[Senate Hearing 113-476]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-476
A TRANSFORMATION:
AFGHANISTAN BEYOND 2014
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 30, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
TIM KAINE, Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Allen, Gen. John, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), distinguished
fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.................. 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Blanc, Jarrett, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC............. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 45
Campbell, Kathleen, Acting Deputy Assistant to the Administrator,
Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for
International Developement, Washington, DC..................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 47
Kaine, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement... 1
Nazary, Parnian, advocacy manager, Women for Afghan Women,
Washington, DC................................................. 30
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Sumar, Fatema, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and
Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 45
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Tom Udall.................................................. 51
(iii)
A TRANSFORMATION:
AFGHANISTAN BEYOND 2014
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tim Kaine
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kaine, Cardin, Risch, Johnson, and
McCain.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM KAINE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Kaine. I want to call the meeting of the
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian
Affairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to
order.
This is an important hearing that we are having today.
There will be other members coming and going, as is the norm
here in the Senate, and we are very excited to have witnesses
here today with us.
I am starting promptly because we have a vote at noon.
We have two very distinguished panels. I want to make sure
that we hear from all the witnesses and have an opportunity to
engage in dialogue. And so I welcome you all and all members of
the public who are here for this important hearing on
Afghanistan beyond 2014.
At the turn of the century 2000, few in Afghanistan could
have imagined a country where millions of girls were attending
school, where Afghan youth enjoyed cell phone access and 75 TV
channels at their disposal, where there is a multiethnic
Parliament with 70 female Members, actually a higher percentage
of women representation than in the United States Congress. Few
would have imagined that Afghanistan, whose life expectancy
would have grown by more than one-third in a decade, nor could
have anyone imagined national elections after three decades of
war.
But we have this hearing today recently following April 5,
2014, the beginning of a momentous transition for the people of
Afghanistan, the first democratic transfer of power in the
history, in the proud history, of that country. We were
witnessing a campaign of hope and resilience during that
Presidential campaign with high voter turnout, nearly 70
percent. We saw long lines of Afghan voters who wanted to send
a powerful message to the Taliban who tried but failed to
intimidate them through violence and fear. The vote was the
evidence of a strong democratic demand among the Afghan
population and the grit and determination of the people.
The election trends are positive. There will be a runoff
election. We do not have a favorite in the election, but we
rejoice in the turnout and that democratic demand evidenced by
high turnout.
There were reports of fraud, although less than in past
elections. There was violence, certainly efforts to intimidate,
though better than in earlier instances. The challenges are
significant both in the completion of this campaign and
certainly beyond.
But the elections are an Afghan moment. They also should
serve to remind us and the American public of how far
Afghanistan has come in the last 13 years.
We hold this hearing today to talk about that. We are not
going to gloss over challenges. We will talk about challenges,
but we believe this political transition provides a significant
opportunity to shift and talk now about the future of the
country.
Americans have to know what has been achieved and how an
enduring partnership with the Afghan people can ensure that the
next decade is as transformative as the last. That is the
reason that I wanted to hold this hearing today.
The American people should also always, always take time to
be proud of the servicemembers who served in Afghanistan and
continue to serve and to our diplomats also and to all from our
country who were all ``small A'' ambassadors sacrificing so
much to help the Afghan people build a better future.
We saw a horrendous attack last week in Afghanistan that
killed three American physicians, and that is a grim reminder
of the challenges that remain and the sacrifices that have
occurred thus far.
I visited Afghanistan twice, once as Governor to visit my
Virginia Guard proudly serving in Afghanistan and once last
year with five other Senators to explore the situation as we
approached 2014. I have been privileged to meet our troops in
the field, in Kabul, and elsewhere and to meet our wonderful
State Department, USAID, and other Americans who have helped
bring about some significant progress since 2001.
We often debate here in the Senate--and we should--about
troop levels in the bilateral security agreement that is no
doubt important. We have to support, train, and advise a
mission beyond 2014, as do many Afghan political leaders. But
today our focus is on other aspects of Afghanistan's
transformation. The U.S. Government, the private sector
economic development, the NGOs working together in the future
to improve the lives of Afghans.
Just a couple of examples. The State Department is working
to support the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline
project, and we want to get details about what can be done to
facilitate the success of that endeavor.
USAID's Better Than Cash program is working to build an
electronic banking system for Afghan citizens.
Farmers have and they need still to have even speedier
access to markets for licit agricultural products.
School enrollment for girls is at an unprecedented level.
We do not want that to go backward. We want it to go forward.
Life expectancy has increased by two decades. That is a
statistic that continually makes me kind of step back and gasp
because this is not actuarial math. This is seat-of-the-pants
math. But if you basically take a country of 30 million people
and you increase life expectancy by 20 years, by my calculation
that is 600 million years of additional human life. That is
pretty significant. It took the United States about 50 years to
make that same move from 1900 until just after World War II.
That was an achievement of the last decade in Afghanistan.
Here are some issues that I hope our witnesses will discuss
today, and from reading their testimony, I am confident they
will. The challenge of youth. The median age in Afghanistan is
18 and the resilience of the democracy rests pretty
significantly on the government's ability to engage and then
meet in a patient, realistic way the aspirations of Afghan
young people.
The Afghan economy and issues along the New Silk Road. I
want to thank the Department for making this a priority.
Greater economic integration is essential to Afghanistan's
future and the neighbors'. And the New Silk Road can be a
positive vision for the region's future rooted in the free
exchange of goods, people, and ideas.
We are going to have powerful testimony about this today of
the empowerment of women. We have to work to ensure that the
success and the journey of Afghan women thus far is
irreversible and continues.
And lessons learned. What are lessons learned from the
experience that we have had in the first 11 or 12 years about
things that we have not done well or that others have not done
well, NGOs or others, and how can we apply those lessons to
improve as we go forward.
The country is on a transformative journey and the people
know what is at stake. In January, Colonel Jamila Bayaz, a 50-
year-old mother of five, became the first woman to be appointed
police chief in Afghanistan. At her promotion ceremony, she
said she would not have achieved her position had it not been
for the efforts of the United States and the international
community.
I do understand--and I think my colleagues hear this as
well--a sentiment of exhaustion at home over the long, long, 13
years of war, the longest wars in the history of the United
States. And that leads to some exhaustion, and it can lead to a
temptation to focus on other issues rather than to continue to
be supportive. But we have invested too much of ourselves as a
nation to walk away from Afghanistan.
And today we have great witnesses who can share with us
things that we can appropriately do, given all the budgetary
and other limits we face, things that we can appropriately do
that will continue to advance the quality of life in
Afghanistan and a strong partnership between our country and
the Afghan people.
I was going to ask Senator Risch to do opening comments. I
think what I will do is let Senator Risch deliver comments when
he appears as the ranking member on this subcommittee. What I
will do now with the approval of my colleagues is introduce the
first panel and ask you to make opening statements, and then we
will move into questions and answers. Again, we are going to
try to have both panels up and have a good dialogue by noon so
that we can vote at that time.
On the first panel, we have the following.
Jarrett Blanc is Deputy Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has served in this role and as the
Special Advisor to the Special Representative since 2009. He
has been significantly engaged during this transformative
period and we look forward to hearing Mr. Blanc's testimony.
Fatema Sumar is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South
and Central Asia. She joined the State Department in August
2013. Prior to that, she was working on this committee staffing
this corner of the world. So she sat in the chairs behind us
and this is her first effort to sit and be grilled by committee
members. So I encourage my committee members to be tough since
this is her first effort in the witness chair. [Laughter.]
But we are very, very glad to have her back to talk about
this from the State Department's perspective.
And finally, Kathleen Campbell is the Acting Deputy
Assistant to the Administrator for USAID's Office of
Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs. She came from Save the
Children where she was associate director of Development Aid
Policy and Advocacy.
We are glad to have you, and if you would deliver opening
statements in the order I introduced you and then we will move
quickly into a good dialogue. Thanks for being here today.
STATEMENT OF JARRETT BLANC, DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Blanc. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the committee, and thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss the future of Afghanistan beyond
2014.
In particular, I would like to thank the members of this
committee for your continued support for this mission. The
American people have been generous, steadfast, and brave in
supporting Afghanistan.
And I would join the chairman in calling attention to the
memories of the three American citizens killed last week at the
Cure International Hospital in Kabul, not only them, but to the
dedication of thousands of American women and men who have
served in our Armed Forces and our diplomatic outposts and our
assistance programs in Afghanistan.
The investments we have made in Afghanistan have paid
important and underreported dividends. We began this mission in
late 2001 to prevent Afghanistan from again being used to
launch attacks against us. As part of an international
coalition of more than 50 nations, we have helped make the
world more secure.
Our mission now is to make these gains sustainable by
handing over and supporting increasingly capable Afghan
institutions. As we approach the end of the ISAF mission and
the beginnings of the political transition to a new Afghan
Government, I would like to describe evidence that Afghan
institutions are precisely that, increasingly capable and
sustainable, and to outline the challenges that these
institutions now face and the ways in which we and our partners
can and intend to continue to help them overcome those
challenges.
Afghan confidence and ours begins with the performance of
the Afghan National Security Forces, the most highly regarded
institution in the country. The Afghan National Security Force
has progressed from supporting ISAF operations to conducting
them jointly to leading complex operations with ISAF support,
and finally in June of last year, to taking the lead for
security throughout the country. Since June of last year, they
have held their own against the insurgents and have
successfully planned and carried out a highly complex effort to
protect polls and voters on election day, thwarting Taliban
efforts to disrupt the first round of the elections.
The electoral process to date is further reason for
measured confidence in Afghanistan's future. For the first time
in their history, on April 5 Afghans led every component of the
electoral process. The security forces provided the security.
The electoral bodies planned and administered the process,
meeting nearly every deadline throughout the calendar, and
Afghan media provided platforms for reasoned debate about
policy and generally avoided inflammatory rhetoric. Afghan
political elites formed multiethnic tickets and campaigned all
across the country. And most importantly, enthusiasm for the
democratic process and hope for their future brought millions
of Afghans to the polls despite bad weather and, of course,
Taliban threats.
Similarly, Afghan electoral bodies have responded
appropriately to allegations of fraud.
Afghan youth, civil society groups, and women all played
critical roles in the elections.
The involvement of Afghan women in the elections, in
particular, is a sign of a shift in attitude toward women
nationwide. And as Secretary Kerry said in his speech at
Georgetown last year, if I had to walk blind into a district in
Afghanistan and could ask only one question to determine how
secure it was and how much progress it was making, I would ask
what proportion of girls here are able to go to school. There
is no question investing in Afghan women is the surest way to
guarantee that Afghanistan will sustain the gains of the last
decade and never again be a safe haven for international
terrorists.
Sustaining progress through 2014 depends on continued
growth of Afghanistan's governance and security institutions
and continued support by the international community for a
sovereign, stable, unified and democratic Afghanistan. Our
assistance programs through the period of transition will
remain focused on building the capacity of Afghan institutions
to sustain the gains of the last decade, including continued
support for Afghan women.
Let me single out three factors in particular that can
contribute to sustaining progress in Afghanistan. The first, of
course, already mentioned is the bilateral security agreement
which could allow for a limited post-2014 mission focused on
training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces and
going after the remnants of core al-Qaeda.
Second, the Government of Afghanistan needs to enact
policies that will empower the private sector to grow the
Afghan economy to make up for decreases in international
assistance and to provide jobs for the large population of
youth, increase government revenues to overcome the current
fiscal gap between revenues and expenditures.
Regional integration, the third factor, will also improve
Afghanistan's economic process. And in particular, I would call
attention to the Istanbul Process, an Afghan-launched and led
mechanism from November 2011 which represents a step forward in
terms of dialogue and cooperation between Afghanistan and its
neighbors.
The United States has been in Afghanistan for 13 years. We
have invested billions of dollars and nearly 2,200 of our
service men and women have sacrificed their lives so that
extremists who attacked us on September 11 will not again
threaten American territory, our citizens, or our allies from
Afghan soil. Under President Obama, United States strategy and
that of our international partners has aimed at strengthening
Afghan institutions so that the Afghan Government and people
can provide for their own security, grow their own economy, and
manage their own internal and external affairs. The common
element in all three of these transitions, security, economic,
and political, has been the gradual and responsible transfer of
leadership to Afghan hands. That remains our approach and it is
working.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blanc follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jarrett Blanc
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
future of Afghanistan beyond 2014 along with my colleagues, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Fatema Sumar
and USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator Kathleen Campbell.
Allow me to begin by thanking the members of the subcommittee for
your continued support for our mission. The American people have been
generous, steadfast, and brave in supporting Afghanistan. We continue
to make great sacrifices, and I would particularly like to honor the
memories of the three American citizens killed last week at Cure
International Hospital in Kabul along with the dedication of thousands
of American men and women who have served in our Armed Forces, our
diplomatic outposts, and our assistance programs in Afghanistan.
The investments we have made in Afghanistan have paid important and
underreported dividends. We began this mission in late 2001 to prevent
Afghanistan from again being used to launch attacks against us. As part
of an international coalition of more than 50 nations, we have helped
make the world more secure since 2001, and as the major funders of an
international civilian assistance effort, we have enabled the Afghans
to rebuild their own capacity to provide security, educations, and jobs
to their own people and become a reliable partner in efforts to prevent
extremists from using their land to launch violence against our people
and our allies.
Our mission now is to make these gains sustainable by handing over
to and supporting increasingly capable Afghan institutions. As we
approach the end of the ISAF mission and the beginnings of the
political transition to a new Afghan Government, I would like to
describe evidence that Afghan institutions are precisely that--
increasingly capable and sustainable--and to outline the challenges
that those institutions now face and the ways in which we and our
partners can help them to overcome those challenges.
Afghan confidence--and ours--begins with the performance of the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the most highly regarded
institution in Afghanistan. As the international community and the
Afghan Government together envisioned at the 2010 NATO conference in
Lisbon, the ANSF has progressed from supporting ISAF operations to
conducting them jointly to leading complex operations with ISAF support
to taking over the lead for security throughout the country, which
formally took place nearly a year ago in June 2013. Since then they
have held their own against the insurgents, secured major events like
last fall's Loya Jirga, and successfully planned and carried out a
highly complex effort to protect polls and voters on Election Day,
thwarting Taliban attempts to disrupt the first round of the elections.
The electoral process to date is further reason for measured
confidence in Afghanistan's future. For the first time in their history
on April 5, Afghans led every component of the electoral process.
Afghan forces provided the security. Afghan electoral bodies planned
and administered it, meeting nearly every deadline from candidate
registration through release of the preliminary vote tallies. Afghan
media provided platforms for reasoned debates about policy and
generally avoided inflammatory rhetoric. Afghan civil society
organizations and candidate agents monitored the polling centers.
Afghan political elites formed multiethnic tickets and campaigned all
across the country. Afghan institutions were not flawless but they were
responsive, demonstrating significantly increased capacity from the
2004 and 2009 elections. For example, on Election Day, as some polling
centers reported running low on ballots, the Independent Election
Commission (IEC) tapped prepositioned supplies of contingency ballots
and kept the public informed with regular press conferences throughout
the day. Most importantly, enthusiasm for the democratic process and
hope for their future brought millions of Afghans out to vote despite
bad weather and Taliban threats.
Similarly, Afghan electoral bodies have responded appropriately to
allegations of fraud. In accordance with electoral laws passed last
year, the IEC has quarantined the ballots from centers where it
believes further investigation is warranted, the Independent Electoral
Complaints Commission (ECC) is adjudicating complaints of fraud, and
candidates continue to refer allegations of irregularities to the
appropriate authorities. If, as now seems highly likely, a second round
is necessary, the competence, transparency, and impartiality of these
bodies will be critical in ensuring that the Afghan people broadly
accept President Karzai's successor as legitimate and credible.
Afghan youth, civil society groups and women all played critical
roles in the elections. Youth were active in all the major Presidential
campaigns, reportedly turned out in large numbers to vote, and ran as
candidates for many provincial council seats against older incumbents.
Afghan civil society groups took responsibility for monitoring the
elections, sending 12,000 trained observers to polling centers
throughout the country, making sure procedures were followed and filing
complaints and alerting news media when they were not. Afghan women
also ran for provincial council seats (nationwide, 11 percent of the
candidates were women), served as female searchers at polling stations,
and also voted in large numbers, especially in urban areas. Nearly 2.5
million Afghan women cast votes, 36 percent of the total. The Afghan
Women's Network issued a statement thanking the national security
forces for ``providing full support to all women during the election
and facilitating a secure environment for people to go vote.''
The involvement of Afghan women in the elections is visible sign of
a shift in attitudes toward women nationwide. A recent Democracy
International poll found that 92 percent of Afghans believe that women
have the right to participate in elections; similarly, the Asia
Foundation found that 83 percent of their respondents in Afghanistan
said that women should have the same educational opportunities as men.
It would be naive to underestimate the considerable social, economic,
and legal challenges that still confront Afghan girls and women. These
changes have not yet halted violence against women or opened enough
schools to girls in every province and it will take many years for them
to do so. Still, the elections and the shift in perceptions provide a
basis for hope. As Secretary Kerry said in his speech at Georgetown
last year: ``If I had to walk blind into a district in Afghanistan and
I could only ask one question to determine how secure it was and how
much progress it was making, I would ask, `What proportion of the girls
here are able to go to school?' '' There's no question in my mind that
investing in Afghan women is the surest way to guarantee that
Afghanistan will sustain the gains of the last decade and never again
become a safe haven for international terrorists.''
Sustaining progress in Afghanistan after 2014 through the
Transformation Decade depends on the continued growth of Afghanistan's
governance and security institutions and continued support by the
international community for a sovereign, stable, unified, and
democratic Afghanistan. This partnership must be based on the
principles of mutual respect and mutual accountability and should
recognize the increasing responsibility of the sovereign Afghan state
and a calibrated reduction of financial and other assistance from the
international community. Stability requires Afghan progress on security
and political goals which must be matched by effective governance, the
advancement of rule of law, human rights, and economic reform. Our
assistance programs through this period of transition will remain
focused on building the capacity of Afghan institutions to sustain the
gains of the last decade, including continued support for Afghan women.
Let me single out three factors in particular that can contribute
to sustaining progress in Afghanistan in the next decade. The first is
the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). The BSA could allow a limited,
post-2014 mission focused on training, advising, and assisting Afghan
forces and going after the remnants of core al-Qaeda. Such a mission
would further strengthen the ANSF in its fight against the Taliban and
it would allow us to continue to deny terrorists opportunities to plan
attacks against the United States, our interests, and our allies.
President Obama has left open the possibility of concluding the BSA
later this year with Karzai's successor. Both frontrunners have said
publicly that they would sign it soon upon taking office.
