        And I know, Director Clapper, we've talked about ways to
    try to get them some of the recognition. They're not often
    recognized in State of the Union addresses, but I hope that
    we'll continue to find ways that we can, during these tight and
    challenging times, affirm the very extraordinary work that
    these men and women do protecting our country.
        I want to take a moment, Director Clapper, again, following
    up on what Senator Mikulski raised, I think the challenges
    around cyber terrorism and cyber threats grow dramatically. We
    now know the public report that (inaudible) put out a year ago
    about challenges disproportionately coming out of China and
    Russia.
        I believe you stated last year that you thought that the
    effect of cyber attacks on America were estimated to cost close
    to $300 billion in economic damage, that damage in terms of
    direct attack.
        But I also think we see time and again cases where
    intellectual property is taken and competitors are able to
    enter into the marketplace basically leapfrogging over the
    whole R&D step because they steal our intellectual capital.
        We now have seen, I know, a series of committees, including
    my banking subcommittee, have been looking at the--some of the
    data breaches that at we're talking now at 70 million potential
    loss of data--personal data information just with Target alone.
    And (inaudible) disproportionately was ill-equipped.
        I think this is an indication, though, that, industry by
    industry, these attackers can find the weakest link. And even
    companies that are doing the right things; if their colleagues
    in the industry are not keeping up to standards, there is a
    challenge.
        Do you have any sense of--or would you or anybody else on
    the panel care to kind of reposit a new number or a different
    number or a higher number in terms of the economic threat, the
    intellectual capital threat, and obviously the personal
    information threat posed by these cyber activists?
        Director Clapper. Senator, I think it's almost incalculable
    to tote up what the potential costs may be. This starts from
    the sheer difficulty of ascribing value to intellectual
    property, particularly over time. So, the potential dollar
    value is inestimable if you consider it in its totality.
        So no, I really can't give you a good number, and we'd have
    a hard time coming up with one. Whatever it is, it's big.
        Senator Warner. Anybody else want to add a comment?
        I guess the question I would also have, kind of continuing
    down this lane, though, is that I, as someone that came from
    the IT and telecom sector, I get the concern about additional
    government regulatory burdens, but--and how you set it, an
    appropriate standard, something that also is fluid as this
    field is. But my gosh, not having some standards, not having,
    again, for the good actors, some safe harbor, seems to me to be
    a real economic challenge.
        And I guess one of the questions I would have for you, in
    light of the data breaches at Target, Neiman Marcus, now we
    hear Michael's and others, you know, what does it say about the
    ability of the private sector to keep its data secure?
        Director Clapper. Well, this is a great concern to all of
    us. And to Senator Mikulski's point earlier when this was
    discussed a year ago or so, and there was a lot of discussion
    and debate in the Congress about the need for some cyber
    legislation.
        There has to be, in my view--and I'll ask others to speak
    to this--a partnership between the government and the private
    sector, understanding the concerns about burdens being placed,
    regulatory burdens and all that sort of thing that could be
    placed on the private sector.
        But the government cannot do all this by itself. The
    private sector, particularly if you're, you know, have a
    concern about the piece of this that I am, which are foreign
    nation states, principally China and Russia, which represent
    the most sophisticated cyber capabilities against us.
        And then, you know, the litany of other potential threats--
    be they nonstate actors, activists, criminal, whether foreign
    or domestic.
        And we need--the civilian sector is kind of our do line, if
    you will, or our first line of defense. So there--in my
    opinion, there needs to be some way where we can depend on that
    sector to report to us, to enable the government to help them.
    I'd ask Director Comey to speak to this as well.
        Director Comey. And, Senator, that's what I meant, to
    responding to Senator Mikulski about some of the work we have
    to do to protect the American people in this area, getting all
    tangled up in controversy around surveillance.
        Without the cooperation of the private sector, I think of
    us as--we're patrolling a street with 50-foot-high walls. We
    can see that the street is safe. But we're of no use to the
    folks who need help behind the walls in those neighborhoods.
        So we have to find a way for them to tell us what's going
    on and us to tell them what's going on in order to protect the
    American people. But it gets caught up in this swirl around,
    oh, my goodness, the government wants private people to
    cooperate.
