    [Senate Hearing 113-465, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 113-465, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2015 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2410

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                       MARCH 5, 12; APRIL 2, 9, 10, 2014

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                                                      S. Hrg. 113-465 Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2015 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 2410

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                       MARCH 5, 12; APRIL 2, 9, 10, 2014

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                                      ______

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                            COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina         ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia       KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    JOE DONNELLY, Indiana                ROY BLUNT, Missouri
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              MIKE LEE, Utah
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                  TED CRUZ, Texas
    ANGUS KING, Maine

                        Peter K. Levine, Staff Director

                    John A. Bonsell, Minority Staff Director

                                     ______

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                         MARK UDALL, Colorado, Chairman

    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    JOE DONNELLY, Indiana                DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    ANGUS KING, Maine                    MIKE LEE, Utah

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                 march 5, 2014

                                                                       Page

    Nuclear Forces and Policies......................................     1

    Bunn, M. Elaine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Nuclear
      and Missile Defense Policy.....................................     6
    Wilson, Lt. Gen. Stephen W., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global
      Strike Command.................................................    12
    Benedict, VADM Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
      Programs.......................................................    20
    Harencak, Maj. Gen. Garrett, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff,
      Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration...................    25
    Questions for the Record.........................................    46

                                 march 12, 2014

    Military Space Programs..........................................    49

    Loverro, Mr. Douglas L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
      for Space Policy...............................................    52
    Zangardi, Dr. John A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
      Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
      Information Operations, and Space..............................    58
    Shelton, Gen. William L., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space
      Command........................................................    63
    Mann, LTG David L., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile
      Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic Command and Joint
      Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense....    69
    Chaplain, Ms. Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
      Management, Government Accountability Office...................    77
    Questions for the Record.........................................   103

                                 april 2, 2014

    Ballistic Missile Defense Policies and Programs..................   105

    Bunn, M. Elaine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Nuclear
      and Missile Defense Policy, Department of Defense..............   110
    Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and
      Evaluation, Department of Defense..............................   116
    Syring, VADM James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency,
      Department of Defense..........................................   120
    Mann, LTG David L., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and Missile
      Defense Command/Army Forces Strategy Command and Joint
      Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defenses...   131
    Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
      Management, Government Accountability Office...................   140
    Questions for the Record.........................................   167

                                     (iii)

                                 april 9, 2014

    National Nuclear Security Administration Management of Its
      National Security Laboratories and the Status of the Nuclear
      Security Enterprise............................................   179

    McMillan, Dr. Charles F. Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory   181
    Hommert, Dr. Paul J., Director, Sandia National Laboratories.....   188
    Goldstein, Dr. William H., Director, Lawrence Livermore National
      Laboratory.....................................................   198
    Augustine, Norman R., Co-Chair of the Congressional Advisory
      Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise,
      Institute for Defense Analyses; Accompanied by ADM Richard W.
      Mies, USN (Ret.), Co-Chair of the Congressional Advisory Panel
      on the Government of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, Institute
      for Defense Analyses...........................................   218
    Annex 1..........................................................   231
    Annex 2..........................................................   285

                                 april 10, 2014

    Strategic Forces Programs of the National Nuclear Security
      Administration and the Office of Environmental Management of
      the Department of Energy.......................................   287

    Held, Edward Bruce, Acting Administrator and Acting Under
      Secretary for Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security
      Administration, Department of Energy...........................   294
    Richardson, ADM John M., USN, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion
      Program, and Deputy Administrator, Office of Naval Reactors,
      National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.   307
    Cook, Hon. Donald L., Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
      National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.   310
    Owendoff, James M., Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
      Office of Environmental Management, Department of Energy.......   310

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2015 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 5, 2014

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                          NUCLEAR FORCES AND POLICIES

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mark Udall
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Udall, Donnelly, King,
    Sessions, Fischer, and Vitter.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK UDALL, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Udall. Let me bring today's hearing to order.
    Ladies and gentlemen, if you will have a seat. Thank you for
    your forbearance. I am running a little bit late and I
    apologize.
        This afternoon, we will hear testimony from the Department
    of Defense (DOD) regarding nuclear matters for fiscal year
    2015. I want to thank all of you for taking the time to testify
    today.
        I want to start by giving some perspective to the general
    topic of our nuclear stockpile. Since the first detonation of a
    nuclear weapon 69 years ago, we have debated whether they
    should exist and whether they remain relevant today. That
    debate will continue for the foreseeable future.
        It seems to me, however, that the negative aspects of this
    debate, particularly the relevancy of the mission, have had a
    negative impact on the morale of those serving us in the field.
    I believe we must emphasize that as long as these weapons
    exist. The mission performed by the men and women of our
    nuclear enterprise is relevant and essential to our national
    security. We must be clear that we place the highest trust in
    their ability to carry out their duty because it involves
    nuclear weapons, and we must be clear that we expect a great
    deal from them. But above all, we must demonstrate that we care
    about their well-being, their families, and their future. I am
    sure that our witnesses understand this, but I want to assure
    them that I do too.
        General Wilson, I would like to congratulate you on
    assuming command of the Air Force Global Strike Command. I
    suspect a large portion of today's hearing will be centered on
    the recent incident involving cheating at Malmstrom Air Force
    Base. I hope your testimony will provide insight into your
    impressions so far and what we can constructively learn from
    this incident. I would add that I am, of course, sensitive to
    the ongoing reviews by the Services and the Secretary of
    Defense.
        General Harencak, you are the point person on the air staff
    trying to deconflict the various missions of the Air Force with
    respect to nuclear weapons. I plan to ask you about what I
    perceive as a gap in coordinating the Air Force's nuclear
    command and control.
        Admiral Benedict, I would like to congratulate you as well
    on your promotion. This was long overdue and consistent with
    the recommendations of the 2008 Schlesinger Report. I would
    like to know your perspective as a naval officer on the recent
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) cheating incident.
    You are the senior naval officer responsible for the warhead
    and its delivery systems, and I want to hear your insight in
    this matter from a Navy perspective.
        Ms. Bunn, welcome to the subcommittee. DOD is eliminating
    the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
    Strategic Affairs, Madelyn Creedon's office. This office has a
    40-year history of overseeing policy related to nuclear weapons
    and proliferation, as well as space and cyber. I understand
    your office will be separate from these other offices which
    have a long and synergistic relationship with you. While you
    are not Senate-confirmed, I would like your honest and frank
    assessment to Congress of what effect this move will have on
    the long-term health of the policy mission you oversee even
    past your tenure.
        With that, let me turn to my colleague and the ranking
    member, Senator Sessions, for his opening statement, and then
    we will turn to our witnesses' opening statements and
    questions.
        Senator Sessions?

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to share a few thoughts, just take a few
    minutes. I do not pretend to be the guru on nuclear and
    strategic weapons, but having been on this committee since I
    came to the Senate 17-plus years ago, they have come before me.
    I would just share with you a few things.
        It has been my concern, which I have raised publicly, that
    the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) statement that had some 30-odd
    references to a world without nuclear weapons was stunning to
    me. I just was shocked. The President has said he wants a world
    without nuclear weapons. Secretary Hagel, within a year of
    confirmation, had signed on to a report titled ``Nuclear
    Zero.'' So I raised concerns about it. Maybe some would think
    that was just politics as usual. But I am concerned about it. I
    think it creates a dangerous perception perhaps that either we
    are going to go to zero or we are not going to use the weapons
    if we have them and create instability and a lack of confidence
    in our allies around the world. They have expressed that to us
    repeatedly. So, I was concerned about it.
        I will say, Mr. Chairman, it does appear that the budget
    request from the administration gets this pretty close to where
    we need to go, and I would like to hear your positions. It
    seems like we have had a move that recognizes the triad's
    importance and the need to modernize nuclear weapons. This is a
    right step, in my view. Particularly in this time of Russia and
    China's aggressiveness, we do not need to be sending any signal
    that somehow we are not willing to modernize or utilize even--
    God forbid--the weapons that we have.
        I would share a couple of things. This was from the U.S.
    National Intelligence Council Global Trends Report of 2030. It
    said, ``the nuclear ambitions in the United States and Russia
    over the last 20 years have evolved in opposite directions.
    Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy
    is a U.S. objective, while Russia is pursuing new concepts and
    capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its
    security strategy.'' In fact, we know that in 1999 they did a
    war game in which they invaded Belarus, and part of it was to
    utilize tactical nuclear weapons, in their words, to de-
    escalate the conflict. We know in recent years they have talked
    about using tactical nuclear weapons out there. So that is an
    important thing.
        China. I am looking at a report from October of last year
    from the state-controlled media in China, the Global Times. It
    says, ``because the Midwest States of the United States are
    sparsely populated, in order to increase the lethality of our
    nuclear attacks, we should mainly target the key cities on the
    west coast of the United States, such as Seattle, Los Angeles,
    San Francisco, or San Diego.'' They go on to say, ``if we
    launch our DF31A ICBMs over the North Pole, we can easily
    destroy a whole list of metropolises on the east coast in the
    New England region of the United States, including Annapolis,
    Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Portland, Baltimore, and
    Norfolk, whose populations account for one-eighth of the
    American total residents.''
        Now, Admiral, Annapolis must get the Navy's attention. I do
    not know. Put them in that list.
        What I would say to all of our colleagues, and we do not
    like to think about this, but Russia is thinking about it,
    China is thinking about it, Iran is thinking about it, and a
    lot of other countries are thinking about it. It is said that
    Pakistan may have the most active nuclear program today, and
    North Korea is developing their nuclear launch missiles. India
    activated the reactor of its first indigenously built ballistic
    nuclear submarine. India and China now have submarines capable
    of launching nuclear weapons.
        In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that just came out,
    the headline, ``Protect the Homeland,'' I thought it was
    interesting for our committee that DOD says this. We will
    continue to size and shape the joint force based on the need to
    defend the U.S. Homeland, our most vital national interest. The
    first recommendation is missile defense, and it talks about
    what we need to do there. Nuclear is the second one listed. The
    third one is cyber. We need to talk about modernizing our
    forces. The first three listed on the QDR fall within our
    subcommittee. I am thinking, history being what it is, we do
    not want to wake up a few years from now and having a 9/11
    report wondering why the subcommittee was not on top of these
    issues.
        So, where are we financially? We have this chart. Could you
    all bring it up a little closer maybe so you could see this?
        [The chart referred to follows:]

        Senator Sessions. Secretary Hagel said, ``we are going to
    invest in the modernization we need to keep the deterrent
    stronger than it has ever been, and you have my commitment on
    that.'' So I like that. I was glad to hear him be clear on that
    because, as I said, his record caused me concerns.
        Now, these numbers--I had to cross examine my staff to be
    sure I got this. These numbers include ICBMs, submarines, and
    bombers, not just the weapons themselves, so that is the good
    news. This represents what percentage of the defense budget we
    spend on the nuclear triad and the weapons that go with it. It
    was high in the 1990s.
        The last time we modernized was in the 1980s. We have the
    oldest nuclear arsenal in the world. That is undisputed. Our
    warheads are 30 to 40 years old. The B-52s are 52 years old.
    ICBMs are 34 years old. Submarines are 23 years old. I went on
    a nuclear submarine and spent the night on it. I was surprised
    how old it was, and things are always breaking. They spend a
    considerable amount of time on our nuclear submarines fixing
    the smaller things.
        What about affordability? According to the Congressional
    Budget Office (CBO), if we get this system back up--all right.
    So here is what we need to do. The neglected modernization
    since the end of the Cold War requires replacement of the
    triad. It just does. We have to be planning to replace it.
    Exactly what year, I guess, we could dispute, but the goal is
    there.
        We need to modernize the whole nuclear complex, as we well
    know and as we have been talking about. Therefore, we have to
    have a funding up in the next decade to make sure that we get
    our funding up to the right amount, and that could take around
    $35 billion a year which, at $35 billion a year, will represent
    about 5 percent of our defense budget. It is not impossible for
    us to reach that. If we could get to the point where we
    modernized in the right way, we would be on the right path.
        Now, of the new spending, only 2 percent of this amount is
    for the weapons modernization itself. That is relatively
    inexpensive, and it is a small price to pay for the Nation's
    ultimate insurance policy and for an arsenal that has
    maintained great power and peace really for 70 years.
        I remember having lunch with a member of the Russian
    parliament and professor, and I asked what about their tactical
    weapons. I have told you all this before. The professor popped
    up and said do you know how many troops China has on our
    border. We are never giving up tactical nuclear weapons. So
    that is the real world we live in.
        This shows this peak up here, and as I said, this would
    fund the submarine modernization, the aircraft, the new bomber,
    at least that portion of it dedicated to nuclear weapons and to
    the ICBMs which, as I said, are getting awfully old too.
        This has been a little bit of an epiphany for me as we have
    been looking at these numbers. I hope you all take this in the
    spirit of pure reality and what the United States needs to do,
    and we do not need to fail. If we need to accelerate some of
    this, it is a relatively small part of the budget overall, and
    I think we have to do it. At a time where the will of the
    United States is being questioned, I think it may be even more
    significant that we stay on track to leave no doubt that we are
    going to have an arsenal, we are going to use it only, only,
    only if we have to. But we have the will to defend ourselves if
    need be, and you do not want to launch a nuclear attack on us
    because that would be a grave mistake.
        Anyway, that is my 2 cents worth. Thank you for letting me
    ramble on. I look forward to working with you, Senator Udall.
    You have been good on this, and we are all learning together. I
    think we are coming back into the right path. I think we are
    getting close to what we need to do.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Sessions. I think the
    Senator points out the importance of this committee's role as
    an authorizing body and also an oversight body. We are going to
    hold a series of very important hearings over these next months
    as we prepare for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
    markup itself. I know we will hope to have the kind of
    attendance that Senator Fischer and Senator King and Senator
    Donnelly always display on this committee. They are always here
    and they are always engaged.
        With that, let me make a short comment on questions and
    timing. I would like to aim to end the hearing by about 4 p.m.
    We are going to have, I think, eight votes starting at 4 p.m.,
    for my colleagues that are here. We have four witnesses. I
    think we can get the job done. I would ask each of you to keep
    your statements at 3 to 5 minutes, and then we will open the
    floor for 7-minute rounds.
        I think we will start on my left with Ms. Bunn, and then we
    will work across the panel here. Ms. Bunn, the floor is yours
    for 3 to 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF M. ELAINE BUNN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
              DEFENSE, NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY

        Ms. Bunn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions,
    other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I really
    appreciate the opportunity to testify today, and I appreciate
    your support for nuclear forces.
        With your permission, I will submit my written statement
    and only highlight a few points now.
        The QDR, which was submitted yesterday with the fiscal year
    2015 budget, makes clear the key role of nuclear forces in our
    strategy. It says that our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate
    protection against a nuclear attack on the United States, and
    through extended deterrence, it also serves to reassure our
    distant allies of their security against regional aggression.
    It also supports our ability to project power by communicating
    to potential nuclear-armed adversaries that they cannot
    escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression.
        Also, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his
    risk assessment for the QDR, ranked maintaining a secure and
    effective nuclear deterrent at the top of his list of mission
    prioritization.
        DOD's budget request for fiscal year 2015 supports our
    nuclear policy goals, as laid out in the 2010 NPR, in the
    President's June 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy, and in the
    current QDR.
        We continue to ensure that this President and future
    Presidents have suitable options for deterring, responding to,
    and managing a diverse range of current and future situations,
    including regional deterrence challenges.
        We continue to work closely with our allies, some of whom
    live in very dangerous neighborhoods, to ensure continuing
    confidence in our shared national security goals, including
    assurance of our extended nuclear deterrence commitments.
        Preserving the nuclear triad of strategic delivery vehicles
    and investing to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    force is critical for success in all those efforts.
        The 1043 Report, which we will provide to Congress this
    spring, will address these issues and the budget issues in more
    detail, but let me just say that our modernization goals have
    not changed since 2010. We have made considerable progress, but
    we have had to make some adjustments due to fiscal constraints.
        Three other issues I would like to address briefly. One, is
    the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) force
    structure. The administration is considering how to reduce
    nondeployed strategic delivery vehicles to comply with the
    limits of the New START treaty by February 2018, and we will
    make a final force structure decision and inform Congress prior
    to the start of fiscal year 2015.
        Two, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
    compliance. We are concerned about Russian activity that
    appears to be inconsistent with the INF Treaty. We have raised
    the issue with Russia. They provided an answer that was not
    satisfactory to us, and we told them that the issue is not
    closed and we will continue to raise this.
        Three, the nuclear enterprise reviews. With regard to
    recent issues with a few Air Force/Navy nuclear personnel, the
    Secretary of Defense has created two special review panels, one
    an internal review and one an external review. Those reviews
    are not about assigning blame. They are about identifying,
    assessing, and correcting any systemic deficiencies that we
    might uncover and applying the best practices for carrying out
    our nuclear mission across the nuclear force.
        Again, Mr. Chairman, other members, thank you very much for
    letting me testify today. I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Bunn follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by Ms. M. Elaine Bunn
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of
    the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify for the first time on our nuclear forces and the National
    Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2015 and Future Years
    Defense Program. I am joined by Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, Director
    of Strategic Systems Programs for the U.S. Navy; Lieutenant General
    Stephen W. Wilson, Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command; and
    Major General Garrett Harencak, Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic
    Deterrence and Nuclear Integration for the Air Force.
        You asked me specifically to address the policies and programs that
    the Defense Department has in place to sustain our nuclear forces and
    ensure that our deterrence is sound following the 2010 Nuclear Posture
    Review and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). But let me
    first start by thanking this committee for your continued support of
    the nuclear forces and the nuclear enterprise.
        Translating the goals of ``sustainment'' and ``deterrence'' into
    effective plans and capabilities is more than a little challenging, as
    this committee knows quite well. U.S. policies and programs concerning
    nuclear weapons have to reflect considerations that range far beyond
    the purely military, because the weapons, their deployment and posture,
    and what we say about them can entail issues of foreign policy,
    diplomacy, intelligence, science and technology, and homeland security,
    for example.
        We want an arsenal that contributes to effective deterrence. We
    want an arsenal that is kept qualitatively up to date, that is
    survivable and flexible but that is no larger than necessary to meet
    our national security needs. We want an arsenal that is an effective
    deterrent against the advent of regional nuclear powers whose
    intentions and decision processes are far from transparent. But most of
    all we want an arsenal that is safe, secure, and effective, and that
    will contribute to deterrence as long as nuclear weapons exist.
        The path to accomplishing these goals will necessarily be adapted
    as required based on changes in the strategic environment and the
    financial and technical resources available. But there are two
    principal, mutually supporting components to our efforts. The first is
    working to ensure that this and future Presidents have suitable options
    for deterring, responding to, and managing a diverse range of 21st
    century security challenges. The second is working constantly with our
    allies to ensure continuing confidence in our shared national security
    goals, including assurance in our extended nuclear deterrence posture,
    and strengthening strategic stability with Russia and China.
                     strengthening the president's options
        Since 2010, we have made significant progress in strengthening the
    President's options for deterring, responding to, and managing 21st
    century security challenges. Deterrence is not limited solely to
    nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear strategic capabilities, such as ballistic
    missile defenses and investments in a capability for conventional
    prompt strike systems, play an important role in our strategic posture;
    however, they are not substitutes for our nuclear forces.
    New Nuclear Employment Strategy
        With regard to policy, the most significant development since the
    Nuclear Posture Review and the entry into force of the New START treaty
    is the nuclear employment guidance issued by the President last June.
    This new Nuclear Employment Strategy was the culmination of an 18-month
    effort that reviewed U.S. nuclear deterrence requirements, developed a
    range of nuclear employment strategy options, and analyzed potential
    implications of each strategy option for U.S. nuclear force
    requirements and achieving U.S. and allied objectives if deterrence
    fails.
        Both an unclassified and classified report on this guidance were
    provided to Congress in June 2013 and subsequent classified briefings
    have gone into greater detail. There are five important aspects of the
    new employment strategy:

             It affirms that the fundamental purpose of nuclear
            weapons remains to deter nuclear attack on the United States
            and our allies and partners. The United States will maintain a
            credible deterrent, capable of convincing any potential
            adversary that the adverse consequences of attacking the United
            States or our allies and partners far outweigh any potential
            benefit they may seek to gain through an attack.
             It affirms that the United States will only consider
            the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend
            the vital interests of the United States or its allies and
            partners. The guidance narrows U.S. nuclear strategy by
            directing that planning should focus on only those objectives
            and missions that are necessary in the 21st century, including
            deterring nuclear use in escalating regional conflicts. The
            regional deterrence challenge may be the ``least unlikely'' of
            the nuclear scenarios for which the United States must prepare,
            and continuing to enhance our planning and options for
            addressing it is at the heart of aligning U.S. nuclear
            employment policy and plans with today's strategic environment.
             At the completion of the study, the President
            determined that we can ensure the security of the United States
            and our allies and partners and maintain a strong and credible
            strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a one-third
            reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level
            established in the New START Treaty. The President indicated in
            his Berlin speech that the administration would pursue such
            reductions through negotiations with Russia.
             The Nuclear Employment Strategy reaffirms our
            commitment to a safe, secure, and effective arsenal that the
            United States will maintain the nuclear Triad, and that U.S.
            nuclear forces will continue to operate on a day-to-day basis
            that maintains strategic stability with Russia and China,
            deters potential regional aggressors, and assures U.S. allies
            and partners.
             It adopts an alternative approach to hedging against
            technical or geopolitical risk, which could lead to future
            reductions in the non-deployed nuclear weapon stockpile. The
            United States is investing in a more modern, responsive
            infrastructure; however, modernizing this infrastructure will
            take at least a decade or more to achieve.

    Sustaining and Modernizing Nuclear Forces
        We have analyzed the different types of adversaries we must deter
    and the range of scenarios for which we must prepare, and we have
    concluded that the range of options provided by the nuclear Triad
    offers the flexibility needed for the range of contingencies we might
    face. A sustained long-term investment in the enterprise is required;
    the strategic delivery vehicles we rely on today grew out of
    investments the Nation made in the 50s, 60s, 70s, and 80s. Many of
    these systems are aging out of service, and we must now invest in
    extending the life of some and replacing others. The force structure
    choices we make today will determine the capabilities a President will
    have in 20, 30, and 40 years. We cannot say what mix of capabilities
    the United States will need that far into the future, but modernizing
    the Triad will provide the next generation of U.S. policymakers with a
    flexible and resilient range of capabilities.
        The fiscal year 2015 budget and FYDP reflect our plans for
    maintaining and modernizing the Triad. The 1043 report which the
    Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy plan to
    provide to Congress in April will address these issues in more detail.
    We appreciate Congress providing 30 days from the release of the fiscal
    year 2015 budget request to submit the 1043 report.
    Strategic Delivery Vehicles
        With regard to the strategic submarine force, the construction of
    the first of 12 Ohio-class replacement submarines is scheduled to begin
    in 2021, with long-lead item procurement beginning in 2016. The first
    new U.S. SSBNs will enter the force beginning in fiscal year 2031 to
    maintain the minimum number of submarines necessary to meet strategic
    requirements. These submarines will include new advances in nuclear
    reactor design that eliminate the need for midlife refueling, thereby
    providing greater operational availability for each submarine.
    Eliminating the need for the midlife nuclear refueling will allow a
    force of 12 Ohio-class replacement submarines to replace the 14 SSBNs
    needed for deterrence missions today and provide significant long-term
    cost savings. The service life for the Trident D-5 SLBM has been
    extended so that transition to the Ohio-replacement submarine will
    occur before we need to begin replacing the missiles.
        To sustain the Minuteman (MM) III, Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missiles (ICBMs) through 2030, the fiscal year 2015 budget funds
    critical upgrades and component replacements. The Air Force Analysis of
    Alternatives (AOA) is examining options for a post-2030 follow-on
    system known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. This will enable
    development of a comprehensive plan to modernize and extend the life of
    the MMIII or to develop a follow-on ICBM. Follow-on ICBM activities
    will be closely coordinated and aligned with steps taken to modernize
    the MMIII through 2030 in order to achieve cost savings. This AOA
    should be finished in late spring or early summer.
        Our nuclear-capable strategic bombers can be used to demonstrate
    our commitment to allies and our capabilities to our adversaries. The
    United States will continue to maintain two B-52H strategic bomber
    wings and one B-2 wing. Both bomber types are aging. Sustained funding
    and support is required to ensure operational effectiveness through the
    remainder of their respective service lives. The fiscal year 2015
    budget continues funding for the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) which
    is currently in development.
    Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
        The President is the only one who can authorize the use of nuclear
    weapons and our Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
    systems are critical to providing the President situational awareness
    in a crisis, responses for consideration, and transmitting the
    President's orders to strategic forces. The Department is formulating a
    long-term strategy to modernize critical NC3 capabilities including
    enhanced NC3 support for regional contingencies. The Department
    continues to prioritize resources to address known capability gaps
    while incrementally building toward a modern NC3 architecture that will
    ensure timely decision-making support for the President.
    Nuclear Weapons, Stockpile, and Infrastructure
        Along with delivery vehicles and NC3, strengthening a President's
    options requires sustained commitment to warhead life extension
    programs (LEP) and infrastructure modernization. Thanks to the measure
    of budgetary relief Congress provided for fiscal year 2014, we have
    been able to continue uninterrupted production of modernized W76-1
    submarine launched ballistic missile warheads, and have completed the
    first system-level engineering development test of the B61-12 bomb.
        The administration has outlined a concept that we refer to as the
    ``3+2'' strategy. This strategy, when completed decades from now, would
    result in five types of warhead designs in place of the twelve unique
    warhead types in today's active nuclear weapons stockpile. The strategy
    envisions three interoperable warheads compatible with both submarine
    and land-based ballistic missiles, and two aircraft-delivered weapon
    types. This modernization and consolidation of warhead types would
    allow for more efficient hedging and therefore reductions in the non-
    deployed stockpile.
        One of the two air-delivered weapons, the B61-12 gravity bomb and
    its accompanying tail kit assembly (TKA), are scheduled for first
    production in 2020. This LEP will enable us to consolidate and retire
    several different variants of the B-61 and shift our surveillance
    resources to other areas of the stockpile. Most importantly, over time,
    the B61-12 will become the sole nuclear gravity bomb in the United
    States inventory and will be carried by both dual-capable aircraft
    (e.g., F-15E, and in the future F-35), as well as the B-2 bomber and
    the Long Range Strike Bomber. The second air delivered weapon, the air-
    launched cruise missile (ALCM) will be maintained as our standoff
    weapon until a follow on system, the long-range standoff (LRSO)
    missile, achieves first unit production in fiscal year 2025-fiscal year
    2027.
        Development of the Interoperable Warhead-1 (or W78/88-1), part of
    the ``3+2'' strategy, is being delayed beyond the National Nuclear
    Security Administration's (NNSA) future years nuclear security plan.
    This delay is the result of prioritizations due to the current fiscal
    climate.
    Budget and Fiscal Uncertainties
        Thanks to the 2-year budget agreement that Congress recently
    approved, we are now facing a more certain fiscal environment, at least
    in the short term. Ultimately, sustained and reliable funding profiles
    are necessary to avoid cost increases and to meet our modernization
    timelines.
    Personnel Review for the Nuclear Enterprise
        The recently publicized issues concerning a few Air Force and Navy
    personnel involved with the nuclear forces pose no threat to the
    reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear forces. There are
    nonetheless serious issues of professionalism and discipline that must
    be addressed. The Secretary of Defense has created two special review
    panels to assess the reasons for these failures and to propose
    corrective actions.
        The internal review, co-chaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense
    Madelyn Creedon and Rear Admiral Peter Fanta from the Joint Staff, will
    examine the nuclear mission in both the Department of the Air Force and
    the Department of the Navy regarding personnel, training, testing,
    command oversight, mission performance, and investment. They will
    report their findings to Secretary Hagel no later than April 30, 2014.
    Additionally, General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret) and Admiral John Harvey,
    USN (Ret) will lead an independent review to provide a broader,
    external examination of the DOD nuclear enterprise. They have been
    asked to provide findings and recommendations to the Secretary no later
    than June 2, 2014. These reviews are not about assigning blame, but
    about identifying, assessing, and correcting systemic deficiencies, and
    applying best practices for DOD nuclear enterprise personnel.
    strengthening extended deterrence and assurance and strategic stability
        Since 2010, we have made considerable progress in strengthening
    extended deterrence and assurance, and we continue to engage Russia and
    China on efforts toward mutually beneficial steps for enhancing
    strategic stability.
        Extended Deterrence and Assurance: We will continue to assure our
    allies and partners of our commitments to their security, and
    demonstrate it through forward deployment of U.S. forces in key
    regions, strengthening U.S. and allied conventional and missile defense
    capabilities, and the continued provision of U.S. extended nuclear
    deterrence. U.S. nuclear weapons have played an essential role in
    extending deterrence to U.S. allies and partners against nuclear attack
    or nuclear-backed coercion by states in their region that possess or
    are seeking nuclear weapons. A credible ``nuclear umbrella'' has been
    provided by a combination of means--the strategic nuclear forces of the
    U.S. Triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons currently forward deployed in
    Europe in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
    U.S.-based nuclear weapons that could be forward deployed quickly to
    meet regional contingencies. Security relationships in key regions will
    retain some nuclear dimension as long as nuclear threats to allies and
    partners remain. Extended nuclear deterrence can also serve our
    nonproliferation goals by reassuring non-nuclear allies and partners
    that their security interests can be protected without a need to
    develop their own nuclear weapons.
        As outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, we have been
    working with allies and partners on how best to strengthen regional
    deterrence--beginning formal dialogues on the topic where they had not
    existed, and maintaining and refreshing the NATO deterrence dialogue
    which has long existed.
    Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia
        Our allies in Northeast Asia live in a dangerous neighborhood, and
    in the year following the Nuclear Posture Review, we initiated formal
    deterrence dialogues with both South Korea and Japan. Our Extended
    Deterrence Policy Committee with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and our
    Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan address relevant nuclear and
    missile defense issues with each ally. Exploring concepts such as
    extended deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability through table
    top exercises and frank discussion helps us develop shared
    understandings with each ally and prepare for a range of security
    challenges and scenarios. Also, in October 2013 the U.S.-ROK alliance
    agreed upon a bilateral, tailored deterrence strategy to address the
    growing North Korean nuclear threat.
        These high-level dialogues underscore that the United States is
    unequivocally committed to the defense of Japan and the Republic of
    Korea, and that both allies are committed to working with the United
    States in deterring aggression and promoting peace and stability
    throughout the region. Our ability to send strategic bombers and
    tactical nuclear-capable aircraft to the region to signal resolve
    resonates with our allies, as the B-52 and B-2 flights over South Korea
    last March during a period of heightened tension on the peninsula
    demonstrated.
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization
        NATO's 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review affirms that
    nuclear weapons and missile defense are core components of NATO's
    overall capabilities for deterrence, and that as long as nuclear
    weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. NATO will continue
    to seek conditions and consider options for further reductions of non-
    strategic nuclear weapons, and we will continue to work closely with
    our NATO allies on all issues related to the Alliance's nuclear
    capabilities through the Nuclear Planning Group and the High Level
    Group. These fora provide a critical venue for discussions among NATO
    allies on a broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the
    continued safety and security of nuclear weapons, shared perceptions of
    potential threats to Alliance members, and the development and
    evolution of common alliance positions on nuclear policy.
        The United States currently forward deploys dual-capable aircraft
    (F-15Es and F-16s) and B-61 gravity bombs in Europe in support of NATO.
    In line with the 2013 Nuclear Employment Strategy and the 2010 Nuclear
    Posture Review, we will maintain the capability to deploy dual-capable
    aircraft as well as bombers globally, if needed. The Department will
    integrate nuclear delivery capability into the F-35 Joint Strike
    Fighter during follow-on development block upgrades of the aircraft at
    the end of calendar year 2024.
        The longstanding special relationship between the United States and
    the United Kingdom remains strong. The Common Missile Compartment for
    the next generation of our respective SSBN fleets is a cooperative
    effort that will provide cost-sharing benefits to both countries. In
    the current era of declining defense budgets and overall fiscal
    uncertainty, this type of collaboration is prudent.
    Strategic Stability
        We would welcome the opportunity to take additional steps with
    Russia to enhance strategic stability, including exploring
    opportunities for missile defense cooperation and further nuclear
    reductions. The administration has said that it will pursue further
    reductions negotiated with Russia.
        Even as we pursue new opportunities for cooperation, strategic
    stability also requires that we are vigilant in verifying compliance
    with existing arms control obligations. The U.S. takes treaty
    compliance very seriously and utilizes all measures that are available
    to us through the New START treaty. As of February 5, 2014, the United
    States and Russia have each conducted 54 on-site inspections under the
    New START treaty verification regime. We have met our inspection quotas
    for the Treaty's first 3 years, and we have begun the fourth year of
    inspections. Delegations from the United States and Russia have also
    met six times under the Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission to
    address issues related to implementation of the Treaty.
        Although China's arsenal is smaller than Russia's, China continues
    to modernize its nuclear weapons and delivery systems. As it has for
    several years now, the United States continues to urge China to engage
    in discussions on strategic issues in a variety of venues. Both
    countries have said they want to address the other's concerns about
    their strategic postures. A sustained dialogue on our broad strategic
    postures and greater transparency between our two nations would be an
    opportunity for both countries to make those goals more credible.
        One final word about strategic stability: for the United States,
    strategic stability, however we define it, must entail security for our
    allies and respect for their interests.
                                   conclusion
        The National Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2015 and
    Future Years Defense Program underscores our commitment to ensuring
    effective options for this and future Presidents; ensuring a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons
    exist; assuring U.S. allies; and continuing to engage Russia and China
    on strengthening strategic stability. The overall goals have not
    changed since 2010 and we have made considerable progress, but we have
    had to make adjustments due to budget constraints, and may have to do
    so again as the budget landscape becomes more clear. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify; I look forward to your questions.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Ms. Bunn.
        General Wilson?

     STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
                      FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        General Wilson. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
    allowing me to appear for the first time today as Commander of
    Air Force Global Strike Command. This summer our command will
    celebrate its fifth anniversary. The command was stood up to
    provide a singular focus on the stewardship, the safe, secure,
    and effective operations of two-thirds of our Nation's nuclear
    triad.
        Advancements and modernization taking place in the nuclear
    arsenals of other nations of concern are a clear indicator that
    the role of nuclear deterrence operations has not declined, as
    some would have us believe, but has actually become more
    critical.
        We have provided a credible nuclear deterrent for the past
    50 years. It can be easy to lose sight of the fact that there
    are almost 25,000 airmen in our command doing the mission
    absolutely right 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week, 365-days-a-
    year. We must continue to show them that they are important and
    relevant, and that we value the critical work that they carry
    out every day with pride, discipline, and precision.
        Our mission is unwavering. We develop and provide combat-
    ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike
    operations to support the President of the United States and
    combatant commanders. The command's priorities provide the
    clear path to mission success.
        First, we will deter and assure with a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear force.
        Second, we are going to win the fight both in our overseas
    contingencies where we have nearly 1,000 airmen deployed around
    the world today and with the 1,100-plus deterrent force who are
    every day deployed to the missile fields of Montana, North
    Dakota, Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado.
        We will strengthen and empower the team by continuing to
    improve both the quality of life of our airmen and their
    families, aware of the unique demands both of the mission and
    the locations in which they live.
        Finally, we will shape the future by staying focused on the
    people, our human capital development, and a nuclear force
    modernization and initiatives.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear
    before the subcommittee and to discuss things going on in Air
    Force Global Strike Command. I look forward to your questions,
    and with your permission, I would like to enter my written
    testimony into the record.
        Senator Udall. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of General Wilson follows:]
             Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Stephen W. Wilson, USAF
                                  introduction
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
    of the subommittee; thank you for allowing me to represent the over
    25,000 Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) airmen and civilians,
    and to appear before you as their Commander for the first time. I will
    use this opportunity to update you on our mission, the status of our
    forces, and the challenges we will face over the next few years.
                    air force global strike command mission
        AFGSC will mark its fifth anniversary this year. Our command was
    created in 2009 to provide a singular focus on the stewardship and
    safe, secure and effective operation of two legs of our Nation's
    nuclear Triad. The Triad is an enduring construct that is just as
    relevant today as it was at its inception. Advancements and
    modernization taking place in the nuclear arsenals of other nations are
    a serious concern and indicate AFGSC's Nuclear Deterrence Operations
    mission is not losing relevance, but has actually become even more
    critical. In order for us to participate in every spectrum of conflict
    from humanitarian operations to nuclear engagement, we must be ready
    and effective at every point along that continuum, and we can never
    fail in nuclear operations. Our Nation has successfully avoided the
    unthinkable by having a credible deterrent for over 50 years.
    Continuing in the proud heritage of Strategic Air Command tailored for
    the 21st Century, AFGSC's mission is to: ``Develop and provide combat-
    ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global strike operations--Safe,
    Secure and Effective--to support the President of the United States and
    Combatant Commanders.''
    Air Force Global Strike Command Nuclear Mission
        At the core of our mission statement are three reinforcing, key
    attributes: ``Safe--Secure--Effective.'' These were outlined in
    President Obama's 2009 Prague speech where he said: ``Make no mistake:
    as long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe,
    secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that
    defense to our allies.'' The attributes of ``safe, secure, effective''
    serve to underpin every nuclear-related activity in AFGSC, from the
    discipline adhered to in the smallest task, to how we prioritize our
    planning and programming for the Future Years Defense Program. The
    effects of our nuclear force, as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture
    Review, are to ensure strategic stability, to support the regional
    deterrence architecture, and to assure our allies and partners.
    Air Force Global Strike Command Conventional Mission
        Our conventional bomber forces defend our nnational interests by
    deterring or, should deterrence fail, defeating an adversary. Two
    capabilities are fundamental to the success of our bomber forces: first
    is our ability to hold heavily defended targets at risk, and second is
    our ability to apply relentless and persistent combat power across the
    spectrum of conflict anywhere on the globe at any time. The United
    States' fleet of penetrating and stand-off heavy bombers is second to
    none, capable of long-range and long-endurance missions. These bombers
    carry our latest high-tech munitions in vast quantities to ensure the
    USAF can meet our Nation's global responsibilities, and remain in high-
    demand by the regional combatant commanders.
                     air force global strike command forces
        The two Numbered Air Forces under AFGSC, Eighth Air Force and
    Twentieth Air Force, serve critical national security roles as
    Component Numbered Air Forces to United States Strategic Command and as
    Task Forces for on-alert nuclear forces.
    Twentieth Air Force
        Twentieth Air Force (20 AF) is responsible for the Minuteman III
    intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force and our UH-1N
    helicopter force. The 450 dispersed and hardened missile silos maintain
    strategic stability by presenting any potential adversary a near
    insurmountable obstacle should they consider a disarming attack on the
    United States. No potential adversary can credibly destroy this force
    without depleting their own arsenal. Every day a force of over 1,100
    airmen is deployed to our three missile fields, executing effective
    deterrence operations. 20 AF maintains a 24-hour-per-day, 7-day-per-
    week, 365-day-per-year no-fail mission. Accomplishing this mission
    demands we focus on sustaining our current systems while modernizing
    for the future. How we will accomplish this is outlined in the
    paragraphs below.
        Minuteman III
        We continue efforts to sustain the Minuteman III ICBM (MM III).
    This includes upgrading the command, control and communications
    systems, and support equipment.
        The ICBM Cryptography Upgrade (ICU), Code System Media (CSM), and
    the Strategic Targeting and Application Computer System (STACS)
    programs are fully funded, providing for hardware and software upgrades
    to allow the secure transmission of critical codes and targeting data
    via modern media. These upgrades will enhance security while reducing
    the number of operations, maintenance, and security forces man-hours
    required for the annual cryptographic code change at our Launch
    Facilities (LFs) and Launch Control Centers (LCCs). We project fielding
    the new CSM in 2014, new STACS in 2015 and the new ICU in 2019.
        We are also equipping ICBM LCCs with modernized communications
    systems that will upgrade or replace other aging and obsolescent
    systems. Beginning in 2015, we will start replacing Voice Control
    Panels and Ultra-High Frequency radio receivers, accomplishing
    recurring Higher Authority Communications/Rapid Message Processing
    Element life extensions, and upgrading extremely high frequency (EHF)
    communications, which provide connectivity through the National
    Military Command System (NMCS). Furthermore, we advanced the Minuteman
    Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network Program, which
    upgrades, modernizes and secures the Emergency Action Message network,
    with operational fielding scheduled for March 2015.
        We conducted four MM III flight tests in fiscal year 2013, the
    first time we've accomplished four flight tests in 1 year since 2006.
    This, along with two successful Simulated Electronic Launch tests in
    the operational environment, demonstrates the operational credibility
    of the nuclear deterrent force and the Command's commitment to
    sustaining that capability. Operational testing is currently funded
    through the fiscal year 2015 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), with
    four operational test launches funded per year to satisfy test
    requirements outlined by U.S. Strategic Command and the National
    Nuclear Security Administration.
        We continue to examine emerging technologies to ensure the MM III
    weapon system remains reliable and ready through 2030. Additionally, we
    are looking into how investments in these technologies can transfer to
    and provide savings for the future Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
    (GBSD) program.
        Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
        The Minuteman missile system, currently on its third model, has
    been on continuous alert since the 1960s, over 50 years ago, and has
    proven its value in deterrence well beyond the platform's intended 10-
    year lifespan. The GBSD program is intended to replace or evolve the MM
    III. All parts of the Triad are complementary; the ICBM provides the
    responsive portion of that balance. Initial ICBM capability gaps were
    identified, validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    (JROC), and approved in August 2012 by the Air Force Chief of Staff,
    resulting in an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). The AoA commenced in
    September 2013, and will identify an affordable, viable, flexible
    concept for the next generation ground-based strategic deterrent force.
    This analysis is critical to inform near-term MM III sustainment
    programs to ensure technologies and components can be utilized in GBSD
    acquisition. Our U.S. Navy partners are fully engaged with our GBSD
    team, investigating the benefits and risks of commonality, with the
    objective to reduce future design, development, and manufacturing costs
    for their strategic systems. Our GBSD AoA results are due to the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in June 2014. I ask for your support
    of GBSD as we move forward, ensuring it will lead to a viable
    replacement for the MM III ICBM.
        UH-1N
        AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's fleet of 62 UH-1N
    helicopters. The vast majority of these aircraft support two critical
    national missions: Nuclear Security in support of the ICBM force, and
    the Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government mission in the
    National Capital Region.
        Although the UH-1Ns are 45 years old, we currently plan to fly them
    for at least another decade. We must sustain the helicopter's current
    capabilities, while selectively upgrading them to reduce existing
    capability shortfalls and avoid increased sustainment costs due to
    obsolescence. Safety improvements currently underway include the
    installation of crashworthy aircrew seats across the fleet by 2015 and
    night vision goggle-compatible cockpits that will be fully integrated
    by 2016. In addition, the command has begun fielding the Helicopter
    Terrain Avoidance and Warning System and Traffic Collision Avoidance
    System to improve aircraft situational awareness and survivability.
    Finally, Air Force Global Strike Command is currently in the process of
    arming our UH-1Ns in order to meet OSD and U.S. Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM)-mandated security requirements for the missile fields. We
    have completed training our initial helicopter aircrew cadre, and
    initiated the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for
    integrated operations with Security Forces personnel. We anticipate
    initial operational capability by the end of March 2015.
        While we can to some extent mitigate the UH-1N's deficiencies in
    range, speed, and payload, no amount of modification will close these
    critical gaps entirely. This can only be accomplished by fielding a
    replacement aircraft that meets validated mission requirements. The Air
    Force cancelled the planned UH-1N replacement program, the Common
    Vertical Lift Support Platform, in 2013. However, we continue to
    explore replacement options, including acquiring aircraft currently
    possessed within the Department of Defense through the Excess Defense
    Articles program. At my predecessor's request, RAND recently completed
    a Business Case Analysis of the costs and mission effectiveness of
    sustaining the UH-1N as well as 19 other military and commercial
    replacement options. We will continue to pursue affordable replacement
    options while safely flying the UH-1N.
    Eighth Air Force (8 AF)
        Eighth Air Force is responsible for the B-2A Spirit (B-2) and B-52H
    Stratofortress (B-52) bomber forces. This includes maintaining the
    operational readiness of both the bombers' nuclear and conventional
    missions. The B-2 gives the United States the ability to attack heavily
    defended targets while the B-52 serves as the Nation's premier stand-
    off weapon delivery platform. The B-52 may be the most universally
    recognized symbol of American airpower . . . its contributions to our
    national security through the Cold War, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Allied
    Force, Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are remarkable. Our flexible
    dual-capable bomber fleet is the most visible leg of the nuclear Triad,
    allowing decision makers the ability to demonstrate resolve through
    generation, dispersal or deployment, which includes the ability to
    quickly place bomber sorties on alert ensuring their continued
    survivability to meet commander requirements.
        B-52H
        Our airmen have worked tirelessly to keep the venerable B-52 in the
    air. The B-52 is able to deliver a wide variety of stand-off, direct
    attack, nuclear and conventional weapons in the Air Force. This past
    year, we maintained 100 percent coverage of our Nuclear Deterrence
    Operations requirements while supporting overseas Continuous Bomber
    Presence (CBP) commitments, despite a 26 percent reduction in B-52
    flying hours. Although we were able to balance aircrew readiness to
    meet United States Strategic Command requirements during these
    reductions, we only recently returned to pre-sequestration readiness
    levels to meet all combatant commander mission requirements.
        AFGSC continues work toward completing the Combat Network
    Communications Technology (CONECT) upgrade. This upgrade resolves
    sustainability issues with aging cockpit displays and communications
    while also providing a ``digital backbone'' enabling integration into
    the complex battlespace of the future. CONECT replaces aging displays,
    adds a radio, provides beyond-line-of-sight communications and
    situational awareness, and adds machine-to-machine retargeting. The
    CONECT program is currently funded to field the upgrade across the
    entire B-52 fleet. The first B-52 CONECT installation will complete in
    April 2014, and the second B-52 is scheduled to begin conversion in
    July 2014.
        We are working on an upgrade 1,760 internal weapons bay upgrade to
    the B-52's bomb bay that greatly improves flexibility and precision
    weapon capacity for all smart weapons. Configuring the aircraft to
    internally carry these smart weapons and the pathway for integration of
    the Joint Air to Surface Stand-Off Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER)
    will give the warfighter an additional advantage over an adversary, and
    will provide increased capability to our joint force commanders.
        Continuing to upgrade and modernize the B-52 will keep this
    platform relevant, viable and an integral part of AFGSC's contribution
    to the fight, providing vital long-range strike and massive firepower
    until the Air Force determines the requirement for a suitable B-52
    replacement.
        Last year, we successfully executed six Air Launched Cruise Missile
    (ALCM) flight test evaluations, meeting STRATCOM ALCM test requirements
    for the third straight year. The ALCM, employed only on the B-52,
    remains a strong and capable stand-off nuclear weapon, but some
    critical components are nearing the end of their service life. To
    ensure the B-52 remains a credible part of the Triad, we have initiated
    an ALCM Service Life Extension Program (LEP). The ALCM will remain
    viable through 2030, when the Long Range Stand-off Missile (LRSO) is
    scheduled to reach its initial operational capability.
        Minot Air Force Base (AFB), ND, has one of the oldest runways in
    the U.S. Air Force and has been deteriorating for years. We developed a
    multi-phased plan to completely replace the runway and widen the
    existing taxiway. The $70.5 million plan also includes the repair and
    upgrade of airfield lighting. To date, we have replaced both ends of
    the runway and widened the taxiway. Starting on 1 April 2014, we will
    close the runway and begin replacing the center section which is slated
    to be complete by 1 October 2014. During this 5 month runway closure,
    we will utilize the improved taxiway to meet STRATCOM requirements. For
    day-to-day training, we will relocate a portion of our B-52 force to
    Ellsworth AFB, SD. The end state will be a new runway capable of
    supporting strategic operations through 2050. This multi-year
    construction plan has been an operational challenge. However with the
    outstanding performance by our airmen, proper oversight, and risk
    management, we are ensuring both safe operations and combat capability.
    For your continued support of this vital construction project, we thank
    you.
        B-2
        The B-2 continues to deter and assure. We saw a vivid demonstration
    of this on 28 March 13 when we flew two B-2s from Whiteman AFB, MO, on
    a 75 hour, 6,500 mile combined training mission to South Korea. This
    high-visibility B-2 mission sent a strong and timely message of
    assurance to our South Korean, Japanese and Australian allies.
        We emphasized 2013 as the ``Year of the B-2'' by celebrating the
    20th anniversary of the first delivery of the B-2 Spirit bomber to
    Whiteman AFB, MO. For 20 years, the B-2 has defended America as a
    visible strategic deterrent. In each of our Nation's last four armed
    conflicts, the B-2 has led the way in combat. This is a direct result
    of the outstanding airmen who keep the aircraft flying. The B-2 with
    its long-range and stealth capability is able to penetrate heavily
    defended enemy defenses and deliver a wide variety of nuclear and
    conventional weapons in the Air Force inventory.
        We will preserve and improve the B-2's capability to penetrate
    hostile airspace and hold any target at risk without subjecting the
    crew and aircraft to undetected threats. To do this, we secured JROC
    validation of the Defensive Management System-Modernization (DMS-M)
    Capabilities Development Document, allowing the program to enter into
    the engineering and manufacturing design phase of the acquisition
    process. This upgrade provides the B-2 aircrew with improved threat
    situational awareness and increased survivability by replacing the
    current DMS Threat Emitter Locator System and display system with
    modernized and sustainable systems capable of addressing modern
    threats. In sum, this program will keep the B-2 viable in future anti-
    access environments.
        AFGSC continues to evolve B-2 conventional combat capability by
    fielding vital programs such as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP).
    Our Nation's ability to hold hardened, deeply buried targets at risk
    was bolstered by successful fielding of the 30,000-pound MOP.
    Additionally, MOP dolly and rail system prototype functional testing
    was successful. The dolly and rail system will increase storage
    capacity and create more efficient handling of the MOP. We would like
    to thank Congress for your support on this critical program.
        We continue striving to maintain the proper balance of fleet
    sustainment efforts, testing, aircrew training, and combat readiness.
    The dynamics of a small fleet continue to challenge our sustainment
    efforts primarily due to vanishing vendors and diminishing sources of
    supply. Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is working to ensure timely
    parts availability; however, many manufactures do not see a strong
    business case in supplying parts for a small aircraft fleet. Problems
    with a single part can have a significant readiness impact on a small
    fleet that lacks the flexibility of a large force to absorb parts
    shortages and logistics delays.
        Fleet-wide Bomber Initiatives
        CBP increases regional stability and supports allies in the United
    States Pacific Command area of responsibility. In 2014 we celebrate the
    10th consecutive year of conducting CBP operations. CBP is an enduring
    requirement and we have taken steps to reduce the cost of squadron
    rotations. Specifically, over the past year we worked closely with
    Pacific Air Forces to reduce the logistics footprint of these rotations
    by standardizing and positioning a permanent maintenance equipment
    package at Andersen Air Force Base.
        Additionally, we coordinated Jet A fuel conversion from JP-8 at all
    AFGSC bases to ensure this seamless fuel transition without any mission
    impacts. This effort aligns AFGSC with the USAF initiative to reduce
    aviation energy costs. AFGSC plans to completely transition to Jet A by
    mid-2014. Once complete, AFGSC projects $6 million in annual savings.
        Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B)
        The combat edge our B-2 provides will be challenged by next
    generation air defenses and the proliferation of these advanced
    systems. The LRS-B program works to extend American air dominance
    against advanced air defense environments. We continue to work closely
    with Air Combat Command to develop the LRS-B and field a fleet of new
    dual-capable bombers. This new bomber, scheduled to become operational
    in the mid-2020s, will hold any target on the globe at risk. We request
    your support for this essential program to ensure we maintain the
    ability to penetrate the most advanced integrated air defense systems.
        Long-Range Stand-Off Missile (LRSO)
        The LRSO is the replacement for the aging ALCM. In a similar manner
    to LRS-B, the LRSO is necessary to ensure we maintain a credible
    deterrent in the future. We need LRSO to maintain the safety of our
    aircrew and protect our aircraft, while maintaining the ability to
    strike at targets from outside contested airspaces in anti-access and
    area denial environments. The LRSO will be compatible with the B-52, B-
    2, and LRS-B platforms. The LRSO AoA is complete and JROC approved
    while the Draft Capabilities Development Document has completed
    staffing through the AFROC Process. In December 2013, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense deferred program funding due to concerns over the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) funding profile for the
    associated warhead as well as other nuclear enterprise priority bills
    such as the B61 Tail Kit Assembly. We are working closely with NNSA and
    AFMC to develop a new acquisition and funding strategy that will
    maintain LRSO's ability to replace ALCM in a timely manner. Recent
    Congressional NDAA language directed us to sustain the Conventional Air
    Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) until we retire both the ALCM and CALCM
    concurrently. Sustaining the CALCM, slated for retirement in fiscal
    year 2015, would drive a significant bill. Currently, the USAF plans to
    replace CALCM with the modern JASSM-ER until the future conventional
    version of LRSO is available.
        B61
        The B61-12 LEP will result in a smaller stockpile, less special
    nuclear material in the inventory, and B61 surety. AFGSC is the lead
    command for the B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly program, which is required to
    meet STRATCOM requirements with the B61-12. The B61-12 Tail Kit
    Assembly program is in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
    Phase 1 and is synchronized with NNSA efforts. The design and
    production processes are on schedule and within budget to meet the
    planned fiscal year 2020 First Production Unit date for the B61-12 Tail
    Kit Assembly, and support the lead time required for the March 2020
    B61-12 all-up round. This joint AFGSC/NNSA endeavor allows for
    continued attainment of our strategic requirements and regional
    commitments.
                                    security
        Nuclear surety and security are at the forefront of the Command's
    mission. We partnered with DOE, NNSA and the U.S. Navy (USN) using the
    Joint Integrated Lifecycle Surety methodology to assess the relative
    vulnerabilities of the nuclear enterprise. Additionally, our Command-
    level Strategic Security Plan (SSP) integrates multiple security
    initiatives and projects across AFGSC, allowing me to make decisions
    that improve overall security performance.
        A major AFGSC initiative continues to be designing new Weapon
    Storage Facilities (WSF) to consolidate nuclear maintenance,
    inspection, and storage. We have put forward a $1.3 billion program to
    replace all deficient and worn buildings across our aging 1960s-era
    Weapon Storage Areas with single modern and secure facilities at each
    location. This initiative eliminates security, design, and safety
    deficiencies and improves our maintenance processes. The project will
    undergo validation by external agencies to include the Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Air Force Safety
    Center, and Air Force Security Center. We are also seeking DOE and USN
    input to explore ways to standardize across all organizations. We will
    attain 35 percent design completion for the first facility at Francis
    E. Warren AFB, WY, by April 2014. Our goal is to include the military
    construction (MILCON) for this new weapon storage facility in fiscal
    year 2016, with the MILCON for the remaining facilities in future
    years. In sum, these facilities are needed to meet requirements for a
    safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
        We continue to work within the Air Force to complete the $337
    million LF secondary door modifications that provides rapid closure and
    security for all LFs. As of January 2014, 390 of 450 sites are
    complete. We would like to thank Congress for your support during the
    life of this program.
                  nuclear command, control, and communications
        Assured communications connectivity continues to be the linchpin to
    credible, secure strategic deterrence. The ability to receive
    presidential orders and convert those orders into action for the
    required weapon system is critical to performing the nuclear mission.
    As the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Chief
    Architect, AFGSC plays a pivotal role in providing reliable and
    survivable NC3 systems to support national objectives. In addition to
    the ICBM sustainment and modernization actions previously discussed, we
    are addressing water intrusion issues at LCCs across the missile fields
    of Minot AFB, ND, and Malmstrom AFB, MT, averting communication
    failures, and ensuring uninterrupted ability to transmit and receive
    command and control message traffic. Additionally, cryptographic
    modernization upgrades allowed Air Force nuclear operations to
    transition to more secure equipment and satellite communications
    networks. These transitioned networks greatly improved security of
    sensitive nuclear command and control message traffic. We are also
    working multiple modernization efforts to replace legacy equipment on
    the Strategic Automated Command and Control System (SACCS). Finally, we
    are partnered with Air Combat Command and STRATCOM in relocating the
    SACCS Operations Center in preparation for the demolition of the
    current STRATCOM headquarters building.
    Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal
        The Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal (ASNT) program will
    provide a fixed and transportable system of survivable NC3 Command
    Posts. These Command Posts support nuclear-tasked bomber, tanker,
    National Airborne Operations Center, Take Charge and Move Out aircraft,
    reconnaissance forces, and nuclear reconstitution teams. Global ASNT is
    one part of the ground element of the larger Minimum Essential
    Emergency Communications Network. Global ASNT replaces degraded legacy
    NC3 systems in AFGSC, Air Combat Command, Air Mobility Command, U.S.
    Air Forces Europe, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command
    providing redundant strategic communications paths in executing
    STRATCOM war plans.
                  new strategic arms reduction treaty progress
        The Russian Federation was notified in February 2014 that the last
    of 50 Peacekeeper LFs near Francis E. Warren AFB, WY (formerly the
    400th Missile Squadron) have been removed from New Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (NST) accountability. The process involves removing
    and burying the 110-ton launcher closure door and filling the launch
    tube and associated underground structures with gravel. Following the
    completion of elimination actions for the remaining 50 non-operational
    LFs at Malmstrom AFB, MT (formerly the 564th Missile Squadron) and 3
    test LFs at Vandenberg AFB, CA, the demolition contractor will return
    to the sites and accomplish remediation actions necessary to prep the
    sites for disposition. The original landowners will have the first
    option to purchase the sites. The completion of these actions marks a
    key milestone in U.S. efforts to reduce the number of non-deployed
    launchers accountable under NST. The LF elimination in Montana began in
    February 2014. 40 of the 50 LFs are on contract using fiscal year 2013
    funding with completion expected in July 2014.
                  nuclear deterrence operations core function
        We continue to improve and strengthen the nuclear enterprise
    through our long-range planning efforts. To this end, we conducted an
    AFGSC-wide review to ensure a coherent 20-year comprehensive investment
    strategy for the Air Force Nuclear Deterrence Operations (NDO) Core
    Function. This plan will bolster our ability to provide the President
    and combatant commanders vital warfighting capabilities by prioritizing
    modernization, sustainment, and acquisition efforts for our bomber,
    ICBM, and helicopter weapon systems and the nuclear command, control,
    and communications systems that underpin these systems.
        One of the methods we use to inform our NDO long-range planning and
    investment strategy efforts is wargaming. Our first wargame, Strategic
    Vigilance, was conducted in December 2013 as an analytic tool to
    explore new concepts and capabilities, study and refine emerging
    operational concepts, prevent technological, strategic and operational
    surprise, and evaluate the Air Force Strategic Plan & Vision. Moreover,
    Strategic Vigilance explored the ability to conduct combat operations
    across the spectrum of conflict. The results from this and future
    wargames will provide us insight into the employment of global strike
    assets that will allow us to better organize, train and equip AFGSC for
    years ahead.
                       2014 focus areas (our priorities)
        Deter and Assure with a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Force.
    Nuclear weapons demand a culture where safety, security and
    effectiveness permeate all aspects of this critical national mission to
    include our people who embody this special trust and responsibility
    through all aspects of their life. The greatest Air Force in the world
    will only remain dominant through their professionalism, dedication,
    and commitment to service--and living our Air Force core values.
    Although we will continue to be challenged with sustaining aging weapon
    systems, we will leverage the innovation of our great airmen to get the
    most out of our resources.
        Win the Fight. Whether that fight is in overseas contingencies
    where we have nearly 1,000 airmen deployed, or with our over 1,100
    nuclear deterrent forces deployed to the missile fields conducting the
    mission today and every day, we will forge ahead to keep both our
    nuclear and conventional forces combat ready.
        Strengthen and Empower the Team. We will continue to improve the
    quality of life for our airmen and their families, aware of the unique
    demands of our mission and our locations. We will continue to foster
    resiliency and strength within a wingman culture, and we will
    aggressively continue focused education and development at all levels.
    Furthermore, we will continue to strengthen, broaden, and deepen our
    culture around our command values of:

              Individual responsibility for mission success
              Critical self-assessment of our performance
              Uncompromising adherence to all directives
              Superior technical and weapon system expertise
              Persistent innovation at all levels
              Pride in our nuclear heritage and our mission
              Respect for the worth and dignity of every airman
              Safety in all things large . . . and small

        Shape the Future. We will stay focused on our human development and
    our weapon system modernization initiatives. Our responsive and
    resilient MM III, providing the foundation for strategic stability,
    must be sustained to 2030 and we will advocate for a follow-on system
    based on our Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent work. The B-52 will
    remain the stand-off platform of choice well past 2040, and will prove
    a versatile platform with unmatched battlefield persistence in lower
    threat environments. The B-2 will be our strategic penetrating platform
    denying safe haven to any adversary. The Long Range Strike Bomber will
    ensure we can continue to hold any target on the globe at risk. As our
    Air Launched Cruise Missile becomes obsolete and unsupportable, we will
    field a credible and flexible deterrent with the stealthy Long-Range
    Stand-Off missile.
        Uphold the Standard. We understand the importance of ensuring
    compliance at all levels, and we uphold our standards through
    inspections. We recently implemented the new Air Force Inspection
    System. The foundation of this new system, the Commander's Inspection
    Program (CCIP), is being executed by our wing Inspectors General (IG)
    for organizations below the wing level. The CCIP is monitored virtually
    by our command IG and validated by a Unit Effectiveness Inspection
    (UEI) Capstone event every 2 years. The first formal UEI Capstone event
    is scheduled for the second Bomb Wing in April 2014. Additionally, we
    conducted Initial Nuclear Surety Inspections at the 307th Bomb Wing in
    March 2013 and 131st Bomb Wing from July through August 2013, resulting
    in the first Air Reserve component and Air National Guard units
    certified to employ nuclear munitions. Going forward, we will continue
    to utilize our rigorous inspection process to ensure the highest of
    standards and determine areas of the mission that require improvement.
    All three ICBM wings will undergo NSIs in 2014--the 91st Missile Wing
    just passed this inspection in January 2014.
                                   conclusion
        Thank you for your continued support of Air Force Global Strike
    Command and the nuclear deterrent and global strike missions. Our
    enduring challenges in AFGSC are: First, to instill a culture where
    every airman understands the special trust and responsibility of
    nuclear weapons; second, to maintain excellence in our conventional
    forces; third, to sustain the current force while modernizing for the
    future; fourth, to solidify and sustain a culture where our airmen are
    proud to serve in and embrace the great importance of the deterrent
    mission.
        Fiscal constraints, while posing planning challenges, do not alter
    the national security landscape or the intent of competitors and
    adversaries, nor do they diminish the enduring value of long range,
    strategic forces to our Nation. Although we account for less than 1
    percent of the DOD budget, AFGSC nuclear forces represent two-thirds of
    the Nation's nuclear Triad, providing the ultimate guarantee of
    national sovereignty, while AFGSC conventional forces provide joint
    commanders rapid global combat airpower.
        It is my absolute privilege to lead this elite team empowered with
    special trust and responsibility, and I can assure you that we at Air
    Force Global Strike Command will meet our challenges head-on in order
    to provide our Nation with ready forces for nuclear deterrence and
    global strike operations--safe, secure, and effective.

        Senator Udall. Thank you for that testimony.
        Admiral Benedict?

     STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
                            SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Benedict. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify here today. I represent the men and the
    women of our Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP). Your
    continued support of our deterrence mission is greatly
    appreciated. Thank you.
        The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the U.S.
    nuclear triad with the ballistic missile submarines and the
    missiles that they carry. My mission, as the Director of SSP,
    is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure the safety
    and the security of the Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent
    capability, the Trident II (D5) strategic weapons system (SWS).
    My written statement, which I respectfully request be submitted
    for the record, addresses my top priorities.
        Senator Udall. Without objection.
        Admiral Benedict. Due to time constraints, I would briefly
    like to touch on three of these topics: nuclear weapons safety
    and security, SSP's Trident II (D5) life extension efforts, and
    solid rocket motors.
        First, my top priority is the safety and the security of
    the Navy's nuclear weapons. Custody and accountability of the
    nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy are the cornerstone of our
    program. Our approach to the nuclear weapons mission is to
    maintain a culture of excellence and self-assessment that
    produces the highest standards of performance and integrity.
    This culture is grounded in procedural compliance, level of
    knowledge, a questioning attitude, forceful backup, and
    formality. It is emphasized at all levels of the enterprise and
    forms a fundamental element of an integrated, layered approach
    to ensuring a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent.
        Second, the Navy is proactively taking steps to address
    aging and technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of
    the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class submarine's
    service life and to serve as the initial baseline mission
    payload for the Ohio-replacement submarine platform. This is
    being accomplished through a life extension program (LEP) to
    all Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems to include launcher,
    navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and reentry.
        Finally, I remain concerned with the decline in demand for
    solid rocket motors. While the Navy is maintaining a continuous
    production of solid rocket motors, the demand from both the
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
    Air Force has declined. Not only did this decline result in
    higher costs for the Navy as practically a sole customer, but
    it also put the entire specialized industry at risk for
    extinction. While the efforts of our industry partners and
    others have created short-term cost relief, the long-term
    support of the solid rocket motor industry remains an issue. I
    continue to work with our industry partners, DOD, senior NASA
    leadership, Air Force, and Congress to do everything we can to
    ensure this vital national industry asset is preserved.
        Our Nation's sea-based deterrence has been critical to our
    Nation's security since the 1950s and will continue to assure
    our allies and deter potential adversaries well into the
    future.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and at the
    appropriate time, I will take any questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by VADM Terry Benedict, USN
                                  introduction
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss Navy's
    strategic programs. It is an honor to testify before you this morning
    representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
        SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure
    the safety of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II
    (D5) Strategic Weapons System (SWS). The men and women of SSP and our
    industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our
    sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines, sailors, and
    coastguardsmen who are standing the watch, ensuring the security of the
    weapons we are entrusted with by this Nation.
        The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad
    with our ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the Trident II (D5)
    SWS. A number of factors have contributed to an increased reliance on
    the sea-based leg of the triad. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
    reinforced the importance of the SSBNs and the Submarine Launched
    Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) they carry. SLBMs will comprise a
    significant majority of the Nation's operationally deployed nuclear
    warheads, thus increasing the Nation's reliance on the sea-based leg.
    The Chief of Naval Operations has stated the Ohio Replacement Program--
    along with the propulsion and the SWS--remains one of Navy's highest
    priorities.
        Ensuring the sustainment of the sea-based strategic deterrent
    capability is a vital national requirement today and into the
    foreseeable future. Our budget request provides the required funding to
    support the program of record in fiscal year 2015 for the Trident II
    (D5) SWS. To sustain this capability, I am focusing on my five
    priorities: Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security; the Trident II (D5)
    SWS Life Extension Program; the Ohio Replacement Program; the Solid
    Rocket Motor (SRM) Industrial Base; and Collaboration with the Air
    Force.
                      nuclear weapons safety and security
        The first priority, and the most important, is the safety and
    security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Navy leadership has clearly
    delegated and defined SSP's role as the program manager and technical
    authority for the Navy's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons security.
        At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
    one of our Nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters
    at Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our
    two Strategic Weapons Facilities and Waterfront Restricted Areas in
    Kings Bay, GA and Bangor, WA. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Force
    Protection Units have been commissioned at both facilities to protect
    our SSBNs as they transit to and from their dive points. These
    coastguardsmen and the vessels they man provide a security umbrella for
    our Ohio-class submarines. Together, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
    Guard team form the foundation of our Nuclear Weapons Security Program.
    My headquarters staff ensures that our nuclear weapons capable
    activities meet or exceed security, safety, and compliance criteria.
        SSP' s efforts to sustain the safety and improve the security of
    these national assets continue at all levels of the organization. The
    Navy's nuclear weapons enterprise maintains a culture of self-
    assessment in order to sustain safety and security. This is
    accomplished through biannual assessments by the SSP headquarters
    staff, periodic technical evaluations, formal inspections, and
    continuous on-site monitoring and reporting at the Strategic Weapons
    Facilities. The technical evaluations, formal inspections, and on-site
    monitoring at the Strategic Weapons Facilities provide periodic and
    day-to-day assessment and oversight. The biannual SSP assessments
    conducted by my staff evaluate the ability of the local organizations
    to self-assess their execution of the assigned strategic weapons
    mission and compliance with requirements. The results of these biannual
    assessments are critically and independently reviewed through the Navy
    Nuclear Weapons Assessment and provided to the Secretary of the Navy
    and the Chief of Naval Operations for review. The most recent biannual
    SSP assessment was signed in January 2014 and will inform the Navy's
    Nuclear Weapons Assessment due later this month.
        We also strive to maintain a culture of excellence to achieve the
    highest standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting
    the strategic deterrent mission. We continue to focus on the custody
    and accountability of the nuclear assets that have been entrusted to
    the Navy. SSP's number one priority is to maintain a safe, secure, and
    effective strategic deterrent.
                           d5 life extension program
        The next priority is SSP's life extension effort to ensure the
    Trident II (D5) SWS remains an effective and reliable sea-based
    deterrent. The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
    credible deterrent and exceeds the operational requirements established
    for the system almost 30 years ago. The submarine leg of the U.S.
    strategic deterrent is ready, credible, and effective, thereby assuring
    our allies and partners and deterring potential adversaries. However,
    we must watch for and resolve potential age-related issues to ensure a
    continued high level of reliability.
        The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on our Ohio-class
    ballistic missile submarines for nearly 25 years and is planned for a
    service life of 50 years. This is well beyond its original design life
    of 25 years and more than double the historical service life of any
    previous sea-based strategic deterrent system. As a result, effort will
    be required to sustain a credible SWS.
        The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and
    technology obsolescence in today's sea-based deterrent or SWS. SSP is
    extending the life of the Trident II (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class
    submarine service life and to serve as the initial baseline mission
    payload for the Ohio Replacement submarine platform entering
    operational service in the 2030s. This is being accomplished through an
    update to all the Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation,
    fire control, guidance, missile, and reentry. Our flight hardware--
    missile and guidance--life extension efforts are designed to meet the
    same form, fit, and function of the original system to keep the
    deployed system as one homogeneous population, control costs, and
    sustain the demonstrated performance of the system. We will also remain
    in continuous production of energetic components such as solid rocket
    motors. These efforts will provide the Navy with the missiles and
    guidance systems we need to meet operational requirements through the
    introduction of the Ohio Replacement SSBNs.
        While budgetary pressures and impacts of sequestration have
    resulted in some deferred or delayed efforts, strategic deterrence
    remains one of the Navy's highest priorities. As such, the Navy is
    committed to minimizing, to the maximum extent possible, financial
    impacts to this program in order to meet strategic requirements.
        One impacted effort is the change to our flight test program. In
    accordance with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) requirements, the
    Navy must flight test a minimum of four Trident II (D5) missiles per
    year in a tactically-representative environment. The purpose of flight
    testing is to detect any changes in reliability or accuracy. The fiscal
    year 2015 budget request reflects a reduction of two planned flight
    tests for affordability. The Navy has coordinated with STRATCOM to
    determine that this temporary reduction is manageable in the short-
    term, contingent upon our plan to ramp back up to four flight tests per
    year by fiscal year 2017. A prolonged or further reduction in planned
    flight tests would impact our ability to detect changes in system
    reliability and accuracy with the required degree of statistical
    confidence to meet STRATCOM requirements. I am strongly committed to
    ensure our flight testing returns to four flight tests per year in
    fiscal year 2017.
        Despite budgetary pressures, the Navy's D5 life extension program
    is on track. In 2013, the Navy conducted the second flight test of the
    D5 life-extended (LE) guidance system and the first flight test of the
    D5 LE command sequencer. The D5 LE command sequencer began its initial
    fleet introduction earlier this year. The life extension efforts for
    the remaining electronics packages are on budget and on schedule. The
    life-extended missiles will be available for initial fleet introduction
    in fiscal year 2017.
        Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS
    is the SSP Shipboard Systems Integration efforts, which utilize open
    architecture and commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software for
    shipboard systems. This update will be installed on the final U.S. SSBN
    in April of this year completing installation on all fourteen U.S.
    SSBNs, all four U.K. SSBNs, and all U.S. and U.K. land-based
    facilities. This effort is a technical refresh of shipboard electronics
    hardware and software upgrades, which will extend the service life of
    the SWS, enable more efficient and affordable future maintenance of the
    SWS and ensure we continue to provide the highest nuclear weapons
    safety and security for our SSBNs.
        To sustain the Trident II (D5) SWS, SSP is extending the life of
    the W76 reentry system through a refurbishment program known as the
    W76-1. This program is being executed in partnership with the
    Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. The
    W76-l refurbishment maintains the military capability of the original
    W76 for an additional 30 years.
        The Navy is also in the initial stages of refurbishing the W88
    reentry system. The Navy is collaborating with the Air Force to reduce
    costs through shared technology. In particular, the Air Force and Navy,
    consistent with Nuclear Weapons Council direction, are conducting
    studies examining the feasibility of a joint approach for fuzes for the
    Navy's Mk5/W88, the Air Force's Mk21/W87 and the future W78 and W88
    Life Extension Programs. We believe the joint replacement fuze program
    is feasible and has the potential of several major benefits for the
    Nation, including the potential to achieve significant cost savings.
                            ohio replacement program
        One of the Navy's highest priority acquisition programs is the Ohio
    Replacement Program, which replaces the existing Ohio-class submarines.
    The continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a
    credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic
    missile submarines. The Navy is taking the necessary steps to ensure
    the Ohio Replacement SSBN is designed, built, delivered, and tested on
    time with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
        To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
    the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Ohio Replacement SSBN will enter service
    with the Trident II (D5) SWS and D5 life-extended missiles onboard.
    These D5 life extended missiles will be shared with the existing Ohio-
    class submarine until the current Ohio-class retires. Maintaining one
    SWS during the transition to the Ohio-Class Replacement is beneficial
    from a cost, performance, and risk reduction standpoint. A program to
    support long-term SWS requirements will have to be developed in the
    future to support the Ohio-Class Replacement SSBN through its entire
    service life, currently projected into the 2080s.
        The Navy continues to leverage from the Virginia-class attack
    submarine program to implement lessons-learned and ensure the Ohio
    Replacement Program pursues affordability initiatives across design,
    construction, and life cycle operations and support. Maintaining this
    capability is critical to the continued success of our sea-based
    strategic deterrent.
        A critical component of the Ohio Replacement Program is the
    development of a common missile compartment that will support Trident
    II (D5) deployment on both the Ohio-Class Replacement and the successor
    to the U.K. Vanguard-class. While lead U.S. ship construction has
    shifted from 2019 to 2021 as a result of the Budget Control Act of
    2011, the Navy is maintaining the original program of record for the
    design, prototyping, and testing of the common missile compartment and
    SWS deliverables in order to meet our commitments to the United
    Kingdom. Any further delay to the common missile compa11ment will
    impact the United Kingdom's ability to maintain a continuous at sea
    deterrent posture.
        The United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a shared
    commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement
    since April 1963. As the Director of SSP, I am the U.S. Project Officer
    for the Polaris Sales Agreement. Our programs are tightly coupled both
    programmatically and technically to ensure we are providing the most
    cost effective, technically capable nuclear strategic deterrent for
    both nations. Last year, marked the 50th anniversary of this agreement,
    and I am pleased to report that our longstanding partnership with the
    United Kingdom remains strong. The United States will continue to
    maintain its strong strategic relationship with the United Kingdom as
    we execute our Trident II (D5) Life Extension Program and develop the
    common missile compartment. Our continued stewardship of the Trident II
    (D5) SWS is necessary to ensure a credible and reliable SWS is deployed
    today on our Ohio-class submarines, the U.K. Vanguard-class, as well as
    in the future on our respective follow-on platforms. This is of
    particular importance as the sea-based leg of the Triad provides our
    assured second-strike capability thereby enhancing strategic stability.
    The Ohio Replacement will be a strategic, national asset whose
    endurance and stealth will enable the Navy to provide a continuous,
    uninterrupted strategic deterrent.
                       solid rocket motor industrial base
        The fourth priority is the importance of the defense and aerospace
    industrial base, in particular, the solid rocket motor industry. I
    remained concerned with the decline in demand for the solid rocket
    motor. While the Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability
    at a minimum sustaining rate of 12 rocket motor sets per year, the
    demand from both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
    (NASA) and Air Force has declined. Not only did this decline result in
    higher costs for the Navy, as practically a sole customer, but it also
    put an entire specialized industry at risk for extinction--or at least
    putting it on the ``endangered species list.'' That is not something we
    should risk. The Navy cannot afford to solely carry this cost, nor can
    this nation afford to lose this capability over the long-term. While
    the efforts of our industry partners and others have created short-term
    cost relief, the long-term support of the solid rocket motor industry
    remains an issue that must be addressed at the national level. At SSP,
    we will continue to work with our industry partners, DOD, senior NASA
    leadership, Air Force, and Congress to do everything we can to ensure
    this vital national industry asset is preserved.
                        collaboration with the air force
        The final topic is strategic collaboration between the Services.
    The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing the challenges of
    sustaining aging strategic weapon systems and have begun to work
    collaboratively to ensure these capabilities are retained in the long-
    term to meet our requirements. To do so, we are seeking opportunities
    to leverage technologies and make the best use of scarce resources.
        As I testified last year, the Navy and the Air Force established an
    Executive Steering Group to identify and investigate potential
    collaboration opportunities and oversee collaborative investments for
    sustainment of our strategic systems. As a part of this effort,
    technology area working groups are studying collaboration opportunities
    in the areas of Reentry, Guidance, Propulsion, Launcher, Radiation
    Hardened Electronics, Ground Test and Flight Test systems, and Nuclear
    Weapons Surety.
        Navy is also supporting an examination of the advantages of
    collaboration and commonality within the Air Force's Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives. Members of my staff are
    participating with their Air Force counterparts to analyze the
    potential for commonality presented by each of the alternatives being
    examined. Additionally, an evaluation of the benefits, along with any
    potential risks, is being conducted as part of the overall effort.
        The entire spectrum of potential commonality must be analyzed with
    the goal of using commonality where appropriate while ensuring
    essential diversity where needed, and being good stewards of taxpayer
    funds. The timing is now to address collaboration opportunities to
    maintain our ballistic missile capability in the long-term.
        Many of the industries and required engineering skills sets are
    unique to strategic systems. Key to SSP's historical success has been
    our technical applications programs, which have provided a research and
    development foundation. As we evaluate maintaining this strategic
    capability to match the full service life of Ohio Replacement
    submarine, we will need to resume these critical efforts. Navy is
    developing a plan to reinvest in these technical applications programs.
                                   conclusion
        SSP continues to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic
    deterrent and focus on the custody and accountability of the nuclear
    assets entrusted to the Navy. Our budget request provides the necessary
    funds to sustain this capability in fiscal year 2015. However, we must
    continue to be vigilant about unforeseen age-related issues to ensure
    the high reliability required of our SWS. SSP must maintain the
    engineering support and critical skills of our industry and government
    team to address any future challenges with the current system as well
    as prepare for the future of the program. Our nation's sea-based
    deterrent has been a critical component of our national security since
    the 1950s and will continue to assure our allies and deter potential
    adversaries well into the future. I am privileged to represent this
    unique organization as we work to serve the best interests of our great
    Nation.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Admiral Benedict.
        General Harencak?

            STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GARRETT HARENCAK, USAF,
      ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR
                              INTEGRATION

        General Harencak. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions,
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for your continued
    support of our triad and our nuclear Air Force. As the
    headquarters Air Force A-10, I advocate and integrate for our
    Air Force nuclear forces. I appreciate the opportunity to
    update the subcommittee on all of our efforts here today.
        I look forward to your questions. I respectfully request my
    written statement be entered into the record.
        [The prepared statement of General Harencak follows:]
             Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Garrett Harencak, USAF
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force
    nuclear programs.
        As the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and
    Nuclear Integration, my team, on behalf of the Chief of Staff of the
    Air Force, leads planning, policy development, advocacy, integration,
    and assessment for the airmen and weapon systems performing Nuclear
    Deterrence Operations, a core function of our U.S. Air Force.
    Stewardship and continuous improvement of this mission remains a top
    Air Force priority, in support of the President's mandate that the
    United States maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
        The stability that a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
    provides in today's increasingly complex, multi-polar, proliferated
    environment is essential to U.S. national security. In order to
    maintain this vital capability for our Nation and our allies who rely
    on it, the Air Force remains fully committed to making the necessary
    long-term investments in the development of our personnel and in the
    sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization of our nuclear forces
    and supporting infrastructure
                      deliberate development of our airmen
        The exacting nature of Nuclear Deterrence Operations requires a
    cadre of experienced, motivated professionals committed to the highest
    levels of performance and accountability. For that reason, the airmen
    we entrust with the special responsibility of supporting and conducting
    the nuclear mission are the single most important element of the
    enterprise and are foundational possess the necessary quality and depth
    of nuclear expertise is a multi-dimensional effort that incorporates
    force development, personnel management, education, and training
    processes. In our ongoing effort to strengthen the nuclear mission, we
    have worked hard in recent years to institutionalize a more deliberate
    and holistic approach to human capital management.
        In support of that effort, the Air Force instituted a Nuclear
    Enterprise Human Capital Strategy to strengthen manning and management
    of nuclear career fields. We recently formalized our processes and
    policies for identifying, designating, and tracking Key Nuclear Billets
    (KNB), select positions of responsibility within the nuclear enterprise
    that are vital to its health and sustainment. KNBs require defined
    levels of nuclear experience based on each specific position and are
    given the highest assignment priority. The program allows us to more
    effectively manage the assignment of qualified personnel to critical
    nuclear positions, and we rely on a periodic revalidation process to
    ensure KNBs are aligned to meet the constantly changing needs of the
    enterprise.
        We are leveraging the best practices learned from the KNB process
    to address specific areas of need, for example, in the identification
    of personnel supporting the nuclear command, control, and
    communications (NC3) mission. This process allows us to better assess
    and address experience gaps in order to ensure a continuous pipeline of
    NC3 personnel with the right combination of training and expertise will
    be available in the years to come. Through a separate effort, we are in
    the early stages of establishing best practices for developing our
    civilian nuclear workforce, a critical facet of the enterprise on which
    we depend to provide continuity and highly specialized technical
    expertise. We are also revising the methods we use to select senior
    nuclear commanders to include a more robust screening and interview
    processes. Our efforts to instill are also progressing.
        In order to more deliberately structure the career progression of
    our of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) officers, we stood up
    an ICBM-experienced career management team focused solely on the
    development of missileers. Beginning last February with the creation of
    a separate career field for ICBM operations (13N), a development team
    of senior nuclear leaders was established that now convenes regularly
    to manage the career field. This effort has led to increased
    competitive selection among missileers for developmental education
    opportunities, codification of the process used for managing the
    transition of officers from the ICBM force into other career fields,
    and the creation of a career pyramid aimed at producing seasoned
    leaders within the ICBM community.
        Lastly, another important area of sustained effort is the
    streamlining of the Air Force's Personnel Reliability Program (PRP), a
    tool we use to ensure airmen with nuclear weapons-related duties meet
    the highest standards of individual reliability and trustworthiness.
    Our work to strengthen and restore this program's focus on its intended
    purpose is yielding results. We are in the process of finalizing new
    policies governing PRP that will standardize its implementation across
    the Air Force and reemphasize its role as a commander's program.
               fostering continuous improvement in our operations
        Excellence in nuclear operations is underpinned by a culture of
    compliance and accountability, adherence to high standards, and
    critical self-assessment. Upholding these values requires effective
    processes and structures to identify and correct systemic weaknesses
    across all realigned the Air Force's focus on the nuclear mission, we
    have applied persistent effort to institutionalizing a comprehensive
    system of problem identification and solving based on self-assessment,
    trend/root cause analysis, and communication that complements external
    inspection processes.
        In support of that ongoing effort, we significantly strengthened
    the nuclear inspection process by revising the inspection guidance,
    establishing independent oversight, standardizing inspector training,
    and issuing guidance for root cause analysis. Our work to enhance trend
    analysis and resolution from nuclear surety inspections continues, one
    of five focus areas identified in 2010 as part of the Air Force's
    nuclear enterprise update to the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, we
    have carried forward our use of the Air Force Comprehensive Assessment
    of Nuclear Sustainment process to critically examine the sustainment
    activities needed to keep our aging weapon systems safe, secure, and
    effective.
        We continue to apply sustained, senior-leader oversight and
    governance to the nuclear enterprise through the Nuclear Oversight
    Board, chaired by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
    and the three-star level Nuclear Issues Resolution and Integration
    board. These structures provide a forum for resolution of issues
    affecting the enterprise, coordination of strategic guidance, and
    alignment of institutional priorities. As the Secretary of the Air
    Force recently emphasized, we will continue to examine policies,
    practices, and culture throughout the enterprise to uncover, and, when
    necessary, confront systemic institutional deficiencies that may be
    hindering innovation and improvement.
        Despite the challenge of prioritizing investments within
    increasingly stringent fiscal constraints, the Air Force's fiscal year
    2015 budget request for nuclear deterrence operations reflects a
    careful balance of investment between near-term readiness and long-term
    recapitalization requirements. The Air Force made a number of difficult
    cost and schedule adjustments to our programs in order to maintain
    affordability without incurring undue risk. Considerable work lies
    ahead as we endeavor to revitalize our delivery platforms, weapons
    systems, and NC3 systems. Accordingly, the Air Force appreciates
    Congress's continued recognition of the importance of nuclear
    deterrence to our national security, as well as your support for our
    major modernization and recapitalization plans.
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request continues robust investment in
    the development of the dual-capable Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B),
    one of the Air Force's top acquisition priorities. LRS-B's extended-
    range, significant payload, and ability to penetrate and survive in
    non-permissive airspace will provide unmatched operational flexibility
    to Joint commanders upon delivery in the mid-2020s.
        The Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile, the follow-on to the aging
    AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) first fielded in 1982, will
    serve as the next-generation nuclear-capable standoff weapon compatible
    with the B-52, B-2, and LRS-B. Although the fiscal year 2015 budget
    request delays the LRSO program for 3 years, the Air Force continues
    risk reduction and early systems engineering work, as well as
    coordination with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    to ensure the production schedule for a life-extended LRSO warhead is
    synchronized with operational requirements. To make sure deterrence
    requirements continue to extension program for the ALCM that will
    sustain this weapon system through 2030.
        For our current generation of nuclear-capable bombers, the B-2 and
    B-52, the fiscal year 2015 budget request funds a range of
    modernization and sustainment initiatives that will extend the combat
    effectiveness of these long-range strike platforms through the 2020s
    and beyond. In particular, the budget request fully funds the
    installation across the entire B-52 fleet of the Combat Network
    Communication Technology (CONECT) system, a suite of technologies that
    equips the B-52 with 2lst century communications, retargeting, and
    situational awareness capabilities. Other enhancements include smart-
    weapon carriage capability in the internal weapons bay, anti-skid brake
    upgrades, and modem transponders that will ensure the B-52 is compliant
    with impending U.S. and international requirements. Key upgrades for
    the B-2 funded in the fiscal year 2015 budget request include the
    Defensive Management System Modernization, the Common Very Low
    Frequency/Low Frequency Receiver, and Flexible Strike, a capability
    that will allow for the eventual integration of advanced digital
    weapons such as the B61-12 and the LRSO. Together, these programs will
    ensure the B-2 retains its unique and highly valued ability to hold the
    global target set at risk.
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request also supports significant
    modernization of the Air Force's ICBM force, comprised of 450 Minuteman
    III missiles geographically dispersed in hardened underground silos.
    America's venerable ICBM force, on continuous alert since 1959 when the
    Atlas ICBM went operational, provides unsurpassed stability and
    responsiveness at a cost far lower than other strategic systems.
    Several key modernization programs are continued in the fiscal year
    2015 budget request that will sustain Minuteman III and its associated
    support and test equipment through 2030. These include upgrades to
    solid our Launch Control Centers, and a joint warhead fuze program that
    is leveraging commonality between Air Force and Navy systems to deliver
    a cost-effective material solution.
        In July, we anticipate completion of the Analysis of Alternatives
    (AoA) for the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) effort, an ICBM
    solution that will extend the Nation's land-based strategic deterrent
    beyond 2030. Final validation of the AoA is expected this October. The
    fiscal year 2015 budget supports a Milestone A decision for GBSD in
    fiscal year 2015.
        Also funded in the fiscal year 2015 budget request are risk
    reduction activities associated with Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA)
    integration for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Current plans have
    JSF DCA capability being fielded in Block 4B in 2024. This initiative,
    along with the related B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) and its
    associated Tailkit Assembly, are of high interest to our North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization allies who view the United States' continued
    support of extended deterrence capabilities as a visible and important
    commitment to the alliance.
                     nuclear weapon modernization programs
        Another area of sustained focus is our partnership with the
    Department of Energy (DOE) to extend the service life of the warheads
    and gravity weapons that form the basis of the ground and air legs of
    the Triad. While the top priority is to prolong the lifespan of these
    systems, these LEPs represent an important opportunity to incorporate
    modem safety, security, and use-control features in systems that were
    first operationally deployed in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Among
    these programs, the life extension of the B61--which will eventually be
    the only gravity weapon employed by our long-range bombers and dual-
    capable aircraft to support extended deterrence request continues the
    Air Force's support of the B61-12 LEP. However, as a result of
    sequestration impacts, the fiscal year 2015 budget reflects a 1-year
    slip of the B61-12 LEP first production unit (FPU) from fiscal year
    2019 to fiscal year 2020. Both the LEP and its associated Tailkit
    Assembly successfully completed all scheduled objectives and milestones
    for calendar year 2013 and are on-track for calendar year 2014.
        Our work to life-extend the W78 warhead used on the Minuteman III
    ICBM continues. Last fall, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) directed
    an adjustment of the W78/88-1 FPU from fiscal year 2025 to fiscal year
    2030, and in January, the Consolidated Appropriations Act funded the
    study of a W78 LEP. Lastly, my staff continues to collaborate closely
    with the NWC and our DOE mission partners in support of the selection
    of a life-extended warhead for the LRSO missile, the follow-on program
    to the AGM-86B ALCM. The Air Force was recently invited by NNSA to
    participate in the commencement of a Phase 6.1 study for the LRSO
    warhead, an effort that is expected to commence in July of this year.
                  nuclear command, control, and communications
        Our Nation's nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)
    enterprise forms the backbone of a system that provides a secure and
    survivable communications capability between the President, senior
    leaders, and our nuclear forces. Day-to-day, these aging ground, air,
    and space systems are relied upon to provide assured connectivity
    across the spectrum of conflict, from peacetime to the most challenging
    wartime conditions. Our work to integrate efforts across the NC3
    enterprise and to advocate for NC3 capabilities is producing steady
    progress. Internal have produced a strong collaborative framework for
    identifying requirements and synchronizing investment.
        During the most recent Program Budget Review, we made strides
    toward prioritizing future NC3 funding. The Air Force Nuclear Weapons
    Center is building a strategic roadmap for NC3 sustainment. Air Force
    Global Strike Command (AFGSC) is working to more fully incorporate NC3
    requirements into planning for nuclear deterrence operations. As part
    of that effort, AFGSC will host a first-ever user-level NC3 symposium
    in April. My staff is also partnering with AFGSC to identify, and if
    necessary, mitigate any NC3-related cyber vulnerabilities in the B-52
    fleet, building on the success of a similar initiative we conducted for
    the Minuteman III system.
        We are also working with Air Education and Training Command to
    better equip our NC3 warriors with the proper training experiences and
    curriculum so they will be ready to advocate for these capabilities in
    the future. Furthermore, we are developing an Air Force instruction
    that will codify NC3 roles and responsibilities across the Service.
    Lastly, my team continues to focus effort on extending assured
    communications capability to the bomber fleet, integral to ensuring
    these platforms remain mission capable in highly contested
    environments.
                            new start implementation
        Under the terms of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
    START), the United States and the Russian Federation have committed to
    reducing their strategic nuclear forces in accordance with the Treaty's
    central limits not later than February 2018. In support of that
    obligation, the Air Force has fully funded activities necessary to
    align our ICBM and heavy bomber forces with the baseline force
    structure previously reported to Congress.
        While the Department of Defense anticipates making a final New
    START force structure decision before the end of fiscal year 2014, Air
    Force efforts to eliminate treaty-accountable ICBM silos and bombers no
    longer used to perform the nuclear mission are well underway. To date,
    we have completed elimination of 50 empty Peacekeeper ICBM silos and 39
    non-operational B-52Gs, as well as modification of 2 B-52H ground
    maintenance trainers. In addition, the procurement of conversion kits
    necessary to render B-52Hs conventional-only is on schedule, as are
    previously planned eliminations of ``phantom'' silos.
                                    closing
        Thank you for the opportunity to share the Air Force's views on
    Nuclear Deterrence Operations. Our focus on continually improving the
    nuclear mission-particularly through our support and development of the
    airmen entrusted with carrying out that mission--particularly through
    our support and development of the airmen entrusted with carrying out
    that mission--is ongoing, and will remain one of the Air Force's top
    priorities.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, General. Let me thank the panel.
        I want to throw it first to Senator King for questions he
    may have. Let us do 7-minute rounds.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, Ranking Member Sessions, thank you for that chart. I
    learn visually and I think that is a very powerful piece of
    information up there. I appreciate your work to put the data
    together. It raises serious questions.
        Ms. Bunn, perhaps you could react. This tells us that we
    are under-investing and that we have to change that, or
    otherwise we are just putting off investment decisions. It is
    like not rebuilding bridges and roads. We are going to have to
    pay for them eventually. Your thoughts on the data that is
    presented here?
        Senator Sessions. Senator King, I would just note the
    green, if you cannot see it, is 2017, and that is when we are
    reconstituting the triad plan. We did hit about the lowest
    percentage of the defense budget in 2007, if you cannot see it.
        But excuse me. Go ahead.
        Senator King. I am interested in your thoughts about
    whether the little glimmers of green at the end of the chart
    are sufficient.
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. It is clear that there will be
    recapitalization cost in the out-years that are not shown on
    the chart, and indeed, we think that those are both reasonable
    and necessary.
        Senator King. Are we going to be able to make them in light
    of the reinstitution of sequestration in 2 years?
        Ms. Bunn. If there is sequestration after 2015, Senator, it
    will hurt this a lot. We would love to see stability and
    predictability in the funding for that recapitalization so we
    can do it most effectively and efficiently.
        Senator King. I just hope adequate provision is taken. We
    have to be realistic. Everybody around here hates
    sequestration, but it has a way of rearing its ugly head
    continuously. So this is going to have to be part of your long-
    term planning in DOD because I am just afraid this might be a
    lower priority than readiness or personnel costs and those
    kinds of things. This is an important investment.
        General, help me with the pronunciation of your name.
        General Harencak. ``Har-en-cak'', Senator.
        Senator King. ``Harencak,'' thank you.
        When I was a senior in college, I wrote my senior thesis on
    the subject of deterrence, and I am not going to incriminate
    myself by telling you what year it was, but I will tell you
    that Lyndon Johnson was President of the United States.
    [Laughter.]
        But it seems to me that the theory of deterrence has
    fundamentally changed because at that time we were talking
    about state-to-state deterrence, and there was a certain
    presumption of rationality. We were really talking about the
    Soviet Union. Today we are talking about the possibility of
    non-state actors who are not particularly rational and who are
    potentially suicidal. The whole idea of mutually assured
    destruction was that you wanted to keep your life. Now we have
    people who are potentially suicidal.
        Talk to me about the theory of deterrence as it applies in
    this utterly new set of circumstances, for instance, a nuclear
    bomb on a tramp steamer headed for Miami manned by fanatics who
    are prepared to die for the cause.
        General Harencak. Senator, the theory of nuclear
    deterrence, having a credible nuclear deterrence, I do not
    believe has fundamentally changed. What it does do--and the
    forces that we provide the Nation protect against its only
    existential threat, and while a credible, stable, nuclear
    deterrent that is actually used every day, I get asked a lot of
    questions. People say, well, but you never use these weapons.
    But we use them every single day. That is the concept of
    deterrence. A continued at-sea deterrence that Admiral Benedict
    provides, our bomber forces, our missiles that are across five
    States----
        Senator King. How do all of those things deter 12 madmen on
    a ship? That is my question. Your answer is not responsive.
    Deterrence works with countries and rational people. How do you
    threaten and scare by deterrence this terrorist group that has
    a nuclear weapon in the hold of the ship?
        General Harencak. You may not be able to do that, Senator,
    but that does not mean that our forces are not as relevant
    today as they are.
        Senator King. I am certainly not suggesting that we should
    abandon it. I am just suggesting should the theory not be
    updated to take account of modern realities.
        General Harencak. I am not debating that, sir. I will say
    our capability as a Nation to do nuclear forensics, nuclear
    detection, and nuclear attribution is very good, and that
    alone, those three aspects, will allow us to know where this
    particular threat came from, and that is that ability to be
    able to respond to it.
        Senator King. I think that is the key, that intelligence is
    our first line of defense in this new world.
        General Harencak. Absolutely, sir. Absolutely.
        Senator King. Ms. Bunn, do you have any thoughts on this
    question of the theory of deterrence as it applies in 2014?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. I would agree that the fundamentals of
    deterrence are the same in that you are trying to convince a
    potential adversary that the cost and risk of aggression far
    outweighs any benefit that they hope to gain. When I have
    thought about how that might apply to deterrence, I am not sure
    that our nuclear forces are so relevant there, but the idea of
    trying to make sure that they do not gain what they are hoping
    to gain is the key. Terrorists are willing to die but they want
    to die accomplishing something. If you can keep them from
    believing that they are going to accomplish what they want to
    accomplish, then the theory of deterrence may apply in some
    way. It is different than it applies to state actors, I
    believe, and I have far less confidence in deterring terrorists
    than I would in deterring other states.
        That is why our counterproliferation measures are so
    important. That is why trying to secure nuclear materials
    around the world, initiatives like the Proliferation Security
    Initiative where we work with countries all over the world to
    interdict cargos that could contain nuclear materials, for
    instance. That is why those are so important. You want to be
    able to deny them the ability to have the capability, and then
    if somehow they got it, you want them to think that they are
    not going to succeed.
        Senator King. You have a lot of smart people to think about
    these things, and I just hope that there is some real thought
    being given to how we deal with the current reality. I do not
    want our current deterrent to be Maginot Line of the 21st
    century that does not deal with existing threats.
        I was recently in the Middle East and I think it was an
    Israeli who said the terrorists are always very clever and
    nimble, and we have to be the same, it seems to me.
        I have taken my time.
        Admiral, I share your concern about the industrial base. I
    think that is something we really need to spend some time on
    because it is not something that can just be turned off and on
    when we need it. You guys need to be thinking about how do we
    maintain the industrial base.
        The final thing I am concerned about is cyber, and that is
    where the next likely attack is going to be. Are we fully
    secure in terms of the nuclear architecture and the
    communications and command? Because that is also a place where
    terrorists are going to be very clever.
        Thank you very much for your testimony.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I do not know if Senator Donnelly has a schedule problem. I
    am going to be here.
        Senator Donnelly. Go ahead.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I understand, Admiral Benedict, that as the years go by, we
    are projected to rely more on our sub-sea nuclear deterrent
    capability. I have heard the figures. Are you able to tell us
    what those trends are and what percentage of our response force
    would be submarine-based?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. If you are referring to after
    implementation of the New START treaty, the submarine-based leg
    of the deterrent will encompass approximately--and there are
    various ways to count--but approximately 70 percent of the
    deployed warheads accountable to the United States.
        Senator Sessions. Which is very important.
        Now we have the new submarine moving forward, and we have
    had it delayed--2 years it has been pushed back?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Can you tell us the progress, or lack of
    it, on that, and share with us any thoughts?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
        The new Ohio-replacement submarine was delayed 2 years.
    That was done in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 as a result of
    the Budget Control Act of 2011. That was delayed from 2019 to
    2021.
        Those reductions, while 2 years to the platform--the Navy
    made a decision that we would not delay by those 2 years the
    build of what is called the common missile compartment, as well
    as all the strategic weapons system material, that which I
    deliver for the mission. That decision was made specifically to
    support our ally, the United Kingdom, which we are supporting
    under the Polaris sales agreement, which I execute.
        So the platform was delayed. The platform is pressurized.
    We have re-baselined the program to deliver the platform by the
    necessary dates in order to replace the Ohio submarine as it is
    retired from service. It is an aggressive schedule, but it is
    fully funded in the fiscal year 2015 presidential budget
    submission and it fully supports the needs of the Navy and,
    most importantly, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM).
        Senator Sessions. I should know but I am not sure to what
    extent I do, the President's budget in that regard exceeds the
    Ryan-Murray spending limits. Do you know?
        The President is asking for another $115 billion over 4 to
    5 years, and I do not know if you are counting that money,
    which has not been approved because it would require us to
    burst through the spending caps we just agreed to 10 weeks ago.
    It is not a little matter. But we do need to keep that program
    on track.
        Ms. Bunn, thank you for sharing with us. Things happen that
    makes the hair stand up on the back of your neck, like the
    Russian invasion of Ukraine. Having been there 3 years ago, I
    just did not see that coming. I did not see the democratic
    revolution coming either. So things happen rapidly.
        The Wall Street Journal reported last year that the former
    Chief of Staff of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, General
    Yesin, was interviewed, and he said, all in all, China may have
    850 warheads ready to launch and that, ``other warheads are
    kept in storage and intended to be employed in an emergency.''
        Now, in this open session, is there anything you can
    comment about that? Which would be about half of what we are
    projected to go to under the New START--more than half.
        Ms. Bunn. What I could say, Senator, is that when we did
    the NPR and when we did the follow-on analysis that led to the
    guidance that the President issued in June, we did take account
    of not just Russia but other countries as far as we could see,
    as far as we could project. In addition to that, if we are
    wrong about how we project, we have a hedge. We have a hedge
    capability with our platforms because of the number of
    platforms we have and the ability to upload those if we needed
    to, if the world situation surprised us.
        Senator Sessions. I am just curious about the concept we
    keep hearing about, ``bilateral,'' as if China does not exist
    on the planet. I am afraid it does, and apparently it has a
    growing nuclear arsenal.
        Do you think we could be reaching a point where nuclear
    reduction should be done on a trilateral basis, if at all?
        Ms. Bunn. The Chinese are modernizing their nuclear forces.
    We do not see them growing. They are modernizing fairly
    steadily and increasing some. At some point--at some point--we
    will need to include others in arms control negotiations. I do
    not think it is the next step. If we could ever get another
    reduction with the Russians, there might be one more round
    there.
        Senator Sessions. That is a concern.
        General Harencak, where are you on the new bomber? Are you
    the one to ask about that? Maybe General Wilson. What
    percentage of those bombers--has a decision been made to
    configure it, or at least some of them, for nuclear weapons?
        General Harencak. Yes, sir. Senator, the long-range strike
    bomber is on track. It is exceptionally well run where we are,
    and 2 years after its initial operating capability, it will be
    nuclear certified, sir.
        Senator Sessions. So that decision----
        General Harencak. That decision has been made. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. It would be a considerable improvement
    over the B-52?
        General Harencak. Many, many orders of magnitude.
        Senator Sessions. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
    thank all of you for your work.
        I sense that the administration and DOD is thinking more
    clearly about this area, and some of the spending priorities
    represent a step in the right direction. I am pleased about
    that.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This would be for anybody who would like to take a swing at
    this, but I will start with Ms. Bunn. Do you believe there is
    enough funding to sustain the current nuclear triad with the
    modernization steps necessary?
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, I think we have a good path that we are
    on for modernization, and while we have had a few slips because
    of budget concerns, we are on the path. I think the key
    question is, are we on the path to get where we need to be in
    the time we need to be there, and I believe the answer is yes.
        Senator Donnelly. I would like to ask this of Lieutenant
    General Wilson. Who do you think is the biggest threat to the
    U.S. nuclear arsenal?
        General Wilson. I would say right now our arsenal has
    served us well. Deterrence has served us. The capabilities
    across the board have served us for the past 50 years, but all
    of them are aging from the bombers to the submarines to the
    missiles. So the threat is we need to modernize them. We just
    cannot afford not to modernize them. I think we are on a path
    to be able to do that.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral, what is it that in this area
    keeps you up at night?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, taking off on what General Wilson
    said, the programs do need modernization, and to me, the thing
    that keeps me up at night is ensuring that I have an
    experienced, expertised workforce that can do that
    modernization. As you can see by the chart, the programs were
    built many years ago. While they have been in some form of
    modernization, it is not nearly the type of modernization, the
    extent of modernization that we are talking about here,
    recapitalization of the force and that is required in the
    future. Having that experienced workforce, both civilian,
    contractors, and military, is what keeps me awake at night,
    sir.
        Senator Donnelly. As a follow-up to that--and that would be
    to you or any of the others--what has happened with our
    workforce in the nuclear forces area? With the challenges we
    have seen, the problems we have seen, why do you think this has
    occurred?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, I will take the first stab at that.
    There are certain areas of technology that only this group at
    the table exercise, specifically things like reentry mechanics,
    reentry materials, strategic guidance, strategic propulsion,
    rad-hard electronics to the level that we require to perform in
    the system. You can talk about those. You can do experiments on
    those, but until you are actually designing systems, fielding
    systems, and then supporting systems, that is experience and
    expertise that you just do not get out of a textbook.
        Senator Donnelly. What I am trying to find out is some of
    the cheating scandal headlines we have seen, some of the other
    things. What has caused these in your best judgment?
        General Wilson. Part of it may be we focused on the culture
    of perfection, and we know that human beings are not perfect. I
    guess what we will shift to is how do we make sure we have
    flawless execution in the field through teamwork, make sure
    that people understand that they are important and they are
    relevant.
        Young soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines--they read
    things in the paper, and there are lots of things being said
    about the nuclear enterprise. I keep coming back to 99.5
    percent of our airmen are people we are real proud of. They get
    it. They understand the importance of our mission. Regardless
    of what we read in the paper, they are dedicated. They are
    professional. They have pride in their work. They understand
    the importance of their work. Some of them do not. We had a
    small number recently, as you mentioned, that did not live up
    to our core values of integrity. It was not a failure of the
    mission. It is a failure of a small number of individuals, and
    the vast majority, 99.5 percent of them, are ones we are real
    proud of.
        Senator Donnelly. General Harencak, I wanted to follow up
    on what Senator King was asking too, and that would be in
    regards to the non-state actors, the tramp steamer that is out
    in the Atlantic somewhere. As part of preventing this, are you
    part of that loop or is that left more towards other parts of
    DOD?
        General Harencak. Senator, the short answer is, yes. We are
    part of this loop. Everything we do, every time we try to
    modernize a particular weapons system--many of them--these are
    old. These were science experiments, if you will, that are
    sitting there. Every time we reinvest in the knowledge of how
    to do certain things to our forces and to our platforms, we are
    all contributing together to help in nuclear detection, nuclear
    forensics, nuclear attribution, the intelligence. So all of us
    at this table and so many more of us are all part of this.
        There is not one particular solution to that tramp steamer
    thing you talked about. So the answer is, everything we do
    contributes to across the spectrum of conflict, across all the
    threats trying to fill gaps and seams and protect against it.
        Senator Donnelly. Do the intelligence forces meet with all
    of you as to what should we be looking for, what are the things
    you think might be next on the list? Are those ongoing
    communications?
        General Harencak. Absolutely.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral Benedict?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. As part of my requirement, I am
    obligated to deliver once a year what is called a vulnerability
    assessment on each one of my locations, and that is us, SSP, in
    direct collaboration with the local Intelligence Community
    (IC), as well as the national IC, so that we are well-prepared
    to address any threats at each one of my locations.
        Senator Donnelly. Then I would just like to finally ask
    about cyber, and that is, how do you make sure that with all
    the cyber attacks that go on, with all the changes almost on an
    hourly basis in those areas that our system will work, God
    forbid, if ever needed, but that our system is ready to go?
        Admiral Benedict. So, sir, we take a very layered approach
    to that to address that question. First and foremost, our
    systems which launch we do not permit to be attached to any
    type of the gig or the Internet or the larger system. They are
    standalone systems. So with that, we are very concerned about
    things like counterfeit parts or viruses being introduced.
    Again, there is a very layered approach from information
    assurance certification, which I am required to comply with, as
    well as Nuclear Weapons Standing Safety Group inspections every
    5 years that look at entry points into the architecture. We are
    very concerned about cyber, and so again, through a very
    measured, layered approach, we try to minimize any entry points
    to the standalone systems which launch.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you all for your service.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Senator Vitter.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of
    you for your service and for your testimony today.
        I want to back up, and I apologize if any of this ground
    has already been covered. But from the 40,000-foot level, if
    you will, when the Senate passed the New START treaty, there
    was a very clear set of discussions and agreement that that
    would be accompanied by major resources and modernization, and
    that was a very important prerequisite to a lot of folks in the
    Senate voting for the New START treaty. I voted against it, in
    part because I did not have confidence that that stuff would
    happen.
        In fact, in terms of those resources and that
    modernization, are we not significantly behind what was
    promised in those discussions? I am not blaming any of you, but
    as a factual matter, are we not well behind that modernization
    schedule and that level of resources? Anybody.
        Ms. Bunn. They are looking at me.
        Senator Vitter. Yes. [Laughter.]
        Ms. Bunn. Sir, the updated 1251 Report--there have been
    some slips in schedule since then. Most of those are due to
    budget constraints. But I think what we see is last year, this
    year, the prioritization of the nuclear mission in large part
    probably because of those commitments that were made then.
        Senator Vitter. Are we not about 34 percent short of the
    dollar commitment over 5 years that was promised, a $4.1
    billion commitment? We are not close to that? Am I missing
    something?
        Ms. Bunn. The precise numbers I would have to get for the
    record, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In November 2010, the administration pledged to modernize U.S.
    nuclear forces and the U.S. nuclear enterprise, and to spend the funds
    necessary to achieve these objectives.
        The administration remains committed to these programs, although
    mandatory cuts due to sequestration and spending caps have had an
    effect. Actual and proposed spending on the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) weapons activity programs from fiscal year 2012
    through fiscal year 2017 is approximately 3 percent less than what was
    outlined in the updated report pursuant to section 1251 of the National
    Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010.

