[Senate Hearing 113-586]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-586
THE PATH TO EFFICIENCY:
MAKING FEMA MORE EFFECTIVE FOR STREAMLINED DISASTER OPERATIONS
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 24, 2014
__________
Available via http://www.fdsys.gov
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
91-178 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Deputy Staff Director
Keith B. Ashdown, Minority Staff Director
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Lauren Corcoran, Hearing Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARK BEGICH, Alaska Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
Pat McQuillan, Staff Director
Brandon Booker, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Begich............................................... 1
WITNESSES
Thursday, July 24, 2014
Hon. John R. Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 2
Joseph Nimmich, Associate Administrator, Office of Response and
Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 4
Christopher Currie, Acting Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.......... 6
Daniel Sutter, Professor of Economics, Johnson Center for
Political Economy, Troy University............................. 7
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Currie, Christopher:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 76
Nimmich, Joseph:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Roth, Hon. John R.:
Testimony.................................................... 2
Prepared statement with attachment........................... 25
Sutter, Daniel:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 90
APPENDIX
An Analysis Report submitted by the Subcommittee................. 97
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Roth..................................................... 153
Mr. Nimmich.................................................. 157
Mr. Currie................................................... 162
THE PATH TO EFFICIENCY:
MAKING FEMA MORE EFFECTIVE FOR STREAMLINED DISASTER OPERATIONS
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THURSDAY, JULY 24, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Emergency Management,
Intergovernmental Relations,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Begich,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Begich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEGICH
Senator Begich. Thank you all very much for being here. I
appreciate it. Thank you for coming this afternoon. Again, this
is the Subcommittee on Emergency Management, Intergovernmental
Relations, and the District of Columbia. I will call the
meeting to order.
For the last year-and-a-half, this Subcommittee has
examined a number of critical issues affecting the emergency
management community. Today, we are here to assess FEMA's
progress in its efforts to balance timely disaster response and
recovery with good stewardship of the taxpayers' money.
For example, since 2009, the DHS Inspector General (IG) has
documented the ongoing problem with the management of disaster
recovery spending, identifying $1.36 billion in potential cost
savings. Within these IG audits, they have identified almost
$276 million in wasteful ineligible disaster recovery spending
from 2009 to 2013.
Finally, this Subcommittee has reviewed the IG and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO's) reports on the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) workforce. FEMA's workforce
is the greatest asset. The knowledge, skills, and expertise of
FEMA's workforce are critical to successfully working with
disaster survivors, State, local, and Tribal Governments. Yet,
challenges such as staff that lack the necessary qualifications
and training can result in inconsistent application of FEMA's
recovery policies. This can lead to misspent wasteful spending
and slower recovery. It is paramount that FEMA's workforce be
properly trained in order to save taxpayer money.
Since the massive flooding that resulted from the ice
breakup on the Yukon last year, the Village of Galena, Alaska,
has been on the front lines of major FEMA response. Hundreds of
FEMA responders have been tasked with helping Galena rebuild.
But, we do not expect every visitor to our State to fully
understand the unique nature of life in rural Alaska.
Responders must be able to adapt. Swift and efficient recovery
cannot be supported by a workforce that lacks experience with
Tribal communities or has not planned for high shipping costs
and economic impact of increasing barge traffic along the
river.
These are a few of the issues from this Subcommittee's
research that appear to be ongoing challenges. I am looking for
further in-depth conversation with our witnesses. We also will
hear from FEMA about the steps they are taking to fix these
longstanding issues.
Today, we will hear from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Inspector General, FEMA's Associate
Administrator for Response and Recovery, and the GAO. We will
also get the perspective from outside government from an
economist who specializes in the economics of natural hazards.
I look forward to an informative dialogue on the lessons
learned, the improvements made, and examples of best practices
in efficiency and performance that can be applied to FEMA.
Again, I want to thank all of you for being here today, and
I would like to go down the line here. I will introduce each
one, and then if you could give your testimony. And, again, all
written material will be, as requested, in the record, and I
appreciate your time here.
The first is the Honorable John Roth. He is the Inspector
General for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Roth.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JOHN R. ROTH,\1\ INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Roth. Thank you, Chairman Begich, and thank you very
much for inviting me here today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the Appendix on
page 25.
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My testimony today will focus on some high-risk management
challenges that we have identified in our recent audit reports
and in our ongoing work with regards to FEMA. I will also
discuss our new, more proactive approach to audits designed to
identify problems earlier in the disaster recovery cycle.
As I know you are keenly aware, FEMA faces a daunting task:
To be ready for anything, anywhere in the United States and its
Territories. FEMA's Public Assistance Program is immense, with
FEMA reporting over 100,000 applicants with projects worth
approximately $50 billion. FEMA has obligated about $10 billion
annually from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) to deal with these
disasters. This does not count Hurricane Sandy, which will cost
the Fund many more billions of dollars.
We audit about $1.2 billion of these costs each year. We
have determined that, generally, communities improperly spend
about 23 percent of the grant funds that we audit. Therefore,
we estimate for this year, our Disaster Grant Audits will
identify or prevent about $300 million in improperly spent
disaster assistance.
Attached to my testimony today is our most recent Capping
Report, summarizing the work we have done in fiscal year (FY)
2013. As we have in the past, we continue to find problems with
grant management and accounting, ineligible and unsupported
costs, and noncompliance with Federal contracting requirements.
A significant issue this year was insufficient insurance
required to protect grant recipients from future losses. We
also noted a sharp increase in questioned costs for ineligible
contracting procedures.
In the past, my office has focused much of its efforts on
auditing past transactions. This, as you note, has led to more
than a billion dollars in questioned costs and funds pout to
better use. Unfortunately, once that money is spent, it is
often too late to recover the funds or correct the underlying
problems.
Therefore, we are in the process of transitioning to a more
balanced audit portfolio approach. Our new proactive approach
is in four phases.
First, we deploy our Emergency Management Oversight Teams.
These teams accompany FEMA during the initial response to
Presidentially declared disasters. We expect to do about five
of those this year.
Second, we anticipate conducting about 20 Capacity Audits
early in the recovery phase, before applicants have spent
significant amounts of Federal funding. These audits will
assess whether communities and other applicants have the
capacity to properly administer the grant funds. Our
recommendations will focus on correcting weaknesses to prevent
applicants from misspending Federal funds before they are
spent.
Third, we anticipate conducting about 20 Early Warning
Audits later in the recovery phase. These audits will determine
whether applicants are, in fact, accounting for and expending
FEMA grant funds correctly. The early reporting of
noncompliance should enable communities to take actions to
correct or at least mitigate the financial impact of
noncompliance.
