[Senate Hearing 113-376]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-376
ENHANCING OUR RAIL SAFETY: CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR PASSENGER AND FREIGHT
RAIL
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 6, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-623 WASHINGTON : 2014
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEAN HELLER, Nevada
MARK BEGICH, Alaska DAN COATS, Indiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JOHN WALSH, Montana
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
David Schwietert, Republican Staff Director
Nick Rossi, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut, ROY BLUNT, Missouri, Ranking
Chairman Member
BARBARA BOXER, California ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DEAN HELLER, Nevada
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DAN COATS, Indiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CORY BOOKER, New Jersey RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on March 6, 2014.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Blumenthal.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Blunt....................................... 3
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 66
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 71
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 73
Prepared statement........................................... 75
Witnesses
Hon. Mark Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia..................... 5
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator, Federal Railroad
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.............. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Geoffrey C. Blackwell, Chief, Office of Native Affairs and
Policy, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission...................................... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Prentiss Searles, Marketing and Rail Issues Manager, American
Petroleum Institute............................................ 43
Prepared statement of Bob Greco, Group Director, Downstream
Operations, American Petroleum Institute................... 45
Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Association of American Railroads.............................. 46
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Hon. Heidi Heitkamp, U.S. Senator from North Dakota.............. 67
Prepared statement........................................... 84
Hon. John Hoeven, U.S. Senator from North Dakota................. 69
Appendix
City of Fargo, prepared statement................................ 89
Bruce Bennett, President, Stage 8 Locking Fasteners, prepared
statement...................................................... 90
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
by:
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 92
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 102
Hon. Heidi Heitkamp.......................................... 104
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 105
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 108
Hon. Roy Blunt............................................... 109
Hon. Kelly Ayotte............................................ 110
Hon. John Hoeven............................................. 111
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Cynthia L.
Quarterman by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 112
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 114
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 116
Hon. Heidi Heitkamp.......................................... 116
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 119
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 119
Hon. Roy Blunt............................................... 120
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Christopher A.
Hart by:
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 120
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 124
Hon. Heidi Heitkamp.......................................... 125
Response to written questions submitted to Geoffrey C. Blackwell
by:
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 125
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 127
Hon. Heidi Heitkamp.......................................... 127
Response to written questions submitted to Prentiss Searles by:
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 128
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 130
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 130
Hon. Heidi Heitkamp.......................................... 131
Hon. John Thune.............................................. 132
Hon. Roger F. Wicker......................................... 133
Response to written questions submitted to Edward R. Hamberger
by:
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 133
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 135
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 137
Hon. Heidi Heitkamp.......................................... 140
ENHANCING OUR RAIL SAFETY:
CURRENT CHALLENGES FOR PASSENGER
AND FREIGHT RAIL
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2014
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:04 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard
Blumenthal, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal. Let me call this subcommittee meeting
to order and begin by thanking Chairman Rockefeller, who may
not be with us this morning, for the honor of taking over this
assignment. It's a recent one for me and I want to thank
Senator Warner for his excellent stewardship and leadership of
this subcommittee. I hope to fill his shoes, in part, and thank
my colleagues for joining me this morning: Senator Cantwell,
Senator Heitkamp, Senator Hoeven, and of course, the Ranking
Member, Senator Blunt, whose leadership on this issue is
longstanding. And he and I look forward to an era of very close
bipartisan work together as is characteristic of this committee
and particularly this subcommittee in general.
Welcome to our witnesses. By way of warning, we have votes
at 11:20. I'm told that there will be a single vote and then
two voice votes. I'm hoping that we can take a brief break,
ten, fifteen minutes, and then come back and resume the session
this morning.
We are here this morning because of safety and reliability
issues that deeply concern, in fact alarm, much of the American
traveling public and much of the business community that relies
on freight. The transportation of products and people is
absolutely essential to our economy. It's the lifeblood of job
creation and economic growth.
So we are at a critical period in the Nation's long and
storied railroad history and we plan to have a series of
hearings, this one being simply the first of a number and it
was scheduled before I became Chairman, but I'm very glad that
all of our witnesses could come back after the snowstorm
required its postponement.
Obviously, there are severe consequences to failures in
safety and reliability. We've seen them in Metro-North, the
busiest railroad in the country, and the series of incidents
have caused not only delays in convenience, economic harm, but
also injuries and fatalities. Injuries at the Bridgeport
derailment and crash back in May, and then more recently, on
December 1, at Spuyten Duyvil in the Bronx of New York where
four people were killed and there were several injuries.
But the American public also may not realize, looking
forward, the severe environmental consequences and economic
costs that could result from repetitions of these failures in
safety and reliability. And recently, in The New York Times, I
saw a map. I'm going to ask that it be shown momentarily, as
soon as it arrives, but clearly these failures can cause
pollution problems, as well as other kinds of damages, to
health and to safety in the general public.
We're going to focus on the responsibilities of railroads
to make investments and improve policies and practices; change
their cultures; and install new leadership, because this record
has to be improved. We need to invest in the future of our
railroads and these hearings and the work of this committee
will explore what can be done, what must be done, to improve
safety and reliability. But we're also going to focus on the
responsibilities of our Federal agencies to oversee and
scrutinize those practices and policies, and the leadership and
management that has to come from our railroads.
And I must say right at the beginning that I have been
disappointed and disturbed by some of the delays and failures
in rulemaking and oversight and scrutiny that has been imposed
on these railroads. With seven rules left to finalize from a
law passed in 2008, the Railroad Safety Act of 2008 still has
not been implemented years later. And some of those rules are
pass their deadline in the time that's been given to implement
them. Rules delayed means safety denied and that is
unacceptable and intolerable.
And so, part of what we're going to do here is make sure
that we impose accountability on Federal agencies. I understand
that there have been steps in the right direction. The recent
voluntary operating practices announced by the Department of
Transportation, that relate to rail safety regarding freight,
particularly on speed, rerouting, certain kinds of inspections
of content of those freight cars, are very welcome, but they
are voluntary. And again, legal standards have to be imposed
and followed so that they truly protect the public.
I understand that recently, Operation Classification and
unannounced inspection indicated that 11 of 18 samples were not
assigned correctly. Eleven of 18 samples of crude oil, to be
transported through the United States, simply on a random
inspection, done voluntarily under Operation Classification by
PHMSA, showed that there are significant lapses.
So I think that we need to make sure that the regulatory
agencies are not victims of regulatory capture as happened, for
example, in the financial industry in 2008. We saw the
consequences; they affected not only Wall Street but Main
Street. The focus affected by that regulatory laxity were
severely harmed financially and their lives changed forever; so
too, in Canada, in North Dakota, in New York, and Connecticut.
The costs can be in lives as well as dollars.
We have a responsibility to do better. This hearing will
also look at ways, and future hearings as well, that we can
prioritize Federal dollars for infrastructure. Members of this
subcommittee have indicated, and I have as well, very directly
and pointedly that we need more investment in infrastructure
and the ways to do it, whether it's an infrastructure bank, a
railroad trust fund, are going to be part of an effort that we
will have ongoing and part of legislation that, I hope, will be
introduced within the next months.
And again, we're going to work in a very bipartisan way to
reach conclusions that can actually also achieve passage
because we need bipartisan work on rail transportation. There's
nothing Republican or Democratic about it. And the effort to
prevent laxity, lethargy in enforcement begins here, but so
does the effort to achieve greater investment. And in that
bipartisan spirit, I'm going to turn to our Ranking Member,
Senator Blunt.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY BLUNT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Well, thank you Chairman Blumenthal. And
after a week as Chairman, you're already having a major hearing
and off to quite a start and I look forward to our opportunity
to work together on this committee.
I also want to thank Senator Warner for his leadership and
his continued interest in these areas and for taking time to be
here today on what he and I thought was an important topic when
we originally decided we needed to have a hearing on this. And
again, thanks to you for following through on that and I look
forward to our opportunity to work together.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming today. We
have six people: four government witnesses, two private sector
witnesses. Obviously, this is a topic that has significant
implications and involves both the government and the private
sector finding ways to work together. I know I join you in
being pleased that our colleagues from North Dakota, Senator
Hoeven and Senator Heitkamp, have--while not on the Committee--
have joined us today and will be functioning as if they were
acting members of this committee. And certainly, they may
understand these issues better than anybody else on the
Committee; certainly as well as anybody else understands.
There's certainly no doubt that the recent rail accidents
involving trains transporting crude oil have brought new
questions of rail safety and transporting this product to the
forefront. The central issues we are grappling with here is how
our infrastructure can keep up with the national and global
needs that we have, specifically the infrastructure we're
talking about today; rail infrastructure and the twenty-first
century demand. We're talking about, the new demand we're
talking about on that infrastructure is energy.
There's no doubt that infrastructure is a critical
component of our economy. Again to mention Senator Warner, he
and I were and are co-sponsoring two pieces of legislation that
would add just tools to the toolbox. I think all of us have
talked about this many times; the infrastructure challenge is
so big, it's hard to imagine putting more things in that
toolbox than we can use because there are so many different
ways to do, as you just suggested, Mr. Chairman, what needs to
be done.
Quality transportation is, of course, vital to connect
people and connect products with each other. The Energy
Information Agency projects that world energy consumption will
grow by 56 percent between now and 2040. They also project that
crude oil production will be at 8.5 million barrels a day in
the United States by the end of this year; 8.5 million barrels
is 3.5 million barrels higher than we were producing in 2008.
And so, obviously this is a part of our energy economy that has
grown dramatically and we expect it to continue to grow. We
need to look today--one of the things we'll be looking at is
clearly what impact that has had on rail.
In 2012, Class I railroads moved more crude oil than ever;
over 230,000 carloads. Now, that's up from 9,500 carloads just
4 years ago. And those are numbers that, the kind of numbers I
have a hard time repeating later because I'll think surely I
didn't, even though I'm the one reading this information,
surely I didn't read that right. In four years, we've gone from
9,500 carloads of crude oil on rail to 230,000 carloads of
crude oil on rail. And obviously, a dramatic change both in our
energy profile, but also in how we're moving that energy
around.
Now one of the things that obviously benefits from that is
the ability to send those carloads to a different place than a
fixed pipeline might send them. But I think, again back to
infrastructure, whether it's increasing pipeline capacity, rail
capacity, how we deal with that, that's just going to be an
important part of the foreseeable future for us unless we walk
away from the energy opportunity we have.
This examination of where we are needs to be balanced. It
needs to understand everything from tank car design, to rail
infrastructure, to rail safety. And I think, when you look at
the panel here today, we clearly are prepared to talk about all
of those things and to look at how we classify hazardous
materials. And back to the Chairman's comments; how that
classification is working and how it needs to work better.
It's also important that we have somebody here from the
Federal Communications Commission to talk about positive train
control. Positive train control can only happen if you can have
the information you need to have and that can only happen if
you have the towers sited that need to be sited. And this is a
topic I brought up with Chairman Wheeler in this room when he
was testifying in his nomination hearing. I think I also
brought it up with two other members of the Commission that
have recently been added when they were testifying.
And now, how are we going to solve this tower siting
problem and is it possible to do that in a way that meets the
deadline of the law? And, my personal belief is that if the
answer is no, it's not possible. So what are we going to do
about that?
The private sector companies have invested substantially in
time and resources and rail safety. Rail safety is at a higher
level than it has ever been, but what do we want to talk about
today is what do we still want to do? I know Mr. Szabo,
particularly with a lifetime of time spent in this industry,
could probably tell us better than anybody else. I may ask him
to later. What's happened in the 30 years you've been doing
this? And if you look at the derailment numbers and all the
other numbers, there is dramatic improvement. And what do we
still need to do to make that even better?
But I think it's important we understand how far we've
moved in just the last few years. And Chairman, again, thank
you for holding this hearing and I look forward to working with
you as the Chairman of this subcommittee.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Blunt.
I'd like to ask Senator Warner, since by all rights you
should have been here if the hearing had taken place when it
was supposed to, whether you'd like to make any opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. I will be very, very brief in mine. And I
really appreciate your courtesy for having me back, and Senator
Blunt as well, we had a great working relationship during my
tenure. I want to thank all the witnesses. I would have gotten
this in right under the wire as I moved off the Committee but
for the snowstorm.
And, you know, I think there's enough, particularly on the
tanker car safety, enough economic opportunity, enough money
being made that we've got to be able to figure out a solution
set here. And I want to give special kudos to Senator Heitkamp
who basically gave me tanker car safety 101 and 102 for about
an hour and a half one day and taught me a lot about this, both
the challenges that we face and the fact that, you know,
there's got to be a collaborative way. And particularly
appreciate the focus from industry.
I know there has been great progress since we started this.
I also just want to echo, again, since I will get this done in
under a minute or I'll never be invited back, echoing what
Senator Blunt said. There's got to be a way. There's enormous
asset value created by these thousands and thousands of towers.
I've said, in my previous life, I would take that obligation
off of all the railroads if I could have the revenue stream but
we've got to find a way that the FCC can license this in an
efficient and effective and expeditious manner or we're not
going to get the rail safety that I know the Chairman and the
Ranking Member want.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Let me begin the questioning before we have to leave for
votes. And I'm delighted that we have a great turnout this
morning. So we're going to begin with 5 minutes apiece to each
of the Senators.
Mr. Szabo, what can you tell us about so far of the results
of the Operation Deep Dive look into Metro-North?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH C. SZABO, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Szabo. So you want a Q&A before opening statements, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to have any statements that any
of the witnesses may have.
Mr. Szabo. OK, opening statements.
Mr. Chairman, and to Ranking Member Blunt, members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify.
Over the past decade, train accidents/derailments have
declined by 47 percent; highway grade crossing accidents are
down 35 percent; and employee fatalities have dropped by 59
percent. Meanwhile, intermodal freight traffic has surged
toward a new record. Amtrak ridership has reached all-time
highs. While rail became the fastest growing mode of public
transportation, new records in safety have been achieved four
out of the past 5 years, and preliminary data indicates all-
time best for Fiscal Year 2013. Better than Fiscal Year 2012,
previously our safest year on record.
But we owe it to the public to always do better. That's
what we expect out of ourselves at FRA, and it's what we expect
out of the industry that we regulate. So let me share with you
my vision for driving the next generation of rail safety. And
it consists of three pillars.
First is continuing strong oversight and enforcement that
is data driven. Second is advancing more proactive safety-based
programs that identify and mitigate risk well in advance of an
accident. And third is ensuring predictable and reliable
funding for rail in order to improve infrastructure through
capital investments and develop new safety technologies through
robust research and development.
Our enforcement program is based on the strategic use of
data. By using statistical modeling, we allocate our resources
and execute our national inspection plan. It's a disciplined
approach that has been the foundation of the dramatic drop in
accidents over the past decade. We also learn from every
accident and identify root causation to further eliminate risk
and identify the need for additional regulation.
In December, we initiated Operation Deep Dive; a
comprehensive look at Metro-North's entire operation. And we'll
share with you our report in a couple of weeks after we've
analyzed all the data. We've got a target date of March 17.
FRA is also part of a comprehensive strategy for ensuring
the safe transportation of Bakken crude. In partnership with
our sister agency PHMSA, we're examining the entire system for
crude delivery for making sure it's properly classified and
packaged, to supporting PHMSA's tank car rulemaking, to taking
steps to further eliminate risk through railroad operations.
And I would like to recognize AAR for committing to a series of
immediate voluntary steps that will significantly enhance
safety.
The Rail Safety Advisory Committee is currently engaged in
three tasks regarding the safe movement of hazardous materials,
train securement, and appropriate crew size. And they have a
firm April 1 deadline to complete their work. Last month, we
revised our track safety standards to require railroads to
adopt a more performance-based approach of rail inspections to
maintain higher levels of safety. And as we work with the
industry to advance positive train control, we continue to make
strides addressing human factors by taking steps to ensure the
competency of locomotive engineers and conductors.
But the next level of safety will come from advancing
proactive safety-based programs, like system safety for
passenger railroads and risk reduction for freight railroads,
including programs like Confidential Close Call Reporting.
While our data-based oversight and enforcement program has
produced tremendous results, this data comes from accidents
that have already occurred. Through Close Call Reporting it
allows us to gather this data before, before an accident
happens, and develop risk mitigation strategies well in
advance.
New regulations will require railroads to do thorough risk
analysis, to identify hazards, and put in place customized
plans, including a fatigue mitigation plan to reduce risk. This
push, over and above our traditional oversight and enforcement,
will help us drive continuous safety improvement. But the
sooner we put rail on par with other transportation, with the
source of dedicated and predictable funding, the sooner we will
achieve the next generation of safety.
Capital improvements in advancing next generation
technology must be a part of the mix. And funding the National
Cooperative Rail Research Program, work force development
efforts will ensure a pool of talent with the necessary skills
and technical capacity.
Mr. Chairman, I'd also like to thank you, personally, for
the work you did in helping FRA secure additional resources,
additional employees, for Fiscal Year 2014. That's a great
first step for us. It's going to help us better in our
enforcement program.
And I look forward to any questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Szabo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator, Federal
Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, on behalf of
Secretary Foxx, to discuss the safety of our Nation's railroads. Rail
is a particularly safe mode of transportation, and one that American
passengers and shippers are choosing more than ever before. Today, I
will first give an overview of the railroad industry's safety record
and the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) safety program,
including our implementation of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of
2008. Then, I will discuss the U.S. Department of Transportation's
(DOT) actions in response to recent accidents and present FRA's vision
to drive the next generation of rail safety.
FRA's mission is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient
movement of people and goods for a strong America, now and in the
future. We are a data-driven agency. Every regulation, safety advisory
and emergency order we issue is based on facts and sound research using
advanced statistical methods and modeling. We closely monitor data and
trends to identify, reduce, and eliminate risks.
Two straight years of record-breaking safety performance, along
with significant reductions in all types of accidents since 2008, are
strong evidence that FRA's approach to oversight and enforcement is
effective.
The Railroad Industry's Safety Record and FRA's Safety Program
FRA's top priority is safety, and Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 was the
safest year on record, with preliminary data from FY 2013 indicating it
will be even better than FY 2012's record.
Since FY 2004:
Total train accidents have declined by 47 percent.
Total derailments have declined by 47 percent.
Total highway-rail grade crossing accidents have declined by
35 percent.
These safety improvements resulted in 13-percent fewer fatalities
overall (895 fatalities to 779 fatalities--95 percent of which are
trespassing or grade crossing related), 59-percent fewer employee
fatalities, and 9-percent fewer injuries (9,367 injuries to 8,534
injuries) over 10 years. These improvements are impressive in their own
right, but especially if you consider the regulatory workload that FRA
received from the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) and
passenger and freight rail's growth during this same time.
Amtrak set new ridership records in 10 of the last 11 years,
Rail was the fastest-growing mode of public transportation,
and
Intermodal freight traffic surged toward a new record.
RSIA mandated that FRA, as the Secretary's designee, complete an
unprecedented 42 tasks, including final rules, guidance documents,
model State laws, studies, and reports as well three types of annual
reports and hundreds of periodic accident reporting audits.
Thirty of the 42 tasks are complete, and the rest are in the
pipeline progressing towards completion. Appendix 1 lists the
rulemakings, non-periodic reports and studies, guidance, and model
State laws that FRA has completed as of February 26, 2014.
The chart and table below illustrate a decade of safety
improvement.
Ten-year Railroad Safety Trends by Accident/Incident Cause
*Accident/Incident, Train Accident, and Highway-Rail Incident Numbers Normalized by Million Train-Miles for
Fiscal Year, Non-Accident Hazmat Releases Normalized by 200 Million Hazmat Ton-Miles for Fiscal Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Accidents/ 19.039 18.093 17.525 17.298 16.907 16.873 16.696 16.063 15.167 14.852
Incidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human-Factor- 1.721 1.648 1.380 1.297 1.230 1.041 0.948 0.995 0.919 0.888
Caused Train
Accidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Track-Caused 1.314 1.398 1.318 1.258 1.094 1.036 0.972 0.954 0.843 0.727
Train Accidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equipment- 0.548 0.499 0.433 0.418 0.435 0.366 0.370 0.342 0.286 0.271
Caused Train
Accidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Signal/ 0.692 0.707 0.641 0.506 0.497 0.484 0.494 0.469 0.438 0.430
Misc.-Caused
Train Accidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Highway-Rail 4.024 3.800 3.797 3.523 3.240 2.986 2.900 2.881 2.773 2.685
Incidents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Accident 1.387 1.398 1.147 1.221 1.227 1.149 1.063 1.079 0.933 0.932
Hazmat Releases
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response to Accidents
As we use data and research to drive continuous safety improvement,
we learn from every accident. FRA investigators focus on identifying an
accident's root causes so we can further eliminate risk and take
appropriate enforcement action. This is one more facet of our
comprehensive approach to rail safety.
The Department, including FRA, has responded aggressively to recent
accidents that have received widespread attention.
Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A description of Metro-North Railroad is in Appendix 2 to this
testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of several accidents on Metro-North Commuter Railroad
Company (Metro-North), FRA issued Emergency Order 29 and Safety
Advisory 2013-08 on December 11, 2013.
Emergency Order 29 required Metro-North to take immediate
action to prevent excessive train speeds by identifying and
prioritizing high-risk areas, modifying its existing signal
system to ensure speed limits are obeyed, and ensuring a higher
level of engagement and communication among operating
crewmembers in higher risk locations. To date, FRA has not
identified any instances of noncompliance with Emergency Order
29.
Safety Advisory 2013-08 helps ensure that all railroads
adhere to Federal regulations regarding maximum authorized
train speed limits through training, operational testing, and
train crewmember communication.
On December 16, 15 days after a fatal accident in New York, FRA
commenced Operation Deep Dive, a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary
safety assessment of Metro-North where technical and human factors
experts are reviewing safety-critical procedures and processes,
including operations, mechanical and engineering. The Federal Transit
Administration is participating with FRA to ensure investments in
Metro-North are properly prioritized to improve safety.
The rail safety team is assessing the following:
Track, signal and rolling stock maintenance, inspection and
repair practices;
Protection for employees working on rail infrastructure,
locomotives and rail cars;
Communication between mechanical and transportation
departments at maintenance facilities;
Operation control center procedures and rail traffic
controller training;
Compliance with Federal hours of service regulations,
including fatigue management programs;
Evaluating results of operational data to measure efficiency
of employees' execution and comprehension of all applicable
Federal rail safety regulations;
Locomotive engineer oversight;
Engineer and conductor certification; and
Operating crew medical requirements.
Operation Deep Dive ended February 14, 2014 and FRA will present a
report of its findings within 30 days afterwards. FRA will meet with
Metro-North to discuss the findings and appropriate remedial actions.
Additionally, FRA will discuss best practices and lessons learned from
Operation Deep Dive with other commuter rail chief executive officers
(CEOs) through the American Public Transportation Association.
Rail Accidents involving Crude Oil
Crude oil transportation by rail rose quickly because of increasing
production in the Bakken region of North Dakota. FRA is paying close
attention to that region, and accident rates in North Dakota have
fallen over the past three years, even with increased traffic.
In response to recent train accidents in the United States and
Canada involving tank cars carrying crude oil, DOT, including FRA and
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), has
taken action on multiple fronts to mitigate risks and ensure the safe
transportation of crude oil, ethanol, and other hazardous materials by
rail. FRA and PHMSA have related but distinct responsibilities in
managing the risk from the transportation of hazardous materials. PHMSA
produces regulations pertaining to the transportation of hazardous
materials by rail, which are primarily enforced by FRA's safety staff,
while FRA's staff also acts to enforce comprehensive safety regulations
for rail transportation.
On January 16, oil industry representatives and rail industry CEOs
met with the Secretary and heads of PHMSA, the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, and FRA in a ``Call to Action.'' The CEOs were
asked to develop specific plans to immediately improve the safety of
crude oil shipments, and recommendations on how to improve safety over
the long term. After analyzing their plans and suggestions, on February
20, 2014, Secretary Foxx sent a letter to the Association of American
Railroads (AAR) with a list of actions to be voluntarily taken
immediately by industry to dramatically improve the safety of railroads
transporting crude oil and the communities they move through. AAR
President and CEO Edward Hamberger signed the agreement that same day,
and individual railroads are signing on subsequently. The letter from
Secretary Foxx listed eight commitments:
1. By July 1, subscribers will apply HAZMAT routing analysis to
trains with 20 or more tank cars loaded with petroleum crude
oil (Key Crude Oil Trains). The routing analysis utilizes a
computer model to analyze 27 risk factors to determine the
safest and most secure route for the product to travel.
2. By July 1, subscribers will adhere to a speed restriction of 50
mph for all Key Crude Oil Trains, and 40 mph in high-threat
urban areas if they are using a DOT 111 tank car.
3. By April 1, subscribers will equip all Key Crude Oil Trains on
main track with distributive power locomotives or an operative
two-way telemetry end of train device to achieve benefits in
braking speed and substantially reducing the kinetic energy in
trains to prevent pile ups.
4. Effective March 25, subscribers will perform at least one
internal rail inspection and two track geometry inspections
more than is required by current regulations every calendar
year on Key Crude Oil Train routes.
5. By July 1, subscribers will begin installing wayside defective
bearing detectors every 40 miles on Key Crude Oil Train routes
to prevent equipment-caused accidents.
6. Subscribers will develop an inventory of emergency response
resources along Key Crude Oil Train routes. This information
will be provided to DOT and emergency responders upon request.
7. Subscribers will provide $5 million to develop and provide
training on hazardous material transportation and fund training
for emergency responders through the end of 2014. Comprehensive
training will occur at the Transportation Technology Center,
Inc. facility in Colorado with a training program fully
developed by July 1.
8. Subscribers will continue to work with communities on Key Crude
Oil Train routes to address location-specific concerns.
A copy of the full agreement is included with this testimony. This
agreement is an important step in improving the safety of crude oil
transportation by rail. FRA will continue to use its regulatory
authority to address this issue and act accordingly to maintain public
safety and confidence.
Here is a summary of other DOT actions in response to accidents
involving crude oil and other hazardous materials.
Order and Advisories
FRA issued Emergency Order 28, and both FRA and PHMSA issued safety
advisories, held public hearings, and notified shippers and carriers of
the critical importance of public safety when transporting hazardous
materials.
FRA's emergency order addresses unattended trains, train
securement, the use of locks, communication between train crews
and dispatchers, and daily safety briefings for railroad
employees and was published August 7, 2013.
A joint FRA-PHMSA safety advisory on related issues was also
published August 7, 2013.
A joint FRA-PHMSA follow-up safety advisory was published
November 20, 2013.
Rulemakings
In addition to the emergency order and safety advisories, FRA is
updating applicable rail safety regulations, and as PHMSA will describe
in more detail, FRA is collaborating with PHMSA on a rulemaking that
addresses DOT Specification 111 tank cars. All rulemakings are subject
to extensive study and analysis.
But tank cars are only one part of the chain of delivery, and we
must identify and evaluate all of the risks associated with bulk
movements of hazardous material, such as ethanol and crude oil, and
then work to eliminate those risks.
On August 28, 2013, FRA and PHMSA held a public meeting with
industry stakeholders to solicit input for a comprehensive
review of the Hazardous Materials Regulations applicable to
rail. PHMSA and FRA are collaborating to address comments
received at the public meeting.
On August 29, 2013, FRA convened an emergency session of the
RSAC. During the emergency RSAC meeting, participants
established three collaborative working groups to formulate new
rulemaking recommendations regarding (1) transportation of
hazardous materials by rail, (2) appropriate train crew sizes,
and (3) train securement procedures. These working groups are
meeting on a regular basis and we expect formal recommendations
for consideration by April 1, 2014.
Operation Classification (the ``Bakken Blitz'')
In August 2013, PHMSA, supported by FRA, launched Operation
Classification, which involves joint activities at all transportation
phases to investigate how shippers and carriers are classifying crude
oil and what actions they are taking to understand the characteristics
of the material. The operations have primarily targeted shipments from
the Bakken region and consisted of unannounced spot inspections, data
collection, and sampling as well as verifying compliance with Federal
safety regulations. Operation Classification is nearing completion.
As I have described, rail safety is at an all-time best. Yet, these
accidents illustrate why we can never be complacent.
Our Vision for the Next Generation of Rail Safety
Continuous safety improvement requires a comprehensive strategy
designed to eliminate risk. Here is FRA's strategy, founded on three
pillars:
1. Continuing a rigorous regulatory and inspection program based on
strategic use of data;
2. Advancing proactive approaches for early identification and
reduction of risk; and
3. Capital investments, and robust research and development.
Pillar I. Continuing a rigorous regulatory and inspection program
As stated previously, FRA's approach to rail safety has led to
unprecedented safety improvements. We will continue this framework for
safety oversight and enforcement and improve it. Data driven analysis
will continue to guide workforce planning and inspection activities.
FRA's regulatory program improves safety by developing rules based
on facts, incident and accident causation analysis, comparison of
alternative mitigation measures, and cost-beneficial solutions. FRA
rulemaking considers current and future industry capabilities,
compliance burden and cost, and other economic and social realities.
Within this context, FRA will continue to attempt to meet statutory
milestones with its available resources.
State rail inspectors are a force multiplier for FRA's compliance
and enforcement efforts. The State Rail Safety Participation Program
consists of states employing safety inspectors in the five rail safety
inspection disciplines. State programs conduct planned, routine
compliance inspections; and may undertake additional investigative and
surveillance activities consistent with overall program needs and
individual State capabilities. FRA provides on-the-job training to
State inspectors. We invite additional state participation in this
important program and view it as an opportunity to improve oversight in
key states and regions.
Focus Areas
Safety overall has improved; however, accidents related to human
error and track defects account for more than two-thirds of all train
accidents, and trespassing and highway-rail grade crossing incidents
account for approximately 95 percent of all rail-related fatalities. We
will allocate resources and work with partners, such as Operation
Lifesaver, to make improvements in these challenging areas. The
following rulemakings, reports, guidance documents, and other actions
are important milestones that will guide our work in these areas:
Human Factors
Final rule to advance nationwide implementation of positive
train control (PTC) systems (which prevent overspeed
derailments, train-to-train collisions, and other types of
accidents often caused by human error) by defining statutory
terms and the essential functionalities of PTC systems. FRA
also issued two other rules designed to reduce some of the
costs of PTC implementation,. PTC systems are a technology that
promotes safety improvement through the reduction of certain
human-factor-related incidents and will complement FRA's other
safety efforts, such as implementation of safety Risk Reduction
Programs (RRP) and crash energy management.
Final rule requiring a railroad to have a formal program for
certifying train conductors. This will raise the bar of
professionalism and ensure that only those persons who meet
minimum Federal safety standards serve as conductors.
Proposed rule that would enhance safety by mandating that
certain railroads (each Class I railroad, intercity passenger
railroad, and commuter railroad) have a Critical Incident
Stress Plan that may help mitigate the long-term negative
effects of critical incidents upon railroad employees and the
impact of performing safety-sensitive duties in the days
following such incidents when the associated stress may hinder
their ability to perform such duties safely.
Final rule on the hours of service of passenger train
employees. This rule draws on detailed research into the causes
of train operator fatigue and analysis of thousands of operator
work patterns. FRA also published in the Federal Register three
lengthy, detailed statements of agency policy and
interpretation to clarify the hours of service laws as amended
by RSIA.
An FRA-led industry-wide initiative to combat the dangers of
electronic device distraction in the railroad workplace as well
as an emergency order and then a final rule prohibiting
distracted operation of trains.
A proposed rule that would establish minimum training
standards for each class or craft of safety-related employee
and contractor. The rule would require the qualification and
documentation of the proficiency of such employees on their
knowledge and ability to comply with Federal railroad safety
laws and regulations and the employing railroad company's rules
and procedures implementing those laws and regulations. A final
rule on minimum training standards and plans is under
development.
Track Safety
Final rule to Improve Rail Inspections. Requires the use of
performance-based rail inspection methods that focus on
maintaining low rail failure rates per mile of track and
generally results in more frequent testing; provides a four-
hour period to verify that certain less serious suspected
defects exist in a rail section once track owners learn that
the rail contains an indication of those defects; requires that
rail inspectors are properly qualified to operate rail flaw
detection equipment and interpret test results; and establishes
an annual maximum allowable rate of rail defects and rail
failures between inspections for each designated inspection
segment of track. These changes are intended to reduce the risk
of derailments caused by rail failures by improving the
accuracy of rail inspections and shortening the time that
latent, undetected rail flaws remain in track.
Vehicle/Track Interaction Safety Standards. The final rule
was based on research into vehicle/track interaction, and it
promotes the safe interaction of rail vehicles with the track
over which they operate under a variety of conditions at speeds
up to 220 mph. The rule also adds flexibility for safely
permitting high cant deficiency train operations \2\ through
curves at more conventional speeds so that both freight and
passenger trains may better sustain maximum allowable speeds
through curved track.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Cant deficiency involves traveling through a curve faster than
the balance speed and produces a net lateral force to the outside of
the curve. http://www.highspeed-rail.org/Documents/
PRIIA%20305%20DocSpec%20and%20other%20NGEC%20Documents/
305%20PRIIA%20Tilt%20
presentation.pdf
New Technology to Improve Track Safety. Through our research
and development program we are about to bring to market new
technology for avoiding track buckles (sun-kinks). The device
measures the neutral temperature of rail and warns the railroad
when track maintenance is required to avoid track buckling. We
are also developing technology to predict rail temperature
variations. This provides railroads information needed to
decide the extent and duration of slow orders to reduce safety
risk on hot days.
Grade Crossing Safety and Trespass Prevention
Standards requiring railroads to establish and maintain
toll-free ``1-800'' emergency notification systems by which the
public can telephone the proper railroad about a stalled
vehicle or other safety problem at a specifically identified
grade crossing.
Regulations requiring 10 states to issue State-specific
action plans to improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings.
Model State laws on highway users' sight distance at
passively signed crossings and on highway motorists' violations
of grade crossing warning devices.
A proposed rule specifying the types of information that
railroads would have to report to the Department's National
Crossing Inventory.
A five-year strategy to improve highway-rail grade crossing
safety, including an audit every two years of Class I
railroads' highway-rail grade crossing accident reports to
ensure that these railroads are accurately reporting these
incidents. Resources permitting, FRA will conduct such audits
every five years on other railroads.
Guidance addressing pedestrian safety at or near passenger
rail stations,
An FRA-released smartphone application with grade crossing
information.
Pillar II. Advancing proactive approaches to reduce risk
Continuous safety improvement requires a multi-faceted approach.
The next level of safety will come from advancing proactive safety-
based programs that analyze risks, identify hazards, and put in place
customized plans to eliminate those risks.
Risk Reduction Programs (RRP) and System Safety Programs
(SSP) that help identify accident precursors so that corrective
action can be taken in advance. We will issue a final rule
before the end of 2014 to require passenger railroads to
develop and implement SSPs. A notice of proposed rulemaking
that would require freight railroads to establish RRPs is
currently under development. Both are designed to require
railroads to develop and implement systematic risk-based
approaches to ensuring continuous safety improvement.
Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C\3\RS), a
voluntary and non-punitive program for railroads and their
employees to report close calls. Results from one C\3\RS pilot
site indicate nearly a 70-percent reduction in certain
accidents. C\3\RS helps develop a positive and proactive safety
culture, using detailed data far beyond what is obtained during
accident investigations. The magnitude of the information
provided from proactive programs like C\3\RS in comparison to
traditional data from accidents and injuries is illustrated
below:
Programs like Confidential Close Calls Reporting allow us to gather
data before an accident occurs and to develop risk mitigation
strategies well in advance.
Pillar III. Capital investments, including robust research and
development
As you know, portions of two important rail laws expired at the end
of FY 2013: RSIA and the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act
of 2008 (PRIIA). The President's FY 2014 budget for FRA laid out a
comprehensive, multi-year reauthorization blueprint for moving forward.
The fundamental goal of this proposal is to develop a coordinated
approach to enhancing the Nation's rail system-an integrated strategy
that addresses safety and passenger and freight service improvements.
This new approach reflects the complex reality of how rail works in the
United States-most track is privately-owned and carries a mix of
passenger and freight trains. Safety is improved not just through
regulations and inspections but also through capital investments and
research and development.
For example, chokepoints often hinder the efficient movement of
intercity passenger, commuter, and freight trains, while the
elimination of grade crossings with strategic placement of overpasses
and underpasses enhances rail, vehicular, and pedestrian safety.
FRA's reauthorization proposal's key priorities include the
following:
Modernizing our rail infrastructure. Past generations of
Americans invested heavily in building the infrastructure we
rely on today. Most segments of the Northeast Corridor were
built more than a century ago. Maintaining and modernizing
these assets will lower long-term costs and result in a safer,
more efficient and reliable rail system.
Meeting the growing market demand. With 100 million more
Americans expected by 2050, the national transportation system
must be prepared to handle substantial increases in the
movement of people and goods. Given the existing capacity
constraints on other modes, rail will play an increasingly
vital role in balancing America's transportation system by
accommodating this growth, resulting in public benefits such as
reduced reliance on foreign oil, reduced air pollution,
increased safety, and more travel options. The budget
incorporates market-based investments in building or improving
passenger rail corridors, eliminating rail chokepoints, adding
freight capacity, and conducting comprehensive planning.
Successfully implementing PTC. The mandated deadline of
December 2015 will likely not be reached by many railroads.
Commuter rail operations are cash-strapped and unable to attain
certain necessities for implementation, such as communications
spectrum. FRA's budget proposes grants for those commuter
railroads and research and development for new technologies to
improve rail safety. FRA's August 2012 Report to Congress
``Positive Train Control: Implementation Status, Issues, and
Impacts'' summarized the major technical and programmatic
challenges and obstacles associated with PTC implementation
that FRA had identified so far. \3\ Subsequent to the report's
submission, a new issue regarding PTC communications towers
deployment arose under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Communications Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Positive Train Control: Implementation Status, Issues, and
Impacts''--http://www.fra
.dot.gov/Elib/Details/L03718
Promoting innovation. FRA's vision is for the domestic rail
industry to be again world-leading. We want U.S. companies to
develop patents for state-of-the-art rail technology, to supply
rail operators throughout the world, and to employ the best
engineers and railway workers. The United States should be
exporting intellectual capital and rail products, not importing
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
them.
Mitigating rail's impacts on communities. Improving quality
of life by eliminating grade crossings, sealing corridors,
reducing noise impacts, and including safety enhancements that
allow for service improvements and economic growth.
Research and Development. Implementing new technology will
be a key driver for future safety improvement. Here are a few
examples of important research:
Track inspection technologies that detect defects
before they become failures in service.
Computer modeling capabilities to improve
understanding of vehicle/track interaction, wheel and rail
profiles, and contact conditions.
Autonomous recording methods to provide more frequent
and cost-effective measurements of track condition.
Research to develop new methods for monitoring
difficult-to-detect safety issues such as longitudinal rail
force, ballast lateral restraint, and ballast condition.
High-speed rail research and development, which has
identified several key risk factors for corridors shared by
passenger and freight operations. Research to understand
these risks and mitigate them is ongoing.
Research on new technologies for improving grade
crossing safety. One project that has significant potential
is implementation of Intelligent Transportation Systems at
grade crossings. FRA is also conducting human-factors
research to understand the behavior of highway users when
they approach grade crossings. This research is expected to
lead to recommendations for improved signage and warning
systems. FRA will consider the benefits and costs, and
feasible alternatives, for any recommendation.
A research and development program to achieve
reliable, long life from concrete ties. The program
involves freight railroads, Amtrak, manufacturers, and
universities.
The National Cooperative Rail Research Program, which
enhances the development of technical skills for a capable
workforce to design and operate the next generation of safe
railroads.
The Need for Predictable Funding
An overarching issue that runs across all of these priorities is
the need for sustained and predictable Federal funding for rail
programs, similar to the treatment of other modes of transportation.
Congress has for decades funded highway infrastructure and safety,
transit, and aviation programs through multi-year authorizations that
provide guaranteed funding. This enables States, local governments, and
other stakeholders to plan and make large-scale infrastructure
investments on a year-to-year basis. Likewise, internationally, other
major rail systems have been planned and developed through a
predictable multi-year funding program.
Conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to testify and answer your questions
today. Safety is FRA's number one priority, and we appreciate your
attention and focus on such an important issue for the American public.
Our vision for the next generation of rail safety balances a
comprehensive and effective regulatory framework with innovative,
proactive ideas and capital investment, including critical research and
development. We look forward to working with this Committee to improve
our programs and make the American rail network as safe, reliable, and
efficient as possible. I will be happy to respond to your questions.
Appendix 1
FRA Rulemakings Completed as of March 5, 2014, that Were Mandated,
Explicitly or Implicitly, by RSIA \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In addition, FRA commenced a rulemaking to define ``critical
incident'' for purposes of the mandated rulemaking on critical incident
stress plans as specifically required by Sec. 410(c)).
1. To specify the essential functionalities of mandated PTC
systems, define related statutory terms, and identify
additional lines for implementation. (Sec. 104).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In addition, FRA has issued two final rules on PTC, and another
final rule on PTC is in clearance in the Executive Branch.
2. To establish substantive hours of service requirements for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
passenger train employees. (Sec. 108(d)).
3. To update existing hours of service recordkeeping regulations.
(Sec.108(f)).
4. To require State-specific action plans from certain states to
improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings. (Sec. 202).
5. To require toll-free telephone emergency notification numbers
for reporting problems at public and private highway-rail grade
crossings. (Sec. 205).
6. Increase the ordinary maximum and aggravated maximum civil
penalties per violation for rail safety violations to $25,000
and $100,000, respectively. (Sec. 302).
7. On prohibition of individuals from performing safety-sensitive
functions in the railroad industry for a violation of hazardous
materials transportation law. (Sec. 305).
8. On procedures for emergency waivers. (Sec. 308).
9. To require the certification of conductors. (Sec. 402).
10. On the results of FRA's study of track inspection intervals and
other track issues. (Sec. 403(c)).
11. On concrete ties. (Sec. 403(d)).
12. To require owners of railroad bridges to implement programs for
inspection, maintenance, and management of those structures.
(Sec. 417).
13. On camp cars used as railroad employee sleeping quarters. (Sec.
420).
14. Amending regulations of the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation to provide that the Secretary delegates to the
Administrator of FRA the responsibility to carry out the
Secretary's responsibilities under RSIA.
Completed RSIA-Mandated Guidance and Model State Laws \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ In addition, FRA has published three guidance documents on the
hours of service laws as amended by RSIA in the Federal Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Guidance on pedestrian safety at or near rail passenger
stations. (Sec. 201).
2. Guidance for the administration of the authority to buy items of
nominal value and distribute them to the public as part of a
crossing safety or railroad trespass prevention program. (Sec.
208(c)).
3. Model State law on highway users' sight distances at passively
signed highway-rail grade crossings. (Sec. 203).
4. Model State law on motorists' violations of grade crossing
warning devices. (Sec. 208).
Completed RSIA-Mandated Non-periodic Reports or Studies
1. Report to Congress on DOT's long-term (minimum 5-year) strategy
for improving rail safety, including annual plans and schedules
for achieving specified statutory goals, to be submitted with
the President's annual budget. (Sec. 102).
2. Report to Congress on the progress of railroads' implementation
of PTC. (Sec. 104).
3. Conduct study to evaluate whether it is in the public interest
to withhold from discovery or admission, in certain judicial
proceedings for damages, the reports and data compiled to
implement, etc., a required risk reduction program. (Sec. 109).
4. Evaluate and review current local, State, and Federal laws
regarding trespassing on railroad property, vandalism affecting
railroad safety, and violations of highway-rail grade crossing
warning devices. (Sec. 208(a)).
5. Report to Congress on the results of DOT research about track
inspection intervals, etc. (Sec. 403(a)-(b)).
6. Conduct study of methods to improve or correct passenger station
platform gaps (Sec. 404).
7. Report to Congress detailing the results of DOT research about
use of personal electronic devices in the locomotive cab by
safety-related railroad employees. (Sec. 405).
8. Report to Congress on DOT research about the effects of
repealing a provision exempting Consolidated Rail Corporation,
etc., from certain labor-related laws (45 U.S.C. Sec. 797j).
(Sec. 408).
9. Report to Congress on the results of DOT research about exposure
of railroad employees and others to radiation. (Sec. 411).
10. Report to Congress on DOT study on the expected safety effects
of reducing inspection frequency of diesel-electric locomotives
in limited service by railroad museums. (Sec. 415).
11. Report to Congress on model plans and recommendations, to be
developed through a task force to be established by DOT, to
help railroads respond to passenger rail accidents. (Sec. 503).
Appendix 2
Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North) is the second
largest commuter railroad in the nation, with an annual ridership of
82,953,628.\7\ It is a subsidiary agency of the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, a New York State Authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ http://web.mta.info/mta/network.htm#statsmnr
Three main lines, the Hudson, Harlem, and New Haven Lines,
branch northward out of Grand Central Terminal, located in mid-
town Manhattan, into suburban New York and Connecticut. Metro-
North maintains the equipment and infrastructure and operates
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and controls the trains on these lines.
Amtrak operates on the Hudson Line, between Spuyten Duyvil
and Poughkeepsie, and on the New Haven Line, between New
Rochelle and New Haven.
The West of Hudson Service, the Port Jervis and the Pascack
Valley Lines, operates from New Jersey Transit Rail Operations'
(NJ Transit) Hoboken terminal, providing service to Rockland
and Orange counties. NJ Transit maintains the equipment and
operates and controls the trains. Metro-North maintains the
infrastructure.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Szabo.
I'm going to interrupt because the votes have been called.
We should have a ten-minute recess and we'll come back and
resume.
Thank you.
[Pause.]
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you all for your patience.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN,
ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. Quarterman. Good morning. Chairman Blumenthal and
Ranking Member Blunt, members of the Subcommittee, Senators
Heitkamp and Hoeven, thank you for your leadership on advancing
rail safety and for the opportunity to appear here today to
discuss PHMSA's comprehensive approach to ensure the safe
transportation of crude by rail.
Safety is the top priority for Secretary Foxx, for the
Department of Transportation, PHMSA, and all of its sister
modes. We all work diligently to protect the American people
and the environment from hazardous material transportation
incidents.
As you know, energy production in the United States has
markedly increased. The use of rail to move crude has increased
exponentially in the past few years, especially crude from the
Bakken region. In fact, crude oil production in that area has
elevated North Dakota to the second largest oil-producing state
in the Nation. As recently as November 2013, approximately
600,000 barrels per day of oil produced in North Dakota were
transported by rail; going from less than 11,000 carloads in
2009 to close to 400,000 in 2013. This increase in crude
shipments by rail, and recent incidents, underscore how
important it is to be ever vigilant in protecting local
communities and the environment.
To deal with this challenge, the department has taken a
comprehensive approach to address the risks associated with
transporting crude by rail. Together, PHMSA and FRA are
focusing on regulatory and non-regulatory methods to, in the
first instance, prevent incidents from occurring by putting in
place necessary operational controls and improving track
integrity to lessen the likelihood of an incident. In case an
incident does occur, we are looking to mitigate the effects and
ensuring effective emergency response.
PHMSA and FRA have been working together to issue
guidelines and rulemakings; participate in rail safety
committees and public meetings; enhance inspection and
enforcement; and coordinate with other agencies to improve
public safety. As one example, this past summer PHMSA, FRA, and
FMCSA teamed together to implement Operation Classification.
This was an unprecedented initiative with DOT inspectors
performing unannounced inspections and testing crude oil
samples to verify that the materials were being properly
characterized and classified for transportation.
In January, Secretary Foxx issued a call to action, asking
crude oil and rail stakeholders to commit to taking immediate
steps to improve the transportation of crude oil. The Secretary
identified some actions the department was considering and
challenged those industries to take such preventive and
mitigative steps immediately.
To date, the call to action has been a success for safety.
We've received firm commitments from rail and crude oil
industries to take immediate actions to improve safety. Those
actions include increased track inspections to prevent
derailments, and a litany of mitigative steps to reduce speed,
use alternate routes, improve braking, improve crude oil
testing and classification, and improve emergency responder
preparedness and training.
In addition to regulatory and non-regulatory efforts to
improve rail safety, we've increased our efforts to improve the
public awareness and understanding of hazardous materials'
regulatory requirements. Our efforts include enforcement and
outreach efforts focused on proper classification and
characterization, safety and security planning, and ensuring
emergency responders and the public are aware of hazmat
transportation requirements.
As I've stated earlier, PHMSA is committing to improving
transportation safety and I believe our comprehensive approach
to addressing safety is working. Our aggressive first step and
continuing focus on this issue will help to prevent and
mitigate incidents and move us closer to our goal of zero
deaths and injuries.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to speak today. We
look forward to continue to work with Congress to address rail
safety issues, specifically those dealing with the
transportation of flammable liquids. I would be pleased to
answer any questions the Committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Quarterman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator,
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department
of Transportation
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the
Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA)
comprehensive approach to address the risks associated with increased
bulk shipments of flammable liquids by rail. I would also like to thank
you for your leadership and for your efforts to advance rail safety.
While rail safety is improving, high-profile train accidents like the
ones we've seen in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, Canada; Aliceville, Alabama;
and Casselton, North Dakota underscore how important it is to be ever-
vigilant in protecting local communities and the environment.
Safety is the top priority for Secretary Foxx, everyone at PHMSA,
and the other modes in the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).
PHMSA continues to work diligently to protect the American people and
the environment from the risks of hazardous materials transportation by
all modes, including rail. PHMSA works to achieve its safety mission
through efforts to prevent and mitigate accidents by developing
regulations and guidance, taking rigorous enforcement actions,
collaborating with stakeholders, and educating emergency responders and
the public.
This testimony will focus on the risks posed by the transport of
bulk shipment of flammable liquids, including petroleum crude oil, by
rail and PHMSA's efforts to both prevent and mitigate those risks.
First, I will provide an overview of the current state of petroleum
crude oil (crude oil) transportation in the United States. Second, I
will discuss our comprehensive approach to prevent and mitigate the
damage caused by rail accidents involving hazardous materials.
I. State of Crude Oil Transportation by Rail
As energy production in the United States increases, so does the
transportation of more products in their various forms by multiple
modes. The epicenter of the increased crude oil production is the
Bakken Formation, occupying about 200,000 square miles (520,000 square
kilometers \2\) of the subsurface underlying parts of Montana and North
Dakota, and Saskatchewan and Manitoba in Canada. Production from the
Bakken in recent years has elevated North Dakota to the second largest
oil producing State, and it is one of the most important sources of oil
in the United States. While most new Bakken drilling and production has
been in North Dakota, drilling operations also extend into Montana,
Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. As of 2013, the Bakken produced more than
ten percent of all oil in the United States. In November 2013, 10,022
Bakken wells extracted approximately 29 million barrels of oil and 32
million cubic feet of gas. This equates to over 900,000 barrels of oil
produced daily (See Table 1).\1\
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\1\ Data from the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources
website: https://www
.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicalbakkenoilstats.pdf
Approximately 71 percent of all oil produced in North Dakota, or
around 800,000 barrels per day, was transported by rail in November
2013, according to the North Dakota Public Service Commission.\2\
Corresponding with increased production, the volume of crude oil moving
by rail has quadrupled in less than a decade (See Table 2--a Class I
railroad is a railroad having annual inflation-adjusted operating
revenues for three consecutive years of $250 million or more as the
figure $250 million is adjusted by applying the railroad revenue
deflator formula).\3\ While overall train volume has increased, train
accidents declined by 43 percent, and train accidents involving a
hazardous materials release are down 16 percent between 2003 and
2012.\4\
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\2\ http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/usa-rail-regulator-
idINL2N0KQ1WN20140116
\3\ The Surface Transportation Board Website indicates that the
inflation-adjusted dollar amount for 2012 (the most recent year for
which a complete year of annual operating revenue data is available) is
$452,653,248 or more for a Class I railroad. Figures in table are
quarterly totals. Source: Association of American Railroads
\4\ Data from 2003-2012 compiled by FRA Office of Safety Analysis.
Despite this decline in such accidents, there is always the
potential for low-probability, high-consequence events to occur that
could have devastating consequences to the public, communities, and the
environment. Recent incidents in the United States and Canada
demonstrate the need for a renewed focus on rail safety efforts. PHMSA
works in partnership with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to
address and mitigate the risks associated with the rail transport of
hazardous materials. Here are a few incidents that have sharpened our
focus on the safe transportation of high-hazard flammable liquids by
rail.
