[Senate Hearing 113-525]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-525
DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 5, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee.................... 2
Green, Hon. Mark, president, International Republican Institute;
former U.S. Ambassador; and member, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC................................ 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Harman, Hon. Jane, director, president, and CEO, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars; former member, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC................................ 3
Jeffrey, Hon. James F., Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting
Fellow, The Washington Institute; former assistant to the
president and deputy national security advisor, Washington, DC. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Pifer, Hon. Steven, senior fellow, The Brookings Institution,
former ambassador to Ukraine, Washington, DC................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey.............. 1
Wollack, Kenneth, president, National Democratic Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared statement of the NDI Election Observer Delegation to
Ukraine's 2014 presidential election submitted by Kenneth
Wollack........................................................ 56
(iii)
DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE
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THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine,
Markey, Corker, Johnson, and Flake.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
I want to welcome our panelists and thank them for taking
time to share their perspective with the committee on
developments in Ukraine, which appear only slightly less
ominous than they did in act one of this crisis.
Now we are in the beginning of act two, with the successful
election of a President by the Ukrainian people in
internationally certified elections, which is a major victory
for Ukraine's struggle for freedom.
Past elections in Ukraine have exhibited stark divisions
between east and west. Significantly President-elect Petro
Poroshenko won districts from one end of Ukraine to the other.
It seems clear that the events of the past year and Russia's
violation of their sovereignty unified Ukrainians as never
before.
While it is clear that President Poroshenko has a mandate,
the challenges he confronts are daunting. He must rebuild the
Ukrainian Government and an economy which has been weakened by
the previous Presidents' corruption, while countering Putin in
the east.
We are committed as a nation to working with the new
government and the people of Ukraine to consolidate Ukraine's
democracy and economy, and help Ukraine withstand the malign
tactics of its neighbor to the east. President Putin continues
to direct events in Ukraine, seeking to undermine the new
government and to foment discord in the east with the clear
goal seeking a long-term ability to control and direct
Ukraine's politics and policies.
As Catherine the Great said, ``I have no way to defend my
borders except to extend them,'' a point that seems to have a
renewed poignancy today.
To counter that 18th century mindset, I welcome President
Obama's announcement this week of a European reassurance
initiative that will increase our presence across Europe and
build the capacity of our friends such as Georgia, Moldova, and
Ukraine so that they can better work alongside the United
States and NATO, as well as provide for their own defense.
In my view, there are three things that are crucial for
Ukraine's future. First, President Poroshenko must build a
Ukrainian Government that is capable, transparent, accountable,
and strong enough to meet both foreign and domestic challenges.
Second, the Ukrainian Government will have to accommodate
restive citizens in the east while gaining control from
foreign-directed forces.
And thirdly, the Ukrainian economy must be resurrected,
including decreasing energy dependency on Russia.
At the end of the day, the creation of a viable, successful
Ukraine capable of preserving its sovereignty is an unfinished
legacy of the cold war, and will take time. It is a necessary
goal that requires the commitment and cooperation of the
Congress, the executive branch and our allies, working
together.
With that, let me turn to Senator Corker for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thanks to our
expert witnesses here who will be helpful to us, I know
especially the last one, who just came in well-dressed and
looking sharp.
I do want to congratulate the people of Ukraine for the
election that just occurred. I know that we had a lot of
observers there, including I think Jane Harman, who just walked
in, and many of our colleagues. Poroshenko, who many of us had
the opportunity to meet over the course of time, I think is the
person today.
There are tremendous issues to overcome in Ukraine,
forgetting the external effect that Russia is having on the
country. There are tremendous corruption issues, energy issues,
democracy issues, human rights issues, all kind of issues for
any leader to have difficulty undertaking, not to speak of the
external issues I just mentioned. There is no question that
Russia played a role in eastern Ukraine. There is no question
that they continue to play a role in eastern Ukraine.
Obviously, it looks like they are back and forth between trying
to negotiate with this new government and create alliances
there and, at the same time, continuing to destabilize the
country in other ways.
So I look forward to what our witnesses have to say
relative to what our policy should be going ahead. I know there
was an announcement today where Cameron and our President
announced the need for new sanctions in Russia. I look forward
to hearing what the witnesses have to say about that. I know
numbers of us have joined together pushing for that kind of
thing.
But the fact is we have tremendous challenges there. I know
just having come from eastern Europe, concern for security and
stability in that region is paramount right now as they have
seen Russia doing what it has done. So the fact is we not only
have the issue of Ukraine to contend with--and again, I know
you are going to enlighten us in that regard, but also the need
to show tremendous strength and perseverance relative to
eastern Europe in general. So a very, very important issue of
great geopolitical significance.
Thank you all for being here, and I look forward to our
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Let me introduce our panelists--the Honorable Jane Harman,
director, president, and CEO of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, and a former colleague of
mine in the House. We welcome you back to the committee. We
also have with us former Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer,
who is now with the Brookings Institution. Our third panelist
is former Assistant to the President and Deputy National
Security Advisor James Jeffrey, now the Philip Solondz
Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute. Next
is Mark Green, the president of the International Republican
Institute [IRI] and former Ambassador to Tanzania, and Member
of the House of Representatives. Finally, someone who is no
stranger to the committee, Ken Wollack, the president of the
National Democratic Institute [NDI].
Let me welcome you all to the committee.
I will advise you that all of your full statements will be
included in the record, without objection. We would ask you to
summarize them in about 5 minutes or so. And we will proceed in
the order in which I introduced you. Jane, you are first.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANE HARMAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENT, AND CEO,
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS; FORMER
MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking
Member Corker. Both of you are dear friends of mine and former
colleagues and also friends of the Wilson Center, and I
appreciate being invited.
Everyone on the lineup here is a close friend, and I was
very proud to be a member of the NDI delegation in Ukraine just
a week and a half ago. It is the eighth election I have
observed. NDI and IRI do this brilliantly, and it matters to
have them in countries and to have teams with them who can get
around.
And in that connection, on the day before the election in
Ukraine, my small group, headed by former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, met all the leading candidates, including
Petro Poroshenko, who impressed me as a man capable of leading
his country. And it was impressive to see his enormous victory.
Would a lot of Members of the Senate not like a victory of 55
to 56 percent in a crowded field, avoiding a runoff?
At any rate, let me just make some brief comments.
This is Ukraine's third chance to get it right. Ukraine got
it wrong after the wall came down. Ukraine got it wrong after
the Orange Revolution. A series of governments were corrupt and
not competent. This is chance three, and I think it will either
work or it will be three strikes and you are out. I do not
think Ukraine will get a chance like this again.
Second point. The West obviously needs to help Ukraine, and
President Obama announced some aid. The IMF and the EU are
poised to help. But Ukraine has to help Ukraine. This is the
chance for Ukrainians to take responsibility for their future,
and I do think that many Ukrainians with whom we spoke get
that. I think there are five things that President Poroshenko--
he will be President this Saturday--needs to do.
One is go to east Ukraine and tell the folks there--he says
he is going to do this--that he favors some form of
decentralization that is consistent with one Ukraine and that
he wants them to serve in his government. The current Acting
President Turchynov was in east Ukraine the other day, and I
thought that was a good move.
Second, include the Maidan crowd, the crowd that
demonstrated in Maidan so bravely over 6 months, in the new
government. Some of them want to serve. Some of the current
government members were in the Maidan. This has to be a
different movie from Egypt. The people who were brave and
courageous and wanted to change their country have to be
included in the government.
Third, enforce the anticorruption laws. There are some on
the books. If they need to be stronger, make them stronger.
Certainly it is true that Poroshenko is himself an oligarch, as
are most of the folks in senior leadership positions in
Ukraine, but this is his chance to show that he is going to
lead his country not just pad his bank account.
Fourth, assemble an A-plus economic team from inside and
outside the country so that the tough steps can be taken to
qualify for IMF and EU loans.
And fifth, welcome the Ukrainian diaspora back. There are
very many smart and some wealthy Ukrainians out and about who
could help their country.
Then comes the tough issue--and you mentioned this, Senator
Corker--what to do about the Russians and the unrest in the
east part of Ukraine. I think it is time for a united voice,
all the Europeans, President Obama, and others, to call on
President Putin to stop most of this violence. I am assuming
there are some crazies he cannot stop, but we all know that
Chechens and others are crossing the Russian border in trucks
with arms. And those folks have to come home. The border has to
be policed. The flow of arms has to be stopped. And Putin
should tell the separatists in east Ukraine to lay down their
arms.
But second, we do need more sanctions. And I would say that
these sanctions against the banking industry and the economic
industry and the energy--the economic sector and the banking
sector have to be imposed. And I know that Europe is reluctant,
but Chancellor Merkel seems to be open to this. And President
Obama should press big-time to have those sanctions in place if
President Putin does not respond in the shortest period of time
to this demand to stop the violence in east Ukraine.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Ambassador Pifer.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN PIFER, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO UKRAINE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Pifer. Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to talk to you today about the Ukraine-Russia
crisis and the United States policy response.
And, Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a written statement for
the record, which I will now summarize.
Ukrainians went to the polls in large numbers on May 25 in
an election that met international democratic standards. Petro
Poroshenko won a resounding victory.
The President-elect now faces significant challenges. He
must find a way to manage eastern Ukraine, where clashes
continue between separatists and government forces. He must
oversee implementation of the economic reforms in Ukraine's
program with the International Monetary Fund. He must address
the questions of decentralization of power.
Mr. Poroshenko also faces the major challenge of dealing
with Russia. Unfortunately, by all appearances, Vladimir Putin
remains opposed to Kiev's desire to draw closer to the European
Union. He continues the policy that Moscow has pursued since
its illegal occupation of Crimea; Russia seeks to destabilize
the Ukrainian Government.
There is no evidence that Moscow has used its influence
with the armed separatists in Ukraine's east to urge them to
deescalate the crisis. To the contrary, Russia appears to
support and encourage them. Numerous reports indicate that
arms, supplies, and fighters flow from Russia into Ukraine.
Russia has legitimate interests in Ukraine, to be sure. But
those interests do not mean that it should resort to force,
seize Ukrainian territory, or support separatism.
The U.S. policy response appears to have three vectors.
First, the administration has bolstered the political
legitimacy of the Government in Kiev and targeted assistance to
help Ukraine reform.
One area where Washington should do more is military
assistance. The Ukrainian military needs help in strengthening
its defensive capabilities. Ukrainian units in the field could
use basic equipment such as tents. The decision to provide body
armor, night-vision goggles, and communications equipment is
welcome, if overdue.
The United States should also offer counterinsurgency
advice and intelligence support. It is also appropriate to
consider providing light antiarmor weapons and man-portable air
defense systems, particularly since the Ukrainian military, at
United States and NATO request, eliminated many of its stocks
of MANPADS.
The second vector of United States policy has aimed to
reassure NATO allies in the Baltic and Central European
regions, who are more nervous about Moscow's intentions
following the seizure of Crimea. United States and NATO
military forces have deployed with the objectives of reassuring
allies of NATO's commitment to their defense and of
underscoring that commitment to Moscow.
On Tuesday, the President proposed a $1 billion program to
increase the U.S. military presence in Central Europe. Congress
should approve expedited funding for that.
The third vector of U.S. policy has sought to penalize
Russia with the goal of effecting a change in Moscow's course
on Ukraine. Washington has ratcheted down bilateral relations.
G7 leaders, the G8 less Mr. Putin, met in Brussels instead of
Sochi.
The U.S. Government has worked with the European Union to
impose visa and financial sanctions on selected Russian
individuals and entities. The sanctions to date, although
modest, appear to have an impact. Projections of Russian GDP
growth in 2014 have been reduced, and Bloomberg reports that no
Russian company has been able to sell foreign currency bonds
since March.
Sanctions, however, thus far have failed in their primary
political purpose. Russia has not significantly altered its
course on Ukraine. More robust sanctions are justified and
should be applied. These could include: expanding the list of
Russians targeted for visa and financial sanctions; applying
targeted sanctions on the financial sector of Russia, beginning
with the sanctioning of at least one major Russian financial
institution as opposed to smaller pocket banks; and blocking
Western companies from new investments to develop oil and gas
fields in Russia.
In considering sanctions, Washington should be smart. Where
possible, it makes sense to use a scalpel rather than a
sledgehammer. The U.S. Government should avoid measures that
are counterproductive.
Washington should also encourage Kiev to pull together a
package for a settlement of the country's internal divisions.
These could provide a basis for stabilizing Ukraine. The big
question, however, is whether the Kremlin would be prepared to
support any settlement.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, members of the committee, the
Ukrainian crisis will likely continue for some time. The
challenges facing Kiev are steep. Stabilization will not prove
easy.
But we should remember that Ukraine has rich economic
potential and a talented people. Many Ukrainians seem to
recognize that they have a precious second chance to turn their
country around, after the missed opportunity of the Orange
Revolution.
United States policy should aim to maximize the prospects
that this time Ukraine will succeed. This will be important for
the people of Ukraine and for a more stable and secure Europe.
Also, the best rebuke to Moscow's policy would be to see
Ukraine in several years' time looking more and more like
Poland: a normal, democratic, rule of law, and increasingly
prosperous European state.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pifer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Steven Pifer
introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to testify on
the Ukraine-Russia crisis and how the United States should respond.
As Ukraine struggles through the ongoing crisis, Ukrainians went to
the polls in large numbers on May 25 in an election that observers
agreed met international democratic standards. Petro Poroshenko will
take office on June 7 with renewed democratic legitimacy, having won a
clear mandate from the Ukrainian electorate.
The President-elect faces significant challenges. He must find a
way to manage eastern Ukraine, where clashes continue between armed
separatists and government forces. He must oversee implementation of
the economic reforms to which Ukraine agreed in its program with the
International Monetary Fund. He must address the important questions of
decentralization of power and political reform.
Mr. Poroshenko also faces the major challenge of dealing with
Russia. Although Vladimir Putin said that Russia would respect the will
of the Ukrainian electorate, Russian actions suggest a different
approach. There is no evidence that Moscow has used its considerable
influence with the armed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
(provinces) to urge them to de-escalate the crisis. Numerous reports
indicate that arms, supplies and fighters cross from Russia into
Ukraine, something that Russian border guards could interdict.
What apparently triggered Russian efforts to destabilize the
interim Ukrainian Government after former President Victor Yanukovych
fled in February was the interim government's affirmation of its desire
to draw closer to the European Union and sign the Ukraine-EU
association agreement. Mr. Putin opposes that. Given that Mr.
Poroshenko also supports the association agreement, Russia will likely
continue its destabilization efforts.
The U.S. Government's response has been organized along three
vectors: (1) bolster the Ukrainian Government; (2) reassure NATO allies
unnerved by Moscow's aggressive behavior; and (3) penalize Russia with
the objective of promoting a change in Russian policy. The
administration generally deserves high marks on the first two vectors.
More should be done, however, to raise the consequences for Moscow
should it not alter its policy course regarding Ukraine.
why should the united states care about ukraine?
At a time when the U.S. foreign policy in-box is overflowing, why
should Americans care about Ukraine? Let me offer three reasons.
First, Ukraine has been a good international partner of the United
States for more than two decades. When the Soviet Union collapsed in
1991, Ukraine had on its territory the world's third-largest nuclear
arsenal--including some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads arming 176
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 45 strategic bombers--
all designed to strike the United States. Ukraine agreed to give up
that arsenal, transferring the nuclear warheads to Russia for
elimination and destroying the ICBMs and bombers.
In 1998, Ukraine was participating in the construction of the
nuclear power plant at Bushehr in Iran. At U.S. behest, the Ukrainian
Government aligned its nonproliferation policy with U.S. policy and
withdrew from the project, forcing Russia to find another and more
expensive provider of turbine generators for the Iranian reactor.
In 2003, following the downfall of Saddam Hussein, Kiev responded
positively to the U.S. request for contributions to the coalition force
in Iraq. At one point, the Ukrainian Army had nearly 2,000 troops, the
fourth-largest military contingent, in country.
And in 2012, Ukraine transferred out the last of its highly
enriched uranium as part of the U.S.-led international effort to
consolidate stocks of nuclear weapons--usable highly enriched uranium
and plutonium.
This kind of partnership merits U.S. support when Ukraine faces a
crisis.
Second, as part of the agreement by which Ukraine gave up its
nuclear weapons, the United States, Britain, and Russia committed in
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and not to use, or
threaten to use, force against Ukraine. Russia's illegal seizure and
annexation of Crimea constitute a gross violation of its commitments
under that document, as does Russia's ongoing support for separatists
in eastern Ukraine. The United States and Britain should meet their
commitments by supporting Ukraine and pressuring Russia to halt actions
that violate the memorandum.
Third, Russia's actions constitute a fundamental challenge to the
post-war order in Europe. The illegal seizure of Crimea is the most
blatant land-grab that Europe has seen since 1945. The United States
and Europe need to respond adequately and ensure that Russia faces
consequences for this kind of behavior. Otherwise, the danger is that
Mr. Putin may pursue other actions that would further threaten European
security and stability.
the situation in ukraine: the may 25 presidential election
Ukrainians went to the polls on May 25 to elect a new President.
The success of that election has important implications. Since Mr.
Yanukovych fled Kiev (and Ukraine) at the end of February, many
Ukrainians, particularly in the east, had seen the acting government as
illegitimate. The May 25 election will put in office a President with
renewed democratic legitimacy.
By all accounts, the election proceeded normally in most of the
country. Sixty percent of the electorate voted, an impressive number
given that armed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk--where about 14
percent of Ukraine's voters reside--prevented voting in most precincts
in those oblasts.
On May 26, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
election-monitoring mission released its preliminary assessment of the
vote. While noting some problems, it concluded that the election was
``largely in line with international commitments . . . in the vast
majority of the country.'' Virtually all election observers--including
the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations and Committee
of Voters of Ukraine--concurred in the positive assessment of the
election's conduct.
According to Ukraine's Central Electoral Commission, Mr. Poroshenko
won with 54.7 percent of the vote, a figure that tracked closely with
the number reported in the two major exit polls released on the evening
of May 25. The strength of that victory was remarkable and, by crossing
the 50 percent threshold, Mr. Poroshenko avoided the need for a runoff
ballot. Every previous Presidential election since Ukraine regained
independence had to go to a second round.
Two other things were notable in the election results. First, of
the top five candidates, four--who together won a combined total of 77
percent of the vote--supported Ukraine drawing closer to the European
Union. Second, in contrast to all the talk in Russia of neofascists
running things in Ukraine, the two candidates from far right parties
won a combined total of less than 2 percent of the vote.
domestic challenges
Mr. Poroshenko will be sworn in as Ukraine's fifth President on
Saturday.
Eastern Ukraine poses the first of several difficult challenges
awaiting him. Dozens, if not hundreds, have died in clashes between
Ukrainian military and security forces and armed separatists in Donetsk
and Luhansk over the past month. Mr. Poroshenko has said his first trip
as President will be to Donetsk.
Many in eastern Ukraine are troubled by how government power in
Kiev changed in February and regard the acting government as
illegitimate. Polls show, however, that more than 70 percent wish to
remain a part of Ukraine. Mr. Poroshenko's election should lift some of
that cloud of illegitimacy. If he can successfully assure the
population in the east that he will listen to and address their
political and economic concerns, he can undercut support for the armed
separatists, whose welcome may be wearing out. That could also give a
boost to the roundtable process launched by the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe aimed at resolving Ukraine's
internal divisions.
Mr. Poroshenko's second challenge will be implementing the economic
reforms to which Ukraine agreed in order to receive $17 billion in low-
interest loans from the International Monetary Fund over the next 2
years. Ukraine has the potential to receive as much as $25-$35 billion
from the International Monetary Fund, other international financial
institutions and Western governments to help it meet its external debt
obligations--provided that it implements its reform program.
The reforms are necessary to put the country's economic house in
order and end rampant corruption. But the reforms will hurt many
households across the country. Mr. Poroshenko will need to find a way
to sustain the public's support for pursuing those reforms, a
potentially difficult political test.
The third challenge is decentralizing Ukraine's Government, in
which too much power rests in the capital. Transferring some political
authority to the oblasts--such as making regional governors elected as
opposed to appointed by the President--would promote more effective,
efficient, and accountable governance. It would also address demands in
the eastern part of the country for more local authority.
Mr. Poroshenko has said that he would like to see early Rada
(Parliament) elections this year. That would be a wise move, as it
would revalidate the Rada's democratic legitimacy in the aftermath of
February's turmoil and would put in place Rada deputies reflecting the
country's current mood.
With regard to foreign policy, Mr. Poroshenko supports bringing
Ukraine closer to the European Union, which includes signing a Ukraine-
EU association agreement that contains a deep and comprehensive free
trade arrangement. That will expand access to EU markets for Ukrainian
exporters. Opinion polls show that a majority of Ukrainians supports a
pro-European Union course.
Mr. Poroshenko has also expressed a desire to develop a working
relationship with Russia--a sensible position given the many links and
interactions between Ukraine and Russia. The principal challenge,
however, is that Mr. Putin and the Kremlin oppose Ukraine's pro-Europe
course, which would remove the country from Russia's sphere of
influence. There are no significant indications to suggest that
Moscow's goal of holding Ukraine back from Europe has changed.
russia's approach and motives
On May 23, Mr. Putin said he would respect the results of the
Ukrainian Presidential election. If Moscow is prepared to deal directly
with Kiev in a normal manner and cease its support for the separatists
who have created chaos in Donetsk and Luhansk, that would be a positive
and welcome step. But skepticism is in order: this would amount to a
total reversal in Russia's course over the past 3 months--and it is not
clear why the Kremlin now would decide to do that.
