[Senate Hearing 113-474]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-474
STRENGTHENING U.S. ALLIANCES
IN NORTHEAST ASIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 4, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MARCO RUBIO, Florida
BARBARA BOXER, California RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Auslin, Michael, resident scholar, director of Japan Studies,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.................. 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Helvey, David F., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East
Asia, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC............... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Response to question submitted for the record by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin......................................... 38
Russel, Hon. Daniel, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Smith, Dr. Sheila, senior fellow for Japan Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations, Washington, DC.............................. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Council on Foreign Relations Report submitted for the record
by Dr. Smith............................................... 39
(iii)
STRENGTHENING U.S. ALLIANCES
IN NORTHEAST ASIA
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 4, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:57 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Benjamin L.
Cardin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Cardin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Let me welcome you all to the Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs' hearing, ``Strengthening the
U.S. Alliance in Northeast Asia.''
I know that Senator Rubio, who had planned to be here today
as the ranking Republican member, will not be able to be here
due to the travel problems associated with the weather
conditions. And, as some might be aware, because of that,
scheduled votes today in the United States Senate have been
postponed until tomorrow. So, it probably will mean we will not
have as many of the members of our subcommittee present today
as we would otherwise have, but I just want to assure, not only
our witnesses, but also those who are following this hearing,
the incredible importance of today's hearing of the
subcommittee, not just for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, but for the United States Senate.
This is our first hearing this year. Last year, we held a
series of hearings dealing with the administration's
``Rebalance to Asia'' policy. We looked at it from a good
governance standpoint, we evaluated its economic impact, and we
also looked at the military security issues as well as
environmental issues. We covered a lot of specific areas of
interest that further demonstrated why the ``Rebalance to
Asia'' is critically important for not only the administration,
but also for Congress. So, we hope to assess how we are moving
forward in regards to concrete actions and appropriate
resources.
The U.S. alliance with Japan and the Republic of Korea
serve as the centerpiece of U.S. engagement in Northeast Asia.
How we work together and how the United States approaches and
manages these relationships is vital to U.S. security interests
and has important implications across the entire region.
In this hearing, we will evaluate the status and trajectory
of U.S. relations with each of these key allies, and I hope to
hear from our witnesses on areas where we should increase
cooperation, both bilaterally and trilaterally.
Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of U.S.
engagement in the region. Last October, Secretaries Kerry and
Hagel held a historic meeting in Tokyo with their Japanese
counterparts and released a joint statement reaffirming the
alliance and defining steps to upgrade the capability of the
partnership, including the announcement of a revision to the
United States-Japan defense guidelines. In recent months, Japan
established a National Security Council, adopted the National
Security Strategy, and established the National Defense Program
Guidelines. These actions are moving Japan toward a more active
role in the international sphere and opening the door for a
more robust alliance with the United States. There have been
positive developments for the Futenma Replacement Facility
since the Governor of Okinawa approved a landfill permit. But,
clearly, more challenges remain. When I was in Japan, one of
the centerpieces of our conversations was the future of United
States presence in Okinawa and how that relates to our security
arrangements. And there have been stalled efforts to move that
forward. Some of that has created political issues, both in
Japan and the United States. So, it was encouraging to see some
positive developments.
In December, Congress passed the National Defense
Authorization Act providing funding to make way for the
eventual transfer of marines and their dependents from Japan to
Guam and Hawaii. United States and Japan reached a milestone
agreement in 2013, the U.S.-Japan Okinawa Consolidation Plan,
which lays out details for consolidating and closing U.S.
military bases in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan, thereby
reinforcing our efforts to modernize the alliance to meet
emerging challenges in the region. And, of course, Japan
announced last year that they would be joining the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, TPP, negotiations, a step that was
welcomed by the United States.
So, I hope at this hearing we can get more specifics on how
we are moving forward on the security front and on the economic
front with Japan.
In South Korea last year, we celebrated the 60th
anniversary of the alliance. In May, President Park visited the
United States, and it was an honor to have her address a joint
session of Congress. And I had a chance to have a conversation
with her and go over her vision on how to improve security
arrangements in Northeast Asia. We had a good conversation, and
she moved forward with the suggestion of developing an OSCE-
type forum for Northeast Asia. South Korea is an important
economic partner for the United States, particularly since the
signing and implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade
Agreement in 2012. And it is promising to see South Korea's
expression of interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
In addition, our countries reached final agreement, earlier
this month, on sharing the defense costs of U.S. troops
stationed in South Korea. From cooperation on clean energy to
supporting our mission in Afghanistan, this alliance has truly
transformed into a global partnership.
Although we see these positive steps in our bilateral
alliance, this region is home to some very serious challenges.
North Korea continues down the path of belligerent and erratic
behavior, including expanding its Yongbyon uranium enrichment
facility, restarting the reactor, and displaying complete
disregard for the welfare of its own people. China continues to
make aggressive moves to stake its claim in the East China Sea,
including the November announcement of a new Air Defense
Identification Zone. Japan and South Korea remain deeply
suspicious of one another, based on sensitive historical
issues, and the Japanese Prime Minister's rhetoric on these
issues is increasingly concerning to many. Additionally, fiscal
constraints in the United States have raised questions among
our allies about the potential impact on these important
alliances. These are all issues I hope we will be able to
address during this hearing.
These issues not only demand that we work closely with our
allies and avoid surprises, but they also present opportunities
to reinforce our bilateral and trilateral cooperation. We need
to build on our successes, focus on shared goals, and continue
to grow and expand our alliance in Northeast Asia to ensure
each relationship reaches its full potential.
I hope President Obama will seek to reinforce these
messages when he travels to the region again next month. I look
forward to hearing from both our panels today on how we can be
sure we are well postured from both a diplomatic and a
strategic perspective in order to address these shared
challenges.
And, with that, we will turn to our first panel, where we
have our government witnesses. And we thank you both for being
here.
Daniel Russel is no stranger to this committee, Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific
Affairs at the Department of State. Mr. Russel began his tour
as an Assistant Secretary on July 13 of last year. He
previously served at the White House as Special Assistant to
the President and National Security Staff Senior Director for
Asian Affairs.
We are also pleased to have with us today David F. Helvey,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia in the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Previously, he served as the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense and was a Principal Director for East Asia in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and
Pacific Security Affairs, East Asia.
Welcome to you both. We will start with Mr. Russel.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL RUSSEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Russel. Chairman Cardin, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear today before you to discuss this
important set of issues that you laid out in your introductory
remarks.
I would like to request that my prepared statement be
entered into the record.
Senator Cardin. All the witnesses on both panels, their
full statements will be made part of the record, so you may
proceed as you wish.
Mr. Russel. Thank you.
The Obama administration has made the Asia-Pacific a
strategic priority, based on America's stake in a prosperous
and stable region. And the Department of State is focused on
dedicating diplomatic, public diplomacy, and assistance
resources to the region commensurate with the priority and the
comprehensive nature of our engagement.
From the outset, the governing principle of this
administration's Asia rebalance policy has been to ensure close
ties with our partners and allies. Our alliances with the
Republic of Korea and with Japan contribute significantly to
regional security, stability, and prosperity. These alliances
are rooted in our shared strategic interests, our deep and
growing economic ties, our shared values, and in extensive
people-to-people connections.
I am pleased to report today, Mr. Chairman, that our
alliances with both countries have never been stronger. We are
working hard with our Japanese and South Korean partners to
modernize these alliances and to address broader shared
interests across the Asia-Pacific and around the globe. I want
to thank you, Mr. Chairman, as well as members of the other
subcommittee, for your leadership, your travel, and your public
statements underscoring the importance of these alliances.
Let me speak briefly to each relationship.
The United States-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of
peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. We cannot
achieve our national goals without a strong partnership between
the United States and Japan.
And the alliance between the United States and the Republic
of Korea is the lynchpin of stability and security in Northeast
Asia. Our alliance with South Korea was forged in shared
sacrifice in the Korean war, and it continues to anchor
security on the peninsula today.
Each alliance relationship rooted in security cooperation
has evolved into an increasingly global partnership that helps
provide significant benefits for our people and the
international community. We cooperate closely on a wide range
of issues, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief,
and in dealing with global hotspots. At the same time, the
alliances remain focused on the core mission of safeguarding
our security. In particular, that means deterrence and defense
against the threat posed by North Korea's continued pursuit of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. We will continue to
stand shoulder to shoulder with our allies in the face of this
danger.
In order to achieve the shared goal of peaceful
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, we will continue
closely to coordinate with the ROK and Japan, as well as with
other partners in the region, such as China.
And I want to make very clear that our alliances in
Northeast Asia and around the region are not aimed at China.
The United States welcomes the rise of a stable and prosperous
China which plays a greater role in strengthening regional
stability, prosperity, and international rules and norms.
Tangible, practical, and visible cooperation between the United
States and China is critical to addressing regional and global
challenges, from North Korea to climate change. Similarly, the
United States seeks good relations between China and its
neighbors. We encourage all our allies to pursue positive and
constructive relations with China.
We are concerned, however, by an increase in risky and
tension-raising activities by China in the East China Sea near
the Senkaku Islands, including China's uncoordinated
announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone there. These
concerns are amplified by China's behavior in the South China
Sea. We will continue to discuss these issues directly with
China and with affected countries in the region.
Mr. Chairman, strategic cooperation among the United
States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea is essential to the
well-being of all our countries in the region. In light of this
fact, the current friction between our Japanese and Korean
allies is a cause for concern and a problem that requires
dedicated efforts by all parties.
In closing, let me make one final point. Bipartisan
congressional support for our alliances and the close
cooperation between the legislative branches of our three
countries have been critical to the success we have achieved
over the last six decades, and will be even more important in
the future.
So, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important
topic. We will hear now from my colleague, but then I am happy
to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel R. Russel
Chairman Cardin and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss this important topic.
Early in his first term, President Obama began implementing his
vision for the Asia-Pacific rebalance, based on America's enduring
stake in a prosperous and stable region. The United States has been, we
are, and we will remain a Pacific power. In the second term, the
administration is building out this strategy. The Department of State
is focused on dedicating diplomatic, public diplomacy, and assistance
resources to the region in a way that is commensurate with the truly
comprehensive nature of our engagement. And under Secretary Kerry we
are intensifying our support for U.S. companies, climate and energy
cooperation, people-to-people exchanges, youth and exchange programs,
education, women's empowerment, and other initiatives.
The members of this subcommittee know well the importance of the
Asia-Pacific region to American interests. The broader region boasts
over half the world's population, half of the world's GDP, and nearly
half of the world's trade, and is home to some of the world's fastest-
growing economies. More and more American citizens are now living,
working, and studying in the Asia-Pacific region; people-to-people and
family ties have witnessed tremendous growth. Growing numbers of
American companies are investing in and exporting products and services
to rapidly expanding East Asian markets. And, as the region's economies
continue to grow and their interests expand, it becomes increasingly
important that the governments and institutions there contribute to
upholding and strengthening international law and standards--ranging
from human rights to environmental protection to responsible policies
on climate change, maritime security, and trade and investment. Simply
put, the effects of what happens in the Asia-Pacific region will be
felt across the globe and have direct implications for America's
interests.
For all of the changes in Asia, this much is constant: our
alliances in the region have been and will remain the foundation of our
strategy toward the Asia-Pacific. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, as
well as Ranking Member Rubio and the other members of the subcommittee
for your leadership, travel, and public statements which have all
underscored the importance of our alliances to our vision of a secure,
stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region. As you have noted, shared
values and a shared history of successful partnership with the United
States place Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) at the center of
this administration's rebalance strategy. The success stories of the
ROK and Japan are powerful reminders of the broad range of benefits
that accrue from a sustained commitment to free markets, democracy, and
close cooperation with the United States. Our alliances with the ROK
and Japan contribute significantly to expanded security, stability, and
prosperity across the region.
I am pleased to report today that our ties with both countries have
never been stronger. Polling shows that the U.S.-ROK relationship
enjoys record levels of favorability in South Korea--and the United
States has enjoyed this high level of support for the last 2 years.
Polling also shows that 84 percent of Japanese citizens support our
bilateral alliance. But we do not take our allies for granted. We are
working hard with our Japanese and South Korean partners to adjust our
presence and to modernize our alliances to help maintain peace and
security and address broader shared interests across the Asia-Pacific
and around the globe. The upcoming visit by President Obama to Japan
and the ROK will propel our efforts.
u.s.-japan alliance
Let me begin with Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone
of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region; we cannot achieve
the President's goals without strong and growing ties between the
United States and Japan. Our two countries are coordinating closely on
a wide range of issues, including regional security and global
hotspots. As Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Kishida emphasized
during their meeting in Washington last month, we are working
diplomatically and militarily to strengthen and modernize the U.S.-
Japan alliance.
I cannot overstate the importance of our alliance with Japan to
continued U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific. Over 50,000 U.S.
military and civilian personnel are stationed in Japan under the U.S.-
Japan security treaty and the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement,
under which Japan provides facilities and areas for U.S. forces for the
security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and
security. The Japanese Government provides over $2 billion annually to
offset the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan: including the USS
George Washington, which is the only U.S. aircraft carrier in the world
that is forward-deployed. This strategic posture means that U.S. forces
in Japan are capable of carrying out missions throughout the region and
beyond.
U.S. support for the Japan Self-Defense Forces' humanitarian
assistance operations in the wake of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami
were demonstrations of the alliance's strength and capability and set
the stage for U.S.-Japan coordination on Typhoon Haiyan relief in the
Philippines in 2013. The unprecedented landing of a U.S. Marine Corps
MV-22 Osprey on a Japanese ship during the Haiyan response demonstrated
our joint capabilities, and highlighted the interoperability of the
U.S. and Japanese militaries.