                                                [In billions of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   Fiscal Year
                                                                   ------------------------------------------  Total
                                                                     2012   2013   2014   2015   2016   2017
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NNSA Weapons Activity Request.................................   $7.6   $7.6   $7.8   $8.3   $8.8   $8.9   $49.0
    Updated Report Pursuant to Section 1251 of the NDAA for Fiscal    7.6    7.9    8.4    8.7    8.9    9.0    50.5
     Year 2010....................................................
    Difference....................................................      0   -0.3   -0.6   -0.4   -0.1   -0.1    -1.5
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Despite fiscal constraints, the administration is fulfilling its
    pledge to modernize strategic delivery systems. Actual and proposed
    spending on Department of Defense platforms and weapons delivery
    systems for fiscal years 2012-2021 is approximately 10 percent less
    than what was stated in the updated report pursuant to section 1251 of
    the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010. The funding shortfall is primarily the
    result of three programs: the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic submarine
    replacement project, the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic
    missile, and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. The
    Ohio-class Replacement Project spending is lower than originally
    projected due to a better projection of expected costs and a 2-year
    program slip. The Trident II spending is lower than originally
    projected due to significant cost savings in the rocket motor
    procurement. The Minuteman III spending is lower due to cancellation of
    contracts for some support helicopters that the Air Force determined
    are no longer required, delaying the W87/Mk21 Air Force fuze to align
    more closely with the Navy's fuze modernization program, and deferring
    the W78/88-1 Life Extension Program outside the Future Years Defense
    Program. The remainder of the funding shortfall is the result of across
    the board reductions from the spending limitations implemented after
    the commitments were made.
        Additional details will be provided in the report pursuant to
    section 1043 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012.

        Senator Vitter. I am being told that a large part of what I
    am describing is Department of Energy (DOE) funding, but that
    was certainly part of the discussion, part of the commitment.
    Are we not well short on that?
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, the funding is not what we thought in
    the updated 1251 report. I understand that the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) will be here to present their
    budget in a few weeks, and I would defer to them on those NNSA
    warhead issues.
        Senator Vitter. Here is what I am trying to wrap my head
    around. New START was premised on that. We are not keeping
    those promises for whatever reason. Also, I think it is very
    fair to say our relationship and trust level with Russia has
    hit a recent all-time low, and yet we are talking about further
    nuclear reductions. Why? None of that seems to add up to
    further nuclear reductions in my mind.
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, the President did, as a result of the
    big study that was done over 18 months, say that we could
    reduce our nuclear forces and still maintain a safe, effective,
    and reliable deterrent and assure allies, but that we would
    pursue negotiations with Russia. We have suggested that to the
    Russians. They are not particularly interested. They say that
    they are focused on implementing New START by February 2018,
    and so I do not foresee that happening anytime soon.
        Senator Vitter. Again, just for the record, I want to
    express concern with the fact that the funding and the
    modernization that New START was premised on is not happening.
    So to me, that calls into question the New START reductions to
    begin with, and yet we are discussing, at least theoretically,
    further reductions. Again, for the record, I want to underscore
    the fact that clearly since the passage of New START and the
    ratification of New START, our relationship and trust level
    with the Russians has taken a nose dive. I just think all of
    that should add up to extreme caution about further nuclear
    reductions and further agreements with the Russians.
        With regard to existing agreements with the Russians, are
    there ongoing concerns of their not keeping their end of the
    bargain in significant circumstances?
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, with regard to New START, we have just
    finished one of the 3-week compliance groups, and while there
    are small issues, there are no big problems with New START
    implementation.
        Senator Vitter. I was actually talking about preexisting
    obligations of the Russians prior to New START.
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. As I mentioned in my statement, we do
    have concerns about the INF Treaty compliance.
        Senator Vitter. So there are real concerns there about
    compliance?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Has there been any positive resolution or
    movement toward positive resolution on those in the last year,
    say?
        Ms. Bunn. Our concerns have been raised with the Russians.
    We raised them a number of times with the Russians. Senior
    officials have. We were not satisfied with their response and
    we will continue to raise it.
        Senator Vitter. Okay.
        General Wilson, I wanted to ask you. There were several
    recommendations with regard to 8th Air Force and Global Strike
    and some have been implemented and some have not been
    implemented in terms of some of the organizational
    recommendations. Would implementing all of those organizational
    recommendations not be helpful in terms of having a more
    effective command through both 8th Air Force and Global Strike?
        General Wilson. Senator Vitter, I am not aware of what
    specific organizational challenge that we have not implemented.
        Senator Vitter. I will come back to that.
        Another issue with regard to Global Strike is
    recertification of a second weapons storage area (WSA). Where
    does that stand and how comfortable are you without our having
    that second WSA?
        General Wilson. Certainly having one of anything presents
    risk. What we are working on now is to come up with a
    comprehensive WSA update. All of our WSAs are old. Our oldest
    is 52 years and the average is just over 38 years. So we are
    building a plan with an investment strategy to bring forward to
    recapitalize all the WSAs at our bases over a 15-year period,
    and we will be working on that to bring forward this next year.
        Senator Vitter. Let me jump back quickly. I am out of time.
    But to my previous comment, I think the recommendation to
    remove all non-bomber-related missions from 8th Air Force and
    Global Strike was implemented, but the recommendation to assign
    all bombers to the 8th Air Force was not. Specifically, do you
    think implementing that recommendation would be helpful?
        General Wilson. We have a terrific relationship with Air
    Combat Command which maintains the B-1. Our focus has been on
    the dual-capable bombers, on the B-2 and the B-52, making sure
    they can be safe, secure, and effective in their nuclear
    mission, as well as to do their conventional mission. We have a
    terrific relationship with Air Combat Command who maintains the
    B-1.
        Senator Vitter. Why did the Schlesinger Commission
    recommend that reassignment, and do you disagree with that
    thinking?
        General Wilson. I cannot specify why the Schlesinger Report
    recommended that. I think there is goodness in the way we have
    it today. Right now, the B-1s are over in the Middle East. They
    have been over there for the last 13 years. Our B-52s have been
    in the continuous bomber presence for the last 10 years in the
    Pacific. We have been focusing, quite frankly, on rebuilding
    and reenergizing the nuclear enterprise. So that has been our
    number one priority to make sure our dual-capable bombers are
    capable of doing their mission.
        We also have that Global Strike capability. Today our B-52s
    have been in the Pacific, and the B-1s have been in the Middle
    East in the fight since 2001.
        Senator Vitter. Okay. Thank you.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
    witnesses for being here today.
        Secretary Bunn, last year, Secretary Creedon testified that
    the analysis of alternatives (AOA) to replace the Minuteman III
    ICBM would be completed in 2014. Can you tell me the status of
    that study, and do you think we are going to see a completion
    date on it this year?
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, the study is on course, and I do
    anticipate we will see that study completed this year.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Harencak and General Wilson, I know that the study
    is going to probably cover this in detail, but can you discuss
    the risks and the benefits that we are looking at in extending
    the current system?
        General Harencak. I can start, ma'am, and then I will turn
    it over to General Wilson.
        The Minuteman III system dates to 1970. While we are doing
    an extraordinary job in keeping this weapons system, our plan
    is to keep it to 2030, and that means we are going to have to
    sustain and modernize this.
        Everything we do to sustain and modernize the current
    Minuteman III will be applicable to any possible follow-on. For
    example, if we decide we are going to modernize with the
    propulsion or the guidance system, we are starting, if you
    will, with the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence (GBSD) studies
    to make sure that whatever we do will be applicable to whatever
    comes out.
        I will say that keeping the Minuteman III past 2030 just
    increases our risks. It is already, as I said, a system that
    dates to 1970.
        General Wilson.
        General Wilson. I do not have much to add from General
    Harencak. Built in the 1970s, designed for 10 years. We are
    going to maintain it and sustain it through 2030. Everything
    General Harencak just talked about, whether it be guidance,
    propulsion, fuses, we are going to need to modernize over the
    years, and we are doing that.
        We will also make sure we can transition each of those
    technologies into the GBSD follow-on, and as Ms. Bunn just
    mentioned, that AOA will be complete this June.
        Senator Fischer. You said we are on track to do that. So
    the modernization is taking place and it is meeting the
    recommendations that you folks have for it.
        General Wilson. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Good.
        Admiral Benedict, in your opening statement, you talked
    about how the submarines were the most survivable leg of the
    deterrent. What about all the technological innovations that we
    are seeing? Are you concerned that in the future something may
    come about where it will not be, and how would you address that
    then?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, ma'am. We are concerned about that.
    As we did the initial design and did the analysis on the
    replacement for the Ohio-class submarine, which is called the
    Ohio-replacement platform, our largest focus was on
    survivability and the stealth aspects of that platform.
    Scheduled to start construction in 2021, that class of boat
    will be deployed through the early 2080s. So we have worked
    very closely with the IC and the technology analysts. We are
    looking out and we are ensuring that we have the flexibility
    built into that platform to address what we know but, most
    importantly, to adjust for what may come in the future, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Do you factor in the costs of any
    adjustments that may happen in the future? I know when we do
    not even know what is going to be that innovation that is out
    there that could be a detriment to us, is there any way that
    you can factor that in?
        Admiral Benedict. What we do factor in when we look at the
    lifecycle cost of the platform are those known upgrades,
    modernization periods to address the known knowns. It would be
    impossible to address the unknown unknowns, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Harencak, I understand that the Air Force is
    evaluating their technical feasibility and keeping empty silos
    warm. Is that correct? To have that warm status on them?
        General Harencak. Yes, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, Congress
    expressed its preference for keeping them in a warm status. Can
    you talk a little bit about the benefits on why they should be
    kept in a warm status?
        General Harencak. There are two main reasons, ma'am. The
    number one reason is the way the system was built, it was
    interconnected separate systems. If we remove missiles, we need
    to keep the silos in a warm status so we maintain the
    continuity between them and the communication aspect that was
    built for many good reasons back in the 1960s. So it is much
    easier. It is much less expensive for us to remove a missile
    and then keep the communication system and the actual tactical
    unit which is in groups of 50s together. There is a very real
    operational reason why we would not want to do it.
        In other words, if we do not keep it warm, we would
    eliminate the silo. By eliminating the silo, it cuts the
    connection, and it requires us to spend a lot of money, a lot
    of effort to now recertify the weapons system and to reconnect
    those communications links.
        The second reason is by allowing us to remove missiles and
    still keep them in a warm silo, it allows us to pick those
    silos that are worst performing, that have the most water
    intrusion, that have the most infrastructure problems with it.
    It also allows us to recapitalize and sustain our system with
    the ease of being able to put a missile into a warm silo, then
    work on the other silo.
        So those two main reasons, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. With that interconnectedness, you said
    that was less expensive to keep the silo warm and that was one
    of the reasons?
        General Harencak. Absolutely, ma'am.
        Senator Fischer. So if we are going to see any
    decommissioning of these missiles, would it be your
    recommendation that the silos would be kept warm?
        General Harencak. It would be my highest recommendation.
        Senator Fischer. I assume you know there are proposals out
    there that we need environmental studies done on the ICBM areas
    in order to have them decommissioned. In your opinion, do you
    think that is a wise use of our resources?
        General Harencak. Ma'am, the U.S. Air Force believes that
    we should maintain the silos in a warm status. I will leave it
    at that.
        Senator Fischer. That is a military decision.
        General Harencak. That is the belief of our Chief, Under
    Secretary, and mine that it is in the best interest of us to
    keep our silos in a warm status.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, General. I appreciate it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Let me recognize myself at this time.
        General Wilson, we had a nice visit earlier today. I want
    to turn to the cheating scandal. I do not want to get ahead of
    the ongoing investigation, but my understanding is the missile
    combat crews are required to achieve almost 100 percent score
    on their readiness exams in order to succeed in their careers.
    Is this the most effective method for evaluating the knowledge
    and readiness of these launch officers? What alternatives to
    the exam model are you investigating?
        General Wilson. Thank you, Senator.
        We are investigating all kinds of different alternatives of
    how we both train, test, and evaluate. As I mentioned to you
    earlier today, I think 100 percent is an unrealistic standard.
    It is not the right way to go. We have experts across the
    field. Air Education and Training Command (AETC) is helping us.
    We have behavioral psychologists. We have a lot of folks
    looking at the problem as to what is, again, the best way to
    train, test, and then evaluate.
        As I mentioned to you, I have recently, within the last few
    days, taken the out-brief from all the work we have going on.
    We have three main efforts today. We have a command-directed
    investigation that I ordered looking into this problem. We have
    what I call a force improvement program that we have modeled,
    quite frankly, off of Navy, work that they have done and taken
    their best practices, and what that is, is a grass roots effort
    to get to the people doing the job and understand those things
    that are inhibiting them from doing their job better. I took
    the first initial out-brief from the force improvement program
    on Monday. We are going to take those two efforts and we have
    another effort underway, again, with some scientists, as well
    as AETC to help us look through the problem set. We are going
    to roll all those up with surveys from the families, as well as
    the leadership, and to provide those recommendations back to
    the Secretary of Defense to meet his deadline here later in
    March.
        Senator Udall. Given the importance of your mission, we
    look with anticipation to what those studies and
    recommendations will be.
        I understand upwards of 92 missile officers were
    implicated. That has meant you have had to bring in additional
    crews from elsewhere, and then you have had to increase the
    workload of existing crews. A couple of questions along that
    theme.
        How long do you anticipate this to last? Has the readiness
    of the missile force suffered as a result?
        I want to point out, as we all have, that the tireless,
    quiet professionalism of the vast majority of the men and women
    of our nuclear enterprise should not be damaged by the alleged
    actions of a few.
        General Wilson. Yes, sir. Let me answer the second question
    first. The readiness has not suffered, to start with. What we
    have done is we have taken crews from Minot and F.E. Warren,
    and they have augmented the team at Malmstrom Air Force Base.
    We will shift the output coming out of the schoolhouse at
    Vandenberg Air Force Base, and we expect to be back up to full
    strength by late spring on the number of crews that we have
    available to do the mission.
        As a side thing that came out of this, what we found is
    that the crews coming from both Minot and F.E. Warren to
    Malmstrom are learning a great deal, and so as we work the
    standardization amongst all the missile crews, we found that
    the folks are each learning from each other. We are taking this
    opportunity to make each of the teams better.
        They are spending about a month from each of the bases at
    Malmstrom. Then they are going back and rotating crews. The
    crews are on the same work schedule. They are typically doing
    eight alerts a month, and nobody is exceeding that. We have not
    increased their workload. What we have done is we found out we
    were able to take best practices and best ideas at all the
    bases because all the bases are, quite frankly, now working at
    Malmstrom Air Force Base.
        Senator Udall. Admiral Benedict, could I turn to the
    discussion that you had in the Navy, I think about a year and a
    half ago, about the interoperable warhead (IW). It would
    combine the W78 with the W88. Do you still have the concerns
    that were expressed some 18 months ago?
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, 18 months ago, we expressed concerns
    about doing the necessary technology work, commonly referred to
    within the domain space as 6.2, 62A, exploratory engineering
    analysis, as well as the costing of that. We expressed those
    concerns to the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). We were able to
    work through those concerns with both NWC, as well as DOE and
    NNSA. We were on a path to fully support--the Navy is--the IW
    effort.
        In the President's budget just recently submitted, the IW
    project is delayed to a date no earlier than 2030, and so that
    effort will be suspended until such time as appropriate with
    lead time to support that date, sir. When that happens, we will
    fully support it.
        Senator Udall. I know General Wilson will understand the
    spirit of the question I am going to ask you and you will as
    well. The ICBM cheating scandals. Give me another Service's
    perspective. How do you test the readiness of your missile
    crews?
        Admiral Benedict. The first thing that I would like to say
    is I truly appreciate General Wilson's and the Air Force's
    transparency in sharing with the Navy what they are learning
    and what they are doing. I would also like to assure you that
    as soon as we found out, we, the Navy, both myself, as well as
    Vice Admiral Connor, called General Wilson and other general
    officers in the Air Force and offered whatever assistance we
    could. So there is great transparency between the Navy and the
    Air Force as we work to support the Air Force in this.
        From a Navy standpoint, one of the things that I have the
    fortunate opportunity to leverage off of is the nuclear power
    culture that exists on a submarine. That is an innate culture
    that is trained and instilled in every officer and enlisted
    individual who goes to sea on a submarine. The absolute high
    levels of standards and ethics that when reports are made and
    individual actions are assigned and reported as complete, that
    for the safety of the boat, for your individual safety, and the
    safety of your crew member, that those are taken as absolute.
        We work off of five fundamental principles, and I think
    that is what we tried to share--Admiral Connor did--with
    General Wilson: procedural compliance, level of knowledge,
    questioning attitude, forceful backup, and formality. All of
    these, those five traits, give us a level and layered approach
    to ensure that while we are all human and capable of making
    mistakes, that we as a team are much stronger if we implement
    those five. So those are the things that we are sharing with
    the Air Force, and fortunately the Air Force is sharing with us
    what they are learning. We will, I assure you, integrate their
    lessons learned into our training programs.
        Senator Udall. Secretary Bunn, I want to turn to you for my
    last question, but I did want to share with the committee--I
    guess we are a subcommittee, but we are proud of what we do--
    Senator King's comments earlier that from the early days,
    Senator King, DOE has been studying small nuclear devices. I am
    told that Albert Einstein, of all people, urged FDR to do the
    kind of research into so-called suitcase bombs. That work has
    proceeded apace in DOE. But your question about deterrence in
    the 21st century is a fundamental one and I hope this
    subcommittee can continue to consider it, study it, and discuss
    it. It is a challenging environment, as we know.
        I mentioned, Madam Secretary, in my initial remarks my
    interest in your comments on the fact that we are breaking up
    the functions of the Global Strategic Affairs Office. You know
    the details of how that is going to operate. Do you think that
    having your office separated from other functional areas will
    make it easier or harder to perform your duties? I ask that in
    the context of the command of this hearing. There is a real
    focus on modernization, efficiency, safety, training.
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, in this case, I do not think it will
    make much difference. I say that because there is some logic to
    having cyber, space, and nuclear missile defense together in an
    Assistant Secretary of Defense shop. There is also logic in
    having, where we are moving to, strategy, plans, and
    capabilities to having nuclear missile defense policy there as
    well. So no matter where my office sits on the organization
    chart, I will continue to work across policy with the relevant
    offices, cyber, space, plans, strategy, and the regional
    offices in Asia and Europe. We will continue to do that.
        I think the important issue is senior attention, and with
    the Secretary--Senator Sessions mentioned earlier the
    Secretary's remarks on the importance of the nuclear mission
    with the nominees that we have for Deputy Secretary and Under
    Secretary, if they are confirmed, I think we will have that
    senior attention. That is what is important in the way my
    office operates.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for those insights. We will watch
    this with interest certainly on an ongoing basis.
        I do not know if those are the bells for the series of
    votes to begin.
        If I could turn to Senator Sessions for any other comments
    or questions he might have.
        Senator Sessions. Briefly, Ms. Bunn, our understanding is
    that we could go back and modernize the triad over a period of
    years and keep the net cost of that in the modernization of the
    weapons at a level of around 5 percent of the defense budget.
    Is that consistent with what you understand?
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, I hesitate to use a precise percentage
    because so much depends on what is counted and what assumptions
    are made. But I would say that it is a low digit, a low single
    digit percentage of the defense budget.
        Senator Sessions. I think that is important to us because
    we need a healthy triad and healthy nuclear deterrent. As DOD
    wrestles with its priorities, I think they are going to have to
    put some of this in there.
        The NWC is something I have felt good about. I have been
    openly questioning DOE. They are out there. They get a bunch of
    money and they get to do it on their own time. But I think our
    NWC is an effective way to begin to make sure that what they do
    is what DOD needs and not a dime more is spent than necessary.
        Do you participate with that, and do you think it could be
    strengthened? Are there any changes needed to it?
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, I participate at the next level down
    from the NWC. That is at the Under Secretary level, and I am a
    layer below. But I do participate in the group that supports
    our principals. I think you are right that the NWC has been
    very active in making sure that what DOD needs, what our needs
    are, and what NNSA puts forth are closely synchronized. DOD has
    also given a lot of attention to cost estimation and program
    management and those kinds of issues and even volunteered some
    assistance of the DOD Office of Cost Analysis and Program
    Evaluation (CAPE) in past years looking at some of the facility
    modernization at NNSA.
        Senator Sessions. I hope that will continue. They have to
    participate with intensity in this effort.
        I do not want to overstate my happiness about where we are
    financially and the way the programs are going. I think we have
    seen a more healthy approach in the last year, and I compliment
    DOD. But the ballistic missile submarine has been delayed 2
    years, at least, as you have told us. The air launched cruise
    missile has been delayed 2 years or more. Right?
        Ms. Bunn. One to 3 years. The budget reflects 3 years, but
    we will try to buy back as much of that as possible.
        Senator Sessions. The follow-on ICBM. We do not have a
    decision on that yet to go forward. Right?
        Ms. Bunn. Correct.
        Senator Sessions. So that is still in limbo.
        The B-51 LEP was delayed 2\1/2\ years, maybe more?
        Ms. Bunn. Sir, since fiscal year 2014, there has been about
    a 6-month slip in the B-61-12.
        Senator Sessions. I think that is it. I just think maybe I
    go back a little further. We previously projected it and then
    we extended it some more.
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. I think it is now over 2\1/2\ years.
        So we talked about the W-78/88 IW. That has been delayed
    considerably. Maybe up to 5 years now instead of 2. It was 2
    years.
        Then the plutonium handling facility is deferred at least 5
    years, Admiral Benedict or Ms. Bunn?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. The NWC has gone back to look at how to
    modernize what we need in a more modular----
        Senator Sessions. I support a more frugal approach. I will
    give you an A, but it is delaying things.
        The uranium processing facility is delayed 4 years, I
    understand, and DOE weapons activities are $2 billion short of
    New START commitments over the last 5 years.
        In this place, words do not mean much. The QDR does not
    mean much. It is whether the money is getting out and whether
    the projects are getting completed.
        Senator Udall. I am still trying to get an A from Senator
    Sessions. [Laughter.]
        Senator King, I think, had another comment or a question.
    We have a few more minutes before we have to head to the floor.
        Senator King. Ms. Bunn, I just wanted to tell you a story.
    You mentioned how the council was one level above you. 40 years
    ago, I worked as a staff member in this place, and one of my
    jobs was to set up hearings. I once called the Office of
    Management and Budget to get a witness for a particular
    hearing, and they gave me this title of Deputy Under Secretary
    or something, and I said, well, I do not really understand
    these titles. Can you tell me who this person is? The fellow on
    the other end of the line gave me an answer, which if I ever
    write a book about Washington, will be the title of my book. He
    said, he is at the highest level where they still know
    anything. [Laughter.]
        What bothers me is that I know that I am now above that
    level. [Laughter.]
        But I just wanted to try to make you feel better. You are
    around in that vicinity.
        Thank you very much.
        Ms. Bunn. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Udall. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. If I can just have a short answer from the
    panel here. We hear about the importance of uploading the
    weapons, and I would just like to hear from you folks how
    important you believe it is to retain that ability if we are in
    a crisis scenario and where we have missiles stacked over here
    and a couple submarines over here, and if it is a crisis, how
    are we going to get it all done in time and if it is going to
    work. A long question but just give me your thoughts. Ms. Bunn?
        Ms. Bunn. It is very important to maintain a hedge. The
    more surprised you are the longer time you have to bring it
    back.
        Senator Fischer. Is uploading vital in a crisis situation?
    If so, how can we better prepare for it? Besides intelligence,
    physically how are we going to prepare for it?
        Ms. Bunn. There are two reasons that one might want to
    upload. One, if there were a technical failure in some of our
    systems or warheads and you needed to compensate for that; and
    two, if there were a geostrategic surprise. In other words,
    your projections--you got it wrong. That kind of surprise--you
    have probably a longer ramp-up time and you have longer to do
    it. I guess I would say, we believe that we have sufficient
    forces operationally deployed now to deal with short-term
    crises.
        Senator Fischer. General?
        General Wilson. Senator, I would say that today we have 450
    ICBMs out in the field. That is the bedrock of our strategic
    stability. We do not need to upload those.
        For our bombers, certainly if we were loading weapons, that
    sends a very visible signal to any adversary. So it is a deter-
    and-assure piece for the bombers.
        Senator Fischer. But if we have these extra warheads at DOE
    facilities, you believe you would have enough time, as the
    Secretary said, to be able to move them to the silos. If all
    hell breaks loose, if we are going to have everything happen,
    you could still, hopefully, have the opportunity to upload
    more? No?
        General Wilson. We do not plan to upload our silos. We are
    going to use them once, if we ever use them.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, ma'am. We keep our weapons in a
    position where we would be able to upload and we routinely test
    to assure ourselves that the performance of the system in an
    uploaded position is measurable.
        Senator Udall. I want to thank the panel. I want to thank
    all the Senators who participated.
        We will keep the record open for 3 days, through the end of
    the week.
        I certainly had a number of questions. General Harencak, I
    did not get to the question I had for you, and five or six
    other questions, and for the rest of the panel, I had some as
    well. I didn't get them all answered this morning, so I might
    submit them for the record. Thank you for being here today.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                             global strike command
        1. Senator Vitter. General Wilson, the U.S. National Intelligence
    Council report from December 2012 notes that in addition to ``Russia
    pursuing new concepts and capabilities for nuclear weapons . . . other
    nuclear powers, such as Pakistan and potential aspirants Iran and North
    Korea, desire nuclear weapons as compensation for other security
    weaknesses.'' Do you believe these are of concern and add to the value
    of Global Strike Command and are they examples of why this command
    should be expanded and strengthened despite the pressures to downsize
    the Department of Defense (DOD)?
        General Wilson. Absolutely, these developments are a concern. They
    certainly reinforce the importance of having and maintaining a robust
    and credible nuclear deterrent led by a command with a primary focus on
    stewardship of these capabilities. I believe our post-New Strategic
    Arms Reduction Treaty (START) force structure is sufficient to deter
    our adversaries while assuring our allies. Air Force Global Strike
    Command (AFGSC), and the entire DOD, face a significant challenge as we
    balance national priorities and fiscal realities. We continue to look
    through the strategic lens and balance risk as we systematically
    prioritize threats. Although we account for less than 1 percent of the
    DOD budget, AFGSC nuclear forces represent two-thirds of the Nation's
    nuclear triad and provide the ultimate guarantee of national
    sovereignty. Furthermore, our forces continue to provide overwhelming
    conventional power to joint commanders around the world. As a core
    element of our national defense, we must continue to fully resource our
    strategic capabilities.

                              weapons storage area
        2. Senator Vitter. Major General Harencak and General Wilson, in
    February 2011, then Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton A.
    Schwartz, USAF, told Congress that the Air Force could not afford to
    recertify a second weapons storage area (WSA) to house the Nation's
    air-launched cruise missiles despite a September 2008 Nuclear Weapons
    Management concluding that ``the closure of the WSA at one of the
    bomber bases was a significant mistake with a negative operational
    impact,'' and that the closure left our B-52 bomber force vulnerable to
    attack. Last year, this committee added language encouraging the
    Secretary of the Air Force to reexamine plans, including requirements
    and costs, for reconstituting a second nuclear WSA for nuclear-armed
    air-launched cruise missiles. This direction noted the potential to
    consolidate the old WSA's existing security perimeter and the
    installation of modern detection and denial systems which could reduce
    security personnel requirements and result in significant cost savings
    from original estimates. What is your opinion regarding the amount of
    risk the Nation is assuming by only having one WSA for the entire
    inventory of these weapons?
        General Harencak. Air Force WSAs currently meet U.S. Strategic
    Command operational requirements and provide for the safe, secure, and
    effective storage of our nuclear weapons. As part of a comprehensive
    WSA recapitalization initiative, AFGSC and the Air Force Nuclear
    Weapons Center (AFNWC) are currently assessing infrastructure
    conditions at all five operational AFGSC bases--F.E. Warren Air Force
    Base (AFB), Minot AFB, Malmstrom AFB, Whiteman AFB, and Barksdale AFB--
    in order to develop an investment strategy.
        Prior to the finalization of the WSA investment strategy, the Air
    Force must validate requirements and assess the costs of sustaining
    existing facilities relative to the costs of new construction. Our goal
    is to have a finalized and approved implementation plan that could
    support projects beginning in fiscal year 2016. In February 2014, the
    Air Force provided a report to the defense committees on this matter
    pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal
    Year 2014.
        General Wilson. The air launch cruise missile capability is a
    critically important piece of the Nation's nuclear triad, and certainly
    having one of anything presents risks. A single location simplifies
    enemy action and adds mission vulnerability during inclement weather,
    natural disaster, major accident, and periodic maintenance scenarios.
    All of our WSAs are aged, the oldest being 52 years with the average
    just over 38 years. We have an investment plan to recapitalize our WSAs
    at our bomber and missile wings over a 15+ year period, and we are
    working to bring that forward in the fiscal year 2016 program.

        3. Senator Vitter. General Wilson, have you examined new technology
    when it comes to a WSA recertification and ways to harness such
    technology to reduce the number of security personnel, which I am to
    believe is the largest incurred cost to operate a WSA?
        General Wilson. The command has been deeply involved in the
    planning of the new WSAs. The new WSAs are being designed to maximize
    security capabilities and take advantage of key technologies. In
    coordination with our partners, we will ensure the facility is in
    compliance with all DOD nuclear security standards, and is manned with
    the right-sized security force.

                                 doe partnering
        4. Senator Vitter. General Harencak, regarding the Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR), there are a number of references to the United
    States maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force. The QDR
    also states that DOD will collaborate with the Department of Energy
    (DOE) when it comes to nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure.
    DOE brings a tremendous amount of capability to the table when it comes
    to the design of our nuclear infrastructure. Has the Air Force ever
    collaborated with DOE on the design of a modern, more cost-effective
    WSA, using technology to reduce the security personnel requirement?
        General Wilson. The Air Force continues to benefit from its multi-
    decade strong partnership with DOE on nuclear weapons-related programs.
    Recently, we have relied on DOE's technical expertise to support the
    design of modern, more cost-effective WSAs. Additionally, we are
    leveraging best-practices and lessons-learned from other mission
    partners--the U.S. Navy for instance--in order to optimize the
    investments we have planned in our nuclear WSAs.
        Personnel and technology are but two elements of a multi-
    dimensional security construct the Air Force relies on to protect
    nuclear weapons. While future WSA designs will incorporate advanced
    technology, technology itself does not necessarily reduce the
    requirement for security forces. The Air Force remains open to
    exploring innovative, cost-effective solutions that enhance the safety,
    security, and reliability of our WSAs.

        5. Senator Vitter. General Harencak, could DOE help you solve the
    recertification issue for a second WSA?
        General Harencak. The Air Force and DOE work together frequently on
    solutions within the Nuclear Enterprise, however, the AFNWC is
    responsible for the design and certification of Air Force nuclear WSAs.
    DOE does not conduct facility certifications. The AFNWC oversees all
    Air Force nuclear facility certifications in accordance with DOE and
    DOD guidelines, and works closely with DOE to support facility projects
    and certifications.
        The question of certifying a second WSA for air launched cruise
    missiles is under consideration as part of a broader Air Force WSA
    investment initiative. In February 2014, the Air Force provided a
    report to the defense committees on this matter pursuant to the NDAA
    for Fiscal Year 2014.

                                 threats abroad
        6. Senator Vitter. Ms. Bunn, the recently released QDR states,
    ``our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate protection against a nuclear
    attack on the United States and through extended deterrence, it also
    serves to reassure our distant allies of their security against
    regional aggression'' and that in a new round of negotiations with
    Russia, ``the United States would be prepared to reduce ceilings on
    deployed strategic warheads by as much as one-third below New START
    levels.'' Today, Russian troops are on the march in Crimea, with no
    clear idea of their ultimate intentions. Ukraine and our NATO allies
    are dealing with Russian regional aggression today. Considering these
    threats to our allies and Russia's clear advantage in tactical nuclear
    weapons, is this an appropriate time to negotiate a further,
    significant reduction in our nuclear inventory?
        Ms. Bunn. The QDR, reiterating the findings of the Nuclear Posture
    Review follow-on analysis, and the President's nuclear employment
    guidance from June 2013, reflect the administration's determination
    that we can ensure the security of the United States and its allies and
    partners, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while
    reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third.
    Administration officials have since been clear that any future
    reductions would not be unilateral, but part of further negotiated cuts
    with Russia. We will not enter into any agreement with Russia that is
    not in the national security interests of the United States. However,
    Russia, by its words and deeds, has demonstrated no interest in
    negotiating further reductions.

        7. Senator Vitter. Ms. Bunn, in your opinion, is Russia the type of
    partner we can trust to work with?
        Ms. Bunn. In light of recent events in Crimea, the administration
    continues to review its policy toward the Russian Federation. However,
    we continue to work with Russia under the framework of a number of
    agreements that remain in force, some bilateral and some multilateral.
    We honor our commitments under these agreements, and we expect Russia
    to hold to its obligations as well.

        8. Senator Vitter. Ms. Bunn, the QDR followed up on a June 19,
    2013, speech by President Obama, stating that in further negotiations
    with Russia, ``the United States would be prepared to reduce ceilings
    on deployed strategic warheads by as much as one-third below New START
    levels.'' Given recent issues with Russia, do you believe this is a
    wise decision?
        Ms. Bunn. In the course of developing the current nuclear
    employment guidance, the administration determined that we can ensure
    the security of the United States and its allies and partners, and
    maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our
    deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third. The foundation
    of this posture is protecting the national security interests of the
    United States. Regarding further reductions, administration officials
    have since been clear that such reductions would not be unilateral, but
    be made after further negotiated cuts with Russia. However, Russia has
    so far shown no interest in negotiating further reductions, nor is the
    current climate conducive to such negotiations.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2015 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 2014

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                            MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:07 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mark Udall
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Udall, Donnelly, King,
    and Sessions.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK UDALL, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Udall. Let me bring today's hearing of the
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee to order.
        I want to thank our witnesses for your patience. I know
    Senator Sessions will be here shortly. I would like to deliver
    my opening statement, and then when Senator Sessions arrives, I
    know he will have some remarks as well.
        This afternoon, we will receive testimony regarding the
    Department of Defense (DOD) military space programs for fiscal
    year 2015.
        As I said, I want to thank all of you for taking your
    valuable time to be here today.
        On February 11, Director of National Intelligence (DNI),
    James R. Clapper, testified to the full committee that
    ``threats to U.S. space services will increase during 2014 and
    beyond, as potential adversaries pursue disruptive and
    destructive counter-space capabilities. Chinese and Russian
    military leaders understand the unique information advantages
    afforded by space systems and are developing capabilities to
    disrupt the United States' use of space in a conflict.''
        I do not have to tell the witnesses that Director Clapper's
    statement illustrates how our policy is just now beginning to
    catch up with the threat and that our operational plans are
    just now starting to synchronize with the policy and material
    requirements flowing from the operational plans. Given these
    rapidly changing threats to our space-based assets and the need
    to examine these issues at the ground floor, this hearing is
    timely.
        General Shelton, good to see you again. I want to just say
    your command, as I know you know, is squarely in the middle of
    this vortex of events. I hope to hear more from you in this
    unclassified forum regarding what we are doing to protect space
    assets from these threats, not only now, but over the next 15
    years. I know that we are discussing plans to move away from
    larger satellites and toward smaller hosted payloads. But it is
    my understanding that we know little about the cost and benefit
    in comparison to existing satellites where we have perfected
    the engineering and are now at a point where we can procure
    them at a fixed price, allowing for incremental improvements.
        General Mann, congratulations on becoming the commanding
    officer of the Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC). Your
    operations are located both in Colorado and Alabama which, of
    course, makes your command all the more relevant to Senator
    Sessions and myself. I understand your command is in charge of
    Kwajalein Atoll, which is one of the most important ground
    assets we have, not only for space tracking, but for missile
    testing. I am interested in hearing more about your long-term
    plans for Kwajalein and how your command supports U.S.
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM) for space situational awareness.
    Unlike military sites in my State of Colorado, Kwajalein Atoll
    does not have an elected Member of Congress to advocate for
    them and their needs. I hope to make this subcommittee their
    advocate.
        Mr. Loverro, you were with us last year. Welcome back. It
    is your job to develop the necessary policies to support DOD's
    space operations. I hope to hear how these policies are
    changing in light of the threat we face, combined with the
    fiscal constraints we are under for the foreseeable future. I
    would also like to know how you are working with STRATCOM to
    turn those policies into effective operational plans.
        Dr. Zangardi, you are a veteran in appearing before this
    subcommittee. Welcome back. The Navy is fielding the Mobile
    User Objective Satellite (MUOS) system which will allow cell
    phone-like satellite service worldwide to DOD personnel. It is
    my understanding that the Navy recently had a setback with
    satellite number 3 and has had to switch it with another
    satellite. I would like to know the status of the system and
    how the Navy is developing its ground system to support the
    MUOS constellation.
        Finally, we saved the best for last, Ms. Chaplain. You are
    our Government Accountability Office (GAO) expert on DOD space
    systems. Your reports are the bedrock for helping our
    subcommittee perform its oversight duties. I would like to hear
    about your recent findings on new entrants to the DOD launch
    market and your recent work on the Family of Advanced Beyond-
    Line-of-Sight Terminals, including its cost overruns, and
    restructuring the acquisition program to only support command
    post terminals.
        I would also like to note I have some real concerns that
    the Air Force has decided to spend hundreds of millions of
    dollars over the Future Years Defense Program on developing an
    all-new helicopter at the same time they are accepting higher
    costs and increased risks for overhead architecture. They could
    save a huge amount of money by purchasing existing aircraft and
    investing the savings in improved space situational awareness
    (SSA) and smarter acquisition practices that would bring down
    the cost per copy of essential satellite programs like Global
    Positioning Satellite (GPS)-3.
        Now, my remarks here say I am going to turn to Senator
    Sessions for his opening statement and then move to the
    witnesses, but I think we could start without Senator Sessions,
    and when he arrives, we will make some time for him.
        I would like to end the hearing, if at all possible, at
    4:30 p.m. We will shoot for that. We have five witnesses. I
    think we could make that a possibility.
        Senator Sessions is arriving, so let me just finish saying
    I think I am going to ask my colleagues if 7-minute rounds are
    acceptable. If Senator Sessions would like to make an opening
    statement, I would like to recognize him now.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. Thank you. We thank all of you for being
    here and look forward to working with you as part of this
    subcommittee. We have a lot of important issues before us, and
    we depend on you and your integrity and good judgment to help
    us make the right decisions.
        General Mann, it is good to see you. We are proud of your
    new command, and good luck.
        General Shelton, this will be your last hearing, maybe? We
    appreciate your service too and all you have done.
        We are looking at the budgets for DOD. I believe that
    Secretary Hagel will be forced to make some tough decisions. I
    think all of the things that he has listed in his reductions
    will not occur. I do not think, under the Budget Control Act,
    they will have to be cut that much, which is good news. But we
    need to determine pretty soon what will end up having to be
    reduced and how we will handle that. As the ranking member on
    the Senate Budget Committee, Mr. Chairman, it is just a very
    tough time for us, but I believe if we are smart, we will be
    able to work through this without having these programs that we
    have invested so much in for so long be damaged.
        Thank you all.
        I will submit my full statement for the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Sessions follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Senator Jeff Sessions
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
    distinguished panel of witnesses. I would like to extend a special
    welcome to Lieutenant General David Mann, the Commander of the Army
    Space and Missile Defense Command in Huntsville. This is General Mann's
    first hearing before this subcommittee and I look forward to working
    with him on the many important issues facing Army Space and Missile
    Defense Command. This will also likely be General Shelton's last
    hearing before this subcommittee and I would like to congratulate him
    on his distinguished career and thank him for his service. We have many
    witnesses, so in the interest of time, I will keep my opening remarks
    brief.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to discuss the fiscal year 2015
    military space budget. The impacts of sequestration on the defense
    budget are far reaching, yet the President's budget makes no serious
    attempt at addressing the debt-related issues that got us here in the
    first place. This budget demonstrates a failure in presidential
    leadership that undermines our national security. In the case of
    today's hearing, this lack of presidential leadership jeopardizes the
    strategic advantages we have enjoyed in space for much of the last 6
    decades. Our hearing today is an opportunity to hear from our witnesses
    how they plan to limit that risk.
        The acquisition of critical space capabilities has become a zero-
    sum-game where program delays and cost overruns will lead to
    cancellations. No longer can we tolerate the multi-billion dollar cost
    overruns of the past 2 decades. No longer can we afford program risk,
    which this budget clearly demonstrates through its lack of new on-orbit
    capabilities and limited research and development efforts. Adversaries
    like China and Russia are rapidly positioning themselves to overtake
    American dominance in the space domain and I am concerned what falling
    behind could mean for our national security.
        Over the last year considerable advances in space denial
    capabilities have been demonstrated by China. According to an
    unclassified November 2013 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
    Commission report, recent Chinese attempts to disguise what data
    suggests to be a new high-altitude anti-satellite capability is a cause
    for serious concern. I am troubled by these developments and look
    forward to understanding your strategy for countering and deterring
    China's offensive space efforts. I also look forward to better
    understanding whether such developments are leading the administration
    to rethink its own counter space strategy, which I have criticized in
    the past as being deficient. Increased Space Situational Awareness and
    unproven and potentially costly new distributed architectures alone
    will not provide the level of deterrence necessary to reverse these
    troubling trends.
        In closing, I would like to congratulate the Air Force for the
    significant cost savings it was able to achieve for the Evolved
    Expendable Launch Vehicle program. It is quite rare these days to see
    good acquisition news and I was pleasantly surprised to learn that the
    Air Force has achieved some $4.4 billion in total program savings since
    the fiscal year 2012 budget. I urge the Air Force to continue to take
    all steps necessary to continue to reduce costs in both launch and
    space vehicle acquisitions and to reinvest those savings in the
    development of our future space capabilities.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing and look forward
    to working with you to address the many challenges we are going to face
    this budget cycle.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        I want to start with Mr. Loverro and work across the panel.
    I think if you all could keep your remarks from 3 to 5 minutes,
    any additional comments you have, of course, we can include in
    the record. That will give us time for a robust round of
    questions and interaction with the members of the subcommittee.
    Mr. Loverro?

    STATEMENT OF MR. DOUGLAS L. LOVERRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
                      OF DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY

        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, members of the
    subcommittee, I am pleased to join General Shelton, Lieutenant
    General Mann, Dr. Zangardi, and Ms. Chaplain to testify on DOD
    space programs and policies. I first testified in front of
    Congress on these topics about 1 year ago and I welcome the
    opportunity to continue that discussion today.
        As I stated last year, space remains and will continue to
    remain vital to our national security. It underpins DOD
    capabilities worldwide at every level of engagement, from
    humanitarian assistance to the highest levels of combat. It
    enables U.S. operations to be executed with precision on a
    global basis with reduced resources, fewer deployed troops,
    lower casualties, and decreased collateral damage. Space
    empowers both our forces and those of our allies to win faster
    and to bring more of our warfighters home safely. It is a key
    to U.S. power projection, providing a strong deterrent to our
    potential adversaries and a source of confidence to our allies.
        But the evolving strategic environment increasingly
    challenges U.S. space advantages. Space is no longer the sole
    province of world powers. It is a frontier that is now open to
    all. In the last several decades, space has become more
    competitive, congested, and contested. Those terms, the so-
    called three Cs, have been used extensively, and I believe it
    serves us well to put them in perspective.
        On the first C, as an American, I welcome the competitive
    aspect of today's space environment. I am highly confident that
    with the right policies, the United States is well-positioned
    to remain ahead in that environment. The changes you authorized
    2 years ago on export control reform and the changes the
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and DOD
    have embraced on commercial launch are just two of the many
    right steps we are taking. I am not worried about the
    competitive nature of space.
        On the second C, congestion, I am not quite so welcoming,
    but I am optimistic. Congestion and debris in space is a real
    issue and it threatens to put our use of space at risk. But the
    policies and programs of the United States, programs like the
    Air Force's Space Fence, are aimed at reducing that risk.
    Likewise, the work we and the Department of State are doing
    internationally and at the United Nations to set rules of the
    road for outer space, as well as the SSA sharing work that
    STRATCOM is leading, are aimed at bringing a similar focus on
    this issue to the community of space-faring nations. I am
    somewhat confident that we are on the right course to deal with
    congestion.
        But what worries me the most is the last C, the contested
    nature of space, which we now face. Over the last 15 years,
    other nations have watched us closely and have recognized that
    if they are to challenge the United States, they must challenge
    us in space, and they are endeavoring to do so. The United
    States has successfully addressed such challenges before in
    air, sea, and land domains, and now we must likewise respond in
    space. We do so against a backdrop of a decreasing budget that
    challenges both the ability and the speed with which we can
    act, but in no way diminishes the importance of successfully
    sustaining the crucial advantages that space provides.
        Our strategic approach for these issues remains consistent
    with what we outlined in the 2011 National Security Space
    Strategy and reaffirmed in DOD Space Policy in 2012. In the
    written testimony I have submitted to the subcommittee, I have
    outlined the five key elements of this strategic approach:
    promoting the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space;
    enhancing the resilience of DOD space architectures; partnering
    with like-minded international organizations and commercial
    firms; deterring aggression; and defeating attacks and
    preparing to operate in a degraded environment. My testimony
    also describes specific steps we are taking to implement our
    approach in each of these areas.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Loverro follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Mr. Douglas L. Loverro
                                  introduction
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee, I am pleased to join General Shelton, Lieutenant General
    Mann, Dr. Zangardi, and Ms. Chaplain to testify on Department of
    Defense (DOD) space programs and policies. I first testified in front
    of Congress on these topics 1 year ago, and I welcome the opportunity
    to continue that discussion today.
        As I stated last year, space remains vital to our national
    security. It underpins DOD capabilities worldwide at every level of
    engagement, from humanitarian assistance to the highest levels of
    combat. It enables U.S. operations to be executed with precision on a
    global basis with reduced resources, fewer deployed troops, lower
    casualties, and decreased collateral damage. Space empowers both our
    forces, and those of our allies, to win faster and to bring more of our
    warfighters home safely. It is a key to U.S. power projection,
    providing a strong deterrent to our potential adversaries and a source
    of confidence to our friends.
        But the evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S.
    space advantages. Space is no longer the sole province of world
    powers--it is a frontier that is now open to all. In the last several
    decades, space has become more competitive, congested, and contested. I
    am confident that with the right policies, the United States is well-
    positioned to remain ahead in the competitive environment. I am equally
    confident that we are on course to deal with congestion. But what
    worries me the most is the contested environment we now face. Over the
    last 15 years, our adversaries have watched us closely and have
    recognized that if they are to challenge the United States, they must
    challenge us in space.
        The United States has successfully addressed such challenges before
    in air, sea, and land domains, and now we must likewise respond in
    space. We do so against the backdrop of a decreasing budget that
    challenges both the ability and speed with which we can act, but that
    in no way diminishes the importance of successfully sustaining our
    crucial advantages in space.
        Our strategic approach remains consistent with what we outlined in
    the 2011 National Security Space Strategy and reaffirmed in DOD
    Directive 3100.10, the DOD Space Policy, released in late 2012. In my
    testimony today, I will outline the five key elements of this strategic
    approach and describe specific steps we are taking to implement our
    approach.
           promoting the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space
        As still the world's leading space power, the United States is
    uniquely positioned to define and promote the responsible, peaceful,
    and safe use of space. We need to do this to ensure that we can
    continue to reap the military benefits that space provides and, more
    importantly, the civil, scientific, and economic opportunities it
    presents. Space is woven into the fabric of modern economies and the
    United States, beyond all others, has led the way in using that to our
    national advantage. We are taking steps to make sure that access to and
    use of space is not threatened by irresponsible actions. DOD is working
    closely with the Department of State to establish an International Code
    of Conduct and other ``rules of the road'' for the safe and sustainable
    use of space. Those rules include common sense standards for debris
    limitation, launch notification, on-orbit monitoring, and collision
    avoidance. The United States already follows these practices and, by
    encouraging their adoption by others, could help ensure that space
    remains sustainable for the future.
        I know there are some who question the wisdom of these multilateral
    activities. They are worried that in establishing international norms
    of behavior we would limit our response options. Let me assure you, we
    do not intend to allow that to happen. We have worked side-by-side with
    the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Military Services, Defense
    agencies, and Intelligence Community to make sure that any agreement we
    develop enhances security and does not threaten current or future U.S.
    capabilities.
        I am not so naiive as to believe that a simple set of rules will
    solve all of the major issues we face--they will not; nor would I
    expect that they will inhibit those who would try to threaten our use
    of space. But common sense rules that can be embraced by a majority of
    space-faring nations will help stem the rise of uncontrollable debris,
    add demonstratively to spaceflight safety, and clearly differentiate
    those who use space responsibly from those who do not.
        Our efforts here go beyond mere words--they are backed by actions.
    As I have discussed before, a key aspect of improving spaceflight
    safety, and assuring we can monitor the space environment more closely,
    is our space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities. We have been
    working on this for some time, and I am happy to report that we have
    made some real progress over the last year. That progress comes in two
    forms--new sensors and information sharing agreements.
        On the sensor front, we have remained on a constant path for the
    last several years to reposition sensors where they can do the most
    good and to invest in new sensors where needed. Last year we reported
    that we had entered into an agreement with Australia to relocate and
    repurpose a launch tracking radar, the C-Band radar, from Antigua to
    western Australia to aid in our ability to monitor activities at low
    altitude in the southern hemisphere. That work is now underway. We
    complemented that effort with a second agreement signed with Australia
    this past November to relocate the Defense Advanced Research Projects
    Agency-developed Space Surveillance Telescope to western Australia to
    give us an unmatched ability to track deep space objects in that
    critical region of the world. Additionally, after years of focused
    effort, and a sequestration-imposed 6-month delay, we will soon award
    the contract for the first Space Fence site. The Space Fence will
    provide an unprecedented ability to track an order-of-magnitude greater
    number of objects in low earth orbit, supporting long-term spaceflight
    safety.
        The Department has also made great strides in more transparently
    sharing SSA information with other space operators. Over the past year,
    U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has continued to pursue SSA sharing
    agreements with commercial companies and foreign governments,
    consistent with existing legislative authority. This year, STRATCOM
    signed 5 agreements with other governments--Australia, Japan, Italy,
    Canada, and France--and increased to 41 our agreements with commercial
    satellite operators. Many more agreements are in varying stages of
    negotiation. We are committed to providing SSA services to enhance
    spaceflight safety for all.
        While the purpose of these agreements is to allow us to share more
    advanced space flight safety products with other space-faring nations,
    they really serve to lay the groundwork for the next stage of effort--
    two-way data sharing. The space environment is too big and too complex
    for a single nation to bear the entire cost of monitoring it. Cost-
    effective SSA requires cooperation among space actors. The increasingly
    congested space environment means that an unparalleled level of
    information sharing is needed to promote safe and responsible
    operations in space and to reduce the likelihood of mishaps,
    misperceptions, and mistrust. We are currently engaged in detailed
    technical discussions with several nations that have space situational
    awareness capabilities to explore opportunities for two-way information
    exchange. This type of sharing will increase SSA information available
    to the United States while limiting unnecessary duplication of SSA
    capabilities. In short, we save money and improve safety for us and our
    allies.
                        improving dod space capabilities
        Improved SSA is but one facet of the next pillar of our strategy--
    improving our own space capabilities. This element boils down to a
    single refrain--make DOD space systems and architectures more
    resilient. Yes, we need to continue to improve how space systems
    operate, the services they provide, and the capabilities they create;
    yes, we need to make space systems less expensive; but above all
    others, we have to focus on making those capabilities more resilient.
    The most capable and cost-effective space capability in the world is of
    little use if it is not there when the warfighter needs it. If we are
    to overcome the challenges posed by others, resilience is job one.
        We have been talking about resilience for some time, but often I am
    unsure if we have clearly defined what we mean. In fact, I am sure we
    have confused several audiences. Before I describe specific investments
    in resilient space architectures, allow me to explain the concept.
        Resilience, in fact, is not an end in and of itself; rather we seek
    to assure the mission benefit that our capabilities provide--
    omnipresent positioning from the Global Positioning System (GPS),
    global surveillance from overhead intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (ISR), and worldwide information availability from
    Satellite Communications (SATCOM). As we see it, that assurance can be
    achieved through a combination of: (1) strengthened or resilient space
    architectures; (2) the ability to replenish lost or degraded
    capabilities; and (3) defensive operations to provide warning of and
    interruption to an adversary's attack. Making architectures more
    resilient is a combination of adequate protection, increased
    proliferation, service diversity, appropriate distribution, well-
    reasoned disaggregation, and operational ambiguity--all to create a
    service that can stand up to an adversary's attack. These are the same
    force structure ideas we use in every other field of warfighting to
    help our systems survive in a hostile environment.
        With these concepts in hand, we have begun to consider resilience
    in a variety of architectural and programmatic discussions. For the
    first time ever, for example, our protected SATCOM analysis of
    alternatives is focusing on resilience. The same will be true when we
    look at overhead persistent infrared monitoring later this year. From
    an investment standpoint, we have identified extremely cost-effective
    enhancements in automated anti-jamming for our Wideband Global SATCOM
    system (WGS) to increase protection in a jammed environment. We are
    committed to assuring that GPS can face the rigors of a hostile
    battlefield environment by continuing our investment in our military
    (or ``M-code'') user equipment program. The Department continues to use
    Space Modernization Initiative (SMI) investments to improve
    affordability and capability of our current Space Based Infrared System
    and Advanced Extremely-High Frequency architectures. SMI funds are also
    being used to invest in evolutionary follow-ons to those architectures
    that disaggregate strategic and tactical elements and look at ways to
    distribute and proliferate the resulting pieces. Every aspect of these
    decisions is driven by our focus on improving space system resilience.
     partnering with like-minded nations, international organizations, and
                                commercial firms
        Resilience, however, will not be achieved through U.S. investment
    alone. The reality of the budget is such that we cannot just hope to
    ``buy our way out'' of these challenges. They are too complex, and they
    are too long term. Instead we have taken a more expansive approach:
    joining with other like-minded space-faring nations and commercial
    partners to create a coalition approach to space, just as we have done
    in other warfighting domains.
        Space is no longer limited to just a few nations. It is a major
    force structure component for each of our allies, and that is force
    structure we can all share. Whether we are talking about the dozens of
    radar and electro-optical imaging satellites that the United States and
    our allies already have on orbit, the rapidly multiplying navigation
    constellations whose satellites will soon number over 100, or the ever-
    growing array of weather and SATCOM capabilities at the world's
    disposal, we have begun to recognize that the United States neither
    can, nor does it need to, go it alone in space. This is a fundamental
    shift in how we approach this problem. Just as in other fields of
    combat where we combine with allied land, sea, and air forces, so too
    can we combine our space forces with equally effective results and for
    very little increased investment.
        For example, by 2020 we anticipate that at least six nations or
    regional intergovernmental organizations will have fielded independent
    space navigation systems--our GPS network, the European Union's
    Galileo, Japan's Quasi Zenith Satellite System, the Indian Regional
    Navigation Space System, China's Compass system, and Russia's Global
    Navigation Satellite System. Those constellations will include nearly
    140 satellites, with a dizzying number of new signals and services.
    While it may be possible for an adversary to deny GPS signals through
    jamming, physical antisatellite attacks, or a cyber-attack on a ground
    control network, it is much more difficult to eliminate multiple
    services at the same time. Assuring U.S. warfighters have access to the
    bulk of these systems is a very powerful way to make sure no warfighter
    will ever have to face battle without the incredible benefit of space-
    enabled positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). To that end, we have
    begun negotiations with like-minded PNT owner/operators to ensure the
    United States has that access. We must likewise ensure our equipment is
    capable of receiving these different signals--just as is already
    happening in commercial applications.
        The same is true for other space services and is already bearing
    fruit in our plan for future space weather capabilities. We closely
    examined what we could get from others--international partners, U.S.
    civil agencies, the commercial sector, and even non-space services--and
    we defined a new, minimal, DOD owned- and operated-system that is an
    order-of-magnitude less expensive than the previously planned system it
    replaces. Together this ``system of systems'' meets U.S. warfighting
    needs in a way that stymies an adversary's ability to threaten the
    resulting whole. A combination of diversity, distribution,
    disaggregation, and proliferation can increase resilience while
    reducing needed investment.
        This approach is particularly well-suited to areas in which the
    commercial world plays a major role, such as remote sensing. In this
    area, we are aligning several of our policy elements to take advantage
    of and hasten the diversity- and proliferation-driven resilience I have
    been discussing. Building on over a decade of experience with
    traditional commercial providers, we are reexamining commercial remote
    sensing licensing policy, while leveraging new authorities to relax
    export controls for systems that are widely available commercially. Our
    aim is to posture U.S. industry--both traditional commercial providers
    and entrepreneurial start-ups--to compete successfully in a burgeoning
    global marketplace.
                              deterring aggression
        The fourth strategic element is to prevent and deter aggression
    against our space systems. In fact, all of the policy elements I have
    covered thus far--promoting responsible use, improving our own
    capabilities, and partnering with allies and commercial space
    providers--are also aimed squarely at this fourth strategy element.
    Those efforts are complemented by a focus on SSA to provide timely and
    accurate indications and warning prior to an attack and attribution
    during and after an attack, with a focus on command and control systems
    that support our ability to respond appropriately.
        Let me discuss two efforts aimed at those objectives. First is our
    Joint Space Operations Center Mission Systems. That program delivered
    its first operational increment early last year, and we are on track to
    complete increment two in fiscal year 2017. That will be followed by
    additional increments that support characterizing attacks and
    coordinating operational responses.
        The second is the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness
    Program recently announced by General Shelton. This previously
    classified program will deliver two satellites later this year for
    launch into near geosynchronous orbit (GEO). From that unique vantage
    point they will survey objects in the GEO belt and allow us both to
    track known objects and debris and to monitor potential threats that
    may be aimed at this critically important region. In short, threats can
    no longer hide in deep space. Our decision to declassify this program
    was simple. We need to monitor what happens 22,000 miles above the
    Earth, and we want to make sure that everyone knows we can do so. We
    believe that such efforts add immeasurably to both the safety of space
    flight and the stability that derives from the ability to attribute
    actions--to the benefit of all space-faring nations and all who rely on
    space-based services.
        Taken together, all of these elements combine to enhance stability
    and deterrence--seeking to reduce the likelihood of attack, to provide
    the necessary indications and warning to take evasive actions prior to
    an attack, to deny benefits to the adversary if such attacks are
    undertaken, to attribute the source of the attack, and to make it
    impractical for an adversary to isolate the United States from the
    community of space-faring nations that will be affected.
      defeating attacks and preparing to operate in a degraded environment
        Even with all these efforts in place, however, attacks may occur.
    Our last strategic element is to assure we can defeat attacks and
    prepare to withstand them should they occur. Much of our effort in this
    area is coordinated through our Space Security Defense Program (SSDP).
    SSDP was established last year as an outgrowth of the Space Protection
    Program initiated in 2008 by Air Force Space Command and the National
    Reconnaissance Office. SSDP is developing methods to protect and defend
    our space systems by finding ways to counter the ever growing list of
    threats they will face.
        Several of the initiatives I have already mentioned today, such as
    the WGS automatic anti-jamming capability, are derived from work of
    SSDP. We have requested increased funding for SSDP this year to allow
    them to examine non-material solutions, such as changes to tactics and
    procedures, that can be implemented today. While our long-term intent
    is to move to more resilient and more defendable space architectures,
    we have over a decade before those systems will even begin to deploy,
    and we need to protect ourselves and our on-orbit systems now.
                                 other matters
        Let me conclude by moving from our overall strategy to address
    specific matters in which I know there is continuing interest. First,
    last year your colleagues in the House Armed Services Committee
    challenged me to explain why the United States was leasing
    communication links from a Chinese provider to support U.S. Africa
    Command (AFRICOM). I agreed that while the initial lease was driven by
    operational need, it was not an appropriate long-term solution. I
    pledged that we would address the issue as quickly as possible. I am
    happy to report that we have. Working with us, AFRICOM has made
    significant progress over the last year in moving DOD SATCOM leases
    from the Chinese Apstar system to other commercial satellite providers
    in the region. We have already transitioned over 75 percent of the
    Apstar bandwidth to other satellites, and our intent is to be
    completely transitioned by May of this year.
        Second, we are developing a better strategy for making long-term
    commitments to commercial SATCOM providers to reduce cost, increase
    capability, and add resilience. Later this year, Air Force Space
    Command will purchase a commercial transponder, one that is already in
    space, for use by AFRICOM. This is not a lease--instead it is
    government ownership of an on-orbit asset that will be managed and
    operated by the commercial provider at a small fraction of the cost
    that it would take to lease this capability on an annual basis. Not
    only will this transponder help to accelerate the move off of Apstar,
    it will provide needed experience with this new method of acquiring
    commercial SATCOM, potentially ushering in a revolutionary way to do so
    worldwide.
        Third, we recently welcomed the President's new National Space
    Transportation Policy, released November 21, 2013. This policy will
    help ensure the United States stays on the cutting edge by maintaining
    space transportation capabilities that are innovative, reliable,
    efficient, competitive, and perhaps most importantly, affordable. This
    policy supports DOD's ongoing efforts to provide stability to the
    industrial base that currently provides launch vehicles to the national
    security community by mandating that all programmatic decisions are
    made in a manner that considers the health of the U.S. space
    transportation industrial base. The policy also calls for a level
    playing field for competition that can spur innovation, improve
    capabilities, and reduce costs, without increasing risk. The
    President's budget request already bears evidence that this strategy is
    working: the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle request has been reduced
    significantly. Those benefits will become even greater in the future as
    we fully qualify new entrant launch providers, an effort that is
    already well underway.
        Fourth, we continue to make progress in building coalition space
    operations. Led by STRATCOM, the Department is working with close
    allies on cooperation, not only in the systems we fly, but in the
    operations we perform. This initiative paves the way for far closer
    operational collaboration with allies than we have ever had, with the
    aim of eventually broadening participation to include additional space-
    faring countries.
        Finally, just as the United States develops its space capabilities
    and leverages them to support military operations, so too do other
    countries. We are increasingly seeing rival nations begin to integrate
    space into their own operations in the same way as the United States
    and our allies have done for years. This is not unexpected. But it does
    mean that the benefits we ourselves derive from space will begin to be
    available to those that we may someday have to face in combat. We
    recognize that this is the reality of the future and we are beginning
    to prepare to face a more capable adversary. We appreciate the
    increased interest from Congress in this area and look forward to
    working with you over the coming years to assure our strategies and
    plans in this area are thoroughly deliberated.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to provide these
    updates on the Department's space policies and programs. My colleagues
    and I look forward to working closely with Congress, our interagency
    partners, our allies, and U.S. industry to continue implementing this
    new approach to space.

        Senator Udall. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Zangardi?

     STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN A. ZANGARDI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
     OF THE NAVY FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS,
            INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, AND SPACE

        Dr. Zangardi. Good afternoon. Chairman Udall, Ranking
    Member Sessions, Senator Donnelly, Senator King, thank you for
    the privilege today to speak before you and with this
    distinguished panel.
        I am happy to announce that the MUOS program continues to
    make positive strides in achieving overall program goals. On
    the heels of our first successful launch of Space Vehicle (SV)-
    1, in February 2012, SV-2 launched from Cape Canaveral, FL, on
    July 19, 2013. Its legacy payload--that is, the ultra-high
    frequency (UHF) payload--is available now for early operational
    use. Our three remaining satellites are on schedule to be
    launched in January 2015, August 2015, and sometime in 2016.
        The most significant challenge for the program over last
    year has been delays with satellite number 3. During last
    year's thermal vacuum testing, satellite 3's legacy payload
    experienced an uncommanded shutdown. The program office
    initiated a thorough investigation and identified the root
    cause as insufficient solder volume during the production of
    the output multiplexer (OMUX). The program office initiated
    corrective actions and has since determined that this
    deficiency is isolated to satellite 3 only. Satellites 4 and 5
    are not impacted. Since satellites 3 through 5 are under a
    fixed price incentive fee contract, the U.S. Government will
    not incur any additional expenses due to the delay.
        In order to minimize the schedule delay of approximately 6
    months, the Navy has decided to move satellite 4 up into the
    third launch slot in January 2015.
        The MUOS program continues to meet objectives for ground
    sites in Geraldton, Australia; Wahaiawa, HI; and Northwest, VA.
    These sites have completed hardware installation and final
    acceptance testing and have been officially handed over to
    Fleet Cyber Command. The fourth site at Niscemi, Sicily,
    recently cleared a major hurdle. I would like to thank the
    State Department for their efforts in working with the Italian
    Government to bring resolution to the installation of the three
    large antenna dishes.
        Terminal development continues as the Army lead on the
    Manpack radio is in the final phases of development to support
    the upcoming MUOS multiservice operational test and evaluation
    (MOT&E). Army fielding of the MUOS-capable Manpack radios is
    scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2015 and continue through
    fiscal year 2027.
        Additionally, the Navy is developing the MUOS capability
    for the Digital Modular Radio to support shipboard operations.
        While these two radios are our primary focus, several U.S.
    terminal vendors have contacted us to gain access to the MUOS
    testing laboratories. Three vendors have been scheduled to
    utilize the laboratories beginning in March and others will be
    scheduled in the near future as their terminals are ready for
    testing. These additional terminals are expected to greatly
    increase the number of MUOS terminals over the next several
    years.
        Over the past 18 months, the program has conducted numerous
    phases of testing and is in the final risk reduction testing
    before conducting the MOT&E later this year. MOT&E is the final
    test that will certify the system operational, testing the full
    end-to-end capability of the terminals, ground stations, and
    satellites utilizing real-world scenarios in order to achieve
    initial operational capability (IOC). The Navy is extremely
    proud of our MUOS program and we look forward to seeing the
    program become operational.
        Senators, I am standing by for your questions.

        [The prepared statement of Dr. Zangardi follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Dr. John A. Zangardi
                                  Introduction
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
    honored to appear before you today to address the Navy's space
    activities. Space capabilities underlie the Navy's ability to operate
    forward and meet increasing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) demands
    with a shifting focus towards the Pacific. The Navy continues to be
    highly dependent upon space-based systems for beyond line of sight
    communications; missile warning, intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance, and environmental remote sensing to provide battlespace
    awareness in support of joint warfighting and global maritime
    operations; and positioning, navigation and timing information for
    critical command and control, battlespace and global navigation, and
    information system timing. The Air-Sea Battle Concept, whereby joint
    air and naval forces retain freedom of action through tight
    coordination of operations in and across multiple domains, highlights
    the particular importance and criticality of the space domain. With the
    emergence and proliferation of anti-satellite and counter-space
    weapons, the United States can no longer assume that the space domain
    will remain uncontested. Our service must remain nimble and agile as we
    deal with these new space threats.
        In the face of rapidly emerging threats in space, the Navy must
    continue to pursue new investment strategies and widely diverse
    capabilities to provide resilient access to space and space services to
    ensure mission success. As adversaries become more proficient in their
    use of space capabilities, they will continue to develop both offensive
    and defensive space capabilities in an attempt to remove or reduce the
    asymmetric advantage the United States enjoys in the space domain. It
    is critical the Navy continue to leverage space capabilities while
    improving the resilience of future space architectures to meet
    information demands in an increasingly contested electromagnetic
    environment. The Navy must also identify alternative sources and
    capabilities and work with the other Services to develop and refine the
    necessary tactics, techniques, procedures, and operational plans to
    help preserve Navy fleet information dominance in degraded or denied
    areas.
        The Navy's Information Dominance strategy fully integrates the
    Navy's information functions, capabilities, and resources to optimize
    decisionmaking and maximize warfighting effects. Navy leaders
    increasingly rely on critical satellite communications (SATCOM) paths;
    positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) signals; environmental
    monitoring (EM) data; missile warning (MW); and intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) reporting to satisfy the three
    pillars of Information Dominance: assured command and control (C2),
    battlespace awareness, and integrated fires. Maintaining access to, and
    proficiency in, operations utilizing all of these space capabilities
    enables decisiveness, responsiveness, and agility--critical attributes
    for a forward-deployed force operating in an anti-access/area denial
    environment.
                      mobile user objective system (muos)
        The capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of our Navy and Joint
    forces across the board require improved access to reliable worldwide
    communications to successfully execute their missions. The Navy's MUOS,
    with its advanced technology wideband code division multiple access
    (WCDMA) payload, is the key enabler that will support worldwide multi-
    Service users in the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band for many years to
    come. MUOS will provide increased communications capabilities to
    smaller terminal users that require greater mobility, higher data
    rates, and improved operational availability. As today's legacy UHF
    satellite constellation continues to age, MUOS, with its legacy
    payload, provides the bridge to allow our forces time to transition to
    the newer and more capable WCDMA terminals.
        The MUOS program continues to make significant strides in achieving
    the overall program goals. In February 2012, the first satellite was
    launched and within 8 months its legacy payload was made operational in
    order to replace a failing UFO-5 satellite, providing seamless
    transition without any degradation in service. The second MUOS
    satellite launched from Cape Canaveral, FL on July 19, 2013, and its
    legacy payload is now available for early operational use in the event
    of an unexpected failure of an on-orbit legacy satellite. The remaining
    three satellites are under a fixed price incentive fee contract and
    will launch in January 2015, August 2015, and a date to be determined
    in 2016.
        Production of satellites #4 and #5 has gone very well, however
    there have been challenges with satellite #3. During last year's
    thermal vacuum testing, satellite #3's legacy payload experienced an
    uncommanded shutdown. The subsequent investigation using photographic
    inspection, contractor logs and technician interviews identified the
    root cause as insufficient solder volume during the production of the
    Output Multiplexer (OMUX). The program office has initiated corrective
    actions and through extensive investigation has determined that this
    deficiency is isolated to satellite #3 only. It does not affect any of
    the other satellites.
        In order to minimize impact on the launch schedule, the third
    satellite will be repaired and launched in a later launch slot, and the
    fourth production satellite is on track to take its place on the launch
    schedule in January 2015. That is a 6 month slip from the original
    schedule. Because of an effective contract structure, the government
    will not expend any additional funds to bring the third satellite up to
    standards. Additionally, thanks to flexible program management and the
    ability to launch satellite number four earlier than planned, the
    warfighters who depend on satellite communications will see no change
    in service.
        In addition to the spacecraft, the MUOS program continues to meet
    objectives for the ground sites in Geraldton, Australia; Wahiawa, HI;
    and Northwest, VA. These sites have completed hardware installation and
    final acceptance testing, and have been officially handed over to Fleet
    Cyber Command. The fourth site at Niscemi, Sicily, has had several
    setbacks over the past year as Italian protesters have caused
    significant delays; however, the program recently cleared a major
    hurdle with the installation of the three large antenna dishes at the
    Niscemi site. The U.S. and the central Italian Governments have worked
    together closely and Navy officials have increased cooperation with the
    local Sicilian authorities to maintain unfettered access to the site.
    Italian Government studies were released in 2013, reassuring the local
    population that all RF levels at the site are within safe and normal
    operating levels. Two previous studies were conducted by the U.S. Navy
    with acceptable results by both American and Italian health standards.
    The Navy resumed work late last summer at the site, and the current
    projection is to finish work by the end of this year.
        The final segment needed to achieve full MUOS capability is the
    fielding of the MUOS-capable terminals. The MUOS waveform software was
    completed in 2012, placed in the Joint Tactical Network Center (JTNC)
    Information Repository, and made available to industry in December
    2012. The first terminal that will be fielded and has been used to
    complete the initial phase of the MUOS End-to-End (E2E) testing is the
    AN/PRC-155 Manpack Radio. The U.S. Army PEO C3T Tactical Radio Program
    has developed this terminal by adding the MUOS capability to this new
    radio. Army fielding of MUOS capable Manpack radios is scheduled to
    begin in fiscal year 2015 and continues through fiscal year 2027.
        Additionally, the Navy is currently adding the MUOS capability to
    its Digital Modular Radio (DMR) to support shipboard operations.
    Upgrade kits will be fielded in fiscal year 2016 to existing UHF SATCOM
    DMRs and older systems will begin full DMR installations in fiscal year
    2017 with 196 radios fielded by 2020. The Navy has been contacted by
    several MUOS terminal vendors to gain access to the MUOS testing labs.
    Three vendors have been scheduled to utilize the Navy testing labs
    beginning in March and others will be scheduled in the near future as
    their terminals are ready for testing. These additional terminals are
    expected to greatly increase the numbers of MUOS terminals over the
    next several of years.
        Since the beginning of the MUOS program, development of the full
    MUOS capability has been managed through multiple program offices,
    including PMW 146 (Navy), Tactical Radio Program Office (Army), Joint
    Tactical Networking Center (Army) and the Defense Information Systems
    Agency. Significant progress has been made since the Navy was assigned
    overall responsibility by USD(AT&L) in May 2012 to deliver the MUOS
    End-to-End capability. The first phase of events designed to reduce
    risk associated with seams between each of the program offices has been
    completed. WCDMA voice and data calls were successfully transmitted by
    a Manpack Radio through the MUOS-1 satellite, routed through the MUOS
    ground system using a single ground site, and received by a second
    Manpack Radio. The second phase of risk reduction events is in progress
    and involves 2 MUOS satellites, 2 ground stations, and at least 15
    Manpack Radios. The next major event for the MUOS program is the
    completion of the Multiservice Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E)
    which will occur later this year. The MOT&E is the final test that will
    certify the system operational, testing the full E2E capability of the
    terminals, ground stations and satellites utilizing multiple
    operational scenarios. Once the system is certified the program will
    achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) followed by Full
    Operational Capability (FOC) after all five satellites have been
    launched and tested.
        Additional developmental testing was sponsored by the prime
    contractor in 2013. Initial indications are that MUOS may provide some
    coverage for narrowband SATCOM in the Arctic. A recent test
    successfully communicated over MUOS to an aircraft flying at 23,000
    feet at 89.5 North latitude. Further testing will be required to
    determine if and to what degree surface ships could employ MUOS to
    communicate in ice free waters in that region. Routine surface and
    subsurface operations in the region cannot be supported as there is
    insufficient coverage. The USAF EPS is required to support joint Arctic
    operations. MUOS is not capable of supporting joint Arctic operations,
    and it does not provide a protected SATCOM capability. Protected SATCOM
    is essential to these operations.
                            navy multiband terminal
        The increasing threat to access Space is a growing Navy concern.
    A2/AD threatens satellite communications systems that enable critical
    warfighter commander assured C2 functions. The Advanced Extremely High
    Frequency (AEHF) Satellite communications program acquired and deployed
    by the USAF provides a means to protect satellite communications. The
    Navy Multiband Terminal (NMT) Program will allow the Navy to leverage
    the AEHF satellite communications program to mitigate this risk. NMT
    provides secure, protected, and survivable high capacity mission
    bandwidth access for all warfare areas in an A2/AD environment. NMT
    variants are being installed on surface ships, submarines, and shore
    sites, including ground sites for the Enhanced Polar System program.
    Each order for a production lot of NMTs requires a 15-month lead time
    for the first unit of delivery. The remaining units can be delivered
    over a 12-month window. Once a unit is delivered to the Navy, it
    undergoes an additional period of Government testing of up to 2 months
    prior to being delivered to its ultimate installation platform. This
    timeline means that an NMT unit may be bought up to 29 months prior to
    installation, giving an inaccurate perception of being early to need.
    Further program cuts could lead to breaks in production, which will
    negate learning curve efficiencies and increase production costs, while
    delaying delivery of this much needed capability for the warfighter.
    Given these points, if current budget funding levels remain stable,
    program FOC will occur in 2022.
                      positioning, navigation, and timing
        Precise time and time interval (PTTI) is absolutely critical to the
    effective employment of a myriad of Department of Defense (DOD)
    systems. Coordinated Universal Time as referenced to the U.S. Naval
    Observatory (UTC-USNO) is the DOD standard and the primary PTTI
    reference for the Global Positioning System (GPS). The Navy remains at
    the forefront of timekeeping technology with the USNO Master Clock, an
    ensemble system of independent atomic clocks. Four Navy Rubidium
    Fountain (NRF) atomic clocks achieved FOC at USNO Washington, DC in
    August 2013. These additions to USNO's timing suite improve UTC-USNO to
    better than one nanosecond per day as required for GPS III. The DOD
    Alternate Master Clock facility in Colorado Springs, CO received its
    second of two planned NRF clocks in early February. IOC was delayed to
    September 2014 and September 2015, respectively, due to furloughs and
    funding cuts.
        The Navy initiated a Critical Time Dissemination (CTD) program in
    2013 to ensure PTTI remains available to DOD users in contested
    environments. This program will provide critical upgrades to timing
    stations to overcome dependence on GPS-only solutions and ensure
    correct PTTI delivery to the warfighter. These efforts are being
    resourced and executed in concert with DOD Chief Information Officer
    (CIO) priorities and the department's long term strategy for Assured
    PNT. CTD funding supports four lines of effort: development of a radio-
    frequency interface, a timing reference upgrade, timing system
    integration, and development of an optical interface. The $3 million
    cut to CTD research and development in the fiscal year 2014 budget due
    to `excess growth' will retard program goals at least 1 year to fiscal
    year 2019.
        The Military-Code (M-Code) GPS signal is a new encrypted signal for
    military users designed for resiliency. The USAF led development of M-
    Code GPS User Equipment is critically important to the warfighter in
    order to capitalize on the advantage gained by precise PNT while
    enhancing its ability in a denied and degraded environment. Hand-held
    requirements are vital to the USMC, however current development has
    been deferred to increment 2, and delaying USMC access to M-code beyond
    fiscal year 2022. Protecting the funding for its development is
    important to ensure that the ground segment keeps pace with on orbit
    capabilities and provide future access to space-based PNT for ground
    forces utilizing hand-held devices.
                            environmental monitoring
        Environmental monitoring is a vital capability that the Navy relies
    on for its short- and long-term forecasts, as well as climate
    monitoring programs. Satellite data is the primary method for
    collecting these large volume data sources that are used to feed the
    Navy's, as well as other Federal and International numerical models. As
    the DOD budget has decreased over the past several years, the Navy has
    relied on other Federal agencies and international governments to
    provide the necessary data. The DOD is not the only organization
    feeling the budget crisis. Smaller budgets are a reality for space
    organizations around the world and thus there is the potential of being
    left without the necessary resources to ensure operations can be
    conducted safely and efficiently. In order to develop mitigation plans,
    the Navy has been participating with the Air Force in a study to review
    the operational requirements for Space-based Environmental Monitoring.
    This study has shown that space-based solutions are required;
    especially to support Ocean Surface Vector Wind and Tropical Cyclone
    Intensity. The study is due to report out by the end of April but the
    Navy is hopeful that the documented requirements will be met with the
    necessary resources to support this vital service need.
              intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr)
        The Nation's recent focus on the western Pacific and the Arctic has
    increased the need for better access to space-based ISR systems. The
    WESTPAC and Arctic key maritime operating areas of interest are located
    in remote regions of the Earth, cover very large expanses of water, and
    offer limited access from land-based and airborne sensors. Space-based
    sensors are not restricted in these areas. In fact they are well-suited
    to support the wide variety of missions the U.S. Navy is called upon to
    support, from both a strategic and defensive perspective, for the
    Nation as well as our International Partners.
        Significant progress has been made since last year's testimony in
    defining maritime collection needs for future national and commercial
    ISR systems. Over the last year the Director of National Intelligence
    has completed work on a series of capability documents for our next
    generation national systems. These documents outline required sensor
    collection capabilities as well as system architecture design
    specifications. The U.S. Navy has been actively engaged in ensuring the
    Nation's maritime collection needs are properly defined so the sensors,
    when fielded, will be able to provide the required collections to
    support these missions well into the 2030 timeframe and beyond. The
    Navy is also working with the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency
    to determine what role commercial satellite systems can play in meeting
    our collection needs. Commercial sensors offer unique collection
    capabilities for the maritime domain that in some cases exceed national
    systems capabilities, cost less than their national counterparts, and
    provide information at the unclassified level which ease data flow
    within DOD as well as with our allies and coalition forces. Although
    national security concerns do preclude use of commercial sensors for
    some collection operations, they can play a significant role in filling
    collection gaps.
                                nano satellites
        With the increasingly contested nature of space and the
    promulgation of International counterspace capabilities, the pressure
    has been turned up for more resilient, cost-effective access to space
    and capability on orbit. In response, the Navy is participating in nano
    satellite initiatives designed to provide low cost and quick response
    capability for emerging space requirements. One such effort is the
    Vector Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, which launched two,
    foot-long ``CubeSats'' in November 2013 to demonstrate advanced
    communications capabilities. Both satellites were part of the
    Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)-3 mission which launched from
    Wallops Island, VA on a MINOTAUR IV space vehicle. The satellites will
    be demonstrated and their military utility assessed by our mission
    partners through the spring of 2014. The multi-mission satellite is
    designed with an open payload interface that allows third party
    capabilities to be integrated quickly. Three companies are now
    developing prototype naval payloads for the multi-mission satellite
    using our Small Business Innovative Research program. While not as
    capable as larger satellites, nano satellites can be launched in
    relatively short timelines in order to address a quickly evolving
    operational need.
                                   conclusion
        The Navy continues to be reliant upon space for SATCOM, PNT, EM, MW
    and ISR information in order to enable decisionmaking in increasingly
    contested and denied environments. Growing global uncertainty and
    emerging and expanding adversary capabilities will continue to require
    the Navy to become more resilient and efficient in the use of available
    assets in order to maintain the level of effectiveness that the Nation
    expects. This will require a revalidation of fleet information
    requirements and promotion of resilient measures to ensure that threats
    to space access and services are continuously evaluated and that
    mitigations are in place to ensure forward-deployed commanders have the
    tools necessary to ensure mission success.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts
    with you today. We look forward to answering any questions you and the
    subcommittee may have.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Dr. Zangardi.
        General Shelton?

      STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
                          FORCE SPACE COMMAND

        General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, Senator
    Donnelly, Senator King, it is an honor to appear before you
    once again as the Commander of Air Force Space Command. It is
    also a privilege to appear with these distinguished witnesses
    on the panel here.
        As you noted in your opening statement, our Nation's
    advantage in space is no longer a given. The ever-evolving
    space environment is increasingly contested as potential
    adversary capabilities grow in both number and sophistication.
    Providing budget stability and flexibility in this very dynamic
    strategic environment is necessary to maintain and bolster the
    viability of our Nation's space capabilities. Given this new
    normal for space, I believe we are at a strategic crossroads.
    It is a reality that requires us to address how we protect our
    space systems, challenge traditional acquisition practices, and
    consider alternative architectures that are more resilient and
    more affordable.
        I thank you for your support, and I look forward to working
    with Congress to keep you abreast of our efforts to provide
    resilient, capable, and affordable space capabilities for the
    joint force and for the Nation. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Shelton follows:]
              Prepared Statement by Gen. William L. Shelton, USAF
                                  introduction
        Chairman Udall, Senator Sessions, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you once again as the
    Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). As the Air Force space
    and cyberspace lead, I am responsible for organizing, training, and
    equipping more than 40,000 military and civilian employees to provide
    Air Force space and cyberspace capabilities for the combatant commands
    and for the Nation. My team works hard to deliver these capabilities
    around the world, every hour, every day.
        Space and cyberspace capabilities are foundational to the Joint
    Force Commander's ability to deter aggression and to execute global
    operations across the entire range of military operations, from
    humanitarian and disaster relief through major combat operations. Our
    military satellites and computer networks are technological marvels,
    providing mission-critical global access, persistence, and awareness.
    These systems not only provide essential, game-changing capabilities
    for our joint forces, they are increasingly vital assets for the global
    community and world economy.
        Specifically in space, our sustained mission success integrating
    these capabilities into our military operations has encouraged
    potential adversaries to further develop counterspace technologies and
    attempt to exploit our systems and information. Therefore, I believe we
    are at a strategic crossroad in space. With the threats to our space
    systems increasing and defense budget uncertainty, the status quo is no
    longer a viable option. This ``new normal'' in space requires us to
    address protection of mission-critical systems, challenge traditional
    acquisition practices, and analyze new operational constructs.
        The grand challenge before us is to assure essential space services
    will be available at the time and place of our choosing, while
    simultaneously lowering the cost of executing these missions. Finally,
    the budget situation of the last year certainly reminded us that our
    ability to provide these services now and into the future is fragile.
     mandate for change: future space capabilities at a strategic crossroad
        The space environment has fundamentally changed since our fledgling
    efforts in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Our space systems were
    designed to operate in a relatively benign environment, and the detente
    between the United States and the Soviet Union kept the peace--even in
    space. There were few space-faring nations, and even fewer with
    indigenous launch capability. Today, there are more than 170 nations
    with some form of financial interest in a variety of satellites, and 11
    nations that can independently launch satellites into space. The rapid
    expansion in space traffic over the past 50+ years occurred largely
    without conflict, but that era is coming to an end.
        The joint force dependence on space assets yields a corresponding
    vulnerability we know others seek to exploit. Counterspace developments
    by potential adversaries are varied and include everything from jamming
    to kinetic kill anti-satellite weapons. Global Positioning System (GPS)
    jammers are widely available, complicating our employment of GPS
    navigation and timing signals in weapons and platforms. Satellite
    communications jammers are also available, which may challenge over-
    the-horizon communications when needed most. Also, some nations have
    developed and successfully demonstrated anti-satellite weapon
    capabilities which could threaten our satellites in times of conflict.
    Unfortunately, all projections indicate these threatening capabilities
    will become more robust and proliferated, and they will be operational
    on a shorter than predicted timeline.
        In addition to adversarial counterspace programs, the growing
    debris problem is also a concern to spacecraft operators in all space
    sectors: military, civil and commercial. While we are routinely
    tracking some 23,000 objects at the Joint Space Operations Center
    (JSpOC), our sensors are unable to detect and reliably track objects
    smaller than 10 centimeters. Our models project more than 500,000 man-
    made objects greater in size than one centimeter in orbit today--many
    of these small objects represent a potentially catastrophic risk to
    fragile-by-design spacecraft.
        We are also addressing the President's direction to support the
    National Broadband Plan by finding balance between assured access,
    spectrum sharing and reallocation/repurposing. Use of radio spectrum
    for ground-space communications must be protected from both a
    regulatory perspective and from targeted adversary action.
        With the rapidly expanding adversary threats to our spacecraft, the
    growing debris population and decreasing budgets, we must adapt our
    satellite constellation architectures to become more resilient, while
    simultaneously making them more affordable. Just as combat aircraft
    necessarily evolved with the threat, we can no longer expect satellites
    built for a permissive environment to operate effectively in an
    increasingly contested space domain.
        Due to the cost of launching satellites, our design philosophy has
    been to maximize the functionality on a given satellite, which
    translates to increased weight, size and corresponding cost. As a
    result, we build just enough satellites, just in time, to sustain our
    constellations. This philosophy worked well over the years, but in the
    new normal of space, we are vulnerable to the cheap shot or to
    premature failure. For example, loss of a single satellite in our
    missile warning or our protected communications constellations would
    potentially leave large gaps in a vital capability. We must consider
    different architecture options that will provide adequate and resilient
    capability at an affordable cost. Our die is cast through the mid-2020s
    with the outstanding satellites we are buying and successfully placing
    on orbit to support national security objectives and joint operations.
    Because of lengthy acquisition timelines, to affect these architectures
    in the post-2025 timeframe, we need to complete ongoing studies soon to
    determine the most efficient approach for the future.
                         confronting budget challenges
        Based on available funding, we made difficult decisions in the
    Command to survive fiscal year 2013. The Budget Control Act of 2011
    resulted in significant fiscal year 2013 cuts to the Operations and
    Maintenance (O&M) budget at Air Force Space Command, which in turn
    compelled irreversible changes and significant risk to space operations
    going into fiscal year 2014. The welcome relief and flexibility
    provided by the fiscal year 2014 Appropriations Act is sustained in the
    fiscal year 2015 President's budget--our space operations budget
    requires this level of support to maintain our current operational
    posture and manage risk in changing operating conditions.
    Impact of Sequestration
        Despite our cost reduction efforts, last year's sequestration cuts
    required drastic actions at AFSPC. We cut $304.8 million from our O&M
    budget for fiscal year 2014 alone to comply with the Budget Control
    Act. Achieving that magnitude of reductions required continued civilian
    workforce pay freezes, a 25 percent reduction of contractor services
    within my headquarters (on top of a 50 percent reduction the year
    before), inactivation of some operational capabilities, and most
    notably $100 million of additional risk in Weapon System Sustainment
    funding. This means that in fiscal year 2015, vital sustainment
    activities are delayed or deferred, which could translate into system
    outages of increased duration or severity. Additionally, AFSPC uses a
    significant portion of our O&M budget to fund mission-essential
    contractor operators for our space and cyberspace missions--there is no
    flexibility here. Our search for savings over the last several years of
    declining budgets virtually eliminated any margin in O&M; therefore,
    the cuts began to erode these contracts which are essential to perform
    and sustain our mission.
        While the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 alleviates a portion of the
    cuts we were facing in fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, we remain
    concerned that continued sequestration-induced budget cuts in fiscal
    year 2016 and beyond, as well as overall funding instability, could
    undermine our space capability for years to come.
      challenging legacy space architectures and traditional acquisition
                                   practices
        This past year, we continued success in our acquisition programs to
    provide greater mission assurance and cost savings. As we transition
    from development to production, we have captured success through lean
    processing, smart testing and appropriate oversight and reporting. The
    Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) made tremendous strides
    implementing ``should-cost'' initiatives that resulted in real program
    savings of more than $1.4 billion across the Future Years Defense
    Program. The result of these actions can be seen in streamlined
    assembly, testing and delivery of a number of programs to include
    Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Space-Based Infrared System
    (SBIRS), Wideband Global Satellite Communications (WGS) and GPS III.
    Space Modernization Initiative (SMI)
        In 2011, AFSPC adopted the Efficient Space Procurement (ESP)
    concept to reduce procurement risk and lower overall cost by
    transitioning from buying satellites one-at-a-time to buying satellites
    in blocks using fixed price contracts. This approach allowed us to take
    advantage of economic order quantities and the efficiencies inherent in
    a stable production line. We then used a portion of these savings to
    invest back into mission areas under SMI. The overall SMI strategy is
    to invest in program efforts that create increased trade space for
    future decisions. Study contracts under SMI are helping us better plan
    for a challenging future by exploring affordable technology
    alternatives and architectures in missile warning, communications,
    global positioning, navigation and timing mission areas.
        SMI-funded studies position AFSPC to take advantage of
    opportunities such as greater commercial satellite availability, a
    competitive medium launch market and faster commercial production
    cycles. SMI also postures the Air Force to rapidly address emerging
    kinetic and non-kinetic threats. These investments are critical to our
    ability to define future options to increase resiliency in this dynamic
    operational space environment.
    Resilient Architectures
        As we work toward increased resiliency and affordability, we are
    examining a range of options, one of which is disaggregation.
    Disaggregation concepts call for the dispersion of space-based
    missions, functions or sensors across multiple systems or platforms. By
    separating payloads on different satellites we will complicate a
    potential adversary's targeting calculus, decrease size and system
    complexity, and enable use of smaller boosters--with the goal of
    simultaneously driving down cost.
        In addition, we are evaluating constructs to host payloads on other
    platforms where feasible, and take better advantage of available
    commercial services. The trailblazing Commercial Hosted Infrared
    Payload program, a government infrared payload on a commercial
    satellite, was a technical success by any measure, and we learned
    significant lessons on the overall hosted payload concept.
        Over the past several months, we've met with more than 65 space
    companies to seek their ideas on alternative architectures. From those
    meetings, we collected many concepts that will inform our Analyses of
    Alternatives (AoA) for the future of protected military satellite
    communications and overhead persistent infrared systems. In addition,
    the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is supporting our AoA studies with
    threat definition, technical evaluations and cost analysis support.
    AFSPC and MDA are collaborating on future space sensor architecture
    studies and sensor performance assessments across a broad set of joint
    mission areas. Finally, federally Funded Research and Development
    Centers, as well as others, will complete studies this year on
    disaggregation and its secondary impacts on the launch industry and
    space architectures.
    Better Buying Power
        As previously mentioned, our use of the ESP approach and the
    Department of Defense's (DOD) Better Buying Power concepts resulted in
    significant positive results. SMC, under the sterling leadership of
    Lieutenant General Ellen Pawlikowski, awarded a block buy contract for
    the AEHF space vehicles 5 and 6, obtaining $1.625 billion in savings
    from the original independent cost estimate. Also, we anticipate the
    award of a contract for two more SBIRS satellites later this year,
    taking advantage of lessons learned on AEHF 5 and 6. Despite parts
    obsolescence challenges that required initial nonrecurring engineering
    and advance procurement efforts, we will realize significant savings
    using a firm, fixed-price contract.
                  space capabilities for the joint warfighter
    Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
        SSA underpins everything we do in space. Gaining and maintaining
    awareness in space requires data from global sensors and the
    integration and exploitation of that data to support operational
    command and control (C2). The JSpOC Mission System (JMS) is integral to
    improving SSA and C2. JMS Increment 1 was approved for full deployment
    and operationally accepted last year. This increment delivered the net-
    centric framework and the initial capability advances toward better
    operator understanding and monitoring of the space environment. JMS
    Increment 2 will build on that foundation by fielding groundbreaking
    capabilities to include greatly improved capability to detect and
    characterize orbital hazards and adversary threats. Increment 2 will
    also enable the JSpOC to transition from the legacy Space Defense
    Operations Center system to expanded computational capacity and
    improved automation, thereby improving our ability to handle space
    events and allowing us to retire increasingly difficult to sustain
    hardware. Furthermore, it will allow integration of data from our
    network of space surveillance sensors, previously unavailable
    intelligence community data, and data from other commercial, allied and
    governmental sensors. The JMS program clearly represents game-changing
    capability for the Nation's space situational awareness.
        Enhancements to the Space Surveillance Network are necessary to
    close sensing gaps and take full advantage of the JMS high performance
    computing environment. International cooperative efforts are part of
    that effort. As an example, in November 2013, Secretary Hagel and
    Australian Defense Minister Johnston signed a Memorandum of
    Understanding finalizing arrangements to move the Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency's Space Surveillance Telescope from its
    original site in New Mexico to a site in Western Australia. The high
    capacity and extremely accurate capabilities of this telescope will
    significantly enhance SSA in deep space. The telescope will be
    relocated and operational in 2016 to monitor geosynchronous orbits over
    the Pacific region. Similarly, we have reached an agreement to place a
    C-Band Radar in Australia to help with southern hemisphere SSA
    coverage.
        Another big step forward is the new S-Band Radar, commonly known as
    the Space Fence. We will build this critical SSA sensor on Kwajalein
    Atoll, and remotely operate from Huntsville, AL. This radar will track
    much smaller objects and cover almost all orbital inclinations with a
    capacity to track many thousands of objects daily. Budget uncertainty
    contributed to a 1 year delay, but the contract should be awarded this
    spring, with an initial operational capability date in fiscal year
    2019.
        Our ground-based radars provide outstanding deep space tracking and
    space object identification capabilities, but they are not well-suited
    to search operations. Our ground-based optical systems are outstanding
    deep space search and tracking assets, but they can only perform their
    mission at night, and they must have clear skies to conduct imaging
    operations.
        Based on the success of a sensor flown on a missile defense
    experimental satellite, in 2010 we developed and launched the Space-
    Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite, with a 7-year design life,
    into low-earth orbit to augment both search and tracking of man-made
    objects. The follow-on program is being developed; however, it will not
    be launched until 2021 based on available funding. The result is a
    potential 4-year gap in this crucial space-based coverage, which will
    limit our ability to maintain timely custody of threats to our
    satellites in geosynchronous orbits. We have extended our network to
    include allied contributions to mitigate the potential loss of data.
    For example, the Canadian Sapphire satellite, launched in 2013, is a
    contributing sensor to our space surveillance efforts, but
    unfortunately, this satellite has a 5-year design life and is expected
    to be decommissioned about the same time as SBSS. We are working hard
    to extend the life of SBSS and other potential contributors to mitigate
    this potential coverage gap.
        A future contributor to extend and enhance coverage is the
    Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program (GSSAP). This system
    will collect SSA data allowing for more accurate tracking and
    characterization of man-made orbiting objects in a near-geosynchronous
    orbit. Data from GSSAP will contribute to timely and accurate orbital
    predictions, enhance our knowledge of the geosynchronous environment
    and further enable space flight safety to include satellite collision
    avoidance. GSSAP is expected to launch in 2014.
    Assured Access to Space
        It is essential that we sustain a reliable capability to launch
    national security satellites into space. To that end, we continued our
    unprecedented string of successful launches in 2013. Alongside our
    industry partner, United Launch Alliance, we executed an all-time high
    of 11 launches of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV).
        The commercial space launch industry made substantial progress last
    year with successful launches by Orbital Sciences and SpaceX. Our
    launch acquisition strategy aims to take advantage of the competition
    made possible by these new entrants once they are fully certified under
    the approved new entrant certification protocol. We have been very
    successful placing new satellites in orbit by placing a premium on
    mission assurance. As we move forward in an era of competition for
    launch services, we must remain focused on mission assurance to ensure
    national security payloads are safely and reliably delivered to space.
        Our launch and range infrastructure has served the space enterprise
    well over the years, but the infrastructure overall is old and it
    requires considerable sustainment and modernization efforts. Due to the
    previously mentioned O&M budget shortfalls, we took action to right-
    size our infrastructure on both coasts and at our down-range sites. Our
    National Security Space Essential Range will not compromise public
    safety or mission assurance, but we will continue to balance
    sustainability and modernization to overcome obsolescence, as well as
    implementing better contract mechanisms to control costs.
    Military Satellite Communications
        2013 was a successful year for AFSPC military satellite
    communications as well. The Air Force launched the third AEHF satellite
    in September 2013, delivering increased capacity for survivable,
    secure, protected and jam-resistant satellite communication for
    strategic and tactical warfighters as well as our most senior national
    leadership and international partners. The Air Force also successfully
    launched the fifth and sixth WGS satellites within 76 days of each
    other. These satellites significantly increase high-capacity satellite
    communication to joint forces around the world.
        The WGS program exemplifies the opportunities to leverage
    commercial satellite technologies to reduce the cost of providing space
    systems. However, we need to go further. At SMC, our program managers
    collaborated with industry to explore other possibilities. Through the
    use of broad area announcement solicitations, SMC awarded contracts to
    17 vendors to examine concepts for secure satellite communications at a
    lower cost.
    Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
        By the end of 2013, we completed production of all 12 GPS IIF
    satellites. The fourth GPS IIF satellite was launched in 2013, and we
    plan to launch three satellites in 2014, three more satellites in 2015,
    and the final two GPS IIF satellites in 2016.
        As has been widely reported, the navigation payload delivery for
    GPS III is delayed beyond the contracted date. Although we don't
    believe this will result in any impact to our ability to provide gold
    standard PNT services to the world, we are concerned about the impact
    to the overall GPS III program. We are working remedies with the prime
    contractor for this delay.
        We also expect the Next-Generation GPS Control Segment Block 1 to
    transition to operations in 2016. In November, we tested the system's
    ability to command GPS Blocks II and III satellites using space system
    simulators, including control of the major PNT signals. This
    demonstration is a major step forward to prepare for the GPS III era of
    more secure and robust GPS signals to the warfighter.
    Space-Based Infrared System
        The SBIRS GEO-2 satellite was launched, delivered for operational
    trial period and operationally accepted in 2013. To date, the data
    provided by both SBIRS GEO-1 and GEO-2 satellites is outstanding,
    providing enhanced missile warning and battlespace awareness over
    critical portions of the world. SBIRS GEO-3 is planned to launch in
    2016.
    Terrestrial Environmental Monitoring
        Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellite number 19
    will launch in April 2014 and we expect the satellite will remain
    operational well into the 2020s. We are concerned about potential gaps
    in meteorological coverage when current DOD, civilian, partner and
    allied meteorological satellites reach their end-of-life in the 2015-
    2025 timeframe. The Space-Based Environmental Monitoring AoA was
    conducted to study follow-on options, such as international
    partnerships, hosted payloads or a new satellite, for continued
    meteorological support to warfighters in the most cost-effective
    manner. The results from the AoA are currently being reviewed by the
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
                                   conclusion
        The men and women of AFSPC remain committed to providing
    unsurpassed support to our warfighters and allies. Every day they bring
    innovation, excellence, and uncompromising focus to the Nation's space
    missions that are conducted 24/7 across the globe.
        Our Nation's advantage in space is no longer a given. The ever-
    evolving space environment is increasingly contested as current and
    potential adversary capabilities grow in number and sophistication.
    Providing budget stability and flexibility in this very dynamic
    strategic environment is necessary to maintain and bolster the
    viability of all space capabilities.
        I remain committed to a course of action that acknowledges and
    responds to uncertainty in this new normal. The status quo is not a
    viable alternative in response to the new normal. We are reaching out
    to our talented airmen, industry partners, allies, and Congress to make
    the changes necessary to provide required capability that is affordable
    and resilient.
        I thank you for your support and look forward to working with
    Congress and this committee to keep you abreast of our efforts to
    provide resilient, capable and affordable space capabilities for the
    joint force and the Nation.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, General Shelton.
        General Mann?

    STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID L. MANN, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY SPACE
     AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND
       JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE
                                DEFENSE

        General Mann. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions,
    Senator Donnelly, Senator King, thank you for your ongoing
    support of our soldiers and our civilians and our families.
        This is my first appearance before the subcommittee, and it
    is an honor for me to be here to talk about the values of space
    to the Army, especially in light of declining budgets.
        Space is essential to the Army and it is truly the ultimate
    high ground. The Army is the largest user of space capabilities
    for DOD. In order for the Army to see, shoot, move, and
    communicate, we need space. The advantages that space provides
    are critical to our success and that of our joint partners.
        As the Army's proponent for space, my organization
    coordinates with all the members of the space enterprise in
    order to provide the capabilities through our three main tasks:
    number one, to provide trained and ready space missile defense
    soldiers out there, to build the future force and future
    capabilities for tomorrow, and also to look at emerging
    technologies for the day after tomorrow.
        That said, it is important to make the point that our
    soldiers, sailors, Air Force, marines, and civilians out there
    are truly our asset. That is our greatest asset to getting
    after this capability.
        This subcommittee's continued support is essential to
    providing the capabilities that have proven so vital to
    maintaining our edge on the battlefield.
        I appreciate the opportunity to speak about the value of
    space to the Army and look forward to your questions. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of General Mann follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by LTG David L. Mann, USA
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of our soldiers,
    civilians, and families. This marks my first appearance before the
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a
    body that has been a strong supporter of the Army and the key
    capabilities that space affords our warfighters. Your past and future
    support is vital as we pursue joint efforts to provide critical space
    capabilities for our Nation, our fighting forces, and our allies. Thank
    you for your continued support.
        In my current assignment, I have three distinct responsibilities.
    First, as the Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command, I have title 10 responsibilities to organize, man, train, and
    equip space and missile defense forces for the Army. Second, as the
    Commander, Army Forces Strategic Command, I am the Army Service
    Component Commander (ASCC) to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). I
    am responsible for planning, integrating, and coordinating Army space
    and missile defense forces and capabilities in support of STRATCOM
    missions. Third, as the Commander of STRATCOM's Joint Functional
    Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), I am
    responsible for synchronizing missile defense plans, conducting
    ballistic missile defense operations support, and also serve as the
    warfighter's advocate for missile defense capabilities.
        Today, I am honored to appear with these other witnesses to provide
    this subcommittee insight on the critical space-based capabilities that
    our respective commands continuously provide the warfighter.
        As the Army's proponent for space, U.S. Army Space and Missile
    Defense Command (USASMDC)/Army Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) coordinates
    with the other members of the Army space enterprise, to include the
    Army intelligence, signal, and geospatial communities. We are engaged
    across the broader Army community to ensure space capabilities are
    maximized and integrated across our entire force and that potential
    vulnerabilities to our systems are, to the greatest extent possible,
    mitigated. We also collaborate with STRATCOM, its Joint Functional
    Component Command for Space (JFCC Space), and other members of the
    joint community to provide trained and ready space forces, as well as
    space-based and space-enabled ground-based capabilities to the
    warfighter. Additionally, we work closely with acquisition developers
    in the other Services to ensure the enhancement of systems that provide
    the best capabilities for ground forces.

        My focus today is to impress upon the Subcommittee the need to
    ensure our space capabilities are maintained, if not further enhanced,
    during the present environment of increasing threats and declining
    resources.
                       the workforce--our greatest asset
        At USASMDC/ARSTRAT, as is the case within all the Army, our people
    are our most enduring strength. The soldiers, civilians, and
    contractors at USASMDC/ARSTRAT support the Army and joint warfighter
    each and every day, both those stationed on the homeland and those
    deployed overseas. Within our command, we strive to maintain a cadre of
    space professionals to support our Army.
        In step with the Army, our USASMDC/ARSTRAT leadership team embraces
    the imperatives of Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention
    (SHARP). As stated by the Chief of Staff of the Army, sexual harassment
    and sexual assault violate everything the U.S. Army stands for
    including our Army Values and Warrior Ethos. At USASMDC/ARSTRAT, I will
    continually assess the effectiveness of our SHARP efforts to ensure we
    are meeting the needs of our soldiers, civilians, and family members.
    Our workforce deserves nothing less.
                      reliance on space-based capabilities
        Our Army provides a globally responsive and regionally engaged
    force that supports the Joint Team with critical enablers and, as
    directed, responds to crises at home and abroad. The Army is dependent
    on space capabilities to execute Unified Land Operations in support of
    the Nation's objectives. Army space forces contribute to the Joint
    Force and the Army's ability to be adaptive, versatile, and agile to
    meet tomorrow's security challenges. Simply put, space capabilities are
    critical elements of the Army's ability to see, shoot, move, and
    communicate.
        The Army is the largest user of space-enabled capabilities within
    the DOD. Our ability to achieve operational adaptability and land
    dominance depends on the benefits derived from key assets in space.
    Integrating space capabilities enables commanders, down to the lowest
    echelon, to conduct Unified Land Operations through decisive action and
    operational adaptability.
        There are currently six Army warfighting functions that contribute
    to operational adaptability: mission command, movement and maneuver,
    intelligence, protection, fires, and sustainment. Space-based
    capabilities leveraged and employed across the national space
    enterprise enable each of these warfighting functions. Virtually every
    Army operation relies on space capabilities to enhance the
    effectiveness of our force.

        When combined with other capabilities, space systems allow Joint
    Forces to see the battlefield with clarity, navigate with accuracy,
    strike with precision, communicate with certainty, and operate with
    assurance. Dependence on space as a force multiplier will continue to
    grow for the Army of 2020 and beyond, especially in an era of tight
    fiscal resources, a smaller force structure, and possibly, a further
    reduced forward presence. The bottom line is the Army depends on space
    capabilities in everything we do. Retaining our global space
    superiority is a military imperative.
                 space in support of army warfighting functions
        There are five space force enhancement mission areas: (1) satellite
    communications (SATCOM); (2) position, navigation, and timing; (3)
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; (4) missile warning;
    and (5) environmental monitoring. Commanders and soldiers leverage
    these space force enhancement capabilities to conduct warfighting
    functions. They are critical enablers to our ability to plan,
    communicate, navigate, and maintain battlefield situational awareness;
    target the enemy; provide missile warning; and protect and sustain our
    forces. Joint and Army forces require assured access to space
    capabilities and, when required, have the ability to deny our
    adversaries the same space-based capabilities.
        Joint interdependence is achieved through the deliberate reliance
    on the capabilities of one or more Service elements to maximize
    effectiveness while minimizing vulnerabilities. As the DOD Executive
    Agent for Space, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for
    leading the development, production, support, and execution of military
    space operations. STRATCOM is the combatant command headquarters
    responsible for planning and advocating for space capabilities for the
    warfighter. The Army continues to utilize national, joint, and
    commercial systems for additional capabilities while pursuing cross-
    domain solutions that support Unified Land Operations. The Army must
    continue to influence joint requirements and new solutions that provide
    compatible space capabilities in support of our warfighting functions.
    Finally, we must actively engage in focused experimentation, smart
    developmental test and evaluation, and timely military utility
    demonstrations to take advantage of dynamic technological advances in
    space.

        today's operations --provide trained and ready space forces and
                                  capabilities
        While the Army is the largest DOD user of space, we are also a
    provider of space-based capabilities. Each day, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    provides trained and ready space forces and capabilities to combatant
    commanders and the warfighter. Within our 1st Space Brigade,
    approximately 1,000 soldiers and civilians--forward-deployed, forward-
    stationed, or serving at home--provide space capabilities that are
    essential in all phases of operations. The Brigade, a multi-component
    organization comprised of Active, Army Reserve, and associated National
    Guard soldiers, provides flexible, reliable, and tailored support to
    combatant commanders and warfighters by conducting continuous global
    space support, space control, and space force enhancement operations.
    The Brigade's three battalions provide satellite communications, space
    operations, theater missile warning, and forward-deployable space
    support teams.
        Army space professional personnel policy is the responsibility of
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT. We serve as the Army's proponent and developer of
    training for space professionals and provide training assistance for
    Space-Enabler indentified positions. Our Army Space Personnel
    Development Office (ASPDO) is the focal point for all Functional Area
    (FA) 40 Space Operations Officers matters and executes the personnel
    development and life-cycle management functions on their behalf.
    Additionally, ASPDO develops policies, procedures, and metrics for the
    Army Space Cadre. The Army's Space Cadre, utilizing FA 40s as its
    foundation, is comprised of over 3,000 soldiers and civilians. The
    Space Cadre and Space Enablers consist of soldiers and civilians from
    multiple branches, career fields, disciplines, and functional areas.

        Today, there are approximately 400 multi-component FA 40s serving
    in joint and Army organizations across all echelons of command--
    tactical, operational, and strategic. These Space Operations Officers,
    along with members of the Army's Space Cadre, directly influence the
    execution of strategic operations in support of operational and
    tactical level ground maneuver forces. Their principal duties include
    planning, developing, acquiring, and integrating space force
    capabilities. Over recent years, the maturity of the career field and
    the capabilities these officers provide to the Army and its joint
    partners has led to an increased demand for FA 40 personnel. As the
    Army continues to reduce its overall end strength, FA 40 billets have
    fared well in the support of our corps and divisions. We have actually
    realized a slight increase in billets due to the requirements of the
    Special Forces community. During the past year, USASMDC/ARSTRAT space
    professionals have supported over a dozen major exercises, several
    mission rehearsal exercises for units deploying in support of Operation
    Enduring Freedom, and other named operations.
        An overview of some of the critical space capabilities provided by
    Army space professionals is highlighted below.
    Army Space Support Teams:
        The Army deploys specialized Army Space Support Teams to support
    Army corps and divisions, other Services, Joint Task Forces, and
    multinational forces. The teams, which maintain a continuous presence
    in the Afghanistan theater, provide space-based products and services
    to commanders and warfighters. The teams are on-the-ground space
    experts, pulling key commercial imagery, forecasting the impact of
    space weather, and providing responsive space support to their units.
    During 2013, USASMDC/ARSTRAT deployed four Army Space Support Teams and
    Commercial Imagery Teams to U.S. Central Command's area of operations.
    Since this era of persistent conflict began, we have deployed teams on
    86 occasions. These teams bring tailored products and capabilities that
    meet critical theater commander needs.

    Satellite Communications:
        Our mission in satellite communications (SATCOM) is to ensure
    reliable and resilient access to tactical warfighter networks and the
    DOD Information Network primarily through the successful execution of
    satellite payload operations and the management of regional satellite
    communication centers. USASMDC/ARSTRAT conducts payload and
    transmission control for all DOD-owned wideband SATCOM bandwidth,
    including communications carried over the Defense Satellite
    Communications System (DSCS) and Wideband Global SATCOM System (WGS)
    constellations.
        Additionally, we serve as the Consolidated SATCOM System Expert (C-
    SSE) for the DOD narrowband and wideband SATCOM constellations, which
    include the DSCS, the WGS, the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), the
    Ultra High Frequency SATCOM (UHF), and the Fleet Satellite
    Communications System. As the SATCOM System Expert for MUOS, the Army
    is responsible for DOD's use of our next generation tactical system,
    which will transform tactical SATCOM from radios into secure cellular
    networked communication tools. During 2013, our Wideband C-SSE experts
    conducted detailed testing on the recently activated WGS-5 and WGS-6
    satellites that are now providing increased Wideband SATCOM resources
    to combatant commanders. In 2013, we supported the early activation of
    the MUOS-1 legacy payload and will soon directly support the testing
    and activation of enhanced capabilities on the MUOS-2. The Army also
    has a significant role and assigned responsibilities in DOD's expanding
    use of military satellite communications through a number of growing
    programs and initiatives, and is the operational lead for multiple
    international partnerships.
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT also mans and operates the Wideband Satellite
    Communications Operations Centers (WSOCs) and the Regional Satellite
    Communications Support Centers (RSSCs). The satellite communications
    control missions of the DSCS and the WGS are performed by the 1st Space
    Brigade's 53rd Signal Battalion and Department of the Army Civilians
    utilizing the capabilities of the globally located WSOCs and RSSCs.
    Support to the joint community, agencies, and our allies continue to
    grow exponentially as use of military SATCOM increases. SATCOM is the
    Army's top space priority. We are actively transforming our concept of
    operations and upgrading our capabilities to defend vital mission
    command links and provide assured access to SATCOM. For example, we
    recently replaced aging antennas and terminal equipment at the Wahiawa,
    Hawaii WSOC. The new WSOC at Fort Meade, Maryland will be completed
    this year, and we broke ground for the construction of a new WSOC
    facility in Germany. Modernization and equipment replacement are
    required so that the centers remain compatible with the fleet of new
    and expanding WGS assets being deployed by the Air Force.
    Friendly Force Tracking:
        Friendly force tracking systems support situational awareness
    enroute to and throughout areas of operation. Joint and Army forces
    require precise position, navigation, and timing information to enable
    confident, decisive maneuver by both ground and air assets. The DOD's
    Friendly Force Tracking Mission Management Center, operated by USASMDC/
    ARSTRAT from Peterson Air Force Base, CO, receives more than 1 million
    location tracks a day to provide a common operating picture to command
    posts and operations centers. This capability, performed on behalf of
    STRATCOM, is an essential worldwide enabler to both military and other
    government agencies.

    Ballistic Missile Early Warning:
        Early warning is a key component of indications and warning for
    missile defense. Army forces need assured, accurate, and timely missile
    warning launch location, in-flight position, and predicted impact area
    data. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS)
    Detachments, operated by Army personnel, monitor adversary missile
    launch activity and other events of interest and then share this
    information with members of the air and missile defense and operational
    communities. Our JTAGS Detachments are forward-stationed across the
    globe, providing 24/7/365 dedicated and assured missile warning to
    theater level commanders.
    Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Support:
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides geospatial intelligence in direct support
    of the combatant commands as an operational element of the Army's
    National-To-Theater Program and as a member of the National System for
    Geospatial Intelligence. The Army's space and intelligence experts
    exploit a variety of commercial, civil, and DOD imagery data derived
    from space and airborne sources. Additionally, they aid in the
    exploration of emerging spectral system technologies and in
    transitioning new capabilities to the warfighter. During 2013, our
    GEOINT professionals created over 17,000 geospatial intelligence
    reports which provided essential support to the geographical and
    functional combatant commands. Late last year, our GEOINT Team was
    presented the 2013 Military Achievement Award by the U.S. Geospatial
    Intelligence Foundation for its work in developing a process to speed
    the exploitation of large volumes of hyper-spectral imagery data from
    DOD's experimental Tactical Satellite-3 platforms.
    Operations Reach-back Support and Services:
        Our Operations Center, located in Colorado Springs, CO, continues
    to provide daily reach-back support for our space experts deployed
    throughout the operational force and enables the Army to reduce our
    forward-deployed footprint. This center maintains constant situational
    awareness of deployed elements, continuously responds to requests for
    information, and provides the essential reach-back system of
    connectivity with technical subject matter experts.

    Strategic Space Surveillance:
        The Army also operates facilities and assets that are of utmost
    importance to protecting the Nation's use of space. The Ronald Reagan
    Ballistic Missile Test Site (RTS), located on the U.S. Army Garrison-
    Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, is a national asset that
    provides unique radars and sensors that contribute to STRATCOM's space
    situational awareness mission, enabling protection of the Nation's
    manned and unmanned space assets. This strategic site also serves as a
    critical asset for ballistic missile testing and is ideally located to
    provide equatorial launch benefits.
        addressing tomorrow's requirements--building future space forces
        Over the past 2 decades, Army operations have transitioned from
    being ``supported'' by space capabilities to being truly ``enabled'' by
    them--space capabilities are an integral part of military operations.
    Military and civilian space technology has dramatically improved
    access, processing, and dissemination of data collected by space-based
    capabilities. To ensure our continued access to space-based
    capabilities, we must continue active participation in defining space-
    related requirements. These identified needs equip us to develop and
    mature joint and Army force structure and concepts of operations in
    sync with the deployment of capabilities, thereby enabling our forces
    to conduct tomorrow's full range of military operations. Assured access
    to space is our focus--ensuring the requisite capabilities and effects
    are delivered to the tactical warfighter on time, every time demands
    that our space capabilities and architectures become more resilient
    against attacks and disruption. We must ensure the Army is prepared to
    conduct operations in a space-degraded environment.
        In our second core task of building space forces for tomorrow, we
    use our capability development function to meet future space
    requirements. We continue to use both established and emerging
    processes to document our space-based needs and pursue validation of
    joint, Army, and coalition requirements. This regimented approach helps
    ensure limited resources are applied where warfighter operational
    utility is most effectively served. This approach enhances our pursuit
    and development of necessary capabilities across Doctrine,
    Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel,
    and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains to address threats and vulnerabilities
    while sustaining land force operations. In addition to conducting and
    evaluating experiments, war games, studies, and analysis, our Battle
    Lab develops and validates concepts leading to space related DOTMLPF
    alternatives and solutions.

        In 2011, the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army approved the
    Army's Strategic Space Plan. This document, shaped by national level
    guidance such as the National Space Policy and the National Security
    Space Strategy, outlines the Army's space enterprise path for strategic
    planning, programming, and resourcing.
        The essence of our space strategy and the guiding vision of the
    Army space enterprise are to ensure Army forces conducting Unified Land
    Operations have access to resilient and relevant space-enabled
    capabilities. To achieve this, our space strategy rests on three tenets
    that link Army strategic planning and programming for space to the
    guidance in national and DOD space policy and strategy. The three
    essential tenets are:

             To enable the Army's enduring mission by providing
            requisite space-enabled capabilities to support current
            operations, as well as future transformation efforts;
             To leverage existing DOD, national, commercial, and
            international space-based capabilities; and
             To employ cross-domain solutions to create a resilient
            architecture to address threats and vulnerabilities, and assure
            access to critical capabilities needed to sustain land force
            operations.

        The initial implementation tasks of this strategy are complete.
    This past November, the Army completed a Space Capabilities Based
    Assessment to identify critical space gaps and potential solutions.
    These solutions are currently being evaluated and prioritized to ensure
    the most critical and affordable solutions are pursued. The Army also
    implemented a Space Training Strategy last year. This strategy seeks to
    improve the Army's understanding and utilization of space capabilities,
    to improve operations in contested operational environments, and to
    create an integrated and seamless continuum of career-long space
    education and training.
    the day-after-tomorrow--continued space technology materiel development
        Our final core task entails our materiel development function--
    pursuing essential capabilities for the day-after-tomorrow. Our goal is
    to expand technological capabilities to ensure space and space-based
    products provide warfighters, especially those who are remotely
    located, with dominant battlefield advantages. While we are very much
    aware that today's, and likely tomorrow's, fiscal realities will limit
    technology modernization efforts, we strongly believe that we must
    continue to conduct research, development, and demonstrations of
    capabilities that return maximum advances in our combat effectiveness.
    We cannot afford to mortgage future combat readiness by continuing to
    defer research today. As such, we continue to prioritize, leverage, and
    invest in promising space research and development technologies.

        In conjunction with both DOD and non-DOD agencies, we continue to
    advance three responsive space Joint Capability Technology
    Demonstration (JCTD) Program efforts that have the potential to provide
    enhanced space capabilities to ground commanders and warfighters. A
    summarized update of these three initiatives follows.
    SMDC Nanosatellite Program-3 (SNaP-3):
        Future constellations of relatively low cost nanosatellites
    deployed in mission-specific, low earth orbits can provide a cost
    effective, beyond-line-of-sight data communications capability. This
    capability is targeted for users who, without it, have no dedicated
    access to satellite communications. These satellites are also very
    useful in exfiltrating data from unattended ground sensors that have
    been placed in remote locations to track enemy troop movement, thereby
    reducing the friendly force footprint. SNaP-3, an OSD-approved JCTD,
    seeks to utilize small satellites to provide dedicated coverage to a
    wide range of underserved users in remote areas. The Army is building
    and will launch three SNaP-3 nanosatellites to address this
    communications shortfall. We are hopeful that, in the near future, this
    initiative will transition to a program of record.
    Kestrel Eye Visible Imagery Nanosatellite:
        Kestrel Eye is an endeavor to manufacture and fly three electro-
    optical near-nanosatellite-class imagery satellites that can be more
    responsive in support to ground warfighters. Weighing about 30 pounds
    and capable of producing 1.5 meter resolution imagery, data from each
    Kestrel Eye satellite will be down-linked directly to the same tasking
    warfighter via a data relay system, also accessible by other theater
    warfighters, without any continental United States relay pass-through
    or data filtering. The intent of this program is to demonstrate a
    small, tactical space-based imagery nanosatellite that could be
    employed in large numbers to provide a cost effective, persistent
    capability for ground forces. Each satellite would have an operational
    life of greater than 2 years in low earth orbit. The initial Kestrel
    Eye launch is scheduled for 2015.
    Soldier-Warfighter Operationally Responsive Deployer for Space
            (SWORDS):
        SWORDS, an OSD-approved JCTD, is an initiative to develop a very
    low-cost launch vehicle that can respond to a combatant commander's
    launch request within 24 hours. This launch system is designed to take
    advantage of low-cost, proven technologies and materials to provide an
    affordable launch for small weight payloads to low earth orbit with a
    goal of about $1 million per launch vehicle. SWORDS employs a very
    simple design, using commercial off-the-shelf hardware from outside the
    aerospace industry. It incorporates a benign bi-propellant liquid
    propulsion system, and uses simple and low cost launch support and
    launch site hardware. NASA is providing reimbursable support for
    development of the SWORDS launch vehicle.
                                   conclusion
        The Army is the largest user of space and space-based capabilities.
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT is actively engaged in organizing, manning, equipping,
    and training space forces for the Army. We also work with other
    organizations to continue to develop and enhance technology to provide
    our warfighters with the best battlefield capabilities. We will
    continue to rely on and advocate for space products and services
    provided by the DOD, other government agencies, our allies and
    coalition partners, and commercial entities in order to see, shoot,
    move, and communicate. In adapting to the budget realities, space
    capabilities will become even more critical to enabling adaptive Army
    and Joint Forces.

        While continued technological advances are critical, the most
    critical space asset we possess are the dedicated soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, and civilians who develop, field, and operate space
    technology and deliver its capabilities to the warfighter. The men and
    women of USASMDC/ARSTRAT will continue to focus on providing trained
    and ready space forces and capability enhancements to these
    warfighters, the Army, the joint community, and to the Nation.
        I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
    matters and look forward to addressing any questions you may have.
    Secure the High Ground!

        Senator Udall. Thank you, General Mann.
        Ms. Chaplain?

     STATEMENT OF MS. CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION
       AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions,
    Senators Donnelly and King, thank you for inviting me to
    participate in today's hearing on DOD's space programs.
        The GAO has been tracking space acquisitions, past
    problems, and reforms. Most of DOD's space programs have
    overcome significant problems and are now in the production
    phase. DOD has continued its focus on implementing acquisition
    management and oversight improvements. There are still
    technical and manufacturing  programs  affecting  key  programs
     such  as  MUOS  and  GPS-3, but the portfolio as a whole has
    not seen problems on the scale it saw last decade.
        The challenges that face DOD now, in fact, are different
    than the ones faced just 5 or 6 years ago when most programs
    were in the development phase.
        First, faced with budget constraints, DOD has been seeking
    ways to reduce costs and achieve savings as it negotiates
    contracts for more satellites and launch vehicles. For launch
    vehicles, it is also working to introduce competition and lower
    costs.
        Second, faced with growing security threats and the need to
    increase resilience, DOD has been reconsidering its approach to
    acquisition. For instance, instead of building a satellite that
    meets many mission needs and serves a multitude of users, DOD
    is considering whether it should disperse missions, functions,
    and sensors across multiple systems, platforms, or domain. This
    approach is known as disaggregation.
        We recently reported on DOD's efforts to introduce
    competition into the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
    program, and today we are reporting our preliminary findings
    related to disaggregation. On the EELV program, we reported
    that DOD has taken significant steps to gain insight into
    contract costs with its current provider, United Launch
    Alliance (ULA). This effort has resulted in significant
    savings. We also reported that DOD could take a range of
    approaches to introduce competition with the 14 cores coming
    up, and we specifically laid out the benefits and challenges
    with 2 approaches, having the EELV competitors compete for
    launches under a commercial approach or having them compete
    similar to the way DOD now contracts with ULA.
        In short, both approaches can foster competition. The first
    could further reduce prices, but it could also result in less
    insight into costs and reduce DOD's flexibility in scheduling
    launches. The second would maintain the flexibility and
    insight, but could add costs. For new entrants, for instance,
    it could require them to develop and install new business
    systems to fulfill government data requirements. We do not
    recommend an approach that should be taken. It is really DOD's
    decision and it is not GAO's role to make such a
    recommendation.
        On the second question of disaggregation, we are reporting
    today that while our prior work shows these concepts can
    potentially reduce costs and development time, DOD does not yet
    have the knowledge it needs to make a transition to
    disaggregation on a wide scale. While DOD has conducted some
    studies that have assessed alternative approaches to the
    current programs of record, some within DOD do not consider
    these studies to be conclusive because they were either not
    conducted with sufficient analytical rigor or did not consider
    the capabilities, risks, and trades in a holistic manner.
        More analysis about disaggregation is important because
    this approach can have far-reaching effects and because there
    are challenges to its implementation. For several missions,
    this analysis is in progress and we will be continuing to
    evaluate DOD's progress this summer for this subcommittee.
        This concludes my opening remarks. I am happy to answer any
    questions you have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department
    of Defense's (DOD) space systems acquisitions. DOD spends billions of
    dollars each year to develop, produce, and launch space systems. These
    systems provide the government with critical intelligence information,
    communication methods, and navigation information, which are vital to
    many military and other government programs. Because these systems can
    be highly complex, they require large investments of both money and
    time to develop, produce, and launch. Given the expensive nature of
    space systems in today's constrained government budget environment, it
    is essential that DOD manage the acquisition of these systems carefully
    and continue to address problems that have plagued space systems
    acquisitions in the past decade.
        In the past, DOD has seen program after program experience
    significant cost increases coupled with schedule delays. However, in
    recent years these problems have largely been overcome for the programs
    currently in production, and additional satellites of the same design
    are now being launched. With the worst of their acquisition problems
    behind them, DOD is beginning to look at potential new directions for
    the national security space community, including options for meeting
    program requirements through the disaggregation \1\ of large space
    missions into multiple smaller satellites as a means to increase
    satellite resiliency and reduce acquisition costs and development
    time.\2\ In addition, DOD has been introducing significant changes to
    the way it acquires space launch services, by transitioning to a new
    acquisition approach with a longer-term commitment, and by taking steps
    to introduce competition to its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
    program, a major change from the last 8 years of that program. These
    potential changes may provide benefits to DOD, but there are challenges
    to their implementation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Air Force defines space disaggregation as ``[t]he
    dispersion of space-based missions, functions or sensors across
    multiple systems spanning one or more orbital plane, platform, host or
    domain.'' Programs may consider disaggregation in the future because it
    allows for options within a system's architecture to drive down cost,
    increase resiliency and distribute capability. Air Force Space Command,
    Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures, White Paper (Aug. 21,
    2013).
        \2\ DOD Space Policy defines resilience as the ability of an
    architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success
    with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and
    across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite of
    hostile action or adverse conditions. The policy further states that
    resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government,
    commercial, or international capabilities. See Department of Defense
    Directive 3100.10, Space Policy (Oct. 18, 2012). However, Office of the
    Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials we spoke with stated DOD
    is in the process of refining the definition of resilience and
    determining a methodology for measuring it.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        My testimony today will focus on: (1) the current status and cost
    of major DOD space systems acquisitions; (2) recent actions taken to
    further improve space systems acquisitions; and (3) potential impacts
    of the direction DOD is taking on upcoming changes to the acquisition
    of DOD space systems. This testimony is based on Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) reports issued over the past 5 years on
    space programs and weapon system acquisition best practices, and on DOD
    reports. In addition, it is based on ongoing work conducted to address
    a mandate in the Senate Report accompanying the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 for GAO to review the potential
    benefits and limitations of disaggregating future space systems.\3\ It
    is also based on work performed in support of our annual weapon system
    assessments, as well as space-related work in support of our reports on
    duplication, overlap, and fragmentation across the Federal Government.
    Finally, this statement is based on updates on cost increases and
    investment trends and improvement actions taken since last year. To
    conduct these updates, we analyzed DOD funding estimates for selected
    major space systems acquisition programs from fiscal years 2013 through
    2018. More information on our scope and methodology is available in our
    related GAO products. The work that supports this statement was
    performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
    to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
    basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
    We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
    our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. DOD
    provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 165 (2013). The Senate Report mandated
    GAO to assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of disaggregating
    key military space systems and examine whether disaggregation and
    payload hosting (an arrangement where DOD instruments are placed on
    commercial or other agency satellites) offers benefits to cost and
    survivability of a constellation (a group of similar satellites
    synchronized to orbit the Earth in an optimal way).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   background
        Over the last decade, DOD has been managing many challenging space
    systems acquisitions. A longstanding problem for the department is that
    program costs have tended to increase significantly from original cost
    estimates. In recent years, DOD has overcome many of the problems that
    had been hampering program development, and has begun to launch many of
    these satellites. However, the large cost growth of these systems
    continues to affect the department. Figure 1 compares the original cost
    estimates with current cost estimates for some of the department's
    major space acquisition programs.

        The gap between the estimates in figure 1 represents money that the
    department was not planning to spend on these programs, and did not
    have available to invest in other efforts. The gap in estimates is
    fairly stable between fiscal years 2014-2018, a result of the fact that
    most programs are mature and in a steady production phase. This figure
    does not include programs that are still in the early stages of
    planning and development.
        In past reports, we have identified a number of causes of
    acquisition problems. For example, in past years, DOD has tended to
    start more weapon programs than is affordable, creating a competition
    for funding that focuses on advocacy at the expense of realism and
    sound management. DOD has also tended to start its space programs
    before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be
    achieved within available resources and time constraints. There is no
    way to accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop,
    and build a satellite system when key technologies planned for that
    system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention.
    Finally, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all
    requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenges or
    the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full
    capability. DOD's preference to make larger, complex satellites that
    perform a multitude of missions has stretched technology challenges
    beyond current capabilities in some cases.
        Our work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to
    address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that
    DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
    incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
    requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and
    demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We
    have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program
    manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array
    of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit
    space programs. DOD has generally concurred with our recommendations,
    and has undertaken a number of actions to establish a better foundation
    for acquisition success. For example, we reported in the past that,
    among other actions, DOD created a new office within the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to focus
    attention on oversight for space programs and it eliminated offices
    considered to perform duplicative oversight functions. We have also
    reported in the past that the Air Force took actions to strengthen cost
    estimating and to reinstitute stricter standards for quality.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Longstanding
    Problems, but Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments Are
    Optimized. GAO-13-508T. (Washington, DC: April 24, 2013) and Space
    Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of
    Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. (Washington, DC: March
    21, 2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           the current status and cost of space systems acquisitions
        Most of DOD's major satellite programs are in mature phases of
    acquisition, and some of the significant problems of past years, such
    as cost and schedule growth, are not currently as prevalent. Table 1
    describes the status of the space programs we have been tracking in
    detail.

        While many programs have overcome past problems, some of the major
    space programs have encountered significant challenges in the last year
    and some delays in development and production. For example:

             The Air Force's Space Fence program office is
            developing a large ground-based radar that is expected to
            improve on the performance of and replace the Air Force Space
            Surveillance System, which became operational in 1961 and was
            recently shut down. The Space Fence radar will emit radio
            frequencies upward to space, from ground-based radar sites, to
            detect and track more and smaller Earth-orbiting objects than
            is currently possible, and provide valuable space situational
            awareness data to military and civilian users. The Air Force
            had originally planned to award a contract for Space Fence
            systems development in July 2012, but due to internal program
            reviews and budget re-prioritizations, this date has been
            delayed to May 2014. In addition, the number of radar sites
            planned has been reduced from two to one, though DOD plans to
            have an option under the system development contract to build a
            second site if needed.
             In April 2013, DOD proposed canceling the Missile
            Defense Agency's Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) because
            of concerns with the program's high-risk acquisition strategy
            and long-term affordability. PTSS was intended to be a
            satellite system equipped with infrared sensors that would
            track ballistic missiles through their emitted heat. The
            planned satellite system would consist of a constellation of
            nine satellites in orbit around the Earth's equator. We
            reported in July 2013 that the decision to propose canceling
            the PTSS program was based on an evaluation of the acquisition,
            technical, and operational risks of the PTSS program.
            Specifically, DOD's evaluation assessed the PTSS cost,
            schedule, technical design, and acquisition strategy to
            identify whether risks could challenge the program's ability to
            acquire, field, and sustain the system within planned cost and
            schedule constraints. The evaluation also determined that the
            PTSS program had significant technical, programmatic, and
            affordability risks. The program officially ceased operations
            in October 2013.
             The Air Force has nearly completed its analysis of
            alternatives to determine the direction for space based
            environmental monitoring, which will be a follow-on program for
            the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Through
            this analysis, the Air Force analyzed various options that
            included, but were not limited to, a traditional procurement of
            a weather satellite similar to the existing DMSP satellites, or
            a disaggregated approach using small satellites and hosted
            payload opportunities. According to the Air Force, the study
            was completed in the fall of 2013 and is awaiting final
            approval.
             The MUOS program plans to launch a third satellite in
            January 2015, which represents a delay of 6 months due to a
            production issue on the third satellite. Specifically, the
            third satellite failed system- and subsequent unit-level
            testing after rework last year and the program determined the
            root cause to be a manufacturing deficiency on a component
            critical for the operation of the satellite's ultra-high-
            frequency legacy communications payload. The program is
            replacing the component. According to the MUOS program office,
            the program is on track to meet the launch schedule of
            subsequent satellites, which is important because most of the
            communications satellites that MUOS is replacing are past their
            design lives. Synchronizing deliveries of MUOS satellites with
            compatible Army Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (HMS)
            terminals remains a challenge. Currently over 90 percent of the
            first satellite's on-orbit capabilities are being underutilized
            because of terminal program delays. Consequently, military
            forces are relying on legacy communication terminals and are
            not able to take advantage of the superior capabilities offered
            by the MUOS satellites. Operational testing and initial
            fielding of MUOS-capable HMS terminals is planned for fiscal
            year 2014, with a production decision expected in September
            2015.
       recent actions dod believes will improve space system acquisition
     processes, and continuing barriers to program oversight and management
        We have reported in the past that DOD and Congress are taking steps
    to reform and improve the defense acquisition system, and in the past
    year additional actions have been taken towards these goals.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO-13-508T. GAO-12-563T.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DOD Continues to Take Actions it Believes Will Improve Acquisition
            Oversight
        In November 2013, DOD published an update to its instruction
    5000.02, which provides acquisition guidance for DOD programs.\6\ With
    this update, DOD hoped to create an acquisition policy environment that
    will achieve greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending.
    Air Force officials noted that, for satellite programs, there are two
    major changes that they believe will improve the acquisition process.
    First, the instruction was changed to formally allow satellite programs
    to combine two major program milestones, B and C, which mark the
    beginning of the development and production phases, respectively.\7\
    According to the Air Force, satellite programs have typically seen a
    great deal of overlap in the development and production phases, mainly
    because they are buying small quantities of items. They are often not
    able to produce a prototype to be fully tested because of the high
    costs of each article, so the first satellite in a production is often
    used both for testing and operations. Air Force officials believe that
    this change to the acquisition guidance will allow for streamlining of
    satellite development and production processes, and provide more
    efficient oversight without sacrificing program requirements. GAO has
    not assessed the potential effects of this change. In the past, we have
    reported that committing a program to production without a substantive
    development phase may increase program cost and schedule risks, and we
    plan to look at the impacts of this change as it begins to be
    implemented.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Interim Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, Operation of
    the Defense Acquisition System para. 5.d.(10)(b) (Nov. 25, 2013).
        \7\ In defense acquisitions, milestone B provides authorization for
    a program to enter into the system development phase, and commits the
    required investment resources to the program. Milestone C is the point
    at which a program enters the production and deployment phase.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A second change made this year, according to Air Force officials,
    is the requirement that DOD programs, including space programs, undergo
    independent development testing. While development testing for DOD
    programs is not new to this policy revision, now the testing
    organization will be an independent organization outside the program
    office. For space programs, this organization will be under the Program
    Executive Officer for Space, and will report their findings directly to
    that office, providing what the Air Force believes will be an
    independent voice on a program's development status. The Air Force is
    confident that these changes will provide benefits to program
    oversight, although because these are recent changes, we have not yet
    assessed their potential for process improvements.
        In addition, DOD is adopting new practices to reduce fragmentation
    of its satellite ground control systems, which adds oversight to a
    major development decision. Last year we reported that DOD's satellite
    ground control systems were potentially fragmented, and that standalone
    systems were being developed for new satellite programs without a
    formal analysis of whether or not the satellite control needs could be
    met with existing systems.\8\ In the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2014, Congress placed more oversight onto this process
    by requiring a cost-benefit analysis for all new or follow-on satellite
    systems using a dedicated ground control system instead of a shared
    ground control system.\9\ This new requirement should improve oversight
    into these systems' development, and may reduce some unnecessary
    duplication of satellite control systems. According to Air Force
    officials, the first program to go through this process was the
    Enhanced Polar System, and all future satellite programs will include
    this cost-benefit analysis in their ground system planning. In
    addition, the act directed DOD to develop a DOD-wide long-term plan for
    satellite ground control systems.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ GAO, Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of
    Commercial Practices Could Improve DOD's Operations, GAO-13-315
    (Washington, DC: April 18, 2013).
        \9\ Pub. L. No. 113-66, Sec. 822(a) (2013) (codified as amended at
    10 U.S.C. Sec. 2366b(a)).
        \10\ Pub. L. No. 113-66, Sec. 822(b) (2013).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Additionally, the Defense Space Council continues with its
    architecture reviews in key space mission areas. According to Air Force
    officials, the Council is the principal DOD forum for discussing space
    issues, and brings together senior-level leaders to discuss these
    issues. These architecture reviews are to inform DOD's programming,
    budgeting, and prioritization for the space mission area. The Council
    has five reviews underway or completed in areas such as overhead
    persistent infrared, satellite communications, space situational
    awareness, and national security space launches. They are also
    initiating a study of how DOD can assess the resilience of its space
    systems. DOD also recently held a forum on resiliency that included
    participation from senior leaders from several groups within DOD and
    the Intelligence Community to create a work plan towards resolution of
    critical gaps in resiliency.
        Many of the reforms that are being initiated may not be fully
    proven for some years, because they apply mainly to programs in early
    acquisition stages, and most DOD space systems are currently either in
    the production phase or late in the development phase. We have not
    assessed the impact of actions taken this year, but we have observed
    that the totality of improvements made in recent years has contributed
    to better foundations for program execution.
    DOD Continues to Face Barriers to Program Oversight and Management
        While DOD has taken steps to address acquisition problems of the
    past, significant issues above the program level will still present
    challenges to even the best run programs. One key oversight issue is
    fragmented leadership of the space community. We have reported in the
    past that fragmented leadership and lack of a single authority in
    overseeing the acquisition of space programs have created challenges
    for optimally acquiring, developing, and deploying new space
    systems.\11\ Past studies and reviews have found that responsibilities
    for acquiring space systems are diffused across various DOD
    organizations, even though many of the larger programs, such as the
    Global Positioning System and those to acquire imagery and
    environmental satellites, are integral to the execution of multiple
    agencies' missions. This fragmentation is problematic because the lack
    of coordination has led to delays in fielding systems, and also because
    no one person or organization is held accountable for balancing
    government-wide needs against wants, resolving conflicts and ensuring
    coordination among the many organizations involved with space systems
    acquisitions, and ensuring that resources are directed where they are
    most needed. Though changes to organizations and the creation of the
    Defense Space Council have helped to improve oversight, our work
    continues to find that DOD would benefit from increased coordination
    and a single authority overseeing these programs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication,
    Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-
    12-342SP (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012); and Space Acquisitions: DOD
    Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities but, Persistent Challenges Remain
    in Developing Space Systems, GAO-10-447T (Washington, DC: Mar. 10,
    2010).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A program management challenge that GAO has identified, which stems
    from a lack of oversight, is that DOD has not optimally aligned the
    development of its satellites with associated components, including
    ground control system and user terminal acquisitions. Satellites
    require ground control systems to receive and process information from
    the satellites, and user terminals to deliver that satellite's
    information to users. All three elements are important for utilizing
    space-based data, but development of satellites often outpaces the
    ground control systems and the user terminals. Delays in these ground
    control systems and user terminals lead to underutilized on-orbit
    satellite resources, and thus delays in getting the new capabilities to
    the warfighters or other end-users. In addition, there are limits to
    satellites' operational life spans once launched. When satellites are
    launched before their associated ground and user segments are ready,
    they use up time in their operational lives without their capabilities
    being utilized. Synchronization of space system components will be an
    important issue for DOD in considering disaggregating space
    architectures, as the potential for larger numbers and novel
    configurations of satellites and ground systems will likely require the
    components to be synchronized to allow them to work together in the
    most effective way possible. As mentioned earlier, DOD is taking steps
    in response to improvements mandated by Congress. But it will likely be
    difficult to better synchronize delivery of satellite components
    without more focused leadership at a level above the acquisitions'
    program offices. For example, budget authority for user terminals,
    ground systems, and satellites is spread throughout the military
    Services, and no one is in charge of synchronizing all of the system
    components, making it difficult to optimally line up programs'
    deliveries.
     dod is considering and adopting significant changes to space systems
                                  acquisitions
        Fiscal pressures, past development problems, and concerns about the
    resiliency of satellites have spurred DOD to consider significant
    changes in the way it acquires and launches national security
    satellites.
    Potential Changes to Acquiring New DOD Space Systems
        Significant fiscal constraints, coupled with growing threats to DOD
    space systems--including adversary attacks such as anti-satellite
    weapons and communications jamming, and environmental hazards such as
    orbital debris--have called into question whether the complex and
    expensive satellites DOD is fielding and operating are affordable and
    will meet future needs. For example, a single launch failure, on-orbit
    anomaly, or adversary attack on a large multi-mission satellite could
    result in the loss of billions of dollars of investment and a
    significant loss of capability. Additionally, some satellites, which
    have taken more than a decade to develop, contain technologies that are
    already considered obsolete by the time they are launched.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO, Briefing on Commercial and Department of Defense Space
    System Requirements and Acquisition Practices, GAO-10-135R (Washington,
    DC: Jan. 14, 2010).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To address these challenges, DOD is considering alternative
    approaches to provide space-based capabilities, particularly for
    missile warning, protected satellite communications, and environmental
    monitoring. According to DOD, the primary considerations for studying
    these approaches and making decisions on the best way forward relate to
    finding the right balance of affordability, resiliency, and capability.
    These decisions, to be made over the next 2 to 3 years, have the
    potential for making sweeping changes to DOD's space architectures of
    the future. For example, DOD could decide to build more disaggregated
    architectures, including dispersing sensors onto separate platforms;
    using multiple domains, including space, air, and ground, to provide
    full mission capabilities; hosting payloads on other government or
    commercial spacecraft; or some combination of these.
        Our past work has indicated that some of the approaches being
    considered have the potential to reduce acquisition cost and time on a
    single program. For instance, we have found that DOD's initial
    preference to make fewer large and complex satellites that perform a
    multitude of missions has stretched technology challenges beyond
    existing capabilities, and in some cases vastly increased the
    complexities of related software.single program. For instance, we have
    found that DOD's initial preference to make fewer large and complex
    satellites that perform a multitude of missions has stretched
    technology challenges beyond existing capabilities, and in some cases
    vastly increased the complexities of related software.\13\ In addition,
    developing extensive new designs and custom-made spacecraft and
    payloads to meet the needs of multiple users limits DOD's ability to
    provide capabilities sooner and contributes to higher costs.\14\ Last
    year, we reported that one potential new approach, hosted payload
    arrangements in which government instruments are placed on commercial
    satellites, may provide opportunities for government agencies to save
    money, especailly in terms of launch and operation costs, and gain
    access to space.\15\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to
    Address Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems, GAO-07-96
    (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2006).
        \14\ GAO-10-135R.
        \15\ GAO, 2013 Annual Report: Actions Needed to Reduce
    Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial
    Benefits, GAO-13-279SP (Washington, DC: April 9, 2013).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As new approaches, such as disaggregation, are considered, the
    existing management environment could pose barriers to success,
    including fragmented leadership for space programs, the culture of the
    DOD space community, fragmentation in satellite control stations, and
    disconnects between the delivery of satellites and their corresponding
    user terminals. For instance, disaggregation may well require
    substantial changes to acquisition processes and requirements setting.
    But without a central authority to implement these changes, there is
    likely to be resistance to adopting new ways of doing business,
    particularly since responsibilities for space acquisitions stretch
    across the military services and other government agencies. Moreover,
    under a disaggregated approach, DOD may need to effectively network and
    integrate a larger collection of satellites--some of which may even
    belong to commercial providers. We have reported that ground systems
    generally only receive and process data from the satellites for which
    they were developed. They generally do not control and operate more
    than one type of satellite or share their data with other ground
    systems. To date, however, DOD has had difficulty adopting modern
    practices and technologies for controlling satellites as well as
    difficulty in coordinating the delivery of satellites with the user
    terminals that must be installed on thousands of ships, planes, and
    ground-based assets. These are conditions that are difficult to change
    without strong leadership to break down organizational stove-pipes and
    to introduce technologies or techniques that could enable DOD to better
    integrate and fuse data from a wider, potentially more disparate,
    collection of satellites.
        In light of suggestions that disaggregation could potentially
    reduce cost and increase survivability, the Senate Committee on Armed
    Services mandated that we assess the potential benefits and limitations
    of disaggregating key military space systems, including potential
    impacts on total costs.\16\ To date, we have found that the potential
    effects of disaggregation are conceptual and not yet quantified. DOD
    has taken initial steps to assess alternative approaches, but it does
    not yet have the knowledge it needs to quantify benefits and
    limitations and determine a course of action. DOD officials we spoke
    with acknowledge the department has not yet established sufficient
    knowledge on which to base a decision. While DOD has conducted some
    studies that assessed alternative approaches to the current programs of
    record, some within the department do not consider these studies to be
    conclusive because they were either not conducted with sufficient
    analytical rigor or did not consider the capabilities, risks, and
    trades in a holistic manner. For example, according to the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense's Office of Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation, a recent Air Force study that assessed future satellite
    communications architectures contained insufficient data to support the
    conclusion that one architectural approach was more resilient than
    others, and the cost estimates it contained did not consider important
    factors, such as ground control and terminal costs, in calculating the
    implications of changing architectures.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 165 (2013).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To build consensus in the department, and to conduct a more
    rigorous analysis of options, DOD is currently in the process of
    conducting additional studies that will consider future architectures.
    Included in these studies are Analyses of Alternatives for future
    missile warning, protected satellite communications, and space based
    environmental monitoring capabilities.\17\ Among the range of
    alternatives these analyses are considering are approaches that keep
    the current system, evolve the current system, and disaggregate the
    current system into more numerous, but small and less complex,
    satellites. DOD has nearly finished the space-based environmental
    monitoring study and expects to finish the other two in either this
    fiscal year or next.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ An Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) is a review in the DOD
    acquisition process that compares the operational effectiveness,
    suitability, and lifecycle cost of solutions to satisfy documented
    capability needs. Factors considered in the AOA include effectiveness,
    cost, schedule, concepts of operations, and overall risk of each
    alternative. A GAO report in 2009 found in many cases the AOAs did not
    effectively consider a broad range of alternatives and that DOD
    sponsors sometimes identify a preferred solution before an AOA is
    conducted. GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Many Analyses of Alternatives
    Have Not Provided a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options, GAO-09-
    665 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2009). These AOAs are to investigate
    follow-on programs for SBIRS, AEHF, and the Defense Meteorological
    Satellite Program. In addition to missile warning, SBIRS supports
    missile defense, battlespace awareness, and technical intelligence
    missions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Moreover, as DOD continues to build knowledge about different
    acquisition approaches, it will be essential to develop an
    understanding of key factors for decisions on future approaches that
    could impact the costs, schedules, and performance of providing mission
    capabilities. Some considerations for moving to a new or evolved
    architecture may include the following:

             Common definitions of key terms, such as resiliency
            and disaggregation, across all stakeholders, and a common
            measurement of these terms in order to compare architectural
            alternatives.
             The true costs of moving to a new architecture,
            including transition costs for funding overlapping operations
            and compatibility between new and legacy systems and non-
            recurring engineering costs for new-start programs, among
            others.
             Potential technical and logistical challenges. For
            example, with hosted payloads, our past work has found that
            ensuring compatibility between sensors and host satellites may
            be difficult because of variable interfaces on different
            companies' satellites.\18\ In addition, scheduling and funding
            hosted payload arrangements may be difficult because the
            timeline for developing sensors may be much longer than that of
            commercial satellites.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ GAO-13-279SP.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Impacts to supporting capabilities, such as ground
            control and operations and launch availability, and
            longstanding challenges we have identified regarding how these
            have been managed.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ GAO-13-315. GAO, Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs
    to Ensure New Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information.
    GAO-11-641. (Washington, DC: September 15, 2011) and Space
    Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
    Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. GAO-08-1039.
    (Washington, DC: September 26, 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Readiness of the acquisition workforce and industrial
            base to support a new architecture.

        Given that DOD is in the early stages of assessing alternatives,
    our ongoing work is continuing to identify potential benefits and
    limitations of disaggregation and examine the extent to which these
    issues are being factored into DOD's ongoing studies. We look forward
    to reporting on the results of this analysis this summer.
    Recent and Upcoming Changes to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
            Program
        DOD has made some changes to the way it buys launch services from
    its sole-source provider, and plans to allow other companies to compete
    with that provider for launch services in the near future. DOD's
    Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program is the primary
    provider of launch vehicles for U.S. military and intelligence
    satellites. Since 2006, the United Launch Alliance (ULA) has been the
    sole-source launch provider for this program, with a record of 50
    successful consecutive government missions. From 2006 through 2013, DOD
    had two types of contracts with ULA through which ULA provided launch
    services for national security space launches.\20\ DOD utilized this
    dual-contract structure to achieve flexibility in launch schedules and
    to avoid additional costs associated with frequent launch delays.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ Under this two-contract structure, DOD bought launch
    capability on one series of contracts, and launch hardware on another
    series of contracts. Launch capability included things like overhead on
    launch pads, engineering support, and labor to conduct launches.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the last few years, though the dual contract structure met DOD's
    needs for unprecedented mission success and flexible launch capability,
    predicted costs continued to rise for launch services. In response to
    these cost predictions, DOD revised its acquisition strategy to allow
    for a ``block buy'' of launch vehicles, where DOD would commit to
    multiple years of launch purchases from ULA, with the goal of
    stabilizing production and decreasing prices. In addition, and
    partially in response to GAO recommendations, DOD gathered large
    amounts of information on ULA's cost drivers to allow DOD to negotiate
    significantly lower prices under the contracting structure.\21\ In
    December 2013, DOD signed a contract modification with ULA to purchase
    35 launch vehicle booster cores over a 5-year period, 2013-2017, and
    the associated capability to launch them. According to the Air Force,
    this contracting strategy saved $4.4 billion over the predicted program
    cost in the fiscal year 2012 budget. We recently reported on some of
    the changes included in this new contract from the prior contracts.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ GAO-11-641.
        \22\ GAO, The Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
    Competitive Procurement, GAO-14-377R (Washington, DC: March 4, 2014).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to this change in the way DOD buys launch vehicles, DOD
    is also in the process of introducing a method for other launch
    services companies to compete with ULA for EELV launches. Since 2006,
    when ULA began as a joint venture between then-competitors Boeing and
    Lockheed Martin, the EELV program has been managed as a sole source
    procurement, because there were no other domestic launch companies that
    could meet the program's requirements. With the recent development of
    new domestic launch vehicles that can meet at least some EELV mission
    requirements, DOD plans to make available for competition up to 14
    launches in fiscal years 2015-2017. Any launch company that has been
    certified by DOD to launch national security space payloads will be
    able to compete with ULA to launch these missions. DOD is currently
    finalizing their plan for this competition, including what requirements
    will be placed on the contractors and how they will compare proposals
    from the contractors.
        Based on our discussions with DOD officials, they plan to use a
    best value approach for this competition, in which price is not the
    only consideration. DOD will likely consider several factors when
    comparing proposals for launch services for the 14 booster core
    competition between ULA and new entrants, including price, mission
    risk, and satellite vehicle integration risks. DOD could require
    competitive proposals to be structured in several ways. If DOD requires
    proposals to contain both fixed-price and cost reimbursement features
    for launch services and capability, respectively, similar to the way it
    currently contracts with ULA, there could be benefits to DOD and ULA,
    but potential burdens to new entrants. For example, DOD is familiar
    with this approach and has experience negotiating under these terms,
    and ULA is familiar with DOD's requirements given ULA's role as the
    EELV's sole launch provider. But use of a cost type contract may negate
    efficient contractor business practices and cost savings due to
    government data requirements under this type of approach, and it may
    give ULA a price advantage because DOD already funds launch capability
    for ULA. Alternatively, if DOD implements a fixed-price commercial
    approach to launch proposals with fewer data reporting requirements,
    DOD could lose insight into contractor cost or pricing, but may receive
    lower prices from new entrants due to these fewer data reporting
    requirements. DOD could also require a combination of elements from
    each of these approaches, or develop new contract requirements for this
    competition. We examined some of the benefits and challenges of the
    first two approaches, either of which can facilitate competitive launch
    contract awards, in a recent report.\23\ DOD expects to issue a draft
    request for proposal for the first of the competitive missions, where
    the method for evaluating and comparing proposals will be explained, in
    the spring of 2014.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ GAO-14-377R.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The planned competition for launch services may have helped DOD
    negotiate the lower prices it achieved in its December 2013 contract
    modification, and DOD could see further savings if a robust domestic
    launch market materializes. DOD noted in its 2014 President's Budget
    submission for EELV that after the current contract with ULA has ended,
    it plans to have a full and open competition for national security
    space launches. Cost savings on launches, as long as they do not come
    with a reduction in mission successes, would greatly benefit DOD, and
    allow the department to put funding previously needed for launches into
    programs in the development phases to ensure they are adequately
    resourced.
        In conclusion, DOD has made significant progress in solving past
    space systems acquisition problems, and is seeing systems begin to
    launch after years of development struggles. However, systemic problems
    remain that need to be addressed as DOD considers changes to the way it
    acquires new systems. This is particularly important if DOD decides to
    pursue new approaches that could require changes in longstanding
    processes, practices, and organizational structures. Even if DOD
    decides not to pursue new approaches, these problems must still be
    tackled. In addition, challenging budget situations will continue to
    require tradeoffs and prioritization decisions across programs, though
    limited funds may also provide the impetus for rethinking
    architectures. We look forward to working with Congress and DOD in
    identifying the most effective and efficient ways to sustain and
    develop space capabilities in this challenging environment.
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, this completes my prepared
    statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you and members
    of the subcommittee may have at this time.
                         contacts and acknowledgements
        For further information about this statement, please contact
    Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact
    points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
    may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made
    key contributions to this statement and related work include Art
    Gallegos, Assistant Director; Pete Anderson; Virginia Chanley; Erin
    Cohen; Desiree Cunningham; Brenna Guarneros; Kristine Hassinger; Laura
    Hook; Rich Horiuchi; Jeff Sanders; and Roxanna Sun.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Ms. Chaplain.
        We will do 7-minute rounds. I will start.
        General Shelton, I want to turn to you. Much has been said
    about the disaggregation of satellite sensors to smaller
    satellites or hosted payloads, but no studies have been done to
    prove that it increases survivability and lowers cost. What is
    your point of view on that set of questions?
        General Shelton. Senator, as Cristina just said, we are in
    the middle of these studies right now. In fact, she mentioned
    this as well. The way we have gone about procuring satellites,
    particularly advanced extremely high frequency (AEHF) and
    space-based infrared system (SBIRS) and GPS, we have bought
    blocks of satellites, in some cases two, in some cases more,
    but we have bought in blocks and saved considerable money by
    doing that. Some of that money we have plowed back into what we
    call strategic modernization initiative funds, and those funds
    support both technology improvement, as well as studying these
    disaggregation concepts, alternative architectures for the
    future.
        What we are trying to do here is get ahead of the threat or
    at least stay up with the threat so that we are much more
    resilient, much more survivable in our architectures in
    critically important space capability for the future.
        I would agree that we are not quite there yet. We have not
    gotten to definitive answers, but we are certainly in the
    middle of some very important studies on what those answers
    would be.
        Senator Udall. If there is one thing that you are known
    for, it is advocacy of SSA, and I want to thank you on behalf
    of the subcommittee for the great service you have done the
    Nation in that regard.
        Do you believe we need an overall coordinated architecture
    for this effort rather than this accumulation of sensors that
    we now have?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir. We do have an overall
    architecture, and it is orbital regime by orbital regime. So
    what we need in low earth orbit, what gaps we have in
    capabilities, what we need in geosynchronous orbit, what gaps
    we have in those capabilities--we are filling those gaps. We
    are in the process of providing new sensors that would, indeed,
    fill those gaps with things like the Space Fence which will go
    out on Kwajalein, with things like the space-based space
    surveillance satellite, which will come probably in the 2018-
    2019 timeframe. We are looking at moving the space surveillance
    telescope that is now in New Mexico down to Australia to
    provide us better coverage of deep space in the southern
    hemisphere.
        There is a range of things that we are doing in terms of
    sensor technology, but in addition to that, we are putting a
    new system out at the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC)
    called Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS). That
    will fuse all this data and provide us much better capability
    to be predictive in our SSA, much less reactive because right
    now we do forensic analysis, frankly, of what happened. We want
    to get to the place where we are predicting what is going to
    happen and then we can take steps to avoid the consequences of
    those actions.
        Senator Udall. Let me ask a final question of you that gets
    at the heart of this important discussion we are having. Do you
    believe deterrence concepts work with space assets?
        General Shelton. Senator, that is a very difficult question
    because traditional deterrence theory involves two things. It
    is either denying benefits to an adversary or imposing costs on
    an adversary. But much of that deterrence is based on being
    able to see what capabilities the adversary has. We do not make
    public in most cases some of the capabilities that we have, so
    there is no transparency there, so there is no deterrence.
    There is very little capability to really verify what we might
    consider as deterrence or treaty obligations or anything of
    that nature. Typically, what we have looked at for strategic
    deterrence in many cases does not apply because you just do not
    have the same situation, and as you reach into the cyber
    domain, it gets even worse.
        Senator Udall. That is a whole other conversation, is it
    not?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for those insights.
        General Mann, maybe I could turn to you. As I mentioned,
    one of the primary assets you maintain is the one on Kwajalein.
    Its location makes it very important for SSA.
        Could you please explain to the subcommittee how the Army
    budgets for SSA and what improvements might be made in the
    budget process?
        General Mann. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
        Currently, the way we work the budgeting process is, we
    receive from STRATCOM the needs, the requirements each year in
    terms of products, whether it is imagery, and we use that to
    help form the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) that the Army
    puts forth. So we have an arrangement where we work very
    closely with STRATCOM, with the Air Force, to make sure that we
    fully understand what the requirement is and then we POM
    accordingly.
        Now, something that might come in out of cycle or an
    additional request is something that we would have to take back
    to the Army and it would have to be prioritized and funded if
    it met that threshold.
        Currently, that is the process, working very closely with
    STRATCOM based upon what their requirements are every year.
        Second, your second question, Senator. I think not so much
    from the budgeting process--I think really what I have to do is
    I have to make sure that I truly articulate the importance of
    SSA to the leaders that make the decisions. Obviously, there
    are multiple claimants for limited resources. From a budgeting
    standpoint, my challenge, my objective, is to make sure that I
    clearly articulate the importance and the priority that these
    requests should receive. Quite frankly, I think it is
    reflective in how the Army's senior leadership view space,
    missile defense, and cyber. It is at the top of the priority
    list. So I am pretty confident we are going to get the support
    we need.
        Senator Udall. Dr. Zangardi, let me try and fit in one last
    question. I know you will give a succinct answer.
        You talked about MUOS. It is designed to replace an aging
    UHF system the Navy operates which, as I have implied, is near
    its end of life. Do you expect the event with satellite number
    3 to affect our capacity to replace the aging system? If so,
    how?
        Dr. Zangardi. No, sir, I do not. We experienced a 6-month
    delay moving to number 4 and pushing it back to a January
    launch of 2015. With the capacity we currently have up on
    orbit, between UHF,  ultra-high  frequency  follow-on  (UFO),
    MUOS,  SV-1,  and SV-2--we have two UHF packages there--hosted
    payloads and leased satellite capability, we exceed the Joint
    Staff requirement by 41 percent for channels where access is
    provided to the warfighter. So we are pretty confident that
    that will have no impact on the operational warfighter.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Shelton, the November 2013 U.S.-China Economic and
    Security Review Commission raises concerns about China's
    efforts to militarize space and develop an anti-satellite
    (ASAT) weapon capability. They say this in the unclassified
    report: Although Beijing claims the launch was part of a high-
    altitude scientific experiment, available data suggests it was
    intended to test at least the launch vehicle component of a new
    high-altitude ASAT capability. If the launch is part of China's
    ASAT program, Beijing's attempt to disguise it as a scientific
    experiment would demonstrate a lack of transparency about its
    objectives and activities in space. Furthermore, such a test
    would signal China's intent to develop an ASAT capability to
    target satellites in an altitude range that includes U.S. GPS,
    and many U.S. military intelligence satellites.
        Is that accurate, to your knowledge? Do you agree with that
    assessment? Is it a concern to us?
        General Shelton. Senator, at this level, all I can say is
    we are concerned about all orbits now. We are concerned about
    low earth orbit because we saw the 2007 Chinese ASAT test,
    which was a success. We are concerned about work that we have
    seen since then that includes all the way up to geosynchronous
    orbit. Some of our most precious assets fly in geosynchronous
    orbit.
        Senator Sessions. Are there actions we could take to deter
    our potential adversaries from taking such action? What do we
    consider it to be? Is it the equivalent of shooting down a
    military plane or attacking a ship? How do we respond to any
    potential attack on our satellite capability? Should we not
    make that clear now?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir. Those are policy questions that
    we are addressing right now. Maybe Mr. Loverro wants to say
    more about that. But I will tell you from the technology point
    of view, we are addressing that very issue.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Loverro, what do you think about
    that? Sometimes ambiguity encourages aggression, as many people
    stress. Should we have a clear position with regard to the
    consequences of aggression against a satellite of the United
    States?
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, Senator. Actually, our national policy
    makes it clear that we view U.S. space assets as our sovereign
    assets and that attack on them is equivalent to attack on any
    sovereign assets. We have stated in our National Space Policy
    that we intend to go ahead and defend those assets in times and
    places of our choosing because we do view those as critical to
    U.S. national security.
        Senator Sessions. I think it is important to make sure we
    understand. I am not sure you have stated absolutely clearly
    what would happen. But to the extent to which we make it very
    clear that you do not get to knock our satellites out and
    nothing will happen, I think it is very important. Thank you
    for sharing that, and I am glad you are working on it. We will
    probably inquire about it further as we go along.
        General Mann, in November 2011, your team tested the
    Advanced Hypersonic Weapons (AHW) system. It demonstrated the
    best results to date for the development of a future prompt
    global strike capability. I understand there will be another
    test in August of this year. Can you provide the subcommittee a
    quick update on the progress that is managed by your command?
        General Mann. Yes, thank you, Senator. Again, I am pretty
    proud of our team, those men and women at Huntsville with
    Sandia Labs, working with those folks. It is the only
    successful test to date of the AHW system.
        Right now we are on track. As you mentioned, we have a test
    scheduled for August of this year. Then based upon the results
    that come from that test, then we will go ahead and again work
    closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as to
    what they would like us to do, what the next steps are. I know
    that they are working with the Navy also on possible
    utilization of this capability.
        Senator Sessions. I think there is a competitive
    environment for production of this, as I understand it. But
    tell us how you feel like your team is doing, to what extent it
    is an in-house operation, and how the costs are shaping up.
        General Mann. Senator, right now we are on target with the
    costs. I do not see any kind of an overrun at this moment.
    Everything is predicated on what happens after the test. We
    have the monies allocated to support the test. We do not
    envision any kind of overruns. But really, I think once we see
    the results of the test and whether or not it met all the
    parameters and all the objectives, that I think will be
    illuminating for the OSD folks to really take a look at where
    they want to go with this, how much further they want to go. Do
    they want to look at a naval application for that? But in terms
    of the budget, we are on budget. We are not over budget and we
    are on target right now to execute. No show-stoppers at this
    point.
        Senator Sessions. You feel like there is nothing
    scientifically blocking you from success and reaching the goal
    at this point?
        General Mann. Not at this point, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. General Shelton, briefly. The full
    committee has delved into the concerns about cyber warfare and
    any vulnerabilities our systems might have, particularly our
    space and missile systems, to cyber attacks that could
    neutralize their capabilities even for a period of time. It
    might be a critical period of time.
        Do you have any thoughts about that? I know you are
    concerned. Maybe some of the other panelists would offer an
    opinion.
        General Shelton. Yes, sir. We are going system-by-system
    looking at our cyber vulnerabilities, and we have a large
    information assurance program that gets into those
    vulnerabilities and patches them and tries to prevent access.
    In many cases, these are closed systems. That does not mean
    there are not vulnerabilities, but they are closed systems not
    accessible through the Internet. So it would take insider,
    special access, those kinds of things to get to these closed
    networks. But nevertheless, we are addressing all those touch
    points, if you will, and closing off those vulnerabilities as
    best we can.
        Senator Sessions. Any other members want to comment on
    that?
        We had legislation that required that to be done, a review
    to be done and a report to be done on this. What we found was
    the full committee staff recommended, and the subcommittee has
    fundamentally adopted it, that all our vulnerable systems--not
    just space and missile--be examined for these possible
    weaknesses. I think it is very important. Thank you for your
    work.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Loverro, I do not know if you would be the guy to
    answer this one, but we currently rely on National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather satellites. They are
    getting older, and I am concerned about their impact on
    military operations as they get older, if they are becoming
    less capable. I was wondering if there is a master plan to
    upgrade the weather satellite program and whether, as you look
    at it, you have the funding streams to get it done.
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, Senator. Again, this is probably one of
    those questions that can be shared between myself and General
    Shelton. Let me start and perhaps let him finish.
        Within DOD, I was a party to an extensive review of DOD
    weather needs, analyzing not just the NOAA systems but
    commercial and international systems as well, and what kind of
    specific needs did DOD need to bring to bear to assure that its
    capabilities were protected. Air Force Space Command took a
    very aggressive approach on that, brought forward a program and
    issues budget that I probably should turn to General Shelton to
    go ahead and talk about.
        General Shelton. Yes, sir. Following that analysis of
    alternatives that Mr. Loverro is talking about, we have gone
    forward with a weather system follow-on program we call it,
    which will end up being a small satellite which has unique DOD
    requirements satisfied. Like he said, we will count on NOAA,
    international and commercial partners to provide the rest of
    the data that is needed to round out the weather picture.
        We are in the process right now of launching a defense
    meteorological satellite program. Satellite number 19 will
    launch within the next couple of months from Vandenberg Air
    Force Base. We will put up a new satellite. What happens after
    that is under review, but we are confident we are in a good
    place, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. General Mann, the hypersonic missile
    program is really quite a task. You are doing amazing work on
    it. What I was also wondering is, as other nations are working
    on this, as we know they are, do we have groups working on how
    to counter their efforts in this area or how to protect our
    Nation from their efforts I guess would be a better way to put
    it?
        General Mann. Let me say that we are aware of the
    technologies that are being looked at. I would like to take
    that for the record. I really do not know of specific programs
    that we are putting into place to combat that threat, but we
    are aware. In the case of Russia, I know that Russia is heavily
    involved in looking at this kind of capability. But really, let
    me take that for the record to get you the exact programs, if
    they are out there.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Just as the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to mature and
    field capabilities to counter the growing ballistic missile defense
    threat, we also are working to address the emerging threat posed by a
    hypersonic glide body delivery platform. DOD continues to evaluate
    defensive capabilities to address the emerging hypersonic technology
    threat. Additionally, as is the case with many of our technologies, DOD
    is attuned to and working diligently to identify and neutralize
    adversarial actions to garner hypersonic technology. Upon request,
    further details could be provided via a classified session or paper.

        Senator Donnelly. General Shelton, as we look at the
    ground-based interceptor systems and such, we are looking at
    some sites for further development to protect us from North
    Korea and Iran. Do you see that as a necessary step as we move
    forward?
        General Shelton. Senator, I really do not work missile
    defense, to tell you the truth, other than to provide radar
    support to missile defense interceptors. That may be something
    General Mann could answer better than me.
        General Mann. Yes, Senator. Thank you.
        Obviously, putting a third site out there on the east coast
    will provide increased capacity, not so much capability, but
    increased capacity. You will take your assets and spread them
    out so that you do not have them just at Greeley or at
    Vandenberg Air Force Base. It also will give you a little bit
    more decision space or battle space, as it is known, in order
    to make a decision regarding a threat emanating from Iran.
        But I will have to tell you that I think that the greatest
    priority, the most important thing that we need to really focus
    on, is long-range discrimination because I think it is fair to
    say that we will never have enough interceptors to really
    address all the threat vehicles that are out there. So I think
    it is more important that we are as efficient and as effective
    with the interceptors that we currently have. That is the
    reason why making sure that we are providing the interceptor
    with the best track data, the discrimination to be able to
    really identify the target within a complex, that is what I
    would really highly recommend.
        Senator Donnelly. This would be to whoever would like to
    take it. If China is conducting test targeting objects, for
    instance, up to 12,000 miles away from the Earth's surface,
    could this affect our GPS capabilities, our GPS satellites?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. In a significant way?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. Would their efforts, if they do this,
    indicate a significant improvement in China's space weapon
    capabilities as well?
        General Shelton. No question. Yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. This would be for Dr. Zangardi, and that
    is, in relation to relying more heavily on networks and
    computer components to utilize our military and space systems
    than we ever have before, what confidence do you have in our
    ability to detect counterfeit parts, similar parts that create
    a danger of their own, obviously? Number one, it is important
    to protect our Nation. Number two, Naval Warfare Crane out of
    Indiana does a lot of this work. It is something that is very
    concerning to me to make sure that we get this right.
        Dr. Zangardi. Yes, sir. It is very concerning to us also.
    We spend time with the Naval Warfare Center at Crane. That does
    not fall within my portfolio. I mainly work with Space and
    Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) out of San Diego and
    their technical acquisition expertise in this area.
        We take it very seriously. Specifically as related to MUOS,
    we have put in place actions in the program to review what we
    are taking in, what we are procuring. In a broader IT sense,
    the IT portfolio within the acquisition of the Navy falls under
    me. We take very seriously this threat and we are putting in
    place actions to begin to ensure that we are not buying parts
    that would not be good for us to have.
        Senator Donnelly. What is your determination--I will ask
    this very quickly as I am out of time--as to the rate of
    counterfeit parts, what you are seeing? Do you see an increase,
    decrease, or what is your best estimate at the present time?
        Dr. Zangardi. Sir, I am hesitant to give an estimate. I
    would like to take that question for the record and provide you
    an answer at a later time.
        Senator Donnelly. That would be fine.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company (LMSSC) has experienced a
    total of eight known counterfeit parts incidents since 2008, none on
    the MUOS program. The trend is declining with the last incident
    occurring in October 2012. The breakdown is:

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    2008                          2009                    2010                    2011                   2012                   2013
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2..................................  2.....................  3.....................  0....................  1....................  0
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The program procures screened and controlled parts and also follows
    a robust counterfeit parts prevention process. The strategy centers on
    purchasing parts from authorized sources, Original Component
    Manufacturer or their franchised distributors. Requirements are flowed
    to subcontractors to further ensure that procurements they make also
    conform to LMSSC policy.

