[Senate Hearing 113-540]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-540
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE ``UMBRELLA MOVEMENT''
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 3, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BARBARA BOXER, California RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Bush, Dr. Richard III, Director, Center for Northeast Asian
Policy Studies, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan
Studies, senior fellow, foreign policy, Brookings Institute,
Washington, DC, prepared statement............................. 12
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Richardson, Dr. Sophie, China Director, Human Rights Watch,
Washington, DC, prepared statement............................. 15
Russel, Hon. Daniel, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Submitted written testimony of Ellen Bork, senior fellow, Foreign
Policy Initiative, Washington, DC.............................. 25
(iii)
EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF THE ``UMBRELLA MOVEMENT''
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Cardin and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Let me welcome you all to the Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
I have checked with Senator Rubio, and he consented that,
because of the time issues--and that is that there are a series
of votes that should take, unfortunately, the rest of the
morning, starting at about 10 o'clock this morning and because
of other scheduled meetings of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, including a meeting with King Abdullah and a hearing
on Iran sanctions, it is not possible to extend this hearing
beyond the very short period of time that we have available.
So, I thank the witnesses for their understanding, and we
are going to try to expedite this. There may be questions for
the record, because we may not have time to ask all the
questions. And I would ask the witnesses to please respond to
questions that may be asked for the record that normally would
have been given.
This will be the last hearing that I chair for the
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. And I really
want to thank Senator Rubio for his help and cooperation. I
think we have had a good schedule of hearings on the Rebalance
to Asia and all the different components of it. We started with
human rights, and we end with human rights.
And I thank Danny Russel, the Assistant Secretary, who has
been incredibly helpful to us in understanding the issues, has
worked very closely with our committee.
And, Danny, I thank you personally for all of your help.
I do want to acknowledge the staff that have been, I think,
incredibly helpful to me. I had a lot of experience in Europe,
not much in Asia, and they really covered for me well, and I
want to thank them all personally for doing that. Algene
Sarjery, of my staff, who has been incredibly helpful; Kelly
Swaine, who is a detailee from the Department of State; Michael
Schiffer, from the committee staff; Carolyn Leddy, Victor
Cervino, and Jamie Fly, from Senator Rubio's staff. All of them
have really made, I think, the work of this subcommittee very
productive. It was certainly done in a nonpartisan way, and I
thank them for their help.
We clearly have a very serious issue regarding what is
going on in Hong Kong today. The last 48 hours have been very
disturbing. We saw some violence, and we saw the end of this
phase of the protests without the accomplishment of universal
suffrage, which was a commitment given by the Chinese
Government as a followup to the original Joint Declaration. So,
clearly, we are concerned about that. There is legislation
pending in the Congress to deal with this. The United States
acted, in 1992, in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act,
saying human rights are of great importance to the United
States and directly relevant to U.S. interests. And we gave
Hong Kong status as a separate entity, but the President can
take that status away if he believes Hong Kong is not
sufficiently autonomous to justify such treatment.
So, Secretary Russel, it is a pleasure to have you here.
And, without objection, all of your written statements will
be made part of the record, for both panels, and the members'
opening statements will also be made part of the record.
Secretary Russel.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. DANIEL RUSSEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I thank
you both for the opportunity to testify on this important and
timely topic, but also thanks to you, personally, for your
leadership and your partnership as chairman of this
subcommittee.
Secretary Kerry has made the U.S. position very clear, in
public and in private. An open society with a high degree of
autonomy and rule of law has made Hong Kong successful and is
essential to its future stability and prosperity. So, the
United States supports universal suffrage and the aspirations
of the Hong Kong people under the ``one country, two system''
framework.
As President Obama said at a press conference in Beijing
last month with President Xi Jinping standing right next to
him, the United States consistently speaks out on the right of
people to express themselves and encourages that the elections
in Hong Kong are transparent and fair and reflective of the
opinions of the people there. We believe that the legitimacy of
the Hong King Chief Executive will be greatly enhanced by
universal suffrage, by an election that provides the people of
Hong Kong a meaningful choice of candidates representative of
the voters' will. This means allowing for a competitive
election in which a range of candidates with different policy
approaches are given an opportunity to seek the support of
eligible Hong Kong voters.
In regard to the ongoing pro-democracy demonstrations in
Hong Kong, the United States has consistently emphasized our
support for freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, and
we have encouraged both sides to address their differences
peacefully through dialogue. And we have been clear, in the
face of Chinese allegations, that the United States is not in
any way involved in the protests. In fact, it is disingenuous
to suggest that this debate is driven by outsiders, when it is
so clearly about Hong Kongers' own hopes for their future.
It is important to note that the electoral reform process
in Hong Kong is still underway. The debate is ongoing, and
legislative action is planned for the first half of 2015.
Failure to enact reforms would be a setback. We, therefore,
encourage Beijing, the Hong Kong Government, and the people of
Hong Kong to work together to ensure that a competitive process
for the selection of the Chief Executive through universal
suffrage is established for 2017. A multicandidate, competitive
election would be a major step in Hong Kong's, and indeed the
People's Republic of China's, political development.
The United States and Hong Kong are bound by shared values,
economic and cultural relations, and people-to-people ties.
Hong Kong has long protected fundamental freedoms. It is number
one on the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index. It is
the ninth-largest market for U.S. exports. It is a key source
of foreign direct investment in the United States. That gives
the United States, as well as China, a vested interest in
preserving the system and autonomy of Hong Kong that brings
stability and prosperity. That is why we stress the importance
of China upholding its commitments. That is why we continue to
speak out clearly and remain engaged on Hong Kong.
Thank you. I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel Russel
introduction
Today's hearing is timely given the debate taking place in Hong
Kong over electoral reforms and the implementation of universal
suffrage for the 2017 selection of Hong Kong's next Chief Executive. I
welcome this opportunity to share with the committee the
administration's views and response to political developments in Hong
Kong, particularly with regard to the National People's Congress
Standing Committee's (NPCSC) August 31 decision and the Hong Kong
Government's response to the protests. I would also like to touch on
the importance of our relationship with Hong Kong under the ``One
Country, Two Systems'' framework.
Secretary Kerry is watching the situation in Hong Kong closely. The
administration believes that an open society, with a high degree of
autonomy and governed by the rule of law, is essential for Hong Kong's
stability and prosperity--indeed this is what has made Hong Kong such a
successful and truly global city. As we do around the world, the United
States advocates in China for internationally recognized fundamental
freedoms, such as freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of
expression.
Long before Hong Kong made its way into headlines, we made clear to
Beijing our support for universal suffrage and the aspirations of the
Hong Kong people under the ``One Country, Two Systems'' framework. We
will not back off on that support. We have reaffirmed our position
publicly and privately in numerous meetings with Chinese and Hong Kong
officials at all levels of government. Most recently, Secretary Kerry
raised Hong Kong in meetings with Chinese interlocutors in the runup to
the APEC summit in Beijing, and President Obama made these points there
in his meetings with President Xi. As the President said at a press
conference in Beijing with President Xi standing next to him, the
United States is going to ``consistently speak out on the right of
people to express themselves, and encourage that the elections that
take place in Hong Kong are transparent and fair and reflective of the
opinions of people there.''
The ``One Country, Two Systems'' model, which is a long-standing
Chinese position put forward by Deng Xiaoping and reflected in the
PRC's Constitution, has provided a solid foundation for our strong
relationship with Hong Kong. It means, among other things, that China
accepts that Hong Kong government will retain its own legislative and
judicial powers, as well as its own laws. And it means that Hong Kong's
freedoms should be guaranteed by the PRC. At the time of reversion in
1997, China--under the ``Basic Law''--committed to several important
principles: ``One Country, Two Systems,'' ``Hong Kong people governing
Hong Kong,'' maintenance of ``a high degree of autonomy,'' and that the
Chief Executive and all the members of the Legislative Council should
be elected by ``universal suffrage.''
The ``One Country, Two Systems'' principle has enabled Hong Kong to
flourish as an important example of prosperity, tolerance, open
expression, and free market ideals. ``One Country, Two Systems'' has
been central to Hong Kong's economic success. Hong Kong currently ranks
first in the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom. The PRC,
I would note, ranks 137th.
Mr. Chairman, preserving Hong Kong's unique system and character
serves the best interests of all parties. So we are concerned by signs
that China's commitment to the ``One Country, Two Systems'' model, as
well as to maintaining a high degree of autonomy, are eroding. While
Hong Kong's media environment remains far less restricted than on the
mainland, the steady downward trend in media freedom is troubling. The
ability of Hong Kong's judiciary system to remain independent in the
long term will be another critical indicator of China's commitment to
the unique ``One Country, Two Systems'' model.
In addition, the legitimacy of Hong Kong's Chief Executive will be
greatly enhanced if the promise of universal suffrage is fulfilled. By
this I mean an election that provides the people of Hong Kong a
meaningful choice of candidates representative of the voters' will.
This means allowing for a competitive election in which a range of
candidates with differing policy approaches are given an opportunity to
seek the support of eligible Hong Kong voters.
That is why the administration has called on the PRC to uphold its
commitments to Hong Kong under the Basic Law to preserve Hong Kong's
freedoms and autonomy, including through universal suffrage. We
encourage Beijing, the Hong Kong government and the people of Hong Kong
to work together to advance Hong Kong's democratic development,
establish universal suffrage by 2017, and preserve Hong Kong's autonomy
and its free and open society.
Beijing's Decision and the Nominating Committee
Based on the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law from
1997, in 2007 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
(NPCSC) agreed that the election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive ``may
be implemented by the method of universal suffrage'' in 2017. Over the
last year, the people of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government, and the
authorities in Beijing have vigorously debated how that process should
take place.
Early this year, the Hong Kong government held a first round of
public consultations to discuss the implementation of universal
suffrage for the 2017 election. Hong Kong residents submitted numerous
suggestions for designing the electoral system and many Hong Kong
residents voiced their desire for significant democratic reform. I
visited Hong Kong in early May and met with a broad cross-section of
the public, including representatives of civil society and various
political parties, in addition to the head of the Legislative Council
and senior officials in the Hong Kong government. I can attest to the
vigorous and open debate in Hong Kong about how best to implement
universal suffrage.