Our security relationship with Japan made remarkable progress in
2013. Two important successes that my colleague from the Department of
Defense can discuss in further detail were the October 2013 ``2+2''
meeting between Secretaries Kerry and Hagel and their Japanese
counterparts, which launched the review of our two countries' Bilateral
Defense Guidelines, and Okinawa Governor Nakaima's signing of the
landfill permit for the Futenma Relocation Facility. We hope to use the
Defense Guidelines review process to modernize our respective roles,
missions, and capabilities for an alliance truly capable of meeting the
challenges of the 21st century.
Another key development is the Japanese Government's review of what
the U.N. Charter describes as, ``the right of collective self-
defense.'' Collective self-defense is simply defined as one nation
taking action to help defend another nation from attack by a third
party.
Japan's Constitution is the only one in the world that explicitly
renounces war as an instrument of foreign policy. In the past, Japanese
Governments have chosen to interpret their constitution as not
permitting the exercise of this right to collective self-defense. It is
my understanding that the Japanese Government is studying this
interpretation.
The practical effect of a decision by Japan that it would be
permissible to conduct collective self-defense could include enabling
its U.N. peacekeeping troops to defend other U.N. peacekeepers under
attack. Under the current policy, if North Korea were to launch a
ballistic missile toward the United States, Japan could not use its
ballistic missile defense interceptors to destroy that missile in
flight. We recognize this is a decision for the Japanese Government and
people, and we welcome Japan's openness and its steps to consult with
countries in the region about these deliberations.
u.s.-republic of korea alliance
The U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance is the linchpin of stability
and security in Northeast Asia. 2013 marked the 60th anniversary of the
U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, which serves as the foundation of our
alliance and a force for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
and in Northeast Asia. Our alliance with the ROK was forged in shared
sacrifice in the Korean war, and it continues to anchor security in the
region today.
As Secretary Kerry reaffirmed during his meetings with ROK leaders
in Seoul last month, the U.S.-ROK alliance is a critical component of
Washington's strategic engagement with the Asia-Pacific. Our open
societies, our shared commitment to democracy and a market economy, and
our sustained partnership provide a foundation for the enduring
friendship that tightly binds the American and Korean peoples. Over the
past six decades, our close cooperation has evolved into an
increasingly global partnership, encompassing political, economic,
social, and cultural cooperation and providing prosperity for both our
peoples.
The United States remains dedicated to the defense of the Republic
of Korea, including through extended deterrence and the full range of
U.S. military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, as
emphasized in the Joint Declaration issued by President Obama and
President Park in May 2013.
The United States and the ROK recently concluded negotiations on a
Special Measures Agreement (SMA), by which South Korea will increase
its contributions to help offset the cost of stationing of U.S. troops
on the Korean Peninsula to $867 million in this year alone,
demonstrating that both nations are politically and economically
committed to making our alliance more sustainable and adaptable.
We are constantly working to improve readiness and interoperability
in order to meet existing and emerging security threats. As my
colleague Deputy Assistant Secretary Helvey can describe in detail,
last week the United States and the ROK began two of our largest annual
joint military exercises, KEY RESOLVE and FOAL EAGLE. Another major
annual military exercise, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN, is scheduled for
August. And even as our alliance continues to counter the threat from
North Korea, we are expanding our cooperation to meet 21st century
challenges beyond the Korean Peninsula.
dprk-related tensions
Our alliances with the ROK and Japan provide deterrence and defense
against the threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's
(DPRK) continued pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
technology. We will continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our
allies in the face of this growing North Korean threat.
Mr. Chairman, over the years we have seen a pattern of North Korean
provocations followed by ``charm offensives'' aimed at extracting
payoffs and concessions from the West. Despite the DPRK's recent
overtures at engagement, we have yet to see credible indications that
North Korea is prepared to come into compliance with the relevant U.N.
Security Council resolutions, or even negotiate on the key issue:
denuclearization. The United States remains committed to authentic and
credible negotiations to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement
of the Six-Party Talks and to bring North Korea into compliance with
its international obligations through irreversible steps leading to
denuclearization. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed
state. We will not reward the DPRK merely for returning to dialogue. As
the President has said, the DPRK can achieve the security, respect, and
prosperity it claims to seek by choosing the path of denuclearization.
For our part, the United States pledges to continue working toward a
world in which the people of North and South Korea are peacefully
reunited, and the Korean Peninsula is democratic, prosperous, and free
of nuclear weapons.
In addition to our concern about the security situation on the
Korean Peninsula, the United States remains gravely concerned about the
human rights situation in the DPRK. The U.N. Human Rights Council's
Commission of Inquiry released its report last month, documenting the
deplorable human rights situation in the DPRK. We are working
tirelessly to persuade the DPRK Government to release Kenneth Bae, the
U.S. citizen who has been held in North Korea for more than a year. We
welcome the recent release of an Australian citizen, but continue to
urge the DPRK Government to release the ROK citizen still under
detention, just as we seek resolution of the cases of the many ROK,
Japanese, and other citizens abducted and held by North Korea over the
decades.
challenges: regional tensions
Mr. Chairman, the United States takes a clear position with regard
to behavior of states in connection with their territorial or maritime
disputes: we firmly oppose intimidation, coercion, and the use of
force. In the East China Sea, we are concerned by an unprecedented
increase in risky activity by China's maritime agencies near the
Senkaku Islands. The United States returned administration of the
Senkakus to Japan in 1972, and they fall within the scope of the U.S.-
Japan mutual defense treaty, in particular its Article V. Tensions over
the Senkakus have led to a sharp downturn in Sino-Japanese relations.
China and Japan are the world's second- and third-largest economies and
have a shared interest in a stable environment to facilitate economic
prosperity. Neither of these two important countries, nor the global
economy, can afford confrontation and crisis.
We object to unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo
or advance a territorial claim though extra-legal or nondiplomatic
means. Unilateral attempts to change the status quo raise tensions and
do nothing under international law to strengthen claims. Therefore we
were also concerned by China's sudden and uncoordinated announcement of
the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea last
November. One of the problems with the Chinese ADIZ announcement is
that it purports to cover areas administered or claimed by Japan and
the ROK. We have been clear that China should not attempt to implement
or enforce the ADIZ and it should refrain from taking similar actions
in other sensitive or disputed areas.
I do not believe that any party seeks armed conflict in the East
China Sea, but unintended incidents or accidents may lead to an
escalation of tensions or a tit-for-tat exchange that could escalate.
As such, we wholeheartedly endorse calls for crisis-prevention
mechanisms, including senior-level communications to defuse situations
before they become full-blown crises.
Our concerns are amplified by the situation in the South China Sea,
where we are seeing a similar pattern of coercive behavior, strident
rhetoric, and ambiguous claims. This is an issue that senior
administration officials have raised directly and candidly with Chinese
leaders.
I would like to underscore for the committee that the Obama
administration has consistently made best efforts to build a strong and
cooperative relationship with China. Tangible, practical, and visible
cooperation between the United States and China is critical to
addressing regional and global challenges, from North Korea to climate
change. Similarly, the United States seeks good relations between China
and its neighbors; we encourage all our allies to pursue positive and
constructive relations with China. I want to make very clear that our
alliances, in Northeast Asia and around the region, are not aimed at
China.
The United States welcomes the rise of a stable and prosperous
China which plays a greater role in strengthening regional stability,
prosperity, and international rules and norms. A strong diplomatic,
economic, and military presence by the United States has helped create
the conditions that made China's extraordinary growth possible and that
presence remains essential to regional stability. No country should
doubt the resolve of the United States in meeting our security
commitments or our determination to uphold the principle of freedom of
navigation and overflight. But neither should there be any doubt about
the administration's desire for constructive relationship with China
based on solving regional and global problems as well as managing
disagreement and areas of competition.
strategic cooperation in the region and beyond
One of the strongest signs of the maturity of our partnerships with
the ROK and Japan is our cooperation on global issues beyond our
respective borders, from humanitarian assistance to climate change. The
benefits of our cooperation with Japan and South Korea are not limited
to the people of our three countries, but increasingly accrue to
citizens around the world.
Yet at this moment, and despite our many areas of cooperation and
common interest, relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea are
strained. The current tension between our two allies is a cause for
concern, and a problem that requires sincere efforts by both parties to
address. There is an urgent need to show prudence and restraint in
dealing with difficult historical issues. It is important to handle
them in a way that promotes healing. We are working closely with our
Japanese and ROK partners to encourage them to take the steps needed to
resolve tensions caused by the legacy of the last century through
patient and persistent diplomacy. The simple fact, Mr. Chairman, is
that strategic cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the ROK
is essential to developing the security order in Northeast Asia,
especially given the threats facing us and our allies from North Korea
and other regional uncertainties. No one can afford to allow the
burdens of history to prevent us from building a secure future.
That is why it is so important that we have been able to cooperate
with Japan and the ROK on relief efforts, development, and other
important projects throughout Southeast Asia. For example, we saw the
benefits of increased trilateral disaster response capacity just last
fall when the United States, Japan, and South Korea were leading
contributors of humanitarian and recovery assistance to the Philippines
following the devastation left by Typhoon Haiyan. We are working
trilaterally with the ROK and Japan to further improve our
interoperability and information sharing during a disaster.
Japan and South Korea are models for other nations in the region
and around the world. Both the ROK and Japan have transitioned from
one-time recipients of foreign aid to important donors. Whereas once
Peace Corps Volunteers were seen throughout the ROK, the Peace Corps
and its counterpart recently signed a memorandum of understanding that
will enable both parties to cooperate in third countries around the
world--in fact, the ROK's Peace Corps counterpart is now the world's
second-largest after our own Peace Corps. Last December, during Vice
President Biden's visit, the United States and Japan announced the
initiation of a U.S.-Japan Development Dialogue between our respective
foreign assistance and foreign affairs agencies. The first formal
meeting of that dialogue took place last month in Washington.
The Republic of Korea and Japan have been active supporters of
international efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. We are
working together on Syria, where Japan and the ROK are providing
assistance to address the humanitarian needs of the Syrian people and
where both have strongly supported international efforts to find a
political solution. U.S. and ROK soldiers have served side by side in
Afghanistan, where the Republic of Korea and Japan are major donors to
reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Japan has provided over $1.35
billion in assistance to the Palestinians since the mid-1990s, making
Japan one of the major donors to the Palestinians after the United
States. Our cooperative partnerships with Japan and the Republic of
Korea enable increased engagement and impact on a global scale. Both
Japan and the ROK are invaluable partners on the international stage,
as well; both currently promote our shared values while serving on the
U.N. Human Rights Council, and this year the ROK will complete a
successful term on the U.N. Security Council.
alliance ties
Our deep economic and trade ties with Japan and the ROK provide
practical benefits, jobs, and lower consumer prices to Americans. To
reap the full reward of our alliance partnerships, we are working to
further strengthen our economic relationships and harness the dynamism
of growth in the Asia-Pacific region for the benefit of the American
people.
The revitalization of Japan's huge economy is of direct interest to
the United States. An economically vibrant Japan will attract more U.S.
exports, help stimu-
late even greater Japanese investment in the United States, and serve
as a model and source of growth across the Asia-Pacific region.
Economic growth will also strengthen Japan as an important partner. We
support Japan's goal of unlocking greater growth through structural and
regulatory reforms and are working with the private sector as well as
Japanese counterparts to bring out the best ideas and solutions to this
end. We are also working with Japan to increase economic opportunities
for women, both in our own economies and globally. Japanese companies
account for approximately 650,000 jobs in the United States, and the
United States is one of the largest sources of foreign investment in
Japan. Our relationship will continue to grow closer in response to
changes such as the availability of U.S. oil and gas to the
international market, further integration in high-tech manufacturing,
and mutual support for innovative enterprise.
The Republic of Korea is Asia's fourth-largest economy, our sixth-
largest goods trading partner, and our fifth-largest export market for
agricultural goods. Our two countries have one of the most vibrant
trading relationships in the world. Two years since the U.S.-Korea Free
Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) entered into force, our bilateral trade in
goods now tops $100 billion annually. During 2012 and 2013, the U.S.
enjoyed a $4.4 billion foreign direct investment surplus with Korea.
That positive trend looks likely to continue, with recent developments
including Hankook Tire's announcement that it plans to invest $800
million to build its first U.S. production plant in Clarksville, TN.
The United States is the top destination for ROK foreign direct
investment, and Hyundai, Kia, and Samsung now employ thousands of U.S.
workers. We are working closely with the Republic of Korea to ensure it
fully implements both the letter and spirit of its KORUS commitments,
in order to be able to realize the full strategic and economic benefits
of the FTA.
As Secretary Kerry noted recently, ``A shared commitment to
economic growth and innovation is part of why the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) agreement is a cornerstone of the President's
economic policy in Asia.'' That's why one of our highest economic
priorities in the region is the successful completion of the TPP
negotiations. In the United States, Japan, and other member nations,
the TPP will support jobs, foster new business opportunities, and
promote economic growth. The TPP will serve as a platform for building
a high-standard trade and investment framework for the Asia-Pacific
region--promoting transparency, openness, and innovation. Given close
trade ties and the strategic importance of closer economic cooperation
with our allies, we naturally welcome the ROK's expression of interest
in joining the TPP.
Underpinning the historic success of our alliances and our hopes
for the future are the robust people-to-people ties between citizens of
the United States and citizens of Japan and South Korea. They form the
foundation of our partnerships with both countries, helping us to
understand and appreciate each other.
Our people-to-people ties with the ROK are dynamic and strong. The
ROK sent over 70,000 young people to study in the United States last
year--more per capita than any other major sending country--and the
number of U.S. students going to the ROK continues to rise. Continuing
the trend of U.S.-ROK innovation and investment in educational
exchange, last October our countries renewed the Work, English, Study,
and Travel (WEST) program, which provides opportunities for qualified
university students and recent graduates from the ROK to study English,
participate in internships, and travel independently in the United
States. ROK students contribute over $2 billion to the U.S. economy;
even more important than the immediate economic boost these students
bring is the intangible long-term investment in our alliance--a shared
experience that underscores to younger generations the enduring value
of our partnership.