        We really do. But we want to do it through clear, lawful
    guidelines and rules of the road to make those communities
    safer on the street and in the neighborhoods.
        Senator Warner. I know my time is up, and I concur with you
    in trying to get this collaboration, and information sharing is
    so critical. And I think, again, the challenge that these
    retailers saw in terms of them, when do they cross that line to
    report to the public? Because I think if the public had a full
    understanding of how often and how many firms are under daily
    assault, it would, you know, maybe even make pale about some
    other concerns they have about some of the other activities
    going on. This is a thorny area that's evolving day to day.
    And, again, I hope the Congress comes back and revisits it.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Senator Warner.
        Senator Rockefeller.
        Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I'm going to make a statement. I'm not going to ask a
    question. I'll wait for second round. There's something I feel
    so strongly about I have to make this statement.
        The president announced that Section 215 telephony metadata
    should no longer be stored by the government and he asks the
    director of national intelligence to work with the Attorney
    General to come up with alternative options.
        Ultimately the decision rests with Congress and this
    Senator absolutely opposes contracting out this inherently core
    governmental function.
        What seems to be lost in this conversation is that every
    day we face a growing and evolving threat from multiple enemies
    that could cost American lives. The terrorist threat remains
    real and ongoing. The government's ability to quickly assess
    the data has protected Americans from terrorist attack.
        The hard fact is that our national security interests do
    not change just because public opinion on issues fluctuates.
    The collection and querying of this metadata is not a private
    sector responsibility. It is a fundamental core government
    function and should remain that way.
        I'm concerned that any change of our current framework
    would harm both our national security and privacy.
        While the President has made it clear that he understands
    our intelligence need for this data and that we should keep
    collecting, I do not believe that he came up with a better
    alternative. In fact, he just threw it to you, and ultimately,
    to us.
        Here is why: Practically, we do not have the technical
    capacity to do this. And certainly it's impossible to do so
    without the possibility of massive mistakes or catastrophic
    privacy violations.
        There are hundreds and hundreds of telecommunication
    companies in this country. They each have their own
    initiatives. So you can't just talk about one or two big ones.
    They're all--they got niches. They're all going to have to go
    into this protocol.
        Prospects are just daunting and, to me, ridiculous. They do
    not want to become agents of the government. They do not want
    to become the government's guardians of a vast amount of
    intelligence data. They stress that.
        The telecom providers themselves do not want to do this,
    and for good reason. Telecom companies do not take an oath of
    allegiance to protect domestically and internationally.
        Small matter? No, it isn't. It's a big matter. They are
    neither counterterrorist agencies nor privacy protection
    organizations. They are businesses. They are interested in the
    bottom line. And they are focused on rewarding their
    shareholders, not protecting privacy or national security.
        I have served on the Commerce Committee for 30 years and I
    know the telephone companies sometimes make empty promises
    about consumer protection and transparency.
        I've been through many iterations of this and it's not
    happy. Corporations' core profit motives can and sometimes have
    trumped their holding to their own public commitments.
        My concerns about private providers retaining this data for
    national security purposes are only heightened by the advent of
    the multi-billion-dollar data broker industry that mines troves
    of data, including telephone numbers, which it uses to
    determine our most personal inclinations.
        One data broker holds as much as 75,000 different data
    points about each one of us, including our health and financial
    status. This is staggering.
        Further involving the telecom providers in the extended
    storage of this data for intelligence purposes would not only
    make the data subject to discovery in civil lawsuits but it
    would also make it more vulnerable to theft by hackers or
    foreign intelligence organizations, another powerful reason to
    be against private companies taking responsibility for an
    inherently government function, core government function.
        Additionally Target's recent loss of 110 million American
    consumers' personal information hackers--to hackers does not
    reassure me at all that moving this sensitive data to the
    private sector for intelligence purposes would adequately
    protect its consumers' privacy.
        Moving this data weighs in a stringent audits and oversight
    mechanism that this Committee has worked over the years to put
    in place and now has added on 20 more amendments to do more.