On July 6, 2013, a catastrophic derailment involving an unattended
freight train containing 72 loaded DOT Specification 111 tank cars of
crude oil occurred in the town of Lac-Megantic, Quebec. The train,
which was 4,701 feet long and weighed 10,287 tons, was not properly
secured and rolled down a descending grade, subsequently derailing near
the center of Lac-Megantic. The locomotives separated from the train
and came to a stop about a half mile east of the derailment. In the
course of the accident, 63 tank cars derailed. Several derailed tank
cars released crude oil, causing fires that killed 47 people,
extensively damaged the town center, and required the evacuation of
about 2,000 people from the surrounding area. Transport Canada is
currently investigating the accident, with the assistance of the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and DOT.
On November 7, 2013, a train carrying crude oil to the Gulf Coast
from North Dakota derailed in Aliceville, Alabama, spilling crude oil
in a nearby wetland and igniting into flames. There were a total of 88
DOT 111 tank cars containing crude oil in the 90-car train. Twenty-six
DOT Specification 111 tank cars derailed, 21 of which released all or
part of their contents. The NTSB is currently investigating the
accident, with the assistance of DOT.
On December 30, 2013, a train carrying crude oil derailed and
ignited near Casselton, North Dakota, prompting authorities to issue a
voluntary evacuation of the city and surrounding area. A collision with
a disabled train blocking the track caused 20 DOT Specification 111
tank cars to derail. Estimates indicate that those cars lost 476,436
gallons of product. NTSB is investigating the accident, with the
assistance of DOT.
Accidents like these demonstrate both the inherent dangers of
transporting hazardous materials and the various factors that may cause
accidents and the unintentional release of hazardous materials. PHMSA
strives to prevent these accidents from occurring and, in the event
they do occur, helps to mitigate the consequences of these types of
accidents. Train accidents involving hazardous materials releases like
the ones previously described highlight the need for a robust hazardous
materials transportation regulatory system, strong enforcement
capabilities, and wide-reaching communication with and training of
hazardous materials stakeholders, including the public, hazardous
materials transporters, and emergency responders.
II. Comprehensive Approach to Prevent and Mitigate Rail Hazardous
Materials Accidents and Incidents
PHMSA's safety mission involves working to ensure that the
transportation system is functioning as it should. With regard to rail
safety, PHMSA and FRA have taken a comprehensive approach to mitigating
the risks posed by the bulk transport of hazardous materials by rail.
Specifically, PHMSA, in coordination with FRA, is focusing on methods
to prevent accidents and incidents from occurring and ways to mitigate
the effects of those events that do occur. On the prevention front, we
are working together to implement necessary operational controls and
ensure rail track integrity to lessen the likelihood of accidents.
PHMSA has requirements in place to mitigate effects of potential
accidents through appropriate classification of the materials being
transported; appropriate packaging of the materials, including ensuring
materials are in the appropriate container; and effectively
communicating to transportation workers and first responders what
material is involved so they can handle or respond correctly to any
accidents associated with the material. This approach is designed to
prevent the occurrence of a hazardous materials release in the course
of rail transportation and mitigate the damage caused should a
hazardous material release occur.
PHMSA has a variety of regulatory and non-regulatory tools to
address the risks of the bulk transport of flammable materials,
including crude oil, by rail. In the wake of increased crude oil
movements by rail and recent incidents, PHMSA has used many of these
tools to improve safety. Most recently, PHMSA has issued guidance and
an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, participated in rail safety
committees, held public meetings, enhanced enforcement and inspection
efforts, and coordinated with other agencies to improve the safety of
the public.
Regulatory Efforts by PHMSA and FRA
On May 14, 2010, PHMSA published a final rule (HM-233A) to amend
the Hazardous Materials Regulations to incorporate provisions contained
in certain widely used or longstanding special permits that have an
established safety record.\5\ As part of that rulemaking, PHMSA adopted
a requirement that would allow certain rail tank cars transporting
hazardous materials to exceed the gross weight on rail limitation of
263,000 pounds upon approval by FRA.
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\5\ See Federal Register http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-
25/pdf/2011-1414.pdf
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On January 25, 2011, FRA issued a Federal Register notice of FRA's
approval pursuant to PHMSA's May 14, 2010 final rule.\6\ The approval
established detailed conditions for manufacturing and operating certain
tank cars in hazardous materials service, including the DOT
Specification 111 tank car, which is the tank car used for the
transportation of flammable liquids, such as crude oil, that weigh
between 263,000 and 286,000 pounds. These actions provided tank car
manufacturers with the authority to build a 286,000-pound tank car.
Rail car manufacturers have used that authority to manufacture an
enhanced DOT Specification 111 tank car (CPC-1232) under the conditions
outlined in the January 25, 2011 approval. Specific improvements to the
car include the following: normalized steel, puncture resistance, head
shields, and top fitting protection. Should a manufacturer choose to
design a car outside the conditions of that approval, it can seek
another approval in accordance with section 179.13 of the Hazardous
Materials Regulations in title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
To date, PHMSA and FRA have not received any requests to design a car
that deviates from the January 25, 2011 approved design.
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\6\ See Federal Register http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-
25/pdf/2011-1342.pdf
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Following the publication of the PHMSA final rule and the
subsequent FRA approval, PHMSA received a petition (P-1577) \7\ from
the Association of American Railroads (AAR) on March 9, 2011,
requesting changes to PHMSA's specifications for the DOT Specification
111 tank car used to transport Packing Group I and II materials \8\
(See Table 4 for tank car comparison).\9\ During the summer of 2011,
the AAR Tank Car Committee (TCC) created a task force (Task Force),
which included PHMSA and FRA participation, with a dual responsibility
to develop an industry standard for tank cars used to transport crude
oil, denatured alcohol, and ethanol/gasoline mixtures and to consider
operating requirements to reduce the risk of derailment of tank cars
carrying crude oil classified as Packing Group I and II, or ethanol.
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\7\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2011-
0059-0001
\8\ ``Packing Group'' designates the hazard level posed by a class
of materials. Class 3 (flammable liquids) Packing Group I materials
have a low boiling point and represent a high flammability risk.
Packing Group II materials have a higher boiling point and a low flash
point and represent a slightly lower flammability risk.
\9\ Table 4 provides a comparison of the DOT Specification 111 tank
car currently authorized in the Hazardous Materials Regulations, the
minimum standards for the DOT approved tank car pursuant to the January
25, 2011 Federal Register Notice and the tank car proposed for
incorporation in petition (P-1577) by AAR.
The Task Force worked to address the root cause, severity, and
consequences of derailments, and its recommendations were finalized on
March 1, 2012. As a result PHMSA, with FRA's agreement, initiated an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) to arrive at a more
comprehensive solution.
In May 2012, PHMSA began drafting an ANPRM to consider revisions to
the Hazardous Materials Regulations to improve the crashworthiness of
railroad tank cars and identify and address operational improvements.
The draft ANPRM addressed several Petitions for Rulemaking submitted by
industry and recommendations issued by the NTSB.\10\ The draft ANPRM
posed a series of questions to the regulated community designed to
solicit comments on potential operational and tank car design
improvements that could improve rail safety, along with the costs of
these improvements. The draft ANPRM was also designed to build and
improve on the Task Force recommendations and examined the differences
in the DOT-approved tank car (pursuant to the January 25, 2011 Federal
Register Notice) and the tank car proposed in AAR's petition.
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\10\ See NTSB recommendations: R-07-4, R-12-5, R-12-6, and R-12-7
http://www.phmsa
.dot.gov/hazmat/regs/ntsb/rail
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concurrent with completing the first draft of its ANPRM in May
2012, between April 2012 and October 2012, PHMSA received three
additional petitions (P-1587, P-1595, and P-1612) and one modification
of a previously filed petition (P-1612). These petitions were submitted
by concerned communities and various industry associations requesting
further modification to the tank car standards. In response to this
additional information, PHMSA published an ANPRM on September 6,
2013,\11\ which addressed all of the petitions and NTSB recommendations
related to rail safety, including tank car and operational standards
for flammable liquids.
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\11\ See Federal Register http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-09-
06/pdf/2013-21621.pdf
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Public interest in this rulemaking was significant. We received
comments from local communities, cities and towns, rail carriers,
shippers, equipment suppliers, tank car manufacturers, environmental
groups, and the NTSB. PHMSA is reviewing the extensive public comments
received during the comment period, which ended on December 5, 2013,
and will use the comments to assess possible future regulatory changes.
PHMSA, in coordination with FRA, is considering all regulatory avenues
available to improve rail safety.
Tank cars are only one part of the chain of delivery, and we must
identify and evaluate all of the risks associated with bulk movements
of highly hazardous material, such as crude oil and ethanol, and then
work to reduce or eliminate those risks.
In addition to the rulemaking activity by PHMSA, DOT took
additional regulatory action following the Lac-Megantic derailment. On
August 7, 2013, FRA, in coordination with PHMSA, issued an emergency
order \12\ addressing the immediate hazard of death, personal injury,
or significant harm to the environment, by instituting requirements
related to attending and securing certain hazardous materials trains
and cars, including crude oil and ethanol unit trains. The emergency
order addressed the leading factors identified in preliminary findings
in the Lac-Megantic investigation, and PHMSA and FRA are conducting
field inspections and investigations to monitor compliance with the
emergency order.
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\12\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-19215
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 25, 2014, the Department issued another emergency order
\13\ to improve the safe transportation of crude oil by rail. The
emergency order requires those who offer crude oil for transportation
by rail to ensure the product is properly tested and classified in
accordance with Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations. All Class III
crude oil shipments must now be designated as Packing Group I or II,
thereby requiring the use of a more robust tank car. (Previously some
Class III crude oil shipments were allowed to be designated as Packing
Group III.) As our efforts in testing crude oil samples have uncovered
evidence of misclassification, the emergency order highlights the
importance of properly testing and classifying crude oil prior to
shipping to ensure the product is being transported in containers that
are designed to safely store the hazardous material while in transit.
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\13\ See DOT website: http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/dot-issues-
emergency-order-requiring-stricter-standards-transport-crude-oil-rail
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Non-regulatory efforts
Concurrent with FRA's August 7, 2013 emergency order, PHMSA and FRA
published a joint Safety Advisory \14\ that addressed preliminary
findings of the Lac-Megantic investigation and made the following
safety and security recommendations: (1) reminding railroads to review
the adequacy of their crew staffing requirements for trains
transporting hazardous materials; (2) requiring system-wide evaluations
to identify particular hazards that may make it more difficult to
secure a train or pose other safety risks; and (3) requiring that
procedures be developed to mitigate those risks.
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\14\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-19211
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The joint Safety Advisory also announced an emergency meeting of
FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) to address rail safety
concerns, which was held on August 29, 2013.\15\ During the emergency
meeting, PHMSA and FRA explained the safety requirements in the August
7, 2013 emergency order and the recommendations in the joint Safety
Advisory, and proposed that an RSAC working group be formed to address
hazardous materials transportation requirements. RSAC members discussed
the formulation of a task statement regarding appropriate train crew
size, hazard classes, and quantities of hazardous materials that should
trigger additional operating procedures, including attendance and
securement requirements. PHMSA continues to participate in FRA's RSAC
meetings on hazardous materials transport by rail. The RSAC plans to
provide its recommendations regarding hazardous materials rail safety
by April 2014 to FRA, who will forward the recommendations to PHMSA for
further evaluation.
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\15\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-19471
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to participating in the RSAC meetings, PHMSA, as
mentioned above, has been a participant in and an observer of the TCC.
This committee is comprised of representatives of the Class I, short
line, and regional railroads; rail tank car owners, manufacturers, and
repair facilities; and shippers and customers of hazardous materials by
rail, as well as participants from PHMSA, FRA, Transport Canada, and
the NTSB. The TCC works together to develop technical standards for how
tank cars, including those used to move hazardous materials, are
designed and constructed. PHMSA also participates as a working member
of other rail task forces.
On August 27-28, 2013, before the RSAC meeting, PHMSA and FRA held
a public meeting to review the requirements in the Hazardous Materials
Regulations applicable to rail operations.\16\ PHMSA and FRA conducted
this meeting as part of a comprehensive review of operational factors
that affect the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail.
This meeting provided the opportunity for public input on requirements
related to rail operations.\17\ PHMSA and FRA are currently reviewing
the transcript and public comments and will use the comments to inform
their future possible regulatory changes.
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\16\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-17201
\17\ See public comments http://www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;D=FRA-2013-0067
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 20, 2013, PHMSA and FRA issued another joint Safety
Advisory to reinforce the importance of proper characterization,
classification, and selection of a packing group for Class 3 materials
(flammable liquids) and the corresponding regulations for safety and
security planning.\18\ This Safety Advisory noted that we expect
offerors of hazardous material by rail and rail carriers transporting
hazardous material to revise their safety and security plans as
required under the Hazardous Materials Regulations, including the
required risk assessments, to address the safety and security issues
identified in FRA's August 7, 2013 emergency order and the August 7,
2013 joint Safety Advisory. FRA has initiated a focused effort to audit
security plans, specifically at railroads that move unit trains of
flammable liquids.
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\18\ See Federal Register https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-27785
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On January 2, 2014, PHMSA issued a Safety Alert warning of the
variability in certain crude oil and emphasizing that proper and
sufficient testing to ensure accurate characterization and
classification should be performed.\19\ Proper characterization and
classification are integral for the Hazardous Materials Regulations to
function as they were designed. Characterization and classification
ultimately determine the appropriate and permitted packaging for a
given hazardous material. This Safety Alert addressed the initial
findings of ``Operation Classification,'' a compliance initiative
(described below) involving unannounced inspections and testing of
crude oil samples to verify that offerors of the materials have
properly characterized and classified the hazardous materials. The
Safety Alert expressed PHMSA's concern that unprocessed crude oil may
affect the integrity of the packaging or present additional hazards,
related to corrosivity, sulfur content, and dissolved gas content. The
alert also noted (1) that preliminary testing had focused on the
classification and packing group assignments that have been selected
and certified by offerors of crude oil, and (2) that PHMSA has found it
necessary to expand the scope of its testing to measure other factors
that might affect the proper characterization and classification of the
materials.
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\19\ See safety alert http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/
DownloadableFiles/1_2
_14%20Rail_Safety_Alert.pdf
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Call to Action
On January 9, 2014, the Secretary issued a ``Call to Action'' to
actively engage stakeholders in the crude oil and rail industries to
take immediate steps to improve the transportation of crude by rail. On
January 16, 2014, the Secretary held a meeting where the Administrators
of PHMSA, FRA, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
challenged representatives of all stakeholders to identify prevention
and mitigation strategies that can be implemented quickly.
Specifically, the ``Call to Action'' discussed (1) operational
controls and track maintenance measures that could prevent accidents
and (2) the proper classification and characterization of hazardous
materials. The meeting was an open and constructive dialogue on how,
collaboratively, industry and government can make America's railways
and other modes of transportation for hazardous materials safer, since
the misclassification of a hazardous material affects more than just
the railroad industry. During the meeting, the rail and crude oil
industries agreed to consider potential actions they could take to
enhance safety, including speed restrictions in high-consequence areas,
alternative routing, the use of distributive power to improve braking,
increased track inspections, improvements to crude oil testing and
classification processes, and emergency response preparedness and
training. In addition, the participants agreed to return to the TCC for
discussions on further improvements to the tank car standard. On
January 22, 2014, the Secretary sent a letter to the attendees
recapping the meeting and stressing the importance of this issue.\20\
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\20\ See Call to Action follow-up letter at http://phmsa.dot.gov/
staticfiles/PHMSA/Down
loadableFiles/Files/
Letter_from_Secretary_Foxx_Follow_up_to_January_16.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the weeks following the ``Call to Action'' meeting, PHMSA has
worked closely with industry stakeholders to advance the safety
initiatives. We have received voluntary agreements from the AAR, the
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, and the American
Petroleum Institute to consider ways to quickly implement the
approaches to safety discussed during the meeting.
Enhanced Enforcement and Outreach
In addition to regulatory and non-regulatory efforts to improve
rail safety, PHMSA has increased its efforts to improve awareness and
understanding of, and compliance with, the Hazardous Materials
Regulations. These efforts include enforcement and outreach activities
that are focused on proper classification and characterization of
hazardous materials, development of safety and security plans, and the
awareness and understanding of Hazardous Materials Regulations. PHMSA
has focused on addressing the considerable public, media, and
congressional interest in the subject of crude oil transport by rail.
As mentioned above, PHMSA launched ``Operation Classification,'' a
compliance initiative involving unannounced inspections and testing of
crude oil samples to verify that offerors of the materials have
properly classified and described the materials being shipped. In
January 2013, PHMSA and FRA began planning this initiative and
officially launched ``Operation Classification'' in August 2013. This
initiative is an ongoing effort, and PHMSA will continue to collect
samples and test them to determine the characteristics of Bakken crude
oil, as well as oil from west Texas. To date, PHMSA has taken 58
samples to collect some preliminary information about the hazards
associated with these oils. PHMSA has uncovered 11 potential
violations, primarily related to improper packaging group assignment,
and plans to release the findings of Operation Classification publicly
upon conclusion of the effort. PHMSA has initiated enforcement actions
on potential violators. In addition, as these violations could indicate
further non-compliance issues, PHMSA continues to expand the scope of
its investigations. PHMSA will use the results of the findings to
consider the benefits, costs, and alternatives of any future regulatory
action.
On January 17, 2014, PHMSA published a Web Page entitled
``Operation Safe Delivery: Enhancing the Safe Transport of Flammable
Liquids.'' \21\ This site describes the Department's efforts to enhance
the safe transport of flammable materials by rail and serves as a
valuable resource for enhancing the safe transport of flammable
liquids. The site will receive regular updates to provide progress
reports on industry commitments as part of the ``Call to Action'' and
additional Departmental activities related to rail safety initiatives.
This site also displays the Department's rail safety action plan.
Although the site was only recently unveiled, it has already received
considerable traffic and is an educational resource for industry and
the general public.
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\21\ Website available at http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/PHMSA/
menuitem.6f23687cf7b00
b0f22e4c6962d9c8789/
?vgnextoid=c5ff6d96d8283410VgnVCM100000d2c97898RCRD&vgnextcha
nnel=0f0b143389d8c010VgnVCM1000008049a8c0RCRD&vgnextfmt=print
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PHMSA is also diligently responding to both congressional and media
inquiries on the subject of crude oil transport by rail. Since the
beginning of 2013, PHMSA has received and responded to over twenty
letters from Members of Congress requesting information on this topic.
Finally, PHMSA is coordinating with the Government Accountability
Office on an audit of the transportation infrastructure of the United
States used to accommodate increased shale oil and gas production.
III. Closing Remarks
During my four years as PHMSA's Administrator, I have experienced
marked changes in our hazardous materials transportation landscape. The
emergence of the United States as the world's leading energy producer
has undoubtedly changed our transportation system and provided new
challenges for PHMSA. I have seen these changes and the evolution of
the energy industry firsthand. I have also seen the lasting
consequences that transportation incidents can have on the public and
local communities nearby. We must prepare for these new and shifting
demands right now and ensure that we protect our communities and the
environment. Effective standards and regulations are important
mechanisms for keeping America's people and its environment safe while
providing for the transportation of the Nation's energy supplies, and
we will continue to use our authorities to improve the effectiveness of
our standards and regulations. PHMSA's oversight and enforcement
capabilities, along with those of our Federal and State partners, are
critically important.
PHMSA and FRA are committed to improving the safety of the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail and other modes. With
this in mind, I believe that our comprehensive approach to rail safety
is working, but we must continue to adapt our approach as we identify
changing risks. Improvement in tank car integrity is one part of the
ongoing effort to address the changes in the risks associated with
transportation of hazardous materials. Furthermore, PHMSA and FRA are
not alone in our safety efforts. As the ``Call to Action''
demonstrated, the rail and crude oil industries are integral partners
in improving transportation safety, and PHMSA will continue to work
collaboratively to improve safety. We have a long way to go to reach no
deaths, injuries, environmental or property damage, or transportation
disruptions, but I truly believe our efforts are helping prevent
accidents and will help mitigate their damage.
In closing, we look forward to continuing to work with Congress to
address rail safety issues, specifically those dealing with the bulk
shipment of flammable liquids. Together, we will strive to keep
America's people and its environment safe while providing for the
reliable transportation of the Nation's energy supplies. Everyone at
PHMSA is dedicated and committed to fulfilling our safety
responsibility to the American people. It is an honor to serve the
American people and to work with the dedicated public servants at
PHMSA. Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I
would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman.
Mr. Hart.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hart. Thank you, Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member
Blunt, and members of the Subcommittee for inviting the NTSB to
discuss lessons learned from accidents that can help improve
rail safety.
Rail safety in America is improving, as we have already
heard, with total accidents and incidents down almost 23
percent since 2004. However, a spate of recent accidents
reminds us that our railroad system can and must be made safer.
Improving rail safety requires a comprehensive approach
starting with actions to prevent accidents such as the December
1 Metro-North rail accident in the Bronx, which resulted in
four fatalities. This tragedy has led to NTSB recommendations
that will help prevent future accidents.
We must also take action to make accidents less severe.
Last July, a crude oil train derailed near the town center of
Lac-Megantic, Quebec, triggering an intense crude oil fire; 47
people died and the town center was destroyed. This tragedy
demonstrates that until we have figured out how to prevent
accidents completely, it's also important to mitigate the
consequences.
One of the major improvements the NTSB has been
recommending for decades to help prevent accidents is positive
train control. The tragic Metro-North accident in the Bronx was
one type of accident that PTC is designed to prevent. PTC could
have also prevented at least 25 other freight and passenger
rail accidents that the NTSB has investigated since 2004.
Congress has mandated the implementation of PTC by the end of
2015. This deadline is the law of the land. PTC must be
implemented by that deadline to prevent future accidents.
The NTSB has recommended a transparent accounting of the
railroad industry's actions taken and not taken to meet the
statutory deadline. The NTSB is very disappointed and concerned
that the FRA will not proactively release the railroads' PTC
progress reports. The public interest would best be served by a
full and transparent accounting of progress toward PTC.
Another way to prevent accidents is to make sure that the
Nation's rail infrastructure is adequately maintained. Broken
rail and other track defects are a major cause of derailments.
Accordingly, the NTSB continues to call for more robust track
inspections to identify and fix problems before they cause
derailments.
We must also mitigate the consequences of accidents,
especially those that involve flammable or toxic liquids such
as crude oil and ethanol. We've already heard that rail
carriage of both ethanol and crude oil increased more than 440
percent between 2005 and 2010. In 2012, ethanol was the most
frequently transported hazardous material in the railroad
system.
On December 30, near Casselton, North Dakota, 20 cars of a
crude oil train derailed spilling about half a million gallons
of crude oil and igniting a fire that burned for 24 hours.
Fourteen hundred people were evacuated from their homes. As I
mentioned earlier, in Lac-Megantic, last July, a crude oil
train derailment resulted in the deaths of 47 people. In
coordination with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada,
the NTSB issued recommendations to the FRA and to PHMSA
addressing specific improvements related to the safe transport
of flammable liquids by rail.
More broadly, the NTSB has publicly stated since 1991 that
DOT-111 tank cars, which are the primary means of transporting
crude oil and ethanol by rail, are too easily damaged even in
low speed derailments. Their continued use to ship flammable
liquids poses an unacceptable risk to the public. The revised
DOT-111 design implemented by industry since 2011--the CPC-1232
specification car needs further changes to improve its
crashworthiness. An improved Federal tank car design standard
must include enhanced head shields and tank jackets and
increased tank shell thickness.
The NTSB is encouraged that industry stakeholders and PHMSA
are in broad agreement over the need to improve the DOT-111
design. We will monitor the PHMSA rulemaking closely, although
the improvements are long overdue. Next month, we will hold a
tank car safety forum dealing with the transportation of
flammable liquids by rail, and we will address tank car issues,
operations issues, and the emergency response issues.
Accident mitigation also requires that first responders
have the training and resources necessary to safely and
effectively respond to hazardous materials accidents. Railroads
have a key role in helping prepare first responders and quickly
responding to hazmat derailments. You've heard reference to the
announcement by the Association of American Railroads and DOT
Secretary Foxx of a series of new voluntary freight rail safety
measures including measures to improve emergency response. As
you may be aware, railroads and the DOT participate with the
NTSB in our rail accident investigations and many of the newly-
announced voluntary measures related to issues that we are
examining in our ongoing investigations.
Meanwhile, we continue to investigate the Casselton, ND
accident and the four accidents involving Metro-North. Already
in 2014 we have issued three safety recommendations to Metro-
North. We will issue additional recommendations if needed
without waiting on the completion of that final report. Our
investigators are doing the methodical, comprehensive job that
the American people expect from the NTSB. We anticipate issuing
final reports and recommendations addressing more than ten rail
accidents by the end of this year.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I look forward
to answering the Subcommittee's questions.
Thank you very much for inviting the NTSB to participate in
this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, On
Behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board
Good afternoon, Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and
Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
and to update you on our ongoing work to improve railroad safety by
investigating railroad accidents and issuing safety recommendations.
Our nation's economy depends on a safe, reliable rail transportation
system, and the American public expects and deserves nothing less.
Recent railroad accidents under active investigation, including fatal
accidents, remind us of the clear imperative to stay vigilant and stand
ready to make improvements to the safety of railroad transportation.
Our Nation's railroad system is safe, but evolving demands on the
railroad system mean evolving safety challenges, and much work is ahead
in our shared mission of making our Nation's railroad system as safe as
it can be.
Recent events have placed railroad safety at the forefront of the
national conversation. Last May, in Bridgeport, Connecticut, 76 people
were injured when a Metro-North Railroad (Metro-North) commuter train
derailed, fouled the adjacent track, and was struck by a train
approaching on that adjacent track. Just more than a week later, a
Metro-North track foreman was struck by a train and killed in West
Haven, Connecticut. In July, a CSX train operating on Metro-North
tracks derailed in The Bronx. In December, four people lost their lives
and 59 others were injured when a Metro-North commuter train derailed
in The Bronx after entering a curve with a 30-mile-per-hour (mph) speed
limit at 82 mph. One month later, 2014 dawned with a team of NTSB
investigators working the scene of a serious railroad accident near
Casselton, North Dakota, where 20 cars of a 106-car BNSF petroleum
crude oil unit train ignited after colliding with cars from a derailed
BNSF grain train.\1\ More than 476,000 gallons of crude oil were
released in the accident, and the massive fire triggered a voluntary
evacuation of 1,400 people from the surrounding area and resulted in
millions of dollars in damage.
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\1\ A unit train is a train made up of cars carrying the same
product.
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Our investigations into these accidents continue, and the second
portion of this written testimony will update the Subcommittee on what
we have learned so far. Last week, we issued three recommendations to
Metro-North that Metro-North install signs to clearly warn train crews
that they are approaching areas of permanent speed restrictions and
that Metro-North install and review inward-and outward-facing audio and
video recorders in locomotives and control cars, which is a
longstanding NTSB recommendation to the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA).
Current Safety Issues
First, I would like to offer some perspectives on safety issues
including, (1) safety deficiencies in the design of thousands of
railroad tank cars; (2) the need for widespread implementation of
positive train control (PTC) systems; (3) the need for installation of
inward-and outward-facing locomotive cameras; and (4) the need for
focused, industrywide efforts to foster top-down safety cultures in
which safety thrives. There is not one approach that will improve rail
safety, but it must be addressed by implementing varied approaches
that, when working together, can help drive down the number and
frequency of accidents or mitigate the severity of accidents.
Railroad Tank Car Design
The Nation's railroad network is taking on an expanding role--one
that has profound economic importance--as a major channel for the
transportation of crude oil and other hazardous products. As the NTSB
noted recently, the American Association of Railroads' 2012 Annual
Report of Hazardous Materials Transported by Rail states that crude oil
traffic has increased by 443 percent since 2005 and that this growth is
expected to continue for the foreseeable future. According to the FRA,
the volume of crude oil transported by rail has increased dramatically
in recent years, from approximately 65,600 carloads in 2011 to
approximately 257,450 \2\ carloads in 2012--an increase of 292
percent.\3\ Moreover, not only is more crude oil being transported by
rail, but some of the crude oil being moved on the Nation's railroad
system--such as that originating in the Bakken formation--may have more
volatile properties. Last month, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued a safety alert advising ``the
general public, emergency responders and shippers and carriers that. .
.the type of crude oil being transported from the Bakken region may be
more flammable than traditional heavy crude oil,'' with the results of
further tests of Bakken crude oil forthcoming.\4\
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\2\ The capacity of a tank car is about 30,000 gallons or 675
barrels of oil.
\3\ FRA Emerg. Order No. 28, 78 Fed. Reg. 48218, 48220 (Aug. 7,
2013).
\4\ PHMSA Safety Alert: Preliminary Guidance from Operation
Classification (Jan. 2, 2014).
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Furthermore, ethanol traffic transported by railroad increased 442
percent between 2005 and 2010; in 2012, ethanol was the most frequently
transported hazardous material in the railroad system.\5\ The evolving
role of our Nation's railroad network in the transportation of
flammable crude oil and ethanol requires interested parties to take a
comprehensive approach to eliminate or significantly reduce the safety
risks. This approach must include improvements to track inspection and
maintenance programs and the crashworthiness of the tank cars that
transport these materials.
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\5\ FRA Emerg. Order No. 28, 78 Fed. Reg. at 48221; see also NTSB,
Letter to The Honorable Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation (Jan. 21, 2014), at 7 n. 11-13 (and citations therein).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, as the volume of flammable materials transported by rail
grows the Casselton, North Dakota, accident has become an increasingly
commonplace story--and multiple recent serious and fatal accidents
reflect substantial shortcomings in tank car design that create an
unacceptable public risk. The crude oil unit train involved in the
Casselton accident consisted of railroad tank cars designed and
manufactured to Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 111-
A100W1 (DOT-111)--a design that presents demonstrated and serious
safety concerns when used to transport hazardous materials such as
crude oil. Specifically, the NTSB has identified vulnerabilities in
DOT-111 tank car design with respect to tank heads, shells, and
fittings that create the unnecessary and demonstrated risk that, in an
accident, hazardous materials could be released and, in the case of
flammable materials such as crude oil and ethanol, could ignite and
cause catastrophic damage.\6\
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\6\ See, e.g., NTSB, Derailment of CN Freight Train U70691-18 With
Subsequent Hazardous Materials Release and Fire Cherry Valley,
Illinois, June 19, 2009, Accident Rpt. No. NTSB/RAR-12/01 (Feb. 14,
2012), at 88 (concluding that, in accident involving breaches of DOT-
111 tank cars, ``If enhanced tank head and shell puncture-resistance
systems such as head shields, tank jackets, and increased shell
thicknesses had been features of the DOT-111 tank cars involved in this
accident, the release of hazardous materials likely would have been
significantly reduced, mitigating the severity of the accident.'').
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The NTSB continues to find that accidents involving the rupture of
DOT-111 tank cars carrying hazardous materials often have violent and
destructive results. For example, on July 6, 2013, a 4,700-foot-long
train that included 72 DOT-111 tank cars loaded with crude oil from the
Bakken fields derailed in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, triggering an intense
fire fed by crude oil released from at least 60 cars. The fire engulfed
the surrounding area and completely destroyed buildings and property.
Forty-seven people died. The NTSB is assisting the Transportation
Safety Board of Canada (TSB) in its investigation of that accident, and
last month both the NTSB and TSB issued safety recommendations asking
FRA and PHMSA, as appropriate, to require railroads to evaluate the
safety and security risks of crude oil train routes and select routes
that avoid populous and other sensitive areas, require railroads to
develop comprehensive emergency response plans for worst-case releases
resulting from accidents, and require shippers to sufficiently test and
properly classify hazardous materials such as crude oil prior to
shipment. With respect in particular to the recommendation on
classification of crude oil, PHMSA's safety alert regarding Bakken
crude oil underscores the critical importance of accurate
classification of flammable materials. We look forward to working with
PHMSA and FRA on implementing these recommendations.
In addition, the NTSB is investigating, or has investigated, a
spate of recent similar accidents in the United States that demonstrate
the destructive results when DOT-111 tank cars containing hazardous
materials are punctured, including:
The July 11, 2012, Norfolk Southern Railway Company train
derailment in a Columbus, Ohio, industrial area in which three
derailed DOT-111 tank cars released about 54,000 gallons of
ethanol, with energetic rupture of one tank car in a post-
accident fire.
The October 7, 2011, Tiskilwa, Illinois, train derailment of
10 DOT-111 tank cars resulting in fire, energetic rupture of
several tank cars, and the release of 162,000 gallons of
ethanol.
The June 19, 2009, Canadian National Railway train
derailment in Cherry Valley, Illinois, in which 13 of 19
derailed DOT-111 tank cars were breached, caught fire, and
released about 324,000 gallons of ethanol. The post-accident
fire resulted in one death, nine injuries, and the evacuation
of 600 houses within half a mile of the accident.
The October 20, 2006, New Brighton, Pennsylvania, Norfolk
Southern Railway Company train derailment in which 23 DOT-111
tank cars derailed, fell from a bridge, caught fire, and
released more than 485,000 gallons of ethanol.
Federal requirements simply have not kept pace with evolving
demands placed on the railroad industry and evolving technology and
knowledge about hazardous materials and accidents. In fact, the current
American Association of Railroads (AAR) industry standards adopted for
DOT-111 tank cars ordered after October 1, 2011 that are used to
transport packing group I and II crude oil, impose a level of
protection greater than corresponding Federal requirements. \7\ At this
point, however, the NTSB is not convinced that these modifications
offer significant safety improvements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ These new standards, for example, call for DOT-111 tank cars
that transport flammable liquids in packing groups I and II (the
highest-risk of the three packing groups, classified according to flash
and boiling points) to be built with protective ``jackets'' around
their tanks, constructed of normalized steel at least 7/16 inch thick,
and call for non-jacketed tanks to be constructed from normalized steel
(steel that has been subjected to a heat-treating process that improves
its material properties) at least half an inch thick. See American
Assoc. of Railroads, Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices:
Specifications for Tank Cars, M-1002. Corresponding Federal regulations
require steel thickness of at least 7/16 inch, but they allow for the
use of non-normalized steel and do not require incorporation of jackets
or head shields. See 49 C.F.R. part 179, subpart D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB continues to assert that DOT-111 tank cars, or tank cars
of any successor specification, that transport hazardous materials
should incorporate more effective puncture-resistant and thermal
protection systems. This can be accomplished through the incorporation
of additional protective features such as full head shields, jackets,
thermal insulation, and thicker head and shell materials. Because the
average service life of a tank car may run 20-30 years, it is
imperative that industry, the FRA, and PHMSA take action now to address
hazards that otherwise would exist for another half-generation or
longer.
Following the 2011 Cherry Valley, Illinois, accident the NTSB
recommended that PHMSA improve DOT-111 tank car crashworthiness by:
[r]equir[ing] that all newly manufactured and existing general
service tank cars authorized for transportation of. . .crude
oil in Packing Groups I and II have enhanced tank head and
shell puncture-resistance systems and top fittings protection
that exceeds existing design requirements for DOT-111 tank
cars.\8\
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\8\ See NTSB, Derailment of CN Freight Train U70691 With Subsequent
Hazardous Materials Release and Fire, Cherry Valley, Illinois, June 19,
2009, RAR-12/01 (2012); NTSB Recommendation No. R-12-5 (2012).
The NTSB also recommended that PHMSA improve requirements for
bottom outlet valves so that they remain closed during accidents
involving impact forces \9\ and require improved center sill or draft
sill attachment designs,\10\ and the NTSB reiterated its prior
recommendation that PHMSA, in consultation with FRA, require that
railroads immediately provide emergency responders with accurate, real-
time information on hazardous materials on a train.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-12-6.
\10\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-12-7.
\11\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-07-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The importance of providing correct information to first responders
highlights a related issue. Following the freight train derailment in
Paulsboro, New Jersey, on November 30, 2012, which is the subject of an
ongoing NTSB investigation, the NTSB learned of the critical importance
to first responders of immediate, accurate information about the
contents of a derailed tank car so that first responders may tailor
their emergency response in a manner that best protects life and
property. First responders' ability to make good decisions in
responding to a hazardous-materials release depends on their clear
understanding of what is in a tank car. Any improvement to railroad
tank car safety must proceed hand-in-hand with an improved approach to
ensuring first responders have adequate information to take appropriate
life-saving actions. PHMSA indicates it, along with FRA, is working to
implement this recommendation.
Although important decisions are clearly ahead for regulators and
industry, the NTSB is pleased that at least some progress has been
made. PHMSA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM)
on September 6, 2013, for potential safety improvements to DOT-111 tank
cars, and we remain engaged in that rulemaking proceeding. In NTSB
comments on the ANPRM dated December 5, 2013, we urged PHMSA to
promptly address the four recommendations that were included in the
NTSB report on the Cherry Valley accident, described above, and to
issue improved and effective regulations that reduce the risks
associated with DOT-111 tank cars. We will continue to carefully
monitor PHMSA's progress and will ensure decision-makers have the full
benefit the lessons the NTSB has learned through its investigations.
The NTSB also continues to call on industry stakeholders to rise to the
challenge and explore measures that will improve tank car design in the
interim. Industry and Department of Transportation leaders met in
January to discuss development of an industry plan to make certain
safety improvements.\12\ This dialogue is encouraging, and the NTSB
will continue to urge regulators and industry stakeholders to follow
through on any commitments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``Rail, Oil Industries Weigh New Safety Measures in Wake of
Derailments, Explosions,'' NBC News Investigations, Jan. 16, 2014,
available at http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/16/
22328508-rail-oil-industries-weigh-new-safety-measures-in-wake-of-
derail
ments-explosions?lite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementation of PTC Systems
PTC systems help prevent (a) derailments caused by overspeeding,
(b) train-to-train collisions by slowing or stopping trains that are
not being operated in accordance with the signal systems and operating
rules, and (c) injury to track workers. The first NTSB-investigated
accident that train control technology would have prevented occurred in
1969, when four people died and 43 were injured in the collision of two
Penn Central commuter trains in Darien, Connecticut. The NTSB
recommended in response to that accident that FRA study the feasibility
of requiring railroads to install an automatic train control system,
the precursor to today's PTC systems.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-70-020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More recently, in 2008, more lives were lost in a PTC-preventable
accident when a Metrolink commuter train and a Union Pacific freight
train collided head-on in Chatsworth, California, killing 25 people and
injuring 102 others. The NTSB concluded that the Metrolink engineer's
use of a cell phone to send text messages distracted him from his
duties. PTC would have prevented the tragedy that resulted. In the
aftermath of the Chatsworth accident, Congress enacted the Rail Safety
Improvement Act (RSIA) of 2008, which requires each class I rail
carrier and each provider of regularly scheduled intercity passenger or
commuter rail transportation to implement a PTC system by December 31,
2015, on each line over which intercity passenger or commuter service
is operated or over which poison-or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous
materials are transported.\14\ In 2012, however, FRA exempted about
10,000 miles of track from the PTC mandate, and several rail carriers
and transit authorities have stated that they will not meet the 2015
deadline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432,
Sec. 104 (2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We continue to see accidents that could be prevented by PTC. The
December 1 Metro-North accident in the Bronx, which killed four people
and injured 59 others, would have been prevented by PTC. We also are
examining the role PTC could have played in the May 28 roadway worker
fatality. Since 2004 alone, in the 25 PTC-preventable freight and
passenger rail accidents that NTSB investigated, 65 people died, more
than 1,100 were injured, and damages totaled millions of dollars.\15\
With each PTC-preventable accident, the case for PTC only grows
stronger, yet progress toward industry-wide implementation has been
slow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ These accidents do not include Metro-North accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementation of PTC systems was included on the NTSB's Most
Wanted List when the list was first published in 1990 and has remained
on the list almost continuously since that time. We may never eliminate
human error from the railroad system, but PTC provides a level of
redundancy to protect trains and those on board when human factors,
such as distraction or fatigue, might otherwise set an accident
sequence into motion.
Some rail carriers have installed PTC or are working to meet the
2015 deadline. However, in August 2013, the Government Accountability
Office reported to the U.S. Senate that, due to a number of complex and
interrelated challenges, the majority of railroads will not complete
PTC implementation by the 2015 deadline.\16\ NTSB files are filled with
accidents that could have been prevented by PTC, and for each and every
day that PTC implementation is delayed, the risk of an accident
remains. For PTC to reach its greatest safety potential, it must be
implemented on all passenger and freight lines subject to the
installation requirements specified in the RSIA. Lives depend on it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Gov't Accountability Office, Positive Train Control:
Additional Authorities Could Benefit Implementation, GAO Rpt. No. GAO-
13-720 (August 2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/
656975.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is much debate by policymakers over whether to extend the
2015 deadline established by RSIA. If Congress were to delay the
statutory deadline, railroads that had delayed planning PTC
implementation would be rewarded and railroads that had moved ahead
with planning for PTC implementation by the deadline would essentially
be punished. If the deadline remains unaltered, the NTSB would
encourage FRA to take appropriate action to ensure railroads are
complying with all applicable requirements regarding PTC
implementation.
Following the head-on collision of two Union Pacific freight trains
in Goodwell, Oklahoma, NTSB issued the following recommendation to the
railroads covered under the RSIA mandate:
Provide positive train control implementation update reports to
the Federal Railroad Administration every 6 months until
positive train control implementation is complete. The update
reports should consist of two sections: components and
training. The components section should include a description
of the positive train control component to be implemented, the
number of components, the number of components completed on the
report date, the number of components that remain to be
completed, the overall completion percentage, and the estimated
completion date. Components are defined as locomotives, wayside
units, switches, base station radios, wayside radios,
locomotive radios, and any new and novel technologies that are
part of a positive train control system. The training section
should include the number of safety-related employees and
equivalent railroad carrier contractors and subcontractors that
need to be trained, by class and craft; minimum training
standards for those employees and contractors, meaning the
knowledge of and ability to comply with Federal railroad safety
laws and regulations and carrier rules and procedures to
implement positive train control; the percentage of employees
who have completed training; the percentage of employees who
remain to be trained; and the estimated date that training will
be completed.
Additionally, the NTSB recommended that FRA:
Publish the positive train control implementation update
reports submitted by all railroads subject to the positive
train control provisions of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of
2008 and make the reports available on your website within 30
days of report receipt.\17\
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\17\ See NTSB, Head-On Collision of Two Union Pacific Railroad
Freight Trains Near Goodwell, Oklahoma June 24, 2012, Rpt. No. NTSB/
RAR-13/02 (June 18, 2013); Recommendations Nos. R-13-23 and R-13-27
(2013).
The NTSB believes this information should be made available online
to ensure a transparent accounting for actions taken and not taken to
meet the 2015 deadline so that regulators and policymakers can make
informed decisions. However, because of FRA's lack of sufficient action
on its recommendation, this week we classified this recommendation as
``Open--Unacceptable Response.''
Inward-and Outward-Facing Locomotive Audio and Image Recorders
The December 1, Metro-North accident in The Bronx raised questions
about the actions of the engineer prior to the crash. The NTSB has
repeatedly called for railroad carriers to install inward-and outward-
facing audio and image records to answer similar questions that have
arisen in other accidents. Recorders in locomotives and cab car
operating compartments are critically important not only because they
would assist NTSB investigators and others understand what was
happening in a train in the minutes and seconds before an accident, but
also because they would help railroad management prevent accidents by
identifying and responsibly addressing safety issues before they lead
to injuries and loss of life and allow for the development of material
that can be a valuable training and coaching tool.
The Chatsworth tragedy in 2008 again made the case crystal-clear
for understanding crewmembers' activities in the minutes and seconds
leading up to accidents. Discussing the strong safety case for a
requirement for inward-facing cameras in locomotives, the NTSB noted
that
[i]n all too many accidents, the individuals directly involved
are either limited in their recollection of events or, as in
the case of the Chatsworth accident, are not available to be
interviewed because of fatal injuries. In a number of accidents
the NTSB has investigated, a better knowledge of crewmembers'
actions before an accident would have helped reveal the key
causal factors and would perhaps have facilitated the
development of more effective safety recommendations.
On the basis of that reasoning, the NTSB recommended that FRA
require the installation, in control compartments, of ``crash-and fire-
protected inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders capable
of providing recordings [for at least 12 hours] to verify that train
crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are
essential to safety as well as train operating conditions.'' \18\ The
NTSB also recommended that FRA ``[r]equire that railroads regularly
review and use in-cab audio and image recordings . . . to verify that
train crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are
essential to safety.'' \19\
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\18\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-10-1.
\19\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-10-2.
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The NTSB recently reiterated these important recommendations in its
report on the collision of a BNSF coal train with the rear end of a
standing BNSF maintenance-of-way equipment train near Red Oak, Iowa,
which resulted in fatal injuries to the two crewmembers of the striking
train. Damage was in excess of $8.7 million. As the NTSB stated in its
report, the accident again demonstrated the need for in-cab recording
devices to better understand (and thereby prevent) serious railroad
crashes that claim the lives of crewmembers, passengers, and the
public.
Last week, we issued our longstanding recommendation on this
subject directly to Metro-North Railroad. An industry-wide FRA-mandated
approach would be far more effective, but failing that, we will address
the recommendation on an individual basis.
Safety Culture
Fostering the development of transparent, top-to-bottom safety
cultures in transportation is an important priority of the NTSB.
Creating and nurturing a thriving safety culture within rail carriers
is even more imperative in light of the expanding role of the Nation's
railroad system as a main transporter of flammable materials.
The NTSB held a public forum on September 10 and 11, 2013, on
successes and challenges associated with creating and maintaining
strong safety cultures across the transportation modes, including rail.
Panels of experts from academia, industry, and Federal regulatory
agencies, such as the FRA, offered their perspectives on the
significant organizational commitments and managerial work that are
required to maintain safety cultures across large, complex
organizations such as transportation carriers.
As Members of the Subcommittee well remember, organizational
factors at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)
contributed to the fatal June 22, 2009, Metrorail train collision near
the Fort Totten station in Washington, D.C. The NTSB found that WMATA
leaders did not take sufficient action to make safety a priority and to
identify and address safety issues from the top down: the WMATA General
Manager did not provide adequate information about critical safety
issues; the WMATA Board of Directors did not seek information about
critical safety issues; and the Board of Directors did not exercise
oversight responsibility for system safety.
While WMATA has addressed many of these issues, the NTSB is
examining the role of safety culture in the Metro-North accident
investigations. The NTSB public investigative hearing regarding last
May's two Metro-North accidents examined the importance of an
organizational safety culture and the critical role that organizational
culture plays in preventing accidents. The NTSB learned during the
hearing that Metro-North has undertaken efforts to foster a stronger
safety culture but that challenges remain. The then-president of Metro-
North, spoke of the ``challenge'' associated with creating ``a clear
understanding across the organization that safety is the core value and
we're not looking for shortcuts, and that we want people to work
safely.'' \20\ Metro-North officials and labor stakeholders further
assured the NTSB that Metro-North is taking action to address safety
issues from the top to the bottom. Organizational issues within the
railroad industry will continue to be an area of examination as the
NTSB investigations of the Bridgeport, West Haven, and two Bronx
accidents continue. In particular, the Bridgeport accident underscores
the critical importance of regular, vigorous, and robust inspections of
tracks. Railroad management must afford track workers adequate time and
opportunity to conduct inspections and make repairs as necessary. As
part of its ongoing investigation, the NTSB is undertaking a
comprehensive review of Metro-North track inspections and follow-up
work and is also looking at the adequacy of the FRA's Track Safety
Standards.
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\20\ NTSB, Board of Inquiry in the Matter of Two Metro-North Rail
Accidents: Bridgeport Train Derailment on May 17, 2013 and West Haven
Collision Death of a Metro-North Track Foreman on May 28, 2013, Tr.
Vol. II at 329 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 7, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The importance of building relationships between management and
employees that foster a vibrant safety culture cannot be overlooked.
Trust is an essential ingredient in those relationships. A culture in
which front-line employees may openly report operational errors and
safety issues without fear of reprisal is absolutely critical, and, as
we have seen in the aviation context, improves safety.
The NTSB will continue to urge Federal regulators, such as FRA and
the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), to facilitate establishment
of appropriate safety cultures. The WMATA accident, in particular,
underscored the critical need for rail mass transit operators to
enhance and nourish safety cultures. Our 2014 Most Wanted List
reaffirms our view that:
[t]he FTA should consider the elements of safety culture, crew
resource management, fatigue risk management, and technology,
as well as lessons learned from the rail industry, as it moves
forward with [new legislative authority to set and enforce new
safety standards and conduct investigations]. Identifying and
implementing these will be key to saving lives and preventing
injuries.
Updates on Ongoing Investigations
I would now like to update the Subcommittee on developments in
several recent investigations that are keeping the NTSB's railroad
investigators very busy and demonstrate the need for continued
vigilance in the railroad operating environment.
Metro-North Railroad Accidents
On December 1, 2013, the NTSB launched an investigative team to The
Bronx, where a Metro-North Railroad commuter train with approximately
115 passengers on board derailed shortly after 7:15 a.m. near the
Spuyten Duyvil station, while going from Poughkeepsie to Grand Central
Station in New York City. Four passengers died in this Thanksgiving
holiday weekend accident and at least 59 others sustained injuries
requiring medical treatment. Metro-North estimated damage in excess of
$9 million.
The NTSB issued a preliminary factual report on the accident on
January 14, 2014. Based on evidence obtained to this point, our
investigators have found that the accident train was traveling at
approximately 82 mph when it derailed in the curve on approach to the
Spuyten Duyvil station. The speed limit for the curve was 30 mph. PTC
would have prevented this accident. Metro-North does not have a PTC
system and has stated it will not meet the deadline, but it thought its
system would be as robust as PTC. This accident clearly demonstrated
that it was not.
Investigators have conducted detailed inspections and testing of
the signal system, train brakes, and other mechanical equipment, and
thus far have found no anomalies. They found no pre-accident anomalies
in the track in the derailment area. Investigators have interviewed the
train crewmembers, including the engineer and first responders and will
continue to obtain and examine evidence from NTSB headquarters as the
investigation proceeds. We are receiving excellent cooperation from the
parties to the investigation: the FRA, Metro-North, the New York Public
Transportation Safety Board, Teamsters Local 808, the New York Police
Department, the New York Fire Department, and Bombardier
Transportation, which manufactured the cars involved in the accident.
Last week, as I stated earlier, the NTSB issued three safety
recommendations to Metro-North. We recommended that Metro-North install
signs to clearly warn train crews that they are approaching areas of
permanent speed restrictions; install inward-and outward-facing audio
and video recorders in locomotives and control cars, and regularly
review and use in-cab audio and image recordings in conjunction with
other performance data, to verify train crew actions are in accordance
with rules and procedures that are essential to safety. As our
investigation proceeds, the NTSB will be prepared to issue additional
safety recommendations if we determine any further safety improvements
are necessary pending completion of our investigation.
The Bronx derailment was the fourth accident involving Metro-North
property to trigger an NTSB investigation in 2013. Last June, the NTSB
issued an urgent safety recommendation following the May 28 accident in
which the track foreman died, calling upon Metro-North to immediately
implement redundant measures to ensure the safety of track workers \21\
(Metro-North indicates it is implementing this recommendation), and the
NTSB reiterated a safety recommendation to the FRA to require redundant
signal protection, such as shunting, for maintenance-of-way work crews
who depend on the train dispatcher to provide signal protection.\22\
That recommendation is currently classified as open with an acceptable
response.
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\21\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-13-17.
\22\ NTSB Recommendation No. R-08-6.
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I am pleased to inform the Subcommittee that Metro-North has fully
cooperated in all these investigations, at a difficult time for the
railroad and its employees in the wake of several closely-spaced
accidents. We anticipate and look forward to Metro-North's continued
cooperation as the investigations proceed.
Although it is still too early in our investigations of these
accidents to draw definitive conclusions, we will seek answers to the
following questions, among others: What caused these accidents? Are
there common threads among the accidents? What improvements can Metro-
North, regulators, and others adopt that will prevent similar accidents
from occurring in the future?