Second, the Government of Afghanistan needs to enact policies that
will empower the private sector to grow the Afghan economy to make up
for decreases in international assistance, provide jobs for its large
population of youth, and increase government revenues to overcome the
current fiscal gap between revenues and expenditures. The economic
challenge is illustrated by flat government revenues over the last 2
years, which reflect a number of factors, including a general slowdown
in the economy and hesitation from potential investors (partly a
response to uncertainty over the elections and the BSA). The Afghans
have taken some steps in recent months to improve revenue collection
though there is much work to be done. Corruption remains a fundamental
challenge in Afghanistan to governance as well as economic growth--
something Afghans themselves recognize. Indeed, both frontrunners have
advanced anticorruption agendas during the campaign and both have
repeatedly spoken of the need to improve Afghanistan's infrastructure,
establish the appropriate legal and security environment to attract
foreign investment, and expand educational and technical training
opportunities for Afghan youth.
Regional integration, the third factor, will also improve
Afghanistan's economic prospects. My colleague, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Fatema Sumar, will discuss this topic in detail later in this
briefing. However, let me provide some political context for it. The
region's stability is inseparable from Afghanistan's stability and
prosperity. The Istanbul Process, an Afghan-led mechanism launched in
November 2011, represents a step forward in terms of dialogue and
cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors. This emerging
consensus is an important development in terms of the political and
security trajectory of Afghanistan.
The United States has been in Afghanistan for 13 years, we have
invested billions of dollars, and nearly 2,200 of our service men and
women have sacrificed their lives so that the extremists who attacked
us on September 11 can never again threaten American territory, our
citizens, or our allies from Afghan soil. Under President Obama, U.S.
strategy and that of our international partners (as established in
conferences in Bonn, Chicago, and Tokyo) has aimed at strengthening
Afghan institutions so that the Afghan Government and people can
provide for their own security, grow their own economy, and manage
their own internal and external affairs. The common element in all
three of these transitions--security, economic, and political--has been
the gradual and responsible transfer of leadership to Afghan hands.
That remains our approach and it is working.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Blanc.
Ms. Sumar.
STATEMENT OF FATEMA SUMAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU
OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Sumar. Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, it is a
particular honor for me to be here today given my work on the
committee from 2009 to 2013. So thank you for holding this
timely hearing and inviting me to testify.
I will summarize my remarks but ask that my written
testimony be submitted into the official record.
Senator Kaine. Without objection.
Ms. Sumar. I will focus today on our efforts to promote
regional economic connectivity between Central and South Asia
through an initiative that we call the New Silk Road. As you
know, Afghanistan has made tremendous strides over the past 12
years. As a result of that progress, the region now has an
opportunity to establish a new set of economic, security, and
political relationships. This, in turn, will also support
sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan.
And I want to underscore that none of this would be made
possible without the significant investments made possible in
Afghanistan, thanks to the support from the U.S. Congress.
There is no doubt that regional connectivity between
Central and South Asia is difficult. This will take many years.
It is the least economically integrated region in the world and
geopolitical tensions abound. Barriers to trade remain high and
many economic reforms are needed. Progress ultimately will
depend on the countries themselves deciding that it is in their
interests to work together to adopt global best practices.
But despite these many challenges, it is telling that
Afghanistan and its neighbors are championing certain aspects
of this initiative. They are creating new north-south
connections to complement vibrant east-west connections across
Eurasia, including those pursued by Russia and China. By
supporting their ability to make their own economic choices, we
underscore longstanding U.S. support for the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states in this
region.
Under the leadership of Secretary Kerry, our New Silk Road
initiative focuses on four key areas. The first is creating a
regional energy market, bringing surplus energy from Central
Asia to energy-dependent South Asia. The second is improving
trade and transport routes across the region. The third is
streamlining customs and border procedures to reduce the costs
of doing business. And the fourth is connecting people and
businesses across the region to connect new regional markets.
By no means is the United States doing all of this alone.
In fact, we work in direct partnership with countries in the
region, international financial institutions, aid agencies, and
others. And our programs complement and support regional
priorities such as the Istanbul Process.
Let me turn briefly to the first area, energy, where no
sector represents a greater win-win across the region. With a
population of more than 1.6 billion people, South Asia's demand
for energy is growing. At the same time, Central Asia is a
repository of vast energy resources, including oil, gas, and
hydropower.
To help create a regional energy market, the United States
is supporting multiple projects, including CASA-1000, TUTAP,
and TAPI. The World Bank's CASA-1000 project is an electricity
transmission line that will enable Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to
supply 1,300 megawatts of surplus summer hydropower to
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Asian Development Bank's TUTAP
electricity project will facilitate the export of electricity
from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to Afghanistan
and eventually Pakistan.
These projects have the power to be transformational. For
the first time, Central Asia's vast energy resources will be
supplied to an energy-dependent South Asia. And the fact that
some of this is clean energy is even more compelling.
The United States also supports the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline, which you
mentioned Senator Kaine, known as TAPI. If ultimately brought
to fruition, this project would be a game changer for the
Indian subcontinent.
On the second area, trade and transport, we are focused on
improving the legal and regulatory frameworks and removing
impediments to trade and investments. Bringing states into
multilateral trade institutions and getting neighbors to work
together are critical steps for cooperation.
On the third area, customs and borders, vibrant markets
require functioning transit-trade corridors. We are working
with regional partners to reduce border wait times, increase
cooperation at key checkpoints and crossings, and prevent the
transit of illegal and dangerous material. Our goal is to
support open but secure borders throughout the region.
Already trade is picking up as a result. In the last 5
years alone, the volume of intraregional trade in Central Asia
has increased by 49 percent. The average cost of crossing
borders dropped 15 percent in the last 3 years. And thanks to
United States technical assistance, trade is now moving across
Afghan borders faster, down from 8 days in 2009 to 3\1/2\ hours
in 2013.
But ultimately, regional connectivity is about our fourth
area, connecting people and businesses. We have funded the
studies of hundreds of Central Asian and Afghan students across
Central Asia in an effort to build the next generation of
leaders, including women. Our women's symposiums in Central and
South Asia have brought together women entrepreneurs, private
sector partners, and government officials to advance
opportunities for women. And we are making real progress
connecting our businesses through regional trade forums such as
the one we held in Islamabad 2 weeks ago and others in
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Bangladesh. With our support, for
instance, over 250 Kazakhstani, Uzbekistani, and Afghan
businesses gathered in Afghanistan in February where they
signed over $8 million in letters of intent for commercial
sales.
In conclusion, let me reiterate that while we will continue
to face challenges on connecting this region, our New Silk Road
initiative is a powerful vision for how Central and South Asia
can fully participate in a 21st century global economy and
benefit from gains from trade, but also honors the considerable
investments Americans have made for over a decade in
Afghanistan and the broader region by supporting security and
stability for a more prosperous region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sumar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fatema Z. Sumar
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, thank you for inviting me to
testify today. It is a particular honor for me to appear before this
committee, given my previous experience working on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. And it is a privilege to speak alongside my
colleagues, Jarrett Blanc and Kathleen Campbell, from the State
Department and USAID.
Mr. Chairman, the hearing you called today is particularly timely
given the historic transition currently underway in Afghanistan, which
my colleagues will speak to in greater detail. I will focus my
testimony on the broader region to discuss how we are working to
promote regional economic connectivity between Central and South Asia
to promote greater regional stability and prosperity.
Afghanistan has made tremendous strides over the past 12 years. As
a result of that progress, the region has the opportunity to establish
a new set of economic, security, and political relationships. This in
turn will also support sustainable security and stability in
Afghanistan. None of this work would be possible except for the
foundation that has been laid by our investments in Afghanistan, thanks
to the strong support from Congress. These investments have created the
potential for a fundamental improvement in peace and security if we can
build on them.
As part of our efforts, the U.S. Government is promoting regional
economic connectivity through our New Silk Road initiative. We know
that peace and stability are much more likely to be sustained when
countries in the region are tied together in trade, when their
economies and people share important links.
Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that regional connectivity between
Central and South Asia is difficult and will take many years. This is
the least economically integrated region in the world, and geopolitical
tensions abound. Barriers to trade remain high, and many economic
reforms are needed to realize the full potential of regional
cooperation. The international community and private sector can support
investments in infrastructure and economic reforms, but progress
ultimately will depend on countries themselves deciding it is in their
interests to work together and adopting global best practices.
Despite the many real challenges, it is telling that Afghanistan
and its neighbors are embracing certain aspects of this initiative,
creating new North-South transit and trade routes to complement vibrant
East-West connections across Eurasia, including those pursued by China
and Russia. Countries in the region know they have more to gain
economically by working together than by being isolated. By supporting
their ability to make their own economic choices and pursue their own
interests, we underline longstanding U.S. support for the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states in the region.
Under the leadership of Secretary Kerry, our New Silk Road
initiative focuses on four areas to link Central Asia with South Asia
through Afghanistan by:
(1) Creating a regional energy market bringing surplus energy
from Central Asia to energy-dependent South Asia;
(2) Improving trade and transport routes across the region;
(3) Streamlining customs and border procedures to reduce the
costs of doing business; and
(4) Connecting businesses and people across new regional
markets.
By no means is the United States doing all of this alone. In fact,
we work in partnership with countries in the region, international
financial institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank, aid agencies, and others. And our programs support and complement
regional priorities set forth by the Istanbul Process, the Regional
Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA), and the Central
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC).
energy
Perhaps no sector represents a ``win-win'' for Central and South
Asia more than energy. With a population of more than 1.6 billion
people, South Asia's economies are growing rapidly, and in turn South
Asia's demand for inexpensive, efficient, and reliable energy is
growing. At the same time, Central Asia is a repository of vast energy
resources--including oil, gas, and hydropower.
To help create a regional energy market, the United States is
supporting the World Bank's CASA-1000 electricity transmission project.
When completed, CASA-1000 will enable Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to
supply 1,300 megawatts of surplus summer hydropower to Afghanistan and
Pakistan. CASA has the potential to be transformational. For the first
time, Central Asia's vast energy resources will be supplied to an
energy-starved South Asia. And the fact that it is clean energy is even
more compelling.
We have seen major advances on CASA in the past months. The four
CASA countries have made progress in their negotiations to finalize a
Power Purchasing Agreement. The World Bank, CASA's lead donor, recently
approved its $526 million contribution to CASA. And the U.S. Government
has agreed to provide $15 million in project financing for CASA,
subject to continued appropriations from Congress. Our contribution
should encourage other donors to come forward and fill CASA's remaining
funding gap.
We are also working closely with the Asian Development Bank to
support its TUTAP electricity project which brings exports of
electricity from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to
Afghanistan and eventually Pakistan. By 2018, exports from the Central
Asian countries to Afghanistan will reach a capacity of 900 to 1,100
megawatts, with year-round supply from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
balancing summer supplies from Tajikistan.
The United States also supports the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline--known as TAPI. If ultimately
brought to fruition, this project would be a game changer for the
Indian subcontinent. We have a long way to go, and much is dependent on
the will and flexibility of the Government of Turkmenistan in taking
the necessary steps forward to bring TAPI to the next stage.
trade and transport
Improving the legal and regulatory framework, removing impediments
to trade and investment, combating corruption and breaking down
barriers to trade are necessary preconditions for trade and investment
connectivity in the region. Bringing states into multilateral trade
institutions and getting neighbors to work together to break down
institutional and bureaucratic barriers to trade are critical steps for
regional economic cooperation. Cooperation on customs and transit is
further advanced by new transit-trade agreements between Afghanistan
and its neighbors, under discussion or early in the implementation
stage.
This is why the U.S. Government is assisting Afghanistan and
Kazakhstan in their efforts to accede to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and helping WTO members Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan fully realize
the benefits of accession. We are also working to operationalize the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) and to encourage
full implementation of the Cross-Border Transport Agreement between
Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. These agreements hold the
potential to dramatically accelerate regional trade.
The United States also works on improving the trade and investment
climate throughout the region through our Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks with Central Asian states,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Clearly, one of the biggest obstacles to connecting Central Asia to
the rapidly growing markets of South Asia is the barriers between India
and Pakistan. Trade normalization between these historic rivals would
be a game-changer, signaling to the region and the world South Asia is
really open for business. We have been encouraged by positive signs
from Islamabad and New Delhi that things may be moving in the right
direction, and we are hopeful we will see movement following India's
election.
customs and borders
Vibrant markets require functioning transit-trade corridors.
Regional economic cooperation with Afghanistan requires a commitment by
governments in the region to allow trade to flow across open but secure
borders and reduce the costs and time of doing business at the borders.
To support these goals, the United States is working with
governments and donor partners to streamline customs procedures and
increase cross-border information-sharing throughout the region. The
United States supports the ongoing efforts of the European Union's
Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) and Border Management in
Afghanistan (BOMNAF) programs, the Central Asia Border Security
Initiative (CABSI), the World Customs Organization, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the U.N. Office of
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to improve information-sharing and law
enforcement cooperation.
Already, trade is picking up as a result. In the last 5 years, the
volume of intraregional trade in Central Asia has increased by 49
percent. The costs of doing business are slowly coming down, with the
average cost of crossing borders dropping 15 percent in the last 3
years. And thanks to U.S. technical assistance, customs procedures have
been streamlined at seven Afghan border crossing points, resulting in
expedited trade with average release time down from 8 days in 2009 to
3\1/2\ hours in 2013, saving $38 million annually.
businesses and people
Ultimately, regional economic connectivity is more than
infrastructure, border crossings, and the movement of goods and
services. At its heart is the importance of connecting people and
businesses across historical, cultural, ethnic, and national borders.
The sharing of ideas and expansion of economic markets also creates
opportunities for youth and women and strengthens regional stability
and prosperity.
This is why the United States has funded the studies of hundreds of
Central Asian and Afghan undergraduate and graduate students across
Central Asia in an effort to build the next generation of leaders. The
U.S.-organized Central Asia-Afghanistan Women's Economic Symposium and
South Asia Women's Entrepreneurship Symposium have brought together
women entrepreneurs, private sector partners, and government officials
to address shared obstacles and advance opportunities for women
entrepreneurs.
With U.S. support, over 250 Afghan, Kazakhstani, and Uzbekistani
business people gathered in Afghanistan, signing over $8 million in
letters of intent for commercial sales. Just 2 weeks ago, Central
Asian, Afghan, and Pakistani businesses signed 16 Memorandums of
Understanding at the Central Asian Business Opportunities Conference in
Islamabad. Similar U.S.-sponsored events in Kazakhstan, Afghanistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Bangladesh have successfully brought together hundreds
of South and Central Asian businesses and entrepreneurs, including
women, generating millions in trade and fostering important
relationships across political, religious, and ethnic lines. We will
continue to support programs that connect businesses and people across
the region, creating new markets for goods and opportunities for trade
and innovation.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, regional economic connectivity between Central and
South Asia is not easy. We will continue to face challenges and
setbacks, even as we achieve progress. But the New Silk Road initiative
provides the region with a powerful vision for how it can fully
participate in a 21st century global economy and benefit from the gains
from trade. It also honors the considerable investments Americans have
made for over a decade in Afghanistan and the broader region by
supporting security and stability for a more prosperous region.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Ms. Sumar.
Ms. Campbell.
STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN CAMPBELL, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Campbell. Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on the role of USAID in Afghanistan beyond 2014.
Our work in Afghanistan is emblematic of our agency's overall
mission: USAID partners to end extreme poverty and promote
resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security
and prosperity. USAID's role in Afghanistan is to promote a
stable, inclusive, and increasingly prosperous country.
This is a critical moment in Afghanistan's history, and
USAID is working with the Afghan people and our international
partners to do all we can to ensure this transition goes as
smoothly as possible and that Afghanistan emerges as a stable
country on a path toward self-sufficiency.
We understand fully that the fiscal reality our Nation
faces at home means that resources available for Afghanistan
will decline over time. Weaning Afghanistan from extraordinary
levels of assistance is necessary for us and essential for
them. To achieve this without triggering a crisis, we must
remain a strong partner and continue to provide assistance in
areas critical to Afghan development and stability.
I first visited Afghanistan in early 2002 and worked there
until 2005. So I know from personal experience that the
progress Afghans have made is remarkable but still fragile.
USAID's development assistance, which represents
approximately 3 percent of the total military and civilian
financial cost of the war in Afghanistan, has helped Afghans
achieve gains ranging from a tenfold increase in the number of
children enrolled in school to a 20-year increase in life
expectancy, as well as a fivefold increase in per capita GDP.
The Afghan media is robust. Women have campaigned prominently
and turned out in record numbers in this recent election.
Parliament increasingly exercises its oversight authority.
These are extraordinary gains for a country that in 2002 had
virtually no access to reliable electricity, roads, or modern
communications and disadvantaged almost half of its population,
its women and girls, by prohibiting them from contributing to
Afghan society and the economy.
USAID's strategy going forward calls for making durable the
significant achievements in health, education, and women,
focusing on economic growth and fiscal sustainability to
mitigate the economic impact of the troop withdrawal, and the
declining levels of donor assistance, and supporting legitimate
and effective Afghan governance and, in turn, promoting
stability. USAID has also adjusted its implementation model to
meet the challenges of transition.
While significant progress has been made to date, there is
still much to be done to strengthen the critical role that
women, youth, and civil society play in Afghanistan's future.
USAID is supporting women including through the launch of
USAID's largest gender program which will empower women to
participate fully in the economic, political, and civil society
sectors.
In recognition of the fact that youth are integral to the
future stability of Afghanistan, USAID is supporting the
provision of market-driven job skills, business training,
access to credit, business development support, and job
placement services.
USAID's assistance also supports the development of a
strong and active civil society to enhance the political
process, solve community problems, and advocate for good
governance. With USAID's support, civil society organizations
have played a critical role in the 2014 election to date.
Direct assistance to the Afghan Government is used to build
the Afghan Government's ability to sustain these investments
and gains that have been made and to reduce its dependence on
donors. All direct assistance to the Afghan Government is
subject to strict safeguards and oversight.
To ensure strong oversight of United States assistance
funds, USAID developed the Accountable Assistance for
Afghanistan, or A3 initiative, which, combined with standard
USAID oversight measures, prevents funds from being diverted
from their development purpose by malign actors. We do not
assume that there is any level of acceptable waste, fraud, or
abuse in our programs.
In conclusion, to secure our overall national security
objectives, USAID remains committed to ensuring that the
remarkable progress made in Afghanistan is sustained and made
durable. The risks and the sacrifices that the people of the
United States have made in Afghanistan and the determination of
the Afghan people, particularly women, demand no less.
I look forward to answering any questions you have. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathleen Campbell
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify
before you today to discuss the role of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) in support of U.S. civilian
development efforts in Afghanistan looking at 2014 and beyond. Our work
in Afghanistan is emblematic of our agency's overall mission: USAID
partners to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic
societies while advancing our security and prosperity. USAID's role in
Afghanistan is to promote a stable, inclusive, and increasingly
prosperous country. During the past decade, Afghanistan has made
remarkable development gains across multiple sectors, thanks to the
whole-of-government efforts of the United States, along with our
international partners, the Afghan Government and the Afghan people. It
is an honor to appear before you today with Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Fatema Sumar, and Deputy
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Jarrett Blanc.