The Japanese Government has made educational internationalization a
component of its growth strategy, and both our governments are working
with the private sector, academia, and NGOs to expand mutual
understanding and friendship between our young people. While the number
of Japanese students earning credit at higher education institutions in
the United States has dropped sharply over the last decade, the United
States and Japan are committed to increasing two-way student exchange,
and both countries have already taken steps--such as increasing grants
for study abroad and demystifying the U.S. visa process--that we hope
will reverse this trend. We remain dedicated to working with Japan to
double student and youth exchanges by 2020 to ensure that our
partnership remains strong for decades to come.
I want to make a special note, Mr. Chairman, of acknowledging the
Americans in uniform who are currently serving, or have served, in
Korea and Japan. Our strong relations with Japan and the ROK would not
be possible without the hundreds of thousands of men and women in
uniform who have dedicated themselves in the service of our strategic
alliances. These service men and women represent the best of the United
States in Japan, the ROK, and around the Asia-Pacific region, and upon
their return to the United States, they continue to serve as grassroots
ambassadors for the great friendship between the United States and our
allies.
conclusion
Our alliances with Japan and the ROK are rooted in shared strategic
interests in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world, our deep
economic ties, and, most importantly, our shared values and the strong
personal relationships that have developed through extensive people-to-
people ties. Our alliances have never been stronger, and the United
States is actively working to deepen our engagement with both
countries.
In closing, let me make one final point. Strong, enduring,
bipartisan congressional support for our alliances and the close
cooperation between the legislative branches of our three countries
have been critical to the success we have achieved over the last six
decades, and will be even more important in the future.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Helvey.
STATEMENT OF DAVID F. HELVEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR EAST ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Helvey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to offer perspectives from the
Department of Defense on our alliances in Northeast Asia.
Our treaty alliances and other partnerships remain the
foundation for protecting our interests and achieving our
security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, which is why
the modernization and continued transformation of these
critical relationships forms a central pillar of President
Obama's strategy to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.
Our treaty alliances in Northeast Asia with Japan and the
Republic of Korea support this strategy through contributing to
a secure and prosperous region, facilitating a defense posture
that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient,
and politically sustainable, investing in interoperability and
strengthening our regional defense cooperation to promote
shared interests and advance international rules and norms.
I am pleased to have the opportunity, again, to meet today,
and I commend the committee's continued interest in this
important subject.
Mr. Chairman, transforming our alliances and partnerships
to meet the challenges of the 21st century is the central
driver of our efforts with both Japan and the Republic of
Korea. We have developed for each alliance a forward-looking
agenda based on enhancing security, increasing the ability of
our militaries to work together seamlessly, and building our
allies' capacity to contribute to regional and global security.
Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of peace
and security in the Asia-Pacific region. In October, Secretary
Hagel joined Secretary Kerry and their Japanese counterparts in
Tokyo for a historic U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee
meeting that reconfirmed the alliance's commitment to the
security of Japan through the full range of U.S. military
capabilities, and that set forth a strategic vision reflecting
our shared values to promote peace, security, stability, and
economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific.
As part of these efforts, we will be revising our bilateral
guidelines for defense cooperation for the first time since
1997, updating our alliance roles and missions, and
incorporating new areas of cooperation, such as space and cyber
defense. The revision of the guidelines, which we hope to
complete by the end of 2014, will ensure that our alliance is
capable of responding to the 21st-century challenges. And I can
point to the unprecedented landing of the U.S. Marine Corps MV-
22 Osprey on a Japanese ship during the Haiyan response,
demonstrating the interoperability of the United States and
Japanese militaries and our ability to work jointly, as an
example of what lies ahead.
We are also taking steps to ensure that our forward
military presence in Japan is sustainable over the long term.
In December 2013, the Governor of Okinawa approved the
Government of Japan's request for a landfill permit necessary
to construct a new airfield at Camp Schwab to replace Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma. This was a major step forward.
Closing Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and returning other
U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa is central to our plans to
reduce the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa by about 9,000 and
establish a Marine air-ground task force of about 5,000 marines
on Guam. We are delighted that this effort is now on track, and
we are confident that the ultimate result will be one that is
good for the United States, good for the United States-Japan
alliance, and good for the people of Okinawa.
Finally, Japan is one of our most significant ballistic-
missile defense partners. Japan is codeveloping the SM-3 Block
IIA. It hosts the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet. It operates its
own BMD-capable Aegis ships, and has agreed to host a second
ballistic missile defense radar, in addition to the radar that
is already located in Shariki. We hope to have the second radar
operational by the end of 2014.
Turning to the Republic of Korea, our alliance with the
Republic of Korea continues to serve as a lynchpin of peace and
stability in the region, and is evolving into a partnership
that contributes to security across the globe. Last year, we
celebrated the 60th anniversary of the United States-Republic
of Korea alliance, welcomed President Park's first year in
office, and stood shoulder to shoulder in the face of North
Korean provocation.
In October, Secretary Hagel met with Minister Kim for the
45th security consultative meeting in Seoul, a meeting which
reaffirmed our bilateral commitment to build a comprehensive
strategic alliance based on common values and mutual trust, as
well as our two nations' commitment to defend the Republic of
Korea through a robust combined defense posture.
In light of the continued threat posed by North Korea, we
are taking a number of steps to enhance our force posture and
capabilities on the Korean Peninsula so that our combined
forces can continue to deter and, if necessary, respond to
North Korean aggression or provocation.
Mr. Chairman, the dynamic nature of the region, and the
growing threat from North Korea, make trilateral cooperation
among the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan more
important than ever. Simply put, trilateral security
cooperation is an essential element of deterrence against North
Korean threats. The Department of Defense encourages a healthy
and open United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan
relationship. To that end, we will continue to look for
opportunities for our three countries to exercise together and
to use the defense trilateral talks to promote cooperation,
dialogue, and transparency between Tokyo and Seoul.
Let me turn briefly to offer some perspectives on another
important relationship, the relationship with China. China's
economic dynamism, regional influence, and comprehensive
military modernization present both opportunities and
challenges for the United States-China relationship. We seek a
constructive and productive United States-China relationship in
which we will pursue opportunities to engage where there is
mutual benefit while managing differences in areas of
competition.
Within the Department of Defense, we seek to build a United
States-China military-to-military relationship that is healthy,
stable, reliable, and continuous and supports--and serves as an
important part of the overall bilateral relationship. However,
we remain concerned about the lack of transparency regarding
China's growing military and its increasingly assertive stance
on territorial and maritime disputes. We encourage all parties,
including China, to deal with their disputes peacefully,
without coercion or the use or threat of force, and to ensure
that the maritime claims are resolved in accordance with
international law. A first step is peacefully addressing these
disputes would be to quickly reach agreement with ASEAN on a
meaningful code of conduct for the South China Sea.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense will continue to
prioritize the Asia-Pacific region, particularly our
cooperation with our allies in Northeast Asia. We remain
steadfast in our defense commitments to both Japan and the
Republic of Korea, and we will continue to work to improve
security cooperation, enhance military capabilities, and
modernize each of these critical alliances. We look forward to
continued support of this committee as we continue to rebalance
toward the Asia-Pacific.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Helvey follows:]
Prepared Statement of David F. Helvey
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before you today to offer perspectives
from the Department of Defense on efforts to strengthen and transform
our alliances in Northeast Asia.
Our treaty alliances and partnerships remain the foundation for
protecting our interests and achieving our security objectives in the
Asia-Pacific region, which is why the modernization and continued
transformation of these critical relationships forms a central pillar
of President Obama's strategy to Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. Our
treaty alliances in Northeast Asia--with both Japan and the Republic of
Korea (ROK)--contribute directly to this strategy, principally through
their contributions to promote a secure and prosperous region; to
facilitate the enhancement of a geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable defense posture in
the region; to strengthen our readiness through updates to our
operational concepts and plans; to invest in interoperable capabilities
that are most relevant to the future security environment; and, to
strengthen regional defense cooperation in a way that promotes shared
interests and that advances international rules and norms. I am pleased
to have the opportunity to describe how our alliances help meet these
objectives and I commend the committee's continued interest in this
important subject.
Mr. Chairman, we are actively working with Japan and the ROK to
transform and modernize our alliances in ways that ensure they meet our
original security goals of assurance and deterrence while also building
our alliances into platforms for broader cooperation on traditional and
nontraditional security challenges, both in Asia and globally. In fact,
transforming our alliances and partnerships to meet the challenges of
the 21st century is the central driver of our efforts with both Japan
and the Republic of Korea. In recent years, and in concert with the
senior leaders of both countries, we have developed for each alliance a
forward-looking agenda based on enhancing security, increasing the
ability of our militaries to work together seamlessly, and building our
allies' capacity to contribute to regional and global security.
Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of peace and
security in the Asia-Pacific region. In October, Secretary Hagel joined
Secretary Kerry in Tokyo for the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative
Committee (SCC), or 2+2, a historic meeting that marked the first time
Japan has hosted this bilateral meeting for the Secretary of Defense
and Secretary of State to meet with both of their counterparts. That
meeting reaffirmed the indispensable role our two countries play in the
maintenance of international peace and security, reconfirmed our
alliance's commitment to the security of Japan through the full range
of U.S. military capabilities, and set forth a strategic vision that,
reflecting our shared values of democracy, the rule of law, free and
open markets, and respect for human rights, will effectively promote
peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific
region. As part of our efforts to strengthen this critical partnership,
we will be revising our bilateral Guidelines for Defense Cooperation
for the first time since 1997, updating alliance roles and missions in
peacetime and during contingencies to reflect the contemporary security
environment, and incorporating new areas of cooperation such as space
and cyber defense. This revision of the Guidelines, which we hope to
complete by the end of 2014, will ensure that our alliance is capable
of responding to 21st century challenges.
In addition to updating alliance roles and missions, we are taking
steps to ensure that our forward military presence in Japan is
sustainable over the long term. Critical to this effort is our plan for
the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps forces on Okinawa. In December
2013, Governor Nakaima of Okinawa approved the Government of Japan's
request for a landfill permit necessary to construct a new airfield at
Camp Schwab to replace Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. This was a
major step forward, and is testament to the strong leadership and
commitment to the alliance on the part of Prime Minister Abe. Closing
MCAS Futenma and returning other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa--
approximately 2,500 acres of land--is central to our plans to reduce
the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa by about 9,000 and establish a
Marine Air Ground Task Force of about 5,000 Marines on Guam.
When this effort is complete, we will have operational Marine Air-
Ground Task Forces in multiple locations across the theater, increasing
our ability to respond quickly to regional crises and contingencies.
The remaining Marines on Okinawa will be more concentrated in less
populated parts of the island, and centered on a new air station that
the Government of Japan will build. This realignment and movement of
troops to Guam advances our goal of having a geographically
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force
presence in the region. We are delighted that this effort is now on-
track, and are confident that the ultimate result will be one that is
good for the United States, for the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and for the
people of Okinawa.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that Japan is one of our most
significant ballistic missile defense (BMD) partners, as evidenced by
our cooperation in codeveloping the next generation sea-based
interceptor, the SM-3 Block IIA; its role as host for the U.S. Navy 7th
Fleet, and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force's own BMD-capable
Aegis ships; and its agreement to host a second TPY-2 BMD radar, in
addition to the radar already located in Shariki. We hope to have the
second radar operational by the end of 2014. Japan is truly a model BMD
partner, and we look forward to expanding on that cooperation in the
future.
Similarly, the U.S.-ROK Alliance continues to serve as a linchpin
of peace and stability in the region and is evolving into a partnership
that contributes to security across the globe. Last year we celebrated
the 60th Anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, we welcomed President
Park's first year in office, and we continued to stand together in the
face of North Korean provocation. In October, Secretary Hagel met with
Minister Kim in the 45th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). That
meeting reaffirmed our bilateral commitment to build a comprehensive
strategic alliance based on common values and mutual trust as well as
our two nations' mutual commitment to defend the Republic of Korea
through a robust combined defense posture. To enhance effective
deterrence options against North Korean nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Secretary Hagel and Minister Kim
formally endorsed a bilateral ``Tailored Deterrence Strategy'' that
establishes a strategic alliance framework that strengthens the
integration of alliance capabilities to maximize their deterrent
effects.
In light of the threats posed by North Korea, we are also taking a
number of steps to enhance our force posture and capabilities on the
Korean Peninsula. We are especially focused on enhancing the alliance's
military capabilities to ensure that our combined forces maintain the
defense of the Republic of Korea and can deter and, if necessary,
respond to North Korean aggression or provocation. One of our highest
priorities is the development of comprehensive alliance countermissile
capabilities to detect, defend against, disrupt, and destroy missile
threats. This effort includes interoperable intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and missile defenses, as well as the
supporting command, control, communications, and computers (C4).
As part of our work to modernize the alliance, we continually
assess progress toward implementation of the Strategic Alliance 2015
(SA 2015) plan in order to ensure continued readiness to provide for
the combined defense of the Korean Peninsula after the transition of
operational control in wartime to the ROK. A new cost-sharing agreement
with the ROK will help ensure that we have the resources necessary for
the combined defense and that both countries are sharing in the
investment the alliance requires to defend South Korea. We continue to
make progress in the development of our bilateral plans, including the
completion last March of the U.S.-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan, which
enables our two countries to respond jointly and more effectively to
North Korean provocations. We also regularly exercise to ensure the
readiness of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). Currently, we are in
the middle of the bilateral military exercises KEY RESOLVE and FOAL
EAGLE, which are, respectively, an annual command post exercise and an
annual series of joint and combined field training exercises.
In addition to advancing our bilateral alliances with Japan and the
ROK, the dynamic nature of the region and the growing threat from North
Korea make trilateral cooperation among the United States, the ROK, and
Japan more important than ever. Simply put, trilateral security
cooperation is an essential element of deterrence against North Korean
threats. The Department of Defense encourages a healthy and open
trilateral relationship in order to facilitate better relations with
our two closest allies in Northeast Asia. To that end, we continually
look for opportunities for our three countries to participate in
military exercises and highly value our Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT)
as a forum to promote cooperation, dialogue, and transparency between
Tokyo and Seoul.