The NTSB tentatively expects to complete our investigations of all
four accidents involving Metro-North trains or property in the second
half of this year. We recognize and share the Subcommittee's sense of
urgency to understand what lessons can be drawn from these accidents
and to ensure that the railroad industry and its regulators implement
appropriate safety improvements to prevent recurrences, and if our
investigation reveals problems that need immediate attention, we will
not hesitate to issue appropriate recommendations before we complete
the investigation.
Freight Train Collision and Crude Oil Release near Casselton, N.D.
As I noted above, the NTSB is investigating the December 30, 2013,
Casselton, North Dakota, accident that resulted in a significant post-
crash fire that triggered a voluntary evacuation of about 1,400 people
from the surrounding community.
The accident sequence began shortly after 2 p.m. when 13 cars of a
112-car westbound BNSF Railway grain train derailed. One of the
derailed cars came to rest on the adjacent track. Shortly afterward, a
BNSF 106-car petroleum crude oil unit train travelling east on the
parallel track collided with the derailed grain car. The collision
caused the head-end locomotives and the first 21 cars of the crude oil
train to derail. Some of the crude oil tank cars were punctured during
the accident releasing crude oil that ignited and caused the energetic
rupture of several other tank cars. Dense smoke and concern over
expanding fires resulted in voluntary evacuation of the surrounding
area.
The crews on the two trains were uninjured. No injuries to the
public were reported. Damage was estimated at $6.1 million.
On a preliminary basis, we have found that, of the 20 tank cars
that derailed, 18 tank cars were breached and more than 476,000 gallons
of crude oil were released. NTSB investigators have completed the on-
scene portion of the investigation, including interviews with the train
crews and first responders. A broken axle and two wheels were shipped
to the NTSB materials laboratory in Washington, D.C., for further
evaluation and analysis, as well as the locomotive event and video
recorders. The parties to the investigation include the FRA; PHMSA; the
BNSF; the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen; the
International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation
Workers, formerly known as the United Transportation Union; Trinity
Rail Car; and Standard Steel, LLC.
Conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and to provide
updates on our ongoing investigations as well as NTSB perspectives on
several compelling safety issues. Please be assured that the NTSB will
remain engaged on these and all issues affecting transportation safety.
I look forward to answering the Subcommittee's questions.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Hart.
Mr. Blackwell.
STATEMENT OF GEOFFREY C. BLACKWELL, CHIEF,
OFFICE OF NATIVE AFFAIRS AND POLICY, CONSUMER
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
Mr. Blackwell. Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt,
and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today concerning the FCC's role in enhancing rail
safety.
The FCC recognizes that positive train control has the
power to save lives, prevent injury, and avoid property damage.
It is the top priority of the FCC to work with all parties to
help them fulfill their legal obligations and advance the
deployment of PTC as prescribed by the Rail Safety Improvement
Act of 2008. At the same time, we recognize the need to balance
the very legitimate concerns regarding the potential impacts of
such a major infrastructure deployment on historic properties
including sites of religious and cultural significance to
tribal nations.
This imperative is reflected in the FCC's statutory
obligations under Section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act as well as the National Environmental Policy
Act. Regulations developed by the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, require that the FCC review and assess whether a
proposed communications facility may have an adverse effect on
historic properties and consult with federally-recognized
tribal nations as part of the review process. The NHPA and our
rules require that applicants ascertain prior to initiating
construction, whether their construction could have a
significant environmental impact including an adverse effect on
historic properties.
A cornerstone of the Commission's implementation of Section
106 is the Tower Construction Notification System (TCNS). TCNS
is a secure online system that allows parties constructing
communications towers to ascertain whether their proposed
construction would implicate a tribal nation's interest in
culturally or religiously significant sites. A parallel system,
E106, exists to facilitate review of towers by State Historic
Preservation Officers (SHPO). TCNS and E106 provide an easy and
efficient way to exchange information among FCC staff, tribal
nations, State Historic Preservation Officers, and applicants.
In the spring of 2013, the railroads informed us that they
intended to deploy PTC using a system that required the
construction of approximately 22,000 wayside poles. We
immediately sought to develop alternative ways to leverage TCNS
and E106 to facilitate the deployment of this necessary
infrastructure while also ensuring compliance with all the
relevant statutes and our rules.
The TCNS and E106 systems are tried and true; designed to
ensure efficient reviews, but were not designed for the sheer
volume of the PTC wayside antenna structures. TCNS and E106 do,
however, offer unique efficiencies that will provide many
advantages to all the parties involved.
Being mindful of the FCC's trust responsibility to consult
with tribal governments prior to implementing a regulatory
action, we took the following steps: First, we consulted with
the Council on Environmental Quality and the Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation (ACHP) on the best path forward with
the conclusion being that the most expeditious is for the
Commission to tailor its historic preservation review processes
is to develop a Program Comment. This is a document adopted and
issued by the Advisory Council that allows the FCC to follow
alternative historic preservation review processes.
Second, on September 27, we released a Section 106 Scoping
Document as an initial step in developing a Program Comment. We
then held tribal consultations in South Dakota in November, and
Oklahoma in December. In unprecedented fashion, these meetings
with tribal officials also included demonstration and
presentation sessions by the railroads.
Third, on January 29, we released a draft Program Comment
which seeks to promote administrative efficiency by providing
for submission of poles in batches while ensuring that SHPOs
and tribal nations will receive sufficient information about
each pole to evaluate its effects on historic properties.
Comments on the draft Program Comment were due February 12.
The Program Comment was formally submitted to the Advisory
Council this past Tuesday, March 4. And under its rules, ACHP
would act on the Program Comment by mid-April.
Once adopted, the Commission is prepared immediately to
begin accepting railroad submissions for the up to 20,000
additional constructions now expected. Complicating our work to
create an efficient process for new PTC construction is the
fact that we must consider more than 10,000 PTC constructions
that were undertaken without completing the environmental and
historic preservation review clearly required by Federal laws
and regulations. This issue has figured prominently in our
discussions with SHPOs and tribal nations as we seek to create
an efficient review process.
Based on those discussions, it is clear to us that issues
related to prior construction must be resolved at the same time
as the issues surrounding future PTC infrastructure.
In closing, let me reiterate that the Commission recognizes
the importance of PTC to enhancing rail safety and is committed
to creating an efficient and timely review process. This
process will ensure full consideration of the effects of PTC
wayside poles on historic properties including sites of
religious and cultural significance to tribal nations in a
manner that allows the railroads to complete construction by
the statutory deadline.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blackwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Geoffrey C. Blackwell, Chief, Office of Native
Affairs and Policy, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau,
Federal Communications Commission
Chairman Warner, Ranking Member Blunt, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today
concerning the Federal Communications Commission's role in enhancing
rail safety. My name is Geoffrey Blackwell, and I am the Chief of the
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Office of Native Affairs and
Policy, or ONAP, which is part of the Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau. ONAP was established in August 2010 to promote the deployment
and adoption of communications services and technologies throughout
Tribal Lands and Native Communities and to ensure robust government-to-
government consultation with federally-recognized Tribal Governments
and increased coordination with Native Organizations, including on
environmental and historic preservation reviews and related matters.
Along with other Commission Bureaus and Offices, ONAP is part of the
internal infrastructure team at the Commission that coordinates closely
on the matters involved in this hearing.
The Commission recognizes that positive train control (PTC) is a
transformative technology that has the power to save lives, prevent
injuries, and avoid extensive property damage. Clearly, PTC deployment
is a top priority of all of the agencies and companies represented at
the table today. It is also a top priority of the Commission to work
with all parties to help them fulfill their various legal obligations
and responsibilities and advance the deployment of PTC within the time-
frame prescribed by the Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA).
At the same time, we recognize the need to balance legitimate
concerns regarding the potential impacts of such a major infrastructure
deployment on historic properties, including sites of religious and
cultural significance to Tribal Nations. This imperative is reflected
in the FCC's statutory obligations under Section 106 of the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), as well as the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). Most notably, NHPA regulations developed by the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) require that the FCC
review and assess whether a proposed communications facility may have
an adverse effect on historic properties, and consult with Federally
recognized Tribal Nations as part of its review process.
For example, railroad tracks often follow historical trade and
navigation routes that have been used for centuries, both by European
settlers and by Native peoples before and since European settlement.
Construction along the tracks therefore has the potential to affect a
number of cultural or religious properties, from traditional burial
sites to sacred landscapes. Our consultations with Tribal Nations
revealed such specific histories. According to the Tribal Historic
Preservation Officer (THPO) of the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma, when the
railroad was constructed through historical Quapaw community lands in
the southern plains, the soil of multiple burial mounds was bulldozed
into the right-of-way to build up the track bed. According to the THPO
of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, the largest Tribal cemetery
ever discovered in the state of Mississippi was found under a railroad
right-of-way. Several THPOs for Tribal Nations resident in both North
and South Dakota have identified village sites that lie underneath
existing rail lines. Likewise, Tribal Nations with an interest in the
Columbia River Gorge have identified sacred sites and petroglyphs that
are either underneath or alongside the existing tracks. Construction
along railroad tracks can also affect historic properties that are not
of cultural and religious significance to Tribal Nations. For example,
the Pennsylvania, Georgia, Montana, Wyoming, and New Mexico SHPOS have
identified historic districts in their states that lie astride rail
lines.
Accordingly, to address these concerns the Commission is dedicating
substantial resources to establishing a specially-designed review
process that would allow the railroads to deploy PTC wayside
infrastructure by the December 31, 2015, statutory deadline, while also
ensuring that it meets its statutory obligation to fully consider the
effects of this infrastructure on historic properties, including sites
of religious and cultural significance to Tribal Nations.
Background
RSIA requires that freight and passenger railroads deploy by
December 31, 2015, interoperable PTC systems along routes transporting
passengers and certain hazardous cargoes. While the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) is responsible for overseeing the railroads'
implementation of PTC by the statutory deadline, the FCC plays a role
in two aspects of PTC deployment. First, the FCC regulates access to
spectrum, and many railroads are installing PTC systems that require
licensed spectrum to enable wireless communication. Second, it is well
established--and has been upheld by the D.C. Circuit--that a Commission
licensee's construction of a facility (e.g., a communications tower) to
use Commission-licensed spectrum constitutes a major Federal action and
Federal undertaking within the meaning of NEPA and the NHPA. Thus, the
FCC has a legal responsibility to review the environmental and historic
preservation impacts, including impacts on properties of religious and
cultural significance to Tribal Nations, of infrastructure projects,
like PTC, that will provide wireless services using FCC-licensed
spectrum. It is a common misperception that the responsibility to
ensure that Tribal Nations have an opportunity to participate in this
process arises only with respect to the lands upon which Tribal Nations
currently reside. In fact, the NHPA requires a nationwide scope, and
Tribal involvement in the FCC process is typically most important on
non-Tribal lands. These previously inhabited areas are precisely where
Tribal governments do not presently own the land or have the authority
to protect their religious and cultural properties, except through the
NHPA.
Providing Spectrum
Broadly speaking, the FCC understands that two types of PTC systems
will be implemented in the United States. While they both use
frequencies in the 217 to 222 megahertz range, they have different
spectrum requirements. In the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak and the
commuter railroads intend to implement Amtrak's Advanced Civil Speed
Enforcement System (ACSES), via 12.5 kHz spectrum channels. Outside of
the Northeast Corridor, commuter railroads, Amtrak and the freight
railroads intend to implement a system developed by the freight
railroads, Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS),
via 25 kHz channels.
Since 2010, FCC staff has been working with freight and commuter
rails to identify spectrum that is suitable and available for the
deployment of an interoperable PTC system. PTC-220, a consortium of the
Nation's seven Class I freight railroads, has acquired a substantial
block of nationwide spectrum, as well as additional spectrum in dense
urban markets, for the purpose of implementing PTC systems. FCC staff
continues to work with PTC-220 and other relevant stakeholders to
enable more intensive use of PTC-220s spectrum holdings, which will
allow other railroads, especially commuter railroads, to benefit from
PTC-220s spectrum holdings and networks. Provided that pending and
future FRA requirements do not materially impact PTC spectrum needs, we
believe the seven Class I freight railroads generally have sufficient
spectrum to deploy PTC. We also believe that an increasing number of
commuter rails have access to sufficient spectrum to deploy PTC. We
continue to work actively with those still seeking spectrum.
Environmental and Historic Preservation Review
The Commission's rules require that applicants ascertain--prior to
initiating construction--whether a facility they wish to construct
could have a significant environmental impact, including an adverse
effect on historic properties. If the facility may have such an impact,
the Commission's rules require the preparation of an Environmental
Assessment (EA) and further environmental processing.
To determine whether there will be an adverse effect on historic
properties, the rules require the applicant to follow certain
procedures set forth in the Commission's 2004 Nationwide Programmatic
Agreement (NPA) with the ACHP and the National Conference of Historic
Preservation Officers (NCSHPO). Intended to facilitate historic
preservation review for communications projects, the NPA includes
procedures for participation of Tribal Nations and, where necessary,
referral to the Commission for government-to-government consultation.
The NPA also improved the process for SHPO review and excluded some
constructions from review under defined conditions. The Commission's
rules also specify procedures for NEPA compliance. No formal regulatory
action is required to adapt these procedures for PTC wayside poles, and
the Commission staff is working with the railroads to make the
necessary informal adjustments to the process.
While the Commission's rules include certain exemptions and
exclusions from NEPA and NHPA review, none currently available would
categorically exclude the entire PTC wayside pole system. The creation
of exemptions for infrastructure deployments like PTC would require not
only consultation and negotiation with ACHP and NCSHPO, the other
necessary signatories to our NPA under ACHP rules, but also a full
notice and comment rulemaking proceeding at the Commission, a process
that could take a year or longer.
A cornerstone of the Commission's implementation of the NPA is the
Tower Construction Notification System (TCNS), a secure technology
solution that allows parties interested in constructing communications
towers to ascertain whether their proposed construction would implicate
a Tribal Nation's interest in culturally or religiously significant
sites in the area of the proposed construction. TCNS is a non-public
system that facilitates the notification, interactions, and review of
proposed constructions, while protecting the private nature of both the
particular applicant's proposed construction and the site of religious
or cultural significance to a Tribal Nation. Use of TCNS immediately
narrows the areas of interest of Tribal Nations to only those that they
have indicated as relevant in this process and currently, every single
Tribal Nation in the country has set their areas of interest to
participate in the TCNS system. A parallel system, E-106, exists to
facilitate review of communications towers by interested state historic
preservation officers (SHPOs).
On average the Commission processes more than 10,000applications a
year for new or collocated communications infrastructure through these
systems. TCNS and E-106 provide an easy way to exchange information
among Commission staff, Tribal Nations, SHPOs and applicants.
Facilitating Efficient PTC Infrastructure Deployment
In the spring of 2013, the railroads informed FCC staff that they
intended to deploy PTC using a system that required the construction of
approximately 22,000 wayside poles with antennas along the railroad
tracks. Through continued discussions with the railroads we concluded,
and the railroads have agreed, that the Commission's TCNS and E-106
processes, as they existed, were not suited to ensure efficient review
of PTC wayside infrastructure on such a large scale. In fact, the
existing TCNS and E-106 process was originally designed for tower-by-
tower review and does not efficiently scale up to the large scale and
linear nature of the proposed PTC projects. At the same time, we
recognized that TCNS and E-106 do offer unique efficiencies that will
provide many advantages to the railroads, FCC staff, SHPOs, and Tribal
Nations. Consequently, the Commission immediately sought to develop
alternative ways to leverage TCNS and E-106 so as to facilitate the
deployment of necessary infrastructure while ensuring compliance with
the relevant statutes and our rules. In doing so, we are mindful of the
Commission's trust responsibility to consult with Tribal governments
prior to implementing any regulatory action or policy that could
significantly or uniquely affect Tribal governments, their land and
resources.
Complicating our work to create an efficient process for new
construction of PTC infrastructure is the fact that we must consider
more than ten thousand PTC infrastructure deployments that were
undertaken by the railroads without completing the environmental and
historic preservation review clearly required by Federal laws and
regulations. This issue has figured prominently in our discussions with
SHPOs and Tribal representatives, and in consultations with Tribal
government officials, as we seek to create an efficient review process.
Based on those discussions, it is clear to us that issues related to
prior construction must be resolved contemporaneously with the issues
surrounding future PTC infrastructure construction.
In May 2013, FCC senior staff advised the major freight railroads
to defer submission of requests seeking SHPO and Tribal review of
wayside pole deployments until the FCC could develop a more streamlined
process specifically tailored to PTC wayside poles. FCC staff has
consistently advised commuter railroads, which will deploy a limited
number of wayside poles, to continue using the TCNS and E-106 systems.
The Program Comment
Upon concluding that our existing processes were not suitable for
PTC infrastructure review, FCC staff consulted with the
Administration's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and with the
ACHP on the best path forward. CEQ confirmed that we could not simply
exclude PTC wayside poles from the required NEPA review without a
formal notice and comment rulemaking process to develop a categorical
exclusion. ACHP similarly confirmed that there was no ready path to a
broad exclusion from NHPA review. ACHP further advised that the most
expeditious way for the Commission to streamline its historic
preservation review process is to develop a ``Program Comment.''
A Program Comment is a document adopted and issued by the ACHP that
allows a Federal agency such as the FCC to follow alternative historic
preservation review processes that address specific needs of an agency.
Under this approach, the FCC must develop a draft Program Comment and
propose it to ACHP after consultation with all stakeholders, including
government-to-government consultation with Tribal Nations. Adoption and
implementation of the Program Comment does not require a formal FCC
rulemaking.
We released a Section 106 scoping document--an initial step in
developing a Program Comment--on September 27, 2013. We then met with
Tribal officials and railroad representatives, in Rapid City, South
Dakota in November 2013, and Tulsa, Oklahoma in December 2013. In an
unprecedented fashion, in addition to face-to-face consultations
between Federal and Tribal officials, these meetings also included
sessions with all interested parties present. At their request, we also
coordinated with the railroads to facilitate live demonstrations of
their PTC deployments to Tribal officials.
As a result of those meetings and consultations, on January 8,
2014, the Commission advised the Class I freight railroads to begin
submitting through TCNS and E-106 proposed PTC infrastructure along
segments of track that were discussed during the Rapid City and Tulsa
meetings using a Beta version of the process we envision implementing
in the Program Comment. While the TCNS and E106 systems are not
designed for public inspection, and thus do not have public view
versions, we believe it is a good indication of forward progress that
one of the Class I freight railroads has voluntarily filed information
in TCNS, and four have filed forms in the E-106 system.
We began our PTC solutions dialogue with Indian Country in August
of last year--the earliest practicable date--at the annual meeting of
the National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers in
Billings, Montana. We are scheduling additional consultations with
Tribal Nations in the Pacific Northwest and Southwest to gather input
on the draft Program Comment and continue the productive conversations
between the Tribal Nations and the railroads. We also conducted a
dialogue last week with the Culture and Heritage Committee of the
United South and Eastern Tribes, and we have conducted numerous other
meetings with regional and national inter-Tribal organizations.
FCC staff has also engaged numerous SHPOs on the proposal to create
a more efficient review process. In particular, we provided information
to the SHPOs by letter in July 2013, October 2013, and January 2014,
and we have conducted four teleconferences with the SHPOs in August
2013, December 2013, and February 2014.
The FCC publicly released a draft Program Comment on January 29,
2014. The draft Program Comment would apply to wayside infrastructure
that will be constructed within existing railroad rights of way for use
in the implementation and operation of PTC systems. Infrastructure
eligible for the procedures of the Program Comment may support either
wayside antennas or base stations, but must not: (1) be taller than 75
feet; (2) create a foundation hole in excess of 15 inches in diameter
(unless agreed to in the context of manual excavation); (3) require a
foundation deeper than 15 feet; or (4) be situated outside the railroad
right-of-way. Applicants using the proposed Program Comment must ensure
that associated cultural resource reports are prepared by professionals
who meet the relevant standards in the Secretary of the Interior's
Professional Qualifications Standards. Additionally, applicants must be
willing to support Tribal monitoring activities if requested and to
compensate Tribal preservation offices for professional services in
accordance with the ACHP's guidelines. The draft Program Comment seeks
to promote administrative efficiency by providing for submission of
poles in batches, rather than pole-by-pole, while ensuring that SHPOs
and Tribal Nations will receive sufficient information about each pole
to evaluate its effects on historic properties.
Comments on the draft Program Comment were due yesterday. The
Commission expects to submit the Program Comment to ACHP by the end of
February. Under its rules, ACHP should act on the Program Comment by
mid-April. Once adopted, the Commission is prepared immediately to
begin accepting submissions from railroads under its terms.
Collaboration
Throughout this process, the Commission has been working closely
with our partners at the Federal Railroad Administration, the National
Transportation Safety Board, ACHP, CEQ, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service to share information and ensure coordination between our
agencies. As I stated we are also working closely with Tribal Nations
and their cultural preservation officials, the SHPOs and, of course,
the railroads subject to the PTC mandate. We will continue our close
and productive collaboration with all of these parties to ensure that
the Commission's processes do not inhibit the deployment of PTC by the
statutory deadline.
In closing, let me reiterate that the Commission recognizes the
importance of PTC to enhancing rail safety, and is committed to doing
what is necessary to allow for an efficient and timely review process
that ensures full consideration of the effects of PTC wayside poles on
historic properties, including sites of religious and cultural
significance to Tribal Nations, in a manner that allows the railroads
to complete construction by the statutory deadline.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Blackwell.
Mr. Searles.
STATEMENT OF PRENTISS SEARLES, MARKETING AND RAIL ISSUES
MANAGER, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE
Mr. Searles. Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt and
members of the Subcommittee, Senators Heitkamp and Hoeven,
thank you for the invitation to testify on this important and
timely topic of enhancing rail safety.
My name is Prentiss Searles. I am the Marketing and Rail
Issues Manager for the American Petroleum Institute (API). I am
testifying on behalf of my boss, Bob Greco, who has the flu
today.
API represents all segments of the oil and natural gas
industry with more than 590 members who supply most of the
Nation's energy. The revolution in North American energy
development has been possible by technological breakthroughs
and decades-old methods of energy development which has set
this Nation on the path to energy security; a concept
unthinkable just a few years ago.
The energy policies we choose today will determine if our
nation will continue its march toward global energy leadership;
a unique and once-in-a-generation opportunity. America's
dramatic increase in domestic energy production has
fundamentally altered the global energy markets and, more
broadly, the geopolitical landscape for decades to come, all
while providing a much-needed boost to our economy.
In order to achieve our Nation's full potential as a global
energy leader, all of us have to work together to ensure that
our energy infrastructure is capable of safely, reliably, and
efficiently transporting ever increasing amounts of
domestically produced energy whether by truck, barge, pipeline,
or the focus of today's hearing, rail. Meaningful and lasting
improvement in rail safety will only come from a holistic and
collaborative approach to accident prevention, mitigation and
response. And the oil and natural gas industry will continue to
work with our colleagues in government, the rail industry, and
others on continual safety improvement.
The Memorandum of Understanding, recently released between
the railroad industry and the Department of Transportation
which outlines operational changes to improve rail safety, is
an important step in our shared goal of improving the safety of
America's freight rail system. While it's true that 99.997
percent of hazardous materials transported by rail reach their
destinations without incident, the oil and natural gas industry
is committed to getting to zero rail incidents. Because, when
it comes to safety, the only number that matters is zero
incidents. Getting to zero will take the long-term commitment
to working collaboratively with all stakeholders and applying
our best science, research and real world data in a thoughtful
and a deliberate manner.
Being a safe steward of our Nation's energy resources and
providing the leadership in raising the bar on industry
performance isn't new to the oil and natural gas sector. For 90
years, API has been the world leader in developing and
improving equipment and operating standards, 600 and counting
for oil and natural gas through a collaborative process that
involves all stakeholders, as well as government regulators.
This process is accredited by the American National Standards
Institute, or ANSI, which is the same organization that
accredits the government's national laboratories.
We have already assembled the best experts from our
industry, the railroad scientists and engineers, and others, to
tackle some of the issues raised by the recent incidents
involving the transport of crude by rail. PHMSA also committed
to join our effort to develop a comprehensive standard that
addresses the classification of crude oil to ensure that we are
moving that product in the safest manner possible. This
includes possible safety improvements for material
characterization, transport classification, and quantity
measurement of crude oils based on the best available science
and data. This is part of our industry's longstanding
commitment to safety.
In 2011, the oil and natural gas industry helped lead the
multi-industry effort that led to significant improvements in
the design of tank cars and we moved forward voluntarily with
those improvements so that, this year, we are approaching 40
percent of the crude tank cars in use by our industry that
exceed the current Federal safety standards. With this
achievement, please keep in mind, as Administrator Quarterman
said at last week's House hearing on rail safety, ``Getting a
new tank car is not a silver bullet. First, we need to prevent
derailments.''
In the final analysis, the women and men of the rail and
oil and natural gas industries, as well as the communities
traversed by our Nation's freight rails, deserve our laser
focus on these challenges. Our potential as a global energy
leader is rooted in our ability to safely transport our game-
changing energy resources safely every time, be it by truck,
barge, pipeline, or rail.
We look forward to continuing to work with our colleagues
in government, in the rail industry, and with others to develop
a long-term holistic and comprehensive approach to rail safety
that includes prevention, mitigation and response, and moves us
closer to what, I think, is our shared goal of zero rail
incidents.
Thank you for your time and attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Greco follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bob Greco, Group Director of Downstream
Operations, American Petroleum Institute
Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify on the important
and timely topic of enhancing rail safety.
My name is Bob Greco, Group Director of Downstream Operations at
the American Petroleum Institute. API represents all segments of the
oil and natural gas industry, with more than 590 members who supply
most of the Nation's energy.
The revolution in North American energy development has been made
possible by technological breakthroughs in decades-old methods of
energy development, which has set this Nation on the path to energy
security, a concept unthinkable just a few years ago.
The energy policies we choose today will determine if our Nation
will continue its march toward global energy leadership; a unique and
once in a generation opportunity. America's dramatic increase in
domestic energy production has fundamentally altered the global energy
markets and more broadly the geopolitical landscape for decades to
come, all while providing a much needed boost to our economy.
In order to achieve our Nation's full potential as a global energy
leader, all of us have to work together to ensure that our energy
infrastructure is capable of safely, reliably, and efficiently
transporting ever-increasing amounts of domestically produced energy,
whether by truck, barge, pipeline, or the focus of today's hearing,
rail.
Meaningful and lasting improvement in rail safety will only come
from a holistic and collaborative approach to accident prevention,
mitigation and response, and the oil and natural gas industry will
continue to work with our colleagues in government, the rail industry,
and others on continual safety improvement.
The Memorandum of Understanding recently released between the
railroad industry and the Department of Transportation, which outlines
operational changes to improve rail safety, is an important step in our
shared goal of improving the safety of America's freight rail system.
While it's true that 99.997 percent of hazardous materials
transported by rail reach their destinations without incident . . . the
oil and natural gas industry is committed to getting to zero rail
incidents. Because when it comes to safety the only number that matters
is zero incidents.
Getting to zero will take the long-term commitment to working
collaboratively with all stakeholders and applying all of our best
science, research, and real-world data in a thoughtful and deliberate
manner.
Being a safe steward of our Nation's energy resources and providing
leadership in raising the bar on industry performance isn't new to the
oil and natural gas sector. For 90 years, API has been the world leader
in developing and improving equipment and operating standards--600 and
counting--for oil and natural gas through a collaborative process that
involves all stakeholders, as well as government regulators. This
process is accredited by the American National Standards Institute, or
ANSI, which is the same organization that accredits the government's
national laboratories.
We have already assembled the best experts from our industry, the
railroads, scientists and engineers and others to tackle some of the
issues raised by the recent rail incidents involving the transport of
crude oil. PHMSA also committed to join our effort to develop a
comprehensive standard that addresses the classification of crude oil
to ensure we are moving that product in the safest manner possible.
This includes possible safety improvements for material
characterization, transport classification, and quantity measurement of
crude oil based on the best available science and data.
This is part of our industry's longstanding commitment to safety.
In 2011, the oil and natural gas industry helped lead the multi-
industry effort that led to significant improvements in the design of
tank cars. And we moved forward voluntarily with those improvements--so
that this year we are approaching 40 percent of the crude tank cars in
use by our industry that exceed the current Federal safety standard.
With this achievement please keep in mind, as Administrator Quarterman
said at last week's House hearing on rail safety, ``getting a new tank
car is not a silver bullet; first we need to prevent derailments.''
In the final analysis, the women and men of the rail and oil and
natural gas industries, as well as the communities traversed by our
Nation's freight rails, deserve our laser focus on this challenge. Our
potential as a global energy leader is rooted in our ability to safely
transport our game-changing energy resources safely every time, be it
by truck, barge, pipeline, or rail.
We look forward to continuing to work with our colleagues in
government, in the rail industry, and with others to develop a long-
term, holistic and comprehensive approach to rail safety that includes
prevention, mitigation, and response and moves us closer to what I
think is our shared goal of zero rail incidents.
Thank you for your time and attention.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Searles.
Mr. Hamberger.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear here before you today, Ranking Member
Blunt, members of the Subcommittee. I will be focusing on two
important aspects of rail safety: moving energy by rail and
positive train control. But obviously, stand ready to answer
questions in any other safety area that interests the
Subcommittee.
Regarding moving crude by rail, as impressed as Senator
Blunt is, the 200 some thousand carloads in 2012, 2013 looks to
be about 410,000 carloads. And I think the 2015 and 2016 will
continue to show that upward growth. Unfortunately, as we've
all been discussing, several recent high-profile incidents have
shaken the public confidence and have raised the question: Can
railroads, in fact, move crude oil safely?
I'm here to tell you, unequivocally, the answer to that
question is yes. Not only can we--we do. 99.997 percent of the
time, from origin to destination, without an accidental
release. But we agree with Mr. Searles. The goal has to be 100
percent. And to that end, we were pleased to sign an agreement
with Secretary Foxx addressing voluntary action items that we
hope and believe will continue to improve our safety record.
When you take a look at how to address risk, there are
three basic tranches, if you will, basic pots. One is to
prevent. That's on us, prevention. Next is mitigation. To me,
that is knowing what's going into the tank car and what is the
tank car. And then, containment, working with the emergency
responders in the local communities. The agreement we have with
Secretary Foxx addresses all three of those.
Briefly, under that agreement as far as prevention, we are
going to be doing more frequent track inspections, speed
restrictions in high-threat urban areas, enhanced braking, and
the use of a sophisticated routing model, which we use now,
developed by the Department of Homeland Security and others,
for our toxic ventilation chemicals. We're going to use that
now for crude oil as well. These steps are aimed, as they say,
at accident prevention.
One other way we, of course, improve safety is by
investing. You mentioned, Chairman Blumenthal, the need to
continually invest. We will put $26 billion of private capital
into our network this year to maintain, expand and improve that
network. That also improves safety.
Turning to mitigation, we believe that the current tank car
standard must be improved. We have adopted many of the
recommendations from the NTSB. There's a detailed graphic in my
written statement as to what we have recommended to PHMSA and
we believe that existing tank cars, again consistent with the
recommendation through the NTSB, must be retrofitted or phased
out of moving flammable liquids as aggressively as possible.
Finally, emergency response is crucial. We already train
22,000 emergency responders through TRANSCAER, through
individual actions by the railroads, 2,000 of those out in
Pueblo, Colorado at the Emergency Response Training Center,
which we run under contract with the FRA. We've committed to a
$5 million investment in a very special training module on
crude oil and a stipend to assist an additional 1,500 emergency
responders to go to Pueblo for hands-on experience in dealing
with tank cars carrying crude.
Turning quickly to PTC, I have testified before this
committee in the past about the challenges of the technology
and the scope of PTC. We will not meet the 2015 deadline of
having all 60,000 miles installed and operational. Not because
of lack of trying; $4 billion to date, thousands of man-hours,
but the technology and scope issues are still there. Another
challenge addressed by our friend from the FCC--and I say our
friend--we've worked closely with Mr. Blackwell, but it is
still a challenge.
As you pointed out, Senator Blunt, the whole point of PTC
is communications. Communication between the back offices,
between the locomotive, between the wayside interface units,
what's coming, what's out there: the infrastructure of
communication has to be there.
Right now, we've been put on hold installing the 22,000
additional poles that we need. But let me emphasize, these are
poles about 40 feet high, on railroad right-of-way not on
tribal nation lands, on railroad right-of-way, that has been
disturbed, in many cases, for 100 or more years. We believe
that the FCC has the authority to give a program exemption for
those monopoles on the railroad right-of-way. About 97 percent
of the 22,000 would be covered by that.
I appreciate the fact that the FCC has decided not to go
down that route and has tried to work with us on this Program
Comment. A draft was delivered to us last evening. Best as we
can tell, they have accepted several of our recommendations but
some of the core problems still remain. It is still a pole-by-
pole process, 22,000 of them. Pole by pole, it is still not a
closed-end timeline. There is no enforceable deadline at the
end. And third, and the most, I think, troubling, that it is up
to the railroad to do the study to prove the negative. We have
to go out and prove that there is no cultural or historic
interest in a particular site, rather than having those who
believe that there is an interest come forward with evidence as
to why they believe there's an interest.
So we think that--we appreciate the efforts. I've met with
Chairman Tom Wheeler. Of course, Roger Sherman, Jeff Blackwell,
who I think has been living this issue for the last 6 months,
but we've already lost the 2013 construction season, 2014 is in
jeopardy.
Thank you for your attention. I apologize, Mr. Chairman,
for running over.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads
On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the current state of rail
safety and specifically the transportation of crude oil by rail. AAR
freight railroad members account for the vast majority of freight
railroad mileage, employees, and traffic (including crude oil) in
Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
The development of shale oil represents a tremendous opportunity
for our Nation to move closer to energy independence. The widespread
benefits this would entail include reduced reliance on oil imports from
unstable countries whose interests do not necessarily match up well
with our own; increased economic development all over the country;
thousands of new well-paying jobs; tens of billions in savings in our
Nation's trade deficit every year; and substantial amounts of new tax
revenue for governments at all levels. Rail has a critical role in
delivering these crucial benefits to our country.
Let me make clear at the outset that, for our Nation's freight
railroads, pursuing safe operations is not an option, it's a business
imperative. Most importantly, it's the right thing to do. Railroads are
not just faceless corporations from somewhere far away. Rather, your
neighbors are our neighbors. No matter where you live, chances are good
that current or former rail industry employees live close by. We have
an obligation to operate safely for their benefit and for the benefit
of all members of the communities we serve.
Unfortunately, several recent serious rail accidents in Canada and
the United States have led some to question railroads' ability to
operate safely. We are committed to restoring their confidence and
demonstrating that nothing is more important to railroads than the
safety of their employees, their customers, and the communities in
which they operate.
Railroads share the deep concern of members of this committee and
the public at large regarding the safe transport of crude oil. From
2000 through 2013, a period during which U.S. railroads originated
approximately 832,000 carloads of crude oil, more than 99.98 percent of
those carloads arrived at their destination without a release caused by
an accident. That said, railroads continue to look for ways to be
safer. As the tragic accident last year in Quebec showed, and as
reinforced by recent oil spills in North Dakota and Alabama, more work
must be done to ensure public confidence in the transportation of crude
oil by rail.
Working cooperatively with government agencies, our customers, our
employees, and our suppliers, we're applying what we've learned over
the past few years as rail crude oil traffic has surged to help ensure
that our Nation is able to safely and reliably utilize the tremendous
national asset that domestic crude oil represents. This will be a true
team effort involving shared responsibility among everyone involved in
crude oil production, delivery, and consumption.
Railroads have long been doing their part--including taking actions
that go beyond what legislation and regulations require--to maximize
safety, and the industry will continue to take steps to further improve
safety. As explained later in this testimony, these actions fall into
three broad categories:
Accident Prevention
Railroads are continuing to reinvest record amounts--their
own funds, not taxpayer funds--back into their infrastructure
and equipment. Despite a weak economy, railroads have invested
far more back into their networks over the past five years--
approximately $115 billion--than in any five-year period in
history. This year, we project that railroads will invest more
than $26 billion in their networks, more than ever before. One
of the major aims of these investments is to make the rail
network more robust, so that the industry's decades-long record
of declining accident rates continues.
Railroads have voluntarily agreed to institute speed
restrictions, additional inspections, and other operational
modifications for trains carrying large amounts of crude oil.
By July 1, 2014, railroads will begin using a sophisticated
statistical routing model that takes into account a variety of
variables, including population density, rail traffic volume,
track conditions, and availability of alternative tracks, so
that trains with large amounts of crude oil can move on routes
that pose the least overall safety and security risk.
Consequence Mitigation
In 2011, the rail industry voluntarily adopted industry
standards requiring new tank cars that carry crude oil to be
built with additional safety features to reduce the probability
of release should an accident occur. This year, railroads have
called for even more robust new tank car standards for crude
oil.
Railroads have also called for an aggressive retrofit and
phase out program for existing tank cars used to carry crude
oil.
Emergency Response
Railroads help communities develop and evaluate emergency
response plans, and they train tens of thousands of emergency
responders each year. The industry has agreed to spend several
million dollars this year to develop an emergency response
training program at the Transportation Technology Center in
Pueblo, Colorado specifically geared to crude oil spills and to
provide tuition assistance for some 1,500 emergency responders
from across the country to attend that training.
Crude by Rail Meets Crude Oil Production Demand
The huge increase in rail crude oil volume is a function of the
massive, salutary development of North American oil resources in recent
years, especially ``shale oil.'' U.S. crude oil production peaked in
1970 at 9.6 million barrels per day, but by 2008 it had fallen to 5.0
million barrels per day as depletion of older fields outpaced new
production. Over the past couple of years, however, technological
advances in the extraction of shale oil, along with relatively high
crude oil prices, have led to sharply higher U.S. crude oil production.
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) states that production rose
to an average of 6.5 million barrels per day in 2012 and 7.5 million
barrels per day in 2013. Barring unforeseen circumstances, deposits of
crude oil in shale formations across the country will continue to be
developed. As a result, the EIA projects that U.S. crude oil production
will increase to 8.5 million barrels per day in 2014 and 9.3 billion
barrels per day in 2015.
Much of the recent increase in crude oil production has occurred in
North Dakota, where crude oil production rose from an average of 81,000
barrels per day in 2003 to 940,000 barrels per day by the fall of 2013,
making North Dakota the second-largest oil producing state.
Of course, crude oil has little value unless it can be transported
to refineries, but most U.S. refineries are located in traditional
crude oil production areas (Texas, Oklahoma) or on the coasts where
crude oil transported by tanker is readily accessible (California,
Washington, New England, Gulf of Mexico). In part because of the long
process required to obtain permits to build new refineries, it's
unlikely that new refineries will come on line quickly near the new
production areas.
Historically, most crude oil has moved from production areas to
refineries by pipeline. However, in many of the new shale oil
production areas, the existing pipeline network lacks the capacity to
handle the higher volumes. Pipelines also lack the flexibility and
geographic reach to serve many potential markets. Railroads, though,
have the capacity and flexibility to fill this gap. In fact, the
ability of a railroad to serve a refinery can make the difference
between the refinery continuing to operate or closing down.
Railroads have seen dramatic recent increases in demand to
transport crude. In 2008, U.S. Class I railroads originated 9,500
carloads of crude oil. By 2012, carloads had surged to nearly 234,000.
Final numbers for 2013 aren't in yet, but we estimate that crude oil
originations on Class I railroads in 2013 were around 408,000 carloads
and terminations were around 434,000 carloads.\1\ In 2013, crude oil
accounted for about 1.4 percent of total originated carloads on Class I
railroads, up from just 0.03 percent in 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Originations do not exactly equal terminations because some
crude oil that originates on U.S. Class I railroads might be delivered
to U.S. short lines or to railroads in Canada for termination and
because some crude oil that terminates on U.S. Class I railroads might
originate on railroads in Canada or on U.S. short line railroads.
Assuming for simplicity that a rail tank car holds about 30,000
gallons (714 barrels) of crude oil, the approximately 408,000 carloads
of crude oil originated by Class I railroads in 2013 equal around
800,000 barrels per day, or about 11 percent of U.S. crude oil
production.
Advantages to Our Nation of Transporting Crude Oil by Rail
Looking ahead, both pipelines and railroads will be needed to
provide safe, reliable crude oil transportation for our Nation. In
addition to the critical fact that railroads provide transportation
capacity in many areas where pipeline capacity is insufficient,
railroads offer a number of other advantages for transporting crude
oil:
Geographical Flexibility. By serving almost every refinery
in the United States and Canada, railroads offer market
participants enormous flexibility to shift product quickly to
different places in response to market needs.
Responsiveness. Rail facilities can almost always be built
or expanded much more quickly than pipelines and refineries can
be. Essentially, railroads are the only transportation mode
that can invest in facilities quickly enough to keep up with
production growth in the emerging oil fields.
Efficiency. As new rail facilities are developed, railroads
are involved at every step, helping facility owners decide
where to locate assets and how to lay out rail infrastructure
to maximize safety and efficiency.
Underlying Infrastructure and Equipment. Just over the past
few years, railroads have invested tens of billions of dollars
to replace and resurface tracks, buy new locomotives, build new
terminals and track capacity, hire new employees, and take
other steps to enhance their ability to transport crude oil.
Notwithstanding these attributes of rail, railroads recognize that
if we are to continue down the path of energy independence, other
transportation modes--including, of course, pipelines--have crucial
roles to play.
Working to Prevent Rail Accidents
We all know that, unfortunately, rail accidents happen, despite
railroads' best efforts to prevent them, and some of those accidents
have tragic consequences. Railroads take the challenge of moving the
Nation's crude oil extremely seriously, and they recognize that
improving safety is an ongoing process.
The industry's commitment to safety is reflected in safety
statistics from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The three
most common safety measures used by the FRA are train accident rates,
employee injury rates, and grade crossing collision rates. From 2000 to
2013, the train accident rate fell 43 percent, with 2013 having the
lowest rate ever, according to preliminary FRA data. The rail employee
injury rate fell 48 percent from 2000 to 2013, with 2013 having the
second-lowest rate ever (behind 2012). The grade crossing collision
rate fell 42 percent from 2000 to 2013, with 2013 having the second-
lowest rate ever (behind 2012).
Collisions and derailments, two of the major categories that
comprise the broader train accidents category, have fallen sharply over
time as well. For example, according to FRA data, in 2000 there were
739 derailments involving freight trains on main lines or sidings,
equivalent to 1.35 per million freight train miles.\2\ In 2013,
according to preliminary FRA data, there were 378 derailments (a 49
percent decline), equivalent to 0.70 per million freight train-miles
(48 percent lower). In 2000, there were 45 collisions involving freight
trains on main lines or sidings, equivalent to 0.08 per million train-
miles. In 2013, the comparable figures were 28 collisions (down 38
percent) and 0.05 per million freight train-miles (down 37 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A train-mile is the movement of a train the distance of one-
mile. For perspective, a million train-miles is roughly equivalent to
300 train trips across the country.
Railroads are proud that their overall safety record, as measured
by FRA data, has been trending in the right direction for decades. That
said, it is an unfortunate reality that rail accidents occur, despite
railroads' capital and labor intensive efforts to prevent them, and we
know that some of those accidents have tragic consequences. Given the
extent and complexity of rail operations--the railroad ``factory
floor'' is outdoors and approximately 140,000 miles long--
infrastructure and equipment sometimes fail and it is impossible to
eliminate all risk of accidents. And while railroads respect and
applaud the professionalism and attention to safety that rail employees
bring every day to their jobs, human error continues to be a leading
cause of accidents. Our goal is zero rail accidents, but when accidents
do occur, we want to minimize and mitigate their negative impacts.
One of the most important ways that railroads have reduced
accidents is through significant and consistent investments back into
their networks. In fact, in recent years, America's freight railroads
have been reinvesting more private capital than ever before to renew,
upgrade, and expand their infrastructure and equipment, including a
record $25.5 billion in 2012 and a comparable amount in 2013. Rail
spending this year is expected to be even higher. The vast majority of
these investments have improved rail safety directly or indirectly. In
fact, for many of these investments, improving safety is the primary
reason the investments are made.
Just from 2008 to 2012, Class I railroads spent nearly $26 billion
in capital expenditures on new crossties (77 million), new rail (2.9
million tons), and new ballast (nearly 61 million cubic yards). Over
the same period, they spent billions of additional capital expenditure
dollars on signal and communications systems, bridges and tunnels, and
machinery. These and other capital investments, as well as the billions
of dollars railroads spend on maintenance of their networks each year,
have made railroads much safer. And as the charts above show, there is
a clear correlation between rail reinvestments and rail safety
improvements.
The Role of Safety-Enhancing Technologies
At a basic level, railroading today seems similar to railroading
150 years ago: it still consists of steel wheels traveling on steel
rails. This apparent similarity, however, masks a widespread
application of modern technology and a huge variety of ongoing
initiatives to research, test, and apply advanced technologies to yield
the safety record of continuous improvement experienced by the railroad
industry.
Many of these advancements were developed or refined at the
Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), the finest rail research
facility in the world, in Pueblo, Colorado. TTCI is a wholly owned
subsidiary of the AAR. Forty-eight miles of test tracks, highly
sophisticated testing equipment, metallurgy labs, simulators, and other
diagnostic tools are used to test track structure, evaluate freight car
and locomotive performance, assess component reliability, and much
more. The facility is owned by the FRA but has been operated (under a
competitively bid contract with the FRA) by TTCI since 1984.
A few of the many examples of safety-enhancing rail technologies
developed at TTCI or elsewhere that have come into widespread use or
are in the process of being implemented include:
Wayside detectors that identify defects on passing rail
cars, including overheated bearings and damaged wheels,
dragging hoses, deteriorating bearings, cracked wheels, and
excessively high and wide loads.
Internal rail inspection systems using induction or
ultrasonic technology to detect internal flaws in rails which
are caused by fatigue and impurities introduced during
manufacturing.
Track geometry vehicles that use electronic and optical
instruments to inspect track alignment, gauge, curvature, and
other track conditions. Processed data from track geometry cars
can help railroads determine when track needs maintenance.
New automated detector systems are being tested and
evaluated by TTCI to inspect the under carriage, safety
appliances and freight car components using machine-vision-
based car inspection systems.
Ground-penetrating radar that helps identify problems (such
as excessive water penetration and deteriorated ballast) that
hinder track stability.
Because a relatively small share of freight cars cause an
inordinately high percentage of track damage and have a higher
than usual propensity to derail, TTCI is working on ways to use
optical geometry detectors to identify poorly performing
freight car trucks.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ In terms of rail cars, ``truck'' refers to the complete four-
wheel assembly that supports the car body.
Positive train control (PTC) systems, designed to
automatically stop or slow a train before certain accidents
occur, are being developed and implemented. PTC is discussed
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
more fully later in this testimony.
Railroads and their suppliers will continue to pursue these and
other technological advances that make rail transportation safer and
more secure.
Rail industry safety will also be enhanced by the Asset Health
Strategic Initiative (AHSI), a multi-year rail industry program that
will apply information technology processes to improve the safety and
performance of freight cars and locomotives across North America. In a
nutshell, AHSI aims to improve safety and reduce costs across the rail
industry by addressing mechanical service interruptions, inspection
quality, and yard and shop efficiency. It is based on the recognition
that improving asset health means more than just focusing on railcar
and locomotive repair. Rather, it encompasses the entire rolling stock
health cycle, incorporating prevention, detection, planning, movement,
and repair.
Modifying Rail Industry Procedures to Enhance Crude Oil Safety
To enhance the safety of crude oil movements, railroads are
voluntarily making operational modifications for trains carrying large
amounts of crude oil. These modifications are the result of
consultations with Secretary Foxx and other officials at the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), Administrator Szabo at FRA,
Administrator Quarterman at PHMSA, and other government policymakers.
Railroads share their vision for making a safe rail network even safer,
and we're pleased that we were able to work together to pinpoint new
operating practices that enhance the safety of moving crude oil by
rail.
First, routing. Several years ago, the FRA, PHMSA, the
Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the railroads jointly developed the Rail
Corridor Risk Management System (RCRMS), a sophisticated statistical
routing model designed to aid railroads in analyzing and identifying
the overall safest and most secure routes for transporting TIH
materials. The model uses a minimum of 27 risk factors--including
hazmat volume, trip length, population density along the route,
availability of alternate routes, and emergency response capability--to
assess the overall safety and security of rail routes. The FRA
regularly audits railroads' use of the RCRMS. Major railroads have
agreed that, no later than July 1, 2014, they will begin using the
RCRMS for trains carrying at least 20 carloads of crude oil.
Second, speed restrictions. Back in August 2013, railroads self-
imposed a 50-mph speed limit for trains carrying 20 or more carloads of
crude oil. Beginning no later than July 1, 2014, if a train is carrying
at least 20 cars of crude oil and at least one of those cars is an
older ``DOT-111'' car (these cars are discussed further in the next
section), that train will travel no faster than 40 mph when travelling
within one of the 46 nationwide ``high threat urban areas'' designated
by the Department of Homeland Security.\4\ In addition, railroads will
continue to work with communities through which crude oil trains move
to address, on a location-specific basis, concerns that the communities
may have.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In the United States, FRA regulations specify that freight rail
trackage be classified into one of six track ``classes'' based on track
quality. The class of a section of track determines the maximum FRA-
allowable speed for that section. Freight train speed on ``excepted''
and ``Class 1'' track cannot exceed 10 mph; on Class 2 track, 25 mph;
on Class 3 track, 40 mph; on Class 4 track, 60 mph; and on Class 5
track, 80 mph. In practice, it is common for railroads, for a variety
of reasons, to operate at speeds lower than the FRA maximum. (For
example, U.S. freight trains rarely, if ever, exceed 70 mph, even on
the best Class 5 track.) If a track's class does not permit 40 or 50
mph crude oil trains, those trains will travel no faster than the FRA
limit. Our understanding is that, on U.S. Class I railroads, most of
the trackage on which trains with large amounts of crude oil travel are
Class 4 or 5 tracks.
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Third, inspections. Comprehensive FRA regulations dictate the
various kinds of inspections railroads are required to perform and how
often. A description of the full range of inspections that railroads
undertake is beyond the scope of this testimony, but suffice it to say
that the FRA-mandated inspection regime is comprehensive and thorough.
New FRA regulations regarding inspections for internal rail defects
will become effective on March 25th. Railroads have agreed that, going
forward, for main line tracks on which trains carrying at least 20
carloads of crude oil travel, they will perform at least one more
internal rail inspection each calendar year than the new FRA
regulations require. In addition, railroads will conduct at least two
automated comprehensive track geometry inspections each year on main
line routes over which trains with 20 or more loaded cars of crude oil
are moving.\5\ The FRA regulations do not require railroads to perform
automated comprehensive track geometry inspections.
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\5\ Track geometry includes such parameters as track gauge,
curvature, alignment, profile, and the cross level of the two rails.
Track geometry inspections are generally performed by sophisticated
stand-alone cars that use a variety of sensors, measuring systems, and
data management systems to create a representation of the track being
inspected.
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Fourth, defect detectors. Railroads will make sure that specialized
track side ``hot box'' detectors are installed at least every 40 miles
along routes with trains carrying 20 or more cars containing crude
oil.\6\ These detectors help prevent accidents by measuring if wheel
bearings are generating excessive heat, which is a warning that the
bearings are in the process of failing.
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\6\ There may be cases where safety considerations (e.g., a track
located on a grade) might dictate otherwise. In these cases, detectors
will be installed as close to 40 miles as conditions allow.
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Fifth, braking. By April 1, 2014, railroads will make sure that
trains operating on main line tracks carrying at least 20 carloads of
crude oil are equipped either with distributed power locomotives (i.e.,
locomotives placed in locations other than the front of the train) or
with two-way telemetry end-of-train devices. These technologies allow
train crews to apply emergency brakes simultaneously from both the head
end and locations further back in the train in order to stop the train
faster.