And then, last, we anticipate conducting about 20
traditional Disaster Grant Audits. We typically perform these
audits once the applicant completes most of the disaster work.
Thus, under our new approach, fewer than a third of our
audits would be considered to be traditional audits done after
the money was spent, and the bulk of our work is done to try to
prevent misspending of FEMA funds.
I am encouraged by the fact that FEMA officials have
implemented corrective measures to address issues we identified
in our past reports. FEMA recognizes that applicant
noncompliance with Federal procurement standards continues to
be a significant source of findings and questioned costs.
As a result, FEMA has developed and is implementing a new
Procurement Disaster Assistance Team. The team will provide
assistance to applicants in advance of contract awards to
reduce procurement violations.
Additionally, FEMA's Recovery Directorate plans to
establish a section dedicated to responding to, implementing,
and learning from the Office of Inspector General (OIG) audits.
FEMA has already completed a 3-year look-back analysis of our
audits to help set policy priorities and plans to activate the
new section by the end of this fiscal year.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I
welcome any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Let me move to the next speaker, if I can, Joseph Nimmich,
who is the Associate Administrator for Response and Recovery at
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which is part of the
Department of Homeland Security.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH NIMMICH,\1\ ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE
OF RESPONSE AND RECOVERY, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Nimmich. Good afternoon, Chairman Begich. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify before you today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Nimmich appears in the Appendix
on page 63.
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I appreciate the oversight that this Committee provides.
Your guidance, along with the recommendations of the Government
Accountability Office and the DHS Inspector General, reinforces
FEMA's ability to provide critical service to the American
people while eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse. You are the
voice of those we serve, and your findings enable us to better
meet the critical needs of survivors, States, Tribes, and local
communities to prepare for, protect against, respond to,
recover from, and mitigate the impacts of disasters.
Increased efficiency is a worthwhile goal for any and all
organizations and we are committed at FEMA to streamlining our
processes to improve the services we provide. While the
challenge of increased efficiency crosses all sectors, it is
important to realize the unique challenges associated with the
rapid delivery of lifesaving and life sustaining services in
disasters.
Many of the issues raised by this Committee are symptoms of
more systemic problems. I want to assure you that we are
committed to addressing the underlying causes and not just the
symptoms. With a firm understanding of these issues, FEMA is
developing solutions to our most significant challenges. We
continue to seek ways to be more efficient stewards of
appropriated resources. But, we must balance that need with the
need to quickly and directly provide services to disaster
survivors to help them recover and rebuild.
FEMA's reforms are focused in three major areas: Building
the capacity, competency, and capability of FEMA's workforce;
the consistency and complexity of FEMA's business processes;
and the ability to use information and data for rapid
situational awareness and effective decisionmaking. I would
like to take a moment to talk about each of these in greater
detail.
FEMA is focused on its workforce and better managing,
training, and equipping each member. Much of what the IG and
the GAO indicate as improper cost or contracting procedures are
symptomatic of a disaster workforce that has not received the
training and tools it needs to perform to its full potential
and provide grantees critical information at the time of
decision.
As a case in point, in the last 3 years of IG Capping
Reports, the IG identified a systemic problem in sub-grantee
contracting procedures. We identified the root cause of these
discrepancies and implemented improved training and workforce
oversight to correct the issues. To address the immediate needs
of local communities, FEMA implemented a Temporary Response
Team of contract attorneys to deploy within the first 48 hours
of a disaster to support grantees and sub-grantees to ensure
their actions are consistent with the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR). This will eliminate the problem of
deobligating funds well after the event.
Through the new FEMA Qualifications Standards and Cadre
Management System, we will institute a more permanent fix,
ensuring that each employee is provided the training and
experience necessary to perform their job while holding them
accountable to provide disaster survivors accurate information
to rebuild their future.
Workforce development takes time, but good management and
accountability cannot wait. We are committed to making clear
policy-driven decisions that are correct the first time.
To better allocate resources, FEMA is strengthening the
connection between strategy, budget, and execution through a
comprehensive resource management system. FEMA is increasing
its focus on performance metrics and linking performance
allocations to outcomes to ensure the most effective use of the
funds provided.
The recently released FEMA Strategic Plan for 2014 to 2018
provides aggressive performance goals for each of the 16 key
priority outcomes the plan requires. The Strategic Plan
reaffirms FEMA's commitment to its guiding principles and sets
new priorities designed to strengthen its organizational
foundation. The plan focuses on getting back to basics,
streamlining policies, improving our information technology
(IT) systems and security, and strengthening the workforce.
Building on a solid foundation will enable FEMA to identify
additional efficiencies and ensure issues identified today do
not become tomorrow's challenges.
FEMA is committed to addressing the need for effective data
management analytic capability by making our IT systems more
capable, secure, and resilient. The better use of data
analytics will provide early reliable basis for decisions.
Better business systems will provide consistency and
transparency.
We continue to make extensive efforts to address and
improve our programs and ensure they are efficient, effective,
and meeting the critical needs of survivors.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Administrator Fugate and the
entire FEMA leadership team, I want to thank the Committee for
your focus on these important issues and the opportunity to
testify before you today, and I look forward to any questions
you or the Committee may have.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
The next person we have on the list is Mr. Christopher
Currie. He is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice
Issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER CURRIE,\1\ ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Currie. Chairman Begich, thank you very much for the
opportunity to be here today to discuss ways to strengthen FEMA
disaster operations.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Currie appears in the Appendix on
page 76.
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Mr. Chairman, today, FEMA's preparedness, response, and
recovery missions are larger, more expensive, and more complex
than ever before, and the future is not looking any easier.
Extreme and rare weather events are now expected to be the norm
and it is very difficult for FEMA to budget and manage in such
an uncertain and reactive environment.
While FEMA cannot control disasters or always predict them,
it can work to make sure programs are more effective and
efficient. In the years since Hurricane Katrina, FEMA has made
much progress in responding to disasters. However, we have also
reported on areas where it could continue to improve. This
afternoon, I would like to drill down into two of those areas.
The first area is FEMA's administrative costs, or what it
costs FEMA to deliver disaster assistance to State and local
communities. Examples of this include salaries, travel, and
other support costs for FEMA employees deployed to disaster
locations, and rent and other costs for operating its joint
field offices in these locations.