Kiev, the United States and European Union will watch closely to
see how Russia deals with Mr. Poroshenko in the coming weeks. After 2
months of intimidating military maneuvers on Ukraine's eastern border,
it appears that Russia now has finally returned most of the troops to
their bases. That is a welcome step.
Russia has legitimate interests in Ukraine. But those interests do
not mean that it should resort to force, seize Ukrainian territory, and
support separatism. There is much that the Russians could do if they
truly wished to defuse the crisis. There are many indicators that the
Russian Government has been supporting the armed separatists in eastern
Ukraine, including by providing leadership, such as Colonel Chirkin
(Strelkov). The Russian Government could end that support and order its
personnel to cease fighting. Moscow has taken no visible steps to urge
the separatists in eastern Ukraine to lay down arms and evacuate
occupied buildings, as was agreed in Geneva in mid-April. It could do
so now. The flow of arms, including sophisticated antiaircraft weapons,
other supplies and fighters, including from Chechnya, continues from
Russia into eastern Ukraine. That is something Russian border guards
could interdict if ordered to do so.
Mr. Putin's approach toward Ukraine thus far appears driven by
several factors.
Russia's main focus has not been Crimea, which it illegally
occupied in March. The Kremlin appears to seek a weak and compliant
Ukrainian neighbor, a state that will defer to Moscow and not develop a
significant relationship with the European Union. For Mr. Putin,
possessing Crimea while mainland Ukraine draws closer to Europe is no
victory.
Although he lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union as the
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Mr. Putin does
not seek to rebuild it. Doing so would require that Russia subsidize
the economies of others, an economic burden that Moscow does not wish
to bear.
What Mr. Putin does want is a sphere of influence, which he views
as a key component of Moscow's great power status. Countries within
that sphere are expected to eschew policies, such as drawing too close
to NATO or the European Union, that the Kremlin regards as inconsistent
with Russian interests. A Ukraine that has signed, and is implementing,
an EU association agreement would be a country moving irretrievably out
of Moscow's geopolitical orbit.
Domestic political factors also motivate Mr. Putin's policy. The
seizure of Crimea was popular with most Russians, particularly his
conservative political base. His domestic approval rating now exceeds
80 percent. Trying to pull Ukraine back toward Russia, given the
historical and cultural links, is also popular with many Russians.
Another factor apparently motivating Mr. Putin is to see the Maidan
experiment--which began with the demonstrations that started in late
November and continues as Ukraine shapes a new government--fail. As was
evident in 2012 following the brief period of large demonstrations in
Moscow, the Kremlin greatly fears civil protest and moved quickly to
clamp down. It does not want to see protest succeed in neighboring
Ukraine.
Finally, while it is difficult to understand how the Kremlin
functions, some suggest that Mr. Putin operates in a bubble in which he
receives information from relatively narrow channels dominated by the
security services. When the Russian President talks about what has
happened in Ukraine over the past 6 months--or about what happened 10
years ago during the Orange Revolution--he does not describe protests
motivated by popular discontent with an increasingly authoritarian
leadership or a stolen election. He sees an effort orchestrated and led
by the CIA and its sister European services, aimed in large part at
hemming in Russia. Such a flawed understanding of Ukraine is worrisome,
as bad analysis offers a poor foundation on which to base policy.
How will Russia proceed regarding Ukraine? The April 17 meeting of
the U.S., Russian, Ukrainian and European Union Foreign Ministers
offered a chance for a diplomatic solution. Little appears to have come
of it. Moscow did nothing to get illegal armed groups in cities such as
Donetsk or Slavyansk to disarm or evacuate the buildings that they
occupied. Instead, it appears to have encouraged and supported those
groups. Today, unfortunately, the Russians continue to do little to
exercise the very considerable authority that they have with the armed
separatists to defuse the crisis.
It is not clear that Mr. Putin has a grand strategy on Ukraine. He
may be making decisions on an ad hoc basis. He likely did not decide to
move to seize Crimea, for example, until he saw how events played out
in Kiev at the end of February. He then saw an opportunity, and he took
it.
We must bear in mind that Mr. Putin surprised the West. Once it
became clear that the acting government in Kiev would pursue the EU
association agreement, most analysts expected a negative reaction from
Moscow. But we anticipated that Russia would resort to its considerable
economic leverage: block Ukrainian exports to Russia, press for payment
of outstanding loans, or raise the price of natural gas for Ukraine.
Russia instead used its military to take Crimea.
The West should also bear in mind Mr. Putin's claim to a right to
protect Russian ``compatriots''--ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers
who do not have Russian citizenship. This was the justification for
Russian action in Crimea. What does it mean for other states
neighboring Russia with significant ethnic Russian minority
populations?
the u.s. policy response
The U.S. policy response over the past 3 months appears to have
three vectors: support Ukraine, reassure NATO allies, and penalize
Russia with the goal of effecting a change in Moscow's policy.
The first vector has aimed to bolster Ukraine. Since the acting
government took office in late February, there has been a steady stream
of senior U.S. officials to Kiev, including Deputy Secretary of State
Bill Burns, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Vice President Joe
Biden. The Vice President will return to Kiev for Mr. Poroshenko's
inauguration. President Obama has hosted Acting Prime Minister Arseniy
Yatseniuk and met Mr. Poroshenko yesterday during his visit to Warsaw.
These demonstrate U.S. political support and bolster the Government in
Kiev.
The United States worked closely with the International Monetary
Fund to develop the current program for Ukraine. Provided that Ukraine
implements the program's reforms, it is front-loaded to give Ukraine
early access to significant funds, much more so than in most 2-year IMF
programs. U.S. assistance programs should now focus on helping Ukraine
implement the agreed reforms.
U.S. officials have launched particular programs to assist Ukraine.
Of particular importance is the effort to help Ukraine diversify its
energy sources and increase energy efficiency so that it can reduce its
dependence on Russia. A second program seeks to help Ukraine track
where funds stolen by officials in the previous government went, with
the goal of freezing and securing the return of those moneys to
Ukraine.
One area where the United States should do more is military
assistance. The Ukrainian military needs help in strengthening its
defensive capabilities. Given that most Ukrainian army bases are in the
western part of the country--a legacy of Soviet times when Soviet
forces in Ukraine were deployed primarily against NATO--many units that
deployed to Donetsk and Luhansk lack infrastructure. MREs and other
nonlethal equipment such as sleeping bags, tents, and logistics are
needed to help sustain soldiers in the field.
The decision to provide body armor, night-vision goggles, and
communications equipment is welcome, if overdue. The United States
should also offer counterinsurgency advice and intelligence support. It
is appropriate to consider providing light antiarmor weapons and man-
portable air defense systems, particularly since the Ukrainian
military, at U.S. and NATO request, eliminated many of its man-portable
air defense systems so that they would not be subject to possible theft
and terrorist use. Finally, the U.S. military should continue its
program of exercises with the Ukrainian military, which has been a
standard element of the U.S.-Ukraine military-to-military cooperation
program for more than 15 years.
The second vector of U.S. policy has been to reassure NATO allies
in the Baltic and Central European regions, who are more nervous about
Moscow's intentions and possible actions following the seizure of
Crimea. U.S. and NATO military forces have deployed to the regions with
the objectives of reassuring those allies of the alliance's commitment
to their defense and of underscoring that commitment to Moscow.
The most significant deployment has been that of four U.S. airborne
companies, one each to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, for what
the Pentagon has described as a ``persistent'' deployment. These units
lack heavy weapons and pose no offensive threat to Russia, but they are
a tangible indicator of U.S. commitment to the four allies. It would
send an even stronger message were the U.S. companies joined by
companies from other alliance members. For example, a German company
might be paired with the U.S. company in Lithuania, a British company
with the U.S. company in Estonia, and so on.
Speaking on Tuesday in Warsaw, President Obama proposed a $1
billion program to increase the U.S. military presence in Central
Europe. This is an appropriate step, given new concerns about Russia
and Russian policy since the Kremlin's seizure of Crimea. Congress
should approve expedited funding for this.
The third vector of U.S. policy has to been to penalize Russia with
the goal of effecting a change in Moscow's course on Ukraine.
Washington has ratcheted down bilateral relations, and G7 leaders--the
G8 less Mr. Putin--met today in Brussels instead of in Sochi, as had
originally been planned.
The U.S. Government has worked with the European Union to impose
visa and financial sanctions on selected individuals and entities over
the past 2 months. While the Russian economy was already weakening in
2013, the sanctions imposed to date, although modest, appear to be
having an impact.
The Russian Finance Minister has projected that Russian GDP growth
in 2014 would be \1/2\ percent at most and perhaps zero. That is down
from projections of 2.0-2.5 percent in 2013. The Russian Economy
Minister said that the Russian economy could be in recession by June, a
development that he attributed to geopolitical circumstances, i.e., the
effects of Russian policy toward Ukraine and the resulting sanctions.
The Russian Finance Minister also noted that capital flight in the
first quarter of 2014 amounted to $50 billion. Other sources suggest it
was higher, perhaps on the order of $60-70 billion. Standard & Poor's
has reduced the investment grade of sovereign Russian debt to one level
above junk bond status. According to Bloomberg, no Russian company has
been able to sell foreign currency bonds since March, in contrast to
2013, when Russian companies sold $42.5 billion worth of such bonds.
The sanctions are having an economic impact, but they thus far have
failed in their primary purpose. Russia has not significantly altered
its course on Ukraine.
The U.S. Government has been more restrained than it should have on
sanctions. Part of the reason is the administration's desire to move in
concert with the European Union, so as to minimize the opportunity for
Russian wedge-driving or selectively targeting American companies for
retaliation. Unfortunately, the European Union has been overly cautious
on sanctions, in large part due to concern for its trade with Russia,
which is more than 10 times U.S.-Russia trade, and the need to find
consensus among 28 member states, which generally produces a lowest
common denominator approach.
The West needs to recognize that Moscow remains part of the problem
in Ukraine and is not yet part of the solution. Absent a change in the
Russian course, the United States and European Union should apply
further and more robust sanctions, which are already more than
justified by Russia's actions. Additional sanctions could include:
Expanding the list of individual Russians--inside and
outside of government--targeted for visa and financial
sanctions. Sanctions should apply to family members as well.
Applying targeted sanctions on the Russian financial sector,
beginning with the sanctioning of at least one major Russian
financial institution (as opposed to smaller pocket banks).
Blocking Western energy companies from new investments to
develop oil and gas fields in Russia, just as the United States
and European Union have moved to block their companies from
investing in the development of oil and gas resources on the
Black Sea shelf around Crimea.
The goal of sanctions should be to change Mr. Putin's calculus.
Russian analysts have long described an implicit social contract that
he has with the Russian people: diminished individual political space
in return for economic stability, growth and rising living standards.
He delivered spectacularly on his part of the bargain from 2000-2008,
when the Russian economy grew by seven-eight percent per year. Some
Russian economists in 2013 questioned, however, whether the projected
2.0-2.5 percent growth would suffice; the objective of sanctions should
be to inflict economic pain on Russia and undermine Mr. Putin's ability
to deliver on his side of the bargain. That may--may, not necessarily
will--lead him to adopt a new policy course.
There is an alternative view. It holds that Mr. Putin will use the
sanctions as a scapegoat and attempt to put all the blame on the West
for Russia's poor economic performance. How sanctions will affect the
Russian public's view toward Mr. Putin and his calculations regarding
policy regarding Ukraine remain to be seen. The egregious nature of
Russian actions over the past several months nevertheless argues that
the West should impose significant consequences.
In considering and applying sanctions, the U.S. Government should
be smart. Where possible, it makes sense to use a scalpel and carefully
target sanctions rather than a sledgehammer. It also makes sense to
avoid policies that would not help Ukraine and would damage other U.S.
interests--such as halting implementation of the New START treaty or
accelerating the deployment of SM-3 missile interceptors that may not
be technically ready for deployment in Poland.
possible elements of a settlement
Washington should encourage Kiev to pull together the strands of a
package to stabilize its internal situation, including elements of
interest to many in eastern Ukraine. Elements of a settlement could
include the following:
De-escalation of the fighting in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian
military could cease security operations if the armed separatist groups
stand down and negotiate an evacuation of the buildings that they have
occupied over the past 2 months. Moscow has called on Kiev to halt its
operations; it could greatly increase the chances of this if it
persuaded the separatists to abide by the Geneva agreement to evacuate
occupied buildings and disarm. For its part, the government in Kiev
should disarm the far-right Praviy Sektor movement.
Decentralization of political authority. Members of the acting
government and Mr. Poroshenko have suggested the possibility that some
political authority could be shifted from Kiev to regional and local
leaders. Mr. Poroshenko should put forward concrete proposals for
decentralization, which may require constitutional reform. One obvious
step would be to make the oblast governors elected as opposed to
appointed by the President. It would also be sensible to transfer some
budget authority to regional governments.
Early Rada elections. The May 25 Presidential election gives Mr.
Poroshenko a strong democratic mandate. It would make sense to hold
early Rada elections in order to renew the democratic legitimacy of the
parliamentary body as well.
Russian language status. The acting government has indicated its
readiness to give the Russian language official status (which it
already enjoys in certain regions as the result of a language law
passed during the Yanukovych Presidency). Mr. Poroshenko could affirm
his readiness to support official status for Russian.
International relations. Kiev's foreign policy is of interest to
many Ukrainians. Some, as well as Russia, are concerned about the
prospect of deepening relations between Ukraine and NATO, despite the
fact that the acting government and Mr. Poroshenko have indicated that
they have no desire to draw closer to NATO. That is and should be
Kiev's decision. But not pursuing a deeper relationship with NATO now
seems an appropriate policy for Ukraine: deepening relations with NATO
would antagonize Moscow, and there is no appetite in the alliance to
accept Ukraine as a member or offer a membership action plan. Most
importantly, a push toward NATO would be hugely divisive within
Ukraine, where polls show at most only 20-30 percent of the population
would support such a policy; it would be particularly controversial in
eastern Ukraine. Without forever foreclosing the option, Kiev should be
able to articulate a position that assures Russia that NATO is not in
the cards in the near- or medium-term, a policy that the alliance could
acknowledge.
Mr. Poroshenko, the Rada and a majority of Ukrainians favor drawing
closer to the European Union and signing the Ukraine-EU association
agreement. Moscow has complained that the European Union refused last
year to discuss with it the association agreement. Kiev might indicate
that it would be prepared for a trilateral EU-Ukraine-Russia discussion
on steps that the European Union and Ukraine could take to ameliorate
negative effects of the association agreement on Ukraine-Russia trade--
but not on the question of Ukraine's right to decide for itself whether
or not to sign the agreement.
Crimea. It is very difficult to envisage a scenario by which
Ukraine regains sovereignty over Crimea. That does not mean that
Ukraine or the West should accept Russia's illegal occupation and
annexation. However, in a broader dialogue to find a settlement, it
might make sense for Kiev and Moscow to set Crimea aside for the time
being and return to the issue later after a settlement of other issues
has been reached.
These elements, which build on many points that the acting
Ukrainian Government and Mr. Poroshenko have already articulated, could
provide a basis for stabilizing Ukraine. They address a number of
issues that the Russians have raised over the past 3 months--though
they do not go as far as Moscow would want. The big question is whether
the Kremlin would be prepared to support any settlement that shaped up
along the above lines. At the moment, it is not clear that the Russians
would.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, members of the committee, the Ukraine
crisis will likely continue for some time to come. With the election of
a new President, the government in Kiev is better prepared to meet the
challenges confronting it than was the case 3 weeks ago. Still, the
challenges are steep.
Addressing those challenges would be substantially easier were
Russia to cease its efforts to destabilize Ukraine and adopt a more
helpful policy. But it does not appear that the Kremlin is ready to
cease those destabilization efforts. If it does not, the United States
and European Union should move to apply more robust sanctions on
Russia, with the goal of persuading Moscow to change its policy.
International financial institutions and Western governments have
pulled together a substantial financial package for Ukraine. The United
States and European Union should target their assistance programs to
help the Ukrainian Government implement the economic reforms in its IMF
program. That will help Kiev stay on program--necessary for continued
access to international financing--and will help bring about the
reforms needed to build a more transparent, competitive, and productive
economy.
Washington should also encourage the Ukrainian Government to
develop a settlement package that would help heal the internal
differences that have developed over the past 4 months. Once Kiev
adopts that package, the United States and European Union should give
it full political backing and urge the Russians to support it as well.
Stabilizing Ukraine will take time. But it has rich economic
potential and a talented people. Many Ukrainians seem to recognize that
they have a precious second chance to turn their country around--after
the missed opportunity of the Orange Revolution.
U.S. and Western policy should aim to maximize the prospects that,
this time, Ukraine will succeed. That will be important for the people
of Ukraine and for a more stable and secure Europe. Also, the best
rebuke to the Kremlin's policy would be to see Ukraine in several
years' time looking more and more like Poland--a normal, democratic,
rule of law, and increasingly prosperous European state.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Jeffrey.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. JEFFREY, PHILIP SOLONDZ
DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE; FORMER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Jeffrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Corker, members of the committee. Again, I very much
appreciate being here today.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine is the most serious
challenge to the international order since 9/11. As such, this
crisis requires action at three levels.
The first of the immediate steps that have been taken and
are being taken deal with the phenomenon itself. As the acting
National Security Advisor with President Bush during the 2008
invasion of Georgia, I believe that the administration, under
somewhat similar circumstances, had done, all in all, a good
job dealing with the Russian incursion into Crimea and now in
eastern Ukraine. It has not challenged Russia militarily on the
ground, and I think that is a wise decision given the stakes
and given the difficulty of deploying U.S. troops. On the other
hand, it has used economic sanctions and every diplomatic tool
possible and, in particular, brought along an initially
recalcitrant Europe. And this will be a problem going forward
as well, but the administration is trying its best on that.
Thanks to both these efforts by the international community
and, more importantly, as my colleagues have noted, the will of
the Ukrainian people represented in the elections and the
willingness of people even in eastern Ukraine to support a
unified and sovereign Ukraine, the Russians have had to change
their tactics somewhat, less direct military aggression, more
indirect forces. But, nonetheless, as my Foreign Service
colleague, Steve Pifer, just said, the strategy that Putin is
following remains the same: to destabilize Ukraine and ensure
it can never be a sovereign country able to choose its own
future, which I believe would be with the West, and defend
itself against falling under Russian sway.
Thus, at the second level, we need to look at additional
steps. The administration has announced a number of good moves
this week. The Senate in the draft Preventing Russian
Aggression bill has come up with others. I have my own. I will
just touch on a few.
First of all, I would second Ambassador Pifer. We need to
provide not just MREs, although they are needed, but weapons
and advisory teams to help the Ukrainians deal with this
insurgency in the east. We have much experience in stability
operations. They need to know how to use military force while
reaching out to the population.
Secondly, we need to, as the President said, very rapidly
deploy significant heavy--that is, armor-heavy--prepositioned
stocks and rotational forces along the borders of NATO's east.
Again, the President is moving forward on this. This should not
wait for additional money. We have the equipment. We can deploy
the troops. We should also ensure that this becomes a NATO
mission and that NATO also provides troops along with ours, as
we did several times during the cold war.
We have mentioned economic support for Ukraine. That's
very, very important. And there, President Poroshenko is going
to have to do a lot of work himself because a lot of money has
gone into Ukraine without much result.
Finally, as mentioned in your draft bill, we need to do
more to wean Europe from Russian gas and from Russian financial
investments and other pressures that it is able to use thanks
to its economy. There are ways to do this that would have
immediate and, more importantly, long-term effects. The long-
term issue I want to dwell on for a little bit because that's
the third order of magnitude we have here.
Again, what we have seen in the last months is an
extraordinary development in the history of Europe and
certainly in the history of the post-cold war. I reject the
notion that Russia was pushed into this by NATO's expansion
east. I was involved at a certain level on those decisions back
20 years ago, and while perhaps that could have been done
differently, the point is as NATO moved east, it also stood
down the vast majority of its conventional forces. Russia did
not do the same. The United States, the EU, the international
community tried for 20 years with tens of billions of dollars
to integrate Russia into the international community in every
way possible. The result is a Russia that is trying to expand
again using 18th century models.
At this point, we have to consider the stark likelihood of
not just a Russia but possibly a China as well, ever more
closely tied to Russia, motivated to challenge both the
international order and America as guarantor of that system. We
need to start thinking as a country, as an alliance, and as a
global community about the implications of this. If we wish to
avoid a geostrategic shift, as dramatic as 1989 only in the
other direction, maintaining the integrity of this
international order including, if needed, by force must be
among our vital interests.
Thank you very much, Senators.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jeffrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador James F. Jeffrey
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me here today. What has happened in
Ukraine is the most significant challenge to the international order
since the attacks of September 11. While not aimed directly at the
United States, the strategic fallout of Russia's aggression against
Ukraine is, in some respects, more threatening to the global order we
have helped build and defend over the past century. After all, we are
not dealing with a terrorist group, but a nuclear-armed U.N. Security
Council permanent member, one of the world's greatest hydrocarbons
exporters, intending to regain the international status enjoyed by the
Soviet Union. To this end, Russia has used all tools at its disposal,
from gas export blackmail to direct and indirect invasion--from Georgia
and Syria to Crimea and Eastern Ukraine--to achieve that status, not
only trampling the values that ground our global order in the process,
but to a significant degree, attempting to replace it.