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Mann, I just want to emphasize--I think you said
    something very important that what we really need to be talking
    about on this missile defense is long-range discrimination and
    sensors. Does the President's budget take that into account?
    Are there initiatives, programs?
        General Mann. Thank you, Senator.
        Yes, there are programs, and in fact, as a result of the
    bipartisan budget agreement that took place, I am pretty sure
    that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) received some additional
    funding. That is one of the things in their portfolio that they
    are looking at. How robustly it is funded I really cannot say,
    but I do know that MDA is looking at that as a technology that
    they are going to pursue.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        General Shelton, I want to engage in a hypothetical. This
    hearing is about the importance of the military aspects of
    space. Tell us what would happen if all of our space assets
    were wiped out in a 5-minute period. What would that mean to
    our ground and naval forces if we were in a conflict situation?
        General Shelton. I would tell you, Senator, that we are so
    dependent on space these days. We plug into it like a utility.
    It is always there. Nobody worries about it. You do not even
    know sometimes that you are touching space. So it would be
    almost a reversion back to almost industrial-based warfare,
    industrial age warfare. We would not be able to communicate as
    well. We could not navigate as well. We would not operate with
    the precision. We would not have the coordination. It would be
    a while recovering our coordinated, integrated aspects of
    warfare. We operate as an integrated joint team now. Much of
    that is provided by space capability. So recovering that
    without space would be very difficult, if not impossible.
        Senator King. Given the importance and given that
    vulnerability, does it not make strategic sense--I know there
    is a discussion. I think the term is ``disaggregation''--to
    spread these capabilities over smaller satellites, different
    satellites, commercial satellites so that we do not have a
    Pearl Harbor of space where a few major facilities are knocked
    out and then we are in trouble? Just strategically, is it not
    better to have a diverse structure?
        General Shelton. Senator, this is exactly what started
    taking us down this path. As we started thinking through--I
    will call it the cheap shot. Let us postulate an AEHF satellite
    on orbit. Four of them represent the entire constellation. Take
    one of those out, and you have opened up a big gap in our
    ability to communicate over protected resources. That would be
    very difficult for the National Command Authority. It would be
    very difficult for our deployed troops. So, yes, dispersing our
    capability, having a much more failure resilient and attack
    resilient architecture, that is exactly what our study efforts
    are aimed at and trying to provide that capability for the
    future.
        Senator King. Do we have options, including military
    capabilities, on civilian satellites, and vice versa, for that
    matter?
        General Shelton. We are exploring those concepts right now.
    We have had a very successful test of a commercially-hosted
    infrared payload. It was an infrared sensor hosted on a
    commercial satellite, a very successful program. It showed us a
    lot about what was possible of hosting payloads on commercial
    satellites, lots of lessons learned, and we are continuing to
    pursue those concepts for the future.
        Senator King. In Maine, we are having a lot of success
    putting cellular towers in church steeples. If that is not dual
    use, I do not know what is. [Laughter.]
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Ms. Chaplain, what about the possibilities of
    greater competition in terms of launch capability? We have the
    unified launch system--is it Lockheed and Boeing. But are there
    other companies? Is this an area where there can be some
    competition and therefore greater economies for the Government?
        Ms. Chaplain. I think we finally arrived at the point where
    there are other companies that can begin to contend for space
    launches. They have not been certified yet and it might take a
    little while before they are certified. But SpaceX is going
    through that process, for example, and it hopes to be certified
    by the end of the year. There is at least one more company that
    might be in the mix there.
        DOD has set aside a number of launches, 14, that they could
    compete for, but they will compete with ULA too. Competition is
    on the horizon and it is a matter of just figuring out how best
    to do it in a way that you can measure the competitors in a
    similar way.
        Senator King. Let me ask a basic question. Who owns the
    rockets and how do we pay for it? Does the Government or does
    the military contract with ULA, for example, and say we will
    pay you $10 million to get this satellite into orbit, or do we
    buy a rocket from them and then we launch it? Who has title to
    this?
        Ms. Chaplain. It is a combination of things, but we buy it
    as a service. The rocket itself and the launch is bought as a
    service, and then separately we have a contract with ULA that
    is not a fixed price contract. It is a cost-plus contract, and
    it pays for all the things that go behind launching those
    rockets. There is a lot of capability and skill sets behind
    those launches that need to be maintained.
        Senator King. If this is something that is done on a fairly
    regular basis and has been for some years, why are we doing
    cost-plus and not fixed price?
        Ms. Chaplain. It has been the Government's choice to follow
    the cost-plus approach mainly to have maximum flexibility,
    maximum convenience. They want ULA to be ready to launch these
    rockets whenever the Government wants them to launch. If you
    move to an approach where you are more dependent on the
    supplier and you are not paying for this extra premium of
    capability, you could have delays. You might be in a situation
    where the supplier cannot readily accommodate you. If you have
    several suppliers, that might be okay. You could go back and
    forth and see who could meet that, but when you have one
    supplier, the Government, in the situation it was in, chose to
    have this kind of convenience and flexibility and it chose the
    approach it did to accommodate that.
        Senator King. I would appreciate your keeping the
    subcommittee updated on the progress of competition in this
    area of launch just so we can be aware of what is available
    when and what the timetable is.
        Ms. Chaplain. We are happy to do that.
        Senator King. I appreciate it.
        One more quick question, Mr. Chairman, if I can take
    another minute.
        General Shelton, there is a recent Congressional Research
    Service report that says we have an orbital debris problem. How
    serious is that and is there any way to deal with it?
        General Shelton. Senator, just some numbers. We routinely
    track about 23,000 objects on orbit right now. About 1,000 of
    those are active payloads. The rest of those are defunct
    satellites, pieces of debris, defunct spent stages, those sorts
    of things.
        Our models tell us that between 1 centimeter in size and 10
    centimeters in size, which is the practical limit of what we
    can track--so those 23,000, by the way, is just what we can
    track, but between 1 and 10 centimeters, we think there are
    500,000 objects on orbit. So, yes, this is a very serious
    problem, and I have seen nothing yet that will be technically
    viable for active debris removal.
        Senator King. So it is just something we have to cope with,
    but it seems to me you could lose a very valuable satellite to
    a very cheap piece of space junk.
        General Shelton. We actually already have. There is a
    commercial satellite that was hit by an old Russian satellite
    and caused catastrophic loss for the company, Iridium.
        We need better capability to track, which is what the Space
    Fence is all about. We need all space-faring nations to not
    generate more debris because our biggest fear is that if you
    get more and more debris on orbit, eventually you get to the
    place where debris begets debris. You have a cascading effect
    and you have polluted entire----
        Senator King. Might this not be an area rife for
    international cooperation? It is in everyone's interest who is
    in space to deal with this problem, and maybe we could have a
    joint venture on this cleanup problem?
        General Shelton. Yes, sir. I know Mr. Loverro has been
    actively involved in that internationally certainly to address
    the debris creation problem but also to generate norms of
    behavior internationally that would keep people on the straight
    and narrow.
        Senator King. We need returnables. We need a returnable
    law.
        General Shelton. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator King.
        Mr. Loverro, let me ask you a similar question I have asked
    some of the other panelists and that is the question that
    attaches to the disaggregation of space sensors and hosted
    payloads. The studies are underway. Which satellite systems do
    you think are best suited for this approach?
        Mr. Loverro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is interesting. We have already created several
    disaggregated systems without realizing it. One of those would
    be the weather systems we talked about with Senator Donnelly
    earlier. Probably about 50 to 100 different satellites with a
    variety of sensors all contribute to that weather picture. I
    spoke--I do not know if it was in this committee last year or
    whether it was on the House side--that if I were an adversary
    trying to target the weather capability, I would not know what
    to shoot at because there are just too many targets.
        GPS is somewhat of a disaggregated system. We call it
    ``distributed,'' many satellites that if you lose one, you do
    not lose the capability. In fact, you could lose several and
    not lose it. That is not an invitation to lose any, but it
    certainly makes it more resilient than the example that General
    Shelton gave, for example, on the AEHF system where if you lose
    one satellite, you lose coverage for an entire hemisphere.
    Those kinds of systems, AEHF and SBIRS, where one system tends
    to cover an entire side of the Earth, are the ones really where
    we see the most danger.
        That does not mean that we are secure in any of our space
    capabilities. All of our space capabilities need to respond to
    the threats we have seen. They were not built to go ahead and
    sustain themselves in an environment in which they are
    threatened. They were not built in an environment where they
    would be used in conventional warfighting and threatened by
    conventional means. They were built for nuclear warfighting. So
    all of the architectures need to be refreshed with that view in
    mind. Disaggregation is an important concept especially for
    AEHF and SBIRS. But that concept, what we call resiliency in
    space, applies to all of our space systems.
        Senator Udall. Assess the new entrant policy in space and
    then, if you will, think 10 years out for us, what concerns you
    would have, what might be some of the up sides.
        Mr. Loverro. Absolutely. I think we have talked a lot about
    the up sides. I think Ms. Chaplain has already talked about
    some of the cost reductions that we have seen in the EELV ULA
    program. Some of those we get because we have decided to buy
    more launchers, but there is no question that some of those
    came about in the face of competition. I already spoke in my
    opening statement about competition being good.
        I think that there is clear evidence that the competitive
    aspects of launch will benefit DOD. We were on that path in the
    early 1990s and we moved away from it because at the time we
    did not think there was enough launch rate to sustain
    competitive actions in space. The indication for the future is
    that is not the case. The indication is that there is enough
    launch need to sustain a competitive environment. The
    indications are that in that competitive environment, we can
    bring commercial launch back to the United States. SpaceX has
    been one of the most successful companies in attracting
    competitive international launch back into the United States,
    which is good for us all.
        I think this is a very key aspect. I think what we will
    have to avoid and what the President's National Space
    Transportation Policy clearly suggests is that we want to
    maintain that competition for the future. We do not want to be
    10 years down the road, as you hypothesized, and decide, maybe
    we should go down to one supplier. We think that is the wrong
    way to do it. We think that to keep the environment competitive
    keeps it inexpensive or lower expensive. It is never going to
    be inexpensive, but at a lower expense. It keeps folks trying
    to go ahead and prove the technology on their own rather than
    relying on the Government to do so. We think that is a critical
    aspect of the future.
        Senator Udall. I think, as you were saying, we have to
    thread the needle here. We have under-capacity that presents
    one set of threats; over-capacity presents another set of
    threats. The U.S. Government, therefore our people, are on the
    hook either way, and we have to try and find that balance.
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir, absolutely.
        Senator Udall. Ms. Chaplain, let me turn to you. We always
    look forward to having you here because you have such a great
    understanding of the challenges and what we need to do to keep
    faith with the taxpayers.
        Talk about the EELV a bit. I know you mentioned the lack of
    transparency in the launch services contract schedule. Could
    you speak to that?
        Ms. Chaplain. So until recently, there has been a great
    deal of lack of transparency into costs, particularly on what
    is known as the EELV contract. That is the one that is the
    cost-plus side. But in the course of negotiating contracts
    recently, the Government made a tremendous effort to get
    insight into cost, and they did so to a great extent. What did
    not happen was not all the costs could be tied to a launch
    vehicle by the Government. So there is probably 70 percent or
    so where you cannot exactly tie those activities and parse them
    out amongst launch vehicles. But the Government does have a lot
    more transparency into those costs. They know what they are.
    They know what they are paying for a year. They know how to
    break it down amongst all the activities. That is great
    progress from where we were before. It is just a matter of, you
    just do not have that visibility tied by launch vehicle, and
    there are reasons that are good to have that. Hopefully we will
    get that in time.
        Dr. Zangardi. Sir, may I add from the Navy's perspective?
        Senator Udall. Yes, please, Doctor.
        Dr. Zangardi. From MUOS' perspective, we have seen an
    increase in transparency. We are happy with what we are seeing.
    We have also seen a decrease in cost. So we have seen an
    improvement. Now, granted, the data points we have are quite
    limited, but then again, we have seen improvement over the last
    couple years.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that elaboration.
        Ms. Chaplain, I have been asking many of the panelists
    about disaggregation of existing satellite systems, which after
    10 years I think have stabilized costs and requirements. Do you
    believe the assessments involved purely from a schedule
    standpoint will timely inform the decision for using existing
    systems or follow-on systems?
        Ms. Chaplain. I do have questions about whether the
    assessments will be done in time to have enough input into the
    next set of buys that come up for programs like SBIRS. In other
    cases on the communication side, they probably will be able to
    have maximum information provided and ability to do things
    about that information. But I am concerned that if they take
    too long, time will make its decision for it. If you do not
    have enough time to act on the information that you get, you
    are just going to have to go along and buy what you keep
    buying.
        Senator Udall. It is an important point.
        Senator Sessions?
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. We have seen some progress in
    competition, and it has saved the taxpayers some money. Mr.
    Loverro, you mentioned that the EELV buy was 36 over a period
    of years, and my understanding is that you believe it saved
    $4.4 billion. Competition and a longer buy were the main
    factors in that, in your opinion?
        Mr. Loverro. Yes, Senator. I do not want to quote a number.
    It is not my business to be in the budget game specifically,
    but savings were significant and I believe both factors led to
    those savings.
        Senator Sessions. We have seen some other savings too when
    we rebid the maintenance program for one of our systems. It was
    a billion dollar savings. Do you know what I am referring to
    there?
        Mr. Loverro. You may be referring to what is called the
    launch infrastructure program, so-called, LISC program, launch
    range infrastructure program, a competitive bid that one of
    General Shelton's organizations, the Space and Missile Systems
    Center, is responsible for. Again, I think competition is
    looked for to drive those savings down. I would again turn to
    General Shelton for more details on that program.
        Senator Sessions. General Shelton?
        General Shelton. Senator, the $4.4 billion figure that you
    quoted is accurate. If you look at the fiscal year 2012
    President's budget as your baseline and then look at what we
    actually contracted for, there is $4.4 billion of difference.
    Now, a lot of people want to dispute that. A lot of people want
    to reaccount for that money. But, in fact, from an Air Force
    budget perspective, it is $4.4 billion of difference.
        As Mr. Loverro just talked about, this combined contract
    that will service both the eastern range and the western range
    for launch services is going to save us a bundle of money. We
    are in the source selection process for that right now and
    contract start should be the 1st of October this year.
        Senator Sessions. I think I am correct--and I will just
    wrap up here--to say that we were, I think, at $554 billion for
    budget function defense, which includes homeland security
    monies. That dropped down to $518 billion. Then it was
    projected to go to $498 billion this year. Then Ryan-Murray put
    back money that moved it back up to $521 billion this year. It
    is projected to be at $521 billion next year and $523 billion
    the next year. That is billions of dollars each. Basically,
    under the Budget Control Act we have today, it will be at flat
    level spending considerably below what we were a few years ago.
        But it does start increasing then at the rate of $13
    billion a year for the next 6 years, I believe it is. So we end
    up over $590 billion at the end of the 10-year budget window.
        I say that I am not sure we can replicate these kinds of
    cost savings in the future, but a few more of those cost
    savings plus the fact where we are now--I am not sure we have
    to devastate our procurement system to stay on track even with
    a very constricted budget DOD has dealt with. In fact, my
    analysis of the budget is DOD has the most significant
    reductions than any other department of our Government. If you
    were given more time to achieve the savings, it would be easier
    even then. The biggest danger was we had these cuts so fast.
    That is what the Ryan-Murray--I did not like the way they did
    it, but the result of getting more money this year so we do not
    have another big cut on top of the last one because there are
    efficiencies in productivity.
        This $4 billion savings, General Shelton--you could not
    account for it in the first year, could you? You had to account
    for it each year over a period of years. Savings effected today
    may not actually accrue until the out-years. That is one of my
    particular concerns about the danger of the difficulties in the
    defense budget.
        We will have to see where we are. Thank you for your work
    to bring down costs. As technology gets more common, things
    that 10 years ago were out of this world are more routine today
    and should cost a lot less. You certainly see computers and
    everything else drop in their cost. So maybe we can not be too
    pessimistic about our budget. I hope so.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that, Senator Sessions.
        I have one more question. I did not have a chance to check
    with Senator Sessions, but if he does not have any other
    questions, I will ask my question and we will end the hearing.
        But I would add to what Senator Sessions said. The Murray-
    Ryan budget possibilities and opportunities are there as long
    as we do not fall back into sequestration 2 years hence.
        Senator Sessions. Let us talk about that. Everybody needs
    to get this straight. With sequestration and the way current
    law expects spending to be, DOD will spend $521 billion this
    year, $521 billion next year, $523 billion the next year, and
    then go to $536 billion, $549 billion, and it goes up $13
    billion each year thereafter. So there is really no more cuts.
    It is just flat spending for 3 years, which is not easy to deal
    with. There is a feeling that I keep picking up among my
    colleagues that we are facing additional cuts as a result of
    the sequester. The sequester was what hit us this year. That is
    what got us, and it was dangerous.
        I do not know whether you have sufficient money to meet the
    defense needs of the country or not. But if we keep finding
    these kinds of savings, we might surprise ourselves and we can
    maintain a sufficient defense of America at a more reasonable
    cost. I hope so.
        Senator Udall. Me as well. Thank you for that, Senator
    Sessions.
        General Mann, the last question is yours for the day. The
    Air Force may fire communication satellites, but SMDC is the
    primary scheduler of bandwidth for DOD communications via the
    wide band global satellite and the defense satellite
    communications systems. Over the next 5 years, what do you see
    as the Army's biggest issue and what do you recommend to help
    alleviate it?
        General Mann. Senator, thank you for that question.
        I think we talked a little bit about this in terms of
    maintaining persistent and protected communications, I think it
    is going to be our biggest challenge over the next couple of
    years. So whether that is hardening the things that we have in
    space on orbit or our ground stations and also looking at our
    tactics, techniques, and procedures, how we operate those
    things, those are the areas, I think, that we really need to
    focus on to make sure that we address a threat that is only
    going to evolve and increase in intensity over the next couple
    of years.
        Senator Udall. We on the committee look forward to working
    with you on that important mission.
        I want to thank the panelists again for spending time with
    us, for being succinct, for being to the point.
        We will leave the record open for another 3 or 4 days. We
    may extend some additional questions to all of you. Thanks
    again for your time.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:18 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
                          joint mission system program
        1. Senator Vitter. General Shelton, the Joint Mission System (JMS)
    is responsible for Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and command and
    control (C2) of space forces. The JMS program office inserted some
    important commercial SSA capabilities into the JMS program. The
    committee previously included report language stating that this
    capability requires timely migration from fragile legacy components. In
    addition, there are some very concerning emerging threats in the space
    environment which are highly classified. In an effort to meet growing
    demands, the national security community has utilized similar
    commercial SSA capabilities elsewhere. In your testimony, you state
    that this new normal in space requires us to address protection of
    mission-critical systems, challenge traditional acquisition practices,
    and analyze new operational constructs. Given your statement about the
    growth of these space threats and other known current utilization of
    similar commercial SSA technology by similar important intelligence
    programs, would it be possible to accelerate the integration of
    commercial SSA capabilities into the JMS program?
        General Shelton. The JMS acquisition approach allows for the agile
    adoption of capability with accelerated delivery to the warfighter. The
    JMS Program Office has already awarded contracts to two commercial
    companies (a.i. solutions and Analytical Graphics Inc.) to provide
    commercial SSA capabilities.
        During fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016, the JMS program will
    be primarily focused on the integration of commercial products from
    these two companies. The pace of the effort is limited by funding and
    by the time required for security and other modifications of the
    commercial software to run in JMS.

        2. Senator Vitter. General Shelton, would integration of
    established SSA capabilities into the JMS program help the Air Force
    detect, analyze, and characterize these threats faster?
        General Shelton. The integration of established SSA capabilities
    does assist the Air Force in detecting, analyzing, and characterizing
    threats faster. Some of these capabilities have already been
    incorporated into the JMS program and are being used in operations
    today. During the course of fiscal year 2015 and fiscal year 2016,
    additional capabilities will be integrated into the JMS baseline. These
    capabilities include commercially developed SSA tools we believe will
    be extremely valuable in meeting current and emerging threats.

        3. Senator Vitter. General Shelton, what can Congress do to assist
    in this process to help provide what the warfighters need?
        General Shelton. As a still evolving system, JMS presents several
    opportunities to exploit new SSA tools and alternative architectures to
    build an adaptive and resilient capability to attain appropriate SSA
    and C2 of space forces in a dynamic strategic environment. JMS
    enhancements will field advanced capabilities to improve the detection
    and characterization of emerging threats and orbital hazards and
    integrate previously unavailable data sources and sensors. However, the
    greatest challenge in attaining this gamechanging capability has been
    fiscal, rather than technical.
        Funding stability will enable the warfighter to further enhance and
    maintain a robust national space capability to address progressively
    more challenging and numerous adversary threats. For example, an
    improved JMS will have the capacity to monitor and respond to full
    electro-magnetic spectrum interference, decreased threat identification
    and warning response times, and the ability to forecast and predict
    future SSA events with sophisticated modeling and simulation. Together,
    these new capabilities will present the joint force with a more
    resilient, capable, and affordable space capability.

        4. Senator Vitter. General Shelton, in addition to your testimony
    today, we also heard from General Mann, where he stressed to the
    subcommittee the need to ensure our Nation's space capabilities are
    maintained and further enhanced. In that effort to better understand
    these needs, I am requesting a briefing from you or someone on your
    staff in the near future on how the Air Force is striving to connect
    both established and emerging processes, as well as on space threats
    from adversaries as highlighted by recent statements made by General
    Shelton and Admiral Haney during testimony before this full committee.
    Will you work to ensure this briefing happens?
        General Shelton. Yes. I will ensure a briefing is scheduled with
    you on how the Air Force plans to organize, train, and equip in order
    to provide essential, gamechanging space and cyberspace capabilities
    for our joint forces to combat current and emerging space threats.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2015 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mark Udall
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Udall, King, and
    Sessions.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK UDALL, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Udall. The subcommittee will come to order. The
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee meets today to consider the
    ballistic missile defense programs and policies supporting the
    President's budget request. We have five expert witnesses
    joining us today to help us review these important and complex
    issues.
        Ms. M. Elaine Bunn is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. She's testified
    before the subcommittee on nuclear policy, and she's here today
    as the Department of Defense's (DOD) expert on missile defense
    policy issues.
        The Honorable Michael J. Gilmore is the Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation within DOD. He provides DOD and
    Congress with independent assessments of the adequacy and
    results of our missile defense testing and also plays a
    critical role in reviewing and approving the semi-annual
    integrated master test plan for missile defense.
        Vice Admiral James D. Syring, USN, is the Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA), which researches, designs,
    develops, tests, and fields our Ballistic Missile Defense
    System (BMDS) and supports its operation and improvement. He is
    responsible for roughly $7.5 billion in this year's budget
    request.
        Lieutenant General David L. Mann, USA, is the Commander of
    the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) and Army
    Forces Strategic Command. He is also the Commander of the Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense. He
    represents the crucial warfighter perspective on missile
    defense issues, which we always want to keep in mind since they
    are the customer and the user.
        Ms. Cristina T. Chaplain is the Director of Acquisition and
    Sourcing Management at the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) and leads the GAO evaluation of our missile defense
    acquisition programs. Congress has benefited from her work on
    this topic, among many others.
        We welcome you all to the subcommittee and we thank each of
    you for your long and dedicated service to the Nation and to
    our security.
        Ballistic missile defense has taken on a growing importance
    as missile threats have grown. We all want operationally
    effective, cost effective, and affordable missile defenses to
    protect our Homeland, our forward deployed troops, our allies,
    and our partners. We also recognize such missile defense is
    both technically challenging and expensive.
        Unfortunately, by imposing sequestration on DOD's budget
    and the rest of government, Congress has made the effort more
    difficult. Those constraints mandated by Congress affect our
    missile defense programs just like all other government
    programs. If we let sequestration return with full force next
    year, it will make things worse. I would continue to urge my
    colleagues on both sides to work to avoid that.
        With respect to our Homeland missile defense capability, we
    have a system in place today that protects the entire Nation
    from limited missile attacks from North Korea and a potential
    Iranian threat. Yet, we all know that we have had problems with
    the kill vehicles on that system and we need to fix those
    problems and demonstrate the fixes through realistic testing
    before we buy more interceptors. That's what we call fly-
    before-you-buy.
        Those kill vehicle problems occurred because we deployed
    the system before it was properly designed, engineered, and
    tested. In other words, in its haste to deploy the system
    quickly the Bush administration did not practice fly-before-
    you-buy. Consequently, I am pleased that the budget request
    includes funds to redesign the kill vehicles so that they will
    be more effective, robust, and reliable. This subcommittee has
    supported such a redesign. In order to avoid repeating any of
    the previous mistakes, we also need a rigorous acquisition
    approach with stringent engineering design and testing to be
    confident it will work before we deploy it.
        As DOD has told us, we also need to improve our Homeland
    defense capabilities by investing in additional sensor and
    discrimination capabilities. That is their highest investment
    priority because it will make our current system more effective
    and allow us to defeat more threat missiles with our existing
    and planned interceptors.
        Regional missile defenses are a high priority for our
    regional combatant commanders because they need a capability to
    address existing missile threats to Europe, the Middle East,
    and Asia, especially those from Iran and North Korea. That's
    why the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Robert
    Gates unanimously recommended the European Phased Adaptive
    Approach (EPAA) to the President. It would rapidly provide the
    capability they needed to protect North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) Europe against the growing Iranian missile
    threat.
        Phase 1 of the EPAA was deployed in 2011 and we are on
    track to deploy phase 2 in Romania next year. Phase 3 is
    planned for deployment in Poland in 2018 at the same site we
    agreed with Poland back in 2008. We will be interested to hear
    more about the progress of EPAA and on our regional defense
    efforts, particularly with our allies and partners in the
    Middle East and Asia.
        With all of that said, we look forward to your testimony on
    these important topics. Before we turn to you for brief oral
    statements, let me turn to my friend and ranking member,
    Senator Sessions, for any comments that he wishes to make.
    Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you make
    some very important observations, that I share, in your
    remarks. Thank you for that.
        In March of last year, Secretary Hagel announced steps to
    strengthen homeland missile defense, including the deployment
    of 14 more ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Alaska, which was
    really bringing it back up to the Bush plan after they had been
    reduced, and deploying a second AN/TPY2 radar in Japan to
    provide improved early warning, particularly from North Korean
    launches. This was a recognition, I think, that we face a long-
    range missile threat to the Homeland and that threat is
    increasing faster than we expected.
        This year the budget request includes several important
    initiatives meant to improve the ground-based midcourse defense
    (GMD) system. They include: a redesigned exoatmospheric kill
    vehicle (EKV) for the GBI, which you made reference to; a new
    long-range discrimination radar to be deployed in Alaska; and
    software improvements for threat discrimination. Those are good
    steps. I believe they'll save money in the long run. If we can
    get our discrimination ability and our ability to discriminate
    against false threats, we can use fewer launches and have more
    effect. I commend Admiral Syring and Secretary Hagel for these
    steps.
        Back in 2009, DOD decided to cease deployment of GBIs at 30
    at Fort Greely and that has now been overcome. I recall a
    meeting in Senator Lieberman's office with Secretary Gates and
    other Senators where we discussed our concern about the
    decision to go to 30 from 44. While Secretary Gates assured us
    that the intention was to improve the GMD system at the time,
    funding shortfalls and the administration's emphasis on
    regional missile defense meant there was very little real
    improvement available to GMD.
        Today, I think we move forward. The next 5 years, MDA
    intends to spend around $700 million to design a new kill
    vehicle and I believe this is overdue.
        Speaking of funding, let me show this chart.
        [The chart referred to follows:]

        Senator Sessions. It looks awfully crowded, but it tells us
    how in Washington things start eroding when we don't really
    understand what's happening to us. The President made a
    commitment at the time of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty (START) that we would be involved in this, but this is
    how it looks.
        According to our staff estimates, the President's proposed
    5-year spending plan that he's submitting today for missile
    defense is about $6 billion less than the President's fiscal
    year 2012 spending plan. This is what he submitted as his
    spending at $8.8 billion in 2015 and 2016. Here we are for 2015
    and we're at $7.8 billion, and dropping down to $7.3 billion in
    fiscal year 2019.
        Based on that, we're talking about over the Future Years
    Defense Program (FYDP) about $6 billion less than we were
    expecting to spend. Now, if this is because you've saved money
    on the energy buildings at their laboratories, maybe we could
    survive that. Maybe it wouldn't be so devastating, because I
    have doubts about whether all that money, $5 billion, $10
    billion buildings, was necessary. All I'm saying, Mr. Chairman,
    is having a credible missile defense system is so fundamentally
    important, and it's less than 5 percent of our total defense
    budget for the whole system, and we ought to be able to--
    actually, that's about 2 percent. $7 billion out of $500
    billion is a lot less than that.
        I would say that just points out where we are. That's what
    we're wrestling with, the kind of issue we're dealing with
    today. We want a good, strong missile defense system. Can we
    complete it with those numbers and do you have a plan that will
    work? It would be great if you can do it at those numbers, but
    I'm a bit uneasy about it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman--I would say one more thing. The
    sequester does not require us to cut any more in the future.
    The big cuts were this year and somewhat next year. But that
    Ryan-Murray bill filled in the hole this year and filled in
    some next year, leaving us at basically, the 050 account, at
    $521 billion this year, $521 billion in 2015, $561 billion in
    2016--no, $523 billion in 2016, $536 billion in 2017, $549
    billion in 2018, $562 billion in 2019, $576 billion in 2020,
    and $590 billion in 2021.
        We're going to have some pretty good increases, about a 2.5
    percent increase, after the next 2 years, after the cuts we've
    already taken. You had to make big cuts this year, even with
    the little extra money that Ryan-Murray put into the account.
    But it avoided, I think, disastrous pain and some very unwise
    decisions you would have had to make. I'm sympathetic with the
    problem, but we're going to all have to tighten our belt and
    defend America without wasting money, because the interest on
    the debt is going from $233 billion this year to $880 billion
    10 years from today, according to Congressional Budget Office,
    and that passes the whole defense budget in 4 or 5 years.
        Thank you.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        We will hear from the panel from our left to your right.
    We'll start with Ms. Bunn, and if you'll keep your oral
    statements brief, and I know you came prepared to do so, then
    we can open the subcommittee up to questions from you. Ms.
    Bunn, you're recognized.

      STATEMENT OF M. ELAINE BUNN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
      DEFENSE, NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF
                                DEFENSE

        Ms. Bunn. Thank you, Chairman Udall, Ranking Member
    Sessions, Senator Donnelly. Thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today. Thank you for the work you do to provide for the
    common defense.
        That defense with regard to ballistic missiles includes the
    defense of our Nation, deployed forces, allies, and partners
    from the threat posed by ballistic missiles of many ranges--
    short, medium, intermediate, and long-range missiles. We need a
    variety of defenses for two missions: first, defending the
    United States against limited long-range ballistic missile
    attacks from countries such as North Korea and Iran, as you've
    said; and second, defending against regional missile threats to
    U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling
    them to defend themselves.
        For both Homeland and regional missile defense, our
    strategy has to take into account uncertainties, including both
    the uncertainty of future threat capabilities and the technical
    and fiscal uncertainties inherent in our own program
    development. The steps we've taken to strengthen our missile
    defense posture are focused on developing and deploying proven,
    cost-effective capabilities to address both existing and
    emerging threats.
        With regard to Homeland defense, we know that North Korea
    has taken actions that are provocative and concerning. They've
    conducted three nuclear tests. They continue their efforts to
    bring the KN08 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile
    (ICBM) to operational capacity. While Iran has not yet deployed
    an ICBM, its continued efforts on space launch vehicles, along
    with its desire to deter the United States and our allies,
    provide Iran with both the means and the motivation to develop
    longer-range missiles, including an ICBM.
        The U.S. Homeland is currently protected against potential
    ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and Iran. But to
    ensure that we stay ahead of the threat, we're taking several
    steps to strengthen our Homeland defense posture. Deploying 14
    more interceptors in Alaska will provide additional protection
    against both North Korea and Iranian ICBM threats as they
    emerge. We are also deploying, as you mentioned, a second
    missile defense radar to Japan, and are requesting funding to
    develop a radar that when it's deployed in Alaska, will provide
    persistent sensor coverage and improved discrimination against
    capabilities from North Korea.
        Finally, as you mentioned, we're initiating a redesign of
    the kill vehicle for the GBI. That will not only improve the
    reliability and performance of the interceptor, make our
    missile defenses better; it should also be easier to build,
    upgrade, and maintain than previous versions.
        While the ICBM threat from the Middle East has not yet
    emerged, the regional ballistic missile threat from Iran as
    well as Syria exists today. Iran already has the largest
    inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and is
    capable of striking targets throughout the region and into the
    eastern part of Europe. The Assad regime in Syria has several
    hundred short-range ballistic missiles that can reach much of
    Israel and large portions of other countries, including Turkey.
        North Korea also possesses regional ballistic missiles and
    has recently conducted a number of short-range missile
    launches.
        Our responses are tailored to the circumstances of each
    region, that is Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific
    region. We're continuing to implement regional missile defenses
    that are both phased--that is, as technology becomes available
    we phase them--and adaptive to the emerging threats. Our focus
    is on developing and fielding capabilities that are mobile,
    scaleable, and relocatable. We're also encouraging our allies
    and partners to acquire missile defenses and to strengthen
    operational missile defense cooperation. So it's both the stuff
    and the operations.
        We have made progress in strengthening our regional missile
    defense posture in the past 2 years. We've upgraded five
    additional Aegis ships with missile defense capability and
    increased our inventory of both the Theater High Altitude Air
    Defense (THAAD) and Standard Missile (SM) interceptors. In
    Europe, we already maintain a missile defense ship presence in
    the eastern Mediterranean, along with the radar deployed in
    Turkey, and plans to deploy Aegis Ashore sites in Romania in
    2015 and in Poland in 2018 are on schedule. In the Asia-Pacific
    region, we maintain an Aegis ship presence along with Patriot
    batteries deployed in Japan and South Korea. Last year we also
    deployed a THAAD battery to Guam in response to North Korean
    provocation. Of course, we also maintain a missile defense
    presence in the Middle East and a strong missile defense
    partnership with Israel, and are working with Gulf Cooperation
    countries as they expand their air and missile defense as well.
        We have made progress over the last several years, but we
    cannot afford to stand still. The President's budget reflects
    our goal of retaining the flexibility to adjust and enhance our
    defenses as the threat and technologies evolve.
        Thank you for having me here today. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Bunn follows:]
                      Prepared Statement by M. Elaine Bunn
                                  introduction
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of
    the Department's fiscal year 2015 budget request for missile defense.
    Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a critical national security
    priority--both for the Homeland and for our ability to project power
    abroad, prevent and deter conflicts, and defend our deployed forces and
    allies.
        You asked for my assessment of how the programs and fiscal year
    2015 budget request for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) reflect
    missile defense policy and posture. The President's budget requests
    $8.5 billion in fiscal year 2015 with $7.5 billion for the MDA to
    develop and deploy missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S.
    Homeland and strengthen regional missile defenses.
        As reflected in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review , which was
    submitted with the budget request, our top missile defense policy
    priorities have not changed. The first priority is the defense of the
    U.S. Homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
    We are committed to maintaining an advantageous position compared to
    the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats from North Korea
    and Iran. This requires continued improvement to the ground-based
    midcourse defense (GMD) system, including enhanced performance of the
    Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) and the deployment of new sensors.
        DOD's budget request for fiscal year 2015 also continues to
    implement regional approaches that are tailored to the unique
    deterrence and defense requirements of Europe, the Middle East, and
    Asia-Pacific regions. These regions vary considerably in their
    geography, history, and character of the threat faced, and in the
    military-to-military relationships on which we seek to build
    cooperative missile defenses. Our focus is on developing and fielding
    capabilities that are mobile and capable of being redeployed to
    different locations as necessary to address the threat. We are also
    encouraging our allies and partners to acquire missile defenses, and we
    are working to strengthen missile defense cooperation that can
    contribute to significantly increased performance than individual
    countries can achieve on their own.
        I will begin with a discussion of ballistic missile threat and
    trends, and then focus on our progress on three key policy priorities:
    sustaining a strong homeland defense, strengthening regional missile
    defense, and fostering increased international cooperation and
    participation.
                      ballistic missile threats and trends
        Ballistic missiles are becoming more survivable, reliable, and
    accurate at greater ranges. Regional powers are basing more missiles on
    mobile platforms at sea and on land. Technical and operational measures
    to defeat missile defenses also are increasing. China, Iran, and North
    Korea, for example, exercise near simultaneous salvo firings of short-
    and medium-range ballistic missiles from multiple locations to saturate
    regional missile defenses. Countries are designing missiles to launch
    from multiple transporters against a broad array of targets, enhancing
    their mobility and effectiveness on the battlefield. Shorter launch-
    preparation times and smaller footprints are making new systems more
    survivable.
    Iran
        Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
    Middle East, and today can strike targets throughout the region and
    into Eastern Europe. In addition to its growing missile inventories,
    Iran is seeking to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing
    systems with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs. Iran is
    developing an anti-ship ballistic missile which could threaten maritime
    activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. While Iran
    has not yet deployed an ICBM, its progress on space launch vehicles--
    along with its desire to deter the United States and its allies--
    provides Tehran with the means and motivation to develop longer-range
    missiles, including an ICBM.
        Although we do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build
    nuclear weapons, Iran has developed technical expertise in a number of
    areas--including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic
    missiles--from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-
    deliverable nuclear weapons.
    Syria
        While Syria does not pose a ballistic missile threat to the U.S.
    Homeland, the Assad regime does possess short-range ballistic missiles,
    and has shown a willingness to use them repeatedly against its own
    people. Syria has several hundred short-range ballistic missiles, all
    of which are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of
    Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country.
    North Korea
        North Korea's weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to
    the United States and to East Asia. North Korea has conducted three
    nuclear tests. It also is seeking to develop longer-range ballistic
    missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States,
    and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road mobile ICBM, which it
    paraded most recently in July 2013, to operational capacity. While the
    reliability of an untested North Korean ICBM is likely to be very low,
    North Korea has used its Taepo-Dong-2 launch vehicle to put a satellite
    in orbit, thus successfully demonstrating technologies applicable to a
    long-range missile.
        North Korea's efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles
    raise broader regional and global security concerns, by threatening the
    United States' allies and partners and increasing our concerns about
    ballistic missile technology proliferation.
    China
        In the regional ballistic missile context, China is augmenting the
    over 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic missiles with a limited
    but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic
    missiles that will improve China's ability to strike regional targets.
    China also continues to deploy growing numbers of anti-ship ballistic
    missiles.
                                homeland defense
        The U.S. Homeland is currently protected against potential limited
    ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and Iran by the GMD system.
    This system consists of GBIs, land-based early-warning radars, sea-
    based radar systems, and a sophisticated command and control
    architecture.
        The Department of Defense is implementing steps to strengthen the
    U.S. Homeland missile defense posture as announced by Secretary Hagel
    in March of last year. The refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort
    Greely, AK, is underway and the budget includes funding for the
    acquisition of GBIs to support GMD operations, testing, and spares, and
    emplacement of additional GBIs in Missile Field 2 as we progress toward
    44 deployed interceptors by the end of 2017. Secretary Hagel also
    announced the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. This
    deployment will provide improved early warning and tracking of missiles
    launched from North Korea at the United States as well as its regional
    allies and partners. We remain on track to complete deployment of this
    capability by the end of the year.
        The President's budget request also includes funding to initiate
    the redesign of the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). The redesigned
    EKV, in essence a next-generation kill vehicle, will not only improve
    the reliability and performance of the GBI, but by being designed to
    allow for a more standardized production process, the kill vehicle
    should also be easier to build, upgrade, and maintain than the previous
    versions. This investment in the next generation kill vehicle for the
    GBI is especially important considering the test problems associated
    with the Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) version of the kill vehicle.
    Although we are committed to ensuring the effectiveness of the current
    kill vehicle through testing; we are also pursuing a redesigned kill
    vehicle that will improve the reliability and effectiveness of the GMD
    system.
        The submitted budget also includes funding for development of a
    Long-Range Discrimination Radar. This radar will provide persistent
    sensor coverage and improve discrimination capabilities against threats
    to the Homeland from North Korea and will provide the Sea-Based X-band
    radar more geographic deployment flexibility for contingency and test
    use.
        We are also requesting funding to improve the discrimination
    capabilities of the existing GMD system. These investments will lead to
    a GMD system more capable of discriminating and destroying reentry
    vehicles with a high degree of confidence and will improve the
    efficiency and effectiveness of our Homeland missile defenses.
        As directed by Congress, the Missile Defense Agency is also
    currently evaluating four potential locations for an additional GBI
    site in the continental United States. An additional missile field in
    the Eastern portion of the United States would increase the overall
    survivability of the GMD system, provide more time to conduct missile
    defense engagements, and would allow for the deployment of additional
    interceptors.
        That said, the cost of building an additional missile defense site
    in the United States is very high. Given that the ICBM threat from Iran
    has not yet emerged, and due to the recent test failures associated
    with the current GBI kill vehicles, the highest priorities for the
    protection of the Homeland are in improving the reliability and
    effectiveness of the GBI and improving the GMD sensor architecture. The
    current GMD system provides coverage of the entire United States from
    North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs. No decision has been made to
    deploy an additional missile field in the United States. If an ICBM
    threat were to emerge in numbers that necessitated the deployment of
    additional interceptors, the steps being taken now, to include
    conducting an environmental impact statement, will shorten the
    construction timelines associated with deployment of a new missile
    defense site.
                            regional missile defense
        The Department's budget request for fiscal year 2015 also continues
    to implement regional approaches that are tailored to the unique
    deterrence and defense requirements of Europe, the Middle East, and
    Asia-Pacific regions.
    Europe
        We are continuing to implement the European Phased Adaptive
    Approach (EPAA), and we are working in close collaboration with our
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to develop an advanced
    network of sensors and interceptors--on land and at sea--to protect
    NATO European territory and our forces and military facilities.
        The United States has operated a forward-based radar in Turkey and
    maintained a sea-based missile defense presence in Europe since 2011.
    The SM-3 Block IB was deployed on Aegis BMD ships as an operational
    interceptor for the first time in 2013. The Block IB version of the
    interceptor uses an improved seeker and signal processor that allows
    for greater on-board discrimination and area coverage than the SM-3 IA.
    In October 2013, a ground-breaking ceremony was held at the land-based
    SM-3, or Aegis Ashore, site in Romania. The site is planned to be
    operational by the end of 2015.
        We have also taken steps to meet the requirement for sea-based BMD
    capabilities by establishing a homeport for four U.S. Aegis BMD
    destroyers at the naval facility at Rota, Spain. These multi-mission
    ships will support the missile defense mission, as well as other U.S.
    European Command (EUCOM) and NATO maritime missions. The first of the
    four ships to be stationed at Rota, USS Donald Cook, has already
    deployed to Europe, and the USS Ross will arrive this summer. The final
    two ships, the USS Carney and USS Porter, will arrive in 2015.
        The President's budget request also supports the Aegis Ashore site
    that will be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe and the
    development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor that will be deployed on
    land and at sea. These capabilities will extend coverage to all NATO
    European countries.
        As Secretary Hagel emphasized in his announcement in March of last
    year, our commitment to NATO missile defense ``remains ironclad'' as
    demonstrated by our strong support for the BMD capabilities either
    already deployed, or being developed for Phases 1 through 3 of the
    EPAA.
        Our NATO Allies are also making significant contributions to the
    European missile defense mission. Romania, Spain, and Turkey are
    hosting U.S. missile defense assets and provide the external security
    for the facilities. Beyond hosting the second Aegis Ashore site in
    Europe, Poland has also announced its intention to spend up to $10
    billion to acquire increased air and missile defense capabilities. DOD
    is engaging directly with Poland to assist in the development of its
    missile defense requirements and is promoting U.S. systems to meet
    these requirements.
        Several allies have modern surface combatant ships that could be
    equipped with a BMD sensor or interceptor capability. The United States
    will continue to encourage its NATO allies to do even more to cooperate
    and invest in missile defenses that will contribute to Alliance
    security.
        The Netherlands has committed to spend up to 250 million Euro to
    upgrade the SMART-L radars on four of their frigates and it, along with
    Germany, has committed Patriot PAC-3 systems to NATO missile defense as
    demonstrated through the ongoing NATO deployment in defense of Turkey.
        France is planning to provide its Spirale satellite detection
    system and a long-range radar for NATO territorial missile defense and
    has contributed the SAMP/T air and missile defense system, which became
    operational in 2013, to NATO BMD. Despite the U.S. decision to forgo
    production of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS),
    development will be completed in 2014. Germany and Italy are
    considering the system a possible future national contribution to NATO
    BMD.
        The United States conducts exercises designed to hone our Alliance
    missile defense capabilities. EUCOM is engaged with NATO in the
    development of a biennial NATO-led BMD exercise event that serves to
    reinforce and expand upon other, routine BMD training evolutions that
    take place on a quarterly and semi-annual basis.
        Many NATO Allies also participate in Nimble Titan, a series of
    exercises designed to understand how the missile defenses of many
    participant can work together in a crisis or conflict. The Nible Titan
    14 campaign, which began last year with regional tabletop exercises,
    has 21 participant nations, and NATO participates as an alliance. The
    final exercise of Nimble Titan 14 is a capstone event that will take
    place in April involving all participants in a cross-regional wargame.
    Asia-Pacific
        The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the region has
    been our strong bilateral alliances, including with South Korea, Japan,
    and Australia. All three of these nations play an important role in our
    regional efforts to achieve effective missile defense.
        South Korea obviously has an immediate, proximate stake in
    preventing missile strikes from North Korea. We have worked very
    closely with South Korea to ensure that our Alliance maintains the
    capacity to do just that. The United States deploys Patriot PAC-3
    batteries in South Korea to defend U.S. and South Korean forces. In
    addition, South Korea is taking steps to enhance its own air and
    missile defense systems, which include sea- and land-based sensors and
    Patriot PAC-2 batteries. DOD has been consulting closely with South
    Korea about how it can upgrade its missile defense capabilities and we
    are mutually committed to sustain and strengthen protection against the
    North Korean missile threat.
        Japan has its own layered missile defense system, which includes
    Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile (SM)-3 interceptors, PAC-3
    batteries, early-warning radars, and sophisticated command-and-control
    systems. Japan is upgrading two ATAGO-class Aegis destroyers to BMD
    capability with certification scheduled for fiscal year 2018 and fiscal
    year 2019 and has recently expressed interest in purchasing two
    additional Aegis BMD ships, which would increase its inventory to a
    total of eight BMD-capable ships. As mentioned earlier, Japan also
    hosts a U.S. missile defense radar and has agreed to host a second
    radar.
        Japan is also a critical international partner for BMD development.
    One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development
    of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3 Block IIA.
        The United States and Australia have forged a long-standing
    partnership on missile defense research and development--most notably
    with regard to sensors. In addition, Australia is involved in a
    trilateral discussion on missile defense in the Pacific involving the
    United States, Australia, and Japan.
        Going forward, we will continue to emphasize the importance of
    developing a regional ballistic missile defense system that includes
    the sharing of sensor data among allies.
    Middle East
        The United States maintains a strong defense relationship with
    Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in a
    comprehensive missile defense architecture. Israeli programs such as
    Iron Dome, the David's Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon
    System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United
    States, create a multi-layered architecture designed to protect the
    Israeli people from varying types of missile threats. Missile defense
    figured prominently in the Austere Challenge exercise we conducted with
    Israel in the fall of 2012, the largest U.S.-Israeli military exercise
    in history. A similar exercise, Juniper Cobra, is scheduled to take
    place in May of this year.
        The United States is also working with a number of Gulf Cooperation
    Council (GCC) countries on missile defense, including supporting the
    purchase of missile defense systems through the Foreign Military Sales
    program. The United Arab Emirates is procuring the Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense system, with the first delivery expected next
    year. This is in addition to the UAE's earlier purchase of Patriot
    systems, which have been delivered. Saudi Arabia is in the process of
    upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3
    configuration. Kuwait is also purchasing Patriot PAC-3 batteries.
        U.S. Air Force Central Command maintains a series of regular
    exchanges between United States and GCC air defense officers at the
    Combined Air Operations Center located at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
    These exchanges provide an opportunity for increased situational
    awareness of missile threats in the region as well as the potential for
    future BMD planning and operational cooperation.
        As the GCC states begin to field more capable systems, the United
    States and its Gulf partners must work toward greater integration of
    those capabilities across the region. The desired end state is a
    regional missile defense architecture in which GCC member states
    participate and contribute to the extent practical, leading to a
    networked, layered defense of key strategic centers that strengthens
    deterrence and increases our collective ability to defeat a ballistic
    missile attack.
    Russia
        This administration, in keeping with previous administrations, has
    sought cooperation with Russia on missile defense. Genuine missile
    defense cooperation would be in the security interests of all parties
    by strengthening the defensive capabilities of the United States, NATO,
    and Russia. It would also help to remove missile defense as a source of
    tension in the bilateral relationship, and send a powerful signal to
    potential adversaries that ballistic missile threats will be
    ineffective as a tool of coercion.
        The United States has pursued missile defense cooperation with
    Russia with the clear understanding that we will not accept constraints
    on our missile defense systems, we will implement the EPAA, and Russia
    will not have command and control over the ballistic missile defense of
    NATO territory.
        The United States has been open and transparent with Russia about
    our plans for European missile defenses, and explained in detail why
    U.S. missile defense systems in Europe will not negate the Russian
    strategic nuclear deterrent. We have made a number of proposals that
    would have laid the groundwork for meaningful cooperation, including a
    proposal to establish missile defense cooperation centers in Europe,
    and more recently, a proposal that would provide for reciprocal
    transparency about our respective missile defense plans and programs.
    These proposals would allow for the better understanding of the purpose
    of our missile defenses and for predictability about our missile
    defense plans for the future.
        Russia has not reacted positively to the U.S. proposals and has
    instead continued to seek legally-binding restrictions and limitations
    on our missile defense deployments to Europe. In the course of our
    bilateral dialogue, we have continuously rejected any limitations on
    our missile defenses. Our missile defense deployments to Europe address
    the regional ballistic missile threat posed by Iran and Syria, and
    cannot be subject to limits imposed by a third party.
        Russia's intervention into the crisis in Ukraine, in violation of
    international law, led to the suspension of our military to military
    dialogue and we have not continued to engage Russia on the topic of
    missile defense. As Russia's violation of international law continues,
    we will review any future bilateral engagements on missile defense to
    ensure that they are in the security interests of the United States and
    our allies.
                                   conclusion
        The ballistic missile threat--to the United States, to our allies
    and partners, and to our forces overseas--is evolving, and we continue
    to grow and adapt our Homeland and regional missile defense posture and
    international cooperation to address it.
        We have had some very significant progress over the last several
    years, but this administration has emphasized from the beginning that
    we cannot afford to stand still. The President's budget request for
    fiscal year 2015 reflects DOD's goals of retaining the flexibility to
    adjust, and to enhance our defenses as the threat and technologies
    evolve. Missile defense is crucial to maintaining our most vital
    security commitments--the defense of the United States and the
    protection of our allies and partners and our forces around the world.
        I want to thank you for having me here today, and I look forward to
    your questions.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Secretary Bunn.
        Dr. Gilmore.

      STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL
               TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, Senator
    Donnelly: I'll just briefly discuss what I see as the
    highlights of the test program over the last year. We learned a
    lot during the last year. We conducted the first ever
    operational test of elements of the BMDS, working together to
    demonstrate a layered defense such as might be necessary in the
    U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations or elsewhere
    in the world.
        In that test, Aegis performed an intercept of a medium-
    range ballistic missile. THAAD was available to perform an
    intercept if Aegis failed, and in fact, THAAD did fire an
    interceptor at the Aegis target, which then ended up
    intercepting a piece of the debris after Aegis successfully
    intercepted its target. Then THAAD had to plan its intercept in
    the presence of the debris from the Aegis intercept. That's an
    important thing to demonstrate because in the kinds of large
    raids that many of the scenarios that we are worried about
    might occur there would be multiple intercepts and the systems
    would have to plan intercepts in the presence of debris and
    other junk that was created by previous intercepts. So that was
    a very important test.
        The integration demonstrated in that test between Aegis and
    THAAD was limited. The organic systems, the organic Aegis and
    THAAD radars, and the organic Aegis and THAAD battle management
    systems, were used to plan those intercepts. They did share
    information through the command and control system that BMDS is
    working on. But true integrated battle management won't be
    possible until further upgrades for the command and control
    system, the BMDS command and control system, come on line later
    in this decade.
        Nonetheless, it was a significant test. Many important
    things were learned. There were actually some surprises in the
    test. The intercepts were successful, but there were some
    surprises, and those surprises are being used to plan upgrades
    and changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures that our
    deployed forces can use as they today use these systems in
    CENTCOM and elsewhere.
        In my view, it was a very valuable test, and as far as I
    can tell, the combatant commands feel the same way. They
    strongly supported the test and felt that they learned a lot
    from it.
        One thing that was demonstrated by the test--originally
    there were four targets that were going to be used in the test.
    We ended up only using two because we ran out of time because
    of problems associated with readying the two targets that
    actually were used. That's a problem that Vice Admiral Syring
    is working with and that his predecessor was working on and
    that continues to be a problem of note, with no easy solutions
    in sight, although I know Vice Admiral Syring and MDA are
    working very hard to make the targets more reliable, and it
    will be important to achieve that.
        There was the failed intercept test of the Capability
    Enhancement 1 kill vehicle on a GBI. We've learned a lot from
    that, and that's been alluded to. The Failure Review Board
    found several issues of concern associated with the design of
    the kill vehicle. I had recommended that MDA consider
    redesigning the kill vehicle and Vice Admiral Syring and DOD's
    leadership independently decided that that would be a good idea
    and funding, as you've noted, is provided for that. I think
    that's a good idea, and it's particularly important to use a
    rigorous systems engineering process in that redesign so that
    we don't end up with just patchwork fixes, but rather a more
    comprehensive fix to these problems that we've seen that will
    result in a robust kill vehicle as we go forward.
        Finally, there were at least two important tests of the SM-
    3 1B interceptor, which provides additional capability,
    additional processing, and an improved seeker that will help
    discriminate lethal objects from things that we don't care
    about. When conducting ballistic missile tests, the so-called
    tests FTM-21 and -22, which my office is going to report on
    later this year, to support a full-rate production decision,
    those intercepts were successful and, in fact, the intercept of
    the second target was meant to and did, in fact, exercise the
    capabilities of the new seeker and the new processor in the SM-
    3 1B. That was successful.
        Of course, that was a salvo shot. We were interested in
    seeing how the missiles would behave when there was one ahead
    of another and how the interceptors worked and the kill
    vehicles would work when one was looking at what the first one
    was doing and having to contend with the flash and other
    effects that are created by successful intercept as it trails
    the first interceptor.
        Unfortunately, the second interceptor failed in flight,
    problems associated with the third-stage rocket motor, which is
    common to both the SM-3 1B and 1A. MDA and Vice Admiral Syring
    are conducting a Failure Review Board to understand that
    failure thoroughly. It could be connected to previous failures
    and MDA is going to look at a way ahead there.
        Those are the highlights of the test program. I would also
    make one final note. My testimony, as it has for the past 4 or
    5 years when I've testified, says that we're still several
    years away from validating the models associated with missile
    defense that we're going to need in order to do a thorough
    assessment of operational effectiveness and suitability for
    this system, because we're never going to be able to test in
    live tests over the full range of conditions under which it
    might be employed. So the models are very important.
        Every year I've said, and I've said it again this year,
    that we're still several years away. Unfortunately, that is
    correct. One of the reasons, one of the primary reasons it's
    correct, is because of the 4\1/2\-year delay that we've had to
    suffer in gathering information on the performance of the
    ground-based missile defense system as a result of the three
    test failures that have occurred, and the last successful
    intercept using a GBI occurred in December 2008.
        We have made progress on THAAD and Aegis, collecting
    information there and validating models. There's still more
    work to be done. But we're definitely lagging when it comes to
    the ground-based missile defense system because of the test
    failures and the need to recoup from those failures.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gilmore follows:]
                    Prepared Statement by J. Michael Gilmore
        Chairman Udall, Senator Sessions, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss missile defense
    testing and my assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
    (BMDS).
        Over the last year, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and
    Patriot each demonstrated progress toward short-range ballistic missile
    threat class capability, even though Aegis BMD suffered a Standard
    Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IA intercept failure and an SM-3 Block IB
    missile failure during fiscal year 2013 flight tests. The Theater High-
    Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) (twice) and Aegis BMD (once) demonstrated
    progress toward medium-range ballistic missile threat class capability
    when they successfully destroyed medium-range air-launched targets
    during two separate tests. The Command and Control, Battle Management,
    and Communications (C2BMC) demonstrated the capability to control two
    operationally-deployed AN/TPY-2 radars in Forward-Based Mode, using
    operational communications architectures, personnel, and tactics,
    techniques, and procedures.
        The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element experienced a
    third consecutive failure in its flight test program. Supported by my
    office and by U.S. Northern Command, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    conducted a GMD intercept test using a Capability Enhancement-I (CE-I)
    Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) flying a more challenging and
    operationally realistic profile than the three previous CE-I intercept
    tests. The EKV failed to separate from the third stage, and could not
    complete the planned intercept.
        Significant to a system-level characterization of the BMDS, the
    BMDS Operational Test Agency Team and the MDA conducted the first
    operational flight test of the BMDS that included Aegis BMD, THAAD,
    C2BMC, and an AN/TPY-2 radar operating in its Forward-Based Mode. This
    test, Flight Test Operational-01 (FTO-01), was planned to include a
    layered ballistic missile defense with the C2BMC providing information
    on system-level performance. The AN/TPY-2 (Forward-Based Mode) radar
    acquired and tracked all targets and passed track data to both Aegis
    BMD and THAAD via C2BMC. Although a layered defense between Aegis BMD
    and THAAD was demonstrated, the integration demonstrated was limited
    because, consistent with the test's design and the current capabilities
    of the BMDS and C2BMC, engagements were managed using the organic
    capabilities of the Aegis and THAAD systems. The test results are being
    used to modify and refine the tactics, techniques and procedures to be
    used by deployed Aegis and THAAD units, as well as to incorporate and
    field upgrades to those systems' suites of software.
        The 2013 test program, although less robust than previous years,
    was adequate to support the development of the BMDS. The MDA conducted
    tests as scheduled in the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), versions
    12.2 and 13.1, approved by the MDA and DOT&E directors. However, except
    for Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement testing, all key flight tests
    scheduled in IMTP 12.2, moved to later calendar quarters in IMTP 13.1,
    many to fiscal year 2014 from fiscal year 2013. This includes Aegis
    Ashore and Aegis BMD testing. Most of these changes were due to budget
    issues, brought on by sequestration, other Department budget
    reductions, and target availability. Due primarily to problems with
    target readiness, the first operational test of the BMDS, FTO-01, was
    moved one quarter later in IMTP 13.1, and completed in that same
    quarter.
        Last year, the MDA conducted eight flight tests and five ground
    tests of the BMDS and/or its elements that were the primary
    contributors to DOT&E's characterization of the BMDS. While the
    cumulative results of the testing conducted to date do not provide
    sufficient data to quantify BMDS system-level performance for all of
    the many possible instantiations of the BMDS, they are adequate to
    reveal specific strengths and weaknesses in system-level capability
    that contribute to the overall development of the BMDS.
        The GMD flight test program, affected by three consecutive test
    failures, is under review. The MDA conducted six GMD intercept flight
    tests in the 8-year period from January 2006 to January 2014. The
    Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in these tests were equipped with
    either a Capability Enhancement-I (CE-I) Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
    (EKV) or an upgraded EKV version called the CE-II. In the first three
    intercept flight tests, the GBI hit its intended target; in the second
    three tests, the GBI did not intercept a target successfully. Following
    the FTG-06 failure of the GBI to hit its intended target, the MDA
    conducted FTG-06a as a redo of FTG-06. However, FTG-06a also resulted
    in a failure of the GBI to hit its intended target. While waiting for
    final results from the Failure Review Boards, the MDA planned FTG-07 to
    demonstrate CE-I EKV performance in a more challenging operational
    scenario than previous CE-I tests, and to increase confidence in the
    fielded GBIs that are equipped with CE-I EKVs. However, this also
    resulted in a failure of the GBI to hit its intended target.
        The MDA responded to the Failure Review Board results for FTG-06
    and FTG-06a by changing EKV fabrication processes, improving quality
    control processes during GBI fabrication, and redesigning a CE-II EKV
    component. In fiscal year/calendar year 2013, the MDA successfully
    tested a CE-II EKV incorporating the redesigned component in GMD
    Control Test Vehicle-01 (GM CTV-01), an interceptor-only flight test.
    The FTG-07 Failure Review Board determined that the root cause of the
    failure rested in two significant design susceptibilities with the EKV
    battery and electronic control power supply common to both the CE-I and
    CE-II EKVs. Consistent with the results of the most recent Failure
    Review Board, these GBI flight test results led me to recommend in my
    most recent Annual Report that MDA consider re-designing the EKV using
    rigorous systems engineering design principles to make the EKV more
    robust against failure. The MDA Director independently made the same
    recommendation to the Department's leadership, and the missile defense
    program submitted as part of the President's Budget allocates funds for
    redesigning the GBI EKV.
        Since Flight Test Standard Missile-15 (FTM)-15 in April 2011, Aegis
    BMD has experienced one missile anomaly and three missile failures.
    During FTM-15, the SM-3 Block IA Third Stage Rocket Motor, or TSRM,
    experienced a failure in a critical component, leading to unexpected
    behavior just prior to achieving a successful intercept. The faulty
    component, common to both the Block IA and IB missiles, was
    subsequently redesigned and flown successfully in FTM-18. During FTM-16
    Event 2 in September 2011, a catastrophic failure of the TSRM resulted
    in a failure to intercept. The MDA determined the cause to be an issue
    with one of the firing parameters and they made the necessary software
    modifications to mitigate the issue and verify the fix during numerous
    ground firings and a later successful FTM-19 flight test. Another TSRM
    failure occurred during the first of two Initial Operational Test and
    Evaluation flight tests (FTM-21) when the second of two salvo-fired IB
    missiles experienced a TSRM failure following a successful intercept by
    the first missile. The MDA is investigating this latest failure using
    the Failure Review Board process. The TSRM issues just described affect
    both the IA and IB missiles since the TSRM is a common component to
    both missile variants. Finally, a Block IA missile failed to intercept
    during Flight Test Integrated-01. A Failure Review Board determined
    that the cause of this failure is unrelated to the TSRM issues.
        The MDA will conduct their first engagement of an Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missile, with the target flying a range of greater than 5,500
    kilometers, in fiscal year 2016, rather than fiscal year 2015 as
    planned in IMTP 13.1. The first GMD salvo test of two interceptors
    fired at a single target will occur in fiscal year 2018. Finally, the
    MDA will conduct a multiple simultaneous engagement of two interceptors
    on two targets in fiscal year 2020 during an integrated system-level
    operational test. When I briefed you last year, the multiple
    simultaneous engagement was planned for fiscal year 2018. These changes
    will align the frequency of GMD testing back to 12-month centers. Also
    significant, beginning with the fiscal year 2016 test, all but one of
    the subsequent GMD tests will be against Intercontinental Ballistic
    Missile class targets.
        For Aegis BMD and THAAD, sufficient data now exist to perform
    quantitative estimates of the probability of engagement success for the
    tested battlespace (which is less than the full intended battlespace)
    of the two weapon systems. The probability of engagement success
    estimates for these two weapon systems are included in the classified
    portion of my 2013 Assessment of the BMDS.
        For other BMDS elements, my assessments often contain subjective
    content due to the limited amount of test data that are available and
    the resulting limited progress toward verification, validation, and
    accreditation (VV&A) of the required BMDS models and simulations. Many
    of the models and simulations used in the ground tests are still not
    accredited for performance assessment, thereby limiting quantitative
    assessments based on their results. Some portions of the battlespace
    where data are lacking cannot be assessed. Examples include high
    closing velocities associated with longer range targets for Aegis BMD,
    salvo intercept time spacing for GMD since it has not yet attempted a
    salvo launch, and launch-on-remote track for THAAD. My office and the
    MDA are working to assure the IMTP supports BMDS modeling and
    simulation by providing the test data required for rigorous VV&A. The
    MDA was able to collect important data on Critical Engagement
    Conditions and Empirical Measurement Events supporting VV&A. However,
    model and simulation VV&A to support comprehensive quantitative
    performance assessments will, in many instances, require several more
    years to complete.
        My comments to this committee during my testimony of the last 5
    years, regarding the IMTP development process, remain accurate. The
    Director of MDA, Vice Admiral Syring, has continued to pursue a
    rigorous IMTP development process that has produced a well-justified
    set of tests. During the reporting period, the MDA continued to
    emphasize operational realism when planning for and conducting both
    ground and flight testing. My office continues to be involved
    throughout the semi-annual review and revision process leading to each
    update of the IMTP. This process has worked well during the preparation
    of the previous plans that I approved jointly with the MDA directors.
    The process has enabled each version of the IMTP to be revised in a
    timely manner consistent with policy changes, flight test results
    (including unsuccessful intercepts), and changes in budgetary
    resources. The IMTP is a rigorous plan for obtaining the test
    information needed to assess BMDS performance quantitatively.
        The rigorous testing incorporated in the IMTP will inevitably lead
    to flight test failures. These failures, although often perceived as
    setbacks, provide information that is absolutely critical to assuring
    that our ballistic missile defenses will work under realistic and
    stressing conditions. The IMTP does not, however, include explicit
    provisions for backup or repeat tests that would be needed in the event
    of flight test mission failures. Therefore, the effects of unsuccessful
    tests, such as the FTG-07 and FTM-21 missile 2 failures, need to be
    mitigated through future updates of the IMTP. Thus far, the semi-annual
    revision process has allowed flexibility in making the necessary
    adjustments when needed.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Dr. Gilmore.
        Admiral Syring.

       STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                 DEFENSE AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Admiral Syring. Good afternoon, Chairman Udall, Senator
    Sessions, Senator King, Senator Donnelly. Out of our total
    request of $7.46 billion for the fiscal year 2015 missile
    defense program, we are requesting approximately $1.3 billion,
    including the Air Force early warning radar investments, for
    Homeland defense as we prepare to expand our GBI inventory to
    44 by 2017.
        My highest priority remains the successful intercept flight
    test of the CE-2 EKV. In January 2013 we conducted a highly
    successful non-intercept test of the CE-2 EKV. Its performance
    exceeded our expectations and confirmed we're on the right
    track to return GMD to intercept flight testing. I am confident
    we have fixed the problem we encountered in the December 2010
    test and we look forward to conducting the FTG-06B intercept
    test this summer.
        I'm also optimistic that we have identified the root cause
    of the intercept failure involving our first generation EKV
    last July, when the CE-1 kill vehicle failed to separate from
    the booster's third stage. We have accounted for that issue and
    its probability in the upcoming flight test this summer and are
    working towards a correction for the entire fleet before the
    end of the year.
        Instead of continuing to make year-to-year reliability
    improvements in our GBIs, in fiscal year 2015 we will begin to
    redesign and improve the GBI EKV. The new EKVs will be more
    producible, testable, reliable, and cost-effective, and
    eventually replace the kill vehicles used in our current GBI
    inventory.
        We will also begin development of the long-range
    discriminating radar, with deployment planned in 2020. The new
    midcourse tracking radar will provide persistent coverage and
    improved discrimination capabilities against threats to the
    Homeland from the Pacific theater.
        We will continue to improve the performance of the Aegis
    weapon system and request to procure 30 SM-3 Block 1B guided
    missiles in fiscal year 2015. We will request 4-year multi-year
    procurement authority next year for the SM-3 1B starting in
    fiscal year 2016.
        In fiscal year 2015, we will also procure in our request 31
    interceptors for THAAD and fund additional AN/TPY2 spares and
    an additional THAAD battery for the Army.
        We remain on schedule to meet the presidential mandate for
    the deployments of phases 2 and 3 of the EPAA. With 15 flight
    tests planned in fiscal year 2015, we will continue to test
    elements of the system to demonstrate they work before we
    commit to fielding.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
    subcommittee's questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Syring follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by VADM J.D. Syring, USN
        Good afternoon, Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions,
    distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this
    opportunity to testify before you today. Our current budget request of
    $7.459 billion for fiscal year 2015 will continue the development of
    defenses for our Nation, deployed forces, allies, and international
    partners against increasingly capable ballistic missiles. The fiscal
    year 2015 missile defense program will support the warfighter and needs
    of the combatant commanders (COCOMs) with the development and
    deployment of interceptors, sensors, and the command, control, battle
    management and communications (C2BMC) system that makes up the
    integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Our PB 2015 request
    supports needed improvements in homeland defense and continues strong
    support of regional defense initiatives. Our fiscal year 2015 program
    plans include continued investments in advanced technologies and future
    capabilities to keep pace with the increasingly complex threat.
                            ballistic missile threat
        The threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries are
    acquiring a greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their
    range and making them more complex, survivable, reliable, and accurate.
    The missile defense mission is becoming more challenging as potential
    adversaries incorporate BMD countermeasures. Space-launch activities in
    Iran and North Korea involve multistage systems that serve to further
    the development of ballistic missile technology for longer-range
    systems, including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-applicable
    technologies and systems. As the Director for National Intelligence
    testified last year, ``Iran has demonstrated an ability to launch small
    satellites, and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical
    steps . . . provide Tehran with the means and motivation to develop
    larger space-launch vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an
    ICBM.'' Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the
    United States by 2015. In addition to the Taepo Dong 2 space launch
    vehicle/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has paraded the KN08 road-
    mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable
    of reaching Guam and the Aleutian Islands. Iran also has steadily
    increased its ballistic missile force, deploying next generation short-
    and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs) with increasing
    accuracy and new submunition payloads. Iran has publicly demonstrated
    the ability to launch simultaneous salvos of multiple rockets and
    missiles. Demonstrating that it is capable of modifying currently
    deployed ballistic missile systems, Iran has flight-tested a Fateh-110
    ballistic missile called the Khalij Fars by adding a seeker to improve
    the missile's accuracy against sea-based targets. This ballistic
    missile has a range of 300 km, which means it is capable of threatening
    maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.
                           support for the warfighter
        Our overriding goal is to provide support to the warfighter. With
    this budget we will maintain our commitment to build out homeland
    defenses to 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBI), pending a successful
    return to intercept this summer, and focus on Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) system reliability and GBI performance. We will also
    maintain our commitment to deploy Phases 2 and 3 of the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach (EPAA). We are continuing efforts to improve the
    performance of the Aegis Weapons System and deliver Standard Missile
    (SM-3) Block IB guided missiles. We will also deploy a second forward-
    based X-band AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan, improving homeland and regional
    defense capabilities and increasing our global operational AN/TPY-2
    radar posture, and build and improve the C2BMC infrastructure at
    fielded sites. We plan to procure interceptors for Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and, pursuant to our agreement with the
    Army, fund additional AN/TPY-2 spares and an additional THAAD Battery.
        Last year, we conducted or participated in over 17 multi-event
    exercises and wargames, which are critically important to the
    warfighter and the intensive engineering efforts across the Agency. MDA
    also worked collaboratively with combatant commanders, Office of the
    Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Services to complete a strategy and
    roadmap providing a series of near-, mid- and far-term architecture
    options for the BMDS that are the basis for program planning for the
    rest of this decade. In response to the continued fielding by U.S.
    adversaries of air, missile, and rocket capabilities, in May 2013 MDA
    assumed the responsibility of Technical Authority for Integrated Air
    and Missile Defense (IAMD), and as such will lead the Department's
    joint IAMD engineering and integration efforts, including interface
    definition and control as well as technical requirements allocation.
        Finally, we continue to work closely with the Director, Operational
    Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) and with independent testers and the
    Services. From October 2012 to the present, we have executed 9 high
    profile flight tests, 13 if you include our involvement with and
    contributions to Israeli flight tests. The highlight was Flight Test
    Operational-01 (FTO-01), the historic and unparalleled operational test
    of our regional layered ballistic missile defenses this past September,
    which involved THAAD and Aegis BMD, ground- and sea-based forward
    deployed sensors, and C2BMC. The two targets were launched on
    operationally realistic trajectories towards a defended area near the
    Reagan Test Site in the Pacific Ocean. This was a highly successful
    operational test involving MDA, the Operational Test Agency, Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and U.S.
    Pacific Command, as well as U.S. Army soldiers from the Alpha Battery,
    2nd Air Defense Artillery THAAD, U.S. Navy sailors aboard the USS
    Decatur and British sailors aboard the HMS Daring, and airmen from the
    613th Air and Operations Center. Similar to the Flight Test Integrated-
    01 test conducted in October 2012, FTO-01 provided the warfighters
    confidence in the execution of their integrated air and missile defense
    plans and the opportunity to refine operational doctrine and tactics,
    techniques and procedures.
        In fiscal year 2015, we have 15 flight tests in the Integrated
    Master Test Plan. As the BMDS matures, we are continuing to increase
    the complexity in our flight test program by: conducting more system-
    level operational tests; increasing the number of BMDS assets in those
    tests; increasing the numbers, types and ranges of the threat
    representative targets we use; conducting more simultaneous launches;
    and replicating potential wartime scenarios to realistically exercise
    warfighting chain of command to evaluate command and control concepts
    of operation and tactics, techniques and procedures. We also have
    system-level ground tests that combine the warfighter chain of command
    with the developmental system and test under varying conditions to
    improve confidence in the system being deployed to combatant commands.
    We are entering a period of unprecedented complexity and increased
    testing tempo based on that complexity. Our flight tests will also
    involve an increasingly stressful set of threat representative targets
    as well as longer range interceptors for our regional capabilities.
    Over the coming years, U.S. Government stakeholders--to include
    soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen--and allies will have a larger
    role and impact in our test program than ever before.
                                homeland defense
        MDA's highest near-term priority remains the successful GMD
    intercept flight test of the newest GBI Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle
    (EKV)--the Capability Enhancement (CE)-II EKV. Based on our analysis of
    the data from the successful January 2013 non-intercept controlled
    flight test of the CE-II GBI (CTV-01), we plan to conduct FTG-06b, an
    intercept flight test, this summer. CTV-01 demonstrated the successful
    dampening of the vibration environments that affected the navigation
    system and resulted in the failure of the FTG-06a mission conducted in
    December 2010. FTG-06b will demonstrate the ability of the CE-II EKV to
    discriminate and intercept a lethal object from a representative ICBM
    target scene. An increase in the number of GBIs in the fleet assumes a
    successful return to intercept of the CE-II EKV.
        Last July, with FTG-07, we conducted an intercept flight test of
    the upgraded CE-I, or first generation, EKV. We made numerous
    improvements to the CE-I fleet through upgrades since the last
    successful CE-I flight test in 2008. In FTG-07 the EKV did not
    intercept the target because the kill vehicle on the GBI did not
    separate from the booster's third stage. The failure investigation is
    progressing toward a root cause. Once the investigation is concluded,
    we will take steps to make any fixes to the fleet that need to be made
    for both the CE-I and CE-II EKVs.
        Today, 30 operational GBIs protect the United States against a
    limited ICBM attack from current regional threats, such as North Korea
    and Iran. Last year we began refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort
    Greely, AK (FGA) to develop silo capacity to support delivery of an
    additional 14 GBIs, continued emplacing GBIs in Missile Field 2 (MF 2),
    and continued conducting GBI component testing and refurbishing
    currently deployed GBIs to test and improve their reliability. We are
    requesting approximately $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2015 for homeland
    defenses. We remain committed to a ``fly-before-you-buy'' acquisition
    approach. Pending a successful outcome of the GMD intercept flight test
    this summer, we will resume taking delivery of GBIs and emplace them in
    MF 2 and MF 1 as we progress towards 44 by the end of fiscal year 2017.
    Beginning in fiscal year 2016, we will acquire replacement GBIs to
    support GMD operations, testing, and spares, pending the outcome of
    flight testing.
        Construction of the GBI In-Flight Interceptor Communication System
    (IFICS) Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort Drum, NY, is proceeding on
    schedule. Once it is operational in late-2015, the east coast IDT will
    enable communication with GBIs launched from Fort Greely, AK and
    Vandenberg Air Force Base in California over longer distances and
    improve defenses for the eastern United States by increasing system
    performance in specific engagement scenarios.
        We currently operate a forward-based X-band radar, the AN/TPY-2
    radar, in Shariki, Japan, which is in the northern part of that
    country. In September 2012 the Secretary of Defense directed the
    deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 X-band radar in Japan to provide
    improved tracking coverage for launches out of North Korea. Working
    with our Japanese partners, we expect to complete the deployment of the
    second AN/TPY-2 radar in Kyogamisaki in southern Japan by the end of
    this calendar year. We will also deploy a new C2BMC capability which
    will enhance the overall performance of the radars when operating in a
    mutually supporting dual radar mode.
        We will take additional steps to keep pace with the threats to the
    U.S. Homeland. We have requested $99.5 million in fiscal year 2015 to
    redesign and improve the GBI EKV. The redesigned EKV will be built with
    a modular, open architecture and designed with common interfaces and
    standards, making upgrades easier and broadening our vendor and
    supplier base. The new EKVs will improve reliability and be more
    producible, testable, reliable, and cost-effective and eventually will
    replace the kill vehicle on our current GBI fleet. We are currently
    assessing concepts, acquisition options, and timelines to test and
    field the redesigned EKV. Our goal is to begin flight testing the
    redesigned EKV in fiscal year 2018. We also request $79.5 million,
    which includes $29 million in MILCON funding for planning and design,
    to begin development of a Long-Range Discrimination Radar, with
    deployment planned in 2020. The new long-range, mid-course tracking
    radar will provide persistent coverage and improve discrimination
    capabilities against threats to the Homeland from the Pacific theater.
    This new radar also will give more geographic flexibility to deploy the
    Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar for contingency and test use.
        MDA requests $122 million in fiscal year 2015 to support the
    Discrimination Improvements for Homeland Defense (DIHD) efforts. The
    goal of this effort is to develop and field an integrated set of
    capabilities to improve BMDS reliability, lethality, and
    discrimination. The end result will be a deployed future BMDS
    architecture more capable of discriminating and destroying a reentry
    vehicle. Our plans in this area will support a near-term DIHD
    capability (2016) and a DIHD capability fielding in 2020.
        We are requesting $64 million in fiscal year 2015 for continued SBX
    radar operations. In collaboration with the Services, Joint Staff, U.S.
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and the COCOMs, we maintained the SBX
    radar in Limited Test Support Status, where the radar continues to
    support the BMDS test program and remains available for contingency
    deployment under the operational command of PACOM. In 2013 SBX
    supported real world operations, with 49 days at-sea, and the FTG-07
    GMD test with a total of 110 days at-sea and demonstrated an autonomous
    acquisition capability.
        We are also examining locations for a possible additional CONUS
    interceptor site. The current GBI sites at Fort Greely, AK and
    Vandenberg AFB, CA provide capability necessary to protect the
    Homeland. While there has been no decision by the Department to move
    forward with an additional CONUS interceptor site, such a site would
    add battle space and interceptor capacity should it be deemed necessary
    to proceed with deployment. Our CONUS Interceptor Site study determined
    the following sites are viable candidates and they are to be included
    in the Environmental Impact Statement: Fort Drum, NY; Naval Air Station
    Portsmouth SERE Training Area, Rangley, ME; Ravenna Training and
    Logistics Site, OH; and Fort Custer Combined Training Center, MI. The
    Environmental Impact Statement, which will take approximately 24 months
    to complete, will assess environmental impacts at each of the sites, to
    include potential impacts to land use, water resources, air quality,
    transportation, socioeconomics and other factors established by the
    National Environmental Policy Act.
        For fiscal year 2015 we are requesting approximately $38.6 million
    for our network of strategic radars. We will continue missile defense
    upgrades of the Early Warning Radars in Clear, AK and Cape Cod, MA. We
    expect to complete the Clear radar upgrade in 2017 and the Cape Cod
    upgrade in 2018. Last year MDA worked with the Air Force to begin
    upgrading the Early Warning Radar (EWR) at Clear, AK to give it a
    missile defense capability, providing improved ballistic missile
    defense sensor coverage over the continental United States and reducing
    sustainment and operating costs. We also transferred sustainment
    responsibility for the Beale (California), Fylingdales (United
    Kingdom), and Thule (Greenland) Upgraded Early Warning Radars back to
    the U.S. Air Force.
                               regional defenses
        Deployment of regional defenses to protect our deployed forces,
    allies and international partners remains one of our top priorities.
    Our fiscal year 2015 budget request funds the continued development and
    deployment of defenses against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs in support of
    combatant commanders' near-term and future priorities. MDA will
    continue to focus on threats from the Asia-Pacific and Middle East
    regions as we continue to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach
    to protect our deployed forces and our allies.
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
        In fiscal year 2013, MDA delivered 37 THAAD Interceptors and
    expended 2 in flight tests, for a total of 84 delivered to Army war
    stock. We also delivered hardware for fielding of the third THAAD
    battery: two Tactical Station Groups, six Launchers, and a set of
    Peculiar Support Equipment. Training of the soldiers who will operate
    the third THAAD battery has begun and we expect it to be completed in
    fiscal year 2015. This year we expect to deliver the fourth THAAD
    battery. In collaboration with the Services, Joint Staff, STRATCOM and
    the COCOMs, we achieved first operational deployment of the THAAD
    capability for the defense of Guam. In recent tests we demonstrated
    THAAD's ability to intercept an MRBM as part of an integrated
    operational test with Aegis BMD (FTO-01), the second intercept of this
    class of target since FTI-01. THAAD has put together a remarkable
    record of success, successfully intercepting 11 out of 11 targets with
    the operationally configured interceptor.
        For fiscal year 2015, MDA is requesting $464 million for THAAD
    procurement, which includes the purchase of 31 THAAD interceptors. We
    also are requesting $300 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2015
    and $76 million for THAAD operations and maintenance. We will continue
    to enhance THAAD's ability to operate through post-intercept debris,
    enable launch of THAAD's interceptors using sensor data provided by
    other BMDS sensors, and maintain capability against current and
    evolving threats. THAAD will conduct two flight tests in fiscal year
    2015. In FTT-18 THAAD will demonstrate an intercept of a separating
    IRBM target using the THAAD radar, launcher, fire control and
    communication, interceptor closed loop operations, and engagement
    functions. In FTO-02 THAAD will engage a SRBM with associated objects
    and demonstrate advanced radar algorithms.
    Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
        Last year MDA completed six BMD Weapons System installations on
    Aegis ships: two Aegis BMD 3.6; three Aegis BMD 4.0; and one Aegis BMD
    5.0 (USS John Paul Jones) in conjunction with the Navy's Aegis Baseline
    9 installation. The USS John Paul Jones will replace the USS Lake Erie
    as the BMD deployable test ship to support MDA and Navy testing of
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense capabilities. We now have a total of
    30 BMD capable Aegis ships in the Fleet. In 2013 we delivered 10 SM-3
    Block IAs and 16 SM-3 Block IBs. By the end of 2015, over 65 SM-3 Block
    IBs will be delivered.
        We are requesting $929 million in RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2015
    to continue development, testing, and installation of Aegis BMD
    capabilities to defeat longer range and more sophisticated ballistic
    missiles launched in larger raid sizes. We request $435 million in
    fiscal year 2015 for Aegis BMD procurement, which includes $348 million
    for 30 SM-3 Block IB guided missiles and $12 million for operations and
    maintenance of SM-3 Block IAs. In response to the combatant commanders'
    demand for more BMD ships with the latest tested capability, Navy and
    MDA have incorporated Aegis BMD into the Navy's Aegis DDG Modernization
    Program and new construction DDGs. We will continue upgrading the
    capability of existing BMD ships and integrating new and modernized
    ships to the BMD fleet, with a planned operational availability of 43
    Aegis BMD ships in fiscal year 2019. The homeport transfer of four
    Aegis BMD ships to Rota, Spain began this past February with the USS
    Donald Cook. Another Aegis BMD ship, USS Ross is scheduled to transfer
    later this year, and the remaining two Aegis BMD ships will transfer in
    2015.
        With the Japan Ministry of Defense, we completed multiple SM-3
    Block IIA component Cooperative Development Project Critical Design
    Reviews, including: Staging Assembly, Steering Control Section,
    Guidance System, Third Stage Rocket Motor, Sensors, Kinetic Warhead
    Guidance Electronics Unit Assembly, Divert and Attitude Control System,
    and Kinetic Warhead, culminating with an overall missile system
    Critical Design Review, in October 2013. Also in October, the SM-3
    Block IIA completed Propulsion Test Vehicle-01 in which the missile and
    new composite canister both demonstrated successful and safe ignition
    and egress from the vertical launching system.
        Last year was a significant year for Aegis BMD testing, with five
    for five successful intercept tests and successful transmission of Long
    Range Surveillance and Track data through C2BMC to the GMD system in
    FTG-07. FTM-20 (February 2013) demonstrated the ability of the Aegis
    BMD 4.0 Weapon System to Launch on Remote using data from the Space
    Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstrator satellites. FTM-20
    employed an SM-3 Block IA against a unitary medium-range target. High
    quality infrared fire control data from STSS was provided through
    C2BMC. C2BMC generated very high quality fire control quality data and
    passed the track data over operational communications links to the
    firing Aegis ship to conduct a launch on remote engagement. This
    complex test proved the value of an integrated C2 and sensor network
    and the use of space-based sensors to expand the BMD battle space. FTM-
    19 (May 2013) supported the development and assessment of the Aegis BMD
    4.0 Weapon System and the SM-3 Block IB prior to an fiscal year 2014
    full-rate production decision. A second Aegis BMD ship successfully
    acquired the target and conducted a simulated engagement using space-
    based sensor data.
        In a span of 23 days, Aegis BMD was a principal player in three
    major operational flight tests: FTO-01, FTM-21, and FTM-22, which all
    achieved successful intercepts. FTM-21 (September 2013) and FTM-22
    (October 2013) fired SM-3 Block IBs to validate operational
    effectiveness and suitability of the Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapon System and
    the SM-3 Block IB. FTM-22 was our fifth consecutive successful
    intercept mission using the 4.0 Weapons System and SM-3 Block IB and an
    important milestone for Phase 2 of the EPAA. FTM-21 and FTM-22 also
    completed Director Operational Test and Evaluation Initial Operational
    Test and Evaluation flight testing requirements for the 4.0 Weapons
    System and the SM-3 Block IB.
        To complete Initial Operational Test and Evaluation requirements
    for the 4.0 weapons system, we also conducted a tracking exercise, FTX-
    18, over the Atlantic Ocean in January 2014, which confirmed the
    capability of the 4.0 weapons system to track and engage a raid of
    three ballistic missile targets with simulated SM-3 Block IBs. In this
    event, multiple Aegis BMD baselines participated, yielding comparative
    raid performance data, including the Aegis Ashore Romania deckhouse at
    Lockheed Martin in Moorestown, NJ. The Aegis Ashore system will be
    deployed to Romania later this year.
        We also continue development of a Sea Based Terminal capability to
    provide protection of maritime forces against advanced anti-ship
    ballistic missiles and increased layered defense for forces ashore.
    Using an incremental development approach, we are incorporating BMD
    capability into the Navy's Baseline 9 architecture, to include terminal
    defense with the SM-6 guided missile and the BMD 5.0 weapon system. In
    2013, we completed the initial design phase and initiated software
    development for missile and weapon system modifications. We plan to
    test and certify the first increment of sea based terminal capability
    in 2015. We also finalized the requirements for the second increment of
    Sea Based Terminal capability, scheduled to certify in 2018.
        The fiscal year 2015 Aegis BMD flight test program will include
    almost all of the Standard Missile variants, with firings of SM-3 Block
    IBs from ships as well as the PMRF Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test
    Center, execution of raid scenarios with engagements in both Anti-Air
    Warfare and BMD warfare areas, Launch on Remote for long-range
    engagements, developmental Controlled Test Vehicle firings of the SM-3
    Block IIA missile, and tracking exercises for the Sea Based Terminal
    weapon system configuration.
    European Phased Adaptive Approach
        We will continue to support the EPAA to provide coverage of
    European NATO territory from Iranian ballistic missile threats by
    investing resources for EPAA development, testing and deployment. Phase
    1, which provides coverage of NATO territory in Europe with the
    deployment of Aegis BMD 3.6 ships with SM-3 IAs and a SPY-1 radar in
    the Mediterranean, the AN/TPY-2 radar (Forward Based Mode) to U.S.
    European Command (EUCOM) in Turkey, and the C2BMC Spiral 6.4 system at
    Ramstein AFB in Germany, has been operational since the end of 2011.
        Our goal in EPAA Phase 2 is to provide robust capability against
    SRBMs and MRBMs. The architecture includes the deployment of the Aegis
    BMD 4.0 and 5.0 weapon systems with SM-3 Block IBs at an Aegis Ashore
    site in Romania and at sea. A formal ground-breaking ceremony for the
    Aegis Ashore site took place in Deveselu, Romania in October 2013. The
    start of construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania
    this year involves the delivery of the deckhouse from Moorestown, NJ,
    to Romania. The site will be integrated into the EUCOM command and
    control network, tested and operational by December 2015. MDA requests
    $123 million in fiscal year 2015 to continue development of the Aegis
    Ashore sites in Romania and Poland. We also request $226 million in
    fiscal year 2015 for the continued procurement of equipment for Aegis
    Ashore in Poland.
        Four months after disassembly and transport of the Aegis Ashore
    equipment to the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) began, an Aegis
    Light Off ceremony was held on 6 December, 2013 to commemorate the
    first time the Aegis Combat System was powered on, with sailors manning
    the consoles and the system brought on-line at the PMRF deck house
    facility. We are now preparing for Aegis Ashore flight tests at PMRF
    this year and in 2015.
        Deployment of Phase 3 will enhance and expand protection for
    European NATO countries and U.S. forces through the region from MRBMs
    and IRBMs from the Middle East. In support of EPAA Phase 3, the SM-3
    Block IIA, which we are co-developing with the Japanese Government, and
    an upgraded version of the Aegis Weapons System are on schedule to be
    available for deployment in 2018 at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and
    Poland, and at sea. MDA requests $264 million in RDT&E funding in
    fiscal year 2015 to continue the bilateral, cooperative effort. The
    upgraded Aegis Weapons System and C2BMC system with engage on remote
    AN/TPY-2 radar (forward based mode) capability combined with the
    faster, longer reaching SM-3 IIA will expand Aegis BMD battle space to
    counter more sophisticated threats and will extend coverage to NATO
    allies in Europe threatened by longer range ballistic missiles.
        Working closely with Navy, we will deliver the upgraded 5.1 Aegis
    BMD Weapons System as a part of the Navy's Baseline 9 architecture on
    ships for deployment worldwide in 2018 to support combatant commanders
    requirements to counter an expanded threat set. This past year we
    continued development of the Aegis BMD 5.1 fire control system.
    Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and Sensors
        In 2013 we continued to support warfighter operations of the EUCOM
    BMDS capability for regional defense. In partnership with the combatant
    commands, we maintain the capability to engage multiple simultaneous
    threat attacks in the region. As the foundation of BMDS, the MDA C2BMC
    team supported the warfighter in real world operations across multiple
    Areas of Responsibility, which included deployments to the Middle East,
    Turkey, and Kwajalein. Last year we fielded software upgrades to U.S.
    Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S.
    Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) and installed
    Spiral 6.4 MR-2 at PACOM, NORTHCOM, and STRATCOM. This year we
    completed software upgrades to CENTCOM and EUCOM. We also delivered the
    Distributed Training System to CENTCOM for Air and Missile Defense
    Exercise 13-2.
        For the first time, in 2013, we conducted a flight test with
    successful debris mitigation (FTO-01) and also generated fire control
    quality track data from space sensors for a live fire Launch-on-Remote
    Aegis BMD 4.0 Weapons system and SM-3 Block IA engagement (FTM-20). In
    addition to continuing the enhancement of global BMD survivable
    communications and support for operations and sustainment of C2BMC at
    fielded sites, in fiscal year 2015 we will integrate Space Based
    Infrared System Increment 2 capabilities into C2BMC to support cueing
    of BMD sensors worldwide. We will also improve sensor data integration
    and battle management in C2BMC to support Aegis BMD cueing and launch-
    on and engage-on remote capability.
        In support of homeland and regional defense, we continued to
    sustain AN/TPY-2 operations and supported the deployment of additional
    AN/TPY-2 radars and the C2BMC infrastructure. For the second AN/TPY-2
    radar deployment to Japan, we identified candidate sites, conducted
    site surveys, selected sites, obtained agreements with the host nation,
    and initiated site design efforts. We deployed the AN/TPY-2 (Terminal
    Mode) as part of a THAAD battery in the PACOM Area of Responsibility.
    Last year we relocated the AN/TPY-2 radar in CENTCOM to a permanent
    location. Additionally, we accepted the AN/TPY-2 radar Number 8 and
    provided it to the 3rd THAAD Battery; awarded a production contract for
    AN/TPY-2 Number 12; awarded a production contract for an additional
    Prime Power Unit; and awarded a contract for AN/TPY-2 spares.
        We request $393 million in fiscal year 2015 to develop and deploy
    BMDS sensors (includes Long-Range Discrimination Radar), and $183
    million to operate and sustain the nine AN/TPY-2 radars and support the
    UEWRs and Cobra Dane radar. We request $444 million in fiscal year 2015
    to operate and sustain C2BMC at fielded sites and continue C2BMC
    program spiral development of software and engineering to incorporate
    enhanced C2BMC capability into the battle management architecture and
    promote further interoperability among the BMDS elements, incorporate
    boost phase tracking, and improve system-level correlation and
    tracking. We will also continue communications support for the AN/TPY-2
    radars and C2BMC upgrades. We request $31 million for continued
    operation of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System and Near-Field
    InfraRed (NFIRE) satellite system in fiscal year 2015. We continue to
    operate the two STSS-D satellites to conduct cooperative tests with
    other BMDS elements and demonstrate the capability of the satellites to
    cue and track against targets of opportunity to provide high precision,
    real-time tracking of missiles and midcourse objects that enable
    closing the fire control loops with BMDS interceptors. We also continue
    to operate the NFIRE satellite, which has the capability to collect
    near-field phenomenology data for use in developing plume to hard-body
    handover algorithms for boost phase interceptor programs.
                          developing new capabilities
        We are developing fiscally sustainable advanced technology that can
    be integrated into the BMDS to adapt to threat changes. Our investments
    are focused on technology that brings upgradeable capability to the
    warfighter. Our advanced technology investments are determined by
    systems engineering, which permits us to evaluate and determine which
    emerging technical solutions will best address gaps in the BMDS and
    enhance its overall capability and performance. The goal of our
    technology investment strategy is to deploy a future BMDS architecture
    more capable of discriminating and killing reentry vehicles with a high
    degree of confidence, allowing the warfighter to dramatically improve
    shot doctrine. One of our greatest challenges is the ability to bring
    multiple sensor phenomenology (i.e., reflective and thermal properties
    of the missile) into the missile defense architecture. Relying purely
    on terrestrial radar for precision tracking and discrimination of the
    threat is a potential weakness our enemy could exploit in the future.
    Adding persistent electro-optical sensors to our architecture is a high
    payoff solution for this gap.
        MDA requests $45 million in fiscal year 2015 for Discrimination
    Sensor Technology. We will integrate advanced sensors on existing
    unmanned aerial vehicles and demonstrate their ability to create a
    precision track that shooters can use to target their interceptors
    quickly and accurately. We will test the first precision track sensors
    at PMRF this fall. In parallel, we will begin integration and ground
    test of an advanced sensor upgrade to these precision track sensors
    with follow-on flight testing in fiscal year 2016. MDA's Discrimination
    Sensor Technology development and test plan is a cost-effective,
    stepping stone to MDA's long-term goal of persistent discrimination
    coverage from a space platform.
        Additionally, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and MDA are
    collaborating on future space sensor architecture studies and sensor
    performance assessments across a broad set of joint mission areas and
    on Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) studies with threat definition,
    technical evaluations, and cost analysis support. MDA is supporting
    AFSPC in its review of concepts that will inform an AoA for the future
    of protected military satellite communications and overhead persistent
    infrared systems. As an example, MDA is exploring the potential of
    BMDS-focused space sensors that also provide data contributing to Air
    Force missions such as Space Situational Awareness.
        MDA requests $14 million in Weapons Technology in fiscal year 2015
    to combine the knowledge gained from our Discrimination Sensor
    Technology effort with our high-power directed energy program to build
    the foundation for the next-generation laser system capable of
    addressing advanced threats and raids at a much lower cost than
    existing missile interceptors. We are pursuing a unique set of laser
    technology to execute missile defense missions from high-altitude, low-
    mach airborne platforms operating in the clear, low turbulence
    stratosphere. We have been developing two promising solid-state lasers:
    one at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the other at the
    Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory
    collaboratively with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
    (DARPA). Both lasers achieved record power levels within the last year.
    MDA will continue high energy efficient laser technology development
    with the goal of scaling to power levels required for a broad spectrum
    of speed of light missile defense missions. This year, we are working
    with several aircraft prime contractors defining concepts for
    integrating a multi-kW class laser into a mid-altitude, unmanned aerial
    vehicle. A laser test platform addresses a broad spectrum of mission
    applications and we will continue our collaboration with our service
    partners, the Air Force Research Laboratory, and DARPA for joint
    development and test opportunities.
        MDA requests $26 million in fiscal year 2015 for the Common Kill
    Vehicle (CKV) Technology effort. MDA's strategy is to achieve as much
    commonality among future GMD kill vehicles and other future kill
    vehicles for Aegis BMD and THAAD. In fiscal year 2014 this CKV
    technology effort will help establish the requirements foundation for
    the redesigned GMD EKV, which we are now planning as the first phase
    (Phase I) of our overall kill vehicle development strategy. Our fiscal
    year 2014 joint government and industry concept definition effort will
    also assess the ability of industry to meet those requirements. In
    follow-on CKV efforts, or Phase II, we will make investments that
    reduce the costs of production and weapon system operations through new
    kill vehicle architectures and scalable technology that improves the
    effectiveness and performance of our interceptor fleet against an
    evolving threat. Our investments in large format focal plane arrays,
    smaller inertial measurement units and high performance propulsion
    components as well as new kill vehicle architectures are key enablers.
    This technology development allows us to engage a more numerous and
    increasingly more complex threat, eventually establishing the
    technology foundation for killing multiple lethal objects from a single
    SM-3 or GBI.
        MDA requests $16 million in fiscal year 2015 for the Advanced
    Research area which conducts leading-edge research and development with
    small businesses, universities, and international partners to create
    and advance future missile defense capability. This effort includes
    managing the Small Business Innovation Research and Technology
    Applications programs to help MDA-funded small businesses to transition
    their technology to missile defense applications. MDA is also seeking
    to leverage the creativity of our Nation's universities by sponsoring
    academic research focused on developing breakthrough capabilities for
    missile defense.
        MDA requests $9 million in fiscal year 2015 for the Advanced
    Concepts & Performance Assessment effort, which delivers independent
    assessments of government, university, and industry technology concepts
    that, along with systems engineering requirements, support acquisition
    strategy decisions and define our technology focus areas. This effort
    has greatly improved our assessment of advanced BMD technologies to
    address evolving threats for the warfighter. We work directly with
    universities, federally Funded Research and Development Centers,
    University Affiliated Research Centers and innovative small businesses
    to develop cutting edge data collection, modeling techniques, hardware-
    in-the-loop, and high performance computing platforms to speed the
    assessment of innovative technology concepts.
                           international cooperation
        MDA is engaged with over 20 countries and international
    organizations, such as NATO. Our major international efforts reflect
    the Department's goals in the Asia-Pacific, Middle East, and Europe:
    building partner BMD capacity, supporting the strategic shift to Asia-
    Pacific, and executing EPAA deployments.
    Building Partner BMD Capability
        Since I last testified before the committee, we had several
    successes in our cooperative development programs with our Israeli
    partners. Through our cooperative efforts, Israel is developing a
    layered and robust BMD capability. In November 2013 the Israel Missile
    Defense Organization (IMDO) and MDA achieved a second successful
    intercept using the David's Sling Weapon System. This past January we
    successfully conducted the second fly-out of the Arrow-3 upper tier
    interceptor. These programmatic milestones provide confidence in future
    Israeli capabilities to defeat the evolving ballistic missile threat in
    the Middle East. Another recent and significant accomplishment for the
    Department is the precedent-setting international agreement with Israel
    regarding coproduction of the Iron Dome missile defense system that was
    signed on March 5, 2014. The agreement supports increasing U.S.
    industry co-production of Iron Dome components.
        Our largest co-development effort is with Japan on the SM-3 Block
    IIA interceptor. Japan has committed significant funding for their part
    of this co-development project. Japanese and U.S. components will be
    fully integrated and flight tested in the coming years. The Japanese
    dedication to this program ensures we will remain on track to deliver
    SM-3 Block IIA in support of the EPAA Phase 3 in the 2018 timeframe.
        After spending a year establishing processes, procedures, and an
    information technology infrastructure, the Defense Security Cooperation
    Agency designated MDA a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Implementing
    Agency in February 2012 for the THAAD missile defense system and the
    AN/TPY-2 radar. MDA is currently executing one FMS case with the United
    Arab Emirates for two THAAD batteries and accompanying launchers,
    radars, and interceptors. We are actively engaged with several nations,
    particularly those in the Gulf region, to provide program information
    and pricing and cost data that may inform future decisions to procure
    THAAD as an upper tier missile defense capability.
    Supporting the Strategic Shift to the Asia-Pacific
        As I have already stated, along with the cooperative efforts on the
    SM-3 Block IIA, the United States and Japan are working together to
    support the deployment of the second U.S. forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar.
    Our Japanese partners should be commended for their efforts in
    supporting this deployment to the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF)
    base in Kyogamisaki in southern Japan. This radar will enhance both
    regional BMD capability and improve defense of the U.S. Homeland.
        MDA also supported the deployment of a THAAD missile defense system
    to Guam for the defense of U.S. deployed forces in the region. This is
    our first long-term deployment of a THAAD battery.
    Executing EPAA Deployments
        Last October MDA and other Department leaders participated in a
    ground-breaking ceremony for the Aegis Ashore site in Romania. Site
    preparation work has started, and we are on schedule with military
    construction activities demonstrating real steps to deliver EPAA Phase
    2 in the 2015 timeframe.
        In addition to programmatic planning and deployment activities, MDA
    is also supporting EUCOM efforts to ensure the necessary Implementing
    Arrangements are in place to support EPAA fielding timelines. In the
    near-term, this means coordinating on and, where possible, streamlining
    the construction, site activation, and equipment acceptance processes
    in Romania. We are also laying the groundwork for these efforts in
    Poland. Again, all activities are on track to support the stated EPAA
    timelines.
        We are also working through NATO to ensure U.S. C2BMC and NATO
    command and control networks are fully interoperable. The United States
    and NATO test existing and future ballistic missile defense
    capabilities through a series of ongoing test campaigns in order to
    evaluate current capabilities and reduce risk for future development.
        MDA will continue to engage NATO and regional Allies in support of
    U.S. national security strategy through international cooperation in
    missile defense. For instance, the United States is working with NATO
    on a study to identify cooperative opportunities for European nations
    to develop and procure missile defense capabilities to complement the
    U.S. EPAA contribution to NATO BMD.
        MDA remains engaged and committed to expanding work with our
    international partners, to include conducting joint analyses to support
    partner missile defense acquisition requirements, cooperative research
    and development projects, co-development, deployments, FMS, and co-
    production. It is an honor to work with dedicated international
    partners on activities that benefit both U.S. and international
    contributions to missile defense architectures.
                                 cybersecurity
        MDA has been working diligently to enhance the cybersecurity
    posture of missile defense networks and improve the protection of
    ballistic missile defense information. MDA has developed new policies,
    partnered extensively with industry and other Department of Defense
    organizations, and has continuously increased investments in
    cybersecurity to ensure our networks and information remain secure
    against cyber attacks.
        I have coordinated policy Memoranda with the DOD Chief Information
    Officer's office and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics and signed MDA Policy Memoranda on ``Securing
    Ballistic Missile Defense Information on Government and Non-Government
    Networks and Systems.'' These require MDA program executives, program
    managers, contracting officials, and contractors to follow existing
    guidelines and implement new cybersecurity measures. We published MDA
    Manual titled: ``Procedures for Protection of Critical Program
    Information and Mission-Critical Functions and Components within the
    Missile Defense Agency.'' We conducted a cybersecurity industry day
    titled: ``The Emerging Role of Cybersecurity in Missile Defense Agency
    Acquisitions.'' This served to inform MDA industry partners of new
    cybersecurity requirements and threats and elicited feedback from
    industry representatives on how they can meet the new cybersecurity
    requirements. MDA also expanded a partnership with DOT&E to test and
    experiment with cybersecurity on MDA systems. This partnership
    leverages DOT&E resources and teams MDA with special cyber expertise
    and extensive knowledge of current threats.
        The MDA Computer Emergency Response Team performs continuous
    monitoring of MDA government information systems to protect and defend
    the confidentiality, integrity and availability of MDA networks and
    data. MDA is enhancing the established integrated security
    architecture, aligned to the Defense Enterprise Security Architecture
    that constantly improves methods to protect, monitor, analyze, detect,
    and respond to unauthorized activity within MDA information systems.
    Cyber boundary protection measures include state-of-the-art firewalls,
    intrusion detection and prevention systems, and email spam/virus
    prevention capabilities. The Missile Defense Agency will continue to
    work closely with Federal agencies, industry partners, and others to
    identify and implement measures to further increase the security of
    missile defense information while continuously seeking to improve
    technologies and capabilities that protect MDA critical program
    information.
        I am proud to report we completed our first experiment with DOT&E
    in February. In the first experiment, MDA successfully demonstrated
    cybersecurity improvements that are in development. As a result of
    extensive interactions with a live cyber Operational Force during the
    first experiment, MDA will pursue new ways to strengthen cybersecurity
    that will be demonstrated in future experiments.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, we have stayed focused on our core mission. We will
    continue our work with the warfighter to develop, test, and field a
    networked, global BMD system that is flexible, survivable, and
    affordable and invest in promising and potentially game-changing
    technology programs to ensure the BMDS will be capable of defeating the
    complex threats we expect to face in the future. In order to ensure we
    are using the taxpayer's dollars wisely and deploying effective missile
    defense capabilities, we will continue to test elements of the system
    to demonstrate that they work before we commit to their fielding. It is
    vital that we provide the warfighters the cost-effective and reliable
    weapon systems they need to do their job. I remain dedicated to
    committing the manpower and resources to correcting the issues in our
    GMD program, executing a successful intercept flight test this summer,
    and keeping the focus on reliability in our operational homeland
    defenses. We continue to make good progress in our work with our
    international partners, and I want to increase my focus on those
    important efforts.
        I look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Admiral.
        General Mann.

    STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID L. MANN, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY SPACE
     AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND
       JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE
                                DEFENSE

        General Mann. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions,
    Senator Donnelly, Senator King: Thank you for your continued
    support of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. This is
    my second appearance before this subcommittee and it is an
    honor to appear before you today to talk about the importance
    of missile defense for our Nation and the need to maintain
    these capabilities in the face of maturing threats and
    declining budgets.
        Today, I'd like to briefly discuss global missile defense
    operations, the SMDC/Army Forces Strategic Command's role as a
    force provider. To accomplish these assigned missions, we focus
    on three tasks, tasks that are very similar to what I discussed
    during the space hearing: to provide trained and ready missile
    defenders; to build future missile defense forces and
    capabilities; and to develop future technologies.
        In addition, I'd like to outline my role as the Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense,
    basically an operational integrator on behalf of U.S. Strategic
    Command (STRATCOM). We execute four tasks in support of these
    responsibilities: first, to synchronize operational-level
    planning; second, to support ongoing operations and asset
    management; third, to integrate training and exercises and test
    activities; and finally, to advocate for future capabilities.
        This subcommittee's continued support of missile defense
    capabilities and for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
    and civilians who develop, deploy, and operate these missile
    defense capabilities is essential.
        Again, I appreciate the opportunity to speak on the value
    of missile defense for our Nation. I look forward to addressing
    any questions that you may have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Mann follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by LTG David L. Mann, USA
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of our
    servicemembers, civilians, and families. I appear before you today
    bringing both a Joint and Army perspective for effective missile
    defense capabilities. We appreciate this subcommittee's continued
    support of the Army, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the
    Department of Defense, and the missile defense community. It is an
    honor and privilege to testify before this Subcommittee along with
    these distinguished witnesses who bring missile defense capabilities to
    our Nation, forward deployed forces, partners, and allies.
        I have three main responsibilities. First, as the Commander of the
    U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC), I have Title 10
    responsibilities to train, maintain, and equip space and global
    ballistic missile defense forces for the Army. Second, as the
    Commander, Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT), I am the Army
    Service Component Commander (ASCC) to STRATCOM. I am responsible for
    planning, integrating, and coordinating Army forces and capabilities in
    support of STRATCOM missions. Third, as the Commander of STRATCOM's
    Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC
    IMD), I am responsible for synchronizing missile defense planning,
    conducting ballistic missile defense operations support, and advocating
    for missile defense capabilities for the Warfighter.
        In accordance with these responsibilities, my intent today is
    threefold: to highlight USASMDC/ARSTRAT's missile defense force
    provider responsibilities with respect to the Army and the geographic
    combatant commanders (GCC); to outline JFCC IMD's role as an
    operational integrator of joint missile defense for STRATCOM; and to
    summarize key Army ballistic missile defense activities and
    developments.
                           the strategic environment
        Ballistic missile threats from regional actors such as North Korea
    and Iran are increasing, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and are
    likely to continue to grow over the next decade. In a resource
    constrained environment, we must be prepared to quickly adapt and
    confront various threats. Holistic strategies that effectively
    integrate offensive and defensive capabilities are essential. It is of
    utmost importance that we prioritize missile defense resources to
    optimize these capabilities for the Warfighter.
        To meet the objectives of the current Defense Strategic Guidance,
    STRATCOM and the Army continue to provide and enhance homeland and
    regional missile defense. We have worked with partners in U.S. Pacific
    Command (PACOM), U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and STRATCOM to
    review and improve our capabilities in the PACOM area of responsibility
    in accordance with the Department's strategy to rebalance toward the
    Asia-Pacific region. The deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense (THAAD) battery to Guam has enhanced our ability to protect
    U.S. territories in the region and signal our commitment to our
    regional partners. The March 2013 Secretary of Defense announcement of
    the deployment of 14 additional Ground-Based Inceptors at Fort Greely,
    AK, and a second missile defense sensor in Japan will provide improved
    capability and capacity to defend the Nation against a limited
    ballistic missile attack. Toward this end, we continue to work with
    regional partners and allies to increase our information and data
    sharing.

        The Defense Strategic Guidance also establishes a priority to
    maintain a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and
    the Middle East. We are continuing to build capability and capacity in
    these regions consistent with the objectives of the Phased Adaptive
    Approach to regional missile defense. To further protect our allies and
    partners in these regions, the Army has deployed additional Patriot air
    and missile defense forces to Turkey and Jordan.
        In summary, the growing complexity of the strategic environment
    based on technological advances of the threat and fiscal realities
    require cost efficient and effective methods of integrating current and
    future capabilities. We will continue to partner with the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) and combatant commands to ensure we pursue a
    fiscally responsible path to keep pace with evolving threats by
    identifying and prioritizing capability additions that provide the
    greatest operational value.
          the workforce--recognizing and protecting our greatest asset
        These challenges I've highlighted cannot be mitigated without the
    dedication of our greatest asset--our people. During the DOD Space
    hearing before this Subcommittee a few weeks ago, I felt it appropriate
    to highlight our workforce and the Army's commitment to deter instances
    of sexual harassment and assault. At USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC IMD, our
    people are our most enduring strength. The servicemembers, civilians,
    and contractors at USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC IMD support the Army and
    joint warfighter each and every day, both those stationed in the
    Homeland and those deployed across the globe. Within USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    and JFCC IMD, we remain committed to providing trained and ready
    servicemembers and civilians to operate and pursue enhanced system
    capabilities for the Nation's ballistic missile defense system (BMDS).
        In step with the Army, our USASMDC/ARSTRAT and JFCC IMD leadership
    team embraces the imperatives of Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and
    Prevention (SHARP). As stated by the Chief of Staff of the Army, sexual
    harassment and sexual assault violate everything the U.S. Army stands
    for, including our Army Values and Warrior Ethos. At USASMDC/ARSTRAT, I
    will continually assess the effectiveness of our SHARP efforts to
    ensure we are meeting the needs of our soldiers, civilians, and family
    members. Our workforce deserves nothing less.
                    accomplishment of missile defense tasks
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT, a force provider for missile defense capabilities,
    is a split-based command with dispersed locations around the globe that
    are manned by multi-component soldiers, civilians, and contractors.
    Organizations around the world, including STRATCOM, NORTHCOM, and the
    GCCs leverage our capabilities. Our title 10 responsibilities include
    operations, planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army
    forces and capabilities in support of STRATCOM's missile defense
    mission. USASMDC/ARSTRAT also serves as the Army's global operational
    integrator for missile defense, the Army's proponent for global missile
    defense force modernization, and the Army's technical center lead to
    conduct air and missile defense related research and development in
    support of Army Title 10 responsibilities.
        Our operational function is to provide trained and ready missile
    defense forces and capabilities to the GCCs and the Warfighter which
    address today's requirements. For example, USASMDC/ARSTRAT soldiers,
    serving in the Homeland and in remote and austere forward deployed
    locations operate the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and
    the Army-Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance Forward-Based Mode (AN/
    TPY-2 FBM) radars. A summary of the ongoing missile defense
    capabilities provided by our missile defense professionals is
    highlighted below.

    Support to Global Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD):
        Soldiers from the 100th Missile Defense Brigade, headquartered in
    Colorado Springs, CO, and the 49th Missile Defense (MD) Battalion,
    headquartered at Fort Greely, AK, remain ready, 24/7/365, to defend our
    Nation and its territories from a limited intercontinental ballistic
    missile attack. Under the operational control of NORTHCOM, Army
    National Guard and Active component soldiers operate the GMD Fire
    Control Systems located at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska, the
    Missile Defense Element in Colorado, and the GMD Command Launch Element
    at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. These soldiers, in conjunction with
    JFCC IMD and NORTHCOM, also oversee the maintenance of GMD interceptors
    and ground system components. At the Fort Greely site, 49th MD
    Battalion military police secure the interceptors and communications
    capabilities at the Missile Defense Complex from physical threats. The
    GMD system remains our Nation's only defense against a limited ICBM
    attack.
    Support to Regional Capabilities:
        The 100th Missile Defense Brigade also supports GCCs with AN/TPY-2
    FBM radar detachments and provides subject matter expertise on operator
    training and certification. These operational capabilities are present
    today at strategic locations around the globe.
    GMD System Test and Development:
        In addition, soldiers from the 100th MD Brigade actively
    participate in GMD test activities and continue to work with MDA
    developers on future improvements to the GMD system.
    Ballistic Missile Early Warning:
        In support of the Joint Force Commander's theater force protection,
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues to provide ballistic missile early warning
    within various theaters of operations. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint
    Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) Detachments, under the operational
    control of STRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Space, but
    operated by USASMDC/ARSTRAT space-professional Soldiers, monitor enemy
    missile launch activity and other infrared events. They provide
    essential information to members of the air, missile defense, and
    operational communities. Our JTAGS Detachments are globally forward,
    providing 24/7/365, dedicated, assured missile warning to STRATCOM and
    GCCs in support of deployed forces.
        Our second major task is to build and mature future missile defense
    forces--our capability development function. These are the missile
    defense capabilities we will provide tomorrow. A major component of our
    capability development function is to train Army soldiers on missile
    defense systems. During the past year, USASMDC/ARSTRAT trained over 350
    soldiers and recertified as an Army Learning Institution of Excellence
    for missile defense training.

        The Army uses established and emerging processes to document its
    missile defense needs and pursue Army and Joint validation of its
    requirements. As a recognized Army Center for Analysis, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    conducts studies to determine how best to meet the Army's assigned
    missile defense responsibilities. With this information, we develop the
    Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
    Personnel, and Facilities domains to mitigate threats and
    vulnerabilities for MDA-developed GMD and AN/TPY-2 FBM missile defense
    systems. This disciplined approach helps to ensure limited resources
    are applied where Warfighter operational utility can be most
    effectively served.
        In our third major missile defense task, USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides
    critical technologies to address future needs that will enhance
    Warfighter effectiveness--our materiel development function. In
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT, our technology development function is primarily
    focused on space and high altitude. While MDA is the principal materiel
    developer for ballistic missile defense, USASMDC/ARSTRAT has a number
    of ongoing missile defense related materiel development efforts, to
    include ongoing research and development of an OSD sponsored
    conventional offensive strike capability to address ballistic missile
    threats. A brief summary of two of these research and development
    efforts, as well as an overview of an essential Army testing range,
    follows.
    High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator:
        As we have repeatedly witnessed during conflicts in both Iraq and
    Afghanistan, insurgents pose serious dangers to U.S. forward operating
    bases by employing quick-attack, low-trajectory, rockets, artillery,
    and mortar (RAM) strikes. The technology objective of the High Energy
    Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) is to demonstrate a solid-state
    laser weapon system that will serve as a complementary kinetic energy
    capability in countering RAM projectiles. This directed energy weapon
    system will also have a significant capability against unmanned aerial
    vehicles (UAV). An initial demonstration was recently completed against
    short-range mortars, UAVs, and UAV-mounted intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance sensors. This demonstration served as a risk
    reduction for future subsystem development and integration while
    advancing this technology effort to a 50 kilowatt demonstration in
    2017. The 50 kilowatt HEL MD will consist of a ruggedized and
    supportable high energy laser with subsystems installed on a tactical
    military vehicle to enhance the safety of deployed forces. The synergy
    of both directed and kinetic energy systems has the potential to
    enhance significantly our Homeland defense capabilities, particularly
    against cruise missile and indirect fire threats.
    Low-Cost Target Development:
        The Army continues to pursue a technology effort to develop a suite
    of low cost targets for the Patriot testing program. The intent is to
    design threat-representative targets at a substantially reduced cost
    for short-range ballistic missile testing. Over the past year, using
    existing excess solid rocket motors, the Army realized significant
    savings within its operational testing account. The Army will continue
    to leverage technology advancements in order to realize less expensive
    targets that are representative of actual threats.
    Missile Defense Testing:
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Test
    Site (RTS). RTS, located on the U.S. Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll in
    the Republic of the Marshall Islands, is critical to both offensive and
    defensive missile testing requirements, such as the GMD system and the
    U.S. Air Force strategic ballistic missile systems. In addition to
    their testing mission, personnel at the Reagan Test Site conduct
    continuous operational space surveillance and object identification
    missions.
      joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
      synchronizing missile defense operational level planning and support
        The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense (JFCC IMD) is STRATCOM's missile defense integrating element
    and has been operational for 9 years. Like the other Joint Functional
    Component Commands, JFCC IMD was formed to operationalize STRATCOM
    missions and allow the headquarters to focus on integration and
    advocacy. Headquartered at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado
    Springs, Colorado, the JFCC IMD is manned by professional Army, Navy,
    Air Force, Marine Corps, civilian, and contractor personnel.
        As the Secretary of Defense and various combatant commanders have
    previously testified, the warfighter remains confident in our ability
    to protect the Nation against a limited ballistic missile attack, even
    in the face of the changing fiscal environment. We are actively engaged
    with MDA and the combatant commanders to optimize and execute the
    administration's plan to increase the number of ground-based
    interceptors (GBI) at Fort Greely from 26 to 40 and to deploy a second
    AN/TPY-2 FBM radar to Japan.
        We have collaborated with NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, and MDA to identify
    homeland interceptor sites that best meet operational requirements. The
    four sites recommended for Environmental Impact Statement analyses have
    been provided to this subcommittee. The operational contributions of a
    third interceptor site can vary based on the overall level of
    improvement to the strategic BMDS. Although MDA continues the planning
    work necessary to implement this measure, I recommend the priority of
    investment should be to programs that improve discrimination and
    tracking capabilities and overall GBI system reliability.

        On behalf of STRATCOM, JFCC IMD is working across the military
    enterprise to increase the integration of existing capabilities in
    order to maximize efficiency and effectiveness to protect the Homeland,
    our deployed forces, partners, and allies. The key force multiplier is
    ``integration'', which is a critically important mission area for JFCC
    IMD and directly supports STRATCOM's assigned Unified Command Plan
    (UCP) responsibilities for missile defense.
        As an operational and functional component command of STRATCOM,
    JFCC IMD has derived five key mission tasks from the STRATCOM UCP
    responsibilities:

             Synchronize operational level planning, integrate
            security cooperation activities, and recommend allocation of
            forces via the global force management process.
             Conduct operations support and asset management for
            missile defense forces and provide alternative execution
            support.
             Integrate Joint BMD training, exercises, and test
            activities.
             Advocate for future capabilities, conduct analysis and
            assessments, and recommend the operational acceptance of
            missile defense capabilities into the architecture.
             Provide information system security and network
            support to assure a reliable BMDS communications network.

        To accomplish each of these five mission tasks, we maintain close
    collaborative relationships with the GCCs, MDA, the Services, the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and our
    allies. Through collaborative processes, we continually add to our
    deployed capability while gaining operational experience and confidence
    in our collective ability to defend our Nation, deployed forces,
    partners, and allies. Following, I will highlight some of our
    collaborative efforts to enhance missile defense planning and
    capabilities for both the Homeland and regional architectures.
    Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture:
        In response to the changing strategic environment, the Secretary of
    Defense directed us to bolster homeland and regional missile defense
    capabilities. In addition to the previously deployed AN/TPY-2 FBM
    radars and deployment of the THAAD battery to Guam, we are finalizing
    the plan to deploy an additional FBM radar in the PACOM area of
    responsibility, and we are expanding our missile defense collaboration
    with allies. We are maturing the European Phased Adaptive Approach
    (PAA) with the forward deployment and stationing of Aegis BMD ships in
    Rota, Spain, developing the Aegis Ashore site in Romania, and
    continuing the production of the SM-3 IB interceptors. Given many of
    the challenges associated with implementation of these architectures,
    JFCC IMD, supporting STRATCOM as the global synchronizer for missile
    defense, is collaborating with the GCCs to assess and address the cross
    regional gaps in the areas of planning, policy, capabilities, and
    operations.

    Global Assessment:
        As regional phased adaptive approaches mature, and with homeland
    defense at the forefront, JFCC IMD collaborates closely with the GCCs
    to assess the level of risk associated with the execution of their
    operational plans given their allocation of BMD capabilities. The
    overall assessment serves to shape recommendations for global force
    management and advocacy efforts for future capability investments. We
    have completed the 2013 Global IAMD Assessment and are currently
    conducting the 2014 assessment. For the 2013 assessment, we expanded
    the previous BMD-only assessment to look at integrating both air and
    missile defense assets to more accurately reflect the way we fight and
    the associated operational risks.
        With regard to regional threats, JFCC IMD assessments indicate that
    addressing missile defense threats will remain a challenge. Our
    research, supported by the 2013 Global Assessment, reinforces the fact
    that GCC demands for missile defense capabilities exceed the available
    BMD inventory. We must continue to address this mismatch using mobile
    and re-locatable missile defenses and a comprehensive force management
    process. We also possess a full spectrum of offensive and defensive
    capabilities to deter and defend against the ballistic missile threat.
    Global Force Management:
        The increasing demand of BMD assets is managed by the Joint Staff
    and the Services. STRATCOM, as the designated Joint Functional Manager
    for missile defense, relies upon JFCC IMD to evaluate and recommend
    sourcing of BMD requirements based on assessed risk. Due to the high
    demand, low-density nature of missile defense assets, all sourcing
    decisions have a direct and significant impact to other combatant
    commanders' campaign and contingency plans. The Global Force Management
    process enables senior leaders to make more informed BMD sourcing
    decisions based on global risk.
    Multi-Regional BMD Asset Management:
        JFCC IMD, in coordination with STRATCOM and the GCCs, manages the
    availability of missile defense assets to balance operational readiness
    postures, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance activities, and MDA and
    Services' test requirements. This important process allows us to
    continually assess our readiness to defend against a ballistic missile
    attack and to recommend adjustments to optimize the overall BMD
    architecture.

    Training, Exercises, and War Games:
        JFCC IMD continues to focus on the integration of allies into
    regional missile defense architectures. We leverage training,
    exercises, and war games to increase dialogue and partnership. We are
    underway with Nimble Titan 14, our biannual multinational BMD war game.
    While budget constraints have caused us to reduce the scale for
    regional exercise from interactive war games to table-top exercises, we
    are still able to accomplish many of the stated objectives. For the
    first time, Nimble Titan 14 will include the participation of the
    Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Estonia,
    Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In addition to NATO, we anticipate over 20
    participating nations and a large number of international observers.
    Our campaign goals for this iteration of Nimble Titan will advance
    national policy objectives by helping mature NATO's new missile defense
    mission area; explore options for increased regional multilateral BMD
    cooperation; and openly work coalition BMD issues with Middle East
    nations. We continue to focus on cross-regional coordination, offense/
    defense force integration, sensor integration, and multinational BMD
    planning solutions.
        The Nimble Titan war game is an invaluable medium to advance U.S.
    missile defense policy. The war game allows us to mature cooperative
    relationships with our allies and partners as well as advance our
    Nation's and combatant command's regional security objectives. This
    event is critical to developing a common understanding of policy
    hurdles associated with combined BMD architectures. Conclusions derived
    from training, exercises, and war games will continue to shape our
    recommendations on asset allocation, resources, and operational
    planning through the existing DOD and missile defense community
    management structures.
    Joint BMD Training:
        In August 2012, the DOD designated STRATCOM as the lead for
    integrating and synchronizing Joint BMD training. This designation
    mandated the transfer of missile defense training resources and
    responsibilities from MDA to STRATCOM by the end of fiscal year 2013.
    JFCC IMD is executing this mission on behalf of STRATCOM and declared
    initial operating capability on October 1, 2013.
        In coordination with STRATCOM, the Joint Staff, combatant commands,
    and the Services, we have developed a comprehensive program of actions
    and milestones to achieve a full operating capability with the creation
    of a Joint BMD training center of excellence by the end of next fiscal
    year. The center of excellence will be located in Colorado Springs and
    will coordinate and synchronize all aspects of BMD training and
    education to further develop commanders, warfighters, and civilians
    engaged in BMD planning and operations. This approach builds upon
    existing capabilities and closes gaps between Service, Joint, and
    regional BMD training and education. As part of the center of
    excellence construct, our training capability will evolve into a
    ``blended learning/higher education'' approach to improve efficiency
    and reduce the cost of providing Joint BMD training and education.
    Warfighter Acceptance and Integrated Master Test Plan:
        As the missile defense architectures matures, operators call for a
    credible, comprehensive assessment of new capabilities to inform
    warfighter operational acceptance. In 2013, the DOD conducted a new
    regional operational test that assessed the integrated capability of
    Aegis BMD, AN/TPY-2 FBM, and THAAD. This first-of-its-kind test
    validated the THAAD's integrated regional capability against multiple
    threats in an operationally realistic environment. Our next operational
    test in fiscal year 2015 will build upon the success of the previous
    test. We plan to conduct an integrated test of key elements of EPAA
    Phase II, specifically the integrated capability in AN/TPY-2, Aegis
    BMD, and Aegis Ashore. Additionally, JFCC IMD is working closely with
    MDA, the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and
    NORTHCOM to address issues uncovered in recent GBI testing of both the
    CE-I and CE-II variants. Although the investigation into last year's
    CE-I flight test failure is not complete, the early indications provide
    assurance that technological remedies are being instituted for the GBI
    fleet. We will continue to partner with the MDA to ensure we maintain
    an annual test cadence to maintain warfigher confidence.
        In summary, JFCC IMD serves an integrating role for missile defense
    across multiple regions as we operationalize new capabilities, evolve
    command relationships, and reinforce our missile defense partnerships
    with allies. In view of worldwide events and current fiscal challenges,
    JFCC IMD remains focused on our key mission task to collaborate with
    the GCCs and MDA to posture our forces to meet current and future
    ballistic missile threats. Our missile defense capability continues to
    strengthen as Warfighters gain increased competence and confidence in
    the BMD System. While work remains to be done, we have made significant
    progress in evolving the global missile defense capabilities, thereby
    strengthening the defense of the homeland, and advancing our
    partnerships with allies in this pressing endeavor.
        army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
        The Army is a close partner with the MDA in supporting its materiel
    development efforts. We continue to develop and field systems that are
    integral to our Nation's air and missile defense capabilities. A
    summary follows of the Army's major air and missile defense systems,
    aligned within the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
    Logistics, and Technology organizational structure.
    Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD):
        Air and missile defense (AMD) is an enduring Army core function and
    an essential component of the Army mission to provide wide area
    security. To meet this mission, the 2012 Army AMD Strategy details a
    plan of action to develop a comprehensive portfolio of IAMD
    capabilities intended to provide protection against the expanding
    threat of ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and
    long-range, precision rocket, artillery, and mortar attacks.
        Within the AMD arena, the IAMD Battle Management Command System
    (IBCS) remains the Army's highest priority effort and serves at the
    foundation for Army AMD modernization. The program will field a common
    mission command system to all echelons of Army AMD forces to defend
    against rockets, artillery, and mortars; cruise missiles; manned and
    unmanned aircraft; air-to-ground missiles; and tactical ballistic
    missiles. IBCS provides a comprehensive solution for the AMD gap by
    coordinating air surveillance and fire control across Services and with
    coalition partners. During this past year, soldiers demonstrated
    incremental capabilities of IBCS. Additional efforts are underway to
    integrate IBCS and C2BMC to support the BMD mission.
    Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3):
        Patriot/PAC-3 is the Army's premier weapon system against air and
    tactical ballistic missile threats. With the DOD decision to end U.S.
    participation in the Medium Extended Air Defense System program at
    completion of the design and development phase, the Army continues to
    make improvement investments to the Patriot system to support the AMD
    strategy. The aim is to increase reliability, drive down operational
    and sustainment costs, and remain viable well into the future. Seeing
    that about half of all Patriot units are currently deployed,
    operational tempo and stress remain high.
        A number of significant Patriot/PAC-3 capability enhancements have
    been accomplished over the past year. Among the accomplishments were
    the completion of the Army's planned upgrades to all 15 PAC-3 fire
    units, fielding of the 15th Patriot battalion, and continued successful
    operational flight tests of the next generation PAC-3 missile, the
    Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE). During recent successful testing,
    both tactical ballistic missiles and air breathing threats were
    simultaneously engaged. The Army conducted a successful Milestone C
    defense acquisition board and remains on track for delivery of the MSE
    to the Warfighter by the fourth quarter of 2015. Additionally, the
    Patriot radar received a new digital processor. Coupled with recent
    software upgrades, the new digital processor increases performance of
    the radar against evolving threats while dramatically improving
    reliability, availability, and maintainability.
    Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System
            (JLENS):
        The JLENS system provides long-range, persistent, and elevated
    surveillance, detection, classification, identification, and fire
    control quality tracking of airborne objects such as cruise missiles,
    manned and unmanned aircraft, and large caliber rockets. The system has
    demonstrated the capability to track surface moving targets. In
    accordance with direction from OSD and the Joint Staff, the Army is
    scheduled to deploy the JLENS system to Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
    Maryland. With this deployment, the Army will initiate a 3-year
    operational exercise of how surveillance aerostats improve missile
    defense sensor capabilities.
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System:
        THAAD, a key component of the BMDS architecture, is designed to
    defend deployed and allied forces, population centers, and critical
    infrastructure against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
    THAAD is a high demand, low-density asset. A fully operational THAAD
    battery consists of 95 soldiers, an AN/TPY-2 FBM radar, 6 launchers, a
    fire control and communications element, a battery support center, and
    a support element. THAAD has a unique capability to engage threats in
    both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-kill lethality.
    There are now four activated THAAD batteries. Equipment training and
    fielding has been completed for two of the batteries. In April 2013,
    one of these batteries conducted the first ever operational deployment
    of THAAD in response to the escalation of tensions in the Pacific
    region. The third THAAD battery is currently undergoing training and
    will be operationally available next year; the fourth battery is
    scheduled to become fully operational the following year. The addition
    of THAAD capabilities to the Army's air and missile defense portfolio
    brings an unprecedented level of protection against missile attacks to
    deployed U.S. forces, partners, and allies.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Sessions, as a member of the joint
    missile defense community, the Army will continue to pursue
    enhancements to the Nation's missile defense system. As a Service, the
    Army has lead responsibility for GMD, AN/TPY-2 FBM, Patriot, and THAAD.
    Our trained and ready soldiers operating GMD elements in Colorado,
    Alaska, and California remain on point to defend the Homeland against a
    limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack. As a force provider
    to the GCCs, our soldiers ensure essential regional sensor capabilities
    and ballistic missile early warning. STRATCOM, through the JFCC IMD,
    continues to integrate BMDS capabilities to counter global ballistic
    missile threats and protect our Nation, deployed forces, partners, and
    allies.
        While the operational, doctrine, and materiel development
    enhancements of the BMDS are essential, our most essential assets are
    the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians who develop,
    deploy, and operate our missile defense system. I appreciate having the
    opportunity to address missile defense matters and look forward to
    addressing any of your questions.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, General.
        Ms. Chaplain.

     STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
         SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Chaplain. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions,
    Senators Donnelly and King: I'm pleased to be here today to
    discuss recent GAO findings on missile defense acquisitions.
    For the past 12 years, we've been mandated by Congress to
    assess MDA's progress in developing and delivering missile
    defense capabilities.
        Overall, MDA has accomplished a great deal since it was
    formed in 2002, developing and delivering a broad set of
    systems that provide important protection to our Nation and our
    allies. But several acquisition challenges have persisted since
    we began our reviews.
        First, in the face of time pressures, MDA has employed
    high-risk acquisition strategies that overlap overall
    development and production activities. While this practice has
    decreased over time, programs that began with highly concurrent
    strategies still face problems. For example, the recent failure
    during a test of the Aegis SM-3 Block 1B, just discussed, means
    that a component common to the 1B and the deployed 1A
    interceptor may need to be redesigned and flight tested. While
    the failure review is not yet complete, if a redesign is
    necessary, interceptors that were already produced may require
    retrofits. MDA continues to procure new 1B interceptors while
    it investigates the cause of the failure.
        Also, a July 2013 failure in the GMD system test means that
    MDA did not demonstrate the CE-1 kill vehicle could perform
    under more challenging conditions than previously tested,
    further delaying knowledge of the interceptor's performance
    capability.
        The GMD program has had many years of significant and
    costly disruptions caused by production getting well ahead of
    testing and then discovering issues during testing.
    Consequently, even though some assets have already been
    produced, MDA has had to add tests that were previously not
    planned and delay tests that are necessary to understand the
    system's capabilities and limitations.
        In the 12 years we've assessed MDA acquisitions, we've also
    reported that testing has been hampered by reliability and
    availability problems with targets, as well as optimistic
    planning. MDA has worked to mitigate these risks. This year we
    reported significant progress in testing, with the first
    system-level operational flight test in 2013 that Dr. Gilmore
    just described.
        A third area of challenges we have highlighted in the past
    decade is on reporting acquisition progress to Congress. Our
    recommendations have included making sure baselines and annual
    reports are complete, that they follow best practices, that
    they better explain variances, and that they be stabilized.
        For fiscal year 2013, MDA's cost and schedule reporting
    still lack the clarity, completeness, and quality necessary to
    track actual costs and schedule growth over time. For instance,
    baselines were still not supported by independent cost
    estimates, nor did they fully reflect operations and
    sustainment costs.
        In recent years, however, MDA has been devoting resources
    and attention to improving its baselines. For instance, we
    reported this year that MDA took steps to explain most of the
    significant cost and schedule changes both in the short- and
    long-term. MDA is also in the process of implementing new cost
    reporting standards based on best practices. As such, we
    anticipate significant improvements in our next review.
        Lastly, in a separate review this year we found MDA has
    enhanced management for deploying missile defense systems in
    Europe under the EPAA. Also, key EPAA programs, such as Aegis
    Ashore, are making good progress. However, the success of the
    EPAA policy hinges on the delivery and integration of an array
    of complex systems. Further, while the United States is
    generally meeting its commitments, some capabilities
    specifically needed to achieve greater levels of integration
    are not planned to be delivered as originally anticipated.
    Since integration is critical to achieving the capability
    desired in EPAA, we have recommended that MDA develop an
    integrated master schedule that pulls together the complex set
    of activities that need to be done. Such a schedule makes good
    sense whether we view EPAA as a policy or an acquisition
    program.
        This concludes my statement. I'm happy to answer any
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain
      missile defense: mixed progress in achieving acquisition goals and
                            improving accountability
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the acquisition
    progress achieved and challenges that remain for the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Since 2002, MDA has been
    charged with developing and fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense
    System (BMDS), which is expected to be capable of defending the United
    States, deployed troops, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles
    of all ranges and in all phases of flight. It has spent over $98
    billion to develop and deploy a diverse collection of land-, sea-, and
    space-based assets, and has requested an additional $38 billion for
    fiscal years 2014 through 2018 to continue its efforts. Since its
    inception, MDA has been operating in an environment of tight timeframes
    for delivering capabilities--first with a presidential directive in
    2002 to field a limited capability by 2004 and then with a presidential
    announcement in 2009 to deploy U.S. missile defense in Europe. Looking
    forward, it will also have to operate in an environment of budgetary
    constraints, which necessitate tough trade-off decisions. As a result,
    MDA will require additional steps to reduce acquisition risk to ensure
    it provides warfighters with systems whose performance and capability
    is understood, and which are delivered on time and on budget.
        This year, we continue to report that missile defense acquisitions
    are high risk. MDA has made tangible progress in increasing the
    complexity and sophistication of missile defense tests, enhancing plans
    and processes for deploying U.S. missile defense in Europe, and
    increasing the completeness and clarity of cost and schedule reporting
    to Congress. However, two key programs face challenges stemming from
    higher-risk acquisition strategies that overlap production activities
    and development activities; testing overall continues to provide less
    knowledge than initially planned and considerably more improvements are
    needed in both reporting to Congress and in planning for deployment of
    missile defense in Europe. Many of the challenges MDA faces are tied to
    the technical and integration risks that are inherent in the
    capabilities MDA is seeking to deliver, while others are tied to tight
    timeframes placed on MDA as well as changing demands. Nevertheless, MDA
    still has opportunities to take steps to reduce acquisition risk,
    increase transparency, and enhance oversight. MDA's new Director is
    focused on doing so, though it may take time for his efforts to affect
    the MDA's broad portfolio of acquisitions, particularly older programs
    that began without sound foundations for success.
        Since 2002, we have been mandated to prepare annual assessments of
    MDA's progress toward its acquisition goals.\1\ Our report in response
    to this mandate was issued on Tuesday, April 1, 2014.\2\ This testimony
    highlights the findings from that report as well as relevant findings
    from other recent related reports.\3\ To assess MDA's progress and
    related challenges, we examined the acquisition accomplishments of
    individual missile defense programs and supporting efforts that MDA is
    currently developing and fielding. We conducted this work in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
    require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
    appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
    obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
    based on our audit objectives. Additional information on our scope and
    methodology is available in our issued reports.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub.
    L. No. 112-81, Sec. 232 (2011) mandated our most recent report. Our
    reports include references to all prior legislation that mandated our
    work.
        \2\ GAO, Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition
    Goals and Improving Accountability, GAO-14-351 (Washington, DC: April.
    1, 2014).
        \3\ GAO, Missile Defense: Precision Tracking Space System
    Evaluation of Alternatives, GAO-13-747R (Washington, DC: July 25,
    2013); and Regional Missile Defense: DOD's Report Provided Limited
    Information; Assessment of Acquisition Risks is Optimistic, GAO-14-248R
    (Washington, DC: Mar. 14, 2014). Currently, our work on Homeland
    Ballistic Missile Defense is ongoing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   background
        MDA's BMDS is being designed to counter ballistic missiles of all
    ranges--short, medium, intermediate, and intercontinental. Because
    ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, sizes, and
    performance characteristics, MDA is developing multiple systems that,
    when integrated, provide multiple opportunities to destroy ballistic
    missiles in flight for the strategic defense of the United States and
    regional defense of its deployed forces and allies. The BMDS
    architecture includes space-based sensors, ground- and sea-based
    radars, ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles, and a command and
    control, battle management, and communications system to provide the
    warfighter with the necessary communication links to the sensors and
    interceptor missiles.
        Table 1 provides a brief description of some of the BMDS systems,
    which MDA refers to as elements, and programs included in this year's
    assessment. More details can be found in our report.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ GAO-14-351

        Table 1: Description of Selected Ballistic Missile Defense System
                              Elements and Programs
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Description and key
               BMDS element/program                      components
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Aegis Ballistic Missile Aegis Defense       Aegis BMD is a sea-based
     (BMD) with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)        system developed to defend
     Block IB.                                   against short-, medium-,
                                                 and intermediate-range
                                                 ballistic missiles in the
                                                 middle part of their
                                                 flight. MDA is developing
                                                 several versions of
                                                 missiles and associated
                                                 ship-based software and
                                                 processors. The SM-3 Block
                                                 IB features additional
                                                 capabilities over the
                                                 previous SM-3 version to
                                                 identify, discriminate, and
                                                 track objects during
                                                 flight. All sea-based Aegis
                                                 BMD systems also include a
                                                 shipboard radar and command
                                                 and control systems.
    Aegis Ashore..............................  A land-based, or ashore,
                                                 version of Aegis BMD
                                                 initially using SM-3 Block
                                                 IB missiles with plans to
                                                 use various versions of SM-
                                                 3 missiles and Aegis weapon
                                                 system software as they
                                                 become available.
    Command, Control, Battle Management, and    C2BMC is a globally deployed
     Communications (C2BMC).                     system that links and
                                                 integrates individual
                                                 missile defense elements.
                                                 It also allows users to
                                                 plan ballistic missile
                                                 defense operations, see the
                                                 battle develop, and manage
                                                 networked sensors.
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)        The GMD program is a ground-
     System.                                     based defense system
                                                 designed to defend the
                                                 United States against a
                                                 limited intermediate and
                                                 intercontinental ballistic
                                                 missile attack in the
                                                 middle part of their
                                                 flight. Key components
                                                 include a ground-based
                                                 interceptor consisting of a
                                                 booster with a kill vehicle
                                                 on top, as well as a
                                                 communication system and a
                                                 fire control capability.
                                                 There are currently two
                                                 versions of the kill
                                                 vehicle: the initial design
                                                 known as the Capability
                                                 Enhancement-I (CE-I) and
                                                 the upgraded design known
                                                 as the Capability
                                                 Enhancement-II (CE-II).
    Targets and Countermeasures...............  MDA develops and
                                                 manufactures highly complex
                                                 targets that represent
                                                 realistic threat scenarios
                                                 during BMDS flight tests to
                                                 aid other BMDS elements'
                                                 developmental efforts. MDA
                                                 develops and manufactures a
                                                 variety of targets
                                                 including short-, medium-,
                                                 intermediate-, and
                                                 eventually intercontinental
                                                 ranges.
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense         THAAD is a mobile, ground-
     (THAAD).                                    based missile defense
                                                 system designed to defend
                                                 against short- and medium-
                                                 range ballistic missiles in
                                                 the late-middle and end of
                                                 their flight. THAAD is
                                                 organized as a battery,
                                                 which includes
                                                 interceptors, launchers, a
                                                 radar, a fire control and
                                                 communications system, and
                                                 other support equipment.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: GAO analysis of MDA data.

        When MDA was established in 2002, the Secretary of Defense granted
    it exceptional flexibility to set requirements and manage the
    acquisition of the BMDS in order to quickly deliver protection against
    ballistic missiles. This decision enabled MDA to rapidly deliver
    assets, but we have reported that it has come at the expense of
    transparency and accountability.\5\ Examples of key problems we have
    cited in reports in recent years and which continue to affect MDA's
    acquisitions are highlighted below.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen
    Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency, GAO-12-486 (Washington, DC: Apr.
    20, 2012); Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and
    Accountability, GAO-11-372 (Washington, DC: Mar. 24, 2011).

             MDA's highly concurrent acquisition approach has led
            to significant cost growth, schedule delays, and in some cases,
            performance shortfalls. Concurrency is broadly defined as the
            overlap between technology development and product development
            or between product development and production. While some
            concurrency is understandable, committing to product
            development before requirements are understood and technologies
            are mature or committing to production and fielding before
            development is complete is a high-risk strategy that often
            results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases,
            schedule delays, and test problems. At the very least, a highly
            concurrent strategy forces decisionmakers to make key decisions
            without adequate information about the weapon's demonstrated
            operational effectiveness, reliability, and readiness for
            production.\6\ According to MDA officials, they have taken some
            steps to identify and track concurrency in their programs.
            However, high levels of concurrency adopted earlier for some
            programs persist today.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening
    Acquisition Management, GAO-13-432 (Washington, DC: Apr 26, 2013) and
    GAO-12-486.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Testing disruptions have reduced the knowledge planned
            to be available to inform acquisition decisions and understand
            performance. For example, flight test failures disrupted MDA's
            acquisitions of several components and forced MDA to suspend or
            slow production of three out of four interceptors, including
            the GMD interceptor and the Aegis BMD Standard Missile-3 Block
            IB (SM-3 Bock IB).\7\ In the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
            (GMD) case, because MDA moved forward years ago with CE-I and
            CE-II interceptor production before completing its flight
            testing program, test failures have exacerbated disruptions to
            the program. Specifically, because the program has delivered
            approximately three-fourths of the interceptors for fielding,
            it faces difficult and costly decisions on how it will
            implement corrections from prior test failures. Additionally,
            after fielding these assets, the program has had to add tests
            that were previously not planned, in order to assess the extent
            to which prior issues were resolved. It also had to delay tests
            that were needed to understand the system's capabilities and
            limitations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ GAO-12-486
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             MDA has been challenged to meet some of its goals for
            the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). During the past
            several years, MDA has been responding to a mandate from the
            President to develop and deploy new missile defense systems in
            Europe. This four-phase effort was designed to rely on
            increasingly capable missiles, sensors, and command and control
            systems to defend Europe and the United States. Each successive
            phase is expected to defend larger areas against more numerous
            and more capable threat missiles. DOD delivered the first
            phase, for short and medium range defense of Europe, in
            December 2011, and has been making progress in developing some
            systems to support future phases. However, in March 2013, the
            Secretary of Defense canceled two programs, planned for the
            fourth phase, thus eliminating the fourth phase, which was
            intended to provide additional layer for defense of the United
            States against intercontinental ballistic missiles. The
            cancelations were driven in part by affordability concerns,
            schedule delays and technical risks associated with these
            programs.\8\ Our previous work found similar issues with other
            EPAA efforts.\9\ We also found that MDA has lacked a
            comprehensive management approach to synchronize key EPAA
            activities.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ The two programs canceled in fiscal year 2013 were the Standard
    Missile-3 Block IIB (SM-3 Block IIB) and Precision Tracking Space
    System (PTSS).
        \9\ GAO-11-372, GAO12-486, and GAO-13-432.
        \10\ GAO, Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach
    Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability
    Challenges, GAO-11-179R (Washington, DC: Dec 21, 2010), and Ballistic
    Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation
    Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe, GAO-11-220 (Washington,
    DC: Jan.26, 2011).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Finally, MDA's acquisition baseline reporting has
            provided limited insight into the cost and schedule progress of
            the BMDS. Due to the acquisition flexibilities it has been
            granted, BMDS's entrance into DOD's acquisition process is
            deferred, and laws and policies that generally require major
            defense acquisition programs to take certain steps at certain
            phases in the acquisition process will not apply until the
            program enters this process. For example, major defense
            acquisition programs are generally required to document key
            performance, cost, and schedule goals in an acquisition
            baseline at certain phases in the acquisition process; because
            BMDS has not progressed through threshold phases of the DOD
            acquisition process, this requirement is not yet
            applicable.\11\ To improve the transparency and accountability
            of BMDS development efforts, Congress has enacted legislation
            requiring MDA to establish some baselines.\12\ MDA reported
            baselines for several BMDS programs to Congress for the first
            time in its June 2010 BMDS Accountability Report (BAR).
            Specifically, MDA's baselines, including resource and schedule
            baselines, are reported in the BAR and are updated annually.
            Since 2011, although progress has been made to improve the
            reporting, we have found issues affecting the usefulness of
            MDA's acquisition baselines for oversight due to (1) a lack of
            clarity, consistency, and completeness; (2) a lack of high-
            quality supporting cost estimates and schedules; and (3)
            instability in the content of the baselines.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2435 requires an approved program baseline
    description for major defense acquisition programs before the program
    enters system development and demonstration (now known as engineering
    and manufacturing development), production and deployment, and full-
    rate production. The BMDS program meets the definition of a major
    defense acquisition program, which is defined in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2430
    and implemented by DOD in its acquisition policy.
        \12\ Pub. L. No. 112-81, Sec. 231(a)(2011) (codified as amended at
    10 U.S.C. Sec. 225) requires MDA to establish and maintain baselines
    for certain elements or major portions of elements prior to the product
    development phase (or its equivalent) and prior to production and
    deployment, and report these to the congressional defense committees
    annually. See also, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-181, Sec. 223(g), repealed by
    Pub. L. No. 112-81, Sec. 231(b)
        \13\ GAO, Schedule Best Practices Provide Opportunity to Enhance
    Missile Defense Agency Accountability and Program Execution, GAO-12-
    720R (Washington, DC: Jul 19, 2012), GAO-14-351, GAO-13-432, GAO-11-
    372.

        Our work has recommended a number of actions that can be taken to
    address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that
    DOD reduce concurrency and more closely follow knowledge based
    acquisition practices. We also made recommendations designed to reduce
    testing risk, and to improve schedule and cost reporting. DOD has
    generally concurred with our recommendations, and has undertaken some
    actions to reduce acquisition risk, and improve accountability and
    transparency.
       mda made progress on testing and further improved some management
                                   practices
        This year we found that MDA gained important knowledge about the
    BMDS system-level performance and individual elements by successfully
    executing several flight tests. We also found that MDA further improved
    some of its acquisition practices for managing the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and improved the clarity of its resource and
    schedule baselines.
    Progress: MDA Demonstrates BMDS Capability Through Testing
        In April 2014, we reported that MDA made progress in demonstrating
    the systems' capabilities by conducting the first system-level
    operational flight test in September 2013.\14\ This is a significant
    achievement because it is the first time that MDA conducted an
    operational flight test that involved multiple elements working
    simultaneously. The test involved warfighters from several combatant
    commands, and according to independent testing officials, recreated a
    potentially realistic scenario. During this test, MDA launched two
    medium-range ballistic missile targets, including its newly developed
    air-launched extended medium-range ballistic missile (eMRBM). Both the
    Aegis SM-3 Block IA and THAAD successfully intercepted their targets,
    demonstrating progress towards achieving an integrated BMDS. In
    addition, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB and GMD programs successfully
    conducted developmental flight tests in 2013 that demonstrated key
    capabilities and modifications made to resolve prior issues.
    Specifically, the Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB intercepted all targets in
    its last three flight tests. GMD also successfully conducted a non-
    intercept flight test of its CE-II interceptor, demonstrating the
    performance of a guidance component that MDA redesigned in response to
    a December 2010 flight test failure.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ GAO-14-351
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Progress: EPAA Acquisition Management Improves
        We also found that DOD improved the acquisition management of
    EPAA.\15\ In our first report on the subject in 2010, we assessed
    progress of EPAA acquisition planning against six key acquisition
    principles that synchronize acquisition activities and ensure
    accountability.\16\ We found that DOD has established testing and
    acquisition plans for technology development and engineering, and had
    begun work on identifying key stakeholders. This year, we found
    improvements in these areas. For example, DOD completed identifying
    EPAA stakeholders and in 2012 issued a directive updating the
    warfighter role in testing and capability acceptance.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ GAO-14-248R
        \16\ GAO-11-17R
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Lastly, in April 2014, we found that MDA continued to improve the
    clarity of its resource and schedule baselines, which are reported to
    Congress in its annual acquisition report called the BAR.\17\ In its
    2013 BAR, MDA continued to incorporate useful changes it made last
    year, and took some additional actions to improve the completeness and
    clarity of the BAR baselines by:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ GAO-14-351

             identifying the date of the initial baseline and, if
            applicable, the date when the initial baseline was most
            recently revised;
             explaining most of the significant cost and schedule
            changes from the current baseline estimates against both the
            estimates reported in the prior year's BAR and the latest
            initial baseline; and
             making the baselines easier to read by removing
            cluttered formatting such as strikethroughs and highlights that
            made some of the events listed in past BARs unreadable.
            mda continues to face testing and acquisition challenges
        Although MDA has taken some steps to improve its acquisitions, the
    agency continues to face several challenges that we have found in
    previous reviews. Specifically, it faces challenges stemming from high-
    risk acquisition practices, as well as challenges in BMDS testing,
    managing the development of EPAA capabilities, and reporting resource
    and schedule baselines that support oversight. Until MDA addresses
    these challenges, the agency and decisionmakers may not obtain the
    information needed to assess the capabilities of the BMDS or make
    informed acquisition and investment decisions.
    Challenge: Implementing Higher Risk Acquisition Programs
        While MDA has gained important insights through testing and taken
    some steps to improve management and increase transparency, it still
    faces challenges stemming from higher-risk acquisition strategies that
    overlap production activities with development activities. While some
    concurrency is understandable, committing to production and fielding
    before development is complete often results in performance shortfalls,
    unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, and test problems. It can
    also create pressure to keep producing to avoid work stoppages. Our
    April 2014 report found that Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB and GMD, which
    have already produced some of their assets before completing testing,
    discovered issues during testing that could affect or have affected
    production.\18\ Although both programs demonstrated progress in
    resolving previous issues, some of which stemmed from their concurrent
    acquisition strategies, testing revealed new issues. Specifically:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ GAO-14-351

             An interceptor failure during a September 2013 test of
            Aegis BMD SM-3 Block IB means that a key component, common to
            the deployed SM-3 Block IA, may need to be redesigned and
            flight tested. While the failure review is not yet complete, if
            a redesign is necessary, interceptors that were already
            produced may require retrofits. MDA continues to procure new
            SM-3 Block IBs while it investigates the cause of the failure.
             A GMD CE-I interceptor failure in a July 2013 flight
            means that MDA did not demonstrate the interceptor could
            perform under more challenging conditions than previously
            tested, further delaying knowledge of the interceptors
            performance capability. Additionally, the failure precluded
            confirmation that previous design changes improved performance,
            and delayed the upcoming test needed to resume production of
            CE-II interceptors. According to program officials, the failure
            review is not complete, but the failure could have been caused
            by a component common to both the CE-I and CE-II interceptors.
            It is still unclear what, if any, corrective action will be
            needed. The GMD program has had many years of significant and
            costly disruptions caused by production getting well ahead of
            testing and then discovering issues during testing.
            Consequently, even though some assets have already been
            produced, MDA has had to add tests that were previously not
            planned and delay tests that are necessary to understand the
            system's capabilities and limitations. Additionally, since it
            has delivered approximately three-fourths of its interceptors,
            MDA faces difficult and costly decisions on how it will
            implement corrections from prior test failures. As a result of
            these development challenges, the GMD program will likely
            continue to experience delays, disruptions, and cost growth.

        We made recommendations to address the ongoing issues with both
    systems in our April 2014 report.\19\ First, we recommended that the
    Secretary of Defense direct MDA's Director to flight test any
    modifications that may be required to the Aegis SM-3 Block IB, before
    the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, & Logistics
    approves full production allowing the program to manufacture the
    remaining interceptors. Second, we also recommended testing the fielded
    GMD CE-I interceptor in order to complete the original purpose of the
    failed test to (1) demonstrate the CE-I's effectiveness against a
    longer range threat in more challenging conditions, and (2) confirm the
    effectiveness of previous upgrades as well as (3) confirm any new
    modifications to address the failure work as intended. DOD partially
    concurred with the recommendation on the Aegis SM-3 Block IB, stating
    that MDA will verify the efficacy of any modifications by testing and
    that the full production decision will be vetted through the DOD
    process. DOD did not agree with the recommendation on GMD, stating that
    the decision to flight test the interceptor will be made by the
    Director, MDA, based on the judgment of other stakeholders.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ GAO-14-351
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Challenge: Gaining Expected Knowledge From Testing
        In this year's reports, we found that testing has provided less
    knowledge than initially planned.\20\ While MDA accomplished some
    testing goals, it experienced testing shortfalls, including failures of
    Aegis and GMD interceptors I mentioned above. The agency also combined,
    delayed, and deleted some tests, and eliminated test objectives in
    others. These changes reduced the knowledge expected to be available to
    understand the capabilities and limitations of the BMDS. Examples of
    key testing problems we cited in this year's reports are:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ GAO-14-351 and GAO-14-284R

             Operational Integration--Although the September 2013
            operational flight test demonstrated layered defense between
            Aegis BMD and THAAD, the Director, Operational Test and
            Evaluation concluded that the test did not achieve true
            integration. Specifically there were system network issues,
            interoperability limitations, and component failures. For
            example, the test uncovered several issues with communication
            networks that are needed for interoperability between the
            elements. Interoperability is important because it can improve
            missile defense effectiveness and mitigate some limitations of
            the systems working alone.
             Test plan revisions continue to reduce the knowledge
            planned to be available to understand BMDS performance and
            inform acquisition decisions. In our March 2014 and April 2014
            reports, we found that MDA combined, delayed, and deleted some
            tests, and eliminated test objectives in others. For example,
            MDA had to make some adjustments to its September 2013
            operational flight test, reducing the number of targets from
            five to two and removing the participation of more mature
            elements. The agency also reduced the number of ground tests,
            which are used to assess performance and interoperability.
            While MDA added other ground tests to mitigate some effects of
            this reduction, they are smaller in scope and may not provide
            the same amount of data about how the systems work together.

        Previously GAO has made recommendations to improve MDA's ability to
    gather expected knowledge from testing. For example, we recommended
    that MDA add non-intercept tests for new targets and ensure that its
    test plan can absorb unforeseen events, like failures, in order to
    minimize disruptions to the test schedule.\21\ We also recommended that
    MDA synchronize its testing with development and delivery schedules for
    its assets.\22\ MDA generally concurred with our recommendations, but
    has not fully implemented them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ GAO-13-432 and GAO-11-372
        \22\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile
    Defense Components Continue with Less Testing and Validation Than
    Planned, GAO-09-338 (Washington, DC: Mar 13, 2009).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Challenge: Managing Development and Deployment of U.S. Missile Defense
            in Europe
        In March 2014, we found that while MDA made further improvements to
    the way it manages EPAA, it has yet to develop or implement a complete
    management strategy for synchronizing these efforts.\23\ Specifically,
    MDA has not established an integrated schedule and has yet to
    completely define EPAA requirements. As a result, it remains unclear
    how different EPAA efforts are aligned together and what constitutes
    success in delivering EPAA capabilities. Considering that defensive
    capability planned for EPAA increasingly depends on integrated
    performance of the participating systems, an acquisition approach that
    identifies and synchronizes all needed activities becomes increasingly
    important. While flexibility is a hallmark of the EPAA policy, it also
    increases the risk of delivering less capability than expected without
    demonstrating the actual performance of what is delivered.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ GAO-14-284R
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In fact, our March 2014 report found concurrency, fragmentation of
    development activities, and delays for some originally planned
    capabilities. For example, we found that some systems may be delivered
    later than originally anticipated for integration activities. This
    reduces the time to discover and correct issues. We also found schedule
    delays that reduced both the capability MDA plans to deliver and the
    understanding of how that capability will perform. For example,
    although MDA delivered the first set of capability in December 2011, an
    upgrade originally planned for 2014, is now expected in 2015.
    Additionally, we found that MDA split the delivery of capability it
    initially planned to deliver in 2015 into two segments. It now plans to
    deliver what it calls ``basic'' or ``core'' capability in 2015 and the
    remainder in 2017. Similarly, MDA also realigned its plans for the
    capability it initially planned for 2018 into two segments--designating
    a subset of originally planned capability to be delivered in 2018, with
    the remainder in 2020 or later. Finally, MDA postponed its plans to
    conduct a formal system-level end-to-end assessment of EPAA
    capabilities because of concerns with data reliability associated with
    such tests. MDA is currently making investments to develop the tools it
    needs to improve the reliability of their system-level assessments, but
    they are expected to be ready after two-thirds of EPAA capabilities
    have been delivered.
        We have previously made recommendations to improve management of
    EPAA, which are highlighted in this year's report.\24\ Although DOD
    generally concurred with these recommendations, it has not yet fully
    implemented them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ GAO-14-284R
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Challenge: Reporting Resource and Schedule Baselines that Support
            Oversight
        Although we found in March 2014 that MDA took some additional steps
    to improve the clarity of its resource and schedule baselines, this was
    the fourth year that we have found MDA's resource baselines are not
    sufficiently reliable to support oversight.\25\ Additionally, issues
    with the content and presentation of the schedule baselines continue to
    limit the usefulness of the information for decisionmakers. According
    to agency officials, MDA is taking steps to improve the reliability of
    their resource baselines, however, until MDA completes these efforts,
    its baselines will not be useful for decisionmakers to gauge progress.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ GAO-14-351
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Since MDA first reported baselines in June 2010, we have found that
    the underlying information supporting its resource baselines does not
    meet best practice standards for high-quality cost estimates.\26\ MDA's
    resource baselines reported in its 2013 BAR remain unreliable because
    the agency is still in the process of improving the quality of the cost
    estimates that support its baselines. For example,
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, GAO-09-3SP
    (Washington, DC: March 2009).

             MDA has not fully implemented its cost estimating
            handbook. In April 2013, we reported that, in June 2012, MDA
            completed an internal Cost Estimating Handbook, largely based
            on GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide which, if
            implemented, could help address nearly all the shortfalls we
            identified. According to MDA officials, the agency is still in
            the process of applying that handbook to its cost estimates and
            therefore revised estimates for BMDS elements included in the
            2013 BAR were not ready for our review.
             MDA has not obtained independent cost estimates of the
            reported baselines. Officials from DOD's Office of the Director
            for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation told us that
            although they examined costs for some BMDS elements over the
            last 2 years, they have not completed a formal independent cost
            estimate for a BMDS element since 2010.\27\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ A formal independent cost estimate would be conducted or
    approved by DOD's Office of the Director for Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation. It would be an independent cost estimate of the
    full life-cycle cost of the program and would include all costs of
    development, procurement, military construction, and operations and
    support.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             MDA's cost estimates reported in the 2013 BAR do not
            include operation and support costs funded by individual
            Military Services. In April 2013, we found that MDA was not
            reporting the operation and support costs borne by other
            Military Services and concluded that as a result MDA's reported
            costs may significantly understate the full costs for some BMDS
            elements. We recommended MDA include these costs in its
            resource baselines reported in the BAR.\28\ DOD agreed that
            decisionmakers should have insight into the full costs of DOD
            programs, but the department stated that the BAR should only
            include content for which MDA is responsible. However, limiting
            the baseline reporting to only MDA costs precludes
            decisionmakers from having insight into all the costs
            associated with MDA's weapons systems. We continue to believe
            that reporting these costs would aid both departmental and
            congressional decisionmakers as they make difficult choices of
            where to invest limited resources.DOD does not currently report
            the full costs for MDA's missile defense acquisitions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ Our previous and ongoing work notes the importance of
    including the long-term costs associated with operations and support in
    cost estimates for BMDS weapons systems (for example see GAO-11-372).

        In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,
    Congress took steps to address concerns over MDA's cost estimates.\29\
    As a result, we did not make any new recommendations regarding cost
    this year. However, we plan to continue to monitor MDA's progress
    because establishing high-quality cost estimates that are accurate,
    credible, and complete is fundamental to creating realistic resource
    baselines.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ Pub. L. No. 113-66, Sec. 231.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In April 2014, we also found that assessing MDA's progress in
    achieving its schedule goals is difficult because MDA's 2013 schedule
    baselines are not presented in a way that allows decisionmakers to
    understand or easily monitor progress.\30\ For instance, MDA's schedule
    baselines identify numerous events, but provide little information on
    the events and why they are important. In addition, MDA's schedule
    baselines do not present any comparisons of event dates. Because MDA's
    schedule baselines only present current event dates, decisionmakers do
    not have the ability to see if and how these dates have changed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ GAO-14-351
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the MDA
    Director to improve the content of the schedule baselines by
    highlighting critical events, explaining what these events entail and
    why they are important, and by presenting information in a format that
    allows identification of changes from the previous BAR as well as from
    the initial baseline. DOD concurred with our recommendation.
        This concludes my statement, I am happy to answer any questions you
    have.
                     gao contact and staff acknowledgments
        For future questions about this statement, please contact me at
    (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
    Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
    page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to the
    work this statement is based on include David B. Best and Patricia
    Lentini, assistant Directors; Susan C. Ditto; Aryn Ehlow; Wiktor
    Niewiadomski; John H. Pendleton; Karen Richey; Brian T. Smith; Jennifer
    Spence; Steven Stern; Robert Swierczek; Jay Tallon; Brian Tittle; and
    Hai V. Tran; Alyssa Weir; and Gwyneth B. Woolwine.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Ms. Chaplain.
        Let me start. I think we'll do 7-minute rounds.
        We've not had a successful intercept test with the GMD
    system since 2008, as has been acknowledged. But we have had a
    series of test failures with both the early and most recent
    model of deployed kill vehicles. Admiral Syring, you've said
    your highest near-term priority is to return to a successful
    intercept test this summer to demonstrate corrections to the
    system.
        I want to ask if each of our witnesses agrees that it is
    our essential near-term priority to fix the problems we have
    encountered with our current kill vehicles and to demonstrate
    those fixes in realistic intercept testing before we build or
    deploy any additional interceptors. I assume these are yes or
    no answers, but I'll start with Ms. Bunn and move across.
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. Dr. Gilmore?
        Mr. Gilmore. I agree.
        Senator Udall. Admiral, I think you agree.
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. I'll keep it to two words: Yes,
    sir.
        Senator Udall. General Mann?
        General Mann. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. Ms. Chaplain?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes.
        Senator Udall. Using that same approach, let me turn to
    acquisition rigor for redesign of the GMD kill vehicle. Given
    the numerous problems we've encountered with our current GMD
    kill vehicles, the budget includes funds to start a redesigned
    kill vehicle for the GMD system, one that will be reliable,
    robust, producible, and other attributes that are lacking in
    the current kill vehicles because we did not follow rigorous
    design, engineering, and acquisition practices.
        I want to ask each of our witnesses if they agree that in
    order to avoid repeating the kill vehicle problems we had with
    the previous rush to failure approach, we need to follow a very
    rigorous acquisition approach to the redesigned kill vehicle,
    an approach that includes robust design, engineering,
    development, testing, and demonstration of a kill vehicle
    before we deploy it.
        Could I ask if you agree to that as well? Ms. Bunn?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Could I add one thing?
        Senator Udall. Please, yes.
        Ms. Bunn. I think we have the right man to add that rigor
    to the acquisition process.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that.
        Dr. Gilmore.
        Mr. Gilmore. I view that as essential.
        Senator Udall. Admiral?
        Admiral Syring. Absolutely critical. We have one chance to
    get this right.
        General Mann. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. Ms. Chaplain?
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes. Thanks for asking.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for answering.
        Let me try the same format one final time. I want to move
    to fly-before-you-buy for missile defense. Admiral Syring, your
    prepared statement makes clear that you are following a fly-
    before-you-buy approach on the GMD system, and that you will
    not build or deploy additional GBIs unless we have successful
    flight test results first.
        I have a two-part question, first to ask you, Admiral, if
    you plan to use the same approach before deploying further
    variants of the GBI? Then after you've answered, I'd like our
    other witnesses, if they agree that we need to follow this fly-
    before-you-buy approach. Admiral?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, in this year's budget request we've
    requested an intercept test every year on an annual basis
    between now through the FYDP. But to address your question on
    2017, there's an interceptor test that's scheduled before each
    next block of the interceptors is fielded. I'm confident that
    that will test the configuration before it goes into the ground
    adequately. As I've said before, intercept testing on an annual
    basis is a critical need for the GMD program.
        Senator Udall. Ms. Bunn.
        Ms. Bunn. Mr. Chairman, the fly-before-you-buy was a policy
    enunciated in the ballistic missile defense review of 2010 and
    it continues to be our policy.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        Dr. Gilmore.
        Mr. Gilmore. I agree. I'd just like to add one thing, and
    that is, that the modeling and simulation that I discussed in
    my opening statement is also critical here, because we're never
    going to get enough replications to reach conclusions about
    statistical confidence in the system without rigorous modeling
    and simulation.
        The flight testing and the modeling and simulation go hand
    in hand, and, in fact, I've been working with Vice Admiral
    Syring and his predecessors to assure that that's the case.
    Both are needed.
        Senator Udall. General Mann.
        General Mann. Yes, sir. We're in total agreement with MDA's
    way ahead and the importance of testing.
        Senator Udall. Ms. Chaplain.
        Ms. Chaplain. Yes, we agree with the importance of fly-
    before-you-buy.
        Senator Udall. Let me direct a question to Admiral Syring,
    General Mann, and Ms. Bunn. You've each indicated that, in
    addition to improving interceptor reliability, our investment
    priority for Homeland defense is to improve our sensor
    discrimination capability, rather than deploying an additional
    interceptor site on the east coast. The budget requests funds
    for a number of sensor and discrimination improvements.
        Can you each tell the subcommittee why improving our sensor
    and discrimination capabilities is so important and how it will
    improve our existing Homeland defense system? For example,
    would they allow us to defeat more ICBM threats with our
    planned number of interceptors, thus making the system both
    more operationally effective and more cost effective? Ms. Bunn,
    do you want to take a shot at that first?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. What you said, that is that better
    discrimination makes the interceptors we have more effective
    and more efficient.
        Senator Udall. Admiral.
        Admiral Syring. Sir, as the enemy continues to increase in
    both capacity and capability, the need for discrimination in
    sensoring is vital to, one, address those capability
    improvements of the enemy threat and, two, to get the most
    intercept capability out of our inventory of interceptors. Both
    are critical to the escalating capability and capacity of the
    threat missiles.
        Senator Udall. General Mann.
        General Mann. Yes, Senator. I think it's acknowledged that
    we'll never have enough interceptors to address the size of the
    threat inventory out there. So it's very important that we're
    as effective as we are with what we have. Also, by improving
    the effectiveness of the missile, it gives us a little bit more
    breathing space in terms of how we operationally employ the
    system. I'll leave it at that. Thank you.
        Senator Udall. Let me follow up. There is, of course, no
    limit to what you could do. There's always a limit to
    resources. What I hear being said is that it's a higher
    priority to improve our sensor and discrimination capabilities
    than it would be to deploy an additional interceptor site on
    the east coast. I say that in the context that we don't have
    unlimited resources.
        Ms. Bunn, would you comment on that, and then the Admiral
    and the General?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. The priority for this budget is in
    improving the EKV on the interceptors that we have, redesigning
    that, and improving the discrimination. While an east coast
    site might provide additional defense against an emerging, not-
    yet-here threat from Iran, the next dollars spent need to be on
    EKV improvement and discrimination and sensors.
        Senator Udall. Admiral, do you have anything to add to
    that?
        Admiral Syring. Sensors and discrimination, really on an
    equal priority with improving GBI reliability. They both inform
    the warfighter shot doctrine.
        Senator Udall. General?
        General Mann. Yes, sir, I concur with the previous
    witnesses.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that.
        My time is up. It's my privilege to recognize Senator
    Sessions, the ranking member.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Dr. Gilmore, testing has proved that we can utilize a kill
    vehicle to kill on a hit-to-kill basis, through the other tests
    of other systems; is that correct?
        Mr. Gilmore. That's correct.
        Senator Sessions. The concept is proven and we're doing it
    in others. But our GMD system is the one that's the most
    lacking and problematic at this time?
        Mr. Gilmore. We have the least information----
        Senator Sessions. The least testing.
        Mr. Gilmore.--about the performance across the full
    possible battle spaces, to use the colloquialism, for GMD in
    comparison with the other elements of the BMDS.
        Senator Sessions. The THAAD is 11 for 11 in its tests, as I
    understand it. Aegis is 18 for 21, Patriot 21 for 25. We were
    successful with the satellite engagement launch. But we're
    three for six on Ground-based Midcourse.
        Mr. Gilmore. Yes, that's correct. In fear of adding too
    much, I would also point out that, yes, THAAD has a very good
    record, although we've only just in the past couple of years
    started testing against medium-range ballistic missiles. A lot
    of the testing had been against short-range ballistic missiles,
    and now THAAD is deployed on Guam because Guam otherwise
    wouldn't have a defense against an intermediate-range ballistic
    missile. Coming up shortly, Vice Admiral Syring, at the request
    of the combatant commands, is going to do a test of THAAD
    against an intermediate-range ballistic missile.
        I certainly agree with all of the figures that you just
    cited. They're absolutely correct. I would just point out that
    there's still more to learn about the performance of these
    systems, and it's not just from the standpoint of what an
    independent operational tester might want to know. It's
    actually, even more importantly, from the standpoint of what
    the combatant commanders want to know about how these systems
    will be used, how they want to use them, and how they will
    perform.
        Senator Sessions. Good. I think it's important that the
    Americans and our adversaries know that we have very effective
    missile systems that will work, but we have some testing to do.
        Admiral Syring, my impression is that you are firmly
    convinced that testing must be more vigorous than we've had in
    the past and that you intend to see that that happens. Would
    you share your personal view with us about what it takes to
    ensure we have a viable missile defense system?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. We've added and are requesting
    one GMD missile test every year now. I would say that we hadn't
    done enough before, for whatever reason. We haven't done the
    work necessary for us to improve the models, to give Dr.
    Gilmore confidence in an assessment of the system. All of that
    has been lacking.
        But it's all anchored in flight testing and the need to
    test more often and for us not to be afraid to test. To not
    test a CE-1 interceptor for almost 5 years is not where we want
    to be long term. We want to continue to test and we'll continue
    to request annual testing of the GMD system.
        Senator Sessions. I couldn't agree more.
        Ms. Bunn, we thought we were putting in money for testing
    for the last several years. It's really surprising to me that
    we haven't had a GMD test in 4 years. Can you explain that?
        Ms. Bunn. Sir, I've been in this office for a year, so I
    don't have quite the history for that. Could I defer to Dr.
    Gilmore?
        Senator Sessions. Let's ask Dr. Gilmore. He's been there.
        Ms. Bunn. He may have a more----
        Mr. Gilmore. We've had tests, Senator. The last successful
    test----
        Senator Sessions. Is he responsible to you?
        Ms. Bunn. No, sir. We all work together quite closely, but
    no.
        Senator Sessions. No, you have different roles, okay.
        Mr. Gilmore. I'm the independent tester.
        The last successful intercept that we had----
        Senator Sessions. Explain that? You're part of DOD----
        Mr. Gilmore. Sure.
        Senator Sessions. But your role is set up to be an
    independent tester of the systems.
        Mr. Gilmore. Correct.
        Senator Sessions. To help Congress and others know that
    we're getting accurate testing, realistic testing, on the kind
    of situations we might face.
        Mr. Gilmore. I'm charged by law with assuring the testing
    is adequate, meaning it is set up to give us the information we
    need about how the systems will perform in realistic combat
    conditions. I think that's an exact quote from the law. Then
    it's my responsibility to report factually, comprehensively,
    and objectively on the test results. I'm not supposed to be an
    advocate for the system. I am not. I should have no stake in
    the outcome one way or another and just serve up the facts the
    way they are, which is what I have tried to do.
        Senator Sessions. How is it we haven't done any sufficient
    testing on GMD in the last several years?
        Mr. Gilmore. The last successful intercept was in December
    2008. Since that time we've actually done a bit more. We've
    attempted a bit more than one test per year. Unfortunately,
    with the exception of the captive carry test that was conducted
    last year of a partial solution to the problem that was
    manifested in the CE-2 kill vehicle failure in FTG-06A--that
    was a success, but it was a non-intercept test--all the other
    tests have failed.
        We have been attempting to test, and, in fact, Admiral
    Syring had set up tests that were exceeding somewhat the pace
    of one per year. But unfortunately, because of problems with
    the kill vehicle and its design, those tests have failed. The
    very first failure, in FTG-06, had to do with a quality control
    issue. A cable wasn't securely fashioned and came loose in
    flight.
        Then there was the problem that was discovered in FTG-06A
    with the Internal Measurement Unit (IMU) saturating because of
    vibrations in the structure of the kill vehicle, and that was
    unanticipated. Then there was the most recent failure----
        Senator Sessions. Which is the reason you need to test,
    right?
        Mr. Gilmore. Absolutely.
        Senator Sessions. It's unanticipated.
        Mr. Gilmore. Essentially, all of these failures, but you
    can put the quality control issue with the first failure in a
    separate bin if you would like. The other failures that have
    had to do with the IMU, for example, it saturating, and the
    failure with the CE-1 to separate, those are failure modes that
    really can't be predicted by modeling and simulation.
        The modeling and simulation, although it's essential,
    basically assumes that the kill vehicles will function
    mechanically, for lack of a better way to put it, the way that
    they're supposed to. However, it's turned out there have been
    some surprises there because of the way those kill vehicles
    were designed.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring, my time is basically up,
    but you intend to continue to deploy the next 14 interceptors.
    What kind of kill vehicle will you place on those? Then you
    have a plan to develop an entirely new kill vehicle that would
    replace those in the future--I mean, those that have already
    been placed on the system?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. The plan to get to 44 by 2017
    includes reliability improvements to the CE-2 interceptor.
        Senator Sessions. That's the one now?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, that's the current interceptor
    that we will fly this summer. There's small reliability--not
    small, but reliability improvements on top of that, that will
    be tested in fiscal years 2015 and 2016. One example would be
    the alternate divert thrusters, which will address the systemic
    problem of vibration that we addressed with isolating the IMU
    to get at the heart of the problem, to address not only the IMU
    issue but another issue we had with the divert system.
        Again, before those are fielded, we'll go through intercept
    testing and prove to me and to Dr. Gilmore that we're ready to
    go.
        Senator Sessions. Then finally, you will be bringing on a
    system that I guess uses some of the proven technology of the
    SM-3 and Patriot and THAAD for the future?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. The components of those systems,
    which you articulated very well in terms of their success,
    would be candidates for the EKV design. We have three very
    interesting, viable, technically capable concepts from three
    companies that we'll be evaluating over the next year as we
    continue to work on requirements in the kill vehicle arena as
    well.
        We have to get the kill vehicle requirements right. We have
    to get the Homeland defense requirements allocated properly
    across all parts of the kill chain, of which the kill vehicle
    is one.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Udall. Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you to all of you.
        This would be for whoever wants to answer the question.
    We've seen extraordinary circumstances in Ukraine, along the
    border there, and actions taken by Russia and its leader. One
    of the things that had been worked on was a missile defense
    system very nearby. So I am wondering as to--we obviously have
    Navy ships in the area. But I am wondering if there has been
    any further discussion since these activities started where
    Russia invaded Crimea, massed troops on the Ukrainian border?
    Has there been any additional discussions with Poland, the
    Czech Republic, Romania, and other nations about the missile
    defense systems we have there?
        Ms. Bunn. Senator Donnelly, let me say a couple of things
    here. The NATO missile defense, the EPAA, was designed against
    threats from the Middle East, not Russia.
        Senator Donnelly. I understand that. However, it was of
    significant concern to Mr. Putin.
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, it was.
        In general, I would say that Russia's intervention in
    Ukraine in violation of international law has put into flux a
    lot of our policies with regard to Russia. As Secretary General
    of NATO Rasmussen said yesterday, NATO is considering a lot of
    options for dealing with Russia now, relooking at its policies.
    General Breedlove calls it a paradigm shift.
        Let me just say that the government's looking at a lot of
    options, the U.S. Government, NATO, yes, economic and
    diplomatic, but also what military options for strengthening
    collective defense. I don't want to get out in front of, in
    open session, our NATO allies.
        Senator Donnelly. Have you been speaking with our allies in
    Poland or in the Czech Republic or in Romania or our NATO
    allies?
        Ms. Bunn. We've had a lot of discussions with them on a
    number of issues. As I say, I don't want to get out in front of
    our allies on a particular option.
        Senator Donnelly. Do you think at some point it would be a
    good indication to Mr. Putin to tell him we are working on
    these things, we are moving forward with these things, we are
    strengthening these things?
        Ms. Bunn. I think indeed that's one of the reasons
    Secretary General Rasmussen came out, after the NATO
    ministerial of all the foreign ministers yesterday, and said we
    are looking at lots of ways to enhance our collective defense.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. I guess maybe it's a game of
    semantics, but are we at some point planning to tell him that
    we're not just looking at them, but we're moving forward with
    some of them?
        Ms. Bunn. Indeed, there have been things. We've moved
    forward with, obviously, some reinforcements of aviation
    detachments, Baltic air policing. There are some steps that
    have already been taken. Yes, there will come a point where----
        Senator Donnelly. I understand you may have to talk around
    this a little bit as well, but how long would it take to finish
    the missile defense shield system in the region?
        Ms. Bunn. The plan is 2015 and 2018 for the next two
    phases. If you're asking what's technically feasible----
        Senator Donnelly. Have we talked to them about moving up
    those timelines? Mr. Putin apparently has no interest in
    timelines. So you know, he's not going to wait for 2018. His
    interests are not the same as ours.
        Are we taking a look at our timelines and other things in
    regards to that? Are those timelines that are flexible, that
    can be moved up, if necessary?
        Ms. Bunn. No discussions at this point with them----
        Senator Donnelly. By ``with them'' who do you mean?
        Ms. Bunn. You asked about----
        Senator Donnelly. Our allies.
        Ms. Bunn.--the nations----
        Senator Donnelly. Yes.
        Ms. Bunn.--specific nations. I guess I would defer on the
    technical, what's possible, to Admiral Syring.
        Admiral Syring. Senator, if I can, the Poland capability in
    2018 is on track. The program of record is doing well. It is
    hinged on two things. It's hinged on the SM-3 Block 2A
    development schedule, which is progressing well with our
    Japanese partners, but again paced by development progress,
    schedule, and funding. Then the actual site proper for the
    military construction (MILCON) and the equipment. We've proven
    very successful in Romania. We've built the site now in
    Moorestown and at Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) out in
    Hawaii. We'll build it again in Romania here before next year.
        All of that funding is mostly in the fiscal year 2016
    timeframe. To go faster it would require money in 2015 in terms
    of the technical feasibility of accelerating, which I don't
    have.
        Senator Donnelly. It may be more a question of money than
    the ability to technically move up timelines if we need it?
        Admiral Syring. It's money and it's the SM-3 2A development
    schedule.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. When we look at our Navy-based
    systems--as we talked about, much of the ground-based is in
    concerns about Iran, but obviously caused concern by the
    Russians as well. With the Navy-based systems, they can be,
    based on where the ships are and the angles and all those
    things, they can cover other areas besides Iran. They can cover
    Russia, if necessary, couldn't they?
        Admiral Syring. In this forum I'll say they can cover a
    wide range of geographic areas.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay. When we look at Iran--and again,
    whoever wants to answer it--what is your best judgment on how
    far they are right now to having a nuclear weapon completed?
    Obviously, they're in discussions now, but if they were to
    decide, okay, the discussions didn't work out, how long would
    it take for them to reach completion?
        Ms. Bunn. Senator, for the record, I'll go back and look at
    the Director of National Intelligence's worldwide threat
    assessment. We're trying to get them not to go there.
        Senator Donnelly. I'm hopeful of that, too.
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, I understand. Let me get that for you for
    the record, because it's an intelligence assessment.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Senator Donnelly. If they complete that, do they have the
    delivery systems in place already to deliver it?
        Ms. Bunn. They have short- and medium-range missiles
    already. That's the reason for the EPAA in Europe. They have
    those short- and medium-range missiles already. They're working
    on a longer-range missile.
        Senator Donnelly. Does that long-range--would that longer-
    range missile reach our country?
        Ms. Bunn. If they are successful in developing and testing
    that. They are trying for it, and so yes, they're trying for
    one that would reach us.
        Senator Donnelly. Unfortunately, my time is up. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Would you give me an update--Ms. Bunn, maybe this is you;
    or if not, whoever the appropriate person is--on the status of
    the environmental impact statements (EIS) on the four locations
    for the GBI site, the east coast site?
        Ms. Bunn. Admiral Syring is actually the best for that,
    because MDA has named the four sites and they've begun the EIS
    on the--let's see, Michigan, Maine, Ohio, and New York. I will
    ask Admiral Syring, with your permission.
        Senator King. Michigan's on the east coast? I hadn't
    noticed that. [Laughter.]
        Ms. Bunn. In the eastern part of the United States, even
    though Michiganders might not like to----
        Senator King. The guy from Indiana----
        Ms. Bunn. They don't want to call themselves----
        Senator Donnelly. Chairman Levin will be surprised.
    [Laughter.]
        Senator King. Oh, that Chairman Levin. [Laughter.]
        Admiral?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. We completed the down-select in
    January of this year to the four sites, and it's the Survival,
    Evasion, Resistance, and Escape facility in Portsmouth, ME;
    Fort Drum, NY; Camp Ravenna, OH; and Fort Custer, MI.
        The EIS process has started. We've said it will take us 24
    months to complete that. That's actually faster than the
    historical DOD EIS process, but we're confident that we have a
    great team in place that does this in terms of deployment for
    other systems that we deploy around the world.
        We'll develop a contingency plan, and you know what that
    is, Senator, in terms of how would you do--how would you
    actually build the site, how would you design the site, how
    would you field what we call it, is a continental United States
    interceptor site, since it is both midwest and the east, based
    on the threat trajectories of the areas that we're considering.
    That'll be a cost, schedule, and acquisition-focused
    contingency plan.
        We've actually already developed a very detailed
    requirements document, overarching requirements document, that
    we've been working on for the last 6 months. That'll inform the
    contingency plan and the detailed plan for all four sites to
    not wait if the decision is so made, to be able to get on with
    it if the requirement comes from the combatant commander and
    DOD makes that decision.
        Senator King. You'll have essentially a mockup of a plan,
    so you don't start from scratch after the EIS?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. There's a plan--there's planning
    work that can go on at a level below the detailed planning
    level, that will be done on each of the sites, so we don't have
    to wait another 2 years for that work to be done. We can do a
    lot of this work in parallel prior to selecting a site, that
    will be then tailored to the individual site that we select.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        I was in Israel a few months ago and visited an Iron Dome
    site. Talk about real-time research and development (R&D). I
    understand that we're doing a lot of funding of that system,
    but we're also getting a lot of the intellectual property back.
    Are we incorporating--and I know that's a different, that's not
    intercontinental. But it's certainly missile defense and it
    seems to be working. They claim an 85 percent efficiency.
        Are we learning anything from that, from that system?
        Admiral Syring. We are. Let me address programmatically
    what we're doing and then I will pass it to General Mann if
    that's okay in terms of what the Army may be looking at. We
    were very successful with the Israelis to sign an Iron Dome
    coproduction agreement this year, which will set us up for 30
    percent of production of that interceptor in the United States
    this year, 55 percent next year, which is a good thing for us
    and it's a good thing for Israel that that's in place, because
    we'll have a second source for the provider of that
    interceptor.
        We've also requested in this year's budget $175 million for
    Iron Dome, both interceptor and battery procurement, that will
    be informed in terms of how many interceptors, how many
    batteries we actually buy, through the coproduction work that's
    going on.
        There's a very detailed contract negotiation that's going
    on between Rafael and Raytheon today. We don't have any privity
    of contract on that, so our insight is somewhat limited. But
    I'm confident that as we allow that process to work forward
    that the right answer will come out.
        Senator King. But you're satisfied with the privity of
    intellectual property, if you will, that we're learning the
    lessons along with them?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. The design and the technical data
    packages come, are coming and will come with it.
        Senator King. Now, having been through this hearing last
    year and then a briefing afterwards and another hearing today,
    it's clear that this is a tough problem. This is a tough
    scientific problem, physics problem. Are we thinking about
    alternatives? Is it possible, instead of sending a missile up,
    high-powered lasers or some other alternatives to this, what is
    appearing to be a very difficult piece of construction and
    engineering?
        General Mann. I'll take this. I don't know if Admiral
    Syring wants to jump on. But there's a lot of different efforts
    that are under way. When you're talking about cruise missiles
    or rockets, artillery, mortars, things like that, we're looking
    at directed energy very aggressively. In fact, we've already
    had a successful test back in December of last year in the 10
    kilowatt range, where we were able to knock out mortars and it
    was also effective against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).
        What we're doing right now is we're working with the Navy.
    We've transported that demonstrator to Florida and we're doing
    testing with the Navy under more environmentally challenging
    scenarios. We're looking at by 2017 we could probably get up to
    the 50 kilowatt. Again, we're looking at threats that are low-
    level threats, whether it's UAVs, possibly cruise missiles.
        I know that MDA is also looking at directed energy, really
    looking at a higher level platform, maybe post-launch or post-
    boost level type engagements. So we're working collaboratively
    with MDA to really leverage, like you were talking about, other
    technologies, in this case directed energy.
        Senator King. But in dealing with an intercontinental
    missile, the only option is another missile at this point?
        General Mann. At this point.
        Senator King. One of our advantages is naval power. I'm
    worried about anti-ship missiles. How do we--in terms of
    missile defense, how do we--is that up to the ship or how do we
    think about missile defense of our naval vessels?
        Admiral Syring. I'll talk about the ballistic missile
    defense and then General Mann can talk about the cruise missile
    defense of the ship. We have a very robust sea-based terminal
    defense program that's requested in this year's budget, that
    helps us to defend the carrier sea base against that exact
    threat. I'd like to share the details of that in a classified
    forum, but it's based upon the SM-6 missile that the Navy has
    successfully tested and developed.
        Senator King. I'd like to, if we could follow up, have that
    briefing.
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, we'd be happy to.
        Senator King. Cruise missile defense?
        General Mann. Again, cruise missile defense, right now, I
    think, there's 9 countries that are currently aggressively
    involved in cruise missile technologies, and I think there's
    another 20 that's looking into this. Right now--I talked about
    using directed energy as a technology that we can leverage to
    get after that threat.
        We're also right here locally--I think you all are aware of
    the Joint Attack Netted Sensor that aerostat that we're going
    to be placing at Aberdeen Proving Ground. It's going to be a
    test from fiscal years 2014 through 2017. We're working with
    U.S. Northern Command on this, and that basically provides
    greater surveillance and fire control radar capabilities, so
    when netted with interceptors like the Norwegian Advanced
    Surface-to-Air Missile System that we have here locally that's
    protecting the National Capital Region--we're going to do a
    test that will provide us with greater range, greater sensor
    coverage of this area. We're looking forward to learning from
    that to help us get after the cruise missile threat, which is
    growing.
        Senator King. It's a serious threat.
        General Mann. Yes, sir.
        Senator King. Admiral, I can't resist. The studies you're
    doing for the east coast site remind me of when God came to
    Moses and said: ``I have good news and bad news. The good news
    is I'm going to empower you to part the waters of the Red Sea
    and let my people escape to freedom.'' Moses said: ``What's the
    bad news?'' God said: ``You have to prepare the environmental
    impact statement.'' [Laughter.]
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator King.
        Let me turn back to the GMD system and the question whether
    it protects all of the United States. I'll direct this to
    General Mann, Admiral Syring, and Ms. Bunn. In your prepared
    testimony you each state that the current ground-based
    midcourse protects the United States against a limited
    ballistic missile attack from North Korea and from potential
    Iranian ICBMs. This is an important point. I want to make sure
    the record is clear on this since there seems to be some
    confusion on this subject here on Capitol Hill.
        Ms. Bunn, is it correct that our current GMB system covers
    the entire United States, including the east coast, from
    missile threats from North Korea and from Iran?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir, that's certainly my understanding.
        Senator Udall. Admiral Syring?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. General Mann?
        General Mann. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. On that note, General Mann, is that why your
    prepared testimony says, ``As the Secretary of Defense and
    various combatant commanders have previously testified, the
    warfighter remains confident in our ability to protect the
    Nation against a limited ballistic missile attack, even in the
    face of a changing fiscal environment''?
        General Mann. Yes, sir. But it also goes to the point where
    we need to continue to improve our technology, whether it's
    sensor discrimination, EKV improvements, because we know that
    the threat is not just satisfied with the current capability.
        Senator Udall. It's not static.
        General Mann. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. It's not always symmetrical, either.
        Ms. Bunn, let me go back to this question. In addition to
    the EPAA, we are pursuing regional missile defense enhancements
    in the Middle East and Asia, including significant efforts at
    cooperation with our allies and partners in each region. From a
    policy perspective, can you describe what we are trying to
    accomplish with our allies and partners in each region,
    including our efforts in the Middle East, with Israel and with
    the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and our efforts in Asia
    with Japan and South Korea?
        Admiral Syring and General Mann, after the Secretary
    comments, if you have anything to add, we'd appreciate it for
    the record.
        Ms. Bunn. Mr. Chairman, as General Mann pointed out, as
    we've all pointed out, the supply of short- and medium-range
    ballistic missiles is greater than the number of regional
    defense missile interceptors that we have and will have for the
    foreseeable future. So I think for protecting both our deployed
    forces as well as our allies and partners, it's important for
    others to also have their own missile defenses. It's also
    important to net them together to make them interoperable in a
    way that the sensors that we each have can share information
    and make the use of each of our missile defense capabilities
    more effective, more efficient.
        In the Middle East, we have a longstanding cooperative
    relationship with Israel. It goes back almost 28 years now. I
    was doing the math. I was the action officer for the first
    agreement with Israel. That was in 1986. That is a longstanding
    cooperative relationship.
        We are making efforts with the GCC, as I said. A number of
    those countries are acquiring and interested in acquiring their
    own missile defense capabilities and, as the Secretary of
    Defense said in Manama recently, that working together, trying
    to get the GCC to also see that sensor interoperability, sensor
    sharing, makes every country's missile defenses more capable.
        In the Far East, certainly with Japan, Japan is also--that
    was the other missile defense agreement in 1986. Japan, we've
    had a longstanding cooperative program with, and, in fact, we
    are co-developing right now the SM-3 2A with the Japanese. They
    have their own deployed Kongo-class ships as well with missile
    defense capability. South Korea is examining some integrated
    air and missile defense, moving forward on that as well.
        Senator Udall. Thanks for that update.
        Admiral?
        Admiral Syring. We're doing a lot around the world. Let me
    just highlight some of the main points, and I'll just add to
    what Ms. Bunn said. The NATO command and control system, I
    think, was a huge success in terms of that being operational at
    Ramstein and connected with our command and control system for
    the first time ever. That will enable us to add nodes to
    basically both networks in Europe.
        Spain has been very forthcoming and we're very thankful for
    their ability to host the four destroyers in Rota as part of
    EPAA. Turkey hosted the TPY2 site. The Netherlands and Germany
    have stepped up with Patriot in Europe with Patriot batteries.
    Romania and Poland, their ability to host our Aegis Ashore
    sites and their willingness to accept our systems there, I
    think, goes without further mention.
        Israel, again just a great partner, partnered on actually
    four development programs with them: Iron Dome, Arrow 2, Arrow
    3, and David's Sling.
        Asia, Japan, just shift to the west, the Japanese, in terms
    of the SM-3 2A development program, but they have the Aegis
    destroyers that have BMD capability on them as well, that
    actually serve on station. We're in active discussions with
    them on how to upgrade their capability as well.
        In the Gulf, back east, great progress with the United Arab
    Emirates in terms of the THAAD agreement that we signed with
    them. I'm working actively for more opportunities across the
    Gulf region in the next year and hopefully we'll come back and
    report progress there.
        Then South Korea, I think we're in the formative study
    discussions, just answering some of the questions that they
    have as well.
        Finally, there's a lot of countries that have been
    discussing and are asking questions about how their ship
    sensors can help and how they can contribute to BMD in terms of
    search and track capability on our network.
        Senator Udall. General, do you have any additional?
        General Mann. Just very quickly, Senator. In addition to
    the material acquisition programs that we're talking about
    here, we do a lot of collaborative exercises with a lot of our
    allies out there, especially in the CENTCOM area of
    responsibility (AOR). I'm also about to do a capstone exercise
    later this month that's going to involve 22 nations.
        At those exercises, not only do we get into, in some cases,
    tactics, techniques, and procedures, but we also get into some
    of the policy issues related to sharing of data, which
    sometimes causes some sticking points on sharing data, whether
    it's sensor data or whatever it might be. Very robust
    engagements are ongoing right now with our allies.
        Senator Udall. The three of you took us on quite a tour.
    It's impressive what we're doing. I know we want to do more.
        I know my time is about to run about. But Admiral Syring, a
    short, concise comment, if you could, on what would happen if
    sequestration came back fully in fiscal year 2016?
        Admiral Syring. It would put all of the efforts that we
    have requested to begin development back on the table.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Let me just tell you, you're going to be
    looking at $521 billion. Is that sequestration or not? It's the
    same you had last year. Does that mean you can't fund what
    you've been talking about? We're talking beyond each other,
    like ships in the night, it seems to me, about numbers.
        Admiral Syring. Sir, with----
        Senator Sessions. There is no more cuts if we stay on the
    Budget Control Act (BCA) numbers. I'm trying to figure out what
    we're saying here. That's what I was asking at the very
    beginning.
        Admiral Syring. If we take a cut, be it to the proposed
    fiscal year 2016 program----
        Senator Sessions. The proposed program?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, the requested program from DOD.
        Senator Sessions. Is DOD requesting more than the BCA?
        Admiral Syring. We haven't put a 2016 budget together yet.
    We've put together a 2015 budget that assumes controls in 2016.
        Senator Sessions. You better not be counting on spending
    more money than the BCA, because we already have extra money
    this year and next year. If we can get by spending at $521
    billion this year and $521 billion next year, we go up $13
    billion a year thereafter, we've made it past the danger
    period, which was this year and next year, really were the most
    crisis years.
        We're going to have to keep talking about that, because
    there's just confusion out there. I do think sometimes our DOD
    is talking about the projections that assume more money than is
    in the BCA, assume we will have to have another vote to bust
    the budget and spend above that, and sometimes they're not. So
    it's confusing. We need to be apples to apples when we talk
    about these numbers.
        Admiral Syring, so this redesigned kill vehicle, that need
    for the GBIs, the first test of that is supposed to be in 2018.
    When can we expect and you would hope and expect to be able to
    retrofit our 44 GBIs with this new system?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, the budget request asks for two flight
    tests in fiscal year 2018 of the new kill vehicle, first a non-
    intercept test and then an intercept test. But I would just
    caution that as we develop the acquisition approach and
    strategy, you have my commitment to make sure that we don't cut
    corners and we do it right.
        Right now I think we can make a flight test in 2018, for a
    fielding of the first interceptor by 2020. But again, that's
    going to be informed by proper design progress and testing
    progress.
        Senator Sessions. What can you tell us in a public forum
    about the intelligence estimates of Iran and North Korea with
    regard to a missile system that can reach the United States?
        Admiral Syring. The intelligence estimate is they're able
    to flight test, the projection is, to flight test an ICBM by
    2015.
        Senator Sessions. We don't doubt that they eventually have
    the capability to make that a successful missile if left to
    their own devices?
        Admiral Syring. I'd like to take that into a classified
    forum, sir.
        Senator Sessions. They've made progress with missiles.
    They're pretty sophisticated in them, as are the North Koreans.
    We would think, as much as their people suffer, it's not
    possible, but it apparently is possible. They already have
    proven fairly sophisticated technology.
        Admiral Syring. They are making capability improvements and
    capacity improvements every day.
        Senator Sessions. Now, the plan, General Mann, to protect
    Europe and what we are trying to do there--maybe this is your
    question--that plan is to deal with Iran, not Russia; is that
    correct?
        General Mann. That is correct.
        Senator Sessions. We're not pretending that we have the
    capability to protect Europe or the United States from a
    massive Russian launch.
        General Mann. Senator, you're correct. That is for threats
    emanating out of the Middle East, Iran.
        Senator Sessions. It's something I hope we can be
    successful on. I know we can if we work on that.
        Thank you. I yield back my time.
        Senator Udall. Senator King.
        Senator King. One question. Admiral Syring, you said
    several times in your last answer, you talked about networks
    and connecting networks in Europe. It raises the question of
    how--are you thinking as you develop this project about cyber
    vulnerability? Because the good news is we have a very good,
    interconnected, wired society. The bad news is it makes us very
    vulnerable to cyber attack.
        Is part of your design strategy cyber attack resistance as
    far as the command and control and the networks that connect
    the sites and those kinds of things?
        General Mann. Yes, sir. A very robust cyber program within
    MDA.
        Senator King. Good. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator King.
        We have a few more minutes. I have a few more questions, so
    I'll pick up where we left off on the budget. General Mann, the
    budget request, if it were approved by Congress, does it meet
    the needs of the warfighter for improving our missile defense
    capabilities?
        General Mann. Yes, Senator.
        Senator Udall. Admiral Syring, does the budget request put
    us on a path to improving our ability to defend against both
    Homeland and regional missile threats? If so, what are some of
    the initiatives that will provide such improvements?
        Admiral Syring. It does put us on that path, sir. The one
    marker I'll put on the table is that discrimination capability
    to the east is equally important, and long-term we're going to
    be looking to address that gap. Right now the strategy would be
    to move sea-based X-band radar to the east as the long-range
    radar is built to the west.
        The other gap I would say would be infrared sensing
    capability, which is heavily in the R&D phase right now, and
    we're working hard on that.
        Senator Udall. I know Senator Sessions and you had an
    exchange about the budget. We talked briefly about ensuring
    that we're all on the same page, apples to apples, oranges to
    oranges. There will be additional time to discuss that as we
    move forward, and we'd welcome clarifications, additional
    information, in the testimony you'd submit for the record. I
    think it is important to understand where we are.
        Ms. Chaplain, you've been patient. You're the watchdog that
    we all appreciate being involved. GAO has been a consistent
    advocate for the fly-before-you-buy approach and has warned for
    years that deploying missile defense systems before they're
    fully developed and tested could end up taking more time and
    costing more money than using a more rigorous acquisition
    approach.
        We've spent, I think, at least 3 years trying to diagnose
    and fix the problems with the kill vehicles for the GMD and
    have conducted or will conduct a number of very expensive and
    previously unplanned flight tests to demonstrate those fixes.
    Can you give us a rough order of magnitude of what it has or
    will cost us to try to fix these problems after the fact,
    including the additional flight tests? I imagine it may be over
    $1 billion.
        If we had used a more rigorous fly-before-you-buy approach
    with GMD, do you believe we might have been able to avoid those
    additional costs? I ask the second question not to pile on, but
    just because everybody in this hearing wants to learn from
    mistakes, shortcomings, you name it.
        Ms. Chaplain. Our estimate for fixing the problems in the
    flight tests and recovering from it is at $1.3 billion right
    now. So it is close to what you said, even more than that. We
    do believe those costs could have been avoided had a fly-
    before-you-buy approach been followed. [Pause.]
        Senator Udall. Excuse me. Thank you for that clarification.
    As the hearing comes to a close, I wanted to see if Senator
    Sessions had any other questions he might like to ask.
        Let me ask one more question and go back to Dr. Gilmore.
    You've approved several versions of the integrated master test
    plan. That lays out the schedule and the testing for the
    objectives, I should say, for missile defense testing. There
    have been suggestions that we should substantially increase the
    pace of testing our missile defense systems, particularly our
    GMD system, and that that would greatly help accelerate system
    development.
        Could you comment on the factors that drive our testing
    pace and whether you think we should or could accelerate
    testing significantly above the currently planned test pace?
    Although there have been some changes and delays in the
    testing, can you explain whether we've been able to really put
    in place a plan that helps us understand how we move forward?
        I know you've been speaking of this. You're clearly the
    historian and the expert on much of this.
        Mr. Gilmore. The historical pace of testing has been about
    1.2, not to be too precise----
        Senator Udall. I want you to be precise.
        Mr. Gilmore.--ground-based missile defense tests per year
    over the last decade since 2000. Early on the flight test pace
    was a little higher than that. It was up around 1.3, 1.4.
        Senator Sessions. Are those complete tests? Or are some of
    those partial tests of the system?
        Mr. Gilmore. I'm counting the tests that were meant to
    conduct intercepts.
        Senator Sessions. Actual intercepts?
        Mr. Gilmore. Yes. I can give you the details. I think I'm
    correct on that.
        It's also true, because I've reviewed the historical
    record, that both General Kadish and General Obering had
    testified at various times on their plans for the program
    before this subcommittee and other committees that they hoped
    to be able to do three or four tests a year. They were never
    able to achieve that.
        Would it be good to be able to do three or four or more
    tests per year for the ground-based missile defense system?
    Yes, it would. Can I sit here and say that there is absolutely
    no way that can be achieved with additional money? No, I can't
    prove that. But I can point to the historical record, where at
    least two MDA directors tried to increase substantially the
    pace of testing beyond one per year and did not succeed.
        I can only guess to some extent, while that's true, but I
    hope you'll regard it as an educated guess, and this is based
    on my interactions with Vice Admiral Syring and his staff and
    his predecessor. There is just a certain amount--these are very
    complex tests and there's a huge amount of data that are
    collected, that have to be analyzed after the test. If you
    don't take the time to analyze those data, then you're not
    going to be able to learn and understand what the problems are
    and what the corrections should be and what you want to pursue
    in the next test and what you want to put into your development
    program to improve the performance of the system.
        Moreover, it takes many months to plan these tests. This
    first operational test that we did, which didn't involve the
    ground-based missile defense system but did involve THAAD and
    Aegis, was a tremendously complex thing to plan. Then also Vice
    Admiral Syring's team had to deal with a lot of unanticipated
    events along the way, including problems with targets that had
    to be corrected in real time, and that's why the test got
    pushed out and why we didn't get all the information we hoped,
    but we still got a lot.
        It's not just a matter of buying additional interceptors
    and buying additional targets. You would think it might be that
    simple: Instead of buying one additional GBI a year and one
    additional target a year, we'll buy more, that will enable us
    to test more. Certainly that's necessary, but you also have to
    have a lot of engineering expertise in-house. A lot of this
    work can't be done in parallel.
        You'd have to have larger teams of experts if you wanted to
    plan two tests simultaneously or three and execute two or three
    tests simultaneously instead of three. Then you would run into
    the infrastructure problems. There's only one Reagan Test Site,
    there's only one PMRF. There's only so much activity you can
    jam into them.
        Could additional funding help increase the pace of testing
    for GMD or these other systems somewhat? Yes. But I think
    there's a limit. I can't state precisely what it is. I also
    know that it wouldn't happen overnight. It would take a number
    of years to build up the additional engineering teams, the
    additional hardware in the loop facilities that have to be used
    to prepare for the tests.
        I can only go back to the historical record on GMD and
    these other tests, and the historical record is what I said.
    It's about 1.2 intercepts a year, even though various directors
    have tried to do more and, unfortunately, didn't succeed.
        Senator Udall. Thank you. I'd make two short comments, then
    I'll turn to Senator Sessions before we adjourn the hearing.
        I think the average American family has 1.8 children, is
    that not right? Maybe there's some parallel here. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Gilmore. I won't speculate on that.
        Senator Udall. Director Clapper was asked--by the way, for
    the record I wanted this, the comments that he made about the
    Iranian capability. I think he said the Iranians are moving to
    develop an ICBM. He said adding a weapon to that ICBM is a
    whole other problem. He implied that there would be additional
    time to weaponize that missile. But that doesn't mean we can
    rest easy, of course, and that's the mission you all are on.
        I just want to thank you for your work, for your commitment
    to our country and our country's defense. Let me recognize
    Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. I just wanted to take one
    moment before we adjourn to express my sympathy to the family
    of Dr. Schlesinger, who passed away March 27. What a national
    treasure he's been. He's given of himself to the country so
    much and was with Dr. Perry, former Secretary Perry, who was
    chairman, and he was vice chairman, of the American Strategic
    Posture Report in 2009, which I offered legislation to call
    for. They really produced a report. It was a bipartisan report,
    a bipartisan commission, that gave us, I think, the right
    advice on the strategic posture of the United States. We will
    make a mistake if we get far away from that, in my opinion.
        In 1974, he was given credit for what came to be known as
    the Schlesinger shift when he was with Nixon, to move away from
    mutually assured destruction as the policy of the United
    States. Then he was Secretary of Energy under President Carter
    and just continued to be a source of wisdom on matters of
    technical and nuclear issues.
        This subcommittee has benefited from hours of his time that
    he's given when he could have been doing other things. He was
    very valuable in helping us maintain a bipartisan strategic
    posture.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that, Senator Sessions. I'd
    like to associate myself and the subcommittee with what you
    just shared with us. We'd do well to emulate Dr. Schlesinger's
    role.
        Thank you all. We'll keep the record open through the end
    of the week. We may want to direct some additional questions to
    you. You may want to amplify or add to your statements. Thanks
    again for taking the time to be here.
        The subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:03 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall
               investment priority for sensors and discrimination
        1. Senator Udall. Ms. Bunn, Admiral Syring, and General Mann, you
    indicated that, in addition to improving the reliability of the Ground-
    Based Interceptor (GBI) and kill vehicles, our Homeland missile defense
    investment priority is the improvement of our sensor and discrimination
    capabilities, rather than deployment of an additional interceptor site
    on the east coast of the United States. Please explain why such
    improvements in sensors and discrimination capabilities are the
    investment priority, and how they will improve our Homeland missile
    defense capability.
        Ms. Bunn. Investing in sensor capabilities improves the performance
    and efficiency of our Homeland defenses. The deployment of a Long-Range
    Discrimination Radar in Alaska would provide persistent missile defense
    radar coverage and improve discrimination capabilities against threats
    to the Homeland from North Korea and would provide the Sea-Based X-band
    (SBX) radar more geographic deployment flexibility for contingency and
    test use. Improved sensors have the operational effect of increasing
    the number of attacking warheads the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) system can intercept.
        The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat from Iran has
    not yet emerged, and the current GMD system provides coverage of the
    entire United States from North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs. If
    an ICBM threat were to emerge in numbers that necessitated the
    deployment of additional interceptors, the steps being taken now,
    including completing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), would
    shorten the construction timelines associated with deployment of a new
    missile defense site.
        Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) systems
    engineering process is based on allocating integrated Ballistic Missile
    Defense System (BMDS) requirements that balance capability and
    feasibility across sensors, command, control, battle management and
    communications, fire control, and weapons. Consistent with this process
    and our strategy to improve our Homeland defense capability, the MDA
    will engineer and allocate integrated system requirements to drive
    balanced and integrated BMDS development activities for improvements in
    sensors and discrimination capabilities. These activities, executed in
    parallel, include developing the long range discrimination radar,
    improving existing sensor hardware (including the Aegis SPY-1),
    improving discrimination threat databases in sensors and weapons,
    improving discrimination techniques in software across multiple BMDS
    elements, air and space electro optical/infrared sensor capabilities,
    and the next generation kill vehicle.
        Discrimination is the ability of the BMDS to distinguish lethal
    reentry vehicles from other threat objects, such as decoys.
    Discrimination is executed across the BMDS. It begins with sensor
    measurements. It ends with kill vehicle selection of the target reentry
    vehicle. Improving discrimination via algorithm development and
    maximizing sensor utility is MDA's first investment priority. Through
    analysis conducted during the BMDS Vision Study, the missile defense
    community identified improved discrimination as an essential capability
    of the BMDS to counter increasingly complex threats, allowing for fewer
    interceptors to be expended against a threat cluster.
        Adequate discrimination capability allows the BMDS to intercept the
    correct object while reducing the interceptor waste that results from
    committing interceptors to objects that aren't lethal reentry vehicles.
    An additional interceptor site on the east coast will increase GBI
    inventory, while allowing earlier engagements (increased battlespace)
    against threats from Southwest Asia (compared to interceptors launched
    from Fort Greely, AK and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA).
        An east coast interceptor site will increase the warfighter's time
    to shoot the interceptors according to shot doctrine, but the site
    itself doesn't improve the discrimination needed to select the lethal
    object hidden in a confusing threat complex. It doesn't reduce
    interceptor waste, because extra interceptors don't overcome the
    inability to distinguish the lethal object. For cost-effective success,
    we need the right balance between number of interceptors, the right
    sensor capabilities, and adequate discrimination capability.
        General Mann. It is vital that we effectively employ our
    interceptors to counter a ballistic missile threat emanating from rogue
    state actors. Essential enhancements to the current ballistic missile
    defense (BMD) sensor architecture enable more efficient and effective
    operational employment of limited GBIs by improving the ability to
    distinguish the target within the threat complex.