        It makes it less vulnerable to abuse. And I want to
    reiterate, the team--the telecom providers want no part of it.
    They say so; they never have. They didn't under FISA, but they
    had to.
        Blanket liability probably did the trick but that's a very
    different situation. This is not a foundation for a good
    partnership.
        In fact, for context, under the existing system there are
    only 22 supervisors in the intelligence directorate, highly
    trained and skilled, and 33 intelligence analysts who work
    specifically in the intelligence directorate.
        These are professionals. They've spent their careers
    preparing to do this job and to do it well. They work in an
    extremely controlled environment with anonymized data. Their
    queries are subject to multiple overlapping checks, audits and
    inspections, and keeping in mind that these queries involve
    only anonymous numbers, no name, no content, no location,
    unlike many private companies, no-one is listening to your
    private conversations or reading your e-mail.
        The data is highly secure. It's secure. And the queries of
    the data are conducted only by highly trained professionals,
    which the telecom companies do not have and could not be
    trained to have for a very long period of time, plus they don't
    want any part of it.
        Last year this Committee worked to significantly strengthen
    215 oversight with the adoptions of 20 major reforms, making
    the telecom providers keep the metadata for intelligence
    purposes where it will be needed to be searched, or introduced
    a whole new range of privacy and security concerns.
        I think going down this path will threaten, not strengthen,
    our ability to protect this country and the American people
    from a terrorist attack and massive invasions of their privacy.
        OK. I used my time. But I can't tell you how strongly I
    feel about this.
        The President left us in a very interesting position. He
    said, I want to keep collecting. I want to keep collecting. But
    I don't want the--I don't want the government to maintain--NSA
    to maintain the metadata.
        And then he started talking about another entity, private
    entity. I think we all agree long hence that that's an
    impossibility, not yet created, no experience, does not exist.
        So what does that leave? That leaves the telecommunications
    companies and they don't want it. And they shouldn't have it,
    in the interest of national security.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much for that, Senator
    Rockefeller.
        I would like to point out, so the public knows, Senator
    Rockefeller is chairman of the Commerce Committee and, in my
    view, he knows what he's talking about.
        Chairman Feinstein. Senator Burr.
        Senator Burr. Thank you, Chairman.
        Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for what you do day-in and
    day-out. And thank your colleagues for us. As the vice chairman
    said, he and I had the opportunity to be in Afghanistan for
    part of last week and we met with many people who work for you
    and are doing a great job in a very challenging and difficult
    area of the world, and we're grateful for that.
        Director Clapper, over the last several years, the
    committee's had some difficulty receiving timely briefings
    after significant events or terrorist attacks, despite the
    commitment we had from you that those briefings would happen
    within 24 hours.
        Moving forward, will you renew your commitment to the
    Committee to brief us on those events in a timely fashion?
        Director Clapper. Yes, sir. We always strive to do that.
        Senator Burr. Director Olsen, without getting into
    sensitive sources and methods, how would you characterize the
    intelligence community's ability to provide tactical warnings
    of terrorist attacks that are on U.S. interests?
        Director Olsen. It's a complicated question. I mean,
    obviously it's a focus of ours to be able to provide that level
    of tactical warning. As we've discussed, the nature of the
    threat has become significantly more geographically spread out.
    And that challenges the Community in collecting the kinds of
    information that would provide that type of tactical warning.
        And we've seen the types of smaller-scale attacks,
    particularly on soft targets. I think, for example, of the
    attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. That type of attack,
    using small arms, a small number of individuals, puts a great
    deal of pressure on us in order to provide the type of tactical
    warning that would save lives under those circumstances.
        So it's a focus of ours. We have increased our cooperation
    and interaction in particular with the State Department and
    diplomatic security as a community. We come together as a
    community to do that. But as I've said, it's difficult to
    provide the level of tactical warning that would provide, you
    know, the advance warning necessary to preserve lives under
    those circumstances.
        Senator Burr. Thank you.
        Director Brennan, without getting into sensitive sources
    and methods, how would you assess the counterintelligence
    capabilities of al-Qaeda and its affiliates?