Let me turn briefly to offer some perspectives from the Department
of Defense on another important relationship, the relationship with
China.
China's economic dynamism, regional influence, and pursuit of a
long-term, comprehensive military modernization program, present both
opportunities and challenges for the U.S.-China relationship. Thus, we
seek a constructive and productive U.S.-China relationship, in which we
will pursue opportunities to engage where there is mutual benefit,
while managing differences and areas of competition. Within the
Department of Defense, we seek to build a U.S.-China military-to-
military relationship that is healthy, stable, reliable, and
continuous, and an important part of the overall bilateral
relationship. The Department is pursuing three key areas of focus for
the military-to-military relationship: (1) sustained, substantive
dialogue; (2) concrete, practical cooperation in areas of mutual
interest such as counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, military medicine, and maritime safety; and (3) building risk
reduction mechanisms to manage differences responsibly.
However, we remain concerned about a lack of transparency regarding
China's growing military and its increasingly assertive behavior in the
maritime domain, highlighted by its announcement in November of an Air
Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea and continued
pressure against other claimants in the South China Sea based on its
ill-defined ``9-dash line'' claim. We encourage all parties, including
China, to reject intimidation, coercion, and aggression and to base
their claims on well-founded principles of international law and to
pursue them peacefully through diplomatic processes in accordance with
international law and norms through the establishment of peaceful,
diplomatic processes for preventing maritime conflicts. A good first
step would be timely conclusion of a China-ASEAN Code of Conduct for
the South China Sea.
Moving forward, as the United States builds a stronger foundation
for a military-to-military relationship with China, we will also
continue to monitor China's evolving military strategy, doctrine, and
force development and encourage China to be more transparent about its
military modernization program. In concert with our allies and
partners, the Department will continue adapting U.S. forces, posture,
and operational concepts to maintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacific
security environment.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense will continue to prioritize
the Asia-Pacific region, particularly our robust cooperation with
allies in Northeast Asia. We remain steadfast in our defense
commitments to both Japan and the Republic of Korea and will continue
to work to improve security cooperation, enhance military capabilities,
and modernize each of these critical alliances. We look forward to the
continued support of this committee as we continue to rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank both of you for your testimony,
but, more importantly, thank you for your service during this
critically important time.
Mr. Helvey, I want to start with a statement that was made
this morning. I understand that it has been somewhat taken
back, but I want to make sure that the record is clear here. I
am referring to Assistant Secretary of Defense Katrina
McFarland talking about the administration's budget as it
relates to the Department of Defense. And she said, and I
quote, ``Right now, the pivot is being looked at again,
because, candidly, it cannot happen.'' That had many of us
concerned as to the administration's commitment to the
Rebalance to Asia. Can you clarify the current priority within
the administration and how this budget will be consistent with
that priority?
Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, there has been a clarification that
was issued, and, you know, in brief, the Rebalance to Asia can
and will continue. And this is exactly what we have done in the
2015 Defense budget.
The President's decision to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
reflects a careful assessment of the long-term U.S. interest in
the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, and also
reflects the strong and inextricable ties between the United
States and other Pacific nations. In this respect, the
rebalance is driven by our calculation of our interests rather
than determined by the resources.
This is not to say that resources do not count, however. As
Secretary Hagel spoke of last week in discussing the 2015
budget which was submitted today, the funding levels we seek
provide the opportunity to present a responsible approach that
protects readiness and modernization while maintaining a force
large enough to fulfill our defense strategy, though with some
additional risk. As he said, we have to adapt, innovate, and
make difficult decisions. And we have done that in our budget.
Our resourcing will enable us to uphold our commitment to the
region, including a strengthened posture and presence, and
ensure the United States preserves its status as the preeminent
military power in the region.
Senator Cardin. Thank you for that clarification.
Let me just point out, when you look at the regional
bureaus and the support that they have received within the
Department of State budget and within DOD, Asia, while not at
the bottom, is not as strong as it should have been. The last
several budgets by the Obama administration have tried to
balance that to reflect the priority in Asia. Can we expect
that resources will continue to be prioritized toward the
Rebalance to Asia?
Mr. Helvey. Yes, sir, at least from within the Defense
budget, our resources do reflect those priorities, as outlined
in the Defense Strategic Guidance from 2012. As I said, the
budget that we have presented allows us to fulfill our defense
strategy, which includes the rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific.
Now, within the Department of Defense, as you know, sir,
our budgets are not allocated by region, they are allocated
through the services. And so, many of the things that we are
doing, whether it is partner-building capacity or cooperation,
investing in capabilities that are most relevant to the Asia-
Pacific, those are reflected in the budget.
Senator Cardin. In the Department of State, there are
regional allocations. How are we doing, Mr. Russel, with the
budget?
Mr. Russel. Well, thank you for asking, Chairman. This is
an important priority for all of us, and it is an important
priority for President Obama. I know, from my time at the
National Security Council, when we conducted an interagency
exercise, along with the Office of Management and Budget, to
bring together not only the Asia policy people from each of the
relevant departments, but also the comptrollers and the budget
people, to underscore the priority that President Obama places
on the Asia-Pacific as a strategic priority.
In the case of the State Department, as you noted, the
Obama administration has made some headway in funding more
robustly our Asia-Pacific priorities. And, while Secretary
Kerry himself will be testifying before the Senate on the State
Department budget next week, and I know, as a matter of
practice, it is not good for the Assistant Secretary to get out
ahead of the Secretary, I can say, as Deputy Secretary Heather
Higginbottom briefed the press earlier today, that the
President's fiscal year 2015 budget represents a continuation
of the commitment to fully fund the rebalance.
I know that the fiscal year budget, like the FY14 request,
the budget for 2015 shows a significant increase in funding for
our programs in the Asia-Pacific region. I believe Deputy
Secretary Higginbottom pegged that at approximately a 9-percent
increase. Moreover, in other areas, including public diplomacy
and in the overall utilization and ability to maximize the
resources and the personnel that we have in the region, we
believe that we have made, and continue to make, headway in
intensifying our efforts in fulfilling our national strategy.
Senator Cardin. Thank you for that. I had not intended to
spend time at this hearing on that, but, considering Secretary
McFarland's initial comments, I thought it was important that
we clarify that. And I expect, next week, when Secretary Kerry
is before the full committee on his budget, that we are going
to be talking more about Ukraine, Iran, and Syria than we will
be able to get into the specifics on the budget, but I do
intend to ask questions for the record on some of these issues,
and I am pleased to hear your comments, Mr. Russel.
Mr. Helvey, I want to discuss part of your statement on
dealing with the Okinawa stationing of marines. This has been a
thorn in our relationship for over 15 years. The community
certainly has changed dramatically since that military facility
was first constructed. It has presented a real PR problem
between Japan and the United States. We all recognize that our
future alliance requires different locations for facilities,
and we have been working on this for a long time. And there
have been challenges. There have been challenges in Japan,
there have been challenges in Congress, there have been a lot
of questions asked, a lot of good questions asked, about the
economics of this and whether it works, and whether it works
for the future.
So, I am very much interested in your, I guess, summary
comment, ``We are delighted that this effort is now on track,
and are confident that the ultimate result will be one that is
good for the United States, for the United States-Japan
alliance, and for the people of Okinawa.''
If you would not mind just expanding a little bit more as
to what you think is a realistic time schedule for us to
implement the understanding between Japan and the United
States.
Mr. Helvey. Well, sir, thank you for that question. As you
pointed out, this is a longstanding issue that we have been
working with our colleagues and counterparts in the Government
of Japan. Since at least 1996, the United States and Japan have
been in agreement on the need to relocate the existing Marine
Corps Air Station at Futenma, around which, as you noted, a
significant population has grown in recent years.
Since 1999, we have agreed on a site in the vicinity of
Camp Schwab, near the village of Henoko, so I am--this kind of
gives you a sense of, you know, the timeline as it has evolved.
And this, again, was confirmed most recently last October in
the Two-Plus-Two statement that we had with our counterparts--
Secretary Hagel and Secretary Kerry, with their counterparts.
So, the agreement by the Governor of Okinawa to approve the
landfill permit does reflect a significant step forward,
because we are now in a position where the Government of Japan
can now begin construction on the airstrip at Camp Schwab to
start building out what the Futenma Replacement Facility, as it
is known in the vernacular, where that is going to be----
Senator Cardin. But, let me give you what I----
Mr. Helvey [continuing]. In 10 to 20 years.
Senator Cardin. In my visit to Japan, and in my
conversations with my colleagues on the Armed Services
Committee and on the Appropriations Committee, it seems to me
that we do not have a clear understanding as to the sequencing
of appropriations in Japan and the United States to make this a
reality. Are you confident that we have an understanding with
the Government of Japan as to how their Parliament will be
funding the staging and funding the new facilities that are
necessary for this transition, consistent with the ability of
Congress to also appropriate the funds necessary for the
transition to Guam and Hawaii?
Mr. Helvey. Senator, I would like to take that question for
the record, if I could. I am going to have to do some
additional consultations to be able to provide a fulsome
response.
[Editor's note.--The requested information can be found in
the Q&A in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record''
at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Cardin. And I appreciate that. I want to make sure
things are accurate.
I just think it is important that we have clear
understandings, and there has been a reluctancy in Congress to
do certain things as it is still unclear what is being done in
Japan. And I think it is important that, if we are all sincere,
we are trying to move forward with this relocation, which is
absolutely essential, that we have a transparent and an open
strategy with Japan as to the viability of the projects, to
make sure that we have accurate funding dollar amounts, and
that there is a commitment to fund it in a timely way by both
Parliaments, in the United States and in Japan.
Let me move forward to Korea and talk a little bit about
the transition of authority on the troops there, as the OPCON
is supposed to be implemented in December 2015. How are we
doing in regards to the implementation of that commitment to
turn over command to the Koreans?
Mr. Helvey. Well, Senator Cardin, the transition of wartime
operational control, which is the central point of your
question, should sustain and enhance the alliance's combined
defense posture and capabilities, support both the alliance's
bilateral defense priorities and its future development. The
United States and the Republic of Korea remain committed to
making the preparations necessary to transfer wartime
operational control on the timeline that was established in the
Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan, which would be December 2015.
OPCON transition, however, has always been conditions-
based, and we continue to assess and review the security
situation on the Korean Peninsula, in the context of
implementation of the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan. One of the
key outcomes from the security consultative meeting last
October between Secretary Hagel and Minister Kim was the
establishment of an OPCON Working Group, where the United
States and the Republic of Korea are examining where we are, in
terms of both sides, the United States and the Republic of
Korea, in meeting the timelines and the commitments under the
Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan, in light of a request from the
Republic of Korea to look at the conditions for transition of
operational control.
So, we are in the process of doing that. It is something
that we do regularly through our alliance. We are meeting the
timelines now, but we just want to make sure that we are taking
a look at where we are going to be going, in the context of the
changing security environment, particularly in North Korea.
Senator Cardin. Mr. Russel, moving to the relationship
between the Republic of Korea and North Korea, and the regional
concerns on the activities within North Korea. Obviously what
gets most of the attention is their nuclear activities, but
there is also the erratic behavior of the government, the way
that they treat their own people, and gross violations of human
rights, the failure to have an economy that can adequately take
care of the needs of their own people, all of which have
presented challenges for the international community.
It appears like there is a dialogue taking place between
the Republic of Korea and North Korea. Of course, we had the
six-party talks. Can you just update us as to the confidence
level that we have a method for trying to resolve issues in
North Korea?
Mr. Russel. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First and foremost, our approach to North Korea is
predicated on very, very close coordination, in the first
instance, with our ROK ally, as well as with Japan, and then
broader coordination with the other partners in the six-party
process and with the international community. The ability of
the United States to maintain a united front, and the
insistence that North Korea has to come into compliance with
its international obligation to begin denuclearizing, is one of
the things that has served as a bulwark against now familiar
North Korean tactics.
One familiar cycle we have seen in North Korean behavior is
generating regional tension through provocative steps and
threatening behavior, only to follow that with a so-called
``charm offensive,'' in the hopes that they will be able to
elicit concessions and substantive rewards from the United
States, from the ROK, and from the international community.
They have failed in that effort.
The agreement by North Korea, belatedly, to move forward
with the exchange of elderly family members separated by the
Korean war, bringing together aged South and North Koreans who
have not seen each other, in some cases, for many decades, was
a welcome step, but it is a step that we attribute to the Park
administration's firm and principled-based approach to dealing
with North Korea.
Like the United States, the Government of the Republic of
Korea insists that North Korea must take irreversible steps to
begin coming into compliance on its denuclearization
obligations, that humanitarian actions can be pursued, and the
ROK has taken some modest steps in that direction, but there
will be no progress until and unless North Korea accepts that
its nuclear program and its ballistic missile program are not
acceptable to the international community, and directly at odds
with North Korea's own stated desire for greater security, as
well as economic assistance, if not integration.
Based on this firm set of principles and close coordination
between the United States and our allies and our partners, we
have denied North Korea consistently the benefits that it had
previously achieved through its misbehavior and through its
threats.
On human rights, the United States has strongly supported
the Human Rights Council's decision to form a Commission of
Inquiry, which recently issued a report and will be discussed
next month--or later this month, in Geneva, by the Human Rights
Council. That report found a truly appalling set of
circumstances in North Korea, and was able to document many of
the very, very troubling practices there.
The United States will continue to work with the
international community and with our partners, including the
ROK, to speak out and to shine a light on the problems of human
rights in North Korea, even as we focus intently on the
requirement that North Korea take steps to denuclearize and to
end its illegal ballistic missile program.
Senator Cardin. Thank you for that answer.
Is there anything new to report in regards to our efforts
to improve the relationship between our two close allies, the
Republic of Korea and Japan? Have there been any new
initiatives? There seems to be some provocative activities;
there were provocative activities last year. Do we see any good
will that we might be able to foster a better relationship
between those two countries?