As such, the Ukraine crisis requires action at three levels by the
United States and its partners. First, we must take immediate steps to
deal with the situation at hand in a Ukraine being deliberately
destabilized. Second, we must take long-term steps to counter the
Russian goal of denying Ukraine any level of independence and stability
that would permit it to develop relations with the West and avoid being
absorbed by Russia. Third, Russian actions in Ukraine and elsewhere,
combined with China's actions in its near abroad, and the ever-
deepening partnership of Russia and China, require us and our friends
to rethink the very foundations of the international order since 1989.
The Obama administration has been generally successful at the first
level and is working hard at the second, but appears at best uncertain
about the third. Let me describe each of these challenges and
responses.
Based on my experience with President Bush during Russia's attack
on Georgia in 2008, the Obama administration has reacted in a generally
reasonable way, similar to that of the Bush administration, to this
latest Russian aggression. It has of course had to adapt to an EU often
reluctant to act against Russia. It has, correctly, not challenged
Russia militarily on an issue of vital importance to it but not
directly to us, in an area not easily accessible for U.S. forces. But,
as President Obama noted at West Point, his administration has
mobilized international condemnation, economic sanctions, albeit
limited, and significant coordination with EU states in response, and
effectively assisted the new Ukrainian Government. The President has
taken appropriate military steps to reinforce NATO's eastern marches,
including ship transits into the Black Sea, aircraft reinforcements,
and rotating ground troop deployments throughout at least the rest of
this year.
These steps have had impact. While sanctions so far have been very
limited, their very specter has at least temporarily damaged the
Russian economy, from the value of the ruble and investment outflows to
GDP growth, and the threat of more sanctions appears to be an effective
deterrent against new direct Russian aggression. Furthermore, Mr. Putin
did not count on the power of free men and women to act against
vassalage. The high turnout and resounding victory of Mr. Poroshenko in
the elections 10 days ago, and the reluctance of even many Ukrainians
in alleged ``pro-Russian'' areas of Eastern Ukraine to abandon their
country, have stymied, at least temporarily, Putin's gambit for an
easy, ``popular'' win.
Nevertheless, he has not abandoned his goal ``by other means.''
While Russia has pulled back many of its conventional troops arrayed on
the Ukrainian border, its public line concerning the Ukrainian
Government remains harsh and dismissive, and it shows no willingness to
reverse its illegal annexation of Crimea. Most disturbingly, its
continued direct pressure on Kiev--with deployment of irregular combat
units to Ukraine to augment Russian nationalists and intelligence
teams, and additional financial and gas price pressure--demonstrates
that only the tactics, not the goals, of its campaign against Ukraine
have changed.
It is thus critical that the United States, NATO, and the EU
augment longer term measures to counter this blatant Russian
aggression. Many of these measures parallel the proposals in the draft
Russian Aggression Prevention Act under consideration. Given the
absolute requirement for the United States to act in accordance with
NATO and the EU in responding to the Ukraine crisis, I would urge that
the administration be given latitude in deciding which measures to
implement, how, and when, to ensure we remain synchronized with our
European partners. But I believe that the most important steps for the
United States and its friends to take should include the following:
First, lift the ban on lethal weapons and advisory support,
including against irregular forces, to the Ukrainian security
forces. This is a difficult decision given its impact on
Ukrainian Government perceptions, Russian calculations, and
European concerns. But refusing direct assistance to a
democratic government facing what is unquestionably aggression
is a mistake. In the end, such a move almost certainly will not
``provoke'' Putin. He is opting for aggression with or without
U.S. ``provocations,'' and while all such steps have risk, we
are more likely to gain his attention if we stop ``self-
deterring'' ourselves. The Ukrainians have earned the right for
more support than MREs. To quote the Fall 2004 edition of
Middle East Quarterly, providing an account of the 2004 battle
of Kut, Iraq, ``The Ukrainian Army . . . soldiers who were
stationed at the CPA compound fought valiantly and tirelessly
during the assault.''
Second, in line with the President's new initiative
announced in Warsaw, strengthen NATO's eastern border
countries, not simply with deployments of U.S. light infantry,
but by prepositioning battalion-size ``heavy packages'' of
tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery
in each of the frontline NATO states. The United States would
keep a company forward deployed with the remainder of a
battalion ready to fall in on the prepositioned equipment. This
should be a NATO-blessed deployment, and NATO states should
provide a second battalion package in each country. That, plus
urgent specialized equipping and training of several local
battalions in each country to cooperate closely with this
force, would give an almost immediately available reinforced
heavy brigade on each NATO country's borders. Aside from the
significant defensive enhancement against any new ``Crimea,''
this step would signal Moscow that the United States and NATO
are going to defend alliance territory, and that military moves
are still in the Obama administration's quiver.
Third, help meet the needs of the Ukrainian economy and its
energy sector, along with EU international financial
institutions. The IMF has pledged $17 billion, which will be
supported by $15 billion from the EU, $1 billion from the
United States, and various other sources. This money must be
used more wisely by Ukrainians than in the past, but the need
is palpable. Providing Ukraine with gas from the European gas
net and other energy relief being worked on by the EU and the
U.S. Government is critical, especially by the fall.
Fourth, Ukrainian democracy and unity must be encouraged in
the U.N. and other institutions, and on the ground. This means
support and counsel in the struggle to regain territory taken
by separatists. The United States has much experience in
stabilization under fire and should help. The Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with its Geneva
process is assisting on reconciliation with those among the
separatists willing to lay down arms and talk. We should
encourage Ukraine to reach out to them. But regaining security
control is paramount in contested areas, and we need to help.
Fifth, keep the sanctions already in place until Russia
ceases its attempts to subvert Ukraine and is willing to
discuss the future of Crimea.
Sixth, help Western Europe become less dependent on Russian
gas and cash flows. Overall trade and financial exchanges with
Russia are limited for the EU, but significant for Russia. That
theoretically gives the EU the upper hand. But Russia is a
command economy with one man deciding. Europe is a
decentralized capitalist economy, with many vested interests
and no single leader. Thus, this will not be easy.
Nevertheless, initiatives to give Europe more energy options--
including steps to realize what the Economist estimates as a
possible U.S. export of 75 billion cubic meters of gas a year
and other measures to promote liquefied natural gas--must have
priority.
But, while Ukraine's fate is not yet secured and will be a risk
even with these measures, my biggest concern is at the aforementioned
third level, the underlying message that Putin's many moves against the
global order portend.
While on the margins the United States and NATO could have tailored
relations with Russia differently since 1991, I reject the notion that
it was Western actions that produced the Russia we face today. Could
NATO have decided not to expand eastward? Of course, but it is
difficult to see how that would have assuaged Putin and at least a good
part of the Russian population who long for the return of a Soviet-
sized empire. After all, while NATO expanded, it simultaneously drew
down dramatically. U.S. combat brigade equivalents in Europe are down
from 18 in 1989 to 2 today. Major continental NATO armies, notably the
British, German, and French, have been drastically cut, with
conscription ended. The Russian military to the contrary has not been
reduced proportionally. NATO expansion thus did not increase an
alliance offensive threat against Russia. Rather, it strove to block
the re-creation of Imperial and Soviet Russia through force, an
inherently legitimate goal existential to the free peoples of eastern
Europe.
Furthermore, throughout the last 20-plus years the United States,
NATO, the EU, OSCE, and other international organizations did
everything possible to fashion for Russia a strategic position in the
global order, from tens of billions of dollars in direct and indirect
aid, to massive investments and joint ventures, to subcontracting much
of Western European energy requirements to Gazprom, to sponsoring
Russian entry into Western global institutions, most notably the World
Trade Organization, and reinforcing the Security Council. Clearly
neither that nor the drawdown of NATO force structure had any effect on
Putin and many of his countrymen and women. Rather, it is at least as
likely that by providing him with potential pressure points from gas
deliveries to local conventional-force superiority, it encouraged his
policies.
At this point, we have to consider the stark likelihood of not just
a Russia, but possibly a China as well, motivated to challenge both the
international order based on peaceful settlement of disputes,
international law, and global security, and America as guarantor of
that system. If, as is likely based on events from Crimea to the South
China Sea, this threat materializes, the United States will have to
rethink its entire foreign policy.
Neither Europe, as we have seen repeatedly in the current Ukraine
crisis, nor Japan and South Korea, are able on their own to ``pivot''
to a new posture. This will require analysis and then action by the
United States. This potential threat was not covered in detail in the
President's West Point speech. Furthermore, his recipe for most foreign
policy challenges--acting only with the support and concurrence of
international organizations, and within multilateral constraints--is
unlikely to work against major conventional state competitors. For
example, such an approach certainly will be impossible at least in the
U.N. with Russia and China at the table, and very difficult with the EU
or with our East Asian allies without strong, ``from the front'' U.S.
leadership, including readiness to use force to defend the current
system. The administration appears ambivalent about such uses of force.
But if we wish to avoid a geostrategic shift as dramatic as 1989, only
in the other direction, then maintaining the integrity of this global
system must be among our ``vital'' interests.
The Chairman. Ambassador Green.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK GREEN, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE; FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR; AND MEMBER, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
Menendez, Senator Corker, members of the committee, I
appreciate this opportunity to testify on recent developments
in Ukraine. I will summarize my written testimony and try not
to repeat what others have said.
IRI's mission is to encourage democracy in places where it
is absent, help democracy become more effective where it is in
danger, and share best practices where democracy is
flourishing. Given that mission, it is only natural that
Ukraine has been an essential part of our programming for more
than 20 years. In addition to our primary office in Kiev, we
have operated offices in Odessa and, until recently, in Crimea.
IRI has monitored all national elections in independent
Ukraine's history, including the most recent election on May
25. Our high-level mission was led by Senator Kelly Ayotte,
your colleague, and included Congressman Peter Roskam, chairman
of the House Democracy Partnership. We visited more than 100
polling stations in places like Cherkasy, Kharkiv, and Odessa.
In preparation for this election, we trained more than 5,000
observers representing candidates, political parties, and the
Maidan movement.
In the view of our observation team, these elections were
free and fair and met international standards. Of course, what
makes their accomplishment so remarkable is the wide range of
challenges Ukrainian officials faced while administering this
election. In many ways, these challenges remain and need urgent
attention--and perhaps the help of the West.
As others have noted, one very obvious challenge they faced
in recent months was Russian-sponsored violence in the south
and east. Separatists used high-grade, cutting-edge tactics and
equipment. There were widespread cases of these violent groups
taking over radio stations, establishing checkpoints, and in
one case, shutting down an airport. Well-equipped bands of
military style forces sought to shut down the election in parts
of the country, and in a few places they succeeded.
Another challenge that was and is important and that I do
not think has received enough attention is the plight and
tragedy of Crimean Tatars. The history of suffering of the
Tatar people is well-known. Stalin's forced deportation
resulted in the death of tens of thousands of Tatars, and they
were only able to return to their ancestral homeland near the
end of the Soviet Union. They now make up nearly 15 percent of
Crimean's population. They have boycotted the illegal Crimean
March referendum and rejected its results, and the community
has repeatedly pledged its continued support for a united and
sovereign Ukraine. Obviously, their courage might not have the
approval of Moscow.
Since the beginning of our work in Ukraine, we have sought
to assist the democratic aspirations of the Crimean Tatar
people. We have worked with them closely to build communication
exchanges and to try to link them up, particularly youth, with
Western Europe and other parts of Ukraine. Unfortunately, we
are unable to continue that programming in occupied Crimea, and
we would very much like to return and find ways to help this
population. In any case, in light of the Russian annexation and
the Soviet history, we should all be very watchful of how the
Tatars are able to live and work and hopefully prosper in the
face of Russian rule.
In some ways, the most serious challenge Ukraine is facing,
I would argue, is the overwhelming force of Russian propaganda
that has been projected into that country, combined with the
lack of Ukrainian media and social media in certain areas. It
is hard for any nation to build a sense of national purpose and
unity when there is a lack of indigenous media. It is nearly
impossible when that void is filled with hostile, foreign-born
propaganda bent on destabilizing communities and government
borders. We should work to help foster independent, truly
Ukraine-centered media that can reach out to every part of that
country. More and more people, especially young people, now get
their news and information through social media platforms.
Again, there's a lack of social media platforms that are
Ukraine-centered in parts of that country, and I do believe
that we can help boost social media platforms that will help
create a sense of unity and identity.
One of the most subtle and yet serious, challenges that
Ukraine has faced, and will continue to face, is a weakened IT
infrastructure. Recent reports suggest that much of the
government's IT has been compromised by foreign-sponsored
viruses. On the day of the election, the IRI delegation learned
that Russia had launched a major cyber attack aimed at bringing
down the Central Election Commission's main database. Had it
succeeded, the elections would have failed and perhaps given
Ukraine's opponents further pretense for mischief, aggression
and destabilizing activities. In this day and age, effective IT
is absolutely necessary for effective democracy and governance.
Members of the committee, it is too easy to focus on their
challenges in Ukraine. We should also focus on the hopeful
signs. As my colleague, Jane Harman, has noted, President-elect
Poroshenko has already taken significant steps to move the
country forward. He has indicated that he will retain current
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk and some other members in the current
government. He stated his top priorities are to maintain the
unity of the country by reaching out to the eastern regions,
tackling corruption and creating jobs.
Mr. Chairman, recent events in Ukraine make clear both the
challenges and possibilities that lie ahead. The fact that
Ukrainians, in the span of a few short months were able to
remove from office a corrupt but powerful leader and then turn
around and conduct national elections that met international
standards is remarkable. The fact that all of this was
accomplished in the face of threats and violence is historic.
To be clear, as my former colleague, Jane Harman, has said,
the Ukrainians, not their friends in the West, are responsible
for shaping their country's future. They have a unique history
and a rich culture that is all their own. They want to chart a
path that meets their own needs and aspirations, not anyone
else's. As one of IRI's Ukrainian staff proudly said to us
recently, ``We went to the Maidan to find Europe, and instead
we found Ukraine.'' This is a great moment for Ukraine and
potentially a great moment for democracy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mark Green
introduction
Chairman Menendez, Senator Corker, members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on
recent developments in Ukraine. Given the present challenges facing the
Ukrainian people and their newly elected leadership--from rebuilding an
economy devastated by corruption and mismanagement to defeating the
efforts of a small, but deadly group of foreign-inspired (if not
foreign-sponsored) separatists--this hearing is urgently needed. The
implications of what is happening in Ukraine, especially in areas near
its border with Russia, could affect developments throughout the
region.
irj's deep ties to ukraine
The International Republican Institute (IRI) is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan organization, and one of the four core institutes of the
National Endowment for Democracy. Our mission is to encourage democracy
in places where it is absent, help democracy become more effective
where it is in danger, and share best practices where democracy is
flourishing. While Ukraine's future is obviously up to Ukrainians, at
IRI, we believe the community of Western democracies can play an
indispensable role in providing tools and assistance to help Ukraine
realize its great potential.
Ukraine has long been an essential part of IRI's programs. In fact,
thanks to the support of numerous funders from the United States,
Europe, and Canada, IRI has been operating democracy and governance
initiatives there for more than 20 years. In addition to our primary
office in Kiev, we have operated offices in Odessa and, until recently,
Simferopol in the Crimean Peninsula.
In carrying out our mission to support more democratic, more
accountable governance, we have tried to enhance civic engagement and
advocacy at the subnational level by increasing civil society
organizations' capacity and strengthening their linkages with political
parties. We have worked to foster a national dialogue involving civic
and political activists from all around the country. For example, we
have brought together local elected officials from cities which border
Russia and cities in western Ukraine to learn from each other and
create a network of reform-oriented leaders. We have sought to increase
the participation of youth, women, and minority groups in political
processes. (IRI's Women's Democracy Network (WDN), one of our flagship
programs, launched a chapter in Ukraine in February 2011. The Ukrainian
women of WDN started an innovative gender monitoring project during the
2012 parliamentary election campaign to support women candidates, boost
the participation of women in political life, and raise people's
awareness about the importance of women's participation in
decisionmaking processes at the national level. Later this year, WDN
Ukraine will establish a special Political Leadership Academy to
develop potential women candidates.)
In particular, over the course of many years, IRI has developed
extensive relationships with the Crimean Tatar community. IRI has
worked with Tatar civic organizations to enhance their capacity to
conduct young political leadership schools and public hearings on the
peninsula. IRI was also the only international organization to observe
the Tatar community's local elections in 2013.
may 25 presidential election
IRI has monitored all national elections in independent Ukraine's
history, including the most recent Presidential election on May 25. IRI
fielded a high-level election observation mission led by Senator Kelly
Ayotte and included Congressman Peter Roskam, which visited more than
100 polling stations in Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv,
Kiev, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Ternopil, and Vinnitsya. In preparation for
elections, we trained more than 5,000 observers representing
candidates, parties, and the Maidan to help ensure the transparency and
legitimacy of the electoral process.
IRI observers reported only minor irregularities and none that
would affect the outcome of the election. Our observers reported that
the election was well-administered and that polling officials were
knowledgeable and approached their job seriously, working long hours,
without breaks to ensure that the election was free, fair, and
democratic. In areas of the country where nearly 87 percent of the
population resides, polls were open and voting went smoothly. In the
limited areas where voting was denied or suppressed--Crimea, Donetsk,
and Luhansk--it was due either to Russian occupation or interference.
In short, in the view of the IRI observation team, these elections
were free and fair, and met international standards. What makes this
accomplishment especially remarkable is the range of challenges
Ukrainian officials faced as they administered this election. Some of
the challenges, as described below, will need urgent attention from the
Poroshenko government in the months ahead. They also represent
opportunities for friends of Ukraine (such as the U.S., Canada and
Europe) to help.
violence from russia
Among the most obvious challenges that Ukrainian officials have
faced in recent months was the Russian-sponsored violence in the south
and east. The Russian-sponsored separatists used high-grade, cutting-
edge tactics and equipment. There were widespread cases of these groups
taking over radio stations, shootings, establishing checkpoints, and in
one case, shutting down an airport. Well-equipped bands of military
style forces sought to shut down the election in parts of the country,
and in a few places they succeeded.
The appearance of Russian-sponsored special forces without insignia
or other identification seemed designed to create uncertainty and
confusion among military and civilians alike. The use of paid
mercenaries, Russian counterintelligence service (GRU) veterans and
now, apparently Chechen fighters, presented Ukrainian security leaders
with new tactical challenges and, no doubt, will be studied by American
and other Western analysts in months to come.
tatars under russian occupation
Another specific challenge that we at IRI want to bring to the
committee's attention is the plight and the tragedy of the Crimean
Tatars. Nowhere have the fears of Russian influence been more acutely
felt in recent months than in their community in Crimea. The history of
the suffering of the Tatar people is well-known. Stalin's deportation
resulted in the death of tens of thousands of Tatars. It was not until
the final years of the Soviet Union that they were able to finally
return to their ancestral homeland. These days, Tatars make up nearly
15 percent of Crimea's population and growing.
The Crimean Tatar community, represented by the Mejlis of the
Crimean Tatar people, boycotted the illegal Crimean March 16 referendum
and rejected its results. Instead, the community has repeatedly pledged
their continued support for a united and sovereign Ukraine. Now their
very existence in their homeland is under threat.
Since the beginning of our work in Ukraine, IRI has sought to
assist the democratic aspirations of the Crimean Tatar people as they
built their own internal democracy within representative bodies such as
the Mejlis and the Congress of Crimean Tatar representatives known as
the Kurultai. In addition, from 2010 to 2013, IRI conducted a program
from our office in Simferopol that sought to equip Crimean Tatars,
particularly youth, with the knowledge and skills necessary to enact
reforms on the peninsula. IRI also has supported the development of a
Web site for the Crimean Tatar Mejlis to improve communications between
that body and its community, and conducted a wide range of programming
from building the capacity of local Tatar civil society organizations
to enabling them to be able to conduct young political leadership
schools.
IRI also conducted several exchanges for Tatar youth to travel to
other parts of Ukraine and Western Europe to learn from their
colleagues and build networks of motivated and politically active
youth.
Currently, IRI is unable to conduct programming in occupied Crimea.
We would like to find ways to partner with the Crimean Tatar community
in the future through a series of study trips for young political and
civic activists to both learn from and enhance linkages with their
counterparts in other regions of Ukraine. We also see a great need to
foster and build independent media on the peninsula. In any case, in
light of the Russian annexation and the history of brutal treatment of
the Tatars, we should all be watchful of how the Tatars are able to
live peacefully and democratically in the face of Russian rule.
russian propaganda, lack of ukrainian media and social media platforms
In some ways the most serious challenge facing Ukraine is the
overwhelming force of Russian propaganda that has been projected into
Ukraine, combined with the lack of Ukrainian media and social media in
certain parts of the country. Using English language television in both
United States and Europe, the Kremlin has actually convinced many that
the invasion and occupation of Crimea was merely an administrative
``correction'' of a Soviet decision made in 1954. It has apparently
convinced some in the West that the militants it pays and supplies to
create fear and chaos in eastern Ukraine are citizens who feel
persecuted due to their ethnicity or language, when polling data
completely refutes such assertions. The force and effect of such
propaganda is even more pronounced in Ukraine where there is no access
to accurate news accounts and analysis at all.