        Director Brennan. Increasingly good. And unfortunately, I
    think they just have to pick up the papers sometimes or do some
    Google searches for what has been disclosed and leaked. And
    they really go to school on that. And they adapt their
    practices accordingly. And they take steps to protect their
    ability to communicate, to move and to operate.
        And so, we are giving them, I think, the substance for
    their counterintelligence programs.
        Senator Burr. Thank you.
        Director Comey, can you assure this Committee, the Congress
    and the American people that the FBI has and will continue to
    pursue the individuals who killed four Americans in Benghazi?
        Director Comey. Absolutely, Senator, you have that
    commitment. It remains one of our very top priorities. I have a
    lot of people working very hard on it right now.
        Senator Burr. We realize that the ability to share actions
    that the bureau might have taken in this case are limited. But
    I think I speak for the entire Committee that anytime we can be
    briefed on progress, I hope you will do so.
        Director Comey. Yes, sir.
        Senator Burr. General Flynn, when I saw one of my
    colleagues ask about cybersecurity, it seemed like you had
    something you wanted to contribute to that. Let me give you
    this opportunity, because I think you're in a unique position
    to comment on it.
        Lt. General Flynn. Well, I would just offer on
    cybersecurity, one of the other aspects, you know, Director
    Clapper mentioned state actors. I think that what is a serious
    threat that we are paying very close attention to are these
    non-nation-state groups and actors, al-Qaeda being among them,
    as one organization among many others, are what I would just
    describe as in the transnational organized criminal elements
    that are also operating in the cyber domain. And they have no
    rules that they have to adhere to. And they are increasingly
    adapting to an environment that is actually benefiting them.
        And so I think that we--while we definitely need to pay
    attention to those nation-states that have, you know, that in
    some cases have parity with us, we also have to pay very close
    attention to the non-nation-state actors that are out there
    that are doing things like we see--that have already been
    described here today. And that, to me, is an increasingly
    growing threat.
        Senator Burr. Great. I thank, once again, all of you for
    your willingness to be here.
        I thank the chairman, and yield the time.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you, Senator Burr.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Director Clapper, do you have an intelligence assessment of
    the impact of the interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program?
    Does it slow it down, pause it? The requirements, as you know,
    about dilution and limitations of centrifuges and those kinds
    of things, is this going to have a real impact on the progress
    of nuclear capability in Iran?
        Director Clapper. Yes, it will, Senator King. Clearly, it
    gets at the key thing we're interested in and most concerned
    about is the more highly enriched uranium--the 20 percent
    enriched uranium. So, yes, it does.
        Senator King. Second question. You told us back on the
    20th, quote, ``We judge that the new--that new sanctions would
    undermine the prospects of a successful comprehensive nuclear
    agreement with Iran.'' Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in early
    December said that the entire deal would be, quote, ``dead'' if
    the international community imposed new sanctions.
        Is that still your view?
        Director Clapper. Yes, sir. It would be good to have them
    in reserve if we need them, but I think right now the
    imposition of more sanctions would be counterproductive.
        Senator King. How do you mean ``in reserve''? If the
    Congress passed them, would you consider--
        Director Clapper. Well, obviously, the Iranians understand
    our system. And the point there is that if the--if we had
    additional sanctions right now, I think this would, you know,
    the Iranians would live up to their word and it would
    jeopardize the agreement. But they understand that this is a
    subject of great interest in the U.S. Congress. And to me, just
    that fact alone is a great incentive to ensure compliance with
    the bargain.
        Senator King [continuing]. So what you're suggesting is we
    don't need new sanctions. Even those that have a delayed
    trigger, it's the knowledge that Congress can impose them that
    provides the impetus.
        Director Clapper. That would be my view, yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Another question for you, Director Clapper. There have been
    suggestions from outside groups, and we hear it all the time,
    that section 215 really doesn't produce anything useful. And
    we've had testimony about plots thwarted. In order for us to
    assess this difficult issue, which as Senator Rockefeller
    pointed out, the President sort of tossed back in our laps.
        On the one hand, we want to weigh national security
    concerns and the importance and significance of the program,
    against privacy rights and the concerns of the public about
    having large amounts of telephony--telephonic data in the
    government's hands.