Mr. Russel. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is very much in the
interests of the United States, and therefore it is very much a
diplomatic priority for the United States, that the friction
and the tension between these two extraordinarily close friends
and allies of the United States be reduced, and be reduced
quickly. Both Japan and the Republic of Korea need to make
respective efforts to help create a more conducive and positive
climate. They are both dealing with the legacy of very, very
sensitive and very difficult issues, historical issues from the
20th century. We have maintained a direct and candid dialogue
with the political and the governmental on the opinion leaders
in both countries. We continue to stress the need for prudence
and for restraint for all parties to take steps that will
promote healing. These legacy issues cannot be solved by any
one party, alone. But, all parties can contribute to a reversal
of the current atmosphere and the creation of a positive trend.
Both the Republic of Korea and Japan are healthy, stable
democracies. They are both important free-market economies.
They, themselves, have close cultural ties and roots in shared
values. Moreover, both the Republic of Korea and Japan have a
huge strategic interest in bilateral, as well as trilateral,
cooperation, including and particularly because of the threat
posed by North Korea.
The United States and Japan have, I think, set a positive
model of how two countries can move from the enmity of war to
reconciliation and an extraordinary partnership, friendship,
and alliance. That is a model that I hope can increasingly be
emulated by other countries. It is necessary to deal with the
sensitive issues of history to ensure that that history does
not obstruct the ability of Japan and the Republic of Korea to
meet the challenges of today and to fulfill the goals of
tomorrow.
So, the short answer, after a long introduction, Mr.
Chairman, to your question, is, yes, the United States has both
an interest and a role, not as a mediator, but as a friend and
as a partner. That is a role that we are pursuing with vigor.
Senator Cardin. Well, I think this has to be a very high
priority. We want to see good relations with all the countries
in that region of the world. One of my concerns is that it
looks like China is trying to increase the wedge between Japan
and the Republic of Korea to establish a closer relationship
with the Republic of Korea, to the detriment of Japan. It is
critically important that the United States, which has close
alliances with Japan and Republic of Korea, that we use our
relationships to improve the relationship between those two
countries.
In my visit last year, it was so obvious. More questions
were asked, I think, on that subject than any other subject,
even though the maritime security problems were huge and
China's huge. But, these historic disputes have caused real
challenges to the functioning relationship between two allies
of the United States.
With that, I thank our witnesses.
Mr. Helvey, I just want to underscore the importance of
trying to get on the same page on the replacements to Okinawa.
This is an issue that is critically important to both
countries. We support it, but we have to have the numbers that
make sense, and we have to be on the same page with, in regards
to our mutual commitments. So, I look forward to that
information being made available to our committee.
Thank you.
We will now turn to our second panel. And we are pleased to
have two distinguished experts on Northeast Asia. First is Dr.
Sheila Smith, a senior fellow for Japan Studies at the Council
on Foreign Relations. Dr. Smith currently directs the Project
on Japan's Political Transition and the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
And then we have Dr. Michael Auslin, a resident scholar and
the director of Japan Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, AEI, where he studies Asian regional security and
political issues. Mr. Auslin is also a biweekly columnist for
the Wall Street Journal.
Welcome, both of you. We look forward to your testimony. As
I indicated earlier, your written comments will be made part of
our committee record, and you may proceed as you wish.
Dr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF SHEILA SMITH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR JAPAN STUDIES,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Smith. Chairman Cardin, thank you for the privilege of
joining you today to discuss our alliances in Northeast Asia.
Japan and the Republic of Korea are two of America's
closest allies. Both were forged in the wake of World War II
and at the beginning of the cold war that defined the last half
of the 20th century. We have over 60 years of shared history in
managing regional security in Northeast Asia. We have economic
ties that are deepening for the pursuit of new trade agreements
and new energy ties. And we share a common interest in the
norms and institutions that govern international relations,
particularly regarding the peaceful resolution of international
disputes. These are close U.S. partnerships, with a burgeoning
agenda of cooperation.
Both alliances also face new sources of challenge. The
first is the changing strategic balance in Northeast Asia. For
over a decade now, the stability of that region has been tested
by the proliferation ambitions of North Korea. In addition, the
rising influence of China is reshaping the region's diplomatic,
economic, and military relationships.
Our bilateral relations with both Japan and South Korea are
strong. Last fall, Secretary Hagel traveled to Seoul to mark
the 60th anniversary of our security treaty and for the
bilateral ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting. From there,
he traveled to Tokyo, where he was joined by Secretary Kerry
for a Security Consultative Committee ``two-plus-two'' meeting
with their Japanese counterparts. At both meetings, a detailed
agenda of alliance cooperation was outlined, with very similar
aims of strengthening deterrence and defense cooperation.
In Japan, the Defense reforms initiated by Prime Minister
Abe inform our revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for
Defense Cooperation. Similarly, we are building strong economic
and energy partnerships with Japan and South Korea. The KORUS
Trade Agreement has been a tremendous benefit to both South
Korea and the United States, and we are working with Japan to
complete negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Energy cooperation, I believe, also strengthens our
partnership with these Northeast Asian allies. We continue to
discuss renewal of our civilian nuclear agreement with Seoul,
and we have initiated new LNG projects with Japan.
But, today our biggest challenge may be the deterioration
of relations between Seoul and Tokyo. Memories of the past
century continue to infuse contemporary political relations in
Northeast Asia. And, since 2012, the Japan-ROK relationship has
taken a turn for the worse. President Lee Myung-bak's visit to
Dokdo, or Takeshima, as the Japanese refer to them, that
summer, and the progress of Korean court cases inside South
Korea over victims' claims for World War II compensation from
Japan have called into question the foundation of postwar
Japan-ROK diplomacy.
Popular sentiments in both countries have gone from mutual
respect to antagonism. Newly elected leaders in both capitals,
President Park Geun-hye and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, have
failed to find a path to overcome their diplomatic
estrangement.
Next year will be the 50th anniversary of the Bilateral
Peace Treaty that negotiated the basis of postwar
reconciliation and restored diplomatic ties between these two
U.S. allies. Without high-level dialogue, that anniversary
could be an even more difficult moment for the relationship.
This worsening Japan-South Korea relationship comes at a
time of considerable change in Northeast Asia. China's rising
economic and military influence has had a tremendous effect on
both societies, and there, too, the postwar settlement is
called into question. Most worrisome is the relationship
between Japan and China, who have confronted each other in the
waters around the Senkakus as Beijing has sought to contest
Japan's administrative control over these remote, uninhabited
islands. Chinese paramilitary ships continue to challenge the
Japan Coast Guard, and in 2013 the Chinese military began to
intimate its interest in the airspace and waters around these
islands. The announcement, in November last year, of a new
Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone adds another layer of
complexity to the already dangerous tensions developing in the
East China Sea.
The United States must pursue three priorities in Northeast
Asia. First, Washington must continue its crucial role in
deterring aggression and in advocating for risk reduction in
this increasingly crowded East China Sea maritime space.
Second, the United States must do all that it can to encourage
the leaders of Japan and South Korea to overcome their
political resistance to dialogue. Washington cannot broker
reconciliation, but must continue to point out the costs of
continued estrangement, for regional stability as well as to
their own security.
Finally, the United States must continue to deepen the
economic bonds, including energy, that sustain our relations
with Japan and South Korea. Our own future well-being and
security will depend upon these alliances as we navigate the
challenges of a transforming Asia-Pacific.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Sheila A. Smith
U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia are critical to the success of our
Asia strategy. These alliances are half a century old, with extensive
agendas of economic and security cooperation. Japan and South Korea
continue to host the bulk of our forward deployed forces in Asia, yet
these are not just military alliances. The people of Japan and South
Korea share our commitment to democratic values, to an open and fair
global trading order, and to a cooperative approach to ensuring
regional stability in a rapidly changing Asia-Pacific.
Both Japan and South Korea have new political leaders: in December
2012, Abe Shinzo was elected Prime Minister after his Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) gained a majority in Japan's Lower House of
Parliament and Park Geun-hye was elected to a 5-year term as South
Korea's President by a wide margin, assuming office in February 2013.
Abe's LDP received overwhelming support in the Upper House election of
Parliament in the July 2013, giving the conservatives a majority in
both Houses of Parliament for the first time since 2007. Park had led
her Saenuri Party as it maintained its majority in the April 2012
legislative elections for the National Assembly. Thus both leaders have
a strong electoral mandate, and will be in power for the next several
years.
Unfortunately, the relationship between Tokyo and Seoul has
deteriorated significantly, making it difficult for the United States
to deepen and expand cooperation with its allies. Where once strong
trilateral cooperation between Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo could be
expected across a wide range of issues, today that cooperation is less
likely. For over a year now, the leaders of Japan and South Korea have
not met.
update on u.s.-rok alliance
The Republic of Korea continues to face an unstable and
unpredictable regime in Pyongyang. Last fall, the United States and the
Republic of Korea commemorated the 60th anniversary of their alliance
and outlined plans for advancing the emerging global partnership
between Washington and Seoul. The U.S.-ROK alliance has successfully
deterred aggression by North Korea against the South on the Korean
Peninsula. Washington and Seoul work closely to craft and support the
U.N. Security Council Resolutions that seek to sanction North Korean
proliferation. After successive incidents in 2010 involving the use of
force by Pyongyang against the South, the U.S.-ROK alliance has
bolstered defense cooperation and strengthened their combined defense
posture. In March 2013, the two governments completed their ``counter
provocation plan,'' designed to anticipate and meet any further
military actions by the North Koreans. In addition, last fall Secretary
of Defense Chuck Hagel and Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin approved a
``tailored deterrence strategy'' that would meet WMD threats from the
North, and this includes the counter missile as well as the Korean Air
and Missile Defense system.
The U.S.-ROK alliance also includes a global agenda of cooperation.
Since 2009, in accordance with the Joint Vision for the alliance, the
United States and South Korea have set forth a broader agenda of global
cooperation, including partnering in developing mechanisms for ensuring
global nuclear security. South Korea hosted the second Nuclear Security
summit in 2012. In addition, South Korea continues to expand its
peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, and disaster relief
activities, and cooperates with the United States and others in Syria
and Afghanistan. Future goals for the alliance include achieving the
transition of wartime operational control (OPCON), deepening
cooperation through their Cyber Cooperation Working Group, and
continuing to implement base relocation and returns of U.S. Forces
Korea (USFK).
update on u.s.-japan alliance
The U.S.-Japan alliance has also confronted a new security
challenge. Since 2012, China has begun maritime patrols of the Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea, challenging Japan's administrative
control. Rising tensions, and growing popular sensitivities over the
islands, have frozen diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Beijing,
and the increasing paramilitary patrols have upon occasion been
supplemented by interactions between the two militaries.
The United States has direct interests in this growing tension. As
Japan's treaty ally, the United States has increased its defense
cooperation with Tokyo (such as the deployment of F-22s in Okinawa and
expanded training between U.S. and Japanese forces, including
amphibious landing operations) to deter miscalculation, and has
conveyed to Beijing in repeated high-level meetings (including between
President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping last year) the
U.S. interest in a peaceful resolution of China's maritime disputes
with its neighbors. China's announcement in November 2013 of a new Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, however, puts
new pressure on Japan's air defenses (as well as South Korea's) and
exacerbates tensions over the Senkaku Islands.
The U.S.-Japan alliance has also begun an important set of
revisions as Japan has initiated its own defense reforms. In October,
Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Hagel traveled
to Tokyo for a Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meeting with
Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera.
The highlights of that meeting included an agreement to revise the
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines to enhance the alliance
deterrent (especially with intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities). A review of roles, missions, and
capabilities will supplement the discussion of the Guidelines, as will
a review in Japan of the government's interpretation of the
constitution with regard to the right of collective self-defense.
Finally, Japan's economic policy reforms, dubbed ``Abenomics,''
have had some initial success in raising expectations for an improved
economic performance. A combination of fiscal stimulus and a new
emphasis on monetary policy combined to stimulate greater optimism in
Japan's economic future. Breaking the deflationary mindset is seen as
the prerequisite to greater investment and consumer spending. Early
signs of traction in 2013 were apparent, but much will depend on the
Abe government's ability to tackle the more politically difficult
economic restructuring Japan needs to truly turn its economy around.
Japan's decision last year to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
is widely seen as one of Prime Minister Abe's best policy tools for
opening the market and restoring economic competitiveness.
challenges for 2014
The United States has several challenges ahead in managing its
alliance relations in Northeast Asia. First, both alliances will need
continued attention to defense cooperation. Regional security trends
make alliance readiness and strategic adjustments to the alliance
deterrent necessary. The United States and Japan will revise their
Defense Cooperation Guidelines to consider new missions and upgrade
capabilities based on their strategic assessment of regional military
balance. Tensions in the East China Sea and the continued concern over
the situation on the Korean Peninsula will require continued attention
to crisis management provisions and to reassess the alliance readiness.
Force posture adjustment continues to be necessary, as are upgrades in
alliance deterrence (such as the ongoing improvements in ISR and
ballistic missile defense capabilities). Japan's own reorientation of
its defense posture southward will also shape alliance cooperation. In
the U.S.-ROK alliance, the most important consultations continue to be
over whether to transition OPCON from the USFK to the Korean military.
The nature and timing of this transfer, of course, will be conditions
based, and should be undertaken in order to ensure a seamless combined
deterrent force. The potential for provocations from the North cannot
be underestimated, especially near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), and
close allied consultations on how to anticipate and respond to such
provocations remains a high priority. Finally, the potential for
intermediate range missile and/or nuclear testing remains, and the
continued ability to deter (including extended deterrence) is crucial
to regional stability.
Second, economic cooperation continues to be an important component
in our alliance cooperation. The TPP negotiations are a critical
component of U.S.-Japan cooperation. Recent slowing of progress rests
largely on two requirements. The first is that the lack of trade
promotion authority prompts concerns over the ability of the Obama
administration to gain congressional approval of a final agreement.
Second, the desire for a high standards agreement limits the U.S.
willingness for compromise, particularly on Japanese agriculture.