Mitigation Through Enhancing Tank Car Safety
While railroads pursue continuous improvement in safe operations,
including most recently the new voluntary actions described above, it's
important also for tank car standards to evolve to mitigate the
consequences of an incident when one occurs. Crude oil and thousands of
other products are transported in tank cars. The total North American
tank car fleet consists of about 335,000 cars. Railroads themselves own
less than 1 percent of these cars; nearly all are owned by rail
customers and leasing companies. The dozens of distinct types of tank
cars are differentiated by characteristics (pressure or general
service, insulated or non-insulated, how much they can carry, and so
on) that make them suitable or not suitable for carrying particular
commodities. Approximately 228,000 tank cars are so-called ``DOT-111''
general service tank cars. These cars are considered the workhorses of
the tank car fleet. According to the most recent figures, around 98,000
DOT-111 cars are used to transport crude oil or other flammable
liquids.
In the United States, Federal regulations pertaining to tank cars
are set by PHMSA. Transport Canada performs a similar role in Canada.
In addition, the AAR Tank Car Committee sets industry standards
regarding how tank cars used in North America are designed and
constructed. These standards are often above and beyond Federal
standards. The Tank Car Committee is comprised of railroads, rail car
owners, rail car manufacturers, and rail hazmat customers, with active
participation from the U.S. DOT, Transport Canada, and the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
The rail industry has been aggressively searching for ways to
improve tank car safety. For example, in March 2011, the AAR petitioned
PHMSA to adopt more stringent requirements for new tank cars used to
transport certain types of hazardous materials, including crude oil.
These tougher standards called for more puncture resistance through the
use of a thicker tank car shell or a jacket, extra protective half-
height (at a minimum) ``head shields'' at both ends of tank cars, and
additional protection for the fittings on the top of a car that enable
access to the inside of the car.
In July 2011, after it had become clear that PHMSA approval of the
AAR's proposal was not imminent, the Tank Car Committee adopted what
the AAR had proposed to PHMSA as the basis for new industry standards
for tank cars used to carry ethanol or crude oil. The new standards,
referred to as ``CPC-1232,'' apply to new tank cars ordered after
October 1, 2011. To date, around 18,000 tanks cars have been built to
this tougher CPC-1232 standard.
More recently, in November 2013, the rail industry called on PHMSA
to adopt standards even more stringent than CPC-1232 for new tank cars
used to transport crude oil and ethanol. The November 2013 proposal
also called for aggressively retrofitting or phasing out of tank cars
(including CPC-1232 cars and the older DOT-111 cars) used to transport
crude oil or ethanol. The November 2013 proposal recognizes that input
is needed from shippers and tank car manufacturers to determine the
precise parameters of a phase-out program and to identify the retrofits
that should be required.
Since the November 2013 proposal, the rail industry has continued
to evaluate what other standards might be appropriate to make tank cars
used to transport certain commodities, including crude oil, more
robust. For example, railroads now support strengthening tank cars used
to transport crude oil with thicker, 9/16th inch shells.\7\ Railroads
also would require that tank cars be equipped with jackets and thermal
protection, as well as full-height head shields, top fittings
protections, and bottom outlet handles that will not open in a
derailment.
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\7\ Some railroads also support 9/16th inch tank car shells for
freight cars carrying ethanol.
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The graphic on the next page summarizes proposed rail industry
standards for tank cars carrying crude oil.
Through these additional standards and other means, railroads are
continuing to work with other stakeholders to enhance rail safety and
provide certainty to all stakeholders. These efforts reflect the rail
industry's long-standing belief that the safety of crude oil by rail is
a shared responsibility among all stakeholders in the crude oil supply
chain.
The concept of shared responsibility also applies to accurate and
timely determinations as to the chemical characteristics of the crude
oil railroads are asked to transport. Under Federal regulations, the
entity ``offering'' the crude oil to the railroad for transport (e.g.,
the oil producer) is responsible for properly classifying the oil based
on its level of hazard. On February 25, the FRA issued an executive
order requiring that crude oil from the Bakken region be tested to
ensure that it is properly classified before it is transported by rail.
Railroads support the pursuit of proper classification and labeling of
petroleum crude oil in tank cars by shippers prior to transport. This
is essential to ensuring that first responders are able to safely and
appropriately respond in the event of an accident or incident.
Improving Emergency Response: Partnerships with First Responders and
Shippers
The railroads have extensive emergency response functions, which
work in cooperation with federal, state and local governments,
especially since 9/11. Sharing important information about shipments is
part of that. Upon request, railroads provide appropriate local
authorities with a list of the hazardous materials, including crude
oil, transported through their communities. It is simply not true, as
one sometimes hears, that railroads refuse to provide this type of
information.
Significantly, more than 25 years ago, the AAR established what is
now the Security and Emergency Response Training Center (SERTC), a
world-class facility in Pueblo, Colorado, that is operated by TTCI. The
SERTC has provided in-depth hazmat emergency response training to more
than 50,000 emergency responders and railroad and chemical industry
employees.
In 2007, Congress authorized the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium (NDPC), a consortium within the Department of Homeland
Security and funded by FEMA. The purpose of the NDPC is to identify,
develop, test, and deliver training to the Nation's emergency first
responder community. Of the NDPC's seven members, only one--SERTC--is
specifically designed to provide first responder training for rail and
other surface transportation accidents. No other training center in the
country possesses comparable infrastructure, including dozens of
freight and passenger railcars, highway cargo tanks, intermodal
containers, van trailer, and even a barge. Live simulations deliver
tactical intervention training with unsurpassed realism.
Unfortunately, since it was added to the NDPC in 2007, SERTC has
received only $10 million from FEMA for surface transportation first
responder training--$5 million in 2009 and $5 million in 2010. We
understand that budgets throughout the Federal government have been
challenged in recent years. That said, Congress provided an additional
$5 million to the NDPC in the 2014 omnibus appropriations act,
increasing NDPC funding from $93 million to $98 million. FEMA has yet
to allocate those dollars among the NDPC members. We hope this
committee would agree that allocating these funds to enhance the
ability of first responders to respond to crude oil incidents would be
a sensible step for FEMA to take.
In addition to SERTC, as part of their regular operations,
railroads and communities develop and evaluate emergency response plans
and train more than 20,000 emergency responders each year. Through
their own efforts and working in conjunction with the Transportation
Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER),
railroads will continue to work closely with emergency responders in
the communities they serve so that damage caused by train accidents can
be minimized.
In addition to their other ongoing emergency response training
efforts, the AAR recently announced that railroads will provide
approximately $5 million by July 1 of this year to develop a
specialized crude-by-rail training and tuition assistance program for
local first responders. The funds will be used to design a curriculum
at TTCI specifically devoted to crude oil emergency response, to
provide tuition assistance for an estimated 1,500 first responders to
attend TTCI for training, and to provide additional training to local
emergency responders closer to home.
By July 1, 2014, railroads will also develop an inventory of
resources for emergency responders along routes over which trains with
20 or more cars of crude oil operate. This inventory will include
locations for the staging of emergency response equipment and contacts
for the notification of communities. When the inventory is completed,
railroads will provide the DOT with information on the deployment of
the resources and will make the information available upon request to
appropriate emergency responders.
Finally, it is sometimes claimed that railroads bear no costs for
cleanup of oil spills and that the entire response burden falls on
local responders. That's not true. Emergency responders have control of
railroad accidents in which crude oil (or any other hazardous material)
is spilled, but railroads often provide the resources for mitigating
the accident. As noted above, railroads have emergency response plans
in place to mobilize the labor and equipment necessary to mitigate
accidents. Railroads also reimburse local emergency agencies for the
costs of materials the agencies expend in their response efforts.
Address Safety Concerns, But Don't Lose Sight of the Benefits of
Domestic Crude Oil
The development of crude oil resources in recent years represents a
tremendous opportunity for this country, including the opportunity to
move toward energy independence. As a report earlier this year from the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes, ``the prospect of U.S.
energy independence is grounded in the production growth from tight oil
formations such as the Bakken Formation in North Dakota and Montana,
and the Eagle Ford Formation in Texas.'' \8\ CRS says that, ``Relative
to other fuels, the United States is more dependent upon imports for
its oil requirements, still accounting for almost 40 percent of
consumption,'' but ``since June 2005, when crude oil imports reached a
peak, they have dropped almost 3.3 million [barrels per day], or 23
percent, through October 2013.''
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\8\ ``An Overview of Unconventional Oil and Natural Gas: Resources
and Federal Actions,'' Congressional Research Service, January 23,
2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It's difficult to overstate the economic and security benefits
associated with continued growth in domestic crude oil production. Over
time, it will mean reductions in the Nation's trade deficit of tens of
billions of dollars every year. It will mean new and better employment
opportunities for hundreds of thousands of Americans and better
economic development opportunities for regions all over the country. It
will mean billions of dollars in new tax revenues for governments at
all levels. And it will mean less reliance on sources of oil from
places in the world that are not secure and whose interests do not
necessarily correspond well to those of the United States. The Peterson
Institute, a well-respected, nonprofit, and nonpartisan research
institution devoted to the study of international economic policy,
recently found that, along with lower energy costs, the growth in
domestic energy production should increase annual U.S. GDP growth
between 0.09 and 0.19 percentage points through 2020. That adds up to
hundreds of billions of dollars in higher GDP.
As we discuss ways to enhance the safety of transporting crude oil
by rail, these important benefits should be kept in mind.
Positive Train Control
The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA) requires Class I
freight railroads to install a fully functioning, nationwide positive
train control (PTC) network by the end of 2015 on main lines used to
transport passengers or TIH materials. Specifically, PTC as mandated by
Congress must be designed to prevent train-to-train collisions;
derailments caused by excessive speed; unauthorized incursions by
trains onto sections of track where maintenance activities are taking
place; and the movement of a train through a track switch left in the
wrong position. The technology must also be fully interoperable,
meaning that the system in place on any one railroad must be able to
seamlessly interface with the system on any other railroad.
PTC is an unprecedented challenge, both in terms of the
technologies to be used and the integration of those technologies. A
properly functioning PTC system must be able to determine the precise
location, direction, and speed of trains; warn train operators of
potential problems; and take immediate action if the operator does not
respond to the warning provided by the PTC system. For example, if a
train operator fails to begin stopping a train before a stop signal,
the PTC system would apply the brakes automatically before the train
passed the stop signal.
Railroads have been devoting massive resources to PTC. They've
retained more than 2,200 signal system personnel to implement PTC, and
to date have spent approximately $4 billion (of their own funds, not
public funds) on PTC development and deployment. They expect to spend
that much again--approximately $8 billion in total--before development
and installation is complete. Hundreds of millions of dollars will be
spent each year after that to maintain the system.
PTC's complexity, the enormity of the implementation task, and the
fact that much of the technology and engineering applications PTC
requires have had to be developed from scratch mean that, despite
railroads' best efforts, much work remains to be done. The many
potential failure points in PTC systems must be identified, isolated,
and corrected, and the system must be made fully interoperable across
all of the Nation's major railroads--all without negatively affecting
existing rail operations.
Railroads also face serious non-technological barriers to timely
PTC implementation. Today, the most serious such challenge involves PTC
antenna structures.
At its heart, PTC is a massive communications system. Locomotives
must be able to communicate with the ``back office'' concerning the
train's speed, location, and many other parameters and receive
information regarding, among many other things, the locations of other
trains in the area, possible schedule changes, safety alerts, and so
on.
This back-and-forth communication can take place only if a
sophisticated, comprehensive wireless communications network is in
place. A key part of this network is a series of thousands of antennas,
spaced (on average) every few miles along the 60,000 or so miles over
which PTC is being installed on U.S. freight railroads. These antennas
are generally around 40-feet tall, and the vast majority are to be
installed directly adjacent to the tracks on existing railroad rights-
of-way, owned by the railroads themselves, in holes just a few feet
deep and a couple of feet wide. In total, approximately 22,000 PTC-
related antennas need to be installed.
The railroad industry began working several years ago with the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to license the wireless
spectrum necessary for PTC, and to its credit, the FCC has worked
diligently to address spectrum-related issues. Nonetheless, the
industry learned just last year that, under the FCC's interpretation of
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), railroads
must ascertain, on an antenna-by-antenna basis, if the antennas will
negatively impact areas of historic, cultural, or religious
significance.
At the center of the challenge is the FCC's required notification
and evaluation process that utilizes the FCC's ``Tower Construction
Notification System'' (TCNS) for review by Native American tribes.
Under that system, railroads must input certain information into the
TCNS. That information is then transmitted to any Native American tribe
that has expressed interest in the county in which an antenna will be
located.
The initial information that railroads must input into the TCNS,
such as the precise location of the antenna to be installed and its
height, is relatively straightforward. That information is then
transmitted to interested tribes through various means, and the tribe
has up to a couple of months to expresses interest in the proposed
antenna site. If it does so, it can demand much more comprehensive
information about that site--such as a complete archaeological
history--that can be difficult (if not impossible), costly, and time
consuming for the railroad to obtain. Based on railroads' experiences
to date, it takes, on average, three to five months between the time
the railroad initially inputs information into the TCNS and the time
when all necessary reviews are completed and the antenna can be cleared
for installation. Multiply this process by 22,000 antennas and it
becomes very clear why this is such a significant issue.
As stated earlier, the vast majority of PTC antennas are not large
and are to be installed in small holes on railroads' own rights-of-way.
Many of the rail lines in question have been in use for decades, often
for well over 100 years. Generally speaking, the rights-of-way at issue
have been disturbed countless times in the past as railroads performed
standard maintenance, installed other types of signal systems, built
culverts, improved drainage, or undertook any of innumerable other
activities related to rail operations and infrastructure construction
and upkeep.
Once railroads started using the TCNS last year, it quickly became
clear that the system was woefully inadequate for a deployment on the
scale of PTC and in the time frame mandated by the RSIA. In fact,
shortly after railroads began using the TCNS, the FCC asked them to
stop using it while the agency developed a new process for PTC
antennas. That was around ten months ago.
After nearly a year of discussion among various parties, during
which the installation of wayside antennas ceased, on January 29, 2014,
the FCC proposed what it calls a ``streamlined'' process for PTC-
related reviews. Unfortunately, we do not believe the ``streamlined''
process will lead to a meaningful reduction in the substantial and
excessive delays associated with PTC antenna installation.
Under the streamlined system, the FCC would still require an
antenna-by-antenna evaluation. Perhaps most vexing, even when a tribe
cannot identify any specific historic or cultural area or property that
could potentially be impacted at any proposed individual antenna site,
the tribe can still demand a comprehensive review of the site, which
could include field work and the preparation of wide-ranging cultural
resource reports and ethnographic studies. The tribe can also demand
that railroads dig holes for antenna structures by hand. These demands,
which the streamlined process allows, extend well beyond what is
required under the NHPA. Moreover, the streamlined process does not
establish firm deadlines by which the FCC will resolve disputes
regarding sites, and it is not clear the agency has the resources to
manage disputes around potentially thousands of antenna sites.
Included as an appendix to this testimony is a copy of the AAR's
recent comments on the FCC's streamlined proposal. As the AAR comments
make clear, the FCC has ample authority to exempt all PTC-related
infrastructure no taller than 75 feet located on the railroad right-of-
way and not immediately proximate to a known historic property. We
respectfully suggest that these antennas should be exempted. If the FCC
decides not to pursue an exemption, it should put in place a process
that really does expedite the historic review process, provides
deadlines on the resolution of disputes, and encompasses all railroads'
PTC infrastructure on the right-of-way. The existing ``streamlined''
process does none of these things.
Just to be clear, railroads are not seeking exemptions regarding
PTC antenna installations on Native American reservations or similar
areas, or in areas that are shown to be of significant historical or
cultural interest. In these cases, railroads are happy to work with
state preservation officials and tribes. Rather, railroads respectfully
suggest that the NHPA was not designed and should not be used to impede
PTC antenna installation in the way it has come to.
The bottom line is that without further changes to the FCC approval
process, the timeline for ultimate deployment of PTC will be delayed
significantly. The 2013 construction season was lost for PTC wayside
antennas. A new review process at the FCC will not be in place until at
least April of this year. If that process takes several months to clear
locations, the 2014 construction season will also be in jeopardy.
Railroads will continue to work with the FRA and the FCC in good faith
to try to find a workable solution to this issue. Please keep in mind,
though, that these antennas are at the heart of the PTC network, and
there is no realistic ``work around.'' Until railroads are able to
install these antennas in large numbers, huge portions of the PTC
testing and implementation process simply cannot proceed.
Railroads have been working extremely hard to meet the 2015 PTC
deadline, and they will continue to aggressively pursue PTC
implementation. However, due to the significant technological
challenges associated with PTC development and installation, the eight-
month construction moratorium imposed by the FCC, and the remaining PTC
regulatory uncertainty, railroads believe that the existing PTC
implementation deadline of December 31, 2015 will need to be extended.
Doing so would allow railroads, the FRA, and others to make sure PTC is
done right.\9\ In the meantime, incremental PTC implementation would
continue, meaning that more and more of the safety benefits of PTC
would be coming on line.
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\9\ Some of you may have seen an article in the January 29
Washington Post on delays to the Washington metro's new ``Silver
Line.'' The article points out that the line's automatic train control
system has delayed the completion of the project for months and still
is not working correctly. The metro's train control system is many
orders of magnitude less complex than what freight railroads are
implementing. Still, the metro's problems offer a clear example of why
the rail industry--and policymakers--should be very concerned with PTC
implementation and the importance of making sure that such a complex
system operates as intended, no matter how long it takes. Unlike the
Washington metro, railroads do not have the luxury of simply not
operating a new line.
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Conclusion
Our nation's freight railroads share the urgency of this committee
and the public at large regarding the need to augment the safe
transport of products by rail. Railroads will continue to work with the
Administration, their customers, and other stakeholders as necessary to
identify additional safety enhancing steps that will make the North
American rail network even safer.
Appendix to Mr. Hamberger's Prepared Statement
Mr. Hamberger submitted to the Committee a copy of ``Comments of
the Association of American Railroads'' submitted to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in the matter of ``Comment Sought on
Draft Program Comment to Govern Review of Positive Train Control
Facilities under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act,'' WT Docket No. 13-240.
The entire submission can be found at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/
document/view?id=7521073012.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamberger, for
your comments and all the witnesses.
We're going to begin a 5-minute round of questions and we
can do a second round if my colleagues wish to do so.
You know, I want to thank you, Mr. Hamberger, for your
comments on the voluntary agreement recently concluded with
Secretary Foxx, which I welcome, but voluntary agreements are
no substitutes for enforceable rules any more than they are out
on the highway here when drivers travel our interstates. And I
think that the laser focus that Mr. Searles mentioned certainly
has to be applied with greater rigor and vigor.
A lot of Americans, I think justifiably, are wondering
whether the Federal authorities, the Federal watchdog, have
been asleep or absent. And that goes to the recommendations
that Mr. Hart mentioned, recommendations, for example, for
cameras facing inward and outward.
So let me begin the questioning by saying with respect to
those recommendations, Mr. Szabo, why haven't they been
implemented as orders?
Mr. Szabo. We continue to work through our regulator
priorities. Obviously, the list starts with the 42 mandates of
the Rail Safety Improvement Act prioritizing those and
completing those first. It was an unprecedented number of
requirements in that Act. And so those additional
recommendations that come in after what Congress has mandated
to us get added to the hopper, but we believe that we have a
responsibility to you to execute those things that you mandated
of us first and foremost.
On cameras, we started some good work with AAR with the
industry and labor. About 10 months ago, based on that in
November, I directed staff that that was to be a regulatory
priority for 2014. And in fact, we have already now initiated
efforts inside the Rail Safety Advisory Committee to start
drafting those regulations.
Senator Blumenthal. You know, we're now years after the
first recommendation from the NTSB on cameras. We are still
awaiting, as Mr. Hart mentioned, the PTC progress report.
I've said before, and I'll say it again here, that four
people might be alive today if some of these recommendations,
including cameras facing inward and outward, alerters,
automatic train control, had been implemented.
Mr. Szabo. Mr. Chairman, if I may, our report on PTC
implementation, in fact, was delivered to Congress about 18
months ago, ahead of schedule. And so, we've delivered that to
you with a set of recommendations that we have asked Congress
to make.
Senator Blumenthal. But coming back to the recommendations
for specific measures that might have prevented many of these
incidents, my view is that we're behind. We've been lax and
lagging and the question is why haven't those orders been
forthcoming from the----
Mr. Szabo. Yes. And it's a matter, again, of putting things
into what is a pipeline on regulatory priorities. When you're
handed 42 in a Congressional mandate, and then additional
recommendations continue to come in, you know, not only don't I
have the resources, but if you understand the regulatory
process----
Senator Blumenthal. Well, you need a different----
Mr. Szabo. It starts with us and feeds through a process.
Senator Blumenthal. You need a different authority.
Because, for example on cameras, is there a requirement that
you go through the APA rulemaking process?
Mr. Szabo. Well, if we're going to mandate it, we have to
go through a rulemaking process.
Mr. Chairman. And you need to get a different authority.
Mr. Szabo. And of course, that's appropriate because,
Senator, we owe it to everybody to get it right. And that's why
it requires doing that due diligence.
You know, certainly you can do things fast, but if you do
them fast you run the risk of committing errors that actually
can harm safety or harm capacity in the industry. And so, you
really have to do your due diligence, make sure that all
stakeholders have appropriate input, and make sure, when you
put that reg out, you've got it right.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, I don't differ with anything that
you've just said. But the recommendation was made by the NTSB
in 2008. We're here in 2014, so due diligence has required 6
years and, in the meantime on that issue, cameras and on others
where there were deadlines from Congress there still have been
no regulations.
Let me turn----
Mr. Szabo. But Congress did not mandate that in 2008.
Senator Blumenthal. Not that one, but others.
Mr. Szabo. And so, those things that you chose to mandate
were the things that we prioritized first. We feel we owe that
to you.
Senator Blumenthal. Let me ask Mr. Hart.
Will the investigation of Spuyten Duyvil, and the
Bridgeport incident, and the collection of incidents relating
to Metro-North, be done by a time-certain?
Mr. Hart. Yes. We are planning to combine the four Metro-
North accidents into one report to be issued in November.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you. My time has expired so I'm
going to turn to Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, why
don't we have the tank standards yet? I think you all have been
working on that for two and a half years. And, as quickly and
briefly as you can explain that, why has it taken that long?
Ms. Quarterman. Thank you, Senator Blunt. As you may know,
the process started with both the entire department and PHMSA
and FRA working very closely with AAR and their tank committee
looking at advancements to tank car standards. The end of that
process resulted in a tank car standard that the department was
not willing to support, and it also did not address some of the
operational issues that were on the table as part of that tank
car committee and specialists.
Senator Blunt. So your outside advisory group came back
with standards that you didn't think were adequate?
Ms. Quarterman. The AAR's outside advisory group, correct.
And so we decided to go forward with a rulemaking process.
That rulemaking process began in 2012 where we began to draft
standards. As part of that process, we began to get a series of
petitions that slowed down our finalizing and advanced notice
of proposed rulemaking. That advanced notice went out in
September. We got more than 150,000 individuals commenting on
that.
As of December 5, I can tell you that now FRA and PHMSA are
sequestered together drafting an advanced--a notice of proposed
rulemaking, we have our regulatory experts in the room, our
financial experts that have to deal with the regulatory
analysis that's required on that rule. And we are working
extremely hard. I think we are close to a first draft. And I
can tell you, I've never seen a rule drafted faster than that.
Senator Blunt. I may come back to that if some of my
colleagues don't answer other questions I have. And Mr. Hart,
you said that you thought that positive train control, I think
your quote was said, ``Must be implemented by the end of 2015
to the maximum extent possible.'' Is that the deadline? When in
2015 is the deadline?
Mr. Hart. I'm referring to the Congressional deadline of
the end of 2015.
Senator Blunt. Right. And by, ``enacted by the maximum
extent possible,'' you mean, some railroads would enact this
and others without penalty wouldn't?
Mr. Hart. The NTSB would like to see full implementation of
PTC, but if it can't all be done, we'd like to see as much as
possible by as many as possible as soon as possible.
Senator Blunt. Mr. Szabo, do you want to comment on that?
Mr. Szabo. Yes.
The current Congressional mandate actually mandates full
deployment by December 31, 2015 which, in our report to
Congress, we indicate will not be achievable. We do believe
that partial deployment is doable and partial deployment will
provide very real safety benefits, but we need from Congress,
we need from you, currently FRA does not have the ability to
make any provisional certifications. It's either it's all done
or it isn't. And so, we really need from Congress the tools and
the authority to allow for provisional certification to, in
fact, help achieve that partial deployment and achieve that
accountability that Mr. Hart was talking about. Understanding
the legitimacy of the challenges the industry has, along with
the good faith effort that they've been making.
Senator Blunt. You know, I would say, I'm not sure I have a
final view on this yet, but I would say if we expand the law or
expand the deadline, and there is some kind of partial
deployment, I'd strongly encourage you to think about that as a
trial run rather than having--we've seen what happens when you
implement a technical system without going through a trial run,
a trial run where maybe even information is widely shared but
not where one company has to comply and another company
doesn't. And you may use that as a laboratory time to test the
system rather than to say, ``OK, you've worked harder than
everybody else, so we're going to penalize you by putting you
under full, positive train control and every other company has
two more years,'' or something like that.
Mr. Szabo. Senator, I think your point is very, very valid.
You know, positive train control will, in fact, be the
backbone of our future safety efforts relative to human
factors, but it's critical that we get it right. There's never
been an undertaking of this magnitude installing PTC anywhere
else in the world. And so, actually taking a look at those
places where it can be implemented most easily, ensure that we
get the bugs out of it as we continue to advance, are best
going to serve safety and make sure that we don't do anything
to gum up capacity for the industry. There are a couple of
threats here in getting it wrong. And so, provisional
certification will allow us to make sure we get it right.
Senator Blunt. Well, I'm going to follow the Chairman's
very well determined lead here and wait for other questions for
another round.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Blunt.
Senator Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding the hearing. And thank you for the witnesses that
are here and everybody that's working on this issue and for
your voluntary efforts to date.
I'm glad my colleagues from North Dakota are here because I
know you see this issue, you know, from the perspective of your
state but I want you to understand the perspective of our state
because practically every newspaper in our state has
editorialized on this. The state legislature is considering
legislation. The city of Seattle is considering legislation.
And the issue is that as this rail transports into our state
from Spokane down to PASCO through the Columbia Gorge, to say
nothing of the treachery and the unique environmental aspects
of the Columbia Gorge, then through Vancouver, then up to
Tacoma and perhaps on through Seattle, through Everett, up to
Skagit County for processing. So you hit every population area
in our state. OK? We're talking about population areas, three
of them that are larger than your whole state, OK. We're
talking about waterfronts that are integrated with ferry
systems and in highly, you know, active waterfronts.
So when people look at this issue for us, they see the
volatility of this product moving through major population
centers. Not one, but every population center in our state,
save a few. So that's why our state is very anxious about this.
And that's why, Mr. Chairman, I agree. I don't personally think
that this is an issue about voluntary, although we appreciate
voluntary. I think to protect our citizens we have to be clear
about what it is we're willing to do.
So I first have a question for Mr. Searles about these DOT-
111 car issues that Mr. Hart has basically said are
unacceptable public risk. That's what NTSB has said right now.
They're unacceptable. So my question is when are the companies
committed to ending the use of these cars?
Mr. Searles. Thank you for the question, Senator.
The first thing that we've done is we've stepped in and we
developed over a 3-year period the upgraded tank car standards.
So these are the CPC-1232 standard and that took 3 years to go
in and look at all of the data that was required to understand
the best approach that could be taken to make these cars safer.
The industry concluded with consensus on that. And in the
review of that consensus standard, the DOT led the review to
determine whether or not we were going to have sufficient
improvements there. And the conclusion was that we did and thus
we petitioned the Federal Government to make the CPC-1232 the
new standard. All of that was data-driven. Since that time, we
have been building that tank car to the point that we have 40
percent of the fleet this year will be the new tank car and 60
percent by the end of 2015. So we have been leaning forward
beyond what the DOT requirements were and are today. And
believe that those tank cars are going to be sufficient to be
able to move the tank car to be able to move the product from
here forward.
Senator Cantwell. So what year will all of them be off our
rails?
Mr. Searles. We are looking at the tank cars that were
manufactured before the new standards came out. And in fact, in
our comments to the ANPRM we asked for the FRA and PHMSA to
lead a taskforce to review that. Since that time, we have been
looking at the requirements to determine if retrofits are
possible and whether or not there are meaningful improvements
to those tank cars that can be made.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I guess I would say, since we've
gone from 4 years ago, having basically nothing by rail on
crude, to now having something like 480,000 carloads of crude,
so about 11 trains per day, to our populations centers, this is
a big deal.
Mr. Searles. Absolutely.
Senator Cantwell. So knowing when those cars that are going
to be off those rails, that NTSB has already said are
unacceptable, Mr. Chairman, this is a key issue for me and for
my state. And then, I know I have 30 seconds left, I guess I
would just say that I don't know when you have a voluntary
system, not everybody complies with it. What do you do about
that? And even when people sign a voluntary agreement and then
have a violation, is there a penalty? Is there a risk against
that, in stopping that behavior?
So, Mr. Chairman, I think I'm more in the boat of where you
are. I think we have to mandate the security that needs to be
there because these population centers are just, you know--I
don't know what our cities in jurisdictions are going to--they
might decide to ban this altogether.
I think we have to prove that the public is going to be
safe here and, again, I know I'm out of time, but we haven't
even gone to this issue of the highly flammable material and
maybe somebody could tell me what safety precautions are going
to be made in the future to change a Bakken oil into a
transportable product that is not as flammable.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Cantwell.
Senator Heitkamp.
STATEMENT OF HON. HEIDI HEITKAMP,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Heitkamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. It's really quite an honor to be here and I am grateful
for the invitation and grateful for the opportunity.
I want to kind of start out where Maria left off. And I
want to assure the Senator from Washington that where we may
see it differently because we're producing but you're refining,
you're refining Bakken crude in your state. And we all are
concerned about safety. This is not a tradeoff of economics
versus safety. We have to make the transportation of this
material as safe as what is humanly possible on the rails. I
don't think there's any doubt about it.
Now, Mr. Hart, I want to go back to one of your comments,
because we have focused a lot on the 111s and, you know, I'm
always amused when people say 40 percent. I think the more
important question that we have is how many of the 111s have
been retired? You know, if you look at the 111s transporting
this material, obviously if you're growing the fleet, which you
have to in order meet the demand of transporting, of course
you're going to have a lower percentage of 111s on the rail.
But the concern is getting the 111s off.
And Mr. Hart, I think following on that track, you also
said that you think the 1232s are deficient, if I heard your
testimony correctly. So I want you to reaffirm that and then I
want to hear from both the Association of American Railroads
and from API on what their reaction is to that. And we can talk
about the regulation after that.
Mr. Hart. Thank you for the question.
Yes. I did say that the 1232s are still not adequate. As I
mentioned, the NTSB is holding a forum on the transportation of
crude oil and ethanol next month that will talk about not only
rail cars but a variety of other associated issues, including
operations and emergency response.
Senator Heitkamp. I only have so much time, so I really
want to just focus on getting kind of an immediate reaction to
the comment about the 1232s. Yes.
Mr. Hamberger. On behalf of the AAR, we filed comments at
the PHMSA and the ANPRM recommending that new tank cars be
built exceeding the 1232. We are requesting that they require
the full-height head shields, the jacket, thermal protection,
top fitting protection, high capacity pressure relief valve. So
we think that the 1232 was a big step above the DOT-111s.
Knowing what we do now about some of the volatility of some of
the crude moving, we think we need to go even beyond the 1232s.
Senator Heitkamp. Interested in API's response.
Mr. Searles. Thank you.
I think the information that has been, that AAR's referring
to, has not been shared that substantiates the benefit of these
improvements. You're starting to get down into a very narrow
range of improvement and you go from very small number to an
even smaller number. And so, we would look forward to having
those discussions on that. However, I would say that the 1232,
again, was studied for three years. Actually, it was studied
for 2 years and then another third year was taken to review how
sufficient that performance specification would be.
Senator Heitkamp. So this is shaping up as a regulatory
fight here, obviously, and it appears that PHMSA and FRA are
moving in the direction of the Association of American
Railroads in terms of recommendations on the tank cars. I think
it's doubtful they're going--as she said already, she thinks
the 1232s are deficient. That's why they didn't go through the
process back when you guys requested their weighing-in on
approving the tank car. This is very problematic from a public
standpoint, because the public expects that we're going to make
decisions and they're going to be fact-based.
Now, we haven't had a major derailment that involved the
1232s. We've obviously had major derailments that involve the
111s and, I only have 42 seconds. So I'd like to ask Mr.
Searles, how many 111s have been taken off the train?
Mr. Searles. The 111s continue to be the tank car that was
provided in the regulations.
Senator Heitkamp. So we need to be careful when we say 40
percent and it's going to be less because it had to mean we've
taken these cars off the trains. It just means that we've grown
the fleet to the point that their percentage involvement is
dwindling; correct?
Mr. Searles. The numbers indicate that we are moving in the
direction that will bring us to these safer tank cars.
Senator Heitkamp. But, as of today, there hasn't been any
major movement of 111s off the rails?
Mr. Searles. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Heitkamp. Yes.
Senator Blumenthal. Senator Hoeven.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HOEVEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. Thank you to
Senator Blumenthal, also to Senator Blunt, for holding this
hearing and appreciate all of you being here.
The country is producing a lot more energy thanks, in very
large part, to the states like North Dakota; very positive for
the country in terms of knowledge, job creation, economic
growth, but having affordable energy and from a national
security standpoint. But we need the infrastructure to move
that energy from where we produce it to the markets. That means
pipelines, but that also means moving it as safely as possible
by rail and by truck. And that's what today is all about. We
need to do this safely and we need a comprehensive approach. A
comprehensive approach that both prevents derailments and if a
derailment occurs that we minimize the risk of fire or
explosion. That means that everybody's got a role to play here:
the regulators, the railroads, and the shippers.
Obviously, oil companies own most of the cars. And so, you
know, people, we've got to work together to get this done. And
so, I'm going to have questions for each of you, which I'm
obviously not going to get done in this session, but hopefully
I'll have a follow-up opportunity and, you know, I want to
start with inspections.
And I'd like to ask Administrator Szabo, have you increased
inspections? I know the answer to that is yes, but give us some
sense of what you're doing. And also, do you need more
inspectors to meet the demands of the increased volume?
Mr. Szabo. Well, as I've stated in my testimony, our
inspection and enforcement program is data driven. And so, we
actually use statistical modeling to analyze that data and
determine, you know, our National Inspection Plan and it's
based on where there is risk.
One of the reasons why I believe the agreement with AAR is
so important is because it helps us determine the most safe and
secure route to be used for the movement of this product using
the 27 risk factors. And that also gets run through a computer
analysis to determine the most safe and secure route. But then
we mandate of the industry additional equipment and track
inspections along those routes; as well as it allows me to
better focus limited resources on those routes. Certainly, the
45 additional employees that we received as part of the 2014
budget package are going to help us tremendously but, you know,
the truth of the matter is there can be an endless demand for
resources.
I have a responsibility to make sure that I am as smart and
strategic as possible with the limited resources that you
choose to provide me.
Senator Hoeven. But at this point, you are making provision
for additional inspectors and we certainly want to work with
you through the appropriations process to see that you're able
to do that in a sensible way, in a cost-effective, sensible
way, but we need to make sure we're doing more inspections.
Mr. Szabo. And, Senator, if I could add one more point
that's an important piece to that. You know, we do have the
state inspection partnership. And there are 30 states across
the Nation that choose to hire their own inspectors. We train
them. We absorb the cost of training them and certifying them,
but then states are able to use these inspectors to supplement
our inspection efforts in their own states and raise the bar
that much higher.
Senator Hoeven. Mr. Blackwell, how are we going to or how
are the railroads going to implement positive train control,
which is part of the safety solution, if they can't get the
tower sited on their own right-of-ways? Does that require
legislation or, I mean, is FCC going to just hold them up
forever, or does it require legislation? Or what do we have to
do to get positive train control out there?
Senator Blackwell. There are, we believe, in our programs,
on this----
Pardon me, Senator.
We believe the Program Comments strike the appropriate
balance between front loading, the type of information that is
usually requested and readily available, and with PTC's goals
and deadlines. And in doing so, we prescribe much-ordered
deadlines that are already streamlined processes. We don't
expect that all the applications will take the maximum time
allowed, but we've accelerated procedures and reduced the
overall review process by 40 percent. Specifically, this
includes shortened timeframes for initial responses and
situations lacking responses. And we've also established a new
deadline for our FCC review of resolutions and disputes.
The Program Comment limits the scope of review to a smaller
area of potential effect from one-half mile to one-quarter
mile. And it also allows for exclusions of wayside structures,
similar to nearby existing structures in the right-of-way, for
wayside structures located within rail yards of at least 1,000
square feet and from affects on the rails and the track beds
themselves.
The Program Comment, like the NHPA and our rules, also set
standards for requesting additional information requiring
tribal nations and State Historical Officer----
Senator Hoeven. Mr. Blackwell, I'm over my time. We'll come
back to this. But my question, very specifically, is going to
be either you're going to commit to work with the railroads to
get this done, or it's going to require legislation. But I am
over my time and we can certainly come back to that.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Hoeven.
Welcome, and thank you to Senator Thune for joining us. If
it's OK with you, I'm going to ask Senator Klobuchar to do her
questions and then turn to you.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Congratulations. You'll do a great job and you're
working with a good guy with Senator Blunt. We once shared a
committee together and I'm looking forward to both of you
working on this important issue.
I'm in the neighboring state of Minnesota and we've
certainly seen the effects of increased rail. We're pleased
that we have more of our own energy in this country. We think
it's very important. But, at the same time, we can't lag behind
for our capacity and our safety standards.
I get very frustrated by government delay. I'll tell you
that. So if you could answer your questions quickly, that'll
show that we're on the right road.
Ms. Quarterman, have you thought about what this rulemaking
that's taken two and half years of trying to focus on the cars,
the tank cars, that carry the most flammable and volatile
liquid since the severe derailments have involved that to try
and move that quicker?
Ms. Quarterman. We've been moving as fast as we possibly
can. We have been working on these rules very hard. And I will
say the discussion at the panel among the witnesses today point
to why, even though we are working fast, we need to be
strategic and deliberative in our process. As you've seen, the
tank car standard has evolved over the past several years.
Senator Klobuchar. Do you think it's safer to have new tank
cars or retrofitted cars?
Ms. Quarterman. It depends on what the retrofit is.
Senator Klobuchar. And do you think that we'll have the
manufacturing capability to get those cars? I know Burlington
Northern has just voluntarily agreed to buy 5,000.
Can we get those off the factory floors fast enough?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, I recently had a meeting with one of
those manufacturers and they said they thought they could. I
think they're eager to do so.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
And, again, as many of us have urged here, just the sooner
we can get this done, the better. We had a derailment with a
train loaded with iron ore on December 5 of last year in Two
Harbors, Minnesota. Seventy-six rail cars piled up and, others,
17 cars loaded with iron ore pallets parked on an adjacent
track were hit and derailed. Our reports indicated that,
actually, it was Canadian National; that they hadn't removed
the snow and ice from the tracks. As you know, we've had a lot
recently, despite warning from crew members.
Do you think the railroads have the appropriate lines of
communication, and I think this is probably best a question for
Mr. Hamberger, in place to ensure that crew members can easily
report these kinds of concerns?
Mr. Hamberger. I'm unaware of the specific that you're
talking about but I've always said that when it comes to
security and safety, the 180,000 crew members that we have are
the first line of notification of whether something is not
right if it happens to be a security issue, and the same for
safety. So I believe every railroad has in place a
communication systems to get those kinds of safety issues from
the employees. So, I would think so.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Well, we'll follow up with you with getting the facts out
there so we can talk about it further.
The other thing I hear around our state on issues, things
that have already been talked about, is that on not having the
capacity to prepare for and respond to an event like a
hazardous spill or a derailment. What do you think, Mr.
Hamberger, that rail companies could do to assist communities
to ensure that they're properly prepared should a disaster
occur?
Mr. Hamberger. Several things that they are already doing,
and that is: working with the emergency responders and training
and letting them know what is coming through their communities
and designing training programs for the most dangerous things
coming through the communities. But we're also--and the
agreement with Secretary Foxx, as an industry, taking on an
inventory of what are the emergency response equipment out
there; whether it's foam or booms near water supplies and try
to have that available both for other railroads but also share
it with appropriate emergency responders so they know what's
available.
Senator Klobuchar. Mr. Szabo, do you think we have enough
track inspectors out there?
This is something I've heard from our own Department of
Transportation, as well as some of the workers that aren't on
the panel today, but I know they're concerned about this. Do
you think we have enough track inspectors? And what can be done
to address a shortage? I know, in our state, we only have a few
of them.
Mr. Szabo. Well, I think this is similar to the answer that
I gave Senator Hoeven.
You know, first off, the 45 additional employees that the
2014 budget provided for us is going to help. The agreement
that was signed with AAR requiring them to do additional
inspections is going to help. My ability to more strategically
focus on crude routes is going to help; and, you know,
following our data is going to help, as well as the ability for
states to supplement through our state partnerships. So you
know, I think we've got the tools and we just need to execute.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
And I'm out of time here but, Mr. Blackwell, I'll follow up
on the record about some of the concerns raised by Senator
Hoeven about trying to move on the PTC implementation and just
the concern that this is something that could help and that
this is just taking too long. So we'll follow up on the FCC
role on what we can do to speed it up.
Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Thune, again welcome and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
you and Ranking Member Blunt for holding this hearing on a very
important subject and I will follow up on Senator Klobuchar's
issues on PTC but I do want to thank the panel for being here
today.
And, you know, one way we could get fewer trains in North
Dakota is to horizontally drill from South Dakota.
[Laughter.]
Senator Thune. Pull some of that energy back down into our
state.
Senator Hoeven. We're watching you.
[Laughter.]
Senator Thune. You know I've had some experience. I worked
as the State Rail Director in South Dakota prior to coming to
this job. And the railroads are so important in our part of the
country. The reason there's so much interest here, you can tell
today, is that we're incredibly dependent. So much so that back
when the Milwaukee Road abandoned the railroads in our state in
the late 1970s, the State of South Dakota actually acquired the
railroads, not the power and the rolling stock but the right-
of-way and the track and everything to keep railroads active
and going. It's the most efficient way to move freight and,
obviously, critically important to our agricultural economy. So
for many years, the State of South Dakota actually operated, or
I shouldn't say operated, but contracted, for operations with
some railroads and maintain the track and right-of-way; so this
is a critically important issue in our state and to all the
states that are represented here.
I want to ask a question and this would be for Mr.
Blackwell. And I appreciate it's been talked about a little bit
already, the effort the FCC's taken to expedite the approval of
PTC towers and I'm also encouraged that the FCC has issued a
draft proposal. However, I'm still concerned about how long
it's going to take before Class I railroads are going to be
able to take advantage of this process. It's my understanding
that that draft proposal was submitted to the Advisory Council
for Historic Preservation this week and that the ACHP will then
have 45 days to review and approve it.
Given that timeline, what is the earliest date in which you
think railroads will be able to begin installing towers under
the new system?
Mr. Blackwell. So, maybe a bit of the challenge, if you do
the math right now, but it would be 45 days from the date of
the transmittal. We would be ready to begin processing those up
to 20,000 more. There's absolutely nothing holding everybody
back now from preparing the information to be ready to go as
soon as possible.
Senator Thune. So after a tower is submitted for approval,
how long do you anticipate it would take for final approval?
And do you have any estimates on how this will compare to the
timeline under the current approval process?
Mr. Blackwell. Well, we did shorten the--by frontloading
the system with an amount of information that's normally
routinely gathered, we were able to shorten timelines
significantly. Overall, it is 40 percent. We did also shorten
timelines associated with the initial responses, lack of
responses, and then encouraged the parties that may have
disputes to come to the FCC. And we have a self-imposed 15 day
deadline to deal with those.
Senator Thune. OK.
This would be a follow-up question for Mr. Hamberger.
The railroads have run into a lot of obstacles and their
efforts to meet this 2015 PTC deadline but the FCC approval
process clearly has become a big impediment to that. Let me ask
you what your overall assessment is of the FCC's draft proposal
and do you think it will help expedite the process for that
approval?
Mr. Hamberger. I have not personally read what was
submitted last evening but my lawyers, who have, so this is
secondhand, advise me that some of our comments submitted in
the process have been acknowledged but the core issue of not
having an end date to when a decision has to be reached, there
is a deadline on expressing an interest, but not on reaching a
conclusion. And although we can file by county, each individual
pole still has to be dealt with and the upfront submission of
data that Mr. Blackwell is talking to is, I believe, it's an
ethnographic study where we have to show, prove a negative,
that there is no cultural or historic interest in that site
pole by pole, by pole. We do not think that this solves the
problem. Again, recognizing the amount of effort that has gone
into it and I appreciate Chairman Wheeler's personal interest,
but we are not there.
Senator Thune. So in the interim, the FCC has initiated
this beta process for PTC tower approval in which railroads are
able to batch these applications, as was mentioned, up to 20
PTC towers in the same county.
Have railroads made use of that process?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes.
And in several cases they have gotten back automatic
responses of that, not wanting to go forward in some cases. I'm
told that not one of those have yet made it through the
process.
Senator Thune. Do you like that process? Do you see
benefits to that process? Do you see limitations to that
process?
Mr. Hamberger. We went forward, as Mr. Blackwell indicated,
in an informal process in dealing with the tribal nations that
we knew had interest and have erected 10,000 poles. We think
that the rules that FCC has allow that. They have told us that
we cannot do that; that we have to work through the TCNS
process.
And I think that is a bureaucratic slowdown that is
adversely affecting our ability to make progress. I was going
to be delivering our white paper, effective of 12-31-2013, at
which we had been projecting that we were going to be able to
meet 40 percent of our implementation by the end of 2015.
That's what we projected at the end of 2012; that we were going
to be able to get about 24,000 miles up and running. We can no
longer make that projection.
And so I'm not in a position to submit that as part of my
testimony today. We're still going back to the railroads and
trying to get what the number might be. And unfortunately,
until this process plays out, we don't know. We just don't know
how long it's going to take.
Senator Thune. And that 45-day clock hasn't started running
yet.
Mr. Blackwell. It started running Tuesday.
Senator Thune. It did, OK. OK.
So we're talking 45 days, middle of April, and then how
many days after that to get a final rule?
Mr. Blackwell. Well, we could start processing the
applications immediately.
Senator Thune. OK.
And you're saying if they are submitting applications,
doing all the preparatory work right now, that those
applications could start being processed immediately when that
45 days runs out?
Mr. Blackwell. The submission process, under the Program
Comment, would begin once the Program Comment became final.
Forty-five days. The ACHP has it for 45 days.
Senator Thune. OK. All right.
Mr. Hamberger. That assumes they don't extend.
Senator Thune. Right.
Mr. Blackwell. I would clarify something, Senator, about
the ethnographic studies that Mr. Hamberger just mentioned.
This draft Program Comment does not require ethnographic
studies. The reference is to help the railroads prepare
materials that, based on our experience, are frequently asked
for in the course of the Section 106 reviews.
Senator Thune. Well, I guess the only thing I would say,
Mr. Chairman, is there's a lot of pressure on the railroads,
obviously, to comply with and to meet the 2015 deadline. And
there are a number of us on the Committee who are co-sponsoring
legislation that would extend that by a reasonable amount of
time so the railroads have the time to comply. But the FCC has
become a critical component in allowing that process to move
forward. And I would hope that you will do everything you
possibly can to expedite this process, because, for a lot of
reasons, there's a sense of urgency attached to this and I hope
that that's fully understood there at the Commission.
Mr. Blackwell. Senator Thune, Senator Hoeven, the FCC is
committed to tailoring the process in a way that will enable
the railroads to meet their current statutory deadline fully
committed.
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I'd like to
ask consent to have in----
Senator Blumenthal. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Thune follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Thune, U.S. Senator from South Dakota
Thank you Senator Blumenthal, and Senator Blunt for holding this
important hearing and I am glad that Senators Hoeven and Heitkamp are
able to join us today to underscore their first-hand perspective when
it comes to increased domestic oil and gas production from their home
state and the recent accident that occurred there.
The topic of this hearing is particularly timely, as we've seen
several high-profile accidents in recent months involving both freight
and passenger railroads, some of which have sadly resulted in the loss
of life and injuries to rail passengers.
As a Senator from South Dakota, I am particularly interested in the
safety issues involved in transporting crude oil from the Bakken
region, and I am encouraged to see railroads, the oil industry, and the
various Federal safety agencies working together on this issue--
including improvements when it comes to tank car safety to protect
against releases of commodities that are increasingly moved via the
second safest mode of bulk transportation.
I am also interested in hearing from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and the Association of American Railroads on the work
that is being done to speed up the approval process for the
communications towers that railroads must install to fully implement
Positive Train Control (PTC), which can certainly assist in reducing
the incidence of some, but not all, rail accidents.
While I agree that PTC is an important safety technology that
railroads should work to install as quickly as possible, I worry that
the current statutory deadline of December 2015 is unrealistic for most
passenger and freight railroads. I think this is especially true in
light of some of the delays that have occurred at the FCC that we will
hear more about today.
Along with Senators Blunt, McCaskill, and Pryor, I have introduced
legislation, which is supported by other members of this committee, to
extend the 2015 deadline in order to allow the railroads a realistic
time-frame for full implementation. There are now 12 bipartisan co-
sponsors of this legislation, and I hope that our committee will
consider this bill in the coming months.
At the end of the day, we have a shared interest in seeing PTC work
as intended, and avoiding the unintended consequences of an unworkable
timetable that could weaken the overall safety of our rail network. We
all want PTC done right, and I appreciate the perspectives of our
witnesses on how we can work together to make that happen.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Senator Thune.
And I think that comment, by Senator Thune, points to a
very real issue that the FCC has to address. I'm going to be
meeting later in the day with Chairman Wheeler and certainly
this topic is high on the agenda.
I come away from the testimony, so far, with the feeling
that your agencies collectively and individually need more
authority to expedite these rules and make this system work
better.
Do any of you disagree? And, please, don't hesitate to
disagree.
Mr. Hamberger. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to jump in even
though it's not exactly on the point to your comment because I
don't want to let stand on the record without responding, but I
know this is dangerous at the first hearing.
I'm testifying before you as our new chair, but you talked
about the inadequacy of voluntary actions. And I submit to you
that every railroad has a voluntary rulebook which goes beyond
the requirements of the FRA that really helps deliver the
safest transportation mode America has. And you talked about
inward-facing cameras; we're not waiting for the rule. Kansas
City Southern has already gone through the process; had to go
through----
Senator Blumenthal. You may be right, Mr. Hamberger, and I
apologize for interrupting, but I'm limited in terms of the
time I have to ask my question.
Mr. Hamberger. I'm sorry.
Senator Blumenthal. You may be right about some railroads,
but certainly not all. Metro-North is not moving ahead with
cameras. The NTSB has recommended to Metro-North that it have
those cameras, but we still have not seen them. It took a
derailment with four fatalities to cause Metro-North to
implement automatic train control, alerters, and other
commonsense sensible measures still have not been implemented.
There is a reason why Congress has mandated certain
actions. And the rules necessary to enforce those laws still
have not been issued in many instances despite deadlines that
have been passed. And I am not, I hope, unfairly criticizing
the FRA or PHMSA. I know that resources are an issue, but I'm
asking really for authority; whether the agencies need
authority to expedite these rules, to issue emergency orders.
We're talking here about huge and humongous costs in lives
and dollars, in the creditability and trust in our system,
potential environmental affect. I was going to hold up--oh, we
now have the--these issues unite and interlock the entire
country. As you can see, what happens along those arteries of
transportation affects the Midwest, the states that are
represented here by my colleagues from North and South Dakota,
Missouri, and eventually, potentially Long Island Sound as well
as Albany, places in New York, the Northeast.
So there has to be a sense of urgency here that, I think,
may not be felt by all the railroads in all necessary respects
about these rules. So, in terms of enforcement of our laws that
protect safety and reliability, isn't there a need for more
authority?
And Mr. Blackwell, you seem to be on the verge of saying
something. So let me call on you.
Mr. Blackwell. I was. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We believe that we've identified the most expeditious
process. We have not placed bureaucratic process above public
safety. We take our responsibility with respect to public
safety at the Commission deeply seriously.