As disaster costs have risen, so have these costs. In
September 2012, we found that average administrative cost
percentages had doubled in the last 20 years for disasters of
all sizes. To put this in terms of real dollars, our analysis
shows that of the $95 billion spent on major disasters from
2004 to 2013, $12.7 billion, and that is about 13 percent, were
FEMA's administrative costs.
Recognizing these rising costs, FEMA issued guidance and
targets for managing administrative costs in 2010. However, we
found that FEMA did not require these targets to be met and 37
percent of disasters exceeded those targets. As an example, for
large disasters costing between $500 million and $5 billion,
FEMA's target for administrative costs is between 8 and 12
percent of disaster spending. However, 4 out of every 10
disasters we looked at had costs above 12 percent.
Now, we recommended that FEMA implement required goals for
administrative costs and monitor how well they achieve these
goals. As of this month, FEMA was still considering options for
addressing this recommendation, but has taken it very
seriously. While it is difficult to control the overall costs
of disasters, it will be important for FEMA to monitor its own
costs to ensure that it is as efficient as possible.
The second area I would like to discuss is opportunities to
strengthen FEMA's workforce. The increasing number, size, and
complexity of disasters requires a larger Federal disaster
workforce. During Hurricane Sandy, more than 17,000 Federal
personnel, including more than 7,000 FEMA staff, were sent to
the affected area in one of the largest deployments ever.
FEMA's after-action report self-identified that workforce
readiness for an event like Hurricane Sandy was a challenge.
Just as examples, just prior to Hurricane Sandy, FEMA found
that 28 percent of its disaster positions were vacant. Also,
deploying so many staff nearly exhausted the number of
available personnel. According to FEMA, a month into the
response, by November 2012, it had only 355 of its almost 7,000
total reservists--that is 5 percent--available to deploy,
because the others were either already deployed or not
available for deployment.
We have also reported on broader human capital issues at
FEMA and have made a number of recommendations. For example, we
found that FEMA could better collect and analyze agency-wide
workforce and training data and recommended they develop
mechanisms to do that.
Regarding its Disaster Reserve workforce, we have also
recommended that FEMA better define its criteria for hiring and
compensating these employees and ensure that they are
qualified. Also, we have recommended they better monitor how
these employees implement disaster assistance policies across
the country to ensure consistency.
FEMA has made progress in addressing our recommendations
and has efforts underway to strengthen how it manages its
personnel. As part of our ongoing work for you, we will
continue to evaluate these efforts.
This completes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased to
answer any questions you have.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Next, we have Daniel Sutter, a Professor of Economics at
Troy University. Please.
TESTIMONY OF DANIEL SUTTER,\1\ PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, JOHNSON
CENTER FOR POLITICAL ECONOMY, TROY UNIVERSITY
Mr. Sutter. Chairman Begich, thank you for the invitation
to discuss the need to make FEMA more efficient for effective
disaster response. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sutter appears in the Appendix on
page 90.
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The enormous generosity of Americans is never more evident
than in the aftermath of natural disasters, and naturally, some
of this assistance will be channeled through the Federal
Government. Today, I would like to make three points about
increasing efficiency in disaster response.
First, FEMA currently assists with many smaller events,
which threatens the availability of assistance when most
needed.
Second, the damage threshold for Federal assistance should
be raised and tied to per capita personal income to avoid FEMA
having to respond to so many smaller disasters.
Third, a more thorough assessment of the potential for
State and local governments to respond should inform the
establishment of a new threshold for Federal assistance.
I would like to expand on each of these points. First, the
point about minor disasters dissipating resources. Too many
events are being declared major disasters. Presidents have
declared an average of 60 major disasters per year since 1996,
an average of more than one per week. The GAO has found that 36
percent of these declarations between 2004 and 2011 involve
less than $10 million in Federal assistance, demonstrating that
these weekly disasters do include some relatively small events.
These events dissipate FEMA's resources and energy.
Disasters with total assistance under $50 million have
distressingly high administrative costs, as the GAO has shown,
at an average of 20 percent, compared with 12 to 13 percent for
larger disaster declarations. And, administrative costs
exceeded total Federal assistance for 12 recent smaller
disasters. We pay a high price for having FEMA assist with
these relatively small events.
Second, the public assistance damage threshold should be
raised. FEMA public assistance to State and local governments
introduces third-party payment to disaster response. Third-
party payment is well known to increase costs due to the
problem of moral hazard. Rising administrative costs, improper
payments, identified by the Office of Inspector General, and
the professionalization of State and local emergency management
in pursuit of Federal disaster assistance, as noted by the GAO,
all reflect, I think, this third-party cost inflation. Third-
party payment should be avoided whenever possible, and by
limiting FEMA assistance to truly major or unanticipated
disasters would allow this.
The low damage threshold FEMA uses to evaluate Governors'
requests enables the declaration of small events as major
disasters. FEMA set a threshold of $1 per capita for statewide
damages in 1986 and has adjusted this for inflation since 1999.
The threshold for public assistance should have been tied to
per capita income since 1986, consistent with the normalization
of disaster losses by natural hazards researchers. The GAO
found that 44 percent of all declared disasters between 2004
and 2011 would not have met an income-adjusted threshold.
Third, I think the Federal assistance should be based on a
better assessment of State and local capability. FEMA set the
$1 per capita threshold somewhat arbitrarily in 1986, so a
significant revision need not be tied to this baseline.
A more thorough assessment of the potential for State and
local governments to respond to disasters should be undertaken.
Financial instruments allow State and local governments to tap
into private sector capital and to cover disaster losses. For
instance, public assistance covers several categories of costs,
including property and equipment, debris removal, and emergency
protective measures. Adequate insurance can cover the property
and equipment losses, increasing government's ability to meet
any disaster.
Furthermore, new financial instruments, like weather
derivatives and catastrophe bonds, have emerged since 1986.
Although primarily to date used by businesses or insurers to
help manage weather and catastrophe risk, these financial
instruments could help state and local governments pay for
personnel expenses, debris removal, and other costs.
Establishing a damage threshold in consideration of the
financial instruments now available to State and local
governments would help ensure that Federal assistance is
available and there when truly needed after major disasters or
unexpected disasters.
By avoiding third-party cost inflation and providing better
incentives for State and local governments to prepare, a
reduced Federal role will also help stem rising disaster costs
for the Nation.
Thank you, Senator Begich, and I want to thank again the
Committee for the opportunity to testify today.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much. I made some notes. I
want to come back to you with some questions, but you bring up
some intriguing ideas.