        Is the program effective? Does it make a difference? Is it
    an important tool? Or is it just something that's nice to have?
        Director Clapper. I think it's an important tool. And I
    also think, and I said this before, that simply using the
    metric of plots foiled is not necessarily a way to get at the
    value of the program. What it does is allows us to eliminate
    the possibility of a terrorist nexus in a domestic context.
        So, for example, last summer when I think 20 or so
    diplomatic facilities in the Mideast were closed because of
    various threat conditions, and in the course of that we came
    across nine selectors that pointed--indicated--pointed to the
    United States. So the use of this tool, of the 215 tool,
    enabled us to quickly eliminate the possibility of a domestic
    nexus. So, to me, that's another important way of considering
    the value of the 215 program.
        Senator King. Director Comey, do you have views on the
    significance of 215? You understand that this is not easy for
    this Committee. The public is very skeptical. And in order for
    us to continue to maintain it, we have to be convinced that it
    is in fact effective and not just something that the
    Intelligence Community thinks is nice to have in their toolkit.
        Director Comey. Yes, I totally understand people's concerns
    and questions about them. They're reasonable questions. I
    believe it's a useful tool. For the FBI, its primary value is
    agility. That is, it allows us to do in minutes what would
    otherwise take us hours. And I'll explain what I mean by that.
        If a terrorist is identified in the United States or
    something blows up in the United States, we want to understand,
    OK, is there a network that we're facing here? And we take any
    telephone numbers connected to that terrorist, that attack.
        And what I would do in the absence of 215, is use the legal
    process that we use every day, either grand jury subpoenas or
    national security letters. And by subpoenaing each of the
    telephone companies I would assemble a picture of whether
    there's a network connected to that terrorist.
        That would take hours. What this tool allows us to do is do
    that in minutes. Now, in most circumstances the difference
    between hours and minutes isn't gonna be material, except when
    it matters most.
        And so, it's a useful tool to me because of the agility it
    offers. And so, I think it's a healthy discussion to discuss,
    so what might replace it and how would we change it?
        I would just want folks to understand what the trade-offs
    would be in any diminution in that agility. But that's where it
    matters most to the FBI.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. That's very helpful to the
    dialogue. Thank you very much, Senator King.
        Senator Risch.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Director Clapper, I want to compliment you for how you put
    together your statement here in putting cybersecurity at the
    top. This is the one open hearing we have every year. And those
    of us sitting in this panel spend most of a couple afternoons a
    week going through this stuff.
        I think the American public really does not have an
    understanding of how important this threat is. I notice you put
    it ahead of terrorism. You put it ahead of weapons of mass
    destruction. You put it ahead of proliferation. And I think you
    wisely did that.
        You said that the industrial control systems and
    supervisory control and data acquisition systems used in water
    management, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power
    distribution and mass transit provides an enticing target to
    malicious actors.
        And I couldn't agree with you more, except I think that
    that is a real understatement of what the situation is out
    there. Certainly they are attractive targets.
        But, more importantly than that, we've got chinks in our
    armor, as you know. And although we do our best with firewalls
    and what have you, this is something we've got to get more
    diligent at.
        I bring this up because in my state, in Idaho Falls, Idaho,
    at the Idaho National Laboratory, there's nobody doing more on
    supervisory control and data acquisition matters. And we also
    have the isolatable transmission and distribution system we
    call the loop, and a very important wireless test bed, national
    user facility at the Idaho National Laboratory.
        The problem I have is this. I've spent a lot of time there.
    I've spent a lot of time with the people there. And they are
    grossly underfunded in what they're doing.
        Now, that's true in all areas of government spending, and
    we're all under tremendous pressure. I know that. Everybody in
    this room knows that. And there's no bigger advocate for
    cutting than I am.
        But, inasmuch as you have put this at the top of your
    priorities, what I would urge you to do is review our
    priorities of spending and look at these particular operations
    at the Idaho National Laboratory. They're doing a lot of good
    work in this. And this is an area that we truly do need to be
    more vigilant on.