Domestic politics in both countries could undercut the U.S.-Japan
cooperation that to date had enabled progress on this important
economic security initiative. The United States and South Korea now
enjoy the benefits of their free trade agreement (KORUS), approved by
the U.S. Congress and the Korean Assembly at the end of 2011.
Differences remain over some sectors, but overall trade has improved.
Finally, energy cooperation will also be on the alliance agenda
this year, and with both allies, energy has a strategic impact. The
United States and South Korea will continue to discuss their civilian
nuclear cooperation, and expectations remain high that a new agreement
can be reached. Additional time was granted by the Senate in January
2014 to allow a more careful discussion. Japan too has new energy needs
after its triple disasters in 2011 changed the national consensus on
the country's overall energy mix. Exports of U.S. liquefied natural gas
(LNG) and potentially other energy resources to Japan should be
considered, as they will transform Japan's dependence on Russia and the
Middle East for the bulk of its imported energy needs.
bilateral cooperation between tokyo and seoul
Perhaps the thorniest issue for U.S. foreign policy in Northeast
Asia continues to be the difficult relations between Seoul and Tokyo.
Since coming into office, President Park and Prime Minister Abe have
failed to organize a high-level summit meeting, and as a result,
domestic sentiments within each country have become increasingly
antagonistic. Several factors account for the deterioration in this
important bilateral relationship. First, the continuing sensitivity
particularly in South Korea to issues related to historical memory
impedes closer security cooperation. In 2012, the two nations were
close to concluding two important security agreements, an information-
sharing agreement and an acquisitions and cross-servicing agrement
(ACSA) that would have allowed cooperation in case of a contingency on
the peninsula. Domestic politics in South Korea derailed this effort,
however.
Second, the visit in 2012 of former Korean President Lee Myung-bak
to the island of Dokdo (Takeshima for the Japanese) inflamed popular
sentiment in Japan, as did President Lee's statements on Japan's lack
of remorse for its colonization of the Korean Peninsula. The change of
leadership in Seoul only deepened the rift as President Park continues
to advocate to others the need for Japan to reflect on its past and
take a more ``correct understanding of history.'' Pressures within
South Korea, largely led by court cases appealing for greater South
Korean Government activism to gain new compensation for victims of
Japanese oppression during World War II, continue to make this a
contentious issue, and sentiment in Japan toward South Korea has
worsened considerably. The 50th anniversary of the bilateral peace
treaty between Japan and South Korea next year will focus attention on
this sensitive issue of remorse and compensation for WWII.
Finally, the rise of China is deepening the difficulties in the
Japan-South Korea relationship. President Park began her time in office
by visiting Washington and Beijing, but ignoring South Korea's
longstanding diplomatic ties to Tokyo. Moreover, in high-level meetings
with China, South Korean officials join with China to chastise Japan on
its past history, creating the impression that Seoul and Beijing seek
to isolate Japan diplomatically. While the historical legacy of World
War II has long been a source of pain and friction in the diplomatic
relations between Japan and South Korea, the growing synchronization of
territorial disputes and criticism of Japanese leaders' positions on
history between Seoul and Beijing make it difficult for Tokyo to
manage. Popular sentiments in Tokyo have become very sensitive to this
notion that Japan is the target of attack by its neighbors, just as
popular sentiments in Seoul have become very sensitive to Japanese
revisionist statements on the conflicts of the 20th century.
The U.S. role in these tensions is a difficult one. While U.S.
interests are not served by the continuing estrangement between our two
closest allies in Asia, Washington cannot broker a deal on the complex
issue of historical memory. For reconciliation to occur, it must be
undertaken directly by Tokyo and Seoul. Nonetheless, the United States
must continue to urge President Park and Prime Minister Abe to take
steps toward a concrete discussion on reconciliation, and to outline to
both leaders the costs of their continued contention. Without
leadership by both Park and Abe, this dispute could become much more
difficult to resolve, and could undermine their ability to manage their
own country's security. A comprehensive review of the path to restoring
strong political and economic ties must be undertaken, and no
preconditions to dialogue should be set.
The lost opportunities of this continued friction are real for the
United States, and for the region. Close trilateral cooperation on
North Korea is vital in case of a crisis or even worse, a conflict.
U.S. access to bases in Japan is imperative to our ability to defend
South Korea. Korean cooperation with Japan will be vital to ensuring
the safety of Japanese citizens on the peninsula and in deterring North
Korean aggression against Japan. Likewise, maritime cooperation between
Seoul and Tokyo is essential for nonproliferation activities, as well
as broader stability of East China Sea. Japan and Korea have a long
history of coast guard and air defense cooperation, and should see this
as an added stabilizer for the East China Sea, especially after the
ADIZ. Furthermore, the ability of Tokyo and Seoul to cooperate in and
around the East China Sea should become the basis for encouraging
Chinese participation in similar risk reduction mechanisms, perhaps
through the trilateral China, Japan, South Korea summitry. Finally, the
frictions over their postwar settlement ultimately do affect the United
States. More and more, U.S. citizens are raising questions about the
historical disputes between Japan and South Korea, including the issue
of compensation for the system of sexual slavery during WWII, and
wondering about the rising nationalist impulses of both countries.
There is plenty of room for nongovernmental discussions between U.S.
and regional historians on some of these issues, and for U.S.
engagement in a broader Asian discussion of historical memory. Our own
leadership in demonstrating the importance of historical reconciliation
has been a source of strengthening our relations with both countries.
In both Korea and Japan, we must continue to emphasize the importance
of reconciliation.
what more can be done?
President Obama's visit to both countries in April offers an
opportunity to highlight the strengths not only of our bilateral ties,
but also of the value of our trilateral partnership for regional
security and prosperity. Elected representatives in Congress, too,
should take every opportunity to demonstrate the importance of these
alliances to the United States. Personal ties with the leaders of Japan
and South Korea will allow for a more intimate dialogue on issues of
reconciliation, and will allow for greater understanding of the
changing security and economic concerns in the region. The United
States has a tremendous stake in Asia, and our partnerships with both
of these vibrant democracies and dynamic economies are indispensable to
our own success. With Seoul and Tokyo, we have shared interests in a
broad agenda of cooperation across the Asia-Pacific: freedom of
navigation, the rule of law, an open and fair international economy,
and the right of self-determination and territorial integrity. Finally,
we must continue to invest in the next generation of alliance leaders,
and the United States must continue to lean forward in funding,
educating, and sending abroad our very best young minds. Building the
personal relationships, and learning first hand about these two
accomplished cultures, is one of the best means of ensuring the health
of our relationships with Japan and South Korea in the generations
ahead.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Dr. Smith.
Dr. Auslin.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL AUSLIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, DIRECTOR OF
JAPAN STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Auslin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
come talk to you today about the status and trajectories of our
alliances in Northeast Asia.
This hearing is being held at a particularly important
time, for, as the United States continues a broad drawdown in
military forces, the security trendline in Asia is worsening,
not improving. Security in Asia remains based on our alliances
which, for the past half century, have been focused on a
handful of key nations, Japan and South Korea preeminent among
them. As the committee understands, strengthening these
alliances is one of the surest ways to maintain stability in
the Asia-Pacific region, preserve U.S. influence, and help
promote a future of greater freedom and prosperity for half our
world.
You asked about the current status of the bilateral
alliances and their progress. Regarding Japan, I would argue
that we are witnessing a divergence between the politics and
the policy of the United States-Japan alliance. While
Washington applauds many of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's
measures to strengthen Japan's security and fulfill
longstanding agreements with the United States, there is
growing tension over perceptions of his approach to historical
issues, such as the December visit to the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine. While I argue that fears of the dangers of Mr.
Abe's nationalism are overblown, we should be worried about the
potential political divergence between Washington and Tokyo
over the coming year.
As has been noted, South Korea and Washington continue to
have close ties. In January 2014, we came to a new 5-year
special measures agreement, under which Seoul will raise host-
nation support payments for U.S. forces. However, one
continuing source of uncertainty, which you have already
highlighted, in this alliance is the so-called OPCON Transfer
of Wartime Command of United States and South Korean Forces,
which has already been delayed twice, and is most likely to be
delayed after 2015.
The challenges we face this year, I think are threefold.
The first, we have discussed several times here, is poor Japan-
ROK relations. America's two closest allies barely speak to
each other, and the tensions are at their highest in decades.
While I have not been privy to what we have done to try to
ameliorate that, Washington, I believe, should be doing much
more behind closed doors in a very frank way to try and bridge
the gap and stress common interests between our two allies.
The second challenge, also discussed here earlier, is North
Korea, which, under Kim Jong-un, has become even more of a
wildcard than before. I believe the administration does not
appear to have any current initiatives to deal with the Kim
regime. And, as long as there is a stalemate between North
Korea and the rest of the world, Pyongyang wins.
In China, President Xi Jinping's first year in power saw
new and destabilizing acts, such as the establishment of the
East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone. Having
consolidated his power in his first year, he now has 9 full
years to push forward, not only his program for domestic
economic reform, which we should welcome, but also his national
security objectives, which increasingly seem to be at odds with
a stable Asia-Pacific region and dismissive of the Obama
administration's rebalance.
There are areas for bilateral and trilateral cooperation in
the coming year. Bilaterally with Japan, I agree with Dr. Smith
that Washington must focus on preserving stability around the
disputed Senkaku Islands. A greater American presence in the
waters around the islands can help prevent an accident that
causes conflict.
The economic basis of the United States-Japan relationship
surely can be strengthened by concluding the Trans-Pacific
Partnership talks, but we must recognize there remains a
significant gulf between Washington and Tokyo, and the apparent
death of fast-track trade promotion authority in the Senate
means that any TPP agreement would find it difficult to get
ratified.
With Seoul, we should be working on setting a realistic
timeline for OPCON transfer, and also thinking of new
initiatives for dealing with North Korea, such as stronger
financial measures aimed at the Kim regime.
Many of these initiatives can be done in a trilateral
fashion, such as greater cooperation and consultation on the
ADIZ, on North Korea, and on building up missile defense. An
innovative approach would be to try and expand the limited
trilateral military exercises, which we currently conduct, or
exploring limited joint training. Another idea is to consider a
trilateral vision statement on the region's opportunities and
challenges.
The Obama administration's rebalance has helped the
American Government and public begin thinking about our
interests in the post-Iraq and -Afghanistan world. Yet, the
administration has also undercut its own policy, in two ways:
firstly, through defense cuts that make it more difficult to
maintain our presence abroad and call into question our long-
term credibility, and secondly, by a hesitant approach to
China's latest provocations that raise questions about our will
to oppose their destabilizing actions. Washington must assure
its friends and partners that it will not let the balance of
power in Asia shift in favor of those who seek to use might to
achieve their objectives. An Asia in which coercion is
regularly employed cannot be an Asia that remains peaceful and
prosperous in the long run.
In conclusion, there are three things that the
administration, I think, should focus on. First is to clarify
what its actual goals are in Asia, and make those goals clear
to our allies and to those with whom we must deal. Second,
Congress and the administration must ensure that our projected
defense cuts do not further erode our readiness or our presence
in Asia. And third, I argue, it is time for a new interagency
strategic vision statement on Asia that lays out our interests
and strategy. The result of such an approach would be stronger,
liberal alliances and, quite likely, a region that is more
stable and prosperous.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Auslin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Michael R. Auslin
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rubio, members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to come talk to you today about the status and
trajectories of our alliances in Northeast Asia. This hearing is being
held at a particularly important time, as the United States enters the
final phase of winding down its combat role in Afghanistan and as the
U.S. public begins looking forward to a future less focused on the
Middle East. At the same time, several years of uncertainty regarding
the U.S. defense budget are now being replaced by a better
understanding of how our military will resize and reshape itself for
the coming decade.
That said, the choices we are making as to our future foreign and
security policies obviously do not take place in a vacuum. Other
countries have their say as to how the world will look, and in part the
future judgment on the wisdom of our likely course will be based on how
other countries react to our policies. Nowhere is this more true than
in Asia, where the world continues to watch, with equal parts envy and
apprehension, the rise of China.
China continues to present a unique policy challenge to the United
States. Our economic interdependence all but mandates close and smooth
working relations at the public and private level; yet our political
and security competition seems to grow without pause. This is the same
dynamic faced by many of our allies and friends in Asia, to whom of
course, the Janus-faced aspect of today's China is of enduring concern.
While the United States has broad-based economic, diplomatic,
cultural, and social relationships with the nations of Asia, this
hearing rightly seeks to understand the strengths and weaknesses of our
alliance structure in Northeast Asia. Our alliances have been based for
the past half-century on significant security commitments to a handful
of key nations, Japan and South Korea preeminent among them. Because of
this, China's activities in the region, as well as the ongoing North
Korean nuclear and missile challenge, are the major influences on our
alliance relations with Tokyo and Seoul.
Before discussing these two separately, it is important to note
that our allies and partners in Asia are well aware of, and concerned
about, projected drawdowns in the U.S. military. They are keenly
attuned to how far the continental United States is from the
flashpoints of Asia, such as the Korean Peninsula or the South China
Sea. They read the headlines about our Navy shrinking to its smallest
size since World War I and that the Air Force will shed hundreds of
planes over the coming years. They find it hard to square such hard
numbers with the constant statements of the Obama administration that
it is rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. They worry that
assurances by the United States Government that budget cuts at home
will not affect the U.S. presence in Asia are mere rhetoric.
Indeed, both governments and publics in Asia are aware that U.S.
military activity throughout the region is declining. Last year,
Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, testified
before Congress that his travel budget had been cut by half. Similarly,
the Pentagon has been forced to reduce military-to-military exchanges,
such as postponing the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium or canceling
exercises run by Pacific Air Forces. General Hawk Carlisle, Commander
of Pacific Air Forces, has been just one of the senior military leaders
publicly to state his concern that resources have not followed the
commitment to rebalance.