You asked about additional authority. Under the applicable
statutes and regulations--and Mr. Hamberger suggested that the
Commission might be able to do a wholesale exemption of
positive train control. Under applicable statutes and
regulations, a wholesale exemption of the infrastructures
associated with PTC from NEPA and the National Historical
Preservation Act would require negotiation with the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation and the National Conference of
State Historic Preservation Officers and the full notice and
comment rulemaking of the Commission including consultation
with tribal nations. And that would take us well beyond the
December 2015 deadline.
Senator Blumenthal. Any other comment?
And let me ask the same question with respect to resources;
more authority clearly necessary. What about more resources?
Also necessary; based on what I've heard today and what I've
heard over years of learning and listening about this process.
I know that Mr. Szabo would agree because we fought for
more resources for the FRA. And what we've achieved, I will
say, still is inadequate in spite of the increase that we
managed to restore to the budget. So I think that one of the
lessons of today is that we need both resources and authority.
Let me ask, in particular, about the Operation
Classification results so far. As I mentioned at the very
outset, a very high proportion to samples--I think the majority
of the samples taken indicated that the packing was
inappropriate to the content of the crude. I know I'm probably
misstating, in technical terms, the result but basically in the
majority of samples, correct procedures were not followed.
Ms. Quarterman. Within those particular samples that we're
taking. We started this effort last August and we have gone out
a series of times doing this testing. And each time we've gone
out, we have extended the testing that we perform. We started
by looking first at flash point, initial boiling point. As we
learned more, we continued to go back and expand the tests. We
now include vapor pressure and sulfur content. We're beginning
to do corrosivity tests and flammable gas content. It's a
learning experience in terms of trying to understand the
characteristics of this particular crude oil.
We have to all remember, we're talking about crude oil
here. We're not talking about a refined product. And crude oil
varies from region to region and place to place and we want to
understand exactly what the characteristics of this particular
crude are. Last week, we were out again. We had a multi-agency
strike force in North Dakota with members of the FRA, the
FMCSA, the North Dakota folks as well.
Senator Blumenthal. Well, let me just interrupt because I
want to turn to Senator Blunt for our next round.
On February 4, you released the first round of your test
results which concluded that 11 of 18 samples, taken from cargo
tanks delivering crude oil to loading facilities, we're not
assigned to the correct transportation packing group. As a
result, you issued notices of violation; $93,000 in fines to
the shipping companies involved.
Doesn't that give you a lot of alarm?
Ms. Quarterman. It does, indeed. And that is why we, the
Department, issued an emergency order related to classification
and testing. We amended that order today, after we had some
questions from operators about the order. And that's why we're
out on the ground every day despite resource issues. I didn't
respond to that question but certainly after have those.
Senator Blumenthal. So maybe voluntary compliance isn't
working as it should be.
Ms. Quarterman. Well, I think we have to double-check on
these things. Absolutely.
Senator Blumenthal. I may have an opportunity to follow-up
in a third round, I'm sure, to the chagrin of our witnesses but
I'm going to turn to Senator Blunt because I've reached the end
of my time this time.
Senator Blunt. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Ms. Quarterman, what, on the strike force, were you testing
a new rule or was this a rule that the railroad should have, or
the shipper rather who complies here? The shipper or the
person----
Ms. Quarterman. The shipper or offerer is the person who
needs to comply with the rules.
Senator Blunt. And was this a new rule?
Ms. Quarterman. No, it was not a new rule. It's an existing
rule.
Senator Blunt. So your view is that in the strike force, on
a rule that was existing, it had been out there for how long;
we talking years, months, days?
Ms. Quarterman. Many, many years.
Senator Blunt. That they were not complying in how many
cases out of how many?
Ms. Quarterman. I believe Senator Blumenthal was talking
about, what was it, 11 out of 18 in one particular series of
tests that we did. We've gone out about five or six different
times and we haven't finished our enforcement actions,
obviously, so there may be more coming.
Senator Blunt. So in the total, is this 11 out of 18 or is
this 11 out of a particular route? I'm interested in knowing
more about that.
Ms. Quarterman. It's 11 out of a particular 18. It was one
trip.
Senator Blunt. That was the total test in that one trip,
was 18?
Ms. Quarterman. That's my recollection, yes.
Senator Blunt. And in terms of--are you going to change the
way you require this testing? Is that in your proposed rule
that we test for different things than we have?
Ms. Quarterman. It certainly is on the table. We are
looking at everything related to the movement of crude oil, so
classification issues are something that we're looking at as
well.
Senator Blunt. Yes.
On the tank cars, I thought Senator Heitkamp made a
particularly helpful observation about, you know, you obviously
have a lot more shipping going on so the cars that were out
there could be out there.
What I don't understand, Mr. Hamberger, is who owns these
cars? I think, generally, they have been owned by the shipper
but does that mean the orange juice cars are owned by the
orange juice people and the milk cars are owned by the milk
people. And what does that mean?
Mr. Hamberger. Tank cars are a bit of an anomaly in that we
own basically very few tank cars.
Senator Blunt. ``We'' being the railroads.
Mr. Hamberger. Being the railroads, yes, sir.
They're owned either by producers or leasing companies who
build them and then lease them out to the shippers. In other
areas, boxcars, you know, automotive bi-levels, tri-levels,
most of those, many of those at least, are owned by the
railroads but some of those are also owned directly either by a
shipper or by a leasing company. But in the tank car area, it
is almost not, as you mentioned, BNSF did just announce they're
going to purchase 5,000 but that is not the normal for us.
Senator Blunt. Right. And I assume that these cars can be
that the 111, if I'm using the right terminology, could still
be used for something else even if we decide for--I'm seeing a
number of heads shaking here. So taking 111s off the railroad
is a different question than using them for another purpose.
Mr. Hamberger. That is correct; yes.
Our recommendation is not to use them for flammable
liquids.
Senator Blunt. Right. And Mr. Blackwell, how long have you
worked for the FCC?
Mr. Blackwell. Off and on for 15 years, sir.
Senator Blunt. And how long in the current job?
Mr. Blackwell. Four years.
Senator Blunt. And when did the FCC realize that it had
responsibilities under positive train control that was passed,
I guess, in 2011?
Mr. Blackwell. We first learned about the massive number of
wayside poles, just under a year ago.
Senator Blunt. So this is not--I can't go back and say what
did you do though, you just didn't know how involved you were
going to be? Mr. Hamberger, you want to help me with that?
Mr. Hamberger. Well, that isn't exactly correct.
I think Mr. Blackwell may have learned a year ago, but when
the FCC awarded the spectrum to a group called PLC 220, it's
the railroad organization that bought the spectrum for PTC, as
part of that award there's a requirement that you submit to the
bureau every 6 months what you're doing to make sure that
you're using that spectrum because otherwise, why, you know,
why should you get to keep it? So starting in 2009, we
submitted statements to the FCC telling them what we were doing
to implement the award of that spectrum including putting up
poles along their right-of-way.
Senator Blunt. And, I would say that the recent people that
have appeared here that are now serving on the FCC seem to be
much more aware of this and, Mr. Blackwell, I think you would--
the Commission itself is responsible here to this committee and
you're responsible to the Commission. But what I'm wondering at
now, and I think I'm right here, you mentioned some dates. You
said September the twenty-seventh. There was one day and that
was last year. You're talking September 27, 2013; right?
Mr. Blackwell. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. And then, January 29, 2014?
Mr. Blackwell. That was the release of our draft Program
Comment.
Senator Blunt. And Senator Thune had you in sometime in
mid-to-late April 2014. And then, you've got the whole 22,000
towers to side, even if you group them? I'm having a hard time
imagining, unless something changes, you get all that agreed
to, all that done, by the end of 2015, let alone your assertion
that there's plenty of time for the railroads to comply by the
end of 2015. You're not going to have 22,000 people out there
setting individual towers on a given day when you all are
finally done with this, and 22,000 individual pieces of
equipment. The idea that we can, the government, can drag its
feet as long as it has and then suddenly, in the middle of the
year before this has to be completed, the next year, the
government can assert that there's plenty of time for the
railroads to comply now that we've finally come up with our
rules, I just think is ludicrous.
Now, let me be sure I understand these poles, too. There
are 22,000 towers and poles. How many of those would be the big
tower that I would envision when I think about something like a
telephone, cellular; any of them?
Mr. Hamberger. No. The ones that we're talking about are
what are called monopoles. They could be as high as 60 feet,
could be as low as 20 feet depending on terrain. Generally
speaking, go down into the ground six, eight, ten feet, maybe
two feet diameter of a hole. Ninety-seven percent of them will
be on the right-of-way of the railroad. Again, not in tribal
nation land. We understand if it is tribal nation land that
would be a different consideration. And if we were talking
about the big radio towers, that obviously is a different
consideration.
Senator Blunt. Do we have to build any of those big towers?
Mr. Hamberger. About 500, apparently.
Senator Blunt. Five hundred----
Mr. Hamberger. Of the 22,000?
Senator Blunt.--cellular type towers and the others are----
Mr. Hamberger. It's included in the 22,000; 500 in the
22,000.
Senator Blunt. So 40 feet, that's somewhere in the
streetlight, telephone pole----
Mr. Hamberger. That's my assessment, yes.
Senator Blunt.--is the size that you're talking about.
And I'm going to ask one more question and then I'm going
to be done with this. On the wayside structures you mentioned
in rail yards, can they build things there that they couldn't
build in the right-of-way without approval from your
organization, Mr. Blackwell?
Mr. Blackwell. Senator Blunt, I should clarify a couple of
things. Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act
applies nationwide, not just on tribal lands. And it applies
within the rights-of-way. In fact, these rights-of-way, because
they're private in nature, there have not been surveys. Folks
don't know what's in them. But the exceptions to that are
identified under Program Comment do involve a rail yard. There
are exceptions for wayside structures similar in nearby
existing structures in the right-of-way. For wayside structures
located within rail yards of at least 1,000 square feet--
100,000 square feet, excuse me. And reviews are exempted from
rails on the track--the review of the--impact for rails on the
track beds themselves.
Senator Blunt. Do you think you'll have all, assuming the
railroad complies with every deadline you've set, do you think
you'll have all these towers agreed to? When do you think is
the last time you'll finish the approval process on the 22,000
towers; the ones that are going to then be built by the end of
2015?
I'm going to keep track of this topic and if it's like
November 2015, whenever it's finally done, I'm going to come
back and ask you how you thought these towers were all supposed
to be done by the end of 2015, which is exactly what you said
here today. I just don't understand how you think there's--I'll
let you answer the question, then I'm done.
Mr. Blackwell. Well, there was a reference earlier to the
base stations, those towers can go through the process right
now; our regular process. We also developed a process that had
been mentioned earlier on the beta testing process for railroad
subdivisions that were demonstrated in our Oklahoma and in our
South Dakota consultations. The FCC is fully committed to
tailoring our process in a way that will enable the railroads
to meet the current statutory deadline, Senator.
Senator Blunt. I actually don't believe that's possible
based on the sitings you have to do and the towers that still
have to sited, but I'm going to watch this pretty closely and
if the FCC is fully committed as you say they are, to have all
of these towers in place by the end of 2015, you're going to
have to be really quick to let them know that they can set
these towers. Again, I'll just repeat, there aren't 22,000
crews that are going to, on a given day, each set a tower.
Senator Blumenthal. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. And a question to follow up to that. I mean,
once the towers are installed, you still have to test, you
still need interoperability, you have a whole bunch of things
that have to happen subsequent to that; correct?
Mr. Hamberger. Correct.
Senator Thune. So, I mean, this is a--yes. This is a
process that's going to go on for some time.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for those excellent
questions, Senator Blunt and Senator Thune.
And I might just make the observation that even before
November 2015, I think we may need to have a separate hearing
on some of the question you've been raising because they are
profoundly important and they go to the core of safety and
reliability in both freight and passenger.
If my colleagues would like, Senator Heitkamp.
Senator Heitkamp. Yes. Just, quickly.
You know, this really fits in kind of three categories for
me. Number one, prevention of derailments. Second category is
mitigating the consequences of derailments. And then, making
sure that, in the third category, that we have in fact trained
professionals who respond to these crises. And I want to just
briefly hit each one.
I was surprised, Mr. Szabo, that you didn't talk about
technology very much when you were asked because I think
technology is such that you could in fact inspect that track
every time a train went over the track. And so, you know, I
just want to lay that--I don't have a lot of time, so I just
want to lay that marker down that we're interested in the
relationship that you have with the Association of American
Railroads so we make sure we get that technology deployed.
In the category of mitigation, I think, you know, with all
due respect, PHMSA doesn't have a very good record on this. And
I know you said you're moving with all due diligence but that's
not the past history on this. I think there was a lack of
engagement. In fact, Senator Hoeven along with Senator
Landrieu, sent a letter in December of 2012 asking where that
collaboration was, where that discussion was. Now we're here,
in crisis almost, trying to resolve this issue and I think it's
a lesson for all of us to respond and react.
Finally, I want to talk about classification. There hasn't
been a lot of talk about how this product gets classified,
except the Chairman raised this.
I want to ask Ms. Quarterman. Taking a look at the range of
violations, would it have changed how any of that product was
actually shipped? It may have changed how people respond to it
if there's a crisis, and I recognize the need to know exactly
what that is for the first responders, but would it have
changed how they shipped that product?
Ms. Quarterman. I don't have a list of each of the
violations that are listed there but we're talking here about
cargo tanks, which are trucks on the highway. And there are
differences between the tanks that are used for Packing Group I
packages and Packing Group II packages.
Senator Heitkamp. I just want to focus on the railroad. I
want to focus on the rails.
Ms. Quarterman. Once it went to a rail, whether it would
have made a difference if the packing group were wrong?
I don't know what the number was at that time. Packing
Group I and Packing Group II are very similar.
Senator Heitkamp. In terms of the requirement on how they
ship.
Ms. Quarterman. In terms of the requirement.
Senator Heitkamp. So we just want to make sure that we're
laying down the understanding that these classifications are
relevant and important and must be met. But they may not
change, in fact, how that product moves under current
regulation.
Finally, I want to talk a little bit about classification
because in my discussions with API and with PHMSA, you know,
this is facts. I mean, what actually is in the tank or what
gets produced, it's chemically provable. But yet, we have all
of this disagreement about what is this, what is this product.
And I know that API has come up with a pretty extensive outline
on process in terms of studying this and getting to the point,
and I know you're currently moving. Are you guys communicating?
Are you giving us what we need in terms of a process so the
public can be guaranteed it's moving forward appropriately?
Yes, API.
Mr. Searles. Yes, thank you.
We, indeed, are moving forward with the development of a
standard that looks at classification of crude oil and what it
does is look at all of the aspects that need to be resolved.
There have been several questions that have come from PHMSA and
we're addressing those and any other questions that come up
during those meetings. So that is a group of scientists and
engineers, and railroads and PHMSA will be participating in
those meetings. In fact, they had somebody at the last meeting.
Senator Heitkamp. So we're building consensus on how we're
going to test this or what the standards are going to be, Ms.
Quarterman?
Ms. Quarterman. API has stepped forward to put together a
standards creation body. We are participating in that body. We
have, since we last met with Secretary Foxx, we have had a
series of meetings with crude oil representatives including
API, but also individual shippers to ask them what are the
characteristics of the crude. And I've had a series of
conversations over the past month with individual companies.
Some are providing information on that and we have told them
what we know about the crude so far.
And, you know, we did probably as many tests last week as
we had in the period before, so we will have a lot more
information after we get the results from that.
Senator Heitkamp. I think this is headed in the right
direction.
I just want to thank both the Chairman and the Ranking
Member for this extraordinary opportunity to participate and
ask if it's okay if I submit a statement for the record.
Senator Blumenthal. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Heitkamp follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Heidi Heitkamp,
U.S. Senator from North Dakota
Chairman Blumenthal, Ranking Member Blunt--thank you for organizing
this hearing on the critically important topic of rail safety.
Right after the Casselton derailment, I spoke with Senators Warner
and Blunt to request that this committee hold a comprehensive hearing
to examine rail safety--and they didn't hesitate to commit to
investigating the topic we will consider today.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate as a guest of your
subcommittee and, more importantly, thank you for you leadership and
responsiveness on this important issue facing the country.
Why We Need This Hearing
Our country is in the midst of an energy revolution, and North
Dakota is at the heart of it. Nearly a million barrels of oil are
produced in my state each day, and additional growth is expected in the
coming months and years.
This energy boom is dramatically changing our country. It is
putting us on the path to North American energy independence and
helping wean us off of foreign oil. It increasing the competitiveness
of American manufacturing. And it is providing thousands of jobs and
creating new wealth in the countryside.
But with all these benefits come additional costs. And just last
month in Casselton, North Dakota, we saw what can happen if we don't
properly manage those costs.
Transporting crude by rail was so different even just a few years
ago. Trains in the past would carry little if any crude. And when crude
was carried by rail, it was in relatively small amounts mixed in with a
diverse variety of grain and container shipments.
Shipments of rail by crude have increased exponentially over the
course of the previous five years. Trains have had to fill in where
other forms of energy transportation are lacking. According to the
Association of American Railroads, the number of railcars carrying
crude oil on major freight railroads in the U.S. grew by more than
6,000 percent between 2007 and 2013. Now we are seeing entire key
trains of tanker cars carrying more than half a million barrels of
crude to market.
It's past time for industry and regulators to respond appropriately
to the dramatic changes in the rail freight marketplace. I look forward
to hearing from the railroads and oil producers today on their thoughts
for the future of their respective industries. I also look forward to
hearing the thoughts of the DOT regulators on what they believe we need
to take to make the shipment of crude safer.
What I Hope to Learn From this Hearing
I've spoken with many of the officials and agencies here today. We
have talked about the derailment in Casselton as we seek to find out
what happened and learn about the steps that we can take to prevent
them from happening in the future. We have spoken about railcar safety
standards, train speed limits, accident clean up, routing, training for
first responders, the packaging of crude, track inspections--the list
goes on.
But you get my point--I've been looking into these issues since the
Lac Megantic derailment in Quebec last summer--even before the
derailment in Casselton. We were very fortunate no one was hurt as a
result of the Casselton derailment. But as we saw in Quebec, that isn't
always the case.
Today, I hope to get some more insight into these issues and hear
about them in a public forum. North Dakotans need to know that as
traffic continues to increase on our rail system, they will be safe in
their homes and communities. I'm committed to making sure that's the
case.
Understandably, rail safety is on the minds of many North Dakotans
following the Casselton derailment and subsequent explosions--and it's
certainly an issue I'm very focused on. For many of us in the Senate,
the Casselton derailment has trained our focus on efforts to improve
safety for the rail shipments of crude oil--and we need to consider all
angles to update needed standards and regulations.
To truly improve safety, we need to work together. An effective and
comprehensive response will require coordination and collaboration--
from the industry, Federal regulators, and local governments. Everyone
should want safety to be a top priority. And everyone should want to
make sure we hit needed deadlines to show that safety is our top
priority.
DOT should set that example by leading the way. There are multiple
jurisdictions within the DOT that are involved with the oversight and
policy setting for the rail shipment of crude. It will be important
that DOT provide the leadership to coordinate the activities of the
multiple agencies involved and play an active role in guaranteeing the
timely completion of the work of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Rail Administration (FRA)
to improve the safety of crude rail transportation.
I'm grateful to have Secretary Foxx at the helm, whom I believe is
up to the task.
Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute to this ongoing
discussion today.
Senator Heitkamp. Thank you so much.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you for joining us, Senator
Heitkamp, and thank you for your excellent questions.
Senator Hoeven.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up with Administrator Quarterman and
PHMSA. I did write, along with Senator Landrieu, in December
2012 and asked what you were doing and how soon we would get
the regulations, understand the regulatory requirements for
both the shipping industry, the shippers, as well as the
railroads, so that they could go from the DOT-111 cars to the
newer 1232 cars or whatever that model is going to be, what
those requirements are going to be. And so, I come back to you
today, and we've had some dialogue on it, but when are we going
to see that standard so that the industry has some certainty
and so we can move to the new cars as aggressively as possible?
Ms. Quarterman. As I've said several times today, we're
working very hard on getting that standard done, but a couple
of things, I think, are important to remember here. The first
is that the DOT-111 tank car itself was created in the 1960s
and has had modifications over that time. So we're talking
about a standard that could be in effect for decades.
So we really need to get this right and, as you've heard
from the panel today, from Vice Chairman Hart about his
concerns about the 1232, the AAR about their modifications to
their standards, and we're continuing, even though the
rulemaking period has closed, to hear comments from many other
stakeholders suggesting that the new standard should be
different from either the 111 or the 1232. We really have to
get all those comments together and look at the data and
determine what the right new standard is for whatever number
that new car because that's number one.
Number two, the other important point to make is, as we
have all said on this panel; this really requires a
comprehensive approach. Do we need to improve the 111 tank car?
Absolutely, we do. And we are working hard to make that happen,
but that is a mitigative step. We need to first concentrate on
prevention and do all these other things, like rerouting
trains, perhaps slowing them down as we have with the AAR
agreement, looking at braking mechanisms. We need to do all of
those things together to improve and we're working on that
hard.
Senator Hoeven. Ms. Quarterman, of course we do. And that's
what we've been talking about today. But I'm asking you when
you're going to move forward with the new standard? That's the
question I'm asking.
Ms. Quarterman. Well, as I said earlier, FRA and PHMSA
folks have been together working on a rule. We have a first
draft of a rule. They are working on, what we call, a
regulatory evaluation which is really the cost-benefit
analysis; an important part of that----
Senator Hoeven. Your rule has to go to OMB. Has that
happened yet?
Ms. Quarterman. It has not happened yet. No, it has not.
Senator Hoeven. And they've talked about having a proposed
rule out before the end of the year. Are you anticipating that
timeline?
Ms. Quarterman. I'm hopeful to beat that, yes.
Senator Hoeven. OK. Now I'm going to turn to Mr. Searles
and Mr. Hamberger.
How can you two help make this happen in a way where we get
it right and we get it done? And either one can start.
Mr. Hamberger. In my humble opinion, one way to do it would
be to split the rulemaking into two. Address the new tank car
standard and then deal with the retrofits. There is a two-year
backlog right now and those cars could be being built to a
standard that a year from now is not deemed adequate. It seems
to me that the message should be sent for certainty to, whether
it's a railroad or shipper, a leasing company, whoever is
buying a new car that this is the new car standard because it
does have to last for 25 or 30 years. There is not a great deal
of difference in the new car standard between some of the
stakeholders that are talking to PHMSA. So that would be one
thing that might be a way to show some progress. Because, the
issue of the retrofit and phase-out, there are different types
of DOT-111s; some of them actually have a jacket.
And so, how do you deal with that? And, you know, what
product is this for? And that, I think, is taking a lot of
resources but it would just be an unasked-for thought, but
since you asked that, maybe that would be one way to move
forward at least on the new tank car standard.
Senator Hoeven. Mr. Searles.
Mr. Searles. Yes, thank you.
I think that there are opportunities to move forward now
with what we had consensus with 3 years ago. Those are safe
cars; those are what are being built today; those are the
things that will be the state-of-the-art. To that end, an
interim final rule could be put forward today and you wouldn't
have to worry about consistency and certainty taking place at
that point. I agree that if you were looking at retrofits and
those, there is more study that needs to be done. All of this
needs to be done in a holistic and systematic way, as
Administrator Quarterman suggested, because classification also
has an impact to the tank car design. And we need to be able to
get all of that information so that we are doing the right
thing at the right time.
Senator Hoeven. We had a meeting about 30 days ago with the
regulators, with the railroads and with the shippers and we
talked about a comprehensive plan with both short-term and
long-term steps. We need to work together, we need to get it
right, we need to be comprehensive, and we need to make this
happen.
I'd like to thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member, not
only for holding this hearing but I brought up the positive
train control issue. Mr. Blackwell, I would strongly recommend
that FCC put forward a plan to this committee as to how they're
going to work with the railroads to actually facilitate or to
empower them to get the PTC in place by the end of 2015. I
think that there's a lot of confusion here on how that can
actually happen. And it seems to me, you've got to show the
path whereby the railroad is able to respond. They have a
responsibility, obviously, to do it. The one question I'd ask
is, will there be a different standard for freight and
passenger trains with PTC or will that be a consistent
standard?
Mr. Blackwell. No. The freight train would be able to be
treated the same--oh, sorry. It'd be the same standard.
Senator Hoeven. So, it would be the same standard?
Mr. Blackwell. Same standard, yes.
Senator Hoeven. Well, I'd strongly urge that some
visibility on this path--I think Senator Blunt did a marvelous
job of laying it out. I don't understand how that's going to
work yet. But if we're going to have a comprehensive plan that
both prevents derailments to the extent possible and then we
make sure that we reduce the risk of fire or explosion or other
risks, as well as having a strong emergency response, we've got
to have positive train control. So just like we've got to move
forward on the tank car standards, we've got to move forward
with things like PTC; as well as the technology, Mr. Szabo. And
we're going to try to help in terms of making sure that there's
funding to do it but with both people and technology to
inspect.
So, Mr. Blackwell, you were going to say something and I'll
wrap up here, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Blackwell. I was going to say, just to add, Senator,
that many commuter rails are installing a different type of PTC
system and can use existing infrastructure to deploy and
because it's a much smaller order of magnitude are utilizing
our existing system right now.
Mr. Szabo. Senator, if I may, just two comments.
I mean, first off, thank you for bringing up technology as
did Senator Heitkamp. While I touched on it in my testimony, I
would truly appreciate additional questions for the record to
allow me to talk about that quite a bit more because our R&D
program and advancing technology is going to be a critical
piece of driving the next generation of safety. And two, the
debate on PTC. The challenges with siting the towers just adds
one more reason why my agency needs the power to do provisional
certification so we can get as many pieces, you know, as much
deployed as quickly as possible, you know, and get up and
achieve those safety benefits.
Senator Hoeven. We'll work with you on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Senator Hoeven.
I think we're going to want all of you back and we're going
to want you back soon. We're going to want to drill down--
forgive me for using the oil well analogy.
[Laughter.]
Senator Blumenthal. We don't have oil wells in Connecticut
so I feel safe in using that term. But we do have freight, by
the way. We have ten private freight railroad companies and
they're moving ethanol. As a matter of fact, the amount of
ethanol has grown from zero in 2011, to about 340 loads a month
over two rail lines in 2012.
So the issues that have been raised here, in terms of
moving crude oil and moving fuel, are increasing in urgency and
importance. And, just to follow up Senator Hoeven's comments,
you know, a number of you said we need to get it right. Nobody
disagrees that we need to get it right; we do need to get it
right, but we need to get it done. And the delays that we've
seen, for whatever the reasons, are putting people at risk.
They're putting products and freight at risk, but they're also
putting people at risk.
And so, we need to develop a way to make this system work
better. There has been general agreement that more authority
and more resources are necessary. There will be questions for
the record. I'm glad you raised that issue, Mr. Szabo. And I'm
glad you would welcome them. We're going to keep the record
open and a number of us will have questions for the record.
I don't want to prolong this hearing now. I began by
asking, Mr. Szabo, whether you could tell us anything about the
results of Operation Deep Dive.
Mr. Szabo. Yes. I committed that to you. We will have that
report issued. Our deadline is March 17. We're endeavoring to
meet that deadline and I promised you a personal briefing and
that is still my commitment.
And rest assured, while we're in the process of analyzing
everything that's in the report, we're not just sitting back
and waiting. We, in fact, have been in near daily contact with
Metro-North on things that we believe deserve immediate
improvement. And while there'll certainly be a, you know, a
list of recommendations and perhaps other actions coming out of
the report, we're not waiting for the issuants to issue all of
those recommendations. We need fixes in real-time.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
Well, fixes in real time is the message. And they have got
to be real fixes in much realer time.
And thank you all for being here today. Thank you to my
colleagues, particularly Senator Blunt, for participating and
thank you to the panel.
This hearing is closed.
[Whereupon, at 1:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of the City of Fargo
Chairman Blumenthal and Ranking Member Blunt,
In the past eight months there have been four train derailments
involving cars carrying crude oil, three of which resulted in fire.
Only one of those events resulted in the loss of life but the potential
in the others was great.
The derailment in Lac-Megantic first caught our attention last
July. Our City Administrator, Pat Zavoral, and I met to discuss
possible issues related to rail traffic as crude oil trains can be seen
passing through the City of Fargo several times each day. We reached
out to BNSF and held a teleconference with them to discuss the issues.
Our first concern is the monitoring and maintenance of the rail
lines that pass through Fargo. The shifting soils have long been noted
to be a problem within our community. We were told the number of trains
that pass through our community on a daily basis, are over 100 and
climbing. This emphasizes the need to have a high level of security and
extra maintenance efforts for the rail lines.
The speed of trains that travel through our community is a concern
as well. We recognize the impact that slowing and speeding up have on
the travel time of the trains, but our main concern is the safety of
the citizens around the rail lines. We have a full understanding of
physics and the results of higher speeds and the resulting damage to
the cars and adjacent properties when trains derail. Speed is a major
component when we study the anatomy of a crash or derailment and we
believe that slower speeds in major urban areas are essential to public
safety.
We recognize that slower speeds will make for a longer wait time at
a rail crossing. Continued efforts to upgrade protection at grade
crossings are essential. Grade crossings need to be looked at all along
the lines not just within the borders of cities. This is evident to me
daily, when the driving public will take the risk to quickly pass
before a train reaches the crossing. Each time an engineer has to take
emergency measures to slow a train to avoid a potential crash there
becomes another opportunity to fatigue the parts on the cars and cause
issues further down the line.
The construction of the cars that carry crude is another area of
concern. Everything we are learning about Bakken Crude Oil is that it
is more flammable, has lower ignition points, and lower flash points.
It is imperative for the public's safety that this material is treated
and transported in a manner will commensurate with the volatility of
the product. As newer, safer cars are built it is important that the
railroad industry looks closely at the car's features as they put
trains together.
Recent discussions about railcar safety have indicated that new
cars should have more protection at the bulkheads as well as better
protection for the valves and other assemblies on the cars. The
suggestions here are welcome, however; it is imperative that as train
cars are arranged the old design and new designed cars will not be
placed in close proximity to each other. The concern that we have is
that an old car involved in a derailment will tear open and potentially
ignite the crude inside.
If a new car is the next car in the line, the protection that is
afforded in that car could potentially be of great danger to responders
to the incident. It is our fear that the newly designed car may act
more like a pressurized vehicle if there is direct flame impingement on
that car. As the crude inside heats and the pressure builds, the
potential is there for a more violent and catastrophic explosion of
that car. It would be our hope that only like constructed cars will be
put in sequence when placing together a crude or ethanol train.
The causes for all of the past derailments are different, from
human error to broken equipment to weather. We will never be able to
predict the next derailment or its cause. I believe it is imperative
that congress work with the railroad to implement Positive Train
Control (PTC). This will allow for earlier detection of issues along
the line and will be able to slow the train traffic in an area if a
problem is noted.
This is of particular concern to Fargo as we have several trains
that pass each other as they pass through our community. If we have a
derailment of a train within the community, any measures that we can
provide to prevent a potential issue should be put in place.
We recognize the impact that the railroad has had in the
development of our country. We recognize the impact that the railroad
will have in the future expansion of our economy and interstate
commerce. We support the use of rail to move products throughout our
country. The BNSF has been a great partner with the Fargo Fire
Department and we appreciate the support that we receive from them. As
you consider measures that regulate railroad industry, we ask that you
do so with public safety and the safety of first responders in mind.
Thank you for your time,
Steven J. Dirksen,
Fire Chief,
City of Fargo, ND.
Cc: U.S. Senator Heidi Heitkamp
U.S. Senator John Hoeven
U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar
______
Prepared Statement of Bruce Bennett, President,
Stage 8 Locking Fasteners
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Minority Member:
Thank you very much for including my statement in the official
record of this oversight hearing.
Stage 8 Locking Fasteners is a small business located in San
Rafael, California. The company has been designing and manufacturing
only locking systems for standard and custom fasteners for a wide range
of industrial application for 30 years. These industrial applications
include power generation and distribution, automotive, construction
equipment, farm machinery, and military applications to include
critical applications on the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV).
Railroad applications of Stage 8 Locking systems include locomotive
components, critical track fasteners for crossings, switches and other
components. All Stage 8 locking systems are designed to improve safety
while increasing reliability.
I would like to address a railroad safety issue that could
ultimately affect the lives and safety of thousands of people. From
2001 through 2010, the Federal Railroad Administration reported that
there were some 8,092 derailments on U.S. railroads. The third largest
cause was mechanical problems with the wheel sets. The remainder were
caused by track defects, signal failures, miscellaneous and human
factors. My company, Stage 8 Locking Fasteners, has worked closely with
the Wheels, Axels, Bearings, and Lubrication (WABL) Committee of the
American Association of Railroads (AAR) on an important safety device,
a new Roller Bearing Cap Screw Locking Plate, which has been approved
as an alternative to the standard locking plate. We have developed this
system to prevent future derailments caused by loose roller bearings,
focusing on the failure modes of freight car and passenger car wheel
sets. We found through testing that vibrations associated with railroad
use regularly loosened fasteners (e.g., nuts and bolts) in railway
rolling stock, track and bridge structures. As a result, we have
developed a safety system that ensures against cap screw fastener
loosening and the resulting bearing failure. Roller Bearing Cap Screws
are an important safety device which, when kept tight, significantly
decrease failures of Roller Bearing components and derailments.
In 2011, Stage 8 made two very impressive ``hands-on''
demonstrations of their new safety system to individuals in the Offices
of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), specifically in the
Motive Power and Equipment Division within the Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, as well as to the Deputy Associate FRA
Director. The end result of those meetings was the recognition that the
safety solution presented to them was indeed an ``excellent solution''
in preventing future derailments. However, in both meetings, the FRA
claimed ``their hands were tied'' because they had no regulatory power
to influence the disposition of this type of equipment and that it was
the job of the railroad industry to police their own.
We are aware that the AAR has adopted a Manual of Standards
(industry voluntary standards), designed to ensure safe operation of
railroads and rail cars. One of its standards does mandate the torque
values when applying the cap screws on the various end caps, on freight
car wheels, and additionally mandates the breakaway torque, that should
be there, when they remove the wheels for servicing. It is highly
questionable the extent to which rail car companies are complying with
the maintenance and replacement policies under this AAR voluntary
industry standard. The FRA currently mandates that cars be removed from
service if an end cap screw is loose, however it is my understanding
that there is currently no way to check for loose cap screws prior to
failure, and that this requirement is currently not enforced or
enforceable. Our new Cap Screw Locking System provides for visual
inspection which, at a glance, tells if the cap screw remains properly
torqued.
This safety locking system would prevent future derailments caused
by roller bearing failure due to loosening cap screws, focusing on the
failure modes of freight rail cars, as well as passenger cars. One of
the company's experts--who was previously a Mechanical Design Engineer
in the Mechanical Department of the Southern Pacific Transportation
Company--spent the majority of his time analyzing the causes of
derailments. He found that vibrations associated with railroad use
regularly loosened fasteners (e.g., nuts and bolts) in railway rolling
stock, track and bridge structures. As a result, years later the
President and Founder of Stage 8 developed a safety system that would
ensure against fastener loosening and derailments from premature
rollerbearing failure caused by those loose fasteners.
The Roller Bearing Manufacturers Engineering Committee (RBMEC)
reports that 23 percent of all bearing Failure Progression Modes (FPM)
are coded 'LO' for loose. The Stage 8 Cap Screw Locking system (CSLS)
prevents loose roller bearings and provides a significant safety
improvement. Canadian National Railroad internal MD-11 reports further
support this data.
Stage 8 subjected its safety locking system to a rigorous field
test over the period from October 2010 to July 2013. Present at the
test were John Hyde and Gerry Kubicka from Stage 8, Dr. Todd Snyder
representing WABL, Dwight Porter, Justin Schrewsberry and shop
personnel from Progress Rail. Attached is a summary of the test
results. The highlights of the results are highly significant:
Stage 8 and WABL conducted the tests over 150,000 miles
hauling coal from Wyoming to Missouri.
An equal number of wheel sets were equipped with the Stage 8
Cap Screw Locking Systems (CSLS) and compared to the legacy cap
screw locking systems installed on the other wheel set on the
same truck.
Twenty-nine percent of the wheel sets equipped with the
standard locking plates were removed from service within 30
days prior to the residual torque tests due to various failure
reasons and were therefore not available for testing--
classified as failed and removed.
No Stage 8 wheel sets were taken out of service, for any
reason, during the over 150,000 mile test period.
All of the wheel sets equipped with the Stage 8 Cap Screw
Locking System retained 100 percent of the initial torque
applied
Only 20 percent of the wheel sets equipped with the legacy
cap screw locking system retained over 90 percent of the
initial torque applied.
74 percent of the wheel sets equipped with the legacy system
retained between 50 percent and 90 percent of the initial
torque applied.
7 percent of the wheel sets equipped with the legacy cap
screw locking system suffered total failure.
The cost-benefit analysis of this technology demonstrates how this
safety system could save the railroad industry millions of dollars. The
analysis states:
The overall cost to the railroad industry of wheel sets due to
loosening roller bearing components was a staggering
$223,590,820 in 2010 based on the number of wheel sets changed
and the $1,940 cost per wheel set. According to a 2009
University of Illinois Engineering Department study,
derailments caused by loosening resulted in additional annual
costs of $6.2 million. Derailment costs are not included in
this analysis; however, the safety improvements of the CSLS
must be taken into consideration when analyzing the overall
advantages of the CSLS.
It is estimated that installation of the CSLS will be completed
on the entire fleet of 1,363,423 freight cars over a period of
seven years, at a cost of $30,930,225 per year. This cost would
be offset by the savings of $38,580,735 in the first year
alone, resulting in the return of the initial investment plus
$7,650,511. The overall net savings over the first seven years
averages $607.61 per car for each and every car in the fleet.
The end result is an annual return of $7 for every $1 invested
in equipping a car with the CSLS.
In March of 2011, Stage 8 presented this system to engineering
experts in the Federal Rail Administration's Motive Power & Equipment
Division of the Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance. The FRA
officials assured us our safety system was an ``excellent solution'' to
the problem and would certainly prevent future derailments due to loose
bearings. However, notwithstanding the merits of our safety system, the
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance then informed us that the FRA
could do nothing to ensure the railcar industry takes a hard look at
this life-saving technology.
We are astounded that a Federal agency charged with the
responsibility of ensuring the safety of freight and passenger rail
transportation admits to not having sufficient regulatory authority to
take appropriate measures to prevent train derailments and cannot
enforce existing regulations requiring the removal of wheel sets when
they do not function properly.
In the best interests of railroad safety, I would request that, in
developing any broad rail safety legislation that legislative authority
be included in the bill instructing the Federal Railroad Administration
to commence in a rulemaking that would incorporate the current AAR
safety standards as part of the agency's mandatory rules to enable the
FRA to enforce these standards. Railroad companies and companies that
own and operate freight and passenger rail cars would be required to
comply with specific torque values for the end cap screws at
installation and during service where it is most needed to ensure
against premature or catastrophic failure, and upon removal.
I would also like to request that reports and studies
substantiating the nature of the problem addressed in my testimony and
attached to my statement also be included in the hearing record.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. The FRA's Operation Deep Dive, which is a 60 day
comprehensive review of Metro-North's safety practices and standards,
commenced on December 16, 2013 and was released on March 14, 2014. The
FRA examined all safety related aspects of Metro-North Railroad
including track quality, inspection methodology and quality of repair,
signaling and train control functionality, and protection for on track
crews. What can you share with us today about what the FRA has learned
from its comprehensive review about Metro-North's safety culture?
Answer. FRA learned that Metro-North had an unhealthy safety
culture. They placed an emphasis on on-time performance, to the
detriment of safety: track inspections were rushed, Metro-North track
maintenance standards were not met, and mainline efficiency tests were
not conducted so as to not adversely impact on-time performance. These
issues were part of a faulty culture that Metro-North allowed to
develop.
FRA learned that Metro-North had no office or department, including
its Safety Department, that proactively advocated for safety. No Metro-
North office or department actively searched for unsafe conditions and
practices, and once they were discovered, no one took ownership to
ensure effective remediation.
FRA also learned that safety-related training and management
oversight were deficient across departments.
FRA provided its detailed findings and recommendations in a report
to Congress by March 17, 2014.
Question 2. In a report published on April 17, 2013 the DOT
Inspector General evinced findings that the FRA was delayed on issuing
rules that Congress directed in the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
(RSIA). At the time of the report, FRA had not issued 9 of the 17 final
rules mandated by RSIA.
The DOT IG report also found that there were inefficiencies in the
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee or RSAC process, namely that there
were breakdowns in communication between FRA and the RSAC on several
rulemakings and that certain critical documents were not shared with
the stakeholders sitting on the RSAC.
Because of these issues, the Inspector General concluded that the
``delayed promulgation of the RSIA required rules has delayed the
mitigation of railroad industry safety hazards that Congress intended
the rules to address.''
The FRA, in January, did issue final rules for adjacent track work
and rail integrity. FRA has also announced its plan to begin the
rulemaking process for inward and outward facing cameras. This leaves 8
rules left for the FRA to issue. Why hasn't the FRA done everything it
can to protect passengers?
Anyone who rides the rail in this country deserves a safe and
reliable service. I am deeply concerned by the apparent failings at FRA
to heed important safety recommendations by Congress and the NTSB, our
Nation's top Federal safety organization. The NTSB has been calling for
cameras in and on trains since 2008. It's 2014; why have you not acted?
It's baffling that it took a major derailment in New York in December
to get the FRA to commit to requiring cameras. I'm concerned that
regulatory capture is getting in the way of the FRA's work, which is
absolutely critical to protecting the traveling public. If you can
simply issue an emergency order requiring cameras, why not do that?
Commuters deserve more. What is the status of the inward/outward facing
camera rule? What is the plan? What is the timeline for action? Action
appears to be missing.
What is the status of other delayed rules like the training
standards for railroad employees rule? The FRA should be doing
everything it can to protect passengers; but the failure to require
even basic safety recommendations from the NTSB concerns me, many of my
colleagues and many of the constituents I've spoken with.
What are inefficiencies in the rulemaking process that you can
improve to cut down the time it takes to develop new rules? Does the
RSAC process work? Do you agree that the FRA has a problem with
regulatory capture--if not, why not?
Answer. FRA continues to act diligently in completing its
regulatory workload, placing a priority on those rulemakings that will
most effectively advance safety, particularly those required by
Congressional mandate.
As to how to reduce ``the inefficiencies of the rulemaking
process'' in general, FRA has to strike a balance between speed and
quality. ``Quality'' includes adherence to demanding procedural and
substantive legal requirements. As you know, all three branches of the
Federal Government--Congress, the courts, and the Executive Branch--
have established certain mandatory procedures and substantive
requirements related to the rulemaking process (i.e., the development
and issuance of regulations, including FRA safety regulations). With
few exceptions, before FRA is permitted to issue a final rule, there
must be public notice of the proposal and an opportunity for public
comment; a reasonable response to any public comments; an articulated,
rational basis for the rule; and consistency of the rule with any
applicable laws.
For many FRA rulemakings, other Federal agencies and offices are
part of the clearance process: these draft rulemaking documents,
cleared by FRA staff and by me as Administrator, go into a pipeline
that extends from this agency to the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation, which circulates the document to other agencies and
offices within the Department, and then to the Office of Management and
Budget, where the draft rule is circulated to relevant non-DOT agencies
and offices.
Costs and benefits of a draft proposed rule and draft final rule
must be identified, analyzed, and weighed against each other. This
evaluation can be very complex, but provides critical information to
decision makers, reviewers, and the public. It should also be noted
that the complex nature of the administrative review process for draft
rulemaking documents means that widening one part of the pipeline
(e.g., by adding resources) is not enough to expedite issuance of a
rule if the rest of the pipeline remains narrow; the delay simply
occurs at a different stage of the process. After FRA issues a final
rule, FRA's procedural rules provide for the filing of petitions for
reconsideration, a vehicle through which litigation is often avoided,
thus conserving administrative and judicial resources. A final rule is
also subject to judicial review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and may
be set aside by the court. (By contrast, NTSB does not issue rules; it
issues recommendations, and these recommendations are not subject to
notice and comment, cost-benefit analysis, or judicial review.)
Regarding inward- or outward-facing cameras, it is important to
note they would not have prevented the December 1 Spuyten Duyvil
derailment. FRA acted appropriately with Emergency Order 29 to require
those measures that had a direct relationship to the accident and would
provide immediate safety benefits to Metro-North's operation. While
Congress could have mandated a camera when it passed the RSIA in 2008,
it chose not to, so congressionally mandated rulemakings were given
priority in the rulemaking process. FRA does believe that inward-and
outward-facing cameras can provide value and will assist in accident
investigations. That is why in the summer of 2013, while giving
priority to finishing the 42 Congressional mandates established in the
RSIA, FRA was involved in various camera projects occurring in the
industry. Based on what we learned, FRA placed this issue on our
internal rulemaking agenda in November of 2013 for action in 2014. As
planned, the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) has accepted the
task of formulating recommendations on the appropriate design and use
of locomotive-mounted cameras and will begin RSAC working group
meetings on the topic this summer, with recommendations due early next
year.
You asked whether FRA has a problem with ``regulatory capture.'' I
can assure you that it does not. FRA is a data-driven agency, dedicated
to achieving its safety mission for the good of the public, and subject
to the highest ethical standards. FRA works tremendously hard to ensure
that it prioritizes its rulemaking endeavors to address the most
safety-critical issues in the timeliest fashion. Given the 42
individual mandates imposed on the agency in the RSIA, FRA has utilized
its limited resources in an efficient manner in order to advance and
address the safety needs of the country and industry in a timely
fashion. During the five-year period from February 1, 2009, to January
31, 2014, FRA published approximately 76 major regulatory documents,
including 66 advance notices of proposed rulemaking, notices of
proposed rulemaking (NPRMs), and final rules; 3 emergency orders; and 7
interpretations, for an average of more than 15 major regulatory
documents per year. We are also actively involved in many pending
rulemakings, including one on fatigue management, which will address
the issue of sleep apnea and other fatigue-related issues.
We believe our approach to handling and prioritizing rulemakings
has increased the level of safety across the industry. This is
evidenced by the historically low accident statistics during the last
ten calendar years. During this period, total derailments decreased 48
percent, total train accidents decreased 48 percent, and total highway-
rail grade crossing accidents decreased 32 percent. The year 2012 had
record low numbers of train accidents, and that safety record was
surpassed in 2013. But we always owe the public better. Our goal is to
drive continuous safety improvement. We expect this of ourselves and we
expect it of the industry we regulate.
You also asked if the RSAC process works. The RSAC process not only
works, it is vital--especially for the difficult issues, which we tend
to propose be handled there. It ensures the highest level of
transparency and provides the highest level of public input. A
chartered advisory committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
RSAC includes representatives of stakeholders throughout the railroad
industry (rail labor, rail management, rail suppliers, rail passengers,
State rail safety programs, and other organizations), and ensures that
FRA hears a wide range of opinions early in the rulemaking process so
that proposals are appropriately vetted early, clarified, and
communicated. The RSAC's meetings are also open to the general public,
announced in the Federal Register, and part of the agency's public
docket system. The RSAC process saves time--especially at the end of
the process--by making the cost-benefit analysis more accurate,
minimizing petitions for reconsideration, and creating a rule that is
understood by the regulated community.
Regarding the current status of the rulemakings mandated by the
RSIA, I refer you to a list attached to my prepared testimony,
enumerating the FRA rulemakings completed as of today (March 6, 2014),
that were mandated, explicitly or implicitly, by RSIA. Here is the
status to date of the remaining RSIA-mandated rulemakings:
1. The critical incidents final rule was in the final stages of
review at FRA.
2. The training standards final rule was in review in the Executive
Branch.
3. The system safety plan final rule was being reviewed within FRA.
4. The NPRM on risk reduction plans was being reviewed within the
Department of Transportation.
5. The NPRM to extend the alcohol and drug rule to maintenance-of-
way workers had been redesignated by OMB as non-significant and
was expected to be published in April.
6. The emergency escape breathing apparatus final rule was delayed
due to competing priorities and need to reexamine data for an
economical option to comply with the RSIA.
7. The dark territory rule was being held in abeyance because
technology implementation plans expected in railroads' risk
reduction and system safety plans will likely make the rule
unnecessary for safety. (The mandate is for either a rule or
guidance.)
Question 3. As a result of Metro-North's series of recent accidents
in the past year, the FRA issued several orders and recommendations to
Metro-North to improve its safety standards in the short term. FRA
ordered a safety stand down for Metro-North, directed the railroad to
implement a confidential reporting system for employees, and issued an
emergency order to Metro-North to modify its signal system at critical
curves on the rail line.
Most of the public orders and recommendations only came after
Metro-North experienced its 4th major incident. Where was the FRA last
spring? What actions did you immediately take after the first
derailment in May 2013 in Bridgeport? The FRA seemed pretty quiet only
until the December incident--what specific steps did you take
immediately after the Bridgeport derailment to improve safety and
reliability at our Nation's largest public transit provider?
What assurances can you give to us today and to the commuting
public that Metro-North has a trustworthy level of safety while FRA
rules are being developed and finalized?
Is there sufficient reason to have confidence in this railroad in
the short-term while we develop long-term solutions?
Answer. Following the May 2013 Bridgeport derailment, on June 2, I
personally met with Metro-North President Howard Permut to discuss
concerns about their safety culture and the need to implement a
confidential close calls reporting program. From May through November
2013, FRA conducted 245 inspections on the Metro-North system, and
conducted a focused inspection of Metro-North's Roadway Worker
Protection. Given that the joint NTSB-FRA investigation is focusing on
a failure in a compromise joint in the track, FRA increased track
inspections utilizing FRA track inspectors and an FRA Automated Track
Inspection Program (ATIP) vehicle, which FRA uses to inspect track to
determine whether the track conforms with the track geometry standards
set in FRA's Track Safety Standards (49 C.F.R. part 213) (e.g., proper
gage). (Between June 3-20, FRA's ATIP car covered the entire Metro-
North territory.)
On June 26, FRA facilitated a meeting on compromise joints hosted
by Metro-North. In addition to Metro-North, participating railroads
included Amtrak, Long Island Rail Road, New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, and Port Authority Trans-Hudson. The agenda covered
compromise-joint protocol including inspection and maintenance, an FRA
presentation on joint bar inspection technology, and a general
discussion to identify best practices. This was followed by a second
meeting with Metro-North, Amtrak, and Long Island Rail Road to discuss
automated track inspection technology, with FRA again presenting.
Metro-North indicated it would explore possible utilization of an
automated ride-monitoring system to supplement periodic track-geometry
surveys.
On July 12, in a meeting with Metro-North President Howard Permut,
FRA stressed that safety must take priority over on-time performance.
Mud conditions on the Harlem Line were discussed, along with Positive
Train Control for the New Haven Line, between New Rochelle and New
Haven (on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor), and Metro-North's
reconsideration of the possibility of participating in FRA's voluntary
Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C\3\RS) program. Mr. Permut
responded by noting the existence of numerous capital projects
(bridges, stations, catenary, rail, and ties) and the absence or near-
absence of funding from the State of Connecticut and the Federal
Government.
Throughout Operation Deep Dive, the FRA teams met regularly with
Metro-North leadership and staff. Where appropriate and practicable,
Metro-North immediately implemented corrective actions in response to
the safety concerns that FRA identified.
To provide an update to my March 6, 2014, testimony, Metro-North's
new president has fully accepted FRA's March 17, 2014, Deep Dive
Report, its findings, and directed actions and recommendations; has
fully acknowledged the problems confronting the railroad; and has
committed to working with FRA to restore the railroad to a level of
safety preeminence. In light of this, FRA has confidence that progress
is being achieved and will continue to be achieved.
FRA will be conducting 30-day progress meetings to track Metro-
North's advancement in addressing the safety issues identified through
Operation Deep Dive and other actions to enhance safety. In addition,
the FRA Deep Dive teams are returning to the Metro-North to observe and
document the railroad's actions in response to FRA's findings. Some of
FRA's directed actions and recommendations can be achieved in the short
term; for others, more time is needed. The safety culture of the
organization cannot be changed overnight, but there is reason to be
confident that safety will be improved in both the short and long term,
with the management of Metro-North, the railroad's employees, FRA, and
other interested stakeholders working together.