Let me first start, with you, Chris, and that is it was
interesting, your data points in regards to administrative
costs and what you are seeing, or the growth in it. I guess one
of the questions, first, is in 2010, you had mentioned the
targets that were set or agreed to, and they were not
mandatory, but they were targets or goals. And, you had
indicated about 37 percent of them exceeded those targets in
some form or another.
What was the main cause, if you can recall, what forced
them to exceed that, I guess? What was the driver? For example,
if I can pause you for a second, I know in Alaska, in a rural
area, you will have some unusual shipping costs, air costs,
barge costs. But, was there a common denominator in that, or--
--
Mr. Currie. Chairman Begich, we have not actually looked at
the common denominators, but you are absolutely right. I mean,
each disaster in and of itself is very different. So, each
disaster has its own story as to why it costs what it costs.
I did want to say that these costs are not requirements.
FEMA does not require them because they want to allow
flexibility for the Federal Coordinating Officers----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Currie [continuing]. To make the decisions they need to
make in that case of a disaster. But, I think one of the
causes, obviously, is the rising number of personnel that are
required to respond to these disasters----
Senator Begich. Because the disasters are bigger, or that
is what we are doing?
Mr. Currie. I think it is both, sir. I think, obviously, in
the case of, Hurricane Sandy, FEMA deployed more than 7,000
people. That is travel. That is lodging costs. That is very
expensive.
Senator Begich. Yes.
Mr. Currie. But, also, the assistance that is being
provided is much greater, even in smaller disasters. And, I
would also argue, in smaller disasters, you do not have the
economies to scale that you have in larger disasters. So, it is
common to see administrative costs be much higher as a
percentage in those smaller disasters, as well.
Senator Begich. You heard the commentary just at the end
here regarding maybe raising those thresholds. Did you look at
any of that kind of information, of what impact that would
have, or----
Mr. Currie. Oh, on administrative costs, sir?
Senator Begich. No. Raising the thresholds on what kind of
disaster----
Mr. Currie. Oh, right. Absolutely. We have an extensive
body of work on that, and our position is that FEMA has not
adjusted the per capita indicator to account for inflation and
personal income, and had they done that, it would be much
higher than it is today. And, if that had been the case, then
many of the smaller disasters may have not been declared.
However, I think what is very important is--and what we
have advocated for--is that FEMA take into account other
factors besides the per capita indicator. Every State is very
different and has a different way of responding to disasters
and different capabilities.
So, in Alaska, for example, the costs of getting the
assistance to where it needs to get may be much higher----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Currie [continuing]. And that could be something that
needs to be factored into the decision of when a disaster is
declared.
Senator Begich. Again, I do not mean to monopolize your
time, but I want other people to be thinking about these
answers as I am walking through them with you. You are the
front-end person. For example, would it be logical to say, here
is some baseline--maybe it is income, maybe it is per capita--
but then look at more regional and the impacts.
For example, in Alaska, going to Galena is not like going
from here to Baltimore.
Mr. Currie. Right.
Senator Begich. So, you have a different kind of impact. If
you are going to move people there, it could take you three
plane trips, if the weather is good, to get you there. Or, you
might end up moving equipment by a barge rather than a truck.
Mr. Currie. Right.
Senator Begich. Do you think there is a formula that should
be looked at instead of a one-size-fits-all? Even though in a
lot of cases FEMA has flexibility, is it to say, here is our
baseline that we really need to be focused on to raise this
threshold of what we consider a disaster, but keeping in mind
that even though it may be a--like, Galena, to a lot of others,
might have been a small disaster, but for the community, it
wiped it out. So, in their view, it was big. So, do you think
there is a way to have some sort of formula in there? And,
then, I am going to jump down the row here. But, do you----
Mr. Currie. I think that has been the goal, sir, with the
per capita indicator, is to have a baseline. And, what we have
argued is that, not that the per capita indicator is bad, but--
--
Senator Begich. By itself, it is bad.
Mr. Currie. Well, by itself, exactly----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Currie [continuing]. It is bad. And, the fact that, by
itself, it has not been adjusted to take into account other
factors. But, certainly, FEMA could take into account many
other factors if it chose to do so. I know it is considering
options, because we actually recommended that they do this and
we have an open recommendation. I know they are----
Senator Begich. When did you recommend that?
Mr. Currie. This was in 2012.
Senator Begich. OK. Let me ask John, and then I am going to
go to you, Joe, in a second. Do you want to respond? You heard
the conversation here to those questions, and I have some other
more specific for you, but do you have any thought about that
as you looked at doing an IG report and what that means and the
impacts of small versus larger disasters?
Mr. Roth. Right. I mean, certainly, as far as the threshold
for a Presidential declaration, we have done some work on that,
also, in 2012. Very similar results to GAO----
Senator Begich. OK.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. That it has not been indexed for
inflation, that it has resulted, of course, in a creep up of
the number of Presidentially declared disasters, which, of
course, then increases the size of the Disaster Relief Fund.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Roth. I think we ought to recognize that the statute
does not require a specific formula. It simply requires FEMA to
analyze whether or not the States have the capacity to
respond----
Senator Begich. To deal with it.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. To a specific disaster. The rule of
thumb has been the amount of damage that has occurred as a
result of the disaster, but certainly factoring in things like
the cost of recovery for a disaster could be one of the factors
that they look at.
Senator Begich. OK. Joseph, do you want to----
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir. Well, first----
Senator Begich. I wanted to give them an opportunity to lay
it down for you, and then maybe you could respond to it.
Mr. Nimmich. Thank you, Senator, and first----
Senator Begich. Daniel set it up, so I think----
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. We need to be very specific here
that the threshold is not the only element that is considered.
The 44 CFR requires several elements, and some of which you
have described, Senator, in terms of the effect on the
community. Some of the issues with raising the threshold
indicators involves the dynamic between rural States and larger
States that have larger capacity.
We are, in fact, as a result of the GAO audit and the IG
audits, looking at and working with States at the moment to be
able to identify what is the right set of criteria, but it is a
multiple set of criteria. The Stafford Act prohibits a formula.
The threshold is just one indicator. There are disasters that
have been denied even though a State may have made the
threshold because other factors indicated that it was well
within the State's capabilities.
Senator, one of the things that we really need to
understand, there has been a drive for States to be able to get
more disasters, that States have had difficulty during the last
several years with the economy to be able to get that.
Senator Begich. Got you.
Mr. Nimmich. What we are----
Senator Begich. Do you think that is one of the drivers,
that they saw----
Mr. Nimmich. Sir, a lot has to do with population shift,
the infrastructure that is being developed. There are multiple
factors that go into it. Some of it, you heard, the severity of
storms.