Of course, more and more people, especially young people, get their
news and communications through social media platforms. Once again,
these channels are currently dominated by Moscow, and countervailing
platforms and views are blocked by Moscow wherever they can be. The
democracies of the West should help foster free and independent news
media in Ukraine that can reach all parts of the country. We should, in
particular, support the creation and protection of truly Ukrainian
social media that allows users to communicate freely and openly without
blockage or intimidation. The recently introduced Russian Aggression
Prevention Act has a number of provisions that support these ideas and
IRI would welcome the chance to work on this front.
Mr. Chairman, the cold war has been described by many as a conflict
of ideals and principles: human rights and free markets versus
communism and statism. I would suggest that the West is once again in a
conflict, this time with Russia, over ideas and principles. Russia,
with an innovative international media program that touts its ``managed
democracy'' as the best form of government is making great gains in
this battle of ideas. The United States must lead the way in
formulating new approaches to counter Russian propaganda. As eloquently
stated by former Under Secretary of State Paula Dobriansky. the West
must counter Russian President Vladimir Putin's policies and that
failure to do so ``will embolden Moscow's aggression against other
countries with significant Russian populations.''
it infrastructure and cyber warfare
One of the most subtle, and yet serious, challenges that Ukraine
faced during the election and continues to face today is a weak and, in
some cases, infected information technology (IT) infrastructure. In
this day and age, people depend on technology for governance, national
security, the conduct of elections and many other matters. Recent
reports suggest that much of the government's computer structure has
been infected or compromised by foreign-sponsored viruses.
On the day of the election, the IRI delegation learned that Russia
had launched a major cyber attack aimed at bringing down the Central
Election Commission's main database. Had it succeeded, the elections
would have failed and perhaps given Ukraine's opponents further
pretense for mischief, aggression, and de-stabilizing activities. While
the Ukrainian Government was able to fight off the attack, what became
clear was the vulnerability of Ukraine's IT systems. Ukraine needs help
in replacing its IT infrastructure and in protecting it going forward.
moving ukraine forward
There are also some hopeful signs for Ukraine as it moves forward
from these elections. The losers in the Presidential election conceded
honorably and in ways that can foster unity. President-elect Poroshenko
has already taken significant steps to move the country forward. He has
indicated that he will retain the current Prime Minister (Arseniy
Yatsenyuk) and others in the current government. He has stated his top
priorities are to maintain the unity of the country by reaching out to
eastern regions, tackling corruption, and creating jobs.
President-elect Poroshenko has also indicated that his government
will undertake important constitutional reforms. A strong democracy
relies on a constitutional order that protects citizens' rights, as
well as limits government authority and provides for the rule of law.
In particular, the new government has expressed its willingness to
consider amending the constitution with the goal of decentralizing and
subsequently granting greater power to regional and local councils. The
direct election of governors, which would certainly result in greater
decentralization, is one of the changes under consideration.
The West can and should play a supportive role in facilitating
changes in local governance. North American and European expertise can
be brought to bear in providing experience and technical assistance in
a way that can assist in producing local governments that are more
accountable to the needs of the Ukrainian people. Similarly, the West
can play a critical role in advising Poroshenko and his government on
innovative and effective means to show real results in the battle
against corruption, which continues to be one of the key concerns of
voters, and is also detrimental to Ukraine's hopes for greater foreign
investment.
Ukrainians stand united in their desire to remain a unified
country. In IRI's April 2014 public opinion survey, the vast majority
of Ukrainians (90 percent), even those in the east, want their country
to remain united. In addition, a majority of Ukrainians (54 percent)
want Ukraine to join the European Union. Ukrainians deserve a leader
who will undertake these issues immediately.
developing a long-term strategy to assist ukraine
At this critical juncture in Ukraine's further democratic
development, it is essential that Ukraine's friends support the
Ukrainian Government and civil society efforts to build a prosperous
and democratic country. In supporting these efforts, the United States,
through mechanisms such as the United States Agency for International
Development, should increase democratic assistance to the country to
provide support to the newly elected government to enact reforms. There
is a great need to accelerate government capacity-building to fight
corruption and build citizen-oriented structures. This will build
citizen faith in leaders and harness the energy of the Maidan. To
further promote the development of a diverse and representative party
system in Ukraine, additional assistance should be provided for the
development of political parties (particularly new and emerging ones
resulting from the Maidan movement). In addition, Ukraine's friends
must seek to enhance the capacity of a burgeoning civil society in
Ukraine, which rediscovered its voice during the Maidan movement.
Marginalized groups, such as youth and minority groups like the Crimean
Tatars, need to be supported in their efforts to develop a democratic
and unified Ukraine.
Finally, the U.S. and others should support the building of
linkages between Ukrainians from eastern, southern, central, and
western parts of the country. Ukrainians want to learn from each other
and strengthen relationships with their fellow Ukrainians from
different parts of the country. They also want to acquire the knowledge
and skills to be able to build a democratic and prosperous country. IRI
stands ready to work on these and other great initiatives that can help
the Ukrainian people.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, recent events in Ukraine make clear both the
challenges and possibilities that lie in the months and years ahead for
the Ukrainian people. The fact that Ukrainians, in the span of a few
short months, were able to remove from office a corrupt but powerful
leader and then just weeks later, conduct national elections that met
international standards, is remarkable. The fact that all of this was
accomplished in the face of threats and violence sponsored by one of
the world's most powerful governments is historic. It will take every
bit of this same resolve, and more, to meet the daunting economic,
security and governance challenges. At IRI, we believe there are many
things the U.S. can and should offer to help.
The Ukrainians, not their friends in the West, are responsible for
shaping the country's future. They have a unique history and rich
culture all their own, and they want to chart a path that meets their
own needs and aspirations, not anyone else's. As one of IRI's Ukrainian
staff proudly stated recently, ``We went to the Maidan to find Europe,
and instead we found Ukraine.''
The Chairman. Mr. Wollack.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH WOLLACK, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Wollack. Mr. Chairman, Senator Corker, members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity to comment on recent
developments in Ukraine.
With support from USAID, as well as the National Endowment
for Democracy, and the Department of State, and the Governments
of Sweden and Canada, NDI has conducted democracy assistance
programs in Ukraine for the past two decades. Most recently, we
fielded an international observer delegation for the election,
which was led by NDI Chairman Madeleine Albright and former
Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio. And we were also
fortunate to have Jane Harman as part of the leadership of that
delegation.
Ukraine has turned a corner onto a decidedly democratic
path. At the same time, the country is facing an extraordinary
set of challenges, some new and some long-standing. Most
pressing is the external threat from Russia, which has
illegally occupied Crimea. Russian-backed and armed separatist
operations in the eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk amount
to an undeclared war against Ukrainian sovereignty.
On the domestic front, the challenges are no less daunting.
The economy is in crisis. Corruption, by all measures, has been
rampant, and public confidence in political institutions is
low. While there has been overwhelming support in both the east
and the west of the country for Ukrainian unity, there are
divisions over the distribution of governmental powers.
External forces are working to exploit and politicize these
divisions through a campaign of disinformation.
The Euromaidan demonstrations were sparked by anger over
the Yanukovych government's abrupt refusal to sign a European
Union treaty. But they were sustained for 3 months by a more
basic demand for dignity. They introduced accountability to
citizens as a requirement of governance. However, the
redistribution of power from elites to citizens will be
sustainable only if civic and political leaders find post-
Maidan ways to keep people engaged in politics. The country now
has the opportunity to translate the energy of this watershed
moment into a sustainable democratic trajectory, one that makes
future Maidans hopefully unnecessary.
The first test of Ukraine's ability to navigate this
transition was the May 25 Presidential election, and by every
measure, Ukraine passed that test.
This was perhaps the most important election in Ukraine's
independent history. Where they were allowed to cast ballots in
the vast majority of the country, Ukrainian voices came through
loud and clear. They voted for sovereignty and democracy, and
they did so not with celebratory fanfare but with sober
determination. In observing elections in more than 60
countries, including previous polls in Ukraine, rarely has NDI
heard such positive commentary about the process from political
contestants and nonpartisan monitors alike.
After President-elect Poroshenko's inauguration this
weekend, the government will need to pursue open and
consultative governance practices that incorporate the
interests of Ukrainians from all regions of the country. He and
other leaders will need to focus as much on process as on
policy outcomes. Delivering on citizens' expectations will be
impossible without encouraging meaningful public participation.
Beyond the urgent need for economic reforms and the
diversification of trade and energy supplies, these
expectations include constitutional changes, including
decentralization; serious anticorruption measures, the number
one priority for Ukrainians throughout the country; and
judicial reform.
Since February, the Government and the Parliament have
enacted an impressive set of reforms and civil society
organizations are helping to shape an ambitious agenda. I draw
your attention to the Reanimation Package of Reforms, an
impressive civil society initiative to improve election laws,
procurement practices, education policy, and access to public
information among other issues. By listening to and consulting
with citizens and communicating in clear terms how short-term
sacrifices will lead to longer term improvements, government
leaders can help smooth the path to results.
For political parties, the challenge will be to build
support from the grassroots up and base policies and strategies
on citizens' concerns. This will require parties to embrace new
ways of organizing.
The Euromaidan movement showed that citizens can wield
considerable political power. But by their very nature, street
protests are inchoate. Sustained popular participation requires
leadership and structures. Channeling the energy of Euromaidan
into the day-to-day and admittedly less exciting business of
reform and governance is the next hurdle. These efforts need to
be disseminated more widely throughout the country.
It will be important for the national dialogue on ensuring
rights and representation for all Ukrainians to accelerate and
deepen. This process, which is now underway, would benefit from
broader and more active participation from civil society.
The impact of past U.S. assistance to Ukraine is more
visible now than ever before. Years of corrupt and inept
governance masked much of Ukraine's promise. But that sustained
support from the United States, nonetheless, helped democratic
groups get established, expand, accumulate skills, and survive
through political hardships. Also in the new political
environment, partners of U.S. assistance projects can be found
among the most active reformers in the Government, Parliament,
political parties, and civil society.
Ukraine now needs help in all of its priority reform areas.
Ukrainian political and civic leaders have been unanimous in
requesting such support. There are major financial needs to be
sure. In addition, Ukrainians are eager for technical
assistance, peer-to-peer contacts, and linkages to
international counterparts. Just as Ukraine's problems will not
be solved overnight, international engagement needs to expand
and aim for the long term.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wollack follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth Wollack
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to comment on recent political developments in Ukraine in
the wake of the May 25 Presidential election.
ndi in ukraine
With support from USAID, as well as the National Endowment for
Democracy, the Department of State, and the Governments of Sweden and
Canada, NDI has conducted democracy assistance programs in Ukraine for
the past 25 years. These efforts have focused on strengthening citizen
engagement in issue advocacy, governance, political parties and
elections, and on women's participation in politics.
Most recently, NDI fielded an international election observation
mission that was led by NDI Chairman Madeleine Albright and former
Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio. Delegation leaders also included
Wilson Center President Jane Harman, former Hungarian Member of
Parliament Matyas Eorsi, and former U.S. Senator Ted Kaufman. The
mission's leadership reflected the importance of a trans-Atlantic
commitment to a democratic and sovereign Ukraine. NDI also helped
Opora, Ukraine's largest nonpartisan citizen monitoring group, deploy
2,000 observers across the country, including to Donetsk and Luhansk,
and conduct a parallel vote tabulation that confirmed the official
election results. Along with several European groups, NDI also
supported 350 observers from the European Network of Election
Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), a coalition of the leading citizen
monitoring groups in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
external and internal challenges
Ukraine has turned a corner onto a decidedly democratic path. At
the same time, the country is facing an extraordinary set of
challenges, some new and some longstanding. Most pressing is the
external threat from Russia, which has illegally occupied Crimea and
massed troops on Ukraine's eastern borders. Russian-backed and armed
separatist operations in the eastern oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk
amount to an undeclared war against Ukrainian sovereignty. This
represents an urgent threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity as well
as a challenge to the European security order.
On the domestic front, the challenges are no less daunting. The
economy is in crisis; corruption, by all measures, has been rampant;
public confidence in political institutions is low; and citizen
patience is limited. While there has been overwhelming support in both
the East and the West of the country for Ukrainian unity, there are
divisions over governmental structures. While these would not in
themselves threaten the integrity of Ukraine, external forces are
working to exploit and politicize these divisions through a campaign of
disinformation.
euromaidan and elections
The Euromaidan movement and the Presidential election have set a
solid foundation for Ukraine to address many of its long-standing
internal challenges. Euromaidan set the stage for the election. The
election has in turn set the stage for further and deeper reforms.
Euromaidan was sparked by anger over the government's abrupt
refusal to sign a European Union treaty, but it was sustained for 3
months by a more basic demand for dignity and respect from government.
The Euromaidan demonstrations that began last November fundamentally
altered the political dynamics in the country. They highlighted
Ukrainians' demands for change, including more transparent, accountable
and uncorrupted political practices as well as respect for basic civil
and political rights. They led to the collapse of a government, its
replacement by a more reform-oriented and EU-focused interim
government, and the scheduling of a snap Presidential election. Less
visibly, they introduced accountability to citizens as a requirement of
governance for perhaps the first time in Ukraine's history.
Euromaidan drew participants from across the country and spawned
similar demonstrations in cities in all regions, reflecting widespread
consensus on these issues. Public opinion research also demonstrates
that Ukrainians across regions share a desire for national unity, more
responsive governance and greater public integrity.
Tragically, the Euromaidan demonstrations resulted in the deaths of
more than 100 Ukrainians and injuries to many more. Other deaths in the
east and south, including those in a fire in Odessa, present the need
for a concerted reconciliation process.
However, the redistribution of power from elites to citizens
prompted by Euromaidan will be sustainable only if civic and political
leaders find post-Maidan ways to keep people engaged in politics.
Street protests are blunt instruments for governing and cannot be
prolonged indefinitely. The country now has the opportunity to
translate the energy of this watershed moment into a sustainable
democratic trajectory--one that makes future Maidans unnecessary. It
remains to be seen how effective this transition to more conventional
forms of participation will be.
The first test of Ukraine's ability to navigate this transition was
the May 25 Presidential election. By every measure, Ukraine passed that
test.
This was the most important election in Ukraine's independent
history. The NDI observer delegation listened to the people of Ukraine
in meeting halls, government offices, and polling places. Their voices
came through loud and clear. They voted for sovereignty and they did so
with determination. They wanted the world to know that Ukraine could
not be intimidated by external threats. They achieved their purpose.
By turning out to vote across the vast majority of the country,
Ukrainians did more than elect a new President. They showed the world
their commitment to unity and democracy. Their votes conveyed that
these principles should be valued over geopolitical strategy or
leaders' personal enrichment. Ukraine's electoral administrators,
campaigns, government authorities, election monitors and voters showed
courage and resolve in fulfilling their responsibilities in compliance
with Ukraine's laws and international democratic election standards.
The losing candidates deserve commendation for their constructive
responses to the results. In observing elections in more than 60
countries since 1986, including previous polls in Ukraine, rarely has
NDI heard such positive commentary about the process from political
contestants and nonpartisan monitors alike.
In most of the country, the elections were generally run well and
proceeded without major incidents. Voter turnout was 60 percent. The
preelection period and Presidential election were virtually free of
formal candidate complaints. Polling station commissioners cooperated
to facilitate voting and address issues, while large numbers of
nonpartisan citizen observers and party poll watchers, including many
women, witnessed the proceedings. Across the country, voters often
stood in long lines, waiting patiently to cast their votes.
Isolated problems did crop up. Molotov cocktails were thrown
overnight at some polling stations, but those precincts opened in the
morning for voting. On election day, bomb threats temporarily closed
some stations, but the security forces responded effectively and voting
resumed. Observers also noted incidents of overcrowding at polling
sites, police presence inside polling stations, late arrival of mobile
ballot boxes, and poor accessibility for voters with disabilities. None
of these concerns, however, diminished confidence in the process or the
results.
By contrast, in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, representing just
under 20 percent of the electorate, most voters were denied the
opportunity to vote.
No polling took place in Crimea due to the Russian occupation.
Crimea is home to 1.5 million registered voters, representing 5 percent
of the Ukrainian electorate. The Central Election Commission (CEC)
reported that approximately 6,000 Crimean residents registered to vote
in other parts of the country, which was the only procedure available
to them.
In Donetsk and Luhansk, two of five Eastern provinces, armed groups
carried out illegal actions--including seizures of government buildings
and electoral facilities, abductions and killings of journalists and
widespread intimidation--aimed at preventing the elections. Even in the
face of such violations of fundamental rights, electoral officials
opened 23 percent of polling stations in those two oblasts.
International and Ukrainian election observers witnessed these
officials' brave and determined efforts. Ultimately, only small
percentages of eligible voters in Donetsk and Luhansk were able to cast
votes.
Any disenfranchisement of voters is regrettable. Universal and
equal suffrage for eligible citizens is fundamental to democratic
elections. However, the three cases of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk
should not negate the fact that the vast majority of the electorate--
more than 80 percent--had the opportunity to cast ballots for the
candidate of their choice.
Also, it is important to note the source of voter
disenfranchisement. In most countries where NDI has observed elections,
disenfranchisement has been caused by authorities or political
contestants interfering with the process for electoral advantage. In
Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, the responsibility lies with foreign
forces occupying Ukrainian territory and armed groups seeking to
prevent voting, despite good faith efforts by election officials. Such
disenfranchisement cannot be allowed to negate the legitimacy of
elections or the mandate they provide. Unfortunately,
disenfranchisement occurred in parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Georgia in recent elections due to terrorism by nonstate actors or
foreign occupation. Nevertheless, those actions did not negate the
credibility of the overall process.
All NDI observers commented that the mood surrounding the election
was marked less by celebratory fanfare than by sober determination,
reflecting both a recognition of the challenges that lie ahead and a
resolve to meet them.
next steps
The Euromaidan movement made change possible and the election added
momentum. The task ahead is to make such change sustainable. After he
is inaugurated this weekend, President Poroshenko will need to pursue
open and consultative governing practices that incorporate the
interests of Ukrainians from all regions of the country. He and other
leaders will need to communicate effectively the prospect of short-term
sacrifices and deliver on the longer term expectations of the
Euromaidan movement. Moreover, they will need to focus as much on
process as on policy outcomes. Delivering on citizens' high and varied
expectations will be impossible without opening channels of
communication and encouraging meaningful public participation.
These expectations include:
Improved security;
Constitutional reform, including decentralization and
outreach to the east and south;
Economic growth and stability;
Anticorruption measures;
Diversification of trade and energy supplies;
Political institutions that channel dissent, facilitate
debate and respond effectively to citizens' concerns;
Transparency, integrity, and accountability in all aspects
of public life;
An open and fair judicial process; and
A legislative process that is based on consultation and open
debate.
While some of these expectations were articulated on the Maidan,
public opinion research has shown that they are shared by all
Ukrainians, including those who did not participate in the
demonstrations and even those who opposed them. In public opinion
polls, Ukrainians consistently cite corruption as their top concern.
Some meaningful reforms have already been undertaken; many more are
needed for Ukraine to reach its democratic potential.
For many years, political parties, civil society organizations and
government agencies were isolated from one another and from citizens.
However, the building blocks for a more unified and inclusive system
are now in place. The Rada and the current Cabinet of Ministers
represent all regions. President Poroshenko was elected with
pluralities in all oblasts that voted, gaining an inclusive and strong
public mandate.
Since February, the Government and the Parliament have enacted an
impressive set of reforms. Civil society organizations are holding
politicians accountable and helping to shape an ambitious agenda. I
draw your attention to the ``Reanimation Package of Reforms,'' an
impressive civil society initiative to improve election laws,
procurement practices, education policy, and access to public
information, among other issues, through civic advocacy and strategic
cooperation with parliamentary and government allies. It is an
important example of a successful transition from ``the square'' to
sustainable political participation.
The task ahead is for parties, civil society organizations and
government to become citizen-centric, rather than leader- or oligarch-
centric. Giving citizens meaningful influence over these political
institutions would contribute to their coherence and effectiveness.
Government: The government and the parliament are under intense
pressure to deliver results to an impatient public. Ukrainians have
historically had limited trust in politicians and parties. One way to
address this challenge would be to focus on public consultation along
with meaningful reforms. By listening to and consulting with citizens--
and communicating in clear terms how short-term sacrifices will lead to
longer term improvements--government leaders would help smooth the path
to results.
Political Parties: Ukraine's political parties need to rebuild.
Former President Yanukovych's Party of Regions is on the wane. Other
established parties performed below expectations in the elections. Even
the President-elect's party is small. A coherent and loyal opposition
to the government has not yet formed. In the past, the leading
political parties have been top-heavy and personality-driven. Those
structures are now struggling to survive in the changed political
environment. However, it is promising to see that some new parties are
emerging. These groups seem well positioned to infuse established
parties with new energy or gain traction in their own right. For all
parties, the challenge will be to build support from the ``grassroots''
up and base policies and strategies on citizens' concerns--including
demands for transparency and public integrity. This will require
parties to embrace new ways of organizing that are more labor-intensive
but ultimately more sustainable. Local and parliamentary elections,
which could be called as early as this fall, will present opportunities
for building a genuine multiparty system.