Question 4. Following Metro-North's incidents and coming
immediately in the aftermath of the Spuyten Duyvil derailment, the FRA
was able to issue several safety directives to Metro-North but was only
able to issue an Emergency Order for the modification of the railroad's
signal system. According to your office, Emergency Orders are difficult
to issue, as there have only been 29 in the FRA's history. An Emergency
Order for the other safety directives, for instance the confidential
close call reporting system, could have been extremely beneficial for
reasons of greater enforcement and oversight to ensure compliance. Does
the FRA need more authority from Congress to be able to issue Emergency
Orders more easily? Do you lack authority in other areas that Congress
should review to help the FRA protect passengers?
Answer. FRA's existing statutory authority to issue emergency
orders, as well as other safety orders and regulations, properly
requires an assessment that addresses all aspects of the public
interest. The statutory language conferring the authority to issue an
emergency order reads, in part, as follows:
(1) If, through testing, inspection, investigation, or research
carried out under [49 U.S.C. chapter 201], the Secretary of
Transportation decides that an unsafe condition or practice, or
a combination of unsafe conditions and practices, causes an
emergency situation involving a hazard of death, personal
injury, or significant harm to the environment, the Secretary
immediately may order restrictions and prohibitions, without
regard to section 20103(e) of this title [i.e., prior notice
and an opportunity for comment and oral presentation] that may
be necessary to abate the situation.
(2) The order shall describe the condition or practice, or a
combination of conditions and practices, that causes the
emergency situation and prescribe standards and procedures for
obtaining relief from the order. * * *
49 U.S.C. 20104(a). The statute sets a high bar for issuing an
emergency order, because it is issued without prior public notice and
an opportunity for public comment. In that sense, it is difficult to
issue an emergency order. An emergency order represents final agency
action, which is subject to review both administratively and in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. 49 U.S.C. 20104(b), 20114(c).
FRA's Emergency Order 29 was appropriate to address the immediate
safety issues identified in the most effective way. In particular,
Emergency Order 29 required Metro-North to take immediate action to
prevent excessive train speeds by (1) identifying and prioritizing
high-risk areas where operating rules required speeds to be reduced by
more than 20 mph, (2) modifying its existing signal system to ensure
speed limits are obeyed, and (3) ensuring a higher level of engagement
and communication among operating crewmembers in higher risk locations.
To date, FRA has not identified any instances of noncompliance with
Emergency Order 29.
Issuance of an emergency order to mandate a C\3\RS program on the
railroad would have been inappropriate and unproductive. A confidential
close call reporting program only works if an organization has ``buy
in'' from employees and management at all levels so that it is
voluntary, and only if appropriate protections are in place to ensure
that employees have a confidential, discipline-free method to report
close call events. It is not a quick fix. It is meant to provide
valuable data that can be analyzed to improve safety over time.
Notably, new leadership at Metro-North has agreed to implement a
C\3\RS program, and FRA is currently in the development and
implementation of such a program.
Question 5. According to a 2012 report by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), FRA is only able to inspect about 1
percent of the Nation's tracks each year with the resources they are
allocated.
The agency's rail-safety oversight framework relies on inspections
to ensure railroads comply with Federal safety regulations. FRA
inspects railroad infrastructure and operations, identifies safety
defects, and may cite railroads for violations.
The GAO has found that the FRA faces three major rail safety
challenges--(1) implementation of its oversight of mandated safety
measures and new railroad risk reduction plans, (2) adjusting to
changing rail traffic flows, and (3) ensuring it has enough inspectors
for its current and future oversight workload.
Mr. Szabo: Has the FRA been able to increase the percentage of
track inspected in one year since 2012? What can be done to increase
this coverage? How much will the additional funding in the Safety and
Operations Budget help?
Answer. In FY 2014, FRA received $184.5 million for its Safety and
Operations account, an increase of $15 million from FY 2013. This
increase will allow FRA to hire 45 new staff and should enable FRA to
have roughly 350 inspectors on board by the end of this fiscal year. By
strategically using safety data, FRA assigns its inspectors across its
eight regions and five safety disciplines to help ensure maximum safety
benefits. To do this, FRA uses a mathematical staffing allocation model
that is driven by statistical analysis, and then adjusts the allocation
based on knowledge of local conditions and emerging safety issues.
Question 6. Does the FRA use any automated inspection technology to
oversee safety of the U.S. railroads?
Answer. Yes. The primary automated inspection technology that FRA
uses to oversee safety of the U.S. railroads is the ATIP program, which
I described briefly earlier. The broad purpose of the ATIP program is
to minimize the risk and severity of a train accident, which
potentially includes a catastrophic hazardous materials incident, by
accurately collecting and distributing track geometry information and
intelligence, both to FRA and to the railroads whose track is being
inspected by FRA. The data collected by the ATIP cars provides
supplemental assistance to all railroad inspectors through advance
detection of potential accident-causing hazards by identifying
noncompliant and unsafe track geometry locations and conditions needing
evaluation and remediation. ATIP prioritizes its surveys to maximize
its capability to detect potential accident-causing hazards on higher
risk routes, such as passenger, hazardous material, and higher speed
track. The accurate track geometry information is disseminated to FRA
and respective railroads for evaluation and remediation to minimize the
risk of a passenger train accident or catastrophic hazardous material
train accident.
FRA also anticipates the potential need for ATIP to support
requests from other U.S. Government agencies for track inspections,
such as we have gotten in the past. These agencies include the
Department of Energy (track inspections prior to rail shipments of
nuclear fuel) and the Department of Defense (route surveys of the
Strategic Rail Corridor Network, or STRACNET (which is an
interconnected and continuous rail line network consisting of more than
36,000 miles of track serving more than 130 defense installations)). In
addition, FRA provides support for the Department of State.
The ATIP survey miles for the past four years are listed in the
table below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak Assessment
Calendar ATIP Enforcement (2010-2012)/ Remote Total Miles
Year operation (2013)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 52,760 29,245 82,005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 42,717 34,224 76,941
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012 53,225 21,896 75,121
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 40,523 16,561 57,084
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 7. What technology does the FRA use to detect early signs
of troubles before they become accidents?
Answer. FRA is also working with railroads and labor organizations
to implement voluntary programs to collect information about safety
issues before they develop into accidents. Railroads that use the
C\3\RS, for example, let their employees anonymously report unsafe
track (and other) conditions to supplement FRA's ATIP inspections,
FRA's regulatory inspections, and the carriers' own track inspections.
C\3\RS is a key piece of FRA's efforts to proactively improve safety.
It is designed to improve railroad safety practices by collecting and
studying confidential close call reports detailing unsafe conditions or
events, and developing and implementing targeted corrective actions. At
its core, C\3\RS is voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive. FRA is
currently engaged in expanding the program nationwide. C\3\RS programs
are actively running on the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the
National Passenger Railroad Corporation (Amtrak), New Jersey Transit
Rail Operations, and the Strasburg Rail Road, and FRA is working with
additional railroads, including Metro-North, and the Long Island Rail
Road, to implement program sites.
FRA also provides oversight of the rail inspection technology
utilized by the railroads to perform rail inspections through the
agency's Rail and Infrastructure Integrity Division. The Rail Integrity
Branch within the Rail and Infrastructure Integrity Division was
established to provide FRA oversight on railway non-destructive
inspection technologies for detection of internal rail flaws and for
other rail-related maintenance programs. This branch performs onsite
inspections, investigations, and/or evaluations to determine the
effectiveness of railroads' programs that address the inspection,
maintenance, and replacement of rail.
The branch provides oversight into the capabilities of the
industry's various computerized non-destructive rail-inspection
systems, the training and experience of the flaw detector car
operators, and the accuracy of the defect verification/identification
process utilized by the test car operator. Exposure to all phases of
these processes has considerably increased total FRA safety oversight
within the industry.
As one example of how the Rail Integrity Branch is developing
expertise that will potentially improve rail inspection technology and
expand its deployment, the branch oversees waivers issued to CSX
Transportation, Inc. (CSX), that allow relief from certain provisions
of the Track Safety Standards. As a condition for granting these
waivers, CSX has implemented an experimental process for continuous
test rail inspection that has the potential to minimize risk associated
with rail-flaw development by allowing the carrier to test its rail
more frequently, control rail-flaw development, and reduce service
failure and derailments. The inspection technology is referred to as an
``ultrasonic computer based test system.'' The project also shows
significant potential to improve railway safety by increasing
inspection speed and providing extended system coverage. Based on the
results of initial trial performance of this technology, FRA believes
that this experimental rail inspection system may ultimately prove to
be more capable than the system previously used, in terms of its
ability to identify rail flaws and to do so quickly. FRA is working
with CSX to improve this continuous rail inspection process.
Question 8. Does the FRA have its own means of verifying railroads'
compliance with the Federal safety standards or does it depend on the
railroads' own inspection data?
Answer. FRA inspectors conduct routine inspections to verify
railroads' compliance with the Federal railroad safety standards and
the Hazardous Materials Regulations. FRA's inspections are conducted on
track, signal systems (including signal systems installed on
locomotives and signal systems installed along the track wayside),
rolling stock (locomotives and railcars), operating practices, and the
transportation of hazardous materials. We also carry out regular
inspections of companies that offer hazardous material for
transportation by rail (rail shippers) to determine their compliance
with the Hazardous Materials Regulations. FRA also routinely audits
railroads' bridge programs, as well as the accuracy of a railroad's
accident and incident reporting. We also investigate hundreds of
complaints submitted to FRA each year by private citizens alleging
violations of Federal rail safety or hazardous materials requirements.
FRA uses information technology to strategically analyze FRA's
inspection and accident/incident data in order to identify trends and
prioritize inspections. FRA's C\3\RS program also uses information
technology to sort the C\3\RS data and identify emerging risks.
And, as previously mentioned, FRA conducts an ATIP Program. It
utilizes a fleet of track geometry vehicles. The ATIP vehicles traverse
the Nation conducting track-geometry surveys, the results of which are
shared with the railroad being inspected. The ATIP vehicles identify
defective conditions and conditions that could eventually develop into
defects, thus identifying early signs of trouble before they cause
accidents. Note, however, that FRA's role is to monitor the railroads
to determine whether their track is in compliance, not to inspect the
track itself. The duty to inspect for compliance with the Track Safety
Standards rests on the track owners, which are the railroads. Many
railroads have their own automated track inspection vehicles to inspect
their own track.
Question 9. The FRA regulates railroads across the entire country.
At NTSB's November hearings on the Metro-North Bridgeport derailment
and the West Haven accident, a representative from the Long Island Rail
Road (LIRR) testified that the LIRR conducts inspections at a higher
rate than Metro-North and also employs automated inspection vehicles
more frequently.
At a meeting between Congress members, DOT and the FRA, Mr. Szabo,
you spoke to the fact that alerter systems are good railroad practice
and standard on most railroads across the country while Metro-North
lacked these devices in each train cabin where an engineer operates.
You stated that you were checking with the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) on whether any other railroad didn't
have alerters as a standard device in each train cabin.
In your opinion, how does Metro-North's standard of safety compare
to other railroads' throughout the country? What other areas besides
the aforementioned does Metro-North lag behind the rest of the Nation's
railway system? Have you followed up with APTA on whether or not there
are other railroads without alerters in every train cabin?
Answer. Operation Deep Dive uncovered an unhealthy safety culture
on Metro-North, one where an inappropriate overemphasis on on-time
performance had adversely impacted safety. As resources permit, FRA
will conduct similar efforts on other commuter operations to determine
to what extent Metro-North is an outlier in safety culture.
Overall, passenger railroad operations in this county are very
safe. Nonetheless, there have been eight passenger fatalities resulting
from commuter rail train accidents in the last five calendar years.
However, this represents an improvement over the previous 5 year period
in which there were 43 passenger fatalities. This safety improvement is
due to work in many areas, including initiatives to improve accident
avoidance and survivability. We owe the public a drive for continuous
safety improvement.
You also inquired about Metro-North's lack of an alerter in each of
its train cabs. An alerter is a type of locomotive-mounted equipment
that is used to assure that the locomotive operator is alert, not
physically incapacitated, and aware of, and complying with, the
indications of a signal system or other operational control system.
Systems like Positive Train Control, or the signal upgrades the FRA
required of Metro-North under Emergency Order 29, can provide a similar
level of protection.
Metro-North has the greatest number of units operating without
alerters. Current Federal regulations require a working alerter on any
locomotive, including a control cabin locomotive, ordered on or after
September 8, 2000, or placed into service for the first time on or
after September 9, 2002, if the locomotive is the controlling
locomotive of a commuter or intercity passenger train. See 49 C.F.R.
238.237. Most carriers have either retrofitted existing equipment,
provided a similar level of protection through other technology, or are
in the process of retrofitting their fleet; however, this provision
does not apply to rebuilt locomotives. There are separate, higher
requirements for alerters on high-speed passenger trains (i.e.,
traveling at a speed more than 125 miles per hour but less than 150
miles per hour; e.g., Acela Express); namely, there must be an alerter
in the controlling cab of any high-speed passenger train. See 49 C.F.R.
238.447(c) by operation of 49 C.F.R. 238.401. Finally, there are also
separate requirements for alerters on locomotives used in freight
service. See 49 C.F.R. 229.140.
Question 10. On January 15, 2014, the Regional Planning Association
released a report titled, ``Getting Back on Track: Unlocking the Full
Potential of the New Haven Line.'' The RPA report concludes that the
New Haven Line's largest issue is the severity of its aging and
deteriorating infrastructure. Due to the state of the railroad's
infrastructure, the New Haven Line (NHL) is extremely underfunded and
requires tremendous increases in funding to reach a state of good
repair. At current funding levels of less than $200 million a year, it
would take 20 years to reach a state of good repair. Connecticut has
dedicated $1 billion to the railroad in its 2013-2017 capital plan, but
the RPA concludes that an additional $3.6 billion is needed to replace
the railroad's obsolete infrastructure by 2020.
These infrastructure needs, which include deteriorating bridges,
some over 100 years old, worn track, and outdated signaling and power
systems, pose threats to safety as seen in the Bridgeport derailment.
Broken and ill-repaired track has put lives at risk and it's only a
matter of time before such an incident reoccurs if nothing is done.
How critical is sound infrastructure to the ensuring safety on the
Nation's railway system? How many of the existing safety concerns can
be solved by reaching a state of good repair for the Nation's
railroads?
Answer. A sound and safe infrastructure is critical to ensuring the
safety of train operations. But so too are sound and safe rolling
stock, sound and safe signal systems, sound and safe operating
practices, sound and safe safety-critical personnel, and sound and safe
intermodal intersections with railroad tracks (such as highway-rail
grade crossings and railroad bridges over navigable waters). All the
pieces need to be sound and safe to ensure we have a safe railroad
system. In other words, a state of good repair means we have safe
track, signal systems, rolling stock, operating practices, safety-
critical personnel, and intermodal intersections.
One of the keys to ensuring that the Nation's railroad system is
maintained in a state of good repair is predictable, dedicated funding.
Congress has for decades funded highway, transit, and aviation programs
through multi-year authorizations that provide guaranteed funding. This
enables States, local governments, and other stakeholders to plan for
and to execute infrastructure investments in a comprehensive and
efficient manner, with a view towards long-term safety and operational
improvements.
Reliance upon inadequate and unpredictable annual appropriations
has made it extraordinarily difficult for the U.S. rail system to be
maintained in a state of good repair. The Administration proposes to
rectify this problem with legislation authorizing mandatory contract
authority through FY 2018 for rail investment programs. The programs
would be paid for with resources in a new Rail Account of the
Transportation Trust Fund that will be funded with revenue from pro-
growth business tax reform.
Question 11. On December 1st, a Metro-North train derailed
resulting in four casualties and close to seventy injuries. The train
was travelling at approximately 82 mph in an area where speed was
limited to 30 mph. The NTSB investigation is ongoing, but officials
recently recommended that Metro-North install inward-and outward-facing
cameras on its trains. The NTSB has called on all railroads to install
such cameras since a 2008 crash between a passenger and a freight train
resulted in the death of 25 people. The FRA has recently indicated its
decision to begin the rulemaking process on this issue.
Following the December 2013 Metro-North derailment that resulted in
four casualties and close to seventy injuries, the NTSB recommended
that Metro-North install inward-and outward-facing cameras. This is
something the NTSB has been recommending since 2008.
The FRA announced earlier this year that it would begin the
rulemaking process for requiring inward-and outward-facing cameras in
all locomotives and operating cabs. How will this rulemaking help
address safety concerns? Some have raised privacy concerns with the
cameras; can these issues be addressed in the rulemaking? Can you
provide an update on where this rulemaking stands?
Answer. FRA recognizes the potential value of both inward-and
outward-facing camera recordings for accident investigation purposes
and to advance safety. For these reasons, in the summer of 2013, FRA
became involved in various camera projects occurring in industry, and
in November 2013 placed the camera rulemaking on FRA's internal
rulemaking agenda for 2014. Today a task statement pertaining to this
issue was presented to the RSAC for its consideration, and the task was
accepted by the RSAC. We expect the RSAC to report its recommendations
on the issue by April 1, 2015.
Although FRA recognizes the value of voice and image recordings for
accident investigation purposes and as part of an operational testing
program, FRA is also well aware of the significant privacy concerns
presented by the installation and monitoring of these cameras.
Accordingly, we must fully understand and address these privacy
concerns and ensure that the technology is implemented with appropriate
safeguards and controls in place that address the privacy concerns and
also achieve the desired safety results. Addressing these concerns
through the rulemaking process--through the RSAC process in
particular--will ensure that these issues are appropriately analyzed
and addressed and that the technology is implemented in as efficient a
manner as possible.
Question 12. The FRA has limited budgets and inspectors to address
safety issues posed by crude transportation. While the volume of crude
oil being shipped by rail has increased dramatically in the past few
years, FRA and PHMSA have limited resources to ensure crude oil is
transported safely. I believe we need to invest more in our
infrastructure, particularly when it comes to the safety of our
transportation systems. Mr. Szabo, do your current budgets provide an
adequate number of inspectors and rail safety employees to cover all of
the issues posed by the rail safety issues we've seen recently?
Answer. It is important that FRA receive predictable and dedicated
funding. I can assure you that FRA will make maximum use of whatever
resources it is provided. As discussed above, FRA uses a staffing model
that draws on the latest railroad accident and inspection data to
strategically allocate its inspectors around the Nation and across
safety disciplines. For FY 2014, FRA received a larger Safety and
Operations budget, which will allow FRA to hire 10 new rail safety
inspectors and 20 rail safety specialists.
FRA has not requested new staff for FY 2015. However, the Office of
the Secretary of Transportation (OST) has proposed a new $40 million
Safe Transportation of Energy Products Fund, which would be available
to FRA as well as the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) to address issues surrounding the transportation
of crude oil and other materials. FRA may be able use these funds to
hire temporary staff as well as to conduct other activities such as
research and testing.
Question 13. How would increasing investments in rail safety
programs help you better address safety needs?
Answer. In addition to adding new railroad safety staff in FY 2014,
FRA is increasing its investment in key safety programs. FRA is
planning on spending an additional $1 million on its C\3\RS program to
support nationwide implementation. As I said earlier, the program
allows railroad employees to report close calls on a voluntary,
confidential basis, without fear of disciplinary action. FRA also plans
to spend almost $900,000 on high-speed rail safety certification to
help ensure the safety of high-speed rail projects under construction
before they enter into operation. Additionally, FRA plans to spend
close to $700,000 to update its Railroad Safety Information System for
enforcement of new safety regulations including those mandated by RSIA.
For FY 2015, FRA requests significant new investment in the
Nation's rail system--$4.8 billion in FY 2015 and $19 billion over 4
years--that will directly improve safety. With these resources, FRA
proposes to fund, among other things, positive train control
implementation by commuter railroads and Amtrak. Moreover, FRA will
fund state-of-good-repair work by Amtrak to improve Amtrak's
reliability and increase the safety of its aging infrastructure.
Moreover, some program funds would be eligible for grade crossing
improvement and community rail safety initiatives.
Question 14. Mr. Szabo, are there other ways that some of your
costs could be offset?
Answer. FRA's proposed rail investment program is fully paid for in
the President's budget. FRA proposes that Congress fund rail programs
through a 4-year reauthorization bill paid for through a Rail Account
of the Transportation Trust Fund. The President's budget proposes this
trust fund spending be supported by revenues generated from reforms to
the corporate tax code. Details about the change in tax policy are
listed in the President's budget.
Question 15. DOT-111 tank cars were involved in the Lac-Megantic,
Alabama, and North Dakota derailments and explosions. The DOT-111,
which accounts for 69 percent of the U.S. tank car fleet, has a
documented history of failure during accidents. AAR has asked DOT to
adopt tougher standards for new tank cars, as well as requiring the
retrofit or phase out of tank cars built to less stringent standards.
API and the Railway Supply Institute (RSI)--who represent tank car
manufacturers--also support higher tank car standards, but have
concerns about retrofit costs.
For several decades, the NTSB has expressed concern about the DOT-
111 tank car. Other stakeholders, including AAR, API, and RSI, have
sought tougher tank car standards. DOT is almost a year behind on a
rulemaking, which would propose updates to the DOT-111 standards, and
does not anticipate issuing a final rule until next year. This is
unacceptable to me and the thousands of people living in communities
that see these train cars roll through their towns everyday--
communities along these rail lines deserve more. Again, this seems to
be another example of regulatory capture; the DOT for all intents and
purposes outsourced tank car recommendations to industry back in 2011.
And here we are 3 years and several high profile accidents later, and
we're still talking about the need for stronger tank cars.
What is taking so long to issue these rules? Why can't the process
be sped up? Can we build a tank car strong enough to prevent all of
these accidents from happening? How important is a comprehensive
approach to addressing the safety issues posed by transporting crude?
Answer. FRA is working closely with PHMSA to provide support and
resources in an effort to expedite the development and issuance of an
NPRM to address DOT-111 tank cars and also to comprehensively address
the risks, and mitigate the consequences, of train accidents involving
hazardous materials in general, and crude oil in particular. The
Secretary has delegated to the Administrator of PHMSA the statutory
authority to issue rules pertaining to the transportation of hazardous
materials by all modes of transportation, including rail and I believe
PHMSA provided testimony at the February 26, 2014, hearing of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials which summarizes the specific
circumstances surrounding the development and progress of this rule.
You also asked whether it is possible to build a railroad tank car
strong enough to prevent the release of its contents during any
accident scenario. The short answer is ``no,'' not given the current
state of the art. Because improving tank car survivability cannot, by
itself, prevent rail accidents and unintentional hazardous material
releases, a comprehensive approach is necessary. Only if the risks of
transporting petroleum crude oil are comprehensively addressed are real
safety improvements going to be made. For this reason, FRA, in
partnership with PHMSA, is aggressively pursuing comprehensive
improvements to the rail transportation of crude oil, including
improving railcar survivability through tank car design improvements,
rail operational practices, and proper testing and classification of
crude oil before being offered for transportation.
We need strong tank cars that are highly puncture-resistant during
train accidents as well as operating measures to prevent train
accidents from occurring in the first place and to mitigate the
seriousness of an accident if it does occur. No matter how many rail
safety regulations are in place or how high the tank car standards are,
it is necessary to have personnel and equipment in place to deal with a
train accident and any unintentional release of hazardous material if
it occurs during railroad transportation. In short, a comprehensive
approach to the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail is
essential.
Question 16. In July, a train carrying crude derailed and exploded
in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, killing 47 people and destroying the city's
downtown. On December 30th, a train in North Dakota carrying crude oil
struck another train which set off an explosion and required the
evacuation of more than 1,500 people. On January 7th, a train carrying
crude and propane derailed and caught fire in New Brunswick, Canada
forcing an evacuation less than 35 miles from the Maine border.
A series of freight rail accidents over the past 8 months highlight
the need for safety plans to be in place so that communities and first
responders know how to respond when there is a train accident carrying
crude, propane, or any other hazardous material. Training first
responders is a good first step to improving the response to incidents,
and I was glad to see that included in your recent agreement.
Mr. Szabo, as part of your agreement, AAR committed to rerouting
trains carrying at least 20 cars of crude oil to the ``safest and most
secure routes.'' How will these routing decisions impact communities
that are not currently seeing a large influx of crude-by-rail? Will
other communities see an increase in crude trains and will additional
resources be focused on these communities?
Answer. AAR, on behalf of its member railroads, has committed to
complying with the route analysis requirements of the Hazardous
Materials Regulations (49 C.F.R. 172.820(c)-(f) and (i)) when operating
trains transporting 20 or more loaded railroad tank cars containing
crude oil. The route analysis rule requires railroads to collaborate
with State and local officials on the routing of certain hazardous
materials and to select the routes posing the least overall safety and
security risk on which to transport those materials. The rule requires
an evaluation of the safety and security of the routes currently used
and alternative practicable routes over which a railroad has authority
to operate. The rule also mandates, at a minimum, the consideration of
27 specific safety and security risk factors. The identified risk
factors include operational, infrastructure, and consequence elements,
such as population centers, environmentally sensitive areas, and
emergency response capabilities along the routes.
It is difficult to predict the extent to which compliance with the
route analysis requirements will alter specific crude rail routes.
However, compliance with the regulation will ensure that crude oil is
transported over the safest and most secure rail routes, which will
reduce the risk of an accident in the first place and help to mitigate
the effects of an accident should one occur.
In addition, other commitments from the railroad industry will
further enhance the resources available to communities through which
large quantities of crude oil are transported. These additional
railroad industry agreements are to develop an inventory of emergency-
response resources along routes over which trains carrying large
quantities of crude oil move; to make the relevant information
available to appropriate emergency responders; to allocate $5 million
to develop and provide a hazardous material transportation training
curriculum applicable to crude oil transportation for emergency
responders; and to fund a portion of this training through the end of
2014.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. With the number of crude oil rail shipments across the
country expected to increase over the next several years, what actions
has the FRA taken to identify rail corridor segments that are more
susceptible to train derailments, either due to aging or faulty
infrastructure, geographic terrain, or other means, and what actions
have been taken to address to address this issue?
Answer. FRA has taken action on multiple fronts to mitigate safety
risks on rail corridors. In 2013 and 2014, FRA safety inspectors from
FRA's five core disciplines--Hazardous Materials, Motive Power and
Equipment, Operating Practices, Signal and Train Control, and Track--
have performed approximately 3,500 inspections in the subdivisions over
which unit trains of crude oil are moved.
Major freight railroads also committed to using the Rail Corridor
Risk Management System (a risk-based routing analysis tool developed in
coordination with the Federal Government as part of the implementation
of the rail routing amendments to the Hazardous Materials Regulations)
to analyze the safety and security risks of particular routes and to
ensure that trains transporting large quantities of crude oil are
operated on the safest and most secure rail routes.
In response to the Secretary's Call to Action, the Association of
American Railroads committed to employing speed restrictions in 46
federally designated high-threat urban areas, implementing train
braking enhancements using distributed power or two-way telemetry end-
of-train devices, more frequent rail and mechanical inspections,
installation of wayside defective-bearing-detection equipment, and
providing resources to enhance emergency response capabilities and
community awareness along crude oil routes.
In addition, the American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association (ASLRRA) responded to the Call to Action by identifying
specific actions that it believes small railroads can voluntarily take
to contribute to a safer national rail network. For example, contingent
upon securing a 6- to 12-month pilot project grant from FRA, ASLRRA
plans to create the Short Line Safety Institute that will do the
following:
Begin with a focus on the transportation of crude oil by
small railroads and then expand to the transportation of all
commodities for Class III railroads.
Work with FRA to develop and implement pilot safety
inspection and evaluation projects for short line railroads.
Work with FRA to evaluate the current safety and compliance
attainment levels on small railroads; contract and train expert
qualified inspectors; and develop training, assessment, and
reporting document systems.
Work with FRA to create benchmarks and objectives to measure
the progress and effectiveness of the Short Line Safety
Institute safety inspection programs.
Question 2. What actions are being taken by your agency/
organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
Answer. FRA has provided a grant to the American Chemistry Council,
which oversees the Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency
Response (TRANSCAER) program. The TRANSCAER program is a voluntary
outreach program that focuses on assisting communities to prepare for,
and respond to, possible hazardous materials transportation incidents.
TRANSCAER members consist of representatives from the following
industries: chemical manufacturing, transportation (including
railroads), distributors, and emergency response (including State and
local agencies). Through the Department's ``Call to Action,'' both the
railroad and petroleum industries have renewed their commitment to
enhancing emergency response communications and training, most recently
with the American Petroleum Institute (API) joining the TRANSCAER
program and the railroad industry committing to developing an inventory
of emergency response resources along routes over which trains
transporting large amounts of crude oil operate. This inventory,
relevant information from which will be made available to appropriate
emergency responders, will include locations for staging emergency
response equipment along the routes and contacts for the notification
of communities. In addition, the railroad industry has committed
approximately $5 million to develop and provide a hazardous material
transportation training curriculum applicable to petroleum crude oil
transport for emergency responders and to the fund a portion of the
cost of this training through the end of 2014.
FRA hazardous materials inspectors provide basic training to
states, municipal governments, and local emergency response agencies.
Knowledge gained from this training enables fire and police agencies to
identify the type and positioning of hazardous commodities and to
develop appropriate incident response or containment plans. The
training provides detailed explanations of regulations pertaining to
hazardous materials documentation, placement of hazardous materials
within trains, appropriate packaging, and railroad communication
protocols. FRA inspectors often demonstrate tank car safety features
and describe train crew responsibilities to ensure that emergency
responders know the appropriate railroad personnel to contact for train
makeup information.
FRA has also issued a grant to the American Chemistry Council,
CHEMTREC, and TRANSCAER for the design and delivery of a training
program focused on the needs of volunteer emergency responders,
including fire fighters, emergency medical technicians, police
agencies, and others. The training program will include approaching and
managing a derailment, tank car recognition and damage assessment,
chemical properties and hazards, hazard communication, firefighting
techniques, environmental concerns, and other related topics. FRA is
often an active participant in the training, conveying valuable
insights based on experience and lessons learned.
FRA's eight regional offices have law enforcement liaisons who
focus on highway-rail grade crossing safety. Regional liaisons have
been effective in getting rail safety awareness courses included in the
accreditation process for law enforcement officers. FRA also provides
information to local judges and prosecutors supporting consistent
enforcement of highway-railroad safety laws.
Question 3. What immediate measures can states, municipal
governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
Answer. In order to be prepared for the potential consequences of
any rail accident involving hazardous materials and to mitigate those
potential consequences, States, municipal governments, and local
agencies can take advantage of both existing measures in place to
ensure emergency responders are prepared for such incidents and the
rail and oil industry's renewed commitments through the Department's
``Call to Action,'' as noted in my answer to your previous question.
Through the TRANSCAER program, the railroad and hazardous materials
shipping industries collaborate and cooperate with communities through
which hazardous materials are transported. For example, in accordance
with AAR Circular OT-55-N, railroads are to assist in implementing
TRANSCAER's community outreach program to improve community awareness,
emergency planning, and incident response for the transportation of
hazardous materials. The same industry standard provides for the
disclosure of certain commodity flow data upon request to local
emergency response agencies and planning groups. At a minimum, such
information must include rank-order identification of the top 25
hazardous commodities transported through the community. Accordingly,
appropriate emergency response personnel should be in communication
with any railroads transporting hazardous materials through their
jurisdictions in order to ensure that they have access to the most up-
to-date information on the commodities being transported through their
jurisdictions and the extent of emergency response resources available
along the rail routes.
States that currently do not have rail safety programs can join
FRA's State Rail Safety Participation Program. Thirty states currently
partner with FRA to regulate rail safety. State inspectors provide
supplemental safety inspections that nonparticipating states do not
receive. FRA does not reduce its inspection efforts in a state that
elects to employ rail safety inspectors. Therefore, states that have
rail safety inspectors receive a net gain in rail safety inspections. A
larger rail safety inspection force results in correction of more
safety defects, better response to public complaints and railroad
accidents, and State expertise to directly address rail safety issues
with railroad operating and maintenance personnel. Public safety
concerns about unsafe rail operations can best be met by enhanced rail
inspection using both State and Federal resources.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. Can you provide me with an account of the research and
development activities the FRA is currently engaged in to enhance track
inspection efforts underway? How are the technologies being developed
by FRA different than the technologies that are currently deployed by
the railroad?
Answer. FRA has conducted research and developed several new track
inspection technologies, including the following:
the Gage Restraining Measurement System: a train-based
system to assess the performance of track components such as
crossties and rail fasteners;
the Portable Track Loading Fixture: a handheld device to
assess the performance of rail fasteners;
the Joint Bar Inspection System: a machine-vision system to
detect rail joint bar defects and failures;
the Portable Ride Quality Measurement System: to identify
locations of poor track quality;
the Autonomous Track Geometry Measurement System (ATGMS): an
unmanned and cost-effective way of assessing track quality over
large rail networks
Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR): a system to detect poor
track support; conditions such as foul ballast and waterlogged
foundation; and
Rail Defect Inspection Systems.
In terms of the last category (rail defect inspection systems), we
have developed a rail defect measurement system that does not require
contact with the rail. This system does not detect all types of rail
defects. It was designed to find the most prominent type of defect
(transverse defect). Future generations of the system may be adapted to
look for other types of rail flaws. Compared to conventional systems,
the current system can operate at higher speeds and is not adversely
affected by rail surface condition. Another rail defect inspection
system that we are developing will accurately measure the size of
defects so the appropriate corrective action can be taken. The system
uses the Computed Tomography (CT) scan technology used in the medical
field.
ATIP is used by FRA to inspect track to determine whether it
conforms to the track-geometry provisions of FRA's track safety
regulations. The fundamental track geometry inspection technology
employed in ATIP is used by both FRA and many railroads. The vision for
the future is to use ATGMS to cover more mileage at lower cost and then
schedule a manned vehicle with many of the inspection systems described
above to fully assess the track conditions. The information from the
ATGMS will be used for planning walking inspections and manned car
inspections. The comprehensive information collected by the manned cars
will be used by researchers to better understand the track behavior
and, when warranted, will provide more guidelines to promote safety.
FRA develops inspection technologies that are safety focused, with
the intent to reduce the number of derailments and other types of
railroad accidents/incidents and unintentional releases of hazardous
material. Some of these technologies have a side benefit of aiding in
the maintenance planning for the railroads.
As to how the technologies being developed by FRA differ from the
technologies that are currently deployed by the railroad, several of
the technologies listed above are already in use today by railroads.
Others are nearing the end of the research and development stage and
are being transferred to the industry as prototypes.
Question 2. What level of funding was provided to FRA for research
and development in the current fiscal year? Does this level of funding
provide adequate resources to your agency to complete your research and
development missions?
Answer. FRA received $35.1 million for FY 2014 for its Railroad
Research and Development program, and has requested for $35.25 million
for FY 2015. This amount supports FRA's ongoing research into railroad
safety issues and the development of technologies that can reduce
future accidents. The program's areas of focus are track, rolling
stock, train control and communications, human factors, and railroad
systems issues. Regardless of funding level, FRA will effectively use
its budget to undertake meaningful research and development work.
For FY 2015, FRA also requested new research program funding under
the Rail Service Improvement Program to expand its work into emerging
areas facing the rail industry. These include the following:
Upgrades to the Transportation Technology Center ($15
million): The Transportation Technology Center (the Center) in
Pueblo, Colorado, does not have facilities for testing,
evaluating, and demonstrating state-of-the-art high-performance
rail infrastructure and equipment. Upgrading the Center will
result in faster approvals for new equipment, stronger safety
standards, and early identification of reliability issues,
saving long-term maintenance costs and ensuring better
passenger service.
National Cooperative Rail Research Program ($5 million):
Section 306 of Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act
established this program, managed by the National Academy of
Sciences, to provide a rail research program similar to those
for aviation, highways, and transit. FRA launched the program
in 2012 to develop the intellectual infrastructure needed to
advance effective rail policy, and proposes to continue funding
the program.
Question 3. I understand the President's budget would provide
additional resources for FRA to hire inspectors. These inspectors would
be in addition to the additional FTEs provided to the FRA in FY14. What
are the greatest resource needs of the agency and how will additional
hires--should additional FTEs be provided--be directed at addressing
current capacity shortfalls at the agency?
Answer. In its FY 2015 budget, FRA has not requested money to add
new inspectors or other staff. However, OST has proposed a new $40
million Safe Transportation of Energy Products Fund, which would be
available to FRA as well as PHMSA and FMCSA to address issues
surrounding the transportation of crude oil and other materials. It is
possible that FRA may use these funds to hire temporary staff as well
as to conduct other activities such as research and testing.
In general, FRA strives to maximize the funding it receives,
regardless of the amount. Regarding full-time equivalents, each year
FRA rebalances its inspector workforce across the FRA regions and
across safety disciplines based on analysis by its staffing allocation
model and professional judgment by top FRA management. This year, FRA
is particularly attuned to the need to address increased shipments
crude oil and ethanol.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. At the hearing you discussed the inspection
partnerships that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has with
several states. How many states participate in this program? Can you
provide a list of these states for the Committee? How many additional
inspectors are made available through this program? Will these
inspectors be useful in approving Positive Train Control (PTC) systems?
Answer. Thirty states currently participate in FRA's State Rail
Safety Participation Program with 176 State inspector positions
currently authorized by State programs. Please accept this table titled
``State Rail Safety Programs'' into the record of this hearing. The
table provides a breakdown by State, with further details, such as the
FRA Office of Railroad Safety region that works with the State program
and the safety discipline of the State inspector(s) (e.g., motive power
and equipment, operating practices, hazardous materials, and signal and
train control). State inspectors will not be involved in the process to
approve PTC systems.
Question 2. What are the major safety issues accompanying the
transportation of crude oil by rail and what have been the most common
types of accidents that have occurred in the last five years?
Answer. Crude oil, like ethanol, presents unique risks in
transportation by rail because of flammability and volume of the
material shipped in unit trains.\1\ Although it is rare to have only a
single rail car breached that contains a flammable liquid, a breach of
only a single tank car in a train accident followed by the ignition of
a self-feeding pool fire \2\ can result in energetic ruptures of
adjacent tank cars. Further, in derailments of unit trains of crude
oil, adjacent tank cars containing crude oil will be involved.
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\1\ A ``unit train'' is defined as a train in which all the cars
are shipped from the same origin to the same destination, without being
split up or stored en route).
\2\ A ``pool fire'' is a turbulent diffusion fire burning above a
horizontal pool of vaporizing hydrocarbon fuel.
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Also, crude oil facilities are coming online quickly and employing
personnel with limited experience in loading and securing tank cars for
transportation. These facilities and their operators are continually
learning (through FRA and industry outreach activities) how to inspect
and secure a tank car prior to offering it for transportation.
Unlike the vast majority of other chemicals shipped by rail, which
are produced to a specification under the auspices of a rigorous
quality assurance program, crude oil is a naturally occurring, mined
material with properties that vary based on location and time of
extraction. The variability of the properties of crude oil, such as its
flammability, gas content, corrosivity, and vapor pressure, make it
difficult to determine the appropriate package for transportation. Tank
car owners and shippers of crude oil must work together to ensure the
equipment is not damaged by the crude oil with which it is loaded, by
selecting compatible interior coatings, (if required), gaskets, and o-
rings for service equipment.
To answer your other question, about the most common kinds of
accidents, FRA's accident/incident database indicates that during the
5-year period between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2013, 41
percent of train accidents were caused by defective track, road bed,
and structures; 37 percent by human factors involving train operations
or handling equipment, switches and derails; 11 percent by mechanical
and electrical failures; 1 percent by signal and communications causes;
and the remaining 10 percent by miscellaneous causes.
Regarding train accidents in which crude oil was unintentionally
released, there have been seven in the last 5 years in the United
States as well as two in Canada. The Canadian accidents occurred at
Lac-Megantic in Quebec and at Plaster Rock in New Brunswick--the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada is investigating both. Based on
the available information, the Lac-Megantic accident was a result of
improper securement of the crude oil train; the Transportation Safety
Board of Canada has not released an official report of the findings of
their investigations. The accident in Casselton, ND, was a result of a
unit train of crude oil colliding with a grain train fouling (blocking)
the main line; the grain train had derailed as a result of a broken
axle. Other U.S. train accidents during the last 5 years involving
releases of crude oil include the following: Vandergrift, PA
(mechanical causes); Aliceville, AL (broken rail); and New Augusta, MS
(broken rail).\3\
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\3\ The three other U.S. train accidents in the last 5 years that
have resulted in the unintentional release of crude oil were at Havre,
MT (November 1, 2010); Monroe, LA (December 1, 2011); and Parkers
Prairie, MN (March 27, 2013).
Question 3. One of the requirements in the Rail Safety Improvement
Act of 2008 is that PTC technology be interoperable, meaning that the
systems of different railroads operating over each other's track would
be able to communicate with one another. How does the FRA plan to
certify interoperability of the various PTC systems it is required to
approve? Will certification of interoperability be more difficult if
some railroads complete installation before others? How many FRA
employees do you think will be needed to certify PTC systems? Do you
worry that using these inspectors for this purpose will further limit
the agency's ability to conduct oversight of rail safety generally?
Answer. PTC system interoperability will be created primarily
through two different, but complementary, approaches. One approach is
for the railroads to select a single common shared industry standard
technology. Currently, for example, the majority of freight and
passenger commuter railroads outside of Northeast Corridor (NEC) are
relying on Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS),
and the NEC railroads are relying on the Advanced Civil Speed
Enforcement System (ACSES). The second approach (where different
railroads elect to implement different technologies) calls for the
affected railroads to each implement all of the technologies involved.
For example, freight and passenger railroads that implement both I-ETMS
and ACSES would run the two systems in parallel. FRA views
certification as the process of measuring, testing, and evaluating the
effectiveness of the functions of the system prior to authorizing a
system for operational use. In both approaches, the FRA certification
process is focused on ensuring that the implementing railroads have:
(1) correctly deployed the technology, (2) put in place adequate
training and maintenance programs to ensure that the railroads can
safely operate and maintain the systems, and (3) implemented technology
that performs the required PTC statutory functions.
The FRA personnel involved in the certification process are looking
to see that an adequate series of tests and inspections have
established that safeguards designed into the hardware and software of
the system are operative, function as intended, and collectively
constitute acceptable controls; and that the equipment supplier and the
railroad have successfully implemented these safeguards and controls.
Production models of a given system design need be tested only to
verify that all safeguards are present and properly functioning.
Specifications (procedures, tests, and inspections) for subsequent
certification reviews must be produced as part of the design process.
The FRA certification personnel are also verifying that an adequate
series of tests and inspections is performed according to
specifications established during the design phase to ensure that the
required set of safeguards (hardware, software, and procedural) are
present and operational in the installed equipment, and on all
communication links. This work also examines the operational procedures
and administrative structure of the organization that controls the
equipment, and must establish that the procedural and administrative
environment supplements and complements hardware and software
safeguards, and that physical safeguards are appropriate. The FRA
personnel involved in the certification must also ensure that an
adequate series of tests and inspections is performed to establish that
the system has continuous safeguards, that the system can make real-
time checks on its performance, and that the system can search for
loopholes once the system is operational or after any system
malfunction, as well as after scheduled or unscheduled hardware or
software maintenance or modification.
Certifying computer systems is a very difficult issue. It involves
an examination of the provided safeguards (hardware, software,
procedural, and administrative), and ideally, a quantitative estimate
of the probability of various failure modes. It is almost impossible to
identify and protect against all possible failure modes of a system.
The matter of overall equipment configuration becomes especially
important in large systems containing many computers, either collocated
or geographically distributed. The overall hardware configuration must
be examined in order to establish the consequences of a total or
partial loss of a major component in the system. This becomes more
difficult when multiple certification requests must be processed
simultaneously. Completion of the certification process by one railroad
before another does not necessarily mean that one railroad's
certification is any more difficult than the other. Depending on the
specific implementation and the issues being examined, early completion
of the certification process by one railroad potentially could
facilitate the certification process of subsequent railroads since
issues, especially those related to the system specification and
design, may have already been adequately verified.
FRA depends heavily on the vendors and railroads in the
certification process. As a matter of practicality, without the
proactive participation and good faith efforts of the vendors and
railroads to ensure system safety through the entire design,
implementation, and operation of the system, not only would timely
certification of a system not be possible, but the level of safety
oversight that would be provided would be inadequate relative to the
system complexity. FRA staffing needs are therefore heavily dependent
on the technology deployed, the capabilities of individual inspectors,
as well as the level of effort and degree of objective safety oversight
being expended by the vendors and railroads. In order to not detract
from FRA's other safety inspection activities, FRA established a
dedicated PTC Branch. The branch, consists of 8 regional specialists
(GS-13) (1 per region), 2 senior specialists (GS-14), and a supervisor
(GS-15) dedicated to PTC system certification and safety oversight.
This group is augmented by a senior scientist (senior level (SL)/
scientific (ST)) and senior electronics engineer (GS-15) as well as two
senior signal engineers (GS-14) and contract engineer support as
required.
The complexity and size of the railroad-specific safety plans to
support the certification request are immense. The safety plan
associated with the Electronic Train Management System, for example, a
simpler predecessor system to the proposed I-ETMS system, contained
more than 6,000 pages of highly technical information. FRA will receive
38 safety plans from the railroads, with some of equal or larger size.
If these safety plans are received simultaneously, FRA staffing will
not be able to process them concurrently. A best case scenario for the
review process for a single plan would be 6 to 9 months. Although the
railroads are working with FRA to coordinate these document reviews,
this remains a new process with a scope not attempted previously by any
of the participants--freight railroads, intercity passenger railroads,
commuter railroads, and FRA.
FRA approval of the PTC Development Plans (PTCDP), a significantly
simpler document, took nearly 18 months. The PTC Safety Plans (PTCSP)
will be more complex and voluminous than the PTCDPs. The FRA review may
result in changes in the PTCSPs as a result of design, hardware, or
software issues that would prevent certification, making the timeline
for approval uncertain. The potential result could be delays in some
certifications and the ability of the affected railroads to use
deployed PTC systems.
Although FRA support of the various railroads often provides a
window into a railroad's progress, it by no means presents a complete
picture of what is happening with a program or project. FRA support is
usually requested when there are issues impeding progress. In
situations where no FRA support is requested, FRA has only anecdotal
evidence of progress, or lack thereof.
For regular, detailed, and unfiltered reporting on a railroad's
progress with PTC system implementation, it would be necessary to embed
a dedicated FRA PTC-qualified inspector into each railroad's
development and deployment team on a full-time basis. With the
complexity of PTC systems, multiple inspectors may be required. FRA has
not requested additional staff or funding to provide this level of
oversight as we believe it is currently not warranted based on the
railroads' actions and would introduce a high degree of Federal
intrusion on railroad and vendor autonomy.
Question 4. Beyond the rail and oil industries, what other
industries has FRA consulted with, or does it plan to consult with, in
its efforts to improve tank car safety?
Answer. FRA's Office of Railroad Safety has regular interactions
with all segments of the freight rail industry including the railroads,
labor, shippers of hazardous materials, tank car manufacturers, tank
car owners, and tank car inspection and repair facilities. These
meetings are intended to both disseminate information related to our
enforcement and regulatory objectives as well as understand the
potential impacts of regulatory amendments and discuss non-regulatory
measures to improve the safety of transportation of hazardous material
by rail. For example, tank car manufacturers provided valuable insight
relative to the possible design enhancements and retrofit options. They
stressed the importance of developing a practical standard (one that
will provide the needed improvements and can be built based on the
current state of the manufacturing practices) as soon as possible to
provide the certainty to make the needed investments in the next
generation of tank cars. And in another example, ethanol shippers
discussed preemptive actions taken to improve the safety in
transporting denatured alcohol by rail, characterization sampling and
testing to ensure accurate information is available for first
responders, standard emergency response tactics, and training of
emergency response trainers.
Question 5. What role does FRA play in ensuring Amtrak's compliance
with historic preservation and tribal consultation requirements under
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act? Did FRA play any
role in ensuring Amtrak's compliance with these requirements when PTC
towers were installed?
Answer. FRA is responsible for complying with Section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act when providing grants to Amtrak. For
these grants, FRA works with Amtrak to ensure the appropriate analysis
and consultation consistent with the legal requirements of Section 106
is completed. This requirement would apply where the grant funds
potential installation of any antennas required for PTC, but does not
apply where antennas required for PTC are installed without grants from
FRA.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question. Mr. Szabo, there has been a significant increase in the
number of rail accidents that have garnered media attention. I realize
that a number of investigations are ongoing but have there been any
overarching trends in the causes of these accidents? Also, what, if
any, would the impact be of some of the legislative proposals before us
today and those currently being considered by the Federal Railroad
Administration? Proposals such as Positive Train Control and mandatory
two man train crews?
Answer. Media attention is a poor metric for determining
overarching trends in rail safety. FRA certainly understands the media
focus on incidents involving passenger trains or the transportation of
crude oil by rail, given their potential to directly affect the general
public. With that said, FRA routinely generates analysis of overarching
trends in rail safety, and those trends indicate that rail continues to
grow safer as a mode of transportation.
Growing safer does not mean, however, that there is not room for
continuous safety improvement. FRA depends on its analysis of trends in
rail safety to identify where improvements can best be made. FRA
continues to work to address the leading cause of deaths related to
railroad operations, which is trespassing on railroad property; and the
second-leading cause of deaths related to railroad operations, which is
highway-rail grade crossing incidents. Together, trespassing and grade
crossing accidents account for more than 90 percent of all rail-related
deaths. With respect to train accidents (i.e., rail equipment
accidents/incidents that result in damage to railroad property in
excess of the dollar reporting threshold and excluding highway-rail
grade crossing accidents to avoid double-counting; e.g., derailments
and train-to-train collisions), which have decreased by 48 percent in
the last 10 years, the most common causes are human factors and track
issues. FRA continues to work to address these issues. PTC systems will
serve to prevent and reduce the risk of human factors train accidents
and incidents. FRA is currently considering the safety effects of
mandatory two person crews on certain trains. Meanwhile, FRA is
conducting research on the detection of track defects and improving the
Automated Track Inspection Program.
With respect to pending and potential legislative proposals,
however, it would be inappropriate to comment on them in this forum. If
you were to request a letter expressing the views of the Executive
Branch on such legislation, FRA would gladly provide input.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. As you know, the rail car manufacturers were not
present in the initial January meeting between the Secretary, the
railroads, and the oil industry on tank car standard. What type of
outreach is DOT doing to the manufacturing industry? How will the
industry be involved in discussions and meetings going forward?
Answer. It is important to note that the meeting hosted by the
Secretary was not to discuss tank car standards, but was for the
purpose of discussing oil classification and testing, and railroad
operating modifications. In addition, representatives of FRA's Office
of Railroad Safety met with representatives of the Railway Supply
Institute (RSI), an industry association representing most of the tank
car manufacturers and owners, as well as the individual manufacturers.
RSI discussed the industry's position on tank car design and retrofit
options for existing tank cars. Individually, manufacturers discussed
innovative design ideas intended to improve the crashworthiness of tank
cars and survivability of tank cars in a pool fire. The industry
clearly understands that the safety of transporting flammable liquid is
currently a focus issue, but the industry also realizes that tank car
enhancements must be designed with all specifications of tank cars in
mind, understanding that all hazardous materials pose a risk to public
safety and the environment.
Over the past 4 years, FRA's Tank Car Quality Assurance Team has
audited all tank car manufacturing, inspection, and repair facilities.
During these audits, FRA educated the facilities on how to meet the
performance requirements, ensure the final product meets the
specifications, identify non-conformances, and prevent reoccurrence of
non-conformances.
The Secretary of Transportation issued a letter to Association of
American Railroads (AAR) President and Chief Executive Officer Edward
Hamburger urging the AAR's Tank Car Committee (TCC) to develop a
consensus standard for the next generation general purpose tank car.
The TCC comprises representatives of Class I, II, and III railroads;
tank car manufacturers; and shippers. At the spring 2014 TCC meeting,
AAR hosted a special session intended to develop the consensus
standard. A consensus could not be reached.
The manufacturers, individually and in conjunction with the Railway
Supply Institute, submitted comments to the docket for HM-251 (the DOT-
111 tank car rule). Their comments were reviewed and closely considered
relative to the Regulatory Impact Analysis and proposed regulatory
amendments.