        And it's unfortunate that Americans can't hear the kinds of
    things that we hear that are really quite frightening as far as
    what the possibilities are if we are subject to a cyber attack
    in this and many other areas.
        So I'd urge you to consider that, Director Clapper, and
    appreciate your bringing this to the forefront and to the
    focus.
        Director Clapper. Senator, thanks very much for that. It
    gives me a chance to say something about the entirety of the
    DOE lab complex, which is a phenomenal contributor to U.S.
    national intelligence.
        It has unique expertise, unique technical competence that
    is unmatched anywhere else in the Intelligence Community.
    That's something I've been working with the DOE headquarters to
    try to rationalize the way in which we convey funding from the
    national intelligence program to all the labs. So, I'm very
    sensitive to that, and I appreciate you bringing it up.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Director Clapper. We appreciate
    that also. And I think the American people will appreciate
    that, even though they don't, and really can't know the details
    of it.
        Director Brennan and Director Flynn, these next remarks are
    directed to you. I have a constituent, Sergeant Beau Bergdahl,
    who's being held captive. And I want to publicly thank you for
    the exchanges, the information and the frequent interchange
    between both myself and your office and my staff and your
    office staff.
        It's impossible to sit here and convey to you what this
    family is going through. We all say we can't understand, and we
    really can't.
        And, obviously, without getting into the classified
    material or saying something unintentionally that would impact
    his safety, I think we'd go a long ways to helping his family
    have some peace if you would reiterate publicly, as you have to
    me privately, about what a high area of concern this is for the
    United States government to return Sergeant Beau Bergdahl to us
    personally.
        Lt. General Flynn. Yes. And Senator, thanks. Thanks for
    reminding the American public about Beau and his plight right
    now.
        I would tell you that every soldier that we have on the
    battlefield that is in a situation like that is--becomes our
    number one priority. There are, 24 hours a day, seven days a
    week, there are dedicated resources to doing everything we can
    to bring him home safe and sound.
        And I would just say to the family, I can't imagine what
    they go through, but they have our absolute commitment from
    the--all the leadership, and I know I can speak for this table
    here from the Intelligence Community, but definitely all the
    leadership inside of the Department of Defense to bring him
    home safe and sound.
        Senator Risch. Thank you, Director.
        Director Brennan.
        Director Brennan. Senator, I'd just say that when I was at
    the White House, I had the honor and privilege to meet with
    Sergeant Bergdahl's mother and father. It was a very moving
    experience.
        And I told them then that we would do everything possible
    to bring their son home safely. He is somebody who was on the
    front lines, keeping this country safe. And I know that we are
    doing that on a regular basis. And so we--our thoughts and
    prayers are with the family as well as with Sergeant Bergdahl.
        Senator Risch. Thank you from the bottom of our hearts for
    your efforts in that regard.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thanks, Senator Risch.
        Senator Rubio.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Thank you all for being here today.
        I wanted to touch on something that was actually touched
    upon last night in the State of the Union and may have been
    addressed earlier before I came.
        And it's this; on the one hand we keep hearing how the core
    of al-Qaeda has been significantly degraded, particularly in
    its presence in the FATA, et cetera, and in Afghanistan before
    that.
        But on the other hand, we see that their power is now
    growing in a diffuse way. We see it in North Africa, Lebanon,
    Syria, Iraq. And, of course, there's still a presence in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. There's the concern about fighters
    from Syria returning to Europe and other countries.
        Isn't this diffusion of their presence and power, isn't
    this an even bigger and more complex challenge than when they
    were, than when their core was centralized in one place?
        Director Clapper. Senator, let me start. Senator Rubio,
    actually, it is, because of the dispersal and the growth of the
    so-called franchises into many other areas of the world; much
    more globally dispersed.
        That, plus the fact that, as we've also discussed here
    today, they've gone to school us on how we try to track them.
    So the combination of those factors, the geographic dispersal
    and the increasing challenges in collecting against them, makes
    al-Qaeda, in all of its forms, a very--in total, a very
    formidable threat.
        Matt.
        Director Olsen. Senator, yes, I agree wholeheartedly with
    Director Clapper.
        I think it is important to think about the threat in a
    number of different ways. So there is a group core al-Qaeda.