2014 is a pivotal year for Afghanistan as the country navigates a
series of three transitions: the first democratic transfer of power in
Afghanistan's history; the completion of the security transition,
including the withdrawal of a majority of international troops; and the
continuing effort to reduce Afghanistan's reliance on international aid
by facilitating private sector-led economic growth. This is a critical
moment in Afghanistan's history, and USAID is working with the Afghan
people and our international partners to do all we can to ensure these
transitions go as smoothly as possible, and that Afghanistan emerges as
a stable country on a path toward self-sufficiency.
We understand fully that the fiscal reality our Nation faces at
home means that resources available for Afghanistan will decline over
time. Weaning Afghanistan from extraordinary levels of assistance is
necessary for us, and essential for them. To achieve this without
triggering a crisis, we must remain a strong partner and continue to
provide assistance in areas critical to Afghan development and
stability. To do this with fewer resources, we are making tough
decisions and prioritizing investments that have the greatest potential
for long-term sustainability. As USAID navigates through the 2014
transition period and beyond, we are committed to expending every
effort to safeguard taxpayer funds and ensure that the development
progress in Afghanistan is maintained and made durable.
Looking to 2015 and beyond, USAID will continue to pursue America's
goal of an inclusive, stable Afghanistan, and to support Afghanistan's
goals, as described in the Afghan National Priority Programs, the
bilateral Strategic Partnership Agreement and at the Tokyo Conference
in July 2012. These goals include increased Afghan ownership of their
development, reduced dependence on foreign aid, improved delivery of
services by the Afghan Government, and the promotion of democracy,
fundamental freedoms, and human rights. Afghanistan has made important
progress in key areas like establishing a sound electoral framework and
improving budget transparency. While much more progress is needed in
various areas, the political transition represented by the Presidential
election presents an opportunity for further reforms.
In support of these goals for Afghanistan, USAID's strategy going
forward calls for making durable the significant achievements in
health, education, and for women; focusing on economic growth and
fiscal sustainability to mitigate the economic impact of the troop
withdrawal and declining levels of civilian assistance; and supporting
legitimate and effective Afghan governance, and in turn promoting
stability.
I first visited Afghanistan in early 2002 and lived and worked
there until 2005 as head of the International Rescue Committee in
Afghanistan. In 2002 when I arrived, buildings were in ruin throughout
the city; wrecked planes littered the airport; there were no phones,
few shops, and three currencies; driving through the Shomali plain
outside Kabul, red stones edged the highway warning people away from
fields of land mines scattered amongst destroyed grape vines and
orchards. Afghanistan has made considerable progress over the ensuing
12 years. Afghan businesses are now exporting an increasing number of
agriculture commodities; Afghans have become active participants in
their government, making their voices heard in elections while
advocating for needed reforms; and they have experienced tremendous
gains in access and quality of health and education services.
I bring these perspectives to USAID's work today, and I know from
personal experience that the dramatic progress Afghans have made is
remarkable, yet still fragile. That is why USAID has been planning and
adjusting its programming for years in anticipation of the transitions
in 2014, to maximize sustainability and ensure oversight and
accountability of the resources the American people have provided in
support of Afghanistan.
usaid impact and results
USAID's development assistance, which represents approximately 3
percent of the total military and civilian financial cost of the war in
Afghanistan, has helped Afghans achieve gains ranging from a tenfold
increase in the number of children enrolled in school, to a 20-year
increase in life expectancy, as well as fivefold increase in per capita
GDP. These are extraordinary gains for a country that in 2002 had
virtually no access to reliable electricity, roads or modern
telecommunications, and disadvantaged almost half of its population--
women and girls--by prohibiting them from contributing fully to Afghan
society and the economy. Specific examples of how USAID has supported
meaningful gains in Afghanistan that have contributed to extraordinary
results are as follows:
Health: Life expectancy has increased from 42 years to over
62 years since 2002; the maternal mortality rate has declined
by 80 percent from 1,600 to 327 deaths per 100,000 births; and
child mortality decreased by 44 percent from 172 to 97 deaths
per 1,000 live births.
Education: In 2002, there were approximately 900,000 Afghan
children in school, and virtually none were girls. Today,
approximately 8 million children are registered to attend
school and more than one-third of them are girls.
Economic Growth: Afghan Government revenues have more than
doubled from 2002 to 2013. Revenue from customs has been the
fastest growing segment, increasing over 400 percent since
2006. The estimated Afghan GDP in 2011 was $23.6 billion, more
than six times higher than in 2002, representing a 9 percent
per year average increase. Afghanistan's overall ranking in the
2014 World Bank/IFC ``Doing Business'' Index improved from 170
to 164 (out of 189 countries).
Mobile Technology: in 2002, there were few fixed telephone
lines and making calls outside of Afghanistan required a
satellite phone. Today, the combined phone network covers 90
percent of the Afghan population. Eighty-five percent of women
have access to a mobile phone. The telecommunications sector is
Afghanistan's greatest source of foreign direct investment,
largest remitter of taxes to the government, and biggest licit
employer, providing jobs for 100,000 Afghans.
The Afghan people recognize the progress that has been made. For
the past 9 years, The Asia Foundation, with support from USAID, has
conducted a nationwide survey of Afghan attitudes and opinions,
tracking trends among the population. The results of the 2013 survey
show the impact these gains are making. Fifty-seven percent of all
Afghans said they believe their country is moving in the right
direction. This number has increased steadily since 2008, when it stood
at 38 percent. Not surprisingly, the vast majority--88 percent--said
they were better off economically than they were under the Taliban.
Five in six Afghans--men and women--believe that women should have an
education. Seventy-five percent believe it is acceptable to criticize
the government in public--a sign of an active democracy with an
independent media, which is the civilian institution in which Afghans
have the most confidence.
Afghanistan has also made significant gains in governance, though
much more is needed. Afghanistan enacted a constitution in 2004 that
enshrines democratic principles, women's rights, and freedom of
expression. The Afghan media is robust, diverse, and independent.
Afghanistan's Parliament is 25 percent female and women have campaigned
prominently and turned out in record numbers in this recent election.
The Parliament increasingly exercises its oversight authority over key
appointments and over the budget. More reforms are needed, but the
basic foundation of self-governance is strong.
usaid moving forward
USAID understands the challenges facing Afghanistan. In
anticipation of this transitional year, as well as 2015 and beyond,
USAID has regularly reviewed and adjusted its programs to ensure that
they advance the strategic objectives of the United States and are
achievable and sustainable. USAID's strategy in Afghanistan is
threefold:
Maintaining and making durable the gains made in health,
education, and for women;
Supporting continued economic growth and employment through
a focus on the agriculture sector and private sector
development, operations and maintenance of infrastructure
investments, and responsibly developing the extractives
industry, all key to ensuring future fiscal sustainability;
and,
Fostering legitimate and effective Afghan governance,
including support for the 2014 Presidential and 2015
parliamentary elections, the rule of law, and a robust civil
society.
Operationally, USAID has adjusted its implementation model to
improve sustainability and meet the challenges presented by the
transition.
Developing a multitiered monitoring strategy to address
reduced mobility and decreased field staff that, along with
other monitoring and evaluation efforts, will continue to
ensure appropriate oversight of projects;
Transforming USAID's approach in Afghanistan to one of
mutual accountability that incentivizes Afghan reforms by
conditioning an increasing percentage of our assistance to the
government on progress on reforms and that continues to
increase government involvement and ownership of development
needs; and
Focusing on long-term sustainability through implementing
USAID policies on sustainability, including the principles of:
(1) increasing Afghan ownership and capacity; (2) contributing
to community stability and public confidence in the Government
of Afghanistan; and (3) implementing effective and cost-
efficient programming.
USAID is also focusing its assistance to encourage regional
integration to strengthen economic ties between Afghanistan and its
neighbors in an effort to bring greater prosperity and also greater
stability to the region. USAID is laying the groundwork for a more
economically connected region by facilitating trade, providing
technical assistance for regional energy projects such as the World
Bank's Central Asia and South Asia (CASA)-1000 project, promoting
business-to-business networking and helping countries address other
border issues, including countering trafficking in persons.
For example, USAID's Afghanistan Trade and Revenue project is
working with the Government of Afghanistan to achieve World Trade
Organization accession, promote trade agreements and private sector
linkages throughout South and Central Asia, and to strengthen the
government's ability to generate revenue from trade and legitimate
taxation. Just 2 weeks ago, USAID sponsored the Central Asian Business
Opportunities Conference in Islamabad, a business-to-business
networking event that included over 300 participants from Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and the five Central Asian countries. Progress was made on
some of the technical challenges of regional trade. We will continue to
engage on building regional economic linkages at the Astana Economic
Forum next month. This effort requires developing technical know-how,
political agreement, and, in some cases, physical infrastructure,
agreements, and policies that meet international standards. It is one
of the ways we are assisting Afghanistan stand on its feet as a viable
economic partner in its region.
USAID is constantly reviewing and evaluating its portfolio to
ensure maximum impact in coordination with the U.S. Government
interagency and the Afghan Government, including through a semiannual
portfolio review process. For example, as a result of internal USAID
reviews and in consultation with the Afghan Government, USAID
determined that an activity supporting access to credit for agriculture
in southern Afghanistan was not delivering the desired results. USAID
de-scoped that activity and reprogrammed the funds to other elements of
the program that continue to deliver results. The lessons learned from
that agriculture activity have helped inform the design of new USAID
agriculture programs that focus on strengthening value chains
throughout Afghanistan. We are also leveraging the ongoing work and
expertise of our colleagues at the Commerce Department, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation, and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, to ensure a coordinated and effective effort.
supporting women, youth, and civil society in afghanistan
While significant progress has been made to date, there is still
much work to be done in Afghanistan related to strengthening the
critical role that women, youth, and civil society play in
Afghanistan's governance and its future.
Women
Women, while much more active in society than in 2001, still face
many challenges. The Asia Foundation Survey found that the most
pressing problems for women, as identified by Afghans, include
education and illiteracy, lack of job opportunities for women, and
women's legal rights. Looking to 2015 and beyond, USAID is aiming to
solidify gains for women by further integrating them into projects
across all of the sectors in which USAID works to ensure their access
to increased opportunities for economic independence, education,
improved health, and participation in democratic processes. USAID is
supporting these opportunities in a number of ways, including through
the launch of USAID's largest gender program in the world, known as
``Promote.'' This program will develop a cadre of educated Afghan women
between the ages of 18 and 30, empowering them to fully participate in
the economic, political, and civil society sectors of Afghan society:
it will help women establish and/or expand small- to medium-sized
businesses; help civil society organizations increase their knowledge
and skills so they can better support women's rights, outreach and
advocacy campaigns; facilitate fellowships with relevant Afghan
Government ministries and agencies with a goal of achieving a critical
mass of women in the civil service; and train women in the public,
private, and civil service sectors in management and leadership. In
addition to Promote, Afghanistan is in the vanguard of USAID's
agencywide Gender Equality and Female Empowerment policy, which
requires that all USAID projects undergo gender analyses to identify
gender-based disparities in access to opportunities. To date, more than
40 gender analyses have been completed in Afghanistan, to determine how
best to integrate women into USAID projects across all sectors. These
efforts compliment the work of other agencies such as the U.S. Trade
Representative, which signed Memorandum of Understanding on Joint
Efforts to Enable the Economic Empowerment of Women and Promote Women's
Entrepreneurship with the Government of Afghanistan last year.
Youth
Afghanistan is facing a rapidly growing population and out of a
population of almost 30 million people, 68 percent are under the age of
25. In recognition of the fact that youth are integral to the future
stability of Afghanistan, USAID is providing support to this segment of
society by improving access to education, increasing technical and
vocational education and training opportunities, and establishing 2-
and 4-year post-secondary programs. In addition to working with the
Afghan Government to improve the relevance of academic programs to the
labor market, USAID is aiming to increase the provision of market-
driven job skills and business training, access to credit, business
development support, and job placement services. Through its
Afghanistan Workforce Development Program, USAID projects that 25,000
Afghans will be trained and/or placed in jobs, many of whom will be
women and youth.
Civil Society
A vibrant civil society in Afghanistan is critically important to
establishing effective bridges between the Afghan Government and
citizens, serving as active observers and watch dogs, and participating
in government policymaking and service delivery through robust
advocacy. USAID's assistance supports the development of a strong and
active civil society sector to help Afghan citizens more effectively
participate in the political process, solve community problems, and
advocate for good governance. With USAID support, civil society
organizations have played a critical role in the 2014 election to date,
deploying thousands of election observers across the country. Civil
society organizations have also played an unprecedented role in
organizing citizens across the country to identify their top priorities
for the next administration and distilling those priorities into a
candidate pledge, which was signed by a majority of Afghan Presidential
candidates. These candidates committed themselves to support policy
recommendations involving peace and stability, social and economic
development and human rights and good governance. This is the first
time a Presidential candidate pledge has been utilized in Afghanistan
at this scale. Looking to 2015 and beyond, USAID will continue to help
strengthen the gains civil society has made to date.
oversight and accountability
USAID has learned important lessons over its 12-year engagement,
and has drawn on experiences in other challenging environments,
including Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan, and Colombia, to ensure strong
oversight of U.S. assistance funds.
In addition to standard USAID oversight measures implemented
worldwide, USAID has implemented the Accountable Assistance for
Afghanistan (A3) initiative, designed to prevent funds from being
diverted from the development purpose to malign actors. Some of the
approaches USAID employs under A3 include:
1. Award Mechanisms--We rely less on large agreements and have
increased the number of smaller and more flexible agreements. We are
also utilizing assistance awards that provide the most visibility on
project costs, such as cost-reimbursable contracts and limiting layers
of subcontracts to two.
2. Partner Vetting--The USAID Mission established a Vetting Support
Unit in February 2011. The unit conducts checks on non-U.S. companies
and non-U.S. key individuals for prime contractors, subcontractors,
grant recipients and subgrantees to determine whether or not they are
associated with known malign entities or individuals. We have kept over
$49 million from being awarded to those who did not meet our vetting
requirements.
3. Financial Controls--We are enhancing controls on project funds,
such as using electronic funds transfers in lieu of cash payments,
using independent financial monitors to verify appropriate usage of
funds, ensuring close review of recipients' claims prior to payment,
and performing audits of locally incurred cost.
4. Project Oversight--USAID uses a multitiered monitoring approach
that includes, as appropriate, independent monitoring contractors;
observation by U.S. Government staff; reporting by implementing
partners, local nongovernmental organizations and civil society; and
use of technological tools, such as time- and date-stamped photos. By
using multiple sources of monitoring data, USAID can compare
information received from separate sources to ensure the greatest
degree of oversight possible.
USAID's multitiered monitoring approach focuses on gathering and
analyzing multiple sources of data across those tiers in order to
compare information and ensure confidence in reporting data, allowing
USAID to use the results to make further programmatic decisions.
Supporting this approach is the new Implementation Support Team (IST).
This team is charged with providing an additional layer of critical
review and analysis, on a cross-sectoral basis, for the streams of
monitoring information collected and for providing USAID leadership and
program managers with advice for addressing challenges in project
implementation.
Building on past monitoring and evaluation activities in
Afghanistan, USAID has recently issued a request for proposals for the
new Monitoring Support Project. This request was issued following
extensive consultations with international donors, Congress, and
implementing partners as well as a comprehensive analysis of USAID's
experience using independent monitoring around the world. This project
will utilize a variety of monitoring methods to verify project data,
including site visits, GPS and time/date stamped photos, interviews,
and crowd-sourcing. Independent monitoring, however, is not the sole
source of monitoring data. And, it will not take the place of USAID
staff as project managers. Instead, it is one tool that USAID can use
to validate reporting data from other sources. Should USAID determine
that its multitiered monitoring approach cannot provide adequate
oversight over project activities, it will not hesitate to terminate or
de-scope projects.
Audits provide useful oversight and discipline, and complement and
reinforce USAID's own efforts to ensure U.S. tax dollars are used
effectively and efficiently. There are currently over 100 on-going
audits of USAID programs in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2013, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office, USAID Office of Inspector General,
and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
completed over 65 financial and program audits in Afghanistan.
Although there are inherent risks in doing business in a country
like Afghanistan, we prioritize the effective and accountable use of
taxpayer dollars and do not assume that there is any level of
acceptable fraud, waste, or abuse in our programs. This means that
oversight must be a process of continual re-examination of ongoing
efforts, and that there must be flexibility to adjust to new
circumstances as they arise.
direct assistance in afghanistan
Direct assistance to the Afghan Government is used to build the
Afghan Government's ability to sustain the investments and gains that
have been made over the last decade and to reduce its dependence on
donors. As the U.S. transitions its programs in Afghanistan,
Afghanistan must continue to build its capacity to govern and provide
services to its people. Providing funds directly is a critical way in
which to accomplish this goal. At the same time, USAID has put in place
stringent measures to safeguard taxpayer funds, and only works with
those Afghan ministries in which USAID believes it can responsibly
mitigate risk. This is in keeping with commitments made by both the
previous and current U.S. administrations to increase our work through
local governments and organizations, not just in Afghanistan but around
the world. Such work is critically important to fulfill the ultimate
goal of assistance, namely helping countries stand on their own two
feet.
USAID implements direct assistance in Afghanistan through two
mechanisms: multilateral trust funds, such as the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) managed by the World Bank, and through
bilateral direct assistance agreements with specific Afghan ministries.
Of the approximately $17.5 billion in obligated USAID funds for
Afghanistan since 2001, about 5 percent, or $770 million, is allocated
for direct assistance with the Afghan Government, of which USAID has
disbursed $283 million. About half of all funds thus far disbursed are
for health sector programming. USAID only disburses money as direct
assistance to the Afghan Government after substantial conditions are
met to ensure the funds will be responsibly and accountably managed and
tracked.
USAID has a rigorous system of oversight for its direct assistance
programming with the Afghan Government. USAID conducts assessments to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of each ministry for which a
direct assistance project is being contemplated. These assessments
review a ministry's basic procurement, financial and human resource
systems and are followed by a USAID-conducted internal assessment of
the risks associated with working with the ministry. To date, USAID has
contracted accounting firms to conduct 16 ministry assessments. From
these assessments, USAID has decided to provide direct assistance to
seven ministries to implement a specific project. After the assessment
and review, we then build our mitigating measures and safeguards
accordingly to each project that we conduct with the specific ministry
or agency to ensure risks associated with the project are mitigated. At
the same time, through technical assistance, we also seek to build
Afghan systems that will be able to prevent fraud, waste, or abuse on
their own.
For direct assistance, USAID utilizes multiple levels of protection
to mitigate risks to taxpayer funds. These measures may include, but
are not limited to:
Requiring the establishment of a noncommingled, separate
bank account for each project with USAID;
Disbursement of funds only after USAID has verified that the
ministry has achieved a performance milestone or USAID has
verified incurred costs;
An annual audit by a USAID OIG-approved firm;
Substantial involvement and oversight by USAID staff in
procurement processes;
Independent management, monitoring, and evaluation of
services; and
Technical assistance through other projects to increase the
capacity of ministries while addressing any vulnerabilities or
weaknesses identified in the assessments.