Question 2. Late February, Metrolink commuter railroad held a PTC
media event in California concerning the status of PTC implementation.
Would you please provide the Committee with an updated status report on
Metrolink's implementation of PTC, including development of its
dispatching system, its PTC back office system, and status of PTC
revenue service runs across Metrolink territory.
Answer. Metrolink continues to make significant progress towards
the completion of PTC implementation, although they have encountered a
number of technical and other obstacles that have precluded completion
as originally planned. Perhaps the most significant impediment was the
inability of the original dispatch system and back office system
contractor, Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC), to deliver a
functioning dispatch system as originally required. The lack of a
functioning dispatch system that could integrate with the PTC system
components resulted in Metrolink's recently terminating ARINC for
cause, and resulted in a 2-year delay in the program. Metrolink
subsequently engaged Wabtec Corporation to develop the required
dispatch and back office systems. Once completed, installed, and tested
(which FRA believes will occur late in the second quarter of calendar
year 2014 or early in the third quarter of calendar year 2014),
Metrolink will be able to begin revenue demonstration operations on its
own territory. Until the Metrolink dispatch and back office system is
available, the railroad will be unable to conduct revenue demonstration
operations on Metrolink territories.
As a risk mitigation measure, and in order to gain experience with
the Interoperable Electronic Train Management System (I-ETMS),
Metrolink began revenue demonstration operations over the BNSF
Railway's (BNSF) San Bernardino subdivision on February 20, 2014, using
one trainset and three trains per day. Metrolink experienced
significant technical issues that necessitated placing the revenue
demonstration on hold pending resolution of these issues. Engineering
changes to address these issues were recently completed and
successfully regression tested, with revenue demonstration on BNSF
scheduled to recommence.
Assuming there are no additional major technical issues discovered
during Metrolink's dispatch and back office systems testing, subsequent
integration and revenue demonstration operations over Metrolink
territories, or during system testing by Union Pacific Railroad (UP),
Amtrak, and BNSF, FRA anticipates receipt of the system certification
request from Metrolink for I-ETMS in the first quarter of calendar year
2015.
Metrolink has completed its PTC track database asset mapping and
validation as well as wayside interface unit verification and
validation. Metrolink has also completed roughly one-third of the
required brake testing and is conducting Los Angeles regional
communications network design and testing with UP; BNSF; Amtrak; PTC
220, LLC; Transportation Technology Center; and Meteorcomm
Communications. The majority of the onboard system work has been
completed on the rolling stock; however, additional hardware and
software modifications will be required before the onboard systems will
be fully completed. Employee training has also begun.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Kelly Ayotte to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question. Recently, there have been significant public safety
concerns raised in the New Hampshire towns of Newington, Stratham,
Greenland, and the City of Portsmouth regarding a pending application
from Sea-3, Inc. to expand its liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) facilities
in Newington.
These communities are concerned about the condition and safety of
the Portsmouth and Newington Industrial Tracks, given the potential
danger associated with using them to transport highly flammable
material. Currently, Pan Am Railways operates 2-3 trains per week, each
with 7-12 rail cars, which are only allowed to travel 10 miles per hour
due to track conditions.
As you know, I recently sent a letter to you requesting that the
FRA conduct an inspection of the Portsmouth and Newington Industrial
Tracks, and that given the significant public safety concerns you or a
representative from the FRA attend a public forum on track safety in
our state.
Can you commit to me that you will conduct an inspection of these
tracks? Are you willing to attend a public forum on track safety in New
Hampshire?
Answer. On March 10, 2014, an FRA representative will attend a
Newington town hall meeting in Newington, New Hampshire. At the
meeting, the FRA representative will discuss when and how often the
track and bridges are inspected, what is the current condition of the
track, who owns the tank cars that the propane is moved in, and who
checks the structural integrity.
Previously, on January 23, 2014, an FRA railroad safety inspector
conducted an inspection of the Portsmouth Branch and Newington
Industrial track identifying three noncomplying defects to the Track
Safety Standards. The Portsmouth Branch and Newington Industrial track
last underwent a Sperry rail test in August 2013.
During the week of April 28, 2014, the regional track safety
specialist along with a railroad safety inspector will conduct a
walking inspection of the entire Portsmouth Branch (10.5 miles), and
the Newington Industrial track (3.7 miles). On May 14, 2014, the FRA
Automated Track Inspection Program's track geometry car will conduct a
field survey of the Portsmouth Branch and the Newington Industrial
track.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Hoeven to
Hon. Joseph C. Szabo
Question 1. The Federal Railroad Administration cites track and
infrastructure failure as the second leading cause of train derailments
in the United States. The incorrect interaction between moving vehicles
and the track is a common cause of derailments. What research has your
administration conducted to develop track inspection technologies, and
what work are you doing to develop the next generation of rail defect
prevention?
Answer. FRA has conducted research and developed several new track
inspection technologies including the following:
a. Gage Restraining Measurement System: a train-based system to
assess the performance of track components such as crossties
and rail fasteners;
b. Portable Track Loading Fixture: a handheld device to assess the
performance of rail fasteners;
c. Joint Bar Inspection System: a machine-vision system to detect
rail joint bar defects and failures;
d. Portable Ride Quality Measurement System: to identify locations
of poor track quality;
e. Autonomous Track Geometry Measurement System: an unmanned and
cost effective way of assessing track quality over large rail
networks;
f. Ground Penetrating Radar: a system to detect poor track support
conditions such as foul ballast and waterlogged foundation; and
g. Rail Defect Inspection Systems.
We have developed a rail defect measurement system that does not
require contact with the rail. Compared to conventional systems, it can
operate at higher speeds and is not adversely affected by rail surface
condition.
Another rail defect inspection system we are developing will
accurately measure the size of defects so the appropriate corrective
action can be taken. The system uses the computed tomography (CT) scan
technology used in the medical field.
Question 2. In addition, how will the focus of research conducted
through the Automated Track Inspection Program (ATIP) evolve to develop
technical solutions to types of derailments we have seen of late?
Answer. Currently, FRA's Automated Track Inspection Program
monitors track geometry by periodically collecting track data to
confirm that the track conforms to certain requirements of the FRA
Track Safety Standards. The vision for the future is to use Autonomous
Track Geometry Measurement Systems (ATGMS) to survey more mileage at
lower costs. In addition to determining defective conditions, the
increased coverage would allow track trending analysis; then, a manned
vehicle with the inspection systems described above could be scheduled
to fully assess the track conditions. The information from ATGMS will
be used for planning walking inspections and manned car inspections.
The comprehensive information collected by the manned cars will be used
by researchers to better understand the track behavior and, when
warranted, will provide more guidelines to promote safety.
Attachment: ``State Rail Safety Programs''
Attachment
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question 1. In recent months, DOT officials concluded that eleven
of eighteen samples taken from cargo tanks carrying Bakken crude were
not labelled correctly. In addition, it has been revealed that the
Bakken crude involved in the deadly Lac-Megantic accident was
inaccurately labeled. Given your ongoing investigation of Bakken crude,
how big of a problem is misclassification of crude? Is this happening
frequently?
Answer. During PHMSA's initial investigations in August 2013, PHMSA
determined that some facilities were relying on old and broadly generic
data, instead of conducting actual testing, to determine the proper
classification and characterization of crude oil.
(b) By November, 2013, PHMSA found that facilities began to
periodically test (i.e., flash point and boiling point) crude oil to
determine the classification and packing group selection in accordance
with the hazardous materials regulations. Through PHMSA's
investigations and continuous presence in North Dakota in February and
March, concurrently, with release of the Secretary's Emergency Order,
PHMSA documented that industry has increased its efforts to determine
classification and packing group selection by conducting tests more
frequently.
Question 2. You recently announced an amended Emergency Order to
address the testing of crude. Beyond the Emergency Order and your
current investigation, what oversight procedures are in place to ensure
that proper classification is being conducted? What long-term
procedures need to be addressed to ensure that proper classification
continues to be addressed?
Answer. (a) PHMSA continues to have a presence in North Dakota.
Investigators frequently visit rail loading facilities to oversee
compliance with the Emergency Order. This includes review and
collection of shipping papers, train consists, cargo tank load receipts
laboratory test results, and Safety Data Sheets. In addition PHMSA
recently hired an investigator to focus on the Bakken region and
provide direct oversight of operations in North Dakota. In addition to
regulatory efforts and with regard to longer-term strategies, PHMSA has
supported the American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee
initiative to develop industry standards for proper sampling
techniques, testing criteria, and testing frequency for crude oil.
PHMSA actively participated in the discussions during working groups
sessions held thus far and will continue through expected completion in
July, 2014.
Furthermore, through the United States--Canada Regulatory
Cooperation Council the two nations have collaborated on a variety of
crude oil related efforts. Specifically, the United States and Canada
have held meetings to discuss classification, testing and sampling
issues that could have future ramifications on classification
procedures for crude oil.
Question 3. How do current requirements for shipping crude by rail
differ from requirements for shipping by pipeline?
Answer. The Hazardous Material Regulations set forth the criteria
for classifying and describing crude oil for transportation, which
directly correlate to authorized packagings, typically tank cars
designed to withstand dynamic forces normally incident to
transportation by rail. The HMR also require hazard communication
(i.e., placards, shipping papers, emergency response information). For
transportation by rail, the container and the material are in motion
along fixed track and rail infrastructure regulated by FRA. The
Pipeline Safety Regulations focus on the form of the material in
transport, and crude oil is moved at specified flow rates through fixed
pipeline infrastructure.
Question 4. In January, API along with other stakeholders met with
Secretary Foxx and Administrators Szabo and Quarterman to discuss the
safe transport of crude oil by rail. At that meeting, DOT asked API to
consider a number of additional safety measures, including sharing
testing information. Both DOT and API have previously stated that you
are working together to provide necessary information. However, on
March 28, DOT provided a press statement saying,''we still lack data we
requested and that energy stakeholders agreed to produce. The overall
and ongoing lack of cooperation is disappointing, slows progress, and
certainly raises concerns.''
The recent DOT statement differs drastically from information you
and your staff have previously and recently provided. What specific
information have you asked the industry to provide and what information
is still outstanding? Are discussions for data ongoing with the
industry? If so, are there hurdles to the industry for providing data
to DOT?
Answer. The following questions were posed by PHMSA to API and
Crude Oil shippers prior to two meetings held in early February 2014:
What tests or methods do you use to determine the properties
of the crude oil to include its vapor pressure, flammable gas
content, flash point, boiling point, hydrogen sulfide content
and corrosive properties prior to offering it in
transportation?
Who performs these tests and how frequently are they
completed?
When you find high levels of gases in crude, what actions do
you require of your oilfield personnel before loading into a
transport vehicle? What information about the crude oil
properties, if any, is provided by the producers to you prior
to transportation? How is this information communicated?
What information do you share with truck and rail carriers
about the crude oil properties?
Are there any prescribed limits involving vapor pressure,
flammable gas concentration or hydrogen sulfide content above
which the crude oil is not placed into transportation? If so,
what are these limits and how are they determined?
While discussions are ongoing and PHMSA has received some testing
information from individual crude oil companies, the data thus far has
been limited. As part of its on-going efforts, PHMSA has supported the
American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee initiative to develop
industry standards for proper sampling techniques, testing criteria,
and testing frequency for crude oil. PHMSA has actively participated in
the discussions during working groups sessions held to date and plans
to continue up through expected completion in July.
Question 5. Please provide detailed information on how the industry
has not been responsive, including information on when and how your
requests for information have stalled or been denied.
Answer. The Secretary's Call to Action in January 2014 specifically
called on the crude oil industry to provide information and data on
testing and classification procedures. In addition PHMSA held meetings
with API and Crude Oil shippers in early February 2014 to follow up.
While discussions are ongoing and PHMSA has received some testing
information from individual crude oil companies, the data thus far has
been limited. As part of its ongoing efforts, PHMSA has supported the
American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee initiative to develop
industry standards for proper sampling techniques, testing criteria,
and testing frequency for crude oil. PHMSA has actively participated in
the discussions during working groups sessions held to date and plans
to continue up through expected completion in July.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question 1. With the number of crude oil rail shipments across the
country expected to increase over the next several years, population
centers and fragile natural resource areas that are home to crude oil
rail corridors will be more susceptible to rail traffic accidents. What
actions has PHMSA taken to identify sensitive areas where crude oil
train derailments could prove to be catastrophic, whether they are
geographically, environmentally, or otherwise?
Answer. Part 130 of PHMSA's regulations requires certain rail
carriers to develop and maintain oil spill prevention and response
plans as discussed below. These requirements are intended to prevent
and contain spills of oil during transportation. More specifically,
with regard to spill response planning, a basic response plan is
required for oil shipment in a packaging having a capacity of 3,500
gallons or more and a comprehensive response plan is require for oil
shipment in a packaging containing 42,000 (1,000 barrels). Crude oil
trains are currently subject to the basic oil spill response required
by 49 CFR Part 130.
PHMSA is committed to improving emergency response and recent
efforts highlight this focus. On February 10, 2014, PHMSA held an
emergency responder stakeholder engagement meeting. This discussion
focused on the level of preparedness emergency responders and public
safety officials have with regard to the rail transport of crude oil
unit trains through their communities.
In addition, on January 16, 2014, Secretary Foxx, FRA Administrator
Szabo, FMCSA Administrator Ferro, and I issued a ``Call to Action.'' At
that time, the Department asked crude oil stakeholders to identify
prevention, mitigation and response strategies that could be
implemented quickly to enhance the safe transportation of crude by
rail. In regard to population centers and fragile natural resource
areas, the following actions have been taken to address the concerns
you raise:
AAR agreed to, by no later than July 1, 2014, voluntarily
expand routing requirements (Sec. 172.820) to trains carrying
more than 20 cars of crude oil. In addition, AAR agreed to
address risks of unit trains of crude oil by implementing speed
restrictions of 50 mph for trains carrying more than 20 cars of
crude and implementing speed restrictions of 40 mph for
specific trains carrying more than 20 cars of crude in high
threat urban areas designated by DHS.
AAR agreed that rail carriers must assess available routes
using, at a minimum, the 27 factors listed in Appendix D to
Part 172 of the HMR to determine the safest, most secure routes
for security-sensitive hazardous materials. These factors
address safety and security issues, such as the condition of
the track and supporting infrastructure; the presence or
absence of signals; past incidents; population density along
the route; environmentally-sensitive or significant areas;
venues along the route (stations, events, places of
congregation); emergency response capability along the route;
measures and countermeasures already in place to address
apparent safety and security risks; and proximity to iconic
targets. The HMR requires carriers to make conscientious
efforts to develop logical and defendable systems using these
factors.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) agreed to work with
the railroads to enhance emergency response training through
transportation community awareness and emergency response
trainings. In addition, the AAR agreed to inventory crude oil
routes and share this information with emergency responders,
develop and provide a hands-on training curriculum applicable
to crude transport for emergency responders, and work with
communities on crude oil train routes to address location-
specific concerns.
These immediate actions by the regulated community and PHMSA's
outreach to emergency responders are an important first step in
improving emergency response. However, regulatory modifications may be
necessary. Based on the recent occurrence of more accidents involving
crude oil, the NTSB has recommended in two Safety Recommendations (R-
14-4 and R-14-5) that PHMSA reconsider the threshold quantity for
requiring the development of a comprehensive response plan for the
shipment of oil and that PHMSA work with the FRA to expand hazardous
materials route planning and selection requirements to include certain
trains transporting large amounts of flammable liquids. PHMSA agrees
with NTSB and plans to consider these issues in a future rulemaking.
Question 2. What actions are being taken by your agency/
organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
Answer. PHMSA launched a comprehensive outreach plan to educate
industry, first responders, and the general public on the risk and
proper classification of transporting crude oil. PHMSA has provided
extensive information on its public website and social media stream to
include the Secretary's Call to Action, Safety Advisory Notices,
Amended Emergency Order, a thorough list of questions and answers
(Q&As) related to transporting crude oil. PHMSA's Hazardous Materials
Safety Assistance Team (HMSAT) has scheduled a series of public
workshops and seminars to educate industry and first responders about
the properties of crude oil and how to be better prepared for
responding to crude oil incidents. PHMSA also held a meeting with
various members of the emergency response community to discuss the
risks crude oil poses and the challenges associated with unit train
incidents.
In addition to PHMSA's outreach effort, the Secretary's Call to
Action has prompted industry to establish rail safety measures for
transporting crude oil. This includes emergency response. The American
Petroleum Institute (API), the American Associations of Railroads
(AAR), and American Short Line & Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
have committed to assisting state and local communities with the
development of response plans, sharing of information to include crude
oil train routes, and providing training for responding to a crude oil
incident.
Lastly, since 1993, the HMEP grant program has provided funding to
States, Territories, and Tribes to ensure local emergency responders
are prepared and trained to effectively respond to and mitigate the
consequences of hazmat transportation incidents. With the recent
emphasis on crude oil shipments, PHMSA has encouraged grantees to
allocate funding towards emergency preparedness activities such as
developing/revising response plans, commodity flow studies, and
response training applicable to a crude oil incident.
PHMSA looks to intensify its outreach effort under the FY 2015
proposed Emergency and Preparedness Information for Communities (EPIC)
initiative that requests more resources to conduct outreach campaigns,
site visits, and grassroots training with potential state, local, and
tribal grantees.
Question 3. What immediate measures can states, municipal
governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
Answer. Prompted by the Secretary's Call to Action, states,
municipal governments, and local agencies are encouraged to reach out
to the railroad industry to gain better understanding of the frequency
and quantity of hazardous materials being transported by rail through
their communities. Knowing this information, states and local agencies
can adequately prepare by developing response plans and providing
training for first responders in case of rail incidents involving crude
oil.
The Association of American Railroads has a program to provide
local first responders (upon written request) a list of the top 25
hazmat commodities transported through their communities on an annual
basis in order to assist emergency responders with preparing for any
emergency involving those materials.
In addition, although not specifically related to transport, Local
Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) under the EPA could provide
valuable information related to risks in a specific community.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question 1. Ms. Quarterman, I don't know if you've been to
Washington--but like many places in the west, our cities grew up
around--and because of--railroads. It is a legacy that we are proud of.
But it also means that there is a lot of rail freight moving through
our population centers. So when people see these unsafe DOT-111 tank
cars being used to move crude--they are concerned, just like I am
concerned. Are you able to give us an actual date that the updated tank
car standards will be finalized?
Answer. PHMSA in cooperation with FRA, is in the process of
developing a draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, RIN 2137-AE91,
``Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains.'' You can monitor progress
at: www.reginfo.gov.
Question 2. Does your agency have ample staff and expertise to keep
moving this, and other safety-critical rulemakings, forward?
Answer. PHMSA staff are subject matter experts in the field of
hazardous materials transportation and have a high level of expertise.
However, PHMSA is small agency relative to its national program
responsibilities to ensure nearly one million shipments of hazardous
materials arrive safely daily. In the FY 2015 budget, the
Administration has requested $7 million (over the FY 2014 enacted
level) additional funding for the hazmat program as well as $40 million
to ensure the transportation of energy products.
Question 3. What can we do in Congress to give you the resources to
make sure these standards are kept up to date and don't get delayed?
Answer. PHMSA's program operations continue to rely on 20-year-old
legacy information management systems for data collection, integration,
and analysis. This reliance on obsolete systems impacts operational
efficiencies, including regulatory matters. Quality information is
necessary to improve safety standards. The program would be better able
to improve overall performance and efficiency if adequate funding were
provided to consolidate disparate and obsolete data systems used by all
internal programs that contribute to the extensive rulemaking process.
In FY 2014, we requested $28.9 million for IT modernization of the
hazmat safety program over a span of 7 years. To date we have received
only $11.4 million of that necessary funding.
PHMSA deals with very complex and technical public safety issues
that require extensive review, as they should. In addition, there are
very significant economic impacts associated with safety regulations
that can require extensive regulatory evaluations (Safety Benefits and
Cost). The rulemaking process is deliberative because it is crucial to
receive and analyze input from a wide variety of stakeholders,
including shippers and carriers, state and local officials, and
concerned citizens.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question 1. What is the timeline for release of PHMSA's findings
regarding the chemical makeup of the U.S. crude samples as part of
Operation Backpressure?
Answer. PHMSA expects to release results in May 2014.
Question 2. When will you be sharing the methodology used to arrive
at your conclusions with producers and third-party independent
verifiers?
Answer. PHMSA is prepared to share the methodology that was used
for testing at the same time it shares the test results in May 2014.
Question 3. Is it true that the lab used when testing the
characteristics of Bakken crude is the same lab used by many energy
industry companies? Does the contracting lab use the same methodologies
to test crude oil characteristics for PHMSA that they use for testing
the samples from the oil and gas companies? If that is the case, would
you say that using the same testing lab improves the ease with which
oil companies would be able to share crude analysis data with PHMSA to
support Operation Backpressure?
Answer. Yes, the testing laboratory PHMSA has contracted with to
perform tests is widely recognized and used by the industry. However,
we have established a wall between the work performed for us and their
industry clients.
Yes, the contracting laboratory uses the same methodologies to test
crude oil for energy industry companies as it does for PHMSA, with the
exception of corrosion testing, which the industry is currently not
performing.
No, using the same lab and test methods does not necessarily lead
to more data sharing, since there are contractual, proprietary, and
legal issues governing the relationship between the laboratories and
their clients. This information is protected and not releasable without
proper authority. Nevertheless, PHMSA has invited producers and
shippers to share information they have collected and PHMSA has
recently received some results from some individual producers.
Question 4. In terms of sample size, I understand that the sample
size was not incredibly large or diverse in terms of well-site
diversity. While you of course can't be expected to test every single
well and shipment, do you view the current testing under way as an
initial phase of testing? In other words, will you use the results from
this testing to go back to the Bakken, take several more samples, to
ensure that they all generally match or fall within some identifiable
range of the samples you are testing now?
Answer. PHMSA's plan of sample collection for testing is primarily
based on the volume of shipments from rail loading facilities.
According to the AAR, approximately 640,000 barrels of crude are moved
out of North Dakota via rail per day. All of these facilities store
crude oil processed from each of the over 10,000 wells in large storage
tanks prior to loading on rail cars.
Yes.
Yes.
Question 5. As part of the testing, is PHMSA collecting samples
from multiple points along the line of delivery? Specifically, are
samples being taken from the well head, the loading point and the
delivery point?
Answer. Yes, PHMSA has collected from multiple locations to include
cargo tank and rail car loading points. PHMSA is currently working with
producers to identify opportunities to collect samples at or near the
well heads, as well as other delivery points, including destination
points.
Question 6. Your agency recently announced some fines against
several producers in the Bakken for product mislabeling based on your
tests and what you determined were shipments that were identified in
the wrong Packing Group. Since that time I know my staff and staff from
other offices and Committees have reached out to you, and while we take
you at your word regarding the mislabeling and testing, it seemed that
you had no clear answer as to how this product, based on a different
Packing Group would be handled. Why is that? Do you not have clear,
identifiable standards that a producer, shipper, third-party trucker
can access?
Answer. With regard to packing group, for rail shipments of
flammable liquids, the packing group can trigger additional
requirements including the need for a comprehensive security and safety
plan that address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route
security. In addition, a change in packing group can change the package
which the commodity may be transported in, e.g., the tank cars or truck
cargo tanks.
The regulatory requirements for crude oil provide a uniform safety
system that is globally recognized and harmonized. This regulatory
system is well known and has been in place for decades. Because of this
robust regulatory system, nearly one million shipments of hazardous
materials arrive safely daily.
Question 7. What are the different requirements that come with
increasing packing standards from Class I to Class II? Fines were
recently assigned from your agency for the mislabeling of crude
carrying tanker cars, and standards should be enforced when they are
required. However, it is unclear to the stakeholder community what the
differences are in terms of their responsibilities--other than changing
the label on the tanker--for Class I and Class II tankers. What are the
differences between Class I and Class II with regard to operation
requirements and the need for response plans?
Answer. The accurate selection of the shipping description is
important in determining the proper packaging, and the packing group
can change the tank cars authorized. With regard to packing groups, for
rail shipments of flammable liquids, the packing group can trigger
additional requirements including the need for a comprehensive security
and safety plan that addresses personnel security, unauthorized access,
and en route security. As much of crude transport is multi-modal,
assigning the wrong packing group can have serious downstream
consequences. For example, different cargo tanks are used for packing
groups I and II flammable liquids.
With regard to response plans, the threshold for such plans is
based on the quantity of oil, not packing group. Part 130 of the
hazardous materials regulations provides the requirements for oil spill
prevention and response plans. There are two types of response plans:
Basic and Comprehensive. More specifically with regard to spill
response planning, a basic response plan is required for oil shipment
in a packaging with a capacity of 3,500 gallons or more and a
comprehensive response plan is required for oil shipment in a packaging
containing 42,000 gallons (1,000 barrels).
Question 8. Are you at the table with the oil producers, rail
companies, and suppliers as they continue to game out and work on specs
for tank cars? If not, why? And why were you not at the table with many
of these same companies when they worked on new specs and standards
after the 2009 Illinois ethanol derailment and explosion? I believe the
new standards agreed upon, without input from PHMSA, were also then
submitted to your agency for input, but PHMSA has failed to comment
thus far on those proposed standards. Industry-wide standards that have
now been in place since 2011.
Answer. Yes, PHMSA has been continuously involved with development
of tank car standards. Specifically, PHMSA engineers sit on the AAR
Tank Car Committee (TCC) in an advisory capacity and participated in a
2011 task force created with a dual charge to develop an industry
standard for tank cars used to transport crude oil, denatured alcohol,
and ethanol/gasoline mixtures, and to consider operating requirements
to reduce the risk of derailment of tank cars carrying crude oil
classified as packing group I and II and ethanol. PHMSA and FRA were
highly involved in this task force and hoped that the activity would
lead to a comprehensive approach. The task force promised to address
the root cause, severity, and consequences of derailments and its
recommendations were finalized on March 1, 2012. The AAR task force did
not address many of the recommendations provided by PHMSA and FRA.
After considering the outcome of the AAR task force, PHMSA decided
to initiate an ANPRM. On September 6, 2013, PHMSA issued an ANPRM
regarding tank car specifications. The comment period for the action
closed on December 5, 2013.
Question 9. While I think it's great to see various industries
working together to come up with an accepted best-practice, in this
newly designed tank cars, shouldn't the agency tasked with regulating
the standards for movement of this product be both engaged on the front
end, and offer feedback when new standards are adopted? We now have a
tank car on the tracks since 2011 PHMSA has yet to offer comment on.
Answer. As mentioned in response to question 8 above, PHMSA has
been and continues to be involved.
The Hazardous Materials regulations currently have such a review
process in place. Section 179.4 requires proposed changes in or
additions to specifications for tank cars to be submitted to the
Executive Director--Tank Car Safety, AAR, for consideration by its Tank
Car Committee. Following this, The Tank Car Committee will review the
proposed specifications at its earliest convenience and report its
recommendations through the Executive Director--Tank Car Safety to the
Department. The recommendation will be considered by the Department in
determining appropriate action.
PHMSA engineers sit on the AAR TCC in an advisory capacity and
participated in a 2011 task force created with a dual charge to develop
an industry standard for tank cars used to transport crude oil,
denatured alcohol, and ethanol/gasoline mixtures and to consider
operating requirements to reduce the risk of derailment of tank cars
carrying crude oil classified as packing group I and II and ethanol.
On May 14, 2010, PHMSA published a final rule (HM-233A) to amend
the Regulations to incorporate provisions contained in certain widely
used or longstanding special permits that have an established safety
record. As part of this rulemaking, PHMSA adopted a requirement that
would allow certain rail tank cars transporting hazardous materials to
exceed the gross weight on rail limitation of 263,000 pounds upon
approval of FRA.
On January 25, 2011, FRA issued a Federal Register notice of FRA's
approval pursuant to PHMSA's May 14, 2010 final rule. The approval
established detailed conditions for the manufacturing and operation of
certain tank cars in hazardous materials service, including the DOT
Specification 111, that weigh between 263,000 and 286,000 pounds. Taken
as a whole, the PHMSA rulemaking and the FRA approval serve as the
mechanism for tank car manufactures to build a 286,000 pound tank car.
As such, rail car manufacturers currently have the ability to
manufacture DOT/TC-111 tank cars meeting the CPC-1232 industry standard
under the conditions outlined in the January 25, 2011 approval.
Question 10. You mentioned that a Strike Force met in North Dakota
the week prior to the March 6 hearing that was comprised of PHMSA, FRA,
and FMCSA. Can you provide my office with details about that meeting?
Were samples collected? From where? Has such a task force been deployed
to other oil plays in different regions of the country?
Answer. PHMSA organized a Multi-Agency Strike Force Operation
during the week of February 23, 2014, which was the first such strike
force of its kind deployed specifically in the oil fields.
Participating agencies other than PHMSA, included the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Customs
and Border Protection, and the North Dakota Highway Patrol Commercial
Motor Vehicle Enforcement. A total of 23 personnel formed five
different teams to conduct inspections of crude oil shipments and
assist each other with the expertise and regulatory jurisdiction
normally exercised by each participating agency.
Yes. Samples were collected from 14 petroleum crude oil loading
facilities located throughout the western part of North Dakota. PHMSA
investigators collected samples of crude oil from various locations
including cargo tanks, storage tanks, and pipelines connected to rail
cars.
No.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question 1. What are the major safety issues accompanying the
transportation of crude oil by rail and what have been the most common
types of accidents that have occurred in the last five years?
Answer. Transporting petroleum crude oil can be problematic if
released into the environment because it is both flammable and causes
environmental damage when spilled. The risk of flammability is
compounded in the context of rail transportation because petroleum
crude oil is commonly shipped in large unit trains. In the last five
years there have been seven major accidents in the United States and
Canada which involved crude oil. All of these incidents have occurred
within the last ten months. Due to the investigation process, the type
of five of these incidents is still to be determined (Four in the
United States and one in Canada). The other two incidents types were
Collision (Casselton, ND) and Lack of Securement of a Train (Lac-
Megantic, Quebec).
Question 2. Do you have concerns about whether industry will
continue to adopt voluntary safety enhancements if Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's final rule ultimately
obsoletes the $7 billion investment that has been made to manufacture
cars to the CPC-1232 standard the development in which PHMSA
participated?
Answer. PHMSA understands the industry's needs to set best
practices and industry standards. We encourage the development of such
practices, however PHMSA has the responsibility of ensuring tank car
standards continue to meet acceptable safety requirements. When
considering these standards, PHMSA considers the points of views of
stakeholders through its rulemaking process.
Question 3. Beyond the rail and oil industries, what other
industries has PHMSA consulted with, or plan to consult with, in its
efforts to improve tank car safety?
Answer. In addition to the rail and oil industries PHMSA continues
to consult with tank car owners, tank car manufacturers, emergency
responders, and other Federal agencies and local government.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question. AAR has stated that rail is the safest way to transport
crude oil. They contend, and I am quoting here, ``pipelines have
spilled 55 percent more [hazardous materials] per ton-mile than have
railroads.'' Do you agree with their assessment, if not what is the
safest way to transport petroleum products?
Answer. According to AAR the number of crude oil car loads
originated by the members increased from 11,000 in 2009 to more than
400,000 in 2013 with an expected increase. Over the last 10 years,
while train volume has increased, train accidents have declined by 43
percent and the number of train accidents involving hazardous materials
has declined by 16 percent. Despite this decline in accidents,
derailments can have lasting consequences to the public, communities,
and environment. PHMSA recognizes opportunities to improve safety and
are sharply focused on further reducing risks regardless of how this
product is transported. Whether transported by rail or by pipeline, the
shipment of crude oil must be done safely and in accordance with our
regulations. This is a safety issue that applies to all modes of
transportation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Roy Blunt to
Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman
Question 1. Are there any precedents where the implementation of
new regulations on tank cars that ship hazardous materials have also
impacted an existing fleet?
Answer. Yes there is. Most recently on January 13, 2009 PHMSA
issued a final rule that improved the crashworthiness of railroad tank
cars used to transport poisonous by inhalation (PIH) materials (i.e.,
chlorine and anhydrous ammonia). The final rule required PIH tank cars
to have better puncture resistance head, side and strengthened valves,
top fittings and nozzles.
The final rule also imposed operational requirements and
prioritized retirement or replacement of existing cars.
Question 2. The Feb 25th DOT Emergency Order requires that all
crude oil be classified in Packing Groups 1 and 2. I have heard from
many oil producers that they already often treat crude oil as Packing
Group 1 or 2. What type of data did PHMSA collect that led DOT to
believe the Emergency Order requiring the practice was necessary? Do
you have figures on how often shippers of crude oil use Packing Group
3?
Answer. One of the goals of the Emergency Order is to eliminate the
use of a non-DOT spec tank standard for transporting bulk quantities of
crude oil. In light of continued risks associated with petroleum crude
oil shipments by rail, the further action described in this Amended
Order is necessary to eliminate unsafe conditions and practices related
to the classification and packaging of petroleum crude oil that create
an imminent hazard to public health and safety and the environment.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Hon. Christopher A. Hart
Question 1. The NTSB since has been in Connecticut on the New Haven
Line investigating each Metro North incident that has occurred over the
last year. You have done extensive discovery and have interviewed Metro
North management, employees, and related parties for insight and
feedback.
You have also provided progress reports on your findings at NTSB
held hearings and briefings to Congress. What is the status of NTSB's
investigation report on the Metro North incidents? When can policy
makers and other stakeholders except these reports? Why does it take a
year to complete incident reports? It seems unnecessarily long.
Answer. The NTSB plans to combine four of the Metro-North
accidents--the May 17 derailment and collision in Bridgeport, CT; the
May 28 worker fatality in West Haven, CT; the July 18 CSX trash train
derailment on Metro-North tracks in The Bronx, New York; and the
December 1 derailment also in The Bronx--in to one report that will be
presented to the Board in mid-November 2014.
As the investigations have progressed, we issued four safety
recommendations to Metro-North and reiterated one safety recommendation
to the FRA. These recommendations provide an early glimpse in to the
investigation of the safety shortfalls we identified to date and can
also be used by policymakers who are examining ways to improve safety
at Metro-North.
The NTSB has 10 rail investigators in our Office of Rail, Pipeline,
and Hazardous Materials Investigations (RPH) who are currently
investigating 23 rail accidents. We investigate all relevant aspects of
all railroad accidents; operations, mechanical, signals, track, and
human performance. Although we attempt to complete each investigation
within 1 year, limited resources challenge our ability to reach that
goal. The final reports will fully explain the various issues related
to each accident, and will also provide policymakers with a great deal
of information that will assist in their efforts to improve railroad
safety.
Question 2. At one point, you mentioned that if a common thread
such as safety culture can be traced through each of Metro North's
accidents, the NTSB would consider consolidating each incident into one
report. Have you made a decision on whether or not to do this?
Answer. As stated previously, the NTSB will consolidate 4 Metro-
North accidents in to one report that will be presented to the Board in
mid-November 2014.
Question 3. One year seems like long to publish an investigation
report. Can you accelerate this process? Does NTSB have a resource
problem?
Answer. The NTSB had been under a hiring freeze due to
sequestration. The FY 2014 budget has allowed us to begin hiring
actions again, with a priority on RPH positions. We hope to add 4
people to the RPH office over the next few months, and these resources
will help with the workload.
The hiring freeze, which has left us unable even to replace those
who retire, has impacted all modal offices at the NTSB, and even after
hiring new staff, the training time will result in the new staff not
being available to lead their own investigations for at least one year.
The effects of sequestration will be felt for several years, and if
sequestration is implemented again, the NTSB will face the same
resource constraints and potentially delay accident reports even
further.
I am happy to talk with you further about the needs of the NTSB.
Question 4. What type of follow up does the NTSB do once they issue
a recommendation to the FRA or an individual operator such as Metro-
North? The NTSB first recommended that the FRA requires cameras in
2008--what follow up has occurred since that time with FRA? The NTSB
should not have to recommend something twice but I would hope there is
an ongoing dialogue with agencies and operators about their
recommendations.
Answer. We agree that it seems unnecessary to issue recommendations
multiple times, but too often, we see no action on recommendations by
the recipient. After issuing a recommendation, the NTSB tracks the
progress via correspondence with the recipient. I can provide you with
the correspondence history on any recommendation in which you are
interested.
In the case with redundant worker protections, like shunting, the
NTSB issued that recommendation to the FRA in 2008, but six years
later, this recommendation has not been implemented despite indications
that the FRA would implement it.
Question 5. The NTSB has made several recommendations to the FRA,
Metro North, and the Nation's railroads in general following the string
of Metro North accidents in 2013. Following the May 28, 2013 accident
that resulted in the death of track foreman Robert Luden, the NTSB
recommended the installation of shunting systems. The NTSB has also
made recommendations for inward and outward facing cameras for the
Nation's railroads as well as recommended to the FRA to issue an
adjacent track rule which it now has.
Mr. Hart, What other recommendations does the NTSB have to improve
safety on the Nation's railroads in the short-term that can be
implemented immediately and cost effectively?
Answer. The focus of the NTSB is to issue recommendations to
improve safety without conducting a cost-benefit analysis; therefore,
it is difficult for me to discuss the cost effective component.
However, there are several recommendations to the FRA that have been
open for a number of years that would be relatively quick to implement.
For example, the NTSB has recommended that the FRA develop and publish
a guide for crewmembers on the hazards of using certain types of
medications while on the job (R-00-002). This recommendation has been
open since 2000 and despite the wealth of information that is available
about the side effects of various drugs, no new regulations have been
implemented.
Question 6. What should we be focusing on as Federal regulators to
improve safety on the Nation's rail system in the long run?
Answer. There is no one ``silver bullet'' to improve rail safety,
but at the NTSB, we have seen some themes in our investigations that,
especially when taken together, go a long way to making our railroads
safer. Current safety issues, or overarching trends, include: safety
deficiencies in the design of thousands of railroad tank cars; the need
for widespread implementation of positive train control (PTC) systems;
the need for installation of inward-and outward-facing locomotive
cameras; the need for improved medical programs; and the need for
focused, industrywide efforts to foster top-down safety cultures in
which safety thrives. There is not one approach that will improve rail
safety, but it must be addressed by implementing varied approaches
that, when working together, can help drive down the number and
frequency of accidents or mitigate the severity of accidents.
1. Improved Tank Car Design. The NTSB has called for more robust
tank cars for over 20 years. More recently, the accidents in
Lac-Megantic, Quebec, Casselton, ND, and New Augusta, MS, and
in Casselton, ND illustrate the continuing need for these
improvements. Enhanced head shields, jackets, and thicker
shells could reduce or mitigate the severity of these
accidents.
2. Technology. The NTSB has called for positive train control (PTC)
or its predecessor technology for over 40 years. This
technology would prevent or mitigate head-on collisions,
roadway worker fatalities, and other accidents that are the
result of human factors deficiencies. PTC preventable accidents
continue happening with the most recent occurring on December
1, 2013, in The Bronx, NY, which killed four people and injured
59 others. Since 2004, in the 25 PTC preventable accidents that
the NTSB investigated, 65 people died, more than 1,100 were
injured, and damages totaled millions of dollars.
Unfortunately, we have been told by the railroad industry that
many railroads will not meet the 2015 deadline for
implementation. The NTSB has recommended that railroads provide
PTC implementation update reports to the FRA every 6 months
until PTC implementation is complete. The NTSB believes the FRA
should make this information available online to ensure a
transparent accounting for actions taken and not taken to meet
the 2015 deadline so that regulators and policymakers can make
informed decisions.
3. Inward-and Outward Facing Audio and Image Recorders. The December
1, Metro-North accident in the Bronx raised questions about the
actions of the engineer prior to the crash. The NTSB has
repeatedly called for railroad carriers to install inward-and
outward-facing audio and image records to answer similar
questions that have arisen in other accidents. Recorders in
locomotives and cab car operating compartments are critically
important not only because they would assist NTSB investigators
and others understand what happened in a train in the minutes
and seconds before an accident, but also because they would
help railroad management prevent accidents by identifying and
responsibly addressing safety issues before they lead to
injuries and loss of life and allow for the development of
material that can be a valuable training and coaching tool.
4. Improved Medical Programs. Updating medical exams to include a
review of drug-to-drug interaction, screening for sleep
disorders, and thorough physical examinations; improved testing
for color discrimination capabilities; and more frequent checks
for personnel with chronic conditions. The most recent NTSB
investigations illustrating this trend include Goodwell, OK and
Red Oak, IA. Additionally, there is preliminary evidence to
support the need for improved medical programs in current on-
going investigations.
5. Top-down Safety Cultures. Fostering the development of
transparent, top-to-bottom safety cultures in transportation is
an important priority of the NTSB. Creating and nurturing a
thriving safety culture within rail carriers is even more
imperative in light of the expanding role of the Nation's
railroad system as a main transporter of flammable materials
and the continual increase in passenger ridership.
The NTSB held a public forum on September 10 and 11, 2013, on
successes and challenges associated creating and maintaining
strong safety cultures across the transportation modes,
including rail. Panels of experts from academia, industry, and
Federal regulatory agencies, such as the FRA, offered their
perspectives on the significant organizational commitments and
managerial work that are required to maintain safety cultures
across large complex organizations such as transportation
carriers.
Currently, the NTSB is examining the role of safety culture and
the critical role that organizational culture plays in
preventing accidents at the Metro-North Railroad. As we
continue the on-going investigations into five Metro-North
accidents, including the Bridgeport, CT, derailment on May 17
where 76 people were injured, the West Haven, CT, roadway
worker fatality on May 28, the derailment of a CSX train along
Metro-North tracks on July 18, the derailment on December 1 in
The Bronx where four people were killed, and most recently, an
additional roadway worker fatality on March 10, 2014, in
Manhattan, NY, we will examine organizational issues that
likely impact the safety performance at Metro-North. The
importance of building relationships between management and
employees that foster a vibrant safety culture cannot be
overlooked. Trust is an essential ingredient in those
relationships. A culture in which front-line employees may
openly report operational errors and safety issues without fear
of reprisal is absolutely critical, and, as we have seen in the
aviation context, improves safety.
6. Maintenance Issues. The Metro-North Bridgeport accident
underscores the critical importance of regular, vigorous, and
robust inspections of tracks. Railroad management must afford
track workers adequate time and opportunity to conduct
inspections and make repairs as necessary. As part of an
ongoing investigation, the NTSB is looking at the adequacy of
the FRA's Track Safety Standards.
Question 7. What has your research showed about the importance of
inward and outward facing cameras? Why is this such a critical tool for
protecting passengers?
Answer. Inward-and outward-facing video and audio recorders can
provide vital information to investigators about what happened during
an accident. This information can also be incorporated in to company
training programs, which will improve passenger safety.
Question 8. The NTSB investigates railroads across the entire
country. At NTSB's November hearings on the Metro North Bridgeport
derailment and the West Haven accident, a representative from the Long
Island Railroad (LIRR) testified that the LIRR conducts inspections at
a higher rate than Metro North and also employs automated inspection
vehicles more frequently.
At a meeting between Congress members, DOT and the FRA,
Administrator Szabo spoke to the fact that alerter systems are good
railroad practice and standard on most railroads across the country
while Metro North lacked these devices in each train cabin where an
engineer operates. He stated that he was checking with the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA) on whether any other railroad
didn't have alerters as a standard device in each train cabin.
In your opinion, how does Metro North's standard of safety compare
to other railroads throughout the country?
Answer. Our on-going Metro-North accident investigations only focus
on those specific accidents and do not enable us to generate an overall
safety rating for Metro-North's total operations or to compare its
overall safety with other railroads. That being said, we will likely
issue recommendations as a result of these investigations that can be
applied at other railroads to improve the safety throughout the
country.
Also, positive train control (PTC) is a technology that includes
the role of the alerter, and the NTSB has been on the record for more
than 40 years calling for PTC to be implemented throughout the rail
industry. Accidents like the December 1, fatal accident could have been
prevented or mitigated by PTC.
Question 9. What other areas besides the aforementioned does Metro
North lag behind the rest of the Nation's railway system?
Answer. Our investigations have identified and will continue to
identify safety shortcomings of Metro-North. The four recommendations
issued up to this point clearly point to areas of improvement for
Metro-North in the areas of worker protections, in-cab audio and video
recorders, and speed control.
We will not hesitate to act on other safety shortfalls at any time
as the investigations proceed.
Question 10. On December 1, a Metro-North train derailed resulting
in four casualties and close to seventy injuries. The train was
travelling at approximately 82 mph in an area where speed was limited
to 30 mph. The NTSB investigation is ongoing, but officials recently
recommended that Metro-North install inward-and outward-facing cameras
on its trains. The NTSB has called on all railroads to install such
cameras since a 2008 crash between a passenger and a freight train
resulted in the death of 25 people. The FRA has recently indicated its
decision to begin the rulemaking process on this issue.
Following the December 2013 Metro-North derailment that resulted in
four casualties and close to seventy injuries, the NTSB recommended
that Metro-North install inward-and outward-facing cameras. This is
something the NTSB has been recommending since 2008. What safety
benefits does the NTSB see in requiring these cameras? Are some rail
agencies already using this technology?
Answer. In 2008, the NTSB recommended inward-and outward-facing
audio and image recorders after the deadly rail accident in Chatsworth,
CA, and we recently reiterated that recommendation in Goodwell, OK.
This important crash protected information would assist investigators
in reconstructing accident scenarios. Also, it could help railroad
management prevent accidents by identifying and responsibly addressing
safety issues before they lead to injuries and loss of life and allow
for the development of material that can be a valuable training and
coaching tool. In the future, image technology may well play a role in
identifying fatigued engineers and allowing interventions.
TO THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION: Establish an ongoing
program to monitor, evaluate, report on, and continuously improve
fatigue management systems implemented by operating railroads to
identify, mitigate, and continuously reduce fatigue-related risks for
personnel performing safety-critical tasks, with particular emphasis on
biomathematical models of fatigue. (R-12-17)
TO THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION: Conduct research on new and
existing methods that can identify fatigue and mitigate performance
decrements associated with fatigue in on-duty train crews. (R-12-18)
In the investigation of the 2012 Goodwell, OK, head-on train
collision, the NTSB made the following recommendation to all Class I
railroads:
Install in all controlling locomotive cabs and cab car operating
compartments crash-and fire-protected inward-and outward-facing audio
and image recorders. The devices should have a minimum 12-hour
continuous recording capability. (R-13-26)
The NTSB continues to believe that inward-and outward-facing audio
and image recorders improve the quality of accident investigations and
provide the opportunity for proactive steps by railroad management to
improve operational safety.
On February 18, 2014, in the wake of several accidents at Metro-
North Commuter Railroad, the NTSB issued the following two
recommendations to Metro-North:
Require the installation, in all controlling locomotive cabs
and cab car operating compartments of crash-and fire-protected
inward-and outward-facing audio and image recorders capable of
providing recordings to verify that train crew actions are in
accordance with rules and procedures that are essential to
safety as well as train operating conditions. The devices
should have a minimum 12-hour continuous recording capability
with recordings that are easily accessible for review, with
appropriate limitations on public release, for the
investigation of accidents or for use by management in carrying
out efficiency testing and systemwide performance monitoring
programs. (R-14-08)
Regularly review and use in-cab audio and image recordings in
conjunction with other performance data, to verify that train
crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that
are essential to safety. (R-14-09)
Some commuter and freight railroads have installed or are
installing these cameras, and their use is a condition of employment.
Voluntary installation is an excellent step forward, but we are not
confident that all railroads will install cameras unless they are
required by rule.
Question 11. In July, a train carrying crude derailed and exploded
in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, killing 47 people and destroying the city's
downtown. On December 30th, a train in North Dakota carrying crude oil
struck another train which set off an explosion and required the
evacuation of more than 1,500 people. On January 7th, a train carrying
crude and propane derailed and caught fire in New Brunswick, Canada
forcing an evacuation less than 35 miles from the Maine border.
A series of freight rail accidents over the past 8 months highlight
the need for safety plans to be in place so that communities and first
responders know how to respond when there is a train accident carrying
crude, propane, or any other hazardous material. Training first
responders is a good first step to improving the response to incidents,
and I was glad to see that included in your recent agreement. Mr. Hart,
based on your response to safety incidents generally, what more should
be done to ensure emergency responders are able to quickly and
appropriately respond to these types of incidents?
Answer. The NTSB has issued recommendations to the FRA and PHMSA to
require the railroads to immediately provide to emergency responders
accurate, real-time information regarding hazardous materials on a
train in the event of an accident. These recommendations were issued in
2007 as a result of an accident in Anding, MS, and we continue to see
other rail accidents in which timely information to first responders
results in a lack of coordinated response and can endanger the
responders and the communities through which these trains travel.
More can be done by railroads to provide real-time data on train
manifests, especially when the manifest is available electronically. We
look forward to working with you to ensure that our first responders
are armed with up-to-date information in the aftermath of an accident.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Hon. Christopher A. Hart
Question 1. What actions are being taken by your agency/
organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
Answer. The NTSB believes there should be better coordination
between first responders and the railroads travelling through their
communities. To that end, the NTSB has issued recommendations to the
FRA and PHMSA to require the railroads to immediately provide to
emergency responders accurate, real-time information regarding
hazardous materials on a train in the event of an accident. These
recommendations were issued in 2007, but we continue to investigate
rail accidents in which timely information to first responders results
in a lack of coordinated response and can endanger the responders and
the communities through which these trains travel.
More can be done by railroads to provide real-time data on train
manifests, especially when the manifest is available electronically. We
look forward to working with you to ensure that our first responders
are armed with up-to-date information in the aftermath of an accident.
Question 2. What immediate measures can states, municipal
governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
Answer. The accident in Paulsboro, NJ, in November 2012, is an
example in which first responders were not adequately trained to
respond to the toxic release and did not have the necessary resources
(air monitoring equipment, fire suppression equipment, etc.). Local and
state governments should contact the railroad operators in their
community and work to improve emergency responders' training and
identify how resources will be provided and managed in the event of
derailments involving hazardous liquids. It should include first
responder training and routine refresher training. Also, public
education programs for communities through which railroads transport
hazardous materials can be developed. Lastly, municipalities should
adequately identify and analyze risks, or adequately provide for
response to releases of hazardous materials that are transported
through communities.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
Hon. Christopher A. Hart
Question 1. Local stakeholders have raised concerns about the
conditions of the ground in and around Casselton that could potentially
affect track quality or integrity. Is the NTSB, in its review of the
Casselton Derailment, testing ground quality near the Casselton
Interchange to determine whether or not it was a factor contributing to
the derailment?
Answer. The NTSB accident investigation is ongoing with many
factors being reviewed. As part of the investigation, track conditions,
including ground and subgrade, and maintenance records will be reviewed
for their condition as well as for compliance with current FRA
regulations and BNSF Railway established maintenance procedures.
Question 2. When will the NTSB's investigation be completed? Will
NTSB issue recommendations to the regulators based on these findings?
Or will the independent agency reiterate previous recommendations that
have not been acted upon--such as the recommendations from the findings
of the 2009 Cherry Valley derailment?
Answer. The NTSB goal is to complete its investigation of the
Casselton, ND, accident in about one year. However, if we identify
safety issues that need more immediate action, we can issue safety
recommendations at any time before the report is complete. An example
is found in safety recommendation R-14-10 issued on April 7, 2014, to
the American Association of Railroads requiring that second-hand use
axles undergo non-destructive testing specifically designed to locate
internal material defects in axles.
Regarding the Cherry Valley, IL, tank car recommendations, the NTSB
is closely following the rulemaking actions at PHMSA, and we will
comment on those efforts to ensure our lessons learned are part of the
record on tank car design.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Geoffrey C. Blackwell
Question 1. One key aspect to implementing PTC is providing the
necessary spectrum. Various types of equipment owned by many different
railroads must be able to communicate on any track equipped with PTC.
It would be most efficient to utilize a single radio frequency band
across the entire PTC system to minimize the cost of radio receivers
and network equipment. A consortium of the Union Pacific, Norfolk
Southern, CSX, and BNSF railroads, has purchased licenses to some
frequencies in the 220 MHz range. Along with Amtrak and other
railroads, the consortium has requested additional 217-222 MHz spectrum
and appropriate license and rule changes, claiming 220 MHz will be
insufficient in congested urban areas. Although frequencies may be
available in various bands, the railroads prefer the 217-222 MHz range
due to compatibility with current infrastructure and the radio
communication technology they have chosen to employ. Because of
uncertainty over spectrum needs, the FCC issued a public notice seeking
comments from stakeholders on May 5, 2011, but has not instituted a
formal rulemaking process regarding PTC radio spectrum issues.