That debate intensified during the summer. Local NGOs conducted an
online poll of public opinion in which almost 800,000 Hong Kong
residents expressed pro-democracy views, and in early July, perhaps as
many as 500,000 Hong Kong residents took part in the annual pro-
democracy demonstration. The Hong Kong government in July submitted a
report to Beijing based on its results of the public consultation and
the NPCSC then issued its decision on August 31.
The NPCSC decision on August 31 set limits on the selection of the
Chief Executive by universal suffrage. It limited the number of
candidates to two or three, required the Chief Executive to be a person
who ``loves the country and loves Hong Kong,'' and mandated that any
nominee must receive the endorsement of more than half of the 1,200
person nominating committee. While the NPCSC's decision conformed to
requirements of the Basic Law in the literal sense, it was criticized
by many Hong Kong groups and triggered the public protests that are
still underway. The objection to the NPCSC decision of August 31 is
that it would effectively block nonestablishment candidates from
competing in the election for Chief Executive.
The Protests and the Hong Kong Government Response
On September 26, a week-long student strike and independently
organized demonstrations against Beijing's decision escalated when a
few dozen university students entered the grounds of Hong Kong
government headquarters. When a crowd surged onto a major adjacent
thoroughfare, Hong Kong police used tear gas to disperse the crowd.
Rather than dispersing the protesters, however, the use of tear gas
prompted more residents to take to the streets and protesters settled
into three main protest locations.
On October 21, the Hong Kong government and leaders from the Hong
Kong Federation of Students engaged in one round of televised talks,
but there has been little dialogue reported between the two sides
since. The Hong Kong government has complained that the protest
movement lacks representative leadership it can negotiate with.
Protesters have countered that the government is not taking their
demands seriously.
Within the past 2 weeks, Hong Kong police have enforced civil court
injunctions to clear certain protest sites. While there were some
clashes between police and protesters in clearance operations in the
Mongkok area, we assessed that both parties had for the most part acted
with patience and restraint. The alarming flareup on November 30 near
Hong Kong government offices demonstrates, however, that the potential
for violence remains and that all sides need now more than ever to
exercise restraint and to lower tensions.
Since these protests began in September, we have emphasized at all
levels our support for freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of
expression without fear of retribution. We have encouraged the Hong
Kong authorities and the protestors to address their differences
through dialogue. We have urged the Hong Kong government to act with
restraint and the protestors to express their views peacefully. We have
also categorically denied allegations from China that the United States
is in any way involved in the protests. It is disingenuous to suggest
that this debate is driven by outsiders when it is so clearly about
Hong Kongers' hopes for their future.
Next Steps
It is important to note that the electoral reform process in Hong
Kong is still underway. Due to the protests, the Hong Kong government
delayed a second round of public consultations, which are now expected
to begin later this month. These consultations are meant to allow the
public to provide input into how the nominating committee will be
constituted and the mechanism by which candidates will be selected. It
will be during this round of consultations that the government and the
residents of Hong Kong explore options for devising a nominating system
that can garner a sufficient number of votes to pass the legislature.
In order for electoral reforms to be implemented, a bill to amend
the Basic Law must pass the Legislative Council with a two-thirds
majority and be approved by Beijing. This legislative action is planned
for the first half of 2015. If the Legislative Council does not amend
the Basic Law by the summer of 2015, Beijing has said that the 2017
election for Chief Executive would again be carried out under the
existing system under which the Chief Executive is selected by an
Election Committee of 1,200 members rather than directly by Hong Kong's
5 million potentially eligible voters. This would be a significant
setback to the democratization process, and it underscores the
importance of the efforts by Hong Kong's authorities and its people to
design an electoral process that maximizes progress toward universal
suffrage under the Basic Law.
Conversely, if the Basic Law is amended to provide for a
multicandidate selection process for the Chief Executive, 2017 will
mark the first time in Hong Kong's history that its citizens will be
given a voice in that choice. A multicandidate competitive election
would be a major step in Hong Kong's, and indeed the People's Republic
of China's, political development.
U.S. Interests and Actions
Mr. Chairman, allow me to describe the importance we place on our
relationship with Hong Kong. This relationship rests on three pillars:
shared values, economic and cultural relations, and people-to-people
ties. Hong Kong has long reflected and protected fundamental freedoms:
freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, a strong
independent legal system, rule of law, a free media, and an active
civil society--all values shared with the United States.
We are also linked by strong economic ties. Hong Kong is the ninth-
largest market for U.S. exports and the sixth-largest market for U.S.
agricultural products.
Despite Hong Kong's small population, our trade surplus with Hong
Kong is our largest surplus with any single trading partner. More than
1,400 American companies have invested in and set up shop in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong is a key source of foreign direct investment in the United
States, as well. Hong Kong's world class financial markets, which
include Asia's second-largest stock exchange and third-largest foreign
exchange market, are supported by a transparent regulatory regime and
strict oversight. Hong Kong is a strong voice in both APEC and the WTO
in favor of free trade, often in alignment with our own goals.
This is possible because of Hong Kong's special status under the
principle of ``One Country, Two Systems'' that allows Hong Kong to
operate as a separate customs territory from China and exercise
autonomy in areas other than foreign and defense affairs, including its
judiciary system and its U.S. dollar-linked currency and financial
system. This has allowed us to develop a robust relationship in law
enforcement arenas--including export control, counterterrorism,
counterproliferation, antimoney laundering, and anticorruption--in
which Hong Kong's authorities work with the United States to protect
our security interests. The United States has signed a wide range of
agreements with Hong Kong since the handover, which provide for
extensive technical cooperation in these and other areas. For example,
Hong Kong counterparts respond positively to more than 95 percent of
requests from U.S. Customs to search containers and the Hong Kong
Customs and Excise Department has actively enforced the Convention on
the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).
In addition, we have deep social, cultural, and people-to-people
ties, boosted by the tens of thousands of U.S. citizens residing in
Hong Kong, and the thousands more who visit Hong Kong, visa-free, every
day for business or tourism. Hong Kong is one of the highest per capita
sources in the world of foreign students in America's higher education
system and hosts thousands of American students, academics, and
journalists as well.
conclusion
The United States and China each have a vested interest in Hong
Kong's continued stability, autonomy, and prosperity. It is therefore
important that China upholds its international obligations and
commitments that Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy will be respected
and nurtured. It is in all of our interests to see electoral reform in
Hong Kong that provides the people of Hong Kong a meaningful choice of
candidates, and that the 2017 elections in Hong Kong will be
transparent, fair, and reflective of the opinions of the Hong Kong
people.
We have also consistently counseled the Hong Kong government to
exercise restraint and called on protesters to exercise their right to
freedom of expression peacefully. We have consistently supported
further dialogue between the government and protesters as the best way
for Hong Kong to move this important debate forward. An open society
that respects the rights of its citizens and universal freedoms, with
the highest possible degree of autonomy and governed by the rule of
law, is essential for Hong Kong's continued stability and prosperity.
We will continue to voice our support for universal suffrage in
Hong Kong and to stand up for universal human rights and fundamental
freedoms. We will stand up for Hong Kong's autonomy under ``One
Country, Two Systems'' and the Basic Law. We will continue to encourage
the government and people of Hong Kong to work together peacefully to
advance Hong Kong's democratic development. We believe this engagement
remains the most effective way to preserve Hong Kong's autonomy and
free and open society.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss Hong Kong. I look forward to answering any questions
you and others from the committee may have.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Secretary Russel, again, for all
of your leadership on this issue.
As I pointed out, the 1992 United States-Hong Kong Policy
Act, which acknowledged the separate identity of Hong Kong from
mainland China and recognized the importance of Hong Kong as an
economic partner of the United States and its global role in
the economy, gave the President the ability to eliminate that
status if it is not sufficiently autonomous to justify such
treatment, and spelled out very clearly that human rights are
of great importance to the United States and directly relevant
to United States interests in Hong Kong. The 1984 Joint
Declaration between Great Britain and China, ``one country, two
systems,'' contained in its index the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which provides for universal
suffrage. Then the 1990 China National People's Congress
Declaration, the Basic Law for Hong Kong, spelled out the
ultimate aim and selection of the Chief Executive by universal
suffrage, upon the nomination by a broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.
They clearly are not following that with their most recent
declaration on August 31.
The protests were peaceful. We had nothing to do with the
protests, as you pointed out. The authorities exercised some
restraint, but recently that changed.
My question to you is what action does the administration
intend to take to communicate that their most recent action, on
August 31, was unacceptable? And Congress is prepared to take
action, which, among other things, reinstates our basic
commitment to human rights, but also points out that the annual
report on its progress will be reinstated, but also changing
the burden from the administration having to certify that it is
no longer in status to one where you have to certify that they
are in status. Would that not be helpful in giving you
additional leverage in being able to make it clear that their
current policy is unacceptable?
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for those
questions, and those very important questions.
We, too, were disappointed by the August 31 decision of the
NPC. Now, our analysis suggests that this decision does not
necessarily contravene the letter of the Basic Law, but the
decision could and should have gone much, much further to allow
for a nomination by a broadly representative nominating
committee in accordance with democratic procedures.
Our logic is this. The legitimacy of the Chief Executive,
which matters greatly, would be enhanced by a competitive
electoral process that includes multiple candidates. Our
objective is to encourage a process that culminates in
universal suffrage, which allows the people of Hong Kong to
have a meaningful say in the selection of the Chief Executive.
Now, the August 31 decision that you referenced
circumscribes, to some extent, the nominating process. But,
that process--how to define membership and the procedures of
the nominating committee--is very much still underway, it is
still a work in process. It is going to be the subject of a
second round of public consultations that are expected to start
later this month.
I would also add, Mr. Chairman, that, in our approach,
which has been forceful and clear, we have taken care not to
lose sight of the fact that this is an issue that will and
should be decided by the people of Hong Kong. And they have
demonstrated they are no pushovers. They have shown that they
are willing to express their dissatisfaction and their
aspirations directly to the authorities through responsible and
peaceful dissent. I believe our role is to foster that and to
shine a bright light on the situation and show that we support
the rights of the people of Hong Kong.
So, you asked what we are doing about it. Well, first and
foremost, we are speaking out very clearly and very forcefully.