    And, as the President said last night, that group is on the
    path to defeat. That is the group that brought forward 9/11,
    led by Zawahiri.
        Operationally, that group is not what it was 10 years ago.
    It is the ideological leader of a movement that has spread. And
    that movement has spread both in terms of the geographic
    presence in a number of different countries across the Middle
    East and North Africa.
        It's spread in terms of the diversity of actors. A number
    of those actors have a largely local or regional agenda. In
    other words, they don't necessarily pose a threat to us here at
    home, at least not now.
        And it's also changed in the way Director Clapper has said,
    in that they've innovated and they've--sought out ways to carry
    out attacks that are not as complicated, that--and they've
    promoted the idea of lone attacks or smaller-scale attacks that
    would be harder for us to detect.
        So, in all of those ways, it's a more complicated and more
    challenging threat.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        The second issue I wanted to focus on that really bothers
    me sometimes is these romanticized notions about who Edward
    Snowden is and what he's done to this country.
        You know, all the reporting's been centered on things we've
    read in the papers about the 215 programs, but his revelations
    go far beyond that.
        Is it safe to say that he has not just compromised
    operations, but there are Americans and allies who are at risk
    because of the actions of this individual?
        Director Clapper. Absolutely, sir. That's--yes.
        Senator Rubio. And, is it also safe to say that General
    Flynn, I would ask you this. Are there men and women in uniform
    who are potentially in harm's way because of what this
    individual has done?
        Lt. General Flynn. Senator, I believe there are.
        Senator Rubio. All right.
        Is it safe to say that the revelations that he has made,
    what this individual has done is perhaps the gravest violation
    and most significant, most harmful revelation of American
    intelligence secrets in our history?
        Lt. General Flynn. Yes, sir. As I stated at the outset,
    that's how I would characterize it.
        Senator Rubio. I wanted to ask you quickly about Asia.
        I just returned from a trip to Japan. I know that they've
    recently made changes to their intelligence--the laws governing
    their intelligence programs.
        Could you comment, whoever would be appropriate, briefly on
    how that's increased our ability to partner with them, and how
    you see the opportunities to more fully engage with the
    Japanese in intelligence sharing, given their increased
    capacity and the protections now afforded?
        Director Clapper. Yes, sir. I was aware of your visit and
    appreciate your engagement with some of our intel people.
        Senator Rubio. Are you following me? No, I'm kidding.
        Director Clapper. The Japanese are emerging as great
    partners. They--and the passage of this Secrets Protection
    Laws, as it's called, are going to do just as you inferred,
    enable us (sic) to do more sharing with us.
        We are in--have agreed on a recent--recently on an
    intelligence sharing arrangement where they will be sharing
    with us. I would be happy to go into more detail about this.
    But really emerging as great intelligence partners and this
    extends to the prime minister.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio.
        That completes the round. It's my understanding that
    Members do not request a second round with one exception, and
    that is Senator Wyden, who would like to ask a ten-second
    question.
        Questions will be sent to the panel and hopefully, you will
    respond to them rather promptly.
        Your ten seconds are upon you.
        Senator Wyden. Thank you, Madam Chair. This is a request
    for the record. General Clapper, and it's apropos good point
    that Senator King meant. He asked you and General Comey whether
    bulk collection of all these phone records on law-abiding
    Americans were necessary to prevent terror, and you all said it
    was because of timeliness.
        As you know, the Independent Review Commission at page 104
    of their report said that was not the case. They could get the
    data in a timely way without collecting all of these millions
    of phone records on law-abiding Americans.
        So if you all would, for the record--and I've asked this as
    well before, give us an example of a time you need a record
    that was so old that the relevant phone company no longer had
    it.
        And I'm going to say, Mr. Director, I think that's
    possible, within 30 days, to have an answer to that. Since I've
    asked it repeatedly if there's some reason you can't do it, let
    me know.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
        And you had a long ten seconds. Be grateful.
        Ladies and gentlemen, thank you. And, gentlemen, thank you
    very much and the people that you represent. This Committee
    appreciates their service and your service.
        So the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                             Supplemental Material

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