By raising expectations throughout the region that the United
States would be more involved in Asian issues, we have created a
dangerous gap with our inaction. While Secretary of State Kerry focused
on climate change during his visit to China, South Korea, and Indonesia
just 2 weeks ago, many of the nations of the region are far more
concerned about the growing risk of conflict and what must be
considered coercive behavior by China. Just last week, our ally the
Philippines protested the Chinese use of water cannons by patrol boats
on Philippine fishermen around the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the
South China Sea. Asia's civilian airliners, except for Japan, are all
complying with Beijing's intrusive demands for identification of
peaceful flights over the East China Sea through China's new and
unprecedented air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Japan continues
to respond to regular incursions by Chinese vessels into the waters
around the Senkaku Islands.
The nations of Asia watch very carefully Washington's hesitation
and desire to avoid confronting China. They get clear messages from our
actions that they must expect to deal with China on their own. They
already perceive a shift in the balance of power, and we must recognize
that at some point we will be seen as a paper tiger, whose commitments
are not backed up by commensurate national will. Meanwhile, the
trendline in Asia is worsening, not improving, making our lack of
response all the more noticeable.
That said, our country retains a significant amount of influence in
the Asia-Pacific region. This is due in no small part to the 325,000
men and women of U.S. Pacific Command, many of whom are forward
deployed or on regular visits throughout the region. Our half-century
old alliance structure also provides us with unique working
relationships and the opportunity to remain involved with a core group
of countries which themselves play diverse roles in Asia. As this
committee understand, strengthening these alliances is one of the
surest ways to help maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific region,
preserve U.S. influence, and help promote a future of greater freedom
and prosperity for half our world.
current status of bilateral alliances and progress in recent years
Today, our bilateral alliances reflect the changes rippling through
Asia as well as constraints here in the United States. To begin with
Japan, I would argue that we are witnessing a divergence between the
``politics'' and the ``policy'' of the U.S.-Japan alliance. We are
still in a delicate period that began in 2009, when the then-ruling
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) upended the relationship by reopening
the question of realigning U.S. forces in Japan. The core of the 2006
agreement that the DPJ decided to relitigate, so to speak, was the
proposal to move Marine Corps Air Station Futenma out of its crowded
urban location and relocate it to the less-populated northern part of
Okinawa.
Fast-forward 5 years later and current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
who resigned his position back in 2007, has moved to push the original
agreement ahead and complete the Futenma Relocation Facility in Nago
City. In addition, Mr. Abe has signaled his intention to reinterpret
Japan's ban on exercising collective self-defense, which is something
the United States has long wanted. He has confirmed his predecessor's
decision to buy the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and to loosen Japan's
restrictions on arms exports. Much of this is codified in Tokyo's
first-ever national security strategy. Just as significantly,
Washington and Tokyo have agreed to revise the 1997 Mutual Defense
Guidelines by the end of 2014 to update the alliance for the 21st
century, including such new areas as the military use of space and
cyber space. From this perspective, the policy of the U.S.-Japan
alliance is moving in the right direction to respond to the new
challenges it faces.
Yet, if the bilateral relationship is looked at from a ``politics''
perspective, Tokyo and Washington have moved from disagreement over
policy to political tensions over perceptions of Prime Minister Abe's
approach to historical issues. His December visit to the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine resulted in a rare public reproach from the U.S.
Embassy in Tokyo and strong condemnations by Beijing and Seoul.
Statements by his appointees to Japan's public broadcaster have been
criticized for their attempts to reinterpret Japan's wartime past.
Fears that Prime Minister Abe is thinking of backing away from previous
governments' statements on war-era comfort women have raised the ire of
groups both in Asia and abroad. While I would argue that the fears of
Mr. Abe's nationalism are overblown, we should be worried about the
potential political divergence between Washington and Tokyo over the
coming year.
However, whereas Japan and the United States continue to have
difficulties in their relationship, the ties between Washington and
Seoul remain extremely close. President Obama crafted an unusually
tight relationship with former South Korean President Lee Myung-bak,
and has continued the trend with current President Park Guen-hye.
Uncomfortably for Tokyo, Presidents Obama and Park share similar
sentiments regarding Prime Minister Abe's perceived historical
revisionism. In terms of the U.S.-ROK working relationship, in January
2014, the United States and South Korea came to a new 5-year Special
Measures Agreement (SMA), under which Seoul will raise its host nation
support payments for U.S. forces in Korea by nearly 6 percent,
increasing spending to around $870 million per year.
One continuing source of uncertainty in the alliance is the so-
called ``operational control'' (OPCON) transfer of wartime command of
U.S. and South Korean forces. Originally scheduled for 2007, it has
been delayed twice at the request of the South Koreans, and is now
planned for 2015, though that date, too, is likely to be pushed back.
While our combined command structure in South Korea has resulted in an
extraordinarily close training and working relationship between the two
militaries, Seoul's inability to successfully develop the capabilities
needed to lead military operations in wartime is a source of concern.
With both Seoul and Tokyo modernizing their militaries, Washington
can look forward to a future with ever more capable allies. Both
countries are likely to purchase the F-35 fighter and each has
ballistic missile defense capabilities, such as modern Aegis-equipped
guided missile cruisers. Each also has been the target of cyber
attacks, and both are thus focused on increasing their cyber defense
capabilities.
One major difficulty for the United States in Asia is the poor
state of bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea. America's
two closest allies barely speak to each other, and tensions are at
their highest in decades. Part of this is due to the historical issue I
noted above, but it also derives from the continuing dispute over the
Takeshima/Dokdo Islands in the Sea of Japan (terminology over this body
of water was settled by the State Department in 2012). The lack of
trust and bitter feelings between the two countries makes it difficult
to optimize the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia. Instead of having two
allies working closely together, U.S. military planners must conduct
most of their operations on two bilateral tracks. Given that the common
threat from North Korea, and now antagonistic behavior from China, such
as the ADIZ, affects both, Tokyo and Seoul would be well advised to put
aside some of their differences and embrace their similarities. Sadly,
there seems no prospect of this happening anytime in the near future.
Challenges for 2014
The challenges we face in our Northeast Asian bilateral alliances
this year are threefold: first, the poor state of Japan-ROK relations;
second, North Korea; and third, Chinese provocations. This list has
been steady for quite some time, and is unlikely to change soon.
I have already briefly discussed the tensions in the Japan-ROK
relationship, but it is worth mentioning here that, if anything, ties
seem to be getting worse. Despite their deep economic links, and their
shared liberal values such as rule law, freedom of the press, and the
like, they find the tensions between them at historically high levels.
President Park appears to desire to draw closer to China at Japan's
expense, and has steadfastly refused to meet Prime Minister Abe. She
has taken the opportunity of visits by senior American officials, such
as Vice President Biden, to publicly criticize Japan. For their part,
leading Japanese now openly talk about ``Seoul fatigue,'' and a growing
resentment against President Park's refusal to reciprocate to Japanese
outreach. This is a serious state of affairs, and while the United
States cannot make the two nations end their feud, Washington should be
doing much more behind closed doors to make clear that our patience is
not infinite, and that we cannot be as effective as we want to be if we
cannot work in a trilateral fashion with our two most important allies
in Asia.
The second major challenge this year is the unending crisis that is
North Korea. It is disheartening to say that we currently know even
less about what is happening inside Pyongyang than we did during the
rule of the late Kim Jong-il. Since executing his uncle late last year,
Kim Jong-un has become even more of a wildcard and enigma than his
predecessors. By continuing his family's long-term pursuit of nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile technology, he has dashed the hopes of
some who saw in him an incipient reformer, partial to Disney
characters. We no longer have confidence that China retains its
traditional influence over the Kim family, as tenuous as that may have
been, nor are we any better at anticipating Pyongyang's next
provocative act.
The six-party talks, designed to solve the nuclear crisis, have
been stalled since 2008, and the Obama administration's one attempt at
a deal, the 2012 Leap Day Agreement, was broken by the Kim regime just
months after its signing. The administration does not appear to have
any current initiatives to deal with North Korea, and U.N. sanctions
continue to be undercut by China. As long as there is a stalemate
between North Korea and the rest of the world, Pyongyang wins. Even the
devastating U.N. report detailing human rights abuses and the crimes
against humanity that are regularly perpetrated by Pyongyang seems to
have had little effect on galvanizing some type of approach to put more
pressure on this heinous regime. Moreover, the longer America waits and
watches developments in the country, the more competent North Korea
becomes in its nuclear and missile programs.
Nor is there much reason to be confident about the trajectory of
China. Unlike his immediate predecessors, President Xi Jinping has
consolidated his power in his first year in office. He appears to have
better control over the military than former President Hu Jintao ever
did, and has streamlined his country's national security decisionmaking
process. He now has 9 full years to push forward not only his program
for domestic economic reform, which the United States should welcome,
but also his national security objectives, which increasingly seem to
be at odds with a stable Asia-Pacific region.
President Xi's first year saw new and destabilizing acts, such as
the establishment of the East China Sea air defense identification
zone. Provocations over the Senkakus also increased, with reports of
Chinese fighter jets being sent near the area and an instance of a
Chinese naval vessel locking its firing radar on a Japanese Maritime
Self-Defense ship. If these are any indications to go by, President Xi
is comfortable pushing the boundaries of provocative behavior. That is
the reason the trendline in Asia is negative, and is not improving
despite regular high-level U.S.-Chinese interaction, such as the
Sunnylands summit between Presidents Obama and Xi last year and Vice
President Biden's visit to Beijing last December.
It appears that the Chinese Government has calculated that it can
continue its assertive, even coercive, actions in the face of America's
protestations that it is rebalancing to the Pacific. Tensions are
running high enough in Northeast Asia to cause Prime Minister Abe to
remark at Davos earlier this year that Sino-Japanese relations are in a
pre-1914 stage. As of now, it does not seem that Washington has come up
with a successful policy that can encourage Beijing to act in a
constructive manner on security issues, while continuing its
integration into the world economy. Not surprisingly, many believe this
is the greatest foreign policy challenge our country will face in the
coming generation.
Areas for bilateral and trilateral cooperation in 2014
Given the challenges in Northeast Asia faced by us and by our
allies Japan and South Korea, there are important areas of cooperation
that Washington can explore. Bilaterally with Japan, Washington should
work to clarify how it can help preserve stability around the disputed
Senkaku islands, including in the air domain. While war between Japan
and China over the Senkakus is a remote possibility, there is a much
higher likelihood that an accident could cause a true crisis, and
perhaps even limited conflict. Although the U.S. Government has chosen
not to take a position on the sovereignty claims by Japan and China, it
recognizes Japan's longstanding administration of the islands. Thus,
showing support for Japan through a greater American presence in the
immediate waters around the islands does not seem like a provocation on
our part.
In addition, continuing expanded military exercises between U.S.
and Japanese forces, such as last month's Iron Fist exercise in
California with U.S. Marines and Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force
units, will help the Japanese military become a more capable force and
more credible in its new focus on protecting Japan's southwestern
islands from threat. There is also room for more cooperation between
the U.S. Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force in refusing to
recognize China's ADIZ over the East China Sea. Such activities have a
clear diplomatic component, as well, and can serve to promote a clear
vision of U.S. engagement in the region.
Finally, the economic basis of the U.S.-Japan relationship can be
strengthened by a timely conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
talks. Unfortunately, the recent round of negotiations in Singapore
showed that there remains a significant gulf between Washington and
Tokyo on import tariffs, especially for agricultural goods. On top of
that, the apparent death of ``fast track'' Trade Promotion Authority in
the Senate means that any TPP agreement would find it difficult to get
ratified. There are also reports that foreign negotiators are hesitant
to make any agreement if they cannot be assured of fast track status in
the U.S. Senate. The Obama administration must push both at home and in
Tokyo to better sell the benefits of a high-standards free trade
agreement.
Washington's interest in North Korean denuclearization means that
2014 should be a year of new initiatives with Seoul. To let another 12
months go by without any new approach to pressuring North Korea means
that Kim Jong-un will further strengthen himself. Recommitting to
financial sanctions against the Kim family and its lieutenants may be
one way of bringing them back to the table, but the State Department
must work with Seoul and Tokyo to have a united front in the face of
Chinese opposition. On the security side of the U.S.-ROK alliance,
clarifying Seoul's readiness for OPCON transfer will help remove future
uncertainty. Working, as well, to improve South Korea's ballistic
missile defense capability can provide some assurance that threats from
the North can be answered.
Most of these initiatives could be done in a trilateral fashion,
since Japan and South Korea face similar security challenges. There is,
however, little to no likelihood of Seoul and Tokyo agreeing to work
more closely on their own. Nonetheless, the Obama administration should
push firmly for more trilateral cooperation and consultation on the
ADIZ, on North Korea, and on building up missile defense capabilities.
Blunt talk about the costs of their diplomatic freeze may help move
forward quiet initiatives, such as trilateral negotiations on North
Korea.
An innovative approach would be to try and expand the limited
trilateral military exercises that we current conduct. Exploring
limited joint training is another way to help build trust between the
two country's defense forces. Another idea is to consider a trilateral
vision statement on the region's opportunities and challenges. Such a
diplomatic document by the liberal leaders in Northeast Asia could even
develop into a larger document bringing in such stalwart U.S. allies as
Australia and those that feel increasing pressure from China, like the
Philippines.
How to Create Stronger, Like-Minded Alliances?
In making the rebalance a central part of its foreign policy
strategy, the Obama administration has helped the American Government
and public begin thinking about our interests in the post-Iraq and
Afghanistan world. Recognizing the dynamic nature of the Asia-Pacific,
its crucial importance to the global economy, its opportunity to help
promote democracy, but also its security challenges is the beginning of
setting American foreign and security policy on a new path.
Yet the administration has also undercut its own policy in two
ways: firstly, through defense cuts that make it more difficult to
maintain U.S. presence abroad and call into question our long-term
credibility; and secondly, by a hesitant approach to China's latest
provocations that raise questions about our will in opposing
destabilizing actions.