FEMA is working very closely with the States to have non-
Stafford Act capabilities. There is an awful lot that the
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs),
the voluntary organizations, that other agencies provide short
of a Stafford Act. The goal has always been to try to get to a
Stafford Act declaration because that opens up the DRF. But, we
are really working with States now to be able to identify where
they have capability that they can use, both from the Federal
Government, voluntary organizations, and their own, to be able
to reuse grants and other capabilities that we take the drive
away.
We are also looking at what are those initial indicators
for the threshold, and then the obligations that actually come
in long afterwards to see if, in fact, the thresholds, while
may appear low, are really, because of the way we assess
damage, really are a right level, or are we finding that States
are trying to get to that threshold in order to get there----
Senator Begich. Got you.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. But when we see the obligations
later, they are much lower. All of these are being taken into
consideration as we move toward a proposal that GAO has asked
for. We owe GAO an answer by the spring of 2015----
Senator Begich. OK.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. And we are moving in that
direction, but we are consulting with the National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA). We need to consult with the
Tribes and other people that have implications now that they
may not have had before.
Senator Begich. Let me, if I can, I am going to jump back
to you, John, if that is OK? I am going to move around a little
bit here. But, one of the things in our analysis, we found 40
open disasters, some 10 years old, or 12 of the disasters
declared before 1999. I am assuming--and this actually kind of
goes back to one of the things Christopher said on
administrative costs--the longer these are open, there is an
accumulation of administrative costs, operational costs just to
maintain these open accounts.
Is there something that FEMA could do better to--I know
when I was mayor and we had things that were--I mean, if we had
grants, and sometimes they were obligated but unobligated, we
would look at these projects and determine if they are reality
or not, or if what is happening is a department--in my case as
mayor--a department is stretching the money in order to take
off their two points or three points for administrative
overhead and then say, ``Oh, we are working on it still,'' and,
really, they will never have enough money to do it, or they
have done it and they are just waiting for other claims that
might come forward.
What is your thought here? Is there something more we could
be doing, or FEMA could be doing, and, it is always hard when
you have a community who has this money sitting there to say,
you have not used it in 15 years. And, they will always--I know
this as a mayor--you are always going to have a reason why it
still should stay there.
Mr. Roth. You raise very good points. We are doing an audit
on this very specific issue, a systemic audit to understand the
root causes of this. I will say that when we do an audit and we
see unobligated funds that we do not think there is a
likelihood of expenditure on, we will advise or recommend to
FEMA that they deobligate the money, put it back into the DRF
so it can be used----
Senator Begich. And, that is in process now, that review
you just described----
Mr. Roth. Correct.
Senator Begich [continuing]. Or is it something you do on a
regular basis, or is it just something that you have added in?
Mr. Roth. Both.
Senator Begich. OK.
Mr. Roth. So, in any audit that we do of any project, if we
see money that is unlikely to be spent, we recommend that it be
deobligated, first thing. Second----
Senator Begich. Can I pause you there on that----
Mr. Roth. Of course.
Senator Begich. Do you go back and see what FEMA's
compliance to that is on that kind of recommendation, what
their percentage of compliance is?
Mr. Roth. Yes. We track every recommendation that we do. We
do followups with FEMA over time----
Senator Begich. What would you say on that one, for
example, is it 20 percent of the time they take that
recommendation, 100 percent of the time, or----
Mr. Roth. Off the top of my head, I would not be able to
give you an answer.
Senator Begich. Could you provide that for us?
Mr. Roth. Absolutely.
Senator Begich. I would just be curious, because that is an
interesting recommendation. If you say, here is this money, you
view it as not usable, I am assuming, then, FEMA always has the
opportunity to put their reason why they still need to keep it,
but, I would be curious on those recommendations.
But, then you had a second piece. I did not mean to
interrupt you.
Mr. Roth. Certainly. And, then, we are doing a systemic
audit to look at the root causes of this.
Senator Begich. Good.
Mr. Roth. That is currently in process. And, I guess my
third point here would be that, The way the system works is
that you have grantees, who are the States, and then you have
sub-grantees, who are these localities. Neither the State nor
the sub-grantee have any inherent interest in turning that
money back.
Senator Begich. No, I know this. [Laughter.]
Mr. Roth. And, the States, as the entities that are
supposed to be administering these, I think we ought to be a
little more----
Senator Begich. Aggressive.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. Aggressive in ensuring that they are
looking at these projects, actively managing the projects, and
they get FEMA money to do that management, and recommending
when there are projects that need to be closed out, that we
close them out.
Senator Begich. I am going to one more, and again, I want
to keep a little flexibility here for folks to respond and so
forth, but I want to get a couple more questions in and watch
our time at the same time.
In doing our research, one thing that we noted was the DHS
OIG website does not have a data system that provides either
Congress or the general public kind of what comprehensive
records, status and recommendations. Can you tell me, is there
something that you could do--and when I say ``you,'' your
agency--do to make that more transparent, at least to Congress
so we have better access, and obviously a broader perspective,
to the public. What would you recommend, or are there thoughts
that are in process now, that you are looking at this issue?
And, you know what I am referring to is the transparency of
this.
Mr. Roth. I do, and, in fact, I saw that in the staff
report----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. That was issued. I think that is a
very good point----
Senator Begich. Good.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. And, candidly, it is one I had not
thought of.
Senator Begich. OK. So, it is one that seems reasonable?
Mr. Roth. Absolutely, and so I have directed my staff to
start to take a look at these issues----
Senator Begich. OK.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. And to ensure that we do a little
better on metrics, making those metrics public----
Senator Begich. Good.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. As far as the number of
recommendations, the age of the recommendations, and what
specific----
Senator Begich. And what is the status?
Mr. Roth [continuing]. Whether they have been closed out,
whether FEMA agrees----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Roth [continuing]. Disagrees with the recommendations.
Senator Begich. Will you let the Committee know if you have
some challenges in trying to--if there is something that is
coming up that you think we could be helpful in helping make
that happen. I think that is a great the more people know that,
obviously, Committee, but the public understand, because I
think as we continue to have--and I think it was very clear by
almost everyone here, the testimony of the amount and the size
of these disasters are increasing, and some of the calls we
start to get now are, well, what happened to such and such
grant, and I understand there was an audit, and then they say,
well, what happened to that, and more access is better. So, if
there is anything we can assist in that, but I think it is
great you are looking at this.
Mr. Roth. I could not agree more. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Begich. You bet.