Civil Society: Ukrainian civil society is robust and Euromaidan has
only added to its vitality. The Euromaidan movement showed that
determined, organized citizens can wield considerable political power.
By their very nature, however, street protests are inchoate. Sustained
popular participation requires leadership and structure. Channeling the
energy of Euromaidan into the day-to-day and admittedly less-exciting
business of reform and governance is the next hurdle. Initiatives like
the ``Reanimation Package of Reforms'' and, before that, nonpartisan
citizen election monitoring projects and campaigns to defend freedom of
assembly and other rights set great examples of effective organizing.
These tactics need to be disseminated more widely throughout Ukraine so
protesting is no longer the advocacy strategy of first resort.
It will be important for the national dialogue on ensuring rights
and representation for all Ukrainians to accelerate and deepen. Indeed,
this process, which is now underway, would benefit from broader and
more active participation from civil society.
The added benefit to resolving these internal crises is that doing
so puts Ukraine in a stronger position to address the external threats
to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The tangible benefits of
democratic governance and closer ties with Europe and the West will
ultimately eclipse hollow propaganda to the contrary.
international assistance
The impact of past U.S. development assistance to Ukraine is more
visible now than ever before. Years of corrupt and inept governance
masked much of Ukraine's promise. But that sustained support from the
U.S. nonetheless helped democratic groups to get established, expand,
accumulate skills and survive through political hardships. Nonpartisan
citizen election monitors introduced transparency to Ukraine's
electoral procedures. Initiatives like the Chesno Movement promoted
accountability among candidates for public office. Civic coalitions
like ``For Peaceful Protest,'' a long-time advocate for the right to
freedom of assembly, helped to organize Euromaidan around the
principles of peacefulness and voluntarism. Also, in the new political
environment, partners of U.S. assistance projects can be found among
the most active reformers in the Government, Parliament, political
parties, and civil society.
Ukraine now needs help in all of its priority reform areas. In
NDI's meetings throughout the country over the past 3 months, Ukrainian
leaders have been unanimous in requesting such support. There are major
financial needs, to be sure. In addition, Ukrainians are eager for
technical assistance, peer-to-peer contacts and linkages to
international counterparts--in the areas of constitutional reform and
decentralization, civil service reform, procurement, public integrity,
judicial reform, communications, citizen outreach and engagement,
transparency and accountability, and political party and civil society
strengthening. Just as Ukraine's problems will not be solved overnight,
international engagement needs to aim for the long term.
The Chairman. Well, thank you all for your testimony.
And before I start a round of questioning, let me recognize
that Ukrainian Ambassador Motsuk is here, and we welcome you,
Mr. Ambassador, to this hearing.
The G7 statement says we stand ready to intensify targeted
sanctions and to consider additional significant restrictive
measures to impose further costs on Russia, should events so
require. As I listened to what I think was a majority of you,
it would seem to me that the collective view here--and correct
me if I am wrong--is that that time is already here. Am I wrong
in what I have heard, or is that basically what you are saying?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Yes, the time is here, Senator.
Ambassador Pifer. Yes. The Russians, I think, are
thoroughly involved in what is going on in eastern Ukraine, and
they have the power to stop that if they wished.
Ms. Harman. And, yes, our asymmetric strength against
Russia is our economic power. Their economy, even before the
individual sanctions, was in bad shape, and it has gotten
worse. And by doing this quickly, although it will be some
short-term pain for Europe in particular, it will be medium-
and long-term gain for Europe and for us. We have an energy
sector, obviously, that could export substantial amounts of
energy to Europe.
Ambassador Green. Mr. Chairman, the position of Western
leaders previously was that if Russia interfered in the conduct
of the elections, that more sanctions would be coming. I think
it is clear that they did, in fact, take a number of steps to
interfere with those elections. So I would argue that the time
has come, most definitely.
The Chairman. You mentioned a cyber attack. How do we know
that to be the case, that it emanated from Russia?
Ambassador Green. That was actually brought to us by our
Ambassador, by the U.S. Ambassador in Kiev, and has been
reported, although not as widely reported, quite frankly, as I
think it deserves.
But while they were able to fight it off, it laid bare what
a number of people have been suggesting, and that is that so
much of the infrastructure system, which was operated by
Russian-supported government officials, has been infiltrated
and is weakened, and that seems a basic way in which it
happened.
The Chairman. And, obviously, if they had been successful,
they could have undermined the veracity of the election and
therefore pursued their goal. So your point is well taken.
Let me ask you this. What do you think, from your
experiences, will affect Putin's calculus? I know what his
calculus is. At least I think I know what his calculus is. What
is going to affect his calculus in a way that changes Russia's
course of events under his leadership?
Ambassador Pifer. I would argue that the possibility of
more intense Western sanctions could--and I say could, not
necessarily will--affect his calculus. If you look at what is
happening to the Russian economy, it was already in difficulty
in 2013, but the sanctions and the threat of more robust
sanctions have increased the problems for the Russian economy.
And many Russian economists go back and say that Vladimir Putin
has this implicit social compact with the Russian people in
which he says you are not going to have much in the way of
political freedom, but in return, you are going to get economic
security, a growing economy, and high living standards. And Mr.
Putin delivered spectacularly on that between 2000 and 2008.
Last year, some Russian economists were saying tht even the
projected growth in 2014 of 2 percent would not be enough for
Mr. Putin to hold up his end of the bargain. So we need to try
to increase that pressure.
Now, I should say one of my colleagues at Brookings, who is
very knowledgeable about Russia--his concern is that what will
happen is that it may play a different way, that Mr. Putin may
seize on the sanctions and then use them as the excuse, blame
the West for the economic difficulties, and then use that to
sidestep his own economic mismanagement. But I would argue,
that even if there is just the prospect of changing his
calculus in the way that makes him change the policy, the West
should do it because of the egregious nature of Russian actions
in the last couple of months.
Ms. Harman. And let me add to that. As we know in American
politics, it is the economy, stupid. And the polling in Russia
right now shows nationalism running high, but over time, as
sanctions bite further--and I do think there should be some
sectoral sanctions done very carefully. I agree with Ambassador
Pifer that they need to be done carefully--people in Russia
will have a lower standard of living. And let us understand
that Putin already has not learned Colin Powell's Pottery Barn
rule: if you break it, you own it. He now owns Crimea or at
least temporarily is renting Crimea. And he is stuck with a
horrible economy and the need, which he has had to fulfill, to
increase the pensions and the payments for state workers in
Crimea, and that is another hit on the Russian budget.
I think Senator McCain is right when he says Russia's
economy is a gas station and Russia is a gas station posing as
a country. And if that gas is turned off, at least with respect
to Europe, that is a huge hit. He has made a deal with China,
but I think that shows desperation. That does not show long-
term advantage.
The Chairman. Ambassador Jeffrey.
Ambassador Jeffrey. I would like to add that I am very much
in favor of sanctions, and I think we have seen particularly
some secondary effects of them. We should continue and
strengthen them, trying to keep the Europeans on board because
they will take most of the pain.
Nonetheless, I am a little bit concerned if we think that,
to sum it up briefly, 21st century values, economic
development, people power and such triumphs over aggression,
over nationalism, and over 18th and 19th century values. I am
not sure in the parts of the world where I have been deployed
that that is true, and I really do not think that is true with
Mr. Putin certainly, because he is very clear in his goals, or
with the Russian people. His desire--and it seems to have a lot
of support--is to recreate something like the old Russian
imperial power as one of the great powers with a droit de
regard over much of the area around Russia today stretching
into Eurasia and into Central Europe. This is a very dangerous
strategy.
You asked how can we respond against it. He is facing the
EU and the United States with a $2 trillion economy. We have
$30 trillion. We have six times the population, two or three
times the number of forces under arms and far better equipped.
Why is he doing this? And why is he seemingly having some
success? Because we are divided. We are not sure what the
threat is, and in particular, we are reluctant--the United
States to some degree and the Europeans even more--to meet
force with force. That is why it is so important to take
military moves while also strengthening the economic and the
political sanctions and strictures against him because he does
not believe we are going to stand up for our values.
The Chairman. So you would be supportive of the President's
billion dollar initiative on the security and NATO?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Absolutely, except it should not be
contingent upon action. He has the authority. He has the
equipment. He has the troops to start doing this tomorrow.
The Chairman. Ken.
Mr. Wollack. I would just like to make one point about
Russia's role in the election. We should not lose sight of the
fact that 17 percent of the electorate was disenfranchised
either because of the occupation of Crimea or the Russian-
backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk.
The question remains with the fighting still going on in
these two oblasts where the Russian goal is to make Ukraine
ungovernable. So the actions to try to destabilize the country
before, during, and after the elections continues.
The Chairman. I have a lot of questions, but I am only
going to say one final question. Then I am going to turn to
Senator Corker.
What can Poroshenko do in eastern Ukraine? Some of you have
talked about decentralization of government. I would like to
hear exactly what you think that means because, of course, the
Russians wanted a federated system so they could pick Ukraine
apart. I assume you do not mean that. Protections for the use
of the Russian language; or inclusion of more easterners in the
government? Do some of you have thoughts as to what Poroshenko
can do to try to consolidate the eastern part of Ukraine as
part of the national body politic?
Ms. Harman. We do not want to dominate this at this end of
the table. But I listed five things, and I think the border
with Russia is absolutely crucial. From all of the information
that I have seen on the public record, there are truckloads of
people who may or may not be Russian but they are coming over
the Russian border, and they are mostly, we think, Cossacks,
Chechens, or Russian nationals. So closing that border to that
kind of traffic is absolutely critical. The Ukrainians probably
do not have the capacity to do that. Obviously, the Russians
do. And I think having an international call on them
specifically to do that right now would at least expose the
role that they are playing. And I think we are all united in
understanding what that role is.
It is tragic that some Ukrainians who wanted to vote were
prevented from doing that, as Ken Wollack just said. I thought
it was 13 percent, but he says 17 percent of the country could
not vote. And then there are, of course, the folks in Crimea
which we all view as an occupied part of Ukraine, most of whom
could not vote either.
Ambassador Pifer. Mr. Chairman, I would make the comment
that I think Mr. Poroshenko has said that he wants to make his
first trip as President to Donetsk, and he may well find a
receptive audience there. It is important to bear in mind the
majority population in eastern Ukraine is ethnic Ukrainian.
They may use Russian as their first language, but they are
ethnic Ukrainian. And polls showed some very interesting things
in the last several months. The polls show that, while many
people in eastern Ukraine were uncomfortable with what happened
in terms of the change of power in Kiev at the end of February
and that they regarded the acting government as illegitimate;
70 percent wanted to stay in Ukraine. They did not want
separation. They did not want to join Russia. Large majorities
criticized, condemned the armed seizures of the buildings by
the separatists. They did not want to see the Russian army
come. So I think there is audience there that he can appeal to.
I think decentralization of power, to some extent, not as
far as Russia would like to go, makes sense because the
Ukrainian Government right now is overly centralized. So, for
example, making regional governors elected as opposed to
appointed by the President would be a positive step. Pushing
some budget authority out to the regions would be a positive
step in terms of more efficient, effective, and accountable
governance.
Also, Mr. Poroshenko has said that there would be some
status for the Russian language. This seems to be a very touchy
issue in eastern Ukraine, and there are things I think that he
can do that would, in fact, begin to make the majority of that
population in eastern Ukraine feel more comfortable that Kiev
is looking out for its political and economic interests and
undercut the support for the separatists that are being backed
by Russia.
The Chairman. Ambassador Green, last word.
Ambassador Green. Mr. Chairman, first off, with respect to
the polling, IRI has done a great deal of polling. And
Ambassador Pifer is precisely right. Every part of the country,
even the area in the far east which may have wanted more
autonomy from Kiev, wanted to be part of Ukraine, viewed
themselves as Ukrainian, did not see discrimination, and very
much wanted to remain part of Ukraine.
I would argue that what the President-elect needs to do is
to take a look at what Putin did in the lead-up to this
election. Putin sought to sow seeds of doubt to destabilize,
sent agents in, shut down radio stations, and so on and so
forth. So what I think Mr. Poroshenko will need to do, among
other things, is to build a media that can communicate non-
Moscow messages, give an accurate picture, provide channels for
Ukrainians from all parts of the country to get together in
social media platforms, to communicate with each other and
exchange ideas.
Finally, I would argue that a significant exchange program
which creates east-west, north-south understanding inside the
country to build a new generation of leaders that think of
themselves entirely as Ukrainians and not regionally, I think,
is vitally important. Again, based upon what we have seen from
President Putin, that is very much what he fears.
The Chairman. Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is good to note that we have people on both
sides of the aisle here that are pretty uniform in their
thinking about both Ukraine and Russia, and that is good to
hear. And I think we have a lot of that on our committee.
So it seems to me it is very evident to all that we have a
country that has underperformed, has missed 20 years, if you
will, of development and has huge challenges within the
country. Then you have this other issue that is of major
geopolitical significance to the world. They come together at
Ukraine on the border. They affect much of our policy over the
last 60 or 70 years that Europe would be whole, democratic, and
free. So we have two really big issues, and if Ukraine does
move to the West, it also creates internal issues to Russia as
Russian people see a country evolving in a very different
direction from where they are and that certainly poses a threat
to their leadership there.
So let me just start. The newly elected leadership is
impressive. He is an oligarch, I agree, Congressman Harman. At
the same time, it was not a state-owned enterprise. He did sort
of make it the, I will not say the honest way, but a different
way than a lot of the oligarchs.
Is there any difference of opinion that he is absolutely
committed to making the transition that is necessary to be made
within the country? Does anybody feel like that is not the
case?
Ms. Harman. I hope he is committed. We have to see what he
does. We thought Yushenko was committed. We thought Yushenko
was the new leadership for Ukraine, and he turned out to be
enormously disappointing. Some people thought that Yulia
Tymoshenko was the new voice of leadership, and she turned out
to be very disappointing. So I think it really matters what he
does.
Senator Corker, I just had maybe one suggestion for the way
you framed this. I think that Ukraine is Ukraine. Ukraine is
not part of Europe. It is not part of Russia. It is a country
that is situated next to NATO countries. Many people in Ukraine
are very interested in, and have a long history of, connecting
to Europe, but some people in Ukraine are also very interested
in, and have a long history of, connecting to Russia. And I
think the best outcome for Ukraine is to have a somewhat
decentralized government where Ukraine can be both and
certainly latched to Europe. That is in our interest, but I
also think it is in Ukraine's interest. But if Russia would
only back off, if we could get this to change, I do not think
it would be bad for Ukraine also to choose, if it chooses, to
have robust ties to Russia.
Senator Corker. And it is very apparent that that is what
the newly elected president plans to do.
Did you want to say something, Mark?
Ambassador Green. I was going to say I was one of those who
had the chance to meet with Mr. Poroshenko the day before the
election, and while I absolutely agree the proof is in the
pudding, he was impressive in laying out a clear agenda for
what needed to be done, including constitutional reform and
taking on corruption. So he certainly knows what to do.
Obviously, I believe that we should be there when requested to
try to help him get there.
Mr. Wollack. I think in our meetings with the President-
elect and with the Prime Minister, I think everybody
understands the challenges that lie ahead, and I think they are
all deeply committed to these issues. And they realize that now
there is a second chance for meaningful reforms in the country.
At the same time, I think we have to put our faith in
institutions and processes as well and not just individuals.
And the parliament is going to play an important role. Civil
society is going to play an important role, and the question is
whether all these various sectors of society can work
constructively together in order to achieve the goals that we
all share.
Senator Corker. Well, I too was impressed. And I think
Yatsenyuk is very impressive, and hopefully a team will be put
together to move things ahead.
Since I am running out of time, I will stop here, but I was
going to ask, is there anything that you see the Western
countries that are involved and care about Ukraine not doing
other than, I know you mentioned some military equipment and
training that needs to take place, that should be done now? I
know it has to be Ukraine itself that makes this happen. I
could not agree more. But, obviously, assistance from us is
going to be needed and persistence is going to be needed. Is
there anything that you see right now? Just if one person could
respond very briefly because I want to move on to something
else. Is there anything that you see that is missing right now
in the complement of efforts that would be helpful to help them
move along? Yes, sir.
Mr. Wollack. I would just mention two quick things.
Number one, I think the commitments on financial assistance
should not be caught up in bureaucratic hurdles here, that
funds have to flow in a timely way.
And second, as my chairman talks about, when Madeleine
Albright talks about, the Marshall Plan was not only about
funding. It was also about massive technical assistance. And
when we met with the government there, they welcomed large-
scale infusion of human resources in the country on all the
major reform issues. They look to the United States for
expertise. They look to the diaspora community for expertise.
They look to the Europeans, particularly Poland, for those
expertise. Poland is engaged on the constitutional reform
issues as well. I think on civil service reform, on all of
these issues, having technical assistance on a large scale
embedded in ministries and government offices, in civil
society--this is all welcome. They believe this international
engagement is critical at this time.
Senator Corker. So, Mr. Jeffrey, I want to move on to the
other topic, and that is Russia. I had an executive in my
office this morning. I will not name the name or the company. I
do not think he would like that to occur. But you have this
issue you just mentioned. This is a major geopolitical issue,
the biggest that has happened since 9/11. And yet, the tools
that we are willing to use obviously are very different than
the tools we used in 9/11. I agree, especially having just come
from Poland, Romania, and Estonia, this is a major geopolitical
event. And how we respond to this is going to reverberate for
generations.
And so you mentioned sanctions, and many of us here have
pushed for more robust sanctions. Some people would say--this
executive would say--that we pushed for globalization around
the world to try to create democracy because we think that our
way of doing business causes the world to be better place. I
agree with that. At the same time companies all have become
intertwined. They all work through joint ventures. And I could
not agree more.
I would like to see sectoral sanctions. I think we have
already crossed the redline, and sanctions ought to be in place
for what happened in eastern Ukraine.
But how do you respond to the folks who come in who, I have
to say, do not have an impact on me in that way, but how do you
respond to people who say what you just said, and how do you
respond to the President when he talks about how we do not want
ourselves to be split from Europe? We want to go with them. Is
that an appropriate place to be, or should we be even more
forward than where we are today?
Ambassador Jeffrey. In my view, you have to stay pretty
closely synced with Europe, but we do seem to have, in many
respects, an unusually robust ally in Angela Merkel compared to
where the rest of the Germans and where much of Europe is. And
so we can nudge her forward, and there has been some success.
Senator Corker. Do you really see that?
Ambassador Jeffrey. I would say that compared to her
population, she is tougher than most Germans. The overwhelming
majority of the German population basically on every poll or
most polls shows understanding for Putin, and this is what we
have to deal with.
In terms of the economic issues, it is not a question of
cutting Russia out of the global economy. We cannot do that.
They are not Iran. And that is basically not our argument with
them. The problem is they are able to use blackmailing
political leverage based upon some of their economic
activities, most notably selling gas to Europe, and
secondarily, the way that Russian funds are deposited. I spent
almost an hour with Putin in 2007 where he harped on this theme
in a very unpleasant conversation with President Bush. And they
see this as political weapons.
So what you need to do is to diversify in the best market
economy tradition, for example, European gas purchases. And I
know that that is in the draft bill. But there are other
seemingly minor things that are so important. The European
Union is looking to take on the monopolistic aspects of the
vertically integrated Russian gas industry from production to
transportation, to actually marketing in many countries, and to
break that up. Those are the kind of things that will not only
send a signal but will eventually rob Russia of its somewhat
strange capability to blackmail an entity, Europe, that is many
times larger an economy and power in every sense.
Senator Corker. So I know my time is up, and hopefully you
can respond to someone else, Mr. Green, in just a minute.
I want to say I think the biggest fear that I have was
expressed by someone in Poland last week, and that is that we
end up accepting a bitter peace with Russia. In other words,
yes, this is the biggest geopolitical event since 9/11, but we
are not willing to use the same tools. So we end up in a
situation where they exude extremely bad behavior. We do not do
much. And we end up in this bitter peace where we have this
nation that has broken international norms and laws, reneged on
agreements, and in order to keep peace, we continue to go along
in this bitter peace that, in essence, creates a lot of
insecurity in Eastern Europe and causes people to question the
United States.
So with that, I know other people have questions. Mr.
Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and let
me thank all of our witnesses for their extraordinary work.
I want to thank NDI and IRI for their participation in the
monitoring of the Ukrainian elections under the auspices
generally of the OSCE. Senator Portman and I were there on the
ground, had a chance to visit polling stations, and had a
chance to meet with the leadership of the country. So we share
your observations, and I thank you very much. We very much have
similar observations.
Mr. Jeffrey, I want to just concur in your overall concern
that the international order of dealing with these types of
incursions is very much at jeopardy here, and it goes well
beyond Ukraine. Clearly, what Russia did in Crimea, what they
are doing in eastern Ukraine violates international commitments
and agreements, et cetera, and we can go through all of them,
including the OSCE core commitments.
But it is also now being looked at in the China seas. I
went from Ukraine to Vietnam, and all I heard in Vietnam is
their concern about China in the South China Sea. When I was in
Japan, I heard about the concerns about the East China Sea. If
we do not engage a better order, we are going to see what
happened in Ukraine used by major powers elsewhere to solve
territorial disagreements.