         acquisition rigor for redesigned exo-atmospheric kill vehicle
        2. Senator Udall. Admiral Syring, at the hearing you agreed that we
    need robust acquisition rigor for the redesigned Exo-atmospheric Kill
    Vehicle (EKV) and said that ``we have one chance to get this right.''
    What are the elements you believe are essential to a fully rigorous EKV
    redesign acquisition program, including for system engineering, design,
    development, test, and evaluation, to make sure that we do not repeat
    any of the problems we have had with the current prototype EKV design?
        Admiral Syring. The primary elements necessary to improve the
    success for the redesigned EKV and GBI acquisitions are identified
    below:

         (1)  Define stable requirements that reflect projected operational
    needs over the next decade;
         (2)  Allow adequate time to design necessary components to meet
    our requirements;
         (3)  Establish reliability, producibility, testability,
    maintainability, and cost effectiveness as design criteria;
         (4)  Conduct comprehensive design reviews with stakeholders to
    ensure program needs are met;
         (5)  Procure sufficient test assets early in development to
    thoroughly identify and handle design problems;
         (6)  Confirm the design meets requirements through extensive
    design verification testing and comprehensive qualification testing;
         (7)  Execute rigorous systems engineering processes to integrate
    components into the redesigned EKV, the redesigned EKV into the GBI,
    the GBI into the GMD and the GMD into the BMDS;
         (8)  Complete a methodical ground test campaign that proves system
    level performance using models and simulations that are anchored to
    test data;
         (9)  Conduct flight testing to demonstrate and assess system
    capabilities and provide data for modeling and simulation anchoring;
    and
        (10)  Enhance the Stockpile Reliability Program, Service Life
    Extension Program, and the obsolescence program to better understand
    the state of the GBI fleet throughout the lifecycle.

                      kill vehicle failure and correction
        3. Senator Udall. Admiral Syring, last July, the flight test of the
    GMD system with the Capability Enhancement (CE)-I kill vehicle failed
    because the kill vehicle failed to separate from the booster. Please
    explain the cause of this failure; whether it is related to the more
    modern CE-II kill vehicle; how you plan to fix the CE-I problem and
    demonstrate the correction; and whether you will make any changes to
    the fleet of deployed CE-I interceptors.
        Admiral Syring. The FTG-07 Failure Review Board concluded the
    failure was the result of excess EKV battery current leakage. The leak
    caused EKV electrical component reset and the EKV's subsequent
    inability to separate from third stage.
        For the CE-II EKV, we are considering two design changes. The first
    is redesigning the EKV battery. The second is incorporating improved
    grounding ties. Both hardware design changes will include software
    updates to the electronics unit (flight computer). We expect the
    redesigns to make the electrical system more robust, while improving
    EKV and GBI reliability.
        For existing CE-Is, we are developing updated EKV embedded software
    (ESW) 22.2 to include electronics unit (flight computer) reset recovery
    capability. This capability will be demonstrated through accredited
    system level and formal qualification testing. ESW 22.2 can be loaded
    into CE-Is while the interceptor is in the silo.

        4. Senator Udall. Dr. Gilmore, do you believe there should be a
    future GMD intercept flight test with the CE-1 kill vehicle to
    demonstrate the objectives intended for the failed FTG-07 flight test
    last July?
        Dr. Gilmore. Yes, I believe the MDA needs to fly a GMD intercept
    test with the CE-1 kill vehicle as I recommended in my 2013 Annual
    Report. This should be done to satisfy the test objectives not achieved
    on the FTG-07 mission.

        5. Senator Udall. Ms. Chaplain, do you believe there should be a
    future GMD intercept flight test with the CE-1 kill vehicle to
    demonstrate the objectives intended for the failed FTG-07 flight test
    last July?
        Ms. Chaplain. MDA should conduct a CE-I test once the cause of the
    July 2013 test failure is understood and any mitigations are developed
    in order to demonstrate the original objectives of FTG-07. Although MDA
    has demonstrated the CE-I's initial capability, FTG-07 was originally
    designed to assess CE-I performance against more challenging threats
    and longer range targets. Additionally, this test was intended to
    confirm the effectiveness of previous design changes made to improve
    the performance of the CE-I.
        We recognize that MDA must balance several competing GMD
    priorities, including which flight tests to conduct, and conducting
    another CE-I flight test in the immediate future may not be feasible.
    However, there remain a number of uncertainties regarding the CE-I
    performance. Until those uncertainties are resolved, the warfighter may
    not be able to make the most effective use of the interceptor because
    they will not know the interceptor's full capabilities and limitations.
    As such, we maintain that flight testing the CE-I should continue to be
    a priority for the Department of Defense (DOD) since the CE-I
    constitutes a multi-billion dollar investment by DOD and serves as the
    primary defense of the U.S. Homeland against enemy ballistic missile
    attacks.

                        standard missile-3 test failures
        6. Senator Udall. Admiral Syring, as noted at the hearing, there
    have been several flight test failures related to the Third Stage
    Rocket Motor that is common to both the Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block
    IA and Block IB interceptors missiles. Please explain what caused this
    problem; how you are addressing it; and how it will affect the full-
    rate production decision for the SM-3 Block IB interceptor.
        Admiral Syring. Two Flight Test Standard Missile (FTM) have
    experienced Third Stage Rocket Motor (TSRM) failures; FTM-16 (September
    1, 2011) and FTM-21 (September 18, 2013). The TSRM is a dual pulse
    rocket motor that uses an interpulse delay (IPD) to vary the ignition
    start time of the second pulse which increases SM-3 Block IA and IB
    battlespace. The TSRM is controlled through a nozzle that can vector
    thrust during rocket motor burn and an integrated hybrid attitude
    control system during coast.
        FTM-16 had an unexpected energetic event during second pulse TSRM
    operations causing the missile to lose control. The Failure Review
    Board (FRB) determined the failure to be a result of higher than
    expected heating of the rocket motor case and nozzle joint. The FRB
    discovered a dependency of heating severity on IPD where shorter IPDs
    overheated the aft closure joint. To address the issue, the heating
    effects were mitigated by limiting the minimum IPD. The FTM-16 FRB was
    closed and the final report was issued in December 2012.
        FTM-21 was the first flight test to employ a dual salvo engagement
    of a single target and the first SM-3 intercepted the target, while the
    second missile experienced a TSRM anomaly in the second motor pulse
    during flight following a maximum IPD. A FRB to investigate FTM-21 has
    been established and the leading theory is that the TSRM failure was
    due to severe internal flow conditions that eroded an O-ring located at
    the rocket motor case and nozzle interface. The FTM-21 FRB is expected
    to close in December 2014.
        Based upon ground and flight test firings, the TSRM currently meets
    overall design reliability requirements. Between ground tests and
    flight tests of the IA and IB, the TSRM has been 23 for 23 and 19 for
    21, respectively. A TSRM Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) that
    addresses both FRB findings and adds design margin to the TSRM began in
    March 2014 with final ECP design scheduled for completion in third
    quarter fiscal year 2015. The ECP makes minor changes to the insulators
    at the motor case and nozzle joint, which will better protect the O-
    ring. The current ECP development and test schedule will support the
    fiscal year 2015 production and a retrofit decision for the current SM-
    3 fleet will be made after completion of ECP testing with a final
    decision based on a reliability cost-benefit analysis.
        Operational testing of the SM-3 Block IB is complete and a
    production decision for the SM-3 Block IB for fiscal year 2015 and
    beyond is dependent upon system suitability and effectiveness
    determination by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),
    and submission of the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation report to
    the Secretary of Defense and congressional defense committees. It is
    anticipated that DOT&E will support full rate production.

                       european phased adaptive approach
        7. Senator Udall. General Mann, the European Phased Adaptive
    Approach (EPAA) to missile defense is designed to provide increasing
    levels of missile defense capability for the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) Europe against Iran's growing regional ballistic
    missile threat. The first of 3 EPAA phases was deployed at the end of
    2011, and we understand that Phase 2 is on track for deployment in
    Romania and at sea during 2015 and Phase 3 is on track for deployment
    in Poland and at sea in the 2018 timeframe. From a warfighter
    perspective, will the EPAA provide a necessary and significant military
    capability to defend NATO Europe against Iran's growing ballistic
    missile threat, including our forward deployed forces in the region?
        General Mann. Yes, additional military capabilities will be
    achieved to defend NATO and our forward deployed forces against the
    growing threat. Upon completion of Phase 2 in 2015, the EPAA will
    provide a more robust capability to defend against short- and medium-
    range ballistic missile threats. Operational deployment of sea- and
    land-based SM-3 Block IBs will provide multiple, in-flight,
    opportunities to engage and destroy threat missiles. The follow-on 2018
    operational fielding of Phase 3 capabilities, to include sea- and land-
    based deployment of SM-3 Block IIAs, will result in added ability to
    counter more sophisticated threats and extend coverage to European
    partners and forward deployed forces threatened by longer range
    ballistic missiles.

        8. Senator Udall. Ms. Bunn, what is the level of support from our
    NATO allies, particularly Romania, Poland, Turkey, and Spain, for our
    planned EPAA deployments, and what actions are they taking to improve
    NATO missile defense?
        Ms. Bunn. All NATO allies fund the expansion of the missile defense
    command and control system through NATO common funding. NATO also
    operates a BMD Operations Center (BMDOC) in Ramstein, Germany. The
    BMDOC is operational 24-hours a day, 7-days a week, and is staffed with
    officers from several NATO countries.
        Several NATO allies are also making voluntary contributions, which
    vary from hosting U.S. missile defense assets (Romania, Poland, Turkey,
    and Spain) to fielding operational capabilities available for NATO
    deployments. Poland currently possesses RAT-31 radars and has announced
    its intention to spend U.S. $10 billion to acquire integrated air and
    missile defense capabilities for territorial defense. Poland will host
    a U.S. Aegis Ashore site and will be responsible for external site
    security. Romania will also host a U.S. Aegis Ashore site and will be
    responsible for external site security. Spain currently has one PAC-2
    battery in its inventory. It has also agreed to host four U.S. Aegis
    ships in Rota and will be responsible for external site security.
    Turkey currently possesses RAT-31 radars and has decided to acquire a
    lower-tier air and missile defense system. Turkey currently hosts a
    U.S. AN/TPY-2 radar and is responsible for external site security.
    Other NATO countries are evaluating potential national contributions to
    NATO BMD. The United States welcomes any member's decision to
    contribute to this important mission.

        9. Senator Udall. Admiral Syring, you have indicated that EPAA
    Phases 2 and 3 are on track for deployment in 2015 and 2018,
    respectively. You also indicated that Phase 3 will depend on the
    successful development and testing of the SM-3, Block IIA interceptor
    we are jointly developing with Japan. Please explain the current
    development and test schedule risks for the SM-3 IIA interceptor, and
    whether you will adhere to the fly-before-you-buy approach of
    demonstrating its capability in realistic intercept flight testing
    before deploying the system.
        Admiral Syring. The SM-3 Block IIA is currently on schedule to meet
    EPAA Phase 3 deployment (by end of calendar year 2018). At this stage,
    development and test schedule risk is in component level
    qualifications. To reduce risk, the program has established and is
    conducting a comprehensive ground-based qualification test plan for all
    principle components. These ground tests will validate missile
    component design and performance and reduce risk in advance of flight
    testing in second quarter of fiscal year 2015. One such ground test was
    the Propulsion Test Vehicle-01 conducted in October 2013 in which the
    missile and new composite canister both demonstrated successful and
    safe ignition and egress from the vertical launching system.
        The SM-3 Block IIA program will adhere to the fly-before-you-buy
    approach. Program flight testing as defined by the current MDA
    Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) is:
        SM-3 Cooperative Development (SCD) Flight Test events:

             Controlled Test Vehicle-1 (CTV-1) scheduled for the
            second quarter of fiscal year 2015;
             CTV-2 scheduled for the fourth quarter of fiscal year
            2015;
             SCD Flight Test Mission-1 (SFTM-1) scheduled for the
            third quarter of fiscal year 2016;
             SFTM-2 scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal year
            2017;

        Post SCD Flight Test (support for production decision) events:

             Flight Test Mission 29 scheduled for the first quarter
            of fiscal year 2018;
             Flight Test Operation 03 Event 1 scheduled for the
            third quarter of fiscal year 2018;
             Flight Test Operation 03 Event 2 scheduled for the
            third quarter of fiscal year 2018; and
             Flight Test Operation 03 Event 3 scheduled for the
            fourth quarter of fiscal year 2018.

                       iranian icbm development estimate
        10. Senator Udall. Ms. Bunn, Admiral Syring, and General Mann, at
    this full committee's worldwide threats hearing in February, the
    Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper, was asked about
    public estimates that Iran could be ready to test an ICBM as soon as
    2015, and whether it would take Iran more time to actually integrate a
    nuclear weapon onto an ICBM. DNI Clapper answered: ``That's quite
    right. What we're speaking of here is simply a missile system that
    could potentially have ICBM-class range. That's not to say anything
    about their actually mating it with a nuclear weapon. That's another
    problem.'' Do you agree with DNI Clapper's assessment that, while Iran
    might start testing longer-range missiles as soon as next year, it
    would be an additional problem for Iran to integrate an operational
    nuclear weapon onto an ICBM, and take more time--if Iran were to decide
    to pursue nuclear weapons?
        Ms. Bunn. Yes, I concur in DNI Clapper's assessment that it would
    take Iran additional time to integrate an operational nuclear weapon
    with an ICBM.
        Admiral Syring. Yes, I agree with DNI Clapper's assessment.
        General Mann. Yes, I agree with DNI Clapper's threat assessment
    regarding Iran.

                          testing content and schedule
        11. Senator Udall. Dr. Gilmore, you noted in your testimony that
    scheduled missile defense tests have often slipped for a variety of
    reasons. The MDA has indicated that, as reflected in the IMTP, it has
    worked to realign tests to maintain as much planned test content--
    meaning test objectives measured by Critical Engagement Conditions and
    Empirical Measurement Events--as early as practicable. Please provide
    your views on whether the evolving IMTP has managed to realign the
    collection of such empirical data without undue delay.
        Dr. Gilmore. The MDA uses a very rigorous process to revise the
    IMTP twice a year to account for the results of past testing, including
    failures, and to maintain progress in collecting the empirical data
    needed to validate and accredit the models that must be used to fully
    evaluate the performance of the BMDS. I am an integral part of that
    process and approve the document once finalized. To date, I am
    satisfied that the MDA's revisions to the IMTP have placed appropriate
    priority on collecting key empirical data (specifically, Critical
    Engagement Conditions (CEC) and Empirical Measurement Events (EME))
    without undue delay. Tracking progress in collecting those data over
    time will become substantially easier in the future. The MDA and the
    BMDS Operational Test Agency (OTA) have recently jointly developed a
    software tool that allows quick, automated assessment of the impact of
    IMTP changes on CEC/EME data collection, and ultimately its impact on
    digital model verification, validation, and accreditation.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
                    redesigned exo-atmospheric kill vehicle
        12. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring, is the focus on improving
    reliability of the current kill vehicle or improving performance? In
    other words, will the redesigned kill vehicle be more capable?
        Admiral Syring. The redesigned EKV (RKV) will improve EKV
    reliability and performance. We initiated a rigorous system engineering
    process to define balanced requirements to make a producible, reliable,
    available, and testable redesigned EKV. It will be built to improve
    performance against the emerging threat in the context of balanced BMDS
    architecture. The architecture includes a long-range discriminating
    radar (LRDR) and a BMDS-wide set of discrimination improvements for
    Homeland defense.

        13. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring, if your first test of the RKV
    is fiscal year 2018, what year can we expect to start and complete the
    retrofit of our 44 GBIs with the new RKV?
        Admiral Syring. We plan to begin fielding the RKV in fiscal year
    2020. More details will be provided in the acquisition strategy for the
    RKV later this summer. The strategy will define cut-in points for the
    RKV plus a cost benefit analysis to determine the best value among: (1)
    refurbishing existing CE-I and CE-II EKVs; (2) replacing those EKVs
    with RKVs; or (3) replacing fielded GBIs with new GBIs using the RKV.

        14. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring, are there plans to develop a
    multiple EKV (placing more than one EKV atop a GBI)? If so, what is the
    schedule?
        Admiral Syring. Yes. As part of Common Kill Vehicle Technology
    effort, we will invest in multi-object kill vehicle technology. These
    investments reduce costs of production and weapon system operations.
    Cost reductions made through new kill vehicle architectures and
    scalable technology will improve the performance of our interceptor
    fleet against an evolving threat. Our investments in large-format focal
    plane arrays, smaller inertial measurement units, and high-performance
    propulsion components (plus kill vehicle architectures) are key
    enablers. Technology development lets us engage numerous and
    increasingly complex threats. It will eventually establish the
    foundation for killing multiple lethal objects from a single SM-3 or
    GBI and lead to developing a multiple kill vehicle capability beyond
    2021; see schedule attached.
        Attachment:
        As stated

        15. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring, is there funding in the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for this effort?
        Admiral Syring. Yes. See the chart below for the EKV funding
    breakout:

               ground-based midcourse defense system improvement
        16. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring, in addition to the RKV, what
    other steps is MDA taking to improve the GMD system and how much will
    these various efforts cost?
        Admiral Syring. The four major steps to improve GMD reliability and
    capability are: (1) redesigning the EKV; (2) upgrading GBIs in the
    fleet to resolve known risks and problems; (3) increasing the
    robustness of the stockpile reliability program; and (4) improving
    discrimination through improved ground and interceptor software.
        The President's budget 2015 submission for these steps is shown in
    the table below:

        17. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring, while you've added about $660
    million to the GMD program over the next 5 years, the cost to develop a
    RKV is about $700 million. How can you accomplish these other
    objectives?
        Admiral Syring. The primary Homeland defense objectives include
    discrimination improvements for Homeland defense (DIHD), LRDR, and the
    RKV.
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request for DIHD is $122 million,
    spread across various MDA program elements (PE): PEs (0603179C,
    0603882C, 0603884C, 0603890C, and 0603896C).
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request for LRDR is $79.5 million,
    which includes $29 million in military construction (MILCON) funding
    for planning and design. The remaining $50.5 million for LRDR is in PE
    0603884C/Project MD96.
        For the RKV, the amount budgeted in PE 0603882C/Project MD97 is
    $705 million for fiscal years 2015 to 2019, with $99.5 million
    requested in fiscal year 2015.
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request provides for continued
    development of these new GMD and Homeland defense objectives. We will
    continue to assess the requirements and funding required for the GMD
    program and Homeland defense in future budget requests.

        18. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring, do you still have plans to
    develop and test a two-stage GBI? What are the advantages, what is the
    schedule?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, the MDA plans to flight test a two-stage GBI.
    The next test planned for fiscal year 2019 is Flight Test GMD (FTG)-17.
        The two-stage GBI provides flexibility to the warfighter due to an
    increase in battle space and opportunities for multiple shot
    engagements. The GMD program of record (POR) supports test article
    design improvements (trajectory fly-out fans, software timing, etc.)
    and a two-stage flight test.
        Deploying a two-stage GBI requires additional activities (system
    design that leads to production decision, non-recurring engineering to
    complete GBI design, updating operational software) that are not
    included in the GMD POR. The MDA is working with the warfighter to
    develop operational requirements that will be reflected in an
    acquisition strategy for future GBIs to be approved this summer.

                                     russia
        19. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring and General Mann, what missile
    defense capabilities might be useful as part of a potential military
    response to Russian aggression in Crimea? Russia deploys short range
    ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that could be vulnerable to our
    Patriot, THAAD, and SM-3 missiles.
        Admiral Syring. [Deleted.]
        General Mann. Although the actual effectiveness of any defensive
    system is dependent on scenario specific variables, the Patriot, THAAD,
    and SM-3 missile defense systems are designed to defend critical assets
    from short- and medium-range missile threats. Patriot also has a
    capability to defend against cruise missiles. These systems are low-
    density/high-demand assets currently deployed to several areas of
    operation, to include the U.S. European Command. I defer to the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense on any discussion regarding their potential
    deployment to address the Crimea situation.

        20. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring and General Mann, could we
    accelerate current plans to field SM-3 missiles in Romania (2015) and
    in Poland (2018)?
        Admiral Syring. The MDA is on schedule to deliver Aegis Ashore to
    Romania in 2015 and to Poland in 2018 in support of EPAA Phases II and
    III. Should DOD decide to accelerate deployment of these systems, it
    would be costly. Acceleration wouldn't include the more capable SM-3
    Block IIA guided missile, and there are other associated risks.
        With regard to Romania, construction began at the Aegis Ashore
    Romania site in October 2013. No opportunities exist to accelerate the
    schedule on the ongoing MILCON project due to procurement schedules of
    long-lead items.
        By increasing shift work, we could accelerate Aegis BMD weapon
    system (AWS) installation, integration, and testing by approximately a
    couple of months with additional Research, Development, Test, and
    Evaluation (RDT&E) funding. Any acceleration to the Navy's integration
    and testing and manning schedule and plans must be determined by the
    Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
        With regard to Poland, there are two options to accelerate
    deployment of Aegis Ashore Poland:
    Option 1. Acceleration of Aegis Ashore Poland by 9 months
        Shorten MILCON contract acquisition time by awarding a negotiated
    sole source contract

             May result in a higher negotiated cost requiring more
            MILCON funding
             Coordination with United States Army Corps of
            Engineers (USACE) as DOD construction agent is required to
            revise acquisition strategy and obtain sole source approval
             Current Aegis Ashore host nation-Poland (HN-PL) AWS
            equipment contract delivery date supports this option
    Option 2. Acceleration of Aegis Ashore Poland by 18 months
        Requires MILCON funding availability in the fiscal year 2015 budget

             May result in a higher negotiated bid requiring more
            MILCON funding
             Contracting acceleration; issue a sole source design-
            build contract
             Requires coordination with USACE as the DOD
            construction agent to revise acquisition strategy and obtain
            sole source approval

        Requires more RDT&E funds due to an accelerated schedule requiring
    complex premium shift work and additional equipment. Includes
    specialized material handling equipment during site activation,
    installation and checkout, and transition and transfer leading to
    initial operational capability
        Requires AWS equipment swap with Navy, coordinated with Navy
    program executive officer, Integrated Weapon System, and must be
    authorized by Congress

             Maintains current Aegis Ashore HN-PL AWS equipment
            contract delivery date
             AWS ship set accelerated delivery does not require
            modification of funding
             Margin exists in AWS delivery where both options
            support operational capability

        The accelerated Aegis Ashore system will be able to launch SM-3
    Blocks IA and IB guided missiles. The Aegis BMD 5.1 weapon system
    (required to launch the IIA missile) and SM-3 Block IIA missile will
    not be available earlier than 2018. However, compliance with section
    223 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
    (P.L. 111-383) requires us not to procure other than long-lead or
    deploy operational missiles on European land until operationally-
    realistic testing of the interceptor and system are certified to
    Congress.
        MDA can only address costs and programmatic impacts of MDA
    responsible efforts. A more complete response requires coordination
    with the Navy and other organizations to more fully reflect DOD costs,
    operational impacts, and national security policy implications.
        Note: The MDA delivers all SM-3 missiles to U.S. Fleet Forces
    Command for allocation to combatant commanders. U.S. Fleet Forces
    Command determines the mix of variants deployed to ships and ashore
    based on BMD requirements through the Global Force Management process.
    Deploying SM-3 interceptors to Poland before delivery of the SM-3 Block
    IIA in 2018 would reduce the availability of SM-3 Block IB guided
    missiles.
        General Mann. I defer to the MDA to address this question but my
    understanding is resource constraints, planned production, fielding and
    manning schedules, and basing agreements with the host countries may
    impact the ability to accelerate the current plans.

        21. Senator Sessions. Admiral Syring and General Mann, does MDA
    have any plans to develop space-based interceptors if Russia becomes a
    direct and aggressive threat to the United States and its allies? If
    not, why not? Is it a matter of technology, funding, or simply policy?
        Admiral Syring. [Deleted.]
        General Mann. I defer to the MDA to respond.

                        east coast missile defense site
        22. Senator Sessions. Ms. Bunn, what kind of ICBM threat from Iran
    would prompt the administration to make a deployment decision on a
    third site?
        Ms. Bunn. The improvements to the GMD system, including the
    deployment of 14 additional interceptors, give the United States the
    ability to stay ahead of a projected ballistic missile threat from
    Iran.
        If an ICBM threat from Iran were to emerge in numbers that
    necessitated the deployment of additional interceptors beyond the 44
    currently planned, the steps being taken now, including completing an
    EIS, would shorten the construction timelines associated with
    deployment of a new missile defense site.

        23. Senator Sessions. Ms. Bunn, Admiral Syring, and General Mann,
    the administration was surprised by the threat from North Korea--
    prompting the March 2013 decision to add back the 14 GBIs in Alaska,
    which DOD cancelled in 2009. How do we know we won't be surprised by
    the Iranians?
        Ms. Bunn. We continually monitor the long-range ballistic missile
    threat from Iran and North Korea, and we made the decision to expand
    the number of deployed GBIs on the basis of those threat projections.
    The expansion of our Homeland defense will also provide additional
    capability against potential Iranian ICBMs. We continue to make
    investments in order to stay ahead of the ballistic missile threat to
    the Homeland by improving sensor capabilities and interceptor
    reliability.
        Admiral Syring. This question requires an intelligence assessment
    to answer. Accordingly, the MDA respectfully defers this question to
    the DOD Intelligence Community for a response.
        General Mann. The research, development, and testing regimen
    required to develop a missile capable of intercontinental ranges is
    significant. The Intelligence Community continually assesses research
    and development, testing, infrastructure, and operational readiness
    data in order to provide indications and warnings of an adversary's
    ballistic missile capabilities. Testing conducted by Iran would likely
    be detected by a number of national and international monitoring
    activities and would serve to provide insight into their ballistic
    missile program development progress.
        We must continue to enhance our own BMD capabilities against the
    evolving threat. Improved sensor capabilities and interceptor
    reliability will serve to further enhance our ability to counter these
    threats.

        24. Senator Sessions. Ms. Bunn, Admiral Syring, and General Mann,
    what steps can we take to shorten the time necessary to field a third
    site in the United States?
        Ms. Bunn. The administration is taking steps now to shorten the
    timeline for fielding another interceptor site in the United States.
    The MDA has evaluated potential sites and has chosen four sites for
    additional evaluation. MDA will complete an EIS that encompasses the
    four sites. Preparing an EIS would shorten the timeline for deployment
    should the administration make the decision to do so.
        Admiral Syring. The administration has not made a decision to
    execute a continental U.S. interceptor site (i.e. east coast missile
    defense site). The MDA is taking steps to shorten the timeline for
    fielding another interceptor site in the United States. The MDA
    evaluated potential sites and selected four candidates for further
    evaluation. The $20 million provided by the fiscal year 2014 Omnibus
    Appropriations Act for National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2013, section 227 activities allows MDA to allocate funds and
    initiate the efforts related to the continental U.S. interceptor site.
    Those efforts include conducting an EIS encompassing all four candidate
    sites, conducting geotechnical and unexploded ordnance surveys,
    developing non-site specific master plans, and refining modeling and
    simulation tools to address the inclusion of another interceptor site.
        If the administration decides to accelerate work on a continental
    U.S. interceptor site, regardless of the year started, the first year
    would require approximately $30 million of MILCON Planning and Design
    funding on non-site specific design to shorten the timeline for site
    activities.
        General Mann. The most prudent step to reduce the timeline to field
    a potential third missile defense site is already in progress.
    Compliance with section 227 of the National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2013, which directs evaluation and environmental impact
    assessments of potential U.S. missile defense sites, will shorten the
    time necessary to achieve an operational site by an estimated 24
    months. If a decision to field a third site is made, predictable
    resources and rapid contracting authority would assist in optimizing
    the schedule timeline.

                        east coast missile defense radar
        25. Senator Sessions. Ms. Bunn and Admiral Syring, there is no
    funding in the FYDP for an additional LRDR. How do you plan to address
    the need for an additional discriminating radar directed against
    Iranian threats?
        Ms. Bunn. The fiscal year 2014 President's budget request includes
    funding to begin development of the LRDR. Over the FYDP, DOD plans to
    continue LRDR development and to acquire one radar.
        The administration has not made a decision regarding the
    acquisition of a second LRDR. This decision will be based upon the
    projected threat and the capabilities needed to counter that threat.
        Admiral Syring. The MDA is evaluating options and has not made a
    decision on the acquisition of a second LRDR. We plan to address the
    need for a second LRDR by monitoring the maturation of the threat,
    potentially moving the Sea-Based X-Band Radar to the Atlantic, and
    potentially developing a second LRDR.

        26. Senator Sessions. Ms. Bunn and Admiral Syring, ultimately, is
    the plan to purchase another LRDR for the east coast? Shouldn't we see
    such funding in the FYDP?
        Ms. Bunn. The administration has not made a decision regarding the
    acquisition of a second LRDR. This decision will be based upon the
    projected threat and the capabilities needed to counter that threat.
        Admiral Syring. The MDA is evaluating options and has not made a
    decision on the acquisition of a second LRDR. This decision will be
    based upon the maturation of the threat and the capabilities needed to
    counter that threat. There is an option to deploy the Sea-Based X-Band
    Radar to the Atlantic while the need for a second LRDR is assessed.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2015 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 2014

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

      NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT OF ITS NATIONAL
    SECURITY LABORATORIES AND THE STATUS OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mark Udall
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Udall [presiding],
    Donnelly, King, Sessions, and Fischer.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK UDALL, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Udall. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee will come
    to order. Good afternoon to all who are attending.
        Let me make a short comment initially on questions and
    timing of this hearing. We have two panels today, and I'd like
    to conclude the hearing at 4 p.m., with 45 minutes per panel.
    That means the first panel will go until about 3:15 p.m., and
    then the second panel will go until about 4 p.m.
        I want to note that we have a series of five stacked votes
    starting at 3:30 p.m., and I'll stay as long as possible past
    3:30 p.m., and then go vote. Then hopefully some of my other
    colleagues will have had a chance to vote and they can come
    back and close the hearing, if that's okay with my colleagues,
    and I'm sure it will be.
        I'm going to ask my colleagues if 7-minute rounds makes
    sense. Seeing no objection, we will go with 7-minute rounds.
        With that, let me start off with our first panel with Dr.
    McMillan, Dr. Hommert, and Dr. Goldstein.
        I think I'm going to put my statement in the record and
    turn to Senator Sessions if he had any comments because I know
    we want to get to some questions.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Udall follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Senator Mark E. Udall
        Let me bring today's hearing to order. This afternoon, we will
    receive testimony regarding the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) Laboratories and the Status of the Nuclear
    Security Enterprise. I'd like to thank all of the witnesses for taking
    the time to appear here this afternoon.
        We will have two panels today; the first panel will consist of NNSA
    Laboratory Directors, Dr. Charles McMillan of Los Alamos, Dr. Paul
    Hommert of Sandia; and Dr. William Goldstein of Lawrence Livermore. The
    second panel will consist of Mr. Norman Augustine and Admiral Richard
    Mies, co-chairs of the Congressional Committee on the Governance of the
    Nuclear Security Enterprise at the Institute for Defense Analysis.
        The heart and soul of our Nation's nuclear deterrent are the
    scientists and engineers working in our NNSA laboratories.
        The relationship between science and the nuclear enterprise was
    best highlighted by Robert Oppenheimer who at the end of World War II,
    looked back on the Manhattan Project and said to his fellow scientists
    at Los Alamos that:

              ``If you are a scientist you cannot stop such a thing. If you
            are a scientist you believe that it is good to find out how the
            world works; that it is good to find out what the realities
            are; that it is good to turn over to mankind at large the
            greatest possible power to control the world and to deal with
            it according to its lights and its values.''

        The core mission of these laboratories has not changed since
    Oppenheimer reflected on the nature of the scientific enterprise that
    serve as the foundation of our deterrent. That scientific base is a
    fragile enterprise that needs constant oversight by the witnesses here
    today--and by this subcommittee. Congress needs to ensure the resources
    are available to maintain this scientific enterprise so that our
    nuclear deterrent remains an effective one.
        The testimony of the first panel will be on the NNSA laboratories
    relative to the fiscal year 2015 budget. I look forward to the views of
    the laboratory directors as they are our eyes and ears on the state of
    health of the laboratories and the stockpile.
        The second panel will inform us of the status of the nuclear
    security enterprise as a whole--including the relationship between the
    laboratories and the NNSA. Mr. Augustine and Admiral Mies already have
    a track record of being forthright and I expect as much today in their
    testimony.
        With that, I'll turn to Senator Sessions for his opening statement
    and then we'll move to the witnesses for their opening statements.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

        Senator Sessions. Right, we do, and we, unfortunately, have
    had three votes coming up all of a sudden here.
        Please note that I think all of us believe that we need a
    modernized nuclear force, that we're past due for that, and we
    need the help of the labs to get there. But, I'll just say it
    this way. I'm glad you're reevaluating, intensely, construction
    of new buildings and some of the other things. Imagine that we
    might just ask France to do this for us, and I suspect it would
    be cheaper. We've created such a large infrastructure over the
    decades that we're not as lean as we ought to be. We are just
    hammering the military. We just had the Army people in, this
    morning, talking about going from 570 to 490 to 450 and maybe
    420 in uniformed troop levels. So, the money's tight.
        The nuclear program, including the triad, is only about 5
    percent of our budget, but that's not an excuse for not
    managing every dollar carefully. You probably know that my view
    is that we have to get this done, we'll pay the price that's
    needed to get there, but if we can do it for less, and
    effectively, that's what I believe is our responsibility to do.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you. I've enjoyed working with you on
    this subcommittee. You've done a good job, and I believe that
    we're reflecting, pretty much, the national interest. That's
    what I'm pleased about.
        Thank you. I'll look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        I do owe each of you just a brief introduction, and to
    connect you to the laboratories that you all helm. We have the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) laboratory
    directors: Dr. Charles F. McMillan, of Los Alamos; Dr. Paul J.
    Hommert, of Sandia; and Dr. William H. Goldstein, of Lawrence
    Livermore.
        Dr. McMillan, why don't we start with you.

      STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES F. McMILLAN, DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS
                          NATIONAL LABORATORY

        Dr. McMillan. Thank you, Chairman Udall and Senator
    Sessions. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here before
    the subcommittee today.
        I am Charlie McMillan, the Director of Los Alamos National
    Laboratory (LANL), and I ask that my written comments also be
    entered into the testimony as part of the record.
        Today, I want to focus on Los Alamos' ability to deliver
    today's commitments while ensuring our capabilities for an
    ever-changing future. There are three areas that I'd
    particularly like to draw your attention to: first of all, the
    plutonium strategy; and very much to the point you were making,
    Senator Sessions, reductions in critical program budgets; and
    then harmonizing requirements and budgets.
        I bring these concerns to your attention because,
    particularly within the current global environment, I believe
    the work at our laboratories is fragile. Because of severe
    budget constraints over the last 2 years, there is no longer
    management flexibility, at least at my lab, to address further
    funding shortfalls, balance risks, and meet mission
    requirements.
        We now have, in my view, a sound business case, agreed on
    with NNSA, for a realistic plutonium strategy. We need approval
    to move forward in order to execute our plutonium missions,
    which cannot be accomplished with current aging infrastructure.
    Senator, it's one that we believe is at a much lower price
    point than the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
    (CMRR) was.
        Recent budget guidance reduces our funding in three key
    areas: facility and maintenance; security; and our science,
    technology, and engineering base. Any reduction in facility
    budgets undermines mission capabilities, especially to sites
    such as Los Alamos, where infrastructure continues to age and,
    in some cases, dates back to the beginning of the Cold War.
    Current requirements in the area of physical, cyber, and
    information security are outstripping our funding allocations
    and necessitate more prudent management decisions that balance
    risk and available funding.
        As I contemplate the body of science needed to continue
    assessing the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the
    future, underfunding our science base is increasingly risky
    today. I understand that budgets will not grow significantly.
    We've heard your message. Therefore, we must work with the
    Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA to develop better risk-
    informed requirements. Let me give you an example.
        The design basis threats for our physical security posture
    are a place where I believe we could reexamine requirements.
    Following September 11, we added guns, gates, and guards to our
    physical security systems. With security technology
    improvements that are available today and better threat
    analysis capabilities, it's possible to reduce the security
    costs while at the same time maintaining an appropriate
    security stance, but the requirements would have to change.
        The laboratory and its people are committed to our mission,
    solving our Nation's security challenges through scientific
    excellence; however, they must have the tools in order to
    deliver. Congress, the administration, and the laboratory need
    to continue working together to develop an agreement on nuclear
    facility strategies. We face an uncertain future that may be as
    complex as any we have dealt with since the Cold War. We need
    decisions on out-year funding levels that balance risk and can
    be sustained for the complex. Predictability is important. We
    also need decisions on the role of the science, technology, and
    engineering base at our three laboratories.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. McMillan follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by Dr. Charles F. McMillan
        Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Sessions, thank you for inviting
    me to testify today. I am Dr. Charles McMillan, Director of Los Alamos
    National Laboratory. I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify
    before the subcommittee on the health of Los Alamos.
        As I have stated previously before the committee, NNSA governance
    will play a key role in determining both our efficiency and
    effectiveness as we address mission and budget challenges. Over the
    past year, I have interacted with both the Congressional Panel on NNSA
    Governance and the National Academy of Sciences. Should I be asked to
    participate in the review established by the fiscal year 2014 Omnibus
    Appropriations Act, I will do so again. I am hopeful that theses panels
    will deliver recommendations that enable a successful nuclear program.
    Future success of the enterprise depends on governance as well as
    budgets and balancing of the program.
        Today I will provide an update on: recent Los Alamos technical and
    scientific achievements; the proposed plutonium strategy under
    evaluation in numerous national security circles; and, Los Alamos
    budget realities that pose challenges to meeting our mission
    requirements.
                                accomplishments
        Since I last appeared before you, our weapons and science programs
    have achieved significant technical breakthroughs, and our operations
    and environmental management organizations have delivered on
    significant commitments.
        In regard to our weapons program, we again completed, on time, my
    letter to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense regarding the 2013
    Annual Assessment. We successfully conducted two B61 hydrodynamic
    shots, which were executed as planned and within committed budget
    levels. Los Alamos executed the important subcritical experimental
    series, Gemini, and I am pleased that the fiscal year 2015 request
    recognizes this success by including an increase for the Los Alamos
    subcritical experiments at Nevada (I'll note that the team was just
    recognized with the Department of Energy, Secretary's Achievement
    Award; their highest non-monetary award). The capabilities supported by
    the increase will provide an important new tool for stewardship,
    building on the success of the Gemini series, and filling a present gap
    in our technical understanding.
        Also during the past year, we successfully completed production of
    three W87 development pits. We developed the Plutonium (Pu) Strategy in
    partnership with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
    and worked with the Department of Defense (DOD) Cost Assessment and
    Program Execution organization and the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) on
    a business case analysis, which affirmed our strategy on plutonium
    infrastructure.
        Over the course of the year, Los Alamos responded to several
    technical issues on the W76-1 that enabled continued production to
    remain on schedule. Los Alamos provided lead design agency support for
    the first successful lot of PBX 9502 (Insensitive High Explosive)
    produced in over 20 years that will benefit both DOD and the Department
    of Energy (DOE). Each of these demonstrates that weapons program
    mission execution remains our key focus, but I'd also like to spotlight
    some remarkable accomplishments from our scientists and engineers that
    go beyond our core mission.
        We continue to excel at the science that underpins all of our
    mission assignments. Los Alamos scientists put several pieces of
    significant hardware and power sources on the Mars Curiosity Rover. One
    of the most impressive called ChemCam, which was developed by a team of
    collaborating institutions, has verified the presence of water on Mars
    and fired over 100,000 laser shots gathering unprecedented data that is
    still being assessed. The tremendous data capabilities for the
    technology do not stop there. The laser, which was originally developed
    for an environmental mission, is an example of technology that has been
    used in a variety of applications and then ``spun into'' one of the
    Lab's core missions. While the laser has now delivered results in the
    environmental and space realms, just this year it was repurposed for a
    nonproliferation mission application tool for inspection and
    diagnostics needs of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
        Members of our Earth Sciences team at Los Alamos have released
    research over the last several years outlining the causes of large
    scale forest mortality. This research is critically important because
    we all see the wildfires on the news every summer and question what
    droughts mean for our Western forests. Our research shows that as the
    West experiences increased temperatures; it is the warmth, not
    necessarily the lack of moisture, which will kill our forests because
    of the water evaporating out of the soils. Using our data, it is now
    possible to forecast forest health or mortality by decreasing or
    increasing ambient air temperatures. We also now have indicators of
    where the greatest fuels loads will be for wildfire preparation
    purposes.
        Los Alamos biologists continue to play a key role in the
    development of a vaccine for the AIDS virus. The considerable diversity
    and adaptability of HIV worldwide represents a critical challenge for
    designing an effective HIV vaccine. Through work done at Los Alamos, it
    appears that a vaccine computationally optimized for immunologic
    coverage of global HIV diversity, called a mosaic vaccine, confers
    protection from infection in an animal model. HIV mosaic vaccines are
    being moved into human trials, and the approach has the potential to be
    groundbreaking in the global fight to combat this deadly disease. This
    research has been done in collaboration with several universities and
    has been funded by the Federal Government and non-profits like the
    Gates Foundation.
        In addition, Los Alamos has recently made progress on two key
    operational issues related to our Plutonium facility that have now been
    either resolved or are well on their way to resolution:

             Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades
            Project II: This complicated, multi-layered technology security
            project challenged the Laboratory on many dimensions. But I can
            tell you today that working with NNSA, we have completed this
            important upgrade. The new integrated security systems are now
            operable and protecting assets.
             We are making significant progress in resolving the
            criticality safety concerns at our plutonium facility that
            caused us to pause operations. We have improved our criticality
            safety posture and are in the process of resuming our important
            activities and deliverables.

        Finally, the environmental management cleanup campaign to remove
    3,706 cubic meters of transuranic waste from the site by June 30, 2014
    has been one of the largest and most complex waste cleanup challenges
    the Laboratory has undertaken. As of February when the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant (WIPP) experienced issues and suspended incoming shipments,
    we were at 85 percent Campaign completion. Today, box and drum
    processing is complete for the remaining 120 shipments, and we have
    identified alternate temporary storage for them. Shipment to Waste
    Control Specialists in Texas commenced the first week of April and
    completion of the 3,706 m3 Campaign by the deadline is again on track.
    We will continue to support WIPP in their investigation efforts so this
    important resource will once again be available in the future.
        I am very proud of the hard work put forth by the Laboratory staff
    to achieve these impressive successes. What I hope will continue to be
    a positive story is the next update regarding our proposed alternate
    Plutonium strategy.
                               plutonium strategy
        Last year in testimony before this subcommittee I outlined the
    structure of an alternate Plutonium Strategy that would provide the
    country with critical plutonium capabilities, including pit production,
    in the absence of the Chemistry Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear
    Facility (CMRR-NF) at Los Alamos. Over the past year, we have worked
    hard to turn these ideas into a plan.
        The Strategy proposes a three-phased approach. The phased approach
    is designed to manage both safety and programmatic risk in the near,
    mid, and longer term timeframe and to address risks in the timeworn
    Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Facility and Plutonium Facility
    (PF)-4 respectively. I believe the current plan, if fully implemented,
    will both preserve our critical plutonium capabilities once the CMR
    building is finally shuttered, and it will greatly extend the life of
    our existing Plutonium processing capability at Technical Area (TA)-55.
    This plan is effective, efficient, and timely, and is the best fiscal
    solution for this country.
        Getting more out of our existing facilities and breaking up new
    construction projects into small achievable pieces, reduces many of the
    problems associated with prior ``big box'' nuclear construction
    projects. Issues such as large annual funding requirements and decades-
    long acquisition periods will be scaled down to manageable levels and
    will be adaptable to future changes in requirements.
        The three key elements of the current plan involve modifying CMRR-
    Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB) so we can
    slightly increase the amount of material in the facility per revised
    guidance, while keeping it as a radiological facility (thanks to the
    efforts of NNSA in updating regulations to bring the facility into
    alignment with modern safety standards). The ability to increase the
    materials from about the mass of one nickel's worth of weapons grade
    material, to about two nickels' worth of mass may not sound like much,
    but it is significant. We are currently in the process of outfitting
    RLUOB with equipment that will enable us to take advantage of the
    increased material allowed in the building.
        However, I believe that RLUOB is not a silver bullet because we
    still must have the capability to handle kilograms of material not just
    the gram quantities currently allowed at the facility. The requirements
    lead us into our proposed Phase II recommendation which is to better
    utilize our existing high hazard nuclear space in PF-4.
        Reconfiguring PF-4 would allow us to accommodate the analytical and
    materials chemistry capabilities that cannot be transferred to the
    CMRR-RLUOB (see attachment 1). Over the past decade, many of our
    planning assumptions that were valid when CMRR was designed have
    changed, allowing us to reclaim about 10 percent of the valuable lab
    space in PF-4. In combination with Phase 1, this space can enable us to
    terminate operations in the CMR Facility for less than the overall cost
    compared to constructing CMRR-NF. This reduced cost profile also comes
    with limits to manufacturing capacity and lacks a long-term vault, but
    near-term requirements have changed to the point where this is a
    reasonable compromise for the near term.
        We have plutonium recovery requirements that were implemented
    during the Cold War to preserve as much of our limited supply of this
    vital metal as possible. We now have an abundant supply of the
    material, so if we reduce the recovery requirement and eliminate the
    redundant equipment needed for these operations, we now have very
    valuable vacant existing space. This space can be converted over the
    span of a few years for missions of far greater consequence. Also, from
    a cost and regulatory perspective, it is typically less expensive and
    faster to create new missions inside an existing permitted workspace.
        Finally, there will be an unavoidable need to construct new high
    security, nuclear workspace because it is simply not possible to
    indefinitely meet program requirements with the available space. Here
    again, we have come to a conclusion and are proposing to NNSA, that
    smaller, segmented, or modular facility additions will be the most
    effective path forward. Whether it is a plutonium storage vault, a pit
    processing facility, or a radiological diagnostic suite, we will need
    space for these operations after we determine which is least
    appropriate for inclusion in our existing plutonium facility. These
    modest steps should be sufficient to preserve our plutonium
    capabilities into the future and hopefully avoid some of the pitfalls
    we have experienced trying to construct very large multipurpose nuclear
    facilities over several decades. These additions are intended to
    ``scale'', not solve, most of the past acquisition challenges with
    ``big box'' nuclear projects and be adaptable for a broad range
    possible futures--not just at Los Alamos. Another significant benefit
    to moving operations to modules would be to extend the life of PF-4 for
    several decades.
        I would like to touch on the recent Pit Production report by the
    Congressional Research Service (CRS). Many of the ideas in the report
    were originally contemplated by Lab staff as they began to look at
    alternatives to CMRR-NF. While the report is comprehensive, it fails to
    recognize many of the risks and challenges certain options would face.
        The report envisions sending analytical and materials chemistry
    work that supports the production mission, around the complex to take
    advantage of existing capabilities. This is an approach that we still
    believe to be valid should we need some type of bridging capability.
    However, in the long-term, there will be increased risk by the
    additional shipments of samples through commercial shipping vendors,
    and increased risk in the timeliness of completing the work. In our
    expert opinion, the country needs analytical and materials chemistry
    capabilities to reside at the same place where pits are produced.
        The NNSA and Laboratory's Plutonium Strategy plan does not envision
    the kind of massive upgrade or legislative acceptance of much greater
    risk contemplated by the CRS report. The report suggests that Los
    Alamos could somehow massively upgrade our RLUOB facility to a Hazard
    Category II facility. Nuclear facilities are designed from the ground
    up for their intended purpose. RLUOB was designed as a radiological
    facility, not a Hazard Category II facility. Under the CRS upgrade
    scenario, the proposal would necessitate improvements in security,
    seismic reinforcement, air handling, fire suppression, and other
    systems that were not designed to nuclear facility standards, and
    therefore unable to ultimately address the nuclear safety basis
    requirements. I believe that Los Alamos has the most credible and cost
    effective path forward that could potentially be completed to meet the
    proposed 2019 closure timelines for the CMR Facility.
        Before moving on I would like to mention one more issue related to
    our plutonium mission. With the future Life Extension Programs (LEP)
    schedule delayed, you will likely hear that the need to produce pits is
    no longer on the same timeframe. I think it would be a mistake for the
    country's pit production capabilities to be tied to the future of any
    one-weapon system. In my opinion, it is critical that our country
    maintain this capability and continue to develop a stable and
    responsive pit production infrastructure. We need to heed past lessons
    learned: when this capability was incapacitated for a short period,
    then exorbitant time, energy, and money was spent to bring it back on
    line when the country was again in need. This will always be a
    cornerstone capability, no matter the weapons modernization strategy of
    the time.
        Regardless of the nuclear weapons systems the United States decides
    to move forward with or when, if we do not rejuvenate our limited
    plutonium capabilities, we will have few options going forward. This
    scenario would be particularly troubling should an unforeseen problem
    emerge in our existing systems or if there was a dramatic technological
    or geopolitical surprise with another nuclear armed country. Because of
    delays in project start-up since the decision to defer CMRR-NF, I am
    concerned that we will miss the target date to terminate program
    operations in CMR by 2019. Should we be forced to terminate CMR
    operations before they can be transferred to CMRR-RLUOB and PF-4, our
    ability to execute plutonium missions will be jeopardized.
        Mr. Chairman, our world is becoming more unpredictable. It would be
    a mistake to take our current capabilities for granted. For the most
    part, the infrastructure that supports our stockpile was built during
    the early years of the Cold War. Upgrades to our facilities and
    supporting infrastructure continue to be delayed. There will be a
    period when the infrastructure fails and it will take time and
    significant funding to replace.
                                     budget
        In that vein, I am particularly concerned about the latest budget
    guidance we have received from the Office of Infrastructure and
    Operations in NNSA. Their planning direction would significantly reduce
    our facility operations and maintenance budgets in fiscal year 2015 by
    $56 million, an 18 percent cut compared to fiscal year 2013, with
    additional reductions planned for fiscal year 2016. It will be very
    difficult to deliver on mission requirements if our already-aging
    infrastructure is further undermined, and there will undoubtedly be
    scope impacts to our mission deliverables.
        The past few years have seen deferral of CMRR-NF and reductions in
    the funding available to operate and maintain our aging buildings. Such
    trade-offs can be made in the short term, but over the long term they
    will inevitably be detrimental to our ability to field experiments and
    preserve or build capabilities with metals such as plutonium that
    further our understanding of the stockpile and prepare us to respond
    with future LEPs or other solutions. Simply put, within the existing
    budget allocation, the plutonium sustainment, infrastructure and
    science, and engineering campaigns need attention and a significant
    increase in priority.
        We are living in a period in which we are underfunding our science,
    technology, and engineering base (ST&E). As evidence, both physics
    laboratories are seeing flat or declining budgets at a time period in
    which the NNSA's overall budget has increased by 26 percent (fiscal
    year 2009 compared to fiscal year 2015 request). This stagnation has
    removed all the flexibility we once had to manage our way through
    budget challenges. This gives me serious cause for concern as I
    contemplate the body of science needed to continue assessing the safety
    and reliability of the stockpile in the future.
        Regarding mission funding, I am encouraged by the national
    consensus surrounding the B61 LEP effort, and believe that the Nation
    needs to sustain the momentum associated with full funding, consistent
    with the Nation's treaty commitments to our allies.
        However, it is increasingly clear to me that there is a growing
    divide between the annual funding allocations and the requirements
    placed on us by our partners. The B61 LEP is possible only because we
    invested many years into capability research and development. As we
    move forward, the funding needs for short-term deliverables should not
    come at the expense of the underlying science and engineering base and
    at the expense of our infrastructure to serve tomorrow's mission needs.
    These are again, trade-offs that can be made for limited periods of
    time, but they are not sustainable in the long term. The LEP is the
    eventual deliverable, but multi-year capability investments enable such
    an outcome.
        A plutonium manufacturing capability to sustain newly-manufactured
    pits for the Design Agencies takes many years of investment. These
    capabilities, together with plutonium devices for scaled subcritical
    experiments such as the Gemini series, are essential components of our
    deterrence, as well as critical technologies for enabling the
    confidence to move towards a smaller stockpile.
        As I have stated on previous occasions, it is the ST&E base in
    combination with first-class computational and experimental research
    facilities that will guarantee that we will attract and retain the
    workforce needed to address complex stockpile issues in the future.
    There is no single budget line for ``sustain knowledge-based
    deterrence'', but let me assure you that this knowledge base will be
    the foundation on which our future deterrence will rest, particularly
    as our underground testing program passes into the realm of a
    historical artifact.
        I recognize that everything in the nuclear weapons complex
    typically comes with significant funding requirements attached to it;
    however, the things we need funding for are getting reduced and our
    suggestions to reduce some costs are tabled. I have real, operational,
    working insight on actions that would reduce costs in Pu processing,
    line item projects, and risk/cost analysis in a number of areas. If we
    could get leverage for these ideas and get decisions made, it would
    make a big difference. In the interim, our NNSA mission and performance
    requirements are increasing and there is no reprieve that could be
    provided by prudent management and decisive actions.
        To give you some example, we have seen very little relief in the
    mountain of oversight reviews we must support. Risk aversion among our
    partners is driving our safety mandates to the point where actually
    doing work is becoming increasingly difficult. More generally, simply
    trying to gain permission to build a facility or execute a work scope
    has become problematic because the many layers of permissions now
    routinely generate a ``non-concur'' that stops the process.
        Security requirements are another interesting microcosm. I am
    worried about proposed funding reductions to our physical, cyber, and
    information security budgets as we update our assessment of threats to
    reflect current reality and try to operate within more stringent
    requirements. I have already asked NNSA for permission to reduce the
    size of my physical security staff to meet these reduction targets, but
    our risks will be increased as a result. In addition, our information
    and cyber security budgets are barely staying flat, yet cyber-attacks
    on our computer systems continue to accelerate.
        This is one area that keeps me awake at night because as we have
    seen across this country, cyber intrusions are getting more complex and
    more damaging within both the commercial and government worlds. Again,
    I believe that we could better manage our security needs through
    realistic assessment of risk and make prudent management decisions to
    balance that risk and available funding.
                          nuclear security activities
        Ensuring broader mission delivery in a dynamic and changing world
    is an important part of what the National Laboratories do--and this
    mission delivery is at risk in the present budget. The broad topics of
    nuclear proliferation, nuclear counter proliferation, emergency
    response, and nuclear terrorism are key elements of this nuclear
    security strategy and mission. For example, nuclear counter
    proliferation is a set of activities designed to defeat the development
    and use of nuclear weapons and improvised nuclear devices by sub- or
    extra-national groups, as well as states of proliferation concern. In
    our examination of the National NCP context we see Lines of Operation
    that include identification and prediction of nuclear threats,
    monitoring and detection of proliferation and nuclear terrorism
    activity, upstream defeat of nuclear threat pathways, defeat of nuclear
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, and attribution of the
    nature and pathway of developing nuclear WMD proliferation.
        Although there is no single U.S. Government Department or Agency
    responsible for all of these lines of operation, NCP is a particular
    focus of Los Alamos because the work is consistent with the objective
    of preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation that was placed at
    the top of U.S. Nuclear Policy agenda by the Nuclear Posture Review,
    and because countering nuclear threats requires exquisite expertise in
    nuclear weapon design, global monitoring, nuclear intelligence, and
    technical nuclear forensics.
        In order to respond to threats or incidents of a certain type, DOE/
    NNSA is required to provide technical assessments, based on nuclear
    design principles, to tactical, operational, and national-level
    decision makers. Los Alamos has a lead role in doing so based on years
    of investment intended to make our nuclear weapons program capability
    available in a tactical, operational environment. Although our nuclear
    weapons program capability is directly applicable to defeating nuclear
    WMD, the materials, processes, and phenomena that may be present in
    nuclear threat objects can be significantly different than the U.S.
    stockpile.
        Therefore, special attention and effort is required to address this
    mission and we can do so in a way that is also synergistic with the
    stewardship of technical capabilities for the U.S. stockpile. However,
    funding within the Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation Programs
    and Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response components of the NNSA's
    Weapons Activities account has been volatile recently and may not
    adequately address the requirement to provide technical assessments
    based on nuclear design principles for aspects of the NCP mission. It
    is yet another example where national requirements for which we have
    responsibility are at significant risk of not being met.
        I bring these budget and risk issues to your attention because in
    past years I would look for ways to mitigate the funding repercussions
    without impacting my mission requirements, but this year I believe we
    are cutting it too close. The U.S. nuclear policy related to weapons
    systems, critical facilities, and commitments to maintain core defense
    and science capabilities is in a period of transition that translates
    into program risk and ultimately a national security risk.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, as I look to the future, if these requirements and
    budgets persist, I have significant concerns about the health of the
    weapons program and the skills and capabilities of Los Alamos. We need
    weapons design work to exercise our weapons scientists, we need
    appropriate nuclear facilities to work in, and we need to sustain the
    broader science base required at Los Alamos to feed our national
    security programs.
        Without some coordination of our mission requirements to our
    funding allocations, and dexterity in management, we are going to see
    an accelerated loss of capabilities because my technical staff will
    continue to be pursued by those in private industries offering better
    opportunities to exercise their drive and innovation. It is only
    through the steadfast commitment, hard work, and utmost dedication of
    our people to serving the Nation that we experience our successes and
    achievements, so retention of this talent is a priority.
        Congress and the administration need to develop an agreement on
    what our nuclear facilities strategy will be as we enter an uncertain
    future in a landscape we have not dealt with since the Cold War. We
    need decisions on appropriate funding levels that can be sustained for
    the complex through the out years, and decision on what role a broader
    science and engineering base has at the NNSA Laboratories.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to testify today and I
    would be happy to answer any questions.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Dr. McMillan.
        Dr. Hommert.

      STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. HOMMERT, DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL
                              LABORATORIES

        Dr. Hommert. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and
    distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
        I am Paul Hommert, Director of Sandia National
    Laboratories. I'd like to briefly summarize the key points of
    my written testimony.
        First, I am pleased to report that my laboratory is now
    successfully executing three full-scale engineering development
    efforts and supporting the continued production of the W76-1
    life extension program (LEP). I want to thank Congress for the
    support of these programs in the fiscal year 2014 authorization
    and appropriations bills. That support allows me to report that
    each of these programs remains on or under original cost
    estimates. In the case of the B61 LEP, the largest of these
    programs, I can report that we have already been able to
    realize $120 million in savings over the life of the program.
        In the case of the B61, we have had to adjust schedule as a
    result of the funding profile we received being different from
    our original June 2012 planning basis. However, the cost
    savings I just mentioned will help us significantly mitigate
    any cost growth that would result from funding-induced schedule
    slip. We have achieved this cost performance by increasing our
    program management rigor, having a strong focus on controlling
    labor cost growth, and utilizing, where appropriate, common
    technology across the programs.
        I brought with me today an example of common technology.
    Last year when I testified before this committee, I showed you
    a radar module designed for the B61 air delivery system, the
    green board here. We successfully tested that module in the B61
    in August. Here I'm holding an electrical model of the W88 ALT
    370 arming, firing, and fusing assembly with that very same
    radar module incorporated. This assembly, which will become a
    key component of our submarine launch ballistic missile
    deterrent, will be part of a Navy flight test later this year.
    This radar component will also be used in our work with the Air
    Force Mk21 program. The use of this common technology across
    three systems brings considerable cost savings, on the order of
    $170 million, and confidence to these three major design
    activities. Furthermore, the fiscal year 2015 President's
    budget request supports these programs at a level that will
    allow us to meet current first production unit schedules.
        While I am sanguine about our progress on the modernization
    programs, I am concerned about what I see as an increasing
    imbalance in the overall program. The resource required to
    execute modernization, which is the clear priority, is causing
    us to reduce efforts in other areas that increase long-term
    risk. Examples at my laboratory include surveillance, advanced
    and exploratory technology development, and, very importantly,
    high-priority infrastructure recapitalization. In fact, as I
    elaborate in my written testimony, I believe more is being
    asked of us today at budget levels in constant dollars less
    than we've had at--in comparable periods at any time in the
    last 30 years. In addition, we face new cost pressures, such as
    pension and medical care, that we haven't faced before.
        Let me be clear. I raise these concerns, fully cognizant of
    the overall fiscal constraints you face and to which Senator
    Sessions just spoke, however, I do believe those of us
    entrusted with the stewardship of the Nation's nuclear
    deterrent must acknowledge and look to mitigate risks. Two
    examples of areas that can mitigate these risks are increased
    programmatic flexibility inside a budget top line and support
    for synergistic work we do for other national security
    missions. For my laboratory, these broader efforts have often
    been a means to further advance technology for the weapons
    program of the type you're looking at in that component.
        I do have some thoughts on the topic of your next panel--
    namely, governance--but, in the interest of time, I will save
    those for your questions, to which I look forward.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Hommert follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Dr. Paul J. Hommert
                                  introduction
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and distinguished members
    of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today on the administration's request to Congress for the
    fiscal year 2015 budget and on the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) governance of the National Security Laboratories.
    I am Paul Hommert, President and Director of Sandia National
    Laboratories. I am pleased to join Charlie McMillan and Bill Goldstein,
    who are here today for this discussion.
        Sandia is a multiprogram national security laboratory owned by the
    U.S. Government and operated by Sandia Corporation \1\ for the NNSA.
    Sandia is one of three NNSA laboratories with responsibility for
    stockpile stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation's nuclear
    weapons. Within the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, Sandia is uniquely
    responsible for the systems engineering and integration of the nuclear
    weapons in the stockpile and for the design, development,
    qualification, sustainment, and retirement of nonnuclear components of
    nuclear weapons.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin
    Corporation under Department of Energy prime contract no. DE-AC04-
    94AL85000.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While nuclear weapons represent Sandia's core mission, the science,
    technology, engineering, and business professional capabilities
    required to support this mission position us to support other aspects
    of national security as well. Indeed, there is natural, increasingly
    significant synergy between our core mission and our broader national
    security work, including research and development in synergistic
    defense products, cyberspace, nuclear assessments and warning, and
    global nuclear dangers. Examples of areas where Sandia has applied its
    expertise with a direct nexus between nuclear weapons (NW) work and
    non-NW benefits for the Nation include the development of satellite
    technology, synthetic aperture radar, hypersonic vehicles, global
    monitoring systems for nuclear material detection, and our
    contributions to cyber defense, which are enabled by our longstanding
    work in the command and control of nuclear weapons.
                         major points of this testimony
        Today, Sandia is executing its NW mission in the context of three
    overarching imperatives. First, take care of the current U.S. stockpile
    through such activities as annual surveillance and stockpile
    maintenance through limited-life component exchanges; second, sustain
    the stockpile into the future through life extension programs and
    alterations; and third, maintain and advance Sandia's required
    engineering and science capabilities, operations, and infrastructure.
        My statement will provide an update since having testified before
    this subcommittee on May 7, 2013, and before the House Subcommittee on
    Strategic Forces on October 29, 2013. Itwill emphasize Sandia's
    execution of a full suite of modernization programs in full-scale
    engineering development, address the status of the NW stockpile
    regarding the other two imperatives, and describe the synergistic
    connection between Sandia's NW mission and other major national
    security missions. Today, we would not be able to deliver on our
    nuclear weapons mission without these synergistic relationships. All
    these topics will be viewed within the context of the administration's
    request to Congress for the fiscal year 2015 budget. Listed below are
    the major points of my statement.

        1.  Sandia is successfully executing a full suite of modernization
    programs in full-scale engineering development: the B61 Life Extension
    Program (LEP), W88 ALT 370, and Mk21 Fuze Replacement.
        2.  As of March 2014, we have met all major B61 LEP milestones on
    schedule as adjusted against receipt of program appropriations. By
    employing effective cost-management measures, we were able to minimize
    cost impact due to schedule delays caused by discrepancies between
    planned and received funds.
        3.  Our assessment of the administration's fiscal year 2015 budget
    request to Congress is that support for the modernization programs is
    consistent with first production unit (FPU) plans. However, although
    the budget emphasis placed on modernization is understandable, it
    presents challenges for supporting the current stockpile and the
    underpinning capability, particularly in the long term.
        4.  At Sandia, the NW mission is strongly connected to other key
    national security mission areas: reducing global nuclear dangers, which
    is the work we do in nonproliferation, treaty monitoring, and securing
    nuclear facilities; nuclear assessments and warning, which involves
    foreign nuclear weapons assessments; cyberspace, which has grown from
    our early work in NW use control; and synergistic defense products,
    which refers to a set of products on which we work for the Department
    of Defense, which are synergistic with the products for the NW program.
        5.  We support the goals of the Congressional Advisory Panel on the
    Governance Structure of the NNSA and offer what we believe are guiding
    principles for improving the construct.
                executing a full suite of modernization programs
        We are currently in full-scale engineering development on the B61
    LEP, W88 ALT 370, and Mk21 Fuze Replacement. Indeed, for the first time
    since the end of the Cold War, we are executing three Phase 6.3
    programs simultaneously. We are confident that our in-depth scientific,
    engineering, and technical expertise, combined with increased rigor in
    project management and cost control, will enable successful completion
    of these programs. Several years ago, we recognized the magnitude of
    the challenge before us, coupled with the expectations of high rigor in
    all aspects of cost, schedule, and performance. Thus, we took steps to
    prepare the institution to execute in this environment.
        During the past calendar year, we completed co-locating the core
    design teams, enhancing our classified networks to reflect the volume
    of the work, and most significantly, staffing the programs and training
    the workforce. I will now summarize our progress in each of the
    modernization efforts.
    The 861 LEP: Sustaining the 861 Safety, Security, and Reliability
        As I stated in my testimony of October 27, 2013, the B61 LEP
    includes a prudent mix of the following activities: (1) requalification
    and reuse of existing components that we can certify for at least an
    additional 20-year lifetime, (2) remanufacture of some existing
    component designs, and (3) replacement with new designs, where
    required.
        This approach to the program reduces the number of components to be
    developed, as well as the technical and programmatic risk associated
    with the life extension, but it does add lifetime risk to the B61-12.
    The resulting B61-12 design is the minimum that

             Meets threshold military requirements, including
            compatibility with future digital aircraft interfaces
             Addresses known end-of-life and technology
            obsolescence issues
             Sustains and updates safety and security for this
            system
             Consolidates the B61 Modifications (Mods) 3, 4, 7, and
            10 into a single B61 Mod 12

        Cost and Schedule Performance
        The B61 LEP can be thought of as having three major phases--design,
    component and system qualification, and production. We are now about 75
    percent complete on design, and by late fiscal year 2015, we will be at
    a 95 percent design point and will be ready for a planned first flight
    test of this bomb. This remarkable progress is the result of a
    significant effort on our part. As we learn more about the design, we
    will look for opportunities to consolidate some of the follow-on tests
    on subsequent development builds for the B61 in order to provide margin
    to the cost and schedule. For example, as I stated in October 2013, at
    the start of our Phase 6.3 on the program, the radar component was
    considered high risk. In August 2013, we tested our new radar for the
    B61-12 at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada. The test of the new design
    was so successful that we have decided to consolidate three originally
    planned tests into the one we have completed, thus having an estimated
    $300,000 as contingency for budgetary fluctuations.
        We have been successful in bringing innovative approaches to the
    B61-12 execution to reduce risk and cost. For example, in February
    2014, Sandia collaborated with the Air Force to successfully perform a
    key aerodynamic test with multiple configurations at the Air Force
    Arnold Engineering Development Center in Tennessee. In this test, the
    bomb included the new tail kit developed by the Air Force. The test
    sharpened our insight into the bomb's spin motion during freefall and
    led to enhanced understanding of a complex spin phenomenon, which in
    turn provides better understanding of the B61-12 flight performance.
        As of March 2014, we have costed $350 million of the estimated
    incremental cost for Sandia to execute the B61 LEP. This amount is
    consistent with the June 2012 cost estimate that specifies an
    incremental cost of $2.65 billion for Sandia to execute the B61 LEP
    over 11 years. Against those expenditures, we have met all major
    milestones on schedule as adjusted against receipt of program
    appropriations. By using sound program-management measures, we are
    working to minimize cost impact due to schedule delays caused by
    discrepancies between planned and received funding. In fact, we
    currently project cost savings of approximately $120 million over the
    life of the program, which will go a long way to offset such
    discrepancies.
        Our success in cost control reflects in part our commitment to
    manage labor costs, which are the largest component of the overall
    program cost. As an example, our efforts to manage healthcare cost and
    pension cost obligations have allowed us to keep labor rates for fiscal
    year 2014 below those we used in our cost estimate reflected in the
    Weapon Development Cost Report.
    Further Modernization Efforts at Sandia
        As discussed, we are currently executing two additional full-scale
    engineering development efforts: the W88 ALT 370 and the Mk21 Fuze
    Replacement. Across these two programs and the B61 LEP, we have taken
    an overall system approach, using common technology and components to
    an unprecedented extent. This approach is significantly reducing risk
    and cost in these programs. For example, a modular arming, fuzing, and
    firing (AF&F) design is being developed for the W88 ALT 370 and the
    Mk21 Fuze Replacement. Given the benefits of a common-technology
    approach, we will look to use it in all our future efforts.
        W88 ALT 370
        The W88 ALT 370 is well into full-scale engineering development and
    is executed on schedule and within budget relative to an FPU scheduled
    for December 2019. This modernization program replaces the AF&F
    assembly and adds a nuclear-safety connector for enhanced lightning
    protection.
        Sharing technologies and components with other modernization
    programs, the W88 ALT 370 is cost-efficient and presents reduced risk,
    in keeping with the Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) plan for stockpile
    modernization. The W88 ALT 370 has not only developed a common subset
    of fuze requirements to support the W87/Mk21 fuze replacement
    application, but it also features a common radar module with the B61
    LEP. Already prototyped, this radar will be included in a D5 missile
    Navy test flight later this year, which will evaluate radar performance
    in the unique reentry environment. The results of this flight test, as
    part of the rigorous performance testing and qualification efforts,
    will not only further the design of the W88 ALT 370 program, but also
    of the B61 LEP.
        Significantly, through our surveillance and component evaluation
    programs, we were able to save tens of millions of dollars by
    requalifying the Bell XI sensor (originally used in the W88-0) and
    making it available for use in the W88 ALT 370 inertial navigation
    module. Like the B61 LEP, the W88 ALT 370 is being managed with
    increased program and cost rigor.
        Mk21 Fuze Replacement
        The Air Force has a requirement, validated by the NWC, to replace
    the Mk21 arming and fuzing assembly (AFA). Because of our expertise and
    ability to leverage similar work done for the W88 ALT 370, Sandia was
    chosen to replace the fuze. Leveraging other work enables efficiencies
    in design, development, production, and life cycle support. We entered
    Phase 6.3 of the program in August 2013. The team, including
    approximately 100 staff, is on track to establish the program baseline
    this summer.
        During this fiscal year, a requirements review documented and
    confirmed key requirements that enabled us to launch full-scale
    engineering development in November 2013. A few months later, in
    January 2014, we conducted a key compatibility test for a Mk21 fuze
    component by using the U.S. Air Force test bed that simulates a missile
    interface. This test is significant because it confirms design
    decisions to enable the fuze to communicate effectively with the Air
    Force missile. It also demonstrates that the program is making
    appropriate progress toward fielding a replacement AFA.
        Together, the B61 LEP, W88 ALT 370, and Mk21 Fuze Replacement
    provide substantive required upgrades to all three legs of the U.S.
    nuclear weapons triad.
        W76-1
        The W76-1 LEP continues with broad-ranging production across the
    entire national security enterprise. Beginning with the first
    production unit in the fall of 2008, Sandia has teamed with the NNSA
    and Navy to meet delivery schedules while working through the challenge
    of relocating the Honeywell FM&T Kansas City Plant to a new facility.
    Production is targeted for completion at the end of September 2019.
    Embedded in this effort is requalification of all the production lines
    and maintaining deliveries to the Pantex Plant.
        Executing the modernization programs requires that we have absolute
    confidence in the safeguards and security aspects of our work. Sandia
    is committed to ensuring that we have trusted information systems,
    supply chains, and employees throughout all phases of the stockpile
    stewardship life cycle.
    Future Modernization Efforts
        W78/88-1 LEP
        In June 2012, the NWC authorized a Phase 6.2 study for a W78/88-1
    LEP interoperable warhead. Based on recent NWC guidance, NNSA deferred
    this program and established a new projected FPU in fiscal year 2030.
    NNSA does not propose to fund this life extension beyond fiscal year
    2014 until such time that the Phase 6.2 study is restarted. Remaining
    fiscal year 2014 funds are directed toward a 120-day study to consider
    stand-alone warhead options for Mk21 and MkS aero shells and toward the
    orderly suspension of W78 LEP activities. The program will document the
    results of Phase 6.2 activities for the W78/88-1 LEP through end of
    fiscal year 2014, archive program files, and develop a restart plan for
    use if and/ or when future funding is allocated to the program.
        LRSO
        NNSA and the U.S. Air Force joined forces in a Phase 6.1 (concept
    assessment) Long-Range Standoff (referred to as LRSO) study to begin on
    July 1, 2014. Sandia will potentially be asked to conduct a Phase 6.2
    and 6.2A (engineering feasibility; cost estimation) study from fiscal
    year 2016 to fiscal year 2018 and initiate a Phase 6.3 effort starting
    in fiscal year 2019.
                             budget considerations
        First, I would like to express my appreciation for the bipartisan
    efforts of the Senate and the House to enact fiscal year 2014
    authorization and appropriations that recognize and support the most
    critical nuclear weapons modernization efforts. Specifically, the
    fiscal year 2014 enacted authorization and appropriations provide the
    necessary resources for the modernization programs to remain on
    schedule and meet all the NNSA and Department of Defense performance
    requirements. As I stated in my testimony to this subcommittee in May
    2013, fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016 are critical to maintaining the
    cost, schedule, and performance of the overall program.
        In this regard, we are also pleased to see the strong support for
    the weapons program in the administration's fiscal year 2015 budget
    request to Congress. As I have previously testified, budget continuity
    is the most significant risk to maintaining schedule, and therefore
    overall program costs, on the life extension and alteration programs.
    In my opinion, the fiscal year 2015 President's budget request for the
    nuclear weapons account, if fully supported, will provide such
    budgetary continuity and allow the nuclear security enterprise to
    continue on a successful path toward delivering on the modernization
    commitments. However, as I have stated in other sections of this
    testimony, support for the current stockpile and the underpinning
    infrastructure and capability presents challenges, particularly when
    viewed in the long term.
             overall perspective on a balanced national nw program
        In the preceding sections of my testimony, I have discussed the
    progress my institution has made on the stockpile modernization
    programs. Given their overall scope and time urgency, it is appropriate
    that these programs dominate Sandia's work activities. However, as I
    discussed earlier, the entirety of the NW program must also be judged
    against the imperatives to steward the current stockpile and maintain
    the science and engineering base and infrastructure necessary to both
    sustaining and modernizing the stockpile now and in the future.
        When I consider the fiscal year 2015 budget request, I am concerned
    that the NW program is drifting out of balance as efforts to sustain
    the current stockpile, conduct appropriate levels of advanced and
    exploratory work, and support critical infrastructure continue to see
    reduced funding given the understandable emphasis on the modernization
    programs. The pressure on infrastructure extends even to support for
    projects necessary for the execution of the modernization programs. A
    case in point is the recapitalization of Sandia's facility for
    radiation-hardened microelectronics fabrication. Fiscal year 2015 is
    the third year in a 6-year $150 million effort to mitigate production
    risk for the current modernization programs, but this recapitalization
    effort is not supported in the fiscal year 2015 budget request. This
    example is symptomatic of what I see happening across the program,
    namely, budget pressure forces greater risk acceptance in areas not
    perceived to have immediate impact. Other clear examples are that,
    despite the stockpile being the oldest yet in our history, the
    surveillance program is facing further reductions and advanced and
    exploratory work has decreased by 80 percent in the past 4 years. Given
    the overall fiscal constraints facing the country, it is appropriate to
    set priorities in a way that preferentially reduces risk to the most
    urgent programs. I understand and support that approach; however, it is
    important that all of us engaged in the stewardship of the Nation's
    nuclear deterrent acknowledge and explicitly look to minimize the
    overall risks that are increasing over time. In that regard, I urge
    both Congress and NNSA to maximize program management flexibility
    within an overall budget level.
        To understand the pressure the current program faces, I will make
    some historical comparisons. Although details are often hard to compare
    for different periods, I believe a simple high-level view of Sandia's
    weapons program in 2014 compared with 2 previous years is informative.
    Consider first 1987. At that time, Sandia was executing weapon design
    activity comparable with what we are doing today. The stockpile was
    essentially new and required little or no surveillance, our
    infrastructure was receiving continuous recapitalization, and we were
    executing a healthy advanced and exploratory program. In constant
    dollars, the budget then was comparable with the budget today, but the
    demands on the program were very different. For example, we did not
    face the challenges posed by an old stockpile or the loss of nuclear
    testing. Now consider 2005, just 9 years ago. We were executing two
    full-scale engineering efforts although one (the W80) was terminated in
    that year; so, the scope of design work was less than it is today. In
    addition, we were making major investments in stewardship facilities
    (pulsed power and the microelectronics research and fabrication
    facilities) and in computing, and we were executing a robust
    surveillance program. In my view, the program in 2005 was in overall
    balance and at a budget level slightly higher than today. I believe
    that today, the program is not in balance. We are executing three
    modernization programs and are continuing needed stewardship tool
    application and development. However, we are deferring investments in
    the production infrastructure and curtailing surveillance activities
    for an aging stockpile. In addition, we also face labor cost drivers,
    such as pension and medical care costs, which were either nonexistent
    in 1987 and 2005 or considerably less in constant dollars. From this
    simple historical comparison, two overall points emerge about the
    program at Sandia:

        1.  More is being demanded of us today than at any other time since
    the end of the Cold War and the cessation of nuclear testing, yet
    budget levels are essentially flat or slightly down. This situation is
    leading to the imbalance and risk that I spoke to earlier.
        2.  The modernization programs are being executed with increased
    efficiency primarily because we are using the tools of stewardship
    (e.g., simulation) and overall enterprise cost reductions.
      sandia's stockpile surveillance and assessment, infrastructure, and
                                     people
        In this section, I will focus on our achievements and challenges in
    sustaining the current nuclear stockpile, maintaining the underpinning
    infrastructure and capabilities, and attracting the people who will
    carry the work of today into the future. I will refer to these aspects
    in the context of the administration's fiscal year 2015 budget request
    to Congress.
    Stockpile Surveillance and Assessment
        An effective surveillance program at Sandia has made it possible to
    sustain confidence in the current stockpile and requalify parts from
    the current B61 stockpile for an additional 20 years of use in the B61-
    12. It also enabled us to extend the life of neutron generators by
    better characterizing aging phenomena and to support life extension of
    the current W78 warhead by providing confidence that the warhead
    components are aging gracefully. These achievements represent
    significant cost savings while allowing us to sustain confidence in the
    stockpile.
        As I testified last year, funding allocations for Sandia in fiscal
    years 2013 and 2014 required that we constrain surveillance efforts,
    and current indications are that fiscal year 2015 funding for Sandia
    will impose additional constraints on our surveillance program. At
    Sandia, we recognize the realities of the current fiscal environment,
    and thus we continue to apply a risk-based prioritization approach to
    our surveillance activities and infrastructure. I am concerned,
    however, that continued funding shortfalls in this area over long
    periods will lead to fewer lab and flight tests, testing fewer of the
    full-range operational environments, and reduced safety testing.
    Science-Based Infrastructure and Capabilities
        Sandia stewards the microelectronics research and fabrication
    facilities for the NW program, as well as for the Department of
    Energy's nonproliferation payloads. In those facilities, we design and
    fabricate an array of unique microelectronics, specialty optical
    components, and microelectromechanical sjrstem devices. When discussing
    the National NW program, I stated that the recapitalization of the
    facility for radiation-hardened microelectronics fabrication is not
    being supported in the fiscal year 2015 budget request. This lack of
    funding will increase the risk for delivering the modernization
    programs.
        We also have significant recapitalization needs at other
    experimental and test facilities critical to the success of the B61
    LEP, W88 ALT 370, and future life extensions, particularly at the
    Tonopah Test Range and our large-scale test facilities. The fiscal year
    2015 budget request for recapitalization continues the downward trend
    from fiscal year 2014 and therefore further restricts our ability to
    reduce risk to the modernization programs. These infrastructure needs
    are impacted by the fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Readiness
    in Technical Base and Facilities program.
        Sandia's high-performance computing capabilities, vital tools for
    our mission responsibilities in stockpile surveillance, certification,
    and qualification, continue to prove indispensable to our broader
    national security work. On a positive note, the resolution of the
    fiscal year 2014 budget resulted in an executable program in high-
    performance computing that can support critical work for our
    modernization programs. We are pleased that the fiscal year 2015 budget
    request continues to provide funding for high-performance computing.
        Sandia is a recognized world leader in the developmnt and
    applications of pulsed power, as evidenced by our Z facility and the
    research program that it supports. Z is indispensable to conducting
    high energy density physics research critical to the stockpile
    stewardship program. An important deliverable for fiscal year 2015 is
    an assessment of the national program in inertial confinement fusion.
    Funding stabilitjr in this program area is needed for the long-term
    health of the stewardship program. The fiscal year 2015 budget request
    takes a step in restoring the funding needed to efficiently develop and
    utilize the full capabilities of the Z facility.
    Future Stewards of the NW Stockpile
        To execute the demanding modernization programs with which the
    Nation has entrusted us, we knew we would have to attract and retain
    new staff, the future stewards of our stockpile. Since fiscal year
    2010, we have hired approximately 1,000 scientists and engineers-
    typically for us, two-thirds engineers and one-third scientists. These
    individuals were hired for the totality of our national security work.
    Fifty-seven percent of these new hires are in the first 3 years of
    their professional career and were recruited broadly from the Nation's
    finest research universities with the highest standards. Coupled with
    our experienced staff, they are responsible for the execution and
    progress on the modernization efforts. These hires, however, have a
    different social contract. They no longer have a defined benefit
    pension plan, and they are encountering an operational environment of a
    complexity that they might not have anticipated. Yet they are
    fundamentally attracted to the Laboratory by the nature of our work.
    Consistent with our role as a federally funded research and development
    center (FFRDC), we hire new talent for the long term. When the
    modernization programs are completed, we expect that recently hired
    staff will continue in nuclear weapons or other national security
    missions at Sandia. In recruiting, we have used the Laboratory Directed
    Research and Development program as a critical element, particularly
    for Ph.D. candidates.
        Staffing three modernization programs has been a tall order in two
    significant ways: attracting many new hires with the right
    qualifications expeditiously and maintaining a stable Lab size. We were
    successful on both counts. As discussed above, we have a strong
    contingent of new hires, and the overall size of Sandia grew by only
    about 2.5 percent since 2010. To keep the Lab size stable, we shifted
    some personnel among the national security missions conducted at the
    Laboratory. For example, Sandia engineers may be expected to work on
    the weapons program one day and on an effort for the Department of
    Defense the next day. To ensure their successful contributions to the
    programs on which they are working, we have developed common tool sets
    and defined the necessary experience and the expectations of doing
    engineering at the Laboratory.
    synergy between our nw mission and other key national security missions
        At the beginning of my testimony, I referred to the synergistic
    connection between Sandia's NW mission and other major national
    security missions. To energize and sharpen its nuclear weapons
    competencies and mitigate risk, Sandia relies on its broader national
    security work. The symbiotic relationship between the nuclear weapons
    mission and broader national security missions prevents insularity and
    creates a challenging, vigorous scientific and engineering environment
    that helps us attract and retain the new talent we need. Such an
    environment is essential for us to succeed against the challenges we
    now face.
        I strongly believe that today it is not possible for my Laboratory
    to deliver consistently on the commitments to the nuclear weapons
    program without the synergistic interagency work that attracts top
    talent, hones our skills, and provides stability through the cycles of
    the nuclear weapons program.
        Government commitment to the broad national security work of the
    laboratories is essential for the United States to ensure the
    preeminence of our nuclear weapons and to enable multidisciplinary
    technical solutions to other complex and high-risk national security
    challenges. In no way does our interagency work detract from our focus
    to execute our core NW mission.
        In the next three sections, I will discuss some of the broader
    national security work we are conducting at Sandia, which we view to be
    particularly synergistic with the NW mission.
    Reducing Global Nuclear Dangers
        Around the world, the risks posed by nuclear weapons, materials,
    and knowledge are increasing. The explosive growth of the nuclear power
    enterprise has resulted in at least 18 countries planning to build
    their first nuclear power plants, and major new construction is
    underway or planned around the globe. This nuclear power expansion,
    occurring with an unevenly applied approach to safety and security, may
    well increase the likelihood of proliferation over the long term.
    Nuclear ``lockdown'' is progressing, but work is still necessary to
    attain our security goals-both domestically and abroad. Sandia has a
    broad portfolio of nuclear nonproliferation activities, working
    collaboratively with Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and several other
    DOE laboratories. Sandia has long-standing expertise in nuclear
    security and safeguards and engages cooperatively with partners in more
    than 100 countries to reduce the threat of proliferation and terrorism.
        While the fiscal year 2015 budget request to Congress
    understandably emphasizes stockpile stewardship and the life extension
    programs, we are concerned about the size of proposed decreases in
    nuclear nonproliferation programs. Cooperative relationships with
    nation states having at-risk nuclear materials and nuclear weapons
    programs are hard to establish and potentially harder to rebuild, so
    these cuts may reverse the benefits from important work already
    completed. There is not enough national attention on helping the
    civilian nuclear enterprise grow in a safe and secure manner.
        Similarly, increased focus is needed on the strategic requirements
    for next-generation technology and expertise to support our national
    nuclear nonproliferation policy goals. Sandia continues its commitment
    to helping reduce global nuclear dangers, but its resources for such
    work will need to shift to other activities if this budget is enacted
    as submitted.
    Nuclear Assessments and Warning
        The long-term vision for Sandia's nuclear assessments and warning
    mission area is to ensure that the United States will achieve an
    integrated, comprehensive, persistent monitoring and responsive warning
    architecture for NW activities worldwide. To achieve this vision, we
    research, develop, and deploy products and services that ensure the
    effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent and counter foreign efforts from
    impacting our national security capabilities and interests. Thus, we
    provide sensing systems and analysis to detect nuclear detonations and
    nuclear material and to understand nuclear threats against the United
    States and its allies, covering all aspects of the nuclear timeline.
        One of our key programs is development and delivery of the
    satellite payloads for the U.S. nuclear detonation detection system.
    Through NNSA's NA-22 program, the satellite payloads program is fully
    funded in the fiscal year 2015 President's budget request, which is
    critical to maintaining a strong nuclear warning program for the United
    States.
    Cyberspace and Synergistic Defense Products
        Sandia's extensive cyber research and development program is rooted
    in its rich history of work in the command and control of nuclear
    weapons. Sandia integrates scientific understanding, technology
    development, and complex requirements-driven engineering to develop
    solutions to cyber challenges. Work in this mission area also involves
    management of trusted components for the modernization programs.
        In the mission area we refer to as synergistic defense products,
    Sandia delivers a set of products in support of Department of Defense
    missions, such as combatting terrorism at home and abroad and dominance
    across the full spectrum of warfare. Among those products are real-time
    synthetic aperture radar and hypersonic vehicles, which actively draw
    from and feed back into the NW program.
                                   governance
        On the topic of NNSA governance, I look forward to the
    recommendations of the Congressional Advisory Panel. In our
    interactions with the Panel, we have stressed three important
    principles that we believe should shape the character of any
    recommendations:

        1.  Mission. In our view, the three nuclear weapons laboratories
    have evolved into unique national security science and technology
    institutions. Built around the core nuclear weapons capabilities, they
    offer broad value to the country's 21st century national security
    challenges. Any governance construct should reinforce this mission
    reality.
        2.  FFRDCs. The laboratories are FFRDCs. Any governance construct
    should enable them to fully embody key features of the FFRDC model as
    described in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Some of those key
    features are the following: The FFRDCs attract and maintain high-
    quality personnel; maintain currency in their fields of expertise; meet
    special long-term research or development needs; and operate
    autonomously in the public interest with objectivity and independence
    and are free from organizational conflicts of interest.
        3.  Management fundamentals. Any governance model must rely upon
    and demonstrate sound management principles. Clear line-management
    accountability, a focus on strategic outcomes as articulated by the
    government, and independent and effective oversight that supports
    continuous improvement are particularly important.