As I mentioned, I was in the room when President Obama stood
next to Xi Jinping in Beijing and spoke forcefully about our
support for the rights of the people of Hong Kong. I was in the
room when Secretary Kerry stood next to the Chinese Foreign
Minister in front of the cameras and said that we are concerned
about the situation in Hong Kong because human rights are a
centerpiece of American foreign policy. And I can attest,
personally, to the fact that words matter, because I have been
the target of considerable Chinese unhappiness about those
words. We have their attention.
So, my points would be, one, Mr. Chairman, this situation
is still playing out. It is far from over. And it would be a
mistake to underestimate the resolve and the determination of
the Hong Kong people. Two, the Chinese know that the world is
watching. And this matters. It has a reputational cost to them.
With regard to the third part of your question concerning
the prospect of legislation, I know that there is a discussion
underway among our staffs about the specifics. In terms of the
general principle, I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that nothing in
the legislation should undermine the principle that Hong Kong
is autonomous. We want to be careful not to lump Hong Kong and
the mainland together in a way that undercuts inadvertently
that autonomy, because Hong Kong's record in rule of law and
economic freedoms is so important. I mentioned that Hong Kong
scored number one on the Heritage Foundation's list of economic
freedom. Well, what I did not mention is that the PRC ranks
137. These are different systems. And preserving the difference
between these two systems should be an objective of any
legislation.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I agree with you, words do
matter. And I think the President's comments, the Secretary of
State's comments, were strong and very appropriate. So, I agree
with you. But, I think actions are also important. And we are
concerned about how the protesters are going to be treated,
because we know there are some legal issues that are now
pending, some orders that are currently pending, and I would
hope that we will watch very carefully how the legal system of
Hong Kong deals with the individuals that were peacefully
demonstrating. And I can tell you that this Senator is going to
be watching that very closely as it could have major impact on
action that I propose to take in the next Congress.
And then, just the last point I would make, I think it is
very clear the commitment that China made for Hong Kong to be
able to implement universal suffrage. And we acknowledge the
autonomy of Hong Kong, but it appears very clear to us that
China is influencing the implementation of universal suffrage
in a way that is inconsistent with the commitment they gave to
respect the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. And it has been, now, 30 years since the Joint
Declaration. We have passed enough time that this is a critical
milestone as to whether Hong Kong indeed will embrace
democratic principles.
With that, I turn to Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing.
And thank you for being here today.
I wanted to ask you, right off the bat, on September 29,
the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong issued a statement.
Here is what it said, in part, ``We do not take sides in the
discussions of Hong Kong's political development, nor do we
support any particular individuals or groups involved in it.''
Does that reflect the official position of this administration?
That we do not take sides?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you, Mr. Ranking Member, Senator
Rubio. I did not get a chance to express my appreciation for
your work, your leadership, and your support on this
subcommittee.
The statement issued by the consulate in September, which
is one of a long series of public statements by U.S. officials,
was aimed at eradicating a story that was topping the news in
Hong Kong, suggesting that the United States was the hidden
hand behind a particular group or a particular individual
involved in the demonstrations. The fact of the matter is,
Senator, we do take sides. We take the side of justice. We take
the side of freedom. We take the side of dialogue. We take the
side of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. We take the
side of peaceful protest. We do not take sides with an
individual or a particular group.
But, if you look at our statements, the statements of the
U.S. Government, the President, the Secretary of State, and the
consulate, you will see a consistent and clear message of
support for the principle of universal suffrage in line with
the Basic Law, support for the democratic aspirations of the
people of Hong Kong, and, importantly, support for ``one
country, two systems.'' We believe that the United States has a
stake in preserving the unique character and system of Hong
Kong. That is a system that has, as I mentioned before you came
in, the number one spot in the Heritage Foundation's Index of
Economic Freedom. That counts for a lot.
Similarly, we strongly support the process to apply
universal suffrage to the selection of the Chief Executive in
2017. And by ``universal suffrage,'' we do not mean a very
narrowly constructed arrangement, we mean giving voice to the
citizens of Hong Kong, giving them a say in the selection of
their leader.
Senator Rubio. Yes. Well, thank you for that explanation.
That clarifies most of that. But, I did want to ask you this,
then. On the 31st of August, China's National People's
Conference--and I am going to read from it just to make sure
that I get it right--it placed strict conditions, as has been
talked about here. And here is one of the things that they said
about the--that the Deputy Secretary General said, the
candidates would need to, ``love the country''--
I imagine meaning China--``and also love Hong Kong.''
So, I wonder if that--by that term, of ``loving the
country,'' is basically code for loving the--having loyalty to
the Chinese Communist Party. And so, my question is, Is it the
position of this administration that the August decision, with
regard to the nature of this election, is in keeping with the
aims and the requirements of article 45 of the Basic Law? Are
the Chinese compliant with that in their position that they
have taken?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you for that question, Senator.
We were disappointed by the August 31 decision. We think
that that formula excessively circumscribes the selection
process that will be an essential element of the application of
universal suffrage. Our analysis suggests that, while that
decision of the National People's Congress may not literally
contravene the letter of the basic agreement, it falls very far
short of the aspirations of the people of Hong Kong, and it
falls short of what we would hope for, in terms of a nomination
process that would result in a broadly representative
nominating committee, in accordance with democratic procedures.
The key point, Senator, is, we believe that, for the
purposes of Hong Kong's long-term stability and prosperity, the
legitimacy of the Chief Executive will be greatly enhanced by a
credible application of universal suffrage that allows a free
expression of choice by the voters to select from among
competing points of view, not simply a choice between three
identical handpicked candidates. And this is what is under
discussion now among the stakeholders in Hong Kong.
I visited Hong Kong in May and found a very vibrant debate
between nongovernmental groups, between political parties,
between the Hong Kong authorities, and, obviously,
representatives of Beijing. That debate has intensified. It has
spilled out onto the streets. It has taken the form of major
referenda and questionnaires. And, later this month, we expect
and hope that it will again take the form of a second round of
public consultations.
So, we consider this still a work in progress, and it is
our determination, as an administration, to speak out and have
America's voice----
Senator Rubio. But, to summarize your----
Mr. Russel [continuing]. Very clearly----
Senator Rubio [continuing]. Summarize your statement--and I
appreciate your answer--but, to summarize it is that perhaps
they have found a technical way to, at a minimum, be
semicompliant with the letter of law, but certainly fall well
short of the spirit of the law, in----
Mr. Russel. That is our view.
Senator Rubio [continuing]. Regards to how it is been
written.
Well, in that sense, then, is there not a couple of lessons
to be taken from this? The first is that the Chinese Government
has proven to be an untrustworthy ally--or an untrustworthy
partner, in any sort of future--or international agreements. I
mean, they basically signed this agreement, and now have found
interesting ways to circumvent it, certainly in its application
or how it is working, as you said, in the spirit of it. What
does that say about their future reliability in any other
agreement they enter into with us, with the international
community, with anyone?
Mr. Russel. Senator----
Senator Rubio [continuing]. At a minimum, it calls into
question their reliability.
Mr. Russel. Senator, there is no question but that the
United States, the region, and the world is watching how China
deals with Hong Kong and how it implements its commitments
under the Basic Law and other agreements. That is why we have
been urging and counseling the Chinese, both privately and
publicly, to exercise restraint, to be flexible, and to allow
the voices of the people of Hong Kong to be heard.
Their neighbors are drawing conclusions also about China
and about the reliability of China's pledges and commitments. I
do not think that there is a case that can fairly be made to
describe this August 31 decision by the NPC as in direct
contravention of the Basic Law, but I equally believe there is
not a credible case that would allow us to argue that the
August 31 decision furthered the cause of universal suffrage.
Senator Cardin. Senator Rubio has one additional question,
but I just really want to underscore one point of urgency here.
You point out that the region is watching, the world is
watching. And you are absolutely correct. Hong Kong is very
important economically, not just to the United States
bilaterally, but it is a part of the economic fiber of global
commerce. So, there is a great deal of interest in what is
happening. But, when you see what happened in the Taiwan
elections, you know that it has political consequences, at
least the analysis is that it had an impact on the results in
Taiwan's elections. When you look at British parliamentarians
being denied visas to look at the country to see if they are in
compliance with agreements, that raises questions as to whether
China's taken taken this to a different level.
So, I would just underscore the urgency of a strategy that
includes more than just words as it relates to the autonomy and
our relationship with Hong Kong.
And Senator Rubio has one additional question.
Senator Rubio. I just would make the comment, I think you
can make the argument that how you apply a law directly
contradicts its meaning, even if--maybe what they are saying
and what they are doing, here, are two separate things. They
clearly want to influence the outcome of this election toward--
they clearly want to set up a process that would elect someone
that will do their bidding and will be compliant to the wishes
of the Central Government in China. And that is in direct
contradiction to an agreement that was based upon true
autonomy.
And so, I do believe it is in direct contravention of the
agreement. I, furthermore, would say that, you know, there have
been statements--I am sorry--there have--there has been
evidence that these groups of armed thugs who miraculously
showed up out of nowhere to beat up these protesters--I think
the evidence is pretty clear that they were sent there by the
Central Government, at least in my opinion. And I would love to
see someone disprove that. So, I think that you have to look at
that, as well, as a factor in all of this.
But, here is my final point. I think that the learning--the
lesson to be learned by all of this is that all this talk out
there, that the hopes that--you know, these economic
interchanges and dialogue with China was going to change the
nature of the Central Government, is a fairytale. It is wishful
thinking. This government, as it is currently structured in
China, is--this is their nature, is to control, to be
authoritarian. And every instance in which they have been
challenged in that, or have been challenged toward more of a
democratic or a societal opening, they have pushed back
against. And Hong Kong is the latest example of it. And I think
there is a lesson to be learned there, that if we are hanging
our hopes that more economic interchange with them is going to
somehow transform them into a more open, more liberalized, and
more inclusive government, it does not seem that way at this
point, certainly from their reaction with what has happened in
Hong Kong. And I think that that is a factor that we need to
accept today as a reality, and base our policy based on that
reality, because this does not leave me hopeful that this is a
government that, at any point in the near future, is going to
be more open and more accommodating. In fact, it is the tactics
of a government that is becoming increasingly more centralized,
more authoritarian, and more willing to take strong actions
against those who challenge the authority of the Communist
Party and the Central Government. And I think that bodes ill
for the future of the region, and, quite frankly, of the world,
as China takes on a greater economic and military importance.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
Secretary Russel, once again, I personally thank you for
the courtesy, respect, and expertise that you shared with this
subcommittee during the past 2 years. It has been a very open
relationship, with very frank discussions. As a result, I think
the United States spoke with greater strength in our messages
to East Asia and the Pacific. So, thank you very much. And with
that, you are excused.