So I just want to come on very strongly in support of your
comments that we need to get NATO involved in Ukraine because
it does involve the security of our NATO alliance, and we need
to have an enforceable code of conduct in the China seas so
that we can restore some semblance of discipline in how we deal
with territorial disputes.
I just really also wanted to underscore points that have
been made of what we need to do in Ukraine. Congresswoman
Harman, I agree with you completely that the message of
protesters in the Maidan was much more fundamental than just
taking sides on ethnic disputes. They want a country that
responds to the needs of their people, and they want a country
free from corruption. And that is not going to be easy in
Ukraine. It is going to take a long-term commitment to get the
country to perform at the level that the protesters expect and
will demand.
So, therefore, first and foremost are our economic programs
to help them so that they have a performing economy, and I
think we all agree on that.
We also need to work internationally. The point that was
raised about bringing Europe along with our policies is
absolutely essential. And I really do think President Obama
deserves great credit for being able to mobilize Europe in a
more cohesive fashion than we have seen in previous problems in
other places of Europe.
But it does require attention to the economics and the
fundamental economics, which deal also with energy. And we very
much need to be aggressive in providing short-term and long-
term alternatives to Ukraine on their energy issues.
It also involves sanctions, Mr. Chairman. I think there is
total agreement here that we need to be tougher on sanctions
and that sanctions work and that the threat of sanctions has
worked. But the threat only works to a certain degree if you do
not deliver. Russia's actions during the election and the words
that were given beforehand I think indicate that it is time for
us to move forward with additional sanctions. They have to be
strategic, and they have to be well thought out, and they have
to be in coordination with Europe.
But I want to get to another point that has been just
talked about, and that is whether we can affect the balance on
the border between Ukraine and Russia. Right now, as you
pointed out Congresswoman Harman, the people from Russia who
want to come into Ukraine have no difficulty getting through
that border. And, yes, it would be nice if President Putin
would do something about it, and I think we have to be very
firm about that. But President Putin does not do what he says.
So I do not want to take his word that he will maintain the
border as being safe for Ukraine against incursions from
Russians.
So I think we have a responsibility to help build up the
border security for Ukraine. I think the United States and
Europe can play a pretty constructive role in strengthening the
border security issues. OSCE has capacity here although the
Russians may make it difficult for OSCE to give that type of
technical support. But it seems to me that we can find an
effective way to help Ukraine deal with its own defense of its
border. And I just would like to get your view as to whether
that would be a priority, should be a priority, and whether
that can effectively be carried out.
Ms. Harman. Well, you know I agree with you. How to do it
does matter. What the process is does matter. It needs to be a
Ukrainian response, it seems to me, but inviting in
international organizations to help is right. The OSCE has an
interesting position in the country. OSCE convened roundtables,
three of them, led by Wolfgang Issinger, former German
Ambassador to the United States, who by the way now is a
scholar at the Wilson Center. We are very proud of him. And
those roundtables began to achieve something that Mark Green is
talking about, which is a conversation in the country to unite
all the parts of the country. A really good idea. And they are
going to continue.
But OSCE is interesting because it is a member organization
that includes Russia. And I was there in Vienna following my
trip to Ukraine and was told that the way the procedures work
at OSCE, Russia is kind of locked in for a 6-month period to
the actions OSCE is taking in Ukraine. So it seems to me it
would be really smart to get OSCE mobilized to do exactly what
you are talking about with help from NATO to increase the----
Senator Cardin. The mission is in Ukraine. It has been
there.
Ms. Harman. Right.
Senator Cardin. We do have capacity.
Ms. Harman. And it is in east Ukraine, and to mobilize more
resources at the border. And then see. Putin responds to
strength. Let us see him push against that, an organization
that he is a member of that is just asking for reasonable
border controls. Big trucks full of armed people, who may or
may not be Russian, who are destabilizing the country should be
stopped.
Senator Cardin. They are going to need technical
assistance. They are going to need equipment. They are going to
need more than the international community is currently
providing.
Ms. Harman. I would say, yes, surely. I mean, Ukraine has a
very undercapitalized defense system.
But I would just end with our strength against Russia is
our economic strength. I think that is where we can stop Russia
more effectively, and I think sanctions are by far our best
weapon. We always talk about the terrorists attacking us
asymmetrically where we are weak. Where Russia is weak is its
economy, and sectoral sanctions, that I think everybody here
supports, done intelligently and quickly could get a very rapid
response.
Senator Cardin. I am for that, but I would not trust Russia
to stop the flow into Ukraine. They need border security.
Ambassador Pifer. Senator, if I could just add. I agree we
can do more to assist the Ukrainians in terms of tightening
their border. But I think particularly in the short term it is
going to be difficult given the length of the border between
Russia, Donetsk, and Luhansk. And my guess is as long as the
Russians are determined to get things across that border, they
will find ways. So in the short term, the pressure of
additional sanctions on Russia--we have got to get Russia to be
part of the solution, not part of the problem.
Ambassador Green. If I can add, let us also remember the
history of brush fire battles. We also need to help the
Ukrainian Government in that part of the country deliver. We
need to help them build their capacity, build their IT
infrastructure, help them deliver basic services, and really
provide the links to the government that those communities are
looking for that have been taken apart by the destabilization
activities. Mr. Putin comes in, knocks out the radio stations
and attempts to sponsor these separatist movements. Success in
building governing capacity should also be part of the
solution. I do agree on the hard force side, but it is also
important, I think, to create that sense of linkages to the
national government and the kinds of successes that reinforce
for all those communities why they want to be Ukrainian in the
first place.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Senator, I agree with everything my
colleagues have said, but at the end of the day, what you have
laid out is a military problem and it is not a military problem
that we are ignorant of because we saw this in Vietnam. We saw
it in Iraq. We see it today in Afghanistan where you have an
insurgency supported and in this case largely generated from
across the border. It is a tricky problem, as we have seen in
those other places, but there are ways to deal with this.
First of all, all of the things stated to strengthen the
Ukrainian Government, to strengthen the support of the people,
to strengthen the economy. That then leverages into a
counterinsurgency strategy of stabilization that puts a minimum
on force, although force is necessary, and a maximum on
reconciliation and slowly moving in, picking the low-hanging
fruit, as you do in any properly organized stability operation,
so that the area controlled by the pro-Russians does not
expand.
Meanwhile, at the same time, you are putting a lot of
pressure through sanctions, through diplomatic activities,
through strengthening NATO, which is something Putin does not
like, watching American ground troops on his western borders,
to send a signal that it is just going to get worse if you keep
this up. And what are you gaining? Bit by bit, Ukraine is
deepening its sovereignty. It is deepening its stability. And
in the long run, you are not going to win this insurgency. And
then there can be a time to move this forward. So you need the
political. You need the economic steps. You need to reach out
to the population. But it is also a military activity.
Mr. Wollack. Senator, could I just comment on what you said
regarding the impact of Ukraine and other places? Moldova will
be signing the association agreement later this month. It will
be holding parliamentary elections in November. And I think we
have to have a very watchful eye on what is happening in
Transnistria, what will happen following the signing of the
association agreement in a very small and very vulnerable
country close by.
The Chairman. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jeffrey, you just used a business term, which I like, a
low-hanging fruit, which implies prioritization.
My colleagues, certainly on the Republican side, realize
that I really try and address any problem with a strategic
planning process. What I would like to do is quickly go through
something like that. The strategic planning process starts with
describing reality. You cannot deny it. You have to bow to
reality and then, based on that reality, set yourself
achievable goals. So I want to just kind of lay out my
assumptions what the reality is and I want to get your
reaction, particularly if you are disagreeing with me in terms
of where I am going wrong.
The first assumption. It makes no economic sense to Russia
what Vladimir Putin is doing. There is no economic sense.
Number two, as a result, this is all about Putin's ego.
This is all about his ability to maintain control and power.
Number three, what gives him power is his oil and gas, you
know, the gas station, and his monopoly control over supply
which is quite honestly crazy. In business, customers should be
in control, not the supplier.
Here is another reality. We can talk about sanctions. I
have a somewhat contrary view to that. Most of the harm to the
Russian economy occurred before any sanctions were imposed
because the world does recognize what he is doing makes no
economic sense and it is scaring investors. So Vladimir Putin
has done his own economic harm, and that will continue
regardless of what the West does. And by the way, another
reality is because sanctions are a double-edge sword, mutually
harmful, I do not believe the West will ever have the will to
impose the kind of sanctions that will affect his calculus
whatsoever. So we can talk about them. I do not believe they
are going to be imposed. And by the way, this may be not a bad
thing. I would rather inflict one-sided pain on Vladimir Putin,
make him pay a price without us having to pay a price.
So that is, to me, the assumption that this is the reality
situation.
From that, now you establish goals. To me the number one
short-term goal--and I think it is obvious--is Ukraine must
gain control over the east. Anybody disagree with that? Okay.
We need to help them. Right? So we can talk about
sanctions. They will not get imposed. So we will not be
changing Putin's calculus, but we can help them secure the
east. So we need to do those things. That is number one.
Number two. We certainly, when we were on the ground, heard
about the incredible effect of the propaganda coming from
Russia. We need to counter that aggressively. We can do that
too. Can we not?
So those are the two, from my standpoint, top priority
short-term goals.
Then medium-term. I think this is really what was so
hopeful about the protest in Maidan is that really was the
coming together of the Ukrainian people after 20 years to say,
okay, we are sick of the corruption. So we need to do
everything in terms of our actions. If we have to tie aid or
help to make sure that anticorruption laws are passed, I think
we should do that. That is the medium term. Another part of the
solution is we have to have a successful government in Ukraine.
Then long-term. Again, understanding what gives Vladimir
Putin power is his oil and gas monopolies. We need to break
that up. So we should be taking actions today to make sure that
Vladimir Putin understands that his monopoly will not be in
place, not 2, 3, or 4 years from now.
So again, that is just my way of thinking. Here are the
assumptions. Here is the reality, and I think you have to bow
to it. And here are the goals that we can actually achieve and
we can help.
Where am I wrong? What am I missing? I will start with you,
Congresswoman Harman.
Ms. Harman. Well, I generally agree. None of us mentioned
Russian television, but Madeleine Albright who, as I mentioned,
headed the NDI delegation of which I was a member, speaks
Russian. And she kept talking about the domination of this
message from Russian TV into Ukraine everywhere that she went.
And we do not, and the Ukrainians do not, have an effective
counter. So I commend you for putting that on the table. I
think it is a very important short-term goal.
We have discussed the border. I think everyone agrees that
more needs to be done on the border.
In the medium term, my understanding is that there are now,
as part of this package of laws that Ken Wollack mentioned, the
Reanimation Package, or at least what has been passed to date,
some strong anticorruption--there is an strong anticorruption
law. The problem is it is not enforced. And that should be a
huge early step of the Poroshenko government, and hopefully
that happens.
On the long term, absolutely break up the gas monopoly. I
still am hoping for sectoral sanctions. But we have an
opportunity in this country--Tom Friedman, the op-ed writer for
the New York Times, has called it a grand bargain--to get
everyone to buy into a package of safe development of energy,
safe transportation of energy, and then export of energy, a
variety of energy, not just LNG, to replace Russia as the gas
station for Europe.
And there is another point. Senator Markey I think was
going to be here. But I know he has a notion that we should
help Ukraine--perfect. I think we rehearsed this. [Laughter.]
Hello to my former colleague.
Senator Johnson. If you are going to talk renewable energy,
again I would think that would rank pretty low on the priority
scale.
Ms. Harman. Well, but let me make the point.
Senator Johnson. Because, again, we have to take a look at
what is going to be most effective.
Ms. Harman. All right. Speaking for Senator Markey, which I
have done for many years----
[Laughter.]
Ms. Harman [continuing]. His point is that Ukraine is the
least efficient user of energy of any of the countries in that
region.
Senator Johnson. They have their windows open in the
wintertime because it gets so hot.
Ms. Harman. If we could help promote energy efficiency in
Ukraine, we would reduce Ukraine's dependence on Russia. So
there are steps like that that we should be taking.
Senator Johnson. Ambassador Pifer.
Ambassador Pifer. Senator, I agree with most of your
construct. I would make just two points. One, I do think that
there is value in sanctions because otherwise----
Senator Johnson. Let me ask you. Do you honestly think they
are going to be imposed to the point where they would actually
have an--again, if we could actually impose them, I think it
might affect Vladimir Putin's calculus at a cost to the West.
So, again, because of that cost to the West, do you honestly
think they are going to be imposed? Because like Congressman
Green said, Vladimir Putin has crossed the line. He has done
what we said if he did we would impose them, and we have not
imposed them yet.
Ambassador Pifer. No, I agree.
I can see sanctions that I think would have a serious
impact on Russia. I cannot tell you politically that I am sure
we could bring the Europeans to do that.
Senator Johnson. That is a real problem. So, again, I am
just trying to think what is achievable, what is possible. Let
us do what is possible.
Ambassador Pifer. But I think there is still a possibility.
So I think we should still be trying to push because otherwise
the egregious nature of what has happened--I mean, this is the
first time since 1945 where a big country has used military
force to take territory from a small country in Europe. There
needs to be some penalty for this.
The other point on the gas question. I think we should be
doing things, including looking at exporting American LNG, to
begin to make it more difficult for Gazprom. But I think we do
have to be realistic. Europe now gets about 30 percent of its
gas from Russia. Europe will only very slowly wean itself away,
and we should be finding ways to encourage that.
I would also agree with what Jane Harman said about working
with Ukraine. Ukraine has huge possibilities if they get more
efficient use of their energy to reduce their gas consumption.
Plus, they also have this possibility, perhaps in 5 to 7 years'
time, to produce huge quantities of unconventional gas within
Ukraine. And if the Ukrainians make that happen, they could
actually be in a situation where by 2020, they perhaps could,
with the combination of domestic production and importing gas
not from Russia, but from the West, be in position where they
would not need any gas from Russia. And that would be a very
important change in this dynamic that now exists because
Ukraine's biggest economic vulnerability to Russia now is the
fact that it depends on Russia for about 60 percent of its
natural gas.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to continue on this line on energy because we
have had a number of discussions on this committee. While there
are some sharp disagreements on the committee about things like
LNG exports, I think there are also some strong agreements,
whether it is helping reverse flows of energy back to Ukraine
from some of its western or northern neighbors working with
Ukraine to develop its own energy capacity. Algeria is
interested in more exports of energy under the Mediterranean to
Europe.
My sense of the Russian economy is it is a rust belt
economy with natural resources, and the toughest thing that we
could do for them is to do just exactly what Senator Johnson
said and kind of break up that monopoly. So we ought to be
looking at all of those opportunities even including potential
resources like Algeria that would like to ship more energy to
Europe. So it is not just what we can do, although we can do a
lot, but other partners who would want to help them wean away
from that monopoly is critical.
I wanted to ask just about one topic and that is the
polling about the east, the Donetsk and the eastern area. You
talked about that earlier, Ambassador Green. The polling is
pretty strong that huge numbers in the east do not want to be
part of Russia. They do not want to be severed from Ukraine.
But the polling is also pretty strong that they have a great
distrust of the Government in Kiev, and some of that has been
because of the propaganda campaign from Russia. But some of it
was also because of steps like this kind of effort to
potentially strip away Russian as an official language in a
population that, though Ukrainian ethnic, speaks Russian as a
first language.
Obviously, this is something that the President needs to
address immediately. You have talked about this effort by the
President to say I want to go to Donetsk first. But maybe in a
little more granular detail, talk about the kinds of things you
think the President needs to do right out of the gate to start
winning over eastern Ukrainians to the notion that Kiev will
not be stiff-arming us but will be including us and respecting
our traditions, including the Russian language.
Ambassador Green. Well, you have just laid out some of it
yourself. I do think it is important. Symbols are important and
so are the early steps from Poroshenko in going to the east.
But it is also, again, capacity building so that the government
is seen as being able to deliver on some of the basic needs and
wants in that area.
I also would not separate out what we have all been talking
about in terms of corruption. One of the reasons why some of
the far reaches of the country are so angry with Kiev is
because the economy was plundered by the previous President,
all rife with corruption. In many ways, that is what the Maidan
movement was about. Sure, there were events that sparked it in
terms of backing out of the movement towards the EU, but it was
also this basic anger toward a government that was riddled with
corruption, unable to deliver and unable to provide for basic
services.
Couple that with linking that part of the country to Kiev
in terms of a national dialogue through the media, exchanges
that create a youth network of reform-minded Ukrainians, those
may seem like long-term activities. I would argue they are not.
I would argue they are immediate steps that need to be taken. I
think each one of those steps would send very important signals
to that part of the country in addition to all of the other
things that we have been talking about.
So in terms of what members of the committee have been
putting forward, my own view is all of the above. If we are
looking for simple solutions, I am not sure they are there. I
think we need to take a very comprehensive approach that has
both the security aspects to it, to the capacity building, to
the basic infrastructure that is necessary for delivering
services, for creating a sense of purpose and unity in having
that dialogue.
Senator Kaine. Ambassador Pifer and then Mr. Wollack.
Ambassador Pifer. Thank you, Senator.
Let me give you maybe six pieces of a package that could be
used to overcome the divisions within Ukraine.
First of all, the government would offer to deescalate its
use of force if the armed separatists laid down their weapons,
left the occupied buildings.
Second, this idea of decentralization, which Mr. Poroshenko
has already talked about, pushing some authority out to the
regions and to local levels.
Senator Kaine. Election of governors rather than
appointment.
Ambassador Pifer. Exactly, yes.
Third would be early Rada elections. The big news about the
May 25 election was it lifted part of that cloud of
illegitimacy over the acting government because you now have
somebody who has a strong democratic mandate. Early elections
for the Parliament would give the Parliament also a renewed
democratic legitimacy, and that would be important.
Part number four would be agreement--and again, Poroshenko
has talked about this. Some validation, some affirmation of
official status to the Russian language is a very big issue in
eastern Ukraine.
A fifth element would be a very strong and a very visible
anticorruption campaign. Tens of thousands of people were on
the streets there. It was in part about the fact that they are
just tired of corruption that permeates every level of society.
And I think another part would be his foreign policy
approach. You have already had people--Mr. Poroshenko, the
acting government--state they do not want to get too close to
NATO. Six years ago, I testified that Ukraine was ready for a
membership action plan, which they were. I have since come to
the conclusion that NATO is just a very controversial topic
within Ukraine, and there may be some way for the Ukrainians to
say without saying ``never'' but to say ``not now'' in a way
that I think would be useful in avoiding what could be
otherwise a very controversial topic.
Senator Kaine. How confrontational or provocative is a
continued move toward the EU association in eastern Ukraine?
So, for example, there has been a political agreement, but
economic pacts are supposed to be signed in June. Is that
provocative in eastern Ukraine?
Ambassador Pifer. It is certainly less provocative.
Particularly among the young in eastern Ukraine, I think that
they look to the idea of Europe and see that is where they want
to go. So while maybe not pushing NATO, I think Ukraine should
go ahead and go forward with the association agreement with the
European Union.
Now, the problem that they have is what I believe triggered
the Russian activity from Crimea's seizure on to what you see
going on in eastern Ukraine is that the Russians do not want to
see Ukraine do that association agreement because Ukraine
moving in that direction becomes irretrievable for Moscow.
Senator Kaine. So it does not provoke eastern Ukrainians
but it may be additionally provocative to Russia.
Ambassador Pifer. Exactly.
Senator Kaine. I only have 30 seconds. I want to ask one
very fast question.
One concern that I had early was the presence of the
ultranationalist parties in Ukraine and what power they might
have, parties that have some strong anti-Semitic tendencies. I
viewed it as a real positive that their candidates of the two
main ultranationalist parties got less than like 2.2 percent of
the combined vote in the presidential election. Am I right to
read that as a really positive trend?
Ms. Harman. I think it is a very positive trend. They got
clobbered. But I also think we have to allow free expression in
the country. I abhor those views, but I think if we try to
censor and bury those views, we are doing Egypt.
I just would add one more thing to Steve's list, and that
is possible amnesty for those in east Ukraine as part of a
bigger deal. And I would caution against early Rada elections
because there has to be enough political capacity for all of
the new voices to be able to run campaigns. We saw that in
Egypt again. The elections were too early and they could not
win.
Mr. Wollack. I would just add one thing too in this. I
think the Russian actions in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk has
had the unintended and opposite effect in a majority of
provinces in the eastern and southern part of the country.
There is much more eagerness on their part--and the elections
showed it--for Ukrainian unity as a result of those actions. So
I think it has had a huge impact.
I would just also add on the national dialogue, to expand
and deepen the national dialogue would be something that the
President could do as well.
The Chairman. Senator Flake.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
It is good to see some of you I have not seen in a while. I
apologize for missing the oral testimony. But a couple of
issues, and I apologize if you have covered them.
How do you believe, Ms. Harman, the Russia-China deal on
natural gas affects the ability for us to export LNG in an
effective way? Part of the attraction here is, although it
would take a while to get the infrastructure in place for it to
make a real difference, price signals would have been sent
immediately. To what extent is that nullified by this big
Russia-China deal?
Ms. Harman. Well, I said earlier that I see it as a sign of
desperation. I think Russia was beginning to believe--and I
still believe it should be a reality--that we, the United
States and Europe, are going to cut off their ability to sell
gas to Europe. So they desperately wanted another market. We do
not know, or at least I do not know, what the terms are of that
deal. Many people speculate they are not very favorable to
Russia. And until we know that, I am not sure we can fully
answer the question.