Let me, if I can, Joe, you heard the conversation in
regards to the disasters that have open-ended, pre-1999, so
forth, long-term ones. Give me your thought on that response.
Do you agree with the IG in regards to how you can handle
these, or what we can do better? The other audit they are
doing, which will, hopefully--it will be very interesting to
see is there, again, a common denominator? What is the root
problem of these? Are they independently very different or is
there something across the board? Can you give me some comment.
Mr. Nimmich. So, sir, some of the disasters that are open
for 10 years have reasons that they are open for 10 years, and
sometimes it is litigation and other issues that are going on.
Of those that are open over 10 years, there are three
significant ones. The vast majority, I would say, the highest
percentage of the costs or obligated money--unobligated money--
exist around the 9/11 disaster, exist around the 1994
earthquake, and exist around Hurricane Irene, the first one
back in the 1990s. So, these three disasters----
Senator Begich. Can I pause you on that?
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. I recognize those are major ones, but at
some point, you have to close them out. I mean, that, to me----
Mr. Nimmich. So, that comes to the issue, Senator, which is
it is a joint issue on closing it out. Now, you mentioned the
fact that management costs continue.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Nimmich. There is a ceiling on the management costs, a
certain threshold that they stop at a certain point unless they
ask for an extension or an increase in those management costs.
Senator Begich. Have you ever granted them on those three
big ones?
Mr. Nimmich. I cannot answer that, sir. We can answer it
for the record.
Senator Begich. I would like that.
Mr. Nimmich. So, once the management costs reach a
threshold--but, this is a joint effort. The States need to
provide the information so we can close out each of those, and
there may be only specific project work items that are inside
there, that we are looking for that information to be able to
close it out.
Senator Begich. How do you incentivize the States to do
that, because I am going to be very blunt with you. As a former
mayor, a city of 300,000 people, a billion-dollar budget, we
covered 1,900 square miles of city, if there is no incentive, I
am going to keep that on the books, because--there are a lot of
reasons why I will keep it on the books. One, it helps my
balance sheet, to be frank with you, when I am doing bonding
and other things. I have all this money sitting there. That is
one little piece. But, the second is, I do not want to give it
back to you. If I give it back, I will never see it again.
So, what is the incentive to tell the States--or the
locales, but in most cases States--to get off the dime and
close it out and do their work?
Mr. Nimmich. So, Senator, you used the right word,
``incentive,'' because most everything that has been proposed
for close-outs--and, I need to make the point that since 2011,
Administrator Fugate has had us focus on this and we have
returned tens of millions of dollars each year and have closed
out over 50 percent of the open----
Senator Begich. Open disasters.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. Disasters. But, there are still
quite a few, as you know.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Nimmich. So, incentives are tough. Most of what
everybody proposes are disincentives, either termination at a
certain period in time, which may not be the correct answer if,
in fact, you have valid project works that are open. And, prior
to the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA), sir, the repairs
had to be done, and we are working on repairs over time. Some
of the road repairs, some of the repairs that we are looking at
can take 10 years or 12 years to actually make, until we have
adjusted the final costs.
So, incentives are the right way to go. It is a real
challenge when you are offering a State or a sub-grantee some
additional money that they do not need to have for the repair
of that issue. Again, with the pre-SRIA requirements that are
in the legislation, we really do not have a way of doing that.
So, we are open to suggestions on incentives.
Senator Begich. Good.
Mr. Nimmich. The reality is, there are some disincentives
we could put into the program. As you well know, States do not
want to see disincentives in terms of losing money that they
may actually be able to use, even though it has taken a long
time.
Senator Begich. Right, but we have disincentives in a lot
of programs. The Highway Trust Fund money, if they do not use
it, at a certain point, they can be deobligated very quickly,
even if it is obligated. There are disincentives with the CDBG
money. I mean, as a former mayor, I remember we had a goal. If
we received these monies, we have to move them. And, disasters,
in the moment, they are complicated, but once you get past the
crisis moment, it is a project. There are timelines.
Mr. Nimmich. It is a project, sir, but to put it in
reference, FEMA is an insurance company, and every time you and
the client deal with an insurance issue, there is always debate
over what was covered, what should be covered, and some of
those debates go on for a very long period of time.
Senator Begich. Let me just say, I had a small disaster in
my house in Anchorage and the insurance company made sure I
closed it out. So, the incentive was, we are closing it out.
That was the incentive, so get my work done. Actually, we
closed it out so fast that they had not done their final
inspection and we got paid. So, that was good. But, this is an
area we are interested in, because----
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir. We look forward to working with the
Committee on identifying ways to more rapidly close out
disasters.
Senator Begich. OK, because it is an obvious thing what
happens, is we hear from people and they go, 15 years, that
money has been sitting there. What the heck is going on?
Daniel, I want to ask you a question. I thought it was
interesting, and you called them weather derivatives and
catastrophic bonds. Are most of those applied for by private
corporations, not local governments or State governments?
Mr. Sutter. Yes. Those financial instruments have been
usually used either by companies or insurance companies.
Senator Begich. I kind of ask you this and maybe, Joseph,
you can answer this, too--is there an opportunity to have a
hybrid partnership, maybe that between local governments or
State governments to utilize these kind of bonds in conjunction
with disaster preparedness? I do not know the answer to this. I
am just asking this question, because it would seem--I know
when we did catastrophic liability issues within the city, we
had a threshold covered out of our self-insurance fund, then we
had another threshold that was insured, and then above that,
another level.
Is that a model or an opportunity, I guess, to do some
demonstration capacity projects in regards to these types of
bonds with local governments or State governments? Who would
like to--Daniel, maybe, and then Joseph.
Mr. Sutter. I think that, certainly, there could be some
hybrid or new types of instruments that might be derived. There
could be some kind of cost sharing or self-insurance amongst
different States that could seek to share some of these costs.
I think, certainly, weather derivatives have a good possibility
to use here, because they are used in some ways to substitute
for insurance----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Sutter [continuing]. On things that would otherwise be
hard to insure because they would be related to a business's
cost.
Senator Begich. Got you.
Mr. Sutter. So, by tying the payment to some measurable
weather statistic, like heating degree days or inches of
snowfall----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Sutter [continuing]. Or something like that----
Senator Begich. Rainfall, things like that.
Mr. Sutter. Right. You can make a payment that is not so
directly tied to a business's cost. So, I think they create
quite a bit of potential for both States and local governments
to be able to access money to help them rebuild or deal with a
disaster response, costs, that were not available at the time
of the passage of the Stafford Act.