All direct assistance requires compliance with USAID accountability
and oversight procedures, including site visits. Ministries are
required to fully comply with the conditions precedent prior to and
throughout the disbursement process. If Afghan ministries fail to
adhere to these conditions, the agreements are subject to immediate
suspension or termination.
For example, USAID has worked closely with Afghanistan's energy
utility, Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), to assess its financial
management systems, audit its progress and monitor results. USAID
negotiated a series of preconditions and financial controls pursuant to
the launch of a $75 million program to install a turbine at Kajaki dam.
In addition to the tight financial controls implemented with DABS,
USAID has been involved in every step of the procurement and
implementation process to ensure that results are being delivered as
planned. Payments of $1.6 million have been made by DABS to the
implementing contractors only after being verified financially and
technically as appropriate for the delivery of the goods or services in
question. This project also includes a phased approach, with
increasingly more significant parts of the project being undertaken
only after a thorough review of the previous phase to ensure both
financial and technical aspects of the project proceed properly.
conclusion
USAID understands the risks and the sacrifices that Americans, our
troops, diplomats, and their families take every day to serve in
Afghanistan, whether in a military capacity, as a government civilian,
or as an implementing partner. Since 2001, 434 people working for USAID
partner organizations in Afghanistan have been killed and another 768
wounded.
Throughout our efforts, we are applying important lessons from the
past 12 years in Afghanistan, as well as from other high-risk
environments in which USAID has worked. As USAID navigates through the
2014 transition period and looks to 2015 and beyond, we are committed
to expending every effort to safeguard taxpayer funds and ensure that
the remarkable development progress in Afghanistan is maintained and
made durable, in order to secure our overall national security
objectives. It is an honor to be able to share with you today a small
glimpse of what USAID is doing in that regard. I look forward to
answering any questions that you may have.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Ms. Campbell.
With the two great panels and votes beginning at noon, we
will do a 6-minute round of questions, one round for the first
panel. We will leave the record open for written questions. We
will then move to the second panel.
For this panel, let me begin with the issue of women's
empowerment and any potential backsliding. As recently as
February, there were efforts by certain elements in the Afghan
political system to weaken laws on the books protecting the
rights of women and girls. Human Rights Watch has particularly
warned about concerns of backsliding in this area.
What do you think of the likely direction of this trend and
how can the United States engage with the new government on
this issue? You have referred to it briefly, but I am
interested in your thoughts on the trend and what specifically
we can do to make sure it goes in the right direction. Please,
Ms. Campbell.
Ms. Campbell. Thank you.
As you noted, women have made tremendous progress. We
believe that the educational services that we have been helping
the Afghan Government to provide is one of the best measures
that we can take to ensure that the progress women have made is
respected and maintained.
As I noted in my testimony, one of the largest programs
USAID has ever designed for women is about to be launched this
summer. The Promote project will build on the gains we have
made in educating girls and will target women with secondary
education to become the future leaders of Afghanistan. The
support we will be providing will focus on helping this cohort
to become leaders in the economy, leaders in government,
leaders in civil society, providing support to civil society
groups who can advocate on behalf of human rights and women's
rights. So we are confident there will be a voice for women, by
women, and by supportive men in the future.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Blanc.
Mr. Blanc. Senator, thank you. If I could just add some of
our political work, in addition to our programmatic work. I
think, first of all, it is important to note in the case that
you just described of the potential for legal backsliding
earlier this year, that it really was Afghan women who
mobilized to prevent that law from being enacted and
successfully ran a campaign that got the legislature or got the
executive engaged and defeated the effort. And I think that is
exactly the kind of thing that we hoped to see and are glad to
be seeing in the politics of Afghanistan.
The second thing that I would note is that the
international community has been very clear, going back through
perhaps the Lisbon Conference and then moving through a variety
of fora, the Tokyo Conference, the Chicago NATO summit, the
Bonn Conference, that the assistance that Afghanistan needs is
very much contingent on continued progress in a number of
areas, including continued progress on the rights and role of
women. And I think it is something that Afghans broadly
understand and I hope contributed to the successful effort
earlier this year.
Senator Kaine. While we are on the subject of the
international support for the Afghan effort, why do you not
give us an update on the current status of the Tokyo Mutual
Accountability Framework and how you see that developing once
the Presidential elections are through.
Mr. Blanc. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework has
both some high-level aspirations and some very specific
responsibilities for the Government of Afghanistan. And I think
that as we expected in Tokyo, we are seeing better progress in
some areas than in others. We are very pleased, for example, to
see a more transparent budget process. We are very pleased to
see a better process for sharing budgetary decisions with the
provinces. And of course, we are especially pleased to see the
implementation of all of the agreed steps in the Tokyo
Framework in the runup to the election.
There are other areas where there is still work to be done,
for example, in passing a new mining law. And I think one thing
that we have been very careful about is to remind not just the
current administration but all of the candidates and the people
who are likely to continue to play significant roles in
Afghanistan in the next administration, that this is the set of
expectations that we have agreed to--we in the international
community and the Afghans--and we are not really expecting a
change from that in the early days of a new administration.
Senator Kaine. Other comments on the framework?
[No response.]
Senator Kaine. Let me ask one additional comment about the
most recent elections. To what degree was the democratic demand
that was seen in the sizeable turnout expressed in terms of a
desire to reduce corruption in the country, and what do you see
about anticorruption efforts going forward?
Mr. Blanc. I will quickly start and just say that all of
the major candidates and certainly the two candidates who now
appear to be possibly moving forward to a second round made
anticorruption and governance a central part of their campaign,
and both have signed broad anticorruption pledges. So I think
it is very clear that the Afghan people are demanding an
improvement in governance and a reduction in corruption. And
that is something where again, as was the case in the women's
issue earlier this year, our role is increasingly to support
Afghan domestic politics in doing the right thing.
Senator Kaine. Other comments? Kathleen.
Ms. Campbell. Yes. I would just add that the United States
is happy to see that it is civil society--it is the Afghan
people--who are stepping up and speaking out on these issues.
It is one of the things that USAID is providing support for--to
build the capacity of civil society in this area. The media, I
think, has also had a very important role in ensuring
transparency, increasing transparency regarding the Afghan
Government's activities.
Some of our work with Afghan Government institutions is
also focused on strengthening their systems so that they are
less subject to corruption, and increasing the transparency of
those institutions.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Blanc, I represent Idaho and I have a constituent that
is being held by the Taliban, as you know. His name is Bo
Bergdahl. And people in Idaho read with interest and indeed
with concern the recent news reports about the fact that the
Haqqani network was holding him. The Taliban want to release
him, but because of the fragmented situation as far as the
United States is concerned between the DOD, Department of
State, et cetera, they are having difficulty doing this. This
caused a great deal of concern.
Having said that, I know who we are dealing with, and I
understand that there are answers to these things. So I want to
give you this public opportunity to put a fence around this and
explain to my constituents in Idaho and to America how hard all
of you work to try to get people like this released and
particularly Mr. Bergdahl. So I would like, if you could,
please to give us some reassurances in that regard.
Mr. Blanc. Senator, thank you very much for the opportunity
to respond to that story which, as you indicate, we view as
entirely inaccurate.
Our hearts go out to Sergeant Bergdahl's family. Our hearts
go out to Sergeant Bergdahl. He has been gone for far too long.
And we and our colleagues across the Government in the
Department of Defense, in the intelligence communities,
elsewhere are striving in the most energetic and creative ways
we can devise to try to secure his release. Speaking for my
office, I can say without qualification that nothing energizes
the efforts of our office so much as Sergeant Bergdahl.
Unfortunately, the Taliban broke off direct contact with us
in January 2012. We would very much like to return to direct
contact with them, and if we do, at the top of our agenda will
be Sergeant Bergdahl.
It is certainly not the case, as was reported, that somehow
the Taliban and Haqqani network are seeking to release him and
that interagency squabbles within the United States Government
are preventing or delaying that.
Senator Risch. Mr. Blanc, thank you very much. I continue
to be impressed with what a high priority this is for the State
Department, for DOD, and I appreciate how well you keep in
touch with us and in touch with those who need to know these
kinds of things. We appreciate your efforts and we are all
going to work together to see if we cannot make this happen as
soon as possible. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator Risch.
I am going to violate a rule and ask another question or
two in case one of the colleagues wants to come back, and then
we will move to the second panel.
Talk a little bit about the relationship, the economic
prospects between Afghanistan and Pakistan. That has been a
very challenged relationship. And yet, they are in a regional
economy where greater licit economic trade could be to the
benefit of both. This pipeline project is an example of
something that could be a tangible. If you would talk a little
bit about the prospects there, I think that would be helpful.
Ms. Sumar. Thank you for that question, Senator Kaine.
So as you know, as we think about the region, one of things
we are really struck by is the real willingness in leadership
that we are seeing from the countries themselves to actually
find more creative ways to engage and not to be trapped by
their own geography, so to speak. And so we are seeing this in
different types of markets, and one is the energy market, as
you rightly pointed out. We have seen more movement in the last
6 months, I would say, than we have had in 6 years or so on
electricity transmissions
in particular. And so projects such as CASA-1000, which is this
electricity transmission line that would go from Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan to Afghanistan and then to Pakistan has really
galvanized I think cooperation and negotiations among these
countries in a way that they really have not had these
discussions and negotiations before.
I think CASA-1000 would make a great Harvard School of
Business study actually, not just for this particular project
of electricity lines, but looking at how these countries are
willing to work together for a common future.
What really strikes me here is there is a common need here
which is in this case energy generation and the need for more
energy for Pakistan, for India, for the broader South Asia
Continent. Water is literally spilling in Tajikistan, for
instance. However, the Tajiks are not making any money off of
the excess water they have, particularly in the summer months.
So if there is a way to create the hydro potential, both to
upgrade existing facilities but also to create new transmission
lines that can bring excess, surplus hydro down from the
Central Asian states into Afghanistan where Afghanistan
benefits both as a recipient where it will keep 300 megawatts
off the grid and also to capture revenue fees from the transit
of 1,000 megawatts into Pakistan, it creates multiple
opportunities for these countries.
And so we have had really positive momentum. The World Bank
brought CASA-1000 to a vote at the end of March where it
secured a $526 million grant and loan guarantee for the
project. Construction will begin later this year. The United
States played a critical role in this process by both a $15
million financial contribution to CASA-1000 but also the
political support and really working very closely with the
World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and all the four CASA
countries to get this project up and moving. And so we are very
proud of our initiative and work in that area.
TUTAP is another project in the electricity line which is
also having similar kind of results. Electricity for the first
time is already flowing, for instance, from Uzbekistan to
Afghanistan. In fact, most of the lights that come on in Kabul
are thanks to the lights that are being supplied from the
Uzbeks on those electricity lines.
Plans are underway now to connect these grids to bring
electricity from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, from Uzbekistan
down to Afghanistan, and also from Tajikistan and then
eventually connect at a substation in Afghanistan and transit
over into Pakistan as well.
And so these are the types of new relationships. We know
the traditional dynamics well here between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, for instance. What we are also seeing now are these
kind of conversations between their finance teams, their
economics teams, their water and energy teams on price
negotiations, on transmission, on electricity.
On TAPI, TAPI we still believe has the power to be
transformative in changing the natural gas markets that connect
this region. It is the reason we have been a strong supporter
for years. I think there is a lot that you would need to happen
in order to attract the kind of international oil companies and
the international investment to secure the pipelines, and we
are actively working with the Turkmen, for instance, for them
to have the conversations that they would need to secure the
financing, to secure the rights and the access to work with an
international oil company to move a project like that forward.
But if these types of projects go forward, what is really
telling for us and what really I think energizes us, frankly,
is you have a way of really kind of changing the dynamic of
Central and South Asia through the Af-Pak lens. And you are
creating connections that give all of these economies in
different ways many more options than they currently have, and
it gives them more ways to strengthen their sovereignty and
economic independence in the region.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thanks very much.
Additional questions for the first panel, Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Briefly. I wonder if one of you could tackle
for me the relationship between Afghanistan and Iran and how
much business they are doing back and forth.
Mr. Blanc. Senator, I do not have numbers with me about
their business. I am not sure if one of my colleagues might. If
not, we are happy to provide that for you.
Senator Risch. I wonder if you could provide it, but also
if you can give us a general sense at this point.
[The written reply by Mr. Blanc to the requested
information follows:]
As a result of their geographic, linguistic and cultural
connections, Afghanistan and Iran share significant trade ties,
particularly in the Western region of Afghanistan and in Herat. Much of
the trade practiced today between the two countries goes back
generations. In recent years, Afghanistan-Iran trade has increased due
to cost increases and customs delays for cargo transiting Pakistan in
2011, when the closure of the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC)
indirectly affected commercial traffic as well. Given these problems
and the lack of other feasible transit options, many private Afghan
traders opted to bypass the delays in Pakistan by moving goods through
Iranian ports instead. Afghan imports transiting through and
originating from Iran rose from $1.6 billion in 2011 to $2.7 billion in
2012 according to data from the United Nations. The number of Afghan
exports to Iran remains very small, estimated by the U.N. at only $12
million in 2011 and decreasing to $8 million in 2012.
Understanding that Afghanistan continues to have limited transit
options for accessing international markets, we have advised the
Government of Afghanistan to exercise extreme caution in its trade with
Iran to ensure that Afghanistan is not used by Iran to undermine the
international community's effort to ensure Iran lives up to its
international obligations. Where possible, we encourage Afghanistan to
seek alternate trading routes. We have used diplomatic engagement and
technical assistance to support implementation of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, which we hope over time will reduce
barriers to Afghan access to Pakistani ports. We also continue to
support Afghanistan's access via Central Asia, where U.S. investments
in the Northern Distribution Network over the past decade have improved
infrastructure and trade facilitation significantly.
Mr. Blanc. Maybe I will just answer a general question.
You know, I think that obviously there is trade between
Afghanistan and its neighbors, including with Iran. And some of
that is healthy and is necessary, and we encourage Iran to play
a responsible role in Afghanistan.
One thing that we do consistently is to remind our Afghan
partners about the nature of our sanctions against Iran so that
when they make decisions about things, for example, work
through the Chabahar Port, they understand the implications
that that has because of the very strict laws we have in place.
Senator Risch. Ms. Sumar.
Ms. Sumar. I would reiterate that this is one of the
toughest neighborhoods in the world, and so if you look in this
context, you have Iran, Russia, China, and all the other
tensions and relationships that you already have existing
within the broader South Central Asia space. And so economic
relationships that are already existing there, whether it is
with the Iranians, the Chinese, the Russians, others in the
region, those relationships continue to exist.
But I think in our diplomatic relationships that we have
with these countries in terms of looking at ways to strengthen
their economic independence, we continue to reiterate, you
know, be careful in the decisions you are making so that you do
not run afoul of United States sanctions on Iran, which are
very important to us and one of our top priorities. Our policy
on Iran is very well known in our relationships. It is a
constant conversation that comes up in our relationships with
these countries. And we have continued to engage India and
others that engage on trade with Afghanistan via Iran, for
instance, on Chabahar Port and others that their engagement
needs to be in strict accordance with United States law and
U.S. sanctions so that they do not run afoul of those issues.
So we can definitely, Senator Risch, come back to you with
the actual statistics of trade between Iran and Afghanistan.
But we definitely do it in our regional economic engagement
work within a broader context of the kind of policy options
that we would like to see.
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. I want to thank the first panel. Thank you
very much for your testimony today. Ms. Sumar, you are going to
be invited back now that you have survived the first witness
experience, transitioning from committee staff to the witness
table. Thank you all.
And I would like to invite the second panel to come up and
we will jump right into this testimony. As the second panel is
coming forward, I will just introduce them, and these are
individuals who will be no stranger.
Gen. John Allen, U.S. Marine Corps, retired, is a
distinguished fellow currently in the foreign policy program at
Brookings, but as all are aware, prior to joining Brookings,
General Allen commanded the NATO International Security
Assistance Force and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan from July 2011
to February 2013. He has a long track record of service to our
country before those assignments, but those are assignments
particularly relevant to the hearing today.
In addition, we are fortunate to have with us Parnian
Nazary. She lived in Afghanistan until 2004, a native, when she
moved to the United States for her education. She is joining us
today representing Women for Afghan Women. Ms. Nazary has
always promoted Afghan women's rights through her involvement
with various agencies working with Afghani women.
And I will say I have read a lot of written testimony in my
15 months in the Senate. Both of your sets of written testimony
for very different reasons were particularly compelling, and I
am glad to have you here today.
And I would ask General Allen to begin and then Ms. Nazary
to follow.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN ALLEN, U.S. MARINE CORPS, RETIRED,
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Chairman Kaine and Ranking Member
Risch. It is an honor to appear before this subcommittee on
this important subject of the future of Afghanistan in the
post-2014 period.
Before I offer a brief statement, please let me thank the
members for all that you continue to do for our magnificent
troops in Afghanistan. As this year winds down to the close of
the mission, I believe history will record well that the United
States Congress on behalf of the United States people
unfailingly supported our troops and our mission through very
difficult years, and for that, Mr. Chairman, and to all the
members of this committee and to the U.S. Congress, I will
always be very grateful.
I would like to present my thoughts today on the future of
Afghanistan in the form of a letter that I will be writing to
the President of Afghanistan once he is inaugurated. And so it
will take the form of correspondence, and it goes as follows.
``Dear Mr. President, please accept my sincere
congratulations on your election as the President of
Afghanistan. Your election represents one of the most historic
moments in the modern history of your country: the peaceful
transition from one elected government to another. Indeed, this
act sets a precedent for a region where democracy and peaceful
transitions are far more aspirational than realistic.
``I have been and remain, Your Excellency, one of the
strongest advocates of Afghanistan. So it is in that spirit,
sir, at your inauguration that I offer the following points for
your consideration.
``First, sign the bilateral security agreement and, in so
doing, embrace Afghanistan's desire for a long-term security
relationship with the United States, NATO, and key partners.
Seek to repair Afghanistan's relationship with the U.S. and the
West. Here is your chance, Mr. President, to begin your
Presidency in partnership and not in conflict with the nations
who bled and spent their treasure on and for Afghanistan's
people.
``Additionally, embrace your role as the Commander in Chief
of the Afghan National Security Forces. They have demonstrated
extraordinary feats of organization, development, and
operational accomplishment. They are brave, principled, and
ready to endure great hardship in following your orders and
sacrificing for Afghanistan. And your forces need to see, and
need to feel, your firsthand engagement and positive
leadership.
``Second, protect the remarkable advances of civil society
and, in particular, those of women. Much has been accomplished
here, but often in spite of existing leadership, systems, and
policies. The world is holding its collective breath in
anticipation of what will become of the gains of women and
minorities under your administration. Your public commitment to
defending, furthering, and advancing women's and minorities'
rights will be warmly welcomed by the international community,
which is keen to help, but will also require a comprehensive
strategy of Presidential decrees and legislative reforms to
lock in these gains and to secure the future. As you well know,
Mr. President, no state has ever successfully transitioned into
a developing society without fully embracing the constructive
role of women.