But I think there is an enormous opportunity for the U.S.
energy industry to get its act together, to work with the
Europeans, and to find new markets in the medium term,
including the export of LNG. I understand that there are
regional markets that price LNG, and we do not want to lose the
enormous cost advantage that we have here in America. On the
other hand, I think we need to be a little more strategic, and
if there are international opportunities for us to sell energy,
not just LNG, to Europe, we should fully explore those.
Senator Flake. Thank you.
With regard to sanctions, as we mentioned, Russia has
already tripped some of the measures. They have passed the
threshold where we said that we would move forward with
additional sanctions. The Europeans are not following.
What in your view, Mr. Jeffrey, will it take for the
Europeans to come on board?
Ambassador Jeffrey. First of all, overt Russian military
action by conventional forces I think is the redline that would
push the Europeans to take a very dramatic step forward. I do
not think that Putin is going to do this. I think that is why
he stood down some of his forces, while he is now using
irregular forces rather than his own elite spetsnaz types as he
used in Crimea.
Nonetheless--and this gets back to Senator Cardin's
question earlier--even the sort of kiddy sanctions that we are
seeing and long-term gas and oil and other energy decisions
that we are discussing here have, as you mentioned, Senator
Flake, tremendous future implications for the movement of money
and economic decisions around an integrated world. And it is
hurting Russia in many ways when we are taking these steps,
even if they are not bold or major, even if they are not like
what we did against Iran or, as was earlier said, we do not use
the tools we used after 9/11. Well, we went into Iraq. We are
not going to go into Russia that way. But even these minor
steps have very significant consequences.
And the other thing is they are hard for us and
particularly the Europeans to do. Putin does not think that we
will do hard things. Every time we do a hard or halfway hard
thing, we are sending a signal to him that who knows what we
are going to do tomorrow if he keeps this up. And that is a
good thing.
Senator Flake. Ambassador Green, when our delegation was
there just before the seizure of Crimea, the acting Prime
Minister said, with regard to the Ukrainian military, we have
nothing that shoots, runs, or flies I believe, or something
like that. They will develop some of that capacity over time.
But what are the political implications of using military
force in the east? How is it played and how will it play in the
future in terms of the dynamics with the Russian speakers and
the leanings of some people? What are the military implications
of action by the Ukrainian Government in the east?
Ambassador Green. Well, first off, we have been talking
about, throughout this hearing, it is essential that the
Ukrainian Government show that it is able to govern and
actually to deliver. Obviously, a huge part of government's
purpose is to be able to deliver security along its borders. So
I think that is terrifically important.
What you point to is that the infrastructure, security
infrastructure, military and IT, has been weakened. It has been
weakened and is currently no match for Russians whether they--
--
Senator Flake. That goes across the military, police force,
across the board.
Ambassador Green. One of the things that we heard quietly
from Ukrainians is that we are worried that the Russians know
exactly what we are going to do before we do it because they
are the ones who helped set up this IT infrastructure in the
first place. In terms of what the West can do, the West can
help, can respond to requests, and help the Ukrainians build
their capacity on all levels to be able to secure the borders
but also to deliver the basic services that link those
communities in those areas to a central government.
Right now, with all the propaganda that they are getting
from Moscow, with the armed thugs who are going back and forth
and destabilizing wherever they can and starting problems like
tossing Molotov cocktails into polling places, it raises doubts
in the minds of the communities along those borders. My own
view is that we need to help them assuage those doubts. I think
a big piece of it is basic capacity building so that there is
some semblance of governing authority.
If I can return to something that you said in your remarks,
which I think is key, we have a tendency in the West to think
that signals and symbols are only long-term, and I could not
disagree more. I think what you are talking about is so
important because sending signals of Western support, Western
dedication and devotion to not just Ukraine but to the entire
region is essential because in those communities that have
historically weaker links to central governments, where they
are being bombarded with all of these mixed signals, I think it
is important that they know that the community of democracies
is there and will be there. So I think it is a long-term signal
that has an immediate payoff. It is terrifically important
strategically.
Senator Flake. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really
appreciate the discussion that we are having on what our next
path should be on sanctions. Having spent the last several
months in pretty close consultations with our European allies
color me fairly pessimistic that they are ready to take the
next step. We have referenced in previous hearings the small
dinner that some of us attended with Chancellor Merkel in which
she can charitably be described as stuck in her current
position regarding robust caution on sanctions.
Some European nations are not sitting still. They are
actually moving the other way.
Senator Johnson and I, amongst others, sent a letter to the
French today asking them to halt their sale of two Mistral-
class warships to the Russians, the very type of warships that
were actually used in the invasion of Crimea.
So I want to just pin the five of you down on your exact
recommendation for us on sanctions because I think we have got
a good conversation about this. But assuming that the Europeans
are not willing to move with us on the next level of sanctions
and to use Ambassador Jeffrey's analogy, a move from kiddy
sanctions to tiger sanctions, sectoral sanctions--assuming that
they are not ready, would you recommend that the United States
precipitously move forward unilaterally with sectoral-based
sanctions regardless of whether the Europeans are ready to join
us? And if you can give just quick answers, and if you have a
caveat, add it. That would be fine.
Ms. Harman. Well, it is nice to see all my former
colleagues on the Energy and Commerce Committee in the House.
I do not think that unilateral sanctions work well. We have
seen this movie in Iran. I think put maximum pressure on Europe
and hope that Angela Merkel can be helpful to do this. It is in
their interests to do this. It will be cheaper in the long run
to do this. But if Europe will not go along, I would move to
larger individual sanctions because getting at some more of
these folks does get at the energy sector. A lot of them are
major players in the energy sector in Russia, and it does hurt.
And I think the sanctions that have been imposed to date, not
fully effective, have had a big bite on Russia.
Senator Murphy. If people can give quick answers to this
question. I have one more after this.
Ambassador Pifer. I think we need to push and see if we can
do sanctions in concert with Europe, but if Europe will not go
along, I would agree, more individual sanctions. I would also
target families. There are ways to keep people who want to
travel to New York and Miami, for example, from coming here.
I guess the one area I would look at, if we decide to go
unilateral, would be in the financial area just because so much
of the international commerce is denominated in dollars. This
would require somebody smarter than me about these questions,
but maybe looking at sanctioning one major Russian bank like
Sberbank or Gazprombank. Could the United States do that
itself? I think that would have significant implications on the
Russian economy, and I think we could have some effect. We
would have to calculate what blowback there might be against
the U.S. economy.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Unilateral sanctions if we cannot get
concerted ones with the Europeans, but we do have to be
careful. They should be designed to persuade not provoke the
Europeans because maintaining solidarity with these guys is
still very important.
Ambassador Green. I would agree with what you have just
heard. Not speaking for IRI here, speaking only for myself, I
think one of the least reported stories in recent months is
what has been happening in Moscow and the fact that Putin has
taken a number of steps to impose restrictions on his own
people and to shut down dialogue, which means he obviously
fears the effects of sanctions.
My own view is that as you have heard here, ratcheting up
individual sanctions and family sanctions are important
signals, and I think we should constantly be pushing our
European allies and remind them of the lines that have already
been crossed in an effort to try to get broader sectoral
sanctions.
Mr. Wollack. NDI does not take a position on sanctions.
But I would just make the point that I think the Ukrainians
and I think the international community sees Crimea as lost at
least for the short term. And I do not think we can afford to
see de facto occupation in two of the five provinces in eastern
Ukraine. And whatever can be done to hold Russia accountable
for what is taking place in Donetsk and Luhansk I think will be
very, very important.
Senator Murphy. Here is my second question. We may have
time for one or two people to answer. But it is a much broader
question about the future of NATO and the future of article 5
protections. I agree with you that Europe will certainly react
if there is a movement of troops across the border, and the
idea is that they are protected under the mutual defense
covenant in NATO. But Russia is perfecting a new form of
warfare in which they do not march troops across the border, in
which they very slowly but methodically contest areas, gain
control of areas with a range of tactics from intimidation to
bribery to provocations to little green men with no Russian
uniforms. And so this is a longer term challenge for us.
But is article 5 still a sufficient protection for
countries along Russia's border?
Ambassador Jeffrey. Yes, it is, Senator Murphy, as long as
it is backed with a real capability. That is why it is so
important that the President has put U.S. light infantry along
those borders, and I hope through this billion dollar program
it will be heavier forces and reinforced with NATO.
To be sure, the light green men were facilitated by the
presence of 40,000 traditional motorized rifle and tank
regiments along the border that basically like scissors, paper,
rock blocked the Ukrainians from taking more effective military
action in the early days against Crimea. So he has got a very
sophisticated set of military and paramilitary steps. The first
capability that the eastern states of NATO need is a stronger
military with U.S. forces there as we had in Berlin and other
places so they know it only may be a few Americans today but
there will be many more tomorrow.
Senator Murphy. Jane, let me just ask a slightly different
version of the question to you. Let us say the tactics that are
being used in eastern Ukraine were used in Romania or Bulgaria.
Let us say Russia was actively funding separatist movements
within those nations. My impression is that does not trigger
article 5, but should we be having a discussion about whether
that protection is sufficient?
Ms. Harman. I think we should have a discussion about how
to meet our NATO obligations. Article 5 is central to that. I
also think the other NATO members have to put more into the
fight both in terms of resources and money.
And a final point on sanctions which I forgot. A senior
Russian official was recently at the Wilson Center and
suggested that we yank the visas for Russian Duma members to go
to the south of France and Florida. They all have their dachas
there and they love their vacations more than they love their
political jobs. And that would really get their attention, and
I think that is something that Europe could go along with even
if the restaurants in the south of France lose a little money.
Ambassador Pifer. Senator, if I could just add briefly. I
think it would be actually very useful within NATO for a
conversation to be about the appearance of little green men.
What happens if 150, quote, local protesters seize a television
station in eastern Estonia? I think NATO ought to have that
discussion in advance so then when it happens, NATO has an
answer ready. My worry is that if it happens, it is not going
to be useful if NATO debates for 4 or 5 weeks whether that is
an article 5 contingency.
Senator Murphy. That is my point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all very much for being here.
And I would like to pursue that line of questioning a
little bit because it is my understanding that over the next
few weeks the NATO Defense Ministers are working to develop a
readiness action plan. And I just wonder if you all could talk
a little bit about the kinds of things they ought to be
thinking about, not just with respect to Ukraine, but with
respect to some of the other countries in Eastern Europe that
are potential targets for this kind of Russian activity and
what kind of response we ought to be thinking about from NATO.
Should we have a more assertive position, either rhetorically
or in terms of other symbolic actions, that we could be taking
now that would help send a very strong signal both to Russia
about taking further action but also to our allies about our
support for them?
So I do not know who. If you would like to speak to that
first, Mr. Pifer?
Ambassador Pifer. Going back to 1997, NATO has tried to be
nonprovocative in terms of its military deployments on the
territory of the countries that joined from 1999 on. So there
have not been permanent United States deployments in places
like Poland or Romania or the Baltic States. I think what we
have seen in the last 3 months, the Russians have fundamentally
changed the rules. And so now it is time to consider
something--I think the Pentagon uses the term ``persistent,''
but moving toward some kind of a permanent American military
presence in the Baltic states and Poland. I do not think that
these have to be large units. I do not think they have to have
significant offensive capability. They are basically there as a
trip wire, but that trip wire worked and kept Berlin free for
35 years.
The one thing I would add, though, that does bother me a
bit. And I have tried to talk to my European friends about
this, that when you look at the on-the-ground permanent
deployment now in the three Baltic States and Poland, you have
one American airborne company with about 150 troops in each of
those places. It should not just be American. What I have been
trying to lobby for is it would be great if you could have four
European countries, have a German company paired with the
American company in Lithuania, a British company with the
American company in Poland and so on. I think that would be
very good in two ways, one in terms of sending a signal to
Moscow that the article 5 commitment is shared by all NATO
allies. And I think it would also probably send a good signal
to Capitol Hill where at some point you may be getting asked
questions about why is this just an American burden.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I certainly agree with that. I
wonder if any of you are willing to speculate on why they have
been so reluctant to do that. Is it because of the concerns
about the relationship with Russia and their trading
opportunities and their dependence on energy, or is there
something else going on?
Ambassador Jeffrey. First of all, there is the 1997
agreement, and if you look at the language of it, it is clear,
as Ambassador Pifer said. The conditions--and it said
explicitly under the current and foreseeable conditions, we
will not be making large, permanent deployments. Well, it is
clear that, God, if the conditions have not changed under what
we have seen in the last few months, they will never change.
And secondly, we are not even talking about, as Steve said,
large and permanent. We are talking about a few companies from
various countries falling in on what we would call battalion
packages with the other four companies on alert ready to be
flown in almost immediately and fall in on their equipment.
That can very rapidly--I saw it in Kuwait in 1998. That can
very rapidly generate 5,000 troops. The Berlin brigade was a
trip wire, but as you remember from those pictures of
Checkpoint Charlie in 1962, it was a trip wire with M-60 main
battle tanks.
If you have a conventional military capability, again you
block the ability of Putin to intimidate the reaction to the
infiltration, the little green men, little seizures of things
along the borders because people can deal with those as police
problems without having to worry about 10,000 Russian troops
coming across the border.
Senator Shaheen. I think that is worth exploring a little
more, but I want to change the subject. I am sorry. I had
another hearing, so I was not able to get here to hear your
testimony.
But I wanted to explore the economic situation in Ukraine
because I know early in this crisis, one of the overwhelming
views that we heard was that if Ukraine's economy does not
improve, that it creates a situation where the whole country
could fall. Again, I do not know who wants to address this, but
if you could speak to where we are in terms of economic
assistance for Ukraine, to what extent do we think that that is
having an impact there. Is there more we should be doing? Are
we seeing the austerity measures that are being called for
having a negative effect in a way that is challenging? And then
corruption. Are we seeing any potential positive efforts to
address corruption in a way that we think will have long-term
effects?
Ms. Harman. Well, I think we have all said more or less the
same thing, but I think I am the only mother and grandmother on
this panel. And we need tough love here. Everyone cares about
Ukraine's economic future, but Ukraine has to care about
Ukraine's economic future. And the anticorruption piece is
absolutely huge. If the resources from the West just go into
McMansions for a few oligarchs or fat bank accounts, wherever,
that is unacceptable. And we have already seen that. So the
Poroshenko government, which starts Saturday, has to move out
smartly, and he says that he will do that. That is point one.
Number two, there will be austerity measures required to
qualify for IMF loans, substantial, huge IMF loans. Other
countries like Egypt are not prepared to do this. There is a
huge political cost to this. When you tell somebody your gas
bill is going to go up by 100 percent or more, et cetera, that
is hard to hear. But this is the time. This is the third chance
for Ukraine for this government to say to folks, hey, you
fought and died in the Maidan. You want a different kind of
government. This is what it will take, and after we do this for
a short period of time, the aid will come and we will build a
noncorrupt country with a sensible jobs program and your future
will look brighter.
Ambassador Pifer. If I could just add. Right now, Ukraine
has an offer in the next 2 years from the IMF, other
international financial institutions and western donors between
$25 billion and $35 billion. So there is a good sum of money
out there.
The other bit of good news. My understanding is that when
the IMF team went to Ukraine in March to talk about the
program, they said for the first time in dealing with Ukraine
in 20 years, the Ukrainians said here is the problem, here is
our to-do list. Every other time, the IMF said here is your to-
do list. This time, the Ukrainians had the right to-do list. So
they know technically what they have to do, and they understand
that their ability to access that $25 billion to $35 billion
will be tied to their continued implementation of reforms.
I agree with Jane. I think the big question is can they
sustain the political support for those austerity measures. On
May 1, as one of their prior actions for the IMF, they raised
the price of heating. May 1 is a great time to raise the price
of heating because no one needs it, but in November-December
when people see their bills up 60-70 percent, that is when the
government is going to have to come out and say we just have to
grit and get through this the next couple of years because this
is key to unlocking the economic potential.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I know
Mr. Green wanted to comment on that.
Ambassador Green. Senator, thank you.
IRI has been polling in Ukraine for a long time, and we
have conducted two polls right before the election, as well as,
of course, the polls themselves in the election. I think the
good news is the Ukrainian people have their eyes open. They
understand the path ahead is not going to be an easy one. The
polling shows that they are prepared for tough measures and
difficult steps. The polling also shows that the leash may be a
short one.
So my own judgment is as long as the government sends clear
signals that it is moving to take on corruption, there is some
hope that they will take on these aggravating factors. Then
they have got a mandate. Then they have got the capacity to
take these challenges on. The Ukrainian people are well
educated. Ukrainian people know what they are up against. The
Maidan is very much still front and center to them and close to
their hearts and those who tragically were killed in the
Maidan. So there is a sense of euphoria tempered by realism and
as long as they start making those very clear steps, I think
the mandate is there.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you all very much.
The Chairman. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
There is an old saying that if you give a person a fish,
you feed him for a day. If you teach him how to fish, you feed
him for a lifetime. So that is what we are really talking about
here.
Ukraine is the second least energy efficient country in the
world, second from the bottom. Ukraine, if it just improved not
to Germany's level, but just to Poland's level, would back out
almost all of the natural gas it imports. Teach a country to
fish.
It has vast untapped natural gas resources. Vast. Third in
Europe. Teach a country to fish, to develop its own energy
resources. That is where we should be. That would scare Russia.
That would petrify Russia. That would be the Ukrainian people
banding together themselves, saying we must do this.
So I introduced a bill this morning to deal with this
Achilles heel of Ukraine, which doubles the funding for the
State Department, USAID, Export-Import Bank, OPIC, and U.S.
Trade and Development Agency to deal with this issue both of
energy efficiency and natural gas development inside their own
country, to leverage programs that are already there, but to
bring in our expertise to help them to telescope the timeframe
that it takes for them to do it. So that is, without question,
where we have to be as a nation. That is our opportunity.
And exporting LNG from our country--that might heat their
homes for a day. We can do that. But that is really not where
we should be.
And I will just add parenthetically here for those who are
criticizing President Obama's plan on Monday that the EPA
announced to reduce our greenhouse gases, and who are decrying
the increase in electricity rates here in America for doing
that are the very same Republicans who are also supporting
exporting our natural gas, which is going to so dramatically
increase our own domestic electricity rates that it will dwarf
any increase that comes from the President's announcement on
Monday about what the EPA is doing. It is not even close, if
that is a concern.
But back to this subject, which we should be able to work
together on on a bipartisan basis, that is where we should be,
and that is what we should be leveraging.
You are an expert on this, Congresswoman. Can you talk a
little bit about energy efficiency, about this whole area, and
how dramatic a difference you believe it can make, given your
own experience with your lighting legislation here in America.
You really do know this issue cold.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Senator Markey. It is kind of
interesting to see you at the bottom of the queue on the
committee. This is a new for me.
Senator Markey. A little bit of humility is a good thing.
Ms. Harman. You are very humble now.
Senator Markey. I am proud of my humility.
Ms. Harman. You and I worked closely together on energy
efficiency, and so did all of our colleagues on the House
Commerce Committee, and I think we did pretty well. And you
mentioned light bulbs, which were a bipartisan initiative and
passed on a bipartisan basis. Efficient light bulbs seems like
a little thing, saves a huge amount of energy. We also did
building standards and we did fuel efficiency and we did a
number of other things.
I cannot vote here anymore, but I certainly support your
initiative to help countries help themselves. It is a point we
have all made about tough love for Ukraine. They have to take
these steps, but we could give them tools that would help them
take these steps. So I think others may want to comment, but I
think this is a very good angle.
Finally, I said something--I am not sure you were here--
about using our asymmetric strength against Russia. Our
asymmetric strength is our economy. Our asymmetric strength is
some of our good ideas like these. And the aid we give Ukraine
could help with these ideas. And that would go a lot further
than some of the other ideas that are more kinetic.
Senator Markey. May I ask each one of the witnesses--just
very briefly. I do not have a lot of time--on this question of
energy efficiency, natural gas? We have to help them with the
reverse flow and other issues. Do you all agree this is an area
we should really zero in on, and that will make the bigger
long-term difference than any change in the LNG marketplace?
Ambassador Pifer. Certainly energy efficiency in Ukraine
and helping Ukraine produce its own natural gas is a big thing.
I think we actually may be moving in that direction. In 2012,
the price that Ukrainian households paid for their heating gas
was one-sixth the price that Ukraine was paying to import that.
By raising the prices, they are going to introduce a huge
incentive for all of those households to close the windows.
Senator Markey. Ambassador Jeffrey.
Ambassador Jeffrey. Absolutely, as two major components,
along with others, and I would include us exporting LNG and
encouraging Europe to get it from other sources as well.
Senator Markey. Even if it does increase electricity rates
in the United States.
Ambassador Jeffrey. For reasons that go well beyond the
Ukrainian problem.
Senator Markey. Congressman.
Ambassador Green. Senator, IRI does not take a position on
energy legislation nor sanctions legislation. I will say that
we believe in a comprehensive approach. So it is almost all of
the above in terms of building capacity in Ukraine.
Mr. Wollack. With regard to technical expertise, however,
the Ukrainian Government welcomes--on energy diversification
and a host of all the reform issues, they welcome technical
expertise in a major way as they go forward.