        Based upon my 38-year career, including senior leadership positions
    in two U.S. laboratories, it is my opinion that the NNSA construct has
    made it more difficult to manage and lead these institutions in a
    manner that fully demonstrates the value of these principles.
                                  conclusions
        As I discussed at the beginning of my statement, Sandia is
    executing its NW mission by taking care of the current U.S. stockpile,
    sustaining the stockpile into the future, and maintaining and advancing
    Sandia's required engineering and science capabilities, operations, and
    infrastructure.
        We are currently executing three modernization programs-the B61
    LEP, W88 ALT 370, and Mk21 Fuze Replacement-on schedule and on (or
    under) budget. As I discussed earlier, budget continuity remains the
    largest risk to these programs. I believe that the fiscal year 2015
    budget request supports the modernization programs consistent with FPU
    plans.
        The overall demands of the NW program are significant-in many
    respects, they are unprecedented-and I am concerned that they are
    causing an imbalance in the program by increasing risk. As discussed in
    this statement, a budget emphasis placed on modernization is
    understandable, but it presents challenges for supporting the current
    stockpile and the underpinning capability in the long term. By the same
    token, considering the fiscal constraints facing the country, it is
    appropriate to set priorities in a way that preferentially reduces risk
    to the most urgent programs. It is therefore all the more important for
    all of us engaged in the stewardship of the Nation's nuclear deterrent
    to acknowledge the risks and work hard to minimize them. Significantly,
    Sandia's broad mission space is essential to mitigating risk to the NW
    program and delivering unique value to solving the Nation's national
    security challenges.
        The recommendations of the Congressional Advisory Panel will be
    important as I believe the NNSA construct has made it difficult to meet
    the original intent of strengthening the nuclear weapons enterprise.
        Finally, I want to restate that Sandia is committed to fulfilling
    its service to the Nation with excellence in all aspects of the
    program. We appreciate the leadership role of Congress in authorizing a
    sound path forward for U.S. nuclear deterrence.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Dr. Hommert.
        Doctor, would you help me pronounce your name properly, if
    it's--is it ``Goldsteen'' or----
        Dr. Goldstein. It is, in fact ``Goldsteen.''
        Senator Udall. ``Goldsteen.''
        Dr. Goldstein. Thank you.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Dr. Goldstein. You are
    recognized.

       STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM H. GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE
                     LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

        Dr. Goldstein. Thank you. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member
    Sessions, distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf
    of the more than 6,000 men and women of Lawrence Livermore
    National Laboratory (LLNL), thank you for this opportunity to
    provide perspective on our work.
        I've submitted my full statement to the subcommittee, and I
    ask that it be made part of the record.
        My name is William Goldstein. I'm the Director of LLNL. In
    the spirit of full disclosure, I should note that, although I'm
    in the 30th year of my career as a scientist there, this is my
    11th day as director. So, while I can claim to know a great
    deal, I'm quickly learning how much I don't know.
        As director, I have three major objectives: first, to
    ensure that the best and most innovative science, technology,
    and engineering is brought to bear to sustain the confidence in
    our nuclear deterrent and to support cost-aware options for
    warhead LEPs and infrastructure modernization; second, to
    operate the National Ignition Facility (NIF) safely and
    efficiently as a national user facility where nuclear weapons
    designers can hone their skills and test their models, where
    students can be trained in the fundamental science that
    underpins nuclear performance, and where we can explore the
    path to ignition and, hopefully, fusion burn in the laboratory;
    and third, to apply the unique strengths of the lab established
    by, and required by, our core nuclear deterrence mission to new
    and evolving challenges in national and global security.
        This past year, with the support of this subcommittee,
    we've made progress in all of these areas. LLNL successfully
    met its annual assessment responsibilities and achieved all
    deliverables for the W78/88-1 LEP and long-range standoff
    (LRSO) study in support of the Air Force. NIF has provided data
    needed for stockpile stewardship, including advancing our
    understanding of the physics associated with ignition.
        Working often in coordination with Los Alamos, we
    successfully conducted a series of hydrodynamic experiments at
    our contained firing facility, and Los Alamos' dual axis
    radiographic hydrotest facility, including a successful test of
    a pit reuse concept.
        In partnership with National Security Technologies
    personnel at the Nevada National Security Site, we
    significantly increased the shock rate at the Joint Actinide
    Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility, and have
    continued to support studies on pit and secondary assembly
    production at Los Alamos and Y-12, respectively.
        In addition, we've provided innovative support to the
    Intelligence Community, the Department of Homeland Security,
    and the Department of Defense (DOD), among other agencies
    responsible for the National Security Enterprise and the
    Nation.
        The President's fiscal year 2015 budget proposal helps
    strengthen our ability to deliver for stockpile stewardship by
    providing a modest increase in funding for our core weapons
    activities. This small increase in directed stockpile work and
    the science campaigns would enable us to improve our
    capabilities in support of current stockpile warheads, continue
    the development of cost-aware LEP options for the future, and
    help us recruit and retain new stockpile stewards as senior
    weapons experts retire.
        The budget request also stabilizes funding for the NIF,
    following 2 years of significant reductions, and this will
    allow us to continue our recent restructuring of the facility
    and its operations in order to increase experimental
    opportunities and allow researchers to effectively support the
    stockpile stewardship mission.
        These small increases for core weapons activities are
    especially critical in light of the delays in the LEPs for the
    W77/88 and the LRSO, which limit opportunities for our
    scientists and engineers to learn and practice the skills
    needed for weapons development and engineering.
        Now, we've had some success exercising weapon engineering
    skills in work for DOD on conventional munitions, such as the
    BLU-1298 low-collateral-damage weapon, a notable example of
    work for other agencies that helps us sustain the health and
    vitality of the laboratory. This work exercises some, but not
    all, of the skills required to support sustaining the nuclear
    stockpile, and therefore, retaining these needed skills
    continues to be a challenge in the current program and budget
    environment.
        I also have some comments on the relationship between the
    laboratories and NNSA, but, again, in the interest of time, I'd
    like to delay for the questions and again thank the
    subcommittee for its continuing support of the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program (SSP) and for the dedicated men and women
    of Lawrence Livermore who are committed to making our Nation a
    safe and secure nation.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Goldstein follows:]
                 Prepared Statement by Dr. William H. Goldstein
                                opening remarks
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am William H.
    Goldstein, the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
    (LLNL). Thank you for the opportunity to provide my perspective on the
    President's fiscal year 2015 budget request and governance of the
    Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's (DOE/
    NNSA) national security laboratories. I will also report on ongoing and
    future activities at LLNL in support of NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship
    Program (SSP) and our other important national security missions in the
    context of the budget proposal.
        As one of the DOE/NNSA national security laboratories, LLNL is
    responsible for helping sustain the safety, security, and effectiveness
    of our Nation's nuclear stockpile. A large part of that responsibility
    involves developing and maintaining the skilled workforce and broad set
    of capabilities and facilities that constitute a key component of the
    U.S. nuclear deterrent. Consistent with our mission, we also apply our
    capabilities to develop innovative solutions to important 21st-century
    national and global challenges.
        This subcommittee's continuing support of the SSP has helped enable
    us to sustain confidence in the nuclear weapons stockpile without
    nuclear testing. The successes of the SSP would not have been possible
    without these investments.
    Stockpile Stewardship Program Challenges
        The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review noted that ``significantly
    increased investments'' were required to ``sustain a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist.'' As our
    weapons age, we must strengthen the science, technology, and
    engineering base that underpins the U.S. nuclear stockpile and, when
    required, extend the life of warheads in accordance with national
    policy. The needs of the SSP include:

             Stockpile Assessments. While currently assessed to be
            safe, secure, and effective, stockpile warheads have aged well
            beyond their original design intent. Maintaining confidence in
            the stockpile requires a vigorous assessment program, subject
            to rigorous peer review, made up of both physical and enhanced
            surveillance, underpinned by NNSA's science, technology,
            engineering, and production capabilities. If Life-Extension
            Programs (LEPs) are prolonged or postponed, assessment tools
            and capabilities must be enhanced to address a growing set of
            issues, and to help guard against technical surprises.
             Life-Extension Programs. Because weapons in the
            stockpile continue to age beyond their intended service life,
            timely execution of planned LEPs is important. The LEP strategy
            supports the United States Strategic Command's ``3+2'' vision
            for the future stockpile (three future missile-delivered
            warheads and two future air-delivered weapons), endorsed by the
            Nuclear Weapons Council. Recent high-level decisions have
            resulted in a postponement of the ongoing W78/88-1 LEP, and the
            stretch-out of the incipient Long Range Stand-off (LRSO) LEP.
            These delays impact the needs of ongoing annual assessment
            activities and create challenges for workforce management.
             Modernization of Facilities. A healthy complex is a
            crucial component of the Nation's nuclear deterrent
            capabilities, and provides a hedge against technological
            surprise and changing world conditions. Plans for modernization
            of two major capabilities are evolving because of budget
            constraints and will result in delays in their availability:
            the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security
            Complex, and modernized plutonium research and pit production
            capabilities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
            Other facilities are aging across the complex, leading to many
            smaller-scale but important infrastructure investment needs,
            including needs at LLNL.
             The Science, Technology, and Engineering (ST&E) Base.
            The ST&E capabilities at the NNSA laboratories are the
            foundation of the SSP. The people and their tools are needed
            for assessing and, where necessary, refurbishing our nuclear
            warheads. As the stockpile continues to age, and while LEPs and
            new production capabilities are delayed, our scientists and
            engineers face increased challenges in addressing the effects
            of aging on weapon safety, security, and effectiveness. We must
            continue to improve the ST&E capabilities that underpin the
            SSP.

        In facing these challenges, LLNL remains focused on caring for the
    existing stockpile and sustaining or modernizing weapon systems
    consistent with national policy. To this end, we are strengthening the
    underpinning science, technology, and engineering of stockpile
    stewardship, and striving to maintain a responsive infrastructure,
    including innovative support to the NNSA production facilities. We are
    working to ensure that our workforce has the training and skills to
    meet current and future mission requirements. We are carefully
    considering cost-risk-benefit tradeoffs as we work on LEP warhead
    design options, to inform future LEP decisions. More generally, we
    continue to partner with NNSA and others in the complex to move the
    NNSA enterprise forward and offer innovative approaches to ensuring the
    effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
                               budget perspective
        Balancing investments across priorities is an enormous challenge.
    The nation cannot overfund one aspect of the SSP and put at risk others
    that are essential to long-term success. Fiscal constraints are
    stretching out the schedules for many SSP activities, investments, and
    deliverables. This increases program risk by leaving the complex
    potentially less prepared to deal with unanticipated technical
    problems, or a surprise brought on by the ever-evolving capabilities of
    adversaries. Resource constraints put a premium on early identification
    of stockpile issues, which increases the pressure on our ST&E base.
        In this regard, we have previously expressed concerns to this
    subcommittee about the sufficiency of long-term ST&E and surveillance
    investments in the program needed to support annual assessment. Under
    the President's budget request for fiscal year 2015, the prospect for
    LLNL is a modest, 4 percent, increase in funding relative to fiscal
    year 2014 for core weapons activities. This is a welcome change after 2
    years of significant budget decreases for two major reasons:

             It provides needed capability improvements and program
            stability. The proposed funding increases in Directed Stockpile
            Work (predominantly in Stockpile Systems and Stockpile
            Services) and the Science Campaigns (predominantly in Primary
            Assessments and Dynamic Material Properties) will enable us to
            improve our capabilities in support of current stockpile
            warheads (e.g., in improved material and component lifetime
            assessments and in addressing open Significant Findings), and
            continue the development of cost-aware LEP options. Benefits
            will include improved assessments of primary performance for
            aging, reconfigured, reused, and remanufactured pits; further
            exploration, development, and maturation of component
            technologies; and the development of more efficient methods for
            manufacturing.

        The LLNL staff has shrunk by about 30 percent since fiscal year
    2007 and nearly 15 percent over the last 2 years. This has stressed our
    depth of expertise in some areas as senior weapons experts have
    retired, and limited funding has constrained our ability to bring in
    and train the next generation of stockpile stewards. A stable program
    budget helps us ensure the succession of expertise necessary for long-
    term success in stockpile stewardship.

             It provides a predictable path forward for National
            Ignition Facility (NIF) activities. NIF is delivering data to
            support needed improvements in SSP predictive capabilities.
            Data from a range of experiments are being used to test and
            validate our simulation models and train our workforce. NIF has
            also recently achieved a key technical success on the path to
            ignition. Coupled with the progress we are making to improve
            the efficiency of NIF operations, level funding from fiscal
            year 2014, as proposed in the fiscal year 2015 President's
            budget request, for operations and experimental activities will
            allow researchers to effectively support the stockpile
            stewardship mission. At the requested funding level, we will
            continue providing essential data and make progress in fiscal
            year 2015 toward understanding the requirements for achieving
            ignition and energy gain, which is important to understanding
            thermonuclear processes in weapons.

        However, we have continuing concerns:

             Work balance in stockpile stewardship--maintaining
            direct expertise in weapons development and engineering and
            supporting enhanced surveillance. With the proposed budget, our
            work on the ST&E underpinning stockpile stewardship will
            increase, which is an important and a positive trend. At the
            same time, with the postponement of the W78/88-1 LEP and the
            delay in the first production unit date for the LRSO LEP, the
            opportunity for LLNL to exercise capabilities necessary for
            weapons development and engineering are impacted. Maintaining
            expertise in these areas will continue to be a challenge. We
            are also concerned about the continued decrease in funding
            (both nationally and at LLNL) associated with enhanced
            surveillance. Enhanced surveillance (capabilities to predict
            and quantify potential future issues in stockpile warheads) is
            of growing importance to the Annual Assessment of the stockpile
            as current stockpile warheads continue to age.
             Laboratory infrastructure. LLNL's infrastructure
            requires continual reinvestment to enable Laboratory staff to
            perform their important work for the Nation efficiently,
            safely, and securely. LLNL successfully maintains required
            levels of readiness for its ``mission critical'' facilities and
            ``mission dependent/not critical, enduring'' facilities.
            However, the median age of facilities is 35 years and the most
            recent line-item facility construction project at LLNL was the
            Terascale Simulation Facility, begun in 2002. The deferred
            maintenance backlog is growing and three major mothballed
            facilities in deteriorating condition await funding for
            decontamination and demolition for proper risk reduction.
             I am pleased to report that several of our proposed line-item
            investments are on the NNSA's list of high priority items,
            including an Electrical Infrastructure Upgrade Project that
            addresses our highest assessed risk to future operations, and a
            new emergency response center. We are pleased that the fiscal
            year 2015 budget request funds the emergency response center,
            but remain concerned that the Electrical Infrastructure Upgrade
            Project has been deferred for a second year. We are working
            with NNSA to ensure the earliest possible start for this
            project.
             governance of the nnsa national security laboratories
        We have consistently stressed to many audiences the importance of
    partnership and shared responsibility with NNSA to the successful
    execution of our vital national security mission. We stand ready to
    work with DOE, NNSA, and Congress to turn ideas about a ``more agile''
    relationship between NNSA and the national laboratories into actions.
    We have provided input to, and are actively listening, for the findings
    and recommendations of the Congressional Advisory Panel on the
    Governance of the Nuclear Enterprise, and the National Academy of
    Science Committee on Assessment of the Governance Structure of the NNSA
    National Security Laboratories, established by the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. The initial finding of the
    first panel that there has been a ``loss of sustained national
    leadership focus'' is strong motivation to quickly determine a path
    forward. We are eager to contribute constructively to the deliberations
    that will surely follow the issuance of the panel's recommendations.
                 stockpile stewardship program accomplishments
        Fiscal year 2013 and the beginning of fiscal year 2014 have seen
    many significant accomplishments in assessing and sustaining the
    Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and applying and strengthening the
    underpinning ST&E. Our work was carried out through partnerships and at
    sites across the NNSA complex. Over the last year, we have:

             Completed Cycle 18 of the Annual Assessment of the
            stockpile. Continuing efforts at LLNL increased the rigor of
            the assessment process through extensive peer review that
            included the Independent Nuclear Weapon Assessment Process, and
            the application of improvements in predictive capabilities.
            During the last year, we also reduced surveillance backlogs and
            expeditiously addressed significant findings.
             Completed key LEP tasks. We identified a cost-informed
            preferred design concept and down-select of the pit and nuclear
            explosive package for the W78/W88-1 LEP (now on a 5-year hold).
            The selected design meets all military threshold requirements
            and enables achievement of enhanced surety. In addition,
            warhead options for further evaluation in Phase 6.1 were
            identified for the LRSO weapon.
             Attained important results at NIF to support the SSP.
            NIF high-energy-density physics shots are providing valuable
            data about the properties of materials at extreme conditions,
            the interaction of matter with intense radiation, and
            hydrodynamic turbulence and mixing of materials. Experiments to
            develop an improved understanding of the underlying physics for
            achieving ignition produced more energy through ``self
            heating'' from fusion reactions than was delivered into the
            fusion fuel. Altogether 158 shots were fired on NIF in fiscal
            year 2013 to support the SSP. Diagnostics and support
            capabilities have grown considerably to meet user demand, and
            the NIF team is continuously improving the efficiency of
            operations.
             Brought the 20-petaflops (quadrillion floating point
            operations per second) Sequoia supercomputer into classified
            operation. Operating as a tri-laboratory resource, Sequoia
            enables the use of higher-fidelity physics models in
            simulations and makes it possible to run large suites of
            simulations for estimating the sources of uncertainty that
            affect weapon safety and performance. In addition, NNSA reached
            a key step (Critical Decision-0) toward acquisition of the next
            major computer platform to be deployed at LLNL through CORAL
            (Collaboration of Oak Ridge, Argonne, and Lawrence Livermore).
            CORAL aims to achieve important technological advances needed
            by the SSP for predictive capability and 3D uncertainty
            quantification.
             Conducted a wide range of highly successful SSP
            experiments. Laboratory scientists designed and fielded
            experiments at facilities at Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, the
            University of Rochester, and the Nevada National Security Site
            and gathered data to improve our understanding of weapons
            physics and support LEPs. For example, we tested an innovative
            concept for pit reuse in a highly successful hydrodynamic test
            at LLNL's Contained Firing Facility.
             Engaged in developing new additive manufacturing (AM)
            processing technologies. Providing capabilities far beyond
            current state-of-the-art commercial tools, these new AM
            technologies are able to create features and architectures at
            the micro- and even nano-scale to make materials with
            previously unachievable properties (e.g., ultra-lightweight
            structural materials). Working with partners within the NNSA
            complex, we are exploring the potential role for this
            technology in support of the SSP.
                     meeting broader natonal security needs
        Since the Laboratory's founding in 1952, Livermore researchers have
    applied their capabilities to develop innovative technical solutions to
    help meet pressing national and global security needs. The work has
    grown in importance as the country faces an expanding list of complex
    national security issues in the 21st century, for which solutions
    demand scientific and technology innovation. Research and development
    projects at LLNL support the U.S. military, counter chemical and
    biological threats, and enhance cyber, aviation, and infrastructure
    security. We help in areas that take full advantage of LLNL's unique
    research capabilities, special expertise, and our multidisciplinary
    teaming approach to problem solving.
        Work for NNSA on nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism, for
    the DOE's Office of Science and energy technology offices, other
    Federal agencies, and other sponsors, not only meets their important
    needs but serves to sustain the long-term health and vitality of LLNL.
    These efforts extend existing core competencies and build new strengths
    in multidisciplinary ST&E, which in turn, benefit the stockpile
    stewardship mission and national security. Notable activities in fiscal
    year 2013-2014 include:

             Emergency response. LLNL's National Atmospheric
            Release Advisory Center (NARAC) provides predictions of the
            impacts of hazardous atmospheric releases to emergency managers
            and responders. Each year, NARAC typically responds to 10,000
            airborne-plume simulation requests for emergency preparedness,
            participates in 100 major emergency response exercises, and
            responds to 25 incidents, including major events such as the
            Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant accident.
             Radiation detection. Customs and Border Patrol is
            piloting LLNL's new Enhanced Radiological Nuclear Inspection
            and Evaluation (ERNIE) software that will improve the
            sensitivity of radiation portal monitors to provide high levels
            of nuclear security while also reducing the high false alarm
            rate that can interfere with traffic volumes at monitoring
            stations.
             Foreign nuclear weapons analysis. LLNL provides
            accurate, comprehensive, and timely assessments of the nuclear
            weapon capabilities of countries of concern. Our analysis
            contributes to decision-making at the highest levels, including
            National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). We also develop
            technologies and systems to help the Intelligence Community
            meet its data collection and information exploitation needs.
             Cyber security. LLNL is expanding the application of
            cyber security capabilities that are able to provide real-time
            situational awareness inside a large computer network by using
            a distributed approach to monitoring for anomalous behavior.
            Through our Network Security Innovation Center, we work with
            private partners to counter the constant attack on commercial,
            infrastructure, and national security networks.
             Tracking space debris. The national security community
            is proposing to use nano-satellites with LLNL-developed optical
            system for tracking space debris. A constellation of such nano-
            satellites is projected to be able to track pieces of space
            debris with a precision 10 times greater than currently
            possible, which would greatly reduce the false alarm rate for
            possible collisions with U.S. satellites.
             Nuclear forensics. LLNL's Nuclear Forensics program is
            beginning to use the capabilities of NIF to produce fission
            products needed for more realistic forensic exercises. The
            samples are used in round-robin exercises that ensure the
            Nation's nuclear debris diagnostic capabilities are maintained
            in a constant state of readiness.
             Advanced conventional munitions. The BLU-129/B low-
            collateral-damage munition, developed from concept to delivery
            to the combatant commander in only 18 months, recently won the
            18th annual William J. Perry Award, and we completed a highly
            successful hypersonic sled test of an advanced kinetic energy
            warhead in 2013.
             Support for the U.S. military. The Laboratory's
            Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS), a
            tool to assist in planning missions against facilities that
            potentially support WMD production, was used scores of times in
            the past year to provide technical assistance to combatant
            commanders and to U.S. troops in the field. We also support
            DOD's mission to detect and defeat improvised explosive
            devices.
             Countering biological threats. LLNL developed and
            licensed a technology to safely validate the performance of
            biodetection systems designed to provide early warning of
            aerosol releases of biological agents. Our cutting-edge
            detection technologies support the needs of the recently
            released ``National Strategy for Biosurveillance.''
             Aviation security. To better protect against the
            threat of homemade explosives to commercial air transportation,
            LLNL provides the Department of Homeland Security with
            expertise and extensive facilities for explosive testing and
            evaluation.
                     workforce recruitment and development
        To sustain the Laboratory's expertise in nuclear weapon design and
    cultivate its spirit of innovation, LLNL endeavors to attract a world-
    class workforce by providing the opportunity to serve the Nation
    working on exciting projects, with outstanding colleagues, and state-
    of-the-art research capabilities. Many prospective career employees
    first come to the Laboratory as postdoctoral fellows to work on
    cutting-edge ST&E, often funded by Laboratory Directed Research and
    Development (LDRD). LDRD is exceedingly effective for workforce
    development, and, in many cases, it is the only means by which we
    explore innovative approaches to meet emerging national needs before
    they are sufficiently demonstrated to attract sponsor funding.
        Recruitment and employee development at LLNL has been challenged in
    recent years as weapons-related funding has decreased. The program
    stability offered in the fiscal year 2015 budget request greatly helps
    the Laboratory in workforce planning and recruiting. Fortunately, we
    continue to attract outstanding young people. For example, in the 4
    years of the program, the extremely competitive DOE Office of Science
    (SC) Early Career Research Program has made awards to 10 LLNL
    researchers. Only two DOE laboratories have more awards.
        LLNL provides an extensive range of employee development,
    mentoring, and leadership training programs to foster career growth.
    Special attention is being devoted to identifying and meeting needs for
    critical skills and to succession planning. Succession plans are being
    developed across the Laboratory and used to inform nominations for
    advancement and leadership development programs.
                                closing remarks
        I thank the subcommittee for its continuing support of the SSP, and
    the dedicated men and women of LLNL, who are committed to making our
    Nation more secure through advances in ST&E. We greatly appreciate the
    attention the SSP is receiving, but the challenges confronting the
    program and its investment needs are substantial.
        In the face of these challenges, LLNL remains focused on caring for
    the existing stockpile and modernizing or sustaining weapon systems
    consistent with national policy. The prospect for LLNL under the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2015 is a modest increase in
    funding for weapons activities. This reverses the trend of recent
    years, and will help us strengthen the SSP's underpinning ST&E,
    maintain a responsive infrastructure, and develop cost-informed options
    for LEPs.
        We must ensure that our workforce continues to have the training
    and skills necessary to meet current and future mission requirements.
    As long as there are nuclear dangers in the world, a cadre of talented
    scientists and engineers dedicated to national service and with the
    necessary skills, training, and tools, will be needed to sustain the
    nuclear stockpile without testing. In this regard, I am concerned about
    the delay of work on LEPs at LLNL, which limits opportunities to
    exercise weapons development and engineering expertise. In addition, as
    LEPs are prolonged or postponed, the pressure increases on SSP
    assessment tools and capabilities as they address a growing set of
    issues and protect against technical surprise.
        With sustained support for the SSP--and for complementary work as a
    broad-based national security laboratory--LLNL will continue to help
    ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, and
    develop innovative solutions challenges in nuclear security,
    international and domestic security, and energy and environmental
    security.
        Thank you for this opportunity to address the subcommittee.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Dr. Goldstein.
        Let me recognize myself and start the round of 7-minute
    blocks of time.
        I want to start with Dr. McMillan. The NNSA has stated it
    still wants to move out of the old chemistry metallurgy
    research (CMR) facility by 2019, given its aged state. Is this
    target achievable? What has to be moved out to make it happen?
    What happens if you don't achieve the target date?--as a
    follow-on.
        Dr. McMillan. Senator, thank you for the question.
        Yes, it is achievable, and the provisos really fall into
    three categories. First of all, the funding stream profile. In
    fiscal year 2014, we need to see $90 million available to do
    the work in those facilities. In 2015, we need to see $38
    million. Second, in the out years, we need to see $85 million,
    relatively uniformly, out to 2019. Third, we're going to need
    to have a streamlined process, what DOE and NNSA call the 413
    process, for being able to do the project. We need to be able
    to do that efficiently; and, if we do that, then I think that
    will work. With funding in the next 2 years, out-year funding,
    and then a streamlined process, I believe it's possible to do.
        The pieces of the work that we need to move out of CMR are
    primarily analytical chemistry. There is some what we call
    material characterization work that happens there, but it's
    mostly analytical chemistry. That's what we need to be able to
    move out.
        If we're unable to do that, we face choices such as
    extending beyond 2019, which I think is unadvisable. That
    building will be 70 years old at that point. The nuclear
    facility standards were very different in 1952, when the
    building came online. Either we do something like that or we
    have a gap in capabilities. But, it's probably early to really
    say what those consequences would be.
        Senator Udall. Dr. Hommert, let me turn to you and the B61
    LEP. Your laboratory's performing the largest amount of work on
    that weapon. I think you're now in an engineering phase. Let me
    ask you three questions connected to that effort: What's your
    assessment of the largest remaining technical risk you have to
    buy down in this program? Second, assuming you enter into
    production in time, what is your assessment of the capacity of
    reduced components in this program combined with all the other
    activities at the Kansas City plan? Third, do you see any areas
    for cost savings once it enters production?
        Dr. Hommert. Senator, thank you for the question. On the
    issue of technical risk, when we began the program 2 years ago,
    the highest technical risk we had was actually that radar
    module that you just saw. We've put that risk largely behind
    us, the green board there. As we stand here today, I would say
    there are a couple of areas of low- to moderate-risk that we
    continue to watch. It's important that we maintain effective
    work with our supplier base in a variety of different component
    areas--magnetics, et cetera. We have a small, relatively
    fragile supplier base, and it's important that we maintain
    strong relationships with them and ensure that they can meet
    our quality and schedule requirements.
        There is also a longstanding issue with the program, which
    is to effectively integrate the Air Force component into the
    B61. We continue to work closely with the Air Force and with
    their contractor, and we've made progress on that in the coming
    year, but that is a new technical component of the program that
    we'll have to continue to watch all the way through our design
    period.
        I would say, in aggregate, technical risk posture is
    stronger and in a better place than where we were a year ago,
    retiring that risk element in large measure. I feel pretty good
    about that.
        With respect to production, as we look at the production
    requirements through Kansas City, we think that the phasing of
    the programs, largely the 76-1, will complete its production by
    the time, in 2019/2020, when we begin the 61 production. I
    believe that that's effectively phased.
        The other thing I think that's very valuable in our working
    relationship with Kansas City, I think we've honed that working
    relationship very effectively through the 76-1 process and
    production. We're doing that now. I think we'll have
    effectively, a more honed and working relationship with Kansas
    City when we enter that. Also, the sequencing with where we
    would go with the Mk21 program, which now we look at 2023.
    Actually, the phasing is pretty good through the throughput for
    Kansas City right now.
        Finally, on cost savings in production itself, actually
    that has to begin well before production. We have a very active
    cost-control board with Kansas City. We're trying to make sure
    that there's a level of dialogue that we're factoring into our
    designs. The questions of manufacturability, we think we've
    made great progress on that, on the 61. We expect we'll see
    cost savings through the production period, as we've begun to
    see already in design phase.
        Senator Udall. The subcommittee certainly likes to hear
    that.
        Dr. Goldstein, you talked about the NIF. It's a
    multibillion-dollar facility. It focuses on--192 laser beams on
    a small target to simulate the condition of a nuclear weapon.
    One of the milestones associated with the facility was to
    achieve ignition or a sustained burn of a small target
    containing an isotope of hydrogen. My understanding is, this
    milestone has not been achieved. Can you explain to us why it's
    important to achieve that milestone, where you are in the
    progress towards this milestone, and what other stockpile
    activities are you using the facility for?
        Dr. Goldstein. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
    You're correct, that milestone was not achieved. Achieving
    ignition is important to the SSP because of the data that it
    will allow us to collect on physical properties important to
    understanding weapons performance, including the process
    referred to as ``boost,'' which occurs in all of our current
    stockpile weapons.
        This information is important in our assessment of the
    legacy stockpile and could help us develop options for future
    LEPs, and also to test the fidelity of our integrated
    multiphysics computer simulation codes. At the present time,
    we're making steady progress towards understanding the
    underlying physics associated with achieving ignition on NIF.
    As measures of progress, we've already set new records for the
    production of fusion neutrons and demonstrated a process known
    as bootstrapping, which is a prerequisite, a stepping stone, if
    you will, that's needed on the way to demonstrating fusion
    ignition. We've also demonstrated success in predicting the
    behavior of recent experiments using those large multiphysics
    codes that are used for weapons design.
        It's important to bear in mind that our work on ignition is
    even now helping us to evaluate and improve the level of
    confidence we have in the physics models used in our weapons
    computer codes.
        At the same time, both LLNL and LANL have been using NIF to
    collect data on materials properties under the very extreme
    conditions that are found in operating nuclear weapons, on the
    transport of radiation, in weapons geometries, and on the
    hydrodynamic behavior of weapons materials.
        I'd also add that NIF has already provided important
    confirmatory data for a theory put forward by a Livermore
    designer that resolved a so-called ``energy balance conundrum''
    that has bedeviled nuclear designers for decades. I mean, since
    the time of testing, we have not understood the nature of this
    process. It has been resolved recently, with the significant
    help from the experimental validation done on NIF.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Doctor.
        Let me recognize Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I've been on this committee 17 years, it's hard to believe,
    but I've never been comfortable with where our money is spent
    and how we've managed it. It's given me some concern over time.
        The first thing I want to draw your attention to--I don't
    know if you have a copy of this chart. Do you have that copy?
        [The chart referred to follows:]

        Senator Sessions. Just see if we have this correct. The
    chart, across the top, is the commitment made by the President
    and Congress to secure New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
    ratification in 2010 with regard to modernizing our nuclear
    weaponry. It appears to me that we're about $2 billion below
    that promised amount. This top line being those numbers. For
    example, in 2012, the commitment was $7.6 billion, and we came
    in a little over $7.2 and $7.9 and $6.9, $8.4, $7.7 is where
    we're headed. This is somewhat of a dangerous trend, it seems
    to me. Then, if you take the results of these delays, I guess
    we can blame the results of this failure of money is that the
    W76 was to be completed in 2017 and it looks like we have a 2-
    year delay on that, with a reduced number of warheads. Would
    you agree or disagree with that?
        Dr. Hommert. That is--fiscal year 2019 is the current
    schedule for the 76, yes.
        Senator Sessions. All right. Then, in the B61, the first
    production unit (FPU) was to be in 2017, but it looks like we
    have a 3-year delay to 2020. Is that correct?
        Dr. Hommert. Yes, Senator, that's the current schedule.
        Senator Sessions. Dr. Hommert, are these formal decisions?
    Have they been adopted by the labs? Who has made these
    decisions?
        Dr. Hommert. These FPU dates are the agreed position of the
    Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and then the NNSA and as
    requirements through to us.
        Senator Sessions. All right. The NWC and the NNSA has said
    this is what we're going to have to do, based on the budgets
    that we have, I guess is the way to express it.
        Dr. Hommert. Yes, Senator, that's correct.
        Senator Sessions. Then, the W88, we don't have a date
    specified for that. It's in development engineering. Would you
    say a delay is likely on that?
        Dr. Hommert. I don't think there'll be significant delay on
    the 88, as I currently see it right now.
        Senator Sessions. The interoperable warhead (IW)-1, delayed
    at least 5 years?
        Dr. Hommert. That's correct.
        Senator Sessions. That's correct?
        Dr. Goldstein, and then the LRSO weapon, initial low rate
    production, to begin in 2025, looks like it's delayed for 3
    years.
        Dr. Goldstein. That's correct.
        Senator Sessions. CMRR, we're looking for functionally
    attainable by 2020, completion in 2023, and now looks like
    we're going to 2027. The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)--
    that's the--what is that? That's the----
        Dr. Goldstein. That's the UPF at----
        Senator Sessions. Yes, okay. That's the building I've been
    asking questions about. So, that's delayed.
        I guess I'm saying to you, those represent fairly serious
    delays in the important programs that we've focused on, would
    you not agree? I assume you think, in addition, I'd ask you, is
    that unfortunate? Would you have preferred to stay on track?
    Who would like to answer that? [Laughter.]
        Dr. Hommert. I'll take a first crack. Let me just deal with
    the first three--the 76, the 61, and the 88--very quickly. I
    believe the schedules now are still schedules that provide
    effective margin against any issues in the stockpile. What is
    of paramount importance is to now hold them on schedule. The
    61, for example, 2014, 2015, and 2016--are these the most
    important years? If we can hold the budgets at the requested
    levels, we will be able to execute that, and that timeframe is
    acceptable.
        From my perspective, going back to my comments, the
    emphasis to now get these modernization efforts on a defined
    schedule, which you've gone through, Senator, I think has been
    effective, but it's had an associated effect of pressuring
    other elements of the program, which both Dr. McMillan and I
    have highlighted, in the infrastructure, surveillance, et
    cetera. I think that is where my current concern is most.
        Senator Sessions. Let me, just briefly, tell you. Last
    year, our interest on the debt was $220 billion, which is a lot
    of money. But, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) told us
    that in 10 years, the interest on the debt for 1 year would be
    $880 billion. So, this is going to crowd out a lot of things.
    I'm just saying it's going to take a heroic effort in the
    laboratories, I believe, to ask yourselves, ``Can't we produce
    what we need for the Nation at a lower cost?''
        Now, the NWC told Congress, on March 13th, that, while the
    fiscal year 2015/2019 budget request will meet nuclear
    stockpile requirements, as you've indicated, Dr. Hommert,
    quote, ``The program is fragile, and any funding reductions at
    this point could pose unacceptable risk to the health of the
    nuclear enterprise.'' Would each of you agree, a yes or no, to
    that?
        Dr. McMillan. Yes.
        Dr. Hommert. Yes.
        Dr. Goldstein. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. That's where we are. We're in a tight
    situation, for sure.
        Let me ask one question--my time's about up--and give you a
    chance to ask this. The interim report of the Congressional
    Advisory Panel on Governance of the National Nuclear Security
    Enterprise concludes, ``The existing governance, structures,
    and practices are most certainly inefficient and, in some
    instances, ineffective, putting the entire enterprise at risk
    over the long term. The NNSA experiment involving creation of a
    semi-autonomous organization has failed. This needs to be fixed
    as a matter of priority.''
        Briefly, I'll give you a chance to respond, maybe all three
    of you. Do you agree with that assessment? What's been your
    experience? What actions could you suggest? In 1 minute or
    less. [Laughter.]
        Or you could supplement, of course. But, we are going to
    need to talk about their recommendations and what we're going
    to do.
        Please, Dr. McMillan, do you want to start?
        Dr. McMillan. Sure, I'll start.
        As I'm sure you know, Senator, I and my colleagues have
    interacted closely with the subcommittee, and I have not yet
    heard the report. I'm looking forward to their report, here in
    a few minutes. But, I certainly find a lot that I resonate with
    in the statement you made, particularly on the issues of
    efficiency, as I said in my prepared remarks.
        Dr. Hommert. I would agree with that. I believe it's timely
    to reexamine the construct, because I think it's not as an
    efficient way to operate, and, as you just cited, there are
    significant pressures to control cost and meet schedule. I
    believe there's a relationship there, that it's, again, a good
    time to reexamine, and we look forward to the work of the
    Congressional Advisory Panel on that.
        Dr. Goldstein. I would agree that there's much room for
    improvement; in particular, in the efficiency area. We have had
    the opportunity to interact with the committee and to provide
    our input and our observations.
        The one thing I would add, I think, is that the NNSA,
    together with its labs, have been tremendously successful over
    these years in executing the SSP, and I don't think we should
    lose sight of that fact as we go forward.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, and I agree. I wish Congress
    and the President would allow new weapons to be built. I think
    that'd be safer and cheaper and better. But, we have to
    refurbish, it appears, what we have, and we have to get it
    done, in my opinion. More delays are not acceptable.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator King.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Let me talk about your workforce for a few minutes. How do
    you fellows assess the morale and the state of your workforce?
    This is a time in our economy when high-tech scientific people
    are in great demand in the private sector. Are you able to
    recruit and retain the people that you need? Is that an issue?
        Dr. Hommert. Senator, in order to meet the modernization
    programs that I just discussed, we've had a very significant
    recruiting requirement over the last 4 years. I'm actually
    pleased to reply that we've had a fair degree of success in
    that. We've brought something just under 1,000 advanced-degreed
    scientists and engineers. That's a new generation of stockpile
    stewards from the finest research universities in the country.
    We are under pressure to retain them because they do have other
    opportunities. You would expect that, given their talent. But,
    I'm reasonably optimistic we can do that, as long as we have
    the stability to execute the programs, because that's what
    keeps them. They believe they're doing something important,
    challenging, and, if we can convey to them that stability, I
    think we'll be effective in retaining that workforce.
        Senator King. Are they straight-up Federal employees? Are
    they subject to furloughs and all of the kinds of things that
    we've gone through?
        Dr. Hommert. They're not Federal employees, but, as
    contractors to DOE, we certainly were subject to the impact of
    the shutdown of the government in October. That had a very
    dramatic effect, and it's not a point of stability. That did
    cause some retention issues for us. I think we've been able to
    push through that. But, yes, we were subject to that impact.
        Senator King. Do either of you want to comment on that?
        Dr. Goldstein. I would just follow up on this issue of--we
    are not Federal employees, but we are subject to furlough when
    we run out of money. LLNL actually was the only DOE lab that,
    because of limited carryover, was actually in a position of
    having to close for several days in October. The morale impacts
    of that, the lack of security that that conveyed to our
    workforce--were significant. We can point to specific people
    who have left the laboratory because of their reaction to that
    kind of uncertainty.
        Dr. McMillan. Senator, if I could.
        We do a lot of our recruiting at LANL through our postdoc
    program. We have continued to be able to recruit extremely
    high-quality postdocs, among the best in the world. However, we
    are seeing increasing pressure on retention, and, in the last
    year, I've lost some of my very best mid-career people to
    universities, and I'm fighting off attempts on some of my
    people from companies such as Google, Apple, and Yahoo!.
        What's the reason for their readiness to leave?
        Dr. McMillan. Exactly the issues that my colleagues have
    talked about: instability in funding, uncertainty about the
    future program. We need to be clear and stable for the
    employees.
        Senator King. We certainly agree. I hope we can achieve
    that.
        We haven't conducted an underground nuclear test, or any
    kind of test for that matter, since 1992. What kind of problems
    does that raise? Because you're in charge of being sure that a
    weapon is ready to go if it's needed, God forbid, but you don't
    have the ability to test them. Are there ways to test, other
    than by testing the whole weapon, that can ameliorate that
    problem?
        Dr. McMillan. Yes, Senator. I would say two key areas, and
    they're parts of the SSP.
        First, we do experiments in areas where we can. In the last
    year, I'm very proud of the people of LANL in having developed
    a very innovative new diagnostic for an experiment that we did
    in Nevada. It didn't produce any nuclear yield, but it was a
    way for us to gain information we had never had before.
        Another example of that is what my colleague Dr. Goldstein
    mentioned of doing experiments on NIF. We're finding those to
    be very productive of information in domains of weapons
    performance that we haven't historically been able to touch.
        The second broad area is modeling and simulation. Through
    the last 20 years of the SSP, we have all worked to develop not
    only the computing machines, but the codes that run on those
    machines, to help us bridge the gap to testing. As someone who
    helped develop that program 20 years ago, I'm not only proud of
    what we've done, I am amazed at how far we've been able to go.
    It's successful beyond my expectations.
        Senator King. You can do, in effect, partial testing. You
    can test the components----
        Dr. McMillan. Yes.
        Senator King.--the firing mechanism, all of that. You
    simply can't test the physics of the nuclear part, itself.
        Dr. McMillan. That's correct.
        Senator King. Last December, the CBO talked about the
    nuclear weapons complex and cost for the next decade, including
    $105 billion for nuclear weapons supporting the labs of the
    naval reactors. Within the CBO report was a chilling statement,
    ``If they follow historical trends, efforts related to
    sustaining and modernizing the weapons stockpile are likely to
    be particularly susceptible to cost growth.'' That's a term we
    don't like to hear around here. Can you comment on that? Can we
    do the upgrades and the work that we need to do without
    necessarily being particularly susceptible to cost growth?
        Dr. Hommert?
        Dr. Hommert. I'm particularly sensitive to this because
    there's been a lot of dialogue in Washington about the cost of
    the modernization programs, and I believe we have a high degree
    of confidence that we can hold to the cost estimates that we
    submitted on each of these programs. We have a process that's
    called a Weapon Development Cost Report. We're very committed
    to execute on that. We have, in that, appropriate contingency.
    As I indicated, on the largest of those programs, we've been
    able to actually realize savings in the first 2 years. So, that
    may have not--that may have been the historical
    characterization. I think we've gotten the message. We
    understand the pressures that you're under, and I'm confident
    we can execute to that.
        But, I'll also emphasize something I said earlier, that if
    you look at our budgets today in constant dollars and what's on
    our plate, there's actually more on the plate, and less,
    overall. We got it, we're working on that, and I am confident
    that we can execute without significant cost growth if we hold
    the schedules.
        Senator King. I was just going to end with that. I think
    what I'm hearing is, you can do it if we can deliver some kind
    of certainty and predictability. Fair enough?
        Dr. Hommert. Absolutely. The biggest risk to cost growth is
    a delay in appropriations that causes the schedule to slip.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Dr. Hommert. Then you'll inevitably have some cost growth.
    If we don't have that, I think we're--we can do it.
        Senator King. That's an important message for us.
        Thank you very much, gentlemen.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Fischer.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here today.
        I apologize if I'm repeating any questions that you might
    have had. I was at a Commerce Committee markup, so my staff
    tells me that my questions are good to go. So, you can correct
    him if there is an issue here. [Laughter.]
        Again, thank you.
        Dr. McMillan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, Andrew
    Weber, testified to me last year that DOD and DOE agreed on
    achieving a production rate of 30 pits per year by 2021, but
    this budget would delay that rate to 2026. What was the reason
    for the delay, please?
        Dr. McMillan. As you said, the----
        Senator Fischer. Has that requirement changed at all?
        Dr. McMillan. As we discussed in earlier conversations,
    both the immediate need for pits for systems such as the
    Adaptable Warhead 1 have moved out. The requirement for 30 pits
    per year has also moved out. However, I think it's important
    for this committee to understand that, with a capability like
    pits, it's important that we be making them. I would remind you
    that, following the closure of Rocky Flats in 1989, we lost the
    ability to make pits. It cost us nearly $1 billion in almost a
    decade to regain that capability. I don't think we should go
    there again.
        Even if we're not making pits at the rate of 30 per year,
    we need to be continuing to practice that arc so that the
    people who do the work are able to do it for the country when
    it's needed.
        Senator Fischer. Is that going to have an impact on our
    current modernization plans, then----
        Dr. McMillan. Not after the delays----
        Senator Fischer.--if we're not able to----
        Dr. McMillan. Not after the delays that are in place. If we
    can do 30 by 2026, that will provide what we need.
        Senator Fischer. If we cannot do 30?
        Dr. McMillan. If we cannot, then it will, of course, have
    an impact.
        Senator Fischer. If we can do the 30 by 2026, are we going
    to meet the targets, then, by--I think it's 2030, that are 50
    to 80?
        Dr. McMillan. That depends on the funding. As I've
    discussed, we've laid out a three-phase program for plutonium
    strategy. The first two steps of that, which are what we're
    working on most immediately, will get us to the level of about
    30 per year. We should be able to do that by 2026. Then, if we
    make further investments, that will get us to the 50, and
    possibly beyond 50, per year.
        Senator Fischer. We're delaying a cruise missile warhead.
    Is that correct?
        Dr. McMillan. Yes.
        Senator Fischer. By how many years?
        Dr. McMillan. Three years?
        Dr. Hommert. Roughly 3, yes.
        Dr. McMillan. Yes, My colleagues are better prepared for
    that one than I am.
        Senator Fischer. Are we going to be looking at delaying
    everything by 3 years, 5 years, 10 years? What are we looking
    at?
        Dr. Hommert. Let's see, the three programs we're executing
    now--the 61, the 88, and the Mk21--the first two of those are--
    I believe the schedules are firm now, 2019 and 2020. There has
    been a change in the schedule on the Air Force Mk21, but I also
    believe that's now firm--2023, I believe. I think those are
    firm. I think the ones that are less firm right now because we
    haven't done 6-2--what we call our cost-estimate phase of 6-2--
    are the cruise missile system and the, what we call, IW-1 and -
    2. Those, I think, are still to be nailed down.
        Senator Fischer. Last year, Doctor, you were saying, that
    about the LEP schedule, and maybe seeing that slip, as well,
    and significantly slip--and you said, quote, ``You then have
    the possibility of stacking up a fair amount of production
    requirement falling on top of one another early the next
    decade, and also just late design activities that can
    complicate our ability to support the 50---or, I'm sorry, the
    78/88. There is sequencing and phasing here that is important
    to adhere to.'' Are we looking at a problem with that
    sequencing and phasing?
        Dr. Hommert. I think we're in--we're not--a year ago, when
    we were here, we had a fair amount of uncertainty as to exactly
    what the 2014 budget would bring to execute those programs. The
    final numbers on 2014 were such that we are able to hold the
    current schedules of, particularly, the 61, the 76 production,
    and the 88, which would--if we can hold them through the 2015
    and 2016 appropriations funding process, would avoid that
    stackup, which would have been clearly a possibility.
        Senator Fischer. Are you worried that some of these systems
    are going to age out, though, if we can't hold it?
        Dr. Hommert. Certainly that's a concern. The 61 schedule
    needs to be held. I'll just leave it at that.
        Senator Fischer. Okay, thank you. I think I'll stop there.
        Thank you, gentlemen.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
        Senator Donnelly.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This is to follow, a little bit, up on my colleague Senator
    King's questions. In regards to keeping your talent, when we
    look at the folks that work there and we see some of the salary
    challenges of an Apple or a Google or those kind of things,
    what are the most important, I guess you'd call it, counter-
    weapons you have to try to keep people on the team?
        Dr. McMillan. Why don't I start with that one, Senator? I
    think, first of all, the importance of mission. People come to
    the laboratory because they believe that the mission we provide
    for the Nation is an important mission. To the degree that we,
    as a country, make sure they--that that commitment is
    reciprocated, that's an important tool.
        Second, I think having the tools to be able to do the
    scientific work that no one else in the world can do. I
    remember, in the late 1990s, when Silicon Valley was drawing
    off my computer science people. Having the fastest computers in
    the world for them to work on to tackle those mission
    requirements would help to balance some of the differential.
        I think, third, we need to constantly pay attention to the
    work environment, making an environment in which those people
    can work rather than one in which they're stymied. As our
    colleagues from the governance panel talk, I think that's one
    of the things I'm looking for is, are we able to govern the
    laboratories in our relationship to the government in ways that
    will make it possible for people to work rather than impossible
    for them to work?
        Dr. Goldstein. Speaking from a laboratory that has Google
    and Netflix and assorted other giants right down the street----
        Senator Donnelly. Great neighborhood, huh? [Laughter.]
        Dr. Goldstein. Absolutely--in many ways, yes. [Laughter.]
        We're in a situation where people don't even have to move
    in order to take these jobs, and they are constantly pinged by
    these companies. When we lose somebody to one of these
    companies, the people who leave are offered--I don't know if I
    want to use the word ``bounty,'' but----
        Senator Donnelly. Well, is----
        Dr. Goldstein.--compensation. If they can go back to us
    and----
        Senator Donnelly. I've heard the salaries can be, like,
    triple the salary or more.
        Dr. Goldstein. There are many things. The salaries can be
    larger, but also, the other parts of the compensation package--
    stock options, things like that--as well as a range of
    amenities that these companies can offer their employees.
        I will just go through the things that I think distinguish
    us from them, and that we've found work very well in attracting
    and retaining talent:
        First of all, it is, as my colleague said, the mission, the
    ability to make a difference on a national scale. That's one of
    the reasons it's so important for that mission to be strongly
    emphasized and reinforced all the time.
        Second, it's the caliber of the people that they get to
    work with at the laboratory. That's kind of a circular thing.
    If we have good people there, we can keep good people there.
        Third, it's the caliber of the facilities. This makes it
    absolutely essential that we find ways to reinvest in keeping
    our science, engineering, and technology facilities at the
    forefront. That's one of the things that our people come
    looking for, and it's one of the things that keep them there.
         I'll just mention, also in this context, the importance of
    the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program
    at these laboratories, which is one of the important ways that
    we recruit people and also retain them. We keep our scientists
    at the forefront of their fields through this--among others,
    this mechanism. When there's pressure on this program at the
    lab, we feel it in our ability to attract and retain the
    nuclear force that we need.
        Senator Donnelly. Have you been able to stay as deep as you
    need to be, talent-wise? Are we as deep as we have ever been,
    or has it been more difficult to try to make sure that we're
    meeting all the goals we need to meet, in terms of having
    critical talent in our locations?
        Dr. Goldstein. I would answer that by saying we have the
    critical talent we need right now for the program, but we are
    not deep in the areas that are critical. I believe that's
    primarily because we're making the best use of the budgets that
    we have, and that does lead to our being thin in areas where,
    if we lose the next person, it could become an issue.
        Dr. Hommert. My colleague said this very well; I'll just
    try to summarize: importance of the mission, the stability with
    respect to the ability to execute the mission, the requisite
    infrastructure, and an environment conducive to the best in
    science and engineering. If we have those things, I mentioned
    earlier, we have brought some outstanding staff to the
    laboratory. They are fully capable of executing our mission,
    but we need those elements.
        Senator Donnelly. On a long list of things that we can do
    better here, if you had three top things that you looked at us
    and said, ``We need you to do this and this and this,'' what
    would they be?
        Dr. Hommert. Reinforce clarity on the expectations of our
    mission and its importance. In doing that, do it with a time
    horizon that gives us some confidence of the stability that we
    would execute on that mission. Then, I think, to your next
    panel, I do believe, to listen carefully to their
    recommendations about the nature of the environment in which we
    can operate in these institutions, because that's going to be
    very important to retain this new workforce we've brought
    through. Those would be the three things I would suggest.
        Senator Donnelly. Dr. McMillan?
        Dr. McMillan. I agree with my colleague.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Senator King, did you have a----
        Senator King. Before this panel leaves, I hope you will
    take the message back to your people that they have one of the
    most important missions in this country, and it doesn't get
    recognized, because their mission is to provide the
    intellectual guts of our deterrent. If you look back at the
    sweep of history, I think the fact that we've gone for 69 years
    without a use of nuclear weapon is a miracle. It's a miracle
    because of the credibility of the deterrent. Your people are an
    essential part of that. It's hard to recognize a negative, in
    effect, because what they've done through their work and their
    contributions, along with all those others in the nuclear
    enterprise, has enabled our deterrent to be a kind of umbrella
    for the world, which there is no more important work.
        I just hope you'll convey that those of us here understand
    and appreciate that.
        Dr. Hommert. Thank you, Senator.
        We do provide our workforce the opportunity to Webcast and
    view this hearing, so hearing that from our political
    leadership is very, very important. They'll hear it directly.
        Senator King. Let the record show. [Laughter.]
        Senator Udall. Yes, let me thank Senator King, Senator
    Donnelly, Senator Sessions, and Senator Fischer, and hopefully
    I'm on that list, as well. But, I think what I hear everybody
    saying on the committee is that your people, and their
    intellectual capital, are part of our overall deterrent.
    Senator King put his finger on it.
        We thank you for your service and for your time. I know we
    could spend easily another hour or 2 with you, but the day is
    getting on. I'm going to excuse all of you and ask our next
    panel to take their seats.
        Thank you. Thank you.
        Dr. Hommert, I'm tempted to keep this assembly here but I
    guess it's $1 million. I've never held $1 million in my hands.
        Dr. Hommert. Probably even more than that.
        Senator Udall. The Doctor is saying ``even more than
    that.'' I feel asset rich and cash poor.
        Dr. Hommert. It's the best of American technology----
        Senator Udall. It's a work of art. [Pause.]
        I want to welcome Mr. Norman R. Augustine and Admiral
    Richard W. Mies. They're the co-chairs of the Congressional
    Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security
    Enterprise at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
        If I might, I just wanted to set the stage for these two
    gentlemen. We just spoke to this with the previous panel. This
    is a part of my opening statement that I put in the record, but
    I think it's important, for those watching and here today, to
    understand what we face and what our opportunities are. By
    that, I mean, look, the heart and soul of our Nation's nuclear
    deterrents are the scientists and engineers working in our
    laboratories. Robert Oppenheimer--and Senator King's a great
    student of history----
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman----
        Senator Udall. Yes.
        Senator Sessions.--we have to vote. I just see the first
    vote starting. Do you think we're going to try to come back and
    forth----
        Senator Udall. Yes, we're going to----
        Senator Sessions.--between the votes?
        Senator Udall. Would you all like to--there's a series of
    votes. The first vote will most likely be about 20 minutes, so
    perhaps, Senator King----
        Senator Sessions. Go early and come right back?
        Senator Udall.--if you go early, and then I'll hold the
    fort. Then when you return, whichever one of you arrives first
    will--this is a bipartisan subcommittee--will chair the
    subcommittee.
        I want to highlight what Robert Oppenheimer said at the end
    of World War II. He looked back on the Manhattan Project, and
    he said to his fellow scientists at LANL, ``If you're a
    scientist, you cannot stop such a thing. If you're a scientist,
    you believe that it is good to find out how the world works,
    that it is good to find out what the realities are, that it is
    good to turn over to mankind at large the greatest possible
    power to control the world and to deal with it according to its
    lights and its values.''
        Since Dr. Oppenheimer's leadership, the core mission of
    these laboratories has not changed on the nature of the
    scientific enterprise that served as the foundation of our
    deterrent. That scientific base is a fragile enterprise that
    needs constant oversight by the witnesses here today and by
    this subcommittee. We, as a Congress, need to ensure the
    resources are available to maintain this scientific enterprise
    so that our nuclear deterrent remains an effective one. I look
    forward to both of you providing us with your testimony,
    particularly with a focus on the relationship between the
    laboratories and the NNSA.
        Both of you, Mr. Augustine and Admiral Mies, have a track
    record of being forthright, and I expect as much today in your
    testimony. Thank you for being here.
        Mr. Augustine, perhaps we'd turn to you.

    STATEMENT OF NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, CO-CHAIR OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
       ADVISORY PANEL ON THE GOVERNANCE OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY
    ENTERPRISE, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES; ACCOMPANIED BY ADM
      RICHARD W. MIES, USN (RET.), CO-CHAIR OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
       ADVISORY PANEL ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NUCLEAR SECURITY
               ENTERPRISE, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

        Mr. Augustine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have about an 8-
    minute statement, which, with your permission, I'll proceed.
    Otherwise, I can submit it for the record and make it more
    brief.
        Senator Udall. If you could make it more brief, that would
    be well appreciated. I'll leave it to you.
        Mr. Augustine. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the
    subcommittee, and I will submit a longer statement for the
    record, and we appreciate this opportunity to share with you
    the findings to date of our panel on the Governance of the
    Nuclear Security Enterprise. Admiral Mies and I have the
    privilege of serving it as co-chairmen.
        Congress asked our panel to broadly examine the performance
    of the Nuclear Security Enterprise and to consider alternatives
    and improvements. Let us state very clearly at the outset that
    the current viability of our nuclear deterrent is not in
    question. At the same time, the existing governance structure
    and operating practices are most certainly inefficient and, in
    some instances, actually ineffective, which does put the entire
    enterprise at risk over the long term.
        During the past 5 months, the panel has focused attention
    on the NNSA, both in the headquarters and the field, including
    the laboratories, the production plants, and the Nevada
    National Security Site. We've examined the current situation
    from the perspectives of the national leadership, from the
    users of the facilities, and also from the standpoint of the
    customers of the facilities and the employees.
        We've benchmarked the NNSA against proven management
    approaches that have been used by high-performing enterprises
    both in the private sector and in the government. We've
    conducted onsite visits to virtually all the installations, and
    we've heard from dozens of expert witnesses. I should say that
    Admiral Mies and I appreciate the great support of our
    colleagues on the panel and certainly the candor of those
    people that we've interviewed.
        Today, we are prepared to summarize our panel's findings on
    the current health of the NNSA and the root causes of its
    challenges, but we are only beginning to formulate our
    recommendations, and we'll look forward to presenting those to
    you. We believe we're on schedule for our final report.
        Unfortunately, the unmistakable conclusion of our
    factfinding is that, as implemented, the NNSA experiment
    involving creation of a semi-autonomous organization has
    largely failed to achieve the system that Congress apparently
    intended. This does need to be fixed as a matter of priority.
        Despite the flaws, we found examples of great success in
    NNSA's endeavors. To date, the science-based SSP has succeeded
    in sustaining confidence in our nuclear deterrent, unmatched
    technical innovation on the part of NNSA scientists and
    engineers has produced a dramatically increased understanding
    of the aging of our nuclear weapon stockpile, the labs and
    plants are providing solid support to the nonproliferation
    efforts and unique expertise to the Intelligence Community.
    NNSA's naval reactors organization continues to provide the
    world-class performance in developing and supporting the most
    advanced naval nuclear propulsion systems in the world.
        On the other hand, NNSA, as a whole, continues to struggle
    to meet fundamental commitments. To that point, it's lost
    credibility among many of its customers and overseers. At the
    root of the challenge are complacency and the loss of focus on
    the nuclear mission by both the Nation's leadership and the
    public, following the end of the Cold War. Although the
    national leadership has provided strong policy and has provided
    substantial amounts of funds, it's evident that the
    followthrough has been insufficient, and Congress' present
    focus on this issue is certainly timely and welcome.
        Fundamental reform will be required to shape the enterprise
    so that it can meet all the Nation's needs and rebuild the
    essential infrastructure that's required. While the technical
    work is rocket science, certainly the kind of management issues
    we've seen are not. That's not to say that they will not be
    difficult to rectify. Many have to do with culture. In my
    experience, there's nothing harder to change than culture.
        The changes that we will recommend undoubtedly will be
    difficult to implement. They will require strong support from
    the higher levels of the government, including Congress and
    certainly the White House.
        While organizational issues such as we have addressed are
    important, they are, frankly, the easy part and a necessary,
    but not sufficient, condition to achieve the improvements that
    Congress has pointed to.
        The panel believes that the enterprise today benefits
    immensely from the political leadership of an engaged Secretary
    of Energy and the strong science and engineering of the
    National Laboratory system, but we have found five systemic
    disorders that have taken root that we believe are at the heart
    of the problem. With your permission, Mr. Chairman and members
    of the committee, Admiral Mies is prepared to describe,
    briefly, those five issues.
        Senator Udall. That's perfect.
        Admiral Mies.
        Admiral Mies. Chairman Udall and Ranking Member Sessions,
    let me add my thanks, as well, for being here today. My remarks
    are intended to provide some specifics on the panel's findings
    within the context of my co-chair's overall characterization of
    the health surrounding the enterprise.
        As Norm indicated, our panel has identified five systemic
    disorders which result from the causes outlined in Norm's
    preceding testimony.
        The causes and the disorders are really inseparable. Most,
    if not all, of these disorders can be traced back to national
    complacency, the lack of a compelling national narrative, and a
    widely accepted understanding regarding the role of the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent in this century.
        Today, I would like to offer a brief synopsis of our
    panel's key findings, specifically focusing on the five
    systemic disorders we have identified:
        First, a sustained loss of national leadership focus. Since
    the end of the Cold War, the United States has experienced
    significant erosion in its ability to sustain nuclear deterrent
    capabilities for the long term. The atrophy of these
    capabilities has been well-documented in numerous reports over
    the past decade. The fundamental underlying cause of this
    erosion has been a lack of attention to nuclear-weapon issues
    by senior leadership, both civilian and military, across both
    past and present administrations and Congresses. This lack of
    attention has resulted in public confusion, congressional
    distrust, and a serious erosion of advocacy, expertise, and
    proficiency in the sustainment of these capabilities. Absent
    strong national leadership, NNSA, as well as the whole Nuclear
    Security Enterprise, has been allowed to muddle through. First
    and foremost, we must consolidate and focus national-level
    support----
        Senator Udall. Admiral, if I might stop you there, we had
    hoped to phase in your testimony, like we're going to phase in
    the modernization of our weapons. I believe I need to go to the
    floor, so we'll temporarily recess, and when the first
    Senator----
        Admiral Mies. Fine, sir.
        Senator Udall.--arrives, you can pick up at your second
    point.
        So----
        Admiral Mies. Great.
        Senator Udall. We stand in recess. [Recess.]
        Senator Sessions [presiding]. Colleagues, we are very
    apologetic from having our meeting interrupted when having good
    people like yourselves testifying on important subjects. We are
    hearing it, we are reading the report, and we will consider
    very seriously your recommendations.
        So, Admiral, I believe you were getting warmed up, so feel
    free to go ahead and----
        Admiral Mies. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        I have already begun, and I am talking about five systemic
    disorders. I've already covered the first.
        The second is a flawed DOE/NNSA governance model. The
    current NNSA governance model of semi-autonomy is fundamentally
    flawed. NNSA has not established effective leadership, policy,
    culture, or integrated decisionmaking. Indeed, the design and
    implementation of NNSA governance has led to numerous
    redundancies, confused authorities, and weakened accountability
    within DOE.
        The third disorder is a lack of sound management principles
    and practices. NNSA and the associated policy-setting and
    oversight organizations within DOE reflect few of the
    characteristics of successful organizations. An entrenched
    risk-averse bureaucracy lacks a shared vision for, and a
    unified commitment to, mission accomplishment; and hence, they
    don't act as a team. Both DOE and NNSA lack clearly defined and
    disciplined exercise of roles, responsibilities, authorities,
    and accountability aligned to NNSA's mission deliverables. Too
    many people can stop mission-essential work, for a host of
    reasons; and those who are responsible for getting the work
    done often find their decisions ignored or overturned. Chains
    of command are not well defined, and resources are
    micromanaged. Personnel management and career development
    programs, issue resolution processes, and deliverable aligned
    budgets are deficient. Shortfalls in project management and
    cost estimating are well documented and acute.
        Fourth, there is a dysfunctional relationship between the
    NNSA Federal workforce and their management and operations, the
    management and operating (M&O) partners. The trusted
    partnership that has historically existed between the
    laboratories and DOE/NNSA has--headquarters--has eroded over
    the past two decades to an arms-length customer-to-contractor
    adversarial relationship leading to a significant loss in the
    benefit of the Federally Funded Research and Development
    Centers (FFRDC) model. The trust factor essential to this
    model, underscored by a recent National Academy of Sciences
    study, results from unclear accountability for risk, a fee
    structure, and contract approach that invites detailed
    transactional compliance-based oversight rather than a more
    strategic approach with performance-based standards.
    Additionally, excessive fragmented budget and reporting lines
    also confound effective and efficient programmatic management
    and further erode any sense of trust. Furthermore, there is no
    enterprise-wide approach within NNSA. While there are examples
    where the relationship has improved, such as at the Kansas City
    plant, overall this government and M&O partnership remains
    highly inefficient and, in many cases, severely fractured.
        Fifth and finally, there's a lack of close collaboration
    with selected customers. The issues the panel has identified
    are mainly with DOD weapon customers, and this is at once a
    culture--cultural and communications divide. There's no
    affordable, executable, joint DOD/DOE vision, plan, or program
    for the future of nuclear-weapon capabilities. There's a lack
    of effective joint planning and budget coordination because of
    a fundamental lack of mechanisms to ensure requisite
    collaboration and consensus to address core mission
    requirements. As a consequence, DOD customers lack trust in
    NNSA's ability to modernize facilities and execute warhead
    LEPs. Although other customers appear to be satisfied, hereto a
    more strategic approach could strengthen capabilities in the
    services provided.
        In conclusion, lasting reform requires aggressive action
    and sustained implementation in all five of these areas, but
    national leadership engagement is really the common theme.
    Improvement is possible, but it will demand strong leadership
    and proactive implementation of the panel's recommendations by
    the President, Congress, and an engaged Secretary of Energy.
        Thank you for your time, and we look forward to answering
    your questions.
        [The prepared statements of Mr. Augustine and Admiral Mies
    follow:]
                   Prepared Statement by Mr. Norman Augustine
        Mr Chairman and Ranking Member Sessions, thank you for the
    opportunity to present the findings to date of the Congressional
    Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise.
    Admiral Rich Mies and I serve as its co-chairmen.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The other Panel members are: Dr. Michael Anastasio, Admiral
    Kirkland Donald, U.S. Navy (ret.), Mr. T.J. Glauthier, The Honorable
    David Hobson, Dr. Gregory Jaczko, Dr. Franklin Miller, Dr. William
    Schneider, Jr., The Honorable John Spratt, Jr., The Honorable Ellen
    Tauscher, and The Honorable Heather Wilson.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress tasked our panel to broadly examine the performance of the
    Nuclear Security Enterprise and to consider alternatives.
        Let us state at the outset: The current viability of the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent is not in question. At the same time, the existing
    governance structures and practices are most certainly inefficient and
    in some instances ineffective, putting the entire enterprise at risk
    over the long term.
        During the past 5 months, the panel has focused attention on the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--both headquarters and
    field, including the laboratories, production plants, and Nevada
    National Security Site. We have also examined the current situation
    from the perspective of the national leadership in the Legislative and
    Executive branches and from the perspective of customers of the NNSA in
    the Department of Defense, Department of State, the Intelligence
    Community, and the Department of Homeland Security. We have benchmarked
    NNSA against proven management approaches used by other high-
    performing, high-technology organizations both in the private sector
    and in government.
        The panel's work has relied on our 12 members' decades of
    experience of a broad scope dealing with nuclear enterprise issues; we
    have reviewed thousands of pages of previous studies; we have conducted
    on-site visits to numerous installations; and we have benefitted from
    the views of dozens of expert witnesses. We appreciate the Active
    engagement of our colleagues on the panel and the candor of those we
    have interviewed.
        Today we will summarize our panel's findings on the current health
    of the NNSA and the root causes of its challenges. We are only now
    beginning to formulate the recommendations that we will provide in our
    final report.
        Unfortunately, the unmistakable conclusion of our fact finding is
    that, as implemented, the ``NNSA experiment'' involving creation of a
    semi-autonomous organization has failed. The current DOE-NNSA structure
    has not established the effective operational system that Congress
    intended. This needs to be fixed as a matter of priority, and these
    fixes will not be simple or quick, and they need to recognize the
    systemic nature of the problem.
        Despite the flaws, we have found examples of success in NNSA's
    endeavors. To date, Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship has succeeded
    in sustaining confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Unmatched
    technical innovation on the part of NNSA's scientists and engineers has
    produced dramatically increased understanding of the country's aging
    nuclear weapon stockpile. The labs and plants are providing solid
    support to non-proliferation efforts and unique expertise to the
    Intelligence Community. NNSA's Naval Reactors organization continues to
    provide world class performance in the development and support of the
    most advanced naval nuclear propulsion systems in the world.
        But, NNSA as a whole continues to struggle to meet fundamental
    commitments. To the point: it has lost credibility and the trust of the
    national leadership and customers in DOD that it can deliver needed
    weapons and critical nuclear facilities on schedule and on budget.
    Simply stated, there is no plan for success with available resources.
    NNSA is on a trajectory towards crisis unless strong leadership arrests
    the current course and reorients its governance to better focus on
    mission priorities and deliverables.
        At the root of the challenges are complacency and the loss of focus
    on the nuclear mission by the Nation and its leadership following the
    end of the Cold War. Although the national leadership has provided
    strong policy statements and substantial sums of money to the
    enterprise, it is evident that follow-through has been insufficient.
    Congress' current focus on the issue is a welcome development.
        Over the decades this changed situation has translated into the
    absence of a widely accepted understanding of, and appreciation for,
    the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology in the 21st century,
    with the resultant well-documented and atrophied conditions of plans
    for the U.S. strategic deterrent's future--in DOD as well as in DOE.
    Within the Nuclear Enterprise this has been reflected as a lack of
    urgency and need for a compelling mission focus.
        As earlier reviews have concluded, and this panel endorses: this is
    no time for complacency about the nuclear deterrent. America's
    deterrent forces remain of utmost importance; they provide the ultimate
    guarantee against major war and coercion. Further, our allies depend on
    these forces and capabilities for extended deterrence and could well
    pursue their own nuclear weapon capabilities if they perceive the U.S.
    commitment or competency to be weakening. Other countries carefully
    measure U.S. resolve and technological might in making their own
    decisions about proliferation and nuclear force sizing. U.S. leadership
    in nuclear science is something the country cannot afford to lose. The
    United States, along with its allies, are in a complex nuclear age;
    with several nuclear powers modernizing their arsenals, new nuclear
    technologies emerging, and potential new actors--as well as regional
    challenges--raising significant concerns. This would be a dangerous
    time to stumble.
        Fundamental reform will be required to shape an enterprise that
    meets all of the Nation's needs and rebuilds the essential
    infrastructure that is required. But while the technical work is rocket
    science, the management and cultural issues are not as complex.albeit,
    in the case of the latter, not easily rectified. What is needed is to
    issue clear plans and provide sufficient resources for success; assign
    and align responsibility, along with the necessary authority; and
    provide strong, accountable leadership and management at all levels to
    execute the mission. The panel believes such reform is possible, but it
    will demand determined and sustained high-level leadership.
        The changes the panel will recommend undoubtedly will be difficult
    to implement regardless of where the enterprise is located within the
    government's structure, since the fundamental problems are cultural
    more than organizational. Organizational change, while not unimportant,
    is only a small portion.the easy portion.of the revisions that must be
    made. Previous efforts to reform and previous studies calling for
    action have largely failed due to lack of leadership follow-through, a
    lack of accountability for enacting change, and, we might add, the lack
    of effective, sustained top-level demand for change from the national
    leadership.
        The Department of Energy by itself would be challenged to oversee
    the radical steps that will be needed. Success is imaginable only with
    the strong and active engagement of a knowledgeable Secretary,
    supported by the White House and Congress, and a structure that removes
    impediments and that aligns to mission priority. The panel believes the
    enterprise today benefits immensely from the political leadership of an
    engaged Secretary of Energy and the strong science and engineering of
    the national laboratory system.
        Each successive administration since that of President Eisenhower
    has reaffirmed the need to sustain a credible nuclear deterrent that is
    safe, secure and reliable. But sustained national commitment and focus
    on the entirety of the mission and the enterprise charged with its
    execution has been lacking since the end of the Cold War, as evidenced
    by the condition in which the enterprise finds itself today. DOE and
    the NNSA have failed to act with a sense of urgency at obvious signs of
    decline in key areas. Five systemic disorders have taken root that we
    found to be at the heart of the problem. With your permission, Admiral
    Mies will briefly outline those issues.
        Thank you.
                                     ______

               Prepared Statement by ADM Richard Mies, USN (Ret.)
        Mr Chairman and Ranking Member Sessions, let me add my thanks as
    well for being here today. My remarks are intended to provide some
    specifics on the panel's findings within the context of my Co-Chair's
    overall characterization of the health surrounding the Enterprise.
        Our panel has identified five systemic disorders which result from
    the fundamental causes outlined in Norm Augustine's preceding
    testimony. The causes and the disorders are inseparable. Most, if not
    all, of these disorders can be traced back to national complacency.the
    lack of a compelling national narrative and a widely accepted
    understanding--regarding the role of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in this
    century.
        Today I would like to offer a synopsis of our panel's key findings,
    specifically focusing on the five systemic disorders we have
    identified.
        First, a loss of sustained national leadership focus. Since the end
    of the Cold War, the United States has experienced significant erosion
    in its abilities to sustain nuclear deterrent capabilities for the long
    term. The atrophy of these capabilities has been well documented in
    numerous reports over the past decade. The fundamental underlying cause
    of this erosion has been a lack of attention to nuclear weapon issues
    by senior leadership--both civilian and military--across both past and
    present administrations and Congresses. This lack of attention has
    resulted in public confusion, congressional distrust, and a serious
    erosion of advocacy, expertise, and proficiency in the sustainment of
    these capabilities. Absent strong national leadership, NNSA, as well as
    the whole Nuclear Security Enterprise, has been allowed to ``muddle
    through.'' First and foremost, we must consolidate and focus national-
    level support.
        Second, a flawed DOE/NNSA governance model. The current NNSA
    governance model of semi-autonomy is fundamentally flawed. NNSA has not
    established effective leadership, policy, culture, or integrated
    decisionmaking. Indeed, the design and implementation of NNSA
    governance has led to numerous redundancies, confused authorities, and
    weakened accountability.
        Third, a lack of sound management principles and practices. NNSA,
    and the associated policy-setting and oversight organizations within
    DOE, reflect few of the characteristics of successful organizations. An
    entrenched, risk-averse bureaucracy lacks a shared vision for, and a
    unified commitment to mission accomplishment and hence they do not act
    as a team. Both DOE and NNSA lack clearly defined and disciplined
    exercise of roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability
    aligned to NNSA's mission deliverables. Too many people can stop
    mission essential work for a host of reasons and those who are
    responsible for getting the work done often find their decisions
    ignored or overturned. Chains of command are not well defined and
    resources are micromanaged. Personnel management and career development
    programs, issue resolution processes, and deliverable aligned budgets
    are deficient. Shortfalls in project management and cost-estimating are
    well-documented and acute.
        Fourth, a dysfunctional relationship between the NNSA Federal
    workforce and their management and operations (M&O) partners. The
    trusted partnership that historically existed between the laboratories
    and DOE/NNSA headquarters has eroded over the past 2 decades to an
    arm's length, customer-to-contractor adversarial relationship, leading
    to a significant loss in the benefits of the federally funded research
    and development centers--the FFRDC model. The trust factor essential to
    this model--and underscored by a recent National Academy of Science
    study \2\--results from unclear accountability for risk, a fee
    structure and contract approach that invites detailed transactional
    compliance-based oversight rather than a more strategic approach with
    performance-based standards. Additionally, excessive, fragmented budget
    and reporting lines also confound effective and efficient programmatic
    management and further erode any sense of trust. Furthermore there is
    no enterprise-wide approach within NNSA. While there are examples where
    the relationship has improved, such as at the Kansas City Plant,
    overall this government-M&O partnership remains highly inefficient and
    in many cases, severely fractured.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Charles Shank and C. Kumar Patel, et al., Managing for High
    Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security
    Laboratories (The National Academies Press, 2013).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Fifth and finally, a lack of close collaboration with selected
    customers. The issues the panel has identified are mainly with the
    Department of Defense weapons customers. This is, at once, a cultural
    and communications divide. There is no affordable, executable joint
    DOD-DOE vision, plan, or program for the future of nuclear weapons
    capabilities. There is a lack of effective joint planning and budget
    coordination, because of a fundamental lack of mechanisms to ensure
    requisite collaboration and consensus to address core mission
    requirements. As a consequence DOD customers lack trust in NNSA's
    ability to modernize facilities and execute warhead life extension
    programs. Although other customers appear to be satisfied, here, too, a
    more strategic approach could strengthen capabilities and the services
    provided.
        In conclusion, lasting reform requires aggressive action and
    sustained implementation in all five of these areas. But, national
    leadership engagement is really the common theme. Improvement is
    possible, but it will demand strong leadership and proactive
    implementation of the panel's recommendations by the President,
    Congress, and an engaged Secretary of Energy.
        Thank you for your time and we look forward to your questions.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you very much for the work you put
    in this. I do believe it's very important, and hopefully we'll
    be able to have a good discussion today and we'll be able to
    study your recommendations.
        I would point out that we could be marking up near Memorial
    Day by that time. To the extent to which you have any specific
    recommendations that could become part of the National Defense
    Authorization Act, that if you could have those by that date,
    or as soon as you could--it may not be everything that you're
    fully prepared to recommend, but if there are some things that
    you're unified on, I would appreciate it if you could get that
    to us by that date.
        Mr. Augustine. We could certainly do that.
        Senator Sessions. Senator King, do you want to start?
        Senator King. Sure.
        First, I don't know why you guys beat around the bush so
    much. [Laughter.]
        I'd like to engage you to do a similar study of the entire
    U.S. Government, but----[Laughter.]
        You keep talking about culture. In my experience, leading
    cultural change is probably the hardest thing in any
    organization. You can move the boxes around, and the only way
    to make cultural change is through leadership, in my
    experience. Would you give me some thoughts about how do we get
    to the cultural issues that are at the heart of a lot of your
    criticisms?
        Admiral Mies. Again, I think the creation of NNSA was
    simply what you suggested, as moving the boxes around. It
    really didn't address the cultural issues, which, from my
    perspective, are DOE-wide, not just isolated to NNSA. There's a
    real need to attack a number of the cultural issues, and you're
    not going to do that in a short period of time. It will take a
    long time to make the changes you need. But, stability and
    continuity of leadership are key elements of it. Clearly
    defined roles, responsibilities, authority, and accountability
    are other key elements of having a well-understood, well-
    defined chain of command to make an organization responsive. I
    think career-development programs with rotational assignments
    are presently weak within DOE, and NNSA specifically, and there
    is a need to have stronger career development to develop
    greater technical competence, to give people who are in the
    headquarters more field experience and vice versa, so there's
    an appreciation on both sides. I think project management
    expertise has been weak and inconsistent. You've had examples
    of very deficient cost-estimating processes. I would comment
    that the issue has not been cost growth, in many cases, of
    these projects as it has been poor cost-estimating upfront,
    which came in with very unrealistic estimates of the cost of
    some of these facilities and the LEPs, and that created
    unreasonable expectations.
        Again, working on the cultural issues and trying to restore
    a sense of credibility and regaining the trust that has been
    lost over a period of time, I think is really critical to the
    success of the organization.
        Senator King. I should have asked, as a preliminary
    question, is the view that you all have represented in this
    interim report the consensus view of the 12 members of the
    Commission?
        Mr. Augustine. It's an unanimous view, sir.
        Senator King. Okay. When do we expect your final report?
        Mr. Augustine. The date we were given is late summer, and
    we are on schedule, and I think we have a good chance of
    having--perhaps not a bound, finished report by Memorial Day,
    but certainly having the essence of a report by then.
        Senator King. I think the sooner the better, because we
    want to get it within time to be able to incorporate your
    findings into the bill that we're going to be working on
    starting around Memorial Day. Don't worry about the binding,
    just give us the data. That would be very helpful.
        Mr. Augustine. That's absolutely in our minds.
        Senator King. What came through to me was a general lack of
    attention to this subject. Has that been part of the problem,
    from Washington in general, from the administration, from
    Congress?
        Mr. Augustine. Senator, I think that's true. I think, back
    in my own career, when I graduated from college, the most
    important job, if you were an engineer, to work on in the
    Nation was probably the nuclear deterrent. The place at the
    leading edge of technology at that time was in DOD. Today, the
    leading edge of technology is certainly not within DOD. The
    nuclear deterrent has certainly not been the highest priority
    issue among our Nation's leadership.
        Senator King. But, ironically, in large measure because
    it's worked.
        Mr. Augustine. That's very ironic. We tend to take it for
    granted, and one day it may not work if we don't pay attention
    to it, of course. We visited so many of these laboratories, and
    some of the buildings go back to World War II. If you're a
    young scientist, and you go to work in a place where there are
    buildings around from World War II, where you're not sure if
    you're going to be put on furlough, you can't attend scientific
    meetings, that's not an attractive place to work. That should
    be a real concern of ours.
        Senator King. What are the immediate steps that you see?
    We're going to be talking about this, late spring and summer.
    What should be in our bill to make changes? I realize this is a
    little premature, you're not at your final recommendations,
    but, to the extent you can give us a preview.
        Mr. Augustine. We are just beginning to formulate
    recommendations, and we have pretty good agreement about what
    the problems are. That's the easy part. I would say that our
    recommendations will come in two categories. One will be
    organizational--do we have the right organization? It certainly
    appears that we don't. It's not clear what is the right
    organization. There are no silver bullets here. The second
    category will be dealing with some of these issues that the
    Admiral has described. I think that there are some things that
    just stand out. Much of it is Management 101. If I had to
    summarize one word of something that's lacking, the word would
    be accountability. We have to get accountability into this
    system. We're going to make a number of recommendations in that
    regard.
        Senator King. That's a challenge for all of government,
    because in business, accountability is whether you stay in
    business the next day. In government, it's not quite the same.
    We have to find an alternative to the profit motive to provide
    that kind of accountability. But it can be done. We've done it
    in wartime, certainly. We did it when the President said,
    ``Let's get a train to New York in 3 hours,'' and it was
    accomplished. I've read about that case. That was a case where
    there was a clear goal and a clear deadline, clear
    accountability, and it happened. Maybe that's the kind of thing
    that we need here.
        Mr. Augustine. I think the lack of emphasis by the Nation's
    leadership is clearly a part of the issue here. But, I've spent
    10 years in the government, and the rest of my career, most of
    it, in the private sector. It is just very hard to imagine
    government--and part of it is the personnel system--that no
    company would survive with the government's personnel system.
    It would be gone in a year.
        Admiral Mies. I think there are probably some
    recommendations that would be appropriate for your bill, but I
    think there are some broader congressional issues which aren't
    necessarily relevant to the bill itself. I think the importance
    of encouraging greater expertise and advocacy within Congress
    is important. A greater understanding of the role of the
    deterrent, as you've expressed, I think, is critical. Better
    collaboration between the authorizers and the appropriators on
    nuclear weapons programs would be beneficial. Conducting a
    joint program review between DOD and DOE on nuclear weapons
    programs would also be very helpful. Again, greater
    synchronization between the DOD and the DOE budget submissions
    and their synchronization, in terms of agreement, would be very
    important, as well. I think those are a number of issues.
        Lastly, I would say timely confirmation of nominations to
    assume the leadership positions is really critical.
        Senator King. I think we heard, in the prior panel, that
    timeliness and predictability and certainty are something that
    we can help supply to this proposition.
        Before you leave, gentlemen, I would commend to you one of
    my favorite books about Washington. It's out of print now, but
    you can get it on Alibris. It's called ``The Institutional
    Imperative or How to Understand the U.S. Government and Other
    Bulky Objects,'' written by a fellow named Robert N. Kharasch.
    It's absolutely brilliant, and some of your writings read like
    chapter subheads. It's hilarious, brilliant, and insightful. I
    recommend it to you.
        Admiral Mies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall [presiding]. Thank you, Senator King.
        Let me thank Senator Sessions and Senator King for
    hurriedly making their way back so that we could continue this
    important hearing. I know we have another vote, I think, that's
    going to be underway soon, but, before we--was it just called?
    So, we have to--certainly, we could squeeze in another 10
    minutes.
        But, I thought, on the heels of what Senator King just
    shared with us, Mr. Augustine, you're famous for a number of
    things, but perhaps one thing that really stands out for me is
    a chart that you produced, ``Augustine's Checklist for an
    Acquisition Adventure or `A Formula for Failure'.'' I have a
    copy right here. I think my colleagues have copies. How did you
    produce this list? Relative to the NNSA, are there three or
    four things that stand out on this list that might be common to
    the NNSA and probably other agencies and other human
    institutions?
        Mr. Augustine. Senator, transparency requires that I helped
    contribute to some of the problems on this list along my
    career. [Laughter.]
        Senator Udall. That's why you have even more legitimacy.
        Mr. Augustine. I've been interested in acquisition and
    program management. I worked for David Packard when he was at
    DOD. He was one of my heroes. I've studied a lot of people,
    I've seen a lot of programs go badly, I've seen some go well,
    and I started putting together a list of what was the
    difference between the ones that went the way you'd hope and
    the ones that didn't. This is a brief version of that list.

        Mr. Augustine. To your specific question, there are several
    things I would----
        Senator Udall. I'd hate to see the entire list. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Augustine. There are many things on the list that one
    could apply, but the ones that stand out to me, one is to
    continue--as you mentioned, if you do these things, you could
    be pretty sure a program will fail--one is to continually
    revise schedule and funding. Another is to divide management
    responsibility among several individuals. Get a headstart on
    work prior to finalizing goals, schedule, and cost. Share
    authority for project direction with staff advisors. Eliminate
    independent checks and balances, particularly in the cost-
    estimating area. The last one I would really cite would be,
    minimize a manager's latitude for judgment and rely on
    regulations instead. I'm afraid we can check all six of those
    boxes.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for your frankness and for your
    insights.
        I don't know if you were asked this earlier, if you have
    been----
        Yes, let me recognize Senator Sessions. He has a comment.
        Senator Sessions. I have to run and vote again, too, and
    I'm afraid I may not get back, which is a disappointment to me.
        I believe you're exactly right. My general impression of
    this over the years is who holds this group accountable? One
    reason, I believe, it's psychological, it's like, ``It's
    nuclear weapons.'' Whatever they say they need, we give. Then
    we've had political support from various people in various
    areas of the country, and things have built up over the years,
    and been protected over the years.
        I believe that this report you've submitted to us is very
    valuable. I'll just ask you this one question, fundamentally.
    If we started over, it seems to me, and we decided we were
    going to refurbish our nuclear arsenal, wouldn't we just
    construct a building or so somewhere, or create something, and
    hire a lean group of people and get the job done? Now we have
    these places all over the country, that have been there for 50
    to 60 years, with people that claim, ``Well, I do this,'' and,
    ``I do this.'' It all ends up costing a lot more.
        My little joke, I guess it was, why don't we just hire
    France to do this? They wouldn't spend this much money. Nobody
    would spend this much money. We don't have money to waste.
    We're going broke. DOD is getting hammered. We're talking about
    losing 100,000 soldiers in a few years, so, we all have to work
    on it.
        I want to thank you, Mr. Augustine. You're famous for doing
    reports. You've done another good job for your country. Admiral
    Mies, you want to call this one Augustine IV or something?
    [Laughter.] But, thank you, because you, both of you, all the
    committee members, have just done a fabulous job.
        I do think, Mr. Chairman, that we won't be able to fix
    everything. I understand that. But, some of the recommendations
    you make, I hope that we can effectuate. I believe it can help
    us create a good nuclear program at less cost. That's what
    we're going to have to try to do.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        I think we've reached the point where we could adjourn the
    hearing. I don't want to presuppose where your final
    recommendations land. I think we have a very good feeling for
    what you've observed and concluded. But, I want to thank both
    of you for taking the time. I know we compensate you handsomely
    in psychic rewards, but I would echo what Senator Sessions
    said, as well. I think the final conclusion, when it comes to
    what you do, is--I've never seen one of the reports in which
    you've been involved stay on the shelf--it's always in people's
    hands--because of the way you go about that important work.
        Let me thank both of you. I will adjourn this hearing. I
    think we'll keep the record open for 3 more days, until the end
    of the week for any additional questions to be submitted for
    the record. Again, we look forward to your conclusions and to
    hearing from you again.
        This Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing is now
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
                                    ------

                                ANNEX 1

        [The interim report titled: ``Congressional Advisory Panel
    on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise''
    follows:]

                                ANNEX 2

        [The final report due during the July/August 2014 timeframe

    was not yet available at time of printing]

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR

                   2015 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2014

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

          STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

       ADMINISTRATION AND THE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF THE

                              DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in

    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Mark
    Udall (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Udall, Graham, and
    Vitter.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MARK UDALL, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Udall. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee will come
    to order.
        Senator Vitter will be joining us shortly. He is serving as
    the ranking member today, and we have Senator Graham here.
        I am going to make a short statement. When Senator Vitter
    arrives, we will look to him for a short statement.
        Then, as I've talked to Mr. Held, I am going to recognize
    Senator Graham for some questions. We all have busy schedules
    around here and we work with each other to make sure that we
    maximize our time.
        With that, this afternoon we will receive testimony
    regarding the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
    and the Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the
    Department of Energy (DOE) for fiscal year 2015.
        Let me thank all the witnesses here today for taking time
    to appear. I know your time is valuable, as well.
        The purpose of this hearing is to examine the Nuclear
    Weapons Stockpile Program of the NNSA, as well as the cleanup
    programs associated with former defense production sites of the
    DOE.
        We will have two panels today. The first panel will be Mr.
    Edward Bruce Held, the Acting Administrator of the NNSA, who
    will speak to the overall NNSA budget. The second panel will
    consist of Dr. Donald L. Cook, the Deputy Administrator for
    Defense Programs; Admiral John M. Richardson, USN, the Deputy
    Administrator for Naval Reactors and the Director of the Naval
    Nuclear Propulsion Program; and Mr. James M. Owendoff, the
    Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Office of EM
    at the DOE.
        Mr. Held, welcome to the subcommittee. I understand it's
    probably bittersweet for you. Just this Wednesday, Lieutenant
    General Frank G. Klotz, USAF, was confirmed for the position of
    Administrator of the NNSA. So, while I say welcome, I also want
    to thank you for your service in leading the NNSA while we
    waited on the Senate to act.
        There is no shortage of work to go around in stopping the
    spread of nuclear material that can harm our country, yet we
    continue to see a decrease in funding for these programs. In my
    opinion, there is a fundamental flaw in the way the budget for
    nonproliferation programs is coordinated in the executive
    branch. In that vein, Mr. Held, I would like to hear from you
    regarding the underlying reasons for the funding decreases
    we've seen over the past several budget proposals. It is my
    intent to advocate strongly for solutions in the upcoming
    National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to help mitigate
    these cuts.
        Dr. Cook, you are in charge of ensuring our nuclear
    stockpile meets military requirements. It is essential that
    these programs continue in the most cost-effective manner
    possible and meet the deadlines required by the Department of
    Defense (DOD). I understand DOD may be embracing a modular
    approach for the plutonium and uranium buildings at Los Alamos
    and Oak Ridge, respectively. I'd like to hear more details
    regarding these approaches, as it is my opinion that they
    assist in meeting requirements while saving time and taxpayers'
    money.
        Admiral Richardson, you continue a long, distinguished line
    of military officers in the Navy's nuclear program. A facility
    in Idaho where we store and examine spent Navy nuclear fuel is
    also growing older, but it is not getting better with age. I
    understand we are now at a critical juncture to replace the
    spent fuel storage pool, and it will soon have impacts on the
    Navy's fleet. I need to understand what the problem is and how
    we can be of help here.
        Mr. Owendoff, your office is in charge of cleaning up
    former defense sites used in the production of nuclear weapons.
    This is a daunting task. Colorado is home to Rocky Flats, one
    of those legacy sites, so this is an item of great interest to
    me in my State. There have been setbacks at the Waste Isolation
    Pilot Plant (WIPP). Those setbacks include a mine fire, and it
    recently underwent a complete shutdown due to the release of
    radiation in the mine. It's essential that we understand what
    transpired with both of these events, and with the fire, in
    particular. We ought to include the key takeaways from the
    recent accident report that was issued in efforts to address
    those takeaways.
        With that, let me turn to Senator Vitter for his opening
    statement, and then, as I mentioned, Senator Vitter, I will
    turn to Senator Graham and give him some time to question Mr.
    Held, if that's acceptable to you.
        Senator Vitter. Sure, absolutely.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID VITTER

        Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, Senator Udall.
        Despite the President's rhetoric of a world without nuclear
        weapons, the administration has announced its intention to
    maintain and modernize the nuclear triad and to preserve the
    important role of nuclear weapons to deter adversaries,
    including nuclear adversaries, and reassure allies. I think
    that's good, because I think that is a safer world, having this
    deterrence in the right way.
        However, the President's prohibition on the development of
    new nuclear weapons remains in place even while other nations
    continue to develop and produce new nuclear weapons. I do
    question that. If we have nuclear weapons in the triad, for
    important strategic reasons, I think we should have them in the
    most effective, including cost-effective, way possible.
        Unlike the United States, Russia, for instance, maintains a
    robust nuclear warhead production capability. Of additional
    concern, of course, is Russia's huge disparity in tactical
    nuclear weapons. Certainly, recent events in Crimea reinforce
    the enduring role for U.S. nuclear weapons, particularly with
    our NATO allies in mind.
        I am also concerned about nuclear modernization shortfalls,
    and I would point to this chart, to my left, to your right.