``Third, reach out to Pakistan. For myriad complex reasons,
the relationship between your country and Pakistan and their
respective peoples has deteriorated alarmingly over the course
of this conflict. The absence of trust, compounded by
uncertainty about the future, has left both nations to hedge
their bets, to the good of no one and the detriment of all
involved. Both nations share substantial common trade,
economic, social and security interests. In that regard, I
suggest you seek to reinvigorate the Afghan-Pakistan Transit
Trade Agreement and support TAPI and pursue aggressively other
cross-border and regional economic ties with Pakistan. As well,
dealing with the alarming growth of extremists, terrorists, and
insurgents on both sides of your common frontier should be a
high priority and an important basis for constructive dialogue
between your administration and that of Prime Minister Sharif
in Islamabad. This dialogue can also serve as a platform for
resolving the long-simmering issues over the Durand Line.
``Fourth, make Afghanistan business-friendly. As you build
effective governance and reinforce the rule of law, initiate
the necessary legal and regulatory reforms to leverage the
natural entrepreneurial spirit of the Afghan people and to
create a truly business-friendly environment to attract
international businesses. The Tokyo Donors Conference in July
of 2012 signaled a readiness of the international community to
invest on the order of 16 billion U.S. dollars during the
coming decade. This can be accelerated by the right reform
package and your clear and public commitment to doing business
within Afghanistan and externally within the region and with
the international community.
``Last, but in the long term, most importantly, Mr.
President, I urge you to undertake a sweeping, coordinated, and
decisive counter-corruption campaign. Here time is not on your
side. Acknowledging that the United States and the West bear
some responsibility for the state of corruption in Afghanistan,
the great challenge to Afghanistan's future is not the Taliban
or Pakistani safe havens or even an incipiently hostile
Pakistan. The existential threat to the long-term viability of
modern Afghanistan is corruption. For too long, we focused our
attention solely on the Taliban as the existential threat to
Afghanistan. They are an annoyance compared to the scope and
the magnitude of corruption with which you must contend. While
the Afghan National Army will battle your nation's foes and in
that context battle the Taliban, the battle for Afghanistan,
the real fight, will be won by righteous law enforcement, a
functioning judiciary, and an unambiguous commitment to the
rule of law. Indeed, wresting back the institutions of
governance from corruption must be one of your highest
priorities. You know, Your Excellency, that corruption is the
dry rot of democracy.
``In closing, Mr. President, I offer these points with the
greatest respect. Your commitment to these five areas will be
welcomed by the Afghan people who have endured so much, and
your leadership in these areas will be hailed internationally.
The future of Afghanistan is in your hands.''
I ask that this statement be read into the record, sir, and
I am ready for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gen. John Allen, Retd.
Chairman Kaine and Ranking Member Risch, it is an honor to appear
before this subcommittee on this important subject of the future of
Afghanistan in the post 2014 period. Before I offer a brief statement,
please let me thank the members for all you continue to do for our
magnificent troops in Afghanistan. As this year winds down to the close
of this mission, I believe history will record that the United State
Congress unfailingly supported our troops and their mission, and for
that Mr. Chairman, I will always be grateful.
I'd like to present my thoughts today on the future of Afghanistan
in the form of a letter I will be sending to the President-elect.
______
Dear Mr. President: Please accept my sincere congratulations on
your election as President of Afghanistan. Your election represents one
of the most historic moments in the modern history of your country: the
peaceful transition from one elected government to another. Indeed,
this act sets a precedent for a region where democracy and peaceful
transitions are more often than not aspirational and not realistic.
I have been and remain, Your Excellency, one of the strongest
advocates for Afghanistan. I have seen up close the nobility of your
people, and I have a comprehensive appreciation for the potential of
your country. You will have many competing priorities as you assume
office, but please know the American people and the international
community wish you every success, and wish for your people every
opportunity to move beyond more than three decades of war to a future
they and we have sacrificed so much to achieve.
It is in this spirit, President ---------, at your inauguration, I
offer the following points for your consideration:
First, sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), and in doing
so, embrace Afghanistan's desire for a long-term security relationship
with the U.S., NATO, and other key partners. Seek to repair
Afghanistan's relationship with the U.S. and the West. Here is your
chance Mr. President to begin your Presidency in partnership--and not
in conflict--with the nations who bled and spent their treasure on and
for Afghanistan's people. Additionally, embrace your role as Commander
in Chief of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). They have
demonstrated extraordinary feats of organization, development, and
operational accomplishment. They are brave, principled, and ready to
endure great hardship in following your orders and sacrificing for
Afghanistan, and your forces need to see and feel firsthand your
engaged, positive leadership.
Second, protect the remarkable advances of civil society, and in
particular those of women. Much has been accomplished here, but often
in spite of existing leadership, systems, and policies. The world is
holding its collective breath in anticipation of what will become of
the gains of women and minorities under your administration. Your
public commitment to defending, furthering, and advancing women's and
minorities' rights will be warmly welcomed by the international
community, keen to be helpful, but will also require a comprehensive
strategy of Presidential decrees and legislative reform to lock-in
these gains and secure the future. As you well know, Mr. President, no
state has ever successfully transitioned to a developing society
without fully embracing the constructive role of women. Your many
friends in the international community are ready to assist you in
further empowering the role of women, and more broadly the role of
civil society, in building legitimate and enduring institutions of
governance.
Third, reach out to Pakistan. For a myriad of complex reasons, the
relationship between your country and Pakistan, and their respective
peoples, has deteriorated alarmingly over the course of this conflict.
The absence of trust, compounded by uncertainty about the future, has
left both nations to hedge their bets--to the good of no one and the
detriment of all involved. Both nations share substantial common trade,
economic, social and security interests. In that regard, I suggest you
seek to invigorate the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and
pursue aggressively other cross border and regional economic ties with
Pakistan. As well, dealing with the alarming growth of extremists,
terrorists, and insurgents on both sides of your common frontier should
be a high priority and an important basis for constructive dialogue
between your administration and that of PM Sharif in Islamabad. This
dialogue could also serve as the platform for resolving long simmering
issues over the Durand Line. Mr. President, the bottom line is that the
Afghan and Pakistani people are in the same lifeboat, adrift in a sea
of political turmoil, economic challenge, and extremist threat. Your
collective approaches to these daunting problems will brighten the
possibilities for both countries. Reaching out to Pakistan at the
beginning of your administration is both courageous and timely, and
will be strongly supported by the international community, including
India.
Fourth, make Afghanistan business friendly. As you build effective
governance, and reinforce the rule of law, initiate the necessary legal
and regulatory reforms to leverage the natural entrepreneurial spirit
of the Afghan people and to create a truly business friendly
environment to attract international businesses. The Tokyo Donors
Conference in July 2012 signaled a readiness of the international
community to invest on the order of $16B USD during the coming decade.
This can be accelerated with the right reform package and your clear
and public commitment to doing business within Afghanistan, and
externally within the region, and with the international community.
Last, but in the long run most importantly, Mr. President, I urge
you to undertake a sweeping, coordinated, and decisive
countercorruption campaign. Here time is not on your side.
Acknowledging that the U.S. and West bear some of the responsibility
for the state of corruption in Afghanistan, the great challenge to
Afghanistan's future isn't the Taliban, or the Pakistani safe havens,
or even an incipiently hostile Pakistan. The existential threat to the
long-term viability of modern Afghanistan is corruption. Indeed, across
your great country, the ideological insurgency, the criminal patronage
networks, and the drug enterprise have formed an unholy alliance, which
relies for its success on the criminal capture of your government
functions at all levels. For too long, we've focused our attention on
the Taliban as the existential threat to Afghanistan.
They are an annoyance compared to the scope and magnitude of
corruption with which you must contend. While the Afghan National Army
will battle your nation's foes, the battle for Afghanistan will be won
by righteous law enforcement, a functioning judiciary, and an
unambiguous commitment to the rule of law. Indeed, wresting back the
institutions of governance from corruption must be one of your highest
priorities, Your Excellency, for as you know, corruption is dry rot of
democracy. Your fledgling institutions of government and governance and
any real hope of economic development will be stillborn if the drug
lords and CPN leadership remain in control.
In closing, Mr. President, I offer these points with the greatest
respect. Your commitment to these five areas will be welcomed by the
Afghan people who've endured so much, and your leadership in these
areas will be hailed internationally. The future of Afghanistan is in
your hands.
With abiding respect now and always, I remain,
John R. Allen, General, U.S. Marine Corps
(Retired),
Former Commander, NATO International Security
Assistance Force, and U.S. Forces Afghanistan.
Senator Kaine. Without objection. Thank you, General.
Ms. Nazary.
STATEMENT OF PARNIAN NAZARY, ADVOCACY MANAGER, WOMEN FOR AFGHAN
WOMEN, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Nazary. Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and other
members of the committee, thank you for giving me the
opportunity to speak today about the progress, challenges, and
hopes of my Afghan sisters in this critical year of transition
in Afghanistan.
Let me also thank you for your longtime support of the
Afghan people and especially Afghan women.
The suffering of Afghan women, especially in the last three
decades, is widely known and extensively documented by rights
organizations. Some of us Afghan women became victims of war
and insurgency, but let us remember and celebrate that many of
us are survivors. Born and raised in war, my personal life is
intertwined with the political struggles of my country, making
my political and policy views inseparable from my story.
Many of you already know that under the Taliban regime,
women were banned from education, employment, access to health
care by virtue of being banned from visiting a male doctor,
political participation, and many other basic rights. The
Taliban had even banned women from appearing by the glass
windows inside their own homes. In other words, Afghan women
were not free inside their own homes, let alone in public.
I was barely a teenager when the Taliban took over Kabul in
1996. One of the first things they did was to close all schools
for girls. During the Taliban regime, I could not enjoy simple
things in life as a girl. I was denied basic things just
because of my gender.
Yet, despite the Taliban's ban on girls' education, many
brave women started secret schools in their homes. I enrolled
in secret schools three times but each one was discovered and
closed down by the Taliban. Every day I walked to the secret
school with fear, as the Taliban had security checkpoints in
almost every block. I hid my books in an unmarked bag and
changed my route to school constantly.
In class were about 30 young girls. I was the youngest and
did not have to wear a chaderi, a long cloth covering women
from head to toe and imposed on all women over the age of 13 by
the Taliban. However, once my classmates were inside the class,
they would cast the chaderi aside.
We were enjoying our secret classes until one day a girl
enrolled in my school burst into the room. The Taliban are
coming, she screamed. Everyone rushed to grab their chaderi and
wrapped up our books and whatever we could get our hands on.
Some of us threw our books in the closet. Everyone was
trembling as the Taliban blasted through the door and rushed in
carrying whips and rifles. ``What are you doing here,'' one
snarled. ``Learning to sew,'' one of our teachers said, her
voice shaking. Pretending to sew was a backup plan in case the
Taliban raided our secret school. As the Taliban saw an
unstitched cloth in our hands, they hit the teacher with a
whip.
Another Taliban gang man opened the closet and saw our
books. He called shameless and dirty and tore our books into
pieces.
The Taliban ordered all of us out of the building. Some
passers-by pleaded with them to let us go. The Taliban finally
let us go but took our teachers. I remember running home in
tears, fear, and shock.
At age 13, I was stopped on the street and yelled that I
should start wearing a chaderi outside now I was old enough.
One day I was stepping out of home wearing a chaderi when I
suddenly felt the burn of a lash on my back. I began to run.
But the Talib religious police ran after me and hit me again
and again. I still do not know what my crime was, but I only
remember hearing ``palan tu kujas,'' the man beating me said in
a heavy accent. Where is your skirt?
After these experiences, I refused to live under their
rules, but at that age and in those circumstances, the best I
could do was to wage a silent resistance. By myself, I started
to study harder than ever because I knew I could only fight
such an ideology through the power of education. My home became
my school and I became my own teacher. The Taliban wanted to
create a prison for me and with the help of my family, I
created my own school.
My story is not unique. This was the situation for millions
of Afghan women under Taliban rule.
In sum, the suffering was unspeakable. The pain was
unbearable and the operation was unimaginable. And this is
where Afghan women more forcefully started their fight for
equal rights after the Taliban regime finally collapsed in
2001. And let me tell you, over the last 13 years the gains
Afghan women have made are beyond anyone's wildest
expectations. Afghan women have come a long way since the dark
days of the Taliban regime, and all of this happened in just a
little over a decade.
Yet, despite the immense progress, all the gains made so
far remain fragile. With the U.S.-led coalition forces
scheduled to leave by the end of this year, many Afghan women
feel uncertain if their gains will be sustained without
continued support from the international community. During my
trip to Afghanistan last month, the one sentiment among all
Afghan women was a shared fear of being abandoned by the
international community while the Taliban insurgency continued
to threaten women's hard-won gains.
The Taliban have not changed. They have become more
complex. But they have not changed their views on education of
women. Their targeted attacks on education, including schools,
teachers, and students continue; prominent women's rights
activists, including media, including singers, journalists, and
musicians are well documented and continue.
Despite increasing attacks on Afghan women across the
country, it does not stop them from fighting for their rights.
I saw a picture of a woman voting in 2014 elections with her
ring finger because her first finger was chopped off by the
Taliban in 2009 elections. That is the fight of Afghan women
and their bravery now. This shows the bravery of Afghan women
who put themselves on the front lines and fight for equality,
justice, freedom, and democracy.
While I was inspired by the progress made, I am most
concerned with the future. Before discussing the specifics, I
would like to make one point. As we all look toward the future,
I would like to ask you to remember that a country cannot be
built in 12 years or even 20. Afghanistan's development as a
more stable, rights-respecting partner for the United States in
an incredibly unstable region cannot be measured in years or
election cycles. This is a process that will take decades and
generations. My generation is the first of what will hopefully
be many that has been educated and brought up in a largely
democratic society. My generation has to be able to move
forward toward the democratic foundations to firmly take root
in the country. And for that to happen, the torch has to be
passed to them, something which is taking place, but the
sustained involvement and support of the international
community is critical for it to be completed.
Looking forward, we understand U.S. civilian financial
commitments will be significantly less than over the past 13
years. However, we need to know your support will not waver
even if funding levels drop.
The bilateral security agreement, which has the support of
almost all Afghans, will be signed by our new President I hope.
Some United States troops need to remain and funding must
continue in order to allow my generation to complete the hard
work of reclaiming Afghanistan from a generation of war and
fundamentalism to a generation of hope and democracy.
Having considered this, I share with you a set of
recommendations which I hope will help better shape support for
the Afghan women beyond 2014. I have submitted four
recommendations in my written testimony and am reading a
snapshot of it here.
Firstly, for peace and justice, I have looked at
extensively into peace talks with the Taliban and have reached
a conclusion that reconciliation with the Taliban is fruitless.
I am more than 100 percent convinced that any peace deal with
the Taliban would most definitely compromise women's rights and
their gains will be eroded away.
Two, ensure that women's rights remain central to the
leadership between the United States and Afghanistan. In every
conversation a United States official has with an Afghan
official, he or she should mention the importance of women's
rights.
Three, continue to invest in education and especially in
higher education. Scholarships to study abroad for Afghan men
and women and the American University of Afghanistan in Kabul
are excellent examples of such an investment.
Four, continue to provide long-term support to Afghan civil
society organizations, especially those involved in promoting
women's rights.
Five, support the Afghan National Security Forces beyond
2014 in order for them to fight the Taliban insurgency and
provide support for the Afghan men and women fighting for their
rights.
Six, continued support for the Afghan media and freedom of
speech.
Seven, support women's shelters, educational programs to
highlight domestic abuse, and other social programs which
tackle the multitude of issues facing Afghan women.
Thank you all for your support of Afghanistan. We would not
be in the midst of a successful election or be here talking
about progress made without you and the American people's
immense sacrifice on our behalf. We are also grateful to our
American sisters who have supported us and have stayed with us
through the bad and the worst times. It is because of your
support and sacrifices that we, the women of Afghanistan, have
been empowered to fight for gains despite all odds against us.
We are determined to move forward and strengthen the
foundations for a better tomorrow and hope our friend and ally,
the United States, will walk with us.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nazary follows:]
Prepared Statement of Parnian Nazary
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and other members of the
committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak today about
the progress, challenges, and hopes of my sisters in this critical year
of transition in Afghanistan.
Let me also thank you for your long time support of the Afghan
people and especially Afghan women. Without your support, the support
of your colleagues and support from the people of the United States,
Afghans would likely still be living under Taliban rule, deprived of
everything, including basic human rights.
The suffering of Afghan women, especially in the last three
decades, is widely known and extensively documented. Some Afghan women
became victims of war and insurgency but we also must remember and
celebrate that many of us are survivors. Born and raised in war, my
earliest childhood memories from the 1990s include collecting golden
and bronze bullet shells from my neighborhood in Kabul and building
castles out of them. My personal life is intertwined with the political
struggles of my country, making my political and policy views
inseparable from my story.
I was barely a teenager when the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996.
One of the first things they did was to close all schools for girls,
leaving me and millions of other Afghan girls locked up in our own
homes with no hope of receiving an education.
Even though things were not easy before the Taliban took over my
city, I was still able to go to school and see my friends. But after
the Taliban I was denied basic rights and opportunities because of my
gender.
Yet despite the Taliban's ban on girls' education, many brave women
started secret schools in their own homes. I was overjoyed when I found
out about one such secret school in our neighborhood, Shar-e-Now. Even
though my parents knew I could be harmed by the Taliban for attending
school they agreed to enroll me.
I walked to school every day with fear as the Taliban had security
checkpoints in almost every block. I hid my books in an unmarked bag
and changed my route to school constantly.
Once inside the class, I was happy to see another 28 or so girls. I
was not old enough to wear a chaderi, a long cloth covering women from
head to toe, but the older girls did. They'd throw their chaderis to
the side as soon as they'd stepped into the class.
We were enjoying our secret classes until one day a little girl
studying with us burst into the room. ``The Taliban are coming,'' she
screamed.
Everyone rushed to grab their chaderi. Some of us wrapped up our
books in whatever we could get our hands on. Some of us threw our books
in the closet, hiding them under piles of clothes. Everyone was
trembling as the Taliban blasted through the door and rushed in
carrying whips, some of them with rifles hanging from their shoulders.
``What are you doing here?'' one of them asked. ``Learning to sew,''
one of our teachers said, her voice shaking. The Taliban soldiers
looked around and saw twenty or so girls with needles, threads, and
cloth in their hands.
Pretending to sew was a backup plan in case the Taliban raided our
secret school. One of the Taliban soldiers wanted to know why we wanted
to learn to sew. Our teacher replied, ``Because you do not let us go to
a tailor shop and we want to learn to at least sew our own clothes.''