Mr. Russel. Thank you very much, Chairman.
Senator Cardin. Our second panel is Dr. Richard Bush,
director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Chen-Fu
and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair of Taiwan Studies, senior fellow in
foreign policy, the Brookings Institute; and Dr. Sophie
Richardson, the China director, Human Rights Watch, Washington,
DC.
Our witnesses have agreed that their written statements
will be incorporated in our record, and they are open to us
proceeding directly with questioning. And I appreciate that
very much. And, as I said earlier, we may have some additional
written questions for the record.
[The prepared statements of Dr. Bush and Dr. Richardson
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Richard C. Bush
There has been a wide range of views in Hong Kong about the value
of democratic elections.
So far, the Chinese Government has consistently chosen to engineer
the Hong Kong electoral system so that no individual it mistrusts could
be elected Chief Executive (CE) and no political coalition that it
fears could win control of the Legislative Council (or LegCo). To elect
the Chief Executive, it created an election committee composed mainly
of people it trusts. For LegCo, it established functional
constituencies that give special representation to establishment
economic and social groups. These functional constituencies together
pick half the members of LegCo. As a result, Hong Kong's economic elite
has dominated those institutions.
Major economic interests in Hong Kong have been happy with the
current setup because it provides them with privileged access to
decisionmaking and the ability to block initiatives proposed by the
democratic camp. Within this establishment, there is long-standing
belief that majority rule would create irresistible demands for a
welfare state, which would raise taxes on corporations and wealthy
individuals and so sap Hong Kong's competitiveness.
The public, on the other hand, supports democratization. In the
most representative election races (for some LegCo seats), candidates
of the pro-democracy parties together get 55 to 60 percent of the vote.
Those parties have tried for over 20 years to make the electoral system
more representative and to eliminate the ability of Beijing and the
establishment to control political outcomes. But there are divisions
within the pan-democratic camp between moderate and radical factions,
based on the degree of mistrust of Beijing's intentions.
There is a working class party and a labor confederation that
supports Beijing and is supported by it. On electoral reform, it has
followed China's lead.
Of course, any electoral system requires the protection of
political rights. The Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law
protected those rights on paper, and the judiciary generally has upheld
them. But there are serious concerns in Hong Kong that political rights
are now being whittled away.
The August 31 decision of the PRC National People's Congress-
Standing Committee on the 2017 Chief Executive election confirmed the
fears of Hong Kong's pan-democratic camp that Beijing does not intend
to create a genuinely democratic electoral system. That decision almost
guaranteed there would be with some kind of public protest.
Before August 31, there had been some hope in Hong Kong that
China's leaders would set flexible parameters for the 2017 election of
the Chief Executive, flexible enough to allow an election in which
candidates that represented the range of local opinions could compete
on a level playing field. Instead, the rules the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress laid down were interpreted as ensuring
that Beijing and the local Hong Kong establishment, by controlling the
nominating committee, could screen out candidates that they saw as a
threat to their interests.
I happen to believe that before August 31 there was available a
compromise on the nomination process. The approach I have in mind would
have liberalized the composition of the nominating committee so that it
was more representative of Hong Kong society and set a reasonable
threshold for placing someone in nomination. This would have been
consistent with the Basic Law (a Chinese requirement) and likely
ensured that a pan-Democratic politician could have been nominated (the
democrats' minimum hope). Hong Kong voters would have had a genuine
choice. There were Hong Kong proposals along these lines. Such an
approach would have had a chance of gaining the support of moderate
Democrats in Legislative Council, enough for reaching the two-thirds
majority required for passage of the election plan.
Reaching such a compromise was difficult because of the deep-seated
mistrust between the Hong Kong democratic camp and Beijing, and within
the democratic camp. If there was to be movement toward a deal Beijing
would have had to signal that it was serious about such a compromise,
in order to engage moderate democrats. It chose not to, and an
opportunity was lost.
Why Beijing spurned a compromise is unclear.
Perhaps it interpreted its ``universal suffrage'' pledge narrowly,
to mean one-person-one-vote, and not a competitive election. Perhaps it
wished to defer a truly competitive contest until it was sure that one-
person-one-vote elections would not hurt its interests. Perhaps Beijing
was overly frightened about the proposed civil disobedience campaign
called ``Occupy Central.'' Perhaps it judged that radical democrats
would block their moderate comrades from agreeing to a compromise.
Perhaps China actually believed its own propaganda that ``foreign
forces'' were behind the protests. Perhaps it never had any intention
of allowing truly representative government and majority rule. But if
Beijing believed that taking a hard line would ensure stability, it was
badly mistaken.
Whatever the case, the majority in Hong Kong saw the August 31
decision as a bait-and-switch way for Beijing to continue to control
the outcome of the CE election and as a denial of the long-standing
desire for genuine democracy. A coalition of student leaders, Occupy
Central supporters, democratic politicians, radical activists, and
middle-class people resorted to the only political outlet they had:
public protest. If the Chinese Government had wished to empower Hong
Kong radicals, it couldn't have hit upon a better way.
Although Beijing's August 31 decision guaranteed a public response
in Hong Kong, the form it took was unexpected. Student groups preempted
the original Occupy Central plan, and the takeover of three separate
downtown areas resulted, not from a plan but from the flow of events.
The Hong Kong Police did overreact in some instances, but each time it
sought to reestablish control, there was a surge of public support for
the core protester groups, mobilized by social and other media.
The protests were fueled by more than a desire for democracy.
Also at work were factors common in other advanced societies. Hong
Kong's level of income and wealth inequality is one of the highest in
the world. Young people tend to believe that they will not be able to
achieve a standard of living similar to that of their parents. Real
wages have been flat for more than a decade. Buying a home is out of
reach for young people, in part because a small group of real estate
companies control the housing supply. Smart and ambitious individuals
from China compete for good jobs.
Hong Kong students have gotten the most attention in the current
protests. Just as important however, are older cohorts who are
pessimistic about their life chances. They believe that the Hong Kong
elite, which controls both economic and political power, is to blame
for these problems. They regard genuine democracy as the only remedy.
The Hong Kong government's response has been mixed but restrained
on the whole.
The Hong Kong police did commit excesses in their attempt to
control the crowds. Teargas was used once early on, and pepper spray on
a number of occasions since then. There was one particular incident
where police officers beat a protester excessively (for which seven of
the officers involved were arrested last week).
It is worth noting that the scenario for which the police prepared
was not the one that occurred. What was expected was a civil
disobedience action in a relatively restricted area with a moderate
number of protesters who, following their leaders' plan, would allow
themselves to be arrested. What happened in late September was very
different. There were three venues instead of one. Many more protesters
took part, and they had no interest in quickly offering themselves for
arrest. Instead, they sought to maintain control of public
thoroughfares, a violation of law, until Beijing and the Hong Kong
government made major concessions. Even when courts have ordered some
streets cleared, those occupying have not always complied.
After the initial clashes, the Hong Kong government chose not to
mount a major crackdown but instead to wait out the protesters. It
accepted the occupation for a number of weeks, and now seeks to clear
some streets pursuant to court order. Moreover, the government
undertook to engage at least one of the students in a dialogue over how
to end the crisis. In the only session of the dialogue to occur, on
October 21, senior officials floated ideas to assuage some of the
protesters' concerns and to improve upon the electoral parameters laid
down by Beijing.
The dialogue has not progressed for two reasons. First of all, the
Hong Kong government is not a free agent in resolving the crisis.
Beijing is the ultimate decider here, and the Hong Kong government must
stay within the guidelines it sets. Second, the student federation
leaders who took part in the dialogue are not free agents either. They
represent only one of the student groups, and other actors are
involved. With its leadership fragmented, the movement has never
figured out its minimum goals and therefore what it would accept in
return for ending the protest. It underestimated Beijing's resolve and
instead has insisted on the impossible, that Beijing withdraw the
August 31 decision. Now, even though the Hong Kong public and the
leaders of the original Occupy Central effort believe that the
protesters should retire to contend another day, the occupation
continues.
For those who believe that the rule of law is a fundamental pillar
of Hong Kong's autonomy, the last 2 months have been worrisome. Once
some members of a community decide for themselves which laws they will
obey and which they won't; once the authorities pick and choose which
laws they will enforce and abide by, the rule of law begins to atrophy.
The protesters' commitment to democracy is commendable. The generally
restrained and peaceable character of their protest has been widely
praised. But something is lost when both the community and its
government begins to abandon the idea that no one is above the law.
Regional views implications: Observers have believed that the
implications of the Umbrella Movement are greatest for Taiwan, because
Beijing has said that Taiwan will be reunified under the same formula
that it used for Hong Kong (one-country, two systems). And there was
momentary media attention in Taiwan when the Hong Kong protests began,
but it quickly dissipated. The vast majority of Taiwan citizens have
long since rejected one-country, two systems. China's Hong Kong
policies only reconfirm what Taiwan people already knew.
Hong Kong events also send a signal to all of East Asia's
democracies, not just Taiwan. Anyone who studies Hong Kong's politics
and society comes to the conclusion that it has been as ready for
democracy as any place in East Asia, and that its instability in recent
years is due more to the absence of democracy than because it is
unready.
The long-standing premise of U.S. policy is that Hong Kong people
are ready for democracy. Since the protest movement began, the U.S.
Government has reiterated its support for the rule of law, Hong Kong's
autonomy, respect for the political freedoms of Hong Kong people, and a
universal-suffrage election that would provide the people of Hong Kong
``a genuine choice of candidates that are representative of the peoples
and the voters' will.'' Washington has also called for restraint on all
sides.