Senator Markey. I think that we really do have a huge
opportunity here, and the more we learn about this country, the
more we can see that it can be transformed in the blink of an
eye. They could increase their energy efficiency by 10 percent
in 2 years. They could increase their energy efficiency by 50
percent in 5 years. We have to use every bit of leverage that
we have in order to help them accomplish that goal. That is
what is going to keep Gazprom up at night with nightmares. That
is why China looms larger in their life because they are going
to see a market shrinking dramatically, and their geopolitical
leverage as well, because that is what it is really all about.
Whether you talk about Syria or Iraq or Libya,
unfortunately, oil underlies a lot of each one of those
regions, and here we really get a chance to do something for
them that makes them self-sustaining. And my hope is that we
can talk about this issue on a bipartisan basis in the
committee and get right at the heart of their weakness, get
right at the heart of what this whole story is about, which is
their necessity today of importing natural gas. But it is
something that we can really change dramatically, and have
Ukraine say to Russia, we do not need your natural gas any more
than we need your soldiers. And that is a statement they should
be able to make in the very near future if we help them to
construct a plan and if we give them the help they need in
order to be successful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Markey may be the newest
member of the committee, but he is front and center on energy
policy and global affairs. And we appreciate his expertise on
the committee.
Two final questions. Ambassador Green, you have talked
about this several times in your answers, and I would like to
hear some other views as well. In Ukraine, yes, but in all of
Eastern Europe the saturation the Russians have created with
their broadcasting into the region, of course, is not open-
ended broadcasting in terms of views. It is very much directed
by the state.
What more should we really be doing with Voice of America
and Radio Free Europe to quickly increase our level of
engagement in this region, so that in addition to a
domestically-created series of social networking platforms,
there are additional opportunities for multiple voices to be
heard?
Ambassador Green. Senator, I would argue that we should
boost those programs, boost them into the regions, but we
should also take a look at the social media platforms. There
are ways that we can help to create anchors outside of the
region such that it makes it harder for mischief. It makes it
harder for the Russians to come in and shut them down. So it is
helping to provide the technical expertise to foster the
development of social media platforms that are indigenous in
the region, but also taking steps to help reinforce and protect
them from hostile moves such as we saw in eastern Ukraine.
The Chairman. Anyone else have thoughts?
Mr. Wollack. I would say we can also work with the Poles
and others in Eastern Europe. So this is not just something the
United States is doing. I think we have a lot of friends in the
region in which we can enhance their capacity for broadcast and
communications in Ukraine and also bolster the Ukrainian
capacity in this regard as well.
The Chairman. Jane.
Ms. Harman. Well, just to reinforce Mark Green's earlier
comments about social media, I think there is a huge voice in
Ukraine that knows how to speak for itself. It just needs
resources.
The Chairman. One final question, which I think is really
an important one, but one which, in the focus of Ukraine, we
have not talked about, and that is the nuclear nonproliferation
implications of what has happened in Ukraine. Ukraine
voluntarily surrendered their nuclear weapons that they
inherited from the former Soviet Union, in exchange for a
commitment by Russia, as well as the United Kingdom and the
United States, to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity.
Are there implications for global nonproliferation regimes
with the loss of Crimea and the threat to eastern Ukraine? Is
there a conclusion that if Ukraine had retained these nuclear
weapons, the loss of Crimea would not have happened and
therefore possession of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee
of territorial integrity when threatened by another nuclear
power such as the Russians? I am concerned that at some point
some are going to rivet their attention to that. In some of my
travels, I have heard a little bit of that from other
countries. I would like to hear if anybody has any perspectives
on that.
Ambassador Pifer. Mr. Chairman, actually I helped negotiate
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances, which was
part of the agreement by which Ukraine gave up its nuclear
weapons.
And I think one of the tragedies of what the Russians have
done with their assault and the annexation of Crimea and in
their continued action in eastern Ukraine, which is violating
the commitments they made in that document to respect Ukraine's
territorial integrity, sovereignty, not to use force against
Ukraine, is that they have now devalued the idea of security
assurances which could have been a tool in other proliferation
cases. For example, it might have been part of the solution on
Iran or North Korea at some point. And so one of the reasons
why I think it is now incumbent on the United States and
Britain, who cosigned the Budapest Memorandum--one of the
reasons why we should be doing things to support Ukraine but
also to penalize Russia is to make clear that there are, in
fact, consequences for violating those sorts of commitments.
But the Russians have done grievous damage to the ability of
security assurances of the Budapest Memorandum kind to be part
of a solution in future proliferation cases.
Ambassador Jeffrey. I agree with Steve.
But from the standpoint of the Middle East where I spent
much of my time and effort in the past and now, what is
important is what happens in the days, weeks, months, years
ahead. If the Russian action is punished at an ever greater
degree of power by the international community, if Crimea is
not acknowledged as basically Russian, the way we just forgot
about South Ossetia, if we can show that there are military and
other actions that, first of all, will preserve the bulk of
Ukraine will make it a vibrant part of the Western community in
the future, then I think countries will say, yes, led by the
United States, the West stood up to that aggression. And there
is an international alternative to us developing not just
weapons of mass destruction but large armies and little 1914
kind of local coalitions and other things that, taken together,
are going to undercut this global order. So we have got a lot
of work ahead of us to ensure not just for the sake of Ukraine,
but for the sake of nonproliferation and the overall
international order that, just to quote an earlier American
President, ``this shall not stand.''
The Chairman. Well, this has been a very insightful panel.
We appreciate you all sharing your time, as well as your
expertise and your insights.
This record will remain open until the close of business on
Friday.
And with the gratitude of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of the NDI Election Observer Delegation to Ukraine's
2014 Presidential Election Submitted by Kenneth Wollack
This preliminary statement is offered by the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) election observer delegation to Ukraine's May 25, 2014,
Presidential election. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
NDI's chairman, and Ana Palacio, former Foreign Minister of Spain,
cochaired the delegation. Other members of the delegation's leadership
group included former U.S. Senator Edward ``Ted'' Kaufman of Delaware;
former U.S. Representative Jane Harman of California, director,
president and CEO of the Wilson Center; and Matyas Eorsi, former member
of Parliament from Hungary and former member of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe.
This preliminary statement is offered as votes are being tabulated
and any electoral complaints that may be lodged are yet to be
processed. NDI therefore does not seek to offer its final analysis of
the election, and it recognizes that ultimately the people of Ukraine
will determine the meaning of the election as they exercise their
sovereignty. NDI's mission operated in conformance with the Declaration
of Principles for International Election Observation and Ukrainian law,
and it cooperated with nonpartisan citizen election monitors and other
international observer missions that endorse the Declaration.
The delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has funded
the work of this delegation and, along with the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency (SIDA), has supported NDI democracy assistance programs in
Ukraine.
summary
Ukrainians have achieved a democratic milestone. By turning out to
vote yesterday across the vast majority of the country, Ukrainians did
more than elect a new President. They showed the world their commitment
to sovereignty, unity, and democracy. Their votes expressed the clear
aspiration that these principles be valued over geopolitical strategy
or leaders' personal enrichment. Despite constraints, Ukraine's
electoral administrators, campaigns, government authorities, election
monitors and voters showed courage and resolve in fulfilling their
responsibilities in compliance with Ukraine's laws and international
democratic election standards. The candidates deserve commendation for
their constructive responses to the results.
The Russian occupation of Crimea prevented any voting in that
region. Armed groups interfered with electoral preparations and voting
in large parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts--two of five eastern
provinces. The disenfranchisement of voters in these places represents
a serious violation of rights. At the same time, it does not negate the
legitimacy of the overall election or the mandate it provides. A
democratic election process should not be held hostage to foreign
occupation or illegal actions by armed separatists seeking to disrupt
the democratic process.
In those places where voting took place, the elections were
generally well run and proceeded without major incidents. Large numbers
of domestic and international observers mobilized across all of Ukraine
to safeguard the integrity of the process. In observing elections in
more than 60 countries since 1986, including previous polls in Ukraine,
rarely has NDI heard such positive commentary from political
contestants and monitors.
This democratic election can begin a process to reinforce public
confidence in the country's political institutions. The task ahead for
the new President, as well as other political and government leaders,
will be to pursue open and consultative governing practices that
incorporate the interests of Ukrainians from all regions of the
country. The leaders must communicate effectively the prospect of
short-term sacrifices, and deliver on the longer term expectations of
the Euromaidan movement.
The task is great. These expectations include:
An accountable government;
Political institutions that channel dissent, facilitate
debate, and respond effectively to citizens' concerns;
Transparency and integrity in all aspects of public life;
An open and fair judicial process;
An electoral system that encourages new faces and ideas; and
A legislative process that is based on consultation and open
debate.
These are ideals to which even established democracies aspire, but
Ukraine has reached a moment in history where that path is once again
open to it. Some meaningful reforms have already been undertaken; many
more are needed for Ukraine to reach its democratic potential.
i. political context
This was the most important election in Ukraine's independent
history. It
came at a critical moment following a groundswell of citizen political
engagement prompted by the Euromaidan movement and amid challenges to
the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The Euromaidan demonstrations that began in November 2013
fundamentally altered the political dynamics in Ukraine. They
highlighted Ukrainians' demands for change, including more transparent,
accountable, and uncorrupted political practices as well as respect for
basic civil and political rights. Euromaidan was sparked by anger over
the government's abrupt refusal to sign the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement, but it was sustained for three months by a more basic demand
for dignity and respect from government. Euromaidan drew participants
from across the country and spawned similar demonstrations in cities in
all regions, reflecting widespread consensus on these issues. Public
opinion research by several respected sources through April and May
also demonstrates that Ukrainians across regions share a desire for
national unity, more responsive governance and greater public
integrity.
Tragically, the Euromaidan demonstrations culminated in the deaths
of more than 100 Ukrainians and injuries to many more. Other deaths in
the East and South, including those in a fire in Odessa, present the
need for a concerted reconciliation process.
The country is facing serious challenges: an economic crisis; an
inherited deficit of confidence in political institutions; internal
differences of opinion about the country's future course; and most
significantly, occupation of territory and, in other regions, armed
insurrections aimed at disrupting political processes. An inclusive
public mandate will help the government address these challenges.
In the aftermath of the May 25 vote, it is hoped that the national
dialogue on ensuring rights and representation for all Ukrainians will
accelerate and deepen. The best legacy of Euromaidan would be a
politically active and engaged citizenry combined with responsive and
accountable institutions that together preclude the need for future
Maidans. It will take concerted efforts from all citizens of the
country to address the many economic, political, and security
challenges facing Ukraine in the days and months ahead.
The international community has a critical responsibility to be
engaged over the long term with assistance--financial, diplomatic, and
technical. This support must be set in the context of respect for
territorial integrity, promotion of fundamental rights, and a
commitment to the country's democratic and economic development.
Ukrainians have said that they welcome technical assistance, which
would be integrated into their reform efforts.
ii. election day
Three types of elections were held on May 25: the Presidential
vote; one single-mandate parliamentary race; and a series of local
polls (more than 40 mayors, including Kiev, 27 settlement executives,
200 village executives, plus two city councils, including Kiev, and
three village councils).
In 23 of Ukraine's 27 administrative units (24 oblasts, the
republic of Crimea, and the cities of Kiev and Sevastopol), the
elections were generally well run and proceeded without major
incidents. Overall turnout is now estimated at 60 percent. By contrast,
in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, representing just under 20 percent of
the electorate, most voters were denied the opportunity to exercise
their franchise.
In most of the country, voting proceeded unhindered. The pre-
election period and Presidential election were virtually free of formal
candidate complaints. Political party representatives comprising the
polling station commissions (PECs) cooperated with each other to
facilitate voting and address issues, while large numbers of
nonpartisan citizen observers and party poll watchers witnessed the
procedures, including many women among their ranks. Across the country,
voters often stood in long lines waiting patiently to cast their votes.
Isolated problems were significant in some places, including, for
example, Molotov cocktails thrown at three PECs the night before the
elections in the southern city of Kherson, though all opened on time
for voting, and in Mykolaiv, also in the South, bomb threats briefly
closed at least seven PECs, though voting resumed in each of them. The
delegation did observe incidents of overcrowding at polling sites
(particularly in Kiev, Lviv, and Sumy), police presence inside polling
stations (in Zaporizhia), and late arrival of mobile ballot boxes
(Odessa). Also, most polling places were not easily accessible by
voters with disabilities. There were concerns prior to the elections
about a possible lack of quorums of polling site officials, problems
related to large-scale substitutions of those officials immediately
prior to the elections, and the inability of security forces to respond
to disruptions. These concerns, however, were not realized.
No polling took place in Crimea due to the Russian occupation.
Crimea is home to 1.5 million registered voters, representing 5 percent
of the Ukrainian electorate. The Central Election Commission (CEC)
reported that approximately 6,000 Crimean residents registered to vote
in other parts of the country, which was the only procedure available
to them.
In Donetsk and Luhansk, illegal actions by armed groups--including
seizures of government buildings and electoral facilities, abductions
and killings of journalists and widespread intimidation--aimed to
derail the elections. Even in the face of such violations of people's
fundamental rights, electoral officials opened nearly 20 percent of
polling stations in those two oblasts. International and nonpartisan
Ukrainian election observers witnessed their brave and determined
efforts by these officials.
The delegation deeply regrets any violations of voters' rights to
exercise their franchise, including those which occurred in Crimea,
Donetsk, and Luhansk. Universal and equal suffrage for eligible
citizens is fundamental to democratic elections. However, these three
cases should not negate the fact that the vast majority of the
electorate--well more than 80 percent--had the opportunity to cast
their ballots for the candidate of their choice.
Also, it is important to note the source of voter
disenfranchisement. In most countries where NDI has observed
disenfranchisement, it has been caused by authorities or political
contestants interfering with the process for electoral advantage. In
Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, the responsibility lies with the foreign
forces occupying Ukrainian territory and armed groups seeking to derail
the electoral process, despite good faith efforts of election
officials. Such disenfranchisement cannot be allowed to negate the
legitimacy of elections or the mandate they provide. Unfortunately,
disenfranchisement has occurred in parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Georgia in recent elections due to terrorism by nonstate actors or
foreign occupation. Nevertheless, those actions did not delegitimize
those elections.
Election Observation
Large numbers of nonpartisan citizen election observers mobilized
across all of Ukraine to safeguard the integrity of the election
process and promote public confidence. The Civic Network Opora and the
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) each mobilized approximately 150
long-term monitors and issued reports leading to the elections; each
group fielded approximately 2,000 election-day observers in all
regions. Opora also mounted systematic election-day observation of the
voting, counting and tabulation processes through deploying monitors to
a representative statistical sample of polling stations that allowed it
to issue reports on the quality of the opening of polls, turnout and
critical aspects of the processes.
These observers had full access to the processes under the law, the
authority to lodge official electoral complaints and witness entry of
results at the district election commissions (DECs) into the CEC's
computerized results tabulation system. This level of transparency
added to confidence in election-day procedures. Ukrainian citizen
observers courageously deployed to all parts of the country except
Crimea. At times they faced difficult circumstances.
The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(OSCE/ODIHR) was responsible for organizing approximately 1,000
election-day observers, including 100 long-term observers (LTOs) who
were in place across across the country beginning on March 27, except
in Crimea. This effort was joined by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and other
bodies. The European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations
(ENEMO) deployed 50 LTOs and 300 additional election-day observers. The
International Republican Institute (IRI) also observed the election.
These observer missions, along with NDI, cooperated in their
observation efforts. Each of these missions reported that they received
cooperation from election authorities at all levels.
iii. electoral framework and preelection environment
The pre-election period was compressed due to the constitutional
requirement to hold elections within 90 days of a President being
unable to fulfill the duties of the office. Nonetheless, NDI has rarely
heard such positive commentary on the election process as it has from
contestants and observers in these elections. This includes the
Institute's monitoring of elections in more than 60 countries since
1986, including previous polls in Ukraine. Traditional violations, such
as misuse of state resources for electoral advantage, vote buying and
intimidation were not raised as issues by the candidates, observers or
election officials, though they were prominent in several past
Ukrainian elections.
Electoral Framework and Administration
March 2014 amendments to the Presidential election law brought the
framework into compliance with international standards and responded to
many previous recommendations from domestic and international
observers. The CEC as well as most district and precinct commissions
performed professionally and, in some cases, with notable courage.
Election commissioners and precinct premises were targeted with threats
and violence in Donetsk and Luhansk. Those who fulfilled their
responsibilities in the face of significant security risks in some
parts of the country deserve particular commendation.
Campaigns and Candidates
The 21 Presidential candidates on the ballot represented a broad
range of political perspectives and parties, including the former
ruling party. Campaigning was muted compared to previous Presidential
elections, due to events in parts of the east, but the candidates and
their teams were able to communicate with voters freely in most parts
of the country. Campaign messages overwhelmingly focused on peace,
stability, and Ukrainian unity. More traditional ``pocketbook'' issues
like jobs, education and healthcare were not central to the campaigns.
Violence and instability prevented normal campaigning in Donetsk and
Luhansk.
Media Environment
In most of the country, media freedoms were generally respected.
Journalists were able to operate without interference and voters had
access to multiple media perspectives, although coverage of the
campaign was downplayed in favor of events in the south and east. There
were some reports of unattributed paid advertising and socalled ``black
PR,'' and some media outlets were seen to favor particular candidates.
In Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk, however, media freedoms came under
attack. Journalists faced censorship, harassment, violence, and
kidnapping. On the eve of the election, a journalist was murdered. In
addition, a pro-Russia disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting
the Ukrainian Government and its supporters permeated the pre-election
environment.
Women's Participation
Women represent 54 percent of the Ukrainian population, but they
are underrepresented in politics as leaders. Only two Presidential
candidates were women. The delegation did not see strong evidence that
Presidential or local government campaigns systematically promoted
women as candidates or campaigners, nor systematically targeted support
from women voters.
Campaign Financing
The corrosive role of money in politics is a major area of concern
that has not yet been adequately addressed in legislation or practice.
The amendments to the Presidential election law do little to control or
bring transparency to campaign finances. Some Presidential candidates
voluntarily disclosed on their Web sites sources and amounts of
donations and expenditures. These are welcome steps, but before any
future elections, consideration should be given to regulatory and
legislative frameworks that would address these longstanding concerns.
iv. the delegation and its work
The NDI delegation's coleaders, Albright and Palacio, symbolize the
importance of a trans-Atlantic commitment to a democratic Ukraine, The
delegation arrived in Kiev on May 21 and held meetings with national
political leaders, Presidential candidates, election officials, senior
government officials, representatives of nongovernmental organizations,
the media and the diplomatic community. On May 24-25, observers
deployed in teams to 11 regions across Ukraine, including Kiev, where
they met with regional and local government representatives, election
administrators, and political and civic leaders. On election day, the
NDI teams observed voting and counting processes in polling stations
across the country.
In addition to Albright, Palacio, Harman, Kaufman, and Eorsi,
members of the delegation included:
Brian Atwood, former administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and former president of NDI;
Hattie Babbitt, former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization
of American States, former deputy administrator of USAID and a
member of the NDI Board;
Richard Blum, chairman and president of Blum Capital
Partners and a member of the NDI Board;
Patrick Griffin, former assistant to the president and
director for legislative affairs under President Clinton and
member of the NDI Board;
Rick Inderfurth, former assistant secretary of state for
South Asian affairs and former U.S. representative for special
political affairs at the U.N.;
Kurt MacLeod, vice president for Asia and Eurasia at Pact;
Sarah Mendelson, former deputy assistant administrator at
USAID;
Sharon Nazarian, president of the Y&S Nazarian Family
Foundation;
James O'Brien, vice chair of the Albright Stonebridge Group;
Stephen Sestanovich, former U.S. Ambassador at Large for the
former Soviet Union and a professor of international diplomacy
at Columbia University;
William Taylor, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and vice
president for the Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute
of Peace;
Kenneth Wollack, president of NDI;
Pat Merloe, director of electoral programs at NDI;
Ermek Adylbekov, program manager in NDI's Kyrgyzstan office;
Catherine Cecil, NDI's resident director in Ukraine;
Kathy Gest, director of public affairs at NDI;
Laura Jewett, NDI's regional director for Eurasia;
Daniel Mitov, NDI's resident representative in Brussels and
former executive director of the Democracy Foundation in
Bulgaria;
Teona Kupunia, senior program officer in NDI's Georgia
office;
Tinatin Museridze, senior administrative and financial
manager in NDI's Georgia office;
Gegham Sargsyanm NDI's resident country director in Armenia;
Andrei Strah, a consultant to NDI in Moldova; and
Aida Suyundueva, formerly of NDI's offices in Kyrgyzstan and
Azerbaijan.
The mission builds on the ongoing observations of NDI's long-term
analysts, who have worked with the Institute's Kiev-based staff since
April, and the findings of NDI's April 7-11 pre-election assessment
mission. Ted Kaufman and Matyas Eorsi, members of this delegation, also
participated in the pre-election assessment. NDI also issued a May 9
statement on separatist referendums and a second pre-election statement
on May 19. NDI's 38 observers visited polling stations in districts
across Ukraine. In addition to its international observation
activities, NDI supported the election monitoring efforts of Opora and
ENEMO.
NDI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working to support and
strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen
participation, openness and accountability in government. NDI has
monitored 340 elections and organized more than 150 international
election observer missions in 63 countries, including four pre-election
and election day assessments in Ukraine.