The Taliban gunman asked my classmates to show their work. All we had
was unstitched cloth. He then hit our teacher with a whip.
Another Taliban gunman opened the closet and saw our books. He
called us ``shameless and dirty'' and tore some of our books. I was in
tears because my English vocabulary notebook was there too. I had spent
so much time putting all of it together. My notebook also contained my
drawings of girls studying by candle, something which perhaps made the
Taliban gunman even more upset.
The Taliban ordered all of us out of the building. Some residents
watching us pleaded with them to let us go, citing the Taliban's own
edicts to be in presence of women without a moharam, an immediate blood
relative. The Taliban finally let us go but took our teachers. I
remember running home in tears, fear, and shock.
Months later, I learned about another secret school teaching
English. I enrolled, but within a week or so I found a note behind the
door which said the Taliban had closed down the school.
When I was old enough and had to wear the chaderi outside, I once
stepped out in my neighbourhood wearing a chaderi, and suddenly felt
the burn of a lash on my back. I began to run--the man hit me with
second and a third lash. I still don't know why I had to be beaten on
the street at age 13. I only remember hearing, ``Palan tu kujas?''--
``where is your skirt?''
After these experiences I refused to live under their rules, but at
that age and in those circumstances, the best I could do was to wage a
silent resistance. By myself, I started studying harder than ever
because I knew I could only fight such an ideology through the power of
education. My home became my school and I became my own teacher. Of
course, I needed books, which were forbidden to girls. I asked my male
relatives for books, including some in English. I also wanted recorded
materials, CDs, DVDs, tapes. Since the Taliban did not allow these, I
had to ask my families and friends traveling outside the country to
bring me English movies or recorded books secretly. A few of them
agreed to take the risk. My uncle brought me the movie ``Titanic.'' It
was the only English movie I had and so I watched it over and over,
learning every single word. I even cut my hair to look like not Kate
Winslette but Leonardo Dicaprio, the male star of the movie. At that
age it seemed like a good idea, especially since I wanted to speak
English just like he did.
After working on my English for 3 years, I started teaching it to
seven young girls in our neighborhood. I practiced Urdu, Pashtu, and
Dari by reading novels, poetry, and any book available. I memorized
Suras of the Quran in Arabic and verses of Hafez poetry. I also became
interested in arts and started painting, cooking, and knitting. The
Taliban wanted to create a prison for me. Instead, I created my own
school.
My story is not unique. Unspeakable suffering, unbearable pain, and
unimaginable oppression were the norm for millions of Afghan women
under the Taliban.
And this is where we started our fight for equal rights after the
Taliban regime finally collapsed. Since then our accomplishments have
been monumental, though we also know there is far to go.
In terms of education, there are millions of Afghan girls enrolled
in primary, secondary, and high schools. Hundreds of thousands of girls
have graduated from colleges and universities.
In terms of media, under the Taliban regime everything was
forbidden except for one Taliban radio station, the content of which
included announcing the new limits imposed on civilians by the
Taliban's Department of Vice and Virtue, the religious police. For
instance, they would announce the number of hands chopped, some of the
hands were hanged in trees for public display, or forbidding white
shoes since it would be disrespect to the Taliban's white holy flag.
For entertainment, the radio program included reciting tarana, men
singing Taliban poetry without music. The sound of the Taliban's chants
was so mournful. Like other girls, I'd turn off the radio once informed
of the new rules I had to obey in order to avoid being beaten on the
street the next day. It's unfortunate that some of that dreadful
Taliban poetry can now be found in a book published by the Taliban's
former Pakistan Ambassador Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaef's book the ``Poetry
of Taliban.''
But things have changed now. There are more than 70 TV network and
hundreds of radio stations in Afghanistan. During my trip to Kabul in
2012, a young woman was singing and dancing on stage at an Afghan TV
station for Eid celebrations. I thought this program, with the
modernity and liveliness of it, was being produced outside of
Afghanistan. But I was wrong; my family said this was being broadcast
from a live concert in Kabul.
In terms of technology, the only tech equipment available to Afghan
civilians were old fashioned analogue phones that were always monitored
by the Taliban. We had no way of communicating with our fellow Afghans
and no means of communicating to the outside world. The country had
become a giant prison inclusive of public punishment and humiliation.
Today, almost 90 percent of Afghans have access to cellphone and
over 6 million Afghans have access to the Internet, which was also
banned under the Taliban regime. (CITE)
Access to health care has dramatically improved for Afghan women
since 2001. Under the Taliban regime, child mortality rate in
Afghanistan was the highest in the world. For example, one in every
four children died before the age of 5. Today, it is 1 in 10, a
dramatic reduction (NPR). Back in 2001, life expectancy was estimated
by the United Nations to be around 45 for Afghans. Today, it has
increased to 60 years, an astonishing improvement in just a decade. For
comparison, it took four decades to achieve the same level of
improvement in life expectancy in the United States from early 1900s to
the onset of World War II (USAID).
In terms of employment, tens of thousands women work as government
employees, in the private sector and as teachers, journalists, doctors,
engineers, college professors, business owners, security officials and
in many other public and private spheres.
Prior to 2001, political participation for women in Afghanistan was
nonexistent. But today, women make up 28 percent of Afghanistan's
Parliament, higher than the U.S. Congress where it's at 18 percent
(World Bank). Afghan women have served as governors, district
governors, and many other high profile positions since 2001.
Perhaps, the most striking indicator of increasing political
participation for Afghan women came on April 5 of this year when around
7 million, or 60 percent of eligible voters, went to the polls to cast
their ballots for a new elected leader. According to Afghan election
officials, women made up 36 percent of voters. In the former Taliban
stronghold of Kandahar province, women made up 10 percent of candidates
running for provincial council seats. And during election campaigning,
the presence of women in election rallies was something international
media outlets could not ignore. The New York Times wrote: ``There is
finally the sense here, after years of international aid and effort
geared toward improving Afghan women's lives that women have become a
significant part of Afghan political life, if not powerful.''
Aside from the elections, since 2001, Afghan women have taken the
lead in organizing themselves as part of the growing Afghan civil
society and fighting for their rights, at times successfully
overturning laws which restricted women's rights. For example, Afghan
women rights groups successfully fought the Afghan Government when it
wanted to close shelters for battered women under pressure from Islamic
clerics in 2011 (NPR). Another example was of Afghan women stopping the
Afghan Government from including a new criminal penal code which barred
family member's testimony in cases of domestic violence, effectively
making it impossible to convict those accused of violence against
women. My organization, Women for Afghan Women, took the lead on this
and we lobbied the Afghan Government hard until President Karzai agreed
not to sign the new bill into law, eventually sending it back to
Parliament for further review.
In just over a decade, Afghan women have come a long way since the
dark days of the Taliban regime. Yet despite the immense progress, the
gains made so far remain extremely fragile. With U.S. led coalition
forces scheduled to leave by the end of this year, the security
situation in Afghanistan facing related uncertainty, and existing
questions concerning future U.S. funding, many Afghan women question if
their gains can be sustained.
I was in Afghanistan in February-March of this year and the one
common sentiment among all Afghan women is their shared fear of being
abandoned by the international community while the Taliban and
insurgency continue to threaten our hard-won gains.
The Taliban continue to attack education. The U.N. reported more
than 1,000 attacks on education in 2009-2012, including schools being
set on fire, suicide bombings and remotely detonated bombs, killings of
staff, threats to staff and abductions (Global Collation to Protect
Education from Attack).
The Taliban have stepped up their attacks on prominent women in the
Afghan Government and also in local communities. For example, Sitara
Achakzai, a prominent Afghan women's rights activist was shot dead by
the Taliban after leaving a provincial council meeting in Kandahar.
Last year a Taliban attack targeted Islam Bibi, a top female police
officer in Helmand province. Two other female police officers were
killed within 6 months in 2013 in Laghman province in eastern
Afghanistan. ``Female police officers seem to be a favorite target of
[Taliban] insurgents,'' (The Guardian).
Taliban's opposition to media and women's participation in public
life is no less severe than it was a decade ago. For example, in 2012
the Taliban beheaded 17 people, including two women, for attending a
mixed-gender party where there was music and dancing (ABC News).
Despite increasing targeted attacks on Afghan women and girls
across the country, it has not stopped them from joining security
forces or serving as public officials. While women are in the front
lines of fighting for their rights, their success also depend on the
continued support of the international community and the Afghan
Government.
While I am inspired by the progress made, I am most concerned with
the future. Before discussing specifics, I would like to make one
point.
Since moving to the U.S. and having the opportunity to learn about
the international community's interventions in countries such as
Afghanistan, I am often struck by the short point of view policymakers
are forced to adopt.
As we all look toward the future, I would like to ask you to
remember that a country cannot be built in 13 years or even 20.
Afghanistan's development as a more stable, rights respecting partner
for the U.S. in an incredibly unstable region cannot be measured in
years or election cycles. This is a process that will take decades and
generations.
My generation is the first that has been educated and brought up in
largely democratic society. Young Afghans, male and female, are better
educated and more connected to the world than any generation before us.
This was evident in the fact that 70 percent of the candidates for
provincial council seats were youth (TOLO TV). Afghan media, which have
witnessed an explosive growth over the last 13 years, are mostly run by
youth. Mine is a generation full of hope but we also face incredible
uncertainty as the international community prepares to withdraw from
Afghanistan.
For my generation to be the force that allows democratic
foundations to permanently take root in the country while eventually
coming to power, progress and stability must be maintained as the torch
is passed. This is now taking place but the sustained involvement and
support of the international community is critical for the process to
be completed.
Looking forward, we understand the U.S.'s civilian financial
commitments will be significantly less than over the past 13 years.
However, we need to know your support will not waver, even if funding
levels drop. The Bilateral Security Agreement, which has the support of
almost all Afghans will be signed by our new President, some U.S.
troops need to remain and funding must continue in order to allow my
generation to complete the hard work of reclaiming Afghanistan from a
generation of war and fundamentalism to a generation of hope and
democracy.
Having considered this, I share with you a set of recommendations
which I hope will help better shape support for the Afghan women beyond
2014.
(1). The Taliban, their supporters, and the like-minded groups
across the region continue to pose a threat to women's social, legal,
economic, political and basic rights. Based on the experiences of
Afghan women activists, the Taliban have refused to show any changes
toward the treatment of women since their fall from power in 2001. In
case of any peace talks with the Taliban, all parties involved must be
extremely cautious of the fact that a peace deal with the Taliban would
compromise women's rights and erode their gains.
(2). It is vital that women's rights remain central to the
relationship between the U.S. and Afghanistan: To preserve the gains of
Afghan women, the U.S. must continue pushing Afghan politicians and
diplomats to do the right thing. As a funder, ally and partner, the
U.S.'s role in Afghanistan hopefully will not soon disappear; meaning
every conversation a U.S. official has with an Afghan official should
mention the importance of women's rights.
(3). While millions of Afghan girls have been enrolled in primary
schools since 2001 (USAID), it's important to continue investing in
education and to further invest in higher education for women through
scholarships, technical programs and other educational opportunities
beyond 2014. Afghanistan's next generations will depend on continuation
of such support.
(4). Continued support for Afghan civil society organizations,
especially those involved in promoting women's rights: Through
strategic investments and mentorship many women leaders have been
brought up in Afghanistan. Continuing to support such agents of change
and progress will encourage the continued transformation of Afghan
society.
(5). Supporting Afghan National Security Forces beyond 2014: I
believe one cannot support women's rights, human rights, or development
in Afghanistan without also supporting a strong ANSF because security
is the foundation from which all Afghan progress can grow and be
sustained. We at Women for Afghan Women believe it's vital some U.S.
led international troops stay in Afghanistan, supporting and training
our military while also symbolically assuring the Afghan people they
won't again be abandoned by the international community. This also
means continuing to fund the ANSF. I know this is not cheap ($4 Billion
annually +/-), but it is necessary.
(6). Continued support for the Afghan media and freedom of speech
in Afghanistan. The explosive growth of Afghan media and the rapid rise
of freedom of press have been two key and major gains of the last 13
years. Afghan media have also played a critical role in enabling
democratic principles to take root in Afghanistan.
(7). Supporting women's shelters, educational programs to highlight
domestic abuse, and other social programs which tackle the multitude of
issues facing Afghan women.
Thank you all for your support of Afghanistan. We would not be in
the midst of a successful election or be here talking about progress
made without you and the American people's immense sacrifice on our
behalf. We are also grateful to our American sisters who have supported
us and stayed with us through the bad and worst times. It's because of
your support and sacrifices that we, the women of Afghanistan, have
been empowered to fight for gains despite all odds against us. We are
determined to move forward and strengthen the foundations for a better
tomorrow and hope our friend and ally the United States will walk with
us.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much, Ms. Nazary.
Six-minute rounds and we will go until we need to vote or
until witnesses have other commitments. I will begin.
General Allen, we hear different assessments of the current
status and strength of the Afghan National Security Forces,
depending on whether we are in intel meetings, foreign
relations meetings, armed services meetings, depending on
whether we are talking to NGOs that are active in Afghanistan.
Your letter that you intend to send to the President delved
into that a bit, but I would like your candid assessment of
both strengths and continuing challenges with the ANSF in your
view.
Mr. Allen. Thank you for that question, Senator.
I think the case is clear that in almost any developing
security force, the more technical dimensions of that force are
always going to be a challenge.
As well, there will be the challenge associated with the
development of leadership. The substantial challenges which I
faced as the commander and I believe still will be a challenge
for some sometime in the future will be ensuring that the
Afghan leadership are well prepared and developed, they are
continually improved in their capabilities by the long-term
presence of our forces on the ground in an advisory capacity,
that the institutions of the schools and the training centers
are well equipped and poised to continue the upward development
of the Afghan leadership because without credible Afghan
leadership at all levels, from the general officers through the
mid-grade down to the youngest of the troop commanders, the
Afghan National Security Forces will hit a glass ceiling very
early. So the leadership development is a really important
dimension of what we are doing.
And more work simply needs to be done. We typically found
that the officer corps had deep roots in one of three eras: the
Soviet era, the mujahideen era, and then the modern era, the
era where we would see young Afghan officers, men and women who
look like our young officers, who are professionally oriented
in the same manner. And they are the hope of the future. But as
you know, it takes time obviously for them to ascend through
the ranks.
In the meantime, doing as much as we can in an advisory
capacity, we have to work with the Soviet era officers, those
officers who have been developed over a period of time who have
fewer skills and less education. The mujahideen jihadi leaders
are an example of that. So the officers are an area which
deserves our continued attention and for as long as possible
our long-term touch of that aspect of the Afghan society.
And then the technical dimensions. It is one thing to
conduct infantry operations. It is another thing to support
infantry operations. So everything from the logistics support,
the combat service support, the air movement locally by
helicopter movement or by fixed wing transport, all of these
require technical abilities. And as those capabilities are more
profoundly placed into the hands of the Afghans over time, that
kind of training regimen is going to be important to ensure
that they have the ability to exercise those capabilities.
When I was the commander, at the beginning of my tour in
July 2009--excuse me--July 2011, we saw very few large-scale
operations being accomplished in Afghanistan because of the
inability of the staffs to plan them and execute them and the
inability of the organization to support them. As I was
departing--and I know as of last year--we were routinely seeing
corps level operations occurring across Afghanistan where
numbers of regiments or brigades would be in the field being
supported routinely by the logistics of that organization.
Now, that is a huge improvement from where we were, but
that improvement has to continue. There has to be a long-term
touch of those forces to continue that upward spiral. An
advisory presence--I may well get the question in any case--I
think is essential to the long-term capacity of the Afghan
National Security Forces to create the security platform on
which we hope to see credible governance and real economic
opportunity occur. That will occur with the right kind of
advisory presence.
And it is not just about the numbers. It is about the
presence. I have been involved in training of foreign forces
for many years and I have been an advisor. Just our presence in
their ranks provided the connectivity of the moral support of
the American people and, more broadly, the international
community. It means that the lives of these Afghan troops
matter because we are with them and we are in their ranks. So
advisory presence is not just about imbuing them with the
technical skills or the tactical skills. It is about being
simply with them.
And so much work remains to be done. We have got to keep
our hands on the officer development program because the Afghan
National Security Forces will never better than their officers.
But there is much technical work remaining to be done. As we
continue to flow technically oriented equipment into the hands
of the Afghans, we have got work to be done there.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
One question for Ms. Nazary, then to Senator McCain.
Ms. Nazary, your recent visit to Afghanistan coincided with
the period of the first round of the Presidential elections.
Tell me what the Afghan population desire is with respect to
women's empowerment issues you describe. Was it a key feature
of the campaigns and is the popular support strong for
continuing on the path of progress and battling against
backsliding if there are those who want to reverse course?
Ms. Nazary. In all of the public debates, all the
candidates spoke about their support for Afghan women's rights,
and even up to the very last debate, Dr. Ghani emphasized the
support for Afghan women's rights. So that has been seen very
widely, and I think during the elections, the people were very
enthusiastic in Afghanistan. In their rallies, there were more
people coming and everyone watched the debates. It was the
first Presidential debates we had so openly. So it was a great
joy to be there and see that.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses.
General Allen, one of the great pleasures of my life, as
well as honor, is to be associated with people like you who are
such outstanding leaders, and your work in Afghanistan, in my
view, and before that in Iraq, has been incredibly honorable.
And I thank you for your continued service to the country, and
I thank you, Ms. Nazary, also.
Obviously, the reason why I am very interested in hearing
your views is we seem to be seeing, in my view, a replay of
what happened in Iraq when we ended up without troops there.
There was an April 21 piece that says United States force
in Afghanistan may be cut to less than 10,000 troops. I
remember there were some leaders that said that the minimum
should be 20,000, and then it seemed to be the coalescing
around our military and Ambassador and others, 10,000 plus
3,000 or 4,000 additional NATO troops. Is that pretty much the
way you have seen this evolve?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir. Sir, as you recall, my recommendation
on the U.S. side was 13,600 U.S. and about 6,000 non-U.S. NATO
and partner nations.
Senator McCain. Right. And now we are in a situation where
it seems to be--as General Dempsey once testified before the
Senate Armed Services Committee about the numbers in Iraq, it
cascaded down. It seems to be cascading down.
Here again, according to this article, the decision to
consider a small force, possibly less than 5,000 United States
troops reflects a belief among White House officials that
Afghan security forces have evolved into a robust enough force
to contain a still potent Taliban-led insurgency. Do you share
that view?
Mr. Allen. I do not, Senator. Look, the Taliban are going
to be a potent and resilient insurgency for a long time. The
question is whether they are an existential insurgency.
From my perspective, an Afghan National Security Force that
is well advised and well supported, which gives us the time to
lock in these leadership traits and technical capabilities and
battlefield skills, that will ultimately put the end to the
insurgency in Afghanistan. They have not had the time. The
Afghan National Security Forces have not had the time to
embrace a culture of leadership, to embrace the technical
dimension of modern warfare, or to, in fact, embrace the
ability to fight in large formations on the battlefield. That
will come over time. Our presence, a credible presence, with
those forces is what will lock in that success and lock in that
security platform.