Finally, the strategic question for East Asia is what the rise of
China means for its neighbors. That question will be answered in part
by China's power relative to the United States and others. But it will
also be answered by what happens between China and its neighbors in a
series of specific encounters. Through those interactions, China will
define what kind of great power it will become. North Korea, the East
and South China Seas, and Taiwan are the most obvious of these specific
encounters. But Hong Kong is as well. If the struggle there for a more
democratic system ends well, it will tell us something positive about
China's future trajectory. If it ends badly, it will say something very
different.
Looking forward, several options exist for resolving the crisis and
only one of them is good.
One option is a harsh crackdown by China. Article 18 of the Basic
Law gives Beijing the authority to declare a state of emergency in Hong
Kong if ``turmoil'' there ``endangers national unity or security and is
beyond the control'' of the Hong Kong government. In that case, Chinese
national laws would be applied to Hong Kong and could be enforced in
the same way they are in China. We would then see crowd control,
Chinese style. I believe this scenario is unlikely as long as Beijing
has some confidence that the protest movement will become increasingly
isolated and ultimately collapse.
A second option is that the occupation ends but the
unrepresentative electoral system that has been used up until now
continues. That would happen because two-thirds of the Legislative
Council is required to enact the one-person-one-vote proposal of the
Chinese and Hong Kong governments for electing the Chief Executive.
Getting two-thirds requires the votes of a few democratic members. If
all moderate democrats oppose the package for whatever reason, then the
next CE will be elected by the 1,200-person election committee, not by
Hong Kong voters. Protests are liable to resume. There is a danger that
in response, Beijing will move quietly to restrict press freedom, the
rule of law, and the scope for civil society beyond what it has already
done.
The third scenario is for a late compromise within the parameters
of Beijing's August 31 decision. The goal here would be to create a
process within the nominating committee that would make it possible for
a leader of the democratic camp to be nominated for the Chief Executive
election, creating a truly competitive election. That requires two
things. First, the nominating committee must be more representative of
Hong Kong society. Second, the nominating committee, before it picks
the two or three election nominees, should be able to review a greater
number of potential nominees. Done properly, that could yield the
nomination of a democratic politician whom Beijing does not mistrust
but whose platform would reflect the aspirations of democratic voters.
Prominent individuals in Hong Kong have discussed this approach in
print, and Hong Kong senior officials have hinted a willingness to
consider it. For such a scenario to occur, Beijing would have to be
willing to show more flexibility than demonstrated so far; the Hong
Kong government should be forthcoming about what it has in mind; and
some leaders of the democratic camp must be willing to engage both
Beijing and the Hong Kong government. In the climate of mutual mistrust
that has deepened since August 31, that is a tall order. But at this
point it appears to be the best way out of a bad situation.
______
Prepared Statement of Dr. Sophie Richardson
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rubio, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. As
protestors remain on the streets of Hong Kong, this discussion is
timely, and we hope to clarify the critical human rights issues at
stake.
It is appropriate to recall that in 1997 the hope was that not only
would Hong Kong's autonomy be respected, and the rights to the freedom
of assembly, expression, and political participation there would remain
intact, but also that these realities might have a positive effect on
the mainland. People in Hong Kong have continued to make clear how much
they value an independent judiciary, a free press, a meritocratic civil
service, and a professional police force. Yet developments of the past
year have shown that in fact, the mainland's politics and disdain for
rights are having alarming consequences for those realities, a
territory of critical importance to the United States and within the
region.
Since 1997, Human Rights Watch has expressed concern over erosions
of Hong Kong's autonomy, particularly with respect to the independence
of the press, increased interference into Hong Kong politics, and a
growing role for Beijing's Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong.
Consistent with its attitude toward other regions on its periphery from
Tibet to Taiwan, President Xi Jinping's government appears to perceive
Hong Kong people's greater demands for a fully elected government--one
that responds to their concerns and one in which they are entitled to
according to law--as an existential threat. Beijing has insisted that
the Chief Executive must be someone who passes a political litmus test
set by the Chinese Communist Party, has made clear that efforts by
people in Hong Kong to press their demands through every possible
peaceful avenue will be rejected, and has moved swiftly to crush any
expressions of sympathy in the mainland for pro-democracy efforts in
Hong Kong.
The extraordinary demonstrations by a cross-section of people in
Hong Kong are in turn not simply about the composition of Hong Kong's
nomination committee. After waiting patiently for years for China to
fulfill its promise to give democracy, many are angry at the central
government's overreach, particularly with respect to its decision to
retain control over the selection of Hong Kong's leader. Many expressed
growing frustration and a sense of marginalization by the Hong Kong
government, arguing that it increasingly failed to respond to the
interests of the majority on issues ranging from education policy to
urban planning. They are also a reaction to threats to key independent
institutions in the territory that have helped protect human rights,
and to growing unease over whether the Hong Kong government is serving
the interests of the Hong Kong people or the central government when it
comes to key decisions. In the broadest sense, the current tensions are
local and logical reactions of people who have enjoyed civil liberties,
an independent judiciary, a free press, and a reasonably responsive
government, but who see these freedoms increasingly threatened, and who
have some sense of how these rights are denied just across the border.
beijing's legal obligations with respect to hong kong
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration spells out the terms for
transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese control. That document
stipulates that Hong Kong shall have ``a high degree of autonomy'' in
matters other than national defense and foreign policy, while the Basic
Law, Hong Kong's functional constitution, states that universal
suffrage is the ``ultimate aim'' for the selection of the Chief
Executive, the top leader, as well as members of the Legislative
Council. The Basic Law also provides that the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies to Hong Kong, and the
Covenant's guarantee of universal and equal suffrage means that people
not only have the right to vote in elections, but also that they should
have the right to stand for elections regardless of their political
views. The committee responsible for monitoring the implementation of
the ICCPR has also stated that when the law requires a certain
threshold of supporters for nomination, ``this requirement should be
reasonable and not act as a barrier to candidacy.''
Hong Kong's Basic Law states that Hong Kong can move toward the
goal of universal suffrage by amending the electoral methods in three
steps. First, two-thirds of all Legislative Council members have to
endorse the amendments. Second, the current Chief Executive has to
agree to it. Lastly, the amendments have to be reported to China's
Standing Committee for the National Peoples' Congress (NPCSC) for
approval.
The central government, in a series of decisions made since 1997,
has backtracked on this obligation to institute universal and equal
suffrage. The commitment to allowing electoral reform to be decided by
Hong Kong people was first broken on April 6, 2004, when the NPCSC made
an ``interpretation'' of the Basic Law adding a requirement that the
Chief Executive submit a report to Beijing justifying the need for any
further democratization. The decision shifted the initiative in
proposing electoral reforms to Beijing's hand-picked Chief Executive,
and away from the Legislative Council. In April 2004, directly after
this NPCSC decision, the Chief Executive submitted a report that
downplayed the need for substantial reform, and the NPCSC quickly
followed this with a decision that ruled out universal suffrage for the
2007 selection of the Chief Executive and the selection of the 2008
Legislative Council.
In 2007, it ruled again that there would not be universal suffrage
for the next elections of the Chief Executive and the Legislative
Council in 2012. However, the 2007 decision also said that universal
suffrage was ``maybe'' in store for the next Chief Executive election
and Legislative Council elections in 2017 and 2020, respectively.
recent developments
As Hong Kong authorities began in late 2013 to prepare for a public
consultation on how the 2017 elections should be carried out, Li Fei, a
top mainland official and chairman of Beijing's Basic Law Committee,
gave a speech stating that Hong Kong's Chief Executive must be an
individual who ``loves the country and loves Hong Kong,'' and that
people who ``confront the central government'' do not meet this
criterion. This followed similar pronouncements by Li's predecessor,
Qiao Xiaoyang, as well as the director of the Liaison Office of the
Chinese Government in Hong Kong, Zhang Xiaoming. Li added that the
nomination committee for the Chief Executive would be restricted to a
small selected group of Hong Kong people who will make a ``collective''
decision on candidates allowed to run in the election. The position
countered earlier proposals by pro-democracy groups advocating a
process in which all Hong Kong voters would be considered ``members''
of the nominating committee and candidates securing a specified number
of public nominations would get on the ballot.
Over the subsequent months, the Hong Kong government and large
parts of the public made their views clear about democracy and about
Hong Kong's future. In early June 2014--shortly after the 25th
anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre--the Chinese Government issued a
``white paper'' asserting ``overall jurisdiction'' over Hong Kong, and
that Hong Kong ``is limited to the level of autonomy granted by the
central leadership.'' This was widely seen as a violation of the
commitment to ``one country, two systems'' in which Hong Kong would be
granted ``a high degree of autonomy,'' except in foreign affairs and
defense. While the substance of the ``white paper'' was not new, and
carries no legal weight, its timing and language were seen as abrasive
and unnecessary by many in Hong Kong.
In late June 2014, more than 700,000 Hong Kong people--one in five
registered voters--participated in an unofficial, nonbinding referendum
to choose among three proposals for political reform that ensure
universal suffrage via the pro-democracy ``Occupy Central with Love and
Peace'' movement. The central government dismissed this effort as
illegal and the product of ``anti-China forces.'' In mid-July, Hong
Kong Chief Executive (CE) Leung Chun-ying submitted the results of the
government's public consultation to the central government, claiming it
was ``mainstream opinion'' that a subsequent CE ``love China and love
Hong Kong,'' that the power to nominate CE candidates should remain
vested in a committee controlled by Beijing, and that the legislature
should not be democratized before the 2017 elections. The results of
the public consultation as presented to the central Chinese Government
were clearly manipulated, and failed to reflect different views
articulated by large segments of the population.
Following the report's submission, on August 31, 2014, the NPCSC
handed down its decision, which catalyzed the Occupy demonstrations:
while it would allow all eligible voters in Hong Kong to cast ballots
for the territory's Chief Executive, it would impose a stringent
screening mechanism that effectively bars candidates the central
government in Beijing dislikes from nomination for Chief Executive.
In reaction to the Chinese Government's August 31 rejection of open
nominations for Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Occupy Central protest
leaders, pan-democrats, and student protest leaders vowed to launch an
``era of civil disobedience.'' Students boycotted classes between
September 22 and 26; as that boycott came to a close, a group of
students entered Civic Square, in front of the government headquarters
in Admiralty, without permission. Police surrounded the students, and
arrested and pepper sprayed some of them. The police treatment of the
students provoked a large number of people--about 50,000--to congregate
around Civic Square on September 27. ``Occupy Central'' organizers then
announced that they were officially launching their planned
demonstrations.