Our allies, foremost among them Japan, have raised concerns about
the competing priorities of the Obama administration. They worry that
the rebalance is empty rhetoric and that Washington is all too eager to
avoid antagonizing China. Both Seoul and Tokyo wonder if Washington is
doing everything it can to blunt North Korea's plans to become a full
nuclear power. They are concerned that we are too laissez faire about
the balance of power, or perceptions of the balance of power, in Asia.
It is in American interests to make clear to our allies that it is
their responsibility to protect their own territory. But Washington
must also assure its friends and partners that it will not let the
balance of power in Asia shift in favor of those who seek to use might
to achieve their objectives. An Asia in which coercion is regularly
employed cannot be an Asia that remains peaceful and prosperous in the
long run.
There is much that we can do to ensure our resolve is clearly
understood. The most important step the administration can take is to
clarify for itself what its actual goals are in Asia. This was perhaps
one of the key failings of the rebalance: it never articulated what the
administration desired to accomplish. Is it to blunt China's assertive
behavior, to promote democracy and liberalism, or to open markets? For
example, the administration never fully explained why it was seeking
more rotational basing opportunities for U.S. forces in Asia, which was
perhaps the most visible of its rebalancing moves.
The nations of Asia well understand that Washington and Beijing
have very different visions for Asia's future. The administration would
do well to recognize the reality that we and the Chinese unfortunately
agree on very little and have competing goals. We can and should
continue to try and work with the Chinese, but the clearest signal
would be sent to our Northeast and Southeast Asian allies if we
appeared to understand what is evident to everyone in the region: China
seeks to build its power and influence to a point where it has the
freedom of action to carry out any policy that it desires. While there
is little reason to believe Beijing wants war or any type of conflict,
it appears increasingly willing to risk hostilities because it believes
that no one will oppose it.
Second, Congress and the administration must do everything possible
to ensure that current and projected defense cuts do not further erode
our readiness or our presence in Asia. If the numbers of planes and
ships in Asia start to dip, it will be harder to maintain our
credibility. Joint exercises and military exchanges need to be fully
funded, so that partner militaries believe that we remain a steadfast
friend to them.
Third, strategic planning exercises, like the Quadrennial Defense
Review, should not be budget-driven documents, but rather explore what
the military really needs in order to maintain its qualitative
superiority in Asia. What types of weapons systems are best suited to
Asia's unique challenges of distance and potential adversaries with
growing capabilities? How can we take advantage of asymmetric means of
defense? Once we have done that, then the Pentagon needs to reach out
to Tokyo and Seoul to discuss the best ways in which they can build to
their strengths and complement our investments.
In short, in order to build like-minded alliances, both Congress
and the pubic should push the administration to be clear-eyed about the
challenges we face, openly discuss them, and have a realistic plan for
meeting them. That would reassure our allies that we truly put our
shared values at the center of our foreign policy and that we will not
ignore the actions of those who seek to destabilize Asia in their
favor. The result of such an approach will be stronger liberal
alliances and quite likely a region that is more stable and prosperous.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you both. You have given a good
overview of the strengths and what we have been able to
accomplish in the rebalance, but also the challenges that lie
ahead.
And I was listening to both of your testimonies. I was
struck by the maritime security issues that we talk about a
great deal. Rather explosive. We are worried that it could
trigger a major incident at any time. And thinking about the
events over the past week in Ukraine, where Russia, for the
second time, is using its military force to take control over
lands that do not belong to Russia. There is no dispute that
Crimea is Ukrainian territory, yet Russia is using its military
there. And in the China Seas, the dominant military force is
probably China. And we are all concerned as to whether they are
going to just use military might, causing an incident. And now,
if Russia's activities in Ukraine go unchallenged, does this
raise the concern that China could use that as an example for
its own military actions in disputed areas?
Either one of you.
Dr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will start off the
answer to that very complex question.
I think last year I took a fairly careful look at the
maritime risks inherent in China's new contestation of the
Senkaku issues. And so, I would like to submit that for the
record here, the----
Senator Cardin. Absolutely. It will be made part of our
record.
Dr. Smith [continuing]. Council on Foreign Relations report
on that. The United States has very deep interests, obviously,
in any kind of incident, be it very small or in gray-zone areas
or a more direct military confrontation in the East China Sea,
so we have to be very careful in our thinking, but also talk
very closely with Japan about its thinking about how it might
manage a response to the Chinese.
[Editor's note.--The Council on Foreign Relations report
mentioned above can be found in the ``Additional Material
Submitted for the Record'' section at the end of this hearing.]
Dr. Smith. I do not know that I would be ready quite yet to
extrapolate from the Ukrainian situation into Chinese behavior.
I have watched, over the last couple of days, China's initial
responses to this, and they seem, themselves, quite cautious
yet. I think there is an opportunity to engage with China,
through the U.N. and directly, on its understanding of the
situation in the Ukraine, and I think we ought to, with a
particular emphasis on Chinese practices, as well.
But, I think the escalatory path that I imagine in the East
China Sea is one that could be direct, could come out of the
island dispute, but could also be an opportunity that presents
itself in a different confrontation; for example, a conflict on
the Korean Peninsula, or, as you say, perhaps even elsewhere
around the globe.
I think the Japanese are particularly concerned about their
readiness and their ability to respond, should China move
against these disputed islands. And our ability to help them in
making sure that they are ready to respond effectively, I
think, will be very, very important.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Dr. Auslin.
Dr. Auslin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for raising that.
I think the short answer is, yes. And I think it is
probably equally useful to look in the other direction, which
is to say, What has Vladimir Putin seen in our reactions, or
lack of reactions, to what China has been doing in this region
for several years?--to say whether that may have encouraged his
assessment of our willingness to--and the West's willingness,
overall--to opposed his recent moves.
I agree, I think that China is misjudging Japan's
willingness to defend the Senkakus for as long as is entirely
possible. And we just recently saw a move, out of the Japanese,
to set up a new quick-response force of 3,000 forces that would
be designed specifically for amphibious combat and to respond
to any threats to the islands.
But, in terms of what China, itself, is taking away from
the Ukraine situation, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has come
out with a statement supporting what Russia is doing. So, it is
clear on which side they are aligning themselves. There is a
consistency, in terms of their willingness to support
destabilizing actors and actions around the world, and this is
no different.
Whether or not this, as Dr. Smith said, extrapolates into
their willingness to raise the risk level and use force
regarding the Senkakus, I would just simply say, I think the
trendline has already moved in that direction. We and the
Japanese have made very clear the ways in which we want this to
be resolved peacefully. And yet, now we have an ADIZ, we have
broader claims over the waters, and the spread of this to away
from just patrol boats to the navy itself. So, I think we
should be worried about the risk line, and certainly the
lessons that Beijing is getting from watching our responses to
other such provocations around the world.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Well, I thank you for that observation. It
does have us very concerned. Another reason why how Ukraine is
ultimately resolved is so important.
Both of you have raised the dilemma of our relationship
with Japan and the Republic of Korea and, so far, our inability
to strengthen the ties between those two countries. So, what
would you suggest that we could do that could get two allies
that have strong views about each other to look to the future
rather than to the past, recognizing the responsibility to
acknowledge the historical issues?
Dr. Auslin. Well, Mr. Chairman, if there were an easy
solution to that answer, you know, we would all be celebrating
it, and I am sure it would have been implemented. I think,
again, what we need to be concerned about, at one level, is the
trendline. And the trendline is, these relations are getting
worse, they are not getting better. Whether China, itself, is
seeking to put a wedge between South Korea and Japan, clearly
President Park of South Korea has seen it in her own interest
to move closer to China, to move away from what had been a
fairly good working relationship with Japan. And that is
something that has not improved over the year. And, in fact,
Mr. Chairman, I would argue that that was probably a lot of the
decision, going into the decision that Prime Minister Abe made
to visit the shrine in December, quite frankly. You noted that
it came on the first anniversary of his coming back into
office. And I think he gave a year to try to see how these
relations were going to work with both China and South Korea,
and, at the end of it, concluded that he had very little to
lose by doing what he thought was right for his own domestic
constituency, and send a message that is--Japan would be
looking out for its own interests.
Again, I do not know what is going on behind closed doors,
but I think there comes a time where we, given our commitments
to both of these countries, need to be extraordinarily blunt
and have a real heart-to-heart talk, so to speak, with both of
them about the problems this is causing. And I would argue,
quite frankly, that our patience is not infinite; that, to the
degree that this makes our job harder for them, then they need
to not only think about what that might ultimately cause, in
terms of the ability of the United States to fulfill its
commitments, but also how we may rethink what is in our own
best interests.
Thank you.
Dr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the President's visit--President Obama's visit to
the two capitals in April provides an opportunity, at the
highest level, for the President to convey his concerns to both
Prime Minister Abe and to President Park. I do think that there
was a certain movement that we could see going on, on the part
of governments in South Korea and Japan, toward the end of last
year. Very initial discussions with our team here in Washington
and people in the think-tank world, as well, to sort of feel
our way through of what a comprehensive discussion might look
like between these two countries. Unfortunately, Prime Minister
Abe's visit to Yasukuni, I think, has set that back somewhat.
I do think reconciliation, the final reconciliation between
these two countries, needs to incorporate a broad host of
issues. South Koreans are very concerned about Mr. Abe's views
on history, have asked him, directly and repeatedly, to
reaffirm his commitment to both the Murayama and the Kono
statements. I think, on the side of the Japanese, I hear often
that reopening the basis of the 1965 treaty, restarting again a
conversation about compensation and settlements, when that was
diplomatically accounted for in 1965, that would be a problem
on the Japanese side. So, I think you have bookends at both
ends here within which the Japanese and South Korean leaders
will have to discuss what they think is possible.
I do think that the power of the Presidency is great, and
the President's direct engagement with these two leaders may
provide some stimulus to a conversation, perhaps a trilateral
meeting later this year at the UNGA meeting in September, for
example, may be another opportunity, down the road.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. I would strongly support what you are
saying about the President's visit, and I would hope he would
have concrete suggestions, not just, ``You need to improve the
relationship,'' but steps that could be taken by both leaders
in doing that.
I had a chance to meet with both leaders in May in their
respective capitals, and I sensed a real interest in trying to
move forward. But, since that time, just the reverse has taken
place.
One final question or observation for you, and that is, in
Japan, the interpretation of their constitution to allow for
self-defense I think makes it possible that Japan will take its
military presence to a new level. Is that a positive or a
negative or just a reality type of observation? Is this
something that we should be concerned about, or is this a
natural evolution for Japan?
Dr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
I think the interpretation of collective self-defense has
been outlined by the Abe Cabinet in a very specific way. And I
suspect that, in April, the report of his advisory committee
will be issued, and we will see the government develop very
concretely what it means when it says that the Japanese
military should be able to work alongside the United States
military and perhaps other countries in the region in
humanitarian and disaster capacities. So, I think we will get
more granularity to the concept that the Abe government is
putting forward in the next 5 to 6 months.
I also suspect that the United States Department of Defense
and the Japanese Ministry of Defense will be talking very
carefully about how this will affect and enhance alliance
cooperation on a number of the kinds of contingencies that we
have talked about here this afternoon.
I am not so much worried about the progress of this
discussion, in large part because I trust the democratic
practices of Japan. Their legislature will be very involved in
that discussion, and I do not think you are going to see any
government, be it Mr. Abe's or any others, be able to move the
Japanese people in a direction that they do not want to go.
So, I suspect you will have a very full parliamentary
discussion this coming fall and that you will hear all kinds of
viewpoints representing the popular sentiments and concerns
inside Japan about reinterpreting that particular piece of
Japan's Constitution.
Thank you.
Dr. Auslin. Mr. Chairman, I would just say, we should be
concerned only if it does not go through. I think that it is an
extraordinarily important step for Japan that is part of moves
that have been undertaken by both the Democratic Party, when it
was in power, and now under Mr. Abe, which is, for example,
buying the F-35s and the increase in their abilities in
ballistic missile defense, as we have seen.
Allowing for a reinterpretation of the right to the
exercise of collective self-defense will only help Japan become
an exporter of security, and that is something we want to see.
We want to see Japan not be as isolated as it has been for many
of its neighbors, but to--as much as it has done work on things
like counterterrorism and antiterrorism, on--its Coast Guard is
active around the region. This is an extraordinary opportunity
for Japan to become truly engaged with its neighbors in a way
that removes ambiguity about its commitment to stability in the
region. And so, anything that we can do to encourage this or
encourage the process within the structures of the alliance, I
think we should be doing.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Well, once again, thank both of you for
your very helpful testimony before the subcommittee. And I will
look forward to reading the report that you have submitted for
our review.
We are going to keep the committee record open until close
of business Friday, in the likelihood that members may have
questions that they would like to submit for the record. If you
are the recipient of those questions, we ask that you try to
respond as promptly as possible.
And, with that, the subcommittee will stand adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of David F. Helvey to Question
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
futenma replacement facility
Question. The relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in
Okinawa has been a thorn in the side of the alliance for over 15 years,
although the Okinawan Governor's landfill permit approval late last
year was an important milestone that should allow for more progress
with this project. You stated that the realignment and movement of
troops to Guam is "on-track."
Is the Department of Defense confident that Japan and the
United States are on the same page when it comes to the
sequencing and funding for the Futenma Replacement Facility and
the movement of troops to Guam?
Are the stakeholders in this process prepared to make
timely decisions and take care of their own responsibilities
efficiently?
Answer. The Department has closely coordinated with the Government
of Japan to ensure that we have a common plan for sequencing and
funding of the realignment initiatives on Okinawa and Guam, including
the Futenma Replacement Facility. This multifaceted effort is regularly
reviewed to take into account both actual and anticipated changes
occurring in the implementation of this plan.
As part of this review process, working together with our GoJ
counterparts, and taking into account variables such as available
funding, construction capacity and sequencing, and collateral
construction requirements, we have and will continue to make
adjustments to the plan in as efficient and timely a manner as
possible.
______
Council on Foreign Relations Report ``A Sino-Japanese Clash in the East
China Sea'' Submitted by Dr. Sheila A. Smith