Senator McCain. And that credible force is what you just
stated.
Mr. Allen. That was my recommendation.
Senator McCain. Then it goes on to say during a March visit
to Washington, General Dunford told lawmakers that without
foreign soldiers supporting them, Afghan forces would begin to
deteriorate, ``fairly quickly in 2015.'' It goes on. ``The
Afghan Air Force, still several years away from being self-
sufficient, will require even more assistance,'' he said. Do
you share that quote from General Dunford? That view.
Mr. Allen. Well, again, Senator, I do. I believe from my
own personal experience, both in Afghanistan and in Iraq, in
Bosnia, in other places, the accepted, enthusiastic presence of
foreign forces in the formations of an emerging youthful
force--it is an essential presence frankly.
And at the end of the Soviet era, we learned two lessons.
One was that the Soviets left advisors with a pervasive touch
across the Afghan forces that had been provided by them. Now,
you might have problems with the Soviets or have problems with
the Afghan forces, but in the end, they were a pretty effective
force. And the Soviet decision was to leave substantial numbers
of advisors and a substantial resource trail of money to
support that force.
When the Soviet Union began to come apart and the advisors
first were withdrawn and then when the Soviet Union collapsed
and the money was withdrawn, we saw ultimately the very rapid
deterioration of the post-Soviet Afghan force. It began to
collapse, fragment along ethnic and tribal lines, and we saw
from that the emergence of the civil war and all of the horror
that Ms. Nazary has talked about.
Our recommendations were predicated upon having a
sufficient advisory presence and a long-term funding stream to
give us the time to prepare the Afghans and to lock in those
skills so that they on their own, as they ought to on their
own, will be the authors of the stability of Afghanistan over
the long term. That is why this campaign has always
envisioned--it has always envisioned--
a residual force that would carry on the work at an advisory
level that we paid such a high price to pay for in the
conventional phase.
So I do agree with General Dunford.
Senator McCain. And you would think that we might have
learned a lesson from Iraq, but perhaps not.
I guess, finally, it is pretty obvious it is going to be
Ashraf Ghani or Abdullah Abdullah as the next President of
Afghanistan. You have had a lot of conversations and engagement
with both of those individuals. Do you have confidence in both
of them?
Mr. Allen. I have confidence in both of them, sir. Dr.
Abdullah Abdullah--and I want to be careful with my public
comments not to appear to influence the runoff if it comes. I
will limit my comments that I have known Dr. Abdullah Abdullah
for some period of time. I think he is a very responsible
leader with great governmental experience. I worked very
closely with Dr. Ashraf Ghani because he was the coordinator
for the process of transition. He also is a former minister and
has had extensive experience.
The value of both of those candidates, frankly, is that
they are extraordinary well educated. They are well connected
into the Afghan society across tribal and ethnic lines. They
are well accepted and well known by the international
community, and I believe, very importantly, they hold very
similar views on the long-term presence of the West and the
value of that presence both for civil society, the rights of
women, and the long-term security stability. I believe they are
also, very importantly, committed to what I think is the
existential threat in Afghanistan and that is rooting out
corruption.
Senator McCain. I thank you, General Allen. And I know you
have also been involved in other issues, including the Israeli-
Palestinian issue, and I thank you for your continued service
to the country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Ms. Nazary, a question about youth activism. General Allen
talked about the need to train the military leadership with
young leadership coming up through the ranks. Talk a little bit
about the engagement of the Afghan youth in the election
process that you just observed. With that average age being age
18, a lot of our hopes about the future of Afghanistan rests
with the leadership of that generation, those who are 18 to
your age. And talk about their degree of political
participation in this recent first round of the Presidential
elections.
Ms. Nazary. I think the Afghan population is--about 70
percent of the population is under the age of 25. So that
actually gives me great hope for the future of Afghanistan. I
know of Afghans my generation who have come to study abroad or
in Afghanistan and have been extremely active. For example,
Afghanistan 1400. It is the year 1393 in Afghanistan. So 1400
is looking ahead. And it is a youth coalition built in
Afghanistan by the youth, and they are very politically active
and make informed choices of who to vote for. This is something
that gives me real hope.
Senator Kaine. Thank you for that.
General Allen, I want to ask a question about Pakistan. You
heard the first panel when I asked the question about the
economic opportunities with Pakistan, and Ms. Sumar offered
some thoughts about how a number of projects could potentially
sort of change what has been the complicated dynamic you
described. Do you have the same hope about those? Do you have
concerns? What is your current thought about that piece of
advice that you will give to the next President on the Afghan-
Pakistan economic relationship?
Mr. Allen. Well, I think that the new President and his
administration in Kabul really gives us an opportunity to reach
out to the Sharif administration in Islamabad to create a new
era of cooperation. That cooperation, as I said in my opening
statement, can come in many ways, but one of the most important
opportunities for cooperation is economic cooperation. I think
we all know from our study of history and our study of
insurgencies that you fight an insurgency to a certain point in
a military context, but you lock in the gains of governance and
economic opportunity by stimulating economic growth, economic
relationships, and regional trade.
My sense is that Prime Minister Sharif grasps that. He said
important things about improving the relationship with India,
and part of that improvement is not just a political
relationship but it is an economic relationship as well. So by
tying in the Central Asian states to the emerging economy of
Afghanistan--and we do not really know yet what that economy
looks like. It has been distorted by 30-plus years of crisis
and conflict. But by tying in the Central Asian states and
their wealth to the emerging Afghan economy, ultimately to a
willing and receptive Pakistani system of government which is
at a policy level willing to have the relationship with
Afghanistan, and then have that transit across Pakistan to
India creates an opportunity for economic development in that
part of the world that we just cannot begin to imagine.
So my hope is that the new President in Kabul will reach
out to his counterpart in Islamabad and deal with the issues of
security and the people-to-people dynamics, but the opportunity
for economic advantage for both countries, if they can see that
same common interest, I think is really important.
Senator Kaine. I want to ask you a question about your last
piece of advice dealing with what you view as the existential
threat, corruption. You indicated that the West and the United
States may have made the problem worse to some degree, and yet
most of the challenge is a domestic challenge for the President
and the new leadership team to deal with. Let me ask you about
the piece that is on the U.S.'s side of the equation. While we
can and will continue to encourage anticorruption efforts, are
there lessons learned from the last decade that the United
States should put into practice as we contemplate the kinds of
aid whether it is international development or trade or other
economic assistance that we provide to Afghanistan going
forward? What improvements should we be looking to make on our
own side of the equation?
Mr. Allen. Chairman, this deserves a lot of analysis
because the knockout blow in insurgency is not delivered by the
military. The knockout blow is delivered by the development of
credible governance and economic opportunity. What we have
discovered in Afghanistan--and I believe other Afghans would
agree with me--when all of the institutions, recognizable
institutions, of governance and the rule of law and the
judiciary were crushed, after year after year either though the
Communist coup or the Soviet era or the civil war or the
Taliban period, the one thing that typically was functioning
was the tribal system. And the patronage networks, which are
inherent in a tribal system anywhere in the world, ultimately
took on a far greater role in Afghan life than the systems of
government and recognizable institutions.
It is going to be very difficult to root them out of the
government and root them out of the institutions of government
that they have sought to continue to influence because in many
respects the struggle in Afghanistan, beyond the struggle in
the battlefield against the Taliban--the struggle will be
building credible governance at the expense of the criminality
and the criminal patronage networks and the corruption. The
criminal patronage networks see that a well-functioning
government, a well-functioning judiciary, one that is based
truly and credibly on the rule of law is in direct competition.
So the struggle is not necessarily apparent to those who are
observing what is happening in Afghanistan.
This swath of Afghan youth are fed up with corruption. They
are fed up with having to pay a bribe to have their daughters
or their spouses seen by physicians. They are fed up with
having to bribe their way into schools. We have a swath of the
youth of Afghanistan that is poised and ready ultimately to
throw off the burden that corruption has placed on that
society. And unless the administration of the newly elected
President is willing to comprehensively go after the criminal
patronage networks and the drug enterprise, often protected as
we have seen in other insurgencies by the ideological Taliban
right now, the ideological insurgency, we are going to have a
problem over the long-term viability of Afghanistan.
So lessons learned. Ensure that as we dedicate development
money and expend development money--ensure that the vetting
process is proper and that the vetting process goes as deeply
into the Afghan fabric or the host nation's fabric of society
as we can to ensure that none of that money is siphoned off by
subcontractors, sub-sub-subcontractors and ultimately find
their way into the hands of the Taliban.
If I were to design a campaign like this all over again and
we had the time to get it right, I would have looked very, very
hard at the kinds of authorities necessary and the
organizational approaches that give us the ability to achieve
synergy between our intelligence organizations, law
enforcement, and threat finance organizations to create synergy
that permitted us to get at what is emerging really as an
unholy alliance in many respects, which is the criminal
patronage network operating in conjunction with the money-
generating effects of the drug enterprise, supported by,
protected by the ideological insurgency, the Taliban.
We have seen this elsewhere and we are going to see it
again elsewhere. Going into a campaign well organized with the
right kinds of authorities so that we can conduct law
enforcement, counternarcotics, counterdrug work as we are doing
counterinsurgency gives us the ability to tap into the
strengths of all of those organizations. But in some respects,
we firewalled those capabilities, and there was no cross-
pollination that could have permitted us to build the synergy
necessary to take that triangle apart and to attack the
component legs of that triangle.
So lesson learned for me if I were ever to advise someone
again about a long-term counterinsurgency that we might be
involved in, it would be, first and foremost, recognize that
the threat will be corruption inherently. It always will be,
that there will be a drug component most likely, and that the
two of those legs will be in some form of a symbiotic relation
with the insurgency itself. Let us go in organized with the
right kinds of legal authorities for the military, the police,
the drug enforcement entities, the intelligence, and the threat
finance. Let us go in with the right kind of organization,
which I sought to do in my final months there as the commander,
to let us get at probably the greatest threat to our success in
that next insurgency, which is the insipient criminality that
will exist once we have washed away the insurgency itself.
Senator Kaine. Ms. Nazary, I would like your opinion on the
very same question. As you travel and interact with Afghan
women and Afghan society, talk to me about your thoughts about
this future anticorruption challenge in Afghanistan.
Ms. Nazary. I think corruption is a challenge, and with the
candidates, they all have again spoken that they will step up
their efforts to work against corruption and I hope they will
succeed in that.
Senator Kaine. And do you have that same sense that young
people coming up have come up in a way where they are ready to
cast off the notion of having to pay a bribe to see a doctor,
having to pay a bribe to get into school?
Ms. Nazary. That is very true, getting into school, getting
jobs and opportunities. There is corruption and we see that,
and people are fed up by that. Youth are fed up by that. And
the civilians would very much want that to go away.
Senator Kaine. There is much that we can do and should do.
Your testimony about us continuing our focus and engagement is
very important, but the thing that is ultimately going to be
the best guardian of success is that demand of the public that
things be different, the demand of the Afghan public that
things be different.
Very, very good testimony. Again, both of your written
testimony was quite provocative and informative, and your
personal testimony today was as well. I appreciate all being
here.
The record of this hearing will stay open until close of
business 1 week from today. So if committee members have
questions that they wish to submit in writing, they will be
submitted to you, and I hope you will respond promptly if they
do.
But again, thank you for appearing on this important topic.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of Jarrett Blanc to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Section 602(b) of the Afghan Allies Protection Act of
2009 authorized the issuance of Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to
Afghan nationals who were employed by or on behalf of the U.S.
Government in Afghanistan and who meet certain requirements. What
percentage of SIV recipients are translators or security personnel?
What percentage of SIV recipients are locally employed political
officers or program support staff?
Answer. Since the start of FY 2014, the Department of State has
issued over 1,900 Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to Afghan principal
applicants, for a total of over 4,000 issued SIVs this year including
eligible family members. This is more than all the previous years
combined and more than double the total number of Afghan principal
applicants issued visas in FY 2013. Of those total numbers, Afghans
employed on behalf of the U.S. military, including translators and
security personnel, continue to comprise the majority of SIV
applicants. According to National Visa Center data on occupations as
reported by SIV applicants, over 6,500 of those who have applied for
the SIV program and received Chief of Mission (COM) approval to date
reportedly worked as translators and another 200 as security personnel.
Locally employed (LE) staff employed by the Department of State in
Afghanistan have received 196 SIVs since 2012, with the vast majority
(172) issued since October 2013. To date, 714 LE staff have submitted
SIV application letters. These applications represent all aspects of
the work done by LE staff, both those assisting with political issues
and those in more traditional support staff roles.
______
Responses of Fatema Sumar to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. How does the New Silk Road initiative work to develop the
capacity of civil society watchdog organizations in Central Asia as
countries in the region are encouraged to deepen economic ties across
borders?
Answer. USAID's Development through Regional Cooperation (DRC)
program supports the New Silk Road initiative's work with civil
society. The DRC is a regional initiative covering all five Central
Asia countries, with expanding participation of Afghanistan and
Pakistan civil society organizations (CSO). The program is
strengthening their watchdog and advocacy capacity in key thematic
areas such as environmental issues, women entrepreneurship and
children's rights. The program seeks to identify, network, and
strengthen these CSOs from across the region in order to generate
grassroots domestic constituencies for reform and while linking them to
advance integration between Central Asian countries, as well as between
Central and South Asia.
Question. How has the NSR sought to develop links among women
business leaders in Afghanistan with their counterparts in South and
Central Asia?
Answer. To increase women's economic participation, the U.S.
Department of State and USAID support a number of programs which link
women business leaders with each other to expand market opportunities
and exchange business best practices.
For instance, the Department of State supports two regional
initiatives: the Central Asia and Afghanistan Women's Economic
Symposium (WES) and the South Asia Women's Entrepreneurship Symposium
(SAWES). Now in its third year, the WES initiative has trained
thousands of women and helped hundreds to obtain new or larger loans,
establish or expand businesses, and gain employment in Central Asia. As
part of the WES initiative, we are expanding women's markets and
strengthening local production capacity through international textile
trade hubs in Kazakhstan and the Fergana Valley situated across
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The initiative also helped
launch the Central Asia Afghanistan Business Women's Network, which is
the first regional women's business association to promote business,
border, and trade reforms helpful for businesswomen across Central Asia
and Afghanistan and has been operating for over 2 years.
The SAWES initiative is continuing efforts to empower women
entrepreneurs through regional cooperation in South Asia and beyond. As
a direct result of knowledge gained at the 2012 Symposium, the Afghan
delegation established an advocacy group called ``Leading Lady
Entrepreneurs of Afghanistan for Development'' (LEAD) in July 2013 to
ensure businesswomen's voices are heard by policymakers. Through a
series of cross-border training, advocacy, and networking activities,
the initiative is helping to increase access to finance, markets, and
business capacity for Afghan women entrepreneurs and develop
connections with businesswomen across the region. For example, in April
2014, Afghan businesswomen, including LEAD members, participated in a
regional study tour to Bangladesh where they gained experience in
leadership skills, sustainable business models, advocacy tools, and
access to financial support.
With U.S. support, Afghan women participate with Central Asians in
business training at the Aga Khan Central Asia University and are able
to attend the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek. Since
2010, USAID's Central Asian Trade Forums have brought together business
and government representatives from the CAR countries and their
counterparts from Afghanistan and Pakistan, including women
entrepreneurs and organizations such as the Women's Development Agency
in Tajikistan. In February 2014, the Afghan-Kazakh-Uzbek business-to-
business conference in Mazar-e-Sharif attracted businesswomen and
businesswomen's associations and led to commercial agreements in
cosmetics and textiles. Moreover, since 2012 USAID's Women's Leadership
in Small and Medium Enterprises (WLSME) program in Kyrgyzstan has
worked with nearly 600 women entrepreneurs to build better linkages
with suppliers, buyers and regional markets. In July 2013, USAID
announced the Promoting Gender Equity in National Priority Programs
(Promote), a 5-year program (2014-2019) to enable Afghan women to
increase their participation in the formal economy by securing higher
education opportunities and employment with advancement potential as
well as establishing and expanding viable small- to medium- to large-
sized women-owned businesses. Planned activities will coordinate
closely with other USAID and donor projects, such as the regional
economic growth project Afghanistan Trade and Revenue Project (ATAR),
designed to address Afghan women's economic empowerment in-country and
regionally.
Question. How much assistance funding has the State Department and
USAID dedicated toward the goals of the New Silk Road Initiative since
its announcement?
Answer. We are thankful for Congress' support for regional
programming between Afghanistan and its neighbors in South and Central
Asia. This type of programming, which we call the ``New Silk Road
Initiative,'' is critical to supporting the development of a prosperous
and stable Afghanistan embedded in a prosperous and peaceful region.
Since 2011, the New Silk Road initiative has coordinated and
intensified efforts by the United States, donors and regional
stakeholders to advance regional economic connectivity. For the past 3
years, we have aggressively employed diplomatic and development means
to facilitate Afghanistan's economic transition through regional
connectivity between South and Central Asia and the broader region.
The State Department and USAID have committed more than $24.3
million in regional Central Asian Economic Support Funds (ESF) to
support targeted interventions with funds from fiscal year 2012 through
fiscal year 2014. These funds have been and will be used to increase
trade and investment; improve transit; advance cooperation on energy
trade; promote effective management of natural resources across the
region; and develop sustainable people-to-people constituencies for
regional engagement on private sector and trade development.
In addition to these regional resources, bilateral resources from
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics have supported
regional connectivity priorities. For instance, in the area of trade,
USAID has leveraged resources from the Regional Economic Cooperation
(REC) project in Central Asia, the Afghanistan Trade and Revenue (ATAR)
project and the Pakistan Trade Project (PTP) to work toward the common
goal of facilitating trade across a traditionally unconnected region.
ATAR alone has committed nearly $8 million toward cross-border
programming between Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Infrastructure projects funded with ESF resources in Pakistan have
built multiple roads linking Afghanistan to Pakistan and the broader
region, including all four major trade and transit routes including
Peshawar-Torkham, Quetta-Chaman, Bannu-Gulam-Khan, and Angoor Adda. The
Pakistan TRADE project has also worked to boost regional trade and has
reduced the time in Karachi port for Afghan goods in half, from 43 to
23 days.
Recognizing the importance of cross-border trade and transit
between Afghanistan and Central Asia, we have undertaken a
comprehensive effort to ensure that regional and related bilateral
activities are properly coordinated and function to promote regional
trade and investment and security. We have made investments in core
infrastructural assets such as roads, aviation and telecom, laying the
foundations to help promote interconnectivity with the people,
businesses and countries of Central Asia. Substantial investments have
also been made in power generation and distribution that will further
enable economic development as well as promote domestic, regional and
foreign investment and enhance regional stability.