On September 28, Hong Kong police declared the protest illegal, and
cordoned off the government headquarters grounds. The announcement drew
even more protesters, who demanded access to the government
headquarters. After an hours long standoff with police, protesters
walked out onto a major thoroughfare that separated them from
government headquarters. Police responded with pepper spray, batons,
and 87 cans of tear gas. Protesters refused to disperse, and by the
next morning they had occupied three sites in Hong Kong. For weeks, two
of these sites remained occupied by hundreds of protesters, despite
repeated police clearances, and assaults by persons opposing the Occupy
movement. After police cleared one site in Mongkok on November 26,
protesters responded with ``fluid occupation'' which involves
repeatedly ``crossing roads'' slowly along the stretch of the former
occupy sites to temporarily block traffic, as well as a failed
escalation on November 30 to block all access to government
headquarters in Admiralty.
human rights concerns
Human Rights Watch has a host of concerns about human rights
violations in Hong Kong, both specific to the protests and to larger
issues.
On the core issue of electoral arrangements, the Basic Law
guarantees the continued application of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights to Hong Kong, which in turn guarantees that
people shall not only have the right to vote in elections, but also
that they should have the right to stand for elections regardless of
their political views. While the August 31 NPCSC decision will expand
the vote to choose the Chief Executive to all eligible voters, it
retains central government control over the nominating committee that
will determine who may run as a candidate for Chief Executive. As
recently as October 23, 2014, the U.N.'s Human Rights Committee
expressed concern that the proposed nomination process poses
``unreasonable restrictions'' on the right to run.
The protests themselves have involved a number of human rights
violations.
Mainland and Hong Kong authorities deemed the protests
illegal because organizers had not obtained permission under
the Public Order Ordinance. Yet this Ordinance is in tension
with international law because it imposes significant
restrictions on the freedom of assembly without considering the
importance of the right to gather to express grievances, and is
susceptible to political abuse.
The Hong Kong police's use of force, including tear gas and
pepper spray, against unarmed protestors is of deep concern.
While we note as positive Chief Executive Leung's condemnation
of violence against protestors on October 4, and the arrest of
seven police in late November for their brutal beating on
October 16 of a peaceful demonstrator, the October 6 statement
by the Chief Executive that authorities would use ``all actions
necessary'' and evidence of further incidents involving
excessive use of force by the police have undermined public
confidence in the strict adherence of the police to the U.N.
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms. Human Rights
Watch calls on the Hong Kong government to conduct an
independent investigation into police conduct during the
protests.
We are similarly deeply concerned about arrests of peaceful
protestors at the beginning of the demonstrations in late
September, but also during the late November efforts to clear
protestors from particular locations, including the arrests of
student demonstration leaders Joshua Wong and Lester Shum.
We are also concerned that protesters appear to be subject
to various types of intrusive surveillance by both the Hong
Kong and Chinese governments, which apparently have based
decisions to arrest protest leaders and bar others from
entering China on their online postings and participation in
the protests. The sense of pervasive collection and monitoring
of participation in public debates and protests have thrown a
pall over Hong Kong's robust civil liberties.
larger implications
The central and Hong Kong government's failures to engage
meaningfully with popular demands for greater democracy in the
territory--through a formal consultation process, through a civic
referendum, through months of peaceful demonstrations--leaves a
longtime bastion of respect for rule of law on edge.
Beijing has made its disdain for the views of people in Hong Kong
clear through its extraordinary overreach regarding autonomy, electoral
arrangements, and a host of other policy issues. And because the
Chinese Communist Party cannot countenance the idea that people in
China might actually want participatory governance, it has repeatedly
dismissed the demonstrations as a product of external, ``anti-China
forces.''
It has also made clear that it will not tolerate any expressions of
support in the mainland for the demonstrators in Hong Kong. More than
100 individuals have been detained in the mainland in recent months for
doing as little as posting pictures of themselves holding a sign
expressing support for Hong Kong people's demand for genuine universal
suffrage. Beijing's unwillingness to allow student leaders or those
sympathetic to the demonstrations from Hong Kong into the mainland is
an utterly anachronistic and counterproductive strategy for dealing
with the concerns there.
None of this bodes well for expectations that China will comply
with key international legal obligations, come to grips with peaceful
dissent, or accept--for Hong Kong, for Tibet, or for Xinjiang--the idea
that many successful governments around the world have officials and
administrations from regions benefiting from autonomy arrangements with
views divergent from those at the national level. It is also an ominous
sign for Hong Kong as a critical space for activists and organizations
that work on or monitor developments in China. The efforts of
nonviolent protestors in Hong Kong has also triggered expressions of
concern across the region, prompting reactions from Tokyo, which rarely
speaks publicly about human rights concerns in China, and from Taiwan,
where voters appear to have been particularly motivated to reject a
government arguing for closer ties to Beijing.
u.s. response
The United States has expressed concern about violence against and
by demonstrators, about the right to peaceful assembly, and the rights
to vote and to run, and officials have said they have expressed these
concerns directly to the highest levels of the Chinese Government. Some
U.S. commentary, such as the initial statement regarding the August 31
NPCSC interpretation, did not accurately characterize the problem,
while other remarks are superficially sensible--calling, for example,
that differences be addressed through peaceful dialogue--but seem to
deny the reality that Hong Kong peoples' efforts to do just that have
been ignored. President Obama's comments on Hong Kong while in Beijing
were so calibrated as to be convoluted, and he and other U.S. officials
have repeated so frequently that the United States has had no role in
fomenting or sustaining the demonstrations that it seems more concerned
in assuaging Beijing's irrational fears than in standing up robustly
for democratic rights.
We believe the U.S.' response to be factually accurate but
functionally and diplomatically ineffective. It makes the mistake of
focusing disproportionately on the reactions of the Chinese Government
while forgetting to demonstrate solidarity with those on the front
lines of a struggle for democracy. It is appropriate to ask why
President Obama could be so publicly restrained on the topics of
elections and democracy in Beijing yet a few days later offer up
extensive commentary and support on the same subject in Burma, and
shortly after in Australia. One thinks about visible gestures of
solidarity for democracy elsewhere--for example, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Victoria Nuland handing out bread to demonstrators
in Maidan Square, American ambassadors observing elections (or
expressing concerns about those elections' shortcomings) in other parts
of Asia, or the U.S. vociferously decrying the rollbacks of democratic
rights in other parts of the world. Why not Hong Kong?
To be so reticent has three problematic consequences. It undermines
the very purpose of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, and it enables other
governments, which for better or for worse take their cues on these
issues from the U.S., to remain virtually silent. Arguably most
problematic, it telegraphs to pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong and
the mainland that they can likely only count on perfunctory support or
recognition from the United States.
recommendations
Physically removing demonstrators from the streets of Hong Kong
will do little to answer their underlying grievances, and arguably will
serve to exacerbate them. Already tensions between protesters and
police have risen to a breaking point. The most critical and urgent
step the central and Hong Kong governments can take is to revisit the
territory's undemocratic electoral arrangements and ensure that
appropriate ones are fashioned--as required by article 45 of the Basic
Law--``in light of the actual situation,'' where the majority favors
genuine democracy. We urge that both take immediate action, including
by developing a time-bound and detailed plan, to put into practice
universal and equal suffrage. Both should ensure that any proposals for
nominations for the 2017 chief executive elections conform to
international human rights standards, including those set out in the
ICCPR. Any committee established for nominating candidates for the
elections should conform to such requirements.
While it is reassuring to a point to see Hong Kong authorities
investigate several police officers who were caught on camera viciously
beating a protestor, that confidence is undermined by repeated
incidents of excessive use of force. In just the past few days police
have appeared to use excessive force in arresting student protest
leaders Joshua Wong and Lester Shum on November 26 in Mong Kok as they
stood by observing police; no warning or peaceful request to surrender
to authorities were issued before police tackled them to the ground. In
Admiralty and Mong Kok in the past 48 hours police have used pepper
spray at close range after tearing off demonstrators' protective
goggles, and used batons to hit people who were clearly trying to leave
these areas. The authorities should meet with protest leaders, given
that the single discussion held in October yielded no results. Hong
Kong authorities should submit a new report to the central government
acknowledging broad support for genuine democracy and ask the NPCSC to
clarify or retract its August 31 decision to make the nomination
committee for the Chief Executive genuinely ``broadly representative,''
as articulated in the Basic Law. The Hong Kong authorities should also
take steps to further democratize the semidemocratic Legislative
Council.
The central government in Beijing should realize Hong Kong's
political system is unsustainable and must be fixed to make it more
responsive to people in the territory. Each of the Chief Executives
handpicked by Beijing has proven deeply unpopular with significant
numbers of people in Hong Kong. At the political level, it would be
encouraging if the senior leadership in Beijing could accept the idea
that people in the mainland and Hong Kong want democracy, and not
construe Hong Kong peoples' demands for democracy as a threat to
national security. At a minimum, Beijing should stop arresting people
in the mainland for peaceful expressions of support to the
demonstrators, and lift whatever restrictions have been put in place so
that demonstrators can enter the mainland.
It is encouraging to see the reestablishment of a Hong Kong caucus
here in the Congress, and the introduction of an updated Hong Kong
Policy Act. We believe that increased U.S. Government scrutiny and
regular reporting are and should be seen as a positive obligation--an
opportunity to identify critical developments and points of leverage in
a territory of considerable diplomatic, economic, and strategic
interest to the United States. Equally important, we urge the U.S. to
be consistent in its support to democratic movements around the world.
The people of Hong Kong deserve no less than their counterparts in
other countries.
Senator Cardin. So, I want to start, Dr. Bush, if I might,
with your expertise in Taiwan. The reports that I have read
indicate that what happened in Hong Kong had a direct impact on
election results in Taiwan. So, I guess my point is, Secretary
Russel said that we are watching, is the international
community in the region watching what is happening in Hong
Kong? And what impact does it have on the region itself?
Dr. Bush. Thanks for the question.