Senator Begich. Very good. Joseph, any thought on that?
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir. Well, both of those, you are
identifying ways to reapply the risk back to the State as
opposed to the Federal Government absorbing the risk.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Nimmich. So, these are significant changes that we
would need to look at. There are other opportunities that
people talk about in terms of being able to do this--a State
deductible level, where the States, based on their GDP or so--
--
Senator Begich. Capacity----
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. Have a certain deductible that
they do not get any resources until they have exceeded that
deductible. There are multiple different ways of looking at
this problem, but what we are really talking about is putting
the risk back to the States that have the highest risk----
Senator Begich. Got you.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. With the potential, I presume, of
not including those very catastrophic events. So, the 9.0
earthquake in Alaska is not something that you are going to be
able to insure against----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. But, certain other things, you
are, some of the lower ones that we are looking at.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Nimmich. That is not how the program is currently
configured.
Senator Begich. Understood.
Mr. Nimmich. And, there are multiple discussions, and we
can continue to look at alternatives, all of which would need
to go through the regulatory process.
Senator Begich. I want to go back to one other part you
brought up and that is the workforce. You talked about
administrative costs, but also workforce and some of the issues
I brought up, especially in rural communities. What are some of
the things that you see that we could do to improve the
workforce capacity? And, you mentioned an interesting comment
here. I think it was you said, I forget which incident it was,
but 5 percent of the reservists were available. I forget which
incident that was, but that is not a ready workforce. So, is
there something that we can do better, FEMA can do better? What
is the piece here? And, you had mentioned they are working on
this, but give me some thought there.
Mr. Currie. Yes, absolutely. The example----
Senator Begich. You understand the issue I am referring to.
Mr. Currie. Yes, sir. The example was in Hurricane Sandy--
--
Senator Begich. OK.
Mr. Currie [continuing]. Which, obviously, is a very
extreme example----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Currie [continuing]. But something that is well within
what FEMA plans for. In fact, I think they even plan for having
multiple events like that going on at a time and factor that
into how ready they need to be.
I think FEMA--we have made recommendations in the past that
they develop a comprehensive workforce plan and analysis. They
have acted on those. I know they have contracted to actually
complete those, and some of those are underway.
I think a big part is workforce training. FEMA has a very
diverse and different workforce. They have permanent full-time
people. They have FEMA Corps now. They have the Corps employees
and they have reservists, all very different employees. For
example, the reservists are not full-time FEMA employees.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Currie. They are called up when they are needed. So,
one challenge has been how do you train reservists when they
are not actually deployed to a disaster, when they are off
doing the other things that they do----
Senator Begich. Come to Alaska. We have one every week, it
seems. [Laughter.]
Mr. Currie. So, FEMA recognizes these challenges,
obviously, and they have taken steps. They have tried to better
communicate with reservists when they are not actually
deployed. They have sent them to the Emergency Management
Institute, all those things to try to get them ready.
I think the other thing with the human capital area is
qualification. This has been a perennial challenge in
disasters. It was a huge problem in Hurricane Katrina. We
reported on it. FEMA has made a lot of progress, but it was a
challenge in Hurricane Sandy, making sure that the people you
deploy, those thousands all at one time, they are in the right
job and they have the training and they need to do the job
right away.
Senator Begich. Joseph, any thought there?
Mr. Nimmich. Sir, that is----
Senator Begich. I mean, you probably agree with what he is
talking about.
Mr. Nimmich. Well, it has been a challenge, but we are
accepting the challenge----
Senator Begich. Good.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. And working diligently on it. In
terms of qualifications, it was just a month before Hurricane
Sandy that FEMA implemented its FEMA Qualifications Standards,
so that was a real challenge in being able to--none of that had
taken effect.
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Nimmich. And, quite frankly, those things do not change
overnight. It takes a significant amount of time. But, I think
the biggest step forward we are taking is realizing we have to
put the infrastructure in place to manage the workforce. So,
this past June, we created internally to FEMA the Cadre
Management Program, which puts people in place to be able to
engage each and every employee in that disaster workforce,
whether they are a reservist or a Corps or a permanent
workforce.
Senator Begich. So, it does not matter where they fall,
just----
Mr. Nimmich. If they are part of the disaster workforce and
have identified that they have a skill set that needs to be
used in that disaster----
Senator Begich. Right.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. They have been contacted, and
they have been contacted to look at what our systems say is
their qualifications, their experience, the equipment they
have, their availability, and in the future, we are going to
add performance in from the last disaster. This is an
opportunity----
Senator Begich. Can I ask you a question on that last
piece?
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. So, that is basically saying you can then
analyze did they perform to what we believed was their
qualification----
Mr. Nimmich. And, what do I need to provide them if they
are not able to perform----
Senator Begich. Got you.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. To what the skill set was, what
did I lack in providing them so that I can get their skill sets
up so the advice and the service that they provide to survivors
in the State is right at the first time, so I am not making
improper costs--thank you---- [Laughter.]
Mr. Nimmich. Improper costs----
Senator Begich. The IG got right in there to make sure you
had the right language. [Laughter.]
Mr. Nimmich. Improper costs or contractual vehicles that
were not in compliance with the Federal Acquisition
Regulations. So, we are not only looking at it. We are doing
something about that right now.
And, Senator, you hit the nail on the head. This is going
to start allowing us to identify where our training gaps are
and how we go about creating the infrastructure of training
that we need so that reservists do not wait 2 years to be
contacted, and when they are called up, their experience and
their knowledge is 2 years old----
Senator Begich. Got you.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. That we are working with them on
a regular basis.
Senator Begich. You had mentioned some ideas of how you are
going to try to get some additional data and some other
information. Do you believe the information systems that you
have are adequate to meet the needs of what you want to do in
trying to analyze--for example, this was a great example,
workforce, the analytics that you want to do. From our
information, it just seems that it is not as effective as it
could be. Is there data that you think, or information systems
that should be better designed for what you need, or what you
have is adequate and you can work with what you have got?
Mr. Nimmich. We have a wealth of data. We do not have the
tools and the analytics to be able to make the knowledge we
need out of some of that data.
Senator Begich. Got you.
Mr. Nimmich. We have a lot of data. It is not always the
right data, either, though. So, as a case in point, we should
be able to use our own data and those of the Weather Service
and other providers to us to be able to estimate damage far
earlier in the process than we do so that we can respond
faster, particularly if it is in individual systems.
Senator Begich. Why can you not do that right now?