Notably, we have also successfully leveraged other resources in
support of the New Silk Road initiative; between fiscal years 2010 and
2014, estimated investments by other donors, total more than $2
billion, including the Asia Development Bank and the World Bank, in
support of energy transmission lines, hydropower plants, and energy-
sector reforms. Specifically, with Central Asia regional funds, USAID's
Regional Energy Security Efficiency and Trade Project has spent over $4
million to fund the CASA-1000 Inter-Governmental Council Secretariat
which coordinates planning on a $1 billion, 1,300 megawatt electricity
transmission line which will connect Central Asian countries with
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Question. Does the Department of Defense have a role in the New
Silk Road initiative? If so, how has the State Department worked with
DOD to support the goals of the initiative?
Answer. The New Silk Road initiative relies on interagency
cooperation to realize the shared objective of a stable, secure, and
prosperous Afghanistan as part of a stable, secure, and prosperous
South and Central Asia. The Department of Defense is one of many
interagency partners that have aided the New Silk Road's focus on
regional economic cooperation. Support has included extensive programs
building the border capacity between Afghanistan and Pakistan and
Central Asia as well as assistance on energy and trade facilitation.
Their support includes both infrastructure, such as installation of
rail scanners on the Uzbek-Afghan border at Termez, as well as
technical assistance to facilitate secure, regional trade flows.
Looking beyond the economic and security development work, our
Department of Defense colleagues have an instrumental role in
developing and maintaining the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and
its supply chains throughout Central Asia that supported operations in
Afghanistan. These endeavors leverage mentoring and other assistance
USAID, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and
other partners provided to businesses. The relationships and expertise
gained through Department of Defense efforts in Central Asia are
critical aspects of continued New Silk Road engagement in the region.
We continue to work with our Department of Defense partners on
identifying ways to incorporate NDN lessons learned within New Silk
Road efforts. In late April, State and Defense personnel met at the
Defense Logistics Agency in Ft. Belvoir to review further ways to
transition NDN for commercial use throughout the region. The New Silk
Road will remain a platform for the Department of Defense and other
interagency partners to pursue our shared objectives regarding
Afghanistan's future in the South and Central Asia region.
______
Responses of Kathleen Campbell to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Does USAID provide support to Afghan civil society
organizations that conduct oversight on Afghan Government ministries
which also receive U.S. support? If so, how many organizations receive
funding and at what levels? Please describe the programming conducted
by these organizations.
Answer. USAID funds activities by a wide range of Afghan civil
society organizations whose work relates to overseeing Afghan
Government performance. These activities are generally organized around
types of services or issues that often are the responsibility of more
than one Afghan ministry, such as monitoring provincial level
corruption and promoting women's rights.
USAID funding for civil society-specific programming in FY13 was
$60.2 million, including $14.4 million in women's-specific programming.
The Agency's principal civil society support program has facilitated
capacity building for 374 Afghan NGOs across the country as part of a
civil society support network. Other programs regularly involve
engagement and capacity building with civil society groups, including
USAID's parliamentary support program, media program, rule of law
program, and work on stabilization and democracy.
There are some cases where funding civil society organizations is
designed to increase the accountability and effectiveness of government
programs that also receive USAID funding. For example:
Elections: USAID has invested $25 million during this
election cycle on programs to support civil society capacity-
building around advocacy for electoral reform. Through these
efforts, civil society organizations (CSOs) are helping to hold
the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the Independent
Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) accountable for
decisions relating to election planning, security, and
complaints. The United States also supports the IEC and ECC
with a $55 million contribution to the $129 million UNDP-
administered ELECT program that pools funding from multiple
donors.
Rule of Law: USAID has supported the Afghanistan Independent
Bar Association (AIBA) through a multiyear, $1.2 million grant,
which provides legal aid and legal awareness services to
indigent Afghans who need representation in court. At the same
time, a component of USAID's Formal Justice Rule of Law program
provides support to the Supreme Court to train judges and
improve court administration so that access to justice can be
improved.
More generally, USAID's two largest and most comprehensive civil
society programs are the Initiative to Support Afghan Civil Society
(IPACS II), which concluded at the end of 2013, and the follow-on
Afghan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP), which started in 2013 and runs
through 2018. IPACS II strengthened a national Afghan civil society
network of 374 local NGOs, many of them women-led or women-focused
CSOs, to improve their capacity in areas such as leadership,
governance, strategic planning, gender awareness and mainstreaming,
sustainability, and monitoring and evaluation. Through these civil
society strengthening efforts, CSOs were able to, for example:
Engage in advocacy and monitoring of the Afghan national
budget process and launch an annual national policy reform
conference;
Advocate with Members of Parliament for the adoption of 29
of 33 amendments to the Social Organization Law, amendments
that President Karzai signed into law in September 2013;
Advocate for changes to nine articles of the government's
proposed law on Non-Governmental Organizations, which are being
considered by Afghanistan's Ministry of Justice;
Advocate for and become signatories to a Memorandum of
Understanding between Parliament and civil society
organizations; and
Bring together civil society organizations, local government
authorities and individual citizens to identify local
challenges and develop local solutions through 1,286 Community
Dialogue Sessions in 30 provinces, involving more than 25,738
people. These dialogues feed into a national level effort to
prioritize civil society's policy reform efforts and advocate
these priorities to the Afghan Government.
ACEP, USAID's follow-on civil society and media program, will
continue this important support to anticorruption and government
oversight activities that utilize civil society organizations, the
traditional media and social media to educate citizens against
corruption. ACEP will promote greater CSO engagement with government
and policymakers, as well as oversight, through trainings in
legislative processes, policy research, constituency-building,
networking, transparency/anticorruption, lobbying and monitoring of
service-delivery, to its 14 key partner organizations and their 140 CSO
partners in the provinces.
In the first year of the program, ACEP plans to award four
Government Monitoring and Policy Advocacy Campaign Grants with
estimated grant ceiling of $43,000-$45,000 per grant, to the following
organizations:
Afghanistan Development and Welfare Services Organization:
The Build Demand for Accountability project will work with
selected government institutions to develop a business process
map (charter) for their administrative services used by
citizens. The project is designed to address the lack of
awareness amongst citizens on the established timeframes for
government services as well as the document flow process and
the roles of various government offices.
Afghan Coordination Against Corruption: AFCAC proposes to
work with the Ministry of Education (MoE) on this project that
is designed to stimulate the creation of an anticorruption
culture at the ministry level. The project will advocate for
the implementation of an anticorruption action plan.
Integrity Watch Afghanistan: The project will carry out
qualitative research in four provinces (Kabul, Nangarhar,
Balkh, and Herat) on the intended and potential role of CSOs in
the provincial budgeting process. It will raise CSOs' awareness
on budget issues through technical trainings and will build
networks of CSOs at the subnational and national levels to work
on provincial budgeting issues.
Initiatives for Development (IDO): IDO proposes to implement
the project in collaboration with Empowerment Center for Women
(ECW) with the goal of launching a civil society advocacy
initiative aimed at improving Government service delivery and
promoting accountability through monitoring National Budget
spending and the performance of the five line ministries.
Question. On May 5 the Washington Post published a story which
described a lack of USAID oversight on a major grantee, International
Relief and Development (IRD). Please provide information about IRD's
hiring and executive compensation practices and its use of
nondisclosure agreements for USAID funded programs in Afghanistan.
Answer. USAID conducts annual ethics training for all of its
employees on post-government employment rules and requirements, with a
particular focus on new employees and those planning to leave Federal
Government employment. Post-government employment rules generally do
not prohibit former employees from working for any particular company.
However, officials who leave the Agency are prohibited from
representing a new employer back to the Federal Government on
particular matters, for example on a contract on which the former
employee worked.
As a nonprofit entity, International Relief and Development (IRD)
primarily receives grants and cooperative agreements as opposed to
contracts. Compensation costs, such as executive compensation, are
generally reimbursable under United States Government (USG) awards if
they are reasonable, allowable, and allocable per governing
regulations. For nonprofit entities such as IRD, annual A-133 audits
are required in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget
requirements. The A-133 independent auditors are responsible for
determining the propriety of costs claimed under USG awards, including
executive compensation and bonuses. IRD's rate calculation and
supporting data included in the A-133 audit do itemize certain costs,
but do not delineate executive compensation separately from other labor
costs. Aggregate bonus costs are broken out as a line item, and are not
delineated by employee. A-133 audit results are shared for review with
USAID, including the Office of Inspector General. Recent A-133 audits
of IRD did not question executive compensation or bonus costs or
identify any other items of questioned costs.
With regard to USAID's grants and cooperative agreements, separate
efforts have been undertaken to reiterate the whistleblower protections
provided to employees of assistance recipients and subrecipients. On
May 9, 2014, USAID sent letters to all assistance recipients regarding
their statutory obligations to notify and observe the legal protections
afforded their employees. Concurrently, a Procurement Executive
Bulletin was issued to all USAID Contracting and Agreement Officers to
ensure that the applicable provisions related to whistleblower
protections were included in all new and existing awards. USAID
contractors and implementing partners have an obligation to report
allegations of waste, fraud, or abuse related to USAID projects. No
contractor or partner should use nondisclosure agreements to limit the
federally protected rights of its employees to report waste, fraud or
abuse.
Question. All of these factors inhibit transparency of U.S. foreign
assistance and make the external coordination of aid dollars even more
difficult.
USAID's Foreign Assistance Dashboard features transaction-level
data for Afghanistan, but does not include performance data.
Why isn't data published on the Dashboard linked to
performance data?
The State Department does not publish its foreign assistance data
on the Dashboard, creating an incomplete picture of U.S. assistance
efforts in Afghanistan.
Why doesn't the State Department publish its foreign
assistance data on the Dashboard?
U.S. agencies involved in foreign assistance do not use the
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) XML format to publish
their data; instead their data is ``crosswalked'' from the Dashboard
into the IATI standard, often compromising the integrity of the data.
Why don't USAID and the State Department use the IATI XML
format at the outset to publish their data?
Answer. The Foreign Assistance Dashboard (FAD) is a Department of
State-managed Web site that presents budget, obligation, and
disbursement data for all U.S. Government agencies that have foreign
assistance funding. The purpose of the FAD is to make U.S. Government
foreign assistance data available to the public in open, machine
readable formats and to enable anyone to track foreign assistance
investments in a standard and easy-to-understand visual format. USAID
submits data to the FAD in accordance with the mandates in OMB Bulletin
12-01, which provides guidance on the regular submission of timely,
detailed, high-quality comparable data on foreign assistance
disbursements. The FAD is not a performance Web site, and OMB Bulletin
12-01 does not require agencies to publish performance data on the FAD.
USAID, however, does publish performance information in several other
places, and links disbursement data from the FAD and Afghanistan's
annual performance data on its Dollars to Results (http://
results.usaid.gov/) Web site. USAID will incorporate FY 2013 data on
the Dollars to Results Web site before the end of the third quarter.
Other publication of performance data include our Annual Performance
Plan and Report as part of the Congressional Budget Justification, on
Performance.gov, on USAID's Open Data Listing (http://www.usaid.gov/
data), and in evaluations which are available online through the
Development Experience Clearinghouse (http://dec.usaid.gov).
In the U.S. IATI Implementation Plan, the administration publically
committed to have all U.S. Government foreign assistance data reported
on the FAD by the end of 2015. USAID has provided the FAD with budget
data since December 2010. In 2012, USAID began providing aggregate
obligation and disbursement data, and in July 2013, USAID became the
first U.S. Government agency to fully comply with OMB Bulletin 12-01
and release detailed transaction-level data to the FAD. Our Department
of State colleagues can provide details on their schedule for providing
the Department's information as well as the status of other agencies
reporting to the Dashboard. OMB Bulletin 12-01 does not require
agencies to report data in the XML format directly to the FAD at this
time. USAID data are submitted to the Department of State in an Excel
file, which is then converted to XML using crosswalk mapping that USAID
developed, cleared, and believes in no way compromises the integrity of
the data. The Department of State then registers the data with IATI,
allowing USAID's transaction-level information to be available in XML
on the FAD ``Data'' page.
Question. Family Planning.--Globally, we are seeing a skyrocketing
demand for family planning services. In the most vulnerable
populations, we see both a high birth rate due to cultural influences,
and a high number of maternal deaths linked to backroom abortions.
What is USAID doing to promote family planning services in
the most vulnerable populations and how do you plan to address
the social and religious barriers?
Answer. USAID's family planning and reproductive health program
contributes to lower maternal and child mortality by enabling women to
choose the number, timing, and spacing of their children and by
reducing unintended pregnancy, thereby reducing abortion. We utilize
mobile outreach and frontline community health workers to provide
voluntary family planning information, services and referrals to women
and men in hard-to-reach and rural areas. We ensure that HIV-positive
women and men have access to quality counseling and family planning
services through the integration of voluntary family planning and HIV
services. In addition, our partnership with other donors has allowed us
to negotiate lower unit prices for the most in-demand contraceptives,
reducing financial barriers and increasing access to a wide range of
contraceptives for women with an unmet need for family planning. We
support the provision of a wide variety of family planning methods,
including nonhormonal methods, in all USAID-assisted countries.
USAID supports innovative interventions to help individuals and
communities address social and religious barriers, which hinder access
to family planning, including harmful gender norms. USAID's programs
work with local support systems, health providers, and traditional
leaders to educate families and communities about the critical
importance of family planning for the health of both the mother and the
child. In Afghanistan, USAID trains and empowers community and
religious leaders and local organizations to deliver health messages
and build community awareness about the need for women, and
particularly young women, to have access to family planning services.
In Yemen, USAID collaborated with local religious leaders and the
Yemeni Ministry of Public Health and Population to conduct a ``Safe Age
at Marriage'' program, and provided integrated family planning and
maternal and child health services to almost 300,000 clients.
USAID recognizes that youth must be reached to transform harmful
gender norms, and that youth themselves have a particular unmet need
for family planning information and services. All USAID-supported
family planning and reproductive health programs address youth health
in some capacity. In Afghanistan, USAID's work strengthens the ability
of family planning service providers to tailor services to vulnerable
populations, including young couples, and increases the availability of
youth-friendly family planning services. In Nepal, USAID supports a
national campaign that targets hard-to-reach key audience--including
youth, young couples, migrants, and the socially excluded--with
messages to promote informed choice and improve method and service use
among clients. The campaign also includes a range of activities
promoting the acceptance of family planning among community and
religious leaders.
______
Responses of Fatema Sumar to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tom Udall
Question. The New Silk Road initiative has undergone an important
transformation from a vision to an action plan economically linking the
countries of South and Central Asia. While the primary focus area,
energy, does have the ability to accelerate development in the region,
it will be difficult to fully take advantage of Central Asia's
hydropower potential and build new capacity without addressing the
tensions around water-sharing that have existed for decades. The U.S.-
Mexico International Boundary Water Commission has been essential in
resolving issues around boundary demarcation, national ownership of
waters, water quality, and flood control in the border region.
What is the scope for similar institutions in the region
and how is the Department supporting them?
How is transboundary water management integrated into the
energy planning pillar of the New Silk Road?
Answer. Although water is essential to Central Asia's economic
growth, regional management of transboundary water resources is weak
and a source of political tension. Improved management could diffuse
tensions over regional water resources and unlock cooperation on energy
issues. With our international partners, we are building capacity to
manage transboundary water issues broadly throughout the region with
technical training, diplomatic engagement, and institutional support.
This includes providing funding to the U.N. Regional Centre for
Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA), which has shown modest
progress on developing a negotiated legal framework for managing
transboundary water. We hope to contribute to the Central Asia Energy-
Water Development program, a World Bank multidonor trust fund that is
improving the regional capacity for managing water. Our efforts
complement the efforts of the International Fund for Saving the Aral
Sea (IFAS), the regional organization tasked with managing
transboundary water issues. However, IFAS' nebulous organizational
structure has impacted its efficacy, as have regional political
rivalries that are often unrelated to water and energy. The increasing
engagement of all five Central Asian nations and Afghanistan in these
programs indicates we are incrementally improving cooperation on
transboundary water management, and moving closer to the sustainable
management of existing surpluses of summer hydropower to be exported
over the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) power transmission
project--a signature project of the New Silk Road. Our continued
support of these programs will be the key to success.
Question. As the region and donors embrace economic cooperation as
a necessity, and the Department continues to identify specific
activities to advance the New Silk Road, the efficient use and
decisionmaking around foreign assistance allocated to the region is
more important than ever. This brings the Department's complex foreign
assistance architecture into question. As it currently stands how are
the separate SRAP, ACE, SCA and USAID foreign assistance units
coordinating project-level decisions when each have separate funding
streams with subregional or single country mandates?
a. Are there efforts to streamline these functions to
better support the New Silk Road initiative and the region as a
whole?
b. How would you recommend that the Department work to
better focus planning and expenditures for programs supporting
the initiative as a whole?
c. How are DOD-funded activities incorporated into your
planning?
Answer. The Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the Department of Defense, and other interagency partners
coordinate to pursue a shared objective: a stable, secure, and
prosperous Afghanistan economically integrated with its South and
Central Asian neighbors. The New Silk Road (NSR) initiative is the
policy and operational framework for interagency cooperation to achieve
the strategic objective of regional connectivity. NSR diplomatic and
programmatic assistance activities focus on four core pillars: trade,
energy, customs/borders, and people-to-people connectivity. Funding
requests and programming are designed in the context of broader U.S.
foreign policy interests, and aligned through bilateral and regional
assistance strategies.
Given the cultural, political, and strategic complexity of the
South & Central Asia region, the discrete competencies and mandates of
a variety of agencies and bureaus are required to advance U.S. national
security and economic interests. We have ensured that these activities
are well coordinated and aligned through a variety of mechanisms, such
as biweekly interagency working group meetings with Washington and
field participants, regular phone calls to missions and communications
with designated points of contact, including the Department of State,
USAID's Asia Bureau and OAPA and DoD/CENTCOM, as well as monitoring
activities of other donors and working with international financial
institutions to allow us to track funding streams, report progress,
share information, and avoid duplication of effort.
The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP)
coordinates U.S. Government-wide policy for national security,
diplomacy, and assistance for those two countries in close cooperation
with USAID's Office of Afghanistan & Pakistan Affairs (USAID/OAPA). The
Department's Bureau of South and Central Asia Affairs works in close
partnership with SRAP and the Asia Bureau in USAID to coordinate
diplomatic and development work for South Asia and Central Asia. The
Office of the Coordinator of Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central
Asia (EUR/ACE) and its Central Asia assistance mandate is integral to
coordinating NSR-related regional and bilateral assistance activities
linking Central Asia, Afghanistan and its neighbors. Within USAID, a
formal intra-agency framework known as the ``Almaty Consensus'' guides
the design and implementation of development programs in regional
trade, energy and commerce which dovetail with the NSR initiative's
four priority pillars.
The diplomatic and development vectors of the NSR initiative are
augmented by close cooperation with the Department of Defense, which
supports training and programs that improve border capacity and
security between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. DOD is also
instrumental in working to assist local businesses that formed the
supply chains throughout Central Asia critical to logistical operations
in Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to make
the transition to compete in a nonmilitary, post-2014 marketplace.
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