Let me endorse your general point. And that is, what China
does in Hong Kong is going to give us an important signal of
what kind of great power it is going to be. If this can somehow
work out well, that would suggest a China that maybe we can
live with. If it works out badly, that is a very different and
negative message.
With respect to Taiwan, frankly, there were a lot of issues
at play, and we do not have the polling results yet to know how
much Hong Kong made a difference. Obviously, it made some. I
would say that people on Taiwan have long since dissociated
themselves from the Hong Kong arrangements. They have always
believed that they do not apply to them. So, when things go
badly in Hong Kong, the attitude is, ``Well, this just proves
it.'' But, I think, you know, among certain groups, it did have
an impact. I think the results of the election, which were very
much antiestablishment, also had an effect on Hong Kong in
building up a certain level of enthusiasm this last weekend.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Dr. Richardson, I want to get your view on the human rights
status in Hong Kong. In 1992, we said human rights are of great
importance to the United States and directly relevant to U.S.
interests in Hong Kong. Hong Kong enjoys a distinct status with
the United States, even though it is ``one country, two
systems.'' And our relationship with China is remarkably
different than it is with Hong Kong, as I am sure you are
aware.
Most recently, the violence against protesters and the
inability
of British parliamentarians to be able to visit and see
firsthand whether they are in compliance with their
agreements--of great concern to us. Can you just give me your
assessment as to the current status of basic human rights in
Hong Kong?
Dr. Richardson. Thank you very much for the question.
You know, Hong Kong has historically been the bastion of
rights in this part of the world. And I think part of the
reason we are having this conversation today is because it is
the democratic part of China. Obviously, there is room for
greater growth for political rights, but I think, as the
bulwark that we want protect, it is critically important.
We have been very concerned, over the last year or two,
about growing threats to Hong Kong's autonomy, but also--and,
as a related matter, limitations on issues ranging from press
freedom to immigration to certain court decisions about who has
access to which kinds of government services. In the past year
in particular, we have tracked what appear to be growing
problems with respect to surveillance, particularly of either
mainland activists or ethnic Chinese activists from other parts
of the world who are in Hong Kong for obvious reasons, to have
some contact with counterparts.
I think the protests have been a little bit
mischaracterized as simply being either carried out by students
or specifically about the particularities of the nomination
process or electoral arrangements. I think there is a much
broader statement being made by a cross-section of people in
Hong Kong who are increasingly concerned about their own
ability to affect or command the attention of the Hong Kong
Government. And I think, obviously, the nomination process is
enormously problematic from a human rights perspective. I mean,
this is black-letter international law, that people should have
the right to run. You know, so this gives you a sense of some
of the kinds of problems that Hong Kong's status is the place
of a free press, that is safe for activists to operate, and
where people can expect police to refrain from use of excessive
force, which obviously has been an issue of real concern over
the last 6 weeks, you know, where those problems do not
pertain.
Senator Cardin. Hong Kong enjoys----
Dr. Bush. Could I just comment for----
Senator Cardin. Yes.
Dr. Bush. I am sorry.
I think the danger in the current situation is that if some
sensible compromise is not worked out along the lines of what
Secretary Russel was talking about--and I think there is still
a chance--that protests will continue and China will ratchet up
or place greater limits on the human rights of people in Hong
Kong, and particularly political rights. And this will not be
obvious, this will not be out in the open. It will be somewhat
covert, but it will have an impact.
Senator Cardin. Hong Kong's special status in economic
power in large part depends on an open relationship with the
United States. What recommendations would you make as to how we
leverage that relationship in order to advance basic rights in
Hong Kong? And, if you want to, you can comment about the
legislation that has been filed that would change the
presumption. It would require the President to certify that
Hong Kong is in status in order to be able to get the status,
rather than currently, which requires the President to take
affirmative action to deny them the special status. Your
comments on how you would like to see the United States use its
leverage with Hong Kong--or use its relationship with Hong Kong
to leverage greater respect for democratic principles, human
rights, and universal suffrage.
Dr. Richardson. I think there are a couple of broad areas
to focus on. The first is about linkage and leverage. I think
there is less of an effort now than there was 10 years ago to
link specific changes to specific policy initiatives, for
example. I think the Chinese Government is extremely
transactional on these kinds of matters, and it is essential
for the United States to use what Beijing wants as a way to
press for what the United States
wants. And so, for example, the Chinese Government is seeking
much greater United States cooperation on terrorism and
counterterrorism issues, about which we have some real
concerns. Separate matter. But, I see no reason, you know, why
the United States should not, or could not, say that revising
the electoral arrangements in Hong Kong, per article 45 of the
Basic Law, is a requirement for further cooperation in some of
those other realms. I think there are a lot of opportunities
for linkage that are not being pursued.
I respectfully disagree with Assistant Secretary Russel
about the U.S. Government's rhetoric when it has mostly, I
think, been factually accurate. I think it has been muted. It
has not necessarily been deployed when it was needed most. And
I think, to a large extent, it has not really reached the
people in Hong Kong who needed or wanted to hear it. I think
the United States continues to be quite inconsistent about
issues about political rights and democracy in Hong Kong and
China, relative to the kind of support that it chose for those
issues in other parts of the world. And being consistent, I
think, matters enormously with Beijing.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Bush.
Dr. Bush. Thank you very much.
If there is a possibility, along the lines of what
Secretary Russel was saying, of getting a competitive election
out of this current unfortunate situation, then we should be
working with all sides in Hong Kong, both the Hong Kong
government and people in the pan-democratic camp to help,
perhaps behind the scenes, to bring it about. But, the
important thing is that we are effective.
With respect to the legislation that you have introduced, I
fully support restoring a periodic report by the Department of
State concerning developments in Hong Kong and how they relate
to the standards set forth in the act.
I am agnostic on the issue of certification. I guess my
main concern has to do with the definitions of what one is
going to be certifying--laws, agreements, and arrangements. It
is not clear what ``arrangements'' are. It could be some very
specific things, it could be very general. And so, I would
encourage some work on defining what it is that is going to be
certified. I do believe that the autonomy is very important. I
worked on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and I was the
lead staffer on the House side in 1992 on the United States-
Hong Kong Policy Act. And, for me, section 201 about Hong
Kong's autonomy was absolutely the most important section. It
remains the important section. I think that it should be
possible, between this committee and the administration, to
work out an effective way to ensure that that autonomy is
preserved.
Senator Cardin. That is--yes, Dr.----
Dr. Richardson. Sorry, may I follow up, quickly?
We are proponents of the idea of reinstating the reporting,
in no small part because--look, even if the issue about the
nomination committee gets resolved--and I am skeptical about
the Hong Kong government's willingness and ability to
accurately represent the views of people in Hong Kong to the
Central Government and push for a better outcome--but, this is
not the end of the line. It is very clear, I think, that the
Chinese Government intends to find ways to try to manipulate
membership of Ledgco, of what its agenda could possibly
include. We are going to be fighting this battle for a long
time, and I think having those kind of reports in hand can be a
very useful tool.
Senator Cardin. This is a good transition to the principal
Republican sponsor of the legislation, Senator Rubio.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rubio. Thank you. And I know we have votes, so I
will be quick. I have two questions; one for you, Dr.
Richardson.
I look at the U.S. response to this, and it seems like the
majority of our statements are designed to prove that we have
nothing to do with what is going on, as opposed to standing on
behalf of the people that are fighting. In fact, you saw that
in the testimony today, that the rationale behind the statement
was, we wanted to make clear that we were not behind any one
group versus another. And that should be 10 percent of what we
talk about. Ninety percent of this should be about democracy.
Can you contrast what the U.S. reaction has been to what is
happening in Hong Kong to the position the United States has
taken in other parts of the world where there has been
democracy movements, whether it is Burma or Ukraine or other
parts of the world? How would you compare the U.S. reaction to
this versus the U.S. reaction to other democracy movements
around the world?
Dr. Richardson. Well, I think you can look at it in a
couple of different ways. You know, I find myself thinking
about, for example, Assistant Secretary Nuland walking out into
Maidan Square and handing bread to people. You know, it was a
very evocative response, a gesture of support. You know,
obviously, there are different circumstances, but, you know,
clearly the United States is capable of very demonstrably
showing its support in certain circumstances.
Look at, you know, what the President said when he was in
Beijing. Again, you know, factually accurate in making the
right points, but, I think, in a way that was maximally
designed not to irk his hosts. I do not mean to belittle the
blowback that Assistant Secretary Russel will have received for
that. But, you can see that it is so calibrated as to become
convoluted. Fast-forward 36 hours, when the President is in
Burma, where he is speaking very clearly, very evocatively, and
in great detail about the importance of democracy, elections,
the particulars of the electoral arrangements. I think that
really sends a message to pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong
and in the mainland that they should not have, necessarily,
terribly high hopes for the kind of support that they are going
to get from the United States in these circumstances.
Senator Rubio. I think the bottom line is that it is clear
that our response to the democratic aspirations of people on
the mainland or anywhere else when it comes to China are muted
by real realpolitik considerations with regarding to China's
influence and size. In essence, if you want democracy--if you
are going to fight for democracy and democratic openings in a
place where China does not want it, you are not going to get
the same response from the United States that you would in
other parts of the world, because we do not want to ruin our
relationship with the Chinese. That is the message that people
are taking. And I think it is a counterproductive one.
And then, my question for you, Dr. Bush, is, If you put
yourself in the position now of people in Taiwan--or, for that
matter, any other nation in East Asia--as they look at Hong
Kong as indicative of the nature of the Chinese Government,
what are they taking away from what they are seeing right now?
Dr. Bush. If you were a citizen of a country in Asia, and
if you had watched what has happened in Hong Kong over the last
20-plus years, you would understand pretty clearly that the
Chinese Government rigged this political system to keep its
friends in power. And that system is illegitimate. The leaders
who are produced by it do not have the support of the people.
Hong Kong is now unstable because of that. So, if you want
stability in Hong Kong, which China says it does, if you want
stability anywhere, it needs to be based on an open,
competitive, democratic system. That is the way to get
legitimate governments.
Senator Rubio. But, that is not what they offer.
Dr. Bush. No, it is not. There are ways, I think, of
working, even within the narrow confines to facilitate a
competitive election. I am not terribly optimistic that it is
going to work out that way. But, if they go in the direction
that you fear and that I fear, they will continue to face
problems in Hong Kong.