Mr. Blackwell, what is the status of the FCC's rulemaking for PTC
radio spectrum? What did the FCC glean from the public comment period?
Has progress been made based on the findings from the public comments?
When can we expect a final rule on PTC spectrum?
Answer. The Commission has not initiated a rulemaking with respect
to PTC spectrum, focusing instead on directly helping the railroads
secure the necessary spectrum. Also, Congress did not direct FCC to
provide spectrum to commuter rails, or any railroads, in the Rail
Safety Improvement Act of 2008. The public record from the 2011 Public
Notice indicated that most commuter rails did not know how much
spectrum they needed to deploy PTC and lacked familiarity with how to
secure spectrum in the secondary markets by lease or acquisition. As a
result, the Commission has worked to educate the commuter rails and the
American Public Transportation Association (APTA) about securing
spectrum in the secondary markets. In addition, we have granted
substantial technical relief to enable PTC system implementation. In
fact, Commission staff has been working closely with the freight and
commuter railroads to identify available spectrum suitable for PTC
deployment.
We will continue to work with all parties on this issue and believe
that we will be able to help the remaining railroads identify and
secure sufficient spectrum for their PTC deployments. In fact, with the
Commission's assistance, approximately 75 percent of the commuter
railroads have acquired or are in discussions to lease spectrum. In
lieu of a rulemaking, therefore, the Commission will continue to assist
all railroads to acquire the necessary spectrum they need through
secondary market transactions and technical relief.
Question 2. As part of PTC implementation, railroads must install
tens of thousands of new antenna structures nationwide to transmit PTC
signals. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains that all
PTC antenna structures are subject to the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA). The location of each antenna must be submitted to the FCC so
Native American tribes can determine if the installation will
negatively impact areas of historic, cultural or religious
significance.
In January 2014, the FCC released a proposal that was intended to
expedite the review of PTC infrastructure.
Mr. Blackwell, has the FCC processed this level of applications
before? Do you agree with Mr. Hamberger's assessment? What additional
challenges might the agency face in processing the applications
quickly?
Answer. The Tower Construction Notification System (TCNS) is a
secure technology solution that allows parties interested in
constructing communications towers to ascertain whether their proposed
construction would implicate a Tribal Nation's interest in culturally
or religiously significant sites in the area of the proposed
construction. A parallel system, E-106, exists to facilitate review of
communications towers by interested State Historic Preservation
Officers (SHPOs). On average, the Commission processes more than 10,000
applications a year for new or collocated communications infrastructure
through these systems, which were originally designed for tower-by-
tower review.
When the railroads informed FCC staff of the extent of construction
necessary to deploy PTC in the spring of 2013, and after continued
discussions with the railroads, we concluded (and the railroads agreed)
that the Commission's TCNS and E-106 processes, as they existed, were
not suited to ensure efficient review of PTC wayside infrastructure on
such a large scale. At the same time, we recognized that TCNS and E-106
offer unique efficiencies that will provide many advantages to the
railroads, Commission staff, SHPOs, and Tribal Nations. In consultation
with Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) and the
Administration's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the Commission
moved forward with drafting a Program Comment intended to streamline
existing procedures and promote administrative efficiency for review of
PTC wayside infrastructure.
The Commission does not agree with the overall assessment of the
program comment by Mr. Hamberger and the Association of American
Railroads (AAR). In fact, many of the changes made to the Program
Comment prior to submission to ACHP were based on comments from AAR and
the individual railroads. Commission staff is fully committed to
working with the railroads subject to the PTC deployment deadlines. We
expect the procedures proposed in the Program Comment to materially
reduce the time it will take railroads to complete required reviews of
PTC infrastructure. Specifically, overall time limits for review are
reduced by 40 percent and appeals must stop at the end of 90 days in
most cases. The Program Comment is currently under review by ACHP, and
we look forward to working with the railroads to help them take
advantage of the new procedures once ACHP has completed its review.
The existing poles constructed without NHPA and NEPA review pose
the most significant challenge to moving forward expeditiously. The
Commission is currently in discussions with the relevant stakeholders,
including the railroads, Tribal Nations, and SHPOs, regarding multiple
mitigation proposals so that we can help expedite resolution of the
pre-construction issues and move forward toward completion of PTC
deployment.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Geoffrey C. Blackwell
Question. Mr. Blackwell, railroad companies are waiting on the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to approve the siting,
construction and replacement of an estimated 22,000 communication
towers and antenna structures before they can move forward on
implementation of positive train control (PTC) technology. What is the
FCC doing to make this approval process more efficient? Aside from
extending the deadline to allow more time for implementation, are there
steps that the FCC could do to speed up the approval process?
Answer. Commission staff is fully committed to working with the
railroads subject to the PTC deployment deadlines. We have drafted a
Program Comment intended to streamline existing procedures and promote
administrative efficiency for review of PTC wayside infrastructure. We
expect the procedures proposed in the Program Comment to materially
reduce the time it will take railroads to complete required reviews of
PTC infrastructure. Specifically, overall time limits for review are
reduced by 40 percent and appeals must stop at the end of 90 days in
most cases. The Program Comment is currently under review by the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), and we look forward
to working with the railroads to help them take advantage of the new
procedures once ACHP has completed its review.
The draft program comment also includes a provision for individual
railroads to enter into voluntary alternative arrangements with State
Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO5) and Tribal Nations. One railroad
has approached the Commission with ideas that might form the basis for
such alternative arrangements, and we are working with that railroad to
advance those ideas.
Another issue is the roughly 10,000 poles that have already been
constructed without the required review pursuant to Section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The Commission is currently in
discussions with the relevant stakeholders, including the railroads,
Tribal Nations, and SHPOs, regarding multiple mitigation proposals so
that we can help expedite resolution of the pre-construction issues and
move forward to completion of PTC deployment.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
Geoffrey C. Blackwell
Question. Please explain the challenges regarding PTC
implementation before your agency and the steps that you are taking to
address them.
Answer. Commission staff is fully committed to working with the
railroads subject to the PTC deployment deadlines. We have drafted a
Program Comment intended to streamline existing procedures and promote
administrative efficiency for review of PTC infrastructure. We expect
the procedures proposed in the Program Comment to materially reduce the
time it will take the railroads to complete required reviews of PTC
infrastructure. Specifically, overall time limits for review are
reduced by 40 percent and appeals must stop at the end of 90 days in
most cases. The Program Comment is currently under review by the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), and we look forward
to working with the railroads to help them take advantage of the new
procedures once ACHP has completed its review.
The draft program comment also includes a provision for individual
railroads to enter into voluntary alternative arrangements with State
Historic Preservation Offices (SHPOs) and Tribal Nations. One railroad
has approached the Commission with ideas that might form the basis for
such alternative arrangements, and we are working with that railroad to
advance those ideas.
Another challenge is the roughly 10,000 poles that have already
been constructed without the required review pursuant to Section 106 of
the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The FCC is currently in
discussions with the relevant stakeholders, including the railroads,
Tribal Nations, and SHPOs, regarding multiple mitigation proposals so
that we can help expedite resolution of the pre-construction issues and
move forward with PTC deployment.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Prentiss Searles
Question 1. ``Operation Classification'' is focused, in part, on
classification and packing group assignments for Bakken crude. Tests
are being conducted to measure the chemical properties of the crude.
PHMSA recently urged API to share information on the composition of
Bakken crude oil. Last week, PHMSA issued an emergency order requiring
that crude oil shippers conduct ``sufficient testing'' before transport
and they must cease shipping crude oil using the least restrictive
hazardous materials packaging standards (known as Packing Group III).
DOT has been testing Bakken crude and has found that there are
ongoing concerns with the proper testing and classification of the
crude oil. Mr. Searles, Federal regulations to test materials have been
in place for many years and prior testimony from API has indicated that
you have also been testing crude for years. How frequently do your
members currently test materials? How do testing practices vary across
companies? What oversight processes do companies have in place to
maintain records of that data?
Answer. API is developing a standard of best industry practices
with regard to sampling and testing for classification of crude oil for
rail transportation. The frequency of testing is dependent upon many
different factors and must account for the variability of the material.
Some criteria to determine the frequency of testing include:
History of source of crude oil
Stability of crude oil source
New crude production or changes in production operations
Type of rail car loading facility
Testing practices are prescribed in standards published by API,
ASTM and ISO. These standardized procedures stipulate the necessary
steps for testing of crude oil and allow for little variability.
Testing data can be supplied from multiple sources over different time
frames. Nevertheless, documentation has to be retained by the shipping
party for a minimum of two years.
Question 2. DOT-111 tank cars were involved in the Lac-Megantic,
Alabama, and North Dakota derailments and explosions. The DOT-111,
which accounts for 69 percent of the U.S. tank car fleet, has a
documented history of failure during accidents. AAR has asked DOT to
adopt tougher standards for new tank cars, as well as requiring the
retrofit or phase out of tank cars built to less stringent standards.
API and the Railway Supply Institute (RSI)--who represent tank car
manufacturers--also support higher tank car standards, but have
concerns about retrofit costs.
For several decades, the NTSB has expressed concern about the DOT-
111 tank car. Other stakeholders, including AAR, API, and RSI, have
sought tougher tank car standards. DOT is almost a year behind on a
rulemaking, which would propose updates to the DOT-111 standards, and
does not anticipate issuing a final rule until next year. This is
unacceptable to me and the thousands of people living in communities
that see these train cars roll through their towns everyday--
communities along these rail lines deserve more. Again, this seems to
be another example of regulatory capture; the DOT for all intents and
purposes outsourced tank car recommendations to industry back in 2011.
And here we are 3 years and several high profile accidents later, and
we're still talking about the need for stronger tank cars.
Several companies have proposed using only newer tank cars and BNSF
Railroad has stated that they will order even stronger tank cars. Would
you agree that these actions will make transporting hazardous materials
safer? Do your members have concerns about the cost implications for
acquiring new cars? What is the industry doing to protect communities?
Answer. The oil and gas industry is focused on a holistic approach
to safety, which includes efforts relating to prevention, mitigation,
and response. One component of mitigation is tank car design. Our
members have been building state-of-the-art tank cars since 2011 based
on designs that were developed over the course of several years through
the evaluation of decades of data. Tank car design must be evaluated
holistically so that changes to the tank cars do not result in
unintended increases in risk elsewhere in the transportation process.
Our industry is currently undertaking an integrated risk assessment so
that we can understand what elements of the supply chain deserve more
focus. Safety is a core value of the oil and gas industry, as such, we
are evaluating tank car designs from a safety perspective.
Question 3. In recent months, DOT officials concluded that eleven
of eighteen samples taken from cargo tanks carrying Bakken crude were
not labelled correctly. In addition, it has been revealed that the
Bakken crude involved in the deadly Lac-Megantic accident was
inaccurately labeled. What changes has the industry made to ensure the
proper classification of crude?
Answer. At a minimum, API member companies are required to test and
classify their product according to Federal regulations. However, our
members also understand the need to assess any potential new issues and
as a result API is developing a standard that addresses the
classification and loading of crude oil into rail tank cars so that we
ensure that the industry has a standard set of recommended practices.
We have also encouraged our members to supply sample data to PHMSA.
Question 4. What issues led to the initial misclassification of
crude? Is this happening frequently?
Answer. The tragedy at Lac-Megantic is currently being studied
extensively by safety experts. When that review is complete, API will
work with other stakeholders to address any issues that contributed to
the accident. However, we will point out, that the product was moved in
a tank car that was designed for the higher packing group product
(Hazard Class 3, Packing Group I) and the emergency response for that
product whether it was a PG I, PG II or PG III, would have been the
same, regardless. Tank cars are not normally run at 65 mph anywhere in
the country (U.S. or Canada).
Question 5. DOT recently announced an amended Emergency Order to
address the testing of crude. What oversight procedures are in place to
ensure that proper classification is being conducted? What long-term
procedures need to be addressed to ensure that proper classification
continues to be addressed?
Answer. DOT oversees the transportation of crude by rail and ensure
that proper classification is being conducted. The API standard will
address this process and will ensure that the industry has a standard
set of recommended practices for the classification and loading and
unloading of crude oil into rail tank cars.
Question 6. What steps, if any, can be taken before shipment to
address the volatile content of Bakken crude?
Answer. API members strive to follow all government regulations
regarding the proper classification of crude oil, including testing for
initial boiling point and flash point. Additionally, companies
undertake a variety of processes prior to the loading of crude oil into
tank cars depending on their business practices. As part of this
process, produced crude oil moves from the well to an oil and gas
separator (or heater treater) where gas, oil, and water are separated.
API is currently developing a standard for the classification,
loading, and unloading of crude oil into rail tank cars that will
assess the characteristics of crude oil to determine which attributes,
in addition to those already in the regulations, may need to be
considered to develop the best handling procedures.
Question 7. In January, API along with other stakeholders met with
Secretary Foxx and Administrators Szabo and Quarterman, to discuss the
safe transport of crude oil by rail. At that meeting, DOT asked API to
consider a number of additional safety measures, including sharing
testing information. Both DOT and API have previously stated that you
are working together to provide necessary information. On March 28, DOT
provided a press statement saying, ``we still lack data we requested
and that energy stakeholders agreed to produce. The overall and ongoing
lack of cooperation is disappointing, slows progress, and certainly
raises concerns.''
The recent DOT statement differs drastically from information you
provided to the Committee. What specific information have you been
asked to provide and what information is still outstanding? Are
discussions for data ongoing with DOT? If so, are there hurdles to the
industry for providing data to DOT? When will the industry provide all
requested information to the DOT?
Answer. There are three separate data collection efforts underway
by: North Dakota Petroleum Council (NDPC), AFPM and individual
companies. Generally there are seven characteristics of crude oil being
collected (e.g., flash point, initial boiling point, vapor pressure,
light end analysis, API gravity, sulfur, and H2S).
API member companies are submitting data to PHMSA and sharing it
with API. More than 150 samples have been submitted to PHMSA thus far
and API continues to encourage our members to submit data to PHMSA. API
is compiling the data shared by our members and members have met
individually with PHMSA to discuss their data.
In addition to the individual proprietary data, the North Dakota
Petroleum Council (NDPC) has contracted to a third party to conduct
quality assurance tests that will study the range and variability of
Bakken crude oil qualities (ND and MT). They will collect 150 total
samples--101 well and 49 rail and that data is from both well sites and
rail facilities from a significant geographic area. The results will
also be provided to PHMSA as a complement to the proprietary data that
individual companies are already sharing. NDPC has provided updates to
PHMSA on their progress.
AFPM is collecting data from the loading rack and the refinery
gate. AFPM has provided updates to PHMSA on their collection effort.
Industry will look forward to collaborating with PHMSA to review the
crude oil quality data compiled through Operation Classification and
the industries data collection efforts.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Prentiss Searles
Question 1. What actions are being taken by your agency/
organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
Answer. In 2013, API published the Oil and Natural Gas Industry
Preparedness Handbook. This Handbook, created in coordination with API,
other industry trade associations (AFPM, ILTA, AGA, INGAA, SOCMA, PMAA,
NATSO) and government partners (DOE, DHS, DOI, DOT, EPA, NSS, NASEO),
is focused on preparing industry and government partners for incidents
involving oil and natural gas operations from an all hazards
perspective. API continues to promote the importance of planning for
preparedness, mitigation and response through education, communication,
the development of partnerships and the necessity of drills and
exercises. API, as well as our members and other industry trades, meet
regularly with federal, state and local partners to stress the
importance of continuous communication and the development of plans to
ensure the ready supply of oil and natural gas to first responders,
communities and critical services. API also works internally with
members, as well as with public partners, to document and share the
expertise that exists within industry related to oil spill response,
spill mitigation and clean up.
Question 2. What immediate measures can states, municipal
governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
Answer. API designed the Oil and Natural Gas Industry Preparedness
Handbook as a tool for industry, as well as for states, municipal
governments, and local agencies. The strategy advocated for in the
Handbook applies to all parties involved in incident response;
communication and education prior to a response. The largest section of
the Handbook is specific guidance for state and local partners. This
section provides guidance on a few specific but critical areas. The
first is to know who the critical partners are in your area upon which
key resources or services depend. This includes roles and
responsibilities, as well as the people who are empowered to make
decisions in a crisis. The second is to know what not to do. This is as
important to the private sector as it is to governments. Understanding
the laws and regulations that can impede response, those that can
facilitate response and those that may not take effect until a response
occurs should be known and understood prior to a response. Thirdly, it
is critical for all parties to understand what matters in an event. For
localities and states, this is often identification of where critical
resources and services are sourced, or where critical assets are
located. Lastly, all of the previous concepts should be combined and
integrated into exercises to ensure all parties understand these
concepts, know what is needed, and to identify gaps in knowledge and
process.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Prentiss Searles
Question 1. Mr. Searles, Federal officials and your industry seem
to agree on one thing: that Bakken crude is light, sweet, and more
combustible than most other crudes. This is obviously a factor in these
explosions, and the correct labeling of these shipments is critically
important. I believe some fines have already been assessed for
misclassification.
Misclassification means that first responders don't know what to
expect when they approach a disaster site. And in a trade dependent-
state like Washington, our rail lines run through major population
centers. Consequences from an accident would be high--which is one of
the reasons cities and newspapers across our state have expressed
concern about the safe movement of crude. Could you tell us what steps
your industry is taking to reduce the volatility of Bakken crude prior
to transport?
Answer. API members strive to follow all government regulations
regarding the proper classification of crude oil, including testing for
initial boiling point and flash point. Additionally, companies
undertake a variety of processes prior to the loading of crude oil into
tank cars depending on their business practices. As part of this
process, produced crude oil moves from the well to an oil and gas
separator (or heater treater) where gas, oil, and water are separated.
API is currently developing a standard for the classification,
loading, and unloading of crude oil into rail tank cars that will
assess the characteristics of crude oil to determine which attributes,
in addition to those already in the regulations, may need to be
considered to develop the best handling procedures.
Question 2. Could you tell us what steps your industry is taking to
better understand the characteristics of crude prior to shipment?
Answer. API has established a group of physical chemists who are
specialists in crude oil properties. They are reviewing different
properties of crude oil to determine in addition to those already
required by PHMSA, those most suitable for classifying and
characterizing the material for rail transportation. Furthermore, these
specialists are also looking at the science behind crude oil properties
used for rail car selection in order to identify those parameters that
could impact rail car design.
Guidance on this subject is being included in the development of
the API standard, a process which is open to all stakeholders such as
the railroad industry, tank car builders/owners and lessors, PHMSA,
Transport Canada, as well as crude oil producers.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
Prentiss Searles
Question 1. A consensus seems to be emerging that steps needs to be
taken to fortify existing tanker cars or to build new and safer cars. I
understand your members own roughly half of the tanker cars used to
carry crude. The other half are owned by rail car leasing companies.
Can you tell me at what stage in the depreciation schedule producer
owned rail cars are? In other words, in general, how long have these
cars been in service?
Answer. The vast majority of tank cars in crude service were built
after 2001 (over 80 percent) and approximately half of those cars were
built in 2012 and 2013 so they are likely to not have been fully
depreciated at this point.
Question 2. If DOT-111s are phased out, the productive life of some
of these assets will be shortened significantly. Would the American
Petroleum Institute support changes to the tanker car depreciation
schedules as an incentive for oil producers to invest in new tanker
cars?
Answer. We have no position on that proposal at this point.
Question 3. At what stage of the depreciation schedule are the DOT-
111 tanker cars in the current fleet? More specifically, what is the
percentage of tankers cars that are nearing their life's end? What
percentage of tanker cars are in the middle or early part of the 50
year productivity window?
Answer. The vast majority of tank cars in crude oil service are in
the middle or early part of the 50-year productivity window. Over half
of those are in the first few years of service life.
Question 4. At the meeting you and I attended with Secretary Foxx,
API committed on behalf of the industry to provide PHMSA with data
regarding the crude in the Bakken. To date, what information has API
been able to provide to PHMSA?
Answer. There are three separate data collection efforts underway
by: North Dakota Petroleum Council (NDPC), AFPM and individual
companies. Generally there are seven characteristics of crude oil being
collected (e.g., flash point, initial boiling point, vapor pressure,
light end analysis, API gravity, sulfur, and H2S).
API member companies are submitting data to PHMSA and sharing it
with API. More than 250 samples have been submitted to PHMSA thus far
and API continues to encourage our members to submit data to PHMSA. API
is compiling the data shared by our members and members have met
individually with PHMSA to discuss their data.
In addition to the individual proprietary data, the North Dakota
Petroleum Council (NDPC) has contracted to a third party to conduct
quality assurance tests that will study the range and variability of
Bakken crude oil qualities (ND and MT). They will collect 150 total
samples--101 well and 49 rail and that data is from both well sites and
rail facilities from a significant geographic area. The results will
also be provided to PHMSA as a complement to the proprietary data that
individual companies are already sharing. NDPC has provided updates to
PHMSA on their progress.
AFPM is collecting data from the loading rack and the refinery
gate. AFPM has provided updates to PHMSA on their collection effort.
Industry will look forward to collaborating with PHMSA to review the
crude oil quality data compiled through Operation Classification and
the industries data collection efforts.
Question 5. Is it true that many of your members use the same
contracting labs that are used by PHMSA to test the qualities and
characteristics of Bakken crude? To your knowledge, do contracting labs
use identical methodologies for multiple clients when testing for
characteristics such as vapor pressure, viscosity, corrosiveness,
boiling point and flash point? If that is the case, do you believe that
oil companies testing crude oil are in a strong position to share data
with PHMSA as part of Operation Backpressure?
Answer. We do not know what labs PHMSA is using for its Operation
Classification studies and I cannot speculate on whether they are using
the same labs as the oil companies. To my knowledge, many of the test
procedures for testing crude oil properties are the same, though some
of the test procedures can have significant reproducibility variance.
Question 6. At the end of this process, if additional requirements
are mandated to further improve the safety of tanker cars beyond the
1232 good faith tanker specifications--do you commit to cooperating in
good faith to meet those standards?
Answer. API will continue to cooperate to ensure that the most
appropriate tank cars are chosen and that approach is based on the
proven and available models. It is our understanding that API's members
and the petroleum industry in general has been purchasing the CPC-1232
standard tank car and we have already committed to adding the safety
valves once they are designed and engineered (i.e., the low trigger,
high-flow pressure relief device and the enhanced bottom outlet valve
handle).
Question 7. In your opinion, are the DOT-111 cars currently in use
sufficiently safe for the transportation of crude?
Answer. Under normal operating conditions, the existing DOT-111
tank cars are safe. However, our members understand that in situations
where prevention fails, there is a need to mitigate incidents. That
said, our members continue to review whether there are possible
improvements that would mitigate incidents if the tank cars are
derailed. If we identify improvements and those are approved by DOT, it
will be imperative that enough time is given to implement the changes
so that the U.S. continues to benefit from our country's crude oil
renaissance while simultaneously implementing changes that would
improve safety.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Thune to
Prentiss Searles
Question. Can you explain for the Committee the logistics and
ownership of tank cars when it comes to that fleet and how long it
would take to cycle the existing fleet of new and older model DOT-111
tank cars?
Answer. There are approximately 100,000 DOT-111 rail tank cars in
the U.S. fleet moving flammable liquids like crude oil and ethanol.\1\
Of that fleet, there are over 42,000 in crude oil service and more than
14,000 of those tank cars are built to the petition car standard.\2\
The Railway Supply Institute has publically stated that there are
another 37,800 tank cars that will be built to the petition car
standard for crude oil service that will be delivered by December
2015.\3\ There will be approximately 80,000 cars in crude oil service
by that time. Tank cars are unique in that they are not owned by the
railroads, they are owned by tank car leasing companies and shippers.
Tank cars have an operating life of 30-50 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Third Quarter 2013 Data from AAR 11/9/13 Fleet Analysis
\2\ AAR NTSB Presentation, 4/22/2014
\3\ RSI NTSB Presentation, 4/22/2014
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The impact on each API member will vary depending on their business
model and on the final PHMSA rule and timeframe. Specifically, the
extent and complexity of a modification, whether companies purchase
cars or lease them, the size of each fleet, the number of cars
backordered, the make-up of the total fleet, the availability of
materials, and access to repair shop or manufacturer capacity will all
determine timing.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to
Prentiss Searles
Question. What would the impact of completing the Keystone XL
pipeline be on the amount of petroleum products that are currently
being transported by rail?
Answer. API does not forecast, but when considering this question,
the following may help better explain the options available to ship
crude oil from Canada or our upper Plains states to domestic
refineries--where we can take a raw material and make more valuable
products. The Keystone XL pipeline is neither the only pipeline being
considered, nor the only means available to ship Canadian or domestic
crude oil. KXL is but one of 6 major pipeline proposals to bring
Canadian crude to market. In addition, 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) of
its capacity is set aside for Bakken crude production (according to the
Department of State). However, Bakken production, is expected to
increase by about 700,000 bpd by 2017 and by 1 million bpd by 2020.\4\
The expected increase in Bakken production is seven to ten times larger
than the set-aside Bakken capacity of KXL. . Rather, it may serve to
reduce the increase in rail traffic that would occur absent KXL by 14
percent in 2017 and 10 percent in 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ICF, 2014
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to keep in mind that the decision to ship crude to
market via pipeline or rail is multifaceted. It is not a matter of
pitting one mode against the other mode. Rail provides flexibility,
shorter times to come on line. Pipeline approvals take time as we
certainly have seen with KXL now, nearly 6 years under review. The
Department of State found the proposed KXL to be the preferred means to
bring Canada's crude from Alberta to our refineries in the Gulf along
that route. Rail offers the option to deliver crude to refiners not
served by pipelines, to help our domestic refiners utilize our own
domestic production, rather than purchasing their crude from more
distant, less friendly sources.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. On January 15, 2014, the Regional Planning Association
released a report titled, ``Getting Back on Track: Unlocking the Full
Potential of the New Haven Line. The RPA report concludes that the New
Haven Line's largest issue is the severity of its aging and
deteriorating infrastructure. Due to the state of the railroad's
infrastructure, the New Haven Line (NHL) is extremely underfunded and
requires tremendous increases in funding to reach a state of good
repair. At current funding levels of less than $200 million a year, it
would take 20 years to reach a state of good repair. Connecticut has
dedicated $1 billion to the railroad in its 2013-2017 capital plan, but
the RPA concludes that an additional $3.6 billion is needed to replace
the railroad's obsolete infrastructure by 2020.
These infrastructure needs, which include deteriorating bridges,
some over 100 years old, worn track, and outdated signaling and power
systems, pose threats to safety as seen in the Bridgeport derailment.
Broken and ill-repaired track has put lives at risk and it's only a
matter of time before such an incident reoccurs if nothing is done. How
critical is sound infrastructure to the ensuring safety on the Nation's
railway system?
Answer. AAR has often testified that one of the most important ways
that railroads have reduced accidents is through significant and
consistent investments back into their networks. Since the enactment of
Staggers, America's freight railroads have been reinvesting more
private capital than ever before to renew, upgrade, and expand their
infrastructure and equipment, including a record $25.5 billion in 2012
and $25.1 billion in 2013. The vast majority of these investments have
improved rail safety either directly or indirectly. For many of these
investments, safety is the primary reason the expenditures were made.
From 2008 to 2012 alone, Class I railroads spent nearly $26 billion in
capital expenditures on new crossties (77 million), new rail (2.9
million tons), and new ballast (nearly 61 million cubic yards). Over
the same period, they spent billions of additional capital dollars on
signal and communications systems, bridges and tunnels, and machinery.
These and other investments, as well as the billions of dollars
railroads spend on maintenance of their networks each year, have made
railroads much safer. This assertion is borne out by the fact that from
1980 to 2013, the train accident rate fell 79 percent, the rail
employee injury rate fell 84 percent, and the grade crossing collision
rate fell 81 percent.
Question 2. How many of the existing safety concerns can be solved
by reaching a state of good repair for the Nation's railroads?
Answer. Clearly, a railroad in a state of good repair is safer than
a railroad with significant amounts of deferred maintenance. Thanks
largely to the $550 billion freight railroads have reinvested back into
their networks since 1980, America's freight railroads are in better
condition today than ever before. And because a financially viable
railroad is in a much better position to reinvest in its network and in
risk reduction strategies than a financially challenged railroad, it is
critically important that the regulatory structure under which
railroads operate recognize the need for railroads to continue to earn
sufficient revenues to allow them to reinvest heavily back into their
systems.
Question 3. DOT-111 tank cars were involved in the Lac-Megantic,
Alabama, and North Dakota derailments and explosions. The DOT-111,
which accounts for 69 percent of the U.S. tank car fleet, has a
documented history of failure during accidents. AAR has asked DOT to
adopt tougher standards for new tank cars, as well as requiring the
retrofit or phase out of tank cars built to less stringent standards.
API and the Railway Supply Institute (RSI)--who represent tank car
manufacturers--also support higher tank car standards, but have
concerns about retrofit costs.
For several decades, the NTSB has expressed concern about the DOT-
111 tank car. Other stakeholders, including AAR, API, and RSI, have
sought tougher tank car standards. DOT is almost a year behind on a
rulemaking, which would propose updates to the DOT-111 standards, and
does not anticipate issuing a final rule until next year. This is
unacceptable to me and the thousands of people living in communities
that see these train cars roll through their towns everyday--
communities along these rail lines deserve more. Again, this seems to
be another example of regulatory capture; the DOT for all intents and
purposes outsourced tank car recommendations to industry back in 2011.
And here we are 3 years and several high profile accidents later, and
we're still talking about the need for stronger tank cars.
AAR recently called for additional changes to the proposed tank car
standard. What prompted this change and how will those changes increase
safety?
Answer. In 2011, AAR petitioned PHMSA to adopt more stringent
requirements for DOT-111 tank cars used to transport packing group I
and II materials. That petition proposed that new tank cars used to
transport those materials must have thicker shells than required by the
current regulations, with current shell thicknesses permitted only for
tank cars constructed of normalized steel and equipped with jackets and
thermal protection. In addition, the petition proposed that tank cars
be equipped with enhanced top fittings protection, reclosing pressure
relief devices, and half-height head shields. Subsequently, AAR adopted
an interchange standard (CPC-1232) with the same requirements
applicable to tank cars used to transport crude oil and ethanol,
effective for cars ordered after October 1, 2011.
AAR now supports even more stringent standards for new tank cars
used to transport these materials. Furthermore, AAR proposes additional
requirements for tank cars transporting flammable liquids, including
packing group III flammable liquids, retrofits of existing cars in
flammable liquid service, and an aggressive phase-out of cars that
cannot meet retrofit requirements. The phase-out program must take into
account factors such as manufacturing capacity, the demand for new DOT-
111 cars, shop capacity for any retrofits that will be undertaken, and
the number of DOT-111 cars that need to be phased out of flammable
liquid service. Input is needed from shippers and tank car
manufacturers to determine the precise parameters of a phase-out
program and identify retrofits that should be required.
The discussion of new tank car standards takes place in the context
of the accident that took place on July 6, 2013, in Lac-Megantic,
Quebec. The Lac-Megantic accident has no parallel in recent times and
over the last several decades the railroads' overall safety record has
improved dramatically. Indisputably, railroads provide an efficient and
safe way to transport hazardous materials such as crude oil and other
flammable liquids.
Question 3. In July, a train carrying crude derailed and exploded
in Lac-Megantic, Quebec, killing 47 people and destroying the city's
downtown. On December 30th, a train in North Dakota carrying crude oil
struck another train which set off an explosion and required the
evacuation of more than 1,500 people. On January 7th, a train carrying
crude and propane derailed and caught fire in New Brunswick, Canada
forcing an evacuation less than 35 miles from the Maine border.
A series of freight rail accidents over the past 8 months highlight
the need for safety plans to be in place so that communities and first
responders know how to respond when there is a train accident carrying
crude, propane, or any other hazardous material. Training first
responders is a good first step to improving the response to incidents,
and I was glad to see that included in your recent agreement.
As part of your agreement, AAR committed to rerouting trains
carrying at least 20 cars of crude oil to the ``safest and most secure
routes.'' How will these routing decisions impact communities that are
not currently seeing a large influx of crude-by-rail? Will other
communities see an increase in crude trains and will additional
resources be focused on these communities?
Answer. Since this aspect of the industry's commitments to USDOT
will not take effect until July 1, 2014, it is premature to speculate
on how the use of the RCRMS tool may impact crude oil routing
decisions. That said, railroads seek to operate safely everywhere, and
their safety record indicates that they succeed the vast majority of
the time.
Question 4. As part of PTC implementation, railroads must install
tens of thousands of new antenna structures nationwide to transmit PTC
signals. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains that all
PTC antenna structures are subject to the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA). The location of each antenna must be submitted to the FCC so
Native American tribes can determine if the installation will
negatively impact areas of historic, cultural or religious
significance.
In January 2014, the FCC released a proposal that was intended to
expedite the review of PTC infrastructure.
How would the FCC's proposed process affect the ability of
railroads to meet the Dec. 31, 2015 deadline? What are the major
hurdles to efficiently moving forward on installation?
Answer. The FCC elected to draft a program comment for
consideration by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
(``ACHP''). The railroad industry argued to the FCC that the FCC should
recommend to the ACHP that a program comment exempt most PTC wayside
infrastructure from Section 106 review under this standard. Such an
approach would not require the FCC to pursue a rulemaking under its own
rules. This approach would ensure that Tribal Nations and the State
Historic Preservation Offices would be able to focus their attention on
those poles that are most likely to implicate historic preservation
concerns, while not causing unreasonable delay to PTC deployment.
Unfortunately, the draft program comment that the FCC submitted to the
ACHP created a process based on the FCC's existing location-by-location
approach and, if adopted by the ACHP, would not streamline the review
process in a meaningful way.
While the railroad industry would not have been able to make the
2015 deadline even if there had been no delay attributable to the FCC,
the delay in installation of the antennas has set back the timeline for
rolling out PTC. Last May, AAR projected that by December 31, 2015, the
industry would have rolled out PTC on 40 percent of the route mileage
required to be equipped with PTC. AAR has now reduced that December 31,
2015, projection to 20 percent of the PTC route mileage and lacking a
date certain by which approval to install PTC antennas will be granted,
the industry cannot make any additional projections.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. In your testimony before the Subcommittee, you
mentioned that in light of recent accidents involving crude oil
shipments, railroads are considering expanding the application of a
number of procedures used for trains carrying toxic/hazardous materials
to trains carrying large amounts of crude oil.
Examples of such procedures include speed restrictions, more
frequent train inspections, and the use of the Rail Corridor Risk
Management System--developed jointly with the Federal government to aid
railroads in identifying the safest and most secure rail routes. When
will the railroads make this determination?
Answer. Pursuant to the agreement with Secretary Foxx, railroads
will adhere to speed restrictions for key crude oil trains within the
limits of high-threat urban areas by no later than July 1, 2014;
perform at least one additional internal rail inspection than is
required each year by Federal regulation effective March 25, 2014; and
begin using the Rail Corridor Risk Management System by no later than
July 1, 2014.
Question 2. What procedures expected to be used by crude oil trains
are different than those procedures currently used by trains shipping
toxic and hazardous substances, and which procedures currently used by
trains shipping toxic and hazardous substances can be used by crude oil
trains?
Answer. AAR Circular OT-55-N specifies recommended railroad
operating practices for the transportation of all hazardous materials,
including crude oil. Earlier this year, USDOT Secretary Foxx called for
the industry to identify steps that might be taken to address the new
and unique challenges associated with crude oil transportation. In late
February, the industry agreed to a series of additional voluntary
actions for crude oil, including increased track inspections, upgraded
braking systems, routing protocols, speed limits in certain areas,
deployment of trackside safety technology and emergency response
enhancements.
Question 3. In your testimony before the Subcommittee, you
mentioned that upon request, railroads provide appropriate local
authorities with a list of the hazardous materials, including crude
oil, transported through their communities. Why is it not general
practice to automatically distribute this information to local
authorities so they can implement the appropriate mitigation and
emergency preparedness procedures in case of a disaster?
Answer. AAR members provide bona fide emergency response agencies
or planning groups with specific commodity flow information covering
hazardous commodities transported through the community. The railroad
industry considers this to be restricted information of a security
sensitive nature and the recipient of the information must agree to
release the information only to bona fide emergency response planning
and response organizations and not distribute the information publicly
without the railroad's express written permission.
Question 4. What actions are being taken by your agency/
organization to coordinate with state and local agencies on disaster
preparedness training and emergency response efforts?
Answer. All major railroads have teams of full-time personnel whose
primary focus is hazmat safety and emergency response. Railroads also
have teams of environmental, industrial hygiene, and medical
professionals available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and 365 days
a year to provide assistance during hazmat incidents. Railroads also
maintain networks of hazmat response contractors and environmental
consultants, strategically located throughout their service areas, who
can handle virtually any air, water, waste or public health issue.
These contractors, who are on call at all times of the day and night,
have multiple offices and equipment storage locations and a vast array
of monitoring equipment, containment booms, industrial pumps, and other
spill response and heavy equipment. Finally, railroads have
comprehensive ``standard of care'' protocols that ensure that impacts
to the community--such as evacuations--are addressed promptly and
professionally.
In addition to relying on their own personnel, railroads have a
long history of working closely with state and local emergency first
responders and emergency planners in many different ways. Each year,
railroads actively train well over 20,000 emergency responders
throughout the country. This training ranges from general awareness
training to much more in-depth offerings. The precise parameters of
these emergency response training programs vary from railroad to
railroad.
In addition to individual railroad activities, some railroad hazmat
training efforts fall under the auspices of the Transportation
Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER).
TRANSCAER is a national inter-industry partnership focused on assisting
communities to prepare for, and to respond to, hazmat incidents.
TRANSCAER offers classroom and hands-on training; emergency planning
assistance; support for community drills and exercises; technical
information, reference, and training materials; and national
conferences and workshops for sharing best practices. TRANSCAER
provides this training at no cost to emergency responders and has
developed a well-earned reputation for quality and effectiveness.
The rail industry is also deeply involved in improving our Nation's
emergency response capability through its support of the Security and
Emergency Response Training Center (SERTC), a world-class training
facility that is part of TTCI in Pueblo, Colorado. The AAR established
SERTC in 1985. Its original mission was to train railroad personnel to
safely handle accidents involving tank cars carrying hazardous
materials. Over time, though, its scope has been broadened to also
serve the public sector emergency response community, other industries,
government agencies, and emergency response contractors from all over
the world.
SERTC's primary focus is still freight rail safety, but SERTC also
offers training covering other surface transportation modes. It
recently implemented emergency response and planning programs related
to passenger rail and mass transit. The Transportation Security
Administration has been using SERTC for employee training since 2006.
In fact, more than 2,100 TSA participants have trained at SERTC to date
in such areas as ``Railroad 101,'' hazmat transportation, and safety
compliance. FBI and National Guard personnel have also been trained at
SERTC. Over the years, SERTC has provided in-depth, realistic, hands-on
hazmat emergency response training to more than 50,000 local, state,
and tribal emergency responders and railroad, chemical, and petroleum
industry employees. Many railroads regularly provide financial
assistance to emergency responders in their service areas to attend
SERTC. Instructors at SERTC average more than 30 years of emergency
response experience.
Question 5. What immediate measures can states, municipal
governments, and local agencies take to mitigate potential disasters?
Answer. They should take advantage of the variety of opportunities
railroads provide to help local emergency responders. As noted above,
railroads have a long history of working closely with state and local
emergency first responders and emergency planners in many different
ways. These consist of a combination of some or all of the following:
Safety Trains. Several railroads utilize ``hazmat safety
trains'' and other training equipment that travel from
community to community to allow for hands-on training for local
first responders.
Training Centers. Several railroads operate centralized hazmat
training sites where they train employees, first responders,
customers, and other railroad industry personnel in all aspects
of dealing with hazmat incidents.
Local Firehouse Visits. In aggregate, railroads visit hundreds
of local firehouses each year to provide classroom and face-to-
face hazmat training.
Table Top Drills. Railroads regularly partner with local
emergency responders to conduct simulations of emergency
situations in which general problems and procedures in the
context of an emergency scenario are discussed. The focus is on
training and familiarization with roles, procedures, and
responsibilities.
Self-Study Training Courses. Railroads make available self-
study programs for emergency responders that allow students to
learn proper procedures at their own pace.
Some railroads also provide related web-based training on hazmat
and general rail safety issues.
Railroads also regularly provide hazardous materials training to
their customers and short line railroad partners. These comprehensive
rail industry efforts point to the seriousness with which railroads
take their responsibilities regarding the safety of the communities
they serve.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. Mr. Hamberger, I think we are all in agreement that the
voluntary crude-by-rail operating agreement is a step in the right
direction.
But city councils in places like Spokane and Bellingham, mayors,
and Washington's major newspapers are telling me that they simply don't
have enough information about what is being moved by rail to give them
confidence that it is moving safely. The Spokesman Review expressed it
pretty clearly, saying it was ``vital that feds create oil-by-rail
safeguards,'' and speaking of the new agreement, ``if that result is
also voluntary, then it won't bring much comfort.'' I agree with them,
and hope--expect--your industry to allay their concerns by answering
their questions about train movements in Washington communities and
nationwide. Very frankly, the consequences are high for Washington
state. We have rail lines, with at-grade crossings, running through the
hearts of our major cities, so a crude derailment could be
catastrophic.
I think that is why folks are asking if voluntary agreements are
strong enough. It is obviously impossible to completely eliminate all
risk in these situations. But I think we all agree that we need to
reduce it significantly to prevent another disaster like we witnessed
in Lac-Megantic or Casselton, North Dakota. That includes improved tank
car safety, oil classification, and rail operations. And on the
operations side, I'm just not convinced that a voluntary, opt-in
initiative is enough to hold bad actors accountable, considering the
potential consequences of a derailment in one of our population
centers.
What penalties exist for railroads that don't sign the voluntary
agreement?
Answer. All Class I railroads have signed the voluntary agreement.
Question 2. What penalties exist for railroads that opt-in to the
voluntary agreement, and then violate it (whether they cause an
accident or not)?
Answer. The voluntary steps that were agreed to by freight
railroads are memorialized in a letter of agreement to DOT containing
the details of the steps. The signatures of the senior railroad
officials affixed to the letter affirm the individual railroads' firm
commitment to abide by the terms of the agreement. AAR does not expect
there to be any compliance issues, but FRA inspectors can monitor
compliance and FRA can undertake additional measures if compliance
issues arise.
Question 3. If industry is behind these voluntary procedures--do
you believe we should be thinking about making them into a statute, or
imposing fines for violating them?
Answer. There would be no safety advantage. Class I signatories
will comply and FRA can monitor compliance.
Question 4. If no, why not?
Answer. There would be no safety advantage.
Question 5. If the good actors are already opting-in, does making
the voluntary standards into law come at a cost?
Answer. All Class I railroads have signed the voluntary agreement.
Question 6. If accidents keep occurring even once this agreement is
fully implemented, is your industry prepared to go further to reduce
risk?
Answer. There is every reason to expect the measures undertaken
will reduce the probability of a crude oil release.
Question 7. Mr. Hamberger, I think we are all pleased that your
industry is working on new, specialized crude-by-rail training as part
of the voluntary operating agreement. I believe that includes tuition
assistance for 1,500 first responders to attend training in Colorado in
2014. Obviously, there are a lot of communities, probably hundreds in
Washington state, that are affected by crude traffic--so I'm a little
worried that 1,500 nationwide is only a drop in the bucket.
In Washington, rail lines run through the heart of our biggest
cities--so this issue really hits home to my constituents. They want to
see this product moving safely, and they want to know that their first
responders have received adequate training from industry experts on how
to respond.
Has the industry considered making a commitment to extending
additional funding for future years, to ensure that this training
reaches a large number of first responders? If no, why not?
Answer. It is important to understand that the training at TTCI
represents only a fraction of the railroads' commitment to emergency
response training. Railroads have a long history of working closely
with state and local emergency first responders and emergency planners
in many different ways. In addition, each year, railroads actively
train well over 20,000 emergency responders throughout the country.
This training ranges from general awareness training to much more in-
depth offerings. The precise parameters of these emergency response
training programs vary from railroad to railroad.
Local responders should take advantage of the variety of
opportunities railroads provide. These consist of a combination of some
or all of the following:
Safety Trains. Several railroads utilize ``hazmat safety
trains'' and other training equipment that travel from
community to community to allow for hands-on training for local
first responders.
Training Centers. Several railroads operate centralized hazmat
training sites where they train employees, first responders,
customers, and other railroad industry personnel in all aspects
of dealing with hazmat incidents.
Local Firehouse Visits. In aggregate, railroads visit hundreds
of local firehouses each year to provide classroom and face-to-
face hazmat training.
Table Top Drills. Railroads regularly partner with local
emergency responders to conduct simulations of emergency
situations in which general problems and procedures in the
context of an emergency scenario are discussed. The focus is on
training and familiarization with roles, procedures, and
responsibilities.
Self-Study Training Courses. Railroads make available self-
study programs for emergency responders that allow students to
learn proper procedures at their own pace.
Some railroads also provide related web-based training on hazmat
and general rail safety issues.
Railroads also regularly provide hazardous materials training to
their customers and short line railroad partners. These comprehensive
rail industry efforts point to the seriousness with which railroads
take their responsibilities regarding the safety of the communities
they serve.
Question 8. Mr. Hamberger, as you know, especially in the West, we
have freight rail lines running through the hearts of our cities--
Seattle, Spokane, Tacoma, and Vancouver, just to name a few in my
state. That makes my constituents concerned when they look at crude
moving by rail. Consequences could be very high if there was to be a
derailment in one of our population centers.
What is your industry doing to invest in these population centers,
far from the Bakken? I don't mean just normal maintenance. But is the
railroad industry developing new standards for track and track types
for areas where track runs through cities? Put another way: is there an
engineering solution (not operations) you are developing as an industry
to substantially lower the risk of any derailment in population
centers?
Answer. While railroading today seems similar to railroading 150
years ago, this apparent similarity masks a widespread application of
modern technology and a huge variety of ongoing initiatives to
research, test, and apply advanced technologies to yield the safety
record of continuous improvement experienced by the railroad industry.
Many of these advancements were developed or refined at the
Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI), the finest rail research
facility in the world, in Pueblo, Colorado. TTCI is a wholly owned
subsidiary of the AAR. Forty-eight miles of test tracks, highly
sophisticated testing equipment, metallurgy labs, simulators, and other
diagnostic tools are used to test track structure, evaluate freight car
and locomotive performance, assess component reliability, and much
more.
A few of the many examples of safety-enhancing rail technologies
developed at TTCI or elsewhere that have come into widespread use or
are in the process of being implemented include: wayside detectors that
identify defects on passing rail cars, including overheated bearings
and damaged wheels, dragging hoses, deteriorating bearings, cracked
wheels, and excessively high and wide loads; internal rail inspection
systems using induction or ultrasonic technology to detect internal
flaws in rails which are caused by fatigue and impurities introduced
during manufacturing; track geometry vehicles that use electronic and
optical instruments to inspect track alignment, gauge, curvature, and
other track conditions; ground-penetrating radar that helps identify
problems (such as excessive water penetration and deteriorated ballast)
that hinder track stability; and positive train control systems that
are designed to automatically stop or slow a train before certain
accidents occur. Railroads and their suppliers will continue to pursue
these and other technological advances that make rail transportation
safer and more secure.
Separately, in response to USDOT Secretary Foxx's challenge to the
rail industry to identify steps that might be taken to address the new
and unique challenges associated with crude oil transportation, the
industry announced in February 2014:
Effective March 25, 2014, railroads began performing one
additional internal-rail inspection each year above those
required by new FRA regulations on main line routes over which
trains moving 20 or more carloads of crude oil travel.
Railroads will also conduct at least two high-tech track
geometry inspections each year on main line routes over which
trains with 20 or more loaded cars of crude oil are moving.
Not later than July 1, 2014 railroads will begin installing
additional wayside wheel bearing detectors if they are not
already in place every 40 miles along tracks with trains
carrying 20 or more crude oil cars, as other safety factors
allow.
Question 9. Mr. Hamberger, a number of commodity groups and
shippers have come into my office in recent months with concerns that
increasing crude-by-rail shipments is negatively impacting their
businesses.
This includes service issues regarding: (1) timely delivery of
their products, (2) timely availability of rail cars, or (3) reduced
rail capacity for non-crude shipments in a way that appears to
eliminate rail as a viable transportation alternative. These concerns
come on top of significant delays--in part caused by crude-by-rail
growth and congestion--to the Amtrak Empire Builder between Seattle/
Portland and Chicago. What steps is the rail industry taking to ensure
sufficient access and reliable service for the broad range of commodity
groups that have historically relied on rail service?
Answer. The recent winter presented rail service challenges that
were far worse than usual in many parts of the country. Railroads are
working around the clock to overcome these challenges. It remains the
railroads' goal to provide service at the high levels their customers
expect.
Having said this, AAR projects that the Nation's freight railroads
will spend approximately $26 billion in 2014 to build, maintain, and
upgrade their nationwide rail network. This year's projected record
investments continue a decades-long trend of private railroad dollars
that sustain America's freight rail network. The result is a rail
network that is the best in the world, serving and expanding to meet
both freight and passenger railroads.
Freight railroads have invested approximately $550 billion of their
own money into the rail network since 1980, including $118 billion in
the past five years alone. From upgrades to bridges and tunnels to new
tracks and facilities, freight rail infrastructure is constantly
maintained and upgraded to meet the demands of an evolving economy.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Heidi Heitkamp to
Edward R. Hamberger
Question 1. The industry has been very cooperative with regulators
throughout this process, and has even asked for the regulators to issue
rules to give them more certainty. It is not often that you have an
industry calling for more regulation. It is even rarer that the
regulators don't response quickly to give the industry the certainty it
needs. Related to this issue, can you tell me what areas of concern you
have regarding the upcoming rules? Do you think that PHMSA and the FRA
could go too far in responding to derailment Casselton? Are you
convinced the regulators are on the right track? Or is it too early to
know?
Answer. Since DOT has not issued a notice of proposed rulemaking,
AAR does not know the direction DOT might go in.
Question 2. Can you please outline the steps the railroad industry
has committed to taking in order to improve rail safety?
Answer. The nation's major freight railroads recently joined
Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx in announcing a rail operations
safety initiative that will institute new voluntary operating practices
for moving crude oil by rail. Additional issues relating to the safe
transport of crude oil discussed in January with Secretary Foxx, such
as tank car standards and proper shipper classification of crude oil,
are being addressed separately. The voluntary initiative addresses
crude by rail safety in eight important areas: routing analysis for
crude trains; lowering crude train speeds in some areas; accident
prevention through inspections; accident prevention with additional
wayside technology; local emergency responder training and tuition
assistance; railroad emergency response capabilities; and braking
systems.
Question 3. Will these changes be costly? And will they ultimately
be passed on to your customers?
Answer. Railroads take the challenge of moving the Nation's crude
oil extremely seriously, and they recognize that improving safety is an
ongoing process. Railroads are proud that their overall safety record,
as measured by FRA data, has been trending in the right direction for
decades. Having said this, AAR has no estimate of the cost of these
changes.
Question 4. To what extent do the different railroads disagree on
what needs to be done to improve rail shipment of crude?
Answer. There is no disagreement. Class I railroads all agree that
actions falling into three categories are necessary to continue to
improve safety. They are: accident prevention, consequence mitigation
and emergency response. Likewise, Class I railroads all signed the
recent letter of agreement with DOT laying out a series of voluntary
crude oil action items.
Question 5. If the railroads agree to industry wide standards to
enhance the safety of the shipments of crude, will the industry have
any issue with the regulators following the lead of industry in
mandating these standards through rulemaking?
Answer. Nothing in the voluntary crude oil agreement with USDOT
would preclude the government from issuing additional safety
regulations at any time. However, there is an advantage to industry
standards. Industry can update its standards much quicker than DOT can
change its standards. Thus, industry standards can offer the public a
safety advantage where feasible.