Mr. Nimmich. Sir, we do not have the skill sets that we are
developing right now. We have taken on----
Senator Begich. Within personnel?
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. OK.
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir. So, we are looking at the better
skill sets and bringing in those people that have the skill
sets to understand the data that goes behind the geospatial
imagery----
Senator Begich. Yes.
Mr. Nimmich [continuing]. That we need to be able to say
what is going on. So, this morning, for the fires in Washington
State, I can now see where every house has been destroyed, what
houses are threatened if the fire changes course. So, I can
anticipate, are they likely to be eligible for some assistance
and be prepared to do that in a more rapid manner.
Senator Begich. Got you. So, with that kind of data, the
question is, your personnel capacity is one of the areas in
order to look at that and say, OK, we know, based on all the
weather patterns and everything else, this area could get hit
by this--I will use the fire as an example--fire disaster, and
there are 72 homes. This is what we think the average
valuations are. Here is the cost. Here is what we need to
prepare for potential damage.
Mr. Nimmich. So, in the tornadoes that hit Arkansas earlier
this year, within 24 hours, we were able to estimate that they
would exceed the thresholds and the other requirements for an
individual assistance disaster, including the trauma, the
number of lives lost, the significant damage to a specific
small town, all of those thresholds they were meeting. So, we
were able to work with them to get a very rapid individual
assistance declaration in place that the President approved,
and within 48 hours after that, we were able to put money in
people's accounts that they needed to buy food, to be able to
pay for hotels, to be able to sustain their lives.
Senator Begich. And, your goal is to make that systemwide.
Mr. Nimmich. My goal is that every survivor in this country
gets the same service, whether they are in remote Alaska or
whether they are in downtown Los Angeles.
Senator Begich. Very good. I just want to make sure I have
covered what I want to cover. Let me back up. I am sorry, John,
you are the center point for a moment here. I think you used
the words--I may get this wrong, but back to basic plan, or
getting to the basics. Do you think, as you work through that,
within FEMA, you are going to identify--obviously, IG and GAO
have identified areas--will you be able to identify the kind of
resources or reallocation of resources that may be necessary to
get to that core issue, or like we just talked about, the data
inputs that you need to have so it is consistent nationwide,
and do you think--I think I know the answer to this, so it is
kind of a, I do not want to make it a softball--but, do you
think you are going to have the resources within what you have,
or do you think, at the end of the day, you are going to have
to figure this out and know that there are some resources
needed?
Mr. Nimmich. So, as far as we----
Senator Begich. Does that make sense, what I am asking?
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir. Absolutely. And, as we work through
the process that we have put in place now to be able to look
from our strategy and those goals that the strategy has down
into the activities that we actually do and be able to equate
those, too, we are looking for twofold. One is to be able to
identify, whether we can meet those goals, and if not, do we
need additional resources. But, also, the Administrator has
made it very clear. We need to do less but better. Where are
the areas that we do not have an impact from those resources on
the outcomes we are trying to achieve, and where do I need to
put those resources?
Senator Begich. Reassign.
Mr. Nimmich. Yes, sir.
Senator Begich. And reallocate.
To the folks from the IG and the GAO, thank you for what
you have done in helping us get some good information to the
staff who, I am a big believer--in this Committee as well as my
other Committee I chair over in Commerce, we spend a lot of
time on oversight. I think the Senate, to be very frank with
you, does not do enough. We do it when there is a disaster, all
right. When there is a crisis, pick the Committee, whatever
Committee you want, when there is something bad happening,
like, it is only now we have realized there is something wrong
with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which actually
the IG and others have done reports on the VA for the last
decade and a half, but that is another story, but it is only
now that people realize.
So, I thank you for participating in this. To the staff, I
want to thank you for the report, because it really helps us go
after these issues and look at $1.1-plus billion dollars of
some that may be wasteful, some may not be. Some may be issues
that we need to work on. But, also to drill down, I think as
you said it, John, to what are the systemic issues here. What
is the root problem of some of these, because it is great to
get a report, but if we do not go one more step down, then we
are on to the next report or the next issue.
And, as you are doing this, the recommendations to me are
always important, because if you are making these
recommendations and then 5 years go by, something bad happens,
FEMA is in here, we are railing on them, and then we go, well,
wait a second, and you will politely say--and I know that you
will politely say, well, actually, in 2009, we recommended A,
B, C, and because we did not do oversight.
So, what I am hopeful of, that this is the beginning of a
continual effort, as we have done already on FEMA, following
it, trying to push the envelope, trying to figure out how to
make your business more efficient, how to make sure the reports
that are being issued are being used in a way that really gets
to the meat of this.
And, then, Daniel, your comments, try and be innovative in
how to think beyond. I know in the city of Anchorage, we did
several things around disaster relief that was different. We
have private sector folks that work in our disaster relief
program. They are actually from Sam's and Costco and others.
Why? Because they are our storehouses. Why would we store all
that stuff? It does not make any sense. They have the
warehouses. They have logistics.
Or, another thing we did, we went on a program to make sure
every city employee was trained in cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR). So, at a bare minimum--because, in a
natural disaster, the odds are you are in your neighborhood.
You cannot get police and fire fighters to it. First responders
may not get there because the roads are out. So, if you have
someone--and we had a 3,000-person workforce, the odds we would
have someone in those communities if it was an off-hour work
time that understood basic first aid and CPR. That was part of
our emergency management plan in a broader sense and trying to
think ahead rather than when the disaster occurs, clean it all
up, and then move on to another thing.
So, I want to really say to the folks at FEMA, I think, as
identified in the report, we have great assets over there,
which are our personnel. We have some work to do to create some
more training opportunities, create some more consistency, not
only with the full-time, but part-times and the ones that are
called up.
I think, on the money issue, we have to drill down and
figure out what are systematic issues here. With the States, we
have to create some incentives for them to get their work done,
because I can tell you, you are right. Some of these projects
get done, take a long time. But, I can also tell you, as a
former mayor, you can get things done. We built a bridge in
Minneapolis in a year and it was done. We can get things done
if we put our minds to it, especially if there is a little
incentive to, if you do not do it, you might end up not having
that money.
And then, again, trying to figure out on the workforce,
what more can we do here to make it the best quality workforce
out there.
So, this is helpful. It helps us identify opportunities of
savings, but also opportunities to improve the quality of
delivery of service here. So, thank you very much for being
here.
I may have some other questions. We will keep the record
open for 15 days for other members who may have some
information or questions they may have for you.
But, again, I want to thank you all for being here today
and testifying in front of the Committee.
At this time, the Committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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