Senator Rubio. So, my understanding is that the Chinese
proposal for what it wants to see Taiwan become is very similar
to the Hong Kong model.
Dr. Bush. The slogan is the same, and it has been rejected
by Taiwan people----
Senator Rubio. They know better.
Dr. Bush. They know much better. For all its problems,
Taiwan people like the democracy that they have, and they do
not want to go backward, which is where they see Hong Kong is
in relation to them.
Senator Rubio. Is it fair to say--and this is my last
question--that looking at what is happening in Hong Kong now is
a true indication of the nature of the Central Government, and
that, moving forward, all of us who care about future of
China's rise in the world, but also its relationship with the
United States and with its neighbors, needs to realize that
what they say--you know, they go into these international
forums, they smile, and they say one thing, and what they are
going to do--are two very different things. When they talk
about autonomy, when they talk about democratic opening, what
it means to them is very different from what we think it means.
And so, that is where you wind up in a situation like what we
have today, where we have someone testifying on behalf of the
State Department and the administration that the agreement does
not violate the letter of the agreement, but it violates the
spirit of it. In essence, they may use the same terms that we
use, but, in practice, they are not the same terms. And the
lesson to be learned is, that is the true nature of this
government, for anyone who is looking to do a future
arrangement or agreement with them.
Dr. Bush. Anybody who has studied China professionally
knows that their definition of terms is not our definition of
terms. And we have to adjust our diplomacy to take account of
that. I think Hong Kong people understand that China's use of
terms is not their use of terms, either.
Thanks.
Senator Cardin. Let me thank both of our witnesses.
I think there is agreement here that, where we normally
look for pragmatism to deal with diplomatic issues, in this
situation it does not work, because the consequences are far
beyond what is happening Hong Kong today. As Senator Rubio
pointed out, and as Dr. Bush pointed out earlier to my
question, the impact on Taiwan is very clear, the impact on a
lot of Asian countries is very clear, because of their
relationships with China and China's importance in the region
and whether they will adhere to understandings that are pretty
clear. And, in Hong Kong, it was very clear that Hong Kong
would be autonomous, as Secretary Russel said--``one country,
two systems,'' but it would have the autonomy. You do not have
the autonomy unless you have the right to select your leader.
And that was clear in the initial declaration, original
commitments to have universal suffrage, which clearly the
August declaration statement backed away from. I could not
agree more with Senator Rubio that this is not a technical
violation, et cetera, that this is clearly inconsistent and
totally against the commitment made by China for allowing
universal suffrage. And it is a matter that we need to be very
clear about. And I think you will hear clear statements on this
subject from the Members of the Senate.
We have potential action. Senator Rubio has a bill that he
has filed, and I know that it will be on our agenda next year.
And we certainly will be watching this issue very carefully. We
will see how they are dealing with basic human rights,
including how they deal with the demonstrators and how they
deal with allowing people access, something you would normally
expect from an open society that Hong Kong claims it is. That
will be matters that will be very carefully watched, not just
by the Members of the U.S. Senate, but I think by the global
community.
So, I want to thank both of you for your contributions to
this hearing and your understanding of how we had to abbreviate
it to deal with the realities of the Senate schedule.
And, with that, the subcommittee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:17 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Submitted Written Testimony of Ellen Bork, Senior Fellow,
Foreign Policy Initiative
I am grateful to Chairman Rubio and members of the subcommittee for
this opportunity to submit testimony for the record of this important
hearing.
The protesters who began occupying Hong Kong's streets in late
September have not achieved their objective: the democratic election of
the Chief Executive who runs the affairs of Hong Kong's 7.2 million
people. Neither the Hong Kong government, nor the central government in
Beijing has shown any flexibility regarding an August 31 ruling of the
National People's Congress Standing Committee in Beijing that in future
Hong Kong voters will choose their chief executive from among
candidates approved by Beijing with the additional criterion that they
must ``love the Country and love Hong Kong,'' or, in other words, be
loyal to the Chinese Communist Party.
Instead, the Chinese Government has dubbed the protests illegal and
the Hong Kong authorities acting on Beijing's behalf refuse to
countenance any change from the Basic Law, Beijing's ``constitution''
for Hong Kong. As of this writing, some protest leaders are on a hunger
strike. Others have turned themselves in to the police as a further
gesture of civil disobedience. The police and court officials are
whittling down protest encampments and the student group at the
forefront of the protests has suggested it may call for an end to
street demonstrations.
Whatever happens next, there is no returning to the status quo ante
for the people of Hong Kong, for China's Communist leadership, or for
the United States. Chinese leaders have demonstrated decisively that
they do not intend to allow Hong Kong autonomy or a transition to
democratic government, regardless of any commitments they may have made
in the past. Hong Kong's democracy movement has been reinvigorated by a
surge of participation by the youngest citizens. Meanwhile, all of Hong
Kong is developing an identity, distinct from the mainland, linked to
Hong Kong's rule of law, civil liberties and in reaction against
Beijing's obstruction of democracy. In response to these developments,
U.S. policy devised to fit the circumstances at the time of the 1997
handover of Hong Kong to Chinese rule, needs to be revised.
As Members of Congress think about how to do that, I respectfully
suggest they keep several points in mind.
A new generation of younger and student activists has transformed
Hong Kong's democracy movement. Recent surveys show strong support for
democracy among the population at large and especially among youth and
young adults. Student protest leaders have eclipsed the older,
established pro-democracy politicians whom they regard, even if
unfairly, as tainted by participation in the post-1997 institutions set
up by Beijing to contain, rather than advance democracy, such as the
only partly elected Legislative Council. Aware of this, the leadership
of the pro-democracy political parties exhibited a striking degree of
deference to the student leaders.
At the same time, Hong Kong is developing a distinct identity. The
number of people who identify themselves as ``Chinese'' or with
reference to the PRC has fallen according to the Hong Kong University
Public Opinion Program which asks Hong Kong people about their ethnic
identity, offering a number of categories which reflect their
attachment to a Hong Kong, Chinese, or other identities. According to
the survey, ``Both the indices of ``Chinese'' and ``citizens of the
PRC'' are once again at their lowest since the compilation of these
indices in 2008. . . . The feeling of being ``citizens of the PRC'' is
the weakest among all identities tested.'' These sentiments were on
display at the Umbrella movement protests. ``I wouldn't say I reject my
identity as Chinese, because I've never felt Chinese in the first
place,'' one protester told Edward Wong of the New York Times. ``The
younger generations don't think they're Chinese.''
It's useful to remember that the ``one country, two systems''
concept has its origins in Beijing's desire to entice Taiwan to unify
with Communist China in the late 1970s. Since then, Taiwan has
democratized, and with it, developed a strong Taiwanese identity,
making it ever more unlikely that Taiwan will agree to come under
Communist Chinese rule absent coercion. Unlike Hong Kong, Taiwan has a
defense commitment from the U.S. and American policy now includes a
stipulation that any resolution of Taiwan's fate must be acceptable to
people on both sides of the Strait.
By contrast, Hong Kong people had no say in whether they were to be
handed over to Communist rule. Many in the younger generation look
askance at the system and institutions Beijing created for post-1997
Hong Kong. The arrangements between China and Great Britain were made
in early 1980s, before many of the current protesters were born, and
over the heads of their parents.
The failure of China's plans to deliver democracy and guarantee
autonomy was predictable. ``To a Westerner,'' the historian Steve Tsang
wrote in 1996, ``the idea of Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong
within the framework of 'one country, two systems' may imply that after
1997 Hong Kong will be free to run its own domestic affairs with no
interference from Beijing as long as PRC sovereignty is acknowledged.
Such an interpretation is totally unacceptable to Beijing.''
The Umbrella movement has made it impossible to pretend any longer
that Beijing intends to allow Hong Kong autonomy and democracy. Yet so
far, despite support for Hong Kong's autonomy and democracy in the
U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, the Obama administration has made it clear
that will not confront Beijing over its actions, or seriously support
democracy in Hong Kong.
In late September, just as the protests were breaking out, the U.S.
consulate in Hong Kong stated that America ``does not take sides''
regarding Hong Kong's democracy struggle. Little had changed by
November 12, when President Obama spoke about Hong Kong in Beijing
during a joint press conference with General Secretary Xi Jinping.
President Obama appeared to be primarily concerned with assuring Mr. Xi
that the U.S. was not interfering in Hong Kong affairs. The President
acquiesced to the end of the protests--without any concessions by the
Chinese Government toward democracy--so long as no violence was used.
President Obama did not mention Beijing's detention of dozens of people
on the mainland for brave actions endorsing the Hong Kong democracy
movement, or the massive censorship of Hong Kong related content on the
Chinese Internet.
``Ultimately,'' President Obama said, the issues underlying the
protests; i.e., democracy and elections, were ``for the people of Hong
Kong and the people of China to decide.'' This depiction of the
democracy struggle in Hong Kong and China as taking place on an even
playing field was problematic to say the least. By presenting the U.S.
as a disinterested bystander, the President delivered a setback not
only to the Hong Kong protesters but also to those working for
democracy in the rest of China, in Russia and Iran and other places and
gave a boost to the dictatorships in those and other countries.
The premises on which U.S. policy and law are based are no longer
valid. The thrust of current law is that Washington will respond to
violations of Hong Kong's autonomy by withdrawing Hong Kong's separate
treatment in some areas of U.S. law. That punishes the victim rather
than the perpetrator. Instead, the U.S. should look for ways to impose
costs on the central government and officials responsible for Hong Kong
affairs. Chinese officials (and their relatives) who make or stash
money in Hong Kong even while undermining Hong Kong's democratic
aspirations are an appropriate target for financial or visa sanctions.
Congress might ask to be briefed by the executive branch about the
assets and travels of such officials.
``One country, two systems'' is not working--at least not the
version that Hong Kong people were led to believe in. Recent events
show that whether democracy advances in Hong Kong depends on principle
and power, not China's fake constitutionalism and not even of
international obligations China undertook in the Sino-British Joint
Declaration.
It has become commonplace to remark that the Umbrella Movement has
changed Hong Kong forever. It is not yet clear whether the U.S. policy
will also respond to this momentous change.