        Senator Vitter. Through a combination of funding
    shortfalls, virtually all of our modernization efforts are
    delayed or deferred. The table at the top of the chart
    demonstrates that funding for NNSA weapons activities is about
    $2 billion less than the commitment made by the President and
    Congress to secure New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
    ratification. To me, this is really important.
        New START ratification was 2010, just a few years ago. Part
    of the discussion that clearly led to that ratification were
    specific commitments about modernization, about funding. As you
    see, we have just not come close to those specific commitments
    ever since then. We're falling far behind. Even a half-billion-
    dollar increase in weapons activities for fiscal year 2015 will
    not close that gap.
        The bottom of the chart illustrates what that means. It's
    not just dollars, it's not just numbers. It means a real impact
    and delay in five areas. The bottom of the chart goes down
    those five important areas.
        That doesn't even indicate an additional 5-year delay, from
    2021 to 2026, to the date when the United States will be able
    to produce 30 plutonium pits per year, and there is no
    indication when we are going to reach the 50 to 80 pits per
    year, which is the military requirement. That's our
    requirement, not 30.
        The NNSA and the National Labs are responsible for
    maintaining the effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile. They do
    this through constant surveillance of the stockpile and by
    implementing life extension programs (LEP) for warheads and
    bombs that are well past their design life. To accomplish this,
    they really require modernization, including modern physical
    infrastructure, and, of course, a highly-trained workforce,
    which can only stay highly-trained, cutting-edge with that
    modernization activity.
        While funding shortfalls don't make the job any easier, I
    would also note that an outside panel of experts has determined
    that governance structures and practices certainly account for
    inefficiency, as well.
        Finally, I just want to note that some members suggest that
    funding for NNSA weapons activities has come at the expense of
    nonproliferation programs. But, again, I think this chart is
    crucial, as it indicates $500 million increase for weapons
    activities doesn't make up for a shortfall. We are still behind
    in a significant way. As the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) told
    Congress very recently, the 5-year budget proposal submitted by
    NNSA is, ``fragile, and any funding reductions at this point
    could pose unacceptable risk to the health of the nuclear
    enterprise.'' I would go further and say, we started with these
    commitments that were the absolute minimum coming out of New
    START. We are now well behind those.
        Those are my main concerns. I'll look forward to the
    testimony of the witnesses.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
        Again, Mr. Held agreed to field some questions from Senator
    Graham. We appreciate that, Mr. Held. You've always been
    flexible.
        Senator Graham.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Vitter.
        Very quickly, the mixed oxide fuel (MOX) program, I know
    you're very familiar with it, in South Carolina. Senator Vitter
    was trying to indicate you have two jobs you have to do. One is
    to modernize our weapons program to make sure they're relevant
    for the needs of the Nation. The other is to rid the world of
    nuclear material, when possible.
        One of the breakthroughs, I think, Mr. Chairman--over a
    decade ago now, there was an agreement between the United
    States and Russia to take 34 metric tons of weapons-grade
    plutonium off the market. Both countries would get rid of this
    excess weapons-grade plutonium.
        Are you familiar with that agreement, Mr. Held?
        Mr. Held. Most certainly, sir.
        Senator Graham. Okay. In 2011, we basically agreed that the
    American disposition path would be MOX.
        Mr. Held. Right. I think we modified the agreement to--we
    would stick with MOX and the Russians would switch from MOX to
    a fast-reactor program.
        Senator Graham. Right. They are using a fast-reactor
    resolution. MOX, for those who may not be familiar with it--and
    I can understand why you would not be--is taking the weapons-
    grade material and blending it down so it can be burnt in
    commercial nuclear reactors. Is that correct?
        Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. How many warheads could be made from 34
    metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium?
        Mr. Held. Thousands, sir.
        Senator Graham. Thousands.
        Mr. Held. The world will be a much safer place without
    those 34 metric tons.
        Senator Graham. Right. We're talking about thousands of
    nuclear weapons potentially made from this stockpile that we
    want to turn from a sword to a plowshare.
        The MOX facilities in South Carolina are 60 percent
    complete. Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Held. In some aspects. We've sunk $5 billion into it.
    Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Right. To finish it out, the estimate is
    around $7 billion. Is that correct? $6 to $7 billion is what
    DOE testified to yesterday?
        Mr. Held. Yes, depending upon how you're looking at it.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        The administration has decided to put this program on cold
    standby, stopping construction. Is there an effort to layoff
    people at the Savannah River Site (SRS) who have been working
    on the MOX program? Or do you know?
        Mr. Held. Until we get a final decision that--no, we are
    not doing----
        Senator Graham. That is reassuring, because the workforce
    is essential. I am confident, Mr. Chairman, that Congress will
    restore funding that was cut from the President's budget, to
    keep this program on track, because the rationale for stopping
    it is that there is a cheaper, more effective disposition.
        Would one of those routes be immobilization?
        Mr. Held. One of those routes would be immobilization,
    dilution in geographic repositories, fast reactors, or MOX.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        Mr. Held. I think those are the four big ones, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. If you did immobilization, what, very
    briefly, would be required to achieve immobilization?
        Mr. Held. We would have a lot more investment in the
    technology to----
        Senator Graham. You'd have to move material from Washington
    State to SRS.
        Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, I am fairly familiar with
    this program. We've had problems with the Bush administration,
    every administration. Immobilization is not going to be faster
    and it's not going to be cheaper, and there is no technology
    that's going to work better than MOX. My commitment to this
    subcommittee is to try to reduce the cost of the MOX program.
        What have the Russians said about changing course, on the
    part of the United States? Do you know?
        Mr. Held. There is a precedent in the 2010 renegotiation of
    the agreement, that the Russians, because of cost factors, they
    wanted to move to the fast-reactor approach rather than MOX.
        Senator Graham. Am I fair to say the Russians rejected
    immobilization because the material could one day potentially
    be reconstituted?
        Mr. Held. That was their position, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Yes. The Russians rejected that because
    they don't want to give up--now, I wouldn't agree to allow the
    Russians to immobilize, because somebody down the road could
    reconstitute.
        You have a tough job. You're trying to do two things that
    are very important: modernize the nuclear deterrent force and
    try to honor agreements, in terms of disposition of excess
    weapons material.
        The agreement with the Japanese, of 700 pounds of weapons-
    grade plutonium, do we know where that would go?
        Mr. Held. That has not been decided as of yet, sir.
        Senator Graham. I think it would be wonderful if we could
    receive that material and take it off the marketplace, but
    you're going to have a hard time getting anyone to do that, in
    light of stopping the program.
        The one thing I worry about, Mr. Chairman, is that when a
    State makes a commitment to accept 34 metric tons of weapons-
    grade plutonium, with a pathway forward that would create jobs
    but would get the material from a sword to a plowshare. You
    stop after it's 60 percent complete, it is just not a good
    model to use, because this is very hard politically to convince
    people to take weapons-grade plutonium in your State and do
    something good for the Nation and the world.
        Do you agree that if we could achieve the goal of taking
    the 34 metric tons, in Russia and the United States, off the
    market, we'll have done the world a great service?
        Mr. Held. I think most certainly the world will be a safer
    place. The question is the relative cost of doing it, and----
        Senator Graham. The relative cost of thousands of nuclear
    warheads taken off the market, what's that worth? You're 60
    percent complete and you're stopping the project, coming up
    with a theory that's previously been rejected by the Russians.
    I just don't think this is very wise. I think we need to fix it
    before we get ourselves in a very bad way with the Russians.
        I'll look forward to trying to restore funding and helping
    you with the other problems that Senator Vitter has tried to
    explain in great detail. Maybe some sequestration relief down
    the road would be helpful to both these projects.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Graham. Thank you for
    taking the time to participate. We will see you at the markup
    for the NDAA as I know we will.
        Senator Graham. Okay.
        Senator Udall. Mr. Held, we look forward to your statement.
    Before you start, I might make note that we're going to, if at
    all possible, end the hearing by 4 p.m. We have four witnesses,
    so I think that's very doable. I am sure that Senator Vitter
    would agree to 7-minute rounds of questions once you've
    completed your testimony.
        Mr. Held. Okay. I'll be very brief, sir. Thank you.
        Senator Udall. Thank you.

    STATEMENT OF EDWARD BRUCE HELD, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR AND ACTING
    UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
                  ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Held. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Vitter, I am
    honored to be with you today.
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request for the NNSA is a clear
    expression of President Obama's commitment to America's nuclear
    security. Within the fiscal constraints of the Bipartisan
    Budget Act (BBA), the President requests a 4 percent increase
    for NNSA, to $11.7 billion. This includes a 26 percent increase
    for naval nuclear reactors and a 7 percent increase for weapons
    activities.
        The President's request for weapons activities funds the
    3+2 strategy approved by the NWC in support of two enduring
    commitments to the American people. One, sustain a safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for America that is,
    two, prudently based on a smaller, safer, and more cost-
    efficient stockpile of nuclear weapons.
        To remain within BBA constraints, difficult decisions were
    unavoidable. The MOX project to dispose of excess weapons-grade
    plutonium will be significantly more expensive than
    anticipated. Although painful, DOE, for its part, believes that
    it would be in the best interest of the taxpayers to place the
    MOX project in reversible cold standby while we explore
    promising possibilities for a more cost-efficient path to
    fulfilling our plutonium disposition agreement with Russia.
        NNSA has performance challenges ahead of us. The Secretary
    of Energy, Dr. Ernest J. Moniz, will always be straightforward
    with you about those challenges. At the same time, NNSA has
    significant successes to build on, and Secretary Moniz insists
    that we get out of our defensive crouch and honestly tell our
    success stories in a way that is meaningful to the American
    people.
        Regarding nuclear security, for example, our
    counterintelligence program was dysfunctional 10 years ago.
    Today, DOE counterintelligence is highly effective, respected,
    and trusted. Less than 10 months ago, NNSA communications with
    our colleagues on the NWC were strained. Today, those
    communications are healthy and transparent, and this improved
    atmosphere is helping us focus on the big strategic issues for
    which the NWC exists.
        On nonproliferation, in just the last 4 years, 11 countries
    plus Taiwan have eliminated their caches of sensitive nuclear
    materials, and security has been hardened at scores of nuclear
    storage facilities around the world to prevent theft by
    potential terrorists. The world is a safer place as a result.
        On project management, NNSA has been on the Government
    Accountability Office (GAO) high-risk list literally since the
    day it was born, in March 2000. Since February 2011, however,
    we have consistently been on schedule and on budget for large
    projects up to $750 million. As a result, GAO has taken us off
    its high-risk list for projects of this size for the first time
    in NNSA's history.
        We still have issues with the multi-billion dollar mega-
    projects, but, thanks to the greater discipline and more agile
    strategy that Secretary Moniz has brought with him, we are
    making progress there, as well.
        That leads me to our first and foremost responsibility,
    which is nuclear safety. For nuclear safety reasons, we simply
    must modernize the aged infrastructure for enriched uranium
    processing in Oak Ridge, we must modernize the aged
    infrastructure for plutonium processing in Los Alamos, and,
    wherever we can reliably do so, we should replace conventional
    high explosives in our nuclear stockpile with much safer
    insensitive high explosives. If we take a commonsense approach
    that emphasizes better/sooner rather than perfect/later, all of
    these are doable within reasonable cost. But, if, heaven
    forbid, we have a nuclear safety accident because we have not
    done so, then, Mr. Chairman, NNSA will have truly failed and we
    will forever forfeit the trust and confidence of the American
    people in all things nuclear.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Held follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Mr. Edward Bruce Held
        Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee, I come before you today to present the President's fiscal
    year 2015 budget request for the Department of Energy's (DOE) National
    Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). I have been honored to serve
    the Department as the acting Administrator for the past 9 months, but
    as a fellow citizen ask for your support to get our nominees confirmed
    as expeditiously as possible. NNSA is a critically important national
    security element of the U.S. Government that deserves a permanent
    leadership team. Retired Air Force Lieutenant General Frank Klotz and
    current Assistant Secretary of Defense Madelyn Creedon are deeply
    experienced and wise people who would make a great team as NNSA
    Administrator and Principal Deputy Administrator.
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request for the DOE is up 2.6 percent
    to $27.9 billion. The NNSA, which comprises over 40 percent of the
    DOE's budget, is up $451 million or 4 percent, to $11.7 billion. In
    today's fiscal climate, this increase is an indication of the
    President's unwavering commitment to nuclear security, as outlined
    nearly 4 years ago in Prague, and reaffirmed last June in Berlin.
    Support in this year's budget request is also due to an unprecedented
    level of transparency and discussion within the interagency on how the
    NNSA can best support implementation of the two key goals of the
    Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): to prevent nuclear proliferation and
    terrorism and to maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent while
    we reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. This budget
    request also supports the major initiatives of Naval Reactors, makes
    investments in physical and cyber security, and funds critical
    infrastructure recapitalization to support effective operations across
    the nuclear security enterprise.
        Within that context, the Secretary and NNSA Leadership understand
    that we have an enduring responsibility to steward the taxpayers'
    dollar effectively and efficiently, and we simply must do better.
    Therefore, NNSA is looking at ways to improve our governance through a
    public interest model that will incentivize mission effective and cost
    efficient solutions to the highest risk nuclear security challenges
    facing our country. We look forward to seeing the interim
    recommendations of the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance
    of the NNSA, as well as to reviewing recommendations from other panels
    focused on governance, including the Secretary of Energy's Advisory
    Board and the independent commission to study the DOE Laboratories as
    directed in the fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
        Another primary area of focus to support effective and efficient
    implementation of our mission will continue to be project management
    and improving our cost assessment and estimation capabilities. The
    Secretary has reorganized the Department to elevate Management and
    Performance to one of three Under Secretary positions. Within this
    framework, the NNSA is committed to effectively managing its major
    projects and has been driving continued enhancements to contract and
    project management practices through a reorganized Office of
    Acquisition and Project Management (APM). In 2013 GAO recognized
    progress at DOE in execution of nonmajor projects under $750 million,
    and narrowed the focus of its High Risk List for DOE to mega-scale,
    unique nuclear construction projects costing more than $750 million.
    APM is leading the NNSA's effort to deliver results by strengthening
    rigorous and well-justified alternative assessments and evaluations,
    providing clear lines of authority and accountability for Federal and
    contractor personnel, and improving cost and schedule performance. NNSA
    is also applying lessons learned from the Office of Science project
    management methods and is collaborating across the DOE. At its core,
    DOE/NNSA's ultimate project management goal is to deliver every project
    on schedule, within budget, and fully capable of meeting mission
    performance, safeguards and security, quality assurance,
    sustainability, and environmental, safety, and health requirements.
        The Department has just released its new Strategic Plan for 2014-
    2018, with the goal to ``Secure our Nation'' and the strategic
    objective to ``enhance national security by maintaining and modernizing
    the nuclear stockpile and nuclear security infrastructure, reducing
    global nuclear threats, providing for nuclear propulsion, improving
    physical and cyber security, and strengthening key science, technology,
    and engineering capabilities.'' The Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA)
    sets firm caps on national security spending in fiscal year 2015, and
    the President's budget request adheres to them so tough choices had to
    be made across the NNSA. While Weapons Activities is up 6.9 percent
    from fiscal year 2014 enacted levels, and the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation (DNN) account is down 20.4 percent, the administration
    and DOE/NNSA remain firmly committed to our nonproliferation efforts
    and to implementing a robust program following the end of the 4-year
    effort to secure nuclear material. In addition, modernization of the
    nuclear security enterprise and sustaining the science and
    technological base directly supports our nonproliferation and
    counterterrorism missions, so there is great synergy between the
    Weapons and Nonproliferation programs that we will continue to
    leverage. Details of the fiscal year 2015 President's budget request
    for the NNSA follow.
                               weapons activities
        The Weapons Activities account request for fiscal year 2015 is $8.3
    billion, an increase of $534 million or 6.9 percent over fiscal year
    2014 enacted levels. It is comprised not only of the Defense Programs
    portfolio, which is responsible for all aspects of stockpile
    management, but also our physical and cyber security activities, our
    emergency response and counterterrorism and counterproliferation
    capabilities, and enterprise-wide infrastructure sustainment. Each
    element is addressed in detail below.
    Defense Programs
        The Defense Programs portion of the Weapons Activities account is
    up $499.5 million, or 7.8 percent from fiscal year 2014, to $6.9
    billion. It funds the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) approved ``3+2''
    strategy with some schedule adjustments, which aims to implement NPR
    guidance to reduce the number and types of weapons in the stockpile
    while maintaining a safe, secure and effective deterrent. The request
    also continues to invest in the scientific and engineering foundation
    and in critical infrastructure. Building on last year's jointly
    conducted planning process for nuclear weapons modernization
    activities, DOE/NNSA and DOD agreed on a prioritized plan to meet
    requirements within current fiscal constraints of the Bipartisan Budget
    Act. Specifically, the fiscal year 2015-2019 budget proposal requests
    funding for the following modernization activities:

             Complete production of the W76-1 warhead by fiscal
            year 2019;
             Achieve the B61-12 life extension program (LEP) First
            Production Unit (FPU) by second quarter fiscal year 2020;
             Achieve the W88 ALT 370 FPU by first quarter fiscal
            year 2020;
             Defer the interoperable warhead (W78/88-1) LEP FPU by
            5 years to fiscal year 2030;
             Delay the Long-Range Standoff warhead FPU by 1 to 3
            years to fiscal year 2025-2027;
             Continue funding engineering design and to study
            alternative approaches to deliver the Uranium Processing
            Facility by 2025.

        The Directed Stockpile Work request at $2.7 billion supports
    transitioning to a smaller, modernized nuclear stockpile while
    continuing sustainment efforts. The requested increase reflects the
    ramp up of Phase 6.3 activities for the B61 LEP and an increase for
    Stockpile Systems, including maintenance, surveillance, plutonium
    sustainment, and tritium program requirements.
        In support of the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
    (RDT&E) program, the Campaigns request is $1.8 billion to provide
    increased technical resources needed for the certification of the
    existing stockpile and qualification of LEP options and components. For
    example, within the Inertial Confinement Fusion and High Yield
    Campaign, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) has achieved recent
    success with a stockpile stewardship experiment that exhibited
    significant ``self heating,'' which is an important step essential to
    achieving ignition on the NIF. This platform will be used for years to
    come in studying a multitude of physical processes of relevance to
    nuclear weapons. Today, these physics environments are only accessible
    on laboratory-based high energy density facilities, such as the NIF,
    since the U.S. has been under a unilateral testing moratorium since
    1992. The fiscal year 2015 request for the NIF is $328.5 million.
        Another area of significant investment by the DOE is in exascale
    computing. NNSA's Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign (ASC)
    provide leading edge, high-end modeling, and simulation capabilities
    that capture and allow us to apply all that we know about weapons
    physics and engineering. The fiscal year 2015 ASC budget request
    includes $50 million for the Advanced Technology Development and
    Mitigation subprogram, established in fiscal year 2014, which funds
    projects that pursue long-term simulation and computing goals relevant
    to both exascale computing and the broad national security missions of
    the NNSA. Both the NNSA and DOE's Office of Science continue to
    collaborate in this area of advanced computing systems, with the Office
    of Science request providing $91 million towards the development of
    capable exascale systems.
        Two decades after its beginning, the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    continues to deliver tangible results from the combined use of our
    leading edge computation and experimental tools. Specifically our level
    of understanding of how nuclear weapons work is far greater today than
    when we were testing. A core mission of the DOE remains to certify the
    safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent; this is
    done each year by the Lab Directors and STRATCOM Commander, which
    continues to support our unilateral testing moratorium consistent with
    the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
    Infrastructure
        The Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) request at
    $2.1 billion supports the underlying physical infrastructure and
    operational readiness for the nuclear security enterprise. The request
    includes funds to upgrade nuclear safety systems, improve the workplace
    environment for plant and laboratory employees, and reduce safety and
    mission risks across the enterprise in support of operational
    readiness. The Site Stewardship request of $82.4 million also ensures
    the overall health and viability of the enterprise.
        Specifically, RTBF construction supports continued design
    activities for the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Project at $335.0
    million, an increase of $26 million from fiscal year 2014, while
    assessing whether there are alternative designs to accomplish the
    mission incrementally and at an affordable pace. NNSA remains concerned
    about the cost growth and sequestration impacts facing the UPF Project.
    In January 2014, NNSA chartered Oak Ridge National Laboratory Director
    Thom Mason to lead a team to develop and recommend an alternative
    approach to the UPF Project. NNSA is committed to our build to budget
    strategy to deliver the UPF Project by 2025, with Building 9212
    capabilities, for not more than $4.2-6.5 billion.
        The NNSA continues to pursue steps to maintain continuity of
    plutonium capabilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)--to
    include analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC)
    capabilities--with a commitment to cease programmatic operations in the
    62-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility by 2019.
    NNSA has developed a three-step Plutonium Infrastructure Strategy, to
    include: (1) Maximizing the use of the Radiological Laboratory Utility
    Office Building; (2) Reusing laboratory space in Plutonium Facility
    (PF)-4; and (3) Evaluating options for modular additions to PF-4. The
    first two steps allow the NNSA to move programmatic operations from the
    CMR facility; the third addresses the PF-4 lifetime while enabling
    production capability and analytical support enhancements to meet
    requirements. NNSA also continues to pursue investments in upgrading
    safety system in PF-4 as part of the overall approach to maintaining
    plutonium capability.
        NNSA's request reflects the partnership between NNSA and DOD to
    modernize the nuclear deterrent, and as in last year's budget, DOD is
    carrying a separate account for the outyears that contains funds for
    NNSA's Weapons Activities and Naval Reactors. These funds are
    transferred to NNSA during budget development and underscore the close
    link between these activities and DOD nuclear requirements and
    missions. We urge your subcommittee's support for alignment of the
    appropriations process and allocations, including the 302(b)
    allocation, with the President's budget. The requested allocation,
    within the spending caps set by the Bipartisan Budget Act, support
    these NNSA and DOD priorities. If not achieved, it could place
    modernization funding and implementation of our long-term stockpile
    sustainment strategy at risk.
    Physical and Cyber Security
        Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of departmental
    operations is a top priority. Shortly after beginning his tenure, the
    Secretary of Energy directed the Department to undertake a thorough
    review of our security management. It became clear that DOE's approach
    to securing the Department's assets, including the special nuclear
    materials, could be strengthened by establishing greater accountability
    and clearer lines of authority.
        Therefore, in February, the Secretary announced his new vision for
    enhancing the Department's health, safety, security and independent
    assessments. First, we have put in place a Chief Security Officer (CSO)
    under each of the three Under Secretaries, each empowered and held
    accountable for managing all security operations within their
    organizations. The CSOs will form the nucleus of a new DOE Security
    Committee, chaired by the Associate Deputy Secretary, which will
    develop unified security strategies across the DOE complex and raise
    the focus on protecting our people and DOE physical and information
    assets. Second, we are moving the Department's key support functions
    for security, health and safety under the leadership of the Under
    Secretary for Management and Performance in order to improve the
    effectiveness and efficiency of Departmental operations. Third, we are
    establishing a new Office of Independent Enterprise Assessments (IEA),
    reporting directly to the Office of the Secretary. This reorganization
    will set us on a stronger course to achieving our goals and mission
    more effectively, efficiently and safely.
        In light of these reforms, the primary mission of NNSA's Office of
    Defense Nuclear Security and the Chief Security Office is to develop
    and implement sound security programs to protect Special Nuclear
    Material, people, information, and facilities throughout the nuclear
    security enterprise. The NNSA's Defense Nuclear Security request is
    $618 million to provide protection from a full spectrum of threats for
    NNSA personnel, facilities, nuclear weapons, and information.
        The Information Technology and Cybersecurity (renamed from ``NNSA
    CIO Activities'') request is substantially increased to $179.6 million
    to provide protection against increasing cyber security threats.
    Information Technology and Cybersecurity supports the national nuclear
    security enterprise by providing information technology and
    cybersecurity solutions such as enterprise wireless capabilities and
    continuous monitoring technologies to help meet security and
    proliferation resistance objectives. The increase reflects expenses for
    items such as improvement to the cyber infrastructure at the NNSA
    sites, requirements for classified computing, and Identity Credential
    and Access Management.
    Emergency Response and Counterterrorism
        The Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response (NCTIR) request of
    $173.4 million applies technical assets from the nuclear security
    enterprise to resolve and manage nuclear and radiological incidents,
    especially those involving terrorism. It addresses this threat by
    maintaining and using response teams to manage the consequences
    domestically or internationally should an attack or incident result in
    radiation exposure to the public. NCTIR conducts training programs to
    train and equip response organizations and uses strategies that
    integrate NNSA expertise with law enforcement or military capabilities
    to locate, identify, and disable a terrorist nuclear device.
        The Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation program request is
    $76.9 million to provide the foundation for the U.S. Government's
    capability to understand and counter nuclear terrorism and nuclear
    threat devices. The program also provides a technical understanding of
    foreign nuclear weapons outside of state control. Based on this
    expertise, the program informs national policies and international
    guidelines, as well as enabling domestic and international nuclear
    counterterrorism engagements.
                        defense nuclear nonproliferation
        The DNN request is $1.6 billion, a decrease of $398.8 million, or
    about 20.4 percent, from the fiscal year 2014 level. The programs under
    DNN have been accurately described as ``defense by other means.'' The
    majority of the decrease is due to the decision to place the Mixed
    Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility construction project at the
    Savannah River Site in cold stand-by to allow further study of more
    efficient options for plutonium disposition. Other decreases reflect
    the conclusion of the President's 4-year effort to secure nuclear
    materials worldwide and bring the fiscal year 2015 request in line with
    funding levels before the acceleration needed to implement the 4-year
    effort.
        We have met--and in some cases exceeded--the goals set in April
    2009 following the President's Prague speech by:

             removing or confirming disposition of 5,113 kilograms
            of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium from
            41 countries and Taiwan (enough material for more than 200
            nuclear weapons and in excess of the target of 4,353
            kilograms);
             completing material protection, control and accounting
            (MPC&A) upgrades at 32 buildings containing metric tons of
            weapons-usable material in Russia (for a cumulative total of
            218 buildings secured in the former Soviet Union since 1994);
            and
             working with Russia and former FSU countries to
            establish effective and sustainable MPC&A capabilities at the
            national level.

        Going forward in fiscal year 2015, the administration remains
    firmly committed to disposing of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. Over
    the past year, we have been working closely with the MOX project
    contractor and others to determine if there are opportunities to make
    the current MOX fuel approach for plutonium disposition more efficient.
    During the same time that we were analyzing the current MOX fuel
    approach, we have been analyzing alternatives to accomplish the
    plutonium disposition mission, including reactor and non-reactor based
    approaches. DOE expects to complete the options analysis and an
    external independent review in the next 12-18 months. It is now clear
    that the MOX approach will be significantly more expensive than
    anticipated--at a $30 billion lifecycle cost estimate--even with
    potential contract restructuring and other improvements that have been
    made to the MOX project. As a result, the MOX project will be placed in
    cold stand-by, meaning we will cease all construction activities in
    order to minimize costs. The Fissile Materials Disposition request is
    $311 million, including $221 million to put the MOX project in cold
    stand-by, while assessing more cost effective options. NNSA must
    immediately take prudent actions to commence lay-up to preserve our
    investment while minimizing costs. The remaining funding will continue
    to support activities for disposition of plutonium and highly enriched
    uranium.
        While much was accomplished under the 4-year effort, serious
    threats still remain. Significant stockpiles of HEU still exist in too
    many places, and global inventories of plutonium are steadily rising.
    DNN programs, working closely with a wide range of international
    partners, key U.S. Federal agencies, U.S. national laboratories, and
    the private sector will continue to remove and/or dispose of the
    dangerous nuclear materials that are still very much a part of our
    world today. The fiscal year 2015 budget request for other DNN programs
    provides funding to continue remaining high-priority nuclear and
    radiological threat reduction efforts, following completion of the
    accelerated 4-year effort activities. This includes $333 million for
    the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and $305 million for the
    International Material Protection and Control program. Fiscal year 2015
    priority efforts include the removal of an additional 125 kilograms of
    HEU and plutonium from high priority countries; the protection of an
    additional 105 buildings with high-activity radioactive sources; the
    consolidation of all category I/II material into a new high security
    zone at a nuclear material site in Russia; preventing illicit
    trafficking by closing key gaps in the radiation detection architecture
    through the provision of fixed and mobile detection equipment; and the
    initiation of new nuclear security activities in the Middle East.
        Another core program is DNN Research and Development (R&D) program,
    at $361 million in the fiscal year 2015 budget request. DNN R&D
    develops new technologies and methods that advance national and
    international capabilities to detect and characterize foreign nuclear
    weapons production activities and detonation events and the movement of
    special nuclear material (SNM). DNN R&D is a national-level program
    providing applied research and development in nuclear security and
    treaty verification technology leveraged by interagency partners at the
    Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and State, and the
    throughout broader U.S. Government.
        Finally, the Nonproliferation and International Security program
    request is $141 million, which supports activities that prevent and
    counter WMD proliferation, including continued support of U.S. efforts
    to address proliferation by Iran, North Korea, and proliferation
    networks; implementation of statutory export control requirements;
    support for treaty verification and transparency; implementation of the
    Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to strengthen International
    Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and efforts to reduce proliferation
    risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power.
        These activities are carried out in support of an interagency
    strategy for nuclear threat reduction and in close coordination with
    related programs in the Department of Defense, Department of State, and
    other agencies. Though difficult choices are inevitable in the current
    budget environment, NNSA continues to strongly support the nuclear
    nonproliferation mission. We are proud that the Office of Defense
    Nuclear Nonproliferation is responsible for delivering the majority of
    the pledges made by the United States under the Nuclear Security Summit
    process. The President and Energy Secretary recently represented the
    United States at the third such Summit in The Hague, where they
    highlighted additional commitments the United States intends to meet by
    the 2016 Summit, which will be hosted in the United States, and
    continued to encourage international commitment to and investment in
    meeting these critical nonproliferation challenges.
                                 naval reactors
        The budget request for Naval Reactors is $1.4 billion, an increase
    of $282.1 million, about 25.8 percent from the fiscal year 2014 level.
    The request includes the base funding required to safely maintain,
    operate and oversee the Navy's 83 nuclear-powered warships. The Naval
    Reactors budget request includes three high priority programs: Ohio-
    class Replacement submarine; refueling of the Land-Based Prototype
    reactor plant; and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project.
    These new projects are essential to maintaining a credible sea-based
    strategic deterrent, to maintain the research and training capabilities
    of the Land-based Prototype, and to maintain the capability to safely
    inspect, store and package naval spent nuclear fuel.
             nnsa program direction--federal salaries and expenses
        NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE), formerly ``Office of the
    Administrator,'' request is $411 million, an increase of $34 million or
    9 percent from the fiscal year 2014 level. The increase reflects two
    requirements: a $20 million one-time cost to fund the move of the NNSA
    Albuquerque Complex to a different leased facility, and a $12 million
    increase associated with the transfer of Corporate Project Management
    from the Weapons Activities account, consistent with congressional
    direction in the fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act. The
    fiscal year 2015 budget request provides support for 1,710 Federal
    full-time equivalents--a 9.3 percent reduction relative to fiscal year
    2012 enacted levels--in response to today' constrained budget
    environment. FSE remains critical to supporting the NNSA mission and
    workforce.
        Separately in the fiscal year 2015 budget request, the
    administration has proposed an additional $56 billion in funding across
    the Government through the Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative
    (OGSI). The OGSI supports the President's broad vision for investing in
    growth, opportunity, and national security and advancing important
    Presidential goals while respecting the budgetary consensus developed
    under the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of December 2013. The OGSI
    allocates around $600 million to further support NNSA's critical
    mission and infrastructure investments.
                                   conclusion
        The NNSA implements a vital mission, responsible for nuclear
    security at home and abroad, and delivering the technology,
    capabilities and infrastructure essential to a 21st century
    organization. An emphasis on mission effective and cost efficient
    nuclear security solutions will be critical for the NNSA to succeed in
    today's fiscal climate where difficult choices must be made but where
    our workforce continues to rise to the challenge and deliver.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Held.
        Let me recognize myself for 7 minutes.
        Let me move to the fact that, 2 years ago, the NNSA
    deferred, for at least 5 years, a replacement of the aging
    plutonium facility at Los Alamos. I think we'd spent up to
    about $500 million on that design. This year, you're looking at
    a redesign of the uranium facility at Oak Ridge at the Y-12
    plant, to be clear, as its design may increase to as much as
    $10 billion. This is a huge amount of taxpayers' money, either
    lost or about to be lost. Can you please tell the subcommittee
    what you're doing to rein in the cost of these facilities, in
    terms of simpler designs?
        Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
        We're doing two things. First, we are applying the same
    discipline and rigor on these mega-projects that we have been
    doing so on the projects up to $750 million since February
    2011. Second, and maybe more importantly, or even more
    importantly, we're switching our strategy from a big-box
    strategy to a more agile, modular strategy. If you look at
    this, this change in strategy was a mother--or, necessity was
    the mother of invention in the plutonium side. What we've done
    is break down this big project into three phases. The first
    phase is driven by nuclear safety concerns. We must get out of
    the old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building by
    2019. We can do that by moving much of that work into the
    brand-new radiological laboratory that we brought in on
    schedule and on budget. Second, we need to get up to the 30-
    pit-per-year target. We can do that by repurposing existing
    facilities in the plutonium facility number 4 in a much more
    cost effective way. Then, third, to get to the DOD target and
    military requirement of 50- to 80-pit-per-year, then we will
    need additional modular facilities there that we will build as
    the mission timing and budget requires.
        Senator Udall. Let me turn, Mr. Held, to the NNSA
    nonproliferation budget. It went down 20 percent compared to
    last year's enacted level of roughly $2 billion, and 30 percent
    relative to the fiscal year 2013 level of $2.2 billion. Now,
    the majority of that decrease is related to the MOX program
    that Senator Graham explored with you. Can you explain to the
    subcommittee, besides the MOX program, what's going on here?
        Mr. Held. Secretary Moniz, since becoming Secretary, has
    been very rigorous looking at budgets across-the-board. That
    rigor has been applied both to nuclear weapons, to
    infrastructure, and to nonproliferation. We have adjusted our
    weapons program, as well. But, a large share of this did, in
    fact, hit the nonproliferation. That is a matter of deep
    concern to us. We have made tremendous progress over the past 4
    years, the 13 countries who eliminated their stockpile or their
    special nuclear material caches. There's a lot more work we
    have to do in the next several years, and $1.6 billion of
    American taxpayers' money is still an awful lot of money to do
    that with. The Secretary is asking us if we can take a look at:
    In these budgetary tight periods, is there a better way, a more
    agile, more mission-effective way that we can get a higher
    return on our investment in nonproliferation? We are not
    walking away from the nonproliferation issue.
        NNSA is the National Nuclear Security Administration. That
    means both nonproliferation and weapons. We are not the Nuclear
    Weapons Administration. We need a coherent narrative to tie
    both of those together. The Secretary is working to do that.
        I believe the 3+2 strategy is actually a good example of
    how we are tying those to the reduced size of the stockpile
    with the continuing safe, secure, and effective stockpile.
        Senator Udall. Let me further pursue a couple of questions
    tied to the SRS.
        Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. I think this site is estimated to cost as
    much as $10 billion, with an estimated $30 billion lifecycle
    cost.
        Mr. Held. For the MOX project, sir?
        Senator Udall. Yes MOX. At SRS, I know there are other
    things that are happening there, but I think you all have
    proposed that you'd put the facility in cold storage in fiscal
    year 2015. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014 authorized DOE to
    conduct a strategic review of the program, to include, but not
    be limited to, MOX, and to take into account the investments
    made to date in the MOX program. It did not, however, authorize
    cold storage. What are the plans for the $343 million
    appropriated in fiscal year 2014? On the same topic, what does
    the fiscal year 2015 budget mean by ``cold storage''?
        Mr. Held. Okay. Sir, you can absolutely trust that we will
    obey the law of the land. You can absolutely trust on that.
        What the strategic study has laid out for us is a good-
    government problem. We have invested $5 billion in the facility
    at SRS. The remaining full lifecycle cost for the whole mission
    is another $25 billion. The question is, is there an
    alternative that can achieve that mission that costs less than
    $25 billion? If there is, then it would be a wise use of the
    taxpayers' money to pursue that. If there is not, then what we
    should be doing is trying to drive down the cost of the MOX
    project as much as possible. That is where we are at, at this
    point. There has been a very thorough, clear-eyed study of
    these options, done by John MacWilliams, the senior advisor to
    Secretary Moniz. We really need to get that study to you as
    soon as possible so that we can all make a good-government
    decision, sir.
        Senator Udall. I have one final question.
        Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. NNSA's nonproliferation program seems to be
    wrapping up a number of efforts, but proposing little, if any,
    new ones. In my opinion, there's no shortage of activities to
    help stem the use of hostile use of nuclear material. You all
    are experts when it comes to responding to nuclear incidents.
    Wouldn't it be a wise investment of the funds we've spent
    developing this capability to train first responders and law
    enforcement officials in other nations in some of the
    capabilities we've developed to date? It seems to me like that
    would strengthen an overall international capacity to detect
    and respond to nuclear incidents. We have a national capacity,
    but how about applying that to the international scene?
        Mr. Held. Yes, sir. Instinctively, I am totally in
    agreement, sir. I think what we need to do across the
    nonproliferation accounts is look and take a step back--because
    we made a lot of progress over the last 40 years. Now we're in
    different budgetary environment, and I think we need to step
    back. Do we need to tweak the strategy a little bit to get the
    higher return for the taxpayers' dollar? Can we get greater
    synergies between nonproliferation and civil nuclear energy?
    This leads to the small modular reactor issue. Can we get
    greater synergies between the weapons program and the
    nonproliferation program and to get greater return for the
    taxpayers' dollar? That is what we are trying to do. GAO is
    going to be looking at this. One of the committees has asked
    GAO to do this. Let's step back and take another look. The
    Secretary has asked the Advisory Board to do that same thing,
    to give us some outside help. In a period of tight budgets, is
    there a better way we can achieve this mission with more
    effective use of the taxpayers' dollar?
        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Held.
        Let me recognize Senator Vitter.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Mr. Held.
        Mr. Held. Sure.
        Senator Vitter. Mr. Held, I want to refer to this chart
    again. The top of the chart, under the light blue, is fiscal
    year numbers that were committed to by all the parties as part
    of the discussion of the New START treaty. Particularly for
    fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, would you say these numbers
    started out being inflated or having a lot of cushion or being
    fake in any way?
        Mr. Held. No, sir. I think what we're all trying to do
    together is fit into a tighter--a changed budgetary
    environment, and do that in the most rational, good-government
    possible way.
        Senator Vitter. Right. Under the top line, which were the
    commitments made, we have the actual appropriations. Of course,
    these first 3 years, they fall well short, which is the third
    line, in red, the difference, so almost $.4 billion the first
    year, almost $1 billion the second year, short; two-thirds of
    $1 billion short, fiscal year 2014, the third year. Just those
    first 3 years, that adds up to a $2-billion shortfall. I assume
    you'd agree, that's significant shortfall from the initial
    goals.
        Mr. Held. You combine that, you combine----
        Senator Udall. If I could interrupt for just 1 minute.
        Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. There's been a vote called. I am going to
    ask Senator Vitter if he would stay in place and continue his
    questioning. I will hurry and vote and be back.
        Senator Vitter. Okay.
        Senator Udall. I will trust you to keep the subcommittee on
    the straight and narrow. [Laughter.]
        Senator Vitter. Okay. I'll take care of some legislation
    and do some other business and----[Laughter.]
        Senator Vitter [presiding].--await your return.
        Again, I just want to underscore, these numbers were part
    of a lot of discussion that was in the middle of passing New
    START. Those commitments were absolutely at the middle of
    passing New START, and very much a part of the reason some
    folks voted yes. I voted no. But, they were certainly at the
    heart of the reason many folks voted yes. I just want to
    underscore, we're falling well short, already.
        Now, you talked about a significantly tougher budget
    environment. I would just suggest this wasn't the 19th century
    when we talked about this; it was a few years ago. We knew the
    budget environment was tough. Nothing has fundamentally
    changed. We knew this was a very tough environment, so I don't
    think there has been any fundamental shift.
        Mr. Held, in a recent letter to Congress, Frank Kendall,
    Chair of the NWC, noted, ``As you are aware, several risks have
    been identified that may affect realization of this strategy
    and NNSA's ability to execute the Stockpile Stewardship and
    Management (SSMP), as written, including a shortfall in out-
    year funding and the failure to achieve assumed savings through
    management efficiencies and workforce prioritization actions.''
        Would you agree with that cautionary warning? Could you
    identify some of the risks to executing your mission if these
    shortfalls were to continue?
        Mr. Held. Yes, sir. I think, in the fiscal year 2015 SSMP,
    which has just been delivered to Capitol Hill, on the first
    page you get a graphic showing the modifications in our
    weapons, the implementation of the 3+2 strategy. We are still
    with the 3+2 strategy, but we've flattened it out, for
    budgetary reasons.
        If more budgetary tightening constraints are applied, we
    will break the 3+2 strategy. We will break the 3+2 strategy.
    That will have implications for our nuclear deterrent, and it
    will also have implications for our ability to reduce the size
    of the stockpile. The 3+2 actually knits those two missions
    together. We have a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent based
    on a smaller number of nuclear weapons. We have more budgetary
    tightness, that program is at risk. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Let's say, just for the sake of discussion,
    this first 3-year experience, $2 billion short, let's say we
    did that again in the next 3 years. I assume that would
    certainly cross the line you're talking about.
        Mr. Held. That will put the Nation in a very difficult
    position, yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Even if we did half of the shortfall--let's
    say, $1 billion short in the next 3 years--and I would note
    that, in contrast to that, fiscal years 2016 and 2017, we're
    supposed to be ahead, trying to make up ground--ahead of the
    original commitments, trying to make up for the last few years.
    But, let's say 2015, 2016, 2017, we're $1 billion short of the
    original commitments, the top line. I assume that would be
    serious.
        Mr. Held. It would be serious, my close colleagues in DOD
    will focus first on the weapons side. Most certainly we will do
    that, as well. An area of increasing concern for me is nuclear
    safety. Our infrastructure, our--enriched uranium in Oak Ridge
    is 70 years old. We can't wait until 2038 to get new
    facilities. The same thing with plutonium. So, nuclear safety
    is an increasing concern of NNSA, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Okay. Again, I want to underscore the
    second half, the lower half of the chart is the results of
    these number shortfalls, funding shortfalls, specific delays,
    which are already here because of the first 3-year experience;
    but I assume you'd agree, going beyond those five delays to
    further delays, further shortfalls would be very serious.
        Mr. Held. The implementation plan that's in the current
    SSMP is referred to as the Deputy Managers Action Group (DMAG)
    option 1. Both DOD and DOE are quite firm that DMAG option 1
    that's articulated in the fiscal year 2015 SSMP is really
    pretty rockbottom for us.
        Senator Vitter. Okay.
        Mr. Held. It still meets the mission, our mission
    requirements, but we're rockbottom at this point.
        Senator Vitter. Right.
        Final thought, Mr. Held. In terms of nuclear modernization,
    the President has pretty much drawn a red line, said ``No
    development of new nuclear weapons.'' If that were not a policy
    and we were just setting about to achieve our deterrent and
    strategic objectives in the best, safest, most cost-effective
    manner possible, would we only talk about modernizing existing
    nuclear weapons, or would we possibly talk about developing
    new, safer, more technologically advanced nuclear weapons to
    achieve those objectives?
        Mr. Held. The plans that we have in the 3+2 strategy meet
    our nuclear deterrent requirements and meet our safety and
    security requirements. So, the 3+2 strategy will----
        Senator Vitter. I am glad they do, but that's not answering
    my question.
        Mr. Held. Right.
        Senator Vitter. My question is, if we didn't have this
    doctrine, ``No new weapons,'' would we try to meet those
    requirements potentially in a different way?
        Mr. Held. I think, under the Nuclear Posture Review, it's
    very important to make sure that we link the nuclear weapons
    mission with the nonproliferation mission. That's been one of
    the tradeoffs that--or the compromises that we've made to make
    sure that there is a nuclear security mission that we are
    achieving, which we think we're doing. The 3+2 strategy, we
    sincerely believe meets our weapons commitments as well as our
    nonproliferation and arms-control commitments.
        Senator Vitter. Okay. Great. A second different way of not
    answering the question, but I'll move on.
        I am concerned that we have a requirement, which I think is
    still the military requirement, of 50 to 80 plutonium pits per
    year, but now we're basically talking about 30, with no plan in
    sight to go beyond that. What are we sacrificing at 30, and
    when might we have a plan in sight to go from 30 to 50 to 80,
    which is the requirement?
        Mr. Held. We are not sacrificing anything in nuclear
    deterrence, actually. The very good scientific and technical
    work has--a high level of confidence tells us that the--some of
    our existing systems are aging quite gracefully, more
    gracefully than we thought, actually. So that the delay of the
    interoperable number 1 for 5 years does not have a mission
    impact, in terms of----
        Senator Vitter. I don't want to interrupt, and I'll give
    you plenty of time, but wasn't part of the idea behind the
    requirement--50 to 80 requirement, flexibility and potential to
    surge, if that was ever necessary, with changing circumstances?
        Mr. Held. Correct. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Don't you think we're sacrificing something
    there?
        Mr. Held. It comes down to the timing of the various
    mission requirements. The pit production capacity is really
    tightly linked to the Interoperable Warhead (IW)-1 needs. The
    IW-1, from purely a deterrent strategy--and this is a NWC
    decision, this is not mine or NNSA, specifically--but, because
    of the graceful aging of the weapons, the urgency of the IW-1
    is urgent, and the reduced urgency of the IW-1 reduces the
    urgency of the 50 to 80 requirement. It doesn't eliminate the
    50 to 80 requirement, but we have a little bit more time to get
    there.
        Senator Vitter. Okay, thanks. I am going to have to run to
    go vote, but I would still suggest we have less cushion, less
    ability to surge, less ability to react to changes around the
    world.
        Mr. Held. I would agree with that.
        Senator Vitter. I would suggest recent events with Russia,
    for instance, suggest that changes around the world may be more
    the norm than the exception.
        Mr. Held. I hear you, sir, and I would instinctively agree.
    I think we need to be careful about these things.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you.
        Mr. Held. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Udall [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
        Mr. Held, thank you for your professionalism and for your
    thorough responses.
        Mr. Held. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Udall. I am going to dismiss you and we wish you
    all the best of luck.
        Mr. Held. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Udall. We'll call the second panel. [Pause.]
        Gentlemen, good afternoon. We just had a vote on the floor.
    There may be subsequent votes. In that spirit, I am going to
    ask each of you to be as concise as you could be. Of course,
    we'll put your entire statement in the record. The reason I
    asked for you to consider short statements is so we can turn to
    some questions and give-and-take between the subcommittee and
    the three of you.
        So with that, let me start by recognizing Admiral
    Richardson. Welcome to the subcommittee.

       STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVAL
    NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM, AND DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF
       NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Admiral Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It's a privilege to testify before you and the subcommittee
    once again. I am very grateful for the consistent and strong
    support of this subcommittee for Naval Reactors. I look forward
    to the discussion of our fiscal year 2015 budget request.
        My 2015 budget request, at $1.4 billion, enables me to meet
    my primary responsibility to ensure safe and reliable operation
    of the Nation's nuclear-powered fleet. My fiscal year 2015
    request is $282 million higher than my 2014 appropriation. This
    increase directly supports our increased workload, including
    three discrete national priority projects and sustaining the
    program's technical support base. The three projects include
    designing a new reactor plant for the Ohio-class ballistic
    missile submarine replacement, refueling a research and
    training reactor in New York, and replacing the spent-fuel
    handling facility in Idaho. The funding for the program's
    technical base, about $950 million, is absolutely essential,
    providing for resolution of emergent fleet issues, spent
    nuclear fuel management, technology development, and operation
    of the prototype research and training reactors. It also
    provides my foundational capabilities, such as security,
    environmental stewardship, and laboratory facilities. In short,
    my technical base at my laboratories is the intellectual engine
    that drives safe, reliable, and responsible operation of the
    nuclear-powered fleet, past, present, and future.
        $156 million of my fiscal year 2015 request funds the new
    reactor plant for the Ohio-class replacement submarine. This
    new propulsion plant includes a reactor core designed to last
    the entire lifetime of that ship, 42 years, without needing to
    be refueled, and will save the Navy over $40 billion in
    lifecycle costs.
        The request for refueling and overhaul of our land-based
    prototype is essential to providing the technologies for the
    life-of-ship core, as well as training about 1,000 nuclear
    operators per year for the next 20 years.
        The fiscal year 2015 request for the spent-fuel handling
    recapitalization project, about $145 million, is required to
    refuel aircraft carriers and submarines, providing a safe and
    effective means of processing and putting their spent fuel into
    dry storage. The existing expended-core facility is close to 60
    years old, is the oldest spent-fuel pool of its type in the
    country. It's showing its age, including leaking walls and
    cracked floors. While operated safely and responsibly, that's
    getting harder every year. The new project has already been
    delayed by 4 years, requiring that I purchase $350 million of
    temporary storage containers that I do not otherwise need.
    Without funding a New START authority in fiscal year 2015, I
    fear this project will be delayed indefinitely, incurring
    further unnecessary costs of at least $100 to $150 million a
    year for further temporary storage.
        Mr. Chairman, at the fiscal year 2015 requested funding
    level, Naval Reactors can safely maintain and oversee the
    nuclear-powered fleet. We can be good stewards of the health of
    our people and the environment. We can make critical progress
    on the Nation's future strategic deterrent. We can continue to
    deliver trained operators to the fleet. We can renew progress
    on the spent-fuel handling facility and keep our submarines and
    carriers at sea. Most importantly, we'll be able to attract and
    retain the incredible people that design, operate, and maintain
    the Nation's nuclear-powered fleet. Without them, we can do
    nothing meaningful. With them, the possibilities are endless.
        With the sustained support of this subcommittee to our
    work, I will continue to lead my team to execute our work on
    time and on budget, and will search tirelessly for the safest
    and most cost-effective way to support the Nation's nuclear-
    powered fleet.
        I thank you again. I am ready to respond to questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson follows:]
               Prepared Statement by ADM John M. Richardson, USN
        Naval Reactors' request for fiscal year 2015 is $1.377 billion, an
    increase of $282 million (26 percent) over the fiscal year 2014 enacted
    funding level. The requested funding permits Naval Reactors to support
    the design, construction, operation, maintenance and disposal of the
    U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered fleet. This Fleet includes 55 attack
    submarines, 14 ballistic missile submarines, 4 guided missile
    submarines, and 10 aircraft carriers, or over 40 percent of the U.S.
    Navy's major combatants. The program also operates 2 nuclear powered
    land-based prototypes to conduct research and development, and when
    coupled with 2 Moored Training Ships, train over 3,000 sailors per year
    for entry into the nuclear fleet. Over 15,000 nuclear-trained Navy
    sailors safely maintain and operate the propulsion plants in nuclear
    powered warships, which operate in support of U.S. national interests.
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request supports three national
    priority projects and the technical support base. The projects are:

             Designing a new reactor plant for the Ohio-class SSBN
            Replacement
             Refueling the Research and Training Reactor in New
            York
             Recapitalizing the spent fuel handling infrastructure
            in Idaho

        Naval Reactors has requested an increase in funding in fiscal year
    2015 to support these projects, and to fund necessary maintenance,
    equipment, construction, and reactor technology development in the
    technical support base that have been delayed or deferred due to
    appropriation shortfalls over the last 5 years.
        Supporting the nuclear-powered fleet to safely and reliably protect
    our national interests while forward deployed requires that Naval
    Reactors maintain a substantial technical base--laboratories, training
    reactors and spent fuel handling capability--to anticipate and
    immediately respond to fleet problems before they become operationally
    limiting. This technical base thoroughly and quickly evaluates all
    fleet technical issues that arise while also supporting design,
    manufacture, operation, maintenance, and development of improved
    technologies. Ultimately, this technical base and laboratory
    infrastructure ensures the safety of the crew and the public without
    impacting the mission of our nuclear-powered fleet. Uncompromising and
    timely support for safe nuclear fleet operation continues to be the
    highest priority for Naval Reactors.
        Over the last 5 years, Naval Reactors' appropriation has been below
    requirements by over $450 million. For example, in fiscal year 2014,
    Naval Reactors was funded $151 million below the request. As a result,
    Naval Reactors will be required to shut down one of the two prototype
    reactor plants in up-State New York during the second quarter of fiscal
    year 2015 due to insufficient maintenance funding. This shutdown
    results in 450 sailors that will not be trained and will not be sent to
    the Fleet next year. This directly translates to more work at sea and
    in port for our nuclear-trained sailors further stressing them and
    their families. This reactor will remain shut down until this
    maintenance can be performed. The funding shortage has also made
    impossible the purchase of vital capital equipment and postponed
    infrastructure improvements, most notably defunding High Performance
    Computing capacity that is needed to deliver the Ohio-class Replacement
    reactor design on time and to support the existing fleet. Cancelling
    this computer purchase in fiscal year 2014 has resulted in at least a
    6-month delay to reactor core manufacturing, impacting the Ohio-class
    replacement lead-ship construction schedule.
        Another portion of the requested increase in funding is required to
    support an increased level of effort for designing a new reactor plant
    for the Ohio-class SSBN Replacement. Activity this year includes
    reactor plant design and component development to support procurement
    of long lead components starting in fiscal year 2019. Progress in these
    areas in fiscal year 2015 will ensure the cost of those components is
    controlled as the program moves forward to construction beginning in
    fiscal year 2021.
        Related to Ohio-class Replacement, the fiscal year 2015 request
    continues to progress the Land-based Prototype Refueling Overhaul in
    up-State New York. In fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, Naval
    Reactors continues the core manufacturing development work needed for
    the Refueling Overhaul which also enables timely construction of the
    life-of-ship core for Ohio-class Replacement and reduces cost and
    schedule risk. Further plant service life engineering design will be
    completed in fiscal year 2015 to ensure that the Land-based Prototype
    plant overhaul, performed concurrently with refueling (that starts in
    fiscal year 2018), supports 20 additional years of research,
    development and training in up-State New York.
        In addition to underfunding operations and infrastructure
    activities described above, the fiscal year 2014 appropriation again
    provided no funds to initiate preliminary design for the Spent Fuel
    Handling Recapitalization Project (SFHP). This project, already delayed
    by 2 years, is needed to replace the aging facility in Idaho that
    processes our spent naval nuclear fuel from aircraft carriers and
    submarines. This processing includes receipt, preparation, temporary
    storage, and packaging of naval spent nuclear fuel for dry storage and
    disposal. The new SFHP is urgently required for three primary reasons:

        1.  The existing Expended Core Facility (ECF) is more than 55 years
    old and the water pool that stores naval spent nuclear fuel is the
    oldest pool of its type in the Nation. This old facility is showing
    accelerating signs of deterioration, including leaking water pool walls
    and cracked floors. While the ECF continues to be maintained and
    operated in a safe and environmentally responsible manner, repair and
    refurbishment actions required to sustain operations in the ECF are
    costly and becoming more expensive each year. The risk associated with
    the degrading condition of the ECF is exacerbated, not only by the
    delay in bringing on the new SFHP facility, but also because the fiscal
    year 2014 shortfall in operations and infrastructure reduced funding
    for maintenance on the existing ECF. Any disruption to operations in
    processing naval spent nuclear fuel at the ECF would require costly and
    timeconsuming emergent measures, and would directly impact Naval
    Reactors' ability to support the Navy's nuclear-powered fleet refueling
    and defueling schedules.
        2.  The new SFHP facility is required to receive, prepare,
    temporarily store, and package full-length aircraft carrier spent
    nuclear fuel. The current ECF facility cannot handle this fuel. In
    order to prevent impact to the operating fleet due to the delay in
    bringing SFHP on line, the Navy must procure extra, otherwise
    unnecessary, M-290 shipping containers that will be used to temporarily
    store naval spent nuclear fuel, to return aircraft carriers to sea
    until the new SFHP can be built. In addition to inherent cost increases
    associated with delaying the SFHP by 2 years these extra containers
    will cost $200 million.
        3.  The SFHP is required to ensure Naval Reactors meets its
    commitments to the State of Idaho for processing spent naval nuclear
    fuel. Without this new facility, Naval Reactors' ability to process
    fuel in the timeframe directed by agreements with the State will be
    jeopardized.

        The fiscal year 2015 request for the SFHP--$145 million--is
    essential to the operational availability of aircraft carriers and
    submarines. Without new start authority and funding in fiscal year
    2015, the project will be further delayed, requiring extended operation
    of an aging facility and incurring additional unnecessary shipping
    container costs of approximately $100 million-$150 million for each
    year of delay.
        At the requested funding level, Naval Reactors can safely maintain
    and oversee the nuclear-powered fleet. Naval Reactors can also continue
    to progress the Ohio-class Replacement and Land-based Prototype
    Refueling Overhaul, renew progress on the Spent Fuel Handling
    Recapitalization Project, and maintain its environmental
    responsibilities.
        Naval Reactors has a history of fiscal responsibility in its day-
    to-day operations, and continues to look for cost saving initiatives to
    further drive financial efficiencies at its laboratories. For example,
    Naval Reactors consolidated its laboratory and procurement prime
    contractors into single contracts, resulting in savings of $24 million
    per year. Naval Reactors developed a more efficient assembly process
    for the USS Gerald R Ford reactor core, saving $50 million in ship
    construction. Careful maintenance of refueling equipment has enabled
    Naval Reactors to save $19 million in repurchases that would have been
    required for the upcoming prototype refueling. Aggressive management
    has enabled Naval Reactors to save $6 million over the life of a Major
    Construction Project in Idaho, and we look forward to similar successes
    in other construction projects. Finally, the new life-of-ship core that
    will fuel the Ohio-class Replacement will enable the Navy to save an
    estimated $40 billion over the life of that class of ships. The
    continued cost performance and cost reduction is greatly enhanced by
    stability and sustained commitment to these long-term, multi-year
    efforts. The uncertainty and instability of the past years has resulted
    in significant disruption, distraction, and increased costs. Full
    funding in fiscal year 2015 would send a strong signal about the
    commitment to the critical work Naval Reactors is planning to perform.
        With the help of Congress, Naval Reactors is committed to executing
    our projects on time and on budget, and to continue to search for the
    safest and most cost effective way to support the nuclear fleet.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Admiral Richardson.
        Dr. Cook.

      STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD L. COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
      DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Dr. Cook. Chairman Udall, in respect to the time, I am
    going to sharply abbreviate my remarks.
        I'd like to point out, it is worth noting the President's
    budget request of $6.9 billion for Defense Programs' portion of
    the weapons activities account includes an increase of $500
    million, or 7.8 percent over fiscal year 2014 enacted levels,
    despite the fiscal constraints of the BBA. I'd like to very
    quickly emphasize where we're going with the 3+2 plan that Mr.
    Held laid out, supported by U.S. Strategic Command, the NWC,
    and all of its entities.
        Today, we're continuing our work on production of the W76
    life extended warheads. We will complete that work by the end
    of fiscal year 2019. The B61-12--mod 12 SLEP--is on track. It's
    now in the third year of full-scale engineering, and it is
    proving to be very highly successful, to date. In the budget
    request, the budget that we have will now begin to ramp up
    initial production at the NNSA production plants, preparing for
    preproduction engineering activities in fiscal year 2016,
    leading to a first production unit in March 2020.
        Finally, the W88 alt 370, an alteration that updates the
    Army fuzing and firing unit, is also progressing well for the
    Navy.
        While I could go further, I'll say we have clear actions
    undertaken in infrastructure and development. I'd like only to
    highlight that, although we talk about responsive
    infrastructure, what we are most interested in moving is a
    responsive enterprise that includes the human element as well
    as the infrastructure.
        With that, I am happy to take questions.
        Senator Udall. Dr. Cook, thank you so much.
        Mr. Owendoff.

        STATEMENT OF JAMES M. OWENDOFF, ACTING PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
       ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT,
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Mr. Owendoff. Good afternoon, Chairman Udall. I want to
    thank the subcommittee for their support for the EM cleanup
    program. I, too, will be short, sir.
        Our request is for $5.3 billion for defense-funded
    activities. It will allow the EM program to continue the safe
    cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from 5
    decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored
    nuclear energy research.
        The President's budget request will provide for treatment
    of 900,000 gallons of liquid waste at our Idaho facility;
    continue construction of the Waste Treatment Plant at the
    Hanford site; at Oak Ridge, it will allow us to begin design on
    mercury cleanup; and, at the SRS, we will immobilize and
    dispose of 1 million gallons of liquid tank waste and bring the
    site's high-level waste mission to approximately 50 percent
    completion.
        EM continues to pursue the cleanup on three overarching
    principles. Safety is first, then our commitment to our
    regulatory commitments, as well as good stewards of the
    financial resources.
        I want to give you just a quick update on the situation at
    the WIPP. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, there have been two
    recent safety events at the plant. The first occurred on
    February 5, when the flammable residues on the surface of a
    salt truck caught fire; a second, which occurred late on the
    night of February 14, was a radioactive contamination event in
    which some contamination became airborne underground. Although
    no one has been harmed by either event, we take both very
    seriously and are committed to identifying, acknowledging, and
    fixing any underlying shortfalls in our policies and processes.
        In the meantime, the contamination event has the potential
    to affect other DOE sites that are preparing their transuranic
    waste for disposal at WIPP. We are working to assess the
    potential impacts and make contingency plans to mitigate those
    impacts, if necessary.
        For a status, we are fulfilling our commitment to the State
    of New Mexico to ship transuranic waste from the mesa to the
    staging storage facility in Texas. We have also made several
    entries into the underground to begin assessment of the
    contamination levels. We are proceeding in a disciplined manner
    to ensure the health and safety of the public and the workers.
        In closing, I want to thank the subcommittee for their
    time. I want to acknowledge, certainly, the significant
    progress that we've made in the last quarter century in the
    cleanup program.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Owendoff follows:]
                  Prepared Statement by Mr. James M. Owendoff
        Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and members
    of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to represent the
    Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM). I
    would like to provide you with an overview of the EM program, key
    accomplishments during the past year and what we plan to accomplish
    under the President's $5.62 billion fiscal year 2015 budget request.
                overview of the environmental management mission
        EM's mission is to complete the safe cleanup of the environmental
    legacy resulting from 5 decades of nuclear weapons development and
    government-sponsored nuclear energy research. This year is an important
    milestone year for EM. Fiscal year 2014 marks 25 years of solving the
    legacy environmental problems from the Manhattan Project and Cold War.
    This environmental legacy includes over 90 million gallons of
    radioactive wastes stored in aging tanks, thousands of tons of spent
    (used) nuclear fuel (SNF), over 10,000 containers of excess plutonium
    and uranium, over 5,000 contaminated facilities, millions of cubic
    meters of contaminated soil and billions of gallons of contaminated
    groundwater. EM was originally charged with the responsibility of
    cleaning up 107 sites across the country with a total area equal to
    Rhode Island and Delaware combined.
        In the 25 years since it was created, EM has made significant
    progress in this cleanup mission, completing 91 sites and significant
    portions of the remaining 16. Since 1989, EM has completed almost $144
    billion worth of cleanup work. Sites like Fernald in Ohio and Rocky
    Flats in Colorado, both of which once housed large industrial
    complexes, are now wildlife preserves that are also available for
    recreational use. At the Idaho National Laboratory, we have
    decommissioned and demolished more than 2 million square feet of excess
    facilities, and removed all EM special nuclear material (e.g., enriched
    uranium) from the State. At Savannah River, we have produced over 3,700
    canisters of vitrified high-level waste and closed 6 of the site's
    underground storage tanks.
        Across the EM complex, our progress in footprint reduction is
    significant. Since EM began tracking this performance goal in 2009, we
    have achieved a footprint reduction of roughly 74 percent. We began
    tracking with approximately 931 square miles. Now, we are down to less
    than 300 square miles. Progress continues. These are just a few
    examples of our significant achievements over the past quarter century.
           environmental management cleanup objectives and priorities
        EM continues to pursue its cleanup objectives guided by three
    overarching principles. Most importantly, EM will continue to discharge
    its responsibilities by conducting cleanup within a ``Safety First''
    culture that integrates environmental, safety, and health requirements
    and controls into all work activities. We are proud of our safety
    record, which shows injury rates that are significantly lower than the
    averages in comparable industries; these rates continue to fall thanks
    to ongoing efforts to strengthen our organizational safety culture.
        After safety, we are guided by a commitment to comply with our
    regulatory and other legal obligations, and to be good stewards of the
    financial resources entrusted to us. We manage these priorities within
    a framework of nuclear safety orders, legally binding cleanup
    agreements, and best business practices. We focus the majority of our
    resources on the materials that contain the highest concentrations of
    radionuclides and other hazardous materials and wastes. In addition to
    these priorities, EM is committed to investing in the development and
    deployment of sound technology as a way to reduce costs and fulfill our
    critical mission.
        Before discussing key recent and planned accomplishments, I want to
    update you on the situation at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)
    in New Mexico. As I am sure you know, we have had two recent safety
    events at WIPP. The first occurred February 5 when flammable residues
    on the surface of a salt truck came into contact with a heat source and
    ignited. The second, which occurred late on the night of February 14,
    was a radioactive release event at WIPP, in which some contamination,
    primarily americium, became airborne underground. The facility is
    equipped with a continuous air monitor, which detected the
    contamination and triggered the underground ventilation system to begin
    filtering air before it left the underground facility. The filters are
    performing as designed.
        To date, preliminary sampling results taken from on and around the
    site indicate the underground contamination event has not created any
    health risks for workers or the public. This includes those workers who
    tested positive for contamination, which was slightly above normal
    background levels. On April 2, we sent two successive teams into the
    WIPP underground to conduct preliminary investigations in a portion of
    the non-disposal area. As anticipated, the teams found no contamination
    in the immediate area. This was an important step toward additional
    entries into the mine to allow for further exploration. In the
    meantime, the event has the potential to affect other DOE sites that
    were preparing transuranic wastes for disposal at WIPP. We are working
    to assess potential impacts and make contingency plans to mitigate
    those impacts to the extent possible.
        We take both events very seriously and are committed to
    identifying, acknowledging and fixing any underlying shortfalls in our
    policies and processes. I am proud of the way the DOE team is
    responding to these events. In the wake of the radioactive release
    event, everyone has been working together to assess the situation,
    develop solutions and identify the lessons that can be learned.
                    key recent and near-term accomplishments
        I would like to take this opportunity to highlight a number of EM's
    most recent accomplishments, as well as those we plan to accomplish in
    the remainder of fiscal year 2014.
    Cleanup Activities
        We continue to make significant progress in our transuranic waste
    disposal program. For instance, in 2013 we shipped approximately 2,500
    cubic meters of transuranic waste to WIPP from the Idaho National
    Laboratory's Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project, which has logged
    more than 15.1 million work hours since the last injury or illness
    resulting in time away from work. WIPP has now received more than
    11,000 shipments and permanently disposed of more than 89,000 cubic
    meters of transuranic waste. At the Savannah River Site, we have
    produced over 3,700 canisters of vitrified high-level waste, converting
    it to a solid-glass form safe for long-term storage and permanent
    disposal. We have now completed over 45 percent of the site's high-
    level-waste mission, and recently closed two more underground storage
    tanks a year ahead of schedule, bringing the total number of closed
    tanks to six.
    Contract and Project Management
        Our cleanup progress depends in large part on a broad array of
    contractors, as well as the successful planning, construction and
    operation of large, often first-of-a-kind, projects and facilities. We
    continue to emphasize continuous improvement in our contract and
    project management by, for example, requiring more upfront planning,
    ensuring Federal project directors and contracting officers are well
    trained, improving our cost-estimating capabilities, conducting more
    frequent project reviews, selecting proper contract types, and tying
    fees to final outcomes. Our efforts continue to generate significant,
    positive results. For instance, we negotiated a contract modification
    for the Salt Waste Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site that
    includes a cap on completion costs, provides incentives for cost
    savings, and gives DOE a share of any savings achieved. In a separate
    project at the Savannah River Site, we recently completed two
    additional low-level salt-waste disposal units 7 months ahead of
    schedule and for $8 million less (about 10 percent) than the
    anticipated total cost of $76.5 million. We are improving our
    management of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP)
    project at Hanford, including holding the contractor accountable for
    self-identification of issues to help ensure resolution as early as
    possible.
               highlights of the fiscal year 2015 budget request
        The fiscal year 2015 budget request for EM is a net $5.62 billion.
    The request includes the proposed reauthorization of the Uranium
    Enrichment Decontamination & Decommissioning Fund and the defense
    deposit of $463 million. The budget request for EM is comprised of
    $4.86 billion for defense environmental cleanup activities (not
    including the fund deposit of $463 million), $226 million for non-
    defense environmental cleanup activities, and $531 million for Uranium
    Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund cleanup activities.
    With the requested funding, the EM program will continue making
    progress in the radioactive liquid waste treatment program, approach a
    successful end to the legacy transuranic waste mission, and continue to
    make significant progress in the decontamination and demolition of the
    thousands of buildings and supporting infrastructure that occupy our
    remaining cleanup sites.
        To provide just a few specific highlights, under the President's
    fiscal year 2015 budget request the EM program will complete the
    treatment of 900,000 gallons of liquid radioactive waste at Idaho,
    emptying the last 4 of the site's aging waste storage tanks. The fiscal
    year 2015 budget request supports the ongoing construction of the Waste
    Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) to process and immobilize the
    Hanford tank waste in a solid glass form safe for permanent disposal.
    Consistent with the Department's objective to immobilize waste as soon
    as practicable while resolution of technical issues continues, the
    fiscal year 2015 budget includes support for analysis and preliminary
    design of a Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System.
        At Hanford, we will complete cleanup of the bulk of the River
    Corridor's more than 500 facilities, leaving the 324 Facility, as well
    as the 618-11 Burial Ground and 300-296 Waste Site, as the primary
    remaining cleanup projects to be addressed after fiscal year 2015.
    Depending on our ability to restore full operations at WIPP quickly or
    institute other mitigation measures, we will also achieve significant
    milestones in the legacy transuranic waste program, pursuing 100
    percent completion at Savannah River and reaching 90 percent completion
    at Idaho, 88 percent completion at Oak Ridge, and 77 percent completion
    at Los Alamos.
    Budget Authority and Planned Accomplishments by Site

                          Idaho National Laboratory, ID
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $391,993..................................  $372,103
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Complete the treatment of 900,000 gallons of sodium-
            bearing radioactive waste, the last of the radioactive liquid
            waste at the Idaho site
             Initiate activities to clean and close the last four
            of the site's radioactive liquid waste tanks
             Complete the exhumation of transuranic waste in the
            seventh of nine areas in the subsurface disposal area and ship
            the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, achieving a
            completion rate equal to about 58 percent of the project's
            total land area
             Continue processing contact-handled transuranic (CH-
            TRU) waste at the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project,
            bringing total CH-TRU prepared in fiscal year 2015 for offsite
            disposal to 4,500 cubic meters
             Continue groundwater monitoring and subsurface
            investigations, analyzing contaminants and transport mechanisms
            to the Snake River Aquifer
             Continue retrieval and onsite transfer of Experimental
            Breeder Reactor II fuel and receipt of Domestic Research
            Reactor and Foreign Research Reactor Fuel

                               Oak Ridge Site, TN
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $429,541..................................  $384,975
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Continue shipments expected to begin later this fiscal
            year to Nevada of Consolidated Edison Uranium Solidification
            Project material from the uranium-233 inventory in Building
            3019
             Reach approximately 90 percent completion in the
            site's transuranic waste disposition mission
             Complete the preliminary design for the Outfall 200
            Mercury Treatment Facility, while continuing to develop the
            techniques and technologies needed to characterize and
            remediate mercury in the environment
             Continue design and prepare for construction of the
            Sludge Buildout project at the Transuranic Waste Processing
            Center

                             Savannah River Site, SC
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $1,255,430................................  $1,282,302
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Immobilize and dispose of 1,000,000 gallons of liquid
            tank waste
             Produce 120 to 130 additional canisters of vitrified
            high-level waste at the site's Defense Waste Processing
            Facility, bringing cumulative production to over 50 percent
            completion of the site's high-level waste mission
             Continue packaging and shipping surplus plutonium
            offsite
             Continue processing aluminum-clad spent (used) nuclear
            fuel in H-Canyon and begin processing Canadian Highly-Enriched
            Uranium Liquid
             Continue to receive non-U.S. origin material from
            foreign countries in support of the Global Threat Reduction
            Initiative program
             Continue receipt of Foreign Research Reactor/Domestic
            Research Reactor spent (used) nuclear fuel

                         Richland Operations Office, WA
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $1,012,620................................  $914,301
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Complete the cleanup of the bulk of the River
            Corridor's more than 500 facilities, leaving the 324 Building,
            618-11 Burial Ground and 300-296 Waste Site as the primary
            projects to be addressed after fiscal year 2015
             Continue progress toward Plutonium Finishing Plant
            cleanout and demolition to slab-on-grade
             Continue to conduct, integrate, and optimize site-wide
            groundwater and soil cleanup activities
             Continue operation of the Canister Storage Building
            and Waste Storage Encapsulation Facility
             Continue progress toward removal of contaminated
            sludge from the K West Fuel Storage Basin, including continued
            progress on the K West Basin Sludge Treatment Project line-item
            construction project
             Complete disposition of surplus facilities in the 300
            Area (excluding 324 Building and ancillary buildings)

                         Office of River Protection, WA
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $1,210,216................................  $1,235,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Continue construction of the Waste Treatment and
            Immobilization Plant (WTP) to immobilize waste as soon as
            practicable while resolution of technical issues continues
             Maintain planned construction of WTP's Low Activity
            Waste facility, Analytical Laboratory, and Balance of
            Facilities, and initiate design of the infrastructure required
            to feed tank waste directly to the facility
             Support analysis and preliminary design of a Low
            Activity Waste Pretreatment System
             Complete waste retrievals in the C Tank Farm

                       Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $224,789..................................  $224,617
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Complete design of the hexavalent chromium pump-and-
            treat remedy project and begin Phase 1 operations
             Complete cleanup activities on public and Los Alamos
            County lands
             Obtain regulatory approval to start remedial projects
            in at least three on-site Material Disposal Areas (A, C and T)
            and complete remedial design for Material Disposal Area C
             Complete demolition of the balance of plant facilities
            at Technical Area 21
             Continue retrieving and processing transuranic waste
            from below-grade retrievable storage

                        Nevada National Security Site, NV
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $61,897...................................  $64,851
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Complete closure activities for 21 contaminated-soil
            sites
             Complete characterization activities for six
            additional contaminated-soil sites
             Support cleanup at multiple sites across the DOE
            complex by disposing of approximately 1,200,000 cubic feet of
            low-level and mixed low-level radioactive waste generated at
            those sites

                        Sandia National Laboratories, NM
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $2,814....................................  $2,801
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Finalize and submit to the New Mexico Environment
            Department a Class III permit modification for regulatory
            closure of the Mixed Waste Landfill and transfer the landfill
            to long-term stewardship
             Submit updated Technical Area V Current Conceptual
            Model/Corrective Measures Evaluation Report to the New Mexico
            Environment Department
             Install up to eight new groundwater-monitoring wells
            at the Burn Site

                   Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CA
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $1,476....................................  $1,366
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015
             Complete the site-specific, baseline human-health risk
            assessment
             Complete groundwater-contamination fate-and-transport
            modeling
             Develop risk-based uranium cleanup standards for the
            Building 812 Operable Unit
             Evaluate available soil-remediation treatment
            technologies and develop remedial alternatives

                            Carlsbad Field Office, NM
                            [In thousands of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Fiscal Year 2014 Enacted             Fiscal Year 2015 Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    $221,170..................................  $220,475
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Key Accomplishments Planned for Fiscal Year 2015 (assuming timely
            restoration of normal operations)
             Support transport and disposal of remote-handled and
            contact-handled transuranic (TRU) waste at the Waste Isolation
            Pilot Plant
             Continue Central Characterization Project for TRU
            waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Idaho National
            Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the Savannah
            River Site
             Maintain capability for receipt and disposal for up to
            26 shipments per week of contact-handled and remote-handled TRU
            for 41 weeks
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
    subcommittee, I am honored to be here today representing the Office of
    Environmental Management. EM is committed to achieving our mission and
    will continue to apply innovative environmental cleanup strategies to
    complete work safely, on schedule, and within cost, thereby
    demonstrating value to the American taxpayers. Our fiscal year 2015
    request allows us to capitalize on our past investments and successes.
    We will make progress in the high-level-waste treatment mission,
    complete the cleanout and demolition of several major facilities across
    the complex, approach the end of our legacy transuranic waste
    disposition mission, and continue the significant progress we have made
    in the management of nuclear materials and remediation of contaminated
    soil and groundwater. I am pleased to answer any questions you may
    have.

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Owendoff.
        Dr. Cook, let me start with you. I asked you this question
    a year ago, and I want to make sure we'll still get the same
    answer. We're embarking on a LEP of the B61 gravity bomb. The
    number of B61 weapons will be reduced by 50 percent, I think,
    if I am right, as a result of this LEP. Your estimate's on the
    order of $8 billion for the LEP, and the informal DOD estimate
    was $10 billion. Is the program cost still around $8 billion?
    Second, can you reduce the costs further? Then, third, is it
    adhering to schedule?
        Dr. Cook. So, in order, the cost remains in the $8 billion
    range. I've signed out, at this point, three selected
    acquisition reports. These are required by Congress. They're
    quarterly reports. The number has not changed, and the schedule
    has not changed since the first. So, that stays on schedule.
        You're correct that the result will be that we not only
    reduce the number of air-delivered bombs by a full factor of 2,
    but this sets the stage to retire the last of the megaton-class
    bombs in America's deterrent, the B83. Additionally, it will
    reduce the amount of special nuclear material in the air-
    delivered bomb leg by more than 80 percent. This comes back to
    Mr. Held's comment about the integration between defense
    programs and nonproliferation.
        Have I answered everything you wanted?
        Senator Udall. I think you did, thank you.
        Dr. Cook. All right.
        Senator Udall. Admiral Richardson, let me ask you a
    question tied to the Idaho National Laboratory. The Naval
    Reactors is proposing to replace the spent fuel handling
    facility at Idaho National Laboratory. Suggestions have been
    made that other spent fuel storage facilities at the
    Laboratory, such as the Idaho Nuclear Technology and
    Engineering Center (INTEC), can perform this mission. Could you
    explain whether this existing facility is suitable, or not, and
    why?
        Admiral Richardson. Thank you, sir.
        In short, that existing facility is not currently suitable
    for the mission of handling spent fuel from our program. When
    we undertook this mission to consider options, the best way
    forward to recapitalize our spent fuel handling facility, we
    did that business case in 2009. We considered the full range of
    options at that time, including upgrading our existing facility
    or using other facilities, like the one at INTEC, which is the
    one you referred to. That analysis concluded that, by far, the
    most cost-effective way and the most effective from a process
    standpoint was to recapitalize the facility on our Naval
    Reactors facility on the Idaho National Lab. There would be
    significant modifications required if we were going to use an
    existing facility. The cost of those modifications would exceed
    the cost to do a new facility, and would require that we do
    that work with radiological controls, which would increase the
    risk, as well. The business case pointed us to a new facility.
        Senator Udall. I'd follow up: When it comes to Idaho, have
    there been effects on the deployed nuclear fleet because of the
    delay in replacing the existing fuel handling facility in
    Idaho?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, to date, we have managed those
    delays, but that has come at an increased cost. Instead of
    moving spent naval nuclear fuel into that facility, we have
    instead had to buy temporary storage containers that will hold
    that fuel until the new facility is built. That's about $100
    million a year in cost for containers that I don't need. In
    short, we're at a position right now that it costs more to
    delay that facility than it does to just get on and do the
    work, because of these temporary containers.
        Going forward, the other thing that we have to consider is,
    the current facility is aging, and as I said, it's one of the
    oldest facilities of its type, and, at some point, it's just
    going to be unsuitable for further operation. At that point, we
    will have no other way but to impact the fleet.
        Senator Udall. Let me turn to Mr. Owendoff. I wanted to ask
    you a little bit more detail about what's happened at WIPP. Do
    you believe, given the recent Accident Review Board's
    findings--was there adequate safety training of workers in the
    maintenance of equipment at WIPP?
        Mr. Owendoff. No, sir, that has been demonstrated as being
    inadequate. That's one of the things that we have already
    started on, is the training of those individuals and going
    through and revamping all of our maintenance procedures and the
    safety culture, sir.
        Senator Udall. Referring to the same Accident Review Board,
    do you believe the Contractor Assurance System was effective at
    WIPP?
        Mr. Owendoff. No, sir, it was not.
        Senator Udall. I would like to acknowledge the important
    role that WIPP played in the cleanup of the Rocky Flats Nuclear
    Facility, which is in my home State of Colorado. I also live
    within a few miles of that facility, so I know all of my
    neighbors appreciate the fact that the WIPP facility was
    brought online, that the State of New Mexico posts that
    important facility. Having said that, we have work to do,
    obviously, based on what happened.
        Mr. Owendoff. Yes, sir, we sure do.
        Senator Udall. What the Review Board demonstrated.
        Let me turn back to Dr. Cook. I want to ask you a question
    tied to the IW. I think you're proposing to delay the warhead
    by up to 5 years. This warhead was to combine the W88 submarine
    warhead with the W78 intercontinental ballistic missile warhead
    in order to reduce the total number of warheads in the
    stockpile. Can you explain why the delay occurred? By the time
    we're ready to start this program, we will have finished
    replacing the fuzes on the W88 submarine warhead, which is in
    relatively good shape. Given that, wouldn't it make more sense
    and be less expensive to consider simply life-extending the W78
    warhead? So, two questions.
        Dr. Cook. Sure. On the first question, it was a joint
    agreement at the NWC, followed by a meeting at the DOD DMAG.
    The set of agreements resulted in keeping the W76 life
    extension moving ahead at full speed, increasing the cost, year
    per year, but according to the projection, so that we could
    execute the B61-12 life extension, because B61s are the oldest
    weapon system in our deterrent. Then, the third part, a strong
    commitment to doing, just as you say, the W88 arming, fuzing,
    and firing unit. But, given the amount of money that was
    available then, that required a deferral of the first
    interoperable by 5 years, and it required a deferral of the
    long-range strike option, or the cruise missile replacement, by
    a time of up to 3 years. So, that was a joint agreement.
        Now, with regard to the W88, yes, we will be modernizing
    that, but through the surveillance program, we found that both
    the 78 and 88 are aging, as predicted. We have good stockpile
    stewardship tools. We believe those systems will be good out
    through 2030, and that's why we've set, collectively, the
    timing for the IW at that point.
        A key part of the IW is to improve the safety. There was an
    earlier question. Given that we can put the 78 and 88 both on
    insensitive high explosives, that would be very strong and
    important improvement in safety.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that update.
        Admiral Richardson, let me come back to you to talk about
    the status of the Ohio ballistic submarine reactor. You're
    developing the reactor for the replacement to the existing
    fleet of Ohio submarines. I understand there might be delay of
    up to 6 months due to a funding shortfall. Could you comment?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, I am managing a funding shortfall
    in my fiscal year 2014 budget. A portion of that total
    shortfall, which was $150 million, about $100 million of that
    was marked against my operations and infrastructure budget, and
    $11 million of that money prevented me from buying a high-
    performance computer that I had scheduled to buy in fiscal year
    2014.
        Part of the capacity of that high-performance computer was
    being allocated against the Ohio replacement reactor design. By
    virtue of being able to do more sophisticated modeling in that
    computer, we had saved about $40 million by avoiding building
    prototypes and doing actual testing.
        By virtue of not being able to purchase that computer, I am
    about 6 months behind right now. If I get funded in fiscal year
    2015, though, sir, I want to make it clear that I believe I can
    make that difference up, keep the project on schedule, be ready
    to award the building contract on schedule, and keep this top
    national priority on track.
        Senator Udall. Okay, thank you for that update.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. Mr. Owendoff, let me come back to you and
    focus on whistleblowers at Hanford. I'd like your help here.
    Let me lay out the predicate. My understanding is that the
    contractors reimbursed for reasonable costs under the current
    contract structure at Hanford; for that matter, at most other
    cleanup sites. This seems to allow reimbursement of lawyers'
    fees in cases involving whistleblowers, which shifts the cost
    burden against them, since they have to pay for their own
    lawyers' fees. Do you have any recommendations for the
    subcommittee to make this burden equitable between parties?
        Mr. Owendoff. Mr. Chairman, I think that's a question I
    need to take back. I know that's been a question before, and I
    know DOE is working on an answer for that issue, sir. So, if I
    could, I'll take it. I don't have any recommendations at this
    time.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I understand that the General Counsel is undertaking a review of
    the Department of Energy's handling of whistleblower costs in a
    different context. We would be happy to share the results when it is
    complete.

        Senator Udall. If I might, let me stay on Hanford.
        Mr. Owendoff. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. I felt, referencing Rocky Flats again, that
    because we were at the head of the line, we in Colorado would
    work with other States all over the country to help them in
    their cleanup efforts. Hanford is probably the most expensive,
    the thorniest, and the most technologically challenged, just
    due to the scale and also the effect on the Columbia River,
    potentially. That's not to downplay any of the other sites.
        With that as a backdrop, it's my understanding you're now
    considering an option to treat low-level waste at Hanford,
    which comprises 90 percent of the bulk volume of the storage
    tanks--my understanding is, this will involve another
    pretreatment facility, in addition to the one that's already
    been under construction for the main facility. What's the
    status of the new pretreatment facility, and how much will it
    cost?
        Mr. Owendoff. Sir, we submitted a data sheet for that, a
    construction data sheet for that, as part of the 2015 budget.
    There is a cost range that I want to say is about $300 million
    roughly.
        Senator Udall. Yes.
        Mr. Owendoff. But, it's very small when you compare that to
    the main pretreatment facility that will serve as the bulk of
    the material. We believe that, by getting this first facility,
    the low-activity facility, which is the lowest in radioactivity
    level, we can get that up and running and start making glass.
    The next more complex facilities are the high-level waste and
    then the very large pretreatment facility.
        We believe this is the right way to go, to get started. The
    Secretary is really pushing us to get that low-activity waste
    facility up and running, sir.
        Senator Udall. As a follow-on, more on the technological
    side, we're going to vitrify some fair amount of that waste? Is
    that the plan?
        Mr. Owendoff. Yes, sir. In fact, it's about a 20 to 1 low
    activity that will stay on site vitrified. Then the high
    activity, which will go ultimately to a repository. So, that's
    a higher activity waste. Both will be vitrified into glass.
        Senator Udall. Dr. Cook, let me come back to you with a
    question about Los Alamos. We have worked, through the
    subcommittee and members of the full committee, to ensure we
    continue to develop a strategy to replace the plutonium
    facility at Los Alamos. It looks like, with the help of DOD, we
    have a way forward that would involve using smaller modules
    constructed in stages. I think the forecasts are, we could save
    several billion dollars. Are you committed to that approach?
    What stages do you still have to pursue to begin construction
    of the smaller facilities? Then, when would construction begin?
        Dr. Cook. Sure. We are committed to the overall approach.
    To run through it very quickly, the DOD Cost Assessment and
    Program Evaluation, with support by NNSA, went through a
    business-case analysis for the plutonium strategy. This was
    endorsed by the NWC. It has three phases:
        The first phase, to provide capabilities in an existing
    building, brand-new, the radiation lab put additional tooling
    in that building to handle a large part of the analytic
    chemistry work.
        The second phase is to do some retooling of the existing
    PF-4. We've determined that there are some missions that we no
    longer need; therefore, older contaminated equipment can be
    pulled out; and, with about a quarter of the space of that
    facility, we can put in new tooling that will support the
    preparation to make pits and some material characterization.
        The third phase of that is to reduce the material at risk
    in PF-4. That will give us a longer lifetime of PF-4. But, to
    do that, we have to create some new special-purpose modules
    that would be placed adjacent to PF-4 and connected via
    tunnels.
        The budget request in 2015 through 2019 supports that
    strategy. We are committed to the strategy. We'll take the
    first and second phases sooner than we take the third phase,
    but we will be doing some conceptual activity for the new
    modules that we require in concert with other two phases.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that update.
        Admiral Richardson, in February it was revealed that there
    was a cheating incident with instructors at the Naval Reactors
    Training Facility in South Carolina. Can you update the
    subcommittee on your investigation and the status of it and, if
    possible, how many persons are involved?
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir. In February, as you said,
    sir, we were disappointed to learn that we did have an incident
    with cheating among the instructors in our school in
    Charleston, in our training reactor.
        Senator Udall. Yes.
        Admiral Richardson. I took two immediate steps. First, was
    to ensure ourselves and the country that the reactors remain
    safe. We were able to do the analysis and convince ourselves
    beyond a shadow of a doubt that the reactors did remain safe.
    The second action I took was to dispatch an admiral to go down
    and lead the investigation. That investigation is complete, and
    has been forwarded to me. We're in the deliberative process of
    working through that investigation. Our way forward is really
    taking shape along three lines of effort:
        The first line is just a purely technical effort. It should
    be near impossible these days to cheat on a written exam. The
    incident was limited to a written exam for one qualification
    down there. With encryption and password protection and those
    sorts of measures, it should be technically almost impossible
    to cheat on a written test these days. We're going to upgrade
    our technical program down there.
        Second, there will be some accountability for those who
    exhibited misconduct. I am really not at liberty to talk about
    the numbers at this point, because I am in the middle of that
    process. But, as soon as I get through that, I am committed to
    coming here and providing you an update. I will close that out
    with the final numbers.
        The third and most important line of effort is really to
    examine our culture across the program so that we can do
    everything--ensure ourselves we're doing everything to
    strengthen the character and the moral courage of our team so
    that it becomes part of the atmosphere in our program, that it
    would be unthinkable to do anything that would compromise the
    integrity of the program or the personal integrity of any of
    our people inside of it.
        I've talked to people across the Navy, experts outside the
    Navy, in academia. We're really leaving no stone unturned. I've
    already held a summit of all of the major commanders of
    nuclear-powered warships, and we are getting after this
    aggressively to make sure that we not only are very clear about
    teaching the principles of why it is important to be truthful
    and honest in the program, but also strengthening the character
    of our team and minimizing to the point of eliminating any
    obstacles that would make it more difficult just simply do the
    right thing. By virtue of that comprehensive approach, we are
    looking forward to improving across the program.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that update. I know that for
    the large majority of the men and women who serve in this
    important area, that they had nothing to do with what happened
    and this doesn't reflect on them. I know, under your leadership
    and with the subcommittee's partnership, we will look at the
    culture, as you pointed out, and make the changes and mete out
    whatever punishment's necessary, and then move forward. Because
    I know, again, 99 percent or more of your personnel are all in
    and comply with what we expect them to do. I appreciate the
    update.
        Admiral Richardson. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that
    endorsement and validation. We expect those folks to do that,
    and we take no comfort in the fact that this is a small number
    of people. This is still a big problem we're paying very close
    attention to. It has my personal attention daily.
        Senator Udall. Yes, I know you are. Again, I don't want it
    to reflect on all the people who have worked 150 percent.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
        No, most of those folks are very disappointed in the action
    of this very small cadre of people.
        Senator Udall. Yes.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. Let me move back to nuclear fuel. The status
    of highly enriched uranium. Admiral Richardson, based on
    current fleet projections, when do you believe we'll have to
    seek a new supply of the highly enriched uranium used in your
    fleet?
        Admiral Richardson. Sir, by current arrangements, we have a
    sufficient supply of highly enriched uranium, out to about
    2064. Beyond that, really, no solution in sight, pending some
    other arrangement or some technology for developing more highly
    enriched uranium.
        Senator Udall. If the subcommittee will suspend for a
    minute. [Pause.]
        All right. Dr. Cook, you're the winner of the jackpot. I
    think you're going to receive the last question of the hearing.
    [Laughter.]
        Dr. Cook. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. Can you explain to the subcommittee whether
    the life extension of the B61-12 will enable you to retire the
    W83 gravity bomb or will be retired independently of the B61-
    12?
        Dr. Cook. It is required, it is linked. It was a difficult
    set of discussions to go through with the NWC. The conclusion
    was that, once successfully implemented, with the first
    production unit, as I said, March 2020, a few years after that,
    once we have what we call stockpile returns and we're satisfied
    that the 61-12 performs well in service, the NWC is fully
    prepared, and intends, to retire the B-83.
        Senator Udall. Thank you for that.
        I am tempted, because Admiral Richardson is here, to get
    his opinion on small- and medium-sized reactors and their
    application in the civilian and domestic power arena. That's
    long been an interest of mine. I know we are doing research at
    DOE.
        Admiral, would you have an opinion or any insights on the
    suitability of such reactors on land and as supplements to
    existing power plants or as substitutes for power plants that
    might be retired?
        Admiral Richardson. Senator, we have been following the
    development of small modular reactors closely. It might be most
    appropriate, sir, if I came in and gave you a brief on what our
    opinions on that are and where we see that going.
        Senator Udall. I would very much welcome that.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. I thank you for the offer.
        Admiral Richardson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Udall. Senator Vitter asked his questions, and he,
    I think, is indisposed on the Senate floor.
        I am going to bring the hearing to an end. I want to thank
    all of you for your time, your expertise, your patriotism, and
    your hard work.
        We'll leave the record open through the beginning of next
    week, through Monday.
        The Subcommittee on Strategic Forces is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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